


**THE SYSTEM OF VEDANTIC THOUGHT
AND CULTURE**

THE SYSTEM OF VEDANTIC THOUGHT AND CULTURE

BY

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To
The Memory of my Father.

PREFACE

In the following pages I have made an humble attempt to present the system of *Advaita Vedantism* both in its theoretical conception and practical bearing. Vedantism is an integral system and in writing these pages the end in view has been to present the system in as complete a form as possible.

I have not confined myself to the philosophy of the Upaniṣads. Nor have I limited my search to Gauḍapada and Śankara. I have also brought in the evolution of the Neo-Vedantic thought after Śankara.

Philosophy in India has never been solely an intellectual discipline. It has ever been the highest art of life. This is certainly true of ancient Vedantism. Though in later Vedantism the demand of conceptual thinking has been satisfied, still Vedantism has never cut itself adrift from its ancient mooring, the art of realising transcendent bliss.

I take this opportunity of conveying my sense of deep obligation to Mahamahopadhyaya Pramathanath Tarkabhusan, and Mahamahopadhyaya Lakṣmaṇ Śastri, formerly Professors of Vedanta, Sanskrit College, and Pandit Anantakriṣṇa Śastri of the Calcutta University for the valuable help I received from them.

My heartfelt thanks are due to my colleagues, Professor Syamacharan Mukerjee, M.A., and Professor Kriṣṇadhan Banerjee, M.A., and my friend Babu Charuchandra Biswas, M.A., B.L., Vakil, High Court, who kindly went through the proofs. I have also to thank Babu Upendra Coomar

Bose, the Librarian, Sanskrit College, for the readiness with which he placed at my disposal the rare books and manuscripts of the Library.

My acknowledgment of services rendered by others will be incomplete if I do not include the name of Sir Asutosh Mookerjee, of revered memory, who kindled in scholars a spirit of research and creativeness.

Basanti Pancami, 1925.

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ERRATA.

<i>Page</i>	<i>Line</i>	<i>Read</i>	<i>For</i>
4	2	"oneself"	"himself."
33	19	"reveal"	"revea."
61	18	read the last word as "yonder."	
71	10	read the first word as "Identity."	
71	10	read the last word as "conceive."	
71	12	"like"	"ike."
72	1	"the outer and the inner"	"outer and inner."
101	12	"is"	"ie."
101	10	read "although all divisions"	"although and the whole all divisions."
106	16	"Epistemological"	"Epistonological."
109	18	"theory"	"the ry."
112	8	"known"	"knowing."
121	1	"originate"	"originates."
126	3	"maintain"	"maintains."
153	1	"Prajña"	"Pragna."
173	4	"are"	"arc."
178	4	"establishes"	"establish."
191	17	"covering"	"cov ing."
248	8	"Asamprajñat"	"Asampragnat."
248	foot-note, 1st		
	line	"Nirvikalpic"	"Nirvikalpie."
257	16	"ceaseless"	"ceaselcss."
260	22	"object"	"objset."
270*	19	"existence"	"xistence."
284	13	"cannot"	"connot"
288	12	"Videhakaibalya"	"Vidahkaibalya."
289	23	"are"	"is."
295	22	"life"	"lifo."
301	4	"led"	"let."

THE SYSTEM OF VEDĀNTIC THOUGHT AND CULTURE

CHAPTER I.

One indivisible, that is pure existence.

Chāndogya Upaniṣad.

Beyond relation, featureless, unthinkable, in which all is still.

Maṇḍukya Upaniṣad.

BEING.

The Philosophy of Vedānta, like all other systems of thought, is an attempt to clearly understand and offer an explanation of the world as it appears to us in our knowledge. It is an attempt to determine the nature of the Ultimate Reality and to understand how it presents before us a world of manifoldness, in order to make out clearly the place and destiny of man in the world system. In fact, we shall find in the course of our enquiry that the two most important questions for man, *viz.*: (1) the theoretical determination of the nature of substance or reality underlying experience and of the origin of knowledge, and (2) the ethical problem of duty and the ultimate ideal of human life—have been thoroughly discussed in the Vedānta and their solutions offered.

Vedāntism is not to be taken as philosophy based solely upon revelation or faith that has no rational

justification. It has got a strong hold upon the children of the soil: to some of them, it is an established principle which cannot be questioned, and this is not due to the Vedāntic thought always appealing to the Śruti as the ultimate source of knowledge, but to its offering a promise full of inspiring hope to humanity aspiring for eternal verities. Needless to say, Vedāntism has a strong claim to its general acceptance, as it is based upon the profoundest form of thinking and argument; in it a deep conception of life and experience has been wrought not upon mere dogmatism, but upon a logical justification. In fact, we meet in it a full form of philosophy developed upon a dialectic and logical basis.

The subject introduced.

The first problem which the Vedāntin seeks to solve is the Ontological problem of Reality, the second, the problem of Cosmology, the third, the problem of Psychology, while the fourth is the last problem of striving after the ideal and its attainment—the final liberation.

The Problems.

We may begin with the determination of Truth. Truth is Reality. Reality is that which does not contradict itself. It must exclude any form of self-contradiction. That it is absolute is proved by the fact, that in endeavouring to deny it or to doubt it we implicitly assume its validity. We may have another mark of reality; as causing impressions upon consciousness—it is something which appears. Appearances have no stability or permanence; nevertheless we cannot set them aside as completely unreal. Thus we may distinguish two forms of Reality; (1) Absolute, and (2) Relative. By absolute reality we mean that which can never be denied, that which asserts itself even if we are led to think its contrary. It is the notion of all notions,

Truth.

the form of all forms. By relative reality we mean that which has an appearance and which makes an effect upon consciousness. It is not real in the sense of existing permanently, or existing by itself independently of others. In fact we may judge, criticise or refuse to accept an appearance, but all these presuppose the position of Reality. A lower degree of Reality may be ascribed to appearance as something that impresses us, though it does not possess the mark of undeniability characterising Absolute Reality (*vide* Chapter 2). Truth has been defined as that which does not know any negation. (सत्यत्वं वाचराहित्यं Pancadaśī, Ch. 3. 29). Any appearance that can be subsequently denied cannot be regarded as truth in the absolute sense. Absolute truth is free from any idea or possibility of being ever contradicted. Such a truth is not appearance, for appearances are often contradicted by subsequent knowledge. Appearance therefore cannot be taken as the ultimate truth, though Vedantism is anxious to grant unto it an amount of being or reality. That which we can think away is a *contingent possibility* but *not truth*, for, truth asserts its own being irrespective of our subjective choice to accept or deny it. We can throw away forms of being, and, therefore, these modes or forms of concrete existence are not truth in the absolute sense. We may *think away* anything, but we cannot think away Being or Existence.

Existence is truth.

Existence is therefore Truth. And in the effort of doing away with Existence, we are conscious of our tacitly assuming it. We can dismiss qualities or attributes of Being, or concrete forms of it, but we cannot put away Existence. The very thought of denial presupposes it. *Existence or Being is the ultimate Reality.* In fact, the existence of concrete things and appearances implies the notion of existence. *Brahman* is Existence,

We have the same implication in the Śruti when it says, "one who thinks Brahman as non-existent, himself becomes non-existent." "Brahman is the being of all beings" (Bṛhadāraṇyaka, II. i. 20; iii. 6). The first notion of *Brahman* is that it is Existence. Since ultimate reality is Existence, we cannot conceive the absolute as qualification of existence, for qualification is determination of Being, and determination is negation. We cannot think that Being-in-itself is equal to nothing. On the other hand, the concept of Being is so deep a notion that we can never be free from it. Even in the attempt to think nothing, we cannot have a complete idea of negation; some positive sense as

Absolute negation—
an impossibility.

"nothing exists" forces itself upon us. The conception of absolute negation is impossible, for so deep and intimate is our conception of Being that any such thought in itself cannot possibly arise. No doubt we can think of the negation of particular existences, but negation of existence itself or the identity of Being and non-Being is out of the question. Negation can only refer to some portion of Being, but becomes entirely meaningless when attributed to Being in its integrity and universality. Absolute non-Being is not thinkable. To think is to judge. That which is judged must be present to consciousness. It must be in some way or other. It must be positive. Absolute non-Being is not even conceivable, for it is open to self-contradiction. Non-Being cannot then be admitted as an abstract category. It is mere verbal expression corresponding to which nothing exists in thought or reality. The charge that Vedantism in reducing everything to the abstraction of being paves the way for its ultimately coming to nothing, is not to the point. Being and non-Being are contradictory concepts; the position of

existence cannot be identical with the negation of existence. Being is the real and ultimate concept: it may not be an immediate object of perception, but it is presupposed in all forms of existence.- It may be unthinkable, but it is not inconceivable. True Being is absolute Being. It excludes all relativity. It denies all dependency. It is absolute position. So far as this position is to be supposed to imply something, reality belongs to it. It must be thought of as (1) absolutely affirmative or positive, *i.e.*, without the slightest possibility of negation or limitation which would cancel absoluteness, (2) absolutely simple, in the sense of not being subject to inner antithesis or contradiction which would make it changeable and transitory, (3) insusceptible of qualitative determination.

Again, Being is eternal existence, for it transcends time. It is all-pervasive as it transcends space. It is fullness of existence as its expanse of existence is free from any external limit. The concept of Being is invariably associated with eternity and fullness. Such being is again oneness, for, nothing exists outside of or external to it.¹

We cannot think of duality or multiplicity of *Beings*. If Being is absolute it must be one, for we cannot conceive a number of absolutes. The ultimate reality cannot possess the same amount of Being, if it is more than one. In such a case a question may arise regarding the amount of Being shared by each one

The absolute is not multiple of existences.

¹ सदा च भूतेषु समोऽधि केवलो
 यथाच खं सर्व्वगमचरं शिवं ।
 निरन्तरं निश्चलमक्रियं परं
 ततो नमोऽस्तुसुफलं तवेदितैः ॥
 मतिविलापनप्रकरणम्—Upadeśa Sahasrī.

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of them, for the total amount of Existence or Being cannot either increase or decrease. It is constant. Such a constant amount of Being these plurals must divide among themselves, and consequently none of them can become absolute, for they ensoul in them a quantum of Being but not the full Being. We cannot conceive the co-existence of a plurality of reals, for absolute existence and co-existence are incompatible.

Co-existence implies a plurality of existences in some form of relation, which is not in harmony with the idea of an absolute existence, for in such a system every one is dependent upon another, implying mutual action and interaction. A system of independent but absolute existences of unique and identical nature must lapse into one Being. If the independent existences be many, it must admit of some difference, and since all difference is denied, we cannot take the absolute as many. We cannot regard the *system of reals* in mutual relation as the Absolute. In such a

The absolute—not a system.

system no one of the related terms can be regarded as absolute, since it is entering into a relation, nor can the system be regarded as absolute, for a system is complex, and made of terms in relation, whereas the Absolute as already indicated, must be an all-pervasive oneness, excluding all possibility of being related to others. Again, we cannot take the Absolute Being as a multiplicity of absolutely different and independent realities, for these would be a number of competing individuals, incapable of being arranged in a system. Each of them cannot be absolute, for that would lead to the supposition of a plurality of absolutes—a contradiction in terms: for these existences must either enter into some form of relation or not; if they are conceived as quite independent, we cannot think of them

as entering into relations; if they do not enter into a system of relations, we cannot explain the world which is a system. As already suggested, we cannot strictly conceive the co-existence of a number of incompatible absolutes, for as absolutes they must be pervasive of existence, and a plurality of such independent existences cannot be reasonably conceived, for it would imply a mutual exclusiveness and contradiction. Again we cannot have the absolute as identical with *becoming*, for the absolute is Being or Existence, and Becoming is not Existence but a tendency, a growth towards it.

The absolute—not becoming.

It is an attempt to attain the fullness of existence, but it is not real Existence. It is the invariable synthesis of Being and non-Being. It is not the complete Being, and as such cannot be the Absolute. But it may be replied that the sum-total of existence is the infinite Becoming; Reality is a dynamic process manifesting itself in the process of growth. On the other hand, it may be submitted that the idea of the absolute is invariably associated with the perfection of existence. It cannot be identified with a process which is growing, for all growth must be a process under the conditions of space, time and causality. Moreover, the process of growth implies an inner or external necessity. If it is an attempt to adapt itself to an external necessity, it is a finite process: if, on the other hand, it is controlled by an inner necessity, it may be asked, whether it is consistent and not self-contradictory to hold the absolute as identical with a process which realises itself in and through the evolution of finite forms and beings. Is it not quite out of keeping with the conception of the Absolute that it should realise its nature in a process of evolving concrete forms? This growth is controlled by

an end, an end which is not existent in actuality or as a fact. The difficulty would not be removed if it is asserted that the end is existent as a formative principle (in idea), for unless it has full realisation, we cannot say that it is fullness of Being or Absolute. Any conception of growth is an indication of an underlying Being manifesting itself; but the growth or manifestation cannot be identical with Being or the Absolute. Growth implies the growth of some thing in time and space. The underlying existence must be conceived as the reality and not the growth itself. The Reality which grows involves an inner necessity of perfecting and realising itself. It is not perfection, with which the conception of the Absolute is identical. To put it more clearly, the conception of perfection is not consistent with the conception of a dynamic process, it is rather invariably associated with a static existence (*cf.* Sankara in the *Viveka Cūḍamaṇi* प्रशान्तमाद्यन्विहीनमक्रिय'). Reality is actuality, a potentially real is every day becoming real, but it is not reality itself. A dynamic process always implies an effort of being, which again involves the idea of want and imperfection involved in its nature, for all strivings are significant of an endeavour to preserve its own existence. But this effort is not Existence, and that which is not Existence cannot be said to be existing continuously. We cannot therefore extend the conception of growth to the Absolute and "cannot rightly attribute to it in its own self a history in time, or think, for Him there are ends not yet real, but waiting to be made real through a succession of events." "To represent therefore that the absolute has a history will be to misunderstand it on a finite analogy." But still it may be asserted that the absolute is a perfect system from the above standpoint, a system in which the energising

principle finds itself realising through the many and in whom the many exist as parts inherent in the system. A question may be asked as how to conceive a system as the absolute. A system as already indicated is made up of parts, which are either identical or different from it; if identical, they are not parts having individual existences; if different, we cannot conceive any relation between them; by being different the one becomes what the other is not. The absolute must be free from all kinds of *bheda* or difference. The Vedāntin classifies these differences under three heads—(1) difference between a thing and its parts, (2) difference between a thing and anything of the same kind or class, (3) difference between a thing and its opposite or something contrary to it. Any one of these differences is not conceivable in the nature of the absolute. It must be one integral homogeneous substance, transcendently aloof. Such a conception of the absolute does not admit of any form of division inherent in it. Even if we accede to the argument that in such a system everything is in perfect order and enjoys fullness of being, still the possibility of division which such a system represents is not in harmony with the conception of the absolute.

To conclude: The conception of growth may be consistent with the conception of a finite being, but never with Reality. We come to the final decision that *Existence or Being is the ultimate Reality. Reality is one and integral substance: negatively, it is neither a system nor a process.*

It becomes now necessary to determine the nature and character of the Absolute. To say that Being must be the ultimate Reality is merely to state what is, but is no determination of the content of Being. To determine the nature of Being we are to appeal to the

inmost being of our own existence, for it is here that we are intimately aware of the essence of being. We cannot for this purpose go to the external universe, for because of its being external, it is not known to us directly, or if at all known, is known as states or modes in consciousness. We are immediately conscious of our intimate being not merely as an existence, but as an existence that is conscious; or more clearly consciousness is its being or existence. In the inmost nature of our self

we cannot make any distinction
 Truth is Being.
 Being is consciousness. between our being and our consciousness. Consciousness is our being.

Being is identical with consciousness. To assert the existence of anything in any sense beyond and independent of thought naturally suggests the doctrine of thing-in-itself, which is supposed to be the permanent possibility of sensations. How are we to understand this thing-in-itself? Is it conscious or unconscious existence? It cannot be anything else, for a real must be either of the two alternatives. If it is unconscious in the sense of an existence totally different from and contradictory to consciousness, we have the unwarrantable hypothesis of metaphysical dualism—that two absolute substances can co-exist. It must necessarily be conscious. Knowledge is the essence of being. If it were different from Being, Being would be its objects. In that case, Being would be, if intelligible, not-self; if un-intelligible, non-being. We come to the conclusion that to think of Being as ultimately real quite different from consciousness is an irreconcilable position in metaphysics. To say that reality or being is inert is to deny the possibility of knowledge or experience. But knowledge or experience is a fact which on any materialistic hypothesis cannot be rationally explained;

for it attempts to explain the origin of consciousness from what is in nature contradictory to it. As we have already pointed out, the concept of being can never be thought away, similarly we can never explain away consciousness; we may think away its objects and states, but we can never think it away and in our very attempt to do so, it asserts its hold upon us. Consciousness is therefore the most positive of facts, the datum of all other experiences. We find in the Śruti, it is such a fact "that when it is expressed, others express themselves, that by its splendour it enlightens or manifests all others."¹ Being is absolute and integral. Since Being is identical with consciousness, consciousness must be thought as undivided, expansive and eternal, transcending limits of space, time and causality.

There are found in the history of thought conceptions of the absolute as unconscious or self-conscious reality. The former seeks to establish that the ultimate Reality is unconsciousness, continuously striving to realise consciousness. This is a contradiction. To say that the absolute is unconscious is to deny all forms of reality to it, for nothing is truly real unless it is real to its own self. The absolute in order that it should be real must be conscious of itself. A stone is not real to itself, it is real to the casual observer. A man is not fully real as he is not fully conscious of himself. The absolute is absolutely real in as much as it is conscious of itself completely. But we must not understand the absolute as personal self-consciousness, for, this would imply a distinction between

It is not unconscious
nor self-conscious.

say that the absolute is unconscious
is to deny all forms of reality to

¹ तदेव भान्तमनुभाति सर्व्वं, तस्य भासा सर्व्वमिदं विभाति—Svetâśvetara VI. 14. Vacaspati has also the same thing in the following passage—
योऽयम् अर्थप्रकाशः फलं यस्मिन्नर्थे च आत्मा प्रथेत स किं जडः, स्वयम्प्रकाशो वा
जडश्चेत् विषयान्मानावपि जडाविति—कश्चिन् किं प्रकाशेत अविशिषाद् इति
प्राप्तमात्ममशेषस्य जगत इति—Adhyasâdhikâraṇa.

self and its own states and processes. It would admit of the possibility of an existence different from the self in reference to which it can regard itself as a personal existence in which so many states and processes inhere. This will imply a difference between it and its parts which is not consistent with the idea of an absolute Being. Those who maintain that self-consciousness is the ultimate reality regard the absolute apprehending itself as the totality of existence by going over the entirety of beings and things. It is conscious of itself as the self-subsisting and self-conscious unity. This position is not accepted by Vedāntism, which holds that the ideas of 'self' and 'not-self' are not immanent in and compatible with the Absolute, for one implies the other by relativity. If they obtain or have any meaning, it is only in the empirical order. In the absolute any such distinction implying relativity and mutual dependence cannot hold true, as it would imply a division in the integrity and purity of being. At the same time we must not think that it is unconscious or semi-conscious in a state of becoming conscious. The self is something eternally accomplished rather than being accomplished—it is the light of knowledge, the breath of wisdom. *Vedāntism thus identifies the absolute being with consciousness.* Any thing falling short of it is not consistent with the conception of the absolute. The charge that the absolute must be conscious of itself and therefore self-conscious does not stand, for to be self-conscious supposes a state of modification and implies a mode of becoming in the integrity of Being which is contradicted by the very nature of being. *Being is Consciousness. Consciousness is awareness.* This does not imply that outside Brahman something must exist as its object; as the sun always shines when there is nothing for it to shine on, so Brahman

is cognition without having an object of cognition. Since Brahman is consciousness it does not require any object to know, it is a transcendental existence. We have no possibility of thinking it as unreal in the sense of not knowing itself. It knows itself without implying the relativity of subject and object. In the case of empirical cognition we are in absolute need of subject and object, but this analogy we cannot extend to the absolute which knows itself without any process of knowing. The law, therefore, that in every case • knowledge implies some form of duality does not hold good.¹

Whenever we want to know anything besides consciousness, we are under the necessity of a duality in the form of subject and object—the one knowing, the other being known, implying a process of the subject in a state of knowing generally called knowledge. Evidently any cognition implies these three factors, but that which is intelligence or cognition itself does not stand in necessity of these states implied in the ordinary process of self-consciousness.² Consciousness does not require any process to be conscious of itself, nor does it imply anything to be its object in reference to which it can regard itself, as subject. It is *absolute* intelligence. It is self-luminous. It is capable of being felt directly and immediately without being the object of knowledge (*vide* Citsukhi, *Jivaji's Edition*, p. 9).³ It is the

¹ *Vide* Vivekacūḍamaṇi (Śloka 242).

ज्ञातज्ञेयज्ञानयुक्तम् अनन्तं निर्विकल्पकं ।

केवलाखण्ड-चिन्मात्रं परं तत्त्वं विदुर्वुधाः ॥

² Upadeśa Sahasrī—

इतिस्तु यद्वोऽहमविक्रियात्मको

नमेऽस्ति क्वचित् विषयः स्वभावतः—इति स्वरूप परमार्थ-दर्शनप्रकरणं Śl. 2.

³ न तावत् स्वरूपाशे लक्षणासम्भवः, अवेद्यत्वेऽत्यपरोक्षव्यवहारयोग्यतायाः तद्व्यवहारः ।

object of direct use, without being the object of sense-perception. Self-luminousness is not an attribute of Being. It is its nature. We sum up. Truth is Reality. Reality is Being. Being is consciousness, it is not unconscious will nor self-conscious personality—it is impersonal, self-luminous substance.

Besides this logical implication of the identity of *Being* and *Consciousness*, the Vedantin advances some psychological evidences establishing the hypothesis of consciousness as identity of existence.

(1) *The vacant state of consciousness.*—Generally it is supposed and felt that the mind or self is continuously

The conclusion supported by the psychology of (1) Vacant state of consciousness.

thinking; no state of mind can be conceived where we can find the self at rest. Again, the self is not only thinking but always organising a world of its own thoughts. The idea of the self as an identical principle subsisting by itself and underlying the variety of processes asserts its hold upon us, and we have the sense of an identity realising itself in the succession of states and processes of consciousness.

The Vedāntist holds that this theory is not true, or true in an empirical sense. It is a mere common notion of mind or self that it exists and maintains its existence in and through states and processes. There are states of consciousness when this multiplicity of conscious states dwindles away suddenly and unexpectedly along with the synthetic unity of apperception. The idea of a logical self organising experience is accepted in Vedāntism from the empirical standpoint, but the Vedāntist denies to it any kind of substantial or transcendental existence. To use the terms of Kant, it can have an immanent existence and use, but it has no transcendent use, for as soon as the empirical order of ideas ceases to exist, the

idea of a self as persisting in an individual and personal sense—as the principle of synthetic unity—no longer has its hold upon us. Of such an existence we have an instance to the point in the *vacant state of consciousness*, where for the time being the empirical whole including the idea of a self as an energising and organising principle loses itself. And we completely forget ourselves and the environment. It takes some time to return to the empirical level of conscious existence. Such a sudden break in the continuity and the unity of our mental life has not only a negative side of total forgetfulness, and denial, for the moment, of the objective conscious life with its bonds of relation, but it has a positive side as well indicating a sense of relief accompanied by a tranquil joy and calmness. In such a state we have a complete oblivion of the active and organising self, and when the sense of the empirical order returns, the mind turns back on the fast-receding experience of bliss and tries to retain it in consciousness. But this state must not be confounded with unconsciousness or subconscious modification of mind. The subconscious modifications are states where conscious or spiritual life is arrested or limited. And from the Vedāntic standpoint sub-consciousness and self-consciousness are forms of empirical existence—the only point of difference is that the former is more subjective, while the latter is more objective. Our mental life has two aspects of existence: (1) *the purely subjective mind*: where the grouping and formation of ideas are not under volitional control. It is a world which spontaneously determines itself forming combinations, possessing no objective value. In such a state of existence, the mind is withdrawn completely from the *objectively* phenomenal order and freely determines or creates an ideal world in which for the time being it has

its being and enjoyment : (2) *the objective mind*: where we purposively determine our universe of thinking, and where we come face to face with a reality having an existence independent of ourselves wherefrom we receive the materials of knowledge and the manifold of experience. The objective mind is conscious of a restraint in the sense of an independent existence besides it. Its existence at every moment subsists in the system of relations it forms with it. The mind is here clearly impressed with an extraneous existence, though it forms a universe of its own out of the facts of perception.

The difference between these two universes from the Vedāntic standpoint is slight. In one case, the self is represented as freely creating a universe for itself. Sometimes these reconstructions are dim and hazy, sometimes they are clear as in a dream. From the realistic standpoint, the dream world is interpreted as the automatic revival of images and spontaneous combination of them formed by the uncontrolled play of the forces of suggestion. From the idealistic standpoint it must be conceded that they are constructions, spontaneous or otherwise, by the creative activity of self. There is no real difference between the two stages above mentioned. The dream world just like the world of experience is an existence coming into appearance in the creative effort of self. The one is no more subjective than the other (see Bṛhad-aranyaka). That the distinction is drawn is due to the realistic tendency of thinking which is inborn in man. And the above distinction is true from that standpoint alone. From the Vedāntic standpoint both are empirical, and real so long as the functioning of Nescience exists—it matters not whether some mode or form of it remains in existence for a greater length of time than others.

Besides these states, there is another in which the functioning of mind-stuff altogether ceases to exist, where the empirical order loses its hold upon consciousness, and for the moment, the entire universe of experience seems to be dissolved into nothing. The vacant state brings in view the static nature of consciousness transcending all forms of activities. Such a state is negative, in so far as the experience and the synthetic unity of apperception disappear. It is positive, in so far as we are conscious of a negation of experience, and a positive feeling of delight.

(2) *The state of dreamless sleep.*—Every one of us often experiences a state of existence in sleep when the world of phenomenal manifoldness completely vanishes, or to use a *Vedantic* term, vanishes in ignorance. The empirical self with its states and processes is stilled, for the time being, in the silence of deep sleep. Such a state of consciousness leaves no impression behind it, except an impression of a positive ignorance of all concrete experience, including the experience of a personal self. When we again come to our senses, we become clearly conscious of an experience of calm and tranquil pleasure left to ourselves. "The sleeper knows not his sleeping, in him who sleeps not, there is no dreaming, no waking. It is the witness of waking, dreaming, and dreamless sleep." (*Advaita-Makaranda*, Verse 11). The state of dreamless sleep would thus imply (1) the feeling of the want of concrete experience, (2) the consciousness of this ignorance, and (3) the consequent feeling of delight.¹ The author of the *Vivarana* characterises this state as one, in which we have a triple modification of the primal ignorance in the form of consciousness as witnessing, as bliss, and as not knowing

¹ *Vide* Chapter III.

anything particular.¹ We have also on the authority of the *Śruti*, that in such a state all concrete experiences cease to have any hold upon us.² 'The whole creation often goes into, but does not know, "the plane of Brahman," being covered up by the falsity of ignorance.' This state is a proof of existence conscious without any modification. *Śaṅkara* in his *Viveka Cudāmani* (Verse 237) has laid a stress upon dreamless sleep as indicative of the impermanence of the world of manifoldness. He argues: had the world of experience been the ultimate reality, it would have been felt in deep sleep; since it is not felt, it is unreal and illusory like dreams.³

(3) *The state of existence known as raptness or abstraction.*—The existence of consciousness, as distinguished from the notion of a personal existence, is experienced in the abstracted condition generally attained by adepts.⁴ The world of manifoldness is not felt in this state of consciousness, where the mind has been utterly withdrawn from the objects of its natural and habitual occupation, and ultimately loses itself. Here the consciousness is impressed by the complete forgetfulness and absence of the facts of ordinary experience implying the temporary cessation of the determinate functional activity of mind. When the adept returns from such a state of conscious existence, he carries back the memory of the transcendental experience and its attendant delight.⁵

¹ Vide Chapter III.

² इनाः सर्वाः प्रजा अहरहर्गच्छन्त्य एतत् ब्रह्मलोकं न विन्दन्त्यवृत्तेन प्रबुद्धाः ।
(*Chhandogya*, VIII. 3. 2.)

³ Vide the complete analysis of *Susupti*, Chapter III.

⁴ मनसो हि उन्ननीभावात् हेतं नैवोपलस्यते ।

Hatayogapradīpikā.

⁵ Vide the analysis of *Samadhi* in Chapter IV.

These psychological facts establish the hypothesis with which we start—*viz.*, that the ultimate Existence is consciousness, and not a self-conscious reality. It is impersonal and self-illuminating.

Our chain of thinking has so far led us to this conclusion. Truth is Reality, Reality is Being, Being is Consciousness, Consciousness is self-illuminating. Truth or Reality is consciousness in the light of its own self, not in the sense of implying a distinction between it and its attributes, but in the sense of its being identical with attributes: or it is an existence which transcends the conception of substance and attributes.

The consciousness of existence, because it is absolute, is the perfection of existence. And because it is perfection,

Being is Bliss.

it is bliss, for bliss is the indication of the amount of being. In finite self-conscious experience we are clearly conscious that, with the gradual growth of our inmost being, we have the invariable expansion, fulfilment, and perfection of our self, with the unfailing accompaniment of delight consequent upon the sense of expansion. The absolute, since it is the ultimate existence, is also the perfection of being, and consequently is identical with bliss. We read in the *Śruti*,¹ “what is great and limitless is bliss, there is no bliss in littleness and limitation.” We cannot accept the ordinary theory that pleasure (bliss) is consequent upon stimulus agreeable to us, and pain, upon stimulus disagreeable to us. Surely this is playing with words. Pleasure is, no doubt, an agreeable feeling. But why is one stimulus agreeable, and another, disagreeable? It is only because one is in harmony with our being, and paves the way for its expansion, while the other retards the process. A stimulus

1. यो वे भूमातत्सुखं नात्ये सुखमस्ति, *vide Chhandogya, Ch. VII. 23. 1*).

by itself is indifferent. It has no absolute character. It has an acquired virtue. It appears as pleasurable, not because it has this property inherent in itself, but only because it makes way for the expansion of our being. It may be urged that harmony is the soul of bliss. It is because (if we see clearly) harmony helps us to feel the expanse of existence, and to fathom the immensity of being. It is an indication of our fitness and capacity for feeling the vastness of existence. The more it grows within us, the more we feel the pulse of infinite existence. The deeper the harmonious vibration, the wider the knowledge, the loftier the feeling, until the vibration is lost in Sublimity itself. In fact pleasure and pain are indicative of expansion or diminution of our being. The very love of existence for itself indicates the essential nature of our being as bliss, for our love for another thing is not love for its own sake. The love of our own being is unconditional. It is love for love's own sake. This proves that our essence is bliss, and that other things appear as blissful because of their being invariably associated with it, because of their appearing as modes of our being.¹

In fact, the concept of being is identical with the concept of bliss, for we cannot, by any amount of abstraction, think of bliss as inherent in non-being. Moreover, bliss must be thought of as a natural accompaniment of consciousness, for we have a clear knowledge that it does not follow upon the growth of an inert physical nature in us, but upon the growth and expansion of conscious life. The more our conscious life feels the sense of expansion, the more does the vision of our conscious

¹ *Vide Panchadaśī, Chap: I, 8 and 9 Ślokas.*

existence dawn upon us as also blissful existence. When we transcend the limitation of our physical nature, we feel not only the pulse of an expansive conscious life, but also of an existence that fills us with serene delight. The states of consciousness, noticed before, are not only indicative of pure integrity of conscious existence, but of a blissful existence as well. With the growth of our conscious being we feel the pulse of a blissful life, and when such a conscious existence has reached its full being, it attains to its nature as fullness of perfection and bliss.

To sum up: Truth is Being, Being is consciousness, Consciousness is Bliss. The ultimate Reality or the absolute must be thought of as *consciousness and blissfulness of existence*. It is an existence which cannot be separated from consciousness and bliss; in fact, no separation can even be conceived. Our final conclusion, regarding the concept of Being, is that it is bliss and consciousness. Reality in itself to the *Vedantin* is the Being of consciousness and bliss. This is the understanding of Being or *Brahman* in its essential, in the terms of *Vedanta*, *Svarupa* nature. *Brahman* is fullness of Being. It is integrity of being. Such a conception of *Brahman*, as Existence and Consciousness, does not enter into the condition of positive thinking, for, in the very attempt of our thinking it, it goes out of our view. It transcends all forms of relativity. Being, in itself, is, to a certain sense, unknown and unknowable. At least, it is not known in the ordinary way. The *Śruti* says:¹ "who does know the knower of all things?"—"One who

Brahman is incogitable.

¹ विज्ञातारमरे केन विजानीयात्—*Br. Ar.* 9. 15.

यस्यामतं तस्य मतं मतं यस्य न वेद सः।—*Kato*.

knows it not, knows", "one who thinks he knows, does not know." Really the absolute cannot be the object of knowledge, for, in that case, it would presuppose the externality of the knower and the knowing process which would contradict its being as absolute.

The *Sruti* says: "Where there are two, one beholds the other, one smells the other, one tastes the other, one hears the other, one feels the other, one touches the other, one knows the other. But when all has become that *Atman*, who is to be smelled by whom, who is to be seen by whom,] who is to be heard by whom, who is to be welcomed by whom, who is to be known by whom, who can know him by whom everything is known? This *Atman* can only be described as *neti, neti* (not this, not this). Incomprehensible, it cannot be apprehended by the intellect, unchangeable, it never fades. Unattached, it never gets mixed up with nature. Perfect, it is behind all pleasure and pain."¹

Though the possibility of knowing *Atman* has been denied, still the possibility of realising *Atman* is retained; and in the *Bṛhadaranyaka* we find *Yajñabalkya* entering into a discourse regarding the way in which *Atman* is to be meditated on and directly felt (this topic we shall fully discuss in Chapter V).

When one has sufficient culture in meditation, one begins to feel, even while standing on an empirical level of consciousness, the immanence and all-pervasiveness of existence; the entire existence impresses us with the sense of a fullness. "This is full, that is full, from the full the full originates, if the full is taken from the full, the full remains."² The *Vedānta* seeks to teach this

¹ Swami Vivekananda's Translation.

² Vide *Bṛhadaranyaka Upanisad*.

fullness of being; there cannot be any sense of want or mutation of being, for, it is the ultimate reality. The soul of *Vedantic* teaching lies in establishing this oneness and ever-permanence of being. When a glimpse of the oneness of existence suddenly flashes upon us, "the earth seems to be full of bliss to all beings, and all beings become sweet to the earth. The air is so sweet to all beings, and all beings are so sweet to the air. The sun is so sweet to all beings, and all beings are so sweet to the sun. The moon is so sweet to all beings, all beings are so sweet to the moon." And the sun, the moon, the air, and the entire existence appear as sweet, not because of themselves, but because of their being identical with the source of all sweetness—the self-effulgent Immortal Bliss. The air is sweet, for He is the air. The sun is sweet, for He is the sun. The moon is sweet, for He is the moon. Everything is sweet, for He is the soul of everything. Everything is sweet, for everything is bliss. We are taught by *Yajñabalkya* to think upon everything as sweetness of existence. This helps us in opening up the vision of identity, for, we are not merely to perceive the earth as earth, but the earth as sweet, and gradually the earth as sweetness, perceiving no longer the earth, but the all-pervasive sweetness in Existence. We are asked to identify our soul with the soul behind the cosmic existence. In this way the general tendency of our understanding to see differences in things and to interpret them as real vanishes, making room for the realisation of an immanent existence of sweetness in everything, preparing the way for the realisation of the transcendental identity of sweetness itself. When a man, attains such a state of existence, verily does he perceive, "his inner existence is full, his outer existence is full,

fullness pervades everywhere." *Atman* is within, *Atman* without, *Atman* all round, *Atman* up and below.¹ Then comes the transcendent state of existence which is the fullness of existence.²

Though from the *Vedantic* standpoint, the ultimate Existence is transcendental, and does not enter into the conditions of empirical thinking, we must not identify *Vedantism* with any form of Agnosticism, for *Vedanta* is positive and definite in its affirmation about the nature of ultimate substance. The existence of consciousness is a fact of experience, though it does not appear in the fullness of being. *Sankara* truly says that the ultimate Being is not altogether removed (एकान्तेन अविद्य.) from experience, for the very fact and possibility of knowledge implies such an existence. We may not form any concrete conception of such a reality, but to say, that we cannot have any knowledge of its existence, is to miss the import of *Vedanta* philosophy. The possibility of knowledge presupposes this existence, for it is ultimately consciousness. It is expressive of all modes of existence. The sun may be kept hidden from view by a trail of cloud, yet the very existence of the cloud is revealed to us by the sun. Similarly the ultimate existence, in its transcendental integrity, may be kept from our view, but our experience and knowledge are possible, because it is revealing them to us. Every form of knowledge, every mode of existence, presupposes the absolute conscious substance. The possibility of experience is an evidence for the actuality of consciousness of existence. This is the *Vedantic* conception of *Being or Reality*.

Vedantism is not
Agnosticism.

Vide *Viveka Cuḍamani*, Verse 392.

Vide *Viveka Cuḍamani*, Verse 404.

This oneness of Being is also indicated in the *Śruti*, *Tat Twamasi* (Thou art that) *Aham Brahmasmi*, (I am Brahman). The axiom establishes the identity of being, and directs us to think of the identity of existence underlying *Jiva* and *Iswara*. The words, 'tat,' and 'twam' imply the individual soul and the cosmic soul, and the word 'asi' points to the identity of their being. The axiom is important in its import, in as much as it points to identity exclusive of difference. This does not prove any relation between Divinity and Humanity, nor any particular synthesis, but it seeks to wake us up from the deep slumber to realise the truth of the oneness of existence, and shake off the fetters of a false personality, due to innate ignorance. Of course, we do not use the words 'tat' and 'twam' in the direct sense of divinity and humanity, for any synthesis, this wise, is impossible—the one is infinite and absolute, the other, finite and limited. Between such existences none can possibly make out any way for synthesis. And any synthesis, taking the literal sense of the words, is impossible, for, it would mean that the contradictory concepts, the absolute and the limited, can be thought of together. When one says 'this is the same *Devadatta*,' no one understands one seriously in the sense that *Devadatta*, seen in a particular place at a particular time, is identical with the man standing yonder. In fact, the motive of the speaker is only to indicate *the identity of existence*, exclusive of temporal and spatial connexions, and not to establish the identity of the person with the differences of time and space.

The axiom interpreted:

Devadatta, so far as temporal and spatial relations are concerned, is not least affected in his being. On the same analogy we can really insist

that, in the axiom, the identity of existence is hinted at, but not any synthetic relation between 'Tat' and 'Twam.' The speaker begins with the determination of Existence as one without second and ends by declaring that this *Sat* is *atman* and everyone in essence is *atman* and identical with it. The possibility of any other relation—difference in unity—does not arise. This identity is sought to be established by the logical relation of the terms—'tat' and 'twam.' The relations are three,¹ (1) Common reference, (2) relation as subject and predicate, and (3) relation as indicated and indicative. The proposition '*thou art that*' comes under the relation of common reference, for it indicates the same consciousness of Existence. Though the terms 'tat' and 'twam' differ as transcending and being the object of perception, still the objective import of terms is identical. They have identical reference to the transcendent consciousness. These terms are related as subject and predicate, both are identified by leaving aside the difference. They are again related as the indicated and the indicative by abstraction of their differences to signify the identity of Existence. In each case the objective significance is put before view. There have been many attempts to interpret this axiom in other ways, notably in the Theistic School of *Vedantism*. The Theists want to put a construction upon the axiom as admitting of an element of difference in the integrity of being in order to make room for the co-existent personality of the human and the divine. They would contend that when one speaks of a man as "this is the same *Devadatta*," what, one really means, is the identity of persons seen in different places at different times. And this is a case of recognition. Recognition implies forgetfulness

¹ Vide *Vedantasara*, p. 83.

and a subsequent assimilation of the past with the present. This involves distinctions of space and time. The proposition is synthetic. The *Sankarites* contend that such an identification with differences in space and time limitation is not possible, for, this would suppose the actual presence of the temporal and spatial conditions in each case, which is a veritable impossibility.

In other words, Vedantism does not see the importance of recognition in perception. To the theistic Vedantists, knowledge is a judgment, an affirmation ; to the *Advaita* Vedantists, knowledge is essentially cognition, judgment makes it determinate.

Some may contend that *Vedantism*, in establishing the identity of Existence interprets the axiom of identity indirectly, leaving out of sight the primary meanings of the words 'tat' and 'twam.'

This is not true, for, as *Vacaspati* points out, the axiom of identity, because of its not being an instrument to anything else, has a clear distinct sense and no secondary or indirect meaning.¹ The primary meaning of a word is not necessarily its etymological sense (शब्दार्थ), but a sense implying an existence which cannot be contradicted, e. g., 'the sky flower' may have a meaning (so far the words are concerned, but it has no primary or direct meaning in as much as it does not indicate anything objective (*vide Vamati*).

Moreover, it is submitted that the theistic interpretation cannot be accepted on the careful consideration of the authoritative texts. In the beginning of the Chapter VI, 2, 3. *Chhandogya*, the speaker begins with the affirmation of Absolute identity. He cannot be consistent in ending it with a duality of existence, *Jiva* and *Brahman* ;

¹ अद्वैतवाक्यं तु अनन्यशेषत्वात् सुख्यायमेव.

or with a monism in which the *Jiva* retains personality in the Divine. The *Vedantin* would distinguish two kinds of epithets, generally ascribed to Brahman; some of them indicate that It is sustaining and supporting the entire existence, a being of infinite attributes, others indicate its transcendental nature, denying all attributes to him.

To be consistent, these quotations must be taken in two different senses, for, at the same moment, we cannot conceive anything in apparently contradictory ways. Some *Śrutis* speak of it in positive sense; some, again, in a negative ones. *Brahman* is represented as the support of

The positive and the negative *Śrutis* reconciled.

certain attributes which, in the next moment, are denied of it. From the former standpoint it is represented as the immanent principle, from the latter

this immanent conception of Being is changed into a transcendent conception. *Vedantism* retains these two conceptions, but in different senses. It seeks to establish the transcendence of Being, with which any conception of immanence is hardly in keeping. It is indeed very difficult to retain logically both the conceptions of *Brahman*. A being cannot, at the same time, be a being with attributes, and a being without attributes. If we are to accept the conception of Brahman as full of powers and attributes, the conception of Brahman as transcendent (as suggested by the negative forms of *Śruti* (नेति, नेति) becomes meaningless. If we are to accept both the positive and negative descriptions of *Brahman*, then the only conception which seems plausible is that, from the empirical standpoint, it must be conceived as the Being of infinite attributes, and, that, besides this empirical aspect, it has a transcendent nature conceived in a negative way. The *Vedantism* of *Śankara* has accentuated the transcendent nature. The *Vedantin* sees no clear road from the

transcendent being to the immanent appearance, for, it argues that the oneness of transcendence cannot be in harmony with the "many-ness" of immanence. He is, therefore, bound to accept the negative *Śrutis* in a direct sense, the positive only in an indirect sense—the one indicative of identity, the other, of manifoldness. Empirically, there is no other way of expressing identity. It can only be hinted at by denying all positive conception to it, and this is actually done in negative *Śrutis*. To the *Vedantins* the negative *Śrutis* are more important than the positive ones, for, the denial of anything presupposes the affirmation of it. If, on the other hand, we make the positive *Śrutis* more important and expressive of the essential nature of ultimate existence, we cannot read any plausible and serious meaning in the negative ones. They become quite useless. But such a position cannot be maintained, for, it is told, in no uncertain terms, that "*Brahman* is not this," "one without second," "nothing exists in the oneness of being." It is only natural to hold that the ultimate existence is destitute of all differences, even of the supposed difference of '*tat*' and '*twam*.'

Again, we have already shown that consciousness is integrity of existence. The co-existence of human and divine consciousness supposes a division in the integrity of being. The idea of a difference implies and presupposes its existence in space. All ideas of difference, and of co-existence, are not clear apart from the conception of space; so to speak of finite and absolute existences and of any difference inherent in conscious life, and at the same to assert such an existence transcending space and time, is not clear philosophy. If we maintain that consciousness transcends space, we cannot speak of any difference in conscious life. If we insist upon such a difference, it can, no longer, be a Being conscious—it is

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like other phenomena, an appearance in space and time. To insist upon the element of difference between the finite self and the infinite self is not metaphysically sound. One may think of the finite self as merely a reproduction, but, as reproduction, it is not real in the same sense as the original. To speak of the finite as issuing out of the infinite is to speak only on superficial analogy, for, that which transcends space and time cannot be supposed as entering finite existence, or evolving finite concrete selves. No doubt, we may conceive them as reproductions, but as reproductions they are merely appearances, seemingly real without being so. They are no doubt parts or manifestations, but never real in the sense in which they are generally understood to be. The axiom of identity asserts the oneness of existence, and draws our attention to it. The real significance of it is to impress upon our mind the identity of our being with the Absolute, and not the synthesis of the two.

CHAPTER II.

APPEARANCE.

From bliss all these becomings are born, by bliss they exist and grow, to bliss they return.

For who could live or breathe if there is not this delight of existence as the ether in which we dwell.

Taittiriya Upanisad.

We have already indicated what we mean by the Reality in the absolute sense. Apart from this conception of absolute Reality, there is another conception of Reality understood in the relative sense. Absolutely, Being is the only Reality; relatively, the manifold forms are real, and here the mark or criterion of Reality is not the unchangeability of its nature, nor the undeniability of its character. They are real because they are perceived or felt by us. We cannot at once deny them, though in the attempt of denying them, they, unlike the concept of being, do not come implicitly upon our consciousness. In the case of absolute Being, the thought of denial is out of the question. In the case of appearance, no such absolute security of being can be granted, but so long as they form themselves as objects of perception, they cannot be set aside as completely unreal. Appearances are real so long as they exert their hold upon us; but they are changeable and transitory. Absolute Reality is transcendent. The absolute is real in itself. The relative is real in as much as it is

understood in a system and order, apart from which, it has no independent existence. And the system has a meaning to the percipient subject. Indeed, it is a truism to say that the world of facts tied up in relation has no meaning by itself apart from the conscious subject which integrates and unifies them. The existence of an appearance depends upon its being a fact of consciousness. Its *esse* is *percipi*. It has consequently no clear meaning and definite sense by itself, as something existing in itself and for itself. These appearances, since they are true in relation to a percipient subject, cannot be absolute and unique in character. Their nature will mainly depend upon the universe of discourse in which they form themselves as parts, upon the respective temperaments of thinking subjects, and upon their ways of assimilating and interpreting them. The subjects are distinct units possessing disparate tendencies. They live in different thought universes. When these thinking units stand in some form of relation to the outward objects, the latter do not impress themselves upon the former uniformly but diversely; so that these appearances as appearances have quite different meanings to individual subjects. It must be conceded that, apart from our consciousness, apart from some form of relation to the thinking subject, Appearances have no objective value. Reality, in so far it is appearance, has no absolute value or character. As soon as we come down from the concept of Being as the transcendent reality and get to the realm of appearances, we cannot get rid of the duality and mutual reciprocity of subject and object, of Reality and Appearance; and so long as the sense of duality persists, the realm of appearances is supposed to be real, but we fail in our attempt of defining its nature.

Some times our expectations do not turn out to be true. Appearance is accepted as true because of some claim or pretension which it suggests. Its value and usefulness in life lend a support to its existence. But it is in the non-fulfilment of the claim or pretension which it suggests, that its falsity consists.

We do not mean to say that in the world of appearance there is no law or consistency. The *Vedantin* submits that these laws or apparent uniformities are our ways of looking into facts. They are supposed to be objective only because of the universality of their acceptance. But this universality is no mark of their being true objectively. It only indicates that the evolution of human mind has attained a certain level, from which the universe seems to be uniform in its course of phenomenal succession. But this view stands upon an unwarrantable assumption that the human consciousness cannot change its present level of existence and pass on to the super-conscious stage. In fact, psychological experiences reveal to us that there are moments in our conscious life where the relations that hold empirically do not obtain. The *Vedantin* refers to these psychological experiences to point out the unreliable and purely subjective character of appearances. No doubt, there may be some forms of assimilation of these appearances in every thinking subject, but on a close examination we can find that they do not hold in every level of conscious existence. They may be necessary laws of thought-construction in a certain stage, and so far as that stage is concerned they may appear useful and necessary, but that does not preclude the possibility of thinking, that they do not hold true in every level of conscious existence. They are relative to the 'given' of experience. Such a relation apart, they have no meaning and existence. We conclude that Being or

consciousness is the ultimate Reality. Appearances or systems of empirical facts are true in so far as they enter into some form of relation with consciousness; this relation apart, appearance has no value or meaning.

We are thus presented with conceptions of Reality— (1) Transcendental Reality, and (2) Apparent Reality. Being is the only Reality which can be regarded as impossible of being ever contradicted as the basis and datum of all experience. Appearances are real in a relative sense. And so long as the empirical mood sways us, they are interpreted as founded upon the ever-present back-ground of Being. Ordinarily, we regard appearance as the effect, Being as the cause, or the underlying substratum of appearance. But this connection has no meaning from the transcendental standpoint. *Vedantism* establishes Absolute Monism by empirically explaining phenomenal order as based upon Noumenon, and by transcendently dislodging all connexion between them.

Brahman is the essence of being but this essence of Being cannot, as we have already said, be the object of ordinary perception. It is a fruit of philosophic thinking. And, apart from this conception of Reality, *Brahman* can also be understood from the standpoint of appearance. *Brahman*, as it appears, is the totality of concrete existences. The entire plurality of existences, the whole mass of phenomena is to be interpreted as *Brahman-in-its-appearance*. In fact, since, besides consciousness, there is no other Reality, this totality of appearance is ordinarily understood as the effect of the permanent cause, Being. Being is transcendently oneness of existence, but, empirically, it is understood as existence immanent in appearance. Empirically speaking, appearance is the indication of Being, but, even empirically, it has not the same amount of Reality or Being.

These are the two forms of understanding Being (*Brahman*)—(1) from the transcendental standpoint, Being is the only Reality, and (2) from the empirical standpoint, Being is the substratum underlying appearances. From

The two senses in which *Brahman* is generally understood.

the former standpoint, it is the oneness of Being exclusive of differences, from the latter, it is the immanent existence, the thread of Being underlying and connecting the mass of phenomenal existence. The one would lead us to think it as an integrity of existence transcending experience, the other, as an immanent principle in knowledge and existence.

Attempts have not been infrequent in the history of thought to combine these two conceptions, and represent the Absolute as a synthetic principle. It is a being that is in reality expressing itself in the phenomenal order, at the same time transcending it. Such systems make essence and appearance equally real. The *Vedantin* keeps these conceptions strictly separate, and submits that the former is Reality as conceived by the wise, the latter, as conceived by the ignorant. No doubt, the *Vedantin* maintains an empirical order of existence, but still he is careful to point out that, even in the mass of manifold existence, the nature of substance as transcendental oneness is never altered. We seem to think as if there is a change in the oneness of Being in the form of modes, and we interpret the modes of existences as the transformation of substance or Being. But, on closer observation, we see that, even in these modes, Being exists intact without being in the least transformed. The *Vedantin* points out the mysterious character of phenomenal existence. It is an appearance on the background of Reality. But we cannot notice the change of

Reality or Substance in any form in immanent experience. The Reality preserves its oneness of existence through all appearances. And the moment this oneness is perceived, the modes of appearances cease to have any meaning for us. The *Vedantin* points out that the appearance is seemingly real, an illusory show, underlying which Reality, in its integrity and purity of being, exists without in any way being affected. Phenomena may appear to us in various combinations or forms, but, in them the essence of Reality preserves itself intact. If we go a step higher, we may say that, in the essence of being, there is no change, no meaning for the phenomenal outlook.

The *Vedantin* puts Reality and Appearance side by side without impairing in the least the integrity of Being to explain Appearance. So long as Appearance exerts its hold upon us as mode of existence, we cannot deny it as

a fact of perception, but the more we think deeply, the more we feel the presence of Reality in its integrity in the forms of appearance. Modes of existence are thus seemingly real without really being so. Their being vanishes away when the underlying essence comes to our direct and immediate vision. Appearance can never be taken as identical with Reality, if, as appearance, it is different from Reality. The appearance has no reality. It is real in the reality of Being. It has no individual or particular reality by itself. It has no independence of existence. Some may argue that *Brahman* is transforming itself into appearances on the analogy of the clay and the pot, but this is not true, for the *Sruti* (*Chhandogya*, Chapter VI, i, 4, 6) is anxious to maintain the permanent unchangeability and integrity of *Brahman* by denying any transformation of its being. Nobody is able

The integrity of Being is kept intact behind the appearances.

to prove the nature of *Brahman* as one existing in the same mode of being, and yet, at the same time, changing. Some may argue that Being is the synthesis of permanence and change, it is change on the background of permanence; but, this is denied by calling *Brahman* *Kutastha*—one that is fixed permanently and immovable. That which is the perpetuity of fixedness of existence cannot be conceived as the support of contradictory qualities—rest and motion, permanence and change. Again the argument, on the analogy, of the clay and the pot, that the world is the transformation of *Brahman* is not to the point, for the possibility of this conception has been denied by indicating *Brahman* in negative terms as ‘*atman* is not this.’ Thus *Śankara* maintains the oneness and unchangeableness of being in which no modification or transformation can be conceived. But he is equally emphatic in his denial of any other cause or substratum of appearance besides *Brahman*.¹

Brahman is again conceived as creating and preserving the world-process—himself all-wise, all-powerful, all-pure and intelligent. We are told, again, in the same moment, that *Brahman* is purity and integrity of existence. To be consistent, it must be said that *Śankara* tries to explain the empirical order of existence as an appearance of Existence (due to Nescience), but when the philosophic vision of the oneness of Being, due to logical discrimination, dawns, these appearances seem to possess no reality in themselves—they appear as real, because they appear on the background of something essentially real.²

¹ नहि एकस्य ब्रह्मणः परिणामधर्मत्वं तद्वरहितत्वं च शक्यं प्रतिपत्तुं ।
Br. Su., Chapter II, Pada I, 14.

² Vide *Brahma Sutra*, Chap. Pada I, Aphorism 18.

Vedantism preserves the integrity of absolute existence by denying the empirical order of existence in the absolute sense, and by explaining it away as a mere appearance, real in the reality of transcendent

existence. This is clearly implied in *A Śurti* interpreted.

the *Śruti*,¹ "Oh, modest one, this was in the form of existence only, which is one without second." This world of appearance (indicated by *Idam*) existed in the past and existed in the integrity of absolute being. Now the commonly accepted doctrine of *Nyaya* is that the predicate which qualifies the subject term must also qualify its attributes, and this qualification must be simultaneous. If the law is applied, the passage would carry the import that which existed before, existed as one without second.² "*Sat*" is the subject term to which are attributed two predicates simultaneously, (1) the world of appearance, and (2) the integrity of Being. Existence, which appears to be manifold, is at the same moment really one without a second. *Brahman* becomes the subject of contradictory predicates. Reality is affirmed as

¹ *Vide Laghuchandrika*, p. 9.—*Advaita Sidhi*; Tukaram Javaji's Edition.

'एकमेवाद्वितीयं ब्रह्म' इत्यादिना जायमाने अद्वैतत्वोपलक्षितब्रह्मनिर्विकल्पक-निश्चये ब्रह्मणि हैताभावविशिष्टरुडोर्द्धारत्वात्, तस्याश्च निषेधत्वेन प्राप्तिपूर्वकत्वेन हैतवति ब्रह्मणि हैतवत्त्वकालावच्छेदेन हैताभावत्वविषयकत्वात् 'सदेव सौम्येदमय आसी'दिति पूर्ववाक्ये इदं शब्दायैतसामान्यतादात्म्यास्य लभ्यत्वेन तस्य हैताभावांश्चि उद्देश्यतावच्छेदकत्वेन तत्र तत्कालावच्छेदत्वभानस्यव्युत्पत्तिसिद्धत्वात्.....हैतवति हैताभाव बोध साहचर्यत्वेन शाब्दत्वासंभवेऽपीदं पदस्य दृश्यत्वरूपेण द्वितीयपदस्य चात्मभिन्नत्वरूपेण बोधकत्वेसाहाय्यत्वाभावात्, कालान्तरावच्छेदेन हैताभावत्वविषयकधियश्च तरति शोकमात्मवित्.....इत्यादि स्मृतिभिः ज्ञाननाश्रयत्वानुमापकदृश्यत्व लिङ्गादिरूपमानान्तरेण च सिद्धत्वेन तज्जनने वाक्यवेद्यार्थापत्तेः, एककालावच्छिन्नं प्रतियोग्य-भावयोरेकाधिकरणवृत्तिलक्षणीरूपो मिथ्यात्वनिश्चयः।

² *Vide the Chhandogya*, Chapter VI, 2, 1.

many; and again, it is denied of this appearance of manifoldness. From this it follows that manifoldness is only an appearance, but does not really exist. Reality is the oneness of being. The transcendental understanding of existence, as one undivided being, may presuppose the understanding of existence as an immanent being, the basis and foundation of all modes of existence. For, the transcendent conception can only be indicated. It cannot be the object of knowledge. Indeed, *Vedantism*, as a system seeking to establish the non-duality of Being and unqualified monism, cannot accept the passage of the *Śruti* describing the evolution of the world-process in the metaphysical sense of its being absolutely true. Hence, it is said that the passage referring to the evolution of cosmos has no primary meaning; it is taken as proof of the ultimate reality as one integral substance.¹ To establish unqualified monism upon a secure basis *Vedantism* simultaneously asserts and denies the manifoldness of existence in *Brahman*. If the world of appearance has been altogether denied of an existence in *Brahman*, there would arise the possibility of our thinking of it as an independent existence, lending a support to metaphysical dualism. To counteract this possibility of thought, the world of manifoldness is first posited in *Brahman* and subsequently denied.² Logically, affirmation goes before negation, 'is' before 'is not.' *Sarbagatmuni* is correct

¹ *Vide Advaita Sidhi*, p. 63, Kumbakonam Edition :

विश्वमित्यात्वस्यागमादि बाधोद्धारः—'विश्वम् सत्यम्' इत्यादिस्तु निषेधविषय-समविषयत्वेन स्वार्थतात्पर्यरहितत्वेन च निषेध्यसमर्पणद्वारेण निषेधवाक्यशेषतो-चितैव ।

² *Vide Advaita Sidhi*, p. 62 :

भावभावायोः परस्परविरुद्धरूपत्वे समेऽपि भावग्रहणिरपेक्षत्वात् नाभावग्रहणमपेक्षते । अभावग्रहणस्तु स प्रतियोगितया भावग्रहणमपेक्षते । अतो 'नेति' 'नेति' श्रुतेरेव सत्त्वश्रुत्यपेक्षा न सत्त्वश्रुतेर्नेति श्रुत्यपेक्षा ।

when he says that *Vivarttha* presupposes *Pariṇam*. The *vivarttha* comes in to complete the conception of *Brahman* as the transcendent aloneness of existence (*vide Sankshepa Sarirak*, Chap. 2, *Sloka* 61) Being-in-its-integrity can be somewhat intelligible to us only in a negative sense as implying the denial of empirical modes, but this denial presupposes the position of modes of Being. The understanding of existence without any modification necessarily presupposes an existence with qualification.

The successive stages in the growth of our consciousness or knowledge of existence may be indicated as, Being with modes, Being as devoid of particular modes, and Being-in-itself. This gives us the conception of *Brahman* as the integrity of Existence.

Three stages in the conception of *Brahman*.

A question may arise, however, how can one ascribe such contradictory attributes to one and the same thing simultaneously? The *Vedantin* reconciles these conceptions by supporting position in empirical, and negation in transcendental sense. Existence is oneness, though it appears as many.¹ Others may step in and assert that Existence is one and manifold at different moments—*viz.*, the moments of involution and evolution. Then all modes of being will disappear in *Mahapralay* (cosmic involution), and will pass into *Sat*, and will again reappear when the process of evolution will set in. This makes the Appearance as much real as Being, though the possibility of its once passing into a state of temporary quiescence is accepted.

The *Vedantin* cannot accept this. This makes the world-process a circle of existence, appearing and

¹ इति तत्र ब्रह्मिण्यु तवत्कालावच्छेदेन इति ताभावन्व विषयकत्वात् ।

disappearing in succession. It becomes a process of becoming. The *Vedantin* holds that, in the promise of complete freedom from the bondage of finite existence, we have the implication that appearance is no part of Being, and has no real existence. The *Śruti* affirms "the self-knower gets over misery" (तरति शोकमात्मवित्), "the wise are free from the snares of names and forms of existence" (विद्वान् नामरूपात् विसृक्तः). In order that these affirmations should carry any significance, it is necessary to hold that in *Brahman* there is no manifoldness; otherwise, the wise can never be conceived to get over the slough of despond. All misery, all grief is due to the sense of the manifoldness of existence, for, we are told "where is grief, where is misery when one has perceived the oneness of existence?"

From the above it will be clear that the *Vedantin* begins with a clear analysis of our notions of existence, and divides them as Transcendental and Empirical. To him Reality is the transcendence of Being. But the empirical existence is not imaginary; it is illusory, and has the possibility of a denial. In this sense it is not absolutely real, though it has an appearance of reality. It is not Being, for, then it would be identical with the absolute, nor is it non-being, for, then it would not be the *fact* or the 'given' of experience. It is the continuous flow of a transitory and shadowy form of existence which eludes our attempt to logically determine and make a categorical assertion regarding it. The author of the *Yogavasishtha* has laid down a classification of men, (1) as truth-seers (सत्यदर्शी), to whom the order of empirical existence possesses no meaning or value, and to whom the world of modes, forms and names has ceased to exist, (2) as seekers after truth (विवेकी), to whom the order of empirical existence appears as mysterious, as something not purely being

nor purely non-being, which appears real without really being so, and (3) as the ignorant, to whom the objects of experience are the only realities. So long as we do not feel the truth of identity the realm of appearance has a hold upon us; but the more we think about it, the more it appears as something which cannot be identified with the absolute, nor can be totally denied in experience. It must occupy an intermediate place between Being and non-Being.

