

THE DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION  
OF THE BORDER STATES

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PART III: LATVIA

BY  
MALBONE W. GRAHAM

PUBLICATIONS OF THE  
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT LOS ANGELES  
IN SOCIAL SCIENCES

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## PREFACE

THE ACCOMPANYING ACCOUNT of the diplomatic recognition of Latvia is the third in a series of studies dealing with the borderlands of the Russian Empire and the way in which they became independent in the course of the World War. The account parallels, in its treatment of the phenomena of war and revolution, the companion studies on Finland and Estonia. The Latvian struggle, however, was complicated by factors which did not enter fundamentally into the diplomacy and strategy of the other two countries, outstanding among them being the activities of the Soviet Red Guards and the Baltic army of General Rüdiger von der Goltz. Although the post-Armistice Soviet incursion created additional military difficulties for the Letts, it raised no major diplomatic problem and, owing to the lack of direct contact between the Allies and the Soviet government, it did not enter the arena of international discussion. The Baltic army, on the contrary, had definite political objectives, which it did not scruple to attain by brutal intervention in Latvian affairs. Its military role is only indirectly touched upon here, but its political objectives loom large in the Paris Peace Conference period. The deliberations of the Allied Powers on the question, as disclosed in the proceedings of the Baltic Commission, are here publicly revealed for the first time. For the privilege and opportunity of publishing this material I am indebted to the directors of the Hoover War Library at Stanford University, to whom I wish to acknowledge my appreciation and gratitude.

The list of those to whom I am basically obligated for the information herein contained is extraordinarily long, and would make up an extended catalogue of persons in widely separated places. Beyond the expression of my grateful appreciation to Professor Antonius Piip of the University of Tartu, Estonia (to whom I am deeply in debt for numerous side lights, particularly on the role of his wartime associate and colleague in London, Zigfrīds Meierovics), I shall confine my acknowledgments to those Letts who, with unflinching willingness and courtesy, have helped me in this task. May I formally record my gratitude and appreciation to His Excellency Mr. Karlis Ulmanis, now president of Latvia; Mr. Alberts Kviessis, former president of Latvia;

Mr. Hugo Celmiņš, former prime minister and minister of foreign affairs; Mr. Karlis L. Seja, former minister of foreign affairs, and Latvia's first minister to the United States; Dr. Vilhelms Munters, now minister of foreign affairs; Professor Hermans Albats, secretary general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Dr. Alfreds Bilmanis, Latvian minister to the United States; Mr. Fridrichs Vesmanis, sometime Latvian minister at London; M. J. Feldmans, sometime Latvian minister at Paris; Mr. Vilis Šumanis, now Latvian minister at Helsinki; Mr. Olgerds Grosvalds, long-time Latvian minister at Paris; and, very basically, to Mr. Karlis Ducmanis, formerly permanent delegate of Latvia to the League of Nations, now a member of the Latvian Supreme Court.

I am also greatly indebted to Dr. Peteris Oliņš, Mr. Vilis Masens, and Dr. A. Stegmanis of the Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs for detailed technical information and explanations of relevant documents; to Mr. M. Stumbergs of the Latvian *Valstsbibliothek* for facilitating access to rare and invaluable materials; and to Mr. Arturs Lūļe, consul general of Latvia in New York, for many and varied courtesies.

For such errors of fact or interpretation as may occur in this work I am alone responsible.

MALBONE W. GRAHAM

November 18, 1937

## INTRODUCTION

THE RISE OF THE LATVIAN REPUBLIC, no less than that of Finland or Estonia, was the product of long-range historical forces which converged almost simultaneously in the war-wracked world of 1917-1918. The three independence movements, seen in the larger historical perspective, followed almost without deviation a symmetrical pattern. This involved an initial roughshod process of conquest, followed by a protracted struggle for cultural survival lasting over two centuries. This unequal struggle, directed first against the masters of the *land*, whose feudal yoke hung heavily upon the peasantry, turned later into a conflict with the masters of the *country*, whose efforts at forcible assimilation encountered a scarcely less implacable resistance.

Alike in Estonia and in Latvia, the struggle for emancipation from the Baltic barons formed the historical pediment of the liberation movement. Out of its partial success in the abolition of serfdom there developed a new cultural force: a new generation arose, springing from the soil, eager to defend in the Republic of Letters the claims of the sons of Livonia, Latgale, and Courland to intellectual enfranchisement. Following this cultural renaissance there came into being a new social class, a militantly nationalist bourgeoisie, which did not scruple, in the hour of Russia's adversity, to make common cause with her revolutionaries against the cultural denationalization practiced by the Czars in the Balticum. Here the broad cultural movements in Finland, Estonia, and the Lettish lands met the granitic resistance of an unyielding social and political order.

What gave peculiar significance to the share of the Letts in the Revolution of 1905 was the convergence of the anti-Balt and anti-Czarist movements, respectively championing agrarian and social revolution. Once merged in a common stream, these two currents in Lettish life, previously flowing separately—at least until the turn of the century—produced an astonishing effect in eroding the legal levees and dikes of Russian society. The high point was reached in the carefully formulated demands for autonomy—strong language in the world of 1905—which served as significant precedents for the political action of the Letts, both within Russia and abroad, from 1914 to 1917.



Defeated by 1907 in the struggle for mastery, the Letts bowed to the inevitable; their leaders marked time in the Duma, while cultivating diplomatic contacts near the Czarist court. Many of their leaders went into exile, compulsory or self-imposed, thus broadening their political background and forging new weapons for the renewed struggle which, whether viewed from the bourgeois or the proletarian standpoint, was inevitable. The first Czarist move toward leniency, in a grant of amnesty in 1913, brought back to the homeland the leading émigrés, and the struggle was intensified—until August, 1914, brought the denouement.

The developments in Latvia after the outbreak of war are traced in the pages which follow. They fall into the same pattern as those of the Finnish and Estonian independence movements. There is the same impounding of nationalist sentiment during the three years preceding revolution in Russia; there is the same striving for crystallized constitutional autonomy in the midst of a colloidal and dissolving world; finally, there is the same desperate resolve to stake all on the declaration of independence, followed by a quest for friends in one of the darkest moments of world history. The final simultaneous collapse of German and Russian military power, accompanied by efforts of the extreme nationalists of both countries to retrieve by violence the political and economic losses incident to revolution, set the stage for the Lettish diplomatic campaign. Latvia finally emerged from the debacle of the reactionaries' plans, owing as much to the fortitude and tenacity of her own statesmen as to the collapse of the preëxisting political order. To have, in 1919, men of the stamina and temerity of Chakste, Meierovics, and Ulmanis was in itself no mean asset for Latvia. With leaders of less vigorous mold, the independence movement might easily have failed, despite the many factors predisposing to its success.

One factor, not mentioned in the diplomatic correspondence of the 1919 period, deserves stress here. I refer to the Bolshevik control of Riga from the end of 1918 to May, 1919. Whatever may be thought of the character of Bolshevik rule there, the fact remains that it forestalled and prevented the reoccupation of the city by the Russo-German reactionaries and adventurers at that time. Although it failed to cast the metropolis in an enduring Soviet mold, the Soviet occupation circum-

vented the effort to make of the Lettish lands the final bastion and outpost of *Baltentum*, as only old-line Russians and Germans dreamed it. With Riga firmly in German hands, the hope of an independent Latvia would appear to have been altogether unattainable. It can at least be said of the Soviet regime that it vicariously saved Latvia from becoming an appanage of the future Third Reich. For that service a whole generation of Letts owes the defunct Soviet a debt it can never repay. Thus Riga was destined to remain neither White nor Red, but basically the symbol of a people determined to break loose from the shackles of slavery to either Teuton or Slav and to develop their distinctive culture pattern free from any alien domination. In the long retrospect of history, Latvian national diplomacy fixed with juridical finality that correlation of political and military forces which, by 1919-1920, finally permitted independence. Bravely, at times even defiantly, it fought with little more than the weapons of the spirit of nationality to make of the devastated provinces of imperial Russia much more than temporary military buffers or links in the *cordon sanitaire*. In the end, it brought into being and secured from the highest councils of the nations the imprimatur of legality for a united country.

## THE INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT

THE LETTISH LANDS of the Russian Empire comprised, before 1917, (1) the southern part of the gubernia of Livonia, (2) three districts of the gubernia of Vitebsk, and (3) Courland. Each of these areas came to the Russian Empire as the result of a separate jural act. Livonia became a part of the Romanov domain as a result of the Treaty of Nystad in 1721;<sup>1</sup> Latgale, as the three districts of Vitebsk were historically called, fell to Russia as a result of the First Partition of Poland in 1772,<sup>2</sup> whereas the Duchy of Courland was not annexed until the time of the Third Partition in 1795.<sup>3</sup> Imperial promises given at the times of annexation were not destined to remain unmodified through the years. In due season the heavy hand of the Romanovs effected as thoroughgoing a centralization of authority in the Lettish lands as in any part of the empire.

For that reason the building up of autonomous popular institutions in any of the Lettish-speaking lands was indefinitely deferred, and the historic diets of the nobility survived only as long as they subserved the purposes of the autocracy. Imperial legislation, by ukase before 1906, by acts of the Duma thereafter, repeatedly modified the prerogatives of the nobility and made their diets, in the end, little more than social organizations of a corporative character. The concession of a certain degree of municipal and local self-government in economic matters did not, however, indicate the slightest desire of the Czarist regime to admit the cultural force of Lettish nationality as a political factor of any magnitude. In the reaction that followed the Revolution of 1905 and its constitutional fruitage in the Duma, the imperial autocracy specifically curtailed the representation of the Baltic Provinces in order to make the Duma more truly Russian in character. After the trial period of extended representation in 1906-1907, this policy operated to deprive the Letts of a channel for their political nationalism in the constitutional agencies of the imperial government. Municipal self-government, a partial degree of territorial self-administration, limited

<sup>1</sup> Superior numbers refer to notes which will be found on pp. 499-525.

representation in the Duma—these were the sole concessions made by the Romanovs to the Letts in the days before the World War.

In contrast to the favored position of both Finland and Estonia, spared for three years from all hostilities, the Lettish lands became a battlefield soon after the outbreak of war. After the German eastward drive in 1915 they were partitioned by the fortunes of war between the German occupying authorities, to the west of the Dvina and the city of Riga, and the Russian forces, which retained the provincial capital and the right bank of the stream. Moreover, political and economic paralysis overwhelmed the Lettish lands. Maritime commerce was cut off, the role of Riga as an export and import center dwindled, and the political factions were sundered by the battle lines. The vaunted power of the Russian Empire to protect a weak people—the principal justification for the retention of minor nationalities within the confines of empire—proved in reality an illusion. The fact of brute conquest by another Power, despite the efforts of the local Lettish Legions to defend the country, destroyed in the minds of the Letts the myth of the omnipotent benevolence of Russia.

With the advent of the Russian Revolution the change wrought in public feeling by the events of the war made itself manifest. Within a week of the overthrow of Czarist rule a Lettish congress, meeting at Valmiera in March, 1917, urged the creation by the new Provisional Government of "an autonomous administrative unit to be called Latvia, out of portions of the gubernii of Livonia, Vitebsk and Courland inhabited by Letts."<sup>4</sup> It was proposed, however, that the new entity should be and remain "an inseparable province of Russia." It is clear, then, that the initial reaction of the Letts to the change wrought by the Russian Revolution indicated a resolve to unite the separate parts of the Lettish nation administratively and to lay the foundation for further constitutional development as events should shape themselves.

In the early days of April the Provisional Government appointed a commission to reform the administration of the Baltic Provinces and to secure a degree of home rule for both Estonians and Letts. The commission consisted of Russian members of the Duma and of the representatives in the Duma from the regions in question. The first fruit of this action was the Law on Estonian Autonomy, which began the

process of national delimitation and gave to Estonia its principal charter of liberation. When, however, Lettish representatives, late in May, claimed the right to a similar reorganization of their lands, the Provisional Government demurred. Despite the solicitations of a spontaneously formed administrative council of representatives of the communal administrations, the government of Prince Lvov refused the grant of autonomy to the Letts.<sup>6</sup> Even the Russia that relied upon the Constituent Assembly for liberation clung with tenacity to outworn norms of law.

As the Provisional Government perceptibly weakened, the authority of the local government institutions increased both by evolution and by concrete design. Particularly in southern Livonia, including Riga, the local government bodies<sup>6</sup> increased their competence, passed from mere administrative to legislative action, and gradually assumed the social and constitutional functions previously performed by the Russian authorities.<sup>7</sup> Courland being occupied, there gathered toward the end of April in Tartu, on Estonian soil, a sort of Courland revolutionary diet, made up entirely of Lettish representatives, which possessed only a moral and not a legal mandate. In Latgale, whose particularist tendencies were already beginning to assert themselves, a similar supreme executive council was formed, which pleaded the cause of Latgallian autonomy. The only coördinating agency, in default of a legally organized national council for all the Lettish lands, was a congress of deputies of the communal administrations, which assembled in Riga and sought to create the nucleus of a parliamentary body. It found its competence and representative character challenged by a congress of landless peasants of infinitely more radical temperament, and only by the most insistent leadership of the nationalist intelligentsia were these fused into a single representative assembly. The sharply differing viewpoints of the two elements in the body—administrators and peasants—made concrete progress difficult, and military pressure from Russian army contingents also hampered the work of elaborating a truly national program. However, a Latgallian provisional national council, meeting on April 26, 1917, pronounced for a united Latvia, and began to counter the separatist tendencies of the Catholic Letts.

As the disintegration of Russia proceeded and the Lvov government

passed from the scene, a more detailed program of national unification was worked out in the critical days of July, 1917. A conference held at Riga on July 30, made up of delegates of every Lettish group organization, unanimously adopted a series of resolutions claiming the right of self-determination for all the Lettish lands, defining territorially the content of the new Latvia (subject to confirmation by plebiscite in the border zones), proclaiming a special autonomy for Latgale, and declaring Latvia to be an autonomous political unit of the democratic republic of Russia. The resolutions also declared legislative, executive, judicial, and local administrative authority to vest in the people of Latvia and in their diet, which was to be elected on the basis of universal, equal, secret suffrage and proportional representation, thereby claiming constituent authority for the new Latvia. Finally, they protested against "annexations"—a phrase clearly directed against Germany—and against every attempt to determine the constitutional status and boundaries of Latvia or any of its constituent parts without the knowledge and participation of the people. This part of the resolutions clearly warned against the renewal of Czarist centralization, on the one hand, and against any peace based on a territorial cession partitioning Latvia, on the other.<sup>8</sup> This declaration, in the light of the later peace negotiations between Germany and Soviet Russia, is highly significant. The urge to actual independence was strong even in July; for tactical reasons, however, independence was not advocated by the extremists, owing to the desirability of securing unanimity on an immediately practical program. Nevertheless, the idea was as manifest in the Lettish lands at the end of July, 1917, as it was in Finland. Individual party congresses, following the general conference in Riga, carried the independence movement still farther, the Farmers' Union—the strongest political party—openly demanding the neutralization of the future Latvia by international action.<sup>9</sup>

On July 5, 1917, shortly before the fall of Riga, the Russian Provisional Government finally conceded that the provisional administrative council of Livonia should have a legal basis and that a provincial parliament and a provincial executive should be organized for the country. Elections were ordered for the beginning of September, but the bombardment and fall of Riga prevented their being held in that

region. Thus the occupation deprived the Letts of the opportunity utilized by the Estonians for consolidating their constitutional position behind lawful institutions. In the unoccupied parts of southern Livonia elections were carried through, and the Livonian National Council assembled shortly thereafter at Valk. Its resolutions marked a further stage in the development of the independence movement although, owing to the Russian retreat and the Bolshevik coup d'état, the activities of the body were quickly suspended.

Until almost the beginning of peace negotiations in Brest-Litovsk no corporate body existed to represent the Letts. However, through the coöperation of the committees in Petrograd working for Lettish war refugees and the bourgeois deputies from the Livonian National Council, there was formed at Valk, toward the close of November, 1917, the Latvian National Council, which was destined to become the principal agency for the constructive expression of Latvian nationalism.<sup>29</sup> Although lacking any formal juridical foundation—revolution does not permit the observance of all the niceties of procedure—the Latvian National Council possessed great moral authority and, because it had cast out socially dissident elements, internal solidarity and cohesion. In particular, it established a series of commissions to handle administrative matters, one of which, the Commission for Foreign Affairs, with Jānis Goldmanis, a deputy of all four Dumas, at its head, seriously began the international activities of the Latvian independence movement.

After the Bolshevik coup d'état, it was clear to the Lettish nationalist leaders that the reliance placed by the Riga political conference on the possibility of continuing the connection with Russia in terms of a federal relationship was gone, both as a theory and as a vital political fact. In consequence, the Latvian National Council enunciated an independence program at the inception of its activity<sup>30</sup> and confirmed it by Goldmanis' declaration to the All-Russian Constituent Assembly on January 5/18, 1918. In the given circumstances, he declared, Latvia felt herself morally empowered to decide the fate of the Latvian people in accordance with their vital interests. Following the dispersion of the Constituent Assembly by Soviet forces, the Latvian National Council met on January 17/30 and 18/31, 1918: (1) it resolved that Latvia

should become an independent democratic republic comprising Courland, Livonia, and Latgale; (2) it protested against any attempt to partition Latvia, since the country, with its people, constituted an indivisible territory; and (3) it protested against any conclusion of peace which should restrict the Latvian people's right of self-determination.<sup>33</sup> Forthwith Goldmanis and Jānis Seskis began to make soundings and form contacts with the Allied governments in Petrograd,<sup>34</sup> and to send representatives to enter into negotiations with the other Border States.<sup>34</sup>

The significance of the January session of the council lay in its recognition of the need for an international program, its creation of a department of foreign affairs, and its resolve to enter into dealings with foreign countries. Although it was then decided to send delegations abroad, only Zigfrīds Meierovics was specially designated for foreign service. At this point the Latvian national movement, which had developed, although from rather imperfect juridical foundations, *pari passu* with the Estonian national movement, suffered a definite setback. Its principal concern in January was to elaborate the bases of an internal, not an international, program. Although Goldmanis did his utmost from his vantage point in Petrograd to popularize the idea of Latvian independence, the precious months during which the Estonian diplomats toiled in the Scandinavian capitals to bring their claims to the attention of both belligerent and neutral governments were largely lost to the Letts. Their cause suffered greatly because Latvian diplomats were not abroad to counter the deceptive influences of German propaganda in regard to the annexationist resolutions of the *Landesrats*.

A further unfortunate consequence of the retardation of Latvian diplomatic moves was that the protests of the Letts against the Russo-German bartering at Brest-Litovsk<sup>35</sup> were not made known abroad until several months after the conclusion of the treaties, and that in consequence the Allied and neutral world was left with serious misgivings concerning the real attitude of the Latvian people.<sup>36</sup> By July, 1918, it was evident to the Lettish leaders that direct contacts must be made with the outside world if the Lettish lands were not to be permanently incorporated into the German Empire. After a third meeting, secretly held on July 7-8, 1918, the National Council resolved to



proclaim the independence of Latvia under an international protectorate but deferred, at the instance of an Allied emissary in Russia,<sup>27</sup> a decision on the question of the neutralization of the Baltic Sea. It also decided that definite diplomatic missions to the Allied countries must be undertaken. Three of the members of the body—Meierovics, Jānis Chakste, and Jānis Kreicbergs—were selected for this purpose and were instructed to make the necessary *démarches* to procure recognition by foreign Powers of the Latvian National Council as the *de jure* and *de facto* government of Latvia, obtain admission to the Peace Conference, inform the foreign public and, at the same time, maintain liaison with the neighboring Border States while abroad.<sup>28</sup> Thus the policy of Baltic coöperation (of which Meierovics was later to become the foremost exponent) was inaugurated in principle by the decisions of the National Council. Finally, the council drafted an extensive protest to foreign Powers concerning the activities of Germany in the Balticum, the territorial cessions of the Brest-Litovsk Peace, and the intrigues of the Baltic barons.<sup>29</sup>

The Lettish National Council, supported by the unanimous national will of an undivided, indivisible Latvia, in this historic moment addresses to the governments and nations of the entire world its energetic protest against the dismemberment of the territory of Latvia and against the falsification of the will of the Lettish people, and it declares categorically and firmly the will of the Lettish people:

1. The Treaty of Brest of March 3, 1918, dismembering the territory of Latvia, is an act of violence against the right of the people to self-determination and must be regarded as null and void.

2. The Lettish people do not desire the annexation of Latvia to Germany nor the personal union of Latvia with Prussia.

3. The decisions of the Landesrats are gross falsifications of the wishes of the population of Latvia.

4. The military and economic conventions which the German Government is about to conclude with the Landesrats of Latvia will not be recognized nor carried out by Latvia and the Lettish nation.

5. The Lettish National Council protests against the violation of the freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly, of personal liberty and of travel, against the arbitrary replacing of the mayors of communes and cities by the occupying power.

6. It deems an urgent necessity *the recognition of the Lettish National Council as the supreme institution of the Lettish State* until war refugees

shall have returned to their homes and the political constitution of Latvia shall have been drawn up and put into effect.

7. It demands the creation of an independent and indivisible Lettish State under international guarantee.

The first fruits of these moves were the actual sending of Meierovics to England in August to deal with the British government and Chakste, somewhat later, to France. The Letts also found friends among the Swiss and French Protestants, who urged the Latvian cause incessantly upon their respective governments.<sup>27</sup> In line with the attitude of the National Council, Meierovics, immediately upon his arrival in London, sought out the resident representatives of the other Border States and kept in constant touch with Holsti, on the one hand, and Piip, on the other. Thus the Letts were soon able to make clear to friends, won through contacts supplied by the Finnish and Estonian emissaries, the actual position of their country. Meierovics prepared memoranda<sup>28</sup> and issued interviews, informed the officials of the British Foreign Office of the exact condition of his country, and was largely instrumental in interesting the British government in the problem of forming the Lettish Legions to police the country after the German withdrawal. There is no evidence, however, that the Lettish representations to the British government were in any respect influential in determining any of the stipulations of the armistice with Germany. They were, however, definitely determinative of British policy: on the day of the armistice Balfour accorded to Latvia the first *de facto* recognition given.

His Majesty's Government have viewed with the deepest sympathy the aspirations of the Lettish people and its desire for liberation from the German yoke. They are glad to reaffirm their readiness to grant provisional recognition to the Lettish National Council as a *de facto* independent body until such time as the Peace Conference lays the foundations of a new era of freedom and happiness for your people. In the meantime His Majesty's Government will be glad to receive you as the informal diplomatic representative of the Lettish Provisional Government.<sup>29</sup>

There is no question that this document marked a milestone on the path of Latvia's liberation as significant for Latvia as the assurance given to Tönisson in Stockholm the preceding February had been for

Estonia. It came ostensibly as a reply to Meierovics' overtures to Balfour, on October 30, requesting Allied protection for Latvia, but there can be no question that the fact of armistice dictated Balfour's reply. It is noteworthy, however, that the assurances given, even in the hour of military victory and after revolution had triumphed in Germany, were by no means as firm or as sweeping as those extended to Estonia at various times during 1918. There was no promise of eventual independence, nor was there any appeal to the principle of self-determination as a premise for Latvian claims against Russia. Certainly British policy considered the provisional recognition of Latvian independence primarily as an anti-German move.

Armistice and revolution permitted the Latvian national movement to express itself in a positive, constructive manner and to establish at least the basic institutions essential to the constituting of a stable government. Within a week of the armistice the Latvian National Council had joined forces with the political leaders left in Riga during the occupation, and, on November 18, 1918, the independence of Latvia was formally proclaimed.<sup>28</sup> This action made possible the forming of a provisional government, headed by Karlis Ulmanis, and the erection of the Latvian State Council as a constituent parliamentary body, formed from the fusion of the Latvian National Council and the so-called Riga Democratic Bloc. Forthwith Meierovics communicated the fact of the political transformation to the Allied Powers and secured a degree of acknowledgment from Italy,<sup>29</sup> and shortly thereafter from Japan<sup>30</sup> and Haiti.<sup>31</sup> Meanwhile an official notification of the proclamation of Latvian independence was brought to the attention of the various powers having representatives in Stockholm.<sup>32</sup>

The relation of the German government to the events transpiring at the time of the armistice constitutes in itself an elaborate chapter of intrigue beyond the scope of this study. In view of the complete failure of the *Landesrats* and of the plans based upon personal union with the Hohenzollern dynasty or the Prussian crown, August Winnig, the German plenipotentiary, in beginning formal negotiations with the Letts on November 22, took as his point of departure the admission that the creation of the Latvian Republic was already an accomplished fact, which Germany recognized as such.<sup>33</sup> Germany therefore promptly

declared, through Winnig, her willingness to deal with the Provisional Government created by the Latvian State Council, which was regarded as the representative body of Latvia. Winnig adroitly made clear to the Letts, however, that the representation of the German elements in the Latvian State Council must be a *sine qua non* of German recognition in a public-law way, carefully refraining from any direct reference to any type of recognition possessing international legal validity. By protracting negotiations until the eve of the fall of Riga into the hands of the Bolsheviki, he utilized every possible advantage to be gained from the difficult position of the Latvian government, and then signed a treaty on December 29, 1918, which, although juridically defective in a number of respects, could not avoid a *de facto* recognition of Latvia.<sup>20</sup> There is every evidence, in the negotiations in question, of a studied duplicity on the part of the German negotiator, who actually sought to undermine the very status of the state he was pretending to befriend. That the subsequent intrigues of von der Goltz and Bermondts were apostolic successors to the systematic duplicity of Winnig there can be little doubt.

## CHAPTER II

### LATVIA AND THE PEACE CONFERENCE OF PARIS

TO THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE the Latvian government sent a well-rounded delegation. Jānis Chakste, president of the Latvian State Council, was named as its head, and his principal associates were Zigfrīds Meierovics, who had already demonstrated his ability in dealing with the British government at London, and Jānis Seskis, who had been connected with the campaign of liberation from the founding of the Latvian National Council in Petrograd late in the autumn of 1917. To these conservative members were subsequently added Margers Skujenieks, a representative of the Lettish Left, and Felikss Cielens, an outstanding Latvian Socialist. Leadership of the group fell throughout upon Chakste, Meierovics, or Seskis.

#### I. THE LETTS AND CLEMENCEAU

The first approach to the Paris Conference was made in a formal note from Chakste to Clemenceau, on February 10, 1919, requesting the recognition of Latvia as an independent, sovereign state, one and indivisible, asking for admission of Latvian representatives to the Peace Conference, and requesting the major Allied Powers to establish diplomatic relations with the Latvian government.<sup>1</sup> A further memorandum of the same date drew the attention of the Peace Conference to the military exploits of the Letts and the moral value which would attach to recognition in bolstering the spirit of the military contingents defending the country against the Bolsheviks.<sup>2</sup> This note clearly revealed that Chakste, at least, was at that time dominated by the conceptions of equilibrative diplomacy, inasmuch as he endeavored to define Latvia's international role in terms of the relationships of power at the moment:

Latvia opposes and will continue to oppose Russian or German domination of the Lettish lands, and sees in the creation of a barrier stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea, between Russia and Germany, the prime condition of political equilibrium in the East of Europe, and the first guarantee against a Russo-German alliance, Bolshevik or otherwise.

In the light of this clearly enunciated doctrine, it was evident that Latvia would cast her lot with the policy of the *cordon sanitaire*. Because of this fact, the Latvian acceptance of the invitation to participate at the Prinkipo Conference was given with far-reaching reservations, foreshadowing a vigorously anti-Russian policy. Latvia's conditions of acceptance were that there should be a truce during which all Russian troops should be withdrawn from the territory claimed by her and that all offensive action of a military character should cease. Chakste also made it clear that Latvia's participation at Prinkipo would envisage the conclusion with Russia of a peace which must be recognized by the Allies, in all its ramifications, and a resultant establishment of permanent normal relations between the two states.<sup>8</sup> The three notes in question, together with a formal, detailed, historical and economic memorandum, comprised the first major diplomatic offensive of the Latvian government; it failed, however, to produce any appreciable results. As the prospect of meeting with the other border nationalities and the Bolsheviks at Prinkipo vanished, the representatives of the border nationalities at Paris drew closer together and endeavored to accomplish aggregately what their individual ventures had failed to achieve. A collective visit to Clemenceau in the middle of March produced no further results.<sup>4</sup> Thereupon the Letts turned to face two new problems: the maneuverings of the *Conférence Politique Russe* in Paris and the divers German intrigues in their own territory.

## II. THE CONFÉRENCE POLITIQUE RUSSE

In dealing with the *Conférence Politique Russe*, Chakste, without entering into the elaborate and practical arguments adduced by Poska on behalf of Estonia for the immediate consideration of the independence of the Border States, filed with Clemenceau what was essentially a point-by-point brief and rejoinder<sup>5</sup> rebutting the arguments of the Russian reactionaries.<sup>6</sup> To their demand that a decision on the future status of the states separated from Russia be postponed to an indeterminate date, the Latvian government replied that postponement meant anarchy, loss of morale, protracted instability of the border governments, and inability to proceed with the necessary reconstruction of the respective countries involved. The other principal argument of the

Conférence Politique Russe was met by the statement that Latvia's independence was notified in 1918 to the All-Russian Constituent Assembly and obtained at least the tacit consent of the Russian nation. To press the argument further was to deny the competence of the Peace Conference itself:

The Latvian delegation has the honor to declare that it is sure that the Peace Conference is competent to make final decisions on the status of these new States, in collaboration with these States, without making its decisions contingent on Russian consent. The Peace Conference has already applied this principle to Poland, and the Latvian Delegation does not doubt that it will apply it also to the other new states in order to reestablish peace and order in the world.

In accordance with this statement, Chakste asked that the Latvian question be placed on the agenda of the Peace Conference as soon as possible and that the independence of Latvia be recognized *de jure*. No further effort was made at the moment to push the argument which Chakste had briefed cogently and directly, although without the psychological appeal which, in the same circumstances, attached to Poska's plea.

Owing to the schedule of work of the Peace Conference, the Latvian claims were not immediately taken under consideration, and for two months the Latvian delegation turned its attention to other affairs, being much more concerned over the intrigues of the Germans in the Balticum than over those of the Russian émigrés in Paris. When, however, the Conférence Politique Russe renewed its political offensive late in May, the Latvian delegation was compelled to counterattack. On May 24, 1919, the Conférence Politique Russe memorialized Clemenceau, declaring that "the questions connected with the organization of nationalities cannot be decided *de jure* without the consent of the Russian people" and stressing "the numerous and complex interests of national defence, economics and finance which bind together the life of the Russian people and that of the nationalities living within the territory of Russia." Reiterating its stand made in March, the Conférence Politique Russe now returned to the attack specifically as it concerned the Baltic Provinces, advancing the argument of geographical determinism as the basis for continued Russian possession of the

Balticum at the psychological moment when the Allies were indulging in conversations with Kolchak.

