

THE EMPIRE REVIEW

"Far as the breeze can bear, the billows foam,
Survey our empire, and behold our home."—Byron.

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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THE MEETINGS OF THE EMPERORS

THE most notable incident of the past month lies not so much in the fact that three Imperial interviews have been held during August; but in the interest these interviews have created throughout Europe. Up to the Franco-German War it was an article of the orthodox Liberal faith that with the advance of democracy, the era of autocratic rule had passed away, and that henceforth the affairs of the world—at any rate of the world of Europe—would be regulated by the elected representatives of parliamentary government. But as a matter of fact, the monarchs of the leading European States have nowadays far more to do in determining the course of public affairs than either parliaments or premiers. Somehow or other, the sovereigns of Russia, Germany, Austria and Great Britain have become the mouth-pieces of their respective nations. As to whether this change is beneficial or otherwise is an open question on which it is too early to express any definite opinion. All I contend is that, at the present day, the "one man" system of government seems to be gaining ground rapidly as compared with that of government by parliament. Even under republican institutions the same tendency to entrust supreme authority to a dictator, whether he is called president or prime minister, manifests itself more and more openly. It is a necessary corollary of this monarchical reaction that the public attaches far more importance to Imperial interviews than they used to do in bygone times. The four greatest sovereigns of Europe have within the last four weeks

met with one another and have discussed, or at all events, are supposed to have discussed, a number of issues, which may conceivably lead to momentous results. No reports of these discussions have been published, or are likely to be published till a remote date; and yet the nations ruled over by the sovereigns in question seem to be well content with the conviction that their national interests are in safe keeping.

In the absence of any official information it is difficult to attach any great value to the reports of newspaper correspondents, who, however their reports may vary, one and all give the reader to understand that if they were only at liberty to name the sources from which their information was derived, no doubt could possibly be entertained as to its authenticity. I think, however, that any person reasonably well acquainted with foreign affairs can have no great difficulty in stating that certain subjects must necessarily have been mentioned in the course of these Imperial interviews. The first, and most important, was that at Swinemünde between the Czar and the Emperor of Germany. The Czar, however weak and vacillating he may be, is doubtless alive to the truth that he has got to work out his own and his country's salvation without foreign aid. The Kaiser, apart from his personal relations and his kinship with Nicholas II., has no interest in intervening in the domestic crisis through which Russia is now passing unless the insurrection in Russian Poland should spread to Posen, in which case he might possibly consider it the interest and duty of Germany to give armed assistance in suppressing any revolutionary rising in Russian Poland. His Majesty, however, is well aware that German sentiment is, on political as well as personal grounds, hostile to taking one side or the other in the conflict between the Russian Government and the Russian people, and, therefore, he may probably have given the Czar to understand that his permanent policy was one of absolute non-intervention. At the same time he may even more probably have expressed his deep sympathy for his fellow monarch and have assured him that the insurgents, who were seeking to establish a reign of terror in Russia by wholesale and indiscriminate assassination, should meet with no support and find no refuge within German territory. It is also likely enough that William II. should have assured his relative that no advantage should be taken of Russia's present paralysed condition to modify the *status quo* in the Balkan peninsula.

According to a story, for whose authenticity I can vouch personally, the late W. E. Forster, then Secretary of State for Ireland during the height of the Fenian conspiracy, was starting to return to his post in Dublin after one of his flying visits to

London. On getting into a cab which was to convey him to Euston station, he remarked to a friend, "I feel just like a lost soul, who had been granted leave of absence from the infernal regions, and who had now got to start on his return to hell." If his Majesty the Autocrat of All the Russias had ever heard the story, he would probably have expressed his sentiments, on leaving Swinemünde on his voyage homewards, in the words of "Buckshot" Forster, or whatever may be their Russian equivalent. Of a surety, the return to his court prison at Peterhof could best be described as a return to hell.

