

# THE BIOLOGY OF WAR

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# THE BIOLOGY OF WAR

BY

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TRANSLATED BY  
CONSTANCE A. GRANDE  
AND  
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1919  
LONDON & TORONTO  
J. M. DENT & SONS LTD.

## TRANSLATORS' PREFACE

*The Biology of War* was written in German, by a German, for Germans—written since the outbreak of the war, in the German fortress of Graudenz, in which the author was imprisoned. If the German government could have had its way, the book would never have seen the light, at any rate never so long as the war lasted; but by a happy chance the manuscript was conveyed to Switzerland, where it was brought out by the leading German-Swiss publishing firm, Orell Füssli of Zürich.

When the book appeared, it was promptly forbidden entrance to Germany, for reasons which will soon be obvious to any one who reads it; and the author was condemned to five months' imprisonment in a common gaol. After that, he was interned in Germany and carefully watched. Some time later he escaped from Germany on a German aeroplane, to Denmark. The aeroplane was the "Albatros 3415," and of a somewhat old-fashioned type. Dr. Nicolai's companion on board was Dr. Silberhorn, a German subaltern. A second aeroplane, the "F 16," accompanied the "Albatros 3415." On board were a lance-corporal and a pilot, both Germans. As neither Professor Nicolai nor his companions were armed, they were not interned by the Danish authorities.

Dr. G. F. Nicolai was born in Berlin in 1872. Before the outbreak of war he was known throughout Germany as the leading heart specialist, in which capacity he had attended the German Empress, whom he is said to have saved from a troublesome malady. He also held the chair of physiology at Berlin University. He married a daughter of Admiraltätsrat Buslay, and has one child, a daughter.

Even before the war Dr. Nicolai was opposed to Prussian militarism, and when war broke out and Germany violated Belgian neutrality, he openly protested. For this he was

degraded from his professorship, and his property confiscated; and finally he was sent to Graudenz fortress, occupying during part of the time the room famous as the Fritz Reuter room. Fritz Reuter, born 1810, died 1874, was condemned to death in 1833 because he belonged to a German Students' Society—a sentence commuted into one of thirty years' imprisonment. In 1840, however, on the accession of Frederick William IV. of Prussia, he was liberated. His tales and poems, mostly in Low German, are still much read and appreciated, and some have been translated into English.

Professor Nicolai's property having been confiscated, his wife and child were left penniless. His wife's father, who belongs to a Prussian Junker family, offered her a home with every comfort if she would renounce her husband. She replied that she would prefer to become a charwoman or a street-cleaner and earn her bread and that of her child in this way rather than forsake her husband.

Anxious to save him from having his health ruined by long confinement, Professor Nicolai's friends brought up his case in the Reichstag, but to no purpose. Those who have seen him recently declare that his imprisonment and suffering have greatly aged him, and that he now looks quite a broken man. By nature, however, he is a very vigorous man, whose health was nowise impaired by severe study nor by his wide travels before the war, sometimes in unhealthy climates. For instance, he has visited such diverse countries as Malacca, the United States of America, Russia, Lapland and China.

The experience of Dr. Nicolai's Swiss publisher is that a surprisingly large edition of *The Biology of War* has been called for in Switzerland, and that it has been read there not so much by scientific specialists or biologists as by persons of wide general education.

The present English translation has been simplified as much as possible without doing violence to the author's ideas; nevertheless the fact remains that this book is not for the intellectually indolent. It has not been possible to make certain passages very simple, owing to the ideas themselves being profound, while the reasoning is throughout very close; yet any one with a sound ordinary education should be able to read it. The whole book is written from the standpoint of a biologist, while

the medical man not infrequently appears in it as well ; while the breadth of the author's knowledge and the variety of his quotations, classical, literary and historical, cannot fail to astonish every reader.

The book has no affinity whatsoever with an ordinary pacifist publication, nor is Dr. Nicolai one of those who are the friends of every country but their own. One of his main contentions is that the dusk of the War Gods has come. An animal, he says, just before it becomes extinct, usually grows monstrously unwieldy and clumsy. War has done likewise : it has grown beyond all bounds. Again, he contends that there is now no biological justification for war, and in particular none whatever for the favourite German argument that without war nations become degenerate and effeminate. Finally, he asserts that war is never to be regarded as a necessary and inevitable part of Nature, something which, like an earthquake, is wholly beyond human control, and something to which we *must* submit. On the contrary, war is in the category of something which can be prevented and to which we need not submit. War ought to be regarded as we regard smallpox or the plague, as something which we can and ought to eradicate by taking proper preventive measures.

The book, of course, always refers specially to Germany, and the effects of war are largely illustrated by showing their action in Germany. The writer demonstrates, for instance, the influence of Bernhardi, Treitschke, Moltke and others on the German mind. But no one must imagine that Dr. Nicolai condemns all war of every description : revolutionary and defensive wars he would put in a category by themselves as justifiable. In order that wars may be prevented, he urges that a society of nations should be constructed ; and that the brotherhood of Man and the strengthening of all human bonds, whether between the members of the family of nations or between members of a human family, must become realities, not ideals. It may be that he does not regard the question from precisely the same angle as President Wilson, but his main lines of thought are the same.

The book, as we have hinted, is reasoned out like Euclid, wherefore it is useless, interesting as it may be, to dip into it and read a chapter here and another there. No real idea of the

author's meaning can be gained by this method, and the adoption of such a plan would be an injustice to what we think most readers will agree is the most remarkable book which this war has yet produced, a volume likely to live in history even when the scientific ideas which it contains have been superseded by the wider knowledge of generations yet to come.

CONSTANCE A. GRANDE.  
JULIAN GRANDE.

BERNE,  
SWITZERLAND.

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# THE BIOLOGY OF WAR

## INTRODUCTION BY THE AUTHOR

### HOW AND WHY THIS BOOK WAS WRITTEN

#### I. THE ORIGIN OF THIS BOOK

§ 1. ITS CONDEMNATORY TONE AS REGARDS GERMANY.—The outward and visible cause of the writing of this book was the Manifesto to the Civilised World published in the early days of October, 1914, by ninety-three representatives of German science and art. The unfortunate effects of this could easily have been foreseen by any dispassionate person. Although probably every one would now admit that the dispassionate few of those days had right on their side, yet many will disapprove of the selection of a German manifesto as a peg on which to hang a book, urging that there are surely enough reprehensible manifestoes published outside Germany. This German manifesto, however, was the cause of this work, which, I hasten to insist, is written primarily for Germans. Consequently, wherever isolated events are discussed, it is in the main only German conditions which are under consideration.

Apart from the fact that it is impossible to gain a correct idea of foreign opinion from the fragmentary extracts quoted from the foreign press, the only way to attain the necessary independence of mind is not to inquire whether other nations besides Germany have been to blame, and to endeavour to ensure no one being able to cast a stone at ourselves. More than ever is it to-day incumbent on every individual and every nation to shoulder his or its share of responsibility for the war. Even supposing that any foreign learned society had issued a more regrettable manifesto than this hot-blooded appeal (which is excusable, considering the anxious time when it was drafted), yet those who have genuine German civilisation at heart are the very persons who need not concern themselves much about

foreign manifestoes, since Germany, and Germany alone, is responsible for her own words and deeds.

These preliminary observations are necessary, because otherwise the fact that it is mainly Germany which is instanced as exemplifying the bad effects of war might have made it appear as if this book were an unconditional acknowledgment of the justice of the view that it is the German people who have been guilty of by far the worst barbarities.

Again, every nation in the world can and even ought to hope that it and its institutions will one day serve as a model for a whole world full of reforming zeal; for such a hope is the strongest incentive to progress. But if Germany entertains any such expectation, she must redouble her efforts to revive the old German idealism and to keep it pure and undefiled.

“Volk, o deutsches Volk, die müssen am größten dich schelten,  
Die dich in Herzens Grund immer am meisten liebt.”<sup>1</sup>

Now, just because this manifesto was calculated apparently to give the lie to our glorious past, it cannot fail to cause every true patriot and friend of humanity (the one ought not to exclude the other) to protest.<sup>2</sup>

§ 2. THE MANIFESTO TO THE CIVILISED WORLD.—The full text of this notorious document is as follows:—

“As representatives of German science and art we protest before the whole civilised world against the calumnies and lies with which our enemies are striving to besmirch Germany’s undefiled cause in the severe struggle for existence which has been forced upon her. The course of events has mercilessly disproved the reports of fictitious German defeats. All the more vigorous are the efforts now being made to distort truth and disseminate suspicion. It is against these that we are raising our voices, and those voices shall make the truth known.

<sup>1</sup> *Epigramme aus Baden-Baden*, by Th. Fischer, 1867. Stuttgart, bei Grüninger: *Hass und Liebe*, p. 33. [Roughly: “People, O German people, they must upbraid thee most bitterly, who in the depths of their hearts ever love thee the most.”]

<sup>2</sup> For truth’s sake it must here be observed that at any rate some of the signatories now regret their action. Even in December, 1914, they wrote telling me as much, so that it would seem as if the intoxication which could so greatly obscure their conceptions of truth and impartiality must have been comparatively shortlived. I may also state that in June, 1915, when this manifesto was reprinted in the *Aktion*, without a word of comment, one of the signatories wrote to that journal stating that he must protest against such a document being reprinted, for “of course” he no longer held such views, “and it was an insult to continue to impute them to him.” In itself such a rapid change of mind is cause for satisfaction, but it is amusing that this signatory should consider it an insult not to be instantly taken for a chameleon.



"1. IT IS NOT TRUE THAT GERMANY WAS GUILTY OF THIS WAR. Neither the nation nor the Government nor the Emperor wanted it. The Germans did everything possible to avert it, and documentary evidence of this is before all the world. In the twenty-six years of his reign William II. has frequently shown himself the defender of the world's peace, as has repeatedly been acknowledged even by our enemies. Indeed, this same Emperor whom they are now presuming to call an Attila was ridiculed for twenty years and more because of his unswerving devotion to peace. Not until our people were attacked from three sides by superior forces, which had long been lying in wait at the frontier, did they rise as one man.

"2. IT IS NOT TRUE that we CRIMINALLY violated Belgian neutrality. It can be proved that France and England had resolved to violate it, and it can be proved that Belgium had agreed to this. It would have been suicidal not to anticipate them.<sup>1</sup>

"3. IT IS NOT TRUE that the life and property of a SINGLE Belgian subject were interfered with by our soldiers except under the direst necessity. Again and again, despite all warnings, did the population lie in ambush and fire on them, mutilating wounded men, and murdering doctors even while actually engaged in their noble ministrations. There could be no baser misrepresentation than to say nothing about the crimes of these assassins and then to call the Germans criminals because of their having administered just punishment to them.

"4. IT IS NOT TRUE that our troops behaved BRUTALLY in regard to Louvain. They were forced with a heavy heart to exercise reprisals on the furious population, which treacherously attacked them in their quarters, by firing upon a portion of the town. The greater portion of Louvain is still standing, and the famous Town Hall is quite uninjured. It was saved from the flames owing to the self-sacrifice of our soldiers. Every German would regret works of art having been destroyed in this war or their being destroyed in the future. But just as we decline to admit that any one loves art more than we do, even so do we refuse no less decidedly to pay the price of a German defeat for the preservation of a work of art.

"5. IT IS NOT TRUE that we disregard the precepts of international law in our methods of warfare, in which there is no unbridled cruelty. But in the East the ground is soaked with the blood of women and children slain by Russian hordes, and in the West the breasts of our soldiers are lacerated with dum-dum bullets. No one has less right to pretend to be defending European civilisation than those who are the allies of Russians and Serbians, and are not ashamed to incite Mongolians and negroes to fight against white men.

"6. IT IS NOT TRUE that fighting our so-called MILITARISM IS NOT FIGHTING AGAINST OUR CIVILISATION, as our enemies hypocritically allege. Without German militarism German civilisation would be wiped off the face of the earth. The former arose out of and for the protection of the latter, in a country which for centuries had suffered from invasion as no other has done. The German army and the German people are one, and the con-

<sup>1</sup> On August 14, 1914, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, then German Chancellor, said in the Reichstag: "Gentlemen, we stand now perforce on guard: necessity knows no law. Our troops have occupied Luxembourg, possibly trodden Belgian soil. Gentlemen, this is contrary to international law. . . . In this way we have been forced to override the justifiable protests of the Belgian and Luxembourg governments. We shall repair the injustice which we are committing as soon as our military object is attained."—TRANS.

sciousness of this makes seventy millions of Germans brothers to-day, without regard to education, rank, or party.

"We cannot deprive our enemies of the poisoned weapons of falsehood. All we can do is to cry aloud to the whole world that they are bearing false witness against us. To you who know us, who, together with us, have hitherto been the guardians of Man's highest possessions, to you we cry aloud: Believe us, believe that to the last we will fight as a civilised nation, to whom the legacy of a Goethe, a Beethoven, and a Kant is no less sacred than hearth and home.

"This we vouchsafe to you on the faith of our name and our honour."

The manifesto was signed by the following:—

- By seventeen Artists actually practising their profession (Peter Behrends, Franz von Defregger, Wilhelm Dörpfeld, Eduard von Gebhardt, Adolf von Hildebrand, Ludwig Hoffmann, Leopold Graf Kalkreuth, Arthur Kampf, Fritz Aug. von Kaulbach, Max Klinger, Max Liebermann, Ludwig Manzel, Bruno Paul, Fritz Schaper, Franz von Stuck, Hans Thoma, Wilh. Trübner).
- By fifteen Natural Scientists (Adolf von Beyer, Karl Engler, Emil Fischer, Wilhelm Foerster, Fritz Haber, Ernst Haeckel, Gustav Hellmann, Felix Klein, Philipp Lenard, Walter Nernst, Wilhelm Ostwald, Max Planck, Wilhelm Röntgen, Wilhelm Wien, Richard Willstätter).
- By twelve Theologians (Adolf Deissmann, Albert Ehrhard, Gerhard Esser, Adolf von Harnack, Wilhelm Herrmann, Alois Knöpfler, Anton Koch, Josef Mausbach, Sebastian Merkle, Adolf von Schlatter, August Schmidlin, and Reinhold Seeberg).
- By nine Poets (Richard Dehmel, Herbert Eulenberg, Ludwig Fulda, Max Halbe, Gerhart and Karl Hauptmann, Hermann Sudermann, Karl Vollmöller, and Richard Voss).
- By seven Jurists (Lujó Brentano, Johannes Conrad, Theodor Kipp, Paul Laband, Franz von Liszt, Georg von Mayr, and Gustav von Schmoller).
- By seven Medical Men (Emil von Behring, Paul Ehrlich, Albert Neisser, Albert Plehn, Max Rubner, Wilhelm Waldeyer, and August von Wassermann).
- By seven Historians (Heinrich Finke, J. J. de Groot, Karl Lamprecht, Maximilian Lenz, Eduard Meyer, Karl Robert, and Martin Spahn).
- By five Art Critics (Wilhelm von Bode, Alois Brandt, Justus Brinkmann, Friedrich von Duhn, and Theodor Wiegand).

## INTRODUCTION BY THE AUTHOR

By four Philosophers (Rudolf Eucken, Alois Riehl, Wilhelm Windelband, and Wilh. Wundt).

By four Philologists (Andreas Heusler, Heinrich Morf, Karl Vossler, and Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff).

By three Musicians (Engelbert Humperdinck, Siegfried Wagner, and Felix von Weingartner).

By two Politicians (Friedrich Naumann and Georg Reicke).

By one Theatrical Manager (Max Reinhardt).

§ 3. GERMAN TRUTH, PAST AND PRESENT.—This document, therefore, was signed altogether by ninety-three German men, some of them very well known. Among them were fifteen natural scientists. Even if this be not a very large number in comparison with the seventy-eight other signatories (thirty-five representatives of art and letters, sixteen moral philosophers, twenty scientists of various kinds, and seven medical men), yet it includes almost all Germans of real celebrity in this branch of knowledge. Now, the wording of the manifesto alone ought to have horrified any natural scientist, even if he approved of its tenor. I will not discuss the fairness of rejecting the mendacities of foreign newspapers without mentioning the lying war news of the German press. The fact remains, however, that every one then knew how little the German Commission of Inquiry into Belgian atrocities was able to ascertain. It might be argued that it was no business of the signatories to have referred to this, even although the mere hint that the vile charges brought against enemy soldiers were not believed made certain manifestoes of foreign intellectuals appear friendly.

Six times, however, does this manifesto contain the words: "It is not true." Now, five of the six points raised unquestionably cannot be thus flatly denied. Whether a person has or has not been guilty of a particular action (Paragraph 1), whether he has committed a crime or acted under compulsion (Par. 2), whether he is exercising reprisals brutally or with a heavy heart (Par. 4), whether imperialism and civilisation are irreconcilable or go hand in hand (Par. 6), and finally whether a person has acted with or without regard to the ill-defined, vague precepts of international law (Par. 5), cannot be positively asserted by any one; and in each individual case opinion depends upon individual sense of justice.

Even in Pars. 3 and 5, where definite details were cited

as to what had been done in Belgium and East Prussia, the categorical statement "It is not true" seems for other but not less sound reasons misplaced, since at best such evidence can only have been hearsay "from a thoroughly trustworthy source." Above all, no one can with a good conscience support the negative assertion that "the life and property of not a single Belgian subject were interfered with except under necessity."

Every one is, of course, entitled to consider anything as truth of the correctness of which he is morally convinced, unless he be posing as a "representative of science"; for it is the chief characteristic of a man of science not to call anything true unless he be convinced, by impartial observation, that it is so. The recognition that there is such a thing as this impartially established truth is a debt which the present generation owes in part to German thoroughness, and the patriotism of departing from it cannot be accepted without question. The three main witnesses invoked, Goethe, Beethoven and Kant, would scarcely have signed such a manifesto, for all three preserved their impartiality even in time of war. Goethe, indeed, especially during the War of German Independence, was often enough blamed for his impartiality, and subsequently for his sharp condemnation of "German gush about the Fatherland."<sup>1</sup> Once, in his irritation, he said: "The world may still have to wait a couple of hundred years before it can be said of the Germans that it was a long while since they were Barbarians."<sup>2</sup>

As for Kant, it was during the first Coalition War that he published his plan for Perpetual Peace, in which with praiseworthy independence he breaks a lance in favour of French institutions, just then being opposed by his own country. Moreover, the founder of critical philosophy would never have described as truth what could only be a matter of opinion.

Finally, Beethoven's last great work, the Ninth Symphony, is a Hymn of Praise to universal brotherhood, while he dedicated the Third Symphony, the one which he considered his finest, to Germany's arch-enemy, Bonaparte.<sup>3</sup>

I agree with the signatories of the manifesto in believing

<sup>1</sup> Goethe, *Letter to Zelter*, August 24, 1823.

<sup>2</sup> *Eckermann's Conversations with Goethe*, Thursday, May 3, 1827. (Brockhaus, 7th ed., vol. iii. p. 114.)

<sup>3</sup> This is not inconsistent with the fact that afterwards, when Napoleon became emperor, Beethoven revoked the "Dedication to the Consul." He considered the Emperor Napoleon as an enemy of human brotherhood.

that German ideas will prevail if the legacy bequeathed to the Germans by these three shining lights is to them "as sacred as their worldly goods." To me, however, it seems no mere chance that these three greatest Germans should have differed from the present generation in their ideas about disputes between nation and nation; for despite technical science, soldiery and trade, the peculiar virtue of the German is still a *certain faculty of just appreciation*. For us Germans the upward path may be by way of Essen, Potsdam and Hamburg, but it must not leave Weimar out of account.

This manifesto, which seemed the negation of every great and fine quality which had hitherto been attributed to and expected from men of science, was signed by Germany's greatest sons; and this was the sort of truth for which Germany's most honoured seekers after truth interceded. Some certainly were able to excuse themselves—if it be an excuse—by urging that they had never read the manifesto, but had allowed their signatures to be appended to it on the strength of a telegram from Herr Erzberger, the well-known Centre Party deputy. Erzberger as an apostle of German science and learning! In any case it would be well to inquire somewhat more closely into the unquestionably very singular manner in which this manifesto came to be launched.

§ 4. A MANIFESTO TO EUROPEANS.—The fact remains, however, that this manifesto was published and distributed broadcast; and considering how the war appeared to have metamorphosed men of science, it seemed desirable, not to say necessary, to appeal to a wider public, especially to maintain a uniform conception of civilisation, just then greatly divided. For although only the few are capable of promoting civilisation, yet it is by the standard of popular feeling that the maintenance of its continuity is ensured. In mid-October, 1914, therefore, together with Professor Albert Einstein and Privy Councillor Wilhelm Förster, I drafted the following manifesto:

"Technical science and intercommunication are clearly tending to force us to recognise the fact that international relations exist, and consequently a world-embracing civilisation. Yet never has any previous war caused so complete an interruption of that co-operation which should exist between civilised nations. It may be, of course, that the reason why we are so profoundly impressed by this is only because we were already united by so many ties, the severing of which is painful.

"That such a state of things should exist must not astonish us. Nevertheless, those who care in the slightest degree for this universal world-

civilisation are under a two-fold obligation to strive for the maintenance of these principles. Those who might have been expected to care for such things, in particular men of science and art, have hitherto almost invariably confined their utterances to a hint that the present suspension of direct relations coincided with the cessation of any desire for their continuance.

“Such feelings are not to be excused by any national passions. They are unworthy of what every one has hitherto understood by civilisation, and it would be a misfortune indeed were they to prevail generally among persons of culture. And not only a misfortune for civilisation, but, we are firmly convinced, a misfortune for the very purpose for which, after all, in the last resort all this hell was let loose—the national existence of the different countries.

“Technical achievement has made the world smaller, and to-day the countries of that large peninsula Europe seem brought as near to one another as the cities of each individual small Mediterranean peninsula used to be; and Europe—it might almost be said the world—is already one and indivisible, owing to its multitudinous associations.

“Hence it must be the duty of educated and philanthropic Europeans to make at any rate an effort lest Europe, owing to her not being welded together in sufficient strength, should suffer the same tragic fate as Ancient Greece. Is Europe gradually to be exhausted by fratricidal war and perish?

“The war raging at present will scarcely end in a victory for any one, but probably only in defeat. Consequently it would seem that educated men in all countries not only should but absolutely must exert all their influence to prevent the conditions of peace being the source of future wars, and this no matter what the at present uncertain issue of the conflict may be. Above all must they direct their efforts to seeing that advantage is taken of the fact that this war has thrown all European conditions as it were into a melting pot, to mould Europe into one organic whole, for which both technical and intellectual conditions are ripe.

“This is not the place to discuss how this new European order is to be brought about. We desire only to assert in principle that we are firmly convinced of the time *having come for all Europe to be united together, so as to protect her soil, her inhabitants and her civilisation.*<sup>1</sup>

“Believing as we do that the desire for such a state of things is latent in many minds, we are anxious that it should everywhere find expression, and thus become a force; and with this end in view it seems to us necessary before all else that there should be a union of all who are in any way attached to European civilisation,<sup>2</sup> that is to say, who are what Goethe once almost prophetically called ‘good Europeans.’ We must never abandon hope that their collective pronouncement may be heard by some one, even amidst the clash of arms, most especially if the ‘good Europeans of to-morrow’ include all those who are esteemed and considered as authorities by their fellow-men.

<sup>1</sup> Whether this protection is to be ensured with weapons from the armoury of Force or of Mind need not be discussed here. At all events Europe must learn to feel herself united into one. (Cf. chap. iii. about war and natural selection, § 34.)

<sup>2</sup> By European civilisation I mean every endeavour, in the broad sense of the word, throughout the world, the origin of which can ultimately be traced back to Europe.

"To begin with, however, it is needful that Europeans should unite, and if, as we hope, there are enough *Europeans in Europe*, in other words enough persons to whom Europe is no mere geographical term but something which they have profoundly at heart, then we mean to attempt to found such a Union of Europeans. We ourselves only wish to give the first impulse to such a union, wherefore we ask you, should you be in agreement with us, and, like us, bent upon making the resolve of Europe as widely known as possible, to send us your signature."

This appeal was sent out privately, and although we received many sympathetic letters about it, yet most of the writers declined to sign it. One did not consider the allusion to Greece quite historically accurate; another thought that the time had gone by for such a manifesto, another that it was premature, and yet another that it was undesirable that scientists should mix themselves up in the hurlyburly of the world. Obviously it would not have been feasible to reconcile the views of any considerable number of men of independent mind, even if in principle they might all be striving after the same objects. Therefore, as a brief manifesto of this kind could only have any value if backed by well-known names, we allowed the plan to drop.

#### § 5. THE PERSONAL SENSE OF INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY.—

In the circumstances it seemed to me that I was bound to raise my individual voice, and express what I honestly believed to be the rights and the stern necessities of the situation, giving the best reasons I could for the faith that was in me. Therefore I announced for the summer term of 1915 a lecture on "War as a Biological Factor in Human Evolution," and began to collect material for it. My being called up as a doctor, and my subsequent imprisonment in the fortress of Graudenz, made it impossible to carry out this plan; and the only course open to me was to work up into a book the notes intended for a lecture. I am still of opinion that it is just during this war that a peace book should be written. It is during this fratricidal European struggle that we must insist upon being considered European, as a single unit. This is necessary, not because of a handful of scholars who happened to wander a little from the straight path (they will soon recover themselves), but because of the countless other individuals who now do not know what to do with their lives, and who must begin again from the beginning both literally and metaphorically. In the case of all of them many ideals have been destroyed, ideals which may have been

confused, but were deep-rooted. For these people I resolved to write a book, assuring them that here on earth war is but a passing phase, to which too much importance must not be attached. To achieve my purpose, and inspire fair-minded and right-thinking men with my own triumphant assurance, I have also endeavoured to set forth a vital conception of the problem of war, so that every one may feel he has some solid ground under his feet, and may again know which way to turn.

Thus did this peace book come into being in the midst of the military life of the fortress of Graudenz. The small fortress was both a hindrance and an incentive to its writing. It was an obstacle because of the lack of books and the absence of friends who could have advised me on matters of which I have no expert knowledge. Nevertheless, some friends did do much to help me, both by pointing out many defects and making emendations, for which I desire once more to tender them my thanks. Again, unfortunately, there were some quotations of which I had taken only hasty notes, meaning to base an oral lecture upon them, and which I was now prevented from comparing with the full text. Yet this was just what I ought to have been able to do, for what I wanted to prove was that there has never been a single man of real eminence who has seen anything great or beautiful in war. This I meant to have done by citing numbers of passages from poets and writers in general, which I had taken much pains to collect, but the mass of material was so overwhelming that I could only give a small portion of it in the last part of my book. I admit that, however great the quantity of material, it would not have been possible to prove any such negative contention absolutely conclusively, for some one would always have been able to say that the enthusiasts for war had been left out of account. But let any one of those intellectuals carried away by the intoxication of the moment attempt to prove the contrary.<sup>1</sup>

I have referred to the obstacles with which I had to contend. Let me now mention the incentives to my work. One constant encouragement was the Fritz Reuter<sup>2</sup> room in the fortress. This

<sup>1</sup> Cf. chap. xiv.

<sup>2</sup> Fritz Reuter, German humourist, 1810-1874. He was a member of a German Students' Society, and in 1833 was arrested and condemned to death, the sentence being afterwards commuted to one of thirty years' imprisonment. He was liberated in 1840, on the accession of Frederick William IV. of Prussia.



room, where this German patriot spent years in captivity because he believed in Germany, has since been converted into a temple by his former gaolers, which is a living instance of the fact that reaction cannot endure for ever. We may be quite sure that the very same persons who to-day still continue to decry as high treason Goethe's conception of the Citizen of Europe will in a few years' time be subscribing to it, even as the successor of the commandant of the Courbière fortress, once Reuter's gaoler, is now keeping his cell in order as a museum.

Just as certain of our forefathers, in advance of their time, enthusiastically advocated a united Germany, even so do we mean to fight for a united Europe. That is the hope inspiring this book; and if I should succeed in convincing even a few individuals that the term "Citizen of Europe" is justified on grounds alike of ethics and natural science, thereby rendering another war a shade less likely, then I should feel that this was a reward for my work for which I scarcely ventured to hope.

Come what may, however, this book had to be written.

G. F. NICOLAI.

GRAUDENZ, in the summer of 1915.

## II. THE STANDPOINT OF THIS BOOK

§ 6. WAR AS A NATURAL PHENOMENON OR HUMAN ACT.—The so-called "objective methods of reasoning" seem to us the highest achievement of modern science. The fact must not be overlooked, however, that the methods alone ought to be objective or impartial. The isolated facts must be impartially collected, but the inferences therefrom will always contain an element of hypothesis, and consequently a certain personal element as well. Poincaré,<sup>1</sup> Lorentz and Einstein, leading mathematicians themselves, that is to say representatives of the most objective science, recently pointed this out, but the standpoints they adopt could not be more divergent. Now, if this be true of mathematics, how much more is it true of physics, of natural science, and of all those branches of knowledge in which efforts have been made to apply natural science merely as a method.

<sup>1</sup> Jules Henri Poincaré (1854-1912), French mathematician, in 1886 appointed professor at Paris University.—TRANS.

It is just here that a false objectivity is harmful, as the enemies of natural science know only too well. Thus one of them recently remarked that no one really knew for certain who his father was ; that he cannot even positively rely upon his mother's statements, for he has to depend upon what she, the doctor, or the midwife says, which may or may not be true. As we do not know even our own parents, it is argued, how can we positively prove whether our remote ancestors were descended from monkeys or not ?

It is easy to see that by thus overstraining the conception of what constitutes proof, an obstacle is put in the way of all increase of knowledge. Such over-scrupulousness can never do any good, and at best it only helps those who always see two sides of a question, and who would fain rescue not only truth for truth's sake but many an article of faith besides.

In any case, our positive knowledge is more increased by a courageous one-sidedness than by that elegant half-heartedness which is everlastingly trying to adjust facts, and which is in no circumstances capable of doing more than correct defects, never of creating anything new. Every one, indeed, feels instinctively that it amounts to an utter lack of either intellect or style. Our age, however, always anxious to be impartial and fair "all round," quite seriously imagines that faith and science, beauty and fashion, art and money-making, war and humanity, liberal and socialistic ideas, internationalism and nationalism, and much else besides are still reconcilable with one another. Such impartiality is in itself never justified. In the case of natural phenomena, however, it can at any rate be partly understood, because there is no cogent reason why we should apply one epithet to them and one only. Thus it is allowable to describe the eruption of a volcano as both beautiful and destructive ; we may note the grace of a tiger's leap without for a moment forgetting that it may cost the life of a human being. The volcano is undoubtedly part of Nature, which has no choice but to obey certain fixed laws ; and the tiger may be considered in the same light. They are natural phenomena, the effects of which we can change (for instance by not inhabiting volcanic districts and by exterminating the tiger), but which themselves will never change. This is perhaps why man, as an onlooker, is entitled to consider them from whatever point of view he chooses. In the case of human action it is quite different, for

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so long as we refuse to give up the right of laying stress on our own individuality and pursuing after our own purposes, so long must we judge man's acts absolutely as those of an individual. War, however, is a human action, and must only be judged accordingly. Any middle course would tend to confusion, and be in short almost contrary to morality.<sup>1</sup>

We may love or hate war. Like good old Herbart,<sup>2</sup> we may say that "we delight not in strife," or, like Ihering, in his love of battle, that "we delight in strife"; but what we may not do is to disapprove of it or excuse it in principle because of all its accompanying circumstances. War, like everything else, should have light thrown upon it from every side before being criticised, but to none but mediocrities would it occur to criticise war from every standpoint or even from only two.

These preliminary remarks are essential in order to show in what sense this book may claim to be impartial or objective. I have endeavoured to collect the material as impartially as possible, and while working it up afterwards I had always one main conception present to my mind—the conception of humanity. This conception can also be impartially expressed as the fact that there is but one human genus, or human race, which can be proved to form one organism. This, however, is anticipating matters, for the main purpose of this book is to prove that there is a sound logical basis for the conception of humanity.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. what Kant has said about the Analysis of the Sublime (*Critique of Pure Reason*, Par. 23). Cf. also § 153 of this present work.

<sup>2</sup> German philosopher, 1776-1841.—TRANS.

# PART I.—THE EVOLUTION OF WAR

## CHAPTER I

### WAR INSTINCTS

#### I. THE IMPORTANCE OF INSTINCTS

§ 7. WAR INSTINCTS VERSUS PACIFISM.—For thousands of years past war has been hated. No thoughtful person has ever yet had anything good to say for it, at any rate not if he thought fit to take the responsibility for his ideas to the extent of committing them to writing. And now almost every one adores and glorifies war, at all events they did so in Germany at the beginning of the present conflict. There is clearly something wrong about this. It is unlikely that the German should suddenly have revolutionised his instincts, thus creating a new variety of human being; and hence it would simply seem as if either educated men of all times or the men of to-day had been mistaken. In reality both were mistaken. Chaste ears cannot endure the mention of what chaste hearts cannot dispense with; but reason never will and never can justify war, and all attempts of modern men to justify it have failed miserably. The ancients knew that war could not be justified, and therefore they cursed it, but they did not realise how strong is man's war instinct, which is more deeply ingrained in him than any kind of reason. The moderns have had practical experience of this, an experience which filled them sometimes with horror and sometimes with admiration; but they again are mistaken in believing that because instinct is so strong in all of us, therefore it is commendable.

In even the sincerest opponent of war there is a certain hankering after war. A primeval impulse, a Something reminiscent of the most secret well-springs of human strength, attaches us to it. Even the best of the Germans, for instance, is at heart and always has been mildly proud of having made his first appearance in history as the conqueror and destroyer of the

Roman Empire, which in itself does not mean much, since all nations first entered their country as conquerors, and even the Jews, assuredly not a warlike people, had first to conquer Canaan.

Now, the fact remains that we still have these reminiscences, and although we may be otherwise human, yet there is in all of us a "tiny fragment of earth," which we in Germany quite rightly describe as "*furor Teutonicus*." In short, whoever becomes involved in a war is always dazzled by the magnificent aspect of so gigantic an event. Delight in war, like an occult instinct, is in a nation's very blood, and when the time comes it arouses and manifests itself. In time of peace such intoxication must be artificially created, which in the case of the Bavarian can be done by means of beer, and he becomes rowdy, while an English sailor uses his fists after drinking enough whisky, the Russian in the joys of vodka beats himself or at any rate his wife, and the southern Frenchman or Italian, when wine has gone to his head, seizes his knife.

It is when nations are overcome by the intoxication of war, that rowdiness, blows, and the use of fists and knives become general. Then the French are no longer "decadent praters," nor the Britons "passive as cows," nor the Russians "sickly dreamers," nor the Italians "gambling Lovelaces," nor the Germans "idealists for ever droning about humanity." One and all become men of action, aflame and afire for war; and it is precisely the fact that the war fever has infected them all which proves that it is an instinct innate in the human race, ever ready to break out.

Now, because delight in war seemed an instinct wholly unconnected with the powers of reflection, it was considered sacred; "for," we are told, "instincts are man's most valuable possession, and if a nation once loses its right instincts and follows wrong ones, it is lost." Now, the second part of this sentence contradicts the first, for if there be right and wrong instincts, then we must not obey every instinct indiscriminately, and in each individual case we must consult our reason as to what we ought to do, in other words, as to whether in this instance the impulse is good or bad. But if, after all, reason is to have the last word, it might be thought that the whole question of instinct had no practical bearing upon the lives of us human beings. This, however, is by no means the case. Man's

instincts are of even more importance in determining his conduct than we have been accustomed to think. Reason, it is true, can decide and direct us; it can develop one instinct and suppress another; but strength to take action proceeds from a whole series of unconscious impulses. And even if a thousand times we have admitted warlike instincts to be wrong, we shall never get the better of them unless we replace them by other and pacific instincts.

In Part III. of this book I shall show that the instinct of love is more powerful than that of hate, but my present purpose is to set forth what after all an instinct really is, and to trace the origin of martial instincts.

§ 8. THE VALUE OF INSTINCT.—Liebmann<sup>1</sup> once pregnantly observed that the conception of instinct is like a railway junction: everything we know about psychology runs into it. Without analysing instincts, indeed, it is impossible either to understand the human soul or rightly to estimate Man's passion for war.

The instincts which we first noticed were just those which are most marvellous, most complex, and consequently most difficult to understand. Hence imperfect knowledge has gradually enveloped instinct with a veil of mystery. The proper way to arrive at a right comprehension of instincts, however, is to begin with the simplest—and here may I be allowed to make a slight digression? We call an act instinctive which an animal performs unconsciously and with mechanical regularity. Such acts are, for instance, the sucking movements of a new-born infant, and the closing of the eyelids when the eye is threatened with injury. Now, as a matter of fact, in the immense majority of instinctive acts there is a really astonishing element of expediency, far beyond the degree of understanding which can possibly be possessed by the animals performing them. Hence it might be thought that an instinct must of necessity serve some useful purpose. Men noted how a bird, which had never seen a nest built, yet carried out this difficult work without any one to teach it, lining the nest warmly at the proper season for its nestlings, of whose future existence it could nevertheless hardly have any foreboding. They noticed how migratory birds unerringly wended their way southwards at the proper season, and how the bee built itself six-cornered cells, long

<sup>1</sup> Otto Liebmann, German philosopher, born 1840.

before modern statics had shown that of all possible constructions these were the cells best suited to the bees' purpose. The instinct of animals thus surpasses all human intelligence : it is truer, less liable to err, and apparently can see what is to come, for which reason Jean Paul called it the " sense of the future."

This conception, which, as will be shown, is a wrong one, gave rise to the opinion which since Rousseau's time has become popular, that all that is necessary is to recognise instincts and follow them : then everything would go right of itself. Even instincts, however, can go wrong, as a little reflection will show. Thus in the lowest animals all acts take place absolutely automatically. Just as the light which strikes a stone expands it, and does so forcibly and always in the same way, similarly whenever it strikes certain low forms of life, such as bacteria, it forces them towards the light (positive Heliotropism, as it is called), or away from the light (negative Heliotropism). Similarly in such low forms of life all sorts of influences produce definite, forcible reactions, which in themselves merely obey certain laws, and are neither expedient nor inexpedient. If, however, they are injurious to the particular animal in question, it becomes extinct. Hence it happens quite naturally that the only species of animals which have survived were so constructed that they were led to do what was good for them and preserved from what was bad for them. The complex instincts of the higher animals arose in precisely similar fashion, and no one need wonder at their expediency. Now, certain of these reactions are obviously of such importance for the preservation of life that they must occur in all animals without exception. For example, it is wholly impossible that any animal could exist whose instinct it was to eat poisonous substances ; and it is equally obvious that the only protoplasms, and, in course of evolution, the only animals which have come into existence are those which absorb substances in themselves nourishing, and involuntarily avoid substances which for them are poisonous. Hence we must not be surprised that all animals should know how to avoid plants poisonous for them.

§9. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF INSTINCTS.—Despite all this, however, if one of these " animals with true instincts " be transferred from its accustomed surroundings to a region in which plants unfamiliar to it occur, it frequently happens that it eats unwholesome plants and consequently

perishes. Thus in a different environment a "true instinct" may become false. Such occurrences are far from rare in Nature. For instance, the instinct of the moth to fly into the candle or lamp, and that of the female thrush to feed the young cuckoo until it pushes her own nestlings out of the nest, are harmful, but they were not always so. The moth first began struggling to get to the brightness at a time when there were no lamps; and its flight towards the sun and upwards did it no harm, but on the contrary good. To feed the young is an instinct without which it is inconceivable that there could ever have been any birds; and the fact that from time to time the cuckoo lays her eggs in the thrush's nest cannot and ought not to alter the latter's instinct.

Hence in Nature, besides many valuable instincts, there are also many harmful ones; and the mere fact that an act was performed instinctively is in itself no proof that in the particular circumstances it was useful. It may probably be safely concluded, however, that at the time when the instinct arose it was useful; and if man has warlike instincts, this is a proof that it was necessary to wage war, but no argument whatever as to its still being necessary. For, as is proved by the case of the moth flying towards the light, instincts are uncommonly conservative, and persist long after the conditions which produced them have ceased to exist; and there are countless instances of such "rudimentary instincts."

Take the case of the dog. He was once an arrant thief, though he has ceased to be one more quickly than his master, so that it would seem as if the teachings of the whip went home more than those of morality. Be that as it may, however, it was in the predatory period of his existence that the dog acquired the habit of burying his excrements, a habit which, in the case of wolves, is often praised as testifying to great intelligence. At a time when the thief on his nocturnal rambles desired to make it as difficult as possible to scent him, there was very good reason for this habit. As the dog, however, did not then realise that this was so, he has preserved this unconscious habit even to this day, despite the fact of his present occupation being much more peaceful; and it is ridiculous to see our street dogs scratching for a time with their hind legs on the asphalt pavement of some modern town after relieving nature. Here is an instance of a senseless, purposeless instinct.



Now, it must not be thought that human beings had no rudimentary instincts. When a monkey of old set upon his enemy, he did what very many animals do—he first showed him his means of defence in order to strike terror into him. Raising his upper lip, he exposed to view his powerful incisors, and clenched his fist threateningly. Similarly, whenever we civilised Europeans, who have wholly ceased to bite and almost ceased to make any use of our fists, get into a passion, we raise the upper lip and clench the fist, precisely as did our ancestor, the old forest-dwelling monkey.

Thus no instinct is useful in itself, its existence being justified only so long as the conditions which gave rise to it remain unchanged. Just as an animal which, in the course of centuries, wanders further north, gradually acquires a thicker coat, even so must it adopt other habits and other instincts.

§ 10. MAN AS MASTER OF HIS INSTINCTS.—What has just been said of animals applies far more to us human beings, endowed as we are with the power of changing our conditions by our own acts to an incomparably greater extent than any animal; and for this very reason it is our duty as far as possible to suit our habits to these altered conditions of life. This is no easy matter, for as I have said, instincts are conservative and tenacious. Thus, since the invention of knives we no longer use our teeth upon our enemies; but throughout all the centuries we have never ceased to show them our teeth. When we realised how much there was to be gained from an organisation of the world, then was the time to have subdued our once useful instinct for war. I do not mean this as a reproach to a great many persons, because in their case this process is a very slow one; but human beings who still continue to abandon themselves enthusiastically to their lust for war always involuntarily make me think I see a dog on the asphalt. No one is readier than I am to admit—what ought to be admitted—that instincts are important to man, more important than many intelligently performed actions. After all, everything most essential to life is rightly removed from the domain of understanding, which is so easily deceived. We are, it is true, conscious of hunger and thirst, the sexual impulse, and maternal love, but all are regulated by instincts; and, what is still more important, the beating of the heart, respiration and digestion proceed safely and surely without our being conscious thereof.

The understanding may err, but never instinct, at any rate not if its province be restricted to things which, being part and parcel of the very physical constitution of man, are virtually unchangeable. Unjustifiable generalisation from this, however, has induced many to deny any real progress in the world. The bacterium, they argue, always acts rightly, Man mostly wrongly. Hence what has been the use of the whole cycle of evolution from the primitive cell to the human being? This point of view, however, is based, I would like to say fortunately, upon imperfect knowledge; for although instinct is indeed infallible, which is an advantage, it is also blind and incapable of learning, and this is its doom. Whenever an animal comes into new surroundings with instincts unsuited thereto, it still continues doing what according to its nature is right, but—in so doing it dies out. Thus one species of animal after another has died out because it could not change. And is man also to die out because he *would* not change? Man, moreover, *could* change. He is not like a bacterium, always obliged to do what is “in accordance with his nature.” Man is able to act differently, and, being capable of perpetual modification, to adapt himself to circumstances. Man alone, in short, can achieve the impossible, in that he can choose, in doing which of course he may err. But this curse of liability to error is the necessary result of liberty, and the direct outcome of the blessed capacity for change, in other words for learning.

Verily the old Bible is wiser than the panegyrist of instinct when it makes man fall at the very outset of Creation, for what constitutes a moral human being is precisely his being free to “sin” or to “do right.” As long as man struggles, so long must he err, or, to put it the other way, were there no error there would be no possibility of struggle.

For thousands of years past our ideal has been a sober, self-controlled human race. Nevertheless, we have still not been able to rid ourselves of physical instincts such as raising the upper lip, while the more complex mental instincts are still more difficult to break with, it being in man's very nature to consider the old as venerable; and this traditional over-estimation of everything old can ultimately be traced back to hereditary instincts which we have unconsciously come to revere. Such instincts in themselves have a tendency to persist; and since we do not clearly realise this, but merely vaguely suspect

it, we imagine that by religiously adhering to everything old we are preserving what is of permanent value. This imperfect knowledge explains why we think it nobler and more honourable to be out-of-date and consequently warlike than up-to-date and peaceful.

Enough has now been said, I think, to show that the comparative value of warlike instincts can only be correctly estimated if it be known what conditions originally gave rise to bellicosity. Otherwise it is not possible for any one to decide whether these conditions still persist, that is to say, whether the war instinct still serves any purpose, or whether, like our rudimentary appendix, once also very important, it is now merely a cause of disease.

## II. TRIBAL INSTINCTS

§ II. MAN'S ORIGINAL TENDENCY TO LIVE IN HORDES.—We may begin by observing that warlike instincts are not necessary or even characteristic attributes of the human race. On the contrary, they rather tend to prove that the conception of humanity has become debased, inasmuch as man, according to his true nature, must necessarily have originally been a peaceful and social animal. This, indeed, may be inferred from the very anatomy of man, who, as every one is aware, is one of the most defenceless creatures ever known to science, possessing neither horns nor fangs, claws nor hoofs, hard outer shell nor poison glands; so that his equally defenceless ancestors, monkeys, could only survive owing to their being at any rate somewhat protected by dwelling in the swaying branches of trees. A climbing animal, however, could not develop into a human being, walking upright, except by coming down from the trees and walking about the ground until it acquired a foot.

Now, the foot being henceforth used for purposes of locomotion, the hand was free. The earliest vertebrate animals, for instance the frog, already possessed this primitive five-fingered hand, which, however, in the case of all animals, became converted, or, if the word be preferred, perfected, into a special organ, usually either a claw or a hoof for defensive purposes. Only in the case of the defenceless monkeys did it remain a hand and acquire skill in tree-climbing. The hand, in its origin peaceful, since it could neither strike nor scratch, but merely

grasp and seize,<sup>1</sup> was superfluous as an aid to locomotion on the ground, and thus became free and able to lay hold of something besides trees. Consequently it clenched, and laid hold of tools, thus becoming the means and symbol of all man's future greatness.

What is even more important, however, is that if man had been a solitary animal when he first attempted to quit the protecting branches of the tree-tops, he would never have been able to do anything of the kind, as he would infallibly have been exterminated by his very much stronger armed enemies. The fact that he nevertheless did take this decisive step, as a result of which he conquered the world, proves that even then he must have possessed some means of defence; and as he did not find the stone which he used as an axe until he descended to earth, his only "powerful means of defence" must have been the fact that weak individuals become strong by uniting to help one another. Man, in short, could only conquer because he was a social being.

Not a single serious argument can be urged against the social origin of the race. The sole objection of which I know, is "that it is just the anthropoids (the so-called human monkeys, orang-outangs, chimpanzees, and gorillas) which live only in family and not in social communities." But this is based on the long-disproved theory, wrongly ascribed to Darwin, that man is descended from these monkeys. We know that the anthropoids are only our cousins, and that we must seek our direct ancestors in very much lower monkeys. Now, all these lower monkeys live in hordes; and how they club together to rob plantations, at the same time setting some of their number on watch, and how they perform other tasks such as removing heavy stones, in order to get at the maggots beneath, are matters of common knowledge. Our ancestors, therefore, were social animals living in hordes, or nomadic tribes; and we were social beings long before that family life began to which persons blinded by the traditional sacredness of the family formerly endeavoured to trace back our social and government communities. Were this the case, then man's deep-seated social aspirations would indeed be of secondary importance. It is not

<sup>1</sup> Deep significance, into which it is impossible to enter in detail here, is contained in the fact that the expression "grasp" in the sense of thoroughly understand comes from the use of the hand, just as does the word *apprendere* (learn) of the Romance languages.

so, however, for man did not voluntarily unite to form a community (the family first, for instance, then the tribe, then a class, then a community, and so on), but it was the primeval community which made the evolution of man possible.

In reality the lowest peoples, such as Bushmen, Tierra del Fuegians, Esquimaux, Andaman Islanders, or whatever their names may be, always live in nomadic tribes or hordes, even when they have still no tendency to form families. Similarly all their habits are directly traceable to tribal instincts. For instance, the chattering and grimacing of savages, repeatedly described by travellers, are the most vivid reminder of the behaviour of animals which live in hordes, such as monkeys, and of certain birds which go in swarms, such as parrots. Naturally, nothing of the sort is ever observable in the case of races originally living solitary lives. Savages in general are extraordinarily gregarious, and for them solitude almost always portends mental and physical ruin, just as solitary confinement is still one of the severest punishments for the European, no matter how fertile may be his mind.<sup>1</sup> The vanity of savages and their capacity for imitation also clearly and certainly point to their having originally lived in hordes; for to whom is the solitary individual to "show off," whom is he to imitate, and with whom is he to chatter?

How far, moreover, it is possible to trace back this tribal nature, and the habits arising therefrom in the gradations of the human race, is shown, for example, by Le Moustier's skeleton of primeval man, a skeleton which, according to Klaatsch, exhibits signs of having received most careful burial. Now, as might be expected, we find all these primitive characteristics in children, for, after all, we know that each individual must pass through the different stages of development which his forefathers underwent. The first impulses of a child's mind, in fact, find expression in vanity, desire to imitate, and chattering or babbling.

Perhaps the most decisive proof of man's originally tribal nature, however, is speech. No one doubts or can doubt that a human being without speech is no human being, and hence that the capacity for speech was acquired at any rate not later than the period when man became man, and probably earlier. Now, there is absolutely no need to insist on the self-evident fact that

<sup>1</sup> These words were, I think, written while the author was in solitary confinement.—TRANS.

speech could never arise in the case of individuals living alone, but only from life in common ; and it is only in the case of social creatures such as parrots, frogs, ducks, hens, dogs, horses, seals and cows that we find speech, or capacity for modulating the sounds uttered. On the other hand, all creatures of solitary habits, even when, like birds of prey, cats and whales, they have comparatively highly developed brains, are mute and speechless, or at most can only utter love-sounds, such as the mewling of a cat, or sounds to alarm their enemies, such as the lion's roar. In other words, they never utter sounds save when they enter into some sort of relations with creatures of their own kind, which they do when in love or at war with them. Speech presupposes relations of some kind, and the fact that man speaks proves that these relations have existed from all time.

Man, as even Aristotle knew, is from his very nature a social animal. Universal brotherhood among men is older and more primitive than all combat, which was not introduced among men until later.

### III. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MAN AND BEAST

§ 12. THE PEACEABLENESS OF ANIMALS.—When a wolf attacks a sheep, or a lion a gazelle, neither wolf nor lion is exposed to any danger. Similarly, beasts of prey in general do not become dangerous to their pursuers save in exceptional cases. If, however, an animal attacks one of its own kind, there is always a possibility that the aggressor may be overcome by the almost equally powerful opponent. For a creature to begin to tackle one of its own kind is thus no light task ; and as every animal instinctively avoids pain, it is not surprising that wars or struggles between animals of the same kind should be of such extreme rarity that it may almost be said that war, like so much else, is a human invention. The argument in favour of this is the hypothesis, first submitted by the Englishman Pye-Smith,<sup>1</sup> that right-handedness, which occurs only in human beings, is due to warlike habits. It is the right arm which is used to fight with, in order that the left arm " may be used to protect the left side, in which the quickened heart-beats were visible."

<sup>1</sup> "On Left-handedness," by Dr. Philip Henry Pye-Smith, *Guy's Hospital Reports*, 3rd series, vol. xvi. p. 141. Cf. also Gaupp, *On Right-handedness*, Jena, 1904.

Even the ancients noticed the remarkably peaceable character of beasts of prey. Lucretius,<sup>1</sup> for example, says :

" Quando Leoni  
Fortior eripuit vitam leo ꝑ Quo nemore unquam  
Expiravit aper majoris dentibus apri ꝑ "

(" When did a stronger lion take the life of another lion ? In what wood did ever a boar end its life through the tusk of a bigger boar ? ")

This is also the opinion of Montaigne,<sup>2</sup> who says, in his *Apologie of Raymond Sebond*, comparing the intellectual attributes of beasts with those of man : " As for warre, which is the greatest and most glorious of all humane actions, I would faine know if we will use it for an argument of some prerogative, or otherwise for a testimonie of our imbecilitie and imperfection, as in truth the science we use to defeat and kill one another, to spoile and utterly to overthrow our owne kind, it seemeth it hath not much to make it selfe to be wished for in beasts, that have it not."

Similarly Shaftesbury<sup>3</sup> points out that the phrase *homo homini lupus* (man is a wolf to his fellow-man) is altogether absurd when we reflect that wolves are very gentle and lovable creatures to other wolves.

It is, indeed, worthy of note that only very few animals wage genuine wars. In the case of most animals, for instance young dogs and cats, the so-called fights of which they are so fond are merely sham fights, nowise intended to injure any one else taking part, but only as training for future fights with other kinds of animals. If, therefore, they could be compared with any human institution, it would be only with sport, which is man's way of playing.<sup>4</sup>

§ 13. THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF WAR WITHOUT PROPERTY.—Except man, the only creatures which wage war, properly so called, among themselves (Homer's *Polemon epidemion*) are stags, ants, bees and a few birds. All these creatures live social lives, and how they came to fight one another, which, as we shall see in Chapter II., is contrary to the universal laws of life, is

<sup>1</sup> Titus Lucretius Carus (c. 70 B.C.) : *De rerum Naturâ*, Book II. l. 323.

<sup>2</sup> *Essays* (5th ed., 1588), Book II. chap. xii., Florio's translation. [Dr. Nicolai, doubtless having no reference library at his disposal, quotes from memory only. We have quoted the original passage.—TRANS.]

<sup>3</sup> *Moralists : a Philosophical Rhapsody*, by Anthony Ashley Cooper, third Earl of Shaftesbury (1671-1713), II. 5. German translation by Karl Wolff, Jena, 1910, p. 86.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Gross : *Die Spiele der Tiere* (Animals' Games). G. Fischer, Jena, 1907.

what needs to be explained. One thing is clear from the first. To fight one's own kind is fraught with danger; and as an animal risks its life in so doing, the possible reward in the event of victory must be sufficient to compensate for such high stakes. At any rate, even allowing for an animal being unable to estimate so exactly what is and what is not worth while, there must be some possible reward in view which induces it to fight. But what can induce a tiger to fight another tiger? Tigers never eat other tigers, and in any case scarcely any animals ever eat their own kind, cannibalism, like war, being one of the blessings conferred by civilisation and peculiar to Man. The poor tiger has really nothing but his body which could tempt another tiger. The grounds over which he hunts do not *belong* to him; and if another tiger happens to covet them he will go and hunt there too. Then, if he be swifter and consequently catch all the prey, so that the other tiger gets nothing, the latter, if he does not want to starve, must go elsewhere; but if the old tiger be the swifter, then the new-comer will be forced to depart. Thus the struggle goes on between the two, without either needing to kill the other, and without the loss of any tiger-flesh.

No conqueror, however, can rob the tiger of what really belongs to him—his strength, his swiftness and his other physical endowments—for they all die with him.<sup>1</sup> War between creatures of the same kind is wholly unthinkable unless they be either cannibals or possessed of something of which it is worth while robbing them. This latter hypothesis is by far the more important of the two.

War, therefore, cannot occur until a certain level of civilisation has been attained;<sup>2</sup> for Man or beast, as the case may be, must have at any rate reached the stage of feeling that he or it has a right to possess something or other, whether it be merely an old bone which a dog has buried and which he often defends as vigorously as a human being his money-chest: or whether it be a female for whose possession stags and cocks fight in truly human fashion. Genuine wars, however, did not begin except where actual property was accumulated; and as property is in a

<sup>1</sup> The fact that man, having become superstitious, hoped to acquire the physical characteristics of his fellow-men by eating them, has always been cited by students of the lower races as one of the reasons which led to cannibalism. Just as superstition is a human characteristic, so also is the cannibalism resulting from it.

<sup>2</sup> Even cannibalism, as modern ethnologists all agree, presupposes a certain level of civilisation. (Cf. *infra*.)



certain sense a sign of civilisation, war might likewise appear to be so. Accordingly we find that wars proper do not occur among animals except in the case of ants and bees, and that they are waged for the sake of honey, a habitation and supplies. For such things Man fights also. The property may consist in fields laid out in all manner of different ways, in weapons, tools, accumulated stores of gold, or in anything whatsoever; or it may be flocks and herds that are involved; or women, either as beasts of burden or as sexual property; or even Man himself, who is handed over to the victor as a slave. Wherever there is nothing to be had, however, no fighting takes place, and Hume<sup>1</sup> is quite right in saying that a savage is but little tempted to turn another savage out of his hut or rob him of his bow, *being himself already provided with these things*. Propertyless animals consequently live in peace one with another. In other words, even the fiercest beasts of prey do not fight among themselves save for quite exceptional causes, which very seldom occur, and which are rightly considered as usually betokening degeneration.

Would Man but realise that there is nothing natural, nothing great, and nothing noble about war, but that it is merely one of the numberless consequences of the introduction of property! In short, war in its essence is a business like thousands of others, except that it is unnatural and assumes certain violent forms. This, however, does not alter the fact that it is essentially the same thing.

It is not so very long since the head of a business house as well as the leader of a troop of soldiers were both called *captain*<sup>2</sup> (*capitano*), so that the lieutenant of to-day need not look down so proudly on a mere clerk.<sup>3</sup> They are both brothers. Both derive their name from the same root, *capere* (take).

#### IV. THE NATURAL PRICE OF WAR

§ 14. WAR AND SLAVERY.—For whatever purpose a war may be fought, and however great the spoils of the victor, mankind

<sup>1</sup> *Treatise of Human Nature*, vol. iii. 2, 8.

<sup>2</sup> This word is in English in the original.—TRANS.

<sup>3</sup> Even the French word *commis* (German *Kommis*=clerk) is derived from the Latin *committens* (fight), although this word can never be proved to have had two meanings. Compare, however, the two meanings of *compagnie*, *campagne*, the same root as in *Commerzienrat* (Councillor of Commerce, a German title conferred upon distinguished financiers and business men—TRANS.) and *mercenarius*.

must always be exploited, either because the accumulated results of his labour are forcibly appropriated, or because others are trying to use the results of his future labour for themselves. *Thus every war which has any practical result and is not wholly superfluous, must necessarily result in the enslavement of a portion of mankind. One consequence of this, however, is that war was only justified so long as it was considered justifiable to impose some form or other of slavery upon the vanquished ; while another consequence is that there can only be any object in war so long as it is possible to impose this slavery.*

Even on superficial reflection it is obvious that the terms of modern peace-treaties likewise attempt to impose some form of slavery. What is a war indemnity if not part of the labour of a vanquished foe, of which we as "exploiters" are depriving him? It is the same thing under a finer name, and Goethe<sup>1</sup> is not so very far wrong in thinking that there is not much to choose between honest soldiers imposing a war-tax and a gang of thieves.

Private property to-day is supposed to be protected, but even if this be so, it is only to the extent of taking nothing from the individual directly, but merely indirectly by imposing a burden on the entire conquered people, which after all amounts to very much the same thing.

Moreover, what can the conquest of a province mean except that we partly appropriate to ourselves what the enemy has done there, and thus are again guilty of exploitation? This is of course also the case if the conquered province is considered only as a colony to serve the purpose of national expansion, save that in this case it is not the individual who is concerned but the community as a whole, and that it is not merely material property which is involved but also to some extent civilisation and ideals. In principle, however, it is the same thing.

Whether war really does make such exploitation possible is another question.<sup>2</sup> At any rate this is the object of war, and

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Goethe, who makes Habebald, in *Faust*, II. 4, say to the Kaiser's myrmidons, who call him a low thief :

" Die Redlichkeit, die kennt man schon,  
Sie heisst : Kontribution,  
Ihr alle seid auf gleichem Fuss ;  
Gib her ! Das ist der Handwerksgruss."

<sup>2</sup> Cf. §§ 52-54, about the advantages derived from war.

therefore if slavery were really abolished there would be no longer any object in war ; and as a matter of fact *there is no object in it in so far as slavery has been abolished.*

Now, slavery being forbidden by our present laws, and being also to a certain extent rendered impossible by present conditions, war has in a twofold sense lost all justification for its existence. In law it is no less contrary to morality than slavery, and in fact there can be no greater advantages connected with it than with slavery. True, numerous relics of slavery such as exploitation still persist, and just so far as these relics extend can there now be said to be any object in war. *Every one, however, who defends war under any conditions whatever ought to know that in so doing he is advocating slavery.*

§ 15. THE USES OF ENSLAVEMENT.—This inevitable connection between war and slavery points to the fact, however, that war, like slavery, had once some use ; for there can be no possible doubt that at a certain phase of civilisation it was not only a benefit but probably also a dire necessity for the majority of mankind to be forced to work for others. An animal's life is almost wholly taken up by the business of feeding. Vegetable feeders are, after all, obliged to swallow huge quantities of food, and when not eating these, are engaged in digesting them or in chewing the cud ; and even beasts of prey spend their days in hunting, eating and sleeping, which merely means that they are resting so as to be ready for more predatory excursions. If to this be added the time which animals require for the business of love-making and for a certain amount of attention to physical cleanliness, there is hardly any spare time left.

Now, the life of primitive man can scarcely have differed from that of animals, for he, too, spent the whole day in the satisfaction of his physical needs. Man, however, in contradistinction to animals, has needs of a higher kind. When these needs began to assert themselves, while mankind was still obliged to work virtually all day long in order to keep alive, it was right and necessary that the great mass of men should work rather more than was absolutely needful for themselves, in order that a select few, without themselves working, might be enabled to live at leisure on the superfluity acquired by the labour of others, and devote themselves to the promotion of civilisation. Similarly, it was equally necessary and desirable that a few peoples should be able to live on the product of the labour of

other peoples, in order likewise to have leisure to promote civilisation. It is absolutely impossible that the marvellous civilisation of the Ancients could have existed without there having been slaves.

The time came, however, when another kind of organisation rendered slavery superfluous. The community as a whole voluntarily gave up part of its earnings to be devoted to purposes of civilisation ; for when the State hands over to the Ministry of Public Worship and Education a portion of the funds it raises by taxation, it is putting something in the place of slavery. Again a select few are enabled, as formerly by slavery, to live at the expense of the generality.<sup>1</sup>

Moreover, there is the fact that, at any rate in principle, a great deal of work once done by slaves can now be performed by machinery ; and if, as is unfortunately the case, our requirements had not been increased so greatly by the introduction of new technical expedients as always to be in advance of what can be achieved by machinery ; if, for instance, we could still content ourselves—which would not be at all a bad thing—with about thrice the output of labour of the Greco-Roman period, then workers would only need to work a few hours daily. As I propose to show, our machines, in the hours worked at present, get through about ten times as much as human hands ; and therefore, in order to get through thrice as much, they would only need to work one-third as long as is now the case. Consequently the workmen would require to work only one-third as long as is at present customary.

The world, however, will have none of such moderation ; and political economists, to suit so many greedy people, invented the phrase about national well-being increasing with increased power of consumption. Possibly what is defined as national well-being may be thus increased, which, however, would only go to prove that the definition is meaningless ; for in reality national well-being does not become greater because all manner of superfluous trash, such as oleographs and shell-covered boxes, is palmed off upon the working classes to-day.

<sup>1</sup> The sums thus expended are, taken altogether, inconsiderable, although the amount necessary for an individual contributor to the sum of the world's knowledge works out fairly high. For example, in order that one Sanscrit student may have the requisite leisure to pursue his researches, about 150 to 200 working-class families must indirectly hand over to him their surplus labour.

But it is this artificially excited greed which in the last resort still continues to bolster up slavery in the shape of exploitation and war.

As property engendered theft, even so it has engendered war, and in its train all crimes, although here and there it was an incentive to virtue. Thus, for feeble souls who will not exert themselves save in the hope of becoming possessed of some tangible object, it is well that there should be something in the nature of a stimulus. So matters remained, and, as Greek and Roman heroic poets recognised, with true perception of the facts of life, the struggle went on for thousands upon thousands of years, for the sake of the world's most precious goods, for love and for gold. Covetousness began with robbery, which in turn aroused in its victim anger and vengeance. The *Iliad* is the Song of Songs not only of a fight for a woman (*Paridis propter amorem*), bringing death and ruin in its wake, but likewise of the wrath of Achilles; while the burden of the Nibelungen myth is the fight for the sparkling golden treasure and the vengeance of Krimhild.<sup>1</sup>

True, for the time being, Venus had ceased to spur the Crusaders on to fight, her place being taken by the Divine Virgin; and that red gold which once seemed the sole possession worth striving for is now merely the symbol of power and above all of possession; but the principle remains unchanged. Only very rarely does it seem as if a multitude of people, for instance the Albigenses, are making an effort to fight for a new idea. Even then I believe that they only seem to do so, and that closer inspection would reveal other motives. I cannot, indeed, conceive of men drawing the sword for an idea pure and simple, an idea wholly unconnected with any conception of power. For the conception of country and nothing else it is probably possible to fight by endeavouring to express to the full in oneself and therefore for others the genius of one's own people; but it will scarcely promote any purely patriotic conception to begin shooting for it with cannon. The value of such material arguments cannot become clearly manifest until purely patriotic

<sup>1</sup> These poems have greater unity than seems to be the case at first sight, for the wrath of Achilles was excited in the fight for the woman (Briseis), and the vengeance of Krimhild also in its essence has to do with the possession of treasure. In the mediæval *Nibelungenlied*, which has been recast in a Christian sense, this appears less clearly. Wagner brings it out more strongly.

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ideas have become closely intermingled with impure and covetous conceptions of power and property.

Fighting, in short, is intimately bound up with property and slavery, and Goethe <sup>1</sup> knew what he was writing about when he said :

“ Krieg, Handel und Piraterie  
Dreieinig sind sie, nicht zu trennen.”

<sup>1</sup> *Faust*, Part II. 5. Mephistopheles' words, when he hands over to Faust the proceeds of a voyage. [War, trade and piracy are trinity in unity—inseparable.]

## CHAPTER II

## WAR AND THE STRUGGLE FOR LIFE

## I. THE BASES OF WAR

§ 16. **DARWINISM.**—Eagerness to acquire property was originally the cause and object of war. In the course of evolution, however, the signification of any particular occurrence may change (which is what is known as a change of function). When our ancestors, for instance, were still swimming about in ponds, our lungs, which we now use for breathing, were a swimming-bladder; and later on, when our forefathers were already living in trees, our hands, with which now we grasp hammers, slate-pencils, axes and swords, were meant for climbing. Thus the function of these organs of ours altered, and similarly the meaning of our institutions altered.

To-day marriage and the stage are moral institutions, but they arose, in the case of the former, from desire for possession, and in the case of the latter from pleasure in motion, as witness dancing, music and tragedy. Similarly with regard to war. It arose as a means of robbery, but being practically useless in this capacity at present, new functions were discovered for it, and now it is stated to tend to counteract materialism, degenerative tendencies and so forth.

Love of possession, which was first aroused in Man, merely explains how Man, forsaking the habits of his peaceful progenitors, first came to wage war. Once this was done, however, war ceased to be a mere "action," and even became "a factor in education."

Now, we first perform our actions and then cannot shake off the effects of them. Cain, who slew his brother Abel, was never the same again, and to this day mankind still bears the brand of Cain. In this respect war is nowise different from any other human action. We have created speech, agriculture, technical science and much else besides, and they are now educating us.

A great many human institutions, such as cannibalism, slavery and idolatry, moreover, have only been temporary; but they, too, have left indelible traces on the human soul. Similarly the fact that our ancestors waged war continuously for more than 10,000 years cannot be obliterated and leave no trace. It would be enough to give the most pacifically inclined human being a warlike bent.

The belief gained ground, however, that still greater influence might be ascribed to war, particularly an influence upon human evolution. War, in short, as one form of the struggle for life, was said to cause selection [*i.e.* to cause the survival of the fittest—TRANS.]. Most of the theoretical defenders of war to-day are wholly ignorant of natural science. They had nevertheless heard enough of Darwinism to know that Darwin was said to have stated that all living creatures achieve victory by means of struggle, and that everywhere the unfit are exterminated and the fit survive, and thus the race is perfected. What could be more obvious than to apply this theory to war? The fit nations conquer, the unfit perish. This may be terrible, and a constant hindrance to progress in the case of individual nations, which is certainly regrettable, but it is the only way to sift the wheat from the chaff. Moreover, by this method perfection is eventually attained, even if the way thereto be long and lead over mountains of corpses. In short, it was believed that the right to make war was one of the so-called natural rights which are part of our birthright, and that war, like the struggle for existence, is profitable to mankind.

Now, apart from the fact that the expression "innate natural right" means nothing, and that the struggle for existence need by no means always be profitable, war does not at all come within the conception of "struggle for existence" in the true sense of this phrase. This claim on behalf of war is therefore reduced to virtually nothing. We must not be surprised, however, at its having been advanced, for our generation can scarcely realise the feeling of enfranchisement throughout Europe caused by the publication, on November 26, 1854, of *The Origin of Species*. All branches of science were immediately hypnotised by enthusiasm for the idea of struggle, and efforts were made to apply it to chemistry, astronomy, cosmology and sociology. It is only with its application to sociology that we are concerned, and this was the most risky. Struggle, indeed, which is met



with throughout Nature, does not cease just at the time when Man came upon the scene, for he, too, is wholly subject to the law of struggle, and no one has ever doubted this. Even Job<sup>1</sup> says, *Militia est vita hominis*. Euripides<sup>2</sup> says literally the same thing: "παλαίστρα δ' ἡμῶν ὁ βίος"; and Seneca<sup>3</sup> also says, "to live is to fight."

Thus the saying that life is a struggle is found in the writings of all the three nations to whom we owe our civilisation—the Jews, Greeks and Romans; and we moderns have all realised this. A Frenchman, Beaumarchais, chose as his motto, "My life is a fight."<sup>4</sup> An Englishman, Darwin, was the author of the phrase "struggle for life";<sup>5</sup> but for us it is a German, Goethe,<sup>6</sup> who expressed it most finely when he said:

"Denn ich bin ein Mensch gewesen,  
Und das heisst ein Kämpfer sein."

From Job's time to Goethe's, however, it probably never entered into the mind of man that any one could conceive of its being possible to fight out with muskets or cannon the struggle which is supposed to fill man's life.

Struggle is everywhere: it is only the methods of carrying it on which vary. The fox's way of struggling with the hare is to eat it up; the hare's way of struggling with the deer is to eat up her food; two species of mice struggle one against the other by one of them being, for instance, more capable of resisting cold than the other. Thus the diverse kinds of struggle in Nature can by no means be compared outright; for every species of living creature struggles for its existence in whatever way is best adapted to it. Similarly it is a mistake to insist that struggle for existence must necessarily be horrible or even brutal. Such terms are meaningless, and old Busch<sup>7</sup> showed that he had more understanding of Nature than all the so-called

<sup>1</sup> The Book of Job (c. 400 B.C.).

<sup>2</sup> Euripides (c. 450 B.C.), *The Suppliants*, line 350.

<sup>3</sup> Seneca (50 A.D.), *Epistolæ morales ad Lucilium*, Letter 96.

<sup>4</sup> In this form the phrase is due to Voltaire (1742), *Mahomet*, II. 4.

<sup>5</sup> English in the original. Darwin generally says "struggle for existence."—  
TRANS.

<sup>6</sup> In his *West-östlicher Divan*, 1819. [For I have been a man—in other words, a fighter.—TRANS.]

<sup>7</sup> These lines, unless I be mistaken, are not by Busch, but by Bierbaum or Hartleben.

Darwinian philosophers, whom he put to shame by his lines :

“ Mensch mit traurigem Gesichte,  
Sprich nicht nur von Leid und Streit.—  
Selbst in Brehms Naturgeschichte  
Findet sich Barmherzigheit ! ”<sup>1</sup>

Darwin<sup>2</sup> himself, in Chapter V. of his *Descent of Man*, explained that social instincts are present even in the lower animals, thus admitting their importance. His successors, however, neglected this aspect of his teachings, and above all failed to realise that, if these social instincts are traced back, a principle is arrived at which has been developed in and owing to struggle, but cannot have originated in it.

It is not chance that it should have been almost exclusively Russians, the inhabitants of a country in which the social system of the *mir* (village community) still prevailed, who have insisted upon this aspect of Darwinian Darwinism, thereby opposing the excrescences of modern Darwinism.

Indications of a belief in the existence of social instincts in the lower animals may be found even in Goethe<sup>3</sup> and in the German philosopher Karl Christian Friedrich Krause,<sup>4</sup> while Espinas<sup>5</sup> cites a great number of facts bearing on the subject. Lanessan<sup>6</sup> also described the chief aspects of the social impulse in animals ; but the first person to recognise its importance as a corrective of so-called Darwinism was the Russian zoologist Kessler,<sup>7</sup> who unfortunately died the following year. His work, however, inspired the great Kropotkin<sup>8</sup> to write in the *Nineteenth Century* a series of articles extending over seven years.

<sup>1</sup> Roughly: Man with the sorrowful countenance, speak not only of pain and strife; even in Brehm's *Natural History* compassion is found!

<sup>2</sup> Darwin, *The Descent of Man* (1871), vol. i. chap. v.

<sup>3</sup> Goethe, writing to Eckermann on October 8, 1827, mentions that the fact that a mother bird feeds interlopers (young cuckoos, for example) points to there being something "divine" underlying her action. "If this were a universal rule prevailing throughout Nature, then it would explain much that is inexplicable."

<sup>4</sup> Krause: *Urbild der Menschheit* (The Human Prototype), Dresden, 1811. Cf. also a number of his other works.

<sup>5</sup> *Les Sociétés animales*, by A. Espinas. Paris, 1877.

<sup>6</sup> Lanessan's *La Lutte pour l'existence et l'association pour la lutte*, 1882.

<sup>7</sup> Kessler: *Comptes-rendus der naturwissenschaftlichen Gesellschaft St. Petersburg*, vol. xi., 1880.

<sup>8</sup> 1890-96. This series of articles was afterwards published in book form by Heinemann, 1902, entitled *Mutual Aid: a Factor of Evolution*, and translated into German by Gustav Landauer. A popular edition was published by Thomas, Leipzig, in 1908. [The first of these articles was entitled "Mutual Aid in Animals" (Sept. 1890); the second, under the same title, appeared Nov. 1890.

Finally, Novikov<sup>1</sup> in many of his writings has dealt with the same subject; but how slight has been the effect of all their writings on orthodox science may be gauged from the fact that such widely known names as those of Espinas and Novikov are not to be found in the latest edition of Meyer's *Konversationslexikon*.<sup>2</sup> I cannot, however, here do more than refer generally to these writings; but I would like especially to recommend to every one interested in sociology in the true Darwinian sense of the term the works of Peter Kropotkin and Novikov.

Like every other species of living creature Man also carries on his struggle for existence, in which there is neither cruelty nor benevolence, neither of which, for that matter, occurs in insensible nature; and he carries it on in accordance with iron laws, rigid and eternal. But—and this is the main point—it must be a struggle for existence, and not a struggle against existence, which war is. Now, to make this distinction clearer, it is necessary to expound the universal principle of struggle in Nature (see §§ 19-21), and then to consider the special conditions under which Man has to struggle (§§ 22-28). This will show that the struggle for existence is concentrated upon procuring free outlet for Man's mental capacities, and thus rendering the maximum amount of energy available for mankind. Every struggle which helps to do this is justifiable, that is to say, it falls into line with human progress; and every struggle which does not so help, or which hinders, is unjustifiable, that is to say, it diverts man from the upward path of progress. Such justifiable struggles, alike productive and prodigal of life, are those to which Lao-tse refers as being "waged with living weapons." Every other struggle, on the contrary, is fought out with "hard, cut-and-dried weapons," and with these no victory can be won. To which category of struggle war belongs will presently appear.

§ 17. THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF GROWTH AND THE LIMITS OF SIZE.—The meaning of this universal principle of struggle in Nature cannot be understood without some knowledge of the

The rest of the series are: "Mutual Aid among Savages" (April, 1891); "Mutual Aid among the Barbarians" (Jan. 1892); "Mutual Aid in the Mediæval City" (Aug. and Sept. 1894); and "Mutual Aid amongst Modern Men" (Jan. 1896).—TRANS.]

<sup>1</sup> Novikov's works, in particular, *Les Luttres entre sociétés humaines*, 3rd ed., Paris, P. Alcan, 1904, and *Die Gerechtigkeit und die Entfaltung des Lebens* (Justice and the Development of Life), Berlin, 1907.

<sup>2</sup> One of the two standard German works of reference.—TRANS.

most primordial biological law, namely, *the law that everything which exists, above all everything which lives, tends to increase beyond all bounds.* Struggle, indeed, can only be explained by the law of growth, for *in itself the earth would have room for a great many things at once, but as each thing tends to increase to an unlimited extent, they necessarily come into collision.*

We often meet with this law in the inorganic world. Owing to the effect of gravitation, the heavenly bodies, once they have taken shape, "grow" by attracting to themselves everything coming within their sphere; and even a crystal "grows," so long as sufficient mother-lye is present. In short, wherever the phenomena of motion take place there is an unmistakable tendency to "accumulate like substances,"<sup>1</sup> which is the same thing as growth. Even now, at any rate in the domain of physics, this can be accounted for theoretically, or at least it may be made to appear plausible, Zehnder<sup>2</sup> in particular having argued much on these lines. Whatever we may think of his and similar arguments, it is nevertheless a fact that everything and, above all, every living substance grows.

True, there are limits to this growth, three in number. A single cell, the most primitive structure, can scarcely grow beyond the size of a pin's head, because the interior of the molecule no longer receives sufficient nourishment from osmosis,<sup>3</sup> and a limit is thus set to the single-cell form of life. The tendency to grow still persists, however, despite the fact that the individual cell cannot increase in size. Hence further growth is impossible unless the isolated cells join together to form communities of cells. Thus it is that individual beings or poly-cellular organisms come into existence. These, too, have an inherent tendency to become larger and larger, as we can see in tracing the development of animals. For instance, the oldest horse with which palæontology has acquainted us was about as large as a fox. Gradually, however, it grew, and is probably still continuing to grow, and so it is with all animals and likewise with us human beings.

<sup>1</sup> Empedocles already had an inkling of this primeval law of growth, for he says (see Diel's *Fragments of the Pre-Socratics*, 1st ed., "Empedocles," 90): "Thus did sweet seek after sweet, bitter make a rush for bitter, sour for sour," etc.

<sup>2</sup> Zehnder's *Entstehung des Lebens* (The Origin of Life), 1910. Published by H. Laupp, Tübingen.

<sup>3</sup> All that is necessary is, of course, that one dimension should not be exceeded. Cells can often expand to a comparatively large size in a flat shape. Compare, for instance, *Caulerpa*, which attains a superficies of several square centimetres. [Sap probably rises in plants and glands form their secretions through osmosis.]

But at length a limit is reached which even the individual polycellular creature cannot overstep. For mechanical reasons aquatic and swamp-dwelling animals very much larger than a whale, land animals very much larger than elephants, or aerial creatures very much larger than a swan cannot exist, for they could no longer have sufficient strength and stability; and palæontology teaches us that this limit, which Helmholtz, among others, calculated in theory for birds, and which could be equally well deduced for other creatures, is in practice not overstepped. In the course of thousands of years all species of living creatures gradually become larger,<sup>1</sup> and when they have attained the limits of what is possible, they have become extinct, as was the case with the mastodon of the Chalk Age. Such creatures as the mastodon, however, enormous as they seem to us, are yet small in comparison with the size to which organic substance might grow, and to which it tends to grow. But as mechanical limits are fixed by mechanical laws, and therefore cannot be overcome, individual creatures must do exactly as cells do in a lower stage of development: and, in obedience to the tendency to grow inherent in each of them, they must join together to form larger structures.

In a certain sense any number of creatures of the same kind, for instance all the mice in the world, all rodents, all mammals, all animals, in short, may be considered as some such larger structure, in other words as an organism. The fact, already mentioned several times, that animals usually do not eat nor even attack their own kind, may be instanced as indicating that, from the point of view of the struggle for existence, an entire animal species is a single organism.

Anything so loosely welded together, however, cannot properly claim to be an organism, but may be compared to some extent with loose heaps of cells as they occur in *Volvox globator*. Unicellular forms of life, however, have developed into organisms properly so called. Similarly there gradually arose, out of and together with these loose conglomerations, higher-grade organisms represented by *social communities*.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> This applies primarily to mammals, but even here there are notable exceptions, although they can usually be explained by certain special circumstances, as is the case with the diminution in size of unicellular fauna. An exception to the principle are insects, as I believe the still living German zoologist, Otto zur Strassen, was the first to point out; and they, with the Brachiopods, are the longest-lived breed on earth.

<sup>2</sup> See chap. xiii.

Now, an organism is superior to a mass of cells ; and likewise social communities, more especially from the standpoint of the struggle for existence, present obvious advantages, the consequence of which is that animals living a social life of some sort certainly amount to more than nine-tenths of the total animal kingdom.

Just as not all unicellular creatures have evolved into polycellular individuals, and an incalculable number of protozoa have remained in the air, in the water and on earth, so there are even now many creatures which live alone. The number of kinds of animals which have risen quite sufficiently high to unite together for social purposes is but small ; although many certainly live in herds, which is a good beginning. Properly constituted communities exist only among the highest insects, such as bees or ants, and among human beings. Consistently with the universal tendency towards growth, these communities are likewise incessantly growing. In the case of Man we shall be able to trace this in detail, but even among animals we see it clearly. To cite one instance, the most ancient species of hymenoptera (bees and bee-like insects) live solitary lives, after which come others whose nest contains only a very few compartments, whereas modern bees have hives with thousands of combs.

§ 18. THE IMPASSABLE BARRIER.—There is even a limit to the growth of these conglomerations of isolated beings, for the reason that the earth only affords sustenance (in other words energy) for a limited number of organisms. But whereas the osmotic limit to single-cell organisms and the mechanical limit to multicellular organisms can be evaded by superior grouping, the limit fixed by the amount of *energy* available is final and impassable.

Now, many kinds of single-cell creatures and many fully-developed species of animals could exist side by side, and in process of evolution increase and multiply to the utmost possible extent. But if one kind were to attain its final stage of organisation as required by the law of growth, that is to say, if there were, for instance, 25 billion elephants or 1000 billion human beings, or 100,000 billion guinea-pigs, or 10 trillion mice, *then in every single case there would be no longer any room on earth for any other living creature besides*. As every species, however, is striving towards this end, the law of growth necessitates struggle;

but, what is equally important, it likewise prescribes the conditions of such growth.

At all events this struggle must be incessantly carried on, since there is an enormous risk of being outstripped; and it would require an incredibly short time for one species of animals to increase to such an extent as to consume all existing supplies. It is the bacteria which possess the greatest amount of vital energy, and a single bacterium, which splits up every hour, has in ten hours produced about 1000<sup>1</sup> others. In the ensuing ten hours each of these bacteria will again produce another 1000 bacteria; consequently in twenty hours their number will be 1000 times 1000 (= one million). And this process would continue, were it only possible, as of course after a time it cannot be, to provide the bacteria with the necessary quantity of food. That is to say, at the end of every ten hours three noughts would have to be added to the figure denoting the number of bacteria; which in one hundred and twenty hours or five days would have attained a figure with thirty-five noughts, and in ten days one with seventy-two noughts. Taking even the smallest sphærobacteria of 0.0001 millimetre<sup>2</sup> diameter, it is easy to calculate that in one day the colony would be a just visible pellet of .0098425 of an inch diameter; the second day it would already fill a tumbler, on the third a four-story house, and on the fourth be a mountain as large as Mont Blanc. At the end of four days and four hours it would have increased to such an extent that it could cover the whole earth with a living coating of mucus of rather more than seven and three-quarters of an inch thickness, thus attaining the maximum quantity of living substance which could exist on earth.

Continuing this calculation, we find that by the fifth day the colony of bacteria would be as large as the moon, and that from the sixth day onwards it would exceed all terrestrial measurements so rapidly that in ten days' time it would occupy the whole of the space visible with the aid of the best telescopes, space with a diameter of more than one hundred years of light.

Although the growth of the higher animals to-day does not proceed at anything approaching such a pace, nevertheless,

<sup>1</sup> Thus: 2—4—8—16—32—64—128—256—512—1024.

<sup>2</sup> About .00003937 of an inch.—TRANS.

supposing no impediment to exist to their increase, then one, or, as the case may be, two specimens of

Bacteria would multiply in about 4 days,  
 Rabbits and mice, in about 20 years,  
 Human beings (with four children per couple), in about 1250 years,  
 Elephants, in about 2000 years,

at such a pace as to attain the maximum of what is possible in this world. Thus, in a comparatively short period each species left to itself would be able so completely to fill the whole world that there would be no room left for anything else. That this has not yet happened is due to this very fact that struggles occur between the different species, and that, in the nature of things, these cannot but be very severe. Yet it seems amazing that in all the millions of years that these struggles have been proceeding no single species should have come anywhere near dominating the rest, and in fact that all existing organisms only absorb a very insignificant portion of the energy actually at their disposal. Whereas each square metre of ground could accommodate 440 lbs.<sup>1</sup> of living substance, in reality it supports only about 0.4 gm.<sup>2</sup> of human substance (that is, only  $\frac{1}{1000000}$  of what is possible), 10 gm. of animal substance (that is, only  $\frac{1}{100000}$  of what is possible), 1000 gm. of plant substance (that is, only  $\frac{1}{1000}$  of what is possible).<sup>3</sup>

In order to understand why the organic world has availed itself so little of the possibilities open to it, and in particular why man, this world's master, should only utilise a smaller and smaller fraction thereof, we must inquire more closely into the origin of life. Not until we understand for what purpose we are striving, will we realise that the reason why we have made no progress in this "*natural struggle involving all humanity*" is precisely because we have allowed our attention to be too much absorbed by "*interhuman wars.*"

<sup>1</sup> 200 kilos = 441.1 lbs. avoirdupois.—TRANS.

<sup>2</sup> 1 gramme = 15.4325 grains troy.—TRANS.

<sup>3</sup> At present each square kilometre in the world is inhabited by 11.4 human beings, whose weight amounts to about 882 lbs. avoirdupois (that is, 4 gm. per square metre), the average weight of a human being, including children, being about 5 stone 9 lbs. Owing to the absence of trustworthy statistics, the other figures are based on a comparatively arbitrary estimate, but as far as gradation of size is concerned they cannot be wrong. Moreover, the precise figures are not of importance in the question under discussion. Of the truth of the principle there cannot be any doubt.



## II. THE STRUGGLE FOR ENERGY

§ 19. WHY THIS STRUGGLE IS WAGED.—The purpose for which this struggle is carried on is sustenance, using the term in its broadest sense; and the struggle for existence might perhaps be more aptly described as a struggle for sustenance. This alone explains why as yet no kind of organism has succeeded in ousting all other forms of life, for the fox, for instance, needs the hare as food, and if he had eaten up the last hare he must perforce starve.

Thus the eater has really far less to do with regulating the numbers of the eaten than *vice versa*, astonishing as this may seem at first to those who believe that they can regulate the course of the world with the help of cannon. Moreover, a similar although generally a less simple connection exists between all animals. Above all, however, every animal needs plants, for plants alone are capable of extracting sustenance from earth, air, fire and water—that is, from the four elements of the Ancients. Hydrogen, nitrogen, oxygen and carbon, the elements of which organisms are almost exclusively composed, are found in superabundance in earth, air and water, and also trifling additions of other substances. A single shipload of iron, for example, would suffice to supply every one in the world with all the iron they require (*i.e.* as a physical component). If it were merely a question of materials, therefore, there would be nothing to prevent the entire globe gradually becoming converted into living substance, and henceforth revolving round the sun as a genuine organism.

What is lacking, however, is the fourth element, fire; for if the actual food be sufficient for fully one hundred trillion tons of organisms, there is only enough of the fire which gives them life and form, that is the supply of energy in the narrow sense of the word, for about one hundred billion tons of living substance, that is for the millionth part. Let me institute a comparison. Whereas the materials would suffice for a large Berlin block of flats, the energy would suffice only for one brick. Consequently the probability from the outset is that it is the comparatively trifling amount of energy-producing sustenance which will be the object of struggle. As a matter of fact this is so. Expressed in terms of physics, life is equivalent to causing

a current of energy to pass through a person. Whenever man eats and breathes he absorbs energy, and whenever he works or thinks he exhales it again ; and the source of all this energy, as is now known with absolute certainty, is the Sun.

Now, of all organisms it is plants alone which are in a position to utilise the radiating energy of sunlight, and with its aid to construct out of earth, air and water complex chemical bodies which, on combustion, like gunpowder, are capable of performing labour. The powder hurls the cannon-ball out of the barrel, and in like manner the sugar which I eat enables my muscles to throw a stone, living substance, particularly that of animals, being capable of consuming the sustenance created by plants and converting it again into labour.

This is commonly called the rotation of life—a misleading phrase, because it is only the chemical substances of which plants and animals consist which take part in this rotation. The genuine life-giving principle, energy, however, does not proceed in a cycle, its action being rather comparable to the parabolic course of the comets. The energy liberated in the sun radiates thence in eight minutes to the earth, remains here a certain period, varying from seconds to millions of years, and then slowly but for us irrevocably quits the earth, and finally, transformed into heat, radiates into incommensurable space.

While on earth, the sun's energy collects water to form clouds, raises winds, and gives rise to ocean currents, causes plants to grow, and by means of plants feeds animals. Without the sun this earth would be a body ever in repose—the repose of death. Not a breath of wind would ruffle the surface of the water, not a cloud arise in the sky. No rain would fall, and there would be neither trees nor shrubs, neither animals nor human beings. The sun's energy may remain long on earth, and in coal it has perhaps been lying for millions of years ; but the day must come when it will leave the earth and find its way out into the realms of space.

Now, what is needed is to utilise this transient force, absorbing as much or causing as much of it as possible to pass through ourselves. This stream of energy, however, without which life could not exist, is of course limited in size ; and to form at all events an approximate estimate of its volume is by no means impossible. Pouillet, in fact, has already done this. As it is known how much energy must pass through every pound

weight so that it may live, so it is also known, as has just been pointed out, that the earth cannot support more than one hundred billion tons of living substance at most. This quantity, however, *could* live; and if Man were able to attract all the available energy to his own race, then, instead of, as at present, 1.5 billions being able to live upon the earth, about three million billions could do so. Mankind, therefore, might increase a millionfold. Then, instead of only eleven human beings on an average living on each square kilometre of earth, as is now the case, twenty millions would do so, or, as some means would probably then be discovered of living on the water, six millions. In any case there would then be six human beings for each square metre, and mankind would therefore have to emulate the ants, and live in buildings of many stories one above another.

Now, this number of human beings is attainable, although, for reasons presently to be explained, we shall probably never do more than approach it. At all events not only is there room on earth for all those at present inhabiting it, but for countless billions besides.

Mankind is now in the midst of this colossal struggle, which is literally *a struggle for a place in the sun*; and *this* is the struggle which ought to be fought out. Whatever assists it means victory; whatever hinders it means defeat.

§ 20. STRUGGLE IN THE ANIMAL WORLD.—The object of this struggle for existence is thus made clear beyond all possible doubt. Every animal and every species of animal must aim at conducting through itself and its own race the largest possible share of the universal flow of energy; but there are very many different ways in which this object might be attained.

The first and most primitive method consists in attempting to deprive others of something by killing them and endeavouring to utilise the energy formerly absorbed by them. If we reflect that the entire animal world does not use up more than one twenty-thousandth part of the energy available, it is evident that "theft" would be of even less use in this case than otherwise, and that this kind of struggle could not come into consideration unless the hitherto unused energy were absolutely unusable. If all the bakers' shops were shut, it is conceivable that some one might commit murder for the sake of food; but if loaves are lying about by the thousand, it would be madness

for any one to strike a wretched beggar dead to get a dry crust, As will shortly be shown, Man, more than any other creature, is capable of utilising for his own purposes all the energy hitherto lying fallow, as it were ; and he, therefore, has absolutely no need to attempt to obtain it by any foul methods. Characteristically enough, however, it was just such methods which were invoked in order to popularise the struggle for existence, which for most of us signifies simply killing one another.

In long past times open combat was of considerable importance, the means at the disposal of animals for the full utilisation of energy being very inadequate. Before Man could be lord of this world the big birds of prey had first to be exterminated, which caused even the old Roman statesman and philosopher, Boëthius,<sup>1</sup> to ridicule war between man and man. "Ye draw the sword against one another," he said, "while ye yourselves are threatened by snakes and lions, bears and tigers." Nowadays, however, this does not really hold good any longer. Man, as if still an animal and with the ways of animals, fought to a finish his struggle with the animal kingdom ; and all that he now remembers is his fight against bacteria, which, characteristically enough, are the smallest known living creatures. But this kind of struggle does not, even in the case of animals, really count as part of the struggle for existence, at any rate not in so far as it aims at effecting selection ; for if one kind of animal destroys another it does not on that account become stronger or fitter. The destruction merely proves that the victor was already stronger and fitter. On the other hand, it is a well-known fact that wherever they have no competition to fear, the old inefficient types have survived a remarkably long while. This is notably the case with Australia, where there are no native mammals.

Increasing the race by ensuring its increased fertility might be considered a second form of struggle for life. If every creature uses up one calory,<sup>2</sup> then 100 will use up 100, and 1000 will consume 1000 calories. This is so simple an example that it is at once clear to every one, and for a time the increase of the human race was considered a universal panacea and the one

<sup>1</sup> Amicius M. S. Boëthius (c. 470-525) : *Consolatio Philosophiæ*.

<sup>2</sup> Term signifying the measure with which energy is measured. Man requires about 2500 calories daily.

object to be attained. But the fact was forgotten that increase is only valuable in so far as the race is at the same time improved, and that greater fertility does little to promote selection unless more children are produced than can live under existing conditions. Many would then of necessity die young, and in accordance with universal law they would be chiefly weaklings, so that the result would be a finer race than if few children were born and all remained alive without discrimination.

In Germany to-day, the population, despite a rapidly falling birth rate, increases in number owing to decreased mortality, which may be a testimony to the excellence of German sanitation and public health regulations, but biologically is certainly not an advantage. This desire to increase population at any cost, this mad craze for numbers,<sup>1</sup> moreover, is not due to scientific reflection. At the back is rather the desire, which I admit is often vague, for as many soldiers as possible. It is thus not a direct but only an indirect result of Darwinian teachings, traceable to the notion of struggle contained therein.

Increased population is supposed to be the consequence of higher evolution, but such increase is not itself calculated to promote evolution, since the individual organisms and the different species of animals have arisen independently of one another, and their mutual dependence is so great that it is scarcely ever possible for one to increase alone. If the lion is to increase, then the gazelles must first do so also: if there are to be more swallows, then there must first be more flies. Beasts of prey, in short, are dependent upon their prey, which in turn depend upon plants. Hence the old saw that in reality all animals and human beings are vegetable feeders, except that the ox digests the grass for us beforehand, which is only a way of saying that the animal kingdom is dependent upon the plant world.

Plants alone derive sustenance direct from the sun's rays, and thus they alone in the whole of creation ought to be able to increase independently and on their own account. Even they, however, are dependent on animals in an extraordinarily large number of ways, of which here only the processes of fertilisation need be mentioned. In principle, at any rate, they could so increase, and it is a fact that by far the greater number of

<sup>1</sup> "Rage et folie des nombres."

organisms upon earth are plant organisms. Whether animals are as one per cent. or more as compared with plants, is perhaps hard to say, but in any case plants are in a very large majority.

§ 21. HUMAN STRUGGLE ON ANIMAL-LINES.—In general, even Man has hitherto contrived to increase only by breeding animals and cultivating plants. In this respect, therefore, progress seems to move in a circle, whence there is no escape, so that Man can produce more only by making other creatures produce more. By this means, however, it is possible to make a sensible advance, for so long as Man lived simply like an animal and took whatever he could lay hands on, probably at most 100 million such human beings, of comparatively modest requirements and likewise comparatively unskilful, could have found conditions on earth under which they could have lived.

Then came the time when Man made himself master of this world, although at first merely of the animal and vegetable kingdoms. Now we arrange the world as we please, allowing only such animals and plants to persist as are most serviceable to us—cultivated plants and domestic animals. Thus mankind is enabled to take a good step forward, and so far we have already increased fifteen-fold since the barbarous age when Man depended on what he could casually find; for instead of about 100 millions the world now contains 1500 millions. Did we make the utmost possible use of everything in this the agricultural period of development, we might increase another fifteen-fold; for if the very most were made of the whole world, probably 150 human beings could live on each square kilometre, and the population would thus attain 22,500 millions.<sup>1</sup> There is, however, still energy enough for 100,000 times more human beings.

The following table is instructive :

*Population in round numbers which the earth could support at different periods.*

Barbaric period	. . . . .	100 millions
Agrarian period { present	. . . . .	1,500 "
{ maximum	. . . . .	20,000 "
Period of full utilisation of energy	. . . . .	3,000,000,000 "

<sup>1</sup> During the war Germany is proving that she is almost capable of supporting a population of 120 per square kilometre. But Germany is neither a very fertile country nor is the very most made of it as yet. Even China, not including Mongolia and Tibet, with her "unscientific agriculture," has succeeded in supporting a population of about fifty-two to the square kilometre, which, were the whole world equally densely populated, would be equivalent to a population of about seven and a half billions.

We are, therefore, half-way through the agricultural period, which must already have lasted about 20,000 years, perhaps longer; but we may rest assured that we shall take much less time to cover the second half of the journey; as we are now directing our knowledge and efforts towards this end.

The reason why with agricultural methods we cannot rise above a population of twenty billions is by no means merely because we are obliged to provide sustenance for such vast numbers of plants and animals in order to obtain sustenance ourselves, but mainly because we do not make rational use of energy, superabundance of which is nevertheless available. Most important of all, however, is the fact that we still continue to use plants in order with their aid to utilise the sun's rays. Plants, it is true, are the gift of Nature, but they are, comparatively speaking, very imperfect, and we know that there are better methods than to have resort to them.

### III. THE STRUGGLE OF MANKIND

§ 22. INCREASE OF VITALITY.—This new method of combat, which, in its highest and most conscious form at all events, is confined to human society alone, depends on the opening up of fresh sources of energy, which can be partly done by increasing the vitality of the individual.

Animal organisms are capable of consuming vegetable food and converting it into labour, that is to say, using it to move muscles, form secretions and develop brain activity—in short, to do whatever is useful to the living creature in question. But as life consists solely of such actions, it is clear that the more of this current of energy an animal can utilise for itself and its own purposes, the greater will be its vitality.

If an animal is to creep or run, jump or climb, swim or fly faster and better, then, other things being equal, it must consume more energy; and if it becomes capable of reacting more quickly or with less provocation, then it must be able to use up its self-contained energy faster, that is, to consume more energy than before in a given period. Every advance, in short, whether in perceptiveness or in capacity for work, is only possible by increased consumption of energy; and the whole difference between us and the lowest form of animal life crawling about

sluggishly on the bottom of the ocean can be expressed in terms of energy.

This example suffices to show how much living creatures have already perfected themselves in process of evolution ; for the living substance of the higher animals actually is capable of increased output of labour, that is, it consumes more energy. In their case assimilation of nutriment is said to proceed much more rapidly. The quantity of energy consumed per kilogram in an hour by polyps, for instance, growing almost motionless at the bottom of the sea, is comparatively trifling. The quantity of energy passing through insects, cuttle-fish, frogs and reptiles is decidedly greater ; but not till we reach the higher animals do we find this current of energy attaining such intensity as permanently to warm the body. Man, for instance, has acquired the capacity of using up between one and two calories per kilogram and per hour : and one human being, therefore, consumes in an hour about one hundred calories, or even, temporarily, very much more, in case of severe physical exertion. Although in course of millions of years the power of assimilating energy may have increased, yet Man can scarcely be said to be better off in this respect than other mammals. Man's superiority is based on something different. By improving their physical substance and correspondingly improving their organs, animals have acquired the power of utilising large quantities of energy. Thus, when the slowly quivering muscle of a worm evolves into the rapidly quivering muscle of an insect, the creature must simultaneously acquire increased capacity for work, else there would be no object in the improved muscle ; and this principle obtains everywhere. Every new organ is conditioned by and requires a capacity for making use of increased and, if necessary, fresh sources of energy, which sources the more highly developed creature finds in eating more and consequently working more. It cannot, however, eat more than it can use up, and thus in the organisation of any particular creature a limit is set to the struggle for energy.

§ 23. THE UTILISATION OF EXTRANEOUS ENERGY.—*Man, however, can do more than this.* As I shall show more in detail later on,<sup>1</sup> the highest animals possess about the maximum number of organs which they are in a position to maintain. I also propose to show what an advantage it has been to Man from the

<sup>1</sup> See § 26.



psychological standpoint to have been able to use organs which can be laid aside or changed (tools). Here, however, I wish to lay stress upon another aspect of this acquired capacity to use tools: the fact that it enables Man to *utilise for his own purposes almost unlimited quantities of energy*. I admit that this is not absolutely without precedent in the animal kingdom, for Man, after all, is responsible for hardly any absolute innovation.<sup>1</sup>

For instance, when a bird of prey high up aloft circles round and round almost motionless, it is utilising the energy of the wind; and when ants keep slaves they are utilising part of the latter's vital energy; but it was Man from whose groping efforts something independent was first evolved. Man it was who first developed and extended the struggle for energy by learning to make use of extraneous energy without its passing through his body. The beginning of this phase of development may be traced even among the most primitive human beings, who made the ox pull for them, the horse run for them, the dog hear and smell for them, and the sheep protect them from cold. Every domestic animal, indeed, which primitive Man tamed for his own ends became a factor in the production of energy. Animals, however, were after all utilised only by making them do that which was natural to them to do; and a further difficulty very soon made itself felt—a difficulty which has become very manifest in Germany during the present war—that a horse which eats oats is thereby eating Man's food. If we can imagine the whole world ever being so full of horses and human beings as is Germany to-day, then it will be impossible any longer to import food from anywhere, and even in peace time there will be keen competition between human beings and the horses which they themselves have bred.

Obviously if all horses were replaced by motor-cars, then more human beings could live on earth than formerly. In this case the motor-car represents the new principle according to which Man is able to compel almost whatever quantities of energy he pleases to do his behests. Not domestic animals but fire it is which makes Man lord of the world. When Man first caused the solar energy stored up in plants to explode and catch fire, he opened up for himself a novel source of power,

<sup>1</sup> In reality the only innovation in principle and without parallel in nature is the *wheel*, which, with its axle, cannot be formed by any single organism. The realisation of this fact would simplify many problems, particularly in aeronautics.

and thus lent such an extraordinary impetus to the conversion of energy that we are quite entitled to speak of things in general having taken a new turn, and to date the mastery of Nature from the kindling of the first fire.

Now, in process of time, but more particularly during the last hundred years, this new principle has been developed to such an enormous extent that we may even now say that in future the old animal principles of struggle for existence will be subordinate to others; for already it is possible to see almost unlimited vistas of progress opening up, whereas, as has just been shown, Nature has everywhere set bounds to the animal struggle for existence.

No one doubts that machinery has revolutionised the world; and what has now to be proved is that, in accordance with *the general rules of the struggle for existence, a machinery victory is the only possible victory which Man can still win to-day.*

At present almost all the so-called natural forces have been pressed into our service, but in reality we still continue to use solar energy. The water which is drawn up by the sun and gradually flows back again to the sea, drives our mills. The woods which grew up in the sunshine of prehistoric times, converted into coal, propel our railways, steamers and electric works, or, changed into benzine, our motor-cars and airships.

These are but a few instances out of many, and the original amount of energy which Man can pass direct through his own body has long been far exceeded by the amount which he includes in his own sphere of influence alone. In Germany, for example, a human being consumes physically between two and three thousand calories daily, whereas with the aid of machinery he consumes on an average from twenty to thirty thousand.

A great deal has been achieved in this way, but Man can still make scarcely any use of solar energy except indirectly, by taking it from plants, waterfalls, coal-seams or petroleum springs. These sources of energy are considerable, and not yet fully exploited, but they are smaller and smaller in comparison with the energy which radiates from the sun to the earth, and most of which never assumes forms in which we could easily utilise it, but remains as heat, and in this way radiates unused back into space again.

In theory Man can directly transmute solar energy into labour, and that in practice he does not do this is partly to be

accounted for by his having found comparatively large quantities of energy conveniently accessible in the form of waterfalls, pit-coal, wood, etc. But in the meantime at any rate he still needs plants, because they are the only machines in which solar energy is transmuted into food. Only in plants does carbon unite with water to form sugar, and if we could succeed in producing sugar and other foodstuffs without the help of plants, then we could really boast of having conquered plants. Indeed, we should not only have "distilled" life from the four elements, but at the same time solved the problem of the homunculus. True, not a single human being would be manufactured straight away in the retort, but there would be sustenance for thousands of millions; and so soon as sustenance is at hand the spawn is not long in following. The last thing which the blind Faust realises is that Man cannot be made happy, but that it is enough to open up a free way for a free people.<sup>1</sup>

Faust would fain wrest new ground from the sea, and not rob others of what they have already occupied; and the doctrine of rightful or wrongful struggle may be summarised thus: *wherever new ground is won, struggle is justifiable, life-promoting and good; but wherever it merely aims at depriving others of something it is UNJUSTIFIABLE, death-dealing and bad.*

For thousands of years the Netherlands carried on their slow, life-promoting struggle against water, and at the same time were a model of what a peacefully advancing people should be. It would be more than usually regrettable were a fine modern struggle such as this to be ended now by force.

§ 24. CREATIVE STRUGGLE AND WAR OF EXTERMINATION.— It is for us now to carry on in principle and on the largest possible battle-field this struggle for new ground which the Netherlands with their primitive means could begin only in the literal sense of the words.

Moltke,<sup>2</sup> when a young man, once laid it down that to increase population by one-fourth in peace-time was of at least as much value as to conquer a province one-fourth as large as the country. We might calculate on this basis the extent of possible conquests in the war of the future; and to any one who does so and who once realises the billions of human beings

<sup>1</sup> See the last act of *Faust*, Part II. The speech alluded to is the one beginning: "Ein Sumpf zieht am Gebirge hin."—TRANS.

<sup>2</sup> Letter from Moltke, written in 1840.

implicated therein, and that every one of the present belligerents might, so to speak, conquer the entire globe, the present cat-fights<sup>1</sup> with cannon in which at most a few millions are moved hither and thither will seem as insignificant as they really are.

Once solar energy is rationally exploited and made to serve us direct, like a domestic animal, then every acre of land, even land which at present scarcely supports a single human being, will be able to provide sustenance for thousands.<sup>2</sup> As regards direct utilisation of solar energy as food, not much has been achieved hitherto, but apart from this we do already utilise considerable quantities of extraneous energy. The world is inhabited by one and a half billion human beings, each of whom consumes every year not quite one million calories. Now, the world's total production of pit-coal is about one and a half billion tons, that is, one ton of coal per inhabitant annually. As each ton produces about eight million calories, it follows that by means of coal-driven machines Man already works about eight times as much as with his arms.<sup>3</sup> If we include the utilisation of water-power, of animal labour, and of several other minor sources of power, it is not too much to say that even now fully ten times as much labour is done by machinery in this world as by Man. Moreover, every extension of coal-mining, every fresh source of energy opened up, confers increased vital powers upon Man; and were social conditions organised on anything approaching a reasonable basis, might also mean a saving of labour. Were the seventeen million horse-power energy contained in the Falls of Niagara profitably employed, about one-third of all human labour could be performed by this means alone.

Obviously with such forces the burden of overworked Man

<sup>1</sup> By the expression "cat-fights" no disrespect is intended towards the victims of the battles now in progress, entailing as they do such trials and sacrifices upon the individual combatant; but despite all the respect we owe those taking part in them, such combats are, from the standpoint of natural science, cat-fights, scrimmages, for the most trivial of objects.

<sup>2</sup> To this subject I have already referred in §§ 18 and 21, where I quoted exact figures.

<sup>3</sup> A very perfunctory calculation, for neither Man nor machinery transmutes into profitable labour the whole amount of calories received, and in both cases the percentage of waste differs. The above estimate, however, is sufficiently accurate to enable the reader to survey the general results; and it is beyond doubt that even now the sum-total of labour performed by machinery many times exceeds the sum-total of that performed by Man.

could easily be lightened, as indeed has already been pointed out (cf. § 15). I have also indicated the reason why this has hitherto not been done. All these problems, moreover, no longer belong to the dim distant future, but, at all events in principle, are already solved, and only awaiting practical application. Thermo-electricity enables us to make direct and rational use of solar energy; and the researches of modern chemists, in particular of Emil Fischer and his pupils, have already proved that the artificial production of foodstuffs is possible. Already we have succeeded in artificially producing most foodstuffs—in fact in everything except the synthesis of albumen. Of late years, however, we have made great strides towards producing this also.

But we cannot as yet make practical use of these experiments in the laboratory, and in order to do this we have still need of struggle. Our object is within sight; on this round ball there is still room for great deeds,<sup>1</sup> and wherever we see "the purposeless forces of undisciplined elements" at work, we exclaim with Goethe:

"Hier wagt mein Geist sich selbst zu überfliegen,  
Hier möcht' ich kämpfen, dies möcht' ich besiegen!"<sup>2</sup>

Compared with this marvellous human struggle how pitiable does war appear! What has it to do with the struggle for existence? Assuredly nothing, save for the fact that it is perpetually destroying a fraction, even if only a small fraction, of mankind, without in reality helping in the struggle. It is therefore simply and solely due to degeneration, as for that matter we have always considered it to be in the case of animals, to which we adopt an altogether more impartial attitude. In this human struggle alone have we an innate right to engage, a struggle requiring all our physical, mental and moral energies; and to "do our bit" in it is no less our inalienable right than our bounden duty.

War is right. Not yesterday's obsolete war, that of Man against Man, but rather a new life-dispensing war for Man's mastery over the earth and its forces, an ever youthful war, of which we have probably as yet not fought out a millionth part, but in which our era is preparing to engage with quite different

<sup>1</sup> "Noch immer gewährt der Erdkreis Raum zu grossen Taten," are the words in the text.—TRANS.

<sup>2</sup> Roughly: Here does my spirit dare even to transcend itself: here is something worth fighting for, here something worth overcoming.—TRANS.

methods from those which have prevailed in any previous era. Already, as I have hinted, we can catch a glimpse of wonderful conquests over Nature, conquests portending victories such as no human being ever won yet. And here comes some one and insists upon our going into raptures over civilised human beings crawling about on the ground and shooting at one another!

Even Faust realised that a higher type of human being can find satisfaction only in a struggle with Nature. He, too, had dallied with love, and waged wars for love. As philosopher he had dealt in the wisdom of the ancients, and as merchant with money and merchandise. In war and peace he had rescued countries and their rulers, and thus he would seem to have achieved the utmost that is possible for any one in this historic world. Yet on looking back over it all he confesses that all is vanity and vexation of spirit; and not until he turns to the simple task of building a dyke in order that a new mankind may have new homesteads, does he experience the divine bliss of creation. It is this creative struggle which we have to put in place of the struggle for extermination.

Emil Fischer has produced an artificial substitute for sugar, and may perhaps find one for albumen. He is the founder, or at any rate the forerunner, of the new era of humanity, and all generations to come will gratefully refer to him as one of the great conquerors in the struggle for the foundations of life. He really practised that "divine art" of which Archimedes speaks. Professor Haber, who has utilised his scientific attainments for the manufacture of asphyxiating bombs, will perhaps not be forgotten either, but he need not even dream of becoming famous as Archimedes "defending his native soil against the Roman legions."<sup>1</sup> First of all, that was two thousand years ago; and secondly, all Archimedes really did was to defend Syracuse when it was besieged, and in so doing he made no use whatever of poison, which was still only used by certain classes of people; and finally, the fame of Archimedes does not rest upon his having defended his native soil, which was allied with Carthage for two whole years against European ideas, then embodied or at any rate dimly conceived by Rome. It rests upon the fact that he was the first real physicist, and therefore all life-dispensing victories of the future may be traced back to his preparatory work.

<sup>1</sup> Schiller: *Archimedes and the Schoolboy*.

## IV. FREEDOM AND NATURAL COMPULSION

§ 25. CONFORMITY TO LAW AND UNFETTERED HARMONY.—It is the custom to say that the struggle for existence selects from among living creatures those best suited to withstand it. Such selection, however, takes place not only in the animate but also in the inanimate world ; and it is quite easy to see that, after all, suitability for a particular purpose and conformity to law are identical, except that we are accustomed to consider them from different points of view. Thus we might say there was "suitability" in the fact that owing to the earth's comparatively slow rotation centrifugal force is smaller than force of attraction, otherwise everything on earth would be hurled out into boundless space beyond hope of recovery. Further reflection shows us, however, that there is nothing really "suitable" about this for any purpose, but that at best it "could not be otherwise."

Wherever centrifugal force is greater than force of gravity no central body at all can be formed ; and if this were to be the case throughout the cosmic system, then there would be no fixed heavenly bodies and the whole world would be different from what it now is ; and in case any form of life had developed it must have acquired equilibrium with the help of quite other forces, and must therefore have been quite different from what it actually is. But if it were to exist, it must of course have been also adapted to this other kind of constellation of force. Conversely, no one need wonder that the shape of this world's mountains and edifices, as well as the rotation of water and of life, should conform in their smallest details and in every respect to gravitation ; otherwise all these things could not justify their existence, or, to put it more accurately, could not exist at all.

Similarly with regard to every detail of the organic world. Undoubtedly it is important for vegetable feeders that there should be plants, and for beasts of prey that there should be prey ; but if after all there were no plants, then no such animals as we now know could have been formed, and if there were no hares there would be no justification for the existence of foxes.

Thus it happens that, to any one who thinks along lines of

natural science, this unity of the world, which used to amaze every one who contemplated it, seems a matter of course. The natural scientist sees no cause for astonishment in "everything being welded together to form one whole," knowing as he does that this conformity to law, which strikes us as harmony, must ever recur under the influence of the all-powerful force of Nature.

Neither can Man avoid this dependence upon others. For instance, in a country in which there were no subjects there could also be no king. Nevertheless, in this harmony of Nature Man produces the effect of something out of place, for he with his free will takes upon him to withstand the compelling force of Nature. And this, moreover, he is able to do.

Much destruction has been wrought owing to this freedom of Man. Everywhere Man has carried pain and grief, unrest and confusion into the safe recesses of "perfect" Nature—war between man and man being but one of the many forms of error into which the human race has fallen. But, as earnest of good to come, Man cherishes the belief in a new harmonious order of things, which he himself will create according to his own free will. True, animals' instinct can never err, while with Man error and endeavour are inseparable. But it is not less true that endeavour is made possible by error, and this fact is worth more to us than any mechanically arranged harmonious order of things, however perfect. With Man came sin into the world, but likewise virtue, slavery but also liberty, war but also sweet peace. How can this apparent dualism be? How could Man rise as it were above the laws to which he owes his being? How was it possible for him to overcome the force of Nature?

§ 26. THE EVOLUTION OF THE BRAIN.—That there is some connection between this liberation of Man and the evolution of the brain cannot reasonably be doubted. It is by his brain and by his brain only that he is distinguished from every other living creature. For all our other physical attributes there is not only some analogy in the animal kingdom, but, as modern comparative anatomy has shown, almost all of them have remained comparatively primitive, even and most of all the extremities, although the contrary always used to be supposed. The human brain alone has developed by leaps and bounds, and with unexampled rapidity, until its size (that is, as a function



of the intelligence compared with the weight of the body) <sup>1</sup> is about one hundred per cent. greater than that of the brains of all other living creatures, even those of the highest order.