As far as the three provinces of Livonia, Esthonia and Courland are concerned . . . their geographical situation binds them especially to Russia. Imperious economic necessity forced the Russian people to sustain a long struggle in order to gain access to the sea. During three hundred years since this purpose has been reached, Russia has made a tremendous effort to develop the ports which are indispensable to her commerce as well as a system of railroads constructed at great expense to carry to these ports a large part of the Russian exports. The Baltic provinces have largely profited by it, for the prosperity of the country is due for a large part precisely to favorable economic conditions resulting from the fact that they were part of Russia. Finally the defense of Russia and of her two Capitals depends largely on the possession of the territories on the shore of the Baltic.

For all these reasons, Russia will never be able to give up the provinces in question, but animated with a sincere desire to satisfy as fully as possible the aspirations of the peoples whose fate is bound to hers, New Russia shall grant a wide autonomy to the populations of these provinces under conditions, naturally, that the rights of all the national minorities and especially those of the Russians shall be duly safeguarded.

On this basis Prince Lvov, Chaikovsky, and Maklakov felt "obliged to reserve formally all the rights of Russia as to the final decision concerning the future of these provinces."

The reply to these pretensions was dual. In the first place, Meierovics, taking advantage of the conversations between the Allies and Kolchak to emphasize the viewpoint of his country, addressed to Clemenceau on May 30, 1919, a vigorous note covering the "contingency of a possible recognition by the Allied Powers of a Provisional Government of Russia."<sup>8</sup> After reviewing succinctly the origins of the Latvian state and the extent of its recognition, Meierovics touched upon Russia, declaring that Latvia was "ready to make all reasonable economic concessions with a view to facilitating free access to the Baltic Sea for that Power," then outlined a series of conditions to be imposed upon the Russian government with respect to Latvian nationals and their treatment. In conclusion, he disclaimed, in the name of his government, "all responsibility for the consequences which might follow any attempt arbitrarily to impose Russian sovereignty on Latvia under any form whatsoever." Given the existing circumstances, this was real cour-



age. But the most important tactical move made by Meierovics was that of requesting the recognition of Latvia as a sovereign independent state before the recognition of a Russian government. This would have confronted even Kolchak with an accomplished and irreversible fact.

The second reply to the Russian émigrés' claims was made on June 17, 1919, by the delegations of all the Border States in a common declaration, emphasizing the *de facto* existence of these states, their efforts at constitutional reconstruction, and the fact that their relations to each other and to Russia could only be determined on the basis of equality as between sovereign states.<sup>9</sup> Accordingly, the decisions of the Russian governmental organs—whatever they might be—could in no wise affect them. The plea concluded with a request for the immediate recognition of their political independence. Such were the Latvian rejoinders.

### III. PARIS AND THE LIBAU COUP D'ÉTAT

Although the contentions of the Russian reactionaries could be met by juridical argument, German intrigue could not. In the midst of further routine endeavors of the Latvian delegation to present the problem of recognition from the angle of reparations<sup>10</sup> and of a joint effort with the other Border States to advance a consideration of their problem,<sup>11</sup> there came the news of the coup d'état of the German Balts at Libau and their overthrow, at least temporarily, of the Ulmanis regime. Although the exact occasion of the coup was unexpected and took the Latvian defense forces by surprise, the Latvian delegation had continually kept the Peace Conference informed of the German intrigues in progress.<sup>12</sup> The actual overthrow of the authority of the legitimately constituted cabinet and government of the country opened a new phase of the Latvian problem. It galvanized the delegation at Paris into fervid activity to demonstrate the legitimacy of their claim to represent Latvia and to expose the conspiracies of the German occupying authorities and the Balt nobility.<sup>13</sup>

The reactions of the Paris Conference to the coup d'état in Libau were varied. The authorities concerned with the distribution of food were immediately faced with the necessity of determining whether the support indicated by the delivery of food should be extended to the counterrevolutionary Balts, and whether von der Goltz and his cohorts

should be fed as freely as the German citizens in Germany itself. The coup d'état had occurred just as the blockade of Latvia was about to be raised; therefore the Supreme Economic Council was insistent upon retaining control over imports and exports, whereas the London Blockade Council was adamant upon the retention of the blockade.<sup>24</sup> The political authorities were in even more of a quandary.

M. PICHON explained to the Committee [of Foreign Ministers] that the Germans now controlled Libau; they had overthrown the Lettish Government, but it was not clear whether this had been done by the Germans themselves or at their instigation. In his opinion, it would be very difficult to arrive at a decision in regard to the question presented to the meeting . . .

MR. HOOVER explained that the German troops and authorities in Latvia had seized the Government and disarmed the army, and had set up there a Government of their own, probably controlled by the German landowners. This government was in entire opposition to the wishes of the Lettish people. The question was whether the Allies would continue to feed the Letts, or not . . .

MR. BALFOUR expressed the view that the Germans were doing two things, firstly, fighting the Bolsheviks, a measure the Allies thoroughly approved of, and, secondly, oppressing the Letts, a measure which the Allies disapproved of.

M. PICHON thought that the Germans had carried out a regular *coup d'état* against the Letts, and by sending food into the country the Allies would indirectly be supporting the German usurpation.

MR. LANSING enquired as to the reliability of the information received. He had seen various reports, but had not been impressed by their apparent validity.

MR. HOOVER said that the Lettish Commander in Chief and some of the Government officials had come to the American Food Mission and had asked for protection. At the present moment, the American representatives in Latvia were defying the Germans.

M. PICHON pointed out that the Letts were wholly anti-Bolsheviks, and at the same time the Germans were fighting the Bolsheviks. He saw no reason, therefore, why food should be stopped.

MR. BALFOUR explained that the difficulty lay in the fact that though both the Germans and the Letts were anti-Bolshevik, the Baltic Barons were also anti-Lettish.

COL. KISCH explained that according to latest information the Germans had arrested all members of the Lettish Government; they had also disarmed the Lettish troops and seized all arms and munitions. A further re-

port stated that the food stores landed at Libau had been looted, but it was not clear by whom this had been done. It was, however, thought that the German Army of Occupation was behind the whole trouble that had now arisen in that country.

MR. LANSING said that the situation was as follows: For a time the Germans and the Letts had cooperated against the Bolshevists. Now, either at the instigation of the Germans or as an independent movement, a rising had occurred, and as a result the Letts might be driven to become Bolshevists, which would constitute a very dangerous situation. In his opinion, under these circumstances, all that the Allied and Associated Governments could do would be to insist on the withdrawal of the German troops and on the restoration of the Lettish Government. But if that were done, the Allied and Associated Governments would then have to rely upon the ability of the Letts to resist the Bolshevists.

MR. HOOVER called attention to the fact that the Lettish Government had been dispossessing the Baltic Barons of their property as fast as possible and not without violence . . .<sup>15</sup>

The foregoing excerpts from an extended discussion given in the official records make it clear that it was Mr. Lansing who proposed that the Ulmanis government be restored. It may be left to the pundits to explain on what basis Mr. Lansing could defend the legitimacy of a government which he had theretofore refused to recognize;<sup>16</sup> it is sufficient to note that in the discussions of the foreign ministers no move was in fact made to effect that restoration. Thus it also stands of record that the immediate determiners of policy failed to act on so crucial a problem. It was left to the two American experts, Professors Robert H. Lord and Samuel E. Morison, to formulate in terms of a more practical character the course which it was believed desirable for the Allied and Associated governments to pursue in the emergency. They accordingly recommended to the American commissioners on April 29, 1919.<sup>17</sup>

1. That the Supreme Council transmit through representatives of the Associated Governments now at Libau to the "Committee of Safety" or whatever *de facto* authority exists at Libau, a demand that the imprisoned members of the Provisional Government of Latvia, and all officials and troops formerly acting under its authority, be immediately released, and that this Provisional Government be restored at once to its previous functions and be respected as the *de facto* Government of Latvia.

That General von der Goltz be similarly notified that the German

military authorities must refrain from any interference in the internal administration of Latvia and must restore to the Lettish Government all arms and other property belonging to it. . . .

3. That the Supreme Council recognize the Provisional Government of Latvia, as it existed before the coup d'état of April 16th, as an independent *de facto* Government: and that a similar recognition be extended to the Provisional Governments of Estonia and Lithuania. Any declaration or recognition made to the Governments in question should contain the provision that the final status of these three countries is to be settled only in accordance with the wishes of the population as expressed through properly elected constituent assemblies: and that, as soon as a recognized Russian Government exists, the Allied and Associated Powers will use their good offices to facilitate an amicable settlement of the relations of these countries with Russia.

A simultaneous effort was made by Sir Esmé Howard to secure action by the British delegation on similar recommendations. It does not appear that the American delegation ever followed up the move of its experts, but the British twice laid before the Armistice Commission the proposals of Sir Esmé Howard and urged immediate action upon them.<sup>28</sup> Before the matter was cleared up at Spa, the Council of Foreign Ministers again debated the question on May 9, 1919, and, finding radically divergent viewpoints on matters of both fact and policy, agreed to the appointment of a committee of representatives of the principal Allied and Associated Powers "to report on the best means of keeping and maintaining order in the Baltic States and revictualling the population."<sup>29</sup> This move, although accomplishing nothing at Libau, avoided, for the moment at least, a breach between the principal Allies over the Baltic question. Far more significantly, it brought into being, in the Commission on Baltic Affairs, a direct creature of the Paris Peace Conference and entrusted it with the finding of guiding principles and constructive solutions for the political crisis. From this point on, until the end of August, the Baltic Commission formed the principal focus of the attention and diplomatic endeavors of the Latvian delegation.

### CHAPTER III

## THE BALTIC COMMISSION AND LATVIAN AFFAIRS

AT THE OPENING MEETING of the Peace Conference's Commission on Baltic Affairs, on May 15, Sir Esmé Howard (British Empire) set forth the existing situation in Latvia. The government at Libau represented the Letts, who comprised 93 per cent of the population, whereas the remaining 7 per cent were Germans deriving from the aristocracy, the liberal professions, and the intellectual classes. Purported Lettish sympathies with the Bolsheviks were, in his opinion, devoid of foundation, the problem being one of land reform rather than a political question. The German occupation was driving the Latvian peasants toward bolshevism, owing to the fact that the German army supported the great landed proprietors, who were Germans. If assured of agrarian reform and a certain amount of partitioning of the land, it was altogether likely that they would no longer busy themselves with bolshevism.

The Germans had subsequently conspired against the Latvian government and, after overthrowing it, had endeavored to establish a new one, but had not succeeded because no one would accept duty in a government under such difficult conditions. Negotiations were under way to form a coalition government. Sir Esmé did not endeavor to assess responsibilities for the coup d'état, although personally convinced that von der Goltz had very probably been involved. What he saw as prime necessities were the organization of the local forces and the supplying of money, arms, and food. In raising these problems, the British representative implicitly brought forward the question of recognition.

M. Kammerer (France) proposed that the commission study in common the internal and external situations of each of the countries (*pays*); that it then consider whether one or more of them were capable of being recommended for complete recognition as independent states; and that it examine whether there was reason for creating a federation, or alliances, between them or whether they should be considered as large provinces of Russia with extensive autonomy.

Thereupon the American representative, Dr. Morison, urged the formulation of a line of policy for the Council of Four or the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs to adopt, so that Allied representatives in Latvia could be guided thereby. Sir Esmé reported that Marshal Foch had already demanded the recall of von der Goltz, the rearming of the Letts, and the recognition of the Latvian government by Germany, noted the German disclaimer of any part in the plot but thought it useful to have the commission give its collective support to the formation of a coalition government.

M. Kammerer concurred with respect to policy, but believed that only a military commission in the field could lay its hand on the German high command and bring about the constitution of a coalition government. In consequence, it was agreed to send a military commission to the Balticum to aid in this task;<sup>1</sup> meanwhile the Allied representatives at Libau were to receive instructions to facilitate the creation of a coalition government.<sup>2</sup>

At this point Sir Esmé Howard urged that the commission get directly in touch with the Latvian representatives in Paris, as Chakste was about to leave the French capital. This was immediately vetoed by Kammerer, who deemed it best that Sir Esmé communicate to the Latvian delegation what the commission thought. The cryptic minutes of the commission merely reveal the desire of the British to have the Latvian cause get a hearing, and the equal, or greater, insistence of the French not to permit this. After this thinly veiled sharp sally, it was agreed that Kammerer should draft the recommendations of the commission. In order to aid him, and to clarify the situation, Sir Esmé read into the record a number of telegrams from Libau showing the extent of German-Balt intrigues.<sup>3</sup>

At its second meeting, on May 19, the Baltic Commission formally adopted the recommendations drafted by Kammerer,<sup>4</sup> involving the conditions on which General von der Goltz would be allowed to remain in the Balticum. The commission, however, took note of the fact that additional intrigues against the Letts were in progress.<sup>5</sup>

By the time of its third meeting, on May 22, the commission was able to obtain firsthand information from Major Keenan (British Empire), who had just arrived from Libau, about the coup d'état there.

In his opinion the government set up under Pastor Needra was Latvian in appearance only and was wholly inspired by the Germans. Although regarding Needra as a Latvian patriot, Keenan characterized him as a puppet in the hands of the German authorities, who controlled the railways, telegraphs, et cetera. There was no doubt that von der Goltz was aware of the plans for the coup d'état, but he had managed to avoid giving the Allies written evidences of his complicity. According to Keenan, the essential idea of the German Balts was to destroy Latvian authority wherever found.

Questioned by the members of the commission concerning the possibilities of forming such a coalition government as had been under discussion at the previous meeting, Keenan declared that it would be quite easy to establish a coalition government including both Letts and liberal Balts, but that the Letts must under all circumstances be in a majority. The greatest obstacle to the formation of such a coalition lay in getting the Balts to renounce their medieval privileges. On this point the Letts were adamant. To reestablish Latvian authority, volunteered Keenan, the Ulmanis government must be reconstituted and a Latvian national army formed as soon as possible under Allied control.<sup>6</sup> For the time being this ended the discussion of the recognition of a Latvian government.

Two other approaches to the Latvian problem were made at this sitting, the first by the commission itself, in endeavoring to determine its own jurisdiction, the second by the Letts, in soliciting the commission's assistance in the repatriation of Latvian prisoners of war. Both involved, in varying degrees, the whole problem of recognition of Latvia as a state. Whereas Kammerer sought to widen the commission's mandate, the Marquis della Torretta (Italy) opposed this and suggested—apparently at the behest of former Czarist diplomats in the background of the Peace Conference—that the commission virtually liquidate itself:

The press [he declared] had learned of the Commission's existence, and unfortunate agitation had resulted. The Estonians and the Letts had believed that their independence was on the point of being recognized,<sup>7</sup> and there was resultant hard feeling on the part of the Russians. In taking up the problem, the members of the Commission were in reality making an

indirect approach to the main Russian problem, i.e., the question of the integrity of Russia or of her future constitution, and might reach conclusions contrary to the policy previously followed by the Allies.

The Allied Powers have always considered the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk as nonexistent either because it was concluded by an illegal government or because it sanctioned a partition of Russia. The Russian people had always been encouraged by the Allies to resist the Germans and the Bolsheviks by the affirmation that the Allies would have made every possible effort to regenerate the country as a whole. Now it was true [he continued] that account must be taken to a certain extent, of the fact existing in the Baltic provinces, but having no knowledge of any change in the program of general policy toward Russia, it did not seem that the Commission could continue its work without the Supreme Council first giving it a clear mandate.<sup>8</sup>

For that reason he requested guidance from the Supreme Council.

Kammerer declared that he believed it possible to proceed by proposing solutions which, it would be understood, could not be definitely accepted without the consent of Russia. The Marquis della Torretta replied that he could not see how the problems concerning Latvia and Estonia could be treated apart from the whole Russian problem. The two lands had hitherto been an integral part of Russia. Russia was not an enemy territory, and the commission did not have enough right to pass upon the disposition to be made of these territories. Therefore he thought that an explicit mandate should be sought from the Supreme Council. In Morison's view, the commission would be safeguarding, not hurting, Russia's true interests in seeing to it that the Baltic Provinces did not fall into anarchy or into German hands. After further technical discussion, Sir Esmé Howard suggested that the commission would not be estopped from proceeding farther with its recommendations in regard to the Baltic countries if the point of jurisdiction were passed on to the Council of Five in a note; to this there was general assent.

It is evident that at this important meeting a decision was reached to try to deal with the Baltic countries as buffer states between Germany and Russia. As this decision and its ultimate results have been dealt with in the monograph on Estonia, the country which the commission took as the test case, no occasion arises for reopening that dis-



cussion here except to note that a treatment quite analogous to that extended to Estonia was intended to be applied to Latvia and that for that reason the Russian émigrés and the Balts were summoned before the commission to give their testimony.

In the light of that decision, the action taken on the Latvian plea for the repatriation of Lettish war prisoners is significant. M. Kammerer thought that it would be more useful to use the Lettish prisoners in the Allied cadres in Siberia than to attempt to repatriate them. In consideration of tonnage difficulties, et cetera, he suggested that the Letts be informed that the possibilities of repatriation would be examined, or, better still, that no official answer be given them. To Sir Esmé Howard's objection that the Latvian request had been addressed to the Peace Conference and that therefore an official answer should presumably be forthcoming, Kammerer replied that the request should be considered as having been received by the members of the Baltic Commission only in their individual capacities, thus avoiding the necessity of a common reply. The record reveals no demurrer, and Sir Esmé Howard asked Kammerer to draft a reply in that sense, which he would personally sign.<sup>9</sup> All this reveals the deep-laid design on the part of the commission, once it had been decided to treat the Baltic Provinces as buffer states, not to have official dealings with them in a sense which would admit an interpretation endowing them with international personality.

The fourth meeting of the commission, on May 26, was devoted to a hearing given M. Maklakov, former Kerenskist ambassador to France. The burden of his presentation was that the Provisional Government of Russia had intended to give autonomy to all the border areas without thereby sacrificing the interests of Great Russia, and that the émigrés felt that the Allied Powers were bound to get Russia's consent to any future arrangements in the Balticum.<sup>10</sup>

At the fifth meeting, on May 28, the Estonians presented their case, and only casual attention was paid to Lettish affairs. Sir Esmé Howard, however, drew the attention of the commission to the fact that the Supreme Council (Conseil des Cinq) had failed so far to act on their resolution in regard to the continuance of von der Goltz's army in the Balticum, and that he had requested the secretariat of the Peace

Conference for prompt action at the next session. Meanwhile Chakste had called upon Kammerer, apparently on May 27, to point out the uselessness of Allied munitioning of Latvia, since von der Goltz was certain to lay his hands on all arms delivered to the Letts by the Allies.<sup>21</sup>

Almost a fortnight elapsed between the fifth and sixth meetings of the commission, during which the Allied negotiations with Admiral Kolchak took place and Riga was evacuated by the Bolsheviks. Both events were extremely disheartening to the Letts, the first because it betokened, to their way of thinking, an out-and-out betrayal on the part of the Allies; the second, because it spurred General von der Goltz to an endeavor to retrieve by force for Germany a situation which, six months before, even Winnig had considered quite hopeless. When the commission resumed its sittings on June 10, Kolchak was virtually recognized. However, the Supreme Council had reacted and authorized a formal demand on General von der Goltz that he withdraw from the Balticum.<sup>22</sup> This latter move marked a step forward, but the wholly equivocal character of Allied policy toward the Balticum and Russia could hardly have been more clearly brought into relief.

At this utterly disheartening moment, the Baltic Commission summoned the Letts to appear before it and present their claims. Three delegates were ushered into the commission's presence, but Meierovics was sole spokesman. The Latvian foreign minister presented to the commission copies of the official memorandum on Latvia, together with a shorter covering memorandum, and then set forth in a brief and careful exposé Latvia's claims to recognition and the existing evidences of accorded status.<sup>23</sup> The Latvian position was squarely presented from an anti-German standpoint, to which the particular circumstances of the moment—the period of hectic interchanges of correspondence on peace terms between the Allies and the German peace delegation—fully lent themselves.

Meierovics therefore presented the Latvian plea as that of a people who had sacrificed everything for world democracy, civilization, humanity—and Latvian independence. After recalling Latvia's contribution in effectives to the Allied cause, he based the request for recognition directly on the unanimous will of the Latvian people,

aligning it with the principles of right, justice, and self-determination proclaimed by President Wilson and accepted, in varying degrees, by the principal Allied Powers. The evidences of accorded recognition possessed by Meierovics were not extensive. He interpreted the rather vague remarks of M. Noulens, in January, 1918, in a very broad manner, adduced the provisional recognition extended by Balfour, referred to a letter of good will from Sonnino, and to the utterances of Viscount Chinda as evidence of Japanese recognition, in order to establish an extremely difficult case. In the last analysis, the Latvian position rested upon confidence in the Allies' ability to redeem promises implicit in the great principles to which they had subscribed.

The elaborate memorandum contained only a short, direct plea for recognition inasmuch as its whole tenor, on the basis of historic facts and economic data, was such as to prove the independent existence of Latvia as the only practical alternative to either the restoration of centralized Russia or the creation of a constitutional federation. By eliminating all other possible courses, the program of independence was left as the only practicable one:

There now remains the third solution to be considered, the creation of independent States upon the ruins of the Russian Empire. Civilized nations are in favor of such a principle, but they recognize that the Germany and Russia of tomorrow would never permit the existence of such independent States, that these States would come under the political and economic domination of Russia or Germany, and that they either could never exist independently or that they would create an economic barrier between Europe and the Orient . . . It is certain that a party of Russians and Germans will not forget past grandeur, and it is even possible that they try by force of arms to subdue the new States. But this question has two aspects: the Lettish and the European. An independent Latvia would at least have the means of defending herself, would have a voice in the political world, and would be able to make known her desire and submit her case. She is not alone in such a situation, for her interests are the same as those of the Finns, Estonians, Lithuanians, White Russians, Poles, Ukrainians and Rumanians; all these people have reason to fear a Germany which is too strong and animated by a spirit of conquest and revenge. An alliance comprising a hundred million subjects of small nationalities is certainly of a nature to inspire Russian or German policy with a little prudence. And what would Europe gain by this policy? It would reduce the possibility of Russian and German aggression and hold the balance against the enormous masses

of Russian and German peoples; it would establish a barrier between Russia and Germany, reaching from the Baltic to the Black Sea, the best guarantee for universal peace and the peaceful development of peoples. The independence of Latvia is one of the guarantees of Central European equilibrium. These are the reasons which actuated the Letts in laying before the Great Powers a demand for the recognition of their independence.<sup>24</sup>

It is obvious that the policy first outlined by Chakste in his initial contact with Clemenceau, a policy based on the theory of the balance of power, of the building up of a new equilibrium, thoroughly pervades this official plea, but that the *politique de la barrière* is a second, reinforcing element. Certainly the official Latvian memorandum contains none of the ideological elements which entered into Meierovics' plea and which, in due season, became the guiding and permanent elements in Latvian foreign policy.

Finally, the short covering memorandum—the work of Meierovics—accompanying the fuller statement of the Latvian case endeavored to supply the deficiencies of the longer document. Openly requesting the recognition of Latvia as a sovereign state, independent, one and indivisible, it immediately asked for its admission as a full member of the League of Nations, with rights equal to those of any other adherent to the Covenant. It then summarized the historic contrasts between Letts and Germans, as well as between Letts and Russians. Reverting to the statements made in the note of May 30 regarding the impending recognition of Kolchak, it declared the Latvian question to be an international, not a Russian one, and denied the right of the Russian Constituent Assembly to decide Latvia's fate.

In ensuing sections of this memorandum, Meierovics stressed the willingness of Latvia to accord Russia all necessary commercial and economic facilities and to assume a proportional share of the pre-Soviet Russian debt—subject to indemnification of Latvia by Russia for the damage wrought in the Lettish lands by the imperial armies during their retreat and for the losses of evacuated Letts, war victims and refugees. At this early date, Meierovics emphasized the value of cooperation between the Border States, and specifically asked the commission for a free hand to develop the *alliances already existing*<sup>25</sup> between Latvia and her neighbors, namely, Finland, Estonia, Lithua-

nia, White Russia, and Poland. The significance of this claim is, of course, that it validates, from the Latvian standpoint, the theory of collaborative coexistence *ab initio* as the official doctrine of state succession held by the Letts. Latvia's final request to the Baltic Commission was for the withdrawal of the German troops and the return of the Lettish refugees from various parts of Russia.<sup>36</sup>

The reactions of the Baltic Commission to the Latvian exposé were immediate. Speaking on behalf of his colleagues, Sir Esmé Howard at once informed Meierovics and the other Latvian delegates that he could confirm the assurances given by all the Allied governments at the moment when the Provisional Government of Latvia was recognized as *de facto* independent, pending the decision of the Peace Conference.<sup>37</sup> This fulfilled to the letter the promise originally given the Letts by Balfour. Sir Esmé Howard thereupon revealed to the Latvian delegates the view of the commission "that it would be practically impossible to establish a definitive status for these countries without the consent of the Russian government which, they were persuaded, was shortly going to be reestablished."<sup>38</sup> It was cruelly clear that the members of the Baltic Commission, either by superior orders, or from personal conviction, or both, were for the moment favorable to Kolchak, believing that his claim to represent all Russia would shortly be made good. It was exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, under those conditions, continued the president, "for the Allied States to recognize immediately the independence of these States." Renewed expressions of sympathy were forthcoming, and assurances—here Sir Esmé made it absolutely clear that he was speaking on behalf of all his colleagues—that the Allies' efforts would tend to guarantee in every way the liberty of the Latvian and Estonian peoples.<sup>39</sup> "If an attempt were now made to establish a state of affairs not accepted later by the Russian Government, the result would be that the establishment of peace in these regions would become much more difficult."<sup>40</sup> On this basis the commission declined the Latvian plea. Handsome assurances were, however, given that the wishes of the Letts with respect to repatriation of their soldiers and reparations<sup>41</sup> would be taken into consideration. Finally, the Latvian delegation was informed that the Allied governments had actively taken under consideration the existing situation

regarding the German troops in Latvia, but that no decision had so far been reached.

In spite of the unquestionably adverse character of the commission's decision, Meierovics' reply was restrained and objective. He reaffirmed Latvia's claim to reparations, then, going to the heart of Russo-Latvian relations, declared:

As concerns our future relations with Russia, it seems to us that a solution similar to that which has been reached with regard to Finland would be the best.

With the support of the League of Nations, it will be possible shortly to establish the terms of an agreement between Latvia and Russia.

At this moment Latvia is the victim of a terrible plot directed by German and Russian forces united on our soil. This manoeuvre, frequently repeated in the course of history, constitutes a very grave danger for the future of our country.

That is why we seek to make the Latvian question an international one. We would not wish our fate to depend on the decisions of an All-Russian Constituent Assembly, and we hope that you yourselves will find the best solution for the relations between Latvia and Russia.<sup>23</sup>

More than this able maneuver could hardly have been expected under the circumstances. Viewed in the retrospect of nearly two decades, the cold logic of Meierovics' analysis stands out, in contrast to that of the commission, as a realistic and positive appraisal of the known forces at work.

With a formal acknowledgment that the commission simply took note of what they had said, and that their statements merited scrupulous attention,<sup>24</sup> Sir Esmé informed the Latvian delegates that the hearing was closed. Nothing of the further deliberations of the commission is disclosed in the minutes of the meeting, and the Latvian plea appears to have received little attention, so far as any constructive solution is concerned, at the seventh session, on June 13, 1919,<sup>25</sup> when an inconclusive discussion concerning means of getting General von der Goltz out of the Balticum took place. This was continued at the eighth session, on June 17, which noted the ultimatum sent by General H. H. Gough to the doughty German commander and discussed its probable reception.<sup>26</sup>

Of greater importance to the Latvian cause, although chiefly nega-

tive in its influence, was the hearing granted by the commission at that meeting to Baron Meyendorff, as representing the German-Balt and Russian minorities in the Balticum. His thesis was extraordinarily simple. The German-Balts, like certain Russians and numerous Letts, had had to seek from the German armies protection against bolshevism. This military coöperation did not prove that there was political coöperation. For the most part only necessity had led to rapprochement.

Although paying lip service to the "laudable efforts made by the governments of Latvia and Estonia" to organize the life of the country, he nevertheless thought the task beyond their means, particularly in Latvia, and especially as far as the formation of an army was concerned. The activities of von der Goltz's army were deplorable, yet Baron Meyendorff declared that he thought the integral and immediate withdrawal of the German forces from the Balticum was not desirable, nor the immediate formation of a Latvian national army possible, seeing that the various combat elements were bolshevized.

The principal complaint against the Baltic governments concerned their radical land-reform policy, which was "disquieting to both the Russian and German-Balt landowners" and seemed likely to compromise the rational solution of the land problem—vaguely envisaged as only a partial and very minor partition to be carried out in the hope of placating the landless peasantry. Politically, the Balts feared possible russification, particularly in language and religion, but were thoroughly anti-Bolshevik and had assured Admiral Kolchak of their desire not to separate from Russia. They did not believe in the viability of the Border States but were hopeful of reëstablishing, for a transitional period, a regime sufficiently equitable to assure them security and the exercise of their rights.<sup>26</sup>

On the conclusion of Baron Meyendorff's exposé Sir Esmé Howard officially took cognizance of his desires regarding minorities and assured him that the commission would forward them to the Council of Five with its approval.<sup>27</sup>

Immediately following Meyendorff's plea, the commission heard a firsthand report from Colonel Warwick Greene (U.S.A.) recommending military support, credit, and loans to all the Baltic countries, but

particularly to Estonia and Lithuania, whereupon the blockade would be lifted. Concerning Latvia, he reported that the Allied military representatives on the spot had urged that "a loan to Latvia be agreed to under analogous conditions as soon as a provisional coalition government shall have been formed *under conditions which will make it, in the eyes of the political representatives of the Associated Governments in Latvia the legitimate representative of the inhabitants of the country.* On the conclusion of an arrangement of this kind the blockade of Latvia shall be equally lifted."<sup>28</sup> Some discussion thereupon took place concerning the power of the Associated governments to advance money to unrecognized governments, since it was discovered that the American, British, French, and Italian governments were legally estopped from so doing. It thereupon became a matter for private banks, involving the pledging by the fledgling governments of their principal resources in flax, forests, and railways as collateral for a proposed loan of about one hundred million pounds. The commission reached no conclusion on the matter, however, and turned to the discussion of other topics.