We conclude then: By the truth of Being we understand something that can never cease to be, that which exists in itself and for ever in one mode of being. It is Existence, it pervades all concrete forms. When the modes cease to be, the essence of being cannot perish.

Just opposed to this essence of Existence, the Vedantists maintain that there is something purely imaginary, generally called *asat*. It has no existence, nor can any existence of it be conceived, though it may have a name, e.g., the sky-flower. Midway between pure Being (सत्) and imaginary existence (असत्) there lies an intermediary existence, called Appearance (सदसत्). It is illusory show of Existence. It is not real. It is false. An idea or an appearance is false when it is supposed to be really existent, but on closer examination is seen to possess a form by which it passes for that which it is not. A thing must appear before we can declare it to be false. For, that which does not appear cannot be said to be either true or false. Even that which is really false must appear, and, for the moment, must be supposed as real though it is not really so. "Falsity or error are relations that imply existences,

Being, non-being and becoming.

which having reality of one kind claim another which they have not. All things are called false, or called so, because they claim a place or property which they do not possess. *They must exist in order to be false*" (Bosanquet—Essentials of Logic).

The entirety of empirical existence, from the Vedantic standpoint, has a falsity of appearance. It is, therefore, not true, and can be subsequently denied by the transcendent knowledge of identity.

A problem creeps up : how to explain this empirical show of existence. *Vedantism* is an exclusive attempt to establish the Identity of Being by the negation of appearances, and consequently to Vedantism the process of becoming is not a problem for solution.¹ A solution has, no doubt, been offered but this is not to be taken seriously. Nobody can clearly understand, and offer a solution to the falsity of appearance.

Even if *Vedantism* does not ascribe any permanence or objectivity, in the sense of existing by itself, to the mass of empirical facts, still it may be asked whence this appearance arises. Since this appearance is a fact, it must have some cause. The appearance has, no doubt, a meaning to one before whom it appears. This one is the conscious self, but consciousness is static existence, and cannot be conceived as causing appearances to its own self. Although the appearance has, therefore, a meaning in reference to consciousness, still its originative ground is not to be sought in the integrity of

To *Vedantism* the origin and the cause of appearance is not strictly a problem.

Still an explanation regarding it is offered in the hypothesis of *Maya*.

¹ न हि सृष्टिवाक्यानां सृष्टौ तात्पर्यं किन्त्वङ्गवे ब्रह्मणि एव ।

consciousness. Hence, in order to explain the fact of experience, the hypothesis of Nescience, as causing appearances upon the permanent background, has been accepted in an empirical sense. This Nescience is innate in us hiding from us the full view of our conscious life. It cannot absolutely shut up the ultimate fact of the consciousness of existence from view. For, its very knowledge supposes the existence of consciousness as the most ultimate and the most positive fact. It has produced only a partial ignorance, in so far as it shuts up from view the nature of consciousness as bliss and undivided existence and as being identified with the inmost essence of our being. We may

here conveniently enter into a comparative study of the systems of *Vedanta* and Spinoza. Both begin with the concept of Being as that which does not know any determination. Spinoza has two conceptions of Substance, as (1) transcending all attributes, and (2) the centre of infinite attributes. It is, no doubt, difficult for Spinoza to explain the logic of connexion between these two conceptions. In fact, in Spinoza's Philosophy there is no clear thinking as to how the transcendental substance is made the centre of infinite attributes and modes. *Natura Naturans* and *Natura Naturata* represent the same Being from two standpoints, but we do not get in Spinoza's Philosophy how these two aspects of substance are reconciled, and can be retained as equally plausible conceptions regarding it. If we insist that substance is unmodified existence, how can we in the same breath make this indeterminate substance the basis or support of infinite attributes. Between Spinoza's Absolute and Spinoza's substance of infinite attributes we do not find any logical clue, though Spinoza seems to retain both of them in his conception of substance. The

Vedanta and Spinoza—a comparison.

Philosophy of Vedanta is frank in its confession upon this point. It emphasises the oneness of Being and attempts to establish it by the denial (in a transcendental sense) of the substance of infinite attributes, to use Spinoza's terms. It proves clearly that, in the transcendental oneness of being, manifoldness cannot remain. Brahman-in-itself is one undivided being, though it appears as many—the totality of existence. This appearance does not pertain to the nature of Being. It is due to Nescience innate in every one of us. Standing on the vantage-ground of transcendent Existence, it is no doubt difficult to explain the cosmic process, its origin and development. Spinoza's Philosophy has no clear solution of the problem. Vedantism has offered a solution in the doctrine of *Maya* which is supposed to be the material or originative cause of the infinite modes of existences. *Natura Naturata* is not innate in Substance; it is innate in Nescience. The *Vedantin* has two Gods, (1) God as Absolute or transcendental Intelligence (Brahman), and (2) God in relation to the world or as conditioning the world, to which is related the principle of individuation, the limiting principle (*Maya*), through which the one becomes many. This emergence of the infinite process of becoming from *Brahman* through *Maya* is figuratively described as the *Lila* of *Brahman*. Such a description suffices to

The Doctrine of *Lila*
the meaning and
significance.

indicate the true nature of becoming, for it does not seek to represent the reality as it is, but, only as it appears. Our volitional and emotional nature may demand the conception of a being superior in power and wisdom, and the tendency of ourselves, so long as we remain on the empirical level of consciousness, is to interpret the process of becoming as an expression of loving sacrifice by the divine of his own being

for the sake of the created being. The *Vedantists* may say that it is a pragmatic necessity and a pragmatic satisfaction that requires us to conceive the absolute as a personal existence fulfilling the demands of love and devotion. It should be marked here that the very essence of *Lila* lies in ignorance of the real thing, for, *Lila* means sportive or playful activity which can never reveal the thing in its true colour before us, but draws up a picture for which we cannot assert any particular reason, and which is merely an appearance suitable to the capacity and understanding, and fulfilling the purpose, of one to whom it does appear, and does not represent the real nature of Being. *Lila* is, therefore, real to one to whom it appears, but has no serious meaning to the one who sportively assumes that appearance. It is spontaneous with *Brahman*.¹ In fact, it appears to be the effect of a free self-imposed limitation without impairing in the least the integrity of the absolute. The vast range of empirical existence is an incomplete expression of the Absolute. There are moments in our life when we come face to face with experiences too deep for words, experiences of sweetness and joy in visions that are uncommon and rare in life ; but since they are appearances they are transitory in their nature and effect, and should be regarded as belonging to

¹ *Vide* Br. Sutra II, ch. I, 33.

एवं ईश्वरस्याप्यनपेक्ष्य किञ्चित् प्रयोजनान्तरं स्वभावादेव केवलं लीलारूपा प्रवृत्तिर्भविष्यति ।

Vide *Brahma-vidyavaran.* p. 461, Kumbhokonam Edition.

यथा भोजनशयनादिरूपा स्वाभाविकीचेष्टा प्रयोजनोद्देशपूर्विका भवति, नैवं परमात्मनः सृष्टिरित्यभिप्रायेण । माण्डुक्ये प्रतिचेष्ट्यः क्रीडापचोऽपि यथा वन-विहारादिरूपा ईषतप्रयोजनोद्देशपूर्विका भवति, नैवं परमात्मनः सृष्टिरित्यभि-प्रायेण प्रयोजनोद्देशरहितया स्वभावरूपा वा क्रीडारूपा वा परमात्मनः सृष्टिरिति श्रुतिद्वय पर्यालोचनया पर्यवसितोऽर्थः ।

the process of manifestation. The Absolute is superpersonal or impersonal in reality. It is personal when it is looked as the unity in which all the details of experience are embraced and pervaded. From the empirical standpoint the absolute includes them as elements of its own fullness. *Vedantism* possesses these two conceptions of the Absolute, but it keeps in the notion of it as the transcendent oneness to the exclusion of the conception of the absolute as the unity of life and consciousness. It sees clearly the two aspects of the absolute existence—transcendence and immanence—but, instead of reconciling them, it lays more emphasis upon the transcendence of Being, and regards the immanence as relative to innate ignorance and the experiences contained therein. In this *Vedantism* is more logical and consistent than Bradley who seems anxious to retain the conception of the absolute as both impersonal and personal. The same principle cannot be thought of as the unity of experiences and at the same time completely and exclusively impersonal. It does not convey any clear sense. No doubt the absolute as personal may be immanent as well as transcendent. But this is hardly in keeping with Bradley. *Vedantism* begins with the æsthetic-teleological conception of experience, but ultimately breaks with it to establish the complete transcendence of Being. Theology is lost in metaphysics.

We can conveniently for the sake of continuity of discourse retrace our line of thinking. Truth is Being. Being is absolute and relative: the relative is an appearance: the appearance is the *Lila* of *Brahman* through *Maya*. What then is *Maya*? What is its nature? *Maya* may be regarded as the principle of individuation, a force, a power revealing the world of forms and modes. It has two

Maya.

forms : the will to manifest and preserve, and the will to destroy. The former brings out the order of existence in space, time and causality in appearance. The latter, when the time for the involution of the cosmic process arrives, begins to work in the contrary direction until the state of a temporary rest and quiescence of existence is reached. These processes of evolution and involution though different are at bottom expressions of the same principle, *Will*. We read in the *Upanishads* that Brahman *wills* (तदेतद् बहुधां प्रजायेति) to be many. Will has thus been the originative cause of the empirical order. But we must not confound *Vedantism* with the system of Schopenhauer which makes willing the ultimate reality existing beyond the empirical order. Though we find in his system a form of will called not-willing expressive of the highest form of denial (the cessation of existence), still we cannot consider it to be identical with the *Vedantic* conception of Reality, for, in *Vedantism* the ultimate being is not willing but pure consciousness. Willing and not-willing are attributes that can be ascribed to *Brahman* as manifesting or destroying, but not to Transcendent Existence. No doubt, as the effect of the negative form of will, we may reach a state of perfect calmness and tranquillity, but such a state of will-less bliss can hardly be logically described as a mode of willing. Moral or religious life presupposes a readiness to sacrifice, and it is only a preliminary condition to reach the state of will-less Bliss. Where we have the complete denial of every form of willing, we are said to have reached the state of transcendent Existence. Willing is essentially energising. It is the root cause of the empirical order, but it cannot possess a transcendent Existence. Even the attempt to realise such a state of transcendent existence is a form of willing, and is equally empirical in existence.

In the *Upanishads* we have the conception of *Maya* as the principle of individuation—the power of one becoming many. From the close study of *Śankar's* writings, we can clearly indicate his tendency of regarding *Maya* as the principle of individuation inherent in Brahman, which in itself transcends it, and is in nature transcendental.¹ The neo-Vedantists after *Śankar* have used the word *Maya* or *Avidya* in epistemological and ontological sense. And they are emphatic in their declaration that it is a principle co-existing with *Brahman* from eternity though not everlasting in the sense of enduring for ever, for it is destroyed by the light of knowledge, e.g., the second aphorism of *Brahma Sutra* has been interpreted by *Śankar* in a way throwing light upon the *Saguna* conception of Brahman, but it has been interpreted by the Neo-Vedantist—the Author of *Kalpataru*, as indicating and involving in it the conception of *Brahman* as *Nirguna*. From this we can infer that in *Śankar*, the *Saguna* conception has a place and importance of its own, but the later and more systematic *Advaita Vedantism* has thrown it overboard and fixed itself directly to the transcendent. (But it must be noticed that *Śankar* ultimately has laid the supreme stress upon the conception of *Brahman* as *Nirguna*, transcendent.)

The existence of Nescience is known to consciousness, not in its integrity, for it is non-relational, but known to it as a witnessing intelligence. It is the object of consciousness

¹ Vide Br. Su. II, 1, Aphorisms 14 and 18, *Sankar Bhasya*.

शक्तिश्च कारणस्य कार्यनियमार्था कल्प्यमाना नान्या नाप्यसती च कार्यं
नियच्छेत् असत्त्वाविशेषादन्यत्त्वाविशेषाच्च । तस्मात् कारणस्य आत्मभूताशक्तिः
शक्तेश्चात्मभूतं कार्यम् ।

as witness (साक्षि चेतन्):¹ It may be compared to a fog or mist which is made manifest by the sun which it covers from view.

Again Nescience, though taken to be real, since it is an object of perception, cannot be regarded as identical with the Absolute reality or having a co-eternal existence with Brahman, for it is seen to lose its existence as soon as the knowledge of identity is obtained. Ignorance to the Vedantists is an intermediate reality between being and non-being. It is not being in the absolute sense, nor non-being or a negation of existence, as it is causing appearance on Reality. The product of *Avidya* (just like *Avidya* itself), since it is felt and perceived, cannot fail to make impression upon us as real and not purely imaginary. They are real in the sense of being objects of sensuous perception, unreal in the sense of not existing transcendently in one mode of Being, for, Truth, to the *Vedantists*, is existence in a changeless state of Being. And even if we conceive *Brahman* as the cause and the ground of empirical order we cannot ascribe to it the same amount of reality with *Brahman*, for, that would mean the equality of cause and effect. But such a doctrine, the equality of cause and effect, according to the Vedantists, does not always hold good (*vide* the discussion of the *Vedantic* Theory of causation).

Nescience or *Avidya* has been defined in the *Citsukhi*² as something which has no definite beginning in time,

¹ राहुवत् स्वाहत चैतन् प्रकाश्याविद्या इति ।

Adwaita Siddhi.

² अनादिभावरूपं यदविज्ञानेन विलीयते । तदज्ञानमिति प्रज्ञालक्षणम्
संप्रचक्षते—*Citsukhi*, p. 75.

which appears as real, but which disappears with the truth of knowledge.¹ The author of the *Panchadasi* regards it

The exact determination of the nature of Nescience.

((नित्तत्त्वा कार्यगम्या) as an existence knowable through effects. In itself it is spurious. The above definition is neither partial nor wide. All kinds

of ignorance, whether primary or secondary, have these three marks—(1) their causes are not known, in this sense they have no definite beginning (अनादि), (2) they produce something which possesses an appearance of reality, and (3) this appearance loses itself with its root-cause on the acquisition of knowledge. This is illustrated in every form of misrepresentation due to ignorance, e.g., a rope-serpent. The false appearance of the serpent is, no doubt, due to our ignorance of the existence of the rope. Some may contend that in the mistaken notion of a rope-serpent we have not a case of ignorance which has no definite beginning, and this fails to satisfy one of the above characters, viz., the indefinite beginning of *Avidya* (अनादि). The reply would be that the ignorance regarding the rope is a concrete expression of that innate ignorance which has kept truth from our view. The definition is not wide as

¹ This definition has been somewhat modified, e.g., by the authors of the *Vedantasara* and the *Tattwanusandhan* in the light of the *Sankhya* system, and it involves the *Sankhya* terminology—*Avidya* is something mysterious, not *sat* nor *asat* (real nor non-real) but different from both, being composed of *satwa*, *rajas* and *tamas*. Curiously enough, we have also some such definition of *Maya* or *Ajnana* in the *Viveka-cudamani* of *Sankara*. It has been characterised as *Anirvachaniya*, neither real nor non-real, nor both—something really strange and mysterious, but one that is destroyed by the knowledge of Identity. It has three *gunas*—*Satwa*, *Rajas* and *Tamas* (Slokas 110-112). From the nature of *Maya* as *mysterious*, the philosophy of Vedantism in its latest development has been styled by the author of the *Khandan Khandakhādyā* the *Anirvarchga Vādā*.

it does not signify any other thing but Nescience or *Avidya*, for all things, excepting *Brahman*, are the products of it, so that we can conceive none of them as ultimately real.

Avidya does not imply negation of knowledge or consciousness. It is not the prior non-existence of knowledge, for, we cannot conceive the prior non-existence and its opposite to be existing simultaneously.

Avidya is not the negation of knowledge.

Similarly we cannot possibly think of *Ajnana* and *Jnana* as mutually opposed to each other, for, two such opposites cannot exist together; nor can we conceive one as the complete negation of the other, in this case the possibility of knowledge of *Ajnana* will be completely denied. *It is to be conceived as something different from consciousness but not completely opposed to it.* The author of the *Adwaita Chinta Kaustava* has rightly characterised it as generally opposed to knowledge. But it is not the contradictory or denial of it.¹ It is not to be taken in negative sense, for, in that case, it cannot be regarded as the material cause of the universe.²

This *Ajnana* has three elements in its constitution—*Satwa*, *Rajas*, *Tamas*. When the *Satwa* is predominant it is said to possess the *Jnana Sakti* (सत्तात् संजायते ज्ञानं) when the *rajas* and the *tamas* are prevailing it is said to possess the *Kriya Sakti*. The *Kriya Sakti* has two properties—(1) *Abarana* or obscuration—the power of covering Identity from view, and (2) *Vikshepa* or Distention—the

¹ अज्ञानं तु ज्ञानसामान्यविरोधि, सत्तात् ज्ञानसामान्यविरोधिभावरूप-
मज्ञानमवश्यमङ्गीकृतव्यम् ।

² *Adwaita Chandrika*, p. 6.

power of originating the illusive phantasmagoria of the phenomenal order. The former is due to the predominance of *tamas*, the latter, to the predominance of *rajas*.¹

Apart from this our attention is drawn to darkness as an instance to the point under consideration. This term is generally accepted as a negative one implying the absence of light. But, on a closer observation, it appears to be more positive in nature in the sense of being perceived. It is not mere absence of light, but something which is thought as holding off all objects from view. A mere negative term implies *absence* of something. It is understood only in thought, but can never be the object of perception, or be conceived as keeping away everything from view. We feel darkness as an *existence*, covering up the entire existence from view. It is not merely a concept of negation, but it is a percept, a substance. Curiously enough we find that some *Nxiyayikas* accept it as a tenth substance (दशमद्रव्य) and do not include it under the category of non-being.²

Of such an existence of *Avidya* we have experience in our own life. Sometimes we are heard to say "I do not know the thing, you speak of" "I was sleeping, I did not know anything." In such cases we are always clearly conscious of the co-existence of knowledge and ignorance.

¹ Adwaita Chinta Kaustava, p. 32.

अज्ञानस्यशक्तिर्द्विविधा, ज्ञानशक्तिः क्रियाशक्तिश्चेति । रजस्तमोभ्यामनभिभूतं सत्त्वं ज्ञानशक्तिः । सत्त्वेनानभिभूते रजस्तमसौ क्रियाशक्तिः । क्रियाशक्तिर्द्विविधा, आवरणशक्तिर्विचेप शक्तिश्चेति रजस्सत्त्वाभ्यामनभिभूतं तमः आवरणशक्तिः । तदुक्तम् " कृष्णं तम आवरणात्मकत्वादिति " साचनास्ति न प्रकाशत इति व्यवहारहेतुः । तथाचोक्तम् नाभाति नास्ति कुठस्य इत्यापादनमाहत्तिरिति । तमस्सत्त्वाभ्यामनभिभूतं रजो विचेपशक्तिः ।

² (Vide Citsukhi, pp. 27-29, Chap. I, Tukaram Jivaji's edition.)

There is no ignorance in knowledge, though knowledge can reveal to us such an existence.

Evidence of consciousness regarding Avidya.

In this sense *Brahman* is said to be the resting ground of *Avidya*.

In this sense, again, it is said to be illuminating and expressing *Avidya*. There is no relation between *Brahman* and *Ajnana* in philosophic sense. In the transcendental integrity of being there can be no *Avidya* as the principle of becoming. But, so long as we judge through the empirical mode of thinking, we often think and think truly that the principle of differentiation is in it. Really this is thinking of *Brahman* on human analogy. *Brahman* is represented as designing the universe through *Maya*. It has no direct relation with anything, for, any other thing, besides it, does not exist. But so long as the empirical order asserts its existence we can offer no better explanation than that the universe is originated from *Brahman* through *Maya*. *Madhusudhan Saraswati* says¹ :—

“*Brahman* is conceived as a designer in the sense of being the support of design.” This conception does not affect its purity of Being, for, as Being, it is understood in transcendent sense ; as a designer, in the empirical sense.

The empirical conception then (of *Brahman* as creating and destroying the world-process through *Maya*) is a mere indication of its existence, but it does not reveal its essential nature. *Brahman* appears in ignorance as a Being in

The real significance of the empirical conception.

which the entire expanse of existence is centred, but the more we approach it and realise its nature, the more the expanse of existence gradually

fades away from vision until it completely vanishes.

¹ कल्पकत्वं हि कल्पना प्रति चार्थत्वं विषयत्वं भासकत्वं वा । सर्वं कल्पना समसत्ताकत्वेन श्रुत्वा व्याघातकम् । — *Advaita Siddhi*.

But such an existence does not find acceptance on all hands. Whatever has no definite origin must not have definite end. Whatever has no definite beginning in time must necessarily be an existence which has no end in time.

The *Vedantin* would reply that no such rule can be laid down. We have an illustration to the point in prior non-existence (प्रागभाव). Nobody can argue with any degree of plausibility that the instance is an illustration having no direct bearing upon the matter, inasmuch as it is referring to a negative form of existence, for, to the *Naiyayikas*, non-being is as much a reality as any form of being. It is accepted as one of the ultimate categories. And, moreover, what is this non-being? We do not understand it as such, we understand it as something existing (the support) implying the absence of a particular thing (the supported), e.g., the non-existence of pot. It has always a reference to the locus.¹

The above exposition, we hope, will elucidate the sense in which the *Vedantists* deny the reality of the world, and yet assert its essential non-difference from *Brahman*. The two propositions are in fact only two aspects of the same truth. The *Chhandogya Upanishad* says (सन्मूलाः सौम्येनाः प्रजाः सदायतनाः सत्प्रतिष्ठाः). "Oh modest one, these created beings have their root, habitation and support in the Real." *Sureswaracharjya* writes in his *Swarajyasiddhi*, "The world has come out of 'Sat,' abides in 'Sat,' and loses itself in 'Sat'; so the entire world is real, but viewed apart from *Sat*, is false."²

¹ भावान्तरमभावो हि कयाचित्तुव्यपेक्षया—इति भावान्तरमभावोन्वो न कश्चिद-
निरूपणात्—*Nyayamakorando*, p. 86 (*vide* Chap. 3—*Abhava*).

न अभावी नाम भावादन्वः कश्चित् अपितु भाव एव । भावान्तरात्मनाऽभावः
स्वरूपेण तु भावः ।

² सत् प्रसृतं इदं सति स्थितं अस्तमेति सति स्वतः सत्तया परिहीय मित्यखिलं
सदेव पृथक् स्या ।

It will thus appear that the world is unreal in itself, real in the sense of identical with existence. But the reality of the world thus understood does not contradict its empirical reality. The ignorant can see the empirical forms

but not the Reality, and they interpret the forms as real. Such a tendency of mistaking the form for the reality or the reality for the form is generally known in Vedantism as *Adhyasa* or Super-imposition. Super-imposition consists in not seeing a thing as it is, and in placing upon it a different picture and construction. Super-imposition or *Adhyasa* is mal-observation implying the ignorance of something and the extension of a false idea to an actual appearance. It is a mis-judgment of the data presented to the senses by a pre-conceived idea. It is purely a subjective construction bearing no correspondence to the reality. This construction possesses a temporary value so long as the subject remains under a delusion. But it has always a reference to this something presented and is possible only when we have a *dim* perception of an object implying neither absolute ignorance nor absolute knowledge of the thing.

Whenever we mistake one thing for another, the fact, as a mere existence, must appear before us, though, for the time being, its special nature must be out of sight. No sooner we do perceive such a fact as a fact only, than the mind confuses it with a false notion on the ground of superficial similarity. Rightly says *Vacaspati* (अव्यन्तवद्दे अव्यन्तवद्दे न चाध्यासः) whenever one thing is before our full view, or whenever it is entirely hidden, there is no chance of confusion. Ignorance cannot shut up from our view the fact wholly, but it can do so only partially, so that there can be no difficulty in understanding that a fact exists. Ignorance is in need of a basis (as if) to operate

and so long as the operation continues, the fact is wrongly interpreted but not altogether denied. It must be pointed out that whenever we mistake one thing for another, the mistaken notion is not to be supposed as existing in mind ; it becomes rather identified with the thing and the fact of observation. For, even in perceptual judgment the form becomes identified with the matter, the mistaken notion with the reality. And the sense of externality is grafted upon the notion due to the mental consciousness taking the form of the external object. When we mistake a rope for a snake, we, for the time being, are clearly impressed by the fact as existing outside of us and being the object of sense-perception. Such a false perception must be distinguished from a memory-image, which is revived by the laws of similarity and association. A memory-image is a mental existence and has no reference to anything outer. And so long as it is known as a memory-image, there is no possibility of its being confused with any fact of perception, for, they are quite distinct from each other. The possibility of confusion can never arise when we know clearly an image to be a memory-image, for it has a fixed reference in the mental continuum. To say that false perceptions are due to the confusion between a memory-image and an object owing to non-discrimination is quite fallacious. So long as we know any particular image to be revived by the law of similarity or of association, we know it to be a fact of memory, and we cannot take the percept of yonder object for a memory-image or *vice versa*. In case of false perceptions our ignorance of the real nature of the object together with the innate tendencies in us present a false appearance before us, and the mysterious power of *Avidya* represents such an object as existing before us. Indeed, in such cases something mysteriously comes to be conceived as existing

outside of us due to Ignorance, which not only conceals the real nature of the thing, but holds up before us a false appearance, which, as appearance, has a meaning to the percipient subject, though it is referred to yonder object as if existing independently and objectively. In false perception we have an entirely different appearance of the presented object. This is the inner meaning of the definition of super-imposition as given by Śāṅkara.¹ The import of this definition is that *Avidya* puts before us something which appears as an entirely new thing, the similar of which might have been perceived previously, but not the particular thing itself. It is entirely a *new creation*. We read in the *Panchapādikā*² “the thing seems to be like a memory-image without really being so, as it has the appearance of existing outside.” The *Vedantin* is anxious to characterise such an appearance as mysteriously real affecting our emotional and volitional nature. Its value for the time being establishes its so-called truth. And it is supposed as real only because it appears, and the prospect of its being useful seems to establish its apparent reality. So long as we are under the spell of ignorance any effort to understand the contrary is futile. But when one gets the true knowledge of the thing, the appearance vanishes away leaving an impression that it never existed, that it was entirely a fanciful creation.

There are some thinkers who contend that when the false appearance is denied (*e.g.* rope-serpent), the serpent does not of necessity go out of existence altogether: the mistaken notion identifying the rope and the serpent is lost—we no longer take the rope as the serpent, but the

¹ अतिरूपः परत्र पूर्वदृष्टावभासः

² अर्थमात्ररूपमिदं रूपमस्य न पुनः कार्यते, एवं स्पष्टं पुरोऽवस्थितत्वावभासनात् ।

rope as the rope. But this does not mean that the notion or existence of the serpent is completely destroyed.

The *Vedantin* submits that when a rope is mistaken for a snake, this snake is not a memory-image (as noticed above). It is not to be confounded with experiences of things seen before. These experiences are within us, but, in a false perception we see an entirely new appearance before us, so that there is no possibility of confusion between the newly presented object and the experience of an object seen before. We have already seen how *Avidya* is conceived as holding up before our view an appearance which, for the time being, is supposed real and is indicated as existing outside as the object of sense-perception. *Avidya* not only keeps away the reality from view, but creates an entirely new appearance which is not to be taken as the reappearance of something perceived. It is, as *Vacaspati* says, not the silver of the market that we see in false appearance, but something entirely new on yonder mother-of-pearl,—a novel appearance in a definite point of space and time. This spatial and temporal mark is sufficient to signify its existence as different from a similar object perceived in a different place at a different time. When this particular appearance is declared false, it is never meant by the *Vedantists* that the entire existence, serpent or silver, should cease to exist. The point of reference does not belong to either of them, but only to the particular appearance before us. That other ropes exist is not to the point, for we never think of them and they actually do not appear. The rope that we see is not purely imaginary, nor purely real—it is a mysterious something, relatively real and non-real. Such a theory is known as the doctrine of *mysterious conception*.

In this connexion we should notice another matter that even a false appearance requires an objective basis, a

substratum which is not necessarily false. An appearance by itself cannot exist, it implies a support. The appearance may be false, but not the support. *Padmapada* truly says—"A super-imposition without a basis is neither seen, nor conceivable."¹

Herein, does the *Vedantin* differ from the *Śūnyavadins*, according to whom the entire existence is a false show upon

The Vedantic conception differs from (1) the *Asat Khyativāda*.

nothing. Such a theory of transference or false appearance is to be distinguished from (1) the *Asat Khyativāda*—the doctrine which maintains that the object of false perception is entirely non-existent. False perception consists in seeing things which do not exist. The silver does not exist, yet we seem to perceive it. Both the object and the knowledge of the object are fanciful and imaginary. They are non-existent. The support, too, does not exist.

Such a position is hardly tenable, for, a fact entirely non-existent cannot be an object of perception. And since we are clearly conscious of the existence of silver as the object of our perception, how can we consistently speak of such an appearance as altogether non-existing? We have already said that a false appearance must be existing anyhow. That which appears can be declared false and subsequently denied; mere non-existence does not appear, nor can it be denied and declared false.²

(2) The *Akhyativāda*—which maintains that false perception is due to non-discrimination of two elements that are clearly different, *i.e.*, the thing perceived is taken to be identical with the

¹ नहि निरविद्वानोऽध्यासो दृष्टपूर्वः संभवीव।

² एकान्तसतस्वर्यसाम्यातिरिति न पेशलम्। चाकाशानलिनीपद्मवादेरप्रतिभासनात्.

image revived by superficial similarity.¹ When a tree is mistaken for a man, we have a false identification between the percept of tree and the image of man. The process underlying such a mistaken identity involves the following elements² :—

- (a) The presentation of something (A).
- (b) The non-cognition of the real nature of the thing thus presented through the defect of the senses.
- (c) The revival of images (B) of other things through superficial similarity.
- (d) The failure of the mind to cognise it as a memory image and this helps to hold it up as something presented, rather than represented.
- (e) The confusion of the presentation and the representation, and the fallacy of mistaking one for the other.

This theory of transference cannot be accepted. If we are clearly conscious of the object as existing y nder, and the image as something revived, how can we speak of a confusion between them due to non-discrimination. So long as we have a knowledge of *grahan* (perception) and *smaran* (remembrance) how can we mistakenly identify these apparently different elements. The discrimination is quite clear. Hence the object of false perception cannot be taken as the revived image or idea of anything. It is something entirely new.

And the possibility of the denial of a false percept implies the actual appearance of it, for, we cannot be supposed to deny something which does not

¹ *Vide Nyaya Makarando*, p. 57, विवेकाग्रहमात्रं विज्ञानानां तत्ज्ञेयानां विभ्रमः. *Vide Nyaya Manjari*, p. 176 स्वरूपेण चाप्रतिभासमानायां श्रुतावनुभवस्वरूपयोर्विवेको न गृहीतोभवतीत्यग्रहणमख्यतिरुच्यते।

² *Vide Nyaya Makarando*, p. 57 (Benares Edition).

appear.¹ And if it is held that we can deny even that which does not appear, then why do we not deny gold instead of silver? According to this doctrine, then we cannot be said to deny the existence of silver necessarily. We can note the difference which was not formerly taken into cognisance.²

(3) *The Atma-Khyativada*.—It maintains that all perceptions are states of consciousness.

(3) *The Atma-khyati-vada*. Besides these, nothing exists outside of us. In false perception, it must also be maintained, to be consistent, that the false appearance is also a state in consciousness. Its falsity consists in the appearance of an inner state as external. The *Vijnanavadin* seems to think that if one maintains the outer existence of silver upon the substratum, one is to accept the possibility of a denial of both the elements (for, according to him, the substratum has no external and independent existence, for, nothing exists external to mind). It is rather convenient to think of the silver as a state in consciousness which is projected outwards. And the falsity is exactly contained therein—in the appearance of an inner state of consciousness as external. When the false cognition is contradicted we do not deny the silver which is real as a state in consciousness, but deny the sense of externality which was grafted upon it—the virtue of its being indicated as existing yonder.³ But, in false perception we are clearly conscious of the object being presented before us as existing yonder. It may be asked: how is it that an inner state seems to appear outwards, as

¹ Vide Adwaita Siddhanta Muktabali: प्रसक्तस्यार्थं निषेधः अननुभूतं त्वप्रसक्तमपि प्रतिषिध्यमानं रजतमिव कनकमपि किंपिति न प्रतिषिध्यते ।

² नञ्चनेन रजतनिषेधो विधीयते, किं तु प्रागग्रह्यतो विवेकः प्रख्याप्यते ।

³ Vide Nyaya Makarando, p. 100, ज्ञानाकारस्यैव वह्निरवभासो विद्यमः

if acquiring some degree of objectivity. Is it because of the projection outwards of a state of consciousness or do we seem to graft externality upon an inner subjective state of existence?

We cannot accept either alternative because anything externally and objectively existing is not accepted by the *Vijnanavadin*. In fact, those to whom the states of consciousness in continuous succession are the only reality cannot speak of anything outer. If still it is insisted on that there is confusion, it can only be the confusion of one conscious state with another. But in such a case we cannot say "yonder exists the silver." And if we say that there is only the one reality of the stream of conscious states and processes, the consciousness of silver will be a state in the totality of conscious states. It will be something identical with the percipient subject or a part of its being. That being so, we must characterise the appearance as something within us,¹ but not, as is generally said—this is silver.²

(4) The *Anyatha Khyativad*—which consists in the superimposition of qualities of one object on another through ignorance.³

The *Anyātha*
Khyātivad.

When we mistake the mother-of-pearl for silver, we read into it the qualities of silver and the object appears as silver without really being so. The real cause of such a false percept is a defect in the sense

¹ Vide *Nyaya Mukarando*, p. 65 (Benares Edition).

² विज्ञानात्मनो हि प्रतिभासे अहं रजतमिति प्रतीतिः स्यात् नेदं रजतमिति । नेदं रजतमिति च बाधानुभवस्येदन्तात्मावापवादानादप्युपपत्तौ न रजतगोचर-
चित्ता, तथा सति रजतस्य धर्मिणो धर्मस्य चेदन्ताया वाधे गौरवात् । तथा च प्रतिषिद्धेदंकारास्यद भावमान्तर ज्ञानरूपमवतिष्ठते ।

³ Vide *Vivarana Prameya Sangraha*, p. 33 :

देशकालान्तरगतं हि रजतं शक्तिसंप्रयुक्तेन दीपीपहितेन्द्रियेण शक्त्यात्मना गृह्यते । न चैवमननुभूतस्यापि गृह्यप्रसङ्गः, सादृश्यादेर्नियामकत्वात् ।

which fails to represent exactly the thing lying at a distance. The senses merely record the superficial quality of brilliancy which, by the laws of revival (especially by similarity), calls up in the mind the residual or the permanent impression of silver. As soon as the connotation of silver (रजतत्व) is revived in mind, we have the perception of silver as the underlying¹ substratum of the connoted quality, for the quality of a thing and the thing itself are indissolubly related. And this perception extends over all forms of silver in different places. Though the silver has not been presented to the senses, still it has become the object of knowledge inherent in self connected with mind and senses. (स्वसंयुक्त-मन-संयुक्त-आत्मसमचेतज्ञानविषयत्व). The possibility of perceiving the silver, not presented to the senses, lies in the indirect implication of a direct knowledge—in holding the possibility, of one knowledge giving rise to another by invariable association, of a connotation immediately bringing in view the substratum or subject. The falsity consists in perceiving the silver not where it really exists but in yonder object. The real silver exists in another place, but it is superimposed for the time being upon the mother-of-pearl. Hence, it is said, falsity lies in taking one thing for another. The

¹युक्तिशकलमेव कामलादिदोषदुषित लोचनालोचितमर्थान्तरं रजतात्मनावभासत इति, नचनेदं रजतमिति वाधावबोधवशात् असत्तैवात्यन्तिकौ रजतश्चेति साम्प्रतम्, सखलु सन्निरुद्धितेदंकारास्यदतादात्म्यनिषेधात् असन्निरुद्धिततानेवास्यार्थादापादयति न पुनरात्यन्तिकीमसत्तां, यद्धि यथा प्रतिभासते तत्तथैवेत्यौक्त्युक्तिर्गोत्यायः ; अन्यथा-भावत्वस्य बलवद्वाधकोपनिपातवशादाश्रयणीयः ; सचेदिदंकारास्यदतादात्म्यनिषेधास्योपपन्नः कुतः पुनरस्यप्रसक्तप्रतिषेधे परिशेषतः प्रसिद्धा प्रदेसान्तर सत्वमप-हृत्यते, तथाच इत्यपिरिक्तावाचो युक्तिः, युक्ति शकलमेव अनाकलित निजाकारस्व-नेत्रदोषवशादेव रजताकारिणापरोक्ष-प्रतिभास-गोचर भावाभ्युपगमात् ।

Naiyāikas maintain a kind of relation between silver and itself. The relation is called *Tadatmya*, i.e., every relation implies two terms, but in the present case the silver is conceived to be related to the silver. In false perception it seems to be related to yonder object whereas it should have been related to silver. The falsity consists in the ascription of silver, not to silver, but to the mother-of-pearl. The superficial similarity, the distance of the object, and the defect of the senses are ultimately the causes of such a false ascription. The distance keeps the object far from us, the defective senses do not give an exact knowledge of the thing, and in its ignorance lies the possibility of either attributing to it the different nature of silver or mistaking it for silver which has been the direct object of consciousness by an indirect implication.¹ The *Naiyāikas* differ from the *Pravakaras* in insisting upon the presence of silver as the third element in false perception. They seem to hold that unless such a reality is presented, nobody would walk after it led by a desire of obtaining it, for, a state of desire without an object of desire is inconceivable. The mother-of-pearl must appear as silver before one can think and will to have it. It must be carefully marked that from this standpoint the confusion consists in the superimposition of a different thing upon another through an imperfect similarity (अनागत आलम्बनमन्यत्र प्रतीतिः—Nyaya Manjari). *Sankar* had this theory in mind when he wrote (यच्चयत् अध्वाससस्यैव विपरीतधर्मत्वकल्पनामसत्ते) “confusion or transference consists in ascribing to an object a quality which it does not possess.” But when one comes to see the actual presence

¹ तन्माद्दोषकलुषितादिन्द्रियात् पुरोऽवस्थितधर्मिगतविकोशत्वादिविशेषा वमर्शकौशल्यूनत्वात् सामान्यधर्मसङ्घचरितपदार्थान्तरगतविशेषस्वरणोपकृतात् भवति विपरीतप्रत्ययः ।

of the mother-of-pearl or of the snake, the false appearance of the substratum is denied, but this does not imply the negation of the silver or the rope. The illustration of the rope-serpent does not prove and support the Vedantic claim, for, the rope remains after all a rope.

This theory is hardly true, and it makes the matter complex by seeking the possibility of a knowledge through another, by introducing the mysterious element of *Jnanlakshana Sannikarsa*. It does not observe the law of parsimony. It does not help the theory much by saying that actually we have the perception of silver (by *Jnanlakshana Sannikarsa*), for one may as well say that, on the perception of the attribute of smokiness, we shall have a simultaneous cognisance of smoke in every place, and since smoke is co-existent with fire, this direct knowledge of smoke would imply the direct perception of fire, which will defeat all the purposes of inference. Our knowledge would extend to everything, and direct perception of distant things would be possible. There will be no necessity of inference.

The *Naiyāikas* perforce accept a relation of silver to silver. A relation implies a duality, one cannot be conceived to be related to one's own self. Even if we accept such a relation, it (the relation) must be, in the case of false perception, between the silver and its substratum. This relation is a false one in the eye of the *Naiyāikas*, for, an intimate and inviolable relation can possibly exist between a thing and itself. The falsity lies therein—in the relation between the substratum and its supposed appearance. The appearance is not false but the relation. This no doubt is very complex. If one is prepared to call the relation false, what prevents one from accepting

the falsity of appearance which would simplify the matter to a great extent.

And moreover, when we have a false perception, we do not clearly understand how something revived in mind recalls the actual percept of the thing. In fact, we do not see how the possibility of ascribing the mental image to yonder object arises, how the inner idea is extended to and seems to be identified with the distant object. This is the most important point which is left unexplained in the theory. To explain this, one requires a kind of identity of nature of the inner and outer existence,—an element missing in the theory put forth. Indeed, the theory of perception (as maintained by the Naiyaikas) as the contact of objects with senses cannot explain the origin of a false percept. It goes so far as to explain the misrepresentation of the percept by reference to a false image revived by the law of similarity which can hardly meet the requirement of the present case. The theory cannot explain why the false percept appears as an existence in space and time. So long as we do not know it to be false, it is a percept and an appearance existing outward.

The *Vedantin*, on the other hand, maintains that in perception the mindstuff goes out through the senses and takes the form of yonder object which does not appear in full view owing to the distance and the defect of the senses. When the mind-stuff is modified in the form of the object, it (the object) is expressed before the clear light of consciousness as 'this' (इदम्), but, its appearance as mother-of-pearl is kept hidden from view by ignorance which with the residue of impressions of silver due to past experience gives rise to the false percept of yonder object being silver. *Vedantism* gives us a reason why the object appears

as silver existing before us. It holds that in transference or super-imposition, we have not only a confusion and change of attributes but something apparently real coming into a temporary existence and forming itself the object of perception.

(5) *The Sat-khyativad.* (5) *The Sat-khyativada of Vattavaskara and Ramanuj.*—It holds that in false perception, we have the appearance of a reality. It makes the object of false perception not false or illusory, but *real* in the sense that it actually exists. And this is due to the mother-of-pearl containing within it the silver-element, for, according to the *Panchikarana*,¹ every material existence is a mixed substance. In false perception the element of silver contained within the mother-of-pearl appears before view, and we have the cognition of something that is really existent or *Sat*.² (*Vide Jatindramatadipika*, p. 12).

Such a perception is not false and, therefore, the knowledge not illusory, though we cannot make an actual use of such a reality. There is a correspondence between our knowledge and reality, but its falsity consists in its not becoming the object of any use. We call it false because it does not meet our practical purpose. The thing is there, but it is in such a negligible quantity that, for all practical purposes, it is of no avail, and as such can be declared false. The supporters of this theory seem to maintain that the complete test of truth lies in the correspondence of cognition and fact—a correspondence not

¹ पञ्चीकरणप्रक्रियया पृथिव्यादिषु सर्वत्र सर्वभूतानां विद्यमानत्वात्। अतएव शक्तिकादौ रजतांशस्य विद्यमानत्वात् ज्ञानविषयस्य सत्यत्वम्।

² सत्त्व्यातिर्नामज्ञानविषयस्यसत्यत्वं *Vide Jatindramatadipika*, p. 12.

from the theoretic standpoint alone but from the practical as well.¹

The above explanation of a false presentation is not true. The contention that the element of silver is not denied but the possibility of its being useful to us, is not logically sound. If the silver is actually there in any quantity, it can be put to some use anyhow. A thing or a presentation is either real or non-real; if it is real, it is an object which satisfies some requirements. We cannot conceive a thing which exists but at the same time escapes all practical determination. Since, according to the theory, this possibility of its being practically determined is denied, it must be accepted that the *reality* ascribed to false appearance is illusory.

Even, if the truth of *Panchikarana* is accepted, the theory does not explain why, on a particular occasion, the element of silver appears before view and not always. The natural assumption would be that the silver, since it is real and present in yonder object, should always appear before view. It may be said in reply that the smallness of quantity of silver accounts for its non-appearance; but still it may be asked what makes the silver appear on a special occasion. The distance or the defective sense cannot be brought in for any relief, for, they make the explanation more difficult and less plausible. The small quantity of the element of silver may escape notice and may not at all arise before clear view if the object lies at a long distance. The possibility of our noticing the silver-element varies inversely with distance and defective sight.

The theory that in false perception we have the presentation of a reality generally known as *Sat-khyati* has an

¹ तर्हि भ्रमत्वं कथमित्येत्—विषयव्यवहार वाधात् मतम् । अतएव शुक्तिकादौ रजतांशस्य विद्यमान ज्ञानविषयस्य सत्यत्वम् । तत्र रजतांशस्य संप्रत्याक्षत्र न व्यवहार इति तदज्ञानं भ्रमः ।

analogue to it in the doctrine of *Alaukika khyati*. It maintains that in false perception we have not only a mis-interpretation and a consequent confusion between two things and their attributes but the presence of a clearly different thing before us. False perception differs from true perception in this that its objects cannot be utilised, while those of correct and real perceptions can be utilised. But it cannot, for a moment, be held that in false perception we have no object—but a mere extension of an inner idea to an outer thing. In every case of perception true or false an object is actually perceived; in the former case, it is actually present, in the latter, it has also an existence. The former is called *Laukik*, as it leads to a presentation that is real, and can be made use of; the latter *Alaukik*, as it leads to a presentation that is real but cannot be in any way utilised. The Vedantist would add the presentation is unreal and illusory.¹

The above doctrines can be chiefly put in two classes:—

(1) One which maintains the appearance of something non-real in false perception (*Asat-khyativada*).

(2) One which maintains the appearance of something real in false perception. Under this class comes the *Vijnanvadins*, the *Naiyaikas*, *Vattavaskar* (*Sat-khyativada*).

(3) Combining these theories we have the Vedantic doctrine the appearance of something relatively real and relatively non-real in false perception (*Anirvacaniya-Khyativada*).

¹ *Vide Naya Manjari*, p. 187 :

येषां शुक्तिकायां रजतप्रतीतिः विपरीतस्थानिस्तदादिनामभिमतता सा तथा न भवतीति सत्यरजतप्रतीतिवदवायवभासरजतसद्भावात् । लौकिका-लौकिकत्वे तु विशेषःतत्र व्यवहार प्रवर्तकं लौकिकं मुच्यते, ततोऽनन्यदौकिकम् ।

The world of manifoldness is a falsity of appearance having its root cause in Ignorance which is innate in us. This ignorance, from the cosmological standpoint, is spoken of as the force primus, the power of *Brahman* to

evolve the world of becoming, but, ontologically regarded, *Brahman* is transcendent ; the world, an illusory concept, a false appearance due to ignorance or Nescience, vanishing away with the attainment of the knowledge of Identity. Popularly in whatever way we may conceive the world of experience, it is, indeed, an appearance, just like other appearances, which seem to have their hold upon us temporarily. The difference is only in point of time—one is somewhat more durable, the other less durable. But both are grounded upon ignorance.

Since in every case of false perception we have an illusory existence before us, implying the ignorance of its substratum, a law can inductively be established that whenever we have a false perception, the supposed or apparent reality must have the same basis with the thing-in-itself.

An objection can be raised : why is it that the world of appearance which is mistaken for
 An objection met. Reality is seen outside, whereas, in fact, it is a superimposition upon the self which is the Reality within us. We see the rope and the snake in the same place, and mistake it to be a rope at another place. It will be difficult on the accepted theory to account for the confusion between the world existing outside with the self existing inside us, since the former has its being in the ignorance of the latter.

The possibility of thinking this wise can arise only from the misconception of the true import of the Vedanta Philosophy. Reality is transcendent, to which any sense

of outer and inner cannot be logically attributed. And, when we speak of mistaking appearance for Reality, we do mean here Reality in the transcendent sense and not one that appears in the form of a self-conscious Ego, for, the sense of ego as a personal and inner existence does belong to the realm of immanent existence with which the outer order of experience has no possibility of being confounded.

Even if we maintain that the self is the inmost of existences, we must say that the tendency of mistaking this inmost existence for the outer order illustrates the deceptive and spurious effect of *Avidya* which not only hides truth from view, but presents a pretended show of the fact. The entire empirical existence is, no doubt, subjective in the sense of being contained within *Brahman*, though represented as existing outside of us, for here the 'we' is not the supposed substratum, but an appearance among other appearances.

From the standpoint of the doctrine of one empirical self (known as *Ekajivavada*), it may be contended that the entire universe forms the outer representation of the self-conscious existence; so that if there is any confusion it is between the inner self and realm of its own ideas representing its outer appearance. The charge no longer stands, for, in this case, the substratum or the underlying substance is self or *Atman* which is taken for the world of appearance—which does not exist apart from or the outside of it, but is something which exists in it as the world of its own appearance. Really there are only two realities: (1) self and (2) the world of appearance, which seem to be identified with each other—the inner self looks upon itself as if confused with appearance which has no existence beyond itself. There is nothing outer to this self for everything is within it and is the world of its representation.

From the standpoint of the doctrine of multiplicity of finite selves, we have a world of ideas corresponding to objective facts, and to us the world of our own construction is true. That there seems to be an objective world is due to inter-subjective intercourse.

This confusion or transference due to ignorance is generally accepted as of two kinds. *Jnanadhyasa* is confusion of a notion with a thing, e.g., the knowledge of a rope for the serpent. It has been defined in the *Tattwanusandhan* as the knowledge of one thing for another which it is not.¹ The effect is a mental state, as apparently identified with an object.² Here an object is confused with a notion of the mind. *Arthadhyasa* is confusion of one thing with another. The effect is the direct knowledge of an object as apparently similar to a cognition of a thing once perceived.³ Here a notion of the mind is confused with an object. There is, strictly speaking, a slight difference between these two forms, for, from the *Vedantic* standpoint, a thing has no reality apart from the notion, though the notion seems to have something corresponding to it. If we ascribe some amount of objectivity to the empirical order, then there is some plausibility of the *Adhyasa* (*Jnana* or *Artha*), otherwise every form of confusion will be a transference of one idea to another. All confusion will be confusion of ideas and notions and not of notions

¹ अतस्मिन् तत्बुद्धिः

² अर्थविशिष्टं ज्ञानञ्चेति ज्ञानाध्यासः, *vide Vivaranaprameya*.

³ प्रमाणजन्यज्ञानविषयः पूर्वदृष्टसजातीयोऽर्थोऽध्यासः (ज्ञानविशिष्टोऽर्थो अर्थाध्यासः—अर्थमात्रसदृशोऽन्यात्मनाऽवभासमानोऽन्योऽर्थोऽध्यास इति) *Vide Vivarana Prameya*, p. 26, l. 1-4. (Benares Edition.).

and objects. Confusion is, again, either *Swarupa* or *Samsarga*, in as much as it is mistaken identity of a thing with another thing, or of a thing with an attribute. The rope-serpent illustrates the first, the crystal-redness, the second.¹

Of these illusory modes of existence two forms are generally distinguished: (1) *Vyavaharik*, and (2) *Pratibhasik*. The former is a form of empirical existence full of meaning and purpose to life, and the latter is purely an appearance. It appears merely and exists so long as we do not find the underlying substratum. It has no interest whatever for practical purpose. Both of them are appearances and illusory concepts misconceived for realities. But we cannot identify a mistaken percept with a real percept, though, to the *Vedantists*, both of them are false or illusory, for, none have permanent existence. Still it would be the height of philosophic indiscretion to fail to take into account the apparent distinction of illusory appearances as *Vyavaharik* and *Pratibhasik*. The one has importance for life and its adaptation, and the other has none. The former has an amount of truth in so far as it fulfils some claim. Its importance lies in its pragmatic effects, which the latter does not possess. Of course between them there is no difference of an essential nature. One may be said to be an appearance of Reality, the other may be rightly called "an appearance of an appearance."

¹ *Vide Vedanta Sidhanta Adarśa*, p. 9. Benares Edition.

स्वरूपाध्यासः संसर्गाध्यासश्चेति द्विविधोऽध्यासः। तत्राद्यो रज्जादौमुजङ्गाध्यास
आत्मनि वाऽनात्माध्यासः, द्वितीयस्तु स्फटिके लोहितस्य शङ्गे पीतस्योऽनात्मनि-
चात्मधर्मत्वादेः

There have been attempts in the course of the development of *Vedantic* thought (e.g., by the author of *Vedanta Sidhanta Muktabali*) to do away with this distinction and classify all forms of appearance as empirical and distinguish them from the Real-*Brahman* or Absolute. Every mode of existence, in some sense real or merely empirical, is, in fact, due to Nescience, and every form of them exists in appearance. The manifoldness is either

Prakasananda's attempt to dispense with the above distinction—its refutation.

real or unreal; if unreal, how can we speak of two forms of unreality or of superficial reality? How can we distinguish them? Really the world of things and beings has as much reality as the rope-serpent. It seems real, because it appears, just as a snake is real, because it appears. Between them as appearances we cannot see any difference.

The force of the above leads us to the conclusion that the entire mass of concrete existence is real only to such extent as the rope-serpent is real. But, even in the empirical order of existence we notice differences which cannot be ignored. The being of every empirical fact of existence is real, because it is felt, but, still yonder tree cannot be said to possess the same amount of being as the rope-serpent. Both of them, no doubt, appear and have their existence in Ignorance. In this sense their origin is similar. But there is this difference—that an appearance, like a rope-serpent, for example, is obliterated by a determinate consciousness. But the appearance of the manifold existence is set aside by an indeterminate consciousness. Surely none can overlook this difference, and this leads us to speak of the rope-serpent as an appearance upon appearance. No doubt, empirical existence has a meaning only in so far as it is perceived, but, the *esse* of concrete things is not the *percipi* of the individual. They exist only because they form part of a system, and

the system as a whole is, no doubt, from the *Vedantic* standpoint, founded on the cosmic Nescience which has its basis and support in *Brahman*. The possibility of something existing and yet remaining out of sight of the individual is logically cogent. We shall turn to this point in our discussion regarding the difference between *Maya* and *Avidya* and the *Vedantic* doctrines of finite souls. One point that ought to be noticed here is that the illusory appearance of the rope-serpent is the object of a concrete mode of ignorance, whereas the entirety of beings has its existence in the primal unmodified ignorance. These two forms of appearance necessitate a hypothesis of two forms of Nescience: the primary, concealing *Brahman* or Identity and giving rise to concrete modes of existences; and the secondary, concealing the concrete things giving rise to false appearances.

We have seen that *Vedantism* wants to trace the entire world-process out of Nescience.

Recapitulation. Figuratively, it is described as the power of *Brahman* to manifest itself, it is the *Sakti* of *Brahman*. Indeed, in the immanent sense we cannot think of *Brahman* and *Maya* as separate principles of existence, because, empirically *Vedantism* insists upon thinking the entire process as originating out of *Brahman*. In the second aphorism of the Vedanta philosophy we have the conception of *Brahman* as the cause and substratum of the world-process. Nowhere in *Vedantism* have we any picture of the cosmos as different from *Brahman*. Empirically we cannot speak of *Brahman* and *Maya* as separate existences. They are indissolubly related as *the Reality and its power of manifestation*.¹ But the more we look deeply, the more we realise that this relation

¹ *Sankara* शक्तिशक्तिमतोरभेदः.

of *Brahman* with *Maya* is rather imposed (आध्यात्मिकतादात्म्या) than inherent, for Being-in-itself does not admit of any possibility of being related to others. So this relation of *Brahman* and *Maya* is not real, for, in *Vedantism* nothing is Real, besides the identity of substance. Still so long as the empirical show of existence obtains, we must speak of some form of relation between *Brahman* and *Maya*. Hence some (e.g., *Vacaspati*

The support of Nescience *Jiva* or *Brahman* ?

and his school) assert that *Avidya* rests in finite conscious units.¹

“*Jiva* is its locus, *Brahman* its object.”² Nescience cannot be thought of as existing in itself, for all existence is

Vacaspati—*Jiva* the support.

ultimately an appearance to some percipient subject. And *Vedantism*

is very eloquent and definite in its refusal to grant an independently objective existence to Nescience, for, that would establish the duality of substances—a position studiously avoided by *Vedantism*. *Avidya* must be thought of as existing somewhere, and *Vacaspati* holds that it must be conceived as existing in *Jiva*. But it may be asked, what constitutes the being of a finite conscious existence ? Surely this finitude of conscious existence is due to the limitation of *Avidya*, for, consciousness has no inherent limitation of itself. But this explanation of *Avidya* as resting in finite selves and finite conscious existences as due to the limitation of *Avidya* may be said to involve a fallacy as both of them are interdependent.

This contention is of no value. Really speaking, there is no fallacy in as much as finite consciousness and *Avidya* are not exactly inter-dependent existences. Both exist

¹ जीवपदा ब्रह्मविषया.

² जीवाश्रिताप्यविद्या स्वीकृतावाचस्यतेर्मेते vide Bhamati, Benares Edition, p. 89.

simultaneously from eternity. The one is the principle of modification, the other is the subject modified, and in the simultaneity of their existences there is no possibility of inter-dependence. The percipient subject has its existence not quite dependent upon *Avidya*.¹ Its percipiency is independent of it, though the fact of its being centred in a particular spot necessitates its being somewhat confined by *Avidya*. We should mark here that *Avidya* can be thought of as existing in consciousness or more properly as dependent upon consciousness (for *esse* is *percipi*). But we can never speak of consciousness as supporting *Avidya* in existence—it must be thought of as supported in the percipient subject.² But if anyone still insists that there is some form of inter-dependence, *Vacaspati* would grant a mutual dependence in the sense of one containing and the other being contained. A familiar illustration is given. Just as we conceive a pot enclosing the sky, similarly we conceive *Avidya* as the limiting form or vessel enclosing within it the sky of consciousness.

Avidya then has existence in *Jiva* or consciousness circumscribed. It covers up the nature of conscious self as impersonal, self-luminous, blissful existence. This is the implication for regarding *Avidya* as fixed in *Jiva* making *Brahman* its object.

Apart from *Vacaspati's* conception there is the other theory of the old school of *Sorba-jnata-muni*, *Prakastman* and *Ananda-bodhacharjya* that *Avidya* is supported in *Brahman*. The purity and integrity of consciousness

Vivarana—*Brahman*
the support.

¹ Vide *Adwaitasidhi*, p. 585, Jivaji's Edition.

अज्ञानस्य चिदात्मत्वेऽपि चित्तेः स्वप्रकाशत्वेन तदभासत्वात् ।

² अज्ञानस्य चिदात्मत्वे चिदधीनस्थितिकत्वेऽपि चितिः अविद्याग्रितत्वतदधीनस्थितिकत्वयोरभावात् ।

is thought of as being the support and the object of *Avidya*.¹ *Sureswaracharya* also regards *Avidya* as supported in *Atman*, the one undivided consciousness.

The empirical order, so long as it holds—and it obtains from eternity—is an order of existence on the background of *Brahman* which, when looked upon as the locus of *Avidya*, is *Jiva*, and when looked upon as object of *Avidya*, is *Brahman*. These existences are simultaneous. They cannot be conceived as existing before and after. The possibility of *Brahman* appearing as *Jiva* (in the sense of *Iswara*), the existence of *Avidya*, and *Brahman* as covered up by *Avidya*—these three elements are mutually dependent upon one another. Hence to the *Vedantists*—the *Samsara*—the process of becoming (the manifold existence) exists in reflection. *Brahman-in-itself* exists transcendently, and through *Avidya* it is reflected as *Jiva*, itself being the primary *Jiva* when it is regarded as the support of *Nescience*. The possibility of such a reflection lies in the prior existence of *Avidya* which can be fitly called the principle through which *Brahman* appears. It must be marked that the existence of *Maya* does not affect the nature of *Brahman*, and, strictly speaking, it is one that does not appear before it—its appearance and reality are true to the *Jiva* which can perceive it as a

(ऐकात्म्य प्रतिपत्तिर्या स्वात्मानुभवसंश्रया, साऽविद्या संसृतेर्वीजं तन्नार्थं सुक्तिरात्मनः।)

Naiskarmasidhi, Sl. 7.

¹ आश्रयत्व विषयत्वभागिनी निर्भिभागाचित्तिरिति केवला ।

पूर्वसिद्धतमसौ हि पश्चिमी नाश्रयो भवतिनापिगोचरः ॥

स्वाज्ञान कल्पित जगत् परमेश्वरत्वं

जीवत्वभेदकलुषीकृतभ्रमभावा ।

स्वाभाविक स्वमहिमास्थितिरसमोहा

प्रत्यक्चित्तिर्दिजयते भुवनैकयोनिः ॥

Samkṣhepa Śariraka.

principle, but not to Brahman, though it seems to have its support therein.

A doubt may be raised as to how we can even empirically conceive pure conscious existence co-existing with Nescience, for they seem to be quite contrary in nature.

We should note here that the *Vedantists* do not make this affirmation in the objective sense. Transcendentally

An objection with. there is nothing else in the integrity of Being, and so long as we do not perceive this integrity of existence, we may conceive the co-existence of consciousness and Nescience just as we can quite conceive the existence of light side by side with darkness. The charge, that self-luminous substance is quite contrary to *Avidya* in nature, and as such cannot simultaneously exist with it, is not to the point, for, that which destroys Nescience can be regarded as quite opposite to it in nature, but not that which reveals it. When ignorance is removed by the modification of mental consciousness in the way expressive of the subject we have a subsequent state introduced into us, *viz.*, the removal of ignorance by the particular modification. The state of our being as consciousness is no longer expressive of ignorance, but of the destruction of it. The nature of consciousness is to express or illuminate. It matters not whether it expresses the existence of Nescience or the destruction of it. Empirically speaking, consciousness cannot be said to be contradictory to and thus destructive of *Avidya*. Really the contradictory opposite of Nescience is not consciousness in integrity but consciousness as modified by the reflection of identity. From the standpoint of Vedantic absolutism the affirmation or denial of Nescience has only an empirical significance. It does not affect the transcendent nature of existence in the least.

