

THE MODERN WORLD
A SURVEY OF HISTORICAL FORCES

Volume VI: TURKEY

THE MODERN WORLD

A SURVEY OF HISTORICAL FORCES

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TURKEY

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I shall be satisfied if my narrative is favourably received by readers whose object is exact knowledge of facts which have not only actually occurred, but which are destined approximately to repeat themselves in all human probability.

Thucydides : I. xxii.

PREFACE

THE original suggestion that I should write this book was made by the Editor of the Series in the Summer of 1923. At that time I had just returned from a visit to Angora, and before that I had spent the greater part of the year 1921 in studying the Græco-Turkish War, first from one side and then from the other. I was also giving the best part of my time and energy, while at home, to the study and teaching of Near Eastern history.

Before I had set pen to paper or even planned the book in outline, I was unexpectedly called to other work of an exacting nature; and, in view of this, the Publishers and the Editor of this Series—with a consideration which I gratefully acknowledge—allowed me to postpone my date of delivery. Meanwhile, I had not had an opportunity to visit Turkey again, and—knowing from my own recent, first-hand experience what rapid changes were taking place in every department of Turkish life—I felt that, if I was to take up the task at this interval of time, I must secure the help of somebody who had been observing events in Turkey at first hand more recently.

At this point, I found that my friend Mr. Kenneth P. Kirkwood, who had been teaching history in the International College at Smyrna, was returning to England with material which he proposed to use in writing a book on Turkey since the War. With the consent of Messrs. Ernest Benn and the Warden of New College, I approached Mr. Kirkwood with a view to joining forces, and the present book is the outcome of that proposal.

Although the book is the work of two hands, every effort has been made to secure unity of treatment. The joint authors first worked out the plan together in detail, and

afterwards submitted to one another, for the freest criticism and suggestion, the drafts of the chapters which they had undertaken respectively.

As regards the spelling of Turkish personal names, an attempt has been made to represent every letter that appears in the original Arabic script, but not necessarily to provide each separate Arabic letter with a separate sign. On this principle, the Arabic long vowels are represented by marks of quantity (ā, ī, ū), and, among the Arabic consonants, Khi is represented by Kh, Ghain by Gh, 'Ain by ', Hemzeh by '. On the other hand, no attempt has been made to distinguish from one another the four Arabic letters which in Turkish are alike pronounced as our Z, or to differentiate between the hard and the soft H, S and T. The chief ambiguities in this system are the failure to distinguish between the aspirate and the vowel Heh at the end of a word (an ambiguity which also exists in the Turkish orthography), and the use of the sign ' to denote not only the consonant Hemzeh but the pre-elision of the vowel augment to the Arabic definite article. This system does not pretend to be scientific. It is an attempt to attain reasonable accuracy without offending the reader's eye by introducing too many orthographical peculiarities.

In conclusion, the joint authors acknowledge with thanks the courtesy of the New York Academy of Political Science, the Editor of *The Political Science Quarterly*, and Professor Edward M. Earle, of Columbia University, in permitting them to reprint as an appendix the English text of the Turkish Constitution of 20 April, 1924, as originally published in *The Political Science Quarterly* (Vol. XL, No. 1, March, 1925) by Professor Earle and Houloussi Y. Hussein Bey. They also acknowledge with thanks the courtesy of Messrs. Constable and Company in placing at their disposal the block of a map

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of the Græco-Turkish War Zone (1919-22), which was originally made for *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey*, published by Messrs. Constable in 1922; and the courtesy of the *Encyclopædia Britannica* in placing at their disposal the block of a map of the Near East, which is being published in the new supplementary volumes of the *Encyclopædia Britannica* to illustrate an article on Asia Minor.

ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE.

June, 1926.

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PART I

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

CHAPTER I

TURKEY AND THE WEST

THE Turkish Republic which was called into existence on 29 October, 1923, by resolution of the Great National Assembly at Angora, is a monument to the ascendancy which the modern civilization of the West has established in the contemporary world. Had our Western civilization not developed on certain lines, and had it not impressed those peculiar lines of development on non-Western minds by expanding far and wide beyond its first narrow borders, it is inconceivable that a Turkish Republic, equipped with a constitution like that of 20 April, 1924, and governed by policies like those of Turkish statesmen in 1925, should ever have come into existence in the interior of Anatolia.

Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that everything in contemporary Turkey which has life in itself or interest for a foreign observer can be traced back to some Western stimulus and will be found to be a reaction against Western influence when not an emanation from it. The Turkish Army, whose prowess enabled the founders of the Republic to secure Turkish independence within the frontiers to which they laid claim, has been equipped and organized on Western models under the menace of conquest by Western (or Westernized) Powers. Turkish agriculture—the basic industry of the country—derives its chief profits by exporting its produce to Western markets, and is beginning to carry on its operations with Western-made agricultural machinery. The political idea on which the Turkish state is constructed—the conception of a nationally homogeneous, administratively centralized, absolutely sovereign state which must be served by its citizens as a jealous God, intolerant of variety or autonomy in any form—has been taken over bodily from that idea of the state which

took shape in modern France. The education and emancipation of women, which has proceeded perhaps more rapidly than any other change in the changing Turkey of the last few years, has been inspired in a general way by the feminist movement in the English-speaking communities of the West, and in some measure can be traced directly to the influence of one American educational institution in Constantinople. Turkish education in every branch, the form and content of Turkish literature, and even the evolution of the language (which, next to the relation between the sexes, is perhaps the most intimate feature in the life of a community) at present display unmistakably the all-pervasive influence of this current setting in from the Western world.

Turkey in process of Westernization, as she is to-day, is the principal subject of the present volume, in which the various aspects of contemporary Turkish life are analysed and surveyed in cross-section; but the significance of Turkey's attraction into the orbit of the West will be missed unless it is appreciated that this is a profoundly revolutionary movement which could hardly have been foreseen by the most acute observer, Turkish or Western, as recently as a century-and-a-half ago. In A.D. 1774, when the Ottoman Empire emerged from the greatest and most disastrous of its wars with Russia, Ottoman society contained hardly a tincture of Western civilization. Its political and social institutions were derived from traditions which had grown up independently from those of the West and which in many important respects were antipathetic to them; and the fact that these indigenous institutions were then palpably breaking down was taken, even by acute observers, to mean that the Ottoman Empire, and perhaps the Turkish people itself, was *in articulo mortis*. In A.D. 1774, it would have seemed fantastic to prophesy that the Empire would survive, truncated, for another hundred-and-fifty

years, and that when it fell to pieces there would emerge from it, as from a chrysalis, a Turkish nation, capable of holding its own against the nations of the West and ambitious to gain admittance to their society on a footing of equality by adapting itself to their way of life.

In order to give the reader some impression of this revolutionary change—without which, a survey of contemporary Turkey loses most of its interest and, indeed, almost ceases to be intelligible—the first part of the volume, describing the old Ottoman Empire as it existed down to 1774 and the upheavals produced by the impact of the West between 1774 and 1919, is prefixed to the main body, which deals with the War and Revolution of 1919–22 and with the new Turkey which is beginning to take shape since the Lausanne Conference of 1923. Before attempting, however, to give a view of Turkey as she was and as she is, it may be well to remind ourselves of the aspect in which she has appeared to Western eyes during the last century-and-a-half; for this is the aspect which, in spite of all that has happened, she still wears to-day for most Westerners who have not a current acquaintance at first hand with the country and its inhabitants.

What ideas are most closely associated with the name "Turkey" in our minds? Most of us think first of Turkey carpets, Turkish tobacco, Smyrna figs and meerschaum pipes.¹ If we happen to be in business, we probably think of Turkey in the second place as a market for staple British products—for example, Manchester goods—but in either case our first association of ideas is commercial. We do not primarily think of Turkey as the home of fellow human beings. We think of it as a place which absorbs a certain annual volume of British

¹ The Meerschaum mines near the Anatolian town of Eski-Shehr appear to be the only source in the world from which this material is obtained.

goods and supplies Great Britain with several special and rather exotic commodities in return.

Probably the next idea that presents itself to our minds is geographical. We visualize Turkey on the map as an area traversed by important trade-routes and containing a number of strategic positions. From the West European standpoint, Turkey is the southern, as Russia is the northern, "land-bridge" between our own world and the vast continental hinterland of Eurasia; but whereas the Russian bridge is continuous, the Turkish bridge is interrupted by the narrow waterway of the Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmara and the Dardanelles, which, for the West, is the essential line of communications—commercial as well as strategic—with Southern Russia, the Caucasus and the lower Danube Basin. The two routes—the land-route running from north-west to south-east and the sea-route running from south-west to north-east—intersect at Chanak and again at Constantinople, and their significance for us is summed up in several historic phrases: "The Question of the Straits," "The Dardanelles Campaign," "The Overland Route to India," "The Baghdad Railway."

If we reflect upon these various associations of ideas we shall find that we think of Turkey primarily as a field for the economic, political and military activities of the Great Powers of the European System—as a "no-man's land," beyond the limits of the Western world, in which Westerners may fall into dangerous conflicts with one another, or as a vacuum which may disturb, by its neighbourhood, the delicately adjusted European balance of power. In other words, we think of Turkey in terms of our own world and not of Turkey itself, and in terms of commodities and geographical features rather than of human beings. We tend to omit the Turks themselves from our mental picture of the country which bears their name.

Moreover, when we do take cognisance of the Turks, we are apt to take extreme views about them. The epithet popularly associated with the Turk in the English mind is "unspeakable," and the inevitable reaction against this popular prejudice takes the form of representing the Turk as "the perfect gentleman" who exhibits all the virtues which the ordinary Englishman lacks. Both these pictures are fantastic, and both convict the people who draw them of failure to feel about the Turks as fellow men. Such pictures are not genuine attempts at portraiture but targets for the innocuous discharge of emotion. The popular picture of "the unspeakable Turk" satisfies the craving to indulge in righteous, or self-righteous, indignation; the contradictory picture of "the Turkish gentleman" satisfies the desire to fly in the face of a vulgar superstition (a desire which, in any community, is always to be found among a quixotic or provocative minority); but both parties are really treating their villain or their hero as a lay figure, and they hit upon the Turk for this purpose because they do not either of them take him seriously or apprehend him imaginatively as a fellow-creature of flesh and blood, knowing good and evil, capable of happiness and sensitive to pain.

In these circumstances, it is not surprising that the trend of modern Turkish history has often been misconceived in the West, and that, again and again, the prognostications of Western onlookers in regard to the immediate future of Turkey have fallen ludicrously wide of the mark. It has been noted already that the movement of Westernization, which has dominated Turkish history during the last century-and-a-half, is so recent and so revolutionary that it might easily have been misread by the most acute and sympathetic observer; the non-humane, if not inhuman, standpoint from which Turkey has usually been approached by Western observers has made misunderstanding still more difficult to avoid; and

this perhaps explains a situation of which we ourselves are hardly conscious but which will assuredly strike future generations, looking back upon it in perspective, as an extraordinary paradox. This Westernizing movement in Turkey, which has reached its climax since the Great War of 1914-18, is one of the outstanding testimonies to the potency of Western civilization among the modern nations of the world; and yet the West itself, which has been the *primum mobile*, has apparently remained unaware of what its own right hand has been doing.

The fundamental fact in modern Turkish history is that the Turks, starting from a historical background and a social system far removed from ours, have latterly been coming on to our ground as fast as it has been humanly possible for them to travel over the rough country that intervenes; but most Western observers have mistaken the direction in which the Turks have been moving and have been blind to the star which has been drawing them on. The cause of this blindness has been a failure to take an objective view of the original point from which the Turks started on their adventurous course.

Having remarked the profound difference between the Turkish historical background and ours, Western observers have seldom paused to consider that both backgrounds alike have been created by the natural adjustment of a particular human society to a particular environment. They have generally assumed that the Turkish background is unnatural because it is subjectively repugnant to the Western mind; this has led them into the further assumption that the Turks are somehow guilty of "original sin" in having developed originally on different lines from ours; and, on the strength of this almost theological hypothesis, Western observers have then made a false inference from the facts before their eyes. Having taken note of the two palpable facts that the Turk's background is different from ours and that recently the Turk has

been passing through a time of change and trouble, they have failed to perceive that he has been undergoing a metamorphosis, and have jumped to the conclusion that he is paying the divinely ordained penalty for his original sin. "The wages of Sin is Death," and the Turk is accordingly written off as "the Sick Man of Europe"—stricken with a fatal malady.

This picture of the Turk as "the Sick Man" has had a curious history. It substituted itself in the imagination of the West for the older picture, in which the Westerner was the sinner and the Turk was the Scourge of God, divinely commissioned to chastise him, sometime between the raising of the second Turkish siege of Vienna in 1683 and the establishment of the Russians on the shores of the Black Sea through the Peace Treaty of 1774. The phrase in which the new concept of the Turk finally found its classical expression was coined by the Czar Nicholas I in 1853, during a conversation with the British Ambassador in St. Petersburg. "We have on our hands a sick man—a very sick man. . . . He may suddenly die upon our hands. . . ." From that day to this, the imminent decease of the supposed invalid has perpetually been awaited by his neighbours—by some of them with pleasurable expectancy, by others with anxiety, but by all with a dogmatic faith which seems capable of surviving any number of disillusionments. It was awaited in 1876 and in 1912 and, most confidently of all, in 1914; and now, when the Turk has given incontrovertible evidence of outward health and vigour by imposing the peace-settlement of Lausanne upon the victorious Allied Powers, his imminent dissolution through some hidden internal disease is prophesied with all the old assurance. We are told that the ravages of siphylis will extinguish the population of Turkey in three generations, or that the Turk cannot mend his own boots or work his own locomotives and will therefore perish through sheer economic

incapacity now that alien minorities have been driven out. This persistence of the "Sick Man" theory indicates how powerfully the Western attitude towards Turkey is governed by *a priori* notions and how little it is based upon objective facts ; for, as it has turned out, "the man recovered from the bite, the dog it was that died." At the time of writing, seventy-three years after Czar Nicholas I pronounced his celebrated verdict, the Czardom has vanished not only from St. Petersburg but from the face of Russia, whereas the Turkish "Sick Man" has taken up his bed and walked from Constantinople to Angora, where, to all appearance, he is benefiting by the change of air.

Thus the Turk perpetually astonishes the Westerner by failing to correspond to his ready-made picture of what the Turk must be, and the astonishment is heightened on the comparatively rare occasions when individual members of the two societies meet face to face. The Westerner has ascertained that the Turk speaks a Turanian agglutinative language instead of an Indo-European inflective language, that he writes it from right to left in the Arabic script instead of from left to right in Roman letters, and that he professes Islam instead of Christianity. With these facts in his mind, he vaguely expects to be confronted by a savage with a flat nose, leathery skin and Mongoloid eyes, mounted perhaps on one of those apocalyptic horses whose hoofs blight the grass where they have trod ; or else he expects to see before him a corpulent figure wearing an immense turban, voluminous robes and a flowing beard, and followed, at a respectful distance, by a procession of veiled women constituting his "hareem." The Westerner does not reflect that Turanian languages are also spoken by his own kinsmen the Hungarians and the Finns, that the Arabic script is an ancient and efficient form of short-hand, and that theologically Islam was an anticipation

of Unitarianism, with a Calvinistic view of predestination and a Protestant belief in the literal inspiration of the Qur'ān. Accordingly, he receives a shock when his Turk turns out to be a White Man wearing Western clothes as if he wore them every day, speaking better French than most Englishmen or Americans, and indistinguishable in figure, features, colour and countenance from a native of Transalpine Europe. No doubt many readers of this book will have seen pictures of Mustafā Kemāl and have wondered whether, in physical appearance, the President of the Turkish Republic was typical of his nation. The answer is in the affirmative. The blonde, grey-eyed, fair-skinned, straight-nosed type of "Alpine," or even "Nordic," physique is perhaps more common among the Turks than the brunette "Mediterranean," and it completely prevails over the Mongoloid type, which in contemporary Turkey is rare—though it does occur in the interior of Anatolia. On the whole, however, the impression of racial difference which the traveller obtains on a journey from the coast into the interior—for example, from Smyrna to Afium Karahisar—is not unlike that obtained in Europe by travelling from the Riviera to Normandy or Bavaria. The further the traveller proceeds inland from the west coast of Asia Minor, the more the numerical preponderance tends to pass from the dark racial type to the fair. To judge by the racial phenomena, he might be travelling towards Northern Europe and not in the direction of Central Asia.

Among those Turks who are descended from the ruling element in the old Ottoman Empire, these racial characteristics may be partly accounted for by the import of slaves from Central Europe, Russia and the Caucasus, which is described in the next chapter; but the bulk of the present Turkish nation is descended physically from the previous population of Anatolia, which, before being converted into Turks, had

figured successively as Byzantines or as Phrygians or as Hittites without any profound modification (so far as our records allow us to judge) in the racial strain. The racial types which are dominant in the Turkish nation to-day may well have been dominant among the population of Anatolia since the eleventh, or possibly the sixteenth century B.C. Indeed, even that nucleus of the later Ottoman community which migrated into north-western Anatolia from the great Eurasian Steppe in the thirteenth Christian century (following the footsteps of earlier migrants along the same road) is unlikely to have been purely Mongoloid in its physical composition. The nomads of the Eurasian steppe have been recruited not only from the Mongols but from all the races round about, and at the dawn of history the "Nordic" type seems to have been dominant among them as far east as the borders of China. In fact, there is no evidence that any of the various ancestors of the Turkish nation were markedly different in physique from their present mixed descendents, who undoubtedly rank in the mass as members of "the White Race."

At the same time, this question of physical race is perhaps less important than is sometimes imagined. There is a common assumption that "the White Race" and Western society are identical—that all Westerners are white and that all White Men are children, by birth-right, of Western civilization. This is of course a fallacy. In the New World, there are numerous coloured populations—for example the Methodist English-speaking negroes of the United States and a majority of the Catholic romance-speaking Mexicans and Brazilians—which are Western in their culture. On the other hand, in the Old World, there are, and always have been, numerous White populations outside the Western fold. In the Old World of to-day there are White barbarians, like the Rifis or the Kurds or their best of the North-west Frontier of India or the

Hairy Ainu of Northern Japan, who are in much the same social condition as our own ancestors were eighteen centuries ago ; there are civilized White Men of non-Western civilization like the Russians or the Persians ; and there are other civilized White Men who are in process of putting off one civilization and putting on another, like the Turks themselves, with whom this book is concerned.

Incidentally, the Turks, White Men though they are, do not feel that repugnance towards associating on a footing of moral equality with Coloured People which is so pronounced among the Protestant "Nordic" peoples of the Western world—particularly among those which speak the English language. In this respect, the Turks resemble the Latin members of our Western Society ; and in the Turkish as in the French, Army a coloured N.C.O., or even a coloured officer, may be seen occasionally with White soldiers under his command. Among the Turks, this racial tolerance is an old Islamic tradition, and it is therefore possible that the tide of Westernization may sweep it away. Since, however, the Turks are adopting Western civilization in its French rather than in its American form, there is some hope that they may still retain what has been one of the best features in the civilization which they are abandoning.

Perhaps enough has now been said to demonstrate that the current Western conceptions of Turkey and the Turks are in need of revision, and to indicate why this is so. The reason is that most Western observers insist upon looking at Turkey from the outside, as an anomalous excrescence upon the Western World. Viewed from that standpoint, Turkey is bound to be an insoluble enigma. In the rest of this book we shall therefore attempt to extricate ourselves from the Western standpoint, to put our feet into the Turk's shoes (or rather slippers, which are considerably easier than our own boots to

put on!), and to look out upon the world through Turkish eyes. If we succeed in doing this in any measure, we shall not only have a better chance of understanding the Turks, but we may catch a not uninteresting glimpse of our own civilization in a new light. We may see the West—as the Russians and the Turks and the Hindus and the Chinese see it—as an alien force of titanic energy, a profoundly disturbing yet intensely fascinating presence which will not be denied.

We shall also see that, while the Turk has certainly been a "sick man" in a sense, his sickness has not at any time been mortal.

In this second and more sensational part of his diagnosis Czar Nicholas went astray because he did not understand the nature of the symptoms. If a person totally ignorant of natural history stumbled upon a snake in course of shedding its skin, he would pronounce dogmatically that the creature could not possibly recover. He would point out that when a man (or other mammal) has the misfortune to lose his skin, he is never known to survive. Yet while it is perfectly true that the leopard cannot change his spots nor the Ethiopian his skin, a wider study would have informed our amateur naturalist that a snake can do both and does do both habitually. Doubtless, even for the snake, the process is awkward and uncomfortable. He becomes temporarily torpid, and in this condition he is dangerously at the mercy of his enemies. Yet, if he escapes the kites and crows until his metamorphosis is complete, he not only recovers his health but renews his youth with the replacement of his mortal coils. This is the recent experience of the Turk, and "moulting snake" is a better simile than "sick man" for a description of his distemper. This book is an attempt to draw a faithful picture of the Turk in his new skin; but in order to understand him properly, we must examine what he was as well as what he is,

and trace how he sloughed off the one skin and grew the other. Our more detailed survey of the new Turkey is therefore prefaced by an outline sketch of the old Ottoman Empire and by a summary narrative of that remarkable metamorphosis which has been accomplished here within the last hundred-and-fifty years.

CHAPTER II

THE OLD OTTOMAN EMPIRE (1373-1774)

THE institutions of the old Ottoman Empire were derived, substantially, from two sources: the civilization of the nomadic stock-breeding communities on the Central Asian steppes, whence came those few hundred refugees who, flying before the face of the Mongols, laid the obscure foundations of the Ottoman State on the north-western rim of the Anatolian plateau towards the close of the thirteenth Christian century; and the civilization of Islam, which these nomads, exiled from their native environment, imbibed on their long passage from the basin of the Oxus and Jaxartes, on the north-eastern marches of Islam, to their new home at the other extremity of the Islamic world, where Islam at that time marched with Byzantine Christendom in the Asiatic hinterland of the Sea of Marmara. Of these two elements in the new society which the Osmanlis proceeded to build up and to propagate throughout the Near East, the one was wholly alien to the West, while the other had had only transitory, and those largely hostile, contacts with it.

The peculiar institutions induced by the Central Asian environment (which, as adapted by the Osmanlis to their new conditions of life, became the most distinctive feature in their system) had never made any lodgement in the Western world, where the nomad invaders had either ebbed away as rapidly as they came, like the Huns and Mongols, or had been assimilated without transmitting any counter-influences of their own, like the Hungarians. Islam, again, which was the second element in Ottoman society, was consciously alien from Western Christendom. It is true that there had been momentous interchanges of influence between the ancient civilization of the Middle East, of which Islam was the last

metamorphosis, and the ancient Græco-Roman civilization of which modern Western civilization was the offspring. The military conquest of the Middle East by Alexander the Great had ultimately led to the spiritual conquest of the Græco-Roman world by the Christian expression of Oriental religion; and when the East, expressing itself afresh in Islam, reconquered its original domain by force of arms, it underwent in turn a spiritual conquest by Greek science and philosophy—the fruits of which were transmitted thereafter to the young society of the modern West through Islamic channels. Objectively, these interchanges were of profound importance; yet on the whole the antipathy between the two societies, which had arisen naturally out of the long vicissitudes of the military struggle between them and had been accentuated after their respective embodiment in the rival religious systems of Islam and Christendom, was made more bitter by the fact that they had become partly intertwined with one another. The common element which they had acquired by contact merely caused either system to appear to the adherents of the other as a wanton perversion of the one true way of life.

Thus the two cultural roots of the old Ottoman Empire inclined it to grow up very alien from, and very hostile to, the contemporary communities that had sprung from the soil of the West. This non-Western, and indeed anti-Western, character of the original Ottoman institutions will become apparent in a brief review of them.

As has been indicated, the nomadic elements in these institutions were the more distinctive, and an understanding of these is often obscured by the common, but mistaken, belief among sedentary peoples that the nomadic life is something primitive and haphazard. Nothing could be further from the truth. The stock-breeding communities of the steppes extract a livelihood from a physical environment in which hunters or

cultivators would be unable to maintain themselves, and they achieve this by a complicated and rigid adaptation. Indeed, the weak point in the nomadic life, considered as one of many alternative avenues for human progress, lies not in any failure to rise above the primitive level, but, on the contrary, in the establishment, by elaborate social organization, of too exact an equilibrium with a fixed environment, which virtually eliminates the element of instability and so closes the door to further change either for the worse or for the better. The nomads, in fact, are the ants and bees of the human family; and in the nomadic horde, as in the hive or the ant-heap, the individuals of the several types which make up the community are co-ordinated in all their activities by a strict military discipline and are governed in all their movements by a strategic plan. Life can only be lived on the steppes by a composite community of herdsmen, cattle and trained animals (dogs, camels and horses), by whose services the herdsmen are assisted in keeping the cattle under control; and, in order to maintain itself at the highest possible numerical strength, the horde must keep constantly on the move from one pasture-ground to another as the scanty vegetation reaches its maximum of growth in different latitudes at different seasons. These marches in search of pasture have to be planned far ahead and demand as much efficiency and experience on the part of the leaders as is demanded from a general staff in order to move an army. The movement normally follows a recurrent annual orbit, sometimes several thousand miles long, and is comparable, not to the aimless drift of vagrants, but to the rhythmical movements which may be observed in the life of advanced sedentary societies—for example, the annual movement which carries agricultural workers to and fro between Italy and Argentina in steamers in order that they may reap a harvest in the southern as well as in the northern hemisphere;

or the daily movement which carries the clerical workers of great Western cities to and fro between their offices in the congested urban centres and their homes in the suburbs. Nomadism is a highly-developed and rigidly organized way of life ; and though, from the point of view of further progress, it may be a blind alley, it is the most economic way of life in its native environment.

The trouble comes when one of those mysterious periodic upheavals of which the cause, climatic or other, is still obscure, suddenly and violently deflects a nomadic community from its regular annual orbit on the steppes and propels it into the domain of a sedentary population. Then the nomad goes forth conquering and to conquer ; for the discipline and organization which he has acquired in the process of extracting a peaceful livelihood from the steppes make him irresistible, at the first onset, in war against the agricultural and commercial populations of less inhospitable regions. In this foreign environment, the nomad's energies are suddenly diverted from herding cattle to governing an empire ; and, like all human beings, he sets out to solve the new problem with which he is confronted by applying to it his own particular experience of the past. He thinks of himself as still a herdsman, though no longer of animals but of men ; and, in order to keep these "human cattle"¹ (a less docile herd than sheep and cows) under control, he selects and trains "human watchdogs" to help him and takes greater pains over their breeding and education than his ancestors took, on the steppes, in providing

¹ In Arabic *Re'iyah*, plural *Re'āyā*. This word, in its metaphorical meaning, was borrowed from the nomadic empire-builders of Arabia by their central Asian successors, the Turks and the Mughals, and from the Mughals by the British inheritors of their Indian Empire, in the Anglicized form "Ryot." The British administration in India retains another nomadic feature in the seasonal migration of the Viceroy's camp between Delhi and Simla.

themselves with animal auxiliaries. This has been the system of most nomadic empires of which we have a record, and, as far as we know, the Osmanlis worked it out to a greater degree of efficiency than any of their predecessors or contemporaries—possibly because they were an unusually small minority ruling an unusually intelligent and civilized subject population, and were therefore driven to make great efforts by the stimulus of self-preservation.

Nevertheless, the nomadic system of empire, even in its most efficient form, bears within itself the seeds of its own decay, for in two respects it is contrary to nature. In the first place, it is an attempt to transplant a peculiar way of life from the steppes, where this is not only the most economic but the only possible means of existence, to the world of fields and cities, where it is quite uneconomic and simply constitutes an incubus on the pre-existing form of society, which is already fully developed and self-sufficient. Secondly, it is an attempt to deal with human beings in the mass on the analogy of animals, and human nature will always revolt against such treatment sooner or later. Hence, after four centuries (A.D. 1373-1774) the Ottoman Empire inevitably broke down, though, being more scientifically constructed than most of its kind, it defied destiny for a longer period and struggled more obstinately against dissolution than the empires of the Huns, the Avars, the Mongols or the "Great Mughals" of Hindustan.

In detail, the method of nomadic empires has been to treat the majority of their sedentary subjects as "human cattle" who are to be periodically milked and shorn and are to be kept in order by a ferocious repression at the first symptoms of insubordination, but otherwise are to be allowed to live their own lives in their own way; and to control these "human cattle" through the agency of a small, select body of "watch-

dog" slaves recruited partly from prisoners-of-war, partly from the victims of professional slave-raiders and slave-dealers, and partly from children who are rounded-up periodically from the "human herd" in order to be broken-in by their masters, with no more compunction than a shepherd feels in separating the lamb from its mother or the calf from the cow. Under the Ottoman system, these "human watch-dogs" were deliberately differentiated from the "human cattle" in almost every respect. Instead of being passive members of the community they constituted the effective power of the state; yet at the same time, so far from being allowed to go their own way as long as they produced their increase in due season, they were kept under minute and perpetual discipline, and the greater the responsibility with which they were entrusted, the less they were allowed to call their souls their own. From beginning to end of their career, and after they had risen to be generals and governors and ministers of state even more than when they were still page-boys in training for their vocation, they were constantly reminded that they and their wives and their children and everything that they possessed were the absolute property of the Government, which, in most nomadic empires, was originally embodied in the person of an autocratic monarch. At their death, their possessions escheated automatically to their royal master, and he could anticipate his claim by depriving the slave of office, rank, property and life itself at any moment at his own unfettered discretion. Since, however, the human "watch-dog," unlike his animal prototype, is, after all, of the same species as the master himself, there has been a tendency, in most nomadic empires, for the dynasty to become merged in the slave-household on which its power depends. For example, the slave-household of Mamlūks (an Arabic word meaning "pieces of property") through which Saladin built up his power in the twelfth Christian century,

themselves took over the sovereignty from the feebler hands of his heirs ; so that from A.D. 1250 to A.D. 1811 Egypt was ruled by the children of Oriental Christian peasants in Trans-Caucasia, purchased as slaves in boyhood by an older generation of their countrymen who had risen, as they were to rise in their turn, from being the slaves of the rulers of Egypt to being the rulers themselves. In Mediæval India, again, where (as in the Near East) Islam was imposed upon an alien society by ex-nomads, there was the series of " Slave Kings " at Delhi, where for 82 years (A.D. 1206-1287) the succession passed, not from the father to the son of his loins but from the master to the slave conscripted or purchased or captured in war, trained in a hard competitive school, and proved by the test of practice to be worthy of the purple.

In the Ottoman Empire the dynasty of the founder's son, who bequeathed his name not only to the state but to the dominant community in it, was not extinguished or superseded in the male line until the year 1922 ; but from the beginning of the fifteenth Christian century onwards the Ottoman Sultans ceased to contract legal marriages and took to breeding exclusively from the female members of the slave-household, who were selected and trained on the same principles as their male counterparts. Thus, from that time onwards until the formal abolition of the slave-household by Sultan Mahmūd II (A.D. 1808-39), the sovereigns of the Ottoman Empire were themselves slaves, or (more accurately) sons of their fathers' slaves, on the mother's side, and this merging of the royal family in the slave-household goes far towards explaining psychologically the barbarous " fundamental law " of Mehmed II (the conqueror of Constantinople), in which he directed his successors to put all their brothers to death at the moment when they ascended the throne. The royal family, like the slave-household and the " human herd " below

it, was to be treated on the analogy of domesticated animals, and the superfluous members were to be "bow-stringed" just as superfluous kittens are drowned as soon as one of the litter has been picked out as the best from which to breed the next generation.

On the training of the slave-household, from the palace gardeners up to the Sultan himself, the efficiency of the Ottoman Empire depended; and we have several first-hand accounts of what this training was from young Westerners who were captured in war and were passed through the Ottoman system before they managed to escape and to return to the Western world. There was the young German Schiltberger, for example, who was taken prisoner at the battle of Nicopolis in A.D. 1397, was drafted into the Ottoman slave-household, served in the Ottoman ranks in A.D. 1402 at the battle of Angora against Timūr, and had the misfortune to be taken prisoner a second time and carried off to Central Asia before he extricated himself from the toils and made his way back to Germany to place his amazing experiences on record. The system as it existed rather more than a century later is described again, in a memoir by a young Genoese named Menavino; and through these and other contemporary narratives from the pens of ex-slaves we are able to form a detailed and accurate picture of the institutions, so alien to our Western society, which, for several centuries, made the Ottoman Empire the most efficient state in the world in the arts of administration and war.

The boys or young men who were recruited (through the several channels above-mentioned) for the Ottoman slave-household were first sent for three or four years into the interior of Anatolia to learn Turkish and to build up their physique by hard labour on the land. They were then returned to the depôts in the capital, and were graded—some being

attached to the corps of palace gardeners, others to the fleet, while others again were hired out to work for private employers. After these two stages of probation, the fittest were drafted, by individual selection, into the corps of Janissaries—the famous body of uniformed and trained (though turbulent) infantry which, until the Ottoman system began to break down, was strictly limited to a strength of about 12,000. The Janissaries, however, in spite of their well-deserved military reputation in the West, were not the *corps d'élite* of the Ottoman slave-household, which was differentiated (like the pack of “watch-dogs” in Plato’s imaginary Republic) into a fighting and an administrative sub-division. The candidates for the latter were picked out from the beginning and, instead of being sent to ply the spade in Anatolia, were given a course of intensive training, lasting as long as twelve years, in residential colleges established in Adrianople, at Constantinople and on the Bosphorus. There they received a literary education in Arabic and Persian (the “humanities” of Islamic culture) as well as instruction in athletic and military exercises and in some manual trade. As a practical training in life, they were given minor posts in the household service of the Sultan, and the nearer they came to his person, the higher the post to which they were eventually appointed upon their “graduation.” This took place at the age of twenty-five, when each page was given audience by the Sultan and was presented by him with a horse and its equipment—after which, the less promising were drafted, by a further process of selection, into the household cavalry, while a chosen few were at once given responsible administrative positions, and would eventually rise to be the governors-general of provinces, the commanders of armies, or the ministers of state who directed the central government of the Empire.

The principles on which this remarkable system of education

was conducted were minute supervision ; scientific selection ; grading and differentiation of functions ; ruthless severity of discipline ; and keen competition—which was stimulated not only by the possibility, at every stage, of qualifying for a higher rank in the service, with the Grand Vizirship as the ultimate goal of ambition, but by the differential rates of pay (for these slaves were paid even during their apprenticeship) which the different ranks carried with them. Forcible conversion to Islam was not attempted, but the unconscious assimilation of the Islamic mental environment during the formative years (assisted, perhaps, by conscious self-interest as the boy grew to maturity) seems to have brought about voluntary conversion invariably. Nevertheless, these ex-Christian administrators of the Ottoman Empire sometimes kept in touch with their parents, from whom they had been taken away in their early youth, throughout their career in the Sultan's slave-household. For example, Ayas of Khimarra in Albania, who held the rank of third vizir (minister of state) during the early years of Suleimān the Magnificent's reign, used to send an annuity to his peasant mother, who had entered a nunnery at Avlona ; and Sokollu, who started life as an acolyte in a church in Serbia and rose, through the slave-training, to be minister of state at the end of Suleimān's reign, created a Serbian Patriarchate at Peć for the benefit of a relative named Makarios, who had continued to follow the ecclesiastical avocation from which Sokollu himself had been forcibly diverted to his own great ultimate advantage.

The key-stone of the whole system was a regulation that the free Muslim subjects of the Sultan should be ineligible, by birth, for entry into the household, which was reserved exclusively for non-Muslim slaves ; and that the sons of those household slaves should pass out into the class of free Muslims, with the veto, which membership of this class involved, upon

their following the career of their fathers. This rule ensured that the men in whose hands the fortunes of the Empire were to lie should be selected by merit, trained in a hard school, and prevented, when they had attained those positions of power which ability and training had opened up to them, from founding a hereditary ruling caste which might supersede the Dynasty whose creatures they were and were intended to remain. That was, however, a defiance of human nature. The free Muslim community of feudal landholders furnished at least as many soldiers as were furnished by the Sultan's slave-household to the Imperial Army, and, as adherents of the dominant religion, they were bound to regard themselves as a privileged community in the state ; yet they were excluded, by their very profession of Islam and their free birth, from holding political and military office, while members of the slave-household who had held such office were debarred from handing on the positions which they had won by merit to their natural heirs. From A.D. 1566 onwards, when the Empire was just completing the second century of its existence, the key-stone of the system was loosened. The members of the slave-household then compelled the Sultan to permit the enrolment of their sons ; and thereafter other free Muslims, who were not the sons of ex-Christian slaves, established their equal right to be admitted to a public career. From that time onwards the Ottoman public service decayed, and the Empire gradually ceased either to hold its own against the Western Christian Powers or to retain control over its Oriental Christian "cattle."

It remains to consider, more briefly, the other parts of the old Ottoman organization, which (as has been indicated already) differed structurally, from top to bottom, from the modern Western State. The tendency of Western States has been towards vertical, not horizontal, articulation—that is,

towards equal citizenship on a basis of national uniformity for all inhabitants of the country and towards the grouping of citizens by locality and not by caste. In nomadic communities, on the other hand, the articulation is horizontal. They are hierarchies of shepherds, watch-dogs and cattle; and, as between these castes (mutually indispensable though they are), the conceptions of equality and uniformity are meaningless because their members differ from one another in kind, while the conception of local grouping is equally inapplicable to a body which is constantly on the march and in which the different component elements, on account of their complementary functions, are as inseparable as are the infantry, cavalry, artillery and engineers in a Western army. In this respect, the Ottoman Empire reproduced the structure of its nomadic germ. The Sultan's slave-household, which has been described above and which was the nucleus of the state, had no local domicile, but was scattered on service through the length and breadth of the Imperial dominions (even the Sultan's personal headquarters, the seat of the central government, being a moving camp); and the "human cattle," below these "human watch-dogs," were likewise organized into a number of groups each of which, likewise, was spatially coextensive with the entire territory of the state. These subordinate horizontal organizations were technically known as "millets"—an Arabic word for which there is no equivalent in Western political terminology because it expresses an incommensurable order of political ideas. If "millet" is translated "nationality," it suggests a community occupying exclusively a solid block of territory and speaking one language; whereas some Ottoman "millets" were everywhere in a local minority and spoke a different vernacular language in different localities. If, again, "millet" is translated "church," in view of the fact that the head of each "millet" was an

ecclesiastical dignitary, that suggests an organization on a different plane from that of the state, whereas the millets were essential, though subordinate, parts of the Ottoman body politic. In addition to the ecclesiastical functions which they performed for their respective members, they registered births, deaths, marriages and wills ; maintained law-courts to decide cases of " personal statute " as between their own members and even to deal with ordinary civil litigation in which both parties were members of the same millet ; and raised taxes to pay their way ; and these functions, which in the West would be regarded as attributes of sovereignty, and, as such, would be jealously monopolized by the state, were expressly delegated to the millets by the Ottoman Government, which, in the fields which it thus assigned to the millets, upheld their authority by the sanction of its own political and military force.

The millet which took highest rank in the Empire was the Islamic community, which (though the name " millet " does not appear to have been applied to it technically) was in essentials organized on the same principles as the rest. It lived under the Sherī'eh or Islamic " canon law " which was interpreted by the muftis (jurisconsults) and administered by the kādhis (judges), the " Grand Mufti " or Sheikhu'l-Islām at Constantinople being the head of the Islamic community throughout the Ottoman dominions. To this Islāmic millet belonged the free feudal landowners and the peasants on their fiefs (in regions where these " cattle " happened to be Muslims and not Christians), and also the converted members of the Sultan's slave-household (though in practice, if not in theory, the Sultan's slaves were above the Islamic law). The next in importance was the Millet-i-Rūm, comprising all subjects of the Sultan, wherever they lived and whatever their vernacular language, who were adherents of the Orthodox Christian

Church. The recognized head of this millet, and the official link between its members and the Imperial Government, was the Œcumenical Patriarch of Constantinople—who thus came nearer, at the zenith of the Ottoman Power, towards realizing his claim to universal authority than he had ever done as a civil servant of the Byzantine Empire, when the Bulgarian adherents of Orthodoxy had possessed their “autocephalous” church as well as their independent monarchy. Since the Constantinopolitan Patriarchate was in the hands of the Greeks, the institution of the Millet-i-Rûm gave the Ottoman Greeks an ascendancy over their Bulgar, Serb, Ruman, Albanian and other Orthodox Christian fellow-subjects, and in a certain sense made them co-partners in the Empire of the Osmanlis. Their ecclesiastical domain was cut down in 1557 by the establishment of the Serbian Patriarchate at Peć; but this was abolished in 1766 through the influence of the Greek official class in Constantinople, whose power in the Ottoman state was at that time on the rise as the Ottoman Government came more and more to lean upon its Greek civil servants in its dealings with the Western Powers. It was not till 1870 that the Porte effectively broke up the Millet-i-Rûm by calling into existence the Bulgarian Exarchate. Of lesser importance were the Armenian millet under the Gregorian Patriarch at Constantinople, the Jewish millet under the Grand Rabbi, and the community of Roman Catholic “cattle” under a representative of the Pope.

There were other Catholics, and also Protestants, domiciled in the Empire who were subjects, not of the Sultan, but of Western Powers such as Venice, France, Holland and England; and these foreign colonies of merchants (which were confined, till the close of the eighteenth Christian century, to half-a-dozen Levantine ports) were granted communal autonomy, on the millet principle, under the presidency of their several ambassa-

dors and consuls. These privileges of extra-territoriality were mostly embodied in "capitulations" or unilateral charters from the Sultan which were revocable at will. In the case of France, alone, they rested on a bilateral treaty of A.D. 1535, which was binding on both parties. The Osmanlis regarded these Western commercial colonies as their nomadic ancestors on the steppes had regarded the alien inhabitants of the oases, from whom they used to purchase the few articles of necessity or luxury which they wanted and could not produce for themselves. Like the Oriental Christian "cattle" of the millets, the Western strangers within the Sultan's gates might manage their own affairs in their own way so long as they paid submissively the tolls, regular or irregular, which the Sultan and his slaves exacted from them.

This was still the constitution of the Ottoman Empire in A.D. 1774, but by that year revolutionary changes were at hand. For nearly a century, the Empire had been fighting a losing battle against the West, and it had now been disastrously defeated by the Russians, who, a century earlier, had been the most backward of the Oriental Christian peoples. These Russians had set out to adopt the ways of the West at the very moment when the Ottoman military reverses at the hands of Western Powers began. This was, and was realized to be, the secret of their victory over the Osmanlis, and so the Russo-Turkish War of 1768-74 and the Peace Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarja made a deep impression both upon the Oriental Christian subjects of the Osmanlis and upon the Osmanlis themselves.

CHAPTER III

THE IMPACT OF THE WEST, 1774-1919

THE "human cattle" of the Osmanlis turned towards the West about a century earlier than their masters. Their new orientation, or rather "occidentation," which became visible, rather suddenly, between the first and last quarters of the seventeenth Christian century (contemporaneously with the parallel change in Oriental Christian Russia) was one of the most important mental movements of modern times—and also one of the most revolutionary, for up to that time, in spite of the common name of Christian, the Oriental and the Western Christians had been deeply estranged from one another.

Their first contact, after their differentiation in the Dark Ages, had been through the mediæval Western movement of expansion known as the Crusades, of which Oriental Christendom rather than Islam had been the ultimate victim. The Oriental Christians had made the acquaintance of the Westerners as fierce conquerors, intolerant propagandists of their own version of the Christian creed and liturgy, oppressive political rulers, and still more oppressive exploiters of a political ascendancy for commercial gain. It is one of the curiosities of history that during the thirteenth and fourteenth Christian centuries, when relations between Oriental and Western Christendom were at their worst, there were moments when the Mongols and other nomadic kinsmen of the original Osmanlis, having just been launched on a career of conquest by one of those eruptions which occur periodically on the Central Asian Steppes, played with the idea of adopting Latin Christianity and co-operating with the Western Crusaders against the Islamic world which lay between. In the event, this conversion did not occur. The Mongol conquerors adopted the religion of the Islamic "cattle" upon whose range they had

settled ; the Osmanlis, who had fled from before the Mongols into North-Western Anatolia, likewise adopted Islam (without abandoning those nomadic institutions which have been described in the preceding chapter) ; and, in the name of Islam, the Osmanlis then set out to conquer the Oriental Christian world from the French Barons, Catalan soldiers of fortune, Venetian and Genoese merchants and other mediæval pioneers of Western society who had brought the choicest portions of the Near East under their dominion. The Ottoman conquest of the Near East (of which the vital stages were accomplished between A.D. 1355 and A.D. 1373) was made possible, partly by the positive efficiency of the Sultan's slave-household, but partly also by the hatred which the Oriental Christian majority of the population felt towards their Western Christian masters whose dominion the Osmanlis were seeking to make their own. "Better the turban of the Prophet than the tiara of the Pope," declared a Byzantine grandee during the last siege of Constantinople in A.D. 1453 ; and this attitude on the part of the Oriental Christians, who doubtless profited, to begin with, by exchanging a mediæval Western for an Ottoman master, was an important, though negative, factor in the progress of the Ottoman arms. Had it not been for this embitterment of the Oriental Christians against the mediæval West, the original Ottoman institutions, effective though they were for their purpose, would hardly have won for the Osmanlis so great an empire. Conversely, if the attitude of the Oriental Christians towards the West had not changed radically in the course of the seventeenth Christian century, the decay of the Ottoman institutions, which had then recently set in, would hardly have been attended with consequences as serious for the Ottoman Empire as those which actually followed.

Since the history of the Oriental Christian subjects of the Osmanlis does not fall within the scope of this book, apart

from its bearing on the history of the Osmanlis themselves, the course of their "Westernization" (great though its historical importance is) can only be indicated very briefly.

It was made possible by the negative attitude of the Osmanlis towards their subject "cattle," and also towards the Western strangers within their gates, which led them to make those far-reaching grants of autonomy which have been touched upon at the end of the preceding chapter. So long as the indigenous Ottoman institutions remained efficient and the Ottoman Empire therefore remained powerful at home and abroad, these grants of autonomy saved the Sultan and his household the trouble of administering elements which they regarded as necessary but external to the Ottoman body-politic, without endangering the mastery of the Sultan in his own house. That danger only began to declare itself after the War of 1682-99, at a time when the grants had been too long established to be revocable in practice. At first they were of little importance, since the Oriental Christian subjects and the resident Western merchants were severally weak and were more hostile to one another than they were to the Ottoman Government under which they lived and which kept the peace between them. They were weak even commercially (though the Osmanlis left the commerce of the Empire almost entirely in their hands), for before the close of the fifteenth century the mediæval commercial Powers of Western Europe had been prostrated—partly by their bitter struggles with one another; partly by the dissolution of the Mongol Empire in the Eurasian hinterland of the Mediterranean and the Black Sea (which closed that hinterland to Venetian and Genoese trade); and partly by their losing battle against the advance of the Osmanlis—and the new commercial Powers of the Atlantic seaboard had thrown themselves so vigorously into the competition for the new trans-oceanic trade that, to begin with, they had little energy

to spare for picking up the Mediterranean heritage of their Italian forerunners. In these circumstances, the volume of trade between the Levant and the West was small; yet, such as it was, it tended to pass into the hands of the Sultan's non-Muslim subjects, especially the maritime Greeks, and so caused the Oriental Christians to do business with the West, to visit Western ports, and afterwards to form resident commercial colonies in certain centres of Western economic life, corresponding to the Western colonies in the Levant.

At first the antipathy of Oriental Christendom towards the West (a legacy from a painful experience during the Middle Ages) prevented this commercial contact from creating relations and influences of a more intimate kind. For example, in the early decades of the seventeenth Christian century, when a Greek ecclesiastic of exceptional open-mindedness and ability, Cyril Lukaris, penetrated as far West as Geneva, mastered and accepted the Calvinist system of theology, attempted a formal conciliation of the Calvinist and Orthodox faiths, and even rose to be Patriarch of Constantinople with this programme, he was eventually brought to destruction by the reactionary majority of his own Church, who joined forces with the Jesuit mission at Constantinople in persuading the Ottoman Government to put him to death as a dangerous revolutionary. By the later decades of the seventeenth century, however, the general attitude of Oriental Christendom towards the West had undergone a profound change—partly, perhaps, because the bitter memories of Western oppression in the Middle Ages had gradually been effaced by time, and partly because at this moment the West itself rather suddenly ceased to fight wars of religion and began to practise toleration, so that it became possible for a non-Catholic or a non-Protestant stranger to visit a Catholic or Protestant country and acquire its material technique and its intellectual culture without being compelled

to subscribe to its religious dogmas. Before the century was over, Peter the Great, the most celebrated of all the Oriental Christian "Westernizers," had gone to school in Holland and England and had used his autocratic power to impose what he had learnt in the West upon his Russian fellow-countrymen. In the same generation a number of Greeks who had been brought into touch with the West by commerce, and had thus become familiar with Western languages, opened their minds to Western sciences, arts, and political and intellectual ideas and thus started a Westernizing movement among the Oriental Christian "cattle" of the Ottoman Empire which was more gradual and more obscure, but possibly less superficial, than that started by Czar Peter in Russia.

Within less than a century this movement had produced striking results. The Ottoman Government, which from the War of 1682-99 onwards was usually worsted in military encounters with Western opponents and was therefore driven to make the best terms that it could by negotiation instead of dictating them as a victor, had turned for assistance to its Oriental Christian subjects with their new knowledge of Western languages and Western ways. High offices of state, diplomatic and administrative, had been created for exclusive occupation by Oriental Christians, and since their special acquirements now constituted their value to their employers, these new officials were not compelled to go through the Ottoman slave-training, like the "human watch-dogs" recruited from the same source during the preceding centuries, but were allowed to retain their own religion together with their hybrid Western and Oriental Christian culture. Within less than a century, likewise, the military organization of Russia, and the concomitant administrative and financial reorganization on which it depended, had reached a point at which Russia—once the most backward of Oriental Christian countries

and the slave of the Osmanlis' "poor relations," the Tatars of the Golden Horde—was able to inflict on the Ottoman Empire a defeat as disastrous as any which it had yet suffered at the hands of Western Powers like the Hapsburg Monarchy or Poland. Under the Peace Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarja, which terminated the Russo-Turkish War of 1768-74, the Ottoman Porte was compelled to cede to Russia the suzerainty over the Crimean Tatars, the direct sovereignty over several ports on the northern coast of the Black Sea, the right of way for Russian merchant-ships through the Straits, *en route* between these new Black Sea ports and the open Mediterranean, and capitulatory privileges, on a most-favoured-nation-treatment basis, for Russian subjects resident in Ottoman territory. It had been bitter for the Osmanlis to be beaten by the peoples of the West, though the West had never failed substantially to hold its own against Ottoman aggression, even at the height of the Ottoman Power. It was far more humiliating to be beaten by an Oriental Christian people and to be compelled to grant to that people privileges which would place it in the same rank as the Western Powers and would bring its representatives—with all the prestige of their newly-won position—into dangerous contact with the Osmanlis' own Oriental Christian subjects. The shock produced by the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarja was so great that it inspired Ottoman statesmen to attempt reforms on Western lines; but these first Ottoman reformers started from the military end like Peter the Great, and not from the commercial end as their own Oriental Christian subjects had started in Peter's generation, now a century past.

This military line of approach to reform in a Western direction is the key to an understanding of the "Westernizing" movement among the Ottoman Turks, and of the repeated discomfiture of that movement, from the Treaty of Kuchuk

Kainarja in 1774 down to the armistice signed at Mudania on the 30th October, 1918. Among the Turks, the movement did not begin as a result of spontaneous personal contacts but as an act of policy—an attempt to hold their own against the West at the point where the increasing superiority of the West was most dangerous and most evident. It was sound reasoning to conclude, as these Turkish reformers did, that the West could only be fought with its own weapons. On the other hand, the military efficiency of the West was a symptom, and not the cause of the West's general superiority. In order to approach that level of military efficiency a non-Western community would have to acquire not merely the military technique of the West but the administrative and financial and hygienic technique and the economic productivity on which a modern Western army depended. In fact, it could not effectively acquire Western military technique without acquiring the whole Western way of life, which, like other civilizations, was one and indivisible. This being so, it was unfortunate for the Turks that they should have approached the general problem of "Westernization" from the military point of view (though it was natural and indeed almost inevitable that they should do so, since urgent military necessity alone had induced them to contemplate abandoning any part of their own institutions in favour of Western substitutes). It was unfortunate because the military side of Western life was perhaps less progressive and less educative than any other. Nevertheless, this was the principal channel through which the Turks imbibed Western culture for nearly a century-and-a-half after the signature of the Peace Treaty of 1774. During the first half of the nineteenth century the reforming efforts of Sultans Selim III and Mahmūd II in Turkey and of Mehmed 'Ali in Egypt (a self-made man of Turkish nationality who was a greater statesman than any of his imperial contemporaries at

Constantinople) were directed, first and foremost, to the Westernization of the Ottoman Army; and after their new-model military establishments had been brought into being, the corps of Turkish officers came to play a leading part in each further attempt to advance—not that officers in Turkey, any more than elsewhere, were initially more liberal minded than people in other walks of life, but because for the next century they were the only numerous and organized class in Turkey that received a systematic Western training and were therefore exposed to the influence of Western culture, the general effect of which, upon the non-Western mind, was revolutionary. Even under the tyrannical autocratic *régime* of Sultan 'Abdu'l-Hamîd (1876-1908), which went to such lengths of reaction that the importation of any printed book into Turkey was prohibited, the Western education of the military cadets was not suspended. 'Abdu'l-Hamîd could not discontinue the training of military officers in the Western art of war without placing his hard-pressed Empire entirely at the mercy of covetous neighbours; but the young men, on their part, could not learn their tactics and strategy without learning Western languages, and these gave them the key to the universe of Western thought. Hence it was a young officer, Enver Bey, who raised the standard of revolution against 'Abdu'l-Hamîd in 1908, and another soldier, Mustafâ Kemâl Bey, who led his countrymen in defying the Allied Powers, resisting the Greek invasion of Anatolia and drawing up the Turkish National Pact in 1920. One of the reasons why the efforts of the Committee of Union and Progress failed during the years 1908-1918, as the efforts of previous generations of Turkish "Westernizing" reformers had failed before them, was this inevitable but undue predominance of a military element which was unfitted by its profession to carry through those liberal and constructive reforms of which its Western

education had given it the vision. It is noteworthy, however, that, as early as the "Young Turkish" Revolution of 1908, the part played by Enver the soldier appears to have been spectacular rather than genuinely dominant, and that the movement was directed and sustained behind the scenes by Tal'at Bey, a Salonican telegraph clerk, and by Jāvid Bey, a financier of Jewish extraction—that is, by Turks who had received their training in two non-military branches of Western technical achievement. As for the later revolution of 1919, which was not only led by officers but was started in order to carry on a war for life or death against a foreign invader of the Ottoman Turkish "homelands," it seemed in 1925 as though its ultimate outcome would depend on whether, after the victory had been won, the military aspect would recede into the background. The chances that this might happen were greater than they had ever been before, because the Revolution of 1908, if it achieved nothing else of permanent constructive value, did open to the young men (and women) of the Turkish nation the gates of higher education which had been closed against them throughout the Hamidian *régime*, so that, a dozen years later (in spite of the chronic intervening state of war) a generation of Western-educated Turks was growing up in which the preponderance of the military class was less marked than it had been before. But this is to anticipate later chapters and indeed to anticipate the future. In the present chapter it remains to survey briefly the Turkish "Westernizing" movement between 1774 and 1918.

The difficulties in the path of the new Turkish "Westernizers" were more numerous and more formidable than those which had confronted their Oriental Christian fore-runners. In the first place, the Turkish "Westernization" began as an artificial movement on the part of a Government, not as a spontaneous movement among a number of private

individuals. Secondly, it was begun late in the day (a century later than the Greek and Russian movements) and on the spur of the moment, under the threat of military destruction. In the third place, it had to be carried through during a prolonged crisis, which lasted from the signature of one Russo-Turkish Peace Treaty at Kuchuk Kainarja in 1774 to that of another in Paris in 1856, and during which the existence of the Ottoman Empire was repeatedly threatened by subject Christian insurgents and by foreign enemies. In the fourth place, these causes gave it (as has been explained above) an unduly military complexion, and this was an unfortunate guise in which to envisage the problem. In the fifth place the Turkish reformers, as if their troubles with Western or Westernized neighbours and with Oriental Christian subjects were not enough, had to overcome strong opposition from the Sultan's slave-household and from Islamic society.