The record<sup>29</sup> reveals the blighting effect upon the commission of the action of the Peace Conference in sponsoring the cause of Admiral Kolchak. Of necessity this decision made the commission partisanly anti-Bolshevik, skeptical of the viability of the new states (although anxious to utilize them as a part of the *cordon sanitaire*), and highly receptive to the views of the Balts, and therefore more tolerant, in principle, toward the Russian minority in its intrigues with the Baltic army. It also reveals the hiatus between the point of view of the plenipotentiaries in Paris, deeply imbued with legalistic conceptions widely at variance with realities, and that of the military representatives in the field, who were fully abreast of local conditions. What makes the recommendations of the military representatives of unusual interest is the fact that their reasoning concerning the situation was dominated throughout by the conception of constitutive recognition, which would give the benison of the Allies, and inferentially of the Peace Conference, to any government recognized (or constituted) by the military representatives on the spot. This is the only instance known to the writer where the military representatives of the Allies in the field arro-



gated to themselves such power, or at least made it the postulate on which all their political reasoning was based.

The minutes of the commission's ninth session, on June 19, 1919, have little to add. They record the transmission of the foregoing recommendations to the "Big Five" of the Paris Conference, and veer sharply off into maritime questions totally unconnected with the Latvian cause.<sup>20</sup> Likewise the minutes of the tenth session, June 24, 1919, touch only the final form given to the recommendations of the experts in the Balticum.<sup>21</sup> At the eleventh meeting, June 30, 1919, the commission reconsidered the advisability of a loan and heard full explanations concerning the uses to which it would be put.<sup>22</sup> Discussion at the twelfth meeting, July 2, 1919, was desultory, although the telegraphic evidence read into the record showed that the internal situation in Latvia had begun to clear with the fall of the Needra cabinet.<sup>23</sup>

Between the hearing accorded the Letts on June 10 and July 2 British policy appears to have undergone a fundamental change, ostensibly based on the pious hope that Admiral Kolchak and the Conférence Politique Russe would eventually become masters of the Balticum once more. Believing the time had come to clarify—both for the Baltic States themselves and for Admiral Kolchak—Allied policy in regard to the Baltic States, pending a definitive decision of their fate, Sir Esmé produced on behalf of his government, at the close of the meeting of July 2, a memorandum reviewing the existing situation.

Although the British government had recognized *de facto* the independence of Estonia and Latvia and had given these peoples the assurance that every possible effort would be made in future to protect their liberty, Lithuania had received neither the same recognition nor the same assurances. It could not, however, be doubted that it was to the interest not only of Europe but also of the Russian anti-Bolshevik movement that these countries be protected against bolshevism. It was equally in the interests of Europe in general and of Russia that they should not become German colonies or fall under German influence.

The Baltic ports being essential as bases for all anti-Bolshevik activity directed against Petrograd or Moscow, it was necessary that stably organized governments be established in these countries. So long as specific assurances were not given to the populations firmly

determined not to return to Russia under the previously existing conditions, it would be impossible to dissipate their misgivings concerning future Allied policy. It would in consequence be impossible to count on the organized governments—apparently an imperious necessity in any anti-Bolshevik campaign. Individually given assurances would not suffice. Sir Esmé therefore proposed that the commission present to the Council of Five a resolution, couched in both anti-German and anti-Bolshevik terms,<sup>54</sup> declarative of Allied policy.

The Allied and Associated Powers once again recognize as independent *de facto* Governments the Governments of Estonia and Latvia, and for the first time the Government of Lithuania; they affirm to them that they have decided to assure to these States the free self-government which their populations desire.

At the same time the Allied and Associated Governments must express their opinion that a definitive solution cannot be reached without the consent of a recognized Russian Government and, while reserving the right to coöperate either directly or by the intermediary of the League of Nations, with a view to obtaining a solution satisfactory to both parties, they cannot for the moment take any step which would bind them to a definitive solution while awaiting the reëstablishment of a recognized Russian Government.

Meanwhile they have the desire and will to do everything in their power to help the Baltic States to organize their local defense and establish an efficient and stable administration.<sup>55</sup>

Sir Esmé concluded by moving that a copy of the declaration be sent to Admiral Kolchak and to the Russian committee in Paris and that both be advised that the Allied and Associated Powers had deemed this step necessary to assure the coöperation of the Baltic States, which was undoubtedly indispensable to the conduct of effective operations against Petrograd and, eventually, Moscow.

The British memorandum may be said to have represented, on its theoretical side, an endeavor to effect a compromise between independence and nonindependence by according *de facto* recognition to the Baltic *governments* while denying status as legally constituted *states* to the nascent republics. It was accordingly tinctured by classic conceptions of the old international law, requiring affirmative action of the mother country as the *condition préalable* to recognition, as well

as by newer notions of the mediatory role of the League of Nations in giving the earmarks of legality to new states. Most basically, it was conditioned upon an as yet executory action of the Allies themselves with reference to the reconstitution of a Russian government. Practically, the proposals were designed to involve Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in the far-reaching interventionist schemes of the moment, while promising them in return only an illusory status, dependent upon the caprices of Kolchak, the *Conférence Politique Russe*, or even the League of Nations. Thus did the British propose to pay themselves and their allies militarily for purely verbal generosity. Small wonder that the Baltic delegations, so far as they knew of the matter, suspected a plot against their independence!

The far-reaching effect of the British memorandum, in even mentioning the areas in question as possessing "independent *de facto* governments," was perceptible at the thirteenth meeting of the commission on July 4. The ingenious compromise it offered appealed to the French, who accepted it, subject to the deletion of all references to Baltic *independence*,<sup>86</sup> which, they felt, went beyond all previous commitments. In this reservation they were backed by the Italians, who favored reference to nothing more than *de facto* governments in any negotiations, lest this encroach on the prerogatives of Kolchak.<sup>87</sup> The Japanese likewise refused to go farther in their commitments, particularly as regards Lithuania,<sup>88</sup> and the United States absolutely refused any sort of recognition, however circumscribed.<sup>89</sup> As Marquis della Torretta pointed out, however, the United States, by participating in the negotiations with Kolchak, had implicitly recognized the local *de facto* governments. It was therefore decided, pending new instructions from Lansing, to suppress all reference to independence and speak only of *de facto* governments.

Owing to delays in clarification of the American position, discussion was not resumed until the fifteenth meeting, on July 11, when, on French initiative, all reference to the Baltic areas as "states" was filtered out.<sup>90</sup> This satisfied the American representative, Colonel Greene, personally, but he was compelled to withhold his formal assent, as did the French delegation for like reason, pending final authorization from his government. The resolution in its final form was approved

by the commission at its sixteenth meeting on July 15, 1919, and thereupon forwarded to the Supreme Council.<sup>44</sup>

Matters reached an impasse in the next fortnight, as the Supreme Council, exhibiting a sudden sense of realities, refused point blank on July 25, 1919, to follow the recommendations of the commission. At the seventeenth meeting on July 29, 1919, with the Marquis della Torretta in the chair,<sup>45</sup> the commission abandoned the procedure outlined in the British memorandum and took up for the remainder of its meetings the problem of German withdrawal from the Balticum. Major Tyler (U.S.A.) revealed that Jānis Seskis, as spokesman for the Latvian delegation, had visited him earlier that day, pleading for a prompt evacuation of the Balticum by the Germans lest they at any later time take with them the flax crop—the sole convertible asset of the peasant population. The Marquis della Torretta, followed by Commandant Aublet (France), both apparently influenced by a German note on the subject,<sup>46</sup> expressed much more concern over the fate of the Balt and Russian minorities than over that of the Estonians or Letts, but Mr. Carr (British Empire) believed General Gough, the Allied commander in chief in the Balticum, to be well aware of the minority situation.<sup>47</sup> Nothing reveals more clearly the divided opinions of the commission than the rather futile debate on recommendations to the Supreme Council regarding evacuation. From this inconclusive discussion the commission proceeded at its eighteenth meeting, on July 31, to definitive recommendations, chiefly in accordance with the suggestions of Marshal Foch. These set a definite time limit, destined not to be observed, within which General von der Goltz and his troops would evacuate the Balticum, leaving by sea on ships to be made available by the British Admiralty.<sup>48</sup> Thus the Paris Peace Conference finally reached a formal decision on the troop problem, although toying to the last, with fine punctilios, over the questions of "state," "government," "territory," "province," and "region." It is open to question whether any other great international gathering, faced by such important issues, ever exhibited so completely the Byzantine spirit in logomachy.<sup>49</sup>

The sole remaining problem regarding Latvia found in the minutes of the Baltic Commission refers to the official attitude of Germany

toward Latvia and the Letts. Despite the numerous evidences adduced from the Latvian side to the effect that von der Goltz was determined if possible to crush the Latvian government and state or else to reduce it, through Needra, to a puppet government, the contrariant official pronouncements from the German Foreign Office are principally in point. Here the evidence submitted to the Baltic Commission by the French and British governments is particularly important. It appears that General von der Goltz endeavored, as late as July 13, 1919, to make his withdrawal contingent on guaranties of German minority rights, and that he refused categorically, at that date, to recognize the Ulmanis government or to agree to withdrawal by sea.<sup>49</sup> To this General Weygand, Foch's chief of staff, categorically replied that the composition of the Latvian government had no relation to the withdrawal of the German troops.<sup>50</sup> There is additional evidence that the German armistice commission at Düsseldorf deliberately sabotaged Allied efforts at a showdown by failing to transmit notes concerning General von der Goltz to the Foreign Office in Berlin.<sup>51</sup> When finally hard pressed by Foch, however, the German Foreign Office gave its pledge regarding the Ulmanis government:

The composition of the Latvian Government has always been considered by Germany as a matter of internal Latvian policy in which the German Government cannot interfere.

The formation of a new Latvian cabinet is therefore in no way connected with the question of the evacuation of Latvia.<sup>52</sup>

## CHAPTER IV

### LATVIA AND THE BORDER STATES

**T**O BREAK WITH the Peace Conference of Paris was not easy. Latvia, no less than the other Border States, had pinned her hopes on its affirmative action, despite the intrigues of the Russian reactionaries and the Allies' flirtations with Kolchak. Yet when the Soviet government actually offered an armistice in the opening days of September, 1919, it was impossible to ignore the overture. Latvia did not, however, desire to break relations with the Peace Conference by such abrupt action as the Estonians took—that of actually decamping. Therefore Jānis Seskis made one more move<sup>1</sup> to secure action at Paris, or at least to discover the real intentions of the Allies, before the Latvian government responded to Chicherin's initiative of September 10. Admitting the impossibility of continuing the struggle against both the Germans and the Bolsheviks, Seskis intimated to Clemenceau that concerted action would be taken by several of the border delegations.

This at once involved a regularization of their status and a definition of their stand toward the Northwest Government of Russia. Seeing the drift of events, Meierovics had already undertaken, singlehanded, a maneuver to bring the Northwest Government to book. In response to a note of September 3, 1919, Lianosov, as premier and foreign minister, informed Meierovics on September 11 that the Northwest Government of Russia was ready to enter, as soon as possible, into the closest relationships with Latvia.<sup>2</sup> This settled the question of recognition without the necessity of an ultimatum, although the phraseology employed strictly avoided the term "recognition."

Following the conferences held during September at Tartu, Tallinn, and Riga, where the five Baltic States took counsel in common, Finland extended a *de facto* recognition to Latvia, nominally in response to a formal request made of Holsti by Meierovics in June, 1919, but actually because a regularization of the relationships between the two countries was definitely in order, since the conclusion of peace between the Soviet government and any one of the Border States would consti-

tute the latter a neutral and would impose upon the other Border States the necessity of so regarding it as long as their hostilities with Russia continued. Holsti's note, under date of September 26, 1919,<sup>3</sup> recognized Latvia as a state, without reference to its form of government, and recognized the Provisional Government as the *de facto* government of the country. This diplomatic formula avoided any type of recognition of a specific form of government, thereby obviating premature judgment on what the Latvian Constituent Assembly might decide.

Almost a month later, after the liquidation of the Bermondts affair, Poland followed in the wake of Finland, in extending a type of *de facto* recognition not unlike that accorded by England and Japan almost a year before,<sup>4</sup> but making any further action dependent upon the decision of the Peace Conference. In striking contrast with the equivocal character of the provisional recognition given by Paderewski was the action of Lithuania, through Premier Galvanauskas, in extending on October 23, 1919, a retroactive declaration of recognition which, omitting all superfluous phraseology, amounted for all practical purposes to a *de jure* recognition.

Considering the proclamation of the independence of the free Republic of Latvia as the decisive expression of the self-determination of the Latvian Nation, the Lithuanian Government has the honor to declare that by its *de facto* relations with the high Government of Latvia it has always respected this decision by recognizing the independence of the free Republic of Latvia as well as its Government, the holder of Supreme Power in Latvia.<sup>5</sup>

Following further codeliberation among the Baltic States at Tartu, to which the Ukrainian government had sent an observer, the government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic, on December 10, 1919, sent to the Latvian government, in much the manner chosen by Galvanauskas, a rescript of recognition. This interesting document, comprising two short paragraphs, reveals at once the zeal and the jumbled ideology of the Ukrainian government.

Directed by the principle of free choice for the peoples and of the full sovereignty of each nation as regards the construction of its own governmental life, the Ukrainian Democratic Republic finds it its duty to aid in

the enfranchisement of all the nations avid for independence, and desires to put into practice the principle of the liberty of nations solemnly proclaimed by the Peace Conference of Paris.

The Ukrainian Democratic Republic recognizes the Republic of Latvia within its ethnographic boundaries with the provinces of Courland, Livonia and Latgale, directed by the Provisional Government named by the Latvian State Council representing a free and independent organization and expressing the will and the sovereign rights of the Latvian people.<sup>8</sup>

This rescript, signed by Petliura as head of the Directory of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic and commander in chief of its army, was countersigned by André Levitzky as administrator of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It seems probable that Levitzky drafted the second paragraph, containing all the essentials, and that some other hand, possibly that of Petliura himself, scrambled the document by including the frothy phraseology of the first paragraph. It is distinctive as one of the few documents evidencing recognition extended by or to the Ukrainian Republic. The internal evidence appears to warrant the assertion that the Latvian government had previously impressed upon the Ukrainian representatives its desire to have the act of recognition include all the Lettish lands. The internal constitutional arrangements in Latvia are equally correctly stated, and the phrase "free and independent organization" reveals acquaintance by the drafters with the other documents evidencing recognition of the Latvian state. But the component elements of the idea of self-determination are only vaguely comprehended. The ideas of option or choice, of popular will or liberty of nations, the conception of external or internal sovereignty, are only fragmentarily and awkwardly expressed. All told, the document is illustrative of the frame of mind of its drafters, but it loses none of the legal effect of a formal recognition.

With the receipt of the Ukrainian attestation the *de facto* recognitions of Latvian independence came to a standstill and remained in that deadlocked position for almost a year. Further recognitions from the West were not forthcoming, and it became gradually clear that no step would be taken by other European states to adjust the status of Latvia until Latvia and Russia had reached some degree of settlement *inter se*. That is why the final plea of Seskis to the Supreme Council,<sup>9</sup> after the



Peace Conference had formally adjourned, fell upon deaf ears, despite the complete military liquidation of the Bermondts affair. It was useless to recapitulate the progress made in internal consolidation or to note the vexations flowing from nonrecognition. For the time being, the presence of Bolshevik forces in Latgale permitted Latvia to continue her campaign against the Bolsheviks and to appear to keep up a solidarity with the Allied governments which was in fact utterly lacking. Owing to the presence of the interallied military mission at Riga, it proved impossible for Meierovics to negotiate at Tartu for armistice, and the French government, through General Niessel, steadfastly opposed any yielding by the Letts to Soviet overtures.

At the end of 1919, Seskis, the last of the original delegation to the Peace Conference, left Paris, entrusting to Olgerds Grosvalds, a member of the delegation especially accredited to the French government in a semiofficial capacity, the task of defending Latvia's interests before the Supreme Council. Grosvalds does not appear to have been singularly influential; perhaps circumstances militated overwhelmingly against any success, but his efforts to push for recognition *de jure* where Georgia and Armenia had succeeded in obtaining formal *de facto* recognition from the Allies proved as unavailing as those of Seskis. Grosvalds waited until Clemenceau had left office to make his plea to Millerand, on January 21, 1920. By this time Latgale had, with Polish assistance, been sufficiently cleared of Bolsheviks to permit him to assert confidently that Latvia had triumphed over both her enemies and to proclaim that Latvia and Poland were the only powers still struggling on the western boundary of Russia against the Soviet forces. On the ground that Latvia had militarily earned recognition, Grosvalds laid the case finally before Millerand,<sup>8</sup> as president of the Supreme Council.<sup>9</sup> When the end of January came and no reply had been received, Meierovics moved to break with the Allies in a way which would least affront them.<sup>10</sup>

On January 31, 1920, he wired to the Soviet and Estonian plenipotentiaries at Tartu that Latvia desired to be associated with Estonia in the making of peace with Russia. Whether for political or for technical reasons, Meierovics' message did not reach the plenipotentiaries until after the Treaty of Tartu had been signed, although Latvia had

throughout maintained an observer on the spot at Tartu and in more or less informal touch with Joffe. The gesture of Meierovics sufficed, however, to indicate to the Soviet plenipotentiaries that the period of hostilities was completely over and that an armistice in fact existed.<sup>12</sup> Thereafter the matter of negotiating with Russia became merely a procedural detail. After some sparring, it was decided to send a mission to Moscow rather than to receive a Soviet mission in Riga, where the political climate would hardly have been equable. The mission left for Moscow on April 10, 1920,<sup>13</sup> and carried on most of the negotiations there. The treaty was, however, not completed<sup>14</sup> before the time of the great Baltic conference at Bulduri in the late summer of 1920, hence the negotiations were transferred to Riga, where the treaty was concluded on August 11, 1920.<sup>15</sup> In the all-essential matter of recognition, virtually no obstacles were encountered, as the formula devised by the Soviet government for Estonia, supplemented by the Estonian emendations, almost exactly suited Latvia's analogous situation. Notwithstanding, the phraseology finally agreed upon, although conveying the same general meaning, differed textually in a number of respects from the provisions of the Treaty of Tartu.<sup>16</sup>

The significance for Latvia of signing peace with Russia and obtaining formal *de jure* recognition was very appreciable. Coming as it did at the very height of the Russo-Polish war, the Treaty of Riga became an event of more than local importance and had repercussions in numerous European capitals.

The peace with Russia has a great significance for us [declared an important Latvian journal]. It was concluded not with certain representatives of the Russian people, but with the government. Russia, on her part, has not dealt with any Latvian political party whatsoever, but with the Latvian State. We have not concluded peace with the Bolsheviks, nor with Russia of the Soviets, but with Russia, the only Russia which at the present time represents this strange people. We have concluded peace with the same Russia which tomorrow or the day after tomorrow will sign treaties with London, which now directs world politics, with the Russia which today is *de facto*, tomorrow *de jure*. . . . To recognize Russia *de jure* within her present frontiers is equivalent to recognizing the new states *de jure* within their frontiers. The circumstance that the treaty of peace between Latvia and Russia was signed at the very moment when Krassin and Kamenev are negotiating with Lloyd George at London lends to the treaty signed a particu-

lar significance. . . . We must avow that the recognition of the sovereignty of Latvia is the capital point for us. After long centuries Russia renounces her claim to rights over Latvian territory and the Latvian people.<sup>26</sup>

The most important fact [commented a semiofficial organ] is that Russia recognizes us as a free and independent State by an official act. The power from which we have separated renounces all its pretensions to our territory. She recognizes our independence. In the name of what legal or moral right could another State now consider Latvia as forming a part of Russia and demand of us some day or other any union with her? Russia has recognized us *de facto* and *de jure*; our recognition by the other Great Powers should no longer be delayed.<sup>27</sup>

With *de jure* recognition from Russia, it was again possible to approach the Allied governments, the northern European neutrals, and the League of Nations for similar action. A clarification of Latvia's relationships to Germany was also an essential preliminary. Although it did not involve a definition of a territorial or marine boundary, the settlement between Germany and Latvia had to record a definite adjustment of power and lay the bases for economic intercourse. The actions of Germany in 1919 made this difficult in the extreme. Following the attack on Riga by the German armed forces in Latvia in October, 1919, the Latvian government proceeded to the confiscation of certain German properties,<sup>28</sup> an act which did not facilitate a restoration of friendly relations. Later Meierovics formally arraigned the German government in a note informing it of the terms on which Latvia would consider a liquidation of outstanding grievances.<sup>29</sup> The German government was hardly cordial, and long and fruitless negotiations took place in Berlin,<sup>30</sup> eventuating in provisional agreements for the repatriation of prisoners, et cetera. Not until July 15, 1920, at the height of the Russo-Polish war, in which Germany had determined to remain neutral, did the formal state of war, construed by the Letts to exist between them and Germany in consequence of the German aggressions on Latvia, terminate through the signing of a provisional convention governing the resumption of relations between the two countries.<sup>31</sup> By Article 2 of this convention, Germany declared her willingness to recognize Latvia *de jure* as soon as any of the principal Allied Powers named in the Treaty of Versailles should have accorded

Latvia full recognition.<sup>22</sup> This unusual stipulation appears to have been the result of a studied endeavor, on the one hand, to withhold formal recognition as long as possible for political reasons, and, on the other, to safeguard Germany from any reproaches which might be made against her by the Allied governments for going beyond the terms of the Treaty of Versailles. However, it would appear that the convention itself, *ex proprio vigore*, in fact extended a *de jure* recognition by formally establishing diplomatic relations and various types of conventional relations between the two countries. Such was not only the result of the divers stipulations, but it was the clearly defined purpose of the convention, as indicated in its preamble. Any effort to claim, therefore, that *de jure* recognition was not *ipso facto* accorded is in reality a subterfuge and denies the facts in the case.

The convention, then, served to regularize Latvia's complicated relations with Germany and, taken in connection with the Peace of Riga, terminated Latvia's role as a belligerent. For the remainder of the Russo-Polish war Latvia acted as a studiously impartial, yet actively mediating, neutral in endeavoring to bring the Soviet and Polish governments to the peace table. This mediatory role, as well as her leadership in regional coöperation, as evidenced in the Bulduri conference, did much to enhance Latvia's prestige and undoubtedly contributed toward breaking down the diffidence of western Europe toward her.

## THE ROAD TO RECOGNITION

## I. LATVIA AND THE COLBY NOTE

BY THE TIME OF THE SIGNING of the Peace of Riga the attitude of Great Britain toward the Baltic States began to clear. The negotiations between Lloyd George and the Soviet emissaries in London broke the ice; it became continually clearer that the Baltic States would survive and make their peace with Soviet Russia. Therefore British policy reluctantly accepted the inevitable and refused to embark on any further counterrevolutionary enterprises. France, however, realizing the terrible plight of her protégé Poland, endeavored, at the height of the Bolshevik drive on Warsaw, to counter by her diplomacy the gains of Soviet arms. Accordingly on August 9, 1920, France extended *de facto* recognition to the government of General Wrangel.<sup>1</sup> This caused much bitterness and disillusionment in the Balticum, Latvia sensing in this maneuver a deliberate effort of France to defer or block the recognition of the Baltic States.

Our situation [declared Meierovics on August 16] has become complicated as a result of the *de facto* recognition of the Wrangel government by the French government. . . . The policy of Great Britain will not be influenced by the French recognition of the Wrangel government. France's policy has not undergone any modification hitherto. It remains what it was at the time of the Prinkipo proposals. It is not of a nature to hasten our *de jure* recognition, although the declarations of Wrangel on the whole Russian problem differ from those of Kolchak and Denikin. Wrangel aspires to a federative Russia—a thing which cannot satisfy us inasmuch as it does not provide for our *de jure* independent existence. It may, after all, further postpone our *de jure* recognition. . . . The recognition of Wrangel has rather the significance of a demonstration against Soviet Russia, which has forcibly entered Poland. It is also a support to the anti-bolshevist movement.<sup>2</sup>

The subsequent publication of the Colby note just as Latvia was making her peace with the Bolsheviks caused still further resentment, the Letts being prompt to note how radically Colby's pronouncements were at variance with the Wilsonian doctrine of self-determination.<sup>3</sup>

Although no formal rejoinder was immediately made by the Latvian government to the United States, doubtless out of a desire not to create thereby further obstacles to recognition, its viewpoint was set forth semiofficially in a most incisive manner, along lines closely paralleling the note eventually sent by Estonia.<sup>4</sup> An inspired press campaign against the viewpoint set forth by Colby was actively kept up for some time by the leading Latvian journals.<sup>5</sup> The principal objectives of this campaign were to destroy the foundations of the juridical arguments against recognition by demonstrating Russia's willingness, as evidenced by the Peace of Riga, to conclude peace on a permanent basis with democratically organized, bourgeois-capitalist states, and to rebut specific objections by stating the constitutional and economic arguments in favor of recognition. Finally, the campaign endeavored to draw public attention throughout Europe to the newly attained status of the Baltic States in preparation for official moves to bring them into the League of Nations.

While Millerand and Colby exchanged reassurances concerning their solidarity in regard to Russia, counterforces were not long in making their appearance. Toward the end of August, Giolitti and Lloyd George met at Lucerne to exchange views and came to an agreement on the policy they would pursue with respect to eastern Europe.

This exchange of views [announced a British communiqué on the subject] revealed the complete agreement which exists between the British and Italian governments on the absolute necessity of the reestablishment of the peace of the world as rapidly as possible. . . . Before the complete establishment of peace there are, however, a certain number of important questions to be solved, the greater part of which are indissolubly bound up with the march of events in the territories of the former Russian Empire. Until peace is established between Russia and the other parts of the world, there will be, to that extent, an atmosphere of trouble and agitation. For this reason the British and Italian Governments have taken measures to reestablish communications between Russia and the outside world. . . . The world, both West and East, loudly demands peace, but it may not be had except on the basis of a full recognition of the liberties of nations. The British and Italian Governments are appalled by the indefinite prolongation of this state of war between nations. . . . They are, in consequence united in insisting that all possible efforts shall be made to put an end to the conflicts now existing between nations.<sup>6</sup>

Almost simultaneously Count Sforza replied to the Colby note assenting to the general principles involved but expressly reserving from his pronouncement on the territorial integrity of Russia Italy's full right "to equally recognize the existence of the Baltic States."

## II. LATVIA AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

From this point on, the phalanx of Allied resistance to the claims of the Baltic governments was broken, and Latvia prepared to push to the full her advantage by seeking immediate admission to the League of Nations. In Latvia itself, sponsorship of the League's principles came through the organization of the Latvian League of Nations Association under the presidency of Chakste and with the active collaboration of Meierovics.<sup>9</sup> Abroad, the Latvian diplomats redoubled their efforts to secure additional evidences of recognition.

By the time that the First Assembly met, in December, 1920, Latvia claimed to have been recognized *de jure* by Russia and, subject to the qualifications discussed above, by Germany; *de facto* by England, France, Japan, Poland, Belgium,<sup>9</sup> Finland, the Ukraine, Lithuania, and Haiti. As further evidence of her status, Latvia pointed out the presence in her territory of diplomatic missions accredited to her government by Great Britain, the United States, France, Italy, Germany, Poland, Finland, Estonia, Lithuania, the Ukraine, and Russia, and of consular officers similarly accredited by the same states and additionally by Belgium, Denmark, Austria, Brazil, Norway, Sweden, Holland, and Switzerland.<sup>10</sup> This imposing array of evidence of informal diplomatic and consular connections failed to convince the Fifth Commission of the First Assembly, which, in its report on the candidacy of Latvia, declared that *de facto* recognition had been extended only by Great Britain, Japan, Finland, Poland, and France, thus disregarding the clear fact of Haitian recognition and recognition by the Ukraine and Belgium.<sup>11</sup> The report of the commission deserves criticism in that it lists as an acknowledged recognition that by Finland, who was herself a candidate for admission, and excludes the recognition by the Ukraine, equally a Succession State and an applicant for admission. In the final vote on Latvia's candidacy, Colombia, Paraguay, Persia, and Portugal closed ranks with Italy in support of Latvia's case, whereas

twenty-four members voted against Latvia and thirteen were absent or abstained. Although it cannot be said that Latvia's general standing was any more favorably regarded than that of Estonia, which received exactly the same positive support, it is noteworthy that three delegations, those from Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Uruguay, which opposed the Estonian claims to admission failed to oppose Latvia and were entered among the absent or abstaining.<sup>13</sup> Thus, to a certain qualified extent, it may be said that the League looked upon Latvia, despite the limited evidences of her recognition, with a slightly friendlier eye; in any event, Latvia was able to count upon her five friends in the First Assembly as having accorded her a type of express *de facto* recognition.

### III. THE SUPREME COUNCIL ACTS

The discussions in the Assembly and its committees revealed, as has already been noted in regard to Estonia, an obvious reluctance of the smaller states to act in advance of the Great Powers. This was not lost upon Meierovics; hence his resolve, on learning of the change in cabinets in France which brought Briand back to power, to endeavor to enlighten personally the chief advocate of European pacification. The rest is now a commonplace. With the aid of Count Sforza, Lloyd George, and Briand, the long-pending *de jure* recognition was finally accorded by the Supreme Council to Latvia, as well as to Estonia and Georgia, on January 26, 1921.<sup>14</sup> Thereafter recognitions were rapidly forthcoming.

The collective act of recognition of January 26, 1921, was accepted by Latvia as conferring final and unreserved *de jure* recognition on the part of all the states represented on the Supreme Council, namely, Belgium, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan. The latter Power, however, saw fit to transmit, as it did for Estonia, a formal confirmation of the action taken by the Supreme Council,<sup>14</sup> opening up the possibility of interpretation, from the standpoint of Japanese constitutional law, that the action of the Supreme Council was not in fact that of a funded recognizing power but merely the act of an agent of the governments represented on the Supreme Council and therefore subject to confirmation or disavowal by the principals—for Japan, in the last analysis, the emperor and his ministers. It is worthy of note,



however, that none of the other governments represented on the Supreme Council attempted any confirmation of the council's action. The Japanese construction is therefore an interpretation *sui generis*.

