

ANGLO-AFGHAN RELATIONS.

BY THE AUTHOR OF "AFGHANISTAN."

I.

THE inception of the policy by which our relations with Afghanistan are controlled at the present time is due to the reflective intuition of Alexander Barnes who, in 1831, when attached to the Teheran Mission under Sir John Macdonald, felt the necessity of combating the growing influence of Russia in Afghanistan. Circumstances, emanating from the presence of the Russian Mission under Prince Menzikoff at Teheran, in 1826, disclosed the policy of Russia towards Persia and Afghanistan to be following two channels: the one, real, immediate and acquisitive; the other, remote, artificial, and aiming at intimidation. The influence of these two methods of approach was inimical alike to Persia and Afghanistan, as also to the interests of India; to their existence may be traced the cause of the Russo-Persian War. The results of this campaign with Russia, in which the Shah was engaged from 1826 to 1828, left Persia smarting under its loss of prestige, broken up into a number of petty principalities and ready to attempt armed incursions across the frontier by way of restoring its good name. Khiva and then Herat, in turn, were considered, selection finally falling upon Herat as the object of attack. The expedition was begun, but owing to the death of Abbas Mirza, the father of the Prince Royal, Mahomed Mirza, who conducted the expedition, it was withdrawn, and for the time being further action was deferred. In the mean time, affairs in Persia had attracted the attention of India, while, as the weakness of the Persian state increased, Russian diplomacy became more active. Distinguished by a marked hostility to England, the policy of Russia aimed at stirring up the tribes of Afghanistan. With this end in view Russian advice counselled Mahomed Mirza Shah to resume the operations against Herat at the same time that a Russian Mission was despatched to Kabul. The intimate association with the affairs of Persia and Afghanistan, which distinguished the position of Russia at this date is interesting, since it reveals how closely our Afghan and our Persian policies were interwoven, the one reacting on the other with sympathetic consequence. There is, also, equal evidence

make the example less worthy of note. A correct appreciation of the position on the part of the French king would have made invasion an accomplished fact, and so proved that it is possible. To-day conditions have changed, intelligence travels quickly, but the steam transport available has diminished the risks formerly incurred. A voyage that might never have taken place in 1690 is now a matter of certainty. At the same time the risks inseparable from naval warfare still remain ; consequently invasion, instead of being impossible, has now become more practicable. Thus the condition of England is rapidly becoming more assimilated to that of Continental Powers, with the result that the need for a second line of defence seems more obvious than it has ever been before.

C. HOLMES WILSON.

of the influence exercised over India by the machinations of Russian diplomacy.

The existence of Russian influence at Kabul, and behind the Herat expedition of 1837-38, synchronised with the formal enunciation of the policy by which, since 1838 down to date, our relations with Afghanistan have been governed. Indeed, no sooner was the Persian expedition of 1837-38 launched against Herat than the Government of India awoke to the urgency of the situation. Lord Auckland, embodying in more concrete shape the spirit of the idea put forward by Alexander Barnes in 1831, proclaimed upon the 8th November, 1838, the necessity of establishing a permanent barrier against schemes of aggression upon our north-west frontier. A treaty of alliance was made with Ranjit Singh and Shah Shujah, and an expedition, ostensibly prepared for the relief of Herat, but not without the intention of checking the growing influence of Russia in Persia and Afghanistan, crossed the Indus under the leadership of General Keane. Kandahar was occupied, and Kabul entered in 1839, when Shah Shujah was proclaimed. Unfortunately, owing to one of those singular mistakes of judgment which, by their very frequency, confirm the impression that our success in Asia is more by good fortune than good management, Kabul was evacuated in the winter of 1841-42 and the beneficial possibilities of the occupation of Kabul dissipated in a disgraceful and signally disastrous retirement.

In respect of Herat, Persian designs upon the fortress were by no means crushed by the effects of the campaign—the first Afghan War of 1838-1842. Within ten years—in 1851—disturbances, arising out of the death of the Khan of Herat, caused the new ruler to throw himself once more upon the support of Persia. This situation gave rise to the Anglo-Persian Convention, January, 1853, by which the independence of Herat and its continuation in Afghan hands was assured. This step, although indicating the importance which the Government of India attached to Herat, and giving direct confirmation to the pronouncement of Lord Auckland in 1838, was not sufficient to provide immunity to the Herat Khanate from Persian interference. Three years later—March 1856—the Government of Persia, taking advantage of a rupture of relations with Great Britain which had occurred in the previous December, despatched a force to Herat. The occupation of the city which followed was short-lived, an *émeute* occurring in which the Persian flag was replaced by that of the British. Within a few months, however, the espousers of the English cause, receiving no encouragement from the Imperial Government, hauled down their flag and Herat passed once more into Persian hands. Surrendered

to Persia on the 25th October, 1856, it was evacuated finally and restored to Afghanistan the 27th July, 1857, under pressure of the expeditionary column which disembarked at Karachi in the Persian Gulf on the 4th December, 1856.

This war, concluded by a treaty of peace signed in Paris the 4th March, 1857, marks an important epoch in our history with Afghanistan. It denoted the resumption of relations which had been in abeyance since 1842, preparing the way for that treaty of alliance which was signed at Peshawar with Dost Mahommed on the 27th January, 1857. By this engagement the assistance of the Afghans, in return for a monthly subsidy during the continuation of the war of 1856, was secured against the Persians. As events proved no such help was required. Although hostilities ceased within six weeks of the date of the agreement the monthly subsidy, beginning in the autumn of 1856, was continued until the 30th September, 1858, the accident of the Indian mutiny dictating the prudence of preserving friendly relations with Kabul until the very disquieting influences, which were then at work, had been allayed. Relations with Afghanistan continued until 1863 to follow a course more or less overshadowed by the growing importance of Russian intrigue in Central Asia.