This sudden advance, which seems doubly enigmatic when we consider how particularly slow and steady has been the development of the brain in other living creatures, must be explained. All living creatures, as we have seen, are intended to absorb the utmost possible amount of energy, which with lower animals amounts to eating as much as possible. They achieve this by having developed organs of sense for finding things, legs for running, arms for clasping, mouths for swallowing, teeth for biting, glands for digesting, and so on. Thus the animal body with its manifold and apparently many-sided organs came into existence; but in order that it may work as a complete whole, the legs must really run in the direction in which the nose has scented prey, and the mouth must snap where the eyes see prey—in short, every muscle of the body must do what the organs of sense require it to do. Some means of communication is therefore necessary between the organs of perception and the organs of action. Hence the nervous system arose, and, in the higher animals, for reasons which it would take too long to explain here, the brain originated, not as an end in itself, but as something of secondary importance. The brain was originally merely the servant of the organs connected with the business of feeding. In this capacity it was certainly important, but had no independent influence on the real significance of life.

This dependence of the brain on the organs connected with food persisted. Whenever the organs of sense or of grasping improved, there was a corresponding improvement in the brain. It readily kept pace with the development of the body, but could not advance a single step beyond it. How, indeed, could a special organ have been developed for understanding speech, if Man had had neither a mouth to speak with nor ears to hear with? *Thus the development of the brain was and is dependent on the development of organs the number of which is, after all, limited.*

<sup>1</sup> This function of the intelligence does not mean something merely proportional. It may be stated somewhat as follows:

$$\text{Brain-weight} = a_1 + b_1 l + c_1 i,$$

*l* standing for the length of the animal and *i* for its intelligence, and *a*, *b*, and *c* being constant quantities to be empirically fixed. Now, the limb *i* in Man has become greater by leaps and bounds.

Even Aristotle knew that no animal with horns or antlers possesses the teeth of a beast of prey as well—in other words, that animals are provided with only one means of defence. Similarly, animals have either good eyes or good noses: they are “seeing animals” or “smelling animals,” but never both at once. This economy is necessary, for if an animal were overprovided with organs it would no longer be able to fulfil properly the purpose for which after all it exists—feeding. Thus throughout all these thousands of years the brain continued faithfully to serve its master, until the revolution came which first liberated it and then placed it on the throne.

Man alone has undergone this revolution, for Man alone by grasping a stone converted his unarmed hand into an armed one. In so doing he may not have created any new bodily organ, but, as Kapp,<sup>1</sup> unfortunately now almost forgotten, phrases it, he planned an *organic extension*, thus acquiring new capacities, just as if he had really added another organ to his body. But—and this distinction is profoundly significant—this acquisition does not inconvenience its owner. If he no longer needs his new organ, he can lay it aside, or even exchange it for other organs, and is thus gradually enabled to acquire a multiplicity of organs, such as no living creature would ever be able to carry about.

The human brain has been influenced to a quite extraordinary extent by this circumstance. These new organs cannot fail to affect and perfect the brain, just as the old organs did; but whereas the brain used to be forced to wait until the new organs were there, now it acquires its new organs itself, and perfects itself through them by its own force. By thus “creating organs for itself,” therefore, the brain acquires freedom and independence, first of all from its own body, be it noted.

All animals depend greatly upon physical advantages, but in Man these are of comparatively little moment. Of what use are the best eyes, since they cannot do what relatively inferior

<sup>1</sup> Kapp's *Grundlinien einer Philosophie der Technik* (Outlines of Technical Philosophy), pp. 29, 39; G. Westermann, Brunswick, 1877. Cf. also Noiré's *Das Werkzeug und seine Bedeutung für die Entwicklungsgeschichte der Menschheit* (Tools and their Importance in the History of Human Evolution), J. Diemer, Mayence, 1880. Both these works are based very largely on L. Geiger's *Ursprung und Entwicklung der menschlichen Sprache und Vernunft* (Origin and Development of Human Speech and Reason), Stuttgart, 1868. This idea, however, was first expressed by Ferdinand Lassalle, who in 1880 said: “Absolute self-sufficiency is the lowest pitch of Humanity.”

telescopes and microscopes can do? Of what use is a good nose or tongue to us in comparison with the benefits conferred on us by chemistry? Our telephones and microphones enable us to hear farther and better, our mechanical scales and other measuring instruments to feel more than any animal with the best special organs of sense. For what do we need great physical strength, when we have steam-hammers, hydraulic presses and giant cranes to work for us? Or speed; with railways and motor-cars to run for us? We need learn neither to swim nor to fly, when our steamers and submarines, our aeroplanes and airships can do so. Every achievement of excellence produced at any time during millions of years in the animal kingdom, man's young brain has likewise produced and brought to greater perfection.<sup>1</sup> We see more clearly than falcons, smell better than dogs, hear farther than elephants, and have a finer sense of touch than bats' wings. We are stronger than the rhinoceros, while in speed we easily excel the horse on earth, the eagle in the air, and the shark in the water.<sup>2</sup>

§ 27. THE AUTONOMY OF THE BRAIN.—From henceforth the brain, now free and powerful, is the decisive factor in the struggle for existence, for to-day intellectual struggles are of more importance than hand-to-hand fighting. Even if all the dwellers upon earth stuck knives into one another, they could not, if the worst came to the worst, do more than kill one another all out, and there would be 1,500,000,000 dead—which after all is scarcely conceivable. If, however, a single individual succeeded in directly utilising solar energy for the production of food, this would mean enabling a billion and a half (1,500,000,000,000) living beings to live (that is, a thousand times as many), which will one day actually come to pass.<sup>3</sup> Truly

<sup>1</sup> Even Helmholtz once said: "If an optician were to bring me an eye, I would refuse it as bungling work."

<sup>2</sup> Our airships, however, cannot yet overtake the falcon, and the dolphin is probably swifter than even our latest racing yachts.

<sup>3</sup> Even 3000 billions are conceivable, and the one and a half billions mentioned here are *probable*—indeed, in so far as such a statement can be made as to the future, they are a certainty. Between one and two thousand years after the introduction of the synthetic production of foodstuffs, they will have been reached, and then the world in general would be as thickly populated as a garden city.

[In England and Germany a billion = a million millions (1,000,000,000,000): in France and America, however, the word (French *milliard*) generally means a thousand millions = 1,000,000,000. In the case of the first figure Dr. Nicolai uses the word *Milliarde*, and in the case of the second figure the word *Billion*.—

TRANS.]

our tools are weapons, but to be used against Nature and not against Man. Our first tool, a stone, was a weapon, but a weapon in the struggle for food, and a tool for turning up the soil.<sup>1</sup> Afterwards this weapon for attacking earth and wood was used against animals, and finally against Man also.

But this is contrary not merely to morality but also to truth, for we are not simply a part of Nature. In Man's small brain the whole of "creation" was pondered over and imitated, and as a result of the freedom thus achieved we are enabled to "live according to laws of our own." Therefore it is that *human action differs from any natural event, and therefore it is that we must not consider war in the light of an earthquake.* Even were it true, which, as has been shown, it is not, that war is Nature's only outlet, this natural compulsion would still not apply to us, for Man ought not even to draw his sword except of his own free will and with a sense of his responsibility in so doing. The struggle for existence is no excuse, nor does it afford any analogy.

Even the usages of war unconsciously admit this, for any one who wants to fight to-day must arm others, since an isolated individual, be he never so brave, is too weak. Arming others and winning allies, even among one's own people, can be done only by persuasion, by influencing men's minds, that is by words. As this present war clearly shows, and as its issue will show still more clearly, therefore, nothing is so important and essential as persuasion, as intellectual struggle, even if such struggle should appear to be temporarily in abeyance. In any case we must never lose faith in the freedom and omnipotence of the intellect; and even now all who hope for any improvement must in their heart of hearts be convinced that the power of persuasion is mightier than that of brute force.

No one should take this comfort to their souls more than the friends of peace, forsaken as they may at present seem. It has been somewhat scornfully said of them that such a handful of men attempting to withstand the War Giant are like a small dog barking at the engine of an express train going at full speed: it would run straight over the dog, without noticing anything. No doubt, for the dog has at most one-millionth part as much living force as the express train; and if Man could do nothing

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Lazarus Geiger: *Ursprung und Entwicklung der menschlichen Sprache und Vernunft* (Origin and Development of Human Speech and Reason), J. G. Cotta, Stuttgart, 1868. Geiger shows that the most ancient tool was used for turning up the soil.

but throw his body in front of threatening evil, his power would not avail much either. Man's will, however, is not bound down to the strength supplied him by his body, but he has the power of releasing almost indefinite forces. Only think : one screw in the rails loosened, and the whole stately express engine is a heap of dust. No dog can do this, but Man can.

The influence which Man exerts upon his fellow Man cannot be expressed in terms of energy. We only know that there is no limit to the power of a word.

"Johannes Huss und andre Ketzler brien,  
Ihr Wort jedoch erklang von Ort zu Orte :  
Welch eine Tugend ist die Kunst der Worte."<sup>1</sup>

Christ and Darwin, Luther and Voltaire knew this art of words, and they were to their time as a lightning-flash setting in motion the accumulated stores of energy of an entire world. And the power of that one small word "war," how it transforms all Europe, and forces all mankind to abandon their accustomed ways for the sake of some new and unknown goal !<sup>2</sup> This we all felt, to our joy and sorrow, in the summer of 1914.

"In the beginning was the Word," always, and the Word alone, for power is always in the hands of the "old," and the "new" has at first never had any weapon save the Word. But the Word need only be left to itself, and as yet it has always come off victorious. And this conquest of the Word, which is carried away by the wind, over all worldly power is, after all, merely what Kant meant by the autonomy of practical reason and the dignity of mankind. True, there is an essential difference between the autonomy of practical reason and that of the brain, to which alone I referred above ; for that "absolute

<sup>1</sup> Platen, Prologue to *Die Abässiden*, 1829, lines 102-104. [Roughly : John Huss and other heretics burned. Yet their words resounded from place to place. Ah, the virtue lying in the art of words !—TRANS.]

<sup>2</sup> Four hundred years ago Luther realised what war meant. "Cannons and fire-arms," he says, "are cruel and damnable machines, I believe them to have been the direct suggestion of the devil. Against the flying ball no valour avails ; the soldier is dead, ere he sees the means of his destruction. If Adam had seen in a vision the horrible instruments his children were to invent, he would have died of grief.

"War is one of the greatest plagues that can afflict humanity ; it destroys religion, it destroys states, it destroys families. Any scourge, in fact, is preferable to it. Famine and pestilence become as nothing in comparison with it. Pestilence is the least evil of the three, and 'twas therefore David chose it, willing rather to fall into the hands of God than into those of pitiless man." (Luther's *Table Talk*, Bohn's edition, pp. 331-2.)—TRANS.

autonomy" insisted upon by Kant cannot exist save as an idea pure and simple. The autonomy of the brain is likewise limited, but it would be quite enough if we made full use of such autonomy as it has.

In order to have finished with war, this freedom of the true natural scientist, the freedom of the thinking brain, would be quite sufficient; and Frederick, in this respect really the Great, was quite right in saying, "If my soldiers began to think, not one would remain in the ranks." Unhappily, however, Schopenhauer also seems to have been right in saying that "Men are not thinking beings."

Schopenhauer, however, was a pessimist, and to-day there is cause rather for optimism, for we now know at any rate one thing which Schopenhauer did not know for a fact: that even *if men do not think, nevertheless their brains are capable of thinking*. It is one of the most interesting facts which modern brain physiologists have taught us, that the brains of animals and Man contain more extensive capacities than any that have ever been evolved from them. As a matter of fact, the brain is more developed than the soul, which is, after all, only what is to be expected, for the instrument must first be there before any one can play upon it. A calculating machine, for example, already contains within its iron framework the calculations  $481 \times 1617 = 777,777$ , and  $5621 \times 13,837 = 77,777,777$ , although neither may ever have been actually made. Similarly in every brain there are very many trains of thought ready waiting which have never yet been used. Nowhere is more striking proof of this afforded than in the works of that Russian man of genius, the physiologist Iwan P. Pavlov, works which open up an entirely fresh train of thought, into which, however, it would take too long to enter now. To make my meaning clear, two examples will suffice. Animals, particularly monkeys, which are much with human beings, can learn things from them which in themselves far transcend the limits of their intelligence; but this causes no modification of their brain, which consequently must already have been in a state to undertake these new functions. Again, the Japanese, who, if they had had to acquire western civilisation by their own exertions, certainly would not have done so under hundreds, perhaps thousands of years, have copied it from the Europeans in only a few years, just as they very quickly copied Chinese civilisation. Moreover, directly

either monkeys or Japanese have really adopted new habits, they adapt themselves to these perfectly. "Missie" smokes her cigarette no less elegantly than any Taudentzien girl, and Soyen Shaku writes books on ethics, the arguments of which lead to conclusions precisely similar to those at which German ethical writers arrived independently.<sup>1</sup>

Many things, even in the lives of nations, may be explained by this fact of there being all manner of possibilities latent in the brain without Man having the slightest inkling of them. This explains both the conservatism which often drives us to despair by its persistent adherence to antiquated grooves, and likewise the suddenness with which a new order of things comes about, the moment any one once succeeds in opening up these "dead tracks" to traffic, or in wresting a single sound from these "slumbering bowstrings."

What we know of brain physiology, therefore, justifies us in being optimistic. However noisy and self-assertive the impulses of hate may be, the social instincts, their opposites and our oldest inheritance, have long been lying dormant in our brain, although as yet they give out no sound. But one day they will be touched, and then their sound will drown that of all ghosts of the past, whether mediæval or modern. That we have "dead tracks" in us, and that love is older than hate, it is the purpose of Part III. of this book to prove.

§ 28. WAR AS A FREE HUMAN ACT.—As long, however, as the world does not know this, and does not believe that Nature's organisation, of which each individual is a part, makes it as it were physically incumbent upon us to observe certain rules and mutual relations, so long might it be objected that just because Man is free and not subject to natural force, he can make war because he chooses to do so; and that as he always has so chosen in the past, he will continue so to choose in the future, for "there always was and always will be war." It is not worth while examining such arguments, for they could be equally well urged in defence of cannibalism or of the Stone Age.

Now, war has indeed been called Logos, ratio, or reason—not human reason, it is true, but, characteristically enough, the reason of kings. As Calderon<sup>2</sup> scornfully wrote, in war powder

<sup>1</sup> Cf. § 194.

<sup>2</sup> Calderon: *En Esta Vida Todo es Verdad y Todo Mentira* (Everything in this Life is Truth and everything Untruth), 1694.

and shot are the last word of kings. But kings did not understand irony, and "ultima ratio regum" was inscribed on the cannons of the Roi Soleil of Versailles, and afterwards upon those of Frederick the Great. In France the National Assembly on August 17, 1791, erased these overbearing words, but in Prussia they still remain, although strangely enough only on field guns intended for attack, and not on fortification guns intended for defence, thus still further emphasising the fact that cannons are not the argument of Man but merely that of kings.

These words are not only engraven on the cannons for tradition's sake, but only a few months ago Loofs,<sup>1</sup> singularly enough a theologian, referred to them as a valuable maxim. Herr Loofs, who is probably a good monarchist, has no conception of what a disservice he is thus rendering to kings, for if war really does amount to "the last argument of kings," then there would be all the more justification for the Republicans making a fitting rejoinder. There is, however, a grain of truth in these words, and hence Kant insists on the necessity for a federation of "free republican states" if perpetual peace is to be maintained.

We hear it repeated over and over again that we are bound in honour to go to war, and that "it is a worthless nation which will not joyfully sacrifice everything for honour's sake." No doubt; but the only question is whether honour can be retrieved by force of arms. A nation which can conceive of this being possible has no more genuine honour in it than a good pistol shot who has made his notions of honour fit in with his sureness of aim.

Does any one really believe that the distressingly deep feelings of hatred, fear and contempt with which the majority of mankind at present regard Germany would not be greatly increased if the ~~the~~ ~~pos~~ were to succeed in imposing their rule upon still more ~~ay~~ ~~have~~ ~~then~~-speaking territories? It is moral conquests which we ~~is~~ ~~make~~, and if Germany were to win, and nevertheless ~~whifil~~ ~~the~~ elementary demands of humanity (which would of course then be more difficult), *then* she would have retrieved her honour.

Does any one believe that at the beginning of the nineteenth century Germany lost her honour because she succumbed

<sup>1</sup> Friedrich Loofs: *Internationale Monatschrift für Wissenschaft, Kunst und Technik*, 1915, vol. ix. No. 1.



before the Corsican's superior military methods? Or that Denmark and Belgium have lost their honour because of having had to yield to their stronger neighbour? Again, was it in any sense an honour for Napoleon or William I. to have conquered those weaker than themselves? Let a man once ask himself these questions impartially: there can be no doubt about the answer. A man's honour depends upon the good opinion of his fellow-men, a nation's honour upon the good opinion of other nations; and the time is past when this good opinion could be earned by the possession of a stronger biceps.

Indispensable as war may seem, regarded as an inherited notion, as a reasonable act, or as the duty of every man of honour, it cannot possibly be anything of the sort. For Man, indeed, nothing can be allowed to be a necessity, except what he himself, after free reflection, has recognised as a right. This is the meaning of the proud words "*Thou shalt*," which he, unfettered Man, uses in contradistinction to fettered Nature's "*Thou must*."

No honour and no dignity could be defended by actions imposed by necessity. Hence any one asserting the necessity of war, in so doing likens it to an animal act; and Fénelon<sup>1</sup> was right in saying that it is the disgrace of humanity that war sometimes seems inevitable.

<sup>1</sup> Fénelon: "*C'est la honte du genre humain, que la guerre soit inévitable*," 1699. *Télémaque*, Book XI.

## CHAPTER III

## SELECTION BY MEANS OF WAR

## I. SELECTION AND EDUCATION

§ 29.—POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE SELECTION.—War, says Professor K. von Stengel,<sup>1</sup> is a touchstone of nations, for in war everything rotten is destroyed : and some pastor or ecclesiastic whose name I have forgotten even goes the length of asserting that war is God's great winnowing vane with which He separates the wheat from the chaff. In this or some similar fashion has the doctrine of selection being effected by the struggle for existence been thoughtlessly and blindly transferred by many persons to war between human beings.

Undoubtedly war does effect selection, but for that matter nothing in the world ever happens which does not to some extent do so. If a new Stock Exchange law is promulgated, those persons perish, at all events as stockbrokers, who cannot accommodate themselves to the new regulations ; and if new riding rules are issued, the first riding prize will not be won by the same person that would have won it under the old rules, although this does not mean that any one will learn to ride better under the new rules. Similarly with regard to war. It must of course sift men, first of all sorting them into living and dead. But how do these so-called Darwinians know that it is the wheat which is left and the chaff which is removed ? Supposing it were the other way about ? For in the case of all selective influences the point is whether the selection is positive or negative. It may have the effect of improving the race or of deteriorating it.

Supposing every gazelle which neither sees nor hears the lion lying in wait for it, or, seeing him, is not able to escape quickly enough, were vanquished and killed ; then after a time the only gazelles left would be those with sharp eyes, quick hearing and

<sup>1</sup> *Weltstaat und Friedensproblem* (A World-wide State and the Problem of Peace), 1909, pp. 111 *et seq.*, by K. von Stengel. [A highly combative character sent by Germany as technical delegate to the First Hague Conference.—TRANS.]

agile limbs. They alone would breed, and thus the race would become clearer sighted, quicker of hearing and nimbler.

If, again, every tortoise with too thin a shell be conquered and killed, then in time the only tortoises left will be those with the thickest shells. It matters comparatively little whether they have good eyes or ears, and as selection does not take effect here, their senses, supposing no other selective influences to intervene, would eventually become dulled; and, owing to this negative selection, we should have a race of clumsy, apathetic creatures with dull senses. Both gazelles and tortoises, however, are admirably adapted to the peculiar circumstances and conditions in which their species must live.

Similarly, if war were constantly Man's chief occupation, Man would assuredly gradually become altogether adapted for warfare. Fighting being what it is, however, it is not to be expected that a specially brave, vigorous or intelligent race would arise, for, as we shall presently see, the effect of war is to exterminate all who come within these categories: but owing to modern trench warfare it would be a kind of rabbit-like race which would come into existence. The new human being would accordingly *have no refined requirements*, since in holes in the earth it would be impossible to satisfy these; he would have a defective sense of smell, if only in order to enable him to endure the stench of decomposing corpses; but he would be agile and nimble, and have good ears and eyes, so as to be able to run fast in and out of holes at the right moment. He would also need his good eyes for taking aim, although, as experience teaches, in perpetual fighting the lust of slaughter decreases, and desire to take cover increases. Owing to the simplicity and primitive nature of his occupation he would have but *slender intelligence*: he would despise peaceful employments because Man is naturally inclined to think highly of his own occupation: he would care little for comfort, his chief ideas about which would be connected with eating and drinking: and finally he would have a certain *esprit de corps* towards his comrades, but above all he would *hate and fear* his enemies. Such is the half-idiotic, troglodyte race which would result from permanent trench warfare. An approximate analogy is afforded by the mediæval mercenary, whose modern counterpart, however, would be only a very much reduced copy, owing to war having become far more stupefying.

§ 30. THE "TREND" OF SELECTION.—No one either will or can deny what has just been said. But what might be urged is that all men of this martial rabbit-like type, such as is produced by war, would be healthy. Such a statement is very difficult to disprove, because it always is difficult to disprove such assertions as that the exception does not prove the rule, and a little never does any harm. Telling a few lies (necessary lies), committing a little murder, a little conjugal infidelity,<sup>1</sup> and an occasional failure to honour thy father and thy mother<sup>2</sup>—all this may be defended.

Now, if any one has any belief at all in its being possible by our own free will to influence human evolution, then any such inclination to experiment is reprehensible; for our desires, our endeavours and our tendencies will one day be accomplished facts for future generations. What to-day is merely hinted at will be an actual fact to-morrow. It is not so much what we are which really signifies, as the direction in which we are tending; and this is why we must think out our thoughts clearly to the end. What we must ask ourselves, therefore, is this: Do we mean, through our institutions, to try to cause the vital struggle for existence to tend to make Man better or worse fitted for the complex conditions of war?

Before answering this question, we must clearly realise that every war which a nation wages not merely makes it temporarily "a trifle" more warlike, but irrevocably gives it an impetus towards what is warlike in general. Thus whoever inflames or even approves the warlike sense of his own people, must be prepared for that last state which all warlike peoples have lived to see and will live to see. Conversely, every time war is averted, humanity tends to become more inclined towards peace; and whoever endeavours to avert a war is likewise bound to take into consideration a last state which would probably be a state in which men would be unfitted for war.

Any one attempting to reason this out logically and rationally, must make up his mind whether his aim is to train men more and more to be soldiers or to be peaceful citizens, and whether he hopes that the future, perhaps a still distant future, will be one of peace or war. By our present actions our race is being

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Luther.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. the famous order to shoot. [The ex-Kaiser's injunction to his troops that they must obey an order to fire, even upon their own parents, if necessary.—TRANS.]

prepared for its future state ; and I believe that, had we always been aware of the effects of our resolves, we might have realised far more clearly whither our pacific and our martial aspirations were leading us. The belief prevailed, however, that it was possible to take side-leaps. Just as a man could occasionally get drunk without being afraid of becoming a "drunkard," so it was believed that men in general could occasionally wage war without becoming "warriors": and some people even went the length of saying that there must be something wrong with a man who had never got drunk or been to war. Those who argue thus forget that, although an individual certainly can take side-leaps without serious consequences resulting, this is impossible for a race, unless what is called negative selection is to set in, which of course for the individual does not signify.

This can easily be proved. It is an ordinary commonplace that Man owes his position in the world to-day solely to the evolution of his brain. I need do no more than recall what has already been explained in Chapter II. (Part II.), dealing with freedom and natural selection, namely that this condition of evolution already prevailed when the forest-dwelling savage made himself his first tool and thus paved the way for the development of his brain. Since then mankind has continued along the broad way leading to ever-increasing liberation of the brain ; and, in my view, with this path of progress we may rest content. Discontent, moreover, would be useless, for we must continue in it. That is the terrible greatness of Nature—that she knows no turning back. Implacable Necessity will have it that what has once been begun must be gone on with to the end. As in the legend of Orpheus—a legend which in some form or other is common to almost all nations—it would be death to look back. However much the savage greatness of the Renaissance may attract us, however grand the heroic combats before Troy may seem, however keen may be the longing for our primeval home aroused in us by delight in the innocent enjoyments of the savage or even of the animal, all these delights are lost to us irrecoverably. We must learn to take pleasure in a new kind of beauty, for in Nature there is no going back, but only going forward.

Now, Nature, when she advances thus in one direction only,<sup>1</sup> owing to the influence of selection is absolutely prevented from

<sup>1</sup> Every one is free to call it progress or not, as he pleases.

ever making any experiments. This at first sight seems strange, for has not Nature always been experimenting? Did she not at first produce many round and many-cornered animals, until it became evident that the bilateral, symmetrical formation was the best? Did she not make experiments with aquatic, aerial and terrestrial animals, until the terrestrial creatures gained the upper hand? Did she not produce six-footed insects, eight-footed spiders, ten-footed crabs and many-footed millipeds, before she arrived at the practical quadruped? All these and many more instances may certainly be justly cited, but on closer inspection we see that Nature's way was not our way.

For example, if we wish to learn to fly, we get wings, as was always done throughout the Middle Ages, and if they do not answer, then they are laid aside, and a balloon is procured, as was done by Montgolfier in 1783. After Man has tormented himself therewith for a while, and realised that it is only possible to steer such a construction to a limited extent, as Krebs and Renard discovered in 1884, the balloon is also put away in its shed, and the almost forgotten wings are brought out again. This time, however, they are put to quite another purpose, that is, they are spread out as slides, as was done by Le Bries and more particularly by Otto Lilienthal, in 1890. And so matters go on, some trying to derive the necessary force from steam-engines (as, for instance, Sir Hiram Maxim did in 1893), or from accumulators, as did Krebs and Renard in 1884, only to find that they did not answer: while others tried the benzoin motor, as did the brothers Wright in 1903, finding this answer: and ultimately, after many experiments, we shall have a serviceable flying machine.

It is easy to see that the possibility of experimenting in the human sense of the word depends upon the possession of detachable organs. Nature, however, has no detachable organs, and is therefore compelled to experiment in some other way. When the animal world made a conquest of the air, various kinds of preliminary attempts were made. Some creatures, such as squirrels, grew bushy tails, thickly covered with hair, so that they might fall more slowly and be able to take longer jumps: in the case of others the skin between leg and arm became extended so as to form a fulcrum, as in the case of the Sciuoptera: in a third case, that of bats, a skin grew and

became stretched between the fingers, which had become very long; and finally, in a fourth case, that of birds, feathers grew.

Although of these four methods only the last, feathers, has proved satisfactory, yet the other creatures cannot now exchange their imperfect equipment for feathers. They must proceed along the way on which they once set out, whether it lead backwards or forwards. There is no turning back for them, and so it is with everything. Should an animal be especially well adapted to night life, to tropics or to mountains, then from henceforth it must permanently live in the night, in the tropics, or in the mountains, and the only way in which it can possibly attain greater perfection is to become altogether exceptionally well suited to its special surroundings.

Thus is the evolution of organisms restricted, and the evolution of Man would be restricted in just the same way, were not his brain free, so that he can change his organs at will.

§ 31. WISE AND FOOLISH.—It may therefore be considered an established fact that human evolution proper depends upon the evolution of our brain,<sup>1</sup> indeed amounts to the same thing. For Man, consequently, many limitations imposed upon animals do not exist. Man can develop freely in every respect, but—and this is the one limitation—if *mankind is to progress, the development of the brain must be promoted*. Or, in other words, every victory of the wise over the foolish means a step forward, and is a sign of positive selection: every victory of the foolish over the wise is a step backward, a sign of negative selection.

Now, it is a universal fact that wherever force decides, whether it be the brute force of cannon or the no less great force of intolerance, it is a hindrance to wisdom, in other words to positive selection based on intellectual superiority. Every decision by means of force is therefore to be rejected.

<sup>1</sup> It is, of course, hardly necessary to say that our brain cannot be thus developed unless the body be likewise developed at the same time. Of the important facts connected with this, the most essential have been cited in what has been said concerning freedom and natural compulsion. Suffice it here to remark that the brain owes much to the hand, and due note should be taken of the fact that everything which refines the hand is promoting human evolution, whereas everything which coarsens it has, to say the least, nothing to do with evolution. Any one who has really understood these condensed reflections will perceive no inconsistency in the fact that the labourer's callous fist is often superior to the manicured hand of a dandy.

“ Du bist im ruhmgekrönten Morden  
Das erste Land der Welt geworden ! ”<sup>1</sup>

This is the one assertion which can be made, with some show of justification, after a victorious war. No further inference must be drawn, however. There is certainly nothing impossible in those who are foremost in the art of killing likewise attaining distinction in the arts of civilisation : such a combination of qualities is not unthinkable, albeit highly improbable. Probably no one has expounded this with so much detail and logic as Steinmetz.<sup>2</sup> According to him victory is gained not by one virtue alone, but by a number of virtues together. As such he instances fidelity, sense of solidarity, endurance, conscientiousness, education, inventiveness, thrift, wealth, and physical health and strength.<sup>3</sup>

Now, this motley collection of the most heterogeneous conceptions is almost a classical instance of—pardon the word, but it is not too strong—the absurdity of the argument of those victory-enthusiasts who never inquire whether victory promotes virtue, but simply call everything a virtue which conduces to victory. In reality all the qualities just enumerated are by no means virtues in themselves, but may be either virtues or vices according to their motive. It is possible to be faithful to something good or to something bad, just as we may have a fellow-feeling for what is good or for what is bad, and so on. Thus all these virtues of Steinmetz are virtues only so long as we consider war and its effects good. If we cease so to consider them, then they become vices, for, as already said, the conservative fidelity wherewith mankind clings to its ancient instinct for war has now ceased to be a good thing ; and the way small groups of individuals cling together, thereby impeding the solidarity of mankind, ought to be blamed, not praised. It is worthy of note that no mention should be made of virtues such as love and truthfulness.

Each one of these “ virtues ” will be estimated quite differently by each individual according to his party. That a

<sup>1</sup> Georg Herwegh's *Germania*, 1871. (The first country in the world hast thou risen to be—but crowned with blood-stained laurels.)

<sup>2</sup> Dr. S. R. Steinmetz in the *Philosophie des Krieges* (The Philosophy of War). Barth, Leipzig, 1907.

<sup>3</sup> In the ensuing pages I shall refer several times more in detail to the question whether there is any such connection between the virtues of peace and those of war. Cf. in particular chaps. iv. and v., and also §§ 119-122.



victory is due to fidelity or conscientiousness will never be admitted by the vanquished. Why, even now, whenever the German war reports are forced to admit some success of the enemy, they attribute it to asphyxiating bombs or some other act of treachery and unscrupulousness.

That thrift should promote victory might also seem surprising, as this time victory is supposed mainly to depend upon who can squander most money in shells. Steinmetz, however, is not referring at all to thrift in war-time, but to thrift in peace-time, and therein most people will readily agree with him. It is hard to see, however, why it should be a virtue to spend little on education, this being the only respect in which a martial state can economise. This particular philosopher, moreover, likewise differs from his fellows in considering wealth also a virtue! War and capitalism—the modern virtues! Herr Steinmetz is at any rate logical.<sup>1</sup>

Strangely enough, Herr Steinmetz makes no mention of courage, which in fact is now no longer a warlike virtue. The courageous, energetic lieutenants did harm rather than good in the early days of the war, and matters did not mend until the reserve lieutenants gained control. An indirect confirmation of the worthlessness of courage is afforded also by those who, in the excess of their enthusiasm, say that nowadays there are no longer any privileged heroes, but that every one is a hero. Any one acquainted with human nature and knowing how rare is real bravery will also know what this means. Just as the individual leader is swallowed up in the General Staff organisation, so the individual hero is swallowed up in the trenches. There was a time when courage was a warlike virtue.

If there be still a martial virtue, then it is a gift for organisation. Railways must work and movements of troops proceed without a hitch; shells must be provided and likewise food for hundreds and thousands of men. No one is readier than I am to admit how well all this mechanism works, especially in Germany, and to marvel thereat. In the capacity to prepare for and carry out any action with this perfection there is something

<sup>1</sup> Concerning education and inventiveness, health and strength, and also the feeling of solidarity, I shall have more to say hereafter. Regarding education cf. §§ 108-111 on patriotism and civilisation; §§ 119-122 on the contrast between civilisation and jingoism; and §§ 134-138 on German humanity and German militarism. Concerning inventiveness cf. §§ 68-70 about the tendency of war always to be behind the times. Concerning health cf. §§ 35-39 on "The Alleged Tonic Effects of War."

which fills us with the most joyful confidence. We have already reached the stage of being able to organise men by the million. But here again a gift for organisation in itself is not a virtue, but merely appears to be one, and only becomes one because of the motives for which a man organises.

This war has shown that we can organise. We organised for war and for the destruction of others. This may please those who consider there is virtue in destruction, but those who see virtue in construction will insist on this proved gift for organisation being used for constructive purposes. Should the war ultimately succeed in bringing this about, as I believe it will, and as I would do everything in my power to ensure its doing, then and only then would this last European war mean the painful liquidation of a bygone period and the promise-laden beginning of a new future.

We always come back to the same point. Those who begin by assuming that war and warlike qualities are good will think that war breeds qualities which are warlike and therefore in their opinion good : but those who dispassionately inquire what are virtue and happiness and what is Man's purpose here below, and then, having once answered these questions, proceed to ask whether one of them is promoted by war, must unhésitatingly admit that war, particularly war under modern conditions, no longer promotes any positive virtue which has anything whatever to do with civilisation.

I might still be able to imagine a civilised fighting-man of Frederick the Great's or Napoleon's time, even so late as 1870, but not now, for the extreme subdivision of labour in all departments of human activity has gradually caused civilisation and the art of war to adopt such absolutely dissimilar forms that any connection between the two seems no longer possible.

But what is both singular and disgraceful is that formerly, when this might perhaps still have been admissible, no civilised human being even thought of going to fight, and that only now, when the gulf between war and civilisation has widened to the uttermost, has universal service been introduced, which needlessly exposes the most highly differentiated human beings to the same risks as mercenaries naturally predestined for war's handiwork. This is like attempting to construct a human skeleton out of brain-cells. There could be but one result : the brain-cells would be completely crushed, and the bone-cells

would alone remain. Such is the kind of selection which will be made by modern warfare. Men of brain perish, men of bone remain, which is also a form of selection, but not one tending towards the kind of evolution which promotes the development of the brain, quite apart from any personal predilection, but from general considerations of humanity.

In principle, therefore, it may be said that, wherever force and intolerance decide, there is no positive selection tending to promote human evolution, for here not the wise man but the strong man has the upper hand. But where justice prevails, there the wise man (not the strong man) rules; talent and not brute force; and consequently positive selection takes place, tending towards human evolution.

Now we understand what every human being means more or less clearly by an "inborn, natural, human right." Even an action which runs counter to the letter of the law seems to us nevertheless justified if "it forwards the general deed of man,"<sup>1</sup> for right is only right if it exercises positive selection, assists talent and furthers civilisation.

§ 32. THE EFFECT OF WAR ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTELLIGENCE.—Now, it is true that in general beasts of prey are considered more intelligent than beasts preyed upon. Even the people have got into the way of thinking it a greater compliment to any one's intelligence to call him a dog or a cat than a sheep or an ox. This also explains why lions, leopards, eagles, griffins and other creatures able to put up a fight ranked above the rest and were chosen for coats of arms.<sup>2</sup> The elephant of Siam, the llama of Peru and the peacock of Burma are foreign exceptions. In general, however, this popular belief that predatory creatures

<sup>1</sup> Robert Browning: *By the Fireside*. [This the author translates by "wenn sie die allgemeine Idee der Menschheit fördert," doubtless correctly.—TRANS.]

<sup>2</sup> An examination of European coats of arms, national and provincial, gives the following approximate result: Eagles occur thirty times; bulls five; leopards, griffins and horses each three times. Thus animals have been selected about seventy times obviously on account of their nature appearing to be martial or fitted for war. True, the marten of Slavonia, the sable of Siberia, and the raven of Galicia are also predatory creatures, but were evidently chosen for other and purely local reasons. Similarly, the Icelandic stockfish, the he-goat of the Faroe Islands, the Istrian goat, and the Schaffhausen ram must not lead us to make any inferences as to peaceful tendencies, for here again local causes determined their choice. These heraldic creatures must be the only instances of "peaceful coats of arms" which Europe can show, so far as animals are concerned. On the other hand, in America and Asia peaceful animals occur fairly frequently, although, it is true, generally because of their representing some product of the country concerned.

are more intelligent is correct. The explanation is that prowling after prey requires more intelligence than running away. Now, although predatory habits are essentially different from Man's martial ways, yet it might be thought that outwardly similar habits of life might produce similar effects.

This, however, is not the case, for we find exceptions even among animals. The very cleverest animals, monkeys and elephants, are not predatory. How is this? So long as the procuring of food is a creature's sole occupation, a beast of prey must of course be more intelligent, it being more difficult and requiring more attention and dexterity to track down a mobile animal than to eat a motionless plant, which in turn demands more intelligence than the plant needs, since it finds its means of sustenance in earth, air and water, and everywhere, without ever needing to look for it.

Thus we note here three stages. Firstly, the plant, which requires and has so little intelligence that this is not even perceptible. Secondly, the vegetable feeder, and thirdly, the beast of prey. This scale, however, applies only so long as the sole concern of an organism is eating, in other words, its own self. But directly it acquires interests in other things and particularly in other creatures, it can educate itself by means of these very interests, and a predatory creature ceases to be necessarily any more intelligent than its prey.

These new and no longer purely selfish interests make even higher demands on a creature's intelligence than the old predatory instincts. For instance, when the cock no longer himself eats up everything he finds, but also sees that the hens get enough, since they have more need of food than he as they have to produce the eggs, this is a social instinct. The bird or animal itself need not be aware of the possession of such an instinct, but in order to transmute it into action it must possess certain higher intellectual qualities. •Above all, the individual must be able to express what he wants. That is, he must have some sort of means of communication (speech), and he must respect the wishes of others, and therefore he must know in what they consist. *Speech, understanding, and capacity for learning* are now the factors which are gradually being more and more developed. They it is which form intellect, and in comparison with them the distinction between predatory and preyed-upon sinks into insignificance. Hence it is that after a certain period,

the *social animals*, such as monkeys, beavers, elephants, wolves, etc., no matter whether they hunt or are hunted, attain a higher degree of intelligence than predatory animals did formerly; and the degree of this intelligence is in the main proportioned to the extent to which they are associated together.<sup>1</sup>

Monkeys, in particular, have an extraordinary faculty for learning and imitation; they understand speech well, and have even an obviously not fully developed language of their own, to investigate which attempts, not wholly unsuccessful, have been made of recent years.

Whether social animals are predatory or preyed upon has nothing whatever to do with their intelligence. On the contrary, the influence of predatory instincts tends rather to retard the development of social instincts, and consequently of the intelligence. Predatory instincts, therefore, after a certain stage, must have injurious effects, because the slight increase of intelligence due to them can no longer compensate for the inevitable disadvantages resulting from any obstruction of social progress.

As regards mankind, all this is beyond possibility of doubt. Observations made upon Malays and Indians have proved that predatory and hunting tribes have not even keener senses (better eyes, ears and noses, etc.), as was long believed; while they are assuredly not more intelligent. In fact, civilisation has always been diffused by the settled, non-warlike peoples.

Of all the nations known to us the Greeks were the civilised nation *par excellence*; and although, when necessity arose, that is when their civilisation was menaced, they fought most valiantly, nevertheless they were not at all warlike, at any rate much less so than the nations with whom they fought and whom they also conquered—an important point. For that matter, peaceful nations, being more intelligent, have frequently overcome warlike nations.

Of the Greeks themselves, the Spartans, and later on the Macedonians, were the most warlike, but at the same time the least highly civilised. Conversely, the Romans were a nation of warriors, but they did little for civilisation. We can observe a similar state of things everywhere, and there is probably hardly a better instance of it than the German nation. In

<sup>1</sup> Concerning the apparent exception in the case of the higher monkeys, cf. § 11, p. 22.

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peaceful victory, and even if nothing seemed to stand in the way of their extermination by force—even then I would shrink from resort to force, and I am convinced that the majority of mankind agree with me.

Every one, however, must compound with his own conscience, and should any one be anxious to proceed to victory by way of force I will go a step further to please him. I feel that all Europeans belong to the same race, and I am proud of this ; but others certainly feel this less keenly than I do, and they let their wholesome race-instinct run to waste in all manner of fantastic and useless notions, such as the supposed existence of a Teutonic race.<sup>1</sup>

But there are those who believe in the Teutons, Germans, or Prussians having a right to predominate. I will not here discuss the justification for such ideas, but those who would fain lead such small aggregates of human beings to victory must at any rate ask themselves whether they are *able*, and if able, also *willing* to fight out this fight in the only way in which it can answer its purpose.

As for Teutonism, the question is as follows : Take the hundred million Germans or, properly speaking, the twenty million more or less pure Teutons living in various parts of Europe, most of whom will have nothing whatever to do with the conception of Teutonism. Do they believe that they *can* with any prospect of success embark upon a struggle against forces fifteen to one hundred times more numerous, and do they really mean to destroy these ? If they have made up their minds to this, then let them make the attempt, and they will be fighting for an idea, and for an object which is at least conceivable.

We are therefore faced with the following alternative : we must either resolve to live in peace with the French, English, and all the rest, or we must wage a war of extermination upon them, a war whose purpose it is not to leave one of them alive.

Whoever, therefore, decides for war is at any rate no fool, and has logic on his side. Nevertheless, I hope and believe that even those who most delight in war will incline towards peace when once they realise what is the inevitable alternative. But this senseless playing at war which is now devastating Europe must be the last of its kind.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. §§ 99-105, about race patriotism.

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In the ensuing twenty years, therefore, it is possible that the fate of the world will be decided once and for all, and the responsibility for this decision rests with the five hundred millions of Europeans. The Mongolians need do nothing but wait, for time and space are on their side.

At a time when the fate of so many men is hanging in the balance, Europeans may, perhaps must, be asked whether on careful consideration they mean to declare all coloured races barbarians, and then begin a struggle for existence, in other words a war of extermination (and not a preposterous war for power), against everything non-European. When once so terrible a conception as that of such a war is grasped, then, if anything save senseless cruelty is to be the result, it also must be thought out to the end, and there would have to be a war *sans trêve et sans relâche*.

We must not spare even the babe in its mother's womb, and must tolerate no bastards. Such a war would be ghastly, but there would be some object in it. It is useless to talk of the justice of a war, but in a sense this ghastliest of wars is the justest because at any rate "it serves its own particular purpose."

To me it seems at least conceivable that some such war might succeed, although I certainly do not believe this. History, indeed, proves over and over again that the despair of nations fighting for their lives gives rise to strength which enables them to triumph over all technical expedients. Here, again, any attempt to interfere with the justice of history by such brutal methods might only too easily hasten the downfall of Europe. European nations, as I think, would do better to concentrate all their economic, technical and scientific resources on increasing their internal vital energy, that is on promoting race hygiene in every respect, and thus endeavour to become the peaceful even superiors of the Mongols.

It opens up vistas of victories not purchased with blood, victories which I am profoundly convinced are within the bounds of possibility. This inextinguishable hope is due to my proud European racial instinct. I cannot and I refuse to admit that the Mongols have, in the long run, greater vitality than I. I trust that the majority of Europeans think as I do, and that never shall we show the Asiatics such a sign of weakness as to draw the sword against them. Even if the European nations were faint-hearted, even if they were doubtful of ultimate

and this "regiment of cripples" which, in the open competition of peace, could hardly hold their own against their more capable competitors, are now getting the best posts, and are highly paid. The effect of this cannot be over-estimated. It may be assumed that in such a never-ending war as this fully twenty-five per cent. of the healthy half of the population,<sup>1</sup> that is about two millions, will either die or be seriously incapacitated cripples. As the latter, about one million, must now be classed with the unfit, these alone will number about thirty per cent. more than the fit.

But what is perhaps still worse is that the unfit stay-at-home half of the population should be reaping exceptionally great and permanent benefits from the war. The stay-at-home lawyer or doctor is, of course, not necessarily inferior, but even should he be so he naturally gets the practice of his abler competitor who has had to go, just as the stay-at-home commercial man gets the customers of his perhaps biologically superior competitor at the front. Thus the thoroughly healthy section of the population, even supposing they come back from the war with unbroken bones, are often injured, perhaps irreparably, in their business or profession. True, they continue to live, but as far as the general public is concerned they might as well be dead, since their former fields of labour and activity are no longer open to them. Moreover, they will now be compelled to provide for the support of the war cripples, war orphans and war widows. It is estimated that we shall have to spend 1,500,000,000 marks (£75,000,000) annually for this, to which must be added no less a sum for interest on war loans. Consequently the healthy worker in future will have to give up about 200 marks (£10) of his income annually to the Government for this purpose.<sup>2</sup> The biological injury thus inflicted upon the population in general cannot be expressed in figures; but one thing must never be forgotten, and that is that all this "obstructed intelligence" can hardly fail to breed anything but discontent, which, again, can scarcely be for the good of the community in general.

And again, even among soldiers Death the Reaper cannot reap quite as he chooses, for naturally even at the front the brave, capable fellows are given harder and therefore more dangerous

<sup>1</sup> i.e. of Germany.—TRANS. (These words were written in 1915.)

<sup>2</sup> We would again remind the reader that this is only a 1915 estimate.—TRANS.



tasks, and consequently are more decimated. There was a time when their greater ability might have availed to protect them somewhat against dangers, but hardly nowadays, for bullets are no respecters of persons. In short, were the war to last long enough, it must infallibly result in belligerent peoples consisting solely of inferior elements, with the possible exception of a handful of commanders of high rank, who are usually less exposed to the dangers of war than other men.<sup>1</sup>

Yet another point. It is the stay-at-homes, the idiotic and sickly indigenous race which is producing the generation to come, and this in particular is almost universally the case with a nation whose soldiers are in the enemy's country, and who therefore appear predestined to conquer; whereas in the case of a nation which has the enemy within its borders a good many at any rate owe their being to the fittest elements, those capable of "taking the field."<sup>2</sup>

§ 34. WHAT A WAR OF EXTERMINATION MEANS.—Thus to-day the original conception of war has become completely reversed, simply because there is no longer anything natural about war: it is now merely a romantic reminiscence. Now, it might be and has been said that the benefits of war come afterwards. It might be thought, however, that any one thus contemplating the remote effects of war ought seriously to reflect upon its inevitable results. That is, he ought to think out his ideas to their logical conclusion, which seems easy but is often very difficult.

The idea of war as a factor likely to favour the selection of the fittest and thus promote human evolution is simple enough. War is here looked upon as representing that relentless or rather disinterested justice which allows the fit to survive and destroys the unfit. Those who consider this right should act accordingly, and proceed to draw up rules accordingly. They ought to adopt the usages of war of which we read in ancient history, rules by which old men were killed and also unborn babes; but not the seemingly humane (!) rules of modern times, rules which make war a farce in the sense in which a natural scientist uses the word—that is to say, cause it to promote negative selection, and thus convert it into a means of deterioration.

<sup>1</sup> Thus, for instance, despite the enormous losses of this war, the numerous royal families have lost very few indeed of their members.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. the statistics in § 38.

The gulf which apparently separates the selfish human being of to-day from the humane promoter of civilisation is merely apparent; and here I would recall what I have already said about struggle between animals and struggle between man and man. Both are justifiable in themselves, and both *can* be carried on logically. Difficulties do not arise until we begin to imagine that it is allowable to carry on an animal struggle against human beings and by human methods. This is senseless and therefore criminal; for war as waged at present can only be considered a justifiable form of struggle for existence if the nations against whom we are waging war are not looked upon as human beings, at any rate not as human beings on a level with ourselves, that is, if it is desired to carry on a war of extermination against barbarians so as to enable true humanity to find room upon and spread over the earth. No European will feel that he is justified in considering another European as a barbarian. The utmost which might be asked is whether we are not entitled to consider ourselves a superior race in comparison with certain undeveloped races, such as the Andamans or Tierra del Fuegians. What will undoubtedly occur is that these peoples will gradually be exterminated by the white race; but it has long been clear that it would be extremely foolish to make war upon them. They die out of themselves wherever they come in contact with whites, bloodless warfare being always more effectual than bloody.

There is only *one* race for which this question of racial superiority might be profoundly important—the Mongolians. I do not know who are the superior—the Mongolians or ourselves—but I can quite understand our looking on the Mongolian race as enemies, and that, for instance, the highest type of European would not easily be induced to have a child by a Mongolian woman, at any rate not to own it. I can therefore also fully understand that we or the Mongolians might say, "Only one of us two races can rule over the world, and we want that race to be ours."

In this case the biologically *weaker* race, that is, the one which may rest assured that in ordinary course it would fall a victim to natural selection, might *perhaps* be justified in saying, "As there is no chance of our getting the upper hand by natural and lawful means, we will try to take by force what Nature withholds from us." This shows very plainly that for the really

strong war is superfluous ; and, as obviously it is generally folly for the weak, it is self-evident that, save in the rarest instances, there can be no object whatever in it.

Now, it is possible that one such rare instance may be afforded by the Mongolians, for, unlike all the other coloured races, they seem to be in certain respects fitter than Europeans ; although it is impossible to know exactly how they will be affected when once they are drawn into the vortex of modern civilisation. Meantime, however, the Sons of Heaven have the enormous advantage of being able to work equally well under all heavens, whether in the icy wastes of the tundras or under the burning sun of Sumatra. Apparently this is a special Mongolian peculiarity, for even primitive Teutonic peoples simply melted away under that southern sun to which their impulse led them, and negro races get consumption if transferred to colder climates.

If all this be really the case, then the greater part of the habitable world belongs to the Mongols and likewise the overlordship thereof ; for it seems out of the question, seeing how much going to and fro there already is and how much more there is certain to be in the near future, that two races should live side by side and yet apart. They will mix, and one will prevail over the other.

But perhaps even the humanest of us all would not desire this, and therefore I can imagine our pointing with pardonable pride to our civilisation, and saying that we are ready to take up arms in defence of it. You Mongols may be better than we are, we would say, but you are different. We do not want to know anything about your civilisation, even supposing it to be superior ; we mean to keep our own. From this point of view I can imagine a war, but then it must be really a relentless, merciless war.

There are now in the world five hundred millions of us Europeans or white men originally from Europe, and one thousand millions of various coloured races. I believe we have even now the technical means at our disposal for exterminating these one thousand millions in the course of the next twenty years. After twenty years, however, we shall no longer be in position to do this—as soon, that is, as C. whole population, constructs her own Dreadnoughts, manufactures her own cannon and shells, as Japan is a.

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Women, they were either killed or violated, and thus a "breed of conquerors" arose. This particular kind of fighting, caused by or at any rate ending in a rape of women, was even to some extent a biological necessity, in order to avoid the mischievous consequences of inbreeding to which human beings dwelling in small tribes must otherwise have been exposed.

In point of fact the result of these barbarous but thoroughly appropriate methods of warfare was to rule the physically inferior out of count; and even if it might be questioned whether this form of selection answered well or not, and whether other methods would not have worked better, at all events war did not then mean negative selection. Now, however, the selection has become negative, and modern laws of war most cleverly prevent war from being of any biological value whatever. The effect of universal service in particular is to injure just the very fittest.

In Germany there live some thirty-three million men, half of whom are too young or too old to take the field. Of the other sixteen million half again are rejected because of some physical or mental inferiority. There remain, therefore, about eight million who are vigorous, healthy and intelligent enough to be allowed to take the field. Children and old men are protected by Government, but besides them the blind, deaf and dumb, idiots, hunchbacks, scrofulous and impotent persons, imbeciles, paralytics, epileptics, dwarfs and abortions—all this human riff-raff and dross need have no anxiety, for no bullets will come hissing against them, and they can stay at home and dress their ulcers while the brave, strong young men are rotting on the battle-field.<sup>1</sup>

The morally inferior are also kept alive, to begin with, all convicts, as a matter of principle, and also all cowards, for in the long run no surgeon-major, however energetic, can do anything to prevent shirking, so systematically is it carried out, and to such a pitch of refinement is it brought. If shirkers are called up at all, they are sent where there is no danger, as sappers, clerks, or ambulance men behind the front, or else they hang about the military hospitals; but most of them are rejected for good and all.

For them, therefore, war amounts to insuring their lives;

<sup>1</sup> "Ist der Krieg ein wissenschaftliches Gesetz?" (Is War a Scientific Law?), by Charles Richet, in the *Monistisches Jahrhundert* for 1912, vol. vi. No. ii.

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Tacitus' time it was warlike and barbaric, but gradually alarmed by too many wars, it became peaceful, and at the same time its civilisation began to arouse the admiration of the world. But again a reaction set in, and, not content with the blessings of peace, we lusted after war and national greatness. Simultaneously, the finest flower of our national civilisation began to droop. After all, however much Moltke and Bernhardi, Röntgen and Emil Fischer, Gerhart Hauptmann and Avenarius may be worth, Hardenberg and Stein, Helmholtz and Liebig, Goethe and Kant were worth more, or at all events they were *different*—in order to avoid any disparaging opinions which may be merely personal.<sup>1</sup>

These men had a freedom and delicacy of thought all their own. Their ideas were the ideas of genius; and they left their impress upon the whole world. All our industrious workers—they might almost be called technicians—of to-day cannot attain thereto.

§ 33. THE FUTILITY OF WARS TO-DAY.—In olden times there may have been some truth in the saying that war meant the survival of the fittest. Firstly, from natural causes the individual tribes, cities or states were very much the same size, for a country's sovereign rights extended as means of communication developed, and these were probably everywhere much about the same. If two of these tribes, cities, or states had a warlike encounter, the probability, therefore, from the outset was that quality, not quantity or numbers, would decide matters, that is, that the fitter of the two would win. Now, the conqueror would kill out all the kinsmen of the conquered, that is, be it noted, not merely the select few sent to fight but the rest who had stayed at home—kill them out to the last man or else lead them away into captivity. As for the enemies'

<sup>1</sup> This contrast, however, is not in any way intended to be disparaging. I have said elsewhere how high an opinion I have of, for instance, Emil Fischer. Bismarck is intentionally omitted, but the very fact of many persons considering this great material politician as absolutely the modern German ideal of a man is perhaps the strongest confirmation of the truth of what I have said.

[Dr. Nicolai doubtless here means the German philosopher Avenarius, who died in 1896, and not the contemporary poet and writer on art. Hardenberg is of course Karl August Fürst von Hardenberg (1750-1822), the Prussian statesman, who succeeded Stein as Chancellor of State, continuing his policy of internal reforms. He did a great deal for Prussia by abolishing trade privileges, sweeping away serfdom, and developing education. Heinrich Friedrich Karl, Baron von Stein (1757-1831), was also a strongly liberalising Prussian statesman.—

TRANS.]

## II. THE ALLEGED TONIC EFFECTS OF WAR

§ 35. THE HARDENING AND ENERVATING EFFECTS OF WAR AND PEACE.—It has actually been said that war directly tends to perfect mankind! The notion that peace enervates men and war hardens them seems to be taken as much for granted by most persons as the view that becoming enervated is a crime against civilisation and becoming hardened the contrary. Both opinions are absolutely unproven commonplaces.

That these "hardening virtues" must not be carried too far even the Germans have just realised; for although we used to envy the English their physical fitness, our hatred has taught us that to resort to all manner of strengthening devices is mere "disgusting pride of muscle." That some good can be learned even from hatred is likewise obvious, for after what has already been said about selection based on intellectual qualities it is not too much to say that we should not make any one-sided attempts to strengthen the body at the cost of the mind. British sports, which are popular throughout the world, may be suited to the whole world (which matters little to us); but their imitation in Germany was injurious to German genius.

It is also idle to discuss, as is so often done, whether we ought to strive to attain to the *Kalokagathie* of the ancient Greeks—the union of beauty and goodness. Personally I can scarcely imagine anything finer, attached as I am to the times and people of ancient Hellas. But I realise that the finest flowers of German intellect did not grow in the soil of *Kalokagathie*. There is a certain delicacy of German thought perhaps incompatible with the iron muscles of a prize-fighter. I am not alluding to the mystics and romantics, nor even to Kant and Schiller, for I know that I shall be told in reply that the days are over when we had need of such dreamers: I am alluding to the most vigorous men of the nineteenth century who have rendered Germany great practical service, which is the one thing which seems to matter now. Such men, for instance, as Siemens, Krupp, Helmholtz, Albe, Ballin and Dernburg certainly abided by the old Latin precept *mens sana in corpore sano*, but it is hard to picture them as prize-fighters or even as exceptionally physically "fit."

Muscular training, therefore, should not be carried too

far, and for this reason many physical exercises have been condemned in Germany. English boxing, like Spanish bullfighting, is forbidden in Germany owing to its alleged brutalising tendencies; and strong arguments have been urged against football and baseball, on the ground that both frequently cause bloodshed. Nevertheless there is apparently no objection to bloodshed in war, the moral element in which is supposed to prevent the killing of men from having those brutalising effects which otherwise appear, even if it be merely animals which are killed.<sup>1</sup> That this is not really the case is proved by the increase of crimes of violence observable after wars, even after the Franco-Prussian War. While wars are actually going on, there is of course a decrease of absolute figures, because most of those forming the criminal classes are at the front. On the other hand, even in this war an alarming increase of youthful offenders who have remained at home is noticeable. Although, owing to scarcity of magistrates and other causes, all comparatively venial offences are as much as possible treated as such and left unpunished, nevertheless the number of juvenile offenders in Berlin; for instance, has increased more than half—which clearly proves how out of hand young people get in war.<sup>2</sup>

But even if this moral deterioration were considered as of no importance, is it in any sense true that war is even capable of physically invigorating a nation? For a long time past the Swiss and the English have waged no wars, and yet they have remained vigorous and warlike.<sup>3</sup> On the other hand, the Turks and the French have always been considered the most warlike nations in Europe, and yet both nations are described as degenerate. The "Sick Man of the Bosphorus" used to be as proverbial as the "degenerate Frenchman." This general opinion is not affected because many persons to-day regard Turkey with other eyes on account of her being their ally, and also because, after the experiences of the Marne and the Yser, they are no longer inclined to call the French degenerate.

A famous example, however, to be found in all school-books,

<sup>1</sup> An alarming instance of moral confusion is the formation of Animals' Protection Societies for the Front.

<sup>2</sup> F. von Liszt, in a lecture about juvenile offenders in war, delivered in January, 1916, asserted that in 1913 1109 young persons of the male sex were charged and punished: in 1915, however, 1790. This estimate was based on the first three Quarterly Reports of the Berlin Head Office for the Protection of Young Persons.

<sup>3</sup> Colonial wars, even the Boer War and the Crimean War, scarcely affected the mass of the British people.

is the "Winter in Capua." Since Livy<sup>1</sup> stated that in such a "centre of debauchery" as Capua Hannibal's armies became degenerate, every one has repeated this. What? This army, which had fought for years in Spain, which could claim to have performed the incomparably difficult feat of crossing the ice-and-snow-covered Little St. Bernard (a feat which caused the death of one-third of the men): this army which won the great victories of Ticino, of the Trebia, and Lake Trasimeno, and in the succeeding years the battle of Cannæ, perhaps the most glorious in the history of the world: this army is said to have become so much degenerated by a single winter in Capua that Marcellus was able to cut it to pieces at Nola! Then Jean Paul must have been right in saying that "steeling warriors by war lasts no longer than starching linen."

If this be really true, if half a year of peace suffice to deprive a tried and experienced army of all its strength, and if, therefore, in order to be proof against such degeneration, we must go to war at least twice a year, it would seem too high a price to pay. Most of us would rather do without being hardened than have to live in a perpetual state of warfare.

§ 36. WAR WEARINESS.—Perhaps, however, it was not Capua at all, but the preceding war which unfitted Hannibal's army for war. It is an actual fact, known to all military writers, that after a certain period of warfare soldiers attain their maximum of military efficiency, a period estimated by the various authors at about six to twelve months. The reason generally alleged for this is that the soldier inured to battle gradually becomes undisciplined owing to the freedom of life at the front and in camp; that he acquires certain tricks<sup>2</sup> which help him to guard against danger, and that therefore he cannot be ordered to advance regardless of everything, in the same way as the youthful new-comer who presses forward in defiance of death. Then there is that negative selection which in time deprives an army of all its bravest men. The famous Marshal von der Goltz<sup>3</sup> writes, in reference to this subject:

"It is natural that death should reap his richest harvest from among the best men, for the bravest go on in front, and they

<sup>1</sup> Livy: *Historiæ*, Bk. XXIII. chap. xviii. (c. A.D. 20).

<sup>2</sup> In English in the original.—TRANS.

<sup>3</sup> C. von der Goltz: *Léon Gambetta und seine Armeen*, 1877. Berlin, F. Schneider & Co. At the time Goltz was reprimanded because of this now universally admired book, and punished by being sent to Gera.



are the first to fall victims to the hail of bullets. No one will hesitate to pay this tribute to the dead or to admit that the worth of an army decreases with every battle fought."

Thus, in the opinion of military men qualified to judge, does war itself help to cause armies gradually to degenerate.

§ 37. THE INJURY DONE TO THE BRAIN BY WAR.—But there is yet another fact, perhaps the most important of all. The Russo-Japanese War it was which first called our attention to the absolutely unprecedented extent to which the nervous system is shattered by modern warfare, even more than by former wars. This was first noticed not by a military nor by a medical man, but by the young Russian author Andreieff,<sup>1</sup> whose book, *Das rote Lachen* (Red Laughter), gives a distressing description of how men are broken down by war, and made incapable of enduring the manifold horrors of another campaign.

Andreieff believes that the "red laughter" which then resounded over Russia's vast plains was equivalent to the shattering of Russia's strength. He was admitted to be right, but people consoled themselves by saying that this nervous collapse was something peculiar to the slackness of the Slav character. Shortly after the outbreak of war, indeed, Bonhoeffer, the German mental specialist, delivered an address repudiating the expression "war mentality," which used to be so frequently heard, although he merely means that there is no difference between the injurious mental effects of war and other mental infirmities caused by physical and mental exertion and impressions.

But as war is for most persons the greatest physical and emotional experience of their lives, it is not to be wondered at that dormant tendencies to disease should be aroused and strengthened during war more than at other times.

At all events no one who has frequent opportunity of observing officers or men returning from the front can have failed to observe the red laughter of war. Very often a man's experiences on campaign have caused him to go mad, and even when matters did not reach this pitch nevertheless soldiers were ill: they turned over in bed unable to sleep, and if they did fall asleep they were tormented by bad dreams. They lived through the battle over and over again, and screamed aloud, sometimes

<sup>1</sup> L. Andreieff: *Das rote Lachen*, 1905. Translated into German by Scholz, Berlin.

in terror, sometimes in anger, sometimes even in a tone of command. Placid men were incredibly irritable, so that their wives were unable to live with them on the same happy terms as before. Strong men wept at the least trifle, being themselves aware that they had lost all self-control; and deep down in the hearts of all was dread of the horrors of battle, although training and custom prevented them for the most part from admitting this.

The remarkable thing is that these serious mental and other derangements almost without exception did not show themselves until the men had returned from the front, and were exposed to the contrast of their own peaceful homes. To such a pass did matters come, that something had to be done; and the military authorities, seeing how difficult it was to induce men, especially wounded men, to return to the front, once they had been home again, in many cases curtailed soldiers' leave to the utmost possible extent.

Now, these observations are based on absolute facts, and they suggest that it was not Capua which ruined Hannibal's army, but the hard fighting that army had previously gone through, and that the rest at Capua was only the cause which let loose so much evil, just as happens when a man goes home to rest.


Of course a man on campaign must learn to ride and march, and to defy inclement weather and the discomforts of bad quarters, and it is certainly true that in a sense this tends to harden him physically. But it is no less true that Man does not win victories with his legs and arms, but with his brain, and there is no doubt that war is injurious to the brain.

For the most important part of Man, therefore, war is in no sense a tonic or fortifying medicine, but on the contrary has a lowering effect.

§ 38. THE INFLUENCE OF WAR ON THE BIRTH RATE.—Now, as after a few wars a slight increase in the birth rate was noticed, it was thought that war must have a good effect on national vitality. Such increase, however, is always slight, and nothing like enough to compensate for the preceding decrease of the birth rate. This appears very plainly from the diagram on page 94 (Fig. 1), showing the birth-rate curve during the years 1868-1872, and also from Fig. 2 on page 96, showing the birth-rate curve from 1830 to 1910.

The birth rate of a nation is far from depending merely upon its biological standing, for in reality every nation is capable of producing an incomparably larger number of children than is ever actually the case. The reasons for this are in general prudential: people feel instinctively that there are no adequate means of supporting more children.

Now, war makes room, first because a certain number of men



The figures are given in thousands per month, and are taken from the Prussian Annual Statistical Reports. In order to make the diagram clearer, the figures are calculated for months of equal length, that is, the figures for the months of April, June, September and November are raised by  $\frac{1}{4} = 1.033$ , those for February, 1869, 1870 and 1871, by  $\frac{1}{4} = 1.10$ , and those for February, 1868 and 1872, by  $\frac{1}{4} = 1.07$ .

FIG. 1.

die, and next because in war-time fewer children are always born. The preceding diagram (Fig. 1) plainly shows that nine months after the outbreak of war the birth rate begins to fall quite suddenly, and that it remains low till about nine months after the conclusion of peace. Now, the curve of the birth rate which might have been expected had there been no war (see the dotted line) is fairly accurately known from the three preceding years (1868-1870). Consequently it is easy to see that

the dotted part shows the numbers of those who ought to have been born but were not—more than 100,000 children. Add 100,000 deaths directly caused by the war, and we have a decrease of population of altogether nearly one-quarter of a million, a deficit which cannot be made up in anything like the time in which it arose.

Further consideration leads to the discovery of other important effects of war on the birth rate. It is clear that even in the first nine months of the Franco-Prussian War (1871) relatively too few children were born. There may be various causes for this, among them commercial depression owing to acute danger of war, an increase in the number of premature births owing to the excitement of the first months of the war, and increase in the number of artificially-induced miscarriages owing to anxiety and uncertainty. This, although not a direct result of war, is nevertheless a direct result of preparations for war.

What is particularly remarkable, however, is that in November, 1871, the birth rate should comparatively suddenly have risen again to its former level; that is, even in April, 1871, very nearly the normal number of children were engendered. But then only the garrison troops which had remained in Germany had been demobilised, while the whole of the great army on active service was still kept in France. Therefore these comparatively unfit human beings actually begot more children than they would have done in normal times—in fact, nearly as many as are indicated by the striped portion of the diagram, that is about 60,000 children. This also strongly bears out my contentions, first that the birth rate does not depend upon biological fitness, and secondly that one consequence of war is that a larger percentage of children have unfit men as their fathers, and that the race thus becomes deteriorated.

What momentous consequences will be those of such a long war as that of 1914-1918, which, moreover, has been carried on under conditions of universal service, it is difficult to forecast; but some idea may be formed when it is reflected that in 1870 the birth rate only fell from forty to thirty-five; that is, by about twelve per cent., but has already fallen by about half.

In the first two years of war about two million too few children will have been born—and between one and two million besides who are below par rather than normal. These

four millions, together with the two millions directly attributable to the war, are in themselves enough to decimate the German people.

It is therefore absurd to speak of war having a good effect upon a nation's procreateness. On the contrary, the curve (see Fig. 2) showing the number per thousand of children born in Prussia from 1830 to 1910 clearly indicates that the influence of war is nothing more nor less than extremely unfavourable.




FIG. 2.—Number of births per thousand in Prussia during the years 1830-1910.

Between 1830 and 1870 the birth rate slowly rose. Then comes the slight decrease owing to the war of 1866 and the heavy falling off owing to the war of 1870, followed by a clearly perceptible but very transitory compensatory increase. This increase, as can easily be calculated, is nothing like sufficient to make up for the decrease. Then follows a gradual and continuous falling off, until in 1914, just before the war, we had reached figures which could not but alarm and indeed did alarm every one who attached any importance to the birth rate, so that, as at one time in France, attempts were made to remedy matters by legislative or administrative measures.<sup>1</sup>

Personally I do not attach such extreme importance to this

<sup>1</sup> If this decrease was long unperceived by the majority of the public, this is because of late years mortality has also greatly decreased: consequently the absolute numbers of the population continued to increase considerably. It need hardly be said that such an "increase of old people" is only apparently a real increase of population, as every statistician admits.

birth-rate question, but at all events statistics clearly prove that war does not have any sort or kind of good effect upon a country's population. That even during the short time that the compensatory increase of the birth rate lasts the quality of the births cannot be influenced for good has already been proved in discussing the question of paternity in war. This seems likewise borne out by a consideration of children born in war. During what I admit was a cursory investigation I have scarcely found a single person of eminence who was procreated in war-time, or whose father was a returned soldier. At all events they are certainly fewer than they ought to be, considering how many wars there have been and how many men more or less eminent.

§ 39. THE REINFORCEMENT OF THE SENSE OF POWER.—War, therefore, invigorates nations from a purely physical standpoint just as do sports sensibly engaged in, without taking any account of the fact that millions perish owing to excess of such invigoration.

Similarly, with regard to the effects of war on character. The enormous upheaval caused by war certainly does more harm than good, but it may perhaps happen that it arouses a slumbering nation. Take a watch which has stopped. If we bang it violently on the table it will probably be broken in two, but sometimes it begins to go again. The watch, however, if it does go at all, goes right, but a nation whose thirst for power has been aroused by war does not know how to quench that thirst. It is ready to do something, but there is no one to direct its energies, and they may therefore lead to all sorts of good or bad results.

A war, especially one ending with an easy victory like those of 1864, 1866 and 1870, will generally make a nation bellicose, and drive it along the road to ruin.<sup>1</sup> But matters often turn out otherwise. Have the rulers of the people never reflected that serious consequences may result from wrenching the hammer from the workman's hand and putting a sword in its place? The working man, now accustomed to use a weapon which he once merely manufactured, is put in a position in which the political fortunes of the country depend directly upon him. No longer is he oppressed: he is fawned upon, and not by the

<sup>1</sup> Hence the biblical phrase: "Scatter thou the people that delight in war" (Ps. lxxviii. 30), and hence the necessity for all who wish Germany well to take a firm stand against any policy of annexation. If Germany is to continue to exist, she must abandon the belief that anything can be achieved by force.

populace only, as witness the commotion made about "our heroes," but also by the Government. It was so in 1813, when the King promised the people a constitution: it was so in 1870, when he really did grant them universal suffrage: it was so in 1914, when the Kaiser first recollected the constitutional ordinance which places the Crown above all parties: and after peace it will be so again.

Moreover, the working man comes into closest contact with cannon, which Lassalle tells us form an important constituent part of the constitution; and thus he realises that in the world to-day might is the mother of right. This might, however, may take any turn; and there are not a few who hope that an after-effect of this present war will be that Germany will become stronger, because they believe that the liberation movement there will be strengthened. This is possible, but even freedom might be attained by more direct means—and with far less bloodshed.

### III. THE SPECIFIC EFFECTS OF WAR

§ 40. ITS ALLEGED CRUELTY.—Sentimental persons consider war wrong because it must of necessity be cruel, whereas robust natures, on the contrary, persist in seeing something good in training men in "wholesome brutality." Apart, however, from the fact that neither sentimental nor "robust" arguments are ever good arguments, cruelty and justice are by no means opposed to each other, although they certainly do not mean the same thing.

When the wolf eats the lamb or Man the ox, this is cruel to the ovine and bovine races, though for the canines and primates natural and right. But it has nothing to do with justice. Both mining and navigation might be forbidden on the ground of their cruelty, just as the manufacture of sulphur matches has been forbidden, and yet they are all honest occupations. Needless cruelty is indeed needless, but necessary cruelties are after all necessary; and however greatly we may revere justice, this fact remains unaltered.

In Germany alone about thirty-five thousand persons annually die an unnatural or violent death, whether from an accident while at work, suicide, or crime. This makes a total of one and a half million dead for the forty-four years of peace immediately

preceding the present war ; and at any rate as yet the war has scarcely exceeded this number.<sup>1</sup> Now, impartially considered, war is not at all particularly cruel. Statistics prove that in the long run death takes a far higher toll of railway employés, fishermen, miners, and sailors than of soldiers, even in the cruellest war. The only reason why the deaths in war make a great impression upon us is that they are crowded together into a short space of time. Norman Angell<sup>2</sup> says, basing his assertion on figures which I admit I have not checked, that as much suffering and loss of human life has been caused by cod-fishing alone in Europe during the last century as by war, and he even goes the length of saying that peaceful occupations of this kind have actually been the cause of almost as much brutality.

Our tropical administration in peace time necessitates a not less heavy toll in the form of the health of fine men ; and a vast deal which goes on in Africa or South America means, sad to relate, that human nature is being morally brutalised in a way as bad as anything which can be charged to war. But above all, our present commercial system being what it is, very many more human beings die from injuries received in commercial competition than from murderous war.

If we consider war from the standpoint of the whole human race, we are almost tempted to smile at the paltriness of its effects. About every second one human being dies, but even this murderous world-war has hardly succeeded in greatly raising this figure, for as a result of it about sixty-four human beings die on an average every minute, instead of sixty.

Our unconscious sentimentality, in fact, leads us to over-estimate the number of war's victims. Of course it might be said that it is young and vigorous persons who die in war, which is certainly true ; but the accident statistics just quoted, according to which thirty-five thousand Germans, in themselves vigorous, perished annually from accidents, prove that even in this case too much is made of war.

This impression of the relative unimportance of war in regard to its effect on the duration of human life is still further deepened if we examine statistics more closely. The days of man's life are threescore years and ten, and as a matter of fact we see that a great number of men in comfortable and

<sup>1</sup> These words were written in 1915.—TRANS.

<sup>2</sup> Norman Angell : *The Great Illusion*, 1910.



sufficiently remunerated occupations, such as those of scholars and scientists, clergy, monarchs, statesmen and others, do reach this age. Yet the working man on an average attains the age of at most forty years. Of the inhabitants of Europe twelve millions die every year, which makes more than 1,000,000,000 (a thousand million) in the last century. As these deaths occurred on an average thirty years too soon, this means that in the last century about *thirty-six thousand million* (36,000,000,000) *years of human life were thus destroyed in Europe alone.*

Now let us assume that during the last hundred years about thirty million human beings have died in Europe as a direct or indirect result of war, and that on an average twenty years were cut off from their lives. This would give only rather more than five hundred million (500,000,000) years of life destroyed by war.

We see, therefore, that the lives sacrificed to war amount to only one-sixtieth part of those sacrificed on the industrial battlefield. Verily, when faced with these figures it cannot be said that war is the cruellest and sternest form of struggle on Mother Earth. Moreover, as a matter of fact the losses of human lives were always very quickly made up again, and the Franco-Prussian War (1870) produced a scarcely perceptible notch in the Prussian population curve. (Cf. the curve on page 96.)

It is true that other wars, wars fought long ago, for instance the Thirty Years' War, have exercised a far worse influence, owing to their indirect results. But just as an individual may quite justifiably go to sea and brave its dangers in the hope of thereby attaining a life of greater comfort and wealth afterwards, even so nations might be allowed to face the comparatively small risks of war, in order that they may become more prosperous afterwards.

Moreover, a certain amount of cruelty is necessary, and therefore also good. The life of an individual is not of such importance as to justify any advance in civilisation being deferred out of regard for it. Are we to cease travelling by rail because trains may collide? Or are we to abolish motor-cars because it may be impossible to avoid inoffensive passers-by sometimes getting under their wheels? Who did not rejoice over the piercing of the Gothard Tunnel, although many workmen lost their lives over the work? Who would lament the construction of vessels of fifty thousand tons burden, although

if such a mammoth liner as the *Titanic*, for instance, goes down, thousands of men find their graves in a single hour? And would the conquest of the air be possible without hundreds of thousands sacrificing their lives in order to buy their experience? Many more such instances might be cited, for the impulse to risk our lives is innate in us, and thousands flock to climb mountains, albeit this sport is foolhardy and of no use in itself.<sup>1</sup>

And thank God that it is so. If civilisation is to advance, there must be men ready to sacrifice their lives, and *the victims claimed by war would be no reason for giving it up. Were it justified in itself*, there would be no reason to trouble about mountains of corpses.

§ 41. MAN AS SUBJECT AND OBJECT OF WARFARE.—War in itself, abstractly considered, is an anachronism; and continues to survive only because men carry it on and prepare for it. Man's participation in war differs from his participation in anything else, because in war he takes both an active and a passive part. In the case of a piece of music a man can be either performer or hearer; in an execution, either executioner or criminal. In short, in all cases, even in legislation, Man is either subject or object. In war, however, Man both shoots and is shot; it is impossible for one person to wage war without some one else doing likewise.

War has often been called the "great leveller," but never has it levelled to such an overwhelming extent as during this war of 1914. It has, in fact, made all human beings in Germany of the same stamp, with the result that they are as like one another as two peas. "Go ahead," and "We'll give it them," "We must win because we have deserved to"—with these and such phrases has every war been ushered in for ages past; and it is not surprising that no one should be able to show much originality in composing variations on so limited a theme. But that Sudermann and Richard Dehmél, Ludwig Fulda and Arno Holz were so like one another no one would at one time have dreamt. There are no longer any parties, and our political newspapers differ as little as one egg from another. This effacement of individuality so that scarcely a shade of difference remains between one person and another, this uniform repetition of

<sup>1</sup> Professor Nicolai can hardly have any first-hand knowledge of mountaineering, and certainly no mountain climber would endorse his statement.—TRANS.

what has been said a thousand times already, is perhaps of all forms of commonplace the most depressing.

The purpose of war, in short, both practical and intellectual, is the destruction of the object by the subject, and at the same time the destruction of the subject by the object. Now, this being so, as no one doubts or even could doubt, it is really astonishing that many persons should so very frequently express surprise at its inevitable results. The fittest symbols of war are in reality two lions devouring each other, which can be called in turn subject and object.

§ 42. KILLING AND DYING.—This peculiar two-fold effect of war manifests itself in another manner. At the first glance there seem to be two characteristics distinguishing war: we are determined to kill and we are ready to die. The readiness to sacrifice their lives for an idea is considered by almost all human beings as an act denoting moral superiority, the Chinese being perhaps the sole exception. On the other hand, readiness to kill another has always been considered to denote moral degradation. Thus it might be thought that here is a case of superiority and inferiority pitted against each other, and that it is to some extent left to the individual to choose whether he will bring out the good or the bad side of war the more strongly; indeed, that it perhaps depends only upon the personality of the individual soldier whether war has a morally invigorating or a brutalising effect upon him.

In practice this two-fold possibility has never been lost sight of, and even now we can read in almost every newspaper in every European country that our soldiers to-day are a "band of heroes uplifted by war," and those of the enemy a "rabble of war-brutalised soldiery." Putting such thoughtless comparisons aside, we might still think that there is something genuinely good in war. We must reject such considerations, however, for the one thing characteristic of war is desire to kill. *Only in war* may we kill our fellow mortals unpunished, for the killing of a man in a duel, which comes within much the same category, is now universally, albeit mildly, punished. Man may sacrifice himself, however, for the utmost possible diversity of objects. Christ sacrificed himself for mankind, Lucretia herself for her honour, Winkelried himself for the deliverance of his country, Thekla herself for love's sake. Doctors sacrifice themselves for the sake of investigating the plague, mothers for their

children, children for their parents, and "noble characters" in general for their fellow-men. In short, every one in his life has abundant opportunity for self-sacrifice, and there is no need for him to select just that particular method of it which necessitates his first endeavouring to sacrifice as many others as possible.

Hence we ought not to consider, as so many do, that the sacrifice of life in war is a reason for retaining war, for there is no lack of other occupations in which life may be sacrificed not equally horribly but more wisely, for instance as a pioneer of new discoveries, in the fight against disease or for lessening the risk of fire or loss of life at sea, in producing articles of prime necessity, on the stormy ocean or deep in the bowels of the earth. Or is it perhaps one sort of heroism when an officer, bearing aloft his country's flag, leads his regiment onwards under a hail of bullets; and another sort when Pettenkofer intentionally swallows a cholera bacillus? And if, even now, there are not many Pettenkofers, then an attempt should be made to induce more to come forward—more Pettenkofers and fewer soldiers. The sum total of heroism would remain the same, but the sum total of human happiness on earth would be increased.

No, it is not dying which is the characteristic act distinctive of war, but killing, for war is the one occasion when twentieth-century Man thinks himself justified in killing his fellow-man. But killing is brutalising, even for those who, like the hangman, kill in accordance with legally prescribed forms. Moreover, the hangman's calling used naturally to be looked upon as ignominious, and even now he has to live, in self-imposed anonymity, a somewhat solitary existence. I do not know a single hangman, and although I consider them thoroughly honourable men, I would not wish to know one.

Even the killing of animals has a brutalising effect; and popular opinion used to put the knacker on a level with the hangman. Doubtless we feel, quite properly, that we must draw a distinction between the hangman and the soldier, in whose case the element of self-sacrifice atones for something. But as self-sacrifice is nowise characteristic of war, its specific effect is, after all, only to brutalise the human race.

§ 43. BLOODTHIRSTINESS.—Love of killing seems to be positively in Man's blood. An American writer, whose name I forget, says that we are not descended from the "noble beasts of prey" but from cowardly vegetable feeders (graminivorous

animals), who, being too weak to kill one another, rage at one another owing to a perverted instinct. In my opinion this is a wrong standpoint, first because most vegetable feeders never eat one another, and secondly because it is *easier* for an animal to fight one of a different species than one of its own.

But what is remarkable about this innate human love of murder is that it reaches such a pitch that Man is one of the few creatures which actually devour their own kind.<sup>1</sup> True, it is frequently noticed that among animals parents eat their offspring (pigs, for instance, do so), but it seldom happens that full-grown animals eat one another. At all events cannibalism is in this sense a purely human characteristic, that is a characteristic which was developed in a comparatively recent period; because in the dwellings of the most ancient human beings charred and split bones of all kinds of beasts of prey have been found, but never human bones so treated. Then came a period, however, when almost all nations were cannibal; and all national epics contain unmistakable references to this cannibalism. This is clear from the legends of the Pelopidæ, of Gaia and Polyphemus; while even in the Bible there are indications of cannibalism, and as children we used innocently to read about it in the story of the juniper tree.<sup>2</sup>

In all these legends it is parents who eat their offspring, which points to the fact that this was the most primitive form of cannibalism, the biological significance of which was obviously to do away as speedily as possible with weakly new-born infants, in order to make room for healthy offspring. Similar reasons account for the exposure of children, which is met with particularly in the case of even peoples such as the Spartans and Chinese, in some respects very vigorous. There were frequently practical reasons for this also, since children are often a great burden, particularly to nomadic peoples. That mothers kill new-born infants to prevent their figures being spoiled by

<sup>1</sup> According to the careful calculations of Richard Andrees, in *Die Anthropologie* (Leipzig, 1887), the number of cannibals, in particular about the year 1870, still amounted to nearly 2,000,000, that is, more than one per thousand of mankind.

<sup>2</sup> In Grimm's Fairy Stories, No. 9 in the German edition. A very ugly story of a stepmother who, in giving her stepson an apple out of the apple-chest, lets the heavy lid fall on his neck, severing it from the trunk, and afterwards cuts him up into little pieces and serves him up as a stew for the father, who thinks the stew excellent and calls again and again for more. Afterwards the boy reappears as a wonderful bird, and at last the bird vanishes and the boy comes to life again.—

suckling them, as is the case in the Solomon Isles, probably seldom happens.

But all this is child-murder. In reality nowadays almost everywhere among primitive peoples old and superfluous folk or captured enemies are killed or eaten, as the case may be. Now, this can scarcely have been a primitive instinct, for the fact that the sick and feeble are not simply left behind in some thicket, but actually killed, proves that a certain sense of responsibility is felt towards them. Only creatures comparatively highly developed from the social standpoint, such as storks, do anything of this sort—or at any rate, they are said to do so. Whether those killed were buried or devoured probably depended chiefly on practical considerations of food-supply, for in countries with few wild animals this is the most convenient way of procuring meat. This can be proved to explain the former cannibalism of the New Zealand Maori, and perhaps also of the industrious Azteks.

Thus originally delight in killing others had beyond doubt a purpose and rational cause. It was not long, however, before some admixture of superstition appeared. The belief arose that by incorporating the bodily substance of good ancestors or valiant foes in one's own body, their good qualities could be acquired; just as for a similar reason the Burmese, Indians, Romans, Serbians and ancient Teutons, and afterwards during the whole of the Middle Ages almost all European nations, used to wall up a living being in a newly-built building, in order that his soul might become its guardian spirit. The existence of this mystical tendency in some living cannibals can be actually proved.

Superstition of this kind of course need not have been the original motive, but on the other hand dogmatic religious traditions were undoubtedly the cause of murderous proclivities having been handed down even into times in which there was no longer any object in them. True, modern charges of killing children out of religious mania, charges formerly made against the Knights Templars and now mostly against the Jews, are unfounded. Philippe le Bel burnt more than one hundred Templars for this cause, but it would seem that desire to get possession of the enormous wealth of their Order was the chief motive in bringing the accusation.

It is impossible not to be struck with the fact that cannibalism

and human sacrifice in general are so very frequently connected with religious ceremonies. It is enough to point out<sup>1</sup> that even Christianity, in the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper, shows traces of cannibalism, and that consequently the derisive appellation of "mangeurs du bon Dieu" is not wholly without justification. In all religions, even in that of the Old Testament, there are references to human sacrifice, though in the Christian era this was no longer permitted. Even here, however, the murderous impulse was stronger than doctrinal principles, and more human beings than ever were slain, on pretext of having been tried and condemned as heretics and witches.<sup>2</sup>

Human sacrifice, however, has occurred in all parts of the world, and at all times, even in the case of the more tolerant religions. Chinese and Hindus, Phœnicians and Carthaginians, Jews and Egyptians, Greeks and Romans, Kelts, Teutons and Slavs, negroes, North American Indians, and South Sea Islanders, all used to sacrifice human beings or still do so.

Nowhere was this abomination so prevalent as in Mexico, where from twenty thousand to fifty thousand persons used to be sacrificed annually on a special day set apart for the purpose; while in the year 1486 fully one hundred thousand human beings were sacrificed at once. The breast of the wretched victim was rapidly ripped open with well-sharpened obsidian knives, the heart firmly seized and torn out and thrown, still reeking, into the maw of an idol near by. This hideous custom of sacrifice, however, was followed not by the Azteks alone but by the in some respects highly civilised Peruvian Incas, and also by all the other primitive American races. Even now in the African kingdom of Dahomey hundreds of negro slaves are annually slain for sacrificial purposes.<sup>3</sup> Stress must be laid upon these religious butcheries just because they, perhaps more than anything else, show how deep-seated in Man is bloodthirstiness.

But in course of time Man was deprived of one chance after another of gratifying his love of blood, and by the eighteenth century virtually all legitimate methods of human slaughter

<sup>1</sup> For further details see Schurtz' *Urgeschichte der Kultur* (Ancient History and Civilisation), Leipzig, 1900.

<sup>2</sup> According to the estimate of Professor Thomasius, of Halle, the number of witches and heretics burned by ecclesiastical and civil courts reached the almost incredible total of about nine millions.

<sup>3</sup> Hermann Brunnhofer's *Kulturwandel und Völkerverkehr* (Changes in Civilisation and Racial Intercourse). Wilhelm Friedrich, Leipzig, 1874.

had fallen into desuetude. True, the poor folk continued to die for the nobles, but they died silently, and no longer in the arena. Only a few traces of official exhibitions of blood still lingered on. Thus in Spain there were still bull-fights; English sailors did not give up boxing nor German students duelling; in Russia there were various sects, such as the Soschigateti, and the sect of the Spassoff Sogolassie, who used to kill themselves or their children; but generally speaking the French Revolution had made it impossible in Europe for the bloodthirsty instincts so deeply ingrained in human nature to find satisfaction. Characteristically enough the French Revolution was attested by a great and unnecessary slaughter of human beings.

War alone remained, and all these primeval impulses were concentrated upon it. What wonder, therefore, that the national genius should have created the so-called national army, and that delight in war, the sole surviving form of bloodthirstiness, should have assumed gigantic proportions! And now we have a Richard Dehmel rejoicing over the death of as many *German heretics* (by which he means men who refuse to admit German supremacy) as possible "ad majorem gloriam patriæ"! And doing so, moreover, with the same sort of pious resignation wherewith an Innocent III. used to rejoice that as many religious heretics as possible should be burnt "ad majorem gloriam Dei"!—for the greater glory of God.

§ 44. THE BRUTALISING EFFECTS OF WAR.—War, which is fought out with cold steel, is after all a bloody business, and the effects of blood must not be left out of account. The saying about a "lion which has once tasted blood" is not a mere phrase; and it is a principle deeply ingrained in human nature that everything which we do a second time comes easier than the first time. "Ce n'est que le premier pas qui coûte," and "l'appétit vient en mangeant." This, indeed, is the foundation of all possibility of evolution, for everything we learn is learned by practice. But it is possible to learn evil as easily, perhaps even more easily, than good; and there is nothing good in considering man's life as of no account, for in the last resort all civilisation is based upon respect for life.

In war, however, life loses in value. In battle, regiments of a man's fellow-men are sacrificed, and civilians and soldiers condemned to death by court-martial for offences which otherwise



would scarcely have been punished. And as for the lives of enemies, an officer, for whom as a man I had great respect, told me, with horror at the recollection, that he once threatened his landlord that he would shoot him if a lost purse could not be found. Human beings, hostages for instance, of whose individual innocence their executioners must be convinced, are shot in cold blood; and when at the very outset of the war a Prussian officer preferred suicide to carrying out an order of this kind, his fellow-officers spoke of this "self-sacrifice for conscience' sake" as *hypersensitive weakness*.

Another instance of indifference is that we are not offended when expressions generally used of animals only are applied to human beings. Even our official reports speak of twenty of the enemy having been "shot down"; and trenches are "cleansed of the enemy," just as an old coat used to be cleansed of filth or vermin.

I agree with our sticklers for the purity of the German language, but even more important than attacking French words seems to me the extermination of brutal expressions. Speech is as a mirror reflecting the soul of a people. Let us therefore be on our guard, and not add to this list, which might be very much lengthened. Perhaps these expressions will disappear again of themselves.

War, indeed, must have a brutalising effect because it forces Man to make the performance of brutal actions his business—a fact which is gradually beginning to be perceived. For instance, W. von Holländer,<sup>1</sup> a soldier who took part in the war for a year and a half, writes as follows: "Warfare has become for us both country and calling. The army is a people apart; and the language of war is a language incomprehensible to any outsider, however excellent a linguist. The exceptional has become the habitual, and what used to be called insanity or madness has in process of time become in the language of war not merely a fact but a matter of course.

"No one who has lived through all of the five hundred days of war without a break has been struck by this gradual transition from excessive tension to passivity. He has been conscious merely of a sense of numbness and resignation, of indifference, utter defiance, in short of every physical sensation being accen-

<sup>1</sup>"Der Krieg als Zustand" (War as a State), by W. von Holländer: *Berliner Tageblatt*, No. 10, of January 6, 1916.

tuated : and only now when almost every one not sent home wounded has obtained leave—leave, the official recognition of a state of war prevailing—only now can the man who has been taking part in the war, over whom the days, hours and seasons stole undesired and uncounted, realise that a barrier has arisen between the past and ourselves, between Germany and the land of war.”<sup>1</sup>

This wresting of a man from his home surroundings in the way here described is the worst thing of all : it is treason against the Holy Spirit of the German nation, which is worse, more unpardonable, and more inexpiable than treason to the flag.

This general truth outweighs in importance any number of individual instances. We may consider Kalisz and Louvain and everything which has happened in real or alleged *franc-tireur* warfare as justified by existing necessities, but the decisive fact is this : that *war confronts human beings with situations in which they must act inhumanly.*

As an example of such a situation the refusal of quarter may be mentioned. It is an absolute fact that as long ago as the Boxer Rising the password was officially issued, “No quarter.” In the present war this fact was referred to by Prince Rupprecht in a famous Order of the Day ; and it is now so generally known that Professor Jastrow,<sup>2</sup> for example, concludes that the reason why the Germans did not make more prisoners was that “our men do not like making Englishmen prisoners.” Even though it be urged that “no quarter” is a painful and unavoidable necessity, this nowise alters the fact that such necessity is brutalising. It might indeed be sophistically argued that it is permissible to kill an enemy in battle, because he voluntarily presents himself, and thus he is only receiving the treatment he perhaps after all desires. Nevertheless, in the refusal of quarter even this apparent justification vanishes ; for if any one asks for quarter he gives it plainly to be understood in so doing that no one has any longer a right to kill him and then say that this was done with his tacit consent. *The refusal of quarter, therefore, whatever military justification there may appear to be for it,*

<sup>1</sup> Note how von Holländer bears out what has been already said about war beginning to exert its mental and moral effects just when a man returns home.

<sup>2</sup> “Eine Lehre aus der Zahl unserer Gefangenen” (Lessons to be drawn from the Number of our Prisoners), by Professor J. Jastrow : *Vossische Zeitung*, No. 308, of June 19, 1915.

is beyond any doubt in principle the most serious of all crimes against human dignity.

This disregard for human life, however, is only one bad aspect of war, albeit the worst. The conception of property is likewise abolished. A friend of mine, a thoroughly respectable man, who used never to keep so much as a book which was not his, ended one of his letters by saying that "he must stop now, for he had to go *commandeering*, which used commonly to be called *stealing in Germany*." It is just his innocent way of expressing what in soldiers' slang is generally called "foraging," which shows that the writer had lost all consciousness that such actions might in certain circumstances be wrong.

Even the old German poet Friedrich von Logau<sup>1</sup> says of a soldier in the Thirty Years' War :

"Keinem hat er was gestohlen,  
Denn er nahm es unverhohlen.  
Was er von der Strasse klaubet,  
Ist gefunden, nicht geraubet."<sup>2</sup>

An officer enlightened me as to the technicalities of "foraging." You go into a shop and ask the price, at the same time for the sake of clearness pointing with your revolver at the object you want to buy, or at the seller. "A penny for that?" you say, and everything is honourably paid for.

Enough of this, however. The wrong is much less in the action itself than in the fact that all this is considered necessarily part and parcel of a "lively, merry war." Once more to quote old Logau, who has hit the right nail on the head :

"Huren, Saufen, Spielen, Fluchen  
Heisst dem Mut *Erfrischung* suchen."<sup>3</sup>

Every masterful impulse must perforce tend towards tyranny and brutalisation whenever the power is in the hands not of a *master* but of a *slave*. And the great majority of mankind are, after all, not masters !

<sup>1</sup> Logau's *Sinngedichte* (Poems of the Senses), quoted in Lessing's Essay on Logau.

<sup>2</sup> Roughly: He stole nothing from any one; he just simply took it. What he picked up in the street, was found, not stolen.

<sup>3</sup> Roughly: Whoring, drinking, gaming, cursing—that's what is called bucking up a man's courage.

## IV. THE TRANSFORMATION OF ALL VALUES

§ 45. THE ENEMY'S MOTIVES.—“ Side by side with the war on the battle-field there raged in Europe a war of words or, more correctly, a pen-and-ink war. This war is being carried on by those who have managed to ensure the safety of their own skins—and property. True, the newspaper scribe does nothing but toss inoffensive piles of paper at the printer's devil; but on this long-suffering paper he blackguards his adversary, derides him, and does his best to put him in a contemptible light.”<sup>1</sup> In this he succeeds only too well, and the newspapers of 1914-15<sup>2</sup> have assuredly poisoned more harmless civilian souls with hatred for all time than the war itself has done. In itself this is not surprising, for as even Jean Paul<sup>3</sup> said, “ in the longest peace men do not say so many false and foolish things as in the shortest war ”; but it is none the less regrettable, because the abyss created between the feelings of the different nations remains. Men die and others take their places. The old cathedrals destroyed by shells cannot, it is true, be rebuilt, though they can be restored. But as for the outrages perpetrated upon the soul of the nation, they will be part of the heritage of posterity, and all the more so because of late hatred of foreigners has been preached even in schools. The Ecclesiastical and Educational Department of His Majesty the Kaiser's Government at Frankfurt-on-the-Oder issued a circular appealing directly to the school inspectors under it “ not to tolerate any efforts to prepare the way for future conciliation between civilised nations.” What is aimed at is clearly a country shut in not merely commercially but also intellectually. At all events the Press has left no stone unturned in order to disseminate hatred and thirst for vengeance, all which is bad for Germany and her aspirations to become the heart of the world, which might perhaps come to pass, but—the heart of the world must be able to *love*.

The extraordinary thing was that to simply no one did it

<sup>1</sup> From *Danzers Armeezeitung*.

<sup>2</sup> Owing to the severity of the (German) censorship, which exceeded everything in any previous war, the decent papers could scarcely do anything, at any rate could not make their influence felt.

<sup>3</sup> Jean Paul Richter's *Friedenspredigt an Deutschland* (A Peace Sermon to Germany), p. 54. Heidelberg, 1808.

occur, obvious as this is, that our enemies see the world in a different light from ourselves: that from their point of view there is as much justification for Panslavism and the British Empire as for the Germans and their demand for a place in the sun; that for France the reconquest of her lost provinces and "revanche" are national problems just as the recovery of Alsace once was for Germany; that Belgium might fight against Germany, and Serbia and Montenegro against Austria with the same sacred zeal for their country as the Tyrolese or Lützow's Black Troops once did; and finally that the Italians' greater sympathy for the French, who are related to them by blood, simply means that here national ideas have won a decisive victory over mediæval, dynastic diplomatic arts. Or is it possible that the Germans were really already so greatly intoxicated by their own overwhelming superiority as to deny other nations any right to an independent nationality?

Thus biassed opinions arose concerning our enemies' reasons for having entered the war. Indeed, it is not to be wondered at if the great mass of people throughout Germany accepted those opinions, and they can hardly be blamed for having done so, since they were but repeating the views of those to whom they were accustomed to look up in childlike trust, as to their leaders.

Now, England was bound to enter the war—legally bound by her solemn pledge of 1839 and morally bound by the familiar terms of the Entente. Yet it was said of her that, as Hermann Bahr, a German journalist, put it, she was making war only "because selfishness and mercenary instincts are stronger than ties of blood and sense of what is right and proper."<sup>1</sup> As long ago as September 13, 1870, France, through the mouthpiece of Ernest Renan, had announced her intention of waging a war of revenge, with Russia and England as her allies. Yet no one believed she had any patriotic feelings, but every one said the war had been hatched by a gang of unscrupulous politicians.

Again, nobody believed that the Russians meant to defend Serbia, and even such obvious reasons for war as *Panslavism and desire for expansion towards the sea* were simply pooh-pooed. It was thought that the Russian people, without

<sup>1</sup> Cf. also the speech delivered by Professor Karl Rathgens in Hamburg. In his opinion the only real reason for the war was "England's reprehensible policy, which aimed at capturing German trade."

knowing why, had been driven into the war by the Grand Ducal party only—in short, led like a “lamb to the slaughter.”

Impartially considered, the behaviour of small states such as Serbia and Belgium was admirable, but the abuse heaped on both of them was indescribable. Scarcely any one would so much as mention the fact that in Italy, especially since the Berlin Congress, the Irredenta had become a power in the land; but every one kept on harping on the small but noisy, and, it was insinuated, even venal minority, representing the whole war as having been “made” by England’s gold.<sup>1</sup>

Similarly with regard to neutrals, whose sympathies are not even gladly and gratefully accepted as a valuable offering, but peremptorily demanded as a moral right. For a neutral to be hostile to us seems to us neither more nor less than immoral. Thus the *Kölnische Zeitung*,<sup>2</sup> for instance, infers from the phrase so often heard in Belgium even before the war, “nos sympathies vont vers la France,” that “in general the Belgians have a curious notion of the word neutrality.” Even about America and the Balkan States we have very often read that their sympathies for the Western Powers are foolish and criminal; and really positive treachery to—well, to what?

This absolute lack of comprehension of our enemies’ motives ought to be all the more regretted by a German, because the power of just appreciation was once the national virtue by which he set chief store.

§ 46. DEFECTIVE SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY.—We, on the other hand, expect neutral and even enemy foreign countries to understand and rightly appraise *our* motives, although some of them are even now by no means obvious. For instance, we expect them to see that a military exemption tax which brought in thousands of millions was not a threat of war; that the invasion of Luxembourg and Belgium was a necessity, and so on and so on.

Does any one really believe that our alliance with Turkey is everywhere approved? Think of Graf Platen. When the Venetian Doge Leonardo Loredano remarked: “We do not want

<sup>1</sup> When Dr. Nicolai wrote this chapter Prince Lichnowsky’s Revelations had of course not been published, nor is it probable that he knew anything of the *Journal* of Dr. Muehlou, formerly one of the directors of Krupp’s works. Both these undoubtedly historical publications, however, entirely bear him out.—TRANS.

<sup>2</sup> “Belgiens Neutralität,” in the *Kölnische Zeitung*, No. 959, of August 26, 1914.

to owe our victory to the Turks' fists," he replied : " Certainly a splendid policy for the Venetians, and one which ought to be held up as a model to the Germans of 1813,"<sup>1</sup>—a reply which now sounds almost prophetic.

Equally one-sided are the attempts to divest ourselves of the responsibility for the war and saddle other nations therewith. It is after all only natural that no one should admit having begun ; but it is nevertheless a fact that of twenty-six " sovereign " states in Europe sixteen<sup>2</sup> are now at war or hopelessly involved in the war. That is, of the four hundred and fifty million nominal Europeans, three hundred and ninety millions, or eighty-seven per cent., are actually at war, and only the very inconsiderable remainder have their armies " peacefully mobilised." And not a soul will accept the slightest responsibility for all these millions being thus up in arms against one another ; and furthermore, as proof of their innocence, every one continues inciting others to war.

The attempt to represent the adversary as solely responsible for the war is, impartially considered, an incitement. The charge of " having begun " was levelled fairly indiscriminately at any and every adversary, although, as can be psychologically explained, the latest adversary was generally stated to be the worst ; and it was perhaps only England's ill luck that it was a comparatively long while before any one else declared war after she did. A delightful instance of how dogs always bite the last man was afforded by that excellent Austrian writer, Baron Leopold von Chlumecky,<sup>3</sup> who, ten months after the outbreak of war, but precisely ten days after Italy's declaration of war, discovered that " Italy is responsible for the world-war."

Now, it might certainly be said that words do not matter so much, and that if one nation insists on considering itself altogether better, more righteous, and less responsible for a war than another nation, this does not do so very much harm. The harm, however, consists in the fact that a nation which denies

<sup>1</sup> *Die Liga von Cambray*, by August Count von Hallermund-Platen, 1830, Note 8. [Count von Platen (1796-1835), German poet, is now chiefly remembered by his lyric poetry.—TRANS.]

<sup>2</sup> Belgium, Bulgaria, Germany, England, France, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Monaco, Montenegro, Austria, Portugal, Russia, Serbia, Turkey and Hungary ; and when this book appears who can tell how many more there may not be !

<sup>3</sup> Baron Leopold von Chlumecky's *Die Agonie des Dreibundes—das letzte Jahrzehnt italienischer Untreue* (The Death-throes of the Triple Alliance : the Last Ten Years of Italy's Bad Faith), 1915.

its share in the responsibility for the war will also do nothing to prevent war. Each nation believes, and believes seriously, that the other nation has attacked it and will attack it again in the future. Consequently it also believes that the only way to ward off war is to pile up armaments.

Thus even this indirect effect of war tends to strengthen the anti-social side of a nation's character, and indeed it cannot be otherwise with all effects of war. No improvement can result unless and until every individual and every nation assumes his or its due share of responsibility and endeavours to correct his or its defects. Whether this is possible, and if so how, will be discussed in Part III. of this book. An essential preliminary condition, however, is that the different nations should not continue to be so distressingly blind as each to shovel all responsibility on to the others. This alarmingly great lack of sense of responsibility would disappear of itself, once a responsible European Association were established; for the saying that "as thy day is, so shall thy strength be" virtually amounts to this: that on whosoever responsibility is placed that person becomes himself responsible.

But if the sense of responsibility be destroyed by proclaiming that "all's fair in war if only you are strong enough to enforce it," this causes the individual human being to degenerate and to swerve from his true destiny.

§ 47. INSULTS AND LIBELS.—Even Hume says,<sup>1</sup> "When our own nation is at war with any other, we detest them under the character of cruel, perfidious, unjust and violent: But always esteem ourselves and allies equitable, moderate and merciful. . . . The treachery [of our commander] we call policy: His cruelty is an evil inseparable from war. In short, every one of his faults we either endeavour to extenuate, or dignify it with the name of that virtue, which approaches it."

This was written two hundred years ago, but although nations to-day have far more opportunity of getting to know one another, things do not seem to have altered, save that there is no longer a Hume to scoff at them nor a George III. to appoint any such scoffer Under-Secretary of State.<sup>2</sup>

No, hatred and lying have become holy; and no effort is

<sup>1</sup> David Hume: *Treatise of Human Nature*, 1740, Book II. Part II. 3: "Of Love and Hatred."

<sup>2</sup> Hume was for a short time Under-Secretary of State in 1763.—TRANS.



spared to proclaim hatred and contempt as brutally as possible, whether by means of derisive exclamations dropped by airmen (often strongly reminiscent of the "heroic speeches" of the Trojan war), or by official proclamations. Discerning persons may merely smile at these, but by the people they are believed; and for a long time a great many really did look upon their enemies as contemptible, inferior and divided among themselves. Reports of revolutions in Odessa and Paris and of risings in India, Egypt, Ireland and the South African Union were readily believed; but when the enemy in his turn reported (with equally slight justification) riots in Berlin, this was considered despicable.

The British army was supposed to be just a pack of riff-raff, with nothing better to show for themselves than "speed records in running away," and pinning all their faith to stone-throwing Basutos, or Afghans with their clubs.

As for the Russians, their army was supposed to consist mainly of "cowardly deserters"; their shells to be "filled with sand," and their tins of preserves with "straw," while their commissariat officers were described as thieves and rogues. As for the French, they had only an army of "children and old men," who went about in "patent-leather boots with holes in them." The Serbians were demoralised; they had no supplies and no ammunition, and were only too glad to be made prisoners by the Austrians. As for the Belgians, they were represented merely as rascally freebooters.

Then followed a whole series of calumnies, some of them the traditional ones in use from time immemorial, some of them new ones, often absolute inventions, but also sometimes containing a grain of truth, although mostly a quite harmless grain. Probably every war since the thirteenth century has begun with the ever successful attempt to persuade the masses that their wicked enemy has been poisoning wells;<sup>1</sup> only it would be difficult to prove that in former wars even university professors helped to disseminate such rumours! In view of the prevalent dread of bacilli, it is easy to understand why this time cholera germs should have been fixed upon; but as a medical man I can scarcely say I am delighted that this un-

<sup>1</sup> Maria Theresa, for instance, wrote on July 22, 1778: "It is said that near London a Bohemian has been hanged who was carrying arsenic on him for poisoning wells. This would be the last straw."

savoury business should have been laid to the charge of French doctors.

It was easy enough to understand why the Russians afterwards levelled similar accusations against the Germans; for a General<sup>1</sup> who did not know that the great numbers of phials containing cholera bacilli to be found in German military hospitals were used for inoculations *against* disease, had jumped to the conclusion that the Germans must be using them to poison wells.

And now for the *gouged-out eyes*. In all military hospitals they were said to have been seen. Here, again, it is possible that those who first spread the report acted in good faith, and may have been misled, for instance, by the frequency of injuries to the intersection of the optic nerves, injuries which result in absolute blindness. But except for a very short time these slanderers must have known better; for the most careful investigations were instituted, in Germany by Provost Dr. Kaufmann<sup>2</sup> of Aix-la-Chapelle and by an unnamed writer on the staff of the *Vorwärts*, and in Austria, where the Serbians were alleged to have done the same thing, by Professor Karl Brockhausen, of Vienna. The last named even offered a reward of fifty kronen for any information as to an authenticated case of a German or Austrian whose eyes had been gouged out, yet not one such authenticated case was brought to light. Energetic measures ought then to have been insisted upon to prevent legends of this sort arising; but nothing was really done, and large sections, even of the educated German public, still believe that in Belgium German soldiers had their eyes gouged out.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Cf. General Gilinsky's Proclamation.

<sup>2</sup> Letter from Dr. Kaufmann, Provost of the Collegiate Church, to the *Kölnische Zeitung* of September 28, 1914.

<sup>3</sup> At the end of August or beginning of September, 1914, a Swiss hotel-keeper (a German by birth and a Swiss by naturalisation only) showed us a letter which he had received from Düsseldorf, and the writer of which said that he with his own eyes had seen forty men in a German hospital (we think that of Düsseldorf) whose eyes had been gouged out by the Belgians. We asked this hotel-keeper whether he really believed this. "Oh, of course I do," he said. At the time such letters as this were being received by certainly hundreds and probably thousands of Swiss people with friends, relatives or acquaintances in Germany.

Another report which was also circulated by the Germans a little later on, when the first Senegalese troops appeared in France, was that the Senegalese soldiers had been seen returning from the front with long strings of ears, which they had cut off from German soldiers. This story we were also told by a Swiss hotel-keeper, who was Swiss by naturalisation only and German by birth; and he went so far as to name a certain Swiss who had recently returned from England via France and had seen these strings of cut-off German ears. We took the trouble to go to Lausanne to find this Swiss, but never could trace him.—TRANS.

Again, in Denmark and elsewhere Belgian children are said to have been exhibited whose eyes the Germans were alleged to have gouged out : and even if from here it is not so easy to test such statements as it was to investigate allegations about what was done in Germany, yet it may be at once assumed that in all probability this is another instance of malicious slander.

That persons have been seen with hands crushed or perhaps cut off is possible, although definite information on this point is not obtainable. But that Russians and Belgians systematically mutilated *children* in this way is something which no one ought to believe and no newspaper publish without having first convinced themselves of its truth.

In the case of the English nurse whose breasts were stated to have been cut off by the Germans, it was afterwards shown how such reports arise. An English court of justice, to which we ought to be grateful for having traced this calumny to its origin, was able to prove that this particular nurse suffered from incurable cancer of the breast.

There is even a grain of truth in the statement published in all the newspapers that the enemy *incorporated convicts in their armies* ; for in every nation it is the custom when war breaks out, as on all other ceremonial occasions, to grant an amnesty to those convicted of comparatively venial offences. A similar charge, familiar to us from former wars, arose in similar fashion.

In East Prussia a chief forester in charge of a German patrol was shot by the Russians. This gave rise to the fable that *all* the foresters in East Prussia had been shot, and a general order by General Marto to that effect was even published, and later on a radio-telegram of General Rostoffski.

There is, of course, a certain amount of justification for the statement as to the enemy *disregarding the Red Cross*. The range of modern cannons usually does not exceed twelve to thirteen miles of country which is generally very imperfectly reconnoitred, and they must sometimes hit hospitals ; and if it is nowadays positively dangerous to wear a Red Cross armband, this may be partly accounted for by there being really nothing clearly visible to aim at because of the grey uniforms worn, so that everything seen to be moving is shot at. And the Geneva armband can be seen a long way off.

§ 48. TRAINING TO HATE.—The ugly aspect of these calumnies is that on both sides they are *increasing*. Let us assume that behind the front a drunken Iroquois kills a captured Mohican.<sup>1</sup> If no one is any the wiser, there the matter will end ; but if it is published far and wide among the Mohicans, then the latter will murder the next three Iroquois taken prisoner. Then the Iroquois, wishing to be “justly avenged,” will kill all prisoners. Thus, owing to its having become known, an isolated action becomes general, and thus even in 1914 atrocities were increased owing to the one-sided nature of the statements given out.

So it was, and so it was bound to be. Let us even assume that the righteous German had none but chivalrous motives for taking the field. Now he hears that the enemy sometimes kill and sometimes do violence to defenceless women, old men and children, and sometimes send them on in front in order to protect their own selves against German bullets. Next he hears that vessels engaged in the dangerous work of mine-sweeping are manned with defenceless German prisoners ; or, as stated in a Grand General Staff report of May, 1915, that the French, when digging trenches, made German prisoners stand in a row, thus forming a living wall to protect them against German attacks. Next he hears that the Turcos are cutting off Germans' heads, and carrying them about in their knapsacks as “war souvenirs,” and exhibiting with a yell of bestial triumph strings of cut-off noses and ears ; that the Russians are cutting off German children's hands ; that Belgian girls are gouging out our soldiers' eyes ; that the English want to starve German women and children to death ; that the Serbians are assassins, and the Montenegrins sheepstealers, the Italians a pack of scoundrels and the Japanese half monkeys. In short, he is so overwhelmed by all these mean and baseless statements which he hears that, however kindly he may be by nature, he must inevitably be convinced that all mankind, except the inhabitants of the German Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the Sultanate of Turkey and the territories of the Turko-Tartar Bulgarian people,<sup>2</sup> is rotten to the core.

<sup>1</sup> Not knowing who in this war first committed these atrocities, I select this fictitious instance of extinct races.

<sup>2</sup> While I am writing this, the Roumanians are trying to make up their minds whether they are a lofty or a debased people.

Even if a spark of respect for human nature does still contrive to persist, then our newspapers chime in and tell people of what sort of a crew mankind really consists. No term of abuse is abusive enough to describe the enemy. *Fliegende Blätter's* old joke about the subaltern who begged the rhinoceros' pardon for having just compared it with his recruit Meyer has not only been resuscitated in the *Deutsche Tageszeitung*<sup>1</sup>—which would not matter—but also in the speeches of German professors. The *Deutsche Tageszeitung* once remarked that to call Russians and Frenchmen swine was insulting the German domestic animal of that name; and Professor Eucken, after railing at the English as low Pharisees, adds that such a comparison is positively insulting to the Pharisees. Similarly, Ludwig Deinhardt says that any one calling Edward VII. a Mephistopheles is insulting Goethe. Why Goethe, is a question which will probably have to be dealt with in a chapter on the influence of war upon the intellect.

Even worse things have been said than these, and every one who reads the speeches of our German professors must, if he takes them seriously, come to the conclusion that we are waging war upon brutes, and that consequently the majority of human beings are beasts. *Whoever thinks thus, however, cannot continue to have any respect for human dignity, and the foundations of his own morality are consequently sapped.*

Of course the German nation as a whole does not consist of wholly lofty and morally perfect natures any more than does any other nation. What has just been said, however, shows very clearly that the present war has a brutalising effect upon even the most moral human being, and unhappily certain newspapers intentionally aim at thus brutalising their readers. For instance, Herr Hugo Caeker, war correspondent of the *Stettin Generalanzeiger*, expressly states that he reports all atrocities, so as to make an end of "all such fine things as pity." Is this really so desirable? Or was Mr. H. N. Brailsford right when he wrote in the *Daily News* of mid-September, 1914, that long descriptions of atrocities have only one effect—to whet the desire for retaliation; and that in time they would create a Europe in which there was no longer any room for such sentiments as

<sup>1</sup> The *Deutsche Tageszeitung* is pre-eminently the Prussian Junker organ, whose motto is "For Kaiser and Country." It is exceedingly violent and Pan-Germanist in tone, and consistently advocates "a big navy."—TRANS.

fraternity and humanity? And was not Professor Wilhelm Förster<sup>1</sup> also right when he wrote as long ago as 1910 that the poisoning of men's imaginations and the dissemination of damaging suggestions by too much newspaper-writing was threatening to become one of the greatest dangers to civilised humanity?

The first year of the war, indeed, proved both to have been right, and no one can absolve our censorship, in other respects severe enough, from the reproach of having intended all atrocities to be reported; for it would be absurd to pretend that those at the head of it do not realise what the ultimate effect of their measures must be. Now that a censorship exists, it is part of the censor's professional duty to realise things of this kind.

Furthermore, was the party truce in Germany alone responsible for virtually not a single voice having been raised against the press, saying, "We are ashamed that there should be German newspapers and German men, officials and others, who presumed to resort to such methods of rendering their country an alleged service"? Quite apart from the impression produced abroad, both among neutrals and among our enemies, did no one consider the effect which such proceedings must have upon the moral sense of *our own* people?