The resistance opposed to the Greek and Russian Westernizers by the reactionary forces in Oriental Christendom was exceptionally weak, because the original institutions and traditions of Byzantine society had been passed under the harrow, first of the Crusaders and then of the Osmanlis. By the date at which the Westernizing movement began, there was little life left in the carcase; yet, even here, the Calvinist Lukaris fell a martyr to the Western cause in the seventeenth century, while Bishop Vulgaris, the chief Westernizing Greek educationalist of the eighteenth century, had to retire from the domains of the Œcumenical Patriarch of Constantinople to the dominions of the more liberal Russian Empress. Even Korais, the father of the Modern Greek language, could only indulge in denunciations of the Orthodox Church because he was safely domiciled in revolutionary and free-thinking Paris. Far more violent was the resistance offered to the Turkish "Westernizers" by the slave-household and by Islamic

society, which, though both in decline, were both still living institutions.

The resistance of the slave-household was the most immediate and the most violent, because of their vested interests which Western military reform was bound to extinguish ; and though they had long since become completely ineffective for fighting a foreign war or putting down an internal rebellion, they were still able to slay their masters. Sultan Selim's attempt in 1807 (at the suggestion of Sebastiani, Napoleon's military attaché at Constantinople) to reorganize the Janissaries cost him his life at their hands, and Mahmūd II had to let eighteen disastrous years go by before he was able to avenge his kinsman and precursor. Mahmūd exterminated the Janissaries at Constantinople in 1826 ; Mehmed 'Ali had exterminated their counterparts the Mamlūks at Cairo in 1811. Neither statesman could begin his military reconstruction on Western lines, or any of the other changes in a Western direction which that involved, until these useless but not stingless drones had been removed ; and the start of fifteen years which Mehmed 'Ali gained over his suzerain gave Egypt the lead over Turkey thereafter until the simultaneous catastrophies which overtook both countries between the years 1875 and 1883.

The opposition in the bosom of Islamic society was less immediately apparent, but was more deeply rooted. Whenever a weak and inefficient society comes suddenly into close contact with a society that is strong and vigorous and effective, there are two alternative and contrary lines along which its members may react towards this dangerous and nervously distracting situation. Either they may fortify themselves in the citadel of their own past and thus attempt to break contact with the disturbing intrusive force and to withdraw into isolation ; or else they may accept the fact that the alien civilization is more potent than theirs and has come to stay, and may make up

their minds to meet a situation, which they cannot avoid, by attempting to adjust themselves to it and to reach some *modus vivendi* between their own traditions and the new order which is taking their kingdom by storm. The latter is the rational course, and it was on this course that the Ottoman reformers embarked from the moment when they resolved to Westernize their military system (a step which involved the eventual Westernization of their life as a whole). However, the rational attitude is not characteristic of Mankind in the mass, or even of most leaders of men, except for brief periods in the history of progressive societies. In a sudden crisis, men tend to act on instinct coloured by emotion. They take refuge from the unknown by hiding their heads in familiar sands and expect salvation through a miracle. When the unknown is a stronger civilization, they take refuge in the religion of their fathers and call on the God of their fathers to save his servants who keep his law. In the Oriental society of the time of Jesus, which was living under the shadow of advancing Hellenism, the rational and mystical tendencies were represented by the two parties of "Herodians" and "Zealots"; and, from the last quarter of the eighteenth Christian century onward, there were "Zealots" as well as "Herodians" in the Islamic world.

In the last quarter of the eighteenth century, while the Ottoman Government was making its first attempts to clothe, arm and drill its troops in Western fashion, the oasis-dwellers and tribesmen of Najd (East Central Arabia) were being converted to Wahhābism—a new Protestant movement in Islam which insisted upon a return to the principles and practice of the Faith in all their primitive strictness. The zeal of the Wahhābis was directed against the laxity and corruption of the Islamic population in the more civilized parts of the Ottoman Empire, and particularly against the Ottoman Government itself and all its works, including its ungodly inclination

towards the filthy devices of the Frankish infidels. The Wahhābīs took and purged Mecca in 1803 and Medina in 1804. They were crushed by Mehmed 'Alī, under orders from the Sultan, between 1810 and 1817, in a long series of campaigns which assisted the Westernizing Pasha of Egypt to get rid of the old-model Army (a gang of turbulent Turkish and Albanian adventurers which had re-occupied Egypt in 1801) and to begin the training of the new model. The second round of the struggle was fought in Africa, where in the last half of the nineteenth century the Sanūsīyah religious order established an empire stretching from the back-country of Cyrenaica southwards to Wadai in the Western Sudan, while in 1883 the eastern or Nilotic Sudan was conquered by the Mahdists from the pseudo-Frankish Government of Egypt, which had held the country for half-a-century. This time the Islamic zealots had to deal not merely with their own more progressive co-religionists in the throes of Westernization but with actual Western Powers in the full tide of Western colonial expansion. The Mahdists were crushed, and the Eastern Sudan was reclaimed for an Anglo-Egyptian condominium, by a British Army in 1898, and the military strength of the Sanūsīyah was broken by the French conquest of Wadai in 1910 and the British repulse of their attack on Egypt in 1916. The third round was opened, before the outbreak of the general war of 1914-18, by the resuscitation of the Wahhābī Power in Najd under a prince of the House of Ibn Sa'ūd, who strengthened the ties binding his followers to himself and to one another by organizing them in a brotherhood (the Ikhwān). In 1924 the Wahhābīs—fortified by subsidies and arms received from the India Office during the General War—captured Mecca a second time, this time from King Husayn the Hashimite (the protégé of another government office in Whitehall), and began to send out their raiding parties towards 'Iraq and

Transjordan. The further development of this third round lies in the future. At the same time, the history of these three zealot outbreaks of the past century and a half, down to the time of writing, presents one common feature which suggests that ultimately the movement may not be of any great importance for the destinies of the Islamic world. In every instance hitherto, this fanatical reaction has only been able to secure a foothold in regions which geography or climate has made safe, either temporarily or permanently, against penetration by Western ways of life, whether military, economic or intellectual. It has failed to hold its ground in relatively accessible and remunerative areas like the Upper Valley of the Nile or Wadai; and it has made practically no impression on such countries as Egypt or Anatolia, which are traversed by great international highways like the Isthmus of Suez and the Black Sea Straits and where the local Islamic population is sedentary and civilized. If such Islamic peoples are to hold their own against the West, they can only do so by the rational policy of adopting Western methods of defence, diplomacy, administration, finance and economics. In these cases—and they are the crucial cases—the mysticism of the zealot is so glaringly contradicted by the logic of facts that it has little chance of capturing the imagination of the Islamic populations concerned; and these populations greatly outweigh those of the steppes and oases, in influence as well as in numbers.

In this collision between the Zealots and the Herodians of modern Islam, it is interesting to observe that, at any rate in the first stages, the Doctors of the Law and the Scribes and Pharisees, as represented by the 'Ulamā in the civilized Islamic countries, usually maintained a friendly neutrality towards the Westernizing statesmen and sometimes gave them active support. This may partly be explained by the fact that the first efforts of the Westernizers were directed against the slave-

household, the members of which—recruited from non-local and non-Muslim sources—were above the Islamic Law and looked down upon the exponents of that Law, who were drawn from the ordinary Muslim population, as no better than the “human cattle” from whom they sprang. The French, during their occupation of Egypt in 1798-1801, successfully played off the ‘Ulamā, as representatives of the Islamic church and of the Egyptian people, against the alien Mamlūks. In 1805, when the professors of the theological university of Al-Azhar at Cairo placed themselves at the head of the Egyptian popular revolt against the evils of the Turkish re-occupation, Mehmed ‘Alī adroitly induced them to depose the Pasha appointed by the Sultan and to proclaim him in his stead, which they did on the ground that the Pasha had broken the Social Contract and that the ‘Ulamā possessed the revolutionary right of dethroning unrighteous rulers—including the Sultan-Caliph himself, if the case were to arise. The story as told by Al-Gabartī, a member of the Faculty, who was a distinguished historian of his own times, recalls the dealings between the sons of the Prophets and the Jehu.¹ In 1826 the Turkish ‘Ulamā supported Sultan Mahmūd in his *coup d’état* against the Janissaries. In 1876, the theological students at Constantinople agitated in favour of the parliamentary constitution advocated by the liberal reformer Midhat against Sultan ‘Abdu’l-‘Azīz. In 1906, their Shi‘ite brethren played a leading part in the revolution in Persia. Indeed, the ‘Ulamā were distinctly on the Westernizers’ side until the Westernizing movement had made sufficient progress for the slave-household to be superseded by a new governing class with a Western education and point of view, and until revolutionaries of this

¹ Al-Gabartī: *Merveilles Biographiques et Historiques* (French translation of the Arabic original; Cairo, 1888-96, nine volumes): vol. VII, pp. 368 seqq.

class began to attack the institutions of Islam itself. In Turkey this issue did not become one of practical politics until after the overthrow of the Hamidian tyranny in 1908, nor acute until after the victory of the new Nationalists in 1922.

In Turkey and Egypt, the two leading Islamic countries of the old Ottoman Empire, the Westernizing movement was launched, amid critical circumstances, by two Turkish statesmen of exceptional ability—Sultan Mahmūd II in the one case and Mehmed 'Alī Pasha in the other. As has been mentioned already, the Westernization of the Army was their point of departure. In Egypt, where the French occupation of 1798–1801 had made a vivid impression, Mehmed 'Alī took Colonel Sève and other ex-Napoleonic officers into his service, as instructors, after 1815. In Turkey, during the eighteenthirties, a Prussian military mission was employed to prepare the Turkish Army for a war of revenge against Mehmed 'Alī (who had used his start in order to wrest Syria from his suzerain), and on this mission von Moltke served his apprenticeship. From his letters, and from a report on Egypt which was made for Lord Palmerston by Dr. John Bowring in 1839, it is possible to gauge the effect of military Westernization on the two countries by that time. Both observers were impressed by the economic burden and human suffering resulting from conscription—a Western engine of destruction which was here introduced without any of those mitigating circumstances, such as short service and effective hygiene, which accompanied its development in the Western countries where it originated. Nevertheless the new military system did produce a notable increase in public security and in the collection of revenue, and through this channel Western influences introduced themselves in unexpected quarters. For example, Bowring records that the naval arsenal at Alexandria had a maternity hospital attached to it! The reason for this juxtaposition

of two such incongruous institutions seems to have been that the Western experts whom Mehmed 'Ali had engaged to organize the arsenal had insisted on adequate medical provision for their employees, and that the Western physicians engaged at their instance to start a hospital soon became principally occupied with maternity work among the local civil population (maternity work being in steadier demand than most other branches of the medical art wherever a competent practitioner is to be found). That Muslim women should have been willing as early as 1839 to have their *accouchements* superintended by infidel Frankish physicians shows how rapidly the anti-Western prejudice was already breaking down.

The crucial period for this first Islamic attempt at Westernization was the twenty years following the peace settlement of 1856, when the defeat inflicted on Russia by France and Great Britain in defence of the Ottoman Empire gave the Ottoman Government a respite from foreign pressure, while their alliance with the two most progressive of the West European Powers gave Turkish statesmen an opportunity of carrying through the process of readjustment to the West under the best auspices. During these years, moreover, Turkey produced, in the person of Midhat Pasha, an administrator of first-rate ability with an enlightened policy. Midhat made his reputation as governor first of a European province along the southern shore of the Lower Danube and afterwards of Mesopotamia. In these territories, where the population was mixed in nationality and the Turkish element was in a minority, he strove to win the loyalty of the people for the Empire by governing in co-operation with the national leaders of the several communities, establishing public security, developing economic prosperity, and, above all, by founding mixed secondary schools in which the young men of all communities could receive a satisfactory education without seeking

it abroad and becoming imbued with anti-Ottoman sentiments in the process. The culmination of Midhat's career was his project for a parliamentary constitution with proportional representation for all the nationalities of the Empire. He was the first Turkish statesman who broke so utterly with the past as to base his policy upon treating "human cattle" as if they were human beings, but unhappily he was born too late in the day. The "human cattle" of the Osmanlis had turned to the West for salvation a century earlier than their masters, and had found it in the Western political concept of nationality, which was as incompatible with Midhat's multi-national parliamentarism as it was with the nomadic institutions of his predecessors. In 1876, the province to which he had devoted his best energy was in revolt and was destined to become the nucleus of the independent national state of Bulgaria, while his second province was destined, half-a-century later, to become the Arab national state of Iraq under the mandate of Great Britain. His labours were lost altogether to his Turkish fellow-countrymen and virtually lost to the world. His parliamentary constitution was set aside by 'Abdu'l-Hamîd and replaced by an obscurantist and murderous personal government, of which one of the earliest victims was Midhat himself. The Empire drifted into another Russian war, from the disastrous consequences of which it was only partially rescued—and that not to its true advantage—by its former Western Allies. The financial consequence, which was bankruptcy, led to the cession of six sources of revenue to a Council of Foreign Bondholders in 1882.

Thus the first attempt in Turkey at reform on Western lines, which had begun after 1774, came to a disastrous end a century later, and there was a simultaneous breakdown in Egypt, where the Rumelian Revolt, the Russo-Turkish War and the Decree of Muharrem were paralleled (in inverse chronological order)

by the rising of the Mahdi in the Sudan, the isolated military intervention of Great Britain, and the joint financial intervention of Great Britain and France. The parallel in the phenomena throws light upon their causes, which seem to have been the same in both countries.

The first of them was the dependence of the reform movement on the personal character of a few individuals. The movement was launched by the foresight and ability of Mahmūd and Mehmed 'Alī; but, once launched, it could not be abandoned or mishandled without disaster, and its initiators had no efficient slave-household, as their predecessors had in the fourteenth, fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, from which to furnish themselves with able heirs. Thus the achievements of these gifted autocratic reformers only gave their inefficient successors a greater opportunity for working mischief; and when able or single-minded statesmen appeared in the next generation in private stations, like Midhat in Turkey and 'Urābī in Egypt, and attempted, at the eleventh hour, to avert the catastrophe, they too were isolated and failed largely because they received little enlightened support or effective assistance from their countrymen. A movement so dependent as this upon individuals was inevitably precarious.

A second cause of disaster was the imperial burden, which Turkey inherited from the past in her European provinces with their Oriental Christian majorities and in her Arab provinces in Asia, and which Mehmed 'Alī deliberately assumed when he conquered Arabia, Syria and the Sudan. To guide the Turkish people alone, or the Egyptian people alone, through the profound social and mental changes implied in Westernization would have taxed the resources of their statesmen; yet these statesmen, from Mahmūd and Mehmed 'Alī through Midhat to the Committee of Union and Progress, spent their best energies, not on guiding their own peoples, but on an

anachronistic and ultimately hopeless attempt to keep alien populations under their rule. The Serbs, Greeks and other Oriental Christian peoples of the Ottoman Empire, who started from the Western concept of nationality and who, in the first generations of political independence, obtained not more, but considerably less than their proper national domain, were saved by this otherwise vexatious delay in realizing their territorial ambitions from the misfortune, which ruined Turkey and Egypt, of being saddled with an administrative burden greater than they could bear. The Turks and Egyptians could not start constructive work upon their own national self-government until they ceased to waste their strength in attempting to thwart the development of other people.

A third cause of disaster was economic. Westernization is an expensive process, and a non-Western country cannot safely fit itself out with Western upper-works unless it simultaneously Westernizes the economic substructure of society. Mehmed 'Alī, with his vicious system of monopolies and his attempt artificially to establish in Egypt manufactures on a Western model, was energetic in the economic field but misguided, while Mahmūd performed little in this field, either for good or for evil. In both countries the effects of this economic failure were serious and prolonged. Al-Gabartī's description of the terrible rise in the cost of living between 1798 and 1821 is comparable to the experience which the peoples of Europe underwent during the years following 1914. It is true that the level of productivity and the volume of foreign trade increased as the nineteenth Christian century advanced; but this increase was due to the efforts of the subject Christian elements and of Western *entrepreneurs* rather than to the efforts of Turks and Egyptians. The virtual monopoly of trade and industry in the Levant, which the Oriental Christians and the Westerners had possessed before the Westernization

of the Islamic peoples began, still remained in their hands; and with the increase in economic development this became a public danger. Financial responsibility and financial interests came more and more to be divided between different hands. Private Western capitalists acquired stakes in Turkey and Egypt which were so considerable and so widely distributed among the investing public that they could now bring political pressure to bear on their home governments to intervene, in military and not merely in diplomatic form, if those stakes were endangered by incompetent or extravagant public administration of Turkish and Egyptian rulers. The feeble successors of Mahmūd and Mehmed 'Alī learnt the fatal secret that their predecessors' prestige could be converted into financial credit (albeit on usurious terms) on the Western money market. The sums which they proceeded to borrow, often at rates which were sheer robbery, were usually squandered with nothing to show for them. The balance was swallowed up by the hopeless attempt to hold in subjection Oriental Christians in Europe or Muslim fanatics in the Sudan. When the crash came and the private Western creditors induced their governments to intervene, they saved part of their speculative assets in Turkey and Egypt, and opened the way to acquiring further assets there of a more solid character, by establishing financial control over the bankrupt debtor governments. During the next quarter of a century, the financial and economic development of the Levant resumed its progress; but it was concentrated even more than before in Western hands, and the achievement of financial and economic autonomy by the Turkish and Egyptian peoples was not only postponed, but was rendered more difficult than ever.

These causes of the catastrophe which befel the Ottoman Empire at the beginning of the last quarter of the nineteenth

Christian century equally account for the failure of the " Young Turkish " movement organized by the Committee of Union and Progress, which put an end to the Hamidian *régime* by the Revolution of 1908 ; for, though a generation had passed, the outlook and policy of these later Turkish reformers remained substantially the same as those of their predecessors. The immediate stimulus of the Revolution of 1908 was a fear, on the Young Turks' part, that a continuance of the Hamidian *régime* might lose for the Ottoman Empire the possession of Macedonia—a territory which Turkey could not hope permanently to retain since the Turkish element there was a small minority of the population. Meanwhile Macedonia was increasingly taxing the administrative, financial, diplomatic and military resources of the Ottoman Government, since it was ringed round by the new independent national states of the Osmanlis' former Oriental Christian subjects, and was claimed by each of them as part of its national inheritance—claims which they pressed by sending guerilla bands across the frontier into the disputed territory, where they fought one another on Ottoman soil and kept Macedonia in chronic disorder. Thus the Young Turks precipitated the Revolution of 1908 in order to retain for Turkey a territory which was bringing her in diminishing returns, and they proposed to retain it by fraternizing with their Oriental Christian subjects on the platform of common liberation from the Hamidian tyranny and of parliamentary self-government in which all Ottoman nationalities were to share. In return for enfranchisement, the non-Turkish nationalities in the Empire were expected to become loyal Ottoman citizens. The revolutionaries showed their sincerity by re-establishing Midhat's constitution of 1876, and for a moment the fraternization was a reality ; but it was over in six weeks, for the programme of the Committee of Union and Progress ignored the fact that

the Western concept of nationality—with its ideal of an independent state for every nation, of national uniformity within each independent state, and of the absolute sovereignty of the state over the whole population and the whole territory contained within its frontiers—was in the ascendant throughout the Near East, and that their policy was incompatible with these ideas. The former Oriental Christian “cattle” of the Osmanlis had long ago been converted to this Western political creed. The nuclei of a Greek, a Serbian, a Bulgarian and a Rumanian national state were already in being. Was it likely that the peoples and the governments of these young national states would renounce their aspiration to complete the process of national unification under the national flag, or that the members of these nationalities who still remained Ottoman subjects would abandon their hopes of political union with their independent fellow-nationals? The unlikelihood of this was increased by the fact that the same spirit of nationalism had begun to infect the Young Turks themselves—especially those among them who had lived in exile at Paris and had breathed in the political atmosphere of Western Europe, in which at this time the element of nationalism was becoming accentuated. While in theory the Young Turkish programme of “Ottomanism” meant that all Ottoman nationalities were to enjoy equal cultural liberty and that all were to be represented in parliament and in the public service on a proportional basis, in practice it meant that the non-Turkish elements were only to be enfranchized, or even tolerated, in so far as they were willing to come on to Turkish ground. In other words, it meant “Turcification” of a more sweeping kind than had ever been attempted through the agency of the Sultan’s slave household at the time long past when the native Ottoman institutions were in full vigour. In the twentieth century such a policy could not possibly succeed—though, had it been

possible, it would probably have been better for all parties concerned, since it would have obviated the terrible human suffering and economic loss which, in the actual event, overtook them all.

The disillusionment of the Young Turks was rapid and thorough. So far from accepting "Ottomanism" as the Committee of Union and Progress understood it, the non-Turkish elements in the Ottoman Empire took advantage of the crisis of the Revolution in order to promote their respective national aims, and the foreign neighbours did likewise. Austria-Hungary annexed the Ottoman provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which she had occupied under an international mandate since 1878; in collusion with her, Bulgaria repudiated Ottoman suzerainty; Italy seized the provinces of Tripoli and Benghazi in North Africa; and the Balkan States, momentarily joining forces, conquered all the European provinces which remained to the Empire west of the River Maritsa. Thus, by 1913, the new Turkish attempt at reform had resulted in that very loss of Macedonia which it had been designed to prevent, and also in the loss of Western Thrace, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Tripoli-Benghazi.

An even greater disillusionment followed the intervention of Turkey in the general war of 1914-18. The motives of the Committee of Union and Progress in taking this momentous step were complex. First and foremost their intervention was a gambler's throw—a bid for retrieving past losses by fishing in troubled waters—but there was also a more rational calculation in regard to Russia, somewhat like that which influenced Italy and Rumania in regard to Austria-Hungary. The Young Turks felt that Russia was their arch-enemy, and that if Russia were to be victorious in a general war she would not forego the opportunity to realize her traditional ambitions at

Turkey's expense (notwithstanding the fact that not only Russia but her Western Allies, who were Turkey's traditional friends, had solemnly promised to guarantee Turkey's integrity as the reward of her neutrality). They argued that Turkey could not afford to be neutral, but must throw her military weight into the anti-Russian scale. The balance was further tilted in this direction by resentment against Great Britain, who, during the century ending in 1907, had played the rôle of champion of the Islamic World against Russian aggression, but in that year had sacrificed her Asiatic policy to new exigencies of policy in Europe, and had made an *entente* with Russia, which left the Islamic peoples more at Russia's mercy than they had been before. The British Government had been cold toward the Turkish Revolution of 1908, and the British public hostile to the Turkish cause during the Balkan War. The last straw was the requisitioning, upon the outbreak of the General War, of two warships which were being built for Turkey in private British shipyards; for, although this right was secured to the British Government under the contract, and although such clauses in contracts between foreign governments and private British ship-building firms were common form, the price of these two vessels had largely been raised in Turkey by private subscription and had already been paid over, so that their requisitioning was resented by Turkish public opinion. The final impulsion was given by the arrival of two German warships—the *Goeben* and the *Breslau*—at the Dardanelles, which were promptly sold by Germany to Turkey in place of the British-built vessels which she had lost, and which then brought Turkey into a state of war with Russia by sallying out of the Bosphorus and bombarding the Russian Black Sea ports.

The Young Turks, once embarked on the War, prepared to conduct it on grandiose lines. Taking a leaf out of Sultan

'Abdu'l-Hamīd's book,¹ they attempted to mobilize the entire Islamic world and obtained a legal opinion (fetvā) from the chief religious jurisconsult of the Ottoman Empire (the Sheikhu'l-Islām) to the effect that hostilities against the three infidel Powers in the Entente camp—Russia, Great Britain and France—would be a Jihād or Holy War, even though waged in alliance with infidel Germany and Austria-Hungary. There was a good case for this opinion, since practically all Muslims who in 1914 were under non-Muslim rule (and at that time they greatly outnumbered those under Muslim rule) were subjects of either Russia, France or Great Britain, while the Central Powers only possessed a handful of Muslim subjects in Bosnia and East Africa. Nevertheless, from the point of view of winning the war of 1914-18, this Jihād was a failure, for the Indian and Russian Muslims and the Afghans, Persians, Egyptians and Rifis took no action until after the Armistice of the 30th October, 1918, under which Turkey virtually surrendered to the Entente Powers at discretion, and even then their subsequent revolts against their infidel masters seem to have been inspired, not by the Islamic feeling upon which the Turkish Jihād of 1914 had been intended to play, but by the Western doctrines of "the rights of small nations" and of "self-determination," which the Entente Powers had been sedulously disseminating during the War as propaganda against their European opponents.

Another pretentious movement which the Young Turks attempted to launch was Pan-Turanianism—a super-national propaganda for a *rapprochement* between all the Turkish-speaking peoples, on the same lines as Pan-Slavism. The idea was taken from a work by a French scholar, M. Léon Cahun, entitled *Introduction à l'Histoire d'Asie*, a copy of which (it is

¹ 'Abdu'l-Hamīd's attempt to resuscitate the Caliphate is described in a later chapter.

reported) had been lent to a prominent member of the Committee of Union and Progress by a foreign Consul at Salonica. M. Cahun's theme was the virtue of the original nomadic institutions which have been described in the first chapter of this book, and the degeneration of the nomadic conquerors after they had abandoned the law of the steppes for the law of Islam. The moral drawn by the Young Turks was that a return to their pre-Islamic institutions would bring national rejuvenation and at the same time would provide a basis for co-operation with other Turkish-speaking peoples outside the Ottoman frontiers. The practical bearing of this propaganda lay in the fact that two-thirds of the Turkish-speaking peoples of the world were to be found within the frontiers, not of Turkey, but of Russia, so that Pan-Turanianism offered a lever for breaking up the Russian Empire. This movement also came to nothing, for the Russian Empire broke down without any permanent break-up of its Asiatic portions; and meanwhile the British Government exploited the tenets of Pan-Turanianism in order to arouse prejudice against Turkey among pious Muslims and especially among the Arabic-speaking subjects of the Ottoman Empire, who were most exposed to the danger of "Turcification." The master-stroke of the British propaganda was the fomentation, in 1916, of an Arab national revolt against Turkey, which was launched in the Hijāz under the leadership of the Amīr of Mecca. When the first of Islamic peoples, to which the Prophet Muhammad himself had belonged, rose against the Ottoman Empire under the headship of a descendant of the Prophet who was hereditary superintendent of the Holy Cities of Islam, and when the insurgents joined forces with the Entente Powers, the Ottoman Jihād was stultified.

As a result of her intervention in the General War of 1914-18, Turkey lost her Arab provinces and her suzerainty over Egypt,

just as she had lost her European provinces and Tripoli-Benghazi as a result of the Revolution of 1908. After the signature, on the 30th October, 1918, of the Armistice of Mudros, which left all the Asiatic provinces south of the Taurus under the military occupation of the Entente Powers and opened the Straits to their navies, the Committee of Union and Progress was utterly discredited and the Turkish people were exhausted and in despair. At that moment they were prepared, not only to lose their Empire, but to resign themselves to some form of foreign tutelage like that under which Egypt had lived since 1882. At that moment the experience of Egypt seemed to them enviable compared to their own, and a British Protectorate or an American mandate was looked forward to by many intelligent Turks of Western education as a haven of refuge from "the strenuous conditions of modern life" in which they had proved "not yet able to stand by themselves."

PART II

THE REVOLUTION OF 1919-22

CHAPTER IV

THE BALANCE-SHEET OF THE YEARS 1908-18 AND THE PEACE TERMS OF THE ALLIES

DURING the half-year between the signature of the Armistice of Mudros on the 30th October, 1918, and the landing of Greek troops at Smyrna (convoys by Allied warships and invited by the Supreme Council of the Allied Powers at Paris) on the 16th May, 1919, the *moral* of the Turkish people was at its lowest ebb. Yet the sequel proved that the balance-sheet of the past ten years of revolution and war was not so utterly unfavourable to Turkey in reality as it appeared at first sight. As soon as the war-weary Turkish people were stimulated to fresh military efforts by the Greek invasion of their national "homelands" in Anatolia, the favourable conjunctions in the new constellation of affairs revealed themselves one after another.

In the first place those alien provinces—Tripoli-Benghazi in Africa, Albania and Macedonia in Europe, and the Arab provinces in Asia, not to speak of the nominal Ottoman suzerainty over Egypt and Bosnia-Herzegovina—were now lost once and for all, with a finality so patent that even the least impressionable Turkish "die-hard" could no longer seriously contemplate their recovery. Subjectively, this represented a crushing defeat, for the Turks had concentrated their energies for ten years on trying to retain these territories. In truth, however, her alien provinces had been a mill-stone round Turkey's neck ever since the break-down of the indigenous Ottoman system, under which they had furnished recruits for the Sultan's slave-household and fiefs for his free Muslim feudatories. It would have been vastly better for Turkey if she had let these provinces go without pouring out her blood and treasure to keep them; but that would have

been too much to expect of human nature, and, in the cutting of losses, "better late than never." After full allowance for the cost of the process, the sloughing off of these provinces was a net gain to the Turkish people and the Turkish state.

There was also a positive gain in the emergence, late in the day though it was, of a genuine Turkish national spirit, with a sober but determined temper and definite limited aims. The disasters of 1908-18 had not touched the Turkish "homelands"; but the landing of the Greek forces at Smyrna struck a blow at their heart and threatened to deprive the Turkish nation of territories vital to its existence before a Turkish national consciousness had come to life. The instantaneous effect was to arouse that consciousness (of which the sub-conscious elements had been accumulating for some time past, as the political philosophy of the West, and the results of its adoption by the Oriental Christians, had gradually penetrated the Turkish mind) and thus for the first time the efforts of the Turkish people were concentrated upon their own salvation. The grandiose dreams of Pan-Turanianism and Pan-Islamism faded away, and, under new leadership the Turks set themselves the task of becoming masters in their own house—masters first in the military and political sense of driving out the Greek invaders and securing from the Entente Powers a recognition of Turkish national sovereignty over territories in which Turks constituted a majority of the population. Beyond this immediate objective, however, they quickly began to look forward to further goals. They realized that even if they won this "War after the War" and obtained peace on their own terms, they would merely have won the war in order to lose the peace if thereafter they failed to make themselves masters likewise in the economic domain. At the same time, the social energies released for constructive national work were notably reinforced by a veritable revolution in the

position of Turkish women—a development which must be mentioned here by anticipation, though its importance was so great that it is treated in detail in a later chapter.

These changes in the internal life of Turkey were accompanied by certain important changes of a negative character, favourable to her, in her international position.

On the one hand, the patent exhaustion of the defeated belligerents in the recent general war was offset by the latent exhaustion of the victors—notwithstanding their apparent omnipotence during the few months immediately following the signature of the armistices. The true degree of exhaustion of any country which had taken part in that gigantic struggle of endurance was to be measured, not so much by the accident of whether it found itself, at the end, on the winning or on the losing side, but by the degree of development which it had attained in its economic life. The Powers with the highest economic development, such as Germany, Great Britain and France, had been able to put forth the greatest efforts and achieve the greatest triumphs of the War, but the complex organization which had enabled them to do this had also exposed them to the greatest derangement and exhaustion as the price of it. On the contrary, the Powers which, in the economic sphere, were conspicuously under-developed, like Russia and like Turkey herself, had broken down militarily, but their very inefficiency had prevented them from incurring the overstrain, and the consequent injury to their systems, which had overtaken their more efficient neighbours. Hence, after the armistices, Great Britain and France, as well as Germany, were relatively less capable than Russia or Turkey of making fresh military efforts; and at this stage, when the victorious Western Powers had emerged from their life-and-death struggle and were no longer in peril of losing their very existence, their Governments were prevented from expending

such capacities for further war as still remained in them by their democratic constitutions and by the intelligence of their people. While the Governments of the victorious Powers—carried along by the momentum of the struggle which was just over—were tempted to continue the expenditure of national energies on the war-time scale, the peoples realized instinctively how great the overstrain had been and how urgently necessary it was, now that the danger was over, to relax the tension. Having the intelligence to form this judgment, and also having the power to make their governments conform (with more or less exactitude and after more or less delay) to the demands of public opinion, they succeeded, by steady pressure, during the years following the armistices, in compelling the Governments to reduce their commitments abroad until these should fall below the national capacity (even at its diminished post-war level) by a sufficient margin of safety. The first and most obvious field for retrenchment abroad was in the Near and Middle East, where no vital French or British interests were involved; and here the common sense of the French and British peoples forced the two Governments to retreat from one position after another, without being moved by the laments of statesmen and officials over loss of prestige. This state of public opinion in Great Britain and France, even more than the actual material exhaustion of those countries, inhibited any serious intervention on their part in the Græco-Turkish War of 1919-22; and, without such an intervention, the military balance was bound, for geographical and other technical reasons which are discussed below, to turn gradually in Turkey's favour.

Another important and unforeseen change in Turkey's favour in the international situation was the reversal in the policy of Russia after the Bolshevik revolution of 1917. Czarist Russia had maintained her rôle of arch-enemy of the

Islamic peoples until the end. Indeed, she never played it more vigorously than during the ten years (1907-17) during which she was unopposed by Great Britain. In 1917 the Czardom was replaced by a Soviet Republic which soon found itself in open war with its predecessor's allies. Meanwhile, ten years of *entente* with the Czardom had already lost to Great Britain the goodwill of the Muslim world, when she was suddenly left, by the disappearance of the Czardom, in the position of being the protagonist in the war against Turkey and conspicuously the chief among Western Empires still possessing dominion over Islamic peoples. The Bolsheviks—hard pressed by the "Whites" under General Denikin, whose armies Great Britain and France had re-munitioned and re-organized after the Armistice of Mudros, which had opened to them the gates of the Black Sea—were quick to appreciate and take advantage of the new situation. They promptly assumed the rôle of champions of Islam, a rôle which Great Britain had left vacant by her change of policy ten years earlier ; and at the same time they sought, not without success, to transfer to Great Britain, as the Czar's executor and residuary legatee in the Near and Middle East, the odium which attached to the Czarist policy in the minds of the Islamic peoples. Their first practical step in this direction was to support the new Turkish Nationalists in that resistance to the Greek invasion of Anatolia which they began to organize, in defiance of the Principal Allied Powers, in 1919. The common sense of Mustafâ Kemâl Bey and his comrades in abandoning the megalomaniac visions of Pan-Turanianism and Pan-Islamism removed a previous obstacle to Russo-Turkish co-operation. The first objective of the Bolsheviks in giving the Turks their support was to expel the Allied Powers from Trans-Caucasia, and eventually, if possible, from the Black Sea, where they were demonstrating their ability to injure the Soviet Republic

by assisting its internal enemies. Their wider purpose was to prove, by positive action, that Russia, under their *régime*, had become the friend of the Islamic world. As for the Turkish Nationalists, they might come to feel in the long run, when their own life-and-death struggle was over, that Russia was hardly less dangerous as a declared friend than she had formerly been as an undisguised foe. At the moment, in the crisis of the struggle, they caught eagerly at the hand which she held out to them, and her support was of the highest value to their cause. Beyond the material assistance in munitions and money which they received from her, their *moral* was raised to an incalculable degree by the feeling that they were not defying the victorious Allied Powers in isolation, but that they had behind them a country which, even in defeat and adversity, remained a potential Great Power, and which had already terrified the ruling classes in Europe and America by the subversive creed which the Bolsheviks had now established as the Russian religion of state.

Thus the new movement which started in Turkey in 1919 was launched under new conditions differing in many important respects from those under which the earlier movements had gone down in disaster—new conditions which offered better prospects to Mustafâ Kemâl than had lain before Enver, Tal'at and Jâvid, or before Midhat, or before Mahmûd II and Selîm III, at the several moments when these older Turkish statesmen had put their fortunes to the touch. Nevertheless, Mustafâ Kemâl's defiance of the victorious Allied Powers was an act of heroic faith and courage; for although the new Turkish leader had the vision to perceive the latent forces in his favour, and though his vision was brilliantly justified by the event, when these forces revealed themselves and prevailed, it must not be forgotten that the outward aspect of

affairs in 1919 was profoundly depressing and discouraging for any Turkish patriot.

The most striking fact in the situation was that the Ottoman Empire was shattered. Its fragments were sundered in complete disintegration, and from the collapse various Arab successor states were springing up. Mesopotamia, or 'Iraq, became an Arab kingdom, under a constitutional monarchy (Faysal, the son of Husayn of the Hijāz, being the first king) and a British mandate. The Hijāz became an independent state under King Husayn. Palestine was assigned to Great Britain as a Mandate, to be (among other things) a national home for the Jews. Transjordan was attached to Palestine as an autonomous principality under another son of King Husayn, the Amīr 'Abdu'llāh. Syria was assigned as a Mandate to France. Egypt was liberated from Ottoman suzerainty and was eventually recognized by Great Britain as an independent kingdom under King Fu'ād. A step was taken to free Armenia and Kurdistan. Of the Ottoman Empire nothing was left but a central fragment in Asia Minor—homogeneous in race, exhausted and impoverished in condition. The bubble of empire had burst, and the vast Ottoman realm built up by Suleiman the Magnificent to equal the empires of Assyria and Persia, Rome and Carthage, had now all but vanished. Only a shattered trunk was left to Turkey after the great war and great defeat.

That part which remained in Anatolia and on the European fringe of the Bosphorus was impoverished and demoralized. The ignominy of defeat had brought despair. The loss of men and resources in a futile war had depleted the nation's capital and bled the country white. Twelve years of campaigning had deranged the internal development of the country. Turkey's provinces were gone; her allies were crushed; and, except for her champions among the Indian Muslims, she was friendless

even in the camp of Islam. Constantinople was held by the victors, Turkey was encircled by enemies. Like wolves about the camp fire the Powers were prowling at the threshold with hungry eyes, for Turkey by nature is rich, and imperialism is greedy.

Such was the apparently desperate condition immediately after the Armistice of Mudros¹ was signed on 30 October, 1918. Fighting was brought to an end, and nothing was left but to await, with fatalistic resignation, the further commands of the Allies. The Straits and Cilicia were occupied by Inter-Allied forces. Save for this precaution, however, nothing further was done towards settling the peace-terms with Turkey. There ensued a long, slow period of anxious waiting, and for nearly two years the Near Eastern settlement was deferred.

The Allies were busy with their European peace-terms, their Wilsonian points and their imperialistic ambitions. The Peace Conference met on 18 January, 1919; but so pre-occupied was it with settling the destinies of Europe that Near Eastern questions were postponed; and no serious effort was made to clear up the Turkish situation until the San Remo conference of April, 1920. Nevertheless, a good deal of bargaining and "log-rolling" went on through those intervening months, and confusion worse confounded arose from the cross-purposes, the selfish ambitions, and the secret agreements which entangled subsequent settlements.

These secret agreements, of which there had been four principal examples² during the Great War, must be mentioned briefly, both to illustrate the manner and attitude in which alliances had been made and the war and peace waged, and

¹ Text in H. W. V. Temperley's *History of the Peace Conference*, vol. I p. 495.

² Texts in *N. Y. Current History*, October, 1921; Temperley, *History of the Peace Conference*, vol. VI, Part IA.

also to lead up to the eventual settlement with Turkey in the Treaty of Sèvres.

On 18 March, 1915, the Constantinople Agreement¹ between Great Britain, France and Russia, was drawn up and signed. This instrument was concerned chiefly with the future of Constantinople and the Straits. It was, in fact, the earliest attempt to come to some mutually satisfactory arrangement by which the aspirations of Russia in the Straits might be made acceptable to France and Great Britain, traditionally jealous of any modification of the *status quo* in this area. The Agreement sanctioned the acquisition by Russia of Constantinople, both shores of the Bosphorus, and the European shores of the Sea of Marmara and the Dardanelles, while providing that Constantinople should remain a free port to Allied merchant ships. It further placed the so-called "neutral zone" of Persia (as defined in the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907), a region which was valuable for its oil resources, within the British sphere of influence. It decided that the Muslim holy places should be detached from Turkey and be placed under an independent Muslim government. Finally, Russia proffered assistance to the Allies, if required, during their attempt to break through the Turkish resistance at the Dardanelles.

The Secret Pact of London,² which was signed on 26 April, 1915, between Italy, France, Great Britain and Russia, was the condition upon which Italy entered the War on the side of the Entente Allies. It included a number of territorial claims made by Italy in the event of the total or partial partition of Turkey-in-Asia at the termination of the War. Among these were demands for "an 'equitable' share of the Mediterranean region adjacent to the province of Adalia,

¹ *Manchester Guardian*, 18 January, 1918.

² See *Manchester Guardian*, 18 January, 1918; and *British White Paper*, Cmd. 671 (Miscell. No. 7), 1920 (Text).

where Italy has already acquired rights and interests which formed the subject of an Italo-British convention."

The Sykes-Picot Agreement,¹ signed on 16 May, 1916, on behalf of Great Britain, France and Russia, related to the future of certain portions—chiefly the Arab regions—of the Ottoman Empire. It provided for negotiations with the Arabs for the establishment, recognition and protection of an independent Arab State or confederation of Arab States; for territorial zones of influence under the respective control of France and England; for the outright acquisition of other territories by Russia; and for certain agreements as to seaports and railway rights. This private and secret treaty indicates, as do the others, the way in which, anticipating the successful outcome of the War, the Allied representatives carved up an empire and planned new states as if the countries and peoples of the world were jig-saw puzzles to be toyed with, shaken up and refitted as a statesman's pastime. Upon such individual decisions rested the future fate of extensive Ottoman territories.

Finally Italy, having then entered the concert of Entente Powers, claimed some participation in the benefits anticipated by the Sykes-Picot Agreement; and as a consequence the St. Jean de Maurienne Agreement² of 17 April, 1917, a corollary of the previous agreement of 1915, was signed not only by Great Britain and France, but also by Italy. This new understanding was responsible in a large measure for Italy's hopes for the control of Western Asia Minor, including Smyrna; and as such was of profound influence in causing the subsequent landing of Greek forces at Smyrna on 15 May, 1919.

¹ *Le Temps*, 22 May, 1919; *Manchester Guardian*, 8 January, 1920; *N. Y. Current History*, March, 1920.

² *Manchester Guardian*, 9 January, 1920; *Chicago Daily News*, 9 February, 1920.

The Agreement of St. Jean de Maurienne, however, was subject to the consent of Russia; and on account of the collapse of Imperial Russia through the Bolshevik revolution, the treaty was never ratified and consequently was rendered nugatory at law. Italy failed to make good her claims in the Ottoman partition and was greatly embittered over the whole Near Eastern settlement.

These were the various proposals entered upon by the Allied Powers in their Turkish policy before the War had come to a conclusion. It was on the scaffolding of these four secret pacts that the later Treaty of Sèvres of 1920 was erected. Well might Turkey have been in despair, after the signing of the Armistice of Mudros, had she known the various plans which the Allies had laid up for her.

While these various pledges between the Allies were in fact causing interminable delays and disputes in the prolonged Peace Conference at Paris, other events were taking place in Turkey itself.

The Italians had landed at Adalia on 29 April, 1919, in accordance with the terms of the Pact of London. They were also pressing to put into force the Treaty of St. Jean de Maurienne, giving them the occupation of Smyrna; but the failure of Russia to ratify this agreement rendered it void juridically. The concurrent demand for the award of Fiume to Italy had been met by the Allies in conference at Versailles with such disfavour that Signor Orlando, the Italian delegate, left the Peace Conference. The Allies, especially the Greeks, were alarmed lest Italy should endeavour to repeat the Fiume *coup* in south-western Anatolia, and, treaty or no treaty, to fulfil her ambitions by occupying Smyrna. This gave M. Venizelos, the astute and ambitious Greek premier, who dreamed of a restored Hellenic Empire extending to Asia Minor, the opportunity to bring round the Allied and Associated

Powers to his wishes. So powerful was his eloquence, so cogent his reasoning, and so great his personal influence over Mr. Lloyd George, that the other Powers finally agreed to send over Greek troops to occupy Smyrna. The true motive was, first, to grant Greece her imperialistic ambitions, and, second, to prevent the Italians from illegally entering the region and causing further international complications. The reason announced was that the Turkish irregular troops and civilians of the district were being unruly, and that the Greek and other minorities were in great danger there; and Article Seven of the Armistice of Mudros was invoked in order to occupy this centre for the alleged preservation of order and security. The inadequacy of this justification was clearly shown later.¹ The report of the Inter-Allied Commission on the Greek occupation of Smyrna dated from Constantinople on the 12th October, 1919, apparently began as follows:—

“The inquiry has proved that since the Armistice the general condition of the Christians of the Vilâyet of Aidin has been satisfactory, and their security has not been threatened.

If the occupation of Smyrna was ordered by the Peace Conference owing to inaccurate information, the primary responsibility lies with the individuals or governments that gave or transmitted inconsiderately such information as is mentioned in No. 1 of the established facts.

It is obvious, therefore, that this occupation was not at all justifiable, and violated the terms of the Armistice between the Powers and Turkey.”

In spite of the erroneousess of the alleged grounds, they were at the time considered a sufficient justification for the military occupation which was carried out by the Greeks with the sponsoring approval of the other Allied governments. The events which then happened were the immediate causes of the long sequence of revolutionary activities in Turkey. The

¹ On this question see Gaillard, G., *Les Turcs et l'Europe*, 1 vol., Chapelot, Paris, 1920; *The Turks and Europe*, Thos. Murby, London, 1921; Toynbee, A. J., *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey*, Constable, London, 1922.

Greek landing of troops in Smyrna, nominally to preserve peace and security, actually to forestal Italian ambitions and to build up a Hellenic empire which should cover all the Ægean coasts and islands and stretch into the fertile hinterland of the ancient Ionia, fired a train of explosive reactions in Turkey, and startled the world with the prospect of another conflict between the West and the East, between Greek Christianity and Ottoman Islam. A new chapter, full of dramatic incidents, was opened in the history of Near Eastern relationships, and in the evolution of Turkey especially. The chapter opened with the rifle shots and bayonet thrusts of the invading Greeks; and the continuing consequences of that occurrence still vibrate like the ripples of a disturbed pond. The decision of the Supreme Allied Council to establish an enclave in Asia Minor under Greek administration proved to be the most ambitious and disastrous conception of all the varied aims of the Great Powers; and the remainder of this narrative will relate how that ill-conceived endeavour brought humiliating loss to the Christian nations engaged in it and paved the way for the amazing birth of a Turkish people fired by the zeal of an intense nationalism and illuminated, however dimly and uncertainly at first, by the light of Western civilization and culture.

On 15 May, 1919, an army of occupation, nominally Allied, but in fact purely Greek, landed at Smyrna, under the cover of British, French and American warships, commanded by Admiral Calthorpe, and proceeded to occupy all the strategic points in the city and the surrounding country. This was accompanied by outrages which were well proven by the later commission of investigation. Massacres and other acts of violence were committed and a reign of terror ensued that shocked the whole world.

The events dating from this landing on 15 May were

the chief factor which incited the Turks to a spirited protest and resistance. The Nationalist movement was born at that time, and while Mustafâ Kemâl Pasha was its leader, the Greek occupation of Smyrna was its creator. As we shall see, this incipient movement of Turkish defence was fanned by the Greek "invasion" to the extent of a three years' bitter war, culminating finally in the ejection of the Greeks neck and crop from Asia and in the birth of a new Turkish state defiant of all foreign Powers.



While events were beginning to gather momentum in Asia Minor; while the Greeks were encroaching beyond the line assigned by the Allied Commission and the Turks were secretly mobilizing in the heart of Anatolia, the Allied Powers were piecing together their treaty of peace with Turkey during the early part of 1920.¹ In January and February frequent conferences were held in London. In April, an important meeting was held at San Remo, where the final details of the treaty were worked out and special agreements were incorporated, for example, the Anglo-French Agreement dealing with petroleum rights. On 10 August, 1920, after the drafts had been submitted to Turkish representatives and their objections had been dismissed, a peace treaty, with certain subsidiary instruments,² was presented at Sèvres to the delegates from the Sublime Porte of Constantinople, who obediently affixed their signatures. Three Turkish signatories, one of whom was the philosopher Riza Tevfik Bey, put their names to the documents, which the Sultan was compelled to accept.

The Treaty of Sèvres, with the simultaneous Tripartite

¹ Gaillard, G., *Les Turcs et l'Europe*.

² Cmd. 963, Treaty Series No. 12, 1920; Cmd. 964, Treaty Series No. 11, 1920.

Agreement between France, Great Britain and Italy regarding French and Italian spheres of influence in Asia Minor, is one of the most striking examples of Western imperialism. Even after a war ostensibly waged to end injustice and maintain the rights of small nations, even after a peace-settlement resounding with the idealistic declarations of President Wilson, preaching self-determination and the right of small nations to the realization of national freedom and unity, even around the council tables of the leading statesmen of the world—the strain and stress and war-weariness, the anxiety and complexity of peace-making, the business of rewarding allies or playing off nations in order to adjust a delicate balance of power, turned the statesmen's heads to the old channels of imperialism and territorial ambition, just as during the War they had yielded to the discredited practices of secret diplomacy. Thus, at London, at San Remo, and at Sèvres, the Allied statesmen worked out a mutual scheme of partition that would not only mutilate the prostrate form of the "Sick Man," but, by the occupation of the most important sea-ports, would be tantamount to the amputation of the most effective and active parts of the dismembered country. It was a triumph of imperialism, for it carved up the richest areas of Western Asia for the gratification of the belligerent Allies, who sought their reward in the hour of victory. Turkey was beaten and prostrate, and therefore she could not protest; the Sultan was being supported by the Allies, who virtually kept him confined in his own palace on the Bosphorus, and therefore he could not and would not object. For the Allies everything was clear. All that they needed was the nominal signature of the Sultan's Government to this piece of paper, and then half Turkey was to be apportioned amongst them.

By the terms of this Treaty Turkey was to be stripped of all her wealthiest and most productive areas, and was to be

left to live on in solitary humility as a Sultanate in the Anatolian interior. The southern or Arab provinces were handed over to Mandatories. The eastern sections, including Armenia and Kurdistan, were to be detached from Ottoman rule and to become respectively independent and autonomous states. Smyrna and all the vineyards and olive groves and grain lands of the fertile south-western littoral of Anatolia were to be given to Italy, as well as the flourishing cotton belt and corn lands of Adalia. A large area adjoining the Straits and the Marmara was to be demilitarized and placed under the control and administration of a mixed inter-Allied commission, while in the centre of this zone, like the fly caught in the innermost strands of a spider's web, Constantinople was to be Turkish and the Sultan was to be enmeshed in a restricted position of dishonour and ineffectiveness. Eastern as well as Western Thrace was to fall to Greece because of her services to the Allies in the War, and perhaps in some measure because Mr. Lloyd George was captivated by the manner and persuasive ways of M. Venizelos. Such, in broad outline, was the structure which the architects of the Sèvres Treaty had planned.

The Treaty of Sèvres received the signatures of all the Allies except the Hijāz and Jugoslavia, and of the Turkish plenipotentiaries sent by the Sultan's Government at Constantinople under the leadership of Dāmād Ferīd Pasha. It was expected to bring to a formal end the state of hostility and the long unhappy armistice period in Turkey. Yet the treaty came to bring not peace, but a sword. The date of signature at Sèvres was made a national day of mourning throughout Turkey; all the newspapers in Constantinople were black-bordered, public entertainments in Stambūl were prohibited, shops were closed, and prayers were said all day for the welfare of the country. Not only were these manifestations of resent-

ment shown in the capital ; but, far in the interior, the news of the treaty sounded like a tocsin to those who had their country's interests at heart. The revolutionary group in Anatolia, fighting to preserve the integrity of the country, was dismayed at the surrender of Turkish rights and territory. It promptly repudiated the treaty and denied the legality of the Turkish signatures ; it declared that the Constantinople Government, being the dupe and the willing instrument of the Allied Powers, had now forfeited all its prestige and its claim to the allegiance of the nation, and must therefore be speedily brought to an end. The Nationalist Organization, led by Mustafā Kemāl Pasha, set to work, with increased seriousness, to defy the terms of the Treaty, to keep out the Allied Powers, and to maintain for Turkey, at all costs, her legitimate homelands in Anatolia. The Nationalist movement, by this patriotic sentiment and zealous prosecution of its war of defence, gained in adherents and in prestige. Just as the landing of the Greeks in Smyrna a year earlier had lighted the fires of patriotic nationalism, so this new insult of an inequitable peace, imposed by force, fanned the flames into fresh fury.

The subsequent collapse of the Constantinople Government rendered the peace treaty nugatory, for the new Turkish Government at Angora would not recognize it, and it proved an abortive attempt to impose terms on a nation which was becoming almost daily more and more intractable and capable of fending for itself.

CHAPTER V

MUSTAFĀ KEMĀL

As has been said, the conditions after the Armistice of 1918 had thrown Turkey into a temper of despair. The Ottoman Empire was at the lowest ebb of all its long history; the "Sick Man of Europe" was about to expire, except for a little surviving symptom of vitality in the Anatolian mountains. Never had the fortunes of the nation run so low in all the expanding and then declining life under the Sultans. Yet it was at this point that the tide turned. A Turkish soldier, Mustafā Kemāl Bey, came forward to save his country from oppression and despair. Thenceforth the history of Turkey is coloured by the personality of this man, of whom some account must now be given.

Mustafā Kemāl was a brilliant soldier and a headstrong, independent character. Born in Salonica in 1880, he had grown up under the fascination of a garrison-town full of troops and well-dressed officers in dashing uniforms. From the first he had turned toward the profession of arms as his future career. He had entered the military college, passed through stage after stage of an officer's training, and had graduated, at the age of twenty-two, to be posted to a cavalry regiment in Damascus.

Incidentally, he had at an early age come under the influence of the new spirit of nationalism and patriotism which was beginning to permeate the Balkan provinces in opposition to the *régime* of Sultan 'Abdu'l-Hamīd, and which sent its root deep down in Salonica especially. He became an ardent radical and shared actively in the great national reform movement which was growing throughout the land. Before he left the Military Academy in Constantinople, he was an enthusiastic Young Turk, and his subsequent years until the

revolution of 1908 were crowded with political escapades, imprisonment and exile, in the midst of his varied military career. When the Third Army marched on Constantinople in order to coerce 'Abdu'l-Hamīd into granting a Constitutional Parliament, Mustafā Kemāl was chief of staff to Mahmūd Shevket Pasha, the Commander.

During the next few years Mustafā Kemāl was sent hither and thither on active service, throughout the Balkan Wars and the Great War; everywhere he was gaining experience, introducing reforms into the Army, and winning the respect of his brother officers and of his soldiers through his personality and ability. He became a military hero, in both Germany and Turkey, when he checked the British forces at Anafarta in the Dardanelles Campaign, and thereafter, in spite of his unpopularity with the German High Command and with Enver Pasha, his Turkish Commander-in-Chief, his military reputation was assured.

There is something Cromwellian about this military leader, who set out to gain mastery over the Sultan's Army; used it with great political sagacity to check and finally to overthrow the unwelcome monarchy which was ruining the country; called a national convention at Angora which recognized him as head of the state and commander in-chief of the National forces; lifted his country to a high position of prestige and power; fought successfully against his foreign enemies; and reigned like a benevolent despot over a down-trodden people. Mustafā Kemāl Pasha carried through the revolution; ruled as a dictator supported by an elected Parliament; carried into his interregnum of administration a reforming zeal seldom shown in such spectacular fashion; and made a unique place for himself in the annals of history as the great iconoclast of the Islamic tradition and the builder of a new Western state out of an Oriental people.

With the signing of the Armistice at Mudros on 30 October, 1918, the Committee of Union and Progress (The Young Turk Party) had fled from the capital, and the feeble and reactionary Liberal Entente party had lifted Dāmād Ferīd Pasha into the Grand Vizirate, Parliament had been dissolved, and Constantinople had drifted into the most complete confusion. The dreams of the reformers were breaking up like a house of cards. Mustafā Kemāl, throwing up his Palestinian command, returned hot-foot to the capital, fired with a passionate determination that the homelands of his country must be safeguarded, at all costs, from foreign intrusion while its internal administration must be reformed and the people rallied to a national ideal of independence.

To put through his programme and attain his end it was necessary to create a new political party, and because Allied troops were in occupation of Constantinople Dāmād Ferīd's Minister of War was tricked into sending Mustafā Kemāl to Asia Minor as "Inspector-General" of the East, with a command composed of the skeleton forces which General Milne had sanctioned for gendarmerie purposes. Mustafā Kemāl was shortly followed by his old colleague, Re'ūf Bey, the distinguished naval commander who had signed the Mudros Armistice. Here in the heart of Anatolia Mustafā Kemāl's aim was to unite the local defence organization into a Nationalist party, to gain the confidence and support of the Army, and thus to bring pressure to bear upon the Ottoman Government in Constantinople in its dealings with the Allies.