While our activities in Persia and Afghanistan demonstrated merely political expansion, a change of quite another order was beginning to define the position of Russia in Central Asia. From this it became evident that a severe test would be imposed upon our trans-border policy. By successive stages Russian aggrandisement had subjugated the several States which were lying between her territories and the frontiers of Afghanistan when the principles of our policy, in regard to that country, were announced in 1838. One by one the Turcoman tribes were conquered until, by the capture of Samarkand in 1868, and the submission of the Amir of Bokhara, Russia gained direct approach to the waters of the Oxus, with the right to furnish its bank with armed posts. The moment was rapidly arriving against which all the energies of Indo-Afghan policy in the past should have been directed. In the interval, before the Russian domination of Central Asia was complete, the aim of British policy to bring about a strong Afghanistan had seemed upon the point of realisation when, in 1863, Dost Mahommed died.

None could foresee the developments of the future. The activity of the Russians in Central Asia boded no good; and with the death of Dost Mahommed it was recognised that the resulting situation contained a challenge to the principles of the policy by which, in years gone by, we had proposed to guarantee the inviolability of

Afghan territory. Indeed, an attitude of non-intervention was no longer politic ; but, instead of seizing the opportunity presented by the death of Dost Mahommed, and occupying the territories of Afghanistan for ourselves, we hesitated. Yet, if the passing visit of a Russian mission to Kabul, in 1838, had been accounted sufficient warranty for the invasion of Afghanistan, how much more the massing of Russian forces upon its northern and north-western frontiers should have propelled us to a renewed display of energy in 1863. Unfortunately for ourselves, the logic of our position was destroyed irretrievably by the train of hostile circumstance which our supineness had set in motion. Whilst our politicians debated, Russia had acted, and Shir Ali, Khan of Herat and son of Dost Mahommed, spurred by Russian promises and intrigues, began a movement against Azim, Khan of Kabul. Varying fortunes distinguished the efforts of the rival factions between 1863-1868 ; but, at length, in 1868, Shir Ali prevailed, and he became recognised as *de facto* ruler of Afghanistan. For the moment the situation showed improvement, as Shir Ali veered from Russia to India. Practical assistance, in the shape of money and materials of war, was at once accorded him by the Government of India, between whose supreme chief, Lord Mayo, and himself as the ruler of Afghanistan, a conference was arranged at Umballa in March of 1869. The outcome of this meeting, not by any means so definite as the interests of a trans-border policy demanded, was held to be sufficient to dispel the feelings of alarm, which the prolonged military activities of Russia in the Trans-Caspian region had aroused. None the less, while the Russians were occupied with the conquest of Khiva and Shir Ali had been disappointed at the aloofness of the Indian Government four momentous years, 1869-1873, were passing. Their close revealed only the further and more complete estrangement of the Amir of Kabul through the amazing ineptitude with which the advisers of the Indian Government dealt with his difficulties. Bitter, indifferent, and relying upon Russian promises of assistance in 1872, Shir Ali became openly defiant, repudiating all suggestions for any formal treaty of alliance, 1876-1877. At the same time, 1877, he flatly declined to admit to Kabul any British officers as the accredited representatives of the Government of India, although in 1878 he himself received a Russian mission there. With the failure of a second attempt (1878) to force a mission upon him, the second Afghan War (1878-1880) began.

Kandahar was occupied by Sir Donald Stewart, on the 8th January, 1879, and, while a second force moved into position against the capital, a third, under Sir Frederick Roberts, marched

against Paiwar Kotal. Shir Ali, flying before these operations, died at Mazar-i-Sharif in February, 1879, the first chapter of the second war closing with the installation of his son Yakub Khan on the Kabul throne and the despatch of the Cavagnari mission to Kabul. The treaty of Gandamak, 26th May, 1879, had barely put the seal upon certain rights which might have led ultimately to the definite establishment of British authority in Afghanistan when, in the following September, the sudden massacre of the entire mission occurred. The second phase of the Afghan War of 1878-1880 opened with the operations of Sir Frederick Roberts. Defeating the Afghans at Charasia, he entered Kabul in October, causing the overthrow of Yakub Khan, and paving the way for the eventual recognition of the late Amir Abdur Rahman as Amir of Kabul. Throughout this occupation of Kabul the temper of the surrounding tribes became slowly inflamed until, in December, 1879, a rebellion against the British was proclaimed. The tribes rising, the forces in Kabul were placed in jeopardy by the interruption of communications with India. Action by Sir Donald Stewart, who had come up with forces from Kandahar, stemmed the torrent, the situation growing more complex when Abdur Rahman, who had retired across the Oxus on his defeat by Shir Ali in the war for succession, 1863-1868, reappeared in March of 1880, to establish himself in north-western Afghanistan. Both the Government of India and the bulk of the population welcomed his return; and withdrawing the territories of the Kandahar province from his rule, he was recognised as Amir of Afghanistan, with certain reservations in respect of foreign policy and overtures from Russia. Unfortunately, the disasters which hitherto had followed British intervention in Afghanistan were to continue. In July, 1880, but a few months after the proclamation of Abdur Rahman as the new Amir, Ayub Khan, Khan of Herat, and youngest son of Shir Ali, had marched upon Kandahar, and defeating at Maiwand the British force under General Burrows, which had been sent to check his advance, had succeeded in investing the city. Sir Frederick Roberts was now once more to come upon the scene. Taking 10,000 men from Sir Donald Stewart's garrison at Kabul, he set out to the relief of Kandahar, accomplishing, by a series of forced efforts, an extraordinarily rapid march of 313 miles, and, on the 1st September, 1880, routing Ayub Khan's army. A little later, in 1881, British troops once again retired to India from Afghanistan; but a sudden attack by Ayub Khan's adherents, in July, 1881, secured the re-capture of Kandahar, Ayub Khan remaining there until, on the 22nd September, he was totally vanquished by Abdur Rahman, losing all his possessions and

retreating to Persia, from where subsequently he surrendered to the Government of India.

