

GREAT BRITAIN AND TURKEY.

A PLEA FOR A SANE POLICY.

IN the Crimean war British soldiers and Turks fought side by side, and in sharing heroically the countless hardships and dangers of cruel conflict learned to respect each other. Both suffered unnecessary hardships and torments from defective, not to say corrupt, administration at home, but this served rather as a link of friendship than as a reason for mutual distrust. The Sultan of Turkey was "our very good friend," and the two great Mohammedan Powers were in very friendly relations. Since 1857, however, the British attitude has changed absolutely, and changed undoubtedly in the direction of erroneous policy and loss of a sane perspective. No longer are the two great Mohammedan empires on friendly relations—indeed, it would be difficult to find more hatred of Great Britain than is expressed and felt at Constantinople, or more hatred and contempt for Turkey than is to be found in our country. And the deplorable side of this mistaken policy is that it is not based upon any sound or serious grounds, any reasons admissible to the minds of statesmen. The changed attitude in Great Britain towards Turkey, and especially towards the present Sultan, dates from the time of Mr. Gladstone, that Grand Old Man who was so singularly unfitted for the post of director of British foreign policy. His unmeasured denunciation of the Turks, and his Billingsgate abuse of the Sultan created a sentimental policy against Turkey which has become one of the cherished traditions of the "nonconformist conscience" of this country, and a serious factor in its foreign policy. It is perhaps idle to point out that Mr. Gladstone was but too apt to allow his sentiment to run away with his reason, and that this was rather the cause of his vehemence than were the "terrible atrocities" on Christians by Mohammedans, or that the massacres which ostensibly called forth his red-hot fury against the Turks were organised from St. Petersburg rather than from Constantinople. The British public was never a stickler for accuracy, and the broad idea of Christians being oppressed and massacred by non-Christians—so dramatically presented—sufficed to set fire to those great reservoirs of false sentiment which actuated the point of view of the general public to so unfortunate an extent. From all sides came the cry of "Turn the Turk out of Europe, bag and baggage," and this sentiment determining foreign policy, the friendship between the two

Mohammedan empires came to an end. But because a mistake was once made, it does not mean necessarily that it should be indefinitely perpetuated. More especially should this be so when all the necessities of British Imperial policy are in the one scale and only the traditional remnants of a sentimental misconception in the other.

The time has come to look at the facts in a proper perspective and decide whether it is well that the British Empire, with its millions of Mohammedan subjects, should remain estranged from Turkey and the Commander of the Faithful. Year by year international politics become more practical and less sentimental, and in our case the altered conditions within the Empire force us to abandon sentiment and do the best possible to remain a world power. The development of the great self-governing colonies into separate and really independent autonomous sections of a paper Empire has so changed the situation that we are now forced to regard India as one of the greatest and surest props of the Empire.

And the one element upon which British confidence is placed and by whose aid we rule India is the Mohammedan element. Without that loyal element the situation would be much more critical than it is, and it would be idle to declare that things are altogether well in the Indian Empire. The British public hears something of the unrest and tumult of transition in India, but there is much which remains untold.

“The Mohammedans and the native Princes are thoroughly loyal,” says one. “Mohammedans in India must come into the political arena,” says another. And yet, relying upon the Mohammedan element for our salvation, we are content to acquiesce in an inherited sentimental mud-throwing, pin-pricking policy toward the spiritual head of the Mohammedan world, the Sultan of Turkey. Such a continuance of a foolish policy cannot be defended upon any logical grounds, and not even those who are anxious to place the problematical welfare of the warring Christian elements in the Turkish Empire before the welfare of the British Empire can find a defence; and therefore it is not only in India, but in Egypt, Africa and the Malay islands that signs are plentiful to indicate the necessity of a changed policy between the greatest temporal Mohammedan ruler, Edward VII. of England, and the supreme spiritual ruler of the Faithful—Abdul Hamid of Turkey. The British Empire has given too many hostages to Mohammedanism to be able to ignore the opinions of the head of the Moslem world. It is in reality this spiritual aspect which makes Turkey so important a factor; because, as a matter of fact, the Turkish Empire is only the fifth or sixth

