

**CENTRAL
AND
SOUTH EAST
EUROPE
1945-1948**

edited by
R. R. BETTS

BULGARIA *by* **PHYLLIS AUTY**
CZECHOSLOVAKIA *by* **R. R. BETTS**
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POLAND *by* **BRIAN IRELAND**
ROUMANIA *by* **E. D. TAPPE**
YUGOSLAVIA *by* **PHYLLIS AUTY**

**ROYAL INSTITUTE
OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS**

THE PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY IS TO provide a handy record of those political and economic events in Central and South East Europe which, since its liberation from the Germans, have transformed society and government there. The story of events during the three fateful years 1945-8 has been re-counted for each country in turn, in the order of their liberation: that is, starting with Roumania, and proceeding to Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Poland to Czechoslovakia, which was the last to be freed. Each chapter has been written by a British student who has a direct as well as an academic knowledge of the country which he or she treats. E. D. Tappe, Lecturer in Roumanian at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies in the University of London, has written the chapter on Roumania; Miss Phyllis Auty, Lecturer in the History of South-eastern Europe in the same School, has written the chapters on Bulgaria and Yugoslavia; Miss Elizabeth Wiskemann the chapter on Hungary; Brian Ireland that on Poland; and Professor Betts, Masaryk Professor of Central European History in the University of London, in addition to editing the whole book, has contributed the chapter on Czechoslovakia, and a concluding chapter whose object is to present a general picture of events in the whole area and to see whether any pattern of cause and event is discernible.

Price 18s. net

CENTRAL AND SOUTH EAST EUROPE
1945—1948

THE ROYAL INSTITUTE
OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

London: Chatham House, St James's Square, S.W.1
New York: 542 Fifth Avenue, New York 19, N.Y.

Toronto *Bombay*
Melbourne *Wellington* *Cape Town*
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

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R. R. BETTS

*Masaryk Professor of Central
European History in the University
of London*

London & New York
ROYAL INSTITUTE
OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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First published 1950

**PRINTED AND BOUND IN GREAT BRITAIN
BY JOHN GARDNER (PRINTERS) LTD
LIVERPOOL**

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PREFACE

THIS study has been written for the Royal Institute of International Affairs in order to provide a handy record of those political and economic events in central and south-eastern Europe which, since its liberation from the Germans, have transformed society and government there. The story of events during three fateful years has been recounted for each country in turn in the order of their liberation, that is, starting with Roumania, and proceeding by way of Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Hungary and Poland, to Czechoslovakia, which was the last to be freed. Each chapter has been written by a British student who has a direct as well as an academic knowledge of the country of which he or she treats. Mr E. D. Tappe, lecturer in Roumanian at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies in the University of London, has written the chapter on Roumania ; Miss Phyllis Auty, lecturer in the history of south-eastern Europe in the same School, has written the chapters on Bulgaria and Yugoslavia ; Miss Elizabeth Wiskemann the chapter on Hungary, and Mr Brian Ireland that on Poland. I have contributed the chapter on Czechoslovakia as well as the concluding chapter, in which I have attempted to present a general picture of events in the whole area and to see whether any pattern of cause and event is discernible.

We have confined ourselves as much as possible to narrative, but, in so far as what is told and the manner of the telling is itself a commentary, we are individually and separately responsible for any judgements which emerge in the course of the story.

The book is strictly limited to the years 1945 to 1948, and makes no attempt to deal with events since the end of 1948. The manuscript was completed in January 1949, but unavoidable delays in publication have inevitably made the narrative incomplete. Much has happened in central and south-eastern Europe during 1949, notably the exacerbation of the struggle between State and Church and the elimination from the ruling Communist groups of dissidents like Gomólka, Kostov, and Rajk. The nationalization of economy has been pushed much further ; the progress towards industrialization and the communalization of agriculture has continued ; Yugoslavia has successfully persisted in its defiance of the Cominform. But though trends and policies which were noticeable in 1948 have become clearer, and more sharply marked, I do

PREFACE

not feel that 1949 has seen any revolutionary developments in the policy of the central and south east European States, or in Soviet Russia's policy with regard to them. I have therefore left the book more or less as it was when it was written, making only such emendations as events have shown to be necessary. The whole record is, of course, limited in all respects by the information available, which far too often falls short of what a historian or an economist would like to have.

R. R. BETTS

London, January 1950



"GEOGRAPHIA" LTD.

**CENTRAL AND SOUTH EAST EUROPE : FRONTIERS
IN 1928 AND IN 1938**

CHAPTER ONE

ROUMANIA

BY E. D. TAPPE

ROUMANIAN territory at the time of the Armistice was much as the cessions of 1940 had made it. On 28 June 1940 the U.S.S.R. had occupied Bessarabia (area 17,000 square miles) and northern Bucovina (area 2,260 square miles). Though recovered in 1941 these territories had since been reconquered by the U.S.S.R. On 21 August 1940 Roumania had, by the treaty of Craiova, ceded southern Dobrogea (area 2,960 square miles) to Bulgaria, restoring the frontier of 1912. Finally on 30 August the Second Vienna Award gave Hungary northern Transylvania and the three 'Szekler' provinces (area 17,500 square miles). Roumania had thus lost a total of some 40,000 square miles, but by no means the whole of the population of the ceded districts, a large part of which had migrated into the territory still left.

The material damage inflicted by the war was less striking than the loss in casualties. Precise figures have never been published, but in May 1943 Antonescu announced losses as already 500,000. It is probable that by the time of the Armistice 300,000 to 400,000 men had been killed. The damage to property occurred chiefly in northern Moldavia where there was severe fighting and in the towns such as Bucharest and Ploesti which were subjected to Allied air raids. The damage to dwellings is estimated at 25,000 out of two million.

The economy of the country was strained, but not irreparably, the Germans being skilful at keeping up the flow of exports to Germany without causing a breakdown in the Roumanian economic system. The figures for the cost of living show how Roumania was really suffering from this drain and yet that later on Roumanians were justified in looking back with longing to the pre-Armistice period as a time of comparative plenty. The cost of living index (based on 100 as the figure for 1937) was 152 in 1940 and 653 in 1944. (The figures for the United Kingdom were 121 in 1940 and 151 in 1944). In 1945 it leaped to 3,860, and just before the currency reform of 1947 was 552,000.

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The state of the national morale had very closely followed the curve of military achievement. The war against the U.S.S.R. had certainly not been unpopular at first. Probably even when the lost territories of northern Bucovina and Bessarabia had been recovered and Antonescu went on to annex 'Transnistria' with Odessa as the capital (18 October 1941), few Roumanians felt any serious qualms. But when the advance stopped at Stalingrad and more and more Roumanian lives were lost without any corresponding gain, discontent grew. Then the German and Roumanian armies were driven back, and on 2 April 1944 the Red Army crossed the frontier into Moldavia. Roumanian participation in the war had been only in a small degree due to affection for the Germans; it was inspired by the desire to recover the lost territories and by the traditional hatred and fear of Russia. Now that the Germans were failing, there was only this anti-Russian feeling to inspire resistance, and it was probably to some extent weakened by the Soviet Government's declaration in April 1944 that the U.S.S.R. aimed neither at acquiring Roumanian territory nor at altering Roumania's social structure, and that the sole purpose of Soviet operations was to clear the country of enemy troops.

This decline of morale in the face of imminent defeat at last made it possible for the anti-German forces to act. The Antonescu regime was a dictatorship, but one not based on the support of a political party. The Iron Guard, with whose support Marshal Antonescu had originally come to power, had been crushed by him in its attempted rebellion of January 1941, after which he and his vice-Premier (Mihai Antonescu) had governed with a cabinet of army officers. The leaders of the Iron Guard and many of the rank and file had fled to Germany; those who remained in the country lay low. The traditional parties were also forbidden to be politically active, though their leaders were at liberty. The National Peasant Party was potentially the strongest, the Liberal Party was in decline, the Social Democratic Party was small. The Communist Party, which had been illegal since 1924, was very small indeed, and its leaders were mostly in the U.S.S.R. At no time was there any large-scale resistance movement. The leaders of the Peasant and Liberal Parties contented themselves with written protests to Antonescu against his continued sacrifice of Roumanian lives after the lost territories had been recovered.

The outstanding personality in the country and the one with the most prestige was Iuliu Maniu, the leader of the National

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Peasant Party, the 'grand old man' of Roumanian politics. The still more aged Dinu Brătianu, leader of the Liberals, had the prestige of his family. The leader of the Social Democrats was Titel Petrescu, and the Communists in Roumania were led by Lucrețiu Pătrășcanu. These four men in June 1944 signed a declaration creating the 'National Democratic Bloc' of their four parties. In the Government the only person who counted besides Marshal Antonescu himself (a harsh and autocratic man, but not notably unprincipled or corrupt) was Mihai Antonescu, whom Goebbels regarded as pro-British, but who was, it seems, merely shifty. King Michael and his mother Queen Helen had as far as possible been kept in the background by Marshal Antonescu. The King's character had not been tested yet, but it was he who must play the chief role in Antonescu's overthrow, because he alone had at his disposal the physical means of arresting the Dictator and the prestige of a position above party politics which could unite the nation after the Dictator's downfall. Preparations were made for the coup d'état; Prince Știrbey and Mr Constantin Vișoianu were sent to Cairo in August to ask the Allies for armistice terms; then on 23 August King Michael acted.

ROUMANIA AFTER THE COUP D'ÉTAT

The 'great historic act of 23 August 1944', as it used to be called in Roumanian speeches and newspapers throughout the following winter, called for considerable skill and resolution on King Michael's part. Antonescu was summoned to the Palace in the afternoon and came suspecting nothing. When the King demanded his resignation, Antonescu refused and began to bluster. The King then summoned aid and had him arrested. In the evening King Michael broadcast from Bucharest radio his acceptance of the Allies' armistice terms. A coalition government was announced on the following day representing the four main 'democratic' parties: the National Peasants, the Liberals, the Social Democrats, and the Communists. The Prime Minister was General Sănătescu, Marshal of the Royal Court, who had been the connecting link between the King and the army in the coup d'état. With the restoration on 4 September of the constitution which King Carol had abolished in 1938, constitutional government seemed to have returned both in theory and practice.

But the military situation was at first chaotic. On 24 August heavy fighting had taken place between German and Roumanian troops, and the Luftwaffe had attacked Bucharest

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and other towns. Next day the Roumanian Government announced by radio that it had offered to allow the orderly withdrawal of German troops, but that the Germans, after giving assurances, had committed acts of aggression. Germany had therefore placed herself in a state of war with Roumania. The Roumanian army now fought alongside the Soviet army and under the command of Marshal Malinovsky. The first stages of the German retreat were rapid, but once within the Carpathians their resistance stiffened and they were not finally cleared from Transylvania until the end of October. During the liberation of Hungary and Czechoslovakia and until the collapse of Germany, Roumania kept from sixteen to twenty divisions fighting alongside the Soviet troops. The casualties which she sustained on the side of the Allies amounted to 169,822, including 111,379 dead and severely wounded.

The armistice was signed in Moscow on 12 September. It is said to differ considerably from the terms which the Roumanians had accepted at Cairo. Of the terms of the armistice as actually signed the most noteworthy are the following: Roumania was to provide in Roumanian currency the funds required by the Allied (Soviet) High Command for the exercise of its functions and to place at its disposal if necessary industrial and transport undertakings, communications, power stations, public utilities, fuel supplies, and food and other materials on Roumanian soil, as well as services according to the High Command's instructions. Reparations to the U.S.S.R. were fixed at 300 million U.S. dollars payable over six years in goods. The Soviet-Roumanian frontier of the 1940 agreement was restored, and Transylvania or the greater part of it was to be returned to Roumania. The armistice Control Commission was theoretically tripartite, but both British and American representatives were to find all their efforts to take a real part in the work of the Control Commission frustrated by the Russians.

On 5 October the cabinet took the decision to purge all those who had been responsible for the pro-Fascist policy of 1938-44. In the course of the month the divisions in the cabinet became obvious. The Communists and Social Democrats, together with two smaller left-wing parties, the 'Ploughmen's Front' and the 'Union of Patriots', formed the 'National Democratic Front' (F.N.D.) and demanded a greater share of power in the government. They accused

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Maniu and Brătianu of opposing essential reforms and of not wholeheartedly carrying out the Soviet alliance. At the beginning of November General Vinogradov, vice-President of the Allied Control Commission, protested to the Prime Minister at the delay in fulfilling the armistice terms, alleging a lack of good will on the part of the Government and demanding immediate implementation of the terms. This brought about the fall of the first Sănătescu Government.

On 5 November General Sănătescu formed his second Government, in which the F.N.D. had increased representation. Within a week this Government decreed (a) the arrest of all former members of the Iron Guard; (b) the repeal of Antonescu's racial legislation; (c) the expulsion, after the end of the war, of 300,000 Germans born in Roumania. Nevertheless the second Sănătescu Government lasted less than a month and on 2 December General Niculae Rădescu, Chief of the Roumanian General Staff, became Prime Minister, forming a cabinet identical with that of his predecessor. General Rădescu had been imprisoned during the war for writing an open letter to the German Minister in Bucharest, von Killinger, protesting against his interference in the internal affairs of Roumania. The Soviet Mission of the Allied Control Commission, knowing of his opposition to the German domination and to Roumania's participation in the war against Russia, had expressly requested his appointment as Chief of Staff in place of General Mihail. What is more, Emil Bodnăraş, on behalf of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, had offered him the command of *Apărarea Patriotică* (Patriotic Defence), a Communist militia numbering 100,000 and consisting of workers who had been armed to assist in expelling the Germans and who had not subsequently been compelled to give up their arms as the non-Communist militia had. Rădescu's refusal of this offer showed that he had no Communist inclinations, and when he proceeded to negotiate for the formation of a government, Ana Pauker, at his interview with the Central Committee of the Communist Party, said bluntly, 'We don't want a Rădescu Government!' Nevertheless the Communists agreed to enter it and accepted Rădescu's conditions that they should suppress the Communist militia and postpone agrarian reform until the Roumanian troops were home from the war.

It soon became clear that the Communists had no intention of respecting these conditions and that they aimed at a Communist-controlled Government. They organized attacks in

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the provinces on centres of local administration with the object of replacing the legitimate officials by Communists. On 16 January 1945 Gheorghiu-Dej, Secretary-General of the Communist Party and Minister of Communications, returning from a visit to Moscow, gave the following instructions to the F.N.D. : (a) to undertake action aimed at overthrowing the Rădescu Government and installing a purely F.N.D. one ; (b) to eliminate Maniu from public life ; (c) to begin an agitation for immediate agrarian reform. By the beginning of February Rădescu's relations with the Russians were deteriorating. When he tried to restore order in the country, the Soviet Mission would summon him for long interviews and accuse him of preventing the people from demonstrating freely. Communist activity was intensified by the Yalta Declaration and by Rădescu's decision to organize free parliamentary elections. The Communist Under Secretaries of State in various ministries sabotaged the work of their departments and refused to resign when the Prime Minister called upon them to do so. He obtained a decree suppressing their posts, but they remained and sent orders to local authorities inciting them to acts of rebellion against the Government. Teohari Georgescu, Under Secretary at the Minister of the Interior, incited peasants to seize land. Meanwhile the press, completely Communist-controlled now that the Soviet Mission had suppressed the last opposition journal, accused Rădescu of sabotaging the fulfilment of the armistice terms. Yet Vishinsky himself had told Rădescu that he had no complaints on this count, and had repeated this in a public speech at Bucharest on 6 February. Rădescu, unable to make statements through the press, had recourse to a public meeting on 11 February and to a broadcast on 12 February. These speeches were not mentioned by any newspaper. Roumanian Communist press articles were broadcast on the Roumanian service of Radio Moscow, and the Red Army's official Roumanian paper, *Graul Nou*, began to attack Rădescu openly.

The crisis reached its climax in the last week of February. On 24 February mass demonstrations against the Government were organized in Bucharest and in some provincial towns. In the evening eight persons were killed in Bucharest by a burst of firing near the Ministry of the Interior. The Communists declared that troops had fired on the demonstrators. Rădescu maintains that the troops had obeyed their orders not to fire, even when the Communists fired on the Royal Palace and other public buildings, and that the eight demonstrators

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were fired on by a lorry-load of Communists. He claims that the autopsy showed the bullets to be of a small calibre not issued to the Roumanian army. After the firing he had promptly broadcast a bitter indictment of those who were causing the disturbances and named as the leaders the Communists Vasile Luca (Secretary-General of the F.N.D.) and Ana Pauker (like Luca a member of the Secretariat of the Communist Party). Next day the press condemned Rădescu as a criminal and demanded his execution. These articles were broadcast in the Roumanian service of Radio Moscow, and the Soviet Mission took over Radio Bucharest.

THE COMMUNIST REGIME

The most significant day in the history of post-war Roumania is 27 February 1945. On that day Mr Vishinsky arrived in Bucharest, while the Soviet High Command occupied the headquarters of the Roumanian General Staff and other Government buildings and disarmed the Roumanian troops in the capital and some of the gendarmes. Vishinsky saw the King and demanded Rădescu's resignation, alleging : (a) that Rădescu had not succeeded in keeping order ; (b) that he had prevented the expression of the people's will, and ordered troops and police to fire on peaceful crowds ; (c) that he had plotted against the Red Army and concentrated 70,000 Roumanian troops in Bucharest. (Rădescu replied on the last count that, owing to the demands on the Roumanian army for the war against Germany, there were only three divisions of 3,000 men each, ill-equipped, in the whole of Roumania, and that of these only a third were in the capital). On 28 February Rădescu resigned. The King invited Prince Ştirbey, who had played a leading part in negotiating the armistice, to form a Government, but the Russians were determined to install the F.N.D. Vishinsky was ruthless, even violent—this was the occasion when, as he left the room where the King received him, he banged the door so forcibly that he cracked the plaster round it!—and the King was forced to summon Dr Petre Groza, leader of the Ploughmen's Front and vice-Premier in the Rădescu Government. On 6 March the composition of the new cabinet was announced. It consisted entirely of F.N.D. and of dissident Liberals and National Peasants, the true Liberal and National Peasant parties being quite unrepresented. Mr Gheorghe Tătărescu, leader of the Dissident Liberals, who was so compromised by his past actions that he was one of the most obvious persons to try as a war criminal

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(for his encouragement of anti-Semitism, his dealings with the Iron Guard on behalf of King Carol, and his collaboration with Hitler) now became vice-Premier and Foreign Minister. The Ministry of the Interior was held by Teohari Georgescu. The tension between the Russian representatives in Bucharest and those of Britain and America was greatly increased by Rădescu's action in seeking sanctuary with the British Political Representative. This situation continued for about two months, when finally Rădescu left the British Legation on a guarantee from Tătărescu that he would receive the normal protection accorded by the law to every Roumanian citizen. He then remained in almost complete isolation in a private house watched by the police until his escape by aeroplane to Cyprus in June 1946.

The Russians at once showed a very different attitude to the Groza Government from that which they had shown to its predecessor. On 9 March Stalin granted Groza's request for the reincorporation of northern Transylvania into Roumania. This had long been a sore point. In its turn the Groza Government pushed forward measures which had been held up under its predecessors, and on 20 March produced the long awaited land reform. This decree confiscated the land of various classes of persons such as war criminals, and expropriated all land in excess of fifty hectares belonging to private individuals. Certain bodies such as co-operatives and schools were exempted from the expropriation. The redistribution was to be done by local committees, and the size of the allotments, which were inalienable, was not to exceed five hectares. The recipients were to pay an indemnity to the State, equal to the average annual produce calculated per hectare, either in money or in kind. Agricultural machines became State property; draught animals and other equipment were distributed. How much loss to production was caused by this reform owing to the uncertainty of tenure felt both by the expropriated landowners and the new recipients cannot be estimated since there were so many other factors at work, notably the disorganization caused by the war, and the severe droughts of 1945 and 1946. The effect of the reform has been to increase the number of very small holdings (1,039,650 hectares were divided among 822,170 'ploughmen') and of State farms (242 were set up with an area of 85,387 hectares, making with model farms already in existence a total of 261). The Government also pushed on with the trial of war criminals, setting up 'People's Courts' for the purpose. That it took

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any real steps to improve the economic condition of the country is not clear. But since no real improvement was possible as long as the Russians continued to remove machinery and to drain the country of livestock, food, and manufactured goods under the terms of the armistice, the initiative in that lay necessarily with the U.S.S.R.

On 4 August the U.S.S.R. resumed diplomatic relations with Roumania. This was the Groza Government's reward for its services to the Russian cause, but Britain and America were not prepared to resume diplomatic relations. On 20 August Mr Bevin told the House of Commons that the Roumanian Government did not, in the view of the British Government, represent the majority of the people. 'The forms of government [in Bulgaria, Roumania and Hungary] which have been set up do not impress us as being sufficiently representative to meet the requirements of diplomatic relations'.¹ King Michael thereupon asked Dr Groza to resign so as to allow the formation of a government in Roumania which might be recognized by Britain and America and which could join the United Nations. He then left Bucharest for Sinaia, breaking off relations with the Government and refusing to sign decrees.

The U.S.S.R. did not, however, weaken in its support of the Government. On 4 September Groza, Tătărescu, and others were received in Moscow, accusing Maniu and Brătianu of sowing discord between the Government and the people on one hand and King Michael on the other. Already on 28 August the Ministry of the Interior had announced the discovery of two terrorist organizations, including followers of Rădescu and of Maniu, which had planned the overthrow of the Government and the assassination of its members. Then on 9 September *Izvestia* alleged that King Michael had acted under pressure from the British and American representatives on the Allied Control Commission, acting without the knowledge of their Russian colleague. The article also claimed that the Groza Government had achieved the effective realization of land reform, had carried out measures to cure Roumania's economic dislocation, and taken steps to punish war criminals and root out Fascist elements. (It is difficult to see what the reference to economic measures could mean unless it referred to the setting up of joint Soviet-Roumanian enterprises—the Russian 50 per cent of capital being largely in the form of German assets taken over as reparations—which had already

¹ 413 H.C. Deb. 5 s., 291

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begun. Such joint companies were set up for banking, transport, publishing, and the oil industry in 1945, and again recently for the production of film apparatus and distribution of films and for the production of tractors and chemicals). The Roumanian ministers' stay in Moscow ended on 12 September with a communiqué announcing a relaxation by the U.S.S.R. of the economic terms of the armistice.

The Council of Foreign Ministers had meanwhile met in London with the Roumanian Peace Treaty upon the agenda. On 18 September Mr Molotov told a press conference that in the Soviet view the Roumanian Government was democratic and enjoyed the confidence of the overwhelming majority of the people. The Balkan discussions in the Council were protracted but quite fruitless, and at the beginning of October they broke down. King Michael continued to refuse to sign his Government's decrees. His birthday (8 November) was the occasion of disturbances in Bucharest. A crowd demonstrated its loyalty outside the Palace. Lorry-loads of Communists armed with sticks drove through the crowd to disperse it. Two of the lorries were overturned by the crowd and set on fire, and shots were fired on the demonstrators from the Ministry of the Interior. Numerous arrests took place on the spot, and for days afterwards members of the National Peasant and Liberal parties were arrested and taken for interrogation.

The impasse in Roumania was eventually solved by the Moscow Conference, which agreed not only that the peace treaty should be drafted by the U.S.S.R., the United States, and Great Britain, but also issued the following communiqué :

The three Governments are prepared to give King Michael the advice for which he asked in his letter of 21 August 1945 on the broadening of the Roumanian Government.

The King should be advised that one member of the National Peasant Party and one member of the Liberal Party should be included in the Government. The Commission referred to below shall satisfy itself that :

(a) they are truly representative members of the parties not represented in the Government ;

(b) they are suitable and will work loyally with the Government.

The three Governments take note that the Roumanian Government thus reorganized should declare that free and unfettered elections will be held as soon as possible on the basis of universal and secret ballot. All democratic and anti-Fascist parties should have the right to take part in these elections and to put forward candidates. The reorganized Government should give assurances of freedom of the press, speech, religion, and association.

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Mr A. Vishinsky, Mr Harriman, and Sir Archibald Clarke-Kerr are authorized as a Commission to proceed to Bucharest immediately to consult with King Michael and members of the present Government with a view to the execution of the above-mentioned tasks. As soon as these tasks are accomplished and the required assurances have been received, the Roumanian Government, with which the Soviet Government maintains diplomatic relations, will be recognized by the United States and the United Kingdom.

The Commission arrived in Bucharest on 31 December. The opposition nominees, Brătianu and Mihalache, were rejected by the Government. The Liberals in their turn refused Groza's request for a list of four nominees from which the Government should choose two. On 7 January it was announced that the Government had accepted Mr Hățieganu as the National Peasant representative and Mr Romniceanu as the Liberal. At the same time the Government undertook (1) to hold general elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot, with the participation of all democratic and anti-Fascist parties willing to nominate candidates, (2) to guarantee freedom of the press, speech, religion, and association. These assurances were amplified orally to the Commission by Dr Groza on 9 January, and he alleged that all concentration camps had been closed and that political prisoners still under arrest did not exceed ten in number. And so, on 5 February, Great Britain and the United States agreed to recognize the Groza Government on the basis of the assurances given in its statement of 8 January and of its oral assurances to the Commission on 9 January.

But events were to show that the British and Americans had not won a victory; they had simply saved face. The inclusion of the two opposition ministers had no effect on the policy of the Government. One of the main points of an Anglo-American protest of 27 May was that the two opposition ministers had not been regularly consulted in advance of all current legislation and were unable to carry out their duties and functions satisfactorily owing to the non-cooperation of the Roumanian Government. 'Its assurances', complained the Note, 'were not being satisfactorily implemented either in the letter or in the spirit.' No electoral bill had been promulgated nor date for the elections announced. The allocation of newsprint prevented the opposition from publishing newspapers; the censorship suppressed important declarations by Allied statesmen; organized groups of roughs attacked those attending opposition or non-Party meetings. The Roumanian

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reply (3 June) contradicted these statements and declared that there was full liberty of the press (yet no Bucharest newspaper, Government or Opposition, published the copies of the British and American Notes, which they had been given). The British-American retort to this (14 June) was : ' The reply of the Roumanian Government not only contains inaccuracies, but gives a completely inadequate and distorted picture of conditions.' The Roumanian Government countered with a suggestion that such observations on its behaviour should be made only by the three great Powers collectively. It expressed the hope that elections would be held by September at the latest, and concluded with the assurance that the holding of an election at the earliest possible date would remain the main purpose of its action. And in fact on 11 July the cabinet approved electoral decrees. These were rejected by the opposition ministers on the ground that the proposed setting up of polling-booths in factories, workshops, institutes, and barracks would provide a means of exerting pressure on the electorate ; that the enfranchisement of all persons over nineteen would include irresponsible elements, and that the compilation of electoral registers within two months with only a six days' allowance after publication for the lodging of objections, gave no time for a real check. The cabinet then amended the decrees raising the age of enfranchisement to twenty-one. They were signed by King Michael on 14 July. The National Assembly was to consist of one chamber only of 414 deputies and was to be elected for four years. For the first time Roumanian women received the vote, forming 65 per cent of the electorate. Only Fascists, Iron Guards, and individuals who had fought voluntarily against the Allies were excluded from voting.

It was not till 15 October that the decree providing for general elections was signed ; the date fixed was 19 November. A fortnight later the British and American Governments sent Notes of protest to the Roumanian Government, declaring that the members of the opposition were continually subjected to acts of intimidation. Their meetings were consistently broken up by armed bands of hooligans with the connivance of the police. (A notorious example of such violence was the Communist attack on members of the National Peasant Party including the Secretary-General, Mr Penescu, when they arrived at Pitești on 9 August to draw up election lists. Penescu escaped with injuries ; one of his colleagues was killed). The Notes went on to enumerate the various means used by the

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Government to discriminate against the opposition, the falsification of electoral lists, pressure through the trade unions, etc. The Roumanian reply on 4 November rejected these charges and declared (1) that since the Soviet Government had not protested, the Anglo-American protests could not be accepted (2) that the Notes were a direct infringement of Roumanian sovereignty and a direct interference in Roumanian internal affairs. The British and American Governments (16 November) rejected these arguments, but the Roumanian Government reiterated them.

The result of the elections of 19 November was what might have been foreseen from the methods used by the Groza Government during the months preceding them. (Mr Teohari Georgescu, Minister of the Interior, however, forecast a close contest). Of the 7,859,212 electors on the registers, 6,934,563 (89 per cent) voted. Of the 414 seats the Government parties secured 348, made up as follows: Communists 73, Tătărescu Liberals 75, Social Democrats 75, Ploughmen's Front 70, National Popular Party 26, Dissident National Peasants 20, Jews 2, Independents 7. The two opposition parties secured 35 seats: National Peasants 32, National Liberals 3. Two seats were won by Dr Lupu's Democratic Peasant Party, and 29 by the Popular Hungarian Union. On 21 November the two opposition ministers withdrew from the Government as a protest against the alleged irregularities of the election. Mr Acheson declared (26 November) that the United States Government could not regard the elections as fulfilling the assurances given by the Roumanian Government in January. Great Britain followed suit on 2 December. But since this did not imply withdrawal of recognition, it did not have any practical effect. The National Assembly was opened by King Michael on 1 December, the cabinet now containing no opposition members.

Destruction of the Opposition Parties

The Groza Government being duly elected without having lost the recognition of Britain and America, their next objectives for the sake of prestige were bound to be the signing of a Peace Treaty and admission to the United Nations. The Peace Treaty was eventually signed in Paris on 10 February 1947, Tătărescu recording a protest on behalf of his Government at having to renounce its reparation claims on Germany. The application for admission to the United Nations was not made until July, by which time the Roumanian Government was

again at loggerheads with the British and American Governments over the question of political arrests. It was in April that reports of the arrest of members of the opposition began to circulate. On 5 May the Ministry of the Interior announced the arrest of a number of persons charged with conspiring to overthrow the regime. In June the number of political prisoners was alleged to be 1,303. The British and American Governments presented Notes on 25 June, protesting against the manner of the arrests and the conditions of detention, and asserting that these things amounted to a denial of the human rights specifically guaranteed under Article III of the Peace Treaty. The Roumanian Government repeated its tactics of rejecting the protest as an interference with Roumanian internal affairs. Immediately afterwards (15 July) about a hundred members of the opposition were arrested, no longer just the small fry, but including Maniu, Brătianu, and Mihalache. The National Peasant Party's premises were occupied and their party newspaper *Dreptatea* was suppressed. Next day the Ministry of the Interior explained its action on the ground that the National Peasant leaders had, on direct orders from Iuliu Maniu, tried to escape abroad, having secured by force the help of a Roumanian Air Force pilot. This act, it said, was inspired by hatred of the democratic regime and fear of having to face a tribunal and popular indignation since they had been implicated in the acts of certain criminal anti-popular elements. The National Assembly, meeting on 18 July, withdrew the parliamentary immunity of Maniu and five other National Peasants by 258 votes to 1. The Minister of the Interior alleged that the persons in question were implicated in subversive activities aimed at overthrowing the democratic regime. Once more the British Government protested (21 July). It expressed surprise at the Roumanian Government's apparent attempt 'to repudiate in advance certain obligations under which they will be placed by the Peace Treaty when it has been brought into force'. (The treaty was not ratified by the Roumanian National Assembly until 23 August.) It rejected the complaint of interference in internal affairs and ended with a threat not to support Roumania's application for entry into the United Nations. The application was in fact rejected by the Security Council on 1 October.

The summer of 1947 also saw interesting financial and economic developments. On 28 May Tătărescu presented the Government with a memorandum saying that general production was only 48 per cent of that of 1939, and that in

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1946 it was smaller than in 1945. This he attributed chiefly to the drought, but also to general lack of trust due to excesses concerning preventive arrests, treatment of political detainees, and abuse in requisitioning. He suggested that Roumania needed a foreign grant of at least \$600 million. This memorandum did not amount to public attack, but it was a private criticism of the Groza Government. However the Government had its own plans, and on 14 June 1947 secured the passage of a law giving the Minister of National Economy power to control any industry in every detail. It was the half-way stage to nationalization. These far-reaching powers were applied not only to Roumanian firms (by December about 750 had passed under control) but also to firms with foreign capital; thus administrators were appointed to the British oil companies, Astra Romana and Unirea. But the most pressing need of the hour was currency reform. The cost of living index (based on the figure 100 for 1939-40) had risen by January 1947 to 74,016. Similarly the retail price index (100 for 1939) had risen by May 1947 to 483,248. The fiduciary circulation in 1938 had been 49 milliards (thousand millions) of lei.¹ In June 1941 it was 77, in June 1945, 640, in July 1946, 2,500, in July 1947, 40,247 milliards. On 15 August a law was voted blocking all Roumanian currency. All foreign currency and all gold except jewellery was declared Government property; it was to be given in and would be paid for in new lei. Of the existing currency 27,750 milliards (57 per cent) were to be converted into new lei at the rate of 20,000 old lei for 1 new, the rest of the old currency was non-convertible. For use in the first week of the new currency the equivalent of 2 to 5 shillings a head was freed but what was to happen to the rest of a citizen's money was to be decided on the individual merits of the case by Government committees. The principle seems to have been that each agricultural household exchanged through its head 5 million lei; professional persons exchanged 3 millions; persons without profession and soldiers in barracks exchanged 1½ millions. Commercial firms were excluded from exchanging. The whole operation had to be completed by 30 August and resulted in the National Bank acquiring 5,387 kilograms of fine gold and foreign currency worth 549,880,000 lei.

The autumn and winter of 1947-8 saw a further stage in the development of Communist domination in Roumania. The opposition parties having been broken, the time had come to

¹ There were 655-675 lei to the £ in 1938.

drop the collaborationist Liberal ministers and to consolidate the governmental party system. On 1 October the Communist and Social Democrat Parties announced their intention to fuse in a 'United Workers Party'. (The Social Democrat Party had been disintegrated in March 1946 when its leader, Titel Petrescu, had withdrawn on finding that a majority of the Party had decided to form a joint list of candidates with the rest of the F.N.D. ; there had been a second split on 27 August 1947 over the question of merging with the Communists.) The National Assembly on 5 November passed a vote of no confidence in Mr Tătărescu by 187 votes to 5. He was accused of harbouring enemies of the country in the Foreign Ministry and the diplomatic service. Next day he resigned, and with him the Finance Minister Alexandrini and their two other 'Liberal' colleagues. Tătărescu was replaced by Ana Pauker, and Alexandrini by Vasile Luca, so that two of the Big Three of Roumanian Communism were now no longer behind the scenes, but held office. (The third, Emil Bodnăraş, became Minister of War on 23 December.) A purge in the Foreign and Finance Ministries and in the diplomatic service followed. Meanwhile attention was largely being distracted from these proceedings by the much advertized Maniu trial (29 October — 11 November). Maniu and eighteen other National Peasants were accused of plotting with the aid of Great Britain and America the overthrow of 'the legal democratic government of Roumania'. The defendants were all found guilty and sentenced to varying terms of penal servitude and imprisonment. Maniu and Mihalache received the maximum sentence, penal servitude for life, but this was commuted to solitary confinement for life in view of their old age.

The Roumanian People's Republic

The destruction of the opposition parties being completed, the only obstacle left to the complete supremacy of the Communists was King Michael. His position had been strong. As the principal mover in 'the great historic act of 23 August 1944', he had been honoured by the Russians, who in the first months of the Groza Government had actually invested him (19 July 1945) with the Order of Victory, their highest decoration, as an expression of their appreciation of the part played by the Roumanian army in the defeat of Germany and Hungary. His appeal to the great Powers a month later and his breaking off relations with the Groza Government had shown the Russians that he could not be relied on to let them have their

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own way in Roumania. As it became clearer to the Russians that the King was not a puppet, it also became clearer to the majority of Roumanians that in him lay their only hope of resisting the encroachments of the U.S.S.R. Hence the demonstration of 8 November 1945. In November 1947 the King went to England for the wedding of Princess Elizabeth, and met Princess Anne of Bourbon-Parma. Early in December their engagement was announced. The King then returned to find that the Groza Government, and especially Ana Pauker, opposed the project, on the ground that Roumania could not afford the expense of such a ceremony. On 30 December a proclamation from the cabinet was broadcast announcing the abdication of the King and the institution of 'The Roumanian People's Republic'. The proclamation said that 'the monarchy represents an obstacle to the development of our State towards a popular democratic regime'. The Act of abdication, read to an extraordinary session of the Assembly in the King's absence, ended: 'This regime constituting a serious obstacle to the development of the country, I, in full consciousness of my responsibilities and in the interest of the country, renounce my royal prerogatives and abdicate for myself and for all my heirs.' The Assembly unanimously passed the bill setting up the Roumanian People's Republic. On 3 January 1948 the King and his mother left Roumania for Switzerland with members of the Court. It was not until 4 March that he made a public declaration that he had signed the Act of abdication under duress and that he did not recognize it as valid. The functions of the King were taken over by the Supreme Praesidium of the Republic.

The elimination of those bourgeois who had collaborated with the Groza Government continued. The party 'National Union: Work and Reconstruction' founded in January 1947 by C. Argetoianu, a former intimate of King Carol, 'to make the bourgeoisie play its political role in a realistic framework', was now to cease its political activity. Mr Alexandrescu's Dissident Peasant Party was merged with the Ploughmen's Front to form the United Peasant Party of Roumania. And measures for crushing the remnants of the opposition continued too. On 20 January seventeen more members of the National Peasant Party were found guilty of sedition. The American and British Governments once more presented Notes (2 and 3 February) protesting against the violation of the clauses in the Peace Treaty guaranteeing freedom of the press, speech, religion, political assembly, etc.

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On 24 February the National Assembly was dissolved and elections fixed for 28 March, so that a new constitution could be adopted. The Government bloc, now calling itself the 'Popular Democratic Front', was to present a single list. The election results were as follows. Of 8,417,467 electors on the registers, 7,663,375 (90·8 per cent) voted. The Government bloc obtained 6,958,533 votes and 405 seats; of the 'opposition' (i.e. the collaborating bourgeois who had not been absorbed into the Government party system), Mr Bejan's Liberal Party won 213,521 votes and 7 seats, and Dr Lupu's Democratic Peasant Party 50,871 and 2 seats. The Assembly's first task, performed unanimously, was to adopt the new constitution and to confirm the appointment of Professor Parhon as President of the Supreme Praesidium. On the same day, 13 April, the Government was reorganized. Under the new constitution the Council of Ministers was provided with three vice-Presidents, each with special duties. These were: (1) Gheorghiu Dej: economic responsibilities; (2) T. Savulescu: co-ordination of the Departments of Agriculture and Forestry; (3) Ştefan Voitec: social and cultural responsibilities. The big three (Pauker, Luca, and Bodnăraş) and Teohari Georgescu, Minister of the Interior, kept their key posts. The composition of the Council was 12 Communists, 3 Socialists, 5 Ploughmen's Front, and 1 National Popular Party.

Little as the new constitution on paper may correspond with the actual workings of the Roumanian State under its present regime, it has many points of interest, some of which may be important because if one day there is a parliamentary regime in Roumania, some desirable reforms will be found to exist already in theory. Article 5 states that the means of production belong either to the State, being the property of the whole people, or to co-operative organizations, or to 'private persons, physical or juridical'. Article 6 states that all natural resources such as minerals, forests, etc., and all public services belong to the State, and such resources and services as are owned by private persons shall pass into the hands of the State. Article 8 recognizes the right to private property and to inheritance. Article 9 says 'the land belongs to those who work it. The State protects the peasant holding. It encourages and maintains rural co-operation. With a view to stimulating agriculture, the State can create agricultural enterprises which are the property of the State.' By Articles 16, 17, and 24 all nationalities enjoy equal rights, including

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the right to receive education, administration, and dispensation of justice in their own language, and protection from hostile propaganda. Article 18 lays down that all citizens over 18 years of age are entitled to vote, and all over 23 may be elected to any office. Article 21 ensures equality for women as regards civic rights, and equal pay for equal work. Article 27 guarantees freedom of conscience and religion, but places education wholly in secular hands, except the training for the ministry of each religion. Article 31 says: 'The freedom of the press, the freedom of opinion, assembly, meetings, processions, and demonstrations is guaranteed. The exercise of these rights is assured by the fact that the means of printing, paper, and places of assembly are put at the disposal of the workers.' Article 32 says: 'Citizens enjoy the right of association and organization if the aim is not directed against the democratic order established by the constitution. Any Fascist or anti-democratic association is forbidden and punished by the law.'

Perhaps the most important point in this constitution is the recognition of equality of the various national minorities with other Roumanian citizens. This is especially important for Transylvania. The number of Hungarian primary and secondary schools in Transylvania is now approximately double that before the war, and these schools are maintained by the Roumanian State. In predominantly Hungarian areas officials are now Hungarians. As for the German minority, it has not been ejected after all (though at the beginning of 1945 the Russians removed almost all men between the ages of 18 and 45 and women between 18 and 35 for work in the U.S.S.R.). The new policy towards minorities was connected with the policy of closer relations with neighbouring States. Roumania signed treaties of friendship, collaboration, and mutual assistance with Yugoslavia (19 December 1947), Bulgaria (16 January 1948), Hungary (24 January) the U.S.S.R. (4 February), and Czechoslovakia (21 July).

In February a startling symptom appeared in the Roumanian Communist Party. Lucrețiu Pătrășcanu, who had been Minister of Justice since the coup d'état of August 1944, was now publicly denounced as having 'fallen under the influence of the bourgeoisie'. Presently he was relieved of his post and arrested. A view widely held in the west was that he had resisted a move of his colleagues to incorporate Roumania in the U.S.S.R. Some colour was lent to this by the fact that he was referred to as a 'chauvinistic nationalist' by the Central

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Committee of the Workers' Party on 20 June. (It must, however, be noted that he was rebuked by his colleague, Gheorghiu-Dej, in the autumn of 1946 for a too nationalistic attitude, when it was a question of equal treatment of Hungarians in Transylvania.) Arrests of members of the opposition early in May included Romniceanu, now head of the National Liberal Party, and shortly afterwards Titel Petrescu and Dimitriu, President and Secretary-General respectively of the Independent Social Democrats.

The Peace Treaty fixed the total armed forces of Roumania at a maximum of 130,000 personnel (the maximum for the army being 120,000). The administration of the army is regulated by a law of 10 May 1948. The period of conscription is two years. This time is devoted partly to military training, partly to educational and political training, for which purpose E.C.P. (the Secretariat-General of Education, Culture, and Propaganda in the army) has its representatives at each headquarters down to platoon level. The army was subjected to purges several times in the years 1946-8, but the largest was held early in the summer of 1948, when it is believed that about 18,000 officers and N.C.O.s were removed, the most senior ranks receiving the fiercest purge. For restaffing there were available the two divisions 'Tudor Vladimirescu' (which celebrated its fifth anniversary in November 1948) and 'Horia, Cloșca, and Crișan'. These were formed in the U.S.S.R. during the war from Roumanian prisoners, who were given a political training. The army equipment may now have been standardized with Soviet equipment; at any rate its badges of rank have now been assimilated to those of the Red Army. It is to be hoped that the regime's claim to have improved the men's living conditions is justified. There was plenty of room for improvement.

On 7 June a further reduction in reparations was announced. In reply to a request from Groza, the Soviet Government had decided to reduce the sum still due from Roumania by 50 per cent from 1 July. In this connexion one must recall that clause of the armistice which bound the Roumanian Government to provide the Soviet High Command with the funds needed for the exercise of its functions. This clause had enabled the U.S.S.R. to extract a sum several times greater than the total of reparations laid down. It has been estimated that in fact Roumania, from the armistice to 1 June 1948, paid the U.S.S.R. \$1,785 million in goods, etc.; a figure which would represent 84 per cent of

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Roumania's national income for that period.

The U.S.S.R. takes the first place in Roumania's foreign trade, both in exports and imports. Paucity of data makes it very difficult to study the question, but the figures for 1947 show that exports totalled about \$34.2 million in value, of which \$17.18 million went to the U.S.S.R., \$5.78 to Czechoslovakia, \$3.73 to Bulgaria and \$3.31 to Hungary. Imports totalled about \$62 million of which \$29.92 came from the U.S.S.R., \$11.4 from United States, \$6.17 from Czechoslovakia, \$3.25 from Hungary, \$2.42 from Switzerland and \$2.18 from Bulgaria. (The imports from Switzerland included goods paid for in 1942-5 and held there at buyer's disposal.) It should be noted that there were exceptionally large imports of cereals in 1947 owing to famine conditions.

On 11 June the Assembly unanimously passed a very important Nationalization bill. This affected mining, banking, insurance, transport, and the principal industries. Article 5 exempts enterprises belonging to a State which is a member of the United Nations and which holds this property as a result of the implementation of the Peace Treaty or of the fulfilment of reparations obligations due to a state of war. (The Soviet shares of the joint Soviet-Roumanian companies are thus safeguarded.) Article 6 provides that in those industrial sectors in which enterprises have been nationalized, the right to establish new enterprises belongs to the State, though under Article 17 the State may, in exceptional cases, grant concessions both to individuals and to corporations for the setting up of such new enterprises. This bill affected British and American interests chiefly in the sphere of oil production. Astra Romana, the biggest British oil interest, had already been liquidated owing to the insurmountable obstacles put in its way by the Roumanian Government, and a British Note had been sent on 6 March protesting against its forcible dissolution. The Roumanian Government has since disposed of the question of compensation by sentencing the board of management to a fine of £7 million for extracting oil from State-owned subsoil without permission.

In the cultural sphere, too, decisive steps have been taken to eliminate western influence. On 17 July the Roumanian Government denounced the Concordat concluded with the Vatican in 1929, and introduced legislation (4 August) for the control of religious denominations. All clergy must now be Roumanian citizens; all clergy and religious officers are liable to dismissal for any 'anti-democratic' attitude; nomi-

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nation to all high ecclesiastical offices (of all denominations, not merely of the established Roumanian Orthodox Church) is subject to Government approval. The Uniate and Roman Catholic Churches, which together have about 2½ million adherents in Roumania, used to have five dioceses each; these have now been reduced to two each. The Orthodox Church has recently suffered a considerable loss of clergy by arrests and imprisonment; instead of the gaps being filled, the size of parishes is greatly enlarged. The Patriarch Justinian appealed on 6 June to members of the Roumanian Uniate Church (i.e. the Greek Catholic Church of Transylvania and Banat, which uses Orthodox ritual, but for 250 years has acknowledged the Papal supremacy) to return to Orthodoxy. Accordingly thirty-eight delegates of the Uniate Church met at Cluj on 1 October and unanimously decided on the reunion. Such is the Government version. In fact, some of the signatories signed under terrorization and torture. The great majority of the hierarchy and laity have resisted the pressure applied to them. But officially the Uniate Church has ceased to exist. Schools, universities, etc., are also being freed from western influence. By a decree of 31 July all educational establishments come under State control, including foreign ones. French has ceased to be compulsory in secondary schools; instead, Russian has become compulsory from the fourth class of the elementary school onwards. French teachers and professors have been deprived of the right to teach in Roumania, and Roumanians studying in France have been recalled. Finally, at the end of November, the Roumanian Government used the expulsion of some Roumanian citizens from France as grounds for repudiating the cultural agreement which had existed between the two countries since 31 March 1939.

The most significant development of the summer of 1948 in Roumania is probably to be seen in the choice of Bucharest as the seat of the Cominform. The Cominform had been established, as announced on 5 October 1947, with headquarters at Belgrade. Then, on 28 June 1948, the world was told that Yugoslavia had been expelled from the Cominform at a meeting of the other members held in Roumania. The headquarters of the Cominform was moved to Bucharest. We have thus the paradox of one of the most anti-Russian and anti-Communist of the satellites being the centre of orthodox Communism outside Russia. The reason is partly that just because indigenous Communists were so rare in Roumania, the Russians gave prominence to non-Roumanian leaders,

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who accordingly have not been led by nationalist feeling into such temptations as those to which Tito succumbed. It is also that Roumania is firmly in the Russian grip by reason of the Russian troops which the U.S.S.R. maintains on Roumanian soil, in accordance with Article 21 of the Peace Treaty, 'for the maintenance of the lines of communication of the Red Army with the Soviet zone of occupation in Austria.' Something too must be attributed to the powerful personality of Ana Pauker. In the struggle between Tito and the Cominform Roumania has played a leading part. On 12 August General Jovanović was killed by a Yugoslav frontier guard while trying to escape from Tito into Roumania. On 25 August the Yugoslav Government protested to Roumania at the campaign directed against Yugoslavia by the Roumanian press and radio. The Roumanian Government categorically rejected this protest (9 September). On 19 October it asked Yugoslavia to recall all Yugoslav professors and teachers from Roumania.

In October 1948 the cabinet instructed all economic ministries and agencies to be ready with their draft plans for 1949 by 10 November. The aim of the regime is to transform a backward agricultural country into an advanced industrial-agricultural one. Nationalization has gone a long way in industry, transport, etc. ; there are now signs that it is coming on the land too. 'It would be wrong,' says *Scântea*, the official organ of the Roumanian Workers' Party (quoted in *Roumanian News*, 31 October), 'if we were to limit ourselves to a Socialist development in industry without introducing Socialism into the countryside.' Other articles attack 'the rich kulaks' for sabotage in the autumn sowing campaign. In trading too the State now plays a great part. There are three types of State-trading enterprise in existence in Roumania : (1) Companies for collecting and processing raw materials, such as Romcereal (cereals), Romlacta (dairy produce), Rompecaria (fish), Comcar (meat), S.C.D. (offals), Aprozar (vegetables) ; (2) Wholesale distributing centres, such as Centrofarm (medical supplies) and others for textiles, metals, and foodstuffs ; (3) State shops, which retail textiles, hardware, food, etc. Nationalization has recently been extended to the production and distribution of films (2 November). The State has intervened drastically, too, in the question of accommodation. Municipal offices are being opened in Bucharest and other towns. All private letting and sub-letting was stopped from 4 December, and only these municipal offices will be able to let vacant accommodation.

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In trying to assess the achievements of the present regime, it is not always easy to distinguish what has been originated by it from what it has taken over from earlier regimes or from private enterprise, since in any case it claims the credit. Nevertheless there are certain public works which it has pushed through quickly with the help of 'voluntary' (i.e. unpaid) labour, such as the Bumbesti-Livezeni section of railway, and the scheme of land reclamation on the River Prut. The determined effort to improve rail communications has a strategic as well as a commercial importance. The schemes for social welfare cannot yet be judged on results. One of the most interesting points to watch will be infant mortality, which before the war was extremely high in Roumania (e.g. 18.2 per 1,000 for children under 5 in 1934). Even if figures were available for 1947, it would be difficult to know how much to allow for the famine conditions of 1946-7. The fact is that no satisfactory assessment of the regime and its achievements can be made so long as no foreigners except trusted supporters of the regime are allowed to visit Roumania, and so long as terror of the police prevents all intercourse between the staffs of foreign legations and the ordinary Roumanian.

CHAPTER TWO

BULGARIA

By PHYLLIS AUTY

REVOLUTIONARY changes in the political and economic structure of the Bulgarian State have taken place since the war. By the end of 1947 power had been transferred from the pre-war political ruling classes to the Fatherland Front, which was dominated by the Communists and their supporters ; Bulgaria had changed from a monarchy to a People's Republic and was established both economically and politically in the Russian sphere of influence in eastern Europe.

At the beginning of the Second World War Bulgaria, with a population of about seven million people, was ruled by a king of German blood, Boris of Saxe-Coburg Gotha. Economically Bulgaria was dependent to a great extent on Germany who, during the nineteen-thirties, had monopolized her exports of tobacco and agricultural supplies and in return exported to Bulgaria consumer goods and armaments. There was little pro-German feeling among the Bulgarian people ; undeterred by the fear of Communism which pervaded their ruling classes, they were still traditionally pro-Russian. They regarded Russia as the great Slav Power who, in the nineteenth century, had helped them to freedom after 500 years of Turkish tyranny.

When war broke out in 1939 between Germany and Great Britain, Bulgaria was at first able to remain neutral, but as the war developed the pressure to throw in her lot with Germany became irresistible. The pro-German element in the Bulgarian Government was very strong, and since Germany was at that time allied to Russia by the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact, the pro-Russian element amongst the Bulgarian people was no deterrent to support for Germany. By 1940, after the fall of France, it seemed as if Germany had triumphed over western Europe, German troops had penetrated to Roumania and were spread along the frontier with Bulgaria. Under German pressure Bulgaria concluded an agreement with Roumania, ceding her the fertile area of south Dobrogea. Those Bulgarian politicians who had cherished irredentist aims since the Treaty of Neuilly thought that the opportunity of realizing their ambitions had come. In March 1941 Bulgaria

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signed the Tripartite Pact, and German troops were admitted into Bulgaria and allowed through passage in their attack on Yugoslavia. The Bulgarian army was used to occupy Yugoslav and Greek territory, and Bulgaria annexed parts of Thrace and of Greek and Yugoslav Macedonia. In March 1941 Bulgaria declared war on Great Britain and the United States.