#### IV. NEIGHBORS AND NEUTRALS

The day on which the action of the Supreme Council took place witnessed the extension of *de jure* recognition by Finland and Poland. Finland's recognition note recalled Meierovics' formal request of June 16, 1919, for *de facto* recognition and Holsti's reply,<sup>25</sup> then conveyed the statement that President Staahlberg had now decided, in the light of the happy collaboration which had taken place between Latvia and Finland at Helsingfors and Riga, to recognize Latvia as a *de jure* free and sovereign State.<sup>26</sup> The Polish note, retrodated, as was the Estonian note, to December 31, 1920, was actually not handed over until the news of the Supreme Council action was received, and was formally regarded by the Latvian Foreign Office as dating only from January 26, 1921. Its tenor signified that the Polish chief of state, after taking counsel with his cabinet, had decided to recognize definitively the Republic of Latvia as an independent and sovereign state, and it conveyed the hope that the example given by Poland would shortly be followed by other governments.<sup>27</sup>

In accordance with her promise in the provisional convention of July 15, 1920, Germany announced on February 1 her formal *de jure* recognition of Latvia and expressed the hope that this final regularization of their relationships would be conducive to their mutual welfare.<sup>28</sup> As was true of Estonia, the Scandinavian countries were the next to extend recognition, in virtually identic terms, although not all on the same day. The Norwegian note<sup>29</sup> was quickly followed by that of Sweden,<sup>30</sup> and Denmark extended her recognition and felicitations two days later.<sup>31</sup> The differences between the texts are of formal character and of technical interest only. They disclose merely the diversity of practice in seeking to attain a single end.<sup>32</sup>

Immediately after the action of the Scandinavian countries, Persia, faithful to the tradition of support of the Baltic countries which she had established at Geneva in the preceding December, hastened to express formally her recognition of Latvian independence.<sup>33</sup> Austria

followed a week later with a most cordial note expressing her willingness to follow in the steps of the Supreme Council and Germany and declaring that there now existed no further hindrance to her recognition of Latvia.<sup>24</sup> Likewise Portugal, whose principal delegate at the First Assembly had staunchly sponsored the admission of the Baltic States, promptly extended in effective form her official recognition.<sup>25</sup> Shortly thereafter Rumania fell in line, possibly with a view to clarifying formal relations with a country having a border coterminous with Poland, which was then negotiating for alliance with her.<sup>26</sup> A final stage in formal regularization of relations between Estonia and Latvia was effected on March 2, 1921, when Meierovics formally commissioned a diplomatic representative as "chargé d'affaires ad interim" to Estonia. In support of this move, Meierovics cited the action of the Supreme Council in recognizing both countries *de jure* and reaffirmed the position he had originally taken, that the two states had always considered themselves legally sovereign and independent.<sup>27</sup>

The next development in the recognition of Latvia came as the principal western European neutrals, Holland, Spain, and Switzerland, endeavored to clarify their relations to the new Baltic republic. Here concern appears to have arisen not so much in regard to the existence or vitality of the new state and its government as in regard to the permanent commercial policies of a state of acknowledged viability. Thus Holland most punctiliously replied, after a discreet interval, to the formal request for recognition by declaring that the Netherlands government "formally recognizes Latvia as a sovereign and independent state and the present Government as its legitimate government"<sup>28</sup> but coupled with this recognition a declaration that the Netherlands government expected most-favored-nation treatment in commercial matters. Similarly Spain, with a somewhat greater emphasis on the legitimacy of newly constituted governments, made clear to Latvia, and placed it on record as a type of condition antecedent to recognition, that she expected a number of guaranties with respect to property, equal treatment of nationals, and recognition of a proportional share of the Czarist debts.<sup>29</sup> Subject to these conditions, she accorded her recognition of "the Republic of Latvia as an independent and sovereign state." Switzerland's recognition was extended on terms identic

with those stipulated in regard to Estonia and on the same date. The Latvian government was directly informed by the Federal Political Department, both by wire and by a formal note, so that the terms of the arrangement were clear and specific.<sup>29</sup> From the fervid protestations of republicanism indulged in at the time of the recognition of Finland, in 1918, Switzerland had, by 1921, come to a less romantic viewpoint, based on objective computations concerning her commercial interests in assuming diplomatic relations with Latvia.

Chiefly because the interests of the Catholic Church in Latvia were far more prominent than in Estonia, and because no political controversy with any neighboring state cast its shadow on ecclesiastical matters, the Holy See ventured to recognize Latvia, on June 10, 1921, in terms virtually identic with those employed later in the recognition of Estonia.<sup>30</sup> In so doing, the Holy See drew particular attention to its lively interest in the civil and moral well-being of the young republic. This was entirely consistent with its general policy in eastern Europe.

In conformity with its practice in other instances, Hungary attempted a purely unilateral type of recognition of Latvia which, however, at least in its written form, perceptibly lagged behind that accorded to Estonia on grounds of racial affinity. It appears that the Hungarian minister of foreign affairs, Count Banffy, conveyed an unsolicited, but informal, oral recognition to the Latvian diplomatic representative in Vienna as soon as the action of the Allied Powers was made known. Hungary having failed to follow this with a written communication, the Latvian government seems to have solicited a more formal attestation, which was given, without reference to the request made, by a formal note of July 20, 1921, addressed directly to Meierovics. The note is terse and to the point, but it prefers to recognize the Republic of Latvia as an independent nation, rather than as a state.<sup>31</sup> This is characteristic of Hungary's recognition texts.

With the receipt of the Hungarian document, recognitions from European states ceased for the remainder of 1921, but the results of a diplomatic offensive, undertaken in South America by the Latvian legation in Paris, and in the Caribbean area and the Far East by the legation in London, began to become manifest. By a decree of July 6, 1921, the Republic of Panama extended recognition. The document is

illuminating in that, in marked contrast to the usual colorless edict, it has an elaborate motivated preamble, recalling that, as a consequence of the recent European conflict, a group of new nationalities with marked ethnic characteristics, definite ideals and aspirations, and their own geographic unity had constituted themselves into independent and sovereign states. Among these, the decree noted the Republic of Latvia as having suggested, through the legation of Panama in London, the convenience of establishing commercial and diplomatic relations with Panama. It further noted that Latvia had constituted herself a democratic republic on the basis of universal, equal, direct, and secret suffrage with proportional representation. Because of these considerations, the communication held: "The Republic of Panama recognizes the juridical existence of the Republic of Latvia."<sup>58</sup> Although there were undoubted shortcomings in phraseology and although the decree *per se* could not take the place of formal diplomatic communications, this use of the decree had real value in putting on record the formal legal reasons actuating a government in extending recognition and fulfilled the constitutional role of a proclamation to the public, having also plenary municipal force at law.

The remaining recognitions received by Latvia during 1921 came from Siam,<sup>54</sup> Cuba,<sup>55</sup> Chile,<sup>56</sup> and Brazil<sup>57</sup> as a result of diplomatic overtures made, in each instance, before the opening of the Second Assembly of the League of Nations. Thus, even though they lag past the date of Latvia's formal integration into the Geneva organization, they are the result of antecedent diplomatic negotiation. Nothing of particular significance attaches to the notes themselves, although the Brazilian decree is not without interest.

#### V. THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS ACTS

Latvia was admitted to the League of Nations by the Second Assembly at its sixteenth plenary session, on September 22, 1921, by the affirmative vote of thirty-eight members of the League, with none opposing and only ten absent or abstaining.<sup>59</sup> The states voting for Latvia's admission were South Africa, Albania, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, British Empire, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Greece,

Haiti, India, Italy, Japan, Liberia, Nicaragua, Norway, New Zealand, Panama, Paraguay, Netherlands, Persia, Portugal, Siam, Sweden, Switzerland, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Of these, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Costa Rica, Greece, Liberia, Nicaragua, Uruguay, and Venezuela had not previously recorded, either individually or at the First Assembly, their attitude toward Latvia. To that extent, therefore, on the theory of automatic recognition by admission into the League,<sup>39</sup> these were equivalent to new recognitions, even if formal attestations were subsequently received from some of the countries voting in the affirmative. Of those absent or abstaining (Argentina, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, Honduras, Luxemburg, Peru, Poland, Rumania, Salvador, and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State), Poland and Rumania had already accorded recognition, and Argentina and Honduras had no delegations present. In reality, therefore, only six delegations which had not yet recognized Latvia withheld their vote.

After being admitted to membership in the League, under analogous circumstances, Estonia took it so entirely for granted that the doctrine of automatic recognition was, or would become, the accepted constitutional doctrine of the League that she deliberately abandoned further efforts to obtain recognition from any League members. Notwithstanding, certain belated recognitions came in after the date of Estonia's admission to the League. The same thing occurred with respect to Latvia, but Latvia, unlike her northern neighbor, did not abandon the campaign for recognition.<sup>40</sup> It would appear that Meierovics sensed the insufficiency of League action when he undertook his trip to western Europe to bring the Allied governments into line in dealing with the Baltic States; *a fortiori*, it seemed worth while to keep up the campaign after the recognition by the Supreme Council; it was therefore allowed to continue and garnered tangible results.

Czechoslovakia was the first of the Powers to correlate its action with the fact of Latvia's League membership, unless the Brazilian decree, itself the product of much earlier inquiry and solicitation, be technically admitted to constitute a capitulation to the acts of the League. In a note identic with that sent to Estonia, the Czechoslovak government, on January 5, 1922, notified its decision "to recognize officially the Latvian State as a sovereign and independent State."<sup>41</sup>

Shortly thereafter the Venezuelan government informed the Latvian envoy in Paris "that the Government of the United States of Venezuela sees no obstacle to the *de jure* recognition of the Republic of Latvia."<sup>43</sup> There being some doubt in the mind of the Latvian government whether or not this negative statement implied positive recognition, the Latvian chargé d'affaires at Paris pressed the Venezuelan envoy in the French capital for an answer and received the personal interpretation, subsequently confirmed by the Venezuelan Foreign Office, "that by the official declaration which I had the honor to transmit to you on January 12, 1922, the Government of Venezuela had recognized the Republic of Latvia *de jure*."<sup>44</sup> Haiti was the next to fall in line, extending on February 13, 1922, a most cordial note of recognition, recalling Haiti's early interest in Latvia and asking Latvia to regard the note "as a formal recognition of the Republic of Latvia."<sup>45</sup>

#### VI. FINAL WELCOME INTO THE FAMILY OF NATIONS

In keeping with its endeavor to pursue a distinct course in matters of recognition, Argentina recognized Latvia by a decree of March 28, 1922, which merely declared that, having seen the demand formulated by the Government of Latvia, the Executive Power of the Nation decreed that Latvia was recognized as a free and independent State. This action was officially notified to the Latvian government by the Argentine embassy in Paris on April 5, 1922.<sup>46</sup> Despite its effort to treat recognition as a unilateral act, the exchanges of diplomatic correspondence incident to the "demand formulated" and the recognition accorded deprive the Argentine gesture of much of its supposed significance.

Two Balkan and two South American countries followed in Argentina's wake. On May 23, 1922, the Greek government extended formal recognition, couched in terms identic with those employed in its recognition of Estonia on the same day and declaring its satisfaction at the entry of Latvia into full membership in the League of Nations.<sup>47</sup> Bulgaria's action came a day later, tactfully following the Greek move by a communication from the Bulgarian minister in Paris to the Latvian envoy in the French capital.<sup>48</sup> On June 2, Peru issued a decree of recognition, based on the formal request made by Grosvalds to Señor

Cornejo, the Peruvian minister in Paris, and transmitted to the Peruvian Foreign Office, and on the additional ground that Latvia had been recognized by virtually all the countries in the world.<sup>46</sup> Owing to the time consumed in transmitting the decree to Paris, Grosvalds was not informed until July 27, 1922.<sup>47</sup> In dealing with Colombia, Meierovics acted directly from Riga, rather than through any of the European legations of Latvia, and addressed the Colombian minister of foreign affairs solicitously, requesting that Colombia recognize Latvia's *de jure* independence. Colombia, in reply, gladly extended recognition on July 8, 1922, declaring her solidarity with the aspirations of the Latvian people.<sup>48</sup> The letter conveying this information could hardly have reached Riga before the recognition extended by the United States, on July 28, 1922, but it was regarded by the Latvian Foreign Office as bearing validity from the date of issuance rather than from the time of reception, and hence as having priority over the American notification.<sup>49</sup>

Luxemburg extended its recognition of Latvia after a special solicitation on the part of the Latvian minister in France. It does not appear whether or not the Latvian diplomat directed attention during the Third Assembly to the comembership of Latvia and Luxemburg in the Genevan organization, but the *mémoire* came at an auspicious moment for strengthening such a correlation, and Luxemburg readily acceded.<sup>50</sup>

With this recognition the campaign, undertaken when the Supreme Council failed to recognize Lithuania simultaneously with Latvia and Estonia, came to a close, for shortly afterward the befuddled Conference of Ambassadors, anxious to liquidate the residue of the Russian estate, reluctantly conceded to Lithuania the status which she had been seeking since the end of 1917.<sup>51</sup> Thereafter it became immaterial to Latvia whether she amassed any additional evidences of recognition or not, and all further formal efforts to extort it from reluctant or unwilling states were abandoned as both unnecessary and superfluous. Notwithstanding, Latvia received, at an opportune moment in 1923, formal recognition from China, this action of the Chinese government being obviously a part of the campaign undertaken by the Peking government for the rehabilitation of China's juridical position, as it offered

recognition in exchange for immediate treaty negotiations "on the basis of equity, equality and reciprocity." It does not appear that the recognition by China was formally solicited, and in any event the Latvian government did not respond to the Chinese overtures to the extent of immediate signature of a treaty along the lines proposed. For Latvia, as for Estonia, the retention of extraterritorial rights in China possessed very real values which neither country was willing to barter away for a recognition already voluntarily extended.<sup>54</sup>

Latvia received recognition from Turkey and in turn gave recognition to the Turkish Republic through the signature of a treaty of amity at Warsaw, on January 3, 1925. Although the term "recognition" is not expressly used in the treaty, the phraseology of the preamble leaves no room for doubt that the intention of each party to recognize the other was clear and unequivocal.<sup>55</sup> Likewise, the hitherto undefined and imprecise attitude of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State toward Latvia was made clear by the instrument of recognition extended to both Estonia and Latvia at Geneva, September 7, 1926,<sup>56</sup> the significance of which, from the standpoint of recognition doctrine, was fully emphasized in the discussion of the Yugoslav recognition of Estonia.<sup>57</sup> Finally, in 1927, the Mexican Foreign Office, in response to the request of M. Zariņš, the Latvian minister in Sweden, courteously extended a recognition meticulously explicit as regards both the Latvian state and its government:

I have the great pleasure of bringing to your attention the information that by a cablegram from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mexico dated yesterday, I am authorized to inform Your Excellency that the Government of the United Mexican States recognizes de facto and de jure the independence of the Republic of Latvia as well as the Latvian Government . . . I would greatly appreciate it if Your Excellency would inform your Government of this decision with the request to consider the present declaration as the evidence of a formal recognition.<sup>58</sup>



## CONCLUSION

**B**ETWEEN THE FAINT MORAL ENCOURAGEMENT given to the Lettish leaders in Petrograd at the beginning of 1918 and the full rounded statement by Mexico nine years later showing full understanding of all the difficulties attendant upon recognition, Latvia passed through four clearly defined stages. These can be traced in their gradual emergence through this study of the formal recognition.

In the first phase, dating from January, 1918, to January, 1920, the Latvian patriots pursued a clearly anti-German, anti-Bolshevik, pro-Ally orientation, seeking to convert the major Allied Powers to the cause of Latvian independence by a demonstration of the solidarity of the Letts with the Allied cause. This period, which has epochal significance, began with the overtures from Goldmanis to Noulens, Buchanan, and Francis and ended with the first plea of Grosvalds to Millerand to hasten Allied sanctioning of Latvia's status. It was a period of war and revolution, replete with intrigues at Moscow, Berlin, and Paris, all directed against the independence of the Latvian state. The pro-Ally attitude adopted by the Letts led them to follow Allied leadership until it became demonstrably suicidal to the nation's interests to consort with counterrevolution. Therefore it ended abruptly.

The second phase, covering the critical year from January 22, 1920, to January 26, 1921, was a period of constructive action. The long roll of the guns died away; armistice was followed by negotiation, by frontier delimitation, by the coöperative endeavor at Bulduri to establish the bases for a new normalcy in the Baltic. Throughout this phase, Latvian diplomacy undermined, by its constructive action, the final juridical bastions of the opponents of Latvian independence and erected the edifice of peace at home. By the time that the Supreme Council had made its epochal decision, incontrovertible facts of peace, stability, and viability confronted it. It could not do otherwise than accept as inevitable the established fact of Latvian independence. With that decision, the edifice of the Colby doctrine, built upon the arid sands of juridical moralization, was swept away by the flood of world-wide public opinion. Latvia had vindicated her right to independent existence before the tribunal of history.

This opened the third phase of the recognition process, in which the judgment of the public at large became converted, after the precedent set by the Great Powers, into the crystallized *de jure* situation of a state established in and before the Law and Society of Nations. Fittingly, this period ended with the avowal by the United States of America that Latvia had established her claim so thoroughly that even the heirs and successors of Colby in the Department of State could not prevail against it.

The final phase was disarmingly simple. It consisted in the legal rounding out of attained status by forming the final liaisons, chiefly with states outside the formally organized Society of Nations, that buttressed Latvia in every direction. Within the fold of the Genevan Society it was formally averred that the mere fact of membership invested her with the attributes of sovereignty and independence. Than this she could ask no more. Once this assurance was of record, it mattered not at all whether the formal evidences of recognition were forthcoming or not, and Latvia regarded the task of vindicating her position and status as complete. That is why the final recognitions were no longer determinative of the life or death of the new state; they were merely indicative of general acceptance of attained status, and set the seal of legal approbation upon Latvia's charter of enfranchisement.

MEMOIRE SUR LES ASPIRATIONS POLITIQUES  
DE LA LATVIA (LETTONIE)\*

En ma qualité de plénipotentiaire représentant du Conseil national letton, auprès des puissances de l'Entente, chargé de demander la reconnaissance de l'indépendance de la Latvia (Lettonie), je me permets d'accompagner ma lettre de créances de ce mémoire.

Le Conseil national letton, constitué en novembre 1917, est l'institution suprême de Latvia. Il groupe, autour de lui, en fait, tous les Lettons organisés : les diètes locales, les partis politiques, les organisations militaires, les corporations, les syndicats, les sociétés, etc. ...

Le Conseil national letton choisit, par voie d'élections, dans son sein, le pouvoir exécutif. Les chefs de neuf départements composent un collège (ou ministère). Le siège de cette administration est à l'abri des forces allemandes.

Dans ses sessions du 16 au 19 novembre 1917 du 15 au 19 janvier et du 26 au 29 juin 1918, le Conseil national letton, soutenu par la volonté unanime du peuple letton, décida de porter à la connaissance des puissances de l'Entente, sa demande irréductible en faveur d'une Latvia une et indivisible. Cette demande fut formulée comme suit :

1. La Latvia (Lettonie), composée de la Livonie, de la Courlande, du Latgale et des territoires habités par des Lettons, demande à être reconnue comme un Etat souverain, indépendant, un et indivisible avec la garantie des puissances de l'Entente et des autres Etats ;

2. Le Conseil national letton affirme à nouveau que la Latvia n'a pas reconnu le traité de Brest-Litovsk du 3 mars 1918, et que, par ce fait même, elle ne se considère point comme engagée par lui. Le Conseil national letton demande que la destinée de la Latvia soit réglée à la Conférence générale de la Paix, conformément aux aspirations des peuples lettons et en collaboration avec les délégués lettons dûment accrédités par le Conseil national letton.

3. Le Conseil national letton demande à être reconnu jusqu'au retour des réfugiés et jusqu'à la constitution définitive de l'Etat letton comme le gouvernement, de jure et de facto, de Latvia (Lettonie). ...

\* *La Revue Baltique*, Nos. 3-4, pp. 86-88.

Vint l'époque des négociations de paix de Brest-Litovsk. ... La Latvia fut sacrifiée; la Russie, qui n'avait d'autres droits sur les pays lettons que celui de la conquête, renonça définitivement à leur possession. L'Allemagne, où regnait une grande incertitude sur la politique à suivre en Latvia, s'appliqua à rédiger les articles concernant la Latvia (Lettonie) dans un langage obscur qui pourrait permettre toutes les interprétations.

Après la conclusion de la paix, il apparut que la Latvia était divisée en quatre parties: (1) La Courlande, qui devait former un Etat à part et servir de champ à la colonisation allemande. Dans ce pays, l'aristocratie allemande est incontestablement la classe dominante; (2) Riga et le district avoisinant devenaient aussi allemands. Un port libre devait être créé à Riga, et la haute bourgeoisie allemande était destinée à devenir la classe dominante; (3) Le reste des pays lettons dans les provinces baltiques restait placé sous la domination allemande jusqu'au jour où "en harmonie avec le désir de la population la paix et l'ordre seraient rétablies" et un Etat nouveau serait créé; (4) La Latgale restait à la Russie.

Ainsi l'Allemagne, craignant les puissantes aspirations nationales lettones, divisa la patrie lettone en quatre parties et la partagea entre deux Etats. L'Allemagne a fait tout en son pouvoir pour justifier cette monstruosité. Quand le Conseil national letton, invité officieusement à prendre part aux négociations de Brest-Litovsk, repoussa fièrement les neuf propositions préliminaires de l'Allemagne et refusa d'engager des pourparlers avec elle, l'Allemagne créa, elle-même des conseils qu'elle appela nationaux. Elle choisit quelques Lettons placés sous sa dépendance, et par ce fait même, sans autorité aucune, des nobles et des bourgeois allemands. Ainsi, furent créés plusieurs Landesrats. Les "décisions" de ces institutions, prises souvent sous la menace de la force armée, furent publiées comme émanant des peuples lettons. Les Allemands et leurs partisans, qui ne forment même pas sept pour cent de la population contre 80% de Lettons, entrèrent pour plus de deux tiers dans la composition des Landesrats. Ils n'ont aucunement qualité pour parler au nom de la Latvia. L'Allemagne travaille inutilement à la falsification de la volonté nationale lettone. Les peuples lettons n'ont jamais désiré l'annexion à l'Allemagne, ni une union

réelle ou personnelle avec le Royaume de Prusse ou la maison royale des Hohenzollern.

La Russie, qui possédait la Livonie depuis 1710, la Latgale depuis 1772 et la Courlande depuis 1795, évita soigneusement d'accorder une autonomie quelconque à la Latvia, ou même de réunir dans une unité administrative les pays lettons placés sous sa domination. ... Les Lettons attribuèrent généreusement cet état de choses au régime tsariste. Ils voulurent faire crédit à la Russie nouvelle contre toute évidence, en dépit de toutes les forces historiques qui ont toujours imposé à la Grande Russie une politique d'oppression à l'égard des autres peuples. C'est ainsi que les hommes politiques lettons ne s'émurent point de voir le Gouvernement provisoire se montrer aussi centralisateur que l'ancien régime. Les Lettons, à qui les sacrifices pour la cause commune donnaient bien droit à une certaine considération, virent leur demande de réunion administrative des pays lettons rejetée une première fois par le gouvernement du Prince Lvov en juin 1917, puis une seconde fois par le Gouvernement Kerensky après l'abandon de Riga par les Russes. Bien entendu, l'autonomie dont jouissait la noblesse allemande sous les tsars fut également refusée aux Lettons; et nous ne parlons pas de l'autonomie promise par le prince Galitzine. Les hommes politiques lettons se montrèrent à dessein d'une modération presque excessive: ils prévoyaient le refus russe et ils voulaient montrer au travers de formules sonores les solides réalités politiques: il fallait que les masses lettones vissent la Russie éternelle.

Les raisons politiques en faveur d'un régime d'oppression centralisatrice sont plus fortes que toutes les bonnes intentions des hommes d'état russes. ... Le régime de Lenine, issu de la révolution d'octobre (V.S.) céda toute la Latvia à l'Allemagne après y avoir pratiqué des destructions, des pillages et des massacres. ... La Russie, en outre, renonça à ses droits de souveraineté sur la Latvia. L'Allemagne s'efforce aujourd'hui de s'approprier ces droits par tous les moyens. Dorénavant, c'est là une question qui n'est plus russe. ...

La restauration monarchique en Russie se prépare, mais elle sera accomplie par l'Allemagne dans son intérêt propre et dirigée contre le monde civilisé. Il n'y a rien de commun entre la Latvia et la Russie, ni dans le passé ni dans le présent, ni dans l'avenir. Les peuples lettons

se refusent à être replacés sous la domination russe. Il n'y a aucune raison pour imposer une solution russe à la question lettone. On dit que la Russie ne pourrait pas exister sans la Latvia, mais quelle est la valeur de cet argument? ... Pourquoi donc soumettre à la domination russe les pays lettons, que la Russie est incapable de protéger? La Russie n'a besoin des ports lettons que pour son commerce de transit, et les Lettons ne voient aucun inconvénient à ce que leur pays prenne à l'égard de la Russie un rôle d'intermédiaire comparable à celui que jouent pour l'Allemagne Amsterdam et Rotterdam, ainsi qu'Anvers. ...

Plus profonde encore est la différence des mentalités. Les peuples lettons, formés par Rome, n'ont aucune sympathie pour l'anarchie ou la monarchie russe. Aujourd'hui, plus que jamais, les Lettons sentent qu'ils sont fils d'une autre civilisation, d'une autre culture, et que leur mentalité est différente. Il n'y a pas d'union possible entre nous, Lettons, et les Russes.

Le Conseil national letton est convaincu que la demande de l'établissement d'une Latvia souveraine est en harmonie avec les principes des puissances d'Occident et soutenue par l'intérêt de la civilisation mondiale. Le Conseil national letton exprime sa foi confiante que la Latvia (Lettonie) ne sera pas cédée, par voie d'annexion ou d'union, à l'Allemagne, ni rendue à la Russie, mais que les sacrifices de sang et d'or consentis par les Lettons en vue d'assurer l'établissement de l'Etat souverain letton par la force des armes seront dûment appréciés à la Conférence de la Paix, à laquelle les représentants lettons seront admis et prendront part.

## DOCUMENT 2

### PROTEST OF THE LETTISH NATIONAL COUNCIL\*

Possessing an unshakeable faith in the final victory of right and justice, the Lettish people have sacrificed without stint their wealth and their best sons in the struggle against the subjection and oppression of nations by Germany. Nevertheless, in the month of February, the enemy accomplished the occupation of all Latvia. Its young and flourishing economic culture is in ruins and its very intense intellectual life is checked. Its rich and picturesque farms are burned and its bustling cities are plunged in a profound silence. About 70 per cent of the inhabitants of Latvia have voluntarily left their hearths or have been forced to do so and have since then been wandering the roads of immense Russia. . . .

The Peace of Brest inflicted the most terrible blow on ruined Latvia. Courland and the city of Riga with its district are given over to the protectorate of Germany; the rest of Lettish Livonia, namely, the districts of Wenden, of Wolmar, and of Walk, are subjected to German occupation until peace and order shall have been reestablished in agreement with the wishes of the population; the fate of Latgalia, comprising the districts of Rezekne, Dvinsk, and Ludza of the government of Vitebsk, remains undecided.

In this way the territory of Latvia, inhabited by a people united by a particular civilization, by a community of political and national aspirations and by economic interests, is artificially dismembered and partitioned between two States under quite different political conditions. The Treaty of Brest is a crime directed against the national, political, and economic existence of the Lettish people in the future; it is a violation of the principles of democracy, an offense against the right of a people to dispose of itself.

The German occupying power has forged for Latvia heavy chains shackling the economic and intellectual life of the country. . . .

The Letts now living in Latvia, as likewise those who have just returned or who are still wandering in the plains and cities of Russia,

\* *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia, 2:833-835.*

would never desire the annexation of Latvia by Germany, nor the personal union with the King of Prussia. The two countries, Latvia and Prussia, have neither political or national aspirations nor economic or cultural interests in common; they are not even contiguous enough to have sufficient organic ties. For that reason, relying on armed force, the occupying power is trying to subjugate Courland to German imperialism and militarism; the fate of Posen and Alsace-Lorraine threatens Latvia.

In order to create a juridical and moral basis for these acts of violation of justice within the dismembered portions of Latvia, the military authorities have hastened to form *Landesrats* composed of the mayors of rural communes and cities and of the representatives of the great landlords of German origin. The resolutions passed at the sessions of these *Landesrats* give an absolutely false idea of the political tendencies and will of the Lettish people. The *Landesrats* are usurping the right of the people to political self-determination, masking the final annexation of Latvia to Prussia. Thus on March 8, 1918, the *Landesrat* of Kurland passed a resolution setting up the province of Courland as a duchy and offering the crown to the Hohenzollern dynasty; on April 12, 1918, the "United *Landesrat*," composed of representatives of the municipality of Riga, of Livonia, of Oesel Island, and of Estonia, decided to set up the Baltic provinces as a monarchy joined with Russia by a personal union through its king, and to offer the crown of the new monarchy to the German Emperor. The German government has just given the order to conclude military and economic conventions between the Duchy of Courland and Germany.

The *Landesrats* created by the occupying power have no right whatever to discuss and decide, in the name of the Lettish people, the fate of Latvia. Their members have not been elected, but appointed by the German administration; they are not representatives of the Lettish people, but of the Baltic nobility, carrying out the annexationist aims of the Pan-Germanists. . . .

In view of the great importance of the coast of the Baltic Sea, the problem of Latvia has become an international problem of world importance. The Baltic *Landesrats* created by the occupying power have neither the qualifications nor the competence to solve it. It must be



solved by the Lettish people themselves, in accord with the interests of world democracy, at the general peace conference.

The Lettish National Council, uniting all national political parties, central communal institutions, and most important social organizations, excepting the extremist parties . . . on April 4, 1918, submitted a vigorous protest to the German Imperial Chancellor, Count Hertling, and the Zemstvo of Livonia took a similar action with respect to the German Imperial Chancellor and the Commander in Chief of the Army of Occupation. The two protests have had no result.

The Lettish National Council, supported by the unanimous national will of an undivided, indivisible Latvia, in this historic moment addresses to the governments and nations of the entire world its energetic protest against the dismemberment of the territory of Latvia and against the falsification of the will of the Lettish people, and it declares categorically and firmly the will of the Lettish people:

1. The Treaty of Brest of March 3, 1918, dismembering the territory of Latvia, is an act of violence against the right of the people to self-determination and must be regarded as null and void.

2. The Lettish people do not desire the annexation of Latvia to Germany nor the personal union of Latvia with Prussia.

3. The decisions of the Landesrats are gross falsifications of the wishes of the population of Latvia.

4. The military and economic conventions which the German Government is about to conclude with the Landesrats of Latvia will not be recognized nor carried out by Latvia and the Lettish nation.

5. The Lettish National Council protests against the violation of the freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly, of personal liberty and of travel, against the arbitrary replacing of the mayors of communes and cities by the occupying power.

6. It deems an urgent necessity the recognition of the Lettish National Council as the supreme institution of the Lettish State until the war refugees shall have returned to their homes and the political constitution of Latvia shall have been drawn up and put into effect.

7. It demands the creation of an independent and indivisible Lettish State under international guarantee.

DOCUMENT 3

COMMUNICATION FROM THE LETTISH DELEGATION  
RELATIVE TO THE SITUATION OF THAT  
GOVERNMENT WITH REFERENCE  
TO RUSSIA\*

LETTISH DELEGATION  
201 BOULEVARD PEREIRE, PARIS  
8 AVENUE DE CAMOËNS, PARIS XVI

PARIS, March 24, 1919

FROM: *The President of the Council of the State of Latvia, Chairman  
of the Lettish Delegation*

TO: *The President of the Peace Conference*

The Lettish Delegation has the honor to bring to the knowledge of the Peace Conference its reply to the note sent by the Russian Political Conference to the President of the Peace Conference on March 9, 1919.