in point of numbers of the Mussulman States. The British Empire, including Egypt, contains 82 millions of Mohammedans; the Chinese Empire, 34 millions; the Dutch Possessions, 30 millions; the French Possessions, 20 to 22 millions; the Russian Empire, 18 millions; the Turkish Empire, 16 to 18 millions; Persia, 10 millions; Morocco, 8 to 9 millions; Afghanistan, 5 to 6 millions; independent Arabia, 4 to 5 millions; and the German Empire, 2 to 2½ millions—a total of 200 to 250 millions in the world of Islam. From the above figures it is evident that, save only Germany, no Great Power can ignore the attitude of the Commander of the Faithful, but the British less than any, because their Mohammedan subjects are placed in vital positions, whereas in many of the other cases they do not really enter into the question of the national existence of the great Power ruling them. It is of interest to remark in passing that Germany, friendly to the Sultan of Turkey, possesses a very powerful weapon against all her possible enemies without running any risk herself. And yet it is precisely to Germany that we have given over the best position at Constantinople! Considering the situation unbiassedly, there seem only two practical possibilities in British policy toward Turkey: either we wish utterly to destroy the present spiritual head of the Mohammedan world and put up another of our own choice and under our discreet tutelage, or else we are content to recognise the present Khalif and make the best of him. In the former case we would have a certain amount of justification in the fact that we are the greatest Moslem Power, but the risk to be run is very much greater than the present administration is ready to undertake, or any administration would be justified in taking under the present conditions of the Mohammedan communities within the Empire. Also there would be the decided opposition from other Mohammedan Powers to consider. Already the *Novoe Vremya* has credited Great Britain with ambition for such a scheme, and in 1899 announced that it had discovered a new British intrigue in Arabia, stating that Great Britain was working to create a Mohammedan Power to rival that of the Sultan. For this purpose they were enlarging the importance of the Sherif of Mecca! Such a far-reaching policy would be understandable and practical, but in justice to British statesmen it must be said that probably such an idea never entered their heads. Even the sentimentalists who clamour for the extinction of the Sultan are only destructive in their theories, not constructive, seeming to regard with equanimity the idea of the world of Islam without a head. The other practical policy for Great Britain to pursue is one of friendship with the Sultan of Turkey, and this irrespective of the fact that he

personally is good, bad, or indifferent, and his administration may or may not leave much to be desired. Friendship does not condone wrong-doing or preclude giving advice, but it does make it possible to be on speaking terms with the Commander of the Faithful, who is looked up to by over 80 millions of our subjects as their spiritual head. Care must be taken to differentiate between the Sultan as a man, as Abdul Hamid, and as Spiritual head of the world of Islam. That he is the latter is none of our doing, but so long as the fact remains we must take it into account and shape our policy accordingly. There can be no disputing that it is necessary for Mohammedans to have a recognised spiritual chief, or rather a Commander of the Faithful (Amir-ul-mu-minin). It should also be remembered that, as far as the Mohammedan world goes, the entire power of the Sultan of Turkey rests upon his holding the office of Khalif of the Islamic world, or descendant of the Prophet. The two Arabian titles borne by the Sultan eclipse all the many others in value, and it is far more vital for him to be known as the "Khalif" and "Khadim," guardian of the two towns, Mecca and Medina, the sacred places whither all Mohammedans direct their prayers, than as ruler of Turkey. That the possession of these titles give him a great influence throughout the Moslem world cannot be disputed. It is not a question whether or not he has a right to them; that would only come into active politics were there any question of dispossessing the actual Sultan. A few years ago there appeared the following letter in the *Bombay Gazette*:—"I think it is the duty of every true Mohammedan to take a deep interest in the welfare of the Ottoman Empire for several reasons. In the first place, the Sultan is the religious head of all Mussulmans, as he undoubtedly supplies the place of the Khalif of our Prophet; in the second place, the Ottoman Empire is the only Mohammedan Power in the world worthy the name, and its downfall would be a severe blow to the Mohammedan world." Recognising that as Khalif his power in the world was immeasurably greater than that of the badgered, bullied Sultan of Turkey, Abdul Hamid has drawn closer the ties binding all communities of Mohammedans to him. He himself lives according to the Koran, austere and soberly, and by his own conduct sets a suitable example to the followers of the Prophet. Professor Vambery says of this wise action of the Sultan:—"He has always placed great confidence in the Panislamic movement, which he inaugurated, and which he certainly directed very skilfully. His agents traverse India, South Russia, Central Asia, China, Java, and Africa; they proclaim everywhere the religious zeal, the power, and greatness of the Khalif. Up to the present,