Re'ūf Bey was sent to Smyrna to organize a national group there, and Mustafā Kemāl himself went to Samsūn to do likewise. With consummate skill the object was attained, and a National Party group and a small military force were formed in each centre under Mustafā Kemāl's own central direction.

While the military activities of the Nationalists were gradually growing more and more effective, important political movements within the country were taking place. The first step taken after Mustafā Kemāl and Re'ūf had done their spadework in Smyrna and Samsūn was the convocation by Mustafā Kemāl of the first Congress, called at Erzerum on 23 July, 1919,¹ to unite all the Turkish nationalist leaders. At this important assembly, the whole future policy was discussed, and although the proceedings were secret an official report of what had transpired was afterwards sent to the High Commissioners of the Allies in Constantinople. The principal action taken was the formation of what was first named the "Anatolian and Rumelian League for the Defence of National Rights," but which afterwards came to bear the simpler name of the "National Organization." A programme was drawn up, containing a number of principles and resolutions reflecting the revolutionists' ideals.

Two months later, on 4 September, 1919, a second Congress was called, this time at Sivas. This meeting, which in effect was similar to the former one, was chiefly for the purpose of giving local committees which had been unable to send delegates to the first congress at Erzerum an opportunity of approving the measures there taken and declaring their willingness to adhere to the terms and plans of the Nationalist organization. The declaration of Sivas was promulgated, and it stated the general principles upon which the subsequent National Pact was based.²

An executive committee was appointed at this meeting by the members of the Assembly. Mustafā Kemāl was by right chosen President of the Committee. The right-hand men were next appointed with unanimity. The first was his friend

¹ Clair Price, *The Rebirth of Turkey* (Seltzer, N. Y., 1923), p. 145.

² Gaillard, G., *The Turks and Europe*, pp. 64-66.

Re'ûf Bey, once Minister of Marine under the old *régime*. During the Balkan wars he had been commander of the cruiser *Hamidiéh*, and had made several raids in Greek waters. He had been one of the signatories of the Mudros Armistice, and he was able to bring over to the Nationalist movement many naval officers and sailors. The second was Bekir Sâmy Bey, formerly Governor-General in Anatolia. The third was Ahmed Rustem Bey, who had previously been Turkish Ambassador at Washington. These two latter were the first political men of note to join the Nationalist movement. Other members of the committee were Khwājā Rā'yf Efendi, Mazhar Bey (formerly the governor of Bitlis), Haydar Bey (a former governor of Kharput), and Hakky Behij Bey.

Having revised and approved the party's platform, the Sivas caucus adjourned, leaving the standing council to take up its permanent quarters at Angora (Anqarah), a place considered more suitable than either Erzerum or Sivas on account of its telegraphic communication with Constantinople and its favourable situation on a branch of the Anatolian railway line.

The local militias which had been formed, mainly out of the large gendarmerie groups stationed at points in the interior, were now organized into the Nationalist Army. This was placed under the command of two of Turkey's most able generals. Qāra Bekir Kiāzym Pasha became commander-in-chief in Eastern Anatolia, and made Erzerum his headquarters. His forces, as we shall see, played a distinguished rôle in the history of the Nationalist Movement. 'Alī Fu'ād Pasha, the defender of Fort Pisani at Janina during the Balkan War, who possessed great prestige among the troops, was made commander-in-chief of the National forces in Western Anatolia.

After the Congress of Sivas, the attention of the Nationalist leaders was taken up very largely with the military operations that continued through the remainder of 1919 and most of

the next three years. Nevertheless, meetings were held in Angora for political purposes from time to time, and a general governmental organization grew up in the midst of the anxious days of the war.

Angora had been chosen for two main reasons. First, the Kemalist Party, which was in fact still a revolutionary and unconstitutional group opposed to the legitimate Government at Constantinople, was compelled to carry on its work both in security and in secrecy, and for that reason it had met in the almost inaccessible interior towns of Sivas, Erzerum, and Angora. The latter position was finally chosen because it was secure without being too remote. As long as the Nationalists were looked upon as rebels, there was need of a good defensive position in case the Sultan's Army should be sent to suppress them.

Angora, in Ancient Greek "Ancyra" or "the Anchor," is a magnificent military position, fortified by nature as well as by the skill of man. Stretching up the side of an isolated hill, the present dilapidated town tries to lie close and securely under the fortified summit, where the ruins of ancient curtain-walls mark the historical importance of the site. The rock is almost unassailable from behind, and a long low plain stretches away before it with a clear and open prospect. Buried as it is in the interior of the Anatolian wilderness, with a single railway line linking it with the rest of the civilized world, its security is great. Difficult to attack, and yet a useful base for military operations either westward toward European invaders like the Greeks, or eastward toward rebellious tribes in Kurdistan or Mosul, Angora as a capital has advantages of position which should not be scoffed at by Western critics.

The second reason for the selection of Angora was that it was in better rail and telegraphic communication with

Constantinople and Smyrna than either of the other towns. This accessibility did not endanger Angora's isolated and safe position, for both railway and telegraphic communication could be severed easily in an emergency and the seat of the Revolutionary Government be entirely isolated from hostile approach. Yet in ordinary circumstances it was desirable to be in touch with what was going on outside, especially at Constantinople.

For these reasons Angora now became the centre of the Nationalist Movement and soon afterwards the capital of Anatolia. It was at best a defensive position, with no pretence to any of the qualifications of a progressive city. Its condition was that of a tumble-down inferior Turkish town, of filthy streets and dirty, foul-smelling houses. Everywhere were indications of Asiatic shiftlessness. Sanitation was, of course, unknown. Malaria and dysentery have always been prevalent, and a disagreeable climate had made it one of the most uninviting of habitations. Nevertheless, for want of a better situation, and for the sake of the combined advantages of isolation and military security, Angora became thenceforth the seat of the new government.

On 5 October, 1919, the Dāmād Ferid Cabinet in Constantinople fell. In its place, a new Cabinet under 'Alī Rizā Bey was formed, and a general election was authorized by the Sultan. This resulted in a very considerable majority in favour of the Nationalist Party, and the Vezir or Prime Minister was himself openly sympathetic toward the Kemalist cause.

A preliminary meeting of the deputies was held at Angora, where the Party's standing council was in session. The future policy of the Government was discussed with great anxiety. Moreover, an important document, drawn up by Mustafā Kemāl on the basis of the Erzerum programme, was brought forward and accepted by the Assembly at Angora. This

document became known as the "National Pact"—in reality, a Declaration of Independence of the Turkish nation. This laconic declaration of the rights and demands of an oppressed people may be quoted in full, for upon it has been built up the superstructure of a virile and strong Turkish state on a Western pattern. The main principles of the Pact were also made the basis for the principal terms of the Peace Treaty of Lausanne.

THE TURKISH NATIONAL PACT¹

The members of the Ottoman chamber of deputies recognize and affirm that the independence of the State and the future of the Nation can be assured by complete respect for the following principles, which represent the maximum of sacrifice which can be undertaken in order to achieve a just and lasting peace, and that the continued existence of a stable Ottoman sultanate and society is impossible outside of the said principles:

ARTICLE I.—Inasmuch as it is necessary that the destinies of the portions of the Turkish Empire which are populated exclusively by an Arab majority, and which on the conclusion of the Armistice of the 30th October, 1918, were in the occupation of enemy forces, should be determined in accordance with the votes which shall be freely given by the inhabitants, the whole of those parts, whether within or outside the said Armistice line, which are inhabited by an Ottoman Muslim majority, united in religion, in race and in aim, imbued with sentiments of mutual respect for each other and of sacrifice, and wholly respectful of each other's racial and social rights and surrounding conditions, form a whole which does not admit of division for any reason in truth or in ordinance.

ARTICLE II.—We accept that, in the case of the three sanjaks which united themselves by a general vote to the mother country when they first were free, recourse should again be had, if necessary, to a free popular vote.

ARTICLE III.—The determination of the juridical status of Western Thrace also, which has been made dependent on the Turkish peace, must be effected in accordance with the votes which shall be given by the inhabitants in complete freedom.

ARTICLE IV.—The security of the city of Constantinople, which is the seat of the Caliphate of Islam, the capital of the Sultanate, and the headquarters of the Ottoman Government, and of the Sea of Marmara

¹ Toynbee, A. J., *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey*, pp. 207-8 (close translation).

must be protected from every danger. Provided this principle is maintained, whatever decision may be arrived at jointly by us and all other Governments concerned, regarding the opening of the Bosphorus to the commerce and traffic of the world, is valid.

ARTICLE V.—The rights of minorities as defined in the treaties concluded between the Entente Powers and their enemies and certain of their associates shall be confirmed and assured by us—in reliance on the belief that the Muslim minorities in neighbouring countries also will have the benefit of the same rights.

ARTICLE VI.—It is a fundamental condition of our life and continued existence that we, like every country, should enjoy complete independence and liberty in the matter of assuring the means of our development, in order that our national and economic development should be rendered possible and that it should be possible to conduct affairs in the form of a more up-to-date regular administration.

For this reason we are opposed to restrictions inimical to our development in political, judicial, financial, and other matters.

The conditions of settlement of our proved debts shall likewise not be contrary to these principles.

Finally, when the council of deputies meeting at Angora was notified that the Allies were willing to recognize the new Parliament if it met in proper legal fashion in Constantinople, and if it were presided over by the Sultan Mehmed IV, the Angora session broke up. As the new chamber of deputies was no longer an outcaste party, but the country's elected parliament, and as Constantinople was still the capital of Turkey, it was decided to comply with the conditions of the Allies. Accordingly, on the 11th January, 1920, the greater part of the deputies, led by Re'uf Bey, the right-hand-man of Mustafā Kemāl and Parliamentary leader of the Party, left Angora and went to Constantinople.

On 28 January, 1920, the "National Pact" was presented to the Parliament and was the same day "legally adopted by the legal Parliament sitting in its legal capital." This was, indeed, a signal triumph for the Nationalist Movement. Constitutionally represented, sitting in the Ottoman capital, and recognized at last by the Allies, the success of the movement seemed assured, and the principles of the Pact

seemed to be accepted by the whole country, through the elected representatives, in the very face of the overshadowing Powers.

But that was the last people's parliament that sat in Constantinople. Before two months had passed, the Nationalist Movement received a staggering blow. On 15 March, the Allied forces, consisting mostly of British soldiers, under the command of General Milne, marched into Constantinople, seized the public buildings, after local skirmishes in which there were some fatal casualties, and occupied the city. This was done in protest against the National Pact and in support of the former Prime Minister Dāmād Ferīd Pasha, who took the same view of the Nationalists as did the British authorities. Allied martial law was proclaimed in Constantinople. During the night, General Milne, after cutting off Constantinople from outside communication, made a series of raids in Stambūl, the Turkish quarter of Constantinople, and arrested as many Nationalist notables as he could find—some forty of them—including their tower of strength, Re'ūf Bey; and on the following morning he deported them to a British prison-camp in Malta.

This high-handed act of General Milne, performed with the consent of the French Commander-in-Chief Franchet d'Esperey, who however was himself absent from Turkey, has never been condoned, and it rendered the greatest disservice to the Allied cause. The arrest of the notables and their subsequent imprisonment was an indignity which has never been forgotten by the Turks and has deeply injured British prestige in the Near East. Although the Nationalists temporarily lost some of their best brains by the Malta captivity, the incident did much to inflame that Nationalist temper which it was intended to destroy. The significance of the arrests and of the occupation of Constantinople was the added resentment which they

produced among the Nationalists of Anatolia, who, still defending in theory both the Sultanate and the ancient seat of Ottoman power, were angered to see their traditional capital in the hands of enemy Powers and their monarch a mere puppet of the Allies. "If the Greek landing at Smyrna created the Turkish national movement, the British support of the Sultan at Constantinople made its fortune," and the very weakness of the Sultan in the hands of the Allies was to doom him in the eyes of the Turks.

The Nationalist Party now became again an outlawed revolutionary body, retired to the isolation of its former base, and was lost to the watchful supervision of the Allies. The deputies who had escaped arrest made their way to Angora, and an attempt to reconstruct the shattered Parliament began. Thenceforth, the country was to have two parliaments, one, under the restored Dāmād Ferīd and an Allied control, in Constantinople; the other, supported by the national sentiment of almost all the Turkish people, in Angora. The first, however, was a mockery; the second, an increasingly powerful instrument of government.

On 23 April, the reconstructed Parliament at Angora, called thenceforth the Great National Assembly of Turkey, began its first session, in which it enthusiastically declared its adherence to the National Pact. Further, it considered more definite plans for introducing the necessary reforms into the administrative and financial organization of the country. At last, completely disillusioned in regard to the loyalty and patriotism of the Sultan and the Constantinople party, it declared that the Ottoman Sultanate and the Ottoman Government had ceased to exist on the terrible night of 15-16 March, because they had lent themselves to the machinations of the Western enemies of the Turkish national party.

"General elections have been held," reported Mustafā Kemāl Pasha to M. Millerand at this time, ¹ "and on the 23rd April, 1920, the Great National Assembly held its first sitting and solemnly declared that it would preside over the present and future destiny of Turkey, so long as her Caliph-Sultan and her Eternal City should remain under the dominion and occupation of foreigners. . . .

The Ottoman people, considering that all its rights have been violated and its sovereignty encroached upon, has, by order of its representatives, assembled at Angora and appointed an Executive Council chosen among the members of the National Assembly, which Council has taken in hand the government of the country. . . .

I have the honour to inform Your Excellency of the desiderata of the nation, as expressed and adopted at the sitting of the 29th April, 1920.

First, Constantinople, the seat of the Khilāfet and Sultanate, together with the Constantinople Government, are henceforth looked upon by the Ottoman people as prisoners of the Allies; thus all orders and *fetvās* issued from Constantinople, so long as it is occupied, cannot have any legal or religious value, and all engagements entered upon by the would-be Constantinople Government are looked upon by the nation as null and void.

Secondly, the Ottoman people, though maintaining its calm and composure, is bent upon defending its sacred, century-old rights as a free, independent State. It expresses the wish to conclude a fair, honourable peace, but declares that only its own mandatories have the right to take engagements in its name and on its account.

Thirdly, the Christian Ottoman element, together with the foreign elements settled in Turkey, remain under the safeguard of the nation; yet they are forbidden to undertake anything against the general security of the country."

The composition of the constituent assembly which thus met at Angora was mixed, consisting, as it did, of deputies from many parts of the country. One of its first tasks was the election of a Government Council or executive. The members of the Government which was instituted at Angora were: Mustafā Kemāl Pasha, Commander-in-Chief and President; Bekir Sāmy Bey, Foreign Affairs; Jāmy Bey, Interior; Fevzī Pasha, National Defence; Ismā'īl Fāzyl Pasha, Public Works; Yūsuf Kemāl Bey, National Economy; Hakky Behīj Bey, Finance; Dr. Adnān Bey, Public Education; Colonel 'Izmet

¹ Cit. in G. Gaillard, *The Turks and Europe*, p. 186.

Bey (later Pasha), Chief of Staff. The strong leaders of the Party, Fethi Bey, Re'uf Bey and several others, were in captivity in Malta, and therefore held no place in the first Kemalist administration.

The Law of Fundamental Organization (made at Angora on 20 January, 1921),¹ stated that sovereignty belonged to the people fully, and no longer lay in the hands of a single monarchical individual. The instrument of popular sovereignty was to be a single chamber of deputies elected by manhood suffrage every two years. The functions of the former Sultan, the Senate, and the Chamber of Deputies were all to be exercised by the new unicameral legislative Assembly sitting in Angora. Ministers of the Government, instead of being the appointees and favourites of the Grand Vezir, who was himself the choice of the Sultan, were henceforth under the new Constitution to be appointees of the Assembly from among its own number, to act as a kind of executive committee for the carrying out of the deputies' commands. The judicial officers were also to be appointees of the Assembly. Under the new Law of Fundamental Organization the Great National Assembly had the power to declare war and peace, to make treaties, and to receive diplomatic representatives of foreign states—powers which formerly had been vested wholly in the Sultan. It had also the power of initiating laws, as under the *ancien régime*, though not the power of dissolution, which the Sultan had previously possessed. The new Assembly was indeed sovereign in almost every respect. It had the usual legislative powers, the executive powers through its ministerial representatives, and the judicial powers through its own appointed judicial officers and the minister of justice. At the head was to be a President, elected by the Chamber of Deputies or Assembly, and a Vice-President. With the prevailing united patriotic

¹ Miss G. E. Knox, in *Modern Turkey*, ed. Mears, 1924.

sentiment of the people there was no possibility of a double party system. All groups were wedded to one Nationalist ideal of national security. The only unharmonious groups were the reactionary royalists, held under the dominating influence of the Allies and of the foreign-supported Sultan in Constantinople ; the elements belonging to racial and religious minorities, which were almost all subsequently driven out ; and certain older groups of " Young Turks," who flirted with Europe and were jealous of Mustafā Kemāl's growing power.

CHAPTER VI

THE GRÆCO-TURKISH WAR (1919-22)

WHILE these political events were taking place, and the struggle between Constantinople and Angora (which remains the chief domestic concern of Republican Turkey to-day) was growing more and more clearly defined, a series of military events was in progress in Anatolia, which must now be recorded.

The occupation of Smyrna by the Greeks in May, 1919, not only created the Turkish Nationalist Movement, but was also the immediate cause of the Græco-Turkish War of 1919-22. The Greeks proved totally incapable of coping with the serious problems of ruling a vast territory occupied by an alien and hostile population. No sooner had they landed than they began a ruthless warfare against the Turkish population, not omitting the commission of atrocities in the worst Near Eastern manner ; they laid waste the fertile Mæander Valley, and forced thousands of homeless Turks to take refuge beyond the occupied area. The natural consequence was that the Nationalist forces in the interior of Anatolia were inflamed into a resentment and a resistance that had all the elements of a good cause. Retaliation followed, and military collisions became more and more frequent ; so that by the end of 1919 the Greek forces in Asia Minor had to be raised to eighty thousand men. The number of the Turkish regulars at that time was estimated at about half that figure.

Moreover, the Greeks, not content with the territory of the sanjaq of Smyrna and the kaza of Aivali assigned to them by the Supreme Council of the Allies, soon extended their area of occupation, on the grounds of strategic necessity and fear for the safety of the Greek minorities. Although the occupation had been sanctioned specifically as a temporary and merely military measure until the ultimate fate of the territory should

be settled, the Greeks proceeded to set up their own institutions in it ; appointed a civil High Commissioner at Smyrna, M. Sterghiádhis; and behaved as though they were permanent masters of the country. The occupation of the capital by the Allied Powers had been a sufficient blow to the dignity and prestige of the Turks ; but now there were added to this these provocations by the Greeks, which were justified neither by right nor by ordinance and were the more galling because the Great Powers seemed to consent to every illegal act of the Hellenic troops. The Nationalist Movement, which had until then been " a vague intellectual opposition to a hypothetical partition of Turkey," now became a powerful force. The handing in of arms under the Armistice terms ceased ; the Nationalist Army was strengthened, and Mustafâ Kemâl increased his influence and prestige among the masses in Asiatic Turkey. Everywhere he gained support in the revolutionary movement of which he was the leader. Under the infamy of foreign occupation, it needed only a spark, only the words of a powerful personality, to fan the spirit of the affronted nation into a flame ; for under invasion the fires of patriotism burn hot and blaze high. The Nationalist Movement gained ground with incredible rapidity throughout Anatolia, wherever news of the Greek occupation had reached. The story *The Shirt of Flame*, by the Turkish novelist Khâlideh Edîb Khânûm, portrays with a strong pen the growth of the popular feeling.

The war between Turkey and Greece which burst out at this time was a defensive war for the safeguarding of the Turkish homelands in Anatolia. It was, as has been shown, a result of the Allied policy of imperialism operating in a foreign state, the military resources and powers of which were seriously under-estimated ; it was provoked by the unwarranted invasion of a Greek army of occupation, taking place with the approval

of the Supreme Allied Council on account of diplomatic complications arising out of the secret treaties and agreements made in the course of the Great War. But we must not lose sight of the larger aspect of it, in which it reveals itself as a struggle of a hitherto Oriental people for liberty to develop in its own way without hindrance; the protest of offended nationalism against the interference of stronger Powers; and the recoil of Western principles, inculcated in the East, upon the West itself. Turkey was struggling to release herself from a prolonged nightmare of Oriental rule. Borrowing from the West, she replied to the West in its own language, and used the ideals of Western nationalism to temper the sword of liberty with a strength of steel. Turkey now cried out with a ringing and passionate appeal for that liberty and freedom of development which had been recognized as the normal right of other countries. Those who thwarted her legitimate aims met with the utmost resistance; those who marched into Anatolia on an illegitimate pretext, and came bringing not peace but a sword, should perish by the sword. The ensuing war was the outcome of this insult to nationhood. In it the heart of the people beat with one desire—national integrity and freedom from the menace of an intolerable foreign yoke.

Preparations for the resistance immediately took place with the utmost seriousness.¹ The new leader found little difficulty in raising troops throughout Anatolia, for although at the Armistice most of the Turkish Army had been demobilized after almost twelve years of campaigning, the popularity of his cause found ready recruits. At first he had at his disposal only two divisions of regular troops. He sent an appeal to the populations of Sivas and 'Ushaq, and many volunteers joined his colours. Colonel Bekir Sâmy, who commanded the

¹ *N. Y. Current History*, October, November, 1921; January, September, October, 1922.

Panderma-Smyrna line and all that district, also rebelled against Constantinople, and added his 10,000 men to the troops of Mustafâ Kemâl, who assumed the general command of all the Nationalist forces.

Naturally, the poverty-stricken disbanded soldiers were a strange and mixed rabble when they flocked back to his colours and enlisted once again for a hard life of campaigning under conditions which would dismay the stoutest troops. Barefooted in some cases, ill-dressed, often without uniform or arms, they volunteered or were pressed into the organization. Many, it was said, were adventurers and the riff-raff of Turkish priors, who had been released during the Great War by Takt Pasha with the special mission of exterminating the Armenian and Greek populations of the Pontus and the interior of Anatolia. Later, the prospects of loot or selfish gain increased the strength of the Kemalist troops and added many chetehs, brigands, nomadic mountaineers, and other undesirable characters. On the other hand, the General had a better source of strength in the vast number of former officers of the Imperial Army, whom the Armistice had released in idleness and left starving in the streets of Constantinople and other cities of the Empire. It is calculated that the Ottoman Army employed over 25,000 officers, a considerable proportion of whom were not Turks, but men drawn from Albanian, Kurdish, Arab and other elements of the Empire. Probably some 5,000 of these ex-officers joined the forces of Mustafâ Kemâl as an easy way to a livelihood. With these combined forces, making up the Turkish Nationalist Army, Mustafâ Kemâl prepared to meet the invading Greek forces in a determined defence of the Turkish homelands.

The story of the Græco-Turkish War may be divided into three main campaigns.¹ The first, in 1920, was entirely

¹ *Quarterly Review*, January, 1923.

favourable to the Greeks ; the second and third, in 1921 and 1922, were alike in that there were partially successful Greek offensives, but each was terminated by a Turkish victory, and the victory of 1922 was complete.

(a) The first offensive took place at the end of June, 1920, when the Greeks, authorized by the three Great Powers, France, Italy and Great Britain, made successful advances on three fronts. One Greek army moved forward from Balikesri and reached the Sea of Marmara in spite of energetic resistance ; this resulted in the capture of Panderma, Brusa, Mudania, Gemlik, and Ismid, and in Greek control over the Magnesia-Aghisar-Panderma line. Another army, supported by an Anglo-Hellenic naval squadron including two British dreadnoughts, landed at Rodosto and other Marmara ports, and in less than a fortnight dispersed the Nationalists in Thrace, capturing Adrianople on 25 July. Twelve thousand Turks who refused to surrender and accept Greek domination were reported to have crossed the Bulgarian frontier. A third army, with Smyrna as its base, pressed eastward as far as 'Ushaq, which it occupied on the 29th August. Such rapid successes emboldened the Greeks, and M. Venizelos, who was chiefly responsible for the whole imperialistic campaign in Asia Minor, was encouraged to demand further Turkish territory as a reward for the services of Greece to the Allies in the Great War.

The Greek successes in the first short campaign were largely due to the superiority of Greek material resources. In the matter of transport, which in modern fighting is the artery of an army, they were well supplied with motor-lorries, and had control of all three railways branching out from Smyrna. In arms, the Greeks possessed vast and largely unused supplies given to them by France and England during the latter part of the Macedonian campaign, and at the conclusion of the

Armistice of 1918 further supplies had been available. Moreover, the Greek lines of communication by sea were quite open, while the Turkish forces were, by the nature of the country and lack of transport, bottled up in the centre of Anatolia and forced to subsist on what stores they had in the interior.

The Turks were not yet fully organized into a regular army. They were handicapped by an anti-Nationalist revolt in the Brusa area under the Circassian leader Ahmed Anzevūr, and the hostility of the Constantinople Government, at whose instigation Anzevūr was acting. They could use only the central sector of the Anatolian Railway and the Angora branch, and they had neither mechanical transport nor good roads. Although they had plenty of small arms, supplies of which had been left over after the Armistice, they were very short of artillery. In the face of these disadvantages it was little wonder that the Turks were unable at this stage to withstand the enemy, though, even so, the resistance that was put up was surprising to the Greeks.

(b) By the beginning of 1921, the military position was giving anxiety to the Greek and Allied Powers. The Greeks were not finding their occupation of the Asiatic provinces easy, and the growing strength of the Turks was ominous. Accordingly, in February, a conference was called in London¹ to which Greek delegates, Constantinople Turkish representatives, and Kemalist Turks were invited. The Allied Powers at that meeting proposed a number of terms to the belligerents which were in fact modifications of the Treaty of Sèvres, made more favourable and conciliatory to the Turks, whose prestige and power were now beginning to command respect. The military clauses of the former Treaty were whittled down somewhat; but on a matter of principle the Kemalist Turks

¹ *N. Y. Current History*, May, 1922.

remained obdurate and refused to accept the proffered terms. The Allied Governments, seeing their efforts at mediation unsuccessful, declared that they would wash their hands of the matter and take a position of neutrality with regard to the Græco-Turkish conflict ; and they repeated this declaration by a formal proclamation of neutrality in May.

The Greeks, frustrated and unsupported in their objective, bitterly resented the withdrawal of Allied support ; but, feeling that it was a case of gaining by themselves what their former friends would no longer help them to obtain, they at once began to make military preparations on a larger scale. They were anxious to launch a new offensive in this same season, before the Turks should have time to get the Nationalist Army fully organized.

Angora, the capital of the new Turkish Government, was this time made a definite objective, for the leaders of the Greek Army saw that a successful assault on that stronghold would be a decisive moral, diplomatic and political victory, would have a powerful psychological effect on the success of the campaign, and would dislodge the Nationalists from their military base. If Angora fell to the Greeks, it would afford a useful vantage point, on the railway line, from which the Greek campaign could be pursued eastward, following the withdrawing Turkish forces, until the whole of Anatolia should be conquered. If, on the other hand, Angora should successfully resist the Greek offensive, it would in any case become almost useless when the Greeks should destroy the only railway in the possession of the enemy. Realizing the significance of this third Greek advance, Mustafâ Kemâl Pasha took every precaution to defend the capital and to hold back the European invaders. Angora was strengthened to the extent of making it " a miniature Verdun," as a Greek writer put it. The natural advantages of the position served the Nationalists well

in their prepared defence ; for both from the north, where a mountain chain hems it in, and from the south, where the Salt Desert extends, the place is well-nigh inaccessible. Furthermore the Turkish Army was carefully reorganized and made ready to resist the advancing Greeks at all odds.

A simultaneous attack was launched by the Greeks on 23 March, 1921, against Afium-Qarahisar and Eski-Shehr, after a reconnoissance in force had been made towards Eski-Shehr in January. An effort was made to gain the important railway junctions of Eski-Shehr and Afium-Qarahisar. With these two railway junctions occupied, the Greeks would possess the great semi-circle of railway which runs from Constantinople to Smyrna, and the Turks would be deprived of the interior Angora-Qonyah line along which they were secretly re-mobilizing and re-equipping their armies on the Smyrna front. On this occasion the Greeks captured Afium-Qarahisar, but had to evacuate it again when their main attack on Eski-Shehr was frustrated at the Battle of In Önü in the first days of April.

On 10 July, 1921, the Greeks commenced a new offensive.¹ The Greek Army, this time converging upon Kiutahiah, at first met with easy successes, and advanced quickly. Kiutahiah soon fell; Eski-Shehr was encircled until the Turkish forces evacuated it ; and, although 'Izmet Pasha's forces pounded at the exhausted Greeks in Eski-Shehr for ten days, it was held firmly against the Turkish counter-attack.

Afium-Qarahisar was next captured, so that the Turks were deprived of the railway running parallel to the front. The majority of the Turkish forces, however, were able to retire intact, and withdrew to the crossing of the River Saqariah, covering Angora itself. Here they took a resolute stand, and mustered all their energy for a final and critical engagement.

¹ X. Stratigos, *Review of the Operations during the Third Period* (dated 9/22 July, 1921).

After a few week's rest, the Greeks advanced again, and re-established contact with the Turks on the Saqariah River on 24 August. Mustafā Kemāl Pasha was in personal command of the Turkish forces, and 'Izmet Pasha immediately under him. An arduous engagement followed, the battle lasting for three weeks, with intense fighting. The Turkish leader was repeatedly in the midst of the field, and on one occasion was severely wounded in the course of battle. The Greeks and the Turks had here come to close grips, and it was a terrific struggle of almost equal forces. The contest was really the meeting of East and West in a contest between a Westernized Power and the new Turkey for supremacy. At last, after hammering away in a desperate attempt to break through the Turkish resistance and defences, the Greeks were finally compelled to give up, and with broken *moral* at last were driven back by Turkish counter-attacks. On the 16th September, a general retreat was ordered; and, burning Turkish villages as they went, the defeated Greeks reached their previous lines on the 23rd and took up positions covering Eski-Shehr and Afium-Qarahisar. They had failed in their objective, and the Turkish Nationalists had gained their second victory. It was not a conclusive success, for the Greek Army was not destroyed; but it undoubtedly gave the necessary moral encouragement to the Turkish defenders. It was, in fact, the turn of the tide in the Græco-Turkish war, and may well deserve the title of one of the decisive battles of the century.¹ The ensuing calm, which lasted for nearly a year,

¹ "The Turkish victory on the banks of the Sakaria radically changed the political complexion of the Near and Middle East. For two hundred years, the West had been breaking down the old Ottoman Empire, but on the Sakaria River it encountered the Turk himself, and, when it touched, the tide of history turned. History will one day find in this obscure engagement on the Sakaria one of the decisive battles of our era."—(Clair Price, *The Rebirth of Turkey*, p. 183.)

gave the Turks ample time to strengthen their forces and perfect their army organization. The Turkish forces, with the help of Allied munitions and native resourcefulness and industry, were re-equipped and again put in good fighting condition.¹

Immediately after the victory of the Saqariah, Mustafâ Kemâl Pasha returned to Angora, where the Great National Assembly honoured him with the title El Ghâzy (which was reserved, in the Muslim tradition, for generals who had conducted victorious campaigns against non-Muslim opponents) and appointed him a Field Marshal. In his speech acknowledging this award, he defined clearly the attitude which the Nationalists held in the matter of the Greek war.

"As President of the Parliament I say before you openly that we do not want war; we want peace. My own opinion is that there is not any obstacle to such an aim. If the Greek Army supposes that it will make us give up our legitimate rights it is mistaken. It is altogether natural that we should be defending our country's existence by arms against attempts to wipe out our nationhood. There can, indeed, be no more reasonable or justifiable attitude than this. Gentlemen, I assure you that we will continue our offensive pressure on the Greek Army till not a single enemy soldier is left in our country."

Nevertheless, the military "offensive" did not make itself felt for many months. Preparations, mobilization and organization proceeded rapidly in the interior, but for almost a year no important military action took place. The Greeks remained in Asia Minor, consolidating their position as well as possible, and maintaining an uneasy hold upon the frontiers of their occupied territory.

Meanwhile, political events moved rapidly and the kaleidoscopic changes were on the whole increasingly favourable to the cause of Turkish nationalism.

¹ General Papoulas's Report of Saqariah Battle, *N. Y. Current History*, October, November, 1921.

The effect of the Sakaria victory was electric. The Turks were now "top dog" in the Anatolian War. The whole world was now forced to recognize that the Government of Angora, with its growing military power, was indeed the *de facto*, if not the *de jure*, Government of Turkey. Again, in March, 1922, on the eve of the next campaigning season, a conference was called by the Allies at Paris to suggest means of arranging some satisfactory settlement; but without success, as the terms were not acceptable. The Allies by this time were growing weary of the struggle in the East, and sensitive over the way in which their plans to set up Greece in Asia Minor were failing.

France, feeling that the support of Greece had been Great Britain's policy rather than hers, and recognizing a new force in Kemalism, had already decided to come to some understanding useful to herself. At the London Conference of February-March, 1921, the French Government had sought a direct understanding with Angora, and after the battle of the Saqariah it sent M. Franklin-Bouillon to Angora to arrange the terms of a separate agreement between France and Turkey, which was signed on 20 October, 1921. This private agreement aroused strong protest from Great Britain,¹ who complained that it had been made without her knowledge or consent, contrary to the terms of the Franco-British understandings. By the terms of this agreement, variously known as the Franklin-Bouillon Pact, the Angora Agreement, and the Franco-Turkish Treaty, a new boundary, more favourable to Turkey than the Sèvres line, was drawn between Syria and Turkey by mutual agreement between Turkey and France, the Mandatory Power. France was to withdraw from the troublesome occupation of Cilicia (which she had partly abandoned,

¹ See Cmd. 1556 and Cmd. 1570 (1921). *N. Y. Current History*, January, April, 1922.

under Turkish military pressure, in 1920); and was to receive various economic advantages, such as a ninety-nine year lease of the iron, chrome and silver mines of the valley of Harchite, near the shores of the Black Sea, and a concession for the operation of sections of the Baghdad Railway from the Mediterranean to the eastern rail-head. The final withdrawal of Allied forces from Cilicia was equivalent to the strengthening of Mustafâ Kemâl's army by about 80,000 troops, such being, according to M. Briand, the number of French troops up to that time facing an equal number of Turkish forces in Cilicia. In addition, it was estimated that the French command left to the Turks enough supplies and ammunition to equip an army of 40,000 men. This, of course, meant a disastrous blow to the Greeks, and was an indirect French support of the Turkish cause, besides being a complete break-away from the joint Allied support of Greece in Anatolia. It meant that France recognized the *de facto* Nationalist Government of Angora as the ruling Government of Turkey; and this was a direct breach with Great Britain, who was still supporting the defunct Government of Constantinople. Thus was brought into sharp relief the actual lack of Allied unity on the Turkish Question. Having concluded a favourable treaty of peace with Turkey, France thenceforth withdrew from any active participation in the Græco-Turkish War.

In June, 1921, before the French withdrawal from Cilicia, the Italians, realizing that Turkey was not likely to submit to an inter-allied partition, as had been anticipated in the Treaty of London of 1915 and in the later Tripartite Agreement of Sèvres, had quietly withdrawn their own forces from Adalia and the neighbourhood. During the spring and autumn of that year Italy had come to a friendly agreement with the Kemalists. In addition, on 31 March, 1922, Italy concluded a new agreement and peace settlement with the impotent Constantinople

Government.¹ Thereafter, Italy, like France, held aloof from the Near Eastern imbroglio.

As has been mentioned, a conference of the Allied Foreign Ministers met in Paris in March, 1922, when still further modifications of the Treaty of Sèvres were made in favour of the Turks. On 22 March, an Allied proposal for an Armistice in Asia Minor was forwarded to Athens and Angora; four days later, new proposals were suggested, including "the peaceful evacuation of Asia Minor by the Greek forces and the restitution of Turkish sovereignty over the whole of that region, within a period of four months after the armistice." The conditions were accepted by the Greeks and by the Constantinople Government, but Yūsuf Kemāl Bey, the Foreign Minister of the Angora Government, demanded that the Greek evacuation of Anatolia should begin at once and be completed within four months, after which an armistice would be agreed to. The Allied Governments replied that the period of the Greek evacuation might be shortened, but that it was conditional on a prior armistice. Negotiations thereafter were attempted without success, until July, when the Greeks once more decided to attempt by arms a quick termination of the war and a settlement of the prolonged and anxious quarrel.

On 17 July, the Greek High Commissioner in Smyrna was instructed by the Royalist Government in Greece to transform the occupied area into the autonomous protected state of "Ionia." Angora protested strongly against this unilateral act in violation of the existing treaties, and once more prepared to prevent it by a vigorous resistance. The Greeks elsewhere were showing similar presumption, for during the same month they announced their intention of seizing and occupying Constantinople. For this purpose they had been steadily

¹ *Christian Science Monitor*, 5 June, 1922 (Text).

concentrating troops in Thrace. Mr. Lloyd George, speaking for the Allied Governments, stated that this occupation of the capital by the Greeks would not be permitted. The Allied garrisons in the city were strengthened to meet eventualities, though not to an adequate extent.

(c) The last campaign of the war began about 18 August, 1922. Small engagements in the region of Brusa and the Mæander valley took place during that week. Then 'Izmet Pasha, making an offensive-defensive movement, launched a strong attack on the Greek centre at Afium-Qarahisar on 26 August. After a heavy engagement, the Greek front was finally broken, and the Greek Army forced to make a hasty retreat. The Turks, following the Greeks up, had advanced no less than forty kilometres by the 29th. A second battle took place on the 29th and 30th at Tunlu Pınar, which the Greeks were compelled to abandon. They tried to hold on at 'Ushaq, but again failed. On 2 September, Turkish cavalry rode into 'Ushaq, swept down upon the headquarters, captured General Tricoupis and all his staff, and returned unscathed to their own lines. After this the Greek Army crumpled up, their *moral* being completely shattered and their exhausted strength broken.

Political intrigue in Greece, which had ended in the fall of M. Venizelos, the return of King Constantine, and the removal as Venizelists of most of the experienced Greek officers who had been carrying on the war in Turkey, had caused the appointment of incompetent royalist officers and court favourites to the Anatolian command. This fact had combined with the gradual withdrawal of Allied support in Asia Minor, due first to the fall of M. Venizelos and secondly to the failure of the Greek forces in Anatolia, to undermine the *moral* of the Greek Army in Turkey, and it was also rumoured that Bolshevik propaganda among Greek troops had helped to

weaken their military effectiveness. The physical condition of the soldiers, ill-shod, badly clothed and insufficiently fed, contributed to their inefficiency, so that, after the reverses at Afium-Qarahisar and Tunlu Punar, the complete collapse at 'Ushaq was inevitable.

The rest of the drama is well known: How the Greeks, defeated in the field, forsaken by their allies, commanded by incompetent political appointees, demoralized by propaganda, and discouraged by the rumoured evacuation of Smyrna, fell to pieces; how, driven on wings of despair, they made their sensational retreat from 'Ushaq, a distance of one hundred and sixty miles, in eight days, followed at their very heels by the Turkish Army under the command of Fevzi Pasha; how, during the rout, the Greeks, abandoning everything but their rifles, and living off the country, stopped only long enough to set fire to village after village as they fled through them, leaving a trail of burning ruins behind; and how at last, on 9 September, while the stragglers of the last Greek detachment dragged wearily along the Smyrna waterfront, the advance guard of the victorious Turkish Army rode in alongside their vanquished enemy, and took possession of the city without an engagement. The war was over. There remained only the evacuation of the Greeks, a painful and anxious task which was at last completed; the occupation of the city of Smyrna by Turkish authorities; the maintenance of order; and the expulsion of the last enemies that remained in hiding. Order was only partially maintained—comparatively well at first, but, as the thousands of Turkish soldiery came pouring in, less easily. Looting and violence developed. Raids were made on the Armenian quarter, which was known to hide some dangerous characters.

In the next few days of disorder there burst out the

terrible fire¹ that swept half the city away, burned for a week, and destroyed the richest section of Smyrna. It was the pyre of the unfaithful city, "Gyaur İzmir," and it was a symbol of the final purging of Turkey. The Nationalists had won, in the ordeal by combat; they were tested in the ordeal by fire, which burned the European quarter and left the inflammable Turkish quarter scathless. There remained for them the greatest trial of all, that of government.

While these spectacular events at Smyrna were engaging the amazed attention of the whole world, and intense sympathy was being evoked for the fleeing Greeks, who were assisted out of the country by every means and agency available, notably the American relief organizations, the Turks were not resting. Not satisfied with the expulsion of the Greek forces from Anatolia, Mustafâ Kemâl Pasha demanded that the Greeks should evacuate Eastern Thrace also, and that this province, in accordance with one of the cardinal assumptions of the National Pact, should be returned to Turkey. To this end, the Nationalist forces were moved northward towards the Straits, preparatory to crossing over into Thrace and driving out the Greeks as decisively as in Asia.

At the Straits, however, Mustafâ Kemâl Pasha found his passage determinedly blocked by the British at Chanaq. On 15 May, 1921, when the Allied Powers had formally proclaimed their neutrality in the Græco-Turkish conflict, they had also designated a neutral zone, including territory on either side of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, on which neither belligerent was to trespass. Having warned off the Greeks from one part of this zone in July, General Harington, the Commander of the Allied Forces on the spot, took up the

¹ Oeconomos, Lys., *The Martyrdom of Smyrna* (a collation of narrative material), Allen and Unwin, London, 1922; *N. Y. Current History*, May, 1923; *National Geographic Magazine* (U.S.A.), November, 1925; *Atlantic Monthly*, January, February, 1923.

same attitude towards the Turks in September. Mustafâ Kemâl Pasha, on his part, demanded that the Allies should allow the Turkish Army to pursue the Greeks into Thrace ; and, upon their refusal, he began to mass his troops at Ismid and simultaneously closed in on the Allied detachment at Chanaq, on the Asiatic shore of the Dardanelles, at the Narrows. The situation became extremely tense, and a collision between British and Turkish troops seemed imminent. A second "Dardanelles Campaign" was threatened, and this aroused great alarm throughout Great Britain and the British Dominions. The crisis was rendered more acute by a sudden reversal of French policy. On 12 and 13 September the French Government had officially assured the British Government of its solidarity in regard to the vindication of the neutral zone ; but, as the likelihood of a conflict increased, M. Poincaré, supported by the whole French Cabinet, fearing the possibilities and perhaps secretly sympathetic with the Turkish cause, determined to withdraw the French contingent from Chanaq, and on 19 September both the French and the Italian contingents fell back to the Gallipoli Peninsula. Mr. Lloyd George and Lord Curzon, however, still maintained the British contingent at Chanaq, and despatched strong military and naval reinforcements, at the same time requesting the Turks to withdraw from their position in contact with the Chanaq lines, in order to avoid the danger of any "incident" that would precipitate war. In the end, General Harington, the Allied Commander-in-Chief in Constantinople, succeeded in preventing actual conflict, and on 3 October he went with his Allied colleagues to Mudania to negotiate an armistice with 'Izmet Pasha. The negotiations almost broke down, but in the end the armistice was concluded and signed on 11 October.¹

¹ *The Times*, (London) 14 October, 1922.

The terms constituted an Allied surrender, under pressure, to the demands of the Kemalists. Already, on 23 September, before the Turkish cavalry had encroached on the neutral zone adjoining the Dardanelles, the Allied Governments had conceded the principal outstanding Turkish demands by consenting that Eastern Thrace, up to the River Maritsa, should be restored to Turkish sovereignty. They had merely demanded that the neutral zones should remain inviolate and Turkish troops be excluded from Thrace during the peace negotiations, into which they invited the Angora Government to enter. The Mudania Armistice conference had been held on the initiative of Angora in response to this Allied overture ; and, in the resulting agreement—which was equivalent to a preliminary peace-treaty—the Allied concessions were naturally embodied.

It was now agreed to evacuate the Greeks immediately from Eastern Thrace, to restore to Turkey all Thrace as far as the Maritsa River ; and to admit forthwith the Turkish civil administration with the means—including 8,000 gendarmerie—for maintaining order. Thus Turkey recovered a substantial foothold in Europe, in spite of every Allied attempt, by secret convention and open terms, to confine her to Asia Minor and to a conditional possession of the Constantinople area up to the Chatalja lines. It was also the end of Greek aspirations at Turkey's expense, for from this time onwards the Greek claims both to Smyrna and to Eastern Thrace were not only rejected by the Allies as well as by the Kemalists, but were abandoned by the Greeks themselves, who signed the Mudania Armistice Agreement on 14 October. The victorious Turks held possession of all that they had claimed in their original National Pact ; the Græco-Turkish war was now finally at an end ; and Mr. Lloyd George, seeing the collapse of his policy, handed in his resignation to the King on 19 October. His

Near Eastern adventure had proved a failure, had created instead of destroying the Turkish nation, and had proved disastrous to Greece. He himself, and the Coalition Government with him, was discredited in the sight of the British people; and a revulsion of feeling brought in, with the new elections, a new British Government pledged to a policy of "tranquillity" and peace.

CHAPTER VII

THE LAUSANNE CONFERENCE AND TREATY

THE patched-up settlement of Mudania being only a temporary expedient by which hostilities in the Near East were suspended, the next task was to arrive at definitive peace terms which would put to an end the confusion of the Turkish Question and bring some conclusion to outstanding problems in the Near East. Preparations were made for a peace conference to be held in Lausanne in November, 1922.¹

An invitation addressed on 27 October to the old effete Ottoman Government in Constantinople, as well as the Turkish Government at Angora, to send delegates to the projected conference drew a protest from Angora on the ground that the form of government based on the sovereignty of the Sultan in Constantinople had ceased to exist on 16 March, 1920; and this deliberate rejection of the old Government by the new led the Constantinople cabinet to resign on 4 November, and the Sultan Vāhydu'd-Dīn to leave Turkey on the 17th. Constantinople thenceforth ceased to be the capital of Turkey, and became a provincial city under the administration of a local governor, Re'fet Pasha. At the same time, the dual government which had existed since March, 1920, was brought to an end.

The Conference of Lausanne opened on 20 November, 1922. Lord Curzon, who held the Secretaryship of State for Foreign Affairs both in the Coalition Government of Mr. Lloyd George and in the succeeding Conservative Government of Mr. Bonar Law, represented Great Britain. 'Izmet Pasha, then Foreign Minister and later twice Prime Minister of the Angora Govern-

¹ Cmd. 1814 (1923) (Minutes of Proceedings); *N. Y. Current History*, January, February, March, August, September, October, 1923; *Quarterly Review*, January, 1923.

ment—which was now the only Turkish Government in existence—headed the Turkish delegation.

Nearly three months of inconclusive and tortuous negotiation ensued, until the first conference was suddenly terminated on 4 February, 1923, by the departure of Lord Curzon for England. 'Izmet Pasha then went back to Angora, reported the failure of the conference, and received encouragement to stiffen the Turkish demands at the next meeting. The *status quo* of the Mudania Armistice was maintained, with British naval and military forces in occupation of Constantinople and the Straits, and Eastern Thrace, up to the Maritsa River boundary line, occupied by a Turkish force which, in both numbers and composition, was something more than the body of gendarmerie which had been stipulated at Mudania.

The Conference of Lausanne was resumed on 23 April, when Sir Horace Rumbold, the British High Commissioner in Constantinople, took Lord Curzon's place, and 'Izmet Pasha returned to press the Turkish demands. For three more months the negotiations dragged on, while the Turkish delegation held with stubborn resistance to the claims of the National Pact in regard to territory, capitulations, debts and other national interests. On 24 July, 1923, the Treaty of Peace was finally signed at Lausanne. The ratification of the Treaty by Great Britain took place on 15 April, 1924. The General Peace Treaty which emerged from these protracted discussions was accompanied by no less than eighteen conventions, agreements, declarations and protocols and by six letters or exchanges of letters. The majority of these documents were signed in each case by certain only of the parties represented at the Conference. The most important of them were the five separate conventions dealing respectively with the Straits, the Thracian frontier, conditions of residence and business and jurisdiction in Turkey, conditions of commercial operation in

Turkey, and the exchange of Greek and Turkish populations.

In the Treaty itself,¹ the most important clauses were those dealing with the new frontiers of Turkey; the redistribution of the Ottoman Public Debt; the abolition of the Capitulation System and the Millet System; and the protection of minorities and exchange of populations. A closer analysis of these various settlements will be made in the chapters of this volume dealing with these respective topics. In this place, reference need only be made to the territorial clauses, which reinstated Turkey in her Anatolian heritage and her foot-hold in Europe, and indeed secured to her almost all the territories to which the National Pact laid claim and which Mustafā Kemāl Pasha had endeavoured to defend or recover.

In Europe, the delimitation of frontiers gave Turkey the whole of Eastern Thrace, including Adrianople, as far west as the Maritsa River, a natural boundary which separated the two Thracian areas. Opposite Adrianople, Turkey also received a bridge-head (containing a section of the railway) on the right or western bank of the Maritsa, in satisfaction of her claims against Greece for Reparation. This gave back to Turkey that ancient foot-hold on the continent of Europe which she had been dangerously near to losing in the precarious struggle of the past ten years; and the dreams cherished by Palmerston, Gladstone and later European statesmen of driving out the Turks "bag and baggage" from the European continent were once again disappointed.

Constantinople, which under the unratified Treaty of Sèvres would have fallen partly under the jurisdiction of an International Commission of Control, empowered to administer the waterway of the Straits with the adjoining shores (as far as might be necessary), was now by the new Treaty conceded to Turkey as an integral part of the State, under the full

¹ Cmd. 1929, Treaty Series No. 16 (1923).

sovereignty and administration of the Turkish Government, including the right to maintain a Turkish garrison in the city. The Allied armies of occupation were to be withdrawn. Safeguards with respect to the use of the Straits both in time of war and in time of peace were, however, carefully stipulated in a special Straits Convention annexed to the main Peace Treaty. A more detailed examination of this problem of the Straits is attempted in a subsequent chapter. Constantinople, since its restoration to the Turkish Government, has become one of the paramount concerns of the new Republic; for although it is no longer the capital of the State it still plays a fundamentally important part in the economic life and in the politics of Turkey, and its rivalry to the new capital of Angora has been a disturbing element in Turkish national politics.

The southern boundary of Turkey under the Lausanne Treaty differed slightly from that laid down in the Sèvres Treaty, and practically confirmed the boundary settlement stipulated in the Franco-Turkish Agreement of 20 October, 1921. By that instrument, France had evacuated Cilicia in return for commercial and economic concessions, and had ceded to Turkey the permanent way of the Baghdad Railway in the section running eastward from the Amanus Tunnel to Mardin and Nisibin in the direction of Mosul, with the significant exception of two small stretches of line on either side of Aleppo, which remained in the French mandated territory of Syria, thus reserving to France a strangle-hold over the whole railway. On the south-east, where the British mandated territory of Iraq lay contiguous to Turkey, the frontier was left provisionally undefined, owing to incompatible claims to the boundary province of Mosul, over which the British and Turkish delegations at Lausanne found themselves completely at variance. This frontier settlement was deferred for subsequent negotiation and a separate decision; and, as is shown

elsewhere, the resultant "Mosul Question" continued to be a grave international issue for several years.

Finally, in accordance with the claims of the National Pact, the Kurdish territories which, under the Treaty of Sèvres, had been promised recognition as an autonomous State of Kurdistan, were now included unconditionally within the Turkish frontiers, thus leaving, in the now otherwise almost completely homogeneous Anatolian Turkish state, one considerable non-Turkish and unassimilable minority, composed of nomadic people who were neither Turkish in race nor genuinely Muslim in religion. The effect of this alien element was to be seen in the subsequent Kurdish disorders and revolt of 1925.

Various measures for the actual defining and marking out of these new Turkish frontiers were incorporated in the Treaty, together with a great many military conditions and limitations.

The complete cancellation of all the time-honoured privileges of the "milletts" and of the formidable advantages enjoyed by foreigners under the Capitulations marked the successful achievement at Lausanne of the Nationalist ideals, the final breakdown of the Allied domination, and the relinquishment of that foreign ascendancy over the internal life of Turkey which for centuries had been one of the most noteworthy features of Near Eastern relationships.

In almost every way the demands of the Turkish Nationalists were conceded by the Allies at Lausanne; and the world had the unprecedented surprise of seeing a defeated and apparently shattered nation rise from its ruins, face the greatest nations of the world on terms of absolute equality, and win from the humiliated victors of the Great War almost every one of its national demands.

The Turkish diplomatic success at Lausanne concluded, save for one question, the peace settlement between the several former belligerents. The question of the Mosul boundary was

left in abeyance in order to prevent a complete blocking of all other negotiations.

What might have happened, had the Turkish settlement been agreed upon during the sitting of the first Peace Conference at Paris in 1919, is an amusing subject for speculation. At that time, the Allies were flushed with victory and cherished exaggerated visions of self-aggrandizement, ineffectually tempered by President Wilson's idealism, while Turkey, defeated and in despair, lay at the feet of her conquerors. Had the terms of the Sèvres Treaty been agreed upon a year earlier and promptly imposed, Turkey might have been partitioned once and for all; but delay let slip this opportunity. Turkey was given time to breathe again and she used it to shake herself out of her lethargy, while the mutually jealous Powers bickered among themselves. The Treaty gained for the Republic of Turkey recognition and respect, power and prestige, independence and security; and deprived the Western Powers of the domination which they had long been establishing and had intended now to complete and confirm.

The causes of this outcome have been indicated already. The Entente was too brittle to survive a decisive victory in the General War. When once the common fear of Germany was removed, cross purposes between themselves, conflicting policies and discordant aims weakened the Allies' diplomatic front; their opposition to the demands put forward by the Turks was not unanimous; and so the Western statesmen at Lausanne gave in, yielding before the dogged and determined assaults of the delegation from Angora. Against this divided Alliance stood a nation resolutely and unflinchingly demanding the whole, and nothing less than the whole, of its claims; and stubbornly claiming all those elements of complete independence which had been set forth in the original National Pact. The greatest credit for the Turkish success in this duel must

be given to 'Izmet Pasha, the deaf, shrewd, calculating and persistently stubborn statesman and soldier. It is said that even his deafness stood him in good stead in enabling him to ignore the counter-proposals of the other parties. Finally, the uncompromising attitude of the chief Turkish plenipotentiary was strengthened by the determination of a President, a Parliament and a People in the Anatolian interior who stood behind him and demanded that he should exact the last letter of the Pact rather than yield on a single point. When 'Izmet Pasha spoke, it was the unanimous voice of Turkey; and Turkey was now a Power to be respected and conciliated in virtue of her great victory over the Greeks, her re-occupation of European territory and her readiness to challenge the military power of the Allies. Sèvres would have written the death warrant of a nation which was sick unto death already. Lausanne wrote not merely a reprieve, but a charter of freedom, signed and sealed by a dozen Powers, for a nation which had proved in action its will to live.

A year or two now elapsed, with no untoward incident occurring in the international relations of Turkey. Both the Nationalists and their enemies were exhausted by the strain of the Anatolian War, coming as it did so soon after the close of the Great War. Greece was humbled by the failure of the Venizelist dreams of Asiatic empire and was now, for a long time to come, completely absorbed in the problems of internal settlement, political stability and economic rehabilitation. Approximately a million refugees from Eastern Thrace and Asia Minor had been driven to find a new home in European Greece west of the Maritsa, where a population of scarcely four millions were already pressing upon the local means of subsistence and the country's total resources. The problem before the humiliated Greek nation was vast enough to claim all its enterprise and energy, and for the time being no spirit was left

in it for further military adventure. Political revolutions, also, engaged the attention of the people and created a domestic question of absorbing interest. King Constantine, who had been restored to the throne in December, 1920, lost it again after the *débâcle* of 1922, when a bloodless revolution in Greece caused the abdication of the King in favour of his eldest son, George II. Shortly afterwards another revolution overthrew the monarchy and brought into existence a Republic—one more example of the penetration of Western political ideals into the Near East. From that time on, Greece continued in a state of unstable equilibrium, with successive changes in political leadership resulting from various *coups d'état* in Athens.

Turkey likewise was busily occupied in restoring peace and order in her various territories, in settling her affairs, and in reconstructing the Turkish state. She had obtained a respite from foreign intervention, and in the period of tranquillity she sought to bring order out of chaos, to build up some secure political structure, and to develop the arts of peace and the opportunities of internal rehabilitation as rapidly and as effectively as possible. The Armistice of Mudania gave the Turkish Nationalists time to work out their policy under more normal conditions than they had experienced since the Revolution; the Peace settlement of Lausanne released the national energy anew for domestic activities, free from the disturbances of international conflict.