Anandabodhacharjya in his *Nyayamakaranda* has refuted the opponent's plea of the impossibility of establishing any relation between *Brahman* and *Avidya*. Nescience can be regarded either as, (1) the negation of consciousness, or (2) as an inert existence, or (3) as the contradictory opposite to consciousness. The first alternative cannot be accepted, for, *Avidya* is a positive existence. It appears to be real. The description of *Avidya* as the opposite to consciousness is not true for the reason noticed just above. It must be regarded as something inert revealed by the light of consciousness.¹

The main difference of the two lines of thought indicated above lies in the conception of *Jiva*. *Vacaspati* has characterised *Avidya* as centred in *Jiva* making *Brahman* its object and *Jiva* co-exists with *Avidya*. *Sarbanatmuni*, *Prakastman* and others regard *Avidya* to be resting in *Brahman*, keeping away from view its transcendent nature. *Vacaspati* insists upon the co-existence of *Avidya* and *Jiva* from eternity. Hence the charge of begging the question has been hurled at his door. The other school is free from this charge in as much as it makes consciousness the resting ground of Nescience, and defines *Jiva* as the reflection of consciousness through *Avidya*. Moreover, the distinction between the schools is necessarily involved in their conception of *Maya* as many or one; *Vacaspati* accepts the former alternative—and so he must conceive it to be based in *Jiva* rather than in *Brahman*. The other school regards it as one, and so it is conceived as based in *Brahman*.

It must be noted here that *Vedantism* fills up the gap between transcendental and empirical existences by *Avidya*.

¹ *Vide Nyayamakaranda*, pp. 318-320 (Benares edition).

The criticism often urged against absolutism, that in explaining everything as attributed to substance by us we do not explain the origin of this "us", cannot be maintained with any force against *Vedantism*. *Vacaspati* has made a frank confession that this "we" is eternal just like the other terms of the empirical order. Eternally we draw a picture upon the background of a transcendental reality. According to the other school so long as Nescience obtains, this "I" is an appearance of *Brahman* through *Avidya*. Its existence cannot be denied. It is only an appearance of Being which does not make any difference to the integrity of transcendental consciousness. Thus to the *Vedantists*, like Kant, the transcendent ideality of the world does not exclude its empirical reality. *Vedantism* would have the appearance of a system urging upon the equal reality of the metaphysical and the empirical order but for its acceptance of the possibility of a denial of the empirical order. From this it follows that the ground of erroneous empirical existence is to be sought in the knowing subject in which *Avidya*, as repeatedly asserted, is innate, be it *Jiva* or *Iswara*.

The empirical order of existence is thus regarded as the effect—an effect in the sense of transformation of *Avidya*, and an effect in the sense of reflection of *Brahman*. For this reflection there must be side by side with it an existence, and empirically we can speak of this as the second principle. So long as the world of appearance exists, the elements of existences—*Avidya*, *Jiva*, *Iswara*, the difference between *Jiva* and *Iswara*, the connexion of *Avidya* and consciousness and lastly consciousness—can be said to be obtaining. The author of the *Panchadasi* points out that they are existences of indefinite beginning, and consciousness *apart*, all the rest are actually destroyed on the attainment of knowledge.

The *Vedantic* doctrine of the Identity-Being and the mysterious reality of appearance vanishing in the reality of Being has been sought to be established on the critical consideration and examination of the law of causation in a metaphysical sense. We are here to analyse the notion of causation and determine the nature of effectuation to see if the effect has a reality of its own, different from the cause. The world is regarded as the effect, *Brahman* as the cause. The question arises. Is the effect real in the same sense as the cause? In other words, can we conceive the effect in any sense

Appearance in what sense an effect—the *Vedantic* conception of causation.

objectively real?

Before we come to the theory from the *Vedantic* stand-point, we should examine the prevailing theories of causation to help us to understand the *Vedantic* theory. We may begin with (1) the *Buddhistic* conception of *Asat-Karanavada*, the theory that every event comes out of nothing, so that we need not assume the existence of an original non-phenomenal cause to explain the appearance of phenomenon. If phenomena exist, we must conceive them as existing somewhere. Since they are phenomena, they cannot be conceived as existing without a cause and a substratum. A phenomenon is a mode of existence and to think of it as projected out of an empty background is self-contradiction; and the consistency of thought demands

The evolution of the conception of causation (1) *Buddhistic* conception.

more than a phantasm of existence for the originative cause to explain even an apparent existence. Even if we speak of 'nothing' as originative of some event or phenomenon, this

'nothing' is no longer nothing, but becomes something real.

It may be maintained that the pot-form cannot be imposed on the clay unless we have the previous destruction

of the lump-form. Strictly speaking, the pot has its cause not in the clay but in the destruction of the lump. It is more proper to hold, therefore, that an effect has its origin in nothing positive but from something that does not exist.

This is hardly true. No doubt, in the making of the pot, the lump-form may be destroyed, but not the clay which is still found to be the material of the pot. None can reason with consistency that the clay of the moment of making pot is destroyed, and that the clay-matter of the pot is something new and different, though similar to the previously existing one in appearance. And this element of similarity is the ground of our erroneously inferring the identity of the matter of lump and of the pot. But we have a clear perception of the identity of the material of the lump and of the pot, and contrary to this perception, we cannot establish a sounder theory upon so slender a basis as inference on the ground of similarity of appearance. Moreover, if we maintain such a similarity between the outgoing and incoming existences, we must insist upon something that can notice these different states of existence and compare them to find their similarity and difference. If this is impossible (and it is no doubt impossible from the *Buddhistic* standpoint), we cannot speak of similarity between the fleeting existences. If anybody asserts that there is a possibility of the cognition of identity even if it does not exist, then knowledge in the true sense of the word as implying correspondence of ideas to facts becomes quite an impossibility.¹

But it may be argued that the essence of causation lies in the invariable antecedence (नियत पूर्ववर्तिता)

¹ Vide *Brihat-Aranyaka Bhasya*—the refutation of *Asat Karanabada*, Chapter II, 2.

of relation. It does not indicate any priority of existence to which it may be related. Invariability is the mark of causation, but it does not necessarily imply anything existing antecedent to it, real or non-real. This theory seems to ignore that a relation implies the act of being related to something. The invariability of antecedence is a mark that can be attributed to an existence, but never to a non-existence. Since it is a mark, we must think of it as a quality or significate of *something* real, for, that which does not exist cannot truly be said to possess any attribute or a mark. Even if, after this, it is maintained that something can come out of nothing, we may ask whether this nothing has any *particularity* depending upon some condition when causing effects or not; if there is any speciality, and there is actually some speciality which distinguishes it as a cause from mere nothingness, we can no longer conceive it as nothing for 'nothingness' and 'individuality' or 'speciality' are not quite compatible; if there is no speciality, we are to lend our support to the spontaneous origin of effects at any time or moment. *Udayanacharjya* has combated the *Sunyavadin's* assertion about the spontaneous origin of events. The spontaneity of origin may imply either:—

- (1) the absence or negation of the cause, or
- (2) the possibility of the effect being produced by itself, or
- (3) the vacuity or nothingness to be the cause.

The first alternative is easily refuted, for, it denies the axiom of causality. It makes effects permanent existences and thus destroys their mark of being events or effects.

The second one also is not true, for, a thing or an event, which does not exist before it is originated, cannot be supposed to be *causa sui* or self-caused. If it is held to be ever existing, it is no longer an effect. Moreover, the

cause is related to the effect in succession which implies a duality of existence—the antecedent and the consequent.

The last is equally untenable, for, it would make either the “vacuity” or “nothing” be something or the effect lasting for good. Both are absurd. We cannot conceive the *prior non-existence* to be the cause, which, when destroyed, gives rise to the effect, *e.g.*, the prior non-existence of a pot is antecedent to its production and may be supposed to be the cause of it, for, a prior non-existence proves nothing and gives no indication of the thing to be produced. We come to realise the possibility of a pot being originated when we have before us the existence of earth not merely as containing the prior non-existence of pot, but the earth as modified into the different parts of a pot likely to give rise to it. A pure prior non-existence is no helpful guide to our determining the cause of a particular thing or event. A special character becomes necessary.¹

The *Naiyayik* conception of *Arambhavada* or *Asat-karyavada* is that a previously non-existent *Naiyayik* conception. effect originates from the existent cause or causes. The operative causes combine together to give rise to something that did not exist before, *e.g.*, a piece of cloth made up of single and isolated threads. It originates in the combination of separate causes which are comparatively more permanent entities, these again out of the combinations of still simpler elements, and so on until we come to the ultimate realities or atoms. It should be marked here that an effect has a temporary existence, and is originated as something sure to be destroyed in time. This theory wants to establish the origin of all things out of the atoms having no extension. The originated things have no continuity of existence from eternity,

¹ *Vids Nyaya Kusumanjali*, pp. 40-45.

nor would they exist for ever. They suddenly come into existence and suddenly vanish away. They are finite existences.

The main difficulty of this theory is that it maintains the origin of bodily substances out of those that are bodiless, a conception that is on the face of it self-contradictory.

Again, if the causes do not contain within them the effects, how can we conceive of an object suddenly emerging into existence? If the effect is granted an amount of *being*, it must have a sufficient reason for its existence; it must be either in any form in the causes or it must be produced by their combination. The first alternative is denied. The second is accepted. But here, it may be asked—is the effect real or non-real? If it is non-real, how can we speak of it as something different from the causes and suddenly coming into existence. Again, if the causes are real in themselves, how can we speak of the combination of them as non-real? And if we grant some reality to the effect, it is an existence not previously obtaining, and as a combination, it is something new and different from the causes, *i.e.*, if you speak of the combination as non-real, it cannot be called an existence. It is only an appearance. If you speak of it as real, it is something either different from the cause or identical with it. The former would grant the possibility of an ever-increasing amount of reality, directly against the theory of conservation; the latter establishes the identity of cause and effect in essence, allowing only an appearance to the effect. In fact, the spirit of the doctrine leads us to think of the combination more as an appearance than as a reality. It is real only as an appearance. The moment we look through the appearance, we notice nothing but the original cause. In

this sense the effect is non-distinguished from the cause, though it appears as something new.

And, moreover, even if we grant the possibility of an entirely new existence issuing out of the permanent causes, still we cannot explain any uniformity of causation by this method. One might conceive a number of sand-units producing oil, just as a number of oil-seeds produces it, for effects are not involved in causes. If effects are entirely spontaneous, and not potentially inherent in causes, how can we insist upon the law—the same cause will produce the same effect. This theory would lead to the supposition of plurality of causes, barring the possibility of inference.

It is, indeed, a truism that a relation exists between a cause and an effect, the particular cause and the particular effect, otherwise the possibility of plurality of causes cannot but arise.¹ We cannot explain this relation on the hypothesis of the *Arambharada* as the relation would imply the existence of cause and effect which the theory denies. If the effect is non-existent in any form before its production, it is not real and cannot be related to the cause.

The contention of the *Nyaya Kandali*, that a thing which does not appear and is not fit for any use must necessarily be non-existent,² is not sound, for it may exist in the form of potency which under favourable conditions would originate as a thing or an event. If the effect is not granted an existence in the cause, the cause, strictly speaking, cannot be said to produce it. The effect should be held to be

¹ Vide *Anirudhabritti* on the Sankyasutra, Chap. I, 115, 119 aphorisms.

² Vide *Nyaya Kandali*, pp. 144, Benares Edition.

अथोत्पत्तिरित्येवमस्यार्थक्रियानिवर्तनक्षमस्य रूपस्य विरहोऽनभिब्यक्तिः तदानी-
सत्कार्यवादः तथाभूतस्य रूपस्य प्रागभावे पश्चाद्भावात् ।

originated out of the prior non-existence involved in the cause, for the immediate antecedent of the effect is not the supposed cause, but the prior non-existence of effect, which when destroyed, produces the effect. And this would lead us to the absurdities of the Buddhistic position noticed before.

Sankar has refuted the *Asatkaryavada* and maintained the reality and the eternity of effect (in empirical sense). We may, in brief, notice his arguments.¹ The effect-form is not *asat* nor imaginary and does not accidentally emerge into existence. The *Asat* or non-existent cannot appear; whatever appears must be supposed to be existent before, though it may be hidden from view. It appears under favourable conditions—when its previous form is removed by appropriate or suitable means. None can reasonably assert that what is previously existent should be perceived—something existing but not appearing before view is impossible and inadmissible—for every existence is not manifested. It may exist, still it may not appear before us. It cannot be held that it is existent only when manifested, for it leads one to the conclusion that all existences are manifested which is not true. The pot-form may exist potentially in the lump-form. It may be objected that had it been so, the lump-form should have occupied a position in space different from the space-position of the pot, just as the wall occupies a space-position distinct from the space-position of the object hidden by it. But this objection has no force, for there is no law that the space-positions of the object that covers and of that which is covered should be different, *e.g.*, in milk, the milk-form shields from view the water-form and yet has the same space-position with the water-form.

¹ Vide Brihadaraṇyaka, Chapter I, Brahman II. Sankar Bhasya.

Sankar further goes on : the past or the future being of an object may be different from the present being, but still it is *being*. If the future being be non-existent then the perception of a *yogin* would be meaningless, for he is said to be perceiving the past and the future just as we see the present. Besides, God's fore-knowledge would be meaningless. The effect-form is, therefore, potentially existent in the cause. It is not purely *asat* before it is produced.

(3) The *Sankhya* Theory of *Satkaryavada*—the theory of evolution with substantial mutation. This theory differs from the *Sankhya* conception. previous one in maintaining that effects are real and are transformations of causes. The effect is not a phenomenon suddenly emerging into existence—it is potentially real in the cause. We cannot hold the amazing hypothesis that the previously non-existent can see the light of existence. This is absurd. An effect must be supposed as potentially present in the cause and a combination of circumstances is necessary to bring it out. It must be noticed here that the reality of effect and the reality of cause are not two different forms of realities. The reality of the cause appears in the effect, for the effect is the cause transmuted.¹ An effect is not a mere phenomenon, nor an appearance—it imbibes in it the reality of the cause. *Parinam* or transubstantiation has been defined as “a process of becoming in which the cause gradually changes and reappears in the form of effect.”² The effect can be described as the immanent finality, the formative principle

¹ धर्मोपरिणामेऽपि धर्मिणः एव परिणामभवति—Yogabartik, p. 292, Jibananda's Edition.

² वस्तुनः तत्त्वसत्त्वाकोऽन्याथाभावः परिणामः—कारणाभिन्नं कार्यं परिणामः—Siddhantaresha.

realising itself through successive transformations till it reaches the final growth and development. It is the generally accepted theory of causation in metaphysics.

But this doctrine of causation, if examined deeply, will be seen to contain within it the promise and implication of the *Vedantic* doctrine of *Vivarttha*. The *Sankhya* doctrine expressly states that the effect is *real* in as much as it is the cause transformed. But transformation means only a change in form. The essence remains intact. If transformation implies a complete change in the being of cause, knowledge would be impossible, for it makes every state of existence different from the previous state. If we mean by transformation a change of a part of its being, we may be asked, is this part different from or identical with the entire being of the cause? If different, we have to make an impossible synthesis; if identical, the complete being is changed, the effect is entirely a different thing.¹ It must be conceded then that the theory does not give us any clear sense, and the doctrine cannot be taken as valid in the way in which it is generally put. The effect as effect might have possibly been regarded as something different, had there been in its nature an element new and unique in itself, but since such an element is wanting, it

¹ *Vide Bhamati*, p. 117 (*Jivaji's Bhamati-Kalpataru Edition*):

परिणामी नित्यता हि न पारमार्थिकी, तथाहि—तत् सर्वात्मना वा परिणमेदेक-
देशेन वा । सर्वात्मना परिणामे कथं न तत्त्वव्याहृतिः । एकदेशपरिणामे वा सं एक-
देशकतो भिन्नो वाऽभिन्नो वा । भिन्नश्चेत् कथं तस्य परिणामः.....अमेदे वा कथं
न सर्वात्मना परिणामः । *Vide Kalpataru* :—तत्र पूर्वरूपस्य सर्वात्मना त्यागेन
रूपान्तरोत्पत्तौ जातस्य प्राक्तनरूपत्वं व्याहृतमतोऽनित्यत्वम्.....य एकदेशे नश्यति
स धर्मिणः सकाशाद्भिन्न इति पक्षे न धर्मिणः परिणामः, किंत्विकदेशस्य स चानित्य
इति न परिणामिनित्यत्वसिद्धिः ।

is nothing new but the cause in some other form. In other words, the cause and the effect express the different forms of the same reality, which, as reality, never changes. The terms, therefore, have a meaning to the person conscious of the phenomenal changes, but, since these changes can have no effect upon the nature of reality as such, they cannot be taken in objective sense. In fact, there is no substantial mutation as the *Sankhya* system postulates, for that would imply an essential difference of nature between cause and effect which the *Sankhya* doctrine denies. Here then is a dilemma. If you maintain that the effect is a mere transformation of the cause, you cannot speak of substantial mutation; if you speak of substantial mutation, you cannot speak of the effect as mere transformation of cause, because in your sense of transformation there is not the origination of anything new. An effect is real in so far as it is identical with the cause in essence. In itself, it has no reality.

(4) Hence we come to the theory of causation as evolution without substantial mutation—the Vedantic theory of *Vivartavada*. According to this, between the cause and the effect there is no such relation in the sense of change or transformation of reality as the *Sankhya* system seems to maintain. The cause is reality, the effect an appearance, and as appearance it must not be confounded with reality. Nobody can argue that effectuation would lose all meaning in this way, for, indeed effectuation has a meaning only in the sense of causing a different appearance, and it has a value in the realm of appearance. The effect seems to be apparently a reality, but, on a closer inspection, we observe that cause subsists in the effect in the integrity of its being, e.g., on applying heat to water, we get

Vedantic conception.

vapour, but can anybody argue that in the essence of water there is any change?¹ No doubt, there is a modification of one state of appearance into another, but no change has been effected in the essence of the thing. The effect is not the mutation of the cause but only an appearance. It is identical with the cause in essence, though in appearance it is different.² The Vedantic doctrine really implies that causation does not hold good metaphysically. The causal category has an immanent use and a meaning so long as the transcendent vision does not dawn upon us. The empirical order is a chain of facts and events tied by the causal law. The immediately prior event is the cause, the posterior the effect. In the phenomenal sense an effect may be the transformation of cause, but in the absolute sense the effect seems to be a *Vivarta*, a reflection, an appearance of the cause. *Vivarta* has been defined as the process of reflection in which the effect does not possess the same amount of being with the cause.³ Though the effect seems to be somewhat different from the cause in the sense of being transformed empirically, yet we must not lose sight of their non-difference in the metaphysical sense. The Vedantin never maintains that Brahman who is above all phenomenal changes (*nama* and *rupa*) is at the same time non-different (in the empirical

¹ Vide Sankshepa Sarirak, Ch. 2, 66, 67.

² Vide Vivekachuramani, Sloka 230,—

सत्कार्यभूतोऽपि सदी न भिन्नः,
 कुम्भोऽस्ति सर्वत्र तु सस्वरूपात् ।
 न कुम्भरूपं पृथगस्ति, कुम्भः
 कुतो स्या कल्पित नाम मात्रः ।

³ दक्षुनः तदसमत्वाको विवर्त्तः, विवर्त्तोनामउपादानविषयसत्त्वाककार्यापत्तिः।
 Sidhantaresha.

sense) from the mutations constituting the universe, nor does he assert that simply because he characterises the phenomenal world as illusory or unreal, the noumenal Brahman which supports and sustains the phenomenal order in existence is equally non-real. We find that Ramanuja brings in a charge against the Vedantism of Sankara on a misconception of the spirit of Vedantism.¹

“Those however who assert the non-difference of the effect from the cause on the ground that the effect is unreal, cannot establish the non-difference, for there can be no identity between the true and the false. If it is true it will establish either the falsity of Brahman or the truth of the world.”

This charge has entirely missed the point in issue. An effect is non-different from the cause empirically, but metaphysically the effect has no independent existence apart from the cause. It, as an effect, does not exist. And when such a knowledge of the ultimate identity of cause and effect has been attained, the effect as effect fails to have any meaning. So long as we do not see things in their true colour, we continue to regard the effect as the transformation of the cause and thus real, but, no sooner is the philosophic insight gained, than the appearance of effect vanishes in the reality of the cause. The empirical order is an appearance of reality, and as appearance not quite different from it. But we cannot posit for it the same amount of being with the cause. Objectively (or in reality) the being of effect is identical with the being of cause; empirically one may be considered as the transformation of the

¹ ये तु कार्यकारणयोः अनन्यत्वं कार्यमिच्छ्यात्वाशयेन वक्ष्यन्ति, न तेषां कार्य-
कारणयोरनन्यत्वं सिध्यति, सत्यमिच्छार्थयोरैकानुपपत्तिः । तथा सति ब्रह्मणो मिथ्यात्वं
अगतः सत्यत्वं वा स्यात् ।—Śribhasya.

other. In fact, the being of cause and effect remains identical, and so long as the empirical order obtains they (the words cause and effect) possess a meaning and acquire a sense. Being is represented as the cause because of its appearance as the permanent substratum of all events, but this is only an appearance of itself, and does not constitute its reality. So long as the empirical sense persists in us, we can understand the unchangeability of the *being* of cause, though it appears as the ground of changes and events. The identity of cause in all forms of effects clearly comes upon consciousness, and, thus understood, the cause is seen to preserve its integrity of existence, though it seems to put on an appearance of transforming itself into effects.

It may be suggested, that the effect is different from the cause, though *in essence* it may be identical with the cause. Both are equally real, so that the cause and the effect are tied up in the relation of identity and difference. They are identical *in being*, though different *in appearance*.

The Vedantin can accept this theory in empirical sense, but not metaphysically. Vacaspati has refuted this theory. What is this *Bheda*—the element of difference—which is supposed to co-exist with *Abheda* or identity? Are they mutually opposed? If so, the cause and the effect will be totally different existences, incompatible in their nature. If there is difference, there can be no identity; if identity, none can imagine a difference; so the attempt to establish a difference in identity (between cause and effect) in objective sense fails completely.¹

¹ *Vide Bhamati*, p. 118—Jivaji's Bhamati-Kalpataru Edition :

कः पुनरयं भेदो नाम, यः सद्भामिदिनैकव भवेत् । परस्परभाव इति चेत्—किमयं कार्यकारणयोः कठकहाटकयोरक्षिणवा । नचेत्, एकत्वमेवासि न च भेदः ; अस्ति चेत् भेदः, नभेदः । न च भावाभावयोरविरोधः सद्भावस्थानासम्भवात् ।

Empirically speaking, the effect, because it is effect, is different from the cause; otherwise when we speak of the effect, we ought to see the cause and its different modifications. Still we cannot speak of the effect as totally different from the cause, the effect is the appearance, the cause the underlying reality. Rightly can it be asserted that if the cause and the effect are totally different, no relation can be sought to be established between them. If they are identical there can be no sense of difference. It comes to this that the effect is non-different from the cause though it appears to be different. But this is a difference on the background of identity, not identity on the background of difference. It is because of the effect having its existence in the being of the cause, and because of the cause being pervasive everywhere in the form of existence, that the effect as existence is non-different from the cause, though in its appearances of 'pot,' 'cow,' etc., it is different from the cause. The manifoldness is true only in the form of the effect. In its essential nature it is identical with the cause.

Vedantism makes a frank confession that empirically the nature of effect cannot be exactly determined. It cannot be said to be either actually existing or non-existing. In the former case it will be identified with Existence or Being, and it ceases to exist as effect. In the latter case it would not be perceived or felt and since it is felt or perceived it is not purely non-existence. The nature of effect, strictly speaking, is mysterious. It is something that escapes logical determination. We conclude: the reality is the cause, the appearance is the effect in empirical sense; in metaphysical sense the effect is identical with the cause, and has no existence. It loses itself in the background of Identity.

It has been shown that the relationship between Being-in-itself and the phenomenal world from the point of view of causality is false. Still the Vedantism has not freed itself from the tendency to regard God as the cause of the world and seeks to reconcile the common-sense view with the metaphysical theory by assimilating the idea of causality with that of identity. "To this end Vedantism forms too wide a conception of causality in that it is not only the law that determines the relation between events and changes of phenomenon, but also the bond between substance and attributes or qualities." (Deussen.)

This extensive use of the concept of causality makes it possible for the Vedantist to speak of the empirical world as based on Brahman which is represented as both the material and the efficient cause of the world. The author of the *Sankshepa Sariraka* says that though Being-in-itself cannot be regarded as the cause of the empirical order, yet there is no difficulty in ascribing to it causation indirectly through Maya. *Sureswara* makes the same affirmation in his *Vartik*.¹ Brahman is called the cause of the universe by implication in so far as it is the support of Nescience. *Apyaya Dikshit* refers us to an analogy by way of illustration, viz., that when the earth is moulded in the form of a pot, the invariable quality of earth, its scent, appears in the pot without being in any way transformed or changed. We may likewise conceive Brahman to be the cause of the

Different descriptions of the empirical order—Brahman or Maya—the material cause.

¹ अस्य द्वैत जालस्य यदुपादान कारणं ।

अज्ञानं तदुपाश्रित्य ब्रह्मकारणमुच्यते ॥

world. Brahman is the material cause, Maya the instrumental cause.¹

Prakasananda, the author of the *Vedanta Siddhanta Muktabali*, conceives Maya to be the material cause of the empirical order. Brahman-in-itself as a transcendent existence cannot enter into the relation of cause and effect—the empirical order in causality must be an order in Maya. Brahman is called the cause only by implication as the basic principle of Maya.² Vacaspati, on the other hand, conceives Brahman, which is the object of our ignorance, to be the material cause of the empirical order, Maya being only a secondary or indirect cause. Opinion differs regarding Vacaspati's position. He has been interpreted in two ways. Brahmananda Saraswati and Madhusudhan maintain that, since according to Vacaspati, Avidya is supported in Jiva, the material cause of the universe is Jiva, Avidya, the instrumental cause,³ or we may simply say Jiva, the support of Avidya, is the material cause.

The author of the *Kalpataru* demurs to this interpretation and maintains that *Brahm n* is the material cause. Avidya as supported in *Jiva* is the instrumental cause of the universe. He refers us to the common example of the rope-serpent. Really what is appearing as serpent is the rope; the rope contains the materiality of the cause, our ignorance is instrumental thereto. Similarly Brahman appears as the manifold existence—the matter of the manifold is Brahman, the instrument is Ignorance

¹ तथा च प्रत्यक्चिति योनिरभिव्यक्तिस्थानम् । Ramtirth's commentary, *Sankshepa Sariraka*—Sl. 2

² Vide *Vedanta Siddhantadarsa*, Sloka 7, last Chapter; *Adwaita Siddhanta Muktabali*, pp: 1-10.

³ Vide *Laghu Chandrika on Adwaita Siddhi*, p. 595.—Jivaji's Edn.

जीव एव वा प्रपञ्चाधारः, न ब्रह्म ; तेन जीवाविद्ययोरेव प्रपञ्चोपादानत्वम् ।

जीव ब्रह्मणोर्वास्तवाभेदात् ब्रह्मणो जगदुपादानत्वादि श्रुत्युपपत्तिः ।

supported in Jiva.¹ We shall see later on the bearing of this distinction on the conception of *Jiva* and *Iswara*.

Prakastmanyati, the author of the *Vivarana*, regards Brahman as conditioned by Maya (not pure intelligence) to be the material cause of the universe. Consciousness in its integrity has no relation to anything, and is transcendental. But when it is possessed of Avidya it is regarded as the material cause. Consciousness thus possessed is *Iswara*.²

In the *Siddhantalesh* we come across the opinion of some one not holding any distinction between Maya and Avidya. The empirical existence is the transformation of *Maya* as supported in *Iswara* who must needs, therefore, be regarded as the material cause of the universe, *Avidya* the instrumental cause. Brahman has been kept untouched. *Iswara* has been regarded the support of Avidya and consequently the material cause of the universe. The author of the *Padarthatatwa* regards Brahman and Maya to be the material cause, for, the world is the *vivarta* of Brahman, and the transformation or *parinam* of Maya.³ According to *Vidyaranya*, *Iswara* is the material cause of the external existence, *Jiva*, of the internal.⁴

¹ *Vide* Bhamati and Kalpataru on the Aphorism—जगदचित्वात्—p. 404, Jiva's V. K. P. Edition.

² *Vide* *Vivaranaprameya*, p. 116 (Benres Edition):

ब्रह्मनाये जगद्योनी माया शक्तयथा महत् ।

यद्वा योनिस्तु मायैव ब्रह्माधिष्ठानमिष्यते ॥

³ *Vide* *Vedanta Siddhantadarsa*, pp. 86-90 ; *Siddhantasara Sangraha*, pp. 92-93.

⁴ *Vide* *Vedanta Sidhantadarsa*, p. 12. *Vide* *Panchadasi*, Ch. IV, p. 88, Slokas 1-12, VI. 17, 18, 19.

These conceptions are different descriptions of the empirical order. All of them agree in ascribing to the world of manifoldness a cause, and this cause is *Brahman* as associated with *Maya*. It is assuredly true that to explain the empirical order both elements are equally necessary: *Brahman*, the principle of existence, and *Maya*, the principle of becoming.

The Vedantin may go so far as to accept the possibility of the existence of a central self-conscious being representing the highest synthesis—the inner and immanent chain of empirical existence. Empirically every finite being is regarded as a reflection, and the synthesis of finite existences in the conception of a super-person may be regarded again as a reflection containing within it infinite centres of finite reflection. Vedantism is a midway between Kantianism and Hegelianism. Kant

The systems of Kant, Hegel, Bradley and Vedanta compared.

accepts the self as illuminating and organising the manifold of sense. The self by its own splendour illumines the process of integration, keeping its transcendent nature hidden from view. Hegel makes this self-consciousness, the self-luminous principle to be the ultimate reality unfolding itself in a dialectic process. Vedantism would trace every existence to self, holding the process to be an effort of self-manifestation. The self in its integrity does not find itself in this self-expression. Vedantism differs from Kant in holding the empirical world to be an expression of Being. It agrees with him in holding the self to be illuminating the entire existence, without appearing before our empirical view. It originates the world of manifoldness which is rightly regarded as the expression of its being, but it never appears in the fulness of its existence before our vision or anywhere in the process of self-revelation. The self when it is reflected on the

primordial Nescience is Iswara, and Iswara is Brahman willing to manifest itself. This expression of Being is relatively real in Vedantism, whereas in Hegel it is the reality. To Bradley finite existences are moments in the absolute Existence, though any ascription of independence to them is bad philosophy; just as one would go to the other extreme if one denies existence to them, since the absolute is the totality of experience. Any point in existence is as much real as the whole of it although and the whole all divisions would be healed up 'in the harmony of its higher bliss'. To Vedantism is due the credit of showing that Being is the plenum of existence and Bliss. It transcends the division and unity of whole and parts.

Apart from this philosophic sense of Being or Brahman the Vedanta retains in the term the common conception of God. It appeals to certain arguments to prove the existence of such a being as the cosmological and teleological principle. Brahman is regarded as the cause creating and preserving the world-process. Some regard it as possessing the power, will and knowledge necessary to it. It is often described as pursuing an end, and for which, it has the necessary wisdom and power. Brahman is regarded as an active agent designing and controlling the world-process. But even as regards this empirical description of Brahman there seem to be differences of opinion among the Vedantists. Thus the author of the Kalpataru suggests that Brahman's activity in creating consists in nothing more than casting a glance, which is sufficient to set Maya working. This description is more consistent with the transcendent conception of Brahman. The entire process is going on spontaneously. Brahman's interference is necessary to set it going—and this interference consists in nothing more than keeping an

eye, as it were, over it.¹ "The Vedas are its breath, the five elements are its perceptions, the entire things and beings are its smile, the final process of involution is its dreamless sleep." Brahman does not require anything more to create the universe than a passing sight. The above quotation makes it clear that the whole process is *spontaneous*. The spontaneous origin of the world-process has been clearly brought out in the conception of *Lila*. Vedantism has ruled out the conception of *Lila* as a purposeful activity and instituted in its place the conception of *Lila* as a spontaneous activity. We may read some motive in creation. But in truth, there is no particular motive behind it. The entire world of appearance is the emanation of Brahman. The description of the world-process as creation or evolution ascribes a will or motive to Brahman, and this will be contrary to the notion of Brahman as pure intelligence and lead us to suppose it to be a personal existence. On the other hand the theory of Emanation of the world-process as spontaneously coming into being supports the idea of Brahman as more or less impersonal in nature. It can keep up the analogy of Brahman being the sun of existence, the concrete beings are the modes of light.

Brahman is described as the cosmological principle
(indicated in the third aphorism of

1. As the cosmological principle.

the Brahma Sutra). Here, again, an interpretation has been put in the *Kalpitaru* to indicate the purity of being as the inner meaning of the Sutra. Brahman is an existence on which we have the simultaneous appearance and disappearance of the cosmic existence, *i.e.*, it is transcendent, on which, for

¹ निश्चितस्य वेदाः, वीक्षितमम पञ्चभूतानि
क्षितमस्य चराचरम्, अस्य सुश्रुतिः महाप्रलयः ।

the time being, originates a world of appearance which, in the moment, is also objectively non-existent. In Vedanta Sutras we have, no doubt, the common notion of Brahman as the cosmological principle, and this is due to the wide use of the law of causation, overlooking the philosophic view that what transcends experience cannot be the cause of that which appears in experience.

Brahman is also described as the teleological principle.

The world reveals to us a wonderful plan and order of existence, and this plan is consistent only with the existence of a conscious power behind it.

2. The teleological principle.

Here, again, to be consistent, we must speak of Brahman as the principle sufficient to account for the mysterious groups of combinations and selections expressive of an intention running through the cosmic order. Sankara truly says that this world of design, as it is incomprehensible to the finite intellect, cannot be thought of as coming out of a blind power. This argument establishes the existence of a rational power or conscious principle behind the empirical order.¹

Brahman is also described as the source of the *Vedas*.

The Vedas are the depositories of instructions regarding every form of conduct, spiritual, moral, and ephemeral. And since they come out of Brahman, Brahman is the ultimate authority and source of laws temporal and spiritual.²

These arguments are inductive attempts to establish the existence of Brahman, a spiritual principle behind Nature. These arguments prove nothing more than the bare possible existence of a conscious principle. Hence

¹ *Vide Brahma Sutra*, II. 2. 1.

² *Br. Sut.*, Chap. I, 8.

Vedantism, in addition to these arguments, appeals to self-conscious experience for the main support of its doctrine.

In the Vedantism of Sankara and his followers these arguments are of mere pragmatic value and useful for the ignorant only. Standing on the empirical level of conscious existence we have no better way of describing the world-process than as one evolved out of and controlled by the Infinite. And so long as our consciousness is dominated by the empirical outlook, we look to the entire process as contained within and sustained in existence by Brahman. This theological conception has been lost in the metaphysics of Vedanta, where it is held that it is only a passing vision on the way to the attainment of final bliss.

The above arguments give us the conception of Brahman as one who possesses attributes. To it are posited the qualities of omniscience, omnipotence and omnipresence. It is omnipotent because it controls Maya. It is omnipresent because it is all-pervasive—the limitations of space and time are effective upon the finite beings, but not upon one that transcends Maya and controls it. It is omniscient because Maya cannot obscure its vision. By Brahman being omniscient we mean its being conscious of everything, its being expressive of everything, and not in its being the subject of conscious process.

In calling Brahman expressive of everything, its nature as an impersonal being is retained, and this is in keeping with the main line of thinking in Vedantism. (Vacaspati.) Vivarana maintains that Brahman's omniscience consists in capacity of expressing everything. Just as the lamp expresses everything lying near it, so Brahman manifests everything into light, as it underlies every form of existence. (Vivarana, p. 23.)

Omniscience may be of two kinds:¹

1. Omniscience which is natural (स्वरूपतः) and inherent. This may be fitly called *intellectual intuition*. *Brahman* is omniscient by this innate capacity.²

2. Omniscience which is acquired (प्रमाणतः) through perception, inference and other sources of knowledge. *Brahman* has knowledge which is direct and immediate.³

To sum up: *Brahman* in association with *Maya* appears as the immanent principle underlying the infinite modes of existence. The description of this immanent principle is not always uniform. Sometimes it is spoken of as if it has a personality of its own—a conception which describes *Maya* as its *Sakti*. This description, however, falls short of the general picture of *Brahman* as

Conclusion.

consciousness. This may be indicated as the effect of the theological attitude of mind. *Vacaspati* sees this and is careful not to ascribe any sort of personality to *Brahman* even when it appears to be associated with *Maya*. He interprets it as a principle underlying the cosmic existence. It does not acquire a personality in relation to *Maya*. *Brahman* transcendent is consciousness and bliss. *Brahman* immanent is the consciousness in infinite modes, the consciousness of all consciousnesses. Vedantism is Transcendentalism with an appearance of Pantheism, because this 'pan' is not real to the Vedantin—it is *theos* throughout, there is no 'all.' It starts with the proposition that 'all' is *Brahman*, and subsequently finds 'all' vanishing away in the fullness of Being.

¹ स्वरूपतः प्रमाणेषु सर्वज्ञत्वं हिदास्थितं—*Citsukhi*, p. 316.

² स्वभावभूत प्रज्ञया ब्रह्मणः सर्वज्ञत्वं *Citsukhi*—*Nayanprasadini*, p. 366.

³ *Vide Citsukhi*, p. 367.

The terms *Maya* and *Avidya* have long been used in an identical sense. We have accepted the general conclusion that the entire cosmic existence is due to Nescience or when we attribute the cause of the universe to *Brahman* we say it is due to its *Sakti*—

Maya and *Avidya*—
the different senses in
which they are used.

Maya. But in later *Vedantism* these terms have been used in special senses. Before noticing them we should mark here the distinction commonly drawn between the terms *Maya* and *Avidya*. *Maya* is the principle of individuation—*Brahman's* power of becoming, or more logically, of appearing as many, whereas *Avidya* is spoken of as the principle of ignorance intercepting things from view. *Maya* and *Avidya* are the same thing from two different standpoints. The one has in it a creative significance, the other an epistemological one. Hence, when we speak of the origin and change in the world-process we attribute it to *Maya*, whereas the misinterpretation of rope for snake is attributed to *Avidya*. *Maya* has been defined in the *Vivarana Prameya Sangraha* "as that which has the capacity of originating something quite contrary and that which is subjected to will for no definite purpose."¹ *Brahmananda* defines it as that which has the capacity of originating mysterious effects which are neither *Sat* nor *Asat*.² It is an originative cause. It is something that can originate, and for which no definite reason can be set forth. In *Maya* the idea of origination is more apparent, and origination implies a power or a will. In *Avidya* the idea of obscuration

¹ विरूप जनकत्वाकारणेच्छाधीनत्वाकारिण वा माया इति व्यवहारः
एकस्मिन्नपि वस्तुनि विद्येप प्रधान्येन मायाऽच्छादन प्रधान्येनाविदेति।

Vivarana Prameya

² तत्र मायाशब्देन सदसद्विलक्षणत्वरूपानिर्वाच्यत्वस्य निरूपणार्थं विचित्र
कार्यजनकत्वरूपमाया।

is more prominent. It causes a confusion of an appearance with an appearance, whereas *Maya* brings out the entire existence which appears as objective to finite consciousness. We have already shown that this distinction between objectively false realities and subjectively false ideas cannot be set aside. The one is denied by the knowledge of Identity, the other by an objectively real thing. *Sankara* has made no clear distinction between *Maya* and *Avidya*. He has used them almost in the same sense. But, in later Vedantism, these terms have been used in different senses. We may now notice them.

(1) *Maya* has been defined as a mysterious entity existing eternally in relation to consciousness.¹ When this primal ignorance is divided into parts, it is called *Avidya*. *Maya* is the entirety of Nescience. *Avidya* is the name given to the parts thereof. *Iswara* is the reflection of consciousness upon *Maya*, *Jiva* is the reflection of consciousness upon *Avidya*. *Iswara*, like *Jiva*, is a product or a reflection. The difference is that the one is the reflection upon *Maya* in its primary stage, when it is free from all forms of differentiation. The other is the reflection upon *Maya* in a state of differentiation.

(2) Somewhat different from but almost similar to the foregoing theory, there is another conception of *Maya* and *Avidya* in the *Tattwaviveka*. The same primal power (मूलाप्रकृतिः) is represented as *Maya* as well as *Avidya*. When this power has predominance of *Sattwa*, it is called *Maya*, and when it has predominance of *Rajas*, it is called *Avidya*. The same principle, when it originates things, is called *Maya*, and when it hides things, is called *Avidya*. This original Nescience is related to *Brahman*. When *Brahman* is reflected

¹ चित्तमात्र समन्वितौ माया अनादिरनिर्वाच्या—Prakatartha Vivarana.

upon *Maya*, it is called *Iswara*, and when reflected upon *Avidya*, it is called *Jiva*. The difference between them is one of degree, and since *Iswara* has for its *upadhi* *Suddha* (pure) *Sattwa*, it has clear knowledge of itself, whereas *Jiva*, having for its *upadhi* *Malin* (impure) *Sattwa*, has no clear knowledge of itself.¹

The *Panchadasi* has almost accepted this distinction of *Maya* and *Avidya*. *Prakriti* is one which is related to *Brahman's* reflection. It is made up of three elements—*Sattwa*, *Rajas* and *Tamas*. When *Sattwa* predominates, it is called *Maya*, and when *Rajas*, it is called *Avidya*.²

(3) The author of the *Sankshepa Sariraka* does not accept the common distinction between *Maya* and *Avidya*. According to him there is only one cause of the empirical existence, and this is Nescience or *Avidya*. When consciousness is reflected upon *Avidya* it is called *Iswara*, and when reflected upon the definite centres of mental consciousness formed in it, generally called *antahkaranam*, it is called *Jiva*. *Iswara* is *Brahman* having for its *upadhi* the Nescience in the state of unmodified existence. *Jiva* is consciousness reflected upon and falsely identified with the *mindstuff*. We have three forms of conscious existence³ :—

- (1) Consciousness, in its transcendence, is called *Bimba*.
- (2) Consciousness, as reflected,
 - (i) On Nescience, is called *Iswara*, the totality of existence.
 - (ii) On *Antahkaranam* is called *Jiva*, the individual unit or being.

¹ Vide *Sidhantalesh Sarsangraha*, pp. 99-103—(Jivananda's Edition).

² Vide Chapter I, *Slokas* 15, 16 and 17.

³ संक्षेपशारीरके तु कार्ष्णीपाधिरङ्गीवः कार्ष्णीपाधिरौश्वर इति श्रुतिमनुसृत्य षड्विद्यायां चित् प्रतिबिम्बः ईश्वरः, अन्तःकरणे चित्प्रतिबिम्बो जीवः—Vide *Sidhantalesa*.

(4) The Authors of the *Vedantasara* and the *Adwaita Chintakaustan* draw no distinction between *Maya* and *Avidya*. Nescience is not one but many. Consciousness reflected in the *Avidya*-unit is *Jiva*, and reflected in the totality of units is *Iswara*.¹

(5) The author of the *Vivarana* maintains that *Avidya* is co-eternal with *Brahman*. When consciousness is reflected in *Avidya* it is called *Jiva*, and its being *Iswara* consists in nothing more than the act of witnessing, a quality which it acquires in contact with *Avidya*. This theory differs from the above one in not making *Iswara* a reflection, the reflection being *Jiva*. *Brahman* itself is transcendent. *Brahman* as witnessing consciousness (as *Bimba*) is *Iswara*, *Brahman* as a reflected consciousness is *Jiva*.²

From this if we proceed a step further we have the celebrated theory of *Ekajiva*—*Brahman* expressing itself in Nescience is *Jiva*. The Nescience is one and *Brahman* appears as a unit of conscious being. The theory does not admit of multiple finite units. (*Vide Adwaita Sidhanta Muktabali*.)

From the above follow chiefly three theories of *Jiva* and *Iswara*.

(1) *The doctrine of reflection*, generally known, as *Abhasabada*, maintained by the authors of the *Vartik* and the *Sankshepa Sarirak*. It holds that *Brahman* is reflected on *Avidya*. It appears as being identical with this reflection which is represented as the cause of the manifold.³ It is the witness, the inner-scient. The same principle, when it appears as being identical with reflection cast upon mental consciousness or intellect (*buddhi*) is called *Jiva*.⁴

¹ *Vide Adwaita Chinta Kaustav*, p. 48, *Vedantasara*, p. 93.

² जीवब्रह्म विभागस्तु लोके विम्बानुविम्बवत्। *Vivarana Upanyasa*, p. 38.

³ *Vide Sidhantabindhu*, Benares Edition, p. 113.

⁴ *Vide Sidhantabindhu*, p. 113.

Both *Iswara* and *Jiva* are reflected consciousnesses and as such are appearances. *Madhusudhan* says that as reflections they are mysterious existences, not real nor unreal, not conscious nor pure inert.¹ The reflection passes for the conscious entity. The advice is given constantly to distinguish the being in essence from the reflection. The "*Twam*" is here altogether false in the sense of being a *reflection* and has no touch of the integrity of consciousness in it and therefore is to be totally ignored. The author of the *Vartik* asserts that to regain the lost identity, one is to completely leave out of sight the false personality of reflected consciousness, and to take in the '*Tat*'—the undivided integrity of being.² This theory makes a distinction between *consciousness* in itself and *consciousness* in reflection. The former is free, the latter is in bondage. How then can we consistently speak of the attempt on the part of the latter to get salvation, for it is in complete bondage. Freedom is attainable only when the bondage is apparent and illusory. Since the theory under consideration makes *Atman* completely free and the personal self quite distinct from *Atman* in being a reflected consciousness, this reflection cannot be logically said to be striving after freedom, for it does not understand (in the way in which it is represented) that freedom is its being. This contention has been refuted by the author of the *Vartik*. The *Atman* itself appears to be in bondage, because of its being associated and mistakenly identified with the reflection. The possibility of its being reflected is its bondage, and the removal of this possibility is its freedom. We have already seen how this becomes possible by the constant reflection on

¹ आभासस्यापि जडाजडविलक्षणत्वेन अनिर्वचनीया त्वात् ।

² Vide *Sankshepa Sariraka*, Ch. I, sl. 169.

the Identity. The reflected consciousness is kept out of sight. The identity of consciousness is retained in constant view. The axiom is here interpreted in an analytic way, but not in the usual way of indicating an identity of *Tat* and *Twam*, by rejecting their *upadhis*. The attention here is completely an analytic effort in the sense of forsaking the '*Twam*,' the reflected consciousness.

(2) *The doctrine of reflection*, generally known as *bimba and pratibimba bada* maintained by the author of the *Vivarana, Prakastman Yati*. This theory is almost the same as the previous one. It is different only in the conception and interpretation of reflection. The former theory regards the reflection as unreal in itself, and we are asked to leave it off by concentrating our thought upon the essence and by drawing it away from *the reflection*. *Prakastman* holds that what (consciousness) appears in reflection is true, though the reflection is false: so that *it is in itself true, though false as a reflection.* "The theory which regards reflection in itself as false is ordinarily known as *Abhasabada*, while the theory which maintains that reflection as reflection is false but is true in essence is known as *Bimba Pratibimba bada.*"¹ The former keeps the reflection and the essence of Being somewhat separate and consequently the reflection looks quite false, whereas, according to the latter, the reflections are not non-real; they are real in their essence, unreal in their appearance as reflection. In this conception the reflection is kept along intimately with the essence of being which is, in fact, involved in it. And the axiom is interpreted as pointing to the identity of *being* involved in '*Tat*' and '*Twam*' by taking off the respective *upadhis*

¹ *Vide Brahmananda's Ratnavali*, p. 114.

स्वरूपतो मिथ्याभूतं प्रतिबिम्बमितिवादः आभासवादः, स्वरूपतः सत्यं प्रतिबिम्बत्व-
रूपेण मिथ्याभूतं बिम्बमेव प्रतिबिम्बमिति वादस्य विवरणोक्तस्य प्रतिबिम्बवादत्वमिति—

of *Jiva* and *Iswara*, and taking in the community of essence.¹ The real is embodied in the reflection. Hence the instruction is to leave off the reflection and to take in the essence by analytic attention. The essence of 'Tat' is involved in the reflection of 'Tvam' and the axiom presents to us the identity of Essence by putting aside the *upadhis*. (भागवतागलक्षणा).

(3) *The doctrine of modification knowing as Abaccheda-bada of Vacaspati.* *Vacaspati* establishes a novel conception. He regards every finite conscious unit as a *mode* of the substance. It is not reflection of consciousness upon anything. It is rather a limitation of consciousness by something external, *viz., Avidya*.² Just as the sky seems to be limited, made definite and characterised as the pot-sky, room-sky, etc., similarly consciousness, so long as Nescience exists, is not seen in its integrity and appears as divided in parts and modified by its *upadhi*. Through the cosmic Nescience (which according to *Vacaspati* is manifold) consciousness appears in the form of modes, without implying any real division in its being.

This theory differs somewhat from the doctrine of reflection where *Jiva* is a reflection, taken for reality through

¹ *Vide Sidhantabindu*, p. 114.—प्रतिबिम्बस्यापारमार्थिकत्वात् जहद-जहन्नक्षयैव तत्त्वादिपदेषु.

² *Vide Sidhantalessa*, p. 157.

तस्मात् सर्वगतस्य चैतनस्य अन्तःकरणादिना अवच्छेदवश्यम्भातीति आवश्यक-
त्वान् अवच्छेदोऽपि इति पक्षं रोचयते ।

Vide Sureswaracharja's Manasolassa

घटाकाशो महाकाशो घटोपाधिकृतोऽथवा ।

देहोपाधिकृतोऽपि देहो जीवात्मपरमात्मनोः ।

तत्त्वमस्यैवादिवाक्येषु तयोरेकं प्रदर्शयते ।

सोऽयं पुरुष इत्युक्तेऽपुमानेको हि दृश्यते ।

non-discrimination. In *Vacaspati's* theory *Jiva* is the limitation of consciousness and one can attain liberation on putting off the sense of limitation due to ignorance.

This theory would explain the axiom of identity by rejecting the limitation put upon consciousness by *Avidya* and taking in the essence of Being. It should be noticed here that *Vacaspati's* position differs according to the interpretation put upon his conception of *Iswara*. If *Jiva* is supposed to be the material cause of the universe, the conception of *Iswara* cannot be strictly retained. In this case *Jiva* will have a universe of its own construction by its *Avidya*. We are forced to this conclusion if we accept *Ratnavali's* interpretation of *Vacaspati*. From this standpoint, 'Tat' will imply pure consciousness. 'Twam' will be *Jiva*. The identity will be established by setting aside *the upadhi of Jiva alone*.

On the other hand one may accept *Kalpataru's* assertion that there is room for *Iswara* in *Vacaspati*, inasmuch as *Iswara* (*Brahman* as modified by the totality of *Avidya* or the primal *Avidya*) is represented as the material support of the world of existence. *Jiva* is consciousness modified by the *Avidya* units. The axiom of Identity is explained as establishing the identity of essence between *Jiva* and *Iswara*. The limitations of 'Tat' and 'Twam' are left aside and the essence of Being is brought clearly before view. [In this case the instrumental cause *Avidya* is though supported in *Jiva*, still the effect of *Avidya*, (the silver) is identified with its material support. Similarly, if the world of existence is a creation of *Avidya*, it is a creation that appears on the background of *Brahman*. *Brahman* as the support of the created order can be called *Iswara* by implication.]

These conceptions have their origin in the difference of analogy often used in the *Śruti* to depict the kind of

relation existing between *Jiva* and *Iswara*. The aphorism¹ 19, Chapter II, Pada II, naturally leads one to think of the doctrine of reflection, whereas the aphorism 42,² Chapter II, Pada III, will suggest the theory of modes and modification.

These theories are not to be taken seriously for they are attempts to clearly represent the nature and position of *Jiva* by analogies. *Sankara* does not lay any emphasis upon these conceptions. Indeed, there are passages in his writings which can support both the views. Later on, *Prakastman* and *Vacaspati* and their respective followers tried to establish their own theories by refuting the opponent's theory and interpreting the analogies of the *Sruti* in their own way. It may be pointed out here that the doctrine of reflection has much in common with the *Sankhya* doctrine of *Jiva*, as the reflection of *Purusha* upon *Buddhi* and of bondage as due to the non-discrimination of the reflection from the original. *Vacaspati's* theory does not bear comparison with any other system.

Closely connected with the above there arises another important question in *Vedantism*—the dispute regarding the existence of one or manifold *Jiva*—the doctrine of oneself and the doctrine of multiplicity of finite selves. There are two prevalent theories.

(1) Those who hold that *Avidya* is manifold, will naturally maintain that finite selves are not one but many. Each unit of existence is consciousness limited or circumscribed by *Avidya*. Each conscious unit is a subject creating its own universe in its own ignorance. The universe is true to the immanent subject. That we seem

¹ उपमा सूर्यकादिवत् ।

² अंशोनात्त्वव्यपदेशात् ।

to see the existence of an external object is due to the interchange of reports among the conscious units. The inter-subjective intercourse naturally suggests a trans-subjective Reality. In fact, this much of objectivity is also the creation of *Avidya*, which not only mistakes a concept for a percept, but lends a touch of objectivity to its own creation. The sense of subjectivity and objectivity is the creation of the innate ignorance, and in each particular mode this is determined by its own ignorance. Nothing exists beyond experience which is true to the percipient subject. None can transcend experience, for everything comes into being in experience. *Brahman* or consciousness is the permanent background upon which the *Jiva* (finite ego) builds up a world through *Avidya*.

Brahman is the 'material' cause and *Avidya* the instrumental cause of the subjective order of existence. It is the *Jiva* which imagines, constructs and perceives the empirical existence—its own creation. *Brahman* is the object of *Avidya* resting in the *Jiva*.

This theory represents subjective idealism. It grants no independent existence besides finite conscious units, which, as consciousness, are static, but, as finite, are personal and active creating their own universes through Ignorance. The moment Ignorance creates the sense of 'I,' the corresponding sense of 'not-I' simultaneously originates in us, and philosophic reflection interprets this 'not-I' as a projection of 'I.' The 'not-I,' the objective pole of existence, is in us and not outside. Subjective idealism in some shape is the necessary consequence of *Vacaspati's* holding *Maya* as manifold and seated in *Jiva*. It makes every finite subjective unit as much real as the other. If one attains wisdom, one is liberated and one's freedom does not imply necessarily the freedom

of others. In such a conception *Iswara* will be consciousness witnessing the sum-total of *Avidya*. And this witness will be one. We have this doctrine in some shape in the *Advaita Chinta Kaustav*.¹

(2) Those who hold that *Nescience* is one indivisible existence will naturally maintain that *Jiva* is only one and not manifold. There are no different modifications or modes of being. Being is one. Nescience is one. *Brahman* appearing through Nescience is the immanent principle in becoming. Nescience being devoid of any part or division, the *Jiva* cannot be manifold. No doubt, there arises the plurality or manifoldness of appearances, but it must not be regarded in any sense real, though it constitutes the presentation-continuum of the *Jiva* (just like the presentations seen in dream, due to the inherent capacity of *Maya* or *Avidya* of holding up a manifold show).

The world appears manifold—it is not real in itself, it is real to the percipient subject. But *Brahman's* being a subject is due to *Nescience*, and since this apart, there cannot exist any other percipient subject (*Nescience* being one and indivisible), the real subject to which everything appears is *Brahman* associated with *Maya*. Consequently the empirical *subject* or self is one. The entire universe exists because the subject exists. The manifoldness of appearance constitutes the mental-whole of the subject. Nothing is independent of this conscious unit, for it is the only subject, and everything has its origin in its ignorance. When *Nescience* will be destroyed, the phenomenal existence will cease to be. In this extreme

¹ *Vide Advaita Chinta Kaustav*, p. 48. (Bengal Asiatic Society Edition.)

form of the conception of *Jiva*, nothing is real in the sense of existing by itself. The conception of liberation or bondage of any particular person is the fanciful creation of Nescience and is not in any sense objective. The empirical reality of becoming is not inconsistent with, and contradictory to, the transcendental ideality of Being; and even if we accept this hypothesis, Being can exist in its transcendence, though at the same time appearing as the immanent principle in becoming. So long as Nescience exists the empirical becoming asserts itself; still this theory retains and accepts the possibility of the *Eka-jiva* attaining knowledge and complete liberation. When that state is reached the entire manifold comes to a complete negation. It is the final consummation. We are told that this possibility of *Brahma* apparently becoming *Jiva* through *Maya* and again attaining liberation through the knowledge of Identity is accepted by *Sankara* in his commentary on the *Brihadarnayak*.¹ This theory is not to be confounded with the doctrine of reflection, where *Jiva* is only a reflection. Here it is *Brahman* itself which appears as *Jiva* through its own ignorance and is, therefore, the only empirical being to which every other thing including *Iswara* is merely an appearance. Man, Nature God and all are appearances to the one percipient subject.

These represent two extreme theories regarding the conception of *Jiva*—the one accepts the multiplicity of conscious units, the other denies it and holds that *Jiva* is only one, *i.e.*, in the one consciousness is becoming personal in many centres and in the other in a single centre. The above theories interpret *Maya*—the

¹ Vide *Sidhantalesa Sarsangraha*—

अविकृतस्य ब्रह्मण एवाविद्यया जीवभावः व्याधकुल सत्त्वहित राजकुमार दृष्टान्तेन ब्रह्मैव स्वाविद्यया संसरति स्वविद्यया विसृच्यते इति बृहदारण्यके प्रतिपादनात् ।

principle of individuation—in such a way as it leads us to the opposed extremes in the conception of *Jiva*. But these extremes of thought can hardly be logically maintained, for the plurality of finite existences naturally leads us to the conception of the unity of existence, and the existence of an individual self is hardly consistent without other centres of existence in reference to which it can regard itself as an individual being.

These difficulties lead to the formulation of other intermediate theories synthesising the truth of the above and based either (1) upon the distinction between *Maya* and *Avidya* or (2) upon the possibility of the division of *Avidya* into the whole and parts.

The former will make the simultaneous existence of a subjective and of an objective order possible in as much as it accepts the customary distinction of the *materia prima* into *Avidya* and *Maya*. *Maya* is *mula-prakriti* with the predominance of *Sattwa* and is the *upadhi* of *Iswara*. It lies at the root of the objective universe. *Avidya* is the *mula-prakriti* with the predominance of *rajas* and is the *upadhi* of *Jiva*. It creates the subjective world of the finite self. These would give us two realms of existence—the objective and the subjective—having different material and instrumental causes for them; so that the world will have an existence independent of the finite mind. Every finite conscious unit has, apart from objective existence, a mental content of its own which is formed by its own ignorance. The world-soul is *Iswara*, the individual-soul is *Jiva*. We can accordingly establish the identity of *Iswara* and *Jiva* by eliminating from the first the limitation of the *upadhi*, *Maya*, and from the second the limitation of the *upadhi*, *Avidya*, when *Brahman* is left as the common denominator.

Those who do not make this distinction between *Maya* and *Avidya*, but insist upon the existence of Nescience as one principle also find the possibility of retaining the conception of *Iswara* and *Jiva* by drawing out a distinction between the unmanifested and the manifested, the causal and the effectual state of *Avidya*. *Iswara* is the reflected consciousness upon the former and is one that contains within it the entirety of existence. *Jiva* is the reflected consciousness upon *Antahkranam* and interprets the objective world in its own terms according to its own vision and intelligence, *i.e.*, in the way in which his mental consciousness is affected by the externally objective existence. The possibility of *Jiva* as a finite self-conscious existence is retained in this conception. Others, again, though maintaining *Avidya* to be the ultimate ground of appearance, assert that it is one full of parts. The consciousness with the totality of *Avidya* as *upadhi* is *Iswara* or the chief or *prima jiva*, and the consciousness with the individual units of *Avidya* as *upadhi* is the secondary *Jiva*. In these conceptions the *Jiva* has a distinct existence within the whole—an element in the collective unity of the totality. Each is an individual unit. Each can attain freedom and escape from the bondage, and its freedom does not affect in any way the empirical order. In these theories *Avidya* is represented as divided in parts—each a unit by itself—and each unit is the *upadhi* of the individual self called *Jiva*. The sum-total of units is the *upadhi* of *Iswara*, and *Iswara* is considered as the unity underneath the totality.

Apart from this conception of the collective totality we come across another theory more logical in character in the organic conception of the whole expressing itself in and through the parts. *Brahman* as manifested through *Avidya* is an organic whole in which the individuals are parts,

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and the parts are represented as intimately connected with the whole.¹ The one *Jiva* is present in all without any exception. But this 'all' is not mere presentations, but parts or organs in the system. This harmonises the multiplicity of *Jiva* units in the life of the totality. And this would be consistent with the *Vedantic* conception of *Lila* which implies a number of self-conscious personal units in mutual relation to one another as integral parts of the supreme self. This supreme-self may be called the *prima* person, and the *Jivas secunda* persons. Here, again, one can attempt to realise the identity by leaving off the *upadhis*. But we must not for a moment think that these conceptions are in any sense metaphysically or transcendently real.²

We can put the above doctrines in the following scheme :—

Names of Authors.	Material Cause.	Jiva.	Iswara.
<i>Sarbajnatmuni</i> ...	<i>Brahman, Maya—</i> <i>instrumental.</i>	Reflection on mental- conscious- ness.	Reflection on <i>Avidya</i> .
<i>Vacaspati Misra</i> ...	<i>Brahman</i> ...	Modified by mental con- sciousness.	Modified by <i>Avidya</i> .
<i>Vivarana</i> ...	<i>Brahman</i> as <i>Bimba</i>	Reflection on <i>Avidya</i> .	<i>Bimba Chai-</i> <i>tanyam.</i>
<i>Prakasanandayati</i> ...	<i>Maya</i> -directly, <i>Brah-</i> <i>man</i> indirectly.	<i>Brahman</i> ...	Imagined by <i>Jiva</i> .
<i>Pothadarthatatwa-</i> <i>nirnaya Kar.</i>	<i>Brahman</i> and <i>Maya</i> — <i>Brahman</i> as re- flected, <i>Maya</i> as transforming.
<i>Tatwairivekakara</i>	Reflection on <i>Malin-</i> <i>Sattwa.</i>	Reflection on <i>Suddha-</i> <i>Sattwa.</i>
<i>Vidyaranya</i> ...	<i>Iswara</i> —the material cause of the objec- tive, <i>Jiva</i> , of the subjective world.	Reflection on <i>Buddhi</i> .	Reflection on the cos- mic <i>Buddhi</i> .