This Russian note is composed of two parts, quite distinct and contradictory, the first of which serves merely to create a sentiment favorable to the singular thesis which the Russian Political Conference is trying to have adopted by the Peace Conference.

The Russian Representatives demand:

A. That the definitive solution of the future status of the States separated from Russia be postponed to a date not determined, and

B. That the questions relative to the future status of the new States be not settled without the consent of the Russian Nation.

In reply to the first Russian demand (A), the Lettish Delegation has the honor to draw the attention of the Peace Conference to the fact that the postponement of a final solution will:

1. Perpetuate in the new States the anarchy from which they are beginning to free themselves, because:

a) The national troops at present fighting for the independence of their country would refuse to continue the struggle to the profit of a restoration of Russian domination within its former boundaries.

\* D. H. Miller, *My Diary at the Conference of Paris*, XVIII, 23-25.

b) Such an attitude of the Peace Conference towards the national Governments will ruin their moral prestige in their country.

c) The national governments, considering the temporary regime, cannot undertake the far-reaching reforms necessary to eliminate the profound causes of anarchy which Russia has bequeathed to those new States; and

2. The perpetuation of anarchy under such conditions will definitely ruin the countries in question by making it impossible for them to reestablish order and the normal conditions of life.

In reply to the second Russian demand (B), the Lettish Delegation has the honor to inform the Peace Conference that the Lettish National Council gave notice, through M. J. Goldmanis, of its separation from Russia to the Russian Constituent Assembly in February, 1918, and to declare that it is sure that the Peace Conference is competent to make final decisions on the status of these new States, in collaboration with these States without making its decisions contingent on Russian consent. The Peace Conference has already applied this principle to Poland, and the Lettish Delegation does not doubt that it will apply it also to the other new States in order to reestablish peace and order in the world.

In view of these facts, the Lettish Delegation has the honor to request that the Lettish question be placed on the order of the day as soon as possible and that the independence of Latvia be recognized *de jure*.

DOCUMENT 4

COMMUNICATION FROM  
CERTAIN RUSSIAN REPUBLICS CONCERNING THE  
RECOGNITION OF THEIR INDEPENDENCE AND  
THE PARTICIPATION OF THEIR REPRESENTATIVES IN THE PEACE CONFERENCE\*

*To His Excellency  
The President of the Peace Conference*

MR. PRESIDENT:

In conformity with the decision that you will find herewith mentioned we have the honor of addressing to the Peace Conference the enclosed protocol of a meeting held 19 April, 1919, by the Delegates of the Republics of Esthonia, Georgia, Latvia and Ukraina, concerning the recognition of the Independence of these States and the participation of their representatives in the Peace Conference.

Accept, Mr. President, etc.

ANT. PIIP  
N. TCHEIDZE  
J. TCHAKSTE  
PROF. VOLDEMAR  
G. SYDORENKO

PARIS, 19 April, 1919

PROTOCOL

The duly qualified representatives to the Peace Conference of the Governments of the Sovereign States of Esthonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania and Ukraine, considering that the prompt and formal recognition of the independence of these States is an important factor for the establishment of a general peace and its maintenance in Eastern Europe, that its postponement would be detrimental to the internal work ne-

\* Translation. French text in *La Revue Baltique*, No. 9 (May, 1919), pp. 235-236.

cessitated by the creation of these States as well as to the organization of their external defense:

Considering furthermore that the Peace Conference has already begun the examination of questions of the highest interest for them, but in the absence of their representatives:

And wishing to bring their collaboration to the just solution of questions bearing on the vital interests of the States which they represent:

Met in Paris, 19 April, 1919, to deliberate in common.

At this meeting were present, the following representatives, as designated:

For the Republic of Esthonia, M. Antoine Piip, Chief of the delegation of Esthonia *par interim*, Member of the National Esthonian Council, Representative of Esthonia in Great Britain.

For the Republic of Georgia, M. Nichola Tcheidze, President of the Delegation of the Republic of Georgia, President of the Georgian Parliament.

For the Republic of Latvia (Lettonia), M. Jahnis Tchakste, President of the Lettish Delegation to the Peace Conference, President of the Council of State of Latvia.

For the Republic of Lithuania, Prof. Augustin Voldemar, President of the Delegation of Lithuania, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

For the Republic of Ukraine, M. Grègoire Sydorenko, President of the Delegation of the Ukrainian Republic.

After having examined all the aspects of the questions created by this situation, the Delegates unanimously made the following decisions:

1. The States represented in the present meeting agreed that in the general interest and for the reasons above mentioned, each one of them shall address the Peace Conference to ask it to hasten the recognition *de jure* of its independence.

2. Each of the States mentioned in the above articles shall beg anew the Peace Conference to admit its representatives so that they can participate in the plenary meetings of the Conference and in its other work.

The present protocol has been established in six copies, one of which

has been sent to the Peace Conference together with a letter d'envoi, bearing the signatures of the Chiefs of each one of these delegations, and each of the five Delegations has kept one of the remaining copies.

Done in Paris this nineteenth day of April nineteen hundred and nineteen.

ANT. PIIP

N. TCHÉIDZE

J. TCHAKSTE

PROF. VOLDEMAR

G. SYDORENKO

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE COMMISSIONERS  
FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION ON THE  
BALTIC SITUATION\*

FROM: *R. H. Lord and S. E. Morison, Russian Division*

TO: *American Commission to Negotiate Peace*

It is recommended (1) that the Supreme Council transmit through representatives of the Associated Governments now at Libau to the "Committee of Safety" or whatever de facto authority exists at Libau, a demand that the imprisoned members of the Provisional Government of Latvia, and all officials and troops formerly acting under its authority, be immediately released, and that this Provisional Government be restored at once to its previous functions and be respected as the de facto Government of Latvia.

That General von der Goltz be similarly notified that the German military authorities must refrain from any interference in the internal administration of Latvia and must restore to the Lettish Government all arms and other property belonging to it.

It is recommended (2) that, in accordance with the suggestion of Mr. Lansing at a session of the Council of Five on April 19th, it be stipulated in the Preliminary Treaty of Peace that the German troops now in the Baltic Provinces and Lithuania evacuate these countries: that this evacuation begin immediately and be completed within a period of . . . weeks: that it be carried out under the supervision of Allied representatives: that until the completion of the evacuation there shall be no interference with the civil administration of those countries, or with such measures for national defence as may be adopted by the Provisional Governments of Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

It is recommended (3) that the Supreme Council recognize the Provisional Government of Latvia, as it existed before the coup d'état of April 16th, as an independent de facto government: and that a similar

\* An identic copy is included in an Addendum to Bulletin No. 230 of the Supreme Council (May 3, 1919), in Miller, *My Diary at the Conference of Paris*, XVIII, 99-100.

recognition be extended to the Provisional Governments of Esthonia and Lithuania. Any declaration or recognition made to the governments in question should contain the provision that the final status of these three countries is to be settled only in accordance with the wishes of the population as expressed through properly elected constituent assemblies: and that, as soon as a recognized Russian Government exists, the Allied and Associated Powers will use their good offices to facilitate an amicable settlement of the relations of these countries with Russia.

It is recommended (4) that, in order to assure the defence of these three countries against the Bolshevists, in view of the impending evacuation by the German troops, the Allied and Associated Governments should undertake to supply Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania with the necessary equipment, food and credits.

It is recommended (5) that an article be inserted in the Preliminary Treaty of Peace, insuring that the question of the reparations due from Germany to Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania, be referred to a mixed commission or other appropriate body for decision.

NOTE.—Practically identical recommendations are being made to the British Delegation by Sir Esmé Howard.

PARIS, 29th April, 1919



## DOCUMENT 6

### LATVIAN NOTE TO THE PEACE CONFERENCE OF PARIS REGARDING THE PROPOSED RECOGNITION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ADMIRAL KOLCHAK\*

In connection with the contingency of a possible recognition by the Allied Powers of a Provisional Government of Russia, the Latvian Delegation to the Peace Conference has the honor to bring to the knowledge of Your Excellency, in the name of the Provisional Government of Latvia, the following facts:

In November, 1917, the Lettish National Council, which represented all the organs of local self-government elected in conformity with the law of June 22, 1917, issued by the Russian Provisional Government, and all the bourgeois political parties of Latvia unanimously proclaimed the absolute independence of Latvia.

In January, 1918, this decision relative to the separation of Latvia from Russia was officially notified by the representatives of the Lettish National Council to the All-Russian Constituent Assembly at Petrograd.

In November, 1918, at Riga, the Latvian State Council, which represents all the political parties of the country with the exception of the Bolsheviks and the Pan-Germans of the *Baltenbund* solemnly and unanimously proclaimed anew the independence of Latvia.

Now the State Council is considered by all the citizens of the country as the legitimate and sovereign organ of the powers of the Latvian State. It has even been recognized in this capacity by several of the Allied Powers.

In consequence, Latvia, a sovereign independent State, freed from all political connection with Russia exists *de facto*; the Latvian State is disposed to assume friendly relations with neighboring Powers. As regards Russia in particular, Latvia is ready to make all reasonable economic concessions with a view to facilitating free access to the Baltic Sea for that Power.

In the light of these considerations, the Latvian Delegation to the

\* Translation. French text in *La Revue Baltique*, No. 10 (June, 1919), pp. 248-249.

Peace Conference has the honor, in the name of the Provisional Government of Latvia, to ask of Your Excellency:

1. The recognition of Latvia as a sovereign independent State before the recognition of a Russian Government;

2. The acceptance by the Russian Government of the following conditions:

a) That the citizens and refugees from Latvia who are found in such great numbers in Russia shall be able to return to their country unmolested;

b) That all Letts and all persons of Latvian origin living in Russia shall have the right, within a period of three years, to opt between Russian and Latvian nationality;

c) Of guaranteeing the free and immediate return to Latvia of the Lettish officers and military forces at present in Russia.

In the name of the Provisional Government of Latvia, the Latvian Delegation to the Peace Conference has the duty to inform Your Excellency of the unanimous and unshakeable will of the Latvian people to defend the independence of Latvia by all the means at its disposal.

The Provisional Government of Latvia declines all responsibility for the consequences which might follow any attempt arbitrarily to impose Russian sovereignty on Latvia under any form whatsoever.

Z. A. MEIEROVICS

*President of the Latvian Delegation  
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Latvia*

PARIS, May 30, 1919

*To His Excellency*

*M. Georges Clemenceau*

*President of the Peace Conference*

DECLARATIONS PRESENTEES PAR LA DELEGATION  
LETTONE A LA COMMISSION BALTIQUE\*

MONSIEUR LE PRÉSIDENT, MESSIEURS :

AU NOM DU GOUVERNEMENT PROVISOIRE DE LATVIA, LA DÉLÉGATION lettone auprès de la Conférence de la Paix est heureuse d'avoir la possibilité d'exprimer devant cette haute commission les revendications de la Latvia et de la nation lettone.

Depuis la première heure de cette guerre mondiale, jusqu'à aujourd'hui, la petite nation lettone a combattu au nom des hautes principes inscrits sur la bannière de l'Entente contre l'impérialisme et la politique de force d'Allemagne. Avec enthousiasme, elle a tout sacrifié pour la démocratie mondiale, la civilisation, l'humanité et pour la liberté de la Latvia. Par nombreuses dizaines de mille les cadavres des meilleurs fils de la Latvia sont restés sur les champs de bataille; toute la Latvia est dévastée car pendant toute la durée de la guerre, on s'est battu incessamment sur le sol lettone. Des centaines de mille de fugitifs lettons errent, sans patrie, dans les immenses espaces de la Russie, préférant le sort de réfugiés à celui de sujets allemands. Cependant, l'Europe occidentale jouit de la paix tandis que le peuple lettone lutte encore, pour l'indépendance de sa patrie, contre ses voisins,—l'Allemagne et la Russie soviétique.

La nation lettone est fière que les Grandes Puissances de l'Entente reconnaissent ses services. Elle est fermement persuadée que les promesses qui nous ont été faites relativement à l'indépendance de la Latvia seront maintenant confirmées d'une façon définitive par la Conférence de la Paix.

La base principale et fondamentale de la souveraineté de la Latvia réside dans l'unanime volonté de la nation lettone. Cette volonté est en complet accord avec les grands principes du droit, de la justice et du droit des peuples à disposer d'eux-mêmes, que les Etats-Unis, par l'organe de leur noble Président, ont présentés comme le but de guerre de la plus grande République démocratique du monde.

\* *La Revue Baltique*, No. 10 (June, 1919), pp. 249-250.

Les cordiales sympathies de la glorieuse France ont toujours accompagné la Latvia dans sa lutte pour son indépendance. M. Noulens, Ambassadeur de France en Russie, dans sa lettre du 22 janvier 1918 adressée au Conseil National Letton, s'est exprimé en ces termes :

"J'accueille votre démarche avec une vive sympathie, comme faite par les représentants d'une nationalité qui a conscience de ses droits et dont les citoyens grâce à l'énergie de leurs aspirations ethniques, sont appelés à conquérir une légitime indépendance.

"La France qui, après quatre années de lutte pour la liberté et le droit de peuples se voit, malgré la cruelle défection d'un de ses alliés, plus près que jamais de réaliser victorieusement son idéal contre les puissances d'Allemagne et d'Autriche, ne peut manquer d'applaudir à vos efforts et de s'en souvenir quand viendra l'heure de la paix définitive et réparatrice."

La généreuse Grande-Bretagne, par la lettre du Secrétaire d'Etat M. A. J. Balfour du 11 novembre 1918, a reconnu nos aspirations nationales dans le document suivant :

"His Majesty's Government have viewed with the deepest sympathy the aspirations of the Lettish people and its desire for liberation from the German yoke. They are glad to reaffirm their readiness to grant provisional recognition to the Lettish National Council as a de facto independent body until such time as the Peace Conference lays the foundations of a new era of freedom and happiness for your people."

L'Italie, ce pays de la vieille civilisation greco-latine, a exprimé son bon vouloir en faveur de la nation lettone par un écrit du Baron Sonnino en décembre, 1918.

Par une lettre de son Ambassadeur à Londres, le vicomte Chinda, le 10 janvier 1919, le Japon, la Grande puissance de l'Extrême-Orient, a reconnu dans les termes suivants l'indépendance de la Latvia :

"I am happy to inform you that H.M. Government have viewed with the deepest sympathy the aspirations of the Lettish people and instructed me to convey to you their decision to grant provisional recognition to the Lettish National Council as a de facto independent body pending the final settlement at the forthcoming Peace Conference."

S'appuyant sur ces bases fondamentales : la volonté du peuple letton, les hautes principes démocratiques exprimés par les Etats-Unis d'Amé-

rique et par l'Entente, et les promesses découlant de ces principes, la nation lettone a mené le dur combat pour sa liberté et depuis le 18 novembre 1918, la Latvia constitué un Etat souverain indépendant, un et indivisible.

Au nom du Gouvernement provisoire de Latvia et de la Nation lettone, la Délégation auprès de la Conférence de la Paix a l'honneur de demander la reconnaissance, par la Conférence de la Paix, de la Latvia comme Etat souverain indépendant.

Z. A. MEIEROVICS

*Président de la Délégation lettone*

PARIS, le 9 juin 1919

MEMOIRE PRESENTE PAR LA DELEGATION LETTONE  
A LA COMMISSION POUR LES AFFAIRES  
BALTIQUES\*

La Délégation lettone auprès de la Conférence de la Paix a l'honneur de présenter à la Commission pour les Affaires Baltiques le "Mémoire sur la Latvia" en faisant les déclarations suivantes:

I. Nous réclamons la reconnaissance de la Latvia comme Etat souverain, indépendant un et indivisible.

II. Pour assurer la défense des intérêts de la Latvia nous demandons qu'elle soit acceptée comme membre de la Société des Nations avec l'entière jouissance des droits attachés à cet avantage.

III. Les frontières séparant la Latvia des Etats voisins: Estonie, Grande Russie, Russie Blanche, Lituanie, doivent être fixées sur des bases nationales ethnographiques avec quelques rectifications liées à des intérêts économiques et nécessitant pour les partis en cause des compensations réciproques. À priori, la question des frontières, déjà partiellement tranchée, peut être considérée comme pouvant être réglée définitivement sans difficultés. Toutefois, au cas ou des différends surgiraient sur lesquels les parties contractantes ne parviendraient pas à se mettre d'accord, la Délégation lettone demande que ces différends soient tranchés par un tribunal international.

IV. Les relations de la Latvia avec l'Allemagne demeureront dans l'avenir ce qu'elles ont été depuis sept cents ans. Les intérêts nationaux, intellectuels, économiques de la Latvia sont en complète opposition avec ceux de l'Allemagne. Le *Drang nach Osten* allemand signifie l'arrêt de mort de la Nation lettone.

V. Les relations de la Latvia et de la Russie. La question lettone n'est pas une question panrusse, mais une question internationale. C'est pourquoi la Constituante panrusse n'a pas le droit de prendre une décision sur le sort de la Latvia. La souveraineté de la Latvia lui appartient en propre, elle ne dépend pas de la Russie.

Nous reconnaissons la nécessité pour la Russie, au point de vue

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\* *La Revue Baltique*, No. 10 (June, 1919), pp. 250-251.

économique, d'un accès à la mer Baltique par les ports lettons, et nous sommes disposés à accepter toutes les exigences économiques raisonnables de la Russie, autant que ces exigences ne menaceront pas la souveraineté de la Latvia. Il est dans l'intérêt de l'avenir de Latvia qu'elle joue le même rôle vis-à-vis de la Russie que celui que les Pays-Bas ont joué vis-à-vis de l'Allemagne.

Un futur rapprochement dans les relations entre la Russie et la Latvia ne peut se produire que sur la voie d'un développement naturel basé sur le principe de deux Etats indépendants, égaux en droits.

Nous prions la Conférence de la Paix de faire comprendre au Gouvernement Russe la nécessité de laisser rentrer en Latvia sans difficultés, avec tout ce qu'ils possèdent avec le consentement du Gouvernement Letton, tous les Lettons qui se trouvent en Russie, qu'ils soient militaires, civils ou fugitifs. Nous demandons aussi que tous les Lettons et toute personne originaire de Latvia demeurant en Russie aient le droit, dans un délai de trois ans, d'opter entre la nationalité russe et celle de citoyen de la Latvia.

Enfin, la Latvia prendra au compte de l'Etat une partie juste et proportionnelle des dettes d'Etat de la Russie contractées jusqu'à l'avènement du régime Bolcheviste, pourvu que la Russie paie l'indemnité due à la Latvia pour la destruction causée par les troupes russes, pour les réquisitions, pour la propriété évacuée en Russie et pour les pertes subies par les réfugiés lettons en Russie.

VI. Les relations entre la Latvia et les puissances voisines, c'est-à-dire la Finlande, et l'Estonie au Nord, la Lituanie, la Russie Blanche et la Pologne au Sud sont en voie de développement, grâce aux multiples intérêts communs qui les lient, développement qui doit aboutir à un vaste travail d'ensemble de ces Etats.

Les tendances actuelles en faveur d'une alliance russo-allemande qui prennent en ce moment une grande extension en Allemagne et qui rencontrent en Russie des échos de plus en plus retentissants se manifestent en ce moment en Latvia par la coopération des Allemands, des Baltes, des Russes et des troupes allemandes d'occupation avec la Landeswehr balte. La réalisation de ces plans constitue pour la Latvia et ses voisins du Nord et du Sud le noeud principal pour la formation d'une future alliance.

Conséquemment, la Délégation lettone a l'honneur de demander à la Conférence de la Paix la liberté plénière pour développer les alliances existant déjà entre elle et ses Etats voisins: Finlande, Estonie, Lituanie, Russie Blanche et Pologne.

VII. La vie économique. La partie économique du "Mémoire sur la Latvia" prouve: (1) que dans les conditions normales la Latvia peut exister au point de vue économique comme un Etat indépendant; (2) que son exportation et son importation s'équilibrent complètement; (3) que son budget d'Etat est solidement établi. Cependant pour pouvoir reconstruire le pays détruit par la guerre nous prions la Conférence de la Paix d'exiger de l'Allemagne qu'elle accorde à la Latvia les restitutions et les réparations basées sur les principes du Traité avec l'Allemagne.

VIII. La situation actuelle. La Latvia étant actuellement presque entièrement délivrée des troupes de la Russie soviétiste, se trouve néanmoins menacée d'un danger encore plus grand: celui qui résulte du pouvoir d'occupation allemand existant encore en Latvia par suite du traité d'armistice. Comme on le sait le pouvoir d'occupation allemand agit de concert avec la Landeswehr balte et les détachements russes pour anéantir l'indépendance de la Latvia en essayant de réaliser l'alliance russo-allemande.

Dans le but de combattre ce danger, la Délégation lettone auprès de la Conférence de la Paix a l'honneur de proposer les mesures suivantes:

a) L'éloignement immédiat des forces militaires allemandes;

b) Le rapatriement immédiat des troupes lettones, officiers et soldats, qui se trouvent actuellement en Sibérie (Vladivostok et Troitzk), des prisonniers de guerre lettons qui se trouvent en Allemagne et des officiers et soldats lettons actuellement en France. Tous ces groupements militaires, contrôlés dans les camps de concentration par des représentants du Gouvernement provisoire de la Latvia et accompagnés par eux, devraient être débarqués dans le Nord de la Latvia, sur le premier désir du Gouvernement Provisoire de la Latvia.

La Délégation lettone auprès de la Conférence de la Paix, après avoir présenté les revendications de la Latvia et de sa Nation, remercie cordialement la Commission pour les Affaires Baltiques pour les possi-



bilités qu'elle lui a offertes de faire connaître ces revendications dans toute leur étendue et espère que la Conférence de la Paix introduira la Latvia dans la nouvelle ère de bonheur de l'indépendance.

Z. A. MEIEROVICS

DECLARATION OF THE RUSSIAN BORDER STATES  
REGARDING THE RECOGNITION OF KOLCHAK\*

Les soussignés, délégués plenipotentiaires des Etats formés dans les limites de l'ancien Empire Russe, à savoir,

La République de l'Azerbaïdjan;

La République de l'Estonie;

La République de Géorgie;

La République de Latvie;

La République Nordcaucasienne;

La République de la Russie Blanche;

La République de l'Ukraine;

ayant pris connaissance de la correspondance échangée par le Conseil des Grandes Puissances Alliées et Associées avec l'Amiral Koltchak concernant les conditions de l'assistance desdites puissances au Gouvernement d'Omsk, ont l'honneur de déclarer, au nom de leurs Gouvernements respectifs, ce qui suit:

1. Les Républiques Azerbaïdjan, Estonie, Géorgie, Latvie, Nordcaucasie, Russie Blanche et Ukraine se sont formées et existent par la libre volonté des peuples de ces Etats. Les Constitutions de ces Républiques sont en train d'être élaborées et leurs relations réciproques avec les Etats voisins sont en voie d'être fixées et seront déterminées par leurs Constituantes respectives qui sont déjà élues sur la base du suffrage universel. Les décisions des organes du Pouvoir gouvernemental de la Russie, quels qu'ils soient, ne peuvent pas donc se rapporter aucunement aux Etats souverains; Azerbaïdjan, Estonie, Géorgie, Latvie, Nordcaucasie, Russie Blanche et Ukraine, et les relations réciproques entre ces Etats et la Russie ne peuvent être réglées que comme entre des Etats égaux dans tous les droits indépendants et souverains alors que la correspondance ce-dessous mentionnée peut être interprétée comme la négation d'un tel droit.

2. Les Républiques nommées dans la préambule, réitèrent, devant la

\* *La Revue Baltique*, Vol. I, No. 11, p. 290. Text also in *L'Europe Orientale*, 1<sup>ère</sup> Année, Numéro 1 (1<sup>er</sup> septembre 1919), pp. 22-23.

Conférence de la Paix et les Grandes Puissances, la prière de reconnaître sans délai leur indépendance politique.

Paris, le dix-sept juin mil-neuf-cent-dix-neuf

A. M. TOPTSCHIBACHEFF, *Président de la Délégation de la République d'Azerbaïdjan*

J. POSKA, *Président de la Délégation Estonienne*

N. TCHEIDZE, *Président de la Délégation de la République Géorgienne*

Z. A. MEIEROVICS, *Président de la Délégation de Latvia*

A. M. TCHERMoeff, *Président de la Délégation de la République Nordcaucasienne*

ANTOINE DE LOUTCKEVITCH, *Président de la Délégation de la République Démocratique Blanche Rutenienne*

G. SYDORENKO, *Président de la Délégation de la République Ukrainienne*

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE BALTIC COMMISSION  
TO THE SUPREME COUNCIL\*

En raison de l'importance qu'il y a à maintenir dans les territoires baltiques Gouvernements stables et ordonnés pour servir de rempart contre le bolchevisme d'une part et contre les agressions allemandes d'autre part, en raison aussi de la nécessité d'une coopération intime entre ces Gouvernements et les Gouvernements alliés et associés, coopération qui ne peut être assurée que si les peuples baltiques ont une entière confiance dans les intentions des Alliés de protéger leurs libertés dans le cas où un Gouvernement centralisé et fort serait rétabli en Russie, la Commission baltique est d'avis que le temps est venu pour les puissances alliées et associées de définir clairement leur politique envers ces Gouvernements et propose qu'une déclaration collective soit faite dans l'esprit de la rédaction suivante :

En réponse aux communications adressées à la Conférence de la paix par les Délégations esthonienne, lettone et lithuanienne, les Gouvernements alliés et associés désirent attirer l'attention des Gouvernements d'Esthonie, de Latvie et de Lithuanie sur la cinquième des conditions exposées dans leur note à l'amiral Coltchak et rédigée en ces termes :

“Si la question des relations entre l'Esthonie, la Latvie, la Lithuanie, les territoires caucasien et transcaspien avec la Russie n'aboutit pas promptement à une solution par entente directe, elle sera réglée en consultant la Société des Nations et avec sa coopération, et en attendant ce règlement, le Gouvernement de Russie accepte de reconnaître ces territoires comme autonomes et de maintenir les relations qui pourront exister entre les Gouvernements de fait de ces pays et les Gouvernements alliés et associés.”

Les Gouvernements alliés et associés ont le plus vif désir et la volonté de faire tout ce qui sera en leur pouvoir pour seconder les Gouvernements baltiques dans l'organisation de leurs défenses locales et dans l'établissement dans ces régions, en vue de la paix générale, de Gouver-

\* *Procès-verbal No. 16* (séance du 15 juillet 1919), p. 6.

nements stables et ordonnés. Ils déclarent en outre leur intention de protéger leurs libertés dans le cas où un Gouvernement centralisé et fort serait installé en Russie.

En même temps il leur semble impossible d'arriver à une solution définitive et garantissant une paix durable sans un arrangement préalable avec un Gouvernement reconnu en Russie; et tout en se réservant le droit de contribuer soit directement soit par l'entremise de la Société des Nations à un réglément satisfaisant pour les deux parties, elles ne peuvent prendre à présent aucune mesure qui les lierait en vue d'un règlement définitif avant la restauration en Russie d'un Gouvernement reconnu.

Les Gouvernements alliés et associés désirent ajouter qu'ils sont convaincus que s'ils donnent leur appui aux Gouvernements d'Esthonie, de Latvie et de Lithuanie, ils peuvent compter que ces Gouvernements accepteront toutes les dispositions que les Gouvernements alliés et associés jugeraient nécessaires à la protection sur ces territoires des minorités ethniques et religieuses.

## DOCUMENT II

### APPEAL OF THE BALTIC STATE DELEGATIONS TO THE PEACE CONFERENCE OF PARIS\*

*To His Excellency*

*The President of the Peace Conference*

We, the undersigned representatives of the independent States, the Republics of Estonia, of Latvia, and of Lithuania, animated by the same aspirations and in complete solidarity, have assembled at Paris, the sixth of September, and, after deliberation, have unanimously decided to address to the Peace Conference the following declaration:

We have learned with satisfaction that the Supreme Council decided during the course of August to take up the question of the Baltic countries and asked the Baltic Commission to present to it a declaration on the subject.

Although we do not know what are the decisions proposed by this Commission, and those which the Supreme Council may take, our peoples do not doubt that the great principles of justice for which the Allies, as well as they themselves, have fought, such as the right of peoples to self-determination, are no less applicable to our countries than to other nations and they hope that the international position of the States which they have respectively constituted, will be definitely settled by the recognition of their independence by the Peace Conference.

But, as the Baltic States now possess a well-established internal organization which assures them of their own life, it is indispensable, in their own interest as well as in the general interest, that this decision be made as soon as possible. The restoration of normal conditions of life in these countries devastated by the war cannot, indeed, suffer postponement, and the struggle which their inhabitants must keep up against the Bolsheviks and for the defense of their territories in general puts these new states under the urgent obligation of creating and assuring for themselves commercial, financial and political rela-

\* Translation. French text in *La Revue Baltique*, Vol. II, No. 1, p. 16. Alternative French version in *L'Europe Orientale*, No. 3 (1 octobre 1919), pp. 89-90.

tions with other states—a thing which is impossible without an international regulation of their status.

At the same time, the peoples whom we represent, being partisans of the creation of a League of Nations which would be capable of defending the rights of all nations, great and small, are desirous for the same reasons of being admitted into the family of free peoples as members of this League.

In consequence, we ask the Supreme Council to be good enough to inform each of the interested Governments of the results of the examination of the question touching its country and to admit each of the aforementioned states into the League of Nations.

ANTONIUS PIIP

*Head of the Delegation of Estonia*

JĀNIS SESKIS

*The President of the Latvian Delegation*

A. VOLDEMAR

*The President of the Lithuanian Delegation*

PARIS, September 6, 1919

LATVIAN APPEAL FOR RECOGNITION TO THE  
SUPREME COUNCIL\*

No. 868

PARIS, le 21 janvier 1920

*A Son Excellence*

*Monsieur le Président du Conseil Suprême*

*Paris*

MONSIEUR LE PRÉSIDENT:

Dans les conjonctures actuelles, le Gouvernement letton estime opportun de réitérer auprès du Conseil Suprême la demande qu'il lui a présentée visant la reconnaissance de l'indépendance de la Latvia.

Au nom de mon Gouvernement, j'ai l'honneur d'attirer l'attention de Votre Excellence sur les diverses étapes qui ont amené le peuple letton à la jouissance de cette indépendance, acquise au prix de luttes acharnées.