Readers of the foregoing narrative, as they followed the history of the Turkish Nationalists' amazing achievement between the years 1919 and 1922, will naturally have asked themselves: How was it that Mustafâ Kemâl Pasha ventured to defy the Principal Allied Powers, and how was it that those Powers failed, at every stage, to take up the challenge, even when the issues at stake were no longer the national aspirations

of Greece but the vital interests of the Powers themselves? A partial answer to the first question is that the Turkish Nationalists were aware, almost from the beginning, that they could count upon the imposing, if imponderable, support of Soviet Russia (a fellow-victim of the victorious Allies). A partial answer to the second question has been given above in describing the psychology of the Allied peoples, and the effect of this psychology upon the policy of the Allied Governments, after the decisive defeat of Germany. It remains to touch upon the mutual jealousy of the Allied Powers, which was a contributing cause of their impotence, and then to record briefly the parts which were played, in the struggle between Greece and Turkey, by these several forces in the background.

The rivalry between Great Britain and France in the Levant dated back to Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in 1798, if not to an earlier time, and had been revived and accentuated, first, by French embitterment over the British occupation of Egypt in 1882, then by the Fashoda incident in 1898, and finally by the allocation of the former Arab provinces of Turkey-in-Asia to the two Powers as Mandatories—an allocation in which Great Britain had not only received the lion's share, but had succeeded, after the Armistice, in obtaining considerably more than France had agreed to give her in the Secret Agreement of May, 1916. French "official circles," the French Colonial Party, and the French Press (as distinct from the French public, which displayed little interest in Middle Eastern affairs) emerged from the Great War with a feeling that, in the Levant, as opposed to Europe, the true enemy was once more a victorious and self-confident Britain rather than a defeated and impotent Germany. This feeling was strengthened after the Armistice when Great Britain, on account of her naval superiority, appeared to play the leading rôle in the joint

occupation of the Straits. It was still further strengthened when, on the initiative of Mr. Lloyd George, the Greek Army was invited to step into the breach left open by the war-weariness of the Western peoples, the preoccupation of the Western Governments with their settlement of accounts with Germany, and the inability of those Governments to agree whenever the Turkish settlement came up for discussion. The Greeks openly regarded Great Britain, or at any rate the British Prime Minister of the day, as in some special sense their patron; and the French began to fear that if Greece obtained the aggrandisement contemplated for her in the Treaty of Sèvres with British diplomatic and naval assistance, the gratitude of Greece would combine with British naval superiority to give Great Britain a decisive ascendancy in the Levant over all other Powers. Thus the Treaty had hardly been signed before the French began to look forward with distaste to its execution. The distaste changed to active hostility when, at the close of 1920, M. Venizelos lost office and the Greek throne was reoccupied by King Constantine—for the French were less disposed than the British to forget the part which King Constantine had played—or was supposed to have played—during the Great War, when the King's resistance to Allied demands had cost more French than British lives. Meanwhile, the Turkish Nationalists had been pressing the French hard in Cilicia, and the desire to escape from a new war reinforced hostility towards Constantinian Greece in inducing the French to make overtures to the representatives of Angora at the time of the abortive London Conference of February–March, 1921. As successive Greek offensives failed during the campaigning season of that year, the French became increasingly eager not to find themselves, for the sake of Greece and Britain, on the losing side. It has been mentioned above how, after the Battle of the Saqariah, M. Franklin-Bouillon

went on a private mission to Angora, and how the agreement which he negotiated with the Angora Government in October, 1921, was of the greatest military assistance to the Turks when they were girding themselves for the final struggle with their Greek opponents. The withdrawal of the French contingent from Chanaq when, after the Greek *débâcle*, the Turks were threatening to turn their arms against the British, was a logical, though not a heroic, culmination of a policy which had been developed under the impulse of jealousy and suspicion. Jealousy was also the mainspring of the policy of Italy, who, after the defeat of Germany, aspired to that "place in the sun" which Germany had forfeited before securing it. While Great Britain and France were rivals of old and equal standing, Italy, as a younger Power, looked forward to raising herself to a level above her present station, and neglected no opportunity of stealing a march upon her senior partners. She anticipated France in the policy of making friends with the Turkish Nationalists; and when she saw France take the same road, she attempted to keep the lead by perpetually outbidding her. Adalia, which the Italians had occupied a fortnight before the Greeks landed at Smyrna, was the Turkish Nationalists' chief port of entry for munitions and other essential supplies until the Franklin-Bouillon Agreement put Italy's services in the shade.

Thus, while Greece received less and less active help from Great Britain as the Græco-Turkish War in Anatolia dragged on, the Turkish Nationalists received more and more positive assistance from Great Britain's European Allies. On the other hand, at the Lausanne Conference, when Great Britain's political programme had already gone by the board and the most contentious of the outstanding issues were those relating to the Capitulations and to Turkey's foreign debts, in which France was mainly concerned, the support which France re-

ceived from Great Britain was perhaps less vigorous than it would have been, in all probability, had the French troops not been withdrawn from Chanaq and the Franklin-Bouillon Agreement not been negotiated. In fact, from the moment when Mustafā Kemāl Pasha unfurled his standard in Anatolia down to the exchange of ratifications of the Treaty of Lausanne, the Turkish Nationals never had to face a united front of the three Principal European Allies. Had the Allies been of one mind in imposing their terms upon Turkey, as they were in imposing them on Germany, Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria, or had Great Britain, at the final crisis, taken separate action with the vigour that France displayed in invading the Ruhr, Mustafā Kemāl Pasha's triumph would have been impossible. It must be recognized, however, that those premises were not only unfulfilled but were incapable of fulfilment, since in the Near East the three Western Powers lacked the stimulus of having vital national interests at stake and were alienated from one another by rivalries old and new, instead of being drawn together by a common fear.

While this disunity among the Western Powers was an important negative advantage to the Turkish Nationalists, they derived an equally important positive advantage from that solidarity of interests between themselves and Russia, the genesis of which has been described in a previous chapter. So long as the Western Powers held the naval command of the Black Sea, and used this command in order to support and equip "White" Russian armies in an attempt to overthrow the Soviet Government by military force, the Soviet Government was bound to seek every means of depriving the Allies of their control of the Straits, on which their command of the Black Sea depended. When the Turkish Nationalists took up arms and drew up their National Pact, in which the recovery of Eastern Thrace and the security of Constantinople

were inscribed among the objectives for which they intended to fight, it became evident to Bolshevik statesmen that to support the Turkish Nationalists might be one of the most effective means of defending themselves; and at this very time the physical barriers between Moscow and Angora began to fall away, for the British forces evacuated Trans-Caucasia (except for Batum) in August, 1919, while General Denikin, who had been master north of the mountains, collapsed in December. In April, 1920, the Moscow Government obtained control of Baku and the whole Republic of Azerbaijan by means of a local Bolshevik Revolution, and immediately began to put pressure upon the weak Armenian Republic of Erivan—the sole remaining obstacle to direct contact between Moscow and Angora overland. Towards the end of September, 1920, Erivan was invaded by Kiāzym Qārā Bekir Pasha, commanding the Eastern Army of the Turkish Nationalist forces, and on 21 October he captured the fortress of Kars—a blow which forced the Armenian Government to sue for peace. Meanwhile, on 31 October, the Red Army broke through the lines of General Wrangel, the last "White" leader in Southern Russia, and on 14 November Wrangel and his surviving troops evacuated the Crimea. At the beginning of December, a Soviet Government was installed at Erivan by a *coup d'état* like that which had been carried out in April at Baku, and this new government promptly made peace with Angora under the auspices of Moscow. The last barrier by land was removed when the Republic of Georgia, whose position had been weakened by the withdrawal of the British force from Batum in July, 1920, was overrun by the Red Army in February and March, 1921.

This establishment of contact between the two outlawed Powers raised some delicate territorial questions. There were the three districts of Kars, Ardahan and Batum, which had

been taken from Turkey by the Russian Empire in 1878, retroceded to Turkey by the Soviet Russian Government in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, evacuated by the Turks and temporarily occupied by British troops under the Armistice of Mudros, handed over by the British partly to the Armenian Republic of Erivan and partly to Georgia, and retroceded to Turkey by Erivan (in so far as they had been assigned to her) in the peace of December, 1920. In March, 1921, the Turkish Nationalist forces and the Red Army marched simultaneously upon Batum, and on the 17th they actually came to blows there. On the 16th, however, a treaty between the two Governments had been signed at Moscow which not only settled the territorial question (by assigning to Turkey the whole of the three districts except the port of Batum itself, which, under certain conditions, was left to the new Soviet Republic of Georgia within the framework of the Soviet Union) but created a regular common front against the Western Powers.

In this treaty (the credit for which, on the Turkish side, belonged to the Foreign Minister at Angora, Yūsuf Kemāl Bey, who went to Moscow to negotiate in person), either party agreed "not to recognize any peace treaties, or any other international acts, the acceptance of which might be imposed by force" on the other. At the same time, the Moscow Government recognized the Government of the Great National Assembly at Angora as the legitimate Government of Turkey, and the territories claimed in the National Pact as that Government's legitimate domain.

This treaty had been preceded by a number of less formal agreements; and, as soon as the land-route was opened, the Bolsheviks had apparently supplied the Turkish Nationalists with consignments of war material and of gold. The amount of the assistance thus given and received in kind seems never to have been revealed by the two Governments concerned, and

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no estimate can be attempted by an outside observer. On the other hand, the diplomatic and moral value to Angora of Moscow's friendship and support was indisputably of the highest order. In facing Greece and her supporter, Great Britain, Mustafâ Kemâl and his comrades were conscious of having not only French and Italian sympathizers in their opponents' rear, but an ally in their own rear on whose loyalty they could count so long as the Straits remained in the hands of the British Navy.

CHAPTER VIII

" THE IDEAS OF 1789 "

THE Turkish Revolution of 1919-22 had two aspects: the defence of the Turkish homelands and the reconstruction of the Turkish State. The struggle for national existence, which has been recorded above, was the first care of Mustafā Kemāl and his companions; but the internal revolution was well under weigh before the victory over the Greeks had been sealed by the peace settlement at Lausanne, though the most sensational steps in it were not taken until after the Armistice of Mudania.

In order to appraise the rapid political changes—all of them revolutionary and the majority of them destructive of things past rather than fruitful of things to come—which were carried through in Turkey between the autumn of 1922 and the spring of 1924, it is not sufficient to study the treaties, conventions, fundamental laws and other public documents in which the intentions of statesmen were set forth, or even to trace the record of what actually happened (which was by no means the same in all cases as that which the legal instruments provided). It is necessary to enter imaginatively into the state of mind of the men from whose initiative these changes proceeded; and that state of mind arose in Angora between the year 1920, when that remote and sluggish Turkish country-town was chosen for the seat of the Great National Assembly, and the signature of the Peace Treaty of Lausanne in the summer of 1923, when the new Turkey began to enter into normal relations with the rest of the world.

Between those two dates, the astonished natives of Angora saw descend upon their town (or upon what was left of it, for the greater part of it had been burnt out a few years earlier) a stream of outlandish and energetic people from the ends of the earth: Turkish soldiers who had lived as attachés in Berlin or

Paris when they had not been on active service ; Turkish administrators who had spent their working-days in government offices in Constantinople, in touch with the Western diplomatic corps in the former Ottoman capital ; and even a Turkish newspaper editor, who had arrived with his printing machines (which he had smuggled in parts across the Bosphorus and through the Allied lines) migrating triumphantly upon the backs of camels. These exotic fellow-countrymen of the Angorans were soon reinforced by still stranger immigrants from further afield : diplomatic representatives from Afghanistan and Azerbaijan and the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic ; Indian Muslim gentlemen who had trekked from the Punjab to Angora overland in order to live under an independent Islamic government ; Egyptian revolutionaries ; and even the Grand Sanūsī himself, who made a pilgrimage all the way from his oasis-capital in the Libyan desert. And these strangers displayed an energy the like of which the native Angorans had never seen. The Great National Assembly built itself a parliament house on somewhat the same architectural plan and approximately the same scale as would have been adopted for the national school, in an English town of the same size as Angora, by the local education authority. An enterprising ex-professor secured the site next to the parliament house and opened a restaurant ; the editor leased a stable, re-assembled his machines, and began to publish the *Hakimiyet-i-Milliyeh* ; the General Staff organized a War Office in the local barracks ; the Government Departments installed themselves in private houses ; the foreign diplomatists established legations in others ; the Prime Minister requisitioned the upper storey of the railway station ; while Mustafā Kemāl Bey, as the acknowledged leader of the movement, rejoiced in a whole villa to himself outside the town and a motor-car to convey him on public business.

Under such conditions—living in extreme personal discomfort and working with feverish energy for their cause—the new inhabitants of Angora broke up the foundations of the old Turkey and set out to lay the foundations of a new order. The hardship which they felt most keenly was their isolation, for these were all men who had received a Western education and who drew their spiritual and intellectual stimulus from the world of ideas which that education had opened up to them ; but this physical isolation, while it prevented them from receiving fresh mental nutriment, turned their minds inward upon themselves and drove deeper into them the particular Western impressions which they had already received. In the domain of politics, those impressions reflected the ideas of the French Revolution.

In opening their minds to Western civilization the Turks, like their Oriental Christian neighbours, had turned towards France and had drunk in the Western stream through French channels. This predominance of French influence, which has been one of the most important forces in the modern history of the Near East, is due to several causes. Its origin is perhaps to be found in the alliance between Francis the First and Suleiman the Magnificent against the Hapsburgs, which was consecrated by the bilateral capitulatory treaty of A.D.1535. French influence was further strengthened by the increase of French trade in the Levant beyond that of other Western nations—an increase which was assisted by the Franco-Turkish political *entente* and which reached its culmination in the eighteenth Christian century—but the decisive stroke was Napoleon's invasion of Egypt (1798-1801), which made an ineffaceable impression on the Oriental imagination. That impression was not impaired by the final defeat of France in the last phase of the Napoleonic Wars ; for France in 1814, like Germany in 1918, succumbed to weight of numbers, after

only just failing to bring the whole of Europe under her military domination. Great Britain, who during the War of 1792-1814 had completed her industrial revolution, succeeded in conquering from France the lion's share of the Levantine trade; but, for all Orientals west of the Isthmus of Suez and the River Euphrates, the French language and literature and French political ideas remained the fountain-head of Western culture. Thus the leaders of the new Turkish movement who found themselves marooned at Angora from 1920 to 1923 looked out at Western civilization through French eyes, and saw visions of a Turkey Westernized in the likeness of France; but the France that inspired them was not the France which had just emerged, hard-bitten and conservative-minded, from the Great War of 1914-18.

When the influence of any society is dominant in the world, its creations, material and spiritual, are radiated out as fast as they take form, but the velocity of the waves of influence varies according to the nature of the medium in which they are conveyed. Military inventions travel at the greatest speed, and of all that French military science had discovered during the years 1914-18 there was probably little that was unknown to the Turkish strategists at Angora in 1920-23. The velocity of abstract ideas is far slower, and the wave of mental influence from France which was making Angora throb and hum in 1923 was the wave which had been generated in Paris in 1789. At Angora in 1923 it was possible to catch the spirit of Revolutionary France still moving over the face of the waters; and if it is true that a visit to Angora in that year assisted a Western observer to re-create the spirit of the French Revolution in imagination, the converse is equally true, that, without some comprehension of the spirit which reigned in Paris from 1789 to 1795, the political history of Turkey since 1920 is incomprehensible.

We turn therefore to a consideration, in brief, of the various phases that followed each other in Revolutionary Angora as rapidly as in Revolutionary Paris. In any country where political change is still going on, the conditions are almost too fluid for the historian to portray them. The best that he can hope to do is to record, as an objective and enlightened observer, and in as detached a mood as possible, the events as they unfold, and to turn on them the searchlight of experience or knowledge of similar past historical events. The reactions that followed the Young Turk Revolution of 1908-09 were so unexpectedly disappointing that they left enthusiastic historians of that recent period stranded high and dry on the reef of their expectations before many years were past; and the student of the present rapidly changing scene must similarly beware of building too high hopes of the future upon his observations of the present.

The revolutionary spirit that centred in Angora and radiated outwards until it permeated all parts of the new Turkey may be considered to have been generated at the preliminary meetings at Erzerum and Sivas, followed by the Congress at Angora. The drawing up of the National Pact (the Turkish *Magna Carta* and Bill of Rights) has already been related; the formation of the first Great National Assembly, in the fastness of Angora, after the Allied Occupation of Constantinople and the Malta deportations, has also been described. From that point onwards the National Assembly takes on an increasingly important aspect as the administrative instrument of the country, and the success of the Mudania Armistice, followed by the still more surprising success of the Lausanne Conference and Treaty, added still more prestige and self-confidence to the Angora parliament. This provincial movement now became important in the eyes of the whole world, and its leaders became the oracles of a nation. Among these

conspicuous men there stood out two or three who were towers of strength to the country in its days of adversity.

First among the statesmen in Turkey is Mustafâ Kemâl Pasha, already renowned as a soldier and military hero who had carried his defeated nation to victory. As a statesman, this progressive and Westernized Turk should command admiration and respect, both for his personal character and for his achievements. He is a man still on the near side of middle age; a man of discretion and judgment, of unwavering determination, and of ambition for his country even more than for himself; a man of strong character and autocratic discipline. As a young man, he had trained himself in the art of public speaking by the organization among his friends of a debating society; he had studied thoroughly all aspects of the French Revolution, which had a great fascination and inspiration for him; and he had often harangued his companions on the subject that was next his heart. His personal magnetism, which is unquestionably strong, seldom fails of its effect in the Assembly and in the Ministry; his cool, steel-grey eyes, strong-looking face, and broad-shouldered, manly figure, endowed with a tongue which can speak both eloquently and laconically, are at once impressive and dominating. Of his gradual assumption of too great and domineering power something will be said hereafter; but due credit must be accorded to him as the father of the Revolution and the founder of the New Turkey.

The foremost statesman of the early Kemalist régime was Re'ûf Bey, whose activities in the first stages of the Nationalist Revolution have already been mentioned. Re'ûf Bey was formerly a naval officer, who distinguished himself in all the Turkish wars of the last quarter of a century. As Minister of Marine in 'Izzet Pasha's Cabinet at the close of the Great War, he was sent to Mudros to sign with Admiral Calthorpe the

armistice agreement of 30 October, 1918, which ended hostilities between Turkey and the Allies. During the ensuing months, he was one of the most active of Mustafâ Kemâl's supporters in creating the patriotic movement, and was at that time almost as influential as Mustafâ Kemâl himself. Indeed, it might be said that what Mustafâ Kemâl succeeded in doing in Samsun and the East, Re'ûf succeeded in doing in Smyrna and the West, and these two were instrumental jointly in stirring up the first flames of nationalism.

Subsequently, after the general election to the Ottoman Parliament in the Autumn of 1920, Re'ûf Bey came as a deputy to Constantinople ; and in General Milne's raid he was arrested and deported to Malta. Later, on his return, he was elected First Vice-President of the Great National Assembly now installed in Angora, and in July, 1922, he became Prime Minister. During 'Izmet Pasha's absence at Lausanne in 1922-3, Re'ûf Bey occupied the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs, as well as that of Prime Minister. Although, unlike most Turks, he does not speak French, the present *lingua franca* of the Near East, he speaks English perfectly and does not disguise his respect and even admiration for England and for the qualities which have made her dominant in the East. When the Chauvinism of the Angora Government became too great, Re'ûf Bey fell out with his party and was one of those who joined the new and more liberal Progressist party that sprang up in opposition. In so doing, he incurred the suspicion and animosity of his former associates of the Popular Republican party.

During the growth of the Opposition Party in Angora in 1924, Fethî Bey took office as Prime Minister. This popular statesman had been formerly an Army officer, acting at one time for two years as military attaché in Paris ; he had been secretary of the Committee of Union and Progress, there

growing familiar with all the liberal ideas of the Turkish intellectuals ; he had served as Minister in Sofia, with Mustafā Kemāl as his military attaché (for they had been staff captains together, were firm friends, and had shared many experiences in common) ; and he had held the position of Minister of the Interior in the 'Izzet Pasha Cabinet in 1918. He was another of the notables who in 1921 were seized in Constantinople and exiled to Malta, and there he learned the English which he now speaks. On his return from Malta, he joined Mustafā Kemāl Pasha and became a very active Nationalist. In 1922, as Minister of the Interior, he went to London to endeavour to negotiate terms of peace ; but he was unable to obtain an interview with any Cabinet Minister and left England after several weeks, advising his Government to deliver that decisive attack against the Greeks which carried the Turkish Army to Smyrna in September. In 1924 he was elected Prime Minister ; but the policy which he followed during the Kurdish rising in February, 1925, was considered to be lacking in severity and vigour, and he was replaced and sent as Turkish minister to Paris.

Perhaps the most influential and powerful man in Turkey to-day, next to Mustafā Kemāl Pasha the President, is Re'ūf Bey's successor to the Premiership in 1921, and Fethī Bey's successor in 1924, 'Izmet Pasha. Like his chief, he is an able and distinguished soldier, and he has to his credit the successful issue of the battle of the Şaqariah. The armistice conference at Mudania revealed him as a clever diplomatist, a formidable opponent of General Harington the British representative ; and this reputation was considerably enhanced in the ensuing peace conference at Lausanne, where he held his own against Lord Curzon. He is a short, rather sallow-faced man, with sharp, restless eyes that seem to take in everything and to compensate for his slight deafness by an added quickness of

perception. A small military moustache, a hooked nose, and delicate hands suggest a strain of Circassian blood. He shows not merely shrewdness but judgment in diplomacy. He is distinctly military in manner, influenced, of course, by German staff instruction and by a careful study of French military methods. A martinet in discipline, he is noted for a short temper, but while he will sometimes show himself impatient and extreme, he can as often be a smooth and *saue* politician, blandly winning his way against an opponent by the latent force of his personality.

These two figures of Mustafâ Kemâl and 'Izmet, particularly, are the prominent characters in revolutionary and Republican Angora. Of their autocratic use of power more will be said later. Under their hands the National Assembly is like clay, sometimes yielding to gentle pressure, sometimes needing to be crushed by their concerted action. Under their combined power (for 'Izmet Pasha has been repeatedly Prime Minister, with Mustafâ Kemâl continuously President) the reconstruction of the Turkish State has gone on, and the introduction of administrative as well as social and economic reforms has progressed steadily and rapidly.

The law of Fundamental Organization which was drawn up at Angora, on 23 April, 1920, and has already been outlined, served as the constitution of the state until the declaration of the Republic on 29 October, 1923; and even then, with slight amendment, it served as the basis of government until it was replaced by a revised Republican Constitution on 30 April, 1924. Thus the Great National Assembly, the Executive and the heads of the various public departments all met and worked in the little inland town of Angora; and the course of national restoration and consolidation, by a rapidly operating evolution following hard on the violence of revolution, was pursued with remarkable seriousness and co-operative zeal.

The stages through which we can follow the growth of the Turkish Republic may now be described. The first stages are characterized by an amazing series of abolitions—the abolition of the Capitulations, the abolition of the Millet System, the abolition of the Sultanate, the abolition of the Caliphate, and the abolition of a large number of social institutions and customs such as the mosque schools, the Islamic sanctions of polygamy, the traditional seclusion and veiling of women, the bans against portraiture and statuary, the wearing of the fez as the national head-dress, and a score of other institutions and customs. In the eyes of the revolutionary leaders this was a clearing of the decks for action: the new Republic was to start with a clean slate, and was to be freed from the trammels of the past; the modern state was to be released from any of the old-fashioned customs which might retard its progress. On the other hand, in the eyes of the world it has seemed an orgy of iconoclasm, the breaking of ancient idols, the repudiation of national traditions and customs, the renunciation of Turkish institutions. It has aroused in the minds of thoughtful and detached observers outside Turkey the question whether the rapidity of social change may not set up dangerous backwashes and reactionary movements which may tend to counteract the revolutionary current. We may perhaps discover whether this is so as we examine more closely the course of events in Turkey during the last few years.

CHAPTER IX

THE ABOLITION OF THE CAPITULATIONS AND THE MILLET SYSTEM

THE new Turkey, when it emerged triumphant from the revolutionary phase of its rebirth and lifted itself out of the confusion of the struggle that has been related in the last chapter, now found itself faced with a much vaster and more complicated task, that of putting its dismantled house in order and rebuilding it in some form which would supply guarantees of security, habitability and comfort. The smoke of battle had rolled away, and the heroes of the Anatolian War were now assembled in Angora. In the ensuing weeks and months of deliberation and legislation and reconstruction, there were seen to be several rocks ahead which endangered the future and the freedom of the advancing Turkish state. These impediments had to be removed, and the Assembly at Angora set themselves to the task with the same vigorous enthusiasm and dogged determination that they had shown in war. The main factors detrimental to internal progress were the Capitulations, the privileges of the non-Turkish minority populations, the Millet System, the outworn Islamic religious superstructure, and the royalist faction centering round the Sultan in Constantinople. Each of these elements had fallen in reputation during recent years, and all were looked upon with suspicion and resentment by the zealous Nationalists, who found in them sources of annoyance or grievance or national menace. One by one the institutions which had grown up in the bosom of the old Ottoman Empire were attacked by the reformers in the Great National Assembly, and were cut out, root and branch, from a state in which they were felt no longer to serve any essential purpose.

The first and most objectionable, to the Turkish mind, of all

the shackles upon national independence was the ancient system of Capitulations. These were "capitula" or "articles" voluntarily granted in accordance with established tradition by the early Ottoman Government to foreign communities resident in its territories. In their modern form these articles gave certain privileges to individuals, corporations and whole communities of other nationalities who were resident in the Turkish domains. In briefly outlining the character of these privileges, we may group them under judicial, economic, and commercial advantages.

The judicial privileges of the Capitulations permitted groups of foreigners within Turkey to be subject to a large extent to their own courts, their own law, and their own judges. From the year 1535 onwards foreign consular authorities in Ottoman territory were given exclusive civil jurisdiction as between their own nationals, who were denied the right even of voluntarily referring civil cases to the Ottoman courts. In suits between foreigners of different nationalities the case was tried in the court of the defendant. In cases between foreigners and Ottoman subjects, the Ottoman Government had always insisted that the trial should take place in an Ottoman Court of Law. This, however, amounted to a trial before a mixed tribunal, since in the Ottoman Court of Law there sat three Ottoman judges and two foreign delegates, usually accompanied by a consular authority of the foreign nationality in question, the latter having almost supreme power of accepting or rejecting the decision of the rest of the Court. Thus the interests of foreign residents were protected in judicial matters by the assurance of a fair trial more or less in conformity with their own legal code. This system was also not without benefit to the Ottoman Empire, in so far as it was responsible for the grafting of an improved legal

code of French character upon the specifically religious body of Islamic law.¹

The commercial privileges of the Capitulations were very much more irksome to the Turkish authorities. Business firms were entirely independent of Turkish control, and could act in a most arbitrary fashion if they so wished.

"There is no law in Turkey," states an American official report, "obliging any foreign bank, banking house, or mercantile firm wishing to establish a branch house in Turkey to submit itself to any official or legal formalities. Consequently, any bank or private firm is at liberty to establish a branch house in Turkey and freely transact and conduct business. An illustration of this is shown by the presence in Constantinople and other parts of Turkey of branches of foreign banks, like the Credit Lyonnais, the Bank of Athens, the Banco di Roma, etcetera, which had not to ask the authorization of the Turkish Government for establishing their branches there. Another example is furnished by the branch of the Standard Oil Company, of New York, which established itself in the same way some years ago. Foreign firms conserve their nationality and are governed with regard to their internal organization, and to the rights and duties of its (*sic*) members, according to the law of their country."²

In addition, the foreign Powers established foreign post-offices at various points in the Ottoman dominions. Although nominally created for the security of mails, these post offices were commonly believed by the Turks to have been misused for smuggling and propaganda.

It will thus be seen that the foreign business and commercial interests operating in Turkey were so distrustful of Turkish business and legal methods that they absolutely protected

¹ "When we impartially strike a balance for and against the Capitulations, we must admit that while they impose fiscal restrictions which Turkey is justified in resenting, and which should be promptly removed, they have had the happiest results for the Ottoman Empire, as constituting the breach which has admitted into Turkey the progress of civilization. As formerly Roman law was, in a measure, secularized by contact with the *jus gentium*, so the law of the Moslems, thanks to the Capitulations, has in part become secularized by contact with European jurisprudence, especially that of France."—(Ravndall.)

² U.S. Commerce Report, 22 May, 1920.

themselves from any Turkish interference ; though it must be remembered that the original privileges were not extorted from a reluctant Ottoman Government, but were, rather, voluntarily granted by various Sultans to foreign communities both in return for diplomatic favours received and as an encouragement to the commercial development of Turkey with foreign assistance.

Naturally, the system soon met with considerable foreign abuse, and became increasingly intolerable to the Turkish people. It became an unchecked means of foreign exploitation, by agents over whom the Turkish Government had absolutely no legal control. Foreign consuls were exalted officials who usurped the place, in large measure, of the Turkish authorities. Foreign residents abused the liberties granted to them, disregarded the police regulations of the country, and in some cases did not hesitate to make capital out of their legal security by extortion or other corrupt practices.

In the matter of the other economic privileges held by foreigners under the Capitulations, the feature most open to criticism was the non-payment of duties and taxes. Foreigners were exempt from every tax levied by the Ottoman Government upon its own subjects, except certain *ad valorem* export and import duties, the maxima of which were limited by the Capitulatory Treaties. No ordinary residence taxes could be levied, so that foreign subjects lived virtually tax-free in Turkey, benefiting in many cases by the state and municipal facilities, small though they were, without having to pay for them. No internal tax could be levied on foreign goods, so that a great deal of "dumping" occurred to the detriment of Turkish home industries. The exemption of foreigners from taxation and the veto of foreign governments over increases in the Ottoman customs duties contributed to the pauperization

of the Turkish Treasury, placed the Sublime Porte at the mercy of European diplomatists and European financiers, and struck a severe blow at native industry and commercial prosperity. The system was, of course, not without advantages to Turkey, notwithstanding the abuses. For example, it opened up large markets in Europe and America for Turkish raw products, and it benefited the individual consumer by permitting the importation, duty free or at preferential rates, of foreign goods in demand among the Turkish population.

On the whole, however, the system of the Capitulations had become so discredited by abuses, so onerous to the Turks by its immunities and unequal privileges, so uneconomic from the standpoint of Turkish prosperity and of native industrial and commercial progress, and so anomalous in a state which had attained to some degree of Westernized nationhood, that their abolition had become only a matter of time. The West itself recognized this fact, and before the Great War the Powers had begun to contemplate consenting to the abrogation of their Capitulatory rights for a consideration.

After the War broke out, one of the first steps taken by the Ottoman Government was to announce the abolition of the Capitulations in September, 1914. This of course was parallel to the Aliens' Acts and Enemy Property Acts enacted in other countries in time of war. There was, however, the important difference that the abolition of the Capitulations was carried out before Turkey became a belligerent, and was also a unilateral violation of age-long treaty rights. As such, it was not recognized by the Allies as a legitimate act of the Turkish Government.

Later, when, after the close of the War, the Allies resumed the privileges which they had formerly possessed under the Capitulations, the Nationalists saw in this an overt attempt to re-enforce unfair restrictions upon Turkey and therefore wrote

into the National Pact of 1920 a strong clause to the the effect that :—

“ It is a fundamental condition of our life and continued existence that we, like every country, should enjoy complete independence and liberty in the matter of assuring the means of our development, in order that our national and economic development should be rendered possible and that it should be possible to conduct affairs in the form of a more up-to-date regular administration. For this reason we are opposed to restrictions, inimical to our development, in political, judicial, financial and other matters.” (ARTICLE VI.)

This resolution contributed towards stiffening the Nationalists' resistance to the Treaty of Sèvres of 20 August, 1920, in which the Allies sought to re-impose the system of the Capitulations. Upon this point, Mustafâ Kemâl Pasha and his supporters would consider no compromise, and stood out firmly for a complete and permanent abrogation of a system which undermined the liberty and the rights of a free nation.

When in 1922 the first peace conference was held at Lausanne, the Turkish delegation, acting in accordance with instructions and with the general wish of the Great National Assembly at Angora, made their demand for the abolition of the Capitulations one of the vital issues in the negotiations for peace. Determined to continue the state of hostilities, and even to fight if need be, rather than surrender what they held to be a fundamental national right, 'Izmet Pasha and his advisers refused to yield, and at first their intransigence made a settlement seem impossible. Lord Curzon, acting on behalf of Great Britain, and the representatives of the other Allied and Associated Powers maintained equally stubborn demands for the provisional recognition of the Capitulations on the lines laid down in the Treaty of Sèvres. So complete was the deadlock that early in 1923 Lord Curzon gave up the negotiations as futile and returned suddenly to London. 'Izmet Pasha returned to Angora in a rather dispirited mood, having failed to get the abolition of the Capitulations recognized. His

determination, however, was reinforced by the support he received from Mustafâ Kemâl and his colleagues in the Assembly, and he returned to the second Lausanne conference with renewed confidence. Conceding a number of lesser points non-essential to the terms of the National Pact, he maintained a stubborn attitude on the subject of the abolition of the Capitulations. Eventually, the British Foreign Office instructed Sir Horace Rumbold, who was then the British delegate in Lord Curzon's place, to accept the Turkish point of view, and to abandon the Capitulatory system entirely. As the chief stumbling block was now removed, the negotiations for peace advanced smoothly to a rapid conclusion.

Thus this most thorny question was settled satisfactorily to Turkey, though most unsatisfactorily to all the Allied signatories. The famous Capitulatory System, with its ancient pedigree, was now dead, as it had already died in Japan. The insistence of the Turks upon abolishing it was not only natural but legitimate, so far had it gone toward giving foreigners a stranglehold on the economic life of the country. Nevertheless, the suddenness of the change—due chiefly to the fact that the Turkish Revolution has come about precipitately as the result of war—has inevitably imposed many hardships upon individuals and seriously offended foreign interests formerly prospering under the protection of the Capitulations; it has also doubtless given a temporary set-back to the economic development of the country by causing some valuable foreign elements to go out of business.

Something has been said in foregoing pages concerning the presence in the old Ottoman Empire of large non-Islamic populations, some of whom, like the Ionian Greeks on the west coast of Anatolia, had been in occupation two thousand years before the Turks appeared on the scene; some of whom were remnants of the Byzantine Christians who had been

largely but not completely assimilated by the incoming Turks ; and some of whom had for one reason or another entered the Turkish domain, settled for business purposes, and become Ottoman subjects since the Turkish conquest. These Re'āyā or herds of "human cattle," subject to the Sultan's rod, were mostly organized in the millets which have already received passing mention in the second chapter. To these privileged communities the Assembly next turned its attention.

The constitution of these non-Muslim native communities may be traced as far back as 1453, immediately following the Turkish capture of Constantinople. Sultan Mehmed II, who was reigning then, organized the non-Muslim populations under his rule into separate autonomous communities according to their respective religions, each under the authority and leadership of an ecclesiastical dignitary. This "Millet-Bashy" was accredited to the Sublime Porte, and wielded authority in civil as well as religious matters. Thus he exercised a temporal power over his "flock" in addition to performing the ecclesiastical functions of his calling. The community under his control was granted certain rights and privileges by the Sultan, which resembled the privileges of extra-territoriality already spoken of under the Capitulatory system. Each community dealt with the Government through its Millet-Bashy, much as foreign nations dealt through their ministers and ambassadors. Each community or millet, moreover, though composed of Turkish subjects, was largely immune from Turkish laws. It was allowed the free enjoyment of its own religion, the education of its children according to its own methods, and a measure of autonomy in the management of its communal affairs. The system was originally intended to simplify the task of government for the Sublime Porte, and to relieve it of the embarrassment of administering the local affairs of the alien communities under Ottoman hegemony.

Also, it was almost a necessary arrangement in view of the fact that the law of the Qur'ān, which was civil as well as religious, could not be applied integrally to Christian communities.

The drawbacks of such a system, from the Turkish standpoint, became considerable. Not only did it run counter to the ideals and aims of Turkification; it also encouraged the perpetuation of a separate communal life which eventually developed into a longing for an independent national life and gave every opportunity for foreign "nationalisms" to grow up in the midst of the Ottoman peoples. The millets engaged in political understandings against the Turkish Government with outside nations; and besides being a cause of anxiety and embarrassment to the Ottoman Government because of these secret activities, they were also perpetually at feud among themselves—feuds which were only suspended when they joined forces to achieve some mutually desirable end at the Government's expense. As a rule, the bitterest jealousy and antagonism existed between rival millets, and this was a constant cause of unrest in Turkey. Blood feuds were carried on between supporters of differing Christian faiths, as for instance in Macedonia between Greeks and Bulgarians; riots and outbreaks between various sects were habitual in Jerusalem over questions concerning the Holy Sepulchre, and these not only scandalized the Western world, but also disgraced the Christian millets in the eyes of Turkey and all Islam.

The leaders of the millets were not without responsibility for these disturbances and feuds, for the patriarchs, bishops, and other ecclesiastical chiefs were not content merely with safeguarding the legitimate interests of their communities, but did not refrain from plotting and stirring up dissensions, fomenting political agitations against other sects or against the Turkish Government, and otherwise abusing the privileges and powers which they enjoyed.

For these reasons, the millet system, like the Capitulations, became extremely unpopular with the Turks, especially with those Nationalist reformers who wanted two things for Anatolia—unification and peace. An earnest desire for the eradication of this anomalous system, which was out of accord with the principles of a modern state, became manifest even before the Young Turk movement began; and this general feeling of hostility was inherited by the Nationalist or Kemalist movement. Unification required the abolition of special concessions to favoured minorities, or, on a more extreme view, the expulsion of those minorities from the Turkish state. Peace likewise required the removal of elements which had contributed so much to agitation, political conspiracy, internecine religious warfare, and subversive tendencies throughout the country. The principles of Article Six of the National Pact, quoted above, applied as much to religious privileges as to economic and judicial privileges, and indicated a desire to end all such special favours to particular communities in the country.

The result was that these Nationalist aims were pressed upon the Conference of Lausanne, and the abolition of the millet system was insistently demanded. The Armenian community was already outside the boundaries of the reduced Turkey, apart from Constantinople, and therefore was not specially mentioned in the Treaty of Lausanne. The millets formerly existent in the Arab provinces of the old Ottoman Empire were also eliminated from the Turkish problem. There remained chiefly the Greek communities, and the discussion centred upon this element. In Western Anatolia, the Greeks had been forcibly expelled or had hastily evacuated Asia Minor for the Greek Kingdom at the time of the Greek *débâcle*. In Thrace and in Constantinople, however, considerable numbers of Greeks remained, and here the problem still confronted the Turkish Nationalists.

During the first conference at Lausanne, a Græco-Turkish agreement was signed on 30 January, 1923, providing for the exchange of the Muslim and the Orthodox nationals, respectively, of the two parties, except the Muslims of Western Thrace and the Orthodox Greeks of Constantinople. Turkey also consented to the Œcumenical Patriarchate remaining at the Phanar in Stamboul subject to certain conditions: first, that the Patriarch Meletios IV should on account of his political activities be replaced by a successor more acceptable to the Turkish Government; second, that the Orthodox Church and its Patriarchate should be disestablished; third, that the Patriarchate (like the Caliphate) should continue only as a spiritual office, with no political functions, and this only under a Patriarch who was properly qualified in respect of "established" residence.

The compulsory exchange of the alien national minorities was an epoch-making decision. It obtained the assent of the other parties to the Conference, although the general public in Europe and America received it with mixed feelings. It meant that henceforth the thorny problem of unassimilable Christian minorities in the Turkish state was to be solved. The non-Muslim nationalities would no longer be a disturbing factor in the Turkish question. Religion and nationality, inseparably blended, had been the elements of friction and irritation in the long Ottoman period, and this friction was to be removed. Oppression, massacres, retaliation, had stained the annals of the last half century in a crescendo of barbarities; now, within Turkey at least, this was to be brought to an end, and it was to be hoped that internal peace would ensue. Recognizing that the Turks and the Christians in their present temper could not expect to bury their hatred and live together amicably, Turkey and Greece asked for the most radical solution ever attempted in the handling of the

Near Eastern problem. It was nothing short of a removal, not by violence or massacre, but by mutual agreement and exchange, of all the Christians in Turkey and all the Muslims in Greece. By a mutual exchange of populations—Greeks going to Greece from Turkey, and Muslims from Greece to Asia Minor—the religious and racial homogeneity of either country was to be secured.

The proposal to uproot hundreds of thousands of innocent and unfortunate people from their homes and transplant them to a foreign environment was not made without cries of indignation and protest being raised. Turkey, in particular, was blamed for inhumanity in ejecting her Christian subjects ; but, as a matter of fact, the project of exchanging populations was the conception of M. Venizelos, who had several times advocated it from 1913 onwards ; and the Christian minorities, at any rate, who had already been uprooted, stood to gain materially by the convention, which provided for the valuation of the private property left behind on both sides and the transfer of equivalent values to the refugees in their new homes.

The abolition of the millet system was in fact preceded by the break-up of the millets or Christian communities themselves through the migration, either forcible or voluntary, of the Greek Christians remaining in Turkey, with the exception of those in Constantinople. The economic effects of this exchange will be dealt with later, especially in relation to the Muslim muhājirs (refugees) who came over from Greece into Anatolia. The political effects of the departure of the Greeks from Eastern Thrace and Asia Minor are palpable. Turkey, for the first time in its long existence as a state, now became almost ¹ homogeneous, a true nation of one nationality and

¹ The Kurds are the only alien element of importance now remaining in Turkey.

language and one national ideal. Like Hungary, she had been dismembered and reduced, until only a small central territory remained to her ; but her population had become uniform and united, of one language, one race, and one faith, and forged into national unity in the furnace of a life-and-death struggle.

CHAPTER X

THE ABOLITION OF THE SULTANATE (1 NOVEMBER, 1922),
AND THE DECLARATION OF THE REPUBLIC (29 OCTOBER, 1923)

THE most momentous act, in many respects, which the Government of Mustafā Kemāl Pasha performed during this new phase of pulling down old and time-honoured Ottoman institutions was the unexpected dethronement of the Ottoman Sultan and the abolition of the most famous Sultanate in Islamic history. Although sudden, and not generally anticipated abroad, this was in fact a logical step in the sequence of historical events; and therefore, as a *fait accompli*, it occasioned surprisingly little protest or reaction. After the victory of the Nationalists over the Greek Army in Asia Minor, and their defiance of the Allies at Chanaq, the self-confidence and assertiveness of the Nationalist Government at Angora knew no bounds. Conscious of great power, inflated with a victory against heavy odds, and led by a heroic captain who commanded enthusiastic and widespread support, the new Government felt omnipotent. This it showed in many ways, but in none was the spirit of proud superiority more plainly evinced than in its contempt for the shadowy ruler in captive Constantinople. The Sublime Porte had months before lost the last vestige of independent authority in Turkey; it had forfeited the respect and the reputation which had hedged about a king still ruling by supposed divine right; it had showed itself to be weak and ineffectual, and to be governed by a *roi fainéant* who was merely an instrument of the overmastering Allied authorities. It had, as has been shown, contributed nothing national and constructive to the Turkish state; and it had accepted without protest the high-handed raid by English soldiers upon deputies of the legitimate parliament at Constantinople. In retrospect, it seems strange

that the Allied Supreme Council, and not least the British member of it, should "lay its money on the wrong horse" notwithstanding the celebrated confession of Lord Salisbury; that they should blindly refuse to acknowledge the rebel Government of Angora, and should cling obstinately to a sovereign who had lost the power to serve either their interests or his own.

When the Lausanne Conference was called to settle the terms of permanent peace, the Allies invited the shadowy Constantinople Government to send representatives. This insistence on recognizing and treating with a defunct and unsupported Sultan was either an empty formality or a clumsy manoeuvre, for it only gave further offence to the Turkish Nationalists and was the signal for a renewed offensive on the part of the Angora Assembly. On 1 November, 1922, a unanimous resolution was passed by the Assembly to the following effect:

"Whereas the Turkish people, in the law of fundamental organization, has resolved that its rights of sovereignty and rulership are incorporated in and actually exercised by the judicial person of the Great Turkish National Assembly, which is its true representative, and this so completely that these rights cannot be abandoned, partitioned or transferred;

And whereas the Turkish people has further resolved that it recognizes no power or corporation which is not based on the will of the nation;

It recognizes no form of Government besides the Government of the Great Turkish National Assembly within the boundaries of the National Pact.

Accordingly, the Turkish people considers the form of Government in Constantinople, which is based upon the sovereignty of an individual, as being obsolete from the 16th March, 1920, onwards for ever.

The Caliphate belongs to the Dynasty of the House of Osman. The member of the Dynasty who is most eligible in respect of knowledge and character is elected Caliph by the Great Turkish National Assembly. The Turkish State is the emplacement on which the Caliphate rests."

In a letter addressed to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mustafâ Kemâl Pasha declared that:

"The Government of Constantinople, its existence being no longer

supported by any national force, has ceased to exist and no longer constitutes a vital organism. The true mass of the people of the nation have instituted an administrative government of the people, defending the rights of the true mass of the people and the peasants, and guaranteeing their welfare."

The significance of the decision embodied in these declarations was profound. It was, of course, tantamount to a resolution not only against the Government at Constantinople, but against the personal position of the Sultan-Caliph Mehmed VI (Vâhydu'd-Dîn Efendi) who was by this time nothing more than the impotent figure-head of the Ottoman Empire, politically recognized and directed by the Allies as the legitimate ruler, but repudiated by the Angora Government and the Nationalists as being the tool of the Allies and therefore a traitor to Turkey.

After a few days' interval, an accusation of high treason was laid against the Sultan and he and his Cabinet Ministers were ordered to be placed on trial. The Sultan, after he had heard the decree, refused either to appear for trial or to abdicate his throne. Instead, fearing that his life was in danger, he appealed to the British authorities for protection. Lieut-General Sir Charles Harington, commanding the British force in Constantinople, thereupon communicated with his Government, in London, and arrangements were made for Vâhydu'd-Dîn Efendi to take his departure on a British battleship. On the morning of 17 November, the Sultan, with his ten-year-old son, Prince Ertoghrul Efendi, and six members of the palace staff, slipped quietly out of the side entrance of the palace, drove in a motor-car to the British naval base, embarked in the tender of Vice-Admiral Brock, and a few minutes later arrived on board H.M.S. *Malaya* without anybody being aware of their flight. The ex-monarch, who was welcomed in the name of King George upon setting foot on British territory, replied that he felt safe under the protection of Great Britain,

adding that he was not abdicating, but merely removing himself from the danger which was immediately threatening him. The *Malaya* then steamed off to Malta, pending a decision as to where Vāhydu'd-Dīn Efendi should eventually take up his residence.

By his departure from Turkish territory, and his setting friendly foot upon Christian soil, the Nationalists claimed that he had forfeited all his prerogatives as Sultan of Turkey, and that his action was to be looked upon as abdication. Upon these grounds they proceeded to organize the now Sultan-less state upon a basis of the people's sovereignty.

After the flight of the Sultan-Caliph Vāhydu'd-Dīn, 'Abdu'l-Mejīd Efendi, second son of the Sultan 'Abdu'l-'Azīz and cousin of the last Sultan, was elected Caliph (but not Sultan) by the Great National Assembly at Angora on 18 November, 1922. This was in accordance with Article 2 of the momentous resolution of 1 November. At the investiture, the prayers were said for the first time in history in Turkish instead of Arabic, an innovation which was intended to symbolize the fact that the state was now based upon the Turkish nationality rather than upon the Muslim religion. The new Caliph, though he bore the title of Commander of the Faithful, was the first to be invested with the Caliph's mantle without receiving political power, and this introduced a new (though, as it proved, a brief) era in the history of the institution.

It has been made clear that, during the earlier days of the Nationalist movement led by Mustafā Kemāl, there was no intention of subverting the established order of government in Constantinople. Rather it was the aim of the patriots who gathered about the stronghold of Angora, to do what they saw that the Sultan was not doing—to save the country from foreign invasion and to pull the enmeshed Government of Constantinople out of the military and diplomatic entanglements in

which it found itself. It is true that the Nationalists showed disapproval—at times even contempt—for the weak-minded Sultan and Cabinet on the Bosphorus, who had allowed themselves to become the puppets of the Allied Powers. But at first there was at Angora a strong feeling that this effete Government must be rescued at all costs from the toils of the foreigner, that the foreign armies of occupation must be driven from Turkish soil, and that the Ottoman monarchy must be restored and be reinstated in a position of responsibility, of respectability and of untrammelled service to the national interest. The Turkish Nationalist Congress of Sivas, on 9 September, 1919, had specifically proclaimed that the new movement in Anatolia had as its aim “to safeguard the Sultanate, the Supreme Caliphate, and the integrity of the country against foreign pressure.” Furthermore, the National Pact adopted by the Ottoman Parliament at Constantinople on 28 January, 1920, contained no implication that it was the intention of the Nationalist movement to alter the form of government of Turkey.

Nevertheless, two years later, the Sultan was dethroned and the nation was committed to a new *régime*. At first this new Government took the expedient form of a military dictatorship of the revolutionary group at Angora, acting as a sort of parliamentary protectorate resembling the first phase of the Cromwellian Commonwealth in Seventeenth Century England. Eleven months later the Parliament at Angora definitely proclaimed a republic, entirely divorced from the ancient form of an hereditary Ottoman monarchy. How can this fundamental and most remarkable reversal of political principles be explained?

It was not due to any sudden and unwarranted change of mind on the part of Mustafâ Kemâl and his followers, but to the condition of subserviency to the Allies into which the Constan-

tinople Government had fallen to such an extent as to become identified with the cause of the enemies of the nation. The reliance of the Sultan upon foreign bayonets cast the suspicion of treason upon him ; the association of the Caliphate with the internationalism of Islam was deemed inconsistent with the independence of a purely nationalist programme ; support of the Caliphate by reactionaries caused fear that traitors might use the prestige of the office for the promotion of counter-revolution. Hence, the cause of national independence came to be associated with the necessity of completely divorcing Turkey from Constantinople and its Byzantinism, from the Sultanate and its dependence upon foreign support, from the Caliphate and its international Islamic embarrassments, and from the monarchy and its essential conservatism. Under the Sultanate, Turkey was precluded from attaining that degree of national freedom and independence for which the awakened nation longed under the influence of Western political ideas. Under the traditional and conservative Ottoman dynasty, the wished-for social and political reforms, the full development of a self-conscious nationalism, and the incipient Western ideals of democratic government were restricted and repressed. The logical result was the overthrow and abolition of the Sultanate, the bloodless revolution, and the subsequent declaration of a popular republican form of government.

As has been shown in the earlier pages of this volume, the Ottoman Dynasty was a type of absolute autocratic monarchy, based on the conception that the relation between rulers and subjects was similar to the relation between masters and slaves, or between herdsmen and cattle. The Turks had suffered from the existence of the Ottoman Empire as acutely, in their way, as the non-Turkish nationalities. They were in many cases as glad to be liberated from it as were their fellow-subjects—the

Serbs, the Greeks, the Rumans, the Bulgars, and the Albanians. During the course of the preceding century, each of these nationally separate groups had thrown off the Ottoman yoke ; now it was the turn of the Turks themselves—aspiring in the same Western fashion to a complete national independence and release from a medieval dynasty—to revolt against the *ancien régime* and declare for a popular and responsible government.

Sudden and upsetting as the revolution against the Sultanate was, it produced in its wake many reactionary ripples and unsteady currents ; but on the whole the change has been advantageous to the new-born Turkish nation. The advantages are three-fold. In the first place the abolition of the monarchy is a symbol of the new order ; it indicates that henceforth the Turkish State exists for the benefit not of a dynasty—which had come to look upon the State as a private estate belonging to the sovereign—but for that of the Turkish people, who were by this time astir with the sentiments of democracy. Secondly, the cutting away of the Imperial establishment meant a very extensive economy in public expenditure ; for the Sultan's civil list had hitherto been notoriously the largest in Europe, while the public revenue of Turkey had been smaller than that of any European country of equal population. This financial saving through the disappearance of the court and the closing of the palaces of Yildiz Kiösk and Dolmah Baghcheh and the reduction in the display traditionally maintained by the diplomatic and military services of the Sublime Porte, was supplemented by economies in the administrative departments. The Angora Government closed the overstaffed and lavishly-equipped public offices in Stamboul, where the great empire of the Sultan had been administered, and in their place it substituted new public offices at Angora, built and staffed in modest fashion—modest because of the unattractiveness of the new Anatolian capital

as a place for display, because of the restricted budget of an impoverished country, because of the Spartan attitude of mind of a new Government recruited from old campaigners, and lastly because humble beginnings were recognized as being more becoming to a young national state. A third advantage was to be found in the simplification of the political situation. In non-Western countries seeking to adjust themselves to Western civilization, the presence of an old-established native dynasty has invariably proved a source of weakness. The monarchs, not the people, play the game of checks and balances, of alliances or rivalries; the kings are the supreme pieces on a chess-board otherwise occupied by pawns; and Oriental kings have had a habit of succumbing to the dominating influences of Western Powers. In Persia, Morocco, and elsewhere, native autocrats have proved ready to place themselves at the disposal of foreign Governments in order to obtain the support of these Governments for the maintenance of their traditional authority over their subjects; and, in Turkey itself both the Committee of Union and Progress and the present Nationalists have had disagreeable experiences of the kind in recent years. 'Abdu'l-Hamid, after accepting the Constitution at the sword's point in 1908, almost succeeded in recovering his despotic authority by force in 1909; and though, since that time, the *de facto* rulers of Turkey have invariably been careful to keep a nonentity on the throne, they, rightly or wrongly, accuse the late Sultan, Vâhdyu'd-Dîn Efendi, of having worked against the Turkish Nationalists on behalf of the Allies, deliberately and not under duress, during the Allied Occupation of Constantinople from 1918 to 1923. The abolition of the Sultanate reassured the Turkish mind that this breach in the solidarity of the national defences would never be opened again.

Almost a year passed after the overthrow of the Sultanate—

a year during which the air was becoming cleared and the course of the Turkish ship of state was becoming better defined. The Græco-Turkish conflict had been brought to a successful conclusion. The Greeks had all left Turkish territory, except for a remnant which the International Commission for the Exchange of Populations was evacuating and sending across to Greece as rapidly as possible. Except in Constantinople, the Armenians were now completely outside the pale of the new Turkish State. The French army of occupation had withdrawn from Cilicia as early as 1922, and with them had gone most of the Armenians, Greeks, Arabs and others who had remained in that corner of Anatolia under French protection. On 2 October, 1923, the foreign occupation of Constantinople came to an end, and the Allied forces evacuated the city amid great Turkish jubilation.

On 29 October, 1923, the Turkish State was declared a Republic.

As has been shown, the Great National Assembly had previously proclaimed itself sovereign of Turkey and had abolished for ever the Sultanate and the old Ottoman *régime*. Now came this notable culmination to the foregoing acts of the Nationalist movement. The "Republic" was hailed with great excitement. Mustafâ Kemâl Pasha El-Ghâzy ("The Conqueror of Infidels"), was chosen President unanimously (his few opponents not voting), amid jubilant cries of *Vive la République!* that resounded through the building in which the Assembly was meeting. It was an unfamiliar cry in a land where oriental monarchical despotism had long reigned, and Ghâzy and President were an oddly assorted pair of titles. Yet the new words sprang to instant popularity. The news was greeted outside with popular demonstrations in the streets, and a salute of one hundred and one guns was fired, as for a new Sultan. Shortly afterwards, when Mustafâ Kemâl Pasha was

received in Constantinople, he met with "fervid and prolonged acclamations of welcome, the like of which was never before known."

This was indeed a remarkable *dénouement* to the long history of an ancient autocracy; and it is natural to inquire somewhat narrowly into the genuineness of the change. The Western world had hailed enthusiastically the Revolution of the Young Turks in 1908-9, because it had promised to bring to the country a limitation of the despotic powers of the Sultan and to introduce for the first time an effective constitutional system; yet the Young Turks had missed their opportunity and blackened their honour by a tyranny and oppression no less shocking than that of 'Abdu'l-Hamid himself. When in 1923 a new order was again announced, in very similar fashion, it was received with considerable scepticism by many interested spectators of international affairs or students of history. A nation does not change its whole mode of thought and cast off the traditions of centuries merely through calling old things by new names. "Can the leopard change its spots, or the Ethiopian his skin?" An ancient monarchy is not turned into a stable republic in a day; a nation accustomed to the rule of a single autocratic and despotic sovereign does not establish a perfectly ordered democratic government or republic in one brief attempt. The history of France from 1789 to 1871 suggests that the road of revolution is a long road to travel; and Turkey likewise may have an arduous journey before her, with many ups and downs and many setbacks. It may yet be found that the fundamental reality in the new-born Turkey, as in the old Ottoman Empire, resides in the personality of a single man. It has been well said that "President Mustafā Kemāl Pasha is a solid fact; the Republic of Turkey may yet prove to be a somewhat shadowy façade."

