## THE SETTLEMENT OF TURKEY

By POLYBIUS

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ONE of the most momentous questions to come up before the Peace Congress is the fate of the Ottoman Empire.—It is already fairly probable that certain outlying sections of this Empire will be detached from Turkish sovereignty and granted independence. Thus, Arabia is already practically recognized as an independent kingdom; Palestine, Syria, Mesopotamia, and Armenia will also become independent of the Turkish Empire. The question, therefore, is really limited to the remaining portions of the Ottoman Empire, namely, Thrace and Asia Minor, which represent less than one-third of the total area of the Empire (about 210,154 square miles out of 710,224), but contain nearly three-fifths of its entire population (11 millions out of 20). It is with regard to these remaining provinces that the question is between maintenance of Turkish rule and dismemberment.

In 1916 and 1917, when the Entente were still under the vivid impressions of the dreadful massacres and deportations perpetrated by the Turks against the Armenians and Greeks, and smarting under the submarine scourge in the Eastern Mediterranean, which had its bases on the Turkish coasts, dismemberment was openly talked of as the only possible solution; and Italy, who has long been embarked upon imperialistic schemes and adventures, insisted, in the preposterous secret treaty of April, 1915, between England, France, Russia, and herself, that Adalia and the southern half of Asia Minor should be her share of the Turk h spoils; Russia taking Thrace,

Constantinople, and the northern half of Asia Minor; France and England being rewarded with Syria and Mesopotamia.\*

The subsequent eclipse of Russia and America's entry into the war having strengthened the more enlightened elements in the Councils of the Allies, this partition of the Ottoman Empire by the four great Entente Powers, without the consent or knowledge of the inhabitants of the Empire, may be considered as null and void. Still more so is the secret promise of the vilayet of Smyrna, exacted by Italy in 1917 from France and England.

I have reason to know that the British Government do not consider themselves to be bound by this latter arrangement; and with regard to the secret treaty of April, 1916, would even welcome its annulment. Thus, in January, 1918, both the British Premier and President Wilson, in two memorable public statements of the Allied war aims, in dealing with the Turkish Empire, spoke of the maintenance of Turkish rule in the "Turkish portions" of that Empire.

Mr. Lloyd George, in his speech of January 6, 1918, stated that Great Britain "was not fighting to deprive Turkey of its capital or of the rich and renowned lands of Asia Minor and Thrace, which are predominantly Turkish in race." And, further on, he added: "While we do not challenge the maintenance of the Turkish Empire in the homelands [sic] of the Turkish race, with its capital at Constantinople—the passage between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea being internationalized and neutralized—Arabia, Armenia, Mesopotamia, Syria, and Palestine are, in our judgment, entitled to a recognition of their separate national conditions," etc.

President Wilson, in his message to Congress of January 8, 1918 (containing the famous fourteen articles), puts the same idea into more general terms: "The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities should be assured an undoubted

<sup>\*</sup> Evidently the writer has confused the Treaty of 1915 with the arrangement come to after the Conference at St. Jean de Maurienne.— Ep. A. R.

security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development; and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened," etc., etc.

President Wilson, as a student of history, could not, of course, subscribe to Mr. Lloyd George's view as to the "homelands" of the Turkish race; he knew that the "homelands" of that race are somewhere in Central Asia beyond the Caspian Sea, and that the Turks came into Asia Minor and Thrace as foreign conquerors in the fifteenth century. Nor could he accept the "maintenance of the Turkish Empire" in Thrace and Asia Minor, as Mr. Lloyd George does, without one word or thought for the Christian populations of those sadly misgoverned lands. In fact, if President Wilson's words are more closely examined, it is evident that he is prepared to support Turkish "sovereignty" only in so far as it permits of the "unmolested autonomous development" of "the other nationalities." This, coupled with President Wilson's advocacy of the principle of self-determination, cannot mean less for the non-Moslems of Thrace and Asia Minor than for the non-Turkish inhabitants of Armenia, Syria, Palestine, Mesopotamia, or Arabia.

But, after all, President Wilson does, in the above statement, indicate the maintenance of Turkish rule in the "Turkish portions" of the Ottoman Empire. And as in a number of provinces, or vilayets, in Asia Minor and Thrace there is a strong Christian minority, the question is not so simple as it seems to many people.

Of course, it is more than probable that both President Wilson and the British Premier, in making the above-quoted statements, were holding open, as it were, a door of inducement for Turkey to abandon the German cause—a consummation that was highly desirable at that time from the military standpoint. But Turkey did not take advantage of this open door; and, therefore, these statements, in so far as they may be considered as binding upon America and Great Britain, need not form an obstacle to a settlement of a different nature.

The existing statistics of the populations of Thrace and Asia

Minor are not absolutely correct, yet they afford an approximately true idea of the proportionate standing of each of the principal racial factors.