however, they have succeeded only in making the birthday of the Sultan a day of public rejoicing throughout Islamic lands, and in preparing the threads wherewith to weave the bond of unity." One writer, who is anything but favourable to the present Sultan or *régime* at Constantinople, makes frank confession as to the result of an attack upon the Khalifate. "I have always deprecated single-handed active intervention on the part of Great Britain in Turkey. But I venture to go further, and state that if all the Powers of Europe were to agree and combine in a common action for the deposition of the Sultan by force, the result would be more disastrous than any former event which has convulsed Europe. Mohammedans throughout the world would regard and resent such an act as directed not against Abdul Hamid personally, but against the Khalifate or headship of their religion. True, such an uprising of Mohammedans would prove futile, as far as regards their being able to withstand superior strength, but I am convinced that not a single Christian would remain alive in Turkey. Such concerted action on the part of Europe would be regarded as a religious crusade, and would be met by a Moslem crescenade."

That British attitude towards Turkey is founded upon Christian intolerance towards Mohammedanism is unthinkable, so untrue would such an attitude be to all the teachings of Christ. In justice it must be admitted that Mohammedanism is undoubtedly a pioneer of better things, and "the history of humanity has seen few more earnest, noble, and sincere prophets, men irresistibly impelled by an inner power to admonish, and to teach, and to utter austere and sublime truths" than Mohammed. To quote Canon Taylor, "an African tribe once converted to Islam never reverts to paganism and never embraces Christianity. Take, for example, the statements of English officials or of travellers as to the practical results of Islam. When Mohammedanism is embraced by a negro tribe, paganism, devil worship, cannibalism, human sacrifice, infanticide, and witchcraft at once disappear. Polygamy and slavery are regulated and their evils are restrained." This would seem to indicate that the faith of Islam is a power capable of doing good in the world, and not merely an attribute of the Evil One. If Mohammedanism has not maintained the high level of its early days, neither has Christianity. It must not be forgotten that in attacking the Sultan, who is the head of the Moslem world, we are also attacking Mohammedanism and that faith which millions of our own subjects hold most sacred and precious. This is not as it should be, and so incomprehensible is it to the Mohammedan mind that the result, at Constantinople at least, is exaggerated fear and hatred of all British actions.

The Sultan of Turkey can understand the attitude of the majority of the Great Powers who bring pressure to bear upon him, and, although he does not approve of the motives, his feelings towards them are much more friendly than are his sentiments with regard to Great Britain. Austria, Italy, Russia, and Germany—all these he imagines to be actuated by a desire to obtain concrete benefits, and while combating them he respects them. But Great Britain, while protesting her disinterestedness, yet takes an active part in the assault upon Turkey, under a veil of sentimental interest in the fate of the Christian races within the Turkish Empire. To the Sultan, British action seems directed towards the end of diminishing the prestige of the Khalif and belittling the importance of the Spiritual Head of the Mohammedan world for British benefit. For a ruler who places far more value upon his spiritual than upon his temporal attributes, as does Abdul Hamid, such an impression of British policy transforms him into our bitterest enemy and throws him into the arms of Germany and into the meshes of a panislamic propaganda. That we are ourselves largely to blame will not lessen the regret when troubles fall upon us in our Mohammedan communities. As a matter of fact the Sultan personally was always predisposed to be on good terms with Great Britain. Of that there are ample proofs, among others from Professor Vambery: "He is aware of the beautiful titles given to him," he writes, "Great Assassin, Sultan Rouge, Abdul the Damned, &c., and once touching upon the Western infatuation against his person, he seemed to find a kind of apology for the cruelties perpetrated in his name." The same writer relates how on one occasion the Sultan told him how he had been brought up with the warmest sympathies for England, how his father had spoken of England as Turkey's best friend, how, with his father's words deeply engraved upon his mind, he grew up with the idea that the English were his best friends, and how bitterly he was disillusioned when he came to the throne! "England's opinion he seemed to think a great deal of, for although he simulated indifference and even assumed an air of hostility, in his innermost mind he was firmly convinced that England, from motives of self-interest, would be compelled to uphold the Ottoman State, and at the critical moment would come to the rescue and lend a helping hand." It certainly does not seem to be "playing the game" to throw opprobrious names and reckless abuse at a European ruler, just because what goes on in his Empire does not please his critics. Those, for instance, who were furious at Mr. Chamberlain's long-spoon metaphor in talking about Russia think nothing of inventing new and bloody titles

for the spiritual head of some eighty millions of our subjects. It is probable that they do not stop to consider whether it consorts with the dignity of the Empire, any more than any serious idea stirred the brains of those urchins who stoned the Old Testament prophet because of his bald head. But there is no reason why the British Government should also forget its dignity, and, what is far more important still, the welfare of the British Empire.