¹ एक एवजीवोऽविशेषणसर्व्वं शरीरं षड्विधिति

² Vide *Sidhantalesh—Adwaita Siddhi* and *Brahmanadi*—pp. 539-542.

CHAPTER III.

COSMOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY OF VEDANTA.

From *Atman* originates *Manas*, *Prana* and all the senses.

Māndūka.

From this *Atman* come into being all men, all gods, all creatures and all things.

Brihat Aranyaka.

We have been able to establish that from the Vedantic standpoint there is not more than a single fact of existence—the fact of consciousness. The pure original and unchangeable consciousness is the basic reality underlying all experience. Vedanta like Kant affirms that “no knowledge can take place in us, no conjunction or unity of one

Recapitulation. kind of knowledge with another without that unity of consciousness which precedes all data of intuition and without reference to which no representation of object is possible.”¹ While Kant recognises this transcendental apperception as the datum of experience, he fails to recognise the identity of consciousness with Existence from the standpoint of pure reason. Vedanta accepts this transcendental apperception as the intimate fact in our knowledge and at the same time the only Reality underlying the system of experience. But in Kant the originative cause of appearance is the thing-in-itself. Kant's system has, therefore, not wrongly been supposed to involve an element of dualism. Vedanta gets over this dualism by declaring

¹ *Vide Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 88.

that this transcendent apperception is also the ontological reality. Whatever is, is consciousness. Consciousness exists. Vedantism has also indicated the static character of transcendent existence, which, as transcendent, cannot be thought of as actively evolving the world of factual existence out of itself. More properly we can characterise Vedantism as a system explaining the world-process as the appearance of Being, but, in which it cannot find itself in integrity. The becoming is, therefore, rather an appearance than a process. The entire existence is to be regarded from the transcendental standpoint as not substantially real, but, as possessing only an appearance of reality. It is the *vivartta* of Brahman.

Empirically the world is a continuous process in evolution, the effect of the primal will to be Many. Brahman in association with Maya is conceived as the individualising dynamism manifesting itself in the creative power and evolving every element of existence out of itself, for its desire of becoming many indicates the potentiality of their existence in it. Vedantism is not *dualism*. Every atom of existence is conceived to be issuing out of the creative Energy. Vedantism regards the world process as issuing out of Brahman and again going into it. When the *Samsara* has run its full course, it again lapses into Brahman. The becoming is like a curve of existence. It issues out of Brahman and develops its full being with the amount of energy with which it starts, and finally through the contrary process of involution it comes to the point whence it has its original start. Vedantism describes the process as issuing out of bliss and finally passing into bliss. The intermediate stage of existence is described as the multiplication of this bliss-existence. The world is a movement of the spirit in itself. It is the cyclic movement of the divine

Creative Evolution
as depicted in the
Upanisads.

consciousness in space and time. Its law is progression, it exists by movement, and it dissolves by the cessation of movement. It is the energy of active consciousness which by its own motion brings out all things from within. All these are real in consciousness, but only symbolic of Being, as the imaginings of a creative mind are faint representations of itself, and yet are not quite real in comparison with this creative mind. Creation is, thus, not a making of something out of nothing, or of one thing out of another. It is the self-projection of *Anandam* into conditions of space and time. *Brahman* as the absolute transcends its expression in the world of relativity.

In later Vedantism the self-projection is described as not inherent in *Brahman*, but is ascribed to it in association with *Maya*. *Brahman* is transcendent

Creation in the light
of later Vedantism.

and immanent, but its immanence is relative to its being supposed to be in intimate touch with *Avidya*, apart from which it is pure *Sat* without any thought of moving itself into becoming.

The later Vedantism has sought to describe the world-process of coming into appearance and disappearing into the formless as a course in *Avidya*, a modification of *Maya*. *Vedanta*, unlike *Sankhya*, maintains only one reality as the cause of the cosmic evolution, and so long as the transcendent vision does not dawn upon us, we must regard the world-process as a history of the self-expression of Bliss. *Brahman* is indirectly supposed to be the originative cause as it is expressive of the process. The development of the world-process has a history of its own from eternity in as much as it is controlled by a law and reveals an order. This history repeats itself in the successive cyclic movement, and Vedantism holds that the movement of any cycle is determined by the *Adrista* which is acquired for it in the course

of its previous cycle. The future movement or course of development by integration and differentiation will be deter-

Elements necessary
for the reappearance
of the world-process :
¹ *Bikṣaṇa*, ² *Adrīṣṭa*.

mined by the destiny it commands by self-effort in the course of this cyclic movement. The reappearance of the world-process in a new cycle requires two things : (1) the first inception and the starting of the process simultaneously with the expression of a desire on the part of *Saguna Brahman*, "I will be many." This is figuratively described as the *Prathama Bikṣaṇa*—the first glance starting the process of evolution. It can be fitly described as the initial point in self-expression. This *Driṣṭi* is necessary in as much as *Māya* cannot independently set itself energising and requires the guidance of a conscious principle. This is indicated by the *Vedānta* doctrine of *Bikṣaṇa*. (2) The sumtotal of *Adrīṣṭa*—the inherent acquired tendency—chiefly determines the course of evolution, for, at every step of it, it is the main directing principle.

Vedantism accepts the *virartta sriṣṭi* according to the transcendental method, *pariṇāma sriṣṭi* according to the empirical method. But there seems to have been

Adrīṣṭa Sriṣṭi, or
Sriṣṭi Driṣṭi.

a divergence of views among the later *Vedantists* regarding the cyclic movement of the empirical order according to the acquired tendency. The generally accepted theory is that whenever the world-process is destroyed, it exists as formal and material potentialities or tendencies which again appear in the next order. These potential forces are of infinite variety and include the germinal principles of all existences. They lie dormant waiting for the next cycle to rise in cosmopoetic activity. (*Brahma Sūtra* 1. 3. 30). *Vedānta* accepts the possibility of *Mahaprālaya* in every cycle of change when the

prevailing order is dissolved to rise again from the temporary quiescence of existence.

The disappearance is only a temporary withdrawal which promises the appearance of a new creation with new life and new forms. According to this theory the world-process is an order of existence somewhat objective in the sense of being independent of finite consciousness. Hence the theory is called *Sristi Dristi*.¹

Some of the Vedantists (e.g., the author of the *Muktavali*) have gone so far as to deny this element of *Adrista* as a necessary element (of creation) and have refused to accept the doctrine of evolution and involution. They maintain that the existence of the world has no meaning apart from its being perceived. *Esse is percipi. Dristi is sristi.* The universe is purely subjective and remains ever as such. There are even some among the Vedantists who do not hesitate to hold that to each unit of existence

Dristi-Sristi. its subjective world is real, and it is entirely lost in dreamless sleep,

and when it again regains consciousness it constructs a new world entirely different from what it perceived before. And this new world is the creation of its own Nescience though it mistakes it for the past one through ignorance. Those who maintain the doctrine of *Ekajiva* will naturally support this doctrine. Its

¹ Vide *Sidhantabindu*, p. 179, and *Vedanta Sidhantadarsa*, p. 66.

तत्र साभासाविद्या मूर्त्तामूर्त्तप्रपञ्चबीजशक्तिरूपा। तदजन्यत्वेऽपि तन्निवृत्तौ निवर्तमानत्वेन तद्ग्राह्येः चैतन्यतत्सम्बन्धजीवेश्वरविभागचिदाभासैः सहानादित्वाद्-व्याकृतमित्युच्यते। अयं चाव्याकृतपदार्थ ईश्वरोपाधिः। सा च स्वयं जडाप्यजडेन चिदाभासिनोज्वलिता पूर्वपूर्वस्कारजीवकर्मप्रयुक्ता सती शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगन्धात्मका-न्याकाशवायुतेजोजलपृथिव्याख्यानि पञ्च महाभूतानि जनयति।

सृष्ट्य ईभाविनी दृष्टिः सृष्टिदृष्टिरितीर्यते।

व्यावृत्तिर्व्यतिरेकः स्यादन्यथोऽनुगमस्तथा ॥

perception constitutes the being of the appearance, and if it ceases to perceive, the totality of appearance comes to an end. "The wise maintains the psychological ideality of the world, the ignorant its objective reality."¹ Nothing is objective, creation or destruction. Every one of them is a fanciful imagining, the working out of one's ignorance. Nothing is real save and except *Brahman*, the *Ekajiva* to whose perception the world owes its origin. This theory is called *Dristi-Sristi*, and the former is called *Sristi-Dristi*. The former ascribes some amount of objectivity to finite things and beings and draws up a picture of evolution and involution, whereas the latter sees no meaning in the existence of anything outside of the conscious unit of existence, be it one, or many. It may accept and notice the changes that take place in the subject which, again, will be the history of subjective processes (true to the particular subject and at a particular time). It makes different universes for different subjective centres and for the same unit different universes for different moments. It does away with all distinctions of empirical reality. Everything is real for it appears. And that which does not appear does not exist. This *Dristi-Sristi* theory has two forms:² (1) *Sristi* is *Dristi*: *percipi* is the being of *esse*, there is nothing objective. (*Prakasananda*). (2) The empirical manifold has no existence independent of consciousness. But it is still not identical with consciousness. *Esse* is, no doubt,

¹ *Prakasānānda* says:—

ज्ञान स्वरूपमेवाहुर्ज्ञेयदेतद्विचक्षणः । अर्थस्वरूपं भास्यन्तः पश्यन्त्येते कुदृष्टयः ॥

² *Vide Vedānta-Ādarsa*, p. 65.

दृष्टिरेव भवेत् सृष्टिर्दृष्टिसृष्टिर्मते तथा ।

दृष्टिकालीनसृष्टिस्तु दृष्टिसृष्टिर्मतानरे ॥

dependent upon *percipi*, but *percipi* does not constitute the being of *esse*.¹

These differences are due to divergent interpretation put upon *Avidya* and the logical goal of theories regarding *Jiva*. The older and ancient Vedantists stick to the former theory, the modern and later Vedantists draw out the logical conclusion of Vedantism and apply it to the solution of the cosmic problem. They identify Vedantism with Idealism (subjective) and fail to perceive the meaning of the objective element (the touch of realism) left by the older school. We can speak of the cosmology of Vedanta from the standpoint of the more ancient school, for the later Vedantists have done away with the problem as not important for the system and characterise the entire cosmos as an appearance due to the innate ignorance.

In the beginning of a particular cycle or round of Existence the entire world is supposed to have been covered up by death as the result of the periodical re-absorption of the world in Brahman.

The picture of creation.

Existence, again, emerges out of the state of absorption, and this may be called the evolution of the particular order. In the state of absorption the elements of creation are in equilibrium. Creation is indicative of the disturbance in the temporary equilibrium, and we have already noticed the forces working in this direction. The creative power of *Brahman*, the seed-forces of things, the individual souls existing in their subtle bodies are all held together and absorbed in Brahman.

¹ *Sidhānta Muktabali, Vedānta Sidhāntādarsa.*

सिद्धान्तमुक्तावलीमते दृश्यस्य दृष्टिभेदे प्रमाणाभावाद्दृष्टेश्च स्वयं प्रकाशज्ञान-
स्वरूपत्वाज्ज्ञानस्वरूपमेव (= प्रतीतिकमेव) जगदित्यर्थः, तथाऽन्यदृष्टिसृष्टिवादिमते
चिदचिदोरभेदाऽसम्भावात्त्राचिरुपदृष्टिभिन्नमपि जगद्दृष्टेः प्रागसत्त्वादृष्टिसमकालीन-
मेवेत्यर्थः ।

The moment the temporary calm is disturbed by a necessity from within, the process of unfolding sets in. Brahman, conceived as evolving from within, is called *Parameswara*. The creative order has two aspects, the causal and the effectual. The causal aspect consists in *Brahman's* desiring to manifest, whence *Maya* is set to evolve the five elements. This *Parameswara* (the Chief Lord) is called *Brahmā*, *Viṣṇu* and *Śiva* in reference to its *upadhi*. When *Parameswara* has *Maya* in its causal aspect with *sattva* predominating as its *upadhi*, it is called *Viṣṇu*. *Viṣṇu* preserves the order. When *Parameswara* has *Maya* in its causal aspect with *rajas* predominating as its *upadhi*, it is called *Brahmā*. *Brahmā* creates the order. When *Parameswara* has *Maya* in its causal aspect with *tamas* predominating as its *upadhi*, it is called *Śiva* or *Rudra*. *Rudra* destroys the order. The same *Brahman* when viewed in these different perspectives is represented as the trinity of *Brahmā*, *Viṣṇu* and *Śiva*.¹

Parameswara is the direct author of the five elements, of the *Linga* or Causal body and of *Hiranyagarva*. The authorship of the world of concrete effects, the [order of *nama* and *rupa*—the world of finite modes, is ascribed

¹ Vide *Vedantaparibhasa*, *Sidhantabindu*.

तत्र परमेश्वरस्य पञ्चतन्मात्राद्युत्पत्तौ सप्तदशवयोपेतलिङ्गशरीरोत्पत्तौ च हिरण्यगर्भस्थूलशरीरोत्पत्तौ च साक्षात्कर्तृत्वम् ; इतरनिखिलप्रपञ्चोत्पत्तौ च हिरण्यगर्भद्वाराहिरण्यगर्भोनाम मूर्त्तित्रयादन्यः प्रथमो जीवः स वै शरीरी प्रथमः स वै पुरुष उच्यते । Sidhantabindu—तवेश्वरोऽपि त्रिविधः । स्वोपाधिभूताविद्यागुणव्यभिचारेण विष्णुब्रह्मरुद्रभेदात् । कारणीभूतसत्त्वगुणावच्छिन्नो विष्णुः पालयिता, कारणीभूतरजउपहितो ब्रह्माक्षष्टा हिरण्यगर्भन्तु महाभूतकारणात्वाभावात् न ब्रह्मा, तथापि स्थूलभूतसष्टृत्वात् क्वचित् ब्रह्मेत्युपचर्यते.....कारणीभूततमउपहितोरुद्रः रुद्रश्चा ।

to *Hiranyagarva* who energises the cosmic elements, bringing out the world of the manifold by the process of quintuplication.

In the quiescence of cosmic absorption a change suddenly arises owing to the will of *Brahman* to express itself, and simultaneously the equilibrium of indeterminate *Maya* is broken. The primordial matter at once comes to a state of determinate existence owing to the break up and division of its constituent elements, *Sattwa*, *Rajas* and *Tamas*. When *Brahman* accepts *Maya* as its *upadhi* and informs it, especially when it selects *Maya* in its *Sattwic* element, it becomes *Iswara*. *Brahman* in association with this *Sattwa* is all-knower, as everything is clearly reflected in its intelligence which is free from any coarse element. *Iswara* soon discovers the existence of *Maya* in its *tamasic* aspect which it begins to energise, and, as the result thereof, originate the elements of nature. We may regard this as the *apara* (the lower) *prakriti* of *Iswara* who by his *para* can freely relate himself to the *apara* without being in any way determined by it. This attribute of freely moving and relating itself to the *apara* is a nature essential to it. This gives us the *material* cause and the *efficient* cause of the cosmic order. *Maya* is never completely independent. This energising and moulding of the *apara* by the *para* is the creative activity, which is predominating in *Rajas*.¹

The *Apara Prakriti* lies at the root of the five subtle elements. It originates the ether, the air, the fire, the water and the earth at the command of *Iswara*. These elements are pure and simple. They do not intermix.

The *Chhandogya* has it—"It conceived the idea I will become many. I will propagate myself. So it created fire. This fire conceived the idea I will become many, it

¹ तमः प्रधानप्रकृतेस्तद्भोगविश्वराज्या

created water; the water conceived I will become many, so it created food."

We have also in the *Taittiriya Śruti* that *Akasa* is first originated from the self-alienation of *Brahman*. *Vayu* originates from *Akasa*, *Tejas* from *Vayu*, *Ap* from *Tejas*, *Earth* from *Ap*. The five elements are called *Sukṣmabhūtas* or subtle matter. These *Sukṣmabhūtas* are a mass of *homogeneous* matter. They originate in continuous succession. They are subtle and do not admit of any use.¹

Vedantism does not maintain the atomicity of matter. The elements have distinctive qualities. *Akasa* is instinct with sound, *Vayu* with energy, *Teja* with the energy of heat and light, *Ap* with the energy of exciting taste, *Earth* with the potency of affecting smell.

From the subtle matter originates the gross matter, the *Sthūlabhūta*, generally called, the *Mahabhūta*. All the five *Shukṣmabhūtas* are elements in the composition of each *Mahabhūta*, though in different proportion. The gross matter, or more properly, the compounded matter, is formed out of subtle matter by the process, *Pancikarṇa*. These *Mahabhūtas* imbibe in them the distinctive qualities of the *Sukṣmabhūtas* and soon begin to manifest them. *Akasa* manifests sound; *Vayu*, sound and energy; *Teja*, sound, energy, heat and light; *Ap*, sound, energy, heat, light, and the capacity of affecting taste; *Earth*, sound, energy, heat and light, and the capacity of affecting taste and smell. (*Vide Vedantasara*).² Authorities

¹ परस्मात् आत्मनः सकाशात् अनुक्रमेण जातानि, तानि च अतिसूक्ष्माणि व्यवहारात्तन्माणि—Panchikaran Vivaranam, Manuscript, No. 46, Sanskrit College Library.

² तदानीमाकाशे शब्दोऽभिच्यज्यते, वायौ शब्दस्पर्शौ, अपौ शब्दस्पर्शरूपाणि जले शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसाः, पृथिव्यां शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगन्धाश्च ।

seem to differ on this point. *Sureswaracharjya* appears to have ascribed these qualities to *Sukṣmabhūtas*.¹

The *Pancadaśi* has also accepted the distinction of the *Sukṣma* and the *Mahabhūtas* and ascribed these qualities to the *Mahabhūtas*.² The *Vidwatmonoranjani* traces the origin of *Panchatanmatra* in continuous succession from *Abyakrita*. From these *tanmatras* originate the *Mahabhūtas* which manifest different qualities. The later *Vedantists* seem to have been influenced by the *Sankhya* scheme of the *Tanmatras* and the *Mahabhūtas*.

We have seen already that *Vedantism* does not accept the atomicity of matter. Still the origin of *Mahabhūtas* out of the five homogeneous elements by *Panchikaraṇa* would suppose the disintegration in different proportions of each element and the consequent integration of them as complex wholes. Nothing new is originated this wise, for, the *Mahabhūtas* are not something entirely different from the *Sukṣmabhūtas*. They are non-different from the causes, just as a piece of cloth is non-different from the threads. The *Sukṣmabhūtas* become *Mahabhūtas* by an inherent necessity through *Panchikaraṇa*. *Vedantism* combines in it the doctrines of *Vivārtha*, *Parīṇama*, and

आसीदेकं परं ब्रह्म नित्यमुक्तमविक्रियम् ।
 तत्स्वभावासमावेशाद्दीजमव्याहृतात्मकम् ॥
 तस्मादाकाशमुत्पन्नं शब्दतन्मातरूपकम् ।
 स्पर्शात्मकस्ततो वायुस्तेजोरूपात्मकं ततः ॥
 आपो रसात्मिकास्तस्मात्ताभ्योगन्धात्मिका मही ।
 शब्देकगुणमाकाशं शब्दस्यशंखुणो मरुत् ॥
 शब्दस्पर्शरूपगुणैस्त्रिगुणं तेज उच्यते ।
 शब्दस्यशंरूपरसगुणैरापश्चतुर्गुणाः ॥
 शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगन्धैः पञ्चगुणा मही ।
 तेभ्यः समभवत् सूत्रं लिङ्गं सर्वात्मकं महत् ॥

Vide पञ्चीकरणवार्तिकम् by सुरेश्वर ।

² *Vide Pancadaśi, Bhūta-Viveka, Ch. I.*

Arambha. The creative order is the *Vivarttha* of *Brahman*, the *Pariṇama* of *Brahman* as informing *Maya*, the *Sthulabhūtas*, including *Mahabhūtas*, are effects of subtle elements originated from *Atman*—effects in the sense of transfiguration and not complete transformation of the causes. Herein is the trace of *Arambhāda*.¹ The physical cosmos composed of fourteen kingdoms of existence (seven higher, seven lower), the stock of provisions, and the physical bodies of all creations have come out of the *Mahabhūtas*.

The process of combination is called *Pancikarāṇa*, *five-fold combination*. This process of quintuplication is hinted at in the *Pancikarāṇa* explained. *Chhandogya* in the doctrine of *Tribitkarāṇa*, *three-fold combination*, or triplication (*i.e.*, the subtle elements of *Tejas*, *Ap* and *Earth* are compounded by the process of triplication). But, later on, in the *Pancadaśī* and other works on *Vedānta* it is carried to its proper conclusion in the doctrine of *Pancikarāṇa*, for, the original elements are five and not three.

But *Vacaspati* and the author of the *Kalpataru* have broken away from the traditional theory of *Pancikarāṇa* and lent a support to the doctrine of *Tribitkarāṇa*. They seem to suppose that *Akasa* and *Vayu* are elements which cannot enter into the process of differentiation and combination. They are the material support whereupon the

¹ Vide *Valabodhini*.

तस्मात् तन्तुभ्यः अतिरिक्तः न पटः, किन्तु संयोगविशेषम् आपन्नाः तन्त्र एव पटः
लाघवात्, अतिरिक्तत्वेमानाभावात् च, एवं अपञ्चीकृतानि अपि पञ्चीकरणात्मकसंयोग-
विशेषमापन्नानि पञ्चीकृतानि इति उच्यन्ते, नतु अपञ्चीकृतेभ्यः पञ्चीकृतानि उत्पद्यन्ते,
आत्मनइव आकाशः । अतएव तत्त्वदीपने—“अपञ्चीकृतानि प्राग्भवशात् पञ्चीकृतताम्
आपद्यन्ते” इति उक्तम्

three elements by the process of triplication bring out the mass of concrete existences.¹

The five elements soon after their origin from the *apara prakṛiti* are disintegrated into parts, and these parts re-combine to form the physical elements, the *Mahabhūtas*. Each *Sukṣma* element is divided into two equal parts; of which, again, one part is divided into four equal parts. Then follows the *process of combination* of these parts. When, for example, the one main division ($\frac{1}{2}$) of *Akasa* is integrated with the sub-divisions of the air, the fire, the water, and the earth, *i.e.*, $\frac{1}{2}$ of the *Akasa* with $\frac{1}{8}$ th of other elements, we have the first compound, the *Sthūla Akasa*. Similarly, when the half of the element, air, is combined with one-eighth of the other elements, we have the second compound substance, air, and so on. In this process we get the five elements in mutual combination, though we retain the same designation for each one of them; and this naming follows the predominating element of the combination. These compounds, again, in other forms of integration and differentiation, give rise to the cosmic system comprising the fourteen worlds: seven in the nether region, four in the middle, and three in the higher regions. We must confess that *Vedantism* does not clearly explain how these regions come to existence in the course of cosmic evolution. We can only presume that the gradation of these regions follows the elements of composition.² The *Satya*,

¹ Vide *Vamati Kalpatoru*, Br. Sutra, II, 3, 1-7, Br. S., II, 3, 10. Vide *Siddhata Bindu*, p. 184. Vide *Vidvat Manoranjani*.

अथ च विद्वत्तम् विद्वत्तमेकैकां करवाणोतिश्रुतेः विद्वत्कुर्वंतउपदेशादिति सूत्राच्च वयाणामिव मेलनप्रतीतेश्च विद्वत्करणमेव केचिन्मन्यन्ते ।

² Vide *Siddhantabindu*, p. 186; *Vedantasara*, p. 12 (*Jibananda* Edition).

एवं विषया अपि पञ्चोक्तकेकभूतजन्याश्चतुर्दशभुवनाख्या ऊर्द्धमध्याधोभावेन सत्त्वर-जस्रमोक्षप्रधानाः ।

Jana and *Tapa lokas* are kingdoms where the life's movement is free, and the soul's vision is expansive because of the predominance of *sattwa* over *rajas* and *tamas* in the composition of their being. The finite beings in the upward movement of evolution gradually reach these kingdoms and find rest in the *satya-*

The planes of *loka* whence they cannot fall away because of the acquired purity of their being which has fitted them for dwelling in the higher regions. They enjoy an expansive life. With the re-absorption of the world process they attain the vision of identity and pass into the silence of existence. These kingdoms by the virtue of the rhythmic vibration of the life-current passing through them make it possible for the progressive soul to understand and enjoy a better life, to command a wider vision of truth for which the soul is a sojourner from eternity. These habitations are full of life, serenity and every thing which is the invariable effect of *Sattwa*. Here knowledge is intuitive. Delight is serene. Life is easy.

The lower region is formed out of the combination of elements in which *tamas* predominates. It is, because of this, full of darkness and makes the development of higher life and mentality hardly possible. It is far removed from the centre of life and cannot receive the current of the universal life and bliss. It is consequently not an ordered system where the regulating life-force can make itself felt. Darkness, ignorance and confusion prevail all round.

The intermediate state is characterised by the possession of the coarse matter, life and mind. Instead of being a disorderly chaotic mass it is a co-herent and orderly system of things which makes it a place wherein life can grow and mind can progressively work. Here life is freer, and vision is clearer and more expansive. It is

higher in order, because it is richer in life, freedom and delight. In these stages the *Rajas* or active element is predominant. But the movement of freedom in *Swarloka* and *Maharloka* is greater in the sense of receiving higher responses of life than is possible in *Bhu* and *Bhubarloka*.

In this way we can conceive a kingdom of beings, formed out of the *apara-Prikriti* by the fivefold combination of the elements.

The being who is conscious of the totality of concrete existences inhabiting the intermediate regions and regards itself as identical with this totality is called *Vaiswanara* or *Virat*. The *Virat* is the waking-consciousness. Each unit of existence conscious of its physical covering is called a *jiva*. Each of them is called in Vedantic terminology a *Visva*. We read in the *Gourpada's Karika*—*Visva* enjoys the gross physical things (विश्वहिस्रूलमुकनिव्यं). These beings do not possess the knowledge of the Identity and are, therefore, bound by their actions, good or bad, which determine the course of their existence, high or low. But the life of devotion and knowledge guides them on to the higher universes. The physical body with its appetites originates out of the *Mahabhutas*.

The origin of the body.

The gross earth transforms into bone, flesh, nerves, skin and hairs; the *Ap* into bile, blood, semen, secretions, and sweat; the *Tejas* into hunger, thirst, sleep, beauty and indolence; the *Vayu* into contraction, expansion, motion; the *Akasa* into spaces of the stomach, heart, neck, and head. The author of the *Ajnanabodhini* has another scheme. The chief transformation of the earth is the bones, of *Ap* is the flesh, of *Teja* the nerves, of *Vayu* the skin, of *Akasa* the hair. The chief element in bile is *Tej*, in sweat *Vayu*, in blood, Earth. The organic appetites and states of hunger, such as thirst,

sleep, anger, indolence have been explained by the ascription of them to one or more of these elements.

We have in the *Chhandogya* an analogous account of the process of nutrition and consequent distribution of different parts of the food throughout the system. This description is based upon the doctrine of *Tribitkarana* : *e.g.*, the food we take in is divided into three parts : one part is the refuse matter, the other transforms into flesh and the finest part goes to the formation and growth of *manas*. It gives a support to the senses. Similarly the water we take is transformed into urine, blood and life. The oily substances transform into bone, marrow and speech. *Manas*, *prana* and speech are supposed to be the finest modification of food, water and oil (Chapter VI).

The word "*Praṇa*" has been used in different senses.

1 *Praṇa* is *Brahman*. All the *devas*, all the senses carry oblations to *Brahman* which is *Prana*. *Prana* is the inmost of being. It exists behind the senses, the *manas* (*Vide Kausitaki Upanisad*, Chapter 2).

(2) *Praṇa* is the cosmic energy. It is the support of the creation (*Vide Prasna Upanisad*, Chapter II). This *Praṇa* originates from *Atman*. The *devas*, the natural forces and the *indriyas* derive their capacities and powers from *Prana*.

(3) *Sankar* holds *Praṇa* to be originated from *Atman*. And it should not be confounded with the *Mula-Prakriti*.

This *Prana* manifests itself chiefly in two ways:—

(1) as the energy inherent in all natural forces.

(2) as the energy inherent in the inner organism, the vital force, the energies of the *indriyas*, and of the active organs (see *Sankar Bhasya*, Br. Ar., Chap. I, 5 Mantra, 5, 6, 7, 8, Chapters 2 & 3).

The former may be called *Adhi-bhuta Prana*, the latter *Adhyatma Prana*. *Sankar* tells us in the commentary on *Brihadaranyaka* that those who worship *Prana* in its limited manifestation acquire a finite life. But those who worship *Prana* as the immanent cosmic life are meant for eternal life.¹ This cosmic *Prana*, the collective dynamism, may be called *Adhidaiva*.²

We have just seen the account of *Prana* in the cosmic sense. We are to see now how the origin of the five organs of action and the five *Pranas* in individuals. the five organs of action and the five forms of energy (*Prana*) keeping up the vitality of the organism are produced. The two are formed out of the *rajasic* constituent of the five elements, *Sukshmathutas*, individually or collectively. Individually the *rajasic* element of the *Akasa* is supposed to give support to speech, that of the *Vayu*, to the hand, that of the *Teja*, to the foot, that of the *Ap* and that of the Earth to the lower organs of evacuation and generation respectively. Collectively they originate the *Vitality* of the organism which regulates the inner functions. This may be called the individual vivifying principle, the mainstay of the physical frame. It is said in the *Sruti* "when the *prana* goes out, all senses, including *manas*, go out, and when *Prana* is seated within, the others perform their functions regularly." *Prana* preserves the physical frame in existence, regulates the

¹ Vide *Brihat Aranyaka*, 1, 5, 13 and *Bhasya* thereupon.

² Vide *Bhamati*, p. 643, यत्त्वस्य विभूत्वान्नानं तदाधिदैविकेन सूतात्मना समष्टिव्यष्टिरूपेण न त्वाध्यत्मिकेन रूपेण ।

entire physiological process and makes the performance of higher functions possible in the physical frame.

This *prana* is pervasive of the whole body and keeps all the parts alive and working. (पञ्चवृत्तिभिः कृच्छ्रे शरीरव्यापित्वात्.) It has different designations in reference to functions it performs. When it regulates the respiratory system, it is called the *Mukhya Prana* or *prana* simply. Its primacy over the other forms is a favourite theme of the *upanisads*. When it is the principle of digestion, it is called *Samānū*, if it helps excretions through the lower organs, it is called *Apana*. When it regulates the functions of the higher organ of the brain, it is called *Udana*. When it is the principle of circulation, it is called *Vyana*.

Sankar seems to hold that the chief *Prana* manifests itself in five forms, so that, that which is generally known as *Prana* is a *mode* of it, but not the *Mukhya Prana* itself.

Let us deal with each one of them :

(1) *As to the Udana*: The *Prasna Upanisad* defines it as "one which, at the time of death, carries the sinner to hell, the virtuous to heaven, the one possessing merit and demerit in equal proportion to the habitation of man."¹ The *Vidvatmanoranjini* regards it as placed or located in throat.² We have also in the *Ratnabali*—"Udana is placed in the region extended from throat upwards."³ These definitions indicate that it is the upward current generally controlling the functions of higher centres. *Sankar* defines it to be the upward current from the feet to the brain.⁴

¹ Vide *Prana Upanishad*, Chs. 3, 5, vide Br. Sn., II, 4, 7, *Bhasya*.

² कण्ठसम्बन्धस्य प्रायेण नियतत्वात् कण्ठस्थानवर्त्तोऽदान इति उक्तम् ।

³ अदानः कण्ठदेशस्थः ।

⁴ अदान उत्कर्षार्थं गमनादि हेतुरापादतलमनकस्थान ऊर्ध्ववृत्तिः । *Sankar Bhasya, Brihat Aranyaka*, 1, 5, 3.

(2) *As to the Prana*: It is the energy which directly controls the process of inhaling and exhaling. We read in the *Prasna Upanisad*, "the *Prana* is situated in the eye, the ear, the mouth, the nose."¹ *Prana* is supposed to be situated in the heart.² 'The heart is *Prana*'! *Prana* regulates the breath activity (*Sankar Bhasya*, 2, 4, 11). The *Vidvatmonoranjini*³ has it that though *Prana* is said to be the heart in the *sruti*, and as such the heart seems to be the place where it is located, still, because of its being directly felt at the end of the nose, it is to be supposed as located therein.

From these authorities it will be clear that *prana* is situated in the five organs of sense, in the sensory nerves accompanying them, and in the heart. And it controls the respiratory system.

(3) *As to the Samana*: It is the energy which helps the digestion and assimilation of food and changes it into the chief ingredients of the body. We have in the *Śruti*, "this *Samana* assimilates the food from which arises the seven sparks of fire (or energy), the five senses, *manas*, and intelligence. *Sankara* says in his commentary (2. 4. 13) "*Saman* is one which sends through the body the essence of food."⁴ The author of the *Vedantasara* regards it as helping the process of assimilation and transformation of the food into blood, and rejecting the rest in the form of excretions (urine, stool, etc.). It is not the process of actually giving out, but only one of forming the materials to be rejected.

¹ (चक्षुश्रोत्रे मुखनासिकाभ्यां प्राणः सप्रतिष्ठते)।

² प्राणाः हृदयम् ।

³ यद्यपि "प्राणः हृदये" इति श्रुतेः हृदिप्राण इति अभिधानात् "हृदयस्थानः प्राणः तथापि नासाय प्रत्यक्षमुपलभ्यमानत्वात् नासायस्थानवर्ती ।

⁴ समानः समंसम्बन्धेषु गतिषु योत्ररसात्रयति ।

The *Samana* has then three functions: it helps assimilation of food and transformation of it into the chief constituents of the body, and it spreads out energy through the body. It can be, therefore, regarded as one sustaining the body and helping its development by the energy which it draws out of food.

As to the Apana: It gives out the refuse matter of the system. The *Sruti* says that *Apana* is situated in *Payu* and *Upastha*,¹ i. e., the lowest organs of excretion, the organs of evacuation and generation. *Apana* expels the rejected material out of the body. Its chief function is to separate the body from the matter which is detrimental to it.

As to the Vyana: It circulates energy throughout the entire nervous system. The *Chhandogga* says that the heart is the meeting place of one hundred and one nerves, from each one of which branches out in all directions 72,000 nerves. The *Vyana* flows through them. It is the cause of energetic actions.² It is situated throughout the organism.

The above definitions establish the two chief marks of *Vyana*. It works from the heart throughout the entire system. It is, therefore, centred in the motor nerves attached to the involuntary and voluntary muscles.

These *pranas* sometimes have been defined in slightly different ways in the *Upanisads*, e. g., *prana* denotes expiration, later on, both expiration and inspiration. (B.A. ; Ch-5), *Apana*, the inspiration, later on, the wind causing digestion and evacuation, *Samana*, sometimes the wind digesting food, sometimes that which connects expiration and inspiration, *Udana*, that which carries food up and down (*Maitri*, II, 6).

Apart from these, in some books we have the reference to other forms of *Prana*. *Nag*—It causes vomiting,

¹ अवाग्मनवान् पायादिस्थानवर्ती अपानः ।

² Vide *Vidvat Monoranjini* वीर्यवत्कर्म्महेतुत्वात् अखिलशरीरवर्ती व्यानः ।

Kurma—It helps the opening of the eyes. *Dhananjaya*—It repairs the system. *Devadatta*—It causes yawning. *Krikara*—It excites hunger.

As to the Nerve centres: An account of the nervous system is given in *Sureswara's Manasolassa* (pp. 94-98). It must be confessed that author has followed the traditional *yogic* account of the nervous system and has not given anything new. The heart is the centre from which spread out nerves in all directions. The cerebro-spinal axis is the habitation of nerve-centres, generally called lotuses or *chakras*. They are the centres of *Pranic* dynamism and, when stimulated, originate forces conducive to the opening of higher spiritual consciousness. These forces as well as the centres are psycho-physical. They never flash across ordinary vision. They are objects of *Yogic* perception. These centres are usually regarded as six or seven in number. The lowest one is called the *Adhara*. It is located in the Pelvic. It is the seat for semi-intellectual sentiments. Next comes the *Swadhishthan*, corresponding to the Hypo-gastric centre, wherein the selfish sentiments are alleged to be originated. Next to the *Swadhishthan* is the *Manipur* corresponding to the Epi-gastric centre (which is marked for selfish propensities). Next to the *Manipur* is the *Anahata* which corresponds to the Cardiac, supposed to be the seat of domestic feelings. Then comes the *Visuddha*, corresponding to the Carotid plexus supposed to be the seat of perceptiveness. We have then the *Ajna*. It corresponds to the *Medulla oblongata*. Last of all comes the *Sahasrara*, corresponding to the cereberum. These two higher centres are regarded as the seat of higher mental-functions and spirituality.

These six centres are connected with one another by the *Susumna*, the nerve which is active in *yogis* alone.

Its main function is to carry up the energy, the coiled up serpent, the *Kundalini*, from the *Muladhara* to the highest brain-centre, *Sahasrara*. The *Suṣumna* lies between the *Iḍa* on the left and the *Pingala* on the right. The nerves also proceed from the *Muladhara* to the *Ajna chakra* where they meet, again, the *Suṣumna*. The *Iḍa* and the *Pingala* are active in all men. In some books we have an account of two other nerves. The *Bajra* is within the *Suṣumna*. The *Citra* is in the *Bajra*. The *Brahma* is in the *Citra*.

The system of conscious life : the origin of the organs of sense and organs of relation (understanding).

The account of conscious life.

As to the sense-organs : The Vedantic psychology conceives the existence of *manas* as the central organ of the soul. It is supplied with knowledge of objects through the sense-organs. The sense-organs are the outlets through which the mental-consciousness can go out and perceive external objects.¹ These sense-organs are five in number : the ear, the skin, the eye, the tongue, and the nose. They are evolved out of the five elements in their *sattwic* aspect respectively. Corresponding to these five senses there are five kinds of perceptions according as their object is sound, touch, form, taste or smell. These are the organs of sensibility supplying the material content of knowledge.

Here, again, the distinctions of *Adhyatma*, *Adhibhuta* and *Adhidaiva* are clearly borne out. The sense-organ is *Adhyatma*, its object is *Adhibhuta*, the corresponding cosmic force is *Adhidaiva*. Vedantism places side by side the two worlds of subjective and objective orders and the synthetic unity of them in the cosmic life. *Adhyatma* represents the

¹ We shall after a few pages give a complete description of the process.

subjective, *Adhibhuta*, the objective, and *Adhidaiva*, the synthetic or cosmic life. The manifested order is represented as the synthesis of the subjective and the objective in the life of the totality. The senses are *adhyatma*, their objects *adhibuta*, *Dik*, *Vayu*, *Aditya*, *Varuna* and *Aswini*, the corresponding *Adhidairas*. This distinction has also been extended to the organs of action. The five organs of action—*Vak*, hand, feet, the organs of generation and evacuation—are *adhyatma* corresponding to the respective *Adhibhutas*—speech, gift, distance, pleasures of generation and evacuation,— and *Adhidaivas*—*Agni*, *Indra*, *Viṣṇu*, *Prajapati* and *Death*.¹ These senses are not mere outlets through which the inner senses of *Antahkarana* goes out. Every sense is endowed with power, *e. g.*, the skin as an *indriya*, is not the mere outer surface of the body; similarly the eye has the power of receiving the colours of bodies, and so on. These capacities are something different from the surface-existence of the senses, though they are inherent in them.²

Vedantism differs in this from the *Saugatas* and the *Mimansakas*. The former identify the senses with end organs (गोलक), the latter, with the end-organs as endowed with capacity. The *Vedantists* cannot agree with the former, for they maintain the serpents can hear, though they have no auditory organ; the trees can feel everything, though they are devoid of all end-organs. They cannot concur with the *Mimansakas*, for, the capacity or *Indriya-Sakti* meets the purpose. There is no necessity of assuming an additional hypothesis of end-organs. These senses are

¹ Vide *Sureswara's Pancīharaṇa Vartik*, 12-23 slokas.

² *Ātma-anatmaviveka*, pp. 10-12, *Vivaranaprāmeya Sangraha*, p. 185, l. 10-115 (Benares Edition).

inert. Though the *indriyas* cannot give us any knowledge unless they have in the background the light of consciousness, till they are necessary to bring objects in direct connection with this light of consciousness.¹

These *pranas* and *indriyasaktis* are subtle and escape direct perception. But they are not all-pervasive. Vedantism does not accept the conclusion of the *Sankhya* that they are all-penetrating, being all-pervasive. Had they been so, they would have given us the knowledge of distant but small things. The author of the *Vivaranaprameya Sangraha* has denied the possibility of *indriyas* going out everywhere in the company of body, for the body is inert, and it can move only in association with *prana*. This *prana* again is not all-pervasive. Had it been so, the *Sruti* would not have propounded its entrance at birth and its exit at death. The name *indriya* appears first in the *Kath* and the *Kena*. Other texts call them *prana*. The enumeration of the ten *indriyas* occurs in the *Brihadaranyaka*. (*Vide* Chs. II, IV, V, 12.) It adds *manas* and *heart*. We have also reference to *manas* as the central organ of cognition and action (*vide* B. A., I, V, 3 IV, I, 6). In the *Katha* the senses are compared to horses, *manas* to their bridle, *buddhi* to the driver (*Kat.*, III, 3). We have a slightly different version in the *Maitri-Upanisad* where the organs of action are compared to horses, the intelligence to the reins, *Manas*, to the driver (*Mai.* II, 9).

(2) *As to the organs of relation* : The mind-stuff or *antahkarana*² is the inner organ. It is called the eleventh

¹ *Vide Vivarana upanyasa :*

न गोलकानौन्द्रियाणि नापि तच्छक्तयोऽपितु ।

शक्तिमद्द्रव्यरूपाणि भौतिकान्धविभूनिच ॥

² दुहर्षान्याहुरेतानि वाक्पाण्यादीनि कर्मण्ये ।

तत्त्विकल्पार्थमन्तःस्थं मन एकादशं भवेत् ।—*Upadesa Sahasri.*

sense. It is to be distinguished from the organs of sense and the organs of action. Its special function is to give us the knowledge of manifold things one by one in succession. It is competent to receive all kinds of sensation. It has four chief functions. It is supposed to be divided into four parts corresponding to the functions. This division is not real, but is merely expressive of its four chief modifications. Each unit of transformation is distinguished from others by a unique quality of its own. The *Antahkaraṇa* is the name given to the totality of *vrittis* or semi-spiritual functions. *Vacaspati* asserts that *antahkaraṇa* is one indivisible entity, though it can work in different ways. It preserves its integrity through differences of functions (vide *Vamati* on Sr., 6, Chap. 2. 4). *Vedantism* does not lend support to faulty psychology. This *antahkaraṇa* is evolved out of the *sattwic* parts of the five elements (the *sukṣmabhūtas*) taken collectively. *Manas* is the *faculty of reflection*. When the *antahkaraṇa* is in the state of doubt due to its inability to make out the true character of anything and to arrive at a clear judgment, it is called *Manas*. Curiously enough this *manas* is, on the one hand, regarded as the central organ of perception, and, on the other hand, regarded as the organ of volition and the centre of all desires, and sometimes, again, as the reservoir of sentiments and feelings. We are told that the senses cannot give us knowledge if the *manas* is not active.¹

The *Vedantic* psychology makes *antahkaraṇa* the inner organ of knowledge as well as of volition including feeling and sentiment. The same organ is represented as performing these functions, each one of which is called a

¹ Vide *Brihadaranyaka Bhaṣya*, p. 238, Ch. 1, 5, 3.

तस्मात् यस्यासन्निरिधी रूपादिग्रहणसमर्थस्यापि सतश्चक्षुरादिः स्वस्वविषय सम्बन्धं रूपशब्दादिविज्ञानं न भवति, यस्य च भावे भवति तदन्वदक्षि मनोनामान्तःकरण सर्वकरण विषयोपयोगोऽवगम्यते ।

vritti, no matter whether it gives us knowledge or leads us to action. These *vrittis* can be classified as giving knowledge or as exciting actions. The former is passive, the latter impulsive. Hence we see that the same mind has been represented as the faculty of reflection, and also as the faculty of desire, deliberation and will. The *manas* has various modifications :

(A) some modifications corresponding to intellectual states :

(1) *Vicikitsa*—doubt, (2) *Dhi*—cognition, (3) *Sraddha*—belief, and (4) *Dhriti*—retention.

(B) Some corresponding to volition and emotion : (1) *Kama*—desire, (2) *Samkalpa*—decision and determination, (3) *vikalpa*—deliberation, (4) *vi*—fear, (5) *Hri*—shame, (6) *Sukha*—pleasure, and (7) *Dukha*—pain.¹

It must be noted here that the *vrittis* are often classified into three classes in reference to their constituent elements—*Sattwa*, *Rajas* and *Tamas*, e.g., liberality, resignation, etc., originate from the *sattwa*; passion, desire from the *rajas*; indolence, confusion, etc., from the *tamas* of *antahkarana* (vide *Pancadasi*, Ch. II, 12, 14, 15). This *antahkarana* is related to the senses and organs of actions through the nerves. The *antahkarana* is seated in the heart, with which all the nerves are connected, so that it can make use of these nerves and proceed to the senses, thence to outer objects (vide *Manasolassa*, Slokas, 9, 10, 11).²

¹ Vide *Maitrai Upanisad*, VI, 30, vide *Brihadaranyaka* I, 5, 3.

कामः संकल्पो विचिकित्सा श्रद्धाऽश्रद्धा धृतिरधृति र्ज्ञेर्धीर्भीरित्येतत् सर्व्वं मन एव ।
Vide the *Gita* इच्छा हेषं सुखं दुःखं संघातश्चेतना धृतिः । एतत्चेत्रं,
समासेन सविकारमुदाहृतम्, Chap. XIII, 6.

² अन्तःकरणसम्बन्धान् निखिलानौन्द्रियाण्यपि ।

रथाङ्गनेमिवलये कौलिता इव कौलकाः

नाभ्योऽन्तःस्करणे सूताजालसंस्थुतसूत्रवत्

ताभिस्तु गोलकान्ताभिः प्रसर्पन्ति स्फुलिङ्गवत्

करणानि समस्तानि यथासं विषयंप्रति ।

The distinction of *Adhyatma*, *Adhibhuta* and *Adhidaiva* has also been extended to the inner organ of *Antahkarana* and its functions. *Manas* is *Adhyatma*, its object is *Adhibhuta*, the moon is the corresponding *Adhidaiva*. Similarly *Buddhi*, *Ahankara* and *Chitta* are *Adhyatmas* with their corresponding objects as *Adhibhutas*, and *Brihaspati*, *Rudra* and *Kshetrajna* as the respective *Adhidaivas*. The *indriyas*, the *manas*, etc., are inspired by the corresponding deities.¹

We can conveniently study here the psychology of volition. The *Vedantin* accepts the successive states of cognition, desire and volition. We have a clear reference to this in the *Chhandogya* and in the *Taittiriya*. In the *Taittiriya* these stages are indicated in the doctrine of *Kosas*. Intelligence or *Buddhi* has the right apperception. *Manas* deliberates and wills. *Praṇa* sets organs to action. That in every action there is an end is laid down in the *Chhandogya*, and this is chiefly happiness and delight consequent upon the knowledge of the limitless and the great. This indeed is the ethical end. The knowledge is due to constant reflection intensified by a fond faith and unconquerable belief in the precepts of the teacher followed by a firm resolution leading on to action conducive to the attainment of happiness. To put it in different terms, we have cognition followed by belief and consequent action.²

When the *Antahkarana* reflects things truly, it is called *Buddhi*, the faculty of discriminating knowledge. The *Manas* weighs reasons for and against, the *Buddhi* apprehends rightly, and perceives clearly. It is the faculty of clear discrimination and right apperception.

The *antahkarana* has another *vritti* or modification in the form of 'I,' the sense of individuality. It is the

¹ (Vide *Brihadaranyaka*, Ch. II, I, 1-15.

² Vide *Chhandogya*, VII, 17-21

asmita, the *asmi*—I exist. The *Chitta* is the spirit of searching.¹ It has also been defined as the faculty of retention.²

These functions of mental consciousness are localised in the different parts of the body.

The Localisation of functions. *Manas* has been located in the throat, *Buddhi* in the mouth, *Chitta* in the navel region, *Ahankara* in the heart-cave.³ The author of the *Pancadasi* localises *Manas* in the heart-cave. Here the word '*manas*' has been used in the sense of *antahkarana*. (Ch. II, 12.) मनो दशेन्द्रियाध्यक्षं हृदयगोलकेस्थितम् ।

The *manas* has a limited or measurable magnitude.⁴ It is not of infinite magnitude. It cannot be so. If it were infinite in magnitude, it would have been simultaneously related to every sense. And, consequently, the possibility of simultaneously knowing everything would arise. Indeed, in that case it would be quite useless, for, *Atman* would experience all things at once. But *Manas* is necessary to enable *Atman* to have experience in succession. The *Naiyaikas* contend that *manas* is eternal, and, being eternal,

¹ We have this division on the authority of the Vartik (*vide* Slokas 33, 34).

मनोबुद्धिरहंकारश्चित्तं चित्तं चतुष्टयम् ।

संकल्पाख्यं मनोरूपं बुद्धिर्निश्चयरुपिणी ॥

अभिमानत्मकसहदहंकारः प्रकीर्तितः ।

अनुसन्धानरूपञ्च चित्तमित्यभिधीयते ॥

² *Vide Vidvat Monoraniini*, p. 13. बुद्धेर्हि अपूर्वः विषयः, चित्तस्य पूर्वानुभूतः ।

³ *Vide* p. 10, Sankara's *Atma-anatmaviveka*.

⁴ मनोऽनित्यं सावयवं संकोचि च विकासिच

आत्मा विभुः स्वप्रकाशः सर्व्वपाणिषु चैकलः

Vide Vivaranupanyasa.

it is without magnitude. An eternal being must be either of infinite magnitude or without any magnitude. But it cannot be of infinite magnitude, for, as pointed above, in that case it would be quite useless. Hence it should have no magnitude whatsoever.

To the Vedantist nothing is eternal, save *Atman*. That which is eternal can only be of infinite magnitude or be without any magnitude. *Manas* is not eternal. It must necessarily be of limited magnitude.

But in the earlier texts *Manas*, *Vak* and *Prana* are affirmed to possess infinite magnitude. (ते एते सर्वे एव समाः सर्वे नन्ताः). *Vak* is the *Pik*, *Manas* is the *Yajur*, *Prana* is the *Sama*. "*Vak* is the *Devas*, *Manas*, the fathers, *Prana*, the men." *Prajapati* is represented to be *vak*, *manas* and *prana*. Here we are to take *Manas* in the sense of collective mental consciousness which is all pervasive and is the *upadhi* of *Hiranyagarva* or *Praṇa*. *Sureswara* also affirms that *Manas* in the sense of cosmic *Antahkarana* has an infinite magnitude.¹

The later *Vedantism* holds that, apart from the cosmic *manas*, there are *manas*-units, appropriated to individuals. Here, again, the *Vedantists* differ amongst themselves about its location and magnitude. Some think that *Manas* is pervasive of the whole body and has a magnitude equal to that of the body. Others hold it to be centred in the heart possessing a lesser magnitude, which, although, is not atomic.² Curiously enough, *Vacaspati* seems to

¹ Vide *Manasa-ullasa*, p. 150, ll. 5-7 :

"ते एते सर्वे एव समाः सर्वे नन्ताः" इति वाङ्मनःप्राधाननुक्रम्य द्विरण्यगर्भ-
रूपेणात्मानानमनसो व्यापकत्वात्। तस्य मनःप्रधानलिङ्गात्मनः समष्टिशरीरस्य
तत्कार्यव्यष्टिशरीरे व्याप्तपपत्तेश्च तद्वाराव्यष्टिपिण्डस्यापियुक्तं सर्व्वात्मकत्वमिति।

² Vide *Sidhantabindhu* and *Pancadasi*.

शरीरमध्ये स्थित सर्वशरीरव्यापकः सत्त्वप्राधान्येन सूक्ष्मप्रपञ्चभूतारब्धः अन्तकरणाख्यः।

have lent a support to the atomicity of *manas* in his *Vamati*, which, subsequently, has been explained away by the author of *Kalpataru—Parimal*. He holds that *Vacaspati* puts forth the *Naiyayika's* assertion in that passage. He does not set forth his view as a *Vedantist*.¹

The *Vedantists* agree in holding that *manas* or *antahkarana* has the capacity of expansion and contraction. No doubt, it is of limited magnitude, but, it has no limit in this direction. It can take the form of anything large or small (vide *Prameya Samgraha and Parimal*).

The *upadhis*, above noticed, which condition the individualisation of the soul, may be classified in the following way:—

The fivefold sheath.

- I. The coarse body, the fleshy covering which the soul casts off at death.
- II. The body which accompanies the soul beyond grave, and which includes:—
 - (A) *The subtle-body* or the finer body consisting of
 - (i) *The life organs—Prana*—the vital currents supporting and preserving the organic existence.
 - (ii) *The five organs of action* including the tongue, the hands, the feet, the organs of generation and evacuation.

¹ See Bhamati and Kalpataru-Parimal, p. 2, 3 29 :

यद्यपि च तःकरणमणुः, तथापि तस्य त्वचा संबहुत्वात्, त्वचश्च सर्व्वशरीरव्यापित्वा-
देकदेशोऽप्यधिष्ठाता लगधिष्ठितेवेतिशरीरव्यापी जीवःशक्नोति सर्व्वाङ्गीणं शैत्यमनुभवितुं ।
मनोऽणुः तस्यात्मना संयोगश्च ज्ञानाद्यसमवाधिकारणमिति नैयायिकपक्षमाश्रित्य,
यदि सिद्धान्तानुसारेण पाञ्चभौतिकं मनः प्रदीपप्रमावात् संकोचविकाशशीलं तत-
संयोगश्च नासमवाधिकारणं ।

- (iii) *the five organs of sense* including the organs of hearing, seeing, touching, smelling and testing.
- (iv) the central organ of conscious life directing the organs of perception and the organs of action, called *antakkaranam*, which, again, is chiefly taken as (1) *manas*, and (2) *buddhi*.

The coarse body is purely flesh. It is the *dense cover*, *Annamay kosa*.

The subtle body is divided into three-fold sheath of *Praṇa*, *Manas* and *Vijñāna*. The organs of vitality and the organs of action combine to form the *Praṇamaya Koṣa*, the *vital cover*. *Manas* with five senses forms the *Monomaya Koṣa*, the mental cover. *Buddhi* with the senses forms the still deeper covering, the *Vijñānamaya-koṣa*, the Intelligence-cover.

Authorities differ on this point. The authors of the *Vedantasara* and the *Tattwa-anusandhan* hold that *Manas* with the five organs of action forms the mental-sheath, while the author of the *Panchadasi* opines that *Manas* with five organs of sense form the mental-sheath. This difference is due to different meaning put on *manas*. The *Panchadasi* regards *Manas* as the faculty of reflection, and it is only natural that it should connect *manas* with the sense-organs, for, they give it a direct report. The *Vedantasara* interprets *manas* as the faculty of willing, and it is quite proper that it should connect *manas* with the organs of action, for, action follows decision and will.¹

¹ Vide *Panchadasi*, Chap. I, 34. Vide *Vedantasara*, p. 9, Jivananda Edition.

मनसु कर्मेन्द्रियैः सहितं मनोमयकोषो भवति ।

We read in the *Vedantasara*.

We read in the *Tattwanusandhan*.—कर्मेन्द्रियैः सहितं मनो मनोमयकोषः । एतेषु कोषेषु मध्ये विज्ञानमय-मनोमय प्राणमयकोषाणां क्रमेण ज्ञानिच्छाक्रियाशक्तिभेदेन कर्तृकरणक्रियारूपत्वं दर्शयति ।

(B) *The causal-body.* The inmost sheath of *avidya* which is called the sheath of bliss owing to the predominance of *sattwa*, for, this body is composed purely of the *sattwic* aspect of *avidya*.

(Apart from these two bodies forming the inner covering of the soul, there is another element which accompanies the soul to the next birth, his *karma*, which has not yet attained complete fruition, but, which, no doubt, is destroyed as soon as it works itself out. But, so long as one has not attained the knowledge of Identity, one cannot get rid of the vehicles of individual existence, *viz.*, the fourfold sheath).

When the *atman* has the totality of subtle bodies as *upadhi*, it is called *Hiranyagarva* (full of splendour and effulgence,—one who has the effulgence of knowledge within). It is also sometimes called *Praṇa*, because it is immanent in everything and possesses knowledge, will and power. *Praṇa* is the dream-consciousness. When consciousness or *atman* has the individual subtle body for its *upadhi*, it is called *Taijas*. *Taijas* enjoys the subtle desires (so called because of its possessing the beaming *antahkaraṇam* as its *upadhi*). The former has the knowledge of the entire existence because of the expansiveness of its being. The latter is limited in its vision, for, it is possessed of one unit of *antahkaraṇam* and cannot see all things through this finite organ.

When the *Atman* has for its *upadhi* the bliss-body, it is called *Iswara*. It is the sleep-consciousness. When it is determined by the individual bliss-body, or the individual Ignorance

it is called *Pragna*.¹ It enjoys bliss. Behind the bliss-body, and, as the inmost of all beings, exists the *Brahman* of complete integrity, the spirit of infinite peace and joy. Beyond the golden veil is the serene light of knowledge.² This inmost existence is through mistake or ignorance apparently identified with the sheaths or its outer coverings and appears to us as the seat of knowledge, will and power. The soul within is pure consciousness of existence, but, so long as ignorance lasts, it appears as the energising conscious principle integrating and organising the manifold of existence. It knows. It wills. It acts. The doctrine of *Koṣas* is an old one, and we find it in the *Taittiriya Sruti*. *Sankara* says 'we have to go behind the five *koṣas* to find out our true self—beyond the physical body, beyond the vital principle, beyond the mind and intellect and beyond our beatific consciousness.'³

We can put the above in the following scheme ⁴:—

1. Individual gross body determinant of <i>Viśva</i> , the individual waking consciousness.	} Sheath of food	} Cosmic gross body determinant of <i>Virat</i> , the cosmic waking consciousness.
2. Individual subtle body determinant of <i>Taijasa</i> , the individual dream consciousness.		
3. Individual causal body determinant of <i>Pragna</i> , the individual sleep consciousness.	} Sheath of Bliss.	} Cosmic causal body determinant of <i>Isvara</i> —the cosmic sleep consciousness.

¹ Vide *Upadesa Sāhasri*. (सत्यज्ञमतिप्रकरण').

विराट् वैश्वानरोवाङ्मः स्वरनुन्तः प्रजापतिः । प्रविलीते तु सर्वस्मिन् प्राज्ञोव्याकृत-सुषुते ।

² हिरण्यगये परे कोषे विरजं ब्रह्म निष्कलम् ।—*Manduka* II, 9.

³ The scheme is taken from the *Brahman—Knowledge*.

The soul seems to be embedded in the five-fold sheath. The author of the *Pancadasi* has established the distinction of the soul from the body in all its *koṣas*—the physical, the vital and the mental by the *Anvaya-vyatireka* method of Logic, a method somewhat similar to Mill's method of difference. Ordinarily, the soul and its coverings are manifested together. But there are circumstances where the *upadhīs* are not, but, the soul is, manifested. The soul is, then, different from the sheaths. In dream-consciousness the self freely creates a world of representation, but the sense-activity is kept in abeyance. In dreamless sleep the creative activity is hushed up in the silence of deep sleep. But the self-luminous ego still shines through the thin cover of Nescience. This discrimination becomes clear in meditative self-absorption when the veil of ignorance is lifted up, and the individual soul realises its identity with the Absolute. In this state the conscious antagonism of the knower and the knowable which characterises empirical knowledge vanishes. This is a sure proof of the transcendence of consciousness.

There is another line of argument by which we can differentiate the self from the body and the mind—by setting forth (1) the difference between subject and object, and (2) the difference between the subject and its instruments.

Citsukhacharya observes that the common distinction of the subject and the object would disappear if the object of cognition is supposed to be identical with the cognition itself.¹

¹ दृग्दृश्य भेदनात् ।

Applying this axiomatic truth *Vedanta* seeks to differentiate the self from body and mind—from the five-fold covering. *Sankara* makes an elaborate use of this form of argument in the beginning of the *Upadesh Sahasri* to establish the clear isolation of *Atman* from every object of perception, the organism, *manas*, and *buddhi* or intelligence. The body, the functions of mind, desires, determination and so forth appear before the self as objects of knowledge and, therefore, imply an existence different from it.¹ Even in the height of introspective analysis the self can clearly discriminate between its nature as a *person* and as a *witness* (साक्षी) and by a supreme effort of withdrawal can understand its transcendent oneness.

The word *saksin* is indicative of direct perception and permanent unmodified existence.² ** The *Jiva* can pass into a transcendent abstraction and can notice or witness its *upadhi* (*manas* or *avidya*) as distinct from it.