In spite of these developments, the war was not altogether uncomfortable for many Bulgarians. In the next two years, although the country was occupied by Germany, there were not large numbers of German troops in Bulgaria and their behaviour was in most cases correct. The ordinary citizens of Bulgaria, with the exception of the Jews, Communists, Anglophiles, and some radical Agrarians, were able to pursue their everyday lives unhindered by the cataclysm which was convulsing the rest of Europe.

The political change in this situation came with the German invasion of Russia on 22 June 1941. After that, as Germany's position weakened her pressure on Boris to take a more active part in the war was increased, but at the same time popular pro-Russian feeling amongst the ordinary population was so strong that it was impossible for any government to send Bulgarian troops to fight with the Germans against the Russians on the eastern front. In 1943 Boris was attempting to save Bulgaria from participating in the German downfall, which could already be foreseen. His efforts were brought to an abrupt close by his sudden and mysterious death on 3 August 1943, immediately after a visit to Hitler's headquarters. He was succeeded by his six-year-old son, Simeon, and real power was vested in the hands of a three-man Regency Council consisting of Prince Kyril (Simeon's uncle), the pro-German Premier, Professor Filov, and the War Minister, General Mihov, the last two resigning their positions in the Government in order to become regents. The Germans continued to exert pressure on the new Government, under the premiership of Mr Bozhilov, to take a more active part in the war and although this aim was never successfully realized, passive aid to Germany continued until the late summer of 1944.

This reluctance of the Bulgarian Government to turn against the Nazis resulted in Allied air attacks on Sofia, which started in November 1943 and continued until April 1944, causing considerable destruction in Sofia and resulting in large-scale disorganization of the internal administration.

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During the period of Allied air attacks the partisan movement, which had been in existence for some time, was helped by the conditions of general chaos. Continuous efforts were made to suppress the partisans, who were carrying on sporadic activity in the hills north and south of Sofia, in the west, and in many of the towns. This partisan movement never became a highly organized national or military force like the Yugoslav partisans. The highest estimate given for its numbers is between 15,000 and 18,000, and it was not a closely knit force but remained split in small groups which undertook local attacks mostly against Bulgarian pro-Nazi authorities. But the partisan movement in the industrial towns such as Plovdiv, Varna, and Burgas was relatively strong. Most of the partisans were young Communists, though other parties were also represented among them and there was a considerable non-party element especially among some of the ordinary people who helped to feed and shelter the partisans. The partisans began to play a more important part in political events in Bulgaria during the period when negotiations for peace were being carried on, and eventually they came into their own when Bulgaria withdrew from the war.

In the latter part of the war a new political movement was gaining strength among the supporters of the partisans; this was the Fatherland Front, which was to have great influence on the history of Bulgaria. This movement had its origin in negotiations for co-operation which had taken place between Communists and left-wing Agrarians as early as 1941, but when the left-wing Agrarian leader, Dr G. M. Dimitrov, was forced to flee from Bulgaria to Cairo in that year, the attempt at collaboration lapsed. In the following year the idea of a united front was revived by his namesake, the Communist leader, Georgi Dimitrov, who had achieved world fame for his brilliant self-defence in the Reichstag trial, and who was broadcasting to Bulgaria throughout this period from Moscow. Dimitrov advocated the formation of a 'Fatherland Front', consisting of all parties that would agree to a broad constructive programme based on active resistance to the Germans and to the pro-German authorities in Bulgaria. Intensive propaganda for the Fatherland Front was put out by the Russian-sponsored station, Christo Botev, which had a large audience inside Bulgaria. By 1944 the Front had become a reality with support from four political parties—the Communist Party, the Zveno Party, the left-wing Agrarians and the Social Democrats. Until the end of the war in Bulgaria the Fatherland Front,

though it played some part among the partisans, was not a strong or widespread national movement.

THE LIBERATION

From March to August 1944 Bulgarian politicians were trying to find an easy way out of the war. It was clear that Germany was losing, but German troops were still on Bulgarian soil. A further difficulty was that some members of the Government were still unwilling to agree to the Allied demand that the Bulgarian army should be withdrawn from the parts of Thrace and Macedonia, which it was still occupying. The opposition was divided—the Agrarians wanted to form a Government of ‘National Consolidation’ of all parties, right and left, and the Fatherland Front was unwilling to co-operate with right-wing parties and former collaborators. The Anglo-United-States-Soviet declaration to satellites issued in April 1944, warning them of the consequences of continued co-operation with the Germans, still failed to bring Bulgaria out of the war. This was followed on 21 May by a specific warning to Bulgaria from Russia of the consequences of continued occupation of Yugoslavia and Greece, and of allowing their naval bases to be used by the Germans against the U.S.S.R. During this period negotiations had been going on in Cairo between representatives of the right-wing Agrarians and the Allies. Simultaneously, representatives of the Fatherland Front had been negotiating separately with the Russians, whose army was rapidly approaching Bulgaria; but it was 26 August 1944 before the Government decided to withdraw from the war. The Sofia Radio announcement of this decision stated that Bulgaria wished to withdraw from the war, in order ‘to pursue a policy of complete neutrality’. By this time Russian troops were rapidly approaching the Bulgarian frontier and it was clear that this declaration of neutrality as a means of withdrawing from the war was totally inadequate.

In Bulgaria feverish negotiations were going on for the formation of a new Government. The Fatherland Front leaders still refused to co-operate with the right, and a Government was formed under the left-wing Agrarian, Kosta Muraviev, with the support of the pro-western politicians, Petko Stainov, Nikola Mushanov, and Dimiter Gichev. This Government, regardless of the pressing realities of the situation, announced its foreign and domestic policy as ‘democratic freedom’, an amnesty for all political prisoners, unconditional neutrality, and the withdrawal of Bulgarian forces from Yugoslavia and

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Thrace. Although the Red Army was already on their frontiers they still thought they could take their time over negotiations with Great Britain and the United States. Throughout Bulgaria tension was very high in expectation of Russia's next move. On 5 September the U.S.S.R. declared war on Bulgaria; five and a half hours later the Bulgarian Government requested an armistice from Russia. Russian forces under Marshal Tolbukhin moved into Bulgaria occupying Varna, Rousse, and Silistra without opposition. Bulgaria declared war on Germany. This was the opportunity the Fatherland Front had been waiting for. On 9 September, after a successful popular revolution¹ organized by the Partisans and the Fatherland Front, a government of the Fatherland Front was formed under Colonel Kimon Gheorghiev, and a new era started in Bulgarian history.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS SEPTEMBER 1944 TO DECEMBER 1947

The four parties in the Fatherland Front were all represented in the new Government formed after 9 September. The Prime Minister and four other members of the cabinet, including Petko Stainov² and Colonel Damian Velchev, were members of the Zveno Party; four were Communists, two of whom held the most important ministries in the Government (Anton Yugov, Minister of the Interior, and Mincho Neichev, Minister of Justice); there were three Social Democrats and four Agrarians.

All these parties in the Fatherland Front had a revolutionary past. The Zveno Party was primarily supported by the military caste and sections of the upper classes. It had formerly had a republican and autocratic policy, but during the war it moved to the left. The Agrarian Party from the days of Stambulisky had followed a radical policy and received widespread support from the peasants. Both these parties had been engaged in political rivalry with the Communists over a long period. During the war the only party that maintained its organization throughout the country in towns and villages was the Communist Party. They strengthened their local party organization by underground work and

¹ The Fatherland Front had managed to gain considerable support in the armed forces. They claimed they had 300,000 men in arms supporting the revolution, and on the night of 8-9 September the only armoured brigade in the Bulgarian army was brought over intact but for some of its officers.

² Stainov called himself an 'Independent' at this time.

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gained increased support, particularly among the workers in the industrial towns, Plovdiv, Varna, etc. The result was that when the Fatherland Front came into power in September 1944, the Communist Party, though small in numbers, was the only party strongly organized and ready to take office. This, and the presence of a Russian army in Bulgaria, gave the Communists a great advantage over their rivals.

One of the first tasks undertaken by the new Government was to eliminate from public life and punish all the politicians who had been responsible for pro-German policy in Bulgaria since 1941. The three regents and many other politicians were arrested immediately and thirst for revenge against collaborators spread throughout the country. 'People's Courts' with powers of summary trial and execution without appeal were set up and began a purge which affected all ranks of society both in town and country. The Fatherland Front was responsible for this policy and the Communist Party, which controlled the Ministry of the Interior and the militia, as well as the Ministry of Justice, played a leading role in the trials. There were later complaints that this rapid judicial process had been used to pay off old scores and private feuds. Rumours circulated that great numbers, varying from 20,000 to 100,000, were executed. The following year it was officially stated that up to March 1945, in 131 trials 10,897 had been found guilty, 2,138 had been sentenced to death and executed, 1,940 had been sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment, 962 to 15 years', 727 to 10 years', and 3,241 to shorter terms. Among those executed were the three war-time regents. Bulgaria's purge of collaborators was probably the most severe of any occupied country of Europe.

Those Bulgarians, who had been prepared to accept the German occupation and who had not been directly affected by the Allied bombardment had not suffered greatly during the war, and they were shocked and alarmed by the severity of the trials. They were also alarmed by the presence of the Russian army in Bulgaria and disliked the difficulties which it entailed. Many of these people belonged to the propertied class and they feared to lose their position of privilege if the left wing gained effective control of the State. It was among these people that opposition to the pro-Russian Fatherland Front began to take root at an early stage. Disillusionment was also caused by the fact that political disagreement soon showed itself within the Fatherland Front.

The Agrarian leader, G. M. Dimitrov, had returned from

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exile in September 1945. He had spent most of the war in Cairo as adviser on Bulgarian affairs to the British military authorities. When he returned, he was cordially received in many parts of the country. He did not enter the Government, but became secretary of the Agrarian Party and announced his intention of reorganizing the party throughout the country. It seems clear that his aim was to organize the Agrarian Party in such a way that it would be strong enough to compete with the Communists and to hold the balance between the eastern and western political elements in Bulgaria. It was not long before he began to be charged with being a British agent, and by January 1945 he resigned his post as secretary of the Agrarian Party. Fierce attacks were made on him in the press, he was placed under house arrest by the Communist Minister of the Interior, his secretary was arrested, and at the end of August 1945 he fled to the United States, where he became the moving spirit in an *émigré* Agrarian movement. He was later condemned *in absentia* to life imprisonment for subversive activities.

The Election Campaign

Political activity of all parties in the first twelve months after the armistice was directed towards building up popular support for the coming election. The Fatherland Front Government was provisional and it was agreed, in conformity with the decision of the Big Three at Yalta in February 1945, that an election should be held as soon as conditions allowed; but it was left to representatives of the Big Three and of the country concerned to interpret what was meant by the 'free elections' that the Yalta Convention had stipulated. In Bulgaria disputes about the proper conditions for a free election split the precarious unity of the Fatherland Front, as well as the Control Commission.

When the Fatherland Front had seized power in September 1944, it had had the support of the outstanding Agrarian politician, Nikola Petkov, and of the leading Social Democrats. In the winter of 1944-5 when the election campaign was being worked up by the political parties, leaders of both parties became involved in bitter controversy with the Communist Party. The Agrarians complained that Communists had seized key positions in the Fatherland Front committees in both town and country and that they were using their positions to gain complete political control. The Communists accused the Agrarians of trying to break up the unity of the Fatherland

Front, of putting their own petty party aims before those of the State, and of hostility to the Soviet Union. Late in the winter the quarrel came out into the open when the Agrarian Party accused the Communists of interfering in the internal organization of the Agrarian Party and of trying to oust from position those Agrarians, like Petkov, who opposed the Communist Party. In May 1945 the Agrarian Party was virtually split into pro- and anti-Communist elements. An Agrarian Party congress was held which was denounced by the anti-Communist elements and only supported by the pro-Communists. Alexander Obbov was elected party leader of all those Agrarians who were prepared to accept the Fatherland Front and to work closely with the Communists. The resignation of Petkov from the Fatherland Front was only a matter of time. In August he and other supporters of the Agrarian Party (including Kosta Lulchev and other Social Democrat leaders) resigned from the Fatherland Front. This group became leaders of a political opposition whose main aim was to prevent the Communist Party from obtaining power in Bulgaria. This meant opposition to the Fatherland Front. They hoped for support in this from the western Powers on the Control Commission. The Fatherland Front on its side had the support of Russia. The Fatherland Front maintained its united party character as other Agrarians, led by Obbov, and Social Democrats took the place of the leaders who had resigned. Both sides settled down to an intensive campaign for the election, which was fixed for 26 August. The opposition at this time protested that they were seriously handicapped in electioneering since the Fatherland Front controlled the militia and local government as well as the press.

The Control Commission

A Three-Power control commission, which had been set up immediately after the armistice to supervise Bulgarian affairs, played an important—in the case of Russia perhaps a decisive part—in the political development of Bulgaria in this period. United States, British, and Soviet representatives on the Control Commission did not work well together because of their opposing political views and aims. The Bulgarian opposition looked to Great Britain and the United States to support their demands for a western type of democracy; the Fatherland Front received from the Russian representative support for its Soviet-inspired united front for 'socialism'. The Russian position was strong, since Soviet troops occupied not only

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Bulgaria, but also neighbouring States. Moral support for the opposition from Great Britain and the United States could achieve little in these circumstances and undoubtedly some people in Bulgaria hoped for more active Anglo-American intervention.

The opposition allegations of terrorism against the Fatherland Front reached their climax when Petkov protested to the British and United States representatives on the Control Commission. In the middle of August Great Britain and the United States sent strong notes of protest to the Fatherland Front and suggested postponing the elections so that conditions could be improved. The postponement of the elections was announced on the very morning of 26 August and was attributed by many people to the fact that the Fatherland Front was anxious not to antagonize the western Powers before the Peace Treaty had been signed and diplomatic recognition received.

The question of the Bulgarian Peace Treaty had been discussed by the Foreign Ministers of the Big Three at the Potsdam Conference in July-August 1945. Their communiqué had stated :

The three Governments have also charged the Council of Foreign Ministers with the task of preparing peace treaties for Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, and Roumania. The conclusion of peace treaties with recognized democratic Governments in these States will also enable the three Governments to support applications from them for membership of the United Nations. The three Governments agree to examine each separately in the near future, in the light of the conditions then prevailing, the establishment of diplomatic relations with Finland, Roumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary to the extent possible prior to the conclusion of peace treaties with those countries.¹

The desire of the Bulgarian Government for diplomatic recognition from the western Powers and to have their peace treaties signed influenced the course of internal politics for the next year and a half.

Concessions to the Opposition

After the postponement of the election on 26 August 1945, the Government announced a number of measures for greater political freedom. These included permission for the legalization of three opposition parties—the Independent Agrarians, under Nikola Petkov, the Socialists, led by Grigor Cheshmedzhiev and Kosta Lulchev, and the Democrats, under

¹ *The Times*, 3 August 1945.

Nikola Mushanov. The opposition parties were each allowed to publish a newspaper and the circulation of these papers was high. These measures did not satisfy the more extreme members of the opposition who, elated by the success of the Anglo-American protest, demanded the resignation of the Government and the removal of Communist ministers from the Ministries of the Interior and Justice. The effective opposition was led by Petkov and Lulchev, who continued to denounce the lack of political freedom in the strongest possible terms, both in speeches and in the press. On 11 October the opposition announced its decision not to participate in the elections ; it stated :

Not wishing to expose Bulgarian voters to the terror perpetrated by the Government in order to win the elections at all costs and not wishing to connive at confirming and legalizing an undemocratic regime, our parties have decided not to participate in the elections . . . but to repudiate them and boycott them completely.¹

At this time President Truman sent his personal representative, Mr Mark Ethridge, to Roumania and Bulgaria personally to investigate conditions. His report was unfavourable. The United States in an official note protested about election conditions to the Bulgarian Government and declared : ' Important democratic elements are excluded through the operation of a single list of candidates. There are indications that the free expression of the popular will is being further restricted by the threats of coercion and later reprisals.' The Bulgarian reply to this note denied these allegations and said that the opposition had ' every opportunity to play a free and unfettered part in the election campaign.' It added a pledge that after the election the Government would take every opportunity to broaden its basis. On 10 November martial law, which had been in effect since the capitulation in 1944, was abolished.

Throughout this election campaign Georgi Dimitrov had remained in Russia. On 8 November 1945 it was announced that he had returned to Sofia. He was the hero of the Communists and of the left wing and had been the inspiration of the Fatherland Front from the beginning ; thus his return gave a fillip to the Fatherland Front morale just before the election.

The Election

In spite of further United States' protests, the election was held on 18 November, with the opposition abstaining. The

¹ *Manchester Guardian*, 17 October 1945.

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results were that of 4,504,735 voters, 3,869,492 (86 per cent) voted for the Government, and 396,137 (12 per cent) against the Government. The new Sobranje met on 16 December, when Vassil Kolarov, a former leader of the Bulgarian Communist Party, who had held high office in the Soviet Union during his exile there since 1923, was elected President. A new Cabinet was formed, with Kimon Gheorghiev (Zveno Party) again as Prime Minister, Colonel Velchev (Zveno) as War Minister, and the Communist, Anton Yugov, again as Minister of the Interior.

In spite of the election majority the Fatherland Front leaders, on 7 January 1946, immediately embarked upon negotiations with the two opposition leaders, Petkov and Lulchev, with the aim of broadening the Government. But the possibilities of compromise between the Fatherland Front and the opposition leaders were very slender. The main inspiration of the Fatherland Front was the Communist Party, to which the opposition leaders were violently opposed. They saw the Communists increasing in power, and were determined to prevent them from obtaining complete power if they possibly could. The opposition demanded the annulment of the election, and hoped that Great Britain and the United States might still be able to use their influence to bring about a new Government in which the Communists did not predominate.

In December 1945, the Bulgarian problem was again discussed at the Foreign Ministers' Conference in Moscow. The communiqué stated :

BULGARIA : It is understood by the three Governments that the Soviet Government takes upon itself the mission of giving friendly advice to the Bulgarian Government with regard to the desirability of the inclusion in the Bulgarian Government of the Fatherland Front, now being formed, of an additional two representatives of other democratic groups, who (a) are truly representative of the groups of the parties which are not participating in the Government, and (b) are really suitable and will work loyally with the Government. As soon as the Governments of the United States of America and the United Kingdom are convinced that this friendly advice has been accepted by the Bulgarian Government and the said additional representatives have been included in its body, the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom will recognize the Bulgarian Government, with which the Government of the Soviet Union already has diplomatic relations.¹

¹ *The Times*, 28 December 1945.

After this, further attempts to reach a compromise were made, but both sides made incompatible demands. The Fatherland Front was prepared to accept Petkov and Lulchev in the Government, provided that they agreed to the Fatherland Front programme and promised not to work against it. Petkov and Lulchev had both by this time hardened in their opposition to the programme of the Fatherland Front, which at an earlier stage they had accepted, and reiterated their demands with uncompromising insistence. These demands included the holding of new elections and the removal of Communists from the Ministries of the Interior and of Justice. Since neither side would accept a compromise, negotiations to implement the Moscow decisions reached deadlock. On 8 January 1946 Mr Vishinsky, Soviet Foreign vice-Commissar, paid a rapid visit to Sofia to give the support of his authority to the position of the Fatherland Front and to confirm their interpretation of the Moscow decisions. He interviewed both Lulchev and Petkov, but they both refused to give way even under Soviet pressure. The opposition remained out of the Government, but negotiations still went on. During this time the United States continued to press the opposition point of view, and it was fairly clear that at least a temporary compromise could have been reached in March 1946, had not the Soviet representative in Sofia vetoed its conditions.

One of the political problems still to be decided was whether Bulgaria should remain a monarchy or become a republic, and a plebiscite was held on 8 September. The results, announced on the anniversary of the revolution, 9 September, were by an overwhelming majority in favour of a republic. Of a total of 4,117,504 voters, 3,801,160 (92.32 per cent) voted for the republic, 197,176 (4.79 per cent) voted for the monarchy, and 119,168 (2.89 per cent) papers were spoiled. Few people queried the validity of this majority, for the monarchy had never had strong popular support in Bulgaria. The German house of Saxe-Coburg had ruled Bulgaria for half a century, and had led her during that time into three wars in which she had been defeated. The young king, Simeon, was allowed to leave the country and paid a sum equal to £5 million sterling in compensation for his family properties. Vassil Kolarov became provisional President.

The Second Election

On 27 October 1946 a new election was held for a Constituent Assembly. The opposition still complained of intimi-

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dation, but by this time with less confidence of any effective support from Britain or the United States. It decided to take part in the election. The Fatherland Front went to the country as a united front, but voters were allowed to cast their vote for a particular party. The results of the election were that 2,984,000 (78 per cent) voted for the Fatherland Front and 1,232,000 (22 per cent) voted for the opposition. The Communists had 277 representatives, the Agrarians 69, the Social Democrats 9, the Zveno Party 8, and the Radicals 1, giving the Fatherland Front a total of 364 (78 per cent) Deputies, and the opposition 101 (22 per cent). The Communists had gained an absolute majority, but the numbers of opposition voters had been considerable and included a section of the Zveno Party in addition to the opposition Agrarians and Social Democrats. It was the largest opposition vote recorded in any eastern country in post-war elections.

Petkov, speaking for the opposition, said that the voting figures did not represent the will of the people, and he assessed his own potential support at about 60 per cent of the population. Both the United States and Great Britain decided that the election conditions had not been satisfactory. It was officially stated in London on 4 November that the elections had not been carried out in a satisfactory manner and that the election campaign had taken place in an atmosphere of terror.

In spite of the Communist triumph the Fatherland Front Government still continued to be selected from all its constituent parties. At last Georgi Dimitrov, who had dominated the political scene but had not held office up to this time, became Prime Minister. His Government consisted of 9 Communists (with Yugov still Minister of the Interior), 5 Agrarians, 2 Socialists and 2 Zveno Ministers.

THE FATHERLAND FRONT AND THE OPPOSITION

The long struggle between the Fatherland Front and the opposition reached its climax in the year 1946-7, when most of the outstanding political figures, who had actively opposed the Fatherland Front were arrested and tried on different charges of treason and anti-State activity. Among those tried during this period was Krustu Pastuhov, one of the leading opposition Social Democrats, who was charged with spreading 'false rumours calculated to undermine the authority of the army leaders, to weaken military discipline, and to cause alarm and despondency in the ranks'. He was sentenced to five

years' imprisonment. Many others were tried at this time and received varying prison sentences.

The culmination of these political trials came in August 1947, with the trial of Nikola Petkov. He was charged with using 'all means of spoken and written propaganda for criminal purposes for preparing a coup d'état for the overthrow of the Government by violence.' He was also accused of having inspired certain army officers to conspire to overthrow the State. At the trials the Public Prosecutor stated that Petkov, aided by international reaction, had planned to seize power through a group of army officers who called themselves the Military League. Petkov resolutely denied that he had ever engaged in conspiracy and protested that he had only used normal methods of expressing opposition to the Government. In his final statement in court he declared that he had 'never participated or had any intention of taking part in any subversive activities or conspiracies against the government of the Fatherland Front.' He declared that he had been the subject of a bitter campaign of calumny 'for such is the sad fate of a Bulgarian politician who defends democracy today.' He concluded by asking the judges 'to leave politics aside' and to give judgement solely on the facts brought up in the trial.

In these last two sentences, Petkov had reached the heart of the matter. His trial was a political trial and his conviction and sentence of death were for political reasons. Petkov did not confess to conspiracy with the military league—but he did put himself forward as the defender of democracy, by which he meant a western democracy, and this was the reason why he fell foul of his former Communist allies.

After Petkov's conviction, the British and United States Governments officially requested the Bulgarian Government to suspend the sentence and allow the case to be reviewed by the Control Commission. On 16 August Petkov was condemned to death by hanging, his appeal was rejected on the 18th, and he was executed on the 23rd. Both the United States and Great Britain had made further protestations against the sentence before the execution and had hoped that they might prevail upon the Bulgarian Government to reconsider the sentence. After the execution an official British Note to Bulgaria condemned it as 'judicial murder'. The trial, it said, was not genuine, but 'an attack on an individual on account of his political opinions'. It was not until the following January that the real reason for the refusal of the Bulgarian Government to mitigate the sentence was disclosed. In

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January 1948 Georgi Dimitrov, when haranguing the parliamentary opposition, said :

If they [Great Britain and the United States] had not intervened from abroad, and if some had not ultimately attempted to dictate to our sovereign court, Petkov's head could have been saved. The death sentence could have been commuted to other punishment. But when it came to the question of blackmailing the Bulgarian nation and infringing on the right of our sovereign people's court, the death sentence had to be executed. And it was executed.¹

During the rest of 1947 and the greater part of 1948 other political trials took place in which numbers of people were sentenced to death and many were sentenced to terms of imprisonment, and gradually all active opponents of the Communist-dominated Fatherland Front were eliminated by these means.

The real issue in Petkov's trial and in many of the other trials was the question of the exercise of political power in Bulgaria. The Fatherland Front, dominated by the Communists, had a very different conception of government, of democracy, and of opposition from that of the opposition parties who took their ideas from the west. The view of the Fatherland Front was that if opposition meant working to overthrow the existing framework of the State, it would ruin any possibility of stable government and economic development in Bulgaria. If such opposition looked for support from Great Britain and the United States, either moral or active, it could only be received if the Communists were turned out of power. The Fatherland Front view was that the opposition's desire to introduce for the first time into the embittered field of Bulgarian politics a western system of opposition, parliamentary government, and complete freedom of political action would perpetuate the political chaos and economic exploitation which the Communists thought had ruined Bulgaria's past history. The Fatherland Front was determined that Bulgaria should have political stability and economic reform, and the Communist leaders had made up their minds that this could only be brought about by a Communist regime. Their plans for Bulgaria, they argued, were for the benefit of the majority of the people. They could only be realized if power was held for a number of years, and this they were determined to do, even if it meant eliminating opposition by the most ruthless methods.

¹ *The Times*, 15 January 1948.

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With Petkov's arrest in June 1946, the opposition lost its leading personality. At the same time the Fatherland Front first deposed the leading members of the opposition Agrarian Party and then on 26 August dissolved the opposition Agrarian Party, and the mandate of its twenty-three Parliamentary Deputies was annulled. This left the Social Democrats as the sole remaining opposition party in the Sobranje.

It is surprising that in the circumstances the opposition Social Democrats, headed by Lulchev, were still courageous enough to oppose measures of the Fatherland Front, but political courage and outspoken criticism are well-known characteristics of the Bulgarian people and the opposition Social Democrats remained true to form. In December 1947 they opposed the new constitution put forward by the Fatherland Front, and in January 1948 they voted against the Budget on which the important economic changes of the two-year plan depended. This latter action roused the Prime Minister, Dimitrov, to make the outspoken attack in which he threatened the Social Democrat Deputies with the fate of the opposition Agrarians. He said :

They ran their heads against a wall Their leader is under the ground. You must think over whether you want to share the fate of your allies' foreign agents and Bulgaria's enemies. If you have not been wise in the past and do not try to gain wisdom, you will receive a lesson from the nation that you will remember until you meet St Peter.¹

This threat clearly indicated that no opposition—as opposition is known in the west—was to be allowed at all in Bulgaria. In July the opposition Social Democrat Party met part of the fate which had been threatened. Six of its nine members were arrested, among them the Social Democrat leader, Kosta Lulchev ; one Deputy fled to Turkey, and one was arrested later.

Before the end of the year the Social Democrats gave up their independent identity and fused with the Communist Party, at that time still called the Bulgarian Workers' Party.²

By December 1948 parliamentary opposition had been eliminated and the Fatherland Front was in a position to go forward with its political and economic plans unhindered by any possibility of losing power in the near future.

¹ *The Times*, 15 January 1948.

² The Bulgarian Workers' Party was renamed the Communist Party at the congress of the party held at the end of December 1948.

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ECONOMIC PLANS

When the Fatherland Front came into power Bulgaria was a backward country, mainly agricultural, both primitive and undeveloped and with considerable unemployment on the land. She was, however, in the fortunate position of being the least damaged by the war of all the eastern countries of Europe. A long-term economic programme of the Fatherland Front, incorporated in a five-year plan due to start in 1949, aimed at introducing gradually over a number of years radical changes into Bulgarian economy by industrializing and electrifying the country and modernizing the whole industrial and agricultural economy. The immediate economic aims, however, were more limited. The aim of the first two-year plan, launched in April 1947, was to restore agricultural and industrial production to their pre-war levels. There was to be some industrial development in the beginnings of production of hydro-electric power and an increase in coal production, together with the establishment of certain new industries, mainly for the production of fertilizers. On the agricultural side efforts were to be concentrated on livestock raising and the beginnings of mechanization of agriculture with the development of co-operative and State farms. These developments in industry and agriculture, though limited in the first two years, could still only be realized with the help of extended foreign trade, improved transport conditions, and better harvests than those of the two preceding years. Unfortunately, the harvest of 1947 was for the third year in succession affected by drought and the Bulgarian economy, since it was predominantly agricultural, was seriously affected. The 1947 targets for agriculture were not achieved and targets for 1948 had to be reorganized on the basis of the actual results achieved in 1947. Available published figures of the Bulgarian plan are unfortunately incomplete, but the following table gives some percentage figures for industrial and agricultural production :

	1939	1946	1947 <i>target</i>	1947 <i>actual</i>	1948 <i>target</i>	1948 <i>actual</i>
Industrial Production	100	137	148	123	167	171.5
Agricultural Production	100	80	151	80	128	95

It is significant that in 1939 agriculture accounted for 75 per cent of total production, and that by 1947 no important change in this figure had taken place. Great efforts, however, were concentrated on industry in 1948 and the aim was to

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reduce the proportion of agriculture in the whole economy to 70 per cent in that year by stepping up both light and heavy industry.

The plan was to be financed independently of foreign loans, 67 per cent from State and autonomous budgets, and 33 per cent from bank credits. With the development in industry in 1948 and the increasing mechanization of agriculture, it was found that investments in the plan had to be 80 per cent higher in 1948 than in 1947.

Trade Treaties

The modernization of Bulgarian economy depended on a successful import and export programme. In 1947-8 Bulgaria built up a network of bilateral treaties with all the countries in the eastern zone, as well as with most western European countries. The most important of these treaties was an agreement (\$87 million) signed with the U.S.S.R. (10 July 1947) for two years. Russia agreed to supply petroleum, cotton, paper, rubber, railway waggons, road vehicles, agricultural and electric machinery, other equipment, coke, chemicals, etc. Bulgaria was to export to Russia 20,000 tons of tobacco, alcohol, and pulp.

Other countries that agreed to supply Bulgaria with industrial equipment and agricultural machinery were Austria (industrial steel and steel products), Switzerland, Poland (machinery and machine tools), the Soviet zone of Germany and Bizonia, Sweden (iron and steel machinery, electrical equipment instruments and spare parts).

Labour

One of the difficulties in implementing this plan was the need for skilled labour in all branches of the economy, industrial and agricultural, and great efforts were made to train up skilled personnel in all these branches. For roads, railways, and ordinary building a great deal of voluntary labour was used in 1947 and 1948, especially young people. But since this kind of labour could only be used on elementary construction work, its value was limited, and in the latter part of the plan, it was clear that more skilled and semi-skilled labour would have to be employed.

Details of the targets and achievements in the plan are given below. It will be noted that the 1947 achievements in all sections, except leather, rubber and tobacco industries, were below the targets, and in the electrical industry, in wheat, soya beet and fruit production they were less than 50 per cent.

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	1946	1947 <i>target</i>	1947 <i>actual</i>	1948* <i>target</i>
Production of metals	100	231	143	283
Machine tool production	100	237	147	304
Metallurgy	100	203	126	236
Electrical industry	100	857	360	875
Food industry	100	123	81	124
Chemical industry	100	168	143	234
Building materials	100	149	140	214
Ceramics	100	163	148	—
Timber and carpentry	100	112	106	167
Paper industry	100	102	101	—
Textile industry	100	131	117	136
Rubber industry	100	195	199	295
Leather	100	113	113	142
Tobacco	100	132	137	186

*Results of the plan for 1948 were given by the State Planning Committee of Bulgaria as follows :

‘The industrial plan of production was fulfilled by 106 per cent. In its main branches it was carried out as follows : electrical production, 98 per cent ; extract industry, 89 per cent ; industry, 107 per cent.

‘Machine building industry over-fulfilled the plan by 106 per cent ; rubber industry by 110 per cent ; electrical industry by 110 per cent ; paper industry by 120 per cent ; leather industry by 134 per cent ; textile industry by 106 per cent ; food industry by 125 per cent.

‘The execution of the plan for agriculture encountered serious difficulties because of the backward and small-scale private farms. Vegetables, sunflower, soya, cotton, vetch, etc., fell short of production. Cereals, oil-bearing seeds, etc., have not yet attained their pre-war level of production. The number of State farms increased from 56 in 1947 to 86 in 1948, while the arable land increased from 20,700 hectares to 77,500 hectares. The number of functioning co-operative farms was increased from 537 in 1947 to 890 with 65, 084 members and 237,927 hectares of arable land, while the total number of co-operative farms reached over 1,000, consisting of some 300,000 hectares. The area of co-operative land is still small. Mechanization of our rural economy was given a new impetus. Machine tractor stations increased from 30 in 1947 to 71 in 1948. The general industrial and agricultural production *per capita* increased by 14 per cent in 1948 as compared to 1939 and by 39 per cent as compared to 1947.’

The Five-Year Plan, 1949-53.

Long-term aims for the development of Bulgarian economy were embodied in a five-year plan which began on 1 January 1949. The aims of this plan, like those of the Yugoslav five-year plan, were extremely ambitious ; but Dimitrov had already shown that he was not likely to adopt a policy against Soviet wishes and it was therefore clear that the plan had Soviet approval.

The plan, described by Dimitrov as ‘gigantic,’ provided for extensive development in Bulgarian industry and the mechanization of agriculture. The ratio of industry to agriculture is planned to change from the 30 : 70 per cent ratio of 1948, to a ratio of 45 : 55 per cent in 1953. This is to be achieved through a heavy-industry construction programme which includes the building of power stations (to increase power from

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560 million kwh. to 1,800 million kwh.) ; metallurgical factories for the refining of lead, tin, and copper ; factories for the production of nitrogen fertilizer, soda, and cellulose ; machine factories for instruments, electrical apparatus, agricultural machines ; and factories for building materials and food processing. Coal mines are also planned to be developed to increase production to 67 per cent above the 1948 figure.

Linked with this industrial development are plans for other big changes in the Bulgarian economy. Private retail trade—still dealing with 32 per cent of all trade in 1948—is to be eliminated. There is to be large capital investment in agriculture with plans for irrigation, land reclamation, afforestation, and the development of State farms and co-operatives. By 1953 co-operatives are to produce as much as 60 per cent of all farming output. Although nationalization of the land is not envisaged in the plan, it is considered that conditions will be created ' in which the problem of nationalization of the land will be solved in practice '.¹

The planners also hope that Bulgaria's population will increase by almost 50 per cent in the next fifteen years, that even in five years the consumption of food will increase greatly, and at the same time the population will greatly develop its output in all fields. To aid in this many social services, such as hospitals, health centres, crèches, and holiday homes are planned to be provided all over the country.

It is clear that Bulgaria cannot achieve all this unaided. Credit and machinery as well as moral support will have to come from the U.S.S.R. and it is probable that much machinery and other goods will be needed from Bulgaria's more developed neighbours such as Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.

FOREIGN POLICY

The main aim of Bulgarian foreign policy in the immediate post-war period was first of all to get the Peace Treaty signed and then to be accepted as a member of the United Nations. In the last eight months of the war, after Bulgarian troops had been withdrawn from Yugoslavia and Greece, 339,760 Bulgarian soldiers had fought on the side of the Allies, and they had had 31,910 men killed or wounded in fighting in Hungary and Austria. The Bulgarians pointed out that this was no small contribution to the Allied war effort and mitigated to a large extent their former pro-Axis policy. They also laid

¹ Stated by Dimitrov in his speech to the Bulgarian Communist Party Congress, December 1948.

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stress on the fact that even in the earlier part of the war, none of their people had fought against Russia on the eastern front, in spite of heavy pressure for them to do so. The Fatherland Front Government considered that the pro-German policy had been one of the small ruling clique led by a German king, that the Bulgarian people were in no way responsible for it and therefore should not be made to pay too dearly in the Peace Treaty.

The Peace Treaty was signed on 15 February, 1947, and these factors were taken into consideration. Bulgaria retained her 1941 frontiers and also kept the Dobrogea, part of which had been held by Roumania after its conquest in the Second Balkan War up to the Treaty of Craiova in 1940. The Greeks put in strong claims during the peace negotiations for a rectification of the Greco-Bulgarian frontier and were very disappointed that this was not granted them. The Bulgarian counter-claims for a Bulgarian port on the Aegean Sea were also disregarded. The Peace Treaty fixed the amount of reparations that Bulgaria should pay to Greece at \$45 million, and to Yugoslavia at \$25 million. Bulgaria's armed forces were also limited. Although Bulgaria protested against the Treaty, it was the most lenient in her history. After the Peace Treaty had been signed the Allied Control Commission and Russian troops were withdrawn from Bulgaria.

The Bulgarian application for admission to the United Nations did not fare so well. Repeated applications up to the end of 1948 were rejected, the western Powers declaring that the terms of the Peace Treaty in relation to democratic freedom inside Bulgaria had not been fulfilled.

One of the important aspects of the foreign policy of the Fatherland Front was that of friendship with Bulgaria's eastern neighbours. The feuds that had existed for the past hundred years were laid aside and Bulgaria made a series of treaties of friendship and co-operation with her neighbours, who by the end of 1947 all had Governments of the same political character as that of the Fatherland Front.

The only exception was Greece, and Bulgarian-Greek relations were mutually hostile. Apart from the problem of frontier rectification, there was the outstanding question of Bulgaria's support of the left-wing rebels in Greece. From 1946 onwards the Greek Government made repeated complaints to the United Nations that Bulgaria was helping the rebels in Greece. A United Nations Commission was sent out in 1946 to investigate, and a permanent sub-commission was

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established in Salonika in 1947. The United Nations, in spite of Bulgaria's denials, accepted a majority report stating that such assistance to the rebels had been given by Bulgaria. Although admittedly in sympathy with the rebels in Greece, the Bulgarian Government did not extend official recognition to them and continued to hope that Bulgaria would succeed in obtaining permission to become a member of the United Nations.

During 1947 and 1948 treaties of friendship, co-operation, and mutual aid were signed between Bulgaria and all the countries of eastern Europe with similar Governments. A clause included in all these treaties was for mutual aid in event of aggression by Germany or by a third Power fighting with Germany.

Among these treaties the pact signed with Yugoslavia on 27 July 1947, was the most far-reaching. This pact, signed by Dimitrov and Tito, and strengthened by another treaty of friendship for twenty years signed on 27 November of that year, provided for close co-operation and a customs union, joint defence 'in the spirit of the United Nations', and an agreement to aid each other in the event of an attack by a third party. At the time of the signing of these agreements, many people thought that they fulfilled the project of federation between the two countries, which had had some support in the pre-war period when relations between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia had been very strained. After the signing of the treaty of friendship in November, Tito declared, 'We shall establish a co-operation so close that the question of federation will be a mere formality'. On 17 January 1948, after signing a treaty of friendship with Roumania in Bucharest, Dimitrov spoke at a press interview about the question of the federation of eastern Europe. He said that it was premature to bring this about, but the first step would be customs unions between the countries of eastern Europe. 'When the time is ripe,' he said, 'the peoples of the popular democracies will decide whether there shall be a federation of States of eastern Europe.' He listed the possible members and stated that Greece might also be included. Dimitrov added that such a federation would co-operate with Russia and make trade agreements on the basis of equality with the United States, Great Britain, and France.

This was clearly a statement of a policy of federation for eastern Europe on a scale hitherto regarded as impossible. The belief held by some observers that this might have been inspired by Russia was exploded on 28 January, when an

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editorial in *Pravda* severely rebuked Dimitrov for this idea.

These countries do not need a problematic and artificial federation or customs union [it said]. What they do need is consolidation and protection of their independence and sovereignty through the mobilization of domestic popular democratic forces, as had been said in the declaration of the Cominform.

Shortly after this Dimitrov retracted his statement and admitted that he had been in error in advocating a federation at that time.

An information bureau to co-ordinate information about the Communist parties of certain European countries had been set up in Belgrade in September 1947. Bulgaria joined the bureau, known as the Cominform, and when nine months later the Cominform attacked the policy and practice of the Yugoslav Communist Party, Bulgaria signed the communiqué and joined in the denunciation of the Yugoslav leaders.

It became clear during 1948 that relations between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia were strained on the question of Macedonia. Tito was accused of wanting to annex Bulgarian Macedonia (Pirin) to the Yugoslav Macedonian Republic, and the Yugoslavs accused the Bulgarians of not allowing the Pirin Macedonians any freedom. Bulgarian policy¹ still envisaged a possible federation of south Slav States (rather than the larger federation suggested by Dimitrov earlier) and was prepared to agree to an autonomous Macedonia within such a federation. Bulgaria was not willing to allow Bulgarian Macedonia to become part of a Macedonian Republic before a larger federation had been achieved. In the earlier plans for a federation, it had been uncertain which of the two outstanding personalities in south east Europe—Tito or Dimitrov—would hold first place, but by the end of 1948 Tito's position had changed and it was obvious that as long as Yugoslavia remained outside the Cominform no federation was possible.

CONSOLIDATION : DECEMBER 1947—DECEMBER 1948

After the elimination of the leaders of political opposition, which had been almost completed by the end of 1947, the Fatherland Front turned to the task of consolidating its position throughout the country and organizing economic developments. The aim of the Government was to bring as many people as possible into the Fatherland Front, either directly or through membership of some organization working with it.

¹ Stated by Dimitrov at the Bulgarian Communist Party Congress, 19 December 1948.

In February 1948, at the Second Congress of the Fatherland Front, it was possible for Dimitrov to state that there was hardly one Bulgarian citizen 'who does not participate in one or other political, economic, social, or cultural organization'. He gave figures for the membership of trade unions, farmers' unions, co-operative organizations, the National Women's Union, Youth Union, and children's organizations, the total amounting to almost the whole of the 7,020,000¹ population of the country. It was the aim of the Fatherland Front 'to re-educate the masses of the people in the spirit of the people's constitution', and in order to achieve this no unit of the economic, political, or social life of the country was too small to be used. The role of the parties which still retained their names, other than the Communist Party, was 'to attract to the Fatherland Front people from among circles where they have influence and contacts'. By this and other means the Fatherland Front was being reorganized in this period as a 'People's Political Organization', with 'compulsory discipline, a common programme, and electoral leadership'.

A constitution embodying the principles on which it was hoped to found the new Bulgarian State was passed in December 1947. It contained the usual features of the constitutions of the new people's democracies. Bulgaria was defined as a People's Republic, in which power emanates from and belongs to the people. All representative organs of State power (National Assembly and Municipal and County People's Councils) were to be elected by general direct and secret ballot of all citizens over eighteen years old.

The supreme organ of State power was to be a National Assembly elected for four years. It was to be the only legislative organ. Deputies could be recalled by their electors before the end of their term of office; they were to have the right of interpellation in the Assembly, and there was provision for a referendum subject to the decision of the Assembly. The Assembly was to elect from its own members the praesidium, consisting of a President and eighteen other members. It had the right to issue edicts and interpret the laws, and also to appoint the Government, which could include persons who were not Deputies. The Government was to be the supreme executive and administrative organ of the State, while local administration was left in the hands of People's Councils in the municipalities and counties, elected locally for three years.

The constitution protected private property and its inheri-

¹ Figure of the census of December 1947.

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tance as well as private enterprise, but gave the State wide powers of public economic organization. With certain exceptions judges were to be elected by the people and were to sit with assessors. Individual freedom was guaranteed, as were equal rights of men and women, free and compulsory education, social insurance, freedom of speech and of conscience. These were the theoretical provisions of the constitution. Economic and social change was also so great and so rapid that increasing numbers of ordinary people, both townspeople and peasants, were needed to play a part in communal life, particularly in the sphere of local government—the organization of voluntary labour for roads and railways, the development of co-operative farms, the education of the illiterate, adult education, etc.

The two-year plan had by 1948 reached a stage when change in the country's economy could be undertaken. Industry was nationalized (December 1947); private banks, foreign and domestic wholesale trade, and large-scale real estate in the towns were nationalized in 1948. This change was strongly disliked by the commercial and townspeople, who were most affected, but the majority of the people were unaffected by it. Some of the working people in fact benefited, since the house property which was nationalized was used to provide homes for industrial workers. It is significant that in spite of these measures for nationalization, 61·3 per cent of the national income was still in private hands in 1948, though it was unlikely to stay there.

AGRICULTURE IN 1948

Agriculture was still based on private ownership of holdings, which were not allowed to exceed 20 hectares¹ per person but since the custom of the country still provided for the division of an estate between all the sons of the family, most of the agricultural holdings did not even reach the legal maximum. Buying and selling co-operatives had been developed in Bulgaria for many years before the Second World War, and these continued their work, but the new Government encouraged the formation of labour co-operatives, where land was pooled and worked on a co-operative basis in addition to co-operative buying and selling. By the end of 1948 there were 1,046 of these new co-operatives in the country which owned less than 3 per cent of all agricultural land. There were in addition a number of State co-operative farms. More than seventy tractor stations

¹ With the exception of the Dobrogea, where 30 hectares was the limit.

had been established in different parts of the country and the aim was to import agricultural machinery so that the number of these stations could be rapidly increased. Nevertheless these changes were only a beginning, and in many parts of Bulgaria farming was still as it had been for hundreds of years.

From articles in the press, broadcasts, and speeches of the leaders, it was clear that Dimitrov's Government did not intend to lay itself open to the charges that had been made by the Cominform against Marshal Tito's policy towards the Yugoslav peasants. Bulgaria had signed the Cominform communiqué attacking Yugoslavia in June 1948, and in the latter part of that year it was apparent that the lessons of this attack were being digested in Bulgaria itself. Speeches were careful to stress friendship with the U.S.S.R., the special role of the Communist Party as distinct from the Fatherland Front, and the importance of limiting the power of the richer peasants, or kulaks.

Dimitrov and his supporters knew that whatever Yugoslavia's position might be, Bulgaria could not develop along the lines planned without the aid of the U.S.S.R. At the end of 1948 there was every sign that that aid was forthcoming and that the plans would go forward, if not at the pace prescribed, at least sufficiently rapidly to revolutionize economic life in Bulgaria within a comparatively short time.

The political revolution started at the end of the war, had finished its first phase by the end of 1947, and 1948 had seen consolidation in both political and economic fields. The Fatherland Front contained five political parties, but all except the Communist Party were without independent political power. The strength of the Front lay in the support of the Communist Party, which had 496,598 members. The strongest support for the Party came from industrial workers and those peasants whose conditions had been improved by the changes brought about by the new Government.¹ Conditions for the ordinary people, particularly in the towns, remained difficult, for food supplies were affected by the three-year drought of 1945, 1946, and 1947, and even in 1948 the harvest was not exceptionally good. But for the majority of Bulgarian peasants hardship was no new experience; they also had deep-rooted revolutionary and radical traditions and had long looked to Russia as mentor, protector, and example.

The new Government had as much political power and more

¹ Delegates at the Party Congress December 1948 consisted of 405 workers, 192 peasants, 51 tradesmen, 245 employees, and 80 independent professions.

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economic control than any Government in the past and it was in a position to enforce its policy. Up to the end of 1948 the increased power of the State had encroached more upon the liberty of the middle and upper class people than on that of the peasantry, but it seemed likely that in the future, if industrial and agricultural development laid down in the five-year plan was to be realized, the peasants would have to come more and more under Government control. By the end of 1948 the main lines of the revolution planned for Bulgaria by the Fatherland Front had become clearly defined; the testing time for its permanence lay in the future.

CHAPTER THREE

YUGOSLAVIA

BY PHYLLIS AUTY

REVOLUTION which gave power to new political forces took place in Yugoslavia during the Second World War. This revolution was identified with resistance to the Axis. By the end of the war the revolution was an accomplished fact, and as a result Yugoslavia in the transition period from war to peace did not experience, as did other eastern European countries, the added disturbance of political confusion. After the war Tito, the leader of the resistance movement, and his supporters began their task of governing the country with the popularity, independence, and experience which they had gained through leading the Yugoslav people to victory during the war. In this respect, Yugoslavia was unique among the countries of eastern Europe. The influence of war-time development, both on the leadership and people of Yugoslavia, remained very strong in the immediate post-war years.

YUGOSLAVIA IN WAR-TIME

In 1941 the Nazis had hoped that Yugoslavia would join the Axis without the necessity of fighting, and when Prince Paul, Regent for the young King Peter who was a minor, signed the Tripartite Pact of agreement with Hitler on 26 March, it had looked as if their hopes would be realized. But on 27 March, popular demonstrations in Belgrade and other parts of Yugoslavia showed that the Yugoslav people were not prepared to accept shameful capitulation to the Nazis—even though the German armies had overrun western Europe and there seemed no hope of withstanding them in the east. On 6 April 1941, the German army invaded Yugoslavia and by 17 April had overrun the whole country. The young king (who had assumed full powers, and supported the demonstrations of 22 March), the Prime Minister, General Simović, and other politicians and members of the Government escaped to the Middle East and later to London. General Simović had delegated his military powers to General Kalafatović with instructions to ask for an armistice. Unconditional surrender was signed in Belgrade on 18 April.

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The Germans, having occupied Yugoslavia, set about dismembering it. They carved it up into eight parts and began to follow the age-old policy of 'divide and rule'. Italy received part of the Croat littoral including Dalmatia and the Dalmatian islands,¹ as well as part of Slovenia. Germany also annexed the north western part of Serbia, parts of Croatia and Slovenia. Hungary occupied a very small part of Slovenia and parts of the rich area of the Vojvodina ; Bulgaria and the satellite Italian State of Albania both occupied parts of Serbia and Macedonia. Two new puppet States were created : the so-called ' Independent State of Croatia ' under Ante Pavelić, leader of the Croat terrorist organization, the ' Ustaši ', and the small State of Serbia under General Nedić. An attempt to create an independent State of Montenegro failed, and Montenegro was put under the protection of Italy. Parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina were incorporated in the ' Independent State of Croatia.'

In spite of this dismemberment, of the lack of leadership in the country, and of the ferocious cruelty and deportations used by the occupiers to crush the people, resistance in the form of sabotage and sporadic fighting started very quickly, and grew to such proportions that at the height of their success in 1943-4 the Yugoslav guerrillas, who had come to be known as ' the Partisans ', were holding thirty-four Axis divisions² and constituting a serious drain on the German war potential.

It was during these years of fighting the Axis that the leadership of the Yugoslav peoples passed entirely out of the hands of the old Yugoslav ruling class into those of the resistance leaders, Tito, and the small group of people who, with him, are today ruling Yugoslavia. Although military activity against the enemy was the prime object of their partisan organization, a further object was to create a new kind of state administration in all areas that were liberated from the occupiers. Support for the Partisans came from all parts of the country and from all ranks of society, though the movement was strongest amongst the peasants and in the mountainous areas. Only a small proportion of Partisans were Communists, but these usually held the key positions.

The opposition to the Partisans of the Royal Yugoslav Government in exile was political. The hatred which many

¹ Except for Brač, Hvar, and Losinj which went to the Independent State of Croatia.

² This figure is the highest quoted in this connexion and includes quisling troops raised in Yugoslavia who fought for the Axis.

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of the exiled Yugoslav politicians felt for Communism, which was the avowed creed of Tito and other Partisan leaders, made them reluctant to acknowledge the exploits of the Partisans against the Germans, and also made them refuse to co-operate with the Partisans even after the Allied High Command had agreed to do so. It also made them more ready to exaggerate the importance of the position of the Cetnik leader in Yugoslavia, Draža Mihailović.