No such grim presentiment could have marred the pleasure of the second of the recent Imperial interviews, that of their Majesties the King-Emperor Edward VII. and of William II., Emperor of Germany. It is possible that both the illustrious sovereigns may have recalled to their memories the fact that Wilhelmshöhe had been the place where Napoleon III. had been interned as a State prisoner after his capture on the fall of Sedan, who, if I am not mistaken, had received them both at Paris as his guests in the days when the "man of destiny" was regarded as the mightiest monarch of the Continent of Europe. As men of the world their Majesties need no object lesson to remind them of the instability of all human fortunes—even of Imperial fortunes. Moreover, the two sovereigns must have felt, and justly felt, that their meeting was in itself a renewal of the close friendship and family affection, which, though never seriously interrupted, had still to some slight degree been obscured by a certain want of harmony between their two countries dating from the days of the Boer war. Thus the restoration of the historic relations between the courts of Potsdam and St. James', as manifested by the Wilhelmshöhe interview, was in itself calculated to confirm the maintenance of European peace and of International amity. The very simplicity of the meeting added to its true character as being rather a family gathering than as an occasion for discussing questions of State policy. This has been the view taken by both the German and the British public as represented by the press of the two countries. For the last three years I have contended in *The Empire Review* that Germany and England—by virtue of their kinship, their common religion, their analogous institutions, their similar principles of law and justice and internal administration, and their respect for liberty on the one hand and for order on the other—were by nature destined to be friends and allies. I have also advocated throughout the period when the larger portion of the British press were doing their utmost to stir up animosity in England against Germany—on the alleged ground that the Government of Berlin was in-

triguing secretly to undermine the power of England and to thwart her vital interests—the urgent importance of friendly relations between the sovereigns of both countries being made manifest to the outer world by such personal visits as that which the King of England has just made to the Emperor of Germany and which the latter is to pay to the former next November. I may fairly claim that my views have so far been fully justified by the course of events, and that my fellow-countrymen are beginning to realise that there is little or no justification for the belief that Germany is at heart hostile to England, while the Germans are beginning to understand that England is not in reality animated by any hostility towards the Fatherland. When two old friends and neighbours, who have had a dispute, have agreed to shake hands and be reconciled, they will do wisely in letting bygones be bygones, and not raising the issue which of the two was most in the right or least in the wrong in respect of the original dispute. What is true of individuals is still more true in the case of nations. All I need say on this subject is that any attempt on the part of our press to represent the *entente cordiale* between England and France as being the sheet anchor of British State policy, cannot fail to excite, however unjustly, a suspicion on the part of Germany that, though his Majesty the King may have represented faithfully at Wilhelmshöhe his good will towards the country of his father's birth, his Majesty does not represent the sentiments of his subjects.

If I am right in regarding the Wilhelmshöhe interview as a family visit, it is not likely that any great portion of the necessarily brief interview should have been taken up by political discussions. If any such discussion should have taken place it may be a fair guess that His Majesty the King may have alluded to the following subjects: the campaign in Morocco, the reforms proposed in Macedonia, and the condition of the Balkan Peninsula as being questions which, under possible if not probable contingencies, might disturb the peace of Europe. We may be certain that His Majesty will, as a constitutional Sovereign, express no opinion of his own inconsistent with what he knows to be the policy approved by his Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; it is possible he might desire that a larger latitude should be granted to France and Spain in restoring order in Mauritania, but he would certainly express his conviction that England has no interest in Morocco sufficient to justify her in taking any effective part in an armed intervention, and that no attempt on the part of the French Republic to violate the Convention of Algenciras would receive any encouragement from England. With regard to the condition of Macedonia, his Majesty might express

the opinion, entertained by all European statesmen, that the real cause of Macedonian unrest is not so much Turkish misrule as the internecine feuds of Greeks, Bulgarians, Serbs and Albanians who are always engaged in endeavouring to exterminate one another, who are actively, though secretly, assisted by the governments of Athens, Belgrade and Sofia, and who would carry out their policy of mutual extermination if they were not restrained by the presence of Turkish troops. His Majesty might add that though some of his Ministers favour the idea of placing Macedonia under the rule of a Christian governor, supported by European troops, they had no intention of re-opening the Eastern Question, which must be the inevitable consequence of any attempt to detach Macedonia from the Ottoman Empire, and that even if they had the will, they have not the power to upset the compact of Mursteg between Russia and Austria, a compact which virtually guarantees the maintenance of the *status quo* in Macedonia subject to such minor reforms as the Concert of Europe might chance to approve.