The *manas*, then, appears more as an object than as an adjunct. It is an accident. But in each case it is the differentiating mark inasmuch as it gives an individuality to consciousness. This difference between consciousness as *jiva* and consciousness as *saksin* is due to the occasional predominance of *Rajasic* or *Sattwic* elements of *Antahkarana*. When the *Sattwa* prevails over the *Rajas*, the vision of the self as transcending mental affections looms before the view. But when the *rajas* predominates over the *sattwa*, the consciousness seems to be identified with the *Antahkarana*, and [appears] as the energising principle, hardly having any chance of distinguishing itself from the

¹ मनोऽपि आत्मा न भवति दृश्यत्वात् करणत्वाच्च ।

बुद्धिरपि आत्मा न भवति दृश्यत्वात् करणत्वाच्च ।—Vide *Ajnanabodhini*.

² साक्षात् ईश्वरान्वित्विकारत्वाच्च ।

Antahkarana. The witness is the seer. It remains untouched and unmoved by affections of any kind because of its being only a silent observer.

The existence of *Avidya* is a fact to the witness. Nescience can keep away everything from view, but not the witnessing consciousness. Nescience, the consciousness of self and the inner organ are in constant relation with the unobscured light of intelligence. They are never subject to our ignorance, error or doubt. The state of *Saksin* or witnessing consciousness is a state of bliss. "Bliss as the object of highest love is certainly present in consciousness"—so says *Vivaran*.

Vedantists are sharply divided among themselves upon the conception of *Saksin*. The study of the different theories is helpful to the understanding of the Vedantic theories of dream. The theories are:—

1. *Jiva* is witness.
2. *Brahman* is witness.

The former, again, may be conceived in two ways:—

- (a) The witness is *jiva*, *jiva* being a reflection of consciousness cast on *Avidya*. It has *avidya* as its *upadhi* (*Prakasatman*).

(1) *Jiva as Witness*.

The *jiva* is the all-pervasive consciousness. It is itself the direct seer, the witness. It is indifferent to all but falsely regards itself as an active agent after erroneously identifying itself with the *Antahkarana*.¹

Vacaspati also regards the *Avidya*-units to be limiting conditions of consciousness. Consciousness thus limited is *jiva*; consciousness when witnessing this limiting condition is *saksi*. According to *Vivarana* the witness is one, for the *jiva* is one. *Vacaspati* makes

witness appropriated to each individual unit of consciousness, for, each has a distinct adjunct. According to *Vacaspati jiva* is the witness.

(2) The witness is *jiva*—*jiva* regarded as having the inner organ of *Antahkarana* as its limiting adjunct. The witness is *jiva* but not *jiva* in the form of the all-pervading intelligence which has *Avidya* as its limiting adjunct. *Jiva* by its intimate association with the inner organ is the witness. Through

(b) *Jiva* as the reflection of consciousness upon *Antahkarana*.

this association with the inner organ, the witness is appropriated to distinct individuals. It may be objected that since *jiva* which is associated with the inner organ is the percipient, it cannot be identified with the witness. For it is generally accepted that the percipient ceases to exist in deep sleep, whereas the witness continues to exist. But this argument is not effective, for the *Vedantin* accepts the distinction between a predicate that is essential and a predicate that is a mere adjunct or non-essential. This distinction is applied to the case under consideration to distinguish between the perceiving subject and the witness. Consciousness in intimate relation to the inner organ is the perceiving subject and in relation to the organs as an accidental adjunct is the witness. In deep sleep the former may disappear, but not the latter, *i.e.*, the witness.¹

Brahman as witness.

Brahman as the witness may be conceived also in two ways :—

(1) The witness is *Iswara* or *Brahman* immanent in all beings. "This witness is the inmost

(1) *Iswara* (as inner-scient) is the witness.

being and is immanent in *jiva*. It is one that illumines Nescience in deep sleep. The individual soul in the

¹ Vide *Sidhantalessa*—साक्षिरूपनिर्दपथम् ।

embrace of universal self in deep-sleep knows nothing without and nothing within.”¹

(2) The witness is absolute consciousness. The author of the *Pancadasī* describes the witness as unchanging intelligence underlying the finer and the gross bodies, and it is called *Sakṣi* because of its being immediately conscious of them, without in any way being affected by them. The witness illuminates *jīva* and the objects of knowledge. The witness is, again, not *Iśvara*, for, as described in the *Kutastha Dipikā*, it is consciousness untouched by the distinction of *Jīva* and *Iśvara*.²

In this connexion we cannot leave out of consideration the normal states of conscious existence: waking, dream sleep, and deep sleep. These three chief states of individual consciousness (as well as the corresponding states in cosmic consciousness—indicated by *Vaiśwanara*, *Taijasa* and *Pragna*) occupy an important place in the *Vedantic* literature. We proceed with the psychological analysis of these states.

On the subject of sleep we have interesting theories advanced by the sages of the *Upaniśads*. *Saurorayani*, the seer of the *Prasna-upaniśad* says “as the rays of the sun become collected into the bright disc at the sunset, and, again, emanate from it at the sun-rise, so do all the senses become collected in the *manas*—the sensorium, and that is why men cannot hear, cannot see, cannot smell,

¹ Vide *Sidhantaśeṣa*.

² Vide *Pancadasī*; *Kutasthadēepa*, *Natakdeēpa*.

अन्तःकरणतद्गतिसाक्षीत्यादावनेकधा ।

कुटस्थ एव सर्वत्र पूर्वाचार्यैर्निश्चितः ॥—25—*Kutasthadēepa*.

cannot taste, cannot touch, cannot give, etc. It is said to have been quite asleep.¹ A few lines after we are again told that "when in deep sleep, he is overpowered by light, he dreams not and great happiness arises in the body. Just as crows live in the tree, similarly he

The *Upanisads* on deep sleep.

exists in the supreme self.² Again, we have in the *Chhandogya Upanisad* "when one is asleep, one is quite happy, when one sees no dreams, then one's *prana* moves in the arteries, then one is not touched by sin, one is possessed of light."³ The *Brihataranyaka* says that in sleep the soul takes rest in the heart-ether.⁴ *Ajatsatru* is heard to instruct *Garga* "when this man is asleep, then the person with intelligence (*i.e.*, the soul) lies deep within the heart-ether." Again, we have in the same *Sruti* (Chapter IV. 3.21) "so this *purusha* (soul) being embraced by the *Prajnatman* does not know anything either internal or external." Another passage in the *Prasna Upanisad* tells us that in deep sleep "the mind is carried every day to *Brahman*, a statement confirmed by the *Chhandogya* in which we read "when a man sleeps, my son, then he becomes identified with the Truth, he gets to his own self; therefore, they call it *Swapiti* for he is gone (*apita*) to his own self (*swa*)."

From these quotations it will be evident that the sages of the *Upanisads* regard deep sleep as the suspension of psychoses (विश्वविज्ञान उपशम). It is a state of calmness of existence. Authorities seem to differ regarding the situation of the soul in deep sleep:—(1) some hold it to be existing in the veins (*Chand.* 8.6.3), (2) some, again,

¹ Pra. Up. 4, 2.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Chhan. Up.* VIII, 6, 3.

⁴ *Br. Su.* IV. 4. 22.

तथाहापि नाकीषु पुरीतति ब्रह्मणि च स्वपितौत्येतदुपपद्यते समुद्यतः

think it to be attaining unity with the *Pran* (*Kaushitaki*, 14.19), (3) others consider it to be resting in the heart cave (*Brihadaranyaka* 4.4.22), (4) others in light—apparently identified with *Brahman* (*Prasna and Chhandogya*), (5) some think it to be embraced by the light of knowledge (*Brihadaranyaka* 4.3.21) Of these explanations the first and the second may be regarded as physiological, the third as psycho-physical, the fourth and the fifth as purely spiritual. Indeed these theories look apparently contradictory, for once the soul is thought to be taking its rest in *Prana*, once in the arteries and at another time in the supreme light of consciousness.

Sankara himself has offered a solution to the apparently contradictory theories of the soul in deep sleep. (3.2.7). He reconciles them by showing that in *susupti* these processes take place in gradual succession. He says "not at choice into one or into the other, but simultaneously does the soul enter in deep sleep into the places mentioned, otherwise we have to accept the partial denial of the *Śrutis* quoted above." But this should not lead us to think that all

Sankara's interpretation of the passages quoted above—reconciliation of the apparently contradictory theories regarding deep sleep.

of them fulfil the same purpose; they, according to *Sankara*, fulfil different ends which are to be combined. Where (*Chand.* 8.6.3) the soul is said to be resting in the veins, we must suppose that an entrance into *Brahman* is sought through the veins. The soul goes into the *heart cave* or into *Brahman* through the veins. The meaning is not in contradiction with the use of the locative case (नाडीषु) for such a use is common e.g., one who journeys to the ocean by the Ganges is said to be journeying in the Ganges "Moreover the *śrutis* might have sought to bring to prominence the veins

through which one goes into *Brahman*. It is said that no evil touches him who has entered by them into the heart because of his being possessed of light (*teja*). By *tejas* we are to mean *Brahman*, for, the confession that it cannot be touched by evil in *susupti* conforms to the theory of passing into *Brahman* through the nerves. We have also "*Brahman is teja.*" The conclusion is that the soul in deep sleep passes into *Brahman* and is not touched by evil. The heart-cave is in close relation with the place of deep sleep. The *puritat* is the envelope of the heart. One who sleeps in the ether of the *puritat* truly lies within the *puritat*, for, what is in the heart is also in the *puritat*. Of the three places of the deep sleep—veins, heart-ether, and *Brahman*—the first two are entrances, the last is the only eternal abode of undisturbed quietus of deep sleep. The soul in its non-difference from *Brahman* reposes in its own majesty and the release of the soul from the *upadhi* (of mental consciousness) in deep sleep is regarded as an entrance of the soul into its own self.

The same self wakes up again. The recognition of the identity in waking proves the continuity of consciousness through these states. This psychological evidence of continuity has been sought to be confirmed by the *Śruti*. "All these creatures go day by day into *Brahman* and yet do not discover it. When they come out, again, they know it not; whether they are tigers here, or lions, wolves or bears, that they become again."

But the entrance of the soul into *Brahman* in *Susupti* does not connote its liberation. Had it been the case, none would return from the silence of deep sleep. The individuality created by *Karma* and *Experience*, for the moment, may be hushed up in Nescience and the soul enjoys the expanse and delight of bliss-body. The subtle or finer body with the impress of individualistic *Karma*

still persists in rising up again in waking and dream-consciousness.

The later *Vedantism* makes a searching analysis of the psychological experience of deep sleep: "I was in sweet sleep, I did not know anything." The experience of deep sleep resolves itself into following elements. *Anandam* or bliss is actually felt. The self in bliss body feels it. The finer and the coarse bodies disappear in *susupti*.¹

Susupti, therefore, is the consciousness of blissful ignorance. *Susupti* is not merely the negation of pain, for we have the clear remembrance of an actually felt pleasure. *Padmapada* says truly "if actually pleasure is felt, then alone can it be remembered, and because it is remembered, it must have been actually felt."² The experience is so deep that it forces itself upon consciousness even in waking and repeatedly comes in clear remembrance. Moreover, the consciousness of bliss is a positive consciousness. It implies the absence and negation of pain. If it is still insisted that *susupti* does involve this negation rather than positive bliss, this negation is not felt but afterwards inferred.³ Again, the negation of pain would indicate the actual presence of painful consciousness in *susupti*, for, the *negation* is universally understood in reference to its object.

¹ *Vide Vivarana, Panchapadika*, pp. 55, 19.

नन्वस्येव सुषुप्तेऽहमुज्ज्वलः सुखमहमस्वाप्समिति सुषुप्तीत्यतस्तत्र स्वापसुखानुभवपरामर्शदेशेनात् नात्मनोऽन्यस्य तत्त्वानुभवः सम्भवति ।

Vide Vivarana अज्ञानकार्यलिङ्गशरीर प्रविलयः हि सुषुप्तिः ।

Prameya Sangraha न सुषुप्ती अहंकारोऽनुभूयते । p. 61, l. 15 (Benares Edition).

² अनुभूतं चेत्सुखं स्मर्येत, न तत्र लिङ्गेन प्रयोजनम् ।

³ अतो दुःखाभावो नानुस्मर्यते किन्तु प्रतीयते । *Vide Vivaranaprameya* क्वचिद्दुःखाभावो नानुभूयते । दुःखाभावज्ञानाभावयोरभावः — अर्थापत्येति वृत्तः ।

This requires the actual presence of painful consciousness in deep sleep. But this is in direct contradiction to immediate experience and subsequent remembrance.

Bliss, though enveloped in *Avidya*, is manifest in deep sleep, for, it is revealed by the naked witness (अनाहतसावित्रं तन्मसुखांशस्य प्रकाशोपपत्तेः) The constantly vibrating *antahkaranam* has disappeared. The *witness* now can express the three-fold modification of *Avidya* in the form of consciousness, bliss and ignorance.¹ The mental consciousness lapses here altogether.

In *śusupti* then the self is neither non-existent nor unconscious. The soul is consciousness. It exists independently of the relativity of empiric consciousness. The difficulty of understanding the semi-transcendent consciousness in *śusupti* is perhaps due to the common sense view that self-consciousness is relative to not-self-consciousness, so that in *śusupti*, the self, dissociated from the empirical mind, must be unconscious.

But at the same time *śusupti* should be clearly distinguished from ecstasy or *Samadhi*. In *Śusupti* the conscious self is wholly dissociated from the mind. *Śusupti* is a normal state of existence, a state of natural isolation. *Samadhi*, on the contrary, is a state of self-isolation brought about by effort. It is not normal, but, at the same time not artificial in the sense of being produced by some foreign objective causes. It is also a state of native but actualised existence.

This actualised existence may be either determinate or indeterminate. The determinate self-isolation differs

¹ Vide *Vivarana* p. 55-56 (Benares Edition). Vide *Prameya Samgraha* सुषुप्तावबुभूत आनन्दात्माभावरूपमज्ञानंचेति त्रयमपि उत्थितेन परावृत्त्यते, Vide *Ratnabali*, p. 16, l. 4, सुखस्वरूप साविस्वरूपः अज्ञानस्वरूपाकारा निर्विकल्पाः त्रिविधविद्यावृत्तयः सुषुप्ती जायन्ते।

from *Susupti* in its concentration into and absorption in a concrete existence. The indeterminate self-isolation differs from *Susupti* in its concentration into and absorption in transcendent consciousness. This actualised existence implies a high state of mental tension which succeeds in driving out all conscious determinates and is itself the absolute indeterminate consciousness. "*Susupti* is the greatest diffusion of attention, *Samadhi* the utmost concentration." The duality of sense is non-existent in both of them. But in *Susupti* the self has a cognition of blank negation, and in *Samadhi*, of the object—in both cases the self not knowing itself as what knows.

The ignorance of all concrete things and the cognition of a blank negation constitute the second element in *Susupti*.

There are differences of opinion among the *Vedantists* regarding the cognition in deep sleep. Some (*Prakastman*, the author of *Vivaraṇ*) hold that the cognition of Nescience implies an indeterminate modification of Nescience indicative of its own existence (अविद्याविषयकाविद्या इति). The three-fold *Vritti* of *Avidya* in form of consciousness, bliss and Nescience originates in *susupti*. Perhaps *Prakastman* has in his mental vision *Patanjali's* definition of sleep "as a particular modification informing of non-existence." *Manas* or *Antahkarana* does not function in *susupti*. *Avidya* is operative therein. He seems to think that in *Susupti* the self actually perceives *Avidya*. And as perception without a *vritti* is thought impossible, the actual presence of it in deep sleep is thought necessary. *Susupti* differs from *waking* in the non-specialised and indeterminate modification of *Avidya*, as distinguished from the specialised and determinate modification of *Avidya* in *waking*.

Memory implies *Samskara* due to impression or perception of the object. This

Prakastman maintains a three-fold *vriddhi* in *susupti* to explain the consciousness of ignorance.

involves *vriddhi* of *avidyā* in *Susupti*. And this indeterminate *vriddhi* is revealed in the ever-shining light of Witness.

Sureswar, the author of *Brihadaranyak-Vartik*, does not accept the modification of *Avidya* in *Susupti* informing of its own existence. He accepts the possibility of an immediate cognition of ignorance without

Sureswar differs and thinks the consciousness of ignorance is direct and immediate. It does not require *vriddhi*.

vriddhi. Ignorance is always an object of direct cognition—of the witnessing consciousness, be it in deep sleep, or in waking. And there is no necessity of a modification or *vriddhi*,

to explain the possibility of memory. *Sureswara*, therefore, refuses to accept *Prakastman's* theory of the cognition of Nescience through a *vriddhi*. We are told by *Brahmanando* that only one *vriddhi* of Nescience is existing throughout *susupti* and other states of existence. There is no special *vriddhi* for *susupti* alone, and, therefore, no such necessity arises to explain the remembrance of unspecialised ignorance in waking.¹

The real difference lies in a single point. *Prakastman* thinks that in *susupti*, the individuating and creative function (*the viksepa*) is inoperative, but still the epistemological functioning (*abarana*) is operative. And this implies a *vriddhi* indicative of (a) the blank and unspecialised Nescience and (b) the knowledge of the Nescience. *Sureswara*, on the other hand, thinks that in *Susupti*

¹ Vide *Adwaitasidhi* and *Brahmanandi* (pp. 558-559, Jivaji's edition).

एकेव चविद्यावृत्ति सुषुप्तादिकालस्थायिनी, नतु सुषुप्ति कालमात्रवृत्तिः काचन-
वृत्तिः, यन्नाशात् अरणम् ।

Nescience exists in itself, devoid of functioning, *Abarana* or *Viksepa*. If the one function ceases, the other must necessarily cease. In it exists Nescience in its integrity and a cognition of it is thought possible without any *vritti* by the witnessing consciousness.

We may reconcile these positions. What *Prakastman* and *Sureswara* really mean is that there is no memory of *Avidya* in waking, for *Avidya* is immediately revealed by consciousness. *Prakastman* holds Differences explained. that in waking as well as in deep sleep we have the clear cognition of Ignorance—in none of them we have remembrance of it. The difference is that in *susupti* we have the perception of unspecialised ignorance, and in waking we have the perception of determinate ignorance. These presentations are, therefore, different. In waking we have, then, the perception of ignorance in the form of determinate modes and the remembrance of ignorance characterising *Susupti*. We cannot be directly cognising *this unspecialised modification of Susupti* in waking, though we are immediately conscious of *Avidya*. "I did not know anything" therefore, refers to the memory of the unspecialised modification—the *Nirvikalpa Avidya* characterising *susupti*.

Sureswara holds that *Avidya* is directly perceived in deep sleep as well as in waking. The remembrance 'I did not know anything' does not concern the unmodified ignorance of *susupti*, but the modifications of waking. In waking and dream we have the perception of primal ignorance as well as concrete modes by the witness. In deep sleep we have not the latter. This ignorance of concrete objects is subsequently revived in the form of memory.¹

¹ Vide *Advaita Siddhi*, p. 558.

नहि धारावाहिकेषु अनुभवेषु तुल्यमानरीकेषु कारणव्यवहारः, तथाच धारावाहिकीऽवाहिकीऽज्ञानानुभव इति वक्तव्यम्, न तु परानयं इति, सत्यम् ; सुषुप्ताख्यायास्तानस्या

Vedantism accepts the absolute distinction of truth and untruth in transcendent sense and

The interpretation of *susupti* differs in reference to the theories of dream consciousness.

the gradations of truth in empirical sense. The truth of waking is denied in dream-sleep, the truth of dream is denied in deep-sleep. And in it a

duality of existence—consciousness and *avidya* obtains. But it is no duality of absolutes, for, in the transcendent height of Being Ignorance vanishes leaving aside the Identity of Consciousness.

Susupti is more directly the denial of dream-sleep than of waking. In this sense the ignorance of *susupti* keeps from the view the presentations of dream-sleep and not of waking. The object of ignorance in deep-sleep will be these presentations. These presentations may be either *Jiva* with its *manas* or *Brahman* with *manas* or *Brahman* in itself. Some explain the consciousness of a blank negation in *susupti* as the perception of secondary ignorance, and others regard it as the perception of primary ignorance. Those who maintain that *Jiva* or *Brahman* in association with *manas* is the immanent consciousness in dream sleep (the percipient of dreams) will naturally hold that the memory of not knowing anything in particular in *susupti* refers to the non-cognisance of consciousness as associated with *manas*. *Susupti* is the non-perception of the subject of dream and its objects.

Those who, on the other hand, maintain that *Brahman* in association with *avidya* is the basic support of dream as

अज्ञानवृत्तेर्नाशे जायति तद्विशिष्टाज्ञानस्य साक्षिणाऽनभ्यमानत्वाभावेन संस्कारजन्याविव्या
व्येव सुषुप्तिविशिष्टाज्ञानभानात् परामर्शलोपपत्तेः, केवलज्ञानांशे तु तुल्यसामग्री
कलाद्वारावाहिकत्वमेव ; अतएव कार्योपाधिविनाशसंस्कृतमज्ञानमात्रमेव प्रत्यो-
पमं सुषुप्तिरित्यभिप्रेत्य वार्तिककारपादैः सौप्तज्ञानस्मरणमपाकतम् ।

well as of waking—the consciousness revealing every form of movement in *Maya* in view—will naturally hold that the *memory* of not perceiving anything refers to the perception of the primal ignorance and consciousness as hidden by it. *Avidya*, here, has *Brahman* as its object. The former two alternatives can be supported from the standpoint of the multiplicity of conscious existence and the last from the standpoint of *Ekajivavada*. *Susupti* in the first two cases as well as in the last is the perception of *Avidya* forming the *upadhi* of *jiva*. Otherwise no remembrance of ignorance in sleep would be possible. There is no difference of opinion in this. But divergence arises regarding the other element—"I did not know anything." From the standpoint of the first two alternatives it refers to those objects which appear in dream and in waking and not to those which appear merely in waking, for they disappear in dream. These objects are *Jiva*, *Isvara*, Consciousness, Nescience, their relations and difference. They obtain in waking as well as in dream-sleep but not in *susupti*. *Susupti* is the consciousness of their ignorance.

The last alternative does not accept these elements and their differences. It accepts the existence of truth and untruth, *Brahman* and *Avidya* in empirical sense; *Avidya* as located in *Brahman* makes *Brahman* its object, hiding it from view and at the sametime holding the manifold by its inherent power—the power of individuation. In *susupti* there has been a temporary suspension of the function of individuation. "I did not know anything" therefore, implies the ignorance of the manifold of the waking and the dream. In *Susupti* the epistemological functioning of *Avidya* persists, the individuating functioning ceases. In this sense it is the perception of the primary Nescience and non-perception of concrete appearances, the empirical manifold.

Dream sleep is the intermediate stage of existence between waking and deep sleep. It has been figuratively described as the "twilight of consciousness." We are told in the *Brihadaranyaka* that the soul in dream resembles a fish moving from bank to bank—
 "as a large fish moves along the bank, the nearer and the further, so does this person move along the states of sleeping and waking."

The Vedantic theory of dream sleep and analysis of dream consciousness.

Dream-psychology has an important place in *Vedantism* for in it the idea of a self freely constructing its universe comes more directly in view. The self becomes totally unconscious of the surroundings—including the physical covering and moves in a universe freely constituted in which it has width of vision, freedom of construction and liberty of movement. It transcends the obstructive and misleading operation of the senses in waking. In this operation the self has the sense of a dependence and a limitation. It feels that the senses sometimes deceive. It feels a stirring impulse in itself to transcend them and attain knowledge immediately. The attempt to get this immediate or intuitive cognition is an approach to consummation. The free movement of the self is normally appreciable in dream-sleep, where the self perceives without the aid of the senses. It has perception without sensation. But dream is no truer than waking. Each is true within itself.

Dream, then, is a spontaneous grouping of presentations which originate independently of objective causes. It is, in fact, the working out of the creative activity of the soul. The dream-world is wider in possibility than waking. The dependence of waking on sense-contact limits its capacity and possibility. In dream the self is free to build up a universe of its own.

The question arises, where does the soul get its materials? On this point the *Vedantists* are sharply divided. Some maintain that the dream-world is a new construction. This gives us the *presentative theory of dreams*. Others

Two theories of dreams. hold that it is an automatic grouping of representations in a state of passivity in sleep. It is a free integration holding up apparently new universes. This is the *representative theory*.

The presentative theory is put most distinctly in the *Brihadaranyaka*. We are told "there are no chariots, no horses, nor any road, but he himself creates the roads, the chariots, the horses; there are no joys, no pleasures, nor any blessings, but he creates the joys and blessings, there are no ponds nor rivers but he creates them because he is indeed the maker."

The presentative theory.

The objects that appear in dream-sleep are new constructions, put in new groupings. They are new presentations, new creations. Those who cannot accept the distinction between *Jiva* and *Iswara* and do not insist upon the common distinction between *Maya* and *Avidya* (*i. e.*, those who hold the doctrine of *Ekajiva*) put a literal construction upon the passage and hold that in dream-sleep new things are put in new universes newly constructed. *Avidya* transforms itself into objects of perception and there is no such difference among these objects as can lend a logical support to any distinction between them, either as objects seen in waking or as objects seen in dream. They regard all experiences as subjectively illusory. They have their origin in *Avidya*, They are determinate modifications of it. The distinction of waking and dream is more conventional than philosophic. There is no criterion by which the one can be distinguished from the other. It regards waking

as well as dream as transformations of Nescience, known by another modification of itself. The entire existence is subjective, it is useless to regard one portion of it as objective, the other as illusory. There is no basis for this distinction. Waking and dream sleep are mere states of the soul—the soul as enveloped in *Avidya*. The one is as much an illusion as the other.

The representative theory of dream is enunciated in the *Praśna-upaniṣad*. It holds that dreams, even though they are usually mere replica of actual waking experience, occasionally involve new construction. This new construction is no new creation (as implied in the former theory) but a new grouping spontaneously woven out. "What is seen over and over again, he sees once more in dream," "what is heard over and over again, he hears once again..... ..what is seen and not seen, what is heard and not heard, what is enjoyed and not enjoyed, he experiences all." This suggests that dreams are subjective and representative synthesis.

Sankara seems to be in the main following the representative theory and regards the dream creation as not in any sense objectively real and distinguishes it from waking percepts by calling it *maya—maya* (illusory). *Sankara* at the end of his commentary on the sixth aphorism (3, 2, 6) holds that the dream world is not the creation of the soul, but a reproduction (in new combination) of the residuum of waking-presentation left in consciousness. In this sense he seems to have urged the distinction between the spontaneous grouping of representations in dreams and the creation of the phenomenal but extra-mental existence. *Padmapada* says "This dream-world is false and illusory originated out of the *samskaras* quickened to activity by the destiny of soul (*jiva*) overtaken

by sleep. The dream is defined to be a *vivarta* of consciousness as associated with *Avidya* and the particular destiny. It is purely subjective and appears within us and not without.¹ By the fact of its being sublated by the experience of waking, the dream-sleep is regarded as more individually subjective and is distinguished from waking which is more permanent in its nature.

The former has its basis in consciousness modified by *Avidya*, the latter in consciousness informing *Maya*. The one is reproduction, the other is production. *Madhusudhan* almost accepts the same view of dream which he defines as the perception of objects due to the desires inherent in mental consciousness when the senses are inactive. Here the world 'desire' is significant, it introduces a volitional element in dream. It seems to hold that desires get freedom in a state of passivity and acquire strength, finally appearing in the form of dream construction. That desire or volition has a bearing on dream consciousness has been recognised by *Sankara* also.²

This reproductive theory is naturally accepted by those who hold a distinction between *Jiva* and *Iswara*. Dream is the creation of *Jiva*. It is *prativasika*. Waking is the perception of objective realities (*Vyavaharika*) supported in existence by *Maya*. *Maya* or *Avidya* is the *causa-materia* of the empirical order, *manas* is the *causa-materia* of the dream-illusion. The objective illusion is due to the primal ignorance, the subjective illusion is due to the secondary ignorance.

¹ *Pancapadika*, p. 10, ll. 16-20.

² *Vide Sidhantabindhu*, p. 189.

तद्वचान्तःकरणगतवासनानि तद्द्वन्द्वित्यवस्थाभावकालीनोऽर्थोपलभः स्वप्नः ।

Vide Sankar Bhasya.

जागरितप्रभववासनानिमित्तत्वं स्वप्नस्य तत्तुल्यनिभासत्वाभिप्रायं तत् । तस्मात् स्वप्नस्य स्वप्नस्य मायाभावत्वम् ।

To complete our analysis of dream consciousness we cannot help noticing the theories propounded in later *vedantism* regarding the support of dream-existence.¹

There are chiefly two theories :—

(a) *The witnessing consciousness* may be regarded as the percipient of dream and at the same time the background on which the dream makes its appearance and gets its hold.

(b) *The Jiva-consciousness* may be regarded as the percipient and the support of dream existence.

Each one of them can be considered from two stand-points according as we do or do not accept the threefold division of existence: (1) transcendental, (2) empirical, as *Vyavaharik*, and (3) empirical as *Prativasik*. Under (a) we have the following subdivisions :—

(i) From the standpoint of those who do not discriminate between the two-fold mode of empirical existence there can be no difference between waking and dream-sleep. The entire manifold is an illusory show, supported in witnessing consciousness.

(ii) From the standpoint of those accepting the above three divisions of existence.

(1) Some maintain that the primal ignorance is the material cause of waking as well as of dream sleep. Both of them are states of the same ignorance. Even the illusory percept of rope-snake is held to be due to the primal ignorance. The difference between them is made out by the way and manner in which they are negated. The illusory percept is negated by a knowledge contradictory to itself, dream sleep by waking. But this negation

¹ Vide *Sidhantaleisar Sangraha*, pp. 451-466, *Jivananda* edition.

must not be taken in absolute sense. They can, again, secure a hold on consciousness. The ground or cause of their existence still persists.

(2) Some maintain that the primal ignorance is the cause of both waking and dream-sleep, but the illusory percept of rope-snake has its origin in secondary ignorance. Still they insist upon a difference between waking and dream sleep. This difference consists in the fact that the one is sublated by the knowledge of identity, the other is sublated by the waking experience. It may be urged how is it that both having origin in primal ignorance can be sublated in two different ways? This difference is due to sleep being the instrumental cause of dream, though ignorance is asserted to be the material cause.

Under (b) we may have the following interpretations of dream :—

(i) Consciousness possessed of *Avidya* as its *upadhi* is the support of dream existence. This would admit the common distinction of waking and dream and explain the dream existence as due to secondary ignorance. This view would be also consistent with the distinction of *Maya* and *Avidya*. *Maya* is the material cause of objective existence; *Avidya*, of illusory existence in dream sleep. The appearances of dream are modifications of *Avidya* known also by another modification.

(ii) Some think that consciousness as covered by *Manas* (i.e., *jiva*) is the support of dream-appearances. When the mind is free, when the senses do not actively work, the *antahkarana** with its permanent *residua* or *retenta* gives rise to appearances. More properly, it is itself transformed into appearances of which the *jiva* becomes conscious. The author of the *Kalpataru* admits the possibility of the modification of mental consciousness in dream.

We now pass on to the sources of knowledge. *Vedantism* recognises six sources of knowledge which can be divided into two classes in respect of their subject matter, *e.g.*,

- (1) Source of the knowledge of transcendent reality.
- (2) Source of the knowledge of empirical existence.

The former is the *Sruti*. The latter is of five kinds:—
 (1) Perception, (2) Inference, (3) *Upamana* (knowledge based on similarity), (4) *Arthapatti* (argument from effect to cause), and (5) *Anupalabdhi* (non-perception). Of these, again, perception is generally regarded as the most important source in as much as others are dependent upon it in some way or other for their premises. *Vedantism* holds the importance of the authority of the *Sruti* over perception. It asserts that the knowledge attained through perception is of doubtful character and cannot pass for truth. It examines the grounds of the alleged superiority of perception. These grounds are:—

The grounds of the alleged superiority of perception as a source of knowledge examined.

(1) Perception, because it is perception, is superior to all other processes of knowledge.¹

This is not true. The validity of knowledge does not depend upon the character of the source. Perception gives us something, but its validity is not warranted unless reasons are advanced to establish the correspondence between the percept and the thing. We are to lay down conditions to ensure that we have no false percept. Perception in itself, therefore, cannot claim the high place which is not infrequently given to it.

¹ प्रत्यक्षानुमानाद्यपेक्षया जात्यैव प्रबलम् ।

(2) Perception is superior because it feeds other forms of knowledge.

But the inference "the world is illusory because it is an appearance, like rope-serpent" is opposed to the perception of the reality of the world. The inference must be fallacious. If it were true, it would deny its very ground and justification.

This argument is true on the surface. The inference in question is not refuting its own ground, for the position is taken in empirical sense, the denial in metaphysical sense.¹

Similarly authority is dependent upon perception and is actually fed by it. But when it goes against perception and its affirmation, it denies its validity as a source of transcendent truth, but not of knowledge empirical.

(3) Perception is superior to all other forms of knowledge because of its priority.

The mere priority of perception is no sufficient proof of its superiority. Really the superiority consists in furnishing the grounds of other modes of knowledge. But it has been shown just now that inference or authority in denying the manifold does not really contradict the premises or knowledge acquired from perception. This apart, none in its special province is dependent upon the other.²

¹ उपजोऽविरोधात् । तथाहि यत् स्वरूपमुपजोऽयने तन्नवाप्यते, नाप्यते च तान्ति काकारः। सच न उपजोऽयते । कारणत्वे तस्याप्रवेशात् ।

² Vide Sidhanta Sidhanjanam स्वत एवहि प्रमाणाणां प्रामाण्यं न निदर्शनमापेक्षामिति. In this sense priority is no test of superiority. On the other hand perception is denied by authority which as a source of knowledge, is quite independent of it.

Perception is denied by inference. Inference, though based upon perception, sometimes helps us in getting over the mistakes of perception. Hence it is said perception when not put under safeguards is inferior to inference based upon logical grounds.¹

The evidence of perception is also denied by inference and authority.

Perception should be held as the source of valid knowledge when it is not contradicted by subsequent experience. But as soon as the facts of perception are challenged, perception loses all value as a mode of knowing. And it is a common experience that knowledge acquired through perception is later on denied by authority, e.g., the illusory percept of rope-serpent.²

The value of perception lies in recording the manifold and not in proving its reality. Indeed perception can reveal to us existence but its validity or invalidity is not involved in itself as perception. But, are we to believe one, who on the authority of the *Sruti* but in direct opposition to experience asserts that "fire is cool," that the "priest is a stone"? Surely not. *Vedantism* accepts the validity of perception in empirical knowledge. And when the *Sruti* goes against the evidence of perception in calling, e.g., 'a stone a priest' *Vedantism* does not accept the authority of the *Sruti* against perception. On the other hand it brings to bear upon the *Sruti* the evidence of experience and construes the *Sruti* in the light of experience and reason. But concerning facts transcending experience *Vedantism* claims the superiority of the *Sruti* over

¹ अपरोक्षितं प्रत्यक्षं हि परीक्षितानुमानापेक्षया दुर्बलम् । *Advaitasidhi*, p. 369.

² *Vide Advaitasidhi* :—

गृहीतप्रमाणभावशून्यपेक्षया क्षमविलक्षणत्वेनानिश्चितस्य प्रत्यक्षस्य नूनवलत्वात् ।
अन्यथा "इदं रजत"मिति क्षमोऽपि "इयं शक्ति"रिति आतोपदेशापेक्षया प्रबलं स्यात् ।

perception for here the *Sruti* reveals to us a fact which otherwise cannot be known. When the *Sruti* denies empirical facts and establish the oneness of Being, its finding should be accepted, though it is quite opposed to perception in its denial of the manifold. The transcendent is knowable only through the *Sruti* and herein the verdict of the *Sruti* must be accepted even when it is contrary to perception. In this sense, between the authority (of the *Sruti*) and perception there is no contradiction, as each of them has a special province of its own in which its verdict is final. Hence it is said in the *Adwaita Sidhi*,¹ "the *Sruti* as proving the transcendental oneness of being is not opposed to perception which proves the empirical existence of being. The evidence of perception in empirical existence is final, just as the evidence of the *Sruti* in transcendental being is final. We accept their authority in their respective provinces.² Since the oneness of being can only be established on the denial of the manifold, the *Sruti* seeks to establish the oneness by refusing to accept or by showing the illusoriness of the empirical facts in the transcendent sense. So far as the transcendent reality is concerned perception is of no avail as a source of knowledge, because the senses can give no evidence regarding the reality which lies beyond their province. *Anandabodhacarjya* truly says, "The authority of the *Sruti* really denies the evidence of perception in making Brahman its object, of which perception can convey no meaning or sense; neither can it affirm nor deny its existence because of its being transcendent."³

¹ *Vide Adwaita Sidhi*, p. 29, ll. 15-22.

² *Vide Sidhantasidhanam*, p. 85, Vol. 3, last 5 or 6 lines.

³ मत्परत्वात् अतःपरत्वाच्च निर्दोषत्वाच्च वैदिकम् । पूर्वेषु वाचकं नायं सर्वं इत्यादि वाक्यवत् ।

Vacaspati holds that the *Sruti* constitutes an independent source of knowledge, because it has a special province of its own, of which any other source is not competent to give any information. But this does not refute the value of perception as a source of empiric knowledge.

Sarbajnatmuni points out that perception is not calculated to give us the knowledge of *Being*. It gives us the knowledge of concrete things and in that capacity it cannot be truly regarded as a source of knowledge, for the ideal of knowledge requires that a particular source should give us knowledge of things covered up by ignorance. *Brahman* is the object of Ignorance, and not concrete objects which are originated in Ignorance. Perception in failing to give this knowledge of Identity does not really acquaint us with the *knowledge* that is hidden by Ignorance.¹

We conclude in the words of the *Advaita Sidhi*, " Perception is accepted as a source of knowledge of the manifold when it is carefully regulated and logically controlled. And this evidence of perception is not contradicted by the *Sruti* (in empirical sense). But perception as a source of knowledge of the transcendent reality is never to be accepted, for it is by its nature inherently incapable of transcending experience and giving us the knowledge of ontological reality. The facts which can be established in other ways do not require the authority of the *Sruti* to prove them. नहि अन्यतः सिद्धेऽर्थे शास्त्रतात्पर्यम् अतो न तत्र प्रमाणं ।

Here, again, *Vivarana* and *Vacaspati* differ. *Vacaspati* maintains that the *Sruti* is a source of knowledge because of its directly indicating and establishing the oneness

¹ *Vide Sidhantalessa*, p. 382, Jivananda Edition :

विवरणवार्तिकेतु प्रतिपादितं न तात्पर्यवत्त्वेन श्रुतेः प्रत्यक्षात् प्राबल्यम्.....
तत्त्वमसौति वाक्यस्य जीवब्रह्माभेदप्रतिपादने तात्पर्येऽपि त्वंपदवाच्यस्य तर्पदवाचा-
भेदः प्रत्यक्षविरुद्ध इति तदविरोधाय निष्कृष्टचैतन्ये लक्षणाभ्युपगमाच्च ।

of existence. *Vivarancharjya* thinks that the objective intention of the Sruti is, no doubt, the oneness of existence, but this oneness of existence is not directly established, but only indirectly, so as not to allow a conflict between the evidence of perception and the authority of the Sruti. According to the Vivarana School the authority of the Sruti is superior to perception because of its being posterior, and free from all defects to which perception is liable. (Vamati, p. 8-10, Sidhantalesa.)

But we must not accept the evidence or the authority of the Sruti simply because it is revealed. The validity of authority does not depend merely upon the character of its source, but on its adducing facts that cannot be contradicted. The infallibility of the Sruti does not lie in its being revealed, but in its revealing truth which cannot be contradicted (अवाधितार्थविवक्षत्वात् वेदस्य प्रामाण्यं) something which reason in accepting does not involve itself in self-contradiction.

Even if perception is regarded as the highest source of knowledge still it cannot explain the difference of percepts from one another and from the perceptual process without involving a fallacy. On the analysis of a perceptual synthesis, e.g., 'This is a pot' we get (1) the existence of a pot, (2) the knowledge of this existence, and (3) the difference between these two elements. The

perception of the pot may be said to
 The net value of perception. involve in it the knowledge of its
 own difference from its object.

Now this element of difference may be conceived either as existing before the actual perception or as simultaneously coming into existence with the perception. The former alternative is quite impossible, for difference implies relation and in the absence of any one of the related terms, the difference cannot be conceived existing by itself. The

second commits a circle. The cognition of difference is necessary to perception, and perception becomes equally necessary to the knowledge of difference.

Perception indicates (*Bheda*) difference with the object (*Viśaya*). But this is not always the case, for, there is no clear consciousness or cognition of it. The memory of *Bheda* or difference may work in perception, but memory implies *Samskara* and previous perception.

The perception of *Bheda* requires the actual presence of it. The knowledge of pot requires the knowledge of *Bheda*, which implies the co-existence of the object different from the pot. And this leads to an infinite regress. *Prakasananda* truly says perception can give us knowledge of reality but it fails to explain the difference. Some think (*vide* *Sidhantaśeṣa*, II, 1) perception only reports the mere existence, the being in abstract. The knowledge of difference and concreteness is due to the operation of the senses.

The *Vedantic* theory then accepts the cognitive element of perception, but not the ordinarily accepted cognitive element. *Prakasananda's* assertion that perception is only informant of existence and not difference makes perception a process of cognition but not of recognition, for it implies difference, temporary forgetfulness and assimilation. Vedanta uses the word perception in two senses—(1) perception as the transcendental apperception, (ज्ञान), and (2) perception as a psychological process (दर्शन). The immediate fact of perception is consciousness. In transcendental apperception, there is no recognition, for, as *Vivaranacharya* points out, *Atman* cannot be the object to anything else and as such the question of recognition cannot arise at all.¹

¹ *Vide Vivarana*, p. 75, H. 22-27, p. 76, ll. 1 to 4 (Benares Edition).

Moreover, perception, as a psychological process, is the expression of an object by consciousness. An object is perceived when it becomes a fact in or of consciousness. Consciousness is expressive of every fact and every existence; perception as a process helps to bring in the object in some form of relation to consciousness. The self-conscious existences, because of their limitation of being, cannot have immediate cognition of everything, hence they require the help of certain processes to acquire knowledge, chiefly of perception.

Perception, according to the Vedantists, is not merely the recording of events of facts through the senses. Such a definition would be incomplete inasmuch as it includes only external perception but excludes introspective or internal perception.¹ Again, the senses by themselves are not competent to give us knowledge. They help to bring the facts in relation to

Perception—the analysis of the process.

consciousness. Perception is the immediate identity of the known and the unknown. It implies the establishing of the identity of consciousness underlying the percipient and the perceived object, because every fact or phenomenon is a phenomenon in consciousness. Nothing can exist out of touch with consciousness for it is immanent in all existence. But this immanent consciousness appears as divided and fixed to concrete centres. Now the absolute consciousness alone is competent to express the manifold. Perception would mean, therefore, the identity of the percipient-consciousness with the objective-consciousness which is directly expressive of the manifold (as it has its existence in the ignorance resting upon it). This identity can be established

¹ To the Vedantists *manas* is not the inner sense as held by the Naiyayikas. This is based upon the authority of the *Katha Sruti* (इन्द्रियैश्च परं मनः).

by the flowing out of the *manas* or *antahkaran* through the sense orifices of the body and taking the form of the object, *i.e.*, it gets determined into a mode like the object, occupying the same position in space and time as the object, provided that the object is fit to be cognized by the senses. An analogy to the point is given in the *Vedanta-parivasa*. As the water of a tank issuing through an aperture enters fields by small canals and assumes the shape of the field, so the inner organ (the *Antahkaran*) leaves the body through the eye or other sense organs, moves to the external objects and takes their forms.

The external perception involves the following elements :—

- (1) The *manas* comes in contact with the senses, and
- (2) The sense with object.
- (3) The *manas* with consciousness immanent in it gets out.
- (4) And is modified in the form of the object.
- (5) The identity takes place between the percipient-consciousness (including *vritti*-consciousness) and the object-consciousness.
- (6) Ignorance is destroyed by the *vritti*-consciousness.
- (7) The object is revealed by the *Pramatri*-consciousness.

Perception is the conformity of the mental order to a given objective order. The Vedantic doctrine of perception thus inverts the ordinary theory. This theory makes the activity of *manas* a more important element and recognises in this going out of the mind the priority of the knower to the object known. Vedantism

The perception of an object and of the self knowing the object.

recognises a sort of realism in the empirical order in which the mental element is given more importance

and freedom than the objects.

The external perception is distinguished by the *antah-karan* going out through the senses and transforming itself into the form of the object. This transformation is called a *vritti* which removes the ignorance of the object-consciousness and establishes an identity of *vritti-consciousness* and object-consciousness. This *vritti* is necessary to destroy the ignorance as well as to establish the identity of consciousness. It is customary to hold that the perception of an object requires only the coincidence of *Vritti-caitanya* and *Viśaya-caitanya*. But the perception of the subject as possessing the knowledge of object requires the coincidence and identity of triple consciousness: *Pramatri-caitanya*, *Viśaya-caitanya* and *Vritti-caitanya*. It gives us the perception of self not as a mere logical presupposition but as a clear determinate existence distinguished from the object or object-consciousness.

To be more logically accurate, it would be more correct to say that there is no such distinction between perception of facts and perception of the subject as knowing the facts, a distinction which is generally borne out by the elimination of *Pramatri-caitanya* in the former case and by urging its introduction in the latter. Perception, strictly speaking, is to put objects to the witness or the percipient-consciousness.¹ Whatever is brought before the witness is revealed, for it is identical with the object-consciousness. In the perception of an object as mere object, the object is put before the witnessing intelligence which it reveals. The element of *Pramatri-caitanya* is all along present, but it may not come into prominence and may escape the vision of the witnessing intelligence for the moment. But it must not be supposed

Distinction hardly tenable.

¹ Vide Sidhanta Sidhanjanam, Part I, p. 139, para. 2.

to be non-existing on that account. In the perception of the self as knowing the fact, the two elements are brought into clear light before the witnessing consciousness.

In every perception, the elements are all present, though all of them may not come to the clear notice of the witness. To insist upon the coincidence of the *viṣaya-caitanya* and the *vritti-caitanya* can hardly explain the perception of the object, for perception is revelation of a fact to the subject. And the coincidence of the above two elements fails to reveal it and make it an object to the subject. The *Pramatri-caitanya* always accompanies *vritti-caitanya* though it may not be fully cognised.

The *vritti* is the determinate consciousness which stands between the consciousness as subject and the consciousness as object. It has two angles of existence, the self and the object. *Madhusudan Saraswati* in his commentary on the *Dasaslōki* makes this point clear by reference to the analogy of the sun expressing the objects hidden in darkness by its own rays. The *Antahkaran* gives out a part of its own being, and consciousness underlying *antahkaran* is called the subject. That part of *antahkaran* which goes out and stands between the subject and the object is called *vritti* and the immanent consciousness is called the *vritti-caitanya*. Of this, again, the part which is modified into the form of the object and is capable of giving us knowledge of it is called *Abhibyaktiyogya* (i.e., capable of expressing or manifesting). Consciousness involved therein is called knowledge. The object is the object-consciousness hidden by ignorance. An empirical existence is supposed to be the object of perception. Strictly speaking, this is not true. That which is covered from view by ignorance forms the true object of knowledge, and that is not an object in itself but the

object-consciousness. It has been already shown that the object of ignorance is consciousness.¹

In internal perception of the states of consciousness, the *Pramatri caitanya* does not go out and rest upon *Visaya-caitanya* but rests upon the *Vritti-caitanya*. It implies the modification of *Antahkarana (vritti)* revealed by the witnessing consciousness. In any form of perception the *Antahkaran* is never free from a *vritti*.

Authorities differ here. Some think that introspection implies a subjective state and a consciousness of this state. It resolves itself into two *vrittis*—one indicative of a state, e.g., pleasure, and the other expressive of it.

Others think that introspection means the clear consciousness of a mental modification. This modification is itself the state, revealed by the consciousness, the witness. It does not require another *vritti* to be conscious of the transformation.

In internal perception we have, therefore, either two or three elements. But in any case a modification or *vritti* is necessary.

A question arises: why does not a *jiva* illuminate its own objects by the essence of its being without the aid of a *vritti* like *Iswara*?

Three answers are possible: (1) From the standpoint of the *Vivarana* the absolute or Brahman is the material cause of, and immanent in, all things. It illumines them.

The necessity of
Vritti.

The *jiva*-intelligence cannot illuminate them though it is of infinite magnitude. Consciousness as *jiva* is under the influence of *Avidya*. It therefore requires a *vritti*—a determinate consciousness to express or illumine them.

(2) From the standpoint of those who hold that *jiva* is of limited magnitude, having *antahkaran* for its *upadhi* : *Jiva*, being definite in nature, cannot illumine all objects, for it is kept from them by its limiting condition. It is not immanent in objects and cannot reveal them without the intervention of a *Vritti* which establishes its non-difference from Brahman or Absolute consciousness expressive of the concrete objects (in being their material cause).

(3) From the standpoint of *Ekajivavada* where *jiva* is all-pervasive and infinite in magnitude, the universe has no independent existence, for everything is subjective and forms the state or process of mental consciousness of the percipient. It does not stand in need of going out through the senses and revealing the external objects hidden in ignorance, for nothing external or objective exists. The existence is purely empirical and is revealed to the subject. It is supported in the ignorance of the subject and requires a modification or *vritti* revealed by the underlying consciousness, a modification of *avidya* showing forth the different forms of existence inherent in it with the help of the self-luminous subject. Perception in this case means the revelation of modes of existence by a modification of *Avidya*, technically called *vritti*. This theory would reduce all perception to introspection. It does not do away with the *vritti*. It accepts it as the transformation of *Avidya*, but not the transformation of *antahkarana*, for, ultimately, this *antahkarana* is also an appearance and a modification of *Avidya*. This theory would reduce all existence to the modification of *Avidya* revealed by the locus-consciousness.

Perception, again, is of two kinds inasmuch as it is the perception of *jiva* or of *Iswara* (this distinction will be in conformity with the first and second theories noticed above). The *jiva*, because of its limitation

Perception (1) of *jiva*, (2) of *Iswara*.

of vision, has not the immediate cognition of all objects. It stands in need of a relation to these objects, a relation which is established by *vritti*, whereas Iswara has nothing beyond its vision and does not require any *vritti* to know things. They are immediately perceived. It is called in Vedantic terminology, *Swarupata pratyakṣa*; whereas the perception of jiva through a *vritti* is called *Falata-pratyakṣa*, i.e., perception through a *vritti*.¹

Citsukacarjya says, "Brahman is omniscient and it knows everything by its immediate vision. It does not require the mediation of a *vritti*" (स्वरूपप्रज्ञया चैत्स्वञ्जलं ब्रह्मणोऽभुवपगत्यते). But, a jiva (though, according to the *Vivarana*, it is in essence all-pervasive) because of its being covered by *Avidya*, or of its possessing *Antahkaranas upadhi* stands in need of a *vritti* to remove the veil of ignorance. Some may contend: how is it that consciousness which is expressive of *Avidya* requires a *vritti* to perceive things? This contention makes confusion between consciousness as expressive of *Avidya* and consciousness as standing in need of a *vritti* for the knowledge of things. The former is consciousness viewed in its integrity, the latter is consciousness made definite by the *upadhi* of *antahkarana*.

Consciousness expressive of *Avidya* is *Sakṣi*. Consciousness with *antahkaran* is *jiva*. This may be made clear by an analogy. The sun expressive of darkness which covers things may be compared to the witnessing consciousness. But still one does require candle light to see things hidden in darkness. Similarly, though consciousness may be expressive of ignorance, still, as *jiva*, it requires a process to see concrete things, and this process is the *vritti*.

¹ Vide Commentary on the Gita, Chapter 9, Sloka 2, *Guḍartha Dipika*.

What, then, is a *Vritti*? The word *vritti* is an important word in the philosophy of *Vedanta* and a clear understanding of it is necessary to follow the account of Vedantic epistemology. The word has two senses, (1) objective, and (2) subjective. Objectively, it is either a mode of becoming (the transformation of *Maya* into the form of particular things) or a mode of knowledge (of the process of becoming). Strictly speaking, in Vedantism the two can be hardly separated. Everything comes out of Nescience and is reported by the *vritti* of Nescience. But if anyone insists upon *Maya* as the material cause and the first glance of *Brahman* as inceptive of creation, then the *vritti* should be regarded as something informing of the cosmic existence different from the first glance (*Prathamabiskṣaṇa*) necessary to start the process and different from the manifold beings evolved out of Nescience.

Subjectively *vritti* is the determinate modification of mental consciousness helping the acquisition of knowledge by the removal of ignorance. In perception *vritti* means nearly the same thing with this difference that in it the *Antahkaran* goes out and takes the form of the object.

The perceptual *vritti* may be of two kinds; the one leading to correct perception, the other leading to false perception with reference to its objects, true or illusory.

The former, again, is of two kinds according as the objects of perception are transcendental or empirical. In the former case it will have a transcendent use, in the latter an empirical use. The former gives us the consciousness

of identity by destroying the primal ignorance ; the latter gives us the knowledge of the concrete objects by removing the special forms of ignorance hiding them from view.

The latter, again, is of two kinds according as it gives us either knowledge of external or internal objects. The external perception is of five kinds. The internal perception is of two kinds according as (1) it gives us the knowledge of the self, and (2) the knowledge of states and processes of consciousness. The former, again, is of two kinds in so far as it is a knowledge of consciousness with its *upadhi* of *Antahkaran* or without any *upadhi*.

There is difference of opinion among the Vedantists regarding the exact function of *vritti* in perception. There are chiefly two theories bearing upon it.

The function of
Vritti.

(1) Some contend that a *vritti* removes the ignorance which hide a particular object from view.

(2) Others hold that the *vritti* establishes a relation between the subject and the object, the identity of consciousness underlying them.¹

This difference in the conception of function of *vritti* is due to the difference in the notion of *jiva*.²

(1) Those who hold that *jiva* is all-pervasive and the material cause of the manifold, being the support of Nescience, will naturally regard that the function of *vritti* consists in the removal of ignorance and not in establishing any relation, for, there is no second term of the relation. Everything exists in the all-pervasive *jiva*, though,

¹ Vide Sidhantalesa, Ratnabali, Paribhasa.

² तस्मात् ब्रह्मजगदुपादानमिति पक्षे चिदुपरागार्था आवरणभङ्गार्था च इतिः ।
जीवोपादानत्व पक्षे तु आवरणभङ्गार्थेवेति ।

for the moment, it is hidden in ignorance. A *vritti* is required to set aside this ignorance.

(2) Those who hold *jiva* to be manifold, each having a unit of *Avidya* as its *upadhi*, will naturally regard the function of *vritti*, as consisting in the removal of ignorance, for, in this case also there is nothing external and objective. Each unit of consciousness has a universe of its own constituted by its own ignorance, and, besides the manifold held up in view by ignorance, nothing objective exists with which it can be said to be entering into relation.

(3) Those who hold that *jiva* is consciousness limited by or reflected upon *Antahkarana* and believe in the existence of an extra-mental order supported by *Maya* will naturally regard a *vritti* to be the means of setting up a relation between the subjective consciousness and the objective fact by establishing an identity of consciousness underlying them and by removing the veil of ignorance covering the object from view.

(4) Those that maintain *Brahman* or the Absolute to be the material cause of the manifold and the *jiva* to be the conditioned intelligence think a *vritti* to be necessary to remove Ignorance by setting up a relation between the subject and the object.

Vacaspati and the author of *Kalpataru* do not accept the theory of perception indicated as above. They have retained the account of perception, given by the *Naiyayikas*, as the knowledge of things through the senses. *Vacaspati* regards *manas* as the eleventh sense; so that the definition can be well extended to internal perception. It covers both the forms—internal and external.¹

¹ Vide *Vamati Kalpaturu* on Ch. IV, i, i.

Next to perception comes Inference. Inference is the process of acquiring knowledge of a thing through the medium of a mark the thing possesses, when there is no way of directly perceiving it. Vedantism has no particular doctrine of inference. It follows in the main the Nyaya doctrine differing from it in some points. The Vedantic theory can, therefore, be best studied in relation to the Nyaya and the Buddhistic theories of inference. It must be noticed here that the Hindu theory of inference is a formal-material process. It has a greater range of application than Aristotle's formal syllogism and Mill's material induction. "It combines and harmonises Mill's view of the major premises as a brief memorandum of like instances already observed, fortified by a recommendation to extend its application to unobserved cases, with the Aristotelian view of it as a universal proposition which is the formal ground of inference."¹

The process of inference has two aspects :—

(1) Inference as the process of acquiring knowledge for one's own self-*Svartha*.

(2) Inference as the process of exhibiting the truth to others.

As to the *Svartha anumana*: This process of inference involves chiefly three elements. The Naiyayikas analyse the process thus :—²

(1) The *Vyapti*—the invariable concomitance between the *hetu* and the *Sadhya* (the middle and the major terms) established by frequent experience (*e.g.*, the concomitance of fire and smoke from their existing together in kitchens).

(2) The *hetu* or the middle term (*i.e.*, the smoke) must be related to the *minor term*, *i.e.*, must have been perceived

¹ Vide the Positive Science of the Hindus.

² Vide *Tarkasangraha*.

in the mountain. This quality of being associated with the minor term is called *Pakshadharmata*.

(3) This relation calls up in memory the *Vyapti* and gets mixed with it. It gives us the knowledge of the mountain in possession of smoke associated with fire. This is no remembrance. It is the *cognition* of the invariable association of fire and smoke and of such a smoke existing in the mountain. This is called the third element of the process. It leads on to the conclusion direct—"the mountain has fire." Just before the conclusion we have a perception of the invariable connexion between the major, the middle and the minor terms, *i.e.*, the middle term is related to the major term, the minor to the middle term. And then the relations are related to one another. The first forms the major premise, the second the minor, the third the conclusion.

Of these the most important element is the *Vyapti*. The whole problem of inference from the known to the unknown turns upon this point.

The question arises : how are we to establish this invariable concomitance? Under what conditions are we justified in establishing the universal major premise, from the observation of particular cases? The comparative study may be most helpful to the clear understanding of the problem.

Invariable concomitance—How is it established.

The *cārvākas* deny the validity and usefulness of inference as a source of knowledge. They hold that the basis of inference—the invariable concomitance (the *vyapti*) cannot be obtained from direct perception, for perception gives us knowledge of things presented to the senses. It is not competent to give us the knowledge of things escaping sense-perception. Nor can inference give us the

Cārvāka.

knowledge of universal proposition or *Vyapti*, for, in this case, we should also require another inference to establish it, which in its turn would imply another and this would lead us to an infinite regress.¹

The Buddhist systems seek to establish the invariable concomitance implied in the major premise on the relation of cause and effect between the *hetu* and the *sadhya* and on the identity of the nature of the *hetu* and the *sadhya*.²

The Buddhists hold the invariability of relation between cause and effect so that when the cause is absent, the effect is absent, when the cause is present, the effect is also present. A specific effect is invariably preceded by a specific cause. The invariable concomitance between the *hetu* and the *sadhya* is sought to be established upon *causal nexus*, for the causal bond is an intimate one and cannot be broken.

Besides this, the Buddhists have shown that invariable concomitance is determined by the identity of the nature of *hetu* and *sadhya*. A mere superficial mark of similarity is not enough. The identity of essence is another ground of inference.

The Naiyayikas do not accept the above views of Buddhism and seek to establish invariable concomitance between *hetu* and *sadhya* by positive instances supported by the absence of contrary instances. The author of the *Sidhanta Muktabali* in the commentary adds:—"Invariable concomitance should be based upon and is actually due to the agreement both in presence and absence of the *hetu* and the *sadhya*." Even if it is contended that invariable

¹ Sarbadarsan Sangraha : Cārvākdarsanam.

² कार्यकारणभावाद्वा स्वभावाद्वा

concomitance is based upon causal nexus the causal relation is nothing more than an invariability, unconditionalness and immediacy of succession (*e.g.*, the definition of cause अन्वयासिद्धयु न्यस्य नियतपूर्ववर्तिता). And this invariability and immediacy of succession, again, is established by the method referred to above. There is no implicate of a power in the cause to produce the effect. The causal nexus is thus reduced by the Naiyayikas ultimately to invariable concomitance. The Naiyayikas see no necessity to make an additional hypothesis of a *nexus* between cause and effect.

They, again, set aside the Buddhist conception of the identity of essence. They, no doubt, accept the reality of the genus, but they point out that the inseparableness in such cases can only be established by the experience of unbroken uniformity. To this end the mysterious identity of essence is not required. *Vyapti* is an inference arrived at by observation of instances where we have uniform agreement in presence and in absence of *hetu* and *sadhya*.