The last Turkish census published was that of 1910, when the disasters of the Balkan Wars had not yet befallen the Ottoman Empire. The only other existing census is that drawn up in 1912 by the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, which is the political as well as ecclesiastical head of the Christians of the Ottoman Empire.

A.—EUROPEAN TURKEY.
TURKISH OFFICIAL STATISTICS, 1910.

| Province of  |    | Turks.  | Greeks.  | Bulgars.  | Others.  | Totals.  |
|--|----|---|--|---|--|--|
| Adrianople Kirk-Kilisse Rodosto Gallipoli Dedeagatch Gumuldjina Chataldja Constantinople | •• | 128,000<br>53,000<br>63,500<br>31,500<br>45,000<br>185,000<br>450,000 | 113,500<br>77,000<br>56,000<br>70,500<br>29,000<br>22,000<br>48,500<br>260,000 | 31,500<br>28,500<br>3,000<br>2,000<br>17,000<br>25,500<br>6,000 | 14,700<br>1,150<br>21,800<br>3,200<br>650<br>2,200<br>2,340<br>130,000 | 287,700<br>159,650<br>144,300<br>107,200<br>91,650<br>234,700<br>68,840<br>846,000 |
| Totals   | •• | 974,000   | 676,500  | 113,500   | 176,040  | 1,940,040  |

## GREEK PATRIARCHATE STATISTICS, 1912.

| Province of                     | Turks.  | Greeks. | Bulgars.  | Others.   | Totals.   |
|---------------------------------|---|---------|---|---|---|
| Adrianople Kirk-Kilisse Rodosto | 55,000<br>64,700<br>32,600<br>47,400<br>185,000 | 65,500  | 32,800<br>28,700<br>3,400<br>2,600<br>16,700<br>25,600<br>4,300 | 15,000<br>1,200<br>22,000<br>3,400<br>800<br>2,300<br>3,200<br>202,800* | 298,500<br>171,400<br>155,600<br>129,000<br>103,700<br>244,600<br>74,000<br>841,000 |
| Totals .                        | . 836,900                                       | 726,100 | 114,100   | 340,700   | 2,017,800   |

<sup>• 122,700</sup> Armenians, 38,800 Jews, 65,000 Greeks of Greece, 20,000 Persians, 46,100 French, British, Germans, Austrians, Italians, etc. In all the other provinces the nationalities under this column are chiefly Armenians, Jews, and Gypsies.

Comparing these two tables, we find that they agree fairly well in most of the items: The Greek table estimates Turks, Bulgars and others at higher figures than does the Turkish table, except in the case of Constantinople where the Turkish population is much reduced. But, on the other hand, the Greek population of that city is also reckoned lower in the Greek than in the Turkish census, the Greek estimate separating the Greeks of Hellenic from those of Ottoman citizenship. Another difference as regards Constantinople is in the estimate of the "other" races. It is well known that there is a strong Armenian colony in the Turkish capital, as well as 50,000 West-Europeans. These cannot possibly be covered by the 130,000 of the Turkish census. The Greek estimates would, therefore, seem to be fairer all round.

Of the provinces enumerated in the above statistical tables, the whole sandjak of Gumuldjina, three-fifths of Dedeagatch, one-fifth of Adrianople, and about one-fourth of Kirk-Kilisse were ceded by Turkey to Bulgaria in 1913 and 1915. Official Bulgarian statistics of these districts have never yet been published, but, on the basis of the Turkish census of 1910, the total ceded population may be safely estimated at about 486,500 souls, of whom about 300,000 are Turks, 104,000 Greeks, 77,000 Bulgars, and 48,000 Armenians, Jews and Gipsies.

Deducting these figures from the totals of the above Turkish statistics, we should have a total population of the present-day European Turkey of 1,453,500 (or 674,000 Turks, 572,000 Greeks, 36,500 Bulgars, 171,000 others). Deducting the same figures from the Greek statistics, we should have a total of 1,531,300, whereof 536,900 are Turks, 621,100 Greeks, 37,100 Bulgars, and 337,700 others.

According, then, to these figures, if we accept the Turkish statistics, we have in a population of about 1½ millions a slight Turkish plurality of 104,000 over the next strongest nationality, which is the Greek; if we accept the Greek statistics, we have a Greek plurality of about 84,000 over the Turks. But even at their own estimate the Turks do not form more than 46 per

cent. of the total population of European Turkey of to-day. And the truth probably lying somewhere midway between the Turkish and the Greek statistics, it is safer to estimate the Turks at about 600,000 souls out of a total population of 1,500,000—in other words, at 40 per cent. of the whole. It must be admitted that this is hardly a sufficient showing to justify European Turkey being called a "Turkish portion" of the Empire, still less the "homeland of the Turkish race," or a country "predominantly Turkish in race," as Mr. Lloyd George puts it.