Under instructions addressed to Lieut.-General Sir Donald Stewart, commanding the forces in Northern and Eastern Afghanistan, by the Marquess of Ripon as Viceroy of India, Sir Lepel Griffin, on the 20th July, 1880, communicated the following promise in the course of a letter to Abdur Rahman on his recognition as Amir of Afghanistan by the Afghan Sirdars, at Kabul, in 1880 :—

“ . . . If any Power should attempt to interfere in Afghanistan, and if such interference should lead to unprovoked aggression on the dominions of your Highness, in that event the British Government would be prepared to aid you to such extent and in such manner as may appear to the British Government necessary in repelling it, provided that your Highness follows unreservedly the advice of the British Government in regard to your external relations. . . . ”

In the first years of his reign Abdur Rahman certainly complied with the conditions stipulated by Sir Lepel Griffin, the correctness of his general conduct prompting Lord Ripon nearly three years later, 16th June, 1883, in the course of a letter to write :—

“ . . . Impressed by these considerations, I have determined to offer to your Highness personally . . . a subsidy of twelve lakhs of rupees a year, payable monthly, to be devoted to the payment of your troops and to the other measures required for the defence of your north-western frontier. . . . ”

In the following year, 1884, the gradual advance of Russia across Central Asia, gave rise to apprehensions about the position of Afghanistan. Merv had been annexed in February of this year, when, after repeated inquiries on the part of Great Britain, it was arranged that an Anglo-Russian Boundary Commission should meet in October at Sarakhs, which had just been occupied. The course of events did not improve with this decision since, although Sir Peter Lumsden was despatched to the rendezvous, the Russian commissioner evaded a meeting. Fears for the situation of Afghanistan were not set aside by the seizure of Pul-i-Khatun in the very month—October, 1884—for which the Sarakhs meeting had been originally convened, and the existence of evident preparations for a further forward movement. The legitimacy of these proceedings was debated between St. Petersburg and London, Kabul and Calcutta, but, in spite of all pledges, the Russians in February of 1885 took possession of Zulfikar and Akrobat. Meanwhile, in India, plans for a full state Durbar at Rawal Pindi, on April 8th, in honour of T.R.H. the Duke and Duchess of Connaught, were in hand. The presence of the Amir of Afghanistan had been invited by the Viceroy, between whom and Abdur Rahman a conference upon the defence and demarcation of the north-western frontier, the strengthening of Herat, and the extension of the

Sakkur-Sibi Railway to Quetta had been settled. While Anglo-Russian friction on the Afghan border did not prevent Abdur Rahman from setting out on his journey, the occasion was seized upon by the Russians to engage the Afghans at Tash Kepr̄ on the 30th March, 1885, when more than 1200 of the Amir's soldiers were ruthlessly butchered. The next day Abdur Rahman arrived in India, meeting with a magnificent reception. At an interview with Lord Dufferin, the Amir, instancing the seizure of Pendjeh, complained that his predictions about the intentions of the Russians had been ignored. The Viceroy, in reply, informed him that any further aggression by Russia against Afghanistan would be considered by England as a *casus belli*, declared that preparations for war had been begun—orders for the mobilisation of two army corps had indeed been issued—and offered the services of engineer officers. At a subsequent audience on the 5th April, 1885, these fair words were confirmed by a gift of ten lakhs of rupees, 20,000 breech-loading rifles, a heavy battery of four guns, a mountain battery of six guns, and two howitzers, besides very liberal rifle and artillery supplies. These presents were guarantees of the benevolence, sincerity, and goodwill of the Government of India, and three days later Abdur Rahman, expressing his appreciation, said in his speech before the Viceroy:—

“ . . . In return for this kindness and favour, I am ready with my arms and people to render any services that may be required of me or of the Afghan nation. As the British Government has declared that it will assist me in repelling any foreign enemy, so it is right and proper that Afghanistan should unite in the firmest manner and stand side by side with the British Government. . . . ”

No doubt so keen a humourist as Abdur Rahman proved himself appreciated the grim touch which the action of the Russians at Pendjeh had imparted to the Viceroy's formal confirmation of the pledges existing between India and Afghanistan. Such things are, however, among the unrecorded facts of life. Perhaps too, it is to be deplored that, in later years, relations between Russia and Great Britain in respect of Afghanistan have been curiously productive of these little ironies.