According to the Vedantins the major premise or the *Vyapti* is not an inference. It is only a *samskara* generated by the observation of concomitance between *hetu* and *sadhya*: it is a permanent impression left upon consciousness and not an inference consciously drawn by the examination of the positive and the negative instances. The positive evidences alone are thought sufficient to produce the belief of invariable concomitance. The negative ones furnish a justification or verification of it. It is said in the *Pari-
bhāṣa* "the *vyapti* is established by the observation of the concomitance supported by the non-observation of non-concomitance." It should be noted here that the Vedantists do not make the confirmation depend upon the agreement in absence between *hetu* and *sadhya*. The

non-observation of non-concomitance proves the rule by the exclusion of contradictory instances, but not by the observation of the agreement in absence of *hetu* and *sadhya*. Vedanta further holds that the number of instances observed is not essential or absolutely necessary to the *Vyapti*. The only element that can be rightly considered essential is the observation of concomitance between *hetu* and *sadhya*—it matters not if we observe it once or many times.¹ Vedanta in laying no stress upon the number of instances as essential to the induction or the formulation of the major premise differs from the empirical view of logic (the enumerative view of induction). The major premise, according to Mill, is a general proposition which is a register of inferences already made and a short formula for making more,—“the real logical antecedent or premise being the particular facts from which the general proposition was collected by induction.” The value of such a general proposition will be greatly increased if the range of experience is wide and the number of instances actually observed is large. The major premise sets forth the objective connexion between the *hetu* and the *sadhya*. The multiplication of instances is quite immaterial for the purpose. Indeed, psychologically the enumeration of instances might be important for belief in the proposition, but logically the objective connexion is all that is needed to lend a support to the conclusion. The ground and origin of our belief in this objective connexion is a question more psychological than logical. The Vedantist is more careful about the impression of concomitance than

¹ Vide *Anumankhanda* व्यभिचारज्ञानविरहसङ्गतं सहचारदर्शनं व्याप्तिराहकम्।

तच्च सहचार दर्शनं भूयोदर्शनं सङ्गदर्शनं वेति विशेषो नादरणीयः ; सहचारदर्शनत्वस्यैव प्रयोजकत्वात्।

about the ground of our belief in it. The particular instances observed do not work separately in mind; they leave a general tendency, a consolidated impression to think of the one with the other, and this becomes the ground of inference. So much about the formation of *Vyapti*.

Now we are to consider *its operation* in inference. We have already pointed out that every form of inference is an extension of our knowledge from the observed to the unobserved through the application of the major premise indicating the concomitance between the middle and the major terms. This *vyapti* is remembered when one observes the middle term (the *hetu*) by the law of association (for the one is always experienced with the other). The Naiyaikas go a step further in holding that this remembrance of the major premise soon gives rise to the knowledge

“ this mountain is covered by smoke
intimately associated with fire ” before
actual inference, *viz.*, “ the mountain
is possessed of fire.” The Naiyaikas thus maintain the actual presence of the major premise as related to the minor in the form of *Tritiya Linga Paramarsa* and our direct cognisance of it. The Vedantin demurs to accept it and holds that in actual inference the major premise is neither remembered ¹ nor the *Linga Paramarsa* (as representing the relation of relations) is presented before consciousness as the main support of inference. The major premise is only a conscious functioning, and

¹ Vedantists differ on this point. We have in the main followed the *Paribhasa*. Madhusudhan seems to hold that *vyapti* is actually remembered.

Vide Adwaita Sidhi, page 23, lines 1-10. Kumbhokonam Edition,
.....रहौतश्चतव्यतिः.....

not the abstract universal of the Naiyaikas. Vedantism thinks that in inference the abstract reason embodied in the universal is not directly presented to consciousness, though it is operative as a conscious tendency (*samskara*) from within. When Mill affirms that in Syllogism we reason not from the major premise, but according to it, Mill seems to agree with Vedanta in disbelieving the abstract universal as consciously operating in inference. The Vedantin, as already indicated, regards the *Vyapti* as a tendency left in consciousness to think in a certain way, but it does not believe in its being co-substantial with things and eternally connected with them. We do not then reason from the universal to the particular, but reason according to it, in which case the universal is the sum of particular cases observed and is the permanent tendency (Samskara) to infer accordingly. Vedantism differs from Nyaya in emphasizing the psychological character of inference, rather than its logical aspect. It makes inference a psychological process and, therefore, does not see the necessity of the abstract universal presenting itself before consciousness to secure the validity of inference. The process of thought as formulated in the Nyaya is, to Vedantists, irreconcilable with the process of the reasoning as normally conducted. The real point of contention lies in the presentation directly of the relation of relations embodied in the *Linga paramarsa*. The Naiyaikas maintain that to secure the validity of the conclusion it is necessary to perceive the absolutely indissoluble connexion between the *Hetu* and the *Sadhya* and also their concomitance with the minor term, and to this end they assert that on the perception of smoke in a particular place we have the indirect cognition of smokiness as its inherent property. This property is co-extensive with smoke of all times and places. And this causes the

simultaneous cognition of them.¹ This, again, leads on to the perception of fire, for they are concomitant. Then we have the inference regarding the fire on the mountain. The point of inference consists in establishing a relation between the mountain and the fire, because of smoke. In this process we have three steps: (1) the perception of the *hetu*, the middle term which leads on to the knowledge of all smoke, (2) the remembrance of the major premise, the invariable concomitance between the *hetu* and the major term, and (3) the actual cognition of the relation of the minor with *vyapti* leading to the inference—this mountain has fire.² The Vedantin does not see the necessity of *Linga paramarsa* and knowledge by implication in Inference. It is enough for inference to

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Parāmarsa.

have the *samskara* of the *vyapti* which works on the presentation of the middle term and this directly is the cause of the inference. Nothing more is necessary. Just as on the presentation of a scented sandal, we directly perceive the sandal, but do not get its scent which is revived in memory by the law of association, similarly it is enough for inference to remember the *vyapti* on the presentation of the middle term in association with the minor, without a direct cognition of it in the form of an abstract logical universal. The *Naiyāikas* hold that the knowledge of the

¹ धूमत्वेन सन्निकर्षेण धूम इत्येवंरूपं सकलधूमविषयकं ज्ञानं जायते—सामान्य लक्षणाप्रत्यासत्तिर्हि तदाश्रयस्य ज्ञानं जनयति ।

² Vide Adwaita Sidhi, Kumbhakonam Edition, page 23 : पार्वतीय धूमेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षदशायां धूमत्वेन प्रकारेण गृहीतस्मृतव्याप्तिस्तत्र वैशिष्ट्यग्रहसम्भवात् 'सुरभिवन्दनमिति वत् विशेष्येन्द्रियसन्निकर्ष विशेषणासंसर्गाग्रहरूपाया विशिष्ट ज्ञानसामग्र्याः पूर्णत्वात् । व्याप्तिस्मृतिप्रकारेण वा पक्षधर्मताज्ञानस्य हेतुता । महानसीय एव धूमो धूमत्वेन व्याप्तिस्मृतिविषयो भवति ।

sandal as sweet-scented is a cognition by implication (ज्ञानप्रत्यासक्ति); similarly the abstract universal—the cognition of smoke as invariably associated with fire—requires the perception by implication of the co-existence of all ‘smokes’ and all fires.

The Vedantin does not accept this. In other words the Vedantic treatment of inference is psychological, the Naiyayik treatment is logical. Vedantism analyses the conditions generally involved in inference, Nyaya puts down the safeguards necessary for logical cogency.

To exhibit the validity of reasoning to others, we require a form of inference composed of five members : (1) The mountain has fire, (2) Because of the smoke, (3) Wherever there is smoke, there is fire, as in the kitchen, (4) This mountain has smoke. (5) Therefore it has fire. The first is the conclusion to be proved. The second gives the reason—the *hetu*, the third the major premise and a concrete illustration of the concomitance of the *hetu* and the *sadhya*, the fourth the concomitance of the middle and the major term, the fifth is the conclusion. The Vedantin, here again, differs from the Naiyayikas in holding that of the above the first three or the last three are sufficient to establish any conclusion. We do not require the full five members. The first three represent reasoning in progressive or synthetic form. The third member is essentially necessary. It is the major premise with a concrete illustration of the concomitance other than the minor term. The second and fourth represent the minor premises, the first and fifth conclusion. Two members are not necessary.

Vedanta does not accept the three divisions of inference of the Nyaya school, viz., *Anvaya Vyatireki*,

Kevala-Anvayi, Kevala-Vyatireki. All inference is of the kind, *Anvayi, i.e.,* the inference on the ground of agreement in presence, *i.e.,* positive concomitance.

The *Kevala anvayi* form of inference rests upon invariable and undeniable concomitance of *hetu* and *sadhyu*—a concomitance the negation of which cannot be conceived,¹ *e.g.,* the pot is *knowable*, because it is *namable*. We get here an *Anvaya Vyapti*—whatever is namable, is knowable, but we can have no *Vyatireki Vyapti*—whatever is not knowable, is not namable, for there is no concrete illustration to the point. Vedanta rejects this form of inference, for, according to it, nothing is eternal except *Brahman*. The negation of all things is thought possible and actually sought. According to the Nyaya system there are absolutely positive concepts. Their corresponding negative forms are non-existent. From the Vedantic standpoint nothing is fully positive, except *Brahman*, and, therefore, everything in the immanent order including the most positive of concepts is actually denied, so that there can be no fixed, unalterable and indestructible relation in the phenomenal order.

Kevala-Vyatireki (negative form of inference) is inference founded upon negative non-concomitance, *e.g.,* the earth differs from others because of smell. The argument analysed may be put thus : if earth is not different from other things then it is not possessed of smell. But it is possessed of smell. It is, therefore, different from others. This form of inference corresponds to Destructive hypothetical-categorical syllogism where we infer the negation

¹ Vide Tattwachintamani-Anumankhandam इतिमदात्मनाभावाप्रति-
योगित्वम् केवलान्वयित्वं ।

of the *ketu* from the negation of *sadhya*, the negation of the cause from the negation of the effect. Such inference is treated by the Vedantin under *Arthapatti* where we infer from effect to cause.¹

Now as the Vedantin rejects both the forms of inference—*Kebala Anvayi* and *Kebala Vyatireki*—he cannot also accept the third one which is inference based upon agreement of concomitance and agreement of non-concomitance, e.g., where is smoke, there is fire ; where is no fire, there is no smoke. One who cannot conceive a mark in complete agreement with anything in presence and absence must refuse to accept any form of inference based upon them. Hence the Vedantin accepts only the inference known as *Anvayi*—agreement on concomitance, invariable but not undeniable.

This process of inference has been extended to the phenomenal existence to establish its unreality and the corresponding reality of Brahman. We can put it in inferential form. The moments of the inference will be: "The manifold existence is false, because of its being different from Brahman ; all that is not Brahman is false, like the silver in the mother-of-pearl." This inference stands on the accepted distinction of *Vyavaharik* and *Pratibhasik* existences. We understand the unreality of the latter in reference to the reality of the former. But for this distinction between illusion and phenomenon, the unreality of the phenomenon would be unintelligible and inconceivable, as being absolutely without a concrete illustration. The negative conclusion about the phenomenal order is in a way positing the Absolute Existence as it is

¹ Vide *Adwaitachandrika*, p. 26.

non-different from the complete negation of the 'given' of experience.

Next to inference comes *Upamāna*. It is the source of the knowledge of similarity. It constitutes a *pramāna* by itself, for it gives us knowledge which is not covered by perception or inference. A particular thing (B-*Gabaya*) which is presented is felt to be like another thing (A-the cow) which is not presented but might have been seen before and remembered; as a result of it A is felt to be like B. B suggests its similar A. Then we have the knowledge A is like B. The functional activity of the consciousness of similarity (*upamāna*) is the cause. The effective consciousness of similarity (*sadrīśya*) is the result.

The *upamāna* is not perception, as the element of comparison is not presented to the senses. But this does not make the knowledge indirect. The knowledge of similarity is direct, for it is immediately felt to be so. The knowledge of similarity is not remembrance, for we are conscious here not of an object seen before, but of the similarity of the particular object with the one seen or perceived before. At the time when one perceives 'the cow,' 'the *gabaya*' may not have been perceived, and their similarity may not have been simultaneously presented. So that to speak of this cognition of similarity as a memory-idea is to misunderstand the whole thing. This identity is felt or perceived and is not the object of comparison. It is no recognition, for recognition implies a temporary forgetfulness and subsequent assimilation. But in the case before us we have the perception of a relation (of an identity) completely new. It is, again, not inference, for the likeness of things is felt to be cognised (अनुभवसिद्धत्वात्) but not inferred through the function of *vyapti*.

Next comes *arthapatti*. Presumption is the supposition or more properly the implication of cause or premise from effect or conclusion. It is inference through a negative mark, *Vyatireki Linga*, which, according to Vedantists, is no inference at all. The stock example is earth, because of its smell, differs from other elements. And this cannot be established unless it is possessed of smell. Hence to explain its difference, it is supposed to possess smell. It is no inference. It is an implication, a hypothesis. The Vedantin in recognising *Arthapatti* accepts the importance of hypothesis as a separate source of knowledge. *Arthapatti* is the supposition of the cause. When a well-ascertained fact cannot be explained without a presumption of another thing as causing it, then this supposition is called *arthapatti*. The process is inductive. The effect is given, the cause is suggested.

By *Arthapatti* the *Vedantin* draws out the implication of the falsity of the manifold of existence. We are told in the *Sruti* that "the wise gets over misery." The knowledge of identity is regarded as the cause of the removal or destruction of misery due to ignorance. This effect (misery) is, therefore, regarded as having its cause in ignorance and this implication is brought out by the capacity of knowledge to destroy ignorance. This also implies the falsity of the empirical existence as it is denied by the removal of ignorance. Similarly when one is told, *Devadatta* is not in the house, one naturally presumes that he must be out and this presumption is also based upon *Arthapatti*. It is a presumption of one event or a thing on the production of negative data.

The *Pravakar* school of *Mimansa* philosophy seems to have a different view of *Arthapatti*. It holds that when

a man is not in the house, the presumption of his staying outside does not immediately follow.

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It is dependent upon another condition, *viz.*, our knowledge of the man as still alive. This view cannot be accepted. If the man being alive be at all doubtful, the presumption of his going out cannot rise at all. This presumption can rise when the fact of his living is certain. This condition is a foregone conclusion. It is a remote condition and has no immediate bearing upon the supposition. Really *Arthapatti* owes its origin to the mutual incompatibility of two well ascertained facts (*e.g.*, a man getting fat and his abstinence from meal during day). This incompatibility is removed by the supposition of a third element, *viz.*, his taking food at night.

Āgama :—Apart from the above sources of knowledge, *Vedantism* acknowledges the authority of *Śabda* as an independent source of knowledge. It may be of two kinds,

Āgama.

(1) inasmuch as the source is personal, when the information is conveyed in the speech of a certain person, and (2) inasmuch as it is impersonal, when the information is conveyed on the authority of the *Vedas*.

But both of them are independent sources when they do not repeat the information already known through other sources. Their claims as distinctly independent sources of knowledge lie in conveying such information as is not possible to get otherwise. Whenever *Sabda* gives us such knowledge regarding anything—duty or reality—it is accepted as a real and a positive source of knowledge. There is a difference in the weight of authority between *Sabda* as personal, and *Sabda* as impersonal.

The former cannot be accepted unconditionally, for there is the possibility that the author may know the truth and

Sabda-(1) as personal
(2) as impersonal.

yet deliberately misrepresent it. On the other hand he may in all good faith present a tissue of truth and falsity which he believes to be solely true. In such cases we are to be careful until we are convinced of the sincerity of the man and the accuracy of his statement. The *Sabda* as personal may be of two kinds in as much as it conveys or not conveys true information.¹

The latter may be accepted unconditionally. It is impersonal in the sense of not being dependent upon any source which can wilfully change it. चाक्षयस्य नतिं वक्तुं प्रभवामः नाम्नाद्यं पर्यनुयोक्तम् । It is eternal. The right appreciation of this *pramana* is bound up with the right understanding of the relation between word and its meaning. *Sabda* and *Artha* are eternal existences. Their relation is also eternal. *Artha* is not to be thought as an independent existence fixed to certain names by convention. The word is indissolubly bound up with things. It directly refers to the thing, it expresses the thing (*vide Jaimini Sutra*, 5). The *Naiyaikas* fix down the denotation of terms by convention. The relation is not eternal. It is fixed by *Iswara*. They infer the existence of convention in each and every case. "All words have their denotation fixed by convention, because they are denotative—like the proper names—*Devatatta* and the like."

The *Vedantists* and the *Mimansakas* do not accept the artificial method of fixing down names. So far as the proper names are concerned they accept the system of artificial convention to denote one thing separately from the other. The thing is finite, and the symbol or name is given by some

¹ *Vide Sabdarthasya*—Ch. I, Pada 1, Sutra 5, लौकिकानि वाक्यानि उपपन्नार्थानि अनुपपन्नार्थानि च दृश्यन्ते ।

person after it has entered into existence. So far they accept the subjective process or naming. The individual is finite and to be destroyed in time, the particular convention is also to be destroyed in time.

As regards the common names (including all things) denotativeness can be accounted for otherwise than by convention. Their meanings are fixed from eternity. The denotative potency of the word is co-eternal with the word itself. The thing it denotes is eternal. So that every word has fixed denotation, and every object (excepting individuals) has a fixed name. They are indissolubly connected from eternity which can never be destroyed even in the *Mahapralaya*. The system of names is not created but only manifested. This manifestation is in time, but the sound-form is eternal. *Iswara* cannot create it or destroy it wilfully. It is eternally present with him. The word which is manifested in one cycle of existence is to be regarded as existent in previous cycles. They are impersonal in the sense of possessing an independent existence and of their subsisting in the same order and nature throughout cycles of existences.

“The *Mimansakas* lay great stress upon the denotativeness of words being independent of any agency,” as it belongs to the words by their very nature. The validity of the verbal cognition is inherent in the word itself and has no reference to the character of the source. The *Mimansakas* as well as the *Vedantin* deny any personal agency in the matter of the composition of the Vedas, which, if accepted, would make it non-eternal and a transitory concern. The *Mimansakas* and the *Vedantin*, therefore, cannot accept the fixation of meanings to words by use and custom as held by the *Naiyāikas*. The *Naiyāika's* conception of artificial and temporary fixation requires the hypothesis of ‘God’ as the creator or originator

of all words and of the *Vedas*. This goes directly against the *Mimansa* theory of the self-sufficient, authoritative and infallible nature of the *Vedas* which as such and as a sure mode of knowledge must not be a matter of personal construction. All words are endowed with an inherent denotative potency from eternity, and the relation between language and thought, words and things is intimate and natural and not acquired through practice. It is an *a priori* synthesis. Thus far, the *Vedantin* agrees with the *Mimansakas*. While the *Mimansakas* accept the permanence of *Sabda* and of the *Vedas*, the *Vedantists* regard that the *Vedas* appear with cycles of existence and disappear at the end of each cycle but the denotative potency remains the same without being in any way altered. The word is co-eternal with *Isvara*. It is, no doubt, supposed to have no independent existence or reality; it is the infinite determination of *Brahman*. But *Brahman* cannot change or alter it. *Vacaspati* says in his *Vamati* ¹ "though the supreme self possessed of *Avidya* as its *upadhi* is conceived as the originator and the author of the *Vedas*, still it has no free choice or power in the matter of their alteration or change. It expresses them just in the form which they possessed in previous cycles of existence.

Every sentence (वाक्यं) is syntactical combination of words, the words, again, of letters. Construction of a Sentence. The letter is expressed by (sensuous form, called) *dhvani*. Technically the letter is called *Varna*. According to the *Naiyaikas* the letters are not eternal. They are created. These letters

¹ *Vide* Chapter I, Pada I, Sutra 3, अनादि अवियोपादानलब्धसर्व्वशक्तिज्ञानस्यापि परमात्मनः नित्यस्य वेदानां योनिरपि न तेषु स्वातन्त्र्यं पूर्व्वपूर्व्वं सर्गानुसारीष तादृशतादृशानुपूर्व्वीविरचनात् ।

are identified with sounds. *Dhwani* is outer expression. But the *Panini* School emphasises the distinction of *letter* and *sound*. The latter is expression. The mental forms of letters are called *śfotas*. Before any letter can be expressed in sound, it appears in mental forms which are permanent and bodiless. The letters, the original sounds, the *śfotas* are names for the same thing ; they have no physical forms and are the original realities of existence. The *Mimansakas* differ from the *Panini* School in not holding with them the mental existence of *śfota*. But still they maintain that letters are real and eternally objective existences expressed by sensuous forms of sounds. These letters are directly felt by the ear. Whereas, according to the former school, letters are not felt by the ear but by the mind, the *dhwani* is perceived by the ear.

A word is a combination of two or more letters. It is impermanent from the *Naiyayika* standpoint. The *Panini* School regard the *word* as a *śfota* originated in combination with *letter-śfotas* but different from them. It is called *pada-śfota*. It is also permanent.

A sentence is made up of words. It has its origin in time. It is destroyed in time. The *Mimansakas* and the *Naiyayikas* agree in this point. The *Panini* School consider this to be also a *śfota*-combination of *śfota-words*.

There are some *Mimansakas* who hold that letters in succession form words and words in their turn sentences. The letters are real and permanent, but the order of succession is transitory, hence the combination of letters and of words is only temporarily real and ceases to exist after a short time. The *Vedantin* keeps to this view.¹

¹ *Vide Bhamati*, p. 98, Nirnayasagar Kalpataru-Parimal Edition :
येऽपि तावत् वर्णानां नित्यत्वमास्थित तैरपि पदवाक्यादीनाम् अनित्यत्वममुपेतव्यम् ।
आनुपूर्वीभेदवन्तः द्विवर्णाः पदम्, पदानिच आनुपूर्वीभेदवन्ति वाक्यम् ।

According to the *Naiyayikas* the relation between words and their connotation or objects is not fixed and permanent; such is also the relation between sentences and their meanings. But while the words have the capacity of indicating their meaning, *i.e.*, they have by custom an acquired sense, the sentence has none to indicate its own meaning. The meaning is found out by syntactical connexion, *i.e.*, the mutual demand of the essential parts of a sentence.

According to *Pravakar* every word has twofold capacity or *śakti*, the one revives in memory the images of the objects which it denotes, the other makes the relation between them intelligible. The first is called *Smaraka-Śakti*. This *Śakti* is a matter of clear cognition. The second establishes the relation spontaneously without coming before clear consciousness. According to *Bhatta* every word has the denotative capacity by which the object is placed or presented before us, whereas these objects have the capacity of indicating the meaning of the sentence.

Now every combination of words does not constitute a true sentence but only such as has the conditions of *Ākankhā*, *Yogyotā*, *Āsatti* and *Tatparya*. *Ākankhā* is the syntactical connexion. It is in the terms of the *Paribhasa* "the mutual demand of the different parts of a sentence for one another, *e.g.*, the demand of a verb for its subject, of the subject for the verb. *Yogyatā* is the compatibility of meaning of words composing a sentence, *e.g.*, when one speaks of watering through fire, the sentence has no meaning as there is no compatibility or harmony. They are quite inconsistent and cannot be thought together. Whenever a sentence is to give us some clear meaning, this condition of compatibility must be fulfilled.

Āsatti is the proximity and immediacy of the parts of

a sentence indicative of things. This proximity has a reference to the form of a sentence which is the expression of a thought-unit. It demands the presentation of omitted words to make us understand the meaning of elliptical sentences.

Tātparya is the inherent capacity of a sentence to indicate some objective sense. It is not the intention of the subject uttering it, otherwise no uniformity of meaning can be secured. It is the objective intention. It is inherent in the sentence. It cannot be wilfully changed. A real or true sentence, even when uttered by one not understanding its import, has a real significance or *tātparya*, for it possesses the capacity of conveying the particular knowledge of the thing. It has an objective intention.

The ascertainment of the objective meaning of a sentence possessing a secular reference may be helped by the knowledge drawn from other sources. In fact, the sentence repeats what is known from other sources. But in the case of the *śruti* the objective intention is understood by the critical reflection of the authoritative texts. The knowledge drawn from other sources has no bearing upon it. It refers to things, of which the other sources are incompetent to give us any information. The *Śruti* cannot be thought to be conveying or repeating experiences already acquired through other sources. It constitutes a *pramana* by itself.

The meaning of a word may be (1) direct or primary and (2) implied or secondary. This capacity of a word of indicating a thing directly or indirectly is known as *Śakti* which, by itself, is something different from word. It is a separate existence. Vedantism, as already pointed out, accepts the capacity of words to denote classes and not individuals. The reference to the individual is not

independent of the reference to the universal or we may as well say the *śakti* in the *Vyakti* has a non-connotative reference (स्वरूपवस्तु) but in the *Jati* it has a connotative reference.

The topic has a close bearing on the theories indicative of the significance of words

- (1) *Anvita-Avidhana.* and their relation to one another.
 (2) *Avihita-anvaya.*

These theories are (1) *anvita-avidhana* and (2) *avihita-anvaya*.

The former holds that every word possesses the inherent capacity of calling up in memory the object it denotes.¹ It has another capacity of presenting the relation between the objects (meanings) thus recalled in memory. The latter is necessary to understand the meanings of words in syntactical combination. But for this capacity we would not have understood clearly the meaning of words in a sentence. But we must not think that the capacity of a word to call up in memory the object it denotes is of itself enough to give us a consistent meaning: it can do so only when it is placed in syntactical relation and when this *relation* is called up.

The latter holds that words themselves can express or convey separate meanings by the function—*Avida* or denotation; they are subsequently combined into a sentence expressing a connected idea. Every word composing a sentence has a clear, distinct sense apart from and independent of the sentence of which it forms a part.

This theory differs from the previous one in holding that every word has an inner capacity of indicating its meaning or the object it denotes, not by the help of memory nor by intention but by a power distinct from

¹ परदृशि पुनः अन्विताभिधाने पदयुगलात् अति युक्तमेव पूर्वम्—*Sankṣepa Śāriraka*, Ch. I, Sl. 384.

both, called *Abhidhana*—something akin to memory but not memory.¹

When the inherent capacity of words has presented the corresponding objects before us, the objects have the capacity of presenting the meaning of the words in relation to one another.

These theories are of no special importance to the Vedantists.

The Vedantists would naturally fight shy of the first theory, for it can give us only knowledge in relation, but cannot convey the sense of Identity. The Vedantists generally agree in this point. But *Brahmānanda* thinks differently. According to him every word has two capacities (1) the capacity of recalling in memory the object it denotes and (2) the capacity of indicating the objective intention, (instead of presenting the relation between objects).² Thus interpreted, the *Anvita-Avidhanabada* can be safely applied to explain the axiom of Identity. It will put forth an explanation naturally akin to the one given by the *Avihita-Anvayabada*. The only point of difference will be that the one will hold the *Śakti* to be inherent in *words*, the other, in *meaning* or *artha*.

Differences, no doubt, would arise in the interpretation of the axiom of Identity from the above two standpoints. From the standpoint of *Anvita-Avidhana* theory the

¹ अभिहितवचना यदा तदानौ श्रुतिसमनुद्धियुगं पदे विधत्तः । Samkṣepa Sariraka, Chapter 1, Sl. 384.

² Vide *Ratnabali*, page 37 :

ननु तथापि तत्त्वमसौ न्यादावनुपपत्तिः ; अन्वितानुभावकत्वेन क्लृप्तस्य क्लृदादिपदस्थानन-
न्वितव्रह्मानुभावकत्वासम्भवात् इति चेन्न । अन्वितेत्यस्य स्वचटितवाक्यतात्पर्यविषयार्थक-
त्वात् । तथा च यस्या पदस्य स्वचटितवाक्यतात्पर्यविषयो योऽर्थोऽन्वितोऽनन्वितोवा
तद्वत् तस्य अनुभावकत्वम् ।

interpretation of the axiom would require the *memory of undivided consciousness* as implied in *twam* and *tat*, otherwise we cannot seek to establish *identity* by reference to consciousness appearing with modifications. Such a *memory* would require the previous knowledge of Identity in some form and this we have in deep sleep and in *Asamprajñata samādhi*. The impressions or experiences of such states would supply us with the necessary elements of establishing and interpreting Identity.

According to the *Avihita-anvayabada*, the words 'tat' and 'twam' have the capacity of presenting consciousness modified either as *Iswara* or *Jiva* and the axiom of Identity is meant to point out the integrity of consciousness behind the apparent divisions. And this integrity is held up before view by the capacity of the objects. This integrity is the objective intention.

Besides the foregoing *pramanas* Vedanta regards non-apprehension as a source of the knowledge of *Abhava*. *Abhava* is non-existence or negation. In Nyaya and Vedanta, *Negation* or *Abhava* is something cognised by a separate source of knowledge.

Before considering the question how *Abhava* is known, we should determine its nature, for this will help us to understand the course of its knowledge.

The *Naiyayikas* regard *Abhava* as a separate existence. But its knowledge is not possible by itself. It is relative to a particular thing or object which, technically, is called its *Pratīyogī*, e.g., when one says there is no cow in the room, what one means to say is that one has the perception of the non-existence or (*the Abhava*) of a cow. Apart from this implication of its object, *Abhava* has a constant reference to its *locus* (*Adhikarana*). The absence of a cow is not only perceived, but it is perceived in some place.

There is no clear meaning in the saying that the cow is non-existent, the speaker must relate some point in space or time where or when he does not see the cow. This implies an undeniable reference of *Abhava* to its *locus*.

To consider next the nature of this relation. The *Naiyayikas* opine differently. The more ancient logicians think *Abhava* to be non-different from its locus or support. This they express by saying that the relation is *swarup*, identical. The neo-logicians break with this affirmation. They think that *non-existence* is related to its locus. And this relation is one of the supported and the support. This relation is an existence by itself (it is called *vaiśiṣṭha*) different from the non-existence as well as the locus.¹

The Vedantin follows the ancient *Naiyayikas* and considers the non-existence to be non-different from its locus. But he insists upon conceiving *negation* or *Abhava* to be an existence different from positive existences though it may be identical with its locus. Although *Abhava* is supposed to be identical with its locus, still it is not locus itself. Had that been the case it would have been perceived or cognised, when the locus is perceived. It requires a direct and explicit perception, for it is related permanently to another term. It is not so much the perception of its locus as the non-apprehension of its object. It has a *double* reference—reference to the object, and reference to the support. The clear apprehension of this nature of *Abhava* requires a form of knowledge which would give us knowledge not only of the locus, but of the *absence*. The perception of the locus, minus the object, gives us complete knowledge of *Abhava*. Perception is not potentially competent to give us this consciousness. It can give us

¹ Vide Muktabali on Karikā 12 (Bhāṣapariśeḍa).

the knowledge of the locus or support in which the knowledge of the *absence* or *Abhava* may be implicit. But to bring it out we require a separate mode of knowing. And this source is *Anupalabdhi*. It gives us knowledge of *absence* directly.

It should be noticed here that the *object* of *Abhava* or what is absent, must be capable of being perceived. It, like merit or demerit, should not escape our observation. In other words *Abhava* must belong to the same order of reality as locus, otherwise there is no meaning in the saying, it would have been seen if it were present. (यदिस्थान् उपलब्धत), *i.e.*, otherwise the perception of the non-existence or absence cannot be held to be involved in the cognizance of its locus.

The affirmation of the Vedantists that *Abhava* or negation is non-different from its locus leads them to identify the negation of empirical existence with the transcendental oneness. The preception of identity, the consciousness of transcendence can be negatively described as the negation of *Avidya* and of the empirical mode of life, for negation as held above is non-different from its locus. And this does away with the charge that can be possibly laid against Vedantism that in liberation it has to conceive the existence of consciousness in transcendence side by side with a blank negation (*vide* Chapter V).

Curiously enough, among some of the Neo-Vedantists *e.g.*, *Sriharsa*, *Citsuka*, *Prakūśananda*, a tendency is noticed to set aside the values of perception, inference, *upamana*, etc., as sources of knowledge. They seem to accept the one undeniable fact of consciousness as the ultimate reality which is self-luminous, and which, as such, does not require any other proof of its own existence. It is the datum of experience and is revealed in self-consciousness. Besides this direct implication and positive evidence of consciousness

these authors do not extend their acceptance to the ordinary sources of knowledge. They have pointed out nice inaccuracies in all of them.

But this is going too far. To deny the validity of the sources of knowledge is almost to court scepticism, which, but for the ever-accomplished positive fact of consciousness, would have been the consistent goal of those that pursue the course.

This tendency has, later on, a check from the author of the *Advaitasidhi* who has accepted the more ancient division of existences, as transcendental, empirical and illusory and has shown that ordinary sources of knowledge have reference to the empirical order. We cannot make any transcendent use of them. But this does not necessarily indicate that they are quite useless. In fact, they are useful and necessary so long as empirical consciousness has a hold upon us. The protest introduced by the aforesaid authors has a meaning in that way. It removes the false notion that the absolute truth is open to the ordinary sources of knowledge. *Sankar* has the same thing in mind when he says "that authoritative texts, etc., make the empirical existences their objects" (अविद्यावद्विषयाणि शास्त्राणि).

CHAPTER IV.

CULTURE.

This *Atman* is not attained by sweet speech, nor by intelligence, nor by wisdom : to one who accepts it in life is revealed its real nature.

This *Atman* is within the heart-cave of every creature.

One who has forsaken all earthly desires can see the great *Atman* by its grace.

He alone who is pure by wisdom can see in meditation the one without parts.

Katha-Upaniṣad.

Vedantism establishes the oneness of Being, and if all is, in truth, *Saccidanandam*, the world of appearance can be the effect, positive in practical sense, negative in essence, of a perverted consciousness, which, for the time being, appears to have forgotten the transcendent oneness of its being and fallen into the error of division and partial experience. This divided consciousness brings in its train the dualities of the empirical order—the dualities of life and death, of good and evil, of pleasure and pain. The soul with the limitation of consciousness feels at every stage an opposing force in nature, in society, in all that meets its obscure vision. It suffers and suffers through ages, until as a result thereof an expansive force begins to assert itself to destroy the false individuality. The theoretical understanding of the oneness of existence is not sufficient to put off the sense of individuality and limitation. One should have illuminating consciousness of identity before one can hope to transcend the dualities of empirical order.

The Vedantism of the *Sankar* School recognises a dualism of pure and practical reason, of reason and will. The main ethical ideal will be to set aside this dualism by establishing the superior claim of the Identity—Consciousness over the solicitations of sense and the readi-

Direct and indirect
ways of Realisation.

ness of will to satisfy them. Vedantism does not accept the transformation of will as the ideal in moral life. It looks for a will-less bliss. This consummation may come in two ways :— (1) direct, and (2) indirect.

The direct way supposes a deep understanding of the illusoriness of appearance and of the reality of Being-in-Identity and a discriminative consciousness which can

(1) Direct.

penetrate through the appearance and apprehend the underlying essence or Reality. This is the life of pure reason, where the sense and the will cannot demand any satisfaction, for, in the unobscure vision of pure reason, the *Saccidanandam* extended in all beings and things is felt in widest commonalty, impartial universality and transcendent Identity. The limitation of a perverted consciousness with all its practical effects disappears.¹ This may be called the *Sankhyamarga*.

But everyone may not possess such a discriminating intellect, and in that case the search after liberation can only be indirect, for, the lower nature requires a satisfaction

¹ धर्मजिज्ञासायाः प्रागप्यधीतवेदान्तस्य ब्रह्मजिज्ञासोपपत्तेः ।”—Sankar.

कश्चित् स तादृश एव प्राचीनसुकृतसम्पदासादितविवेकादिः प्रथममेवानुपयोगादन-
पेत्य धर्मजिज्ञासां ब्रह्मजिज्ञासानेवारभते ।

अन्यः पुनरुत्कटतमसुकृतसम्भारपरिपाकवशात् अनधीतवेद एव विवेकादि-
सम्पत्त्या निरस्तसमक्षैषणो निःश्रेयसीयंस्तदुपायमन्विच्छति—Sidhanta Sidhanjanam.

before it can give way to the higher. Hence we find the meaning of progressive expansion as the right method of life and its evolution, because the satisfaction accom-

(2) Indirect. accompanying every step in its course
 is fully felt and makes the succeeding stage in the order of development easy of reach and realisation. The step which falls behind in the course of expansive life possesses no real meaning for us and can actually be called illusory when we have passed through it.

No doubt, to start with, we explain away all manifoldness, all difference as not pertaining to the nature of the Absolute. We compare the world-process with a rope-serpent, and this is true when we speak of the Absolute and the relative side by side with a view to indicate transcendence. This is the demand of logic. But when we speak of the psychological revelation, the logic of Vedantism can hardly be useful. Our practical vision is far off from the Vedantic Ideal of Identity and the Vedantic teaching of the illusoriness of the world. The Vedantic teaching cannot be effective in calling forth that high form of renunciation which invariably precedes the life of complete giving up in the thought of Identity, unless we have already felt by experience the inadequacy of every other form of enthusiasm in sacrifice and love to bring in complete satisfaction. The *para* or superior *vairagya* which leads on immediately to the perception of Identity is a state that does not appear at our command and free will. Even after a sustained course of *Vicara*, we feel attracted to the manifold. And, after we have gone through all possible courses of development gradually, the lower instincts of service and love cannot attract us away from the life of wisdom. The life of real

renunciation, forsooth, comes only when we feel deep within us a resolve to go away from and transcend the empiric life in order to realise the Identity of Being. When such a state is actually attained, we can understand what we practically mean by the assertion that the world is illusory, and that not a moment too soon. This is the inner meaning of *Sankara's* system, and this is involved in his conception of *Saguna Brahman*. In retaining (even empirically) it as a part of his system *Sankara* admits the possibility of a life of love in service and service in love for the souls yearning for spiritual evolution. If we do not agree to this conclusion we cease to find any necessity of retaining the conception of *Saguna Brahman* as something real to one starting with egoistic consciousness. One may choose to call it a pragmatic necessity, but still the element is there. And *Sankara* clearly sees that the esoteric teachings of Vedantism cannot be revealed unto one who has not the sufficiency of this pragmatic satisfaction.

There are three stages in the course of progressive realisation. We have the egoistic outlook to begin with.

Three stages in the course of progressive evolution. We have the dualities of life and death, pleasure and pain, good and evil, as the first formations of egoistic consciousness. In the second stage we have the dissolution of this egoistic construction by the gradual self-opening of the individual to the universal life as the means of supreme fulfilment. Freedom lies in identifying oneself with the expansive life. The second step is a very important one, and none can at once transcend it.

The first indication of the new birth of the soul within the heart-cave is the appearance of a loving heart and a willing surrender of its energy to the life of service. To save the energy thus spent and to make it useful to

the higher forms of evolution and growth, the Gita urges upon us the necessity of working not for the realisation of sordid and selfish motives and intentions at the behest of animal instincts, but, for the sake of duty and service to the cosmic life expressive of a divine will and purpose. The life of sacrifice, *Karma* in love and faith, is the indication of the heart open to the expansive life. It is also a way and a path to make possible the inrush of such a life within us. We feel within that the life of sacrifice is an outlet of the Divine flow received in us, and again, this sacrifice makes the capacity of receiving and retaining within us such a life all the more possible. This may be called the *Niskama Karma Yoga*.

A step higher, such an expansive movement originates in us the newer forms of heart-beats due to the life-current expressing itself in the form of love and glory and prepares us for mystic visions of sweetness and bliss. Here we are conscious of the finite life-current enjoying the stream of Delight which carries it up further and further, granting to us the possibility of enjoying the manifestation in a thousand ways. Every one of these gratifications, every experience of sweetness makes it possible for us to enjoy the still higher ones.

This is the path of Devotion. Devotion may have two forms:—(1) *Abheda-upasana* in which the identity of Being is kept in view, where the seeker gradually loses himself in the object of love and worship. (2) *Bheda-upasana* in which a difference-in-identity is kept in view, where the seeker embraces the Delight-current, enjoys its soothing touch, and still keeps himself separate. In the former there is the possibility of attaining the Identity-consciousness. In the latter no such possibility can arise. Even in the first case devotion is a practice in deep concentration, and it cannot forego the necessity of reflective

criticism and discriminating consciousness to destroy ignorance. Ignorance is destroyed by knowledge alone.¹

It should be absolutely clear that devotion implies in the beginning the consciousness of duality. It necessarily refers to the *Saguna Brahman*. The transcendent cannot be the object of thought, far less of devotion. But some one, among the Vedantists, known as the *vritti-kar*, lends his support to the view that the transcendent can be the object of devotion. This view is not tenable, for, as pointed out above, devotion implies a duality and a relation—a conception hardly in keeping with the transcendent Identity.²

A transformation of *antahkarana* takes place in devotion. This transformation is wrought gradually. The life of devotion has an inner history and development of its own. The finite throbbing pulse gives itself up to the surrounding expression of the Delight-current and realises a greater and more expansive being in this course. As the effect of such a complete surrender, a psychological transformation takes place. The outer life no longer appears as something quite extra-mental.

Two forms of transformation.

¹ *Vide* Brahmananda Giri Commentary on the Gita, p. 442. (By Venkatanatha, Vani Bilas Press, Srirangam.)

एतादृश निर्गुणोपासनद्वारेण सगुणोपासनं सुसुखीर्षोपायं प्रभवति, नान्यथा ; श्रवणमनननिदिध्यासनाभावे ज्ञानानुदयात्—Chap. XIII, Sl. 1.

² *Vide* Apyaya Dikshit's Nyaya-Rakshamani—

अत्र आनन्दमयजीव इति पूर्वपक्षे ब्रह्मेति सिद्धान्त इत्यधिकरण शरीरं इति क्लृप्ता स्तार्जवं मन्थमानेन वर्णितं.

Vide Anandamaya Adhikaran, where Sankar refutes the opponent's plea of the possibility of worshipping the transcendent. And this opponent, according to Vamati, is some one among the Vedantists, the *Vritti-Kar*.

The little self of ours in wise passiveness feels itself placed in an enveloping and all-pervasive consciousness. Feeling the immanence of bliss the seeker gives up himself totally and completely. Every modification of mental being then acquires a new colour and meaning. Really with the intuitive vision of a life playing all round, everything is looked upon in its relation to and from its place in, the infinite. Everything appears delightful. We have a beautiful description of this beatitude in *Sankar's Bodhasar*.¹

As a result of this opening the adept begins to feel the ever-presence of Divine Grace. With the fullness of heart, with the deep satisfaction that ensues as the result of such a complete surrender, the seeker gradually forgets his finite self. With the intensity of devotion in love the sense of distance and difference absolves itself into one of nearness and affinity paving the way for the final consummation. The finite self-conscious centre gives itself up, in the first stage, followed by the perception of an immanent expansive life in the second. Our consciousness becomes absorbed in the immanent expansiveness of conscious existence.

¹ *Vide Bodhasar-Layaprakarana.*

क्रियातु परमा पूजा तदर्थं क्रियतेऽखिलं ।
 अक्रियैव परा पूजा निश्चला ध्यानरूपिणी ॥
 जागरः परमा पूजा विश्वरूपस्य दर्शनम् ।
 स्वप्नस्तु परमा पूजा परमं क्षेपणीयकः ।
 सुषुप्ति परमा पूजा समाधि योगिनां हि सा ॥
 कर्मयोगः परा पूजा कर्म ब्रह्मार्पणं यतः ।
 भक्तियोगः परा पूजा यो मङ्गलः स मे प्रियः ॥
 ज्ञानयोगः परा पूजा ज्ञानात् कैवल्यमश्नुते ।
 तुरीयं परमा पूजा साक्षात्कारस्वरूपिणी ॥
 क्षयानामपि सर्वेषां विश्वं विस्मृतिकारिणाम् ।

Apart from this, there is another form of culture leading on to the consciousness of Identity. This consists in the gradual opening of the sense of expansion, in thinking oneself to be the immanent principle of the cosmos. Here the finite life is not given up (as above indicated) to a wider but outer self but to the truer nature of its own being. It constantly keeps in

(2) The process of expansion. view its nature as an expansive consciousness in which appear the myriads

of phenomenal existence—the sun, the moon, the stars above, the creatures below. The sense of a finite existence is sought to be lost in the deeper and the truer self of Expansive Being. The self soon begins to realise the oneness of its being and its immanence throughout. It no longer feels itself placed in the vastness of existence. On the other hand it begins to feel within itself the entire existence—the one life, the one joy, through heavens and the earth. The seeker no longer feels helplessness and depravity. A calm and expansive existence of itself is felt to be permeating the mysteries of creation. The seeker gets over the deceptive knowledge that things have an independent objective existence. He soon finds the entire existence to be reflection of his own being, a picture held up in space, time and causality but possessing no independent being of its own. The sense of finite personality dissolves itself into an impersonal expansive existence.

Of these two forms of devotion, the first will be naturally adopted by those that maintain the multiplicity of finite existence, the second by those that believe in the *Eka-jiva*.

We conclude: The path of wisdom begins when the satisfaction of will and heart has been consummated. It leads on to the realisation of the absolute behind the

relative, the unconditional behind the conditioned. It proceeds from intellectual reflection to right discrimination (from *vicara* to *viveka*). In this stage the heart-beats are silent, the intellect with keen penetration sees through the appearance, through the flow of life. Though Vedantism in the later stages of its development has accentuated the importance of discriminative search, still the *Upanisads* have (e.g., discourse of sweetness) laid stress on the gradual progress from the life of love and delight to the bliss of Identity.

Sankara has also recognised the usefulness of devotion in knowledge.¹ *Vidyaranya* has laid emphasis upon devotional pursuit as leading on to and helping the realisation of the final bliss. He recognises two paths of search—the one aided by the devotional practices, the other purely independent of such a culture chiefly resting upon sustained reflection and discrimination. He accepts the validity and usefulness of each of them, but prefers the former one. The neo-Vedantists have stuck to the latter one and some of them have laid emphasis upon the latter as the direct way to bliss and knowledge.² In fact our experiences clearly teach us that the attempt to reach immediately the life of wisdom without the progressive evolution through successive stages may end in failure and premature decay.

¹ तान्येतान्स्वाप्तानानि सच्च्युद्धिकरत्वेन वस्तुतत्त्वावभासकत्वाद्वैतज्ञानोपकारका-
णालम्बनविषयत्वात् ।

² Vide *Jivanmuktiviveka*, p. 34.—(Poona Anandasram Edition)
तथाहि विद्याधिकारी द्विविधः—कृतोपास्त्रिकृतोपास्त्रियेति । तत्रोपास्त्रि साक्षात्कार
पर्यन्तामुपास्त्रिं कृत्वा यदि ज्ञाने प्रवर्त्तते तदा वासनाचयमनोनाशयो दृढत्वेन ज्ञानादूर्ध्वं
विद्वत्संन्यासजोवन्मुक्ती स्वत एव सिध्यतः । तादृश एव शान्ताभिमतोमुख्यो
विद्याधिकारी..... । इदानींतनान्नु प्रायेणाकृतोपास्तय एवौसुक्यमावाप्तुं सहसा-
विद्यायां प्रवर्त्तते । वासनाचयमननाशौच तात्कालिकौ संपादयन्ति ।

When one has attained the last stage of development in conscious life, one no longer perceives the manifold. The meaning of life becomes totally changed. One then is fixed in the stillness of bliss. These—the life of will, the life of love, the life of wisdom—are the successive stages of growth of our empirical being preparing us for the final liberation by dispensing with the error of division. Love and devotion can only be useful in opening the spiritual consciousness, but liberation cannot be attained unless one has in the last stage of spiritual growth the vision of the Oneness.

But this tendency to go deep within and realise the Vedantic conception undivided bliss is often counteracted by the contrary tendency (due to the perversion of our view by Avidya) of thinking the manifoldness as real and the bliss and delight of existence as illusory. The vision of

man has been obscured by innate
 The chief obstacles to knowledge. ignorance. The direct result of this

is two-fold: (1) the tendency of thinking that *Brahman* does not exist: that Life has no source in Delight (असम्भवभावना), and (2) the false identification of body with soul, the psychical with the physical (विपरीतभावना), the effect of materialistic cast of thought. The Vedantin points to the above as the chief obstacles in the way of realising the Identity.

Apart from these, some minor forms of obstacles are mentioned in the later works on Vedantism.¹ These can be regarded as the practical effects of the two main obstacles:—

(1) Actual obstacle—(भूतप्रतिबन्ध) due to the conception of the world as real. It is the enduring effect of the realistic bent of mind and the materialistic mode of thinking.

¹ Vide Mahadeonanda Saraswati's Tattva-Anusandhan.

(2) Possible obstacles (भावीप्रतिबन्ध) due to :—

- (a) The effects of actions done in pre-natal existences in a state of fruition. They are supposed to retard our attempt to get at truth. So long as one has not the retribution of one's own deeds, one cannot get complete liberation; in spite of one's attempt to get freedom, one will be drawn away by these tendencies on the point of fruition. Even one who has occasional glimpses of transcendent vision cannot get rid of these obstacles. One must pay his full dues before one can pass into the silence.
- (b) The desire of progressive evolution (ब्रह्मलोकेच्छा). This stands in the way of our directly realising the Truth of Identity and of attaining final liberation. Vedantism can accept the life of spiritual evolution only as a further advance in the life of wisdom. If one seeks it without having the final end of transcendental existence in view and gets attached to this course of evolution, one will miss the possibility of attaining the freedom of existence. The Vedantin (especially the neo-Vedantist) does not attach importance to any other form of life but the life of intellectual discrimination, for, with a penetrating understanding, the best way to feel truth is to see through the appearances. The desire of a gradual fulfilment constitutes a positive bar to the immediate realisation of the transcendent oneness.¹

ब्रह्मलोकेऽभिवाञ्छयां सम्यक् सत्यां निरुध्यताम् ।

विचारयेत् यस्मात्मानं ननु साक्षात् करीत्यम् ॥

Ordinarily the Vedantin insists upon a course of training mainly moral and religious which prepares the mind for understanding the highly abstract teachings of Vedanta and paves the way for realising the Delight of Identity. Between

The course of preliminary discipline.

the highly developed culture of Vedantism where the soul delights in the soarings of spiritualism and the mutilated life of Egoism where relative verities and errors of practical reason predominate, Vedantism urges upon the life of moral and religious discipline, the life of service and love, the transformation of egoistic will as the intermediate stages helping the soul perplexed with false and distorted vision to attain the Vedantic ideal of the oneness of existence behind the manifold.

The high intellectual penetration presupposes a conquest over the solicitations of the sense and the nervous being. The food sheath and the vital vehicle constitute the gross body. The stable equilibrium of the gross body is the foundation of nature's working in the human being. The equilibrium established by nature is sufficient for the normal vocations of life, but not for the higher form of intellectual and spiritual training. Hence one who has in view the realisation of self seeks to get at one's command a larger amount of vital force. For this purpose a course of physical discipline is thought useful and often adopted, especially by those that are weak and incompetent in physique. This system of training is called *Hathayoga*. It increases vitality. It gives us vigorous health. The *Hatha Yoga* helps us to preserve within us a great quantity of energy. Our life or vital force is related to and is, in fact, the

A course of training to fit our physical being for higher intellectual and spiritual culture—known as Hath-yoga.

individualisation of the cosmic or universal *Prana*. *Hathayoga* is an art to open the valve that separates for the time being the individual and universal life-forces of *Prana* and to establish an equilibrium by which the physical body will be able to sustain the flow or in-rush of an increasing vital force.

The chief processes of *Hathayoga* are *asana* (posture) and *pranayama*: *Asana* consists in putting the physical body in numerous postures; its immediate effect is to cure the body of that restlessness which obstructs deep

Chief processes of
Hathayoga, Asana and
Pranayam.

thinking. It helps us to get an uncommon power of fortitude and control over the different muscles of the body. (*Vide* Brahma Sutra, Ch. IV. 1, 7 Sankar Bhasya.) It brings the entire physical system under the control of will to a great extent. These postures and practices are not to be compared with any other kind of physical training; they are adapted in such a way as to give a control over the physique and make the body best-fitted for the highest courses of discipline. Indeed they are never looked upon as possessing any value of their own. They are useful only because a keen meditative penetration can be undertaken in a well-regulated and self-controlled system. By elaborate processes (*e.g.*, *mudra*, etc.) the *Hathayogin* continues to keep the body free from all impurities, the nervous system unclogged for the free exercise of expiration and inspiration.

Praṇāyama is the method which helps one to control the vital power. It is a systematic art to bring under our control the *Prana* or Vital-current which is the main basis of our organic life. *Praṇāyama* keeps under check the automatic and spontaneous life-current. It helps us to get a command over the functions of the organism and leads to the complete assertion of the will power over

the life-force, of the spiritual force over the physical. Indeed a stage may arrive when by a simple effort of volition the entire vital-process may be restrained in its activity.

Pranayama serves a double purpose : (1) it completes the perfection of body, and (2) it helps to awaken the coiled-up serpent of the *Pranic dynamism* (generally called Kundalini—the base of the vast stored-up energy) which when fully stirred up and kept under the direction of will-power opens fields of extraordinary consciousness and ranges of wonderful experience denied to ordinary men. Nay it goes so far as to awaken the dormant moral and spiritual possibilities as the dynamic-current makes its way gradually through the higher centres of nervous energy generally called *Lotuses*, and through the cerebro-spinal axis. It helps us to control the instincts, passions and impulses that often disturb the wise passiveness of mind. It is a discipline to bring under partial control the entire subjective mind and the forces playing therein. *Pranayama* can be practised in two ways : (1) *purely physical*, to keep the heart beats under control without any ulterior aim of the control of mind, and (2) *psycho-physical* to control the lower passions and to open up the higher sentiments, helping mental and spiritual culture. The latter is more useful than the former.

In the course of self-discipline next comes the ethico-religious training. This will include

(2) A course of mental and moral discipline : (a) the regulation of will and activity, (b) the system of self-control, (c) the practice of concentration. The first purifies or chastens the mental consciousness, the second keeps it under check and prevents an active touch with the distracting surrounding, the third makes it penetrating and keen.

(a) *The regulation of will and activity* :—

Human life is essentially energising. Three-fourths of life is conduct. The realisation of the Vedantic ideal requires a systematic regulation of our activities to bring them to bear upon knowledge. This requires a deep consideration of the law of duty.

The Gita puts forth the two-fold path—(1) the path of knowledge, (2) the path of *Karma* or action. The former is meant for those that have the purity and the tranquillity of mental consciousness. The latter is meant for those that are just on the way. They need to submit themselves to a course of discipline to acquire mental calmness necessary to clear vision and reflective analysis. The latter is not strictly a distinct path, but is only a step to the former.¹ The guiding principle in the life of action should be to do duty for its own sake. The thought of an end—and an end useful to one's self—is to be deliberately set aside. The Vedantin accepts this law, for it helps to bring in unruffled consciousness. Indeed, when one works in this way, one really works according to reason. To work according to reason is not working for a selfish end, for, reason transcends subjective intentions. In Vedantic terminology actions done under the dictates of reason are *Nitya*, actions done for the gratification of subjective desires are *Kamyā*. The *Nitya Karma* does not satisfy any definite purpose, but one is bound to do it, otherwise one acquires demerit. Besides this, there is

¹ Vide Brahmanandagiri, Gita-Bhasya, Sl. 3, Ch. 3 (by Venkatanatha).

चित्तशुद्ध्या ज्ञानभूमिकामारुढाः सांख्याः ; तेषां ज्ञानयोगिनः.....श्रेयः प्राप्नु-
पायः तेन निष्ठा तत् परम् । योगिनां चित्तशुद्धुपायभूतकर्मयोगाधिकारिणां कर्म-
योगेन कर्मरूपेणैवश्रेयः प्राप्नुपायेन निष्ठेति... ..च्युदचित्तस्य ज्ञानोत्पत्तिपर्यन्तां
कर्मकर्तव्यतामुपपादयति ।

another kind of *Karma*, called *Naimittik*, which is also to be done, if one is not to acquire demerit. The point of difference between the *Nitya* and the *Naimittik* is that the former is to be done every day, the latter on particular occasions. It should be pointed out that there is no such categorical divisions of *Karma* into the *Nitya* and the *Kamya*. The same action may be *Nitya* or *Kamya*, if it is not or is done for some purpose.¹

The *Nitya* and the *Naimittik Karmas* have a bearing upon knowledge indirectly. They are necessary to make the heart transparent and the mind penetrative.

The *Kamya Karma* is of two kinds. It may be virtuous or vicious. The one gives us merit, the other demerit. But none of them has any bearing upon knowledge. Actions done with bad intentions corrupt the heart and obscure the vision. Actions done with good intentions have likewise no place in the life of knowledge, for, the ideal of knowledge requires one to be desireless. The state of will-less bliss must be positively hazarded by a willing pursuit of a desirable end. The thought of a particular end naturally disturbs the mental calmness and equanimity. The *Chhandogya* has it "nothing can cross the bridge and enter into the *Brahman-loka*, not even merit" (Ch. VIII, 4.1).

Knowledge can destroy *Kamya-karma*, for, knowledge is opposed to it. *Nitya* and *Naimittik karmas* prepare us for knowledge, and when we are in possession of it, they are no longer necessary.²

This *Kamya karma* is of three kinds :—*Sancita*, *Prarabdha* and *Kriyamana*. Penance and expiation can

¹ Vide commentary on the Gita by Madhusudhan, Ch. 2, 40.

फलानि चित्तदभावभ्रामिवतु कायत्व नित्यत्व व्यपदेशः ।

² Vide Vamati, 59. Jiajiv's—Edition.

destroy the *Sancita karma*. Hence they have also a place in the life striving after the Ideal.

The direct effect of the moral discipline of *Karma* is to prepare one for the esoteric teachings of Vedantism by making oneself composed, tranquil and free from impulses. *Karma* has no direct and immediate effect upon knowledge. It indirectly helps us in acquiring Vedantic wisdom.

Some argue that karma gives us knowledge. There is no further necessity of reflecting and meditating upon the teachings of Vedantism.

Difference of opinion on the effect of sacrifices, penance, on the life of knowledge.

Some are of opinion that the knowledge can be acquired by practical discipline without intellectual penetration, or it is a component element in the life conducive to knowledge. It is not knowledge alone, but knowledge as helped by action which is the true source of wisdom.¹ The Vedantin holds that Karma can have no direct bearing upon knowledge. It prepares us for the still higher course of life revealing the truth before view. It helps us onward. The same thing is said in the *Sruti*—"The *Brahmin* wills to know Him through sacrifices, penance, charity, austerities and fastings," etc.²

The direct effect of these practices is the origin of a desire to know, but not knowledge. *Vacaspati* holds that they indirectly help us to know *Brahman* by purifying us and creating in us a strong desire to know. Though, in fact, we are in *Brahman*, yet the long acquired realistic tendencies stand in the way of our apprehending it, and so long as they have a hold upon us, it is very difficult to pursue steadfastly the course of life leading on to the attainment of knowledge. The performance of sacrifices, the observance

¹ तत्प्राप्तित्तुर्विज्ञानं कर्मचोक्तं महामुने ।

विद्यायाः सङ्कारित्वं मोक्षं प्रति तत् ब्रजेत् ।

² तमेवं वेदानुवचनेन ब्राह्मणं विविदिषन्ति—यश्च न दानेन तपससाऽनाशकैनेति ।

of austerities, the regulated course of moral and spiritual life—all help us in dispensing with the materialistic cast of mind and in opening the door to knowledge by clearing and purifying the heart and removing obstacles from the way. Nobody can seriously maintain that these have any direct bearing upon knowledge. For in their very nature they are so far removed from it that any direct connection cannot be thought to exist between them. Knowledge can remove ignorance, *Karma* is internally incapable of removing ignorance, for, that which is opposed to ignorance can destroy it. But *Karma* is not opposed to it. Moreover, it is pointed out in the *Prameya Sangraha*, if the life of action had been conducive to knowledge, one could not have been asked to renounce it.¹

The *Mimansa* philosophy has two parts: (1) the one enquires into *Dharma*—the right regulation of conduct, and (2) the other into *Brahman*. The former is ethics. It lays down the course of action leading on to progressive evolution (अभ्युदयफलं चर्माज्ञानं). The latter enquires into the ultimate metaphysical truth. It gives freedom and salvation (निःश्रेयसफलं तु ब्रह्मविज्ञानं). There are schools of thought who seem to think that they are successive forms of culture—the one paves the way for the other and is an invariable antecedent to wisdom. The true foundation and explanation of our ethical life is to be found in the life of wisdom, so that both form parts of a life in which knowledge or wisdom has a place side by side with service. Hence it is supposed that the performances of sacrifices and the right regulation

Refutation of *Jnana-Karma Samuccaya-bada*.

¹ अन्यथाज्ञानाङ्गतया सर्वकर्मसत्यासविधानं न इष्टापत्तेः, p. 166.

Vide Sidhanta Sidhanjan—(vide p. 2, foot-note.

सोहापिधानभङ्गाय नैव कर्मणि कारणं
ज्ञानिनैव फलावाप्तिसाधकं कर्मनिरर्थकम् ॥

of conduct have a direct connexion with the life of wisdom and lead on to the same as the explanation and fulfilment of themselves. The Vedantism of *Sankara* accepts all these with a qualification. It accepts all these as preliminaries preparing one for enquiry into Brahman by furnishing one with intelligence, purity and tranquillity necessary to the attainment of wisdom, but of wisdom itself they form no direct foundation or basis, and are not conditions absolutely necessary, for, one is seen to have acquired knowledge of Brahman, even when one has no culture of and practice in, performance of sacrifices, etc.

And, moreover, the life of action and the life of wisdom according to *Sankara*, are distinctively different. One is the transformation of will, the other is eradication of will in the sense of attaining will-less bliss. Their natures are inherently different. The distinctive nature of knowledge and duty is drawn out beautifully by *Sanhara* in a line in the *Upadesa Sahasri* " Knowledge simply reveals the nature of things but cannot freely determine it. It can state only what it is, but cannot change its nature. Action or injunction to any form of action is purely dependent upon us. We can do it or not do it, choose¹ it or not choose it, we have the power of free choice." Action originates something not existing before or helps to evolve something potentially existing. Knowledge does not create anything new. The one is guided by the idea of realisation of the good, the other of Truth.² But any

¹ Vide Naiskarmasidhi, 53.

उत्पादयामास्यं संस्कार्यं विकार्यं च क्रियाफलम् ।

नैवम् क्तियंतस्तस्मात् कर्म तस्या न साधनम् ॥

² Vide Vivarana Prameya Sangraha, p. 169.