And that is only the mere numerical aspect of the question. If one turns to the intellectual comparison between Turks and Christians in Thrace, one finds that there is hardly any ground of comparison at all, inasmuch as the Christians furnish the entire brains of the community. This point will be dealt with more fully hereafter.

## B.—ASIA MINOR.

Here we have again a Turkish census of the year 1910 and a Greek Patriarchate census of 1912. For the Armenian vilayets we have only the Turkish census.

TURKISH OFFICIAL STATISTICS, 1910.
(See totals in Almanach de Gotha, 1915.)

| Provinces.  | Turks.  | Greeks.   | Arme-<br>nians.  | Jews.                                  | Others. | Totals.  |
|---|---|---|--|--|---------|--|
| Constantinople (Asiatic shore) Ismid Aidin(Smyrna) Broussa Konia Angora Trebizond Sivas Castamouni Adana Biga (Dardanelles) | 135,681<br>184,960<br>974,225<br>1,346,387<br>1,143,335<br>991,666<br>1,047,889<br>933,572<br>1,086,420 | 629,002<br>274,530<br>85,320<br>54,280<br>351,104 | 50.935<br>17.247<br>87.932<br>9,426<br>101.388<br>45.094<br>165.741<br>3,061<br>81,250 | 2,180<br>24,361<br>2,788<br>720<br>901 | 1,435   | 318,674<br>1,702,911<br>1,717,762<br>1,254,157 |
| , ,   | 8,192,589   |   |  |  |         |  |

GREEK PATRIARCHATE STATISTICS, 1912.

| Provinces.   | Turks.  | Greeks.                    | Arme-<br>nians.  | Jews.                                       | Others.                                   | Totals.   |
|--|---|----------------------------|--|---|---|---|
| Constantinople (Asiatic shore) Ismid Aidin(Smyrna) Broussa Konia Angora Trebizond Castamouni Adana Biga (Dardanelles) Totals | 124,281<br>116,949<br>940,843<br>1,192,749<br>988,723<br>668,400<br>957,866<br>839,514<br>938,435 | 24,919<br>90,208<br>32,830 | 16,419<br>89,966<br>9,729<br>98,798<br>50,624<br>170,635<br>3,205<br>83,000<br>2,336 | 2,854<br>605<br>478<br>—<br>—<br>—<br>3,340 | 15,471<br>8,749<br>2,087<br>108,292<br>81 | 242,333<br>1,659,529<br>1,570,124<br>1,101,549<br>822,298<br>1,362,023<br>1,109,525<br>968,646<br>423,500 |

The above Greek census was carried out because of the general complaint made against the Young Turk Government that in the official census of 1910 the returns of Turks had been enormously exaggerated, for the purpose of assigning to them a larger proportion of seats in the Ottoman Parliament. The numbers of the other nationalities' could not easily be falsified, as each community keeps a careful register of its own people; therefore the only way by which the Turks could increase their strength in the Turkish Parliament was by exaggerating the numbers of the Turkish population. Thus, while the Turkish census puts the Turks at a total of 8,192,589 for the whole of Asia Minor, the Greek census reduces it to 7,048,662, a difference of 1,143,927. Both statistics, however, are substantially in agreement as to the subject races. The Greek census reckons only 5,000 more Greeks and 14,000 more Armenians than does the Turkish census; the Jews are reckoned at 2,000 less, and the ."others" (chiefly foreigners and Gypsies) at 1,300 less. The Greek census, therefore, bears the marks of a more accurate and dispassionate work than the Turkish; in the district of Aidin, for instance, it reduces the Turkish population of 974,000 only by 33,500, while in the Dardanelles province it even puts the Turks at a higher figure

than does the Turkish census. The greatest reduction is in the Angora district, where the Turks are cut down from 991,660 to 668,400; but there the Greeks, too, are reduced from 54,280 to 45,873, while the Armenians are reduced by less than 3,000. From everything we know of the Young Turk Party and their misrule in Turkey, the charge that they deliberately falsified the census returns by exaggerating the strength of the Turkish population is in every way credible and probable. It is, therefore, safer to use the Greek census as a basis of consideration.

Even so the Turks form seven-tenths of the total population of Asia Minor, outnumbering the Greeks alone by 4 to 1, and Greeks and Armenians together by 3 to 1. But this preponderance of the Turks is smaller in some provinces than in Thus, in Aidin, the Turks are to the Greeks as 3 to a, but form only about 57 per cent. of the total population. In Ismid, they are to the Greeks as 10 to  $6\frac{1}{2}$  (or less than 2 to 1), and form only 47 per cent. of the population. In Broussa, they are as 4 to 1, and form about 72 per cent. of the total population. In Trebizond, as 23 to 1, and form 70 per cent. of the total population. In Adana, as 3 to 2, and form only one-third of the total population. These are the provinces where the Greeks are in greater ratio. In Konia the Turks are to the Greeks as 12 to 1; in Angora, as 14 to 1; in Castamouni, as 39 to 1. In these provinces the Turks form 89 per cent., 81 per cent., and 97 per cent. of the total population respectively. For the moment, I am leaving out of consideration the districts of Constantinople and Biga, for reasons that will be explained further on.