Proceedings in connection with the Russo-Afghan boundary question dragged on through 1886 until, after being transferred to St. Petersburg and London, and again returning to the scene itself, they were concluded in the winter of 1887. Difficulties between Russia and India, on behalf of Afghanistan, were for the moment at an end, when, in 1888, the Marquess of Dufferin gave place to the Marquess of Lansdowne as Viceroy of India. With the new-comer an active frontier policy was inaugurated. In quiet furtherance of this the Quetta railway, which in January, 1888, had been

carried to Kila Abdulla, was continued through the Khwaja Amran beyond Old Chaman to New Chaman. The Amir of Afghanistan professed to regard this extension as a violation of the Treaty of Gandamak which placed the Afghan-Baluch boundary at the foot of the Khwaja Amran—an undesirable site for a rail-head terminus. This undertaking was the forerunner of much military activity, and twice in this year expeditions took the field against the tribes of the Black Mountain. These ventures introduced a disturbing element into conditions prevailing upon the frontier and had an inflammatory effect upon Afghan opinion. At the moment, 1889, the Amir was on service in Afghan-Turkestan superintending certain defensive measures along the northern and north-western frontier, but by the summer of 1890, he had returned to Kabul. In the spring of this year the turbulence of the Khidarzais in the Zhob valley had been suppressed, the increasing energy of the Government of India bringing the danger of a rupture of relations between India and Afghanistan appreciably closer. In view of the position of affairs, the Government of India refused to permit the passage of war materials into Afghanistan, stopping not only the rifles, artillery, and ammunition, but also all imports of iron, steel, and copper. To this action the Amir replied by repudiating the subsidy of twelve lakhs which had been granted by Lord Ripon. At the same time he wrote a letter to Lord Salisbury, who was then Prime Minister, and, in emphasis of his protest against our occupation of New Chaman, prohibited his people from using the railway from the terminus at the northern foot-hills of the Khwaja Amran to the first station on the south side of the tunnel through the mountains.

In the following year, 1891, columns moved against the Orakzai clans in the Miranzai valley, the operations against the Hazaras were repeated for the second time, and hostilities, resulting in the subjugation of Hunza and Nagar and the occupation of Chitral, broke out. The troops of the Amir were also on active service in 1891, occupying the Asmar valley in December under the Sipah Salar Ghulam Haïdar Khan, a proceeding aimed in a measure at the Government of India, who were contemplating similar action. In 1892 troops again were sent across the frontier moving against the Isazai clan in the Trans-Indus Isazai territory. The entire frontier was now in a restless state, and, as the tension between Kabul and Calcutta had increased steadily, it seemed desirable that the Amir should be given an opportunity to declare his intentions. Lord Lansdowne thereupon invited Abdur Rahman to visit India; and, when the Amir refused on the plea of the disturbed condition of his country, the Viceroy suggested that

a meeting should take place on the Indo-Afghan frontier. Again the Amir of Afghanistan demurred; when, since hostilities appeared inevitable and preparations for war were in progress, the proposal that a British mission should visit Kabul, which Abdur Rahman had first addressed to Lord Ripon and repeated to Lord Dufferin in 1887, was taken up. Abdur Rahman was informed that a military mission under the personal command of Lord Roberts, the Commander-in-Chief in India, and escorted by a brigade of British troops, would visit Jelalabad. Lord Roberts had been the active exponent of the forward policy since Lord Lansdowne had assumed vice-regal office. The long series of frontier military operations resulting from his energetic direction of affairs, made his appointment to the head of a peaceful mission obnoxious to the Amir, who naturally also appreciated the objections of the people of Afghanistan to receive a visit from the hero of the 1878-80 war. Moreover, the situation in Afghanistan itself, at the time when this ultimatum was despatched to Kabul, was menaced with the danger of widespread rebellion. The Hazaras had led the revolt against the Amir, and disaffection was manifested even in the capital. Abdur Rahman's natural adroitness never stood him in better stead than at this period. Returning a polite and very diplomatic reply to the notification from the Government of India, he stated that he was sending to the Viceroy his own personal representative. After a little interval, Mr. (now Sir Salter) Pyne was entrusted with letters for the Viceroy and the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, Mr. (now Sir Mortimer) Durand. By travelling slowly and acting with studied deliberation Mr. Pyne achieved his employer's object, which was to procrastinate until Lord Roberts, then on the eve of his return to England, had left India. By these means war was undoubtedly averted, misunderstandings abridged, and the way paved by Mr. Pyne for the visit of the Durand Mission, the Amir's envoy stipulating for an unescorted civil mission.

At this time questions in dispute with Afghanistan were not alone occupied with the vexed areas in occupation by the independent tribes along the north-western frontier of India. The Russians had raised again the agreement of 1873, by which the northern boundary of Afghanistan was defined by the course of the Oxus, and were pressing for its literal fulfilment. Since the conflict at Pendjeh and the Boundary Commission of 1884-87, Russia had turned her attention to the Pamirs where, hitherto, China and Afghanistan had been solely concerned. Fort Pamir, a frontier post, had been erected by Captain Yonoff on the Sarez Pamir in 1891; the brutal massacre of sixteen Afghan soldiers under

Shams-ud-Din Khan by the same officer had occurred at Somatash on the Alichur Pamir, 22nd June, 1892; and in the month before the arrival of the Durand Mission there had been a further Russo-Afghan encounter on the Badakshan border. These disorders were, perhaps, inseparable from a situation in which the rights of the case were so violently opposed to the policy, interests, and intentions of Russia. Insistence upon the justice of the Afghan claim without supporting force would have been futile. The Amir's invitation, therefore, offered opportunity for settling not only the very serious problem of the tribes on the north-western frontier of India, but, equally, the question of jurisdiction on the Pamirs.

The Durand Mission left Peshawar on the 19th September, 1893, accompanied by :

Envoy.	Political Assistants.	Medical.	Military.
Mr. Mortimer Durand.	Captain MacMahon. Captain Manners Smith.	Mr. Donald. Major Fenn.	Colonel Ellis.
	Mr. Clarke.		