In the early months after the invasion of Yugoslavia, Mihailović, a former officer in the Yugoslav army, had fled to the mountains of Serbia and had gathered round him a group of supporters. Although reports reached London that he was resisting the Germans, it was later established beyond doubt that he was not prepared to use his forces to fight the Germans,¹ and it was subsequently proved that his forces had actively collaborated with the Italians and Germans² in fighting the Partisans.³ Although Mihailović was made War Minister and raised to the rank of General by the Yugoslav Government in exile, his position in Yugoslavia was of little military significance and his following comparatively small.

By the end of 1944 the Partisans had liberated a great part of Yugoslavia. In October of that year a joint Soviet-Yugoslav army liberated Belgrade. Ljubljana, capital of Slovenia, and Zagreb, capital of Croatia, were liberated in May 1945, and the last German troops were driven out of Yugoslavia by the end of that month.

By that time the Partisans had an army of more than 700,000 troops, they had the recognition of the Allies, who had helped to supply them with arms, and they had the support of the majority of the Yugoslav people. Regional, religious, and political differences had been sunk in the unity of fighting a common enemy. The Partisans' prestige inside Yugoslavia was tremendous; they had a skeleton civilian administration throughout the country and their political initiative inside Yugoslavia was undisputed.

The political organization of the Partisans for Yugoslavia began to take shape as early as 1942. By the end of that year a number of areas had been liberated from enemy occupation and some form of civilian administration had to be devised to

¹ Jasper Rootham, *Miss Fire: the Chronicle of a British Mission to Mihailovich* (London, Chatto & Windus, 1946).

² Stated by Churchill in his review of the war to the House of Commons on 22 February 1944.

³ Evidence of collaboration with the Italians is given in Elizabeth Wiskemann, *The Rome-Berlin Axis* (London, Oxford University Press, 1949) pp. 293, 294.

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deal with all the problems that arose in the wake of the retreating enemy, and also to ensure supplies to the Partisan army. Administration of these areas was undertaken by 'National Liberation Committees', which were nominated or elected by the people of the districts. These committees were gradually organized to cover the pre-war administrative units of the country, the villages, communes, districts, counties, provinces and eventually the six regions, Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Montenegro, and Macedonia. Thus alongside the many different systems of the occupiers, was established one uniform system for the whole country.

Before committees for all these divisions had been formed, a central organ of government had already been set up. This was the Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ).¹ It was established by a congress of 208 Partisan delegates from all parts of Yugoslavia, which took place at Bihać on 20 November 1942. These members of AVNOJ were from a number of different political parties and included people of Catholic, Orthodox, and Muslim religions. The High Command of the Partisan army was responsible to AVNOJ, and the first task of the Government was declared to be the liberation of the whole country from the enemy.

A second plenary session of AVNOJ was held in Jajce in November 1943, at which it transformed itself into a legislative and executive body. A National Liberation Committee of sixty-seven members with all powers of provisional government was elected by the delegates. President of this Committee was Josip Brož Tito²—whose name was officially revealed for the first time; he was also appointed by the Congress to be Marshal of Yugoslavia and Commander-in-Chief. Twelve other acting ministers were elected. Thus by the end of 1943 the basic scheme of the present Government had already been established. By the end of the war the system was well developed and firmly established. As soon as the enemy was driven out of any area, the National Liberation Committees took over. There was no new political revolution at the end of the war; it had already been taking place gradually and effectively from 1942 onwards.

One other important aspect of the war in Yugoslavia was the aid that was given to the Axis occupiers by Yugoslav collabo-

¹ Antifalističko Veće Narodnog Oslobođenja Jugoslavije.

² Born in Zagorje in Croatia in 1892; served in Austrian army in the First World War; was captured by the Russians. Between the two wars he worked as a Communist organizer in Yugoslavia.

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rationist organizations. The position of General Mihailović has already been mentioned. Četnik forces, some closely connected with his headquarters in Serbia, others, independent groups, fought against the Partisans, sometimes with the forces of the occupying armies. Such Četnik activity took place in Serbia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Lika, and Montenegro. Many of the Četniks left the country with the retreating German army at the end of the war. There were other quisling troops fighting with the occupiers and included in the enemy order of battle: the Ustaši and Domobranci in Croatia, and the Nedić State Guards in Serbia. Together these quisling Yugoslavs numbered many thousands of men. They were responsible for many of the notorious atrocities and cruelties against their own countrymen.

The losses of the Yugoslav peoples in their fight against the Axis were tremendous and affected post-war development for a long time. Of the pre-war population of 15 million, Yugoslavia lost 1,706,000 men, women, and children—that is a ninth of her population.¹ Of these only 305,000 killed were soldiers; the rest were civilian casualties executed, tortured, bombed, burnt to death, and killed in the fighting in the villages. Material losses were also vast. War damage in Yugoslavia was fixed by the Allied Reparations Commission at \$46.9 milliard (£11,750 million), nearly fifty times the pre-war annual national income of Yugoslavia.

This was the legacy of the war to those who were to govern Yugoslavia in time of peace. It contained elements of violence and hatred, of past disunion and war-time collaboration, of heroism, endurance, and military success, of national destruction but also of a new-found unity of purpose. It was against this background that Marshal Tito and his supporters began their task of post-war government of Yugoslavia in 1945.

POLITICAL CHANGES, 1945-6

As the Germans retreated and the fighting came to an end in the early months of 1945, the Partisans' National Liberation Committees took over the administration of the country. In some parts they had already been the recognized organs of local government for at least two years. No other political groups inside the country were in a position to challenge Tito and his supporters who had widespread political support and a well-organized system of provisional government. But the authority of the Partisans was challenged by the *émigré* Govern-

¹ The number of Jews was reduced from about 80,000 to 11,000.

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ment. This Government, self-constituted by the politicians who had escaped from Yugoslavia, and recognized by the King in exile, had played no part in the fight for liberation inside the country. It had appointed General Mihailović, the Četnik leader, as War Minister, and this too had discredited the *émigrés* in the eyes of all supporters of the Partisans. Although the King personally still had some support in the country, the Government which he headed was generally unpopular and without any considerable following inside Yugoslavia. It was in the anomalous position of still being recognized by the western Allies. The British and United States Governments were anxious that agreement should be reached between the *émigré* Government and the Partisans, and during 1944 prolonged negotiations took place. In January 1945, it was announced that an agreement had been made between a specially appointed royalist Premier, Dr Ivan Šubašić and Tito. By this agreement—known as the Tito-Šubašić Agreement—Šubašić and two other *émigré* politicians joined the Partisans' Provisional Government, and the king agreed not to return to Yugoslavia until after the people had had the opportunity of expressing their choice of government. A three-man regency, agreed on by Tito and the *émigré* Government, exercised royal powers.

Negotiations had been prolonged and bitter because of the opposing political views of the *émigrés* and Partisans. The uneasy compromise was not a success and faced with the experienced organization of Tito and his supporters, the *émigrés* who had joined the Partisan government were unable to exercise much influence. Šubašić became Foreign Minister in the reorganized Provisional Government, Milan Grol, a Social Democrat, and Juraj Šutej, leader of the Croat Peasant Party (the nominees of the London Government) were Ministers without Portfolio. Milan Grol stayed in the Government until 18 August, when he resigned in disapproval of what he denounced as 'the arbitrary methods and doctrinaire exclusiveness' of the People's Front.

In August 1945 a third session of AVNOJ, increased by the co-optation of 118 members of pre-war political parties, was held in Belgrade. This Government passed a number of important laws including a land law and an electoral law setting out a system for the election of a representative government.

Parliament was to consist of two chambers, a Federal Chamber (Škupština) and a Chamber of Nationalities. The Federal Chamber was to have 348 members elected by the

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federal regions of Yugoslavia—Serbia 87, Croatia 86, Bosnia-Hercegovina 58, the Vojvodina 41, Slovenia 29, Macedonia 24, Kosovo-Metohija 14, Montenegro 9. These members, elected by direct suffrage, were to represent constituencies of 50,000 inhabitants into which each of the regions was divided. Included in these numbers were a few non-constituency seats allocated to parties whose share of members was proportionately less than the share of votes cast. The Chamber of Nationalities was to have 178 members, 25 for each of the six Federal Republics irrespective of size, 18 for the Vojvodina and 10 for the Kosovo-Metohija area, which were classed as autonomous regions. The voting for this chamber was to be by the d'Hondt system of proportional representation. It was also stated that each of the six Federal Republics was to have a local single-chamber parliament elected by direct suffrage. Voting was to be by universal suffrage for all men and women over the age of 18, together with soldiers of either sex who had borne arms against the enemy during the war—on the principle that if they were old enough to fight for their country, they were old enough to vote for its Government. Convicted criminals and collaborators were excluded from voting.

In the prevailing post-war conditions completion of the electoral register was difficult. Official figures given for the electorate were 8,020,671 people enfranchised and 253,108 disenfranchised.

All supporters of Tito and the Partisans were joined together in a united People's Front, with an agreed political programme and a joint list of candidates for each constituency. Supporting it were the Communists, and sections of the Socialist, Republican, and Agrarian parties, together with parts of the Independent Democrats, the Croat Peasant Party, and the Serb Democrats. The agreed programme was based on the political aims that the Partisans had put forward from the days of the Bihać and Jajce Assemblies—federal unity and equality of all Yugoslav peoples, republicanism, and reconstruction.

The opposition to the People's Front consisted of sections of four main parties—Serb Democrats, Radicals, Socialists, and the Croat Peasant Party. There were also splinter groups of a number of other parties. The main support of these parties came from members of those classes in town and country who had been or expected to be dispossessed by the partisans, and many of those who had actively or passively collaborated with the enemy during the war. There was also Catholic opposition. The opposition was not united in its aims and at

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no time published a joint political programme. It was not allowed any local organization. Opposition leaders alleged also intimidation and lack of political freedom to appeal to the electorate. On 20 September the opposition parties, who knew by this time that they were not likely to win the election, decided to take no part in it. This move was followed at the beginning of October by the resignation from the Government of the remaining representatives of the London *émigrés*, Šubašić and Šutej. The grounds for their resignation were that the Tito-Šubašić Agreement had not been kept by the Partisans. Tito countered this by a public statement in which he replied to Šubašić : ' Everything I pledged to do in my agreement with you and everything proposed by the Big Three in Yalta is being done.' Tito also accused Šubašić and Šutej of playing for foreign intervention. It was clear that the ideas of these representatives of the London Government and those of Tito on political life in the new Yugoslavia were completely divergent. Tito was in power, and determined that his view should prevail.

In both Britain and America there was much speculation whether the elections would be free and fair. Provision was accordingly made by the Provisional Government whereby on polling day opposition votes could be recorded even though there were no candidates to vote for.

The election took place on 11 November. A special system of voting had been devised for an electorate which included a large number of illiterates. There were no international observers present at the election but members of the press of Europe and the United States were allowed to travel freely about the country observing election procedure. The pre-election campaign organized by the Communist Party and National Front was very efficient ; but there is no doubt that Tito, the Partisans, and the National Front programme, were genuinely popular among great numbers of Yugoslavs in all parts of the country. In this respect the Yugoslav election was unique among the eastern countries of Europe in post-war period. *The Times*, commenting on the conduct of the election said, ' there is every indication that the elections in Yugoslavia have been free and fair '. It attributed the heavy polling to ' effective propaganda as well as spontaneous popular enthusiasm '.¹

The election results were as follows : 88.69 per cent of the total electorate went to the polls ; 90.48 per cent of the votes

¹ *The Times*, 14 November 1945.

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cast were for the People's Front, with 9.52 per cent for the opposition. Figures for voting for the Federal Chamber were 6,725,047 for the People's Front and 707,422 for the opposition. Figures for the Chamber of Nationalities were 6,564,975 for the People's Front and 838,239 for the opposition. An analysis of the votes showed that more opposition votes had been cast in the big towns than in the country, and more in Slovenia and Croatia than in other parts of Yugoslavia.

After receiving this great election majority Tito returned to power with a People's Front Government which did not substantially differ from the previous Provisional Government. Tito himself became Prime Minister and Minister of National Defence; vice-Premiers were the Communist, Edvard Kardelj, and the Republican, Jasa Prodanović.¹ Stanoje Simić, a Socialist, became Minister of Foreign Affairs. Other Communists who held important office were: Alexander Ranković, Minister of the Interior, Šreten Žujović, Minister of Finance, Andrija Hebrang, Minister of Industry, and Milovan Djilas, Minister without portfolio. Sava Kosanović, a member of the National Front but not of the Communist Party, was Minister of Information. In all there were twenty-six members of the cabinet which included men from all parties in the Front. Apart from certain minor alterations this cabinet remained unchanged until January 1948.

The election had been won on a republican programme and after this there was no question of King Peter being likely to return to Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia was declared a republic on 31 January 1946. A year later King Peter and other members of the royal family were deprived of their Yugoslav nationality. The majority of the electorate had endorsed the republic, but in certain parts of Yugoslavia, particularly in parts of Serbia, there remained dwindling relics of royalist support.

The cabinet was formed from prominent members of the People's Front, which was composed of the parties which had supported it at the election, but undoubtedly the predominant party was the Communist Party. As the opposition had withdrawn from the electoral lists, it was not represented in the parliament which assembled after the election. Opposition as it is understood in Britain or in any of the western countries had never existed in Yugoslavia, and Marshal Tito clearly had no intention of tolerating the kind of disruptive opposition which had existed in the past. He was determined that

¹ The founder of the Republican Party; he was already an old man by this time and died in July 1948.

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nothing should stand in the way of his party's plans for the recovery and reorganization of the country. Tito himself gave a full definition of his views on political opposition to a correspondent of *The Times*.¹ He said :

There will be no persecution of people who do not side with our People's Front, and no special measures against them. I should like to see our opposition leading a full political life. I certainly expect to see an opposition crystallize out of the many parties which go to form the People's Front in parliament, for we shall have many controversial issues to settle. The People's Front was first formed as the most effective instrument available for fighting the invader and we now have a new battle, the battle for reconstruction. The basic unity of the People's Front is therefore necessary to the country, but that does not mean we expect automatic agreement by all its members. Here I am talking of those who oppose us honestly. You can take it for granted that we do not mean to allow freedom to the sort of opposition that is now so active abroad, which aims only at destroying all that our people fought for during these years. We have earned the right to peace and independence ; there is no place here for people who can proffer only the sterile hope of western intervention in their favour and thus the certainty of another war. They are excluded from our political life.

But it became increasingly clear as time went on that the kind of opposition that exists under western democracy did not come within the scope of Tito's opposition.

A new constitution for Yugoslavia was passed on 31 January 1946. It embodied the basic principles laid down at the war-time Partisan Conferences of Bihać and Jajce. The first Article established a Federal People's State, republican in form, a community of peoples equal in rights who . . . ' had expressed their will to live together in a federal State '.

The Federal People's Republic was to be composed of the same divisions already made before the election—Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro. Serbia included the autonomous province of the Vojvodina and the autonomous region of Kosovo-Metohija.² Each republic was to have its own Assembly and a constitution drawn up independently and reflecting its special characteristics but in conformity with the Federal Constitution. The jurisdiction of the Federal Government was defined under twenty-four heads (Article 44) and covered constitutional

¹ *The Times*, 14 November 1945 and 20 September 1946.

² Both the Vojvodina and Kosovo Metohija have mixed populations. The Vojvodina mainly Serbs, Croats, and Hungarians ; Kosovo Metohija mainly Albanians and Serbs.

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amendments, international affairs, defence and security, federal finance, general economic plans, commercial relations, and communications. Matters not covered in this Article were to be left to the independent authority of each republic.

The machinery of central government was to consist of a People's Assembly of two houses: the Federal Chamber elected by universal suffrage, consisting of one Deputy per 50,000 inhabitants, and the Chamber of Nationalities elected in the republics (30 members), provinces (20 members), and regions (15 members). The two houses were to sit concurrently and be elected for four years unless dissolved through disagreement between the two houses. The functions of President were to be exercised by a praesidium (maximum 38 members), appointed by the People's Assembly. The Government was to be appointed and dissolved by the Assembly in joint session and was to consist of President, vice-Presidents, ministers, chairmen of the Federal Planning and Federal Control Commission, and ministers without portfolio.

In local government provision was made for the devolution of executive and administrative authority to People's Assemblies and Committees in the republics and smaller units of the country.

The constitution protected national minorities, guaranteed freedom of conscience and religion, of speech and assembly, and protected State and private property and initiative and regulated inheritance. It prohibited private monopolies and large land holdings, granted men and women equal rights in State, economic, and political life and provided a system of people's law courts. There was provision for a referendum by resolution of the People's Assembly, or on the proposal of the Government.

RELIEF AND RECONSTRUCTION

The biggest immediate task facing the new Government was to feed and house about fifteen million people. The task was tremendous because of the heavy material losses suffered during the war. Figures give an inadequate impression of the colossal war damage. Over 20 per cent of all buildings in the country were destroyed; total damage to industry was assessed at one-third of its pre-war value, or $4\frac{1}{2}$ milliard¹ dinars (£22½ million); 60 per cent of coal mines were damaged, and 20 per cent of all textile factories destroyed. In agriculture losses were also severe and even more difficult to estimate.

¹ Milliard = a thousand million.

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Great areas of the country were laid waste by fighting ; stock and equipment were largely destroyed. The 1945 harvest, limited by the fighting, was also ruined by drought. But most serious of all was the destruction of the communications system of the country. Over 50 per cent of the railway track of the country was destroyed, together with 75 per cent of railway bridges and more than half of the rolling stock. Of all roads 65 per cent were ruined and those that remained were in a serious condition of dilapidation.¹

These meagre facts give little indication of the real picture in Yugoslavia at the end of 1945, when millions of people were homeless, literally half-clothed, under-nourished, and facing the prospect of starvation. From this situation they were saved by UNRRA aid and by the energy with which the new Yugoslav Government, both central and local, tackled the basic problems of food and shelter.

The total value of UNRRA aid to Yugoslavia was \$420 million of which \$138 million was spent on food, \$83,000 on clothing and textiles, \$19,000 on medical supplies, \$37,000 on agricultural rehabilitation, and \$109,000 on industrial recovery. The great majority of UNRRA supplies was shipped into Yugoslavia in 1945 and 1946. Some supplies, such as industrial goods whose manufacture and procurement had been slow, were delivered in 1947, and a few items in 1948.

In 1945 the most pressing need was to get food into the country and distribute it to the deficiency areas before the winter set in. Even before the war these areas—the hinterland of the Dalmatian coast, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Montenegro—had been unable to feed themselves. They were also the parts of the country most fought over during the war, and their situation at the end of 1945 was deperate. Other areas of the country, normally more prosperous—Slovenia and parts of Serbia and Macedonia—were unable to feed their own people, and transport difficulties made it impossible to move food from agricultural to barren areas. Before the end of 1945 UNRRA had met this situation by sending 608,000 tons of food to Yugoslavia, together with lorries and petrol so that it could be conveyed from the ports into the interior of the country where it was needed.

The job of organizing the transport of food by lorry to depots throughout the country, and its distribution thence to the remote villages, was carried out by the Yugoslavs themselves. This distribution of food was a triumph of organization, hard

¹ UNRRA figures.

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work, and in some cases heroic endurance. Its success was due to the excellent co-operation between UNRRA and the Yugoslav Government. By the end of 1945 UNRRA was providing food for five of the fifteen million people in Yugoslavia.

An UNRRA investigating committee, which met in Yugoslavia in 1946 to look into methods of distribution, reported that supplies were being distributed 'fairly on the basis of need without discrimination' and 'fully in accord with UNRRA principles'.¹

In 1946 the situation improved, though the country was still partly dependent on UNRRA supplies and nearly 500,000 tons of food supplies were delivered to Yugoslavia in that year. Though the crops suffered from drought in 1945 and 1946, UNRRA agricultural supplies, fertilizers, and livestock were beginning to have their effect on the agriculture of the country. The food situation was much improved by the winter of 1946-7, though strict rationing of basic foods was still necessary.

RECOVERY

An important factor in the organization of recovery in Yugoslavia was the currency reform which had been first introduced in Serbia and Montenegro on 10 April 1945 and later was enforced throughout the whole country.

Axis policy in Yugoslavia during the war had encouraged inflation and at one time seven different currencies were circulating in the country. In 1940 the circulation had been 14 milliard dinars, but in April 1945 it had risen to 250 milliard. The currency reform of the Partisans called in all notes and issued 6 milliard new dinars—one new dinar representing twenty old ones. Later in 1945, another 7 milliard dinars were issued. The foreign exchange rate was fixed at 200 dinars to the £ sterling and 50 to the dollar, which was approximately the same as the pre-war rate. Individuals were allowed to exchange 100,000 dinars of their total currency and all other holdings of currency had to be declared against a promise that they could be converted later. A heavy capital levy was imposed of 70 per cent of all holdings of over 5 million dinars and 5 per cent to 70 per cent of smaller holdings according to the size and nature of the business. Consumers' prices, wages, and salaries were pegged to enforce a steady relation between wages and the cost of living. By fixing wages and

¹ UNRRA, *Distribution of UNRRA Supplies in Yugoslavia*; Operational Analysis Papers No. 29 (London, UNRRA European Regional Office, 1947).

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prices the Government aimed at raising the consumption standard of the lowest-paid groups, and they imposed a heavy cut on the spending power of the high income levels.

This reform measure was naturally very unpopular with those who had large sums of money—this applied to those who had been rich since pre-war days, as well as those who had made money out of the war, including large numbers of peasants. Very severe measures were taken against those who contravened the currency law. The new currency was slowly accepted throughout the country; inflation which paralysed recovery in other European countries was prevented, and a stable currency became the basis of the economy of the new State.

The serious condition of Yugoslavia's agriculture was one of the most important problems facing Marshal Tito's Government after the war. Agriculture provided the livelihood of more than 70 per cent of the people. Before the war it had provided a substantial proportion of the country's exports. War losses had seriously affected every aspect of the country's agricultural economy. It was estimated that three-quarters of all the ploughs in the country had been destroyed; losses of livestock were more than 50 per cent of the total; it was more difficult to calculate the losses due to decline in man-power, lack of fertilizers, and to over-exploitation of the soil. These losses had been worst in the poorest parts of the country, the mountainous areas where fighting had been most bitter. The rich agricultural area of the Vojvodina had remained comparatively undisturbed during the war and had been exploited as a food-growing area for the Reich, but it became a battlefield at the end of the war in the Red Army's advance against the retreating Germans and had suffered accordingly. The first aim of the Partisans, therefore, was to get the agricultural area back in production on its pre-war basis.

The question of reform in the system of land holding had been tackled by Marshal Tito's Provisional Government even before the general elections. A new land law was passed on 26 October 1945, and was later confirmed by the elected parliament. This land law was based on private ownership and on the principle of 'the land belongs to those who cultivate it'.

The new land law did not nationalize land, but it limited individual holdings. All land holdings in excess of 35 hectares¹ of arable land were to be confiscated against some compensation.

¹ 1 hectare = approximately 2½ acres.

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Lands held by absentee landlords in excess of 5 hectares were to be confiscated without compensation. All land belonging to the churches and ecclesiastical foundations was to be confiscated without compensation, though 10-30 hectares might be retained in individual cases. The land thus confiscated, together with land belonging to enemy personnel, collaborators, and absentee landlords (which included banks, business concerns, etc.) formed a pool of land for distribution amongst landless peasants and for the creation of State farms.

Although many people lost land, only 800,000 hectares were redistributed under this law because the biggest estates in Yugoslavia had been broken up under land reform after the First World War.

Priority in redistribution, according to the law, was to be given to 'landless peasants, ex-soldiers and Partisans, war-disabled and Fascist victims'. The greatest number of estates broken up under this law were in the richer agricultural areas of the Vojvodina, the Banat, and Slovenia.¹

Part of the redistributed land was made into State farms, which were cultivated as collectives; other land was given by the State to form the nucleus of co-operative farms which the Government had decided should play an important part in agrarian development. Individual peasants were encouraged to join their holdings to State land, or to join with each other, and the resulting co-operative farms were run on a profit-sharing basis. A few co-operative farms were started in all parts of the country, though they did not become immediately popular and the Government did not try to force them on the peasants.

The immediate task in industry had been to restore the pre-war industries to working order and later to try to increase output to pre-war capacity. To establish even a reasonable standard of living in Yugoslavia it was necessary to get heavy industry working so that some exports could be made available and light industry could start turning out consumer goods.

UNRRA industrial aid to Yugoslavia, though small compared with the need, was an important factor in recovery. The total sum expended on UNRRA industrial supplies was \$109,249, and these supplies included road and railway transport of all kinds, locomotives, waggons, motor vehicles, heavy construction and building equipment, machinery, electrical equip-

¹ Many peasants who received redistributed land came from mountainous parts and took some time to adjust themselves to the new kind of farming necessary in these richer, flatter areas.

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ment, liquid and solid fuels, and raw materials such as metals and chemicals.

By March 1946 many industries had been revived, though output was still only about 50 per cent of pre-war capacity. Throughout 1946 the main industrial problems were those of obtaining sufficient equipment to restore industry to its pre-war capacity and, when restored, to provide the skilled labour to ensure the maximum output. These problems became even more acute in the following year when the reorganization of industry on a five-year plan was launched.

ECONOMIC PLANNING, 1947-8

By the end of 1946 the period of post-war relief in Yugoslavia was almost ended; planned reconstruction took its place. In April 1947 a five-year plan for the development of the national economy of Yugoslavia was launched. The plan was both wide in its scope and ambitious in its aims. It covered the main fields of national economy for the country as a whole and for each of the federal republics, in order to remove the 'unevenness in the economic development of the People's Republics'.

The aim of the plan was a major development of Yugoslav industrial capacity, particularly of mining, hydro-electric power, and the establishment of heavy industry. Agriculture was to be developed up to and beyond pre-war capacity, and industrial crops were to be considerably increased. By this means it was hoped to raise the standard of living of the people and solve the problem of under-employment on the land. Nearly half the investment programme was to be devoted to industry, less than 10 per cent to agriculture. The general targets for the five years are shown in the figures given in the table below :

GENERAL SURVEY OF THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN*

	(in milliard dinars)		Percentage Increase
	1939	1951	
<i>The National Income</i>			
Value of social production	203	566.6	180
National income	132	255.0	193
Value of investments	20	69.6	348
Value of investments as percentage of the national income	15.2	27.3	—
National income per inhabitant (in dinars)	8,464	15,625	185
<i>Industrialization</i>			
Value of industrial production (in average full cost prices in 1947)	25.5	126.0	494

**Five-Year Plan for the development of the National Economy of the Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia* (Belgrade, Office of Information, 1947) pp. 77, 78.

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<i>Industrialization (cont'd.)</i>	1939	1951	<i>Percentage Increase</i>
Value of the total industrial production :			
Coal	2·4	6·0	250
Ferrous metallurgy	2·7	9·3	344
Non-ferrous metallurgy	2·1	3·3	157
Metal industries	1·6	11·0	688
Electric power	1·0	4·0	400
Chemical industries	0·9	8·2	911
Building material industry	0·8	6·5	813
Electrical industries	0·4	4·0	1,000
Industrial and agricultural production (according to selling prices in 1947) :			
(a) total in milliard dinars	116·5	266·7	229
Industrial production	52·7	170·0	323
Agricultural production	63·8	96·7	152
(b) total in percentages :			
Industrial production	45	64	
Agricultural production	55	36	

The plan was to be financed without the aid of a foreign loan from the State budget, State credits, and from the profits of State enterprises. Some figures about investments in the plan are given in the following table :

VALUE OF NEW INVESTMENTS FOR THE PERIOD 1947-1951
(in milliard dinars)

Communications	72·6
Unproductive branches	55·7
Industry	54·9
Mining and metallurgy	30·8
Production of electric power	30·0
Agriculture	19·4
Trade	7·8
Forestry	3·6
Building enterprises	3·5
TOTAL	<u>278·3</u>

Although these figures are incomplete and do not give yearly investment over the five years, it is clear that the percentage of national income invested each year would have to be exceptionally high for a country in which more than half the national production was in the hands of private peasants. Investment in 1951—the fifth year of the plan—was to be 69,600 million dinars, that is 27·5 per cent of the scheduled national income for that year. It seemed likely that in order to achieve the five-year investment programme an even higher percentage of the national income would have to be invested over some of the preceding years. This could only be achieved by cutting down the flow of consumer goods as well as food to the general population in Yugoslavia, and it meant that there

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could be no rapid rise in the standard of living for the general public.

By the summer of 1948 there were signs that this investment programme had not been successful. In July 1948 a State loan of 3.5 milliard dinars was floated and was rapidly over-subscribed. Much of this money must have come from the peasants, who were the main section of society left with extra money to spend.¹ On 30 September 1948 Boris Kidrić, Chairman of the Economic Council and Planning Commission, admitted difficulties in the investment programme in a speech in the Federal Council. He said :

I must stress that investments for capital construction and investment for the raising of social standards still fall far behind the pace achieved in realizing production capacities as provided for in the Five-Year Plan. In 1947 we fulfilled 12.5 per cent of the total investment of the whole Five-Year Plan ; this year we shall realize at least 33 per cent and in 1949, 59 per cent.

The fulfilment of the plans for industrial expansion was dependent on the import of finished products and some raw materials from other countries, particularly capital equipment and machinery of all kinds, electrical equipment for industry, high-grade coke, coal, oil, textile raw materials, rubber, leather, and some consumer goods. Yugoslavia's most important products available for export in exchange were minerals and metals, food, and timber. Minerals and metals in short supply in Europe were particularly valuable. With the losses suffered by agriculture in Yugoslavia during the war, and in the droughts of 1945 and 1946, it was not to be expected that much food would be available for export during the five years of the plan, unless the Yugoslav people were kept strictly rationed. This in fact has been done. In 1947, 34 per cent of Yugoslavia's total exports was food—mainly fruit and vegetables, but also some cereals and fats. Other export items in that year were minerals and metals 26.6 per cent, timber 21.6 per cent, industrial products 11.5 per cent, and livestock 5.9 per cent. Imports into Yugoslavia in 1947 were 57.8 per cent raw materials, 19.4 per cent capital construction equipment, 14.9 per cent industrial and other equipment, and 7.9 per cent manufactured articles. It is also interesting that in that year 56 per cent of all Yugoslavia's exports and 53.3 per cent of all imports

¹ Many of the subscriptions were on the instalment system, and during the latter months of 1948 Yugoslav newspapers were carrying articles complaining that many people had failed to keep up their instalments.

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went to or came from the U.S.S.R. and other countries in the eastern bloc.

From 1946 to 1948 the Yugoslav Government built up a network of bilateral trade treaties with a great number of countries, both in the east¹ and in the west. The most important of these was with the Soviet Union (July 1947), which provided for a long-term credit to Yugoslavia and by which the U.S.S.R. was to supply equipment for the ferrous and non-ferrous metal industries, industrial raw materials, including cotton, paper, cellulose, oil production, coal and coke, and supplies of agricultural equipment (tractors, fertilizers, etc.) ; in return for these Yugoslavia was to export lead, zinc, pyrites, concentrates, copper, tobacco, hemp, and foodstuffs. Other important agreements in which the export by Yugoslavia of non-ferrous metals was one of the chief items, included a five-year agreement with Czechoslovakia, totalling 7½ milliard crowns (£37½ million, March 1947) and covering the imports to Yugoslavia of capital goods, such as electric power stations, coke, and machinery, in return for Yugoslavia's export of non-ferrous metals, timber, and foodstuffs ; a long-term agreement with Sweden, totalling 100 million kröner (£6,250,000, April 1947) including two power stations with a capacity of 170,000 kilowatts and 12,000 transformer stations, distribution installations, and other equipment, in return for exports of foodstuffs, non-ferrous metals, caustic soda, and timber ; a five-year agreement with Hungary (April 1947, £28,750,000) which included capital equipment and equipment for electric power stations in return for imports of Yugoslav iron ore, non-ferrous metals, chemicals, and timber ; a five-year agreement with Italy (\$50 million) under which Italy was to supply complete power stations and equipment to Yugoslavia in return for non-ferrous metals, pig iron and bauxite ; a general agreement covering trade to the value of \$40 million with the western zone of Germany, by which Yugoslavia was to get machinery for both light and heavy industries, equipment for electrical plants, blast furnaces, steam boilers and compressors in return for ore and concentrates, timber and livestock. Other important trade agreements were with Holland, Switzerland, and Belgium.

¹ After the breach with the Cominform (see below page 84) this pattern of trade was considerably altered. The Soviet Union reduced its exports to Yugoslavia by seven-eighths and other Cominform countries also reduced their trade. All Cominform countries stopped sending Yugoslavia the capital equipment which was essential to the success of the five-year plan. All trade was suspended by mid-1949.

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Trade treaties in 1948¹ were made with the Soviet zone of Germany (\$11 million), by which Germany was to provide machine tools, electro-technical equipment, textiles, paper and precision instruments, and Yugoslavia was to export foodstuffs and raw materials; with Great Britain (23 December, £15 million, for one year), by which Great Britain was to supply textiles, rubber, chemicals, metal products, spare parts, instruments, machinery, etc., and Yugoslavia to export timber, foodstuffs, tobacco, and other miscellaneous products. Other important trade treaties were signed in this year with Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, the Argentine, and India. The agreement with Holland made in the previous year was also renewed. Holland was to build four ships for Yugoslavia.

In fact these treaties did not always work out as well in practice as had been hoped by the Yugoslavs. Apart from serious political complications there were economic difficulties on both sides. Yugoslavia herself found difficulty in meeting all her commitments, especially since she was committed to supplying simultaneously to both eastern and western countries raw materials urgently needed by both but in short supply. With her need to import capital equipment there was the danger of over-committing her own export supplies. Another difficulty on the Yugoslav side was that Yugoslav prices were higher—in some cases considerably higher—than world market prices. This was later remedied to some extent by the creation of an Export Subsidy Fund, established in 1947. Many of the other countries committed to supply Yugoslavia with capital equipment also found difficulty in fulfilling their obligations and, as a result of this and of political difficulties, in 1948 supplies to Yugoslavia from the eastern countries of Europe fell below schedule and eventually stopped altogether. Important supplies such as oil, coal, coke, machine parts, were seriously affected. Most of these trade treaties, even where there was a long-term agreement, were negotiated on a yearly basis, and there was a considerable modification of this pattern of trade, and in 1949 trade between Yugoslavia and the Cominform countries gradually came to a virtual standstill.

The five-year plan brought in its train great social and economic change. One of the biggest changes was the nationalization of industry, commerce, and trade. By the

¹ Compensation claims of western countries against Yugoslavia were settled in these treaties with the exception of the British treaty, which stipulated the principle of settlement leaving details to be worked out later.

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end of 1948 the only private industry left was that carried on by artisans and people selling products of their own work. The constitution had declared the nationalization of all mineral wealth, waters, sources of natural power, means of road and rail transport, posts, telegraph, telephone, radio services, and foreign trade. Outside this field private enterprise continued in retail trade up to the end of 1947, but it was being slowly eliminated. In 1945 private commerce accounted for 85 per cent of all Yugoslavia's retail trade; in 1946 it was reduced to 48 per cent, in 1947 to 12 per cent and in 1948 it was almost entirely eliminated. A final law of 3 May 1948, nationalized all remaining private concerns—small industries, mills, hotels, shops, etc.

Some critics both inside and outside Yugoslavia said that this process of nationalization had been too rapid, that it was impossible to find sufficient trained people to run the nationalized enterprises, and that these measures hindered rather than helped the five-year plan. A similar criticism was made by the Cominform, but was strongly denied by Tito and his supporters.

As a result of this policy of nationalization and of the simultaneous expansion of industry and constructional works, the problem of man-power became acute. Shortage of skilled labour was particularly serious and most difficult to solve in a country whose population had been until recently largely illiterate. The problem was tackled in many ways—training schools, colleges, and universities became overfull. Trade unions themselves undertook certain kinds of training; skilled personnel was moved to the areas where it was most needed. Foreign experts—Germans, Czechoslovaks, Sudeten Germans, etc.—were brought in and Yugoslav immigrants overseas encouraged to return. Every effort was made to eliminate illiteracy from the adult population so that all men and women could be more readily trainable.¹ Some of the skilled workers were already in these years coming from the peasantry in the deficit areas where many families had in the past lived on land that could not maintain them. The planners anticipated that more labour, both skilled and unskilled, would continue to move into industry from these areas. At the end of 1948 Tito stated that 60,000 industrial workers were needed immediately and 100,000 in the course of 1949.

The problem of unskilled labour was largely solved by

¹ By the end of 1948, after an intensive campaign for the basic education of the population, illiteracy had been reduced from 3,200,000 at the end of the war to 1½ million. The campaign is still going on.

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voluntary work and by the employment of seasonal labour from the agricultural areas. Propaganda and moral pressure urging people to give voluntary labour for the rebuilding of their country was intensive and a great deal of constructional work all over the country was done by the ordinary people.

With labour short and commitments heavy, high output from workers became vital to the success of the plan. The organization of payment by output was begun on similar lines to the system used in the Soviet Union. Extra pay and privileges were given to those who fulfilled or exceeded the norm (or average output) fixed for their kind of work, and norms were continually changed and where possible increased. Publicity was given both to success and failure and the principle of common responsibility for the output of a department, works, or industry, was used to spur people to greater efforts. Trade unions¹ and political organizations also helped in this work. Ration cards for food continued to be issued according to need, with higher rations for all categories of heavy workers and for senior executive officials.

In agriculture the main aim of the plan was to cut down the acreage assigned to wheat crops, but to maintain the same total output by means of improved methods of farming, which would increase yield per acre. The land saved by this was to be put down to industrial crops. Man-power used on the land was to be reduced by these improved methods and by increasing mechanization so that surplus labour would be available for industry. The problem of extracting the most from the land in Yugoslavia could only be dealt with when the wasteful system of small holding and strip farming prevalent throughout the country could be abolished and replaced by mechanized collective farming and larger units. It was not proposed to do this over the five years, since drastic changes in peasant life could not be introduced simultaneously with the founding of a heavy industry, and could not be developed until the necessary machinery was available. But some of the earlier stages on this road were already being introduced. The establishment of co-operative farms was regarded as the first stage. Government policy was to encourage co-operative farms but not to force them on the peasants. At the end of 1948 there were still only 1,192 peasant co-operatives, working

¹ Membership of trade unions in summer 1949 totalled 1,700,000, 35 per cent being women. There were in addition, agricultural unions for agricultural labourers (not small holders) whose membership was believed to be 50 to 60 thousand.

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3·8 per cent of the total arable land of the country. But the policy of increasing co-operatives was being intensified in the latter part of 1948, and went ahead rapidly in 1949.¹ There was a large number of laws controlling the sale of produce, the selection of crops, and the whole process of farming ; taxation of the profits of the free sale of agricultural produce had already been increased, and Kidrić said, in December 1948, that it would increase steeply in 1949. Intensified education of the peasantry and Government propaganda were going on all the time, and it was clear that the accumulation of all these things was preparing for the complete socialization of agriculture.

These changes brought the peasants slowly under greater Government control, but Tito's Government was anxious not to antagonize them by too rapid change. The immediate aim of the Government was to extract as much food as possible so that the townspeople and industrial workers could be fed and some food exported. Various methods for getting food from the peasants were tried in these post-war years : in 1946 low Government prices and harsh measures against peasants were a failure, and the system was modified in 1947. In March 1948 a new system of Government purchase by 'linked prices' was started. By this system the Government agreed to buy any quantity (above a small minimum in certain areas) of all agricultural produce at a 'lower uniform price'. In return for the produce the peasant received not only the money price, but also coupons which would enable him to buy consumer goods at a lower uniform price from State stores. The system was made more attractive by the fact that the consumer goods available at lower prices against coupons were to include the widest possible range of all domestic, agricultural, clothing, and constructional goods, and some of the most important of these goods were not available on free sale.² This system was a voluntary one and the peasants could still sell produce on the free market at much higher prices—in which case they had to buy their consumer goods on the free market at higher prices. The success of the system depended to a large extent on the State being able to make available the kind of consumer goods the peasants wanted of the necessary quality and quantity. When the system was first introduced the peasants in many parts of the country seemed cautiously prepared to try

¹ Figures for co-operatives in 1949 were officially given as 5,246. These together with State farms constituted 20 per cent of total arable land.

² It meant that there were three scales of prices : those for rations, those on the linked price system, and those for free sale.

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it, though most of them tried to work out a method whereby they could have the best of both worlds and sell a proportion of their goods to the Government, keeping a certain amount for the free market. By the end of 1948 there were signs that the peasant demand for available consumer goods was almost saturated, and the State stores were not able to supply the kind of consumer goods wanted because these were not being made in Yugoslavia.¹

In spite of the limitation of land holding and increasing Government control, a number of peasants in Yugoslavia were still able to become prosperous. They could have a high standard of living with more food and more money to spend than the industrial workers and townspeople. The policy of the Yugoslav Government towards the peasants was one of the subjects of Cominform criticism of Marshal Tito and his supporters, and was also one of the subjects of dispute between two members of the Yugoslav Communist Party, Hebrang and Žujović, and the economic planners in the early part of 1948. In the second half of the year, however, the changes mentioned above were already being introduced and there were signs that the hey-day of the peasants was over and that in the future they would be increasingly drawn into the planned economy.

Some of the results of the Five-Year Plan, mainly in the form of percentage achievements, were published in 1947 and 1948. At the end of the first year it was stated that the aims of the plan for that year had been fulfilled by 104 per cent. Figures given for 1948 were that the plan had been fulfilled 'in the main' by 100.4 per cent. In industry the plan had been 101.6 per cent successful, although the figure for oil production was only 58.3 per cent, for mining 91.9 per cent, and the production of automobiles had reached hardly 30 per cent of the planned figure.

The most spectacular achievements of the first two years of the plan were on the constructional side of industrial expansion. Factories had been built, hydro-electric power stations constructed, roads laid, railways reconstructed, and public buildings of all kinds repaired and built in all parts of the country. The next and more difficult stage was for the factories, mines, and power stations to be equipped with the necessary machinery. Most of this had to come from abroad: some had been expected from the eastern countries and some from the west. With the problem of buying this machinery and providing the

¹ In December 1948 Kidrić stated that vouchers for 1,500 million dinars' worth of goods were still being held by peasants who had not exchanged them for goods.

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necessary trained personnel to work it, planning in Yugoslavia entered, in 1948, a new and more difficult phase. The Yugoslavs were entering this critical stage of their development when the denunciation of Tito's Government was issued by the Cominform in July 1948. Even before the Cominform dispute, the plan had probably been beyond the bounds of practical achievement. After the dispute, when the Cominform countries stopped the supply of capital equipment, it was quite clear that the plan as envisaged would not be achieved.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

With the defeat of the Axis Powers at the end of the war, Yugoslavia had resumed her pre-war frontiers. The only frontiers unsettled and in dispute were those on the north west with Italy, and in the north with Austria. The official Yugoslav attitude was that Yugoslavia at the end of the First World War had been wrongfully deprived of land, assigned to Italy and Austria, and that this should be restored at the end of the Second World War. The Yugoslavs claimed Venezia Giulia, together with 954 square miles of Carinthia and 50 square miles of Styria, all of it in Austria.

In April 1945 the Yugoslav First Army had raced to occupy Trieste before the Allied troops in order to strengthen the Yugoslav claim, but after high-level negotiations the Yugoslavs left the occupation of Trieste to the Anglo-American army. Zones of occupation were agreed upon, by which British troops took over the western part of the disputed area, Zone A, and Yugoslav troops occupied the greater part of Venezia Giulia, Zone B. The Italian Peace Treaty was signed by Yugoslavia on 10 February 1947. Trieste and its surrounding area from Duino in the north to Cittanuova in the south remained free territory. The frontier between Yugoslavia and Italy¹ was fixed to run from Monte Forno (Pec) on the Austrian frontier, running south along the upper and middle reaches of the Isonzo river through Gorizia, and leaving the Isonzo river on the west, running down to a point east of Monfalcone and north of the Free Zone. This gave the Yugoslavs a considerable part of the territory they claimed, including the towns formerly held by the Italians, Pola, Rovigno, and Caporetto; it also included, in Istria, one of the most valuable sources of mercury in Europe, with valuable supplies of bauxite as well. The Yugoslavs were not satisfied in spite of the fact that Russia had

¹ Minutiae of frontier demarcation were left to be settled by a frontier commission, which is still at work.

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agreed to this award. They considered that they should receive nothing less than the port of Trieste and all its hinterland, and throughout the whole of this period they made repeated protests to the United Nations about the administration of the Free Zone of Trieste.

Shortly before the Italian elections in April 1948, Great Britain and the United States suggested that the town of Trieste, whose population was almost entirely Italian, should be given back to Italy, but up to the end of 1948 no final decision had been reached on this matter because it needed Russian agreement.¹ The claims to Styria and Carinthia remained unsettled since they were part of the general settlement about Austria in dispute between the Anglo-American Powers and Russia.

Yugoslavia's relations with western countries, particularly with the United States and Great Britain, in the two years 1946-8 were not very cordial, although there was a perceptible improvement in the last twelve months of this period.

When the Marshall Plan was launched in the summer of 1947, Yugoslavia refused to take part in it and the Yugoslav press and official speakers attacked it as an instrument of American economic imperialism.

In July 1948 the United States released Yugoslav assets to the value of \$60 million which had been frozen since the end of the war. These included \$43 million worth of gold, and Yugoslavia in return agreed to settle United States claims against her by payment of \$17 million. Other compensation claims were settled with western countries as trade agreements were concluded. Relations with western countries improved as trade between Yugoslavia and the west increased.

Yugoslav relations with her eastern neighbours were close throughout this period, and up to June 1948 appeared to be very cordial. Russia was traditionally popular with the Yugoslav people and the Red Army exploits had added to this fame. The Russian trade treaty was very important to the Yugoslav five-year plan, and Russian experts, both civilian and military, were in Yugoslavia up to March 1948. It was not until the Cominform denunciation of Yugoslavia and the publication of letters exchanged between the Russian and Yugoslav Communist Parties that it became generally known

¹ During 1949, it became clear that Russia was no longer supporting Yugoslav claims to Trieste; but at the same time owing to Tito's quarrel with Russia his relations with the west became easier and by the summer of 1949, there were signs of improved relations between Italy and Yugoslavia.

that there had been friction between Yugoslavia and Russia throughout the whole of this period.

Yugoslav relations with Bulgaria, in spite of hostilities during the war and pre-war rivalry, were close and friendly up to the time of the Cominform trouble.

Bulgaria agreed to pay Yugoslavia \$70 million in reparations for war damage, but this was later waived by the Yugoslavs in token of the friendly relations between the two countries. In the summer of 1947 a pact of 'mutual assistance and full economic, political and cultural co-operation' was signed by Marshal Tito and Premier Dimitrov.¹ Similar treaties were made with other eastern countries and there were many exchanges of delegations. Bilateral trade treaties were made between Yugoslavia and her neighbours—usually on a yearly basis—and were important to the economic plans of all countries concerned.

Up to the time of the Cominform dispute the outstanding difference between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria was the question of Macedonia. The stated Yugoslav policy even before the end of the war was that the Macedonian people should be given both cultural and political autonomy. This was carried out by Tito as soon as the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Vardar) was established in 1945. Yugoslavia desired a similar policy to be put into effect in Bulgarian Macedonia (Pirin), but although the Bulgarian Government allowed Yugoslav Macedonians to be sent to teach in Bulgarian schools, they did not grant autonomy. Dimitrov's policy on Macedonia was that he was apparently prepared to agree to the union of Pirin and Vardar Macedonia, and possibly but not necessarily Greek Macedonia, to form an autonomous State but only within a South Slav federation and on an equal basis with any other States that joined that federation. Until that eventuated, the Bulgarian Government were not prepared to give autonomy to the area, and they did not encourage the use of the Macedonian language.

After the Cominform dispute, differences on this difficult question increased. Bulgaria accused the Yugoslavs of wishing to incorporate Pirin Macedonia in their State before a federation had been achieved and Yugoslavia denied this and countered with charges of Bulgarian chauvinism and allegations that neither cultural nor political freedom was allowed to Macedonians in Bulgaria. In the recriminations which took

¹ The pact provided for joint action in case of aggression by Germany or by a third Power in alliance with Germany.

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place between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria at this time it was revealed that the Bled Agreement of September 1947 had incorporated a secret clause which provided for the eventual exchange of Pirin Macedonia, which was to go to Yugoslavia, for an equivalent area of Yugoslav territory in the region of Czaribrod, which was to be given to Bulgaria. This exchange, however, never took place and it was clear that as long as the Cominform dispute remained unsettled it was unlikely to be revived.

The policy of both Bulgaria and Yugoslavia in relation to Macedonia was complicated by the problem of Greek Macedonia, which contains the important port of Salonika. Up to the end of 1948 it was the scene of some of the fiercest rebel activity. Both before and after the Cominform dispute the Greek Communists were unwilling to declare themselves in favour of the union of Greek Macedonia with either Yugoslavia or Bulgaria because it was thought that this would prejudice their chances of getting wider support from the Greek people. It seems probable, however, that both in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria those people who favoured a greater Macedonia were anxious to have Salonika as its capital city. While this remained a dream for the future, Tito was going ahead with strengthening his position in Vardar Macedonia by developing the economic resources of this formerly backward area. By the end of 1948 hydro-electric power stations were in the process of building, irrigation works had been started, industrial crops had been introduced, new industries had been started in the Skoplje area, and it was evident that of the three areas of Macedonia, Vardar Macedonia was potentially the richest. This area, bounded on three sides by Albania, Greece, and Bulgaria, had always been a training area for Yugoslav troops, and Tito kept his army there in full strength. It was quite obvious that he did not intend the Macedonian question to be solved by anti-Tito or pro-Bulgarian elements gaining control in the Yugoslav republic of Macedonia.

With Albania also relations were very close up to June 1948. On 27 November 1946, an agreement was signed abolishing custom dues and establishing a currency union. Yugoslavia agreed 'to extend broad support and significant aid in production and other means to the Albanian Republic to bring about its speedy and full economic revival'. The pact was for thirty years, but was unilaterally denounced by Albania immediately after the Cominform denunciation of Yugoslavia, after which relations between the two countries became very strained.

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There was friction throughout the whole of this period between the Yugoslav and Greek Governments. The Greek Government alleged that Yugoslavia was giving aid to the rebel bands of Markos by supplying arms, allowing the rebels to retire into Yugoslav territory, and maintaining training camps for the rebels inside Yugoslavia. They also accused Yugoslavia of harbouring thousands of Greek children. These charges were investigated in 1947 by a United Nations Commission and a majority report declared that they were justified. Yugoslavia denied the general charges, but admitted that Greek children had been received as refugees and were receiving excellent care.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS, 1946-8

In the period between the election and June 1948, the new regime increased in stability and Marshal Tito's personal prestige was high. Life was difficult in these years and many people had cause to grumble, but food and consumer goods, though still scarce and expensive, slowly became more available.

Support for the Government came from the working people in the towns, from the workers in the factories and mines, from a proportion of the administrative classes. Support also came from the small peasants, who formed the majority of the population. Their land had not been nationalized, they were allowed to sell on the free market, and many were being helped by the Government. The peasants in the rich areas and near the towns were making money in this period of food shortage and though many of them did not like the Government, they were too prosperous to be eager for change.

The majority of people of all classes had taken some part in the early stages of reconstruction—in the building of roads, houses, schools, etc. They saw a new country appearing out of the ruins of the old and they felt that they had had a share in the process of regeneration. This gave a measure of united patriotic support for the Tito regime irrespective of region or class divisions. This was something new in the history of Yugoslavia.

In organizing support for the regime, and in the political education of all classes of the people a large part was played by the People's Front, which had come to the fore at the time of the election. Marshal Tito defined the People's Front as :

An organization of progressive persons not only for the struggle

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against reaction and Fascism, the struggle for the preservation of achievements already won, and the attainment of new ones, but also it is an organization which has already fulfilled huge tasks in our country, and will fulfil others in the future . . . The new social order in our country demands a new political life. Numerous and heterogenous in their conceptions, political parties would represent in our country the greatest obstacles to its speedy and sure development. Not only the political but also the economic structure of our country excludes the possibility of the existence of numerous political parties with their old programmes and out-of-date conceptions. A united economic programme demands political unity.¹

Late in 1948 the membership of the People's Front was more than 7 million. The Communist Party—the only party to retain its identity in the Front—represented only a small proportion of it, but its members had key positions and played an active part in all its political work.

It was helped in this work by many other organizations which worked with the People's Front—the trade unions, the A.F.Z.² (organization for women), the Youth Movements and Pioneer Movements (children's organizations). The spoken and written propaganda material of the Front was marked by its exposition of Marxist-Leninist theories and by frequent and admiring references to the Soviet Union. Another important feature in the teaching of the Front was Yugoslavia's 'National Liberation Struggle' and the heroic episodes of the war period in Yugoslavia. These were the subject of lectures, literature, speeches, and courses to audiences throughout the country as well as in universities and schools, and were undoubtedly a factor in creating a proud, united, patriotic support for the new State.