These comparisons naturally suggest a grouping of the Asia Minor vilayets into two classes—those where the Turks form 75 per cent. or more of the population, and those where their ratio falls below 75 per cent. The first class comprises the vilayets of Konia, Angora, Sivas, and Castamouni. The second class the vilayets of Aidin, Broussa, Trebizond, Adana, and the independent sandjak of Ismid.

If we go into more detailed comparisons, and examine the

statistics by sandjaks and cazas, we find that there are districts where the Greeks are stronger numerically than the Turks. Thus, in the 12 cazas of the sandjak of Smyrna (vilayet Aidin) the Greeks number 449,044, as against 219,494 Turks, who form but 29 per cent. of the total population. In the caza of Magnisa, 38,926 Greeks to 37,900 Turks; in the caza of Sokia, 25,801 Greeks to 12,987 Turks. In the vilayet of Broussa: Caza of Kios, 13,602 Greeks to 12,354 Turks; Caza of Moudania, 26,710 Greeks to 8,404 Turks; Caza of Aivali, 46,130 Greeks to 89 Turks; Caza of Artaki, 54,700 Greeks to 5,418 Turks. These cazas are mostly on the coasts; further inland, the ratio of Turks increases.

Now, if the law of self-determination is to be undiscerningly applied in deciding the future status of Asia Minor, of course the large general Turkish majority will vote for Turkish rule. The Moslem does not live willingly under infidel rule. The Moslems of India would doubtless prefer British to Turkish or Arab rule; but that is an extreme case. There is no doubt that, with all the material blessings that have come to Egypt under British rule, the Egyptians would prefer a government of their own race and creed.

But what of self-determination for the  $2\frac{1}{2}$  millions of native Christians of Asia Minor? Are they to be passed over in the general dispensing of liberty and self-government? Are the Greeks of Smyrna, Broussa, Trebizond, and Adana less entitled to such rights than the Arabs of the Yemen or the Syrians of the Lebanon?

The answer is, of course, No. But there are many advocates of a "reformed" Turkish rule, under which the Christian minority shall enjoy the same rights as the Turkish majority. Such advocates are mere theorists, without any grasp of the practical side of the scheme they propose. They show themselves to be ignorant alike of history and of the mentality of the Turk if they believe that Turkish rule can ever afford its Christian subjects that perfect equality, that protection of life, property and nationality, and that full participation in the government that is the birthright of all civilized peoples.

To begin with, I take it that all sides are agreed that a continuation of Turkish rule as it has been thus far, from the medieval Sultans down to Talaat and Enver, is impossible. That rule has been tyranny and absolutism of the worst and most degrading type.

The question then arises: Can Turkish rule be reformed to the extent of bringing it into harmony with modern ideas of civilized, free, popular government? For under a peace treaty like that which is now to be elaborated it cannot be made anything less. There can be no question of erecting a civilized autocracy or "paternal government" on the German pattern. The "reformed" Turkish rule must be a democratic government of the people and by the people; for the Christian minority in Asia Minor and Thrace is chiefly Greek, and the Greek is a democrat by temperament and by immemorial tradition. The Turk cares nothing about democratic government; his creed and traditions make for an absolutist, theocratic government. But it will be manifestly unjust to the Christian minority to force them back under such a political system as will satisfy the Turk.

Then, can Turkish rule be so "reformed" (say, rather, transformed) as to embody true democratic principles? The answer may safely be given in the negative. Such principles are alien and, indeed, abhorrent to the Turkish mind, to the Turkish tradition, and to the Moslem religion. Islam recognizes no equality between the believer and the infidel, but, on the contrary, preaches with no uncertain voice that infidels are dogs, created to be the servants and vassals of the faithful, and, as occasion may require, may be freely slain or downtrodden as a welcome sacrifice to the true faith. And such sacrifices would be no more impossible in the future than they have been in the past if the government is to remain in Turkish hands.