Dès le début de la Guerre mondiale, la Nation lettone a pris fait et cause pour les Alliés, sacrifié un grand nombre de vies humaines, subi la dévastation et la ruine en combattant l'ennemi commun. La victoire de l'Entente a procuré la liberté au peuple letton qui, le 18 novembre 1918, a proclamé son indépendance.

Cette indépendance a été immédiatement reconnue par la Grande-Bretagne et le Japon, et, dans la suite, par plusieurs autres puissances. Une clause, toutefois, réservait à la Conférence de la Paix la fixation du statut définitif de notre pays.

Pour se constituer en Etat, la Latvia avait à compter avec deux ennemis: l'Allemagne, obstinée à réaliser son projet de faire des Pays Baltiques une colonie, et le Bolchevisme russe qui menaçait de détruire cet Etat indépendant, avant-poste de la civilisation occidentale et des institutions démocratiques.

Par un effort d'énergie et de volonté auquel les Missions Alliées ont rendu hommage, la Latvia est parvenue à triompher de ces deux ennemis.

\* *La Revue Baltique*, Vol. III, No. 1 (February 15-March 1, 1920), pp. 20-21.



Ces résultats montrent que l'indépendance de la Latvia est un fait correspondant à des réalités politiques dont il est impossible de contester l'évidence.

Le territoire national est libéré. Sous la pression de nos armées, les Allemands ont repassé la frontière. A l'Est, des combats acharnés et sanglants ont encore lieu entre l'armée lettone et celle des Soviets. En collaboration avec les Polonais, notre armée a conquis sur les Bolcheviks des points stratégiques importants. Ce résultat équivalait à la libération à peu près entière de la Latgale. À ce propos, je me permettrai de faire remarquer que, sur le front occidental, les armées lettones et polonaises en sont seules à continuer la lutte contre les Bolcheviks.

Après tant de sacrifices, notre armée a besoin d'être encouragée par la certitude de combattre pour la défense de l'indépendance nationale. Ainsi, aux motifs exposés à plusieurs reprises par nos représentants à Paris, s'en ajoute un qui découle, naturellement, de la situation militaire actuelle.

En combattant pour son indépendance et en se conformant aux instructions des Alliés la Latvia a cru s'acquérir le droit de voir cette indépendance reconnue de jure par le Conseil Suprême.

C'est à cette intention que je m'adresse de nouveau, au nom de mon Gouvernement, à Votre Excellence, en la priant de vouloir bien me faire connaître la décision du Conseil Suprême.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Président, l'expression de ma très haute considération.

O. GROSVALDS

*Délégué de la Latvia  
auprès du Gouvernement français*

MR. COLBY AND THE BALTIC STATES:  
A LATVIAN VIEW\*

The nations which are fighting for their liberty, their independence and their rights, have always turned with confidence toward the great American Republic, hoping to receive from it, if not material aid, at least moral support. In whom should they have placed their hopes if not in the heirs of Washington, if not in a nation which, thanks to its energy, thanks to its love of liberty, has become great and powerful?

The conduct of the United States during the war only served to augment its authority and its moral influence; this attitude was crowned by the celebrated Fourteen Points, among which the point referring to the right of peoples to self-determination occupies not the least place and has gained for its illustrious author an incomparable glory throughout the entire world as one of the most generous and just principles ever highly proclaimed by an eminent statesman. After this solemn declaration it was to be expected that the United States would be the first to recognize the national states which were coming to make use of the principles proclaimed by President Wilson. As an answer to these hopes there finally appeared the note of the Secretary of State of the United States published August 10, which claims as a merit and vaunts having obstinately persisted in not recognizing the right of the Estonians, the Letts, and the Lithuanians to an independent political life. Notwithstanding, these three peoples have not only laid claim to this right, but have realized it and succeeded—God knows at the price of what superhuman efforts, at the price of what sacrifices—in founding their States, defending them against powerful enemies, who have not been lacking, maintaining order and democratic organization against the flood of anarchy which for a long time threatened to submerge them. Is it just thus to think so little of our efforts and our real services rendered to civilization and democracy throughout the world? And all this because of love for the Russian nation, whose well-being and prosperity cannot, it appears, be conceived of without the enslave-

\* *Bulletin publié par le Ministère des Affaires Etrangères de Latvia*, No. 21 (August 26, 1920), p. 1.

ment of other peoples. The peoples whom it is proposed to immolate to Great Russia ask nothing better than to live in peace and good understanding with their great Eastern neighbor, by placing at its disposal their ports and means of communication. We have no hatred for the Russian nation; on the contrary its misfortunes touch us profoundly. Moreover, we cannot praise too highly the generous support which the American nation would like to accord it. Nevertheless, we cannot consider Great Russia as an idol to which one must offer human sacrifices by immolating whole peoples on its altar.

In his note of August 10 the Secretary of State of the great American Republic endeavors to burden himself with the safeguarding of the integrity of the former empire of the Czars within its true boundaries up to the time when the country may at last enjoy the benefits of a representative government which, save for a few months, it unfortunately has not had in the course of its long historic existence. But however that may be, it is not against the Baltic States, at least, that the charge can be brought of wishing to strike a blow against the "true boundaries" of Russia, if by this term may be understood the ethnographic limits assigned in the same note to Poland and certain other states. If the Russians have the right to live within their natural frontiers, other peoples have it equally.

The note wishes to make exceptions for Poland, Finland, and Armenia, formerly annexed by force to Russia; their liberation from the yoke [of "oppressive alien rule"] would not be an aggression against the right of Russian territory. This logic—if there be any—is not understandable to us. When, indeed, did the Baltic States willingly adhere to the Empire of the Czars? When and by whom was their consent requested? On the contrary, the Baltic States have repeatedly manifested—latterly through the voice of their Constituent Assemblies elected on the most democratic principles in the world—their unshakable will to lead an independent political existence. Their reintegration by force into the Russian Empire, whose yoke they have succeeded in shaking off, would be the most brutal violation of the right of peoples.

Let no one misunderstand: this is not the best way to establish peace in Eastern Europe. The Estonians, the Letts, and the Lithuanians have bought their liberty too dearly to part with it willingly. If, contrary to

our expectations, Russia should succeed in annexing, always by force, her free neighbors, the latter would only await the propitious moment to break their chains; Russia would be and remain internally impotent; the situation would always be uncertain. Moreover, the conquest and enslavement of neighboring peoples by Russia would be an operation so bloody that one can hardly conceive how a civilized nation could, for that purpose, assume the horrible role of accomplice of a hangman.

The surest means of seeing peace established in Eastern Europe would be, on the contrary, to recognize and protect all the national states, who would not fail to arrive freely at a satisfactory understanding between themselves and Russia: economic and political necessities are sufficiently imperious for that.

The change from the Fourteen Points of President Wilson to the note of Mr. Colby is nevertheless painful. Let the note serve as a warning to the Baltic States and to their representatives at the Riga Conference: our force and our security lie in our union. Let us equally endeavor to make sure of the support of our true friends. We hope, however, that the principles which this document contains are not final: they are too much at variance with all that we have hitherto had, with all that we hope for from the great and generous American nation.

## APPENDIX I

### THE UNITED STATES AND LATVIA, 1918-1919

The attitude of the American government toward the Letts in the period immediately following the Armistice was somewhat equivocal. Lansing received information concerning the conditions in Latvia from Vice-Consul Lehrs in Copenhagen in a long memorandum of November 27, 1918, announcing the proclamation of the Latvian Republic, giving the membership of the Ulmanis government yet adding that, "although the character of the new Government of Latvia is unknown at present, *it may be feared that it is in sympathy with the radical socialistic parties* . . . The only reliable battalions in the service of the soviet government in Russia are those consisting of Letts; the commander in chief of the Russian forces, Vadsetis, as well as the president of the Cheka, Peters, are Letts. The attitude towards the Russian Soviet government, however, seems to be a negative one in both republics [Estonia and Latvia] . . . The Russian Government is demanding that Workmen's and Peasants' Councils should be established in the new republics and that the same should unite with the existing councils of German soldiers. The Bolsheviki are threatening heavy reprisals if the councils are not formed immediately, but notwithstanding the pressure the councils have not been established." This initially unfavorable information was followed by information from Stockholm clearly evidencing the anti-Bolshevik character of the Ulmanis regime.<sup>1</sup>

Early in January, 1919, the Lettish National League of America, representing the various Lettish colonies in the United States, appealed to Undersecretary Polk on behalf of the Letts, disclaiming any intention "to express itself in favor of any definite political status for Latvia" but pledging its support to "any party that stands for the self-determination of Latvia, based on a just, general and secret suffrage." Aiming "to employ all legal means available in order to assist the Baltic Provinces in their struggle for political freedom and in their attempt to reestablish and develop their industries and commerce," the

<sup>1</sup> Morris to Lansing from Stockholm, December 18, 1918, No. 3360, in *FR.U.S., 1918, Russia*, vol. 2.

League requested Polk to assist the cause by reiterating the United States' stand for "the principle of self-determination as affecting the Baltic Provinces in order to counteract the propaganda and influence of the Bolshevik anarchists and other terroristic elements of Russia and Germany now carrying on such methods in the Baltic Provinces." This basic demand was coupled with a protest against Lithuanian territorial claims. The League thereupon asked Polk to permit Mr. Charles Ozols, as their representative, to proceed to Paris to intercede with the American Commission to Negotiate Peace on behalf of the Letts.<sup>3</sup> Evidently Polk acceded to this request for a visa, but Ozols' mission to London, where he met Chakste, does not appear to have had any material result in defining the American position.

In March Polk cabled Lansing for permission to issue special letters of recommendation, indicating "that the United States is not opposed to the activities of the League along the lines indicated." Polk's reason for so doing was that "informal recognition of the Baltic Governments by other Associated Governments and lack of recognition by the United States may otherwise react to our commercial disadvantage by creating in those countries the erroneous impression that our attitude towards them is an unfriendly one."<sup>4</sup> To this Lansing promptly acceded.<sup>5</sup> Later, Lansing suggested that Polk inform the Lettish National League that:

1. The United States government firmly believes in applying the principle of self-determination to the Baltic Provinces, with due consideration of the interests of neighboring peoples.
2. It is opposed to any attempt of non-Lettish peoples or governments to annex any portion of the territory unified by geographical and economic ties where the Lettish race is in the majority, against the wishes of the population.
3. When the question of Latvia comes before the Peace Conference in Paris, the delegates of the Latvian Provisional Government (who have already been in communication with the American delegates) will be given every opportunity to present their case.
4. Every facility will be granted to the representatives of the Lettish

<sup>3</sup> Edwin Pilsum to Frank L. Polk from New York, January 21, 1919.

<sup>4</sup> Polk to Lansing at Paris, March 7, 1919.

<sup>5</sup> Lansing to Polk from Paris, March 12, 1919.

National League of America to obtain interviews with the proper representatives of the American Commission in Paris.<sup>5</sup>

In view of the fact that the American Commission had been "in communication" with the Latvian delegation but had extended no recognition whatsoever, the suggested assurances to the Letts are somewhat equivocal. Nevertheless, the germ of the suggestion that the Letts make their plea to the Baltic Commission of the Peace Conference is to be found in Lansing's suggestion. Just what impression the Letts had made on Lansing is rather difficult to determine. Lansing, however, subsequently made clear that he had favored throughout the policy of nonrecognition. Thus he states that on September 21, 1918, he formulated his program of proposed peace terms as follows:

"1. The complete abrogation or denouncement of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty and all treaties relating in any way to Russian territory or commerce.

"2. The Baltic Provinces of Lithuania, Latvia and Esthonia should be autonomous states of a Russian Confederation."<sup>6</sup>

Elsewhere he states: "But Mr. Wilson even further discredited the phrase [self-determination] by adopting a policy toward Russia which ignored the principle. The peoples of Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Ukraine, Georgia, and Azerbaijan have by blood, language, and racial traits elements of difference which give to each of them in more or less degree the character of a distinct nationality. These peoples all possess aspirations to become independent states, and yet, throughout the negotiations at Paris and since that time, the Government of the United States has repeatedly refused to recognize the right of the inhabitants of these territories to determine for themselves the sovereignty under which they shall live. It has, on the contrary, declared in favor of a 'Great Russia,' comprising the vast territory of the old Empire except the province which belonged to the dismembered Kingdom of Poland and the lands included within the present boundaries of the Republic of Finland. I do not mention the policy of President Wilson as to an undivided Russia by way of criticism because I believe the policy was and has continued to be the right one."<sup>7</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Lansing to Polk from Paris, March 27, 1919.

<sup>6</sup> Robert Lansing, *The Peace Negotiations*, p. 193.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 99-100.

## APPENDIX II

### LATVIA AND FRANCE, 1918-1921

New light on the vexed question of Latvian relations with France has just been made available [February, 1941] through permission to use data and citations from the five elaborate unpublished manuscript volumes of Olgerds Grosvalds' *My Paris Diary, 1919-1924*. Initial consultations with Mr. Grosvalds took place at the Latvian Legation in Paris on June 1, 1938, and other installments of data were made available at later dates. The fact of Mr. Grosvalds' removal to Vichy under the impact of war conditions and the concurrent occupation of Latvia by the armed forces of the U.S.S.R. rendered contact with him during this period extremely difficult.

From Volume I of the *Diary* it appears that, after serving as secretary of the Latvian National Council in Petrograd from the earliest moments of its activity, Grosvalds came to Paris at the beginning of 1919 as one of the secretaries to Chakste, Meierovics, and the rest of the Latvian delegation. On the return of Chakste and Meierovics to Riga in September, 1919, Seskis continued in command until December 19, 1919, when he entrusted the further conduct of Latvian affairs at Paris to Grosvalds. From this point on, during the crucial thirteen months until recognition was finally achieved, Grosvalds was the central figure in the negotiations with the Allied governments. Although he no longer had to encounter the machinations of the Conférence Politique Russe as such, he found the atmosphere of the Quai d'Orsay poisoned by the activities of one Bazili, formerly the counselor of the Imperial Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who was at that time extremely hostile to the idea as well as the fact of an independent Latvia. Such was the setting for the developments of Grosvalds' campaign against the inflexible attitude of the Quai d'Orsay (*Diary*, II, 54 [February 24, 1920]).

On March 26, 1920 (*Diary*, II, 88), Grosvalds had his first official conversation with Maurice Paléologue, former French ambassador to Czarist Russia, who was then acting as secretary-general at the Quai d'Orsay. Grosvalds asked him if the Supreme Council had acted on



the case of the Russian Border States. Paléologue, with great tact and courtesy, replied in the negative, adding that there would be no change in French policy until the creation of an orderly Russian government. This alone suffices to show that there had been no perceptible change in French policy since the days when large-scale intervention, such as the *Conférence Politique Russe* hoped for, was still the order of the day with the Powers sitting on the Supreme Council. Grosvalds then pointed out that nine months had passed since the Baltic Commission had acted in a quasi-negative sense, and that Kolchak and Denikin, who were the principal factors in the field at that time, were no longer in the political picture. Meanwhile the Baltic States must live. Had not the Allies already acted in relation to Armenia and Finland? Did they now contemplate entering into relations with the Bolsheviks?

Paléologue protested that France had no relations with Soviet Russia, then added: "France cannot now recognize Latvia *de jure*, but wants to develop *de facto* relations." He sought to establish a *de facto* basis for these relationships by suggesting to Grosvalds that he send in a formal letter which, he intimated, would enable the Quai d'Orsay to give "a quite positive reply." Grosvalds agreed, but wishing to draw the fullest ceremonial advantages from his overture, asked when and how he would be received, and in what capacity. Paléologue, too clever to be caught by this ruse, told him that it would be later, and that he looked forward to the time when he could say to the Latvian envoy: "Je vous souhaite la bienvenue dans cet maison" (*Diary*, II, 89).

During the next month Grosvalds devoted all his energy to preparing a convincing *mémoire* for presentation at the Quai d'Orsay, paving the way for it by a preliminary note and conference with M. Grenard, the political director at the Ministry, on April 13 (*Diary*, II, 103). On April 23, 1920, while the Supreme Council was meeting at San Remo, where Dr. Michael Walters, the Latvian envoy in Italy, hovered in the offing, hoping to be able to advance Latvian interests, Grosvalds finally transmitted the decisive *mémoire*, then awaited results (*Diary*, II, 114). They were not long in forthcoming. On April 29 Grosvalds received from Paléologue the coveted document (see p. 513, note 8) attesting France's *de facto* recognition of Latvia on as broad a documentary basis as could be desired. After haggling with the Quai

d'Orsay over questions of postal correspondence and recognition of Latvian passports and getting only the most insignificant results, Grosvalds at once saw the tremendous value of the document and how far it went toward meeting the Latvian desires. He accordingly hastened to inform the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Riga, declaring: "This document is the most important and most complete of all the acts of recognition which we have so far received. Now it is not an institution which is recognized, but the Latvian State, and *de jure* recognition is held out in prospect" (*Diary*, II, 121).

In the months that followed, Grosvalds' tasks were lightened for a moment by the decision of Meierovics to make a special trip to Paris to make use of this newly acquired leverage. But neither the presence of the Latvian foreign minister in the French capital nor the sending to Grosvalds from Riga of documentary "full powers to defend the interests of Latvia before the Peace Conference"—phraseology already strikingly obsolete for 1920!—nor various routine acknowledgments from the Quai d'Orsay of documents presented to the Peace Conference secretariat sufficed to advance the Latvian cause (*Diary*, II, 150). It appears to have been in no sense due to the actions of Grosvalds that the problem lagged; the truth is that the Russo-Polish war took the center of the stage and that the negotiations were carried on at London, Warsaw, Minsk, Moscow, or Bulduri, rather than at Paris! Only as the French Foreign Office learned independently of Latvia's own peace negotiations with Russia did it move to counter this action by sending to Riga as French high commissioner the Comte de Sartigues (*Diary*, II, 224 [July 4, 1920]). Seeing the French government still in this militant mood, Grosvalds went on vacation to London during August and there endeavored, so far as he had any influence, to counter the effects of the Colby note (*Diary*, II, 291).

With the passing of Premier Millerand from the political scene and the accession to power of the Leygues ministry, Grosvalds felt the political climate begin to thaw. On November 15, 1920, he had a long conversation with the new French premier, which he immediately reported to Meierovics, who was then in Geneva in anticipation of the First Assembly of the League, to which Latvia had submitted her application for admission. The *Diary* records only Grosvalds' letter to

Meierovics, with few, if any, important glossings. From this account it appears that so long as France championed the cause of General Baron Wrangel in his Crimean campaign, all doors were shut to the Baltic States. When Wrangel's star began to dim—Grosvalds marginally noted the fall of Sebastopol to the Red armies on November 14, 1920—it was amazing how quickly France recovered a brisk interest in the fortunes of the Balticum! Although Leygues gave blanket promises of aid in Latvia's financial reconstruction, it proved peculiarly difficult for the Latvian envoy to pin him down to anything more definite than clarification of maritime and commercial relations. Although declaring himself personally favorable to Latvia's case, Leygues refused to commit himself to support Latvia's candidacy at Geneva. When Wrangel's defeat became a complete rout, France promptly veered toward recognition despite a violent press campaign against the Baltic States by the Russian émigré press in Paris, particularly the *Poslednia Novosti* (*Diary*, III, 1-3).

The actual *démarches* which led to Latvia's recognition by the Supreme Council were very definitely the work of Grosvalds, although undertaken, naturally enough, on the orders of Meierovics, who came on to Paris following the First Assembly meeting, and prepared the diplomatic terrain. At 5:00 P.M. on January 26, 1921, Grosvalds was informed by telephone from the Quai d'Orsay, by M. de Peretti, that the long-hoped-for *de jure* recognition had finally been officially extended by the Supreme Council. The actual note from Briand on behalf of the Supreme Council, although dated January 26, was not received by either Pusta, the Estonian envoy, or Grosvalds until January 27, whereupon both immediately informed their respective governments (*Diary*, III, 58-60).

## NOTES

## NOTES TO CHAPTER I

<sup>1</sup> J. Dumont, *Corps universel diplomatique du droit des gens*, Tome VIII, Partie II, pp. 36-39.

<sup>2</sup> Karol Lutostánski, *Les Partages de la Pologne et la lutte pour l'indépendance* (Paris: Payot et Cie, 1918), p. 42.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 212.

<sup>4</sup> *Manchester Guardian*, March 31, 1917, p. 5, col. 3; April 10, 1917, p. 5, col. 7.

<sup>5</sup> Dr. M. Walters, *Lettland: Seine Entwicklung zum Staat und die baltischen Fragen*, pp. 330-331: "For the authorities in Petersburg the desire for an autonomous administration of the Lettish territories was unacceptable."

<sup>6</sup> Separate land councils (Zemski Soviets) were created for Livonia and Courland by decree of the Provisional Government on June 22, 1917.

<sup>7</sup> Walters, *op. cit.*, pp. 332-333.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 338-339. These resolutions, passed July 30, 1917, read as follows: "(1) The people of Latvia (i.e., the entire population of Latvia) have, like all other peoples, the right to full self-determination. (2) Latvia constitutes an indivisible whole, embracing Southern Livonia, Courland, and Latgale (also called Infantia, i.e., the districts of Dvinsk, Rezekne and Ludza of the gubernia of Vitebsk). NOTE.—In the frontier communes of Latvia the local population shall itself decide whether it desires to belong to Latvia or to some other territory or State. (3) Latgale, as a particular constituent part of Latvia, possesses in all matters of local self-government, administration, language, schools, and churches complete self-determination. (4) Latvia constitutes a politically autonomous unit in the Democratic Republic of Russia. (5) Legislative, executive, judicial, and local administrative power vests in the hands of the Latvian people and its Diet, which is to be elected on the basis of general, equal, secret, and proportional suffrage without difference of sex. (6) The Conference protests against annexations and in particular against any attempt to decide the public-law status and the frontiers of Latvia or its constituent parts without the knowledge and decision of the people of Latvia."

<sup>9</sup> Walters, *op. cit.*, p. 340. The idea of neutralization as an intermediary stage between autonomy and independence occurs in the evolution of virtually every Border State. Cf. M. W. Graham, "Neutralization as a Movement in International Law," *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. XX, No. 1 (January, 1927), pp. 79-94.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. "Le Conseil National Letton," *Revue Baltique*, No. 1 (September, 1918), p. 20. As finally constituted, the Latvian National Council was made up of representatives of the Livonian and Courland Land Councils, the Latgalian Revolutionary Council, the principal Lettish military

organizations, and the various Lettish political parties, i.e., the Agrarians, Democrats, National Democrats, and Radical Democrats. In addition, it included members of the postal and telegraph trade unions, land surveyors' union, and representatives of the Livonian and Latgallian coöperative societies and of the Central Committee of Refugees and the Latgallian War Victims' Committee. The National Council established a presidium (called the *Galvena Valde* or Supreme Government) with various departments, including a department for foreign affairs. The curious resemblance to the revolutionary executive structures arising elsewhere on Russian territory, despite the difference in the ideas actuating the Latvian National Council, is noteworthy.

<sup>11</sup> "Le Conseil National Letton," *Revue Baltique*, No. 1, p. 20.

<sup>12</sup> Walters, *op. cit.*, p. 343.

<sup>13</sup> Colville Barclay, British chargé d'affaires in Washington, to Lansing, January 28, 1918. This memorandum recounted the Estonian deputies' conversations with Mr. Lindley, as previously noted, and added: "The Lettish representatives on the Constituent Assembly also called recently at the British Embassy in Petrograd on the same subject and were given a similar answer, care being taken to avoid encouraging them to expect His Majesty's Government to continue the war solely for the sake of their country" (*Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia*, 2:816). It appears that as early as January 11 (N.S.), 1918, Seskis and Meierovics visited M. Brandstroem, the Swedish minister in Petrograd, protesting against the German endeavors to annex Courland. They also emphasized the Latvian demand for self-determination and outlined the Lettish desire to create "an autonomous state composed of Southern Livonia, Courland and Latgalia." On January 4/17 Seskis and Meierovics visited Noulens to endeavor to ascertain the French attitude toward the Lettish claims. On January 5/18, while Goldmanis made his statement to the Constituent Assembly, they visited Lindley and endeavored to ascertain the British stand; the following day they waited upon Ambassador Francis. On January 25 Lindley informed the delegation that Britain would pay no attention to German propaganda of a character militating against the Lettish claims; on January 22/February 4 Noulens informed the same delegation that France "could not fail to applaud their efforts, and keep them in mind in the hour of a final and reparative peace" ("ne peut manquer d'applaudir à vos efforts et de s'en souvenir quand viendra l'heure de la paix définitive et réparatrice") (A. Piip, "Memorandum on Latvian Chronology, 1918-1919," pp. 1-2).

<sup>14</sup> Walters, *op. cit.*, p. 343. "The National Council in Petersburg had already entered into relations with foreign powers and sent the later prime minister and foreign minister, Meierovics, abroad, other members to the Ukraine, etc."

<sup>16</sup> Piip ("Memorandum," p. 2) notes that the second session of the National Council at Petrograd, January 15/18-28/31, 1918, was deeply engrossed in the problem of deciding whether to accept Soviet overtures looking toward "participation in a certain measure at the Brest-Litovsk peace negotiations." After mature deliberation, the Lettish leaders firmly decided against any part in the Brest-Litovsk Peace. Herein Latvian national instinct moved more boldly and with a clearer conception of its permanent orientations than the Ukrainian national movement.

<sup>17</sup> Thus the American consul at Moscow, on June 4, 1918, informed the secretary of state of "protests by the liberal and socialistic elements against the action of the united Landtag of Livonia and Estonia which has requested incorporation of these two provinces into Germany." "Thousands of Letts," he added, "have withdrawn into Russia. There is no evidence of the Lettish or Estonian national movements taking concrete form, but according to some reports German Landsturm troops policing the country meet desultory opposition from Lettish sharpshooters" (De Witt C. Poole to Lansing from Moscow, June 4, 1918, No. 596, in *F.R.U.S., 1918, Russia*, 2:829-830).

<sup>18</sup> "Le Conseil National Letton," *Revue Baltique*, No. 1 (September, 1918), p. 20.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>20</sup> Francis to Lansing from Archangel, September 2, 1918 (received October 15, 1918), transmitting the protest received at the embassy in Petrograd July 14, 1918, in *F.R.U.S., 1918, Russia*, 2:833.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. Pleasant Stovall, minister of the United States in Switzerland, to Lansing from Berne, October 2, 1918 (No. 4747), transmitting a militant plea for the Letts by Dr. Louis Ferrière, pastor of the National Reformed Protestant Church of Geneva. "In all questions concerning the Baltic provinces," wrote the churchman, "great attention must be given at Washington and London not to join in any solidarity the Lettish and Lithuanian questions, but deal with them separately, and if now there is occasion for the Allies to proclaim for any of the Baltic Nations the right of political independence and to become an ally of the allies, as has recently been done for the Czechoslovaks, it must be done for the Letts first, and if possible, at once. . . . But first of all [it is essential that] Latvia [Courland, half of Livonia and that part of the government of Vitebsk called Latgallia] be united as an autonomous political body allied to Russia." Cf. also Professor Emile Doumergue, *Une petite Nationalité en souffrance: Les Lettons, les provinces baltiques et le pangermanisme prussien en Russie* (Paris, 1917); "Les petites Nations ou les portes et les clefs du monde," *Revue Baltique*, No. 1 (September 1918), pp. 3-5; and *La Lettonie et la Baltique* (Paris, 1919). Cf. also the "Memorandum on Latvia," presented by the Swiss Committee for the Study of the Latvian Question, in the *Revue Baltique*, I, 194-197.

<sup>21</sup> See Document 1.

<sup>22</sup> Balfour to Zigfrīds A. Meierovics from London, November 11, 1918. (Latvian Foreign Office files.)

<sup>23</sup> Officially the declaration of independence was communicated by the Latvian State Council to the government of the United States through a note addressed to Mr. Ira Nelson Morris, minister of the United States at Stockholm, December 7, 1918, as follows: "The Latvian State Council has the honor to bring to the attention of Your Excellency that on November 18, 1918, the following proclamation was addressed to the citizens of Latvia:

"The Latvian State Council, considering itself to be the sole repository of sovereign power in Latvia proclaims the following: (1) Latvia, united in its ethnographic limits (Courland, Livonia and Latgale) is an autonomous, independent, democratic and republican State, whose constitution and relations with foreign countries are specifically defined by the Constituent Assembly, convoked on the basis of direct, equal, secret and proportional suffrage of the two sexes. (2) The Latvian State Council has established a Provisional Government of Latvia as the supreme executive power in Latvia.

"The Latvian State Council asks the citizens of Latvia to maintain peace and order and to assist the Provisional Government with all their might in its difficult and responsible task. Therefore, in the new State of Latvia a Provisional Government has been constituted, which has not only stated its purpose to sustain peace and order in the country, but has also taken into its control all the other governmental functions, even including the convocation of the Constituent Assembly and the safeguarding of the interests of the State of Latvia in both domestic and foreign affairs. The Latvian State Council begs your Excellency to bring these facts to the attention of the Government of the United States of America and to ask it to recognize Latvia as an independent State. The President of the Latvian State Council, Jānis Chakste. The Minister-President, Karlis Ulmanis." (Latvian Foreign Office files.)

<sup>24</sup> Cf. Assembly Document 89, 1920, *Application of Latvia for Admission to the League of Nations; Memorandum by the Secretary General.*

<sup>25</sup> Meierovics to Viscount S. Chinda, Japanese ambassador in London, November 21, 1918, appealing to the Japanese government to recognize the "Lettish Council"—a term equally applicable to the Lettish National Council and the Latvian State Council—as the Provisional Government of Latvia; Viscount Chinda to Meierovics from London, January 10, 1919: "His Majesty's Government have viewed with the deepest sympathy the aspirations of the Lettish people and instructed me to convey to you their decision to grant provisional recognition to the Lettish National Council as a de facto independent body pending the final settlement at the forthcoming



peace conference." It is interesting to note that the Japanese communication is much less definite than the assurances subsequently given to Estonia, and avoids any reference to a settlement based on self-determination. It further avoids any recognition of the Latvian Provisional Government. (Latvian Foreign Office files.)

\* Meierovics to the Haitian Legation in London, December 4, 1918, requesting recognition of the Latvian National Council as the Provisional Government of Latvia; C. Benoit, from the Secretariat of State for Foreign Affairs, Port-au-Prince, January 30, 1919, declaring that Haiti, not being a neutral, could not remain indifferent to the appeal of the Latvian National Council and stating: "Je suis heureux de vous faire part des bonnes dispositions où se trouve le Gouvernement Haitien de reconnaître au Conseil National Letton la qualité de Gouvernement Provisoire Indépendant." (Latvian Foreign Office files.)

<sup>71</sup> Cf. footnote 23.