The third Imperial interview, that between the King-Emperor Francis Joseph and Edward VII., gave, one must imagine, even less scope for political controversy than either of its predecessors. Austria and England have less to do with one another both from a political or a commercial point of view than any two of the leading Powers of Europe. Their stars move in orbits which hardly impinge upon one another. The reigning head of the great house of Hapsburg has won the respect of all Europe by the loyalty with which he has held together a heterogeneous and discordant conglomeration of races united only by the fact of living under a common sceptre. The sovereign who was called suddenly to the throne during the revolutionary rising of 1848, who has lived during the occupation of Hungary by Russian troops, who saw his Italian kingdom wrested from him at Magenta and Solferino, who has seen the victorious Prussian army after Sadowa almost within sight of his capital, who has been forced to virtually surrender his claim to be the Emperor of Germany, and to let it pass into the hands of the Hohenzollern dynasty, and whose private life has been even more full of tragedies than his public career, and who yet in spite of all his misfortunes has retained the respect and commanded the confidence of his people throughout a long and chequered career, cannot but be regarded with veneration by his fellow monarchs, and especially by a monarch with so sympathetic a character as that of the sovereign of the British Empire. It is well known to all men who have lived to an advanced age, that one of its chief pleasures is to find that their friendship is sought for and

valued by men who in comparison with themselves are young. It has long been known that His Majesty was a specially welcome guest of the veteran Emperor, and that his advice was more appreciated at the Hofburg than that of any other of his fellow sovereigns. But the main questions which interest the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy at the present day, the relations between the Trans-Leithan and the Cis-Leithan kingdoms, the occupation of Bosnia and the Herzgovina are of a local order concerning which advice could not well be demanded on one side or tendered on the other. If, what is probable, the Austrian Emperor should have been anxious to learn from his Imperial guest what might be expected to be the attitude of England in the event of the agitation in Macedonia leading to the re-opening of the Eastern Question, he may have been assured by his distinguished guest that in such a case England would remain neutral and would neither revert to the policy of the Crimean War nor to that of the Bulgarian atrocities period. I repeat again that this forecast of what questions may have been asked at the Imperial interviews and what answers may have been given rests entirely upon my own surmises and not on any official or private information. I can, however, state with conviction that whatever may have been said or left unsaid at either Swinemunde, Wilhelmshöhe or Ischl, the confidential exchange of ideas between the sovereigns of England, Germany, Austria and Russia has done more to promote the interests of European peace and International amity than has been accomplished by the Conference of the Hague, whose members were described the other day by an English enthusiastic eulogist as the "Peacemakers of Europe."

THE CONFERENCE AND DISARMAMENT

"Still left speaking" is the phrase consecrated to Parliamentary reports on the happily rare occasions when the debates of Parliament are not ended at the hour after which the exigencies of publication require that no further reports of the debate can be received without committing the—in the code of journalism—unpardonable sin of causing our newspapers to miss the London trains. I am too old a publicist to flatter myself that the British public awaits with palpitating interest to learn my individual views as to the ultimate outcome of the Hague Conference. I cannot, however, consider it reasonable that the readers of *The Empire Review* should be asked to form their judgments of foreign affairs on the authority of a writer who cannot lay any claim to official information, and who has not the slightest means

of knowing what may or may not occur during the days which must elapse between his article being handed over to the printers and its appearance in print. Under these circumstances I must pray to be excused, if any of my anticipations should be falsified by events occurring during the period at which I write, and the date at which my anticipations will be communicated to the outer world. However, at the risk of shaking any faith my readers may still entertain as to my omniscience, I shall venture to predict that the Hague Conference may possibly "be left speaking" —or may I say "twaddling"—after the end of the month which will then have passed away like Hans Breitmann's "barty" into *die Ewigkeit*. The nearest approach to perpetual motion is the action of the human tongue when its owners have nothing to say and are determined to say it. Still, I fail to see how even the Hague Congress of Peacemakers can go on talking much longer after the utter downfall and collapse of their ingenious scheme for annihilating war by the simple process of recommending all the nations to reduce their armies and their fleets by common consent. The authorship of this absurd project must fairly be attributed to Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, who seems to me the incorporation into flesh and blood of the mythical Dame Partington, who, as every child knows, set out to the sea-shore with a pail and spoon in order to scoop out the waters of the Atlantic Ocean. The Prime Minister was so enamoured of the notion of destroying bloated armaments by consentaneous reductions that he exerted all his influence to secure the re-assembling of the Hague Conference, notwithstanding the manifold intimations he had received from every leading Continental Power that its re-assemblage could not possibly do any good and very probably might do serious harm. Happily the experience of a year or two of latter-day Liberal statesmanship was not sufficient to destroy the historic authority attaching to the post of a British Premier, and thus—when Sir Henry was credited with the intention of going to the Congress in person and of then and there informing the Powers represented at the Conference that England, in order to show her belief in the disarmament cure for war, was prepared to announce a very serious reduction of her own military expenditure, without any guarantee that her example would be followed by any other great European Power—foreign nations should have found it hard to believe that the Premier had not got England at his back. The delusion was soon dispelled when the Premier's own colleagues were the first to check his exuberant enthusiasm for the reduction of the world's military expenditure by mutual consent. Every great Power agreed it would be an excellent idea that their neighbours should agree to reduce their