Looked at calmly and seriously, it is quite clear that in every one of our Mohammedan interests it is infinitely better policy to be on friendly relations with the Khalif at Constantinople. Nowhere do we stand to gain by purposeless enmity and antagonism. Even financially and economically it is far better to be friends than to be enemies. In destroying Turkish credit we destroy our own investments and resemble rather too closely a man who, having insured a house for fifty pounds, burns it down, forgetting that he had a mortgage on the same premises for a hundred pounds. But quite frankly it must be admitted that even although we may threaten Turkey and be the worst possible friends with the Sultan, we can do nothing beyond threats. There is no possibility of our taking active measures to enforce or carry them out. It is all a bluff, and a bluff fraught with serious consequences to the British Empire and to the Christian subjects of the Sultan. In Armenia, in Macedonia, we cannot stir a finger to prevent massacre, and yet we contentedly push the various elements towards massacre, proclaiming that we are saving them from persecution. As one authority said, "The British fleet cannot go into the interior of Macedonia or of Armenia," and so the British nation is really powerless. We have no armed force which would be of any avail were we to force the question to settlement at the expense of the Turk. British Near Eastern policy is really quite as much of an impossible "bluff" as is the Monroe Doctrine of the United States. We are only working towards the satisfaction of the aspirations of other Powers, and towards our own detriment. In Armenia we may bring about Russian armed intervention, and in Macedonia intervention and war, but in neither case will it be good policy on our part or really beneficial to those whom we profess to be desirous of succouring. The undue encouragement of the small States neighbouring on Macedonia by such bodies as the Balkan Committee has been directly responsible for hundreds of murders in Macedonia, and has brought about a situation which can best be described in the words of one of the most prominent of European statesmen :—

They (the Balkan States) need still to modify their actions and their

aspirations. They are too persuaded that each of them forms the centre of the evolution of mankind. They only pursue objects of a grandeur which they do not justify by their daily actions. The aim of Europe in the Macedonian question does not concern them, and yet it is this which dominates the situation. This aim is to civilise the peoples who are still uncivilised. It is not by anarchist hands, by pillage and assassination of one's fellows that one is able to civilise others: one finishes by becoming oneself a savage and by preventing the progress of civilisation. It is said that the Turks are savages; at least, they have the excuse that they came from Asia and that they are Mohammedans; but the descendants of Solon and of Aristides who slay people in Christian churches and the representatives of new peoples who enter with bombs and with arrogance into the civilisation of the European nations (the initiators of national progress), what can be said of them. It is impossible to ally oneself to a course of action so opposed to their true interests. In this relation I always recall the verse of Lafontaine—"Patience et longueur de temps font plus que force ni que rage."

If we really want peace and reform in Macedonia we can far better secure it by friendly relations with the Turks than by spasmodic unofficial encouragement of assassination. But there are other questions as well in Europe concerning which we cannot be indifferent. There is the case of the two Turkish provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, occupied temporarily by Austria, but threatened with permanent appropriation, and the much more serious one of the Black Sea and the desire of Russia to regard it as a Russian lake. But the British Government possesses the right to have independent witnesses on the Black Sea, because she has the treaty right to maintain two cruisers at the mouth of the Danube. This Treaty right has been disregarded, and at one time there seemed a disposition to withdraw any unit of the British Navy from the Black Sea. There is no question of a fighting force; there is only the upholding of a principle and the re-establishing of the equilibrium at Constantinople, where the Anglo-Russian agreement is regarded as a sign of weakness on the part of Great Britain. It is time to cry a halt and endeavour to recover our lost ground in the Mohammedan world before it is too late. Let us initiate a sane policy of friendship with the Sultan, and in that way reassure our Mohammedan subjects and also really advance the cause of all subjects of the Sultan. Our actual policy does not seem to have been accompanied by such wonderful results that we should be loath to abandon it. But it would be idle to imagine that, after decades of abuse, Turkey and the Sultan will suddenly welcome our chance proposals for friendship unreservedly. Such friendly proposals as are made are generally brought forward with an eye to the main chance, and it is hardly fair to expect exuberant gratitude for them. But, starting from a frank admission that

we are distrusted and disliked at Constantinople, let us decide upon a trial of a serious, friendly policy towards the Commander of the Faithful, such as will do us the maximum amount of good throughout the Empire. Let us continue to press for reform, but on a friendly basis. The announcement of such a policy would do more than anything else to stop religious massacre and counter-massacre in Macedonia than anything else, and would allow of reforms having a fair chance. But chance has afforded to Great Britain an opportunity to give very clear and unmistakable proof of a desire to be friendly, and at the same time, while running no risk, drawing considerable benefit from so doing.