Before we pass on to examine the domestic concerns of the new Turkish Republic, we must recognize from the outset the historical difference between this republican form of government and a type of republicanism which is found in the United States of America or in the Republic of France. These two bodies politic are the creations of enlightened democratic peoples—forms of representative government deliberately and advisedly adopted by nations well trained in the art of government, experienced in political science and inspired by liberal political ideas. It was only natural, in the evolution of governmental methods, that peoples thoroughly awakened to the unfavourable results of an aristocratic or monarchical system, and fully alive to the whole problem of government as ventilated by philosophers, publicists, revolutionaries, agitators and reformers on both sides of the Atlantic, should take a new turning along the road of political liberty and independence. It was only natural that the words of Lincoln, proclaiming a government of the people, by the people, for the people, should find ready acceptance in the mind of these new republican nations. Democracy was already advanced if not matured, and the republic was the obvious expression of a democratically-minded nation. The whole republican conception was essentially one of the people—a popular movement shared in and approved by a large majority of the population.

It is evident that the so-called Republic of Turkey, like other similar forms of government in the East, is of a different texture. Here it is not a popular movement, a natural product of democratic growth, for the simple reason that the people are not in any degree politically educated. Republicanism in the East is a forced plant—an exotic transplanted from Europe and required to flower before its roots have sunk deep and settled firmly. In studying this political growth, we do not see a general public movement or tendency of thought ; there

is no reformation spreading through the nation, no renaissance of the ideas of liberty, except among a numerically very limited intelligentsia with revolutionary views and a reforming zeal. When we examine the Nationalist movement in Turkey, we find that it is the product of a *coterie* of radicals known as the Young Turks, or, more contracted still, a smaller group united into a Party of Union and Progress. We then find the Republic in Turkey created by a small *clique* of revolutionary military leaders, who, having successfully overthrown the existing *régime* and defeated the country's foreign enemies, have set up, with triumphant presumption, a republican form of government of their own design and only thinly veiling their own autocracy. We see this republican government—superimposed thus upon a resigned and unprotesting country—operating, in its artificial manner, with success so long as its creators and leaders hold together and guide the ship of state on an even keel.

Therefore we must look for the growth and development of this republic not in the psychology of the masses, as we should do in studying the French or American democracies, but in the policies of its few leaders. We must bear in mind throughout our study that the Republic, at least during these first years of its life, is a strange and exotic thing, not securely rooted in the hearts of the people, but loosely planted among an acquiescent and only momentarily enthusiastic population of peasants.

Professor Hearnshaw has an apposite passage which may well be remembered in considering the progress of this new Turkish Republic.

“ One of the great guiding principles of politics which is reinforced by history with countless examples and warnings, is that there must be no breach in the continuity of the national life. . . . In our own day the truth that a nation has a life of its own, that it cannot tolerate too rapid and too radical a change of conditions, that it requires time

to adapt itself to new environments and to assimilate new ideas, is being painfully learned by the great peoples of Russia, who in their turn have fallen victims to fanatics obsessed by abstract ideas, devoid of all sense of historic continuity, regardless of the accumulated experience of the ages. . . ."¹

It is indeed a truth which has become a platitude in English political thought that evolution succeeds better than revolution; that evolution or slow gradual development, in the form of constitutional change "moving on from precedent to precedent," is a surer and more stable means of reform than a catastrophic overthrow of one *régime* and the wholesale substitution of a new order. Not only does revolution offend the conservative majority of any group of people, and set up dangerous forces of reaction in indiscriminate opposition even to desirable changes; but no change without the consent and acceptance of the common people is a welcome or substantial change, and the people can be prepared for such change only by the evolutionary process of education and enlightenment, and not by any sudden act superimposed by revolutionary leaders, who may be misunderstood and suspected by the surprised and uninformed masses.

All history illustrates this truth, and especially, perhaps, the history (which has so powerfully hypnotized the Turkish intelligentsia) of the French Revolution—a breach with the past which set up such forces of reaction that for three-quarters of a century afterwards France reverted to a monarchical *régime*, while the hard-won gains of the masses were buried under a bureaucratic superstructure. On the other hand, the contemporary constitutional development of England gained, by slow and considered stages of reform, the fruits of victory in the democratic struggle which the violent French movement gained at one blow and straightway lost again for two generations.

¹ *Democracy at the Crossways*, p. 120.

This fundamental political truth must always be kept in mind, in observing the progress of any nation, and especially in watching the rapid advance of the new Turkey. Is the resuscitation and the revival of Turkey an evolutionary process, slow enough to make permanent progress—an advance, in military language, in which there is time for the entrenchment and consolidation of the positions as they are won—or is it an over-rapid revolutionary change, suddenly and dramatically casting off the Ottoman mantle and hastily, but insecurely, assuming a republican toga? This is the problem with which the student of the New Turkey is confronted, and which the contemporary historian must analyse and determine, if he can.

CHAPTER XI

THE ABOLITION OF THE CALIPHATE (3 MARCH, 1924)¹

IN the preceding chapters on the rapid and radical reconstruction of the Turkish state, it has been recorded how the men of Angora, inspired by the Revolutionary French ideas of 1789, swept away, first, the special privileges of Western residents in Turkey as embodied in the Capitulations; next, the special privileges of the non-Muslim minorities (who, as far as they were not physically expelled, were deprived for the future of the communal autonomy which they had enjoyed under the Millet System); and finally, coming nearer home, the Ottoman Sultanate, which had been the root institution of the old Ottoman Empire. In describing the abolition of the Sultanate (a step which was carried through during the last three days of October and the first day of November, 1922) it has been mentioned in passing that on that occasion the Great National Assembly had maintained in existence the Caliphate—an office to which the Ottoman Sultans, like many other Islamic dynasties in modern times, had claimed title since the time when the Ottoman Empire had attained the rank of a Great Power. The resolution of 1 November, 1922,² had provided that the Caliphate should continue to exist, after the liquidation of the Sultanate, with purely "spiritual" functions, and that future incumbents should be appointed, from among suitable members of the House of Osman, by the Assembly itself. In pursuance of this resolution, the new "spiritual" Caliphate was offered to, and accepted by, 'Abdu'l-Mejid Efendi, who had been the heir-apparent to the deposed Sultan-Caliph Vāhydu'd-Dīn, and

¹ The sketch, in the following section, of the historical background to the modern Caliphate Question is based on the brilliant and exhaustive work of Sir T. W. Arnold: *The Caliphate* (Oxford, 1924, Clarendon Press).

² For an English translation of the text, see page 150 above.

who had been in the bad graces of his imperial uncle during the last four years of his reign, on account of the sympathy which he had then openly displayed for Angora and its programme.

The "spiritual" Caliphate thus created by the fiat of the Turkish Great National Assembly in the Autumn of 1922 was an institution unknown to Islamic tradition and indeed incompatible with the nature of the office as it had actually existed during a long history. This fact, no doubt, would have possessed no more than an academic interest if Angora had succeeded in carrying through its policy; but, after little more than sixteen months' trial, the Turkish Republic proceeded to demolish its own creation. A decree of 3 March, 1924, abolished the "spiritual" Caliphate as ruthlessly as the "temporal" Sultanate had been abolished by the decree of 1 November, 1922; and the unfortunate 'Abdu'l-Mejid Efendi had to follow his uncle into exile. Nobody seriously accused him of disloyalty to the Republic, or of attempting to make the "spiritual" Caliphate more substantial than it had been intended to be. He was the victim of circumstances, and the objection to which such drastic effect was now given at his expense lay not against him personally, but against the intractability of the title with which he had been invested. The Men of Angora might define their puppet Caliphate in whatever terms they chose, but they could not get rid of the fact that the Caliphate had a history, in consequence of which certain definite attributes were associated with it in the mind of Islamic society. Legislation by the Turkish Great National Assembly could not root up this association of ideas or rule out the political consequences which this popular concept might entail. Mustafā Kemāl Pasha and his colleagues evidently discovered by experience that the real alternative lay between accepting the Caliphate in the terms in which the Islamic world understood it or else abolishing it altogether; and since they

had no intention of accepting it on such terms, they ultimately took the alternative course.

The truth was that the distinction between "spiritual" and "temporal" powers was an importation from the political philosophy of the West, and would never have occurred to Islamic publicists, in the light of their own historical experience, if the West had not appeared above the Islamic horizon. Jesus counselled his interlocutor to "render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's and unto God the things that are God's" because both of them were living under the very effective political sovereignty of the Roman Empire; but Muhammad, unlike Jesus, happened to conduct his religious mission in a place where there was, at the time, a political vacuum; and, in the process of propagating his spiritual revelation, he was forced by circumstances to improvise a political system for the people whom he converted. Thus he became the founder of a church and a state simultaneously, and the two institutions were never consciously distinguished from one another in his own thought and action or in the subsequent life of the Islamic society which sprang from his activities.

✓ By inference, indeed, such a distinction may be established, for Muhammad claimed to be, and was accepted as being, the last of the Prophets, and therefore *ex hypothesi* he left no "spiritual" successor in the Western meaning of the term. The "successor" (for this is the literal translation of the Arabic word *Khalifah*) whom he did designate was to be his successor in administering the Islamic community's political and social affairs; so that, if our Western distinction of powers is to be applied at all to the Islamic Khilāfet or Caliphate (an unscientific and misleading procedure at best), it would be less inaccurate to describe the Caliphate as a "temporal" power than as a "spiritual" one. Indeed, the official style,

assumed by the first Caliphs, of "Commander of the Faithful" (Amirul-Mū'minin) corresponds precisely in meaning to the style of "Commander" (*Imperator*) which was assumed, in the time of Jesus, by the temporal rulers of Rome and from which our own word "emperor" is derived; and Western students of the Caliphate will not go far astray if they follow out this analogy. Within a few years of Muhammad's death, his successors acquired by conquest a vast political dominion; and for the next two centuries the Arab Caliphate in the Middle East took up the rôle which the Roman Empire had previously played round the shores of the Mediterranean. Like the early Roman Empire, the early Arab Caliphate was a state organized so effectively over so wide an area that it provided a political carapace for an entire society; and the political prestige of these original Caliphs was so great that when their successors lost their effective power they remained the fountain heads of political authority, from whom rebellious provincial governors and barbarian invaders still sought investiture in order to legitimize the *de facto* power which they seized by force—just as Ostrogothic and Frankish conquerors of Roman provinces sought title from the later Roman Emperors at Constantinople. There were periods when these later Caliphs, even in their own capital of Baghdad, were the puppets of barbarian Turkish Captains of the Guard or of chiefs of invading barbarian tribesmen, who exercised the real power in the Caliph's name—but this again was parallel to the relationship between the last Roman Emperors in the West in the fifth Christian century and their German Masters of the Soldiers like Ricimer or Odowacer, or between the Merovingian *Rois Fainéants* (the heirs of the Roman imperial authority in Gaul) and their Mayors of the Palace.

There was thus no foundation for the thesis advanced by Mustafâ Kemâl Pasha, in his speech of 20 November, 1922,

in the Turkish Great National Assembly at Angora, that the relation between these *de facto* Turkish rulers of Baghdad in the eleventh Christian century and the shadowy Caliphs in whose name they governed was a relation between a "temporal" and a "spiritual" power; and accordingly there was a fallacy in his inference that it was possible in the present instance to safeguard the religious power of the Caliphate and at the same time to maintain the national sovereignty (of the Turkish people), since the temporal power was exercised by the Great National Assembly." The analogy at the back of Mustafā Kemāl Pasha's mind was apparently the Papacy and the relation established in the mediæval Western world between Pope and Holy Roman Emperor after the coronation of Charlemagne at Rome; but in reality the Caliphs never, at any time in their history, exercised those powers of interpreting, modifying, and promulgating dogma, or of disciplining the doctors and administrators of the Islamic Law, which were actually exercised by the Popes (or rather by the Popes and the Church Councils between them) and which were the essence of the "spiritual" power of the Papacy. They did not even claim to say the last word in religious matters, as was claimed by certain Christian Roman Emperors like Justinian. Their position was rather that of "Defenders of the Faith," like the position of the temporal sovereigns in certain modern Protestant countries. Questions of religious doctrine and law were settled by a consensus of the divines; and, so far from being amenable to the Caliph's "spiritual" authority, the divines maintained that their consensus could depose an incumbent of the Caliphate from his temporal power, if he broke the Social Contract. It is significant that in A.D. 1805, when the divines of the theological university of Al-Azhar at Cairo did depose the Pasha of Egypt who had been appointed by the Ottoman Government in 1801, and proclaimed

Mehmed 'Alī Pasha in his stead, they incidentally declared (according to the testimony of one of their number, Al-Gabartī) that they had the right to depose the Sultan-Caliph himself, if occasion were to arise.

Thus the historical Caliphate neither was a "spiritual" power at its zenith nor turned into one during its decline. It merely degenerated from an effective into an ineffective temporal authority. After the capture and sack of Baghdad, and the murder of the last Caliph who reigned there, by the Mongol conqueror Hūlāgū in A.D. 1258, the Mamlūk slave-household of the dynasty of Saladin, who had displaced their own masters as rulers of Egypt since A.D. 1250, sought to legitimize their usurpation by establishing in Cairo a survivor of the 'Abbāsīd House (the dynasty of the Caliphs of Baghdad) and ruling in his name; and in A.D. 1517, when the Mamlūks were conquered by the Osmanlis, the last of their puppet 'Abbāsīd Caliphs was carried off to Constantinople by the Ottoman Conqueror Sultan Selīm I and became his pensioner. There is no evidence, however, for the story that Selīm caused this last of the 'Abbāsīds to make a formal transfer of the Caliphate to him and his heirs. Indeed, the title does not seem to be employed in extant state documents emanating from Selīm after A.D. 1517, while on the other hand it does appear in the state documents of his Ottoman predecessors in the fifteenth and fourteenth Christian centuries, when the Mamlūks were still ruling Egypt in the 'Abbāsīd Caliph's name. The fact was that, while the Caliphs of Baghdad, down to their extinction in A.D. 1258, were recognized as the legitimate source of political authority by *de facto* rulers throughout the Islamic world, such recognition was not accorded to the later puppet Caliphs of the Mamlūks, outside the Mamlūks' own dominions. After the Great Interregnum of A.D. 1258, the title of Caliph was adopted freely, without

being taken very seriously, by any Islamic ruler who regarded himself as a Great Power, just as the title of "Emperor" was taken in the Western Middle Ages by rulers in the British Isles and in the Iberian Peninsula as well as by the Holy Roman Emperors of Germany, and has been taken in modern times by rulers of Russia, Austria, France, Mexico, Brazil and British India. There is a diplomatic correspondence extant between the chancellories of Stamboul and Agra, in which the Osmanli Kaiser-i-Rum and the Mughal Kaiser-i-Hind each mildly chides the other for airing a title to the Caliphate to which he himself has an equally good claim.

The representation of the Caliphate as a "spiritual" office first appears in a treaty between the Ottoman Government and a Westernized Power—that is, in the Russo-Turkish Peace Treaty of A.D. 1774. Under this instrument, while the Sultan surrendered his political suzerainty over the Muslim principality of the Crimea, his "religious" authority there—which was explained as residing in the appointment of Muftis and Kādhis in the Crimea by the Sheikhu'l-Islām at Stamboul—was expressly maintained. In 1912, nearly a century and a half later, a similar provision appeared in the Italo-Turkish peace treaty of Ouchy, under which the Ottoman Government surrendered its political sovereignty over the North African provinces of Tripoli-Benghazi, but once more retained the right of appointing the Islamic religious functionaries in the ceded territory. It is significant that these two arrangements between Turkey and a foreign Power, recognizing the Sultan-Caliph's "spiritual" authority over Muslims transferred to the temporal rule of another sovereign, had almost as short a life as the exclusively "spiritual" caliphate established in Turkey itself by the Resolution of 1 November, 1922. The Sultan-Caliph's "spiritual" jurisdiction in the Crimea was extinguished at the time of the annexation of that country

to Russia in 1781, while in Tripoli-Benghazi it was extinguished in 1923 by Article 22 of the Treaty of Lausanne. The foreign conquerors of Ottoman provinces rapidly made the discovery, which was afterwards made by the Men of Angora, that it was useless in practice to limit the authority of the Caliph by applying to him the Western term "spiritual," which Muslims did not understand, and that, if the Caliph's authority were admitted at all in an Islamic territory, it would be interpreted inevitably by the local population in its historic sense of a temporal power.

It was conceivable, however, that other non-Muslim conquerors of ex-Ottoman provinces might not discover this fact, or at least not until it was too late for their initial error of policy to be remedied, or it was conceivable that, while aware of the consequences, they might still elect to recognize the Ottoman "spiritual" Caliphate over their Muslim subjects in the hope of thus securing support from Islamic public opinion in their rivalry for Oriental dominions with other non-Muslim Powers. In short, from the last quarter of the eighteenth Christian century onward, this Western-made idea of a "spiritual" Caliphate offered a remarkable political opportunity for any Islamic sovereign who had the wit to bring the title of Caliph out of his dynastic lumber-room and air it discreetly. The opportunity was perceived and seized by the Ottoman Sultan 'Abdu'l-Hamid (1876-1909). In exploiting his title to the Caliphate, however, 'Abdu'l-Hamid did not have his eye upon the possibility of re-asserting his political authority in lost Ottoman provinces so much as upon his relations with his remaining Muslim subjects and upon wider relations which he might hope to build up, by this means, among the vast Islamic populations, scattered through distant territories, who had never been under an Ottoman Sultan's rule. In order to understand 'Abdu'l-Hamid's policy in

regard to the Caliphate, it is necessary to recall the circumstances in which he began his reign.

At the moment when he came to the throne, Midhat Pasha, with wide-spread support from the Turkish and other Muslim elements in the Ottoman Empire, was introducing a parliamentary constitution which was designed not merely to put the Muslim and non-Muslim elements on an equal footing (a question over which 'Abdu'l-Hamid may not have been greatly concerned) but to clip the wings of the Sultan and to reduce him from being the incarnation of the Ottoman state to being a constitutional sovereign on the Western pattern. 'Abdu'l-Hamid succeeded in getting rid of the constitution and of its author; but the ghost of Midhat haunted him for the rest of his reign, and he was right to be afraid of it, for the leaven of Western political ideas, which had given rise to Midhat's constitution, could not be purged away and was merely driven inwards. Everywhere in the West, the tendency had been for nations to become self-governing and for autocratic dynasties to be either overthrown or deprived of their original prerogatives. If the Western leaven continued to spread in Turkey, the Ottoman dynasty could hardly look forward to a different fate from that which had overtaken the Stuarts and the Bourbons. Yet the fatal leaven was spreading and evidently would continue to spread unless some contrary process of political thought could be set in motion in the minds of 'Abdu'l-Hamid's Muslim subjects. Might not a resuscitation of the title of Caliph give just the impetus that was needed? As against the rising tide of democracy, the Ottoman Sultanate was a house built upon the sands; and even those foundations which it had once possessed in the slave-household had long ago been carried away. The Caliphate, however, belonged to a plane of ideas which might possibly prove to be beyond the reach of

Westernization. It was one of the historic institutions of Islamic society, and its prerogatives, which had been minutely defined by the early Muslim Schoolmen on the basis of the Qur'ān and the Traditions, endowed the holder of the office with almost absolute autocratic power so long as he exercised it for the public good. As "Commander of the Faithful" in succession to Abū-Bekr and 'Umar and 'Uthmān and 'Alī, 'Abdu'l-Hamīd had a distinctly better chance of remaining absolute monarch of Turkey than he had as Sultan in succession to Osman Ghāzy, the son of a nomad refugee from Central Asia—and, as it turned out, 'Abdu'l-Hamīd did retain his autocratic power for thirty-two years, from the overthrow of Midhat's constitution in 1876 down to its restoration in 1908.

A second circumstance which marked the beginning of 'Abdu'l-Hamīd's reign was the extinction of every independent Islamic state of first-class rank except the Ottoman Empire itself. The Mughal Empire in Hindustan, which had been the peer of the Ottoman Empire in the sixteenth and seventeenth Christian centuries, had gone down to destruction in the Indian Mutiny, after an inglorious last phase in which the titular sovereign of Delhi had lived as a pensioner of the British East India Company; and the infidel Queen of England had recently taken the title of Empress of India. In Central Asia, again, the infidel Manchu Government of China had just crushed the Muslims of Yunnan, Kansu and the Tarim Basin; while, between the Pamirs and the Caspian, the formerly independent Muslim principalities had just been annexed or reduced to vassalage by the infidel Czar of Russia. In fact, there had been a rapid reduction in the number of independent Muslim sovereigns, great and small; the process seemed likely to continue; and 'Abdu'l-Hamīd, who still reigned at Constantinople, might hope to become the residuary

legatee of his defunct or degraded royal cousins in virtue of his Caliphial office. By theory and tradition the Caliphate was one and indivisible; in practice, since the day on which Muhammad died his temporal succession had seldom been uncontested; since A.D. 1258 (as has been mentioned above) every Islamic sovereign of any pretensions had claimed the title; and the last "Great Mogul," with his last breath, would probably have contested a claim on the Ottoman Sultan's part to be Commander of the Faithful in India. Now, however, that the "Great Mogul" had disappeared and his title had been taken by an infidel Englishwoman, the Indian Muslims, with no local Sultan-Caliph of their own, might be induced to look upon the Osmanli's claims with favour. Here were Muslim sheep without a Muslim shepherd, and for these sheep this was a particularly dangerous situation, since they happened to be scattered among overwhelming numbers of infidel goats, and those goats might turn into wolves at any moment.

In fact, the Muslims of India, Russia and China were not only now living under infidel governments; they were also living as minorities dispersed abroad among the Gentiles—Hindus, Russians and Chinese—who threatened to engulf them by mere weight of numbers. Moreover, these alien majorities might be expected to become more hostile and more aggressive as they (like other non-Western peoples) became infected with the Western nationality idea—a political gospel which could have no attractions for the Muslims *in partibus infidelium*, since, being minorities, they would be driven to the wall. Thus there were at least three motives—the loss of their own former Muslim sovereigns, the substitution of infidel Governments, and the menace of future aggressive national movements among the non-Muslim majorities surrounding them—which might incline the Indian, Russian and

Chinese Muslims to look towards the Ottoman Caliphate for moral support and practical organization. " Union is strength and the Caliphate brings union " was a suggestion which, at this time, was bound to make an impression on their minds ; and here Fortune favoured 'Abdu'l-Hamīd in two ways.

In the first place, she put into his hands at the psychological moment all those mechanical means of communication which the West had recently invented and had disseminated over the world : steamships, railways, telegraphs, telephones and the daily press. After the Russians, for their own political ends, had built their strategic railways across Transcaucasia and Transcaspia, Muslim pilgrims from as far afield as Afghanistan and Northern Persia began to take steamer at Batum and travel to the Holy Cities of the Hijaz via Constantinople, where they could see the Caliph's palace on the shore of the Bosphorus as they passed. In the Indian Ocean, British steamship companies, eager to earn dividends by doing a great passenger trade at a small profit per head, succeeded in vastly increasing the annual volume of Muslim pilgrims from India to the same Holy Cities—shrines of which the Ottoman Caliph was the undisputed and not ineffective guardian. Towards the end of his reign, 'Abdu'l-Hamīd further facilitated the pilgrim traffic and advertised his own position as Caliph by building the Hijaz Railway from Damascus to Medina—a triumph of engineering which cost him little, since by that time his Caliphate propaganda had made such headway that he was able to raise subscriptions throughout the Islamic world. If 'Abdu'l-Hamīd had lived a century earlier, his Caliphate policy would have been an impracticable dream, since the physical means for a *rapprochement* between the far-flung extremities of the Islamic world would not have been at his disposal. The modern applied science of the West placed those means in his hands.

His second piece of good fortune was the political rivalry in the East between Great Britain and Russia. After the completion of the conquest of the Indian Peninsula, the suppression of the Indian Mutiny, and the proclamation of the English Queen as Empress of India, the first concern of the British Government was to check the advance of Russia towards the North-West Frontier of the Indian Empire. Realizing, from a long experience, the immense political value of psychological imponderables, the British Government was not content to make military or political *ententes* with Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan, the three Muslim states which lay between India and Russia's advancing frontier. It set out to secure the support of Muslim public opinion by representing itself as the champion of Islam and Russia as Islam's arch-enemy. The abandonment of this rôle to the Bolsheviki after 1917 has been recorded above. Previously to 1907, however, the British Government, in pursuit of its policy of winning Muslim opinion to its side, showed itself complacent, if not positively favourable, as far as India was concerned, to 'Abdu'l-Hamîd's pretensions. Possibly British statesmanship took the erroneous view that the Caliphate was a "spiritual" office, and did not fully realize the political consequences which those pretensions implied. At any rate, its complacency was one of the strong pieces that came into 'Abdu'l-Hamîd's hand when he set out to play this clever game. Among the Indian Muslims, the movement was taken much more in earnest than elsewhere, with the result that the British Government, when it reversed its Oriental policy, fell into acute difficulties with a community which previously had been accounted the most loyal section of its Indian subjects, while the Indian Muslims, in turn, suffered an almost ludicrous disillusionment when Turkish Nationalism eventually burst its bonds and swept the Ottoman Caliphate off the chess-board.

We have seen, however, that this drastic measure of abolition was not taken until the spring of 1924, almost sixteen years after the Hamidian autocracy had been overthrown, in the Revolution of 1908, by the Committee of Union and Progress. The reason for this delay was that, between 1876 and 1908, 'Abdu'l-Hamīd had turned the Caliphate into so imposing an instrument that the revolutionaries could not make up their minds to throw it away when they deposed its author. The Young Turks experimented in keeping a puppet Sultan-Caliph, who was to exercise no influence upon the Government of Turkey, but through whom that Government was to influence the rest of the Islamic world in virtue of the prestige which had been acquired for the Caliphate by 'Abdu'l-Hamīd. When this ingenious policy was put to the test by the declaration of a Holy War in the Autumn of 1914, it broke down, and doubtless from that time onwards Turkish patriots rated the Ottoman Caliphate, as an international asset, at a lower value. Five-and-a-half years later, after Mustafā Kemāl Bey and his comrades had taken charge of the Turkish national cause which the Committee of Union and Progress had brought to disaster, they received a disagreeable reminder that the instrument reconstructed by 'Abdu'l-Hamīd might also be used as a weapon of autocracy in the internal politics of their country. On 11 April, 1920, the then Sultan-Caliph Vāhydu'd-Dīn (in collusion, according to the Nationalists, with the British authorities in occupation of Constantinople, whom the Indian Muslims were at that moment denouncing as his persecutors) publicly condemned the Nationalist Movement, in his capacity of Caliph, as contrary to religion; obtained a legal opinion (*fetvā*) to this effect from the Sheikhu'l-Islām, his official advisor on theological affairs; and emphasized his religious views by unleashing a Circassian brigand against the Nationalist forces. Apparently Vāhydu'd-Dīn calculated that this was a

favourable moment for recovering autocratic power and that the Caliphate was the most effective weapon to employ. As it happened, the Nationalists won, and so Vāhydu'd-Dīn Efendi lost his position—Sultanate, Caliphate and all. Even after this lesson, however, the glamour with which 'Abdu'l-Hamid had re-invested the Caliphate remained so great that in 1922 the victorious Nationalists, while they went further than the Young Turks had done in 1908, and abolished the office of Sultan in addition to dethroning an obnoxious occupant of it, attempted still to preserve a "spiritual" Caliphate as an instrument of potential value to themselves. Fifteen months' further experience was needed before they took the final step of abolishing this attenuated and scarcely recognizable ghost of a historic institution; and then, though their decision was probably wise from their own national point of view, it produced a breach between them and the Indian Muslims and lost them the imponderable support of Islamic public opinion, which had been by no means negligible (as a factor influencing British policy) in the life-and-death struggle from which they had so recently emerged.

On 1 March, 1924, the President of the new Turkish Republic, at the opening of the fifth annual session of the Great National Assembly, announced that the Caliph had been stripped of all significant power and therefore was functionless and was to be expelled. With the full concurrence of the Nationalist party, the office was solemnly declared at an end, and its incumbent, 'Abdu'l-Mejid Efendi, was dispossessed of his rank and position. On 4 March, the ex-Caliph, with all his retinue and household, left the country. Two days later the princes and princesses of the Ottoman Dynasty, as well as the other expelled members of the Imperial family, started by the Simplon-Orient Express for Europe, where they added still more members to the company of kings, emperors, princes,

heirs-apparent, empresses, queens and princesses, who had lost their thrones and had gone into exile. The passing of the last Caliph of Turkey raised many questions and many speculations.

Was there any personal motive behind this event in the drama which Mustafâ Kemâl was acting on the Turkish stage? It was stated on many hands that the presence of a member of the Imperial House, shorn though he was of all political power, was a thorn in the side of the Republican President. It was claimed that 'Abdu'l-Mejîd was a traitor to the new Turkish nation and a dangerous opponent of the Ghâzy. It is true that the presence of a royal heir to the throne may always hold the dangerous possibility of a new royalist *coup* to regain the vacant throne, and thereby be a continued source of anxiety and focus of opposition; but it has been pointed out that 'Abdu'l-Mejîd was no dangerous antagonist. He had not been disloyal to the National Assembly or even unsympathetic towards their policy. Indeed, under the Allied occupation of Constantinople he had incurred considerable odium with his predecessor on account of his Nationalist proclivities. The personal argument, again, was more specious than real. Mustafâ Kemâl Pasha, who had driven out a Sultan supported by foreign armies, had nothing to fear from a powerless and fictitious Caliph of his own creation. Probably the decisive reason was the impossibility of divesting the Caliphate of its traditional political associations in the eyes of the Muslim world. As the last Caliph had never been more than the puppet of the National Assembly, and his nomination to the "spiritual" office had been made without the participation of the rest of the Muslim world, the National Assembly was perhaps within its juridical rights in withdrawing from 'Abdu'l-Mejîd Efendi the Caliphial dignity.

From a purely historical point of view, the passing of this Turkish prince and all his family from the stage is as full of

interest as the passing of the Sultan had been, if not more so; for at this point the Ottoman Dynasty passes out of history for ever. It was the dramatic expression of the metamorphosis by which the Turkish Republic has sprung from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire. For the family of the Caliph is none other than the House of Osman son of Ertoghrul—the dynasty which not only created the Ottoman State but embodied that state so completely that until the other day the Government was called Ottoman and the people Osmanli after the founder's name.

The significance of the abolition of the Caliphate was two-fold. In the first place, it meant that Turkey ceased to be the centre of Islamic authority. A new corner was turned when Turkey dared to repudiate the "spiritual" leadership of Islam, and, by setting up a secular republican government and casting the Caliphate overboard, deliberately gave up Islamic unity and support in exchange for the anticipated benefits of a thorough-going Westernization. In the second place, the blow fell not only on Turkey, but on the whole Islamic world. In the Islamic world until this moment there had only been one Caliph, *ex hypothesi*, just as in Western Christendom until 1801 there was only one Emperor. The theory had seldom been supported by the facts. Nevertheless, the Caliphate had retained an imponderable prestige as the paramount unifying institution in Islamic society, and as the main link with the Islamic past, and its overthrow may therefore cause something like the shock which Western Europe experienced a century ago when the Holy Roman Empire foundered in the storm of the Napoleonic Wars.

Yet Islam may not consent to be without a leader, and the abolition of the Turkish Caliphate may only mean the transference of the office elsewhere. What Turkey in its Westernization has discarded, other Muslim nations may take up, and

whatever prestige the possession of the Caliphate formerly brought to Turkey, may now fall to some new possessor of the office. Indeed, the struggle for possession began immediately. For example, the title was assumed by King Husayn of the Hijaz until his abdication in October, 1924. The leaders of Islamic opinion decided to delay any definite decision for two years, and the election or appointment of a new Caliph was deferred until March or April, 1926. The possible emergence of a non-Turkish Caliph, however, falls outside the scope of this book and has little interest for the Turks themselves, who, having rejected their own Caliph, will pay no regard to a foreign holder of the office.

Meanwhile, the abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate cannot fail to affect the future relations of Turkey with the rest of the world. As an institution, the Caliphate (like the Holy Roman Empire) belongs to a plane on which each particular civilization formed, and deliberately formed, a closed universe in itself—a universe which treated the rest of Mankind as contemptible or ignorant barbarians and the rest of the world as *Dāru'l-Harb* or a zone of war. The Caliphate may have been a centre of unity and concord for Muslims, but only at the price of fixing a gulf between all Muslims and all infidels. And this was not mere theory. Until not much more than two centuries ago it was actually the principle on which the Ottoman Caliphate-Sultanate based its relations with Christian Powers or with dissenting Muslim Powers like Persia. With these communities beyond the pale it regarded itself as being permanently and normally in a state of war; and, quite consistently, it showed the greatest reluctance to enter into treaties with them, or into any other form of peaceful relationship based on equality of status and mutual recognition. It must be added that in the earlier days of the Ottoman Empire the Christian Powers themselves reciprocated this attitude.

It has only gradually been broken down on either side, and, though a network of legal relationships has been built up, a certain moral gulf has remained. The present Turkish National movement is boldly striving to pass this gulf and to come over to our Western ground. This "Westernizing" endeavour, viewed broadly, is an endeavour which deserves our sympathy because it offers the best prospect that has yet appeared of breaking down the barriers between Christendom and Islam, and of finding room for the peoples of both religions in a single world-wide society of nations. Such a society of nations cannot possibly incorporate a Caliphate for which the rest of the world is *Dāru'l-Harb*, any more than it can find a place for Holy Roman Empires or for Christian Orders like the Knights of the Sword. But it can find a place, side by side with the great and small States of the West, for a national State of Turkey or of Egypt or of Afghanistan, so long as that State genuinely accepts the principles of international comity which are now the acknowledged correlatives of national sovereignty in our Western system. There is no reason whatever to cast doubt upon the genuineness of the Turks' intentions, of which they are giving further evidence in their attempts to reconstitute their internal political system, as well as their economic and social life, on Western lines. And if their present mood of iconoclasm must find its victims, we need not regret overmuch that the Caliphate should be among their number. It is hardly an institution that makes for international solidarity in the broadest sense, and it is not quite an historical accident that non-Sunni Persia, which has always repudiated the Ottoman Caliphate, has also been the first Muslim member of the League of Nations.

PART III
THE NEW TURKEY

For a while I had seen greatness. I had watched a New Nation burst its way out, as in a volcanic eruption, through the ashes and ruins of the Ottoman Empire, hurl aside its enemies who clung clogging around it, as restraining as cold lava, and then in a flame of white enthusiasm set out to seek its own destiny. Whether it carried merely destruction, or might fashion itself into something clean and good, I could not see.

CAPTAIN HAROLD ARMSTRONG,
Turkey in Travail.

CHAPTER XII

REPUBLIC AND DICTATORSHIP

THE evolution of a constitutional government, which postulates a more or less enlightened nation, is slow and difficult. It has taken several experiments in Turkey to gain even a semblance of a practical constitution based on popular will and administration. As has been shown elsewhere, the constitution granted by 'Abdu'l-Hamid in 1876 marked no advance because it was withdrawn at once. The constitution forced upon the Sultan in 1908 was also premature, for, had the nation been ripe for self-government, the new liberty could not so easily have been over-ridden. As it was, the constitution which the Young Turks were expected to make into a historic Charter of Liberty broke down under the oligarchical dominion of the very party which had promised a democratic administration. "Even under the most favoured circumstances," to quote Professor J. Holland Rose, "parliamentary government could not work among peoples so profoundly divided by race and religion, so deeply dissevered by the memories of centuries of oppression and bloodshed, all the more since nearly the whole of these populations were illiterate, none of them had received any training in self-government, and none of them had known for many centuries even the rudiments of the Reign of Law, or acquired the habit of trusting to anything save brute force or cunning for their own protection. . . . Self-government in the Turkish Empire as a whole, the peaceful co-operation of many embittered and oppressed peoples with the masters who had long tyrannized over them, could never be anything but a fantasy. Self-government even in the potential national units of the empire—Armenia, Anatolia, Syria, Arabia, Mesopotamia—could only become possible after a long training in the habit of loyal obedience to law, after a painful unlearning

of the modes of life and action bred by centuries of despotism."

In the light of such considerations, it would not be surprising to find that in this third experiment for constitutional government there is still a long way to travel before a true democratic form of administration can be attained. Turkey has taken a step forward—a great step—but the shadow of the past still overhangs the Republic. Neither individuals nor nations can completely escape from their inheritance; and Turkey, even in her new dress, cannot in a day, or even in a decade, change her character completely.

It is, therefore, not surprising when, in our study of the new Turkey, we turn to its form of government, to discern there, dressed in the garb of constitutionalism, a despotic oligarchy, ruling a nation of as yet politically uneducated people with a masterly but also masterful hand. Turkey, since the revolution of 1919–22 and the declaration of the Republic in 1923, has been ruled by an autocratic duumvirate, under the outward veil of constitutional government.

Mustafā Kemāl, a great commander holding the whole of the Nationalist Army under his complete authority, and the mass of the Anatolian peasants under his spell as a conqueror of infidels and a national hero, gained the greatest power in the country. He used this power to drive out the foreign invaders, to sweep away the old Sultanate and Caliphate, and to defy the Governments of other countries, and five years after his country's ignominious defeat he won military and diplomatic triumphs which amazed the world. He proclaimed the country a Republic and himself became its ruler. Thereafter, like another Cromwell, or Napoleon, or (it might be said) another Mussolini, he has guided the destinies of the new state. Under him was 'Izmet Pasha, his chief of staff and military adviser—a tried soldier, an able administrator, and a skilful diplomatist. For all practical purposes, the govern-

ment became a joint autocracy of these two persons, backed by an efficient army and police. The personality and prestige of the President gave him the powers of a dictator, and the ability of his calm and soldierly Prime Minister made the executive a strong partnership. At first the Government was hampered by no opposition, for the rulers were powerful and they were popular. Their cause was the cause of the Republic, and to that there was little declared opposition. "Let the whole world know," said Mustafâ Kemâl Pasha, at Trebizond, "that for me there is no neutrality. I am a partisan of the Republic, and I cannot imagine a single Turk thinking otherwise on this fundamental point which constitutes the credo of the People's Party, itself a partisan of intellectual and social evolution." A few days later he said, in a speech at Samsun, that from the point of view of its ideal the People's Party embraced the whole nation. The fundamental principle of the party was to work for the happiness and prosperity of the nation. In his opinion the only way of doing so was to strengthen the Republic and guide the people in the rapid intellectual and social evolution in which it was now engaged. "Unity is essential, and there can be no rival theories, and no rival parties." The similarity of outlook between the "Ghâzy" and the "Duce" leaps to the eye.

One result of this centralization of powers was naturally to arouse criticism and opposition. The Opposition press indulged in sharp protests, and Husein Jâhyd Bey, the most distinguished among contemporary Turkish journalists, frankly declared that the country was menaced by a dictatorship. Dissatisfaction quickly spread among all classes of the community, including even government officials and army officers. The latter fact prompted the Angora Government to act vigorously, by enacting a law by virtue of which army officers and members of parliament were deprived of personal im-

munities. These further measures helped to increase the unpopularity of the Government among certain factions.

Hostility to the powers of the President was shown repeatedly during 1923 in the debates on the "Organic Statute" or Law of the Constitution. There was great discussion over the right of dissolution which the President asked for, but this right was denied him. The right of veto, which was the other important power for which the President asked, was granted to him in a restricted form.

He made it a point of honour, as he stated in one public address, always to remain both party leader and President, because he was convinced that he had the power to contribute to the consolidation of the Turkish Republic, and also that his party, the Popular Republican Party, was identical with the Government and the nation, so that he ought to be head of both. *L'état c'est moi!* The President has the right not only to remain the titular leader of the party but also in exceptional circumstances to preside over the Great National Assembly and over the Cabinet. During the recesses of the Assembly, which is to be in session only four months of the year, the executive power rests wholly in the hands of the President and his ministers, strengthened by the addition of chairmen of standing committees. Thus the power of the executive is excessive, and the accumulation of powers in the hands of the President gave him a position unprecedented in almost any form of democratic constitution.

The temper of this Kemalist dictatorship can be seen most clearly in the way in which it has shackled the Turkish press. In December, 1923, there was instituted a system of special tribunals, similar in scope and power to the French Committee of Public Safety or the Russian Cheka, for the trial of treason charges. These Tribunals of Independence were a sort of political inquisition, which could perform the most arbitrary

acts of justice or injustice under the sanction of the existing Turkish laws of high treason. During the period that has elapsed since their creation, they have been used more and more in bringing pressure to bear on the Opposition forces in the country.

The first act of the Constantinople Tribunal was to arrest the editors of the three leading newspapers of that city, and to suppress their journals. The reason for this step was the premature publication of a letter addressed to 'Izmet Pasha, the Prime Minister, appealing on behalf of the whole Sunni population of the Islamic world against the then threatened attenuation of the powers of the Caliphate. It was a mild and courteous letter, counselling prudence and calm reflection on the part of the Government in any action against the Caliphate, and submitting that Indian Muslim feeling should be taken into account. As the writers of the communication, His Highness the Aga Khan and the Right Honourable Ameer Ali, were not Turkish citizens and were beyond the reach of the Turkish Government's arm, the editors who published this letter in their journals were arrested and brought before the newly-created Tribunal, on the charge of having published an implicit criticism of the Government and of therefore being guilty of treason and of a desire to overthrow the existing *régime*. They were sentenced to imprisonment with a mild form of penal servitude.¹

Almost immediately afterwards, a second trial followed, when, in January, 1924, Lutfi Fikri Bey, the President of the Constantinople Bar, received a sentence of five years' penal servitude² for the offence of writing in the *Tanin*, a leading Constantinople newspaper, an open letter addressed to the

¹ The effect of this incident on the relations between Turkey and the Indian Muslims is described in a later chapter.

² Afterwards remitted.

Caliph advising him not to be misled by certain propaganda relative to his impending deposition from his office. Lutfi Fikri Bey had followed up his letter by an assurance that he himself was a loyal adherent of the constitutional régime—an assurance which was either deliberately misinterpreted by the Tribunal or else was deemed an insufficient token of patriotism.

Other attacks on the liberty of the press took place in December, 1924, when two Constantinople papers, the *Orient News* (an English Daily) and the *Tok-Söz* (a Turkish journal) were suppressed and the editors punished, in one case by expulsion from the country, in the other by six months' imprisonment. In the summer of 1925 a number of other newspapers in Turkey were suppressed by the Government, and important trials of the editors took place before the Tribunal at Angora.

A further example of this restriction of the press was the suppression of some dozen or more journals of Constantinople and the provinces during the Kurdish rebellion in the Spring of 1925. The *Tanin*, a well-known independent Turkish newspaper of Constantinople, was accused, not of criticizing the Government's policy explicitly in its editorial columns, but of the tacit criticism implied in the editor's prolonged abstention from discussing politics at all! The *Tanin* was seized, and the editor and proprietor, Husein Jähyd Bey, was summoned before the Tribunal of Independence at Angora, tried for subversive activities, and exiled for life to the remote country town of Chorum in North Eastern Anatolia. Thus, from fear of open criticism, the Government deprived the country of one of its most able and courageous journalists, and silenced almost every journal that had ever dared to breathe any word of disapproval of the Kemalist party.

The sudden and unceremonious expulsion of the Greek Ecumenical Patriarch, in January, 1925, was another example

of the autocratic manner of the Government. The then incumbent of the Patriarchate, Mgr. Constantine, was personally "exchangeable" according to the terms of the Lausanne Treaty; and therefore was declared ineligible to hold the Œcumenical office at the Phanar in Constantinople. The Turkish authorities notified him abruptly and gave him less than twenty-four hours from notification to leave the country—a discourtesy that aroused vigorous protests not only in Greece but in the West.

Finally, the powers which Mustafā Kemāl Pasha has taken to himself are a forcible illustration of the type of government prevailing in Turkey during these early years of the Republic.

The first two years of his rule were years of popularity. Mustafā Kemāl Pasha was one of those enlightened despots who have come into prominence in the modern East as similar rulers had arisen in eighteenth century Europe: approved by the popular will, progressive to a point of extravagance, and fired by a formidable zeal for reform. A heroic conqueror who had brought his people out of the house of bondage, a commander, risen from amongst the people themselves, who had delivered them from the yoke of tyranny, it was no wonder that his political sway was almost unchallenged during those early years of his *régime*.

At that time, in 1922, the Ghāzy-President, while staying in the house of a wealthy Turkish merchant in Smyrna, immediately after the victorious re-occupation of that city, met and quickly married Latīfeh Khānum, an energetic and highly educated girl of nineteen who was widely travelled and well acquainted with the manners and customs of Western Europe. As his wife, she took her full share in his responsibilities of government and made it her task to assist in transforming the social condition of the country. For a time her influence was considerable, especially in furthering the feminist movement

in Turkey. The Ghāzy's somewhat abrupt declaration of divorce was either a tribute to the forcefulness of Latifeh Khānum's personality or a testimony to the President's intolerance of any relationship which might hamper the exercise of his autocratic power.

"This power," as it appears to one Western observer, "is greater than that which any Russian Tsar ever experienced. A word from his lips can consign 'Izmet Pasha or any other prominent member of the National Assembly either to prison or to some far-off unimportant post; a single sweep of his pen and the whole status of woman and priesthood, marriage and the institution of the harem become so radically changed that customs sanctified by tradition and religious observances equally time-honoured disappear as before a magician's wand; he divorces his wife by signing himself the decree releasing him from his bond, an act which even that supreme autocrat Henry VIII would never even have contemplated, while he not only reforms the judiciary and the system of education, but actually prescribes the costume and the head-dress of his people with all the authority of a Poiret."¹

Mr. Dudley Heathcote, who visited Asia Minor in 1925, formed the following estimate of the President and his work.

"He has set the clock of progress too fast, and I fancy that a day of retribution is approaching that may seriously undermine his power. The fact that his country is at present undergoing an almost wholesale remodelling is by no means indicative of as radical a transformation in the mind of the general public. Many Turks, of course—and I make allusion to the most clear-sighted and patriotic—are as passionately desirous of reforming their country as Mustafā Kemāl; but while many welcome the iconoclastic measures by which their great leader is hoping to modernize the Turkish Republic, there are even more who regret that progress is being purchased with the sacrifice of so much of what tradition has taught them to revere and to hold fast. Among these earnest patriots I have heard many expressing the fear that in this frenzied *course aux reformes* Mustafā will ultimately unite the many subterranean and reactionary forces that are at present opposing him."²

Even those who admire this remarkable statesman for his military qualities, his courageous facing of adversities, his

¹ The *Sunday Times*, 20 September, 1925.

² The *Sunday Times*, 20 September, 1925.

audacity in reform, and his strong rule, view with misgiving some of the abuses of power which he has committed. Not least of these, from a constitutional point of view, is his centralization of power and his own personal supremacy over the administration and over the Assembly which nominally "elected" him. As creator and leader of the Popular Party, he carried the vast majority of the parliamentary representatives with him in every measure and every act he promulgated. Nevertheless, appreciating the value of an official Opposition, as it exists in nearly every modern state, he professed at first to be willing to recognize a new party, the Progressist Party, which arose to oppose him. This new group, which continues to grow in importance in spite of the subsequent Government efforts to repress it, contained the following elements. There were, first of all, a large number of people, including former "Young Turkish" politicians, many "intellectuals," and Conservative Royalists faithful to the *ancien régime*, who increasingly disapproved of the revolutionary reforms. This group had its strongest following in Constantinople, where there resided numerous officials who by tradition or interest were supporters of the Sultan; and the *Entente Libérale* party, which had formerly been opposed to the "Young Turk" movement, now joined forces with the ex-leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress. All those who had held military or official positions under the Sublime Porte—and their number in the days immediately preceding the Great War was legion—naturally resented the new order, and remained secretly true to their old allegiance, with an eye to a possible restoration of the monarchy. Secondly, there were those members, numbering thousands, of the religious orders whose vested interests were being threatened by the new *régime*. The Islamic *religieux* were naturally outraged by the wholesale confiscation of the lands and property belonging

to the mosques, medresehs and dervish orders. They became a subversive group, threatening to undermine the unity and indivisibility of the Republic, and were accused, probably with some justice, of fomenting reactionary movements such as the Kurdish revolt of 1925. As a consequence, the Government struck a heavy blow in September, 1925, by dissolving the dervish orders. This action, of course, while legally defended as suppressing sedition or organized reaction, could only result in further bitterness and opposition. The influence of these dispossessed and disbanded *religieux* remains powerful, especially in inner Anatolia, where the uneducated peasantry is still dominated by the local sheikhs or dervishes; and the religious revolution that first robbed them of their Caliph, then of their endowments, and finally of their corporate existence itself, has set up amongst the *religieux* a dangerous current of opposition. Thirdly, there is the large cosmopolitan population of Constantinople, which views with dismay the prospect that their city, which has prospered for centuries as the political and commercial capital of the Near East, may decline to the rank of a provincial town and seaport. So antagonistic is this element in Constantinople that the President of the Republic, in spite of his remarkable patriotism and personal courage, has not ventured to visit the former capital of Turkey since the declaration of the Republic in 1923.

These forces of opposition took shape in a "Progressist" Party, which was built up around such distinguished Constantinople deputies as Re'ûf Bey, formerly Mustafâ Kemâl's right-hand man and at one time Prime Minister; Re'fet Pasha, also a former Prime Minister, and the man who paved the way for the dethronement of the last Sultan; Dr. Adnan Bey, formerly liaison officer between Angora and the foreign diplomatic missions at Constantinople; Kiâzım Qara Bekir

Pasha, one of the most notable army commanders in Turkey; and Jambolat Bey, a politician who had been prominent in the days of the Committee of Union and Progress.¹ The formation of this party led to an immediate schism in the Assembly and a rapid desertion to the Progressist ranks of large numbers of deputies, with the result that the Popular Party, now patriotically named the "Republican Party," was threatened with finding itself in an actual minority. As a result of this political crisis, Fethi Bey, an able and popular leader sympathetic towards the Progressists, came into power as Prime Minister in 1924.

In February, 1925, the Kurdish revolt broke out; the Progressists were suspected of being connected with the reactionary elements enumerated above; the Opposition was discredited and Fethi Bey was accused of being half-hearted in his attempt to suppress the insurrection. The Fethi Cabinet fell; another Cabinet under 'Izmet Pasha was formed and was given exceptional and extensive military and judicial powers. Fethi Bey was shortly afterwards despatched as Ambassador to Paris; the Opposition press, as has been described, was paralysed by repressive measures, and the Progressist Party was largely disbanded or intimidated into quiescence. Most of the members, in this time of national emergency, rallied loyally to the Government, forgetting their party differences; and, on the surface, something like a united political front was maintained during the ensuing year.

Through all this storm and stress Mustafâ Kemâl Pasha has ridden securely, and still remains the virtual dictator of the country (with the restored 'Izmet Pasha, his strongest henchman, as his Prime Minister), notwithstanding the terms and intention of the republican constitution which is the juridical basis of his power.

¹ See "The Opposition in Turkey" (*Fortnightly Review*, June, 1925).

The Ottoman Sultanate was abolished on 1 November, 1922; the Republic of Turkey was proclaimed just a year later; but the Constitution of the new state was not promulgated until 20 April, 1924. Its adoption was the final consummation of the revolution. Politically it set the seal on the vast changes brought about since 1919 and closed the stormy period of upheaval and transition with a constitutional charter of state.

On 1 March, 1924, Mustafâ Kemâl opened the fifth annual session of the Great National Assembly with an important presidential address, the substance of which had been awaited with eagerness throughout the country. It was in fact the first declaration of the policy of the Republic and its President. He declared that the nation demanded that the Republic, which had been established and accepted with such enthusiasm, should be protected resolutely and permanently against all attacks (which was interpreted to mean that any government measures, no matter how severe, towards that end would be regarded as justifiable); that uniformity of education and instruction must be realized as quickly as possible (which presaged the abolition of religious schools and the bringing of all public education under the direct supervision of the Vekîl or Minister of Education); that the judicial system must be liberated from all pernicious influences, and that the differences between civil and religious jurisdiction must be removed by placing all courts under the Vekîl of Justice; that the Army must be kept apart from political affairs (which signified that holders of military commissions were not to sit as deputies in the Assembly); and that the Chief of Staff—at the time, Marshal Fevzi Pasha, who had twice been Premier—was to be excluded from the Cabinet. The Ghâzi's final declaration was that religion in the state must be entirely separated from politics, which was taken to mean that the Vekîl for Religious

Affairs (at that time, Khwaja Mustafā Fevzī Efendi), formerly known as the Sheikhu'l-Islām, was to be excluded from the Cabinet, and also implied the abolition of the Caliphate, which, when divorced from politics, was voided of significance. These main propositions, some of them startlingly new, formed the basis of the written charter of the Republic which was promulgated in the following month.

The opening clauses of the Constitution¹ confirmed the earlier decision that "The Turkish State is a Republic." As if fearing the possibility of a revolution or the development of a monarchical form of government through successive phases of personal dictatorship and veiled autocracy, one of the final clauses relative to amendments to the Constitution definitely declared that "No proposal to alter or amend Article I of this Constitution, specifying that the form of Government is a Republic, shall be entertained." In this way the Nationalists, having created the republic, safeguarded themselves from overthrow and their principles from subversion by contrary political doctrines, and at the same time guaranteed a political permanence and stability which no internal changes of Government could shake in its fundamental organization. The die was cast as irrevocably as when the Constitution was signed in the United States after the Declaration of Independence.

For the rest, the Constitution is a relatively simple document sufficing for the needs of a simple and small nation, docile in politics, not complex in organization, and semi-primitive in life. For such a people, accustomed to the absolute rule of a sovereign Sultan and his Ministers, aided or not by a Parliament under the control of a cabal, a very simple political structure was necessary. An elected Parliament, known as the Great National Assembly, is invested with the executive, the legislative and the judicial powers of the state, taking the

¹ For the text of the Constitution, see Appendix.


place of the sovereign. The legislative powers are exercised directly, by the single-chamber Assembly, as provided previously in the earlier instrument known as the Law of Fundamental Organization, or Organic Law, of 23 April, 1920. In order to prevent the Assembly from becoming a military group, as the first Parliament of Cromwell's Protectorate became, and as the deputies and politicians surrounding Mustafâ Kemâl might easily become, a legislative provision allows no seats in the Assembly to army officers. The result has been that a considerable number of army officers who had participated in the Nationalist revolution have resigned their commissions in order to hold their seats as Deputies in the Assembly. The office of Chief of Staff no longer carries with it a seat in the Cabinet. This assures the continuance of a purely civil administration, as free from military influence as possible—a wise provision in view of the history of European states which have been remodelled by a military *coup* and afterwards ruled by a military oligarchy controlling the national army.

“The Assembly exercises the executive power through the intermediary of the President of the Republic, whom it elects, and through a Cabinet chosen by his appointee the President of the Cabinet. The Assembly controls the acts of the Government and may at any time withdraw power from it.” The members of the Cabinet, or Council of Executive Commissioners, are both individually and collectively responsible to the Assembly, in the general policies of the Government. The election by the Assembly of the President of the Republic gives him the titular responsibility for the direction of the Assembly's proceedings; he holds office for a period equivalent to that of the parliamentary term, which is four years, but he may be re-elected. As head of the State, he presides over the Assembly on ceremonial occasions, giving, in November of

each year, a "speech from the throne" or opening address concerning the activities of the Government during the preceding year and the recommendations of the Government for the year to come. In case of necessity he also presides over the Cabinet or Council of Commissioners, usurping the functions of the President on the Council. During his entire term of office the President of the Republic may not take part in the discussions or in the deliberations of the Assembly, and may not vote.¹

In view of the various dealings of Nationalist Turkey with the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, it may be pointed out here that the new order is being built up on very different lines in Turkey and in Russia. For example, the Turkish Republic, in spite of all its attacks on the outward structure of the Islamic "church," is founded upon the religion of Islam.

¹THE ORGANIZATION OF GOVERNMENT IN THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY.



according to Article 2 of the Constitution, whereas the Bolshevik state is based on the dogmatic system of Karl Marx. Count Ostrorog, in an illuminating article on Republican Turkey,¹ has shown how the new Constitution is based very definitely on Muslim precedent, in spite of the secular character of the administration of the state.