The traditions of the Turk are no less a hindrance than his religion to the realization of true democratic government. The Turk came into Asia Minor four and a half centuries ago as a conqueror and a squatter. He seized the land and reduced the natives to serfdom. He has lived ever since as the master in

those lands, and the Christians as his vassals. Even if forced to accept outwardly and in theory the doctrine of the perfect equality of the Christian with himself, in his heart he will repudiate this doctrine, and in practice he will seek to evade it in every possible way. And this will be no difficult task if the civil administration, the judiciary, and the gendarmerie be in Turkish hands, as they will inevitably be, since the Ottoman Parliament will be overwhelmingly Turkish. It would be useless to secure to the Christian minority by means of constitutional provisions a proportionate share in the administration. Turkish cunning would, as in the past, find some sure and legal method of circumventing and nullifying these provisions. The more crying abuses of the past would undoubtedly be abolished, at least, for the time being. But the spirit inherent in Ottoman rule would remain essentially the same. The gulf that separates Islam from other creeds and the Turk from the Greek and the Armenian is too great to allow the former to admit his former serfs and vassals to real equality. This was but too true of the Turks of the Hamidian period; it proved to be doubly true under the "constitutional" and "liberal" era of the so-called "Union and Progress" (Young Turk Party), the "intellectuals" of the Turkish nation, who were largely agnostics, so far, as their own religion was concerned, and yet for purely racial and political reasons were far more fanatically hostile to the Christians of the Empire than the old orthodox Turks. Young Turks were the highest product of the Ottoman race intellectually and politically; before they came into power their leaders lived as exiles in Western Europe, studied political sciences in France and Switzerland, and talked very plausibly and glibly about "liberty, equality, and fraternity." régime, once they obtained absolute power, proved to be infinitely more despotic, illiberal and hostile to the subject races of the Ottoman Empire than the worst reigns of medieval Sultans or of the bloody Abdul Hamid himself.

What has the Moslem community in Turkey to-day to offer better than the Young Turk régime, except a return to the former open absolutism? What elements are there in Mussul-

man society which could form and maintain real, civilized government? What political leaders can be named amongst the Turks who have any ideas as to liberal government, or any experience therein? Who is there among Turkey's prominent men whose past career offers any hope of his ability and sincere desire to offer the Christian minority their due share in the government of the country? The best advocate of the maintenance of Ottoman rule would be hard put to it to name a single Turk of any importance amongst his fellow-Turks who could safely be entrusted with the task of forming a really liberal and civilized government, and of governing Turkey in full accordance with the principles that form the basis of modern, civilized and free popular government.

This inherent inability of the Moslem to understand and to accept sincerely the doctrine and practice of free government and perfect equality between all citizens of whatever creed would inevitably and speedily lead to civil discord between Moslems and Christians, which would be tantamount to the loss of those very blessings of peace, good government and national progress which the coming settlement proposes to establish in the world.

The advocates of the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire will doubtless propose to establish some sort of control over this "reformed" Turkish Empire by outside Powers, or by the much-discussed League of Nations. So far as the latter is concerned, this is not supposed to be, properly speaking, its mission when it comes into being. Its rôle is to be rather that of arbiter, peacemaker, and policeman, as between one nation and another. It cannot conveniently undertake to exercise a continuous control and superintendence over the internal affairs of individual sovereign states, nor, indeed, interfere in those affairs except in so far as they affect international relations.

Therefore, foreign control and superintendence over the internal affairs of Turkey, if such is to be exercised at all, would have to be undertaken by a smaller group of outside Powers—most naturally by those Powers who have direct and live

interests in Turkey. We should thus return to the old "European Concert" of the Great Powers, in which Austria's place would be taken necessarily by the Balkan League or Greece, and in which America could and should legitimately claim a seat. And it is not difficult to forecast the clash of conflicting interests, mutual jealousies, and mazy intrigue that would inevitably result from such a composite superintendence of Ottoman rule, ending, in all probability, in a fresh war. The least that one can say is that to set up any system of outside control over the internal administration of the Ottoman Empire would be to court future trouble by returning to the fatal friction and the shameful compromises of a discredited past. The Greeks and Armenians of the Ottoman Empire have already paid a sufficiently heavy price for the activities of the European "Concert" in Turkey.

If, then, neither the future League of Nations could conveniently undertake to be the permanent policeman of the Ottoman Empire\* nor a concert of the interested Powers would make any better successs of the task than in the past, wherein would lie the gain to the Christians of Turkey, and to the world at large, by the maintenance of Ottoman rule? Even supposing (for argument's sake) that such outside control and supervision were made effective, what would be left of Ottoman rule but the mere name? Then why resort to so much complicated machinery merely to maintain a shadow of a rule that has not one generous tradition or liberal principle behind it in all the five centuries of its past existence, but has ever been the most hideous negation of good government and civilization that modern history has to show?

But there is still another consideration beside the question of the numerical majority of the country, which, as we have seen, is Turkish. Whoever has lived or travelled much in the Ottoman Empire knows, and can testify, that the Christians of that

<sup>\*</sup> Although the League of Nations may not as yet be sufficiently developed and accepted itself to undertake executive or administrative functions, yet it can surely delegate such functions to a mandatory Power under the League's guarantee and supervision.—En. A. R.