armies and navies, but one and all declared it was utterly impossible for themselves to reduce either army or navy, as their existing forces were barely sufficient for their own safety against attack from one quarter or the other. Sir Henry may not be the wisest of Scotchmen, but in common with all Britons born north of the Tweed, he has sense enough not to run his head against a brick wall. No more was said of his visit to the Hague or of his intention to commit Great Britain to any unconditional reduction of her military expenditure. In order, however, "to save his face," he insisted upon the Conference assembling in full force and upon having his personal views submitted to formal consideration. Finally, as I stated in *The Empire Review* of July last the proposition, submitted to the Congress by our accredited delegates, was watered down to a purely academic statement that "the Conference confirms the resolution adopted by the Conference of 1899 in regard to the limitation of military charges, and in view of the fact that military charges have considerably increased in almost all countries since that year the Conference declares that *the question is more than ever urgent*, and that it is to be desired that Governments should resume the study of this question."

It might have been expected that this abandonment of the original British proposition for the above resolution might have been accepted as a meaningless platitude. The statement, however, that the question was more "than ever urgent" could not be accepted by the Powers who were hostile to the idea of any reduction of their military expenditure, and who therefore insisted that it must be modified to receive even the nominal consent of these Powers to its ratification by the Conference. The words I have cited underlined were deleted; and were replaced by the words "highly desirable." Such was the emasculated outcome of poor Sir Henry's crusade against militarism. One would have thought that by this time he would have been satisfied at having the resolution confirmed by the Conference, and thus mitigating the rebuff he had received, without making more ado about his discomfiture. But the pertinacity of a self-willed Scot outweighed even his Scottish prudence. By his instructions Sir Edward Fry, before moving the adoption of the resolution referred to above, has now been authorised to inform the Conference that "the Government of Great Britain would be prepared annually to communicate to any Powers—who would do the same—the programme of construction for new vessels of war and the expenditure entailed by that programme. This exchange of information would facilitate an exchange of views between the governments as to the reductions which might be effected by mutual agreement." A more

astounding proposition was never submitted by the Minister of a great country. Apparently the offer is made to all the Powers alike, great or small, in the old world as well as in the new.

If Sir Edward Fry is correctly reported, he stated that "In ancient times men dreamed of an age of gold, which had existed on earth in the distant past; but in all ages and among all nations, poets, sybils, prophets and all noble and inspired souls have always cherished the hope of the return of this golden age under the form of the reign of universal peace." For the honour of the bar of England to which, however unworthily, I belong, I must decline to believe that this fustian was Sir Edward Fry's own composition, but prefer to think it was excogitated by the brain of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman. I am confirmed in this belief by the recollection of the remark attributed to Lord Beaconsfield, that in the course of his experience he had never known a man with a double barrelled surname who had not—to put the matter politely—a strain of something asinine about him.

Of course, after this appeal to sentiment, the resolution as modified by the Powers—who were not willing to admit that the consideration of a general disarmament was either urgent or expedient—was carried unanimously. If England likes to communicate year after year the reductions she is prepared to make in her fleet or her Army to any Power, however insignificant, who is ready to make reductions on a similar scale, why, in the name of common sense, should any independent State object to such an act of folly on our part? To inform Holland or Belgium or Bulgaria or Portugal how many ships we are going to build or break up, how many regiments we intend to raise or disband, is practically to play the game of war, with our cards laid on the diplomatic table with their faces upwards, for the instruction of all other nations, many of whom are likely to be our adversaries in the event of an European war. The plain truth is, as every man of sense ought to have foreseen, that any one of the ruling powers of the world forms, and must form, its opinion as to the expediency or in expediency of a general disarmament on a simple calculation how far disarmament would affect its own security. Any Power, such as Germany, which believes herself to be the most formidable military State in Europe, has not the slightest desire or intention of reducing her military supremacy. France, though she may approve, in the abstract, of the idea of a general disarmament, has not the remotest intention of carrying this idea into practice. Austria and Russia, who look forward at no distant period to dividing between themselves the territories of the "Sick Man of Europe," are adverse to any diminution of the military

strength by which alone Turkey can be driven out of Europe into Asia. Indeed the United States of America form the only Power which honestly supports the British idea of a general disarmament, and this support is mainly based on a conviction that, for purposes of attack, the military and naval forces of Great Britain are, as matters now stand, immeasurably superior to those of the American Republic.