"It has been thought and said that, under the pressure of foreign influences, a tendency to sympathize with State atheism, Marxism, and Communism has become prevalent with the politicians of Republican Turkey. The legal texts printed at Angora and communicated by the Turkish Government testify that this view is completely erroneous. The trend of thought evidenced in these Turkish draft statutes and in the minutes of the Legal Commission sittings denotes that the politicians of Republican Turkey must certainly be qualified as 'modernists' in the sense familiar to those who have followed contemporary religious controversies, but that they remain, and expressly profess that they remain, Mohammedans."

At one of the sittings of the Commission entrusted with legislative reform, a non-Muslim member moved and argued with considerable insistence that all reference to Islamic law should be abandoned and that members should have recourse only to the legal system prevailing in Western Europe. This proposal, however, was rejected on the ground that, since the common people were almost entirely Muslim, some reference to Islamic law would make the new statutes more acceptable to the country. As a result, due consideration was given to Islamic law in the sittings of the Reform Commission.

Furthermore, as Count Ostrorog has pointed out, the new Constitution, based upon the findings of the preliminary Commission, is quite distinctly Muslim in spirit.

"In the Mohammedan conception the rights of individual liberty and property do not merely represent axioms of human psychology and economic common sense. They have their foundation in the tenets of orthodox faith, the rights of individual liberty and property being described in the Mohammedan creed as forming part of the rights originally given by God to Man to enable him to accomplish his duties

¹ *Daily Telegraph*, 2 June, 1925.

on earth. Consequently, they cannot be abolished in a Mohammedan country unless the Mohammedan creed itself be previously abolished."

Hence, in very orthodox Islamic logic, the following articles in the Turkish Constitution :

ARTICLE 70.—Personal inviolability, right, and freedom of conscience, thought, speech, publication, travel, contract, work, property and use and disposal of property, meeting, association, form part of the national rights of Turkish citizens.

ARTICLE 71.—Life, property, honour, domicile, are inviolable as against any trespass.

ARTICLE 72.—Unless public necessity be thereto established in legal form, and the value previously paid in accordance with a special law, no person whatever can be dispossessed of property.

Thus it will be seen that the Constitution is in strict conformity with traditional Islamic law and customs, and also that it is a distinct denial of any form of Marxism or communism which recognizes no rights of private property. Indeed, the tenor of the Constitution reflects a general national attitude which has no sympathy whatever for Bolshevik ideals. The foreign political ideas by which the Constitution is inspired are not of Bolshevik but of Western origin. For example, the sovereignty of Parliament, which in England is a historic fact, is here erected into a constitutional theory. It must be noted, however, that so far, at any rate, the Parliament at Angora, for all its constitutional rights, has been in practice a much lesser power in the state than the Parliament at Westminster.

In addition to the Constitution, which states, in simple and concise fashion, the principles upon which the new Republican State is built, and its machinery of operation, a whole new fabric of state law and legislation has been adopted or is being prepared with as much speed as is expedient, together with administrative reforms. A great step in advance had previously been taken by the supersession of those religious courts in which the Qur'anic laws of the Sheri'ah were administered, often very badly ; but the Mejelleh (the Ottoman civil code on

the French model), though only half-a-century old, was already inadequate to present-day needs. Much of this old-fashioned body of Ottoman law was discarded and replaced by new codes and legal reforms¹ which in themselves are remarkable evidence of the distance which the Turkish mind has advanced along the road of Westernization. Early in the year 1926 the Minister of Justice, Mahmūd Es'ad Bey, brought before the Assembly a new penal code of 700 articles, adapted from the Italian Code, a new civil code of 1,800 articles taken from Switzerland, and a new commercial code of 700 articles borrowed from Germany. A month or two earlier, the President of the Republic had inaugurated a Faculty of Law at Angora, which, he declared, was intended to be not merely the training-ground of high officials and legal specialists but, more important, the basis of a new jurisdiction consistent with the revolutionary ideals and in harmony with the social needs of the new Turkey. The training of qualified judges and of advocates well grounded in the new legislation and procedure is a wise measure, and shows how well Mustafā Kemāl Pasha understands that none of his revolutionary reforms can be made lasting without a widespread educational activity for disseminating and inculcating the new institutions and ideas. Education and reform must march hand in hand; and, in the fields of technology, agriculture, law, dress and other social customs, religion, and indeed in all departments of life, the schools—general and specialized—are to be organized with a view to teaching the new revolutionary principles.

The judicial system at present existing in Turkey consists of some 600 tribunals (of which 160 are in the villages, while the others are in the towns and cities) which serve as courts of first instance for civil, criminal and commercial cases. Above these courts there is a Supreme Court, composed of thirty-two

¹ See "Turkish Legal Reform" (*The Times*, 18 December, 1925).

members, who are sub-divided into sections dealing with the different types of case, and who either revise, confirm, or reject the verdicts of the courts of first instance. This Supreme Court, formerly sitting at Eski Shehr, is being accommodated in a new building at Angora. The former courts of appeal have been abolished, professedly in the interests of efficiency and rapidity—though neither of these interests is furthered by the reference of cases from Constantinople, where most of the important litigation still arises, to the interior of Anatolia. The country is divided into six general inspectorships, and each inspector-general is assisted by five inspectors, whose duty it is to forward to the Ministry of Justice the grievances of the people and to keep the people in touch with the legislative and judicial reforms emanating from Anatolia. That all this programme of legal and judicial reform will be immediately acceptable and will be put into application cannot be expected even by the most enthusiastic admirer; the incubus of past abuses and past corruption is too heavy. Nevertheless, the new codes of law have been presented, and on a *tabula rasa* a new judicial structure is slowly being erected, while a new body of trained jurists, thoroughly grounded in the new system, is being prepared as a nucleus who will preserve and pass on this latest experiment in legal reform.

CHAPTER XIII

POPULATION, AGRICULTURE AND RAILWAYS

OUR study of Turkey since the Great War has carried us through the transition period of defeat, resuscitation, revolution and political reorganization, and we have surveyed rapidly the main events in that period of violent transformation. We now find ourselves face to face with a definitely republican state, constitutionally organized, sufficiently assured of popular support and guided by an able and a powerful leader. The new Turkey is a very real fact, and not a "shadowy façade" as early sceptics pronounced it to be. With the gradual passage of the country into an era of peaceful reconstruction and internal development we must turn our attention from military and political crises to the economic progress of the country.

Politics, after all, are merely a means to an end—that end being the peace and prosperity of the nation, based on security and opportunity provided by the Government.

"A change in government by itself and alone," as Professor E. F. Nickoley says of Turkey, "will not revolutionize the economic life of the country. But it can, and should, produce a condition that must precede initiative on the part of individuals. Conditions of security must first of all be created. The first requirement must be stable Government, a Government under which the land-owners, the farmers and the capitalist may be assured against injustice and oppression, a Government that will inspire confidence in the people and lead them to exercise buoyant faith instead of dull distrust and pessimism."

The final test of any administration is the resulting economic condition of the country. With this in mind, we must see what the new Nationalist *régime*, the new Republic, has contributed to the economic life of Turkey.

First of all let it be said that a wide-spread and profound pessimism exists in regard to the present economic situation of the country. Business men, both Turkish and foreign, are

depressed; the Turks in general are either indifferent or anxious. It must be pointed out, however, that a large and honest and open-minded judgment cannot be reached simply by viewing the momentary conditions as they stand, or by comparing them with conditions in other more favourably placed countries. It can be reached only when the economic situation of to-day is compared with that of yesterday, and when the present is viewed in the light of the stupendous difficulties and obstacles which lie in the immediate past. Turkey has suffered cataclysmic changes and has set out to return to normal ways and to put her house in order under quite abnormal conditions of national life.

It was the misfortune of the Turkish nation to achieve the Nationalist Revolution and set up the Republic during a period of economic distress which was probably unprecedented in Ottoman history. Although the Republic evicted an honoured and privileged monarchy and confiscated the palaces of Dolmah Baghcheh and Yildiz-Kiosk—symbolic of all the wealth and luxury of the Ottoman Sultans—in reality this was a sorry legacy. The exchequer was depleted and the country was burdened not only with an enormous public debt, but with a foreign control over part of its finances in the form of the international Ottoman Public Debt Commission (though this latter burden may have been a blessing in disguise). The country had been ravaged by a decade of wars and further devastated in the Græco-Turkish War following the Armistice of 1918. The man-power of the nation was depleted both in numbers and in strength, for the ten or twelve years of almost constant fighting had greatly reduced the numbers of able-bodied men and had sapped the energy and the physical health of many of those who had returned after the campaigns. The wars had exhausted the agricultural wealth of the fields, had taken all the beasts of burden,

especially the fine horses of the interior, and had left little in reserve.

Agriculture was itself still in a primitive state; and with neither men nor serviceable beasts, neither implements nor seed, the main resource of Turkey was in a lamentable condition. The disbanded armies were underpaid or unpaid; they lacked clothing; and demobilization released men who had no means of livelihood when once they left the ranks, so that many were left to become vagrant hillsmen, shepherds, robbers, brigands, chettehs. Turkish resources were undeveloped; business and commerce had been in the hands of non-Turks, who had just been expelled in enormous numbers from the country and had carried with them the skill, the intelligence, the capital, and the initiative which were so much needed for Turkish reconstruction.

Further, mistake after mistake was made by the new Government in its first years, causing the country to sink deeper than ever into the economic morass. The revenue system was so mishandled that trade and shipping were severely penalized and discouraged. Constantinople was allowed to fall into a noticeable decline. An extreme policy of non-co-operation, of independence of foreign help, foreign goods, foreign advice, a rejection of loans and a partial repudiation of foreign debt, high prohibitive duties on much that the country needed, and an unwillingness to employ skilled foreign experts or even Turks trained professionally abroad—all these blunders indicated a short-sighted policy on the part of the Republican leaders when first they took control. It must be remembered, however, that these leaders were mostly soldiers, unaccustomed to the responsibilities of government and untrained in the business of statesmanship. Their education in economics and political science was obtained by trial and error; and they had overwhelming odds against them

in their work. That these generals and staff officers, whose distinctions had been gained in a military career, should be required to become civilian statesmen and to raise their ruined country to economic prosperity, was to set them a task as formidable as the labours of Hercules. Whether they rose to the occasion, brought the ship to an even keel after the storm and ruled the state as successfully as they had commanded armies and directed campaigns, can only be judged by surveying the main economic problems with which they found themselves confronted and examining their success or failure in dealing with them. Let us first consider the population problem, which was the most fundamental.

It will be recalled that during the negotiations at Lausanne a convention was signed on 30 January, 1923, between Greece and Turkey providing for compulsory exchange of national and religious minorities. The intention was to give both the countries concerned a nationally homogeneous population, and this solution of a long-standing and increasingly difficult problem, after being commended by Dr. Nansen as the best settlement in the circumstances, was agreed upon by the Governments participating in the peace conference, though it was criticized by outsiders as an unsatisfactory and unnecessarily harsh arrangement. The Turkish acceptance of this proposal, which had been put forward in good faith by M. Venizelos,¹ committed the Turks to a gigantic enterprise, full of pitfalls and of occasions for discontent and friction. A Mixed Commission was appointed to direct the intermigration and to act as a clearing-house for the interchange of private property, and the work of systematically winnowing out the nationalities in Greece and Turkey began.² The bulk of the

¹ M. Venizelos had been in favour of this drastic but definitive solution of the minorities problem as far back as 1914.

² See an article entitled "History's Greatest Trekk," by Melville Barker, *National Geographic Magazine* of New York, November, 1925.

Greek minority in Turkey had already fled or been expelled from the country before the Convention of 30 January, 1923, was signed. On the other hand, the removal of the Turkish minority from Greece had hardly begun.

Turkey immediately set about her task with an unwonted vigour. True, the fears of the pessimists were often realized. Suffering was common; mismanagement occurred; there was a heavy mortality. Western observers resident in Turkey or Greece during the ensuing two years were deeply moved by the tragedy of these refugees, uprooted from their homelands and carried off to a country in which they were as homeless as waifs and in which even the language was sometimes strange to them.¹ Poor, and equipped with few household goods, they often went hungry or half naked; shelterless, some died of exposure, in spite of concentration camps or deserted houses to which as many as possible were sent; mountaineers were sometimes planted on the plains and vice versa, in the Government's inefficient or careless distribution of population. It happened also that although "abandoned" property (Amwāl-i-Metrūkiyeh) left behind by the Greeks was supposed to be earmarked for occupation by the immigrants, many of the "abandoned" houses were already occupied at nominal rents by local Turks who found that they were better than their own, and who, having moved into them, had proceeded to let their own houses. Inevitable abuses crept in frequently in the conduct of this vast exchange.

Yet on the whole, the transference was carried on with considerable expedition, thanks to the good offices of the American Near East Relief, the Mixed Commission and other

¹ Many of the Orthodox Christians from the interior of Anatolia, though they felt themselves Greek in nationality, were ignorant of any language except Turkish. Conversely, the Muslim muhājirs from Crete and south-western Macedonia mostly knew no other language but Greek.

agencies. Reception camps were established for the temporary accommodation of incoming "muhājirs"; food kitchens were organized; orphanages were founded. As rapidly as possible the Christians were evacuated; as speedily the exchanged Muslims arriving in Turkey were "settled" and provided for. The provision indeed was often insufficient. For instance, in 1924, barely £6,000,000 were allotted for this purpose, and a considerable proportion of this sum was spent on the salaries of officials. This fund obviously did not suffice properly to install some 400,000 refugees, as was made plain from the similar experiences of Greece; but in spite of handicaps and mistakes the task was accomplished, and on the whole fairly successfully—notwithstanding the fact that Turkey, who was not yet a member of the League of Nations, did not have recourse to the League for financial and administrative assistance, as Greece did.

The consequences of this exchange were interesting. First of all, the political condition of Turkey was relieved, for there no longer existed within the country a disturbing problem of non-Turkish minorities, claiming religious and civil privileges, military exemptions, and the other benefits of the Millet System. Turkey was now transformed into a homogeneous Turkish national state, containing fewer extraneous elements than almost any other country in Europe or Asia. The way was clear for a national development without hindrance from within.

Economically, it was almost universally prophesied that Turkey would suffer severely by the loss of the most valuable commercial elements in the country. The Greeks and the Armenians had practically monopolized the business activities of the country, as far as these had not been in Western hands. Their expulsion was held to be a fatal blow to the economic life of Turkey. This opinion is still wide-spread among foreign

observers and business men. It is too soon to say whether or not the Turks, who have had little commercial experience, will succeed in taking the place vacated by the Greeks and Armenians.

The incoming Muslims, however, were acclimatized to Greek life and thought ; and, to some extent, at least, brought with them from Greece a business acumen and experience, a resourcefulness, and a spirit of enterprise, which will make itself felt as soon as they are sufficiently settled and established in their new country. They will help to fill the places of the evacuated Greeks and Armenians, and though their native language is not in all cases Turkish, they are co-religionists of the Turks and are at one with them in national feeling, and they may therefore contribute much to the development and prosperity of the country.

When we come to view the population question of the new Turkey, after the re-shuffling during and since the wars of 1912-13, 1914-18 and 1919-22, and after the detachment of so many former Ottoman provinces, we catch a glimpse of one more of the problems that face the Republic. We find a condition more or less comparable to that facing the British Dominions to-day, or the United States of America half-a-century ago. We see a rich country, possessing a favourable climate, untapped water-power, fertile river valleys, magnificent mountains full of unexplored mineral and forest wealth, and extensive areas of productive agricultural land, which, in proportion to its size, presents greater economic possibilities than Canada itself ; but the problem of Asia Minor, like that of Canada, Australia or New Zealand, is a problem of population, in which number is less important than quality and kind.

The present boundaries of the Turkish Republic, inclusive of Northern Kurdistan and exclusive of the Mosul Vilayet,

embrace a population of not more than 9,000,000 people¹ in an area of approximately 210,000 square miles. Thus there is a population of 43 or less per square mile. When this figure is compared with those for the United Kingdom (England 701, Scotland 160, Wales 296 per square mile) it will be realized how seriously handicapped the Turkish nation is in its economic development by under-population, compared with Western countries which it wishes to emulate. Germany, for instance, has 348, Czecho-Slovakia 244, France 187, and even Greece 167 per square mile. It must be remembered, however, that Turkey is not an industrial or manufacturing country, capable of sustaining a large urban population, but is overwhelmingly agricultural; and, from this point of view, we find that it has a larger population than the United States of America (which has 31), Egypt (31), Russia, Canada, Australia, Brazil, and many other basically agricultural nations. There is reason to infer, therefore, that in respect of population Turkey is actually better off than many other prosperous agricultural nations, and that, but for social factors such as poverty and lack of education, she might face the future with a good deal of confidence.

In a country thus sparsely settled, backward in individual development and manufacturing, anæmic in the health of its state finances and general prosperity, and among the masses untouched by the enlightenment of Western ways and Western

¹ As no complete census has been taken, figures are only approximate. Careful estimates of the British Foreign Office in 1924 give 9,000,000; of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 7,000,000. Lieut.-Col. J. H. M. Cornwall calculates independently 8,000,000. The Turkish official figures, varying from 12,000,000 in 1923 to 13,300,000 in 1925, are untrustworthy, as they are believed to include vilayets now detached from Turkey and do not take into account the large exodus of Christian minorities. While no vital statistics exist in the country, there is stated to be a falling birth-rate; and infant mortality, due to poverty and bad hygienic conditions, is high.

scientific progress, agriculture is the natural source of a primitive, land-loving peasantry. In a country whose good climate and physical variety, whose sheltered coastlands, fertile river valleys, and rich productive soil each contribute to the nation's chief asset, agriculture is naturally the staple industry of the Turkish people. Little change has occurred in agrarian conditions during several thousand years of history, for the native peasantry are the last to feel the fresh breezes of Westernism blowing in from Europe and America; and neither the tempests of the Crusades, with the Western trade which followed in their wake, nor the breezes blowing in like the " imbat " from the Italian Renaissance, nor the invigorating airs of missionary and educational endeavour during the last century have influenced in any serious way the ignorant, simple children of the soil. They are the true conservatives: strict Muslims, following the traditions and customs of their ancestors in every aspect of life, and pursuing their agricultural profession along the same furrows that their ancestors drove a thousand years ago. Wars and rumours of wars have influenced them only slightly, except when they have been drafted off to fight and die in distant campaigns, or when their markets have dwindled and their means have shrunk. Revolutions have swept over the country, and institutions have fallen with a crash; the Sultanate and the Caliphate have been carried away by the ever-rolling stream of history; the Empire of which they were subjects has been dismembered and liquidated; their neighbours of alien nationality have vanished from their midst; the surge of Westernism has swept in through the country like a rising tide; yet the native villagers (köylüler) still plod on in their simple life of toil as they have ever done.

The methods of cultivation which they employ resemble those in use at the dawn of history. A crooked stick tipped with flint and drawn by water-buffalo or oxen is the accepted

plough. Deep ploughing, the use of fertilizers, and the advantages of crop rotation are still unknown. Modern machinery for sowing and reaping is merely an object of curiosity; both tasks are done by hand. There are threshing floors in all the villages, where the grain, brought in by the peasants, is threshed by dragging over it heavy logs of wood studded with flint. The process of winnowing is usually performed by tossing the grain into the air. In the absence of mills, it is a common sight throughout Anatolia to see grain being crushed between stones, and the old disused millstones lie by many a forsaken road where a farmhouse, now deserted, or ruined by fire, once stood. Since the long visitation of war that has blighted the country since 1911, even the peasant who can find the wherewithal to equip his farm has only the smallest oxen, hardly three years old. Such beasts cannot pull a deep plough, and subsoiling is impossible with these weakly creatures. Inexperienced to the yoke, they are difficult to drive; and indeed in the interior of Asia Minor, where horses are never used and where these untrained oxen do the work, the women must help to guide or drive the wayward beasts while the tiller holds the wooden plough.

The problem of agriculture in Turkey is the same as that which has recently engaged the attention of experts in India, and similar improvements are needed. No one realizes this more than the Turkish leaders themselves; and, in the reforms undertaken by the Government under the Republic, the demands of agriculture have had primary consideration. The influence of Western science and progress is here noteworthy, and the improvements so far introduced have been freely borrowed from Europe and America, and not evolved from within. The Government has wisely established eight endowed agricultural schools in various parts of Turkey. These will serve the double purpose of instructing the natives in the use

and application of Western scientific methods and of starting a local investigation into native agricultural problems on their own merits.

The President himself has turned gentleman-farmer, as an example to his fellow-citizens. His farm, near Angora, is intended to become a model not only for all agriculturists in Turkey, but also for any other model farms that may hereafter be established in the country. Besides possessing an ideal site and the advantages of good spring water and proximity to the railway, from which sidings run through the estate, this farm is equipped with a collection of fine buildings, eighteen tractors, six British threshing machines, two motor cars and four camionettes, and other machinery. It is a mixed farm, divided between fruit-growing (with a model canning factory), vegetable and crop raising, and live-stock. The latter includes seventy cows and a number of imported Swiss bulls, five thousand sheep, and numerous specially-selected goats, as well as poultry and bees. Other model farms and agricultural schools, not so highly capitalized or so ambitiously conceived as this one, are doing excellent work in training experts in agricultural science, and are in general directed by a corps of well-educated specialists, many of whom have been trained abroad.

As a result of government interest there is a beginning of better conditions in many parts of Turkey. Especially in the west of Anatolia, where the country is most exposed to Western influences, the condition of agriculture has rapidly improved over a period of two or three years. Agricultural implements and machinery have been introduced, tractors are becoming common, and even mills and factories are being built. Agricultural banks and loan schemes are not only projected but are in actual operation to the advantage of the farmers; and Nature herself has done her utmost in restoring prosperity and production to the devastated country.

Perhaps no greater sign of a new era in agriculture can be found than the progress in the use of modern agricultural methods, and with them, of course, a better knowledge of the science and practice of agriculture in general. Shortly before the Great War, modern implements made their first appearance in Turkey—particularly in the Vilayets of Adana and Smyrna. Steam ploughs, reapers, and a very light metal plough were used with success. Along the line of the Baghdad Railway, which before the War was in German hands, many German implements of various kinds were to be found; while in the Smyrna region the peasants were beginning to use American implements.

Since the War, however, the large German steam-tractors have been replaced by the internal combustion tractor, of the light-wheel type, of French, Italian and American manufacture. Turkish soils are, however, very heavy for the most part and tractors must be sufficiently powered for the heavy work which they have to do. They are used both for field work, in ploughing and pulling reapers and mowers, and for belt work.

During the summer of 1924 more than a hundred Fordson tractors were sold in the cotton belt of the Adana region as against twenty-five the preceding year and three in 1922. In 1924 about thirty big German motor ploughs were sold, as against no sales since before the War. Practically all these tractors are equipped with lights, and in this district, during the season, travellers at night can see on every hand the glare of headlights from the field where the farmers work during the night as well as the day.

The harrow is not considered an essential implement by the Turkish peasant, and when it is used it generally takes the form of a log, sometimes weighted with an extra couple of farm helpers or women sitting on the ends. This log is dragged

by a team of oxen or horses over the ploughed ground. In a few places, the disc-harrow is now used with a tractor or the tooth-harrow drawn by horses.

In the Brusa district, which, together with Smyrna and Adana, is one of the most favoured districts in Turkey from an agricultural point of view, the use of machinery is gradually spreading. Steel ploughs are superseding wooden implements, and a score of motor tractors and a number of threshing machines were in regular use in 1925.

At the close of hostilities there was a real need for power-farming, to meet the emergency created by the deficiency in number of the draft animals left by the War, and by the shortage of man-power; and this emergency has been gradually met, until in 1925 there were some six hundred Fordson tractors in Turkey, and perhaps a hundred and fifty in all of other and larger makes. Naturally the introduction of this amount of traction machinery has led to demands for other kinds, since, if a farmer can plant larger areas than with the simpler or easier traditional methods, he must have machinery with which to harvest, to thresh and even to transport his grain and other crops to the nearest port or railway station.

On the whole, however, the use of machinery, while increasing especially near the port towns, is still very much in arrears, and methods remain primitive. With certainly not more than a thousand tractors of all makes being operated in the country in 1925, it was possible to travel from Constantinople to Adana and perhaps not see a single machine in use, so little had yet been done compared with what there was still to do.

In certain branches of agriculture, of course, Turkey holds a prominent position, and the development of these special products has made rapid strides. The figs of Smyrna, as is

well known, are generally reputed to be the finest in the world ; and an agitation in the English daily press in 1925 has had the good effect of improving the methods of export-packing at the warehouses, in which the sanitary conditions had left much to be desired. The cultivation of tobacco, especially in the Samsun area, has reached a very high level, and in the year 1925 six large foreign tobacco-trading firms established branches there.

The extension of cultivation has been proceeding rapidly in almost all parts of agricultural Turkey. The tobacco crop in 1924 was more than double that of the previous year, and showed a proportionate increase in 1925. The cotton industry has also been making very considerable progress in the Adana district, where the area of ploughed lands in 1923 was only 80,000 dönüms, but in 1924 1,500,000 dönüms, of which 900,000 were under cotton cultivation. In 1925 this crop was attracting attention in Lancashire, and samples tested in England have shown a quality which approximates to Egyptian standards. Throughout 1925 increasing attention was given to Adana cotton ; a well-attended conference was held on the spot for the purpose of studying its growth and production ; the Government took an active interest, and promised aid to the producers, while the use of agricultural machinery was facilitated by bank loans. A Manchester firm has built a large ginnery near Adana, which will reduce the cost of cleaning the cotton. Railway facilities and port facilities at Mersina have been improved, so as to give Adana a better economic outlet. In other districts, like Brusa, the cultivation of rice, as well as wheat or barley, is being extended every year ; and the olive output has shown a very notable increase in the last year or two.

Apart from these specialized forms of agriculture, the ordinary farming of the Turk has not hitherto been on a high

level. With the handicaps of ignorance and primitive methods, with his inherent conservatism and distrust of reform, and with the disturbing effect of wars, general agriculture has been depressed. The Turkish farmer has shown apathy because of the uncertainty caused by the wandering bands of brigands who were liable at any moment to descend upon a village and to rob it of its wealth. He has been oppressed by that antiquated tax, the tithe, which bore with unequal severity upon the peasants, and which was frequently used by the tax farmers as a means of exerting blackmail or of avenging personal spites. He has been handicapped by the very defective system of communications, which made it quite unprofitable for a man to try to cultivate a larger crop than he needed for his personal use and than he could dispose of easily in the immediate neighbourhood. To some extent the Republic has brought relief from these disadvantages. The brigands have now been stamped out with a strong hand, by means of a reorganized gendarmerie. At the cost of a very great sacrifice to the public revenues the tithe has been abolished, partly to bring economic relief to the farmer and partly as a political measure. The Government is devoting as much money as it can possibly spare to the task of improving communications, whether by road, sea, air or railway, so that the discouragements to the farmer's enterprise are slowly being removed and the economic difficulties with respect to agriculture are being lessened.

A more serious problem has been that of finance. Money is continually required to finance harvesting and the movement of produce to market centres. The peasants themselves are impoverished and have no reserve of capital. Dealers and merchants in the towns finance farmers to the extent that their means will permit, but money is scarce, credit is restricted, and commercial confidence has not sufficiently revived to

permit of capital flowing in from abroad. The railway companies have stepped into the breach wonderfully, and have given the farmers much valuable assistance, at the same time obtaining for the railways themselves a correspondingly increased amount of business. Certain companies have opened up admirable policies of land development by distributing free seed to all the farmers along the line who ask for it, this seed to be paid for, in money or kind, after the first harvest; by transporting all farm machinery at half the cost of freightage; by sending out inspectors and experts free of charge to the farmers; and by facilitating by reduced charges the distribution and purchase of petrol, oil and motor fuel used for agricultural purposes. Yet it is the Government, notwithstanding a depleted national treasury and the loss of the tithe revenue, that has done most to help agriculture, not merely by passing beneficent laws and reforms, but by giving financial support to the needy Anatolian peasant, by the gratuitous distribution of seed and agricultural machinery, by encouraging the formation of co-operative societies, and by establishing an agricultural bank along the lines followed by so many agrarian countries of Europe to-day. Unquestionably the Republican *régime* is showing courage and good-will in grappling with the tremendous task of agricultural development; and much of the obvious improvement in recent years is to be credited to its direct efforts, when full allowance has been made for political stability, the hard work of the farmer, and the advantages of a favourable soil and climate. In this connection, we must examine the Government's policy in regard to railway development.

Before a country like Turkey, extensive in area, broken and disunited in physical formation, and sparsely settled with a meagre population of backward peasants, can profit from her great natural resources, her agriculture and industry and trade,

one facility above all others is essential. That facility is means of transportation, the economic artery through which the life-blood of a nation courses. The necessary link between the producing areas of the world and the highways of international commerce is that of internal communications, and upon the efficiency of this link the profitable exploitation of the latent wealth of a country depends.

That this is apparent to the Turkish leaders is indicated by the fact that railway construction is being pursued in earnest by the Kemalist Government. Owing to lack of national funds, and of native experience and training, the work of railway development has hitherto fallen to foreigners; and almost all the lines constructed have been concessions to foreign companies which in some cases only consented to embark on these speculative enterprises upon conditions onerous to the Ottoman Treasury. These foreign railways were most highly developed in the flourishing agricultural districts of the western and south-eastern lowlands of Anatolia, where British, French and German lines were constructed to tap the remunerative resources of the grain, fruit and cotton bearing districts lying between Panderma and Smyrna and between Constantinople and Adana. Most of these lines have prospered well, and even the devastation caused by the Græco-Turkish War of 1919-22 has not materially injured their prospects.¹ Certainly those districts to which the railways have penetrated have

¹ The British "Imperial Ottoman Railway" from Smyrna to Aidin and beyond (the oldest railway in Turkey) showed in its report for the half-year ending 31 December, 1924, an increase of twelve-and-a-half per cent in gross receipts over the corresponding second half-year of 1923, while expenses showed a decrease of five per cent. The increase in receipts was the result chiefly of a higher tonnage of general goods traffic, which increased nearly sixteen per cent and indicated a rapid recovery of production in the devastated interior, as well as an increasing resort to railway transportation in place of the traditional camel caravans.

profited greatly and have become conspicuously productive in the space of a very few years. Since the conclusion of hostilities in the country, railway building has progressed steadily and continues to open up new regions and to connect important centres. Most of the building since the beginning of the Republic has been carried on by Turkish engineers with native labour, and is being financed more and more by the Turkish Treasury as far as possible, on account of the reluctance of the Nationalist Government to accept foreign financial aid or to accord to concession holders such terms as they used to obtain. The Administration of the Kemalist Government must be given due credit for its praiseworthy interest in the economic advancement of the country through up-to-date means of transportation, and for its enterprise in executing as zealously as it is able the official programme of road and railway building. Though in some parts of Anatolia Turkey will be faced with those difficulties through which other underpopulated countries like Canada have passed, and though the physical impediments to surveying and engineering and the existence of unproductive or unpeopled stretches will act as detriments, the country seems on the whole to be pushing forward its railway schemes in a steady and commendable way. The Western traveller, of course, will find the existing railways full of obvious defects: slow journeys, irregular train services, roundabout routes and poor accommodation; but these are drawbacks which increasing experience and prosperity will smooth out in due course.

A non-economic motive also underlies the constructional programme of the Government, and this may be mentioned here, since it has a favourable reaction on economic life as well. The military strength of a country depends predominantly upon the mobility of its forces and the accessibility of its frontiers from the military centre of gravity; and, as a chain

has the strength of its weakest link, so the defensive power of a nation may be gauged by its means of communication. The military importance of railway trunk-lines was recognized by Germany in her ambition to reach the Persian Gulf; and the history of the *Drang nach Osten* might be written in terms of railway development in the Near and Middle East. In the alignment of the Anatolian and Baghdad Railway Systems, strategic considerations came first and economic considerations came second.

With the break-up of the Ottoman dominions, the continuity of this German system was destroyed; yet Turkey retained the whole of the Anatolian Railway and all those sections of the Baghdad Railway which had been completed, except for a break on either side of Aleppo, where the line now runs through the mandated territory of Syria. The Anatolian Railway has been the main artery of communication in Turkey during and since the Great War. The local railways based on the western littoral were more useful for commercial and economic purposes; but the chief military route was the trunk-line (mostly single track) running from Haydar Pasha on the Bosphorus (opposite Constantinople) to Qonyah and carried on by the Baghdad Railway through the Taurus Tunnel to Cilicia and through the Amanus Tunnel to the Syrian frontier. This Anatolian Railway, which until the Armistice was under German management, possesses an important branch line, running directly eastward from Eski Shehr to Angora, while at Afium Qarahisar it makes a junction with the French Railway running to Smyrna. On the other hand, there are no railways in central or eastern Anatolia or anywhere near the Turkish Black Sea coast.

The strategic handicap of this deficiency has been severely felt by Turkey not only in the campaigns against Russia on the Caucasian front during the Great War, but in the Græco-

Turkish War of 1919-22. The perilous position of the Turkish Nationalist forces marooned in the far interior of Turkey during the first Greek campaign of 1920, when the single railway line to Angora was first threatened by the enemy, was convincing evidence of the military need for more extensive railway communications. As has been pointed out, the Greeks desired nothing so much as to gain control of this one artery, and the second and third campaigns were largely struggles to secure control of the Angora line and thereby obtain a stranglehold upon the capital itself. The very choice of Angora as the seat of the Nationalist Government, in preference to Sivas or Erzerum, was due chiefly to the strategic advantages of the railway connection. Finally, a further indication of Turkey's dependence on railways for military purposes is shown in the mobilization and movement of troops in the Spring of 1925 to Kurdistan, to quell the Kurdish insurrection in the eastern provinces. Where railways failed, the effective massing of troops in a country in which roads were either non-existent or were made impassable by winter snows, was almost impossible, and accordingly three months or more were required to crush a dangerous rebellion within the national frontiers.

As a result of the obvious need for better means of internal communication, every effort has been made since the inauguration of the present *régime* to extend the railway system further into hitherto inaccessible parts of the country. The Government has shown considerable activity in respect of new construction. Work on both the Samsun-Sivas line from the Black Sea, and the Angora-Sivas line, eastward from the capital, the junction of which at Sivas would open up an important new trunk-line, has proceeded steadily under Turkish direction and engineering; and the Government is determined to complete this difficult undertaking as rapidly as possible.

Other extension lines, mostly of a light-railway narrow-gauge type, have been in course of construction, chiefly in the East, where hitherto means of communication did not exist, and where, from a military as well as from an economic point of view, accessibility is most important. The Anatolian Railway has been given a great many necessary repairs and valuable improvements. In fact, the Kemal Government has staked much on the successful prosecution of a constructional programme of great value to the country; and, if the economic recovery of the country proceeds normally, future years will record a steady progress of railway construction in the interior, which has been as seriously handicapped by the absence of railways as Persia is to-day or as Iraq was until the British occupation.

CHAPTER XIV

COMMERCE, INDUSTRY AND FINANCE

AMONG the Turks themselves, there is a wide-spread feeling that, if Turkey is to become a prosperous country, able to take rank with the countries of Europe, she cannot rest content with agriculture, even highly developed agriculture. Agricultural production may be stimulated, and this may make it possible for the country to support a larger population than at present, and to sustain this increased population at a higher standard of comfort, material civilization and culture than it has yet known. Farming may produce a national revenue by the export of food to the four corners of the world. The soil may continue, as it has done in the past, to breed a race of straightforward, plain-living peasants; but no modern power of any importance derives its wealth and strength from agriculture alone. The industrial revolution ended that possibility. The great nations of to-day are the manufacturing and commercial nations, and industry has taken the place of agriculture as the governing economic activity. Even in Canada and the United States, still pre-eminently agricultural though they are, the national prosperity is marching in step with the commercial or industrial advance. The Turks are eager to set their feet on the same path—and this is very human, though whether it is altogether wise is another question. As they see it, the manufacturing industry creates wealth more quickly than a farm; and so long as Turkey is not likely to be threatened within any measurable period of time by the rural de-population problem, and so long as her national finances remain as slender as they are to-day, in their belief she will retard her advance towards science and civilization if she concentrates too exclusively upon the encouragement of agriculture.

In this belief, the Government has turned its face to non-

agricultural aspects of economic progress, and has given considerable attention to the needs of trade and commerce, in the same spirit in which it has worked for the promotion of agriculture. In this field, Angora was faced with the gigantic problem created by the removal of almost all the Greek, Armenian and other non-Turkish minorities which had woven the warp of commerce into the woof of Turkish agriculture in the economic fabric of the old Ottoman Empire. The principal business elements of the country were gone; the wealthy merchants had carried off or lost their capital; the factories were ruined; skilled labour had almost disappeared. Therein lay the greatest grounds for pessimism in the Turkish outlook. Industry had to be nursed back to life, and protected in convalescence from malign forces or harmful impediments. It had to be nurtured at a time when the Government had no resources, or almost none, and when the administrators themselves were not business men, but soldiers. They handicapped themselves further by their fundamental policy of ruling out foreign financial assistance. Knowing the abuses to which the Capitulations had led, they had abolished the system; and, remembering their long servitude to previous Western concessionnaires and bondholders, they were thoroughly suspicious of would-be investors and discouraged them by the stringency of the safeguards which they demanded. The Government of Angora preferred national impoverishment to the sacrifice of their newly-won economic and fiscal independence; and while this policy retarded the economic growth of Turkey, it was probably not unwise during the first few years of the Republic's existence. It not only preserved the nation from outside bondage, from financial obligations and debt, and from the interference of foreign bondholders. It created a national sense of self-dependence and self-help, and, if it could succeed, it was

calculated to win the respect of other nations. If Turkey under a multitude of handicaps could lift herself out of the financial morass by her own efforts, that would prove her strength. There were the examples of Egypt under British financial control, of Persia under American financial control, and of several states of Europe under the financial control of the League of Nations, and there was the case of Turkey herself in the past, when she had ceded six sources of public revenue to the Council of the Ottoman Public Debt. These controls had produced striking material results, but they were offensive to national pride and possibly debilitating to national *moral*.

The new Turkish Government resorted to the nationalization of a number of industries on a monopoly basis.— Salt had long been a Government monopoly, but this had been one of the revenues ceded to the Ottoman Public Debt in 1881. More recently the Government has taken over as a state monopoly the tobacco industry (formerly ceded to the Public Debt and leased by them to the Régie Ottomane des Tabacs), the match industry, and the cigarette-paper industry; and is heavily subsidizing the sugar industry of 'Ushaq with an eye to the establishment of a monopoly later on. During 1925 the Government also assumed the supervision of the manufacture and sale of alcohol and alcoholic beverages. By all these means a certain additional revenue is obtained for the national treasury without the disadvantage of foreign control. Other measures have been passed, giving economic relief to industry. A law providing remission of taxation upon material for the installation of factories and other industrial concerns was revised; and, with a view to encouraging industry, factories have been exempted from *temettu* (professional tax) and from the real property tax. Part of the credit voted to the Ministry of Commerce is being allotted to the assisting of certain

important industries such as the sugar factory at 'Ushaq above-mentioned, five factories for canning vegetables, a paper factory, a porcelain factory, an olive-oil factory at Aivali (Kydhonies), a textile factory at Adana, and a jute factory at Qastamuni. Parallel with the institution of an Agricultural Bank is the recent creation in Constantinople, with branches distributed in all the important centres, of a Banque Turque pour le Commerce et l'Industrie, which will occupy itself with all kinds of banking business, but especially with the financing of industrial and commercial undertakings. Thus, with only a tiny amount of the budget (1.5 per cent in 1925; 1.7 per cent in 1926) devoted to commerce and industry, the economic development along these lines is making as much headway as such limited funds allow. The intentions are good, but when over half the state revenue is devoted to the interest and amortization of the Public Debt and to the Ministry of War, the constructive and productive services have to be starved in proportion.

Drastic changes in the system of taxation were introduced in Turkey at the opening of the year 1926¹ and offer some hope that the Government may henceforth find a better means of raising its necessary revenue and of financing the domestic reforms which are so needful. The demands for fiscal reform were made more pressing by the cost of putting down the Kurdish revolt of 1925, which ran to the figure of twenty million Turkish pounds; of compensating the large number of small turban and fez manufacturers and traders who had been hit by the adoption of the new hat; of pushing forward railway construction; and of subsidizing and endowing industry, beginning with spinning and weaving, on a scheme which is being put into operation by the Government. The Government will have also to budget for the Turkish share of

¹ "Fiscal Reform in Turkey" (*Manchester Guardian*, 2 January, 1926).

the Ottoman Public Debt, on which so far the Republic has defaulted. To meet these budgetary charges, a new fiscal system is being introduced—based on a close study of Western methods—which is expected to increase the normal state revenue by 60 million Turkish pounds yearly. The new reforms include the revision of the *temettu* or professional tax with its inequitable incidence, which is to be replaced by a graduated income tax of a modern kind. Declaration of incomes and revelation of balance-sheets are, it is reported, to be enforced, and the old comfortable habit of keeping two sets of books—one for the inspection of the authorities and the other for the careful use of the business—is to be eradicated. Death duties are introduced for the first time. Other taxes on the Western model are a heavy amusement tax, a general consumption tax, a domestic animal tax, and further State monopolies on lamp oil, alcohol, sugar and their derivatives. These new taxes are hoped to produce a considerable increase in the national revenue provided that the tax-payers are not already too greatly impoverished and that businesses are not overburdened with government taxes just when they need all their resources for the struggle to keep afloat.

Trade and industry have suffered, not only financially, but also psychologically, by the removal of the capital to Angora. Constantinople has been to the commerce of Turkey what London is to the commerce of Great Britain; but the city on the Bosphorus has an even greater importance, by virtue of its unparalleled geographical position. It stands at the meeting point of two seas, and it is the bridge-head, both in the remote past and in the near future, of two continents—for although the network of Roman roads has disappeared, it has been replaced by a network of modern railways, and there is talk of either a tunnel or a bridge to make a direct railway connection between Europe and Asia. In commerce, as in religion, in

society, in the arts and in education, Constantinople is the great city and centre linking East and West as the Galata Bridge links the local Western and Oriental communities.

The importance of Constantinople to Turkey is obvious. Such a religious, strategic, political and commercial centre can nowhere else be found in the world; and it has with good reason excited the covetousness of many nations. Turkey all but lost it, both during and after the Great War; and the firm recovery of Constantinople was one of the chief triumphs of the Treaty of Lausanne. Because of its royalist and reactionary tendencies, the city is suspected by the Republican Government; yet because of its historical significance and its magnificent commercial advantages it has been revindicated by the Turkish Nationalists with passionate determination.

Nevertheless, for political motives already explained in an earlier chapter, the new Nationalist Government broke away from the past by withdrawing from the Golden Horn to the remote interior at Angora, and what was in the beginning a strategic move became a political step of vast significance to the future of the country. The influence of Angora upon the Nationalist movement and upon the people of Anatolia has been indicated elsewhere; but in our consideration of economic forces we must refer to Angora again.

The removal of the capital to that outlandish spot, if politically justifiable, has proved to be economically questionable. Seldom has the political Government of a state been so completely divorced from the commercial life of the country. Even two years after the establishment of the Republic the President had not paid a visit to Constantinople, the head if not the heart of his country. The result of this aloofness has been apparent.

Constantinople, shunned by the President, neglected by the Government, mismanaged by the prefects who were put in and

out of office in rapid succession, sank into a distinct decline. First the Court with all its dependents vanished; then the Caliphate with its religious *entourage* vanished; then the Œcumenical Patriarchate at the Phanar almost closed its shutters; even the Embassies began to move part of their establishments to Angora; and a gloom in strange contrast to its former splendour settled over the place. Worse still, Constantinople began to lose its trade, partly owing to the political loss of the European provinces of the Ottoman Empire west of the Maritsa and partly owing to the paralysis in the foreign trade of Russia.

"The Government," observes Lieut.-Col. P. G. Elgood, "clinging to Angora, a barren and inhospitable town in the heart of Asia Minor, watches unconcernedly the declining prosperity of the Bosphorus. Its municipal services are fairly well maintained. Trams are clean and observe their time-table, and no less may be said of the steamers which serve villages on either bank of the Bosphorus. The main streets are kept refreshingly free from touts and beggars. In this respect, indeed, the City has profited rather than suffered from a military occupation, and a visitor at first is agreeably surprised at the orderliness of life.

But closer study promotes a different conclusion. Shabby apparel, pinched and listless faces mark the condition of the people. The Government, striving to avoid bankruptcy, have ruthlessly docked their wage bill, and employers of labour have followed suit. With straightened means all classes of society have a hard struggle to support existence, and in the contest the honest citizen goes to the wall. Taxation is intolerably heavy, or would be so, did not every man and woman seize opportunity to evade payment. There are other signs of decay. No one builds new houses, no one repairs the old. Trade is waning, poverty increasing. Ocean-going craft no longer fill the port, and bankers hesitate to give credit to new customers."¹

Such reports of the decline of Constantinople have been coming in thick and fast from residents as well as travellers, during the past two years, and a composite picture of gloom and despair could be constructed from them. Such is the state of affairs in the former capital that to many observers it seems comparable to the post-war collapse of Vienna; and

¹ Lieut.-Col. P. G. Elgood in *The Egyptian Gazette*, 2 June, 1925.

Constantinople is in reality in a very unhappy condition, though the latest reports of all indicate the modest beginnings of recovery.

On the other hand, the growing prosperity and activity in Angora is remarked on all sides. Even in two years the progress has been noteworthy and gives grounds for optimism. Building goes on apace; modern machinery, a number of factories, a bakery, a flour mill, a power station, have appeared; drainage and water supply are being attended to; anti-malarial measures are being actively enforced; places of amusement are being erected; and several embassies and ambassadorial residences have been transferred to the new capital. Angora is at present in the "awkward age," but it is unquestionably in the "growing age" as well. The absurdities of its transformation are apparent, the odd mixing of new and old. It is full of the glaring contrasts inseparable from a period of transition, and a strange assortment of Eastern effects with very modern European products and customs is in evidence. Nevertheless, the change proceeds rapidly, and the new capital quickly takes modern form.

The significance of this shifting of the centre of gravity of national life from Constantinople to Angora is important, and perhaps explains much in the recent history of Modern Turkey. In the uplands of Anatolia, the leaders were cut off from the commercial life of the sea-port city, and, in their isolation, they handicapped the economic development of their country by parochial and often unenlightened policies. Away in the interior they were far removed from that "whispering gallery of Europe," and on several occasions they were seriously hindered in policy and negotiation by their lack of contact with the chancelleries of Europe and the inefficiency of their means of communication with their own plenipotentiaries abroad.

On the other hand, their very isolation has helped the Men

of Angora to maintain the ideals of independence and freedom which were essential to their programme of revolution. They were ignorant often of commercial and economic needs, but they steered their country clear of economic complications and international indebtedness. They let Constantinople sink into the position of a provincial sea-port town, but their total export trade (an increasing volume) from Smyrna, Mersina and all other sea-ports encouraged a wider-spread and better-distributed production than the country had known before. Finally, Angora was felt to stand for the national ideals of character: determination, simplicity, strength. Power had been transferred from an effete and self-indulgent ruling class in the old capital to a group of revolutionaries at Angora, who, in the deadly dulness of a provincial town, found no temptations to distract them from the hard work to which they had set their hands.

The decline of Constantinople has also coincided with the weakening of the Council of the Ottoman Public Debt—an important and justly celebrated international financial organization which, from 1881 down to the cataclysm of 1911-23, had administered a portion of the Ottoman public revenues with beneficial results, not only for the bondholders but for the Ottoman treasury and also for the general economic progress and well-being of the Ottoman Empire. It was natural that the Men of Angora should look with hostility upon an institution which represented a standing international servitude upon Turkish national independence in the financial sphere, and which, in the circumstances of its origin, was a reminder of the joint corruption of the old Ottoman *régime* and of the Western adventurers who had exploited it in its latter days. At the same time, this sentimental hostility in the Turkish Nationalists' minds ought to be counteracted by more rational considerations. While reminiscent of pre-

vious corruption, the Council of the Debt stood in itself for an honourable and a remarkably successful effort at financial reform. The harm done to the Ottoman Empire by its Western creditors between 1854 and 1881 had in large measure been atoned for by the constructive work of the Debt Council between 1881 and 1914; and, finally, the bonds had not only been scaled down and consolidated, but (after their rehabilitation) had largely changed hands in the ordinary operations of the stock-market, so that the bondholders of 1926 could not be held personally accountable for the possible dishonesty of the original bondholders (or, rather, of the issuers of the original loans). Apart from this moral aspect of the case, it is not good financial policy, on a long and un sentimental view, for the Turkish Republican Government to repudiate a composition of such long standing, which was voluntarily entered into at the beginning by its predecessor the Ottoman Government, and which was confirmed in principle (with the modifications necessitated by changed conditions) in the Lausanne Treaty to which the Angora Government has set its seal. It is to be expected that, as the period of war and revolution recedes and the tension of national feeling subsides, the statesmen at Angora will more and more feel the force of these considerations. In the meantime, the Council of the Ottoman Debt, like other private foreign institutions in the new Turkey,¹ is passing through a period of considerable difficulty and anxiety.

The circumstances in which the Ottoman Pre-War Debt was contracted have been indicated in Chapter II. During the reigns of Sultans 'Abdu'l-Mejid (1839-61) and 'Abdu'l-'Aziz (1861-76), the light-heartedness with which the Ottoman Government borrowed from certain Western financiers

¹ *E.g.*, the foreign educational institutions, of which some account is given below.

funds which were mostly swallowed up in unremunerative expenditure was equalled by the alacrity with which those gentlemen raised loans for a country with such vast potential resources, such a magnificent geographical position, and such an ignorant and incompetent Government. These bad habits were formed in the green leaf, between the Crimean War and the events of 1875-78. The nemesis of bankruptcy came in the dry, after the disastrous conclusion of the Russo-Turkish War, when the total debt, including arrears of interest, was reckoned at over £250,000,000 sterling. The final composition was negotiated between the Ottoman Government and the representatives of the foreign bondholders in 1881, and was embodied in the decree of the 28th Muharrem (20 December) of that year. A permanent Council of Foreign Bondholders was formed out of the Anglo-Dutch, French, German, Austro-Hungarian and Italian Groups, and to this Council the Ottoman Government handed over the absolute administration, collection and control of "six indirect contributions"—that is, the revenues from tobacco, salt, wines and spirits, commercial stamps, certain fisheries and the silk-tithe in certain provinces. The Debt Council's administration of these revenues during the next thirty years was able and enlightened, with the result that the revenues came to yield a substantial surplus for the Government itself after the service of the debt (on the reduced scale agreed) had been met; while the salt, silk and tobacco industries were scientifically fostered to the general economic advantage of the country.

The events of 1911 to 1923 prejudiced the activities and the status of the Debt Council in several ways. In the first place, the vast transfers of territory from Turkey to other states—as measured by the difference between the area of the Ottoman Empire in 1911 and the area of the Turkish Republic under the Lausanne Treaty—involved, according to an accepted

principle of international law, the transference to the " successor states " of a fair proportion of pre-war Ottoman indebtedness. The question of what was fair in the circumstances was complicated and contentious, and it was aggravated by the question of arrears, for even the re-apportionment of debt necessitated by the territorial changes of 1913 was not taken in hand definitely until the Lausanne Conference. Moreover, after the signature of the Lausanne Treaty by almost all the parties concerned, a formidable aftermath of unsettled points remained. Apart from the question of apportionment, it was evident that, in transferred territories, the Debt Council could not insist upon securing the receipt of annuities due to it by the direct administration of certain sources of revenue on the principle of the Muharrem Decree. This basis of collection, which was repugnant to the modern Western concept of sovereignty, would never be accepted by Governments not juridically bound to it (as the Turkish Government was) by their own act in the past. Under the Lausanne Treaty, the assignment of adequate security by the " successor states " concerned was left over for arrangement between their Governments and the Debt Council. This provision was bound to affect the attitude of the Angora Government, with its ardent championship of Turkish National sovereignty and its fundamental claim that Turkey should be released from all international servitudes that differentiated her status, to her disadvantage, from that of other independent countries. The new Turkish Nationalism was an even greater difficulty for the Debt Council than the apportionment problem. The Council's position was weakened still further by the breach in its solidarity which had been produced by the Great War. During the War, the Council was naturally represented at Constantinople only by the German and Austro-Hungarian interests, which showed themselves as accommodating as

possible to the Ottoman Government for political reasons. After the Armistice of 30 October, 1918, on the other hand, when the representatives of the Allied interests were restored to the Council, those of the German and Austro-Hungarian interests were ejected, and this ejection was confirmed in the Lausanne Treaty (Art. 56).

The present situation is as follows. Under the terms of the Lausanne Treaty, about 40 per cent of the pre-war Ottoman Debt remains apportioned to the Turkish Republic. On the other hand, the Debt Council has gradually lost its control *de facto* over the sources of revenue ceded to it *de jure* by the Decree of Muharrem. The Angora Government laid hands on the revenues in the territories under its power during the Græco-Turkish War of 1919-22, when Angora was at open breach both with the Ottoman Government at Constantinople (which had originally promulgated the Decree of Muharrem) and with the Allied Powers (whose nationals were now almost exclusively represented on the Council of the Debt). The process was carried further after the Mudania Armistice and was finally completed after the signature of the Lausanne Treaty. At the same time, the Turkish Republic has not only bound itself in this Treaty to accept responsibility for its proportionate share of the pre-war Ottoman Debt, but does not seem ever to have expressly repudiated, or claimed not to be bound by, the Decree of Muharrem. In short, Angora has refrained from challenging the rights of the Debt Council in principle, but has contested or suspended them in practice almost entirely.

The sentimental and practical objections, from the Turkish point of view, to re-assuming the old burden in the old form are evident. No doubt the Debt Council could overcome the sentimental objections by suggesting some scheme of collection less derogatory to Turkish national sovereignty than the

present. The practical burden remains ; and, like all young countries with great economic ambitions which they are impatient to realize, the Turkish Republic resents being handicapped by having to pay off past debts for which the present generation feels no moral responsibility. Sooner or later, however, Turkish public opinion will probably come to see the wisdom of meeting its legal obligations faithfully in respect of the Ottoman Debt from the point of view of self-interest. The new Turkey badly needs money for railways, roads and other public works, and can hardly raise it except by loans in London or New York; and a permanent deliberate refusal to meet its acknowledged existing legal obligations would be fatal to its chances of obtaining new credits abroad. The new system of taxation mentioned above, together with the gradual economic development of the country, may make it possible to shoulder the inherited burden of debt without unduly weighing down the Budget. As it is, the Ottoman Debt undoubtedly imposes a formidable burden on the Republic, but this is not a burden that can be thrown off high-handedly with credit—in either sense of that word.

It remains to mention the Régie Impériale Co-intéressée des Tabacs Ottomans, to which the Ottoman Government had conceded an absolute monopoly of the manufacture, purchase and sale of tobacco in 1884, by arrangement with the Debt Council, to which the tobacco revenue had been ceded by the Decree of Muharrem. The control which the Régie was empowered to exercise over the private growers was felt to be oppressive and came to be strongly resented ; but the financial benefits of the Régie both to the Debt Council and to the Ottoman treasury were so considerable that the concession was prolonged from 1913 to 1925. Meanwhile, the public opinion represented by the tobacco-growing peasantry had more effect on the Republican Government than it had had on the old

Imperial Government—especially as the peasants' dislike of the Régie happened to coincide with the theoretical objections of the Nationalist politicians. On 1 March, 1925, the concession to the Régie was wound up, and the working of the monopoly was resumed by a special department of the Government. The motive of this withdrawal of the concession was not simply that the Régie was an institution of the hated *ancien régime*, nor that it was a privately-owned foreign concern exercising a somewhat oppressive power over the tobacco growers, nor that the cancelled Capitulations no longer protected this foreign company, but that the Government was convinced, rightly or wrongly, that the profits earned by the Régie could be diverted entirely to the National Treasury, and this, if feasible, would help materially to lift Turkish finances out of the morass into which they have been sinking over a long period of years.

Prosperity in Western countries comes from industry and commerce. It is like a plant in that it needs a suitable atmosphere, a good soil, and sufficient nourishment. Turkish prosperity depends on an atmosphere of peace and security; on freedom from outside intervention; on a favourable geographical position and abundance of natural resources, both of which it possesses *par excellence*; and on those three essentials of production—capital, labour, initiative.