The protracted revolt and unrest in Arabia has passed very much unnoticed in the British Press, but it presents an absorbing interest in Constantinople. The province of Yemen is in open revolt against the Khalif at Constantinople with a Khalif of its own. Only the seven towns in military occupation of Turkish troops remain obedient: Yambo, Jiddah and Hodeidah on the coast and Medina, Mecca, Thaif and Sana in the mountains. All the rest of the country is in a state of sporadic revolt and overrun by nomad brigands. A recent Peace Commission which left Hodeiha returned baffled, owing to the refusal of the Imam Yahia to accept terms short of complete autonomy and to his arrogation of the title of Commander of the Faithful, to which strong exception was taken by the Commissioners. The great difficulty for the Sultan of Turkey has been the impossibility for serious negotiations between the Khalif in possession and the aspirant for the Khalifate. It is this difficulty which we can assist the Sultan of Turkey to surmount.

"It is not generally understood," says a well-informed writer on Arabia, "how highly the Sultan values the Arabian provinces. It is on them, and on them alone, that he can base his claim to the title of Khalif. The possession of the holy cities in the hands of the Sultan makes him the chief Mohammedan ruler; there his name is blessed daily in the great mosques in the eyes of all the pilgrims from every part of the Moslem world. Turkey is the guardian of the Kaaba. How many thousands of Mohammedans daily in the mosques of India and Java call for blessings on the head of Abdul Hamid, who would never pray for Abdul Hamid the Sultan. . . . Mecca is to the Moslem what Jerusalem is to the Jew. It bears with it all the influence of centuries of associations . . . it bids him remember that all his brother Moslems are worshipping toward the same sacred spot: that he is one of a great company of believers united by one faith, filled with the same hopes, reverencing the same thing, worshipping the same god."

The rebellions in Arabia undoubtedly threaten this most sacred of Mohammedan possessions, and the Sultan is sparing no efforts

to crush the struggles of the Yemen Arabs to dispute his title. A wastage of Turkish troops, horrible to imagine, and little realised abroad, has long been going on, and yet the question is unsettled. From the north the holy railway to Hedjaz is being pushed on, and its arrival at Medina will make it far easier to control the situation from Constantinople. But it is not yet completed, and the evil in Arabia may well pass all control before the Sultan Abdul Hamid can journey to the Holy Cities by his own railway. With efficient intermediaries the crisis might be averted, and an unrest, dangerous to neighbouring territories and to the Moslem world, might be averted. The British Empire possesses under her protection two such intermediaries in the Sultan of Zanzibar and the Sultan of Muscat, his uncle, who spring from the most ancient Arab families. These two Arab rulers might well serve as intermediaries between the contending parties, and at their own risk bring about the settlement of a lasting quarrel which we as a Mohammedan Power cannot afford to pass over in silence. Especially well fitted is the Sultan of Zanzibar for such a mission, that is, from the British point of view, since he was educated in English school and college and is at the same time in the confidence of the Sultan Abdul Hamid. Quite beside the question of Arabia he might well prove of supreme importance in discussing matters at Constantinople of weight to the British Empire. Far better than any British diplomat he could enter into the Mohammedan spirit and appreciate the point of view of the Khalif.

Meanwhile the Hedjaz Railway is being pushed on, in itself a sign of the solidarity of the Moslem world, and in the future it may well redouble our anxieties in Egypt if we continue to force the Turks to enmity. This railway, ostensibly constructed to enable pilgrims to travel to Mecca without having recourse to infidel ships and quarantine, is being built by the contributions of the Faithful all over the world, and its significance cannot be overestimated. The line, with its proximity to the Suez Canal and the consequent possibility of massing Turkish troops near that vital artery, will enable the Sultan to counteract effectively any possible naval demonstration by the British fleet through the Dardanelles. The line, with its future branch to Akabah in the Red Sea, alters the whole question of the defence of Egypt. No longer is it a question of the British fleet, but of a flank attack on land. It is no wonder that the Anglophobe newspaper, *Ar Raïd al Misri*, in Cairo, wrote: "The Hedjaz line will be of the same importance for the Mohammedan world as was the Suez Canal for the economic world." It is noteworthy to remark that the first telegraphic message sent from Constantinople to Mecca,

along the telegraph line promised at the same time as the railway, was an announcement that, as soon as the railway was finished, Abdul Hamid would in person perform the pilgrimage! The effect of such an action on his part can scarcely be imagined, but it is well to do all that is possible at least to mitigate its evil effects for the British Empire.