Yes, it will be replied, but the people had to be egged on, to make them determined to resist to the uttermost. For a time this effort may have succeeded, but in the long run it failed, just because those who inaugurated this campaign of calumny were not far-sighted enough to realise that it would also have the indirect effect of driving the enemy to resist to the uttermost. Thus the relation between the two belligerents has not been changed, and the sole residue of this attempt to influence popular feeling is mutual hate and boundless contempt, which was wholly unnecessary. A certain Dr. Hanns Floerke of Munich has even undertaken to collect and publish the "Documents of Hate."

The real sufferers, however, are the people, whom the world calls barbarous because their press and their government could not restrain themselves. Even if this epithet may still be in general repudiated, yet it must unfortunately be admitted that

<sup>1</sup> "The Daily Reporting of Sensational Occurrences," by Professor W. Förster, in *Der Tag*, January 19, 1910.

in these last two years we have at any rate become much more *like* barbarians.

Nothing is now heard about all these infamous deeds, and it might be asked why I am unearthing so many ancient and already half-forgotten stories. It is a remarkable peculiarity of Man, however, that the conclusions he draws from all manner of isolated experiences sink deep into his soul, and there persist long after he has forgotten how he ever came to such conclusions. They persist, indeed, even if he has admitted that the basis for them was false.<sup>1</sup> Hence my justification for recalling what has happened in the recent past. What I meant to convey to my readers was this : " You see, here are the reasons for your being so full of hate. You see that these reasons were bad, and you yourselves no longer believe in them. Now, will you not come to the only conclusion possible for a logical person, and give up hating? Will you not have courage to think? Believe me, *whoever thinks can scarcely hate*. At any rate he cannot hate men, but only institutions."

§ 49. TRAINING TO LIE.—This change of attitude to all old-established conceptions must be called a form of mental affection which has seized upon a whole people. This was discussed by Herr Albert Moll in an article published in the very early days of the war, in which he mentions the well-known fact that at times of universal excitement even persons who believe themselves to be speaking truth in reality bear false witness. He shows how the terrors of war, the hatred artificially engendered by the Government against those who began the war, people's desire to help their country by accusing the enemy, and many other like tendencies, cannot fail to have disastrous effects. He himself unwittingly affords a proof of how apparently omnipresent this wholesale insinuation was, by himself being unable to perceive all these injurious effects except in the case of Germany's enemies.

Herr Albert Moll, I admit, insists that those who signed the report of the Belgian Committee of Investigation had certainly no reputation for capacity for sifting evidence ; and he hints that he himself has some notion of how this should be done. He may rest assured that no one will assert that he erred con-

<sup>1</sup> In my work on the reasons for believing in a myogenous theory of heart-beats, I gave a concrete and very instructive instance of this. This work is in the Library of Anatomy and Physiology, Physiological Department 1910. (Page 64 of the separate reprint.)

sciously. He, too, will be classed with those "who believe they are speaking truth although their evidence is in reality wholly false." The hypnotising effects of war, indeed, are terrible, and no one can be reproached with lying when so many others are doing likewise. Only, no one ought to assert that it is good to abandon oneself unconsciously to this frenzy of lying.

It may be at once admitted that lying is often useful to individuals, inasmuch as they can sometimes keep afloat owing to a lie, when, had the truth come out, they must long ago have gone under. Now, is there any object in keeping afloat in this wise? In certain circumstances, assuredly there is. If a particular human being (or a particular nation) is passing through a critical time, and I know that if he can come safely through it he will be able to take up his life again energetically and perfectly normally, then I may try to help him by a lie; and although this is perhaps not morally right, yet it is justifiable on considerations of general humanity. As every one knows, doctors very frequently do something of this sort, but it is plain that there must be some *unselfish* consideration at stake, for whoever lies in his own interest is simply a liar and nothing else.

Now, the Government holds that it, like a skilful physician, is entitled to tell the people lies, and therefore it has always, particularly during the war, endeavoured to defend official methods of reporting events. Over and over again we have been told that we had been forced into a critical position, in which, to use the technical expression, we must "hold out"; and in such circumstances, it was added, there was only too much justification for lying being considered allowable. The belief prevailed that the people would be capable of more resistance if they had no suspicion of the true state of affairs; and it was therefore considered justifiable to prevent their becoming acquainted with the situation. War is thus a training in lying, and every conceivable subsidiary moral purpose vanishes, since this lying is done solely for the benefit of ourselves and our own nation.

The demoralising effects of this lying are most strongly marked in the case of the stay-at-home civilian population. The soldier is less injuriously affected, for those who are confronted with facts must face them in a manner both practical and to some extent therefore truthful. When the soldier at the front sees how his enemy also dies for his cause, he learns to respect



him. He may think and probably ought to think himself and his fellows better soldiers than the enemy ; but he is compelled by the severity of the struggle not very seriously to underrate the latter. While in Germany the enemy was still being black-guarded, the first news arrived from the front. It mentioned how skilled were the Russians in subterranean warfare, how perfect was their equipment in many respects, and how honestly these "Muscovite hordes" believed in the sacredness of their Tsar's cause. Tidings also came of French bravery, of the doggedness of the British and their contempt for death, and of the heroic courage of the Serbians. Yet while one soldier was doing justice to the other, the newspapers at home went on lying and libelling, without reflecting that whoever belittles his enemy belittles his own victory, and that supposing he is defeated his defeat becomes a disgrace.

§ 50. FRANC-TIREUR WARFARE.—There is no more crass instance of the odious and unjust ideas about the enemy than the varying judgments passed upon franc-tireur warfare. Has it never occurred to any one that, while it is an insult to call a man a "franc-tireur," yet to call him by the German version of this word<sup>1</sup> is considered a compliment? What patriotic German heart does not beat faster at the thought of Schill's volunteers in 1807, or of Lützow's volunteers in 1813? Who does not consider both the shooting of Schill's eleven officers at Wesel on September 16, 1809, and the shooting of Andreas Hofer at Mantua on February 20, 1810, wicked and tyrannical acts? Yet these men had risen in wrath not only against their arch-enemy Napoleon, but also against their divinely-appointed Prussian or Bavarian king.

What was right for the Germans, however, is supposed to be wrong for the French and Belgians, whose armed insurgents are perpetually referred to as the lowest dregs of humanity. Thus in his report to the United States President, His Majesty the German Emperor spoke of being obliged to resort to the "sternest measures" in order to "terrify the bloodthirsty inhabitants out of continuing their infamous acts of murder

<sup>1</sup> *Freischärler*=volunteer, armed insurgent.—TRANS.

<sup>2</sup> That the troops of Schill and Lützow wore, whenever possible, no uniform makes no difference from the point of view of popular sentiment, which is alone under discussion. The Tyrolese did not wear uniform, and as for the Belgians, I will deal with them later on. [The Tyrolese patriot, Andreas Hofer, was betrayed to the French and shot by order of Napoleon.—TRANS.]

and violence." And this despite the fact that it is not even certain that we are not bound to consider these "defenders of their country" as regular troops. According to the Belgian military system every male citizen between the ages of twenty and forty belongs to the "militia," keeps his arms at home, and is not obliged to wear uniform, but merely a badge. And after all, to be quite honest, who in Germany would consider the East Prussian farmer as the dregs of humanity, were he to seize his rusty rifle and defend his village, if the Russians invaded the country?

What is honourable for us is likewise honourable for the enemy; and if the defence of a country by national armies is a sacred cause, it is none the less sacred albeit no uniform is worn. Even Georg Herwegh scoffed at such sophistries in the following lines about the Greeks:

" Sie taten, was sie mochten,  
Die Frechheit war enorm,  
Sie siegten, wenn sie fochten,  
Auch ohne Uniform."<sup>1</sup>

Those for whom Herwegh's name has too demagogic a sound may be reminded of good old Rückert's lines:

" Der Bau'r ist nur ein schlechter Schuft,  
Der nach Soldatenhilfe ruft.  
Der Bauer, der sich selbst macht Luft,  
Den Feind, den Schuft, selbst pufft und knufft,  
Der Bauer ist kein schlechter Schuft."<sup>2</sup>

Here, again, the opinion of the soldier who, after all, is alone exposed to the franc-tireurs' bullets, is infinitely the fairer. Yet a so-called intellectual, Herbert Eulenberg,<sup>3</sup> styling himself a "representative of intellectual Germany of to-day," actually dares to say in his reply to Romain Rolland: "The Belgians simply pounced upon the enemy like Paris Apaches, and the Lion of Flanders would have utterly disowned such jackals." And Max Hochdorf,<sup>4</sup> once an æsthete, attributes the franc-tireur warfare to nothing but the drinking propensities and religious

<sup>1</sup> Roughly: They did what they wanted to do, monstrosly impudent as this was. They won every fight that they fought, even without any uniforms.—TRANS.

<sup>2</sup> Roughly: A peasant is no scamp unless he calls for soldiers to help him. A peasant who turns on the enemy—the real scamp—and gives him a good thrashing, he is no rascal.—TRANS.

<sup>3</sup> Herbert Eulenberg, in the *Kölnische Zeitung*, No. 1035, of September 17, 1914.

<sup>4</sup> Max Hochdorf, in the *Berliner Tageblatt* of September 9, 1914.

fanaticism of the Belgian peasants. But on the other hand we find an Austrian officer writing in *Danzers Armeezeitung* as follows: "Take the last armed insurgent enemy who from mistaken but profoundly exalted patriotism shoots at the Germans from his hiding-place, well aware that they will afterwards hang him and even burn his whole village. In my eyes such a man ranks far above a newspaper scribe blustering away with his bombastic but worthless and meaningless phrases, and spitting at the enemy but not fighting him."

This abuse of Belgium is particularly hateful, she being prostrate and unable to defend herself. Her newspapers cannot appear, her citizens, those who still live in their own country, are silent as the grave, and her archives open to the conqueror. We scarcely insist to-day that the victor should be magnanimous, but why heap insult on the defenceless? <sup>1</sup> Even Cæsar said to Ptolemy, King of the Barbarians, who caused Pompey to be murdered and then attempted to blacken his memory:

"Tout beau !—Que votre haine, en son sang assouvie,  
N'aille point à sa gloire, il suffit de sa vie."<sup>2</sup>

§ 51. WAR AND ART.—It has been said often enough that the human mind finds congenial occupation in war and art; and that although a great general needs intelligence and character, yet in the main everything depends upon his intuitively grasping the situation as a whole, which is a task presenting difficulties undoubtedly calculated to appeal to an artist's nature. Hannibal, Frederick II. and Napoleon are frequently considered as artists, and their battles as works of art.

No doubt there is much to be said for this point of view, and a great deal might be urged concerning the connection between the "art of war" and other forms of art. For our present purpose, however, this connection is of no importance, the one question concerning us being whether and to what extent war affects the various forms in which art finds expression, and whether this influence is good or bad. It will be seen to be

<sup>1</sup> It was not, however, the German newspapers alone which trampled upon the Belgian people when they were down. In this respect they were emulated, only too successfully, by certain ostensibly neutral newspapers. For instance, *Der Bund*, of Berne (August 30, 1914), commenting on the German announcement of the destruction of Louvain, said: "It is terrible that such judgments as this should still be necessary in present-day wars. But a population which fires on troops must make up its mind to the worst."—TRANS.

<sup>2</sup> Corneille, *La Mort de Pompée*, 1642.

in any case very slight, and in virtually every instance in which it can be traced it can be shown to be deleterious.

Nevertheless it is artists whose enthusiasm for war has generally been aroused more quickly than that of the members of any other liberal profession. Or rather, they are the first to appear enthusiastic, because persons of an artistic temperament are accustomed to give freest play to every impulse of the moment. Even Rabelais<sup>1</sup> says jestingly that the Latin word *bellum* is perhaps connected with the French word *belle*.

Probably no one believes it, but there are still people who say and write that war and the national enthusiasm it creates have caused art to blossom forth. True, this has not always been asserted, for Mars and the Muses used to be represented as opposites. Here, again, Germany has contrived to set the fashion. Every one knows how Erich Schmidt not merely curried favour in court circles, but even acquired Scherer's professorial chair by showing that Frederick II., who used to murder the German language, and his Seven Years' War were the creators of German literature: and since this doubtful achievement, which Mehring,<sup>2</sup> in one of the best pamphlets in the world, has reduced to its proper proportions, this glorification of the influence of war on literature has become fashionable. In reality, there is no sign of anything of the sort; and as regards lyrics and poetry I purpose to prove this in dealing with war poetry.<sup>3</sup> Here, however, I will confine myself to a few remarks about the plastic arts.

Not many words need be wasted on the subject of battle pictures, beloved of crowned heads and the terror of directors of picture galleries. In olden times, when hand-to-hand fighting still took place, there might have been something inspiring about a battle. The *Gigantomachy* and the *Battle of Alexander*, for instance, are undoubted works of art,<sup>4</sup> which possess a value of their own, apart from their subject. In the time of the great Flemish painters fine figures of warriors engaged in hand-to-hand fights were still painted. Rubens' battle pictures are

<sup>1</sup> François Rabelais, *Gargantua et Pantagruel*, Livre II., Prologue (1550).

<sup>2</sup> Franz Mehring, *Die Lessing-Legende, eine Rettung*, Stuttgart, 1893.

<sup>3</sup> See §§ 182-185.

<sup>4</sup> Whoever would fain realise the value of one such battle picture should lose himself in contemplation of Michael Angelo's Florentine battle cartoon of 1504, which, just because it was a work of art, was so far from pleasing those for whom it was executed, who wanted a *battle picture*.

some of them magnificent, but even in his time it was the animal painter Wouwerman<sup>1</sup> who was most famous as a "battle painter." For him a battle picture afforded an opportunity of showing his white horses to advantage, just as Terborch<sup>2</sup> in his pictures of soldiers thinks only of showing of what fine material the foot-soldiers' trousers were made—with which fact, as a painter, he is somewhat reproached.

Then came the period of powder-and-shot pictures, which we are almost tired of hearing derided; and then the end of the battle picture proper had come. Any pictures of this kind which have since been painted were produced not for their own sake but because they were patriotic in character; and it is no mere chance that not a solitary one of these patriotic pictures has proved to be a real, original work of genius. The old masters who painted the gold-framed Madonnas were likewise inspired thereto by their subject, and how fine an achievement was theirs! Apparently it is true that the great artists' minds were dominated by a desire to express their conception of the Virgin, and the small minds only by enthusiasm for battles.

No one, moreover, has ever been carried away by the conception of a battle as such, for the few notable nineteenth-century battle pictures were painted only when men's feelings had been stirred by some special event. Two periods can be distinguished: the French or Napoleonic period and the German period, about 1870. The following painters belong to the former: Antoine Jean Gros (1771-1835), Horace Vernet (1789-1863), Ernest Meissonier (1815-1891), and Raffet (1804-1860). It is worthy of note, however, that Jean Gros's most famous picture, *Les Pestifères de Jaffa* (Napoleon contemplating those stricken with plague at Jaffa), shows the Emperor just when he is doing something which has no connection with war.

Among German war painters may be mentioned Wilhelm Camphausen (1818-1885), Carl Bleibtreu (1829-1892), Anton von Werner (1843-1915), Arthur Kampf (1867), Carl Röchling (1855-1912) and Adolf von Menzel (1815-1905). As every one

<sup>1</sup> Philip Wouwerman (1619-1668) was born at Haarlem, and is especially famous now as a painter of horses. He had two brothers, whom he taught and who were both artists, the one a landscape painter and the other a painter of landscapes and canals.—TRANS.

<sup>2</sup> Gerard Terborch or Terburg (c. 1617-1681) was a Dutch painter born at Zwolle. His great characteristics are accuracy and finish. His portrait, as a Town Councillor of Deventer, is in the Hague Picture Gallery.—TRANS.

knows, Adolf von Menzel is the only one of these who is of any importance ; and he drew his inspiration, not from the glorious campaign through which he himself went, but from the vanished beauty of the Frederickian world.

Even allowing that here and there a painter of genius has felt interested in great generals, nevertheless painting unquestionably owes virtually nothing to war as war, at any rate nothing which can be compared with what art owes to Christianity. When we come to such a thoroughly "social" art as architecture, we find that it owes even less to war than does painting. The famous "barrack-like" style of building is a synonym for a monotonous style. That soldiers, moreover, even now live in tents or earthen huts, at any rate when really on active service, is but another proof of the conservative and retrogressive nature of war.

Beyond this there is really hardly anything to be said about the direct connection between war and art, for it is scarcely worth while mentioning the beautifully ornamented cannons of the so-called *baroque* period.

Neither does the present war, despite all the enthusiasm about it, seem as if it meant to do much for art, although it affords no lack of possibilities of inspiration. As we all know, in the early days numbers of photographers and cinematograph operators were ordered to the front, for those in command thought it would be such a fine thing afterwards to rattle off a series of victories even faster, if possible, than they had been won.<sup>1</sup> But even the cinematograph system, like so much else, was found to require modification. It was soon perceived to be a mistake to have to rely upon reproducing scenes with photographic fidelity ; and in order to lend the desired life to "empty battle-fields," a number of artists were dragged to the seat of war. By dint of judicious instructions and discreet censoring, it was not difficult to ensure the pictures of these gentry fulfilling reasonable patriotic demands far better than photographs ; but only a very few of the artists taken to the front could be made to produce pictures which, even from the artistic standpoint, were superior to the old photographs. This result may seem regrettable, but at all events it proves that though war may be able to make paintings more patriotic it is not able

<sup>1</sup> For instance, at the beginning of the abortive attack on Verdun in February, 1916.

to make them more artistic—about which opinions will differ according to what each individual expects from art.

Now, these artistic gentry, whose names I do not wish to mention, really did see something of war. They had free access to all battle-fields, no matter how inaccessible these were rendered by barbed-wire entanglements and other defence works. Motor-cars were provided for them: they were shown lacerated limbs and dead horses, men frozen to death in the Carpathians and others drowned in the Masurian Lakes. They could hear the roar of the famous motor batteries, and even, fortune favouring them, of the still more famous 42's. Hindenburg and Mackensen, however unlike they might otherwise have been, resembled each other in having each found time to sit to them. In short, they were made free of all the beauty and greatness which modern war has to offer. And with what result? *None*, except for the fact that we possess no published pictures in which more German than enemy dead can be counted. At best some of the better sort of artists felt a little "seedy" afterwards.

Thus does war transform all our notions of truth, goodness and beauty. But—it does not improve them.

## CHAPTER IV

## THE CHOSEN PEOPLE

## I. ADVANTAGES NATIONS ARE ALLEGED TO DERIVE FROM WAR

§ 52. THE INJURY TO THE WORLD IN GENERAL.—If war is to be considered as an episode in the struggle for existence, then success in it would have in some way or other to benefit not merely a single nation but mankind as a whole. That is, it must somehow promote Man's welfare or comfort, or further his intellectual or material advancement. Hence every grain of corn harvested, every new kind of lamp invented, every method of production which saves human strength, everything which human labour or human genius creates for the use of Man, benefits the world in general. Every grain of corn will feed some human being, every lamp will give some one light some evening, and every improvement in labour-saving machinery will afford some one free time and leisure for self-improvement, study or research.

But war creates nothing substantially valuable. Possibly a war may once have enabled some nation to get some good out of life which it could not otherwise have procured, just as pocket-picking may have done for some individual. This, however, cannot have happened often, and in any case the victor cannot increase his well-being by more than the amount which the vanquished loses by being deprived of the reward due to him for his labour. At best, therefore, war may cause a transference of well-being but assuredly not an increase of it, quite apart from the fact that in general the less capable but physically stronger individual is favoured at the expense of those who are more capable but weakly.

In reality the results are still more deplorable, for war destroys what is substantially valuable. Houses are shot to pieces, crops ruined and human beings killed; but nothing of the sort is produced. Hence, however much transference of well-being there may be, the balance is on the wrong side, even if, as Karl



Weber<sup>1</sup> says, "a few ministers, tradesmen and Jews" may make handsome profits. *Consequently not only war itself but also all work connected therewith is a waste of energy from the outset.* Moreover we ought to reflect that whoever *produces anything useful* enables others to rest, but whoever *destroys anything useful* obliges others to replace or regain it.

The few who profit by war, however, who are mostly also those who give the lead, have only too frequently no interest whatever in preventing war. Even in a very unsuccessful war, they hardly stand to lose much. Whatever happens, they are the gainers, and they it is who make wars. Bismarck once said :<sup>2</sup> "The majority are usually not at all inclined for war. War is kindled by minorities, or, in absolute monarchies, by rulers or cabinets," which is self-evident. What is significant, however, is that *Bismarck* should have said this, for these words<sup>3</sup> prove him to have been convinced that, if the peoples could always have their own way, there would be no more wars. At any rate only the people in general have a real interest in making an end of war ; and if this is ever to be done, then the peoples absolutely must get matters into their own hands.

No one need imagine that Hague Conferences summoned by Russian or other absolute monarchs will ever make serious efforts to ensure peace. None save those interested in the realisation of an idea are in a position to bring it about, and as only mankind in general are uniformly interested in an end being put to war, only mankind in general will be able to effect anything.

Each individual nation may continue to hope that with the help of exceptionally good cannon, airships or submarines, it will be able to wrest to itself in war some special privilege unconnected with labour, and therefore greatly coveted by the majority of mankind. Such calculations may or may not be correct, and are certainly sufficiently vague. But for the world in general it is clear as daylight, clear beyond possibility of mistake, that war is bad business. For the world in general war means loss.

<sup>1</sup> Karl Weber : *Demokrit oder hinterlassene Papiere eines lachenden Philosophen : Abschnitt über den Krieg* (Democritus, or the Posthumous Papers of a Laughing Philosopher : Chapters dealing with War).

<sup>2</sup> Bismarck's speech in the Reichstag on February 9, 1876.

<sup>3</sup> Kant once made a similar observation, but in the form of a definite demand : "To obtain peace the form of government ought to be republican."

When, therefore, the world in general really does wake up, then will general and lasting peace be assured. Peace does not mean the German Empire, nor the *status quo*, nor the "Holy Alliance," nor the "European balance of power," but international democracy—that and nothing else. International democracy need not begin by enforcing peace, but if ever it does *exist*, then it goes without saying that it will not be able to *subsist* without peace.

§ 53. THE ADVANTAGES OF WAR TO AN INDIVIDUAL NATION.—It is hard to say whether a war has ever helped any nation to rise. In reality, during the perpetual wars of past times, with their vacillating fortunes, every nation has sometimes come off victorious, to which fact its rise might be attributed. Nevertheless it is a striking fact, and one which affords food for reflection, that the Chinese and the Jews, the only nations which have succeeded in holding their own for three thousand years, have scarcely ever waged wars, and if they did were invariably beaten.

It can be positively asserted that never has a nation perished because of having been beaten in war. An army of conquerors in enemy country can be destroyed, even in certain circumstances absolutely exterminated, as happened to the armies of Hannibal, Teja<sup>1</sup> and Napoleon. But after all this merely proves that their preceding conquests availed nothing. A city can also be destroyed, and all its inhabitants slain; and the destruction of such a city as Carthage, to which large tracts of territory had been in the habit of paying tribute, produces the impression of the downfall of a great empire.

No true nation, however, has yet been exterminated by war in its own country, although sometimes this may happen afterwards, for a declining, dying nation will of course lose wars. But we must not extend this paradox so as to make it mean that a nation which has lost a war is bound to rise afterwards. At all events we know with absolute certainty that in the case of all the nations whose decline we are witnessing to-day, that decline was not caused by war. The Red Indians, for instance, did not succumb to bullets but to alcohol and disease. Similarly, the Malayans are dying out, although they have never been conquered. But the *negroes*, on the contrary, are by no means a

<sup>1</sup> Teja (Teia or Teias) was the last king of the East Goths. He went to the assistance of his brother Aligern, who was besieged in Cumæ, and after fighting two months a desperate fight against superior forces, he fell in 553, and with him the greater part of his men.—TRANS.

declining race; and despite their never having won victories, at any rate not in America, they are beginning to become a danger there.

In this very broad sense, therefore, it is certainly not true that war operates selection. It was believed, however, that a nation could obtain so many advantages through a successful war that afterwards it would be able to live more easily, and consequently to rise. Now, in times long past there were undoubtedly advantages in making war. A savage had only to win a victory in order to obtain everything he wanted. From his enemies' already prepared fields he could harvest crops which he had not sown; stolen herds of cattle supplied him with food and clothing; and even his captured enemies were useful as slaves. Later on, accumulated stores or perhaps treasures of gold and silver made war still more profitable.

Hence so long as wealth consisted solely or at any rate mainly in accumulated and transportable stores and supplies, wars continued to be profitable, and a strong, brave and enterprising people had great prospect of success in them. But now the wealth of an individual or a nation mainly depends on credit, that is on the fact that his or its signature to a bill or cheque is always honoured. That is, it depends on things which are not transportable, nor there and then transferable. This of necessity means that robbery and violence have become as uncertain and unprofitable as honest labour was in primitive times, for it has become impossible to confiscate wealth.

Whether this statement, which Norman Angell<sup>1</sup> endeavours to prove theoretically, is of quite unlimited application, would be very difficult to determine. It would almost seem as if, at any rate in private life, exploitation still continued profitable throughout the world. Large contractors and large landed proprietors everywhere earn vast sums, in part certainly by means of labour performed not by themselves but by a thousand others dependent on them; and many a *Tchinovik* still continues plundering, very often according to old and time-honoured methods. Might not what is possible for the individual, however, be also in time possible for large communities? The only question, therefore, is whether war is really a practical method of personal enrichment.

§ 54. THE UNPROFITABLENESS OF WAR TO-DAY.—From the

<sup>1</sup> Norman Angell's *The Great Illusion*. Heinemann, 1910.

purely business standpoint war is certainly not a practical method of personal enrichment; and in view of the vast amount of capital swallowed up by a modern war not even the victor can hope ever to see his outlay again. If we reckon only the direct expenditure on army and navy, together with the loss of valuable work which might have been done by the recruits annually called up, and take no count whatever of the enormous additional losses caused by continued upheaval, we find that since 1870 Germany has spent on war and preparations for war a sum which, if capitalised, would amount to-day to about two hundred thousand millions.<sup>1</sup> It is quite obvious that such sums can never be recovered, either by war indemnities, or even by an annual tribute. In order to collect an annual tribute, indeed, more millions would be required for the armies whose duty it would be to wrest it from the population.<sup>2</sup>

That there is no pecuniary advantage to be gained from the occupation of territory is also obvious so long as private property is not interfered with, which probably no country to-day would either wish to do or be strong enough to do. As for stealing public property, commandeering the Bank of England reserves, for instance, this would be a harmless pleasantry, for they do not contain much, since the basis of a country's wealth is its credit.

It will perhaps be objected that it might be some advantage to a poor nation to occupy a rich country, for the taxes in its newly-acquired territory would yield such large sums that its own tax-payers would be relieved. Let us go to the utmost possible length in our assumptions, and suppose, for instance, that in the present war the 68,000,000 Germans, who on an average pay 40 marks per head in taxes, annexed 12,000,000 foreigners (which no one now believes possible); and that these 12,000,000 foreigners, if similarly taxed, would be able to pay 60 marks each. It is easy to calculate that in this case we

<sup>1</sup> 200,000,000,000 marks, *i.e.*, taking the mark at its pre-war value of about 1s., £10,000,000,000.—TRANS.

<sup>2</sup> £10,000,000,000 sterling is probably an underestimate, but my argument would be unaffected were the amount only half or one quarter or even only one-tenth as large. It is a waste of time, therefore, to endeavour to rectify these or any other approximate estimates, which may subsequently be cited, in order to make it appear that arguments based on them can thereby be rectified. I believe I can confidently assert that all figures quoted in this book are able to stand the test of close scrutiny, in that they prove what they are meant to prove. If this is not always so, then it should be proved.

would actually save 2 marks 79 pfennigs in taxes ; but as the war necessary to enable us to do so would impose an additional burden of at least 100 marks on every German, then 100 marks would have to be spent to earn less than 3 marks. Consequently, on closer examination, even this mode of saving turns out to be a great illusion.

War, in short, has ceased to be a paying concern. From the standpoint of natural science, however, this is a matter of secondary importance. What Norman Angell has to say on this subject is well worth reading. What is more important is that war and militarism force a nation on to an absolutely wrong tack. This cannot but do harm—harm which can at any rate be partially expressed in terms of £ s. d.

The construction of fortifications impedes the growth of cities and causes land to be withdrawn from cultivation. The fact that the state needs strategical railways and plans its railway system accordingly, means that not enough attention can be paid to the convenience of railway time-tables. For instance, it is military opposition which has hitherto prevented the electrification of railways and the utilisation of the water-power of the Alps. Again, the fact that the state only supports such industries as may be useful to it in time of war causes the labour and abilities of millions of human beings to be expended on things which are really superfluous. It goes without saying that, owing to the possibility of war, all kinds of property must be senselessly accumulated where it ought not to be ; that whole branches of industry are forced into unproductive channels, and that, owing to continual uncertainty, every one in general is hindered in the free and full development of his capabilities.

But setting aside all this enormous loss and injury, let us consider only the incontestable facts that about four per cent. of the male working population of Germany are permanently withdrawn from their work owing to universal service, and that about twelve per cent. of her total income is directly expended on military objects. This means that war directly absorbs, even in peace time, about one-sixth of man's entire capacity for work, and that war's demands are therefore higher than those of the church, which, as we know, has been content with one-tenth.

Now, even this tenth was admitted to be ruinous, and one

day, when men look back on the past, what will be said of a sixth, which, however, probably amounts to a third, owing to the indirect losses entailed? Were there no longer any risk of war, all human beings would need to work one and a half to three hours less per day. That is, their daily leisure would be increased by so much. We would then have at any rate a seven hours' day, probably even a five hours' day; and what this would mean for the progress of mankind is scarcely conceivable. By working harder than formerly, which would result in still further saving, these comparatively brief working hours could be confined to a single shift; and if a man worked in the morning, then he would have the rest of his time for physical and mental recreation and improvement.

These reflections are amply sufficient to show how diametrically opposed to Man's material and intellectual interests are the consequences of a state of war prevailing in Europe. War forces mankind to do what is unnatural, and fighting like animals perpetuates the animal state in Man, and makes it impossible for him to develop along specifically human lines.

This means that Man's position in Nature is not properly appreciated. We know how much of the animal still lurks in us, and for this very reason we ought daily and hourly to assert our human qualities. The dying Pascal understood life when he wrote, during the years of his long decline: "Il est dangereux de trop faire voir à l'homme combien il est égal aux bêtes, sans lui montrer sa grandeur. Il est encore dangereux de lui faire trop voir sa grandeur sans sa bassesse. Il est encore plus dangereux de lui laisser ignorer l'un et l'autre; mais il est très avantageux de lui représenter l'un et l'autre."<sup>1</sup>

Any one who has understood this wonderfully profound reflection will feel it only natural and logical that in another passage (VI. 9) Pascal should describe war as a ridiculous outrage on the conception of humanity.

## II. NATIONAL EXPANSION OR COLONISATION<sup>2</sup>

§ 55. NECESSITY FOR AND ADVANTAGES OF COLONIES.—When we speak of colonisation we usually do not mean the same thing

<sup>1</sup> Blaise Pascal, *Pensées*, Part I. 7.

<sup>2</sup> In a courageous book on colonies and colonisation (*Der englische Gedanke in Deutschland. Zur Abwehr des Imperialismus*. Reinhardt, Munich, 1915), the last

as occupation. When it is desired to spare a people, then, in accordance with present-day custom, their lands are occupied. A colony, on the contrary, is at any rate so far new territory that no one minds exterminating the inhabitants, or else allowing them to live only in a state of inferiority, as slavery, for instance. This latter kind of colonisation was recently proposed by Herr Delbrück, in *Das afrikanische Indien*. This he did because, owing to the heavy drop in the German birth rate, there seemed no prospect of any territories outside Germany being settled by a population of German race. We are here once more confronted with the primeval law of growth. Everything tends to grow, even every community, and if it can no longer do so by natural means it attempts to do so by unnatural means.

Formerly, when princes alone represented a state, lands were acquired by inheritance, purchase, or marriage, and occasionally also by war, all which was consistent with the conditions of law and order then prevailing. Nowadays a nation as such is assumed to be entitled to an independent existence, and likewise to self-representation. Accordingly this tendency to grow finds expression in an endeavour to make nations grow. Strivings after national expansion, however, are quite as indefinite as the conception of a nation. In the main a nation is held together by community of race, civilisation and language, and because all its members recognise the same frontiers. Now each individual's main desire will be either for increased population, extension of the national language, improved civilisation, or enlarged frontiers, according to which of these he considers most important.

It is now almost universally believed that all these requirements can be satisfied by the acquisition of colonies. They would extend the country's frontiers, and afford room for more population; and even if the latter were not there, it would nevertheless be attracted eventually by the free space afforded by the colony. The national language would be spoken over a publication of Ernst Müller-Holm, there are many noteworthy, and therefore "inopportune" sayings; but unfortunately I was prevented from consulting it. I agree with everything Müller-Holm says about English and German colonising Imperialism, only it seems to me that the great change which has taken place in the last hundred years in the relations between England and her colonies has not been sufficiently taken into account. They were once colonies to be exploited for imperialistic purposes, but now they are colonies attached to the mother country by bonds of sympathy. Subsequently I shall refer to this at greater length.

wider extent of territory, and, as is proved by the example of America, a nation cannot fail to profit by the wider outlook which must result from its having colonial possessions.

Undoubtedly there is much truth in these views.<sup>1</sup> It is easy to understand why every nation should wish to acquire new lands for settlement, and it is well that this should be so. After all, mankind can only progress by means of the selfish but justifiable desire, not perhaps to be sole victor in the struggle for world-domination, but at any rate to take part in this struggle with some prospect of success. Thus each nation hopes that at all events a good deal of its own national civilisation will be preserved, even if all nations should ultimately be absorbed into one universal nation.

Since this struggle will be practically confined to civilisations, numbers will be of importance, for instance in the struggle for language-mastery. Whoever wishes to have any claim even to enter the lists must be able to throw a large number of fellow-countrymen into the balance. And as the Germans are only one-hundredth part of mankind and can only claim three-thousandths of the earth's surface as their own, they must clearly try to expand.

Now, even those who are fully aware that territorial annexation is injurious to their own nationality because of the admixture of foreign elements, still believe that that nationality would be extended by colonisation. Most colonies, it is true, were acquired for other reasons; and Roscher,<sup>2</sup> in his famous division of colonies into "conquistador, mercantile, agrarian and plantation colonies," never once mentions this reason for colonisation. But it is no less true that certain colonies, particularly in America, Australia and South Africa, have conduced to the spread of European races, even if they may not have been originally founded for this purpose. On the other hand, other European colonies, of which I intentionally refrain from citing any instances, have conduced to the spread of Mongol races.

Despite all these events of the past, however, every nation can and ought to colonise for the sake of its own expansion; and all the territory in Europe being occupied, we must attempt

<sup>1</sup> Cf. chap. viii.

<sup>2</sup> Roscher und Janasch: *Kolonialpolitik und Auswanderung* (Emigration and Colonial Policy). Leipzig, 1895.



to get possession of colonies in foreign countries. All which is so obvious as to need no insisting upon.

§ 56. COLONIAL POSSESSIONS AND COLONIAL DOMINATION.—The only question is whether *conquering* a colony is the best way to get possession of it. As Jaurès once pointed out, *colonial possessions* and *colonial rule* must not be identified, "since it is quite possible to possess a colony in which we do not rule, and *vice versa*."<sup>1</sup>

This distinction between possession and rule is a self-evident fact to any one personally acquainted with colonies. It is most apparent in Further India—in that border territory for which the white and Mongol races are always contending. The Malayans were once owners and rulers here; then came the white man, anxious to turn the country to good account, but as neither he nor the idle Malayans would work, they were forced to introduce Chinese coolies. Since then there has been a struggle, in which Europeans, in their love of easily earned profits, let loose Chinese expansion, and thus raised up a mighty enemy unto themselves.

Frenchmen, Englishmen and Dutchmen strive for the mastery, and meantime the Chinaman is working his way gradually up from coolie into proprietor. Indo-China still belongs to the French, but the rice mills, which are the wealth of the country, belong to the Chinese. The Straits Settlements are British colonies, but in Singapore the Chinaman is even now all-powerful; and whenever it is desired to build English schools there, it is the Chinese who have to give the money needed, and consequently it is they who really decide matters. Over the East Indian Archipelago the Dutch flag flies, and the Chinaman is sometimes even now cruelly and inhumanly treated, but his influence is growing.

I myself witnessed an incident there, which is characteristic. A Chinaman and a Dutchman wanted to found a company. To the haughty Dutchman the Chinaman appeared a negligible quantity, owing to the humble position conferred on him by the local legislation. The Chinaman likewise humbly opined that he would never venture to differ from his lofty partner; but, he submitted, as even he must keep control of his own money, he would beg that a clause might be inserted in the

<sup>1</sup> Jaurès, in reporting on the French Colonial Estimates in 1911. *Journal Officiel* of July 2, 1911.

agreement to the effect that "your worship shall have no say whatever in the company's affairs." The Dutch judge assuredly had not a light heart when presiding over the conclusion of the agreement, for in Holland the Chinese are hated; but there was probably no choice, for his fellow-countryman was merely "his worship" and the Chinaman the "humble proprietor." In the East Indian Archipelago the Chinese are beginning to be a nation, and the Europeans are now merely the "ruling caste."

Not even England owns any colony because she one day hoisted the Union Jack over it, but merely because people live there whose feelings and language are English. The British Crown can scarcely be said now to own the British colonies, but at most nominally to rule them. In the hearts of her colonists, however, England lives, and likewise the British conception of a world-wide empire.

Only those capable of tenaciously asserting their national characteristics acquire colonies, and only those who know how to win friends by just dealings can keep colonies. England once made a mistake in this respect, and by her unjust treatment of New York and Boston she lost the United States. She has now learned better; and the very great majority of the Boers who, hardly ten years ago, were conquered by extremely brutal methods, now believe in the justice of England. For this reason and not because of any sort of compulsion, which in no case could England exercise, are these colonies now helping the mother-country; and America, who showed her fist at the Englishman as a ruler, now that her *brother* is in distress is helping him more and perhaps better than if England were governing the United States.<sup>1</sup>

Despite the Star-spangled Banner flying over Washington, America is a British colony in the true sense of the word. America is a British possession because in America also the Anglo-Saxon idea lives. It is not fair to say that it is all due to Yankee love of money-making, although this may have something to do with it. But love of money-making is everywhere. The main point is whether the Americans wish to speculate in German or in English stocks; and here unquestionably sentimental and ideal considerations come into play.

Whoever possesses the art of colonising, whoever tenaciously

<sup>1</sup> It must be remembered that these words were written before America declared war on Germany.—TRANS.

clings to the habits and customs of the homeland, has colonies, whether he incidentally acquires them, as England has done, or whether, like China, he merely conquers them by his labour. These two instances afford admirable proof that colonies depend only upon national character, and not on outward circumstances.

If colonies need not necessarily be acquired by force, what is necessary is to have emigrants who do not go under in a foreign nation, and a form of civilisation to which a foreign nation becomes attached. If, however, a people does not possess this national tenacity, it is useless for it to rule over a foreign people or foreign colonies. In spite of everything these would still remain foreign possessions. If, for example, the Germans could colonise better than the British, they would not first need to deprive England of her colonies: these would become German without that, even under the Union Jack.

It is therefore absolutely useless conquering a colony by war. If the army of a European military state succeeded in occupying the United States of America, this would not produce much effect, unless the entire mode of life and work and the laws and rights there were altered. But if all these were remodelled, in accordance with the principles of a military state, then the inhabitants of this state would quite naturally cease emigrating thither, since the reason why they emigrated was just so as to be able to enjoy American liberty. Thus it might well happen that the only result of the military occupation of America by a European military power would be that that country's influence in America *decreased*.

It is not surprising that the colonies should afford the clearest proof of how little can be decided by force of arms. The competition of the different countries anxious to settle on land is necessarily freer in colonies, and moreover the victory is to the people which proves the fittest, quickest and most adaptable in the struggle for existence. In short, whoever wants to know how genuine victories are won, should go and visit *colonies*, where he may learn something which will be useful to him even in the mother-country.

Let every German who earnestly desires the expansion of his own nationality ask himself and answer the following questions:

1. Why did not the Boers help Germany?
2. Why do the majority of German emigrants go to America and to British colonies, and not to German colonies?

3. Why has German trade become so large in all British colonies and not in a single German colony? And why has it even become large in American colonies, despite the fact that some of the latter are younger than German colonies?

4. Why have the people of Lorraine proved more loyal to Germany in this war than the Alsations, despite the fact that Lorraine contains a greater admixture of French elements, and despite the Alsations being more German in race, and despite their having been far more systematically "Germanised" than the people of Lorraine?

5. Why are the Austrian Poles more loyal than those of Prussia? And why did so many Austrian Czechs fail us?

Any one once grasping the reasons for these facts will realise that national ideas are most deeply ingrained where they are most free from any idea of force, and have no connection with anything but civilisation. That is to say, where the fight is carried on with weapons of life and not of death.

### III. WEAPONS OF LIFE AND WEAPONS OF DEATH

§ 57. THE VICTOR'S EMPTY LAURELS.—Deep down in the human mind a notion seems always to have lurked that not only is right often on the side of the vanquished, but also that it is they who mostly benefit from the fight. It is, to say the least, astonishing that the legend of Rome, Ruler of the World, did not father itself upon a victorious people, but upon the Trojans, the most famous of all vanquished peoples. The only inhabitant of the populous city of Ilion to escape the murderous sword of the Greeks was Æneas (according to others Antenor as well), but the father avenged this one and only descendant, and victorious Greece became a province of the sons of the conquered sons of Troy.

Not many such legends, of which the moral is generally that an unjust conqueror never enjoys the fruits of his violence, can be cited. Even the sober Montesquieu, however, only wrote one chapter concerning the "Advantages accruing to the Vanquished" (*Quelques avantages du Peuple conquis*),<sup>1</sup> and none about the advantages accruing to the victor, which even modern war-lovers seem to think right, at any rate as far as the

<sup>1</sup> Montesquieu : *De l'esprit des lois*, 1748, Livre X. chap. iv.

past is concerned. Thus Steinmetz<sup>1</sup> calls attention to the fact that Alexander's empire conferred the benefits of Greek civilisation on the races which it subjugated, and that in the long run all that the victorious Roman Empire did was to enable the conquered Jews to spread their religion. Karl von Stengel<sup>2</sup> likewise refers to the benefits accruing to Prussia from her defeats in 1806, and to France from her defeat in 1870.

As a matter of fact, if any one derives far-reaching benefits from war, then it is the vanquished. True, there is a prevailing notion that war is only a bad business for the loser. But this is at any rate accounted for in part by the different way in which war affects victor and vanquished. Every nation worth anything at all, after losing a war has always restricted its consumption of luxuries, whereas the victorious nation, thinking how much it has gained by the war, has considered no such restraint necessary, and consequently become overbearing and extravagant.

War brings in its train a certain "superb disdain of life." Whoever must daily risk his life, must not take things too seriously. Now, if the campaign ends gloriously, there is not that moral shock which very speedily forces a conquered people to abandon the martial habits it has acquired in war. Thus the victor, with his feeling of superiority, imagines that he can go on not taking matters too seriously, even under the altered conditions of peace.

After all, war is a "business" like any other, and it is comparatively immaterial that it should be "cruel and violent." Now, whoever learns one business, forgets the others. A white man who has been accustomed to be treated somewhat as a superior being for a time in the tropics, is often years before being able to feel at ease again in his native land. Any one who has played at being master, even for only a few days, fights shy of being a servant again; and any one who has played at soldiers for a time becomes a soldier.

If a nation is often at war, it becomes warlike, and unlearns its peaceful occupations. War, however, cannot do more than protect civilisation, which must be built up on peace; and hence a time comes sooner or later to all martial peoples when they have nothing left to protect. All they can then do is to collapse.

<sup>1</sup> *Die Philosophie des Krieges* (The Philosophy of War), by Dr. S. Rudolf Steinmetz, p. 40. Barth, Leipzig, 1907.

<sup>2</sup> Stengel: *Weltstaat und Friedensproblem* (World-wide Empires and the Problem of Peace), 1909, pp. 108 and 112.

Usually a stronger nation has meantime appeared to rob them of everything which they once stole from others ; but this need not happen, for a victorious nation perishes of internal decay bred of trust in its own victorious armies. Even the Psalmist realised this, and at a time when his sacred books were still full of war and rumours of war. In the sixty-sixth Psalm he rejoices that *dissipatæ gentes, quæ bella volunt* (" He hath scattered the people that delight in war ").

Even more striking are words written by the Chinese philosopher Lao-tse two thousand five hundred years ago. In the Tao-Te-King this atheistical founder of a religion says : " Is a man strongly armed, then shall he not win." By this he means—what he elsewhere explicitly states—that as with plants so it is with human weapons. Hard wood is dead, but the young soft shoots at the top of the tree and at its roots are alive. Now it is by means of these living growths that the plant makes headway ; by their means it spreads, procures sustenance, grows and perfects itself. Here already we have the natural scientist's point of view about war.

So it is with Man. What this practically means was once defined with startling plainness by the shrewd Li-Hung-Chang to General Waldersee, who wondered how the Chinese could look on so calmly while European troops were killing thousands, perhaps millions, of their compatriots. But Li opined that this mattered comparatively little. Once upon a time, he said, the Tartars (Mongols) came—not with cannon and bayonet, but with what were then modern weapons—bows and arrows. The Tartars always won, and they too slew millions of Chinese : indeed, the Chinese had never won a single battle. " But," continued the disciple of Lao-tse, smiling, " where are the Tartars now ? "

Yes, where are they ? China had no powerful weapons capable of deciding a single battle on the battle-field, but she did have those " living weapons " wherewith far more terrible and cruel fights are won, wherewith the fate of nations is sealed and whereof we shall have more to say anon.

§ 58. THE DECAY OF WORLD-WIDE EMPIRES.—The slightest consideration of history, however superficial, confirms the fact that never has a nation reaped any fruits from its victories. Luther clothed the same thought in the fine line :

" Mit unsrer Macht ist nichts getan "

(Our power availeth nought),

and elsewhere he quotes Hannibal as an instance of this, for despite the Battle of Cannæ, perhaps the most glorious in the history of the whole world, he afterwards came to a shameful end. Where are the empires of Alexander the unconquered and Tamerlane the unconquered? Attila, the scourge of God, was merely an episode, like Pugatscheff, who is already half forgotten, and who had no influence whatever on the history of the world. What did it avail Charles XII. to have conquered Russia, Denmark and Poland? Or Napoleon to have conquered Europe? Of what use were the hecatombs of dead slain by order of Zenghiz Khan, and the countless victims of the Crusades? Or what was the result of the irresistible onrush of the victorious Arab hordes who once overflowed all the Mediterranean countries? Even fairly lasting conquests were, in the very last resort, always in vain. The vast empires of the East, built up on war and oppression, endured but for a day and then crumbled to pieces, and those of the West likewise perished.

The huge Spanish empire, on which, in the sixteenth century, the sun never set, has degenerated into a second-rate power. At the beginning of the succeeding century the Dutch States-General were the first sea-power in the world; but only a few years after de Ruyter had sailed victoriously up the Thames with his fleet, Holland was obliged to secede. Without force of arms, England won, owing to her geographical position, her commercial system and her capacity for adapting herself to modern conditions; and although she was Holland's ally and close personal ties subsisted between the two countries, for William of Orange, King of England, was Stadtholder of the Netherlands, nevertheless she forced Holland out of her position as mistress of the seas. At the end of the seventeenth century Sweden, after the victories of Gustavus Adolphus and Charles XII., was admittedly one of the foremost Great Powers; but by the time of the Revolution she had already sunk to the level of a small, insignificant country. After all, Holland's naval and Sweden's territorial ascendancy were merely artificial constructions, which did not owe their existence to any of the true elements of power. They must have, and perhaps it should be said that they ought to have collapsed, which shows the folly of a nation's straining itself to the utmost in war and thus wasting its strength.

Further analogies might be drawn from Spain, Portugal and Venice, whose colonial empires, or rather empires made up of their customers, increased out of all proportion to the strength necessary to hold them together. Hence Machiavelli's apparently paradoxical saying that Venice had never been more powerful than when she did not possess an inch of land in the Italian peninsula. And what has it profited France or Sweden to have been in occupation of German territory? Or what has it profited Germany to have occupied Italian or Polish territory?

Shakespeare's historical plays, and particularly a national epic such as *Henry V.*, cannot be read now without a certain feeling of pensive melancholy. In Shakespeare's time Henry the Fifth was "the mirror of all Christian kings" and Agincourt "the greatest day in English history." It was symptomatic for the history of the world that ten thousand citizen archers should have shot to pieces the almost five times greater knightly army of the Constable of France. But what were the practical results of France's brown earth having drunk the red blood of eighteen thousand of her best sons? For two years England ruled over France, and it was just at this time that the House of Burgundy, under John *Sans Peur* and Philip the Good, attained the zenith of its power. Fourteen years after Agincourt the Maid of Orleans freed and crowned her king, and everything was once more as of old—save that oceans of blood had been senselessly shed—senselessly and after all ingloriously too, for who now ever thinks of Agincourt and the king who once won a battle there?

§ 59. THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF WAR.—But even leaving out of count a country's power and influence abroad, and considering only its internal conditions, we nevertheless find that it is the vanquished rather than the victor who comes off best. War has no beneficial effects on national well-being. It neither raises a nation's standard of civilisation nor uplifts national sentiment. This of course can be better observed in modern wars, because the direct effects of war are here easier to survey.

As I have already hinted, the tendency of trade after a war is so to develop that, although conditions may be almost equally unfavourable for both combatants, yet it is almost always the victor alone who has to endure economic depression, whereas in the country of the vanquished a period of commercial prosperity usually sets in. Most instructive for Germany in this respect are probably the results of the Franco-Prussian War,



since which time economic conditions generally in France, now freed from the demoralising rule of the Empire, have been noticeably prospering. All who know France have attributed this to the fact that after being invaded, she, who before 1870 thought she might aspire to the overlordship of the whole world, learnt to work again.

In Germany, on the other hand, the huge war indemnity made every one imagine that all was going on very prosperously, until the so-called "boom" came about in 1872.<sup>1</sup> A great deal more champagne was drunk, and traces of this period are even




FIG. 3.—Number of vessels owned by the Saxon-Bohemian Steamship Co. between 1850 and 1880.

now observable in the showy and tasteless decoration of the houses, furniture, etc., of the time.

All this extravagance, which had nothing substantial behind it, led to an excessive desire for commercial expansion. Hence the great "smash" and the ruin of thousands of people. Even Bismarck said in the Reichstag on May 9, 1872: "We know that France is bearing the difficult commercial conditions at present prevailing in the civilised world better than we are; and that her budget has increased by a million and a half—a sum not raised by a loan; and we see that her resources are better than ours, and that, in short, in France there is less complaining about hard times."

As a result of the commercial depression, there was an enormous increase in emigration from Prussia. Before 1866

<sup>1</sup> *Die Gründerzeit* it is called—the "business-founding time."

this amounted on an average to about forty thousand annually, but by 1873 it had reached about one hundred and fifty thousand. This immense waste of human material of course alone represents a capital very, very much larger than all the hundreds of millions received from France.

What, therefore, did Prussia gain by her victory, or from her war indemnities, or from the commercial treaty in her favour? Merely to show what I mean and without laying any undue stress upon this single instance, I give the diagram on page 148, the curved line in which indicates the number of vessels belonging to the Saxon-Bohemian Steamship Company. The influence, small though it be, of the disturbances which




FIG. 4.—Increase in the population of Berlin in the nineteenth century.

led to the war of 1859 is clearly traceable, as also are the after-effects of 1866 and 1870-71. The after-effects of 1866 were of course considerably felt by such a company as this.

I would like to add that the number of steamers rose from three to seventeen, that is by fourteen, in the fifteen years between 1850 and 1865; while in the next fifteen years (1865-1880) their number only rose to twenty, that is by three, which in absolute numbers is a nearly five times smaller increase. In the years of peace, therefore, the increase was almost five hundred per cent., but in the ensuing period, of equal length but broken by wars, it was only eighteen per cent.

The above diagram (Fig. 4), the curved line in which indicates the increase in the population of Berlin, should likewise prove interesting.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The figures are based on the Festival publication of the Royal Statistical Office of Prussia for 1905.

It is impossible to calculate all the economic advantages and disadvantages of a war, but there is one point to which I wish to draw attention. The surest indication of a country's industrial development is probably the increase in the number of its steam-engines. Now, if we consider the multiplication of steam-engines in the period 1860-1870 as compared with the decade 1870-1880, we shall arrive at the following interesting table, which throws a lurid light on the effects of war :<sup>1</sup>

Name of Country.	Increase or Decrease in number of Steam-engines used.
Germany . . . . .	-30 per cent.
Austria and Belgium . . . . .	-20 per cent.
France and America . . . . .	0 per cent.
England . . . . .	+15 per cent.

It is obvious that the heaviest decrease occurred in the victorious Germany, whereas vanquished France at all events maintained her former standard. The country which comes out best, however, is England, the smiling onlooker who took no part in the game.

We are altogether far too often deceived by the fact that diagrams frequently show how this, that, or the other national source of wealth has increased in Germany since 1870 ; and we forget that it generally increased still more *before* 1870. What makes such comparisons more difficult is that before this year the statistics of all the different component states in Germany were issued separately, whereas after 1870 we have generally only the statistics for the whole German Empire. I have gone through numbers of reports from Chambers of Commerce and commercial undertakings, and practically always found that the increase in the prosperity recorded before 1870 was greater than that recorded after this year. To go all through this material, however, would greatly exceed the limits of this volume, and indeed the subject would require to be dealt with separately.

Even if we review the whole export and import trade of the world, we arrive at the same result. In the thirty-two years between 1870 and 1902, the world's total trade increased from

<sup>1</sup> The figures are taken from an article by K. Th. von Heigel and W. Hausenstein on "Das Zeitalter der nationalen Einigung" (The Period of National Unity), to be found in J. von Pflugk-Hartung's *Weltgeschichte* (History of the World), vol. vi. p. 353.

about £2,470,000,000<sup>1</sup> to about £4,710,000,000,<sup>2</sup> that is, by 87 per cent. Mainly owing to the growth of American, Japanese and Canadian trade, the percentage of trade in almost all European countries decreased; but whereas in France trade fell off only 3.7 per cent., in Germany it decreased by 9.8 per cent.—nearly thrice as much. The more exact figures for Germany, France and England, and also for the world as a whole are shown in the following table. Exclusive of the precious metals, the value of exports and imports was as follows:

	In thousands of millions of marks (One thousand million marks= £50,000,000)				In percentages of the world's total trade.		
	The World	England	Germany	France	England	Germany	France
1872	49.4	12.2	6.0	5.3	24.7	12.2	10.7
1902	94.2	16.7	10.3	9.7	17.7	10.9	10.3
Decrease of the world's total trade by . . .					28.3	9.9	3.7

Here, again, therefore, the effect on the conquered nation has been good!<sup>3</sup>

Similarly with regard to agriculture. If we examine the interesting curved lines showing the increase of domestic animals in Prussia,<sup>4</sup> we shall find that horses, pigs, goats and horned cattle begin to increase in or about 1855, and sheep in or about 1864, and that thenceforth they continued steadily increasing. After the Franco-Prussian War, no trace of any considerable increase is to be found. If we confine ourselves to conditions more or less reflected in all branches of trade and industry, and

<sup>1</sup> 49,400,000,000 marks.

<sup>2</sup> 94,200,000,000 marks. (Taking the mark as=1s.)

<sup>3</sup> These figures afford all the more conclusive proof of the truth of my contention, because even in 1870 the value of Germany's total trade exceeded the value of France's by 700 millions. Despite the very much greater increase of population in Germany, this difference has become less in the last thirty years.

If British trade shows an even greater relative decrease per cent. than that of Germany, this is because in 1870 England enormously outdistanced the latter. In the intervening years Germany to some extent caught up.

<sup>4</sup> Jubilee Atlas of the German Royal Statistical Office, No. 58, p. 71.

avoid singling out special instances, we shall everywhere arrive at similar results.

The conditions after 1870 were not in any way due to mere chance. After the Russo-Japanese War the finances of the victorious Japan were completely shattered, while for the first time since twenty years the budget of the vanquished Russia showed a surplus. After the Boer War British Consols fell twenty per cent., while the conquered Boers, since losing the war, have become a great power, whose wealth has increased to an enormous extent. Even Spain's regeneration dates from the time when she was conquered and all her colonies taken from her, among them the "Cuban Pearl." Spanish Government Stock speedily doubled in value. For further instances Norman Angell should be consulted.

How, indeed, could this be otherwise, since as a rule victory belongs to whosoever is best and most strongly equipped for war? These military institutions are almost automatically extended to the subject nation, and first of all, of course, to the provinces taken from the enemy. The vanquished, in short, think that in the next war they must have their revenge; and therefore they endeavour to imitate their enemy's institutions, seeing that these seem to answer well in war.

§ 60. NATIONAL INFLUENCE.—Thus in the case of every subjugated nation there is an increase of the outward signs of civilisation, such as wealth, order and health. If, therefore, such a nation has but a latent tendency to increase, then it is likely to do so faster than before. It has always been thus. In Exodus (Chapter I., v. 12) we find: "But the more they [the Egyptians] afflicted them [the Jews], the more they multiplied and grew." Every one must know that this is also the case with the Poles to-day, as can easily be proved by statistics, although our official statistics unfortunately do not take this important fact directly into account. In the eleven administrative districts of Bromberg, Marienwerder, Oppeln, Arnberg, Danzig, Posen, Gumbinnen, Königsberg, Breslau, Köslin and Münster, in which more than 10 per cent. of the population is Polish, the average birth rate is 42 per 1000: but in the remaining administrative districts, where there are only a few Poles, it is only 36 per 1000.<sup>1</sup>

In the Polish provinces, therefore, 16½ per cent. more children

<sup>1</sup> Jubilee publication of the Royal Prussian Statistical Office, 1905, II. p. 24.

are born than in the German ones. Now these so-called Polish provinces are by no means purely Polish, the proportion of Poles being only one-third. But if this Polish third causes a  $16\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. increase in the birth rate, then the Poles themselves must have about 50 per cent. more children than the Germans. That is,

To 1000 Germans 36 German children <sup>1</sup> are born.

To 1000 Poles 54 Polish children are born.

Basing our calculations on the proportions of the Poles as proved by German statistics for Prussia in the year 1910—357 Germans to 35 Poles <sup>2</sup>—we get the following algebraical equation :

$$\log. 357 + n \log. 1036 = \log. 35 + n \log. 1054.$$

Here  $n$  equals the number of years, which is easily calculated ; and the equation proves that in the year 2045 there will be as many Poles in Prussia as Germans.

Besides these purely biological considerations, psychology also intervenes, for in every oppressed people the national sense becomes very much stronger. In general this, of course, applies only to modern times, for except the Jews no ancient nation had any genuine racial national sentiment ; it merely felt that it adhered to a particular form of civilisation. (Cf. Chapter VII.) This is understandable, since a people cannot fail to think it would be better for it to become strong if it has just had a practical demonstration of its being allowable for the strong to subdue the weak, and if the unpleasantness of such subjection is daily impressed upon it by numberless petty subterfuges. Moreover, it will naturally assume that there must be many advantages in subjugating another nation; and it will consequently strain every nerve to attain a national prestige equal to that of the nation by which it has been conquered.

We have seen this in the case of every oppressed nation of modern times. Not till Poland was partitioned did the Poles awake to national consciousness, at any rate their national consciousness was incalculably increased thereby ; while that of the Italians can be proved to have been awakened by the Irredentist movement, and France's national feeling now mainly

<sup>1</sup> This figure is taken as representing the average birth rate in the comparatively pure German administrative districts.

<sup>2</sup> Hüber : *Geographisch statistische Tabellen* (Statistical Geographical Tables), 1914, 63rd ed., p. 11.

subsists on the thought of her "lost provinces." Even Germany is no exception to the rule, and German national feeling awakened under the oppression of Napoleon's foreign domination. As Bismarck said to the Jena students:<sup>1</sup> "Without the oppression of foreign rule the awakening of German national feeling in Prussia would scarcely have been possible. Even now, in Austria, German patriotism is the strongest, at any rate, the noisiest, where the German element, although ruler in name, must nevertheless fight for its existence against a foreign people. German patriotism is most noticeable in Prussian Germany, where the German has to contend against French and Frenchlings, Danes and Poles."

The practical lesson from all this, a lesson which might assuredly have been arrived at more easily, is to annoy foreign peoples as little as possible. Any one not observing this obviously common-sense precept injures himself alone.

To cite one instance profoundly affecting every German, how is Germany the better for the Poles being oppressed? For Prussians and German-speaking Austrians<sup>2</sup> Polish oppression simply means a thorn in their flesh. In Austria the Poles have already to a certain extent the upper hand, while in Germany their power is daily increasing. Even Westphalian soil, where perhaps the most pure-blooded Teutons live, is in danger of becoming a Polish wedge; and a Westphalian Pole has already only very narrowly missed being elected to the Reichstag. It is just those who believe in the future of Germany and in the "German idea" who ought sorrowfully to contemplate Austria. In this land, which has been built up only on dynastic principles and on contingencies such as the celebrated Hapsburg marriages, millions of Germans are slowly going under, simply because the conquerors conquer too much and are now in a minority as compared with the mass of the people, who are of foreign origin.

Even Grillparzer,<sup>3</sup> Austria's greatest poet, who all his life long believed in the significance and power of the sword, resigned himself at last to the melancholy conclusion that victory on the battle-field means nothing, and his last poem, written

<sup>1</sup> *Kommers* is the word used. Bismarck spoke at a students' convivial evening or drinking-bout.—TRANS.

<sup>2</sup> "Austrian Germany" is the peculiar phrase actually used.—TRANS.

<sup>3</sup> Grillparzer's *Sämmtliche Werke*, vol. iii. p. 238. Cotta, 1870.

shortly before his death, about Austria's most famous victory, contains four lines testifying to this conviction :

“ Marchfeld ! So ist dein Sieg nicht wahr  
Aus unseres Herrscherhauses frühesten Tagen !—  
König Przemysl Ottokar  
Hat den Rudolf von Habsburg geschlagen.”<sup>1</sup>

Despite all the successes on the battle-fields, two identical conceptions—those of the inward strength of a nation and of inalienable right—have carried the day. In vain were the triumphs of cannon and battleship : in the last resort it was still living weapons which decided the issue.

§ 61. THE SWORD FOR THE WEAK.—The fact that defeat has “ tonic effects ” and victory enervating effects means that the scales of Justice, wherewith War must weigh the nations, can never rest. The oppressed are for ever gathering together to avenge themselves in war on their enemies ; and again and again they will succeed. Hence the wearisomeness and sameness of history, which is merely a ceaseless ebb and flow of never-ending wars. Over and over again has it appeared, and it will appear again in the future, that no country can in the long run be greater than its people ; and no changes can come about unless Man, perceiving that things cannot continue thus, makes a change of his own free will.

It almost seems, however, as if no one would ever profit by all these lessons, and Hegel rightly maintains that “ the only thing history teaches is that it has never taught any one anything.”

In the case of the present war every nation is clearly anxious to prove that it is still youthful and vigorous, and therefore it behaves just like a child, scattering the teachings of its elders to the winds and making experiments on its own account. And the experiments will be made, but it will be too late !

Empires have only endured when, as in Rome, the spade has followed the sword, or when, as in England's case, a colonising civilisation has followed the cannon. Yet this does not go to the root of the matter, for the most deep-seated cause for the success of these two empire-building countries lies in the fact—by no means fortuitous—that both Romans and Britons called and still do call their conquered peoples not “ subject nations ”

<sup>1</sup> Roughly : Marchfeld ! So then is not thy victory truly one, from the earliest days of our ruler's house ! King Przemysl Ottocar has conquered Rudolph of Hapsburg !



but "confederates." A world-wide empire cannot be welded together and govern itself except freely; and wherever this principle of liberty has not been respected, conquest with the sword, no matter how thorough it may have appeared, has never availed aught. Anything may be done with bayonets—only, as Lassalle once said, we must not sit down upon them, and must not use them for trying to conquer countries. Every people ought to try its best to colonise and to spread; but for this purpose it must endeavour to increase its *vital forces*, its living weapons, to the utmost possible extent. Any one imagining he can colonise with the point of the sword is a fool and a weakling. *None save the weak and foolish need a sword; the wise and strong need none.*

## CHAPTER V

## HOW WAR IS BEING METAMORPHOSED

## I. THE DUSK OF THE WAR GODS

§ 62. THE GROWTH OF ARMIES.—The purpose of this chapter is to show that as time has gone on wars and war losses have become greater. Not much can be claimed to have resulted from any attempts made to "humanise" warfare; and that valuable sense of solidarity which used to prevail in armies is tending completely to disappear.

These historical facts might at first seem to destroy all hope of "perpetual peace" ever prevailing. On reflection, however, it will be seen that in the complete change which is coming over war there are so many obvious symptoms of decline that a rapidly nearing end may be prophesied, not only for the present war, but for war in general.

That war once consisted of duels we are even now strongly reminded by the name *bellum*, which is derived from *duellum*. Then "friends" used to lend a hand, and even in Homer's time it was an event of historical importance when a few dozen Grecian princes with their servants besieged a medium-sized provincial city such as Troy, round whose walls a good runner (Hector) could run twice without being incapacitated, and which therefore cannot have been very large. Originally, indeed, wars meant the administration of comparatively mild thrashings, such as are unavoidable among peoples wandering about in small gangs or living in remote villages.<sup>1</sup> In those times it was already an event for a hundred men to be confronting one another.

Even when we come to ancient history we must not form exaggerated conceptions of the size of the armies.<sup>2</sup> The accounts

<sup>1</sup> Cf. the description of Ithaca.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Hans Delbrück: *Geist und Masse in der Geschichte* (Intellect and Numbers in History), 1912. Verlag der *Preussischen Jahrbücher*. Delbrück mentions the fact that at Hastings only 4000 Normans fought, and not 1,200,000 as reported; and that the Polish army at Tannenberg did not number 5,200,000 but only sixteen to seventeen thousand, and so on.

of the vast armies of Darius and Xerxes are mythical ; at all events they were beaten at Marathon by 15,000 Greeks all told ; and the 10,000 Greeks who fought at Cunaxa<sup>1</sup> were a mighty army according to the notions of those days. Even the Roman armies were comparatively small, and their actual numbers must generally have varied between 40,000 and 80,000, since the total number of men in the Roman garrisons in three parts of the world did not exceed 200,000. At present this extent of territory produces about a hundred times as many soldiers.

During the Middle Ages armies tended to become smaller, indeed in most matters pertaining to external civilisation this period was one of general "retrogression." Even the "vast squadrons" of the famous generals of the Thirty Years' War seldom exceeded 30,000 men, and when 50,000 Imperial troops were assembled together once at Nordlingen, this was considered a very large number. Not till the time of the Roi Soleil of Versailles (Louis XIV.) were there armies of 100,000 men, which the "Philosopher of Sans Souci" (Frederick II.) made slightly larger still. Once, indeed, in the spring of 1757, he had actually brought 150,000 soldiers together.

Then came the French Revolution, and the *levée en masse* of 1793 produced an army of 700,000, while in 1812 Napoleon had actually 750,000 soldiers under the colours in Russia and Spain alone. Prussia, on the contrary, despite her considerable expansion, had in 1806 only 200,000 soldiers (including the fortification garrisons), half of them foreigners. After the peace of Tilsit, Scharnhorst thought it out of the question for Prussia, with her 5,000,000 inhabitants, to have an army exceeding 120,000 or at most 150,000 ; while in reality he did not insist upon the army numbering more than 70,000 on a peace footing and 87,000<sup>2</sup> on a war footing. According to Scharnhorst's principles, therefore, the strength of the German army on a war footing would even now only be allowed slightly to exceed 1,000,000 ; and in any case he would have considered more than 1,600,000 or at most 2,100,000 out of the question in Germany to-day. Even the mass levy of 1813, when Germany's "whole military strength was strained to the uttermost," did

<sup>1</sup> About 60 miles north-west of Babylon, on the Euphrates. The battle was fought in 401 B.C., between Artaxerxes Mnemon, King of Persia, and the rival brother, Cyrus the younger, who fell.—TRANS.

<sup>2</sup> *Mémoires des Generals von Scharnhorst*, under date of July 21, 1807.

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not succeed in raising her army beyond 128,571 men,<sup>1</sup> inclusive of men fit for garrison service, which to-day would mean an army of only 1,700,000.

The following diagram (Fig. 5) depicts the sudden and enormous increase of armies within recent years. From time immemorial armies have been comparatively small, and now all of a sudden we are overwhelmed by disaster. That it is a disaster is manifest from the direction of the curved line, which, in the nineteenth century shows an upward tendency, and now seems as




FIG. 5.—The growth of armies.

if it would never cease mounting upwards. This, however, cannot be, and the following considerations will show that we shall again be overtaken by disaster, and this within measurable distance of time. Thus, supposing the tendency of the curve to remain the same as during last century, that is supposing it to increase very much in accordance with the equation :

$$\text{the strength of an army} = a \times at$$

in which  $a$  stands for half a million and  $t$  for time—then in about three generations we should already have armies numbering billions. Now as these would exceed the population of

<sup>1</sup> According to C. von Plötho in *Der Krieg in Deutschland und Frankreich* (War in Germany and France).

those days, even allowing for the utmost possible rate of increase, it will be seen to be *logically* impossible for armies to continue to increase as they have done during the last hundred years. Some cause *must* come into operation which will once more force the curved line to descend.<sup>1</sup> This is not merely a mathematical but also a scientific necessity.

That wars now involve these much larger numbers, therefore, need not alarm any one, especially as this is at any rate partly due to the growth of social impulses and to Man's increased tendency to form associations. Even Homer says that fellow-countrymen do not make war on one another, and this is still so. The only difference is that the aggregates of people who feel as fellow-countrymen have grown larger. Once it was the tribe, then it was the city, and now it is the state, or rather, the union of states, which feels itself a separate entity. The greatness of such entities must of course always determine the greatness of war. That wars should become greater is in itself no proof that human beings have become more warlike and cantankerous, but rather a sign that they have become more peaceful and conciliatory.

§ 63. THE DEATH AGONY OF THE WAR GIANT.<sup>2</sup>—But there is yet another cause for consolation in the fact that wars continue to become bigger and bigger. Whenever anything is to die a natural death, it must first grow great, that is, reach its maximum size. In Germany mice have not become extinct, but first the aurochs died out and the bison, and then the bear and the wolf; and now even our proud stag is kept alive only by artificial means. In nature it is only the big creatures which die out; but everything which is big must and will die, because, in conformity with the inevitable law of growth, it will grow beyond

<sup>1</sup> Even assuming that all human beings increase faster in the next hundred years than any nation has done hitherto, and that then all nations upon earth will be involved in war, and all available men and women take part in the war, there would still be nothing like enough of them. On the other hand, it is worthy of note that, according to this curve, still greater armies will be possible in the next few years.

<sup>2</sup> The word here used (*i.e.*, *Gigantiasie*), signifying the death of giants, hints at one of the most important principles of self-regulation which can be deduced from palæontology. Bones found show that in the course of centuries all living creatures, except insects, which have thus never become extinct, grow and grow, and then, when they have become very large and apparently all-powerful, they suddenly become extinct. The facts can be proved, and the reasons for this phenomenon have been hinted at in §§ 40 and 41. In reality it is the same thing as is called in the German legend "the dusk of the Gods" (*Götterdämmerung*).

the limits of what is possible. This is the profound meaning which the natural scientist attaches to the phrase "the dusk of the Gods," a meaning so easy to understand and yet so full of mystery. Idolised as war is, it too will be hurled from its pinnacle of power. In my opinion, indeed, any one dispassionately contemplating the spectacle of the present war cannot fail to see in it already many signs of the approaching downfall of wars. *Across the boundless field-grey battle-fronts blows a chill, warning breeze, betokening the approaching dusk of the Gods.*

Everything beautiful and characteristic about past wars has vanished—the gay camp life and the bright uniforms, the soldiers' wild spirits, the gorgeous heroism of the valiant "Summoners to the Fray," the men who used to fight in glorious single combats, and then, mounted on a white charger visible from afar, show themselves to their men, and last of all, standing on a distant hill, cause all eyes to be fixed upon them, if only because of the noise made by their trumpeters.

The General has left the battle-field, and now the soldier has left it also, the former to sit in his villa, holding the telephone-receiver to his ear, and the latter to keep watch in the trenches. But the battle-field itself is empty and desolate, though the noise of battle can be heard for miles around.

It is impossible not to think that the battle-field has ceased to be the first consideration. Formerly the scene of battle used to be carefully selected; now we lie down around the countryside, and dig ourselves in. Where we do so after all matters not at all, only there must be a nice long line, as straight as possible, and there the armies lie, often, it is said, only a few yards apart, and make "war."

The bulk of the work is done in quite another way. One man calculates how much copper, gold or iron there is; another, how best to make the supplies of corn, meat, fat, etc., "hold out"; a third, how the railways must be run; a fourth, where, according to the map, his missiles will hit; and a fifth—the General himself—for how many troops he must ask in order to have the necessary "density" on a particular "space." They must not be too few, otherwise the attacking columns will not be deep enough, and there will be insufficient reserves; and they must also not be too many, otherwise there will be difficulty in feeding them. And many other persons are making many other calculations. Whoever calculates best, wins. The fact that

instead of having a single man of genius as General we have now the impersonal mechanism of the *General Staff* may be taken as showing the extreme length to which this new order of things, which first appeared in Prussia, has now been pushed.

Not for a moment do I assert that this mode of waging war is easier than the old way, quite the contrary; and I am firmly convinced that it takes up more time. Frederick II. and Napoleon, when in camp, not infrequently spent some time in "agreeable converse," for Napoleon's many-sidedness, even when on campaign, was admirable; but I am quite ready to believe that Hindenburg does nothing but wage war. But there has been a change since Napoleon's time, a complete change; and there can be no doubt that the old lively, merry war is dead, its place having been taken by something new, something which to me seems to show signs of approaching decay, but which to others may seem to contain possibilities of further developments.

And it may be that they are right, for war has not yet attained its zenith. Once, while Freiligrath was still writing good poems, he described a wondrous vision of the last battle in Europe:

"Zwei Lager heute zerklüften die Welt,  
Und ein Hüben, ein Drüben nur gilt."<sup>1</sup>

This last die in the old game is not yet cast. Neutrals there still are, and perhaps old Freiligrath was right that there must first be some Armageddon, some battle in which the whole world will take part.<sup>2</sup>

If mankind does not voluntarily bethink itself in time, then this last battle will come to pass, but then it will be an end of all things. One thing is certain: if war ever does attain its utmost possible size, then its death must ensue, for if once one half of mankind has had a victory over the other half, who is to go on fighting?

The lines, however, are laid down along which human evolution, whether voluntarily or not, will proceed. And our good railways and steamers, our airmen and radio-telegrams of the future will ensure this course being followed. The horrible aspect of human evolution in the past was just this, that while our technical knowledge and means of communication impelled us to be constantly forming new and larger, more comprehensive organisations, we crazy human beings, instead of using

<sup>1</sup> Roughly: To-day the world is riven into two camps and only a Here and There avails.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. what has been said (§ 34) about Europeans and Mongols.

them as a source of ever-increasing benefits, converted them into a means of ever greater destruction.

However this may be, war will one day have attained its utmost limits. And another thing is certain : that the last war will also be the greatest and most terrible, even as the last Saurian was the hugest of all. This being so, he who knows can afford to smile calmly, despite all the horrors going on, and even though he may perhaps feel the absurdity of these atrocities more keenly than any one else. Our technical knowledge, in brief, is causing war to grow to a gigantic size, and will then slay it. In Nature it is always so. " Ajax falls through Ajax's strength " ; and the enormous speed at which our technical knowledge is progressing affords this consolation, that the dusk of the War Gods will not be long in coming.

§ 64. DEFENSIVE WARFARE AND LYING.—We have yet another cause for confidence. War is no longer accepted as a matter of course, but an attempt is made to impose at any rate verbal limits upon it. Cabinet warfare and offensive warfare, it is said, are wrong, and only defensive warfare is right. If those who talk thus meant what they said, this would be already something to the good ; for before any one can claim the just right of self-defence, he must first have been attacked, and any one who approves only of *defensive wars* is really condemning the possibility of wars occurring at all ; and if every one held such views there would really be no more wars. But men in general do not yet hold such views. All they do, as Thomas Upham<sup>1</sup> says, is to turn war out at the front door in order secretly to let it in again at the back.

But let us put ourselves in the place of some particular nation which always believes that it was the other side which began. The question still remains as to what may really be justifiably defended. In primitive conditions it does not seem to have been difficult to decide in such a case. If a band of soldiers plundered and robbed in any district, the farmers from the neighbouring villages clubbed together and killed the peace-breakers, and this was looked on as legitimate self-defence. Matters at present are far more complex, for this apparently most legitimate kind of defence is now solely confined to those " wild beasts in human shape " denominated *franc-tireurs*. Moreover, for a long while past the defence of one's native soil

<sup>1</sup> Thomas Upham's *Manual of Peace*.



has not been a distinguishing characteristic of defensive warfare, any more than crossing the enemy's frontier is at all a distinguishing characteristic of aggressive warfare, as Belgium's example proves.

This love of lying makes the expression "defensive warfare" a mere phrase. It goes without saying that if any one breaks into a house or invades a country, those concerned have a right to turn him out, although in civilised countries the police are generally used for such purposes. To have a police force, capable of hanging or executing justice not merely on petty private individuals, but even on great generals and republics, is precisely what the chivalrous opponents of robber-barons are aiming at.

But who is to be considered the aggressor? He who fired the first shot, he who first crossed the frontier, or he who sent the ultimatum? It is just he who will always say that he was merely acting in self-defence. Hence to-day it is more usual to seek for the *aggressor* and not for the *guilty party*. But to find him is much more difficult. In my student days I once wanted to defend myself against an obvious literary wrong done me, but my revered professor, the great physiologist Ewald Hering, dissuaded me from doing so. "You say Herr X. made a mistake," he argued, "but he will reply that you are stupid. You object that abuse is no proof, but he will retort that you began abusing him. And so it will go on. You will reproach each other with making misquotations, will make unimportant side-issues the main issue, and will gradually get more and more insulting, till at length you stop, without any result except that you will be enemies for life."

Most of the absolutely unnecessary so-called scientific controversies actually do arise in this way, without any one being really able to say who first began to adopt an unprofessional tone. A tavern brawl or a street fight occurs in just the same way, and so do wars. Men talk and act and misunderstand themselves into war.

From time immemorial the attempt has been made to convert every war into a "defensive war" by shifting the question of the blame from oneself on to some one else; but apparently Gustavus Adolphus, King of Sweden, was the first to set about doing this systematically. When this monarch sailed across the Baltic to conquer Germany, he did so not as

an aggressor but as "defensor fidei" (Defender of the True Faith). This different point of view explains the many different opinions held about him. The wholly ignorant peasants of those days abided by hard facts only, and they have preserved such evil recollections of the Swedish knights and their Swedish jargon and other pious expedients, that even now in North Germany the "time of the Swedes" is synonymous with a "time of terror." Historians, however, at all events those of Protestant inclinations, "rightly" consider that Gustavus Adolphus was on the whole greatly to be admired for having gone to war.

A hundred other things can be just as well defended as religious beliefs; and, to give only one instance, in wars all over the world it is only too often evident that one combatant is defending his so-called rights and the other his liberty. Now, no one any longer attaches the least importance to rights which are mere matters of form. York formally broke the treaty of alliance existing with France, and in the middle of the war went over to Napoleon's enemies, thus inaugurating the war of liberation, which afterwards received the king's sanction. Nevertheless, even in the opinion of still living Frenchmen, Prussia is undeniably entitled to speak of her "Holy War" and of her defence; although it must never be forgotten that the "tyrant of the French" also believed that he was defending the civilisation of Europe united under his command against the threatening inroads of Asiatics, which was his way of describing the hordes of Russian Cossacks. And if we would now solve the questions then raised, we should find that the solution depends upon whether we adopt the Russian, German, French or European standpoint.

The institution of just defensive warfare was considerably extended by the introduction of preventive warfare, the chief characteristics of which have been revealed to us, with considerable candour, by Bismarck.<sup>1</sup> You first choose the time for striking your blow (which, in parenthesis, is after all only the "best way to cut a fine figure"). For strategical reasons this time must be that in which "it is more to our advantage for matters to come to a head quickly than for them to drag on."<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Bismarck's *Gedanken und Erinnerungen* (Reflections and Recollections), vol. ii. chap. xxii., about the Ems telegram.

<sup>2</sup> Moltke's words spoken at a luncheon on June 13, 1870.

Skilful diplomacy must contrive to make out that it is we who have been attacked.<sup>1</sup> Then, if things go ill, there is nothing more to be done ; but if they go well, you can throw overboard any such old wives' tale as defensive warfare, and proudly admit a flourish of trumpets in order to show your statesmanlike qualities.

There are now such a host of conceptions which are possessions worth defending, that the consequence is, absolutely every one nowadays insists upon having gone to war solely for purposes of defence. To see this we need only read the speeches delivered by the Ministers of the Powers taking part in the war of 1914. It should be noted that even if perhaps not all the Ministers of all the ten Powers were really convinced of the justice of their cause, yet obviously the overwhelming majority of the people were so.

Serbia is defending herself against " absorption " by Austria ; Russia and Montenegro are defending their " brother by race " ; Austria her " prestige in the Balkans " ; Germany her " fidelity to the Nibelungen." France is waging a war of liberation and defending the annexed provinces against the " conqueror " ; England is defending the rights of neutrals ; Japan the " Mongolian idea " in the Far East ; and Belgium alone is defending her own soil ; while as for Turkey, no one yet knows what she really is defending, although it would seem that, like Belgium, she did not enter the war entirely of her own free will.

Additional support has been lent to the foregoing definitions of war aims by the attitude of the Socialist parties in the belligerent countries. These parties are certainly pacifically inclined, and averse from any but defensive warfare. Hence their whole-hearted co-operation proves that these official assertions are really believed by the great mass of the people in belligerent countries. The German Social Democrats are assuredly the best disciplined of all, yet their papers contained statements to the effect that the only reason why Germany began her defensive war against Russian Tsarism by attacking Belgium was to be able to invade France by the line of least resistance, and that even the military subjugation of France was to be merely a strategical episode in Germany's self-defence against Russia !

But it is not only the mass of the people who think thus : even the educated classes do so. In England idealists of a pacifist

<sup>1</sup> Bismarck's " elucidation " on the same occasion.

turn of mind stultify their appeals for peace by suggestively intimating that (English) civilisation must be defended against Prussian militarism; while their fellows in Germany think they must defend (German) civilisation against English narrow-mindedness.

That all these views are *subjectively* true we are quite convinced, but for this very reason we must not allow them to be *objectively* true. Nothing could better show the impossibility of accurately defining the conception of defensive warfare than the constant repetition of such dicta. They simply prove once more that, from the purely national standpoint, every war must be just and right if a nation enters upon it of its own free will. It was really not necessary to write any pamphlets on the subject, for they would never convince "the other side," to whom of course "their war" appears no less just and right. Whoever, therefore, desires to investigate the justness and rightness of war as war must adopt a higher standpoint, the standpoint of humanity. But in this case a war seems neither just nor right unless it in some way benefit mankind.

If, therefore, all these discussions concerning the defensive character of wars are absurd, and merely prove the absence of discerning, critical minds, then every time any one attempts to justify his eagerness for war this must be considered as betokening that he is somewhat ashamed of himself. Furthermore, it is a proof that our views concerning war are undergoing a change, and that we are unconsciously condemning war for war's sake. A new truth may even be heralded by a lie.

## II. THE HUMANISING OF WAR

§ 65. THE PRINCIPLE OF HUMANENESS.—Perhaps the most marked characteristic of modern wars is that while on the one hand the scale on which they are waged is increasing, on the other hand an attempt is being made to humanise warfare. All great men, without exception, have told us about the beauty of humaneness. There is nothing surprising in this, for after all the conception of humaneness is the logical deduction from the scientific fact of there being only one *genus humanum*, only one human species.

Among the dull mass of mankind there is probably a vague notion that such ideas are great and fine, but they are no less

instinctively felt to be profound and terrible. Hence men substitute for this dangerous living conception the safe *dead* symbol of a transcendent but unattainable God, whom they need neither resemble nor follow. Thus the deification of Christ in the second century meant simply a falling away from Him. Imitation of Christ had ceased, and a stage was erected for revering Him.

Not one of us but is aware that society to-day does hateful and inhuman things, but it is these very things which it is thought possible to beautify by covering them with a cloak of love of mankind, about which otherwise no one troubles his head; else it would not have come to pass that the word "humaneness" is now never used except in discussing the inhumane. No one talks of treating his own kind humanely, but when there were still slaves, we used to endeavour to be "humane" to them; and even now the conquerors of a country are "humane" to the conquered.

No one considers the question of the desirability of maintaining the death penalty from the standpoint of the laws of humanity, but from that of practical expediency. It must, however, be "humanely" carried out. The guillotine was a "humane" invention, and the fact that we now only shoot, hang, behead, or electrocute our fellow-men proves how much "more humane" we have become since the Middle Ages, when executions were sometimes performed by a wheel.

Thus we have invented humane warfare! A general belief prevails, in fact, that wars can be made juster and less unpleasant by waging them according to methods sanctified by tradition, and now also established by the Geneva Convention of August 22, 1864, by the Paris Convention of 1856, or the Declaration of London of 1908, by the First or Second Hague Convention (of 1899 and 1907), or by some other mutual agreement.

True, some juggling with words is still needful. War in general and in principle substitutes might for right, as all great military writers, Clausewitz, for instance, quite candidly admit as something which goes without saying. Consequently all manner of artifices must be resorted to in order to bring in the Right. Thus Kahl, the well-known authority on criminal law, lays it down quite simply that "war is a struggle of one State against another, but not murder committed by one human

being upon another." On this principle, he adds, the humanity of modern wars is based.

Now these are at best empty words, for as yet no one has discovered how to carry on war between one country and another without killing human beings in so doing. It might be said that it is Man's business to find out how to fight his wars without needing to kill individuals. But then modern warfare would have to be condemned, since it is unthinkable without slaughter on both sides, and without one man murdering another. In principle this view has always been put forward even by the supporters of war. William Lloyd Garrison, founder of the "Non-resistance Movement," scoffed at such humbug when he wrote: "A man must not kill, else he is a murderer. Two; ten, or one hundred men are murderers if they kill. But a nation may kill, and for ten thousand men to murder one another is even a good and praiseworthy action."<sup>1</sup> Having stated this fact, he then innocently asks *how many human beings must there really be for them to be allowed to break God's command?*

Victor Hugo likewise asks, perhaps still more pointedly: "When will nations realise that to *magnify* a crime can never make it *smaller*? If killing be really wrong, then it cannot possibly be an extenuating circumstance that it was done on a large scale: if stealing be disgraceful, then there can be nothing glorious in taking a province."

In La Rochefoucauld's *Maxims*<sup>2</sup> the same opinion occurs, ironically put: "Il y a des crimes qui deviennent innocents et même glorieux par leur éclat, leur nombre et leur excès. De là vient que les voleries publiques sont des habilités, et que prendre des provinces, s'appelle faire des conquêtes."

And now let us see what a German has to say. Schiller puts similar words into the mouth of his Fiesco: "It is disgraceful to empty a purse, impudent to embezzle a million, but inexpressibly grand to steal a crown. The shame decreases with the increase of the sin." Schiller's Genoese character, it is true, does not mean this ironically, but he, too, has to die—and just because he has said this.

Thus English, French and German men of letters seem to have agreed upon this question. Above all in Germany, the land of justice, this reflection frequently occurs in one form or

<sup>1</sup> We have not his *exact* words by us.—TRANS.

<sup>2</sup> De la Rochefoucauld: *Maximes et réflexions morales*, clxxxviii. 1665.

another. For instance, Johann Gottfried Seume<sup>1</sup> has the following striking lines :

“ Wenn Banditen nur mit Dolchen morden,  
Bleicht man ihren Schädel auf dem Holz.  
Aber wenn der Heldentross in Horden  
Länder würgt, so sind die Helden stolz.  
Durch der Politiken schiefe Brille  
Ist Moralität ein Possenspiel,  
Und Gerechtigkeit nur eine Grille,  
Die in Philosophenschädel fiel.”<sup>2</sup>

Friedrich Hebbel<sup>3</sup> phrases it still more pathetically when he says mankind cannot but blush for its worst members :

“ Der Räuber braucht die Faust nur hin und wieder,  
Der Mörder treibt sein Werk nicht ohne Grauen,  
Du hast das Amt zu rauben und zu töten ! ”<sup>4</sup>

§ 66. THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF NOBLE WAR.—The privilege of theoretically explaining how it may be right to apply force was, however, reserved for our own times. We used to be content to describe the formalities connected with placing might before right as legal, or at any rate as fair.

From time immemorial endeavours have been made to draft rules which would enable an enemy country to be decorously destroyed. In so doing the false analogy of “ peaceful competition ” has often been quoted ; or, as was done recently by the German Emperor, Chrysippus<sup>5</sup> words repeated that “ in running a race not even the runner must lay a hand on his competitor’s shoulder, or put out a leg to trip him up.”

But even for sports these rules vary at different times, and the Idi Jidzu allows a leg to be put out. War is assuredly no sport, but deadly earnest, and the essential distinction between sport and serious fighting is that in the latter there is no doubt about its being allowable to put out a leg ; at all events it is done.

<sup>1</sup> J. G. Seume : *Aus der Elegie auf einem Feste zu Warschau* (From an Elegy on a Warsaw Fort), 1794. Seume knew something of war, having fought in the American War of Independence, although as a German constrained to fight on the side of the English oppressors.

<sup>2</sup> Roughly : When bandits murder only with daggers, we let their skulls bleach on the gallows ; but when great heroes in hordes throttle whole countries, the heroes are proud. Through the distorted spectacles of politicians morality is only a farce and justice only a whim that has entered the philosopher’s brain.

<sup>3</sup> Friedrich Hebbel : *Die menschliche Gesellschaft am Scheideweg* (Human Society at the Parting of the Ways), 1841.

<sup>4</sup> Roughly : The robber uses his fist only now and again ; the murderer plies his work, not without horror. Thou hast the office to rob and to kill.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Cicero : *De Officiis*, Book III. chap. x.

Whoever abides by rules and regulations, however, "saves his face," and accordingly there has always been a code of honour for belligerents; and the more horrible the methods of warfare and the more highly civilised the combatants, the more stress was laid on its outward application. "Thus in the savage wars of the Diadochi a chivalry was observable, seldom found otherwise in fighting in times long past."<sup>1</sup> This code of honour, however, was liable to great fluctuations. In Alexander's time night attacks seem to have been proscribed. At any rate he is reported to have said to Polysperchon, who advised him to attack Darius by night, that *he would rather have to bewail a defeat than blush for a victory* ("malo me fortunæ pœniteat, quam victoriæ pudeat").<sup>2</sup>

The Florentines considered surprise attacks improper. At any rate Machiavelli<sup>3</sup> says how, four weeks before declaring war, they rang the "Martinella," a particular bell kept for the purpose; while as for the ancient Teutons, it is known that they made sure that wind and sun were equally in favour of themselves and their enemies.

The ancient Islamites were not allowed to wage war in the holy month of Ramadan, and in Christian countries not so long since it was the universal custom for fighting to cease on Sundays and holidays. Similar customs are narrated of many other peoples, but they seem to have been merely exceptions, resorted to when victory was believed to be assured. In any case no such scruples prevented Alexander from crossing the Danube by night in order to surprise the Getes, whom otherwise he was unable to conquer; or from similarly attacking the careless Illyrians by night. The Florentines, indeed, never had much opportunity of ringing the Martinella, for in their palmy days they chiefly devoted themselves to science and art, and did not wage any serious wars until the days of the Republic were numbered. Consequently they could not become expert military strategists; but after all Florence did produce Machiavelli, and even supposing him not to have been quite so utterly unscrupulous as we were taught at school, yet the tendencies of his *Seven Books on the Art of War* and of his *Prince* are very much against any such things as Martinella bells. Even that greatly extolled Teuton Hermann von Cheruskia, departing from what was

<sup>1</sup> W. Wägner: *Hellas Land und Volk der Alten Griechen*, ii. p. 662. Leipzig, 1886.

<sup>2</sup> Quintus Curtius, iv. 13.      <sup>3</sup> Machiavelli: *Istorie Fiorentine*, Florence, 1532.



supposed to be German tradition, contrived skilfully to exploit the climatic conditions of the Teutoburg wood to his own advantage. In order to be able to make war even in the holy month, Mohammed simply modified his religion; and Sunday rest in warfare has long been abolished. Indeed, despite all the Pope's efforts, it was not possible to induce the belligerents to have a brief armistice to keep Christmas, when, according to Christian tradition, the angels announced "Peace on Earth."

Fine words in general were always chiefly reserved for official ministerial utterances. In practice Lysander's<sup>1</sup> saying was followed that "if a lion's skin is not enough, a fox's hide must be taken." If strength did not suffice, then a little craft was resorted to as well.

Any one trusting too much to international rules of war, any one who went as a flag-of-truce bearer to the enemy, as for instance Count Montfort went to the Count von Nassau at the defence of the Pont à Mousson, which has again become celebrated of late, was only accounted a fool, and taken prisoner.<sup>2</sup> Similarly even Napoleon on the *Bellerophon* did not find that "hospitality" for which he had hoped, and which he was perhaps entitled to expect.

In reality it has always been thus. The oldest war was decided by a horse being smuggled in, and Socrates' pupil, Xenophon, in his *Cyropædia* recommends many and abominable military stratagems, and what is more, in his *Anabasis* he applies them. The Japanese attacked the Russian fleet without having declared war; the *Emden* stuck on a fourth funnel; the English use the flags of neutral countries, etc., etc.<sup>3</sup> But every one considers his own particular stratagem allowable, and only those of the enemy not allowable.

*Non armis sed vitiis certatur*—war is not waged with weapons but with vices. The victor is always right.

"Fu il vincer sempre mai laudabil cosa  
Vincasi o per fortuna, o per ingegno."<sup>4</sup>

And since this is so, and since strategy evidently always

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Plutarch's *Lysander*, c. iv. 100.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Montaigne's *Essais*, Liv. I. ch. v. 1580. ("Whether the captaine of a place besieged ought to sallie forth to parlie.")

<sup>3</sup> Even Dr. Nicolai does not seem to be above repeating unproved and unprovable statements of the German Press during this war.—TRANS.

<sup>4</sup> Ariosto: *Orlando Furioso*, canto xv. st. 1. 1516. [Roughly: Whoever wins, is praised throughout the country, whether he won by chance or by his wits.]

succeeds better than strength, and nothing matters but success, wars in all civilised countries are gradually becoming more horrible and unchivalrous.

The "noble war" between Cæsar and Pompey, in which neither general ever forgot his respect for the other, was followed by the struggle between the Triumvirs and Cæsar's murderers, which was carried on with every kind of slander and contemptibleness. And will any one deny that the Franco-Prussian War was more chivalrous than that of 1914-15?

Treaties, however sacred, make no difference, for, as Bethmann-Hollweg quite rightly told the British Ambassador, in war-time they are scraps of paper. In actual fact, even now, violations of the so-called Geneva Convention are the order of the day in all armies. Doctors, military hospitals and churches are fired upon as often as "*tactical conditions*" require. Men anxious to surrender are killed, either "because the enemy abuses the white flag," or even without any excuse, merely in obedience to instructions to "*give no quarter.*" Furthermore, every one is killed now if, in view of the situation in general, it may be taken for granted that they would surrender if only they were asked. Within the same category of actions must be included the dropping of bombs by airmen on undefended towns, and likewise the sinking of trading vessels without allowing the crews time to save their lives. No one can be reproached for such actions; they are the laws or rather the customs of war; and it is no mere chance that both the most modern weapons of war have made it possible still further to enhance the horrors of war. "We have not got into the way of such weapons yet," it is alleged—which of all the surprises afforded by this war seems to me the most melancholy.

Two innocent, age-old dreams of mankind are now fulfilled. Man, being the only genuine tribion,<sup>1</sup> has used his brain for the invention of contrivances which make of him both a bird and a fish, for he is master of both the heights and the depths. He can fly over frontiers and dive beneath them. The idea germinates in the heads of the fortunate inventors, and frontiers collapse; and what makes the inventors still prouder is the consciousness of having promoted not merely technical science but also the brotherhood of Man. But lo! the military

<sup>1</sup> Amphibion is an animal living in two elements, as the frog, for instance, lives in the water and on land. A tribion is one living in three elements, as Man can now do, and Man only.

commandeer the invention, and use it solely to carry war over those frontiers hitherto erected against it by Man's free will.

How little specialists thought of such a possibility before the war came and more or less disturbed their mental balance, may be shown by a single instance. A few years ago Sir Arthur Conan Doyle<sup>1</sup> warned England to be prepared for emergencies, urging that with the help of submarines her supplies might be cut off and her people starved out. Admiral C. C. Penrose Fitzgerald wrote that he considered any such measures unnecessary, for he did not believe that any civilised nation would torpedo unarmed and defenceless merchantmen. Poor, sentimental Fitzgerald! So you too thought war was a game to be played in accordance with the rules of some Congress or other—and now thousands of people must pay for your folly. But it may be that there are still people *who would rather have been wrong with old Fitzgerald than have won a victory by means of submarines!*

§ 67. THE VALUE OF HUMANITARIAN EFFORT.—Despite all these absurdities, a deep meaning and justification underlies all efforts, even those of the lowest nations, to make it appear as if there were a chivalrous side to war. Even the military honour of barbarians, for instance, forbids the use of poisoned weapons; though in the case of these primitive folk this was not agreed upon by any Convention, but corresponded to deep-rooted and at the time very valuable instincts.

The fighting on the plains of Troy and even the knightly battles of the Middle Ages consisted mainly in hand-to-hand fighting, in which the object was to vanquish your opponent by physical valour and skill. A poisoned lance-point would then have meant that victory would have been not to the better warrior but to him who had contrived merely to scratch his adversary slightly. Hence the horror of "cowardly murder by poison," which is an innate and ineradicable instinct of all normal human beings.

For like reasons formerly the "insidious bow" was proscribed in the wars of Teutonic peoples, and the Second Lateran Council in 1139 forbade the use of the cross-bow—of course only among Christians. To cause the death of heretics by this means was permissible.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Conan Doyle: "Danger! A Story of England's Peril." Published in 1911 in the *Strand Magazine*.

<sup>2</sup> *Die Kriegswaffen* (Weapons of War), by A. Demmin, p. 69. Leipzig, 1869.

Even then this was of very slight avail, for only fifty years later Richard Cœur-de-Lion founded the first Cross-bow Shooter Companies; and the cross-bow soon became the favourite weapon of the Germans. It must be admitted, however, that these nations, in thus disregarding the Papal injunctions, gave proof of a sound instinct, for even then fighting was beginning to develop into battles involving numbers of human beings in which chivalry could no longer exercise any selective influence. Now and not till now have such prohibitions become meaningless, for an enemy miles away is fired upon or the trenches are "peppered" with machine-guns more or less at a venture, and therefore it must be a mere chance whether any particular man is hit. The plain truth is that the more effective a projectile is to-day, the better it is for use in war.

Yes; say the advocates of these wonderful humane theories, but all that is wanted is to put the enemy out of action; he ought not to be killed unnecessarily. In their wars against the Hottentots, they say, the British noticed that these savages, if wounded only in the arm or even in the body with our modern small-calibre rifles, often continued to advance. In such cases it was needful to have more powerful rifles, but in Europe they are not needed.

Now firstly, it often happens with us that wounded men continue to fight or at any rate to shoot, and in particular experience shows that these slightly wounded men return to the front after a few weeks. In Germany eighty per cent. of all men included in war losses are said to be "slightly wounded." Now even if they are out of action for the time being, they are by no means incapable of taking any further part in the war, and indeed they continue fit for service until at length, even without dum-dum bullets, they are shot dead or crippled. At best, therefore, a "humane bullet" may be compared for mercifulness with cutting off a dog's tail bit by bit. The operation is not over till a certain amount of the tail is cut off, or, as the case may be, a certain proportion of the nation is out of action.

Even those who do not or will not see the brutal logic of this, however, ought to be ashamed thus to tamper with the conception of humaneness. To-day, when all the most refined technical methods are in use; when wolf-traps are dug, in which soldiers get impaled on stakes, and then slowly expire; when

barbed-wire entanglements are constructed, which are then "cleared" with machine-guns when enough "stuff" has got caught in them; when wire trellises are made, charged with electricity, and men left hanging dead in them like flies; when the enemy's trenches are syringed with petroleum, so as to burn the people in them, or their unsuspecting occupants blown into the air by subterranean mines; to-day, when poisoned bombs are used; when "airmen's arrows," dropped from the air, pin the enemy "like a frog" flat to the ground; to-day, when shrapnel and grenades, prepared with the utmost care in view of an explosion on the largest possible scale, are employed and human beings torn to pieces therewith—to-day it is insisted that the dum-dum bullet is the acme of brutality. A German journalist, Herr Binder, calls it "bestially cruel," "one of the most barbarous methods of warfare known to history," according to the words used in the telegram of His Majesty the German Emperor to President Wilson.

The immense excitement caused in September by this dum-dum bullet question, whereby even the German Emperor was induced to take the unusual step of addressing a formal protest to the American President, can only be explained by Man's instinctive craving for genuine humaneness, a craving which has assumed such proportions owing to this most cruel and horrible of all wars, that even the smallest "token of humaneness" appears worth striving after.

Even Sternickel, the murderer who committed in cold blood a dozen murders and robberies combined, was proud of never having caused the death of a child, thinking this a sufficient concession to justice. Thus in every human being there is some trace of a sense of shame, and even the combatants to-day say, "True, we do murder and set on fire, plunder and pillage, and offend against the laws of Christian and human justice, but—we do not use dum-dum bullets."

Such reasoning is not merely foolish but even dangerous, for it makes men think that war is consistent with humaneness, and thus helps them to become accustomed to a horrible state of things. *But we must not become accustomed to anything of the sort.* If we want to remain members of the society of human beings we must consider war as at any rate something extraordinary and abnormal. Modern humanitarian endeavours to lessen the horrors of war are, it is true, frequently charity mis-

directed, but still they do proceed from charity, and a charity which, as might be proved, is fundamentally sound.

Now, just as the war instinct shows that courage and love of action still survive in mankind—courage and love of action which only need directing into other channels—so does this longing for humaneness prove the existence of something in mankind which is a guarantee for the future. We may, for instance, consider rules about dum-dum bullets practically useless and possibly even ridiculous. Yet we may and even ought to do everything in our power to ensure the observance of such rules. However small may be the concession made, it still is a concession, and we are thereby rid of a bit of war.

From this point of view even the Geneva Convention and the prohibition of dum-dum bullets are valuable; and it is some satisfaction to be able to state that *no* nation seems purposely to have infringed this prohibition. True, such bullets have been found in the hands of subjects of *all* nations. Dum-dum bullets, indeed, are manufactured by government ammunition factories in all countries for hunting and for soldiers' rifles.<sup>1</sup> Whenever towns are conquered, parcels of such bullets are of course found, in army wrappers. Besides this, it has happened in all armies that a few men, particularly officers who procure their own ammunition, were deliberately provided with such cartridges: but it is one thing to make this statement and quite another to assert, as has been done by both belligerents, that the enemy systematically makes use of dum-dum bullets.

There are other reasons, however, why such regulations are valuable. They are self-imposed limitations, adherence to which is a recognition in principle of the fact that the attainment of its objects in war is not a nation's highest goal.

In 1839, when Belgium's "perpetual neutrality" was proclaimed, Germany and France in particular made war between each other more difficult; and from that day forth they knew that an impassable wall was erected along the frontier of this neutral land, a wall based on their own agreement.

In 1856, when the Declaration of Paris ensured captured vessels being brought before a proper prize court,<sup>2</sup> Man made

<sup>1</sup> The official name for them in Germany is *Halbmantelgeschosse*. [Which might be rendered as "half-length-cloak bullets."—TRANS.]

<sup>2</sup> The details were enacted for Germany by the law of May 3, 1884. "Short proceedings" are perhaps allowable on board captured vessels in certain circumstances, but at any rate their papers must be properly examined.

it impossible for himself to sink vessels clandestinely—of which the old naval ballads of all seafaring peoples used to boast as a heroic action.<sup>1</sup>

In 1899, when the Second Declaration of the Hague Convention forbade the use of asphyxiating or poisonous gases, mankind voluntarily deprived itself of one of the most effective weapons, and one which, with the ever-increasing discoveries of modern technical science, promised every day to become more valuable.

But whatever our opinion of the value or importance of such conventions, the fact remains that, once they have been concluded, discussion about them must cease; for henceforth, if they are violated not merely is harm done to the enemy but the violator's own honour is irreparably injured. Nothing in this war, therefore, is so deplorable as the violation of Belgian neutrality, submarine warfare and the use of asphyxiating gases; for thereby not merely is human life destroyed, but human honour.

### III. THE COMPARATIVE RETROGRESSION OF WAR

§ 68. REASONS FOR RETROGRESSION.—It takes two players to play chess, but to play at war it takes not only two generals, for the armies in this case do not consist of wooden or ivory figures but of flesh-and-blood human beings. True, of late war has become an industrial enterprise, and thus even here machinery to a certain extent competes with the labouring classes, so much so that those persons ever anxious to find catchwords, and wrong catchwords, for everything, have actually spoken of a "*machine war*." But mankind has not yet got so far. In other branches of life machinery, it is true, has become marvellously independent of assistance from human hands; but in war the musketeer is still more important than the musket, and the gunner than the gun.

That war should be so surprisingly retrograde, considering the high standard of our technical knowledge, is due to quite simple and universal human characteristics. Firstly, there cer-

<sup>1</sup> Cf. for instance the English ballad: "There was a ship that sailed, Upon the Lowland sea," in which the captain's boy swims up to and secretly bores a hole in a Spanish galleon.

tainly does still lurk in men's minds an instinctive feeling that war to-day is some kind of degenerate sport, which is scarcely worth while unless one is actually there oneself. Moreover, sportsmen have after all an "antipathy" to all modern improvements. Thus, a "true yachtsman" would rather be in constant danger of capsizing than get a practical patent reef. There are many more of these harmless sportsmanlike prejudices, such as the huntsman's preference for his double-barrelled gun rather than a modern "Browning," and the old angler's preference for his lob-worm rather than an artificial fly. A rider of the good old school despised the comfortable English trot,<sup>1</sup> which until quite recently was actually forbidden in the German army; while as for the South Sea Islander, he does not even think of exchanging his bow for a modern rifle.

Now, the soldier takes up a similar standpoint, thereby making himself more indispensable and hindering the development of military science. Another instance of the soldier's tendency to lag behind the times is the following. Two such remarkably practical inventions as torpedoing in the dark and destroying whole regiments by poisonous gases meet with considerable resistance, for the soldier continues to lag behind technicians and chemists, who are bound by no chivalrous traditions.

What has chiefly stood in the way of military science being vigorously developed, however, is that the modern soldier is so *cheap*. Formerly a soldier had a certain value. A general had, let us say, fifty thousand soldiers, and used them; and when they were all shot down, the war was simply lost. Consequently he was careful how he made war, and sacrificed as few men as possible. Now, however, he has an inexhaustible reservoir to draw upon in the shape of the nation as a whole; and wherever this reservoir is largest, as in the case of the Russians, then, judging from the General Staff reports, men are sacrificed in the most senseless and cold-blooded way. Even in Germany, especially in the early days of the war, there was not much economy of human lives, at all events in comparison with former wars. Cheap human material, however, is always and everywhere used for all manner of things which could quite well be done by machinery, just as the cheapness of the coolie in China has

<sup>1</sup> For the past year it has been called a "light trot," but riding-masters sometimes make slips of the tongue.



hitherto prevented modern machinery being used to any very great extent.

In naval warfare alone, with its torpedoes, floating mines, etc., machinery is now perforce used in some degree to replace human labour, although in this case ships are involved, of which each dozen cost about £50,000,000 to build, and which therefore represent very considerable sums.

Moreover, war is essentially unproductive. "Necessity teaches man to pray," it is said, and perhaps it really has taught many to pray. But at all events necessity teaches man to *work*, and necessity is the mother of *invention*, for, as Goethe says, "necessity is the best counsellor." Professor Ostwald even thinks that necessity was the mother of all great inventions, because the only inventions ever made have been those necessitated by circumstances.

Now, necessity being so good a teacher, it might be thought that the great necessities of war must necessarily have produced great inventions. This, however, is not the case, for the method and purpose of war are to appropriate the fruits of others' work without working oneself. War, therefore, does not teach Man to work, and consequently does not teach him to invent either, inventions being always the fruit of labour.

Again, war is generally merely a passing phase, and there is not time to profit by the necessity it brings, which, moreover, is too great, and too great necessity acts as a check. For instance, Arctic peoples, who have had to contend too much against the severity of Nature, have produced no original inventions of their own. Of course, when a war lasts so long as this one, and absorbs all the intellectual and material forces of nations, it will not be surprising if there should be a few inventions while it is going on. There cannot be the slightest doubt, however, that future statistics will prove that the average annual number of inventions in Europe during the war was less—much less in comparison—than in any correspondingly long period we may select in the last few decades. At any rate it is a fact that not a single past war has ever been the cause of any noteworthy invention, which again is but one more proof of the comparative unimportance of war for the human race.

Hunger and anxiety about daily bread have sought out many inventions. They taught Man how to cultivate the soil and how to breed domestic animals; they invented the plough and all

other agricultural machinery and implements ; they taught Man to hunt and to fish, and even effected improvements in firearms. And it was love, that other great necessity to which Man is subject, love and the impulse to make advances to others, which led to speech and writing, to the building of roads, the equipment of ships, and eventually to all modern means of communication. War, however, as I shall now proceed to show, has virtually taught Mankind nothing.

The one astonishing result of this war is that the economic distress caused by it is not giving rise to more inventions ; but this is understandable when it is reflected that men of high attainment used to take scarcely any interest in war, and that workshops and laboratories are now mostly deserted. In particular, the young men, whose ideas are still fresh and new,<sup>1</sup> are all at the front. Moreover, the upheaval in all commercial life must of course stand in the way of any really serious efforts to promote civilisation.

§ 69. WHAT ARE THE FACTS ?—When first invented, the sword, in the true sense of the word, was meant for a ploughshare, and not used by men of war till later.<sup>2</sup> But now that they had their weapon, they were actually incapable of improving it ; and it is an ascertained fact, to which Peschel<sup>3</sup> first drew attention, that weapons requiring some skill in their management, such as bows and arrows, have only been evolved among hunting peoples, while agricultural peoples fight with the spear, which is much easier to handle.

This continued to be the case, even in historical times. Between ancient times and the beginning of the nineteenth century war material hardly improved at all, and military science hardly developed at all. Even the use of black powder for shooting, which came into vogue in Europe in the thirteenth century, made little difference ; and after the first blunderbusses re-echoed at Crécy in 1346, there was no further change in anything for half a century.

Moreover, firearms came into use very gradually, and nowhere did they produce any far-reaching effects. Fenimore Cooper's Red Indian novels made us imagine that the "rifles

<sup>1</sup> As the contemporary Swedish physiologist, Tigerstädt, has shown, practically all men of genius made their principal discoveries before the age of thirty, and we may certainly add, before their forty-fifth year.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Ludwig Noiré's *Das Werkzeug* (Tools).

<sup>3</sup> Oskar Peschel's *Völkerkunde* (Ethnology), 1874, 5th ed. 1881, pp. 183-186.

of the Pale-faces" conquered the Red Man. There is of course some truth in this, but the importance of the rifle is over-estimated. Cortez, for instance, after his *noche triste* (night of sorrow) had not a single rifle left, and the victory of Otumba<sup>1</sup> was decided by "cross-bows and Toledo swords."

It is likewise significant that, even at the beginning of the sixteenth century, Machiavelli,<sup>2</sup> according to his *Art of War*, would have had half the infantry armed in "Roman fashion," with sword and shield. The other troops he would have provided some of them "with pikes, like the Swiss," and some with long-distance weapons such as "cross-bows or muskets." In the Spanish armies shields were not given up till some time in the seventeenth century, and in the armies of the Thirty Years' War there were, on an average, twice as many pikemen as musketeers; consequently only about one-third of the foot-soldiers can have been provided with firearms. Only gradually did the proportion of soldiers with firearms increase, and in the Wars of Liberation the first file of the Prussian last line (one-third of the whole number) were originally armed with pikes. In general, however, at the beginning of the nineteenth century the pike had been replaced by the bayonet, at all events in regular armies.

Lances or weapons resembling them, such as scythes, however, continued to be used till far on in the nineteenth century, in revolutionary armies, volunteer corps and whenever the last line was called up. Every one has heard of the Paris pikemen of the French Revolution, and of the Polish and Hungarian scythemen; and even in this war, for instance in the fighting near Arras in the autumn of 1914, dismounted French cavalrymen armed with lances have taken part in infantry bayonet fights. Even now there are good "military instructors" who assert that the most important engagements are only decided by hand-to-hand fighting; and if, owing to a quite natural tendency to over-estimate modern military science, there may have been an inclination to doubt this, there are our General Staff reports to prove that in this war there really has been a reversion to methods of fighting which are comparatively very primitive.

Thus on June 14, 1915, the Austrians attempted to destroy

<sup>1</sup> July 7, 1520, over the Mexicans.

<sup>2</sup> Machiavelli's *Dell' arte della guerra*, 1535, I. vii.

the Italians, as the latter were advancing in the gorges of the Cima Norre, by means of boulders which they hurled down on them from the rocky sides of the Belfiore. Now, history teaches us that this is a method of fighting to which even the anthropoids used to resort. Again, the German colonial forces in East Africa are said to have used bees as a means of defence<sup>1</sup>—which is unquestionably practical, but which had been forgotten in Europe since the Thirty Years' War, and, as far as I know, had never been used in the interval save by a few Australian blacks. On the question whether the statement of our General Staff that Russian troops were armed with "oaken clubs" is to be taken literally or not, no opinion need be offered here. After all, certain present-day methods of warfare are absolutely mediæval.

Let us consider how much has been invented since the year 1300. Compasses, clocks and watches, thermometers, barometers, telescopes and microscopes enable observations to be made with an accuracy undreamt of before. From Germany, the art of printing spread over the whole world; the primitive weaver's loom was replaced first by Cartwright's mechanical loom and afterwards by that of Jacquard. The magical science of alchemy became metamorphosed into scientific chemistry. Galileo and Newton laid anew the bases of physics; the foundations of electrical knowledge were established, and it was speedily put to practical use in the lightning conductor; steam-engines and balloons were invented; gas was introduced for lighting purposes; the technical processes of glass and porcelain manufacture were modernised; in short, science and technical knowledge everywhere advanced. War, however, had neither part nor lot in all this, albeit in this period there was no lack of war. Nor did any one even take any trouble to utilise a single one of these inventions for military purposes. Matters continued thus, until, about the end of the eighteenth or beginning of the nineteenth century, national armies came into existence, and the average middle-class man had to devote his wits to the noble business of warfare. This did not have the effect of making war more creative, but at all events military men learnt from thenceforth to take advantage of inventions already made.

Accordingly explosives were considerably improved. In 1800 an Englishman, Edward Howard, invented fulminate of

<sup>1</sup> Beehives are thrown into the enemy's ranks, and the angry insects cause disorder among the soldiers by stinging them.

mercury, and eighteen years later Egg the engineer constructed percussion caps from it. In 1846 the German chemist Schönbein invented gun-cotton, and the following year a French chemist, Sobrero, invented nitro-glycerine. Twenty years later Alfred Nobel produced the first dynamite. All these inventions, however, were nowise intended for war, but for mining and mining only; and it was almost as if he wished to atone for the disastrous use—a use which he did not intend—made of his invention, for the wholesale destruction of human beings, that Nobel founded his Peace Prize.