बलधीना भवेत् विद्या कर्माधीनो भवेत् विधिः ।

form of enthusiasm, besides knowledge, has not an enduring effect since it is empirical; and all forms of culture—the training of will and the transformation of our moral nature help us onward to the perception of truth by cultivating purity of soul and serenity of heart and thereby realising in the ultimate course of its evolution that the truth is the good, for nothing can permanently attract us and awaken our enthusiasm which is not *true*. The truth is, therefore, the good. In the onward evolution of moral life, we come to identify the good with the truth, and the life of morality gradually transforms itself to the search after truth, for, it soon discovers that truth is our being. In the evolution of will, Will ultimately transcends its ordinary vocation in the search after wisdom where it finds its fullness of realisation—not in the sense of widening its range of activity, but, in the sense of surrendering of itself through the course of expansive development. Moreover, the seeker soon discovers the transitoriness of the life of active pursuits and the fruits thereof; he feels within himself the constant yearning after one that is of enduring interest and value. He wants to transcend the search after things that can satisfy the senses, delight the impulsive cravings and devotes himself to the course that can lead him to the realisation of permanent bliss. We may conclude that the performances of sacrifices, etc., purify the mental consciousness and help concentration and meditation by making the mind calm and quiet.¹ Not only is this true of the Vedic sacrifices, but it is also true of the

¹ Upadesha Sahasri-Samyakamati Prakarana.

शरीरादि तपः कुर्यात् तद्विशुद्धार्थसुखमम् ।

मनसादि समाधानं तस्यै हविशोधनम् ॥—23.

.....यज्ञैश्चतपोभिस्तस्य शोधनम्—22.

Yogic training—both of them having indirect bearing upon the life of knowledge—the former by cleansing and purifying the heart, the other by the course of training, promoting the keenness of penetration of the intellect. *Sureswaracharyya* in his *Naiskarma Sidhi* has pointed out successive stages in Vedantic culture. The right regulation of conduct in the way as laid down in the *sastras*—the observance of *sastric* injunctions and prohibitions—*vidhi* and *nishedha*—the performance of religious sacrifices, penances and daily oblations lead on to the purification of mental consciousness by the destruction of sin. This purification begets clearness of vision. This brings in renunciation which originates a keen desire to attain liberation. *Vacaspati* has almost the same thing in his *Vamati*. One attains merit by the performance of duties (for its own sake).- This merit destroys sin which obscures the vision causing misinterpretation of the unreal as real, the impure as pure; this clear vision sees the unreality of the phenomenal order. It brings in consequence a keen desire to transcend this, and a way is soon found out. The seeker takes to the method of realisation. In this way a bearing of *Karma* on knowledge is traced out.

But there is a difference of opinion regarding the bearing of sacrifices, penance, etc., on the life of knowledge.

Vacaspati thinks that the performance only creates a desire in us to know. It gives rise to an unseen possibility which originates in us a will to acquire knowledge. It has no connexion with knowledge directly: it serves its purpose in creating in us a desire to know and that is all.¹

¹ विविदिषा विनियोगपत्ते हि यत्रादिकर्मोजनितादृष्टं श्रवणादिषु प्रवृत्तिपर्यन्तं विविदिषा शब्दितं ह्यस्मिन्पाद्य नश्यति फलेकनाशत्वात् अदृष्टस्य ।

Prakastaman Yati, the author of *Vedanta Prameya Sangraha*, on the other hand, thinks that the effect of sacrifices is primarily to beget a desire to know and through it, a desire to hear and reflect upon the Vedantic discourse without obstruction until the final stage of knowledge is reached. They not only

Vivaranacharyya's
affirmation.

create a desire but help us by removing obstacles from the path of know-

ledge. They not only give rise to an unseen possibility which dies away on the awakening of a desire, but also to something which is persistent in its effect so long as knowledge is not obtained. This of course happens not directly but indirectly through the removal of possible bars to the attainment of wisdom, *e.g.*, by securing the unobstructed devotion to the discourse on Vedanta, the company of good teachers, etc. The author makes the point clear by an analogy: just as it is not sufficient to create an intense desire in taking food and medicine for the complete recovery of a patient but an easy access to them is really conducive to it, similarly a mere creation of thirst after knowledge is not sufficient, but we must have an easy access and a safe course to it. The sacrifices through the purification of mental consciousness originate an intense desire after knowledge and bring in the fruit, just as the clouds do at the end of the rains.¹

¹ *Vide Prameya Sangraha and Naiskarmasidhi*

नतु कर्मणां ज्ञानसाधनत्वे यावदज्ञानोदयं तदनुष्ठानाद्विविदिषा संन्यासी न सिध्येत् इति चेत् न । चित्तस्य शुद्धिद्वारा प्रत्यक्प्रवणतायां संपन्नायां तदनुष्ठानो परमाङ्गीकारविशेषात्—तदेव संस्कारपक्षे कर्मणां ब्रह्मज्ञानोपायेण सिद्धं ।

प्रत्यक्प्रवणतां बुद्धेः कर्मण्यापाद्यशुद्धितः ।

ज्ञतार्थमस्तमायान्ति प्राण्डन्नेषथा इव ॥

The Vedantin insists upon a course of rigorous discipline to control the innate tendency of the internal and external senses to go out and record a world of sensuous experience and to enjoy it, which disturbs the equanimity of mind necessary to right understanding and discrimination. This discipline aims at the perfection not of the bodily but of the mental being, the control and purification of the emotions, the mastery over the still higher life of thought and consciousness. It fixes its attention upon *chitta*, the stuff of mental consciousness in which all activities and desires have their origin. It wants to purify our emotional and volitional nature. It is most important for anybody aspiring after a high spiritual development. The normal state of man is a state of disorder, a state where the supremacy of the soul is transferred to the senses, where it is subjected to the senses existing in a state of freedom. In such a confused and disordered state the self gradually begins to assert itself, and the powers of order must be helped to overcome the instincts of disorder. This implies self-discipline which institutes good habits of mind in place of lawless tendencies exciting the lower nervous being. This indicates the gradual elimination of impulses and desires stimulating the animal instincts and sordid fleshly motives,—if not a complete destruction of them (for sometimes they become necessary for self and race preservation), at least a complete surrender of them to the will of the self. But in some cases, *e.g.*, those that have entered into the life of renunciation (*Paramahansa*) a complete elimination is thought desirable and actually sought.

The life of renunciation offers the best opportunity of pursuing the uninterrupted search after Truth. In fact, one who is looking forward to absolute freedom cannot

possibly find any serious meaning in the earthly ties and relations and will not hesitate to transcend them and begin to live a life of complete indifference to the environment. Hence we find instructions to cultivate silence and to meditate constantly upon *Atman*.

There are two forms of Renunciation. (1) Renunciation for the acquisition of knowledge, generally called *Vibidiṣa Sannyasa*. It is the renun-

Two forms of Renunciation. ciation of the seeker. This is not merely giving up of worldly desires, but it implies a systematic pursuit of and search after wisdom.¹ Those who enter upon such a course of life are constantly absorbed in hearing and discoursing about *Atman* and concentrating upon it.

(2) Renunciation after the acquisition of knowledge, generally called *Vidwat Sannyasa*. It is the renunciation of the adept. When the adept enters upon a life of inaction consequent upon the attainment of wisdom, his is a life of complete renunciation marked by freedom from desires.² This is a desireless existence. The former is marked by the keen and central desire of acquiring knowledge, the latter is characterised by the absence of this desire. It is a state of knowledge. If the former is a state of *Vairagya*, the latter is a state of *Vairagya* as well as of knowledge.

Vidyaranya has drawn an effective distinction between the two forms of renunciation.³ The seeker should

¹ नक्तंश्या नप्रजया...त्यागिनेकेभ्रमृतत्वमानयः

² The Sruti says : एतं वै तमात्मानं विदित्वा ब्राह्मणाः पुत्रेषथायाश्चविशेष-
णयाश्च लोकैषथायाश्च व्युत्थाय भिच्चाचर्यां चरन्ति—

³ *Vide Jivanmuktiviveka*—यथा विविदिषा मन्यासिना तत्त्वज्ञानाय श्रवणादीनि
संपादनोयानि, तथा विदत्संन्यासिनाऽपि जीवन्मुक्तये मनोनाशवासनाक्षयौ संपाद-
नोयौ।...विविदिषासंन्यासिनस्तत्त्वज्ञानं प्रधानं, मनोनाश वासनाक्षयापसर्जनोभूतौ
विदत्संन्यासिनस्तद्विपरौत ।

hear about and reflect upon Atman. The seeker who intends to get complete freedom in life should go through a system of discipline helping the eradication of desires and the destruction of the mental being.

But nobody should think renunciation to be an indispensable condition which under no circumstances can be set aside. Any one who has

Renunciation is not absolutely necessary for Enlightenment.

his heart pure and mind unswayed by earthly motives can feel the truth of identity of existence. Knowledge

does not depend upon any injunction or upon any convenient and auspicious moment of life. Wisdom does not depend directly upon any condition but solely upon the calmness and tranquillity of mental-consciousness admitting of sustained course of reflection. But this calmness, cannot be commanded in distracting surroundings; hence arises the necessity of renunciation of the common form of life and of seeking to live in isolation from obstructive social environment.

Here, again, there is divergence of views among the teachers of Vedanta. Some think that renunciation

Differences of opinion regarding the bearing of renunciation on the life of knowledge.

like the performance of sacrifices creates an unseen possibility which produces a destiny, as it were, for us clearing away the difficulties that may appear on the path of enlightenment.

The author of the *Vartik* thinks that renunciation begets a fitness and a destiny and this in combination with study and reflection is the cause of liberation. The *Vivarana* school thinks it to be a condition only helping the seeker to follow his own course uninterruptedly without creating any unseen possibility. We conclude in the terms of the *Vivarana Prameya Sangraha* "The life of active duties is

conducive to knowledge by the purification of mental being, the life of renunciation is conducive to knowledge by making it possible for the seeker to hear the discourse upon *Atman* and reflect upon it without any obstruction."

A course of training in concentration is important.

It focuses the mental-consciousness

(c) The practice of concentration, and reveals the nature of anything however fine or minute it may be.

It is a powerful instrument of knowledge.

By concentration the mind acquires the capacity of withdrawing from its limited waking activities. The power of concentration gives us a double power of isolating ourselves from the distracting mental surrounding and of calling forth the higher capacities associated with perceptions of higher truths on supra-mental planes of existence. The energising towards self-realisation is always accompanied by a mastery over the subjective as well as the objective mind, and by a complete control of the course of thoughts in any plane of conscious existence—exoteric or esoteric. And this power of concentration yields us knowledge of all grades of existences—gross or fine, physical or spiritual, material or mental. This power of concentration has an indirect effect upon the mind. It increases the capacity of withdrawnness as a preparation for the higher mental efforts in meditation. Concentration is at once a negative and a positive effect; negatively it is a drawing away of the mind from its objects of natural and habitual occupation, and positively it is the convergence of attention (mind) upon particular thing of its own choice.

Patanjali speaks chiefly of two kinds of *Samadhi*:—

(1) Concentration upon objects of experience, (2) concentration upon self. The former, again, may be of four kinds according as the object is (a) gross or (b) fine matter, (c) the

senses, and (d) the—I, the sense of personality. These four kinds give us clear knowledge of all things excepting *Purusha*. We, then, pass on to the next stage of concentration upon *Purusha*, the transcendent existence through the intermediate stage of discriminating consciousness (विवेकब्रह्मातिः) the self as reflected in *Buddhi* and *Buddhi* itself and their difference. A step forward and we have the knowledge of self.

Patanjali's division of the forms of concentration.

This account of *Samadhi* as given by *Patanjali* has been accepted in its entirety by the author of the *Advaita Brahmasidhi* in his classification of *Samadhi* as (1) concentration upon things knowable (ग्रह्यसमापत्तिः), (2) concentration upon the sense-organs (ग्रहणसमापत्तिः), (3) concentration upon the subject or the "I" (ग्रहीतृसमापत्तिः), (4) concentration upon Indeterminate truth (निर्विकल्पसमापत्तिः). But Vedantists

This division accepted in the *Advaita Brahmasidhi*.

generally accept only two divisions or kinds of concentration known as *Savikalpa* and *Nirvikalpa*. The former is accompanied by a modification, of mind-stuff, the latter, not. Really the first four forms of concentration as laid down in the *Patanjali* system come under the category of *Savikalpa Samadhi*, for, in them the *chitta* or mind-stuff is made to concentrate upon the objects besides self or *Purusha*, and the impressions of these concentrated states and knowledge obtained therefrom are left in form of *Samskaras* (permanent residues) too deep to be effaced. The effect of these forms of concentration is the acquisition of knowledge of all things and beings, even of the clear discrimination between the *Purusha* and the *Prakriti*. Up to this point there is still some effort of *chitta*. When one clearly understands the transcendent indifference of

the *Purusha*, the nature of its non-relational being, and its complete dissociation from the evolving *Prakriti* (or *Buddhi*) by one supreme effort of withdrawnness and renunciation, one attains freedom. The *chitta* with the impressions of the state of *Nirodha* is dissolved in its originative cause—*Prakriti*.

The Vedantin wants to control his thought-process in a way little different from this and this difference is due to the general trend of his thinking and the completely distinctive form of his thought-culture. He centres his thought-consciousness on the truth of

The generally accepted forms of concentration.

Identity immediately when he becomes practised in the art of concentration. The author of *Laghuchandrika* defines *Samprajñat* or *Savikalpa Samadhi* thus: ¹ it is the continuity of the knowledge of one's own self as consciousness differing from body and mind. It can be best described as a stream of conscious flow in the form of *Atman*. The result is the understanding of the self as distinguished from its upadhis and as witnessing the mental consciousness. To this form of concentration one devotes himself after a course of intellectual training in Vedantism. But before one can clearly understand the teachings of Vedanta Philosophy and meditate upon them one must develop in oneself the habit of discrimination of the true from the false, or reality from appearance.

This faculty of discrimination is a great power, for, right knowledge leads on to right conduct. Hence it has been said "without a clear discrimination of the reality from the appearance, there cannot originate a will to give up all desires (pertaining to life here or hereafter),

The importance of discrimination in knowledge.

¹ सम्यग्ज्ञात समाधि-प्रज्ञास्तु मनोदेहमिन्नतया सात्त्विकीज्ञान-प्रवाहरूपः,— 'ब्रह्मादि'—इति शब्द ज्ञानीत्तरं तादृशधीप्रवाहरूपएव ।

and, again, without such a will the control of nature within and without is a veritable impossibility.”¹ This, in fact, is the supreme culture which brings about the direct realisation of the supreme self. It proceeds by the method of intellectual reflection (*vicara*) to right discrimination (*viveka*).

When one is possessed of the high moral and intellectual adaptation, just noticed, one is thought fit to receive the esoteric teachings of Vedantism and can discourse about and reflect upon Atman. This is the direct method. This direct method is hinted at by *Yajñabalka* in the memorable saying.

The direct method
of Realisation.

Srabān displaces the crudest form of ignorance, *viz.*,— that *Brahman* does not exist. *Manan* fights out and logically establishes the truth of Identity. This is the stage of critical discourse and reflection. *Nididhyan* strikes deep the Vedantic wisdom into our heart. It eradicates the innate confusion of the body with the soul.

The direct method of meditation has two forms: (1) the one in which we are the witness of the modification set up in consciousness by the axiom of Identity leading on to, (2) the other where the consciousness is not characterised by any such modification.

(1) *Samprajñat-*
Samapatti.

The former is called *Samprajñat*.
This again may be of two kinds:—

(1) In as much as it is characterised by some local mark due to the clear knowledge of the modification of mental consciousness originated by the saying ‘thou art that.’ This may be called the initial stage of meditation where the adept is conscious of himself, of himself

¹ *Vide Vivarana Prameya Sangraha*, p. 170, Benares Edition.

as a witness and of the modification set up at a particular moment by the axiom.

(2) In as much as it is free from any thought regarding the origin of the modification of mental consciousness. This implies a great intensity of meditation in which the temporal and the spatial marks of modification are lost sight of. The two elements, the witnessing subject and the modifications, are alone left aside.

The former is not free from the verbal suggestion. The latter is free from it.

Next is the higher stage of *Asamprajñat Samadhi*. It is

(2) *Asamprajñat Samapatti*. the concentration wherein consciousness is free from all sense of duality.

It is indicative of the integrity of consciousness. Negatively it is the state in which mental consciousness with the modification has ceased to exist.

The author of the *Vedantasara* holds that in such a state, a modification is set up in mental consciousness in the form of *Atman*, making *Atman* its own object. The ordinary stage of meditation implying the division of subject and object is passed over. The concentration is deep. This state differs from the *Susupti Samadhi* is mental-concentration. *Susupti* is absorption in *Avidya*. In *Susupti* there is no modification of mind, for mind does not then exist; a modification, no doubt, is set up in *Avidya*. *Samadhi* (according to the author of *Vedantasara*) is transformation of mental consciousness in the form of *Atman*, a transformation which is set up by constant meditation upon the Identity implying the removal of the ordinary forms of thought currents and heart-beats.¹ In such a state of high abstraction (in the thought of *Atman* as undivided bliss), the adept

¹ अद्वितीयवस्तुनितदाकाराकारितायाः चित्तवृत्तेः अतितराम् एकैभावेन अवस्थानं ।

quite forgets the surrounding, his concrete being and the ordinary conditions of thinking activity. In this state no duality can exist in any form and the mind gets a complete transformation in the form of *Atman*. Outwardly the seeker is lost within thought process in the meditation of the absolute, but inwardly still the transformation lingers.

The description of *Asampragnat Samadhi* as given by the author of the *Vedantasara* cannot be accepted categorically. It is at best an advance in the acquisition of knowledge, but is not knowledge or liberation. The definition needs modification. The inherent defect of the definition is perceived by the commentator who conceives two stages in *Nirvikalpa Samadhi*: (1) the stage where nothing exists but the transformation of mental consciousness in the form of *Atman*, (2) the stage where nothing but the self, the undivided consciousness and bliss, exists.¹

The foregoing division of the *Nirvikalpa Samapatti* is hardly consistent with the general import of the term. Even if we accept that there exists nothing but the transformation of mental consciousness in the form of *Atman* still it cannot be called *Nirvikalpa*, for some modification

still exists, it matters not, if it be in the form of *Atman* or otherwise. Such a state of transformation one actually crosses through to attain the final stage, but this should not persuade one to make a division of successive stages of the *Nirvikalpic*

Our Conclusion.

¹ *Vide* Subodhini चिरकालाभ्यस्तयदुत्तरसविकल्पकसाध्यनुभवजनितसंस्कारसहस्रतयोः चित्तवृत्तेः ज्ञानादिचिपुटीवलयपूर्वकम् अद्वैते वस्तुनि एकभावनात्मकः प्रथमः । एतत् निर्विकल्पक समाध्यभ्यासपाटवेन लुप्तसंस्कारतया ज्ञानादि-चिपुटी-लयपूर्वकम् अखण्डाकारकारितायाः चित्तवृत्तेः विनापि रूफुर्त्तिं केवलचिदानन्दात्मनावस्थानत्मकः द्वितीयः ।

existence. Really in the way of reaching the final state of quiescence, a transformation of mental-consciousness in the form of *Atman* actually takes place and is, as we shall see later on, the immediate cause of the cessation or destruction of Ignorance; but still we should not make a confusion between the operative cause and the static effect, the *Nirvikalpic* state of existence.¹

Three stages in the evolution of Identity-consciousness.

We meet three stages in the growth of the consciousness of Identity:—

(1) The first time one hears that *Brahman* as an undivided consciousness exists (अक्षिन्नज्ञ), the crudest form of ignorance is removed, *viz.*, the thought of its non-existence no longer gets a hold upon the mind. In Vedantic terms it removes the *Asambhava-bhabana*. So far knowledge is only indirect.

¹ Authorities differ here. Some think the *Nirvikalpic* Existence to be the state of knowledge. Others suppose it to be a state of profound meditation in which the mind is still, being free from all modifications (*vide* the *Subodhini* and the *Ratnabali*) (असम्प्रज्ञात समाधिस्तु सकलवृत्तियुत्थनिरोधरूपेण परिशतमावृतं मनएव—*Ratnabali*). The author of the *Vidvatmanoranjini* distinguishes it from *Susupti* and from both the forms of liberation—*Jivan mukti* or *Videhmukti* सुषुप्तौ बुद्धिः एव नास्ति, बुद्धिः कारणात्मनावस्थानाङ्गीकारात् सुषुप्तः भेदोपपत्तेः । नापि मुक्तौ अतिव्याप्तिः तत्र अविद्यात्कार्थ्यं संस्काराणां अत्यन्त उच्छेदात् इति पुनः व्युत्थानादि व्यवहार दर्शनेन तेषां अनुवृत्तेः दृष्टात् । These differences owe their origin to the careless use of the term *Nirvikalpa*. It connotes a highly concentrated state of mental consciousness in which it is free from all modifications. It is perfect stillness of existence. This may be produced in many ways and as such should not be confused with Identity-consciousness, which supposes the destruction of Ignorance, including the mental-being. Knowledge may presuppose a deep culture in concentration, but this culture itself is not knowledge.

But it must be conceded that the *Nirvikalpic* existence actuated by the thought of Identity is destructive of Ignorance.

(2) With the discriminative capacity more advanced one penetrates through the appearance to get to the essence. This process is called *Driṣyamārjana*, the purification or more properly the distillation of the appearances. This removes the realistic effect of *Avidya*—that everything is material.

(3) In the third stage we pass on to the inner being of consciousness, where by the effort of analytic attention we come to realise Identity with Brahman. "This *Atman* is Brahman." This removes the ignorance that *Atman* is different from Brahman. In the second stage we become clearly conscious of an immutable being, in the third stage, of the *identity of being*. The result is the sinking of the illusory difference in the consciousness of identity. This gives us the direct knowledge.¹

Besides this direct way of realising identity there are other forms of devotion leading on to the realisation of the same truth. The *Gita* urges *Yoga* in addition to dialectic or analytic thinking as a method of realisation.

The indirect method of realisation.

We have it also on the authority of the *Kalpitaru* that those who cannot at once realise the undivided and transcendent consciousness of existence can acquire an aptitude and a fitness in that direction by a sustained reflection upon the immanent existence, the *Saguna Brahman*.² No doubt we are required to meditate upon the Identity at once in the direct method, upon some form of symbol or some aspect of *Brahman*—qualitative or quantitative in the indirect one. This indirect

¹ *Vide* Pancadasi.

असत्त्वांशो निवर्त्तत परीक्षानक्षया ।

अभानांशनिवृत्तिः स्यादपरीक्षधिया ॥ Chapter VII 56.

² *Vide* Brahma Sutra, page 192, Bhamati Kalpitaru Edition.

form of worship is of three kinds: (1) *Pratik-Worship*, (2) *Sampat-Worship*, (3) *Ahamgraha-Worship*. The first two are akin in

Three forms of Worship.

nature, the third is somewhat different.

The underlying psychological operation in *Ahamgraha* form is unique and it forms by itself a different method of worship.

In the most crude form of worship we require a medium, which, for the moment, is the object of worship. When, for example, one meditates upon *Brahman* as identical with the sun (which is regarded as the locus) and when the sun as

(1) *Pratik*.

the locus is predominant in conscious meditation one is said to be performing or engaged in the form of worship called *Pratik* or *Adhyasa*. The devotee is more clearly conscious of the medium of worship than of the object meditated upon or the process of meditation. This forms the initial stage in the opening up of spiritual consciousness.

The next stage is reached when the mind, with an advance in its capacity of meditation, can think upon and is directly conscious of the object of

(9) *Sampat*.

worship with the medium left in the background of consciousness (for the medium may be magnified and be thought identical with the object of worship). The mind with the intensity and depth of concentration has got the power of meditating upon abstract things or qualities. The sense of littleness of the form is removed, some abstract quality or the magnitude of the object of worship is in mental vision. The logical basis of such worship is analogy or similarity in some point between the object and the medium. The former dominates in *concrete* consciousness, the latter,

in *abstract* consciousness. This, again, may be of two kinds according as one reflects upon Brahman in its quantitative or qualitative aspect. We may meditate either upon its *magnitude* (or Vastness) or upon *some power or quality* inherent in its nature. This latter form of worship is called—*Sambarga Vidya*.¹

Besides these, there is a third form of worship, *Ahamgraha*, wherein the attention is not focused upon

(3) *Ahamgraha*. any external object, but upon the self. It magnifies the self as *Brahman*.

This meditation is self-imposed and subject to the free will of the adept. It is not knowledge but a form of training and culture of Will. It should be distinguished from the direct method of realisation by reflective criticism and discriminative consciousness. It makes it possible to acquire a greater effectiveness of will, for it is no longer the will of the individual self, but of the cosmic self. In this form of worship—*Brahman* in its *saguna* aspect is thought to be identical with 'I'. The 'I' is prominently before consciousness with the magnitude of Brahman's Being, whereas in the direct method the sense of 'I' is gradually lost in the immanent consciousness.²

¹ *Vide* Parimal and Kalpataru, p. 122. आरोग्यप्रधाना संपदधिष्ठान प्रधानोऽध्यासः—अल्पेषु कर्मेषु महतां कर्मणां तत्फलाय बुद्ध्या सम्पादनं सम्यद्...
...*Vide* Ratnaprava अल्पालम्बनतिरस्कारिणीत्कृष्टवस्त्वभेदज्ञानं सम्पदं यथा मनः स्वस्वत्थानत्यादनन्तं तत उत्कृष्टा विश्वदेवा अप्यनन्ता इत्यनन्तत्वसात्त्यात् “विश्वदेवा एव मनः” इति सम्पत्तयाऽनन्तफलप्राप्तिर्भवति तथा चैतन्यत्वसात्याच्चरैरि ब्रह्मभेदः सम्पदिति न चेत्यर्थः । आलम्बनस्य प्राधान्येन ध्यानं, प्रतीकोपातिरध्यासः ।

² अहं यद्दोषासनात् सगुणनिर्युथ भेदाद्विधा ।... ब्रह्मत् योगवासिष्ठेऽहंयद्दोषाऽत्मनि विश्वमुपासितुः प्रज्ञादस्य तन्माहात्म्येन तथैव चतुर्भुजाद्यनुभववर्णनात् । निर्युथाङ्ग- यद्दोषासनफलोभूतार्थज्ञानाख्याहेतामैक्यसाचात्कारस्य सर्वं साचात्कारोत्तमस्यैव तत् परिपाके प्रागुपपादितवान्न काऽप्य अनुपपत्तिः ।

The medium of worship generally is the symbol *Om*.

Medium of Worship. It is described as the best and highest object to concentrate the mind upon to obtain spiritual benefit. In all the *upanisads* without any exception, the importance of meditating upon *Om* has been clearly brought out.

“The truth which the entire *Vedas* teach, the truth for which *Brahmacarya* is practised, I speak out that to you in brief, it is *Om*.” “This support is the best, this support is the greatest.”

But there are differences in the form and method of meditation of *Om*. We may notice them.

(1) *The meditation of Om*—as the symbol of being, immanent in and transcending, the manifoldness of existence. This form of meditation is laid down in the *Man-dukya Upanisad*. It represents the word *Om* as indicative of the four stages of conscious existence, waking, dream, deep-sleep and *Turiya*. In the first three the attention is directed to the immanent consciousness and not to the contents of these conscious states. In the last, consciousness in its self-effulgent essence and shining purity remains.

(2) The meditation of *Om* as the cosmic sound; here we have a kind of meditation which proceeds in a different path. Concentration of mind upon such a symbol establishes a tranquillity, a calmness in the mental plane by producing the sense of vastness and by controlling the restlessness of mind. It opens to the seeker the grades of consciousness—buddhic, beatific and finally the Nirvanic.¹ In this connection we may also mention the form of worship of Brahman through the *Gayatri*.

¹ *Vide Sankar's Yoga Tarabali.*

Sankara writes in his commentary of the *Chhandogya* that to those who cannot follow the direct method of understanding Brahman as 'not this' 'not this,' is recommended the forms of worship of Brahman through *Gayatri* which is most effective in bringing out the deep harmony within us. This *Gayatri* is all pervasive, it supports everything in existence. One is asked to think upon the Identity of being—when one reflects upon the *Gayatri*.

The *Gayatri* has three parts :—(1) *Pranab* is the symbol of Brahman. (2) The *Vyahriti* is Brahman manifested in the cosmic being. It places before the devotee the universal manifestation of Brahman. (3) This vision is presented with limitation in the *Gayatri* where Brahman has been represented as the Lord of the effulgent Sun, the Lord who is within us and who is more intimate to us in our inner consciousness. It is the conscious principle behind nature and man. The *Gayatri* is the symbol of the infinite life in immanence. It presents before us the oneness of life in God, man and nature.

Another form of devotion is the concentration on the *heart-ether*. This is technically called *Dakar-Vidya*. In the *Chhandogya Upanisad* we are told that one who is not able to think upon oneself as Identical with Brahman should fix attention upon the heart-cave which is called *Brahmapure*, the inner ethereal expansion. Wherein appears the lightning, the stars, the suns and the moons.

These forms of meditations are recommended for those that do not possess the keenness of intellectual penetration to understand directly and immediately the axiom of identity and feel its truth. The attempt here is to give oneself up to devotional meditation and the immediate

result thereof is the expansion of one's vision, the dawn of a superior consciousness undisturbed by the over-ruling impulses. They cannot give us direct knowledge of *Brahman*, but pave the way for its realisation by wakening up the sense of a vastness—the sense of an infinite presence giving way to the sublimity of silence as it crosses the borderland of immanent existence.

The forms of devotion, noticed above, are not to the same purpose. We have it on the authority of *Sankar* that (1) some of them are conducive to progress in life, (2) some lead on to the gradual realisation of freedom, and (3) some to the attainment of particular end or purpose. The author of the *Kalpataru* thinks that *Pratik form* of devotion meets the demand of the

Conclusion. first, *Dahara-upasana* of the second, *utgeetha upasana* of the third.¹

We have seen already that the direct method of realisation consists in hearing about Identity, in reflecting and in meditating upon it. Which of these three is the most important and useful ?

The comparative importance and value of *Sraban, Manan, Nididhyasan.*

Vacaspati and his followers hold that the last one (meditation) is the most important and useful in as much as it creates a different mentality conducive to the better understanding and immediate perception of *Brahman*.

The author of the *Kalpataru* says that (1) *Vacaspati School.* the knowledge of Identity is acquired through constant meditation upon *Atman*. The intellectual culture in *Vedantism* changes the direction and character

¹ Vide *Sankar Bhasya*, p. 176, *Jivaji's Edition*. Br. Su. 1.1.11—तत्र कानिचिद्ब्रह्मणोपासनान्यभ्युदयार्थानि, कानिचित् क्रमसूत्रार्थानि, कानिचित् कर्मसम्बद्धानि ।—*Kalpataru*—अभ्युदयार्थानि प्रतीकोपासनानि, क्रमसूत्रार्थानि दहरादीनि, कर्मसम्बद्धानि उद्गीथानि ।

of thought-process. It produces a quite different universe of thought. Indeed a course of discipline (hearing and discoursing) helps the mind to assimilate the teachings of Vedantism, but continued meditation alone can set aside the long-acquired realistic adaptation or habit of thinking. *Vacaspati* writes: 'the mind after it has assimilated the Vedantic teaching directly feels and immediately apprehends the identity of consciousness in 'tat' and 'twam' by setting aside the limitations of *upadhis*.¹

The author of the *Kalpataru* says that the mind having a culture and an adaptation due to constant hearing and discoursing about the truth of Identity acquires a competency to feel and apprehend the truth of Identity. The direct or immediate cause of knowledge is reflection and meditation. Hearing and the discoursing are conditions or remote causes. *Nididhyasan* is the chief cause. *Sraban* and *Manan* check the tendency of thinking that *Brahman* does not exist. It promotes mental fitness for sustained meditation and final knowledge. *Nididhyasan* strikes deep the truth of identity into mind which ultimately succeeds in setting aside the innate error of mistaking body for soul and *vice versa*.

Padmapada and the author of the *Vivarana* hold that *Sraban* (or respectful hearing) is the most important of the three in as much as it is the direct and immediate cause of the perception of Identity.

(2) *Vivarana* School. The other two help only by setting up a peculiar subjectivity and by removing the realistic bent of mind. In the case of an

¹ वाक्योत्थभावनापरिपाकसहितमन्तःकरणं त्वं पदार्थस्यापरोक्षस्य तत् तत् उपाध्याकारनिषेधेन तत् पदार्थमनुभावयन्ति । .

* *Vide* *Kalpataru*, p. 55, 56. Bombay. Vamati *Kalpataru* Edition.

adept of a high order of capacity and intelligence free from the natural doubts of ordinary people, the instruction in Identity on a single occasion is thought sufficient for the acquisition of knowledge. It is said by the author of the *Tattwanusandhan* (Mahadeonanda Saraswati) that persons pure in heart, free from natural doubts—persons highly competent for instruction in *Jnanakanda* can see and understand the truth of Identity and feel it immediately when they are told of it, it matters not if they have a course of intellectual training in Vedantism.¹ Those, who are not highly competent by their moral adaptation, who possessing the naturalistic cast of mind yet seek the light to put a stop to the painfulness of divided and partial existence, and in whom still the innate tendencies are effective, are in need of constant discourse and ceaseless meditation. The former is necessary to deepen the notion of Identity, the latter to create a different cast of mind—a new subjectivity.² These two processes prepare the soil for the reception of instruction in Identity and for holding the message firmly within. When the mental soil is thus fully prepared, the seeker is given the final lesson. He is directly told 'that thou art.' This is the immediate cause of the disappearance of Ignorance. To put more logically *Sraban* is the direct cause, the other two are conditions or remote causes of knowledge.³

¹ वस्तुतस्तु शुद्धसत्तायां मुख्याधिकारिणां ऋत्पन्नानां ऋत्पन्नानां च श्लोकेन श्लोकाद्धेन वा ब्रह्मसाम्वात्कार लभते ।

² *Vide Vivarana Prameya Sangraha*, p. 102, para. 2, lines 3, 4, 5, Benares Edition.

³ *Vide Vivarana, Prameya Sangraha*, p. 103 and 104. श्रवणमद्भि, प्रसाधस्य प्रमेयावगमं प्रत्यव्यवधानात् मनननिदिध्यासनेतु चित्तस्य प्रत्यकात्म-प्रवणरंस्कार परिनिष्पत्तदेकाग्रवृत्ति कार्यद्वारेण ब्रह्मानुभवहेतुतां प्रतिपदेत् ।

The authors of the *Panchapadika* and the *Vivarna* think that the direct means of attaining knowledge is study of the Upanisads and constant instruction in the axiom of Identity. Brahman is sometimes called (उपनिषदं पुरुषं) "the *Purusha* of the *Upanisads*." Of everything besides Brahman there are other sources of knowledge. The fruitful source of the knowledge of the illusoriness of the empirical and the oneness of the transcendental existence is the *Sruti* or the Vedanta.¹ Of the transcendent being we can postulate nothing more than its existence from experience. It is presupposed in all forms of thinking, but its being cannot be determined by the ordinary sources of knowledge, for these sources can have no transcendent use. The *Sruti* claims itself to be the only source which can give us right knowledge regarding the transcendent reality and the authority of the *Sruti* is beyond question in this respect. Reflective criticism and meditation are methods of preparing the mind for perception of truth and as such are important conditions helping to acquire knowledge, but not the direct cause thereof.²

These different theories lead us to the consideration of the direct and indirect bearing of *Sabda* upon knowledge—the doctrine of immediate and mediate knowledge by *Sabda*: *Vacaspati* maintains that *Sabda* can give us

The bearing of *Sabda* on knowledge.

¹ ब्रह्माणि उपनिषत् एकगम्यत्व श्रवणात् औपनिषदं महावाक्यमेव ब्रह्मसाक्षात्-कारिकारणं ।

² करणीभूतशब्दगतातिशयहेतुत्वात् श्रवणस्य करणत्वेनाङ्गित्वम्—Citsukhi
मनननिदिध्यासन चित्तगतविचोपादिदोषप्रतिवन्ध निरासन परोक्ष-फल-हेतुतया
प्रमाणस्य फलोपकार्यत्वमिति न विरुध्यते ।

only an indirect knowledge of things. *Sabda* is inherently incapable of giving us direct knowledge.¹ The axian 'thou art that' gives indirect understanding of identity but no direct perception. The effect of Avidya still persists, though our possibility of thinking the nonexistence of *Atman* is lost due to instruction in Identity. But mere respectful hearing and reflective analysis are not enough to give us knowledge unless they are accompanied by sustained contemplation of Identity which removes Ignorance completely and reveals the Identity of Existence. We have it on the authority of the *Kalpataru*: "there is no inherent capacity in *Sabda* to give us direct knowledge. If *Sabda* gives direct knowledge where the object is immediate, then inference should give us direct knowledge of the distinction of the soul from the body, for it has also subject matter within the direct cognisance of everybody. It does not follow necessarily that the directness of a source of knowledge consists in the immediacy of its object. This will set aside the distinction of direct and indirect sources of knowledge. The common analogy 'thou art the tenth' does not prove the contention, for, the understanding of self as the tenth in the company requires the clear perception of one's self by one's own eyes (in addition to one's being reminded of it)." If it is maintained that knowledge as originated by *Sabda* is immediate,—and this is specially true in the case where the object of knowledge by its nature is fit to be immediately perceived,—

¹ शास्त्राचार्योपदेशे शब्दमादि संस्कृतं मन आत्मदर्शने कारयामिति ।—
Parimal, pp. 99.

² Vide Bhamati, pp. 55, 56, 57—Brahmasutra, I. 1. 4, Kalpataru
Parimal Edition, Bombay.

then we, to be consistent, are to hold that wherever knowledge is possible through *Sabda*, it will be direct and immediate. And if knowledge is attained through *Sabda*, there is no future, possibility of mistaken cognition after instruction in Identity (Parimal).¹ But cases are not rare of persons instructed in the Identity still not free from the innate tendency of mistaking the false for the true. Hence it is maintained that the means of direct knowledge is to be sought elsewhere. The instrument is mind or *Antahkaran* which by gradual adaptation and culture may be fit to directly perceive and feel the truth of identity. And it is pointed out that final knowledge is dependent upon the transformation of mental consciousness, so that to hold, again, the instrumentality of *Sabda* at the time of direct perception in addition to the modification is an unnecessary hypothesis.

Prakastman Yati, on the other hand, maintains the possibility of *Sabda* giving rise to the immediate and direct cognition of Identity. Every

(2) *Prakastman*—*Sabda* has a direct bearing on knowledge. form of knowledge implies some object which it reveals to us. The truth or falsity of knowledge is determined not by any inherent quality in itself but by the nature of the object it expresses before our view— if the object is false, the knowledge, though informing us, for the moment, of yonder existence is subsequently denied and is said to be false. If the object is real, the knowledge is true. And not only this character but also the form of cognition as direct or indirect depends upon the

¹ *Vide* Kalpataru,—Parimal Edition (Bombay), pp. 55, 56, Kalpataru; शब्दस्तुनापरोक्ष-प्रमा-हेतुः क्लृप्तः.....अन्वादिस्तुपरोक्षोरेव। Parimal, p. 55, lines 14-19, Bombay Edition.

nature of the object—immediate or mediate. If the object is present before us, the knowledge or the knowing process cannot be mediate. Where there is possibility of knowing one thing directly because of its proximity of existence there can arise no necessity of proving its existence through inference. The immediacy of knowledge consists in the immediacy of its object. (अपरोक्षविषयत्वं ज्ञानस्यापरोक्षत्वं). If this law of direct perception is true, then *Sabda* must give us direct knowledge of Identity as the object thereof is immediately present. And *Brahman* is immediate and direct existence (यत् साक्षात् अपरोक्षं ब्रह्म). The knowledge given by the axiom of Identity must necessarily be immediate. And this doctrine of immediate perception is supported by common experience. That we after some culture and instruction in Vedantism, remain quite ignorant of the truth of Identity is simply due to the fact that the innate tendencies are still effective. They must be uprooted by the two other processes before we can realise the truth of Identity. Nowhere do *Prakastmanyasi* and others that hold the direct bearing of *Sabda* upon knowledge (e.g., *Citsuki*, the author of *Advaita Brahmasidhi*, *Madhusudan Sarasvati*, *Krishnananda Sarasvati*, etc.) dispense with the usefulness of *reflective criticism and meditation*, they being instrumental to uproot the realistic tendencies of mental consciousness, and when the mind is free, it immediately realises the truth of Identity.

The charge of *Vacaspati* and his commentator in the *Kalpataru* (and of the author of *Kalpataru-Parimal*) that many persons even on hearing about the Identity do not seem to realise its truth is not to the point for it is never contended that *Sabda* by itself can give immediate cognition. It may be the direct cause but it is effective only when accompanied and helped by

the other two. These remove the obstacles and *Sabda* gives us the knowledge immediately.¹

We come across an opinion in the *Vivarana* and in the *Siddhantalessa* that *Sabda* (*sraban*) for the first time cannot give us immediate knowledge. It can give us only indirect knowledge and lead us to think of and meditate upon it constantly. When the mind has a course of discipline and culture, then, again, it stands in need of being instructed 'thou art that'—to get direct knowledge.

Nobody can assert that we are committing a circle in reasoning—that knowledge is direct because the object is immediate, and, again, the immediate cognition of the object consists in the directness of its knowledge, for, to the Vedantin direct cognition of any object consists in establishing an identity between consciousness underlying the subject and the object, *i.e.*, the direct cognition of an object consists not merely in the presentation of the object before view but in its being the object of identity-consciousness or itself being identical with *Pramatri*-consciousness. It indicates polarisation of mind-stuff to a fixed object establishing the identity of consciousness. The perception of a thing does not consist in its being the object of immediate direct cognition but in its entering into a definite relation with the consciousness underlying the subject. The fallacy of begging the question does not arise in this case. Similarly when one is reminded of his being the tenth, one becomes conscious of it immediately. The additional hypothesis about the instrumentality of eyes is not clear logic, for, as *Krisnananda* points out in his *Sidhanta*

¹ *Vide Vivarana*, p. 103, Benares Lazarus & Co. Edition.

तत्रापरोक्षज्ञानमुद्दिश्य यज्ञादीनां शमादीनां.....परोक्षविषय निमित्त प्रतिबन्ध निरासनेन शब्दादेवापरोक्ष निश्चय निमित्तं भवतीति मय्यते।

Sidhanjan the real understanding and direct cognition of oneself; as the tenth do require only a definite revelation of the object, by its being the immediate object of *Pramatri*-consciousness.¹

None can maintain that this wise *Sabda* (as a source of knowledge) will be identical with perception, for it is contended that *Sabda*, save the case where the object of cognition is self-consciousness or subject-consciousness, cannot give us direct knowledge of things even if they are immediate. In these cases we require the intervention of the senses inner or outer.²

Moreover, if it is held that the knowledge which one acquires on one's being reminded of Identity is only indirect we shall be bound to accept a somewhat curious position that a directly false idea or perception can be set aside by indirect knowledge. Even when a man is told that yonder object is not a serpent, but a rope, he is not freed from the illusory conception unless he has directly perceived it, for a false perception can be set aside by a true one. No doubt the keenness of intellect due to the reflective contemplation is helpful in the way of preparing the mentality and fostering discriminating consciousness. When the mental consciousness is thus thoroughly disciplined it can immediately feel the truth of Identity. No one can reason with accuracy that the senses external as well as internal are instruments of perception, *Sabda*

¹ *Vide* p. 140, Part I, Sidhanta Sidhanjan. ब्रह्मात्मनि तु शब्दमपि-
ज्ञानसुख्यमाः विषयोपरक्तमेवोत्पद्यत इति प्रमादसंविद्व्यवधानोपाधितया भवत्य-
परोक्षार्थावभासित्वात्।

² *Vide* Adwaita Siddhi, p. 877, Jivaji's Edition.

नच—एवं प्रत्यक्षान्तर्भावः शब्दस्य स्यादिति वाच्यम् ; बोध्यं भिन्नार्कं शब्दाति-
रिक्तेत्वे सति प्रत्यक्षप्रमाकरत्वस्य प्रत्यक्षस्यान्तर्भावे तन्त्रकार ।

is a mere condition—the mental consciousness is the direct cause of the cognition of Identity, the instruction—‘thou art that’—is at best a condition—for it is often noticed that the blind man even in darkness acquires direct knowledge of himself as the tenth on merely being reminded “thou art the tenth.” *Prakastaman* and others conclude that when one has a cultured mind free from the inborn tendencies due to constant reflective criticism and contemplation, one can feel the truth of Identity. This difference of opinion on the indirect and the direct bearing of *Sabda* on cognition owes its inception to the theories of perception, as held by *Vacaspati* and *Vivaranacharya* (*vide* Chapter 3).

Vedantism as a philosophy has its origin in analysis of experience and a deep-seated pessimism—a pessimism based upon searching question into the meaning of the fleeting course of existence and failure to get a satisfactory solution in other directions. The human consciousness not being satisfied with the seen thinks deep to find out the meaning of existence. So long as it has not its mission fulfilled, it cannot rest, the wailing within goads it on to find rest,—rest which it gets nowhere in empirical life. Such a pessimism is not a night-mare upon the human breast. It is a constant inducement to go deep within to find a solution. It leads on to a blessed optimism—an optimism not of the child, but of the seer, in whom the question has its answer, the doubt has its solution. The soul finds rest and peace in the beatitude of Identity. It becomes self-possessed, self-contained and self-delighted. Its mental-consciousness is no longer disturbed ; it feels a harmony everywhere—harmony within, harmony without. It is

just the stream of bliss. It is a silent flow of felicitous existence unperturbed by any external influence.

We cannot close this chapter without considering for a moment the important question of Free Will from the Vedantic standpoint. It is clear from the Vedantic doctrine of transcendence and quiescence of Being that

Freedom of will from the Vedantic standpoint. will does not belong to the self as an integral part of its being. The soul in itself as an identity of existence

is above all categories that can be applied to the phenomenal order. It transcends causal law and is free existence. Therefore, if the controversy between freedom and determinism is ultimately the question as to self-activity being free from causal determination or not, it may be answered that the question does not arise at all. The self in its essence is free from willing. Any conception of determination or freedom cannot be ascribed to it. In so far as the will is an empirical fact it must be determined by the law of causation. Will is what we know and everything we know is within the empirical order and is rigidly determined by the conditions of space, time, causality. The Vedantin, of course, maintains that there can be no action without motive (इच्छा); in so far every action is determined. But this determination is an act of rational choice and in this sense somewhat free. *Vacaspati* says that a person has the capacity of freely identifying himself with any course of action. The *śāstric* injunctions or prohibitions present before us lines of actions. But they cannot influence our choice which is free.¹ The *Kalpataru* makes the same affirmation. Everyone has the capacity of freely acting ;

¹ Vide Bhamati, p. 90, Jivaji's Edition.

the vidhis and *the nisedhas* only hold up before us the lines of action sanctioned or not sanctioned by the *Sastra*.¹

The Vedantin maintains the predominance of reason (*buddhi*) over will or impulse and reason wants to assert itself in every action to see its conformity or harmony with the world of relations. Right conduct depends on right knowledge. The entire universe is a network of relations. Reason alone can understand the harmony of the universal order and can prescribe the right regulation of our conduct. To the Vedantists real freedom consists in the rational determination of our conduct. The Vedanta asserts the supremacy of reason over will. And in this constitutes real freedom, for reason belongs to our higher nature and is something more intimate to us and can regulate us in cosmic sense. Whenever we do anything which reason perceives as the right thing for us to do in the system of relations we, though strictly and logically determined, still feel to be free, for our individualistic and egoistic standpoint has been lost sight of and we feel an expansive movement of our being in such actions and, therefore, more free. In this sense, a child is more free than the tree, the tree more than the stone, the man more than the child, the saint more than anybody. We really feel ourselves determined when, in spite of the clear indication of reason, we go in a way contrary to it. The more we feel the impersonal indications of reason, the more we escape from the *conceit of agency*, the more we are released from the fetters of ignorance

¹ विधिप्रतिषेधैरेव स तादृश विषयोऽनागतोऽपायरूप उपनीतः, येन पुरुषस्य विधिनिषेधाधीन प्रवृत्तिनिष्ठशौरपि स्वातन्त्रं भवतीति । (Bhamati.)

स्वातन्त्र्येण कर्तुं समर्थोऽपि हिताहित उपायत्वमज्ञानम्, तद्विधक विधिनिषेधा-
देव इत्यर्थः ।

² अमृतकल्लोल नदी, Nirban Upanisad.

and consequent action. In witness—consciousness we feel the transcendent isolation of the self, the freedom of indifference (as the self becomes clearly conscious of its transcendence over the phenomenal changes). Ignorance is the cause of our bondage and determination, and the more we realise the nature of our self as consciousness, the more we are withdrawn from the conflict of impulses, the more we feel ourselves free. *Vedantism* thus maintains the freedom of being, though, for the moment, the soul seems to be chained up in the bondage of phenomenal order. If the freedom of action is denied, the greater freedom of Being is retained. To be free one must know oneself, for one is essentially free, and that which is conducive to such knowledge helps one on towards freedom. When Will comes under the guidance and control of reason our conduct becomes somewhat free: *Vedantism* proclaims in no uncertain voice "Virtue is knowledge, Ignorance is vice."

It will thus appear that essential freedom lies in the attainment of knowledge and it is a question of degree—the more we get to ourselves, to our inner essence, the more we feel free. The more we get away from the centre of spiritual existence, the greater we feel the force of necessity and determination. Freedom is the possession of spirit. The more spiritual we are, the greater is our freedom. The world of effects is governed by necessity. The productive Being is free. Brahman has free move in the cosmic evolution; the finite person, the reflection of Brahman, must be thought of as freely willing, if not freely creating. We must not suppose the uniformity of order immanent in cosmos to be a sign of determination, for order is not opposed to rational free choice and guidance. It is the nature of a being essentially rational to move freely, though uniformly

or orderly. The argument from uniformity does not lend support to rigid determination. It is not inconsistent with the hypothesis of a rational choice. Brahman creates or evolves freely, and this freedom is not opposed to uniform order of becoming in cycles. The finite person has no doubt the upadhi of Avidya ; still because of his transcendence in essence over Avidya, he must be thought of as a centre of power controlling himself and his desires and motives. If Brahman is absolutely free, finite units are relatively free in the sense of being somewhat determined by *Avidya* and his freedom is greater when he attains to the stage of *sakshi* (witness) for there he perceives Avidya as upadhi, of which he can make use in any way he likes. The Sruti also promises that a spiritual entity as it grows in spiritual well-being gets freedom of movement. The self-conscious existence is an intermediary between the state of absolute determination and complete freedom. The Vedantin thus accepts the possibility of a relative freedom. But it must be conceded that Vedantism though it begins with and admits in some sense the freedom of will in its acceptance of the personality of finite units of conscious existence soon discovers that man's freedom is not essentially the freedom of will, far less of action, but it is the freedom of Being, for, ultimately the Vedantin seeks to give up the sense of personality to realise the identity of Being. And he feels this kind of freedom can be attained more by giving up himself than by asserting his own. When the vision of transcendent existence appears, he feels clearly the quiescence of existence and feels the soul neither free nor determined. To attain such a state he wants to give up all forms of *willing*, perceiving it to be no longer a part of self, but a fact in the empirical order. The Vedantic ideal of real freedom consists in the extinction of desires, the destruction of

ignorance. Before this state can be reached we try to identify our will with the cosmic force, which has capacity to carry us upward through the forsaking of individuality and the assertion of personality.

We cannot ignore here the Vedantic divisions of *Karma* (more strictly—*kanya karma*) into *sancita*, *prarabdha* and *kriyamana*. The *sancita* or the *accumulated* is *karma* done in previous births. It has not yet begun to bear fruits or operate upon the soul. The *prarabdha*, the “commenced” is *karma* done in former births. It has begun to produce results. The *kriyamana* is the present activity of the agent, destined to affect the soul in future births. The *Vedantin* recognises the free self-determination and holds every one responsible for his action. The law of *karma* is stern and no one can escape the law, for every one is an active agent, and is creating a destiny well or ill for him by his actions and thoughts. The *Vedantin* accepts the conception of self as active agent (empirically) endowed with the power of discrimination between right and wrong and the capacity of freely identifying itself with the one or the other. “The belief in the effect of self-discipline on *karma* is not merely a necessary postulate of theory of retribution but as well a chief condition of escape from the endless round of transmigration and all that go to make up the illusive phantasmagoria of life.” *Vedantism* throws all responsibility upon the agent for his deeds. It no doubt accepts a destiny for the individual but this destiny is the self-creation. Life is perpetual activity and our thoughts and deeds are forces that create for us an unseen possibility which bears fruit sooner or later. The *Vedantin* holds that these become, later on, forces that we cannot in any way transcend. We cannot escape them for they are our own creation. In this sense, man is the creator of his own destiny. In

this light *sancita* and *prarabdha karma* can be regarded as the effect (visibly inoperative or operative) of the *Kriyamana* destined to bear fruits.

God is the regulator of *karmic* effects, we, the creator. When different seeds produce crops in variety, the clouds cannot be held responsible for the difference, though without the shower they cannot grow and be fructified. The seeds explain the differences, the shower, the fructification. God disposes of and distributes impartially the results of actions to their agents. He cannot be held responsible for the inequalities of capacities and conveniences, pleasures and pains. The stream of *karma* is eternal.¹

The *karmic law* to the Vedantists is one that cannot be broken. Even if the knowledge of identity is attained, the deeds already done must have their full effect. The intellectual illumination (identity) can put a stop to the further course of life by destroying the germs of future existence, but it cannot burn up the deeds which have commenced to bear fruit. Knowledge can destroy 'accumulated' *karma*, which has not begun to bear fruit. It can also destroy the future *karma*. The course of the present existence must fully run out before one can attain *Vidcha Kaibalya*. According to some knowledge can mitigate the effect of *Karma* ill or well, but it cannot immediately bring complete independence and liberation, by destroying the commenced *Karma*.²

The author of the *Yogavasistha*, no doubt, agrees with our general conclusion that destiny is self-created—a possibility reared up by our own thoughts and actions in the past. But if this destiny is a created possibility,³ this

¹ *Vide* Brahma Sutra 2. 1. 34 and Bhasya.

² *Vide* Brahma Sutra IV, 1, 19.

³ *Vide* Yogabasisstha, Book Chap. 9, Slokas 17-20.

can be according to the author, set aside if one only tries. He seems to hold that the definite course of life (as determined for it by his past actions) can be changed freely by self-determination and constant endeavour. The moulding of life's course depends entirely upon our free will which is strong enough to upset the course destined by the previous *karma*.

This conclusion upsets the general conclusion that the commenced *karma* cannot be destroyed. One is to reap its full consequence. To consider this point in detail we might divide *Karma* into two classes :

(1) *Karma* for the sake of attaining the knowledge of Identity, and

(2) *Karma* for the sake of progressive evolution.

(1) One can put forth one's complete energies to attain knowledge, and one may be successful, but the seer is to reap the fruits of his own deeds done in the past life. Upon this point the *Vedantists* from *Sankar* down to *Madhusudhan* agree.¹ But still the knower, *Jivanmukta*, does not feel the sting of pleasure or pain so strongly as the ignorant feel, for he is within himself no longer a person, but a seer, a witness—to him the facts of life are illusory. He feels them and feels not. This shows knowledge brings in a change in our life—it makes *karma* ineffective practically though not literally.

(2) The previous *karma* creates a tendency in us and this tendency may be subsequently changed and life's course may flow in another direction. Even if it is thought possible this cannot be achieved at once ; some time must pass before one can eradicate the present tendency and replace it by a new one. It means the transformation of will. In some cases it is achieved

¹ *Vide Gita Bhashya*,—Chap. 4, Sloka 37.

only after a strong effort. Life's course to some extent must be run before one can think of a change in the course of life. The law of *karma* in forming a destiny is effective, though the possibility of our creating further destiny is not precluded. But this possibility can be not realised all at once. It indicates that the law of *Karma* holds true in our moral life. Man creates his own destiny and in fact is creating it every day. This does not make the previous *Karma* inoperative.

The *Sankara* School does not accept the *theory of grace*.

No doubt we come across expressions in the *Upanisads*¹ which indicate the existence of the theory in them and which has received its full development in *Vaiṣṇabism*. (धर्तुं प्रसादात् महिमानम् आत्मनम्). Vedantism cannot lend its support to such a doctrine, for it sees clearly that the bondage is self-creation, to be destroyed by the seeker himself by a clear, penetrative and discriminating consciousness. The well known passage in the *Upanisad—Atman* can be attained by on whom the *Atman* specially selects for its grace,— does not imply any theory of grace, for it means that one who accepts *Atman* in life can ultimately know it, one who forsakes everything and passes into the life of renunciation and deep meditation can ultimately realise the Identity of Being. The Absolute monism of *Vedanta* cannot accept Grace as causing liberation, for, it is logically incoherent with the central principle of the system of Identity. Salvation by grace presupposes the doctrine of eternal sin and the personalities of the finite and the infinite existences. But in the system in which the ultimate existence is will-less static consciousness

¹ *Vide* Setaswetara, Chap. I, i, xii, Ch. III, iv, v, Ch. VI, 10, 18, 23.

where the bondage is held to be not due to eternal sin but to ignorance, the only possible way to get a release is to put aside the error of division and partial experience. There is no way of escape from the bondage save and except through *knowledge*. The central teaching of Vedanta is "know thyself." Man is not a sinner from birth, requiring the intervention of grace directly through the Person of God Himself or indirectly through the person of inspired agents for salvation.

While Vedantism dispenses with the necessity of special grace for redemption directly, it (more specially in its ancient form) lays emphasis upon the usefulness and importance of grace as helping us onward by purifying us and making us fit for the consummation. Really it is more prominent in the ancient Vedantic teachers, *e.g.*, in *Sankar*, in *Vidyaranya*, etc., who insist upon the usefulness of devotion in the life of knowledge.¹ But even in this case the Vedantists do not believe in the theory of grace as the direct cause of liberation. It only indirectly helps us to acquire knowledge by promoting the habit of concentration and by purifying our mental being. It has even been pointed out by *Sankara* that the capacity of our receiving the grace of God is relative to our merit.² Man is to work out his own freedom and nothing can help him so much as his own intelligence and penetrative insight.³

¹ यन्मैवैषदृश्यते तेन लभ्यः.

² In Book II, Chap. I. 36.

³ *Vide* Book III, 2, 4, 1, Sankar's commentary and Bhamai thereupon.

CHAPTER V.

REALISATION AND FREEDOM.

I have known the great effulgent Soul beyond
darkness. Knowing it one crosses Death—
there is no other way to proceed.

(*Śvetāśvetara*)

By knowledge they enjoy immortality.

(*Iā Upaniṣad*)

We have at length come to the last part of our enquiry. We have seen what is the severe course of training which an adept has to go through to attain final liberation, and how again, in Vedantism the moral discipline has been subjected to an intellectual purpose. The moral and religious training prepares us for the transcendental teachings which in their way fashion the intellect to perceive Brahman immediately. We should now see what the Vedantin means by the knowledge of *Brahman* and how he describes the state of freedom. *Brahman* can never appear in its fullness of being in empirical consciousness as an object.

Recapitulation. The possibility of knowing *Brahman* as the object of knowledge is thus for ever excluded. Yet we cannot say that *Brahman* is completely unknown and unknowable. *Brahman* is immanent in experience. It is expressive of Nescience which screens it from our view. If we have ignorance regarding it, this ignorance cannot hide it

completely from our view but only its Identity and its Bliss.

Of such a transcendental self we can speak only in negative terms. Our description of liberation will be naturally in empirical terms which cannot express it better than as the negation of concrete experiences. But nobody can describe the net result of such a process of denial and negation in concrete terms. *Sankara* himself has felt the difficulty of depicting the transcendental state of existence.¹

“Brahman cannot be said to be one, for where is the second different from it; not to be alone, nor to be not alone; not to be nothing, nor to be being, since it is oneness; how can I describe such an existence which is established by the Vedanta.” Really any description of a transcendental existence in empirical terms will fall far short, for our mind in any stage cannot form a right conception of it and language fails to describe it. Such an existence can only be hinted at as the object of the undivided mental consciousness modified in the form of Identity. *Madhusudhan Saraswati* says,² “Though *Atman* is not an object of knowledge, still the ignorance regarding *Atman* is set aside by the undivided but indeterminate mental transformation. We may conveniently notice here the three stages in the process of modification of mental consciousness. The process is started. This is the first stage. Before it can

In what sense *Atman* is said to be known.

¹ Dasa Sloki 20th Sloke.

न चैकं तदन्यद् द्वितीयं कुतस्या न शून्यं न चाशून्यं अद्वैतोक्तत्वात्
 न वा केवलत्वं न वा केवलत्वं । कथं सर्ववेदान्तसिद्धं ब्रवीमि ॥

² अविषयेपि आत्मनि तदाकाररुचिमादिषु तदविदानिवर्त्तकम्, Chap. IV, Adwaita Sidhi.

take a firm hold upon mental consciousness, it must destroy the contrary modification of *Antahkarana* in the form of the *Samsara*. This takes place some time after the process has begun. This is the second stage. The more the modification gains ground in us, the more we become self-introspective until at last the modification of mental consciousness itself dies out, and the self in its integrity reveals itself.¹ This is the third stage. The third stage is preceded by the negation of the manifold existence including the *Vritti* itself. The first stage marks out the origin and the continuity of the *vritti*, the second, its final disappearance, the third is the stage of knowledge.