The strength of any opposition to Marshal Tito's regime at this period was difficult to assess. The greater part of the people who had voted against the regime at the election came from the very small commercial and banking classes, most of whom lived in Belgrade, Ljubljana, and Zagreb, from the rich peasants, and from a section of the Catholic population. Catholic opposition to the regime though officially uncompromising was probably less strongly supported by the ordinary people than in a country like Hungary. The war brought many Catholics into the People's Front and some of them still continued their support in peace-time. Although there was undoubtedly strong opposition to the regime amongst Catholics

¹ J. B. Tito, *The People's Front* (Belgrade, 1946) pp. 31, 32.

² Antifašistički Front Žena. Women's Antifascist Front.

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in Slovenia and Croatia, it was not so strong among the younger sections of the community. After the war a new system of education from primary schools to universities was introduced free to everybody and the whole field was secularized. The Orthodox Church, which was the religion of the majority of the population in the country south of Croatia, did not oppose the regime and many of its priests were active supporters of the People's Front.

The different groups of people who opposed the regime had no common political aims and no cohesion. They were allowed no opportunity to organize themselves. The official view about opposition had not changed from that defined by Marshal Tito in 1945 and interpretation of 'honest' opposition remained very narrow. The regime was not prepared to take any chances on allowing the existence of any opposition which would be likely to gain support or encouragement from anti-Communist Powers abroad, from the *émigrés* in exile or from the people who had suffered under the economic policy of the new regime. Opposition as we know it in the west was not allowed to exist.

During the war the Partisans had had experience in organizing a secret police, known as OZNA (*Odeljenje za Zaštitu Naroda*), whose work was to discover active opponents and spies. This experience was used in the organization of a secret security police inside the new State, which was later known as UDBa (*Uprava Drzavne Bezbednosti*). Although the security police was an accepted fact, little was generally known about its organization. It was thought to have its ramifications throughout society all over Yugoslavia and the results of its work were seen in the numbers of people who were brought to trial accused of anti-State activities during these two years. The head of UDBa was General Alexander Ranković and he was given the credit for creating an organization of ruthless efficiency.

There were many political trials in Yugoslavia in these two years; some of them of people accused of collaboration and war crimes during the war, others of anti-State activities during the peace. The most outstanding of the war criminal trials was that of Draža Mihailović on 10 June 1946. He was accused of raising Četniks, of using his organization against the Partisans, and of war crimes. He was found guilty on 17 July, sentenced to death and executed. Many other Četniks and some members of the former Royal Yugoslav Government in exile were found guilty on similar charges and condemned to death or varying terms of imprisonment. Another out-

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standing trial, on 8 October 1946, was that of Mgr Aloysius Stepinac, Archbishop of Zagreb and Catholic Primate of Yugoslavia ; he was accused and found guilty of collaboration with the enemy during the war, and of anti-Nationalist activities, and was sentenced to sixteen years' hard labour. A number of other Catholic priests were also tried on similar charges and condemned during these years. A feature of the trials of people accused of treasonable activities was the frequently recurring charge of giving information to foreign Powers ; it was used against several of the opposition politicians. Among well-known Yugoslav politicians who were sentenced for these activities was Miloš Trifunović¹ who had formerly been Prime Minister in England for a short period in 1943, Dragolub Jovanović, leader of the Serbian Peasant Party, Franjo Gazi, a prominent member of the Croat Peasant Party, and Boris Furlan. There were also a number of trials in 1947 and 1948 of people accused of having infiltrated into the country as spies on behalf of a foreign Power.

These trials showed the fear, still latent in Yugoslavia, even before the Cominform dispute, that foreign Powers could be used in attempts to overthrow the Government, and they showed the ruthless determination of Tito's Government to prevent the growth of any independent organized opposition.

THE COMMUNIST PARTY

The part played by the Yugoslav Communist Party in the country's development in these two years was important, though much of its activity was shrouded in mystery. Certain of the outstanding members of the Government had long been known as Communists, among them Tito, Kardelj, Ranković, Djilas, Pijade, and Kidrić, but their relative positions in the party were not known. It was also generally accepted that many other Communists were in important positions in public life all over the country, but who they were was often a matter of speculation. It was not until after the Communist Party Congress in July 1948 that some of these matters were cleared up.

In the spring of 1948 it became clear that there had been dissension on policy inside the Yugoslav Communist Party. Andrija Hebrang, Minister of Light Industry, and Šreten

¹ He was released in July 1948 after serving only a small part of his sentence. This practice was frequently followed particularly in the case of workers and specialists whose work was needed by the State.

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Žujović, Minister of Finance, were not present with other Ministers at the Assembly in March 1948, when the year's budget was discussed. On this occasion Edvard Kardelj referred in a speech to members of the Finance Planning Commission who had obstructed the development of co-operatives and maintained an 'incorrect attitude' to the budget, and was assumed to refer to these two ministers. This was confirmed when Hebrang and Žujović shortly afterwards were arrested, imprisoned, and expelled from the Communist Party. A statement of the Communist Party issued later in the year after the Yugoslav Communist Party had been attacked by the Cominform,¹ denounced Hebrang as having been hostile towards the official policy in relation to the peasantry, as well as opposed to the five-year plan. He was also accused of 'fractionalist' activity. Žujović was condemned as having been fractionalist in the past and it was said that he had prevented the granting of credits to co-operatives, obstructed trading arrangements, and obstructed the carrying out of the capital construction envisaged in the five-year plan, which he regarded as unrealizable.

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In September 1947, it was announced that a Communist Information Bureau had been set up with headquarters in Belgrade, and with the purpose of co-ordinating information from the Communist Parties of the U.S.S.R., Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Roumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Italy, and France. This bureau, which became known as the Cominform, started publication of a newspaper called *For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy*; the paper was published in Belgrade in a number of languages including Russian, English, and French.

On 28 June 1948 the astonishing news that the Yugoslav Communist Party had been expelled from the Cominform was first announced in *Rudé Pravo*, the Czechoslovak Communist Party newspaper, and was later published in the Cominform newspaper.² The announcement took the form of a communiqué, which had been issued after a special meeting of the Cominform held in Roumania (though its headquarters were still in Belgrade), and it was signed by all members of the Cominform except Yugoslavia. The communiqué said that

¹ *Statement of the Central Committee of the Communist Party* (Belgrade, 1948).

² Cominform headquarters were moved to Bucharest after the beginning of July.

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Yugoslavia had been invited to attend this meeting but had refused. It consisted of a general indictment of the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia on the grounds that the party had pursued an 'incorrect line on the main question of home and foreign policy' and that this line represented 'a departure from Marxism-Leninism'. It attacked by name Marshal Tito, Edvard Kardelj, Milovan Djilas, and Alexander Ranković—the big four among the Yugoslav Communist leaders. The charges against the Yugoslav Communist Party were many and varied, but could be divided into three main groups: of 'pursuing an unfriendly policy towards the Soviet Union', of pursuing an incorrect policy towards the peasants, and of allowing the Yugoslav Communist Party to become less important than the People's Front, and at the same time maintaining it on a secret, undemocratic, and semi-legal basis.

All these 'errors' and the attitude of the Yugoslav leaders towards them when they had been pointed out by the Soviet Communist Party, were said to show that the Yugoslav Communist Party had broken with its international traditions and 'taken the road of nationalism', which would lead it to become 'an ordinary bourgeois republic' and 'a colony of the imperialist countries'.

The communiqué gave details of each of these charges. On the first, it declared that Soviet military experts in Yugoslavia had been 'defamed' and the Soviet Union discredited, that Soviet civilian experts, including the editor of the Cominform newspaper, had been followed by the Yugoslav Security Police. The main ideological attack against Yugoslavia, however, came in the second charge. It was stated that the policy of the Yugoslav leaders towards the peasants had disregarded class differences; that they had treated the peasants as a 'single entity', thereby failing to aggravate the class struggle which was essential to the period of transition between capitalism and socialism. The communiqué said that in the conditions obtaining in Yugoslavia, where individual peasant farming predominated, where the land was not nationalized, and much of it was held by the kulaks, it was impossible to achieve socialism by methods which glossed over the class struggle. The Yugoslav leaders were trying to do this and were maintaining that the peasantry were the 'most stable foundation of the Yugoslav State'. This meant that the Yugoslav leaders were ignoring the Marxist-Leninist doctrine that the proletariat must be the leader in the struggle for socialism.

The third class of accusations dealt with the organization of

the Communist Party in Yugoslavia. It stated that the Yugoslav Communist Party, which should be the leading force, was playing a less important role in the country than the People's Front, which was composed of the most varied class elements including workers, individual farmers, kulaks, traders, small manufacturers, and bourgeois intelligentsia, and therefore should not be more important than the Communist Party. It added that the Yugoslav Communist Party was being led by a 'bureaucratic regime' created, not elected, inside the party and that the party as a whole still had a secret and semi-legal status; party meetings and elections were not held or were held in secret. The communiqué denounced the recent arrest of the two members of the Yugoslav Central Committee, Andrija Hebrang and Šreten Žujović, who, it alleged, had been arrested because of their criticisms of the anti-Soviet attitude of the leaders of the Yugoslav Communist Party.

The communiqué then denounced the reaction of the Yugoslav leaders to these criticisms and made it clear that the criticisms had been known to the leaders of the Yugoslav Communist Party for some time before they were made public in the communiqué. It stated that the Yugoslav leaders had recently introduced a number of 'leftish' laws, such as the nationalization of medium industry and trade and a new grain tax, which were designed to remove grounds for criticism, but which in fact were hasty projects which therefore only caused dislocation. It added that the Yugoslav leaders had hastened to take measures to liquidate the capitalist elements in the peasantry, but that these measures had been taken without due preparation and would only lead to 'irreparable harm'. The elimination of the last and biggest exploiting class—the kulak class—is possible only on the basis of mass collectivization of agriculture,' stated the communiqué.

In conclusion the communiqué castigated the Yugoslav leaders for refusing to attend the meeting of the Cominform to discuss their 'errors' and declared that by this behaviour they had seceded from the 'united socialist front against imperialism'. Finally the Cominform called on the healthy elements in the Yugoslav Communist Party, loyal to Marxism-Leninism, 'to compel their present leaders to recognize their mistakes openly and honestly and to rectify them; to break with nationalism, return to internationalism; and in every way to consolidate the united Socialist Front against imperialism', or failing this to replace the present Yugoslav leaders and 'to advance a new internationalist leadership of the party'.

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This attack of the Cominform on the Yugoslav Communist Party came as a great shock not only to the people of western Europe, but also to the great majority of the Yugoslav people. To the leaders, however, it could have come as no surprise, since it was clear from the communiqué, and later publications confirmed that letters on this subject had been exchanged between the Yugoslav and the Soviet Communist Parties for some months past. The subjects dealt with in the Cominform communiqué had been discussed in these letters,¹ which covered the period of 20 March–20 June 1948, and the communiqué was obviously the culmination of a failure to come to any understanding. The letters showed increasing hostility and hardening of attitude on both sides. They also showed that since 1945 there had been friction between Yugoslavia and the U.S.S.R. on a number of points.

The Yugoslav reply to the Cominform communiqué was sent to the Cominform in a statement dated 29 June. Most of the points in this statement had already been made in the letters addressed to the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party by the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party between March and June 1948. Both in the letters and in the statement the Yugoslav reply was a categorical denial of the charges, which it described as 'founded on slanders, fabrications, and ignorance of the situation in Yugoslavia'. On the charges relating to alleged hostility to the U.S.S.R., the Yugoslav reply was that they did not in the least correspond to the truth, and moreover that Soviet citizens had not been followed by Security Police in Yugoslavia. The Yugoslavs went over to the attack and accused the Soviet security services of trying from 1945 onwards to enrol Yugoslav citizens in their sphere.

On the questions relating to Yugoslav policy towards the peasants, the statement said that the Yugoslav Communist Party was pursuing a policy of 'restricting the capitalist elements in the village'; it said that in this matter Yugoslav policy should be judged by its practice and achieved results and not 'on the basis of individual isolated and distorted facts'.

The Cominform allegations about the internal organization of the Yugoslav Communist Party were rejected 'with deep indignation'. The Yugoslav statement denied that their Communist Party was undemocratic, that members of the

¹ These letters, together with the Cominform communiqué, have been printed in English in *The Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute* (London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1948). This English text has been used in quotations.

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Central Committee were co-opted rather than elected, and it explained that elections had not been held because of the difficulties of 'the war period and the tempestuous post-war developments' through which they were passing. It also emphasized the importance of the experience and success of the Yugoslav Communist Party in the war and 'the heroic and glorious past of the Party and its present heroic struggle for the reconstruction and development of the country'. The statement added that the allegation of the Cominform that the Yugoslav Communist Party was losing itself in the People's Front was 'rooted in the misunderstanding of the relationship between the Party and the Front in Yugoslavia'. It said that the Party was leading the Front, its programme was voluntarily adopted by the Front, and it was educating the Front in the spirit of Marxism-Leninism.

All the other indictments of the Yugoslav Communist Party by the Cominform were vigorously rejected, as was the suggestion that the leaders of the party had introduced certain hasty measures or made 'concessions to imperialists'.

The Yugoslav statement explained why the Yugoslav Communist Party had not agreed to attend the meeting of the Cominform to discuss these matters. It said that it was not able to do so because the Yugoslav leaders had already received letters from members of the Cominform which denounced the Yugoslav Communist Party and showed that the Cominform members had made up their minds to condemn the Yugoslavs even before they had given them a hearing. In such circumstances it said that the Yugoslav members would not be on an equal footing with the others. In the letters to the Soviet Communist Party, the Yugoslavs had maintained that the proper solution would have been for Soviet representatives to visit Yugoslavia and investigate conditions on the spot.

In conclusion, the Yugoslav statement denied the charges of nationalism, reiterated that by its entire internal and foreign policy, and especially by the struggle during the National Liberation war, the Yugoslavs had given evidence of their international line. The statement ended by calling on the Yugoslav Communist Party to close its ranks for 'the realization of the party line and for even greater strength and party unity,' in order to be able to 'socialize the homeland'. This it said was the only way to prove the unjustness of the charges.

At first many Yugoslavs thought that the denunciation of their leaders was a case of misunderstanding and that the Soviet Union could not possibly have agreed to the attack on

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the Yugoslav Communist Party. But in succeeding months it became quite clear from the Soviet radio and press that this was not the case. Nevertheless, there was at first strong support amongst the Yugoslavs, both spontaneous and organized, for Tito and for the line which he had followed. It was not possible to tell how far there was any immediate support for the Cominform view, but in August 1948, changes were made in the Republican Government of Bosnia-Hercegovina, and later also in the Republican Government of Montenegro, with a view to increasing support for Tito.

On 18 August an announcement was made that a week previously, on 12 August, Colonel-General Arso Jovanović, former Chief of Staff, who had spent three years since the war in Russia, had been killed by frontier guards while attempting to cross the Yugoslav-Roumanian border. Two other officers, General Branko Petričević and Colonel Vlado Dapčević¹ had been captured. These officers were assumed to be leaders of the elements that the Cominform had hoped would overthrow Tito's leadership.

It was in the atmosphere of early reaction to the Cominform communiqué that the fifth congress of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia was held in Belgrade from 21 to 29 July. This was the first congress of the Yugoslav Communist Party to be held for twenty years. The Communist Parties of all the Cominform countries refused invitations to attend the congress.

Marshal Tito's opening speech to the congress² was clearly designed as a justification of his leadership and the present policy of the Communist Party. He dealt with the history of the Yugoslav Communist Party over the past twenty years, giving a detailed account of the national liberation struggle and concluded with a strong refutation of the Cominform attack. He denied that the policy of the Government was leading to encouragement of capitalism in Yugoslavia, but made the important point that Yugoslavia had 'in a certain sense taken new roads of realization' of its aims and quoted Lenin and Engels as a justification for this. He admitted that mistakes had been made by the Yugoslav Communist Party, but indicated that they were not those denounced by the Cominform. Marshal Tito ended his speech by calling on the Yugoslav Communist Party to close its ranks in the face of the new danger.

¹ Brother or cousin of the famous war-time partisan General Petko Dapčević.

² Political Report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, Belgrade, 1948.

Facts about the membership of the Yugoslav Communist Party were given by Alexander Ranković, speaking as personnel secretary of the party. He said that the party had 468,000 members, backed by 1,415,000 members of Communist Youth Organizations; that there were 25,635 cells reaching down into all parts of the country's political, social and economic structure; that in the army 89.9 per cent of officers and 70 per cent of non-commissioned officers were party members; that 29.5 per cent of the members of the Communist Party were workers, and 40 per cent poor peasants.

A new central committee of the party was elected at this Congress, consisting of Marshal Tito as Secretary-General, Alexander Ranković (Minister of the Interior), Edvard Kardelj (vice-Premier) and Milovan Djilas as secretaries. Tito gave the names for the party's Politburo as Marshal Tito, General Alexander Ranković, Edvard Kardelj, Milovan Djilas, Lt-General Gosnjak (Deputy Minister of Defence), Boris Kidrić (Chief of the State Planning Commission), Blagoje Nesković (Premier of Serbia), Moshe Pijade (vice-Premier of the National Praesidium), and Franc Leskovšek (Minister of Heavy Industry).

It was clear from everything that passed at the Congress that Marshal Tito and the other leaders had no intention of climbing down to the Cominform and that they were confident of full support in the Yugoslav Communist Party and among the ordinary people of Yugoslavia.

Political changes made in the cabinet confirmed this view. On 3 September Edvard Kardelj was made chairman of the Federal Control Commission instead of Minister of Foreign Affairs. He retained his position of vice-Premier. On public occasions during the autumn, Marshal Tito ostentatiously showed himself to be on friendly terms with Ranković, thus dispersing rumours that he was hoping to find a solution by getting rid of the leader who had been the most severely attacked by the Cominform.

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS, JULY-DECEMBER 1948

In the second half of 1948 it was clear that Yugoslavia was experiencing serious economic difficulties and these were frankly admitted by the Yugoslav leaders. It was difficult to state how far these difficulties were due to the results of the Cominform dispute and how far they were inherent in the very ambitious aims of the economic plan. Both Tito and Kidrić attributed the increasing difficulties to sanctions imposed by some of Yugoslavia's eastern neighbours. In a speech on 27

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December 1948 during a debate on the 1949 budget, Tito said that 1948 had been 'the most difficult year in the post-war period' and said that obstacles put in Yugoslavia's path by the eastern countries had grown during the last six months of 1948 'to such proportions as to acquire a hostile character'. He said that 'different agreements and commitments undertaken by certain allied and friendly countries are now being grossly violated'; that the attack on Yugoslavia by the Cominform countries was caused by the plans to industrialize Yugoslavia. 'The whole thing', he said, 'is that we are electrifying and industrializing our country, and that we are no longer a backward country exporting our raw materials to other countries so that they may later ship us finished goods'.

Deliveries from some of the Cominform countries diminished in the last months of 1948. Oil from Albania—amounting to about a third of Yugoslavia's needs—had ceased entirely; deliveries of Roumanian oil were not being maintained at the previous level. Czechoslovakia was said by Boris Kidrić to have failed to send promised industrial supplies, and it was clear that Hungary was also lagging behind its commitments. The trade treaty concluded between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union on 28 December, provided for trade between the two countries in 1949 only one-eighth of the volume of that carried out in 1948. This meant that Yugoslavia would not get from the Soviet Union the capital equipment that it had anticipated would be delivered in 1949. This treaty provided the pattern for other trade renewal treaties with the eastern countries of Europe.

The Yugoslav leaders were thus faced with the problem of what to do about the five-year plan if they could not get the expected equipment and machinery from their eastern neighbours. Without equipment the plan would have to be abandoned, with resulting unemployment and serious economic and probably political dislocation. To avoid this alternative sources of supply must be found. Tito and others made it clear in their public speeches that they had no intention of abandoning the main plan for industrializing the country—though they would probably accept minor modifications to it. They intended to do everything to put into effect the plans for heavy industry, mining, oil production, and the development of communications, and in order to do this Yugoslavia would have greatly to increase her trade with western countries. The short-term trade agreement with Great Britain, which had been in negotiation for over a year, was signed at the end of

1948 and was a pointer in this direction. The question for the future was would the west—including the United States—be willing and able to supply the capital equipment the Yugoslavs wanted and would Yugoslavia provide the goods to pay for them? This dilemma lay behind the urgent exhortation at the end of 1948 to the Yugoslav people and particularly to the miners to increase their production, and it also explained the repeated statement of the Yugoslav leaders that the Yugoslav peoples could make the plan successful by their own increased efforts.

In these conditions the food situation was of supreme importance and there was evidence that in the later months of 1948 it was not good. There were complaints from some parts of the country that food for workers was inadequate. It seems probable that while fats and wheat were generally short, inefficient food distribution was responsible for some of the trouble. The food shortage was partly due to the fact that the collection of food from the peasants was still not entirely successful. The lower prices on the free market and many restrictions on food sales had discouraged the peasants from giving up maximum supplies, and the linked prices system was not working as well as had been hoped because of the lack of the kind of consumer goods which the peasants wanted in exchange for their vouchers. Yugoslav peasants, like peasants in other countries all over Europe, were eating more food themselves instead of marketing it. The amount of food available naturally affected industrial output. Food shortage resulted in absenteeism: mine workers and others took time off to go home and work on the land in order to supplement their rations; it also resulted in ill-health with a very serious rise in the incidence of tuberculosis, and at the same time it meant a lowering of output. All these things were admitted by the Yugoslav leaders and great efforts were made to tackle them. Kidrić promised in speeches in the last quarter of 1948 that the export of foods would be curtailed and high calory products kept for Yugoslav consumption; he also promised improved distribution of food. Officials of all kinds were being urged to treat the workers as human beings and make every effort to see that they had better conditions. Attempts were also being made to import from abroad some of the consumer goods, particularly shoes and textiles, which would tempt the peasants to part with more food.

The budget for 1949, published at the end of December 1948, illustrated the serious nature of these economic problems

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and the tremendous efforts that were being made to deal with them. Of this budget 30 per cent was allocated to investment in heavy industry, mining, railways, and electrical projects; 14 per cent assigned to social welfare and health schemes; 8 per cent was for investment in agriculture, with particular emphasis on the development of co-operative production.

CONCLUSION

After the dispute with the Cominform Yugoslavia came to occupy a unique position in Europe. Her post-war development had been in many ways similar to that of the other eastern countries of Europe and her foreign policy for the most part the same as theirs; both had been inspired by the Soviet Union. But Yugoslavia was different from her neighbours in the independence which had characterized her internal development, and it was this independence that led to her differences with the Cominform. As long as this dispute remained unsolved, Yugoslavia was in the anomalous position of travelling the same political road as her neighbours, but estranged from them. At the same time her political ideology and geographical position made it very difficult for her to participate in any political organization of western Europe.

The independent development of Yugoslavia in the post-war years was in part due to the traditional character of the Yugoslav peoples, particularly of the Serbs and Montenegrins, but it was also due to her war-time history. Marshal Tito and other Communist leaders of the resistance movement in Yugoslavia during the war became the peace-time rulers of the country without any post-war revolution. The heroic episodes of the National Liberation movement gave these leaders, and in particular Tito, a support and prestige among the Yugoslav peoples of all kinds which extended far beyond the members of the Communist Party. No other leader in eastern Europe was in a comparable position, and all others owed much more to the direct support or intervention of the Soviet Union. The National Liberation movement, under Tito's guidance, united the Yugoslav peoples—Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Montenegrins, Macedonians—in a way that they had never been united before, and gave them a common purpose; first to defeat the enemy, then to build up their country. Having completed the first half of this task successfully, they felt they could tackle the second in a similar way. It was not surprising in the light of their past history that heavy stress should be laid on what the Yugoslavs had done themselves

and that the National Liberation movement should be emphasized as an inspiration for the post-war struggle to build up a wonderful new Yugoslavia. The idea that they had achieved the impossible once and could achieve it again no doubt inspired both leaders and people to throw themselves into hard work for the ambitious five-year plan and to continue to struggle for it in the face of great difficulties and even after the Cominform dispute had resulted in loss of the economic aid they had expected from the Soviet Union and their neighbours.

There is no doubt that this independence was disliked by the Soviet Union and was at the bottom of the charges made against Yugoslavia, for in its essence the disagreement of the Yugoslav leaders and the Soviet Union was on the subject of how much freedom of development in internal affairs, political and economic, as well as in foreign affairs and military organization was to be allowed to a 'People's Democracy' in the Soviet sphere of influence.

Although the Cominform dispute emphasized the difference between Yugoslavia and her neighbours, the fundamental similarities between her post-war development and theirs remained important. The broad aims of Yugoslavia's political, social, and economic policy were the same as those of the other eastern countries of Europe. Yugoslavia was still organized as a Communist State even though she had asserted her independence from Moscow. This question of national independence was the real issue between Yugoslavia and the Cominform and it was perhaps characteristic that Yugoslavia should be the country to have raised it. The importance of this dispute was incalculable for Yugoslavia. It had resulted in a tightening of political control inside the country and important changes in the pattern of trade. As the east applied economic sanctions against Yugoslavia, Tito started to look for trade with the west. A new phase in Yugoslav history had begun, but it was still impossible to tell whether Yugoslavia would be willing or able to develop close relations with the capitalist countries of the west, or whether Communism and her affinities with the other countries of eastern Europe would prove to be the more important influences on Yugoslav post-war development.

CHAPTER FOUR

HUNGARY

BY ELIZABETH WISKEMANN

Note. It has become essential to emphasize at the beginning of this chapter that it was written in the autumn of 1948, soon after the appointment of Rajk, previously Minister of the Interior, to be Minister of Foreign Affairs. The extent of the transformation evidently imposed by Russia upon the Hungarian state of affairs in the twelve months which followed can be measured by contrasting this appointment with the trial and execution of the same man towards the end of September 1949.

FOR many centuries the history of the Magyars has been the history of their struggle to preserve their identity between the Germans on the one hand and the Slavs on the other. In a sense these two were represented by the Western and the Eastern Empires in the tenth century when the great Magyar law-giver, Stephen (King of Hungary 997-1038), rejected Byzantium and chose western Christianity. But Stephen gained a privileged position; Pope Sylvester II was believed himself to have bestowed the holy crown upon the royal apostle and his kingdom of Hungary was held to 'belong in an especial way to the Holy Roman Church'. The Hungarian clergy were given particular privileges and St Stephen bestowed huge estates upon his church. Already under the rule of St Stephen his subjects were divided into free untaxed Magyars, subject peoples (mostly Slav or Vlach) to pay taxes to both Church and State, and privileged immigrants.

It was the Turkish advance in the early sixteenth century which brought about the only decisive changes in Magyar life between the eleventh century and the twentieth. When the Turks were close at hand the nobility in desperation armed the peasants, who straightway turned on their lords. They were crushed and savagely punished, and in 1514 the Hungarian Diet decreed that the peasants be 'henceforth subjected to their masters in true and perpetual serfdom'. Twelve years later the major part of Hungary was subjected to the Turks until the victories of Prince Eugene drove the crescent from

Buda in 1686 and ended in the expulsion of the Turks from all Hungary by the Peace of Carlowitz in 1689.

It was the Turks who threw the Magyars they failed to conquer into the arms of the German dynasty of the Habsburgs. King Louis of Hungary and Bohemia was killed on the battle-field of Mohács in 1526, and the Magyars like the Czechs could find nothing else to do but to call in the Emperor's brother, Ferdinand of Habsburg, to be the head of the rump of their State ; they insisted, of course, that the union was a purely personal one, never to prejudice the integrity of the kingdom of St Stephen.

The Habsburg dynasty was in truth the chief political instrument of the Counter-Reformation, first in the person of Philip II of Spain, then in that of Ferdinand of Styria, who was elected King of Hungary in 1617 and Emperor in 1619. Transdanubia, or Hungary west of the Danube, most of which came under Austrian rule in 1526 until the Compromise of 1867, has remained to this day the most Catholic part of the country, and what is usually termed the most backward, in spite of its greater natural resources. By the time the Turks were driven out of the rest of the country Calvinism was too deep-rooted here and there for the Austrian authorities to destroy it, and so it has remained. It was strong among the Magyar communities of Transylvania which escaped Turkish rule, and from Transylvania Calvinism was nurtured in Hungary itself, with Debrecen as its centre.

It is important for the understanding of Hungary to remember not only that Buda was a Turkish fortress for some 150 years, but that in 1848, exactly a century ago, the population of the city of Budapest was three-quarters German, the Magyars rather living on the land as magnates or gentry, served by peasants who were still little better than serfs and many of whom were Slavs. Kossuth's March Laws¹ of 1848 brought about, at least on paper, the liberation of these peasants from feudal services and the subjection of the nobility to taxation. The 1848 revolution brought also an attempted break with the dynasty in favour of the independence of a constitutional Hungary. With the help of the Tsar, the Habsburg forces re-subjected the Magyars in 1849 for another eighteen years. In 1867, however, both internal and external pressure induced the Emperor Francis Joseph to agree to the division of his

¹ They were carried on 15 March which has been celebrated ever since as a red-letter day in more senses than one.

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territories into two autonomous halves, that to the west of the Leitha river being governed from Vienna, but that to the east from Budapest.

In the Hungary which existed from 1867 to 1918 scarcely half the population was Magyar; the Emperor had in fact extended the authority of the Magyar upper class over racial groups hitherto dependent upon his authority. The events of 1848 had stimulated all nationalistic feelings, which were now aflame. In 1868 the Magyar leaders enacted a generous Nationalities Law, but in practice the Hungarian Government proceeded to do all it could to magyarize its German, Slav, and Roumanian subjects. This hastened the disintegration of Hungary in 1918 and caused her non-Magyar subjects to welcome the Treaty of Trianon by which, in 1919, she was reduced to frontiers over-generous to them; it was physically impossible to draw ethnically accurate frontiers in the racial confusion of Central Europe.

The Magyar leaders must be held at least in part responsible for the débâcle of 1918-19. They had preserved as far as they could the rule not so much of one national group as of a caste within it. The Magyar peasants or the small but increasing number of factory workers or of the urban middle class had had nothing to say—they had merely enjoyed the advantage of speaking Magyar, which had only replaced Latin as Hungary's official language in the years leading up to 1848. Those who had not been brought up to speak Magyar were gravely handicapped. One magnate, Count Michael Karolyi, had condemned the oligarchic spirit in Hungary and was eager to give his own great estate to the peasants. He was called to power by the collapsing dynasty in October 1918. But in the political atmosphere of Europe at the time it was not surprising that a Communist revolution took place in Budapest early the next year under the leadership of Béla Kun. The new regime was weak and incompetent and without a workable land policy; it brought Allied frowns upon Hungary, and an occupation of the capital by the fiercely despised Roumanians three days after Kun himself had resigned (1 August). A counter-revolution based on Szeged and led by Admiral Horthy swept the Communists away and reinstated both magnates and gentry. Kun and many of his associates had been Jews, and the White Terror which accompanied the counter-revolution almost certainly claimed more victims than the red revolution which it followed;¹ it was something

¹ Or than the one which it preceded by twenty-five years.

of a pogrom, for many of Horthy's young officers celebrated their triumph with the hanging or drowning of Jews.¹

Horthy's forces entered Budapest in November 1919, and on 1 March 1920 he himself was elected Regent of the Hungarian Kingdom he was felt to have rescued. But Admiral Horthy and Count Bethlen, who was Prime Minister from 1921-31, were Calvinists and no friends of the Habsburgs. Indeed they suppressed two attempts of the ex-Emperor Charles to reclaim the Hungarian throne, and on 5 November 1921, partly owing to the pressure of Hungary's Little Entente neighbours, a law was passed by which the Habsburg claim was annulled.

In the Horthy period between the wars the question to which most prominence was officially given was that of the possibility of revising the Trianon Treaty. The Treaty created the problem of Magyar minorities in the neighbouring countries; these Hungarians who now found themselves living in exile in their own homes, were inevitably penalized by the new Little Entente States for Magyar privileges in pre-war Hungary. The Treaty also brought into post-Trianon Hungary a number of Magyar ex-officials now jobless after their eviction from the lost territories. It would have been worth while to work for frontier readjustments, but it was unpardonable to inflame the whole nation, beginning with kindergarten children, with passionate determination to recapture all the lands once attached to the Crown of St Stephen², though the majority of their inhabitants had now grouped themselves around national governments of their own. It was said, not without some justification, that the Hungarian magnates who had lost big estates in Transylvania and Slovakia were primarily concerned to regain them. It is certain that important legislation was constantly postponed with the excuse that the execution of the revisionist programme must precede it.

After the Communist fiasco it was easy to shelve reform as a danger. In the neighbouring countries of Czechoslovakia, Roumania, and Yugoslavia, land reform of a fairly thorough kind had been effected. In Hungary the distribution of land remained, judged by twentieth-century criteria, the most unjust in central Europe; the only piece of legislation which touched it (passed on 7 December 1920) ordered a transference

¹ Many of their victims were thrown into the Danube.

² Any king mounting the throne of St Stephen had to swear 'to reunite with Hungary all parts and provinces thereof recovered or to be recovered'.

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of land so slight as to be almost negligible ; the only magnate who suffered was Count Károlyi, whose entire estate was confiscated. About a third of the population, three million out of nine, remained dependent upon the land yet to all intents and purposes landless, under-employed, and under-nourished. The industrial development of the Horthy period, which was not inconsiderable, absorbed only a sprinkling of the agrarian unemployed. Industry tended to concentrate round Budapest : this, too, created an explosive situation. The regime would have liked best to forbid any labour combination, though the trade unions had reached a membership of about one million in 1914. After 1920 their activities were restricted in every way by the police, and Count Bethlen agreed to tolerate a few Social Democrat Deputies in the Lower House of Parliament on condition that they made no trouble. The old oligarchy was thus restored, working through the two Chambers and the County Assemblies. In the 1922 elections Count Bethlen restored open voting except in the few towns, and the enfranchisement of the peasants ensured their votes for the candidate chosen by the magnates and the gentry, of whom they were decently afraid. In 1932 the Small Holders' Party, which since 1920 had spasmodically supported peasant interests within and outside the Government, chose Tibor Eckhardt, a fiery revisionist with all the social graces, as its leader. With this it ceased to serve any purpose but that of giving play to the personal rivalries of landowning politicians who had the same ends in view. In the same year Horthy's adjutant, General Gömbös, became Premier, and political emphasis seemed to shift from the magnates rather to the gentry. The country continued to be governed by a composite 'Party of Unity' founded by Bethlen, which was always successful in providing itself with a handsome parliamentary majority.¹

A patriarchal system has a great deal to commend it if it shows generosity, intelligence, and efficiency ; but the big landowners in Hungary were often lazy and inefficient. Richer Transdanubia, the district *par excellence* of large estates, was nothing like so productive as it might have been, nor did most of the owners care for their peasants or estate servants as good aristocrats surely should.² The efficient and industrious people in Hungary were the Jews, the leading bankers and

¹ This has recently been compared with the Government coalition majority of 1948.

² The housing of the estate servants was particularly bad.

employers in industry, who also managed some more capitalized farms mainly in the poor south east. They were increasingly hated, perhaps chiefly for their efficiency : the hatred became acute in the early nineteen-thirties when Hungary, like the rest of central Europe, was engulfed in the great slump.

At this time the Austrian Adolf Hitler became Chancellor of the German Reich. The Magyars had no love for the Austrian Germans or for the Germans as a whole, but they had accepted them as the other *Herrenvolk* fit to share dominion over the Slavs. Many Hungarians, and certainly the half-German General Gömbös, were attracted by Hitler's revisionism, his anti-Semitism and his denunciation of democracy, Communism, and Slavs. From Hitler's point of view it was desirable to dominate Hungary in order that she might assist in the disruption of Czechoslovakia and the feeding of the Reich, and his agents, some of them members of the half-million German minority in Hungary, were soon very active in disseminating National Socialism, through propaganda and threats, among the Magyars. At first various rival Hungarian Führer appeared, but after a time attention focussed upon a certain Major Ferenc Szálasi, who had been with Horthy at the counter-revolutionary headquarters at Szeged in 1919 when he was twenty-two. In August 1938 he fused his party with another Hungarian Nazi party which used a cross made of arrows as its badge ; Szálasi's followers were now known as Hungarists.¹ The Hungarian Nazis were urged on by their confederates in the Reich to play upon the peasants' land-hunger, grown greater since the slump ; already in the summer of 1938 one heard of Hungarian villages where the peasants were praying that Hitler (not Szálasi) might come to 'free' them from their Magyar lords. The Hungarian nobility, most of whom understood the Nazi threat to Hungarian independence, was made uneasy by the peasants' reactions to seductive Nazi hints. It was disconcerting, too, that in the elections on 28 May 1939, Budapest registered a big Szálasi vote. This was three months before Hitler attacked the Poles.

Now the Hungarians felt a traditional sympathy for Poland, and they had always stressed their alliance with Mussolini rather than friendship with Hitler ; until Italy's participation they did their best to ignore the Second World War. They had, however, allowed themselves to become conspicuously implicated in Hitler's anti-Czechoslovak activity, and in August

¹ They differed from the Nazis in the Reich in that they never attacked the Catholic Church.

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1940 they received two-fifths of Transylvania from Roumania through a German-Italian Award. The next year, soon after a Hungarian-Yugoslav pact of friendship, Hitler compelled the Magyars to follow up his own attack upon that country and to join in his onslaught on the U.S.S.R. The Hungarians were at this time torn between anti-Slav and anti-Communist feelings, and a desire to keep out of things. Many of their best elements sympathized with Britain, and busied themselves at home with helping Poles and Jews (or Polish Jews) who had fled from Hitler—even before the war Nazi excesses had shaken some of the Hungarian upper class out of its anti-Semitism, which had mostly been snobbish, not murderous.

It was indeed Hungary's alleged tolerance towards the Jews which brought Horthy violent reproaches from the German Führer, and then brought the Nazi occupation of Hungary in March 1944. This was the beginning of a dramatic twelve months. At first the Germans used other tools, but when in October, a few days after the Russians had reached Debrecen, Horthy prepared to make an armistice, the Regent was deposed and Szálasi enlisted to head a government which was to 'hold out to the end'; at the same time the Hungarian Commander-in-Chief, General Miklós, and his Chief of Staff went over to the Russians. The March to October period was terrible indeed, and not only on account of the Nazi Jew-hunt; one still hears that the Szálasi weeks were the 'worst of all'. In spite of the anti-Russian cult of the past, people began to hope everything from the U.S.S.R., and an anti-Nazi resistance movement solidified. By the middle of December the Soviet armies had overrun four-fifths of Hungary, and Budapest was almost encircled. The Szálasi Cabinet had long since withdrawn to the Austrian frontier. By 11 January 1945 Pest was in Russian control, but Hitler ordered a hopeless defence of the citadel of Buda, which held out for another month at the cost of the most shattering destruction. After the fighting there was no bridge left there over the Danube, nor indeed anywhere in the country. Between 13 and 20 December 1944, a provisional National Assembly was elected in liberated territory and met in Debrecen on 23 December; in its turn it elected General Miklós as Premier with a certain Ferenc Erdei as Home Minister and a Communist, Imre Nagy, in the then important position of Minister of Agriculture; on 20 January 1945 an Armistice was signed in Moscow, and before the end of the winter reforms had begun. They were put into effect by a provisional coalition, under Miklós, of the leaders of the

Small Holder,¹ the Socialist, the Communist, and the National Peasant parties ; among these men the Communist Rákosi was probably the strongest personality.

From the time of the Horthy counter-revolution in 1919 until 1944, it had been regarded as something like the betrayal of both one's country and one's class to advocate reform by consent or from below ; only Jews and eccentrics were guilty of it. The social boycott against them helped to push the Jewish *littérateurs* of Budapest to be leftist reformers. Some of them had been connected with the Kun attempt, and many of them placed their hopes in Communism, which was forbidden. They were politically persecuted, therefore, and often spent many years in prison, or went to Russia, or both.

Apart from the formal parliamentary opposition of the Small Holders' Party, the Social Democrats, and the Small Liberal Party led by Rassay, there was another non-Jewish, and perhaps faintly anti-Jewish oppositional group, before the war. A few courageous pioneers calling themselves 'Village Explorers' had set about making real contact with the poorer peasants, something which the peasants' servility, at any rate in the west, made it hard to come by. There were men like Illyés, Féja, Peter Veres, and Ferenc Erdei. They, too, were most of them persecuted writers, but they managed to stir the public conscience here and there with what they wrote, though the Nazis then exploited the result of their work.² Three or four years after Hitler came to power some of them, since they dared not found a party, founded the 'March Front'³ to agitate for reforms which should genuinely alleviate the landless peasants' plight, a poverty which kept most of them in far too primitive a state to recognize their own needs. In the summer of 1939 the March Front people had gained sufficient confidence to found the National Peasant Party ; they could have no Deputies, of course, for the elections were just over, but they stood with the Small Holders and Socialists in opposing German influence until they were all driven underground in March 1944, to re-emerge with the arrival of the Soviet army.

At the end of 1944, after a decade of agitation and upheaval, the Land Reform question was aflame. Apart from the emotional importance it had gained, it had become acutely practical. Most of the owners of the big estates had disappeared. Many villages had changed hands several times in

¹ By 'Small Holder' I always mean a member of the political party.

² Some of their associates later joined the Hungarian Nazis.

³ So called because of March 1848.

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the fighting ; more than 50 per cent¹ of the country's livestock had been lost, and many of the surviving animals had been driven to the west, which was in any case the richer part of the country. Budapest was starving, and famine would sweep the whole country if the land failed to be sown in the spring. Even now it is generally agreed that little would have happened without Russian pressure. In the middle of March 1945, exactly ninety-seven years after the Kossuth March Laws, the long awaited reform was decreed. The Chairman of the Land Reform Council was Peter Veres.

When it came to the point the new law was practical rather than wildly revolutionary. The general maximum agricultural holding was in future to be 100 yokes (i.e. 57 hectares), though up to 200 yokes was permitted if the farm were self-cultivated, and a very few persons, such as Count Károlyi, were allowed to hold 300 yokes in recognition of their particular contribution to the social progress of Hungary. Those who had owned more than 1,000 yokes lost them all, but those whose property had been less than that might keep 100 yokes. The expropriations made available just over a third of the agricultural land of Hungary, which was distributed among some 640,000 small or new farmers, apart from 801,540 hectares of wood and forest land which could not be divided into small holdings and went to the State. In addition to routine expropriations, about half the former German minority had been driven out or had taken to flight² ; since these 'Swabians' had mostly been well-off farmers, this made land available in the villages round Budapest and in the Tolna and Pécs regions. Some 7,000 Magyar peasants (with their families) from Slovakia were settled on these farms, and in addition another 28,000 peasants (plus families) from north-east Hungary, some of them additional refugees from Slovakia. This still left about 21,000 recognized claimants to land unsatisfied, most of them beyond the Tisza where there had been fewer big estates.

The change expressed socially, or sociologically, is indicated in the table below :

	<i>Year</i>	<i>Number of holdings</i>	<i>Per cent</i>	<i>Total number of yokes</i>	<i>Per cent</i>
Dwarf plots 0-5 yokes	1935	1,184,783	72·5	1,631,246	10·1
	1947*	1,189,256	63	3,627,296	22·5
Small holding, 5-20 yokes	1935	348,657	21·3	3,503,322	21·8
	1947	624,541	33·1	6,865,524	42·5

¹ e.g. 39 per cent of the horses, 44 per cent of the cattle, 78 per cent of the pigs.

² Their expulsion was decreed on 24 December 1945, but was only partially carried out.

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	Year	Number of holdings	Per cent	Total number of yokes	Per cent
Farms of 20-50 yokes	1935	73,663	4.5	2,172,300	13.5
	1947	58,237	3.1	1,718,554	10.7
Farms of 50-100 yokes	1935	15,240	0.9	1,036,162	6.5
	1947	9,204	0.5	649,280	4.0
Farms etc. over 100 yokes	1935	12,064	0.8	7,738,814	48.1
	1947	6,427	0.3	2,379,671	20.3

* By the end of 1947 the Reform might be considered to have been carried out. The 1947 figures were published in the official *Gazdaságstatisztikai Tájékoztató* of July 1948.

These figures, however, beg the question unless it is explained that nearly all the 2,379,671 yokes included in the over 100 yokes category consisted of the woods and pastures taken into public ownership. Efforts were made to increase the relative number of holdings of from 5 to 20 yokes rather than to create too many new plots of less than 5 yokes. A good deal of land was given to the owners of dwarf holdings so that they should be farming a more economic unit, but the reform only brought the average small holding up to about 6 yokes.¹ Recipients of land were in fact obliged to buy it over a period of 10-20 years at what was supposed to be the price of 800 kilos of wheat per yoke. The proceeds paid for the carrying out of the reform; theoretically they were also to provide compensation for the expropriated 'later', but the inflation which worked up to the monetary crisis of 1946 put an end to theories of this kind.

A basic agrarian reform is always phenomenally difficult to carry out. In this case the destitution, both public and private, of the country magnified the task. But the reform was promptly realized—it did not remain on paper. Many new farmers had no implements and no animals, and at first the State could help very little. The reform was put through as an individualistic measure, but the estate servants of some big estate which was now divided between them saved themselves by working together in some degree, as they had before. Ostensibly the country was almost united in favour of Land Reform; only the Catholic Church was openly opposed to it. Of course there were those who said that this would last no longer than the revolution of 1918-19, and timid peasants near the Austrian frontier were afraid of the proximity of some of the former big owners who were on the other side.

¹ Of the 640,000 recipients of land, about 370,000 were estate servants and farm labourers, and about 214,000 dwarf-holders.

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FIRST ELECTIONS

The Miklós Government had established itself in ruined Budapest in April 1945. Towards the end of the year technically the freest elections which have ever been held in Hungary took place. It is true that, as in Italy in 1946 and 1948, the Catholic peasantry was affected by being told by their priests that to vote for the parties on the left was to risk the torments of hell. In the municipal election in the capital on 7 October the Small Holders won 123 seats against 100 Socialists and Communists.¹ The general election followed on 4 November, the Small Holders gaining 2,547,000 votes and 246 seats, the Socialists 772,000 votes and 71 seats, the Communists 747,000 votes and 67 seats, and the National Peasants 301,000 votes and 22 seats. Thus the equivocal Small Holders controlled 57 per cent of the seats in the Assembly.²

It had been a strange year, what with the lawlessness both of the occupying army³ and of starving Hungarians at the outset. Meanwhile national councils of the local anti-Germans had sprung up spontaneously in different parts of the country and, considering that they were as innocent as babies of administrative experience, they governed almost well. Soon many professional bureaucrats re-emerged and condemned all this as anarchy, and gradually the national councils were wound up. Some people still say that the worst thing of all was the collapse of the currency, which began to make itself felt some months before the elections.

The radiant hopes of the reformers survived these things. In January 1946 Hungary was declared a Republic, and this destroyed the mystical obligation of revisionism.⁴ In February, Tildy, a Calvinist pastor, a Small Holder who had been courageously anti-German, became the first President, with another Small Holder, Ferenc Nagy, a former president of the Peasants' Union, as Prime Minister. Assistant, or Under-Secretary, to Nagy was a certain Father István Balogh, a priest who had made early advances to the Russians and acted as their liaison with the Small Holder Party until relations between Russians and Small Holders broke down. Imre

¹ These were the figures for the central district. In Greater Budapest, which included the industrial suburbs, 490 seats were won by the Socialists and Communists and 405 by the Small Holders.

² There were also 70,000 votes cast for a liberal party called Citizen Democrats.

³ When I asked an elderly person in Budapest, 'Which was worse, the Roumanian occupation in 1919 or the Russian one now?' he replied, 'No comparison, because the Roumanians were not allowed into our houses.'

⁴ See page 98 footnote 2.

Nagy was appointed Minister of the Interior, while Rákosi, the Socialist Szakasits, and a Small Holder peasant named Dobi were nominated Ministers of State.

Since the days of Eckhardt¹ the Small Holder Party has been one which faced in both directions a little unconvincingly. The Small Holder Deputies elected to the National Assembly in November 1945, like some of their Communist colleagues, had sometimes been well known as pro-Nazis earlier. Some of them were undoubtedly connected with one or two anti-Semitic and anti-Russian incidents which took place in 1946, but it is difficult to assess from which side provocation more often came. In spite of the preponderance of its Small Holder members, it is certain that many Small Holder Deputies were hostile to the new Government and no-one could suppose that they did not intrigue² against it. Months of great economic difficulty coincided with unceasing political friction which culminated, on 25 February 1947, in the arrest of Kovács, Secretary-General of the Small Holder Party, by the Russian military authorities.³ This was strongly but unsuccessfully objected to by the Americans and the British. Kovács was said by his captors to have provided evidence incriminating to many of his party colleagues, including Ferenc Nagy himself; the latter had certainly advertised his preference as between the United States and the U.S.S.R. The inevitable upshot was the expulsion of Nagy⁴ and many of his associates, including Father Balogh, from the official Small Holder Party, and the emergence of one of its more insignificant members, Dinnyés, who became Prime Minister on 31 May 1947. When the Small Holder Minister of Finance⁵ and five Small Holder under-secretaries resigned in December 1948, Dinnyés was succeeded by Dobi, who had been Minister of Agriculture in the meantime.

ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND THE THREE-YEAR PLAN

It was extraordinarily difficult for a small defeated nation without equipment or working capital to get on to its feet at all. The first sure step towards recovery was taken in the summer of 1946. At the beginning of August when the

¹ Eckhardt went to the United States in 1941, and stayed there

² Later this was called 'conspiracy.'

³ By Article 22 of the Peace Treaty, the Russians were in full occupation until the Treaty came into force in September 1947.

⁴ He was in Switzerland at the time.

⁵ Nyáradi—he also announced his resignation from Switzerland.

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official rate had reached 29,667 billion¹ to the dollar, transactions in pengő ceased, and the forint was introduced. The new regime was rich in able economists who insisted that the stabilization must be based upon the acceptance of an income no higher than the value of available goods and services.² This meant looking poverty grimly in the face, but it was successful, and a sober financial policy was steadily continued and consequent grumbling ignored.

Those who were concerned independently of politics with the salutary reorganization of Hungarian social life had never regarded agrarian reform as the final solution of the problem. Agrarian over-population³ had meant that there had not been enough land to distribute reasonably to those who were entitled to it in 1945, and agrarian over-population was something which was bound to recur. An objection which had constantly been raised to land reform in the past was that Hungary was a wheat-producing country and this required the bigger units of the large estates. The answer given by the reformers of 1945 (apart from emphasis upon co-operation in farming) was that Hungary must be industrialized much farther. This would give work to the unemployed people on the land, and instead of exporting wheat, which land reform had certainly made less practical than ever (even in the Horthy days it had been clear that she could not successfully compete on the world wheat-market) Hungary would export manufactures. From the point of view of raw materials Hungary is not badly off. She has enough oil and coal—though much of the latter is not

¹ Billion = a million millions.

² The United States authorities had restored to Hungary the gold reserves² of the Hungarian National Bank which had been stolen by the Germans.

³ The trouble was less acute in Hungary than for instance in Poland, partly because Hungary was relatively more industrialized in 1938 than the rest of eastern Europe excepting only Czechoslovakia. See unpublished statistical material put together by a Committee on the Economic Development of Eastern and South Eastern Europe working at Chatham House during the war under Dr P. N. Rosenstein-Rodan, where the surplus agrarian population in Hungary in 1937 is given as 380,000 or 8.6 per cent of the whole (agrarian population). The occupational distribution, in percentages, of the population was as follows:

	1930	1941	1946
Agrarian	51.8	48.7	49.5
Mining	1.3	1.8	2.0
Industry	21.7	23.6	15.7
Banking, commerce, insurance	5.4	5.5	6.4
Transport	3.9	4.0	3.6
Civil servants and professional people	5.0	5.1	4.4
Servants and labourers (urban)	3.7	2.7	3.2
Rentiers, house owners, pensioners	4.2	4.2	2.9
Army, etc.	3.0	4.4	12.3

of good quality—and she is fortunate in her bauxite deposits. She possesses far too little iron and is deficient in timber and natural water-power. Nevertheless industrialization was the best constructive programme, combined with the diversion of agriculture from corn (except for the supplying of the market at home) to intensive cultivation of garden produce and sugar-beet or, in the Körös river valley, rice, to the growing of sunflower seeds for oil,¹ and the production of wine (which was always likely to find a market abroad), thus facilitating the import of industrial raw materials. The industrialization of the smaller eastern European countries is, of course, also in the interest of the U.S.S.R.