Empire, though numerically inferior, are intellectually superior to the Turks. As I said above, they may be described as the brains of the whole community; and the national life, intellectual progress, and material prosperity of the country is their work, to which the Turk contributes, and has contributed. nothing. On the contrary, the Turkish Government has always blocked the wheels of progress in the country, except, when foreign Governments have wrested commercial and industrial concessions from them for their own subjects by dint of long negotiation, much baksheesh, and occasional naval demonstrations. The Turk is not merely not civilized, he is, apparently, incapable of becoming civilized. His traditions of conqueror, soldier, and squatter, and his religion alike make him impervious to, and contemptuous of, the claims of modern civilization. His laws are based upon his creed, and nothing can be further removed from civilized jurisprudence and dispensation of justice than the Sheri, or Ottoman Law. His very language is largely pastoral, destitute of all scientific or professional vocabulary, cumbrous, and circuitous of expression. His traditions are those of soldiering and of an agricultural life; for these are the only two vocations that have ever attracted him. Throughout the length and breadth of the Ottoman Empire it is almost impossible to find a single physician, chemist, electrician, architect, engineer, artist. tradesman, manufacturer, or skilled mechanic who is a Turk. Among the Arabs there are a few professional men; which proves that it is not merely the Mussulman religion that debars the Turk from the paths of civilization—it is that religion, plus the Turkish blood and tradition, to which European civilization is repugnant. This is further illustrated by the fact (already alluded to above) that the Turkish "intellectuals" (otherwise known as the Young Turk Party) have proved themselves just as hopeless, from the standpoint and standards of European civilization, as the most conservative Old Turk landowner or peasant, and much more bloodthirsty.

The Turk's incapacity for civilization is nowhere more clearly demonstrated than in his public administration. The large

majority of foreigners who have lived long in Turkey agree in saying that the Turk as an individual in private life is usually not an unpleasant fellow to deal with; though separated from European and American standards by what seems to be an impassable gulf, but that he becomes a fiend incarnate as soon as invested with any public office. There has been no government so corrupt, so brutal, so unprincipled and incapable as that of the Turk. And whatever of corruption and incapacity is still noticeable in the public administrations of Balkan States can be distinctly traced back to the long centuries of Turkish domination, which left its deep impress upon these subject peoples: More hideous than even the long tale of butchery, oppression, and shame practised by the Turk upon his Christian subjects since his first appearance in these lands is this moral blight that his rule engendered upon the subject nationalities a legacy of political corruption, lack of moral conscience and sense of duty, slackness, and "graft" in public office that these nations are but now beginning to shake off.

Turkish rule has ever been but one thing—tyranny; and to maintain it would be a hideous injustice to the Christian minority, which is both intellectually and morally the superior of the Turkish majority. If, therefore, the will of the majority, under an undiscerning application of the law of nationalities, be allowed to decide the future of these Ottoman provinces, it can mean but the perpetuation of this corrupt and tyrannical rule, and the unhappiness and unrest of the civilized minority. If the will of this majority be overruled by international control, then it will cease to be Turkish rule, and Turkish sovereignty will become an empty phrase and a useless encumbrance.

It is evident, therefore, from the foregoing brief survey of the question, that the maintenance of Turkish rule is by no means a solution worthy of the historic Peace Conference that is to assemble shortly to evolve a permanent and satisfactory peace, which will eliminate all elements that can breed future wars by establishing such conditions as will make for peace, liberty, free popular government and progress. To maintain the present Ottoman Empire with no matter what administrative and constitutional reforms will not merely be not the "easier" solution of the Near Eastern question, it will be no solution at all, and within a very short time the whole question will be reopened.

The only remaining alternative is, therefore, partition or dismemberment. This, as I said above, will in effect be secured by the application of self-determination to Arabia, Palestine, Syria, Mesopotamia, and Armenia. In the case of Armenia, the law of nationalities is justly to be set aside, the majority of the population of Armenia (i.e., of the vilayets of Erzeroum, Van, Bitlis, Diarbekr, and Mamouret-ul-Aziz) being Turks or Kurds. Why should not a similar solution be found for the Greeks of Asia Minor and Thrace? It will be impossible in common justice to deny these Greeks what is being given to nations that were almost unknown when the Greeks gave to the world the first great ideas of liberty and civilization. If there were no other reason for giving back these lands to their native and original owners, the repayment of the world's indebtedness to the Greek race for its civilization, its arts and its letters would be in itself a sufficient reason.

It would, then, be not only possible, but eminently fair, to partition Thrace and Asia Minor between the Greeks and the Turks—to the Greeks the provinces where the Greek element is strongest, to the Turks those whose population is overwhelmingly Turkish—and to offer every facility for such an interchange and intermigration of the two races as to render this partition more acceptable to both sides. Thus, roughly speaking, Greece would obtain the vilayets of Adrianople, Aidin, and Broussa, and the sandjak of Ismid. Turkey would be limited to the vilayets of Konia, Angora, Castamouni, and Sivas. The vilayet of Trebizond would become, according to the long-expressed wish of its Christian inhabitants, the "Pontus Republic." The vilayet of Adana should be annexed to Armenia, to give the latter state a much-needed outlet to the Mediterranean.