Between the second stage and the expression of *Atman* in the third, if we can speak in such a way, there is no sequence in time. They are simultaneous. Even if *Atman* cannot be said to be known, its knowledge (in the sense of being indicated) may be furnished by the last stage of the transformation of mind-stuff. *Atman* is known only by implication as one invariably associated with the denial of illusory forms of *Avidya* and of *Avidya* itself. And we have this denial in concrete form in the last (*i.e.*, the second stage above indicated) stage of the *vritti* which, after destroying the empiric concepts, is itself lost or destroyed. Strictly speaking, freedom or bondage cannot be attributed to *Atman* which by itself is eternally free. Nothing can restrict the freedom of self, for beyond it nothing exists. It is calmness and quiescence of existence. The conception of freedom is relative to the conception of bondage. Freedom like restraint is an empirical conception and can be spoken of existences that were

¹ *Vide* Laghuohandrika—बरमतल्ल ज्ञानस्य दृश्याश्रयकालपूर्वत्वाभावनियम एव सौक्रियते, p. 4, Jivaji's Edition.

previously in bondage. The bondage is indicated by our deep anxiety for fleshly existence, our anxious solicitude for earthly progress; freedom is indicated by utter indifference for the body and the progressive evolution of self. It implies a clear vision of ourselves as distinct from the fivefold sheath. Indeed, the conception of bondage and freedom is understood and felt by the intellect (*buddhi*).¹ When the mind-stuff is controlled by operations of a not-self, the finite ego feels itself determined by circumstances and reaps the fruits thereof in the form of pleasure or pain. And when the mental consciousness is modified in form of Atman, it understands the nature of relative freedom as compared with its former state of bondage.² The habit of frequent meditation on the Identity brings it down from its nature as an abstract concept to a fact of direct and immediate cognition. We conclude: Realisation of freedom means the cessation of Avidya. Atman is itself free, bondage is only apparent. The knowledge of Atman as indicated by the last *vrutti* implies the destruction of ignorance, or knowledge connotes the destruction of ignorance.

Vedantism draws a distinction between the perception of *Atman* and the perception of concrete facts. In the perception of concrete things the mind-stuff goes out, takes on itself the determinate form of the object. The

¹ Vide Upadesha Sahasri, 59. Parthib Prakarana,—

एवं तर्हि न मोक्षोऽस्ति बन्धाभावात् कथञ्चन ।
शास्त्रानर्थक्यमेव स्यान्न बुद्धिर्भ्रान्तिरिष्यते
बन्धो मोक्षश्च तत्राश्रयः स यथोक्तो न चान्यथा

² बन्धश्च मोक्षश्च मृषेव सूदा बुद्धेर्गुणं वस्तुनि कल्पयन्ति (573) अतस्त्वौ मायया क्लमौ Vivekacudamani.
बन्धमोक्षौ न चान्मनि (575).

object is technically said to be *Falavyaya*. In the perception of Brahman, the mind-stuff does not take any concrete form, for Brahman has none; Brahman is said to be *Vrittivavyaya*. In the former case the process set up is definite and expressive of a concrete existence implying the removal of the concrete ignorance, in the latter case the process set up is indeterminate and expressive of an abstract existence implying the complete destruction of ignorance.

A pot is the object of consciousness qualified by the destruction of ignorance due to the modification of mind-stuff in the form of the pot. We should note the elements of the process :

- (1) the mental consciousness goes out through the senses and takes on itself the form of a pot ,
- (2) this modification removes the ignorance of the pot,
- (3) the invariable associate of the mental stuff, *i.e.*, consciousness expresses the object.

The process is somewhat different in the perception of *Brahman*. Brahman is the permanent hold (ब्रह्मज्ञानध्वंससाध्य) of the destruction of Nescience. Here the mind does not go out through the senses, but is transformed in the form of *Atman*.¹

This modification puts an end to Ignorance or Nescience and the consciousness accompanying the process

¹ Vide Pancadasi, Chap. VII, Slokas, 90, 91, 92.

स्वप्नकाशोऽपि साद्येव धीहत्या व्याप्यतेऽन्ववत् ।
फलव्याप्यत्वमेवास्य शास्त्रकृद्भिर्निवारितम् ॥

.....

ब्रह्मज्ञाननाशाय हृत्तिव्याप्तिरपेक्षिता ।
स्वयं स्मरत्परत्वात्तन्नाश उपयुज्यते ॥

is identical with the one expressed by the annihilation of Nescience, so that the modification is also destroyed with the removal of ignorance. Thus what exactly we mean by freedom cannot be made definite in the sense of knowing *Atman*, but can be indirectly hinted at as a state of existence indicated by the destruction of Ignorance.

A doubt may be entertained that as soon as the transformation of mind-stuff in the form of *Atman* is lost, the knowledge of *Atman* also comes to an end. This is not true. False ideas are set aside by true perceptions. And these perceptions cannot be replaced by false ideas.

No doubt, even after the perception of identity the previous notion of the manifold existence usually retains a hold on the mind. But it makes no effect upon *Atman*. Change may take place in the modification of mind, but it cannot touch *Atman*, even remotely. Moreover, the impression that one gets in *Nirvikalpic* existence is too deep to be effaced, and though the empiric consciousness may return, it cannot make any change in the vision which one gets. The empiric consciousness does not then possess any serious meaning and the wise work unaffected by circumstances agreeable or disagreeable. It may be more in fitness to describe them as watching or witnessing the changes and movements of mind-stuff without being affected well or ill by them. *Oitsuki* truly says,¹ "The false idea of silver, which is destroyed by the process set up in consciousness in the form—'this is not silver,'—has no possibility of coming back upon it even after the process

¹ *Oitsuki*, p. 383, श्रुतिशकलादी ज्ञाननाशिन ज्ञातत्वोपलक्षणाशिसि
निवृत्तस्याज्ञानस्य तावद्विलासस्य वा पुनरुन्मज्जनादर्शनात् संसारशङ्कातद्वा-
नवकाशात् ।

is destroyed. If, again, we mistake another thing for silver, this can again be set aside. But when the entire Nescience has been set aside by the modification of consciousness in the form of *Atman* there is no possibility of false ideas again getting hold over us."

We read in almost all books of Vedanta : *Atman* is the cessation of Ignorance, indicated as if known. When the indication is lost, it is still free.¹

We are now to consider how Nescience or *Avidya* is destroyed. *Atman* is expressive of the existence of *Avidya*, it cannot by itself destroy *Avidya*. Indeed it is expressive

The destruction of Ignorance : the factors conducive to it.

of everything and does not contain in its transcendental nature anything to destroy ignorance, for, in so far it is transcendental, it has no relation with it, and in so far as it is immanent, it is expressive of the manifold including Nescience. Consequently *Atman* in itself cannot be destructive of it. But it can destroy ignorance through the undivided and continuous modification of mental consciousness in its own form. Just as the Sun, which is expressive of pieces of paper, can burn them up when its rays are focussed upon them through a glass, similarly *Atman*, which is expressive of a show of manifold being, can destroy it and its cause *Avidya* when it is helped by the continuous undivided modification. The *Samsara* or becoming is destroyed

An Analogy.

by the contrary tendency of the thought of identity. And this contrary tendency checks the habitual way of thinking the world as real and independent of consciousness. This with the reflection of *Atman* is thought sufficient to

¹ निवृत्तिरात्मा मोहस्य ज्ञातत्वेनोपलब्धितः ।
उपलक्षणनाशेऽपि स्यान्मुक्तिः पाचकादिवत् ॥

indeterminate modification of consciousness is necessary. *Brahman* is the object of this undivided transformation of consciousness (अखण्डाकारवृत्ति). No doubt in every perception we have some knowledge of Being. Such knowledge is indirect. But the ideal of knowledge requires us to be knowing *Brahman* not in the manifestation, but in itself. And this requires a *Vritti* in the form of *Atman*. Indeed, the Vedantists never deny that some knowledge of *Brahman* is implied in all knowledge and as such we are really living, moving and thinking in it; still the knowledge of *Brahman* as *Anandam* or Bliss requires the perception of identity.

What then do we mean by the removal of Ignorance?

What is meant by the destruction of ignorance? What is the exact significance?

Avidya is empirically real. We can conceive it (the denial) in three ways :—

Different views :

(1) The denial of empirical order with its root cause is different from *Atman*. आत्म अयैवाविद्या-

(1) The negation co-existing with consciousness. निवृत्तिः.

The negation of *Avidya* like its position is empirical and does not touch the transcendent reality of *Brahman*. But this negation cannot be real, for it admits of two real existences—*Brahman* and the negation of empirical existence—not unreal or purely imaginary or illusory, for an imaginary being cannot be conceived to be really existing and being destroyed, nor both real and unreal, for they are mutually contradictory and exclude each other; not purely mysterious (e.g., rope—serpent) for everything mysterious has its existence in *Avidya*, and if liberation in the sense of destruction of Ignorance be

conceived as mysterious it will presuppose the continuity of *Avidya* in liberation. Hence *Anandabodhacharyya* conceives and describes the destruction of *Avidya* as something different from all these and yet not identical with *Atman*,—something implying the denial of concrete modes of existence, itself a blank or a barren negation of existence unable any longer to hold up a show of existence.¹

(2) Some say that the negation of *Avidya* is different from *Atman*, though the negation in itself like *Avidya* is a mysterious existence. The negation of *Avidya* is to be conceived just like its position as a mysterious entity considered empirically.

The negation of Nescience—another form of existence—is inherently incapable of producing an illusory existence. The state of liberation would imply the simultaneous existence of *Atman* in its integrity and a negation which is mysterious in nature.²

(3) Yet another description is possible. The destruction of *Avidya* is identical with the attainment of knowledge.³ When Ignorance is dispelled by the knowledge of

¹ *Vide Nyaya Makaranda*, pp. 353 to 355—यथा खलु शक्तिशकलादिः स्वरूपे प्रसिद्धे प्रकारान्तरानिरूपणाच्च परिशेषतोऽनिर्वाच्यता तथा अविद्याव्यावृत्तिरपि प्रसिद्धि परिशेषाभ्यां प्रकारान्तरशालिनीतियुक्तम् । न चेवं सत् अद्वैतव्यावृत्तिः अनिमोचो वा । तस्याः सद्रूपत्वाऽनङ्गीकारात् अनिर्वाच्यताभावाच्च न विद्योपादनत्वात् ।

² *Vide Sidhantalessa* :—एवं अविद्या निवृत्तिरपि ब्रह्मसाक्षात्कारोदयानन्तर-च्छवर्त्तो कश्चित् भावविकार इति तस्या मुक्तौ अनुवृत्तेरभावान्न तदनिर्वाच्यत्वे कश्चिद्दोष इति अद्वैतविद्याचार्याः ।

³ *Vide Adwaita Cinta-Kaustav*, p. 10, आत्मं वाज्ञानहानिः । अविद्यानिवृत्तिरेव मोक्षः, स चाधिष्ठान ब्रह्मस्वरूपः । कल्पितप्रतियोकाभावस्य अधिष्ठानव्यतिरेकेण दुर्निरूप्यत्वात् ।

Vide Chapter III, the Vedantic Theory of Abahava.

Identity what remains is the purity of being without any form of modification. The destruction

(2) The negation identical with consciousness.

of *Avidya* is the negative description of the attainment of knowledge. It is not different from *Atman*, even empirically. This theory would maintain that since, besides *Atman*, nothing truly exists except the empirical forms due to the ignorance of *Atman* and since ignorance in its nature is an empirical existence, the negation of ignorance is not an entity—it is indicative of the transcendent existence of *Atman* and the knowledge thereof. The position of an empirical mode of existence may imply some positive conception of *Avidya*, without which this very mode cannot be conceived as an object in experience, for none can think of even an apparent existence issuing out of nothing. But when any such illusory existence is denied, we have not merely the impression of a negation left upon consciousness, but of something positively existing as its background. The negation of *Avidya* is not by itself, a reality apart from *Atman*—it is *Atman* itself for the position of *Avidya* is taken in empirical sense; its negation, in transcendent sense. To understand the import of this conception we should bear in mind the Vedantic conception of *Abhava* or non-existence as identical with the support and not in any way related to it. Applying this law, we get, the negation of empirical existence as identical with its locus, *Brahman*.

Of these three forms of description of the state of liberation the first two may be taken as of one kind, the latter of a different kind. The first type may be regarded as conceiving the negation of *Avidya* in empirical sense, the second type may be regarded as conceiving the negation of *Avidya* in transcendental sense. The first admits of some form of duality in the conception of a blank negation

co-existing side by side with the transcendental existence of Atman. The second does not admit of any such duality. It also conforms to our ordinary experience. When the false appearance of a serpent is set aside by the removal of ignorance we no longer perceive the serpent but the rope. It will no doubt be a circumlocution to say that we do not see the rope, but the negation of serpent. The negation of serpent is nothing different from the rope, for, the serpent, strictly speaking, has no existence, but is only an appearance of existence and as an appearance it is nothing real, and its negation cannot be taken to be real. Similarly when the totality of experience is denied, the negation or the denial has no existence beside the permanent background—the self or *Atman*. The reality that is noticed in appearances is not the reality of appearance, but in so far as it is real, it is the reality of Being ; the appearance is only illusory. The appearance seems to be real, for it stands apparently identified with the background, *viz.*—Reality. Avidya as the material cause of the universe is real in the sense of causing the appearance of manifoldness. In fact standing on the empirical level of consciousness we cannot call it a pure negation, for pure negation cannot be instrumental in the bringing out of manifold modes and forms. The first two alternatives keep up the somewhat positive character of Avidya and regard its negation as something empirically different from Atman (चरमवृत्तसम्बन्धी कश्चित्भावरूपी विकारः न अभावरूपः). The negation in the sense of destruction is a positive existence, having a definite beginning but no end (असाभाव). It originates in time, but preserves its continuity through eternity, as if the negation of a thing is as much real as the thing itself. The second alternative emphasises the fact that between the empirical and the transcendental existences there is no intermediate stage of

being, so that the denial of the empirical necessarily implies the position of the transcendental, for what is this empirical mode of existence but the ignorance of the transcendental? When we acquire the knowledge of the transcendental existence, the empirical or phenomenal dies a natural death. We may require Nescience to explain the course of the fleeting existence and empirically we do conceive it as a positive fact of experience. But when we are engaged in the contrary process of seeing through appearances—we reach a finality in the process when we fail to see anything but Being and Blessedness. We have seen already that according to Vedantism we think of manifoldness only to deny it subsequently to understand the complete integrity of existence. Position has, therefore, less value in Vedantism than negation and if the former is taken in empirical sense, the latter must be understood in transcendental sense. And in the transcendental sense the last denial is identical with the first affirmation. Ignorance may seem to us as something positive, but

Conclusion.

with advance in knowledge it appears
as mysterious—and with complete
enlightenment it vanishes. To retain the denial and
negation of Avidya as a mode of existence side by side
with the most positive of beings is to violate the law of
parsimony and to make a simple conception complex.
We conclude that freedom implies negatively the
destruction of ignorance, positively the attainment of
light.

When the adept has attained freedom, we expect to find him in a state of transcendental consciousness purely unconscious of the empirical order, for to him the empirical order has neither value nor any existence. His vision is no longer obscured by Ignorance and the empirical order with its variety of phenomena can have no meaning for him.

Such a state of consciousness can hardly be described in positive terms, for it surpasses all description. In the *Atmaprobodh-
opanisat* a beautiful picture of such a state has been outlined, a free translation of which is given below :—

The description of the state of Freedom.

My Nescience is dissolved, I am now consciousness itself stripped of all fickleness.

My sense of personality is eclipsed, the sense of the distinction between the individual and the universal self has been lost to me.

I am not distinct from the absolute self, *Sastric* injunctions and prohibitions are inapplicable to me.

The perception of the different stages of empirical existence is extinguished in me—I am now consciousness of bliss in widest commonalty spread.

I am distinct from a witnessing consciousness, I am fixed and established in my own glory.

I am devoid of old age, and decay, I am above the strife of contending parties.

I am alone, and constant, I am the very image of 'purity' and 'Nirvan.'

I am without a body, or birth, I am only the essence of being, I am pure, I am one without a second, I have lost the threefold sheath, I am enlightened and free, I am a wonder of existence.

I am pure, the inmost essence of myself, I am eternal consciousness, I am the ultimate truth,

I am the very image of consciousness and bliss.¹

Sometimes an adept is seen to reach such a transcendental summit of being and to continue existing therein. To him the empirical order of existence is lost for good. He is said to be awakened from the illusory vision. With the perception of Identity is promised the freedom from the fetters of ignorance. Avidya with all its effects is completely destroyed and the possibility of the dream of personal existence is altogether lost. Such an adept is said to have attained *Vidakhkaibalya* freedom of aloneness accompanied by the forsaking of flesh and of future life. Some define *Videhkaibalya* as the denial of all possibility of a future birth. Such a state is simultaneous with the perception of Identity. In order that one should attain *Videhamukti* one should forsake the fleshly covering the moment when one has the clear vision of Identity. The *Karmic* seeds leading to future birth have been destroyed by knowledge and the past deeds have had their full fruition, and there remains nothing in the individual to cause the continuity of personal existence.² The *Videha-*

Types of liberated Souls.

(1) *Videhmukta*.

¹ *Vide Atmaprobodha Upanisat—Slokas, 1-1', Chapter 2.*

प्रगलित निजमायोऽहं निस्तुलहृशिरूपवस्तुमाचोऽहम् ।
 अस्तमिताहंताऽहं प्रगलितजगदीशजीवभेदोऽहम् ॥
 प्रत्यगतन्नपरोऽहं विध्वस्ताशेषविधिनिषेधोऽहम् ।
 समुदास्ताश्रमितीऽहं प्रविततसुखपूर्णसंविदीवाहम् ॥
 सात्यमनपेचोऽहं निजमह्नि संस्थितोऽहमचलोऽहम् ।
 अजरोऽहमन्यथोऽहं पञ्चविपच्चादिभेदविधुरोऽहम् ॥

² भोगेन त्वितरे चपयित्वा सम्पद्यते—ज्ञानेनाज्ञाने निवृत्ते संचितकर्म्मणां नाशात् आगामिकर्म्मणामन्नेषाद्भोगेन प्रारब्धक्षयच्छरीरान्तराऽरभक्तस्य असम्भवात् भाविशरीरान्तरस्य ज्ञानसमकालत्वं युज्यते ।—*Tattwanusadhan*, p. 33.

muktas pass into the calm and are lost for the empirical order.¹ He shakes off his artificial personality. (विदेहकैवल्यम्)

An adept attains the knowledge of Identity. He does not feel the existence of manifold beings. Still does the

(2) *Jivanmukta*.

sense of manifoldness come upon him implying a loss of and a break in the continuity of his transcendent existence. Such souls are said to have attained *liberation-in-life*. The constant meditation on the identity of existence pursued with vigorous devotion produces a flow of thinking in a direction contrary to the habitual one causing the revelation of *Atman* in its transcendent glory. The sense of personality, no doubt, vanishes; but from such a stillness of transcendent consciousness sometimes the adept is seen to return to the consciousness of the empiric manifold. The stream of personal existence is still kept in-flowing by the acquired tendency due to the course of life and adaptation in previous existences. When the soul, liberated in life, has run the entire course of the present earthly existence and reaped the fruits of *Praravdha* or "commenced" *Karma*, it passes into the freedom of aloneness after death. The difference between the Ignorant and the Wise is that the former regard the manifoldness as real and is attached to it, the latter know it to be false or illusory. It is to the knower an appearance, a dreamlike existence—the false notion of its being a reality has been denied, but the remembrance thereof lasts for sometime (वाचितानुवृत्ति). Even to a *Jivanmukta* nothing is real but *Atman*, for to him is lost the sense of an independent reality beyond self. Truly

सम्प्रसादेऽविकारित्वादस्तं याते विकारिणि ।
पश्यतो नात्मनः किञ्चित् द्वितीयं स्पृश्यतेऽप्यपि ॥

(*Vide Naiskramasidhi*)

it is said,¹ "This knowledge is non-different from its object. The object of knowledge is knowledge. Hence the knower is free from any pulse of desire or aversion." To the seer, nothing is acceptable, nothing unacceptable, for to him nothing really exists but an undivided bliss and consciousness. To him the construction of concepts and the world of values are meaningless. Ignorance in its totality is destroyed by the attainment of knowledge. There is no possibility of thinking that it is being lost by degrees.²

The form of renunciation known as *Vidvat Sannyasa* should not be confounded with the state of liberation in life. This kind of renunciation is conducive to the fixity of existence in the consciousness of Identity. It becomes necessary to eradicate all desires and to destroy the mental being. Renunciation is thought desirable and actually sought to bring in complete rest and tranquillity.³ Both of them, *the Jivanmukta* and the *Vidvat Sannyasi*, have attained the consciousness of Identity, but the *Vidvat Sannyasin*

The distinction between *Vidvat Sannyasa* and *Jivanmukti* drawn out.

ज्ञेयभिन्नमिदं यस्मात् ज्ञेयवस्त्वनुसार्थ्यते ।

न प्रवृत्तिं निवृत्तिं वा कटाक्षेणापि वीचते ॥

¹ अविद्यास्तमयः संस्कारादि कार्यरूपेणाप्यनवस्थानम् । सा स्थूलरूपा संस्कारादिरूपाच । तथाच विदेहताकालीनोऽस्तमय एव मुख्यो मोक्षः, ज्ञातत्वोपलक्षित आत्मापि विदेहकालीन एव । जीवन्मुक्तकालीनस्य ज्ञातत्वोपहितत्वस्यापि कदाचित् सम्भवेन ज्ञातत्वोपलक्षितस्य सर्वदा असम्भवादुपलक्षितस्यैव मोहननिवृत्तित्वम् ।

Lagucandrika, p. 3, lines 1-3v.

सकृत् आत्मप्रसूत्यैव निरुणद्धि अविलम् भवम् ।

² केवलं परमहंसं जानन्नपि चित्तविश्रान्तेरभावाद्दृष्टिमुखो ब्रह्मणि न तिष्ठति । ततो गार्हस्थ्यप्राप्तौ लौकिकभौतिकव्यवहारसङ्घर्षे स्थिते विचित्रे सति विश्रान्ति सिद्धये विद्वत्सत्यासपूर्वकं चिकीर्षति ।—page 10 4, *Jivanmuktiviveka*.

stands in need of some culture to attain *Jivanmukti*. The former is a stage leading on to the latter, wherein knowledge is attained with the killing of desires and of the mental being.

Indeed in any form of liberation nothing remains but a positive consciousness of Bliss. The life of knowledge is contrary to the life of action which implies a sense of duality and a constant adaptation to the environment. The knowledge of identity, if it is once attained, does not fail to put a check upon the course of active life. But still in some cases where the life-current is strong involving fruition of some pre-natal deeds in the immediate future, the knowledge of *Atman* cannot permanently destroy the usual tendency to active adaptation.¹

The fact of a liberated soul coming down to the level of empiric consciousness requires the hypothesis of the existence of *Avidya* as a residual phenomenon. An objection may be put forward : how can we speak of the destruction of *Avidya* when the empirical order seems to have a meaning to, and a hold upon, the liberated soul? How, again, if we once grant the actuality of attaining knowledge, can we speak consistently of *Avidya* superimposing the illusory show of manifold existence upon the liberated soul? The author of the Sankshepa Sarirak, *Sarbajnatmuni*, denies the state of existence called *liberation-in-life*. He asks, how one can consistently assert that *Avidya*

The objection put forth by Sarbajnatmuni.

The author of the Sankshepa Sarirak, *Sarbajnatmuni*, denies the state of existence called *liberation-in-*

¹ This is generally expressed by saying that the consciousness of Identity can destroy the possibility of a future birth by burning up ignorance, the Sancita and the Kriyamana Karma—the inner potencies, the desires, but not the *prarabdha* (vide the Gita-Bhasya (Sanker) chap. IV, 37.

is destroyed when its effects still persist. If the cause is destroyed, the effect should simultaneously cease to exist. How again, does there arise the possibility of Avidya getting a hold upon the liberated soul? To put the thing more clearly how can we speak of liberation in life, since liberation implies the perception of identity and the forsaking of flesh—the threefold sheath of the soul. The author thinks that with liberation ends the continuity of personal existence, and to be consistent, the possibility of personal existence again reappearing must also be denied.¹

To this it may be replied that the conception of liberation-in-life is not altogether improbable. We have seen already that *Avidya* has two effects : (1) obscurization, and (2) distention. Liberation in life connotes that the effect of *Avidya* ceases permanently. Really the

adept has felt the transcendence of soul and a clear discriminative knowledge still persists. The clear vision of the soul as reality is never lost in a liberated soul though it seems to be conscious of an empirical existence.² It is, therefore, more correct to say that *Avidya* no longer persists,

Its refutation.

जीवन्मुक्ति प्रत्ययं शास्त्रजातं
जीवन्मुक्ते कल्पिते योजनीयम् ।
तावन्मात्रिश्चार्थवत्त्वोपपत्तेः
सदोसुक्तिः सम्यगेतस्य हेतोः ।

Sankshepa Sariraka, 4, 39.

² Prakastman says that a Jivanmukta is generally aware of and directly feels the Identity. He occasionally feels it not, when the empirical sense gets a hold upon him as the effect of long-acquired adaptation.

कदाचित् असंप्रज्ञातात्मैकदर्शनं कदाचित् आरब्धकर्म्मोपस्थापितदोषनिमित्त-
हेतदर्शनं भवति — Vivaran.

but its effects in the form of tendencies still continue in operation. The *Jivanmukta* after the preception of identity continues to feel the apparent existence of concrete things. Once the truth is perceived, a tendency is set up which retards the natural and common habit of thought. But it requires some time to put a complete stop to the process of thinking and living to which we are usually accustomed. The capacity of *Avidya* to keep away truth is destroyed. We cannot, therefore, say that *Avidya* has still an existence. What really works upon us is the effect of previous adaptation which after some time is spontaneously lost.¹

This conclusion about liberation in life is a matter of technical dispute among the Vedantic thinkers. Whether even after the destruction of *Avidya* in one capacity, the other capacity exists is a matter of nice theoretical analysis. But as the effect of constant culture, it is

Conclusion. not impossible to reach a state of existence whence the panorama of cosmic existence seems to be a shadowy and unsubstantial appearance vanishing in the glory and the freshness of perpetual light. The mind within gets an altogether different colouring and never sets a value upon the manifold of experience. The whole existence appears as illusory and the soul comes within the direct vision of the adept. Such a state is highly delightful. It is a source of unbounded joy in comparison with which other forms of pleasure dwindle into insignificance. The experiences of such a state are too deep for words, they are feelings too sublime to find any expression. Call it liberation or

¹ *Vide Advaitasidhi*:—ज्ञानिनो ब्रह्मज्ञाने जाते वाचितस्यापि प्रारम्भ-फलस्य कर्मणोऽवाचितत्वम् अतएव ज्ञानिनामपि प्रारम्भेश्वशत् देहादि प्रतिभासते।

anything. But there is no question that in such occasional visitation of the living soul "thought is not, it expires in blessedness and love." And these visitations are informant of the existence of a transcendental bliss and consciousness.

But we must be careful not to make any difference in the conception of freedom, be it liberation complete or liberation in life. The conception of freedom is identically one. It does not matter whether it is immediately followed by the forsaking of flesh or by the continuity of it, as it makes no difference in the quality

of water being water, be it calm or wavy. Freedom is one and identical implying the transcendence of *Atman* over flesh, whether *Atman* is conceived to be existing in or out of flesh. Once one attains the spiritual vision the possibility of confusion of *Atman* with body, of reality with appearance, dies for ever and whether the empirical facts enter into knowledge or not, the vision of truth is never lost. Had there been any possibility of enjoying the concrete joys of life in a state of liberation in life there would have been a chance of difference in the conception of freedom. One who is liberated in life has no cause of either enjoyment or depression for pleasures or pains of flesh (just like one who forsakes the body in liberation). So far as liberation is concerned both are equally free, for both have realised the conception of self as one undivided bliss.

An effective distinction has been brought out in the *Yogabasishta* between *Jivanmukta* and *Videhamukta*. Both are free from earthly desires and are not affected by the mental being which is completely destroyed in the

Videhamukta, destroyed in *reality* as well as in form, but partially destroyed in the *Jivanmukta*,—destroyed in reality (*i. e.*, in its practical effect) but not in form.¹ In the former case the mind with its effect is completely destroyed, in the latter case, the mind exists, but its effect is lost upon consciousness.

We conclude : A *Jivanmukta* has no desire, no action in any real sense. He is really conscious of the transcendence though the life and the thinking process continue to work in the usual way. It cannot make any difference in the clear knowledge of identity. The course or direction of his life and activity is determined by the latent tendencies. No definite law can be

Conclusion. stated down as to how a *Jivanmukta* should behave himself. *Madhusudhan Saraswati* in his exposition of the *Gita* says—“ There is no definite law as to how a person should act when he comes down from the state of transcendental existence for his conduct is directed by the natural bent of mind and the forces of environment.” Examples are given of *Jagnavalkya* who forsakes the active life and enters into fourth stage of life, and of *Janaka* who leads a life of useful activity. The vision of identity makes them utterly indifferent to the environment. They remain unaffected

¹ ब्रह्मभूतः प्रसन्नात्मा न शोचति न काङ्क्षति.—Bh. Gita.

जीवन्मुक्ता न मुञ्चन्ति सुखदुःखरसस्थितौ ।
 प्राकृतेनार्थकारेण किञ्चित् कुर्वन्ति नैव वा ॥
 भूयोऽजन्मविनिर्मुक्तं जीवन्मुक्तस्य तन्मनः ।
 स्वरूपोऽसौ मनोनाशो जीवन्मुक्तस्य विद्यते ॥
 चरुपक्षु मनोनाशो यो मयोक्तोरघूद्वहः ।
 विदेहमुक्तावेवासौ विद्यते निष्कलात्मकः ॥

by the force of circumstances good or evil, the *sastric* or ethical injunctions and prohibitions have no meaning for them. They love but love not, they kill but kill not. "A knower if he kills does not really kill."

But this is what we can infer deductively from the general train of thought of Vedantism. The rule that every one who has seen the light of identity should be

Types of Jivanmukta. indifferent to every worldly concern does not find its application in every

concrete case. We have two types of liberated soul: (1) A class mostly indifferent to all concerns of life and hidden in the mood of thought of *Atman*. They are really lost to the world and centered in the bliss of an awakening existence. Indeed they have a course of empirical existence, but in it they are mostly unconcerned. (2) A class actuated by a universal sympathy due to the perception of the all-pervasiveness of Being. With such liberated souls the will and tendency of being helpful to others are natural. In some cases we can notice that they have a natural bent of mind in this direction if we only trace their life-history. The perception of truth has a direct effect in widening the scope of practical sympathy. It has a force of expansion. The lives that have attained the consummation are actuated by no mean selfish desire, but always by a cosmic sense to do good to others. In fact they feel the vastness of existence and their action is stimulated by the one desire of serving others. They live for others, because others are a part and parcel of the cosmic existence. They love others, for in them they find the identity of Being. In this way they work and move freely without any sense of restraint until the occasion arises when they enter into the Deep and forsake the flesh and the acquired

personality. The *Jivanmuktiviveka* and the *Tatwanusandhan* have laid down certain duties for the *Jivanmukta*.¹

The duties of
Jivanmukta.¹

- (1) *duty to his own self*: (1) to preserve the knowledge of Identity, to leave no room for doubt by the constant meditation upon *Atman* known as *Tapa*.
- (2) *duty to others*: (1) to teach those that are fit for instruction,
(2) and thus help to preserve knowledge for the good of humanity.

These duties are meant for the second type of the liberated souls who are still active and have not fully passed into the life of silence and complete indifference like the first type.

A question arises how men who are going through the same course of discipline to attain the same kind of knowledge differ among themselves even after the illumination. The only possible answer is that the *Jivanmukta* can impose a task freely upon himself (e.g., to uplift humanity, to preach the gospel of truth), but he can give it up whenever he desires it and enter into the Nirvanic calm. The author of the *Jogabasistha* has set aside this apparent difference between the two types by introducing three progressive stages in the life of complete fulfilment.

¹ तत्रोत्पन्नब्रह्मसाक्षात्कारस्य पुंसः पुनः संशयविपर्ययानुत्पादो ज्ञानरक्षा ।
ज्ञानिनो जीवन्मुक्तस्य अखिलवृत्तीनामनुदयान्निरङ्गं चित्तैकाग्रं सम्पद्यते तदेव तपः ।
लोकसंशयमेवापि संपश्यन् कर्तुं नर्हसि । (Tatwanusandhan.)

The life of Enlightenment has been divided into seven stages, of which the first three are stages of culture and preparation, the rest are progressive stages of knowledge. The following are the stages :—

Vasisth's seven stages
of knowledge.

The first one is an intense desire to realise the consciousness of Identity.

The second one is the stage of discrimination of the reality from the appearance—the truth from the illusion.

As the effect of the above two, we have the third stage called *Tanumanasa*—the tendency of mental consciousness to go away from its natural occupation. The mind becomes keenly introspective and introspection becomes easier owing to the intense thirst after knowledge and to the power of discrimination which has the direct effect of producing a general aversion to the natural accommodation and habit of life.

In the fourth stage the adept attains the complete knowledge of Identity or Being. It is called *Sattvapatti*. The stages that follow are stages of *Jivanmukti* where the intensity of tranquillity and peace varies directly with amount of absorption in and concentration upon *Atman*.

In the fifth stage, the adept, as the result of the transcendent vision, becomes free from all attachment to the flesh and desires pertaining to it. It is called *Asansatti*. He is always clearly conscious of his isolation though sometimes he appears as engaged in outward or external activities.

In the sixth stage the adept is full of the consciousness of Identity and hardly perceives the existence of anything, besides Brahman. It is called *Padartha Vabini*.

In the seventh stage he is absorbed in the consciousness of Identity and is completely lost to the empirical order. It is called *Turyyaga*—the stage of final consummation.

The seeker feels and clearly apprehends the truth of Identity in the fourth stage. Up to the fifth stage the liberated soul can freely impose any task upon itself. There is still the possibility of active initiation. The second type of liberated souls belong to this class.

In the sixth stage the seer forgets his personality and remains in the state of transcendent isolation if he is not disturbed from without. The possibility of a break in the continuity of transcendent consciousness due to any active initiation from within is completely destroyed, though the possibility of such a break from without still exists.

In the seventh stage the seer passes into the calm and there remains no cause, inner or outer, of returning to empiric consciousness. He has attained the quiet of Nirvana completely.¹

Logic apart, if we look to life we can readily understand that the fourth stage cannot be the final stage in the life of knowledge. One may pass into the silence

¹ For reference, *vide* Jivanmukti Viveka, pages 90-95, Vicar-candradoya, the last Chapter, Jogabasistha, the Book VI, 120 :—

शास्त्रज्ञानसम्पर्कैः प्रज्ञामादौ विवर्द्धयेत् ।
 प्रथमा भूमिकैवोक्ता योगस्यैव च योगिनः ॥
 विचारणा द्वितीयास्यात् तृतीया मन्दभावना ।
 विलापनी चतुर्थीसंज्ञात् वासना विलयात्मिका ॥
 शब्द संविन्द्यायानन्दरूपा भवति पञ्चमी ।
 अर्द्धसुप्तप्रवृत्ताभो जीवन्मुक्तो ऽत्र तिष्ठति ॥
 स्वयंवेदनरूपाच षष्ठी भवति भूमिका ।
 आनन्दैकमनाकारा सुषुप्तसदृशस्थितिः ॥
 तुर्यवस्थोपशान्ताथ मुक्तिरेवेह केवलं ।
 समता स्वच्छता सौम्या सप्तमी भूमिका भवेत् ॥ (Jogabasistha)

but one cannot remain long therein. The *Jivanmukta* is to go through a course of discipline to bring in the ultimate consummation and this becomes possible only when he has the immediate vision of this oneness in everything of the empiric order. He actually feels within himself the truth of Identity. He still requires to feel the oneness of Being through the cosmic existence. The cosmic life is to be understood and directly felt as identical with Delight, every mode of existence as a part and parcel of his own self, for the self is Delight. The mere intellectual understanding of the oneness has to be assimilated in life to secure the permanent fixity of Existence in Bliss by completely doing away with the realistic bent of mental being. In the fifth stage the adept by an intellectual sympathy feels the all-pervasiveness of Bliss. He enters into the 'bliss-mine.' There is no longer the keen intellectual discrimination. Intuition displaces discrimination. In this stage the adept acquires the power of directly comparing the Bliss of Nirvikalpic existence with the Bliss of Sabikalpic existence—the bliss of Identity with the bliss as manifested in variety. In the sixth stage he apprehends the Identity of Bliss co-existent with the variety of Bliss. He has an existence purely meditative. In the height of meditation he understands himself to be the stream of Bliss-Existence in which the ripples of Delight appear and disappear. This is the stage where one understands the deep-significance of life as *lila* in Bliss. When one has made the most of such a life, when the inner being has its deep satisfaction in the fullness of life in variety, the vision of the immanent oneness dawns more clearly upon consciousness paving the way for passing into the silence of transcendence in the seventh stage. The adept in the fourth stage is called *Brakmabit*, in the fifth stage is called

Brahmabit bara, in the sixth, *Brahmabitbariyan*, in the seventh *Brahmabitbaristha*.¹

The Neo-Vedantists would naturally fight shy of the above conclusion. Let by the rigid logic of absolute monism they cannot naturally accept the possibility of enjoying Bliss in variety in the fifth stage. Krisnananda Saraswati in his *Sidhanta Sidhanjanam* has put different meanings on the terms *Brahmabit*, *Brahmabitbara*, *Brahmabit-bariyan* and *Brahmabit-baristha*.

These words according to him indicate the intensity of devotion in the stage of culture but do not denote any difference in the life of knowledge. One who has finished hearing discourses on Identity is called *Brahmabit*. One

¹ ज्ञानभूमिः शुभेच्छास्याप्रथमा समुदाहृता ।
विचारणा द्वितीया स्वात्तृतीया तनुमानसा ॥
सत्त्वापत्तिश्चतुर्थीस्यात्ततोऽसंसत्तिनामिका ।
पदार्थभाविनी षष्ठी समसौ तुय्यंगा स्मृता ॥

सोऽयं चतुर्थभूमिकां प्राप्तीयोगी ब्रह्मविदित्युच्यते । पञ्चम्यादयस्त्रिंशो भूमयो जीवन्मुक्तेरवान्तरभेदा । ते च निर्विकल्प समाध्यभ्यासकृतेन विश्रान्तिभारतम्येन संपद्यन्ते । पञ्चमभूमौ निर्विकल्प्यात्मकमेव व्युत्तिष्ठते । सोऽयं योगी ब्रह्मविदूरः । षष्ठभूमौ पार्श्वस्थैर्वीधितो व्युत्तिष्ठते । सोऽयं ब्रह्मविदूरीयान् । तदेतद्भूमिकादयः सुषुप्तिर्गाढसुषुप्तिरिति चाभिधीयते ।

¹ Vide Manduka Sruti, 3. 1. 4. Taittiriya-Brahmanandaballī 7, 8, Virapakshapanchāsika—Chapter IV, Slokas 42, 43, 44.

जडात्मिकामिदन्तामथाजडत्वात्मिकामहंतां च ।
सामानाधिकरण्यादिदमहमिति बुध्यते द्विपदी ॥४३॥
उद्भवनां केवल निमग्नमनः पदे दृशाभाति ।
मग्नोन्मग्नोभयविधसुन्मनया मयि पुनः पूर्णं ॥४४॥

.....सुप्रयुञ्जन् अतएव मयि पूर्णं प्रकाशे मग्नोन्मग्नोभयविधं निमिषितत्वेन उन्मिषितत्वेन च द्विरूपं प्रतीयते । यथाहि जलधौ तरङ्गादि निमिषदुन्मिषच्च भवति, सर्वस्वामिब दशायां जलधिरैवतत्तथाहि शिवादिविश्वं मदात्मकमेव सदुन्मिषति, सद्यतिरिक्तं च मय्येव निमिषतीति । (Page 23, Virapakshapanamohāsika.)

who is engaged in critical reflection and free from the natural doubt about the existence of Atman is *Brahmabit-bara*. One deep in meditative penetration is called *Brahmabit-bariyan*. One who is conscious directly of the truth of Identity is *Brahmabit-baristha*.¹

It may be doubted whether a liberated soul when he has forsaken the fleshy existence still continues to work in cosmic sense. This hypothesis is denied by the affirmation of Vedantism that in the transcendental purity of being nothing exists but consciousness and blessedness.

It should be noticed here that those who adhere to the doctrine of the empiric-soul (exclusive of separate souls) can also maintain the possibility of liberation in life.

Here, again, the world-soul through Vedantic culture may attain a state of existence where the world seems to it an illusory show. It is also an attempt to get liberation complete but the liberation of such a soul would mean the disappearance of the world process once for all. But since the world process is still in existence, we cannot ascribe complete liberation to such a soul, for this would suggest the co-existence of the transcendental consciousness and the empirical consciousness even in the state of liberation. But this existence of the empirical self is no obstacle to the transcendental nature of Atman. It cannot be any bar to its being transcendently free. The

¹ Vide Sidhanta Sidhanjanam, Part I, page 83.

श्रद्धा निवृत्तौ ब्रह्मवित् । मनन प्रतिष्ठायां ब्रह्मविद्वरः, विषय सन्भावनादि निवृत्त्या स्थिरौक्यज्ञानत्वात् । निध्यान परिपाके च तद्वरीयान तस्यैव साक्षात्कार-कल्पत्वात्... तावतेव प्राप्तफलतया ऽ क्रियावानिति प्रसंसापरमतुपप्रत्ययेन कर्त्तव्यसमाप्तिं सूचयित्वा तेषामेव बरिष्ठोऽभिधीयते—आत्मरतेः क्रियान्तराभावात् ।

² Vide Sidhanta Sidhanjana, Part I, page 83.

possibility of the world soul attaining liberation is not denied. Otherwise the axiom of identity will be completely useless and meaningless. But it is asserted that when such a self, in which is contained the world of existence, attains liberation by constant meditation upon the principle of identity the whole order of complete existence comes to an end. Nobody can strictly maintain that any particular body has attained freedom for in this conception there is no particular "any" body but only one body. This conclusion is forced upon us by the theory that Nescience is an existence having no definite beginning though an end of it is sought and thought possible. At least from the Vedantic standpoint it is not improbable.¹ "Brahman involves the cosmic process by its own ignorance and gets liberation by its own knowledge. This does not seem impossible from the standpoint of the doctrine of oneself."

The other theories of finite units of existence as reflected or divided consciousness ascribe some distinct reality to finite selves. We can think of them as attaining freedom in life. And their freedom does not conflict with or retard the course of the world process which remains real to those that have not attained knowledge.

But we must be careful enough not to consider such a state of realisation as something obtained which was not previously in sight, as something newly wrought in the course of evolution. It is not an effect produced by any

(2) From the standpoint of Vahu-jivabada.

¹ Vide Citanki :—

तदेवं स्वविद्यया ब्रह्मैव संसरति । स्वविद्यया च मुच्यते इति एकाविद्या पक्षेन कश्चिद्दोषः, page 345.

cause which has been long at a distance from us. This freedom if accepted would make it an object of transitory concern. For whatever is accepted as having an origin in time must be conceived as dying in time. Such a conception would shear away all the charm of the promise of an eternal life. In the growth of being our vision may be drawn towards a perfect state of manifestation as the ideal. But can we think consistently of any state where we get *perfection in manifestation*? Perfection is infinite, Manifestation implies limit; they are contradictory and mutually exclusive in their import. Manifestation implies an expression of being in space and time. The Vedantic perfection is not a state that can be attained progressively. It is not something which grows every day. It is from the nature of the case one, of which we are already in complete possession. It is a permanent existence, though for the moment, it seems to be out of sight. We come to realise it and its permanence by destroying ignorance. It is no perfection, but emancipation.

A question arises:—how are we to characterise this state of liberation? Is it to be described in negative or in positive terms? There seems to be a complete divergence of views on this point among the Indian thinkers. The one point in which the six systems of Philosophy agree is that freedom is obtained by the knowledge of *Atman* though they offer different descriptions of it. And their ideas of liberation differ accordingly. There are chiefly two conceptions: (1) the conception of liberation as freedom from pain, and (2) the conception of liberation as realisation of blessedness.

The former is a negative conception, the latter a positive

The conception of the gradual realisation of Perfection denied.

Liberation—a positive or a negative conception.

The Historical study of the question.

one. The first alternative is accepted by the *Naiyayikas* and the *Mimansakas* generally, the latter by the *Vedantin*.

The *Mimansakas* hold that liberation is the absolute cessation of the body caused by the

(1) *Mimanasaka*. disappearance of *Dharma* and *Adharma*.

It is a negative conception. Otherwise, they assert, it (liberation) cannot be eternal. It is not a mere escape from pain but also an escape from pleasure. It is, no doubt, the existence of *Atman* in itself ; but since in such a state the *Atman* is devoid of the mind and senses, it cannot have any knowledge of itself or of others. Bliss or *Anandam* is an experience requiring the functioning of mind and senses. And since it is accepted that in liberation none of them can exist with *Atman*, *Atman* has no possibility of knowing itself in a state of blissful existence.¹

Sankhya and *Patanjala* hold that liberation is existence in one's own self effected by a clear

(2) *Sankhya*. discriminating consciousness between *Purusha* and *Prakriti*. A clear dis-

crimination of the self from the non-self is invariably followed by the destruction of *Klesas* and *Karmas* which are sources of ignorance and suffering.² From this standpoint too, the ideal in life is to put an end to all miseries and sufferings by obtaining a discriminating knowledge leading on to transcendent existence. The self is consciousness, (दृशि) but not bliss. Emancipation is a state of no positive delight.

¹ मुक्तस्य स्वरूपमात्मवतिष्ठते नेन्द्रियादिक'नापि मन इति मुक्तस्य स्वरूपज्ञानं स्वातिरिक्तं ज्ञानं न भवति । मोक्षस्य दुःखाभावमात्रं न सुखस्वरूपः ।

² We have in the fourth chapter of the *Patanjali*.

प्रसंस्थानेऽपकुसौदस्य सर्वथा विवेकख्यातेर्धर्ममेघः समाधिः । ततः क्लेशकर्म्म निवृत्तिः ।

The *Naiyayikas* maintain that liberation is the complete destruction of pains due to the knowledge of *Atman*-itself. It is not so much the attainment of anything positive

(3) *Naiyayikas*. as the complete destruction of the sufferings due to the ignorance of the real nature of self. Self is existence without any inherent properties of knowledge, will or bliss. These are accidental qualities which are set aside by the knowledge of self. To them the state of liberation is one of pure existence of self without implying blessedness or consciousness.

Apart from these negative conceptions of liberation we have a positive idea of it in the *Slokavartik* of *Kumarila*. The mind is supposed to be co-existing with *Atman* or self in the state of liberation. It thus grants the possibility of knowing the inherent nature of *Atmas* as possessing bliss. For to the

(4) *Kumarila* on liberation. *Mimansakas* all knowledge is possible by the contact of things (self or not self) with the mind. But this conception of enjoying bliss in liberation is set aside in the *Sastradipika* as belonging not to the author (*Kumarila*) himself but to others. Liberation has been understood in a negative sense as net existence of self without the knowledge of its own nature as possessing bliss. For the organ of perception, *manas*, does not exist in the state of liberation.

The *Vedantins* like other thinkers hold that liberation is the existence in one's own intimate being or essence. But such an existence is identical with bliss, for, to the

(6) *Vedanta*. Vedantists bliss like consciousness is identical with Being. "*Anandam Brahma.*" *Atman* is bliss, for it is the object of love and care to every body. We have already shown

that everything has an acquired attractiveness due to its being associated with *Atman*, and that an object which by itself is of indifferent concern to us acquires a new meaning and an attractiveness as soon as it enters into some relation with self. No doubt the *Vedantin* agrees with the *Mimamsaka* in holding that in liberation one transcends both pleasure and pain, but this does not necessarily imply that such a state is a mere negation of them. It is, no doubt, a negation of pleasures and pains that we feel in the course of empirical life, for they are mere transformations of *antakarana*. But even a state of pleasurable consciousness is due to the withdrawal of the veil of ignorance for the moment. It implies the expression of our inmost being for the time. A mere transformation of mind-stuff by itself is inert and colourless. Its appearance as pleasure is due to the momentary expression of Being. When it is mixed up and gets confused with the transformation, we mistake that the transformation is causing pleasure, whereas, in fact, pleasure is only grafted upon it. The delight of transcendental existence does not bear any comparison with the ordinary joys of life.

There is no meaning in the assertion that even if *Atman* is bliss none can feel it as it is beyond our perception. The philosophy of *Vedanta* looks upon *Atman* as not merely bliss of existence but consciousness as well; so that to say "Atman cannot know itself" as bliss is to fail to understand the true import of Vedantism. We have already made references to the states of consciousness where we transcend the duality of subject and object.

Atman is Bliss. Liberation is the forsaking of an accidental personality caused by ignorance. When this ignorance is set aside, we attain apparently lost identity with Bliss. When such a state is attained we are free

Conclusion.

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from the illusory conception of the world as real and of ourselves as workers therein reaping the fruits of our own deeds. Such a knowledge of identity of existence alone brings to us rest—a rest which we are in eager search of as the necessity of our being. The world of becoming presents, no doubt, a panorama of scenic beauties but the heart within cannot get satisfaction with them. It enjoys them, but it still hears the cry of bitter agony within itself, for its nature for the moment has been limited and restrained. It aspires eagerly after an infinite expanse which it cannot get unless it feels and perceives the Identity of Being behind the surface show of appearance.

CONCLUSION

It is one next to which nothing exists—nothing less or nothing greater. It is still like a tree. It is one—the entire cosmos is full of it.

(*Setaswetara*)

So long we were concerned with the exposition of the development of thought in Vedantism. We have seen how it has two sides of enquiry in the solution of the two chief problems of life:—the problem of knowledge and the problem of duty. It establishes absolute monism and inspires us to the realisation of bliss consequent upon transcending the empirical show of existence and feeling the truth of identity. Of the cosmic life expressing itself in differences and innumerable forms, of the vastness of existence in all grades of being, Vedantism as a theoretical attempt has accentuated the oneness exclusive of difference, the identity exclusive of manifoldness. It converges all its attempts to combat any opinion which affirms the duality or the plurality of existences. In this aspect it is a search after the transcendental aloneness and it lays down forms of conduct leading to the high visitation of the soul where thought is not, and everything dissolves in blessedness and joy. This vision of spiritual oneness through all beings and things and the last intuitive vision of this oneness in completeness and by itself are the soul of the Vedanta Philosophy. Every form of serious thinking has a touch of transcendence in it.

The Sankhya preached a sort of metaphysical dualism and spiritualistic pluralism. The soul or more properly *Purusha* is defined as a conscious existence transcendent in nature having no relation with *Prakriti* which evolves

the cosmic system when the reflection of *Purusha* is set upon it, and through the want of discrimination *Purusha* appears as united with *Prakriti*. The Sankhya maintains the existence of two ultimate realities—a position irreconcilable with the deep-seated tendency in man to seek for a unitary being or substance. Buddhism preached the Philosophy of Void in the sense of constant succession of the states of consciousness without any permanent background underlying them and the conception of freedom from the show of life due to Avidya in *Nirvan*. Buddhism is silent about any positive description of *Nirvan* which is defined as the negation of all forms of existence including the myth of an existence of self.¹

Sankara² seems to have drawn a novel conception out of the partial truths involved in them. He sees clearly that experience speaks of an existence directly felt by us and such an existence cannot be conceived of as having its background and origin in the nothingness of Buddhism. He therefore does not accept the Buddhistic conception of everything coming into being from nothing. He sees clearly in the Sankhya Philosophy the conception of

¹ We have here the commonly accepted theory of Buddhism. In a recent publication of the Calcutta University—the System of Buddhistic Thoughts by Yamakami, Buddhism has been presented in a completely different form—a presentation which hardly leaves any difference between Buddhism and Vedantism.

² No doubt the concept of oneness of self is very old in its origin. It makes its first appearance in the Upanisads. It must have gone down, to the time of Buddha, who apparently seems to have offered a new theory of life, but his is nothing new but an old theory based upon psychological analysis and ethical consideration. The picture of Nirvana as drawn in Buddhism is substantially non-different from the conception of liberation as depicted in the Upanishads. The conception of absolute monism first appears in philosophic garb in Gourapada's *Karika*. Sankara received his inspiration from it. He gave the system

Purusha as a transcendent reality. Here, again, he does not see any meaning in the multiplicity of beings in their nature transcendent and with the clear force of logic establishes that Being, if it is transcendent, must be one and not many. Besides this logical acumen he has the Upanisads to support him and to lead him to the conception of oneness of being. His conception of being as transcendental and one without many is the logical goal of the Sankhya conception. And, moreover, he does not fail to perceive the profundity of the conception of Buddhistic *Nirvan* as the denial of concrete forms of existence. He combines in him the positive and negative conception of the ultimate existence of Sankhya and Buddhism respectively in the conception of Brahman which positively is immanent in all forms of concrete existence and negatively implies the denial of these very concrete modes of existence. If we look to Brahman from the positive aspect it is the Being of all beings, the Mode of all modes; if we look to it from the negative standpoint, it is the blank negation of concrete forms of existences. And that which remains after the negation does not enter into the conditions of positive thinking and may be equally said to be identical with negation, so far as positive knowledge is concerned. In fact both Buddhism and Vedantism have

of absolute monism an extraordinary impetus and based it upon logical consideration. He is therefore regarded as the chief representative of the System. The later Vedantists followed him closely. In tracing out the history of thought, we do not mean for a moment that Sankara offers nothing new; what we want to impress is that the course of Upanishadic thought was the main basis of Sankara to work upon, though the Buddhistic and Sankhya systems helped him philosophically to work out a systematic philosophy upon the Sruti in which the truths of these systems have been reconciled and cast into a new mould.

described this transcendental existence in similar terms as the solemn, sublime state of existence, but when they attempt to conceive it logically they come to different descriptions—one calling it the most positive of all beings—in fact, the underlying essence of Being; the other calling it the transcendental negation of concrete existences. But does not this negation of concrete forms lead to the affirmation of Being as an underlying existence, presupposed in all forms of being? And so far as Being in its integrity is concerned, is it not equal to non-being from the empirical level of knowledge? Empirically that which is above limit and contrast passes beyond our comprehension and to us such a notion of Being is tantamount to non-being. We do not say that non-being means the absence of all conception of being but only of the forms and modes. And when these modes and forms are denied, what remains is something beyond the common understanding. Sankara is here most eloquent in saying that even after the denial of concrete modes, what remains must be conceived of as the concept of substance, a concept which above all others is presupposed in all forms of thinking. It is no doubt sound logic that underlying concrete forms of being and consciousness there must exist one which should be conceived of as the permanent background of existences and the permanent background of all beings cannot pass for a non-being. But so far as the understanding in concrete terms is attempted of this Being, it is nothing more than the negation of concrete forms of modes and in this sense it is identical with the non-being of forms of existence. The state of Nirvana in Buddhism has been described in negative terms as the denial of self—the illusory substratum of the states of consciousness. Vedanta seeks to describe it in positive terms as understanding of the identity, and an identity that does not admit of any difference

is one that transcends all conceptions of reality in the empirical sense.

Again the same synthetic insight of Sankara leads him to abolish the duality of Sankhya and interpret the world-process as due to the will to becoming. Sankhya after maintaining a *Purusha* which by its own affirmation is non-relational cannot but accept the hypothesis of *Prakriti* as the material cause of the universe. The system where the souls are devoid of all willing and in nature absolutely transcendent cannot seek to explain the evolution of the world-process without a material which is offered in the theory of an additional existence—*Prakriti*. Vedanta sees the difficulty of Dualism as a metaphysical hypothesis and seeks to find its own conception upon a monistic principle. And led by this instinct, it at once interprets *Maya* and *Prakriti* not as a second substance co-existing with *Atman* or *Purusha*, but as a principle of becoming, the will of Brahman to become many. Vedanta thus holds the empirical order to be an objectification of will, which, in cycle after cycle of existence, brings forth the manifoldness of concrete beings, just as the spider emanates out of it threads and constructs a web with them. So long as the empirical order holds upon us, Sankara thinks we cannot offer a better explanation than this. Vedanta accepts the hypothesis of *Maya* to explain the cosmic order and ascribes to it an existence which is constantly changing, but not purely illusory. Nowhere do we find the attempt to deny the world of experience and so long as it holds upon us, we cannot but accept it as a fact of existence. To avoid any misinterpretation upon this point Vedantism characterises the empirical order as relatively non-real and relatively real. And if the empirical order has its origin in any other thing

besides Brahman, it would necessitate the hypothesis of two substances,—a hypothesis which puts difficulties in the way of explaining the origin and order of the world system and the final liberation; for, if *Prakriti* exists along with *Purusha* the erroneous identification of *Purusha* and *Prakriti* will not cease. This duality will negative the possibility of liberation. *Prakriti* as a substance if it continues to exist side by side with *Purusha* will not cease to cast reflections upon *Purusha* which would always be entrapped in the whirlwind of manifold existence. The empirical order with all its wealth of existence has got a place and meaning, perhaps a value in Sankara's system, and Sankara and other Vedantists lay down a clear line of evolution and progress in this way until one has reached liberation and freedom. The joys of life, the onward strivings of the soul in the course of evolution are set at nought in Buddhistic philosophy, but in Vedantism they have a distinct value, for they are not completely unreal. In the estimation of values, they are agreeable to us as they embody in them an emblem of Being, a reproduction of it. In this way nothing to the Vedantists is insignificant, as all existence points to the ultimate reality of Brahman as its basis. Herein a meaning is found for love, devotion and active service as distinctly helping us onward to the understanding of the truth. They sometimes open up in us the thousand avenues through which the infinite existence is revealing itself—a grade and hierarchy of existences in a harmonious setting all enjoying the infinite expanse of existence surrounding them. The Vedantists accept them all. Not being satisfied with the manifestation he still pursues the search and ultimately seeks to lose himself in the vastness of existence. The intellectual sympathy with the immanent life leads on to the intuitive apprehension of the transcendental Identity

of Being. So long as the seeker was only feeling the pulse of an immanent existence, he had still a feeling of limitation, a painful consequence due to his inability to grasp the entirety of being. And in the process of thus taking in the entire existence, the adept forgets himself and loses his personality in the ever-permanent impersonal background. Vedantism does not shrink from giving a value to the empirical order and interprets it as the *Lila* of Brahman. In fact, the joys of love, the purifying influence of grief and the inspiration of service are all accepted as higher forms of sentiments but Vedantists take care to add that they do not represent the deepest feelings. The blessedness it affirms which results from the perception of Identity can have no comparison with anything of the empirical order. *Anandam* or bliss is pervasive of all existence, but *anandam* in itself or undivided bliss can be reached only in a state where the empirical forms cease to have any meaning and sense. And so long as our consciousness is dominated by the empirical hold, the possibility of intuitively realising this absolute blissful existence is out of the question. And it is, again, true that so long as we do not get to such an existence, the soul within has not its full satisfaction and rest. In the ever expansive form of existence the soul can find no absolute satisfaction until it reaches the finality in expansion wherein it becomes identified with bliss itself. Vedantism sees clearly the difficulty of insisting upon a gradual expansion and fulfilment of our being as the ideal of life, for, however we may gain in inward being, it remains a finite existence commanding a finite bliss, for it is removed from the infinite expanse of life and blessedness. This ideal to the Vedantists is the ideal of progress. But a progress which is in nature dynamic is ever becoming, but never completely is, and as

such it is a life expanding every moment, but never attaining complete expansion. It is in this sense a will always to be, but never a complete being, and as such it falls short of attaining to the absolute where alone can we get an infinite expanse of existence and blessedness. Bliss is existence and so long as we are existences in concrete, we, in the forward march of glory, can never realise in us the summit of existence and shall always fall short of bliss *in toto*. Vedantism sees this inward defect of a system that requires us to be always developing our potentialities but is very loath to part with the stamp of individuality or personality. Such a life in the eye of Vedantists, is a life of continuous development. It is the silent stream of existence which can ultimately come into the "Kingdom of Blessedness" (the abode of Brahman) partaking in mutual interchange of love and blessedness with the centre of existence—the God-head. But so long as it remains finite it cannot be in possession of absolute bliss and there lies the possibility of a break in such a life of love and joy unless and until as result of such a progressive evolution it loses its acquired personality and be once again identical with Bliss—a state whence we cannot conceive any separation, for any such separation is denied in the conception of Identity. Vedantism sees in clear light that the problem of life is not solved unless one sees the truth of Identity and pursues a course of discipline for the assimilation of this identity in life. We may extend the field of our practical usefulness implying a love unto all creatures and beings, the vision of an immanent principle in all grades of existence may come to us, but still we cannot have the perpetual enjoyment of bliss for our conception though high, still represents an attitude

of consciousness more in communion with the immensity of existence as revealing itself through the universe than as representing the transcendental essence. The mind as it reflects upon and comes to the understanding of the true nature of empirical existence, gradually acquires an aptitude to penetrate the appearance in order to find the underlying truth. Vedantism does not stop until the eternal background is reached. Clearly apprehending the utter futility of appearances in totality to give any permanent satisfaction; it seeks to transcend the empirical order and the empirical mode of life. The value of such a transcendental height of existence cannot be overrated. It surpasses all other values of life. Hence it is the Summum-bonum to the Vedantists.

Vedantism is a form of noble enthusiasm to feel the all-pervasiveness of peace, so that we may get peace in life and peace in death, finally passing into peace itself—the *Nirvanic* calm of existence.

“Peace be unto the heavens, Peace be unto the upper ether, Peace be unto the earth, Peace be unto water, Peace be unto herbs, Peace be unto large trees, Peace be unto the Gods of the Universe, Peace be unto Brahman, Peace be unto all, Peace be unto Peace itself.”

Rik-Veda.

PEACE.

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