Meantime, not only explosives but also firearms were being perfected. Napoleon's soldiers still fought with the old flint-lock, in which scarcely any improvement had been effected since the Thirty Years' War. Dreyse's needle-gun of 1827, Colt's revolver of 1831, the Mauser rifle in 1863, and Mannlicher's repeating rifle of 1878 are all phases in this new development. At the same time in cannon the transition to breech-loaders was proceeding, calibres were tending to become larger and larger, and resort was being had to technical inventions such as recoiling barrels. The invention of the Whitehead torpedo in 1867 must also not be forgotten.

That war had an indirect influence on these improvements in firearms cannot perhaps be denied, although in war itself no improvement has ever been made; but here, again, it would be necessary to inquire how much must be ascribed to improvements in guns for hunting purposes. Even if we set everything down to war, however, this would be the sum total of what war has achieved in the domain of inventions; and what is that in a century of such unparalleled technical advance?

It is true that war has gradually learned to utilise inventions for its own purposes. Here, again, war is a Moloch, devouring everything, and usurping for himself inventions made for peace. Just as war commandeers wheat and gold, so does it take possession of ideas, which is perhaps the worst thing about it. The telegraph and the railway, steamers and motor-cars have been drawn into its service. Hardly had Monier suggested making buildings of concrete, than fortifications began to be built of it. Graham Bell's telephone and Marconi's wireless telegraphy were immediately utilised for war. When Schuckert constructed his searchlight, or Gruson or Krupp invented some new steel-composite material, all were instantly used for some

military purpose. Some few modern inventions, indeed, such as airships and submarines, are used almost exclusively for war. If it occurs to our military men, however, to use the airships presented to them for attacking England, they are no more inventors on that account than Mr. Brown when he has his private house connected by telephone with his office.<sup>1</sup>

§ 70. THE MISCHIEF OF OVER-ESTIMATING THE ART OF WAR.— To apply inventions in this way is cheap ; and just because the European military spirit has suffered a great many inventions to be reserved for military purposes, and because a new invention can scarcely ever command any Government assistance unless it seems as if it might be of some "importance in war," an erroneous impression might prevail that war in some way or other promotes technical progress. There is no doubt whatever that in a sense the science of arms, which is very handsomely supported by Government, can develop in quite a different way from the peaceful science of mechanical construction, which is embarrassed by considerations of what will pay and what will not. The manufacture of armour plates, for instance, goes on in such favourable circumstances, that many improvements really have been effected, improvements whereby the business of iron foundries in general and, indeed, all technical science have benefited.

But it would be wrong to call technical science an enemy of civilisation because it has been responsible for various murderous contrivances. Similarly it would be wrong to ascribe to war *as war* a beneficial effect on technical science. If Government would pay the iron industry as much for its *peaceful* products as it now pays for its warlike ones, the results would be quite as satisfactory. True, the largest incomes in Europe were those of Krupp the Cannon King and Nobel the Dynamite King ; but in more peaceful America there are Wheat Kings, Steel Kings, Pig Kings and Beer Kings.

Airships and aeroplanes are a melancholy confirmation of the truth of what has just been said. They are a new means of getting about, whereby men are brought closer together. Zarathustra's dream of the overstepping of all boundaries seemed

<sup>1</sup> How popular is the idea of making war with airships is clear from Heinrich Zschokke's three-volume novel *Die schwarzen Brüder* (The Black Brothers, an Adventure Story, by M. J. R., Frankfurt-on-the-Oder), published in 1791, only a few years after the invention of Montgolfier's balloon. It absolutely describes the methods of aerial warfare to-day.

on the eve of fulfilment, and lo ! militarism intervenes and converts this admirable instrument of peace into a weapon of war, albeit at present not a very dangerous one ; and it seems as if every future success must have to do with war. We are still under the same delusion as that which led the youth athirst for knowledge to ask Archimedes to be good enough to initiate him into the "divine art wherewith he had defended the walls of Syracuse against the Roman attacking machinery." But we have never yet realised what Archimedes meant by his reply that the art was indeed "divine," but that was "before it was in the service of the State."

Inventions which serve a warlike purpose are no less over-estimated than war itself. The invention of powder alone has actually passed into a proverb,<sup>1</sup> which would never have been the case had people known that Berthold Schwarz did not invent it for any warlike purpose, but that gunpowder was a very ancient invention of the Chinese, who used it for purposes of amusement and for fireworks.

The enormous quantities used in war have deeply impressed many persons, but even from this point of view war will not stand the test of serious criticism. Our estimating a country's technical development by the number of Dreadnoughts which it is able to construct simultaneously, merely proves that in our iron age there is no money for peaceful works of civilisation. Moreover, large as men-of-war may be, modern liners are larger. A 42-centimetre Mörser is assuredly huge, but our new telescopes, rotary presses, etc., are still huger. Architecture has certainly added more to its laurels by building churches and modern market-buildings than by building fortifications and barracks. With the 2,500,000 cubic metres of stone from the Pyramid of Cheops alone it would be possible to build thrice over the Aurelian Wall encircling the Eternal City, a wall which is one of the most powerful defence works which have ever existed.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> For instance : "Er hat das Pulver nicht erfunden" (French : "Il n'a pas inventé la poudre"), which may be rendered as "He'll never set the Thames on fire"; and "Er ist keinen Schuss Pulver wert"—"He is not worth powder and shot."—TRANS.

<sup>2</sup> According to Diodorus, indeed, 15,000,000 cubic metres went to build the walls of Nineveh, but his statements, as Rich and Ainsworth have shown, are pure invention. Still more fantastic and equally untrue are Herodotus' statements about the walls of Babylon, which were supposed to have required about 80,000,000 cubic metres of material.

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Even the very extensive excavations necessitated by modern trench warfare are as nothing compared with what was needed, for instance, in the construction of the Panama Canal. If Germany were entirely surrounded with a triple line of trenches, each six feet six inches deep by two feet six inches broad, it would only be necessary to throw up 20,000,000 cubic metres of earth, not much more than is dredged up out of the Panama Canal every year. In short, even in the matter of vastness war has no remarkable achievement to its credit.

War *utilises* all technical expedients, but did not create them. Such an astonishing construction as the 42-centimetre howitzer is not really in any sense a revolutionary invention, but at best an enlargement of and perhaps also an improvement on something already existing. Even the old Mongol chief, Batu Khan,<sup>1</sup> knew that those who throw stones had best throw as large ones as possible ; and he is said to have caused the fall of the fortress of Kieff<sup>2</sup> in an amazingly short time merely because of the enormous size of the stones from his stone-throwing machines. Yet no one has ever called this ancient Mongol prince a " Goethe of action " ;<sup>3</sup> and all I would like to know is whether the newspaper scribe who once ventured to insult the German people by comparing one of Krupp's officials with Goethe can now even remember the former's name.

Can even asphyxiating bombs be considered an invention ? Why, even Hannibal ordered the throwing of earthen vessels filled with poisonous snakes ; and later on beehives were frequently used for the same purpose. Consequently it is no very epoch-making idea to replace an animal poison by a chemical

<sup>1</sup> Died 1256 ; grandson of Zenghiz Khan.—TRANS.

<sup>2</sup> Kieff fell in 1239.

<sup>3</sup> My friend Rösemeier has succeeded in proving, by very painstaking investigations, that the Tartars (Mongols) were by no means the nation of barbarians they were long thought to be. They were far in advance of their age, and 500 years ago had already attained a degree of military efficiency which the European nations of to-day are slowly struggling to attain. In this respect they were doubtless even in advance of Prussia. [Dr. Nicolai's friend, Dr. Hermann Rösemeier, who until September, 1914, was political editor of the *Berliner Morgenpost*, was forced, because of his democratic views, to take refuge in Switzerland during the war. In June, 1918, he published in a French newspaper in France certain statements not altogether complimentary to the Germans and their then sovereign. In November, 1918, the pseudo-Prussian authorities in Berne, who had long been anxious to get an excuse for being rid of Dr. Rösemeier, expelled him from Swiss territory on the ground of this article. To the credit of the French-Swiss newspapers, be it said, they made such an outcry about the absurdity and intolerance of this measure, that it was rescinded.—TRANS.]



one ! Moreover, here again the Mongols were before us, for it is narrated that as long ago as 1241 they caused confusion in the ranks of the Polish and German armies by the use of asphyxiating gases. This cannot be absolutely vouched for, but there is nothing incredible in it. Supposing, however, that it were not true, the fact of the idea having been handed down by tradition proves it to have existed in past times ; and if it were not put in practice this would merely indicate that the Mongols shrank from doing certain things from which we to-day no longer shrink. Let us hope, therefore, that this particular Mongol story is true.<sup>1</sup>

And what else is there ? Airmen's bombs, petroleum squirts, trenches, felt-covered helmets, field-grey or khaki uniforms—these are the other most remarkable "*inventions*." The fear of a shortage of food and raw materials generally has, it is true, given rise to all manner of suggestions in Germany. Hans Friedenthal of Berlin recommended making flour out of straw, and Professor Gräbner of Dahlem making it from bulrush heads. Professor Jacoby, an analytical chemist of Tübingen, "*discovered*" (!) that reindeer moss could be used as a substitute for starch ; Dr. Kobert, a Rostock professor, urges having bread baked out of blood, adding as a recommendation that blood-cakes taste better than black-puddings,<sup>2</sup> but without stating how black-puddings do taste. Yet another suggestion in which there is nothing new, is that sugar, if fermented, can be converted into albumen, in process of which, however, a great deal of nutriment is wasted. All which has hitherto proved of scarcely any practical value. Moreover, the suggestions quite obviously relate to comparatively unimportant trifles.

What really might be argued with some reason is that the extraction of ammonia from the air with the aid of electricity—a process long known to science—has become of more practical importance owing to the exhaustion of the supplies of saltpetre ; and that in this respect our industry really has advanced during the war. Similarly the substitute for manganese in steel production,<sup>3</sup> the replacing of indiarubber proper by home-grown varieties, and many other substitutions, all betoken

<sup>1</sup> "*Tartarennachricht*" is the German word, which means a blood-curdling story. It is impossible to render the play upon words.—TRANS.

<sup>2</sup> The word used for "black-pudding" is "*Blutpudding*."—TRANS.

<sup>3</sup> The new hard-tempered kinds of steel are said to be much superior, making it possible to bore big guns now much faster than formerly.

progress. But here, again, it must be left to the future to decide whether these war substitutes will be able to hold their own in the open competition of peace. In any case they are only a very indirect result of war; and their true cause, like that of all inventions, was economic necessity.

War, in short, is the enemy of the civilian and of all civilian labour.

#### IV. WAR AND THE SENSE OF SOLIDARITY

§ 71. THE DECLINE OF GOOD-FELLOWSHIP.—Solidarity and soldiery are two words which sound very much alike, and also mean very much the same thing. Even the ancients held that fighting brought men nearer one another, which Diodorus explains thus: "When primitive men were attacked by animals, they used to lend one another assistance, as necessity taught them to do." There can be no doubt whatever that old Diodorus was right. Man's utter defencelessness forced him to help his fellow-man, and thus stern Nature forged for her poorest child the weapons wherewith that child afterwards subdued his teacher.

Modern Man is not such a conscientious thinker as Diodorus. He does not believe that the struggle against animals and the elements gave rise to the oldest form of association, but actually presumes to talk of association when a handful of human beings join together in order to oppose the conception of human solidarity. The army, which is there to give practical demonstration of Man's not yet having reached the level of considering every one his neighbour, is instanced as the best and most striking expression of good-fellowship.

The things of this world, however, are such a topsy-turvy mixture, that even here there lurks a grain of truth; and although the army has not been a school of brotherly love, we can still, as time goes on, trace the growth of brotherly love in connection with it. One thing is certain: not until two combatants' friends go to their help does a duel become a war (*duellum* become *bellum*); and the assembling of an army proves at all events the presence of social impulses, and is assuredly one of the oldest ways consciously adopted by human beings of acting in concert.

That others come to the assistance of a single combatant,

moreover, proves that they consider his claims justifiable, and for this cause war is on a higher rung of the social ladder than is a dispute between individuals. But this fundamental idea of obtaining justice, which quite probably led to the formation of the first armies, was afterwards lost sight of. Gradually a separation came about in the army, and the old duke, whom the peoples once chose as *primus inter pares*, became an officer belonging to a special caste apart from the mass of the people : and as in the army this severance is more rigidly enforced than anywhere else in the social scale, splitting it into two entirely distinct parts, it may now be described as something more like a model of bad-fellowship.

Frederick William I. knew what he was about when he abolished the principle "that to obtain a commission in the army all that is necessary is considerable skill in dealing with army mechanism,"<sup>1</sup> thus converting the officers from merely a higher class of soldiers into a "class apart," whose members were as a matter of course not common soldiers from the ranks, but scions of the nobility (pages or squires).

This is still the case to-day, and the system is more or less imitated in other armies also, even if in France, where every soldier is supposed to carry a *bâton de maréchal* in his knapsack, any private can, at all events in theory, still attain to the highest dignities, whereas in the German army this is not even legally possible. That the nobility were originally specially singled out to become officers ought not to surprise us. Perhaps there was nothing else to be done, because the comparatively well-educated middle classes would then have flatly declined to degrade themselves by becoming drill-sergeants of the despised soldiery.

German Liberals are fond of ventilating the question whether the nobility is favoured in the army, and whether the prerogatives of nobility are or are not identical with an officer's prerogatives ; but this is of comparatively little importance. No one doubts that the officers as a body are absolutely exclusive. True, there is no legal basis for this exclusiveness, nor indeed any other basis beyond the fact that an officer has a right of precedence at the Prussian Court. This privilege, however, trifling as it may seem, has sufficed to cement court and officers

<sup>1</sup> *Geschichte des preussischen Landwehr* (History of the Prussian Militia), by R. Bräuer, p. 25. Mittler & Sohn, Berlin.

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together for all eternity; and as the higher officers could be absolutely depended upon, it eventually became possible to utilise the whole nation for manning the regiments, without the latter developing into a people's army. The officers as a whole remained the corner-stone of reaction, preventing the "democratic institution of a nation in arms" from really getting into the people's hands. Hence it can now truly be said that "the world is not so firmly fixed on Atlas' shoulders as Prussia on the shoulders of her army."

Whenever there was any real work to be done—in war, that is to say—ordinary citizens appeared, even in early days, as if by magic, among the officers; and in 1813 these humbly-born officers were even suffered to lay down their lives for their country, which they did with enthusiasm, albeit often without due recognition. Shortly after the regeneration of Prussia, for instance, we find the more recent official military writers endeavouring to prove that in 1806 the Prussian nobility were equal to the occasion, and that in 1813 it was not the people who saved the ruling caste, but, on the contrary, the ruling caste which saved the people. It is characteristic that an attempt should just now be made to prove that Friccius, a citizen-major in the militia, is wholly undeserving of the monument erected to him at the Grimma Gate in Leipzig, and that it is von Mirbach, a noble and an officer of the line, to whom a monument ought to have been erected. It must not be forgotten, however, that even such men as Treitschke blamed "the anxiety to screen the Prussian Guards, who, as long ago as 1814, created so much ill-feeling."<sup>1</sup>

This recent division among the officers themselves gradually increased, for we must not now look for comradeship even within the German officers' corps. Some German regiments are composed of nobles and others of ordinary citizens; some of guardsmen and linesmen, and others of members of the General Staff and troopers. Then there are the gradations of cavalry and artillery, infantry and convoy-men; officers properly so called and ambulance officers, non-commissioned officers and commissariat officers, subalterns and military officials; and each one of these classes and "classlets" is a world in itself, anxiously defending its prerogatives.

<sup>1</sup> Heinrich von Treitschke's speech at the War Memorial Celebration, July 19, 1895, p. 9. Hirzel, Leipzig.

But this is not all. In the incalculably long and destructive war of 1914-1918 capable men are needed, not merely ordinary citizens but even working-class men. But in peace time what on earth is to be done with people "who themselves admit that their father was a carpenter" ? So as the favourite deputy-officers had not enough authority, the temporary expedient was resorted to of creating colour-sergeant lieutenants for show, as it were. That is, they were officers only as far as the enemy was concerned.

§ 72. RESULTS OF THE SEPARATION BETWEEN OFFICERS AND MEN.—Now, the overwhelming majority of the German people consider this separation between officer and "ranker" as quite right and proper. Therefore this state of things, regrettable as it may be, is not really unjust, but it does prove how little the army has done to promote the universal equality of Man. Indeed, it proves that it has actually eradicated every vestige of feeling of equality. Moreover, as Germany has the best army, this has of course been done there more thoroughly than elsewhere.

Among the common soldiers equality does exist, but an equality without liberty, the equality of a pack of slaves, all of them tools in the hands of their superiors. Such equality of course must not be confounded with that instinct of human solidarity to which armies owe their origin.

Formerly, when tribes were too distant to be able to exert any influence on one another, tribal community was the highest form of association which Man was able to imagine clearly ; and this he defended, as a tribal community, as a nation or as an army. Man felt that there must be some such association, and if the internal conditions of the different countries had only continued as free and natural as when army and nation were one, then military associations would quite naturally have become enlarged as intercourse with other human beings began to produce effect. Meanwhile, however, the army, which was originally a product of the people, had become independent of its creator and a tool in the hands of the ruling class, and continued so, although of late population has constantly increased and likewise the army. The nation, in short, no longer decides issues but is itself decided upon.

Genuine social sentiments can never exist without the twofold check of liberty and responsibility. Soldiers in general, how-

ever, are not free, nor are they, taken as a body, responsible. Hence the organisation uniting them cannot be called social. However much comradeship in the army may be talked about, it can only be a matter of outward form.

Now, it may be argued that this may be the case in time of peace, but that in time of war a new kind of comradeship is created between officers and men owing to the existence of a common danger ; but this is only true to a limited extent. Of course both officers and men do their very utmost at present to rub along well together while the war lasts, and each depends on the other. Often enough it happens in " trench casinos " that men give so much rein to their feelings that the distance between officer and private is undeniably bridged over to some extent. But this is all, and when peace does come it will not need to be proved that in reality the distance between man and man is just as great as ever. On the contrary, the fear of spies in this war has added one more partition to the many which divide up modern Germany, and one which even splits up the army. Every one believes himself to be the repository of specially important secrets.

For instance, when acting as army doctor, I once asked a sailor, who said he had injured his heart by overstraining it, how he had done this. He stood at attention and said : " Beg pardon, a sailor mustn't tell secrets." Unfortunately such answers are very characteristic nowadays. A hundred times have I read in an officer's eyes, when a brother officer was asking him some harmless question, the anxious query : " Perhaps after all you're a spy too ? "

Very often this mystery-making showed itself in strange ways. For example, at first the radio-telegraphists in a certain place did a little innocent bragging about the important telegrams they received. Afterwards, when they themselves no longer knew the contents of telegrams, they took refuge in " professional secrecy." Probably there have been many such instances, but the fact that there is nothing behind these uncommunicative official visages does not make matters better. This uncommunicativeness, indeed, is a characteristic of mankind to-day.

Does no one wonder what is to be the end of all this ? The army is on the high road to convert our people into a kind of Jesuitical Order. The Jesuits have also a chief college which every one of them blindly obeys. No one knows *why* he does

so : he simply obeys. Not a soul *speaks* of what he is doing : he does it ; every one keeps a relentless watch on every one else, and every individual impulse is stifled for the good of the Order in general. Man ceases to be an individual, and becomes a mere wheel in an organisation.

The Jesuits also talk of comradeship, and even call themselves brothers ; and this Brotherhood of Jesus has achieved something in the world, in fact a great deal. Time was when we did not envy them their success ; and if we used to say we meant to be a nation all of brothers, we did not mean that we wanted to be Jesuits or to belong to any organisation consisting of officers and common soldiers. We meant something which might perhaps best be defined as the opposite of both. We meant a free brotherliness, in which of course there would be room for both Jesuits and officers, but which was not ruled on the principles of either.

## CHAPTER VI

## HOW THE ARMY HAS BEEN TRANSFORMED

## I. NATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL ARMIES

§ 73. THE INVINCIBILITY OF A NATIONAL ARMY.—The wheel of Time, therefore, has come full circle, and the old days have returned in which every man must be armed. Once again the world bristles with arms; once again every man has become a soldier; and this condition we Germans proudly call that of a nation in arms, and talk about our national army.

Now, it is certainly beyond doubt that, despite all their faults, national armies have given a better account of themselves on the whole than professional armies. Even the Theban militia of Epaminondas were superior to the Spartans (a special caste of whom had been trained to be soldiers), as witness the battle of Leuctra in 371 B.C.; and in 275 B.C. the Roman peasant militia conquered both the Greek mercenaries of Pyrrhus King of Epirus at Beneventum, and the professional armies of Carthage, although they had a genius such as Hannibal to lead them. (At Cannæ, characteristically enough, comparatively few Punic citizens took part in the fighting.) Even the Sicilian city militia had already beaten the proud Africans.

The vast national armies of the Albigenses and Hussites were for long invincible, and the latter, under their great general Ziska, had no difficulty whatever in utterly routing the Emperor Sigismund and his experienced knightly armies, for instance at Deutsch-Brod, in 1422.

Similarly the Swiss peasants at Morgarten conquered the knightly hosts of Leopold of Austria, the people of Dithmarschen<sup>1</sup> conquered the flower of the Danish imperial army, and the Steding peasants only yielded to a feudal army enormously superior in numbers. Even in Germany the very ill-equipped peasant armies could not be conquered until the city militia joined the knightly armies, which had everywhere been beaten.

<sup>1</sup> Marshland coast region of Germany, now part of the Prussian province of Schleswig-Holstein.—TRANS.



Under the popular leadership of Jeanne d'Arc the citizen defenders of Orleans conquered the English army, although the latter had utterly routed the French knightly armies at Agincourt. So long as the Swedish army was a truly national people's army, it was invincible; and in a single year, after an unparalleled succession of victories, it even reached the Danube. Not till afterwards did the Swedes also become professional soldiers,<sup>1</sup> and then there was an end to their conspicuous good fortune.

The American militia under Washington, although at first heavily defeated, eventually won the brilliant victory of Saratoga over the British regulars. Similarly the disorganised masses of soldiers of the French Revolution very soon managed to overthrow the experienced armies of Austria and Prussia. On the other hand, in 1813 and 1815 Prussia's insufficiently trained masses proved superior to Napoleon's Old Guards.

The value of national armies, however, has been tested a hundred times; and although since the outbreak of war Prussian military experts in particular have succeeded in exalting the achievements of "professional soldiers" as compared with those of civilian soldiers, it is only in the pages of biased historians that their so-called successes need be sought. Apparently it is not really so very difficult to master the business of war. The last linesman, who had never served in the army and who was trained in from four to six weeks, has once more learned practically the same things as used to take twenty times as long to learn.<sup>2</sup>

A set of soldiers with experience in war, on the other hand, have very often failed to give a good account of themselves. The German journalist Karl Bleibtreu, for instance, writes that

<sup>1</sup> Towards the close of the Thirty Years' War a large part of the Swedish army and almost all the cavalry consisted of Germans.

<sup>2</sup> Nor does it seem so very difficult to "learn to be a general," as was proved by the Napoleonic marshals of France. Lannes was a dyer, and Murat a waiter, Ney, Böttcher and Oudinot clerks, Soult a copying clerk, and Massena a vagabond. And they all understood their business; and were far more capable than Augerau, who had served as a professional soldier in the Prussian army, or than such persons as the Marquis de Grouchy and Count Lasalle, who had served in a like capacity in the Bourbon army. Even von der Goltz, in passing judgment from the standpoint of a German military man on Gambetta the lawyer, says that in many respects it would have been much better for France had she only listened to him. It goes without saying that, since old Derfflinger's time, it has not been possible to cite any Germans as instances of this superiority of non-professional soldiers.

at Gravelotte and Colomby it was among the Old Prussian troops that panic broke out : it was they who took to flight and who shirked, and similarly with regard to the Old Bavarian troops at Loigny. Even Frossard's picked French troops conducted themselves badly at Rezonville and Gravelotte, and Canrobert's did likewise on the terrace of St. Privat and at Sedan. By this it is not intended to assert that troops differ essentially according to the kind of training they have received. Instances, though not so many, could be alleged to prove the contrary.<sup>1</sup> But it undoubtedly does show that an army's real superiority must be based on something else than technical training.

The reason why it is so difficult to perceive wherein lies that principle of invincibility which manifests itself throughout all the hurly-burly of victory and defeat, is that hitherto men have been firmly convinced of the necessity of deciding all their great struggles by fighting like animals. Thus they have generally fought and fought until at length, after varying successes, the victor on the battle-field was the combatant predestined to victory from the first—namely, the combatant with the *stronger vitality*. Hence the delusion that anything can ever be decided by a battle being won. In reality, however, it was the national army which won—not the flower-decked hosts which, armed to the teeth, go to meet death on the battle-field, but that national army of workers and inventors, artists and scientists, whose vital force creates new life.

That fine nations, especially in former times, should often likewise have been fine soldiers, is not surprising, but has helped to obscure the truth, since it thus frequently happened that victory on the battle-field and genuine victory coincided. For this very reason the exceptions are all the more instructive. Perhaps the most striking instances of nations which have obtained a foothold without having ever won a victory, are the Chinese and the Jews. And modern Italy, proof of whose efficiency of labour is that Italian workmen may be found shovelling up the ground all round the globe, has she not won something from each of her lost wars ? And have not Russia, Germany and Austria, the three empires concerned, all promised the Poles

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Adam Smith's *Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, V. i. 1 (1776). Adam Smith's view is that only a very small percentage of soldiers are possible and necessary in a civilised community, and that they had best be a police force, paid a fixed salary. In proof of the truth of this he cites the instances in which well organised armies have beaten badly organised ones.

autonomy? Polish workmen are to be found, like Italians, all over the world, yet the Polish people have never waged war on their own account; indeed, whenever they have attempted to bring about a revolution by force of arms, they have failed miserably. And is not Hungary also a case in point? In 1849 she was cut to pieces, and to-day she has the decisive voice in the Dual Monarchy.

Why cite all these examples, however, since any one who keeps his eyes open will in the history of nations find proofs and to spare for my contentions? Moreover, no one will be able to adduce any fact to disprove them.

It is national superiority which decides issues, and not military successes; and this is the sense in which the nation decides, or, if you like, a national army. The founders of modern armies had an inkling of this truth, but, spellbound by tradition, they thought they must equip the people with rifles. We shall never attain our object until this delusion has vanished, and until the "fighting army" is identical with the labouring, struggling nation. Then will we try to help our people by making them fitter for life and no longer fitter for bearing arms. Then will the true, genuine struggle begin, one which will perhaps be far more terrible, but more worth fighting, because it will mean the survival of the fittest and not of those most skilled in bearing arms. Thus one day will militarism be overcome, and by an army of the nation.

§ 74. A QUESTION WRONGLY WORDED.—In order, however, that this may one day come to pass, it was perhaps necessary in the first place for the people to be admitted into the professional army. It is regrettable, but may have been unavoidable, that the number of soldiers in Europe should have increased since the Middle Ages from two thousand to four thousand per cent.; for whereas in the Middle Ages out of a thousand human beings not more than four to eight were soldiers, at present one hundred and twenty to one hundred and fifty are so.

Now, this increase, which is absolutely senseless and useless, since all countries have done the same thing, must be explained, if it cannot be justified. It is the one solid fact from which everything else has resulted. Hardly any one alludes to this main fact, however, but only to all manner of absolutely immaterial side-issues. For instance, we argue as to whether the recruited soldier or the mercenary is the better. True, the German word soldier (*Soldat*) is derived from "*Sold*" (pay);

but in general it is imagined that the soldier to-day fights voluntarily for his country, which the mercenary or *Söldner* does not. When Frederick the Great died, in 1786, this distinction may have existed; and it was a symptom of the great changes then preparing in Europe, that public opinion severely condemned those petty German princes who, in return for "subsidies," allowed their mercenaries to fight for England. Only twenty years earlier public opinion saw nothing to condemn in transactions of this kind. Even in 1813 the "new" Prussian army consisted, at all events a small part thereof, of enthusiastically patriotic volunteers, whereas the "old" army was raked together by craft or by force from all parts of the world.

But now it is the English who are dubbed "hirelings"; although, at any rate in the first twenty months of the war, they were all *volunteers*, whereas in Germany the troops are invariably compulsorily recruited.<sup>1</sup> On either side are none but German-born (or British-born as the case may be). Both receive pay also, and that the German is paid less is quite beside the point.

From the purely technical standpoint the professional soldier will, of course, achieve more, but this scarcely matters. The one really important matter is the *spirit animating the army*. This, in an army based on universal service, may be "bad," as was proved in the case of the Russians during the Japanese War; and in an army voluntarily recruited it may be "good," as Americans and British have frequently shown. The contrary, however, may be the case; and although voluntary service as existing in England until recently is preferable for other reasons, this does not affect the quality of the army.

Even the question whether "standing armies" or militia are the better is due to a play upon words, for in reality in every country to-day there is a compromise between these two systems. The ancient profession of a mercenary no longer exists except for officers, beginning with generals, who still sometimes die in harness. All other soldiers, after more or less training,

<sup>1</sup> The only persons in Germany who can be compared with England's volunteer hirelings would be the comparatively well paid officers, who in war time are even very well paid. But from the political point of view this is very much more dangerous, of which Spinoza was aware, when, in his *Political Tractate*, chap. vi. § 31, he particularly insisted that soldiers should receive pay but officers not. Cf. below.

are transferred to the reserve, which after all is the principle of the militia. Officers serve about twenty years, subalterns twelve, the Russians four, German and French cavalry three, and German infantry two years. Upper-fifth-form boys in Germany (or what corresponds to them) serve one year, German doctors and the Serbians six months, the Dutch three months, and the Swiss ten weeks. Here, therefore, we have all grades. How greatly the meaning of all these military titles varies, moreover, even among experts, is proved by the fact that in the 1824 *Military Handbook*<sup>1</sup> the Prussian army of Jena is described as an "organised militia."

All these alleged contradictions in terms, such as soldiers under obligation to serve in the army or hirelings, professional or national army, standing army or militia, matter nothing to-day. Every nation tries to squeeze as much as possible out of the material at its disposal, and for this purpose universal service is of course the best. No reasonable person can be in any doubt about this.

The only possible question, therefore, is whether it is worth a nation's while to sacrifice its best sons for a purpose which is attainable by means of an army. For this is what it all amounts to, and this must determine the purpose for which an army is used. Originally, it is true, an army really was meant for war, and existed only in war—which simple folk probably took to be a matter of course. Indeed, when the business of war was not, as it is now, something wholly apart from Man's ordinary habits of life, it would naturally have been absurd to have kept an army together in *peace* time. Every one used to go about his business, and if war came, then every one used to take up arms.

§ 75. THE THREE REASONS FOR THE INTRODUCTION OF PROFESSIONAL ARMIES.—This gradually changed. First of all a change, often wrongly called degeneration, came about in Man. Peaceful citizens, whose days were filled up with work, forgot how to ride and fight, and consequently were obliged, even in peace time, to practise the increasingly difficult art of war, for which they had no time. Thus professional soldiers came into existence, most of them "international artisans," who travelled from place to place, carrying on their occupation at the same time. Such familiar names as Xenophon, Pyrrhus, G. von

<sup>1</sup> *Militärisches Taschenbuch von 1824.*—TRANS.

Frundsberg<sup>1</sup> and Gattamellata prove that this arrangement was not peculiar to any nation nor to any period.

Secondly, as time went on, the community was constantly requiring a larger and larger police force, as the number of prohibitions was continually increasing, and the minority engaged in perpetually exploiting the masses were forced more and more to maintain troops for their individual protection. That this and not any fondness for waging wars was the main reason for the introduction of standing armies is plain from the fact that, almost without exception, these can be proved to have originated in a mere princely bodyguard, of which we have a reminder in the names of the oldest divisions of standing armies—Prætorians, Guards, bodyguard, "Maison du Roi," myrmidons, gentlemen-at-arms and others:

For this very reason standing armies were practically never recruited from the country's own sons, since it was *against* the latter that they were to be used. The Roman Prætorians were Germans or Parthians; the French Guards were Swiss; the first army of the Hohenzollerns consisted of South Germans; and up till the Prussian Wars of Liberation recruiting abroad was preferred. Indeed, Frederick William I., the real founder of the Prussian army, expressly forbade any attempt to induce the country's sons to take their places beside "common fellows." Accordingly no one thought it strange that scions of the same fatherland should fight against one another. Thus at Malplaquet Swiss were pitted against Swiss, and at Pavia in 1525 German mercenaries under Frundsberg fought against the French "black band," which, for that matter, likewise consisted of Germans under the leadership of Lower Saxon Junker.

Thirdly, there was yet another cause for the establishment of standing armies, and this, strange as it may sound, was men's longing for peace. At a time when there were as yet no standing armies, old Cicero<sup>2</sup> innocently wrote: "We must wage war one day in order afterwards to be able to enjoy peace," thereby correctly describing what is at present actually a fact. In the Rome of Cicero's days there were still so many savage elements that he was obliged, in making such an observation, to hold forth some attractive subsidiary prospect. But when Rome

<sup>1</sup> Georg von Frundsberg (1473-1528), leader of the German free-lances under Maximilian and Charles V.

<sup>2</sup> Cicero: *Quare, si pace frui volumus, bellum gerendum est* (Phil. VII. vi. 19 f.).

became more highly civilised, and consequently, perhaps partly under the influence of the Christian conceptions of fraternity then spreading over the world, not enough men were anxious to become soldiers, Vegetius,<sup>1</sup> a Christian, wrote that "whoever desired peace ought to prepare for war," connecting this statement with Cicero's words, but absolutely reversing their meaning.

Thus we ought to prepare for war in order to avoid it, whereas otherwise no one prepares for anything unless he wants to bring it about. An analogy to this can be found only in the confused reasoning of scholastic theologians. Here also we find the assertion that, as no one can positively know that it is not after all dangerous to deny God, therefore it is safer, especially for His enemies, to believe in Him, "since then He cannot be angry with them."

Lessing has already admirably exposed this "safety" kind of argument. He describes a Jew, who being asked whether he would prefer to believe in a living or a dead Christ, replies: "Rather in a living Christ, for he could always be killed afterwards, but it is difficult to make the dead live again." It has been just the same with war. Timorous persons think it dangerous to believe even in the possibility of peace, for then war might come like a thief in the night, and devour them; and therefore, for safety's sake, an ever-living (*i.e.* a standing) army must be kept. Else the other armies would kill it.

These standing armies for peace, therefore, a condition which even Logau<sup>2</sup> stigmatised as an "armour-clad peace," arose for the following reasons:

1. As a result of war having become unnatural and nations being engaged in peaceful occupations;
2. As a sign of princes' dread lest the disinherited should take vengeance upon them; and
3. As a sign of the people's dread of the horrors of war.

Armies, therefore, were not at all created for war but for peace; and they are not a warlike but a peaceful symptom. But since it is possible that nothing could be less adapted to the

<sup>1</sup> Vegetius: *Qui desiderat pacem, præparet bellum* (*Epitoma Inst. rei milit.*).

<sup>2</sup> Logau's *Sinngedichte*, No. 1802, 1654:

"Krieg hat den Harnisch weggelegt, der Friede zeucht ihn an,  
Wir wissen, was der Krieg verübt, wer weiss, was Friede kann f"

(War has put off its armour, and peace puts it on. We know what mischief war can do: who knows what peace can do f)

awakening desire for peace, all they have succeeded in doing has been to make wars even greater and more horrible. This is always so when we try to cast out the devil by Beelzebub, which, for that matter, is not generally a sign of particularly great wickedness, but always one of particularly great stupidity. Thus modern armies in themselves are not wicked, but they are the *ne plus ultra* of human folly.

## II. DEFENSIVE MILITIA OR AGGRESSIVE ARMY<sup>1</sup>

§ 76. THE ORIGIN AND MEANING OF MILITIA.—I hardly know a single book on militia which does not begin by asserting that originally the principle of universal service prevailed in Germany, in accordance with the old feudal system. In one sense this is true, but it is both saying too much and too little. It says too little because universal service existed not in Germany alone but throughout Europe, and even throughout the world. After all, it is quite natural that the inhabitants of a country should have defended themselves against enemy invasion, a thing which they would generally have done absolutely of their own accord in order to avoid being killed, and which they were everywhere bound to do. Almost all primitive states have been founded on some such necessity for defence and offence.

But it also says too much. Whoever goes to the roots of that patriotic feeling from which ancient Germany sprang ought never to forget how marvellously rich and expressive is our mother tongue. In Germany there is no *conscription générale*, which may mean anything, but only the quite clearly defined "universal military service." This does not mean that it is every one's duty to attack or inflict chastisement on others, but simply and solely that it is every man's duty to bear arms. More clearly it cannot be expressed.

The Ottoman is commanded by his religion to attack, but the German's duty was only to protect hearth and home, and it was left to his own free choice whether he would take part in military excursions into other countries. No one was compelled to take part in the *Ver sacrum*, and this ancient Teutonic custom survived longest in free England, where until quite

<sup>1</sup> Where not otherwise stated, I have relied for my facts mainly upon *Die Geschichte der preussischen Landwehr* (History of the Prussian Militia), by the Prussian minister Bräuer (Mittler & Sohn, Berlin, 1863).



recently every one was liable for home defence only, while the yeomen voluntarily obeyed the king's call to attack, partly because they hoped for plunder (though now they can hope only for pay), and partly from patriotism.

Originally this system prevailed in Germany as everywhere else; and in Prussia, which is somewhat off the beaten track, it survived a particularly long while. When the word "militia" (*Landwehr*) first occurs in Prussian documents, it is used to mean a model peaceful institution, which, it is true, the Hohenzollerns were not long in abolishing.

In the old monastic country of Prussia, after its secularisation, the militia formed an integral part of the so-called "defence works." As Polish was at first spoken there, they were called *Wybraniek*,<sup>1</sup> and there is no official mention of militia until 1613. Ten years later the Elector George William and the Prussian Estates of the Realm came to an agreement concerning this militia, "whereby every tenth man was destined to go to the frontier, while the rest were to remain in the interior of the country to defend it."

Had this idea of utilising the inexhaustible reservoir of universal service only for home defence been further developed, wars would have become impossible. For instance, if to-day only one soldier in ten were allowed to cross the frontier and the recruiting systems were all alike, then even if all Europe united in an attack on the Central Empires there would be only one man available for attack against more than four for defence at the disposal of the Central Empires. Contrariwise, every soldier of the Central Empires would encounter about thirty enemies on the defensive. Indeed, even Germany alone, defending herself against all Europe, would have more than twice as many troops as her aggressors could put in the field.

This "sacred duty of bearing arms," which would almost automatically have prevented any attack, became so completely metamorphosed in the course of ages, that now nothing but the name is a faint reminder—and this only for the learned—that the civilisation of the German nation was once peaceful in character.

It was Charlemagne who first attempted to force the German

<sup>1</sup> *Wybraniek* means selected. Here again, therefore, the fine title and meaning of the militia is not traceable, though it is characteristic that those who translated the word did not do so literally, but freely adapted it, being mindful of the trend of ancient German civilisation.

people into aggressive warfare ; and we ought to reflect, especially just now, that even he did not succeed in calling out the whole nation for more than a few decades, and then only by dint of great difficulty. Charlemagne wanted to uplift and protect the peasant class. Hence he gave his people whatever land he conquered, hoping thereby to induce them to defend it of their own accord. If he freed the peasant class, he hoped to have a nation capable of bearing arms ; but he very soon perceived that this was like arguing in a circle, for the perpetual wars ruined the very class of peasants which they had originally created.<sup>1</sup>

Thus this agrarian reform of Charlemagne, which aimed at establishing a class of peasant soldiers, failed because it was essentially inconsistent. Similarly all agrarian reforms had failed in ancient Greece (the Spartan reforms of Agis and Cleomenes, for instance), and likewise in Italy, from those of Servius Tullius up to and including those of the Gracchi ; and similarly all such reforms were destined to fail in the future, even those of Frederick William III. of Prussia, until 1813.

§ 77. THE RISE OF A HIRELING ARMY IN GERMANY.—Even under the Carolingians men raised by general levy proved unsuited for fighting abroad, but in the long run the vassal army likewise failed. True, in this army the vassal was not a proper professional soldier, but pursued his soldier's calling as a permanent secondary occupation.

Attempts to conquer foreign countries with vassal armies failed utterly, for the German people could not be induced to dream dreams of conquering Italy, as did its emperors. Henry the Lion,<sup>2</sup> for instance, flatly declined to fight Barbarossa's battles, and even the second Frederick von Hohenstaufen was obliged to employ foreigners, mostly Saracens. Subsequently the question whether the "obligation to serve" might be enforced for some object outside the Empire, and if so to what

<sup>1</sup> When the wars ceased, indeed, when one nation was at length victorious, then perhaps it might have been possible to discuss whether it was all worth while ; but even in those days the conquered were wont to revenge themselves.

<sup>2</sup> Henry the Lion (1129-1195), Duke of Saxony and Bavaria, cousin of Barbarossa. Married Matilda, daughter of Henry II. of England, and spent three years in England. He founded Munich, and did much to promote the development of Hamburg, Lübeck and other towns. Owing to his having acted disloyally to Barbarossa in 1175, the latter put him to the ban of the Empire and forfeited his lands. As he submitted in 1181, however, he was suffered to keep Lüneburg and Brunswick.—TRANS.

extent, gave rise to endless dissensions. Indeed, to describe these would mean writing a large portion of mediæval constitutional history. At all events the rulers did not as yet have their own way, and as they cared little about a "universal obligation to serve in peace," they allowed universal service in general gradually to fall into disuse.

A middle course was then agreed upon, which suited both parties concerned. The citizen bought himself for good and all free from the obligation to serve; and with the proceeds of this tax the lord of the soil bought himself a smaller, more convenient army, one which was not always wanting to go home, but, ready either for peace or for war, could be used for making wars on foreign countries as well as on the rights of the lord of the soil's fellow-citizens, irrespective of all ordinances concerning the duty of military service. Thus it was that in England and Denmark German mercenaries were used to quell the risings of the harassed peasantry; while the Hapsburgs in the anti-Reformation movement used Italian and Walloon troops against their Protestant knights, cities and peasants. General levies of the people lingered on only in a few democracies, such as Switzerland; and except in Poland, even the nobility were not universally called upon to serve. Thus national armies were abolished by the ruling caste, because it was still impossible to exploit the nation's strength in the interests of dynasties. What softened this blow for the rulers was that early in the Middle Ages firearms began to be used. Now, not every one was skilled in the use of these; hence the necessity for "trained soldiers" again arose. At all events, just at this time princely guards, gentlemen-at-arms, bodyguards, or whatever their names may have been, began almost everywhere being converted into genuine armies of mercenaries, for the most part a scourge rather than a protection to the country in whose pay they were.

Once the princes found they could depend upon their hirelings to support them steadfastly and independently of the people, they hardly ever kept to their agreement with the latter, but repeatedly demanded not merely its money but its blood also. Wars were very frequent, but those who delighted in war comparatively few. Thus demand exceeded supply, and an army of foreign mercenaries cost a pretty penny. Hence the thoughts of any prince anxious to manage "economically"

could not but be perpetually reverting to universal liability to military service, which, after all, was a way of getting soldiers comparatively cheap. But sometimes he realised that, at any rate in those days, there was danger in making his fellow-subjects fire on their own fathers and brothers; and sometimes he perceived that, after all, these fellow-citizens of his could be better employed for other purposes. Then he sorrowfully reverted to the plan of recruiting his soldiers abroad. And so matters went on, never for long the same.

§ 78. THE RISE OF AN ARMY OF MERCENARIES IN PRUSSIA.—Conditions did not become more stable until Frederick William I.'s time. This "soldier king," who loved parading about with his "set of long-legs," first disbanded the militia established by his predecessor for home defence, alleging that it was "insufficiently trained." This militia was "expressly promised that it should never be taken out of the country." Under penalty of one hundred ducats fine, he even forbade the word "militia" to be used, and he also forbade any homeland recruiting, which, however, he afterwards allowed from pecuniary considerations. But an edict of 1721 restricted it to "such subjects as may come forward of their own free will, and are not already engaged in the cultivation of the soil, in the promotion of commerce," and in certain other occupations.

The twenty-seven years of Frederick William I.'s reign were, by the way, among the most peaceful which Prussia has seen. With a small "show guard" of soldiers it was impossible to make war, for, as the impartial historian cannot fail to notice, to whomsoever God gives an army, He sooner or later gives the war belonging thereto.

Frederick William I.'s army was small and consisted solely of "mercenaries," being thus as unlike our present monstrous national armies as possible. Yet he is universally, and rightly, regarded as the founder of the Prussian military system. To him is traceable the root-principle of the Prussian army, a principle which all modern prating about national or hireling armies, one year's or three years' service, etc., merely obscures. He it was who caused the Prussian army to be classified into "common soldiers"<sup>1</sup> and officers, and since his time it has been impossible for any soldier to become an officer.

<sup>1</sup> *Gemeine* = common soldiers, commoners.—TRANS.

All who speak of this monarch as the founder of the Prussian army testify, perhaps unwittingly, to the fact that this contempt for the "common soldier," which in no other army is so marked, is really characteristic. This sharp delimitation is all that is now left of his system, but to-day it is sharper than ever; and this monarch's contempt for "common fellows" (that is, foreigners or later on the good-for-nothing dregs of his own people), has in course of time become transferred to the mass of the German people. They are still good enough to be "common soldiers," while promotion to be an officer is reserved for the rich or noble.

This standing army proper remained much the same until the battles of Jena and Auerstädt, but in times of real national danger the people also always used to fight for their country. Thus after the Battle of Collin had been lost and the dangerous concentric attack of the Allies on Prussia began, the Pomeranian Estates equipped five thousand yeomanry and offered them to the king, and the Provincial Cities of the Marches and of the domains of Magdeburg and Halberstadt did likewise, adding, it is true, the stipulation that these troops should only be maintained for the duration of the war and only used for the defence of the country. But what a king has, he has, and in the last years of the war these troops were unlawfully employed as reserves. The Great King, however, unlike his successors, did disband these battalions on the conclusion of the war, although his empty treasury may certainly have had something to do with this.

§ 79. ATTEMPTS AT ORGANISATION BEFORE THE BATTLE OF JENA.—After the death of Frederick II. no change took place until the cannonading of Valmy, the victory of the French at Jemappes in 1792, and the conquest of Toulon made the Allies realise that with the French Revolution new forces had gained the upper hand. When we are in a tight place we always think of the people. Consequently in 1794 an edict of the Prussian Military Department<sup>1</sup> approved the offer of the President of the Chamber, von Stein, to collect a militia. The following year, indeed, even the Imperial Court at Vienna began to discuss the question of a "universal arming of the people." But the Prussian Government, which in 1795 still believed in Frederick the Great's army, opined that such a general levy of the people would not suffice to get the better of the enemy, and,

<sup>1</sup> *Ober-Kriegs-Kollegium*.—TRANS.

moreover, was dangerous. Once more did the Prussian bureaucrats prove that they knew better how to attain their end than did the Viennese ; for after all the whole century of German reaction is contained in these few words of August 25, 1795 : " A people in arms is a danger in itself."

Yet the time came when even Prussian bureaucrats were forced to appeal to the people in arms ; which, for the time being, did not get beyond the stage of plans. For eight long years, moreover, nothing was said about it, and meanwhile Napoleon's new armies were turning the world upside down. Then, in 1803, we suddenly hear of General von Rùchel's scheme for raising fully fifty thousand yeomanry, who, significantly enough, were to be under the command of " semi-invalids." General von Courbières had also a plan, which, however, left the militia wholly out of account, and merely proposed to call up more recruits, and dismiss on leave an equal number of experienced soldiers, thus creating a supply of " thoroughly trained " men to increase the standing army for war purposes.

A high and mighty Military Organisation Committee, which had been sitting since 1795, was particularly incensed by Major von Knesebeck's plan for the introduction of a genuine militia to be called the " Patriotic Legions." Degrading punishments, moreover, were to be abolished. The Committee angrily pointed out that the Prussian Military Constitution was a " venerable original document and of matchless perfection," something which could not be meddled with without everything collapsing. When such principles prevailed, the wonder is not that the Organisation Committee should have kept silence so long, but why it should ever have existed at all.

General von Rùchel's scheme was supposed to be accepted, but in reality nothing whatever was done ; and when war broke out only a few Polish battalions could be scraped together, and then in Silesia. Fruitless as the labours of the Military Organisation Committee were, however, they cannot be ignored when the value of soldiers is being inquired into. There is again an inclination to consider that at Jena the officers did not fail so very badly, " for after all such a lot of them did stick to their guns "—as if the value of a human being depended on some one else shooting him dead. If this were the case, hares would make the best officers. The really important fact is that, until the Peace of

Tilsit, the army was entirely in the hands of high-born military men, who, as their Organisation Committee proved, were *absolutely incapable*.

§ 80. THE 1807 REORGANISATION COMMITTEE.—When the bill for all this incapacity had been settled at Jena, and the State of Prussia was prostrate, then it was seen that something must be done. Accordingly the Organisation Committee was converted into a Reorganisation Committee, and, what was of more importance, civilians were appointed members of it. To them it is due that afterwards at any rate some vestige of a new spirit prevailed. It was, however, only a vestige, for in this Reorganisation Committee two opinions fought for predominance. Every one was agreed as to the desirability of having as many soldiers as possible, and as to its being the duty, if practicable, of all citizens to enter the army. That is, something resembling a national army was desired. The question, however, was whether the people or the army should be the first consideration. On the Reorganisation Committee were such men as Baron von Stein<sup>1</sup> and the financial expert von Schön. Under the fructifying influence of French revolutionary ideas, they wanted to create a genuine national army, based on moral qualities. But they had the military party against them, and particularly Gneisenau, who wanted to have as few changes as possible, and to resort to universal service merely in order to squeeze out a larger contingent of recruits for the standing army.

An interesting memorandum<sup>2</sup> has been preserved, submitted by Herr von Schön on December 4 and then handed to Herr von Gneisenau for his expert opinion thereon. Herr von Gneisenau made marginal notes on it, which clearly show that he and his colleague, eminent men as they both were, were as wide apart as the poles. One citation is enough to show this. The civilian committee-member says that soldiers in general must be considered as the flower of the nation, righting all wrongs, and consequently having the highest vocation. This did not please the military men, and von Gneisenau made a marginal note insisting "that the whole nation must realise

<sup>1</sup> Baron Heinrich Friedrich Karl von Stein (1757-1831). In 1804 he was appointed to the Prussian Department of Trade and Manufactures, where he introduced apparently too many reforms to please Frederick William III., and in 1807 he resigned.—TRANS.

<sup>2</sup> Printed in the Supplement to the *Militärwochenblatt* for 1846, pp. 68, 69.

that the only way to maintain its national existence is to uphold its military honour."

Two fairy godmothers, therefore, stood together by the cradle of the new Prussian army. The gift which one wanted to bestow upon it was the power of righting wrongs; while the other wanted to raise it above the rest of mankind by endowing it with "a soldier's special honour," a phrase which must then have been newly coined.

Prussia, therefore, was faced by the problem of whether she meant to become a national army or to remain a military state. These two phrases show quite clearly that we have here a distinction which cannot be expressed in concrete terms. Both mean that army and people are one and indivisible, and yet we know that the two notions are worlds apart. The result of the one is Switzerland, that of the other Prussia and Germany, the remaining countries lying somewhere between these extremes.

It is easy to divine why the democratic tendencies of Stein and his followers were not allowed to prevail. General von Boyen,<sup>1</sup> for so many years Prussian Minister of War, once expressly stated that "the example of the free States of North America and of Switzerland proves that even now it is possible to manage by arming the people in this way." The militia, indeed, he continued, must not be considered as "resulting from the republican form of government<sup>2</sup> in these two countries." Other republics, for instance Holland, Carthage, Genoa and Venice, have maintained considerable standing armies, as von Boyen himself quite truly observes.

Thus although von Boyen arrives at no result, nevertheless his few words of comparison contain the truth, indeed the whole truth. He did not, it is true, express it, but possibly he suspected it. The kind of government matters no more than the particular kind of army. What matters is what is intended, to be done with the armies. Carthage wanted to conquer Spain and Sicily, Holland to conquer the East Indies and neighbouring territory; Venice and Genoa fought for predominance in the Mediterranean. Switzerland and North America, however,

<sup>1</sup> *Beiträge zur Charakteristik des Generals v. Scharnhorst* (Sidelights on the Character of General von Scharnhorst), by H. von Boyen.

<sup>2</sup> I have added the word "republican" in order to make the quotation from Boyen intelligible. The author himself is very careful not to use any such word, and leaves it to the reader to guess.



do not want to conquer anything : they use their armies only for defence, and consequently manage with truly national armies.<sup>1</sup>

Von Boyen must have held some such opinion, for he was a great student of Scharnhorst, and Scharnhorst expressly states that *militia is only suitable for defensive warfare*. It is obvious, indeed, that a national army composed of citizens all engaged in various occupations ought never to take up arms except when compelled to do so in self-defence. The robber attacks, the citizen defends himself.

Now, in every country peacefully-inclined individuals are in the majority, and the circumstance that aggressive armies were formed from these peaceful citizens did much to deprave politics in the nineteenth century. Imaginary contrasts had to be drawn, and at any rate some enthusiasm artificially created, which partly explains the enthusiastic attachment to the hereditary monarchical principle and the race patriotism characteristic of the nineteenth century.

Genuine national armies, however, and true militia are in reality eminently peaceful institutions, being in their very nature suited for home defence but not for aggression. What causes the professional soldier to look down on them, causes the civilian to admire them. And these are the kind of armies we must have if we are serious in our desire for peace. Whoever advocates other armies is forging instruments of war, and is therefore responsible if his instruments in their turn infallibly bring about war.

§ 81. THE REACTION OF THE MILITARY PARTY.—Scharnhorst, however, wanted armies for war, and it was his plans which were approved by King Frederick William III., in whose absolute power the ultimate decision lay. The people about this time were beginning to think of themselves as Germans ; and in 1813 they went to war not to maintain Prussia but to obtain Germany. Then and even later it would have been easy to have had a large German national army—if it had been desired to do so. But nothing of the sort was desired, and the only concession to the new era at length wrung from those in power was craftily to allow the people to imagine themselves to be forming a national army.

<sup>1</sup> *A Citizen's Army : the Swiss System* (Chatto & Windus) contains an exact description of the Swiss army system.—TRANS.

It has often been scornfully observed that the only democratic idea which has gained a foothold is that of national armies, and that they fought the battles of 1914. Such a reproach does not apply to Germany: she has never had a true national army, and what feeble attempts at anything of the sort were made during the troublous times of the wars of Liberation were strangled by professional soldiers before they could really come to anything.

The military party is to be admired for the logical persistency with which it has succeeded in enforcing its will. In the first period of alarm civilians were appointed to the Reorganisation Committee; and the first thing done was to bow them out with infinite politeness. Thus the military men were by themselves once more, and could reorganise. True, it was not upon extremists such as Gneisenau that the work of reorganisation fell, but on the more moderate Scharnhorst, who, however, was always, as Herr von Schön called him—a “regular” (soldier of the line).

In his first memorandum of July 21, 1807,<sup>1</sup> Scharnhorst still insists absolutely on the aristocratic importance of the *standing* army, which he thinks ought to continue to be obliged to serve twenty years! Besides this, however, he wished to organise a provincial militia or yeomanry, but solely for the purpose “of maintaining order in the country itself, assisting the police, protecting the country from the depredations of marauders, and preventing enemy incursions.” He also thought it possible that later on the militia “might *defend* the country, together with the regular troops.”

Scharnhorst, therefore, is chiefly thinking of somewhat better organised citizen guards, and it certainly never occurred to him that such a national army could be used for purposes of aggression. Gradually, however, this “militia,” as it was intended to be, became increasingly diverted from its original purpose of defence pure and simple. The very next year he completed his “Preliminary Draft Constitution for Provincial Troops,”<sup>2</sup> in which he goes a step further. In § 8, for instance, he says: “The provincial troops are intended to ensure order within the country itself, and to defend it against enemy *attack*. They

<sup>1</sup> Reprinted in the *Militärwochenblatt* for 1846, pp. 88-90.

<sup>2</sup> Reprinted in the Supplement to the *Militärwochenblatt* for 1846 (Jan.-Oct.), pp. 62-67. The number of soldiers provided for would correspond to about two millions in modern Germany, taking account of the population.

shall only leave the province when the safety of the monarchy requires them to do so." Here we have the troops already permitted to leave their province and available for use throughout Prussia. There is still no word, however, of their being employed outside the kingdom. Moreover, certain democratic guarantees are provided, as, for instance (§ 17), that the militia should be under officers chosen by themselves, chosen first of all by "all the individuals in a regiment," and so forth.

But nothing came of all these projects. The only thing which did come about was the so-called Scharnhorst system, whose sole purpose was to increase the standing army. The military men had failed to keep abreast of the new times.

### III. THE PRUSSIAN MILITIA

§ 82. THE PEOPLE'S MILITIA.—In January, 1813, came the astonishing news that Napoleon's great allied army had perished in the arctic Russian winter, and, as can be imagined, all German patriots immediately desired to fall upon the prostrate tyrant. But the standing army was not large enough, and there was no militia. Then the Estates of East Prussia set to work, and what the Government, with all its discussion, had not been able to do in twenty years, the people achieved in ten weeks.

On December 30, 1812, York von Wartenburg had gone over to the Russians, and on January 8 he reached Königsberg with his troops, thus conferring a certain amount of freedom of movement on the citizens. On January 31 Minister von Stein arrived in Königsberg; and although he lost no time in falling out with York, and was in fact officially ruled absolutely out of court, still in the ensuing deliberations there is no mistaking his influence and likewise that of President von Schön, who was also in Königsberg. On February 5, Privy Councillor von Brand being in the chair, a meeting of deputies of the Estates was held, which appointed a committee consisting of von Dohna, Heidemann, Hinz, Keber, von Lehndorf-Steinorth and von Schimmelpfennig; and on February 7 the "Königsberg Decisions," together with the complete draft of a scheme of organisation, were sent to the King. Thus the deliberations were over in four days, and in four months the troops were levied, thoroughly trained and already confronting the enemy.

These militia regiments were welcomed. Gratitude of any

long duration being distasteful, however, military men soon set about proving that it was not the Estates who suggested the training of the militia, but the King. It was actually asserted that Scharnhorst was the father of the militia: that he had discussed his project for it with his disciple Clausewitz, who had worked it out in detail and afterwards taken it to Russia: that then he had gone with the Russians to Königsberg, and thus Count Dohna had come to know of the plan. For us, however, this question of who was first is of small interest.

As already stated, there were many projects for a national levy; and in any case it can hardly be called particularly original to suggest that, if an army is destroyed, the surviving civilians should come to the rescue. Everything depended on the spirit which was to animate this new army. Stein and von Schön wanted it to be as far as possible purely for *defence*, and therefore a factor in the promotion of civilisation; whereas Scharnhorst wanted it to be for *attack*, and consequently something which many consider opposed to civilisation.

Eventually the military party was victorious; and this being so, and Stein being after all merely an episode in Prussia, it must unquestionably be admitted that it was not he and von Schön who were the fathers of the modern army, but Gneisenau and Scharnhorst.

The main points of the Königsberg Decisions are as follows:

The militia was not to be called up unless and until the enemy was advancing *over the frontiers*, and it was to be employed only in its own province (§ 1).

It was to be based on universal liability to serve, but men in holy orders and all descriptions of teachers were absolved, except "any officiating priests exceptionally highly qualified for their office" (§ 2).

The military authorities must have a say in the appointment of officers (§ 7).

§ 83. THE ROYAL MILITIA.—In course of time all these regulations were modified. The king and his advisers took only six weeks to revise the Decisions; but this was long enough to enable them to abolish the purely defensive purpose of the militia. Being still anxious, however, to get something out of the people, they were careful not to let their intentions be known. Hence, quite contrary to custom, the Royal Ordinance of March 17, 1813, contains no indication whatever as to the

object of the new army regulations. The Ordinance, indeed, is so very skilfully worded as at first sight to create an impression that the militia were in general to be employed only in the country itself. Thus in § 16 it is expressly stated that the militia may also be employed "outside their own district," which every sensible person would interpret as meaning that they could be employed anywhere in their native province, as stated in the Königsberg Decisions. But any sensible person would have been wrong, and the Government quite right: France, for instance, and all the rest of the world, are also outside any particular district.

A few unimportant apparent liberties were temporarily maintained, but election only by the soldiers themselves was manifestly a farce, and of the two hundred and thirty-seven higher and staff militia officers only two per cent. were civilians, and not a single brigadier was so. Moreover, in § 17 it was decreed that the militia was subject to the discipline of the standing army, which amounted to its being practically wholly at the mercy of the caprice of the Chief War Lords. This set the final seal to the fate of the militia as a defensive organisation. It was now to develop into the most powerful instrument of attack ever known in the history of the world.

In the succeeding century the Prussian militia was systematically transformed into an instrument of war. It had acquitted itself admirably of its original task; but even when it mustered, the advantage of the voluntary system was clear. Those who did not come spontaneously, like the East Prussians, did not come willingly in obedience to the king's command six weeks later. In Pomerania the militia took a very long while to assemble; in West Prussia hardly any one responded to the call to arms; in parts of Silesia and in Brandenburg rebellion broke out.<sup>1</sup>

In the West Elbe provinces, however, where the general level of education was higher, particularly in Westphalia, matters

<sup>1</sup> Thus Herr Flesche, chief of police, reported on April 19, 1813, from Potsdam, "that a large proportion of the militiamen did not appear, and those who did ventured to manifest their displeasure by making a noise. Some did not take the oath at all, and tried to encourage those about them to do likewise." The chief of police was grieved "to have to say this about the inhabitants of a city which at all times has enjoyed the favour of Your Majesty to quite an exceptionally great extent." Most other people, however, will think it scarcely astonishing that the very town to rebel was the one which knew better than any other what militarism meant.

went very badly. Here the people knew not only what French occupation but also what French democratic rule meant, and the Prussian commissioners met with angry resistance everywhere. Moreover, when the line troops and gendarmes at last succeeded in hunting up the people, they forthwith began to desert. It is important to form a true idea of how matters really stood then. Some certainly did volunteer, but the great majority of the army followed the drum only because compelled to do so.

Nevertheless the militia did free and protect the country, and it did achieve distinction and likewise suffered very heavily in the battles of 1813. When the year ended, the enemy had been driven back across the Rhine, and the work of the militia was over.

§ 84. THE TRANSFORMATION DURING THE WARS OF LIBERATION.—Meanwhile the guardians of the country, who ought to have been keeping faithful watch upon the Rhine, had come “to think there was something very fine about hunting”; and on January 1, 1814, when the first army corps under Blücher crossed the Rhine and thus advanced into enemy territory, it included about seven thousand militiamen. They were thus actually employed even outside the country for offensive purposes, although they did not give a particularly glorious account of themselves; indeed, the 1814 campaign in general added little to the glory of Prussian military annals.

Gradually, however, even the decision that universal liability to serve should be merely a temporary expedient for the war was evaded. True, after the Allies had taken Paris, after Napoleon's abdication and the return of the troops to their own country, Frederick William III. would fain have kept his promise, and repealed the ordinance imposing on every young man the obligation to present himself for military service.<sup>1</sup> The king's loyal intention, however, caused a revolution in the palace: there was a change in the Ministry of War, and His Majesty was informed once for all that kingly promises must not be put on an equality with those of other mortals. Consequently on September 3, 1814, a law was promulgated, countersigned by all the ministers (Stein, of course, was no longer minister), and enacting, without any beating about the bush, that “the institutions, therefore, to which this great success is due, and the maintenance of which *is desired by the whole*

<sup>1</sup> Order in Cabinet of May 27, 1814.

*nation*, shall form the main principles of the country's military constitution."

Now, if a national army had been then introduced, perhaps there would have been some justification for speaking of the desire of the nation; but the Government had realised that the popular institution of a militia could quite well be utilised to increase the army proper, and this new law was intended to cover the transition from the defensive militia to the larger and offensive army.

Firstly, in the preamble to the bill, the character of the militia is clearly defined, even for peace time.

Secondly, reservists who had served their full time were consigned to the militia (§ 8, *b* and *c*). Hitherto the militia had been an independent institution, and it was not allowable suddenly to put it on a level with the standing army, especially in view of popular sentiment. From henceforth this distinction begins to disappear.

Thirdly, it was expressly decreed (§ 8) that the first-line militia (up to the thirty-second year) was to be employed *abroad*, though it is true that the second-line militia (up to the thirty-ninth year) might be employed in general only in the country itself, and the last-line men (thirty-nine and over) only in their native province.

Many passages of this law are by no means clear, which is not surprising when it is remembered that the people had not yet forgotten the freedom promised them in 1813. It was first put in force in 1815. In 1814 the militia only overstepped its original limits because the military rendered this imperative. But now that Napoleon was for the second time on the throne of France the Allies determined to attack that country; and although on this occasion the seat of war was territory which was and always had been outside the country, yet the militia were instantly called up and sent abroad. It was thought needful to tell them in extenuation that, "having won their independence, it was now necessary to fight to ensure it." Thus still more of the defensive nature of the militia was laid aside.

#### IV. MILITARISM IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

§ 85. THE NEW MILITIA.—Here endeth the history of the old militia. Its place was taken by another, new in almost every

respect save the name and the cross, as Bräuer himself admits in his *History of the Prussian Militia*. It was an adroit piece of statesmanship on the part of the Prussian Government to have used the popular name of militia, in order in the course of half a century of peace to forge therefrom a keen-edged, passive instrument of aggression. That it meant to do this, and did it, justifies the charge of militarism against the Prussian Government; but its success also proves that there must have been some militarism among the Prussian people.

The authorities behaved as if they still conformed to the 1814 law; and on November 21, 1815, they issued a "Militia Ordinance." Even here provision is made for the civilian authorities having a voice in the election of officers, but with restrictions. The preamble still states that militia exists for home defence; and the second-line militia are still to be employed only in their native provinces. Moreover, a few untrained men were still included in the militia, thus making it appear more or less an improvised force intended for defence. But already the metamorphosis was being prepared. Whereas in 1814 it was frankly stated that the militia were to be disbanded in peace, the staff officers and a few soldiers are now retained, about fifty per regiment; but these staff officers before long developed into so-called *nuclei* of about one hundred and fifty men per battalion. Each year this standing army was enlarged, until by 1819 its number had risen to six hundred and thirty-five. And all, as the King used to say, "in recognition of the splendid enthusiasm shown by the inhabitants with regard to the militia." By ordinance of March 25, 1814, even the militia uniform was altered, "in order intimately to connect them, even in externals, with the standing army."

The game could now begin, and after all its rules were very simple. As the entire "nation in arms" could not be included in a standing army, nor in any other organisation of the kind, at all events not immediately, the militia was first of all *reduced* (!) and then assimilated to the standing army. Then, after the public had had time to get used to this measure, the militia was increased again. In principle the same thing happened afterwards almost every time that the standing army was increased. New regiments were created without adding to the number of troops, merely by transferring men from one regiment to another. For instance, three regiments of four battalions would



be converted into four regiments of three. Then after a certain lapse of time these small regiments were declared "unsuitable for active service," and men were called for to make up the missing four battalions.

Thus militia reserve regiments, militia instruction battalions and other new formations came into existence; and in 1821 the Government could already dispose of over 126,000 militia so called, besides 136,000 troops of the line. The militia were intended for incorporation in the army for active service, and thus were quite openly included in the offensive army. There were besides some 100,000 second-line troops, mainly militia, described as an army of occupation.

§ 86. ARMY AND REVOLUTION.—These organisations were altogether very adroitly created to ensure closer connection with troops of the line. In this there was a two-fold object: to acquire one uniform weapon against the foreigner, also, as must never be forgotten, at the same time to weld the "enemy at home," utterly routed as he was, so firmly into the army as to be able to use them as a weapon for fighting this very enemy. That is, to fight the militia system with militiamen. Thus in the militia-guards officers were entirely abolished, and their places taken by officers of the Guards who had served their time. Yet conservative soldiers of the stamp of General von der Marwitz still spoke of the whole military system as a "damned democratic idea"; and although the militia gave a good account of itself in suppressing the Polish insurrection of 1830, it was a question, even until 1848; as to how it would behave in case of a revolution of the German element in it, despite all the officers of the Guards.

As a matter of fact, even when the militia was called up in 1848, a large number of them proved refractory, and "outrageous excesses" occurred, resulting in many bodies of militia being "deprived of their colours, in token of their unworthiness." But now that they stood in battle array between the soldiers of the line, they learned fast enough to fight against their fellow-citizens. Indeed, it seems as if the militiamen bore a particular grudge against those who had caused "unseemly tumults" and thus obliged them to do anything so much against the grain as to join the colours. Bräuer (Vol. II. p. 162) even states that this hatred frequently vented itself

in "shooting prisoners dead and massacring enemies found concealed in conquered places."

At this period, indeed, the German militiamen do not seem to have lost all sense of shame, for Lieutenant-Colonel von Bonin, describing the evacuation of some insurgents' houses, says: "The invading parties came out again with blood-stained bayonets, without boasting further of their performances. This testified to a certain bashfulness on the part of the young soldiers, as if they were not sure whether they had done right."

To cure such bashfulness, the authorities had a good remedy. They recollected that in general it was better in civil wars to employ soldiers from any other part, and indeed the Prussian militiamen in Posen, in the Rhenish Palatinate and Baden could not have been accused of any lack of dash. Moreover, it was the militia who were most energetic. Thus Staroste writes: <sup>1</sup>

"I have endeavoured to ascertain the feeling and opinions of Prussian military men concerning the Palatinate movement. I have not found a single real democrat among them, at all events *not one who would have expressed his democratic leanings (!)*. Whenever they catch sight of a tattered individual, they at once call him a democrat. Even the Rhineländer is boiling over with hatred of democrats and political agitators, and the Prussians are still worse, but *worst of all* are the *militia*."

The so-called "Baden" campaign at least proved the capability of Prussian militia. There was no doubt whatever that it was not really militia at all nor a people's army, but a princely guard. Old Marwitz and men of that ilk were "idiotic pessimists," and thus nothing any longer stood in the way of the militia being speedily and very greatly enlarged.

A beginning was made by simply neglecting to disband it when this ought to have been done, after the mobilisation of 1850, but keeping back two hundred men as the "nucleus of a company." Then followed events too well known to recapitulate—the army organisation of 1871, which led to another dispute, and then the enormous increases of the army after 1871, which led to no more disputes. And then the German Empire's wonderful military mechanism was ready, Emperor

<sup>1</sup> Staroste's *Tagebuch über die Ereignisse in der Pfalz und in Baden* (Diary of Events in the Palatinate and Baden), vol. i. p. 199.

and Princes, Parliament and People having all slaved together to bring it about.

It took precisely a hundred years to do this. In 1814 the militia invaded France. In 1914 even the last-line troops were employed in attacking the enemy abroad. A year ago, when this first happened in Belgium, a reassuring notice was issued about its being "merely to occupy the newly-acquired parts of the country, which were already as good as German territory." Since then, however, last-line troops, militia, and line troops have been used quite indiscriminately, thereby effacing the last reminiscences of the militia having once been an integral part of the country's "system of defence."

The German last-line troops are now practically *nowhere* fighting on German soil. The majority of the German people are glad about this, as they are quite entitled to be; but in so far as they have still any desire to think for themselves, they must admit that it means that the militia are being employed for purposes the opposite of those for which they were originally created. There may be a great deal to be said for this, but from the standpoint of peace and progress it is singularly regrettable.

§ 86a. UNIVERSAL MILITARY SERVICE IN EUROPE.—In all countries, Free Albion excepted, events have taken a similar course, thus bringing about the institution of standing armies, which theorists ignorant of the world and self-seeking politicians<sup>1</sup> have described as guaranteeing peace, and which could not fail to lead to the disaster of 1914.

I have endeavoured to describe how this singular institution actually came into existence, and in particular to show that in reality universal *liability to serve* is merely a great historical misconception of the universal *duty of bearing arms*. This is so clear from the facts cited that the attentive reader will perhaps even believe it; but I am convinced that a dry record of facts and figures cannot possibly touch any one's feelings. But as I want such events to stir the conscience of even the dullest mortal, I am recapitulating all the facts in this chapter, clothing them in the words of a poet<sup>2</sup> trying to make a foolish world give ear to his words of wisdom and despair. As for his chief

<sup>1</sup> *Realpolitiker*. I have intentionally chosen this courteous epithet, but future generations are more likely to call them, more aptly, "fools and criminals."

<sup>2</sup> *Le Lys Rouge*, by Anatole France, pp. 116-118. Calman-Lévy, Paris.

character, Choulette, in his view, "le régime actuel n'était qu'hypocrisie et brutalité. Le militarisme lui faisait horreur."

"La caserne," remarks Choulette, "est une invention hideuse des temps modernes. Elle ne remonte qu'au XVII<sup>e</sup> siècle. Avant, on n'avait que le bon corps de garde où les soudards jouaient aux cartes et faisaient des contes de Merlusine. Louis XIV. est un précurseur<sup>1</sup> de la Convention et de Bonaparte. Mais le mal a atteint sa plénitude depuis l'institution monstrueuse du service pour tous. Avoir fait une obligation aux hommes de tuer, c'est la honte des empereurs<sup>2</sup> et des républiques, le crime des crimes. Aux âges qu'on dit barbares, les villes et les princes confiaient leur défense à des mercenaires qui faisaient la guerre en gens avisés et prudents : il n'y avait parfois que cinq ou six morts dans une grande bataille. Et quand les chevaliers allaient en guerre, du moins n'y étaient-ils point forcés ; ils se faisaient tuer pour leur plaisir. Sans doute n'étaient-ils bons qu'à cela. Personne, au temps de saint Louis, n'aurait eu l'idée d'envoyer à la bataille un homme de savoir et d'entendement. Et l'on n'arrachait pas non plus le laboureur à la glèbe pour le mener à l'ost. Maintenant on fait un devoir à un pauvre paysan d'être soldat. On l'exile de la maison dont le toit fume dans le silence doré du soir, des grasses prairies ou paissent les bœufs, des champs, des bois paternels ; on lui enseigne, dans la cour d'une vilaine caserne, à tuer régulièrement des hommes ; on le menace, on l'injurie, on le met en prison ; on lui dit que c'est un honneur, et, s'il ne veut point s'honorer de cette manière, on le fusille. Il obéit parce qu'il est sujet à la peur et de tous les animaux domestiques le plus doux, le plus riant et le plus docile."

In this last sentence of Anatole France there is much truth, it may be the whole truth. I do not wish to detract from the weight of his words by dissecting them : I would merely ask the reader to reflect for ten minutes on the following—that universal service is a sign of Man's timorousness and docility, of his willingness to obey and his ever-readiness to smile.

As I write, the last act of the drama is coming to an end. England seems inclined to introduce universal service. "Only

<sup>1</sup> Anatole France is a Frenchman, a good Frenchman too, and thus naturally feels doubly keenly the responsibility of his own country. Consequently it is mainly France which he accuses.

<sup>2</sup> Did Anatole France perhaps intentionally omit to mention the "United Kingdom" of Great Britain ?

for the war," it is added soothingly ; but in Prussia it began in just the same way—"only for the war." It is not for me to advise England, but I would remind her of Schiller's reference to her in his *Fleet Invincible*, the finest utterance of a free man to a free people :

" Soll wirklich denn mein Albion vergehen,  
Erlöschen meiner Helden Stamm,  
Der Unterdrückung letzter Felsendamm  
Zusammenstürzen, die Tyrannenwehre  
Vernichtet sein von dieser Hemisphäre f—  
Bang schaut auf dich der Erdenball  
Und aller freien Männer Herzen schlagen,  
Und alle guten, schönen Seelen klagen,  
Teilnehmend deines Ruhmes fall." <sup>1</sup>

This time, however, matters are more serious. A foreign military power then menaced England's coast, and it was scattered to the winds, as happens to all military power ; but this time militarism is gnawing at England's vitals from the inside outwards. It is even ready to throw open the door to the tyrant, and then the last bulwark against tyranny will be overthrown.

It may be that England's trial to-day is severer and her position more difficult than ever before ; but all the more does it become the bounden duty of all Europeans to assert their proud determination to break their old swords in sunder and to forge no more new ones.

For if England now introduces universal military service, all Europe is her accomplice, and every man in Europe is as much responsible therefor as for the "unavoidable consequences of the militarism of 1914."

<sup>1</sup> The following rendering of these last lines of the poem is taken from Bowring's translation (Bell, 1893), with acknowledgments :

" What ! " He exclaimed, " shall my lov'd Albion,  
And all her race of heroes, now so free,  
Pine in the galling bonds of slavery f  
Shall she, whose name with dread all tyrants hear,  
Be swept for ever from this hemisphere f "  
" Never," He cried, " shall Freedom's Eden true,  
That bulwark of all human rights be shattered "—  
God the Almighty blew,  
And to the winds of Heaven the fleet was scattered !

## CHAPTER VII

## WHEREIN PATRIOTISM IS ROOTED

## I. PATRIOTISM CONSIDERED AS AN INSTINCT

§ 87. **INEVITABLE DECADENCE.**—War is wrong, harmful and needless. Then why do we wage war—we twentieth-century mortals? And why do we even love war?

The external causes for this love of war have already been set forth, but there is the further fact that, without our being fully aware of it, war stirs us to the very depths of our being; and that it is perhaps the last great carouse of which even a degenerate nation can dream. Such simple things as truth and beauty, freedom and progress evoke merely a tired smile, like that of an old man recalling his youthful follies. Something stronger and more tangible in the way of a stimulant is now needed to arouse enthusiasm. Such a stimulant for a nation is war, for an old man wine. Verily war is as sweet wine, and should a nation drink itself young again with wine, this is what Goethe meant by a "precious virtue." It is a reminder of its youthful days, with their wonderful lightheartedness, their pardonable selfishness and their boundless capacity for self-sacrifice.

This intoxication is what is great about war. This it is which has inspired poets and painters; and any one who has ever witnessed the outbreak of war will admit that the elemental force of sudden enthusiasm, with which vast numbers of people are then and there carried away, creates absolutely the impression of their acting instinctively, but never of their acting intelligently. Yet no one will own to having warlike instincts, for it is with war as with wine, which we love not for wine's sake but for the sake of the feeling which it produces in us. Similarly human beings, at any rate superior human beings, do not love war for its own sake, but because it awakens in us primitive and hallowed sentiments which we collectively call patriotism. We love war

because we think it necessary to our mother-country, but without patriotism war would be inconceivable to-day. Tolstoi<sup>1</sup> is right, that so long as patriotism survives there will always be war; for, as Maupassant<sup>2</sup> says, it is "*the egg of wars.*" The War Giant, like Antæus, cannot be vanquished as long as it is perpetually deriving fresh strength from contact with that love of country wherein it has its source.

To-day patriotism seems more powerful than ever. Even nations which have no historical claim whatever to love their country are behaving as if this were not the case. All the separatism of past centuries has been revived again in this patriotism which even the smallest tribes, hitherto held together by nothing whatsoever, have suddenly discovered in themselves. Even the Jews, who for two thousand years were scattered about among all peoples that on earth do dwell, have found out that they, too, have a patriotism, and are becoming national Zionists: even the Americans, who are after all quite a recent conglomeration of miscellaneous peoples, are becoming patriots and imperialists. Such a paroxysm of patriotism, however, is suspicious, and resembles the flaring up of a candle before it flickers out.

Men did not become really fond of yachting and horse-racing until sailing ships and horses had been superseded by better methods of travel. Similarly patriotism did not grow out of bounds until it had already ceased to be a valuable factor in civilisation. The principle "*my country, right or wrong*" could not get a hold on the world until there was no longer a law student in existence, not even the humblest, who would have ventured seriously to defend such a dogma; and "*the Country*" never became a conception transcending all others and throwing all others into the shade, until mankind had already begun to create "*universal*" unions and other "*world-wide institutions.*"

Such is the fate of decadence. But though a man should speak with the tongues of men and of angels, and prove with flawless logic that war is foolish and despicable; and then another should come and say: "*Quite true, but the Country wants it,*" there would be nothing to be done. The second man would come off victorious.

<sup>1</sup> *Patriotism and Government*, in Tolstoi's religious and ethical pamphlets, vol. xi.

<sup>2</sup> *Mon oncle Sosthène*, by Guy de Maupassant.

§ 88. THE COMMANDING POSITION OF PATRIOTISM.—Being in the nature of an instinct, patriotism seems as if it could neither be exterminated nor overcome. The reason why war against war is so hard is just because practically every one loves his own country more devotedly than anything else whatsoever. The thoroughbass of patriotism drowns or silences all other sentiments. In peace the Christian may love God before all else, and the free-thinking monist the brotherhood of Man; the æsthete may put art and its wondrous works before everything else, and the workman place Socialism first. Yet so soon as war breaks out, against God's ordinance, when cathedrals are reduced to dust, and the international bonds uniting the working classes and men of science throughout the world are broken in sunder, Christian and freethinker, æsthete and working man all look on and approve while all our other conceptions of truth, goodness and beauty dissolve before the magic words, "*for the sake of the Country*"—that Country which men put before religion and art, science and politics, and therefore even before civilisation, which after all is but an abstract fusion of them all.

In thus setting the Country on high we forget one thing. At best our country cannot be more than the form in which, in our opinion, religion, art, science and politics, civilisation in short, can best prosper. Who would really stoop so low as to esteem a people more highly merely because he himself belonged to it, unless he were profoundly convinced of its being in every respect superior to other nations? This is so self-evident, as far as any patriotism which can be taken seriously is concerned, that I do not believe any one will venture to assert the contrary. But this being so, then the noblest love of country after all merely amounts to setting too high a value on the form as compared with the contents. This is the commonest mistake which half-educated people make, they being fundamentally incapable of distinguishing inward reality from outward show. With patriotism, in short, as with religion and science, it is the same thing: if allowed to go too far, it becomes a dogmatic commonplace.

When a man has once realised, however, that all patriotism which can be taken seriously must inevitably to a certain extent do away with patriotism, or at any rate set bounds to its growth, then, despite all instinctive enthusiasm, he may perhaps set



about inquiring more closely into what patriotism is really based upon.

We wish to be just to patriotism. It is not the "*greatest thing in the world*," neither is it such an altogether bad thing as extreme Internationalists endeavour to make out. Just because they did so represent it, however, they failed to carry with them the sane-minded mass of the people, or even to make them see how much there is wrong and unjustifiable in so-called modern patriotism. There is, in short, no unconditional patriotism, for it too depends on circumstances, and cannot be judged aright save by taking these into account.

Patriotism is rooted in three sentiments. Two of these, a man's love of his native land and family love, are hereditary instincts, which we can all easily understand, and which are probably common to us all, because of our common past. But the third root reaches out into the future: it is man's social longing—his desire to join with other men to form large associations. Now as no two persons view the future alike, it is here that patriotism divides, and here that the good parts company with the bad.

## II. OUR LOVE FOR OUR NATIVE LAND

§ 89. AN ANIMAL'S LOVE FOR HIS NATIVE SURROUNDINGS AND A HUMAN BEING'S LOVE OF THEM. ATTACHMENT TO SURROUNDINGS INDICATES SUITABILITY FOR THEM.—Our love of our native land is an inheritance, originally transmitted to us by animals. The less an organism is adapted to the general conditions of the world and the more it is suited to the special conditions of its own surroundings, the more deeply rooted may it be said to be in its native land. In this respect the history of evolution shows ups and downs. The lowest forms of life, for instance many bacteria even now, only need certain omnipresent conditions, such as air, light, water and some few food-stuffs which occur everywhere, in order to exist. Thus, being "cosmopolitan" they do not need to be limited to a native element.

Gradually, however, each creature becomes more and more closely adapted to peculiar conditions. The fish must swim in water, and the trout, if it is to thrive, even requires spring-water; the monkey can live only in warm forests, and the orang-

outang, indeed, only in the primeval tropical forests of the East Indian archipelago; birds need air, but the condor needs certain special conditions besides, which he can find in the Andes alone. This increasing adaptation to a specific climate and this growing disinclination to quit a certain area, which may be compared with growing attachment to our native land, are interrupted when the youthful human race makes its first tool.

This is not the place to show how Man used his tools to acquire freedom in every respect. I will content myself with pointing out the obvious fact that the use of tools abolishes the natural compulsion exerted by love of country, since with the aid of tools (using this word in the broadest sense) Man learns to adapt himself to the most varied conditions. Unlike the countless tools of animals which have grown to be a part of them, such as beaks, teeth, prehensile tails, probosces, burrowing feet, etc., human tools can be laid aside or changed at any moment. With his clothing of various thicknesses Man can live in the tropics and at the North Pole, whereas an animal has either a bare skin or a thick coat.

The tiger must fall upon his prey, and consequently inhabit a district where prey abounds, for his claws are part of himself; the mole must dig and consequently creep into the earth, being unable to lay aside his burrowing foot. The horse must be a fleet animal, and therefore cannot quit the steppes, for he cannot put his hoof to any purpose except running. Man, however, can exchange his sword for a ploughshare, and be both farmer and warrior at once. By making a tool of the horse, and hoisting himself on to his back, he can even appropriate his swiftness; and he can actually intensify this speed by building railways and steamers, airships and motor cars. Thus he is able to live everywhere.

Owing to Man's free intellect, therefore, the individual on the highest plane is no longer he who is best adapted to certain surroundings, but he who has most unlimited control over the outer world. Man's attachment to his native soil, therefore, is a relic of the animal in him, and originated in the savage's dread of the unknown. No one, moreover, who has endeavoured to judge human nature impartially can have failed to observe that love of country is in the case of most of us a romantic sentiment, strongly tinged with the influence of Chateaubriand and the

many others who have invented modern love of nature for us. We love German forests not merely for their own sake, but because, from Dürer to Leistikoff, thousands have painted them; because, from Walter von der Vogelweide to Eichendorff, thousands have sung their praises; because Tieck coined the phrase "lonely as the woods"; because there the German oak grows and the German lime-tree too; in short, we love the forests not only for their own sake, but because they have come to be a symbol to us.

Innocent love of country, however, is wholly different. It is a genuine necessity, and is greatest among backward peoples, who have really grown up part and parcel of their native land. Once forcibly transplanted therefrom, they can never settle down properly anywhere else. Who are the people in Europe most famous for their attachment to their native soil before ever modern affectation<sup>1</sup> had insisted on every one's worshipping the art of his own country? They are first and foremost the Swiss mountain peasants, who could not live without their mountains and cows; the fishermen of the Volga, to whom Mother Volga means the world; and the Icelanders, who prefer their stern native land to all the luxury of Central Europe. All these folk have remained comparatively primitive; and the lower we descend the scale of ethnology, the stronger we shall find this unconquerable attachment to the ways and customs of the mother country.

Surprise has often been felt that the sons of primitive peoples, Indians and Maoris, for instance, whom supposed good fortune has transferred to comfortable European surroundings, could yet never be at home there; in fact, that even many civilised savages, who had apparently become quite inured to European ways, having even completed their university studies with distinction, should yet have taken the first opportunity to go back to the bush and become naked savages again.<sup>2</sup> But there is nothing surprising in this, for their primitive brains are simply incapable of feeling at home in such complex new conditions. Hence there are absolutely natural reasons why they should be

<sup>1</sup> *Snobbismus* is the word used, but all students of modern French will perceive that Dr. Nicolai means what the French call "snobisme" rather than what we call "snobbishness." There is, so far as we know, no exact English translation of "snobisme," but it is, we think, nearer "affectation" than "snobbishness."—TRANS.

<sup>2</sup> We cannot say whether there are some Maoris of whom this is true; but certainly there are many of whom it is *not* true.—TRANS.

attached to their native soil in a way which to us at first seems incomprehensible.

§ 90. OVERCOMING OUR LOVE OF OUR NATIVE SOIL.—If I mistake not, it was Macaulay who first pointed out that although love of a man's native soil and patriotism were identical in small communities, such as the Greek republics, the Swiss cantons, and the German imperial cities, for here the narrow confines of "home" really represented a definite conception, yet in the larger communities of to-day this is no longer so in the least. As Ratzel<sup>1</sup> truly says: "Meantime the German's associations are only with his country or bit of country. In the case of the Old Bavarian, however, this country does not necessarily extend to Franconia, and in the case of the Prussian not necessarily west of the Elbe." On the other hand, the dweller in the low-lying plains of North Germany finds what is to him a more kindred homelike land in the Asiatic lowlands, as far as the Yenisei, than in all Southern Germany. The natural motherland of the South German, on the contrary, extends far beyond Germany southwards and westwards—indeed, the dweller in the low-lying plains of the Upper Rhine would more easily feel at home in Lombardy than on the Lüneburg Heath.

Thus a man's natural attachment to his native soil must of necessity tend towards narrowness, and it is just the highly developed, far-seeing nations who have grown beyond this innate love of their native soil, for they have learned not to dread the unknown, and to have open eyes and ears for appreciating beauty throughout the world. The educated Greeks of a later day were at home everywhere in the then known world; the Romans, again, were more attached to Greece than to their own country—indeed, they not infrequently called themselves barbarians; and Tacitus and others even discovered perpetual beauties in the misty land of Germania. From time immemorial we Germans have had an uncontrollable longing for the south; and it is just the "most highly civilised" nation on earth which is freest from this kind of love of country, for the proud Briton knows that in a sense he is able to take his country round the world with him. He has conquered the world just because he hunts elks in Scandinavia, tracks bears in Russia, shoots tigers in India and lions in Africa, always *like an Englishman*. He has

<sup>1</sup> *Deutschland: Einführung in die Heimatkunde* (Germany: an Introduction to the Knowledge of our own Country), by Friedrich Ratzel, p. 312. Leipzig, 1898.

conquered the world, in short, just because for him "Home, sweet home" is no longer anything but a romantic idyll.<sup>1</sup>

Thus this primitive root of patriotism, love of our native soil, or native heath, or native steppes, has in process of time ceased to be of any value as a factor in evolution. Even Gottfried Keller,<sup>2</sup> whom assuredly no one would accuse of want of attachment to his mountains and to everything German, recognised that modern patriotism was becoming a clog.

§ 91. THE ORGANIC FAMILY INSTINCT. NOMADIC TRIBE OR FAMILY ?—The primitive tribes which human beings united to form in olden times owe their origin partly to the human tribal instinct and partly to the family instinct. Neither were ever wholly separate, nor are they now. The family instinct gradually widened until it became a racial instinct—if it be allowable to speak of a race all of whose members spring from a common stock. The tribal instinct simply compelled a fairly large number of human beings to club together to form warlike nomadic tribes, and therefore has really nothing to do with their having sprung from a common stock. It merely indicates that human beings feel more at ease with a number of their fellows than alone.

<sup>1</sup> Dr. Nicolai, like every one else, is entitled to his own opinion. His writing affords much more proof of knowledge of biology than of knowledge of English character, his notions of which seem to be purely theoretical.—TRANS.

<sup>2</sup> "Nationalität," in Gottfried Keller's *Collected Poems*, 1889. Wilhelm Herz, Berlin.

" Volkstum und Sprache sind das Jugendland,  
 Darin die Völker wachsen und gedeihen,  
 Das Mutterhaus, nach dem sie sehrend schreien,  
 Wenn sie verschlagen sind auf fremden Strand,  
 Doch manchmal werden sie zum Gängelband,  
 Sogar zur Kette um den Hals der Freien ;  
 Dann treiben Längsterwachsene Spielereien  
 Genarrt von der Tyrannen schlauer Hand.  
 Hier trenne sich der lang vereinte Strom !  
 Versiegend schwinde der im alten Staube,  
 Der andere breche sich ein neues Bette !  
 Denn *einen* Pontifex nur fasst der Dom,  
 Das ist die Freiheit, der polit'sche Glaube,  
 Der löst und bindet jede Seelenkette ! "

(Roughly : Nationality and speech are the land of youth wherein the peoples grow and flourish ; the maternal home for which they yearn and cry when they are flung on a foreign strand. But many a time these things become leading-strings, or even fetters round the neck of the free. Then, fooled by the cunning hand of tyrants, they, in their full maturity, play like children. Here let the long united stream divide—one disappear dried up in the dust of ages ; the other break out into a new bed ! For the cathedral holds only *one* pontiff, that is to say, freedom—the political faith that looses and binds every garland of souls.)

Originally the family instinct was confined to maternal affection, which, with the impulse to feed, is perhaps the oldest instinct known to us. But whereas feeding is purely selfish, maternal affection is the most primeval impulse which is not devoid of altruism and which has nevertheless not ceased to be selfish; for although the child is already another being, yet the mother feels it to be something belonging to her own self. Not till maternal affection expanded into family affection and finally into universal fraternal affection did the altruism in it become more manifest. The original nature of the sentiment, however, remained unchanged. Once more we see that in Nature there is no beginning, and even what seems to be new and wholly unlike anything in the past is in reality only a development of the old. It was long believed, indeed, that maternal affection was solely due to the mother's feeling a child "flesh of her flesh and bone of her bone." But something similar to maternal affection can be proved to have existed even before any question of sentiment can have arisen, since the parents did not as yet know their own offspring, indeed often never saw them.

In common parlance, it is true, we no longer speak of maternal affection, nor even of maternal instincts, but of "Nature's maternal forethought." For this Autenrieth introduced the fine and appropriate name of "organic instinct," by which he virtually means that as a matter of fact in creatures on so low a level no modification takes place in the rest of the organism. There are countless instances of such organic maternal instincts. The fact that the more offspring an animal produces the smaller and more helpless these offspring are must not be forgotten, for the only object in these vast numbers being born is that, despite all persecution, some may still survive. The creation of pectoral glands which secrete suitable nourishment, of birds' crops for the purpose of predigestion, and of pouches for carrying young, are all facts proving how mother-love has triumphed.

Then comes a series of facts which may indeed be connected with instincts but which are also wholly and solely attributable to mother-love, although at first sight they seem to have nothing to do with it. Among these facts are rutting periods, which are always so timed that the young are not born in the cold of winter, but when young, juicy plants or young, easily digestible animals are to be found. Countless instincts of insects serve

similar purposes. When laying their eggs, many insects seem to exercise almost incredible foresight, so that the future larvæ may be able to creep forth in suitable conditions; and yet no such insect has ever survived the birth of its offspring. In the case of the higher animals, particularly birds and mammals, such compelling instincts constantly tend to become freer, that is, to depend more and more on the intelligence. As their brain constantly increases in activity it must learn to think for the offspring, and if this is to be the case some feeling must necessarily exist. Such a feeling is mother-love.

§ 92. THE CHANGE IN RACIAL INSTINCTS.—Thus mother-love, like most of our sublimest sentiments, can be traced backwards through the animal kingdom to the time when it was still an organic instinct, that is a purely animal quality. This nowise detracts from the value of such a sentiment; but once we perceive that after all it merely represents the equivalent of former physical qualities, already partially extinct, we shall cease to be straightway convinced that such sentiments are eternally valuable. To offend against them, therefore, becomes no worse than inflicting bodily injury; and we realise that in certain circumstances even maternal love may have to yield to something higher. If mankind in general should one day care for all children—as is not beyond the bounds of possibility—because it has realised that this would be a good thing, then maternal affection would be nothing but a rudimentary instinct, perhaps even in the way, just as the appendix, once useful, is now useless, and merely a cause of disease.

If, however, this applies to maternal affection, how much more does it apply to its derivative, family affection, and above all to racial affection. Both family and racial affection are of very mixed origin. Thoroughly human and occasionally anything but desirable elements are intermingled with both. The reason why maternal affection could expand into family affection was that not only did the mother love her child, but the man his descendants. Modern research has long since ascertained that monogamous marriage is no natural institution. Man is by nature polygamous and philoneistic. Originally promiscuity prevailed between all men and women belonging to migratory tribes, just as all animals living in herds are polygamous, and only a few creatures living alone, a number of birds, for instance, are monogamous. We now know with absolute

certainty that everywhere the monogamic period only succeeded the so-called matriarchate period after the wife had become the slave of the husband, who regarded her as a valuable domestic animal and wished to make sure of his right to own her, as if she had been a cow or a sheep. At the same time as the woman was enslaved and taken possession of by the husband, private ownership of other property began to come in; to inherit this legitimately the husband then desired to found a "legitimate" family, within certain well-defined limits. The sacredness of the family, therefore, is really based on the sacredness of private property; and the very nations which to-day set most store by the possession of material property (the Jews, for example) are those who still consider the family most sacred. The sources of family affection, therefore, have at all times been not only the pure well-springs of mother-love, but also the turbid waters of slavery and property-ownership.

As for racial affection, it is after all nothing but expanded family love. We love human beings whom we believe to be descended from the same ancestors as ourselves, and whom we therefore suppose to belong to the same great family. Thus we see that even the second source of patriotism consists of troubled waters, and how foul they often are we shall realise more clearly in analysing race patriotism (§ 99).

### III. THE SOCIAL ASPIRATIONS OF MANKIND

§ 93. THE EXPLANATION OF PUBLIC-SPIRITEDNESS.—An association of human beings seems to us more important than an individual, and by general consensus of opinion the origin of associations is put later than that of human beings. Some thought sex accounted for the formation of associations. A human being, it was said, founded a family, branches of this family then arose, and these formed into villages and towns and afterwards into states. Others saw the explanation in civilisation, arguing that certain occupations, such as agriculture, or, as Schiller says, Ceres, caused Man to associate with his fellow Man.

As was shown in discussing Man's original tendency to herd together, and as anthropologists long ago proved, these views do not really go to the root of the matter. *It was not Man who founded Society, but Society which was his primary state. It*



*was collectivity which first produced the individual.* In other words, Society is older than Man, and Man's ancestors lived in herds even when they were still in an animal state. Man, therefore, always has been Aristotle's *zoön politikon*, the social animal. The universal brotherhood of Man and humanitarian ideas generally are in no sense abstract notions, but the most solid facts. Thus what we have to explain is not how blood-thirsty animals became peace-loving human beings, but contrariwise, how it happened that Man, the social animal, should have become warlike.

But deeply rooted and at all times innate as is this humanitarian instinct of Man's, yet it must everlastingly be struggling against the no less inborn instinct of egoism. We are inwardly cast in human form, and the instrument for using our humanity to the uttermost is at hand, only human beings do not yet know how to play upon it. Hitherto the pure sound of this music whose harmony is of the Future has never been heard on earth : only the favoured few have heard its soft strains and delighted therein.

Mankind's social aspirations, therefore, are beckoning to him to advance towards an ideal which is not something vague and unknown, enveloped in the mists of ages to come, but something which we can already see clear as daylight before us, if only with the mind's eye.

## CHAPTER VIII

## THE DIFFERENT SPECIES OF PATRIOTISM

## I. LOCAL PATRIOTISM

§ 94. NATURAL PATRIOTISM.—German patriotism, like every other, is something large and complex, containing very many almost indefinable elements. There is first, attachment to our native tongue, in whose accents we first learned to make our wants known, which first made us feel intelligent beings, and in which we first learned about goodness, truth and beauty in our childhood's years, when we are still sensitive to beauty and goodness. This attachment includes others—attachment to all the kind people whom we knew when we were children, and who were almost all Germans: to all the great men who first aroused our enthusiasm—Goethe, Kant, Beethoven and many hundreds of others: to much that is beautiful: to our forests and lakes, our old churches and ballads. We are not always aware of this, but so it is, and the patriotism of those very persons who are now declaring that it is unpatriotic to like the Lorelei song because Heinrich Heine wrote it, is partly based on this oft-sung song. Then there is also the recollection of many things endeared to us merely by trivial custom, not simply such things as German beer and capacity for standing it, and German jollity. A great deal else besides which other nations envy us, for instance German thoroughness and love of order, German music and German humour, cannot be understood or judged aright save by those born just on the little spot between the Rhine and Memel; while Silesian *Himmelreich* and Bavarian dumplings<sup>1</sup> help to develop another and more special local attachment. German forests and

<sup>1</sup> Silesian *Himmelreich* is a dish consisting of bread-dumplings with pears, sometimes plums, cooked together. People sufficiently well-off to afford it, add boiled bacon. It is also a favourite dish in Berlin. Bavarian dumplings—the national dish in Bavaria and Bohemia—are prepared in various ways, sometimes containing apples, sometimes plums, and often liver (liver-dumplings.) These last are eaten by preference with cabbage steeped in vinegar (*Sauerkohl*). They are made sometimes of flour, with or without yeast, sometimes with potatoes, cooked or uncooked, and are sometimes boiled, sometimes baked, and sometimes roasted.—TRANS.

Strasburg Cathedral, the Colmar Crucifixion and the North German steppes are all integral parts of our German patriotism.

French patriotism is altogether different. In it traces of the Renaissance survive, and of the Great Revolution, of Burgundy and Champagne, of the marvellous delicacy of a Corot and the Gallic wit of a Voltaire. The Napoleonic legend also intervenes; the cupola of the dome of the Invalides glows in the setting sun, and the Provençal troubadour sings freely of the "Donna franca et cortezza," and extols the "gesta Dei per Francos"—the divine deeds of the Franks.

The solid basis for these human aspirations will be discussed in Chapter XIII. on "The World as an Organism." It is enough to point out here that mankind can never be completely in harmony unless all human beings feel as brethren and comrades. Thus Man's primeval impulse to look forward is not only the root of all patriotism, but also the crowning point of all genuine, true and eternal love of country.

§ 95. TRUE AND FALSE PATRIOTISM.—True and false patriotism here part company, and do so of their own accord. Wherever local patriotism, however local it may be, tends to make humanity humaner, or, if the phrase be preferred, to promote patriotism of the human race, it is justified; but wherever it tends to obstruct this one great aim of Man it is reprehensible.

This idea is part and parcel of mankind. It was not realised all at once, however, for first the egoism of the individual had to be overcome, and for this it was necessary for men to unite together. Municipal patriotism was justified in overcoming the selfish designs of the robber barons. The conception of a State triumphed when it had to be applied to whole civilisations such as modern national governments. Hence no one will ever succeed in undoing what has been done once and for all by the struggles of the nineteenth century, in which men patriotically joined together, thereby ensuring the victory of national patriotism. National states now exist, only needing to be perhaps slightly improved. Hence national patriotism would not now be justified save in a few oppressed territories.

New problems are now awaiting us, only we are attempting to solve them by the same methods as answered in the case of the old problems. Patriotism is no longer a spring-board for Man in his endeavours to take heaven by storm, for its aims are no longer progressive but retrogressive. The patriotisms

involved in the present conflict bring us no nearer the final patriotism of Mankind ; there is no genuine patriotism about them.

What of England and English patriotism? it may be asked. Newton and Faraday, Cromwell and Shakespeare, the Habeas Corpus Act, the World's First Parliament, Scottish ballads, whisky, British soldiers in the desert, Trafalgar and Aboukir Bay, a world-wide Empire and plum-pudding—all these create a feeling against which no Britisher could ever be quite proof. And this is as it should be, for this absolutely natural attachment to those who were young with us, to the place of our birth and the habits with which we grew up, needs no explanation and is nowise disrespectful to any other place, any other human being, or any other habits.

As every man loves and ought to love his wife, albeit he knows that other women are perhaps more beautiful, wiser and better, even so every human being not only may but ought to love his own country. Only he must not forget that this is a matter of personal predilection, and that other men are just as much entitled to have a predilection for any other country.

Above all we must reflect that patriotism is not a simple, unvarying sentiment, but is variable and composite. Certain elements, such as attachment to our mother-tongue, are almost invariably present ; but apart from this we must realise that the fact of a glow of pleasure and satisfaction coming over us all at the sound of our native country's name has many and complex causes. The sources of the sentiment of "home," although in general traceable to the three cardinal causes I have set forth above, vary immensely in the case of each individual. Every one fixes upon what seems to him most essential, and makes his patriotism symbolical thereof. In this universal form the sentiment of home is one of the sacred mysteries of mankind—a priceless possession, like art and beauty.

## II. DYNASTIC OWNERSHIP

§ 96. THE AFFECTION OF SUBJECTS.—Such vague love of our homeland, however, is not of much practical value. It is only in ballads that kings talk as Henry did to Douglas :

" Der ist in tiefster Seele treu,  
Der die Heimat liebt, wie Du ! "

(Roughly : He who loves his home as you do is true in the depths of his heart.)

They generally demand an outspoken attachment to one well-defined fatherland. By old Roman law the father was he whose name was mentioned in the marriage contract (*Pater est, quem nuptiæ demonstrant*). Similarly, whatever country is to be accounted a man's fatherland or his mother-country must have the proper colours flying over it. Countless elements go to make up patriotism, yet here we have the least important selected as its distinctive characteristic.

Almost everywhere in Europe for about a thousand years past we have known none but failed-off countries on a dynastic basis. Thus, owing to unconscious association of ideas, attachment to the hereditary ruling house has become almost the same thing as patriotism; and modern Prussia, where this dynastic patriotism is most strongly marked, was quite right in substituting the motto "With God for King and Country" for the old motto *Pro patria et gloria*, thus placing king before country.

This time-honoured fidelity to a dynasty really meant something so long as a prince represented or symbolised a community not dependent on him for its existence, as was formerly the case with the Teutonic dukes and is still so with the English king. But when princes began making considerable territorial and tribal acquisitions by conquest, purchase or marriage, then genuine love of country and dynastic patriotism excluded each other, and there were not a few who realised this. What had attachment to the Bourbons to do with the Spaniards', Neapolitans' or Sicilians' attachment to their country? How could Burgundy, Spain and the Netherlands be attached to the House of Austria, which for them was represented by the insignificant House of Hapsburg, of Swiss origin? Or what has the patriotism of the Poles, Alsations and Danes to do with attachment to the Prusso-German Empire of the Hohenzollerns?

The bonds uniting a nation together, however, are so vague and indefinite, and the State with its ruler and the often exceedingly useful array of officials representing it are something so impressively real, that as time went on attachment to the State everywhere supplanted patriotism as such. Indeed, history proves the awakening of patriotic sentiments to have always been connected with attachment to some particular ruler.

In the eighteenth century what we now call patriotism was still unknown, but the *Roi Soleil* was looked on as the glory of

France, and Frederick II. as foreshadowing Germany's greatness; Maria Theresa was loved as representing the new unity of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy; and even now the Russian peasant would have no conception of Russia were it not for the influence of the Orthodox Church and the idea of the Tsar as the Little Father. This state of things continued till the great Revolution, after which the "subject" gradually became more important as compared with his ruler. Consequently, at any rate in advanced countries, the conception of nationhood and of a national state became more and more vivid and clear. Meanwhile the irresistible historical tendency of the nineteenth century to unite Europeans into national states became increasingly manifest. Yet the conception of nationhood remained only a sentiment, and no attempt was made to define it more exactly.

§ 97. PRUSSO-GERMAN AND AUSTRO-GERMAN!—Pure and unadulterated mediævalism is still not defunct; and in Germany, to go no farther, it is obvious that even in the nineteenth century the dynastic principle could win the day. After the upheavals of Napoleon's time, there were in Germany two powerful dynasties—the Hohenzollerns and the Hapsburgs. Behind both lay a long and glorious past. The influence of French conceptions of liberty gave rise to dreams of welding all territory "so far as the German tongue is heard" into one great nation; but this could only be done if at any rate one of the two dynasties were abolished. Traditional ideas, however, got the better of modern ones; sanguinary wars set the seal upon dismemberment; the old German Empire was turned into the country of the Hapsburgs, and beside it the youthful Prussia grew up into the new and vigorous German Empire of the Hohenzollerns. Neither country represents any distinctly defined nation. The German Empire, however, approaches thereto, inasmuch as, according to German statistics, it contains only nine per cent. of non-Germans (Poles, Frenchmen and Danes). On the other hand a large number of Germans live abroad, particularly in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, where however, they are greatly in the minority. Indeed, they number only about twenty per cent. of the total population, as compared with the Poles, Slavs, Magyars and Romance nations. But in German territory the dynastic has so completely prevailed over the national idea that instead of condemning Bismarck as the "disrupter" of

Germany, we extol him as its "uniter." Yet he it was who, in the interests of Prussia, his lesser fatherland, really brought about the present state of things.

If we would see Germany a great Power on a national basis, then first of all we should have to liberate the millions of Germans who, as becomes daily more apparent, are gradually perishing in that chaos of nations called the Hapsburg Monarchy. That is, matters being as they are, the ancient dream of German unity cannot be realised save by Austria being broken up and the German Empire annexing what is really German property.

Fanciful dynastic notions, however, are so closely interwoven with our national conceptions, that we do not even perceive what a violent contradiction in terms it is that, at any rate according to the official explanation following on the ultimatum to Serbia, we should have taken up arms in 1914, full of enthusiasm and with flying colours, for the support of our Austrian ally. Imagining that she was drawing her sword for the so-called national unity of Teutonism, Germany really drew it in the interests of Austria, which is composed of more than a dozen nations, and is an outrage on the very notion of race purity.

In reality the existence of Austria is the sole obstacle to the constitution of a German nation wherever the German tongue is heard. The German, therefore, as is so often the case, stands in his own light by maintaining the Austrian dynasty. But apart from these facts, the inevitable result of this alliance between the protagonists of dynastic and those of national patriotism is that neither honestly believes his own kind of patriotism to be the wisest possible. Nor can any one seriously believe in the ultimate possibility of these two divergent kinds of patriotism being fused into one; for the very existence of Austria makes it impossible for Germany to develop into a single united nation.

Hence we are confronted with two alternatives. Either Germany has once and for all abandoned the idea of becoming a single united nation, or else she went to war intending<sup>1</sup> afterwards to attack and dismember her present ally.

The inward signification of this war is the conquest of patriotism. As has so often been the case, Germany is fighting

<sup>1</sup> If such an intention exists at all, it can only be latent in the subconsciousness of the nation. Naturally I have no thought of even alluding to any *mala fides*.

against her own self, and there can be no doubt that in course of time the small Germanies will disappear and their place be taken by one great united mother-country. So long as the small dynasties exist, however, attachment to the newer and greater country will be considered treason to them. The patriots Jahn,<sup>1</sup> Georg Herwegh, Freiligrath, Fritz Reuter<sup>2</sup> and many others besides were forced into exile or imprisoned because of their love for Germany. And even now every one who hopes for a united German mother-country is outlawed by Prussia and Austria, to the applause of the senseless mob.

The very men who talk about Germany's world-wide expansion dread her becoming united, and urge all manner of reasons why she should not do so. The adjunction of Austria would mean too many clericals in the Reichstag; the break-up of Austria must mean that many alien nationalities would break away, and then Germany would be too weak from the military point of view; German territory as a whole is inconvenient from the point of view of trade; and so forth. All which may be true, but if so then it simply proves that German national sentiment is a mere phrase, adopted whenever it is desired to pick holes in the Jews, Social Democrats, Poles or French, but immediately thrown overboard if it threatens to become applicable to ourselves. Let us be frank. Let no one say he is a German to the core, but rather that he is a Prussian and a Hohenzollern to the core.

If modern patriots talked in this wise and were not always confusing everything with their wrong notions of nationality, it would be possible to come to some sort of understanding with them, and readily to admit that for a nation to be in a sort of water-tight compartment is no longer the one thing worth striving for, but that beyond all doubt the conception of the State as the only true form of association is daily becoming more important.

§ 98. THE FREE ASSOCIATION OF STATES.—The association to form a State is a strong and essentially valuable bond of union, and wherever it has been based upon liberty it has proved even stronger than any national or, as they are now so often called, racial bonds, stronger even than the ties of religion.

<sup>1</sup> Friedrich Ludwig Jahn, known as the *Turnvater* (father of gymnastics).

<sup>2</sup> 1810-74. Humorous and prolific writer. Condemned to death in 1833 for becoming a member of a students' society; sentence was commuted into imprisonment for life. He was liberated in 1840.



In Switzerland, Germans, French, Romansch and Italians have united to form one free State. Every one being entitled to his own language, religion and convictions, attachment to these is not lashed up to such a pitch as to supplant loyalty to the State. Moreover, the conception of the State imposes no fetters but merely serves a useful purpose, and being modest in its requirements, acquires solid power.

Similarly in the United States there dwell a medley of associated nations—Germans and Russians, Poles and Magyars, Italians and Englishmen, Irish and Balkan subjects, all living peacefully together and beginning to unite to form a new race. In this case a medley of nations is strong and can maintain itself, whereas in Austria, held together as she is by force, it spells disaster. Furthermore, a new patriotism, American patriotism, is being formed; for, like everything else, patriotism cannot exist unless it be based on moral sentiment, in other words on free will and free determination.

The British Empire, of which the conquered Boers have become absolutely loyal citizens in an incredibly short time, likewise seems to be standing the test. The Boers, after all, remain Boers. Not a word is said about the necessity of everything in the British Empire being English; it is recognised that the Empire is merely a bond of union.

Both the German and Austrian Empires also exist merely for a purpose, but we make the mistake of endeavouring to delude ourselves and others into believing that the German Empire is a national State, which of course annoys a great many over whom the black, white and red banner floats,<sup>1</sup> since they neither can nor will become Germans by nationality, but would undoubtedly be excellent members of a German Union.

Whenever an empire puts forth no extravagant claims, such as to be a sort of centre to which enforced sympathies must gravitate, then it is much easier to see how far it can help to centralise material interests. Unfortunately, however, every one who disapproves of certain institutions, especially those to which the rulers for the time being attach importance, is called an enemy of the empire; and thus every one who really thinks for himself is tempted to regret being a member of that empire. All great imperial conceptions, indeed, originated with the opposition parties. Germany now prides herself upon her social

<sup>1</sup> The German flag.—TRANS.

legislation, and indeed we owe it to applied State Socialism that our economic life goes on smoothly even during the war. But—time was when Liberals and Socialists alike were the country's enemies. The Opposition will not and cannot demand that its advice should be followed, for then it would cease to deserve its name; but it is justified in insisting on being heard and on its opinions, like every one else's, being respected.

To-day there are also some whose views of the war differ from those of the majority, and who believe that it would not be for Germany's good to win a victory. It is of course their duty to do whatever work their fellow-citizens in the majority demand of them; but equally of course they are entitled—indeed, they are bound, to remain true to their convictions. In 1850 King Frederick William IV. actually told the British Envoy that he considered it the greatest blessing that a victory of Prussia over Austria had then been avoided, for, he added, in view of Austria's internal dissensions this would have been inevitable.<sup>1</sup> Similarly every citizen of the country should now be allowed to say what he considers most in the interests of its greatness. Patriotism, in short, should be a moral sentiment, and this is only possible in freedom.

### III. RACE PATRIOTISM

§ 99. THE PROBLEM OF RACE.—The obstacle to us Europeans developing this free patriotism at present is the so-called race patriotism of the small European countries. This has become far too petty for modern world-politics, and after all it has nothing whatever to do with race. Now, this question of race is one of the most melancholy chapters in the history of human knowledge. Consciously or unconsciously, knowledge, supposed to be impartial, has never placed itself so unconditionally in the service of ambitious and self-seeking politicians as in this race question. Indeed, it might almost be said that the various theories of race have really never been put forward save with the object of advancing some claim or other. The writings of Houston Stewart Chamberlain, an Anglo-German, afford perhaps the most distressing example of this.

<sup>1</sup> *Rede zur Gedenkfeier der Kriegsproklamation* (Speech on the Anniversary Celebrations of the Declaration of War), by von Simson, p. 15. Freiburg, 1896.

As we all know, this author has been endeavouring to claim every eminent man throughout the history of the world, Christ and Dante included, for the Teutonic race. It may seem surprising that other demagogic representatives of other races did not make a similar attempt; and that they did not is a testimony to the good sense of foreign men of science. The French anthropologist, Paul Souday,<sup>1</sup> on the other hand, recently endeavoured to prove that probably all Germany's eminent men are of Celtic origin; and as a matter of fact South Germany, to which most of them belong, was originally a Celtic country, while the foreign origin of some of the few eminent North Germans can be proved. Thus Nietzsche was a Slav, and Kant's family emigrated from Scotland. It is worth while to refer to a French edition of Houston Stewart Chamberlain, such as Paul Souday, for it may perhaps make even deluded neutrals realise the worthlessness of such arguments. But most Germans hold some such views as this. True, they say they feel as German patriots ought to feel, just because they are Germans; but in reality they believe in a German race because they think it their patriotic duty to do so. Now, if we consider the foundations on which these race theories are based, we shall see that they are very slender. They are, firstly, that in general it is not proved that a pure race is superior to a mixed one: and secondly, that it is impossible exactly to define what a human race is.