I can see no cause to complain of this state of affairs. Every nation in the world which desires to uphold her independence must be prepared in case of need to fight for her own hand. The "survival of the fittest" is a law of Nature, which applies to nations as well as to individuals; and any scheme which declines to recognise the truth that war is the sole arbitrament by which international disputes can be ultimately decided, is foredoomed to failure as being inconsistent with human nature. Every nation which values its individual existence must base its policy on the principle enunciated in the Latin adage: *Si vis pacem para bellum*. It is on this principle that all other nations are prepared to act, and if the British Empire should, in an evil hour, fall under the delusion that an Empire can be supported by moral force alone, her existence as a World Power will be of no long duration. Believing as I do most firmly that, whatever may be its failings, the British Empire is better qualified by the character of her people, her institutions, and her traditions, to uphold individual liberty, law, order, fair dealing and human progress, than any empire the world has known as yet, or seems likely to know in the future, I regard any policy—which tends to undermine the armed power, forming as it does the backbone of England's Imperial strength—as a pestilent heresy. The fact that the crude proposals of the British Government of to-day for mutual disarmament have been virtually declared by the great Powers of the Continent to be neither urgent nor deserving of serious consideration, is mainly due to the straightforward action of Germany; and to the consequent collapse of the Second Peace Conference. I trust that for many years to come the palace now being erected at the Hague by Mr. Andrew Carnegie for the reception of future Conferences may rest untenanted. If this hope should be fulfilled, *Requiescat in pace* would be an appropriate epitaph for the last of the Hague Conferences. The only epitaph I should bar—if I had the power to do so—would be *Resurgam*.

THE BOMBARDMENT OF CASABLANCA

It is not altogether inappropriate that the last days of the moribund Congress should have been disturbed, morally though not audibly, by the sound of the bombardment of a Moorish unfortified city by French men-of-war. It is a matter for surprise that the peacemakers of Europe did not seize the opportunity of addressing to the belligerents an appeal to suspend any further warlike operations till they had laid their grounds of quarrel before the Conference of the Hague. The reprisals made by the French on the Moors for various outrages committed on citizens of the French Republic are, so far, of no very serious character, except in as far as some hundreds of Moorish fanatics have been shot down at a safe distance; but this outbreak of Mahometan fanaticism may probably necessitate the invasion of Morocco by a French army. Such an invasion might well lead to the resuscitation of the international rivalries which were supposed to have been settled by the Congress of Algeciras, and these rivalries may under conceivable, though I hope improbable contingencies lead to a disturbance of the peace of Europe. Yet the Congress of the Hague, up to the time at which I write, has made no sign, and has thereby manifested the futility of all international arbitration, unless supported by armed force.

The origin of the whole difficulty, with which Europe may suddenly be called to deal, is to be found in the Anglo-French Agreement. By this Agreement France agreed to give England a free hand in Egypt, while in return England agreed to grant France a free hand in Morocco. To put the matter more plainly, England and France swapped Egypt for Morocco. In as far as England was concerned, the compact has proved advantageous. France was the only European Power which had been directly hostile to the British occupation of Egypt, and had excited all her influence in Cairo to hinder our occupation from assuming a permanent character. As soon as France withdrew her opposition no other European Power had any objection to our assuming in fact, if not in name, a protectorate over Egypt. France, however, was not equally fortunate. She had imagined that if England consented to acquiesce in the annexation of Morocco no one else was likely to object, and that she would be at liberty to add Mauritania to her huge North African possessions, and to administer it on the same principle as that by which she administers Algeria and Tunis, the principle in question being that of the rigid exclusion from her territories of all traders other