Since the settlements of Mudania in 1922 and of Lausanne in 1923, Turkey has enjoyed unwonted peace and freedom from interference. As will be shown elsewhere, two external problems only have lately disturbed the general tranquillity of the country: the Kurdish insurrection of 1925 and the Mosul controversy. Turkey's geographical position on the land-bridge between Europe and Asia offers possibilities of a great commercial future, and her latent natural resources are considerable; but at present she lacks the three other essentials: labour, capital and native skill. Of the first,

mention has already been made. Nevertheless, the population per square mile is greater than that of the United States of America; sanitation and hygiene, though still rudimentary, will improve as Westernization proceeds, and will diminish the death-rate; and the conclusion of a cycle of perpetual wars may in the near future permit an increasing birth-rate by releasing men for marriage and domestic life.¹

Capital has been scarce for three reasons. First, continual war has drained the country completely of financial reserves; in fact, the Turkish State has always seemed to exist on a deficit. Secondly, political instability and insecurity of life and property, and the removal of the Capitulations, have kept away money which might otherwise have been invested in Turkey. Thirdly, the Kemalist Government, fearing the internal control exercised by foreign capitalists and investors, has not been inclined to admit foreign capital except on unattractive conditions. Nevertheless, peace will bring an opportunity for internal economy and financial rehabilitation. The political stability of the country, if it can be fairly well assured, promises to attract money as it has been doing gradually during the past three years. The restrictions on foreign capital are growing less, as the Angora Government grows more confident and more experienced in working out satisfactory financial safeguards.

It may take longer to acquire the native ingenuity and skill which used to be almost a monopoly of the Greek and Armenian minorities, but there is no reason, physiological or psychological, why the Turks should not acquire it, given technical education and economic opportunity. The technical education is rapidly becoming available through the commercial, agricultural and other technical schools which are

¹ The recent discouragement of polygamy will probably have the effect of increasing, not diminishing, the birth-rate.

springing up throughout the country. Opportunity has been provided by the departure of the foreign elements. A clear road for commercial, technical, professional and agricultural enterprise lies before the Turkish people, and they have already entered upon it. Whether or not they possess the initiative and the energy to keep up the pace is still unknown. At present they are fired with the enthusiasm of their new Nationalism. It remains to be seen whether the effort is maintained as the abnormal tension produced by prolonged war and revolution relaxes, leaving temporary lassitude in its place.

CHAPTER XV

SOCIAL AND CULTURAL QUESTIONS

THE Revolution of 1919-22 in Turkey has not only wrought a political transformation and stimulated economic progress ; it has also set up a rapid social evolution, which is advancing with such momentum that no one can yet venture to predict the consequences. This social development is undoubtedly the outcome of a much longer and less spectacular period of ferment dating from the Young Turk revolution of 1908-9, during which Western ways and ideals were introduced pell-mell into a country scarcely beginning to awake from a long torpor. The inrush of new ideas was too rapid then to be assimilated, but the intellectual ferment had begun. The leavening took a long time, though it was hastened by the heat of a war with the West ; but latterly the social changes have been taking outward and visible form with great rapidity.

It may be said that social change is the true indication of the reality of revolution. Monarchs may fall, governments may pass, politics may rattle and flare like thunder and lightning, and yet the people may remain unaffected in their daily life. Economic forces may bring ruin or prosperity to a country, may subject it to the control of foreign bondholders, or blight it with unproductiveness, or again may raise it to national prosperity and affluence, and yet the common people may feel little difference. When, however, revolution or evolution brings with it social changes, better education, new opportunities, fairer conditions of life, juster laws and social measures, then it may be said that revolution has struck deep and made a permanent mark. The true significance of the French Revolution was not political, for the fall of one monarchy made room for another, and political institutions changed their form rather than their spirit. The true revolution was a social

transformation, bringing new ideas of education, of liberty, of fraternity, of nationalism, and offering the individual wider opportunities. In Turkey, too, social changes of this kind are discernible.

The increasing momentum of reform under the enlightened despotism of Mustafā Kemāl Pasha has many characteristics of a Renaissance. Seldom has a more rapid transformation been wrought upon the face of a nation than in the new Turkey. A revolutionary zeal descended upon the President as he took the reins of power, and he drove like the wind. Sultan and Sultanate were already gone, swept away by the decision of the Great National Assembly. Caliph and Caliphate next fell before the blast, and were driven forth to find lodgement outside Turkey, if anywhere. The Medresehs or ecclesiastical seminaries were confiscated for State purposes, and their vast properties and endowments made over to the national treasury. Later, the Dervish orders and all similar religious corporations were abolished in the campaign against reaction. Their *tekkehs* and monasteries, like the schools, were appropriated for government purposes and converted into secular educational institutions. Missionary activity was suppressed and Christian Millets abolished. The Capitulations had been repudiated in 1914 and a second time at the Conference of Lausanne, and the economic privileges of foreigners were reduced to unimportance. The women were unveiled, and the women's screen in trams and theatres and public places was done away with. For the men the fez, which had been as distinctive a national headdress as the women's veil, was abolished, and with it all the ancient fashions of salutation and salaam. Persian and Arabic words and phrases were being banished from Turkish literature, and even the name of "Ottoman" was discarded in the general holocaust of ancient social possessions. The fires of iconoclasm burnt hot, destroy-

ing the harem, the eunuch system, polygamy, as well as certain more genuinely Islamic institutions. The Prophet's mantle and sword were relegated to the museum of antiquities, and the palaces of the Sultans were nationalized. Even the Muslim Friday has been discarded in favour of the Christian Sunday as the weekly day of rest, the calendar and the religious holidays have been revised and Westernized, and the old festivals are vanishing. So this destructive policy of the Angora Government goes on under the iconoclastic influence of Mustafā Kemāl Pasha. Everything reminiscent of the *ancien régime* must go; everything that outwardly connects the new Republic by the most tenuous thread with the traditions of the Ottoman Empire is being swept away, with as clean-sweeping a broom as the Bolsheviks have used in obliterating all outward traces of the Russian Czardom.

Yet a nation cannot live on a purely negative and destructive policy. Mustafā Kemāl is not unaware of this, and accordingly he turns his attention to introducing new measures and new manners and customs of a positive character. The emancipation of women came first, and perhaps too rapidly. The prohibition of alcoholic liquor was tried for a year, but proved an impracticable experiment and was abolished. State monopolies and nationalized industries are taking the place of private enterprise; foreign financial and commercial aid is being rejected in favour of native Turkish effort, though the latter is still notoriously lacking in skill or ability. Most important of all, education is being reformed and promoted with a genuine eagerness.

Those who are accustomed to judge a nation's degree of enlightenment and the state of its intellectual progress by its educational development will find much to interest them in Turkey. Here there has existed for generations a strange mixture of East and West, of old and new. The old Qur'anic

schools have trained Turkish boys, as they train Arab boys still, in the language if not the meaning of the Islamic scriptures. Hitherto, these schools attached to the mosques have provided most of the popular education of the Turkish people, while private elementary schools under the Millet System have trained the Armenian and Greek and Jewish minorities in their letters and figures. Higher religious education has been provided by the Muslim *medresehs* and the seminaries of the various Christian denominations, and higher secular education by secondary schools and colleges organized on Western lines—by the Millets for themselves and by the Ottoman Government for the Muslims, and for any members of the other communities who wished to take advantage of them. In some of these latter, such as the Galata Serai Lycée and the Schools of Law and Medicine in Constantinople, the standard was high; but native institutions of this standard were insufficient in number, and they were reinforced by secondary schools and colleges under foreign control, for the most part excellent institutions which gave to the ambitious a first-class education in languages, the sciences, and in Western ideals and outlook. Though politically suspect to the Turkish Government, they nevertheless brought into the country a great gift of education along Western lines, and introduced that Western culture which was so eagerly sought by Turks of the upper class. This variegated system has been in operation for nearly a century in Turkey, and has left its impression on the mind and manners of the nation.

In accordance with the general tendency to secularization, Vasûf Bey, then Minister of Education in the Kemal Government, abolished the Muslim religious schools on 3 March, 1924, and appropriated the endowments for more useful objects. It was thought that the suppression of these ancient ecclesiastical institutions would arouse a storm of protest; but the nation

was silent, the 'Ulamā were silent, and the religious schools vanished apparently unmourned. In their place were set up additional elementary secular schools supported by the Government, which it was made compulsory for all children to attend. According to the Provisional Law of 8 October, 1913, all children between the ages of seven and sixteen must receive primary instruction, either in state schools, or in schools maintained by communities, or in private schools. This law, though only theoretically enforced, remains the basis of Turkish educational policy. The religious schools, converted to primary secular schools, offer a simple but much more useful curriculum of language and literature, history and geography and arithmetic. It is to be hoped that this change will decrease the percentage of illiteracy among the masses of the Turkish population.

All the State schools are under the control of the Ministry of Public Instruction, which has supervision not only over the primary schools, but over the secondary schools, lycées, preparatory schools for students intending to enter higher schools, the various training colleges for male and female teachers, and the technical schools. In the normal schools, the students are entirely supported by the State, which even provides board and clothing. A considerable number of students in the University are also thus supported, in return for which they serve the State for a fixed period after taking their degree.

The higher national schools are organized on the same lines as the foreign schools, and advanced subjects are here taught in laboratories and classrooms. Agricultural schools have been set up throughout the country, commercial and technical schools have been established in the larger cities, and efforts have been made to provide competent staffs and well-equipped buildings. The Galata Serai is still the leading Turkish secondary school. It was established with French encourage-

ment after the Crimean War, and has a number of French instructors on the staff. Its diploma is recognized in France as equivalent to that of a French lycée of the same grade, and it sets the pattern for other Turkish secondary schools, which, so far as the limited funds of the Government permit, are now being established throughout Turkey.¹

In 1901 there was established a single Turkish University at Stamboul, with which were incorporated the existing schools of Medicine and Law. Here both men and women can attend, and do so in increasing numbers; here they can follow various professional courses such as medicine or law, theology, philosophy or pedagogy, as they choose. This University has become the centre of a new intellectual life, and although it has scarcely had time yet to make itself felt in the country's progress, it is undoubtedly justifying its existence, and is making a gallant fight against financial difficulties.

The desire for advanced education is rapidly growing, and with the acute need of the country for trained leaders the opportunities for a University education at home are being increasingly appreciated. Something of the keenness which overcomes the financial obstacles to obtaining an education may be seen in a letter from a Turkish girl attending the University of Constantinople.

"The majority of students in Turkey have to work to keep on studying. The difference between Turkish students and the students of other countries lies in their attitude towards self-support. Certain lines of work they consider beneath their dignity. They will not demean themselves by manual labour. They are not entirely to blame for this attitude, because public opinion and tradition is against an educated person doing such forms of work as janitor service, shoe-blackening, portering, etc. A young Turk who cannot support himself

¹ For a description of the Galata Serai, and education in general in Turkey, the reader may find good material in Muftý-Zâdeh Zia Bey's book, *Speaking of the Turks* (Duffield, New York, 1922) Chapters XI ("Robert College") and XII ("Education and Art").

will not go to the University. He will stay out and spend all of his time in earning his living without feeling the desire and the need of studying. Those who go to the University have to work, of course, to earn money for themselves and their family, for many are married. The way the money is earned is, generally speaking, by working for the Government. Most of them are secretaries, clerks, or copyists in government institutions, their salary entirely depending upon the ability of the Government to pay at the time : they often have to wait for some time for their salaries. Others are officers working at the Military School, while some earn money by contributing to newspapers, by carrying on commerce, and acting as commissionaires. The students studying law earn money by settling small difficulties at the Court of Justice. Some run a cinema ; they spend their morning in study and work in the afternoon. There are few students who do not do some work. Students, in general, like to study and the number of students in the University this year (1924) is greater than it has been for many years."¹

The University quarters in Constantinople are at present very much restricted,² and there is pressing need for expansion in buildings and in staff. In this matter, as in many others, the Government finds itself unable to meet the financial demands made upon it, and higher education suffers accordingly.

Perhaps this largely explains why, in spite of the banishment of foreigners, the suppression of so many foreign institutions, and the cancellation of rights and privileges under the Capitulations, the foreign schools and colleges have been allowed to continue in the new Republic, notwithstanding the repugnance of the Government towards the prospect of higher education remaining largely in the hands of strangers.

These foreign schools have been a peculiarly interesting development in Turkey. American, French, German and English institutions have grown up throughout the old

¹ Berâ'et Ekrem Khânım in *Vox Studentium*, October, 1924.

² Since this was written, it is reported that the Government has assigned to the University the ample buildings and grounds of the Ministry of War in Stamboul (the Ministry having been transferred to more modest quarters in Angora).

Ottoman dominions, and have proved a powerful factor influencing the moral and intellectual development of the Near East. Formerly the majority of the pupils were recruited from the Christian populations of those countries, since Muslims were actually forbidden to attend under the Hamidian régime, which lasted till 1908. The French schools were probably the most numerous in the Near East before the Great War, and French culture has long been in the ascendant. Every educated Turk spoke French almost as well as his mother tongue; the lycées and advanced schools, such as the Galata Serai at Constantinople, were conducted on French lines; and in many of them there were French teachers and professors. As a result, French is the prevailing foreign language throughout Turkey to-day, and there is an intellectual *entente* between France and Turkey which was not broken by the events of 1914 to 1923.

American influence was also manifest throughout the Ottoman Empire; and besides the celebrated University at Beirut, formerly known as the Protestant Syrian College, the American College for Women and Robert College in Constantinople, and the International College at Smyrna, American educationalists in the Near East before the wars of 1912-22 were maintaining over five hundred institutions, from kindergarten grade to University grade, with more than twenty-five thousand pupils. Most of these schools are outside the present limits of the Turkish Republic.

The extent and influence of these foreign institutions in Turkey naturally produced some resentment and suspicion; and although the Ottoman Government attempted to counterbalance their influence by the organization of similar Turkish schools, the system of Capitulations effectively protected the foreign schools from interference in their curriculum. When, however, the Capitulations were abolished in 1914, the Turkish

Government temporarily closed the French schools, and French activity in Turkey has greatly diminished. The victory of the Allies in 1918 did away with the German schools, although a number of German experts are now employed to teach special sciences in Turkish technical schools. Many of the American institutions, being chiefly missionary schools serving the Greek or Armenian populations of Turkey, have ceased work since the expulsion of the Christian elements from the country, and the remaining American colleges are restricted to a purely secular curriculum.

The continuance of any foreign educational work in Turkey is a serious question, and a problem has arisen which the authorities find it difficult to solve. The inherent value of the education provided by the American and European institutions is well recognized; and many officials have sent their sons and daughters to them. Governors of provinces have patronized the foreign schools; Enver Pasha has sent his nephew, 'Izmet Pasha has sent his brother, to American colleges in Smyrna and Constantinople. No reference was made to these foreign institutions in the Treaty of Lausanne; but, in a special letter addressed by 'Izmet Pasha to the Allied delegates, full privileges and immunities were guaranteed to those schools which existed in the Ottoman Empire prior to 30 October, 1918; and the Government has been held to this pledge as though it were an article of the Treaty. Nevertheless, while the extreme importance of these well-endowed, finely-equipped and admirably-staffed institutions is fully appreciated, the Government does not wish to see Western educational institutions usurping the place of native and national education.

The curriculum of the foreign schools is now closely supervised by the Turkish educational authorities; examinations and instructions are subject to inspection; Turkish subjects

are compulsory, and the Turkish staff is appointed to the foreign schools by the Government. A certain amount of friction occurs at times as a result of what the foreign colleges consider undue interference;¹ but on the whole, both sides manage to remain conciliatory and reasonable. Toleration is shown by the Government so long as no definite religious teaching is carried on, no ideas contrary to the security of the Turkish national state are inculcated, and no subversive doctrines are taught. Where such conditions have been broken, whether advisedly or unintentionally, the Government has taken immediate and drastic steps, and has indicated that the terms it lays down for foreign education must be strictly observed in the spirit as well as in the letter. In fact, the foreign institutions have been passing through a very difficult phase.

In general, the educational system in Turkey has been markedly improved by the new Government and is now having a powerful influence on the development of the country in the economic and social fields. The separation of church and state in the Republic has freed all schools from the limitations of religious tradition and conservatism and has given an impulse to secular education. The new ideals of the Nationalists embrace a profound faith in the cause of education, a conviction that education is a unifying factor as well as an important factor of progress in the nation, and that in consequence it must be one of the fundamental interests and functions of the Government. In this respect Mustafâ Kemâl and his colleagues are striving to bring Turkey into line with the enlightened nations of Western Europe and America, and are preparing the way for a genuine advance along Western paths.

¹ At the moment of going to press, an incident has arisen over the character of the Turkish teacher appointed by the Turkish Government to the British High School in Constantinople.

A consideration of the educational system in the new Turkey leads on to the subject of the position of women. This is a sure gauge of social progress, for it has been truly said that "the character of a nation is judged by the status of its women." Turkey has constantly been criticized, in common with other Islamic countries, for the low position which women occupied there. On the whole, these attacks, though hackneyed, were more or less just, at least from the Western point of view. Nevertheless, the question was not always examined impartially nor the truth realized that non-Western societies cannot be judged off-hand by Western standards.¹

If, however, we are to judge a nation by our high standards in respect of women, we shall find that Turkey is swiftly approximating to the standards of the Western world. While polygamy has continued to be countenanced, it has become increasingly unfashionable among the educated class, and the peasants, for whom polygamy has the economic attraction of providing farm helpers (women being the only available supply of labour) have always honourably legitimized their wives' position, both economically and morally, by the legal form of marriage. The seclusion of women has never been practised in the countryside, and in the towns it has now disappeared.

With the introduction of Western ideals into Turkey by the Young Turks, a growing dissatisfaction with their lot began to manifest itself among the women, especially of the upper classes. A demand grew up for the education for women, which 'Abdu'l-Hamid had vigorously opposed during his reign; girls began to attend schools and to be considered capable of learning; the American Collegiate Institute for Girls was founded to meet the new demand, and other institutions were

¹ Most Western critics also ignore the fact that, under Islamic Law, married women enjoy fuller legal rights over their own property than they have acquired in the Western world until very recent times.

established for women. A number of women began to make themselves known as writers and reformers, and to agitate for woman suffrage like women in Western countries. An assault was made upon the exclusion of women from the professions, and although this new and rather radical ideal was bitterly opposed by a large conservative element, women nevertheless began to be accepted as students in medicine, science and law. The appearance of women in public, which previously had been subject to many dangers of insult and suspicion, became more frequent, and even the veil was sometimes discarded, though this too brazen exposure, in a strongly Muslim country where the uncovering of the face is considered the lowest form of immodesty, was frowned upon and sometimes severely penalized by personal violence or insult. European dress began to be affected to a greater extent, and the study of European languages became the pastime of many Turkish ladies with time on their hands.

The change set in motion through the intrusion of Western culture before, during, and after the Young Turk Revolution of 1908-9, continued to develop and spread throughout Turkey during the ensuing years, until now a considerable change has taken place in the position and influence of women.

Under the pressure of war, especially the Balkan Wars of 1912-13 and the Great War of 1914-18, the women of Turkey, like those of most of the belligerent countries of the West, began to participate actively in war-work, to enter the nursing services, to do hospital and relief work, to work for the Red Crescent (the Turkish equivalent of the Red Cross), to fill men's places in offices and shops, and even in some cases to serve on the field of battle. Social services of all kinds were newly undertaken by the new type of Turkish woman. In consequence the relationship between the sexes began to change rapidly, and the capacities of women were demonstrated by the

testing experiences which they underwent. Under these war-conditions, the life of seclusion and subordination, at least in the middle and upper classes, has vanished; among the peasantry, where women had always been co-workers on the land and in the rough life of the farm, the conditions remain the same.

Education became increasingly popular for girls, and the foreign schools and colleges came to be always full. The University of Constantinople opened its doors to women, and for the first time admitted the principle of co-education. Women entered the professions of teaching, of medicine, and of law. They began to work for the further enfranchisement and education of their own sex by writing, lecturing and political agitation. Khālideh Khānum,¹ who was the first Turkish woman to take a University degree, has distinguished herself as a writer in many veins, has served as aide-de-camp to Field-Marshal Mustafā Kemāl Pasha, and by her eloquence, her literary work, and her social activities has made her influence profoundly felt throughout Turkey. Largely through her example, women all over the country were inspired to a vigorous interest in their own progress and opportunities, and were awakened to the realization of their own influence and power.

Socially, they have advanced along Western paths. The old restraints were thrown off; the veil was lifted, and the charshaf or cape, which concealed the hair and descended to the shoulders, will probably share the fate of the fez. Appearance in mixed company at theatres and entertainments has become

¹ In view of a frequent misstatement appearing in many recent books and articles on Turkey, to the effect that Khālideh Khānum was Minister of Education in the first Turkish Cabinet, it may be pointed out here that, on her own statement, she never held that position, but was stated to have done so by the Constantinople Government, which wanted to injure the Nationalists' prestige by spreading the report that they had appointed as Minister a woman who had previously been condemned to death as a rebel.

permissible. Even dancing in public with Turkish men, though not with Christian foreigners, has been countenanced. The women's gallery in theatres and concert halls has been deserted for the main auditorium, where the women now sit beside their male friends and relatives. The curtain separating the women's compartment from the men's in trams and trains has been abolished. Women have even been allowed to take part in theatrical productions on the stage. In every way the manners and customs of the West have gradually permeated Turkish society, and have liberated women from the restrictions and confinement of centuries.

In the matter of marriage, the same process has been at work. Women have grown to realize the degradation and injustice of subjection, and have claimed the rights of companionship on equal terms in the home. Furthermore, they have recognized the evils and indignities of the polygamy which is countenanced by the Qur'an though decreasingly practised in Turkey; and by organized protest and agitation they have procured the passage by the Great National Assembly of a law deprecating polygamy in any part or among any class of the Turkish Republic.

Under the present *régime*, polygamy is not legally proscribed, for the principle rests upon too weighty a text in Islamic law, but plural marriages are distinctly disfavoured and are made subject to such legal formalities and preliminary authorizations as will render them very difficult in practice.

This, it may be, is the Turkish women's greatest triumph, for it represents a complete break not only with the Islamic tradition, but also with the status of inferiority to which the system of polygamy consigned women in the past.

The will to co-operate for a common purpose is indicated by the formation of a women's organization, the "Society for the Defence of the Rights of Women," which during the past

three or four years has succeeded in bringing sufficient political pressure to bear upon the Government at Angora to procure a number of important reforms. It is true that these reforms are the work of a small advanced group of women in Constantinople, many of whom have been educated abroad ; but it is a group which possesses great influence throughout Turkey, so that the progress of their Western principles is bound to be rapid. The Society has recently requested permission from the Constantinople Director of Religious Affairs to be allowed to hold meetings in mosques in order to teach progressive ideas to their more backward sisters, on the plea that it is only in mosques that they can penetrate to the most ignorant layers of the feminine public, who were taught their backward ideas by obscurantist priests and clerics. The addresses are to deal with women's status, education, and social duties under conditions of emancipation, and this propaganda may have much influence in spreading social reforms throughout the country.

These various examples of the social progress of the new Turkey give some indication of how the tide of evolution is running, and how the ideals of Western civilization are permeating the country and gradually converting it from an Oriental community, depressed by the weight of Islamic laws and customs and the incubus of superstition, into a Westernized community enlightened in its outlook and progressive in its attitude.

Nevertheless, the popular press abroad has given such a sensational account of the tremendous changes that are being effected under the new *régime* that it is important to emphasize in conclusion the extent of the obstacles which have still to be overcome. Notwithstanding the spectacular reforms in the cities and among the upper classes, modernization in Turkey will be slow, because Turkish teachers, doctors and specialists are scarce and foreign specialists are not encouraged, while the

majority of the population of the interior can neither read nor write and have little or no communication with the outside world. The standard of living is still exceedingly low, both through ignorance and through poverty. Superstitions still dominate the lives of the people, with serious effects upon the national health and welfare. Life in inner Anatolia is still primitive and unchanged, and the permeation of the new ideas to those sections may possibly have to wait until the extension of railways brings with it the seeds of a new civilization.

At the same time, a wise observer will take a long view. Turkey is likely to encounter the same difficulties as confronted many countries of Europe under the enlightened despotisms of the eighteenth century. Mustafā Kemāl Pasha himself is an "enlightened despot" of a familiar Western stamp. He has introduced modern reforms by the score into a country just throwing off the shackles of mediævalism; he has brought Western influences to bear upon an acquiescent rather than an enthusiastic people. In the West such benevolent despotism was usually followed by a period of reaction and stagnation, because it was imposed upon an uneducated and unprepared public. The passion for reform often died with the reformer. The transformation had been induced by the force of a strong personality; it could not reproduce itself when that personal stimulus was removed. In such things history repeats itself, and in contemporary Turkey, which appears to be developing under the benevolent despotism of its present ruler, the great question is whether or not successors will be found to carry on his work. The Turkish leaders themselves realize that there are few Turks growing up with sufficient power or abilities to replace them when their pioneer work is over. There is a serious dearth of such men in Turkey, apart from the handful who are at present in power. Great upheavals reveal great men; but in the slow process of

peaceful social life it has repeatedly been seen how a nation falls a victim to domestic feuds and rivalries, and progress stops. This is the main danger of the present situation in Turkey. The reforms run the risk of dying out with the reformers by sheer inertia, unless the present leaders can pass on the momentum to others as effective and as enthusiastic, while more numerous than themselves. No appraisal of the historical forces at work in modern Turkey should fail to take cognizance of this very grave question, and Time alone can give the answer. On the other hand, the danger of conscious and deliberate reaction is past ; the nation has its feet firmly set on the Western road of progress ; and there is little likelihood that it will turn its back upon its new objective.

CHAPTER XVI

THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION OF TURKEY AND THE KURDISH PROBLEM

THE signature of the Peace Treaty of Lausanne on 24 July, 1923, marked the close of that epoch in the external history of Turkey which began with the signature of the Peace Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarja on 21 July, 1774. During the intervening century-and-a-half the political map of the Near East had changed beyond recognition. Where formerly there had been one great empire, embracing many peoples, there were now a dozen independent sovereign states, each of which was identified with some single Near Eastern nationality. Yet this great change in the political map was superficial compared with the underlying change in the geographical distribution of the Near Eastern peoples themselves. Down to 1774 they had been thoroughly intermingled with one another—living together not only in the same districts and the same cities, but often in the same villages, quarters and streets—and this intermingling had been to their mutual benefit, since each nationality had been identified, at this stage, not with particular territories or political units, but with particular economic occupations or social functions, so that, economically and socially, they had been interdependent. Between 1774 and 1923, these intermingled peoples had been seized, one after another, by the Western concept of nationality, and under the influence of this compelling idea they had sorted themselves out into homogeneous blocks occupying compact territories and representing units of government, not units of economic activity. The process had worked itself out by violence. War after war, massacre after massacre, and exodus after exodus had accompanied every shift of frontiers; and since the frontiers had been chronically unstable, the Near East had

been living under this reign of barbarity and terror for five or six generations without intermission.

The atrocities of which each Near Eastern people was alternately the perpetrator and the victim during these terrible generations had become the hall-mark of the Near East in Western eyes. They are so notorious to Western readers that it is unnecessary here to refer to them further—except to suggest that the ordinary Western attitude towards the Near East is Pharisaical. When we call to mind the lesser barbarities of which we, or our ancestors, have been guilty in the course of our lesser revolutions, we may profitably ask ourselves whether, if we had been placed in as difficult circumstances as the Near Eastern peoples during these one hundred and fifty years, we should have behaved much better than they. Events which occurred in Belgium, Ireland and the Rhineland, during the ten years ending in 1923, should make us exclaim, as we survey the misdoings of Turks, Greeks, or Bulgars: “There, but for the grace of God, go we Germans, Englishmen and Frenchmen. If stumbling blocks as great as theirs had been placed in our way, our vaunted Western civilization would not have saved us from falling.” As for the economic loss and dislocation which also accompanied the transformation of the political and ethnological map of the Near East, and which was perhaps in the long run more serious, though less sensational, than the accompanying barbarities, they have been sufficiently indicated in previous chapters. At this point it will be convenient to take a brief general survey of the international situation in which Turkey found herself in the autumn of 1923, after the Lausanne Peace settlement.

The most significant feature in the Near Eastern landscape at this date was that the immediate future gave promise of being decidedly more stable than the immediate past. In the Lausanne settlement, the partition of the old Ottoman

Empire into a patchwork of national states was substantially completed. The nuclei of the Oriental Christian "successor states" had been brought into existence as a result of the Serb and Greek wars of independence in the early decades of the nineteenth century, and the re-mapping of the Balkan part of the field had been completed after the Balkan Wars of 1912-13. At the opposite extremity of the region the General War of 1914-18 and the Peace Conference of Paris had generated a constellation of Arab states, some entirely independent and others provisionally mandated to different Western Powers. Finally, since the Armistice, the national movement in Egypt had been stimulated to new life and had achieved part (though only part) of its aims, while in Turkey the National Pact of 1920 had been fulfilled almost in its entirety thanks to the overwhelming victory over the Greeks in 1922. Before the close of the following year, the Ottoman Empire had been formally liquidated by the Turkish Republic, the last of those "successor states" to which it had been giving birth, in travail and sorrow, for so many years. The processes of segregation and partition having thus been completed, there was no valid reason to expect that the political and social instability which they had occasioned would fail to subside, now that its exciting cause had been removed. Not that all the Near Eastern peoples were content, or could be expected to be content, with the new map that had resulted. Violent methods seldom lead to fair results, and even if the violence, barbarity and rancour could have been avoided (which had never been achieved before in human history when revolutions of this intensity were taking place) it is difficult to conceive what formula could have been found for an equitable division of the common territorial heritage of the Near Eastern peoples among the same peoples in severalty. The problem was too complex to be solved with precision; and, in the event, it was

evident that certain nations (for instance, the Serbs and the Rumans) had obtained more than their due and others less (for instance, the Bulgars and the Armenians). After 1923, as before, there were thus some Near Eastern peoples who were deeply aggrieved at their lot. The difference was that, whether the settlement were just or unjust in this feature or in that, the aggrieved parties no longer seriously expected to alter it. The Bulgars gave up hope of Macedonia after losing it for the second time in 1918; the Armenians gave up hope of Erzerum and Van after the treaty of 16 March, 1921, under which the Soviet Government recognized the Turkish reconquest of Kars; the Greeks gave up hope of Smyrna and Constantinople after the *débâcle* of 1922. In the interest of the defeated peoples themselves, as well as for the general good, it was better that this should be so and that even justifiable claims should be abandoned in despair, for only this turning of the back upon the past could release the remaining energies of each nation for the urgent task of putting its own house in order and repairing the economic waste of a hundred and fifty years of conflict. A still more encouraging symptom was that the Turks, in the hour of their sudden overwhelming military triumph, did not revive their aspirations after lost provinces which they had solemnly abandoned in the National Pact.

In the National Pact, Mustafâ Kemâl Bey and his comrades had explicitly renounced their claim to the former Asiatic provinces of the Ottoman Empire, south of the Armistice line of 30 October, 1918, which were inhabited by Arab majorities, and implicitly their claim to the former European provinces of the Empire to the west and north of Thrace. Thus Turkey rid herself of two of the heaviest mill-stones round her neck, which in the immediate past had most conspicuously bowed her to earth and retarded her progress. On the other hand, the

authors of the National Pact had still claimed for Turkey all Ottoman territories inhabited by non-Arab Ottoman Muslim majorities, and this formula had been deliberately framed in order to include the Kurds. Herein the Nationalists of 1920, who in many other respects were far wiser than their predecessors, had surely fallen short of perfect wisdom. If the Young Turks' attempt from 1908 to 1918 to Turkify the Muslim Albanians and Arabs had ended so disastrously, what likelihood was there that the Muslim Kurds (a redoubtable race) would be more amenable to the same policy? Their failure in this case to profit by the lessons of the past involved the new leaders of Turkey in the North-Kurkish revolt of 1925, and in the Mosul Boundary dispute with Great Britain, in which the political destiny of Southern Kurdistan was the main issue. These two questions are dealt with in detail in the pages that follow.

Apart from Kurdistan, the territorial domain and frontiers with which the Turkish Republic emerged from the Lausanne Conference had the appearance of permanence—or, at any rate, of relative stability as contrasted with any Ottoman frontiers of the previous age. There were, however, two outstanding issues in the international relations of Turkey which were possibly more important for her future than any of those which could be reduced to territorial terms. The first of these was the unsolved problem of the Straits, on which the future relations of Turkey with Russia principally depended. The second was the reaction which the abolition of the Caliphate produced in the Islamic World. These two questions are discussed in a later chapter.

Among the remaining non-Turkish peoples left within the bounds of the Republic, almost the only important group is that of the Kurds, numbering over a million of more or less pastoral people, together with a large number of purely nomadic

hillsmen and hunters who are always ready to take up arms. This Kurdish element is almost entirely illiterate and devoid of culture, save for a numerically insignificant intelligentsia residing in the leading cities of Kurdistan, in Bitlis, Kharput, Diyarbekr and Erzerum.

The Kurds have always been a race apart. They do not speak the language of their rulers the Turks, but an Iranian dialect akin to Persian; neither do they share any of the patriotic or national sentiments of the Turks, but have strong tribal allegiances of their own. Their character is one of complete independence—a kind of Ishmael-like aloofness from the other races around them. It is only natural, therefore, that when the West Wind of nationalism began to blow through the Middle East, it should fan into flame a sort of incoherent nationalism among the subjected but unsubdued kurds of the interior, as it had done among the Greeks, the Armenians, the Arabs, and all other subject peoples of the Ottoman Empire. It was only an incoherent nationalism, however. The lack of unity and organization, the dearth of educated leaders other than local Sheikhs, the virtual absence of an intelligentsia, and the mountains by which their territory was broken up into fragments almost isolated from one another, combined to prevent the Kurds from outgrowing their tribal particularism and acquiring a sense of nationality of that intensity which was possible in less extensive and better consolidated countries. Nevertheless, during and after the Great War, the Kurds developed a vague sense of nationality and a less indefinite dislike of their Turkish conquerors. Probably this dated from their persecution and subjection in 1834 by Reshid Pasha and the continued repressive policy of the Sultans during the next half century. Even the reversal of this policy under Sultan 'Abdu'l-Hamid, who befriended and encouraged the Kurds in his antagonism to the Armenians, did not materially change the

Kurdish attitude ; and the latent hostility toward the Turks has remained throughout the ensuing years until the present time. In the Treaty of Sèvres (1920), this sentiment received recognition in a contingent promise to the Kurds of national autonomy and independence ; but the non-ratification of the Treaty left them with their hopes unrealized, and the Treaty of Lausanne did not renew the promises made at Sèvres.

From a religious point of view, also, there seemed to be grounds for discord. The Kurds, like other primitive peoples, were capable of being roused to fanaticism on behalf of a religion to which they nominally adhered without either strict practice or deep understanding. So long as the Caliph remained, the Kurds kept more or less quiet ; but, when the action of the Turkish Government in abolishing the Caliphate indicated that a non-religious and apparently atheistic *régime* had been instituted under the Republic, then the Kurds could be persuaded without difficulty by their religious leaders to take up arms against an infidel Government.

Thus it came about that a grave outbreak against the Republic occurred in February, 1925. The Kurds were incited to insurrection chiefly by a Dervish-Sheikh of great influence in Kurdistan, Sheikh Sa'ïd, the hereditary Abbot of the Nakhshbendi Order. He was a wealthy man who, besides having great prestige as an eminent *religieux*, was known to have large commercial interests. He had family connections with powerful tribal chieftains, so that his seditious teachings spread rapidly, and the revolt, when it did break out, swept like wildfire throughout some thirteen vilayets of Eastern Turkey where the Kurds are in the majority.

On one or two simple pretexts, such as the arrest of several Kurds for *lèse patrie* and sedition, the standard of rebellion was raised at Piran on 13 February, and an open revolt against the Government of Turkey was proclaimed by Sheikh Sa'ïd.

In a few weeks it had spread throughout Kurdistan, and all Eastern Turkey was aflame with insurrection. The programme of the rebels was to re-establish the Sherī'ah or Qur'anic Law abolished by Mustafā Kemāl's anti-clerical Government, and to proclaim Selīm Efendi, one of Sultan 'Abdu'l-Hamīd's sons, Sultan and Caliph. The rebels affixed to the walls of the government building at Diyārbekr proclamations containing insulting references to the President of the Republic, the military commanders, the National Assembly and the Government. They alleged that the Government wished to kill 800 persons, among whom was Sheikh Sa'īd ; that religion had disappeared from the country, and that it must be re-established. In the pocket of the rebel leader Fakrī Bey, who was killed in the first engagement between the Kurds and the Government forces at Piran, there was found a letter declaring that Sheikh Sa'īd had been sent by God to restore the Sherī'ah and that the time had arrived for him to strike his blow for religious freedom.

So rapidly did the rebellion spread that, twelve days after the outbreak, the National Assembly at Angora gave the Cabinet authority to declare martial law throughout all Turkey if necessary. Thirteen eastern vilayets were at once placed under military control, and Constantinople, where further seditious propaganda was suspected, was threatened with martial law. Large government forces were mobilized and rushed as quickly as possible through the deep winter snow of the Kurdish mountains to suppress the uprising and occupy the provinces of Kurdistan. Never was the lack of railway facilities more embarrassing. Permission was obtained to transport Turkish troops through Syrian territory by the Baghdad Railway in order to reach the seat of the insurrection more directly and effectively; but (possibly at the request of the British Government, which feared too great a concentra-

tion of Turkish forces near the boundary of the disputed territory of Mosul) the French authorities withdrew their permission in large measure. The problem of bringing up an army to the east was thereby aggravated; and the mountainous nature of the country, the lack of roads and the severity of the winter prolonged the campaign for three months.

At the beginning of the rebellion, the Kurds had almost everything their own way. Kharput was taken, and the Vilayet of Mamüretu'l-'Azîz soon fell under their control. Dersim, Arghana Palu, Chabakchur and Lija were likewise overrun and held for a time. On 7 March Arghana and Osmâniyeh were completely sacked. Immediately following this came a determined attack on Diyârbekr, which was the Government's chief remaining stronghold and, therefore, the most important objective of the rebels. Situated on the Upper Tigris, Diyârbekr is the base of a Turkish army corps and dominates the south-eastern frontiers of Turkey; and, while it is surrounded by a Kurdish population, the city itself is chiefly Turkish. Diyârbekr (the ancient Amida) has always played an important political rôle on account of its situation, and has been a place of rendezvous for caravans from the south and east. For these reasons Sheikh Sa'id was anxious to capture the city. On 7 March severe fighting took place at Diyârbekr, in which the rebels gained entrance into the city, but were in the end driven back and dispersed in panic by the timely arrival of Turkish reinforcements of cavalry, which had been hurried northward from Mardin. This was the critical engagement of the revolt, and marked its turning point. Heavy Kurdish losses, the death of several rebel leaders, the daily increasing numbers of the government troops and the effective operation of the military *cordon* brought to bear on each of the disturbed provinces in succession, left the rebel Kurds little chance thereafter to make any important gains.

Eventually the rebel tribes were subdued, the insurrection was suppressed, and the leaders captured and punished. Last of all to be taken was Sheikh Sa'id himself, who had escaped into the mountains; but in June he was brought before the Military Tribunal at Angora with a number of other Kurdish chiefs, was given a perfunctory trial, and was executed in the public square for treason. By April the rebellion had been finally crushed, but not without serious results in Turkey itself.

One of the effects of the Kurdish rebellion was to rouse the country to a strongly united and patriotic fervour for the defence of the Republic. The danger of internal revolution was equivalent to the menace of civil war. All Nationalists in Turkey saw their new State threatened by disruption from within, and rallied to the support of the Government as they had rallied when foreign enemies had attacked the country. Fethi Bey, who was then Prime Minister, received general support in his efforts to suppress the uprising. Even Qāra Bekir Kiāzym Pasha, the leader of the Opposition Party, publicly tendered his confidence and support to the Prime Minister. The Turkish Republic seemed to be all the more strengthened by this attempt against its sovereignty.

A second result was the reconstruction of the Angora Cabinet, in spite of the apparent satisfaction with it as it was. Fethi Bey, the Prime Minister, attached the gravest importance to the outbreak; and his measures for suppression were prompt and vigorous. In a long declaration which he made to the Great National Assembly on 23 February, he outlined the causes of the uprising, the character of it, its extent and course up to that time, and the steps which his Cabinet had taken to meet the situation. At the close of his speech, which was heartily endorsed by both 'Izmet Pasha and Kiāzym Pasha, Fethi Bey introduced a bill, drafted by the Cabinet, providing that the use of religion as a means of exciting popular senti-

ment, whether in speech or in print, should be deemed high treason, and as such should be subject to the most extreme penalties of the law. This measure was approved by a large majority. Nevertheless, a few days afterwards, an unexpected thing happened. At the end of an all-night session of the Popular Party on 3 March feeling ran so high that revolvers were drawn (though fortunately not used) and Fethi Bey handed in his resignation at 3 o'clock in the morning, as the result of a vote of censure (carried by 94 votes to 60) against the Cabinet for the inadequacy of its measures for suppressing the revolt. It should be mentioned in passing that several members of Fethi Bey's Cabinet were themselves of Kurdish nationality, though loyal to Mustafâ Kemâl Pasha. The majority of the Popular Party demanded very much severer measures than had been taken. 'Izmet Pasha, Fethi Bey's predecessor in office, was reappointed Prime Minister and a general reshuffling took place.

The consequence of this sudden change was the reassertion of a strong military control at Angora. More drastic measures were immediately enforced for the repression of internal dissension and for the prosecution of the war. Some eighty thousand troops were finally sent out to Kurdistan to crush the disorganized rebels. A heavy hand was laid upon the Constantinople Press, which was held to be one of the contributing causes of disaffection and counter-revolutionary feeling, and more than a dozen Constantinople and provincial newspapers were suppressed. The teaching of religious doctrines which might subvert loyalty to the Republic was prohibited in the mosques. The Tribunals of Independence were re-established in various important centres, and played a part similar to that of the Revolutionary Tribunals instituted by the French Republicans in 1793; and in June, some months after the rebellion had been extinguished, these

Tribunals of Independence ordered the closing of all Dervish monasteries in the Eastern Provinces on the ground that they were centres of intrigue and hot-beds of superstition. The discovery of a monarchical and religious secret society, called the "Order of Reform," organized in the same manner as many of the Dervish fraternities, encouraged the belief that every Dervish was an enemy of the new *régime*; and, on 3 September, the Government closed all the *tekkehs* and *türbehs*, abolished the titles and special costumes of the sheikhs, dervishes and other *religieux* of the various orders, and thus ended this very ancient Islamic institution in Turkey, on the ground of its association with subversive movements in the country.

The underlying importance of the Kurdish revolt, however, is to be found, not in these immediate political results, but in the fact that there exists in the Turkish State a dangerous element of disaffection. An outbreak such as that just described is the symptom of a chronic condition which exists, whether above or below the surface, in the political organism. It is a sign of the reaction which a too-quickly advanced political development produces. Progress must be slow if it is to be sure; and too rapid a development generates the seeds of its own undoing. Action and reaction are equal and opposite, says the physicist. Overgrowth means death, says the biologist. The greater the velocity, the greater the resistance, says the engineer. Evolution which is too rapid becomes revolution, says the political philosopher. Any political movement which overthrows a *régime* consecrated by centuries of existence, and which supplants it by a new *régime* for which the nation is unprepared, is bound to have such a disturbing effect on the political order that counteracting forces will come into play to meet the shock. Here, in the history of this young Turkish Republic, we see the inevitable

phenomenon of a counteracting or reactionary opposition—an opposition not only to the new anti-monarchical *régime*, but also to the new anti-clerical *régime*. One after another, the idols of the old Ottoman order have been overthrown and shattered by the iconoclastic fanatics of the new Turkish Nationalism; and it was certain that, sooner or later, those who could not forgive this arbitrary course of destruction would rise in protest, and with perhaps unreasoning conservatism would attempt to arrest the progress of a movement which had destroyed almost all the institutions which they honoured and valued. This opposition partly expressed itself in the Press; but the Press was quickly gagged. Partly it was found among the *émigrés*, who left Turkey, some voluntarily and others compulsorily, to live abroad. Partly it was silenced in bitterness in the hearts of those Turks who remained under the new order without being reconciled to it; but it went on smouldering in a deep resentment, which smoked and burned without dying out, among those surviving non-Turkish minorities to whom the Nationalists were anathema.

This latter element, represented by the Kurds, was the first to lift its head in open defiance. It must be remembered, of course, that the Kurds had never had any love for the *ancien régime*. Even under the Sultanate they had always been Ishmaelites—a perpetually discontented, disorderly and implacable people. Yet for various reasons they found, when once it was gone, that the easy-going and inefficient Sultanate had suited them better than the Republic, which was not only doctrinaire but was determined to put its doctrines into practice. Their hatred at last broke bounds and burst into hostile action. The Kurdish revolt was a visible manifestation of those forces of protest which elsewhere had been suppressed; and although the Kurdish revolt was suppressed in its turn

by the severest military measures, it was nevertheless a symptom of a deep-seated opposition with which the new Turkey will probably have to contend for years to come.

Moreover, the military measures that were necessary to extinguish the revolt had the inevitable effect of embittering the Kurdish reactionaries still further, of alienating them not merely from the Turkish Republic but from Turkey herself, of fostering the sense of Kurdish Nationalism, and of consecrating the Separatist Movement by the blood of its martyrs. The suppression of the insurrection by traditional methods secured peace for a time ; but the more effectually it was done, the more deeply did the Kurds become estranged from the Turks. In this case the Turkish Republicans, so far from being innovators, simply reproduced, with greater energy, that policy towards subject peoples which had been pursued by the old Ottoman Government—with what results, we know. The inability of the Turks to apply in Kurdistan the lesson which they had been taught by bitter experience in the Arab provinces and Rumelia, is likely to cost them dear.

It has already cost them a second local rebellion in December, 1925, which was ostensibly caused by the new reforms in dress. So rapid, so complete, was the severance from old established national customs, especially in the wearing of the ancient fez, that an aversion on the part of a portion of the population of the North-Eastern Provinces around Erzerum took a very active form. The rebels followed the custom of sticking up posters on the walls of public buildings, to protest against the wearing of " Christian " hats, and to manifest in uncompromising terms their opposition to any new and—to them—unnecessary reforms. Rioting began ; and, with the memory of the previous revolt fresh in mind, the Government took quick alarm and rapid action. In Erzerum, Sivas, and Mar'ash the Military Tribunals were brought into action ; the cruiser

Hamidiyeh was moved up to Rizeh on the Black Sea coast, in order to be on the spot in case of necessity ; and hundreds of arrests, with daily executions, followed.

Nūru'd-Dīn Pasha, a member of the National Assembly, and an officer who had distinguished himself both in the Great War and in the Græco-Turkish War of 1919-22, and who was strongly opposed to the new regulations concerning the wearing of hats, was subjected to a searching attack in the Assembly at the time of this revolt. His objection to the passing of a law making the adoption of a foreign and Christian head-dress obligatory, which he manifested in Angora, was treated as an incitement to counter-revolution, and it was remembered against him that he had a hereditary connection with one of the foremost of the dissolved Dervish Orders. Nūru'd-Dīn Pasha was expelled from the Assembly.

CHAPTER XVII

THE MOSUL QUESTION

IN the preceding chapter, some account has been given of the resistance which the Young Turkish Republic has encountered among the Kurdish population in the eastern portion of the territory recognized as belonging to Turkey under the Treaty of Lausanne. This trouble with the Northern Kurds, whose allegiance was not claimed by any other Power, goes far to explain the eagerness of the Turkish Government to recover the adjoining Vilayet of Mosul (Mawsil)—a province of the old Ottoman Empire which is also predominantly Kurdish in population, but which was occupied by the British Army during the Great War and has been attached since then to the new Arab Kingdom of 'Iraq under a British mandate.

It has been explained above that the ideal of Mustafā Kemāl and his fellow Turkish revolutionaries was the French Revolutionary ideal of the Republic One and Indivisible, and that they treated the Kurdish rebellion in their eastern provinces in 1925 as the French Republicans treated the rebellion in La Vendée in 1793. The rebellion was an unsuccessful protest against a policy of radical standardization and unification on Western lines, in which the variegated institutions of the *ancien régime* were being ruthlessly swept away; and it has been recorded how, after the rebellion had been suppressed, the process of "Turcification" was renewed with redoubled vigour. It was the deliberate policy of the Men of Angora to "Turkify" the Northern Kurds, without shrinking from the employment of whatever force might be necessary to attain this end; and they believed, quite correctly, that this policy would be rendered extremely difficult, if not impossible, to carry out if, next door to the Kurds under Turkish rule, there were to be other Kurdish communities living permanently

under a different flag and rejoicing in a *régime* which encouraged the development of Kurdish nationality instead of repressing it. In the Mosul Province, the encouragement of Kurdish nationality has been the policy of the British Government since this territory first came under British military occupation; and that policy has been accepted by the Arab Government of 'Iraq, which has been established at Baghdad under a British mandate. The Arabs of 'Iraq are not strong enough to attempt the "Arabization" of the Kurds of the Mosul Vilayet, and the Mandatory Power would not in any case countenance such an endeavour. The British policy for the Southern Kurds has been local autonomy on national lines within the framework of a larger body politic; and a dispassionate observer can hardly doubt that this is the right way of dealing with the Kurdish problem, not only in 'Iraq but in Turkey, or that, conversely, the Turkish policy of forcible assimilation is wrong alike for Turkey and for 'Iraq. On this question, however, as has been indicated already, the Turkish Republicans are not open to reason. They are inexorably determined to "Turkify" the Northern Kurds by force; and—given this intention on their side—there is no doubt that the permanent attachment of the adjoining Southern Kurds, in the Mosul Vilayet, to 'Iraq under a liberal *régime* cannot be contemplated by the Turkish Government with equanimity. In all probability the Turkish policy towards the Northern Kurds has been doomed to failure from the outset, whatever happens to Mosul. The policy is intrinsically wrong and is also an anachronism, and the previous outcome of similar Turkish policies in the Arab provinces and Albania indicates that its chances of success are small. The Turks, however, have shown a human disinclination to face this unpalatable fact, and have preferred to attribute their troubles with their Kurdish subjects to British intrigues. They have persuaded themselves that

Great Britain desires to attach the Mosul Vilayet to 'Iraq, not for its own sake, but in order to use it as a base of operations against the authority of the Turkish Government in territories officially recognized by Great Britain as falling under Turkish sovereignty ; and that her motive in giving national autonomy to the Southern Kurds has been not a legitimate concern for the Southern Kurds' welfare but an insidious purpose of setting the Northern Kurds against the Turkish Government by offering them, at close quarters, the spectacle of their Southern kinsmen living under a freer *régime*. This is, of course, a misunderstanding of the British policy; for Great Britain has no thought of extending her political influence north of the Mosul Vilayet into territories which she has recognized at Lausanne as belonging to the Turkish Republic. She has been thinking of securing the welfare of 'Iraq, and not of injuring Turkey.

To some extent there has been a corresponding misconception on the British side. Many British observers have failed to perceive that the Turkish policy regarding Mosul is likewise inspired, not by any aggressive purpose, but by an ideal (albeit a mistaken ideal) of internal welfare. It has been commonly assumed in Great Britain (notwithstanding the first article in the Turkish National Pact) that Turkey wishes to recover Mosul as " a jumping-off ground " for the further recovery of Baghdad and Basra. This view is given some colour by the fact that the Mosul Vilayet does command the rest of Mesopotamia strategically. Yet there is no more substantial ground for this belief than for the contrary Turkish belief that Great Britain harbours designs upon the Kurdish provinces of the Turkish Republic, which are commanded by the Mosul Vilayet politically, owing to the contrast between the two local *régimes* as far as the Kurdish nationality is concerned. The Turkish attitude in regard to Mosul is defensive ;

but, since it is in defence of a wrong policy towards the Kurds, this has only made it morally more difficult for Great Britain to meet Turkish wishes in this matter. Had Mustafā Kemāl and his associates organized their new Republic as a Turco-Kurdish state, in which the two leading nationalities were on an equal footing politically, the Southern Kurds of the Mosul Vilayet might have been eager to come in, and Great Britain, as trustee for their interests, would then have been under a moral obligation to approve and not to oppose such a settlement.¹ Actually, the situation is the exact contrary. The Turks are bent upon repressing the Kurdish nationality in the north, and upon recovering the Mosul Vilāyet in order to carry out the same policy there also, until Kurdish nationalism, deprived of its last citadel, succumbs. In fact, Great Britain is being asked by Turkey not merely to hand the Mosul Vilayet back—which the Mandatory Power believes to be contrary to the interests of 'Iraq—but to hand it back in order that its inhabitants may be subjected to a deliberately repressive *régime*—a change which, beyond all dispute, would be to the detriment of those inhabitants themselves.

This contrast between Turkish and British policy in regard to the Kurds is the crux of the Mosul problem, but on both sides there are further considerations which enter in.

The Turks point out that the city of Mosul (though this is not true of the greater part of the province) was only occupied by the British forces after the signature of the Armistice of Mudros on 30 October, 1918, and on this ground they contend that Mosul has been taken from them illegitimately. The British rejoin that the terms of the Armistice contained no guarantee or implication that the definitive southern frontier of

¹ In the abortive Treaty of Sèvres (Article 64), it was provided that, if Northern Kurdistan were to become an independent national state, the Kurds of the Mosul Vilayet should be free to enter this state if they so desired.

Turkey-in-Asia would coincide with the Armistice line ; and they further point out that if any part of the Mosul Vilayet ought to be incorporated in the Arab state of Iraq on the clear merits of the case, that part is Mosul City, which—in contrast to the predominantly Kurdish bulk of the province in the highlands on the left bank of the Tigris—is predominantly Arab in population.

Another motive for the Turkish claim to the Mosul Vilayet as a whole is that the province comes within the formula of the first article in the National Pact, which, while renouncing title to sovereignty over Arab majorities, still claims for Turkey all territories in which a majority of the population consists of non-Arab Ottoman Muslims. The Mosul Vilayet falls under this head, since, in spite of the Arab character of the capital city, the population of the whole province is predominantly Kurdish. Now every jot and tittle of the National Pact has become sacred in the eyes of the Kemalists, because the Pact is the sign in which they have so miraculously conquered. To fulfil the Pact in every particular has become with them an article of faith to which they hold with passionate superstition. At the same time, it has become a maxim of policy, because the popularity and prestige which the Kemalists have acquired among their fellow-countrymen since they first made themselves responsible for the fortunes of Turkey in 1919, largely rests upon their sustained success in gaining one point after another in their original programme. In almost every international issue in which they have been involved, they have made their own will prevail, either by arms or by diplomacy, often in face of apparently hopeless odds. The attitude of Great Britain in regard to Mosul is the first unyielding resistance which they have encountered. They fear that, if they accept defeat in this controversy, their prestige at home will be shaken and that their political opponents will not fail to avail

themselves of this opportunity of challenging their present monopoly of power.

As against these considerations on the Turkish side, there are strong geographical reasons for incorporating the Mosul Vilayet in the Mandated Territory of 'Iraq. The province is isolated physically from Turkey by a wall of mountains, which are impassable in winter, when they are deeply covered in snow, while even in summer there are only a few practicable passes. The Tigris itself, which rises in the undisputedly Turkish territory of Diyārbekr, has to force its way through a narrow and unnavigable gorge between the mountains in order to pass out from the basin of Diyārbekr into the basin of Mesopotamia. On the other hand, Mosul is united by close geographical ties with Baghdad and Basra. The river-steamers which ply on the Tigris can ascend the river as far as Mosul City; and the streams which drain the mountainous north-eastern parts of the province, and whose valleys offer the only means of access into the heart of these highlands, are tributaries of the Tigris and send their waters down its channel to the Persian Gulf. From the point of view of communications, of trade, and also of irrigation, the Mosul Vilayet coheres with 'Iraq on the south, and not with either Turkey or Persia or Syria, which adjoin it on the three other quarters.