Let the British policy at Constantinople be one of frank recognition of the fact that it is foolish to treat the Commander of the Faithful as if he were only Sultan of Turkey. Let us abandon a policy of cheap, unworthy abuse, such as would never be offered to any other ruler, and change a policy of pin-pricks for one of honest, friendly advice and assistance. The result will be an immense gain to the security of the Empire over which King Edward rules, and the possibility of a sane world policy without a fundamental and perilous weakness in one of the Imperial pillars. Perhaps then the words of Fuad Pasha may come true when he prophesied, "We have not hitherto found that the friendship of Great Britain to us is as firmly established as her own laws! But we have gained many advantages from that Power, nor can we be independent of her help in the future. I am firmly convinced that the British will be our foremost, but the last, of our European allies."

Why should there not be a Mohammedan ambassador sent to Constantinople from Great Britain, side by side with the regular Christian diplomat? Just as the great Roman Catholic Powers send ambassadors to the Vatican as well as to the Quirinal, why should not we, the greatest Mohammedan Power, send a representative to the spiritual Head of Islam, as well as to the Ruler of Turkey? That the two functions are fulfilled by one individual does not matter at all. The fact that we would possess at Constantinople a Mohammedan of high rank as our representative to the Commander of the Faithful would enable us to approach far more closely and intimately to the central point of the belief of eighty millions of our subjects, and although it would be no part of the duties of our Mohammedan ambassador to concern himself directly with the affairs of his Christian colleague, nobody can deny that British policy would benefit greatly by such a practical and logical recognition of our position as a Mohammedan Power.

ALFRED STEAD.

“THEWFIK THE LOYAL.”

In the first place, I should like to say a word or two of one to whom, in my opinion, the public has never yet done sufficient justice. I allude to the late Khedive, his Highness Thewfik Pasha. . . . History will be unjust if it does not accord to Thewfik Pasha a somewhat important niche in the Valhalla of Oriental potentates.—(Lord Cromer's farewell speech, Cairo, May 4th, 1907.)

ROMANCE and tragedy intermingle strangely in the old-time Hebrew story of Hagar and Ishmael, whose names signify “This is thy reward” and “God shall hear.” All remember how the childless Sarai's beautiful Egyptian handmaid, Hagar, bare Abram a son, and how jealousy caused mother and son to be sent forth into the desert as wanderers. Students of Mohammedan lore have read likewise how Hagar and Ishmael, trusting in the goodness of God, journeyed to the country where Mecca now stands, and how, when suffering from thirst, a fountain miraculously sprang up, which is known to-day as the holy well Zemzem. There they sojourned by its life-giving waters, and, under the protection of the tribe of Jorham, prospered, and dwelt together, a united mother and son, until Hagar was gathered to her fathers.

In the story of Thewfik the Loyal, as will presently be seen, there is a similar birth-romance, followed by tragedy; jealousy likewise destroyed the early happiness of mother and son, who became, in a sense, social outcasts; while later, as with Hagar and Ishmael, prosperity gladdened them, and they clung the one to the other till the mother was taken to her rest.

Some sixty years ago, when Ismail Pasha had barely attained to man's estate, and even before his predecessor and uncle, Said Pasha, had become Viceroy, a beautiful Egyptian handmaid in the palace, named Thewfida, found favour in his eyes, and on November 15th, 1852, bore him a son, Mehemet Thewfik.¹ Though Ismail was at the time so young, he had nevertheless already three wives, but no heir. That he had *only* three wives was a fortunate circumstance for Thewfik's mother, as had Ismail possessed the full legal number allowed by Moslem law—namely, four—Thewfida's boy would probably not have been recognised by him. But in the circumstances Ismail, the future Viceroy and Khedive, had legally no choice but ultimately to raise the lowly, lovely Thewfida to the dignity of *Deurtundju Hanem*, or Fourth

(1) The spelling of Arabic and Turkish names always presents some difficulty. In this paper I have adopted the orthography of his Highness's own signature.