The usual honours were paid upon arrival in Kabul. The Mission was met by General Ghulam Haidar Khan, lodged in the Indaki Palace, the residence of Habib Ullah Khan, and presented with a *ziifat* of 33,895 Kabuli rupees. After preliminary conferences, in pursuance of instructions from Lord Lansdowne, Mr. Mortimer Durand on the 11th November, 1893, addressed to Abdur Rahman the following letter :

“When your Highness came to the throne of Afghanistan, Sir Lepel Griffin was instructed to give you the assurance that if any foreign Power should attempt to interfere in Afghanistan and if such interference should lead to unprovoked aggression on the dominions of your Highness, in that event the British Government would be prepared to aid you to such extent and in such manner as might appear to the British Government necessary in repelling it, provided that your Highness followed unreservedly the advice of the British Government in regard to your external relations. I have the honour to inform your Highness that this assurance remains in force, and that it is applicable with regard to any territory which may come into your possession in consequence of the Agreement which you have made with me to-day in the matter of the Oxus frontier. It is the desire of the British Government that such portion of the northern frontier of Afghanistan as has not yet been marked out should now be clearly defined. When this has been done, the whole of your Highness's frontier towards the side of Russia will be equally free from doubt and equally secure.”

And upon the 12th November, 1893, Abdur Rahman's acceptance of the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1873 was confirmed by a note signed by himself and the British envoy.

“Whereas the British Government have represented to his Highness the Amir that the Russian Government presses for the literal fulfilment of the Agreement of 1873 between Russia and England, by which it was decided that the River Oxus should form the northern boundary of Afghanistan from Lake Victoria (Wood's Lake) or Sarikul on the east to the junction of the Kokcha with the Oxus, and whereas the British Government considers itself bound to abide by

the terms of this Agreement, if the Russian Government equally abides by them, his Highness Amir Abdur Rahman Khan, G.C.S.I., Amir of Afghanistan and its Dependencies, willing to show his friendship to the British Government and his readiness to accept their advice in matters affecting his relations with foreign Powers, hereby agrees that he will evacuate all the Districts held by him to the north of this portion of the Oxus on the clear understanding that all the Districts lying to the south of this portion of the Oxus, and not now in his possession, be handed over to him in exchange. And Sir Henry Mortimer Durand, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, hereby declares on the part of the British Government that the transfer to his Highness the Amir of the said districts lying to the south of the Oxus being an essential part of this transaction, he undertakes that arrangements will be made with the Russian Government to carry out the transfer of the said lands to the north and south of the Oxus."

By this note the matter of the Afghan position on the Pamirs was referred to the Anglo-Russian Pamirs Commission of 1895-96. That tribunal settled the question by dispossessing the Amir in favour of the Tsar. In the interval which elapsed between November, 1893, and the assembly of the Commission, a fresh skirmish took place at Yaims in 1894, when an Afghan post was wiped out by Cossacks.

The disposal of the difficulties between Russia and Afghanistan was preliminary to the real work of the Durand Mission. This task, the adjustment of the many grievances set in train by the forward movement, was based upon many important and substantial concessions, the existence of which caused high hopes of the ultimate success of the Mission to be entertained. The assurance of assistance in case of unprovoked aggression given in 1880, and repeated in 1885, was confirmed, the subsidy of twelve lakhs increased to eighteen lakhs, and the right to import munitions of war admitted. Further, this additional engagement, entered as Clause II. of the Durand Agreement, the 12th November, 1893, was contracted :

"The Government of India will at no time exercise interference in the territories lying . . . on the side of Afghanistan, and his Highness the Amir will at no time exercise interference in the territories lying . . . on the side of India."

Two days after the conclusion of its labours, the 14th November, the Mission left Kabul, sharing upon its arrival in India in that prodigal distribution of honours which occasionally reveals but a faint relation between cause and effect. Included in these favours was Mr. Pyne, whose services undoubtedly had constituted him a beneficent factor in the course of the negotiations. This gentleman was knighted, a similar distinction falling to the chief of the Mission. Time, however, has disclosed the Durand Agreement to be possessed of very indifferent qualities.

(To be continued.)

ANGLO-AFGHAN RELATIONS.

BY THE AUTHOR OF "AFGHANISTAN."

PART I.—(*Continued.*)

APART from the developments of the frontier policy under Lord Roberts, the evacuation of the Ningrahar valley after the Afghan War of 1878-80 contributed very largely to the unsatisfactory situation in which we at this time were placed. Had this position, together with Jelalabad, been retained, we should have cut off the retreat of the Afridis, Orakzais, Mohmands, Swatis, and others into Afghan territory. Under existing circumstances these tribes can make good their escape into Afghanistan, even receiving assistance from that country when hard pressed. At the period of the Durand Mission the Government of India laid claim to the entire region—Bulund Khel, Mohmandstan, Asmar, and Yaghistan, the latter embracing Chitral, Bajaur, Swat, Buner, Dir, Chilas, and Waziristan. The Amir put forward a demand for Chageh, the Asmar valley, which he previously had occupied, and objected to the British pretensions. In point of fact, the rights of the Government of India had been already established by conquest and by moral superiority, since this zone, the home of border ruffians, had always required the watchful initiative of a strong Government. The British position was, therefore, incontestable. Moreover, since we were prepared to increase the subsidy of the Amir as a salve for the extinction of his interest in the Chitral region, there was no need to recede from any point. In regard to matters diplomatic, occasion should have been taken to provide, by a special clause in the treaty, for some proportion of these additional lakhs being devoted by their recipient to the task of assisting our own military authorities to draw the fangs of the more turbulent frontier elements. This precaution was ignored, nor was it deemed necessary to allot to the mission the services of a survey officer. Ultimately, after long discussion, the negotiations concluded, when it was revealed that at needless sacrifice the Asmar valley, commanding the approach to the Pamir-Chitral region and south-eastern Afghanistan, and of great importance to strategic considerations on the Indian frontier, had been surrendered to the Amir,

the Birmal tract separated from Waziristan, and an ethnic absurdity perpetrated where the Mohmands' country had been divided by the watershed of the Kunar and Panj-Kora rivers. Such a process of vivisection, intolerable to a tribe who, although involved in constant dissension among themselves, were a united people, was at once resented.