These facts sufficiently explain why the Anglo-Turkish controversy over Mosul has been obstinate throughout, and at times dangerous. On the other hand, it may be noted that the presence of oilfields in the province has had less influence over the policy of either party than is usually assumed to be the case. Though the oil undoubtedly exists, the quantity is still quite uncertain; and in the oilfields of Southern Persia, of which the Anglo-Persian Company holds the concession, the British Navy possesses so vast an ascertained reservoir of oil-fuel that control over the imperfectly prospected oilfields of Mosul, many

hundred miles distant from the sea, is not an urgent consideration in the British Government's Middle Eastern policy. Moreover, even if the control of the Mosul oilfields were an object of immediate and first-rate importance to Great Britain, this would not necessarily cause the British Government to insist upon the Mosul Province being incorporated politically in 'Iraq. The South Persian field, on which Great Britain admittedly depends, lies under the sovereignty of a foreign Government which is now independent *de facto* as well as *de jure*; and 'Iraq itself is an independent kingdom *in posse* and is only mandated to Great Britain for a limited term of years. Thus, a lust after the Mosul oilfields, even if it could be proved against Great Britain, would by no means account for her obstinacy in claiming the province for 'Iraq as against Turkey. Control of the Mosul oil might equally well be secured by an Anglo-Turkish political understanding based on British acquiescence in Turkey's territorial claim. The truth is that the lure of this still somewhat elusive Mosul oil has not been a determining factor in the policies of either party. Those policies have been determined by the political considerations explained above.

It remains to give a brief account of the diplomatic history of the Mosul controversy down to the time of writing—though, in a book of this scope, it would be out of proportion to attempt to follow the intricacies of procedure in detail.

At the Lausanne Conference, it soon became clear that any immediate conciliation of the Turkish and British points of view on the Mosul Question was impossible; and accordingly, with the agreement of the two parties directly concerned, the following text was included in Article 3 of the Lausanne Treaty:—

" The frontier between Turkey and Iraq shall be laid down in friendly arrangement to be concluded between Turkey and Great Britain within nine months (*i.e.*, of the coming into force of the Treaty).

In the event of no agreement being reached between the two Govern-

ments within the time mentioned, the dispute shall be referred to the Council of the League of Nations.

The Turkish and British Governments reciprocally undertake that, pending the decision to be reached on the subject of the frontier, no military or other movement shall take place which might modify in any way the present state of the territories of which the ultimate fate will depend upon that decision."

The subsequent course of the controversy turned upon the interpretation of this text, and of the *procès verbal* of the foregoing conversations between 'Izmet Pasha and Lord Curzon, in which the procedure laid down in the text of the treaty had been agreed upon.

The first stage of this procedure was put into effect by the meeting of an Anglo-Turkish Conference at Constantinople (19 May—9 June, 1924) ; but the respective standpoints of the two parties proved to be still just as far apart as they had been at Lausanne ; and, when the nine months ran out, the question was duly referred to the Council of the League of Nations.

Meanwhile, before a definitive award could be given by the League, the Council had to decide what was that *status quo* which the parties had mutually undertaken to maintain pending the final settlement. Owing to the difficult nature of the country between the Tigris and the Persian frontier, and to the length of time for which the settlement had been delayed, the parties found themselves in disagreement over the exact course of the *de facto* provisional line of demarcation. Beyond the British outposts lay a "no-man's land" which the British did not wish to occupy themselves, but which they claimed that the Turks had no right to occupy on their part. By an unhappy coincidence, this "no-man's land" was the home of certain Nestorian Christian communities which had been evicted by the Turks during the Great War, had made their way to Iraq as refugees, and had drifted back since the Armistice. An encroachment by Turkish military detachments upon the "no-man's land," resulting in a fresh eviction of the Nestorians,

threatened to bring the Turkish and British forces into collision; for some days, the situation which had existed at Chanaq in the autumn of 1922 was reproduced on the Mosul border; and the tension was only relaxed by the action of the League Council, which, on 29 October, 1924, in a session held at Brussels, laid down the so-called "Brussels Line" as a definition of the provisional *status quo*, without prejudice to the eventual settlement.

The Council then appointed a special commission to investigate the situation on the spot and to report its findings and recommendations. The three members were respectively a Hungarian (the distinguished geographer, Count Teleki), a Belgian and a Swede—that is, they were nationals of three small countries one of which had been an ally of Turkey in the Great War, another an ally of Great Britain, and the third a neutral. The neutral Swedish member, M. Wirsén, was President of the Commission.

After a long and detailed investigation at first-hand, the Commission reported to the Council in July, 1925. They submitted that, if the choice were to lie simply between attaching the Mosul Vilayet to Turkey and attaching it to 'Iraq, it would be preferable to attach it to Turkey on the ground that Turkey was a more stable state than an 'Iraq left to its own resources, and that she was therefore more capable of effectively administering this outlying province with its alien population. As things were, this was the choice which the Council would have to consider, since, under the Anglo-'Iraqi Treaty signed on 12 October, 1922, as finally amended, it had been provided that the British mandate over 'Iraq should terminate, at the latest, in 1928. The Commission submitted, however, that while Turkey would be a better sovereign for the Mosul Vilayet than an unmandated 'Iraq, the best sovereign of all would be an 'Iraq under a

British mandate, if the term of that mandate were to be extended for twenty-five years. While recommending this as the best solution in the circumstances, they suggested, as a third alternative, a partition of the province between the two claimants.

The British Government had pledged itself to abide by the Council's award; but when it became evident that Great Britain would seek to prolong her mandate over 'Iraq, and so to create the conditions for that solution which the Commission had recommended as the best, the Turks took up the position that the Council possessed merely advisory and not arbitral powers in the matter according to the terms of the Lausanne Treaty. Meanwhile, the two parties accused one another of intimidating and ill-treating the local population on either side of the Brussels Line. In these circumstances, the Council took two steps. They referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice the question of their competence, under the Treaty, to render an arbitral decision, and they sent out to Mosul a distinguished Esthonian soldier, General Laidoner, to investigate the mutual recriminations of the British and Turkish Governments.

The Turkish Government did not permit General Laidoner to conduct inquiries on their side of the Brussels Line, and they also declined to admit the jurisdiction of the International Court or to appear before it in order to state their case. After hearing the British case, the Court, in November, 1925, gave an advisory opinion to the effect that the decision which the Council was to take, in virtue of Article 3, Paragraph 2, of the Lausanne Treaty, would be obligatory upon the parties and would constitute the definitive determination of the frontier between Turkey and 'Iraq, and that the decision would have to be taken by the Council unanimously—the representatives of the two parties (Turkey and Great Britain), taking part in

the voting, but their voices not counting in the reckoning of unanimity.

The Council accordingly met again to render an obligatory decision. It was open to them to adopt one of the three suggestions of their Commission of inquiry or else some fourth solution of their own; but, at this juncture, the scales were turned by the arrival of a report from General Laidoner, from which it appeared that the Turks had re-commenced the eviction of the Nestorians domiciled on their side of the Brussels Line, to the accompaniment of those barbarities which are customary in the Near East in such cases. Whatever may have been the opinion of the several members of the Council up to this point, the receipt of General Laidoner's report made it morally almost impossible for them to award to Turkey any part of the Mosul Vilayet, with its non-Turkish population of Kurds, Arabs and Nestorians who would then be exposed to similar treatment at the hands of the Turkish authorities.

Accordingly, on 16 December, 1925, the Council of the League of Nations decided that the Brussels Line, which had hitherto marked the provisional *status quo*, should become the definitive frontier between Turkey and 'Iraq, on condition that, within six months, Great Britain should assume responsibility for the mandate over 'Iraq for an additional period of 25 years,¹ and that she should institute local guarantees for the Kurdish element in the Mosul province.

The British Government accepted this award and, within the time prescribed, negotiated a new treaty, embodying its terms, with the Government of 'Iraq. This treaty was ratified by both the 'Iraqi and the British Parliament; and thus the Council's award came into effect as a definitive settlement of the Mosul Question in the opinion of the Council itself, of the

¹ Or less, if, in the opinion of the Council, 'Iraq were to become qualified at an earlier date for admission to membership in the League.

International Court, and of the Governments of 'Iraq and Great Britain.

The Turkish Government, however, declined—and still declines at the time of writing—to recognize the validity of the award ; and the British Government failed to persuade Angora to take the award as the basis for a fresh discussion between the two parties with a view to arriving at an amicable agreement. Thus the League settlement of the Mosul Question, while evidently valid in international law, lacks certainty and stability inasmuch as it has been rejected (even though unwarrantably) by one of the two parties. At the time, the Turkish Government did not make any attempt, or even any threat, to assert by force of arms its unabated claim to the fulfilment of the National Pact on this last outstanding issue ; but there was no security that, while biding their time, they would not take the law into their own hands at the first favourable opportunity. On this account, there was considerable public misgiving in Great Britain over the final turn which the Mosul affair had taken. It was felt that the twenty-five years' extension of the British mandate over 'Iraq, under these conditions, was committing Great Britain to the danger of future war with Turkey ; and that though, in that case, the other members of the League would be bound to take sides against the aggressor, the brunt would inevitably fall upon Great Britain. There also appears to have been some misgiving in the minds of certain members, at any rate, of the League Council. It was recognized that Turkey had forced the Council's hand by her general policy of repression towards the Kurds, her local persecution of the Nestorians, and her refusal to abide by the terms of the Lausanne Treaty as interpreted by the International Court. At the same time, it was pointed out that Great Britain was a Great Power, a Christian country, and a member of the coalition which had been

victorious in the Great War, while Turkey was a small state, a Muslim country, and a member of the coalition which had been defeated in the Great War. It was realized that, on any or all of these three grounds, Turkey might and would protest that the Mosul Award had been given against her out of policy or prejudice, and not on the merits of the case, and that this view might be adopted in other small countries, Muslim countries, or defeated countries outside Turkey herself. This is an important, and an unfortunate, aspect of the Mosul Affair.¹

¹ At the moment of passing the proofs of this chapter for the press, the news arrives that the British and Turkish Governments, as the result of direct negotiations, have reached an agreed settlement of the Mosul controversy on the basis of the League Council's award.

CHAPTER XVIII

SOVIET RUSSIA, THE STRAITS AND THE ISLAMIC WORLD

THE Mosul controversy (the course of which has been described above) was a godsend for the Soviet Government, since to some extent it counteracted the tendency towards an alienation, if not a break, between Russia and Turkey, which began to declare itself as soon as the Greeks had been driven out of Anatolia and the Western Powers had been forced to swallow the Turkish National Pact.

It has been explained already that the key to Russo-Turkish relations has been, is, and probably always will be the control of the Straits. In the past, those relations have been normally hostile because the Straits themselves have been in the hands of the one party and their hinterland in those of the other. From 1919 to 1922, the two parties were thrown together because the Straits temporarily fell into the hands of a third party, the Western Powers, who used their control of this vital waterway in order to bring pressure to bear upon Angora and Moscow alike. While Russia had formerly disliked to see Turkey installed in this strategic position, she objected far more strongly to seeing it in the hands of Great Naval Powers, who could take advantage of it as a base for stirring up trouble for Russia in the Black Sea and the Caucasus. Accordingly, in the Russo-Turkish Treaty signed at Moscow on 16 March, 1921, the two signatories agreed (Art. 5)

"To hand over the final drawing up of an international statute governing the Black Sea and the Straits to a special conference of delegates from the Littoral States, on condition that the decisions made by the conference should not infringe the full sovereignty of Turkey or the security of Turkey and her capital, Constantinople."

Soviet Russia assisted Turkey wholeheartedly in her struggle against Greece and the Western Powers, with this end in

view, and doubtless M. Chicherin hoped to achieve it when he headed the Russian Delegation to Lausanne.

Meanwhile, the political fruits of the Turkish military triumph had caused the Turkish Nationalists to change their point of view. They came to the conference with the assurance that Eastern Thrace and the Gallipoli Peninsula, as well as Constantinople, were to come again under full Turkish sovereignty, and this meant that the substance of control over the Straits would fall to Turkey once more, whatever shadow of external control might appear in the text of a "Straits Convention." At the same time, the new Turkey, like the old, could only expect to exercise this substantial control to good effect by playing off some of her powerful neighbours against the others. In the past she had procured the assistance of the Western Powers in withholding control of the Straits from Russia; latterly, she had procured the assistance of Russia in ousting the Western Powers from their temporary possession of the waterway. As permanent partners, which was she to choose? The impression made by the latest phase of the problem and gratitude felt for the latest favours received might both have inclined the Turks to remain faithful to their new friends; but those new friends were very old enemies, and that enmity was almost bound to revive with a revival of the geographical situation in which Russia held the house and Turkey the entrance-hall. Moreover, Russia was very close, very large, and above all very alien—at least as alien in the guise of a Socialist Soviet Republic as when she had been an Orthodox Christian Czarism. In either form, the Turks found Russian culture unattractive. Not Petersburg and not Moscow, but Paris, was the spiritual home in quest of which they had cast loose from their ancient Islamic moorings, and they were not willing to be diverted to another port. Even while they were fighting

the Western Powers tooth-and-nail for their political and economic independence, they were reconstructing their national institutions from top to bottom on Western lines. Like the Jewish Zionists, the Turkish Nationalists were weary of being "a peculiar people"—that is, of being the very thing that the Russians had become since they succumbed to Bolshevism. The Turks, for their part, had made it their goal to become a normal nation of a Western pattern in a Western world. Thus new sentiment assisted the revival of an old tradition; and as soon as the Turkish Delegation began to negotiate at Lausanne, they found that opportunism pointed the same way.

The British Delegation had come to Lausanne resolved to secure some vestige or semblance of "the Freedom of the Straits," whatever else might go by the board. This freedom meant liberty of passage for all warships in time of peace, and for neutral warships and merchant ships in time of war, since liberty of passage in time of peace for non-Turkish merchant ships had always existed since 1774. In seeking to open the Straits to warships, Great Britain was reversing a policy which she had pursued consistently for more than one hundred years. She had preferred to deny herself a passage for her own men-of-war into the Black Sea, rather than open a passage for Russian men-of-war into the Mediterranean; and if Russia was England's rival—as she had been from 1815 to 1907 and had become again since 1917—this was, on the face of it, the wisest policy for Great Britain, since she had less to gain by attacking Russia in her home waters than by preventing Russia from taking in the flank the British maritime communications with India. In making this reversal of policy, British statesmen at Lausanne were influenced not by the normal past and the probable future, but by the abnormal and transitory circumstances of 1907-22. From

1907 to 1917, Great Britain and Russia had been friends and eventually allies ; Turkey had stood between them when they attempted to join hands in the European War ; and Great Britain had been defeated in her attempt to force the Dardanelles. From 1917 to 1920, again, Great Britain had still possessed " White " Russian friends with their backs to the Black Sea, and the control of the Straits, which she had at last secured in October, 1918, had enabled her to postpone, though not to prevent, their overthrow. These were the considerations which moved the British Delegation at Lausanne to do what they could to keep the passage for warships open. Sentiment also entered in. The freedom of passage for which British, Australian and New Zealand soldiers had died on Gallipoli must not be lost again ; and the Turkish Delegates soon discovered that they could obtain a substantial price for an illusory concession. Thus, having secured their territorial demands, the Turks negotiated separately with the Western Powers a Convention under which the Straits were to be kept open for warships (though with a number of reservations) and two narrow zones on either shore of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus were to be demilitarized (though without inspection or sanctions). By way of exception, the Turkish forces were to be allowed to cross the demilitarized zones in transit, and in Constantinople there was to be a permanent Turkish garrison of not more than 12,000 men ; and, by way of compensation, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan undertook virtually to guarantee the possession of the demilitarized zones to Turkey.

When the draft of this Convention was presented to M. Chicherin on 1 February, 1923, he demanded that it should be re-negotiated point by point in a sub-commission on which the Russian Delegation should be represented ; and when this demand was rejected, he refused to be a party to the Con-

vention and issued a formal protest in which he appealed to Article 1 of the Russo-Turkish Treaty of 16 March, 1921. The Turks took no notice of this protest, but quietly signed the Straits Convention on 24 July, 1923, and on 14 August the Soviet Government unwillingly became a party to it. It did not forgive the Turkish Government, however, for forcing its hand and still less for steering a Westward course, of which the separate action taken by the Turks in regard to the Straits was a visible symptom.

M. Chicherin, however, was too good a diplomatist to be governed by his feelings, and therefore he did not fail to take advantage of the opportunity which was offered to him when the award of the League of Nations went against Turkey in the Mosul controversy. The Turks were now in a mood to accept the suggestion that, however ardently they might aspire to enter the comity of Western nations, with a status like that of Spain or Sweden, they were still being treated as outlaws, like Soviet Russia. The consequence was that a new Russo-Turkish treaty¹ was signed in Paris on 17 December, 1925, by M. Chicherin and Tefiq Rushdi Bey, the Turkish Foreign Minister. In this instrument, the parties severally pledged themselves to friendly neutrality in case of any military attack or hostile alliance or agreement by a third party or parties against either. They further undertook to begin negotiations "for establishing an order of procedure for settling any dispute between themselves which could not be settled by ordinary diplomatic means."

Thus, at the date of writing, the contest between Soviet Russia and the West for Turkey's allegiance was not yet at an end. On the other hand, the contest for Turkey's allegiance between Islam and the West was virtually decided. The change in the relations between Turkey and Islam is perhaps

¹ *The Times*, 29 Dec. 1925 (Text).

the best single measure of that mental revolution which it is the main purpose of this book to record.

Before the disastrous peace of Kuchuk Kainarja set the Western leaven working in the Turkish mind, in A.D. 1774, the chief thing in which the Turks, as a community, took pride was their membership in Islamic society and their heritage of Islamic civilization. Into this civilization they had entered at the moment when they turned their backs upon their native steppes; and, while their attempt to adapt their original nomadic institutions to their new sedentary conditions of life broke down, Islamic culture penetrated more and more deeply into their being. Turkey was perhaps never more purely Islamic than during the two centuries ending in 1774, when her old nomadic institutions were crumbling away while her new Western institutions had not yet begun to be established. At this time almost any Turk, if asked to explain in what lay the greatness of his country, would have replied that the Ottoman Empire was great because it was the leading Power in the Sunni Muslim World and because its sovereign was the acknowledged protector of the Holy Cities. A century later, as has been described above, Sultan 'Abdu'l-Hamid took advantage of the new Western means of communication in order to create prestige for the Ottoman Caliphate among Muslims *in partibus infidelium*. Even after the Revolution of 1908 the Committee of Union and Progress, who undid 'Abdu'l-Hamid's work in almost every other respect, continued his Caliphate policy; and that policy seemed to be justified by success, for, as the Muslims dispersed abroad among the Gentiles began to recover a corporate consciousness, that consciousness tended to focus itself upon the Ottoman Caliphate as an emotional centre, and incidentally upon the Ottoman Empire, as the body-politic in which the Caliphate inhered. Non-Ottoman Muslims became solicitous for the

preservation of the Ottoman Empire as a relic and symbol of the Islamic Universal State, as it had existed in the time of the Umayyads and the 'Abbāsids. Hence a wave of indignation ran through the Islamic world when Italy overran Tripoli and Benghazi in 1911 and when the Balkan States overran the European Provinces of Turkey in 1912; and although the vast Muslim populations under British, French and Russian rule remained remarkably loyal to their Christian Governments when Turkey intervened in the Great War on the side of the Central Powers, their concern for the preservation of Turkish independence and power reasserted itself with redoubled strength after the Armistice, when Turkey in her prostration was deprived of her Arab provinces and was threatened with the loss of Constantinople and Smyrna. The Indian Muslims took the lead in this movement and in March, 1920, a delegation of the Indian Khilāfat Committee visited London and had an interview with Mr. Lloyd George. They showed equal fervour on behalf of the Sultan-Caliph, whom they regarded as a prisoner under duress in the hands of the Allies, and on behalf of Mustafā Kemāl and his comrades in arms, who in their eyes were fighting the battle of Islam in the interior of Anatolia. They denounced the Arabs as traitors to the Islamic cause for having sided against Turkey during the Great War in the hope of winning their national independence—and all this showed how utterly the Indian Muslims misunderstood the situation.

If they had ascertained the views of the Turkish Nationalists at this date, they would have avoided the humiliation of seeing the programme for which they agitated during the next four years eventually stultified by the action of the Turkish Nationalists themselves.

The Turkish Nationalists saw things from quite a different angle. They regarded the Sultan-Caliph not as a victim but

as a traitor, and hated him, on this account, more bitterly than they hated the Greeks or the British. On the other hand, they bore no malice towards the Arabs, who had merely attempted to secure that National independence which the Turks were demanding for themselves ; and, with rare fairness and reasonableness, they renounced their title to territories inhabited by Arab majorities, in the first article of their National Pact. The Arab provinces were palpably non-Turkish in nationality, and their detachment would strengthen and not weaken the Turkish body-politic. The Turkish Nationalists concentrated their thoughts and efforts upon Smyrna, Constantinople and Eastern Thrace, without which they felt that an independent Turkish national state would be unable to live. To the Indian Muslims, however, Thrace and even Smyrna were little more than names, while Constantinople was significant to them not as the greatest of Turkish cities, but as the seat of the Ottoman Caliph ; and even Constantinople moved them less than the Arab provinces, for the early doctors of the Islamic law had laid down, among their classical precepts, that no Caliph could be a true Caliph unless he were the effective sovereign of the whole Jaziratu'l-'Arab (*i.e.*, Greater Arabia up to the Tigris, the Amanus and the Mediterranean) and particularly of the Holy Cities: Thus arose the paradox that the Indian Muslims insisted on the maintenance of a Sultan-Caliph whom the Turkish Nationalists insisted on deposing, and also insisted that the Ottoman Empire, as the Sultan-Caliph's domain, should retain those Arab provinces to which the Turkish Nationalists, on behalf of the Turkish National State which they intended to erect on the Ottoman Empire's ruins, had renounced all claims.

The truth was that the Turks had been led at last, by long and bitter experience, to regard the Caliphate and the whole

Islamic heritage as encumbrances upon Turkish national development, while the Indian Muslims regarded the Turkish nation and its national spirit primarily as instruments for the preservation of Islam in a hostile world. Between these two points of view no compromise was possible, for the two parties were not only pursuing different practical objects, but had drifted far apart in sentiment and cultural values. To the Indian Muslims (whose younger militants were even more old-fashioned than the moderates of the older generation) to be an instrument of Islam was to be a chosen vessel; and, like the Turks of a past epoch, they looked upon this as an honour rather than a burden. On the other hand, the Turkish Nationalists were not only acutely sensible of the burden but were positively hostile to the Islamic connection, which they felt to be reactionary, unfashionable, and above all anti-national in two senses. In the first place Islam, like the Roman Catholic Church, was a universal society transcending and as far as possible ignoring national divisions, so that it was difficult to serve both Islam and Nationalism whole-heartedly. Secondly, Islam had overlaid and effaced the primitive institutions of the steppes; and the Turkish Nationalists, under the influence of the Turanian Movement in its cultural aspect, were building up a legend about their noble Turanian ancestors, like the legend about the noble Teuton which the German and English romantics had built up in the nineteenth century. This legend was hardly true to the facts of history. The truth was that the Turanian conquerors of the Near East had tried, and failed, to found a new sedentary society on the basis of their nomadic institutions; but the Turkish Nationalists, following M. Léon Cahun, persuaded themselves that the experiment, instead of being tried and found wanting, had been nipped in the bud by the premature imposition of an effete Islamic culture upon a vigorous Turanian stock. In fact, in their

eyes, Islam, so far from being a goodly heritage, had become an unfortunate past which had, as far as possible, to be lived down.

The inevitable breach came towards the end of the year 1923, when the Turkish Republic had just been proclaimed and the imminent abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate was already in the air.

On 24 November, 1923, His Highness the Aga Khan and Mr. Justice Ameer Ali, the two most distinguished of living Indian Muslims, who, since the Armistice, had been indefatigable in pleading the Turkish cause before the British Government and the British public, addressed a joint letter to Mustafā Kemāl Pasha in which they begged him to spare the Ottoman Caliphate and explained all that it stood for in the eyes of the Muslim World. This letter was as studiously moderate in tone as the pleas which its authors had addressed to British quarters during the preceding years; but unfortunately they sent copies simultaneously to certain organs of the Turkish Press in Constantinople which the Turkish Nationalists suspected, rightly or wrongly, of being hostile to the Republic and disposed to use the Caliphate as a rallying point for a movement of reaction. Since Constantinople was nearer to London than Angora, the copies of the letter were published in these journals before the originals reached the Turkish Government's hands, and this produced an explosion. The luckless editors were put on trial for sedition before a special revolutionary tribunal and the writers of the letter were castigated in public as foreign busy-bodies in league with the British Government and the Turkish Opposition, who were interfering intolerably in Turkish internal affairs.

The violence of the breach was due to the ignorance of either party regarding the position of the other. Had the Turkish Nationalists realized with what devotion and ability the Aga Khan and Mr. Ameer Ali had pleaded an unpopular

cause, and how much their advocacy had affected the policy of Great Britain towards Turkey, they would hardly have handled them so roughly. On the other hand, if the two authors of the letter had been *au courant* with the internal political situation in Turkey and with the Nationalist point of view, they would probably have taken a rather different line of action. As it was, the estrangement was complete, and the Turkish Nationalists, when they duly abolished the Ottoman Caliphate a few months later, deliberately forfeited for Turkey the support and influence which she had so long enjoyed as the recognized head and front of Islamic unity. The Turks took this momentous step with a light heart, partly because they did not fully realize how momentous it was, and partly because they did not care. In facing Westwards they turned their backs upon their old association with Islam as resolutely as upon their transitory connection with Bolshevism.

When Turkish statesmen discussed the question with Western observers at this time, they spoke somewhat as follows :—

“ Turkey,” they said, “ has poured out her blood and treasure long enough in fighting the battles of Islam. In doing this, she has almost sacrificed her national existence, and it has needed the supreme effort of 1919-23 to save it. That effort has succeeded, and, thanks to its own prowess, in spite of the incubus of Islam, the Turkish nation will live. We have learnt our lesson, however, and henceforth the Turkish nation will live and work for itself, as a healthy nation should do. Our watchword is *Sacro Egoismo*, and this is not only the best thing for us but a good thing for the Western world. The West need no longer fear, and other Muslim peoples need no longer hope, that we shall wish to champion the cause of every Muslim people that is struggling to throw off the yoke of Western domination. As far as that yoke weighed upon us, we have broken it single-handed. Let other Islamic peoples prove their worth by fighting their own battles as we have fought ours. We shall look on sympathetically, but we shall be slow to interfere. After six centuries of war for Islam and twelve years of war for our own existence, it is time for us to rebuild our ruins and attend to our own affairs.”

CHAPTER XIX

CONCLUSION

READERS who have had the patience to follow this book to the end will have noticed that most of the chapters close with a query. This is inevitable in any attempt to present the latest "cross-section" of a revolutionary process; but there is one final query which the readers, in their turn, may possibly address to the writers: "What is the significance of Turkey among the modern nations of the World? Does she really deserve to be placed on a par with Germany, for example, or with India, by being given a volume to herself? The Westernization of Turkey, which the writers have taken as their theme, may be of some interest to the professional historian, but is it not one of those curiosities of history which people of general culture may safely ignore?"

This is a natural and legitimate question, considering the unfavourable perspective in which Turkish history has usually been presented to Western eyes. The Ottoman Turks first appeared above our Western horizon as formidable infidels; and then, when their military and political power declined, we came to see them in the new but equally unfavourable light of exotic or scandalous barbarians. When the ordinary intelligent and cultivated Westerner hears pronounced the words "Near East" or "Ottoman Empire" or "Turkey" or "Modern Greece" or "Bulgaria" or "Armenia," his first association of ideas is with something very remote and dim; his second is painful—there come into his head the words "massacre," "atrocities," "refugee"—and his third is boring: he thinks of "pro-Turks" and "anti-Turks," "pro-Greeks" and "anti-Greeks," and the whole gloomy array of English, French, German and American cranks who are more fanatical in their partisanship for this or

that Near Eastern people than their protegés are in their own cause.

This "pro and anti" attitude towards the Near East is not only boring but barren to the last degree. In itself, it is a sure indication that the experts who display it—however much they may have travelled in their favourite Near Eastern country, and however assiduously they may have studied the facts, or a selection of the facts, relating to its history—are as remote in spirit from the Near East as the most ignorant layman. Such partisanship springs from sentimentality, and the sentimental attitude towards individuals or peoples (whether it be sentimental admiration or sentimental abhorrence) is incompatible with a true inward realization of the fact that these are human beings of like passions with ourselves.

Nevertheless, the realization of this fact is the indispensable key to an understanding of any human being by any other—whatever their respective sex, colour, class, religion or nationality may be—and nothing but this will open the way for Western observers to an understanding of the Turks and their neighbours. Whenever we are surprised or shocked at the difference of their behaviour in their circumstances from our behaviour in ours, we have to say to ourselves: "Here is a fellow human being in a situation of which I have no personal experience. If we changed places, how would he behave and how would I?"

Seen in this perspective, modern Turkey (like every other country or people, modern or ancient, in the world) becomes a humane study; but, beyond this general claim which Turkey may make upon the sympathetic but critical attention of the cultivated Westerner, there is a special feature in her contemporary history which renders it a significant phenomenon in the contemporary world.

The Westernization of Turkey, which has been taken as the

theme of this book designedly, is not a curiosity of history unrelated to the general movement of the times. It is a manifestation, in one local field, of a world-wide process which, in the immediate future, may conceivably have a decisive effect, for good or evil, upon the destinies of Mankind.

During the last few centuries, our Western society has been intruding upon the other civilizations of the world with ever greater insistence. First it has drawn them all into the meshes of its economic system; next it has enlarged the borders of its political ascendancy almost as far as the borders of its trade; and latterly it has been invading the life of its neighbours on the most intimate plane—the plane of social institutions and of spiritual emotions and ideas. This revolutionary process of Westernization, which at this moment is overtaking the Turks and many of their co-religionists in other Islamic countries, has already proceeded further among the Oriental Christian ex-subjects of the Turks in South-Eastern Europe and among their Oriental Christian ex-enemies in Russia, and it is actively at work among the Hindus and the Far Easterners. Thus, in studying the Westernization process in Turkey, we are increasing our understanding of the human world in which we ourselves live and move and have our being; for the issues with which the Turks have been confronted by their contact with the West are confronting other non-Western peoples the world over. Everywhere these peoples stand at the parting of the ways, with the choice of entering the camp of the Zealots or the camp of the Herodians. They can no longer remain neutral; for the West, in its restless activity, will not let them alone. Shall they accept the civilization of the West and attempt to adjust their own lives to it, or shall they reject it and attempt to cast it out as a devil which is seeking to possess their souls? Above the din and confusion in which this agonizing question is being debated in every part

of the world, certain authoritative but conflicting voices can be heard. From the deserts of North Africa and Arabia and from the Kremlin in Moscow, one voice summons the faithful to religious war against the Western capitalist or the Western infidel; from India, another voice exhorts the enlightened and the pure in heart to peaceful but uncompromising non-co-operation; while from Japan and Turkey a third voice claims to offer a practical compromise for practical men. Which of these voices will win the ear of those millions of Oriental Christians, Muslims, Hindus and Chinese who have still to make their decision?

APPENDIX

CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY

(20 April, 1924)

SECTION I

Fundamental Provisions

ARTICLE 1.—The Turkish State is a Republic.

ARTICLE 2.—The religion of the Turkish State is Islam ; the official language is Turkish ; the seat of government is Angora.

ARTICLE 3.—Sovereignty belongs without restriction to the nation.

ARTICLE 4.—The Grand National Assembly of Turkey is the sole lawful representative of the nation, and exercises sovereignty in the name of the nation.

ARTICLE 5.—The legislative and executive powers are vested and centered in the Grand National Assembly which concentrates these two powers in itself.

ARTICLE 6.—The Grand National Assembly of Turkey exercises the legislative power directly.

ARTICLE 7.—The Assembly exercises the executive power through the intermediary of the President of the Republic, whom it elects, and through a Cabinet chosen by him. The Assembly controls the acts of the government and may at any time withdraw power from it.

ARTICLE 8.—The judicial power is exercised in the name of the Assembly by independent tribunals constituted in accordance with the law.

SECTION II

The Legislative Power

ARTICLE 9.—The Grand National Assembly is composed of members elected by the nation in conformity with the electoral law.

ARTICLE 10.—Every Turkish citizen over the age of eighteen possesses the right to vote at legislative elections.

ARTICLE 11.—Every citizen over the age of thirty is eligible to election to the Grand National Assembly.

ARTICLE 12.—The following are ineligible to be deputies : those in the service of a foreign power, persons condemned to penal servitude, persons acknowledging foreign nationality, persons condemned for fraudulent bankruptcy, persons who have been deprived of their civil rights, and citizens who cannot read and write the Turkish language.

ARTICLE 13.—Legislative elections take place every four years. Members whose terms have expired are eligible for re-election. The Assembly which has reached the end of its term continues to sit until the meeting of the new Assembly.

In case it is impossible to proceed to legislative elections, the session of the legislature may be prolonged one year.

Each deputy represents not only the constituency which has elected him, but the whole nation.

ARTICLE 14.—The Grand National Assembly shall meet every year on the first day of November, without the necessity of convocation. The Assembly may not be in recess more than six months a year; such recesses are considered necessary for the purpose of permitting the deputies to visit and inspect their constituencies, of re-uniting the elements of control [of the executive power], and of rest and recreation.

ARTICLE 15.—Initiation of legislation rests with the members of the Assembly and the Cabinet.

ARTICLE 16.—On the day of their admission to the Assembly, the deputies take the following oath:

“I swear before God that I will have no other aim but the happiness and safety of the fatherland and the absolutely unrestricted sovereignty of the nation and that I will never forsake republican principles.”

ARTICLE 17.—The immunities of a member of the Grand National Assembly in the Chamber or elsewhere may not be challenged. A deputy who is accused of an infraction of the law, whether committed before or after his election to the Assembly, and whose interrogation or arrest is demanded by the responsible authorities, may be surrendered only by vote of the Assembly in case of flagrant crime. The execution of any judgment pronounced against a deputy before or after his election shall be suspended until the expiration of his legislative term. The statute of limitations, however, shall not be considered to operate during this term.

ARTICLE 18.—The annual salaries of deputies shall be fixed by special law.

ARTICLE 19.—If the Assembly is in recess, the President of the Republic or the President of the Council may convoke the Assembly in special session.

Likewise, if one-fifth of the number of deputies should demand the convocation of the Chamber in special session, the Chamber must re-convene.

ARTICLE 20.—The debates of the Grand National Assembly are held publicly and the reports of its debates are published without any modification of the text.

However, in conformity with its own rules of procedure, the Assembly may also meet in secret session. In such cases, it is for the Chamber to decide whether it is proper to publish the text of the discussions.

ARTICLE 21.—The debates of the Chamber are governed by its own rules of procedure, adopted in the same manner as ordinary legislation.

ARTICLE 22.—The Grand National Assembly includes among its powers the right of interpellation and of conducting investigations and parliamentary inquiries.

The method of transaction of such proceedings is governed by the regulations of the Assembly.

ARTICLE 23.—No person may hold simultaneously the office of deputy and any other public office.

ARTICLE 24.—The Grand National Assembly at the beginning of November in each year shall elect its president and three vice-presidents for the duration of one year.

ARTICLE 25.—When the Assembly by absolute majority votes to dissolve before the expiration of its term, the session of the new Assembly must begin the first of November following. A session held before that date is considered as an extraordinary session.

ARTICLE 26.—The Grand National Assembly itself executes the holy law; makes, amends, interprets and abrogates laws; concludes conventions and treaties of peace with other states; declares war; examines and ratifies laws drafted by the Commission on the Budget; coins money; accepts or rejects all contracts or concessions involving financial responsibility; decrees partial or general amnesty; mitigates sentences and grants pardons; expedites judicial investigations and penalties; executes definitive sentences of capital punishment handed down by the courts.

ARTICLE 27.—Only by a vote of two-thirds of the deputies may the Assembly impeach one of its members for high treason or for other crimes committed in the course of his legislative term.

If a deputy is liable to one of the penalties mentioned in Article 12 and if he is condemned by a court, he loses his seat as deputy.

ARTICLE 28.—Every deputy loses his office if he resigns, if as a result of unavoidable circumstances he is unable to attend the sessions, or if for two months he absents himself from the sessions without valid excuse or without permission, or if he accepts public office.

ARTICLE 29.—A deputy shall be elected to replace one who has lost his seat for the reasons enumerated in the preceding Articles or who is deceased.

ARTICLE 30.—The Assembly assures discipline and regulates its administration by its own rules of procedure, which are enforced by the President of the Assembly.

SECTION III

The Executive Power

ARTICLE 31.—The President of the Republic is elected by the Assembly from among its members for a period equivalent to that of the parliamentary term. The President exercises his functions until the election of a new President of the Republic. He is eligible for re-election.

ARTICLE 32.—The President of the Republic is the head of the State; in this capacity he presides over the Assembly on ceremonial occasions and in case of necessity over the Council of Commissioners.

During his entire term of office the President of the Republic may

not take part in the discussions or in the deliberations of the Assembly and may not vote

ARTICLE 33 —If the President of the Republic, by reason of illness, or travel outside the country, or for any other cause, cannot perform his duties or if as a result of his death, his resignation, or any other cause, the Presidency of the Republic is vacant, the President of the Assembly takes up his duties in the interim.

ARTICLE 34.—If, while the Assembly is in session the Presidency of the Republic becomes vacant, a new President is elected immediately

If the Assembly is not in session, it must be convoked at once by its President to elect the new President of the Republic

If the vacancy occurs at the end of the legislative term or if a new election has been ordered, the new Assembly shall elect the new President of the Republic

ARTICLE 35 —The President of the Republic shall promulgate in ten days of its enactment any law voted by the Assembly

The President of the Republic must return within ten days any law which he does not consider worthy of promulgation, together with a statement of his reasons, for consideration by the Assembly; amendments to the constitution and legislation concerning the Budget are not subject to the President's suspensive veto

The President is obliged to promulgate any law which is enacted by majority vote of the Assembly after reconsideration.

ARTICLE 36 —In November of each year, the President of the Republic delivers, or causes to be read by the President of the Council, an address concerning the activities of the government during the past year and the recommendations of the government for the year to come

ARTICLE 37 —The President of the Republic designates the diplomatic representatives of the Republic of Turkey in foreign countries and receives those from foreign states

ARTICLE 38 —After his election and in presence of the Assembly, the President of the Republic shall take the following oath

“ As President of the Republic I swear to dedicate myself exclusively to the respect, defence and execution of the laws of the Republic and of the principles of national sovereignty, to devote all my efforts loyally to assure the happiness of the Turkish nation, to contend with all my strength against every danger which may menace the Turkish state, to cherish and defend the glory and honour of Turkey, and in general to conduct myself so that I may never fail in the performance of the duties with which I am entrusted ”

ARTICLE 39 —All decrees promulgated by the President of the Republic shall be signed by the President of the Council and by the Commissioner within whose jurisdiction the measure lies

ARTICLE 40 —Supreme command of the army is vested in the Grand National Assembly, which is represented by the President of the Republic

The command of the military forces in time of peace shall be entrusted, according to special law, to the Chief of Staff, and in time of war to the person designated by the President of the Republic with the advice of the Cabinet and the approval of the Grand National Assembly

ARTICLE 41—The President of the Republic is responsible to the Grand National Assembly of Turkey only in case of high treason. The responsibility for all decrees promulgated by the President of the Republic, according to Article 39, devolves upon the head of the Cabinet and the responsible ministers whose signatures are affixed to the decrees. In case charges other than high treason are preferred against the President of the Republic, Article 17 of the Constitution, concerning legislative immunities, shall be applied.

ARTICLE 42—The President of the Republic, on the recommendation of the Government, may annul or commute the sentences of persons on account of long-continued illness or of old age. Nevertheless the President is not authorized to use this right in the case of members of the Council of Commissioners who may have been convicted by the Grand National Assembly.

ARTICLE 43—The salary of the President of the Republic shall be fixed by special law.

ARTICLE 44—The President of the Council [of Commissioners] is designated by the President of the Republic from among the deputies. The other commissioners [members of the Cabinet] are likewise chosen from among the deputies by the President of the Council who, after obtaining the approval of the President of the Republic, presents the list of the members of the Council to the Grand National Assembly. The Government must within a week present its programme to the Assembly and request a vote of confidence. If the Assembly is not in session, this is postponed until the new session.

ARTICLE 45—The commissioners, headed by their president constitute the "Council of Executive Commissioners."

ARTICLE 46—The members of the Council of Executive Commissioners are collectively responsible for the general policies of the government. Each member, individually, is likewise responsible within the scope of his authority for the general character of his policy and for the actions of his subordinates.

ARTICLE 47—The functions and responsibilities of the commissioners shall be defined by special law.

ARTICLE 48—The number of the commissioners shall be fixed by law.

ARTICLE 49—In case of leave of absence or for any other valid reason necessitating the absence of a commissioner, another member of the Council may be named to replace him temporarily but no commissioner may be charged with the duties of more than two departments at any one time.

ARTICLE 50 —A motion of the Grand National Assembly summoning a commissioner before the High Court entails the commissioner's removal from office

ARTICLE 51 —There shall be established a Council of State which shall be called upon to decide administrative controversies and to give its advice on contracts, concessions and proposed laws drafted and presented by the Government, and to perform specific duties which may be determined by law

The Council of State shall be composed of persons chosen by the Grand National Assembly, from among those who have held important posts who possess great experience, who are specialists, or who are otherwise qualified

ARTICLE 52 —With the advice of the Council of State, the Council of Commissioners shall promulgate regulations for the administration and execution of the law, provided that such regulations shall not contain new clauses. When the regulations are alleged to be contradictory to the law, the Grand National Assembly of Turkey is empowered to adjudicate the matter

SECTION IV

The Judicial Power

ARTICLE 53 —The organization, the jurisdiction, and the functions of the courts shall be determined by law

ARTICLE 54 —Judges are independent in the conduct of trials and in the rendering of their judgments. They shall be protected from any sort of intervention and are subject only to the law. Neither the legislative nor executive power may modify, alter, or delay execution of decisions of the courts

ARTICLE 55 —Judges may be recalled only in conformity with the procedure determined by law

ARTICLE 56 —The qualifications of magistrates, their rights and duties, as well as their salaries and the manner of their nomination and of their dismissal, shall be determined by special law

ARTICLE 57 —Judges may not assume any public or private office outside of that entrusted to them by law

ARTICLE 58 —Court trials are public. Nevertheless, a court may order a secret trial, in cases specified by the code of procedure

ARTICLE 59 —Every person is free to use all the legal means which he deems necessary to the defence of his rights before the courts of justice

ARTICLE 60 —No court may refuse to examine and pass judgment upon cases which are submitted to it and which fall within its jurisdiction. Cases which are outside its competency may be rejected only by a decision of the court itself

ARTICLE 61 —A High Court shall be constituted, the jurisdiction of

which shall include the trial of members of the Cabinet, members of the Council of State, the Attorney General, and members of the Court of Appeals in all questions pertaining to the performance of their duties

ARTICLE 62—The High Court shall be composed of twenty-one members, eleven of whom are chosen from among the members of the Court of Appeals and ten from among the members of the Council of State. The said members are elected by secret ballot by the plenary assemblies of each of these bodies. The members of the High Court elect by the same procedure a president and a vice-president.

ARTICLE 63—Trials shall be conducted by fourteen members and the president of the High Court, which shall reach its decision by majority vote. The remaining six members shall be considered as alternates, to be chosen by ballot, three from the Court of Appeals and three from the Council of State. The president and vice-president may not be chosen as alternates.

ARTICLE 64—The office of prosecutor-general of the High Court is filled by the Attorney General of the Republic.

ARTICLE 65—The decisions of the High Court are subject neither to appeal nor to annulment.

ARTICLE 66—The High Court shall apply only the provisions of existing laws in the examination of cases which are pleaded before it and in the judgments which it pronounces.

ARTICLE 67.—The High Court is constituted when necessary by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey.

SECTION V

Public Law of the Turks

ARTICLE 68—All citizens of Turkey are endowed at birth with liberty and full right to the enjoyment thereof. Liberty consists in the right to live and enjoy life without offence or injury to others. The only limitations on liberty—which is one of the natural rights of all—are those imposed in the interest of the rights and liberties of others. Such limitations on personal liberty shall be defined only in strict accordance with the law.

ARTICLE 69—All Turks are equal before the law and are obliged to respect the law. All privileges of whatever description claimed by groups, classes, families and individuals are abolished and forbidden.

ARTICLE 70—Inviolability of person, freedom of conscience, of thought, of speech, of press, freedom of travel and of contract, freedom of labour, freedom of private property, of assembly of association, freedom of incorporation, are among the natural rights of Turks.

ARTICLE 71—The life, the property, the honour, and the home of each and all are inviolable.

ARTICLE 72—Personal liberty shall not be restricted or interfered with except as provided by law.

ARTICLE 73—Torture, corporal punishment, confiscation and extortion are prohibited

ARTICLE 74—No one may be dispossessed of his property or deprived of the possession of his property except in the public interest In such cases the actual value of the expropriated property must previously have been paid No one shall be constrained to make any sort of sacrifice, other than such as may be imposed in extraordinary circumstances and in conformity with the law

ARTICLE 75—No one may be molested on account of his religion his sect, his ritual, or his philosophic convictions All religious observances shall be free on condition that they do not disturb the public peace, or shock public decency or exist in violation of social conventions or the law

ARTICLE 76—Except in specified cases and according to the form of procedure prescribed by law, the persons and the property of citizens shall be immune from search and molestation

ARTICLE 77—The press is free within the limits of the law and shall not be submitted to any censorship previous to publication

ARTICLE 78—The government shall not restrain the freedom of travel except during general mobilization or a state of siege, or following the declaration of an epidemic in the country

ARTICLE 79—Limitations upon freedom of contract, labour property, assembly, association and incorporation shall be determined by law

ARTICLE 80—Subject to the supervision and control of the State, education in all its forms is free on condition that it conforms to the law

ARTICLE 81—Letters, documents and packages transmitted through the mails may not be opened without an order from the Attorney General of the Republic and a decision of the competent court

The secrecy of telephone and telegraphic communications likewise is inviolable

ARTICLE 82—Any Turk, acting on his own behalf or on behalf of others may address petitions and make complaints either to the competent authority or to the Grand National Assembly of Turkey concerning acts and circumstances which he considers contradictory to the law Complaints or petitions may be offered by separate individuals or by several persons at the same time The reply to an individual complaint must be given in writing to the person concerned

ARTICLE 83—No one may be forced to appear before a court other than that to which he is subject by law

ARTICLE 84.—Taxes are the contribution of the people toward the general expenses of the State Any levy which does not contribute to the general expenses of the State, or any tax, tithe or contribution of any other nature imposed by individuals or by corporations other than the government or in the name of the government, is illegal.

ARTICLE 85—Taxes are levied in conformity with the law Taxes and contributions received in conformity with usage, either by the State

or by the local administration of the vilayets or municipalities, may continue to be collected until they have been regulated by law

ARTICLE 86—When the Council of Commissioners takes cognizance of the danger or imminence of war, or of internal sedition or conspiracy or intrigues directed against the nation or against the Republic, it may decree martial law, which shall not exceed the duration of one month, in all or part of the Turkish territory. This measure shall then be submitted to the Assembly for its approval as soon as possible. The Assembly may prolong or diminish the duration of martial law. In case the Assembly be not in session, it shall be convened immediately in special session. Martial law consists of the suspension or temporary restriction of the inviolability of the person, the home, freedom of the press, correspondence, association and incorporation. The zone placed under martial law, as well as the provisions to be applied and the procedure to be followed in this zone, shall be determined by special law. The suspension or restriction of personal liberty and personal inviolability in time of war likewise shall be regulated by law.

ARTICLE 87—Primary education is obligatory for all Turks and shall be gratuitous in the government schools.

ARTICLE 88—The name Turk, as a political term, shall be understood to include all citizens of the Turkish Republic, without distinction of, or reference to, race or religion. Every child born in Turkey, or in a foreign land of a Turkish father, any person whose father is a foreigner established in Turkey, who resides in Turkey, and who chooses upon attaining the age of twenty to become a Turkish subject, and any individual who acquires Turkish nationality by naturalization in conformity with the law, is a Turk. Turkish citizenship may be forfeited or lost in certain circumstances specified by law.

SECTION VI

Miscellaneous Provisions

ARTICLE 89—Turkey is divided into vilayets, based upon geographic situation and economic relationship. The vilayets [provinces or administrative districts] are subdivided into kazas [counties] the kazas into nahiyes [townships], the nahiyes into kassabas and villages.

ARTICLE 90—Each vilayet, together with its subdivisions, enjoys a separate entity.

ARTICLE 91—The affairs of the vilayets are administered and governed by law, in accordance with the principles of local autonomy and the separation of functions.

Government Officials and Employees

ARTICLE 92—Any duly qualified citizen of Turkey, in full possession of his rights of citizenship, is eligible to appointment as an official or employee of the government.

ARTICLE 93—The duties and privileges of government officials, including the procedure in their nomination and dismissal, shall be determined by special law

ARTICLE 94—In cases of violation of the law the obedience of a subordinate to the orders of his superiors does not diminish the responsibility of the subordinate.

Finance

ARTICLE 95—The proposed Budget (budgetary balance law) shall be placed before the Assembly at the opening of the session, that is, no later than the first of November

ARTICLE 96—No expenditure of public funds may be made except as provided for in the Budget or authorized by special law

ARTICLE 97—The Budget shall be adopted for one year only

ARTICLE 98—The statement of final accounting shall give in detail the amounts of the receipts and expenditures during the fiscal year

ARTICLE 99—The statement of final accounting must be placed before the Assembly without fail not later than the first of November of the second year following the end of the fiscal year which the report covers

ARTICLE 100—A Special Court of Accounts shall be established to control the revenues and expenditures of the State on behalf of the National Assembly and in accordance with the law

ARTICLE 101—The Court of Accounts shall present a statement of audit and verification within six months after the Commissioner of Finance shall have submitted to the Assembly his statement of final accounting

Amendments to the Constitution

ARTICLE 102—Amendments to or modifications of this Constitution may be made only upon the following conditions The proposal to amend must be signed by at least one-third of the total number of deputies The proposed amendment must be thereafter discussed by the Assembly and adopted by vote of two-thirds of the total number of deputies

No proposal to alter or amend Article 1 of this Constitution specifying that the form of government is a Republic, shall be entertained

ARTICLE 103—None of the provisions of this Constitution may be arbitrarily modified on any pretext, neither may the enforcement of any provision be suspended

No law shall be in contradiction to the Constitution

ARTICLE 104—The Constitutional Law of 1878 (1293) together with its amendments and the Organic Law of January 30, 1921 (1337), and the amendments thereto are hereby annulled

ARTICLE 105—The present Constitution shall be considered in force immediately upon publication.

Provisional Article

The sections of the law of December 19, 1923, regulating the status of military officials who have been elected or are eligible to election to the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, shall remain temporarily in force.

Voted and published 20 April, 1924 (1340)

NOTE ON BOOKS

The best recent comprehensive work on the subject of the present volume is *Modern Turkey, a politico-economic interpretation, 1908-1923 inclusive, with selected chapters by representative authorities*, edited by E G MEARS—(Macmillan Company, New York, 1924) This book contains a chronology, texts of select documents, and an ample bibliography—to which the reader may be referred.

The following books may be mentioned here by way of illustration For the institutions of the old Ottoman Empire see LYBYER, A. H., *The Government of the Ottoman Empire in the time of Suleiman the Magnificent*—(Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1913), for the political and economic rivalry of the European Great Powers in the Near East during the generation preceding the wars of 1911-22, see EARLE, E M., *Turkey, the Great Powers and the Bagdad Railway*—(Macmillan Company, New York, 1923), for the Revolution of 1919-22 see PRICR, C., *The Revirth of Turkey*—(Seltzer, New York, 1923) and TOYNBEE, A. J., *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey, a Study in the Contact of Civilizations*—(Constable London, 1922), for the Lausanne Conference see British Blue Book Cmd. 1814 of 1923 (Records of Proceedings [during the first part of the Conference] and draft terms of peace) and *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, edited by H W V TEMPERLEY and published under the auspices of the British Institute of International Affairs—(Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1924) vol. vi and *A Survey of International Affairs, 1920-1923*, written by A. J TOYNBEE and published under the auspices of the British Institute of International Affairs—(Oxford University Press, London, 1925), for the text (French and English) of the Lausanne Treaty see British Blue Book Cmd 1929 of 1923 The history of the Mosul Question since the coming into force of the Lausanne Treaty can be followed in the Official Publications of the League of Nations

The reader who wishes to explore the historical background more thoroughly may be referred to the following select bibliography

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CHRONOLOGY

(Dates according to the Christian Era, not the Hijrah)

<i>Centuries and Years</i>	
VII c.-X c. X c.-XIV c	RISE OF BYZANTINE CIVILIZATION in the Near East BREAKDOWN OF BYZANTINE CIVILIZATION (965-1019, catastrophic war between the Greeks and the Bulgarians, eleventh century, first wave of alien invaders (Normans and Saljūq Turks), thirteenth century, second wave of alien invaders (Crusaders and Ottoman Turks))
XIII c - circa 1373	RISE OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE (circa 1230-40, Arrival of Ertogrūl and his band from Central Asia and their settlement in north-western Anatolia, 1289-1326 reign of Ertogrūl's son 'Osman ('Uthmān), from whom the Osmanli took their name, 1326 conquest of Brusa 1354 conquest of Gallipoli, 1360-1 conquest of Thrace from the Aegean to the Black Sea, 1361-2 the Byzantine Government of Constantinople bound itself to furnish a contingent to the Ottoman Army, 1369 Bulgaria accepted Ottoman suzerainty, 1371-2 conquest of Macedonia, 1373 Constantinople definitively accepted Ottoman suzerainty)
Circa 1373-1774	THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE FLOURISH (1389 victory over the Serbs at Kosovo, 1391 siege laid to Constantinople, 1402 defeat of Sultan Bāyazīd at Angora by Timūr postponed the completion of the Ottoman conquest of the Near East, reign of Mehmed II (1451-81), 1430-75 conquests rounded off by annexation of Salonica (1430) Constantinople (1453), Trebizond (1461), Qaraman (1465) and Kaffa and Tana (1475), sixteenth century Ottoman bid for world-power (1514 defeat of Shāh Ismā'il Safawī and annexation of Mosul, A.D 1516-17 conquest of Syria, Egypt, the Hijāz and the Yaman, 1520-66 reign of Suleiman the Magnificent; 1521 conquest of Belgrade, 1526 victory over the Hungarians at Mohacz, 1529 first siege of Vienna, 1534 first conquest of Baghdad, 1639 second conquest of Baghdad, 1683 second siege of Vienna, 1683-99 first disastrous war against a coalition headed by the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1768-74 disastrous war against Russia, ending in the Peace Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarja)

Circa 1774-1919

BREAK-UP OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE (1783 Russia annexed the Crimea and established her suzerainty south of the Caucasus, over Georgia, 1789-1807 reign of Selim III, 1792 Russia conquered Oczakov and thereby alarmed William Pitt, 1798-1801 French occupation of Egypt, 1805 Mehmed 'Ali made himself master of Egypt, 1804-17 Serbian War of Independence, 1808-39 reign of Mahmüd II, 1821-29 Greek War of Independence, 1831-33 conquest of Syria and invasion of Anatolia by Mehmed 'Ali, 1839-41 settlement between the Ottoman Government and Mehmed 'Ali through the intervention of the European Great Powers, 1854-6 Crimean War ending in the Peace Treaty of Paris, 1875-8 Herzegovinian revolt and Russo-Turkish War ending in the Treaty of Berlin 1876 Midhat Pasha's parliamentary constitution introduced and overthrown, 1878 autonomy of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia and Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina 1881 French protectorate established over Tunis Council of the Ottoman Public Debt created, 1882 British occupation of Egypt, 1876-1909 reign of 'Abdu l-Hamid II, 1908 "Young Turk" Revolution carried out by the Committee of Union and Progress at Salonica, 1908 Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina and Bulgaria declared her independence 1909 attempted counter-revolution and deposition of Abdu l-Hamid, 1911-12 Turco-Italian War and Turkish cession of Tripoli-Benghazi, 1912-13 the Balkan Wars and loss of all Ottoman territory west of Adrianople, 1914-18 the Great War, in which Turkey intervened on 28 October 1914, 30 October, 1918, the Armistice of Mudros, 15 May, 1919, landing of Greek troops at Smyrna

NB—From the Spring of 1919 onwards, the course of events in Turkey is dealt with in detail in the main body of the book Any reader who wishes to see these most recent events set out in tabular form may be referred to the Chronology (1908 to 1923 inclusive) in E G Mears *Modern Turkey*, pp 584-607 and the table of dates (1914 to 1922 inclusive) in A J Toynbee, *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey*, second edition

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
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
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