In other circumstances than those of 1945 to 1948 it would have been difficult to move decisively towards the industrialization of Hungary through private enterprise; now it was inevitable that it should be planned and carried through by the State. The first need was the large-scale investment of capital in industry, and it was in part to ensure and control this that the banks were to be nationalized.

The Hungarian Three-Year Plan was announced on 12 June 1947, one week after Mr Marshall's offer,² and it came into operation on 1 August. It was not over-ambitious in its aims; it was necessarily a plan to reconstruct much that still lay in ruins, but it was a plan to combine reconstruction with development through industrialization. It aimed at raising the standard of living between 3 and 4 per cent above pre-war level by augmenting the national income by 14 per cent. It aimed at a return to 95 per cent of pre-war agricultural production,³ but to increase industrial production by 27 per cent and especially to develop communications (to include two important new canals), mining, and heavy industry. It planned the investment of altogether 6,585 millions forints⁴ in the three years, in three progressive instalments. The total sum to be invested in agriculture was 2,000 million forints, in mining and industry 1,745 million forints, in communications 1,676 million forints, and in building and social requirements 1,164 million forints.

The success of the three-year plan depended upon a series of interrelated factors, the chief of them being the extension of

¹ For both domestic and industrial uses.

² On 10 July, with obvious reluctance, Hungary refused the invitation to confer on this in Paris.

³ The intended transformation of Hungary from a wheat-producing country into a mixed farming area was indicated in the statement that she was to be transformed into a well-irrigated orchard in fifteen years.

⁴ Over £146 million.

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State ownership over industry and commerce, the country's financial progress, the co-operation of labour, and the possibilities of foreign trade.

NATIONALIZATION

MASZ, the State collieries, were organized in 1946, and by the end of that year virtually all coal and bauxite mining and all electrical plants had come into the hands of the Government.¹ The transference of German assets in Hungary to the U.S.S.R. (see Article 28 of the Hungarian Peace Treaty) meant that the latter, also, acquired a dominant interest in the development of Hungarian bauxite mining. Hungarian-Soviet Companies were founded to monopolize all river and air transport, and the country's oil development east of the Danube, where in fact only natural gas but no oil has so far been discovered in spite of a great deal of prospecting.² (The oil in Transdanubia had been in American hands [Standard Oil] until 1941 and Ruedemann, the American in charge, was said to have facilitated deliveries to Germany until then; after the war the Americans, with Ruedemann, returned.)

The end of the year 1946 saw the nationalization of the five leading Hungarian heavy industry concerns³ which were combined into the Heavy Industries Centre (N.I.K.). They had previously been working at a loss⁴ and had received State subsidies of 30 to 40 million forints per month. According to the three-year plan, about 120 million forints were invested in N.I.K. in the first year following 1 August 1947, and, while the number of workers was increased from 65,000 to 71,000, production increased from 67 million forints' worth in December to 166.7 million forints' worth in March 1948.⁵ Whereas N.I.K. exports were to the value of 4 million forints in

¹ It should be emphasized that during the war a large part of heavy industry, transport, and mining had, as elsewhere, come under Government and then under direct German control, and was in fact never really de-controlled again.

² It was estimated that at the end of 1947, through former German enterprises and the Hungarian-Soviet Companies, the Russians controlled:

7½ per cent of Hungary's mining industries.

4½ per cent of Hungary's manufacturing industries.

30 per cent of Hungary's power and electric industry.

9½ per cent of Hungary's transport.

(Percentages reckoned in terms of the capital, plant, ships, etc.)

³ The Manfred-Weiss works (Csepel), the Ganz works, the (Hungarian State) Wagon and Machine Works (M.A.V.A.G.), the (Hungarian State) Iron, Steel and Machine Factory and the Rimamurány-Salgótarján Iron Works.

⁴ And indeed continued to do so for a time.

⁵ Economists generally found post-war Hungarian official statistics accurate until 1949.

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December 1946, they went up to between 15 and 20 millions in the early months of 1948. The setting up of N.I.K. and minor developments during 1947 meant that by the end of that year the State owned 74.3 per cent of the metal industry and 58.2 per cent of the machine industry, reckoned in terms of the number of workers employed.

When the three-year plan was launched, however, under the aegis of a National Planning Office with the right to demand the death sentence for proven sabotage of the plan, the State still controlled less than half (again in terms of labour) the country's industry as a whole. This fact created the central issue in Hungarian politics from early in the year. The Communists and the planners were up against the leading banks, not only on account of the capital they needed for investment, but also because the banks exercised considerable control over industry, especially over chemicals, textiles, leather, and paper.¹ The defeat of the Small Holders in May spelt the defeat of the banks, though it was not until 1 January 1948, that their nationalization became a practical reality. The National Bank took over the control of industry, and other State banking units were formed to deal with foreign trade, long-term investments, small savings, and credits for agriculture, i.e. mainly for farmers' co-operatives.

On 26 March (Good Friday) 1948, all factories with more than 100 employees on 1 August 1947 were taken over by the State, as the result of which 73.8 per cent of the industrial workers in Hungary became State employees, 5.3 per cent employees of local authorities, 3.6 per cent the employees of the joint Hungarian-Russian companies, and only 18.8 per cent still worked for private employers, who owned only 8.7 per cent of the total horse-power capacity of Hungarian industrial machinery.² Hypothetical compensation in State bonds was spoken of for the expropriated industrialists but no-one took this very seriously and none has been received. The smaller industrialists who remained independent expected to be wound up at any moment, but they survived at least until the end of 1948, some of them even very profitably to themselves. Companies in which more than 50 per cent of the capital was foreign were exempted from the new March

¹ The banks had had relatively little interest in heavy industry except for the Rimamurány Iron Works. When they (the banks) were nationalized all enterprises in which they owned more than 20 per cent share capital were nationalized at the same time.

² A very useful article on the nationalization of Hungarian industry appeared in the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* of 11 May 1948.

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Law ; this left American oil interests out of State control until the sabotage trials later in the year. The change which had occurred can best be illustrated by the following figures :

	PERCENTAGE OF STATE EMPLOYEES	
	<i>To end of 1947</i>	<i>From 26.3.48</i>
Iron and metal industry	74.3	92.5
Machine industry	58.2	87.6
Electric power production	22.9	88.7
Leather industry	—	93.5
Textile industry	1.7	78.8
Clothing industry	—	25.8
Paper industry	—	65.0
Food industry	18.5	73.7
Chemicals	13.9	68.2
Printing	35.3	70.4

FINANCE

The Peace Treaty with Hungary was signed on 10 February 1947, and was ratified by the Hungarian National Assembly on 27 June ; it came into operation in the following September. It obliged Hungary to pay \$200 million¹ in reparations to the U.S.S.R., and \$100 million to Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia together, but a larger amount to the latter country which Hungary had injured very much more. According to Article 23 of the Treaty, these sums were 'payable over eight years from 20 January, 1945, in commodities (machine equipment, river craft, grain and other commodities) . . .' According to the Hungarian budget for 1947-8, Hungary in 1947, by the time she had got on to her feet, was paying nearly 18 per cent of her total expenditure in reparations. She arranged to pay in that year \$23 million to Russia (largely in industrial goods), \$9 million to Yugoslavia, and \$6½ million to Czechoslovakia ; in practice she eventually delivered rather more to Russia and less to the other two during the year. In addition she had to meet a claim, which was brought down to \$45 million, made by Russia in respect of Hungarian debts owed to German firms in 1944 ; part of this sum was used to help finance the Hungarian-Soviet companies. Reparations and expenditure on reconstruction made a certain over-issue of credits and notes inevitable, and this among other things pushed prices up.

¹ Many people complained that the Russian soldiers had already stolen a notable portion of this sum. The industrial equipment taken by the Russians was allowed for in the \$200 million, but it was probably worth much more than the estimated figure. Deliveries to the Occupation Army are estimated by some authorities to have exceeded the sum total of reparations.

The situation was met by a stern system of taxation, based upon the introduction of, (1) a general graded income-tax rising from 12 per cent on a workman's wages up to 1,500 forints per month, and rising to 75 per cent on a salary of 6,000 forints; (2) a tax on capital; (3) a capital levy to be paid between 1947-50 in three instalments; (4) a death duty. These taxes have to be paid; they are not evaded as they would be in Latin countries. It is not irrelevant to recall that they were imposed within a century after the legal end put to the exemption of the Hungarian nobility from taxation in March 1848. Between 1848 and 1944 the Magyar upper class had only resentfully and partially accepted the abolition of this essentially feudal privilege.

The new Hungarian State still, however, relied to a slightly greater extent upon indirect rather than direct taxation; if one showed surprise at so undemocratic a principle one was told that in a still predominantly agrarian country it was inevitable. The exchequer at all events was relentlessly replenished, and this made the three-year plan investment programme a serious proposition.

LABOUR

The ignorance of a backward society rather than intelligent conservatism has hitherto meant that the champions of reform in Hungary have always been a minority and have therefore found it difficult to be the champions of reform by consent—this had been the problem of Joseph II's life. But the *élan* of liberation from Hitler and Szálasi meant that the Socialists, like the National Peasant Party, could hope to carry a not unwilling country far along the road of progress. The Communists, dogmatic opportunists as they were, were delighted to cash in on the spirit of the moment, but were prepared to change their methods when their aims should dictate coercion. The Small Holders had shown themselves to be equally opportunist but they were without dogma and pursued contrary aims.

There had been a good deal of Nazi talk at the big Manfred Weiss machine factory at Csepel¹ outside Budapest before and during the war (the elections of May, 1939 gave the first proof of it), but probably the most intelligent and reliable workmen were members of the Socialist unions until the German occupation in 1944. Thus when the Nazi flood and its ancillary

¹ Nazi propaganda was helped by the fact that the biggest Hungarian entrepreneurs, like Weiss and Ganz, were invariably Jews.

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currents, which had affected Hungarian life so overwhelmingly, subsided overnight, the Social Democrats had a skeleton trade union organization which became important as soon as Budapest was liberated. In June 1945 works committees were set up in all but the smallest factories, and for some time they exerted influence even in the matter of management. On 8 August General Miklós signed a decree laying down that employers were only to take on trade union labour; indeed the trade unions became sufficiently powerful to obtain a number of advantages for their members: they helped them when unemployed and acquired priority rights of acquisition for them here and there. But they could not alter the grim facts of 1945-6, starvation, inflation and large-scale unemployment for lack of machines and above all of raw materials. The stabilization of the currency, which was accompanied by systematic rationing, brought order out of chaos, but also consumer goods prices which were prohibitively high for the working people. The great problem on the labour side, as throughout post-war Europe, was the fall in production per worker. This was partly a matter of under-nourishment, but most of all due to the lack of skill and training in a country with so short and slender an industrial tradition.¹ In spite of the obstacles, however, important improvements were made in working conditions. A very sketchy social insurance system had existed since the end of the nineteenth century. In 1927 and 1928 sickness and accident insurance were systematized on paper², and in the nineteen-thirties, thanks perhaps to indirect Nazi pressure, the new laws were more often realized in practice. Social legislation continued to function erratically (partly because people were afraid or ignorant of what they might claim), and the State provided no unemployment relief all through the worst slump period. Now, however, only the employer (i.e. increasingly often the State) paid 13 per cent of the wages the employee received to an all-in insurance fund; the number of panel doctors was increased and they began to take their patients more seriously. A fortnight's paid holiday became the general rule, and trouble was taken to fit up deserted châteaux as holiday homes. A decent midday meal at a nominal price was soon provided in all the major factories. In addition to the foundation of a children's village at Hajduhadháza near Debrecen for homeless

¹ The problem of training new industrial recruits from the country only later became acute.

² See C. A. Macartney, *Hungary* (London, Benn, 1934).

orphan children, nursery schools were attached to the factories, perhaps in the former owner's private house, where parents could leave their children for the day. The industrial workers received their ration-cards free, while people with higher incomes had to buy theirs for a small sum. Since the Government was determined to expand the mining industry, in the days when there was really not enough food to go round—in 1946 the harvest was inadequate still and in 1947 came the intense drought—they diverted food to the miners. Until 1948 indeed, the mass of the industrial workers was not really well fed. For those without work only their trade union cared; the difference from the Horthy period lay in the great increase in the power of the unions. The number of unemployed diminished fairly steadily; on the other hand the attitude of the trade unions became increasingly political, and by 1948 it was unlikely that a man approved by the union leaders would be out of work, but if a man of whom they disapproved were unemployed it was equally unlikely that they would find him unemployment relief. It was about their housing conditions, however, that working people complained most bitterly. In 1910 Budapest housing conditions had been condemned as the worst in any large town in Europe¹; nothing serious had ever been done to improve them, and the destruction of 1944–5 had but aggravated an already scandalous situation.

It would be misleading to suggest that the Republican Government entirely neglected the housing problem,² but Gerö, in some ways the most impressive Communist figure, who was Minister for Transport and Communications,³ insisted that policy required bridges even before workmen's flats. In the same way the Communists on the whole condemned time spent in discussion in the trade unions and works committees or wasted in strikes; the struggle for existence exacerbated the differences of opinion between the political parties. The Socialists were inclined to object to the use of technicians with rightist records who kept the job from their own people, while the Communists wanted the most highly skilled man to get on with the work. Just as the bureaucrats had objected to the 'anarchy' of spontaneous self-government, so the Communists disliked self-government in industry, and works committees were reduced to routine activities. By 1947 the three-year planners were not prepared to allow time and

¹ See C. A. Macartney, *op. cit.* p. 257.

² Rents, as in other countries, were kept very low.

³ Towards the end of 1948 he became Minister of Finance.

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energy to be dissipated in dispute, and when the plan was initiated on 1 August 1947, the right to strike disappeared overnight ; to strike now could be made to look like sabotage, and the National Planning Office could demand the death penalty for those who sabotaged the three-year plan.

SECOND ELECTIONS

A month later, on 31 August 1947, a second general election was held, after a revision of the electoral law designed to exclude rather more pro-Nazi elements than that of 1945. The remains of the German minority were disfranchised *en bloc* ; while most of its members had been good Nazis, a few had been staunchly anti-Nazi all along. Including the Germans, 333,000 persons (6 per cent of the electorate) lost their vote. After the election the Communist Minister of the Interior, Rajk, himself admitted that some 20,000 unqualified voters had voted, and pressure was used to weaken the Socialist, as well as the already disintegrated Small Holder, Party. Members of the latter still remained in the Government alliance but they carried little weight by now. On the other hand six oppositional parties suddenly sprang up and polled 1,955,419 votes as against 3,042,919 cast for the Government groups ; in the new Chamber 140 oppositional Deputies now confronted 271 Government members.¹ The two strongest oppositional parties formed from what had been the main body of the Small Holders were led by Pfeiffer and Barankovics respectively. The first was connected with the Catholic hierarchy and strongly on the right in its views ; it only survived until November, when Pfeiffer fled to America and his followers were excluded from Parliament. The second 'introduced an almost entirely new element into the Hungarian political scene—that of progressive Catholicism'² and Barankovics hoped to bring about a truce between the Catholic Church and the State.

The Social Democrats polled about the same number of votes as in 1945 ; a very small drop (involving some 150,000

¹ The creation of a 'national list' (as e.g. in Italy) gave a bonus to the Government parties, so that they had a higher proportion of Deputies than that of the electors who had voted for them (as is invariably the case with any British Government).

² See 'The Hungarian Elections and After,' in *The World Today*, November 1947. Father Balogh founded a mildly dissident party at the same time and received not inconsiderable support. It was said that the Communists encouraged new parties in order to split the anti-Marxist vote.

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votes) could almost be accounted for by the only Communist chicanery noted by foreign observers which was practised at Socialist expense. Thenceforward the position of the Socialist Party was made untenable, mainly by the Communists but also perhaps by the maladroitness of some of their leaders. Much capital was made out of the secession of their pre-war chief, Peyer, who had always been strongly anti-Communist, to a small Radical group. He, too, then went into exile and thereafter, in the following February, was condemned to eight years' imprisonment. At the same time, a life-long Socialist workman called Kelemen, certainly an honest man, who had held subordinate office between the elections, was condemned for life in connexion with unconvincing charges brought against the Nitrokemia Company.¹ The cabinet which was formed after the elections consisted of 5 Communists, 4 Socialists, 4 Small Holders and 2 National Peasants; the last party had increased its seats from 22 to 36, and Veres received the strange assignment of the Ministry of War. While all major steps were based upon parliamentary legislation, Government continued to be largely by decree.

With the Socialist leaders he trusted being pushed aside, with his right to strike grown as nebulous as in the Horthy days² and the difficult food situation following the drought, the better industrial worker felt little enthusiasm for the new tasks with which he was faced at the end of the summer of 1947.³ It was true that wages were raised by 15 per cent in August. A fresh Collective Agreement, by which wages would depend on output, was then decreed on 1 October. The rates were based upon the average output in September, but were revised several times until a settlement on 7 January 1948. Wages then varied from a minimum of 1 forint (5d.) an hour for unskilled work to 2.50 forints for skilled labour.⁴ Those who produced more than average output earned at a very slightly higher rate. The minimum output recognized was 80 per cent of normal; a poor worker would not be paid less than the 80 per cent rate but would probably be severely reprimanded.

¹ Nitro-chemical Industries Ltd.

² 'Even strikes', Mr C. A. Macartney wrote in the earlier nineteen-thirties, 'are sometimes decided in favour of the workers, and without bullets' (op. cit. p. 267).

³ People most resented working for the Hungarian-Soviet Companies, not, I think, because they were worse treated, but because they disliked the idea.

⁴ Late in 1948, presumably owing to the rise in output, the norms fixed were again found to be too low and were raised.

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FOREIGN TRADE

Thus the three-year plan was launched in all kinds of difficult circumstances and its early progress was slow ; it suffered in addition from the fact that Hungarian prices were too high for foreign markets. Since Hungary, like Britain, Switzerland, or Italy, can only buy enough of the raw materials upon which her industry depends by exporting finished goods, this was serious.

In spite of the extraordinary obstacles to be overcome Hungary's foreign trade, which in 1946 was a mere 13.3 per cent of her trade in 1938, in 1947 trebled the volume of 1946. Before the war Hungary had imported 25 per cent of her imports from Russia and the countries now dominated by the U.S.S.R. and had sent only 13 per cent of her exports to them, while in 1947 the figures had become 39 per cent and 44 per cent respectively ; in 1948 they both rose above 50 per cent. Politics apart, there was perhaps something to be said for spending less on freight by increasing trade with one's neighbours. During the first half of 1948 exports went up by about 75 per cent ; imports were very heavy in February (to the value of 198.4 million forints) but were only overtaken (exceptionally) in June by exports which went up fairly steadily. In July there was an average adverse balance again (29.7 million forints).¹ As compared with 1938 or 1946 there was clear evidence of the progress of industrialization in the increased export of finished goods and the increased import of raw materials.² Raw cotton, coal and coke, and timber were the biggest import items, and finished cotton goods came high on the list of exports. But the planners wished particularly to develop a home industry to employ a maximum amount of highly skilled labour, and to develop the manufacture of wireless and other electrical apparatus, and in July 1948 electrical machinery headed the list of exported manufactures (to the value of 10.2 million forints).

Undoubtedly the industrial workers were producing better. Since it was impossible to suppose that the new technical

¹ Foreign trade figures such as these do not include deliveries of goods as reparations nor goods received from abroad as relief. UNRRA, for instance, spent about £1 million on relief for Hungary.

² Hungarian Exports in July 1948 were as follows :

<i>Monthly Average</i>	<i>Raw Materials</i>	<i>Semi-finished Goods</i>	<i>Finished Goods</i>
1938	60 per cent	10 per cent	30 per cent
1947	36 per cent	18 per cent	46 per cent
1948, June	27 per cent	11 per cent	62 per cent

training encouraged by the authorities could be affecting output so soon as the first half of 1948, the improvement must be attributed to competent State-management, slightly more and better food, the new wage system¹, and incentives such as the appearance of utility clothes at moderate prices. Though the Government was not popular competitive prizes for output had their effect and the plan acquired a certain *élan*; the scale of investment was increased and it was decided to carry out the three-year programme by the end of 1949 and to go straight on with a five-year plan in January 1950 and a ten-year electrification and irrigation project.

The summer of 1948 brought two further advantages. As from 1 June, the U.S.S.R. agreed to cancel half the reparations still owing to them—in practice the alleviation was less than it sounded but was still very considerable. Secondly, the crops were very good and food prices fell; it was possible to halve the price of sugar and to increase agricultural exports so that in October exports again exceeded imports, this time by 42.5 million forints. The Cominform quarrel with Belgrade cut in both directions: Hungary ceased to acknowledge her reparation obligations to the Yugoslavs² but had reason to fear a breakdown in the delivery of timber and metals from a collapsing Yugoslavia. Whatever might be said aloud, however, both parties had an interest in keeping up their commercial exchanges, and until the end of the year they succeeded in doing so to a surprising extent.

The Hungarian Government was trading with fifty-four countries in 1948 and showed no lack of interest in partners in the western world. Important agreements were made, for instance, with the Argentine and Switzerland. Trade with the United Kingdom had in 1947 reached much the same level on the average as trade with Russia until on 2 October 1948 a new commercial treaty prepared a notable increase in the volume of Soviet-Hungarian trade. The October agreement included a Soviet order for machinery worth \$150 million to be delivered between 1950 and 1954. It was supposed that the U.S.S.R. was strengthening her ties with her obedient satellites in order to isolate and ruin the Yugoslav rebel, and

¹ By this time, while output was up to about 80 per cent (measured by 1938), real wages were back to about the 1938 level, with variations. Printers, for instance, who had been almost privileged before, were less well paid, but textile workers, who had been sweated, earned more. Unemployment was falling, but was kept up by prisoners of war returning from Russia.

² By 30 June 1948 Hungary had paid \$21 million out of the \$70 million she was finally to have paid to Yugoslavia.

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a Czech-Hungarian five-year commercial agreement signed in Prague on 20 November seemed to fit into the plan. Trade with Czechoslovakia, though considerable, had hitherto been regarded as disappointing, but it was now expected to double. The following table shows the value of Hungary's trade with the countries most important to her in September 1941 :

<i>Imports (million forints)</i>		<i>Exports</i>	
United Kingdom	24·4	Austria	17·8
Yugoslavia	21·2	Czechoslovakia	14·1
Czechoslovakia	18·8	United Kingdom	12·2
U.S.S.R.	18·1	Yugoslavia	12·2
Switzerland	15·6	U.S.S.R.	11·0
Austria	11·1	Switzerland	9·2
Total exports 165·7.		Total imports 116·2.	
Adverse balance 49·5			

These figures were fairly typical. In October, however, the adverse balance was eliminated and in November a favourable balance of some 81 million forints was achieved, which rose to 164·7 million forints in December.

THE CHURCHES AND EDUCATION

In 1945 the position of the Roman Catholic Church in Hungary, to which about 66 per cent of the population belonged, was in almost every way medieval. The Church was still, as it was in France until 1790, the owner of wide estates and the fount of education. Though the idea of general primary education was formulated in the law of 1868, the State only set about providing schools where the Churches failed to do so. Even in 1946, out of 6,669 primary schools, 4,564, or about 65 per cent, were denominational, and the same thing was true of a similar proportion of the teachers' training colleges. Religious instruction was compulsory in the undenominational state schools. But Hungary had never revoked her (more recent) Edict of Nantes and the Calvinists in eastern Hungary had a peculiar national significance. When St Stephen's crown passed into Habsburg hands and the Habsburgs became the Apostolic kings of Hungary, the Catholic Church seemed to many Magyars to become semi-foreign. Traditionally its bishops were drawn from the magnates' families with their international outlook; later a high proportion of Germans and Slovaks were among its priests. The gentry and the solid peasants beyond the Tisza, who were Calvinists, were proud to be poorer but rooted to their Magyar soil; they claim that the institutions of their Church were free of the taint of international feudalism. Indeed anti-Habsburg feeling, which was partly anti-German, crystallized round the Calvinist Church congregations, to which some 21 per cent of the nation belonged. In the Horthy

period Habsburg legitimism, which was not really very strong, was identified with the Catholic Church,¹ while Calvinists like Horthy and Bethlen gave the regime its flavour. The half-German and three-quarters Nazi General Gömbös was a Lutheran, but as a group the Lutherans were inconsiderable ; both Lutherans and Jews numbered about 5 per cent of the population and both were regarded as alien, the Jews as Jews and the Lutherans as German².

It would be foolish to neglect the effects of 1848 and its March Laws or those of industrialization and war, but yet they had seemed to glance off the social structure of Hungary rather like arrows off a coat of mail. Thus when the Russians arrived in 1944 and the Republic was set up it was faced with a state of affairs such as we in this country have not known since before the Reformation. For his part the Prince-Primate Mindszenty, who was appointed in October 1945, was brought face to face not perhaps with a Condorcet or a Robespierre, but with a trinity formed by the mingling of Russian Communism with the mysticism of the National Peasant Party and the Calvinism of Tildy. So long as the Government of the Republic was moderately leftist, only bigoted Catholics (there were many in western Hungary and in the north east along the Slovak frontier, children of the confessional schools) could support Cardinal Mindszenty with fervour. From the beginning he advocated a Habsburg return. From the beginning he opposed agrarian reform uncompromisingly.³

The Catholic Church in Hungary still owned many lands granted to it by St Stephen over nine centuries before. With over half a million hectares, or a seventeenth of Hungary's agricultural land in its possession, it was, after Prince Esterházy, the biggest landowner in the country. Of this, 450,000 hectares were distributed among the peasantry or, if they contained forest land, taken over by the State ; but the parishes kept their holdings up to 100 yokes (57 hectares) and even gained occasional acres here and there. Altogether there were still 100,000 hectares in the hands of the clergy. It has sometimes happened that parish priests now find themselves better off than bishops and one hears stories of how they have been able to entertain them for the first time to roast goose for

¹ The present writer met quite as many anti-Clerical Catholics as Calvinists who expressed anti-Habsburg views in those days.

² It must not, however, be forgotten that Kossuth and the great poet, Petöfi, were both Lutheran.

³ For some of his pronouncements on the subject see *The Tablet*, 15 October 1945.

lunch. Until 1948 the State avoided anti-religious gestures ; it often gave priority to the reconstruction of churches and it paid a yearly grant¹ to the Catholic Church to maintain its religious, charitable, and scholastic establishments. Meanwhile the Calvinist Church expressed its approval of the Republican constitution and of land reform and supported the three-year plan for the increase of production. The Lutherans followed this example.

In 1947 the Hungarian Government began to introduce eight-year elementary schools instead of schools which only provided four or at most six years' education, and at the same time new textbooks were issued by the State. They were not particularly ' Marxist-Leninist ' but they dropped revisionism and introduced biology ; one heard approval of them from a good many sides. The Protestant schools adopted them but they were rejected by the Catholics ; indeed from now on the children in the Catholic schools were taught to regard all the other children as, thanks to Darwin, lost.² The Government would probably have preferred a compromise all round, and in 1948 it again succeeded in coming to terms with the Protestant Churches,³ terms according to which all the elementary Protestant denominational schools were merged into the elementary State schools, but the Calvinists kept four secondary schools of their own for boys, and two for girls from 14 to 18.⁴ The State guaranteed a grant of 11 million forints for 1948-9, which was to diminish yearly until it vanished after twenty years. The Calvinist Synod ratified this on 7 October.

By 1948, since the Cardinal remained intransigent, the Government found it necessary to put an end to the teaching in Catholic schools according to which its agents were the agents of the Devil. When its intentions became clear, a great Catholic demonstration was organized on 13 May in Buda, and on 17 May the Prince-Primate issued a Pastoral Letter to be read in all Catholic churches threatening with excommunication all those who supported the nationalization of the church schools. On 19 May the Government appointed a Commission to consider the question and on 16 June introduced a nationalizing bill ; after a stormy debate, in which Barankovics condemned a

¹ 90 million forints in the 1947-8 budget.

² Ilona Polányi, ' The Issues in Hungary,' *World Affairs*, April 1949.

³ The Swiss theologian, Karl Barth, famous for his opposition to Hitler, was said to have influenced the Calvinist decision.

⁴ Including the Calvinist ' Gymnasium ' in Budapest.

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State monopoly of education as contrary to natural law, the bill was passed. At first the Prince-Primate forbade Catholic teachers to be nationalized along with their schools,¹ but two hours' religious instruction every week remained compulsory in every school and priests continued to provide this for the Catholic children. One wondered how the children now reconciled the priest's teaching with the biology lessons; at any rate each *Weltanschauung* had its turn, and if that of the Catholics was short, it had extra opportunities on Sundays and in many homes. The State offered teachers slightly better pay and this was denounced as intended to corrupt them. The fact was that they had all been unbelievably underpaid,² and it could scarcely be regretted that in August 1948, when all civil servants' salaries were raised by 17 per cent, those of teachers in schools went up by 20 per cent. The Government organized emergency courses to train new teachers to take the place of those who resigned, but the problem of replacement was not so tremendous as it at first seemed. There had been unemployment among teachers for one thing, and for another the Catholic schools had been particularly understaffed. In addition in mixed villages, the Catholic and Protestant schools could now be combined with the usual advantages of rationalization. The State, incidentally, continued to pay the Catholic bishops³ and the Church continued to levy tithes from all its members.

One of the basic issues between the Catholic Church and the new State was that of the introduction of a more scientific education. The social and economic programme of the Republic required an extension of technical knowledge, whether in farming or in industry. This faced the universities and other institutions for advanced education with new tasks, which were not, however, tackled on any scale until after the nationalization of the schools. In the case of the universities there was no evident clash with the Catholic Church. Although Budapest University is considered to have been founded by the leader of the Counter-Reformation in Hungary, the great Cardinal Pázmány, the Jesuit University he founded was in Slovakia. It was transferred to Budapest in 1783, in Joseph II's day ten years after the temporary suppression of the Jesuits, and in the nineteenth century it became the usual

¹ This veto was relaxed before the end of the year.

² In 1948 a secondary teacher with many years' experience received 600 forints a month, or rather less than £160 a year measured in purchasing capacity.

³ Cardinal Mindszenty alone refused to draw his salary from the State.

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German-type State university with a Catholic Faculty of Theology. In 1895 an *École Normale* on the French model was founded as an expressly secular institution ; it was named after the educational reformer, Eötvös. The other three universities proper at Szeged, Pécs,¹ and Debrecen were founded as State institutions soon after the First World War, partly to replace the Universities which had been lost as the result of the Treaty of Trianon.² There were a number of technical colleges besides, and certain academies which belonged to the Catholics or the Calvinists. Finally, on the eve of the revolution a college named after the sociologist, Györffy, had been founded where peasants' sons could live cheaply and attend University courses.

Between 1945 and 1948 no radical change was made in higher education in Hungary. A famous Marxist, Georgei Lukács, who had been vice-Commissar for Education under Kun in 1919, was immediately appointed a Professor of Philosophy at Budapest. Gradually more and more People's Colleges on the lines of the Györffy College were opened. In 1947 evening classes for factory workers were started at the Budapest Polytechnic. While Professors who had secretly sympathized with the March Front or with Socialism could now express their opinions freely, and while the anti-Jewish discrimination of Horthy days had disappeared, many professors continued their lectures exactly as they had ten or twenty years' earlier.

In September 1948 university reform began in earnest. A series of administrative changes was introduced in order that students should be more carefully selected and thereafter more systematically taught and examined. A special matriculation course was arranged for working people between the ages of 17 and 32. The People's Colleges came under stricter supervision and it was made plain that they existed to help the sons of industrial workers at least as much as those of peasants. A Communist was appointed to be Principal of the 'Eötvös', which was to increase its working-class element. At the same time much more emphasis was put upon the teaching of political economy and upon technical subjects like engineering, so necessary if industrialization was to succeed. A new School of Economics was opened in Budapest with an almost purely Communist staff, and a new provincial polytechnic

¹ An earlier university at Pécs had been destroyed by the Turks.

² A University had been founded at Kolosvár, now Cluj, in Transylvania, in 1872 and another at Pozsony, now Bratislava in Slovakia in 1914.

was projected. For the first time a substantial number of professors was retired in the October term, obviously on account of their political views. It became clear that the selection both of professors and students would mainly depend in future upon their attitude towards the ever more Communist State.

At Christmas 1948 Cardinal Mindszenty was arrested: he was charged with working for the overthrow of the Republic of Hungary.

THE AGRARIAN CRISIS OF 1948

Thus in 1948 the Hungarian Government was faced with a situation which would probably have compelled it to become more uncompromising, independently of the interests of Russia. By 1948 the richer peasants had considerably exploited the inevitable consequences of agrarian reform. The early difficulties of the new small farmers had been capped by the drought of 1947; this helped the richer peasants to buy out some of the new men surreptitiously; some of these became landless labourers again, only casually employed and badly paid at that, perhaps getting a third of the produce of their labour.¹ The richer peasants also resisted three-year plan ideas about developing the cultivation of sugar-beet and sunflower seeds, and stuck to their traditional growing of corn. The Government retorted by heavier taxes,² very steeply graded, both in money and kind, and by enlisting landless labourers to inspect the threshing in 1948.

The Government contribution to the recovery and intensification of Hungarian farming had been considerable, especially in establishing tractor depots (forty by the summer of 1948, mostly in the Great Plain and the east) for co-operative but also for individual use. MOSZK, the Hungarian National Co-operative Centre, founded in 1947, was active in a number of directions, but at first left it to the individual farmers to work with it or not as they chose; there was also a number of co-operatives independent of MOSZK. From the economic point of view co-operative activities were an indispensable complement to the cutting up of the big estates, especially in a country with Hungary's geographical character. But all through the twenty-five years of the Horthy period the Hungarians had been taught to regard Soviet Russia as an inferno, and it was not surprising that MOSZK was im-

¹ This occurred in spite of new and vigorous agricultural trade unions, and continued in spite of a decree regulating agricultural wages in the spring of 1948.

² The richer peasants were also subjected to the capital levy.

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mediately attacked from the right as collectivization in flimsy disguise; the peasants were encouraged to speak of the kolkhoz as of some fearful explosive.¹

The Hungarian internal conflict thus became more acute, and it was some two months before the Cominform breach with Tito that the pro-Communist National Peasant Party leader, Erdei, published a booklet in which he urged a large-scale extension of the functions of the co-operative organizations; they had hitherto concerned themselves primarily with buying and selling. In May a book by Veres appeared; it was called *The Peasant Future of the Country* and came, as it happened, as an answer to Erdei. To Veres the peasantry is an eternal entity of ethical importance which must not be contaminated by industrialization or State aid. Its freedom is more precious than its standard of life; somehow the peasant will make good.²

On 2 July, immediately after the Tito bombshell, Rákosi indirectly rejected Veres's plea, stating that within a year or two it would not be possible to continue to raise the peasants' standard of living without changing the methods in use until now. In September Veres left the Government. A new Ministry to control and develop the co-operatives was projected with Erdei in charge. All hostile voices declared that this was nothing but a drive towards Russian collectivization, and many of the peasants, small as well as rich, were panic-stricken, especially in Transdanubia. There was a good deal of talk at this time about the increase of State farms, but very little evidence that it was even intended. In the autumn of 1948 according to official figures there were 101 State farms, covering together 40,000 hectares. Many of these farms were breeding establishments which had existed for many years; in 1948 they were being extended, and State money was being invested, especially in the breeding of poultry.³ More intensive cultivation required machines used collectively, but until the end of 1948 the Government seemed to intend to reimburse the small co-operative farmer, not merely like an industrial worker, according to his output, but also in proportion to the size of his holding. This would suggest that, as Erdei had said in the spring, within certain collective units the

¹ Hungarians who had fought or been prisoners in Russia did not generally abuse Russian collectivization when they first returned home. They nearly always said that they had been tolerably well treated in Russia so long as they could work, but that it was fatal to fall ill for then no-one seemed to care.

² See 'Land Reform in Hungary,' *The World Today*, January 1949.

³ 9 million forints was invested in poultry-breeding in the first plan year.

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farms of Hungary would still be regarded as the property of the individual farmers.

HUNGARY AND THE U.S.S.R.

It has been seen that the U.S.S.R., through the Peace Treaty with Hungary, gained control of key economic positions in that country, which was obliged in addition to make important deliveries to her of industrial goods. It was clear that the Russians exerted direct political pressure so long as they were in official occupation of Hungary. During the autumn of 1947, as laid down by Article 22 of the Treaty,¹ their army was evacuated, except for small forces along the Austrian frontier near which they controlled an airfield; all kinds of rumours notwithstanding, the evidence suggests that there was no return of Soviet troops to Hungary in 1948. Nor is there evidence that after hurrying through the agrarian reform, the Russians interfered in the routine administration of the country or with the details of the plans etc., drawn up by Hungarian experts. On the other hand the Hungarian Communist leaders had mostly been driven to Russia long before the war by the inter-war regime and thus had long thought in Muscovite terms.

From the beginning of the new regime the Communists had had power out of all proportion to the numerical support they commanded in Hungary. From the time of the formation of the first constitutional Cabinet at the beginning of 1946 the Communists controlled the Ministry of the Interior and they lost no time in building up a police force which was almost 100 per cent Communist. It would be inaccurate, however, to suggest that Hungary, at least until the end of 1948, was a police State in the full Nazi sense; rather she remained a police State to about the extent to which she had been one before; the small group of Communists had if anything less freedom under Horthy than had the far larger mass of uncompromising Clericals of 1948 under Rákosi. Under Horthy there was no possibility of a Communist newspaper, and the Socialist *Népszava* had to be more cautious than the Catholic weekly news-sheet, the *Magyar Kurir*, in 1948. On the other hand the Catholics were prevented from starting a daily paper

¹ Upon the coming into force of the present Treaty, all Allied forces shall, within a period of 90 days, be withdrawn from Hungary, subject to the right of the Soviet Union to keep on Hungarian territory such armed forces as it may need for the maintenance of the lines of communication of the Soviet army with the Soviet zone of occupation in Austria.

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(the Communists asking 'Is this what a Church is for?'), and the other oppositional parties published newspapers of a miserable servility.¹

Where the Nazis had punished a political opponent with physical torture for years in the concentration camps they invented for the purpose, the Hungarian authorities in 1948 would deprive him of his bread card (if he belonged to the rationed bread category) and of the possibility of employment or relief. Let him save himself if he could; there were sometimes ways and means. There seems to have been only one concentration camp in Hungary, a forced labour rather than torture camp, where the most Nazi members of the former German minority were confined, together with black marketeers among whom a number of the richer peasants were included. A rough estimate² of the number of persons in prison in the summer of 1948 was 10,000, a figure which included all common criminals as well as the politically incriminated. Political trials had not been wanting in the inter-war Hungary; in 1948 there was a series of disagreeable prosecutions of supposed saboteurs, including a large number of Ministry of Agriculture personnel which was certainly hostile to the policy of the Government. Some of the indictments, on the other hand, were foolishly weak, but while unconvincing confessions were produced by the political police,³ the accused frequently disowned them in court and it was accepted that they should do so. The arrest of Ruedemann and his associates for sabotage may not have lacked a certain justification⁴ and was also necessary in order to bring Transdanubian oil into State control.

In July 1948 President Tildy resigned. This was misinterpreted abroad in every possible way. In fact the official story was true. It had long been notorious that a relative of the President's indulged in illicit transactions, and Tildy's resignation was merely overdue. He was succeeded as President of the Republic by the pro-Communist Socialist, Szakasits. The choice of Szakasits could not conceal the ugly story of Communist-Socialist relations. In June the remains

¹ This was to avoid confiscation. There was no pre-censorship, beyond that of the printers who sometimes refused to print what they considered 'reactionary.'

² By a private, anything-but-Communist, lawyer, in whom I felt confidence.

³ The headquarters of the political police at Andrassy út 60 was spoken of as a torture-house by the Government's enemies, but there was no comparison with what had gone on in Nazi Germany; in fact political prisoners were treated very much as they would have been in Hungary between the wars.

⁴ See p. 109 above.

of the Socialist Party were finally merged with the Communists in the Hungarian Workers' Party,¹ but most of its leaders had been sent to political coventry; their influence in the trade unions was stifled. The pattern of the planned disintegration of the Socialists was by now all too familiar in many other countries. Perhaps it should not be forgotten that in Hungary the compromise which the Social Democrats had made with Count Bethlen, for good enough reasons at the time, had nevertheless soiled their political reputation and left them in a weak position when the revolution came. In any case, as was judiciously pointed out in an article in *The Times* on 5 June 1947, the Socialist leaders were nonentities by comparison with their Communist colleagues.

It was an essential feature of the Hungarian situation in 1948 that the chief Communist leaders commanded respect on account of their probity, their industry, and their achievements. Bitter opponents, provided they had not lost all sense of reality, were ready to express a certain admiration for the Ministers Rákosi, Gerő, Vas, and even for the Communist publicity chief, Joseph Révai. (Only frivolous critics compared them with Kun.) Yet if the Communist chiefs were respected, they were none the less hated for that. And since nearly all these men were Jews, traditional anti-Semitism, fanned from the right, glowed red-hot. This made the Hungarian Communists particularly dependent upon Russian power, symbolized by the new monuments, both in Buda and Pest, and indeed all over the country, to the Russian soldiers who had fallen in Hungary. (A monument to the Tsar's troops in 1849 would have been equally welcome.) The Communist leaders were aware of their isolation. On 2 September 1948 admission to the Party was suspended for six months, a 'purge' and 'self-criticism' inaugurated, and a 'political-education' drive launched in tedious 'Marxist-Leninist' jargon. Occasionally one met humane and intelligent people who were duly repelled by this propaganda and who had everything to lose from Communism, who yet dreaded the day when no Russian soldier should be left. There had been so much talk of prowling lions and sons of darkness that they feared a White Terror and pogrom on a greater scale than in 1919. And after that there was no programme but that all the reforms were to be undone and the Habsburgs brought back—no conception seemed to be left between the two extremes. If that were so those who

¹This, too, had happened before in Hungarian history, for a Socialist Communist fusion had taken place in March 1919.

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stopped to reflect sometimes asked themselves whether the immense revolutionary upheaval which had at last begun might not be inevitable, even if it were ugly and terrible.

The irresistible influence of the great Powers on the small is another unpalatable but inevitable fact which becomes more evident as the number of the great Powers declines. Here one advantage for the small eastern European States has emerged since 1945. Where Nazi Germany had an interest in preventing their industrialization, the U.S.S.R. is interested in bringing it about.

CHAPTER FIVE

POLAND

BY BRIAN IRELAND

POLAND today has an area of 310,000 square kilometres and a population of some 24 million.¹ Before the war she had an area of 390,000 square kilometres and a population of some 35 million. Then her inhabitants were Poles, Ukrainians, White Russians, Balts, and Germans; three million were Jewish, more than twenty million Roman Catholic, three million Greek Catholic, and nearly four million Orthodox. Now her population is almost homogeneously Roman Catholic and Polish. More drastically perhaps than in any other European country, the war wrought changes that have radically altered the face of Poland as well as her whole political, social, and economic structure, and have made it possible to speak in the fullest sense of a 'new Poland'.

Her war losses were tremendous. More than six million of her people lost their lives, including most of the Jews. Warsaw itself was three-quarters destroyed. Material damage caused by war operations, by the German occupation policy, and by the ruthless destruction inflicted by the Germans in retreat, was on a scale that brought life in many fields to a standstill. Of her pre-war territory, Poland lost about one-third (181,000 square kilometres) in the east to the Soviet Union; and she gained about 101,000 square kilometres from Germany in the west. But the net loss of one-fifth of her area, which has had the effect of shifting her frontiers westwards, has brought important compensating gains. In the west Poland now has a 500-kilometre coast-line, with the ports of Danzig and Stettin (Szczecin); and the acquisition of the highly developed industrial centres of Lower Silesia, which have greatly increased her potential resources of coal (by 66 per cent), of zinc and lead ore (by 100 per cent), and of electric power (by between 30 and 50 per cent), besides giving her a number of important finishing industries, offsets the loss in the east of

¹ The census of February 1946 gave 23,930,000; but mass migrations into and out of Poland were going on at the time and have continued since. There were said to be between 60,000 and 70,000 Jews in Poland in 1946. The population figure of 34,775,698 in January 1939 was an estimate of the Polish Statistical Office.

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valuable forests, of most of her oil and natural gas, and of the potassium salts which before the war were enough for her domestic needs. Moreover much of the land ceded to Russia was marsh or forest; much, too, was poor and densely populated, and thus difficult to develop; whereas the 6 million hectares acquired in the west consisted of well cultivated land from which Germany drew a food surplus. Thus although the cultivable area of Poland is about 14 per cent smaller than before the war, its productive capacity remains the same; and the agricultural population is now about 15 million, against 20 million before the war, of whom one-fifth were regarded as surplus.

These frontier changes, following a complete breakdown of the old political and social system, have thus made possible a sounder balance between industry and agriculture, and have opened the way to a solution of the basic problem of eastern Europe—stagnation of industry and pressure on the land. It is the overriding aim of the administration to solve this problem, and thus raise the standard of living, by completely integrating the new western territories into the Polish economy; and since the liberation all policies, foreign and domestic, political and economic, have ultimately been directed to that aim. On this, of course, one other factor has a fundamental bearing: the change in the power relationship of Poland's immediate neighbours, Germany and the Soviet Union. The implications of this are obvious, if not always palatable to Polish minds; and a sound Polish policy must always take them into account.

THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER

The partition of Poland in 1940 left her prostrate. Her pre-war leaders fled and were discredited. The Soviet Union's policy of deporting millions of Poles caused a serious rift between Moscow and those Polish leaders who set up an exile Government in London. The breach which, after 1941, General Sikorski worked hard to narrow was widened irrevocably in April 1943, when the Soviet Union broke off relations with the London Government. The ostensible reason was that Government's request for an investigation by the International Red Cross into the German allegations about the mass grave of Polish officers discovered in Katyn forest. After General Sikorski's death in the summer of 1943, Mr Mikolajczyk, the Peasant Party leader, became head of the London Government, which remained on good terms with

Britain and the United States and continued to work on the assumptions underlying the agreement signed in 1941 with the Czechoslovak Government in exile, by which a closer political and economic association of Poland and Czechoslovakia was to become 'the basis of a new order in central Europe and a guarantee of its stability'.

As the course of events, in particular the advances of the Soviet army, made this picture of post-war Europe more and more illusory, a rival Polish leadership was being fostered in Moscow. A month before the Katyn incident, the League of Polish Patriots, which had for more than a year been taking shape under Mme Wanda Wassilewska, proclaimed its existence and began recruiting Polish legions under Colonel Berling.¹ These were to be the core of the new Polish army which entered Poland with the Soviet forces and, merging with the underground People's Army under General Rola-Zimierski, took part in the liberation. Members of the League of Polish Patriots joined with a Polish National Council that was set up in Moscow under the Communist, Mr Boleslaw Bierut, and on 21 July 1944 the Council formed an executive Committee of National Liberation with a Socialist, Mr Eduard Osóbka-Morawski, as Chairman. On 22 July the Council issued its manifesto, announcing to 'Poles at home, abroad, and in German captivity' that

The hour of liberation has struck. The Polish Army together with the Red Army has crossed the River Bug.² The Polish soldier fights on our native soil . . . The National Council, called into being by the fighting nation, is the only legal source of sovereignty in Poland . . .

Whereas the London Government and its representatives in Poland were described as an 'illegal, self-styled body based on the illegal Fascist Constitution of 1935', the National

¹ Colonel Berling had refused to join General Anders when the latter took the Polish units formed in Russia to the Middle East, and subsequently to Italy. The decision to bring these units out of the Soviet Union was due to the difficulties put in the way of their direct participation by the Soviet authorities.

² Cf. General Rola-Zymierski's order of the day of 16 April 1945, in which he said that the Polish First Army, by forcing the Oder, and the Second Army, by crossing the Neisse, had 'crossed the western frontier of Poland and entered German territory'. When on 4 January 1944 the Red Army had crossed the 1939 frontier of Poland, the Polish Government in London, in a Declaration to the United Nations, put the fact on record and reaffirmed the legal continuity of the Polish State as represented by its leaders in London and its delegate to the underground inside Poland. This was reinforced by a broadcast on 5 January by Mr Mikolajczyk, then Prime Minister, who explained the delegate's functions and urged the Poles to obey his orders. On 11 January the Soviet Union replied, accusing the London Government of making 'an incorrect assertion about the Soviet-Polish frontier' and refuting its claim to authority in favour of the claims of the Union of Polish Patriots in the Soviet Union.

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Council and its executive claimed to be acting on the Constitution of 1921—'the only Polish Constitution legally passed and valid'.

The manifesto went on to call upon all Poles to fight 'for the freedom of Poland', and to 'regain Pomerania, Opole Silesia, and East Prussia, and the frontier along the Oder'. Administrative bodies set up or maintained by the Germans were to be replaced by councils of 'Polish patriots, regardless of their political views, who enjoy the confidence of the population'. The Committee of National Liberation promised to restore democratic freedoms and equal rights without regard to race, religion, or nationality; to distribute land to the landless; and to 'raise the standard of living of the masses'. Poland's frontiers were to be open to all who wished to return except 'Hitler's agents and those who betrayed her in 1939'.

When Lublin was freed on 25 July 1944 the Committee and the National Council moved there, and on the following day the Committee signed with the Soviet Government an agreement to regulate the relationship between the Soviet Army Commander and the new Polish administration.

Thus the 'Lublin Administration', as it came to be known, was in a commanding position, with its troops on Polish soil, when at the beginning of August 1944 Mr Mikolajczyk arrived in Moscow with Mr Romer, his Foreign Minister, and Professor Grabski, to negotiate on behalf of the London Government, whose troops under General Sosnkowski were fighting no less effectively but far from Poland's frontiers, in the west and in Italy.

The London Government had been in close touch with its supporters in the Polish underground since its formation, by leaders of the Peasant, Socialist, National, and Christian Labour Parties, after the fall of Warsaw in 1939. Most of these leaders lost their lives in the struggle against German oppression; yet it was their inspiration and example that kept alive the spirit of Poland in the face of the German determination to destroy it, and that made it possible to claim by 1944 that 'in the Polish underground there exists a complete Polish State, fully organized at all the levels of State administration—political, military, social, and economic'.¹ What fatally weakened the foundations thus courageously laid was the inability to come to terms with the rival resistance movement organized by Communists, whom the Russians had begun to

¹ Mr Mikolajczyk in his broadcast of 5 January 1944.

drop into Poland by parachute in 1941. In December of that year General Sikorski had tried to reach a working agreement with Moscow, but it came to nothing. At the root of the conflict lay the Soviet Union's refusal to resume relations with the London Government except on its own terms—which included acceptance of the new eastern frontier of Poland—and the London Government's justifiable suspicion that an agreement—to which the western Allies might be expected to give their approval—would in practice deprive them of the authority they claimed over Polish territory as it became liberated. Mr Mikolajczyk expressed this clearly in a Note addressed to Mr Churchill on 16 November 1943.¹ In this he went so far as to say

The entry of Soviet troops on Polish territory without previous resumption of Polish-Soviet relations would force the Polish Government to undertake political action against the violation of Polish sovereignty while the Polish local administration and army in Poland would have to continue to work underground. In that case the Polish Government foresees the use of measures of self-defence wherever such measures are rendered indispensable by Soviet methods of terror and extermination of Polish citizens.

In the event, however, an agreement was reached that the underground forces should reveal themselves as the Soviet troops entered their areas. The Russians promptly arrested many who did so, and the prospect of smooth collaboration was anything but hopeful when on 29 July Warsaw heard the guns of the Red Army and Soviet troops reached Praga, the suburb on the east bank of the Vistula. In the plan for the general rising known as 'Tempest', the London Government had left the decision to give the executive order to the individual commanders of the home army—in Warsaw to General Bór-Komorowski, who claimed to dispose of some 40,000 men, of whom about half were armed. For reasons not entirely clear he judged it opportune to give the order on 1 August.² The people of Warsaw rose, but after a brief success the home army found itself faced by five German divisions, which were quickly reinforced. The Russians apparently were unable to

¹ Quoted in *The Pattern of Soviet Domination* (London, Low & Marston, 1948) pp. 300-303.

² On 29 July the Moscow-controlled *Kosciuszko radio* broadcast in Polish a call to arms in these general terms: ' . . . The Polish Army now entering Polish territory, trained in the Soviet Union, is now joined to the People's Army to form the nucleus of the Polish Armed Forces, the armed arm of our nation in its struggle for independence. Its ranks will be joined tomorrow by the sons of Warsaw . . . Poles, to arms! There is not a moment to lose!'