In a letter, addressed to the Viceroy of India before the Durand Mission had set out for Kabul, Abdur Rahman had warned the Government of the consequence of interfering with the border tribes. He wrote :—

“As to these frontier tribes known by the name of Yaghistan, if they were included in my dominions I should be able to make them fight against any enemy of England and myself, by the name of a religious war, under the flag of their co-religious Muslim ruler (myself). And these people being brave warriors and staunch Mahommedans would make a very strong force to fight against any power which might invade India or Afghanistan. I will gradually make them peaceful subjects and good friends of Great Britain. But if you should cut them out of my dominions they will neither be of any use to you nor to me ; you will always be engaged in fighting or other trouble with them, and they will always go on plundering. As long as your Government is strong and in peace, you will be able to keep them quiet by a strong hand, but if at any time a foreign enemy appear on the borders of India these frontier tribes will be your worst enemies. You must remember that they are like a weak enemy who can be held under the feet of a strong enemy, as long as he is strong ; and the moment he ceases to be strong enough to hold him the weak one gets out of his hold and attacks him in return. In your cutting away from me these frontier tribes who are people of my nationality and my religion, you will injure my prestige in the eyes of my subjects, and you will make me weak, and my weakness is injurious for your Government.”

Early in 1894 the Marquess of Lansdowne had been succeeded by the Earl of Elgin, Lord Rosebery had become Prime Minister, and Abdur Rahman had been invited to England, the invitation being endorsed by Sir Henry Fowler. Regarding the Durand legacy as a bequest to be fulfilled, and undeterred by the fact that frontier feeling was still highly excited over the mission to Kabul, the Government of India proceeded to appoint various boundary commissions. One, destined for the Afghan-Waziristan border with orders to assemble on the 1st October, at Dera Ismail Khan, included Messrs. King, Anderson, Grant, and Bruce with an escort of 3000 soldiers and six guns. Another meeting on the 3rd December at Lundi Khana, and intended for the Mohmand-Bajaur-Asmar boundary, comprised—

Political Commissioners.

Mr. R. Udny.

Mr. C. Hastings.

Medical.

Surgeon-Captain McNabb.

Survey.

Colonel Holdich, R.E.

Lieutenant Coldstream, R.E.

This action on the part of the Government of India attracted

the attention of the Amir, who summoned the Sipah Salar to Kabul from Jelalabad for a conference upon the subject. Rumours had already indicated Abdur Rahman's opposition to the Mohmand demarcation, and storm clouds were gathering over the Kunar valley when, on the 12th June, the Commissioner of Peshawar, Mr. (now Sir Richard) Udny, chief of the future boundary commission, issued the following indiscreet proclamation:—

“PROCLAMATION.

“FROM MR. R. UDNY, COMMISSIONER AND SUPERINTENDENT, PESHAWAR DIVISION.

“To all Bajauri, Mohmand, and other tribes inhabiting the country towards the Indian Empire, from the Kabul river to the southern limit of Chitral, from the boundary line now agreed upon between the British Government and the Amir of Afghanistan.

“(1) Whereas certain questions were raised regarding the boundary between Afghanistan and India, and as H.H. the Amir, as well as the Indian Government, desired to have these questions disposed of in an amicable and friendly manner, so that for the future there may not be a difference of opinion and thought regarding the above matter between these two kingdoms, who have treaties and engagements between themselves. The Government of Great Britain, with the consent of H.H. the Amir of Afghanistan, during the month of September, 1893—Rabbi-al-awal, 1311, H.—sent a mission, consisting of a few officers under the leadership of Sir Mortimer Durand, to Kabul. And by the mercy of God Almighty the two Governments in a friendly manner concluded an agreement on the 12th November, 1893—2 Jamadi-al-awal, 1311, H.—regarding the limits of the country of H.H. the Amir towards India, for hundreds of (krohs) miles from Wakhan on the north to Persia on the south.

“(2) In this agreement it was decided between the two Governments, already bound by agreements and engagements, that the Indian Government will never interfere at any time in the countries lying on that side of the line in the direction of Afghanistan, and that his Highness also will cause no interference at any time in the countries that may be lying outside the boundary-line in the direction of India.

“(3) With the object of demarcating this long boundary with facility and celerity, it was agreed by both the kingdoms, already bound by treaties and engagements, to divide this boundary line into certain parts, and each part of this line should be marked where it is found necessary by the British and Afghan Commissioners.

“(4) Therefore I send this proclamation to you, that I have been appointed Commissioner by the Government of India to demarcate that portion of the boundary which pertains to the tribes noted at the beginning of this proclamation. In this condition of affairs I shall probably start shortly towards Afghan-limits for Asmar, and being joined at this place by a Commissioner appointed by H.H. the Amir, demarcate the boundaries of Afghanistan from Chanak towards the Kabul river. I shall then, I hope, be able to point out the boundary on the spot. Until this is done it is not an easy matter for me to explain the exact features of the boundary. But at present a brief sketch of the boundary will be understood by you from the following details:

“(5) Whereas the kingdom of Great Britain has agreed that H.H. the Amir should retain in his possession the country of Asar on the north of Chanak situated on the Kunar river, or the river of Kashkar, the boundary demarcation

will commence from Chanak in a south-westerly direction up to Kunar, and at a distance of a few English miles from the bank of the Kunar river towards Bajaur. From Kunar the boundary line goes southwards, and, taking a bend, ascends the hills close to Satala Sar, which hills divide the watershed between the Kunar and Panj-kora rivers. From Satala Sar the boundary line passes over the crest of the hill, on one side of which the waters flowing from the Dag Hills fall into the Panj-kora river, whilst the waters on the other side passing through the Satala valley, fall into the Kabul river. And in the centre of this hill lies the Kotal of Satala. The extreme end of the boundary touches the Kabul river in the vicinity of Polosi.