§ 100. THE VALUE OF RACE PURITY.—A pedigree dog is said to be worth more than a mongrel, and this probably explains the strange view that a human being of pure race is worth more than one of mixed race. In the case of dogs, and to a less extent in that of other domestic animals, this can be understood; for Man originally selected for breeding such dogs as he liked or as were useful to him. Thus he bred a small, long-bodied race, with crooked legs suited for scratching holes in the ground, a dog spirited, strong and rapacious—the dachshund, which he used for hunting animals living in holes or caves. Then he bred another kind, tall and slender, with long legs—the greyhound, to hunt hares for him; and similarly he has bred vigilant Pomeranians, sharp-nosed setters, bloodhounds and so on till we come to life-saving St. Bernards.

Now, each of these kinds has its own peculiar qualities, and

<sup>1</sup> Paul Souday in the *Temps* of August 7, 1915.

in other respects its capacities have become quite deadened. Thus the greyhound cannot smell and bull-dogs are inclined to bite. In short, a biologist would say that these pure-bred dogs were by no means particularly well equipped for life ; but Man will have them so, and therefore he attaches less value to cross-breeds, in which the special characteristics of particular kinds of dogs of course vanish. The proof that, from the purely biological standpoint, pedigree dogs are inferior is simply that the most highly bred usually die out before long. Thus St. Bernards only survived for four generations, and there are no longer any absolutely pure-bred pug-dogs ; but, to atone for this, new pedigree kinds are constantly appearing. It is certainly remarkable that police dogs, which from the nature of their employment must be highly trained, are not called "pedigree dogs." Such dogs, in short, are useless except for some special purpose ; and as only dogs are used for so many purposes quite foreign to their nature, it is chiefly in their case that purity of race is greatly insisted upon.

In the case of all other domestic animals, whether horses, cows, goats, pigs or what-not, skilful crossing, or what breeders call improving the breed, is considered of more importance than anything else ; and whenever a particular breed is bred comparatively true, new blood must be from time to time introduced into it. The sole exceptions to this rule are race-horses, which are kept for sport only, and a few fancy breeds of pigeons ; but for work none but half-blood horses can be used. German horse-breeders, moreover, have had to pay dearly for having acted on the suggestion of Bruce Low, and for a time having bought none but pedigree horses. It must not be forgotten also that the strain of English pure-blood pedigree horses has not been known for more than two hundred years at the outside, and therefore is still comparatively young.

Thus in the animal kingdom we find scarcely any warrant for the assertion that peoples of unmixed race are superior to others, and in mankind no warrant whatever for it, since there are absolutely no pure-bred races, with the possible exception of a few peoples on a very low level. Europe, at all events, is an absolute national medley, and any one who does not consider the Jews the flower of the human race should not make such foolish assertions as that concerning the superiority of unmixed races.

Suppose now that it is asserted that although nations owed their origin to crossing, yet in course of time a uniform race is formed from these crossings, and that these ancient races are superior to more recent conglomerate races. Even this would not be true. On the contrary, it is a remarkable fact that the legends of *all* peoples which have attained greatness tell of their having entered their countries as conquerors. Doubtless this is a reminiscence of another fact of which history affords repeated confirmation, that powerful nations which leave their impress on the world always arise just where two national migrations came into collision, and a new young empire resulted. This is also true of the ancient empires of the East. But, not to depart from Europe—Hellas and Rome arose out of that great migration which we describe as the Doric migration and the Greek colonisation of the Mediterranean. The Roman Empire was, moreover, very closely connected with the Etruscan migrations.<sup>1</sup> Again, the German mediæval empire took its rise from the onslaughts of popular migration. It was Arab invasions which, in Spain (and therefore in a foreign land) gave rise to that Arab empire which was in every respect the most important; and subsequently the Spanish Empire arose. The Norman invasions of France and England in the tenth and eleventh centuries gave the impetus to the greatness of both these countries. Prussia arose precisely where there was the greatest blending of Teutons advancing from the tenth to the twelfth centuries over the Eastern Marches, with the conquered Slavs.

Quite possibly everything must not be set down to mixture of blood, but something to dormant energies being aroused. The foregoing brief historical summary, however, suffices to disprove older races having in any way the advantage. Those who urge that all these instances are taken from ancient history, may be referred to the unexampled progress of the United States. Here we see actually before us the rise of a young, vigorous nation composed of fragments of old Europe, sometimes inferior fragments, with a dash of negro and Indian blood, which though slight, nevertheless cannot be ignored. Here is a nation which might well be called *New Europe*. Now many, it is true, will say that though America has progressed, she has not done so in the right way; but probably such things have

<sup>1</sup> Mommsen's opinion differed radically from this, but will not stand the test of modern research.

always been said by those over whom the wheel of flourishing civilisations has passed.

§ 101. HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC RACES.—It is by no means too much to say, therefore, that there is nothing to prove the superiority of a pure human race over a mixed one, and that this is not even probable.

Now, as regards the differentiation of the various races, the unfortunate thing is that we have no absolute criterion for the definition of a race. All manner of expedients have therefore been resorted to. Thus, an attempt has been made by historical investigators to separate human beings into communities having a like origin, or into groups speaking cognate languages, and to classify them according to various similarities or dissimilarities of civilisation; and finally an endeavour has been made to base a definition of race on *physical characteristics*. There is some justification for all these attempts, and all appear to be successful so long as we confine ourselves to the one special line of investigation. But unfortunately these diversely-formed national groups do not coincide.

There are peoples, whose existence is historically attested, such as the Teutons of the migratory period, whose descendants might be sought in Italy, Africa, Spain and Byzantium. Again, there are linguistically allied races, for instance, the "Germans," to which not only Teutons, Slavs and Celts, but even negroes and Mongols belong. Finally, there are anthropological races, for instance, the long-headed North European type, who chiefly live around the Baltic and the North Sea (except Pomerania, West Prussia and Finland).

Now, as nobody knows what is really the proper method of classifying races, every one can select whichever best suits his own particular inclinations; and what is worse, and has led to hopeless confusion, is that every one who has pegged out a "nation" in accordance with one set of characteristics only, tries to make all other characteristics conform thereto.

Thus some persons have attempted to find the same specific characteristics prevailing over the whole territory formerly subject to the inroads of national migrations; while others have tried to prove all German-speaking or all Slav-language territory to be inhabited by one small race, and even to consider the Jews or the Teutons as all belonging to one type of

civilisation only. All these attempts show but too plainly the cloven hoof of partiality.

Historical research, in particular, has been misapplied, and extravagant claims made in its name. The Italian believes in an Italian people extending as far as the sound of Roman legionaries' footsteps was once heard, or, as he prefers to put it now, as far as the Lion of St. Mark's once roared. The Germans would fain claim for themselves all territory over which the hosts of the migratory period once passed. The French Napoleonic Empire alone is still historically too young to have any traditional justification for its claims. These need not be expected for a few centuries to come—that is, unless in the interval the world becomes wiser.

Now, as regards the question of race, historical research may be left absolutely out of account. Suppose that in a territory inhabited by millions of people, only one single individual of foreign race has survived or emigrated. Now, if this solitary individual has characteristics such as are invariably transmitted in case of his crossing with another race, then, owing to continuous crossing, in a few hundred years the entire population would possess these characteristics.

In order to realise this, we must consider that, allowing four children to a generation, a single human being has in the fifth generation, that is after 125 years, 1000 descendants<sup>1</sup>; after 250 years this number has increased to 1,000,000, and after 375 years the number of his descendants would nearly equal that of all living human beings.<sup>2</sup> The historical fact that at any given time a nation was racially pure and has not since received any considerable infusion of foreign blood is therefore of comparatively small importance.

Linguistic researches have likewise led to no definite results, for we know that it may happen that nations, almost to a man, adopt a new language in quite a short time. Thus the Slavs in the East Elbe provinces almost all speak German well, and, it might be added, feel quite German. The Bulgarians, originally a blend of Turk and Tartar, have become so much impregnated

<sup>1</sup> After 25 years 4, after 50 years 16, after 75 years 64, after 100 years 256, after 125 years 1024 descendants.

<sup>2</sup> In the case of physically vigorous national elements, it is scarcely too much to allow four children. But allowing only three children, a billion is reached in nineteen generations (475 years). Allowing two children, it would be reached in thirty generations, or 750 years, that is, not even then in such a very long time.

with Slav civilisation and the Slav language, as to forget all about their origin : while Slavs who have emigrated to Greece have become just like Greeks. The Goths in Spain and Lombardy likewise soon absolutely forgot their Teutonic origin ; and any number of like instances could be adduced. Moreover, all other civilised institutions can be shown to have altered even more rapidly than language.

§ 102. PHYSICAL RACIAL CHARACTERISTICS.—Physical characteristics of animals are studied almost solely with the object of classifying them into species. In the case of Man it is also the only method of attaining any practical results, and it has proved a reliable method of dividing the great human races into white and black, yellow and red. In the demarcation of the small European sub-species, frequently described as races, it has on the whole not answered, and for the following reasons :

1. These peoples probably never were genuine species. They had not time to develop so much, because they did not split off from the so-called Indo-Germanic race until a comparatively late period.

2. A great hindrance to investigation is that it is not known whether the original inhabitants of Europe, the race whom the immigrants encountered, were homogeneous or not. This point, however, will be gradually cleared up when we become better acquainted with prehistoric discoveries.

3. Most important of all is the fact that, in historic times, there has been so much crossing and re-crossing that no one need expect to find more than the remnants of any particular nation anywhere. Rome's legions penetrated as far as the Pontus, to Ultima Thule and heaven knows where besides ; and what is more, they founded numerous colonies, to which the wholly Roman names of Rhenish cities and the Roman cast of countenance frequently noticeable in Rhineland girls, afford eloquent testimony.

Again, before the migrations, some inexplicable impulse towards expansion drove Cimbrian migratory tribes far southwards. Then came the period when the Teutons, as Roman mercenaries, encircled the then known world, until finally they became independent nations, and as such took part in the migrations which overwhelmed all Europe. These migrations have not yet ceased, especially in Eastern Central Europe, between the fifteenth and thirtieth parallels of longitude, that



is in the Balkan regions and in the quadrangle erected upon them, including the corners of Stettin, Trieste, Petrograd and Constantinople. The Courland and Siebenbürgen Germans in Slav and Roumanian territory, the Sezkler Magyars in Roumanian territory, and the Wends and Czechs in German territory may be cited in support of what I say.

But war and peace brought about many changes besides these. All the nations of Europe and the surrounding territory, Mongols, Moors, Finns and Magyars included, fought battles, particularly in Germany. Frequently, however, especially in the case of Spaniards, Frenchmen, Swedes and Poles, troops were often garrisoned in Germany for a long time, or else German and Swiss mercenaries were garrisoned all about the world, leaving descendants behind them, sometimes forcibly begotten, sometimes not.

Besides this, religious and commercial persecution caused people to emigrate to freer or more enlightened countries. The refugees in Ansbach and Brandenburg, the Palatinate and Holland, and the Salzburg people in East Prussia, Denmark and Sweden are instances of religious colonisation; the Italians in Germany and the Poles in the Rhine Country and Westphalia of commercial colonisation.

Besides the historical difficulties of sorting out the different races, there is another difficulty, this time biological. For example, the examination of skulls is in itself an absolutely reliable method of race classification, except that we do not know whether the characteristics of skulls, like other physical peculiarities, are variable, and if so why they vary. Thus, if by means of skulls found and statistics it is easy to prove that in Germany the round-headed (or brunette) type is gradually increasing, or if in America a certain Indian type has lately somewhat frequently occurred among the whites, we still do not know, or at any rate we cannot ascertain from skulls, why this is so. Is it because a certain section of the population, originally in the minority, but possessed of characteristics which are always transmissible, is gradually forcing its way to the front? Or has it to do with the signs of adaptation to certain outward conditions at present unknown to us? Or is the increase due to unsuspected immigration?

In face of these difficulties it might justly be said that, were ethnology to demonstrate the racial purity of a people, this

would be convincing proof of its worthlessness. In reality, however, recent investigations have made an end of all such racial purity. Whereas most nations used to pride themselves on being of racially pure origin, tracing their descent usually to a god or demigod, or at any rate to some famous hero, to-day it is probably only the Russians and Germans who passionately lay claim to racial purity. Or rather, it is claimed by a limited section of both these nations, and one taken far too seriously by both—the Pan-Slavists and Pan-Germanists, and their scientific protagonists.

As for the Russians, they, like the Scandinavians, have remained fairly isolated in their eastern seclusion; and it is a fact that in Scandinavia the North European type (the Teutons) and in Russia the East European type have remained purest.

§ 103. THE MIXTURE OF RACES IN GERMANY.—To claim race purity for Germany, where all European types come in contact with one another as in a melting-pot, is absolutely preposterous. Perhaps she owes her cosmopolitan capacity for understanding "the voices of the nations" better than do other nations to this very circumstance that in her the descendants of all European nations live. At any rate there is more justification for such a contention than for asserting that every racial conglomeration—what Houston Stewart Chamberlain would call a chaos of nations—must necessarily be inferior.

It matters not, however, whether the results of this mixture of races be good or bad. We have to put up with it, since there is no doubt about the fact. But as Chamberlain's bulky volume is very much read in Germany, and as this unjustifiable race pride is one of the worst evils of modern Germany, I do not wish to pass it over in absolute silence. Moreover, its false but seductive reasoning aims, or appears to aim, at proving that the Teutonic race is a pure race.

All race theorists assume that among measurable physical attributes the most important ethnologically are the *formation of the skull*, the *colour of the hair and skin*, and the *dimensions of the body*. Now the German anthropologist Deniker,<sup>1</sup> basing his conclusions on these principal external attributes, has attempted to explain the present race distribution in Europe by the measurements of school-children and recruits, of which

<sup>1</sup> *Bulletin de la Société d'Anthropologie de Paris*, Tome VIII. 4me série, pp. 189, 291.

in some cases there are a great many. He assumes the existence of ten races altogether, including six main races; and shows how they are distributed quite indiscriminately, without regard to language or frontier delimitation, over the whole European continent. Certain races, however, seem chiefly to be found in districts bordering on the sea. Thus the Teutons mainly live around the Baltic and the Irish Sea.

The results of these investigations, which may be found in a valuable work by the German anthropologist Hirt, are of interest to all European nations. I will refer to them, however, only in so far as they relate to Germany, and then only so far as the district within the boundaries of the present German Empire is concerned. As for the complete racial mixture of Austria, no one would probably question this. The map on the opposite page gives an approximate idea of conditions as they actually are. The variously shaded portions represent districts where one of the ten European races to some extent preponderates; the white portions indicate territory where there is a heterogeneous mixture of races.

This diagram can be comparatively easily brought into line with ascertained historical facts. The ancient Teutons were settled about the Baltic, whence they advanced into other countries. In so doing they encountered Celts in South Germany, and Slavs towards the south-east. As for the Slavs, who still predominate greatly in Posen and Silesia, they have occasionally made considerable advances, particularly towards the sea. It is easy to understand this advance seawards, and it accounts for the fact that in Pomerania and Westphalia the Teutonic elements have now no longer the upper hand, as they had originally. The Teutons mostly passed through South Germany, and then before long utterly perished in the far South, which was obviously unsuited to them. Consequently the Celtic race has remained comparatively pure in Baden and Würtemberg (South Germany), while elsewhere it is apparent that there has been an immigration of the Adriatic races as a result of Roman rule, and of the round-headed *homo alpinus*. Apparently the Romans found the kind of life in these parts to their taste. Most of Central Germany, however, is peopled by a mixture of races, or, as Houston Stewart Chamberlain so neatly phrases it, by a national chaos. Wilser<sup>1</sup> bears out this

<sup>1</sup> *Rassen und Völker* (Races and Peoples), by Ludwig Wilser, 1912. Theodor Thoma, Leipzig.




FIG. 6.

fact when he says: "Scarcely one in a hundred of our fellow-countrymen to-day has a type of skull or framework like the skeletons found in the rows of graves of the migration period." Elsewhere he says: If to-day we would discover *true Teutons*, we must go to our northern sister nations—to Sweden, the Netherlands and England."

§ 104. GERMANS AND TEUTONS.—In this racial medley characteristics and habits possessed in common and due to community of language and of civilisation are called German. The word "Teutonic," however, is applied to the original characteristics of a people of unknown origin which is now so much blent with other peoples as no longer to exist, at any rate not in Germany.

Germany, therefore, is a civilised state which has grown up on the basis of community of language, and not a *national state*<sup>1</sup> based on community of race. Hence it is altogether misleading to identify Teutons and Germans, as is so often done to-day. It is true that speech, the main factor in the formation of this new national agglomeration, is mainly based on the Teutonic element; and thus the German is right in claiming intellectual descent from this people, which in itself is a striking proof of how much greater is the power of civilisation than that of race.

It is hard to say how such men as Houston Stewart Chamberlain have arrived at their conclusions. Personally I believe that he very frequently makes assertions of whose correctness he is not convinced. Thus he states that "large numbers of Goths became converted to Judaism," citing as his source "a learned specialist of Vienna University," but without giving his name.<sup>2</sup> Then he mentions letters<sup>3</sup> which he says he has received, and which bear one another out in a manner which cannot but seem "a put-up job." In face of all this, the impartial and critical reader has no choice but to conclude that the author somewhat

<sup>1</sup> A civilised state and a national state are nowise contradictory terms, especially as the word "national" does not mean mere racial affinity. The words "people" and "nation" have now ceased to have any clearly defined meaning. Of course their meaning could be defined, and indeed has been, but this seems to me unnecessary and even undesirable. The fact that no one really knows what is a people and what is a nation proves better than all talk that in truth peoples and nations now no longer really exist. On the other hand, the conception of a state is perfectly clear, and future progress will be closely bound up therewith.

<sup>2</sup> *Die Grundlagen des 19. Jahrhunderts* (The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century), by Houston Stewart Chamberlain, 1898, vol. ii. p. 1011. 5th ed., Munich, 1904.

<sup>3</sup> *Neue Kriegsaufsätze* (More Essays on the War), same author, 1915, pp. 17, 18.

sacrifices the matter to the manner, and that, like his great master Gobineau, he had better have clothed his statements in the form of fiction.

It may, of course, be that the entire Pan-Germanist theory is based on nothing but an extremely unfortunate confusion. The other European nations, so it is said, owe their origin to a blend of the original inhabitants with the Teutons, who mixed with them at the period of the migrations; but in Germany Teutons crossed with Teutons, and thus the race remained pure.

In reality, as is proved by skeletons and discoveries made in burial-places, even in Germany an ancient people was settled as far back as the Flood. When the Cimbrians passed over the land, and afterwards during the migration period some of these primitive inhabitants emigrated or withdrew to the mountains, some of them perished, while some mixed with the new arrivals. But just as in all other European countries, these primitive inhabitants were living in Germany even when Europe was still populated by rhinoceroses and elephants. When the Romans came, a race originating in a cross between these primitive inhabitants and the Celts seems to have lived on the Rhine. Fond as we may be of Scheffel's old ballad about "There lived the ancient Teutons, On both sides of the Rhine,"<sup>1</sup> it is not true. Racially Ariovistus<sup>2</sup> was not a Teuton, but a Celt; and if any one then lived on both sides of the Rhine, it was the Celts. Tacitus, however, called these tribes *Germani*, a name afterwards applied to those tribes which invaded the then civilised world, coming from the parts where Ariovistus had lived. These tribes were the Eastern Goths, the Western Goths, the Vandals and others. From this period dates the confusion, for the *Germani* of Tacitus and those of the migration period are wholly distinct. Thus for a long while no one really knew what *Germani* (Teutons) were; and even in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries there was an inclination to apply this name rather to the French.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> "Es wohnten die alten Germanen zu beiden Seiten des Rheins."

<sup>2</sup> German chief. According to Cæsar's *De bello Gallico*, he was a German chief, whom the Sequani asked to help them against the Ædui, by whom they were hard pressed. He subdued the Ædui, but rewarded himself by pouncing upon the territory of the Sequani. Both these tribes then combined against him, and appealed unto Cæsar to help them. Cæsar defeated Ariovistus and his hordes (58 B.C.) about fifty miles from the Rhine, across which the chief escaped in a small boat. Apparently nothing more is known of him.—TRANS.

<sup>3</sup> Johann Kinnamos (c. 1200), I. ii. 15, 18 (Meinecke's edition, Bonn, 1836, pp. 77, 84) calls the Germans "Allemani" and the French "Germani."

Meantime, however, another name appears. In France distinction had early been drawn between the *lingua romana rustica* in the west and the *lingua theodisca* in the east (*i.e.* Germany). These terms referred merely to language and not to nationality, somewhat as, when we say nowadays of any one that he speaks "High German," we do not mean to infer that he belongs to any particular race. Later on in the eleventh century, however, the adjective "*theodisca*" became converted into the substantive "Teuton,"<sup>1</sup> similar in sound but wholly dissimilar in sense. This word, from which the German *deutsch* was afterwards derived, never in any way meant racial affinity, but that the civilisations or languages of certain peoples were akin. The absurd legend of the Giant Theuto, the supposed common ancestor of all Germans, can be proved not to have been invented until the thirteenth century.

This language distribution coincides with the fact that in the interval the Teutonic migratory tribes had become completely transformed into the settled population of German territory. But, *in so far as they spoke German*, the Teutons, Celts and Slavs *were* German; and thus the German nation was founded, but, as cannot be too often repeated, from the very first it had no connection with race.

The facts recalled here are by no means complex, and if we make close inquiries we shall find that they are admitted by all impartial persons to be beyond dispute. What first caused confusion in men's minds, particularly in the case of the masses, was that Teutons and Germans were perpetually mixed up. Thus Ratzel<sup>2</sup> says in his popular *Local History*: "There was a time when the greater part of our country was not inhabited by Germans at all." And again: "It is a historical fact that, when the Romans penetrated into Southern and Western Germany, neither of these districts was inhabited by Germans." Yet he certainly does say that the people described by Tacitus could only have been Teutons. Now, according to Ratzel, *Germania* has a wider meaning than German, but even Ratzel cannot include the Celts as Teutons, however much he may stretch the meaning of this word. Such inaccuracies as these occurring in Ratzel, however, can do nothing but help people such as Houston Stewart Chamberlain.

<sup>1</sup> Müllerhof and many others even consider that the word "Teutonic" is of Celtic origin.

<sup>2</sup> *Deutschland*, by Friedrich Ratzel, 1898, p. 273.

§ 105. THE EUROPEAN RACE.—To sum up, it must be stated that there are no pure races in Europe, no "pure-bred species" in the zoological sense, not even "constant" varieties. The only question which can be raised is whether there is any "European race" as distinct from Asiatic Mongols, African negroes, Polynesians and North American Indians. Even this can scarcely be the case, if we attach any definite, truly zoological conception to the word "race." The traditional method allotting different races to different parts of the world is now wholly discredited, because it was often proved not to be borne out by existing race affinities. The unfortunate conception of "Indo-Germanic nations," a notion based not upon race but upon language, has had much to do with the discrediting of the theory that particular races belong to particular parts of the world. Language affinity was then taken as underlying all race problems; and it must be admitted that the conception of race has been completely altered in consequence of its being considered from this standpoint.

It may after all be correct and is even extremely likely, that pure races do not inhabit the various parts of the world; but at all events by considering the race problem in this way we do arrive at groups of human beings which, in the main, resemble one another in all important respects. Their history, civilisation, language and physical characteristics are similar, and they themselves are clearly distinguishable from other races. The conception of a people, nation, or group of peoples, and indeed of a race also, is really based not on community of origin alone, but also on community of language, civilisation, customs and habits of life. It would be folly, therefore, to insist on excluding the Finns and Hungarians, the people of Wales, and the Spanish Basques, Prussians and Mecklenburgers from the European community to-day, on the ground that they do not belong, as they certainly do not, to the same race as other Europeans. Similarly it would never occur to a German to cease to consider the Mecklenburgers and Prussians as Germans, and to assert that they really belonged to the Hindus.

Hence the basis of patriotism cannot be racial origin; there is no sense in this. Race patriotism has no solid foundation, and must therefore emulate the heathen by furiously raging in order to conceal this fact. For this very reason it is apt to appear grotesque and particularly unattractive. Consequently not even



German patriotism can be established on any sort of national basis; but the statement that the German peoples, *despite* their multiplicity of origin, have been welded together by community of civilisation to form a new unit, may be and indeed is true, as I propose now to prove. I would merely indicate one fact, and that is this: there can be no community of Germans based on community of racial origin. Consequently any community existing between them is not an inherited possession which they can put in their pockets, as it were, but a community of civilisation; and community of civilisation is something which must be acquired anew and strengthened every day. And it is well that this should be so.

#### IV. PATRIOTISM BASED ON CIVILISATION

§ 106. THE MULTIPLICITY OF OPPORTUNITIES FOR ASSOCIATION. —To belong to the same state or the same race are after all only two out of countless different ways in which human beings can associate or combine.

Men can join together to form large associations, based upon a great variety of interests which they have in common. Large or small circles of those who hold like views on religion, art or science, or who belong to the same profession, divide men up everywhere. Such circles will never quite coincide, indeed they will very frequently intersect. For instance, a man may be associated with a thousand other men through religion, with thousands more by holding similar ideas about art, or by taking an interest in the same kind of sports, or merely by being a member of the same profession. How all these circles may intersect and impinge on one another is shown clearly in Fig. 7. The Germans, French, Catholics and Evangelicals are each represented by one circle, and the number of mixed districts due to this two-fold contrast is obvious. Moreover, it is assumed that blends occur only between Germans and French (the Lorraine people), but not between Roman Catholics and Evangelicals. Thus four groups are got rid of: the Catholic-Evangelical Germans, French and Lorraine people and other nationalities.

In the second column of the diagram I have given names to all these different shadings. Of course such names do not quite correctly describe the real results of various contrasting blends,




FIG. 7.

<sup>1</sup> *Optanten* are the inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine who, after the Treaty of Frankfurt, chose France for their country.—TRANS.

for as a matter of fact there are a great many intermediate shades of opinion, which would result in many more such circles, and thus the number of possible combinations increases very fast. For instance :

1 pair of contrasting opinions would be found to afford	5 possibilities
2 pairs " " " " " "	15 "
3 " " " " " "	63 "
4 " " " " " "	255 "
5 " " " " " "	1023 " etc.

Let us consider how men's sympathies are divided up in Germany alone. Sometimes what determines them is whether a particular individual speaks German, Polish, French or Danish : sometimes whether he calls himself Roman Catholic or Protestant, Jew or Dissenter, or whether he is a Nationalist or a cosmopolitan, a materialist or an idealist, employer or employed. Again, the crucial point may be whether a man votes Conservative or Liberal, with the Social Democrats or not at all, or whether he has artistic, scientific, technical or philosophic leanings. The number of possibilities to which even these main lines of thought would give rise would mean that every adult male German would have his own opinion. To be exact, the number of different concatenations of opinions would amount to 16,777,215 ; and yet I have omitted numerous factors which for many men are decisive—for instance, whether they are collectors or sportsmen, vegetarians, temperance advocates, or some other “-an ” or “-or.”

And with all this infinite diversity, it is insisted that, as far as the Country is concerned, all men must be tarred with the same brush. Everything which makes a man worth anything is to be thrust aside, and nothing may be left except a vague, indefinite “average German,” who coincides with a circle whose contents are perhaps poorer than those of any other, although it seems to contain a great deal because for so many people it replaces so many other circles.

The German philologist Rümelin<sup>1</sup> also realises this contradiction. He reviews all the different aims, endeavours, opinions, etc., which tend to unite men together, and then proceeds : “ I may incline to one set of people for one reason and to another set for another reason. . . . But whenever our feelings are thus sundered and severed, we cannot but resent and deplore

<sup>1</sup> *Über den Begriff des Volkes* (What constitutes a Nation ?) : essays by G. Rümelin, i. p. 103.

it, and all the time we are silently longing to live on a footing of full and complete association with our fellow-men." But he by no means solves the difficulty by insisting that men should give up their individual desires, and cling to the Country, as to "a headquarters embracing all life's aims." This simply proves that the modern conception of Country, based mainly as it is on historic compulsion, no longer satisfies our free aspirations. The Country must be something alive and capable of modification. As Eduard Meyer<sup>1</sup> once put it, it must stand for "an active, conscious determination to create"; and hence the existence of a nation which we are told to respect must be established anew each day by an endless series of plebiscites of a free people.<sup>2</sup>

After all Man is an individual, and no one man is like any other. Hence the fact of men being associated as members of the same State is not always the only point to be considered. "Even in his own country a man must be able to decide to whom or to what his sympathies are to go, even if they go beyond its frontier";<sup>3</sup> and conversely, Man ceases to be a man, that is a personality, if he must admire his mother-country merely because it is the mother-country.

§ 107. STATES WITHIN A STATE.—A student of Goethe, I think it was Bielschoffsky, once said quite truly that every one who had read Goethe had a dash of the German in him. But every one who loves Beethoven's music, or who has enlarged his mind with Kant's philosophy, or realises the value of Robert Koch's methods, has something of the German in him. Indeed, I would even go the length of saying that this is true of every one who continues working on the lines of these men without ever having known one of them.

Similarly, whoever loves Shakespeare, Newton or Darwin has a dash of the Englishman in him; or, if he admires Tolstoy or Pavlov or even only Russian folk-songs, he has a dash of the Russian; and whoever has grown up on Homer, or on Aristotle, as so many did in the Middle Ages, or on Plato, as others have done in recent times, is a Hellene. Whoever sets store by

<sup>1</sup> *Die Anfänge des Staates* (The Beginnings of the State), by Eduard Meyer, 1907. Report of the Meeting of the Berlin Academy of June 6.

<sup>2</sup> "L'existence d'une nation est un plébiscite de tous les jours" (Ernest Renan in *Qu'est-ce qu'une Nation*, 1882, p. 27).

<sup>3</sup> *Zwei Jahre in Paris, Studien und Erinnerungen* (Two Years in Paris: Studies and Reminiscences), by Arnold Ruge, 1844, vol. ii. p. 221. Jurany, Leipzig.

the freedom of government brought about by the French Revolution is a Frenchman. Similarly our love for Dante or the Cinquecento makes us a trifle Italians, and Cervantes seduces us into becoming Spaniards.

Thus the nationality of civilised human beings is very much divided, and the German poet, Richard Dehmel, was quite right in saying that what few brains he had he owed to ten nations. Every human being, indeed, has a world of his own, and the more highly cultivated, in other words the more widely differentiated, two human beings are, the more seldom can one claim another as unconditionally belonging to his world. Most of all do the great feel the loneliness consequent on exceptional endowments. And who, when music has uplifted him above the level of everyday life, has not shared Schubert's "resignation" expressed in his song: "Das Volk, das meine Sprache spricht, das ferne Volk, das find' ich nicht," or applied to himself Schiller's words, "Auch ich bin in Arkadien geboren"?<sup>1</sup>

Civilisation and culture are too personal to the individual for it to have been possible to base governments upon them, and consequently certain of their details were fixed upon. Hence there is really nothing which civilised human beings have in common which has not been already used, as history proves, as the basis for a State.

The nations of Islam in particular owe much to community of religion, and the way this keeps men apart or brings them together is still an important political factor in the Near East. Even the Christian Church at first aimed very high in this respect, by announcing that all the saints should have all things common, and foretelling the "Kingdom of God on earth," which was certainly meant to be a religious State. The reason for its failure was perhaps just because it aimed far too high for the people of that day, and advocated the brotherhood of all mankind. At the time of the Crusades, indeed, a beginning was made in bringing about a united Christian Europe, but in the Thirty Years' War Christianity proved that it could not be used to help to unite men to form a State. During the "Reformation Period," however, religious differences were often still more powerful than those between the different countries and nations. Thus Swiss Roman Catholics fought on the side of

<sup>1</sup> "The nation that speaks my language, that distant nation, I find it not."  
—SCHUBERT. "I, too, was born in Arcadia."—SCHILLER.

Spain and French Huguenots on the side of England. But to-day religion is seldom more than a secondary consideration. In countries of mixed nationality, such as Poland, Alsace, the Trentino and the Baltic provinces, the priests, it is true, are ever ready to exploit religious enthusiasm for national purposes; but the importance of such efforts must not be over-estimated.

Italy has again proved the truth of what has just been said. Calculations based on the old antipathy between the clericals and the House of Savoy, behind which was chiefly Erzberger, have failed utterly. Even cardinals so uncompromising as Ferrari have caused prayers to be said in the churches for the victory of Italy. The Hetwah was also a complete fiasco. This Holy War, of which interested persons had been giving us marvellous accounts for twenty or thirty years past, saying how terrible it was going to be, has been of no earthly use; and indeed it almost seems as if all the fanaticism of the world were at present concentrated in civilised European countries.

In the Middle Ages, particularly, the separate trade and other guilds and leagues did a great deal. The guilds and corporations of those days were very far from confining their efforts to any single State. Their efforts formed, so to speak, a state within a state (*imperium in imperio*) or a state between states. The Hanseatic League, the Confederation of Rhenish Cities, and the peasant agitation all contain the beginnings of a true State. Whether the international association of the working-classes will lead to anything further seems doubtful, especially as working-class instinct absolutely collapsed before national-instincts on the outbreak of war in 1914.

Every one must realise that castes form a state within a state or a state between states. Thus the Church is international, and so also are the proletariat, the nobility and the governing classes. By no means every German is on a level with the German Emperor, but a whole set of international old families, a most heterogeneous medley, are so. We can rage to our heart's content about a "twopenny-halfpenny country," but the rank of its "twopenny-halfpenny princeling" is not thereby diminished, and no German, however highly placed, can ever *attain* thereto. Hence there is no national princely house, but only international ones. Many people in this war have laughed about England's kings having German blood in their veins, but most German princes have likewise a good deal of English

blood, and all have a great deal of foreign blood in them, just as the Tsar is no true-born Russian. And the same thing applies to the middle and lower nobility.

That a purely negative factor, such as hatred or aversion, may help to bring about a union of States is proved by the many coalition wars in Europe. In particular there was the coalition against France and the wars which it waged—wars against French liberty. Now, it seems wholly unnecessary that such coalitions should continue always to be directed against liberty. Men of the most diverse nations are flocking with new-born affection to the Star-spangled Banner in America, and this is at any rate partly due to the aversion with which these immigrants regarded their former countries in Europe; and it would be well if we could one day have such a coalition against all the mediæval ghosts of the past still haunting Europe. If only this could once come about, it would prove more durable than any coalitions hitherto founded.

It would seem, therefore, as if all patriotisms based on any particular form of civilisation were bound to continue unavailing, because they became too much split up. Religion, art, profession and preferences, in fact, are generally not enough to satisfy the whole Man, and are nowise decisive factors in human history.

§ 108. LANGUAGE AS THE ARCHITECT OF STATES.—Now, there is one factor in civilisation which so greatly influences the fates of nations as to be more far-reaching than any yet mentioned. Again, it is so severely applied to certain groups of human beings that it keeps them, so to speak, naturally united. This factor is language. It is language to which Man has consigned as a permanent heritage all the ideas which in process of time have come into existence. Language to him is art, religion and science. It is our Alpha and Omega; and hence any association with language as its basis cannot but be of unparalleled value.

Every human being straightway regards any one who speaks his language as a fellow-countryman, and any one speaking another language as a foreigner. Hence it was only natural that when German patriotism began to make itself felt, the first outcry should have been that wherever German was spoken ought to be German territory. Jakob Grimm, indeed, the first Chairman of the Germanists' Association, said in his opening address at its inaugural meeting at Frankfurt-on-the-Main:

"A people is an aggregate of individuals speaking the same language. This is at once the most pardonable and the proudest statement we Germans can make, for it points with unmistakable certainty to linguistic frontiers prevailing over arbitrarily erected divisions." These words were applauded by all those present, who included such poets as E. M. Arndt and Ludwig Uhland, politicians such as Dahlmann and Beseler, professors of law such as Welker and Mittermaier, Germanists<sup>1</sup> such as Lachmann and Wilhelm Grimm, historians such as Ranke and Gervinus, and finally the future Prussian Minister, Falk.

This primary feeling of belonging to one another, experienced by all speaking the same language, is universal. The Italian Irredentist cares not a jot that the plains watered by the Po can be proved to be inhabited by Teutonic descendants of the old Longobards, or the Upper Isonzo by descendants of the absolutely un-Italian *homo alpinus*. He says that wherever Italian is spoken the Italian flag ought to fly. And whoever disputes this idea because of some political reason will still agree that the sentiment is a right sentiment. There is much to be said to justify the fact that always, as far back as European history extends, "a German" has been understood to mean some one who speaks German, and "a Frenchman" some one who speaks French; and it may be assumed that this will continue so.

Moreover, since the great French Revolution first actually familiarised Man with the conception of human liberty and of his right to think and choose for himself, the trend of evolution really has been in this direction. Existing countries to-day are only such as are tolerably well defined linguistically, except that luckless mediæval survival, Austria. Since the French Revolution all rearrangements such as the unification of Italy, Germany's partial unification, and the creation of national Balkan States, have always tended towards linguistic unity. Nice, Lorraine, and North Schleswig form exceptions. Otherwise, as far as countries are concerned where linguistic boundaries and political frontiers do not coincide, Switzerland, Luxembourg and Belgium are all that remain of past political machinations. More or less in recognition of these countries' abnormal situation, however, they have not been placed on a

<sup>1</sup> The word "Germanist" is used in the sense of a student or person well acquainted with German history, literature, language, etc.—TRANS.



level with other countries, but neutralised. That this abnormal situation and not their unimportance is the reason for their neutralisation seems clear from the fact that much smaller countries are not neutral.

§ 109. THE TRUE IDEAL OF EUROPEAN PATRIOTISM.—Formerly men were attached to an idea, or, if they had none, then they clung to material advantages; and, when they thought it possible to realise either, in or by means of their country, then they were attached to that country as representing this particular idea, and they fought for and sacrificed themselves for their country. But when the mother-country did not correspond to a man's ideal, then he threw it overboard and stood aside—mournfully, for no one cares to be alone; or else he even fought against his country. It is just the noblest characters in history who have acted thus.

Ever since the time of ancient Greece, outlaws, whether oligarchs or democrats, have always fought without compunction against their native land. That is, they put an inalienable ideal above the mere chance fact of having been born in a particular place. Even Coriolanus fought against Rome. And so matters went on throughout the centuries, and particularly in Germany there are numberless instances of such men. But even in England—to give only one instance out of many—the Stuarts accepted aid from their "hereditary enemy," France. During the Reformation the world was divided up according to religions only, without any reference to country; and Swiss Roman Catholics fought on the side of Spain, while French Huguenots supported Protestant England. Even Dante did not hesitate to oppose his own native town, Florence, and no one reproached him for doing so; and Algernon Sidney, the great English Republican, entered into negotiations with Louis XIV.

Even after the French Revolution the French nobility took sides with the Allies against the Republic, and conversely many French Republicans (for instance Moreau at the battle of Leipzig) fought later on for Germany when she took up arms against the Emperor Napoleon. Later still, even in times which we would now describe as times of national excitement, such as the Greek wars of liberation, the mainspring of action was always liberty, and in no sense a universal love of country. If therefore a man had patriotic feelings at such a time, when he could still make up his mind whichever way he chose, it is to be

reckoned unto him for righteousness, for they were based on liberty and the supremacy of reason.

At present we can hardly conceive such freedom of decision. We are asked in all seriousness, all of us, without reference to our ideals, to consider the country in which we were born and its institutions as the greatest thing in the world. Such patriotism, however, has ceased to have any connection with morality; it is the slavish or rather merely animal attachment of an ant to its nest or a bee to its swarm. None can escape the tyranny of this modern idol, not even the ultra-Radical Russian Republicans, who probably hated nothing with such a burning hatred as Tsarism. Yet, although after some hesitation, they at length permitted their followers to fight against Germany. Moreover, they did so not under any external compulsion, for the leaders who gave the word of command were living in free foreign countries, some of them in neutral Switzerland. They did so, in short, because to-day patriotism at any cost takes precedence of the most sacred human rights.

This excessive and exclusive patriotism is not more than one hundred to one hundred and fifty years old. Hence we must cease to compare the patriotism of to-day with that of ancient times. Even those who revere this modern way of a man's loving his country ought at any rate to see that it is different from that of the ancients. True, it is rooted in honourable traditions. It is not the same thing as these traditions, however, but merely a summer blossom which they have put forth, and one which we will hope may be short-lived.

In its stead may we have once more the patriotism of olden times, not a patriotism which cannot choose but be devoted, but one which only becomes so after serious reflection. May it also be rooted in the past, may it also embrace a man's love of his native heath, but let it not suffer this to degenerate into hatred. May it likewise respect religion and morality, but also take into account new, young and growing convictions. Above all may it change mere dynastic patriotism into the conception of citizenship of a State. May it therefore perfect and complete the patriotism of old. May it be love of the individual which yet does not exclude universal love.

Here we perceive the lofty aim of true patriotism, and likewise the difficulty of its attainment. Hesitators, indeed, may think that the aim is impossible of achievement. Yet, like everything

else, in the last resort, it is only a question of liberty. When everything is united and developed according to the principle of liberty, especially when every one can as a matter of course manifest his sympathy with everything good, even if outside the frontiers of his own country; and when no considerable section of people can be compelled to belong to some country which is foreign to them, then the last possibility of friction will have been abolished.

"The barriers of nationality are vanishing before knowledge and art," says Goethe. "The regeneration of Poland is the same thing as European liberty," says Brandes. The obvious truth of both these sayings can hardly be denied,<sup>1</sup> and whoever has thoroughly digested them will have no fear about the new patriotism lacking vitality, especially as on the other side of the Atlantic it has already come to life. In Young America, however, we can see not merely what this new, so to speak cosmopolitan patriotism means, but also the limits which must still be imposed on it.

The tiny nationalities of former times are now too cramped for free patriotism, just as after a time Hessian, Bavarian and Prussian patriotism became too cramped for us in Germany. But the time for the brotherhood of man has not yet come, nor ought it to have done so. There is still too profound a cleavage between White, Yellow and Black. It is in America that that *European patriotism* has awakened which will undoubtedly be the patriotism of the near future, and whose forerunners we would fain be. When the Americans say "America for the Americans," they really mean America for the free descendants of white Europeans; for despite all the enthusiasm for slave emancipation, the feeling that non-Europeans belong to a different race is nowhere stronger than in America, where, especially in the South, it is often manifested in ways both absurd and extravagant.

In America it is realised for what we are fighting; and the reason why America is the birthplace of the new patriotism—and not another land—is that in America the old dynastic patriotism of the smaller European states has become transformed into liberty and responsibility, in short into a true patriotism of civilisation, albeit for the time being inseparable

<sup>1</sup> Dr. Nicolai would perhaps not have written these words after the massacres of the Galician Jews and Ukrainians by the Poles.—TRANS.

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from race. The new Europe is already born, though not in Europe, but over the water, where there are no mediæval ghosts and no trafficking in tomfoolery.

The new Europe is born. Let us, those of us who have remained in Europe, see that it also comes to life here in the old soil, lest civilisation be lost to America for all time, which would be to our disgrace, albeit in reality not so bad as if power were to pass for ever into the hands of the Mongols. Our age, however, needs European patriotism, alike for power's sake and for civilisation's sake.

## CHAPTER IX

## UNJUSTIFIABLE JINGOISM

## I. SELFISHNESS AND LOVE

§ 110. THAT LOVE OF COUNTRY IS NOT TRULY LOVE.—Love, like goodness, uprightness and sense of beauty, can assume any proportions without any one seeing a shadow of wrong in it. No one, for instance, will say that the great love which Christ preached and practised is bad. Only when love, contrary to the very purpose for which it exists, is directed towards itself, may it become a vice. It then intensifies the instinct of self-preservation, the effects of which it is really intended to counteract.

Now, it is only because of poverty of language that these varieties of selfishness are called love; but the people, often quick to detect the difference, have quite rightly sometimes forged new words for them, clearly because the word "love" seemed to them too good.

Whoever loves himself is not a self-lover but a self-seeker. We call those who love their own family immoderately, foolish dotards, and those who love their own nation immoderately we no longer call patriots, but Jingoists. This is an admission of the profound truth that love of self and of one's own interests, and perhaps in certain circumstances even love of country, may be carried to excess, and are therefore at best only relative virtues. At any rate, when these phrases were first used, the overwhelming mass of mankind evidently thought so.

We have already outgrown the naive self-conceit of children and savages. No one with any taste or good breeding will praise or commend himself. If he does, he becomes a laughing-stock, and there is generally an end to his social career. But it is allowable for him to praise and commend himself as a sixty-seven-millionth part of a whole nation.

Now, as is usually the way with men, most of us believe that we always do right and only others wrong. Consequently it is only other nations' patriotism which we call Jingoism. None but the truly great have preserved sufficient impartiality to

admit the possibility of their own countrymen also being Jingoës. Thus Goethe ridicules "German gush about the Fatherland," Chateaubriand and Taine French "gush," and Shakespeare English "gush"; while Lessing calls patriotism "heroic weakness," a phrase which perhaps hits the nail on the head best of all.

Christ and Tolstoy therefore rejected patriotism, and indeed there is not a single truly great man who can be said to have been patriotic in the sense in which the word is used to-day, not even great statesmen, who were certainly willing to die for their country. Frederick II. and Napoleon, for instance, were not patriotic in the modern sense. Frederick II. lived in his enemies' literature, and thought in it too, and Napoleon was perhaps the first, besides Goethe, to dream of the Europe that was in the making. Bismarck, than whom none knew better how to play on men's patriotic passions as on the keys of a piano, and who put the finishing touches to his life's work by astutely exploiting such feelings, was far too astute to abandon his own self to such passions. No one loved his native heath better than the Bismarck of the Marches. No one was more profoundly attached to his own family, his own class and his own people than Bismarck the Junker. Yet Bismarck, who came to maturity during the crisis of 1848 and realised the necessity for German national unity as no one else ever did, never once uttered a patriotic, still less a Jingoistic, word such as we hear now on every hand.

Any one who studies Bismarck's life at all closely, will perceive that exaggerated patriotism is not so much a vice as an error in reasoning. Not even his inveterate enemies will deny that Bismarck was exceptionally far-seeing, and his life shows perhaps better, and above all in more detail than I can, that love of country is not true love but a means of agitation. In Bismarck's complex brain, love of Prussia, of the German Empire and of the Pan-German national State of his dreams all seethed together; and whichever could be utilised was forthwith trotted out.

Now, many will urge that this is all very well for a thoughtful statesman who meant to exploit others' passions for the realisation of his designs, but that a "subject" cannot have any other patriotism except what it is his duty to have for the time being. Is it worth while expostulating with those who talk thus? No,

for the duty of loving to order disappeared together with the conception of a "subject." As we insist on being free in everything, even so must we be free in our inclinations. True, it is allowable for Love to be blind, but not until it has made its choice with open eyes. If it is condemned to be blind before making its choice, it ceases to be love and becomes madness.

## II. *En Masse* SUGGESTION

§ III. THE EFFECTS OF ASSOCIATION ON ANIMALS.—Patriotism is rooted in a man's love of his native land, in the family sense and in social aspirations, and once we know its origin we can understand its nature; but we shall never realise its extent and its vast influence if our knowledge of it is confined to its three-fold origin. Patriotism, indeed, seems inseparable from a certain extravagance, and its tendency to run to seed can only be explained by its being too much exposed to a tropical sun, in the shape of wholesale suggestion. This is perpetually fecundating and poisoning patriotism at one and the same time.

It is a remarkable fact that whenever several animals or several human beings do anything together, the mere fact of co-operation causes each individual's action to be modified. This was known even to the ancients. Thus there is the well-known story of the legendary king who, when his time came to die, asked that a bundle of wooden staves should be brought him, bound them closely together, and asked his sons to break the bundle in pieces. No one could do it. Then the king untied it, and with his own nerveless and aged hand easily broke the individual staves, one after another, saying, "You see, that is the power of association."

Of late we have learned more and more to realise this influence of numbers. We know that two men can carry far more than twice as much as one can carry, and study of the human body has long since taught us the reasons for this fact. We know why a large vessel is faster than a small one, and why one hundred horse-power concentrated in a single motor car can produce greater and more powerful effects than a hundred individual horses. With this we may compare the fact that a number of human beings together act quite differently from a single individual, and in general achieve very much more.

Similarly with regard to animals. Every cavalryman knows that his horse is capable of more when riding with other horses, and that he will easily leap an obstacle at which, had he been alone, he would have jibbed. Every huntsman knows that a pack of hounds advances with much more spirit than one dog alone. Forel, the French-Swiss naturalist, says of ants that the daring of each individual increases in exact proportion to the number of its friends and companions, and similarly decreases in exact proportion to its isolation from its fellows. In proof of this he states that a working ant which, when surrounded by her companions, will readily affront death, becomes timorous and runs away even from a much weaker ant if she is only twenty paces distant from her nest ; also that the ants belonging to a populous ant-hill are invariably more daring than precisely the same kind of ants from a very small ant-republic.

§ 112. THE EFFECTS OF ASSOCIATION ON HUMAN BEINGS.— These remarks about animals are also true of human beings. The individual man is extraordinarily influenced by feeling himself associated with others. Taking the excitement with which a speaker addresses a meeting as equal to one, we can immediately estimate the sympathy aroused by his words at ten- or even one-hundred-fold greater. This is after all the peculiar effect of the spoken word, and Nordau rightly recalls the fact that very often the shorthand reports of speeches which profoundly impressed the audience seem very commonplace when read. We notice the same thing in the theatre. A play which made little impression on us when we read it, may be a brilliant success or an utter failure when acted, so that even the most experienced theatrical manager seldom ventures to prophesy about a "first night."

The accounts of miraculous occurrences which we have, of comparatively recent date, testify to the same fact. Some one in a crowd sees a radiance which he announces as the Mother of God, and suddenly all those present see it equally clearly. Perhaps no one can quite escape being influenced in this way. Very characteristic is an Indian Jungle story, narrated, if I mistake not, by Kipling, as follows : Several Europeans were sitting together one evening in the forest, when an old Hindu conjuror arrived with his son, sowed a bean in the ground, and a climbing plant was seen growing up and up as if it would never stop, towards the night sky. The boy climbed up it, and



vanished into the darkness. The old man rushed frantically about, and then cut the plant, which fell to the ground, and at the feet of those present lay the mangled corpse of the boy, which the father covered with the cloak. . . . A few minutes later father and son took their leave, nothing whatever being the matter with either of them. But each of those present was quite convinced of having seen this horrible sight with his own eyes. This is a most striking instance of the power of suggestion. Nothing of the sort could ever succeed if only a single individual were present.

"In animals these "collective feelings" are based on inherited instincts, in men certainly partly upon the effects of suggestion, but they have never been really thoroughly investigated. In any case it could not be very difficult to ascertain approximately how the same idea is simultaneously suggested to a number of people. Whenever we hear some incredible news for the first time, we do not believe it; but if we hear it repeated from another source once or oftener, we begin to think that after all there must surely be some truth in it. Thus belief is strengthened—simply by constant repetition. *Fliegende Blätter* once published a story in which some one was supposed to meet some school children and tell them: "Go to Brewers' Street, there's a shark got loose there." In the next street he met some servant girls hastening along. When he asked them where they were going in such a hurry, they told him, "To Brewers' Street, a shark's got loose there." Then he met some soldiers and students, all making for Brewers' Street, where they said a shark had got loose. At last he exclaimed: "Upon my word, I think I'll go to Brewers' Street myself. Perhaps a shark really has got loose there."

This joke has a very solid foundation in fact. If we ourselves, under pressure of some sort, express some opinion which we know is probably not true, and then hear every one around us, all perhaps acting under the same sort of impulse, perpetually saying the same thing, in time we become more and more firmly convinced that this opinion, which we at first scarcely ventured to defend, is after all correct. Moreover, as we do not convey our meaning by words alone, but also by gestures, we can be put in a cheerful, depressed, or any other kind of mood without any words being uttered, merely by means of instinctive but skilfully used movements. And if we are already

cheerful, we can be made more so by this means, or more depressed if we are depressed.

This is most evident at a large meeting addressed by some speaker. He has scarcely opened his mouth before he has communicated a dash of his own emotion to every one of his hearers. Supposing it to be only a hundredth part on an average, and supposing there to be one thousand people present, then the speaker's emotion has already been multiplied ten-fold, as will speedily appear from the increased attentiveness, obvious tension and perhaps even applause of the audience. All these factors together will produce what parliamentary reporters call a "sensation." This sensation will react in turn upon each one of the audience, increasing their emotion; and most of all will the speaker himself be carried away by seeing such an excited crowd of people confronting him. This is probably the reason why a speech not cut and dried, indeed even an ill-prepared or extempore speech modified for the occasion, is generally more effective than a well-thought-out, read speech, and why so many unaccustomed speakers are overcome by the success of their own words, and often scarcely know how to proceed. The effect they have produced returns to them in such an intensified form that they become as it were dumbfounded. But if the speaker can control his own emotion and react in turn upon the audience, then a series of what may be called electric shocks is set up between him and his hearers, so that in a few moments both are abnormally excited.<sup>1</sup>

### III. THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF JINGOISM

§ 113. THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF DRAWING THE LINE BETWEEN PATRIOTISM AND JINGOISM.—Where does patriotism end and Jingoism begin? Seriously, I believe that it is impossible to draw the line between them. This would be the case even if Jingoism were only an "excess of patriotism," for it is always a delicate matter to decide what is "much" and what is "not much." But the word Jingoism is also used to mean false patriotism. What does this mean? If I am to be allowed to discuss love of country at all; if, that is, it has to be subject to my other conceptions of good and evil, then patriotism loses

<sup>1</sup> This last sentence is a quotation from, I believe, an English writer, but I cannot give the source.

what ought to be its distinguishing characteristic, and becomes an affection like any other. If I am to reject Jingoism, then I must have the right to condemn what others call patriotism, since no one calls himself a Jingo.

If, therefore, there is to be any difference whatever between Jingoes and patriots, then the Jingo is some one who loves his country under any and all conditions, his country, right or wrong. He is some one who places this love of country before everything else in life; and consequently, if he be a brave, high-principled man, thinks no sacrifice too great to make for it. Then a patriot must be a man who loves and supports what is good in his country (or for that matter elsewhere), and hates and opposes what is bad; but instincts, habits and reflection lead him to the conclusion that he personally had best live in that particular country, and serve it with all his strength and to the best of his ability. Such men are capable of warm and passionate attachment to their motherland, just because they respect themselves and it; but they will never suffer their attachment to induce them to commit a wrong. Such men, however, are usually not called patriots.

The first category of individuals, those who say "my country, right or wrong," may of course be guided by moral principles, that is, if they hold moral principles which allow them to do wrong. As a rule, however, their actions are not based on moral principles. Moreover, they do not require to love their mother-country in the least, and often do not love it. But they are either too weak or too cowardly to be able to help feeling and thinking as every one else does. Indeed, so cowardly are they often that they lay down their lives for their country, without for a moment having meant to do so. Such people call themselves patriots, and their fellow-patriots likewise call themselves so.

From henceforth I shall call them Jingoes and patriots, and the question is how can we explain men being able to become Jingoes. There are two causes for this. First, they are incapable of preventing themselves being carried away by what every one is doing or saying. No sentiment is so much affected by suggestion as patriotism, which in the very nature of things can only be based on some widespread feeling. Furthermore, every weak character tries to lean on some one else, and imagines himself stronger if he does what others are doing; for only the

strong man is strongest by himself. Now, all these feeble characters have usually empty minds, and hold no definite convictions. Hence they cannot feel any particular intellectual or other leanings, since if any one has no intellect neither has he any intellectual kith and kin. Thus, in order never to be forced to stand alone, they will seek some external bond of union, and what could be better suited for this purpose than national sentiment? Every blockhead feels several inches taller if he and a few dozen millions of his kind can only unite to form a majority; and thus in time these dozens of millions, every individual among them incapable of standing alone, become an invincible force.

As the German poet Grillparzer says :

“ Ein Vorzug bleibt uns ewig unverloren,  
 Man nennt ihm heute Nationalität !  
 Das heisst, dass 'irgendwo ' der Mensch geboren,  
 Was freilich sich von selbst versteht.”<sup>1</sup>

The fewer independent characters a nation possesses, the greater is of course its patriotism; and “ *Civis Romanus sum* ” was never more proudly uttered than during the decline of the Roman Empire.

I have hitherto described only the positive attributes of Jingoism. The chief negative attributes are hatred and envy of foreign countries. Love of country, however passionate, even if it fills a man to overflowing and has reached its utmost possible limits, yet remains absolutely pure so long as it is free from any taint of hatred of foreign nations.

This inability of a man to use his reason in order to think above the mass of his fellow-citizens, or to overcome his hatred of foreigners, stamps him as a false patriot or a Jingo.

§ 114. THE NECESSITY OF WAR FOR PATRIOTISM.—But now comes war, and gives the signal for the start. Were it not for war, indeed, no one would have any interest in patriotism, still less in Jingoism. Any one who loved his country would have one more source of satisfaction in the world, and any one who did not would offend no one, for merchants and manufacturers may be safely trusted to find more customers and new markets, and thus increase the prosperity of the nation. Men of science

<sup>1</sup> Which may be roughly rendered: “ One blessing we can never lose; we call it nationality. That means, that man was born ‘ somewhere,’ and that there was no need to say.” (Grillparzer died in 1872.)

are inwardly impelled to do their best work, and thus add to the national wealth in another sense. There is no need to hold out any special inducement to any of them.

Again, if money is required for a school, a theatre, a harbour or a canal, we consider, or we ought to consider, whether the outlay will be justified by a sufficient gain to the country of any sort or kind. Such considerations decide the question, and there is no need of any patriotism. Patriotism, in short, is not of the least practical use in any peaceful occupation.

When it is a question of consenting to an increase of the army, however, or to new cannons or ironclads, then patriotism must be appealed to, for then it is a question of agreeing to privations because of unproductive armaments. Thus even in peace time the threat of war compels us to fan the flames of patriotism.

In general, it is true that the smouldering spark is only just kept alive, for were it to flare up too suddenly it might disturb the diplomatists at their work, of which the governments are scarcely less proud than of heroic deeds on the battle-field. But when war has once begun, there is no more need for any such precautions; and as it generally imposes a variety of restrictions, both intellectual and material, upon the population, it becomes necessary to stimulate patriotism. Indeed, only the extremest patriotic fervour can induce the people voluntarily to endure privations for long.

A good deal of this increase of patriotism comes to pass quite naturally. Every one is suddenly busy about the same thing, and accordingly every one tends to be and feels busier, and this in turn makes every one feel closer to every one else. Again, the uncertainty and anxiety as to the possible trials of the war also cause all weak characters to draw nearer together.

Both sentiments, moreover, are artificially intensified, and a close study of the Press shows that our wire-pullers have an understanding of the instinct of the masses which few will envy them except the late Mr. Barnum. Strange to say, the whole trick merely consists in exaggerating the good points either of their own people or of the enemy, according to what it is desired to make the masses feel.

§ 115. SELF-PRAISE AND FEAR.—Clearly in war time we can stand a great deal of praise. Time was when we used wrathfully to laugh at the French because, after Europe having almost

slavishly copied French ways for a hundred years, they thought they were in the forefront of civilisation. Yet now we calmly accept such assertions as the following (to give only a few instances out of many): "Never in history has there been anything so perfect as Germany" (Lasson)<sup>1</sup>; Germany is the heart of Europe (W. Rein)<sup>2</sup>; Germany is the "soul of Europe" (Gerhard Hauptmann)<sup>3</sup>; side by side with French worship of externals and English utilitarianism, said Rudolf Eucken,<sup>4</sup> stands "German universality," to which, added Kohler,<sup>5</sup> foreign nations owe "what is best in their education." Sometimes the pléthora of epithets used produces a singular effect, as when Lasson<sup>6</sup> says that true earnestness and profound idealism are German secrets, and all vivifying feeling for nature is German. Truthfulness and fidelity are claimed as truly German, and likewise perseverance in overcoming difficulties and love of work, thought and conscientiousness, determination, love of research, and justness. Richard Dehmel<sup>7</sup> repeats himself in exactly the same way when he says Germany is more humane and has more discipline, morality, intellect, mind, and imagination than other countries.

This was the sort of stuff to be found daily in 1914 in the papers. Most of it was far worse still, for the instances just quoted are all statements by well-known people, and not by anonymous and consequently absolutely irresponsible writers.

This self-praise was thrown into relief, as it were, by aspersions cast upon the enemy. We can understand Eucken and Co. talking about Russia's harsh despotism and making the Russian people responsible for a government once so much belauded. Similar opinions were heard even before the war.

<sup>1</sup> *Zwei Briefe an die holländische Zeitschrift "De Amsterdamer,"* by Adolf Lasson, November, 1914. (Two Letters to the Dutch Review *De Amsterdamer*.)

<sup>2</sup> Wilhelm Rein in *Der Tag* of August 18, 1914. This is a parody on Hölderlin (German poet, died 1843), who once said, with quite a different meaning, that "Germany is the sacred heart of the nations."

<sup>3</sup> "An meine amerikanischen Freunde" (To my American Friends), by Gerhard Hauptmann, published in the *Berliner Tageblatt* of October 21, 1914.

<sup>4</sup> *Erster Vortrag in der Urania* (First Lecture in the Urania), by Rudolf Eucken, 1914.

<sup>5</sup> Joseph Kohler, a German jurist, in the *Berliner Tageblatt* of September 18, 1914.

<sup>6</sup> Adolf Lasson's "Fünfte Rede in schwerer Zeit" (Fifth Lecture in Time of Stress), as reported in the *Berliner Tageblatt* of September 26, 1914.

<sup>7</sup> "Brief an meine Kinder" (Letter to my Children), by Richard Dehmel, in the *Berliner Tageblatt* of October 10, 1914.

But when Richard Dehmel calls her the most barbarous of barbarous countries, or a monster of primitive instincts and imported refinements, it is inexplicable. A poet ought to have sufficient respect for poetry not to call a country barbaric which has produced such a brilliant trio as Lermontoff, Dostoeffski and Tolstoy. Moreover, Richard Dehmel knows enough Russians to be aware that together with a great deal of temperament they possess a matchless delicacy of feeling. What sense is there, then, in talking about a monster?

To France the feeling was generally friendly, although the compassionate smile with which the Germans, among them Carl Hauptmann, Roethe, and Richard Dehmel, were fond of dismissing the "poor French" was very unworthy of them; and the abuse heaped upon the Japanese, Serbians and Belgians was likewise wholly unworthy of German independence of mind. But this I pass over, because every one of my readers will have heard it at least a dozen times, if he has not unhappily repeated it.

But what was said of England went absolutely beyond all bounds. Harnack,<sup>1</sup> for instance, said that Englishmen were traitors to civilisation; Häckel,<sup>2</sup> that they were the greatest criminals in the history of the world; and Gustav Roethe,<sup>3</sup> that they are the great cold-blooded hypocrites of the world. According to Eucken, the English are actuated by odious frivolity; according to Carl Hauptmann they are actuated by commercial envy, etc., etc., almost *ad infinitum*. But Richard Dehmel excelled them all, for not only did he call the Englishman "a ravening beast," but even went the length of saying what cynics Shakespeare and Byron were, "if you really study them attentively." If poets and philosophers could say such things as these, it is easy to imagine how "Philistines and journalists" have out-Heroded Herod. As far as I can judge, the record is at present held, among daily newspapers, by the *Deutsche Tageszeitung*. As regards other papers, *Simplizissimus* and *Die Jugend* are contending for the palm.

Any one reading all this every day comes quite naturally to the conclusion that his own nation is the best, and that he is

<sup>1</sup> Adolf von Harnack (German theologian): speech in the Berlin Rathaus, August 11, 1914, and letter dated September 10, 1914.

<sup>2</sup> *Englands Blutschuld* (England's Blood-guiltiness), by Ernst Häckel, the zoologist.

<sup>3</sup> Gustav Roethe, born 1859, still living, is what Professor Nicolai describes as a "Germanist."—TRANS.

bound to defend it, not merely in his own interest but in that of the world in general. Thus war fosters Jingoism and Jingoism war, until it was actually possible for 3016 German high-school teachers<sup>1</sup> to declare that "the only salvation for European civilisation is Germany's victory" (or, as Carl Hauptmann<sup>2</sup> phrased it, that "European independence will never be ensured unless the German armies are completely victorious"). The reason for this is beautifully stated by Juliusburger,<sup>3</sup> who is borne out by such men as Häckel and Ostwald, as follows: "The task imposed on Germany by history is to organise Europe under her leadership."<sup>4</sup>

The one-sided reports of the wonderful bravery of German troops and of the enemy's cowardice come under the same category, and also the attempt, which is made in every war by both parties more or less adroitly, to shift the responsibility on to the enemy; and a thousand other things, all connected with the frightful campaign of calumny which unfortunately makes its appearance together with war, likewise all belong here.

This blowing our own trumpet and blustering are understandable, for they are a heritage from our primeval animal ancestors. The lion roars before attacking; the elephant, when awaiting his enemy, tramples up the ground; the snake puffs itself up and hisses, and the Trojans made long speeches, praising themselves and abusing their enemy. On the other hand, to attempt to increase patriotism by exaggerating danger is peculiar to human beings. There can of course be no object in any such attempt, except it be desired to induce not over-intelligent masses of civilians to give money or soldiers, or to endure privations, and apparently to do it voluntarily. In the animal kingdom no such thing as freewill exists.

It is chiefly the Western Powers which have resorted to this method. In England the Zeppelins, for fear of which large portions of towns were kept in complete darkness, were at first the chief patriotism-stimulators; but in the long run all the outcry has been about German cruelty and barbarity. In

<sup>1</sup> Manifesto of the High School Teachers of the German Empire, October 19, 1914.

<sup>2</sup> "Gegen Unwahrheit" (Against Untruth), by Carl Hauptmann, in the *Tägliche Rundschau* of August 26, 1914.

<sup>3</sup> "Europa unter deutscher Führung" (Europe under Germany's Leadership), by Otto Juliusburger, in the *Monistisches Jahrhundert*, November 13, 1914, p. 657.

<sup>4</sup> For the grain of truth in this untrue assertion cf. § 16.



Germany this method of exaggerating danger in order to induce the populace to do what is wanted could be resorted to only during the first part of the war, because afterwards the military situation seemed too favourable, or was supposed to be so. At first, however, all manner of inventions were circulated in order to strike terror into the Germans. We were perpetually having the proportion "four to one" hammered into us, just as if Austria (and later on Turkey and Bulgaria) did not exist. Even Adolf von Harnack seems to have succumbed to these suggestions, for on September 10, 1914, he wrote, quite wrongly, in order to excuse the Germans having marched into Belgium, that "one hundred and ninety millions had attacked sixty-eight millions," thus simply leaving the Austrians out of account, although they were supposed to have been the principal party concerned. Again, the enemy and his strength, at any rate anything menacing about them, were exaggerated. Our adversaries' spies were said to be everywhere, blowing up our tunnels and dropping bombs on German towns even in the heart of the country. Our wells were said to have been poisoned by French doctors, and vast quantities of gold conveyed through Germany to Russia.

Obviously it is not a matter of complete indifference whether such preposterous stories are believed or not. There is, after all, no getting away from the fact that, for instance, the story of the poisoned wells was for a time believed by fully seventy-nine million people, that is, supposing there to be about eighty million Germans in Germany and Austria, which is approximately correct.

§ 116. THE RESULTS OF JINGOISM.—The wholesale system of suggestion just described was everywhere successful; and no war has ever been so well prepared for as that of 1914. Patriotism assumed unprecedented proportions. But the result of this—one, which, let us hope, was not foreseen—was that international hatred likewise assumed unprecedented proportions. The saddest thing about this is that the suggestions and insinuations will vanish, but the hatred will remain.

Jingoism, once aroused, concentrates a man's whole capacity for affection on himself and his own nation; for everything else there is nothing but hatred: these two passions leave no room for any other outlet of the human soul. I cannot go into this in detail here, but any one who turns up the newspapers of

the first year of the war will find enough regrettable facts, enough and to spare. I will only select a few examples at random, to show what I mean.

First, German intellect went absolutely bankrupt. Everything, in short, was believed. No one, for instance, remarked that it was impossible for a motor car to get over the frontiers, these being blocked, and that such vast sums of gold would be far too heavy to be conveyed thus. Unhappily, the authorities lent support to these fairy tales, at all events indirectly, for no one in any position of authority took any steps promptly to deny the rumour of French doctors having been caught in the very act of poisoning wells and arrested, or of the shooting of the innkeeper Nikolai.<sup>1</sup> Despite the Censorship, nothing was done to prevent the papers disseminating demonstrably false reports of gouged-out eyes, cut-off hands, foresters shot dead, etc.; all reports which of course succeeded admirably in their purpose. After a time, indeed, no report was so absurd that some people did not believe it. And even German scientists fell a prey to this epidemic of people declining to use their intelligence—German scientists who nevertheless ought to have known what careful investigation of the truth means. And the Manifesto, quoted verbatim in the Introduction to this book, a document containing seven times the words "It is not true" and dealing seven times with matters which, in the very nature of things, could not be classed outright with either truth or falsehood, was signed by thirty-five investigators of one form or other of natural science!

That there is no room for ethics in war goes without saying, but the Jingo nevertheless is anxious to claim that he and his have a monopoly of them, no matter how senseless this may be. It is noteworthy that Paul Ernst,<sup>2</sup> writing on the question of

<sup>1</sup> "Another of these false reports was the following: the largest tunnel in Germany, one near Cochem at the frontier, was said to be destroyed, and the innkeeper Nicolai (or Nikolai) of Cochem, together with his son, to have been shot on a charge of having committed this crime. A day later a paragraph appeared in the *Rheinisch-Westfälische Zeitung* to the effect that it had made careful inquiries about this announcement of Wolff, and ascertained the fact that Nicolai, who had committed this dreadful deed, was a Frenchman by birth and a German by naturalisation only. It rejoiced to think that he was not really a German. Yet another day later, and the Sheriff of Cochem announced that there was not a word of truth in the alleged attempt to blow up the tunnel; that Nicolai was alive and a respected man, and that his son was in a Prussian regiment."—From the Diary of Dr. Muehlon, formerly a director of Krupp, of Essen. Orell Füssli, Zürich.—TRANS.

<sup>2</sup> In *Der Tag* of March 25, 1915.

"whether York<sup>1</sup> acted wrongly in concluding the Tauroggen convention, and was a traitor to an ally," argues that York was a German, and moreover a God-fearing, upright German, thoroughly imbued with Kant's ethics. Such Germans never act otherwise than rightly: consequently York's betrayal of his king and allies was a right action! Paul Ernst's actual words are: "A Southerner, even a Frenchman, cannot understand the question at issue. For York, a man of iron, of rigid, unimpeachable honour, it was allowable to act as he did. We owe it to him that our national liberation is rooted not in dishonour, but in a great and heroic sacrifice." The action, therefore, is bad in itself, and would remain bad were it committed by a Southerner or a Frenchman, but committed by a German it at once becomes heroic! I hope the time is not far distant when Germans, Paul Ernst among them, will feel deeply ashamed of the time when they could write such things. Jingoism, indeed, is never so dangerous, because never so seductive to innocent individuals, as when masquerading in the garb of philosophic reflection. They then scarcely notice its cloven foot.

When certain German daily papers, however, insist that prisoners of war and pigs ought to be fed together; or when they follow up an announcement from German headquarters to the effect that "a great many German sailors were rescued by the English" by saying "we really must protest against being rescued by such riff-raff as the English," this is Jingoism grown to such a pitch of brutality and harshness that any one not instantly repelled by it is past praying for.

Unhappily there are only a very few nowadays who are not past praying for. A short time ago a question was put to me by one of our most highly cultivated officers, who has deserved so well of his country that I will not mention his name, especially as when peace is restored he will assuredly regret his question. He asked me, in short, whether it were not possible to throw bombs full of cholera germs or pestilence bacilli behind the enemy's front. When I told him that I thought this would be hardly expedient and that it was likewise scarcely humane, he retorted contemptuously: "What have we to do with humane-ness in this war? For Germany *anything* is justifiable."

This highly placed officer is unhappily not alone in his opinions. Millions think as he does, and most of them go much

<sup>1</sup> Hans David Ludwig, Count von Wartenburg York.—TRANS.

farther. Thus a staff-surgeon at Graudenz told me "he had very often thought whether he could not somehow or other slip over to Russia, so as to inoculate the Russians with living bacteria. Nothing was too bad for such a pack of vermin." Such demoralised individuals simply cease to consider the enemy as human beings like themselves. In one sense, however, they do consider them as their own kind, for they look on them as animals. Hate has become a religion with them—unreflecting, senseless, unreasoning hate.

In Lissauer's "Hymn of Hate" against England there is not even an attempt made to say why, after all, this comical gentleman does hate England. From beginning to end the "Hymn" is merely a barking repetition that "my goodness, he does hate England." And when you have read through his effusion, you would like to ask the writer why, after all, this should be so? Herr Lissauer once quite truly remarked that his verses ought not to be spoken but hissed—an admirable piece of self-criticism. Snakes and vermin there have always been, but probably no one ever thought that so many of them could understand German. The Roman historian Julius Florus<sup>1</sup> tells us that the ancient *Germani* used to tear out the tongues of slanderous poets, saying they did so "to make the poisonous snake stop hissing." To-day we are less severe, but let us lose no time in making the world soon forget that either these ribald lines or the words "Hiddekk"<sup>2</sup> and "Gott strafe England"<sup>3</sup> were ever popular in Germany.

In ancient times, when it was not yet customary to speak foreign languages, and when therefore a foreigner, try as he might, could not make himself understood, it was almost unavoidable that he should have been looked on as a barbarian, *i.e.* as some one speaking a foreign language. Originally, however (that is, before the Persian wars), there was no trace of contempt about this word. Plato could still write: "Great are the

<sup>1</sup> "Tandem, vipera, sibilare desiste." Julius Florus (c. A.D. 150), *Epitome rerum Romanarum*, Lib. IV. cap. xiii.

<sup>2</sup> H.I.D.D.E.K.K.= "Hauptsache ist, dass die Engländer Keile kriegen" (The chief thing is that the English get a hiding). Among Swiss who are friendly to the Entente, however, the current version is: "Hauptsache ist, dass Deutschland englische Keile kriegt" (The chief thing is that the English should give Germany a hiding).

<sup>3</sup> It is said that the British variation of this is: "Gott verzeihe Deutschland" (God forgive Germany).

racés of the Barbarians also," but Aristotle<sup>1</sup> already mentions as a matter of course that the Greeks must be masters of the Barbarians. But now that the whole intellectual life of a foreign nation is almost as accessible to every one as the literature of his own nation, this craze for calling foreigners "barbarians" is merely a mark of defective education.

When some beer-swilling Philistine, sitting with his cronies at his accustomed table, brags about our being the noblest, bravest, most chivalrous, most intelligent, in short in every respect the best nation, this may be overlooked. He may be excused on the ground of his horizon being bounded by the walls of his pot-house. But when such a man as Richard Dehmel says that the German alone has a nobleman's right to rule the world, quite forgetting that he once thought this world in the last resort was not intended to be ruled over at all; when such a man as Hermann Cohen,<sup>2</sup> the philosopher, says only a German is fit to touch philosophy, quite forgetting (to cite only one instance, peculiarly affecting Cohen himself) what Kant owed to Berkeley, then it must be sorrowfully confessed that Jingoism has done a dreadful amount of harm, by debasing free and noble minds until they are almost on a level with those whose knowledge does not go beyond their beer-pot.

#### IV. THE ANTITHESIS BETWEEN CIVILISATION AND JINGOISM

§ 117. CIVILISATION REGARDED AS AN ORGANISM.—Hitherto I have dealt only with isolated instances. They assuredly illustrate the mischievous and anti-civilising tendency of Jingoistic views, but they are not wholly convincing, precisely because they might be only isolated instances. It can easily be shown, however, that civilisation and Jingoism, indeed civilisation and patriotism, are wholly incompatible with each other.

Beyond doubt, as I hope to show in the next chapter, there is a civilisation peculiar to each country, and this must be maintained; but such civilisation is only possible if we sub-

<sup>1</sup> Aristotle (c. 350 B.C.), *Politics*, I. ii. Cf. Roth's *Über Sinn und Gebrauch des Wortes Barbar* (On the Meaning and Use of the Word "Barbarian"). Nuremberg, 1843.

<sup>2</sup> "Das Eigentümliche des deutschen Geistes" (The Peculiarity of the German Mind). A lecture delivered by Hermann Cohen before the Kant Association, in 1914.

ordinate our feeling for our mother-country to our ideal of civilisation—not if we do the reverse. Nietzsche<sup>1</sup> once said that war made the victor stupid, and the vanquished barbarous, by which he probably merely meant that war destroys civilisation, for he does not even hint as to why the intellect of the victor and the character of the vanquished should suffer. It is doubly remarkable that this should have been said by Nietzsche, who more than any one firmly believed in the possibility of and necessity for a collective or world-wide civilisation such as the ancient Greeks used to contrast with the conception of barbarism and call “*Kalokagathie*.”

Probably all really serious thinkers have felt that “specialised civilisation” is not true civilisation. To cite only a few instances, Kant<sup>2</sup> in his *Critique of Pure Reason* says civilisation means developing the capabilities of a reasonable being so as to fit him for life to the utmost possible extent; and Fichte<sup>3</sup> agrees with him in saying, not quite so clearly, that “civilisation is the putting forth of all our strength for the purpose of complete liberty.” But Nietzsche puts it most plainly and definitely when he says: “Civilisation is union between opposing forces.”

An artist, a musician, or a sculptor can no more represent civilisation than a scientist, a technical expert, or a philosopher can do so, nor can all the members of a profession taken together constitute a civilisation. The great edifice of any period of civilisation is due to the fact that all these different component parts, and many more besides, unite to form a single organism, without any one of them being prevented from developing freely. There are, it is true, predominantly religious epochs, such as the Middle Ages, predominantly artistic epochs, such as the Renaissance, scientific periods (as witness the rationalism of the eighteenth century), technical periods, such as the present, and political periods, such as that of the French Revolution. In all these one particular intellectual tendency has preponderated, but when its preponderance became so great as to outweigh other intellectual impulses, then we deny the particular period the right to be called a period of civilisation.

<sup>1</sup> *Menschliches, Allzumenschliches. Der Krieg* (War: Something Human, quite too Human), by Friedrich Nietzsche, 1886.

<sup>2</sup> *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, 1790, § 83.

<sup>3</sup> *Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre* (Basis of the Whole Teaching of Science), by Johann Gottlieb Fichte, 1802, vi. 86

Now, a human being cannot have his hand cut off without the brain being also affected, nor his brain injured without injuring his hand; in short, no part of any organism can be altered without altering the whole. Precisely in the same way does civilisation deteriorate whenever one of its factors suffers. Any one who reflects even a little will at once see how much music lies hidden in all the other arts and sciences. It is sufficient to recall the origin of tragedy and lyric poetry, Pythagoras<sup>1</sup> and the various religions.

Assuredly, if anything whatever be one and indivisible in our disrupted times, then it is civilisation. And, be the times never so disrupted, it remains and will remain so, for in its very nature it must be one and indivisible. No one can dismember civilisation, either as regards space or time. No burning of Alexandria or of Byzantium, no martyrdom or chair of St. Peter, no war, nothing can really affect it. Ever will a hand be there ready to pass on the torch from one day to another, and from one country to another. Only the individual human being can be false to civilisation, and perhaps even this is not possible. Perhaps what we are witnessing during this war is merely an outward veneer which we mistook for civilisation, falling away to show the indomitable heart within. Civilisation cannot be otherwise than an organism, one and indivisible, whose arms encircle the world.

Every organism can be divided up in different ways, according to different points of view, either into the various parts of the body (arms, legs, trunk, head, etc.), or into the different sets of organs (blood-vessels, nerves, digestive organs, etc.).

So it is with regard to civilisation considered as an organism. It can be divided according to the parts of the world where certain forms of it prevail or have prevailed—into Greek and Roman, German and Romansch, Slav and Chinese civilisation, etc. But it can also be divided according to systems, into intellectual, scientific, technical and other forms, which are more or less equally intersected by all the various religions.

For those who do not understand what a scientist means by an organism, I insert Fig. 8, in which Germany, France and

<sup>1</sup> It was by a discovery of this sixth-century Greek philosopher that the relation of the scales in music can be numerically expressed. Pythagoras and his school believed the arrangement of the heavenly bodies to depend on intervals regulated by musical harmony, and that these bodies, in their motion, produce music—the music of the spheres.—TRANS.

England represent parts of the body and the variously shaded branches represent systems of philosophy or of civilisation, indicated by the names Newton, Kant and Napoleon. Any other names might be equally well selected, or any number more added to indicate particular intellectual tendencies. It is easy to see from this diagram that nothing could be taken out without injuring the whole—neither Kant's system of philosophy nor a region such as France. If France disappeared, then certain offshoots of Kant's German philosophy would likewise vanish. That is, if Germany destroyed France, she would irrevocably




FIG. 8.

destroy certain of the flowers of that form of civilisation which is most peculiarly her own.

Of late, owing to the ever-increasing means of international communication, every zone of civilisation has tended more and more to overlap every other one. Civilisations, in short, have been crossing and re-crossing as never before in the history of the world.

§ 118. THE INTERNATIONALISM OF CIVILISATION.—It is no longer possible to think of technical achievement as confined within the boundaries of one particular country. Post and telegraph, railway and steamer communication are essentially universal institutions, and the way they are regulated clearly proves that they are tending to become more and more unified. Wherever there are no international rules, even for some



comparatively trivial matter such as whether motor cars ought to keep to the right or the left, every one concerned feels that here is an anachronism.

• Scientific achievement has also long ceased to be national. Meteorology, international regulation of the weights of atoms, international archæological research, the study of earthquakes and astronomy are instances selected very much at random; but they are sufficient proof to every one knowing anything of the branches of science in question, that here are organisations which have spread all over the world, independent of nationality. But even a national medical science, national jurisprudence, or national educational science would be absurd.

Internationalism is, indeed, so to speak already officially admitted by the existence of numerous international bureaux<sup>1</sup> managed by all the nations together. The most important, about which there is a certain element of the political, have been distributed among Switzerland, Belgium and Holland. The territory of all these three states is ostensibly inviolable, and their neutrality has been guaranteed—unhappily in vain.

Thus, in Berne the World Telegraph Bureau was founded in 1865, the World Postal Union in 1874, and the offices for the Protection of Industrial and Intellectual Property in 1863 and 1886 respectively:

In Brussels the Customs Tariffs Office was founded in 1890, the Slave Trade Office in 1890, and the Sugar Commission in 1902:

At The Hague are the Court of International Arbitration and the Supreme Prize Court.

In the case of International Institutes it was obviously not thought necessary to provide for the contingency of scientists actually denying the international nature of their work. In this, however, a mistake was made. Thus in Germany there are two of these international offices, the Potsdam Institute of Geodesy (1864), and the Strasburg Institute for the Study of Earthquakes (1903). In France there are also two, the Weights and Measures Office at Sèvres (1875), and the International Health Office in Paris (1893), which has several branches in the East. The International Institute for Marine Investigation is at Copenhagen (1902), and the International Institute of Agri-

<sup>1</sup> Only official and permanent bureaux are mentioned here. There are of course numbers of other international associations, and also official agreements.

culture (1905) at Rome. Besides these, there are numerous international conventions to which the governments of the various countries conform. Dr. Fried<sup>1</sup> mentions eighty-six such, connected with trade and communications, law, police, science, social improvements, war and politics.

Not only is civilisation in the broad sense international to-day, but likewise civilisation in the narrower sense—customs, fashions, dances, and street tunes. It is useless attempting to deny this. Every time the Germans have plunged into a war, indeed, those remaining at home have determined to introduce German fashions. Nothing has ever come of it, but with the obstinacy of an unteachable mule we raised this war-whoop louder than ever in 1914. Yet despite the efforts made having been more frantic than ever, the movement collapsed sooner, for international facts are after all more powerful than ever before. Then came the manufacturers, urging that after all they must export ready-made clothing to South America, while others shamefacedly recalled our exports to England, which are undeniably a great many people's means of livelihood. Then came along those who had some knowledge of history, remarking that Germany had once had fashions of her own, such as shag hats and Jaeger underclothing, but at the time it was considered unpatriotic to wear them! Then it occurred to the upper ten thousand that perhaps one day they might want to go again to Monte Carlo to gamble and to the Engadine for winter sports, and that then German fashions might be seriously inconvenient. Thus, despite all the hatred, the same peculiar kind of costumes were being worn in Berlin as in Paris, even in the winter of 1914-15. After all, what claim to be German fashions at present are merely a skilful method of advertisement, suited to the times. Here we have internationalism already too powerful, for there is really no reason why every one should not dress differently and in accordance with his own fancy.

Houses, like human beings, are also international, and unfortunately without any individuality. Paris to-day is scarcely distinguishable, save by her historical buildings, from London, Berlin, or Petersburg; and although Bukarest, Constantinople and Madrid have perhaps still certain peculiarities, yet here, too, there is an unmistakable tendency towards internationalisation.

<sup>1</sup> *Handbuch der Friedensbewegung* (Handbook of the Peace Movement), by Alfred Fried, i. 121. Leipzig.

In a modern part of Milan, Berlin, or Stockholm a man could not now tell in which of the three he was, were it not for the street signs. Indeed, except for externals, the harbour quarters of Hong-Kong, Hamburg, Port Said and New York are almost precisely alike—the same public-houses frequented by sailors, and with the same cinematographs, the same international prostitutes and the same ships' crews: while the fashionable quarters, such as Ulhenhorst and Hong-Kong Hill are much more alike still.

The enterprising traveller, indeed, complains that, unless he buries himself in the solitude of the pampas, the steppes, the tundras, or the forests<sup>1</sup> primeval, it is hardly possible to escape Cook's Standard Hotels.

There remains, therefore, only art, and as a matter of fact it has also become international. The newest operetta is produced almost simultaneously in all the European capitals; Caruso can scarcely now be described as an Italian; and Tolstoy, Ibsen and Bernard Shaw<sup>1</sup> have their schools in every country.

Then there are cross-currents, such as naturalism, impressionism, and so on down to futurism, which came into fashion at much the same time in all countries. Even what is known as "native art" is in reality merely a fashionable international craze which set in about the same time in all countries. In the case of art, however, there might at any rate have been some serious talk about its intensifying national sentiment, art being something traditional and reminiscent of the past. But there are not the people to produce such retrospective art. Education is international. Boys everywhere see and learn the same thing, even in the case of those brought up in the "backest" of backwoods. Richard Dehmel, who grew up in a lonely forester's lodge in the swamps of the Marches, was quite right in saying that what few brains he had he owed to ten different nations; and as for a young artist, directly he has become in any way famous, he is hopelessly engulfed in the internationalism of modern life.

The efforts of the Werdandi Society to revive the ancient and peculiarly German form of art, which could only thrive in

<sup>1</sup> Like many foreigners, Professor Nicolai seems to take Mr. Bernard Shaw much more seriously than do most of that dramatist's own fellow-countrymen. Mr. Shaw will of course retort that a prophet has no honour in his own country.  
—TRANS.

narrow, isolated, mediæval cities, were as much a failure as similar attempts in other countries. Thus all civilisation, in the broadest and the narrowest sense, has now become essentially international. Exceptions there are, of course. But we must never deceive ourselves : these exceptions do not count.

§ 119. THE EFFECT OF JINGOISM ON CIVILISATION IN GENERAL.

—Civilisation and patriotism are ideals, either of which, in the nature of things, must suffice completely to absorb a man's energies. Hence no one can serve both. A man may be a patriot or he may consider that world-civilisation takes precedence of everything. He may say that he snaps his fingers at all civilisation if only his own country does not forget how to handle a sword. In so doing, he is at any rate a consistent barbarian, or he is inconsistent only in so far as he objects to being called a barbarian. But if he merely says that he cares for his own country's special form of civilisation, then he ought to reflect on the thousand hidden links which connect this with foreign countries, and which could not be severed without injuring it.

If a monarch or a soldier returns the High Order of the Golden Fleece, this perhaps matters no more to the world in general than the fact that he once received it, for the order was not created for the purpose of promoting international civilisation. But when men of science return the academic distinctions of countries with which their own country is at war, or when academies exclude such of their members as live in alien enemy countries, this is an offence against the very meaning of an academy.<sup>1</sup> Even if Dr. Schwalbe<sup>2</sup> issues an appeal asking that in future no more international congresses shall be convened in Germany and that no German shall attend any convened elsewhere, this does somewhat concern the public in general. International medical congresses will or ought to discuss general questions affecting health : international conferences of jurists questions affecting the rights of Man : and Dr. Schwalbe and a German jurist such as Herr Kohler are not entitled to express their views on subjects, if those views are based on mere personal or national susceptibility. It is doubtful

<sup>1</sup> Waldeyer (the German anatomist, born 1836) says in an article reprinted from *Nord und Sud*, p. 6 : " If it is a question of positions in regiments, it is clear that these ought to be given up. But in my opinion it is quite another matter to resign distinctions conferred for purely scientific attainments."

<sup>2</sup> Schwalbe (*N.B.*, in the index *Schwalber*) is a *Geheimer Medizinalrat*—a Medical Privy Councillor, a very high honorific title impossible of translation.—

whether they can claim to speak for others at all, but in any case it was the general public which placed them in their present high positions. A soldier would rather die at his post than leave it at the approach of danger, and similarly it is the duty of just such men as these to remain at their posts. If they do not, they are bad soldiers.

There could be no better proof of the hostility between civilisation and patriotism than the fact that patriots to-day quite seriously believe that they can simply forcibly abolish anything and everything which does not fit in with the higher claims of patriotism, and yet not injure civilisation. But any one who dismisses with a contemptuous shrug of the shoulders all civilisation previous to August 1, 1914, calling it "æstheticism or affected decadence," is not merely impiously denouncing his own past, but is guilty of a crime against the very idea of civilisation.

It is not a matter of indifference that teachers should be now at the front, instead of educating young people; our professors drilling recruits, instead of lecturing to students; or our technicians constructing telegraph lines for the War Office or manufacturing poisonous bombs; in short, that our whole male population should suddenly be given another object in life. If of all those occupations which we used to consider worth pursuing we now follow only such as are of use in war, this simply means that civilisation is rent asunder, and this must and will bring punishment in its train.

§ 120. THE SPECIFIC EFFECTS OF WAR.—War promotes everything which tends to retard civilisation, for war alters Man. Three centuries before Christ, Menander said that not even a Divinity could convert a soldier into an orderly civilised human being; and this still remains a fact even now, when civilised human beings have been converted into soldiers, except that civilised men must be more affected than uncivilised because the change in their mode of life is greater. It is of comparatively little moment whether a Polish miner digs coal or trenches, whether a German or British sailor serves on a liner or a man-of-war. But when a teacher is suddenly forced to leave his school, a bank clerk his counter, or a scholar his study, and a rifle is put into his hand and he is sent to the trenches, the difference cannot but be great; and when a poet or artist is wrenched from the land of his dreams and faced with the

reality of cannons, the contrast is absolute, whether it be for better or for worse. Similarly with regard to all so-called "pillars of civilisation."

The medical man alone, as we note with pride, does not need to modify his way of life, except for being deprived of a certain amount of comfort. Even in war-time he makes war against war by healing its wounds; and for wounded men, once their wounds are healed, being again employed in prolonging the war, a medical man, as such, has no responsibility.

For every one else, however, war means revolutionising his habits. All a man's thoughts and reflections are now useless: now it is time to *act*, and thus men of intellect are turned into men of action. But only here and there does one of us mortals resemble Goethe in being able to preserve his calm serenity even within earshot of the cannon thundering at Jemappes. Very few of us can combine intellect and will so as to form a strong personality. Most of us are at best either men of intellect or men of action, and when war remorselessly insists on our doing something, intellect has to take a back place.

All these things, opposed as they are to progress in general, we do out of patriotism and patriotism only. Professor Gerhard Gran<sup>1</sup> of Christiania hints at this when he says that patriotism causes an immense increase of man's capacity for action, but at the same time an immense decrease of his capacity for reflection. Genuine civilisation is a harmonious whole, but only because of the perfect equality between thought and action. It is generally said, indeed, that first place must be given to thought.

Those who remain at home, however, are worse off than the men at the front. It is at any rate conceivable that any one who has spent months at the front, often eating little and poor food and drinking much and poor liquor, marching in the dust and heat, lying down in the dirt and damp, can hardly have had any other thought save how to preserve himself and to destroy his enemy. It is likewise conceivable that when at last he does go home, as if after a long, bad dream, this absolutely unaccustomed trench-life seems to him something unreal, and he takes up his old life where he left it off.

But any one who has remained at home, and seen the deserted

<sup>1</sup> "Krieg, Wissenschaft und Vaterland" (War, Science, and Country). A speech delivered at Christiania University by Gerhard Gran, October, 1914.

lecture-rooms, the badly managed schools, in which the regular teaching only too frequently has had to give way to all sorts of victory celebrations (about which there might be two opinions) and to military training, in the case of cadets: any one who has seen the mostly inferior patriotic plays now being acted in the theatres: any one who reads the political and scientific papers, in which there is still scarcely a word except about the war: any one who sees steel-pen factories turned into cartridge factories and electrical works into shell factories: any one hearing how former actors are now selling the *War Newspaper*,<sup>1</sup> and how artists paint nothing but war pictures: any one forced to watch the gradual disappearance of such few peaceful occupations as still remain and the slow but steady conversion of all the mechanism of life intended for peace into a monstrous war machine—such a man, I say, will hardly be able to refrain from respecting deeply the nation's iron determination, but at the same time he will feel almost completely shattered, just as the civilisation he is contemplating is shattered, quite apart from the deplorable and demoralising campaign of calumny, which he is forced to watch at much closer quarters than the soldiers at the front.

Compared with such inward changes as these, the more material and direct losses are scarcely worth considering, great as they are. Fields are laid waste and cities burned, industries destroyed and artistic achievements reduced to a heap of ruins—all which was perhaps inevitable. But even things which in themselves have nothing whatever to do with the war are senselessly and uselessly interfered with. Even Humboldt<sup>2</sup> complained that his journey round the world was spoilt by the war; and in 1914 the eclipse of the sun passed by without its having been possible to take advantage of it, despite all the preparations made. Above all, no observations could be taken in Southern Russia, and these were to have been the crucial test of Einstein's gravitation theory.<sup>3</sup>

Such is the senseless logic of war. On the one hand millions of human beings are sacrificed; but on the other hand it is asserted that a single bullet-riddled soldier matters more than the most magnificently beautiful cathedral or the sublimest truth—a truth which might even complete the work begun by Newton.

<sup>1</sup> *Kriegszeitung*.

<sup>2</sup> Humboldt's letter to F. Bollmann, of October 15, 1799. In the hands of the Carnegie Museum, Pittsburg.

<sup>3</sup> Albert Einstein, the German mathematician (contemporary).—TRANS.

## CHAPTER X

THE JUSTIFICATION FOR A NATIONAL SENTIMENT  
OF INDIVIDUALITY

## I. THE CONCEPTION OF PERSONALITY

§ 121. THE RIGHT TO INDIVIDUALITY.—The friends of Europe and the opponents of a fratricidal European war probably never felt so lonely as now, for this present war has attained dimensions never dreamed of. Of the 450,000,000 Europeans nearly 400,000,000 live in belligerent countries, and nearly 10 per cent., that is 40,000,000, are under arms, and of these last the fate of 10 per cent. (that is, 4,000,000) is probably already settled.<sup>1</sup> All the battles of the Roman Republic could have been fought with such masses of human beings as these.

Somewhat more than 10 per cent. of Europeans are still living in neutral countries; but even here people are apparently so spellbound by the sight of Death everywhere, that their one desire is—under the most favourable possible conditions, I grant—to enter the war themselves. A war fever is passing over the lands, just as when Peter the Hermit<sup>2</sup> proclaimed “*God will have it so*” throughout the world, and roused the nations to such an extent that at last the very children went to war. This time the rat-catcher’s shrill call to arms does not say “For God,” but “For Country,” for Man has always known how to put together some sort of an idol or god for himself when he has wanted either. But 400,000,000 rats have never yet been decoyed into the trap.

When it is possible for such a war fury as never was to rage through the countries, it goes without saying that everywhere our conceptions of right and honour are being laughed to scorn, our love of country set down as high treason if it does not

<sup>1</sup> This figure must have greatly increased since these lines were written.

<sup>2</sup> “*Deus lo volt.*” Dr. Nicolai calls him “Peter of Amiens,” for he was born in Amiens, c. 1050.—TRANS.



conform to the usual lines, and our belief in humanity described as tomfoolery; and we are only too keenly conscious of the crushing effects of isolation; the feeling of the masses is turned against us. We are like a little ant forced to fight, without a single other ant near to help her, and a hundred paces from her nest.

That so few share our views seems to us alone to discredit them, and it does not help us much to pride ourselves on possessing greater insight than others and to wait for the future to justify us. Assuredly we shall be justified as soon as the present intoxication is followed by doleful dumps; but meantime we feel forlorn and forsaken; and so overwhelming is the living sense of belonging to the majority for the present, that it seems hardly possible to contend against it. Very, very few indeed are they to whom the rat-catcher pipes in vain. Cool and unconcerned, like children or aged persons, do they go through life; but they are not to be envied, for in secret they long, perhaps most of all, once more to be able to make fools of themselves along with the rest of mankind.

Now, those who thus stand or rather *walk* apart from the rest, are marching straight ahead. And if once one of them has been anointed with a drop of democratic oil, and has long realised that the impulses of the soul of the people contain possibilities of progress, none the less genuine for perhaps being misunderstood, then he must almost despair when it seems as if popular sentiment were so martial as to condemn root and branch all who hold views opposed to war. The "thousand good Europeans" to whom Dostoeffski<sup>1</sup> once refers are proof against all talk about patriotism and treachery. They know only too well what sort of patriotism is that of the public-house, the Stock Exchange and the lecture hall. They know how excitable are the people, one day crying "Hosanna in the highest" and the next day "Crucify him," and they are therefore not afraid of being described as men without either honour or country. Yet in the dread hours of doubt, which none are spared who must walk alone, they cannot but wonder whether they, a handful of individuals, have really any *right* to go against a whole nation;

<sup>1</sup> *Ein Werdender*, Book III. chap. vii. 2 and 3. By Dostoeffski, 1875. These twenty pages are among the finest things ever said by any poet about the future European patriotism. I cannot give them here in full, and do not wish to spoil them by abridgement. They should be consulted, however. (The novel is also translated as *Sprössling*.)

whether, after all, numbers do not count for something, and whether, even supposing a single individual to be right a thousand times over, the outburst of feeling of four hundred millions does not count for more than the wisdom of one solitary person, be he never so wise.

Perhaps a nation as a whole may be as foolish as it likes. Perhaps it is one of the privileges to which a mass of human beings feeling itself a nation may justifiably lay claim—to substitute with impunity reason for feeling.

A dog may eat what he likes. Nothing but the whip, perhaps, or a bigger dog, stands in the way of his doing so, never either reason or law. It may indeed be allowable for human beings, acting together in masses, still to adopt the stand-point of a dog, and to let themselves go, supposing the enemy's larger cannon does not prevent them. Why, therefore, engage in an apparently hopeless struggle? Why should a man make himself a laughing-stock, and perhaps even be thrown into prison?

Yet there are men who, despite all these good reasons for being Fainthearts, nevertheless feel impelled to act as Great-hearts, men who think it necessary to do and say certain things even if they cannot shut their eyes to the fact that there is no immediate practical object to be gained by so doing; men, in short, who prefer anything rather than to have their honour stand rooted in dishonour. They feel it their right and duty to confess and to defend their peculiar action. But if an individual has any such right, then after all it is also a nation's right and even its duty to defend against all comers its justification for adopting a standpoint of its own.

§ 122. LIMITATIONS PLACED ON PERSONALITY.—In reality this is so, and the only point which it is often difficult to decide is whether a nation or an individual be justified or not in persisting in a peculiar line of conduct. The very idea of any such thing seems as if its only result must be that every person would go his own particular way. Indeed, it could hardly be otherwise if no one be recognised as having supreme power to decide what is right for the individual or the nation. The average man, however, commonly holds that reason at least must be consulted; otherwise any deviation from the ordinary is not called justifiable individuality, but unjustifiable madness.

Both past and present experience teach us that even crowds and nations can go mad. Modern science would put in the

same category the dancing procession at Echternach,<sup>1</sup> the sacred St. John's (or St. Vitus's) dance,<sup>2</sup> the Children's Crusades, the epidemics of suicide in ancient Rome and modern Russia, witchcraft trials and much else besides, as well as the savage orgies of the Roman circus, and the self-torturings of mediæval cloisters. At all times people have been inclined to set a very liberal interpretation on the word "madness," and been only too ready to call any opinions mad which conflicted with their own. They meant this not merely metaphorically but quite literally. Thus the heathen at one time looked on any Christian as mad, and when Christianity became powerful it in turn considered modern heresy as madness. Indeed, only last century, although during a period of the worst reaction, a medical student wanted the subject of the dissertation for his doctor's degree to be "de morbo democratico, nova forma insanix," and it was due to the opposition of Rudolf Virchow alone that a German university was saved from so singular a doctoral address.

Even now there is a strong inclination to think that our enemies have gone quite mad in their passion for war, and we in Germany used to say this with the utmost equanimity about Italy. With the wisdom of our ten months' experience of war, we declared that the madhouse was the only proper place for people who were afraid of spies, persecuted foreigners, censored the press too severely, wrote countless poems extolling war, indulged in overweening national pride—in short, for all the outward "pomp and circumstance of glorious war." If, therefore, the nations do not wish to expose themselves to their enemies' ridicule and afterwards probably to that of the world in general, then they had best have recourse to reason in order to "moderate their transports of war."

In Germany it is of course customary to distinguish two kinds of reason—pure and practical reason.<sup>3</sup> Nothing is perhaps

<sup>1</sup> Echternach is in the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, and the dancing procession takes place (or should take place) annually on Whit-Tuesday. It was originally instituted as a thanksgiving for deliverance from an epidemic of St. Vitus's dance, in the eighth century.—TRANS.

<sup>2</sup> The "dancing madness" of mediæval Europe proceeded from a sect of Flanders fanatics, in or about 1374. They became known as the Dancers, and as they danced in honour of St. John, their paroxysmal performance was called St. John's or sometimes St. Guy's or St. Vitus's dance.—TRANS.

<sup>3</sup> If we reckon also the power of judgment or discrimination, then there are actually three.

so characteristic of the German nation as this distinction. Those who described Germany as the land of self-engendered disunion were not wholly wrong; and in saying this I am thinking of political, intellectual and moral disunion.\* But more about this anon.<sup>1</sup> For the present let us discuss this dual reason merely in order to sift justifiable singularities from unjustifiable. All the difficulty ultimately arises from some special peculiarity being forbidden by one kind of reason and allowed by the other kind, so that the unhappy being possessed of both sorts does not know what he ought to do.

This difficulty was not invented by Kant, but merely stated afresh by him. It has always been believed possible to consider the world from two different standpoints, only both were not called "reason." We could try, it was said, to comprehend the world by means of our understanding, or to embrace it with our affections. The logical<sup>a</sup> aspect of this question attracted scientists, and the sentimental side religious persons, who endeavoured to take advantage of the strength of human feeling in order to arrive at a fixed conception of the world.

Modern philosophy, however, has been trying since Socrates' day to mediate between these two points of view, and has failed, as it was bound to do. The last and also the finest attempt of the kind was Kant's, and it may in a certain sense be described as final. Kant not only believed that he proved but he actually did prove that these two different standpoints cannot be really reconciled. After all, this goes without saying.

That Kant, in after years, would fain have denied a contrast which in a sense he had himself created, proves man's instinctive craving for uniform definitions. In his sublime system of antinomistic philosophy<sup>2</sup> he explained his idea that both these conceptions of the world are equally possible and even equally necessary, but as they are incompatible with each other, some recourse must be had to metaphysics, and the incomprehensible synthesis is completed in the mystical conception of personality.<sup>3</sup>

As probably every one now admits, this attempt failed. In

<sup>1</sup> Cf. § 134.

<sup>2</sup> Antinomy, in Kant's philosophy, means the apparent conflict of reason with itself.—TRANS.

<sup>3</sup> It is a mystical conception because it attempts to reconcile the irreconcilable. It can only become substantial by proving a new conception of personality as something existing. Personality must be primarily uniform, and must not be construed as only secondarily uniform.

any case the difficulty still remains. Which point of view is really for the time being allowable? Even were it admitted that in the case of liberty, God and immortality must take precedence of practical reason, which means that, after all, feeling must decide, and in the case of mathematics pure reason must be uppermost, there is still the whole material world lying between God and Pythagoras, and what is its proper place can be inquired into in each particular case.

This somewhat meagre result might have been anticipated. If two kinds of reason are recognised as equally authoritative, neither can really permanently prevail over the other. The authority must change hands, even as a solicitous host, attending upon two guests of equal rank, sees that whoever has been handed one course first is handed the next course second.

A decision can be reached only if it be recognised that there must be a supreme judge, something above both these different principles. Kant recognised no such supreme judge, and could not have done so, since according to him the human mind was something intangible, which in a sense could not be discussed. He discovered these two irreconcilable principles in the human mind, and was necessarily obliged to consider them as innate ideas. The penetration of his mind is proved because, at any rate in his *Critique of Pure Reason*, he makes no attempt to explain these things by splitting hairs, but places them together, as being actual realities.

In this sense, however, there is at any rate nothing inexplicable, for there is nothing innate. All the innate ideas with which former thinkers were so fond of encumbering themselves can now be analysed and a place found for them in historical evolution. We know that two living organisms, however divergent in themselves, can always be united if only we go back far enough in the scale of evolution, for there is always a point where the origins of divergent series of evolutions are found united in a single parent stem. This applies no less to organisms and organisations than to the vital functions based thereon.

Now, our soul (Psyche) did not come into existence perfect and complete, as the armed Athene sprang out of the head of Zeus: it developed slowly and gradually in accordance with the laws and forces to whose co-operation it owes in the last resort its imperceptible origin (§ 163). Thus these laws come before all human reason, and therefore, it may be argued, are over

and above it. In any case we must be guided by them, if we want to decide which trend of thought is the right one.

Kant frequently had an inkling of the conception of evolution, but he had not really grasped it. Hence certain facts could not be otherwise than inexplicable to him. A fruit cannot be explained unless we are aware of certain peculiarities about the blossom. Similarly certain qualities of the human mind are still dark and confused, albeit absolutely perfected. Now, however, we are so much in the habit of using our intelligence in coming to conclusions, that it seems at any rate possible to trace all Man's highest ideas back to things which he can understand by using his intelligence. This, however, answers the question from which we set out. Virtue and capacity for enthusiasm are not water-tight compartments in themselves, but are subject to the control of the intelligence which thinks in accordance with universal laws. *Hence virtue, like everything else, can be taught.*

§ 123. THE PRIMACY OF THE INTELLIGENCE.—From time immemorial the supremacy of the intelligence has been conceded. Even primitive Man exerted his intelligence to the utmost, and preferred to invent spirits and Dryads rather than to give up applying the law of causation. In fair Hellas this belief prevailed, and Socrates, the most glorious representative of the limpid soul of Greece, announced the supremacy of the intelligence over all metaphysics, before even such a word was invented, when he said that virtue could be taught.

This is not the place for preaching belief in authority, but it is nevertheless good to know that we are in agreement with the wisdom of Socrates: after all, Socrates is the only man whom the incorruptible spirit of the people has elected to call "the wise." Socrates, however, not only said that virtue could be taught but even pointed out how to learn it, by quoting the old Delphic saying, "Know thyself."<sup>1</sup>

*Virtue may be taught, but only by self-knowledge.*

There is no virtue which applies to all alike, for the basis of

<sup>1</sup> Socrates himself did not directly connect these two most famous sayings of his with each other. It would be taking us too far to prove in detail that he adopts this standpoint, particularly in his memoirs, as regards civilian virtue and the recollection of a former existence. But every one will be amazed at the modern views of this old Greek, if only the modern conception of inherited predisposition be substituted for the Socratic conception of "recollection of a former existence." Both these conceptions are fundamentally the same, and hence it is that the contentions which follow may claim to be called Socratic.

virtue, as of everything else, is the individuality of the individual. But this subjectivity is limited, for there is an objective and universal principle of virtue, which lays it down as impossible to develop a virtue or even a quality in ourselves if we are not already predisposed thereto.

It follows therefore that it is a positive necessity for Man to realise as clearly as possible what forces and capacities in him lie, and then to develop them to the highest possible degree of perfection. The individual must consider how and wherewith he can achieve his utmost and best serve mankind. If he have skilful hands, he ought to become a goldsmith or a mechanic; if he have good eyes, a sailor or a hunter; if he be intelligent he should become a scientist. Such a doctrine will seem to many nothing more nor less than the homely philosophy, "A cobbler should stick to his last." Accordingly narrow-minded people have often enough taken Socrates to task. But they forget that Socrates adds, "Perfect thyself." What he means, therefore, is that the cobbler should certainly stick to his last, but—in the modern sense of the phrase—that is, he should establish a boot or shoe factory.

Again, the modern Socratic doctrine of evolution insists that Man must not remain for ever rooted to the spot where he has once been placed by wise or unwise fate, but that he must try to find a place for himself in the world where he will better himself and it. In other words, even Man comes within the scope of the law of evolution. Owing to it, an individual, a nation, or mankind as a whole can only achieve anything on lines laid down for them by their whole past, or, as Socrates says, by recollection. When dealing with Positive and Negative Selection,<sup>1</sup> I showed that a course actually is mapped out for us, from which we cannot escape, and that it is the only true criterion by which the importance of everything can be gauged. For the rest of the world, animate and inanimate, some such natural force of compulsion is readily admitted, but it is not called virtue.

Now, as shown in § 30, it is certainly possible for Man, by means of appliances which he can take up or put down at will, to rise superior to this natural force of compulsion. But he can do so only in so far as he can make what use he likes of the forces at his disposal. He cannot create any new forces for

<sup>1</sup> § 29.

himself. He can construct as many machines and implements for himself as he pleases, but what he cannot do is to increase as he pleases his own capacity for constructing machines and implements. If a man have a special gift for mathematics, he cannot transform it at will into a talent for writing poetry. Conversely, no amount of taking pains will enable the best poet to become a good mathematician. Every one, however, by close application, can develop his inborn capacities to the utmost possible extent. Goethe's saying that no one but a one-sided person can be past master in anything has become a commonplace. But it all amounts to the same thing as Socrates' saying that virtue may be learned, although only by self-knowledge; and each of us best serves mankind in his own way by following the law of his own being.<sup>1</sup>

§ 124. NATIONS AS INDIVIDUALS.—What has just been said applies to every individual, but still more to the mass of mankind, who are by nature much more conservative than individuals and much harder to induce to embark on any new course—it is said because the uniform variation of the majority would then be necessary. This, however, will only occasionally occur. Thus a nation, however many-sided, cannot and will not be able to achieve anything worth achieving except in its own particular line; and a nation which attempts everything is testifying not to its high qualities but merely to its dilettantism.

Of this principle of division of labour, which seems to us now a matter of course when we consider Nature, a genius such as Socrates had already a vague notion. It is the connecting link between subjectivity and objectivity, allowing as it does an unlimited field for each man's individuality, but converting this unrestricted individuality into the most valuable form of socialism.

Now, in a certain sense nations are likewise individuals. In my last chapter I endeavoured to show how the fact of having the same mother-country and the same general level of civilisation produces certain general characteristics in the individuals composing nations; and that these individuals, taken together and resembling one another as they do, constitute a nation's individuality. If one nation consists primarily of people who possess mercantile qualifications, then it is a commercial

<sup>1</sup> Socrates' *Daimonion*, the Holy Ghost of the Bible, and the germ-plasm (accumulated inheritance) of the natural scientist.



people, and it would be acting wisely if it developed these qualities to the utmost. In so doing it might rest assured that it was going the best way to benefit both itself and other nations. Just as it is contrary to sense, or, in the Socratic meaning of the word, contrary to virtue, for a man whose talents lie in the direction of stone-hewing or masonry to study jurisprudence, so it is wrong from the outset for a nation which has special talents for any sort of occupation to direct its aspirations to something wholly different. Indeed, we speak of a harmony of nations, in allusion to the fact that each nation in general gives of the best that is in it.

What would be the use of the English pretending that they were going to teach the world music, or the French that they were going to teach it how to enjoy life quietly, or the Finns that they were going to teach it mathematics, or the Tartars painting? Undoubtedly there are many gifts which any single nation does not possess and cannot acquire, but each one can contribute one gift which all the others will be glad to receive.

It might be objected that one-sidedness is in the long run injurious, and that it is perhaps possible to remain a master in one's own speciality without on that account being obliged to neglect everything else. That this is not true of individuals is universally admitted to-day. We have been taught this by the very men who, in Germany, are generally accounted the greatest Germans. Goethe taught it us theoretically by his already quoted saying that no one can be a past master without being one-sided; Bismarck taught it us practically, by his well-known refusal to concern himself with anything unconnected with his own special work. He preferred *The Buchholz Family*<sup>1</sup> to all other novels, and, unless I be mistaken, called Anton von Werner's pictures works of art.<sup>2</sup> Goethe certainly did not always

<sup>1</sup> *Die Familie Buchholz* (The Buchholz Family) is a two-volume novel of middle-class suburban Berlin life, by Julius Stinde, published about 1882. In eighteen months 45,000 copies were sold. An *édition de luxe* was sent to Bismarck, who on July 9, 1884, wrote to the author saying that it had amused him during many hours of an illness, and that he marvelled at its fidelity to Berlin life. It is supposed to be the letters of a certain Frau Wilhelmine Buchholz, who relieves her overwrought feelings by writing to a newspaper. The characters are mean, petty and back-biting to the last degree, and incredibly snobbish, almost too mean and disagreeable to be amusing. Many people they would simply bore and disgust, others they would depress.—TRANS.

<sup>2</sup> Anton Alexander von Werner, born 1843, died only in 1915. In 1873 he became professor at the Berlin Academy of Fine Arts, and in 1875 director of it. Of his chief works, all historical, Dr. Nicolai apparently does not think much, but the

follow his own advice, for he painted and to some extent studied physics ; but although the greatness of the man always appears in all his works, his pictures are not remarkable, and his theory of colour is wrong. The reason for this is simply that Goethe was no artist.

No one assuredly has ever attained to any supreme achievement because of not having been one-sided. All-round omniscient persons are certainly often pleasant to meet, and journalism is an occupation like any other. But any one not in quest of amusement must prefer one-sidedness in an individual, above all in a nation.

An individual might be excused for a little preliminary experimenting, on the plea that he must first test his capacities lest perhaps the best in him be lost. In the case of a nation no such danger exists, for it can test its capabilities as the individual cannot ; for while all the individuals of a nation follow their own particular vocation, the nation is all the time being tested to find out what suits its average citizen, that is the nation as a whole. In a nation no capacity can perish, for even were thousands of its citizens to die out, it would still survive in thousands more ; and as these succeed, their methods will at once be imitated and will become the rule. More even than of the individual is it true of mankind as a whole that their path is irrevocably marked out for them by what has gone before. Along this path only can they advance, and hence the importance of their perceiving it ; for then, but only then, can our advance be more rapid. Every attempt, however, to find new paths according to our own ideas can do nothing but obstruct progress.

## II. NATIONAL PECULIARITIES

§ 125. THE MERITS OF INDIVIDUAL NATIONS.—An individual ought not to be self-seeking but should yet possess self-esteem, ought not to be arrogant but yet have proper pride ; and so it is with nations. The individual, owing to his special inherited qualities or his circumstances and education, can almost always produce things which no one else can imitate ; and so is it with

German Government must have differed from our author, because it has bought a number of them. The best known are : " The Capitulation of Sedan," " The Meeting of Bismarck and Napoleon III.," " Moltke before Paris," " Moltke at Versailles " (the two last companion-pictures) and " The Congress of Berlin."—  
TRANS.

nations. Indeed this applies to them in a very much greater degree.