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resume their advance from Praga, or even to give effective air support; not till September did they drop food and arms. An attempt by Colonel Berling's Kosciuszko Division to break into Warsaw was defeated, and the Royal Air Force, flying from bases in Italy because no nearer ones were made available to it, had for a time to suspend its efforts to help in the face of heavy German resistance. By 2 October, when General Bór-Komorowski surrendered, the bulk of the home army had been destroyed.

Mr Mikolajczyk arrived in Moscow on the eve of the Warsaw rising. His main objective, for which he had strong moral support from Britain and the United States, was to broaden the political basis of the Lublin administration by including other Polish leaders from inside Poland as well as from London. In this he was hampered by the intransigence of some of his London colleagues. The attitude of General Sosnkowski was especially embarrassing, but even his replacement as Commander-in-Chief by General Bór-Komorowski after the Warsaw rising did not satisfy Lublin or Moscow, whose essential terms were still acceptance of the new eastern frontier and repudiation of the 1935 constitution, on which the London Government based its legitimacy. Although Mr Mikolajczyk, under strong pressure from Britain, went some way towards a compromise,¹ these questions remained the chief stumbling blocks in October, when further discussions were held in Moscow between the Committee of National Liberation, Marshal Stalin, and Mr Churchill, and between Mr Bierut and Mr Mikolajczyk. On his return to London Mr Mikolajczyk resigned the premiership on 24 November, and he was not in the new Government formed on 30 November by the Socialist, Mr Arciszewski.

While Mr Arciszewski continued to repudiate in the name of his Government all decisions on Poland taken by the three Powers, the Polish Committee of National Liberation transformed itself by decree on 31 December into a Provisional Government. It was recognized by the Soviet Government on 4 January 1945, and 1 February it moved to Warsaw, which had been freed a fortnight earlier.

¹ The London Government set out a post-war plan for Poland on 30 August 1944 in which it promised a 'new democratic constitution' and other social and political reforms. The plan assumed the annexation by Poland of German territory in the west, and of the east said only that 'the main centres of Polish cultural life and the sources of raw materials indispensable to the economic life of the country shall remain within Polish boundaries'. Mr Mikolajczyk at his most conciliatory stood by the retention of the old Lithuanian capital, Vilna, and of Lvov, in whose neighbourhood are valuable oil and potash deposits.

CENTRAL AND SOUTH EAST EUROPE

The decision to restore Warsaw as the capital of Poland was of great psychological importance. The Provisional Government, thus ensconced in the seat of power, felt itself confirmed in authority by the decisions of the Yalta conference, which were announced on 12 February. The three Powers agreed that the Provisional Government 'which is now functioning in Poland should be reorganized on a broader basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad'. This was the limit of deference paid to the Government in London. Nevertheless, the Yalta decisions reflected the strong feeling of the Western Powers that the non-Communist members of the Provisional Government were in fact only nominal representatives of the parties they went under, and that Communist influence was working unduly to the advantage of the Soviet Union and to the exclusion of other trends of Polish political opinion. The Provisional Government was a coalition of four parties: the (Communist) Workers' Party, the Socialist, Democratic, and Peasant parties. The distribution of seats altered slightly during the early part of 1945, but by June the Communists held six seats (including Public Security, Industry, Food and Trade, and Education), the Socialists five (including the premiership), the Peasant Party four (including Agriculture and Land Reform), and the Democratic Party three (including the Foreign Ministry).¹ By the Crimea decisions the Government was now to pledge itself to hold 'free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot'; the Powers would then establish diplomatic relations. The Powers considered that Poland's eastern frontier should follow the Curzon Line (with minor degressions in Poland's favour), and recognized that Poland 'must receive substantial accessions of territory in the north and west'. On the extent of these the Provisional Government's views should be sought, and the final delimitation should thereafter await the Peace Conference.

In June the Commission of Three set up at the Yalta Conference, consisting of Mr Molotov and the British and United States Ambassadors to Moscow, brought together for talks in Moscow the heads of the Provisional Government; Mr Kiernik (acting for Mr Witos, the peasant leader, who was too ill to attend) and two other representatives of Poles in Poland; and Messrs Mikolajczyk, Kolodziej, and Stanczyk on behalf of

¹ Where a Minister was not a Communist, his deputy, or Under-Secretary, usually was.

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the Poles in London.¹ It became clear at once that the members of the Commission differed in their interpretations of Yalta. The Russians wanted no fundamental changes in the Provisional Government, and were moreover keen to get it represented in its existing form at the San Francisco Conference. The western Powers wanted to see a more broadly representative Government taking Poland's part at San Francisco. The agreement² finally reached was to modify the Provisional Government by inviting Mr Witos from Poland and Professor Grabski from London to join the praesidium of the National Council; by including in the Government Mr Kiernik and Mr Wycech from Poland, and Mr Mikolajczyk and Mr Thugutt from London; and by inviting the co-operation of other Polish leaders from abroad.³ The Peasant Party was to have one-third of the seats on the National Council and one-third of the seats in the Government.

The letter rather than the spirit (as Mr Mikolajczyk interpreted it) of this last condition was met in the new 'Government of National Unity' that was formed on 28 June and received the formal recognition of Britain and the United States early in July. Of the twenty-one Government posts seven indeed were given to Peasant Party members. But Mr Mikolajczyk himself held two, as deputy Premier and Minister of Agriculture, and of the other five two were held by members of the Government-sponsored Peasant Party.⁴ Fourteen of the twenty-one ministries were in fact held by men of Lublin. Mr Osóbka-Morawski remained Prime Minister, and the Communists (retaining their key positions)

¹ It was while the Commission was sitting that Colonel Okulicki and fifteen other leaders of the underground were brought to trial in Moscow for 'diversionary activities' and sentenced to various terms of imprisonment. They had been offered safe conduct to Moscow to discuss the future of Poland, and had been arrested while on their way there in March. Colonel Okulicki (who had succeeded General Bór-Komorowski as Commander of the home army) received ten years; Mr Jan Jankowski, deputy Prime Minister of the underground Government, and Mr Kazimierz Puzak, Speaker of the underground Parliament, each received eighteen months. Mr Kazimierz Baginski received one year. Of those who received shorter sentences all but one (who escaped) were re-arrested on reaching Poland after their release. Cf. p. 158, note 1.

² It was reached too late to allow Poland to attend the San Francisco Conference, but as she had been an original signatory of the United Nations Declaration she was left for her name on the Charter, and she signed it on 19 October 1945.

³ Mr Popiel was one of those who accepted. His Catholic Labour Party was later to come under a ban, and in September 1946 he resigned from the National Council, leaving his party to the more accommodating leadership of Dr Widywinski.

⁴ Mr Mikolajczyk's followers were Mr Kiernik, Mr Wycech (Education), and Mr Thugutt (Posts and Telegraphs).

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and Socialists (among them Mr Stanczyk) held six ministries each. The Democratic Party held two.

At Potsdam on 2 August the Powers 'took note with pleasure' of the new Government, and Britain and the United States withdrew recognition from the London Government, 'which no longer exists'. The Potsdam declaration also reminded the Polish Government of its Yalta election pledges, and said the Powers agreed that

pending the final determination of Poland's western frontier, the former German territories east of a line running from the Baltic Sea immediately west of Swinemuende, and thence along the Oder river to the confluence of the western Neisse river and along the western Neisse to the Czechoslovak frontier, including that portion of East Prussia not placed under the administration of the U.S.S.R. in accordance with the understanding reached at this conference and including the area of the former free city of Danzig, shall be under the administration of the Polish State and for such purposes should not be considered as part of the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany.

The effect of this was to deepen the division between those Poles abroad who accepted, and those who were irreconcilable to, the new order of things in Poland. General Anders warned his troops in Italy that if they went home they would be sent to Siberia; but many Polish leaders returned home. On 10 August the Polish Government passed the Amnesty Act, under which many who had been carrying on violent underground resistance in Poland surrendered. On 16 August agreements were signed with the Soviet Union finally regulating the new eastern frontier and, in accordance with Potsdam, Poland's share of German property and reparations.

The amnesty lessened the tension in Poland for a time, but within the Government things did not go smoothly. Mr Mikolajczyk maintained that he had entered the Government expressly to see that free elections were held.¹ He also believed that if the elections were free he would win overwhelming support. The possible repercussions of such a victory, both in Poland and abroad, seem not to have troubled his confidence in his power to manage things in his own way, and he saw the main threat to his power in the authority exercised virtually without check by Mr Radkiewicz, the Communist Minister of Security, and in the attempts of the Government-sponsored wing of the Peasant Party to lessen the influence he claimed to have over the peasant voters. His followers, including Mr

¹ Statement to foreign press correspondents, 3 May 1946.

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Witos¹ and Mr Kiernik, met in congress at Cracow on 4 September and decided against merging with the Government-sponsored Peasant Party. To distinguish themselves they adopted the name of 'Polish Peasant Party'. The praesidium of the National Council accepted the 'new' party, but when in December Mr Osóbka-Morawski, the Prime Minister, spoke of the need to form a Government bloc for the coming elections, Mr Mikolajczyk demanded that three-quarters of the places on the joint lists should be reserved for Polish Peasant Party candidates. Negotiations broke down, and in March the Prime Minister declared that it was no longer possible to expect 'loyal co-operation' from the Polish Peasant Party—'its leaders have come from London to conduct opposition work, and have communications with the Government's opponents abroad'.

The charge became more specific on 5 June, when the Minister of Public Security, Mr Radkiewicz, announced that four branches of the Polish Peasant Party had been suspended for working with W.I.N. and N.S.Z., the secret war-time organizations of the underground home army. The security police were indeed active against the party throughout April, May, and June—on 28 June Mr Mikolajczyk told the foreign press that 1,200 members had been arrested.

The official reply to Polish Peasant Party complaints of unlawful arrest and seizure of property was that many crimes were being committed by terrorists. Certainly, banditry and other forms of underground resistance were rife again, and in the spring and summer of 1946 Polish armed forces were seriously engaged against the Ukrainian gangs of Benderovci. On 3 May Cracow University was closed and 400 people were arrested on grounds of having demonstrated on behalf of General Anders. Jews were being terrorized ('ritual murder' propaganda had been circulating in 1945) and on 5 July occurred the pogrom in Kielce, a haunt of terrorists, in which thirty-nine Jews were killed and forty wounded. Such activities may or may not have been concerted; what does seem clear is that unscrupulous men were using Mr Mikolajczyk's name and party for subversive ends, and that Mr Mikolajczyk himself was being forced by the logic of his tactics into a more and more negative opposition. The Government saw its advantage, and devised a means of driving it home. This was a popular referendum in which the people would be asked to say 'yes' or 'no' to three questions: Are you in favour of

¹ Mr Witos died on 31 October 1945.

abolishing the Senate? Are you in favour of the economic reforms—nationalization of industry and land reform? Do you want the new western frontier to be made permanent?

A positive answer to these could be taken as a general mandate for the Government's policy. The Polish Peasant Party agreed to the idea, and a special bill was passed on 27 April to make the referendum possible. The following day the Polish Peasant Party, after an acrimonious debate in the National Council, went into open opposition, abstaining from a vote of confidence in the Council on the grounds that the session had been used 'for a campaign of calumny against our party.' On 27 May the party recommended its members to vote 'no' on the first question of the referendum. The decision was odd for a party that was by tradition against the Senate, and it betrayed the weakness of Mr Mikolajczyk's position. It also brought to a head differences within the party leadership, and on 8 June Mr Mikolajczyk expelled five members who declared that they would vote against the Senate and that they also differed from Mr. Mikolajczyk on the fundamental question of the Soviet alliance.¹

Meanwhile all the three great Powers had played their cards. On 10 May the United States had suspended deliveries against credits of \$40 million and \$50 million granted in April, on the grounds that the Polish Government was not keeping its election pledges, especially in regard to freedom of the press (an American correspondent's telegram had failed to reach the United States). On 28 May it was announced that the Soviet Government had agreed to cancel Poland's war-time financial obligations, to equip and arm the Polish army till Poland could make her own arms, and to offer credits from its gold reserves and to increase supplies of scarce goods to Poland. On 28 June, two days before the referendum, the British Foreign Office announced that the financial agreement² signed on 24 June, concerning Poland's war debt and gold in the United Kingdom, would not be ratified until the election pledges were redeemed.

¹ In October 1946 this group, led by Mr Tadeusz Rek, joined with another dissident Peasant group, the Piast, to form the 'Polish Peasant Party New Liberation.'

² By this the military debt of £47,500,000 was to be left in abeyance, and the civilian debt of £32 million (which the Polish Government had wished to repudiate as incurred by the London Government) was to be reduced to £13 million, of which £3 million was to be paid at once out of the £7 million Polish gold reserves and the rest paid in fifteen annual instalments of £666,666, starting in 1950. Britain made £6 million worth of surplus goods available, and the Polish Government was to take over the assets of the former London Government.

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The referendum was held on 30 June and the official result was given on 12 July as follows :

	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>
Senate	7,844,522	3,686,029
Economic reforms	8,896,105	2,634,446
Western frontier	10,534,697	995,854

Terrorists were active during the polling. Mr Mikolajczyk protested against irregularities, and, claiming that the true figures gave his party a majority, asked for the result to be declared invalid.¹ Britain and the United States took up his complaint, and in the sharp exchange of Notes that followed asked to be shown the text of the electoral law. The Polish Government warned Mr Mikolajczyk that he must choose between 'joining the democratic camp and the [terrorist] forest party'. He still preferred, however, not to join the Government bloc, which formally emerged on 1 December, while within it the Communist and Socialist parties had already signed their own 'pact of unity'. The election date was 19 January 1947. The cold war went on, to an accompaniment of Notes from Britain and the United States, until Mr Mikolajczyk reckoned, in a statement to the foreign press, that 104 of his party's candidates had been imprisoned and that 300 out of 700 had been disallowed under Article 2 of the electoral law—that is, on grounds of 'collaborating with the terrorists'. A Government spokesman admitted that Polish Peasant Party candidates had been disallowed in ten out of fifty-two constituencies. Three important Polish Peasant Party members² had earlier been struck off the State list, on which, by the electoral law (passed on 22 September by 306 votes to 40), 72 of the 444 representatives on the new National Council were to be elected. In fact, not only was every sort of material difficulty put in the way of the Polish Peasant Party in getting the signatures needed for their lists of candidates, and in getting the lists themselves to the electoral authorities in time, but a general campaign of intimidation was conducted to confuse and discourage the voter whose sympathies were anti-Communist. The peasants, for example, had to distinguish

¹ The responsible electoral commissioner admitted that some ballot boxes had been taken from the booths for counting elsewhere, but members of the polling commissions escorted them to the new premises where the counting was done ; this was allowed for security reasons by the referendum law.

² Mr Baginski, Mr Mierzwa (the party's deputy secretary), and Mr Zdanowski. The first two were under arrest after serving the sentences passed on them in June 1945. The Government press said their impending trials would implicate Mr Mikolajczyk. In October 1946 Mr Augustynski, editor of the Polish Peasant Party's *Gazeta Ludowa*, had also been arrested, and the Government press said that the impending trials of the three would implicate Mr Mikolajczyk.

between Mr Mikolajczyk's party, the Government-sponsored Peasant Party of the bloc, and the 'New Liberation' group.

The official result of the election gave the following distribution of seats on the National Council : Government bloc (Workers', Socialist, Peasant, and Democratic Parties), 392 ; Polish Peasant Party, 27 ; Labour Party, 15 ; Polish Peasant Party New Liberation, 7 ; Catholic Independence, 3.¹

The British and United States Governments announced their conviction that the election had not been 'free and unfettered', and they were not diplomatically represented at the opening session of the new Diet on 4 February. The Diet elected Mr Bierut President of the Republic, and on 7 February Mr Jozef Cyrankiewicz, the Secretary-General of the Socialist Party, who had entered the Provisional Government without a portfolio in October, became Prime Minister of a coalition in which the Polish Peasant Party was not represented. Mr Mikolajczyk ceased, from now on, to play any effective part in Polish affairs. Already in July 1946 the important land reform and agricultural planning boards had been taken out of his control. He became more and more isolated from the peasants on the one hand and from the conduct of policy on the other. On 26 October 1947 his 'disappearance' was officially reported, and on 3 November he turned up in Britain, to be followed shortly by some of his leading supporters.

On 19 February the Diet passed a Constitutional Act. This temporary, so-called 'Little Constitution', is based on the manifesto of 22 July 1944 and, in theory, on the constitution of 1921. In practice it of course does not pretend to resuscitate a social structure which the war had destroyed. It would be surprising if it did. The new structure of Poland is built essentially on Marxist principles, and the provision, for example, that the administration of justice is left to independent courts must be read in that light. The Diet (Sejm Ustawodawcy) has been made the supreme legislative organ ; it elects the President for seven years by an absolute majority in the presence of two-thirds of the Deputies. The President, whose functions are nominally much the same as under the constitution of 1921, is, with the Government and State Council, the supreme executive. The Diet normally meets in October, and must sit for at least a month. It may not rise until 'a

¹ According to official Polish figures the numbers of electors was 12,701,056. Of 11,413,618 votes cast, 11,244,873 were valid. The voting was : Government bloc, 9,003,682 ; Polish Peasant Party, 1,154,847 ; Labour Party, 530,979 ; Polish Peasant Party New Liberation, 397,754 ; other groups, 157,611.

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resolution is passed on the subject of approving the policy of the Government on the motion of the Supreme Control Chamber'. This Chamber, whose President is elected by the Diet, examines 'the economic activities of the authorities, institutions, and State-owned enterprises', and may be charged by the State Council 'with temporary or continuous control of all or certain institutions, of local Government, unions, or institutions subsidized by the State or carrying out activities within the framework of administration'. The precise organization and functions of the Chamber were left to be defined by separate legislation. The State Council, which consists of the President of the Republic (as Chairman), the Speaker and deputy Speakers of the Diet, and the President of the Supreme Control Chamber (in time of war also the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces), has powers which in effect give it the final say over the actions of all other bodies, though if it proclaims martial law it needs the Diet's confirmation. It corresponds, in fact, to the praesidium of other eastern European countries, and is thus the political instrument of the Politburo, in whose councils Mr Jakob Berman is believed to have an influence far beyond the scope of his nominal post as deputy Minister in the office of the Prime Minister.

On 22 February the Diet passed a Declaration of Rights and Liberties, upholding equality before the law regardless of race, creed, sex, origin, social status, and education; and promising security of person, life and property; freedom of conscience, speech, assembly, association; freedom of the press; inviolability of the home and security of correspondence; the right to work and to leisure, to unemployment and sickness relief, and to education. But the exercise of these rights and freedoms is subject to the overriding (and freely interpreted) provision that their abuse 'to overthrow the democratic form of Government shall be prevented by law'.

RECOVERY AND RECONSTRUCTION

The struggle for political power, which virtually ended with the elections of 1947, affected the structural evolution of Poland scarcely at all. Throughout the turbulent months of 1946 she continued to restore her foreign connexions, political and economic, and to lay the foundations for her recovery at home. By the beginning of 1947 she was well on the way to establishing herself as a factor to be reckoned with in world affairs. When in September 1946 the Diet approved the outlines of a three-year plan to run from 1947 to 1949, the three main bases of

Polish reconstruction had already been laid. These were the currency reform of August 1944, the land reform of September 1944, and the nationalization of key industries in January 1946.

The first task of the Administration in 1944 had been simply to supply the immediate needs of the population. The war and the occupation had reduced Poland's industrial capacity by almost half. The damage to transport of all kinds was paralyzing. Between 400,000 and 500,000 farms were wholly or partly destroyed, and one-third of the rural population was displaced. In 1945 more than 48 per cent of arable land had to be left fallow, and, as yields on the rest were deficient, agricultural output was down to 38 per cent of the pre-war level. The loss of livestock was especially serious: UNRRA estimated that in 1945 about a million farms were without a horse (tractors were not widely used in Poland) and 700,000 without a cow. Food was the first necessity, and, to get the land under cultivation, seeds, fertilizers, implements, horses, and tractors were needed. These and much else besides were provided by UNRRA, whose help in the first instance was freely acknowledged to stand between Poland and destitution. By 1947 UNRRA's supplies to Poland amounted in all to some \$500 million.

The Germans had deliberately fostered the inflation of their occupation zloty. The new zloty (at 406 to the £) was introduced with a series of measures to prevent a new inflation in a time of scarcity and also to provide the State with capital for reconstruction.¹ The land reform was intended to break up the big estates and to help the resettlement of the new western territories. Farms of less than two hectares occupied a quarter of all farm land before the war. These were to be increased to not less than five hectares. Farms of more than 50 hectares (100 hectares in Pomerania and Poznan) were taken over with stock and assets; their previous owners were allowed to apply for holdings in other districts or to claim a monthly allowance. Between 1944 and 1947, according to official Polish figures, 3,111,745 hectares of land were redistributed, of which 980,560 hectares of forest were taken over by the State. Of the remaining 2,131,745 hectares, more than half (1,155,397 hectares) was divided among nearly 400,000 families, and the rest was kept for agricultural schools,

¹ Every person over 18 was allowed to exchange 500 zloty at the new rate; deposits were blocked. Corporate bodies were allowed to exchange larger amounts, which were fixed in each case by an exchange commission. The new National Bank had issued 60 milliard zloty by the end of 1946. In March 1948 the note issue was 89,700,000 zloty.

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research stations, and other purposes. In the western territories many big farms were not divided for lack of livestock and buildings, and some of these were kept permanently as co-operatives or State farms. The distribution of produce was mainly in the hands of the co-operatives, which also supplied farmers with seed, implements, and consumer goods. A Peasants' Mutual Aid organization was formed by the State to supplement, and eventually to absorb the old autonomous co-operative central organization, S.P.O.L.E.M.

By the nationalization Act the State took over the key sectors of industry and all enterprises, including former German and Danzig Free City firms, which employed more than fifty workers a shift. Certain manufacturing industries, especially food industries, were turned into co-operatives, and there was a sector left to private enterprise. This was under State 'guidance', and, by a special bill, received financial aid from the State and encouragement to set up new businesses. The State took a hand in the wholesale trade, but most of the retail trade was left in private hands.

In order to maintain full employment, labour was not always rationally employed. There was a serious shortage of skilled labour. The regulation of wages was left to the trade unions and Government representatives, but the rise in wages did not keep pace with the rise in the cost of living. Thus between 1946 and 1947 nominal wages doubled, but real wages increased by only 29 per cent; and in March 1947 the index of real wages was still only 51.2 per cent of the 1938 level.¹ Wages, moreover, were at first paid largely in kind. In January 1946 less than half the wage was being paid in cash, and often the workers were paid only in bread. The Government was constantly striving to improve matters, and it is to the great credit of the Polish workers that on the whole they accepted these hardships and achieved so much in spite of them.²

It was also not possible to institute or administer a complete rationing scheme. The Government took over the distribution of UNRRA and other food supplies from abroad, and collected the farmers' produce. What the farmers had left they could sell on the free market. But as prices rose, more and more food escaped on to the market, and in the autumn of 1945 the

¹ By December 1948 real wages were said to be 10 per cent above the 1938 level.

² There were strikes among textile workers in Lodz who objected to the 'Pstrowski system' (a Polish version of Stakhanovism). The workers were made to give way, and strikes have been made illegal.

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Government set up a supply fund to augment rationed purchases. Thus the Government found itself running two systems, one free and one compulsory. The compulsory collection began to affect agricultural production adversely, and in July 1946 it was abolished. Production was encouraged by tax reliefs to farmers and by an 'Industry for Agriculture' scheme, by which equal amounts of industrial goods had to be sent to the country in return for agricultural goods. The severe winter of 1946-7, which closed the Baltic ports and held up inland transport, caused the Government to reimpose compulsory deliveries, but at free market prices, of grain stocks that were being hoarded by private mills and traders. These stocks were distributed at subsidized controlled prices, and 100,000 special ration cards were issued to self-supplying peasants who had used up their stocks. Milling restrictions and meatless days were imposed, as well as a ban on the use of wheat, rye, and fats for industrial purposes.

The partial rationing system in 1946 covered 10 million of the population, divided into three main categories, two categories of dependants of persons in the first three, and two supplementary categories for children (2,283,500 under 12 who were otherwise ration-card holders) and for pregnant women and nursing mothers. The categories were ordered according to the 'economic and social value' of the persons concerned, the highest, for example, containing 3,293,500 ration-card holders who were State and municipal servants, workers in nationalized industries and certain branches of private industry, students, writers, artists, journalists, clergy, social workers, adult invalids in hospital, and near relatives of men in the forces. The theoretical ration of this category was 1,988 calories a day (with additions for heavy workers); but owing to the irregularity of supplies the ration could never be fully met, and the amounts were altered from month to month. The system was gradually abolished by excluding workers as their wages reached a certain level.

By such improvisations the Government prepared the ground for a comprehensively planned economy. Up to the beginning of 1947 planning was necessarily partial and sporadic. A decree of April 1945 got coal production going. There were separate plans for restoring the ports and inland transport; for a sowing and harvesting campaign; and for the resettlement of the western territories. But State investment was virtually limited to monthly or quarterly allocations of money and such raw materials as could be got from abroad until April 1946.

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when a special budget was introduced for the last nine months of the year. This provided for a gross investment of 23 per cent of the national income (compared with a rate of 13.2 per cent of a national income twice as large in 1938). The emphasis was on productive goods and services: of a total sum of 40 milliard pre-war zloty (which included 13,400 million of foreign credits), transport and communications received 40 per cent; industry and mining 30 per cent; agriculture 13.2 per cent; and the rest had to cover building, education, health, social welfare, and so on. According to official figures this investment plan was completed to 91 per cent, but the resulting output was only three-quarters of what had been expected. The achievement in basic reconstruction was, however, enough to allow a considerable shift of emphasis in the investment plan for 1947, which came within the three-year-plan, and which gave 38.5 per cent of the total investment to industry and mining and 24.4 per cent to transport.

The aim of the three-year plan (a preliminary to the six-year plan due to begin in 1950) was, as Mr Minc, the Minister of Industry responsible for it, said in the debate of the National Council in September 1946, 'to raise the standard of living of the working people above the pre-war level.' It was intended in the first place as a plan of reconstruction, but it also included in the words of Mr Minc, 'several factors that open the way to future plans for extending the Polish economy'. Although it envisaged the building of a few new productive enterprises, including a power station, and electrical network, two steel furnaces, and a big chemical plant, it was mainly concerned with restoring existing plants to full capacity. It was to concentrate on 'the development of those branches of industry which, though not directly satisfying the needs of the consumer, will make possible the most rapid development of consumer-goods production'.¹ The production of coal in particular, as Poland's most exportable asset, was to be increased 'to the limit of technical possibilities'.

The average level of consumption per head of the population was to reach the 1938 level by 1948 and to exceed it, except for agricultural goods, by 1949. The average level of production per head was by 1949 to exceed the 1938 level in agriculture by 10 per cent; in industrial consumer goods by 25 per cent, and in productive goods by 150. Since, however, in the plan the basis 1938=100 referred to production within the pre-war frontiers, the practical effect was to bring industrial

¹ *Polish National Economic Plan*, English version published in Warsaw, 1946.

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production up to the 1938 level. The production of coal, however, was to be 20 per cent above the pre-war level within the present frontiers. Similarly, the intention to raise the national income by 1949 to 234 per cent of the 1946 level (which was only 49·8 per cent of the 1938 level) meant a rise of 16 per cent above the 1938 level within the old frontiers.

Investments of 10 milliard (thousand million) pre-war zloty over the four years (1946-9) were to be at the rate of 20 per cent of the national income, but reaching a peak of 22 per cent in 1947 and falling to 19·3 per cent in 1949. One-fifth of the total, representing some \$400 million, would, it was hoped, come from foreign credits. Nothing, however, was built upon hopes that have not, in the event, been fulfilled, though the Soviet-Polish agreement of January 1948 did later provide for a loan to Poland of \$450 million worth of capital goods, one-third to be used for erecting iron and steel plant.

The planners, in calculating the man-power needed and available for each industry, counted on an increase in the total labour force from 12,821,000 in 1946 to 13,245,000 in 1949. Within this total, urban employment was to increase in that period from 4,419,000 to 5,210,000. The increase would absorb the natural increase of population and draw off about 400,000 workers from the land, where the number employed had fallen by 1948 from 8,402,000 to about 7,400,000, of whom some 600,000 were working on State or other large farms. This shift from the land to industry is essential to a better-balanced economy in Poland, and was to be regulated by plans to improve general working and living conditions in the towns (where housing was a serious problem), and by the control of wages, at least until 1948, to prevent inflation.¹

In industry the targets were interrelated and adjusted, as the plan progressed, to the actual output of coal. In agriculture the aim was to make Poland self-sufficient by 1947, and by 1949 to have a surplus of all main products except beef and milk, where a deficit of 3,300,000 litres in 1945 was to be reduced to one of 1,840,000 litres. Allowing for the change of frontiers and the smaller population, the general level of agricultural production was to reach only 80 per cent of the pre-war level. Wheat and sugar beet output was to be a little higher and potato and rye output a little lower than before the war. The number of horses was to be increased from 1 million

¹ By the end of 1948, according to official figures, the proportion of output was : industry 64 per cent, agriculture 36 per cent, compared with 45·5 per cent and 54·5 per cent respectively.

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in 1946 to 1,600,000 ; that of tractors from 5,500 to 15,000 ; in 1948 there were 14,400 tractors, or one per 1,150 arable hectares. UNRRA experts estimated on the basis of the plan that when Polish agricultural production did eventually reach the pre-war level, 'even allowing for a further increase in domestic consumption by, say, 15 per cent, home consumption would absorb only about 80 per cent of this. Exports could then reach a level of 20 per cent of pre-war agricultural output, or about three times the pre-war level, in value some \$300 million'.¹ In other words, the further industrialization of Poland and a better diet for the Polish worker and peasant need not in themselves mean less food available for western Europe.

The table on page 150 shows the planned and actual output, according to official Polish sources, of some of the main industrial products. Except where otherwise stated, the planned figures (after 1946) represent the adjustment of the 1946 plan in the light of progress up to 1947.

The following are official figures of chief agricultural products according to the adjusted plan and actual output in 1947, and the adjusted plan for 1948 and 1949.

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS
PLANNED AND ACTUAL OUTPUT

	1947		1948		1949	
	<i>plan</i>	<i>actual</i>	<i>plan</i>	<i>plan</i>	<i>plan</i>	
Wheat*	1.0	0.8	1.2	1.6	mill. met. tons	
Rye*	3.9	3.3	4.8	5.5	mill. met. tons	
Potatoes	23.0	24.6	27.8	?	mill. met. tons	
Milk	3.9	4.0	4.8	5.4	milliard litres	
Beef	63.7	70.7	77.0	81.0	thousand met. tons	
Pig meat	381.6	338.4	380.0	685.0	thousand met. tons	

* Including seed, feeding, and losses.

An essential part of the plan was the unification of the western territories, without which, as Mr Minc said, there could be no economic reconstruction of Poland. 'Within the framework of our plan,' he added, 'we shall reply to those who question the allegiance of the western territories to the Polish State, by an increased flow of man-power, coal, capital, and investment goods to the western territories that will integrate them with the old Polish lands into one economic power'. By October 1948 the population of the western territories was about 5,500,000 (against 8-9 million before the war). About 2 million Germans had been expelled, and some 1,020,000 of the original, mostly Polish, inhabitants remained. Of the repatriates settled there 1,830,000 came from the lost eastern

¹ UNRRA, Agriculture and Food in Poland (Revised) ; Operational Analysis Papers No. 30 (London, UNRRA European Regional Office, 1947).

INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS: PLANNED AND ACTUAL OUTPUT

	1938 <i>actual</i>	1946		1947		1948		1949	
		<i>plan</i>	<i>actual</i>	<i>plan</i>	<i>actual</i>	<i>plan</i>	<i>actual</i>	<i>plan, revised</i> 1947	<i>plan, original</i> 1946
Coal (mill. met. tons)									
old territories	38.1								
new territories	28.4								
Electric power (billion kw.)*	66.5	46	47.3	57.5	59.1	67.5	70.3	77.5	80
Pig iron (mill. met. tons)	3.9	5.3	5.7	6.8	6.6	7.5	33.4	8.4	8.0
old territories	0.88								
new territories	0.42								
Raw steel (mill. met. tons)	1.30	0.65	0.73	0.99	0.87	1.08	0.55	1.30	1.30
old territories	1.4								
new territories	0.5								
Rolled goods (mill. met. tons)	1.9	1.1	1.2	?	1.6	2.9	1.9	?	2
old territories	1.3								
new territories	0.37	0.47	0.8	0.79	1.0	1.09	0.93†	1.3	2.0
Woolen textiles (mill. metres)	40	20	21.7	32	32.5	40	20.7†	60	60
Cotton textiles (mill. metres)	400	206.5	205.7	270	257.3	315	160†	400	400
Sugar (thou. met. tons)	491	287	383	442	497	520	?	600	600

* Total production.

† Figures for January-June.

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territories, and 110,000 from western Europe and Britain. Some 2,507,000 settlers were, according to Polish figures, transferred from overpopulated districts in Poland itself.¹ The resettlement and repatriation were continued during 1948.

By July 1948, when a Regained Territories Exhibition was opened in Wroclaw by President Bierut, the western territories were officially said to be producing half of Poland's exports. The periodical *Robotniczy Przegląd Gospodarczy*² gave the following figures to show the western territories' share of Poland's total production :

WESTERN TERRITORIES
PROPORTION OF POLAND'S TOTAL PRODUCTION
(percentages)

	1947 <i>actual</i>	1949 <i>planned</i>
Coal	37	40
Electric power	37	38
Metal and engineering industry	25	28
Textiles	13	17
Chemical industry	19	23
Timber industry	43	49
Sugar industry	20	38

The three-year plan required a considerable expansion of exports, of which coal at first formed more than two-thirds. Dr Oscar Lange told the United Nations Economic Committee on 11 October 1948 that, while the amount of coal exported had been steadily rising, the proportion of coal to all exports had fallen from 68 per cent in 1946 to 63 per cent in 1947 ; in 1948 it would be only half of the total value of exports. On the other hand food imports, which had represented nearly half the total value of imports in 1946, were only 28 per cent of the total value in 1947. Owing to the great need for capital goods the plan assumed an adverse balance of trade throughout the period of operation. The following table, based on official Polish sources, shows the projected and actual figures of Poland's foreign trade :

FOREIGN TRADE

(million \$ U.S.)

	1946		1947		1948*		1949
	<i>actual</i>	<i>plan</i>	<i>actual</i>	<i>plan</i>	<i>actual</i> (Jan-June)	<i>plan</i>	
Exports	126	298	247	400	220	485	
Imports	143	510	317	665	260	775	

* The Economic Commission for Europe (*Economic Survey of Europe, 1948*) gives these figures for Polish foreign trade in 1948 : exports, \$513,000,000 ; imports, \$498,000,080 (f.o.b.).

¹ Figures of the State Repatriation Office, quoted in *Polish Facts and Figures* (published in London by the Press Office of the Polish Embassy), 30 October 1948.

² Quoted in *Polish Facts and Figures*, 21 August 1948.

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Dr Lange said that exports in 1948 were expected to total \$500 million and imports \$530 million, which would imply a drastic cut in the deficit originally projected for 1948 of \$265 million. The following are official Polish figures for coal production and export :

	COAL							
	(million metric tons)							
	1946		1947		1948		1949	
	<i>plan</i>	<i>actual</i>	<i>plan</i>	<i>actual</i>	<i>plan</i>	<i>actual</i>	<i>plan</i>	
Production	46	47·3	60	59·1	67·5	70·3	80	
Export	14	15	20	19	24	25·6	35	

In 1945 the Soviet Union took 5,128,000 tons of Polish coal (of a total output, from May to December, of about 20 million tons). Of this, 3,720,000 tons were repayment for coal lent to Poland before the Silesian mines were freed. The remainder was paid for at \$10 a ton (100 zloty=1 dollar). By the Soviet-Polish Frontier and Reparations Agreement of 16 August 1945 the Soviet Union was to get 8 million tons of coal from Poland in 1946, 13 million tons each year from 1947 to 1950, and thereafter 12 million tons a year so long as Germany was occupied. The 'special price' laid down in the agreement for these amounts—\$1.30 a ton, at a time when the official export price of Polish coal was fixed at \$8 a ton, and some western countries were offering as much as \$12 and more—was explained as a return for the Soviet Union's waiving her rights to the former German mines as 'war booty'. The amount of this 'reparation coal' was halved by agreement in March 1947, and the agreement of January 1948 again fixed Poland's coal export to the Soviet Union at 6,500,000 tons.

Geographical and political factors naturally influenced the direction of Polish trade after the war, and in 1948 the Soviet Union was still Poland's biggest single supplier and customer. But the number of countries with which Poland was trading increased from 22 in 1946 to 37 in 1948, when about 46 per cent of her total trade was being carried out with the Soviet Union and the other eastern countries. The following percentages, from a Polish source,¹ show the distribution of Poland's trade :

	Imports			Exports		
	1936-8	1946	1947	1936-8	1946	1947
U.S.S.R.	1·1	70·3	26·5	0·4	46·8	28·6
Great Britain	12·3	0·7	8·8	19·3	1·9	5·5
U.S.A.*	12·0	1·0	13·0	6·8	0·3	0·3
Germany	19·2	5·2	2·3	19·5	6·0	3·2
Scandinavia	3·6	17·5	24·4	9·6	28·0	29·2

¹ *Polish Facts and Figures*, 15 May 1948.

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	<i>Imports</i>			<i>Exports</i>		
	1936-8	1946	1947	1936-8	1946	1947
S.E. Europe & Czechoslovakia	5.4	4.0	7.1	7.9	6.9	11.4
Western Europe	17.9	4.3	9.7	25.0	9.3	18.8

* Strict controls greatly reduced U.S. exports to eastern Europe during 1948; between the second and third quarters of the year there was a cut of two-thirds in value.

During the first six months of 1948 Czechoslovakia moved up to second place among Poland's trade partners, exporting to her \$24 million worth of goods and importing from her \$20 million worth. The relations between the two countries have become much closer since the agreement of 19 July 1947, by which they set up a Polish-Czechoslovak Council of Economic Co-operation. The aim of this Council, as Mr Minc stated at its first meeting in March 1948, is to 'transform economic co-operation into economic alliance'. A special committee of six reported in August, and on the basis of its reports the Council 'recognized the need for co-ordination of long-term economic plans and of production and investment programmes'. The aim, in fact, is not only to integrate plans on paper but to build and operate plant and utilize resources and supplies of electric power jointly in a way that should carry a solution of such political disputes as that over Teschen, for example, in its stride. A practical start has been made by an agreement to build jointly an electric power station of 150,000 kilowatts near Oswiecim, which should begin to operate by stages between 1950 and 1952. Poland will provide the building and installations, Czechoslovakia the heavy machinery, for which Poland will pay by supplying half the power produced, and afterwards Poland will supply to Czechoslovakia the power equivalent of 300,000 tons of coal a year for twenty years. The Council works through a number of special committees (for industry, trade, finance, agriculture, and so on), some of which deal with scientific and cultural matters. A five-year trade agreement for a turnover of 9-10 million crowns was to be concluded before the end of 1948.

A PEOPLE'S DEMOCRACY

Poland is moving, in the words of President Bierut, 'through people's democracy to Socialism'. During the summer of 1948 the Cominform's dispute with Yugoslavia gave an airing to some of the political and other problems inherent in that progress. In the summer of 1948 Mr Minc explained in the

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Cominform journal, *For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy*,¹ that Poland's economy was still a mixture of Socialist, capitalist, and 'small producer' elements. On the basis of the numbers of people working in the various sectors, he indicated roughly their scope as : Socialist, 24 per cent ; capitalist, 14 per cent ; and small producer, 62 per cent. But these figures, he added, gave no indication of the respective contributions to the national income—still less, of course, did they represent a division into social classes. Finance and transport were almost entirely in State hands ; and the nationalized and co-operative industries accounted for 85 per cent of industrial output and employed three-quarters of the industrial labour force. The State was running 59 per cent of wholesale trade, and the co-operatives nearly 37 per cent. The State and co-operatives between them controlled 86 per cent of the urban grain supply (though less than 40 per cent of meat supplies).

In the course of that summer nearly one-third of the retail trade (which had been affected by panicky hoarding as a result of food shortages in 1947) entered the 'Socialist sector', and Mr Minc made it clear that this process would continue in all fields of economic life. The land reform and the settlement of the western territories, which ended one process—that of the constant impoverishment of the poorer peasant—started another—that of capitalist development. This had been checked by taxes on the richer and credits for the poorer peasants, but it could only be stopped by socializing the means of production. To bring backward farming methods up to date required capital and machinery quite beyond the scope of the small farmer ; some kind of collective work was necessary, and co-operatives were 'the simplest and most acceptable' form of transition. The process, Mr Minc foresaw, would be slow, and slowest in the most important branch, the producer co-operative, because for its success three things were needed : an adequate supply of industrial consumer goods for the peasants ; financial help from the State to equip and develop the co-operatives ; and 'a radical change in the psychology of the peasant'.

About the same time, in his speech to the Workers' Party central committee, Mr Minc gave some details of the way in which the peasants would be approached. The smaller peasants would get tax reliefs, as would the co-operatives. The credit co-operatives must be able to ensure that credits reach

¹ August 1948. The article was based on a speech made in April 1947.

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the small farmers—of 3 milliard zloty allotted to them by the State in 1948 ‘the greater part fell somehow into the hands of the village exploiters’. During the summer of 1948 the co-operatives were in fact reorganized, the object being to take the administrative control out of the hands of the ‘rural capitalists’ and bring it under the Peasant Mutual Aid organization. The State farms were meanwhile to act as models, showing the small producer the advantages of modern methods, and were being transformed under a two-year plan into Socialist farms supplying 15 to 20 per cent of the country’s grain and 10 per cent of its meat.

Mr Minc was, of course, only putting into a Polish context some of the questions raised by the Cominform in its indictment of the Yugoslav leaders. In speaking (in the article quoted above) of the need to have ‘a clear Socialist programme which at the same time shows the way to Socialism’, he foreshadowed the new insistence on ‘people’s democracy’ as a merely transitional stage. The strength of the ‘peasant-worker alliance’, Mr Minc said, lay in its having both political and economic power. That power must be constantly extended.

The fact is that only strong central direction could make it possible to bring order out of the chaos of devastated Poland and to provide the people with work, food, clothing, and essential services. To these the Government has added considerable new social and medical services; and few observers in Poland have failed to be impressed by the speed of her material recovery and by the spirit of the people which has made this possible in spite of all hardships and difficulties. But nothing in Poland is being rebuilt without being also transformed. Reconstruction and reform go hand in hand in every field of activity, and all activities and institutions are moulded to the Government’s purposes and policies.

Thus the State has a monopoly of printing and publishing; it controls the allocation of paper supplies; and through the co-operative ‘Czytelnik’ it controls the distribution of newspapers and periodicals. It also runs the only Polish press agency (PAP). Within these limitations two independent Roman Catholic weeklies (one in Warsaw and one in Cracow) continued to exist, but the press as a whole, like the wireless, films, the theatre, and the various other institutions that were to come under the central supervision of a Commission for Cultural Affairs, is a means of directing, not of reflecting, popular opinion.

The educational system has had to be rebuilt from scratch,

for the Germans came near to achieving their aim of utterly destroying Polish culture. Where new schools had to be built and equipped, new teachers trained (some towns were left without a single teacher), new textbooks printed, new courses planned, these things were done on new lines laid down at a National Education Convention held in Łódź in June 1945. The general principle was to establish 'a public and unified system of national education' to which access should not be barred to anyone for lack of means or social standing. One result of this has been a great increase in the number of university students, many of whom now come directly from working class or peasant homes; another has been that ideological qualifications tend to replace financial and social ones. The State provided not only money grants but free residential hostels for poor students, and in 1947 an Academic Bank was set up, from which in return for a subscription of 200 zloty a student could get a loan of up to 30,000 zloty, repayable over a year. The State also took over the care and education of more than a million war orphans, and dealt with the special problems of illiteracy and the 're-polonization' of Poles who had come under German influence. (The Germans, who closed all other Polish Universities, kept Poznan open as a centre for 'germanization'.)

It will, it is believed, take ten years to complete a system in which, for example, children are to be taught 'to love and understand the great idea of democracy and to understand the role of the Polish State against the background of international events'. Education in this sense goes beyond the school curriculum into all spheres of life. Youth organizations, trade unions (whose membership was, in November 1948, about 3,300,000) and the political parties all play their part.

In a country where the Roman Catholic Church was in the past a political force (and often indeed an instrument of State policy, for example in the repression of non-Catholic Ukrainians between the wars), a conflict was bound to arise between Church and State. Mr Wiktor Grosz, of the information department of the Foreign Ministry, has stated the Government's attitude thus: 'We are determined on the separation of Church and State, and our laws in this respect are similar to those in all civilized countries. We do not consider the Church a political partner, but we are prepared to cooperate with it, with perfect toleration of all religions'.

Although the Concordat with Rome was denounced in 1945, toleration did at first seem possible on both sides. After

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the Kielce pogrom, however, the Primate, Cardinal Hlond, in expressing to foreign correspondents his 'sadness and regret', went on to say that the attitude towards the Jews was 'to a great extent due to Jews who today occupy leading positions in the Polish Government and try to introduce a Governmental structure which the majority of the people do not desire'.

It was perhaps significant that the Primate asked that this statement should not be published in Poland. Subsequently the Church instructed its followers how to vote in the elections, and a Pastoral, in May 1948, condemning the 'Marxist theory', expressed its total opposition to a regime that had instituted civil marriage and secular education. (Religion is allowed to be taught in schools, but the priests who teach it have been accused of exceeding their duties.) A number of priests were arrested in the summer of 1947 for engaging in 'political activities', and in September 1948 the Government placed Mgr Kaczynski, a close associate of the Primate, under surveillance.¹ There was constant sharpening of the conflict during 1948. The Vatican, which had been visited periodically by various Polish Church leaders, continued to recognize the former Polish Government in London.

It may be taken as a sign of the growing concentration of political power in Poland that the Catholic Labour Party² should have come out in May 1948 with a strong reply to the Pope's Letter to the German Bishops. The party regretted the attitude of the Holy See as being 'directed against the most vital interests of the Polish State', and as giving 'hope of political revenge to those who consciously brought about historical disaster to the Polish nation and to other countries. Polish Catholics consider the regained territories to be an integral foundation of the Polish State and a condition of its sovereign existence.'

After the departure of Mr Mikolajczyk, the left wing of the Polish Peasant Party, under Mr Wycech and Mr Niecko, declared itself the legal party, and was admitted in February 1948 to the Government bloc. In May the Polish and pro-Government Peasant parties agreed to join in a United Peasant Party. During the autumn of 1948 the fusion of the Socialist and Workers' parties, preparations for which began with the

¹ The Primate died on 22 October 1948.

² That is, the party officially accepted after Mr Popiel's resignation in September 1946.

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announcement of a Socialist Party purge on June 1947,¹ reached its final stages. From the formal act of fusion on 15 December 1948 emerged the United Workers' Party of Poland, which has become the only effective political voice in the country's affairs.

During the preliminaries to this Mr Osóbka-Morawski resigned the Socialist Party chairmanship and Mr Hochfeld gave up the leadership of the party's parliamentary group. The Communist Workers' Party, which in July 1947 claimed a million members, announced its intention to 'limit its growth to avoid the danger of melting into the working class'. A crisis in the party was narrowly averted in August when the General Secretary, Mr Gomółka, confessed to a plenary meeting of the central committee that certain views he had put forward at the June meeting were 'anti-Leninist', and had been rightly condemned by the central committee in July. Mr Gomółka was removed from the general secretaryship, but continued in his Government posts as deputy Prime Minister and Minister for the Regained Territories.

For the Socialist Party the impending fusion with the Communists had its international aspect. Mr Cyrankiewicz, the Socialist Prime Minister, told the party's central executive on 17 March 1948 that it was necessary to consider seriously 'whether we should continue to take part in international Socialist conferences'. On the day that he spoke party delegates were expecting to fly to London for a meeting of the Committee for International Socialist Conferences (COMISCO), at which it was expected that the Polish and Czechoslovak Socialist parties would be censured. A delay in providing British visas prevented the delegates from arriving in time for the opening of the conference two days later, and on 22 March the Polish Socialist Party announced its withdrawal from COMISCO 'in view of the attempts to destroy the World Federation of Trade Unions and the attitude of the majority of the Socialist parties in western Europe towards the united front policy of the Polish Socialist Party, the Czechoslovak Social Democrat Party, and the Italian Socialist Party'.

¹ On 9 June 1947 Mr Kazimierz Puzak, the party secretary since 1921, was arrested. He had been one of sixteen underground leaders sentenced in Moscow in June 1945. (Cf. p. 137, note 1.) Released in 1946, he returned to Poland. He and several others were tried in October 1948 and sentenced to various terms of imprisonment, which were halved under the Amnesty Act.

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FOREIGN RELATIONS

The break with the western Socialist parties, stigmatized as being 'definitely under the control of American imperialism' was of course a part of the general pattern of events in Europe that had been taking shape before, and continued to do so more precipitately after, the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. The preliminaries to the Cominform were, indeed, held in Warsaw, and the Wroclaw Congress of intellectuals was called mainly on Polish initiative. For Poland 'American imperialism' manifests itself most dangerously in the new policy towards Germany, a policy that has been regarded by the Polish Government as fully justifying its rejection of the Marshall Plan.¹

The Polish Government has repeatedly expressed the view that Poland, as the first victim of Nazi aggression, and in view of her armed resistance and her war losses, was entitled to a say in any peace settlement²; in replying to the invitation to send delegates to the London Conference³ in 1947 the Polish Government said that Poland wished to take part in any international organizations that might be set up to implement the economic terms imposed on Germany, and felt 'morally justified in suggesting that the Treaty be signed in Warsaw'. In February 1947 it was announced that Polish-Soviet talks in Moscow had led to agreement in principle on the German question. At the Prague meeting in February 1948 Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia asked to be represented at the Six-Power Conference in London, and at Warsaw on 25 June the eastern countries put out a joint five-point programme for four-Power control of the Ruhr and a 'democratic German Government' that was intended as a counter to the decisions of the London Conference. On 18 June and 30 July the Polish Government expressed its own views on the London Conference, and in an exchange of Notes between 17 June and

¹ 'This plan leads to economic and political subordination of the participating States, and at the same time expresses the tendency to establish the pre-war economic structure of Europe and with it also the dominating role of Germany . . . Moreover the participation in the so-called E.R.P. of States which were victims of German aggression, or which suffered severe losses in the war against Germany, cannot alter the fact that their own economy is subordinated to the recovery of western Germany. This fact is as yet not altered by the intentions expressed in the Note of H.M. Government (on 7 July 1948) not to concede to Germany a place of priority in reconstruction.' (Note handed by the Polish Ambassador to the British Foreign Secretary, 30 July 1948.)

² Note of 14 November 1946 to the Foreign Ministers of the U.S.S.R., United States, Britain and France.

³ Memorandum of January 1947.

7 August it made a separate approach to France.

The impulse behind these actions was the fear of a new aggressive Germany and, more specifically, the threat of German nationalism to the western territories. The growth of German revisionism and the apparent complaisance of the western Allies to it were the theme of a Polish complaint to the British and United States military authorities on 28 June 1948 and of a Note to Britain on 31 August. Fear of the Germans is genuine in Poland and is based on the bitterest personal experience of almost every Polish family. The contrast that is seen, for example, between Mr Byrnes's Stuttgart speech of 6 September 1946, which appeared to throw a sinister light on the western reservations at Potsdam, and Mr Molotov's reply to it, together with Marshal Stalin's explicit statement to a United Press correspondent on 23 October that the Soviet Union regarded Poland's western frontier as final, becomes a potent instrument in the hands of Polish policy-makers at home. From uncertainty and bewilderment as to western intentions¹ it is but a short step to suspicion, and few Poles can have failed to feel the force of the remark of Mr Cyrankiewicz at the Wroclaw Regained Territories Exhibition in 1948: the security of the western territories, he said, 'lies in our alliance with the Soviet and the eastern democracies. . . .' This is 'political reality'.