"(6) From a review of the above details you will understand that in addition to the countries watered by the Kunar river which lie towards the limits of the Indian dominions, H.H. the Amir has agreed not to interfere in all that country the eastern waters of which fall into the Panj-kora river; nor to interfere or stretch his hand in that quarter of the Mohmand country, the waters of which fall into the Kabul river below Polosi.

"(7) On this account your future concerns and relationship will lie solely with the British Government and no one else, and I have a hope that by degrees there will be the same bonds of friendship between you on the one part, and myself and the frontier officers of the British Government on the other part, which has existed between the said officers and other tribes who reside outside the limits of the boundaries of the Peshawar district.

"(8) The last request is that you should firmly believe, and on this point I will give you every assurance and satisfaction, that the Government of India has no intention of going beyond these limits, which form the present boundaries of the Indian Empire, and that it has no desire to mix itself in any way with the affairs of your country."

"Written on the 7th Zu'l-hijjah, 1311, II.

"A.D. 12th June, 1894."

Since nothing whatever had been decided about the Mohmand line, the publication of such a rescript was a most improper and provocative proceeding. The Amir was offended, while the Sipah Salar retaliated by destroying all copies of the proclamation that found their way across the border. No doubt, too, it was a sense of lingering irritation which a little later caused Abdur Rahman to repudiate the Durand Agreement, where it concerned the Mohmand-Bajaur region. Ghulam Haidar made the views of the Amir quite clear at a meeting with Mr. R. Udny and Surgeon-Captain McNabb on the 12th August, in Jelalabad. The Sipah Salar there rejected entirely the proposed division of the Mohmands, claiming, in place of the Panj-kora-Kunar line, to exercise jurisdiction over them down to the Peshawar valley. Similarly, the Afghan commander-in-chief refused to secede an inch of Kafirstan. Troubles also followed in the wake of the Bruce mission. Breaking camp on the 1st October, and marching *via* the Gomul valley into Southern Waziristan, the laager at Wano was attacked by the Waziris on the 3rd November, with such success that an expedition under Sir William Lockhart was immediately sent against them. In the end the boundary, from the Gomul in the south to the Tochi

and the Kurram in the north, was settled; the solution of the Mohmand *impasse* on the 9th April, 1895, being due solely to the fact that detailed for duty on the Mohmand-Bajaur section was the most distinguished survey officer of his day—Colonel (now Sir Thomas) Holdich. In no wise rebuffed by the remarkable deficiencies of the Durand Agreement, nor the discrepancies of the Udney manifesto, this officer contrived, through clever adaptation of available geographical data, to evolve something of a border line, although no part of the boundary defined south of the Hindu Kush bore any relation to the frontier laid down by Durand or Udney.

Events in the Mohmand country were not confined to the excitement emanating from the proposed delimitation of the hinterland. During the last five years an Afghan freebooter from Jandol, Umra Khan, had made bold bids for supremacy alternately against the Khan of Jandol and the Mir of Dir, uniting with the one against the other as his interests dictated and opportunity served. Success attended him when, in an attempt to occupy part of the Kunar valley, upon which Abdur Rahman had already cast eyes, he was badly defeated by Ghulam Haidar. In due course he recovered, and re-establishing his rule over Dir and Nawagai, he contracted an alliance with Shir Afzal, lately Mahtar of Chitral. At the moment this man was a fugitive and, as such, the cat's-paw of the Amir of Afghanistan, from whose custody he had been permitted to escape, since Abdur Rahman was proposing to step into his shoes if any conspicuous result attended Umra Khan's operations in Chitral. Moreover, Ghulam Haidar and Umra Khan had come to terms upon a basis which furnished the Afghan king-maker with supplies, volunteers, and ammunition. If the nature of the agreement between Abdur Rahman and Shir Afzal were never entirely disclosed, the character of the understanding between the Sipah Salar of the Amir of Afghanistan and the progressive ruffian from Jandol was soon confirmed. As Ghulam Haidar watched over the welfare of the Udney party in the lower Kunar valley, the situation shifted early in the New Year of 1895 from the Mohmand country to Chitral. Here the sudden appearance of Umra Khan at the head of a motley force on behalf of Shir Afzal had precipitated a dynastic war. While Umra Khan seized Kala Drosh in Lower Chitral and proclaimed Shir Afzal, the British agent in Gilgit, Dr. (now Sir George) Robertson, advancing from that station, threw himself into Chitral and set up a cadet of the reigning family as the rightful ruler. Umra Khan, supported by large numbers of well-armed Afghan infantry from the Sipah Salar's camp at Asmar and plentifully supplied with Kabul breech-loaders and ammunition, advanced against Dr. Robertson, inflicting

upon him a crushing defeat. The effect of this disaster on British prestige was in a measure effaced by the pluck and determination of the Chitral garrison, before whom, on the 3rd March, 1895, Umra Khan settled himself for a siege. His triumph was short-lived, since on the 18th April, the investment was rudely disturbed by the arrival of Colonel Kelly with 650 men from Gilgit. By then, too, a larger force had taken the field, for General Sir Robert Low, at the head of 15,000 soldiers with 30,000 transport animals and 10,000 followers, had embarked upon a campaign in the Swat-Bajaur-Chitral country.