There are billions of human beings. Every civilised nation to-day numbers them by millions. Even if, as Schleiden<sup>1</sup> once said, no leaf be quite like another; even if every one of these millions of human beings have some peculiarity, clearly distinguishing his personality from that of all others,<sup>2</sup> yet in the case of most human beings these differences cannot be so very great; and as far as the practical value of the individual for the purposes of the world in general is concerned, every human being can be replaced. But with civilised nations it is different, for the individuals composing them are to a certain extent cast in the same mould, owing to their having all, generally speaking, grown up under approximately similar conditions. This special cast may be regarded as the peculiarity of a particular people.

Of civilised nations, however, there are at most a dozen, of which not a single one can be spared; for it must not be believed that there is any one nation which knows more about religion, art, science, politics, technical achievement and commerce, in fact about all branches of human knowledge, than all the other nations put together. Can British fun and German humour take the place of Gallic wit? Or *vice versa*? Is it allowable to say that we can do without Faraday because we have Helmholtz, or without Lamarck because of Darwin's having been born? Can Bismarck take Napoleon's place or Washington Cromwell's? The Christian religion is as unthinkable without the German Luther or the Russian Tolstoy as without Jesus of Galilee and Francesco d'Assisi. Mathias Grünwald, a German; Rubens, a Fleming; Mantegna, an Italian; and Greco, a Spaniard, all conceived the tragedy of Good Friday differently; but who can say which conception was the profoundest? It is as impossible to decide such a question as to say whether Burgundian, Spanish, or Rhenish grapes yield the best wine. They are, like Russian caviare, charr from the Königsee,<sup>3</sup> the amber of East Prussia, and many other

<sup>1</sup> Matthias Jakob Schleiden (1804-1881), German physician and botanist, chiefly known for his contributions to the cell theory in botany.—TRANS.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. chap. xiv. 4.

<sup>3</sup> The Königsee is a lake in Upper Bavaria, at an altitude of 2000 ft., shut in by high mountain walls, 610 ft. deep, 17 miles in circuit. The charr or char is a fish of the large salmon genus. Varieties are found in Lake Windermere and in the Western Swiss lakes.—TRANS.

things, products of a particular district, and do not come to perfection anywhere else.

Every country has also some special industry of its own, and Lyons silks, Silesian flax, British cotton materials and Russian fur goods are, or at any rate were, celebrated. It is doubtless true that industries change because the different countries progress technically in one way and another. Thus time was when a Damascus sword was the most famous, and afterwards a Toledo dagger ranked first. Next came the great pitch of perfection attained by British steel, which now Germany is successfully endeavouring to supplant.

But a nation can never do everything best, and we shall never be able to dispense with the genius of foreign nations. It is true that in a great many industries Germany now need not fear comparison with any other nation ; but we must not on that account ignore other nations, who after all were our teachers. Something is always coming to the front wherein they can excel us, even if only for a time. Think of modern vehicles and means of communication. Motor cars came from France, aeroplanes from America, submarines and wireless telegraphy from Italy.

Certain specialities are always procured abroad—Lumière plates from Lyons, for instance, tabloids from England, galoches from Russia and straw hats from Italy. Many things are bought abroad because we do not want to produce them at home, but many other things because we cannot produce them, not from any lack of raw materials, but because in certain respects other countries are technically more advanced than we are ourselves. In many ways other countries younger in civilisation have already caught up even with Germany, perhaps actually out-distanced her. It would be idle to attempt a detailed comparison as to which nations do which things best, but no one can deny the extraordinary success of America in the matter of machinery construction, in particular very delicately adjusted machines, and in electrical engineering.

The isolated individual has long been incapable of earning his living without help from others. Similarly nations are forced to depend on one another ; and if each nation were not ready to learn and take hints from others, it would simply mean that the world would be generally the poorer. It is quite regrettable enough that of late the bad habit of every one claiming an invention for one of his own fellow-subjects has been gaining

ground more and more. This, however, is after all a very harmless piece of vanity, but it would be a bad thing if every invention really had to be made a dozen times over.

§ 126. THE DEFECTS OF THEIR QUALITIES.—All this is so obvious that Guizot, for instance, although his *History of European Civilisation* is written entirely from the French standpoint, says<sup>1</sup> that civilisation, albeit in general comparatively uniform in the different European countries, is yet endlessly diversified and is *not perfect in any country*. Its constituents, he adds, must sometimes be sought in France, sometimes in England, sometimes in Germany and sometimes in Spain.

This diversity combined with comparative uniformity is even now the most self-evident fact about civilisation, and therefore serious men ought to refrain from discussing the question whether any exclusive patriotism is justifiable. Only a lunatic could desire the suppression of nations in general in order to put his own in their stead.

Side by side with its qualities, however, each nation has also its defects. Thus the English are bigoted and stubborn, the French vain and vacillating, the Spanish arrogant and the Dutch phlegmatic, the Turks idle and the Corsicans revengeful; the Russians are drunkards and the Germans too fond of liveries, uniforms and titles, the Cretans lie and the Greeks cheat, the Americans put their feet up on the table, and the Chinese spit.

All this is proverbial, even if it often proves untrue. Nevertheless nations have usually other and graver defects—the defects of their qualities, for there is scarcely a good quality in whose wake some bad one does not inevitably tread, like its shadow. A very charitable person is incapable of economy; any one who has made kindness the ruling principle of his life cannot always obey the dictates of prudence; and any one who puts success before all else cannot be the embodiment of the finest flower of civilisation.

The Semitic race, for example, which has a peculiar leaning towards abstract controversies and ethical legislation, early succeeded in expressing a comparatively very pure conception of God, but forbade any portrayal of their God to be made. Consequently they banned art, and, as Emil du Bois-Reymond<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Histoire de la Civilisation en Europe*, by François Pierre Guillaume Guizot, 1828.

<sup>2</sup> *Über eine Akademie der deutschen Sprache* (An Academy of the German Language), by the German physiologist Emil du Bois-Reymond, p. 11. [Du

once said, would have stoned Phidias, the sculptor of the gods. So it happens everywhere. Every nation has good and bad qualities, and, if we consider them attentively, we shall find that the good are the necessary complements of the bad. Hence a nation is usually unable to rid itself of its defects without at the same time losing its qualities;

It conflicts with the law of economy which prevails throughout Nature that any single individual should possess every good quality. The quest of human perfection may perhaps be what is best in us; nevertheless to say "I will," as Faust did, does not make everything possible. Some Mephistopheles is ever ready to whisper in our ear that this or that cannot be done.

But whoever realises the literal impossibility of any one nation uniting in itself all noble qualities will neither believe that his own can do so, nor blame another nation for having faults. Rather will he rejoice whenever he sees anything good and beautiful, and will eventually attain the Goethian pitch of wisdom of being able to say, even of foreign nations :

" Was je ihr gesehn,  
Es sei wie es wolle,  
Es war doch so schön." <sup>1</sup>

### III. THE PECULIARITIES OF THE GERMAN MIND

§ 127. GERMAN CIVILISATION.—The mind of a nation is difficult to grasp, for it is a question of estimating not one human being alone but an unlimited number, and of selecting—not the characteristics of the individual (which would not be difficult), but those of an element of unknown size, in short of a nation.

No one has ever absolutely succeeded in such a task. Here we have Hermann Cohen,<sup>2</sup> the quondam philosopher, saying that the peculiarity of the German mind is "its blend of rationalism and idealism," and that "all mysticism is anti-German," while his colleague Lasson<sup>3</sup> says just the contrary—that

Bois-Reymond (1818-96), though born in Berlin, was of French origin. His speciality was discoveries in regard to animal electricity, and he first employed experimental methods. —TRANS.]

<sup>1</sup> That is, to do fullest justice to the good in them.—TRANS.

<sup>2</sup> "Kriegsvortrag" (War Lecture) by Hermann Cohen, delivered 1915. [Cohen was born in 1842, and is a philosopher.]

<sup>3</sup> "Kriegsvortrag" (War Lecture) by Adolf Lasson, German philosopher, born 1832. Also delivered 1915.

"nothing is so essentially German as a dash of mysticism." Again, Haldane<sup>1</sup> says that the German acts according to principle, in contrast to the Englishman, who acts according to fact; while Schopenhauer<sup>2</sup> hints at the exact contrary being the truth, when he writes that "the Englishman holds fast to the abstract notion of justice, but that the German is an advocate of equity (as he is accustomed to conceive it)."

Another contrast is not without interest. Whereas Cohen's and Lasson's public utterances during the war are simply an endeavour to heap up all noble qualities on what Mephistopheles calls "the German's honoured pate,"<sup>3</sup> Schopenhauer and Haldane both endeavour to find good points in a nation not their own, just as cultivated persons in general overestimate foreigners because they are able to understand even those who differ from themselves. If the German formerly went to greater lengths in this respect than the Briton, this was a national virtue, which all cultivated foreigners very greatly envied him.<sup>4</sup>

It would be easy to add to the list of national virtues which neutralise one another. The flunkeyism of the Germans can be as easily accounted for as their love of liberty. German fidelity and the gratitude of the House of Hapsburg are both proverbial. Belief in the purity of the German woman has not prevented the fallen maiden Gretchen being accepted as her ideal, and only occasionally has any one (old Kölliker<sup>5</sup> for instance) noted this contradiction.

In view of the countless number of diverse elements which go to make up a civilisation, such definitions are mostly too narrow. A face cannot be described but must be delineated, and similarly we cannot realise German civilisation generally except by thinking of certain men such as Goethe and Kant, Kepler and Helmholtz, Beethoven and Mozart, or by bearing

<sup>1</sup> "Great Britain and Germany," Oxford Address delivered by Lord Haldane on August 3, 1911, and published in *Universities and National Life*, 3rd ed. 1912, p. 112.

<sup>2</sup> Schopenhauer's *Über die Grundlagen der Moral* (On the Foundations of Morality), III. § 17. Frauenstadt edition, vol. iv. p. 222.

<sup>3</sup> *Den deutschen Ehrenschädel*.

<sup>4</sup> Karl von Holtei (German poet and playwright, 1798-1880) once put this very finely: "For me the highest criterion of a nation's culture is simply whether this enables it to pay just tribute to the merits and importance of other nations." (300. *Briefe aus zwei Jahrhunderten* [Three Hundred Letters from Two Centuries], published in Hanover in 1872, vol. ii. p. xvi.)

<sup>5</sup> Kölliker's *Goethe's Faustschlag ins Gesicht der deutschen Sittlichkeit* (Goethe's Blow in the Face of German Morality).

in mind German philology and æsthetics, German chemistry and optics, and German technical achievements in the matter of steel production and electricity.

Beyond all doubt the Germans have here a right to claim to have achieved something unique, something which can never be erased from the annals of human civilisation, and for the sake of which the most horrible war would be worth fighting, *supposing* it were possible to uphold or overthrow civilisation by war. But with this right they have also a duty—the duty of inquiring what, after all, is really the origin of a civilisation which has enabled them to do so much.

The German mind did not fall down by chance from the moon. It is explainable, and owes its origin to particular terrestrial conditions. The special peculiarity about its evolution—an evolution which was and must remain absolutely unique—is due to the fact that Germany is situated in the midst of a number of other countries with older civilisations. Hence she drew her inspiration from all quarters, and succeeded in attaining the highest pitch of civilisation when she was still, *politically* speaking, not a nation. Just because of the absence of those restraints which are inseparable from political importance, the German was able to acquire that world-wide universality of mind which, as no one will deny, is or at any rate was his chief mental characteristic.

§ 128. ORIGINALITY.—All great Germans have gladly and gratefully assimilated all the knowledge and ideas of their time. It is impossible to imagine any nation free from foreign influences, and this is doubly true of Germany. Her civilisation and culture are far-reaching, magnificent and original precisely because they are not indigenous, but embrace the entire world.

One of the first to assert this of the German soul revealed, in other words of German music, was Richard Wagner. "German genius," he wrote, "seems destined to go to neighbouring lands in quest of what it cannot find in the mother-country; but it seems no less destined to raise that mother-country above all narrow provincialism, and to create something which will appeal to the whole world."

To no one does this apply more than to Bach, the founder of German music. His life was oppressed by a narrow, humdrum commonplaceness, and he saw hardly anything outside his native Thuringia and Saxony. Yet, unlike musicians belonging



to other countries, he did not, in creating his national music, base it upon the fine popular melodies of his own land. He was, in fact, a true German. He laboriously selected the best throughout the world, and with its help created that pre-eminently German art, music. With immense perseverance he studied all the available material, from the Italian school of vocal music and violin music to French instrumental music and opera, especially orchestral suites, not omitting anything in the Netherlands and England possessing any musical value. All this he acquired in order to make it his own, and on this foundation he created works which, though still keeping to the old forms and frequently strongly reminiscent of Italian music, were nevertheless German. Moreover, eventually they assumed new forms, such as the cantata, the German Passion, and, more characteristic of Bach than any other, the Prussian fugue. Even the fugues, however, still show clear traces of Italian and French influence. Bach, in short, "united in himself the best points of the French and Italian masters."<sup>1</sup>

As every one knows, with Mozart it was much the same, and no one will deny the truth of Wagner's remark about him—that "he was a German who uplifted the Italian school until it became ideally perfect, extending and ennobling it so as to enable it to appeal to all the world."

As for German philosophy, what applies to German music applies also to it. Windelband<sup>2</sup> uses almost the same words of it as Wagner used about music. In his well-known *History of Philosophy*,<sup>3</sup> he says that Kant used to absorb the different trains of thought of foreign philosophic literature, and, by completing one with another, arrive at entirely new conceptions of his own. Kant, he adds, bases his ideas no less upon German popular philosophy than on English psychological analysis and genuine French love of liberty. Among Germans he particularly mentions Wolf;<sup>4</sup> among British, Hume,

<sup>1</sup> *Goldenes Buch der Musik*, by Spemann, chap. cccxxviii.

<sup>2</sup> Contemporary German philosopher.—TRANS.

<sup>3</sup> W. Windelband's *Geschichte der Philosophie*, published 1892, VI. i. pp. 418 et seq.

<sup>4</sup> Johann Christian Wolf (1679-1754), German philosopher and professor of philosophy at Halle, which post he had to leave in 1723, owing to religious persecution. In 1740 Frederick the Great recalled him to Halle. In the eighteenth century his philosophy was very influential, but is now generally considered to have been neither profound nor original. His main ideas were taken from Leibniz.—TRANS.

Newton, Toland<sup>1</sup> and Shaftesbury, and among Frenchmen Rousseau and Voltaire, as having inspired Kant.

What can be proved of German music and philosophy could also be proved with regard to all other arts and sciences. German Gothic art and German minstrelsy have their roots in France, but attained their zenith on this side of the Rhine; and if this has not been the case with German painting, the chief reason is perhaps that it was not possible completely and harmoniously to blend all artistic styles. With rare exceptions, the Germans either continued to "copy the Italians" or failed to rise above the grotesqueness of German fifteenth-century art.<sup>2</sup>

In general, however, Schlegel<sup>3</sup> was right in saying of the German:

" Was in Kunst und Wissenschaft  
Fremder Himmel Grosses schafft,  
Ward von ihm alsbald erkannt,  
Wuchs so mächtiger seiner Hand."

The exclusive narrow-mindedness which is now so fond of noisily masquerading as patriotism is thus peculiarly unbecoming in the Germans, because in them it testifies to a quite exceptional degree of ingratitude.

In this their dependence on foreign lands the Germans have undoubtedly often gone to too great lengths. Germany has been a power to reckon with for fully fifteen hundred years past, and consequently, as Dostoeffski somewhere says, she is not exactly making her maiden speech to the world. The German has either accepted foreign ideas and ways or protested against them. He destroyed ancient Rome, and afterwards the new Roman Catholic conception of the world, and he has put nothing in place thereof. This causes Dostoeffski<sup>4</sup> to dream a vast dream. One day, he writes, the world may witness an altogether extraordinary spectacle; for, once Germany has

<sup>1</sup> John Toland (1670-1722), Irish theologian, brought up as a Roman Catholic but afterwards became a Protestant. His works have a strong deistical tendency. From 1707 to 1710 he was travelling on the Continent, and in 1705 published an account of Prussia and Hanover.—TRANS.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. the chapter "Vom Deutschnationalen" (On the German National Style), in Muther's *Geschichte der Malerei* (History of Painting), vol. ii.

<sup>3</sup> *Gedichte* (Poems), by Friedrich von Schlegel, p. 334. Berlin, 1809. [The poem is called "Deutscher Sinn," and the lines quoted by Dr. Nicolai mean that every great achievement in art or science by any foreign nation was instantly appreciated by the Germans, and improved upon by them.—TRANS.]

<sup>4</sup> "Three Ideas," by Dostoeffski, in the January number of the *Grazdanin*, pub. 1877.

destroyed everything against which she has been protesting for nineteen hundred years past, she herself will suddenly be forced to die spiritually, immediately after her enemies, simply because she will then have no further reason for existing. *For there will simply be nothing left against which she can protest.*

No one not absolutely infatuated will be able straightway to shake off the demoniacal frightfulness of this idea. There is certainly some truth in it, and the present time shows only too plainly how great is the danger. But Dostoeffski was wrong in believing that any one nation is either able or bound to give the world the new idea it needs (Dostoeffski hoped it would be Russia which would do so). For this the world has grown too great and too different in different parts; and if any people really wants to confer any real benefit on future generations, then it must show the world how to perceive and utilise this diversity of conditions. Now, it is just this which Germany can do, and the same instinct which made the Germans slightly contemptible as Protestants in a world cloven asunder will cause them to be gladly received as mediators in a united world. This is what all good Germans have long divined and hoped.

§ 129. THE GREAT GERMAN PERIOD.—One of the first clearly to perceive this was, as always, Goethe, who said that “German gush about the Fatherland,” which began after the Wars of Liberation, was a disease which produced an atmosphere in which “we were wasting away daily from consumption, and consumed with uncertainty, so that, merely in order to live and go on cringing, we must be most shamefully untrue to ourselves.”<sup>1</sup> Goethe is so greatly distressed about this decay of German greatness, and so keenly desirous that not a single valuable universal mind should be lost, that he makes the almost fantastic suggestion to “scatter the Germans, like the Jews, all over the world, for they are only endurable abroad.”<sup>2</sup>

Rightly to appreciate such a suggestion, we must consider that Goethe stood above nations, and felt himself a *European*, not merely as far as his intellect was concerned, but in sentiment, which is more important. In order to know whether we are Europeans or not, he has told us that we must be able “to feel the joys or sorrows of a neighbour nation as if they were those of our own

<sup>1</sup> Goethe's letter to the German composer Karl Friedrich Zelter, August 24, 1823.

<sup>2</sup> W. von Humboldt, letter to his wife, November 17, 1808.

nation."<sup>1</sup> Christ does not mean to exclude legitimate egoism when He says: "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself," for only a person of unhinged mind can do more. Similarly, according to Goethe, we ought only to love another nation as our own, and should any misfortune occur to our own, then it comes first. Thus he says in the same place that, although of course he "does not hate even the French, for after all they are among the most cultivated people on earth," yet he thanked God "when we were rid of them."

Many will object that Goethe possessed absolutely no sense of patriotism, and hence it is important to point out that Schiller held precisely similar views. Yet Schiller could depict the patriotism and love of liberty of oppressed Switzerland and of France under enemy occupation in such glowing colours that a favourite essay-subject in German schools is still to show how *The Maid of Orleans* prepared the way for the awakening of the spirit of patriotism in Germany also. This may, indeed, have been the case, but it is not what Schiller meant. He declared it to be the special peculiarity of the German mind that, unlike that of other nations, it was *not confined within the boundaries of any country*. May the German, he once asks, still take pride and delight in his name at a time when "the Frank and the Briton, as proudly stepping victors,"<sup>2</sup> are deciding our destiny? Yes, he may, he replies! True, he is leaving the battle-field dogged by misfortune, but the really valuable element in him he has not lost. The German Empire and the German nation are two different things. Even were the Empire to perish, the worth of Germany would still be unimpaired. It resides in national civilisation and national character, which are not bound up with the nation's political fate. The political Empire may waver, but meanwhile the empire of the intellect is extending more and more.<sup>3</sup>

This is a clear admission that the characteristics of German thought, art and literature can only be explained by the German

<sup>1</sup> Goethe's *Gespräche mit Eckermann* (Conversations with Eckermann). [Johann Peter Eckermann (1792-1854) was Goethe's private secretary in 1823. He is chiefly remembered for these "Conversations," which were translated into English in 1874.—TRANS.]

<sup>2</sup> From an unfinished poem by Schiller, 1801.

<sup>3</sup> Moritz Carrière, for instance, says, referring to modern Germans: "What Germany lost in external power went principally to benefit art" (*Wechselbeziehungen deutscher und italienischer Kunst* [The Correlation of German and Italian Art], p. 5. Breslau).

Empire having been politically powerless. Moreover, Schiller concludes triumphantly: Germany will win whenever right and reason win and brute force is vanquished.

Who would venture seriously to deny that we would have as much cause for pride in such a victory, indeed more cause, than France has for pride in Austerlitz or England in Trafalgar? For such a victory every German hopes who sets German civilisation before all else. It was thought impossible that Germany should ever lose her world-wide idealism; and Jean Paul was only expressing the opinion then prevalent when he said that we cosmopolitan Germans are quite incapable of shutting our eyes, like the French and English, and seeing nothing of Europe beyond our own noses; we are incapable of thus limiting our horizon.

It was not only our classical writers in 1813 who thought so, however. Our Romanticists did so even after 1813, when it was already clear in which direction matters were tending. It was over such a German victory as this that the old German Students' Societies waxed enthusiastic; and to it Herwegh<sup>1</sup> referred in the ballad in which he states his belief that modern technical science (the "German chariots of fire") will bring about one European civilisation and one only. With patriotic pride he appeals to his nation:

" Wenn alle Welt den Mut verlor,  
Die Fehde zu beginnen,  
Tritt Du mein Volk, den Völkern vor,  
Lass du dein Herzblut rinnen!  
Gib uns den Mann, der das Panier  
Der neuen Zeit erfasse,  
Und durch Europa brechen wir  
Der Freiheit eine Gasse."

(That is, the German people are to step forward and enter the fray when no one else has courage to do so: they are to shed their heart's blood, they are to give the world the man who is to raise the standard of a new and better time; they are to open up a way for freedom in Europe.)

The country was then always conceived as some great human

<sup>1</sup> Georg Herwegh (1817-1875) in 1841 published *Gedichte eines lebendigen* (Poems of a Contemporary), which were republican or liberal in tendency and extremely popular. In 1847 he raised a German democratic legion for the invasion of Baden and the establishment of a revolutionary government there; but failing, he fled to Switzerland. He translated several of Shakespeare's plays.—

moral force, and it is characteristic that in the case of two out of every three patriotic poems in the universal "Book of German Drinking-songs" the note is a longing for liberty. All the efforts then made to bring about one united Germany were identical with the general efforts of nations towards liberty and progress. In those happy days the German ideal and the ideal of humanity were inseparably bound up together. Then came the time when everything changed, and the fine ballad which Treitschke<sup>1</sup> tells us was often sung in his young days, was forgotten :

" Wenn die Deutschen Deutsche werden,  
Gründen sie das Reich auf Erden,  
Das der Welt den Frieden gibt."

(When the Germans become Germans, then will they found that empire upon earth which will give the world peace.)

"Such innocent thoughts, are ours no longer." Yet the old saying about force being overcome by force is no longer altogether true ; and if one thing is certain in this world it is the fact that the only way in which a people can conquer to-day is by concentrating all its strength on peaceful competition between nation and nation, and endeavouring to attain a position from which it will be able to give the world peace. The time has come when brute force no longer decides, but capacity for civilisation. There is absolutely no doubt that in this respect Germany was in advance of all other nations, and she need only have waited and the almost ripe fruit would have fallen into her lap.

§ 130. GERMAN ADAPTABILITY.—It can easily be shown that what underlies Germany's progress is adaptability. The German virtue of being interested in other countries besides Germany, which makes Germans practically citizens of the world, accounts for the fact that Germany is the birthplace of comparative æsthetics and philology as well as of scientific geography. A century ago we in Germany already possessed the best geographical journal, and we still have the best maps and atlases and the greatest number of descriptions of travels. It is owing to the German's desire to become acquainted with the literature of all nations and to his knowledge of foreign languages, that

<sup>1</sup> Heinrich von Treitschke's *Zum Gedächtnis des grossen Krieges* (In Memory of the Great War), p. 28. This "genuinely German" idea occurs in the oldest German novel, in Grimmelshausen's *Simplizissimus* (III. 4), "Of the German hero who overcame the whole world and will establish peace among all nations."

Shakespeare, Ibsen, Tolstoy and Brandes are better loved and perhaps better understood than anywhere else in the world, that we have a Shakespeare Society and a Dante Society, and ten English books are translated into German for one German book which is translated into English. Just because the German had absorbed all the world's ideas and further developed them, was it possible for a Luther to succeed a Huss, a Kepler a Galileo, a Helmholtz a Faraday, and a Kant a Berkeley. How much do we not owe in Germany to the conceptions of such geniuses as Darwin, Jenner, Lister and Pasteur? Yet in all their special branches of science we in Germany have now progressed at least as far as the countries where their discoveries were made.

The special qualities which used to benefit the investigator and the man of art or letters in the Germany of ideals, still benefit the technician and the commercial man in the material Germany of to-day. Our technical science is capable of picking up ideas everywhere and developing them. Hardly had Marconi discovered wireless telegraphy than the *Telefunken* (wireless) system was working admirably. France may for a time have been ahead of us in the construction of motor-cars and aeroplanes, but our technicians have long since caught up with her. We did not invent submarines, but at present ours seem to be the most serviceable.

Our commercial men proved no less adaptable. Unlike British merchants, they did not compel<sup>1</sup> foreign nations to learn their language, but learned the language of those with whom they wished to trade. Again, they did not try to force their goods on the foreigner, but manufactured whatever articles each country needed. Even in quite minor matters, such as fancy goods and light fiction, we readily took the infinite number of hints which we picked up all over the world wherever we turned. In short, there was nowhere anything which we did not turn to good account.

<sup>1</sup> Not literal compulsion, which England has hardly ever applied in such a case, but the much more effectual negative and passive resistance, which, being based on incapacity for acquiring anything foreign, could naturally never be laid aside, and for this very reason irresistibly forced others to learn English. Precisely because we do not possess this innate passivity, we resort to measures of compulsion, which must of necessity fail. Time was when any one was *glad* to be able to speak German in Petrograd, Brussels, Warsaw, Trieste, Budapest, Copenhagen, Prague and Strasburg. This encouraging symptom, noticeable at the beginning of the nineteenth century, became almost automatically changed into its opposite since we attempted to force Germanism upon the world.

Thus did the German adapt himself, and because of his having done so Germany has progressed until in a sense she is now the most up-to-date nation in Europe. Her originality, in short, consists, as already said, in the lack of a certain kind of originality,<sup>1</sup> that kind which might be called provincialism. And for that future which is to unite all nations together nothing augurs better than this. The modern *nihil me alienum puto* is absolutely incompatible with the old idea of originality. It was the proud aim of our approaching victory to be able to say, knowing what it meant and that it was true, "Nothing human is foreign to us."

It may not be without interest to recall the fact that such a genius as Dostoieffski, in his political writings and in his novel *Ein Werdender*, lays claim to these qualities on behalf of Russia, alleging that, owing to her being still comparatively primitive, she had preserved the power of assimilating foreign civilisations. That primitive peoples are capable of much in this respect has certainly been proved by Japan, which in an incredibly short time has assimilated first Chinese and then European civilisation. This may perhaps have been a good thing for Russia and Japan, but not for the world and for civilisation in general.

The Russians have also improved and developed foreign inventions and ideas, but in so doing have as yet achieved nothing of world-wide importance. This is not meant as a reproach, but merely as the statement of a fact. It may be that Tolstoy will mean something to the world to come, but then it would be only his own actual experiences which would survive, not anything based on some one else's experience. Any Russians who have been devoted to foreign literature and ideas have never risen to a great height. The Germans alone have grown really great on "a foreign foundation." As Sir William Ramsay is said to have unfortunately remarked, "they do not steal from foreign nations," but adapt from them, transform what they have adapted and then return it as something new and improved. Let us hope that this was what Sir William Ramsay meant. At any rate, once the hypnotic effects of the war are over, this is the sense he will attach to his words. In a century in which modern means of communication have literally enabled men to

<sup>1</sup> Dr. Nicolai uses the word "originality" in two senses. In this case it has more the sense of the French *un original*—an eccentric person. Nothing is more difficult to render than an English word with a German tail and an *Umlaut* or two thrown in.—TRANS.



unite together, this German capacity for continued and widespread development and improvement—a capacity which no one seriously denies—would have made Central Europe also the centre of Europe.

§ 131. ADAPTABILITY CARRIED TOO FAR.—The future of Europe, indeed perhaps of the world, seemed within our grasp. And we threw it away, because—well, simply because we also have the defects of our qualities. “Can be done,” indeed, and “Must be done” often mean the same thing, and any one who can adapt himself as the Germans can *must* do so. It is this with which the Germans are reproached, or rather, it is this with which they usually reproach themselves. They have not the stubborn tenacity of the Englishman, who gets a footing everywhere, and his English civilisation with him. They are easily swamped in a foreign nation, and they like what is foreign. Readiness to learn and capacity for learning foreign languages lead to fondness for using foreign words; and as we did not trouble much about trifles, we did not consider it absolutely essential to have fashions of our own.

There was no harm in all this, if also no particular good; and in any case it was of no real importance. Now, however, we are going decidedly too far in our adaptability, for we would fain adopt not only foreign virtues but even foreign vices. In short, we are so eager to be like the foreigner that we shall end by being forced to throw overboard the root-principle underlying our national habits. Other nations were political nations; we want to be so, too. They had colonies; we also want to have some. They were Jingoës and nationalists, and therefore we thought we must also be Jingoës and nationalists. In short, because others *are* retrograde, we think we must *become* so; and with the pious fidelity of copyists we are endeavouring, out of the patriotic vanity of the French, England’s obstinate isolation, Spain’s national pride and Russia’s brutality, to forge a coat of mail wherewith to cover our former aspirations. It almost seems as if we had succeeded in this, and as if Theodor Vischer’s lines had come true:

“Was der Corse begann, das hat der Märker vollendet,  
Rohe Gewalt für Recht, ist die Parole der Zeit.”<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Friedrich Theodor Vischer’s *Epigramme aus Baden-Baden*, published anonymously in 1867, p. 27. Vischer was a German æstheticist, born 1807, died 1887. (What the Corsican [Napoleon] began, the Man of the Marches [Bismarck] finished; Brute force for right is the watchword of the day.)

This is bad, and however justifiably we may pose as victors, we will not permanently succeed in making the world believe that we have done otherwise than surrender our most valuable possession and our most vital weapons, receiving nothing in exchange. No human being and no people can really suffer a sea-change into something which after all they are not. It is with capacities as with good fortune; a man either has them or not, and whatever he strives to do against his nature and by mere force of will is never otherwise than unreal and ineffectual.

Good patriots are becoming anxious about Germany now, and are casting a glance at the future; but they are doing so for the same reason as the "Pan-Germanists" are raising an outcry. That is, they fear that Germany will not prove capable of asserting her own individuality. But then they do not consider that her individuality consists in brute force, but in plastic intelligence.

As long ago as 1873, Dostoeffski,<sup>1</sup> always far-seeing, feared some such sudden reversion. In the Russian periodical, *Grazdanin*, he wrote that it was clear that in Germany, after her recent triumph over France, the feeling of national self-sufficiency had reached such a pitch of absurdity that *even science showed traces of Jingoism*. A year later, when this new tendency was actually noticeable, Emil du Bois Reymond, the well-known Berlin physiologist, went still further. "Thorough as we are in everything," he said, "let us beware against falling into the other extreme (of which there are numberless signs), and instead of being a nation which used to be likened to a book-worm, become so much absorbed in politics as to be the least literary of all the great civilised nations."<sup>2</sup>

There is still more ground for this fear to-day. It is a tragedy that, just at the fateful moment when Germanism seemed destined to conquer, indeed it might be said to save the world, we should risk losing the inheritance bequeathed to us by our great forefathers. Such hopes for the future transcend in importance anything in the past. The German historian Meineke may believe that "the supposition that cosmopolitan and national conceptions harmonise" can be set aside because such harmony "was not always present," which no

<sup>1</sup> "Thoughts on Europe," in Dostoeffski's *Political Writings*, 1873.

<sup>2</sup> Address delivered before the Academy of Science, by E. du Bois-Reymond, on March 26, 1874.

one denies. But the very notion of such a thing should spur us on to make every effort to be prepared for it, for come it must. All Germany would need to do would be to remember her old traditions, crystallised by Johann Eduard Erdmann<sup>1</sup> in the words: "To be merely German is anti-German."

#### IV. GERMAN HUMANITY AND GERMAN MILITARISM

§ 132. WHAT IS MILITARISM?—The word "militarism" comes from the Latin *miles*, which in turn comes from *mille* (thousand). There is no trace of contempt about the word as there is about "soldier" (*Soldat*), which means *Söldner* (mercenary): it merely signifies that a man is one of thousands, one of a number. There is something in the word, as in the German word for army (*Heer*), which may be said to mean the same thing as "people"; and in the form "militia" (*Miliz*) this meaning has been preserved. Yet now "militarism" is often used to denote only aberrations from the real meaning of the word, for instance the fact that a man armed lords it over a man unarmed. Those who use the word in this sense are thinking of officers' prerogatives, of compulsory service and subordination, or of smart uniforms; but they are also thinking of a widespread organisation, working without a hitch, embracing in an astounding manner the forces of an entire people; and they are likewise thinking of glory and contempt of death. In short, it is possible to read into the word "militarism" either a fine meaning or an evil one.

All that concerns us is the sense originally attaching to the word—the belief that it is possible to achieve something in the world by means of a host numbering thousands, in other words by force. Militarism in this sense, therefore, is a particular conception of the world. It is the belief that animal struggle, with fangs or cannon, can do more than human struggle, with words and convictions.

Now, there is not the slightest doubt that the overwhelming majority of Germans believe this, which is all the more singular because, as explained in Chapter I., all great Germans have

<sup>1</sup> "Das Nationalitätsprinzip" (The Principle of Nationality) and "Ernste Spiele" (Serious Play), in J. E. Erdmann's *Collected Lectures*, 4th ed. 1890 (originally delivered in 1862), p. 221. [Erdmann (1805-1892) was a German theologian and philosophical writer. "Ernste Spiele" are essays. His *History of Philosophy* has been translated into English.—TRANS.]

hoped for the victory of reason and anathematised war. Now, this contradiction must be explained, and, if possible, traced to its one source.

The Germans say that they make excellent soldiers simply because the German does everything best, and that this is a good thing. Other nations also say that the Germans make excellent soldiers, only they think that this is because people in Germany have been too much taken up with soldiering, and that this is not a good thing. It is clear that here again every one agrees about the main facts, and disagrees only as to the inferences to be drawn from them.

Yet even here the disagreement is not hopeless, for probably no Germans, save for a handful of Hotspurs, believe that their martial qualities are really what is best in them to-day. The modern German, they say, can certainly fight well, just as he can do a great many things well, but this does not prevent him from doing the work of peace as admirably as he would do it even were it no longer necessary to appeal to arms. Militarism, in short, they say, is only a kind of outside husk with which German all-round capability has become overgrown; it is by no means the chief characteristic of German life, as fanatical German-haters think. Moreover, uniforms are only an outer cloak, put on for the time being, but afterwards to be put off; beneath this cloak is the real kernel of German civilisation. The word "civilisation" is then more closely defined as meaning science, particularly chemistry, manufactures (especially iron constructions), trade, and more particularly ready-made clothing, organisation, and above all obedience.

Now, it is far from easy to decide in detail what is kernel and what is husk, for we have gradually come to realise that nothing in this world is due to mere chance. If Belgium has the densest system of railways and Denmark most newspapers; if most letters and telegrams are sent in England; if America has the most schools and Bosnia the fewest; if it is Serbia in which the largest proportion of people are married and in Sweden the smallest; all this is no less significant than the fact that Germany and France have the largest percentage of people belonging to the army or the navy (10 and 14 per 1000 respectively), and America and Switzerland the smallest (1 and .5 per 1000 respectively).

There is nothing in the world which does not matter, and

everything which a human being or a people does is significant. The attentive observer will perceive at any rate the essential original cause for everything which the man in the street describes as accidental, and thus come to see beauty even in what, considered by itself, seems ugly.

German militarism must be considered in this way; and then, even in this distorted form, the German ideal will be clearly perceivable; and we shall see the path which is leading Germany to a nobler future.

§ 133. GERMAN LOVE OF LIBERTY.—It has often been wrongly thought that, by their insistence on civilisation and militarism being one and the same thing, the Germans were attempting to justify one by the other, or correct one by the other. In general all that is meant is that both spring from the same root. There are very few persons who realise that an upright man may have a brother who is a criminal; and hence they think that if one side of the German is good the other must likewise be so. Persons thus attempting to save their honour of course tend to be ridiculous; but, after all, such apparent opposites as militarism and civilisation are really only different forms which, as a biologist would say, "*German substance*" can assume. To endeavour to trace them to a common source and really to explain Clausewitz by Kant cannot but be fascinating.<sup>1</sup>

All the peculiarities said to distinguish the German from other nations, whether advantageously or not, may probably be traced to his strongly-marked sense of individuality. In the most ancient times, as Tacitus tells us, this found expression in love of liberty, and also in an unmistakable thirst for vengeance, about which we find a great deal in the writings of the Roman historian Velleius Paterculus. Most of all, however, it showed itself in excesses, a fact which both these writers confirm. Kleist's superlatively fine description of the Battle of Hermann shows all these un-German characteristics in chaotic savagery.<sup>2</sup> Purged of all impurities, they reappear in Luther's defiant

<sup>1</sup> See *Von Kants Einfluss auf die deutsche Kultur* (Kant's Influence on German Civilisation), by H. Cohen, p. 31. Official Address at Marburg, 1883. Dümler, Berlin. But Cohen did not go deeply into the question, and in order to overcome the difficulty of making the contents of the Peace Book agree with those of the War Book he makes the far from satisfactory statement that the one dealt with principles and the other was empirical.

<sup>2</sup> Heinrich von Kleist (1777-1811), German dramatist of the Romantic school. The *Hermannschlacht* was written in 1810.—TRANS.

saying : " Hier stehe ich, ich kann nicht anders."<sup>1</sup> The impression of German strength is merely enhanced if we think of Galileo, that other great reformer, who likewise " could not do otherwise," yet merely murmured, " Eppur si muove." Galileo's achievement may have been greater and of more permanent value for mankind, but Luther strikes us as having been humanly finer at that particular moment.

The Germans of that day were a savage and self-willed folk, and were tending to become still more so, owing to the conditions of their country. Whoever wished to settle in Germany, the land of forests, cleared a few acres for himself, and squatted down thereupon, not troubling about any one or anything else. It is characteristic that in a German village a house with its surrounding fields are quite complete in themselves ; and that nowhere else in the world are there such straggling and therefore such large villages as in Germany. And as matters began with the house, so they continued in the more advanced stage of social community. True, the free peasant-farmers, except in Friesland and the fen districts, were soon degraded into subjection. But every knight was free ; in most cases he even exercised the lowest judicial functions, and could announce or renounce quarrels for himself and his men-at-arms. Then there were the free Cities of the Empire, the earldoms and principalities, electorates and bishoprics, for since the Emperor Otto had played off the church against the principalities there were ecclesiastical principalities even in Germany.

All these miniature states had their own laws and their own coinage, and Germany has never succeeded in freeing herself from this absurd caricature of her quondam love of liberty. Had not the iron hand of the Corsican smashed up all this hallowed tomfoolery, who knows if we ourselves would have not laid hands on these relics of the Middle Ages ? There is something in provincialism beyond doubt suited to the ways of a German, like the countless associations which he loves forming.

Such was the people on whom the new era burst, with its social demands, first in the form of the doctrine of the Brotherhood of Man, and afterwards in the far more effective form of profitable commercial relations.

§ 134. THREE REASONS WHY GERMAN LIBERTY HAS TAKEN A

<sup>1</sup> " Here I stand : I cannot do otherwise."

**WRONG TURN.**—When solitary human beings began to consort and associate together, first in Europe and afterwards throughout the world, each individual family, clan or tribe as the case might be, could not, even in Germany, continue to insist on keeping to itself. In Germany, however, this new associative tendency encountered very peculiar conditions, conditions which have had a decisive influence on the subsequent development of German mentality.

Firstly, in Prussia, which then became the decisive factor in Germany's history, a thin surface-sprinkling of Teutons, or, more correctly speaking, Germans, ruled over a backward and consequently not easily led mixture of races, consisting of Obotrites, Sorbians, Varini,<sup>1</sup> Wends, Pruzzi, Masurians, Kaschubs, Poles, Czechs, Lithuanians and Letts, besides other Slav peoples. It was quite easy to maintain the comfortable position of overlords here, and the enslavement of the subject peoples made Prussia politically very prosperous. Hence the belief arose that this mode of government left nothing to be desired.

Secondly, the Renaissance, which caused a revival of liberty and civilisation and culture in general throughout Europe, subsequently indirectly led to a diminution of the church's power in Europe. But in Germany, owing to her strong religious bent, it all passed off in religious disputes; and the Humanists properly so called never had much influence there. Hence in Germany all the liberalising tendencies of the new era were from the very first driven into a side channel. Men were so much taken up with religious liberty that they forgot there was any such thing as civil liberty; and so busy were they about spiritual affairs that they forgot all about intellectual matters. Above all, however, Germany got into the habit of considering the world on which she after all depended as something far away above the clouds, and anything "on this side" or "here below" as of small moment.

Thirdly, in his comparative indifference with regard to terrestrial concerns the German did not expect anything on this earth to be complete or perfect, and accordingly he frittered away in all manner of absurd trivialities whatever individuality he still possessed.

Germany thus became the country of differences in rank.

<sup>1</sup> German *Warnen*, a Germanic tribe mentioned by Tacitus.—TRANS.

The nobility in all countries used, indeed, to lay great stress on questions of etiquette ; but whereas in the rest of Europe the knights had ceased to have any importance as a separate class as early as the fifteenth century, in Germany they continued a recognised class on into the nineteenth century. Moreover, ordinary citizens used to ape the nobility, guilds and corporations flourished, and every one endeavoured to obtain some rank, position, title, or order, which would confer on him a distinction, albeit a trifling one, above his fellows.

The ordinary Philistine, therefore, satisfied his yearning " to be somebody " by acquiring stars and titles, while the cultured German found satisfaction for his aspirations in philosophy, which accordingly began to develop along specific lines. Thus, while British and French philosophy turned increasingly towards practical questions, German philosophy became more and more abstract.<sup>1</sup> What German genius needed was that in the free world of thought each individual should be able to be a law unto himself, while in the world of hard facts he was forced to bow the knee to his superiors. A noteworthy instance of this is Kant, than whom no one followed a more independent line of thought, and who yet lived in dependence on others. He who, as Karl Lehrs<sup>2</sup> says, wrote the Marseillaise of philosophy, gave way afterwards in theological questions, and disavowed Fichte's doctrines so as not to incur the suspicion of atheism. Kant was then old, and therefore we will blame, not him, but only those who forced him to take such a step.

It was Kant's philosophy and none other which decided Germany's future. In answer to liberty he brought forward transcendental idealism, and in answer to subjection empirical realism, urging that both transcendental idealism and subjection were equally justified and equally necessary. We may think of this dual answer as we please ; we may urge that the question ought not to have been put so ; and we may also consider Kant or one of his followers to have succeeded in their attempt to bring about harmony by means of dialectics. The fact remains

<sup>1</sup> F. A. Lange, in his *Geschichte des Materialismus* (History of Materialism), published 1875, vol. ii., says : " Those countries which are the home of modern philosophy are turning to practical life, while metaphysics are left to Germany." Pp. 417-468 of this work are singularly interesting.

<sup>2</sup> " Die Philosophie und Kant gegenüber dem Jahre 1848 " (Kant and Philosophy about the Year 1848), by Karl Lehrs, 1886. *Altpreussische Monatschrift*, xxxii. p. 91.



that in practice this "antinomy"<sup>1</sup> was treated in most un-Kantian fashion. Men learned to find in transcendental philosophy satisfaction for their aspirations after liberty, while in other respects they became politicians of the most material order.

This crass inconsistency is the illegitimate offspring of the thrice outraged Teutonic longing for liberty. Once it was outraged by being in bonds of slavery, once by a Christianity that had become abstract, and once by misinterpreted transcendental philosophy. And this inconsistency runs through the whole of German intellectual life.

In fact and practice the German's notion of civilian liberty, a notion which had already had to suffer from the "liberty of a true Christian," gave way for good and all to the "intelligible liberty of a philosopher." In practice the German became brutal and the reverse of free, yet Germany, as far as thought was concerned, continued the freest, and, we may say with pride, the most humane country.

§ 135. "THE ABSOLUTE."—As this liberty, however, only existed in the world of thought and ideas, and was consequently unlimited, it degenerated. Germany, to put it briefly, became the land of absolutism. It was believed that there was an absolute liberty, an absolute happiness, and an absolute knowledge. It was believed that a formula had been discovered by which men could be made free, happy and wise, even against their will; and it is no mere chance that German philosophy should have produced dogmatic Marxianism, which advocated a future State to be absolutely governed, while at the same time German Social Democracy is, generally speaking, the most faithful reflection of the German people, which is a compound of doctrinaire idealism and practical militarism.

Kant believed that by setting up the categorical imperative of duty he could create a moral code which would be at once absolute and binding on all human beings alike. Later on Karl Marx hoped to endow the whole world with happiness and prosperity by first knocking it down and then reconstructing it on right principles. Similarly the Germans really and honestly believe that the world would be happy were it forced to do

<sup>1</sup> Antinomy is a Kantian term, meaning an apparent conflict of reason with itself. Thus it may be argued, apparently equally reasonably, that the universe is infinitely vast and that it has spatial limits.—TRANS.

their bidding. We have succeeded well, and we think the whole world could not but be content were it similarly organised. "Eat, bird, or die" is a German proverb, and the pleasing saying, "If thou wilt not my brother be, thy skull I'll smash most certainly," has become another German proverb.

And the German thinks this is the prescription by which he can redeem the world. He may be wrong, but that does not alter the fact that this is his belief. This being the case, the German, although not really more uneducated or uncivilised than the Briton or the Frenchman, coolly comes along with his cannon and his bombs, having made serious preparations beforehand for this, as if it were the most important business of his life.

A Frenchman will never understand this; he is too frivolous and materialistic. For him a dead man is a dead man, an asphyxiating bomb is an asphyxiating bomb, and so on;<sup>1</sup> and he orders his life accordingly. But the German knows that behind both there lurks something else—an idea. In his opinion, cannon and bombs are something wherewith he is to pursue his civilising mission; hence he plays with such things as innocently as children with crackers. The ideas lurking behind things are the excuse for everything, and behind the bombs every German seeks and finds what he wants to find. The Christian finds his God, the philosopher his Kant, the philanthropist his love of humanity, and the Philistine universal order; and the quintessence of all these "moral ideas" is everlastingly the same—the proud and noble words: "We'll give them a good drubbing."

Led by force, the German has grown pious and good, rich and contented, and because he has learned to believe in the Absolute he thinks that whatever is good for his own country must also be good in itself, and can in time be thrashed into others. Besides this, Germany has become great because from everywhere she has taken what is good, and therefore she would only be paying a debt of gratitude by forcing her virtues—order and organisation—upon others. The only thing she overlooks, however, is that no one has any use for such gifts unless he accept them of his own free will.

Here we have certainly an instance of strange things coming

<sup>1</sup> "A primrose by the river's brim,  
A yellow primrose was to him,  
And it was nothing more."—TRANS.

to pass ; and even if the direct introduction of German order into Belgium meets with difficulties, yet Germany is indirectly, perhaps even against her will, forcing the whole world to organise after the fashion of the Germans. The world sees that German organisation has worked well in war, and tries to imitate it. A very great deal is certainly being organised on German lines. After the war we shall see whether this is a good thing or not, for if foreign nations are likewise working their hardest, the only result can be that the German will have to work even harder than before, so as to keep up with the keener competition. It may be very salutary but it is none the less regrettable that five million people had to die in order that this result might be brought about in Europe by militarism.

Still more regrettable is it, however, that in order to achieve it, German humane aspirations should have become so much misdirected. The fact must certainly not be ignored that worship of success and lust of power have had something to do with the rise of what we call Prussian militarism, yet this cannot be of more than secondary importance. The main and decisive cause seems to me to have been *misdirected humane aspirations*. The Germans, anticipating events, wanted to create that world-organisation the necessity for which is obvious ; only unfortunately they wanted to do this not by dint of reason but by dint of force.

§ 136. BETHINK YOURSELVES !—There is a wonderful picture by Anselm von Feuerbach,<sup>1</sup> “ The Battle of the Amazons,” which hangs in the Nuremberg picture-gallery but has never taken the fancy of the public, to whom it seemed too lifeless to represent a battle. Yet every fibre is brimful of the truest life. Men and women are seen interlaced in an extraordinary manner, and it is impossible to say whether this is due to love or hatred. Thus a boy is shown kneeling before a woman. Is this because of her beauty, or was he knocked down by a passing horse ? Both sides are holding back their weapons and looking each other in the face, and if they raise them now, it will be in love. Then in the centre two are embracing each other as in the very ecstasy of love, and yet in their hands an axe and a lance are flashing. In the foreground lies a maiden, mortally wounded, but her outstretched arm is holding back the man, as a woman

<sup>1</sup> 1829-1890. Von Feuerbach represents modern German classical painting.—  
TRANS.

might seek to detain the husband hastening to leave her after the nuptial night. And on all sides are yearning looks, enraptured gestures, everywhere—in short, Love which “seems to hatred turned” and which is in reality Combat.

I could not help thinking of this picture when our merry, laughing German youths left for the front. They did not hate the enemy as did our ill-advised intellectuals; and they loved the world throughout its length and breadth. And with this vague love of the world and of mankind in their hearts they went forth to battle.

In order to understand how cruelly hard these gentle souls have become “at the front,” I was forced to think of Kleist’s *Penthesilea*.<sup>1</sup> He, too, shows how closely akin is love to hate, and the extremes to which misguided love can go. Penthesilea, the love-sick Amazonian woman, is determined to possess Achilles, but, dazzled by false pride, she marches upon him, surrounded by her yelping dogs, with her elephants and all the pomp and circumstance of glorious war. And yet Achilles was willing to surrender voluntarily to her.

Even so the German army, with its 42-centimetre Mörsers, its asphyxiating bombs, its poisonous gases and its submarines, is marching upon that young world which is ready to accept and believe the old German legend of the humanity of Man.

Penthesilea murders the youthful son of the gods, and dies as a result of having done so. But we do not wish the young divine idea to die, nor yet that Germany should perish. There is still time, and therefore, ye Germans, bethink yourselves! Bethink yourselves of your own selves.

<sup>1</sup> Heinrich von Kleist (1777-1811), German Romantic dramatic author. *Penthesilea*, pub. 1808, is one of the plays by which he is still remembered.—TRANS.

## CHAPTER XI

## ALTRUISM

## I. OVERCOMING PESSIMISM

§ 137. GERMANY'S MISSION. — That men must and do associate with one another no one would deny. The only question is whether their association is best promoted by fighting one another or by helping one another, and whether love or hate, unselfishness or selfishness, right or might prevail or ought to prevail in the world.

No human being is so utterly devoid of all humanity as not to fancy, at any rate in his best moods, that it is permissible to believe in such things as right and unselfishness, love and mutual aid; but afterwards away he goes and acts as if he did not believe in them at all. And, indeed, he does not believe in them as realities, but in his haughty infatuation imagines they are some ideal creation of his own, something which can accordingly be laid aside at will so soon as it is no longer compatible with practical politics. Now, there is nothing on earth more contemptible than practical politics when they conflict with idealism.

Germany, as I hinted at the beginning of the last chapter, is here in a peculiarly difficult position. She dreams herself into a moral world, appealing to the idealism of a man such as Kant; and she acts in a tangible world and pursues practical politics after the manner of such a man as Bismarck. The gulf between these two seems still bridgeable. But Kant degenerated into Cohen<sup>1</sup> and Bismarck into Bernhardt; and just because the German has the loftiest possible conceptions of morality did he depart from them so utterly in practice. Perhaps, indeed, he could not do otherwise. Whoever endeavours to square the circle, very easily manages even to forget his rule of three.

Nevertheless, efforts which in themselves have no prospect of

<sup>1</sup> It is characteristic that Cohen should be almost of the school of Berkeley.

success are scarcely ever quite in vain. Thus when it became impossible to find a rational expression for numbers, the new science of irrational numbers arose. Similarly idealism was not in vain. Thus when it became impossible to act morally on the basis of idealism, the duty arose of seeking another basis of action. If Kantian Germany, without being false to her name, became imbued with "practical politics" to the very marrow of her bones, this merely proves that we are not meant to expend our energies in expressing pious aspirations, that the most magnificent castle in the air can never hold out against terrestrial attack, and that morality based on ideals simply has no solid basis.

The collapse of idealism which became manifest in 1914 must be our justification for seeking some such solid basis. This collapse occurred just when all discerning persons considered it an intellectually incomprehensible anachronism. For this very reason it has proved more forcibly than any past event that the ordinary idealistic morality is wholly inadequate, since it failed to make its followers act morally. This applies to Kantian and Christian morality alike, whether, as Kant will have it, morality is to be compared only with the star-spangled heavens, or whether, as the Church teaches, it is above the heavens.

No nation in the world has more cause to set off in quest of this new earthly morality than Germany, for none has set up such lofty moral pretensions. It may be, however, that those who ascend to great heights must first be profoundly abased. Jena may have been necessary that Leipzig might occur; and it may also have been necessary to declare that right was a scrap of paper so that mankind might be induced to seek some better guarantee. Were this to be so, then even this war might be something which future generations would gladly remember as the birth-throes of a new Society which, as Browning put it in "By the Fireside," "forwards the general deed of man," rightly thinking that in so saying he has said the most which can be said of any event.

Perhaps, however, no people in the world are so well adapted as the Germans to discover this new social order, because of the training they have received from two such contradictions as Kant's idealism and Bismarck's practical politics, both of which collapsed in this war because there was no connection between

them. We may now consider it Germany's future work to reunite these apparently incompatible seams in her character, seams which have already been shown to be of common origin; but to do this work she must shake herself free from all vague and indefinite aspirations forced upon her from without.

That this is possible and that firmly fixed ideals, based on solid facts, are conceivable it is the purpose of the present chapter to prove. This natural morality, as it might be called, will one day become a reality; and it seems as if its day were, so to speak, predestined to dawn in Germany. And this notwithstanding the events of the last half-century, because of the peculiar temperament of the Germans themselves. Then Germany, that *terra nebulosa* in which the sun can yet shine with such wondrous clearness, will have fulfilled her mission *per aspera ad astra*. That mission does not consist in sending calico to Bagdad, but in giving the world peace. It may, I grant, seem foolhardy to cherish any such hope in the midst of the unparalleled horrors of this war, and many persons will rather incline to agree with Heinrich Mann,<sup>1</sup> when he took as a motto for his book, "This nation is hopeless."

Still, it is better to be optimistic than in too great haste to abandon our only hope. Even I fully admit the immense power of those who have made the progress of a whole nation centre round the sale of calico in Bagdad; and I, too, am well aware that self-knowledge cannot be attained save in a hard school. But somehow or other it will come to pass that the German again becomes German; and in another fifty years there will again be a Germany which realises her own true mission, and whose pride is in her own characteristics and not in her armaments.<sup>2</sup>

For at all times it has been believed, even by those who have not "dipt into the future, far as human eye could see," that the war-drum must one day throb no longer and the battle-flag be furled,

. "In the Parliament of man, the Federation of the world."

And likewise that

"There the commonsense of most shall hold a fretful realm in awe,  
And the kindly earth shall slumber, lapt in universal law."

<sup>1</sup> Contemporary German writer.—TRANS.

<sup>2</sup> Apparently, even in 1915 or early 1916, when he wrote these lines, Professor Nicolai must have foreseen the downfall of Germany.—TRANS.

§ 138. THE NEW EMPIRE.—Some semblance of justice, indeed, is weaving and working in all this murder and horror. It all depends whether we can see this semblance. Man to-day lies bound upon the ground with the war-vultures devouring his vitals. But Man to-day need be no less optimistic than his prototype, Prometheus bound, whom, nearly two thousand five hundred years ago, Æschylus made say that, as his mother Themis had taught him, the day must come when might would be overcome and wisdom prevail. Prometheus, it is true, is not yet unbound, and the Titans and the Forces of old still bid him defiance; but we may console ourselves with the reflection that even the oldest tragedian possessed this optimistic belief. For the secret of Prometheus<sup>1</sup> is no cabalistic or magic formula, as the Scholastics used to believe; rather is it the triumphant faith in that future when

• “The man remains,—  
Sceptreless, free, uncircumscribed, but man :  
Equal, unclassed, tribeless, and nationless,  
Exempt from awe, worship, degree, the king  
Over himself; just, gentle, wise : but man.”<sup>2</sup>

Time was when the gods were a savage, primeval folk, and their “peace” was based only “on dark Fate’s perpetual night” —that is, not upon free understanding, but on natural compulsion, which is independent of all personality. Yet personality prevailed, first because of the selfishness of tyrannical Zeus,<sup>3</sup> who represented the age of selfishness and war in which Æschylus lived. But this was only a transition stage, and Prometheus, who endowed the world with the beginnings of all science and all art, all technical knowledge and all civilisation, knows that these forces will overthrow the kingdom of selfishness and self-will, and that the conception of Humanity will then prevail. To symbolise this conquest of Self, Prometheus is to be free if another, out of pure love of mankind, descend into Hades and sacrifice himself for Prometheus, that is for mankind.

We have not yet reached this point. War still goes on, but

<sup>1</sup> Prometheus knows a secret, and Zeus is ready to free him if he reveals it. Prometheus, however, is silent, feeling assured that, even without this, he will be set free.

<sup>2</sup> Professor Nicolai does not quote either Tennyson or Shelley, but we have quoted them because they, in transcendent language, express exactly his meaning.  
—TRANS.

<sup>3</sup> Æschylus says that Zeus “by the force of will has founded a new kingdom in the domain of the Gods.”



peace will come. That is the secret of Prometheus. Assuredly he will be free. Either Zeus will learn to understand the sacred mystery, and then he will voluntarily break his brother's bonds in sunder, or he will never learn to honour Mother Themis.<sup>1</sup> Then will "Zeus be hurled from his throne," and Prometheus will receive his "freedom long desired and long delayed."

What is marvellous about this Prometheus legend of Æschylus is the instinctive faith in the progress of Mankind—a faith which produces that optimism which is ever casting a glance forward towards the future.

§ 139. NATURAL RIGHT.—The pessimist sees nothing but a meaningless "up and down" and "hither and thither" in history, which is to him, as to Schopenhauer,<sup>2</sup> merely a series of events, a nightmare of the human race, without any sort of system. Yet we may proudly say, even although the actual basis in fact for such a conception has but lately been supplied by recent natural science, that almost all mankind have always been optimists hitherto, and thus unconsciously adhered to the conception of evolution. Except for Schopenhauer, after all only a single individual, and the Sophists, all serious thinkers have held it true that the world might rise on stepping-stones of its dead self to higher things. Despite their imperfect knowledge, they believed that a certain definite scheme of evolution could be traced. They even believed in the prevalence of a law which was gradually bringing us nearer to an ideal, and, however widely their opinions may otherwise have differed, all sought what they desired in Right. All followed after Heraclitus, that wise man of old,<sup>3</sup> who proclaimed that what nations had to do was to fight for the Right.

Unhappily these efforts have taken two different directions. Those which have tended in the so-called idealistic direction have endeavoured to bring about a spiritual kingdom, the Kingdom of God: the others, those with a material trend, have endeavoured to bring about social evolution. But instead of mutually assisting each other, these two tendencies have

<sup>1</sup> Themis was wedded to Zeus, to whom she bore the Horæ. She personifies law and order, and was worshipped as a goddess of prophecy.—TRANS.

<sup>2</sup> *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung* (The World as Will and as Idea), by Arthur Schopenhauer, 1819, vol. i. § 35. Cf. also the same work, vol. ii. chap. 38.

<sup>3</sup> Heraclitus (c. 576-480 B.C.), as quoted by Diogenes Laertius, i. 2: "A nation must fight around Right as around a wall."

opposed each other ; and what is now needed is to unite them together.

Since Heraclitus and Æschylus proclaimed struggle and promised victory, Mankind has taken a considerable step forward. True, as Deussen says, we see even now that the "principle of the Right of the stronger, which has been displaced in the individual countries, is the only one still prevailing between one country and another.<sup>1</sup> But between man and man the goddess of law and order has prevailed,<sup>2</sup> and at any rate in principle the 'Right of the Stronger' has ceased to exist."

To this we must hold fast, for any one considering the history of nations really might think that to look for justice upon earth is looking for Utopia. Everywhere it is *Væ victis*—woe to the vanquished ; again has Brennus<sup>3</sup> cast his sword into the scales of justice, and the Old Testament words, "The law is slacked," still hold good.<sup>4</sup>

How comes it then that Man has nevertheless persisted in believing in eternal rights, in love of his neighbour, in altruism, human dignity, and whatever all the other ways may be of stating the fact that Man respects every other man as being one of his own kind ? From time immemorial it has been a disputed question whether this principle of Right is naturally existent in us as an element in our souls, as it were, or has arisen in us, so to speak artificially, having been agreed upon as a result of reflection and the dictates of reason.

For thousands of years this question has been discussed, without any one ever having asked whether this "community among men" may not perhaps be a function of their physical constitution, and therefore an actual demonstrable fact. Were this so, it would of course be absurd to describe Right as man-made. On the other hand, to say that it is implanted by Nature or God in men's souls is the same thing as instinctively

<sup>1</sup> *Die Elemente der Metaphysik* (The Elements of Metaphysics), by Paul Deussen, 2nd ed., pp. 233 *et seq.* The writer adds : "From this may be inferred how immature our race still is, for it may be probably certainly foretold that the time will come when we shall look back on war as a horrible piece of barbarism belonging to long-past dark ages."

<sup>2</sup> Themis, who was the goddess of law and order.—TRANS.

<sup>3</sup> The leader of the Gauls must be meant here, who invaded Greece in 279 B.C. He and his men were checked at Thermopylæ, then devastated Ætolia, and advanced on Delphi, but were completely defeated, when Brennus killed himself.—TRANS.

<sup>4</sup> Habakkuk i. 4.

recognising that it is subject to laws which are after all independent of our personal desires, and superior to all human wisdom.

Here again it can be seen how wisely and (unconsciously) justly mankind in general feels; for except for a short period when the Sophists taught that Right is not anything natural but only something agreed upon, that is, established by Man, every one has believed in a divine or innate Right, that is, a Right independent of any human will, something as it were impersonal and yet a fact. Socrates, in particular, insisted that if there were no absolute Right, then there never could be any Right at all; and if we reflect upon this, it seems and is so self-evident, that since Socrates' time no one has questioned this principle. Only in one respect do the post-Socratic philosophers differ from their Master—very unfortunately for them. They forgot that in the meantime the *φύσις* had been replaced by the *μετὰ φύσιν*—that which lies behind Nature. Men ceased to perceive the primeval cause of everything Absolute in Socrates' simple, natural facts, and thought it needful to take refuge in the metaphysics of Aristotle, or even of the latter's inferior successors. Thus what was subsequently proclaimed as "Natural Right" had nothing to do with Nature, but was, on the contrary, metaphysical Right, which had come about by human ordinance.

Once we have recognised this misconception, the question inevitably arises whether the time-honoured difference between Socrates and his opponents does not vanish if we simply trace back absolute Right to absolute natural laws. I believe that this is so. There is an absolute Right, based upon the conception, which natural science proves true, that Mankind is an organism; and hence this Right is no less absolute than Mankind itself. (Cf. Chapter XII.) This must suffice for us, for none can penetrate beyond his own race and the natural conditions to which it is subject. But if Mankind once realises the necessity of this absolute Right for the human race, then will it have understood the secret of Prometheus. Then will pessimism be overcome, and the vision of Christ be a reality.

§ 140. RIGHT AND WORLD-CITIZENSHIP.—But even if we reject all metaphysical basis for Right, we are nowise entitled to consider the efforts of two thousand years as having been of no avail. Natural science did not then exist, and to develop the

idea of Right it was unquestionably of most importance to prove that a right was unconditionally a right. Without metaphysics this would hardly have been possible.

Now, we must note the fact that all these great moral philosophers of olden times were already thorough *cosmopolitans*. This, though much too often forgotten, after all could not have been otherwise; for absolute Right cannot but apply to all human beings. Christ was by no means the first citizen of the world. Socrates before him taught that all men were brothers, and in return for this the people of Athens handed him a draught of hemlock, even as the people of Jerusalem at a later date nailed Jesus to the Cross, and as even now any one who does not see eye to eye with the mass of his fellow-citizens is outlawed by them. But the death of Socrates served as an example and a warning, and his disciples, to whom alone we owe our knowledge of him, consequently kept very quiet about his dangerous new philosophy. Nevertheless the great Athenian's cosmopolitan ideas must have been very popular even five hundred years after his death, for the comparatively ignorant Epictetus,<sup>1</sup> when expressing his belief in all men having one and the same country, quotes Socrates. If, he says, what philosophers say about the relationship between God and Man be true, what is Man to do, when asked to what country he belongs, but answer, as Socrates did, not "I am an Athenian or a Corinthian," but "*I am a citizen of the world*"?

This idea, however, prevailed not in Greece only, where it was principally advocated by the schools of the *Cynics* and *Stoics*, but among enlightened men throughout the world. Ancient Indian and Chinese literature afford numerous proofs of this. Now, about the time of Christ this conception of world-citizenship, which hitherto had only flashed like lightning across the minds of a few geniuses, seems suddenly to have come to life in the form of a "variation on the conception of Humanity." The time was fulfilled, as the Bible says. While Seneca in Rome was preaching the doctrine of world-wide love, the Jewish scholar Hillel was committing it to writing, and Confucius proclaiming brotherly love in the Far East, while at the same time Christendom was coming into being. It may seem immaterial which of these teachers we follow—provided we do follow one.

<sup>1</sup> *Conversations*, Book I. 9 (c. A.D. 200).

Even St. Paul makes clear allusions to such ideas, and so do the Fathers of the Church and all the later scholastics. The "Kingdom of God," however, was more and more interpreted as meaning life in the world to come—a fact which, in time, certainly prevented this conception from having the revolutionary effects which at first it undoubtedly produced. But even the worldly philosophers, of every school, were all at bottom cosmopolitans, and hoped in one way or another to break down the barriers separating Man from his fellow-man. In the following table the only moderns I have quoted are, intentionally, Germans, because it seems, or at any rate did seem, the special vocation of the German nation to rescue these eternal conceptions of Christianity from the scholastic chaos of the Church.

In the Christian era all serious thinkers were also agreed that a perpetual peace must of course be the object of all this chaos and confusion. To discuss this in detail would lead me too far away from my point, and therefore I give the following table. I would merely add that, with the possible exception of St. Augustine, those mentioned in it all believed *in peace on earth and in the community of all living beings*.

Author.	Object to be attained.	Method of attaining it.
St. Paul	The Kingdom of God on earth	Through Christ
St. Augustine ( <i>De Civitate Dei</i> , xiv. 28)	Everlasting rest in God	Through Christ
St. Thomas ( <i>De regim. princ.</i> )	A Universal Christian Monarchy, with the Pope at its head. (Like Dante.)	Through Christ
Lessing ( <i>Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts</i> ) <sup>1</sup>	The Eternal New Gospel	Through the religion of the Spirit and of Love
Herder ( <i>Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit</i> ) <sup>2</sup>	Humanity	Through the rule of Love and Reason
Kant ( <i>Ideen zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte</i> , 1784) <sup>3</sup>	Perpetual Peace	Through a League of Nations united together by moral ties
Fichte ( <i>Grundzüge des gegenwärtigen Zeitalters</i> , 1806, vii. 18 ff.) <sup>4</sup>	Perfect Society	By mutual improvement

<sup>1</sup> *The Education of the Human Race*, published in 1780.—TRANS.

<sup>2</sup> *Thoughts on the Philosophy of the History of Mankind*. English translation 1800, originally published 1784-91.—TRANS.

<sup>3</sup> *Outlines of Universal History*.—TRANS.

<sup>4</sup> *Characteristics of the Present Epoch*, published 1806.—TRANS.

Author.	Object to be attained.	Method of attaining it.
Schelling ( <i>Vorlesungen über die Methode der akademischen Studien</i> , p. 153; and <i>System des transcendentalen Ideals</i> , p. 417) <sup>1</sup>	A Universal Legal Constitution	By the union of Liberty and Necessity
Hegel ( <i>Philosophie der Geschichte, gesammelte Werke</i> , ix. 11) <sup>2</sup>	Absolute Right	By progress in the consciousness of Liberty

Then came the period when misinterpreted Darwinism altered awakening national sentiment and men's ideas generally. First in England and France, afterwards in Germany, and now in the smallest aggregates of people speaking the same or allied languages, for instance the Czechs and Ukrainians, the masses began to believe that a nation's *rights* depend upon its *might* alone. No jurist, it is true, ventured actually to admit this in so many words, though Felix Dahn,<sup>3</sup> who, after all, is mainly a novelist, did once make certain concessions to nationalism, but even he does not dare to go to too great lengths.

True, in quite recent times, especially after 1870, there was a change even in this respect, and now almost every one denounces his former ideals. No one, for instance, any longer ventures to call himself a citizen of the world: at most he says he is international.

## II. RIGHT AND WAR

§ 141. THE LAW OF NATIONS.—Thus if the mere possibility of there being a Right necessarily implies world-citizenship, it follows of necessity that Right and War cannot exist side by side.

But it is in human nature for every one to be convinced of the justice of his cause. The Castilian or Sicilian robber who plunders the rich only, considers himself an essential element of impartial justice; and the savour of the truth contained in Gerhard Hauptmann's *Biberpelz*,<sup>4</sup> consists simply in showing that there is honour even among the lowest thieves. There is

<sup>1</sup> *Lectures on the Method of Academic Study*, published in 1803, and *System of Transcendental Idealism*, published in 1800.—TRANS.

<sup>2</sup> *The Philosophy of History, Collected Works*.—TRANS.

<sup>3</sup> Julius Sophus Felix Dahn (1834-1912), poet, novelist and historical writer. One of his chief novels, *A Fight for Rome*, published in 1876, was translated into English two years later.—TRANS.

<sup>4</sup> Gerhard Hauptmann's *Biberpelz* (The Beaver) is a comedy published in 1893.—TRANS.

probably hardly a single genuine, passionate criminal who could not produce from the depths of his subconsciousness some moral justification for his actions ; and even the cool, collected criminal, who, narrowly escaping prison, becomes a wealthy and respected citizen, can excuse himself by saying that he " keeps within the law."

And if this is true of the individual, how much more is it true of the masses ! Whenever a hundred persons do the same thing, the individual instinctively feels as if what so many are doing could not but be right. But nowhere do greater numbers of individuals act in concert than in war, and never does this feeling of being one of a number come out more strongly than in war-time. We must therefore never expect any nation to doubt the justice of " its " war even for a moment. Now, is there any criterion by which the justice of a war might be impartially tested ? *Inter arma silent leges*—when war breaks out, laws keep silence, as the unsentimental but logical Romans put it. And they were perfectly consistent, for war as war means that the notion of Right is suspended ; and an appeal to arms proves the refusal to recognise that Right is any longer the Supreme Court of Appeal, and the determination to place Might before Right.

It is important clearly to realise this. We may urge any and every reason for war. We may say it is a natural necessity ; a disease which there is no warding off ; a salutary medicine ; a means of race expansion ; or anything else we please ; but let no one call it just. To do so would be to destroy the conception of Right, for there is no worse injustice than one which assumes the aspect of Right.<sup>1</sup>

Ihering<sup>2</sup> says that resistance to wrong is a duty. Does it really need any further proof that war against war is resistance to wrong ? That is, that resistance to war is a duty ? Is it not a commonplace for Weber's laughing philosopher to say that the conception of Right already includes that of Peace ?<sup>3</sup> A cause

<sup>1</sup> Plato's *Republic*, ii. 4. 361. [Dr. Nicolai also quotes Livy, xxxix. 16, an indictment against hypocritical religion and against using religion as a cloak for crimes.—TRANS.]

<sup>2</sup> Ihering or Jhering, Rudolf von (1818-1892), German jurist, who was a professor at various places, including Basel and Vienna. The work here quoted, *Der Kampf ums Recht*, published 1872, p. 42, has been translated into English as *The Battle for Right*. He was celebrated as an independent and clear thinker, and propounded a fresh view of Roman law, as furnishing the basis of a new and adapted system of jurisprudence.—TRANS.

<sup>3</sup> *Demokrit*, by Karl Jul. Weber, vol. x., *Der Krieg* (War).

may be as just as possible, but as soon as the sword is drawn for it, it ceases to be so, for then it is no longer Right which is championing it, but Might.

In order that Right may prevail between two individuals, they must conclude an agreement. This, however, they can only do because, as the jurists say, they are already legally qualified to do so ; or, as the natural scientist would phrase it, because they already instinctively feel that they are members of a community. But now States come on the scene, as representing the collective determination of a whole community. Like individual human beings, they are living legal entities, endowed with a will of their own. The individual, however, is not merely an individual but also a citizen ; and similarly every State is a member of the human race. Hence it is juridically possible for individual nations to unite together to form a universal human Association for Right.

These premises are obvious. But it necessarily follows from them that Right between human beings is impossible without the recognition in some form or other that they belong to the same State ; and Right between States is no less impossible without the recognition of some form of association which is above States. Thus every dispute about " mine " and " thine," and for that matter every criminal lawsuit, proves that both parties, even if unwillingly and perhaps only under compulsion, submit to the State, and consequently admit that they are brothers in a sense. All self-help, however, is a negation of the State.

Similarly with regard to inter-State matters. All self-help on the part of a State—every war, that is—means that the particular State ceases to recognise any superordinate organisation, thereby destroying the only possible means of ensuring Right. A " just war," in the juridical sense, therefore, is a contradiction in terms.

From a higher point of view, however, war is justified under the same conditions as justify self-help in general. Whenever an attempt is made to encroach upon the innate and inalienable rights of an individual or a nation, then both resort to self-help against whomsoever it may be. This is revolution, and is permissible even in the case of a minority against a majority. War will die out directly the organisation of the world is strengthened. Revolutions there will always be.



Now, after all and despite all, a law of nations does exist, whose enactments remain in force even during war. True, as yet it has always been violated in every war; but even were breaches of this law of nations the rule and not the exception, this would no more overthrow the conception of it than the conception of civil law would be overthrown in a State if the majority of its citizens happened to be criminals.

The mere fact of a law of nations existing, at least in theory, is cause for satisfaction, since it proves that a supra-State community already exists, and that certain component parts of States have already ceased to co-operate in making war. After all, what else does a rule or enactment of international law mean but that certain things are outside war, "extra-bellical," even during war, just as a legation in a foreign country is extra-territorial? Where international law is in force, there is no war.

International law may continue in force during war and side by side with it, but wherever it does exist it restricts war, and the time may one day come when it will have restricted it to vanishing point. But where war is, international law is not. Whether the cannons of one belligerent aim better than those of another depends upon a thousand things, but not in the least upon right.

§ 142. THE RIGHT OF REPRISALS.—That no man really takes international law seriously is obvious for many reasons. Nothing shows this so plainly, however, as the constantly repeated announcement that reprisals have been or else are to be exercised. The bread rations of French prisoners of war in Germany, for instance, are curtailed, which may seem only natural, since, owing to the action of Germany's enemies, there is beginning to be a shortage of bread. As a matter of fact, however, it is not natural at all, for if any country undertakes the obligation to treat prisoners of war in a particular way, it is bound to do this, even should it be suffering from scarcity itself, just as an ordinary citizen must pay his debts, even if this entails his going hungry to bed. A French officer complained of there being no light of an evening, and when told that there were neither gas works nor electricity works in the place and that there was a great scarcity of petroleum throughout Germany, he remarked that that did not concern him, and that if Germany could not give her prisoners any light, then she ought not to take any one

prisoner. This was meant merely as a joke, but it is a striking instance of how little we in Germany are entitled to talk about right.

But to refer to the reduction of bread rations. As matters are now, no one can seriously reproach Germany for having taken such a step. The French, however, consider it a piece of barbarism, and would be quite within their rights in doing so ; but at the same time, according to the newspapers, they are resolving to put their German prisoners of war on a diet which, in their opinion, is insufficient, despite there being not the slightest pretext for so doing, for France is said not to be in the least short of food, indeed she cannot be so.

Again, owing to the crews of our German submarines having attacked trading vessels, the British have not treated them as prisoners of war, but have imprisoned them. The Germans consider this unjust, "because our sailors were captured by the British while faithfully doing their duty"—which is undoubtedly true as far as the individual is concerned, whatever may be our opinion as to the sinking of trading vessels. Germany, however, not content with protesting, puts thirty-nine British officers under military arrest, knowing full well all the while that, even in the opinion of the Germans, they have done nothing dishonourable. Were the infringement of the Geneva Convention really considered a breach of law, and therefore as wrong, it would be impossible to act thus, for no one steals because some one else has done so, and no one treats a criminal except in accordance with right and law.

Reprisals, however, are never "right." Yet the only people to adopt this point of view, which it might be thought was absolutely obvious, were the Russian intellectuals, who, in their Appeal, stated that although the war was certainly accompanied by a great deal of barbarity, yet it was for the Russians to protest only against such barbarities as were committed by the Russian army: anything else was the concern of other nations.<sup>1</sup> All other nations, on the contrary, have protested only against "atrocities" committed by their enemies, and

<sup>1</sup> So far as can yet be told, it is the Russian army—contrary to the view generally prevailing—which is making more efforts than that of any other nation to act in accordance with the precepts of morality, and likewise to take advantage of this war to compel other nations to recognise Russia as a civilised power. This, of course, does not do away with the fact that Cossacks have committed gross excesses.

endeavoured to put the doings of their own armies in the best possible light.

Furthermore, no one will deny that, for instance, the invasion of Belgium, the torpedoing of merchant vessels, the use of poisonous gases, and much else besides are contrary to international law; but that, as Bethmann-Hollweg openly admitted in the Reichstag on August 4, 1914, supposing war to be allowable at all, international law is not unconditionally binding on a nation fighting for its existence. However much all right-thinking men may deplore this, it is impossible to say straight away that there is no justification for such an opinion. But it shows that the law of nations is simply not law, as is proved by these examples; but that, in the opinion of every normal man, there are exceptions and special cases in it. There ought to be no exception to Right, however. In any case it is not anything which can be measured out or made better or worse by something being added to or taken from it.

§ 143. THE RIGHT OF THE STRONGER.—True, there is yet another kind of right: the right of the stronger, which certainly is a right only in name, and has nothing whatever to do with any right for which there is any moral basis whatsoever. But combating prejudice is only too often neither more nor less than combating the misuse of words; and the fact of the same word being used for a right based on strength and a right based on a responsibility has assuredly done a great deal of mischief.

Now the German word *Recht* (right) contains two wholly diverse notions: moral right,<sup>1</sup> and prevailing right (law).<sup>2</sup> Finally there is the attempt made to combine the two senses in the word "justice,"<sup>3</sup> Man's subjective virtue.

This of course easily gives rise to misconceptions such as the right of superior strength—*la raison du plus fort*, as the French say. Now, that in actual fact strength often does create a right, even the Ancients were well aware, and Pindar speaks of "the victorious hand of law sanctifying the grossest violence."<sup>2</sup> Even in his time attempts were made to justify this right by natural science—Darwinistically, as it were. Callicles,<sup>3</sup> for

<sup>1</sup> The words "right," "law," and "justice" are put in the original in brackets and given in *English*. There is, indeed, great difficulty in translating certain passages of this and many other German books, owing to the same word, *Recht*, meaning *right* and also often *law*. For example, *Völkerrecht*—"law of nations."

—TRANS.

<sup>2</sup> Pindar in the *Laws* of Plato.

<sup>3</sup> Plato's *Gorgias*, 38.

instance, says: "In the State, as in Nature, the stronger must rule over the weaker, for natural security consists therein." Even Socrates<sup>1</sup> and Plato<sup>2</sup> assure us that "the right at present prevailing is based on the accident of power," but they claim, on moral grounds, that this ought not to be the case.

Since Socrates' time the question whether Man shall be a practical politician or an idealist has divided the world into two opposite camps; but although every one claiming the name of human being theoretically strives for that Right which he vaguely feels to be his immutable ideal, yet most men abide by the precept of the sober Aristotle, who was content to note the fact that Right, properly so called, did not exist on earth.

Only in the brief period when primitive Christianity prevailed did large numbers of human beings venture to dream dreams of justice, but the brutal facts of this rough world soon put an end to any such extravagances.<sup>3</sup> Even Spinoza<sup>4</sup> finally admitted that the right of each individual extended as far as his might, adding, in order to make this seem less brutal, that the divine spark lurking in every individual might be trusted to prevent too great encroachments on the part of Might.

This state of pessimistic irresolution continued a long while, as the writings of Hobbes, Malebranche,<sup>5</sup> and others testify; while the sharp distinction between this "vale of tears" and "celestial bliss" made the mass of the people consider any discussion of the question in principle impossible. Not till quite recent times did the masses evince a desire for "enjoying celestial bliss while still on earth," and again they began to wonder what, after all, their rights really were. But the revolutionaries of to-day fell into the mistake of the feudal oppressors of yesterday, and built up Right upon Might.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Memorabilia*, iv. 4 et seq.

<sup>2</sup> *Plato's Laws*, iv. 4.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. the chapter on War and Religion.

<sup>4</sup> "Quia unus quisque tantum juris habet, quantum potentia valet."—Spinoza's *Tractatus theologico-politicus*, 1670, cap. ii. § 8.

<sup>5</sup> Nicole Malebranche (1638-1715), French philosopher, who became a Roman Catholic priest. His philosophy has a certain resemblance to that of Berkeley, but his chief connection with English philosophy is through his pupil John Norris, an acute critic of John Locke. Malebranche's *Recherche de la Vérité* appeared in 1674, and his *Entretiens sur la Métaphysique* in 1688. The former was translated into English in 1694.—TRANS.

<sup>6</sup> Auguste Comte has some very wise words about this, the fundamental mistake of all modern revolutions. In *Leçon 46*, vol. iv. pp. 27 et seq. he shows that the founders of a new era always set to work with the methods of the old era.

That there should be a transition period is understandable, but unfortunate, not merely because the bloodshed, for instance during the French Revolution, must be ascribed to this theory, but also because it prevented the innovators from going really to the root of matters, that is, from being consistent. We shall see the reason for that inconsistency which has struck every one in such men as Robespierre and Saint-Just, if we reflect that they, too, wanted to base Right on Might.

Again, Ferdinand Lassalle is to-day popularly considered the first man to have advocated a Future State based on justice. Yet it is singular that he should at the same time have once more proclaimed the ancient doctrine of the right of superior strength; and also that, despite his having strongly opposed the notion of acquired or inherited rights, he should once more have raised the question whether Might or Right comes first. In his speeches and writings on constitutionalism, he adopted the attitude that constitutional questions, or, to use a more comprehensive word, questions of right, are questions of might, arguing that right, in so far as it exists, always depends on actually existing conditions of power, and that therefore written law cannot be lasting or of value except it exactly express these actually existing conditions of power.

Now, this would seem to justify all violence, war, plunder and what not besides, as the reactionaries of that day were astute enough to observe. Thus the *Kreuzzeitung*<sup>1</sup> wrote that the revolutionary Jew's instinct had led him to hit the right nail on the head. Von Roon,<sup>2</sup> then Prussian Minister of War, stated that "what history is mainly concerned about—the history not only of individual countries but also the internal history of each country—was neither more nor less than the struggle for and increase of power." Finally von Bismarck, then Prime Minister,<sup>3</sup> to a certain extent admitted that his Socialist opponent was right, opining that "such questions of right are usually settled, not by confronting one contradictory theory with another, but only gradually, by the practice prevailing in constitutional law." That is, considering who it was who used these words, it all depends on how powerful the country or countries concerned may be at the time. Whether Bismarck

<sup>1</sup> The *Kreuzzeitung* for June 8, 1862, No. 132.

<sup>2</sup> Von Roon's speech in the Prussian Chamber of Deputies, September 12, 1862. Bismarck's speech at the meeting of the Chamber on October 7, 1862.

actually used the words "Might comes before Right" was long disputed.<sup>1</sup>

§ 144. EVOLUTION AND REVOLUTION.—Whether these words were actually uttered or not, the phrase "Might comes before Right" has long become a fact, and the only question is whether it is to be a guiding principle.

If a man have been killed, however unjustly, no right can call him back to life; but this recognition of a fact does not mean that we think it justified, and even if what is done cannot be undone, we may still insist on its not happening so again. Not unless the killing of a human being does not offend any one's sense of right, as is the case with the execution of a murderer, does the matter end there. Otherwise society tries, as far as it can, to protest against the fact of the murder by punishing the murderer.

Hence the words "Might comes before Right" merely mean that it may happen that the conceptions of Right alter so radically that another Right has now generally succeeded in prevailing, although of course only with the help of Might. Of course it may be said that in the French Revolution Might prevailed. But the only reason why Might was able to prevail, and why the whole revolution did not soon fizzle out but revolutionised all conceptions of Right, was because men were already thinking of some such radical upheaval. It was universally felt that conditions before the revolution were wrong. A small minority were endeavouring to enforce alleged rights, which really no longer existed. Hence the victory won by the might of revolutionary ideas was in reality a victory of the new conceptions of Right. In a certain sense Right and Might are identical ideas, although only if it be realised that true Right alone has the Might permanently to prevail. In this sense the saying "Might comes before Right" is justified, but it can also be reversed into "Right comes before Might," which would mean that the new Right is actually more powerful than the old vested Might, however powerful the outward means by which it may be supported.

Modern Right will always struggle against ancient Might, and this it is which justifies revolutions. But modern Right will never succeed in prevailing unless the people, the mass of man-

<sup>1</sup> In 1863 they were attributed to him by Graf Schwerin, and the report spread everywhere. Bismarck protested, but it must be admitted that this was undoubtedly the sense of his speech, even although the words are not actually in the shorthand report of it.

kind, actually accept it; and before they can do this they must greatly modify their conceptions of Right. In other words, a revolution, which is always the work of some far-seeing genius, cannot come about unless evolution has already educated the world so as to be prepared for it.

All revolutions, whether fought out with spiritual weapons or by weapons of iron and steel, have had forerunners. These forerunners failed simply because the new Right had not yet become Might. Socrates died without having had any influence worth mentioning on the world in general; and henceforth the great revolution of Mankind is inseparably bound up with the name of Christ. Huss perished, but Luther prevailed; Galileo had publicly to abjure his own philosophy, but Newton followed, and with him modern science begins. Even the French Revolution could never have taken place unless Voltaire, Rousseau and many others had prepared the way for it.

Thus these forerunners personified the Right to a new order of things; the old order was corrupt even in their day; but the time had not yet come, Mankind was not yet ripe, and there had not been a sufficient change in the conception of Right, either from the political, scientific, or ethical standpoint.

That outward development of power which causes the final collapse of an already decayed structure is usually of merely secondary importance. It is not a cause but a symptom, but because so many people do not look below the surface and see only outward causes and effects, they imagine that it is this new development of power which has really caused a new conception of Right to prevail. Thus and in no other way could the saying "Might comes before Right" have arisen. The decisive factor, however, is always evolution, not revolution: the new conception of Right will and must prevail with or without revolts. But impatient Man often wants to make events move faster, and though sometimes he may have succeeded in so doing, he has quite as often merely delayed matters.

Similarly with regard to war. *If the German people possesses the physical and psychical qualifications for ruling the world, it will succeed in doing so without any war; and if it does not possess such qualifications, the winning of any number of wars will not alter this fact.*

As far as the settlement of actual questions of power is concerned, the war is merely an insignificant, temporary disaster;

and in no case is the saying "Might comes before Right," rightly interpreted, calculated to justify a display of force, on a scale, as it seems, hitherto unprecedented.

§ 145. WAR AND THE JUDGMENT OF GOD.—Only a good Christian can be a good soldier. This may seem like contempt of the Christian doctrine of "Love thy neighbour as thyself"; yet these words contain a truth which explains much that has happened, and may serve as an indication of what is to come. One thing, indeed, is certain. Among moral human beings none may draw the sword save he who believes in God. None save he who is firmly convinced that God awards the victory to him whose cause is just can be at once a soldier and a moral individual; for if no God guides the shot, then it is Might, not Right, which wins.

Now, there is really no necessity to insist on moral considerations in war which we are not accustomed seriously to take into account in any other human transactions. We might be content with saying, like Voltaire,<sup>1</sup> that a trifle more or less wrong in this most glorious of all worlds matters devilish little; and that when millions of men are being destroyed in the hideous struggle for supremacy, we can hardly grudge those who like such emotions as the pleasure of killing a few thousands in honest warfare. In any case, what's in a name? A man dies of a cancerous swelling, even if the doctor consoles him by calling it non-malignant; and the results of a war are equally inevitable whether we call it just or unjust. Even were it proved justifiable, this would not alter the fact of its being hideous.

Yet for most men there is a great deal in a name. Other beings endowed with reason do not understand this. The Lunar Princess Domiladosol,<sup>2</sup> for instance, rightly asks: "But in war why do not men appeal to arbitrators if they believe right is on their side?" But it is just the men of to-day who seem not to perceive the irony of such a question, and they lay more stress than ever on a war being "just." Frivolous and criminal wars, they say, ought to be prevented, and in these they include religious and dynastic wars and wars of conquest. Only a "fight for the Fatherland" is just, in which category people in Germany specially include the wars of 1813, 1870.

<sup>1</sup> *Candide ou l'Optimisme*, by Voltaire, 1759.

<sup>2</sup> *Histoire comique ou Voyage dans la lune*, by Cyrano de Bergerac, 1650, chap. iii.



and 1914.<sup>1</sup> But if even a professor of law such as Wilhelm Kahl passes over 1864 and 1866 in silence, which can hardly be wholly unintentional, yet most of his fellow-countrymen consider wars of conquest also just ; and only a handful of them would allow the fact of Belgium's being annexed or not in any way to affect their opinion of the war of 1914-1918. And though the Sultan of Turkey proclaimed the *Hetwah* or Holy War, that is a *religious* war, this does not make him any less valuable as an ally than Austria. Yet Austria, which is held together only by the Hapsburg Dynasty, could scarcely wage any save a *dynastic* war. And religious and dynastic wars are supposed to be frivolous and criminal !

No, it matters not what epithet we apply to war, but for this very reason is it worth while going into "the justice of war," in order to prove that the few who have ever seriously and impartially called war just have in reality always relied upon the "right of the stronger," that is on a sort of supposed justice based on natural science.<sup>2</sup> This, as I propose to show, has nothing whatever to do either with Right or natural science ; which at once answers the objection that war and peace cannot be determined by natural science alone, and that there are also profound ethical causes underlying war.

Moreover, it is a fact that Man has considered war not merely as a test of power or strength, but always as a means of ascertaining who is in the Right. It was the deluded mystics who used to make the judgments of God an integral part of the institution of law, who have sanctified war, as it were. It used to be believed that in a duel God gave the victory to the combatant with right on his side ; and that an innocent person did not sink in water, and was not scorched by red-hot iron nor affected by poison. Similarly it was believed that the heavenly hosts placed their shields in front of that army which was waging the war desired by God.

The world has long since ceased to believe in God's personal intervention in war. It is known that "God is ever on the side of the big battalions." But the notion that there is still some sort of justice in war seems ineradicable, despite the fact that the least reflection shows that any possibility of the just man

<sup>1</sup> *Vom Recht zum Krieg und vom Siegespreis* (On the Right to make War and the Fruits of Victory), by Professor Kahl, 1914.

<sup>2</sup> Dr. Kahl, the authority on criminal law, for instance, expressly states in one of his addresses : "War is a natural force in the history of the whole world."

winning must be based on the intervention of a higher principle representing justice. The educated believer will assuredly hardly believe that this omnipotent principle can be modified by force of arms ; but the uneducated and superstitious, who imagine they can use their God for their own selfish ends, will invoke His name on behalf of their real or imaginary right.

### III. SOME PRELIMINARY REFLECTIONS ON ALTRUISM

§ 146. NATURAL LAW AND PURPOSE.—It would seem an impossibility to insist on natural duties, since Nature knows neither right nor wrong. Even the phrase “ natural law ” is after all misleading. The ancient Greeks racked their brains a long time as to whether this, that or the other was a “ natural ” or a “ human institution.” Not till a fairly recent period was it thought possible to settle the question by deciding that these things were “ a natural institution.”

In modern science the phrase “ natural law ” is now one which every one understands. Nevertheless, it is still a reminder that we once believed in something which laid down laws for Nature. According to a man’s point of view, he considered these laws just or unjust, and then a belief in the existence of a natural law of course necessarily arose. In reality, however, there is neither law nor right in Nature, but only *facts* and *necessities*, or, to put the matter in a nutshell, *conditions* under which something happens or does not happen. Were it a law that iron follows a magnet, then of course the one must always follow the other ; but in reality magnetism is only *one* of the conditions by which iron can be moved, and if, for example, in any particular case gravitation preponderates over magnetism, then iron does not obey this so-called law.

Given the right conditions, anything is possible ; but as a matter of fact possibilities are mostly so much reduced by all manner of “ necessary ” conditions, that one particular possibility of necessity intervenes. A stone in any position in space could, so far as itself is concerned, move in any direction whatsoever, if it only receives the proper impulse ; but as gravitation acts everywhere on earth, the stone will always tend to move towards the centre of the earth, unless there be a special cause why it should not do so.

Similarly, in the nature of things every human being has the

power of doing everything within the limits of his physical strength. He can, if he pleases, call this power his inborn right. Thus, to quote one instance, there is undoubtedly no natural law to prevent any human being from killing others, stealing their belongings, violating women, idling, and getting infectious diseases and dying. In this sense also each individual and each nation has a "right" to wage war.

But to call the possibility of doing all this "a right" can at best create confusion, for such a possibility has nothing in common with what we call a right. Indeed, in the case of war it is opposed to every conceivable right. Broadly and generally it may be said that, in order to select the one legitimate course from the heterogeneous collection of courses open to us, we must have some object or purpose in view to guide us. But such a purpose transcends Nature. It is probably within the province of natural science to note that some such regard for moral obligations is present in the case of a certain proportion of human beings. Similarly it can note the fact that magnetism occurs in certain substances. Natural science does not know what magnetism is or what moral obligations are, but in both cases it can inquire "under what conditions they occur."

§ 147. **INBORN RIGHTS.**—For instance, it is a fact that most human beings (or, for the sake of prudence, let us say some of them) shrink from committing murder. Whether the word "right" or "fact" be applied to this shrinking does not matter. Similarly it is an undeniable fact that certain persons do not feel any such horror, and that such persons are to be found not only among primitive peoples but even among modern Europeans. Some of them have insane or criminal tendencies, but others seem absolutely normal. At times, indeed, it seems as if almost the entire population of a country absolutely cease to feel such horror. All this is a fact, and, if we please, an inborn right. In any case no one is in a position to restrict this right, and to this extent it is really inalienable. If a man's brain is so constructed that every murder seems to him necessarily sinful, then no written law in the world, no persuasion and no punishment would enable me to deprive him of his conviction. But probably the exercise of such a right can be prevented; and as a matter of fact the State generally does prevent its citizens from giving way to any inclination to enrich themselves by murdering one another; but on the contrary, for a short period

it compels men—even men who have a horror of blood—to kill others. In the first case the result is that in Germany scarcely 400 cases of murder or manslaughter occur in a year—that is, one in every 250,000 of the population. In the second case it may probably be said, although no exact statistics are available, that during the war the number of men who refused to kill to order has hardly been more, proportionately. That is, one in 25,000—in both cases a wholly insignificant percentage.

Now, individuals have of course just as much an inborn right to love killing or to hate it, as to order or forbid others to kill; but even here it is obviously better to refer to such variations not as rights but as divergent possibilities of human nature. In particular, to order and forbid anything is to place limitations on it in precisely the same sort of way as limitations are placed on every natural phenomenon. Every stone falls—that is, it must fall, or, if you will, it has a right to fall. Indeed, we have become accustomed to describe this as a natural law. But we need only put a sufficiently strong support beneath it, and the stone, although still having a right (!) to fall, ceases to do so. We may say that it has now merely a tendency to fall.

If now I place restrictions on a stone on every side, in other words, if I build it into a building, then I deprive it of a number of possibilities of movement, though not of all. It still expands when the sun shines on it and trembles when sounds are made. Indeed, owing to its cohesion with the other stones it has actually acquired more stability and force of resistance, but it is no longer possible for it to fall down at will, or, for instance, to bash in a man's head.

Even so are human beings welded together into large organisations. Their "tendencies" or "inborn rights" still subsist, but it has become impossible for them to give way to these tendencies. Thus any one belonging to a State can no longer murder at will, because by so doing he ceases to be a member of that State.<sup>1</sup> It is therefore merely idle to refer to these so-called inborn human rights. They are far too numerous, and, being altogether peculiar to the individual, cannot be made the same for every one.

Conversely, we may claim that any one feeling absolutely

<sup>1</sup> Even Seneca compares human society to a stone vault which would collapse if one part did not support another: "*Societas nostra lapidum fornicationi simillima est: quæ casura, nisi invicem obstarent, hoc ipso sustinetur.*"—*Epistolæ*, xciv.

impelled to wage war has a right to feel thus, and is also entitled to act upon his impulse, provided society in general does not prevent him from so doing. But any one feeling absolutely impelled to protest against war has also an inalienable right to do so, and is also entitled to protest openly, provided society in general does not prevent him from so doing.

To put it briefly, it is open to every living thing, everything that exists at all, to gain a foothold for itself, and it tends to do this, and therefore has a right to do so. But this means struggle; and it is this innate, inalienable right to struggle which is the highest thing known to mankind. Now, not a single one of all these rights for which we may struggle is preferred before any other. Hence it does not seem possible to make any general deduction from them. The right to struggle is the one thing ever present; and it might be contended that it is the *only truly natural right which can be recognised*.

§ 148. THE RIGHT TO WAGE WAR.—Here we come in contact with the unique problem of war; and it would seem as if this unrestricted struggle of all against all must mean hopeless anarchy and never-ending war, but this is only apparently so. Suppose we are determined to exercise this right to struggle and to survive, but not after the manner of a stone or a bomb, which flies on its way and attains its aim by senseless destruction of every obstacle, unless it meet with equally senseless destruction by encountering too severe resistance. Suppose, rather, that we mean to exercise our right as thinking individuals, knowing what we want. Then we must be quite clear as to what we are really fighting for, and for love of whom—for ourselves, for the country, for civilisation, for our God, or for whatsoever else. Furthermore, we must consider the means wherewith we are going to wage our struggle, for struggle does not necessarily mean war. War is but one of the many possible variations of struggle, which can be carried on in all manner of ways, by persuasion or by force, by labour or by destruction, by the work of the head or by that of the hand.

Hence there are many objects of struggle and many ways of struggling; and in each individual case the question arises whether a particular weapon will serve to attain any particular purpose. For instance, even the most narrow-minded theologians must have perceived by now that, if a man wishes to fight for his God, he had best not have recourse to cannon, as

for many hundreds of years was thought to be the case. In fact, it is altogether questionable whether war is the best means of attaining any human object whatever, whether national or international.

Now, supposing we admit a natural right to struggle, and see the Alpha and Omega of all progress in "inspiring war." Then, I say, we are obliged to ask of what use war has been and of what use it can be. It is this practical aspect of the question of war with which I hope to deal, and I trust I shall show that war is not a suitable method of attaining any conceivable purpose. This, however, does not quite go to the root of the matter, for then we must assume that all human beings act with a definite purpose. But there may be people who refuse to admit the need for having a set purpose, saying that just as they delight in a woman's embraces without any consciousness of an "inspiring purpose," similarly they delight in war, and mean to wage war, even were there no object in so doing—merely for war's sake. Was not the Venus Hetæra always more beloved than the Venus Genetrix? Such persons must be accepted as a fact, and we have no right to criticise them even if we dislike them. The only way to get the better of them is by natural science, which sets out from no preconceived ideas whatever. Now for the first time the full advantage of this method will appear in regard to the dissemination of truth.

Natural science asks under what conditions a stone falls, and under what conditions it does not fall, taking no account of whether in falling it does harm or not. So must we proceed in regard to war, first purely inductively and empirically stating the conditions which, considering how many outlets there are for human energy, have yet made war a necessity. No other method of procedure would lead us to a clear issue. Frischeisen-Köhler,<sup>1</sup> for instance, tries to prove deductively that it is possible for the world to live at peace, and comes to the conclusion that "no natural evolution can cause the disappearance of wars," and this precisely because "they are not a natural necessity."

At first we are inclined to think that here is a misprint, and that the word "not" ought to have been omitted, for if war were really a necessity, then it could not become extinct,

<sup>1</sup> *Das Problem des ewigen Friedens* (The Problem of Perpetual Peace), by the still living German philosopher Frischeisen-Köhler. Müller, Berlin, 1915.

whereas on the contrary if it is *not* a necessity, then it has no real justification for its existence, and might very easily become extinct. Frischeisen-Köhler, however, really means what he writes, and hence his deductions are not so wholly illogical. If we assume that anything in the world is there by chance, then its further evolution must also be chance, and nothing definite can be predicted about it. The Berlin philosopher's conclusion, therefore, is wholly unimportant. His premises are that war is a chance event, but from this it neither follows that it will continue to exist nor that it will pass away.

Hence, in order to form a useful conception of war, it was needful first and foremost to endeavour to conceive it as a necessity in isolated instances; for only when we see under what conditions it is necessary can we decide under what conditions it is superfluous, or rather, impossible.<sup>1</sup>

§ 149. THE LAW OF THE ORGANISM.—We know now that war was, so to speak, a passing phase in mankind's strivings after higher things; we know that its day has really gone by, and that it survives only by virtue of a right sanctified by custom. And now we can inquire what is the real, and, as we think, indestructible and eternal principle of mankind. It may, it is true, be asked whether there is, after all, any such principle, and whether, beyond the categorical imperatives of the individual human being, there exists an automatic, superordinate imperative, which applies to all human beings alike, and by which the justifications of individual imperatives may be gauged. Now, we shall find that there is such a universal moral law, and, strange as this may at first sight appear, it is based upon man's physical nature. Hence it is categorical in quite another sense than that in which Buddha, Christ, or Kant could insist on their moral laws being categorical. Its precepts, however, are identical with those of these three teachers.

This universal moral law, moreover, could be inferred as soon as the conception of natural law was made clearer. A right based on the decision of an individual alone must always be questionable, so long as it may conflict with other rights. The basis of such a natural right or natural tendency must therefore be some independent organism which has no need to respect any rights but its own.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. the chapters on the justification for war from the standpoint of the natural scientist.

Now, here on earth, first the individual, and secondly the human organism as a whole, alone fulfil these conditions. The individual owes his privileged position to the fact, which no one can well deny, that his functions form together a comparatively complete and independent whole. The complete human organism, supposing it to exist at all, which is what we mean to prove, has of course the same privileged situation. Humanity as a whole, indeed, is upon earth virtually entirely cut off from ancient, superordinate, cosmic influences; and thus is not obliged to respect any rights of others.

All connecting terms, however, such as the family or the State, are only casual and mutable products of our changing customs, and can therefore not be considered as natural, but at most as conventional agglomerations. The only organisms which are immutable and consequently above all conventions, must be the individual and mankind in general. They therefore form the basis of all Right, and there is only the right of mankind in general and the right of the individual who is conscious that he is in the right as regards all the world. Then, but only then, is he justified in being a revolutionary.

The sensation which we experience because we feel we all belong to one vast organism, we call *altruism*; but that which we experience because of the fact that we, as personalities, to a certain extent form distinct, individual organisms, we call *egoism*. Altruism and egoism are therefore not unconditional opposites, but the same sentiment directed to a different object. Egoism we need not stop to consider; it flourishes like the green bay-tree; but altruism must be proved to be the necessary equivalent of something actually existing.

#### IV. THE HISTORY OF ALTRUISM

§ 150. THE TWOFOLD BASIS OF ALTRUISM.—All morality is based on the presence of altruism.

The word itself is new, having been coined scarcely a hundred years ago by Comte,<sup>1</sup> who rightly considered it as embracing all the conditions of civilisation and morality.

The term is used by every one in much the same sense, for after all it is merely a verbal difference whether a desire be

<sup>1</sup> This is according to the German philosopher Eisler, but it can be traced further back still, for Seneca's *alteri vivere* really means altruism.



called altruistic if it be likely to benefit others,<sup>1</sup> or to satisfy them,<sup>2</sup> or in general to do them "good."<sup>3</sup> The only point of disagreement is how far altruism serves a good purpose or is allowable. It is possible to be altruistic without limit, as certain Christians would fain have us be; but altruism can also be restricted by declaring it contrary to morality unless it promote evolution, or, in the words of the German philosopher Cornelius,<sup>4</sup> if it take no account of the emotional experiences of our individual fellow-men, but considers only what is permanently beneficial to the world in general.

It is not till we come to the basis of altruism that opinions are divided. Can altruistic sentiments arise in Man, and if so how? And can an individual apparently apart put himself, as it were, absolutely in the place of another? And if so, how? These questions are generally answered in two diametrically opposite ways. The simplest way of getting out of the difficulty is to say that altruism, like so much else, is innate. We can understand why the ancients said this, since they knew nothing about the history of evolution. Aristotle<sup>5</sup> calls Man simply a ζῷον πολιτικόν, the Stoics<sup>6</sup> believed that Man was a social animal for the good of the nations in general, and, finally, Hume speaks of Man having an innate sense of what is generally for the best. All this we can understand; but when Spencer<sup>7</sup> says that altruism is something as primitive as egoism; when John Stuart Mill<sup>8</sup> and Wilhelm Wundt repeat almost precisely the same thing; and when Simmel<sup>9</sup> calls altruism an inherited instinct but Ribot<sup>10</sup> says the altruistic instinct is inherited, then we can only say they might have known they were really saying nothing at all.

Those who consider altruism as egoism in disguise are more logical, but even this view is old, and in reality it is held by all religions, which certainly do insist on altruism; but, probably

<sup>1</sup> As does Herbert Spencer, in his *Principles of Morality*, 1892, § 72.

<sup>2</sup> As does the German philosopher Theodor Lipps, in *Ethische Grundfragen* (Root-Questions of Ethics), 1889, p. 11.

<sup>3</sup> As does the German-Galician philosopher Alexius Meinong, in *Untersuchungen zur Werttheorie* (Investigations into the Theory of Values), 1899, p. 99.

<sup>4</sup> *Einleitung in die Philosophie* (An Introduction to Philosophy), by the German philosopher H. Cornelius, 1903.

<sup>5</sup> Aristotle's *Politics*, i. 2.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. L. Annæus Seneca, *De ira*, ii. 3.

<sup>7</sup> *Principles of Morality*, 1892, § 76.

<sup>8</sup> *Collected Works*, 1869.

<sup>9</sup> *Einleitung in die Moralwissenschaft* (Introduction to Moral Science), by the still living German philosopher Simmel, i. 92. Published 1892.

<sup>10</sup> *Psychologie des Sentiments*, by Théodule Armand Ribot, 1896, § 325. (Translated into English as *The Psychology of the Emotions*.)

because their founders are mostly intellectual weaklings, they consider the satisfaction of a selfish sentiment of happiness as the sole motive for morality. Thus they try to encourage altruism by first appealing to egoism, by promising either earthly bliss (as in the Fourth Commandment of Moses) or bliss in a visionary immortality.

We have four direct testimonies<sup>1</sup> to the fact that Christ said that self-sacrifice, that is altruism, is in reality the sublimest form of egoism. "Whosoever will save his life shall lose it; but whosoever shall lose his life for My sake and the gospel's, the same shall save it" (Mark viii. 35). There could not be a grosser tribute to the egoism innate in every human being; but almost all religious doctrines are alike in this respect. Christ finds eternal bliss in the "beyond" and the Buddhist finds blessed oblivion, the Mohammedan finds houris and the Indian well-stocked hunting-grounds. Even the religious Seneca<sup>2</sup> says, with an egoistic undertone: "Wilt thou truly live for thyself, then must thou live for others."

Even if in religions the egoistic impulse appears only in disguise, yet it is afterwards frankly and consciously expressed, particularly by British writers. For instance, Hobbes<sup>3</sup> attributes right and morality to selfish impulses towards self-preservation and to the fact that we are all mutually dependent on one another. Hobbes argues that as Man soon perceived that he got along better if he took others' interests into consideration, he acts altruistically from egoistic motives.

Those who argued thus are in general the same as those who attributed Right to utility (cf. § 151). What they have said is all very well as far as it goes. Yet all high-sounding phrases, such as Ihering's "egoism of groups" and Meinong's "selfless egoism,"<sup>4</sup> are merely definitions, and explain nothing. Also it matters little whether we love or hate egoism. Kant, for instance,<sup>5</sup> says it is the self-seeking element in man's sensual nature which is "radically wrong." Dühring<sup>6</sup> even says that

<sup>1</sup> Matthew x. 39; Mark viii. 35; Luke xvii. 33; and John xii. 25.

<sup>2</sup> "Alteri vivere oportet, si vis tibi vivere."—Seneca's *Epistolæ*, xlviii. 2. Cf. also lx. 4.

<sup>3</sup> Hobbes, *De cive*, cap. i. § 2.

<sup>4</sup> Alexius Meinong, *op. cit.* p. 103.

<sup>5</sup> Kant's *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft* (Critique of Practical Reason), 1788, Part I. vol. i. 2; and *Anthropologie*, i. § 2.

<sup>6</sup> *Wirklichkeitsphilosophie* (Philosophy of Reality), by Eugen Dühring, 1878, p. 139. [Dühring was born 1833 and died 1901. He was a German philosopher, and a bitter opponent of Darwin.—TRANS.]

egoism is nowise natural, but a product of degeneracy and corruption. On the other hand, Schopenhauer<sup>1</sup> describes egoism (that "impulse towards being and well-being") as the mainspring of action both in human beings and animals; Stirner<sup>2</sup> declares that the Ego is autocratic; and finally, Nietzsche<sup>3</sup> insists that the egoistic view of the world is the *dominant morality* and above the altruistic morality of slaves. All which views and definitions matter equally much—or equally little.

§ 151. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE "ENGLISH" DOCTRINE OF UTILITARIANISM.—In reality these two possible bases of morality are no longer of much interest to-day. But the antithesis between the two points of view to a certain extent still concerns us, because we in Germany have been accustomed proudly to insist on the fact that, instead of a utilitarian morality fit only for a nation of shopkeepers, we possess an absolute morality based on a categorical imperative; and that this morality ordains that every one shall act morally, "however much he may injure himself or others in so doing."<sup>4</sup> Even those who do not believe in such an absolute morality may think it desirable at any rate to apply some form of morality, even should it be on a false basis.

Now, we may readily admit that Kant's transcendental morality is scarcely suited to serve as a basis for conduct on the battle-field; the German 1902 Rules of Land Warfare are accordingly utilitarian, whether they mean to be so or not. Above all, however, this war has proved that it is just the most cultivated persons who are likely to say to themselves that, as they cannot now follow Kant's moral precepts, although these are the only true ones, therefore they conform to no morality, but do what it is their business to do as destructive machines under the stern compulsion of iron necessity.

Now, it is out of the question to base a war morality on Kant's "dignity of Man." Hence we ought—and indeed a nation at war must, at any rate try to discover some other basis

<sup>1</sup> *Über die Grundlagen der Moral* (The Foundations of Morality), 1830, § 14.

<sup>2</sup> *Der einzige und sein Eigentum* (The Individual and his Property), by Max Stirner (real name Kaspar Schmidt), 1845.

<sup>3</sup> In *Zarathustra*, but the idea is more definitely expressed in *Jenseits von Gut und Böse*, by Friedrich Nietzsche.

<sup>4</sup> *Über ein vermeintliches Recht, aus Menschenliebe zu lügen* (On the Alleged Right to Lie from Considerations of Humanity), by Kant, 1797.

for its morality. That is, unless it is to be altogether at sea. Thus the exigencies of war quite naturally lead us towards that so-called "selfish system" which we, not wholly without justification, are accustomed to consider a somewhat contemptible speciality of our relations across the Channel. But instead of endeavouring to view it impartially, our pillars of civilisation are just now doing their utmost to pour contempt upon it.

The chief reason for the scorn with which utilitarianism was received is probably that its opponents considered that utility must necessarily presuppose a selfish motive, which is both wrong and unjust. I have already shown, and in Chapter XII. propose to show in more detail, that in the last resort egoism and altruism by no means exclude each other, but are really identical. Now this modern view it is which is mainly based on the works of British philosophers. They successfully endeavoured to combat egoism by centring all their reflections around the *race*, and then laying down "natural laws of benevolence."

The fact that in Germany we are still so violently opposed to the British is probably mainly due to the Christian conservative philosophers, particularly to Professor Immanuel Hermann Fichte,<sup>1</sup> the son of the great Fichte, and to Friedrich Julius Stahl,<sup>2</sup> member of the High Consistory Court. Both these men, in the worst reactionary period, blackguarded the English because of their philosophy, which, as Stahl so neatly puts it, tends towards revolution. Moreover, both always attribute purely egoistic views to Englishmen whenever the latter refer to the greatest good of the greatest number (that is to altruism). In so doing, however, they utterly ignore Hume, to whom this scarcely applies at all, and also Hutchinson. But *sapienti sat*, and after all it was the opinions of Fichte and Stahl concerning British philosophy which prevailed.

Now, the doctrine propounded by Hobbes<sup>3</sup> in the middle of the seventeenth century, that morality was due to utility, was

<sup>1</sup> *Die philosophischen Lehren von Recht und Sitte in Deutschland, Frankreich und England* (The Philosophical Doctrines of Law and Morality in Germany, France and England), by I. H. Fichte, 1850.

<sup>2</sup> *Philosophie des Rechtes nach griechischer Ansicht* (The Philosophy of Right according to the Views of the Greeks), by Friedrich Julius Stahl, 1830.

<sup>3</sup> *De cive*, Paris, 1642; *De hominis natura*, London, 1650, and *Leviathan*, London, 1651.

far from being absolutely new. The Epicurean natural philosophers had already prepared men's minds for it. Again, at almost the same time Spinoza<sup>1</sup> was teaching similar doctrines at Amsterdam, which, it is true, had for some years past ceased to form a part of the German Empire, but was still very much under the influence of German ideas. Nevertheless it is true that Hobbes was the first systematically to base morality on utility. English philosophers, such as Butler<sup>2</sup> and Paley,<sup>3</sup> Priestley,<sup>4</sup> Hartley,<sup>5</sup> and particularly Jeremy Bentham,<sup>6</sup> who in 1802 first used the word "Utilitarianism," certainly developed this doctrine, but at the same time they did more and more to efface the egoistic substratum of the so-called selfish system by substituting the good of the community in general for the good of the individual. It is likewise true that such British writers as Chesterfield<sup>7</sup> and Jonathan Swift<sup>8</sup> popularised this system, sometimes because they agreed with it and sometimes ironically.

It must not be forgotten, however, that the impulse given by Hobbes determined the whole trend of ideas throughout the civilised world in the ensuing period; and that none of the succeeding philosophers in any civilised country could shake off his influence. Among those who have drawn practical inferences from his works, sometimes pushing them to extremes, the Germans were well to the fore; and in particular I might mention Thomasius,<sup>9</sup> Christian Wolf,<sup>10</sup> Frederick II.<sup>11</sup> and Nicolai,<sup>12</sup> also Holbach,<sup>13</sup> who wrote in French, down to

<sup>1</sup> The chief writings of Spinoza which here come into consideration were not published till after his death.