Constantinople cannot be left under Turkish rule. Its command of the Straits, which must henceforth become and remain a free and neutral international waterway, and the enormous importance of its position as half-way house between Europe and Asia, between the Euxine and the Mediterranean, are reasons why it cannot remain under the retrogressive, antiquated, corrupt, and alien rule of an Asiatic squatter-folk. As well appoint Turkish zaptiehs to regulate the traffic of London or the public works of Greater New York. Constantinople is destined, once freed of the incubus of Turkish rule, to become the greatest mart and city of the whole of the Mediterranean and of Eastern Europe and Asia. On the other hand, it cannot safely be put under the control of any one European State. can only be self-governed—by its citizens, under a republican constitution. For the first years of its existence, and until it builds up stable political institutions, this Byzantine Republic. can be under the protection and guidance of the League of Nations. Its territory should be composed of both shores of the Bosphorus with the sandjak of Scutari on the Asiatic side, and with the sandjak of Chataldja on the European side—the Prinkipo Islands, the Gallipoli Peninsula, and the opposite Asiatic sandjak of Biga (Dardanelles).

This Byzantine Republic would then comprise the following populations:

| Sandjaks.   |             | Turks.  | Greeks  | Others.                                      | Totals.  |  |
|---|-------------|---|---|--|--|--|
| Constantin<br>Chataldja<br>Scutari<br>Gallipoli<br>Biga | ople (Eur.) | 308,733<br>16,100<br>124,281<br>32,613<br>138,902 | 235,215<br>54,787<br>74,457<br>70,431<br>38,830 | 297,160<br>3,188<br>59,752<br>5,100<br>5,757 | 841,108<br>74,075<br>258,490<br>108,144<br>177,894 |  |
| Tot   | als .       | 620,629   | 473,720   | 370,957                                      | 1,459,711  |  |

The vilayet of Adrianople, excepting the caza of Gallipoli, and the Asia Minor vilayets of Aidin and Broussa, with sandjak of Ismid, would be annexed to Greece.

In the vilayet of Broussa there are two sandjaks (Kiutahia and Afion-Karahissar), whose Turkish inhabitants form 91 and 98 per cent. respectively of the total population. These sandjaks, being contiguous to the vilayets of Konia and Angora, might be detached from Broussa vilayet and given to Turkey. In that case, the parts allotted to Greece in Asia Minor would be as follows:

| Sandjaks.        |        |     | Turks. | Greeks.   | Total Population |           |
|------------------|--------|-----|--------|-----------|------------------|-----------|
| Smyrna           |        |     | •••    | 219,494   | 449,044          | 754,046   |
| Magnesia         | ٠      | • • | • •    | 247,778   | 83,625           | 337,925   |
| Aidin            | • •    | • • |        | 162,554   | <b>54,633</b>    | 219.959   |
| Denizlü          | • •    | • • |        | 197,317   | 7,710            | 205.457   |
| Mentesse         | h      | • • | ••     | 113,700   | 27,798           | 142,142   |
| Broussa          | • •    | • • | ••     | 215,492   | 82,505           | 353,976   |
| Bilidji <b>k</b> | • •    | • • | • •    | 194,391   | 26,670           | 239,236   |
| Balikesr         | • •    | • • | • •    | 246,851   | 150,946          | 408,957   |
| Ismid            | • •    | ••  | ••     | 116,949   | 73,134           | 242.333   |
|                  | Totals | ••  | • •    | 1,714,526 | 956,065          | 2,904,031 |

On the other hand, it must not be forgotten that the islands that fringe the Asia Minor coast from the Dardanelles to Castellorizo, and which are almost exclusively Greek in population, belong geographically and commercially to the Asiatic mainland and should be included in the latter's population. these islands belong to Turkey, like Tenedos, Imbros, Castellorizo and the Dodecanese, but are in Greek, French or Italian occupation. Others, like Samos, Nicaria, Chios, Mitylene and Psara have been awarded by the Great Powers to Greece; yet as Turkey has hitherto refused to recognize this award, she cannot complain if they are included in the count of her Asia Minor populations. Some of them, like Samos, Chios and Castellorizo, are so close to the mainland that they must go with that mainland for the safety of the islanders. If, now, the populations of these islands are added to the foregoing table, we have the following results:

| <i>:</i>  |             | Turks.                    | - Greeks.                         | Total Population.                 |
|---|-------------|---------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Asia Minor m  | •• ••       | 1,714,526                 | 956,065                           | 2,904,031                         |
| Tenedos, Imbro<br>tellorizo<br>Dodecanese<br>Mitylene | os and Cas- | 1,550<br>11,960<br>14,376 | 21,877<br>102,727<br>125,753      | 23,427<br>118,837<br>140,439      |
| Chios Psara Samos Icaria                              | •• ••       | 300                       | 71,724<br>565<br>50,277<br>14,760 | 73,524<br>565<br>50,917<br>14,760 |
| Totals  | ••          | 1,743,562                 | 1,343,748                         | 3,326,500                         |