than those of French birth or nationality. It is curious that neither Lord Cromer in Cairo, nor Lord Lansdowne in London, nor M. Delcassé in Paris, seemed to have realised the fact that England had no authority to hand over Morocco to France. There was no analogy, in the case of Morocco, to one of the many semi-savage States in the Dark Continent which were declared, by the Treaty of Berlin, to be open to annexation by the first European State which was ready to incur the cost and risk involved in an effective occupation. By some mistake, which has never been explained, France omitted to inform Germany of the compact concluded between France and England, by which Morocco was to be handed over unconditionally to the former country. Germany had considerable trade interests in Morocco, and refused to acknowledge the validity of the Anglo-French Convention till it had been submitted to an International Conference. At the outset France declined to accept the proposal, but when she discovered that Germany was in earnest, she got rid of her Foreign Minister, M. Delcassé and finally took part in the Conference of Algeciras. In order to save French credit abroad, and French influence at home, it became all-important for the then Ministry of France to be able to say that they had gained a "moral victory at Algeciras." After a protracted discussion the Conference agreed, at the instance of Austria, to a compromise on the following terms. Morocco was to remain an independent kingdom; no annexation by France was to be permitted, and the principle of the open door was to be strictly maintained so that all European countries might still trade with Morocco on a footing of equality. If, as seemed probable, European troops should be required to preserve order, and to protect the lives and property of European residents, the duty of so doing should not be entrusted, as Germany had recommended, to an International military force, but should devolve on France and Spain as the only two countries who had frontiers contiguous to those of Morocco. The Franco-Spanish army when formed was to be placed under the command of a Swiss officer nominated by the Government of Berne. By this compromise Germany virtually won the day, as France was debarred from carrying out the annexation of Morocco, and was compelled to abandon the hope of placing the kingdom under the same system as that she has established in Tunis. On the other hand France was able to contend that she had blocked the way to any German intervention in Moroccan affairs, and had thereby scored a moral victory.

Nearly two years have passed since the Convention of Algeciras was signed and sealed. Yet up to the present nothing

has been done by France to carry out the police duty she had undertaken to perform. For reasons, which are connected with internal political controversies in Spain, the idea of maintaining order in Morocco in conjunction with French troops was extremely unpopular south of the Pyrenees. Even the Swiss Republic did not seem to be very keen about lending the services of a distinguished officer of the Helvetian army to an inchoate Franco-Spanish force; and the formation of the police soldiery which was expected to uphold the authority of law and order throughout the Shereefian kingdom has made little or no progress towards fulfilling its mandate.

Meanwhile matters have gone on in Morocco much as they were wont to do. A French doctor was murdered some months ago by fanatics at Marakeesh, a town not far distant from the western frontiers of Algeria. A French force was sent to Marakeesh with the alleged consent of the Sultan, and executed a number of malefactors who were alleged to have taken part in the murder of Dr. Mauchamp, the French missionary medical man. Various conflicts have arisen between the troops of the unhappy Mulai Abdul Aziz and his brother pretenders to the throne, one of whom, Mulai Hafid, has already risen in open revolt and declared himself Sultan of Morocco, while Raisuli, who seems to be the only man possessed of ruling power, has captured the British commander-in-chief of the Moroccan army, Kaid Maclean, and keeps him in durance as a guarantee for his own safety. Following these alarming incidents Europe is suddenly startled by the news that the half-savage, half-fanatical tribes along the sea coast, who are probably the descendants of the old Moorish corsairs, are up in arms, and that the Mullahs, Mahdis and Dervishes of the district are proclaiming a Jihad for the extermination of all Christian unbelievers. As far as one can learn, the actual loss of life among Europeans has not yet been numerous at Casablanca, but the town has been looted and set on fire by the mob. There can be no question in the mind of any man who knows the East that the French are fully justified in inflicting stern punishment on the Moors, and, if possible, in crushing out the insurrection before it has extended to the interior. Naturally enough, the French Ministers are anxious to represent the danger of the insurrection spreading to the interior as having been averted by the promptitude of the action taken by the French troops; and one can only hope this may be so. It is, however, too early to be confident that the danger is over. Any day it may become necessary for the French Government to march upon Fez, and for this a large army will be required to traverse a roadless, and in many instances a waterless country inhabited by fanatical tribes who know every inch of the ground, and who

may well prove as formidable antagonists as we found their kinsmen and fellow-believers in the Soudan.

I fail to see how order can be restored in Morocco under present conditions, except by a powerful army; and for many reasons the French Government, the French Army and the French public would, if I am correctly informed, be not unwilling to undertake the task. Supposing, however, they cherish the hope that if they prove successful in establishing order in Morocco, they will be able to revert to their original project of annexation, they must be prepared to meet the consequences, which any overt violation of the Treaty of Algeiras must inevitably entail.

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