Yet there is in Poland official understanding for the need to give Germany a place in Europe. The Warsaw communiqué of June 1948 reflected a frequently stated Polish view that far from contradicting the interests of other peoples, the rehabilitation and development of Germany's peaceful industry fits in with the tasks of economic recovery in Europe. The German people should be granted broad opportunities for restoring and developing peaceful industry, agriculture, and transport, as well as foreign trade, since otherwise Germany cannot exist and discharge her reparations obligations towards the countries which suffered from German aggression.

¹ Relations with Britain were troubled by two special problems: the expulsion of Germans from the western territories into the British zone of Germany, and the repatriation of Poles from Britain, which involved the whole question of the London Government and the armed forces at its command. The Polish Government objected to the Polish Resettlement Corps, announced by Mr Bevin in May 1946, as 'a military organization under military discipline', and suspected it might be used to prevent Polish soldiers from returning home. It recalled a law of 1920

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Poland has, indeed, positive ideas of her own on European co-operation, ideas that are based on awareness of Europe's need for Polish food and coal. She took an active part in setting up the Economic Commission for Europe in March 1947 and, as Dr Lange told the United Nations Economic Committee in October, when the report of the Economic and Social Council was being discussed, Poland looked to the E.C.E. for a fundamental approach to the whole problem of European reconstruction. At the instance of the United States delegation, however, the western delegates decided at Geneva against treating European trade and economic reconstruction as parts of a single problem, and the *ad hoc* Committee for Trade and Development which the E.C.E. set up in May 1948 dealt only with specific questions. It was the Polish view, said Dr Lange, that 'the problem of an increase of trade among the different countries of Europe cannot be separated from the problems of promoting an increase of production, particularly in the less developed parts of the European continent'. Dr Lange saw 'a general tendency [in the west] to limit the scope of the E.C.E.', and Mr Modzelewski,¹ the Polish Foreign Minister, linked it with the United States' refusal to grant export licenses 'for about seventy commodities representing Poland's normal imports from the United States', and this in turn with the section of the Economic Co-operation Act which allows the E.R.P. administrator to forbid the export of goods and raw materials that might conceivably augment the war potential of countries not taking part in the Marshall Plan. The last word for Poland may rest with Dr Lange. Although, he said, the Polish economy would benefit from increased trade with

under which soldiers who joined a foreign organization forfeited their citizenship, and applied this law against General Anders and seventy-five of his staff officers. Later it took a more co-operative line, promising not to discriminate against members of the Corps but to give them every facility if they decided, as they were free to do, to return to Poland. But it continued suspicious about the rate of disbandment. Enrolment in the Corps began in January 1947, and some 103,000 of 142,000 Polish troops (with their dependants the total was 160,000) joined. About 8,500 returned to Poland, 9,500 emigrated elsewhere, 2,500 died, 3,500 were discharged on the expiry of service contracts; 66,000 were placed in industry and, 1,600 as students; 400 entered the armed forces. On 16 November 1948 Mr Shinwell told the House of Commons that Corps would be wound up by 1950. The total cost, including 1948 and 1949, would be £27 million. By an agreement of February 1946 1,500,000 Germans were to enter the British zone of Germany, and some 1,300,000 had left Poland by August 1947 when the British suspended entries.

¹ Speech in the second committee of the United Nations General Assembly, 2 November 1948. Mr Modzelewski said that the goods, whose value did not exceed \$10 million, included 'cotton linters, synthetic resin, condenser tubes, radio valves, measuring apparatus, gramophone recording discs, needles for the textile industry, ball-bearings, etc'.

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western Europe and from western capital investment, Polish economic development is based

entirely on our own resources and on co-operation with our neighbours . . . But unless we liberate ourselves from the domination of a political purpose which divides Europe in two, economically as well as politically ; unless we realize fully that the development of trade between eastern and western Europe and the full development of the resources of European countries is in the interest of the countries of western Europe even more than in that of the countries of eastern Europe ; unless we dispel the myth that a permanent recovery of western Europe is possible without the co-operation of the countries of eastern Europe, we shall not be able to work out a constructive policy for the economic development of Europe.

CHAPTER SIX

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

BY R. R. BETTS

LIKE the Thirty Years War, the Second World War began and ended in Prague. What had begun with the arrival of Hitler's tanks on the Ides of March 1939 was ended when Marshal Koniev's tanks entered Prague on 9 May 1945 and there put an end to the last German resistance in Europe. But the losses that the Czech people suffered during these six years of German occupation were not comparable with those suffered during the Thirty Years War, nor, indeed with those suffered by Czechoslovakia's neighbours, Poland, Germany, Hungary, and the Ukraine; Prague remains virtually intact while her sister cities, Warsaw, Buda, Dresden, Nuremburg, and Berlin lie in ruins; Bohemia was not fought over inch by inch, as were western Russia, central Hungary, Poland, and even Slovakia. The regular bombardment of Czechoslovak towns and factories was not begun until the airfields of northern Italy were in Allied hands. Nevertheless the damage done by the war was moral as well as material. Evidence adduced by the Czechoslovak Government at the trial of the quisling, Karl Hermann Frank, put the damage due to physical destruction at £2,180 million¹, and estimated that the Germans at the end of the war had robbed the Czechoslovak National Bank of £500 million and that the German seizure and destruction of property had cost private Czechoslovak citizens £1,750 million. That is, Czechoslovakia was some £4,500 million poorer as a result of the war. More detailed estimates published in July 1946 listed the particulars of war damage in this order of value: stolen gold and silver, securities and fraudulent exchange, damage to buildings, damage to agriculture, stolen arms and military equipment, registration fees exacted from industrial and trading concerns as the price of 'protection', damage to industry, exactions as the cost of administration, damage to transport and communications, and destruction of works of art. Except in so far as they had been damaged by American bombs the great factories of

¹ Unless otherwise stated I have converted Czechoslovak crowns (Kčs) into pounds at the rate of 200 Kčs to the £.

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armaments, locomotives, capital machinery and other heavy goods at Plzeň, Moravská Ostrava, and Brno had been kept running by the Germans for their own war purposes; it would not be necessary to rebuild them from the start, but to convert them to reconstructive production. It was worse with the factories of luxury and semi-luxury consumer goods, such as glass, leather, jewellery, paper, shoes, and textiles, which had been the economic strength of Czechoslovakia; these the Germans had shut down or converted, and they would have to be restarted from scratch. Some idea of the way Czechoslovak economy had suffered during the war can be gained from consideration of the facts that the monthly average of the production of black coal in Bohemia and Moravia in 1937 had been 1,398,000 tons; in October 1945 it was 986,179 tons. The figures for brown coal were 1,490,000 tons a month in 1937 and 1,322,491 tons in October 1945. The monthly average production of steel in 1937 was 192,000 tons; as late as January 1946 it was still only 101,000 tons. In 1937 the Republic had produced 741,187 metric tons of sugar; in 1945 it produced only 449,479 metric tons. Such figures do not indicate an economic catastrophe, but they do indicate the magnitude of the task of material recovery which presented itself to the liberated Republic.

That task was to be the more difficult of accomplishment because of the destruction of communications within and without Czechoslovakia. The Germans had conducted a fighting retreat all through Subcarpathian Ruthenia and Slovakia and part of Moravia, with the result that there was hardly a road or railway bridge left standing in the eastern half of the Republic. There too roads or railway tracks were in great need of repair and many locomotives, trucks, lorries and buses had been devoured by German requisition. Perhaps worse for the recovery of Czechoslovak trade was the disruption of transport in Germany, Hungary, and Slovenia; nothing did more to hinder the reopening of Czechoslovak trade with Britain, America, and the British Commonwealth than the long-continuing difficulty of getting goods to and from the North Sea and Adriatic ports through the chaos of communications or politics that surrounded the country on east, south, and north. Nor could recourse be had to nearer markets and sources of supply, for Czechoslovakia's most natural customer and supplier, Germany, was economically down and out, and the south-eastern neighbours, Hungary, Roumania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia were for long too poor to pay for many of the

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exports that Czechoslovakia might have sent them. Another evil economic legacy of the German occupation was a currency so vastly inflated as to be on the verge of worthlessness.

To destruction of capital, loss of markets, and inflation must be added the loss of life and labour. In 1935 the population of Czechoslovakia had been 14,612,000; in May 1947 it was 12,171,000, having been reduced by almost exactly one-sixth in the interval. Much of this loss was due to the cession of Subcarpathian Russia to the Soviet Ukraine and to the expulsion of the Germans and Magyars after the liberation; but the Czechoslovak Government officially estimated that 7,000 persons had been killed in air-raids, that 38,000 underground fighters had been executed or killed by the Germans, while another 200,000 Czechoslovaks, many of them Jews, did not return from Belsen, Dachau, Oswiecim, Terezin and the other concentration camps; that is, one in every sixty Czechoslovaks lost his life as a direct consequence of the war and the occupation.

It is impossible to estimate the moral consequences of the war and the occupation in figures. The psychological damage caused by the fears, excitements, and humiliation of the Munich period has proved to be lasting, and it left the nation subconsciously very susceptible to anti-western propaganda. The shock of Munich had not been healed even by the contribution made by Britain (which was indirect) and by the United States (which hesitated at the decisive moment) to the liberation of Czechoslovakia, or by the fact that the Czechoslovaks listened to the B.B.C. accounts of their liberation and of their own government in Britain. The revulsion caused by the helpless loss of national integrity in October 1938, and of independence in March 1939, after only twenty years of restored independence, induced in the country a *malaise* that might easily become either cynical renunciation of national ideals that had been fostered for a hundred years, or else a readiness to seek salvation in a philosophy which offered light and salvation from the east. Six years of unwilling service to the triumphant invader was also in itself demoralizing. For six years it had been a patriotic duty to go slow and to sabotage, to destroy and not to build; and six years of such habits, of subservience, humiliation, and starvation, both physical and intellectual, leave their mark on a people and leave them ready either to seek new remedies or to believe that there is no remedy at all.

During the occupation Czechoslovak political activity was carried on in three geographically discrete places. First

there was in London the reconstituted and recognized government of President Beneš, with his nominated cabinet (which excluded both the Agrarians and Slovak Populists on the right, and the Communists on the left), and his National Council of selected refugees. Round Beneš in London were gathered experienced statesmen: his Prime Minister, Mgr Šrámek, creator of the Czechoslovak Catholic co-operative movement, Jan Masaryk and Hubert Ripka in charge of foreign affairs, Jaroslav Štránský, an able newspaper proprietor and professor of law, who was Minister of Justice, the eloquent Juraj Slávik, most Czechoslovak of the Slovaks, who was Minister of Culture and Education. The Slovak nationalists, Hodža and Osuský, were excluded from the London Government, for Beneš was convinced at the time that Slovakia would have to be integrated more closely in the restored Republic than they desired; no talk of a 'Slovak nation' was allowed in the Czechoslovak Government's broadcasts from London. The Communists in London, Clementis, Nosek, and Laštovička, were content with minor posts in government offices, for they were confident that their turn would come later. Secondly, there was a subsidiary part of free Czechoslovakia abroad in the persons of the Czechoslovaks in Moscow, some of them, like the Social Democrat ambassador to the U.S.S.R., Zdeněk Fierlinger, war refugees, others like the Communists Klement Gottwald and Zdeněk Nejedlý, involuntary or voluntary exiles from pre-Munich days. There were also two distinct groups of Czechoslovak armed forces engaged on the Allies' side: the considerable and distinguished body of Czechoslovak airmen and the relatively small contingent in the British Army, which was given the belated, dangerous, and inglorious task of besieging Dunkirk, and the much larger body of Czech soldiers on the eastern front—the two armies of General Svoboda, which the Russians wisely allowed to take an active part in the liberation of their own country under their own commanders and colours. It can be asserted safely that each body of exiles returned home as the champion of that type of society in which it had spent the exciting and revealing years of war. The third element in the politics of liberated Czechoslovakia was the people at home, who constituted a body of opinion without leaders, for such leaders as the Resistance had spontaneously generated had been eliminated by the Gestapo as soon as they had raised their heads; other potential leaders, such as Beran (now archbishop of Prague), Zenkl, the former Lord Mayor of Prague, the eminent journalist Peroutka, and

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a host of professors and other intellectuals, had been confined in concentration camps. Thus it was that the Government which returned from exile came to rule a people with no leaders of its own.

Beneš and the Government in London had already done much work in preparation for the restoration, and believed that they were interpreting the wishes and needs of the people at home in the main lines of the policy with which they returned. As early as 12 December 1943 Beneš had, in the face of some reluctance on the part of the British Foreign Office, signed in Moscow a treaty of friendship, mutual assistance, and collaboration with the Soviet Union. On 17 March 1944 Beneš had announced that the restored Republic would be a national State, thereby indicating his belief that the Czechoslovaks would never again tolerate any considerable German or Magyar minority in their midst. The Government therefore returned pledged to the policy of expelling all the Germans and Magyars in an attempt to prevent the recurrence of the mass treason of 1938, even if it had to be at the expense of forgoing the skill and industry of three and a half million citizens. The third major point of policy to which Beneš was already committed was that of a large measure of nationalization. It was not only that there would be much capital left ownerless as the result of the extermination of Jews and other patriots and of the confiscation of the property of expelled Germans and condemned collaborators, to distribute which to new proprietors would create an infinity of problems, but also Beneš and the most liberal of his colleagues were convinced that the development of Czechoslovak economy and public opinion alike demanded some considerable measure of socialization. Beneš had certainly come to believe that such a development was in keeping with the evolution of Masarykian democracy, and he also had convinced himself, perhaps under the influence of the English environment in which he had lived so long, that it was possible to proceed far along the highroad of socialism without precipitating the country into Communism.¹ There is no doubt that Beneš was right in all these assumptions about the wishes of the people: fear and hatred of the foreigners in their midst, belief that only in close military alliance with the U.S.S.R. was there any assurance of survival for the Republic,

¹ 'You are sure to find exponents of Communism who defend the temporary dictatorship of the proletariat. I myself assert that in a great number of countries it is not necessary. Russian Communists themselves acknowledge that the transformation from a liberal democracy to a socializing democracy can today come about, gradually by means of reasonable evolution.' (Beneš, 16 December 1945.)

and a general willingness to attempt a planned economy were all fairly generally characteristic of the people at the moment of liberation. There were exceptions in the minority which distrusted both Russia and socialism, and in the very considerable minority which hoped to go beyond gradualist socialism to the establishment of Communism. The strength of Communist sentiment amongst factory workers, miners, transport workers, and intellectuals cannot be ignored or denied, for Czechoslovak social democracy had been Marxist from the beginning, and the principles of Leninist thought were familiar and normal for hundreds of thousands who were never members of the Communist Party. On the other hand the westernizing tradition, religious, and cultural and political ties with France, Britain, Italy, and America were still strong. 'We can be the allies of Russia without ceasing to be friends with the west', was the faith and hope of many Czechoslovaks in 1945.

Two other major matters of policy shaped themselves, not by design, but by the manner of the liberation: the form of government through national committees, and the position of Slovakia in the restored Republic.

The Red Army first reached the Czechoslovak frontier on 8 April 1944; its advent was greeted by a triumphant programme on the Czechoslovak service of the B.B.C., and the Government in London at once urged the people at home to form local National Committees of proved and reliable patriots both to assist in the struggle against the Nazis and in the government of each area as soon as it was liberated. Thus encouraged the Slovaks revolted against the puppet Government of Tiso and Mach at the beginning of August. But the crest of the central Carpathians proved as impassable in the face of a determined enemy as it has ever been. The Russians were beaten back from the Slovak-Polish frontier, and while the armies of General Petrov and Marshal Malinovsky were fighting their longer but easier way through Roumania and eastern Hungary, the Germans occupied Slovakia and suppressed the Slovak revolt. During October 1944 Subcarpathian Russia was liberated by the Russians; but they did not enter Slovakia until 29 October. The Germans had crushed the revolt by the capture of Zvolen two days before. Though resistance inside Slovakia ceased, the Slovak National Committee which had led that resistance had already got itself recognized by Beneš as the lawful Government of Slovakia, and when between December 1944 and 10 April 1945 Slovakia

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was cleared of the Germans by the army of the fourth Ukrainian front, the Slovak National Committee took over the government; Beneš prudently recognized the legality of the Committee and the validity of its decrees. On 4 December 1944 he had by decree assigned the administration of all Czechoslovak territory to the National Committees, who were also to send delegates to constitute the Provisional National Assembly. This was a revolutionary decision, for the National Committees thus remained the effective basis of local government down to February 1948, superseding the former centralism of the inter-war years; also Slovakia had *de facto* acquired a measure of autonomy which no-one in Prague dared to abrogate until the Slovak National Council was reconstituted during the February crisis.

Ever since it was reconstituted in London the Czechoslovak Government had insisted that Czechoslovakia must be restored to the frontiers it had had before Munich. It was not easy to achieve this. It is true that the armistice signed between Hungary and the U.S.S.R. on 20 January 1945 restored the Slovak-Hungarian frontier as it had been before the first Vienna award. It was more ominous when the Kiev radio began to encourage Ukrainian irridentist sentiment in relation to liberated Subcarpathian Russia; but this was probably meant at the time to be pressure to induce the Czechoslovak Government to recognize the Lublin Government of Poland, which it did on 30 January 1945.

On 16 February Beneš made his last broadcast from London; on the 26th Masaryk signed the agreement with UNRRA which was to prove invaluable in maintaining the health of the people and the economy of Czechoslovakia during the next thirty months.¹ In the middle of March 1945 Beneš and his Ministers left London and went by way of Moscow, where they picked up the leading refugees in the U.S.S.R., to Košice, the capital of eastern Slovakia, and there, while Bratislava, Brno, and Prague were still in German hands, they proceeded to concert the programme of the restoration. The fateful decision was made to form a coalition of the only six parties which would henceforth be legal: the Populists (Lidová strana—non-socialist and predominantly Catholic), the National Socialists (Narodní socialistická strana, which was in a

¹ Altogether Czechoslovakia received UNRRA goods to the value of \$264,075,000: 45 per cent throughout of that value was in food, 27 per cent in industrial goods, 12 per cent agricultural, 10 per cent textiles, and 5 per cent medical supplies. The total weight was about 1,800,000 tons.

state of transition from Masarykian liberalism to non-Marxist Socialism), the Social Democrats, the Czech Communist Party, the Slovak Democratic Party (non-socialist, Catholic and nationalist) and the Slovak Communist Party. The Slovak Social Democrats were frustrated in their attempts to secure independent recognition at Košice. No other parties were to be permitted to exist. This decision meant that there would be no lawful opposition either in the Assembly or in the country, and that there was therefore never any constitutional alternative government to the National Front thus constituted. On 27 March 1945 the four Czech parties and the Democrats and Communists in the Slovak National Council signed the Košice programme. It laid down the principle that Czechoslovakia was to be an exclusively Slav State of two Slavonic nations, the Czechs and the Slovaks. Public administration was to be based on the National Committees. The property of proved collaborators and of all Germans and Magyars who could not prove that they had actively opposed the Germans was to be confiscated. Peasant ownership was to be maintained, and the confiscated lands were to be distributed among small-holders. The Košice programme also undertook 'to place the entire financial and loan system, the key industries, the insurance system, and all sources of power under general government control, and to place them thus at the disposal of economic reconstruction', but it also promised 'to support the private initiative of employers, tradesmen, and other producers'. All the political freedoms were guaranteed, social welfare was to be fully provided for, and provision made for economic democracy through trade unions and workers' committees. Universities and schools and their textbooks were to be purged of all anti-Bolshevik sentiments. Finally the programme stated that the foreign policy of Czechoslovakia would have as its corner-stone 'the alliance of the State with the Soviet Union, and the determination to carry out vigorously a pan-Slav policy in eastern Europe'. The programme called for good relations with the new Governments of Poland, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria (it did not mention Hungary), and for 'a wider basis of general friendly relations with the democratic western Powers'.¹ The whole programme bears much more clearly the imprint of Beneš and London than that of

¹ There are summaries of this long and important document available in English in the *Central European Observer* of 27 April 1945, and in W. Diamond, *Czechoslovakia between East and West* (London, Stevens, for London Institute of World Affairs, 1947) pp. 1-7.

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Moscow. The Communists, either from necessity or prudence, were content to let it be issued in this moderate and liberalizing form.

Beneš at once constituted his provisional Government. The new Prime Minister was the able and ambitious social democrat from Moscow, Fierlinger; other Social Democrat Ministers were Laušman, the Minister for Industry, and the young and courageous 'westerner,' Václav Majer (Minister of Food). The Communist Party had in the Government Klement Gottwald, the party leader and one of the five vice-Premiers; Václav Nosek, Minister of the Interior, who had collaborated with Beneš in London; Zdeněk Nejedlý, Minister of Education (pupil of T. G. Masaryk and biographer of Smetana and Masaryk, who had returned from his long sojourn in Russia an eloquent and fervent apostle of Lenin and Stalin); Václav Kopecký, Minister of Information, and Vládo Clementis, who returned from his long sojourn in France and Britain to be deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs. The National Socialists had Josef David as vice-Premier, Ripka as Minister of Foreign Trade, and Jaroslav Stránský as Minister of Justice. The Populists were represented by Jan Šrámek, the Prime Minister in exile, now one of the vice-Premiers, František Hála (also a priest) as Minister of Posts, and Adolf Procházka as Minister of Health. The Slovak Democrats had one of the vice-Premierships (Ursiny), and the Ministries of Finance (Šrobár) and Internal Trade (Pietor); the Slovak Communists had Vilém Široký as vice-Premier and Josef Šoltež as Minister of Social Welfare. Jan Masaryk, who remained Minister for Foreign Affairs against his earlier intentions and inclination, and General Ludvík Svoboda, Minister of Defence, had no party allegiance.

This was the Government which followed in the rear of the second and fourth armies of the Ukrainian front as they went forward to drive the Germans out of western Slovakia and Moravia. It was joined by Zorin, the Soviet ambassador, on 10 April. But as Petrov and Malinovsky were liberating Trenčín, Svätý Martin, and Hodonín, another allied force, the third army under the American general Patton broke through the western frontier of Bohemia on the 18th, and proceeded to fight its way towards Prague. On 23 April the Czechoslovak Government called for a general insurrection against the Germans. On 5 May, after the fall of Berlin and the general collapse of the resistance in Germany, the Praguers rose against the German garrison. The Americans were then

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at Plzeň and the Red Army was at Teschen. There is much controversy about what happened next. One thing is certain : the American army stopped in its tracks, indeed even withdrew somewhat, and the appeals for immediate help from Prague went for four days unanswered, with the result that there was much bloody fighting in the city¹, in which apparently a body of 'White' Russians under their leader Vlasov joined in against their former German patrons, and in which much of the Town Hall of the Old Town was destroyed by German tank fire. It is probable that Patton's failure to interfere was due to direct orders from allied headquarters that the Red Army must have the privilege of liberating Prague, and that the Americans were not to advance beyond a line already agreed on with the Soviet High Command. Allegations in the Czechoslovak press that the Americans deliberately left the Praguers to their fate because they were Socialists can surely be discounted. In the end Marshal Koniev sent a tank force from the Berlin sector, which entered Prague on 9 May. The war was ended, and ended in such a way that it was easy to represent the destruction of the hated Protectorate and the restoration of the Republic as a gift from the east paid for by the heroism and blood of fellow Slavs.

On 10 May Fierlinger, the Prime Minister, and on the 15th Beneš returned to Prague amid acclamations.

THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT, MAY 1945 TO MAY 1946

For a year the Provisional Government ruled Czechoslovakia. The effective sovereign was the central committee of the National Front, a caucus of party leaders, which made policy and took executive decisions which the cabinet endorsed, and the Provisional Assembly (200 Czechs and 100 Slovaks delegated by the local National Committees) enacted. The effect of reducing the number of parties from some thirty before 1939 to six was to put real power into the hands of the party leaders and organizations. Each party had its nominees for every office in the land, and the inflation of the civil service was in large measure due to the patronage exercised by each of the parties in the coalition. It was seriously suggested that the shortage of houses was aggravated by the occupation of at least four houses in every precinct and village as party head-

¹ *Rudé Právo*, the Czech Communist daily, subsequently said that 2,216 Czechoslovaks and 935 Germans were killed.

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quarters.¹ The parties had something approaching a monopoly of power, and were in many respects more influential than the courts of law and the legislature.² Even though early in 1946 permission was given for the formation of two new parties, the Slovak Social Democratic Party and the Slovak Freedom Party, they were admitted to the National Front, and there was still no lawful opposition.

There were considerable economic difficulties throughout 1945; only a beginning could be made with rehabilitation, and the evil consequences of war and occupation could not at once be shaken off. The wheat harvest in the Bohemian lands was good, but the rest of the harvest, especially in Slovakia was bad, and the country as a whole produced only enough food to keep itself for ten months. UNRRA help was invaluable in supplementing an inadequate diet until the 1946 harvest. In Slovakia, which had been perhaps the best fed part of Europe during the war, it was necessary in the first year of reunion with the Czech lands to ration flour and sugar. Agriculture was greatly disturbed by the expulsion of hundreds of thousands of German and Magyar farmers, whose confiscated lands were often given to inexperienced persons.³ At the same time the incomplete land reform of the first Republic was being pushed on by revision committees. The great estates, such as those of Schwarzenberg, Thun, and Waldstein, that had survived the first reform were broken up and distributed to existing or new small holders on the principle that no-one should have more than 50 hectares, regardless of whether it was arable, pasture, forest, or mountain. Lack of agricultural machinery and paucity of beasts have continued to hamper Czechoslovak agriculture. Industry also did not immediately recover. Nosek, the Minister of the Interior, said in December 1945 that industrial production was still only half what it had been before the war. In August it had been necessary to publish a decree giving the Government power to direct labour. Industry was, like agriculture, in the throes of revolution, for in August the decree of nationalization was published, whereby 1,500 larger and 5,300 smaller enterprises which together employed 800,000 persons were made national

¹ In 1938 there had been 453,000 civil servants; already by March 1946 there were 530,000, and the number continued to increase. In May 1947 President Beneš told me that whenever it was suggested that any particular civil servant was redundant one of the parties protested that he was indispensable.

² The Provisional Assembly did not meet until 28 October, so that for five months the President and the Inner Committee of the National Front governed by decree.

³ 270,000 farms were confiscated; they totalled 6,700,000 acres.

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undertakings. The mines, heavy industry, transport, banking, and insurance were nationalized completely, and many others in part, notably the chemical and glass industries, building materials, textiles, paper, leather and rubber, timber, gas, and electricity. Some 60 per cent of Czechoslovak industry was nationalized at a stroke, either on the ground that, as in the case of heavy industry and the mines, it was economically sound to do so, or on the ground that the owners of the firms were expelled or proved traitors or (as had happened to many Jewish enterprises) that their owners and their heirs had disappeared.¹

Two things are vital to Czechoslovak economy: foreign markets for manufactures, and raw materials. Czechoslovakia is the only industrialized country in eastern Europe, and though normally it can exist on its own food production, it must import raw materials, particularly cotton, wool, black coal, iron, and some other ores. The German market had almost disappeared; the other countries of eastern Europe were too poor to pay for Czech manufactured goods; transport to the sea was chaotic, and when it was restored the Americans at first insisted that carriage through the American zones of Germany and Austria should be paid for in dollars, of which the Czechoslovaks had very few. The Soviet Union did its best to help Czechoslovak trade, and a trade agreement was signed by Ripka in Moscow in April 1946. During the year October 1945 to October 1946 Switzerland took 16.6 per cent of Czechoslovak exports; the U.S.S.R. 12.9 per cent; then on a decreasing scale Germany, the United States, Sweden, Austria, Holland, Denmark, Belgium, Norway, and Britain, which took only 3 per cent. The U.S.S.R. headed the list of importers with 12.3 per cent; there followed Switzerland, Sweden, Hungary, Britain, the United States, Austria, Germany, Holland, and Yugoslavia. What is interesting about the development of Czechoslovak trade is that after 1946 trade with the east almost dried up, while that with the area outside Russian influence rapidly developed. In the first quarter of 1947 Switzerland and Sweden headed the list of Czechoslovak customers, the U.S.S.R. had dropped to sixth place between the United States and Britain, whereas the United States and Britain headed the list of suppliers, and the U.S.S.R. was no longer in the first ten.

¹ Many of the few Jews who survived the occupation had recorded themselves in 1935 as German speaking, and therefore in 1945 had to prove their loyalty to recover their civilian and economic rights, a long and hazardous procedure.

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One of the most serious perils that threatened every European country after the war was inflation. The war had put vast quantities of currency into circulation, and now there were not enough goods to satisfy a hypertrophied demand. The Germans had flooded Czechoslovakia with currency, and there was grave danger that prices and wages would soar to the astronomical regions that reduced Hungary to a barter economy in 1946. The problem was tackled with fair success in Czechoslovakia. On 1 November 1945 by Government decree all the old currency was frozen, and a new currency was issued by the banks. No private person was given more than 500 crowns (£2. 10s.) of the new currency in exchange for the old, and firms were allowed to draw only operating expenses. No other drawings were permitted without special permission. All other accounts were blocked, and subsequently much of the frozen currency was liquidated by a capital levy and a heavy tax on war profits. On 1 December 1945 prices and wages were defined at a level some three times what they were before the war; since that date both have tended to rise, but not precipitously. One consequence of these currency manipulations was that any private fortunes or individual capitalists existing at the beginning of 1948 to plan and threaten counter-revolution must have been new and few.

Another characteristic of 1945 was the appearance of a group of nation-wide organizations, very characteristic of the country and the time, and destined to have an important political influence. Most important of them was the trade union organization. Before 1939 the Czechoslovak trade unions had been organized by industries, but the Germans had unified them and given them a local instead of an industrial basis. This transformation was retained, and since the liberation all Czechoslovak workers have been members of one organization, the Revolutionary Trade Union Movement (Revolučné odborové hnutí—R.O.H.). The first congress of its executive committee (Ústřední rada odborů—U.R.O.) was held in April 1946, and from that time the U.R.O. played an increasingly powerful part under its Communist president, Zápatocký, and its left-wing socialist secretary, Erban. The Communists from the first realized the value of getting control of the trade union movement, and also of the many other national organizations—the Union of Fighters for Freedom (S.B.S.), the Union of Czechoslovak Youth (S.Č.M.), and the United Society of Czech Farmers (J.S.Č.Z.). One active Communist could multiply himself by his activities in two or

more such associations.

In the meantime the trial and punishment of traitors, collaborators, and those accused of war crimes committed on Czechoslovak soil was begun. The instruments were special People's Courts where lay and professional judges sat together. The arch-traitor, the former Reichsminister for the Protectorate, Karl Hermann Frank was hanged on 22 May 1946. The President of the Protectorate, Emil Hácha, had saved the Government some embarrassment by dying in June 1945. By October 1946 20,000 persons had been arraigned before the People's Courts, one-third of them Czechs; 362 of them (of whom 205 were Germans) were executed, 426 were sentenced to life imprisonment; 13,548 received sentences amounting to over 100,000 years; 3,771 were acquitted. Nevertheless there was later some indignation against the number of acquittals and the lenience of some of the sentences, and though the People's Courts ceased to exist in May 1947 they were later revived and some of those acquitted or lightly sentenced have been retried.

Far more important than this first purge was the wholesale expulsion of the Germans, of whom there were 3,250,000 living in Czechoslovakia before the war, and of whom fewer than a quarter of a million remain today, and those entirely without minority rights. No time was lost in the deportation of the Germans. On 18 June 1945 a proclamation was made announcing that all Germans were to be expelled, with the exception of those who could prove that they had never acted against the Czechoslovak nation, or those who had taken an active part in its liberation, or who had suffered at the hands of the Nazis. Undoubtedly in the first month or two there was some hasty improvisation and rough handling of the eviction, but it was gradually reduced to as much order and justice as is consistent with so radical an operation. It was a great triumph for Czechoslovak policy when the Potsdam conference in July 1945 accepted 'the principle of the transfer to Germany of German populations . . . remaining in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary in an orderly and humane manner'. (The Potsdam communiqué made no mention of the transfer of Magyar minorities.) But the great Powers suspended such transfers until the destination of the evicted Germans could be agreed to. On 25 January 1946 the expulsion was renewed in earnest, to the American zone. In November 1947 Clementis said: 'Within the scope of the transfer permitted by Potsdam, Czechoslovakia has removed

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2,251,000 Germans, of whom 1,464,000 have gone to the American zone and 814,000 to the Soviet zone'. The Americans refused to take any more after 1 December 1946 ; at that date, of the 1,086,465 persons employed in industry in Czechoslovakia only 60,560 were Germans, and most of them were in textiles, mining and pottery. Citizen rights had been restored to 55,017 Germans. There were, of course, no longer any German schools, and the German University in Prague and the German technical high schools in Prague and Brno were abolished. The expulsion of 600,000 Magyars was a difficult problem ; there was no German State to protest against the transference of the Germans, but there was a Hungarian State, which did not want half a million landless peasants. No more than 25,000 Magyars were expelled in 1945, and though an agreement to exchange Slovaks living in Hungary for Magyars living in Slovakia was signed between the two Governments on 27 February 1946, no exchanges were made for more than a year afterwards.

The problem of foreign relations which dominated this first period of the history of the Third Republic was that of Poland. During the months when the Red Army was overrunning eastern Germany the Czechoslovaks began to agitate for acquisitions of territory in southern Poland, Silesia, and Lusatia. There were Slovak-speaking settlements at Orava and in Polish Špiš (Zips) ; the Czechoslovaks had an economic, historical, and ethnic interest in securing the Silesian districts of Kladsko (Glatz), Ratibor, and Hlubčice. They also revived the old pretensions to upper Lusatia, which had been part of the lands of the Bohemian Crown from the fourteenth century to the seventeenth, and which was inhabited by the bilingual Lusatian Serbs, for the survival of whose west-Slavonic language and culture the Czechs assumed patronal rights. In all these areas Czechoslovak and Polish ambitions came into conflict ; but the most fiercely contested prize was the rich area of Teschen (Těšín), on the frontier of Moravia and Poland. The Poles had never reconciled themselves to the partition of that area after the First World War ; the Czechoslovaks had never forgiven the Poles for seizing Czechoslovak Teschen in October 1938 ; the Polish Government claimed the whole area on 15 June 1945, and on the 19th the Polish general Rola-Zymierski occupied it. The Soviet Government was anxious to prevent conflict between its two western allies, and therefore on the 20th summoned the Poles and Czechs to Moscow. The conference lasted for nine days ; what emerged

from it was not an agreement about Teschen, but the cession of Subcarpathian Russia by Czechoslovakia to the Soviet Ukraine. On 6 July it was reported that Czechoslovak troops were in Czechoslovak Těšín, that Polish troops were in Polish Cieszyn, and that the Red Army was between them. The suspicion that the Czechoslovak envoys in Moscow had purchased Russian support for the recovery of Teschen at the price of the cession of Subcarpathian Russia is therefore strong. Both events are important—Czechoslovakia has retained *de facto* the industrial and transport advantages of Teschen, the whole of the Ukrainian people is at last united, the Soviet Union has a foothold on the south west of the difficult passes of the Carpathians, and Slovakia has a common frontier with the U.S.S.R. There continued to be a lot of talk about the other territories disputed with Poland, but by May 1946 it was clear that Poland was firmly entrenched in all the territories she claimed up to the Neisse, and that Czechoslovak protests were going to be unavailing.¹

The last event of importance that remains to be recorded during this period of the Provisional Government is the evacuation of Czechoslovakia by the Allied armies. Early in December 1945 the American and Soviet armies withdrew by concerted agreement; any influence on the political development of Czechoslovakia would henceforward be exerted by their proximity, not their presence.

THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY AND THE TWO-YEAR PLAN MAY 1946 TO FEBRUARY 1948

On 26 May 1946 a Constituent Assembly was elected, whose mission was to draw up and enact the constitution of the restored Republic. The elections conformed to the strictest pattern of those of a parliamentary democracy: they were free, secret, direct, proportional, and genuine in the sense that the elector was free to choose between rival candidates of rival parties. The only formal criticism that could be made was that only the eight recognized parties which composed the National Front were permitted to put forward candidates, and it was therefore impossible to vote against the Government; the election could only alter the balance of party power within the Government. For the Republic as a whole the results were

¹ On 9 March 1947 Czechoslovakia and Poland signed a twenty years' treaty; all territorial questions were to be in abeyance, but each country would undertake to seek solutions within two years. (Text of Treaty in *Central European Observer*, 21 March 1947.)

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Party	Votes	Seats in the Assembly
Communists (Bohemia & Moravia)	2,177,033	93
Communists (Slovakia)	518,882	21
National Socialists	1,298,917	55
Populists	1,110,920	46
Slovak Democrats	988,275	43
Social Democrats (Bohemia & Moravia)	855,771	37
Slovak Labour Party	49,983	2
Slovak Freedom Party	67,575	3
Total electorate : 7,583,784		

It is noteworthy that the Marxist parties (the two Communist Parties, the Social Democratic Party and the Slovak Labour Party) secured 51 per cent of the votes cast, and 47·4 per cent of the total electorate ; the two Communist Parties secured merely 35·5 per cent of the total electorate ; of those the higher proportion was in Bohemia (43·25) and the lower in Slovakia (30·48 per cent). In Slovakia twice as many people voted for the Slovak Democratic Party (61·43 per cent of the electorate) as for the Communist Party (30·48 per cent). It is also noteworthy that 516,428 people evaded the law of compulsory voting, spoiled their ballot papers, sent them in blank, or otherwise declared their indifference or opposition to the National Front.

As soon as the election results were certainly known President Beneš invited Klement Gottwald, the leader of the Communist Party, to form the second government of the National Front. In the new Government there were nine Communists : the Prime Minister (Gottwald), one of the deputy Premiers (the Slovak Široký), the Ministers of Information (Kopecký), the Interior (Nosek), Finance (Dolánský), Agriculture (the Slovak Duriš), Internal Trade, Social Welfare, and the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs (Clementis). There were four National Socialists : one of the vice-Premiers (Zenkl), the Ministers of Education (Stránský), Justice (Drtina), and Foreign Trade (Ripka). There were three Social Democrats : one of the vice-Premiers (Fierlinger) the Minister for Industry (Laušman) and the Minister of Food (Majer). There were three Populists : one of the vice-Premiers (Šrámek), and the Ministers of Posts (Father Hála) and Health (Procházka) ; and there were two Slovak Democrats : one of the vice-Premiers (Ursiny), and the Minister of Transport. The two remaining Ministers, Masaryk for Foreign Affairs and Svoboda for Defence were members of no party, though Masaryk was thought to incline to the National Socialists and Svoboda to the Communists. The Košice programme remained the

programme of the Government, and the Inner Committee of the National Front, composed of the party chiefs, remained the effective executive. There were in fact two tendencies within the Government. One, radical, progressive, and eastern in its affinities, was led by the Communists and was followed somewhat hesitantly at first by the Social Democrats. The other, more cautious and conventional, inclined to think that the social revolution ought not to go much further, and was anxious that its loyalty to the Russian alliance should not involve a breach with the west. This group was led by the National Socialists, particularly Zenkl, Drtina, Ripka and Stránský, in somewhat uneasy alliance with the Populists and Slovak Democrats, who stood definitely on the right, though they accepted both the alliance with the Soviet Union and nationalization as far as it had then gone.

The first act of the Constituent Assembly was unanimously to re-elect Beneš President of the Republic, and thereby to give unquestionable constitutional legality to his continuance in office after the expiry of his first term of office in 1942.

The twelve months which followed the election of May 1946 was the happiest period of the restored Republic. Industrial production showed signs of rapid development; trade, especially with the western countries, was growing apace, there was a good harvest, food was relatively abundant, and it seemed that the Communist Party was content with its leading position in the Government and was prepared to play the game of parliamentary politics according to the normal western rules. The territorial dispute with Poland was put into cold storage, and only a quarrel with Hungary marred the serenity of Czechoslovak international relations. The policy which dominated the political scene was a project for a two-year plan. The Košice programme had said nothing explicit about a planned economy, but the feeling that planning was necessary was implicit in public life from the moment of liberation. The Communist Party took the lead in insisting on its importance, but the other parties at the least acquiesced. An Economic Council had been established in 1945, and its secretariat was the Central Planning Commission. To concert the details of the plan a State Planning Office was set up, and it produced a volume on 'The Reconstruction of the Czechoslovak Republic' which became the basis of a bill enacted by the Assembly and signed by the President on 28 October 1946. The express purpose of the plan was 'to revive and reconstruct the economy of the Czechoslovak Republic and to increase

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the standard of living of our people'. Within the space of two years beginning from 1 January 1947 industrial production was to expand to 110 per cent of what it had been in 1937, and agricultural production was to be restored to what it had been before the war. More specifically the main products were planned to be developed as follows :

	MONTHLY AVERAGE IN 1,000 METRIC TONS		
	1937	1946	1948
Black coal	1,398	1,181	1,479
Lignite	1,491	1,623	1,992
Steel	193	140	200
Electric power (m. kwh.)	342	464	617
Locomotives (units)	6	12	24
Rolling stock (")	97	861	1,265
Tractors (")	17	78	733
Motor cars (")	678	351	1,167
Paper	16	12	16
Cotton yarn	6,281	2,684	4,850
Wool yarn	2,501	not available	1,800
Footwear (thousand pairs)	4,207	"	3,800
Wheat	1,374	"	1,485
Rye	1,479	"	1,187
Barley	1,114	"	1,123
Potatoes	11,914	"	8,782
Sugar beet	5,986	"	4,719

It was also planned to increase the output above the 1937 level, of beef by 35 per cent, of pork fat by 100 per cent, of butter by 100 per cent, of milk by 75 per cent, and of eggs by 50 per cent; 125,000 new houses were to be built. One interesting feature of the plan is that it envisaged a much greater increase in heavy industries than in textiles and footwear. The dependence of Czechoslovakia on imported cotton, wool, and leather was so great, and the difficulty of obtaining the first from the United States and Egypt, and the second from Australia induced Gottwald to envisage the atrophy of the Czechoslovak textile industry.¹

The plan was launched on 1 January 1947 with much synthetic and some genuine enthusiasm, and undoubtedly the fact that each branch of industry had its definite monthly target helped the less handicapped industries to increase their output. It so happened that these industries were also those which were most nationalized, and therefore the statistics of production could be made to read as if the nationalized industries were more efficient. In particular the building industry failed to achieve what was planned for it, and since there was still much private enterprise in building, its failure

¹ K. Gottwald, *Long Term Planning*, Prague, p. 8. For the plans as a whole see *The First Czechoslovak Economic Plan* (Prague, Orbis, n.d.).

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was interpreted as a failure of private enterprise. The following table indicates the degree of success achieved by the plan in the more important branches of production, up to the revolution of February 1948 :

	PERCENTAGE ACHIEVEMENT OF PLANNED OUTPUT				
	<i>Jan. 1947</i>	<i>Apr. 1947</i>	<i>June 1947</i>	<i>Oct. 1947</i>	<i>Jan. 1948</i>
Overall	104·2	101·7	97·2	104·3	103·6
Mining	105·1	101·8	96·7	100·6	100·1
Power	100·1	98·8	103·0	104·3	97·3
Foundries	112·9	108·3	104·8	111·7	108·7
Engineering	108·8	97·7	89·0	92·0	97·6
Glass	97·2	87·1	86·2	99·8	109·9
Pottery	60·0	85·4	91·0	125·1	124·5
Chemicals	53·7	91·1	88·4	93·4	139·6
Paper	100·6	116·5	111·1	118·7	109·5
Timber	102·3	102·2	113·0	120·7	106·1
Textiles	109·7	101·7	93·3	105·6	91·5
Leather and rubber	122·1	124·3	107·5	136·0	103·2

The figures for agricultural production in 1947 have little relevance because of the catastrophic drought which afflicted the whole of Europe that year and which seems to have hit Czechoslovakia harder than any other country. From April to October there was almost no rain at all. Food rations had to be decreased as early as May, and again in November when it was officially stated that the normal Czechoslovak consumer had smaller rations than those which then prevailed in western Germany. In December 1947 it was estimated that the drought had cost Czechoslovakia the equivalent of £60 million. Of the deficit fodder accounted for 44·7 per cent, grain 33·5 per cent, sugar beet 11·1 per cent, potatoes 8·8 per cent, and oil plants 1·9 per cent. The chief sufferer was live stock, which had to be killed and eaten for lack of foodstuffs. Poultry virtually disappeared from the market.

The drought was not only the most important economic event of 1947 ; it also had great political consequences. Relief might have come either from the west or east, but policy was so handled that it was not America but Russia that saved the country from starvation. . . It happened in this way : when on 5 June 1947 the Secretary of State, Mr Marshall, first adumbrated aid to Europe in his Harvard speech, the prospect of material help from the rich resources of the United States was hailed with general joy in Czechoslovakia, and the Government unanimously accepted the invitation to the Paris conference on 7 July. But the next day it was announced that Gottwald, Masaryk, and Drtina had gone to Moscow ' to discuss a trade treaty ' with the Soviet Union. There Stalin made it clear to the Czechoslovak Ministers that acceptance of Marshall aid

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would incur the forfeiture of the friendship and patronage of the U.S.S.R. To compensate for this loss Stalin, Molotov, and Mikoyan promised to Czechoslovakia a five-year trade agreement. Gottwald could not but concur, and his colleagues felt bound to accept the decision on the grounds that the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union alone could and would guarantee Czechoslovakia against German vengeance. Therefore on 10 July, to the great regret of all the western peoples and of most Czechoslovaks, the Czechoslovak Government withdrew its acceptance of the invitation to Paris. Two days later the trade treaty was signed in Moscow. In the autumn, when the dearth was becoming alarming, the U.S.S.R. promised to send 400,000 tons of grain to Czechoslovakia. On 25 November Gottwald appealed to Stalin for 150,000 tons more, and with a gesture of generosity Stalin promised 200,000 tons.¹ On 11 December 1947 the Czechoslovak-Soviet exchange and payment agreement was signed, whereby an exchange to the total value of £25 million a year for the years 1948 to 1952 was planned. Czechoslovakia was to send to Russia pipes, railway lines, industrial equipment, equipment for power stations, sugar, textiles, footwear, plate-glass, and chemicals in exchange for grain, fodder, raw cotton, fertilizers, naphtha, iron, manganese and chromium ores, cast iron, and iron castings. To facilitate this exchange the Soviet Union afforded to Czechoslovakia a short-term credit of £5,750,000. The effect of the treaty would be to raise the proportion of Czechoslovak exports sent to the U.S.S.R. from 11 per cent to 16 per cent.

The compact was made. Czechoslovakia rejected Marshall aid, and bound herself economically as well as politically to her eastern ally. So too was the political destiny of Czechoslovakia decided. Almost from the moment of the withdrawal of the acceptance of the invitation to Paris we begin to see signs of a growing rift in the national front. Before July 1947 the Communist Party had given no indication that it wanted to force the pace. Immediately after the election of May 1946 Jiří Hronek, a spokesman of the Communist Party, had said :

No further revolutionary changes are expected or called for. This is the view of the majority of the population and of the leading men

¹ 50,000 tons of bread grain and 50,000 tons of fodder grain were sent before the end of the year, and the rest of the 600,000 tons by April. It is interesting to recall that the U.S.S.R. sent 700,000 tons of grain to Britain in the same twelve months.

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and women of the strongest Czechoslovak party, the Communist Party. The party has already proved that its programme for the future is consolidation and evolution. This is one of the reasons why so many citizens cast their votes for this party.

The Communists had declared that there was no need for any further nationalization. All seemed set for orderly building on the political and economic bases already laid. The new constitution was being worked out by a committee of the Assembly on orthodox liberal lines; the distribution of the remaining great estates, including those of the Church, was nearing completion. An inclusive bill for social insurance was being worked out in complete harmony of all the parties. But from July 1947 the peaceful political atmosphere began to be ruffled.

Two events made it clear that the non-Marxist parties did not like the decision of 10 July. First the National Socialist vice-Premier, Zenkl, expressed his regret that the invitation to participate in the Marshall aid conference has been rejected. Then there appeared the first quarrel when the Government proposed that the peasants who had suffered from the drought should be compensated by a tax on 'millionaires'.² The Populist newspaper, *Lidová Demokracie*, and the National Socialist *Svobodné Slovo* said that the tax should be borne by all the taxpayers. The same controversy split the Social Democrats, the leader of whose left wing, Fierlinger, carried the party in support of the millionaires' tax against the more moderate Laušman and Majer. More fuel was given to the growing Communist attacks on the protectors of 'capitalists' when three Populist leaders, Hála, Ducháček, and Tigríd went in September on a good will mission to London. Tempers rose still higher as a result of explosive packages being sent to three Cabinet Ministers on 10 September. Drtina, the Minister of Justice, instituted an inquiry, in the course of which it was revealed that there were stores of arms at some Communist local headquarters. It was interesting that when the Communists complained in the Assembly that their premises were being searched they made no attempt to deny the existence of the arms.

The centre of party conflict during the last four months of the year was Slovakia. That country, with its majority of Catholic and conservative peasants, would have to be regimented if the dominant position of the Communists were to

² A Czech millionaire need not be very rich, for a million crowns is equivalent to only £5,000.

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be ensured. There was cause for concern. It is true that the conviction and execution of Father Tiso, the former President of the Slovak Republic, had passed off with no more active protest than the dismissal of the Communist president of the court which had tried him by the Slovak Council of Trustees.¹ Much trouble was caused in Slovakia by the attempts of Polish and Ukrainian dissidents, the so-called Banderovci, to pass through Slovakia and Moravia to the American zone of Austria. Their presence tempted some irreconcilables into treasonable activities against the Republic. On 15 September 1947 the army and police arrested eighty people, former followers of the White Russian, Vlasov, and Slovak civil servants, for concerting a plot to assassinate President Beneš and overthrow the State. The Communist Party demanded a closer alliance of parties to fight the enemies of the Republic, but though the Social Democrats on 15 September signed an agreement to establish a united front with the Communist Party, two days later the National Socialists refused to do so. On 3 October fifty-five more Slovaks were arrested on suspicion of plotting the disruption of the Republic. On the 5th the world was informed that international Communism had been reincarnated in the Cominform. On the 8th the Slovak Trustee for the Interior announced :

From 7 October State security officers arrested 380 persons during a campaign against those who have been organizing 'Tiso detachments'. These are picked troops who, at a given moment, were to replace the army. Fifty-eight have been released without further proceedings ; 85 others were released but were proceeded against ; 237 have been remanded in custody . . . By profession they are : 69 officials and civil servants, 28 private employees, 24 monks and nuns, 35 students, 61 tradesmen, 9 farmers, 9 artisans, and 145 others. The authorities have confiscated two broadcasting stations, . . . six rifles, nine revolvers, and many seditious leaflets.²

Most significant of the arrests was that of Obuch, a high official in the vice-Premier's office, and of the leader of the Slovak Democratic Party, Ursiny. Ursiny resigned his vice-Premiership on 30 October, and the Slovak Democratic Party had been decisively broken. The next day the Communist members of the Slovak Council of Trustees demanded the appointment of non-party Trustees to replace the Democrat Trustees of the Interior and of Justice. The Council rejected the proposal, and its Communist members then resigned and its

¹ This was the cabinet of the local government of Slovakia, composed of Slovak Deputies (*poverenci*) of the National Government in Prague.

² *Svobodná Noviny*, 9 September 1947.

Communist chairman, Dr Husák, declared the Council to be dissolved (1 November). The Prague Government entrusted the Prime Minister Gottwald with opening negotiations for a new Council of Trustees for Slovakia. This he achieved by 20 November. The new board was found to be so constituted that the Slovak Democrats lost the majority on it which they had hitherto enjoyed, and the small Slovak Freedom Party and the Slovak Social Democratic Party held the deciding vote. It was not a clear-cut Communist victory, and it seems clear that the President and the Cabinet had stood firmly against an assumption of power by the Communists in Slovakia where they were a minority of 30 per cent.

If, as seemed increasingly likely, there was to be open party war, it was very important to know which way the Social Democratic Party would go. It was officially Marxist in philosophy, but it had fifty years of progressive, gradual, achievement behind it; many of its members felt closer affinities with the Socialist parties of the west than with the Cominform and believed that events were demonstrating the possibility of achieving socialism in Czechoslovakia without revolution, dictatorship, or a single-party State; the Czechoslovakia of 1947 did not seem to fit into the Leninist picture of mighty capitalists and wealthy landlords engaged in class war with workers and peasants. The workers and peasants seemed to be getting what they wanted without serious opposition. It was in this temper that the party leader, Fierlinger, and the party secretary, Vilím, on 5 October had declared that neither in Poland nor in Czechoslovakia would the Social Democrats amalgamate with any other party. A fateful congress of the party was held in Brno on 16 November when Laušman, the moderate, and not Fierlinger, was elected chairman. This was alarming to the Communists, for it might well be that without the support of the Social Democrats they would not be able to control a majority in the Government or in the Assembly.