<sup>2</sup> *Three Sermons on Human Nature*, by Bishop Joseph Butler, 1726.

<sup>3</sup> Paley's *Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy*, 1785.

<sup>4</sup> Joseph Priestley's *Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity*, 1777.

<sup>5</sup> Hartley's *Observations on Man, his Frame, his Duty and his Expectations*, 1749.

<sup>6</sup> *Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*, by Jeremy Bentham, 1789.

<sup>7</sup> Particularly in his *Letters to his Son*, 1774.

<sup>8</sup> Particularly in his "philosophical travel-romance" *Gulliver's Travels*, 1726.

<sup>9</sup> Christian Thomasius (1655-1728), a Saxon philosopher and jurist. *Einleitung zur Sittenlehre* (Introduction to the Doctrine of Morality), 1692.

<sup>10</sup> *Philosophia moralis*, by the Silesian philosopher, Christian Wolf.

<sup>11</sup> *Examen du "Prince" de Machiavel*, 1739, by Frederick II. of Brandenburg. See also many passages from his letters to Voltaire.

<sup>12</sup> Christoph Friedrich Nicolai (1733-1811), German littérateur and bookseller. See especially many volumes of his *Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek* (Universal German Library), 1765-1791, in which he voiced the opposition to Kant, Fichte and Goethe, that is, to the then new movement of thought.

<sup>13</sup> *Éléments de la morale universelle*, 1776, by Paul Heinrich Thyry d'Holbach (1723-1789).

Nietzsche. And modern German jurists, such as Beneke,<sup>1</sup> Ihering<sup>2</sup> and Gizycki,<sup>3</sup> to say nothing of such men as Kohler, adopt an out-and-out utilitarian standpoint.

On the other hand, Englishmen, especially Locke,<sup>4</sup> but also Henry More,<sup>5</sup> Cudworth,<sup>6</sup> Richard Price,<sup>7</sup> and most of all Shaftesbury,<sup>8</sup> have protested against this utilitarian doctrine.

Most important of all, however, David Hume,<sup>9</sup> one of the most brilliant thinkers whom not only England but the world has ever known, succeeded in showing, basing his arguments on Hobbes's writings, that even without metaphysics it is possible, at all events, to recognise the fact that morality may be wholly disinterested. He took sympathy as the mainspring of his ideas, unconsciously reverting to the Peripatetics' and Stoics' conception of it. These schools looked upon the world as being held together by sympathy, and as merely the expression of a single great organism. Hume is therefore really the founder of modern morality, which is no longer based on metaphysics, but applies to all human beings indiscriminately. His doctrines were afterwards developed, particularly by John Stuart Mill, Herbert Spencer, Adam Smith and Charles Darwin, and to some extent also by German natural philosophers.

I have instanced all these authors, and I might have instanced many more, to show how wrongly men's writings are frequently interpreted. The modern doctrine of utilitarianism may, in short, be summarised as "*that the aim and object of our actions is the greatest possible happiness of the greatest possible number of human beings.*"<sup>10</sup> Now let us see how Germany ensures this.

<sup>1</sup> *Grundsätze der Zivil- und Kriminalgesetzgebung* (Principles of Civil and Criminal Legislation), by M. Beneke, 1830.

<sup>2</sup> *Kampf ums Recht* (The Fight for the Right), in particular *Der Zweck im Recht* (The Object of Right), by Rudolf von Ihering.

<sup>3</sup> *Philosophische Konsequenzen der Lamarck-Darwinischen Entwicklungstheorie* (The Philosophical Consequences of Lamarck's and Darwin's Theories of Evolution), by G. von Gizycki, 1876.

<sup>4</sup> *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, by John Locke, 1690.

<sup>5</sup> *Enchiridion ethicum*, by Henry More, 1667.

<sup>6</sup> *Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality*, by Ralph Cudworth, 1731.

<sup>7</sup> *Letters on Materialism and Philosophical Necessity*, by Richard Price, 1778.

<sup>8</sup> *Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions and Times*, by Anthony Ashley Cooper, third Earl of Shaftesbury, 1713.

<sup>9</sup> Hume ventilated such arguments even in 1738, in his *Treatise upon Human Nature*, published at the age of twenty-seven. In his later works he was constantly departing from modern utilitarianism, and reverting to these arguments.

<sup>10</sup> *Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*, by Jeremy Bentham, II. chap. xvii. p. 234.

§ 152. THE EVOLUTION OF KANTIAN MORALITY.—To this practical maxim Kant<sup>1</sup> opposed his categorical imperative. He based it on doctrines extending back as far as Plato, although on practical reason as well. According to Kant's "categorical imperative," "*Man ought to act in accordance with a maxim which may at the same time prevail as a universal law.*"

Now, without expressing an opinion as to the value of and basis for these two maxims, it is certain that any one desirous of acting morally *can* do so without infringing either; but it is not so certain that any one following only one of them *must* act morally in all circumstances. At all events no general injustice could ever result from the so-called English doctrine, although from the "German" doctrine a good deal inevitably follows which, leaving objective justice out of account, seems to us after all subjectively right and reasonable.

Hence the English doctrine is undoubtedly more practical than that of Kant, because an objective test can be applied to it, whereas, however much we may try to avoid it, there will always be a subjective remainder in the case of a categorical imperative. Besides this, Kant's doctrine, strictly interpreted, cannot be carried out in practice. Human beings, after all, vary greatly, and there is no universal maxim applicable alike to a weak-brained individual and to a genius. For instance, a genius has a right to revolt, but if every human being claimed such a right, the result would be universal anarchy. Whether an individual, however, has a right to resist this indolent world, he alone can decide; and if he does so without regard to the interests of people in general, then he is drifting about aimlessly on the ocean of limitless subjectivity.

Now, it is certain that an upright man will act uprightly quite apart from Kant, Hobbes, or Hume; while a rogue will remain a rogue, whether he call himself a Kantian or a disciple of Hobbes. It does not seem a mere chance, however, that Hobbes should have been born in England and Kant in Germany, although he was of British descent. The Germans have always considered independent, original thought as their province, and often as their privilege as well. In this respect they believe themselves superior to all other nations; whereas the Englishman's love of tradition and of old-established law was often ridiculed as a feeling akin to that of slaves accustomed

<sup>1</sup> Kant's *Metaphysik der Sitten* (Metaphysics of Morals).

to be driven in gangs. Your Englishman, it was said, is after all a slave, despite his political liberty.

Some such distinction there would really seem to be, and its causes are probably to be found deep down in the education and peculiar genius of the German and English nations. It profoundly affects all the external aspects of life, particularly those practical notions of right which have developed in both nations as time has gone on. Schopenhauer assuredly manifested extraordinary psychological perspicacity when he said <sup>1</sup> that *the German is all for equity, but the Briton is for justice*, adding that *equity is the enemy of justice, and often grossly conflicts with it*.

This is not the place to discuss which is the nobler quality, objective justice or subjective equity, although personally I incline to Schopenhauer's view that if human beings are to be able to live together justice is of much the more importance. In any case justice is more suited to every-day life.

It is interesting to trace what has happened in Germany. Setting out from Kant, we have gradually, by a circuitous route via equity, come utterly to deny laws of universal application and wholly to accept a utilitarian doctrine. In England, on the contrary, men have set out from Hobbes, and have arrived, by a circuitous route via Hume's "sympathy," unconditionally to admit established standards.

Kant's morality is based on the subjective categorical imperative; and it is no chance that such a pessimist as Schopenhauer, such an ultra-Radical as Stirner,<sup>2</sup> and such a super-man as Nietzsche, all alleged that the basis of their philosophy was Kant. Even if it cannot for a moment be suggested that the ideas of any one of these three were unethical, the fact remains that it is their school which has produced such men as Moltke and Bernhardi, who proclaim the doctrine that for the strong man every means, even forcible means, of getting stronger is allowable.

§ 153. THE ABUSE OF KANT'S DOCTRINE.—Now, even in the *Handbook of the Usages of Land Warfare*, published by the German General Staff, the principle is always adopted that the necessities of war override any written law introduced by

<sup>1</sup> *Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik* (The Two Root-Problems of Ethics), by Schopenhauer, II. § 17, p. 222.

<sup>2</sup> Pseudonym for Kaspar Schmidt, German philosopher, died 1856.—TRANS.



international conventions. The attitude to be adopted towards restrictive legislation of this kind depends on the judgment of the individuals concerned.

It is easy to see that such instructions, which take no account of anything except of possible advantage, strike at the very roots of all international agreements, and in particular they make the precepts of the Hague Convention about the Laws and Customs of Land Warfare virtually illusory. As I have frequently pointed out, war is restricted and in a sense impeded by such conventions. But if a nation signs them, then, in so doing, it binds itself thenceforward to wage war under these more difficult conditions.

No one denies that the General Staff was justified in assuming that, judging by the experience of warfare, France would be most successfully attacked by a march through Belgium. The chief ground for this assumption, however, must have been that France, relying somewhat on international conventions, had fortified this part of her frontier less than any others. But whether France could be most successfully attacked via Belgium, or not, was no longer the question. By the 1839 Neutrality Law, Germany had become a guarantor of the inviolability of Belgium, and in so doing she herself erected an insurmountable wall along the Belgian frontier. She herself had put an obstacle in the way of war, just as France had done, although this is now beside the point. And now it was for Germany to fight under these more difficult conditions.

She did not do so. She set herself up above objective justice as laid down by conventions, arguing that there was so much at stake for Germany that it was allowable for her to do what best suited her own purposes, without troubling about law. I am firmly convinced that both the Grand General Staff and Bethmann-Hollweg, who defended Germany's action, were, subjectively, absolutely convinced that in this particular case they did right to substitute Germany's advantage for Germany's duty; and that the laws of equity justified their action. But these laws of equity can never be definitely ascertained, and Germans must not be surprised if others, both nations and individuals, do not altogether appreciate them. England, however, declared war as a guarantor of the inviolability of Belgian neutrality, as it was her duty to do in accordance with the wording of the law which guaranteed it.

Since the war began there have been more cases of objective violations of law. I omit all mention of horrible isolated acts, which may be excused upon the ground of fear, confusion, lack of discipline, or absence of supervision; but some proclamations of General von Bülow, Lieutenant-General von Nieber, and Field-Marshal von der Goltz cannot be explained except as deliberate violations of law. It is to be hoped that the authors of these proclamations knew that they flatly conflict with the regulations of the Second Hague Conference.<sup>1</sup> For instance, according to Article 50 of the Hague Convention, no collective punishment in money or otherwise may be inflicted;<sup>2</sup> the torpedoing of merchant vessels conflicts with the Convention concerning Prize Courts, the use of poisonous gases is expressly forbidden, etc. All which is bad, but not the worst.

War is not a moral action. Now, whoever says A must also say B, and he cannot be reproached even if he does so with dogged determination. There is no excuse, however, for the hypocrisy of those who have remained at home, a hypocrisy now coming to light everywhere. We can understand men losing their heads when they see the sky illuminated with the light of burning villages, but there is no excuse whatever for those who write their proclamations by the peaceful light of their study lamp. Those who assert that German militarism and German civilisation are not a contradiction in terms are quite right. Even in peace time, under the influence of militarism, there were many who used to advocate individualist or at any rate social "Eudæmonism" of the most outrageous description, and only too frequently they concluded by an appeal to Kant.<sup>3</sup> Now, in war-time, this has become everywhere the fashion in Germany.

But let us leave this wretched bastard, the product of the womb of Athene, goddess of Wisdom, impregnated by Mars—a union which horrified even the imagination of the ancients, none too fastidious when it came to a question of the illegitimate intercourse of the gods.

<sup>1</sup> "To be hoped," because let us hope that German generals are acquainted with the Hague Conference regulations.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. the late Professor Emile Waxweiler's *Hat Belgien sein Schicksal verdient?* (Did Belgium Deserve her Fate?). Orell Füssli, Zürich.

<sup>3</sup> *Eudæmonism* means happiness or well-being, and in modern ethics is used to denote a general type of ethical theory equally removed from the extremes of hedonism and abstract rationalism.—TRANS.

It may be, indeed, that there is neither an absolute nor even any relative morality, and that consequently we need abide by no sort of moral laws whatever. Our martial philosophers are perhaps more nearly right than they will confess even to themselves in the coming time of calm consideration and reversion to the eternal Kant. But one thing is certain: Kant's own country is already conquered.

§ 154. A CHANGE OF PARTS AND A COMEDY IN CONSEQUENCE.— In conclusion, let me cite a curious parallel. If we set out from the delusion that Kantian ethics prevail in Germany and utilitarianism in England, then just now both nations seem to have changed parts. A dramatic instance of this is the interview<sup>1</sup> which the British Ambassador had on the evening of August 4 with the German Imperial Chancellor, which is, so to speak, a confirmation of how seldom any human being's actions are influenced by his theoretical morality. Bethmann-Hollweg, who likes to be called a Kantian, says: Would Great Britain for a mere word, "neutrality," a word so often disregarded in war-time, just for a scrap of paper—would Great Britain wage war on a kindred nation, who desired nothing better than to be friends with her? For purely strategical reasons it was a matter of life and death for Germany to march through Belgium and violate her neutrality.

In his despatch, No. 160, to Sir Edward Grey, dated August 8, 1914, from London, Sir Edward Goschen says:

"I protested strongly against that statement (*i.e.* that Great Britain was responsible for all the terrible events that might happen), and said that, in the same way as he and Herr von Jagow wished me to understand that for strategical reasons it was a matter of life and death to Germany to advance through Belgium and violate the latter's neutrality, so I would wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of 'life and death' for the honour of Great Britain that she should keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium's neutrality if attacked."

The Chancellor then asked, "But at what price will that compact have been kept? Has the British Government thought of that?"

Sir Edward Goschen's despatch then proceeds: "I hinted

<sup>1</sup> Report of the British Ambassador in Berlin to Sir Edward Grey, Despatch No. 160, August 8, 1914.

to his Excellency as plainly as I could that fear of consequences could hardly be regarded as an excuse for breaking solemn engagements."

Every word here which the British Ambassador says seems dictated by the conception of duty, and every word which the German says, by the conception of utility.

The German philosopher Vorländer<sup>1</sup> probably had a pre-sentiment that this would be so, for as long ago as 1851 he wrote: "Those who pursue only the divine ideal of human nature without at the same time taking into account the reality and truth of human life, as we see it in English ethics, lose themselves only too easily in an empty, confused idealism, which leads to no good in life and does not even enrich our knowledge. But whatever be our views on morality, the important point for statesmen, more than for any other human beings, is not why they do their duty, but that they should do it, as even the 'ethical' Spinoza said."<sup>2</sup>

In view of these facts I think that our professors of philosophy ought at any rate to cease prostituting themselves and Kant and their own nation, and should rather say with Bethmann-Hollweg, "*Pater, peccavi*": we have sinned against the conception of duties undertaken, by thinking altogether too much of our own advantage, albeit perhaps in the circumstances there was some excuse for this, but we hope to do our best to set matters right again afterwards.

§ 155. THE INADEQUACY OF BOTH BASES OF MORALITY.— Whether we base our love of our neighbours on religion or on egoism, we can certainly live quite morally, but then in neither case have we anything really to keep us from egoism. If altruism were only a God-given, inborn sentiment, for which there is no visible cause, then of course it can extend only so far as this inborn sentiment extends; and if any one in a particular case is inclined to be not altruistic but egoistic, then it is useless to reason with him, for there is no modifying any inborn sentiment. No philosophy nor any God can change it.

<sup>1</sup> "Rechtsphilosophie und Moral der Engländer im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert" (Philosophy of Right and Morality of the English in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries), by the nineteenth-century German philosopher Vorländer. In the *Allg. Monatsschrift für Wissenschaft und Literatur*, p. 356. Cf. also p. 460.

<sup>2</sup> "Nec ad imperii securitatem refert, quo animo homines inducantur ad res publicas recte administrandas, modo recte administrantur."—Spinoza, *Tract. politic.* cap. i. § 56.

But if altruism be egoism in disguise, then the original egoism may of course, indeed must, follow altruistic sentiments only so long as it seems right to the superordinate egoism so to do ; and in each individual case egoism may say that altruistic impulses are misplaced. In both cases, in short, if any one behaves decently this is only because he happens to be well disposed. On the other hand, if the other party is to have an absolute right to proper treatment, this right must neither be based on a subjective feeling, nor must it be anything in the nature of a right voluntarily conceded, as it were, from motives of expediency. It must be a right which has nothing to do with my personal feelings or my own will.

So long as morality is not based on actual demonstrable principles, it is simply something in the air, and the modern man realises this only too keenly. Thus Drews,<sup>1</sup> the well-known German student of the life and teachings of Christ, says that there is no empirical morality, and that morality would be in any case inconceivable without God ; but that as morality is a necessity, we must, even against reason, hold fast the conception of a God—as if for most human beings this were such an easy matter ! And Karl Jentsch<sup>2</sup> actually makes the monstrous assertion that “ political economy exists for the individual human being.” Even he thinks that without belief in God there would be no higher aim than the welfare of the individual human being, and as political economy must, he argues, be independent of belief in God, there is no other course but to base it on the individual human being.

Clearly the disinclination to bring morality down to the plane of this earth has very unsatisfactory results. Instead of drawing the only possible conclusion from the fact of there being such a thing as political economy—something higher than the welfare of the individual here below—Jentsch would rather deny the fact, for after all it is denying political economy to assert that it exists for the individual human being.

And all this because a morality brought down to and applied to this world seems to him positively dreadful ! To me it seems that the anti-monist trend given to our ideas, or rather the regrettable popularisation of anti-monist philosophy, is responsible

<sup>1</sup> The modern German religious philosopher Drews made this statement in 1910, in an address delivered in Berlin. Whether this has been printed or not, I do not know.

<sup>2</sup> *Zukunft* (Future), by the German historian Karl Jentsch.

for this moral laxity, many more instances of which might be given.<sup>1</sup> It is always imagined that if morality is not based on categorical imperatives, then it is not morality at all, and not worth discussing.

Let us now see whether it is not possible to find in Nature the conditions of an objective morality, one which would have the incalculable advantage of being independent of our subjective feelings, be they commendable or the reverse.

This is possible because of the fact that mankind can be proved to be an organism.

<sup>1</sup> Anti-monist : Monism is the theory of the universe which attempts to reduce it, despite its apparent diversity, to the unity of a single principle.—TRANS.

## PART II.—HOW WAR MAY BE ABOLISHED

### CHAPTER XII

#### THE EVOLUTION OF THE IDEA OF THE WORLD AS AN ORGANISM

##### I. THE HELLENIC PERIOD

§ 156. THE FIRST PRESENTIMENTS OF THERE BEING A SOUL IN THIS WORLD.—If a natural scientist is to be able to describe any process or occurrence, he must first be able to show how it could come about. We can only understand the secretion of bile because of our anatomical knowledge of the liver. If we are to understand psychic processes we must have some knowledge of the brain; and to account for altruism in Man we should be obliged to prove some corresponding organic basis for it. The fact of the existence of a personality maintained by a homogeneous consciousness explains egoism, indeed in a sense necessitates it. Similarly the undeniable existence of altruism means that there must be some organic substratum on which it is based, and which could only consist in the fact of mankind as a whole being also a homogeneous organism and possessing a kind of collective consciousness. If this could be proved, then we should at any rate have some foundation to go upon.

That mankind is not a mere notion, but a solid fact, may seem absurd to many persons; but there is no denying that the noblest representatives of mankind have at all times believed in there being a soul in this world. All the higher religions may ultimately be traced back to the imperative feeling that an isolated human being is not capable of the highest, which he can attain only by means of organisation. Man is instinctively felt to belong to some larger association or community. True, he cannot clearly grasp this fact, and he is therefore irresistibly impelled to endeavour to express his vague divination by the mystical word "God."

Here we have the moral, that is the human, foundation of all religion, and not until such a human God becomes deified is there anything contrary to morality in it. Obviously, if God no longer represents mankind, but is something extra-human, so to speak, then the individual man has a God who is "too sublime" for him, and he acquires a right to lord it over everything, with an egoism knowing no bounds. And in fact this is exactly what has come to pass everywhere.

But when attempts were made to comprehend this dimly conceived Divinity by means of the intellect, or at any rate to bring it into line with the intellect—when, for instance, the Hellenes first began to indulge in philosophic speculation—even then we find allusions to this soul of the world, as if it were something needing no explanation.

Everything, in fact, which we continue to say, with half-melancholy resignation, about the vanished harmony of the Greek conception of the world, may be traced back to the fact that the divine idea of a world one and indivisible still survived in this Greek people, so simple yet so wise. In reality the hylozoism of Thales<sup>1</sup> and the other six wise men of Greece is nothing but the belief that the whole world is a single great organism. Even for Heraclitus<sup>2</sup> everything had a soul and was full of demons; even he believed that everything had a consciousness and did its share of thinking;<sup>3</sup> even he believed there was a universal "world fire" common to everything, which for him also meant universal intelligence, a conception probably similar to that of the Brahman of the Upanishad.<sup>4</sup> All the pre-Socratic thinkers held such views, as did also the whole Greek nation, which expressed its aspirations by creating for itself the world of Greek divinities, the lost beauty of which has been so touchingly lamented by Schiller.

With Socrates, to whom we otherwise owe so much, first

<sup>1</sup> Aristotle (c. 350 B.C.), *De anima*, I. 2, says expressly of Thales that he taught that even stones had a soul. [Thales was the chief of the seven wise men of ancient Greece, was a native of Miletus, and flourished from about 600 to 540 B.C. In philosophy he sought for a single element out of which the whole world was formed. This he thought to be moisture.—TRANS.]

<sup>2</sup> In Diogenes Laertius, lib. ix. 7. [Heraclitus or Heracleitus, of Ephesus (c. 576-480 B.C.), is said to have been the first philosopher to proclaim the absolute life of nature, and the conception of an unconditioned rational law governing the whole course of nature.—TRANS.]

<sup>3</sup> Sextus Empiricus, *Adversus mathematicos*, viii. 286.

<sup>4</sup> Upanishad, or Vedanta, a system of ancient Hindu philosophy which endeavours to investigate the true nature of the human soul.—TRANS.



came strife into the world. He first began to set Man on a pinnacle. He believed that Man, owing to his moral greatness, could be contrasted with the rest of Nature. True, he also expounded ethical doctrines of a wondrous pathos which has endured to this day and seems destined to endure for all time. But, perhaps, precisely because of these doctrines and his conviction of their profound value, although he could not fully establish them, Socrates believed that ethics could not in any case be explained or proved, but at best only taught. All post-Socratic religion and ethics, in so far as they were dogmatic, never did more than attempt to supply this lack of basis or justification.

Now, certainly no one ought to think that in Socrates himself this great cleavage is always clearly perceivable. In his *Daimonion* there still survives something of that old Fate which his ancestors had revered—that superhuman Fate which created Greek Tragedy, and which even the ancient Teutons revered under the form of that sway of the Norns<sup>1</sup> to which even gods must bow.

§ 157. THE POST-SOCRATICS.—All these doctrines and ideas are mystical symbols of the profoundly realised fact that the destiny of us human beings, despite all our self-seeking and self-will, nevertheless works out in accordance with great laws, eternal and unbending. But men then were trying not merely to feel the world, but also to understand it, and they found it extraordinarily hard to understand what had hitherto been simply felt and taken on trust. Hence they thought they could overcome the difficulty by coining the phrase “Man’s freedom as a moral being is something outside the constraint to which Nature is subjected.” The glorious effects, fraught with infinite consequences, of Man’s having thus insisted on his freedom must not blind us to the fact that in so doing he put himself, so to speak, “outside Nature.”

So long as the cause of this contrast between Man and Nature was not absolutely cleared up, all attempts to unite the two inevitably ended in mysticism or rationalism. Such attempts continued until Kant’s time, yet even he did not quite explain the enigma. He did, however, prepare the way for its solution by contrasting the opposite conclusions reached by considering matters from the standpoint of pure reason and of actual hard fact. If Kant had not at last attempted a mystical or tran-

<sup>1</sup> Norns : Fates (Scandinavian mythology).

scendental solution of the problem, the world would probably have perceived more clearly than it did that his point of view was nearest the truth.

Two thousand years separate Socrates from Kant, and all this time that supra-ordinate principle survived which the wise men of old accepted and believed in as the soul of the world ; but gradually it developed into a conception of Divinity removed from human comprehension. Gradually, therefore, the harmony of the terrestrial world, as taught by the Pythagoreans, degenerated into a harmony of a purely supra-sensual world.

Even in Plato's writings the homogeneity of the world is generally represented only by the Demiurgos,<sup>1</sup> who created the world homogeneous, and whose visible emanations are the celestial bodies. Man, on the contrary, is a miniature God unto himself, an imitation or image of the immortal Gods.

Even in Aristotle we only get glimpses of the world's soul as conceived by his predecessors. For instance, he alludes to a plant-soul.<sup>2</sup> For him, as for Plato, even each separate State is a living being, a *Zoön*, a substance " bearing in itself the principle of its motion, and having a tendency to change." Thus did the State come within the province of natural science, and became something to be investigated by the same methods as all animate beings—that is, by experimental analysis.<sup>3</sup> Many other allusions to some such idea may be found. Thus Aristotle says that a slave is an organ of the family, " a part of his master, as it were a part of his body, but with a separate existence and a soul." Of a popular assembly he says<sup>4</sup> that it is a single consciousness, a single intelligence. The discussions preceding a collective decision precisely resemble the way in which an individual takes counsel with himself, except that the collective individual, having more organs at its disposal and wider and more varied experience, is correspondingly wiser. Aristotle also expressly states that whether the different parts of an organisation are in contact with one another or not, is comparatively immaterial ; for the real basis of the organisation is rather the mutual relationships of life.

Similarly many hints occur in Aristotle that groups of human beings are to be considered as organisms, but the broad,

<sup>1</sup> Demiurgos or Demiurgus is the name applied by Plato to the creator of the universe.—TRANS.

<sup>2</sup> Aristotle, *De anima*, II. ii. 413.

<sup>3</sup> *Id.*, *Politics*, I. 113.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.* III. vi. 4.

general idea of humanity was then waxing dim, and he says nothing about a collective soul of the world. This conception, indeed, survived in a far more definite form among the Stoics, whose *pneuma*—a something which can move of itself and think for itself—embraces the entire world, and is therefore merely the old hylozoist soul of the world, only more vigorously conceived. The Stoics were afterwards joined by Plotinus,<sup>1</sup> who insists on the homogeneity of individual souls; by the Manichæans,<sup>2</sup> the Christians, and above all by Origen.

## II. THE CHRISTIAN ERA

§ 158. THE SCHOLASTIC VICTORY OVER PRIMITIVE CHRISTENDOM.—The Christians believed in the *pneuma hagion*, in a sacred, vivifying, inspiring force, uniting together in itself every individual soul.<sup>3</sup> This *pneuma hagion* was the world-soul, but a body was likewise attributed to this world. Thus St. Paul says :

“For as we have many members in one body, and all members have not the same office :

“So we, being many, are one body in Christ, and every one members one of another.”<sup>4</sup>

This last sentence is perhaps the best, and assuredly the most searching, definition ever given of an organism and the mutual relations of its parts or members one with the other.

In amazement we might well ask ourselves how the plain men who wrote the sacred Scriptures attained to such wisdom? They probably knew nothing of the conception of an organism, nor even of human society. And yet they could define both

<sup>1</sup> Plotinus (c. A.D. 203-262), founder of the Neo-Platonic system of philosophy. He held that the soul is the one source of knowledge, that the Deity can be grasped by intuition only; that after the Deity, the productive source of all existence, comes the universal soul or spirit; and out of the spirit is developed the soul. Kingsley's *Hypatia* gives some idea of Plotinus' philosophy.—TRANS.

<sup>2</sup> Manichæism, whose originator was Mani, born in Babylon, c. A.D. 216, and put to death by crucifixion and flaying, taught that the spirits of light send a succession of prophets to earth—Noah, Abraham, Zoroaster, Buddha, and Jesus *Patibilis*, who is a pure spirit, and his body merely a phantom. Mani himself claimed to be the last such prophet, destined to carry on the work of Christ and Paul—the separation of light from darkness.—TRANS.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. § 163 concerning the conception of the Holy Ghost.

<sup>4</sup> Romans xii. 4 and 5. This conception developed in process of time into the purely dogmatic and in reality quite incomprehensible modern conception of the “Holy Ghost.”

with the utmost clarity ! But how did they do so ? This apparent marvel can only be understood if we take the fact which we would fain prove as being already proven :—" Universal human love is the feeling which testifies to the health of the universal human-organism." Both these things are inseparably bound up with each other, and primitive Christianity was so profoundly penetrated with charity, or man's love of his fellow-man, that this sacred love was the source whence it derived the strength intuitively to perceive the practical effect of such love. Without laying too great stress on intuitive perceptions of truth, we may yet say that every one who believes in the power of the soul to elicit the truth should inscribe in letters of gold these verses from the Epistle to the Romans.

The close and obviously inevitable connection of this Pauline precept with the conception of universal human love is also clear from the fact that even Seneca,<sup>1</sup> who in this respect thought absolutely as a Christian, agrees with St. Paul in considering individual human beings as members of one great supra-ordinate living body.

Christianity, therefore, seemed destined to make widely known the ancient Hellenic idea of harmony in the world, and in the first centuries after Christ even the millenarians hoped that, at any rate at some future time, the Kingdom of God would prevail on earth. Tertullian in particular did so ; and even Origen, who disagreed with the millenarians, in this respect holds similar views ; for he expressly states that <sup>2</sup> " the whole world is like a great animal animated by one soul and one only." Herein he shows his affinities with St. Paul, at the same time laying down that principle which the writer would fain have seen recognised. This principle can be expressed, in up-to-date language, as follows : The cells in an animal, taken together, form a single large organism. Similarly all isolated individuals taken together form a supra-ordinate organism—a statement which is to be understood quite literally, and not metaphorically.

In the interval, however, the world came under the influence of the Christian scholastics, and for centuries this conception

<sup>1</sup> " Omne hoc quod vides, quo divina atque humana conclusa sunt, unum est : membra sumus corporis magni."—Seneca (c. A.D. 60), *Epistolæ*, xciv.

<sup>2</sup> Origen (c. A.D. 200), *De princip.*, I. i. 3, says : " Universum mundum velut animal quoddam immensum atque opiniandum puto, quod quasi ab una anima virtute Dei ac ratione teneatur."

survived merely as a symbol, overgrown and hidden by transcendental Christian mysticism. Even Augustine<sup>1</sup> transformed an idea, which after all is based only on natural science, into something purely spiritual and religious. This great Father of the Church was unfortunately succeeded by the entirely Christian philosophers of the Middle Ages, of whom Abelard<sup>2</sup> may be specially mentioned. Thomas Aquinas<sup>3</sup> alone is a notable exception. These philosophers systematically ignored the clear definitions of Aristotle, whom otherwise they esteemed so highly, as was always the case with those who could not apply his teachings.

Human society was stated not to be natural, but only an artificial mechanism, possibly a creation of the devil. With it was contrasted, as being a true organism, the heavenly Kingdom of God; and here again that actual Kingdom of which men dreamed created a confusion in their conceptions of life.

§ 159. RENASCENCE AND REACTION.—Thus matters remained until the natural philosophers of the Renaissance once more reverted to the pan-psychic ideas of Grecian mythology. Then, when the world seemed wholly given over to killing and fighting, the best mortals, who rightly called themselves humanists, once again became conscious of a longing for humane ways and ideas. They remembered Greek harmony and unity, or, as they occasionally called it, equality. From the teachings of the Church they selected the fraternity of the early Christians, and they even had an inkling of the liberty which knowledge was one day to confer on them.

Since then liberty, equality and fraternity have unmistakably progressed. True, the mass of mankind have neither Greek, Christian, nor scientific leanings, and consequently are not humane either. They oppress their inferiors and bow down to their superiors; and as regards the human race it is just the same. They imagine that a God rules over them, and that the animal kingdom is subject to them.

Since the Renaissance, however, Man has begun to feel that there exists an inward link between himself and Nature; and

<sup>1</sup> St. Augustine (c. A.D. 400) in his *De civitate Dei*, xiv. 28.

<sup>2</sup> Pierre Abelard or Abailard (1079-1142), *Theologia Christi*, i. 1013. [Abelard was born near Nantes, and lived when the controversy of the scholastic philosophy between nominalism and realism was at its height. At the age of thirty-six he was the most famous teacher in Europe.—TRANS.]

<sup>3</sup> Thomas Aquinas (c. 1250), *De regim. princ.*, i. 1.

when Leibniz died some notion of Man's resemblance both to God and beast had already filtered through even to the darkest regions of Europe. This trend of thought it was which was destined to be decisive in the future, but as yet such ideas did not generally prevail. The potentates of those days were still equally alarmed at the notion of Man resembling God, and at that of his resembling the beasts of the field; and although these heretical views first made their appearance decently in the garb of orthodox Christianity, yet the Church was astute enough to perceive the young swan in the duck's egg almost before it was hatched.

We need not here discuss what was done with God, Who became more and more fined down and exclusive, with less and less of the human about Him, until at length, in 1854, the dogma was put forth that the birth even of the mother of God was stainless. Similarly animals were represented as having no resemblance to human beings, a school of thought of which Descartes, who said they were machines, is a typical instance. St. Francis of Assisi was not exactly placed on the Index, but the sense of his poems to Brother Wolf and Brother Sun was scouted. After all, that period was beginning in which the Church helped to erect barriers between different categories of human beings. How, therefore, was it to recognise our brothers in trees and shrubs, or in air and water?

Thus began a time when the natural man, and with him natural society, were once more combated as in the darkest period of the Middle Ages, only more systematically and more strictly in accordance with dogmatic principles. There was even opposition to those who, from purely religious sentiment, would fain have been brothers in Christ or in Nature. Yet such men were many—a whole series of them, indeed, from St. Francis of Assisi to Angelus Silesius,<sup>1</sup> and from Christian Böhme<sup>2</sup> to Goethe. The conception of mankind as an organism seemed forgotten.

The seventeenth century had still not shaken off these

<sup>1</sup> Johannes Angelus Silesius, whose real name was Johann Scheffler (1624-77), was induced by the writing of Böhme and other mystics to join the Roman Catholic church. His mysticism has much in common with Schopenhauer's philosophy.—TRANS.

<sup>2</sup> It must be Jakob Böhme, the German philosopher and mystic (1575-1624), who is here meant. Even when a boy he had a profound sense of there being "God in everything" in Nature.—TRANS.

influences, when men were continually endeavouring to prove that, although Man had natural qualities, he had also purely spiritual gifts which put him on a plane above Nature. Thus Hobbes,<sup>1</sup> in his *Leviathan*, expressly states that natural animal societies, such as the communities in which bees, ants, beavers and other creatures live, have nothing in common with human society, which is based on human intelligence. Spinoza,<sup>2</sup> indeed, as is well known, believed the whole world to have a soul, "quamvis diversis gradibus animata"; and elsewhere he says that whenever a large number of human beings act in virtue of a right, which they all have in common, it seems as if they all had a soul in common. Thus he reverts to Aristotle's views; but the "soul of a State" is to him merely a creation of the human mind and its conscious reflection, not the other way about.

The reversion to Grecian harmony would have been easiest for Leibniz, for according to his theory each individual body consists of an unlimited number of separate monads.<sup>3</sup> Consequently nothing would have been simpler than to apply to society this conception of individuals separated by space but yet forming a unit. Leibniz says somewhere that every plant and every animal may be considered in the light of a large garden full of flowers, or a pond full of fish. But every branch of a plant and every limb of an animal, indeed every drop of its secretions, can also be considered in the light of such a garden or such a pond. Yet, so far as I am aware, Leibniz never directly hints that he looks upon the world as an organism, perhaps because he saw no necessity to express in words what he undoubtedly thought quite obvious. Leibniz was a thorough cosmopolitan, not only because, owing to his principles, he could hardly be otherwise, but for other reasons also. Born in Leipzig, he wrote in French, and his *Monadology* is an attempt to combine "English and French philosophy." His correspondence shows him to have been the trusted friend of persons of all nationalities, and indeed his greatness consists, partly, at

<sup>1</sup> Hobbes's *Leviathan*, 1650, pp. 88-89 Everyman's Library edition (Dent). Published in German in 1794. Similar views were held by Bossuet, for instance (*De la connaissance de Dieu et de soi-même*, iv. 11), Locke, and others.

<sup>2</sup> Spinoza's *Ethics*, II. prop. xiii., dealing with politics.

<sup>3</sup> Monad is the technical term used by Leibniz to mean the ultimate elements in his metaphysical theory of reality. It is a non-spatial qualitative entity, a world in itself.—TRANS.

all events, in his having been truly a man at home in many lands. It would certainly never have even occurred to him that a thinking being, least of all any one styling himself a philosopher, could take sides in the War of the Spanish Succession, in which his various homelands were involved. Leibniz, indeed, did not see danger in men being biassed in favour of one particular land, and therefore did nothing to prevent this being so. In short, he over-estimated human intellects, even as, a hundred years later, Bonaparte over-estimated nations.

Thus matters went on for a long time, and even Rousseau based his "reversion to Nature" on no considerations of natural science or even of Nature. To him the word Nature, in conformity with which he wanted his society to be ordered, was still altogether an idea in the Platonic sense. This idea Rousseau modified very much as it suited him to do so. Whereas in reality Nature is everywhere bound by her own laws, for him Nature is merely a symbol of liberty.

### III. THE MODERN PERIOD

§ 160. ITS FORERUNNERS.—Yet the belief persisted that this world here below is in a certain sense an organism complete in itself and by itself; and, despite the Church and its quest of heavenly bliss, the torch of Knowledge was passed from one to another, and the smouldering spark thus kept alive. The history of the idea of the world as an organism and how it arose, would be undoubtedly one of rare fascination to write; but here it can only be given in broadest outline.

About the year 1500 Nicolas Leon Thomæus<sup>1</sup> was already insisting that there must be some link between individual human beings, whence he argued that there might be such things as second-sight and "natural prophecy." About 1550 Cardanus<sup>2</sup> credited the world with having a genuine life of its own (*propriam et veram vitam*). In 1581 Giordano Bruno<sup>3</sup> wrote of *natura naturans*, and Paracelsus<sup>4</sup> the great Regenerator's

<sup>1</sup> Thomæus, quoted from Rixner.

<sup>2</sup> Cardanus's *De subtilitate rerum* (1550), V. iii. 374 and 439, and xviii. p. 491, ed. 1663: "Utramque esse in rebus veramque earum constituere vitam."

<sup>3</sup> Giordano Bruno, extract from his works by F. H. Jacob, 1789, p. 263.

<sup>4</sup> Paracelsus, *Archido*, vol. i. According to Paracelsus (Swiss physician and naturalist, born at Einsiedeln in 1493), human beings take part in the universal life by means of their sidereal or astral body.



*Consensus* (1580) and Patritius'<sup>1</sup> *Panpyschia* (1591) are all merely different ways of expressing their common belief in the world being an organism.

These few instances, however, can scarcely afford any idea of how prevalent throughout the sixteenth century was the idea of the world as an organism; and to cite further instances would take me too far. I will confine myself therefore to quoting the words of Rixner and Siber,<sup>2</sup> who have devoted a bulky volume to nothing but the opinions of these courageous "innovators" in the domain of natural science. The conclusion to which they come is that, however widely different may be the views, characteristics, knowledge, education and mode of life of these sixteenth-century scientists and thinkers, they all agreed in considering Nature as a living thing. All Nature was to them a universal organism, instinct with joyous life in all its component parts. The principal philosophers quoted are Theophrastus Paracelsus (*d.* 1541); Hieronymus Cardanus (*d.* 1578); Bernhardinus Telesius (*d.* 1588); Franciscus Patritius (*d.* 1597); Jordanus Brunus (*d.* 1600); Thomas Campanella (*d.* 1639); and Johann Baptist van Helmont (*d.* 1644).

In the seventeenth century these ideas were more clearly formulated. Suarez,<sup>3</sup> for instance, says that the individual is only a partial manifestation of the genus. Francis Bacon<sup>4</sup> asserts that there is sensibility everywhere; and Campanella<sup>5</sup> does likewise; while Ficinus<sup>6</sup> proves that civilisation is ever living and immortal, whence he concludes that the world must have an immortal soul. Even Pascal<sup>7</sup> warns us against insisting too much on the difference between Man and animals, alleging that this makes us overbearing; and in a famous passage he

<sup>1</sup> Patritius (1591), *Nova de universis philosophia*, Ferrara, iv. 54 and v. 58.

<sup>2</sup> Thaddeus A. Rixner and Siber's *Leben und Lehrmeinungen berühmter Physiker am Ende des XVI. und am Anfang des XVII. Jahrhunderts* (Life and Doctrines of Famous Physicists at the Close of the Sixteenth and Beginning of the Seventeenth Centuries), sect. "Paracelsus," xv.

<sup>3</sup> *Metaphysic, disputat.* (1605), by the Spanish Jesuit theologian, Francisco Suarez (1548-1617).

<sup>4</sup> "Ubique est perceptio," in Bacon's *De dignitate*, iv. 3 (1625).

<sup>5</sup> "Omnem naturam sentire affirmandum est," in Campanella's *De sensu rerum*, I. i. 13 (1620).

<sup>6</sup> *Theologia Platonica*, lib. xviii. (1641), by Marsilius Ficinus [or Marsilio Ficino, as he is more often known in English, the Italian physician and Platonic philosopher, born in Florence, 1433, died 1499. His book referred to was published in 1482, and intended to show Platonism to be the essence of Christian belief.—TRANS.]

<sup>7</sup> Pascal's *Pensées sur la Religion* (1670).

expressly compares mankind to an individual ; while Newton,<sup>1</sup> who actually compiled laws of the world as an organism, and who was very much disposed to favour such ideas in general, once, for purely physical reasons, refers to the earth as " a lazy animal."

Early in the following century Shaftesbury<sup>2</sup> went the length of saying that however perfect an organism (system) an individual human being may be, yet in order to see real perfection he must be placed in relation to the organism of his race. On the whole, however, the rationalistic eighteenth century was less favourable to speculations of this kind, which, in the then state of learning, could not but be slightly tinged with mysticism. This somewhat sentimental point of view is found even in Fechner,<sup>3</sup> who not only believed in humanity being an organism, but who looked on all the stars and solar systems as living beings. Dreamy speculations such as these, however, have done more harm than good. Poets, it was thought, had a right to endow everything about them with a soul, but thinkers ought to leave such matters alone.<sup>4</sup> In modern times men came to realise the value of empirical investigations, for the time had more or less gone by for philosophical speculations, and men were beginning to look out for facts pointing to the necessity for there being some link between one human being and another, and to the existence of a great human organism.

It is well known that the " suitability and wisdom of the institutions of Nature " had always been instanced as arguing the presence of a Supreme Being, who, however, was usually thought of as God only. Even Parker,<sup>5</sup> for instance, thought it

<sup>1</sup> Sir Isaac Newton's *Philosophiæ naturalis principia mathematica*, published 1687. Even the attractive principle, in Newton's writings, and still more in those of his disciples—Muschenbroek, for instance—has a strong tendency towards animism, and describes the attractive principle as *amitia* (friendship). Lichtenberg says quite plainly that gravitation is the longing of the heavenly bodies for one another. Cf. further the phrase " living force " or *vis viva*, which, I believe, was first used by Leibniz.

<sup>2</sup> *Moralists*, ii. 4 (1709), by the third Earl of Shaftesbury. Translated into German apparently in 1910.

<sup>3</sup> *Zendavesta*, § vi., by Gustav Theodor Fechner, published 1851. Cf. also *Tagesansicht*, p. 29. [In *Zendavesta* Fechner argued that the parallelism of soul and body obtaining in the animal world is not confined to it, but extends both above and below it. He is best known as the founder of psychophysics.—TRANS.]

<sup>4</sup> *Zur Einführung in die Philosophie der Gegenwart* (Introduction to the Philosophy of the Present Day), by Alois Riehl, p. 161, published in 1903. Riehl was born in 1844.

<sup>5</sup> Parker's *Disputatio de Deo*, 1678, p. 114.

needful to infer the presence of a God because of the reason and purpose which he everywhere perceived in Nature. Ralph Cudworth,<sup>1</sup> also, while remarking that the constant maintenance of a proper equilibrium between births and deaths in respect of numbers and differences of sex pointed to the existence of a Supreme Wisdom which appeared to be guiding the apparently fortuitous course of this world, saw nothing but God in this Wisdom.

§ 161. MODERN EMPIRICISM.—Empirical facts, however, accumulate as time goes on, and Kant took advantage of this.<sup>2</sup> But he ceased to have anything to do with a *deus ex machinâ*, thereby being probably again the first to enter upon the way which leads to modern science. He took as his starting-point the contradiction between Man's fetters and the freedom of which he dreams, and asserted from the outset that the organic laws of mankind clearly limit freedom. Human actions, like everything else in Nature, are determined by natural laws. At first sight, for instance, it seems that marriages and, consequently, births and deaths could not be subject to any rule, because they are so greatly dependent on Man's free will. Yet statistics in large countries prove that they too are under the influence of fixed natural laws. Kant compared this unvarying regularity, which is independent of Man's will, with the weather, which is so uncertain that no one can arrange it beforehand, but yet in the main is so certain that the growth of plants, the course of streams and other natural phenomena always go on in the same way without interruption.

Climate, however, can be explained by the laws which govern the earth, considered as a homogeneous heavenly body; and similarly these laws of humanity, in themselves inexplicable, can be explained by considering humanity as an organism. Kant, it is true, had no idea of any such explanation. He says that individual human beings and even whole nations persist in thinking that, by each pursuing after his or its own ends, each in his or its own way and often pulling different ways, they are tending insensibly to fulfil Nature's ends, despite the fact that Nature's ends are unknown to them. They persistently believe

<sup>1</sup> *The True Intellectual System of the Universe*, by Ralph Cudworth, 1678.

• [An attempt to confute the philosophy of atheism.—TRANS.]

<sup>2</sup> *Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht* (A Forecast of a History of the World from the Point of View of a Citizen of the World), by Kant, 1784.

that Nature's ends are their guiding principle and that they are helping to further these ends, yet, even if they did know what Nature's ends are, they would trouble but little about them. Kant also recognises that the actions of individual human beings cannot be wholly explained by their individual characteristics, but he does not say what would explain them. As is so often the case with Kant, however, two frankly admitted contrasts are clearly stated, and thus further scientific investigation is simplified. All that was now required was, if possible, not merely to represent the divergence between restrictions collectively imposed and personal liberty as a virtually insoluble problem, but to bridge the gulf between the two.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Here I would request the reader to re-read the paragraph (§ 26) concerning Freedom and Natural Compulsion, in which it is shown how this can be done by the fact of the brain having been actually freed from the body. I now purpose to prove that the freedom thus acquired is again restricted by the long-suspected fact, which natural scientists did not clearly recognise till last century, that mankind as a whole forms an organism in the strictest sense of the word.

## CHAPTER XIII

## THE WORLD AS AN ORGANISM

## I. THE PHYSICAL REASONS FOR MANKIND FORMING AN ORGANISM

§ 162. HYPOTHESES AND FACTS.— If anything in this world is not instantly traceable to facts, recourse is had to a hypothesis. For example, when it is found impossible to explain certain phenomena in connection with light, we postulate an ether, or small particles moving with extraordinary speed, or something of the kind. Such an hypothesis is all the more generally accepted, the greater the number of demonstrable facts which can be explained by it ; but if a fact be found which conflicts with such a hypothesis, then the latter must of course be dropped.

Thus the theory of the emission of light was overthrown when the phenomena of polarisation could no longer be reconciled with it ; and at present the theory of undulations is being questioned because certain electric phenomena, undoubtedly connected with light, conflict with it. Every *theory* therefore, remains uncertain until the phenomenon on which it is based can be directly observed. Could we succeed in proving the existence of actual light-particles or of ether, this would be a much more direct proof than any theory deduced therefrom.

Similarly with regard to the theory of mankind being an organism. There is much in the life of Man and nations to indicate that there must be some connecting link between individual human beings ; and the number and varied nature of the relations between man and man make it probable that there is some such organism. Nevertheless, the smallest direct proof would be, perhaps not actually more important, but more decisive from the standpoint of science.

Modern men, indeed, although most of them would deny this, are mostly infected with the belief that all solid fact must be material. The proof of dynamic effects between human beings—effects which Aristotle thought sufficient, and which in

fact still are sufficient, to prove that mankind must be considered as an organism—seems to us almost immaterial; and we noisily insist on the proof of an actual physical connection. Every reader will here derisively object that mankind as a whole surely cannot be compared with a single animal. Between the tip of an animal's nose and the tip of its tail there certainly exists a vital physical connection; but what connection is there between a European and a Tierra del Fuegian, between Kant and Eucken, between Frederick II. and William II., between the man in the trenches and Hindenburg, or between Hindenburg and Joffre?

Now, although it would not be absolutely necessary to prove that a bridge of some actual substance exists between all these individuals—for the dynamically living bridge would suffice—yet, in conformity with the materialist requirements of the present day, it must first be shown that there does actually exist a uniform, continuously living connection, which has always subsisted, between *all* human beings in all ages and all lands, and moreover, that it is actually in operation.

Not till this has been done are the connections between the various forces to be investigated, which, resting on this substantial basis, make mankind into an organism which can be taken into practical consideration. Unlike the substantial basis, which remains almost unchanged, these connections between forces develop as time goes on, and every day make the human organism more of a unity and of more importance.

§ 163. THE CONTINUITY OF GERM-PLASM.—The continuity of germ-plasm points to some such physical link between one human being and another. As long ago as 1878 Jäger<sup>1</sup> advocated this idea, and two years later Nussbaum<sup>2</sup> did likewise. It did not become generally known, however, until Weismann<sup>3</sup> made his comprehensive investigations of *hydromedusæ*. This doctrine of Weismann's is now so thoroughly recognised

<sup>1</sup> Jäger's *Lehrbuch der allgemeinen Zoologie* (Handbook of Universal Zoology), vol. ii. Leipzig, 1878.

<sup>2</sup> "Die Differenzierung des Geschlechts im Tierreich" (The Differentiation of Sex in the Animal Kingdom), by M. Nussbaum, 1880. In the *Archives for Microscopical Anatomy*, xviii.

<sup>3</sup> *Die Entstehung der Sexualzellen bei den Hydromedusen* (The Origin of Sexual Cells in the Hydromedusa), by A. Weismann, published 1883. Cf. a later work by this German zoologist, which is very comprehensive, *Das Keimplasma, eine Theorie der Vererbung* (Germ-Plasm, a Theory of its Inheritance), published in 1898 at Jena.

everywhere, that Delage and Goldsmith<sup>1</sup> speak of the "difference between soma and germ-plasm" as a fact of common knowledge. They explain that soma dies with the individual, whereas germ-plasm lives on in posterity, and is thus "immortal and continuous."

Hypothesis does not come in, they say, except in the particular deductions made by Weismann from this fact, deductions which do not concern us. What does concern us is the "fact of common knowledge," which can be easily understood by means of the accompanying diagram.

Every egg-cell (thus, cell A in Fig. 9), out of which an animal




FIG. 9.

or human being is afterwards developed, first splits up once into two parts, of which one, the dark half, grows rapidly, forms the entire body, dies with that body, and disappears with it. (This is indicated by the arrow turned towards space.) The other, lighter-coloured half of the cell, however, does not grow, but remains living germ-plasm, merely arranging itself differently, and converting itself into seed-cells or egg-cells. In Cells B<sub>1</sub> and B<sub>2</sub> in the diagram this process is indicated by the uninterruptedly light colouring of the germ-plasm. The seed-cells or egg-cells which subsist in the testicles or ovaries of a human being are therefore not merely symbolically but quite genuinely living pieces of his or her parents. And as they are transmitted unchanged and alive to our children (C<sub>1</sub> to C<sub>4</sub>),

<sup>1</sup> *Die Entwicklungstheorien* (Theories of Evolution), by Delage and M. Goldsmith. (An authorised translation exists in German.)

and then to our children's children (D<sub>1</sub> to D<sub>8</sub>, etc.), it is a fact that a portion of grandfather, grandchild, great-grandchild, etc., does consist of the same living substance. And as we can and *must* continue in this way indefinitely (as indicated by the side branches of cells A and D left open), it is clear that the tree shaded light, which is all one and is constantly putting forth fresh branches, represents a single organism, all parts of which are connected together. From this the individual human beings (tinted dark, and designated as individuals by letters) grow just as apples do on a tree. They are particles of this organism; in time they fall away, and in so doing become individuals, and die.

But the tree of germ-plasm, which confers form and existence on the different individuals, and is consequently the principal part of humanity, lives on for ever as a homogeneous organism. A portion of this homogeneous organism, however, lives also in each individual, physically connecting us permanently with mankind in general. True, it can be eliminated from the human body without utterly destroying life, but what then is left of the man is proved by such deplorable beings as eunuchs and castrated persons. All recent experiments, indeed, clearly show that all those instincts of life which make a human being into a human being are inseparably connected with this remnant of mankind in general which we bear in us. It lives in us and manifests itself in us. Egoism represents, so to speak, physical self-consciousness, and altruism represents self-consciousness of the germ-plasm. "Others" have, therefore, as we see, a right represented in me, for a portion of their living substance also lives in me.

Whoever first spoke of the slaying of egoism as a slaying of the flesh had a foreboding of more than he expressed. For the flesh is the perishable body, which falls from the universal tree of humanity. That which remains, however, that which makes men capable of love (that is, of morality in the broadest sense of the word), is germ-plasm, or what the Holy Scripture calls the sacred pneuma, "capable of procreation." Luther translated this by *der Geist, der lebendig Macht* ("the spirit that quickeneth"), thus attributing a purely symbolical meaning to it. The conception of pneuma, however, goes beyond this, and cannot be understood save by those acquainted with its origin in Greek philosophy. Into this I am unable to enter in



detail, but Diogenes Laertius expressly states, "That which causes the procreation of us all is the pneuma"<sup>1</sup>—thus meaning precisely what we may now call germ-plasm. Moreover, just as we must now make up our minds that an almost imponderable quantity of germ-plasm<sup>2</sup> influences the whole body, even so the men of old imagined the mysterious workings of the "Holy Spirit."

In the sixth chapter of the Gospel of St. John (verse 63) we read: "It is the spirit (pneuma) that quickeneth; the flesh profiteth nothing." Thus the Bible also must really be referring to germ-plasm. Now, there is no need to state that this pneuma never clearly expressed, either in Greek writings or in the Bible, what we now mean by germ-plasm. Nevertheless it is important to recollect that those who wrote the Bible felt as it were intuitively that it existed. The conception of the crucifying of the flesh, indeed, has been grossly misinterpreted. Flesh was identified with sensuality, and with love, indeed after a time almost altogether with love, and the pneuma with the "higher" attributes of the soul. That this is wrong is clear from 1 Cor. xv. 44,<sup>3</sup> where the soul is mentioned in contradistinction to the pneuma. It is a pneumatic body to which allusion is here made; and this body, if we hold fast to what is known to have been the meaning of the pneumatic in ancient times, actually materially passes through the body of all human beings. Thus we have here again the exact notion of germ-plasm.

The pneuma, in short, is something above mankind, which unites mankind together. It creates the relations between man and man, and also love between man and wife and between man and his neighbour. It creates eternal life, and it creates morality. The victory of the pneuma is the victory of germ-plasm over somatoplasm, the victory of the conception of humanity over individual consciousness, and of altruism over egoism. In this sense we all can and all ought to believe in the Holy Ghost, the *pneuma hagion*.

The habit of combating and pouring contempt on "earthly love," as it is called, is all the worse because it helps, and helps very materially, to bring about heavenly love.

<sup>1</sup> Diogenes Laertius, vii. 156.

<sup>2</sup> The body of a human being is about one thousand billion times greater than the germ-plasm from which it has arisen.

<sup>3</sup> Luther here translates "spiritual" (psychic) by "natural," which is certainly not the sense. ["It is sown a natural body; it is raised a spiritual body. There is a natural body, and there is a spiritual body."—TRANS.]

## § 164. EARTHLY LOVE MAKES HEAVENLY LOVE POSSIBLE.—

There has been a vast deal of speculation as to why procreation must take place by means of a man and a woman, and why the children of the human beings cannot simply be cut away from an unsexual procreator, as is, at any rate for the time being, the case with the lowest animals. The question of the causes for this may be put aside here, but not that of the consequences.

Whenever a creature produces six new creatures by parthenogenesis, experience proves that each one of them is slightly different from the rest; and if we imagine these six offspring producing six species, again by parthenogenesis, then these will become more and more dissimilar, for each species will always be inheriting more and more new qualities<sup>1</sup> in which the others can necessarily have no part. On the other hand, they in turn are exposed to other influences. Each individual, in short, invariably becomes the ancestor of a new species.

Thus the organisms become increasingly split up, and even if at a particular time one branch had succeeded in dominating the world, as Mankind is now doing, yet from that very day they would begin to divide up again. In that case we would still actually have the sinful sons of Cain with us, and the good children of Abel. But if the sons of Cain had murdered all the descendants of Abel, then the race of Cain would again be split up into several divisions, which in course of time would have become quite dissimilar. Between these two types of men a fight would again have become necessary. In short, the inevitable result of this type of procreation would be an everlasting war waged by every one against every one else, for as time went on the transmitted qualities would decrease almost to vanishing point, and would be quite unable to keep the other qualities under control.

But we are sexually begotten, and although, when parents have six children, each one is certainly different from the rest, yet these differences always counterbalance one another because the children's children intermarry, and thus the varying accumulated inheritance of qualities has never time to become very different. Sexual love and sexual intercourse, therefore, are

<sup>1</sup> How this occurs is of no moment. It is a fact that animal species alter in process of evolution, and this is the only fact here alleged in support of my statements.

both the means of ensuring the preservation of the uniformity of germ-substance in any animal species in so far as the animal has an opportunity of sexual union with others of its species. They constantly bring the entire organism of a whole race into contact, and keep it together. Indeed, to the extent to which such an entire organism necessitates altruism, earthly love is the mother of heavenly love.

The basis for the opinions just set forth has already been known for a considerable time. In 1853 the German zoologist Rudolf Leuckart<sup>1</sup> discussed the tendency of sexual procreation to prevent the degeneration—that is, the dispersion—of a race. In 1859 Charles Darwin<sup>2</sup> stated quite plainly that crossing, as opposed to unsexual reproduction, is of great importance in Nature, inasmuch as by this means the individuals belonging to a species or variety are kept pure and uniform in character. His ideas were adopted in the main by Spencer (1864), Nägeli (1866), Hatscheck (1887), Hertwig (1893), Strassburger (1900) and Weismann (1902). Weismann, with his theory of ideas and determinants, created useless confusion, while others think, for instance, that the formation of different varieties is the very reason for bi-sexual procreation.

But it is the Russian biologist Janicki<sup>3</sup> who most strongly insisted on the importance of sexual reproduction. He writes (p. 784): "The world, if I may say so, has not been broken up into a mass of independent fragments, which then, for ever isolated from one another and mere parts of the whole, must strike out for themselves on straight courses, with only side branches. On the contrary, owing to bi-sexual procreation (amphimixis) the image of the macrocosm is periodically but incessantly set up as a microcosm in each part, and the macrocosm resolves itself into a thousand microcosms. It is as if Nature, by introducing bi-sexual procreation, had made a compromise between individualisation and the hypothetical condition of panmixis (procreation by many). The individuals are meant to be as independent as possible, to be able to move about freely and independently, etc., but on the other hand to

<sup>1</sup> Leuckart was born in 1822 and died in 1898.—TRANS.

<sup>2</sup> *Origin of Species*, chap. iv.

<sup>3</sup> "Über Ursprung und Bedeutung der Amphimixis. Ein Beitrag zur Lehre der geschlechtlichen Zeugung" (On the Origin and Significance of Amphimixis [bi-sexual procreation]: a Contribution to the Doctrine of Sexual Procreation), by C. von Janicki, 1906. *Biolog. Zentralblatt*, xxvi. No. 22.

be materially and continuously connected with one another and remain in constant contact, like strawberry plants whose runners are joined together. There is no way out of this save the periodical admixture of germ-substances, whereby the necessary material continuity is transferred into each single individual, paradoxical as this may sound, for the continuity is only present on a miniature scale. But it is there. Each separate individual develops as it were on an invisible system of rhizomes (root-substances), which unite together the germ-substances of countless personalities. This means the negation of that individualisation which for vegetative purposes is indispensable; and if we look at a paramœcium under the microscope we do not at first suspect how something endlessly complex and multifarious, a *whole*, is to be found in this particle of living plasm. This whole is most intimately connected by invisible threads with the sum total of individuals who compose the particular species in question, and who live or have lived a separate existence under the most diverse conditions." And on page 789 he says: "But let us return to amphimixis (bi-sexual procreation). As in the case of unicellular creatures, so also in that of polycellular ones, periodically occurring bi-sexual procreation is a physiological necessity. In both cases bi-sexual procreation affords each individual a constantly renewed connection with that form of life as a whole of which the species consists. In this close connection with the whole, the simplest monoplastid becomes modified periodically as time proceeds, and yet, however often it is divided up, it never meets with a natural death and consequent complete new formation apart from its growth; its body is simply remodelled as in the case of a plastic substance. In the same connection with the whole, in a condensed, primæval plasm, as it were, the life of polyplastids is rooted. The continuity of life, however, is assured by germ-substances (plasms) alone. Somata appear in the light of a series of disconnected curves which arise one after another from a continuous curve, that of the germ-substances taken together. The bodies have lost their plasticity, and each time bi-sexual procreation takes place they are formed anew in ontogenesis."

To this there is scarcely anything to add. Janicki has exhausted the problem, and all that now remains is to draw the necessary inferences and apply them to man's moral actions.

## II. THE APPROACHING MUTATION OF WAR

§ 165. THE MEANING OF MUTATION.—First and foremost it must be proved that the practical importance of this purely physical connection in the life of nations does not end with its being the solid basis of altruism. If, for instance, this living substance should at any time, owing to any influence, have acquired the capacity of changing after a certain lapse of time, for instance a thousand years, then we must not be surprised if after this time all who have some of this living substance in them suddenly undergo a corresponding change.

The enormous importance of this phenomenon need not be insisted upon. It means neither more nor less than that the future history of mankind is already present as a functional occurrence in the bodies of contemporary humanity. That this is true of the brain on a smaller scale was explained in § 26, but it now becomes clear that this may be an absolutely universal principle prevailing throughout the organic world.

Now, such changes and sudden variations do actually occur, and, in the case of plants, where investigation is easier owing to generations succeeding one another more rapidly, it has been carefully studied. The Dutch botanist, Hugo de Vries<sup>1</sup> has shown that in a field of mullein,<sup>2</sup> in which for centuries past the flowers had never varied, noteworthy differences suddenly began to appear. As a matter of fact, this is what happened. In a field of mullein each year a few plants show certain abnormalities, such as longer or shorter, thicker or thinner leaves than the rest. Generally speaking, such abnormalities are of no importance, but suddenly in one particular year one of these abnormalities, long leaves for instance, occurs in a great many cases of plants (de Vries' fifth law). These long leaves are quite constant at once—that is, they are fully transmitted, independently of external conditions. The following year, therefore, this new kind of mullein occurs generally, and thus, as de Vries says, a new kind of mullein has arisen by sudden variations, or so-called mutation.

<sup>1</sup> *Arten und Varietäten und ihre Entstehung durch Mutation* (Species and Varieties and their Origin owing to Mutation), by H. de Vries, 1906.

<sup>2</sup> Mullein is the name for various species of the genus *Verbascum*. The great mullein is a common roadside plant in Great Britain. (Woolly, flannel-like leaves, and tall, dense spikes of yellow flowers.) The German name is *Königskerzen*—king's candles.—TRANS.

How this change comes about, whether really by what de Vries calls mutation, or whether, as others state, it is only a case of latent qualities becoming again manifest, is of no moment here. What does matter is the actual fact, which simply proves that some connection must exist between the individual mullein plants, and that this connection is still strong enough to affect them. Thus between the individual mullein plants there is an actual co-operation of forces. That is, the mulleins as a whole, despite their individual peculiarities, form an organism as a whole. And the fact of the continuity and immortality of the germ-plasm proves that such an organism is conceivable.

Now, beyond doubt a similar connection exists between human beings; and as we human beings, like all other animals, vary mainly with whatever organ has of late undergone the greatest changes (that is, with the human brain), most instances of variation will be found in the psychic domain. Here it is, however, that the striking similarity between the mullein and Man occurs. In each year human beings are present with brain variations. These variations are the expression of abnormal ideas, and may be described as signs of madness or of genius, according to whether they are capricious or reasonable. Whether they really portend genius or madness does not depend on the human beings themselves, but on the future, or rather on the mutations already latent in millions of their fellow-men, at present apparently entirely normal.

Now, if the elongation of the leaves is already present in the germ-plasm of the mullein, it matters not that there should be abnormal mulleins, with too short, too thick, or too thin leaves; they are bound soon to die out. It is the long-leaved species of this particular year which are the geniuses heralding the coming change. And so it is with men. If the time is not yet fulfilled; if brain variations are not yet latent in us, it is of no use for men of genius to arise and prophesy changes. But when the time is fulfilled, then there is no longer need for prophecy. The least trifle is sufficient to give the needed impetus. Huss could achieve nothing where Luther carried all before him. Socrates took poison, but the crucified Christ left behind Him a religion which has influenced the whole world:

Suddenly, at much about the same time, in Germany, France and England men took to flying, just as formerly the

conception of charity arose almost simultaneously in the most diverse parts of the world.

§ 166. THE MOTHER OF WAR INSTINCTS.—These series of evolutions are concluded, and we can survey them. Others are still awaiting completion by evolutions to come. Thus, for instance, Moltke discovered the ethical value of war, while Tolstoy insisted, as no one else had ever done, on the absolute necessity for its abolition. For the present it cannot be said which of these two variations represents madness and which genius. That depends on the direction in which the majority of our descendants mutate in the future. I would merely like to observe that the enthusiasm with which the war of 1914-15 is being carried on is absolutely no proof of Moltke's having been possessed of genius; for, in any organ which is shortly to undergo a mutation, great and frequent variations occur some time beforehand. The fact on which I insisted in my first chapter, that nowadays our opinions about war are more widely divergent than ever before, seems to me a proof that before long our opinion of it will radically change. And the only one of the different mutations which will be able to endure will of course be the one best suited to actual present conditions. Consequently, all that has been said in preceding chapters about the injuriousness of war at the present period, justifies us in coming to the conclusion that Man will one day be transmuted once for all into a peaceful creature. The opinions of Moltke and his satellites down to Bernhardt, after all, wholly differ from those of the average mortal, and may be considered merely as a good omen for this mutation being no longer far off.

Indeed everything points to the fact that the dusk of the War Gods' day has already set in.

### III. THE UNITY OF MANKIND AS REGARDS BOTH TIME AND SPACE

§ 167. MAN'S CONNECTION FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF TIME.—It is impossible to conceive of Man as an isolated being, and this not merely because of his being the product of a succession of ancestors who extend back perhaps for millions of years, and whose gradual perfecting he represents. On this fact, however, I do not propose to touch further here, as it can be looked up in any history of evolution. Note, however, the

unusual complication of the mechanism resulting from this fact. Man lives on directly by his germ-plasm in his children and children's children. Hence, supposing there to be three children on an average in a family, by the twenty-first generation (that is, in about five hundred years) his vitality will be represented in a number of human beings which will about correspond to that of the whole of mankind.

Or, conversely, each individual human being has in him a drop of blood of each human being who lived five hundred years ago. The result is such an infinite number of connections that at present there seems not the slightest chance of completely following up any single case. Houston Stewart Chamberlain says every important achievement we owe to men of Teutonic blood. Possibly; but it is just as possible that, as the modern French anthropologist, Paul Souday, says, we owe everything of importance to Keltic blood. And if any one arose and said everything good is due to Slavonic blood, it would be scarcely possible to disprove his assertion. No one can state in which of the ancestors of a man of genius the germ-plasm was so much modified that the said man of genius was the result. Only one assertion can be made with absolute assurance, and that is that he did not become a genius of himself, but is the product of unknown ancestors, who must be considered as a whole for the simple reason that they are not individually known.

Perhaps even more important than these direct physical links with the past is very often the intellectual influence of a human being—an influence, of course, indirectly also physical. It is a commonplace to say that Man survives in his works, but what is remarkable is how even anonymous human beings have survived in this way. Thus some insignificant diluvial human being, whose body and whose very skeleton are probably long since dust and ashes, covered the walls of the caves in the beautiful Valley of the Vézère with primitive markings intended to represent mammoths and bisons. Perhaps he did so only because he was bored, but on his scratchings we to-day are basing theories as to the origin of art. Thousands of years ago an unknown, perhaps idiotic, female slave at play imprinted her five fingers for the first time on a clay vessel, and in so doing kept the brains of thousands of inquirers busy in the nineteenth century. The half-monkey or half-man, the roof of



whose skull chanced to have escaped decomposition at Trinil in Java, certainly never ventured to dream that after a fabulous lapse of time he would become a personage of importance for all our scientists, and would even influence our whole attitude to life.

No one knows or can foretell how much an individual is influencing or may influence mankind; and in historic times there has been no change in this respect. Have we any idea what occurrence, what saying or even what gesture of some unknown human being may possibly have enabled human beings such as Jesus or Socrates first to utter thoughts which decisively influenced the fate of mankind for thousands of years—have influenced it, indeed, for all time? Yet it may be that at the outset of these thoughts is some vanished human being, whose very name is forgotten, but whose works live after him.

It would be idle to speculate as to what may have been, but not idle clearly to realise that such things are possible. We see an endless series of effects and causes, which in detail we do not know, and which for that very reason we are obliged to consider as a whole. Mankind would be incomprehensible if we did not look upon it as a homogeneous organism.

Now, that thoughts, once expressed, lead among mankind a life so to speak apart from their author, penetrate into others, as it were, and are a living influence on them, just as is physical germ-plasm—of this there can be not the slightest doubt. These thoughts, like germ-plasm, are endowed with eternal life, and proclaim aloud the primeval Orphic wisdom of the harmony of all Life and the fact of mankind being an organism.

As a wise man of old, Empedocles, sings, in this sense there is neither birth nor death: "Yet another truth will I tell unto thee. Not a single mortal thing is truly born, and Death the destroyer is not the end. There is nought but intermixture and exchange of what is intermixed. Only among men is it customary to call this birth."

Thus material and dynamically intellectual connections are transmitted through boundless periods of time, binding mankind together; nor can any one say which are of the more moment, the physical or the intellectual connections.

§ 168. MAN'S CONNECTIONS IN REGARD TO SPACE.—Easier to prove is the existence of an intellectual bond between man and

man—easier at any rate up to a certain point. Still more obvious is this intellectual bond if we consider the spatial relations of contemporary human beings. Even in this respect no living man can be considered as other than part of an organism.

Now, a man only talks and learns because he sees others doing so—that is, because he has some connection with these others. He can only work because he relies on the work of other men. For instance, I can only write because somewhere men have felled trees, other men have cut them up, others again converted them into paper, and finally a whole series of men have conveyed the finished product to me. Another endless series of men furnish me with a pen, another with a penholder, and yet another with ink. But in order that these words may be printed—that is, exert any effect—more endless hosts of men throughout the world have been busy. Some mined the lead for the type, others the iron for the machines, others again produced the oil and dye-stuffs for the printers' ink; and each of these workers requires tools and food, the production of which again has employed more enormous groups of people.

Thus, if we go back to ultimate causes, perhaps the whole world may have had to help in order that even the smallest thought of an author may be transmitted to his reader; while as for the thought itself, it proceeds from millions of brains, and in the last resort can only produce effect because it is somehow predestined to do so in the brain of the recipient. In short, neither intellectually nor physically would Man be conceivable except regarded as part of a great organism.

We call the principles on which mankind works, division of labour; but division is only possible if there be some Whole which can be divided, that is, the labour of all mankind. This sum total of labour, however, is and must proceed from an entire body. That this division of labour is demonstrably present in many human actions, unknown to us, is all the more proof that there actually is Something present which is superior to the will of the individual.

Kant already pointed out that there are many purely physical qualities which obey great laws, the result being, so to speak, an "average human being" who in reality has no existence at all. This average human being in Germany is 50.6 per cent. man and 49.4 per cent. woman; he or she enters into .8 marriages,

has 2½ children, consumes 2500 calories, commits .0002 suicides, .00001 murders, lives 40.5 years, and so on.

We believe that it is of our own free will that we marry, beget a child, get drunk, etc., whereas in so doing we are, unconsciously, merely fulfilling a law, in order to fulfil a particular case of the universal law. Moreover, it must not be forgotten that correlative growth, or rather correlative variability, can be proved to occur in the individual organism as also in mankind. Darwin<sup>1</sup> has defined this phenomenon as follows: Different parts of an organism are so connected in some unknown way with one another that, if one part modifies, the other does likewise, and if modifications occur very frequently in one part, owing to selection, then other parts become modified.

Now it is quite easy to show that, if a new power-press be invented in America, a change occurs in European newspapers; that, when the number of people in Europe increases too much and there is consequently more emigration, this has its effects on conditions generally in America and Australia; and that whenever Armenians are murdered by the Turks, this has its effect on the decisions taken in Washington. Many more similar instances of cause and effect might also be cited. All which proves that, just as not a cell can change in the human body without the whole body suffering therefrom or being affected thereby, similarly no one on earth can do or suffer anything without all mankind and therefore every single individual being affected in some way—often unperceivable, it is true.

Furthermore, just as a single cell forcibly removed from its surroundings cannot long survive alone, even so Man alone and isolated perishes. As far as children are concerned, this is obvious, but even adults, who have already benefited by the influence of mankind in general, cannot survive, unless perhaps under altogether exceptionally favourable conditions, for instance on a solitary island where there are neither savage beasts nor any other special hazards.

#### IV. THE AGE WHEN "MANY SHALL GO TO AND FRO"

§ 169. HUMANITY AND INTERCOMMUNICATION.—All mankind, therefore, is one organism, physically and materially united together by the fact of germ-plasm, and intellectually and

<sup>1</sup> *Descent of Man*, Introduction to vol. i.

dynamically by the fact of action and reaction. But whereas the connections due to germ-plasm are immutable, the reciprocal relations are perpetually changing. Indeed, it is beyond doubt that their numbers increase with time; that is, with their help mankind is developing into a more and more perfect organism. Hence it is these dynamic relations, this interchange of intellectual forces, on which the pitch of organisation attained by the human organism depends in the last resort. Were these relations, therefore, absolutely clearly set forth, then we would know what point in its development the human race has already attained, and what degree of universal brotherhood could be demanded of it.

Hence nothing perhaps would be so well worth doing as to describe these relations, but this is impossible within the limits of this volume, owing to their being absolutely limitless in number. Everything which we call civilisation or culture, language, morals, law or rights, technical achievement, art or science, and much else besides, are merely ways of expressing such relations and the means of continuing them. There are two ways, however, and only two, of hindering everything of the kind. One of those ways is crime, and war the other.

All these relations taken together may broadly and generally be described as Humanity, for the possibility of such relations is precisely that which confers on the human race its unique, dominant position in Nature. This Humanity, however, thus considered, ceases to be a vague conception of any remote ideal of our dreams, but becomes an absolutely tangible embodiment of an existing link. The ideal and the future are only to be found in the perfecting and further development of what already exists, and in opposing everything tending to obstruct such further development—that is, in opposition to crime and war.

To some, however, the fine word Humanity still does not convey a sufficiently definite idea, which is partly due to its being so frequently misused. To others, again, the phrase "human relationships" seems too colourless. They should therefore select the tangible side of intercommunication, which does not include merely trade, post and railways, but, after all, everything forming a tie between man and man; and a survey of the history of evolution would soon prove that all this springs from the same origin—love. Humanity, love and intercommunication, accordingly, all mean the same thing.

What, therefore, really ought to be done is to write a history of intercommunication from the standpoint of Humanity and likewise to promote it. Suffice it here to say, however, that in this respect we are undoubtedly passing through a critical period. During last century all the technical means of travel and communication were perfected by leaps and bounds, and it is inconceivable that this should not produce any moral after-effects.

This striving after perfection of means of communication finds unconscious expression in the Socialist movement of the nineteenth century, the so-called revival of the Christian spirit, and in pacifism. But just because Man was not conscious of these aspirations of his, the masses, with their instinctive conservatism, rebelled against the inevitable New Order of things, and the regrettable but probably inevitable reaction was the war of 1914.

The war, however, is only an episode, and intercommunication—going to and fro—is an epoch. When, on January 7, 1891, the Emperor William II. wrote to Dr. von Stephen, Secretary of State for the German Imperial Post Office, that “the world at the close of the nineteenth century is under the sign of intercommunication,” he merely expressed a commonplace. It is satisfactory to note the assurance with which he proceeds to say: “This intercommunication breaks down the boundaries separating nations, and forms new connections between them.” It would not have been difficult to perceive, arguing from these premises, that all military preparations, all excitation of Jingo passions, and all suppression of methods by which nations can express their desires could do nothing but hinder this process of international union, of which the Emperor clearly had at least a premonition.

§ 170. SPEECH AS A MEANS OF INTERCOMMUNICATION.—Now, the movement tending to develop the dynamic relations between man and man has certainly never come to a standstill. Language was the first means of communication and mutual understanding, and even now it is the most delicate intellectual sediment, and a touchstone of culture and civilisation. True, there are still peoples who manage with a few hundred words, but the vocabulary of a Shakespeare runs into tens of thousands of words. Beyond doubt this increased facility of expression has an extraordinarily refining influence on relations between

man and man. Or rather, these additions to our vocabulary prove that such relations have become more intimate.

Now, it may certainly be objected with reason, that this only applies to the individuals of one nation, that is, to people all speaking the same language. But it is nevertheless a fact that as civilisation advances, the divergencies of language over a large extent of territory decrease. In America the number of languages is greatest,<sup>1</sup> for none of the small, itinerant Indian tribes can be understood by a neighbour tribe. After America comes Africa, and Asia, while Europe, which, like China, that vast aggregate of races, has long been inhabited by civilised peoples, early attained comparative unity of language. Thus in Europe only about fifty (that is, five per cent.) of the thousand odd languages in the world are spoken. This is partly due to the fact that wherever civilisation is high and consequently there is a great deal of intercommunication, languages mix, becoming enriched in the process, and thus all the more easily supplant the poorer and more backward languages. England, in fact, owes the richness of her language, and perhaps also her civilisation, to the fact of almost all Teutonic and Romance families of languages being here included in one speech. The assimilation of foreign words, in fact, is not only a linguistic gain, but likewise signifies an advance in civilisation. For instance, in the Middle Ages, when the German language borrowed from Latin and Greek the words *Brief* (letter—*breve*) *Tinte* (ink—*tingere*), *schreiben* (write—*scribere*), *Kirche* (church—*kyriakon*), *Pfarrer* (pastor—*parochius*), and *Mönch* (monk—*monachus*), it not merely enriched itself in so doing, but likewise proved that the Germans had learned to write and become Christians.

And similarly to-day. The craven fears of the language purists not only impoverish the German language, and make it less resisting, but also show that the purists are nowise disposed to accept the consequences of technical achievement as tending to make all men brothers. The fact of the word "telegraphy" being international merely means that, when it became acclimatised in the different countries, it was everywhere instinctively felt that telegraphy was a means of bringing nations together, not merely outwardly in their bodies but inwardly in their souls. And to-day, when we Germans are endeavouring

<sup>1</sup> In Australia the same conditions probably prevailed, but there many languages have partially died out, together with the natives speaking them.

to supplant the word *auto* by *Kraftwagen*<sup>1</sup>—in itself a felicitous choice—this proves that we to-day have ceased to realise how much such modern inventions tend to unite nations together. The question of foreign words, indeed, is not merely a question of taste, but a moral question. It betokens ingratitude in us to accept the foreign invention and then try to find a German name for it.

At the outset of the Middle Ages, when German mercenaries used to go about the world serving foreign nations, they took their words with them, and even now in France numberless expressions used in war are of German origin, without anybody taking this amiss. The *lansquenet* is the German *Landsknecht* (mercenary), and the *Maréchal de France* owes his name to the German word *Mährenschalk*, meaning a man who holds some one's horse.<sup>2</sup> The French word *arquebuse*<sup>3</sup> is the German *Hakenbüchse*, *canon* is the German *Kanone*, and *flamberge* (sword)<sup>4</sup> is the German *Flamberg*; and even the most modern French weapon, *flèches* (arrows, airmen's arrows) is derived from the German word *Flitz*-(*bogen*).<sup>5</sup> It is not without interest that the word for war in all modern languages (*guerra*, *guerre*, *war*) is not derived from the Latin *bellum*, but from the German word *Wehr* (defence).

In the case of an unsophisticated people this process of assimilation goes on almost automatically. The new product or new invention, as the case may be, comes together with the foreign name, and at the same time civilisation is enriched. Soon every one is quite used to the innovation, and it is not till patriotism has been artificially inflated that, conscious of its own innate weakness, it seeks for external indications of an internal strength of whose absence it is conscious.

Considering what powerful arguments may be urged against any dread of foreign words, other arguments for them simply do not count—such an argument, for instance, as that the

<sup>1</sup> "Power-car," so to speak, in English.—TRANS.

<sup>2</sup> The German word *Mähre* now about corresponds to the English word "jade"—a contemptuous, old-fashioned word for a horse.—TRANS.

<sup>3</sup> The word *arquebuse* is more properly *harquebus*, and meant an early form of fire-arm.—TRANS.

<sup>4</sup> *Flamberge* is a word which now survives only in certain expressions, such as *mettre flamberge au vent*, to draw one's sword, and *flamberge au vent*, with drawn sword. In German it means the broadsword of a knight, and is still used poetically to mean sword.—TRANS.

<sup>5</sup> The word *Flitzbogen* now means a boy's crossbow.—TRANS.

use of international expressions makes every kind of travel very much easier. In any case the outcry against foreign terms which arose in the nineteenth century is merely the expression of the artificial barriers put in the way of all efforts to promote whatever tended to humanise the world. But besides the effect of mixture of languages in civilised countries, however, we must not forget that people soon learned to write their language here, which also tends to lessen diversity of languages in advanced continents.

Once language is, so to speak, fixed by being committed to writing, it can penetrate farther than the human voice, for writing is also one of the technical achievements by which we have overcome the cramping effects of natural compulsion. Not only does the written word, which is also the fixed word, wander all around the globe, whereas the spoken word scarcely penetrates beyond the confines of the speaker's native valley; but Man, having once learned to write, achieves the apparent impossibility of making the fleeting moment lasting. Writing united mankind beyond the bounds to which the individual human tribes wandered, and writing likewise joined race to race for all time.

§ 171. THE RESULTS OF INTERCOMMUNICATION.—It is hardly necessary to remind the reader that the power of the written word to cement nations together did not become a reality until the introduction of modern postal arrangements in the nineteenth century. When the Greek hemerodromes, the *tabellarii* of the Roman Republic, or the "Withingen" of the Order of German Knights used to carry letters, perhaps, at a rough estimate, about 100,000 crossed the frontiers of the various countries in the year, throughout the world. But even had it been a million, this would still not work out at nearly as much as one letter for every thousand human beings, whereas at present in Germany alone nearly a thousand million<sup>1</sup> letters, postcards, etc., go through the post annually—that is, about fifteen for each individual on an average.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Milliarde* is the word used, and this means one thousand millions (1,000,000,000). *Billion* in England and Germany = a million millions (1,000,000,000,000): but in France and America it means a thousand millions.

—TRANS.

<sup>2</sup> The number of letters which went through the post in the United Kingdom in 1911 was 3,047,500,000. Taking the population of Great Britain and Ireland in that year (45,216,665), this gives an average per year of rather over sixty-seven per person.—TRANS.



The number of letters, etc., has increased especially during the last few years. About forty years ago, when the World Postal Union was founded,<sup>1</sup> in those countries now belonging to this Association about three thousand million letters, etc., were posted annually, whereas even in 1906 this number had risen to thirty-five thousand millions (35,000,000,000), and before war broke out it cannot have been less than fifty thousand millions. This means that each individual on an average probably receives something through the post every ten days (in England every three days).

Moreover, letters reach their destination now enormously more quickly than formerly. At the beginning of the mediæval period a letter took nearly a month to go from Germany to Italy. Now it takes forty hours;<sup>2</sup> and the invention of the telegraph means that for the written word distance no longer counts, and in a certain sense the entire world—at any rate the entire civilised world—is already reduced to a single large room, in which it is possible to communicate almost as we please with any one we please—or very soon will be so reduced.

It is a fact of importance that words travel faster than those who carry them. So long as letters had to be sent, a courier was necessary, and sometimes a great deal depended on him. Thus when a sea-captain used to sail with a ship to some far distant part of the world, the owner of his ship could not get at him. This of course made him very independent. No one at home could know how circumstances were when the captain reached his destination; consequently the latter had generally to be not only a navigator but also a merchant. He accepted new cargoes, and sometimes even selected his route when there did not happen to be any agency of his shipowner on the spot. In such circumstances there must of course have been a great deal left to the agents.

Now, however, a sea-captain, on reaching his destination, finds telegraphic instructions awaiting him. He has become

<sup>1</sup> It was founded in 1874.—TRANS.

<sup>2</sup> This is true, despite the fact that in certain places, even comparatively civilised places, such as Siberia or Morocco, the post still crawls with snail-like slowness. Even in some parts of Germany this is still the case. Thus the post in East Prussia between Johannisburg and Lötzen (35 miles) even now takes almost a whole day—seven hours.

merely an employé, but any one who has seen with what a very bad grace an old East Indian captain, for instance, who was proud of his independence, conforms to the new order of things, can realise that here is a case of the telegraph destroying a part of a man's own personality in order that universal organisation may be promoted.

Similarly with regard to a country's foreign diplomatic representatives, commercial travellers, commercial agents permanently stationed abroad, and also superior and inferior officers of the army and navy. Whereas formerly they could not be reached, and therefore had to act on their own responsibility, now they are in telegraphic communication with headquarters, and have thus gradually degenerated into a kind of marionettes. No disrespect is intended to them, but it is merely desired to prove how much man's self-will is diminished by technical science in order that the world's total output may be increased. The possibility of asking for more detailed instructions of course relieves the individual of responsibility, and consequently lessens his sense of responsibility.

But there is another respect in which modern means of communication detract from a man's individual attributes, and that is this. They cause somewhat the same sort of conditions to prevail everywhere. The Virginia planter or the Mecklenburg farmer used to live after their own peculiar fashion, and hardly knew anything of the outside world. But now the daily paper, letters and travellers connect both with the world in general, and make even the backwoodsman somewhat of a cosmopolitan. Which may be regrettable, but which certainly cannot be helped.

§ 172. THE CONNECTION BETWEEN INTERCOMMUNICATION AND THE GREATNESS OF COUNTRIES.—The increased speed with which men can cover space, however, cannot fail to affect a country's greatness in a much more direct way. Up to a certain point this has assuredly something to do with the rapidity of its means of communication. Experience proves that the only countries which were really at all vigorous organisms have been those in which the different component parts could be reached in at most a few days from a single centre. Hence it is possible to trace some connection between the greatness of countries and the development of our means of intercommunication. Let us consider the following figures :

In one day a traveller in the backwoods covers about	12½ miles
" the ordinary post	62 "
" a mail coach	125 "
" a railway (about 1850)	375 "
" a modern railway	1,250 "
" an express train within the limits of technical possibilities	6,250 "

Here we have a scale showing how Man has slowly advanced from being only able to get across a town in one day to a speed which enables him to fly across a quadrant of this planet in the same time.

Had countries increased in the same proportion, then their diameter would have had to increase in the proportion of 1 to 500—that is, the size must have increased 25,000 times.


Figure 10 shows this. The small black square in the middle represents the empire which men would be able to found without any assistance from technical science. The square striped with black indicates the size of a country which can be governed with the help of horses, good roads and correspondingly good postal communications. This refers to the whole period up to the Napoleonic wars. Now, however, with the beginning of modern technical science, empires might have expanded accordingly, and we might have expected some large enough to fill up the big white square.

Translating these reflections into actual facts, we find that a mountain valley may be the natural limit set to the range of power of a barbarian, technically speaking—that is, a man with no means of locomotion save his feet. To the men able to travel by mail-coach were apportioned countries about the size of those which arose at the outset of the Middle Ages, and still exist. But these antiquated, miniature countries are already far too small for the present time, for which some such countries are appropriate as have already been formed in America, Australia, South Africa, Russia, etc., and which will probably before long be compulsorily formed in Europe. In the future, when we can get from any one part of the globe to any other in only one or two days, the world can and will be one homogeneous State.

It is useless for Man to invoke the memory of his beautiful old traditions, and with all his might resist such inevitable evolution. The spirits he has once raised will never depart from him. All these vast means of intercommunication created by the human mind during the last hundred years are now

working together of their own accord, in conformity with laws of their own, and forcing reluctant mankind to come together. This homogeneity of organisation will and must come, and it is probably needless to attempt to hasten it, for we must all

Modern Kingdom.



- Pedestrian Kingdom.
- ▨ Horse " (to 1837)
- Railway "

FIG. 10.

complete the circle of our existence in accordance with laws, rigid and eternal. But Man can actually achieve the impossible. He can understand and love this necessary evolution, and then complete, as it were, of his own free will and creation, what must needs come, and what all other creatures do only in obedience to iron necessity.

No profounder interpretation can probably be given to

Socrates' saying that virtue can be taught. In this sense virtue means understanding our evolution sufficiently to be able to anticipate the future, and from this anticipation to forge the unbreakable weapon with which it is possible to make a stand alike against opinions which may chance to prevail for a time, and against such trivial obstructions and hindrances as war and pestilence.

Thus virtue is likewise happiness, and it is only the European to-day who can possess such happy virtue.

§ 173. PREMATURE ATTEMPTS TO ATTAIN A UNIVERSAL MONARCHY.—If we adopt these ideas as our own, and realise that the fusion of all Europe into one must necessarily result from our slowly moving evolution, then we shall also perceive that it was idle to broach the problem of universal peace and a universal world-monarchy at a time when conditions were not yet ripe for such conceptions. This is nowise derogatory to those dreams of the future which the best men have always dreamed. Such men were geniuses, precursors of a future which they understood by intuition. But we must not be surprised if such projects were never realised, the time being not yet ripe. After all, men were always dreaming of and anticipating the day when they would be able to fly, but this dream was destined to remain unfulfilled until there were machines weighing only a few pounds per horse-power.

The Roman Empire, after being reorganised by Diocletian and Constantine, was in reality merely a federation of comparatively independent provinces, and was doomed to perish on this account. It has been urged that its fall was due to its having had no representative constitution, which may be true. But such a constitution was impossible in view of the then state of technical achievement; and hence the Roman Empire was bound to perish, because it was at the time an impossibility.

The conception of a United States of Europe, however, has never quite disappeared. Apart from the fact that Popes and Emperors were always insisting on something of the sort, on principle, there was no lack of direct and exceedingly diverse attempts made to bring about something of the sort. The most important of these attempts are set forth below:

- 1095. Pope Urban II., at the Ecclesiastical Council of Clermont, proclaimed the *treuga Dei* for all Christendom.
- 1253. Thomas Aquinas published his *Summa Theologiæ*.

- 1300 or thereabouts. Dante Alighieri published his *Tractatus de Monarchia*, first printed in Basel in 1559.<sup>1</sup> Republished in Vienna by Witte in 1874.
1306. Peter Dubois' *De recuperatione terre Sante*. E. H. Meyer's *Die Staats- und völkerrechtlichen Ideen von Peter Dubois* (Peter Dubois' Ideas on National and International Law), Marburg Dissertation, 1908.
1466. Georg von Podjebrad<sup>1</sup> proposed an Alliance of Christian Princes; the first proposal for a federation. Sewitzki's *Der Europäische Fürstenbund* (The Union of European Princes). Georg von Podjebrad. Marburg, 1907.
1495. The Emperor Maximilian I., at the Diet of Worms, proclaimed perpetual public peace.
1600. Sully in his *Economies royales* alludes to a project of Henry IV. and Elizabeth of England for establishing a Christian European monarchy. M. Kükelhans: *Der Ursprung des Planes von Sully* (The Origin of Sully's Project). Berlin, 1893.
1677. Leibniz, in a work entitled *De jure suprematus ac legationis principum Germaniæ*, proposed a European Confederation.
1713. The Abbé Bernardin de Saint Pierre published his *Projet pour rendre la paix perpétuelle en Europe*. Drouet: *L'Abbé de St. Pierre. L'Homme et l'œuvre*. Paris, 1912.
1789. Jeremy Bentham published his *Plan for a Universal and Perpetual Peace on Principles of International Law*.
1795. Kant published his *Zum ewigen Frieden, ein Philosophischer Entwurf* (Perpetual Peace).

In long-past times it was hoped to govern the world from one single centre. Thomas Aquinas wanted it to be ruled by the Pope, Dante by the Emperor, and Dubois by the King of France; but since the fifteenth century it was recognised that this could not be. From that time forth all proposals have mentioned only a confederation of States, all on an equal footing. Not till we come to Napoleon the Great, dazzled and led astray by the ease with which he won his military laurels, do we find any one hoping once more to become the sole ruler of Europe and thus to unite it. More recently still, that is after 1870, Germany cherished similar aspirations, although she was more cautious in expressing them, alleging that she merely wanted to organise Europe. But the shade of the mighty Corsican should be a warning to us all. Europe can only be freely welded together.

<sup>1</sup> Georg von Podjebrad, or Podiebrad (1420-1471), was King of Bohemia, born at Podjebrad. He was elected king in 1458. On religious questions he came into serious conflict with Popes Pius II. and Paul II., the latter of whom excommunicated him.—TRANS.

## CHAPTER XIV

## THE TRANSFORMATION IN HUMAN JUDGMENT

## I. THE PERIODICITY OF OPINIONS

§ 174. CONTRADICTORY VIEWS.—Owing to mistaken impartiality, our age is peculiarly inclined to refrain from delivering itself of clear and unambiguous judgments ; but it is significant that war should never have been discussed from one point of view and one only. In olden times, it is true, men simply accepted facts as they came, and invented a formula to suit the occasion. Thus they compromised with war because it was discovered to have beneficial effects on the health of the population. It seemed a bad thing, but it also seemed a thoroughly effective remedy against something still worse.<sup>1</sup> It was looked on as a sort of blood-letting so as to get rid of superfluous strength, as a tonic preserving us from effeminacy, or a stimulant to arouse nations from brooding moodily over matters. Every one held such opinions, but as it was known that all good medicines, such as quicksilver, arsenic and quinine, are also poisons, the utmost divergency of opinion consisted in the fact that one man looked on war mainly as a tonic medicine and another mainly as a poison. Not till our own times did these differences of opinion become really extreme, and some people began to extol war for war's sake while others were peace-at-any-price men.

How confused are the notions on which both sides base their opinions is obvious from the fact that the most convinced advocates of one set of views are just those who most frequently go over to the other side. Thus Albert Thomas, Jaurès' old friend, entered the French Ministry of War, and Gustave

<sup>1</sup> Even a modern war-advocate such as Karl Braun, the Liberal German deputy, who has nothing but ridicule for the pacific aspirations of others, nevertheless says, in *Während des Krieges*, p. 17 (During the War [Dunker, Leipzig, 1871]), that "war is a disease," and hopes, with the singular and incomprehensible illogicalness which characterises all war-advocates, that "war may soon lead the way to a lasting peace."

Hervé, the most popular of all anti-militarists, supports war on the battle-field zealously and sometimes too zealously in his *Guerre Sociale*, afterwards rechristened *La Victoire*. The British pacifist Frederic Harrison wrote a letter to the *Times* advocating new Dreadnoughts being constructed with the utmost possible speed, and Ostwald, once the apostle of Esperanto as a means of bringing all the world together, is now crying out for war between the nations. On the other hand, generals, when getting old, have very often cursed their "damned job."

If the only result of this modern cleavage should prove to be that extremists on both sides were further apart now than ever, then there would be a good basis for future discussions; but unfortunately the overwhelming majority of mankind praise and exalt war and peace in the same breath. Peace, they say, is delightful, but all honour to war. Thus certain aspects of war are praised, such as the awakening desire of men to sacrifice themselves for a great cause, which is described as the most magnificent aspect of Man's character; while other aspects, such as the inevitable neglect of the sciences, are deplored, and certain wars—for instance, so-called defensive wars—are considered necessary and good, whereas others say that offensive warfare is the greatest disgrace of the nineteenth century.

Thus it could happen that the Socialists in all countries, though in theory in favour of peace, were as much in favour of the war as any one else when it actually broke out. But in the case of the Socialists, as in that of the pro-war intellectuals, it might be urged that the influence of others' enthusiasm for the war, and of suggestion, counted for something; and for this reason we must never forget that there always have been extremists who have endeavoured to see the good and bad sides of war simultaneously.

Thus Napoleon said: "I love this business of war and I hate it," and a hundred years afterwards the German poet, Johannes Schlaf,<sup>1</sup> said the same thing in a book which is, after all, nothing but a lengthy paraphrase of Napoleon's brief utterance (which to me personally is unknown). Schlaf, an author of much delicacy, who, despite his frequent and regrettable lack of clearness, has often shown a real power of interpreting the feelings of his day, writes literally that "to condemn war is

<sup>1</sup> *Der Krieg (War)*, by Johannes Schlaf, 1907. Marquardt & Co., Berlin.



to blaspheme, indeed positively to outrage every truly religious thought and feeling, and likewise every human entity and destiny." Here, therefore, is one who loves war and holds it sacred, but who also hates it; for, as he says in so many words, he would like "to prove that this wicked pacifist blasphemy is based on reason and necessity."

This dual view of war was expressed by a man of such iron nature as Napoleon in order to give vent to his subjective sentiments. But it seems closely akin to madness in the apparently objective dress in which Schlaf tries to clothe it. Yet not one of us is wholly free from this inward contradictoriness, and the chief reason for my quoting Schlaf is to show in what a tight corner the world has gradually landed. Like Schlaf, we instinctively feel that war is something fine and glorious, but no less instinctively that it is something horrible. A man of action such as Bonaparte, or a man of feeling such as Schlaf, set these two sentiments over against each other as an antithesis; but a man of science studying war must endeavour to arrive at some sort of explanation as to why these two diametrically opposite points of view about war should exist.

§ 175. THE IDEA OF EVOLUTION AS THE SOLUTION OF THE DIFFICULTY.—It is easy enough to see how this divergence might be explained. There is hardly any occurrence or phenomenon about which we need always be of the same mind if we trace it back through the ages. That is, no evil was originally an evil, but only became so. Even Börne,<sup>1</sup> despite his having opposed guilds<sup>2</sup> and nobility all his life long, believed that originally both rendered great service. Guilds were necessary organisations to oppose the, at one time, too powerful landed proprietors, while the nobility, as the original champions of intellect and virtue, waged war upon folly and low ideals. The fault, he urged, lay in the fact that guilds and the privileges of the nobility still persist even now, although no one now interferes with the occupations of citizens, and intellect and virtue are not the monopoly of any one class.

Many more such instances of things originally good, but which have outlived their purpose, could be quoted, and among them perhaps we might include war. Like everything which has life,

<sup>1</sup> *Nouvelles lettres provinciales*, by Ludwig Börne (Loeb Baruch), 1825. In his *Collected Works*, 2nd ed. vii. p. 45.

<sup>2</sup> Trade Guilds, something like the London City Companies.—TRANS.

war never remains stationary, but is always developing. Animals did not wage war, but human beings did, and our descendants, the "supermen," as Goethe and Nietzsche call them, will cease to do so. This, at any rate, is what we believe. But let us leave the future to take care of itself, for after all the war with which history has acquainted us was once born; it was young and now is old. But just as the love of a maid seems to us lovely and that of an old woman repulsive, even so is it with war: we cannot and must not judge alike two things which from their very nature and meaning are wholly different. There is nothing whatever in common between Achilles' eternal Song of Hate, and Lissauer's Hymn of Hate to England; and similarly there is the profoundest difference between the battles in the Scamander Valley and the fighting between the Meuse and the Moselle.

Again, universal experience shows that what used once to be necessary and a matter of course, seems beautiful to men because of tradition. Only to the few is it given to perceive the beauty of what is to come. The ideal of beauty of most of us is the retrospective ideal of the past. Thus we can explain the origin of the Biblical Paradise and the Golden Age of the Ancients, as well as the fondness of Tacitus and Rousseau for primitive peoples. Even our ideal of human beauty is that of the Middle Ages, when physical strength and skill were of use, whereas now they are merely "beautiful."

As regards all art, indeed, we think that there must necessarily always be a conflict going on between new tendencies and that "classical art" on which every one, even trained critics, rightly set great store. In fact, we never learned to esteem the different artistic periods aright until we began to consider them historically, that is from the point of view of their place in the scale of evolution.

If, therefore, we wish rightly to appreciate the many and wholly contradictory judgments passed on war, we must take into consideration the fact that war has changed, and that, owing to tradition, most of us still judge it, particularly from the æsthetic standpoint, as it deserved to be judged in the preceding epoch.

§ 176. LOVE OF WAR, ANCIENT AND MODERN.—In dealing with the evolution of war I gave the reasons why our peaceful primitive forefathers turned into warriors, showing also how

division of labour gave a set-back to the soldiers' profession, until in the nineteenth century it acquired a new lease of life. As we do not know what primitive Man thought about war, the ensuing period naturally divides up into three :

1. The archaic period, when men simply accepted war as a fact and when they all had to fight as a matter of course. This begins in the earliest ages, and had probably come to an end everywhere before a single nation entered upon the stage of history.
2. The period of civilisation and cultivation of the ground, a period comparatively inclined towards peace, when only a limited number of professional soldiers used to bear arms, but otherwise mankind tried to engage in labour tending to civilise and cultivate.
3. The period of sentimental glorification of war (the archaistic period), when, owing to the newly-created "people's armies," all men again became warriors. This begins with the great revolutionary struggles at the end of the eighteenth century.

However peacefully inclined our still half-animal, primitive forefathers may have been, and they certainly seem to have been pacific, nevertheless when once fratricide had occurred a latent but universal state of war must have prevailed. At any rate at first, all human beings, although after a very short time all men only, were forced to be ever ready to take up arms. Just as to-day there is still no protection for the rights of individual States, so at that time there was none for the rights of the individual human being. As is the case with the State to-day, so it was the case with the individual then—possession was nine points of the law ; and he might at any moment be forced to defend his rights against those of others, even others who were brutal, overbearing, or crazy. Indeed, there being no sort of guarantee for any one's rights, these could not be defended save in war.

Thus it was almost inevitable that the opinion should have arisen that war is the natural state ; and as primitive people in general think that what they are accustomed to do is right and proper, it may be assumed that our slightly more highly-developed forefathers really did consider a state of war lawful and good. No such opinion has come down to us in written documents ; we know it only in the watered-down, familiar

version that war is something natural and that we have always had war with us.

This view is a wrong one, but we can understand it. Even old Heraclitus believed that war had always existed. He called it the father of all things (πόλεμον πατέρα παντῶν),<sup>1</sup> and looked on it as the motive force that kept the world going. But just as primitive Man certainly did not take up arms save under compulsion, even so for Heraclitus war was only a means to an end, and the end of the world seemed to him to be peace (ὁμολογία καὶ εἰρήνη).<sup>2</sup> Moreover, he did not identify his "struggle" with war and its bloodshed, any more than Nietzsche did, for he expressly states that "Man can cleanse himself neither with filth from filth, nor with blood from bloodguiltiness."<sup>3</sup>

Not only law and right, however, but also phrases are inherited and transmitted like an ineradicable disease, and Heraclitus's axiom, taken far too literally, has been perpetually repeated. Although he was the one solitary instance of a philosopher delighting in war—if even he really did do so—he was taken as a type. Plato,<sup>4</sup> it is true, in his *Laws*, makes Clinias say that all States are in fact perpetually at war with all others; but he adds that this ought not to be so. Similar statements occur also in the subsequent period. Not till Man had grown weary of endless wars, with their ever-increasing horrors, did Hobbes,<sup>5</sup> in his tractate *De Cive*, wrench this sentence from its meaning so as to make it mean that not only did war actually subsist between all human beings, but that this was even the natural state of things. But even Vorländer<sup>6</sup> pointed out that this phrase is only an abstract scientific hypothesis, and is not to be considered as historically exact. Moreover, he of course insisted on the necessity for abolishing this so-called natural state.

If the literature of the world be searched for passages glorifying war, astonishingly little will be found up to the nineteenth century; but we must not forget that love of war was probably

<sup>1</sup> Heraclitus, *Fragm. Müll.* i. 4462.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, in Diogenes Laertius, lib. ix. 8.

<sup>3</sup> Heraclitus, *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker von Diels*, 1903, p. 67, No. 5.

<sup>4</sup> Plato's *Laws*, I. ii. p. 625.

<sup>5</sup> Hobbes's *Elem. philos. de cive*, i. 11 f., and *Leviathan*, ii. 17.

<sup>6</sup> Vorländer, in the *Allgemeine Monatsschrift für Wissenschaft und Literatur*, chiefly quotes the passage in Hobbes's *Leviathan*, chap. xiii.

universal only in the period when Man could still not write. Thus we find everywhere the memory of legends telling how Gods and men fought, but nowhere is it stated that such combats were right or praiseworthy. Perhaps even in later times there were occasional instances of some one really fond of war, but it would seem as if this primitive fondness went hand-in-hand with a primitive dislike of writing. Soldiers who were also literary men, for instance Xenophon and Cæsar, have never loved or praised war. In fact, if we wish to realise how these hypothetical primitive human beings, our ancestors, felt, we must go back a very little way indeed, not beyond quite modern times.

## II. THE VOICE OF NATIONS

§ 177. THE ANTIQUE.—When once division of labour had created various occupations, the world began to perceive that the "farmer" could till his fields better if he were merely a farmer, and were protected in his peaceful employment by the "soldier." Both were thus equal, but they gradually became unequal, because the armed man of necessity got the power into his own hands and became the master. Of course this power was often misused; the defenders of the country and its food-producers were set over against each other; and thus the warrior became not exactly beloved, and war partook of his unpopularity.

This period, which includes almost the whole historical time known to us, must on principle be divided into the time before and that after Christ. Although war was not popular, even before Christ, nevertheless it was accepted as a necessity of nature; and not till the doctrine of loving thy neighbour as thyself was proclaimed did men begin consciously to make war upon war. In practice, however, no such division of time can be insisted upon, because this Christian concept had already taken root in many persons before it was preached, whereas afterwards it seemed to produce absolutely no effect on most Christian people. Religions, in short, the position of which in regard to war is in any case quite exceptional, must be considered by themselves.

The oldest epic poem, the *Iliad*, is certainly a war epic, full of innocent delight in the heroic deeds of the heroes. But there

is not a single passage in which Homer says the least good of war as war. Indeed, in the introductory part, he says by way of a confession of faith :

“ Achilles’ wrath, to Greece the direful spring  
Of woes unnumber’d, heavenly goddess, sing !  
That wrath which hurls to Pluto’s gloomy reign  
The souls of mighty chiefs untimely slain ;  
Whose limbs unburied on the naked shore,  
Devouring dogs and hungry vultures tore.”<sup>1</sup>

And in Book II., when Agamemnon advised the soldiers to return home, the warlike Achæans ran so that

“ their trampling feet  
Beat the loose sands, and thicken to the fleet.”<sup>2</sup>

And even Ulysses, who calls them back, is not angry with the Greeks for so desiring to return to their homes, but says :

“ As many birds as by the snake were slain,  
So many years the toils of Greece remain ;  
But wait the tenth, for Ilion’s fall decreed.”<sup>3</sup>

Elsewhere, too, the only epithets which Homer applies to war show him to have had the profoundest horror of it. He calls it a blood-stained vampire, and speaks of a war-debauchee who did not even care for whom he fought ; and in Book V. of the *Iliad* Zeus says that he would long since have hurled war far deeper down than the Titans, had not Mars chanced to be his own son<sup>4</sup>—even as at the present day the kings of men love war for dynastic reasons.

Yet, even considered as a whole, this war epic is not warlike in the modern sense. True, it sings of war being brought to a close, but also hints at its being overcome. It may, indeed, be said to contain the programme of humanity. Even the object of the Trojan war points to the future, for it was waged to avenge a violation of the time-honoured human right of hospitality, which is equivalent to citizenship of the world. (Cf.

<sup>1</sup> Homer’s *Iliad*, opening lines of Pope’s translation of Book I.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, Book II., Pope’s translation.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, Pope’s translation.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, Book V., at the very end :

“ Sprung since thou art from Jove, and heavenly born.  
Else singed with lightning hadst thou hence been thrown,  
Where chain’d on burning rocks the Titans groan.”

(Pope’s translation.)

Kant's *Perpetual Peace*.) And who is making war? All Hellas, which in reality was so torn asunder. Any such idea could only have been a dream of the future for Homer. From Taygetus and from Pindus the Hellenes came on a thousand ships to Troy. The tiny states of Lacedæmonia and Argos, Messene and Athens, were at one. From all the isles did they come, from Rhodes and Crete and all the Greek colonies. For Homer this was the world, and thus it is that the war which he describes for us is one which the world has as yet never witnessed—a war for which we, too, long, as the war of the future, the only possible war, one waged by the Federation of Man against the rebel who has violated the law of nations.

Homer may begin with the Mænads of Achilles, but from his wrath he comes to Irene, to peace; and the Homeric chants end in the words of Zeus, in the last lines of the *Odyssey*:

“None now the kindred of the unjust shall own;  
 Forgot the slaughter'd brother and the son;  
 Each future day increase of wealth shall bring,  
 And o'er the past oblivion stretch her wing.  
 Long shall Ulysses in his empire rest,  
 His people blessing, by his people bless'd.  
 Let there be peace.”<sup>1</sup>

But “old Homer” has done yet more. Not merely did he sing of a far-off, misty future, which he but faintly anticipated, but he clearly says how such a future is to be brought about. In the lines selected as the motto for this book, he says that fratricidal warfare on earth must be impossible.

Between Homer's time and now we have climbed every rung of the ladder. First, kinsfolk realised that they were brethren, then towns, and finally States. To-day one alliance of States is already opposed to another, and to-morrow Mankind united into a single alliance will look on every war as a “war between men of kindred race,” and will do what Homer wanted—refuse law and help and protection to its engenderer. Herein lies the true meaning of this most ancient of war epics.

Herodotus, the father of history, also writes of nothing but wars and rumours of war, but war is abhorrent to him, “for there can hardly be any one so devoid of all reason as to prefer war to peace, for in peace the children bury the fathers,

<sup>1</sup> Homer's *Odyssey*, Book XXIV., Pope's translation.

but in war the fathers bury their children." And being wholly unable to account for such things, he adds: "But probably some demons or other like wars to occur."

And in Herodotus' days nations in general thought as he did. No one would ever have dreamt of seeing anything good in war. It is significant that all commentators erroneously derive the Latin word for war (*bellum*) from *bellus* (beautiful), explaining that this was meant sarcastically, and that war was called *bellum* because it was *not* beautiful.<sup>1</sup>

War seemed to every one a scourge of humanity. In the Revelation of St. John the Divine the four riders have "power given unto them over the fourth part of the earth, to kill with sword, and with hunger, and with death, and with the beasts of the earth"—thus representing war;<sup>2</sup> and even now we pray: "Give peace in our time, O Lord," and "From plague, pestilence and famine, Good Lord deliver us." It seemed such a matter of course that war could not be otherwise than bad, that as a rule it is not thought worth while mentioning the fact. Not even the bellicose Romans wrote a single pæan in praise of war; and Horace,<sup>3</sup> in his Ode to Mæcnas, when enumerating pleasures which to him do not seem worthy the name, but in which others take delight, particularly mentions war. But this is the only time when he adds any epithet, and in this case the epithet is "*detestata*"—hateful war! And matters continued thus throughout the centuries, for as to mediæval delight in war, very many people have an altogether wrong notion about that.

For instance, Walter von der Vogelweide,<sup>4</sup> who is constantly singing the praises of the knights and princes of Germany, extols their valiance and good breeding, their clemency and readiness to make peace, their constancy and diligence. He

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Rabelais, Prologue to Book III. of *Pantagruel*: "Je crois, en effet, que la guerre est dite *belle*, en latin, non par antiphrase, ainsi que le croient certains rapetasseurs de vieilles ferrailles latines, mais parce qu'en guerre apparaît toute espèce de bien et de beau et que toute laideur et tout mal y sont cachés."

<sup>2</sup> Rev. vi. 1-8.—TRANS.

<sup>3</sup> Horace, *Carm.* i. 1. 25. Some will retort by quoting Horace's well-known *Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori*, but they must not forget to quote the following line also: *Mors et fugacem persequitur virum*, for without it Horace's real meaning escapes us, which is that "as death strikes even a fugitive, it is always better, when a man is once on the battlefield, to die a fine and glorious death for the Country, than to die as a coward."

<sup>4</sup> Walter von der Vogelweide (c. 1160-1230), Simrock's translation, quoted from Bard's edition. Berlin, 1906.



hopes that it may be granted to the Emperor Otto<sup>1</sup> to be just, and to Ludwig of Bavaria to have plenty of good hunting;<sup>2</sup> he praises Philip's wisdom and clemency,<sup>3</sup> and accounts it a virtue in the Landgrave Herrmann<sup>4</sup> that he never indulged in caprice. But not once does he praise a prince for having won a war. Moreover, it is characteristic that, when he appeals to men to join the Crusades, he never invokes any human being, but always the three archangels, Michael, Gabriel and Raphael; and when Leopold returned from the Crusades in 1219, though he certainly extols him, it is for having kept order and returned "unsullied."<sup>5</sup> Only once, and then in his last poem, *Heimkehr*<sup>6</sup> (Homecoming), does he say that a wave of boundless sorrow has come upon the world, and now he, too, would fain seize his lance and with it win a heavenly crown. But this is resignation, and nowise delight in war, for he knows full well that it is after all the Church's duty to be at peace, and that in reality the conception of the Crusades is unchristian. Thus, in his poem, *Der Klausner*<sup>7</sup> (The Anchorite), he says that the reason for so much ruin and desolation is that the Church itself has become warlike.

§ 178. MORE RECENT TIMES.—That no one should have had a good word to say of war while the religious wars were devastating Europe is not surprising. In Friedrich von Logau's *Epigrams*,<sup>8</sup> for instance, war comes off so badly that even his editor, Lessing, assuredly no lover of war, says that Logau "may perhaps have exaggerated the evil aspects of war." The German novelist Grimmelshausen,<sup>9</sup> who himself took part in

<sup>1</sup> Cf. in particular *Gefährdetes Geleit* (Escort Imperilled), p. 125; *An die Fürsten* (To Princes), p. 147; *Mass und Übermass* (Moderation and Excess), p. 179; *Vier Tugenden* (Four Virtues), p. 184, and *Die drei Stühle* (The Three Chairs), p. 189.

<sup>2</sup> *Das Geschenk Ludwigs von Bayern* (The Gift of Ludwig of Bavaria), p. 140.

<sup>3</sup> *Leitstern* (Guiding Star), p. 137, and *Die Milde* (Mercy), p. 140.

<sup>4</sup> *An Landgraf Herrmann*, p. 156.

<sup>5</sup> Walter von der Vogelweide's *Leopolds Rückkehr vom Kreuzzuge* (Leopold's Return from the Crusade), p. 167.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 190.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 126.

<sup>8</sup> *Sinngedichte* (Epigrams), by Friedrich von Logau, 1654. Cf. Lessing's reviews of von Logau, which contain five of his characteristic war-poems, *Der verfochtene Krieg*, *Des Krieges Raubsucht*, *Krieg und Hunger*, *Eine Heldentat*, *Jupiter und Mars* (War and its Champions, Ravenous War, War and Starvation, An Act of Heroism, and Jupiter and Mars).