Through the accident of these events matters had come to an absolute dead-lock in the Mohmand-Bajaur-Asmar region. The Udny commission had been withdrawn with only a part of its work accomplished, the chief receiving the honour of knighthood for his services. Elsewhere, too, the situation was unsatisfactory. The border tribes, alarmed at the prospect of enforced demarcation, their fears accentuated by the establishment of military posts at Wano, in the Tochi and Kurram valleys, on the Malakand—the key to Swat—at Chakdara where the Panj-kora had been bridged, and on the Samana ridge, trembled for their independence. Moreover the presence of these survey parties was constantly used for the purpose of exploiting tribal sentiments by Ghulam Haidar, who would not have acted as he did without very definite instructions and very acute knowledge of the Amir's sympathies. Abdur Rahman was thus engaging in a double game. Exercising a potent inimical authority over events in the Chitral crisis, as that affair waned he was at pains to show his amiability towards Great Britain. In April, 1895, almost simultaneously with the raising of the Chitral siege, Nasr Ullah left Kabul on his visit to England. He arrived in London in May, leaving for Kabul in the following August, the recipient of a G.C.M.G. and the bearer of a similar honour to his brother Habib Ullah. The real purport of the mission, to secure authority to open direct relations between Kabul and the India Office as well as with the Viceroy, and to establish official representation in London, failed. The Amir of Afghanistan professed to find a slight in the curt refusal of the Imperial Government to accede to his requests, and was in high dudgeon. Nevertheless, there was nothing remarkable in this rejection of the Amir's petition. Sir Henry Fowler, however, committed a blunder in sanctioning an invitation which led merely to the ventilation of grievances and paved the way for those preposterous claims to independent sovereignty which distinguished the later years of Abdur Rahman's rule, and, since his demise, have ranked among the many pretensions of Habib Ullah.

By the autumn of 1895, the Chrित्रal imbroglio had been straightened, and the remaining months of the year were occupied with the proceedings of the Pamir Boundary Commission and the doings of the Afghan army in Kafiristan. Here Abdur Rahman had embarked upon a brief campaign, which, after forty days of actual warfare, terminated in the spring of 1896. Aside from these operations, interest in the frontier situation was riveted upon the curious theological studies which Abdur Rahman had been pursuing in Kabul. Expectations were also raised by communications evidently passing between Ghulam Haidar and the principal border fanatics: Said Akbar of the Aka Khels, the Sartor Fakir—the Mad Mullah of the Swat—and the Hadda Mullah. After much labour and while the letters were in exchange, Abdur Rahman had composed a treatise, "Foundation of Religion" or Takwim-ud-din, expounding the merits of the *jihad* or holy war, and the virtues of the *ghazi*. Satisfied with this work, at the close of 1895, he convened for the Nauroz festival, on the 21st March, 1896, a great convocation of mullahs drawn from all parts of his dominions and the Indo-Afghan borderland as well, at which he dilated upon the essential principles of that doctrine which specially enjoins the extinction of the infidel. It was a dangerous way to secure his recognition as one of the supreme heads of Islam, and obviously antagonistic to the preservation of harmonious relations between the tribesmen and the Government of India. After much earnest exhortation the holy men were dismissed, comforted by many gifts and gracious words. Concerned at the action of the Amir and compelled to notice the conduct of Ghulam Haidar, the Viceroy of India (Earl of Elgin), on the 2nd May, 1896, addressed to Abdur Rahman a remonstrance against the unfriendly attitude of his frontier officials. The reply from Kabul is best illustrated by the action of some mullahs who had been summoned to the Nauroz festival. At the Id of Pilgrimage, on the 25th May, the title Zia-ul-Millat wa ud-Din, the Light of the Nation and Religion, was offered to Abdur Rahman. When confirmation of this tribute had been received from the whole of Afghanistan, the Amir adopted it at a special Durbar on the 24th August, at the same time appropriating to himself the further dignity of King of Islam.

Save for these occurrences in Kabul, a few riots in the Tochi valley in February, and the conclusion of the work of the Pamir Boundary Commission, the year 1896 was undisturbed. Intrigues were afoot, however, and emissaries of the Mahommedan religion, in the shape of bigoted travelling fakirs, were "out" as the perfervid exponents of a Moslem crusade. Early in May, 1897, Abdur Rahman received at Kabul with great state a Turkish

visitor from Constantinople. A few hours later on the same day the Amir summoned all the mullahs of the city to a private audience. Meanwhile correspondence passed between the leading lights of the Moslem world on both sides of the frontier, and evidences of unrest and disaffection were increasing. With suspicions lulled by eighteen months' comparative calm, or set at rest by the fact that the Chitral reliefs had been unmolested, the frontier political officers in the Tochi explored routes, made surveys, and constructed roads in continuation of the protective works which were begun in the Tochi valley so soon as that area was occupied. The Tochi lies only a little north of Waziristan and so close to Wano that the Waziris were readily roused to avenge themselves by the mullahs when opportunity offered. It came—with the visit of Mr. Gee, the political officer in Tochi, to Maizar, on the 10th June, 1897, when a treacherous attack was made upon the party and 72 casualties inflicted. In spite of the extreme heat of this month retaliatory measures were at once put into execution, General Corrie Bird, taking the field with 7,000 soldiers, 10,000 transport animals, and 3,000 followers.

(To be continued.)