The policy of the Communists was now to represent the State as being in mortal danger from Slovak separatists, domestic reactionaries, and foreign interference, dangers to which the other parties were, it was suggested, at best indifferent. On 17 November thirty-six persons were arrested at Most on charges of espionage, and the suggestion was at once apparent that the United States was implicated, for American troops were in occupation of Bavaria right up to the western frontier of Bohemia. On 29 November the central committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party met and Gottwald

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declared to it :

In the coming weeks or months Czechoslovakia will have to reckon with an increasing pressure from foreign reaction on the Czechoslovak Republic, but it will be unsuccessful. The tasks of the Communist Party are : to dominate and overcome difficulties caused by the food supplies, to improve distribution of the food supplies, to improve food conditions in Slovakia, to utilize the remaining short period left for autumn cultivation, to end the first year of the two-year plan, if possible, with more than a 100 per cent fulfilment, to put on the order of the day of the Government's working plan a series of important Bills which guarantee the smooth working of the economic system and a proper standard of living for the people, to introduce measures in Slovakia for the complete elimination of the anti-State plot of the Hlinka Party, the extirpation of the agents of reaction and subversive activities from all elements of the National Front, in foreign policy to suppress all features, tendencies, and activities in the political domain, which might be detrimental to Czechoslovakia's relations of alliance with Soviet Russia and the other Slav nations.¹

The significance of this declaration was not realized for another three months. The breakdown of the London Conference of the four great Powers in December could not but exacerbate the anti-western policy of the Czechoslovak Communists.

THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES FEBRUARY TO DECEMBER 1948

The inner history of what happened in Czechoslovakia during February 1948 cannot yet be written. Two of the protagonists, Beneš and Masaryk, are dead without having told their story ; the inner councils of the Czechoslovak Communist Party are secret ; we do not know what part, if any, was played by the Soviet Union. All that can be done here is briefly to narrate the events and indicate their consequences.²

From the beginning of February there were ominous signs. On the 4th the Populist leaders were shouted down in a meeting in the Lucerna Hall in Prague. More serious was a bitter dispute about the date of the general election which was due in April. It could not be held before the new constitution was completed, and there were difficulties about its completion whose nature is not clear. The Communists urged that the

¹ *Svobodné Noviny*, 30 November 1947.

² The official account and some of the documents are given in *What happened in Czechoslovakia* (Prague, Orbis, 1948). An account from the other side has been written by Hubert Ripka : *Czechoslovakia Enslaved* (London, Gollancz, 1950).

election should be postponed until 23 May. They were already campaigning for '51 per cent', that is, for an absolute majority of votes and seats for themselves. They themselves declare they were even then sure of it, pointing to the fact that during 1947 membership of the party had increased from 1,043,754 to 1,310,440 and Slanský, its secretary-general, had declared that it had a greater membership than all the other parties together. On the other hand other observers believed that there was some falling away in the early weeks of 1948, and that it was the Social Democrats who were improving their position.

On 10 February there was another acrimonious dispute within the Government. It was generally agreed that the pay of civil servants ought to be increased. Majer, the Social Democrat Minister of Food, proposed that the salaries should be increased proportionally, the lowest paid getting an increase of 300 Kčs a month, the increase rising to one of 800 Kčs for the highest paid. It was supported by all the other parties except the Communists, who stood out for a flat increase; in this opposition the ministers Duriš and Dolánský were supported by the Trade Union Council (URO) and its president, Zápatocký. This conflict demonstrated to the Communists that they could be outvoted in the Government. In the stalemate which ensued bills for national insurance, educational reform, and the drafting of the constitution itself were held up, and it was possible to make out a case for saying that the factiousness of non-Communist parties was holding up essential developments desired by the people as a whole.

The decisive crisis began on Tuesday 17 February. Nosek, the Communist Minister of the Interior, was suspected by his opponents of packing the higher ranks of the police (S.N.B.) with Communists, and on that day the non-Communist ministers demanded in a cabinet meeting that a number of recent police promotions should be cancelled. The Communists found themselves in a minority,¹ and urged that no decision should be taken because Nosek himself was absent on the plea of indisposition. Then the cabinet refused to transact any other business until the police matter was settled, and so Gottwald adjourned the meeting until the 20th.

The same day, whether before or after the cabinet meeting

¹The Social Democrats voted with the National Socialists, Populists, and Slovak Democrats on these matters, leaving the Communists isolated in a minority in the National front. There is little doubt that their realization that they had no constitutional way out helped to decide the Communists to precipitate the *coup d'état*.

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is not clear, the central legislative committee of the Communist Party held an extraordinary meeting which issued the following manifesto :

For some weeks it has been obvious that the representatives of some political parties in the Government have chosen their own method, in defiance of their obligations to the National Front and the Government programme, to prevent the enactment of the new constitution before the election, and of important laws which constitute the remaining part of the Government's reconstruction programme. The Communist members of the Government have made every effort to enact the new constitution and the remaining points of the Government's reconstruction programme before the election in the common spirit of the National Front. But the governmental representatives of the other parties have endeavoured to frustrate the activity of the Government, obviously with the purpose of unexpectedly evoking an open Government crisis.

In this way the agents of certain parties think to evoke a degree of internal political chaos, which might seriously endanger the carrying out of free democratic elections.

The central committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia has come to the conclusion that the deliberate course pursued by the representatives of certain political parties is connected with the purpose of establishing, before the elections, by anti-democratic and unconstitutional means a non-parliamentary Government of officials, which would attempt to wrest power from the hands of the sovereign people, and in the service of reaction in an atmosphere of political and economic turmoil to prepare for an anti-democratic election. The central committee has therefore decided to take all necessary measures to frustrate the wicked plans of allied reaction and to ensure peaceful development of the new Republic.

In this present grave conjuncture it is essential that all workers, farmers, artisans, and intellectuals, all democratic and progressive people without distinction of party, all true Czechs and Slovaks, should be ready to destroy any subversive plans in the bud and to defend the interests of the State and nation. Despite all the attempts of the reaction and its assistants to disrupt the National Front and the unity of the people, there will stand, ready to defend the people of the democratic regime, the real National Front representing the working people of town and country under the leadership of Klement Gottwald.

In connexion with this critical development of the political situation much greater importance attaches to the general national assembly of works' councils and trade union organizations called for 22 February, as well as to the general national assembly of the farm commissions, called for 28 and 29 February. To these assemblies whose important deliberations the reaction may have wanted to anticipate by their intrigues, will fall the task, important both for the nation and the State, of seeing not only that our national revolution

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is not thwarted, but also that it is successfully developed in the spirit of the people's democracy and socialism.¹

Three days after this publication of the news of an alleged plot to set up a Government of officials, on 20 February, twelve ministers of the non-Communist parties offered their resignation to the President. They were all the Populist and National Socialist ministers, as well as the Slovak Democrats; the Social Democrats were divided,² but Fierlinger took Laušman and the bulk of the party willy-nilly into the Communist camp. Svoboda and Jan Masaryk did not resign. The prudence of this action of the anti-Communist ministers has been much questioned; they probably thought that, if the majority opinion in the cabinet about the police was not to be allowed to prevail, they could by resignation force a dissolution and an immediate general election, so that the people might freely decide at the polls between them and the Communists. Much depended on whether Beneš would accept their resignation or not. Gottwald addressed a great meeting in the Old Town Square and secured its support for a resolution urging the President to accept the resignations and to accept a new government formed by Gottwald. On Sunday 22 February that assembly of works' councils and trade union organizations to which the Communist manifesto had looked as having a vital task to perform came out strongly (not absolutely unanimously) for support of Gottwald against the 'reactionary conspirators', as well it might, for by singular prevision only factories with more than 300 employees, that is the more radical establishments, were represented at the meeting. The next day the security police arrested certain leading National Socialists and Slovak Democrats; the headquarters of all the political parties, including the Social Democrats, were searched for incriminating documents. The meeting of the National Assembly due for the morrow was postponed. Already workers were appearing in the streets armed with brand new rifles sent by their comrades in the arms factories. The only demonstration in protest against

¹ Translation of the text in full as given in *Svobodné Noviny*, 18 February 1948; that paper was for another week to remain independent. In this same number it roundly criticized the manifesto, pointing out among other things, that if the national insurance Bills and the land reform Bill had been held up, it was the Communists themselves who had delayed their enactment. The timing of this manifesto as well as its contents is the best evidence that the Communist Party had planned a coup before ever the twelve ministers resigned. See Josef Josten, *Oh My Country* (London, Latimer House, 1949).

² Majer was later expelled from the Party; Vilím, the General Secretary, escaped from the country.

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these events was that conducted by a large body of students who endeavoured to present their protests to the President ; in the confusion at the gate of the Castle one student was shot in the foot by the police.

The following day, 24 February, the Communists and their allies in the Social Democratic Party and the trade unions brought out the workers in a general strike of one hour to demonstrate the force that lay behind the Prime Minister, and though Beneš protested that ' today's crisis can only be overcome in a democratic and parliamentary way ', the fear that a further refusal to accept the twelve Ministers' resignations would result in civil, if not international, war, induced him with obvious reluctance to accept the resignations on 25 February, and to agree to a new government of Gottwald's nomination. It was a Cabinet of twenty-four, of whom twelve were Communists (including Zápatocký, the President of the Trade Union Council), three were Social Democrats (Fierlinger, Laušman, and Erban the secretary of the Trade Union Council), and the rest were relatively unknown members of the Populist, National, Socialist, and Slovak Parties willing to replace their former leaders and to join in the howls of vituperation against them. Masaryk remained Foreign Minister.

The purge extended to the non-Communist newspapers, which from the 25th with one voice denounced their former champions and editors and thenceforward sang the same song even if the manner of their singing varied from the rude to the recondite. Six newspapers were suspended on 26 February and eight on the next day.

It soon became clear that not President, Parliament (which was not allowed to meet until 28 April), nor even the cabinet was now the ruler of Czechoslovakia, but a self-constituted body which called itself the Central Action Committee of the National Front. It was a body of 92 persons, made up of 10 representatives of the Trade Union Council, 13 representatives of the Communist Party, 8 Social Democrats, 6 members of the United Assembly of Czech farmers and the Central Committee of the Farmers' Commissions (the latter a Communist body), 16 individual members of various national ex-service men's, youth, and cultural associations, and, significantly, 37 representatives of the Soviet-Czechoslovak Friendship League. The vice-President of this Central Action Committee was Slanský, the very able secretary-general of the Czechoslovak Communist party, and since February one of the most powerful

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men in Czechoslovakia. This, or its executive committee, is the body which discusses and decides policy, initiates and frames laws, issues binding decrees, controls the purge, instructs ministries and local government authorities, and supervises the whole hierarchy of action committees which emerged at once in every department of Government and in every social, political, and cultural organization.

An agony of self-purgation affected the whole of society. All the political parties except the Communists expelled those suspected of opposition to the new Government ; the society of journalists expelled many of its most distinguished men to live without the possibility of earning anything by their pens ; the ministries, the National Opera, artists, and sculptors rid themselves of non-conformists ; the Czechoslovak Film Undertaking purged 216 of its employees. The Ministry of Education suspended from their professional functions twelve teachers in the University, and also suspended two lecturers, two assistants, and six students of the Philosophy Faculty. Dr Engliš, the rector of the University, was deprived of his post.

These events in Czechoslovakia excited great interest abroad ; on 26 February Great Britain, the United States, and France issued a joint declaration regretting and condemning 'the establishment of a disguised dictatorship of a single party under the cloak of a Government of National Union'. At the same time the Moscow radio applauded the course of events and assured the Czechoslovak people that 200 million friends stood behind them in their fight against treason and reaction. There was no overt action taken by the Soviet Government in the events in Prague, though the fact that the Soviet deputy Foreign Minister, Zorin, was present in Prague from 19 to 28 February, ostensibly to supervise the consignment of Russian grain, occasioned much comment among those who regretted the revolution in Czechoslovak affairs.

The effect of the February revolution has been to convert Czechoslovakia from a parliamentary democracy of the western type into a people's republic which is substantially a dictatorship of the proletariat. The power of the Trade Union Council is enormous and its Communist chief, Zápatocký, is now Prime Minister, for when Beneš resigned the presidency on 7 June and Gottwald was elected to succeed him on the 14th, Zápatocký succeeded to the premiership. He has shown himself courageous and realistic ; more than once has he rated the workers for idleness, absenteeism, and an unsocialistic desire for higher wages and an excessive share in the profits of nation-

alized industry. There was no startling increase in production despite the fact that on 29 April all industrial concerns employing more than 50 workmen as well as wholesale and foreign trade, distilleries, breweries, bakeries, malt-houses, dairies, and edible fat factories were nationalized. It is true that on the thirtieth anniversary of the foundation of the Republic, 28 October 1948, it was jubilantly announced that the two-year plan had been fulfilled by 101 per cent, but there were still great difficulties in foreign trade, especially in securing raw materials. Again the Soviet Union came to the salvation of her ally, for on 12 December 1948 Zápatočký, Clementis (the Foreign Minister who succeeded Masaryk after his tragic death on 10 March), Dolánský, and Kliment, the Minister for Foreign Trade, went to Moscow and there signed a trade agreement whereby the Soviet Union undertook to send Czechoslovakia 45,000 tons of cotton and 1,500 tons of wool and to provide gold and free currency, presumably for Czechoslovakia to make purchases in the sterling and dollar areas. The Soviet Union also, despite a good harvest in Czechoslovakia, undertook to send a further 300,000 tons of grain, as well as meat and fats. The peasants have shown some nervousness about collectivization, and there have in fact been indications that State farms are being extended, chiefly at the expense of kulaks.

The February revolution was not followed by a Red Terror. The purge usually stopped short at dismissal, and the number of those arrested in the summer of 1948 was greatly in excess of those detained in prison for long. As the year progressed sentences of imprisonment increased in number and in length. The British, French, and American embassies were accused of conspiring to facilitate escapes and assist 'terrorists'. Many thousands of persons fled from the country, despite the heavy penalties imposed on those who tried to get out without the permission of the Ministry of the Interior. Nearly all the ministers who resigned (except Dr Drtina who tried to kill himself and is, like Mgr Šrámek and Father Hála, in detention) are now in Paris, London, or the United States. Most of the other refugees are unhappily living in camps in the American zone of Germany. It has been thought necessary by the Czechoslovak Government to enact on 7 October 1948 a new law for national security which lays down severe penalties for sabotage, conspiring against or insulting the Government, the hoarding of grain by farmers and 'war-mongering', and which enjoins the courts to make careful enquiry into the 'subjective

guilt' of the accused. The whole system of district and appellate jurisdiction has been reconstructed and lay assessors given a greater part to play in the administration of justice (Law of 20 December 1948).

One of the immediate consequences of the revolution was to bring Slovakia to heel. As soon as the crisis arose in Prague the Communist chairman of the Slovak Council of Trustees, Husák, declared that the Slovak Democrat and Slovak Freedom parties' representatives in the Council had no further status there because their leaders in Prague had resigned. On 2 March the Prague Government reconstituted the Slovak Council of Trustees, without reference to the wishes of the Slovak people, so that it consisted of 8 Communists, 2 Social Democrats, one member of the Slovak Freedom Party, one of the Slovak Democratic Party, one trade union representative, and one representative of the Youth Council.¹

The Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party committed suicide when its majority decided to go with the Communists in February. Majer refused to co-operate and was expelled; Laušman resigned from the Government on 30 April. The rest, led by Fierlinger, amalgamated with the Communist Party on 18 April. Nor does the survival of the other emasculated parties in the National Front seem to mean very much, for when a general election was held on 30 May 1948 the voters were given a single list of candidates which they could accept or reject as a whole; the elector had no power to choose for which individual or party he would vote. The result of the election was that 6,431,963 persons voted for the National Front and 1,573,924 returned blank or spoiled papers.

When the election was held the new constitution was not yet law. It had been accepted, virtually in the terms which had been agreed before February, by the Constituent Assembly on 9 May by 246 votes to none.² It is an interesting document, enshrining all the most orthodox liberal principles, to nearly every one of which is appended the note that details to insure this or that right will be enacted later. But harmless as it looked, Beneš was apparently reluctant to sign it,³ and not until Beneš had resigned and Gottwald succeeded him as

¹ Since February 1948 several of the rump parties have changed their names: the National Socialists are now Czech Socialists and the Slovak Democratic party is now the Slovak Party of Rebirth.

² The missing 54 votes are those of the Deputies who had fled, were in prison, or had been purged.

³ Perhaps chiefly because in the preamble it assigns to the Russian Revolution of 1918 the main inspiration for the creation of the Czechoslovak State.

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acting President did the constitution receive the presidential fiat, on 9 June 1948.

The new Government was able to reap the harvest sown by its predecessor by taking through its final stages the bill establishing an extended system of national insurance. It also completed the system of interlocking bilateral alliances and trade agreements by treaties with Bulgaria (23 April), the Soviet zone of Germany (21 July), Roumania (21 July), and Hungary (20 November). Its most notable achievement was an important agreement with Poland, made on 7 August, which envisaged the establishment of an industrial unit reaching from Katowice in Poland to Ostrava in Moravia, which would include the whole coal, zinc, iron and steel industries of both countries, and thus represent an eastern Ruhr, wherein raw materials would be pooled, joint industries established, and foreign trade operated in partnership. The treaty with Hungary was of happy augury; apparently the policy of 1946 and 1947 of trying to force Magyars in Czechoslovakia to give up their farms and go to Hungary has been dropped, and those Magyars who still remain in Czechoslovakia are gradually being readmitted to citizen rights.

On 1 January 1949 the People's Republic of Czechoslovakia embarked on its new five-year plan. In announcing it on 7 October the Prime Minister, Zápatočký, said that it would involve the removal of all remaining capitalist elements from all sectors of the national economy. He also assured the Assembly that Czechoslovakia would not merge with the U.S.S.R. but would preserve her independence.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE REVOLUTION IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE

BY R. R. BETTS

WHEN one reflects on the events chronicled in the preceding chapters in the search for any pattern there may be, one is immediately convinced that, whether what has happened in central and south-eastern Europe be progress or not, there has at the least been a great change. Thrones have been overthrown, ancient and entrenched aristocracies have been dispersed, feudal dominions have been shattered, old privileges abolished; statesmen and politicians who had dominated events have disappeared into retirement, exile or the grave; the old parties have split, coalesced, transformed themselves, died out or blossomed exceedingly; new men, new parties, new ideas have emerged from the coulisses of history and filled the centre of the stage, and it is not only the clique and the disciples who have applauded their achievement; men and women who were accustomed to look to Westminster and Washington, to Paris and Rome for light and leading, have had their faces turned to the East. The habits and traditions of a millennium have been revolutionized in a decade.

Ten years ago Roumania was a Ruritanian kingdom, where a corrupt monarchy struggled with a Fascist group for autocratic power. Today it is a 'People's Republic', its king deposed and in exile; the Fascists are scattered or dead, the former political leaders in prison or in exile; the foreign capitalists of the old order have been extradited; the parties have been abolished or tamed to the acceptance of the dominant philosophy; the Hohenzollern dynasty has been eliminated.

Ten years ago the kingdom of Bulgaria was poor and despised, the victim of the ambitious greed of its Teutonic kings, its meagre territories sliced and pared away by its astute and fortunate neighbours. Today King Boris is mysteriously dead, his son deposed; and the country's economy is co-ordinated and directed towards making the most of meagre resources, helped by the powerful friendship of the U.S.S.R.

The transformation of Yugoslavia is even more remarkable. There, to the discord of the Triune Kingdom has succeeded

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at least the appearance of the harmony of the Federal People's Republic. The dynasty of Black George has been overthrown ; those princes and politicians and generals who had looked to Germany to save them from revolution have been ruthlessly eliminated ; the labour of the farmers of Croatia and Slovenia, of the artisans of Belgrade, the fishermen of Dalmatia, and the herdsmen of Montenegro and Macedonia is co-ordinated in the interests of the nation as a whole. Serb and Slavonian, Orthodox and Catholic together are led by a man who acknowledges the authority of neither east nor west but seeks to establish a socialist people's republic on the basis of its native resources.

The most astonishing transformation scene of all is that in Hungary. Nowhere in Europe did autocracy and dynasticism seem more firmly entrenched ; nowhere were autocrats and the Church more widely endowed with land and power ; nowhere were tradition, custom, and privilege rooted more deeply and for so long ; nowhere was racial pride so high as in Horthy's Hungary. Today the monarchy has been abolished ; the crown of St Stephen has been cast aside, and its latest champion, the prince cardinal archbishop of Esztergom is in prison ; the Hungarian aristocrats are in exile or menially earning their bread, and their great estates have been parcelled out among their former serfs. The Jews, so long despised, now occupy positions of great power in the cabinets of the new State ; the wide cornfields which were once the means of Hungary's economic enslavement to Germany are being broken up into market gardens, poultry runs, and vineyards to supply the needs of growing urban populations in what was before one of the least industrial and urban lands of Catholic Europe. A people, which has long regarded all Slavs in general and the Russians in particular with contempt for their barbarity and hatred for the arbitrary exercise of their power, now officially embraces a political philosophy and a pattern of economy whose origin and character derives from Russia.

Poland too has been radically transformed. For one thing it has been bodily moved westwards : the five-hundred-year old connexion with Lithuania, White Russia, and the Ukraine has gone, and western Slav provinces which have as long been part of Germany have been added to her. Gone too is the ancient and dishonoured monopoly of wealth and power by the Szlachta and the land of Poland belongs to those who work it. The work of Marshals Pilsudsky and Smigly-Rydz is rejected as decisively as that of the Szlachta, and here too a

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people whose whole history since the time of Boleslaw of the Wry Mouth has been one long struggle with Russia, has now adopted the ideology of the Power which guarantees her new frontiers.

The revolution in Czechoslovakia is somewhat different from the others, though no less fundamental. The parliamentary government, the vigorous political life of conflicting parties and of newspapers free to expound and to criticize of the nineteen-thirties have given place to authoritative rule based on an urban proletariat. Thomas Masaryk has been canonized with faint praise and given his niche in the temple of those who did their best according their lights. His son and his successor are dead, formally honoured but scarcely regretted by those who have climbed over them to power. Harmony characterizes the press, purged of dissident and refractory elements. The western tradition is denounced and western influences denied, and the history of the people of Hus and Comenius is being rewritten on the single principle of *ex oriente lux*.

There remain two things to do : first, if not to strike a balance between what has been lost and what gained, at least to present an account ; secondly, to endeavour to see if any pattern of cause and event is yet discernible in this turbulent story.

To deny that much has been achieved would be to fly in the face of the facts. Six nations, some of which have rarely known what good government means, have been given a measure of order and security after Fascist tumult, German invasion and domination, armed revolution, and factious strife. The great danger of German aggression has been removed and all the might of the Soviet Union is there as a guarantee against its revival. Fear of Germany is still very much alive in Czechoslovakia and Poland, but the Czechs and Poles have been persuaded to believe they have discovered where their chief hope against it lies. And there is peace too between nation and nation. Czechs and Poles have agreed to forget Teschen and Ratibor and Ober-Lausitz and have together projected the building of a great ' eastern Ruhr ' in Polish and Czech Silesia. The Magyars seem ready to admit that their fellow-countrymen in Transylvania are free and equal with their Roumanian fellow-citizens, and there is the strength of a common political faith to counter the toxins of nationalism, so that today even Hungary and Czechoslovakia have agreed to stomach each other's minorities and to conclude an agreement for mutually beneficial trade. That such new-

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found harmony is not yet deeply rooted has been shown by the recrudescence of the quarrel for Macedonia which erected its ugly head again as soon as Yugoslavia fell out with the rest of the confession. It has also added to the security of central Europe, even if not to its prosperity, that millions of Germans have been expelled from Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, and that these three countries now for the first time since the Middle Ages are almost ethnically homogeneous.

Within each State there is a government zealous in enacting Statutes, making decrees, publishing orders which affect every department of man's physical and mental activities; a multiplicity of national organizations provides political activity, within strictly defined limits, for young and old, workers and peasants, women and men, in trade union, factory, school, club, and society, in works' councils and volunteer labour camps, in local national councils and action committees, in cultural societies and in the courts of law; indeed it is realized that bureaucratic hypertrophy and the consumption of time in meetings, councils, and demonstrations may seriously hinder production.

Wonderful things have been achieved in repairing the calamities of war, particularly in Poland, Hungary, and Yugoslavia: Warsaw is rising again above its colossal devastation; Pest has recovered its former slick modernity, though the monumental ruins of Buda still stand witness to the extent of the devastation. Minister Gerö may not be loved by many Hungarians, but they all pay tribute to his driving power which has restored so many bridges and so much highway in so short a time. A new Belgrade is being built, and the Yugoslav people are making roads, railways and bridges, and cutting ways for commerce through mountain barriers which have hitherto defied all but the Romans. It is not only reconstruction but new construction which is necessary and which to some considerable extent has been achieved: first factories and then houses are being built, though as yet only a beginning has been made of what must be done if Roumania, Bulgaria, Poland, Yugoslavia, Slovakia, and Hungary are to achieve that measure of industrialization which is necessary if the problem of the surplus peasantry is to be solved. It seems that Poland and Czechoslovakia have had relatively the greatest success in industrialization; but Poland acquired and Czechoslovakia inherited industrial resources and equipment such as their friends have not and find it difficult to develop or purchase. In the re-establishment and development of trade

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there was much to do, and much has been done. The task was made the more difficult by the virtual disappearance of Germany as a market and supplier and by the physical and political difficulties in the way of overseas trade; however a closer trade developed with Sweden, Switzerland, and Holland, and in some degree with Britain, and the difficulties of oceanic trade have to a great degree been compensated by the readiness of the U.S.S.R. to provide raw materials for textiles and heavy industry and food in case of need, as well as gold and free currency for the acquisition of raw materials in the dollar and sterling markets.¹

Increasingly the countries of central and south-eastern Europe are planning production, investment, and commerce. Czechoslovakia has completed its two-year plan and was able to achieve its object of raising industry in many sections to 110 per cent of what it was in 1937. Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia are advancing from short plans more or less accomplished to larger plans for the five, seven, or ten years, and Dimitrov celebrated the end of the Bulgarian two-year plan by inaugurating the first of what he promised to be a whole series of five-year plans. Even on the less congenial soil of Roumania a first plan has started on its course. In each case, in advance of planning has gone nationalization, first of confiscated and abandoned enterprises, then of natural monopolies and heavy industries, then of all enterprises employing more than 100 or 50 persons, then of food, medical, commercial, and other vital commodities, until the field of private enterprise has been contracted to contain little more than some retail trade and a few crafts. State enterprises and national corporations have been developed side by side, and many interesting experiments in public ownership, profit sharing, partial control by workers and local authorities have been made, and in some cases, abandoned. There have been mistakes and some inefficiency, due both to inexperience and to selfishness on the part of both managers and workers; in Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia ministers and party leaders have not hesitated to reprove and punish idleness, absenteeism, greed and ambition when they have threatened industrial and national well-being.

One economic problem which threatened disaster has been more or less satisfactorily dealt with. War and alien oc-

¹ The U.S.S.R. of course sells these commodities at a price, often at a very high price. The transaction is commercially as well as politically profitable to the Soviet Union.

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cupation themselves produced a serious inflation of the currency, which was accentuated by the two facts that there was an excess of demand over supply of goods and services and that large credits were provided by the state banks for financing reconstruction and new enterprises. There began a rapid rise in prices and, in the case of the workers, of wages. But in every case the inflation has been more or less successfully grappled with, usually by the freezing of bank balances, sometimes by the doling out of a new currency in small quantities. Only in Hungary did the inflation reach astronomical proportions and reduce the country to barter. But even there the substitution of the new forint for the old pengő, and the limitation of its issue to the extent of the real income of the nation, have solved the problem with a success which surprised even those responsible for the reform.

Next to nationalization the most drastic economic change has been the redistribution of land. The transformation of the agricultural scene has been most striking, of course, in those countries—Poland and Hungary—where there had been no effective land reform before 1939. But even in Czechoslovakia there still remained a number of largish 'residual estates' after the reform of the nineteen-twenties, which have now been systematically purchased by the State and distributed to small holders or to new proprietors. Generally speaking, throughout central and eastern Europe today the principle applies that the land belongs to those who work it, and there is everywhere a maximum area of land which can be owned by one person, 100 hectares (250 acres) or 50 hectares. This does not mean that the majority of the peasants owns anything like so much, especially in those countries which have a surplus peasant population, but it does mean that many small holdings have been increased beyond starvation size. Also, though there are now millions more peasant proprietors, the redistribution of land has not completely eliminated the agricultural labourer, for there is an increasing number of State farms which are worked by wage-earning labourers.

It will be remarked that the breaking up of the great estates is not in itself a movement towards socialism. Indeed, as fast as the nationalization of industry has diminished the number of entrepreneurs, the redistribution of the land has created a greater number of peasant proprietors. This contradictory movement has created a special problem. The workers' governments need the support of the peasants, both political and economic ; yet Communist theory requires the socialization

of agriculture ; indeed the leaders of the new governments know full well that a multiplicity of separate small holdings is economically wasteful and inefficient, and experience is showing that it is hard to get the peasants to disgorge a prescribed part of their produce to feed the towns and supply the export market. It is the conflict between the peasants' love of property and the demands of theory and long-term prudence which is one of the causes of the quarrel between Yugoslavia and the Cominform. Elsewhere, too, the Communist leaders are in a dilemma between their repeated promises to the peasants that there shall be no collective farms and the anxiety not to offend against the precepts of their Soviet mentors. For the moment the difficulty is being dealt with by preaching to the peasants the merits of producers' co-operation, in the express hope that it may provide an education in the advantages of collective farming.

One other accomplishment of the new governments must be recorded : that in the field of education. The task was two-fold : in Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Roumania in particular there was still much illiteracy as late as 1945, while everywhere, the parties of the left insisted, education had been a matter of privilege or sectarian control. What is being done therefore is, in the first place, to increase the numbers of schools and teachers and to make vastly increased provision for adult education (witness the numerous 'people's colleges' in Hungary). Secondly, where education was still largely in the hands of the Churches it is being secularized. The State is riding roughshod over the devoted resistance of the Roman Catholic church to the attack on its former place in the schools. The basis of admission to the universities has been widened and an undifferentiated education to all up to the age of 15 (as in Czechoslovakia) has been provided. Many universities have been purged of teachers suspected of ' Fascist ' leanings or radical opposition to the new order, who have been replaced by professors and lecturers more in sympathy with the dominant philosophy. In schools and universities alike the compulsory study of Marxist-Leninism, expounded according to the Moscow catechism, is being made a part of the studies of every child and student. The administration of Justice is being radically transformed in accordance with the principles and practice of the ' People's Courts'.

The last thing that remains to do is to see whether any pattern of cause and events can be discerned in the post-war history of central and south-eastern Europe.

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A lack of clarity and simplicity is apparent to the first glance, for there is a disparity between the various countries concerned which is due in the first place to the differences in the manner of their liberation from German occupation or domination, and in the second to the differences of social structure and inheritance with which they started on the road to the common goal.

It is necessary first to recall that some of the countries with which we are dealing were established allies of the U.S.S.R. even before the advent of the Red Army, and therefore to Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia that army came as a liberator, while to Roumania and Hungary, and to a lesser degree Bulgaria, it came as a conqueror. Consequently the conduct, and even the character, of the Soviet troops in, say, Bohemia, was quite different from what it was in Hungary, and correspondingly the memories of the Soviet occupation differ greatly between the two countries. The gratitude with which the Czechs remember Marshal Koniev and his men has in the mind of many a Hungarian been dimmed by memory of deportations, and of many acts of loot and rape. The attitude of the various peoples to the Soviet Union has also been conditioned by the duration of the occupation : the Red Army had left Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia before 1945 was out, but it is still in Roumania and Hungary. There is a further factor which operates here : some of the peoples of central and eastern Europe have long looked on their fellow Slavs of Russia with fraternal eyes, and the Russians and their ideals were consequently much more welcome in Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia (though hardly in Poland) than in Roumania and Hungary, which are not only proudly non-Slav, but have bitter memories of Russian enmity in the past. One consequence of this racial and historical antagonism has been that the Russian-educated Communist leaders in Roumania and Hungary have found only a very small number of direct supporters, and they have therefore had to impose their rule regardless of the inclinations of the mass of the people to a greater extent than in Yugoslavia or Czechoslovakia.

It is interesting, in this connexion, that the Prime Ministers of Roumania and Hungary are not nominally Communists, unlike the Premiers of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia. Poland is in a position by itself, for despite its essentially Slav character, Poland has been nurtured on hostility to Russia, so that in Poland too the Prime Minister is only a Communist by incorporation.

Another thing which helps to deprive the overall picture of simplicity is that the different countries began their post-war tasks very differently equipped. There were some of them, notably Poland and Hungary, which had to start from chaos, with their cities laid waste, their communications destroyed, their production at a standstill, so destitute of effective government that the Red Army was able to bring a new government in its baggage train. Yugoslavia suffered hardly less in the destruction of material things and even more in the destruction of human life, but it had the initial advantage of having generated within itself during the course of the war a government which had merely to continue a task already well under way. Roumania and Bulgaria suffered relatively lightly from the material destruction of war, and were able to initiate political revolution before, but only just before, the advent of the Red Army. But most fortunate of all was Czechoslovakia. It is true that many lives were lost in resistance to the Nazi occupiers, and that the destruction due to bombing was only relatively small, and that Slovakia and part of Moravia had been the scene of destructive fighting, but Prague almost alone among the great cities of Central Europe stood virtually intact, and the great industries of the western and northern Czech lands were still in working order. Of even greater advantage to Czechoslovakia was that fact that it had in London a government long prepared for the day when it might resume its work at home, and already allied in friendly treaty with the U.S.S.R. At the head of that government stood the one statesman of central Europe who had survived the twelve-year crisis with enhanced reputation. Czechoslovakia emerged from the war unique among its neighbours in having a leader and a government of western type and at the same time accepted by and friendly to the Soviet Union. Beneš apparently believed that he could make of his restored country a centre of order and liberty amidst the ruins of Europe, and that he could maintain there a progressive socializing parliamentary democracy based on coalition and compromise, bound by treaty to the U.S.S.R. and by friendship and tradition to Britain, France, and the United States. Though Czechoslovakia was the last to be liberated from the Germans it was the first to re-establish good government and economic health.

There is one other fundamental in which the countries of central and south-eastern Europe differed among themselves, namely, in the degree to which there was a potentially domestic revolutionary situation in each. History and theory alike

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indicate that the possibility of spontaneous revolution exists in any country when there is an acute conflict between the interests of different classes, when there is no possibility of resolving that conflict by constitutional means, when one section of society has considerable economic power without political power, and when it has found spokesmen and leaders and has the chance of some military support. If there has been a general collapse of government due either to victory or defeat in war the chances of successful revolution become much greater. This last condition was present in all the countries with which we are concerned. Military defeat brought the collapse of the old order in Roumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary; the overthrow of German and quisling governments in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia provided a hardly less great opportunity for a new order. But when we look for uniformity in the class structure and the pattern of class conflicts, we see at once that Czechoslovakia was the great exception. Every one of the other countries was predominantly rural; the industrial workers were a minority in Poland and progressively smaller in Hungary, Roumania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria. In Czechoslovakia, however, the peasants were in a minority; it was more industrialized in relation to its size than any State east of it. Consequently in Czechoslovakia there was a large organized body of industrial workers, which, as soon as the Germans were expelled, ranged itself in two large socialist parties, the Communists and the Social Democrats, which in the election of 1946 showed themselves together able to command a majority of votes and seats. Both these parties were Marxist in philosophy,¹ and by tradition and education dialectical materialism commanded a large measure of more or less conscious assent in the country (more of course in the industrialized Czech lands than in predominantly peasant and Catholic Slovakia). Even the numerous supporters of the non-Marxist National Socialist Party were predominantly socialist in sentiment. At the same time there was not a considerable class of landlords and capitalists in Czechoslovakia: the power of the first had been broken by the land reform of the nineteen-twenties, and that of the second by the German occupiers and the freezing of bank accounts in 1945.

The situation in the other countries was radically different. There the number of industrial workers was small, the towns

¹ The Social Democrats, however, had often modified their Marxism by accepting a 'gradualist' approach; certainly many of them did not accept the later Stalinist development of Marxism.

were few, and the peasants predominated. There the Social Democratic parties were small and the Communist parties tiny. Peasant parties, Small Holders' parties, and Ploughmen's Fronts attracted the vast majority of free votes in Poland, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Roumania, and Bulgaria. Conditions for a spontaneous domination by urban workers did not exist. That is not to say that there was no cause for class conflict in these countries. In 1944 there were still landlords in Hungary, there were native and foreign capitalists, privileged and wealthy Churches, and in all the countries there were small but able liberal groups of intellectuals, managers, and civil servants.

Nevertheless the contrast between Czechoslovakia and the rest is marked, and it is therefore the more remarkable that Czechoslovakia was the last of the group to have its revolution. There is a temptation to seek the reason for this anomaly in the direct revolutionary pressure of the U.S.S.R., which unquestionably enabled the tiny Communist parties in Roumania, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria speedily to secure a predominant position. But that that is not the only explanation is obvious when one considers the events in Yugoslavia, where the predominance of the peasants and the fewness of urban socialists was as marked as anywhere, and yet where the revolution first occurred. The transformation of Yugoslavia is to be explained neither by the orthodox theory of revolution nor by direct outside interference, but, in part at least, by the fact that conservative and reactionary elements, as represented by Nedić, Pavelić, Mihailović and Prince Paul were involved in common ruin with their German allies. The Yugoslav revolution was primarily a national one, but it so happened that it was led and regulated by a Communist of great military and political ability, and he and his small body of select companions were therefore able to create a State on the Marxist pattern, but without any solid body of urban proletariat to dictate its structure or conduct. That is one reason why Yugoslavia has proved to be a foreign and irritant body in the organism of the Cominform ; it could not be absorbed and has therefore been extruded.

Such then are some of the historical and social differences which have complicated the picture and made the pattern of events in central and south-eastern Europe irregular and in some measure obscure and asynchronous. Perhaps only in Czechoslovakia has the course of events been in any degree spontaneous ; in the other countries they have been forced to

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conform to what pattern there is by the U.S.S.R. and by the support given to Tito at first by Stalin and Churchill.

The first stage in each country was to secure the expulsion of the more obviously reactionary forces, the 'Sudeten' Germans, quislings, Fascist leaders and agents, royalists, landlords and capitalists, by rallying under a single banner of patriotic liberation and reconstruction all the sections of the population who supported or sympathized with the liberation—peasant parties, partisans, liberal-minded intellectuals, socialistically inclined workers, soldiers, and civil servants. These were brought together into coalition governments, christened People's Front, National Democratic Front, Antifascist National Unions, Fatherland Front, and so on. Usually some soldier patriot was chosen to lead this government—a Miklós, Rădescu, Rola-Zymierski, or Gheorghiev. It is noteworthy that in those countries where the influence of the Soviet Control Commission was immediate, none of these first Prime Ministers was a Communist politician. Only in Yugoslavia was a Communist at the head of the State from the start. In Czechoslovakia the first Prime Minister, Fierlinger, was a Social Democrat, and Gottwald did not succeed until more people had freely voted for the Communist Party than for any other.

These first provisional governments carried out the agreed coalition programmes: the friends of the Germans and the more obvious enemies of the Soviet Union were arrested, tried, and punished; Germans were expelled in their millions from Poland and Czechoslovakia; right-wing parties were abolished; control of economic power was secured by nationalizing critical industries; the redistribution of the land was begun; elections were held and constituent assemblies convened.¹ The next stage was the debilitation of the non-Socialist parties. This was usually achieved by demanding the acceptance of programmes which were repugnant to many of their members and some of their leaders but insisted on by the Communist elements in the government. Those of them who were willing to co-operate in raising the tempo of socialization and in the acceptance of increasingly Communist leadership were retained in reconstructed cabinets, still nominally coalitions. The more reluctant sections of the non-Communist parties were made ineffective by the resignation, dismissal, exile,

¹ These generalizations did not all apply to Yugoslavia, where from the start the Communist-controlled Government acted much less openly and with less care for democratic and parliamentary forms than in the other countries.

arrest, imprisonment or execution of their leaders. In this way were split the National Peasant Party of Roumania, the Peasant Party of Poland, the Agrarian Party of Bulgaria, the Small Holders' Party of Hungary, and, much later, the Slovak Democratic Party, and the National Socialist Party and Populist parties in Czechoslovakia. At the same time the first Prime Ministers were dismissed: Rădescu gave place to Groza; Dimitrov came from Moscow, soon to oust Gheorghiev; Miklós gave place first to Nagy and then to Dinnyes. Party leaders hostile to the trend of policy were eliminated: Petkov and D. M. Dimitrov, Maniu and Brătianu, Nagy and Kovács, Witos and Mikolajczyk, and later Šrámek, Lichner, Zenkl, Drtina, Ripka, Stránský, and Majer. Not always, even at this later stage, did Communists become Prime Ministers: a Social Democrat like Cyrankiewicz in Poland, a 'Ploughman' leader like Groza, or a 'Small Holder' like Dinnyes or Dobi was nominal head of the Government. The Communists, however, became increasingly numerous in the cabinets, and were usually in charge of the more vital ministries, especially those which controlled the police and the armed forces, foreign policy and finance. The effective masters were now able and skilful, often Moscow-trained, Communists like Rákosi, Gerő, Georgi Dimitrov, Ana Pauker, Gheorghiu-Dej and Vasile Luca, Gomólka¹ and Radkiewicz, Gottwald, Zápatocký, and Slanský. The domination of the Communists has been everywhere assisted by the skill and energy with which party members have worked for and obtained leadership in national movements of all kinds—trade unions, youth and women's movements, partisans' and legionaries' associations. From the first, too, there had been an infiltration of national armed forces, partly by officers and troops trained in the Soviet Union whether as allies or prisoners of war, and partly by the promotion of officers known to be zealous for Soviet interests and plans. - The 'Political Departments' or 'Educational Departments' of each national army also helped to ensure that the armed forces would not oppose the revolution. The ubiquity and activity of Communists and police in the everyday affairs of town, factory, and village exercised a degree of psychological pressure which must not be ignored.

The Social Democratic parties presented a somewhat different problem from that of liberal and peasant parties, for they had a long and honourable record of working class

¹ Gomólka was removed from the secretaryship of the Polish Communist Party in August 1948 and ceased to be a minister in January 1949.

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resistance to exploitation and persecution, they avowed Marxist principles even if they hesitated to put them into practice, and they had a strong hold on some of the best elements in the working class. They could not be broken and cast out with impunity, so what could not be destroyed had to be absorbed. Everywhere the story is much the same : Social Democratic parties were invited to enter into a ' popular front ' with the Communists, were asked to accept Communist programmes under Communist leadership, were invited to sever their links with the west and with the Second International. Everywhere those social democratic leaders who would not embrace oblivion and sink their own and their party's individuality in that of the Communists were, like Peyer in Bulgaria, Petrescu in Roumania, Majer and Laušman in Czechoslovakia, driven to resignation or flight.

This elimination of uncooperative elements made it easy to secure the amalgamation of the rumps of the Social Democratic parties with the Communist parties. The amenable Social Democratic leaders, like Fierlinger and Osóbka-Morawski, have thereby sacrificed what respect they had among their own followers without gaining any influence in the councils of the combined parties.

As soon as the Communists had secured control in governments composed of their own leaders and those leaders of other parties who were prepared to collaborate with them, they proceeded to consolidate their position and to attempt to legalize it in the eyes of the world by holding second elections, which have been in varying degrees less orthodox than the earlier liberation elections. Even here at this stage the people were not asked to vote for or against Communism as such, for, except possibly in Czechoslovakia, it had no hope of gaining a majority. The people have been asked to vote for or against the regime ; that is, for the National Front or whatever it was called ; it might be that, as in Hungary, opposition parties were still allowed to present candidates, or, as in Czechoslovakia the people were presented with a single list, which they must accept or reject as a whole, whatever the nominal party affiliations of those whose names appeared on it.

As soon as the governments received their mandates from elections of this kind they went eagerly forward to the completion of the revolution. Nationalization has been extended to all concerns employing 100 or even only 50 employees, so as to leave only a small fraction of industry in private hands. The purgation from society of all elements

hostile to the regime or to the security and well-being of the people's democracy (the two are treated as being identical) is widened and intensified, and professional associations, ministries, universities, churches, national societies, theatre and opera companies, athletic and sports societies are being purified into conformity of word and conduct. *Salus populi suprema lex* is now the principle of universal application, as it is in the second stage of every revolutionary movement. 'People's Courts' have been given extended or revived powers; in Czechoslovakia a new law of national security has been enacted and the death penalty has been restored in Roumania.

It is now the accepted principle in all these 'people's democracies' that every form of human activity must subserve the interest of the community; the right to constructive criticism of detail is admitted, but no-one must preach doctrines fundamentally opposed to the principles on which the new order is based. Within limits it is possible to criticize the way nationalization or planning is being carried out, but criticism of the principle of nationalization or planning is punished as treason or sabotage; except in Yugoslavia criticism of the U.S.S.R., its Government or policy, is equally regarded as treasonable. It has therefore followed that the press, the radio, literature, and the stage have been reduced to a uniformity of doctrine which more clearly than anything else marks how far these new States have moved both from the character of the western democracies and from their own past. Most remarkable is the unison in which the press and the radio rehearse their condemnations of Britain, France, and the United States and foretell their inevitable decline and fall. In Czechoslovakia it seemed that this uniformity of thought and expression extended only to the published word, for one could still in the spring of 1948 hear much indignant criticism, though even that, it seems, soon became dangerous.

Marxist canons were increasingly applied to art and science, partly by composers who refuse to print what does not seem to them to be in harmony with the dominant creed, partly by extrusion of hostile writers and artists from professional associations, partly by the expulsion or suspension of uncongenial university professors, partly by giving State titles and rewards to those who show themselves most ready and able to expound the orthodox view. History is being rewritten to demonstrate the constant debt of central Europe and the Balkans to the east, while the work of westerners from Pope Sylvester II, the Emperor Charles IV, and Lewis of

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Anjou to Palmerston and Gladstone, to Wilson, Briand, Ernest Denis, and Seton-Watson is being denigrated or denied.

The physical treatment of the opposition has varied. The purge seems to have been carried through with the greatest inhumanity in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, somewhat less ruthlessly in Roumania, Poland, and Hungary, while in Czechoslovakia there seems to have been the least physical oppression, perhaps because there is there the widest general support for Marxist socialism. Resistance from and opposition to the Churches also varies from country to country. The Orthodox Church has shown itself amenable and co-operative; also the protestant churches in Hungary and Czechoslovakia have on the whole proved ready to recognize and co-operate with the new regimes. But both branches of the Catholic Church, Roman and Uniate, have found it difficult to reconcile the claims of the State to their concept of universalism and spiritual autonomy, as well as to their interests in property, education, and politics. The Greek Catholics in Roumania and the Roman Catholics in Yugoslavia have been rudely brought to heel, and the Roman Catholic Church in Hungary has been shorn of its spearhead by the imprisonment of the intransigent Cardinal Mindszenty. Of late even the less militant Roman Catholic Church in Czechoslovakia under the leadership of the respected and patriotic archbishop of Prague has moved into opposition.

The political strength of the Roman Church is due to its still considerable command of the allegiance of the peasants, particularly in Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia, and it is the peasants who constitute everywhere the greatest potential danger to the governments which are formally, even if not nominally or actually, dictatorships of the urban proletariat. The peasants constitute a stronghold of newly-gained and passionately prized individual property. The recalcitrance of Tito in the face of the Cominform shows that he at least realizes how powerful this sentiment is; elsewhere too the Communists had to promise that there should be no kolkhozes and are having to proceed with the greatest delicacy in the education of the peasants to embark on the path towards collectivization along the less suspect path of co-operation.

The latest stage in the accomplishment of the revolution has indicated what the form of the new governments is to be. There are still parliaments in every capital, but they have been approved by plebiscite rather than elected, and though they

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still legislate, they have less and less power to originate legislation and to shape it ; they are approximating to the senates of Augustus and Napoleon I, even to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. or the Nazi Reichstag, as being bodies whose main function is to approve and applaud. It would be difficult, with the best will in the world, to maintain that the governments of central and south-eastern Europe are responsible to their parliaments. Effective government is in the hands of the executives of those cabinets or praesidia or Central Action Committees which are largely co-opted and yet are the supreme initiators of legislation and constitutions, makers of all-embracing plans, and in sovereign control of the courts of law. It is hard to see how they can be held responsible either to parliament or people. This sovereignty of the executive is especially marked in the economic sphere ; each of these States has a planned economy embracing every aspect of industry, agriculture, commerce and finance, but all the nationalized enterprises, all the national corporations and State undertakings, all the planning commissions and economic councils are responsible to and controlled by the executive government. That may be all very right and proper, but if political sovereignty is to be sought where economic power is concentrated, there is no doubt of the absolute sovereign power of the executives in Bucharest, Sofia, Belgrade, Prague, Budapest, and Warsaw.

Such is the achievement, for good and evil, of the three years 1945 to 1948. Much of it is native and due to the efforts of the peoples and their own leaders, for it is clear that even if the Soviet Union had not been so near and so powerful revolutionary changes would have come at the end of so destructive and subversive a war as that which ended in 1945. The mere destruction of Germany and of German influence would have fatally undermined dynasties and transformed class structures, as is shown by the history of Yugoslavia ; without their artificial props the landlords of Poland and Hungary were doomed anyhow, for their enemies were primarily the peasants and not the socialists ; Czechoslovakia achieved her own social revolution before her political revolution of February 1948. Nevertheless to ignore the direct and indirect influence of the Soviet Union would be a travesty of history. Its military power is represented as a guarantee to the integrity of Poland and Czechoslovakia, and that fact alone has won more support for the pro-Soviet Governments of those countries than anything else. Its political influence is most

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clearly seen in the way in which the Soviet members of the Control Commissions in Roumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary made and unmade Prime Ministers and cabinets, in the way in which the Lublin Government was brought to Warsaw in the wake of the Red Army, and in the sending of Dimitrov and Vishinsky from Moscow to control events in Sofia and Bucharest. Always the opposition has been conscious of the presence or proximity of the Red Army, a factor which was perhaps most decisive in the case of Beneš's acceptance of Gottwald's ultimatum during the February crisis.

The power of Soviet influence has been seen in other directions : in the unanimity with which her neighbours have supported her policies in the United Nations, in the unanimity (patently reluctant in some cases) with which they rejected the chance of Marshall aid ; in the readiness of Dimitrov to drop his plans for a Balkan federation as a result of direct public rebuke from Moscow ; indeed in the absence of any sort of federation in central or south-eastern Europe, even economic federation. It is remarkable that while each country has its own economic plan, and while planning is extolled as the first essential for national well-being and progress, no sort of international plan has been evolved or even adumbrated for central and south-eastern Europe as a whole, nor, except in the Czechoslovak-Polish plan for upper Silesia, has any attempt to co-ordinate the planning of two or more States been made.¹

Nevertheless something of a pattern is being imposed on the economy of the whole of eastern Europe as the smaller States enter into specific trading agreements one by one. It seems that the U.S.S.R. is becoming the great corn supplier, with all the political influence that that implies ; large-scale corn growing, in Hungary particularly, is giving place to market gardening, poultry breeding, and viticulture ; Czechoslovakia is becoming a vast manufactory for working up raw materials sent from the Soviet Union into clothes and machines most of which are to be delivered in payment, while credits in gold and free currencies afforded by the Soviet Union will enable Czechoslovakia and Poland to purchase such raw materials as they must get from the outside world. All this is some

¹ It was indeed announced, on 26 January 1949, that there is to be established a Council for Mutual Economic Assistance for the U.S.S.R., Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Roumania to 'organize broader economic co-operation among the countries of people's democracy and the Soviet Union'. Whether it will proceed to produce a general economic plan for the whole area remains to be seen.

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compensation for the American aid which has been renounced,¹ but yet that should not delude us into believing that in three brief years all that diversity of faith and interest, of opinion and conduct which were for so long the exasperation and the joy of life beyond the Elbe has given way to the unanimous confession of any single creed, however incontrovertible it may be or seem to be.

¹ The desperate need for such aid is evidenced by the unofficial negotiation for American credits to Poland and Czechoslovakia, and in Yugoslavia's open request for an American loan.

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