<sup>9</sup> Hans Jakob Christoffel von Grimmelshausen (c. 1624-1676) was captured by the Hessians in 1635, and probably was a soldier in the ranks in 1638, 1646, and 1648. His *Simplicius Simplicissimus*, published in 1669, is considered the first German novel of permanent value, and is an appalling description of the misery resulting from the Thirty Years' War.—TRANS.

the Thirty Years' War, also has hardly a page in which he does not express his horror of war, whose irresistible power nevertheless seems to him so great that his hero can see nothing for it but, like his father, to become a hermit. On the other hand, it is characteristic that, as already mentioned, the only person who asserts that war is something natural, though not precisely good or desirable, should be an Englishman—Hobbes.<sup>1</sup> But Hobbes, living in his sea-girt isle, resembled Englishmen of to-day in the fact that he saw comparatively little of the horrors of war (particularly those of the Thirty Years' War).

Hobbes, it is true, lived through the English civil wars of Cromwell's time, although the devastation wrought by them must have been far behind that wrought by contemporaneous Continental wars, if only because they were civil wars and no foreign armies were involved in them.

Moreover, intercommunication and travel are increasing, and confirming men in the belief that war between modern constitutional States was not merely horrible but foolish and useless. Even Erasmus<sup>2</sup> calls war "senseless"; and though his contemporary Luther began by calling cannon "damnable machines and works of the devil," he afterwards, as in so many cases, made great concessions to the war-lust of the age.<sup>3</sup> Suarez<sup>4</sup> explains that a community of interests and civilisation subsists between the different nations, and that this ought to be furthered by community of legislation; and Hugo Grotius,<sup>5</sup> in his famous work on the Laws of War, which long remained the code of international law, made the first attempt to restrict war. Montesquieu remarks that wars in his day had become quite different from those of the ancients as regards their effect on trade, intercommunication and civilisation generally. Holbach, the French philosopher, wrote that war did not even spare the victor, and that even the most successfully waged war was a calamity.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Hobbes, *De cive*, 1642, i. 11.

<sup>2</sup> *Encomium moriæ*, by Erasmus, 1518. Cf. in particular *Militis Christiani Enchiridion* and *Charon*.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. §§ 188 and 189.

<sup>4</sup> Francisco Suarez (1548-1617), Spanish Jesuit. James I. ordered his *Defensio catholicæ fidei contra anglicanæ sectæ errores* to be burned by the common executioner.—TRANS.

<sup>5</sup> *De jure belli et pacis*, by Hugo Grotius, 1625.

<sup>6</sup> Quoted according to N. van Suchtelen, *Das einige Europa* (Europe United), 1915. Published by the *Europäische Staatenbund* (Committee for the United States of Europe).

We must not be surprised, therefore, that all the great men of this period, if they alluded to war at all, should only have done so with the utmost contempt, sparing no pains to flagellate its useless immorality, cruelty and barbarity. Suffice it to quote only a few instances. In any case it does not seem even to have entered into the heads of most writers of the period that there was any need to allege serious reasons for opposing war. They agreed with Leibniz,<sup>1</sup> who, during the war of the Spanish Succession, in which his country was involved, wrote to Foucher saying that "Philosophers have no concern with war"; and in general their one desire was to keep as far from the battle-field as possible. True, they did not all express this desire with the Diogenes-like simplicity of Gellert,<sup>2</sup> who, when he ought once upon a time to have sued for some favour from Frederick II., exclaimed: "Fall down at his feet and recommend him in my name to keep the peace,"<sup>3</sup> and then hastily retreated into his lecture-room.

People of those days believed that, as civilisation progressed, war must disappear of its own accord, and therefore for the most part contented themselves with abusing it. Thus Hume<sup>4</sup> compares two nations at war with two drunken fellows labouring each other with clubs in a china-shop. Quite apart from the bruises, which would keep them doctoring themselves for a long while to come, they would also have to pay for all the damage done.

Pascal<sup>5</sup> gives it as his opinion that "Theft, incest, infanticide and patricide, all once were included in virtuous actions. But war never, for can there really be anything more ridiculous than that a man should have a right to kill me because he lives across the water and his ruler has a complaint against mine, although I have nothing whatever against him?" On which Voltaire remarks sarcastically that "ridiculous" is not the right word, and "infamous madness" is much nearer the mark.<sup>6</sup> Moreover this friend of Frederick the Great considers all wars began only so that men might be enabled to steal,<sup>6</sup> which

<sup>1</sup> Leibniz's *Philosophische Schriften*, about 1700, Gerhardt, vol. i. p. 420.

<sup>2</sup> Gellert's *Brief an ein adliges Fräulein* (Letter to a Noble Damozel), 1758. Cf. H. Pröhle, *Friedrich der Grosse und die deutsche Literatur*, Berlin, 1878.

<sup>3</sup> *Treatise of Human Nature*, 1738.

<sup>4</sup> Pascal, about 1650.

<sup>5</sup> Voltaire's *De la paix perpétuelle*, about 1750.

<sup>6</sup> "Dans toutes les guerres il ne s'agit que de voler," to which Schopenhauer adds the comment: "And let the Germans take warning by that."

on another occasion he condensed into the epigram that the first king was a successful thief (*un heureux voleur*). Schopenhauer went one better,<sup>1</sup> and asserted that "lust of thieving" was the origin of all war. And even the "laughing philosopher"<sup>2</sup> becomes wholly serious when the word "war" is mentioned.

"War," he says, "is a word as heavy as lead. It is the scourge of humanity and of nations, the antithesis of all reason, although not seldom a harvest for the great, for ministers, generals, contractors, and Jews. War is Mankind's obscene picture, and war first begot despotism. War begot the feudal system. War made of free men the first slaves." And Klopstock says in one of his poems that "War is the most hideous laughing stock of the human race."<sup>3</sup> Elsewhere he says that Cerberus had three jaws, but war has a thousand.

I could fill thousands of pages with such quotations. But it would be unfair to pass over in silence the three shining lights of German humane philosophy—Herder, Kant and Goethe. I shall have to refer so frequently to Goethe afterwards that I will here merely remind the reader of the fine passage in *Egmont*. As for Herder, he says: "Mere endeavours for the betterment of mankind can scarcely succeed in any country so long as the spirit of conquest has the upper hand there, dominating everything. Accordingly we are and remain what we were as long ago as Tacitus' time—barbarians, armed for war even in peace."<sup>4</sup>

All noble-minded human beings, he urges, should do their utmost to disseminate such views, if only because they are human beings. Parents should do their best to instil them into their children, so that the dread word, so lightly uttered, may not only come to be detested of men, but that in time we may scarce dare to pronounce or write it, save with the horror with which we speak of St. Vitus's dance, pestilence, starvation, earthquakes, or the Black Death.

Finally, Kant<sup>5</sup> writes: "We are civilised till we have become

<sup>1</sup> Schopenhauer's *Aphorismen zur Lebensweisheit* (Aphorisms on the Philosophy of Life), 1850, chap. v. § 29. Cf. also *Parerga und Paralipomena*, ii. 9, *zur Rechtslehre und Politik* (On Jurisprudence and Politics), § 125.

<sup>2</sup> Weber's *Democritus*, 1840, vol. x. p. 216.

<sup>3</sup> Klopstock, about 1770.

<sup>4</sup> *Briefe zur Beförderung der Humanität* (Letters in Advocacy of Humanitarian Ideas), by Johann Gottfried Herder, 1793-97.

<sup>5</sup> Immanuel Kant's *Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht* (Outlines of Universal History from the Cosmopolitan Standpoint), Part VII., pub. 1784. Cf. also and particularly his *Perpetual Peace*, 1795.

a burden to ourselves, with every kind of social refinement and respectability. But we are a very long way from being entitled to look upon ourselves as moralised. For . . . so long as governments concentrate all their strength on frivolous designs for forcibly extending their power, thus continually putting obstacles in the way of the slow efforts their people are making to think for themselves, so long need nothing of the kind be expected."

§ 179. THE TRANSITION TO MODERN TIMES.—In the preceding pages I have cited only writers fairly generally known, and whose importance is beyond dispute. In so doing, however, I have left the extensive pacifist literature, properly so called, wholly out of account. It is from no lack of deference that I have not mentioned, for instance, Alfred H. Fried and Prof. Wilhelm Foerster in Germany; the Baroness Bertha von Suttner in Austria;<sup>1</sup> Baron d'Estournelles de Constant and M. Jaurès in France; Alfred Nobel in Sweden; Andrew Carnegie in America; M. Jean de Bloch, and above all that great apostle of peace, Tolstoy, in Russia, and very many more besides. We all honour their faith and idealism, but what they said might be considered preconceived opinions, and what I wanted to show was that their pacifist utterances were not by any means isolated, but that in general everything that hath breath and understanding is in agreement with them.

The *Aktion* is shortly to publish a large number of quotations in proof of this, although these will by no means exhaust the list, which would fill many volumes.

I will merely refer to the anthologies of pacifist quotations made by Leopold Katscher<sup>2</sup> and Alfred Fried,<sup>3</sup> which contain many quotations from authors not named here, unfortunately almost always without an exact indication of the source. A great many quotations, some of them very valuable, have already been collected and published in the *Aktion*.<sup>4</sup> They are from a great diversity of writers, who include William Lloyd Garrison, Herder, Swift, Adin Balu, Charles Letourneau, Channing, Flammarion, Alphonse Karr and Emile Rod.

<sup>1</sup> Professor Nicolai includes her among the Germans.—TRANS. •

<sup>2</sup> *Friedensstimmen, eine Anthologie* (Voices of Peace: an Anthology), collected by Leopold Katscher, the Hungarian pacifist, with an introduction by K. F. Meyer and Bertha von Suttner. Leipzig, 1894, 399 pp.

<sup>3</sup> *Handbuch der Friedensbewegung* (Handbook of the Peace Movement), by Alfred Fried. Leipzig and Berlin, 1911.

<sup>4</sup> *Die Aktion*, No. 25, August 7, 1911.

Many more quotations may be found in Tolstoy's *Do Penance*.<sup>1</sup> I would also refer the reader to the quotations given by Dr. Hermann Wetzels, the German philosopher, whose book can unfortunately no longer be bought.<sup>2</sup> Then there are of course a large number of thinkers and authors who scarcely deal directly with war, but whose brief, pithy sayings, torn from their context, are made use of by war advocates. Here I will confine myself to mentioning two instances only. The German writer on art questions, Friedrich Theodor Vischer, after 1870 added to his work on æsthetics a chapter on "War and Art," lauding war to the skies; and Friedrich Nietzsche, the philosopher, is everywhere instanced as having incited the world to the present war.

True, Vischer said after 1870 that "all the idealism of a Teutonic existence lies in war." (Literally he said "lay" in war, but those of like mind with him are right in saying that the context shows that he believes his assertion to be true of the present.) His words, therefore, bring grist to the mills of the Germanophobes. In my next chapter, however, which will also be my last, he will not be quoted, for it deals with war-lovers proper, and it can be proved that this love of war is merely an overflow from the feeling everywhere engendered by the Franco-Prussian War. When Vischer was in the prime of life, and aged thirty-seven, he thought differently. Not only did he consider the "enormous sums swallowed up by standing armies" to be the chief evil in the State:<sup>3</sup> not only did he think it "not lawful to speak" of the triumphant "success of Becker's 'Rhine Chant' without blushing for the Germans":<sup>4</sup> not only does he scoff at Herwegh and his hopes of making anything better by war,<sup>5</sup> but in 1844, in his *Outlines of an Opera*, he directly states that his reason for proposing the Nibelungen Legends as the words of a heroic opera<sup>6</sup> was

<sup>1</sup> *Besinnt Euch* (Bethink Yourselves), by Leo Tolstoy. (Dealing with the Russo-Japanese War.) In Tolstoy's *Collected Works*.

<sup>2</sup> *Die Verweigerung des Heeresdienstes und die Verurteilung des Krieges in der Geschichte der Menschheit* (The Refusal to Serve in the Army and the Condemnation of War in Human History), by Dr. H. Wetzels. Potsdam, 1905.

<sup>3</sup> Vischer's *Kritische Gänge* (Essays in Criticism), 1844, vol. ii. p. 293.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.* p. 302. ("Sie sollen ihn nicht haben, den freien deutschen Rhein"—The free Rhine, the German Rhine, never shall they have it.)

<sup>5</sup> Vischer's "Gedichte eines Lebendigen" (Poems of a Living Man), *Jahrbücher der Gegenwart*, 1843, No. 1.

<sup>6</sup> Vischer's "Vorschlag zu einer Oper" (Outlines of an Opera), in his *Essays in Criticism*, ii. pp. 397 et seq.

because in opera it is not necessary to prove that the characters ever actually existed. Nibelungen operas, however, he says, are no longer possible now, because the present age is "incomparably greater than the remote past." In our century, when Germany's narrow interests have extended so as to embrace the whole world, the Nibelungen characters would remind us too much of the "artificial efforts of Teutomania," which Vischer hated from the bottom of his heart. In short, he still believed then that in the two thousand years which have elapsed since the origin of this ancient legend, the German people "had wrested a new form of culture from Northern asperity."

In 1870, however, when Vischer recanted, he thought it necessary expressly to state that we were still in the midst of this "Northern asperity," and that the warlike ideal still continued to be the German ideal. But although Vischer will not hear of historical evolution, yet we, in criticising his writings, must not forget that there is such a thing. Considered from this standpoint, the words which he wrote after 1870, in war-time and when he was growing old, acquire a wholly different meaning.

And now to come to Nietzsche! He, the war philosopher *par excellence*, was never warlike at all. Victories on the battle-field never obscured the clearness of his vision, and he was perhaps the first to perceive the effect which such unparalleled military successes must have upon German feeling, the more so as they were almost uninterrupted, quite unaccustomed and quite unexpected. His prophetic soul saw in anticipation how these military successes would change the heroic sense into a military sense—a change which even during the war he deeply lamented. Apart, however, from its special aspects, he invariably opposed war with the utmost vigour; and in his *Ecce Homo* he specially denies that by necessary struggle he had ever meant war. He does indeed advocate war, he says, but war without powder and smoke, without the striking of martial attitudes, without pathos and without sprained limbs.<sup>1</sup> His war is the war which Voltaire waged, the war of free minds against false idealism, in which he, like the German philosopher Stirner, included first and foremost ordinary patriotism.

Shortly after the outbreak of war, and when hypnotised by

<sup>1</sup> *Ecce Homo* and *Menschliches, allzumenschliches.*" Nietzsche's *Collected Works*, German edition, Series II. vol. xv.

it, Frau Foerster,<sup>1</sup> it is true, in a so-called apology for her brother, did accuse him of having been out of his mind when he wrote *Ecce Homo*. Yet this same Frau Foerster once on a time declared that all men were criminals who opposed her brother's philosophy on the ground of his having lost his reason in his later years.<sup>2</sup> Fortunately, however, in the days when there was as yet nothing the matter with him, in 1886, Nietzsche expressed his views of war in absolutely unmistakable terms; and any one wishing to know what this supposed martial philosopher really thought about war need only read *War as a Medicine*, and *How to Ensure True Peace*.<sup>3</sup> Here Nietzsche says that war is of no use except for sick peoples—a healthy nation does not need war; and secondly, that a nation in arms (universal service) is inhuman, and worse than war, and that he hoped one day a nation would arise “which would voluntarily exclaim: We will break our sword in pieces,” and which would “raze its whole military system to the ground,” and “rather perish twice over than make itself hated and feared.” And he solemnly adds that “this must one day be the ruling maxim of every single State.” The passage, however, is too fine not to be quoted in full:

“No government will nowadays admit that it maintains an army in order to satisfy occasionally its passion for conquest. The army is said to serve only defensive purposes. This morality, which justifies self-defence, is called in as the government's advocate. This means, however, reserving morality for ourselves, and immorality for our neighbour, because he must be thought eager for attack and conquest if our state is forced to consider means of self-defence—At the same time, by our explanation of our need of an army (because he denies the lust of attack just as our state does, and ostensibly also maintains his army for defensive reasons), we proclaim him a hypocrite and cunning criminal, who would fain seize by surprise, without any fighting, a harmless and unwary victim. In this attitude all states face each other to-day. They presuppose evil intentions on their neighbour's part, and good intentions on their own. This hypothesis, however, is an *inhuman* notion, as bad as, and worse than, war. Nay, at bottom, it is a challenge and motive to war, foisting as it does upon the neighbouring state the charge of immorality, and thus provoking hostile intentions and acts. The doctrine of the army as a means of self-defence must be abjured as completely as the lust of conquest. Perhaps a memorable day will come when a nation renowned in wars and victories, distinguished

<sup>1</sup> “Der ‘echt preussische’ Friedrich Nietzsche,” by Elizabeth Förster-Nietzsche, in the *Berliner Tageblatt* for September 16, 1914. [Frau Förster-Nietzsche wrote a life of her brother, translated into English in 1912.—TRANS.]

<sup>2</sup> Nietzsche lost his reason in 1889, at the age of thirty-five.—TRANS.

<sup>3</sup> *Der Wanderer und sein Schatten*, 1886. Nietzsche's *Works*, German edition, Series I. vol. iii.



by the highest development of military order and intelligence, and accustomed to make the heaviest sacrifice to these objects, will voluntarily exclaim, 'We will break our swords,' and will destroy its whole military system, lock, stock and barrel. Making ourselves defenceless (after having been the most strongly defended) from a loftiness of sentiment—that is the means towards genuine peace, which must always rest upon a pacific disposition. The so-called armed peace that prevails at present in all countries is a sign of a bellicose disposition, of a disposition that trusts neither itself nor its neighbour, and, partly from hate, partly from fear, refuses to lay down its weapons. Better to perish than to hate and fear, and twice as far better to perish than to make oneself hated and feared—this must some day become the supreme maxim of every political community!—Our liberal representatives of the people, as is well known, have not the time for reflection on the nature of humanity, or else they would know that they are working in vain when they work for 'a gradual diminution of the military burdens.' On the contrary, when the distress of these burdens is greatest, the sort of God who alone can help here will be nearest. The tree of military glory can only be destroyed at one swoop, with one stroke of lightning. But, as you know, lightning comes from the cloud and from above."<sup>1</sup>

And people even dare to drag Nietzsche into their polemics!

The lying spirit has grown powerful in Germany, and appears to have got a hold of every one; otherwise such a thing would never have happened.

§ 180. SOLDIERS AND DIPLOMATISTS.—It is by no means only peace-loving scholars and authors who have hated war, however. Soldiers have done so, and among them often even the greatest generals, strange as this may seem to us to-day.

Of "educated soldiers" of comparatively modern times we may take as an example Cyrano de Bergerac, probably the most bellicose of all authors. He actually killed more than a dozen men in duels, and served with distinction between 1638 and 1640, first in the Nobel Guards and afterwards in the Gendarmerie corps of Prince Conti. If ever there were a man who delighted in battle, it was this Gascon, made so real to us by Rostand. Yet he hated war, saying that "all beings are born to associate together, but Man will not have it so."<sup>2</sup> He is for ever poking fun at war. "Does not each side say it is in the right?" he exclaims. "And if they believe this, then why do they not go before an arbitrator?"<sup>3</sup> And in another passage he says that "it is no more discreditable to lose in war than at

<sup>1</sup> Quoted with the Translators' grateful acknowledgments from Dr. Oscar Levy's translation of *The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche*, vol. vii. (T. N. Foulis).

<sup>2</sup> *Histoire comique du soleil*, by Cyrano de Bergerac, 1661, chap. iv. p. 259. *Œuvres Complètes*, Paris, *Mercur de France*, 1908.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* p. 176.

dice"; and he sets far more store by a victory of knowledge than by the winning of any battle whatsoever.<sup>1</sup> Cyrano, indeed, had already comprehended the great and wise modern conception that war is now no longer a suitable form of human struggle, and he condemns war "because it testifies to human cowardice."

From Cyrano de Bergerac to Colonel Hugo von Gizicky and to the Saxon Lieutenant-Colonel Moritz von Egidy,<sup>2</sup> who had the courage to say in 1890 that "war is incompatible with true Christianity," there is a long succession of men whose anti-war views were due to their actual experience of the battle-field. Above all we must never forget that Tolstoy, the greatest genius of them all and likewise the most ardent hater of war, began his career as an officer in the Guards, as did Prince Peter Kropotkin, that other great Russian pacifist. In the same category must be placed Garibaldi, who, although ever ready to fight, nevertheless said that the first thing Europe ought to do was to make war impossible. Even Frederick II. of Prussia<sup>3</sup> was of this way of thinking, for he alludes to war as "this brazen-headed monster, the War Demon, athirst for blood and for destruction," while elsewhere he calls Bellona "that woful, wild woman, beloved of ancient Chaos."

That these and similar utterances are not merely the exaggerated phrases of an eccentric form of poetry tending to hyperbole, and that the philosopher of Sans-Souci really did often feel a horror of the mode of life he was forced to live, is proved by his insistence, even in 1749, that a distinction must be drawn between a man's situation and the man himself, "particularly where war is concerned." True, he was not quite logical—perhaps could not have been so, because of his position. He does, indeed, insist that "we must not satirise war, but get rid of it, as a doctor gets rid of fever"; but very often, as for instance in his famous letter to Voltaire,<sup>4</sup> he merely makes gruesome fun of himself. "Do you imagine," he writes, "that it is a pleasure to go on leading this absurd life—seeing men one does not know dying all round one, and even handing them over to death?"

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.* p. 178.

<sup>2</sup> *Zum Ausbau der ernsten Gedanken* (Serious Reflections made still more Serious), by Moritz von Egidy, 1891, viii, p. 17.

<sup>3</sup> *L'Ode de la guerre* and other passages by Frederick II. of Prussia.

<sup>4</sup> Frederick II.'s *Letter to Voltaire*, November 27, 1773.

"Can any prince," he then goes on, "who clothes his men in blue cloth, gives them hats with white strings, and orders them to right-about and then to left-about, make them go through a campaign for honour's sake, without deserving the honorary title of instigator of good-for-nothings who only become hired executioners from dire necessity, so as to fulfil the honourable calling of highway robbers? The philosophers must send out missionaries to convert people, and to rid the countries of their great armies without this being noticed. These armies are hurling the countries downwards into the abyss; they must be reduced until gradually not a single fighting man is left. No lord of the soil and no people will any longer have any such luckless passion as that for making war, the consequences of which are so disastrous. Every one will utter only reason, things as demonstrable as a proposition in Euclid. I deeply regret that I am too old to hope to witness so fine a sight; indeed, I shall scarcely live to see the first blush of the dawn of that day. I and my contemporaries will be pitied for having lived in an age of darkness, at the close of which, but not before, the first streaks of light were seen breaking unto the perfect day of wisdom."<sup>1</sup>

Is it possible to be theoretically a more convinced pacifist than this great military sovereign, even although he declined to believe in the peace organisation proposed by the Abbé de Saint Pierre?<sup>2</sup>

That other crushing remark of the great king: "If my soldiers began to think, not one would stay in the ranks," is certainly famous, but no one has ever tried to put it into practice. Or have the nations never yet begun to think, in the sense meant by Frederick the Great?

Not even Napoleon, who is called the Soldier Emperor, who was a soldier by profession, and who unquestionably owed everything to war, saw anything necessarily great about war. Even when still a young officer, he complained that he had missed his vocation—an idea which never quite left him. I have already quoted his saying that "he hated this business and he loved it"; and although he waged more wars and won more victories on the battle-field than any other mortal, he over and over again showed that for him war—this barbarous

<sup>1</sup> Frederick II., *Einige Gedanken Friedrichs II. aus Herders Briefen zur Beförderung der Humanität* (Some Reflections of Frederick II. from Herder's Letters in Advocacy of Humanitarian Ideas), 1773.

<sup>2</sup> Frederick II., *Totengespräche* (Conversations with the Dead).

business, as he calls it—was at best a means to an end, never an end in itself. He considered it his mission “to establish civil order on a firm footing, side by side with the military and ecclesiastical power which, until his time, alone prevailed”; and when he founded the Legion of Honour, the first order for all classes of the people, he said that “time was getting on, and soon the greatest general would feel honoured by being permitted to wear the same order as a scholar and an author.” Indeed, he even thought seriously of abolishing professional soldiers and introducing a militia. “In peace time,” he said, “I will manage to induce the sovereigns not to have any soldiers except their own guard.”

Even his enemy, the Austrian field-marshal the Archduke Charles,<sup>1</sup> the only man who in those topsy-turvy times conquered the revolutionary armies and once even Napoleon himself, at Aspern and Essling,<sup>2</sup>—this only general of the Germans of that day—expressly states that “unduly large armies are a curse to humanity, and cause the ruin of countries.”

It is narrated of James Wolfe,<sup>3</sup> the stubborn and apparently cruel conqueror of Quebec, that on his death-bed he was reading a poem by Gray,<sup>4</sup> and said: “I had rather have written such lines than have conquered Quebec”; and even Bismarck, a contemporary of Moltke and in one sense his colleague, said, before beginning his third war,<sup>5</sup> that “he considered even a victorious war always an evil in itself, and one which statesmanship ought to endeavour to spare the nations.” And when he had brought his wars to a victorious conclusion, he so to speak apologises for them, saying that “the last two wars were an unavoidable historical event, come down to us from past centuries.”<sup>6</sup>

It is perhaps also worth while mentioning that the Crown Prince Frederick William, even during the Franco-Prussian

<sup>1</sup> *Aphorisms*, by the Archduke Charles, 1816.

<sup>2</sup> Aspern is a village nearly opposite Vienna, and in the same plain is the village of Essling, where Napoleon was defeated by the Austrians under the Archduke Charles on May 21 and 22, 1809.—TRANS.

<sup>3</sup> Wolfe, 1759. Cf. R. Wright's *Life and Correspondence of Major-General James Wolfe*, 1864.

<sup>4</sup> *The Elegy in a Country Churchyard*.—TRANS.

<sup>5</sup> Bismarck's *Rundschreiben an die diplomatischen Vertreter des norddeutschen Bundes* (Circular to the Diplomatic Representatives of the North German Association), July 9, 1870.

<sup>6</sup> Bismarck's speech in the Reichstag of January 11, 1887.

War, in which he gave an excellent account of himself both as soldier and strategist, expressed his "horror of war," and once actually said: "We really must feel ashamed even to look at barbarians, because they do neither more nor less than what we are doing ourselves." He was truly of the same mind as his great ancestor, Frederick II., to whom he is well known to have been so greatly attached.

What I have done here is to collect the pacifist sayings of the very men from whom such utterances might not have been expected to proceed. It would be superfluous to add to the list. Every one knows that all the great British Ministers condemned war. Whigs and Tories agreed in this. A Liberal such as Gladstone described militarism as the greatest tyrant of our age, and a Conservative such as Lord Salisbury believed that the triumph of civilisation lay in the overcoming of war. Even Crispi said that none but fools or ambitious men desire war.

It may be objected that the history of nations proves this to have been mere hypocrisy, for, after all, they have almost all waged wars—from Frederick the Great's wars to those of Lord Salisbury. But it must not be forgotten that modern militarism is based, not on the fact of wars being waged, but on the conviction of there being something great about war, something which is cause for rejoicing, and for which preparation must be made. It is this conviction which must be opposed; and when men's views have changed, then a new set of facts will arise of their own accord.

But I have given instances enough. Every one who studies literature, even superficially, will admit that there has never yet been any man of eminence who has loved war for war's sake. Subsequently (§ 187) I hope to mention the modern men who do so, among whom, however, is only one, Moltke, whose achievements entitle him to claim to be numbered among the great; and even Moltke was induced, from practical considerations, one day to declare that the cessation of war was something worth striving for.

### III. WAR POETRY

§ 181. DRAMATIC WAR POETRY.—It might be thought that the quotations hitherto given were specially and not fairly selected. Anything so horrible as war, it might be argued, must

have opponents, but certainly supporters also. Let those who think so test things for themselves, however, and they will find it is quite true that, until the French Revolution, and indeed even until the middle of the nineteenth century, there were never any genuine friends of war. True, the oldest epic poems are war poems; but despite there being such an immense deal about battles in the *Iliad* and the *Nibelungenlied*, in Firdusi and the Bible, and in Greek and Roman mythology, not a single one of all these contains the slightest trace of enthusiasm for war. As regards the *Iliad* I have already gone into this in detail; but the tendency of even the German national epic, the *Nibelungenlied*, is in reality against war, and when at last the Germans have torn one another to pieces (Burgundians against Bernese), to the last man, and Theodoric alone remains, there can hardly be any one who does not feel the wearisome folly of war.

No doubt many poets afterwards succeeded in giving fine descriptions of battles, such as the account of the battle of Waterloo in Victor Hugo's *Les Misérables* or Tolstoy's description of battle in *War and Peace*. But it is just in books with a peaceful tendency, written by men of peace, that we find these vivid descriptions. What a gulf really separates poets and soldiers can best be realised from the fact that a poet or dramatist has never yet succeeded in a drama, the central figure of which was a soldier, or the plot of which was a battle. The Napoleonic tragedy has never been made the subject of a successful play or poem, and only quite lately has an attempt been made to use Napoleon in private life (*Napoléon intime*) as material for comedies. Nor is there any drama of Frederick the Great; in Lessing's *Minna von Barnhelm* he merely forms a background. Similarly Schiller preceded his Wallenstein trilogy by *Wallenstein's Camp*, which is destined to throw into relief Wallenstein's human side, and, as Schiller quite properly adds, explain his inhumanity. Even in olden times it was just the same; and the *Seven Men before Thebes* is not a war drama.

This neglect of wholesale slaughter might seem surprising, because, after all, murder and assassination have been frequent themes in all tragedies since Grecian times. The reason for it, however, is simply the endless uniformity of all battles ever fought as yet. If a private individual strikes another dead, he has some sort of reason for so doing which may possibly interest

a poet ; but if a soldier strikes any one dead in battle, he has no reasons whatever for so doing, and it would really be hard to say what a poet or dramatist would make of such an incident. Battles, indeed, are not merely superfluous, but also deadly dull, and deadly dull they remain, even when dramatised, and, be it remarked in parenthesis, when they are painted on canvas.

But beyond all doubt there are fine war songs by which we rightly set much store, and many poetical quotations glorifying war. But the circumstances in this case are peculiar. The poet believes—or did once believe—it to be his duty to put himself in the shoes of as many different people in as many different circumstances as possible. For instance, Schiller is specially commended for having been able to pen his masterly description of the Alps in *Wilhelm Tell* without ever having been in Switzerland ; and similarly he did his best to feel as his characters would have felt, and speak as they would have spoken, without himself really sharing their feelings.

Schiller wrote *Nadowessiers Totenlied* and *Die Kindsmörderin* (The Child-Murderess), and yet he was neither an Indian nor a child-murderer. In like manner he thoroughly appreciated the soldier's free and easy life, and he it was who wrote what is perhaps the most splendid cavalry song in the world. The lines :

“ Und setzet Ihr nicht das Leben ein  
Nie wird Euch das Leben gewonnen sein,”<sup>1</sup>

and

“ Der dem Tod ins Angesicht schauen kann  
Der Soldat allein ist der freie Mann,”<sup>2</sup>

contain the highest moral tribute which it is possible to pay to war. Yet it would be a mistake to insist that Schiller had any trace of enthusiasm for war in him. He knew only too well that, as he says in *Max Piccolomini*, “ war is a cruel, brutal business,” and he also knew that “ war carries off the best ” (as he says in *Siegesfest*).

War is so far from appealing to Schiller's finely sensitive personality, that, perhaps unintentionally, he often does not even refer to it when he might have been expected to do so. In his *Song of the Bell*, in which the whole of life, and even the Revolution, is made to pass before us, there is no description of

<sup>1</sup> That he who does not risk his life shall never win it.—TRANS.

<sup>2</sup> That the soldier alone looks death in the face : the soldier alone is a free man.—TRANS.

war : there is merely a negative reference to it. (*Möge nie der Tag erscheinen*—"May the day never dawn," etc.) In the *Eleusinian Festival* the savages come and "cast their blood-stained weapons from them"; and even though he says that all the heavenly beings descend, Mars, the God of War, is not among them. Similarly the War Gods are not in the *Gods of Greece*, although thirty deities are named, and although, as is well known, Mars was one of the twelve chief gods. (In the second edition he even omitted the "Thunderer," because this epithet seemed to him to sully the "Hellenic harmony.") Finally, in the "division of the earth," in which, according to prevailing opinion, the soldier would have the chief share, only the peasant and merchant, Junker, abbot and king, but not the man of war, are mentioned : and in the poem *Johanniter* Schiller expressly says the watchman's garb adorns a knight better than a coat of mail. But in principle the passage already cited (§ 129) is most important. Here Schiller expressly extols the German for not prancing about like a Frank or a Briton, after the manner of a proud conqueror. Only once, in the poem *Wilhelm Tell*,<sup>1</sup> does he admit justification for a just war, but this war of the Swiss was not a war at all in our sense of the word, but a revolution against a legitimate ruler, and, as we shall see, revolutions are not at all the same thing as wars. In any case, at that time they were put on quite a different footing, a typical instance of which is the fact that Kant, although in principle an opponent of war, genuinely admired the French Revolution.

My reason for devoting so much space to Schiller is to prove that it is by no means always the man who writes good war lyrics who can be claimed as a friend of war. But the same

<sup>1</sup> In his dramas *Wilhelm Tell*, *The Maid of Orleans*, etc., Schiller of course allows certain characters to praise war. Thus in the *Bride of Messina*, in accordance with the impersonal nature of the antique Chorus, he makes his Chorus sing that "Beautiful is peace, that lovely boy," and afterwards that "War hath her victories," war "which decides the fate of Man." Similarly in *Henry V.* (II. iv.) Shakespeare makes the Dauphin of France say that peace "dulls" a kingdom, while in the last act we have the Duke of Burgundy's marvellous speech about the blessings of peace, "dear nurse of arts, plenties and joyful births," and the injury done to "our fertile France" by war, with all her husbandry "lying on heaps," her vines unprun'd, her meadows unmown, and her vineyards grown to wildness. But it is worthy of note that even this play, this "dramatised triumph-song of the British nation" as Gildemeister calls it, ends with the words (V. ii.) spoken by Queen Isabel of France, "That English may as French, French Englishmen, Receive each other. God speak this Amen!" *All. "Amen!"*



thing applies more or less to all dramatic poets, for example to Shakespeare, although he has written enough and too much about wars and rumours of war, and although there are characters in his plays who praise and love war. Although Shakespeare has many a vigorous passage about war, yet he himself was nowise a war-lover, but a peace-lover, as is clear from the characteristic passage in *Henry V.* in which the Duke of Burgundy extols peace. But above all, his sonnets prove this, for, as Bodenstedt says, in them we see the man in the poet before us. Read Sonnets 19, 25, 66, 94 and particularly 107, which is one of the finest of odes to perpetual peace. It is impossible not to admire the assurance which enabled Shakespeare even then to say :

“ Incertainties now crown themselves assured,  
And peace proclaims olives of endless age.”<sup>1</sup>

• § 182. LYRIC POETRY.—Even the war lyrists, however, must not be judged indiscriminately by their verses, for they did not always take Goethe's warning to heart and put nothing in their poetry save what they themselves had inwardly experienced. Referring to war lyrists in particular, Goethe<sup>2</sup> once said : “ Writing war poems and sitting in a room—that would not have done for me ! To sally forth from a camp, where at night you could hear the horses of the enemy's advance-posts—that I could imagine myself enjoying. But my life and work were cast in different lines, and I left such things to Theodor Körner. His war songs absolutely suit him ; but in my case, I being in no sense of a warlike disposition, war songs would have been like a mask which did not fit.

“ I have never touched upon or expressed anything in my poetry save what I had personally gone through and what clamoured for expression in me and occupied my thoughts. I have only written love-poems when I was in love. How could I have written hate-poems, then, without hate ? ”

<sup>1</sup> In Sonnets 19 and 94 we really cannot find much indication of Shakespeare's preference for peace. In Sonnets 25 and 66, and particularly in Sonnet 107, it is clear. Dr. Nicolai admits that he is quoting Bodenstedt's translation, which appeared in Berlin in 1862, with the numbers of the sonnets all changed. Consequently he may be wrong in his numbers as regards Shakespeare. But No. 107 is evidently the sonnet he means, as he quotes the above two lines in a free German translation. We have consulted Dowden's edition.—TRANS.

<sup>2</sup> Eckermann's *Conversations with Goethe* (March 5, 1830), Cotta's edition, iii. pp. 217 *et seq.* [Theodor Körner (1791-1813) was a writer of the fieriest patriotic songs.—TRANS.]

•Here we have the real truth. Most writers concoct their Hymns of Hate without hating. They write to order, and describe a battle when they had rather be doing something else, or, as Theodor Körner once said, "with the enthusiasm of a coward they shout out their delight to their conquering brethren."<sup>1</sup> Their place is with those who sit at home in the chimney corner, and who were an abomination to this young hero.

Even the verses of the oldest war lyricist, Tyrtaeus, limped. We will not concern ourselves, however, with the martial poetry of other nations, but only with that of Germany. Here again we find the same old story—war lyrics only too obviously written, not by the light of a camp fire, but by that of a study lamp. Take the poet Gleim, for instance,<sup>2</sup> whose celebrity is mainly due to his *Songs of a Prussian Grenadier*, published in 1756 and 1757. His poem going all over the wars of Frederick the Great and entitled "To the Eighteenth Century" is sufficient proof of his not having been of a martial disposition.

"Mit Kriegen fingst du an, mit Kriegen endest du,  
Mit Säbel und mit Federkriegen  
Jahrhundert! Allen Kriegeszügen  
Sah Gott vom höchsten Himmel zu!

War Kriege sehen, sein Vergnügen f.  
Nein! rief's vom Himmel, Menschenkind  
Nein!—Aber eure Seelen sind  
Von Gott dem Schöpfer frei erschaffen;  
Das Recht der Tugenden, das Reich  
Der Wissenschaften lag vor euch,  
Und Ihr erwähltet — *Waffen.*"<sup>3</sup>

Old Father Gleim, therefore, excluded war from the category of the virtues, but above all he says that men make war of their own free will (cf. § 6), and this must always be counted unto him for righteousness.

Friedrich Rückert, who afterwards became such a distin-

<sup>1</sup> Körner having volunteered to fight for Prussia against Napoleon in 1813, was entitled to such a sneer. He fell in battle the same year.

<sup>2</sup> Johann Wilhelm Ludwig Gleim (1719-1803). His chief work is that referred to by Dr. Nicblai—*Prussian War Songs of a Grenadier*.

<sup>3</sup> Gleim apostrophises the eighteenth century as an age which began and ended with wars, with wars of the sword and pen-and-ink wars. And God looked down from heaven on it all. Was it then His pleasure to witness wars f No, a thousand times no! But, as the heavenly hosts tell the children of Men, God created them free. The Kingdom of Virtue and the Kingdom of Science lay open to them, and they chose—arms.—TRANS.

guished Orientalist, merely held the mirror up to the nature of his age in his famous *Sonnets in Armour*, in writing which he certainly did not draw on his own personal experience. In treating of the wisdom of the Brahmans he was not so martial. Even the people felt the want of sincerity of his sonnets, and even Major Beitzke<sup>1</sup> says that "sonnets are not a vehicle for the blaring of trumpets and the roar of cannon." In so saying, he is thinking of Schenkendorf and Fouqué,<sup>2</sup> although they did go through the campaign as lieutenants of volunteer marksmen (*Jäger*).

Platen,<sup>3</sup> it is true, also served as a lieutenant in the last campaign against Napoleon, although he did not reach the firing line; and his at first obviously trumped-up hatred of Napoleon, which found vent in feeble rhymes, was, under the influence of this campaign, speedily converted into a feeling exactly the opposite.

As for the Wars of Liberation, indeed, in which nevertheless the nation was said to have arisen as one man, hardly a single person who fought in them afterwards achieved any importance in science or art. Yet just at that time those who ought to have constituted Germany's subsequent greatness were young.

There was one who of course did not then draw the sword, although he had formerly served in the Prussian army; and that was the Franco-German Chamisso.<sup>4</sup> Yet we must not forget his prophetic utterance just then. "I have as yet no country," he said, thinking of the time when all Europe would form one great civilised community. But of all the other poets, many of whom, both before and after, wrote many a battle poem, hardly a single one served in the army; and as for those representing the other arts and the sciences, fewer still of them, if possible, were in the fighting line. Fouqué came from an old general's family; and he, Chamisso, Platen and von Zedlitz were

<sup>1</sup> Gleim's *Lieder für das Volk* (Songs for the People), Halberstadt, 1772, No. 66.

<sup>2</sup> De la Motte Fouqué (1777-1843), author of *Undine*.

<sup>3</sup> Karl August Gustavus Platen, Count von Hallermund-Platen (1796-1835). He wrote various comedies as well as poems, but he is now chiefly known as a lyricist.—TRANS.

<sup>4</sup> Adalbert von Chamisso (1781-1838), known in England as the author of *The Wonderful History of Peter Schlemihl* (published in German in 1814 and translated into English in 1824, with Cruikshank's illustrations), was born at Boncourt, Champagne, of Portuguese origin, spent some time at Coppet with Madame de Staël, where he began his main occupation—the study of botany—and was eventually appointed custodian of the Botanic Gardens in Berlin.—TRANS.

all officers. They, therefore, really ought to have been obliged to go to the war, yet Chamisso and Zedlitz did not go; Immermann<sup>1</sup> was ill in 1813; Eichendorff<sup>2</sup> led a somewhat inactive life, guarding fortifications at Torgau; and Schenkendorf, who could not use his right hand, was employed at headquarters. This exhausts the list of those who delighted in the war. Nevertheless Wilhelm Müller,<sup>3</sup> Justinus Kerner, the brothers Grimm, Ludwig Uhland, Gustav Schwab, Ludwig Tieck, Rückert, Varnhagen von Ense,<sup>4</sup> Ludwig Börne, Count von Pückler-Muskau and Grillparzer<sup>5</sup> were then between twenty and thirty years of age; and Achim von Arnim,<sup>6</sup> Clement Brentano,<sup>7</sup> and Theodor Amadeus Hoffmann,<sup>8</sup> not to mention any others,<sup>9</sup> were not much over thirty. It would seem, therefore, as if, when it is really left open to a man whether he will join the army or no, those who feel themselves capable of actually achieving anything in any direction are not willing to go to war.

§ 183. THE THREE GERMAN POETS OF WAR.—There remain therefore these three: Ewald and Heinrich von Kleist, and

<sup>1</sup> Karl Leberecht Immermann (1796-1840), German novelist and dramatist. He fought at Ligny and Waterloo under Blücher, and then entered the Prussian state service.—TRANS.

<sup>2</sup> Joseph von Eichendorff (1788-1857). He is now chiefly known—in Germany very well known—for certain of his lyrics.—TRANS.

<sup>3</sup> Wilhelm Müller (1794-1827). Some of his poems have been set to music by Schubert, among them *The Miller's Lovely Daughter*.—TRANS.

<sup>4</sup> Karl August Varnhagen von Ense (1785-1858) served in the Austrian army against Napoleon, and afterwards in the Russian army. The letters addressed to him by A. von Humboldt and Carlyle have been published. He was the author of, chiefly, biographical works.—TRANS.

<sup>5</sup> Franz Grillparzer (1791-1872) was an Austrian dramatist, who won fame first by his play *Sappho*, which attracted Byron's notice. It was translated into English in 1898.—TRANS.

<sup>6</sup> Ludwig Achim von Arnim (1781-1831), German poet, the lifelong friend of Clement Brentano.—TRANS.

<sup>7</sup> Clement Brentano (1778-1842), brother of Bettina von Arnim, the correspondent of Goethe. With Achim von Arnim he edited, between 1805 and 1808, the collection of popular ballads entitled *Des Knaben Wunderhorn* (The Boy's Magic Horn), which is very well known.—TRANS.

<sup>8</sup> Theodor Amadeus Hoffmann (really, Ernest Theodor Wilhelm Hoffmann) (1776-1822) was a German writer and musical composer, who was trained for the law, but in 1806 had his career cut short by the invasion of the French at Warsaw. For the next ten years he earned a precarious living by theatrical and musical work, and by writing at any rate some of the tales for which he is now chiefly remembered. In 1816 he was reinstated in the Supreme Court of Justice, Berlin, where he remained till his death. His profound admiration for Mozart made him assume the name of *Amadeus* instead of his real name of Wilhelm.—TRANS.

<sup>9</sup> Schopenhauer simply hid himself in order to avoid being pressed into the army, or, as Gutzkow put it, "so as not to become a companion of Körner's."

Theodor Körner. But was Theodor Körner really a poet? I believe that even his most enthusiastic admirers now no longer think so. Early arrived at maturity,<sup>1</sup> he wrote some comedies which created a certain stir in high society in Vienna, where light literature is much appreciated. Then he wrote a few mediocre tragedies, and then he was suddenly involved in the war, although he had never before given it or military enthusiasm a thought. Romantic notions of the greatness of Roman heroes, particularly Decius's<sup>2</sup> divine sacrifice of himself, stirred his feelings. He went to war an innocent child, and out of his enthusiasm for war wrote a handful of poems, which are rightly remembered, whereas the rest of his writings are mere literary ballast. But after all it is not really the poet Körner who is remembered; but the youth who, full of fine enthusiasm, fell for his country.

He went to war an innocent child, and the views of this twenty-year-old youth hardly count in trying to arrive at an estimate of what the nations really thought. We do not know what life might have made of him, though we may guess at this. When Körner, as he said, "had to spend rather a long time at headquarters against his wish and contrary to expectation," he wrote to Frau von Pereira in Vienna, on July 28, 1813, referring to this period: "If you have had a glance at the kitchen, you can hardly help having a horror of what is cooked there." A few weeks later he fell on the field near Gadebusch, and was thus prevented from giving further expression to this horror.

There remain therefore only the two Kleists. It is scarcely necessary to argue that Ewald von Kleist was no poet, but a patriot. His patriotism, moreover, was merely devotion to the great king, and not at all to his mother-country, Germany. How could it, indeed, have been otherwise with a man who used to travel about Switzerland pressing recruits into the service of his king, a sovereign enthusiastically devoted to French culture? Nor did his enthusiasm for the war go very deep, for the German historian, Maximilian Lenz, when addressing the annual meeting of the Goethe Society in 1915, and endeavouring to discover traces of "German national sentiment in the period of our classical writers," actually says of Ewald von Kleist that "even for this poet, poetry and serving in the army

<sup>1</sup> He died at twenty-two.—TRANS.

<sup>2</sup> Körner's letter to his father of December 19, 1812.

were really two different worlds." There remains, therefore, only Heinrich von Kleist, who was a poet, and who wrote war songs of an outrageous savagery equalling that of any modern writer.

Impartially considered, however, this so-called martial enthusiasm appears in a singular light. It is somewhat staggering to find, for instance, that among the twenty-odd poems of his which have come down to us is one of the finest "peace songs" in all literature. This poem, *Der höhere Frieden* (The Higher Peace), may be quoted in full :

“ Wenn sich auf des Krieges Donnerwagen  
Menschen waffnen auf der Zwietracht Ruf,  
Menschen, die im Busen Herzen tragen,  
Herzen, die der Gott der Liebe schuf,  
Denk ich, können sie doch mir nichts rauben,  
Nicht den Frieden, der sich selbst bewährt,  
Nicht die Unschuld, nicht an Gott den Glauben,  
Der dem Hasse wie dem Schrecken wehrt.  
Nicht des Ahorns Schatten wehren,  
Dass er mich im Weizenfeld erquickt,  
Und das Lied der Nachtigall nicht stören,  
Die den stillen Busen mir entzückt.”

(Roughly : When at the thunder peal of war men arm themselves at discord's call, men who bear in their bosoms hearts that the God of Love created ; they, I ween, can yet rob me of nothing ; not of the peace which is its own defence ; not of innocence ; not of faith in God who preserves from hatred as well as from terror. They cannot forbid me the maple's shade that refreshes me in the cornfield's heat, nor disturb the nightingale's song that entrances my tranquil breast.)

This song was written in 1792 or 1793, during the Rhine campaign, when Heinrich von Kleist, still quite a young man, was a lieutenant in the Prussian Guards ; but, as it clearly shows, war and soldiering did not suit him, and he soon bade farewell to both. The next thing he did was to write his *Schroffenstein Family*, which is such an outspoken description of the folly of war. Indeed, did we not know that it appeared in 1803, it might quite easily be taken for a parody on the present war. Two nations, who really have a great affection for each other, fall out and go to war, because—they have prepared for this war so long, and each side thinks it must break out some day or other. Added to the war are all kinds of misunderstandings, particularly telegrams which have been wrongly interpreted, sometimes intentionally, sometimes unintentionally. The first country which must needs believe in these telegrams is a neutral state (Hieronimus), which would like to intervene between the

respective parties. Then the insane war begins, and when it is over both sides perceive that all they have been doing was to murder their own children.

No, Heinrich von Kleist was never, never a warrior. He *loved right and hated force*. Every line he has written can be explained in this way, and in this way only. We need merely recall all his famous writings: *Der zerbrochene Krug* (The Broken Pitcher), *Prinz von Homburg*, *Michael Kohlhaas*, *Marquise von O*, etc.<sup>1</sup> But Heinrich von Kleist saw that right does not prevail in this world, and this put him beside himself.<sup>2</sup> There is something of his own Michael Kohlhaas about him; "the sentiment of right" made a "robber and a murderer" of him, too, and his war lyrics and his play *Die Herrmannschlacht* are protests against that unjust war of which for him Napoleon was the incarnation. They are not hymns in praise of any just war.

Life made him cruel, and he makes his Herrmann kill "good and bad" indiscriminately, and murder prisoners and envoys; while he makes Thusnelda cause her former lover to be torn in pieces by a she-bear. Then there are scenes such as that in which Herrmann and Fust thrash each other in order to decide who shall have the honour of killing Varus, who is standing by looking on; or the scene in *Penthesilea*, where Achilles is torn to pieces by the dogs of his lady-love. Such scenes are a sign that the writer's imagination, although that of a genius, was nevertheless over-excited. Moreover, his crazy war lyrics were not written till 1809, and consequently at a time when the poet's mind was already unquestionably unhinged. One effect produced another, and the poet, having lost that "higher peace" to which he has addressed such fine lines, came to love murder and horror, and thus, in darkness and night, took his own life. Verily, when we look back calmly upon the life of this German, we cannot but conclude that he had to pay a heavy price for his estrangement from peace. Heinrich von Kleist, indeed, is no argument for war, but rather one against it.

§ 184. THE POET AND LIBERTY.—One more point I wish to bring forward, but it is my main point. In all war poems composed by any genuine poet it is never war, as such, which is brought in, but always "wars unknown to any crowned heads"—revolts of oppressed mankind against some usurper or other.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Plays, except *Michael Kohlhaas* (1808), which is a tale. They are all still remembered and read.—TRANS.

<sup>2</sup> He committed suicide.—TRANS.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. § 130.

Any one instancing war lyrics as proving poets' enthusiasm for war, therefore, must be logical; he must first become enthusiastic for liberty, and then, but not till then, for war.

This is never more clearly manifest than when comparing German war lyrics of former times with those of this war, from whose beneficial influence on art so very much was hoped. The result can already be seen in a number of anthologies, but it is just the true patriots who are likely to be somewhat distressed about this. Most of them would probably agree with Friedrich Lienhard<sup>1</sup> in "deploring the precocious and extravagant doggerel of the present day"; and even the much-praised Hymn of Hate against England, millions of copies of which were sown broadcast, is now rejected as smacking "too much of the Old Testament," and rejected by the very persons who did their best to procure it its short-lived celebrity.

In an astute article in the *Kunstwart*, moreover, the German art-critic, Wilhelm Stapel, pointed out, quite rightly, that to compare the patriotic poems of 1813 and those of 1870 is like first tapping the body of a violin and then a box of cigarettes; the difference is not merely striking but alarming. The cause of the inferiority of the 1870 war poetry was that the old expressions were used again, and an attempt made to outdo them. Moreover, in 1813 the protagonists of liberty expressed their innocent trust in the future; and in 1870 every one was basking in the sunshine of Germany's greatness and of self-satisfaction. The true note of patriotism was already wanting, and there was instead an ebullition in honour of Bismarck, the Emperor and the Empire.

"Freiheit, die ich meine, die mein Herz erfüllt,  
Komm mit Deinem Scheine, süßes Engelsbild,"

(Roughly: Freedom, that I love, that fills my breast, come with thy presence, sweet angel-form)

wrote Schenkendorff in 1813.

"Hurra, Du stolzes schönes Weib, hurra Germania,  
Wie kühn mit vorgebeugtem Leib am Rheine stehst Du da,"

(Roughly: Hurra! thou proud beauteous woman; hurra, Germania! How bravely thou standest there, with arched breast on the Rhine!)

wrote Freiligrath in 1870.

And what about the German poets of 1914? Stapel, whose

<sup>1</sup> *Deutschlands europäische Sendung* (Germany's European Mission), by Friedrich Lienhard. Stuttgart, 1914.



article just referred to was published shortly after the outbreak of war, hoped that "unless appearances be altogether deceitful, we may now be on the eve of another great experience which will prove the inspiration of a finer patriotic poetry, as was the case a hundred years ago." Doubtless the first year of war robbed him of his illusions, for all competent judges agreed that never before were the verses of Fulda, Halbe, Hauptmann, Dehmel, Arno Holz, and Ludwig Thoma so meaningless and so lacking in sincerity as now. Even the humorous verse written since August, 1914, by Leo Leipziger and Georg Freund, Gottlieb and Caliban, shows only too plainly a striving after effect, and is only too obviously written to order. Finally we come to the new poets produced by the war, Fritz von Unruh, Dr. Klemm and others. They may, indeed, be martial, but as poets they are worth but little. In short, all the characteristics which distinguished the lyric poetry of 1870 from that of 1813 (not to the advantage of the former) are still more manifest in the war poetry of to-day.

This continuous deterioration may be accounted for in two ways. Either Germany's capacity for producing poetry has decreased, or wars—that is, the impetus for such poetry—are fought less for an idea or ideal and more for the hope of material advantage. We will deal with the second of these suppositions only.

In the Wars of Liberation<sup>1</sup> the people were fighting for liberty—liberty in all respects, civil, political, military, and social—and likewise for freedom of association. We need only think of Schiller's *Räuber*, or *Kabale und Liebe*, which were essentially "topical" plays. What a complete transformation came about is proved by the impossibility of imagining the events on which these dramas are based as having happened *after* 1813. In the Franco-Prussian War the people were fighting for national unity. This was no longer unconditional progress, and the very men who had formerly championed the conception of unity, such as Georg Herwegh, stood resentfully aside, as also did Bebel and Liebknecht, the champions of the new order of things.

<sup>1</sup> It is significant that we have recently begun to call the "Wars of Freedom" (*Freiheitskriege*) "Wars of Liberation" (*Befreiungskriege*), as if the main object had been liberation from the yoke of Napoleon. Lamprecht recently called attention (in *Krieg und Kultur—War and Civilisation—Hirzel*, Leipzig, 1914, p. 13) to this "remarkable twisting" of a word; for the winning of freedom of thought and opinion, which occurred at the same time, was, he says, fully as important.

• But what happened in the war of 1914? For what are the people fighting now? Our government tells us that it is a defensive war. But mankind has never waxed enthusiastic about anything negative. Others talk about the acquisition of land, and not always for purely commercial reasons. In this, too, there is nothing to inspire poets. And what about the "place in the sun"? Great heavens! the poet's sun, at any rate the sun of a poet who writes good poems, is a wholly different thing from the sun which is meant here.

As Goethe rightly observed, war poems are "poems on particular occasions," and if they are to be good the occasions must be good; and our present-day war poems are bad for the same reason as Goethe's poems on special occasions were bad (when, for instance, he wrote a poem on the birth of some uninteresting Princess of Weimar).

The failure of German war poetry must be accounted for by some other cause than that the occasion was not favourable. Hundreds of thousands of poets put a bridle on Pegasus, and there was assuredly no lack of choice of writers. The noisy enthusiasm of the first months of the war ought to have been calculated to supply the necessary inspiration; and in fact even the German General Staff reports were transfused with a poetic strain.<sup>1</sup> And then what direct possibilities of inspiration! It is with somewhat scant courtesy that Brutus rids himself of a poet who went to the front. "What should the wars do with these jiggling fools? Companion, hence!"<sup>2</sup> But to-day we think differently of jiggling fools.

Richard Dehmel was in the trenches, as a thousand-odd

<sup>1</sup> It is sufficient to recall the dramatic intensity with which, for instance, the conquest of Liège was described in the German General Staff reports. First an attempt was announced, which very nearly succeeded; then, on the seventh, the actual conquest: "The fortress of Liège is taken." And then, on the tenth, came the "truth about Liège," according to which the town was now so firmly in our grip that heaven and earth could not wrest it from us again. This way of putting it caused even simple-minded people to think that there must be something still not quite as it should be, and sure enough on the eighteenth came the official announcement that now the "mystery of Liège could be unveiled." But probably not quite unveiled, for there were still more episodes to come when the commandant was captured and a Zeppelin dropped bombs on the fortress of Liège—two announcements which were omitted from the Wolff telegrams, as subsequently issued. Then think of the really epic description of Belgian atrocities, particularly gouged-out eyes, which the German Chancellor gave to the representatives of the "American United and Associated Press." And think of all the poetic neologisms—"coloured Englishmen," "black Frenchmen," and so forth.

<sup>2</sup> *Julius Cæsar*, IV. iii.

“new poets” also were; and Ludwig Ganghofer was at headquarters; but most of the others, including R. H. Bartsch, H. Eulenberg, B. Kellermann, Aage Madelung, and C. Vollmöller, oscillated between these two extremes, some of them as officers, others as war correspondents.

No, the outward circumstances were favourable to poetry; and if nevertheless none was produced—if, as every one is agreed, Fulda, Halbe, Hauptmann, Sudermann, Arno Holz, Ludwig Thoma, etc., never before wrote such insipid verses, we may at any rate console ourselves with the reflection that the German people’s unconscious sense of fitness and right is still sufficient to prevent it being really profoundly stirred by events not calculated to promote any ideals.

#### IV. MODERN DELIGHT IN WAR

§ 185. THE RENASCENCE OF DELIGHT IN WAR.—In times past, premature war-advocates were only very occasionally to be found. Machiavelli was an instance of one such. In his *Prince* he praises or excuses murder and bad faith, treachery and brutality, everything, in short, which may lead a man to power. Thus he praises and excuses war, and even if he does not go to such lengths as men to-day and insist upon the advantages of war, still he glosses over its evils with the infamous grace of a pupil of the Borgias.<sup>1</sup>

But although Machiavelli extolled war, he was, after all, alone in doing so, and even those who acted upon his principles had sufficient sense of shame to oppose him in theory. Even during his life this was the case. The Medici disavowed him, so that he was forced to join in the conspiracy of Cosimo Rucellai in 1523; and in 1527, when the people had really fought for and won their freedom, they, too, would have nothing to do with him, and he was not even elected a city councillor. Thus matters continued a long while, and not till the nineteenth century, and even then not until the second half of it, did any one venture openly to side with Machiavelli; and then, sad to say, mainly

<sup>1</sup> Cf. in particular his sixth chapter (“Of New Dominions which have been Acquired by one’s own Arms and Power”), in which he lays it down that conquest with arms, in itself useless, is really the beginning of conquest properly so called.

in that very Prussia whose king once wrote against the famous Florentine.

To use the term customary in the history of art, this essentially sentimental reversion to the simple-minded standpoint of the oldest and most primitive human beings might be spoken of as archaistic. But it will be more easily understood when it is seen to have been due to a three-fold misunderstanding.

First, it is a fact that in the nineteenth century the condition of "a nation in arms," which had long been a thing of the past, was resurrected. Formerly only a limited number of professional men of arms were involved in war; but now the entire people were so. It is humanly comprehensible, therefore, that the civilian fathers learned to love the soldiers, their sons, who were actually in the fighting line; and hence it was that first the army became popular, and finally war itself. Yet national armies which owed their origin to the revolution were originally inclined to be altogether anti-warlike; for they were armies against war, nations as a whole protesting against the irresponsible system of government based upon the existence of the old professional soldiers.

In the American War of Independence, undrilled militia commanded by Washington had won a victory over British regulars. Then came the French Revolution, in 1793, with its *levée en masse*, and its national armies with their irresistible onslaught. These armies, originally justified by the fight for freedom, were afterwards increasingly used by Napoleon for wars undeniably more or less dynastic in character, or at any rate wars waged for purely personal considerations. Then they failed, but on the other hand when France's enemies, in their fight for freedom, introduced that same universal conscription for which they had so often blamed France, this decided the issue, first in Austria, under the Archduke Charles, and later on in Prussia under Scharnhorst. But here again, precisely as happened in France, a temporary institution, originally intended only for the war and for freedom, was converted into a permanent one, in order to conform to Metternich's ideas.<sup>1</sup>

The enormous armies of modern times, therefore, originally used for fighting out revolutions, gradually came to be used to serve the purposes of reaction. Their origin was speedily for-

<sup>1</sup> Cf. § 75, on the rise of standing armies, for details of the conversion of territorial defence forces into an army of aggression.

gotten, but the fact of their existence could not fail to incline the peoples to delight in war, for everything which exists clamours to be used. There is something tragic in the fate which has befallen the one and only democratic idea which took possession of almost the whole world. Charles Fourier, however, the Socialist and Utopian, extraordinarily able despite all his eccentricities, perceived that the arming of whole nations must tend to reaction, and accordingly looked upon it as an alarming reversion to the habits of Tartars and Indians.<sup>1</sup>

Secondly, Darwin's<sup>2</sup> biological theory, that in struggle for life are comprised the conditions of racial progress, was frequently used to explain the awakening of delight in war. True, this theory has often been disputed, but in its broad general lines it can scarcely be contested. Since then many persons—mostly professional soldiers, it is true—have imagined that they could perceive not only beauty, but also a useful purpose, indeed even morality, in war and struggle.

Thirdly, it was almost universally assumed that German unity was a direct result of Germany's three wars, in particular of the Franco-Prussian War. Thus for the first time in the history of the world an undoubted benefit seemed really to have been wrought by blood and iron; and this of course also tended to raise people's estimate of the value of wars.

§ 186. MOLTKE AND HIS SCHOOL.—This could not fail to be particularly the case in Germany. Hence it is not surprising that the first voice ever heard from time immemorial praising war *for war's sake* should have been that of a German. It was Hellmuth von Moltke, the conqueror in the three wars to which I have just referred, who wrote, in his famous letter to Bluntschli: <sup>3</sup> "Perpetual peace is a dream, and not even a beautiful dream, and war is a link in God's universal ordinance. In war Man's noblest qualities are developed—courage and resignation, fidelity to duty and readiness to make sacrifices even when it comes to laying down life. *Without war the world would become swamped in materialism.*"<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Cf. § 84, on the very doubtful claims of modern armies to be considered democratic institutions.

<sup>2</sup> *On the Origin of Species by means of Natural Selection*, 1859.

<sup>3</sup> Johann Kaspar Bluntschli (1808-1881), Swiss jurist, born at Zürich, where he was professor for some time. In 1861 he was professor at Heidelberg. One of his principal law-books has been translated into both English and French. He was a strong liberal, and also a great advocate of religious freedom.—TRANS.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Bluntschli's *Collected Minor Writings*, vol. ii. p. 271. Nördlingen, 1881.

• We can scarcely believe our eyes when we see war recommended as a remedy for materialism, and in the very same language as that in which Herder, Goethe and Kant wrote advocating German idealism. But such is the fact; there is no doubt about the genuineness of this letter, and it has borne fruit, although the plain and unadorned simplicity of Moltke's language has never since been attained.

Unhappily, it is by these words that Moltke will probably live in history; but we must in justice point out that they are perhaps not wholly consistent with the character of a man of such profound feeling, and ought perhaps to be considered merely as an after-effect of the war. Before war had conferred on Moltke the utmost which it can confer on any one in Germany—that is, when he was yet a mere captain—he wrote that “increased prosperity by means of peace is better than military conquests”; and he hoped “it would be possible to reduce standing armies in Europe,” and save “the thousands of millions swallowed up in war expenditure, and the millions of men in the prime of life, torn from their occupations in order to be trained for use in war, should war occur,” and “to make an increasingly productive use of these incalculable sources of strength.” Once he even said: “We frankly admit that we are in favour of the much-ridiculed idea of peace between all the European nations. Is not the trend of the history of the world to approach such a peace?” In any case, however, he had a sufficiently prosaic notion of the causes of this approximation to the “ideal,” for he thought the only reason why wars were becoming less frequent was that they were becoming more costly.<sup>1</sup>

The immense influence of the Franco-Prussian War on European ideas can be traced in the writings of the theologian and philosopher, Ernest Renan,<sup>2</sup> even better than in the case of a General such as Moltke. Even on September 13, 1870, Renan wrote: “The tendency of contemporary history consists in the balance being held between patriotic questions on the one hand and democratic and social questions on the other. These latter problems will perhaps in future be the great promoters of peace. Certain it is that the democratic party is turning its

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Rhanon's *Völkerrecht und Völkerfriede* (International Law and International Peace), 1881, p. 43.

<sup>2</sup> Renan's *Correspondence with Strauss*, 1870.

attention to matters which are above Country. The adherents of this party are holding out their hands to one another above all dividing walls of nationalities, and exhibiting great indifference towards minute questions of honour, which primarily concern the nobility and army men." Renan summarises his contentions as follows: "Whatever opens the door into Walhalla shuts the door into the Kingdom of God."

A year later he wrote: <sup>1</sup> "If the result of the folly, negligence, idleness and want of forethought of States were not to bring about wars between them, it is hard to say to what depths of degradation the human race might sink. War is thus one of the conditions of progress, that touch of the whip which prevents a country from falling asleep by forcing self-satisfied mediocrity out of its apathy. Man lives only by effort and struggle . . . and the day when mankind became a great, peaceful Roman Empire, with no more enemies abroad, would be the day when morality and intelligence would run the greatest dangers."

When we see what a transformation has occurred, after only a few months of war, in a peace-loving man such as Renan, who has given us books about Christ full of the most genuine excellence, we need no longer wonder at a pastor who turned martial during the Crimean War, nor at the change in men's minds in 1914. In general, no one need trouble about any books written during war, or shortly after it, by a citizen of a belligerent country.

This is to some extent true even of Dostoeffski's famous article on war, written in 1876, when war was threatening again to break out between Russia and Turkey. This is the *only* time that a really eminent man has written anything which could be interpreted as coinciding with Moltke's views. It is clear that Dostoeffski's is the mind of a genius (although, as we now know, a genius on the point of collapse), playing with the notion that after all there might be something good in the threatening war. But Dostoeffski, who set murderers and prostitutes on a pedestal, had at least so far preserved his reason as to put his poem in praise of war into the mouth of a man who, as he writes, "was known to hold very paradoxical opinions, and who probably defended war merely for the sake

<sup>1</sup> *La Réforme intellectuelle et morale*, by Ernest Renan, p. 111 of the 4th ed. Calman Lévy, Paris, 1884. [Renan's words in the original French, from which we translate them, seem to us sometimes to have a different meaning.—TRANS.]

of paradox." I repeat, therefore, that Dostoeffski by no means defends war. On the contrary, he introduces himself as a speaker, and is perpetually contradicting paradoxes.

Many others, not so great as he, have, it is true, followed in Moltke's footsteps. This is mainly attributable to the three causes I have already enumerated—the existence of national armies, misinterpreted Darwinism, and the fact that the after-effects of the Franco-Prussian War were represented as morally a step forward.

§ 187. INSTANCES FROM THE WRITINGS OF WAR ADVOCATES.— Presumably certain natures have at all times experienced direct, so to speak physical, pleasure in war;<sup>1</sup> and they were assuredly not the least noble persons who did so, especially as for a time a certain sense of moral reticence seems to have withheld them from expressing their feelings. Otherwise there is no explaining the fact that in early times this martial point of view should absolutely never have been represented in literature. The war advocates of those days, in fact, were on the defensive, and only ventured to come forward whenever some new piece of Utopianism made believe that the conception of perpetual peace was on the point of being realised. These humanists, as they might be called, were, indeed, far too sanguine, and the war advocates made a vast deal of cheap fun of them. Not one of the latter, however, has succeeded in making his name known—not even to specialists. Who knows anything about the opponents of the Abbé de Saint Pierre? Who knows anything of such persons as Alexander Lamotte, Valentin Emsler, Frédéric Ancillon, Rühle von Lilienstein, Luden and Tzchiener? Anselm von Feuerbach and Hegel ought alone to be mentioned in this category; for though they opposed Kant they were men of some note. Yet, despite their having considered war necessary, they never asserted that it was useful, nor even good.

It was left to modern times to do this. True, not nearly all those whom I have in mind are out-and-out martially disposed; but the endeavour to represent war as morally justifiable may be seen running through them, like a red thread. Thus the German military writer, S. R. Steinmetz,<sup>2</sup> calls war "an institu-

<sup>1</sup> If I may be allowed to cite an example of a contemporary, I would mention Count Reventlow as an instance of this type of man, but he seems wholly devoid of any such bashfulness as used to prevail at one time.

<sup>2</sup> *Die Philosophie des Krieges* (The Philosophy of War), by S. R. Steinmetz. Barth, Leipzig, 1907.



tion of God, Who is weighing the nations in His scales." War, he says, is "the main form which a State assumes, and the only means which nations have of putting forth all their strength at one time and for the same purpose." Victory is not won because of any single good quality, but because of a number together; and there was never a defeat which could not be traced to some kind of crime or weakness. Fidelity, sense of solidarity, endurance, conscience, education, inventiveness, thrift, wealth, physical health and strength—all these and every other kind of moral or intellectual superiority count before "God's great Judgment Seat," and when "He hurls the peoples one against another."

But the more recent writings of Lasson<sup>1</sup> and Kattenbusch,<sup>2</sup> of Homer Lea and J. P. P. Storey, of Ratzehofer<sup>3</sup> and Stengel,<sup>4</sup> of Professor Wilkinson<sup>5</sup> and Admiral Mahan<sup>6</sup> will only be read in after times with a certain feeling of amazement. All in good time I propose to refer to their writings in detail.

But the book in which this modern conception of war was undoubtedly most uncompromisingly and boldly expressed was *Germany and the Next War*, by the German general, Bernhardt, which appeared in 1912. The fact of its author being a recognised authority on strategical questions lent the book additional importance. Bernhardt argues that Germany must fight for the predominance, without any regard for the rights and interests of other nations. He speaks of the "duty of waging war," and describes the German peace movement as "poison," being firmly convinced that the business before the German people could not be carried out save by resort to the use of the sword. The duty of self-assertion, according to him, is by no means

<sup>1</sup> *Das Kulturideal und der Krieg* (War and the Ideal of Civilisation), by Adolf Lasson. Berlin, 1868.

<sup>2</sup> *Das sittliche Recht des Krieges* (The Moral Right to make War), by F. Kattenbusch. Giessen, 1906.

<sup>3</sup> *Die soziologische Erkenntnis und die 'positive Ethik'* (Recognition of Sociology and "Positive Ethics"), by General Ratzehofer. Leipzig, 1901.

<sup>4</sup> *Weltstaat und Friedensproblem* (A Universal State and the Problem of Peace), by Karl von Stengel. Berlin, 1909. [This von Stengel was a delegate to the First Hague Conference, on which occasion he gave such proofs of his bellicosity as highly to delight the caricaturists of the day, who represented him as a particularly obstreperous goat standing on his hind legs, butting the gardener who is trying to cultivate the peace flowers.—TRANS.]

<sup>5</sup> *War and Policy*, by Professor Spencer Wilkinson, 1900.

<sup>6</sup> *The Influence of Sea-Power upon History*, 1890. [This is probably the work meant, but the German translation of the title is defective. Admiral Mahan was American Naval delegate to the First Hague Conference in 1899.—TRANS.]

confined to merely repelling the enemy's attacks, but includes ensuring the existence of the entire community included within the confines of the State, and making it possible for it to develop and expand. Furthermore, he asserts the desirability of conquests being achieved by war, and not by peaceful means. Silesia, he adds, would not have been worth so much to Prussia if Frederick the Great had acquired it by the decree of an arbitral tribunal. Attempts to abolish war are not merely "immoral and unworthy of mankind," but also attempts to rob Man of his chiefest good—the right to risk his life for ideal objects. The German people, he concludes, must learn to realise that the maintenance of peace cannot and never ought to be the aim of politics.

Perhaps the only other man who has expressed himself so clearly was ex-President Roosevelt in America. He says he despises nations and human beings who calmly pocket insults, and does not admire the love of peace of timorous individuals. America, he continues, if she is to play a part in this world (*sic!*) must perform those sanguinary deeds of heroism which have brought glory to a nation in the past; for only in war can a nation acquire the energy which is necessary in the struggle for existence. If, on the contrary, it were to live in peace and comfort, it must succumb to other nations which have not yet lost the valour and love of adventure (!) of a true man.

All which is nowadays familiar enough. Roosevelt does not seem to have let any trace of his real spirit transpire, and this is particularly the case with his warlike enthusiasm. Indeed it all reads rather like an electoral speech. The sole source of satisfaction seems to us to be that the Americans obviously think differently on such matters, and they did not re-elect "Mister Roosevelt."<sup>1</sup>

It is plain, however, that even lately, at any rate before the outbreak of hostilities, delight in war did not very frequently find expression in literature; but that it was latent in the people was proved only too clearly by their general state of mind after August 4, 1914. After all, such people as Bernhardt merely had the courage to say what thousands of others were thinking—sentiments which were even being vented over a glass of beer,

<sup>1</sup> We translate Dr. Nicolai in full: the time when he wrote this must always be remembered. The notes of exclamation in the citation of Mr. Roosevelt are, of course, the author's.—TRANS.

only in an undertone. I hope and believe that Bernhardt's book does not express the opinions of the best Germans, but assuredly it expresses those of the majority and of the most influential. His views are the views held by the Pan-Germanists, and by members of the Navy and of the Defence Leagues. Large sections of the population, indeed, do now really place military virtues before all others—a point of view which I do not need to discuss, since this whole book was written to oppose it.

## CHAPTER XV

## WAR AND RELIGION

## I. RELIGION AND LOVE OF PEACE

§ 188. THE OLDER RELIGIONS.—The discrepancy between the fact of war and dreams of peace never appears so acute as when we consider religions and their connection with war. True, the oldest religions did not keenly realise the inconsistency of war and religion, for they created a special divinity for each category of emotions. Hence, with so many gods, they could easily set a god of Peace and Right side by side with a god of War, or do as the practical Romans did, and arrange to have a two-headed god, who was simply turned round one way when war was declared and turned round the other way when peace was concluded.<sup>1</sup>

When men became converted to the worship of one God only, however, who was to unite all attributes in himself, a certain difficulty arose ; but it has seldom happened that a religion has laid down its military aspirations as a matter of principle, as was the case with Mohammedanism, for instance. Islam, indeed, was actually invented by Mohammed and his warlike men of Medina for the express purpose of waging war, and they invented their new rules in order to be able to attack and plunder Mecca even in the Holy Month. This religion never shook off the effects of its origin in robbery, and just as Mohammed could always ferret out some verse of the Koran to prove that he might have as many strange women as he pleased,<sup>2</sup> so he invariably contrived to find texts to reconcile slavery and warfare with the will of God.<sup>3</sup> It is significant that in the Koran

<sup>1</sup> What is here said about the two-headed Janus, whose temple was closed on the conclusion of peace, is only symbolically meant. In reality we do not even yet clearly understand the significance of Janus. It is noteworthy, moreover, that in so highly civilised a country as Greece, Ares, the god of war, had virtually no temple, and there are very few statues of him extant.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Weil's *Geschichte der islamitischen Völker* (History of Moslem Peoples), p. 11. Stuttgart, 1866.

<sup>3</sup> Just as Henry VIII. of England introduced the Reformation into England in order to marry the beautiful Anne Boleyn.

the chapter on "The Right to Own Slaves" should be followed by the chapter on "The Right to Make War"; and again it is only too plain what an intimate connection there is between these institutions. It was the resultant close union of brute force and priestly fanaticism, culminating in the harem, the *régime* of hosts of Janissaries, and the slave market of Aleppo, on which the strength of the Osmanli empire depended.

There was a time when it was believed that this Turkish trinity was inferior to the Christian Trinity. That was when Osmanli armies heavily oppressed Europe. To-day the Turk is outwardly driven back almost into Asia, but *morally* he has conquered Europe; and the green standard of the Prophet is flying invisible over every house in which there is talk about that "holy war" which used to be known to Islam only. Formerly other religions were peaceful, at any rate in theory, and waged war only in practice. Buddhism and Christianity in particular, however, are essentially pledged to the conception of the prevalence of a world-wide harmony; and consequently for them war must be an anomaly, as it were, an infringement of their principles. Nevertheless all have come round in some circuitous fashion to approve war, as we shall show more in detail as far as Christianity is concerned.

§ 189. THE OLD TESTAMENT A JEWISH NATIONAL BOOK.—The Old Testament says in so many words: "Thou shalt not kill." This commandment is older and more sacred than the nine others, for after the Flood, when God made a new covenant with Noah, He said, "Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed" (Genesis ix. 6), a command which is repeated many times: for instance, Exodus xx. 13; xxi. 12; xxi. 14; and in Numbers xxxv. God says that whoever kills any one with an instrument of iron, or by throwing a stone, "or with an hand weapon of wood . . . he is a murderer: the murderer shall surely be put to death."<sup>1</sup> No mercy is to be shown, for "ye shall not pollute the land wherein ye are: for blood it defileth the land: and the land cannot be cleansed of the blood that is shed therein, but by the blood of him that shed it."<sup>2</sup>

Thus taking man's life is very often forbidden in the Bible, but according to the Sacred Writings God makes from the very outset a clear distinction between theory and practice:

<sup>1</sup> Num. xxxv. 16-18.

<sup>2</sup> Num. xxxv. 33.

for when God theoretically, by His new covenant with Noah, forbade man to slay his neighbour, he had in practice long since sanctioned fratricide. Cain, who had slain his brother Abel, becomes afraid, thinking he will be forced to take to flight, for he will be killed wherever he is found. The Lord sets his fears at rest, however. "Whosoever slayeth Cain, vengeance shall be taken on him sevenfold" (Genesis iv. 15). This announcement that in practice murder is to go unpunished is remarkable, and Cain would seem to have been the first "murderer pleasing to God," a description which now applies in the main to soldiers only. In this connection the fact may be mentioned that modern militarists, that is agrarians and iron magnates, are reputed to be descendants of Cain; for in the Bible it is said that the descendants of Cain are "such as have cattle," while Tubal-cain<sup>1</sup> was "an instructor of every artificer in brass and iron" (Genesis iv. 20-22).<sup>2</sup> It is not wholly without significance that, as is well known, the breeding of cattle makes men boorish, and that armourers should always have had a special interest in the perpetuation of war.

Apart from this strange story of Cain, however, murder is forbidden in the Bible, and very sternly forbidden. But—it is only the murder of Jews. As is natural, considering the period from which it dates, the Bible is absolutely national in character. The Jew alone is really considered as a human being; cattle and strangers might be slain without the slayer himself being slain. In this case there was a ransom. Accordingly war was of course allowed also, and the Jews were no more illogical than the Moslem who kills the *goyim* or *giaour*. Of late years the Jews and the Old Testament have often been reproached for their contempt for those who were not Jews; and in practice even Christ acted in precisely the same way.

§ 190. THE BROTHERHOOD OF MEN.—There is this difference, however, that in the meantime, through Christ Jesus, the Jewish national church has become the religion of mankind. Since Lessing explained the progressive character of religion so finely in his *Erziehung des Menschengeschlechtes* (Education of

<sup>1</sup> The sixth generation, lineal descendant.

<sup>2</sup> As recently as 1856 Pastor Euen (in *Der wissenschaftliche Materialismus—Materialism based on Natural Science—Berlin*, p. 31) wrote that the descendants of Lamech, Jubal and Tubal-cain (Cain's descendants) all went the same way, and with them sin increased. Thus, even after such a long period as this, Cain's sin is considered a sin by the Church.

the Human Race), thousands of apologists for Christianity have repeated, without turning a hair, that "the reason why the Christian faith is the highest is that, like heaven, it can embrace the whole world"; and it is implied that such a faith lays certain obligations on those who hold it.

In Christ's time the old principle was still in force—that "he that killeth with the sword must be killed with the sword."<sup>1</sup> Christ Himself even goes further, and says "all they that take the sword shall perish with the sword";<sup>2</sup> St. John says that "whosoever hateth his brother is a murderer";<sup>3</sup> and St. Matthew that "whosoever is angry with his brother without a cause shall be in danger of the judgment."<sup>4</sup> But in the main Christ substitutes the duty of love for the right of vengeance. We are most familiar with this new doctrine, which Christ was not the first nor the only one to proclaim, from the Sermon on the Mount; and if there is anything in the world of which Christianity may be proud, it is that in the very early Christian times this brotherhood of all men, which hitherto had been advocated by only a few philosophers, should have been realised by the mass of mankind.

Since the days of the Sermon on the Mount there ought to have been no more wars, for "*war is a satire on the New Testament.*"<sup>5</sup> But here we must remember that even if to-day the Sermon on the Mount is no longer considered as the sole source of all morality, nevertheless for two thousand years it was so; and European Christianity must answer for what it has done, during this long period, with the pound of brotherly love entrusted to it.

No one can seriously doubt that the Christianity of the Gospels was not only peace-loving both in its ideas and its principles, but in practice wholly opposed to war. When Christ says He came not to send peace on earth, but a sword,<sup>6</sup> it is clear from the context that all He means is that conscientious scruples would and were meant to destroy much peace and happiness.

If this passage, therefore, is not an incitement to actual warfare, but at best to struggle, all other New Testament passages, but most of all those which Martin Luther<sup>7</sup> quoted to justify

<sup>1</sup> Rev. xiii. 10.

<sup>2</sup> Matt. xxvi. 52.

<sup>3</sup> 1 John iii. 15.

<sup>4</sup> Matt. v. 22.

<sup>5</sup> Diary of the Emperor Frederick III., 1870.

<sup>6</sup> Matt. x. 34.

<sup>7</sup> *Ob Kriegsleute auch in einem seeligen Stande sein können* (Whether Soldiers can also be in the Realms of the Blest), by Martin Luther. The passages Luther quotes in justification of war are Romans xiii.; 1 Peter ii. 14; Luke iii. 14; and John xviii. 36.

the wars of his day, cannot be used to advocate wars except by wholly distorting their meaning. They all mean, indeed, just the contrary, and the thirteenth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans says that love is the fulfilling of the law (verse 10); in the first Epistle of Peter (ii. 19) we find it said: "For this is thankworthy if a man for conscience toward God endure grief, suffering wrongfully"; in Luke (iii. 14) it is stated outright that a soldier must "do violence to no man"; and in John's Gospel Christ says: "My kingdom is not of this world: if my kingdom were of this world, then would my servants fight" (John xviii. 36). Thus these undoubtedly insincere quotations of Luther<sup>1</sup> go directly to show that Gospels and the early Christians were eminently opposed to war.

The earliest Christians were in earnest about their religion. They courageously refused to serve in the army, and the Romans consequently persecuted them. As peaceful combatants, intentionally unarmed, they went forth to meet the lions in the Roman arena. Even in Christian writings there is a great deal against the State, and in the early days this was the case with official writings also, whereas now it is so only in the case of those of an excommunicated person such as Tolstoy. Thus Tertullian<sup>2</sup> condemns any participation in the service of the State, stigmatising military service in particular as "the service of the devil"; while Origen<sup>3</sup> says that no servant of Almighty God may take up arms, and that no Christian may even legally carry out sentence of death on any one.

## II. THE DILUTION OF CHRISTIANITY

§ 191. THE PRACTICAL COMPROMISE BETWEEN CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE AND WAR.—But this was not for long, and in practice men soon went over into the camp of the militarists. Christ could not quite abolish the sword even during His own lifetime, for according to the Biblical legend Simon Peter cut off the ear of Malchus, the high priest's servant, and had Christ not

<sup>1</sup> I at any rate think that, in spite of our being prejudiced in favour of so valiant a champion of God as Luther, we cannot implicitly admit his good faith when we find such sentences, for instance, as this: "For supposing the sword to have been a wrong thing in fighting, so would it likewise have been wrong, supposing it to keep the peace."

<sup>2</sup> Tertullian's *De idolatria*. Cf. also *De corona militis*.

<sup>3</sup> Origen's *Contra Celsum libri octo*, iii. 451 (c. A.D. 200).



intervened, he would probably have used his sword still more (John xviii. 10, 11). But it was Peter whom the Church chose as its symbol, and it was from the chair of St. Peter that that same Christianity at whose birth the angels sang "Peace on earth" was converted more and more into a Church Militant, until Pope Julius II. finally exchanged his pallium for armour. It is too well known to require any proof that, with the possible exception of the atrocities of such a man as Zenghis Khan, there has never been so much desolation wrought in the world with poison, fire and sword as during the Christian era—partly by the Christian Church itself, through the Inquisition and Courts of Inquisition, and partly in the Church's name, through the Crusades against the Turks, Albigenses, Hussites and others, and through the religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.<sup>1</sup>

But apart from this, the main reason why enthusiasm for war became greater among the proud white civilised peoples than among any others, is probably that, at a period when the people still needed a religion, Christianity proved unable to make a strong enough stand against the murderous propensities, unchristian in the truest sense of the word, of the mighty men of this world. From this reproach Christianity will never be able to clear itself. *Tua culpa, tua maxima culpa.*

So cowardly a compromise between principles and practice cannot be approved, but it is understandable. The energy inspired by a new conception almost always dies away after the death of those who watched its birth and were transported by enthusiasm for it. The Christians, owing to long-continued persecution, became weary and cowardly, and ceased to refuse to kill, if ordered to do so by the State; and thus the legions of Rome actually fostered the new sect. At first Christ's famous precept, "Render therefore unto Cæsar the things which be Cæsar's and unto God the things which be God's,"<sup>2</sup> was probably obeyed, in the belief that in this conflict of duty a "middle course" could be found. But it was impossible to continue in this way; and Constantine, by A.D. 312, had already learnt to pray to the God of Peace for victory in battle. Twelve years afterwards, under Sylvester I. (A.D. 324), when the

<sup>1</sup> The contemporary German philosopher Max Scheler, it is true, says in his war book, p. 268: "In reality the Christian world knows nothing of any such institution as that of a Holy War for the forcible dissemination of the Faith."

<sup>2</sup> Luke xx. 25. Also Matt. xxii. 21, and Mark xii. 17.

Christian Church debased itself to become a state church,<sup>1</sup> it was all over with the peace of Christianity. About the year 400, Mars, the ancient War God, was received among the Saints and called Martinus; and it was not long before the peaceful missionaries of the first centuries of the Christian era were followed by others who made conversions at the point of the sword.

These conversions began in the Saxon wars of Charlemagne, and then, probably owing to the Moslem advance, reached their climax in the Crusades and the Inquisition, and at length gradually dwindled down into colonising missions to convert the heathen, and into powerful home missions, which in turn gradually degenerated from funeral pyres into dragooning people into religion, and then into the refined irritation of attempting to convert them by exercising a purely economic pressure on them. Of Russia and Germany it is best to say nothing, but even in England the Test Acts, preventing Roman Catholics from holding public office or sitting in Parliament, were not abolished until 1829. A Christianity with so much *must* about it, forcing atheistical university professors on to their knees (and in Russia making them absolutely prostrate themselves), destroys all true religious feeling.

Among heretics, it is true, some remnant of the old spirit of Christianity still survived; and the modern Manicheans and Catharists,<sup>2</sup> the Waldensians<sup>3</sup> and Albigenses,<sup>4</sup> the Moravians<sup>5</sup> and Quakers, all, in their best days, refused military service.

Thus even those sects, the essence of whose doctrines was the refusal of military service, gradually degenerated. To-day the Mennonites<sup>6</sup> in Germany, the Doukhobors in Russia, the

<sup>1</sup> See Karl Christian Friedrich Krause (1781-1832), the German philosopher who attempted to found a universal Association of Mankind.—TRANS.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Hahn's *Geschichte der Ketzer im Mittelalter* (History of Mediæval Heretics), 1845. [The Catharists or Cathari held views virtually identical with those of the Albigenses, with whom they were often confounded, and in whose sufferings they shared. They held that matter is intrinsically evil, and that men's bodies are evil; therefore they aimed, by an ascetic life, at freeing themselves from the control of the body.—TRANS.]

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Dieckhoff's *Die Waldenser im Mittelalter* (The Waldensians in the Middle Ages), 1853. •

<sup>4</sup> According to Schmidt's *Histoire et doctrine de la secte des Cathares*, even "legitimate self-defence" was forbidden to the Albigenses.

<sup>5</sup> The best known writers of the Bohemian Brethren (or Moravians) are Peter Chelcicky, who wrote in the sixteenth century, and Johann Amos Comenius, whose chief work was published in 1639.

<sup>6</sup> The Mennonites are a Christian sect organised by a certain Menno Simons

Paulicians,<sup>1</sup> the Nazarenes, and whatever all their names may be, are lying in the trenches side by side with socialistic free-thinkers, shooting at one another. In their views of the world in general they were enemies, in their belief in pacifism they were friends. But all this is now forgotten, and they are all alike in their inconsistency in joining in the present wholesale slaughter.

Menno Simons, the founder of the Mennonites, who died in 1561, condemned war and vengeance, basing his condemnation on the passages in St. Matthew: "All they that take the sword shall perish with the sword" (chapter xxvi., verse 52), and "Resist not evil" (verse 39); and for centuries his disciples faithfully abided by his teachings. Even in 1813 the strength of their moral convictions was still so great that, despite the patriotic excitement of that year, so ruthless a soldier as York<sup>2</sup> actually absolved them, by Rescript dated February 18, from joining the territorials. But in 1915 H. G. Mannhardt,<sup>3</sup> the preacher of the Danzig Community of Mennonites, actually delivered an address glorifying feats of arms and martial heroes.

Any one who impartially compares the principles of Church doctrine with Church practice will feel no surprise that the Church Councils should have forbidden the reading of the Bible; and we can only rejoice that it was a revealed book in the most orthodox sense of the term. Otherwise the Church would not merely have prohibited but also burned it.<sup>4</sup>

§ 192. THE THEORETICAL COMPROMISE OF THE MIDDLE AGES.—Thus in practice did the religion of love gradually become overlaid. But whereas formerly men at any rate felt scruples

(1505-1561), who was originally a Roman Catholic priest in East Friesland, but afterwards abjured Catholicism. One of his doctrines was the necessity of abstention from military service. There are said to be 100,000 Mennonites in the United States and Canada.—TRANS.

<sup>1</sup> The Paulicians were a heretical sect which arose in the seventh century A.D. in Syria and Armenia. Their name comes from the supreme respect which they paid to the writings of St. Paul. They rejected, however, all the Old Testament, and also the writings of Matthew, Mark and Peter. Their founder was put to death in 687, and his successor in 690; the Empress Theodora persecuted them mercilessly, and though Dr. Nicolai seems to infer that some of them still exist, we gather that this is not the case, but that they have long been extinct.—TRANS.

<sup>2</sup> This must be the Prussian field-marshal, York von Wartenburg (1759-1830), who fought in the Napoleonic Wars.—TRANS.

<sup>3</sup> *Taten und Helden, eine Rede zur Kriegszeit* (Deeds and Heroes: a War-time Address), by H. G. Mannhardt, 1915.

<sup>4</sup> Karl Lehrs' *Kleine Schriften* (Minor Works), 1902, p. 508. [Lehrs is a contemporary German philosopher.]

about allowing this to happen, and finally yielded only to pressure from without, even this has now ceased to be the case ; and it proves how little influence Christianity really exerts on the masses, that it is to-day considered wholly immaterial whether Christianity was peaceful and humane or not. What has Christian love to do with us ? it is argued. We are good soldiers and good patriots !

This indifference to the claims of morality is worse even than religious wars. To what straits the few persons are driven who still think of their religion at all, appears from the following poem, published in the *Generalanzeiger* of Bonn, when trench warfare had long been going on, with varying fortune but with no result :

“ Warum der Kampf jetzt steht ?  
Zum Heil für unsre Sache !  
Dass Dein verlöscht Gebet  
Zu neuer Glut erwache.

Dein Gott die Welt durchheilt  
Und sucht und späht und sichtet  
Ein Volk, das ungeteilt  
Die Herzen auf ihn richtet.”

(Roughly : Why does the battle now hold ? For the salvation of our cause ! That thy quenched prayer may be rekindled with new fervour : Thy God ranges through the whole world and seeks and peers and searches out one people that wholly turn their hearts to Him.)

The writer therefore quite seriously believes that God is prolonging the present slaughter merely in order to see which European people is the most pious. (“ Why do we still fight ? ” he asks ; and answers : “ For the sake of our good cause ! ”) A conception of God which is assuredly fit only for a pickle-herring farce, or perhaps for a worshipper of Moloch.

Originally at any rate Christian philosophy was peaceful in principle, and the doctrine that war is consistent with Man's natural state was directly opposed by some, who then inclined to accept the Biblical conception of Paradise. I do not propose to discuss in detail the extensive number of works by scholars on this subject, but I would like to quote the words of Alberic Gentilis,<sup>1</sup> who expressly asserts that “ no war ever came about naturally ” (*a natura bellum esse nullum*). Whenever war was going on it was looked upon as a work of the Devil, or a “ Divine chastisement,” and accepted as calmly as was the Devil.

<sup>1</sup> Albericus Gentilis, *De jure belli libri tres*, 1558, i. 15.

Thus with the help of a little sacerdotal duplicity the difficulty was solved, and all went well until it was desired to reconcile monistically that contrast between war and Christianity which the plain man could not but feel. So long as peace was sought in a remote past or hoped for merely in a far distant future, perhaps only in Heaven, the inconsistency could be ignored; but when it was asserted that peace ought also to prevail in the present, then the time-honoured longing for peace could not fail to degenerate into the grotesque conception formed by the masses of Leibniz's "harmony in the best of worlds." On the other hand, those who, like Voltaire's *Candide*, declined to continue crying peace, peace, when there was no peace, simply denied that such a thing as peace was possible; and asserted that everything centred round the struggle for existence.

Finally every ideal was abandoned, and men fell back upon a vague, shadowy eclecticism. They ceased to see, as old Heraclitus saw, that the object to strive for was successive evolution from war, as the father of all, to peace. They passed almost blindly from war to peace and from peace to war; and it is felt to be wellnigh illogical that those who insist on the value of life, and likewise all friends of peace and even religious people, should long since have become reconciled to war as to something natural and inevitable.

§ 193. THE THEORETICAL COMPROMISE OF MODERN TIMES.—Not till the Reformation, probably under the influence of Luther, did men begin to justify war theoretically also, from the Christian standpoint. To most people, however, war still did not seem exactly a Christian institution, despite its being systematically decked out with Christian symbols. Thus army chaplains (or their equivalent) were appointed, flags and cannon were consecrated by priests, and battleships were baptised. Hume, indeed, still maintained<sup>1</sup> that between a soldier and a priest there is an eternal and unvarying contradiction. For the time being, indeed, the conception of Christianity had merely been "enlarged," somewhat after the manner of that great and unprejudiced King of Prussia<sup>2</sup> who remarked that he con-

<sup>1</sup> Hume's "Essay on National Characters" (*Philosophical Works*, Edinburgh, 1826, vol. iii. p. 225).

<sup>2</sup> *Über die Bosheit der Menschen* (On Human Wickedness), by Frederick II., written November 11, 1761.

sidered whoever helped him as a Christian, and whoever meant to injure him as merely a heathen.

But this "enlargement" of the conception of Christianity had not yet led to its abolition. For instance, Charles Kingsley, in his defence of the Crimean War as a "just war against tyrants and oppressors," wrote that our Lord Jesus Christ is not only the Prince of Peace but also the Prince of War and the Lord of Armies. Whoever fights in a just war against tyranny and oppression, he added, is fighting for Christ, and Christ, as captain and colonel, is fighting for him, for so it is written in the Bible. But though he found many to agree with him—Tom Hughes, for instance—yet on the whole people disagreed profoundly with him. In excuse for Kingsley it may be argued that these words were written during war, that is, while the hypnotic effects of war were being felt.

But the wheel of Time revolved rapidly, and scarcely half a century after the Crimean War the main conception of Christianity, after vainly endeavouring for two thousand years to get possession of the world, had so utterly disappeared, and the illogical absurdity of "Christian warfare" had so thoroughly taken possession of mankind, body and soul, that now nothing any longer surprises us. Here and there a Christian theologian still attempts to combat this new Christianity, as was notably the case with Herr Rade, of Marburg, whose proud saying about Belgium, "I openly defy any one to approve of what we have done there," will never be forgotten, any more than will be his phrase, "the bankruptcy of Christianity." But it is the Gottfried Traubs and Immanuel Heyns who preponderate, in proof of which I will adduce only two facts. Professor Baumgarten,<sup>1</sup> the theologian of Kiel, does, it is true, note the contradiction between the martial ethics of the German nation and the Sermon on the Mount, but tells us that "at the present time we ought to pay more attention again to Old Testament texts," thus smilingly and consciously throwing Christianity overboard. Secondly, the German pastor and theologian, Arthur Brausewetter,<sup>2</sup> writes that "we never knew what the Holy Ghost was till this year of war, 1914."

But in Prussia probably they could not do otherwise than

<sup>1</sup> Baumgarten's "Twenty-ninth German Address for Serious Times," 1915. (See the *Berliner Tageblatt* of May 13, 1915.)

<sup>2</sup> "Pfingstbetrachtung" (Whitsuntide Reflections), by Pastor Arthur Brausewetter. Published in the *Weserzeitung*, No. 24,649, of May 23, 1915.

write thus. Did not the President of the Prussian Chamber of Deputies <sup>1</sup> a short time before call the House to order and upbraid those who described war as an outrage on Christianity? And long before this did not a mighty man of to-day venture to say, without any one protesting, that *none but a good Christian could be a good soldier*, even as a great German philosopher recently stated in a lecture on the war that *none but a good Kantian could be a good soldier*? And yet when Christ was born choirs of angels sang "Peace on earth." And yet Kant wrote his wondrous plea for "perpetual peace."<sup>2</sup>

### III. THE WATERING DOWN OF KANT AND BUDDHA

§ 194. THE MISUSE OF KANT.—The way Kant has been misused is even more repellent to-day than the way religion has been misused. It is, however, typical of the whole miserable business of the compromise between religion and war; and therefore I cannot but refer briefly to it. Some of those who thus misinterpret Kant must be presumed to have read his writings. They know, therefore, that in his preliminary articles Kant would forbid the following:

1. Peace Treaties which contain the seeds of future wars.
2. Annexations (even in the form of voluntary cession of territory).
3. Standing armies.
4. Loans for purposes of armaments.
5. Interventions (interference in the concerns of foreign States).

What Kant would like to see established are the following:

1. The republican form of government in all countries.<sup>3</sup>
2. A federation of free States only.

<sup>1</sup> Herr von Erffa in 1912.

<sup>2</sup> This same German philosopher, Herrmann Cohen, in a volume written in collaboration with Houston Stewart Chamberlain, wrote what was obviously intended to be a work in support of the ideas of his great master. But while Kant hoped and longed for "perpetual peace," his disciple has already had enough and more than enough of it, and turns his back on it accordingly.

<sup>3</sup> The contemporary German philosopher, Max Scheler, on page 23 of his book on the war, says that in the nineteenth century "republics waged far more wars than monarchies"; but it is hard to know exactly what he means by this, for the great military powers of Europe to-day are, with the sole exception of France, monarchies, and France did not become a republic again till 1870.

3. Citizenship of the world (in the form of universal hospitality).

They know, therefore, that in the war which the Kingdom of Prussia fought against the Republic of France, Kant had the courage openly and unreservedly to champion the enemy's institutions. Further, they know that we in Germany to-day have not yet attained one of Kant's eight objects; and yet they appeal to Kant more than to any one else.

It might be possible to connect with Kant that moral regeneration of Prussia which culminated in the Wars of Liberation. Indeed, even he, old man as he was, might have shouldered a rifle to fight for what the people then achieved, and above all for what the best men of that day hoped to achieve—unless he had been wiser than the 1813 idealists and had known from the first that an ideal can never be attained by force of arms. But apart from this, does any one really believe that the ideas of a man who formulated the above eight demands can be consistently quoted by the Germans as their main justification for the war of 1914-15?

But they say that Kant knew nothing about war. As if any one needed to understand anything about the methods of a Rinaldo Rinaldini in order to condemn robbery as immoral! In order to understand this kind of controversy, we must reflect that modern critics of Kant are people over whom a complete change came, the moment the cannon's roar was heard; and who obviously think everybody else can veer round about with the same facility. Thus they think that the Kantian Hamlet is mad about peace only when the wind is north-west, but whenever it shifts to the south he can distinguish a legitimate war from an illegitimate. These Rosencrantz-and-Guildenstern-like military philosophers think that they can entice any tune they happen to need out of the Königsberg flute; and quite seriously imagine that they can exploit the conception of duty of the "half-cracked apostle of peace," in order to inveigle him into the service of the army. The Prussian army, they say, in short, is Kantian because it is the living incarnation of Kant's sense of duty.

Now, however high a value we may set on an army's sense of duty, in the literal sense of the term, this merely means that we respect the individual soldiers as human beings. But



for us all that can matter, for us Kantians all that ought to matter, is whether the army as a whole is doing its duty in Kant's sense, not in letter but in spirit—that is, whether, in the sense of Kant's philosophy, fitting up human beings for the purpose of war is an object worth striving for. Kant himself has supplied a sufficiently clear answer to this question, and not in his peace manifesto alone, which was not the outcome of any mere passing fancy, but the logical inference from his whole moral teaching. Is it not at once obvious that of all conceivable moral maxims none could be so unsuited to war as the injunction: "Act so that thy action might become a universal maxim"? For if I shoot an enemy, I cannot do so, according to Kant, unless also I desire him to shoot me.

Kant's philosophy is absolutely irreconcilable with war. True, Kant himself once<sup>1</sup> called war sublime, in a passage which is quoted by Scheler and which, especially in a popular book, might easily mislead people into thinking that Kant approved of war, unless it be added that what Kant calls sublime is the subject of *negative* pleasure, a fact of which probably only a very few who read Scheler have any notion. Moreover, it must not be forgotten that this particular sentence is given as an instance in a discussion of the sublime in nature. Not till five years later, when the French Revolution had taught him that nations could be free and are therefore responsible as nations for their actions, did Kant write his *Perpetual Peace* manifesto, in which he dealt with war as a moral problem. But then, in 1790, war still appeared to him in the light of a fate from which there is no escape, a fate caused by princes with their subjects, and with which the people were bound to put up as with some natural event. War thus seemed to him a part of Nature.

Now, according to Kant Nature can absolutely never be sublime. If we *call* it sublime, this merely means, according to Kant, that we human beings are aroused to sublime thoughts by the very contrast between us and Nature (what he calls negative pleasure). If we perceive the unconsciously terrible aspects of Nature and yet feel that as moral beings we are superior to any such compulsion, then we apply the word "sublime" to what is evoked in us by this sentiment. "Something otherwise without form or purpose," which "merely strikes terror into the ordinary human being," is sublime to the

<sup>1</sup> *Kritik der Urteilskraft* (Critique of Pure Reason), § 28.

philosopher, if he is—which Kant insists on as important—himself in safety, and therefore does not “look upon such an occurrence as anything before which Man need quail.”

We can now understand why Kant calls war sublime. For that matter, indeed, all he actually says is that “even war has something sublime about it”; and he really looks upon it as an unconsciously terrible event, which he did not then think it possible to avert, but which he even then admits had no power over him. There is nothing here inconsistent with perpetual peace; it is merely the preliminary groping after it. It is already liberation from war, though not yet its conquest.

But it is *Kant—or war*. There is no possibility of reconciling both, although in itself this need not abate any one’s enthusiasm for war, for after all Kant is not the Alpha and Omega of all wisdom. But the Kantians ought to have more fidelity to Kant, and above all to be more true to their own selves. Any one, indeed, who, faced by such facts, does not lose faith in the supremacy of human reason, must needs be very sanguine.

§ 195. THE COMPROMISE OF BUDDHISM.—I have already referred to the virtual identity of Buddhism, as regards its main doctrine of human brotherhood, with Christianity. Buddha also speaks in simple language of the brotherhood of men, of the sacredness of life and of love and pity. His doctrine is neither harder nor easier to understand than that of Christ, but it seems to have met with a somewhat better fate. When Christ was about to die, Peter seized his sword; and when Buddha died and was cremated, there immediately appeared, according to the *Acvagoshas*,<sup>1</sup> the Princes of seven countries, with mighty armies, in front of Kucinagara, to take possession of his ashes. But when the Brahman Drona tells them that “every believer committing a hostile act is sinning against the principle of his faith,” they come to an understanding; and in general the Buddhists really have lived much more at peace than their brethren in Christ.

After Schopenhauer’s glorification of Buddhism—quite excusable in view of the state of knowledge of his day—Buddha’s tolerancæ and love of peace were certainly for a considerable time greatly exaggerated. As long ago as the seventeenth century the Buddhist priests of Japan had entered into a close alliance with the major-domo’s office under the Tokugawa to

<sup>1</sup> *Acvagoshas*, Buddha’s Life and Deeds.

destroy non-Buddhists; and to-day, when the Mongols are aroused from their supposed slumber, even the East has begun not merely to tolerate murder, but—what is even worse—hypocritically to justify it.

When Japan had fought out her great war with Russia, a few faithful Buddhists may perhaps have protested, but Soyen Shaku,<sup>1</sup> one of the highest Buddhist dignitaries in Japan, wrote as follows in justification of the war: "Buddha once said, 'The world in its triple form belongs to me; all things in it are my children, and all are the image of my Ego, for all come from one origin, and are thus parts of my body. Hence I cannot rest so long as the smallest particle of everything existing has not fulfilled its destination.'"

And on this last sentence, imbued through and through with anxious, pitying and world-embracing love, this modern disciple of Buddha has contrived to base his martial enthusiasm. He argues as follows: Buddha himself says that everything which exists has not yet fulfilled its destiny. Therefore the world is not as it ought to be. Many a human being, even now, is ruined and cheated and becomes wicked from *ignorance*. Against this ignorance we Buddhists must wage war. All which is comprehensible, and certainly what Buddha meant; but, according to Soyen Shaku, Buddha's disciples ought to rid the world of ignorance not by instruction, but by cannons, and ought in fact to wage a merciless war to the knife. "They shall exterminate the roots whence all misfortune arises."

Not that Soyen Shaku is to be reproached for defending war, but what is repellent is the hypocrisy with which he twists the meaning of the teachings of his God.

Heine said only that the priest and the rabbi both stink alike. To-day we may confidently include the Bonze as well, for all have bowed the knee to Baal, that great Moloch who swallows up hecatombs of human bodies.

It would not matter about the words of such men as Christ, Buddha and Kant having been wrenched from their true meaning, for there have always been weak characters; but what does matter is that no one blushes scarlet or is even wroth about it. It almost seems as if Mankind had long been content not to be able to make theories agree with practice. Quite apart from whether war be good or bad, it is accepted as a necessary

<sup>1</sup> "Buddhist Views of War," by Soyen Shaku, in the *Open Court* for May, 1904.

fact, which may indeed be discussed but which no one feels morally strong enough to get rid of or even alter. It is as if war were not the work of Man, which could be influenced by educating men, but a product of Nature, against which there is no rising up.

There are still men who feel in what a painful dilemma their illogical train of thought has landed them, but even they are now hardly waiting for some Alexander to cut this Gordian knot of contradictions for them. They and their reason have both long surrendered to supposed facts.

#### IV. THE NEW RELIGION

§ 196. THE MEANING OF EVERY RELIGION.—It cannot be that any religion aims at causing men to believe in the unreality of an abstract or even concrete conception of God, or at supporting the power of some Church or other. If there be any justification at all for religion, this can only be to procure for Man what is ethically valuable—that is, in plain language, to increase man's respect for the dignity of his fellow-men and tend to promote brotherliness.

Now, this is just where all religions have failed; and their failure is attested by, among other things, the fact that, as I have shown, they have all come to deny brotherliness—in other words, to sanction war.

For this failure of religions there is a natural cause. The word "religion" is derived from *religere*, to bind, and all religion is rooted in tradition, and binds Man to something old and sacred which has been handed down to him, that is, to the past. Religion, therefore, is of necessity unable to adapt itself to new conditions, and despite all that may be hoped from the future it is, in its very nature, retrospective. We may found new religions and protest against existing religions, but to the very name of religion there clings a trace of the curse of constraint. The utmost any one has ever succeeded in doing is to pour new wine into old wine-skins—to adapt new doctrine to an old form. But it is often said, and not without reason, that this in itself would not matter so much—for new wine improves in flavour and quality by being put into old wine-skins—if Mankind in general only did not continue to cling to externals, and

always attach too much importance to them in comparison with what is within. Every religion therefore must dwindle down into dogmatism, and in course of time obstruct further progress. Without being in some way or other bound, however, no one can act morally. True, a man can freely impose restrictions on himself, but he must believe in some sort of law or Being which is higher than himself and which guides him.

Yet no one should endeavour to believe in anything if he knows that it has no real existence. Thus any one who does not know that the good God has no real existence, may derive his morality from Him, nay, can and ought to do so. But any one who does know that God does not exist, and yet forges for himself some fanciful notion of Force which he defines as God, is acting foolishly; and in this sense the most innocent idolator is far more reasonable than many deeply learned philosophers.

Let there be no confusion about this. That undefinable aspiration which tells all good human beings that there is Something higher than their own petty selves, that there is a starry firmament and a moral law, is the highest sentiment which Man can feel; and if only he does feel it, this is quite enough. But it is folly—may I be pardoned for so apparently harsh a word—to attempt to consolidate this undefinable aspiration into something of which we know that it has no existence.

Now, let us inquire what such a basis of morality must be like—absolute and yet mutable, above Humanity and yet human, ideal and yet real. This is antinomistic philosophy,<sup>1</sup> and yet some such thing there is which fulfils all these requirements:

That thing is Humanity.

§ 197. THE RELIGION OF HUMANITY.—If it were desired to found a religion which is so to speak unchangeable in its eternal youth and yet capable of modification so as to meet the needs of mankind, then it must be based on something unchangeable and yet capable of change. We know, and we need not here repeat, that there is perhaps nothing really absolute in itself; but it is a commonplace to say that for us Man himself is something absolute. Our organisation, with all its different ways of comprehending the outer world—Man, that is, together with

<sup>1</sup> Antinomy is a Kantian term meaning an apparent conflict of reason with itself. Thus it may be reasoned, apparently with equal logic, that the universe is infinitely extended in space, and also that it has spatial limits. This is probably what Dr. Nicolai means by antinomistic philosophy.—TRANS.

his surroundings<sup>1</sup> is for us actual, tangible fact, a fact which, it is true, progresses, which in the course of centuries has altered, and in the course of countless thousands of years will alter again, but which at any particular moment represents for us something absolute.

Humanity, therefore, is sufficiently absolute and mutable for our purposes. Moreover, it also rises above Man and is yet human.

Humanity has evolved and is evolving still further, in a course and direction which may be chance, but which has been fixed once for all. We were animals, and we became human beings, and the human being of to-morrow is something different from the human being of to-day, albeit the one may be potentially contained in the other.

Thus the Superman is nothing new, but merely something different. It is idle to speculate whether this evolution is good. It is a *fact*, and therefore to oppose it is folly and, it might be even said, a crime. Animals and Man and in the future the Superman are all one, only united together by time. Consequently even the Superman is and remains something purely human, even although he is above Man.

Similarly Man and Superman are one, if the Superman be considered as uniting in himself all actually living human beings—as the totality of mankind, in short. Thus we have unity in space. Hence the conception of the Superman in time and space transcends the individual human being, and yet remains a human being. Finally, however, the conception of Humanity is both real and ideal at the same time.

An attempt has been made to prove that Humanity is objectively a reality; but for us it is an idea, for as we are but a part of it, both as regards time and space, we do not possess the necessary organs to enable us fully to comprehend it. For us it remains the idea of a perfecting process which, taken as a whole, effects on a large scale “what the best human being does or would fain do on a small scale.” “We are uplifted by the wave, sucked under by it, and sink”; but without the conception of the “eternal stream”—the onward-flowing stream of Humanity—it is inconceivable that this should be so.

Thus Humanity fulfils all the conditions for the basis of a

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Umwelt und Innenwelt der Tiere* (The Surroundings and Ideas of Animals), by J. von Uexküll, Berlin, 1909.

lasting religion. This, after all, need hardly be said, and every great thinker of the past who has yearned for a religion has found it within himself. Modern science has also shown that even the most primitive peoples did likewise, for in the likeness of Man did men make their gods. But men gave a more or less absolute life to these creations in the image of God, or, in the case of higher human beings, divine conceptions. This life thus became independent of what takes place in ourselves, and thus the danger inevitably arose and constantly recurred, of these divine images becoming stark corpses, no longer capable of taking part in the life of men.

§ 198. UNIFORMITY OF MORAL LAW.—Whoever would fain have a real religion must base it on the reality of Man, and not on visionary ideals. The natural result of this ever-changing human reality, which in course of time becomes ever more and more perfect, is that the future will seem to us an ever higher reality, in which we can believe, on which we may legitimately set our affections, and to which we must pin our hopes. The three cardinal virtues of Christianity are in truth the mainstays of every true religion; but we must not believe in anything unreal, nor set our affections on anything past, nor our hopes on any mere visions.

It may be asked, do such views deserve to be called a religion? They do and they do not. In actual truth they do, for they mean nothing more nor less than that we feel ourselves inseparably bound up with that with which we are after all inseparably bound up, that is, with our bodies and their sensations. This, however, is so obvious, or at any rate ought to be so obvious, as to need no special name.

In Chapter XIII. an attempt was made to inquire how it is that, from the fact of our being quite certainly organised human beings, certain necessities have arisen which we can define as moral requirements. But these moral requirements are merely based on the fact that we are after all human beings; and all the deductions which we can make from this fact we are accustomed to sum up under the name of Humanity.

To be human, however, simply means that we have comprehended the history of the evolution of mankind; that we know whence we come; that we have a foreboding of whither we are going; and that we are accordingly trying to conform to the general scheme of Nature, which for us means the progress

of human evolution. We believe in this progress of evolution; we love mankind, and we hope for further progress—in other words, for that Superman who is daily and hourly slowly coming into being. This recognition of self-evident facts embraces every moral law. Were we to express the Ten Commandments in accordance therewith, they would read somewhat as follows :

1. There is no morality without *belief in the Superman*.
2. Thou shalt not try to believe in anything of which thou knowest that it has no real existence. As nothing Superhuman really exists except the Community of Mankind, let thy morality be based on this.
3. Inwardly to realise that Mankind as a whole is a reality, means feeling thyself bound up with this world, means having religion, and means loving thy neighbour.
4. Thou shalt love and honour the forms and symbols of the Community of Mankind—family and country.
5. Thou shalt love and honour human life and the life of Mankind.
6. Thou shalt love and honour good traditions (instincts which still serve a purpose).
7. Thou shalt love and honour labour.
8. Thou shalt love and honour truth.
- 9 and 10. Oppose evil traditions (instincts which no longer serve a purpose).

How we formulate our morality, however, is no matter : all that matters is that we should bethink-ourselves of ourselves and understand that Man is an individual and at the same time a part of a supra-ordinate organism. Whosoever knows this, and realises it not merely as a truth which can be acquired but as a living law in him and a sentiment, is a human being in deed and in truth. But whosoever does not realise this, is no true human being, no matter how much he may outwardly resemble one, or, as Kant puts it, how civilised he may be ; for he lacks that essential thing which differentiates Man from all other living beings—the feeling of belonging to the *genus humanum*.

" Scio et sentio genus humanum esse simplex et unum,  
 Scio et volo me esse hominem,  
 Scio et spero nunquam oblivisci."

Whoever is a human being at all, is also a moral human being.



In face of this truth no isolated occurrences have any importance save as phenomena ; and so it is with war. If Humanity wins, the death-knell of war will have sounded—but only then, for Man cannot and will not break his sword in sunder so long as he does not know that a sword has neither part nor lot in the conception of Mankind, but is merely a tool to be laid aside like any other.

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