<sup>72</sup> August Winnig, *Am Ausgang der deutschen Ostpolitik*, chap. ix, "Republik Latvija," pp. 50-55. "I began negotiations with the Latvian Government on November 22," declares Winnig. "The points of view which I took were these: The creation of the Latvian Republic is a *fait accompli* which we recognize as such. Germany is ready to negotiate with the government constituted by the Latvian State Council. We see in the State Council the present representation of Latvia but point to the fact that the German population is not thus far represented in it, and that this representation must be settled peacefully before the German Reich can extend constitutional [staatsrechtliche] recognition to the Latvian Republic." Of this view, Walters, refuting Winnig, writes: "It can be seen from Winnig's statements, for how narrow a construction he worked in that he speaks of a mere 'staatsrechtliche Anerkennung,' which could not have been under discussion, for constitutionally the State was already there, and only *international recognition* could have entered into question . . . [The German authorities] sought to deny recognition to the State Council. The German minority regarded the founding of the State *as though it had not happened*. As previously in the struggle for annexation or partition, so now they took up the fight against the very existence of Latvia as a State [gegen die eigene Staatlichkeit Lettlands]" (Walters, *op. cit.*, pp. 362-363).

<sup>73</sup> Winnig, *op. cit.*, pp. 86-87. On December 26, 1918, Germany appointed Winnig as minister and created a legation. The instrument signed on the twenty-ninth was entitled a "*treaty* [Vertrag] between the *plenipotentiary* of the German Reich and the Provisional Latvian *Government*." Reference is made to an earlier agreement of a military character under date of December 7, but not in fact a political treaty, although so called. Winnig signed as "Deutscher Gesandter bei den Regierungen der Republiken Estland und Lettland."

## NOTES TO CHAPTER II

<sup>1</sup> Chakste to Clemenceau from Paris, February 10, 1919, in *La Revue Baltique*, Nos. 6-7 (February-March, 1919), p. 153.

<sup>2</sup> Chakste to Clemenceau from Paris, February 10, 1919, *ibid.*, p. 153.

<sup>3</sup> Chakste to Clemenceau from Paris, February 10, 1919, *ibid.*, p. 154. The official case of the Letts was presented *in extenso* in the *Memorandum on Latvia, Addressed to the Peace Conference by the Lettish Delegation* (Paris, 1919). Pp. 28.

<sup>4</sup> *Bulletin de l'Esthonie*, No. 1 (April, 1919), p. 17. The Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, and Ukrainian delegations interviewed Clemenceau on the morning of March 16, declaring to him that the two means by which the Allies could aid the Border States against bolshevism were to give them arms, munitions, and credits on the one hand, and recognition on the other. Clemenceau assured the delegations of his sympathy for their cause and stated that he was quite disposed (*tout disposé*) to support their request for independence at the Peace Conference.

<sup>5</sup> Chakste to Clemenceau from Paris, March 24, 1919, in *La Revue Baltique*, No. 8 (April, 1919), p. 193. English text in D. H. Miller, *My Diary at the Conference of Paris*, XVIII, 23-25. See Document 3.

<sup>6</sup> For the text of the note of the Conférence Politique Russe, cf. Miller, *op. cit.*, XVII, 408 ff.

<sup>7</sup> Chaikovsky and Maklakov to Clemenceau from Paris, May 24, 1919 (Supreme Council Bulletin No. 319 [May 29, 1919]), in Miller, *op. cit.*, XVIII, 448-451.

<sup>8</sup> Meierovics to Clemenceau from Paris, May 30, 1919, in *La Revue Baltique*, Vol. I, No. 10 (June, 1919), pp. 248-249. See Document 6.

<sup>9</sup> The heads of Border State delegations to Clemenceau from Paris, June 17, 1919, in *La Revue Baltique*, Vol. I, No. 11, p. 290. See Document 9.

<sup>10</sup> Chakste to Clemenceau from Paris, April 19, 1919, in *La Revue Baltique*, No. 9 (May, 1919), p. 229. Cf. also Miller, *op. cit.*, XVIII, 1-2.

<sup>11</sup> This took the form of a solemnly executed protocol of April 19, 1919, signed by the representatives of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Georgia, and the Ukraine and transmitted to Clemenceau. The document drew particular attention to the situation created by nonrecognition, considering formal recognition, promptly accorded, as an important factor for the establishment and maintenance of peace in eastern Europe, while pointing out that delay would impede internal recovery and military defense. Agreement was reached on a concerted request for recognition, to be made individually but almost simultaneously. Cf. Miller, *op. cit.*, XVIII, 23-25, and *La Revue Baltique*, No. 9 (May, 1919), pp. 235-236. See Document 4.

<sup>12</sup> Z. A. Meierovics to Clemenceau from Paris, March 8, 1919, in *La Revue Baltique*, No. 8 (April, 1919), p. 192.

<sup>18</sup> This correspondence is quite voluminous and ramified. Although having no direct bearing on the question of the recognition of Latvia as a state, it is of the utmost importance in vindicating the Provisional Government's right to speak for the Letts. Cf. Chakste to Clemenceau from Paris, April 19, 1919, recounting von der Goltz's coup d'état (*La Revue Baltique*, No. 9 [May, 1919], pp. 231-232, and Miller, *op. cit.*, XVIII, 28-30) and asking for military measures against the Baltic-German Landeswehr; Chakste to Clemenceau from Paris, May 5, 1919 (*La Revue Baltique*, *loc. cit.*), vindicating the legal mandate of the Provisional Government and asking aid.

<sup>14</sup> Minutes of the Council of Foreign Ministers, April 19, 1919, in Miller, *op. cit.*, XVI, 81-88 *passim*.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 82-87 *passim*.

<sup>16</sup> See Appendix I.

<sup>17</sup> Addendum to Bulletin No. 230 of the Supreme Council (May 3, 1919), in Miller, *op. cit.*, XVIII, 99-100. The recommendations were dated April 29, 1919. See Document 5.

<sup>18</sup> Marshal Foch to Clemenceau from Allied G.H.Q., May 13, 1919 (No. 2478), citing the demand made by General Haking on General Nudant, the president of the Inter-allied Permanent Armistice Commission at Spa, on April 23, 1919 (No. 898), for the immediate reinstatement of the Latvian government. Cf. also Foch's telegram (No. 2312) of May 3, 1919, to General Nudant, transmitting a copy of Balfour's telegram to Haking insisting on the withdrawal of von der Goltz. Cf. Bulletin No. 286 of the Supreme Council, in Miller, *op. cit.*, XVIII, 313-316.

<sup>19</sup> Minutes of the Council of Foreign Ministers, May 9, 1919, in Miller, *op. cit.*, XVI, 254.

## NOTES TO CHAPTER III

<sup>1</sup> *Conférence des Préliminaires de Paix, Commission des Affaires Baltiques, Procès-verbal No. 1* (séance du 15 mai 1919). The resolution of the commission, incorrectly given as of May 14, 1919, is found in Miller, *My Diary at the Conference of Paris*, XVI, 363-364, and XVIII, 344-347.

<sup>2</sup> "La Commission des Affaires Baltiques ... suggère en même temps que les représentants des Puissances Alliées à Libau reçoivent dès maintenant des instructions tendant à faciliter sur place la création d'un gouvernement de coalition en Lettonie" (*Procès-verbal No. 1*, p. 10).

<sup>3</sup> It is apparent that the commission was kept fully aware of the efforts to form a new government without really giving the Letts a clean slate. Intermittent German pressure was exercised to prevent the success of any coalition government, by the intrusion of the demand for lands for the colonization of the German soldiery. Throughout the deliberations, Mr. Morison strongly supported the claims of the Ulmanis government, whereas all that Sir Esmé Howard would support was the resolution to see formed "a coalition cabinet which shall be satisfactory to the Allies," leaving it to the Allied representatives at Libau to pass upon the men selected to achieve that end.

<sup>4</sup> "En ce qui concerne la question de rappel du Général von der Goltz, les gouvernements alliés et associés n'insisteraient pas là-dessus, à condition de recevoir les assurances: (a) (1) Qu'il recevra lui-même des instructions pour faciliter l'établissement du Gouvernement de coalition représentant tous les partis de la Lithuanie (*sic*) en proportion approximative de leur nombre; (2) Qu'il entreprendra immédiatement de réarmer les troupes lettones qui ont été désarmées; (3) Que la mobilisation et l'entraînement des troupes locales lettones seront permis immédiatement sans qu'aucun empêchement soit mis de la part des autorités allemandes; (b) Que le nouveau Gouvernement letton sera autorisé à exercer ses fonctions sans empêchement de la part des autorités allemandes. Au cas où ces conditions ne seraient pas exécutées dans délai de — les Puissances alliées et associées pourront avoir à examiner de nouveau leur attitude touchant le Général von der Goltz" (*Procès-verbal No. 2* [séance du 19 mai 1919], pp. 1-2).

<sup>5</sup> The Latvian delegation in Denmark to the minister of France at Copenhagen; the minister of France at Copenhagen to Pichon, *ibid.*

<sup>6</sup> *Procès-verbal No. 3* (séance du 22 mai 1919), pp. 2-4.

<sup>7</sup> "Les Esthoniens et les Lettons ont cru que leur indépendance était à la veille d'être reconnue."

<sup>8</sup> "Les Puissances alliées ont toujours considéré le Traité de Brest-Litowsk comme inexistant soit parce qu'il a été conclu par un Gouvernement illégal, soit aussi parce qu'il sanctionnait un morcellement de la Russie. Le peuple

russe a été toujours encouragé par les Alliés à la résistance contre les Allemands et les Bolchevicks par l'affirmation que les Alliés auraient fait tous les efforts possibles pour la régénération du pays *dans son unité*. Maintenant il est vrai qu'il faut tenir compte, jusqu'à une certaine mesure, de l'état de fait existant dans les provinces baltiques, mais n'ayant pas connaissance d'un changement survenu dans le programme de politique générale à l'égard de la Russie, il ne me semble pas que la Commission puisse continuer ses travaux, sans que le Conseil Suprême lui donne un mandat précis" (*Procès-verbal No. 3*, p. 7).

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 11-12.

<sup>10</sup> *Procès-verbal No. 4* (séance du 26 mai 1919), *passim*.

<sup>11</sup> *Procès-verbal No. 5* (séance du 28 mai 1919), pp. 12-13.

<sup>12</sup> *Procès-verbal No. 6* (séance du 10 juin 1919), pp. 1-4.

<sup>13</sup> *La Revue Baltique*, Vol. I, No. 10 (June, 1919), pp. 249-250.

<sup>14</sup> *Memorandum on Latvia Addressed to the Peace Conference by the Lettish Delegation*, pp. 16-17 and 28.

<sup>15</sup> Italics mine.

<sup>16</sup> *La Revue Baltique*, Vol. I, No. 10 (June, 1919), pp. 250-251.

<sup>17</sup> "Comme je l'ai déjà dit à vos Collègues esthoniens, nous sommes tous d'accord pour vous confirmer les assurances qui ont été données par tous nos Gouvernements au moment où le Gouvernement provisoire de la Lettonie a été reconnu comme de facto indépendant en attendant la décision de la Conférence de la Paix."

<sup>18</sup> "... nous sommes d'accord ici pour constater qu'il serait presque impossible d'établir un statut définitif de ces pays sans le consentement du Gouvernement russe qui va, nous en sommes bien persuadées, se rétablir bientôt."

<sup>19</sup> "Dans ces conditions, vous comprendrez qu'il est excessivement difficile, sinon impossible, pour les Etats alliés de reconnaître immédiatement l'indépendance de ces Etats, mais nous désirons de nouveau vous assurer de toute notre sympathie et ... les efforts des Alliés tendront à assurer de toute façon la liberté des peuples lettons et esthoniens."

<sup>20</sup> "Si on tâchait d'établir dès maintenant un état de choses qui ne fût pas accepté plus tard par le gouvernement russe, il en résulterait que l'établissement de la Paix dans ces régions deviendrait beaucoup plus difficile."

<sup>21</sup> The minutes indicate that both M. Kammerer and the Marquis della Torretta believed claims of the Baltic Provinces to reparations from Germany could be subsumed under the appropriate clauses of the Treaty of Versailles reserving Russia's rights. Cf. Article 116, par. 3 of the Treaty of Versailles: "The Allied and Associated Powers formally reserve the rights of Russia to obtain from Germany restitution and reparation based on principles of the present treaty."

<sup>22</sup> "En ce qui concerne nos rapports futurs avec la Russie, il nous semble

qu'une solution semblable à celle qui est intervenue à l'égard de la Finlande serait la meilleure.

"Avec l'appui de la Société des Nations, il sera possible dans quelque temps d'établir les termes d'un accord entre la Lettonie et la Russie.

"En ce moment, la Lettonie est victime d'un terrible complot dirigé par des forces allemandes et des forces russes réunies sur notre sol. Cette manoeuvre, souvent reprise au cours de l'histoire, constitue un danger très grave pour l'avenir de notre pays.

"Voilà pourquoi nous demandons de faire de la question lettone une question internationale. Nous ne voudrions pas que notre sort dépendît des décisions d'une Constituante pan-russe et nous espérons que vous trouverez vous-mêmes la meilleure solution des rapports entre la Lettonie et la Russie."

<sup>25</sup> *Procès-verbal No. 6*, pp. 6-7.

<sup>26</sup> *Procès-verbal No. 7* (séance du 13 juin 1919), p. 1.

<sup>27</sup> *Procès-verbal No. 8* (séance du 17 juin 1919), pp. 5-6.

<sup>28</sup> "... les Germano-Baltes souhaiteraient un régime suffisamment équitable pour leur assurer la sécurité et l'exercice de leurs droits."

<sup>29</sup> "Nous prenons bonne note de ce qu'il nous a dit au sujet des minorités et nous pourrions, je crois, recommander ses désirs au Conseil des Cinq" (*Procès-verbal No. 8*, pp. 1-4).

<sup>30</sup> "Un prêt sera consenti dans des conditions analogues à la Latvie aussitôt qu'un Gouvernement de coalition provisoire aura été formé dans des conditions qui en feront aux yeux des représentants politiques des Gouvernements associés en Latvie le représentant légitime des habitants du pays. A la conclusion d'un arrangement de cet ordre le blocus de la Latvie serait également levé" (Minutes of the Council of Four [in this instance Five, since Japan also was represented], June 25, 1919).

<sup>31</sup> *Procès-verbal No. 8*, pp. 5-7.

<sup>32</sup> *Procès-verbal No. 9* (séance du 19 juin 1919), pp. 1-5.

<sup>33</sup> *Procès-verbal No. 10* (séance du 24 juin 1919), Annexe V.

<sup>34</sup> *Procès-verbal No. 11* (séance du 30 juin 1919), pp. 1-5.

<sup>35</sup> *Procès-verbal No. 12* (séance du 2 juillet 1919), pp. 1-2. One telegram introduced by Sir Esmé Howard announced the fall and flight of the Needra cabinet; another made clear the desperate strategy of the Balts in a last-minute move to salvage their own rights under cover of the pretext of fighting communism: "Les Baltes désirent que la Landwehr soit employée contre les Bolchevicks sous la direction de l'Entente. En attendant la formation d'un Gouvernement plus représentatif, l'Administration provisoire du pays serait assurée par six Lettons, trois Baltes et un Juif. Le Gouvernement qui sera responsable devant le Folckrath (*sic*) s'occupera de la formation d'une armée nationale sous le contrôle des Alliés, de la restauration de l'ordre et de la distribution des vivres, sous réserve de

l'approbation du Folckrath qui se réunira le plus tôt possible." It will be noted that at no point in this program is independence mentioned; moreover, it is not clear that the Folckrath refers to the Latvian State Council rather than to some hand-picked body which the Balts hoped to convoke; and why there should be need for the "restoration of order" when the most complete, if repressive, calm had been in effect, thanks to von der Goltz, is far from intelligible.

"Etant donné l'importance de maintenir un Gouvernement organisé et stable dans les Etats de la Baltique comme barrière contre le bolchevisme d'un côté et l'influence allemande de l'autre, étant donné également la nécessité d'une coopération étroite entre les dits Gouvernements et les Gouvernements alliés et associés, coopération qui ne peut être assurée que si *les Etats de la Baltique* ont pleine confiance dans les intentions des Alliés de protéger leur liberté en cas de rétablissement d'un Gouvernement central puissant en Russie, la Commission des Affaires Baltiques estime que le moment est venu où les Puissances alliées et associées devraient préciser clairement leur politique à l'égard de ces Etats et elle propose qu'on leur fasse en commun une déclaration. ..." (*Procès-verbal No. 12, Annexe IV, pp. 16-17*).

"Les Puissances alliées et associées reconnaissent une fois encore comme Gouvernements indépendants de fait les Gouvernements d'Esthonie et de Latvie, et pour la première fois le Gouvernement de Lithuanie; elles leur affirment qu'elles sont décidées à assurer à ces Etats le libre self-government que désirent les populations.

"En même temps les Gouvernements alliés et associés doivent exprimer leur opinion qu'on ne saurait arriver à une solution définitive sans le consentement d'un Gouvernement russe reconnu et, tout en se réservant le droit de coopérer soit directement, soit par l'intermédiaire de la Société des Nations, en vue d'obtenir une solution qui satisfasse les deux partis, elles ne peuvent pour le moment prendre aucune mesure qui les engagerait pour la solution définitive, en attendant le rétablissement d'un Gouvernement russe reconnu.

"En attendant, elles ont le désir et la volonté de faire tout ce qui sera en leur pouvoir pour aider les Etats baltiques à organiser leur défense locale et à établir une administration efficace et stable. ..." (*ibid.*).

"Nous acceptons votre memorandum [declared Kammerer], mais nous demandons la suppression du mot 'indépendants' qui figure dans le 1<sup>o</sup> de la résolution proposée. Dans la lettre du 13 mai 1918, le Gouvernement français écrivait au Conseil national de l'Esthonie qu'il le reconnaissait comme 'organisme indépendant' jusqu'à ce que la Conférence de la Paix ait établi définitivement le statut futur de l'Esthonie. Le memorandum ne parle plus d'organisme indépendant, mais de Gouvernement indépendant" (*Procès-verbal No. 13 [séance du 4 juillet 1919]*).

<sup>77</sup> "Nous sommes un peu liés dans cette question [said Marquis della Torretta] par les termes des télégrammes échangés entre nos Gouvernements et l'Amiral Kolchak. Il vaudrait mieux dire simplement 'Gouvernement de fait'" (*Procès-verbal No. 13* [séance du 4 juillet 1919]).

<sup>78</sup> According to M. Ochiai: "Le Japon a reconnu les Gouvernements d'Esthonie et de Latvie comme des organismes indépendants *de facto*; je ne puis aller plus loin en étendant cette reconnaissance à la Lithuanie" (*ibid.*).

<sup>79</sup> Major Tyler (U.S.A.) reported that "... le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis ne s'est jamais associé à une reconnaissance quelconque des Gouvernements esthonien et letton et, d'après les instructions que j'ai reçues, il n'a pas l'intention de la faire" (*ibid.*).

<sup>80</sup> *Procès-verbal No. 15* (séance du 11 juillet 1919).

<sup>81</sup> *Procès-verbal No. 16* (séance du 15 juillet 1919). For the text of the resolution see Document 10.

<sup>82</sup> Sir Esmé Howard does not appear to have functioned as president of the commission after the fourteenth meeting on July 7.

<sup>83</sup> Baron von Lersner to Clemenceau from Versailles, July 6, 1919, in *Procès-verbal No. 17* (séance du 29 juillet 1919), Annexe II, p. 8.

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 1-6 *passim*.

<sup>85</sup> *Procès-verbal No. 18* (séance du 31 juillet 1919).

<sup>86</sup> According to information supplied the writer by the United States Department of State, under date of May 18, 1936, the Commission on Baltic Affairs held twenty-two meetings in all. What transpired in the last four meetings of the commission is unknown to the writer, but it is believed that nothing substantially altering the conclusions reached in the eighteen available protocols took place, particularly as regards Latvia. The Peace Conference having decided to insist on von der Goltz's recall, whatever data refer to that would be supplementary to, and confirmative of, the stand taken on July 31. As the only point of principle involved in the correspondence with the German government had been settled by that date, no important factor involved is believed to have been omitted.

<sup>87</sup> General Weygand from Versailles to General Nudant at Spa, July 1, 1919, No. 3341, annexed to *Procès-verbal No. 18* (séance du 31 juillet 1919).

<sup>88</sup> "La composition du Gouvernement letton est sans aucun rapport avec le retrait des troupes allemandes."

<sup>89</sup> The failure of telegrams to reach Berlin was admitted by Wachendorf in a note to General Nudant from Düsseldorf, July 24, 1919 (No. 4348).

<sup>90</sup> "La composition du Gouvernement letton a toujours été considérée par l'Allemagne comme une affaire de politique intérieure lettone à laquelle le Gouvernement allemand ne peut pas se mêler.

"La formation d'un nouveau cabinet letton n'est donc nullement en corrélation avec la question de l'évacuation de la Lettonie" (Wachendorf to General Nudant from Düsseldorf, July 24, 1919, No. 4349).



## NOTES TO CHAPTER IV

<sup>1</sup> "The Latvian Delegation has the honor to bring to the attention of Your Excellency [wrote Seskis] that the Government of Latvia received on September 11 an offer from the Russian Soviet Government to open peace negotiations. While not ignoring how little faith can be placed in treaties concluded with the Bolsheviks, the Latvian Government does not believe itself to be in a position to refuse the offer for the following reasons:

"Despite several notes addressed by the Latvian Delegation and Government to the Peace Conference with the request that it cause Courland to be evacuated by the Russo-German troops of von der Goltz, the number of the latter increases from day to day through armed detachments arriving from Germany; the German troops terrorize and pillage the population of Courland and their attitude toward the Latvian Government becomes more and more provoking and menacing. Despite its excellent morale, the Latvian army, in need of armament and equipment, is not sufficiently strong and numerous to fight simultaneously against the German army in Courland and the Bolsheviks who are still in occupation of Latgale.

"The Government of Latvia addresses itself to the representatives of the Allied Powers with a view to learning what support they would be willing to accord to it in its struggle against the Germans and the Bolsheviks. In perfect accord with the Governments of Estonia and of Lithuania, the Government of Latvia is preparing a common reply to the Soviet Government" (*Revue Baltique*, Vol. II, No. 2 [14] [October 15–November 1, 1919], pp. 42–44; and *L'Europe Orientale*, Vol. I, No. 4 [October 16, 1919], pp. 120–121). The translation from the French is the author's.

<sup>2</sup> Meierovics to Lianosov, September 3, 1919; Lianosov to Meierovics, September 11, 1919. "The Council of Ministers of the Northwest Government of Russia [wrote Lianosov], having taken cognizance of your note of September 3 and the documents annexed thereto, has charged me: (1) to express its best sentiments to the Provisional Government of Latvia and wish it complete success in its struggle against Bolshevism, as well as in its work of reconstitution of the country on democratic bases; (2) to express to you its profound satisfaction at the fact that your Constitution, as well as the principles governing your relations with foreign powers, will shortly be determined by the Latvian Constituent Assembly, which principles, the Council of Ministers hopes, will be established on bases giving satisfaction to the two countries; (3) to inform the Provisional Government of Latvia that, without waiting for the principles governing relations with foreign powers to be fixed by the Latvian Constituent Assembly, the Northwest Government of Russia is ready to enter forthwith into the closest possible relationships with Latvia (... le Gouvernement du Nord-Ouest de la Russie est prêt d'entrer aussitôt dans des rapports les plus suivis avec la

Latvie)" (Latvian Foreign Office files.) The emphasis placed on constituent legitimacy by Lianosov is of considerable interest.

\*Meierovics to Holsti from Paris, June 16, 1919; Holsti to Meierovics from Helsinki, September 26, 1919, No. 8016. In the first note, Meierovics merely requested "recognition of the independence of Latvia and of its Provisional Government." Holsti, following closely the formula devised for Estonia, replied: "Le Président de la République qui a toujours été pénétré de la plus vive sympathie pour la Latvia, m'a chargé de porter à la connaissance de Votre Excellence qu'il est heureux de reconnaître le Gouvernement de la Latvia comme gouvernement de facto du dit pays et qu'il porte les meilleurs voeux pour la prospérité du nouvel état et pour l'établissement de liens d'amitié entre nos deux pays." (Latvian Foreign Office files.)

\*I. J. Paderewski to Z. A. Meierovics from Warsaw, October 22, 1919, No. D. 11950/V/19. "J'ai l'honneur de vous informer que le Gouvernement polonais est prêt à reconnaître le Conseil National de Latvia comme organisation indépendante de fait jusqu'au moment où la Conférence de la Paix reconnaîtra à la Latvia un statut conforme aux voeux de la Nation Lettone." (Latvian Foreign Office files.) The remainder of the note expressed hopes for cordial understanding and the friendly reception at Riga of a special Polish mission under M. Bouffat. It should be noted that the Polish note does not refer to any solicitation of recognition, but appears to regard recognition as an act of high policy, and of a unilateral character, accorded at discretion but not in response to any request. The same characteristic attaches to the Polish recognition of Finland, Estonia, and Lithuania. The use of such guarded language so late in the evolution of the Baltic States implies either genuine timidity or an expectation of territorial conquests!

\*E. Galvanauskas to Z. A. Meierovics from Kaunas, October 23, 1919, No. 1520. "Considérant la proclamation de l'indépendance de la libre République de la Latvia comme l'expression décisive de l'auto-détermination de la nation Lettone, le Gouvernement Lituanien a l'honneur de faire savoir que par ses relations de fait avec le haut Gouvernement de la Latvia, il a toujours respecté cette décision en reconnaissant l'indépendance de la libre république de la Latvia ainsi que son Gouvernement détenant le Pouvoir Suprême de la Latvia." (Latvian Foreign Office files.) The note is unusual in being addressed by the prime minister of one government directly to the whole government of another country, but makes up in its definiteness for the deviation from established procedure. Two considerations are outstanding: (1) the declaration retrodates the recognition to November 18, 1918; (2) it accepts Latvia as definitely a republic, in accordance with the terminology of the declaration of November 18, 1918. Finally, the use of the phrase "holder of supreme power" refers to the actual literal rendition of

the name (*Galvena Valde*) given to the presidium of the Latvian State Council. Cf. note 6 *infra*.

<sup>8</sup> Simon Petliura and André Levitzky to the "Honorable Government of the Republic of Latvia." "Dirigé par le principe de libre choix pour les peuples et de la pleine souveraineté de chaque nation quant à la construction de sa propre vie gouvernementale, la République Démocratique Ukrainienne trouve de son devoir d'aider à l'épanouissement de toutes les nations avides d'indépendance et désire mettre en pratique le principe de la liberté des Nations solennellement proclamé par la Conférence de la Paix à Paris.

"La République Démocratique Ukrainienne reconnaît la République de Latvie dans ses frontières ethnographiques avec les provinces de Courlande, Livlande et Latgale, dirigée par le Gouvernement Provisoire nommé par le Conseil d'Etat Letton représentant une organisation libre et indépendante et exprimant la volonté et les droits souverains du peuple Letton. Donnée le 10 décembre 1919." (Latvian Foreign Office files.) The peculiar phraseology of the document reflects the ruling ideas of the Ukrainian directorate.

<sup>9</sup> J. Seskis to the Supreme Council, December 9, 1919, in *Revue Baltique*, Vol. II, No. 4 (16) (December 15, 1919), pp. 72-76. (Excerpts.)

<sup>10</sup> The sole satisfaction which Latvia gained from France by protracted insistence on the part of Grosvalds was a formal confirmation by the French government, in writing, of the alleged *de facto* recognition extended early in 1918 by Noulens. At the end of April, 1920, Maurice Paléologue, the former French ambassador in Russia, wrote on behalf of Millerand to Grosvalds, as head of the Latvian "Legation" in France, that he was under instructions to "confirm the *provisional recognition* by the Government of the French Republic of the existence *de facto* of the independent State of Latvia, while awaiting the final decision of the Allied Governments as regards the question *de jure*" (Maurice Paléologue to Olgerds Grosvalds, April 29, 1920, in Bureau Letton d'Information [Paris], *Bulletin No. 24*, May 6, 1920, p. 1). A comparable statement was made by Millerand to the Lithuanian representative in Paris on May 11, 1920. This obviously went much farther than the original commitment by Noulens but patently fell far short of any assurance of permanence. It recognized more, however, than the Conférence Politique Russe would have desired, by specifically referring to Latvia as an independent state; it likewise intimated that the decision of the Allied governments in the final analysis would be a collective one. More than that it did not vouchsafe to the persistent Lettish diplomat. Cf. Appendix II.

<sup>11</sup> Olgerds Grosvalds to the president of the Supreme Council from Paris, January 21, 1920, in *Revue Baltique*, Vol. II, No. 1 (February 15-March 1, 1920), pp. 20-21. See Document 12.

<sup>12</sup> Thus Commander John A. Gade, representing the United States government in the Baltic Provinces, radioed from Riga to Secretary Lansing

on January 29, 1920: "I am requested by the Latvian Foreign Minister to inquire officially of my Government if Latvia will in the least degree jeopardize American sympathy or possible future economic assistance if she now instructs Latvian delegates in Moscow to attempt to make armistice with the Bolsheviks. French and British requested to forward a similar inquiry, Latvia wishing to undertake nothing contrary to our wishes, but is unable any longer to continue struggle and provinces entirely liberated." To this Secretary Lansing replied on February 4, 1920: "You may bring to the attention of the Latvian minister for foreign affairs that the United States cannot give assurance of such economic and military assistance as would be implied by advising the Latvian authorities to refuse to conclude an armistice with Bolshevik Russia" (*F.R.U.S.*, 1920, 3:644-645, 646).

<sup>12</sup> Cf. J. Raaman, Latvian representative in Estonia, to Aadu Birk at Tartu, February 1, 1920. "D'ordre de mon Gouvernement, j'ai l'honneur de vous communiquer, M. le Ministre, qu'actuellement, à la suite de la reprise de la Latgale sur les Bolcheviques et à la suppression du blocus de la Russie des Soviets, la possibilité d'ouvrir des pourparlers de paix entre la Lettonie et la Russie des Soviets n'est pas exclue. En raison de ce qui précède, je vous prie de bien vouloir me faire connaître si le gouvernement estonien ne trouve pas possible d'engager des pourparlers de paix avec les représentants de la Russie à Tartu en commun avec la Lettonie." (Estonian Foreign Office files.)

<sup>13</sup> Cf. Bureau Letton d'Information (Paris), *Bulletin No. 22*, April 12, 1920, which gives the exact composition of the peace mission.