Of the total population, the Turks form 525 per cent. If arrangements could be made for the intermigration or interchange of the 275,000 Greeks of the vilayets of the new Turkish State with an equal number of Turks of the above table, then the Greeks in the above districts would be increased to 1,618,748, and the Turkish population reduced to 1,468,562.

Greece would unquestionably give full civic rights and complete religious protection to the Turkish population, that should elect to remain in their homes. It must be said to Greece's credit that she has always shown the greatest toleration and liberality toward her Mussulman subjects. In the first Balkan War the Greek armies everywhere respected the Turkish mosques, schools and dwellings, in contrast to the Bulgarians, who made a point of desecrating mosques and violating Moslem domiciles. Even the small Protestant Bulgarian community at Drama, Macedonia, in 1912, when that town was occupied by Bulgarian troops, forcibly took possession of a Turkish mosque in the market-place and converted it into a Congregational chapel. When reproved for this shocking act by their spiritual fathers, the American Board missionaries at Salonica, they refused to give up the mosque. And it was only when the Greeks regained Drama, that the Turks regained their mosque ! Indeed, all mosques and Turkish schools, which had been confiscated and desecrated by the Bulgarians in E. Macedonia in 1912, were restored to the Turkish inhabitants when this country was finally annexed to Greece in 1913. And the Greek

Government has even undertaken to build a mosque at Athers for the Moslem community—an undertaking that has been set back by the European War. What is more important, the Mussulmans of the new provinces acquired by Greece in 1913 were at once given full political rights, including the franchise, and in Macedonia, where they are in more compact masses, have elected fifteen Mussulman deputies to the Greek Parliament. The Turks of Asia Minor and Thrace have, therefore, every assurance that under Greek rule they will not only have equality before the law and equal civic rights with the Greeks, but also full liberty and protection for their public worship and their communal schools. Mr. Venizelos has very broad ideas on this subject, as he has shown by appointing a Mussulman governor for the province of Drama, whose population is predominantly Turkish.

The vilayets of Konia, Angora, Sivas and Castamouni, plus the sandjaks of Kiutahia and Afion-Karahissar detached from the vilayet of Broussa, as above, would then form a purely Turkish state, which could be safely left to a "reformed" Turkish administration. It would comprise a small Christian minority of 571,000 (whereof 296,000 Armenians and 275,000 Greeks in a total population of 4½ millions.

| Vilayds.                            | Turks.    | Greeks. | Armenians. | Total<br>Population. |
|-------------------------------------|-----------|---------|------------|----------------------|
| Konia Angora Sivas Castamouni       | 988,723   | 87,021  | 9.729      | 1,101,549            |
|                                     | 668,400   | 45,873  | 98,798     | 822,298              |
|                                     | 839,514   | 99,376  | 170,635    | 1,109,525            |
|                                     | 938,435   | 24,919  | 3,205      | 968,646              |
| Broussa: Sandj. Afion-Kar. Kiutahia | 244,698   | 1,200   | 5,040      | 250,938              |
|                                     | 291,317   | 16,800  | 8,800      | 317,017              |
| Totals                              | 3.971,087 | 275,189 | 296,207    | 4,569,973            |

Here, again, the exchange of these 300,000 Armenians for an equal number of Turks of the Armenian vilayets would not present insuperable difficulties; and thus the new Turkish state could find itself freed of the Christian minority, and the latter be more content under their own nations. But if it preferred

not to emigrate, this Christian minority would be amply protected against oppression by the Turkish Government owing to the presence of so many Turks in the neighbouring Christian It is possible that some readjustment could be made in the eastern districts of the vilayet of Sivas whereby a large portion at least of the 170,000 Armenians of that region could be territorially annexed to the neighbouring Armenian state. 'Also, a small tract around Amasia and Marsovan, where the Greeks are in great strength, could probably be annexed to the Pontus Republic. In any case, the Turks would still be masters of a large territory, inhabited by more than one-half of all the Turks in existence, and to which the other half could gradually migrate, if they so desired, to live under the Crescent and the sacred law of the Sheri. But it is doubtful whether this emigration will ever assume large proportions provided the Turks in Greece and the other states receive full liberty and protection; and there is no doubt that in the end Turks and Christians will settle down to an amicable and peaceful existence together, such as they have never known thus far, and would never experience so long as Turkish rule were to be maintained over the mentally superior Christian races.

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