<sup>14</sup> According to American sources, the prime questions occupying the Conference in its first three weeks were "the boundary question and the recognition of Latvian independence." However, the territorial questions appear to have been of major importance. "The Latvian delegates have demanded much more territory than they want and as a consequence hope to compromise on the frontiers really desired. . . . Latvia has . . . promised both Poland and Finland not definitely to reach a peace agreement with Soviet Russia without having first taken the matter up in detail with them, probably at a separate meeting of the three foreign ministers" (Commander Gade to Secretary Colby from Riga, May 6, 1920, No. 182). *Bulletin No. 26* of the Bureau Letton d'Information (June 27, 1920) indicated that at that time agreement had been reached in Moscow regarding armistice on the whole Russo-Lettish front, "recognition by the Government of the Commissaries of the People of the sovereign rights of the independent Latvian state," delimitation of frontiers, military guaranties, and repatriation of refugees. It will be noted that virtually all economic questions had proved insoluble up to this point. It was only during the later sessions at Riga that they were liquidated.

<sup>15</sup> For the text of the Treaty of Riga, cf. *Valdības Vēstnesis* (Official Jour-

nal), No. 209 (September 14, 1920), which gives the Latvian and Russian texts. Latvian and French texts are given in H. Albats, *Recueil des principaux traités conclus par la Lettonie avec les pays étrangers, 1918-1928* (Riga, 1928), I, 3-29. All four texts, Russian, Latvian, French, and English, are given in the *League of Nations Treaty Series*, II, 195 ff. (hereafter cited as *L.N.T.S.*).

<sup>15</sup> The stipulations concerning recognition are contained in Article 2 of the treaty. "En vertu de principe proclamé par la République socialiste fédérative des Soviets de Russie, qui établit le droit de tous les peuples à la libre disposition d'eux-mêmes, allant jusqu'à la séparation totale des Etats auxquels ils se trouvent incorporés, et vu la volonté exprimée par le peuple letton de posséder une existence nationale indépendante, la Russie reconnaît sans réserve aucune l'indépendance et la souveraineté de l'Etat letton et renonce volontiers et irrévocablement à tous les droits souverains qui ont appartenu à la Russie sur le peuple et le sol Lettons en raison du droit constitutionnel qui existait, aussi bien que de tractations internationales, lesquelles, dans le sens indiqué ici, perdent leur force pour l'avenir. De l'état antérieur de sujexion à la Russie il ne découle pour le peuple et le sol lettons aucune obligation vis-à-vis de la Russie."

<sup>16</sup> *Latvijas Sargs*, August 12, 1920, cited in the *Bulletin of the Latvian Foreign Office*, No. 10 (Friday, August 13, 1920), p. 1.

<sup>17</sup> *Valdības Vēstnesis*, August 12, 1920.

<sup>18</sup> J. Seskis to Clemenceau from Paris, December 9, 1919, requesting confirmation by the Peace Conference of the action of the Latvian government, notified on November 9, 1919, in confiscating both movable and immovable properties of German nationals in Latvia in retaliation for actions of the German forces toward the Letts, in *Revue Baltique*, Vol. II, No. 4 (16) (December 15, 1919), pp. 75-76.

<sup>19</sup> Z. A. Meierovics to Hermann Müller, German minister of foreign affairs, No. 4740 (n.d.) (the probable date of the document is about January 25, 1920), in *Revue Baltique*, Vol. III, No. 2 (1) (February 15-March 1, 1920), pp. 25-26.

<sup>20</sup> Commander Gade to Secretary Colby from Riga, May 6, 1920, No. 182. "I am informed by the foreign minister that neither the negotiations at Berlin nor Moscow are progressing smoothly. In Berlin the Latvian Red Cross delegation which has been acting in a semi-official capacity is at present at a standstill."

<sup>21</sup> For the German text of the treaty cf. *Reichsgesetzblatt* (1920), No. 183 (August 23, 1920), p. 1623; Latvian and German texts are given in Albats, *op. cit.*, I, 31-37, and in *Valdības Vēstnesis*, No. 183 (August 14, 1920). Finally, both Latvian and German texts, with French and English translation, are found in *L.N.T.S.*, II, 91 ff.

<sup>22</sup> "Deutschland erklärt sich bereit, Lettland auch *de jure* anzuerkennen,

sobald eine der in Friedensvertrag von Versailles genannten aliirten Hauptmächte die Anerkennung ausgesprochen hat" (Albats, *op. cit.*, p. 33). The French version, officially sponsored by the Latvian government, runs: "L'Allemagne se déclare prête à reconnaître *de jure* l'indépendance de la Lettonie aussitôt que cette reconnaissance aura été déclarée par l'une des grandes puissances signataires de la Paix de Versailles." Cf. *Bulletin publié par le Ministère des Affaires Etrangères de Latvia*, No. 2 (4 août 1920), p. 3 [hereafter cited simply as *Bulletin*].

## NOTES TO CHAPTER V

<sup>1</sup> *Le Temps*, August 9, 1920.

<sup>2</sup> *Bulletin*, No. 13 (August 17, 1920), pp. 1-2.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 17 (August 21, 1920), p. 3.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 21 (August 26, 1920), p. 1. See Document 13.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. "Les Etats baltiques et leur reconnaissance *de jure*," *Bulletin*, No. 12 (August 15, 1920), p. 1 (this fired the opening gun in the campaign and set forth the principal arguments); "La Russie et les Etats baltiques," *ibid.*, No. 14 (August 18, 1920), p. 1; "La Politique du President Wilson et les Etats baltiques," *ibid.*, No. 17 (August 21, 1920), p. 3; "*De jure*" (taken from the Riga *Latvijas Sargs*), *ibid.*, No. 20 (August 25, 1920), p. 3; "La Note de Mr. Colby et les Etats baltiques," already cited (cf. note 4, *supra*); "L'autodetermination des peuples et la politique anglaise," *ibid.*, No. 24 (August 29, 1920), p. 1; "À propos de deux Documents diplomatiques," *ibid.*, p. 3; "Situation politique," *ibid.*, No. 25 (August 31, 1920), p. 1 (analyzing the reply of Count Sforza to the United States); "Le quinzième Point Wilson" (taken from *Latvijas Sargs*), *ibid.*, No. 26 (September 1, 1920), p. 3.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 25 (August 31, 1920), pp. 3-4. Cf. the *London Times*, August, 1920.

<sup>7</sup> Count Sforza to Thomas Nelson Page from Rome, August 25, 1920, in *Bulletin*, No. 25 (August 31, 1920), p. 4. Cf. the *New York Times*, August, 1920.

<sup>8</sup> "L'Association lettone pour la Société des Nations," *Bulletin*, No. 18 (August 22, 1920), pp. 1-2.

<sup>9</sup> No document or date for the *de facto* recognition by Belgium is given in the *Mémoire présenté par la délégation latvienne à l'Assemblée de la Société des Nations* (Riga, Typographie d'Etat, 1920).

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 10.

<sup>11</sup> *Records of the First Assembly*, Commissions, Commission V, Annex 6, p. 231.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, Plenary Sessions, Twenty-seventh Plenary Meeting, December 16, 1920, p. 630. (Olgerds Grosvalds.)

<sup>13</sup> Aristide Briand to Z. A. Meierovics from Paris, January 26, 1921. "Le Conseil Suprême des Puissances alliées, prenant en considération les demandes, présentées à diverses reprises par votre Gouvernement, a décidé, dans sa séance d'aujourd'hui, de reconnaître la Lettonie comme Etat *de jure*."

"Les Puissances tiennent à marquer par là la sympathie qu'elles éprouvent pour le peuple letton et à rendre hommage aux efforts qu'il a accomplis, afin d'organiser dans l'ordre et la paix sa vie nationale." (Latvian Foreign Office files.)

<sup>24</sup> Viscount K. Ishii to Karlis Ulmanis from Paris, March 8, 1921. "Dans sa séance du 26 janvier 1921 le Conseil Suprême des Alliés a décidé de reconnaître la Lettonie comme Etat de jure. Le Gouvernement Imperial du Japon vient de décider de confirmer formellement cette décision du Conseil Suprême et m'a chargé d'en aviser le Gouvernement de Lettonie. En portant cette décision de mon Gouvernement à la connaissance de Votre Excellence, je me permets d'exprimer de nouveau les sentiments de sympathie qu'il éprouve à l'égard du peuple lettonien, et de rendre hommage aux efforts qu'il a accomplis, afin d'organiser sa vie nationale." (Latvian Foreign Office files.)

<sup>25</sup> The document previously cited (cf. note 3, chap. iv, *supra*) is dated, according to the Latvian Foreign Office, September 26, 1919; in his note of January 26, 1921, Holsti gives the date as July 16, 1919. It is barely possible that Holsti was under the impression that the *de facto* recognition accorded Estonia on that date had been extended to Latvia as well.

<sup>26</sup> Rudolf Holsti to Z. A. Meierovics from Helsinki, January 26, 1921. "Aujourd'hui j'ai le grand plaisir de pouvoir porter à la connaissance de Votre Excellence que le Président de la République, ayant pris en considération la collaboration si heureuse qui a eu lieu au cours de l'année passée entre la Finlande et la Latvie, à Helsingfors et à Riga, a décidé de reconnaître la Latvie comme état de jure libre et souverain." (Latvian Foreign Office files.)

<sup>27</sup> Prince E. Sapieha to Z. A. Meierovics from Warsaw, December 31, 1920, No. 4329 V/No. 155. "Le Chef d'Etat polonais, après avoir pris l'avis du Conseil des Ministres, a décidé de reconnaître définitivement la République de Latvia comme Etat indépendant et souverain. ..." (Latvian Foreign Office files.)

<sup>28</sup> J. Wewer, German minister in Latvia, to Z. A. Meierovics from Riga, February 1, 1921, M. J. No. A. 414. "Von meiner Regierung habe ich den Auftrag erhalten Euer Hochwohlgeboren schriftlich zu bestätigen, dass das Deutsche Reich in Ausführung des Art. 2 des vorläufigen Abkommens vom 15. Juli 1920 die Republik Lettland de jure anerkannt hat." (Latvian Foreign Office files.)

<sup>29</sup> Dr. Zimmerman, for the Royal Norwegian consul at Riga, to Z. A. Meierovics, February 5, 1921. "La Norvège a reconnu avec le plus vif plaisir la Latvia aussi que son Gouvernement de jure." (Latvian Foreign Office files.)

<sup>30</sup> E. Bolmgren, Swedish consul in Riga, to Z. A. Meierovics, February 5, 1921, No. D. 13/921. "Le Gouvernement de S. M. le Roi de Suède a reconnu la République de Latvia comme Etat libre et indépendant." (Latvian Foreign Office files.)

<sup>31</sup> Helmer Hansen, Danish consul at Riga, to Z. A. Meierovics, February 7, 1921, No. B. K. 1. a. "Le Gouvernement de S. M. le Roi de Danemark



avec un très vif plaisir a reconnu de jure la Latvia aussi bien que son Gouvernement." (Latvian Foreign Office files.)

<sup>22</sup> All three notes express identically their pleasure "de voir entrer au nombre des états souverains le libre Etat (République) de Latvia." The Norwegian and Danish notes insert "indépendants et" before "souverains." The Danish and Swedish notes declare the act of recognition that of their respective governments, whereas the Norwegian note expressly states that Norway recognizes. The Danish and Norwegian notes recognize Latvia as such, and also its government, *de jure*, whereas the Swedish note does not refer to the government and recognizes only the Republic of Latvia.

<sup>23</sup> Isaac Khan, Persian minister in Rome, to Z. A. Meierovics, February 10, 1921, No. 240. "J'ai l'honneur d'informer Votre Excellence que le Gouvernement Impérial de Perse a reconnu l'indépendance de la Lettonie." (Latvian Foreign Office files.)

<sup>24</sup> Baron E. Rosenberg, Latvian diplomatic representative in Vienna, to the Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs, February 10, 1921; Chancellor Johann Schober to Baron Rosenberg from Vienna, February 17, 1921, No. 3, 571/3. "Für die Oesterreichische Regierung, im Hinblick auf die erfolgte de jure Anerkennung Lettlands von Seiten der Ententestaaten kein weiteres hindernis besteht, Lettland auch ihrerseits als de jure Staat anzuerkennen." (Latvian Foreign Office files.)

<sup>25</sup> J. Chagas, Portuguese minister in France, to Olgerds Grosvalds, Latvian minister in France, from Paris, February 19, 1921. "J'ai l'honneur de vous faire savoir que le Gouvernement de la République Portugaise a décidé de reconnaître de jure la Lettonie. Vous n'ignorez certainement pas que j'ai pris moi-même, en qualité de délégué du Portugal à l'Assemblée de Genève, la défense de la cause de l'admission de votre pays dans la Société des Nations. *Je n'ai fait là qu'exprimer les vœux de mon Gouvernement, lequel est très heureux de leur donner la forme effective de la reconnaissance officielle.*" (Latvian Foreign Office files.)

<sup>26</sup> M. Pacliano, Rumanian minister to Denmark and Sweden, to Z. A. Meierovics from Copenhagen, February 26, 1921, No. 81 (telegram). "Gouvernement Royal m'a fait honneur me charger vous communiquer que Gouvernement Roumain reconnaît indépendance Lettonie." (Latvian Foreign Office files.)

<sup>27</sup> Z. A. Meierovics to Antonius Piip from Riga, March 2, 1921, No. P 3421. "Prenant en considération que le 26 janvier 1921 les grandes puissances européennes ont reconnu de droit l'Esthonie et la Lettonie, le Gouvernement letton a l'honneur de vous faire part, Monsieur le Ministre, que dans le but de régler les rapports de nos deux Etats *qui se sont toujours reconnus souverains et indépendants de droit*, M. Jean Stalbow est nommé chargé d'affaires ad interim du Gouvernement letton auprès du Gouvernement d'Esthonie." (Latvian Foreign Office files.)

<sup>20</sup> Olgerds Grosvalds to the Netherlands minister in Paris, February 16, 1921; A. W. L. Tjards Van Starckenborgh, chargé d'affaires *ad interim* of the Netherlands in Paris, to Olgerds Grosvalds from Paris, March 24, 1921, No. 873. "Mon Gouvernement reconnaît formellement la Lettonie comme Etat souverain et indépendant et le Gouvernement actuel de votre pays comme son gouvernement légitime." (Latvian Foreign Office files.) Although this note would fix the date of the Netherlands recognition of Latvia as of March 24, 1921, a list of official recognition dates, supplied by the Latvian Foreign Office, fixes the Netherlands recognition as of March 15, 1921. That some informal notification preceded the note in regard to both Estonia and Latvia is clear from Van Roijen's declaration that the two countries were recognized by the Netherlands "at the beginning of March, 1921." See J. H. Van Roijen, *De Rechtspositie en de Volkenrechtelijke Erkenning van nieuwe Staten en de facto Regeeringen*, pp. 51-52.

<sup>21</sup> Dr. Michael Walters, Latvian diplomatic representative in Rome, to the Marqués de Villaumbia, Spanish minister in Rome, March 2, 1921; the Marqués de Villaumbia to Dr. Walters from Rome, April 8, 1921, No. 23. The formula used in replying to Estonia is carried over, *mutatis mutandis*, to the case of Latvia. The note to Estonia was in Spanish and far less precise than the reply to Latvia, which was given in French. For the value of its arguments see the discussion under Estonia's recognition by Spain. "Le Gouvernement du Roi, dans son désir de maintenir les relations les plus amicales avec tous les Etats légalement organisés, reconnaît la République de Lettonie comme un Etat indépendant et souverain, jugeant que la Lettonie, qui représente un Etat constitué par des territoires qui faisaient partie de l'ancien Empire Russe reconnaîtra aux sujets espagnols qui possédaient des intérêts en Russie la part qui doit logiquement et proportionnellement correspondre à la Lettonie, dans les obligations contractées par l'Empire Russe, et que les espagnols jouiront des mêmes droits qui sont ou seront accordés aux sujets des autres nations. Ce sera de même entendu pour toute lésion qui aurait pu être causée en territoire letton aux intérêts espagnols depuis la constitution de la République. ..." (Latvian Foreign Office files.)

<sup>22</sup> Z. A. Meierovics to Giuseppe Motta from Riga, March 5, 1921, No. 3699; Giuseppe Motta, for the Swiss Federal Council, to Meierovics from Berne, April 23, 1921, No. B. 15. 11. 19 CM. Meierovics, to meet the Swiss demands in advance, had promised most-favored-nation treatment in his note; Motta's reply, informing him that "le Conseil Fédéral a reconnu *de jure* la République de Latvia comme Etat libre et indépendant," developed the Swiss understanding of most-favored-nation treatment, as follows: "Jusqu'à la conclusion de traités, les ressortissants de l'autre Etat bénéficieront, en ce qui concerne la personne et la propriété, de la même protection que les nationaux. Quant au commerce, au trafic et à l'industrie

de toute espèce, les ressortissants de l'autre pays seront soumis aux mêmes conditions que les nationaux. Ils ne pourront pas être grévés de charges, contributions, impôts et taxes supérieurs à ceux imposés aux ressortissants des nations les plus favorisés. En ce qui concerne l'établissement et le séjour, la Suisse et la Latvia se réservent leur liberté dans le cadre des dispositions en matière de police des étrangers." The note ended with an invitation to negotiate and to conclude treaties. (Latvian Foreign Office files.)

<sup>81</sup> Cardinal Gasparri to Karlis Ulmanis, Dal Vaticano, June 10, 1921, No. B.21850. "... le Saint-Siège, accueillant volontiers le désir exprimé par le Gouvernement de la République de Lettonie, s'empresse de reconnaître formellement cette République." (Latvian Foreign Office files.) This differs from the wording employed in the note to Estonia in that the latter received recognition "comme Etat *de jure*." Not even the Holy See is inexorably consistent!

<sup>82</sup> Count Banffy to Z. A. Meierovics from Budapest, July 20, 1921. "Depuis longtemps la Hongrie a suivi avec un intérêt sympathique la lutte de la Nation Lettonne pour reconquérir et consolider son indépendance.

"Aussitôt que j'ai appris que les grandes Puissances européennes ont reconnu l'indépendance de droit de la République de Latvia, Son Altesse Sérénissime, le Gouverneur de Hongrie, m'a donné l'ordre de charger Monsieur Constantin de Masirevich, envoyé extraordinaire et ministre plénipotentiaire royal hongrois à Vienne de déclarer à Son Excellence, le Baron de Rosenberg, Représentant diplomatique de la Latvia auprès du Gouvernement de la République d'Autriche que *la Hongrie reconnaît la République lettonne comme Nation indépendante.*

"Pour donner aux intentions du Gouvernement Royal une sanction positive, j'ai l'honneur d'écrire directement à Votre Excellence en la priant de considérer *la présente déclaration comme le témoignage de la reconnaissance formelle.*" (Latvian Foreign Office files.) The declaratory rather than contractual nature of the instrument in question is clearly evidenced by its internal content.

<sup>83</sup> Georgs Bisenieks, Latvian minister in London, to the minister of Panama in London, about May 2, 1921; R. J. Alfaro, secretary of foreign affairs *ad interim* of Panama, to the minister of Panama in London, about July 6, 1921, transmitting the text of the decree, as follows:

"República de Panamá, Poder Ejecutivo Nacional, Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores. Resolucion No. 33. Panamá, Julio 6 de 1921.

"El Presidente de La República de Panamá en uso de sus facultades legales y considerando: (1) Que como una consecuencia de la pasada conflagración europea, un grupo de nuevas nacionalidades, con caracteres étnicos marcados, con aspiraciones e ideales definidos y con unidad geográfica propia, se ha constituido en Estados independientes y soberanos; (2) Que entre ese grupo de Estados se encuentra la República de Letonia, entidad

que por conducto de la Legación de Panamá en Londres, sugiere la conveniencia de establecer relaciones comerciales y diplomaticas entre aquella nación y nuestro país; (3) Que la nación de Letonia se ha constituido bajo la forma de una República democratica sobre la base del sufragio universal, igual, directo, secreto y con representación proporcional,

"SE RESUELVE: La República de Panamá reconoce la existencia jurídica de la República de Letonia. Regístrese, comuníquese y publíquese. BELSARIO PORRAS; R. J. ALFARO, El secretario de Gobierno y Justicia, Encargado de la Cartera de Relaciones Exteriores." (Latvian Foreign Office files.)

It may be assumed that the Latvian government received this decree with some cover note from the minister of Panama at London.

<sup>24</sup> Z. A. Meierovics to the Siamese minister of foreign affairs, Prince Devawongse, probably from Geneva, December 2, 1920; Prince Devawongse to Meierovics from Bangkok, August 11, 1921. "... I am happy to be able to communicate hereby to Your Excellency the recognition by my Government of the independence of the Letton Republic." (Latvian Foreign Office files.)

<sup>25</sup> Georgs Bisenieks, Latvian minister in London, to the Cuban minister in London, May 27, 1921, No. 1559; Rafael Rodriguez Altanuga, Cuban chargé d'affaires in London, to Bisenieks, October 14, 1921, No. 135. "... I am very pleased to inform you that my Government recognized *de jure* the Latvian Republic on September the 10th last." (Latvian Foreign Office files.) This clearly makes recognition antedate Latvia's admission to the League of Nations.

<sup>26</sup> O. Grosvalds to Maximiliano Ibáñez, Chilian minister in Paris, September 1, 1921; Ibáñez to Grosvalds, from Paris, September 12, 1921. "... Mon Gouvernement ... me demande en date d'aujourd'hui de Vous communiquer que le Gouvernement du Chili a reconnu la Lettonie comme pays indépendant." (Latvian Foreign Office files.) The use of the word "pays," rather than "état" or "nation," is noteworthy.

<sup>27</sup> O. Grosvalds to Gastão da Cunha, Brazilian ambassador in France, from Paris, May 25, 1921; da Cunha to Grosvalds from Paris, December 14, 1921. "J'ai l'honneur de porter à Votre connaissance que mon Gouvernement vient de reconnaître officiellement l'indépendance de la Lettonie, en sa forme républicaine, par Décret du 5 Décembre 1921." The decree, No. 15156, is found in the *Relatorio apresentado ao Presidente da Republica dos Estados Unidos do Brasil pelo Ministro de Estado das Relações Exteriores, compreendendo o periodo decorrido de 1 de Maio de 1921 a 30 de Abril de 1922. Exposição e Anexos* (Rio de Janeiro, Imprensa Nacional, 1930), p. 94. It reads as follows:

"Decreto N. 15.156 de 5 de Dezembro de 1921. Reconhece a independência da Lettonia e a fórmula republicana do seu Governo actual.

"O Presidente da Republica dos Estados Unidos do Brasil: Declara que

ficam reconhecidas para todas os efeitos a independencia da Lettonia e a forma republicana do seu actual Governo. EPITACIO PESSOA; AZEVEDO MARQUES.

"Rio de Janeiro, 5 de Dezembro de 1921, 100° da Independencia e 33° da Republica."

<sup>88</sup> *Records of the Second Assembly, Plenary Sessions, Sixteenth Plenary Meeting, September 22, 1921, p. 319.*

<sup>89</sup> Cf. M. W. Graham, *The League of Nations and the Recognition of States (U.C.L.A. Publ. Soc. Sc., Vol. 3, No. 1)*, pp. 1-76.

<sup>90</sup> Cf. M. W. Graham, *Diplomatic Recognition of the Border States. Part II: Estonia (ibid., Vol. 3, No. 3)*, p. 297.

<sup>91</sup> Dr. Eduard Beneš to Meierovics from Prague, January 5, 1922, No. 47772-21-II. "Vu la résolution de la deuxième Assemblée de la Société des Nations en date du 22 septembre 1921, par laquelle la Lettonie a été admise dans la Société des Nations, j'ai l'honneur de faire part à Votre Excellence que le Gouvernement de la République Tchécoslovaque, soucieux de voir s'intensifier les relations entre la Lettonie et la République Tchécoslovaque, a décidé de reconnaître officiellement l'état Lettonien comme Etat souverain et indépendant.

"Les relations officielles entre la Lettonie et la République Tchécoslovaque se trouvant ainsi regularisées aussi selon la forme, le Gouvernement de la République Tchécoslovaque aime à croire que les liens d'amitié, qui existent déjà entre les deux Pays, s'affirmeront et se resserreront de plus en plus."

<sup>92</sup> O. Grosvalds to M. Gil Fortoul, Venezuelan minister in France, from Paris, October 20, 1921, soliciting recognition; Gil Fortoul to Grosvalds from Paris, January 12, 1922, declaring that "le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis de Venezuela ne voit aucune obstacle à la reconnaissance *de jure* de la République de Lettonie."

<sup>93</sup> Peteris Seya, Latvian chargé d'affaires at Paris, to Gil Fortoul, May 4, 1922; Gil Fortoul to Seya from Paris, May 6, 1922, No. 26. "Il me semble, personnellement, que par la déclaration officielle que j'ai eu l'honneur de vous transmettre en date du 12 janvier 1922 le Gouvernement de Venezuela a reconnu *de jure* la République de Lettonie." (Latvian Foreign Office files.)

<sup>94</sup> W. Baray, Haitian secretary of state for foreign affairs, to Z. A. Meierovics as prime minister of Latvia, from Port-au-Prince, February 13, 1922, acknowledging Meierovics' note requesting formal *de jure* recognition under date of December 13, 1921. "J'ai l'honneur de prier Votre Excellence, de considérer la présente déclaration comme une reconnaissance formelle de la République de Lettonie." (Latvian Foreign Office files.)

<sup>95</sup> Decree No. 86, issued at Buenos Aires, March 28, 1922. "Visto el pedido formulado por el Gobierno de Letonia, el Poder Ejecutivo de la Nación decreta:

"Artículo 1°. Reconócese a Letonia como Estado libre e independiente.

"Artículo 2°. Comuníquese, publíquese en el Boletín Oficial y dése al Registro Nacional. YRIGOYEN; H. PUEYRREDON." (Argentine Foreign Office files.)

M. T. de Alvear, minister of Argentina in France, to O. Grosvalds from Paris, April 5, 1922, No. 7 L. "... mon Gouvernement m'informe que la Lettonie a été reconnue comme Etat libre et indépendant, par un décret en date du 28 mars dernier." (Latvian Foreign Office files.)

"G. P. Baltazzi, from the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Athens, to Z. A. Meierovics, May 10/23, 1922, No. 4545. (Latvian Foreign Office files.) This message is identic in its terms, *mutatis mutandis*, with the note sent on the same day to Estonia. Cf. Graham, *Estonia*, p. 372.

"General Savoff, Bulgarian minister in France, to Olgerds Grosvalds from Paris, May 24, 1922, No. 1106. "Je suis chargé de porter à la connaissance du Gouvernement de Votre Excellence que le Gouvernement Bulgare est heureux de reconnaître la Lettonie comme Etat indépendant et souverain." (Latvian Foreign Office files.)

"Visto el oficio del Ministro de Letonia en Francia, dirigido a nuestro representante en dicho pais, en el que solicita el reconocimiento de la República de Letonia y teniendo en consideración que dicho Estado ha sido reconocido por casi todos los paises del mundo,

"SE RESUELVE: Reconócese a la República de Letonia como Estado libre e independiente. Regístrese, comuníquese y publíquese. (Rubrica del Presidente de la República) SALOMON. Lima, 2 de Junio de 1922."

"Señor A. M. Cornejo, Peruvian minister in France, to O. Grosvalds from Paris, July 27, 1922, transmitting the decree. (Latvian Foreign Office files.)

"Z. A. Meierovics to Antonio Gomez Restrepo from Riga, probably late in May, 1922; Restrepo to Meierovics from Bogotá, July 8, 1922. "Tengo la honra de acusar recibo a V. E. de la atenta nota portadora de la solicitud dirigida al Gobierno de Colombia para que reconozca a la República de Letonia como Estado independiente *de jure*. En respuesta, debo manifestar a V. E. que la República de Colombia, que ha mirado con simpatia las aspiraciones del pueblo de Letonia, le otorga el reconocimiento solicitado. ... " (Latvian Foreign Office files.)

"Harold B. Quarton, American consul in charge of the American legation in Riga, to Z. A. Meierovics, July 28, 1922, No. 1 and enclosure. "In compliance with instructions received from my Government, I have the honor to inform you that the Government of the United States extends full recognition to the Government of Latvia. The Government of the United States at the same time likewise extends similar recognition to the Governments of Esthonia and Lithuania. . . . The rank of Minister has been conferred upon Commissioner Evan E. Young and he will continue to represent the Government of the United States in Latvia, Estonia and

Lithuania." (Latvian Foreign Office files.) For the text of the enclosure cf. Graham, *Estonia*, pp. 374-375.

<sup>82</sup> M. E. Leclerc, chargé d'affaires of Luxemburg at Paris, to O. Grosvalds, acknowledging the latter's note of September 23, 1922, and declaring: "Répondant au désir de votre Gouvernement, le Gouvernement grand-ducal a l'honneur de vous *confirmer* qu'il reconnaît de jure la Lettonie comme République souveraine et indépendante." (Latvian Foreign Office files.) It is implicit in the statement of the Luxemburg government that it conceived its relationship to Latvia to have been determined by the fact of comembership for almost a year in the League of Nations, but no explicit statement on this point by the Grand Ducal government is available.

<sup>83</sup> The Conference of Ambassadors to Ernest Galvanauskas from Paris, December 20, 1922. (Lithuanian Foreign Office files.)

<sup>84</sup> Chao-Hsin Chu, Chinese chargé d'affaires at London, to Peteris Z. Oliņš, Latvian chargé d'affaires in London, August 16, 1923, No. G. 23/427. "On a telegraphed instruction dated August 16th from the Wai-Chiao Pu, Peking, I have the honor to inform you that the Latvian Republic has been officially recognized by the Republic of China. The procedure followed should be the same as that when China recognized Finland and other countries. I am further instructed to approach you on the question of making a treaty of amity and commerce between the two countries on the basis of equity, equality and reciprocity. Please convey this message to your Government and ask them where and when the negotiation of the treaty may take place." (Latvian Foreign Office files.)

<sup>85</sup> *L.N.T.S.*, No. 1390; Albats, *op. cit.*, I, 81-82. The preamble reads: "Le Lettonie d'une part, et la Turquie d'autre part, *également* et sincèrement *désireuses d'établir* et de consolider *les liens de sincère amitié* entre la République de Lettonie et la République Turque et pénétrées de la même conviction que les relations entre les deux Etats, *une fois établies*, serviront à la prospérité et au bien-être de leurs nations respectives. ..."

<sup>86</sup> Momtilo Nintchitch to Vilis Šumanis from Geneva, September 7, 1926, Pov. No. 5. (Latvian Foreign Office files.) The letter is, *mutatis mutandis*, identic with that sent to Estonia on the same day. Cf. Graham, *Estonia*, pp. 375-376.

<sup>87</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 300-301.

<sup>88</sup> M. Armandariz del Castillo, chargé d'affaires *ad interim* of Mexico in Sweden, to M. Karlis Zariņš, Latvian minister in Sweden, from Stockholm, May 18, 1927. (Latvian Foreign Office files.)

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