

# AUSTRIA

(October 1918-March 1919)

*Transition from Empire to Republic*

BY

DAVID F. STRONG, A. M.

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS  
FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY  
IN THE  
FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE  
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

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## AUTHOR'S PREFACE

IN reviewing the years since the close of the World War, it is significant that Austria was more consistently in the news and of more constant concern to diplomats than any of the other smaller states of Europe. The reasons for this are to be found both in the history of its imperial past and in the new situation in which Austria found itself, in the post-war years, as a Republic of some six and a half million people.

The problem which was post-war Austria can be traced to the manner in which this small country came into existence in 1918. Difficulties of a geographical, economic, and religious nature appeared to hamper the efforts of the administrative leaders of the first government. Under conditions which prevailed at the time, definite, and what might have had to be drastic, solutions were postponed, and this postponement led inevitably to a weakened state. The many books about post-war Austria which have been run off both the German and English presses seem to neglect entirely, or pass over in a few pages, those important first months of adjustment and attempted reconstruction—October, 1918, to March, 1919—which historically are the key to the events that followed.

Any attempt to arrive at an understanding of the situation as it then existed is made difficult by the lack of reliable documentary material, for the few weeks following the issuance of the Imperial Manifesto of October 16 witnessed chaotic conditions within the country. Communications were down, and while the Central Government in Vienna was struggling to inaugurate a new era, it was largely uninformed as to the true situation beyond the city limits. In addition to the political confusion, another element complicates the problem of arriving at the truth, and that is the extraordinary extent to which the people of German-Austria were divided along lines dictated by class, religion, or political affiliation. Thus, before accepting the opinion of any writer, or before attending too scrupulously to the re-



marks of any deputy in Parliament, it is necessary to ascertain to what political faith he adhered, and also whether he was Jew or Gentile.

In view of the exceptional bias common to nearly all those whose writings or speeches are now available to the historian, a serious problem is presented in the mere matter of finding out what a situation was and who was responsible for it at any given time during the transitional period from Empire to Republic. When the evidence is so largely stated in extreme terms of partisan attitudes, it is not easy to arrive at a well-balanced judgment of events as they really took place. Nevertheless, this aim has been constantly kept in mind in the pages which follow.

The material for this work was taken in the first instance from the Viennese newspapers, verified wherever possible by parliamentary records, government reports, or other official publications. In these, the most extreme viewpoints were represented by the daily newspapers. On the one hand, there was the clerical *Reichspost*, conservative, and in this period, monarchical at heart. On the other hand, there was the *Arbeiter Zeitung*, official organ of the Social Democratic Party. Fluctuating between these two was the *Neue Freie Presse*, a liberal paper with reasonably good news service but editorially disinclined to array itself on either side of a controversial subject.

A more reliable analysis of the changing scene was offered by the economic periodical, *Der oesterreichische Volkswirt*, which, while opposed to many of the doctrines prevailing at the time, was nevertheless reasonable in its opposition. And from the cultural viewpoint, the *Oesterreichische Rundschau* offered helpful comments to the historian.

Another valuable source, in view of the fact that the Vienna archives are closed, were the stenographic reports of the sessions of Parliament, with the laws, written interpellations and replies. The reports of the sittings proved of great value for at times it was only from the remarks of parliamentary leaders that information could be gained regarding the actual success achieved in the various departments of state. This was particularly true of the Foreign Office.

In reconstructing the background, historical and economic, of the war years in which many of the post-war problems germinated, the volumes on the *Economic and Social History of the World War*, prepared under the supervision of the Division of Economics and History of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, were of great assistance because of their detailed and documentary treatment of such important subjects as food, economic production, communications, and social conditions. Many of the authors of these works were in charge of the various activities of which they wrote and had access to documents and statistical materials which may never again be available. These volumes have been largely used in the following pages in matters relating to the war period. No attempt has been made to write a history of Austria during the War or to consider in detail the many phases of the collapse. These developments, economic, military, and diplomatic have all been treated elsewhere by competent authorities. The special scope and purpose of this work is to present as clearly as possible the period that began with the negotiations for concluding peace and ended in March 1919, a period brief but important.

The most reliable and impartial documents and first-hand records of these crucial days under the Provisional National Government of German-Austria were found in the Hoover War Library of Stanford University, where in addition to the complete files of the American Relief Administration personnel are many pertinent letters and reports by disinterested observers who were considering not only the situation in German-Austria during the winter of 1918-1919, but its relation to the Central European problem as a whole.

The social and economic history of what remained to Austria after the collapse of the Habsburg Monarchy is a tragic story and one of lasting human interest. The glimpses of the Vienna and the Austria of the fateful autumn of 1918 and the winter of 1919 which are offered here are drawn from such contemporary sources as have been available. Yet this work cannot be considered as an exhaustive study, for the field is both rich in

content and far-reaching in its implications for the history of Europe.

The author wishes to express thanks to Professor James T. Shotwell of Columbia University for his helpful and friendly criticism throughout all stages in the preparation of the manuscript; to Professors Geroid T. Robinson and John H. Wuorinen of Columbia University for suggestions in clarifying presentation and style; to visiting-Professor Thomas H. Thomas of Yale University for reading the entire manuscript and particularly for a criticism of the Armistice Period; to Professor Walter C. Langsam of Union College and Professor Erna Patzelt, recently of the University of Vienna, for suggestions based upon their intimate knowledge of Austria.

Appreciation is also expressed to Professor Ralph H. Lutz of Stanford University for permission to use the Hoover War Library, and to the library staff for their valuable assistance in assembling unpublished materials bearing on post-war Austria.

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**PART I**  
**IN THE WAR**

# IN THE WAR

## INTRODUCTION

How long the Habsburg Empire might have continued to exist under conditions prevalent in the spring of 1914 must remain an academic question. Certainly the Emperor's policy of conservatism could not have checked indefinitely the growing power of the Minorities, and the World War gave encouragement to the forces of dissolution. The economic strain brought into bold relief the inherent weaknesses of that working agreement between Austria and Hungary made in 1867 and known as the *Ausgleich*, or Compromise. Similarly, the inability to meet the demands of war either in the economic or the military field necessitated a dependence upon Germany which bordered on subservience and was distasteful to practically all the peoples of the Monarchy save the Germans, and even to these by the end of 1916. And, finally, privation coupled with war regimentation in administration caused the Monarchy to split into its component parts on the basis of nationality, not, however, along reasonable economic lines. In the pages which follow, we shall deal with these problems as the contemporary records picture them in those critical times.

It is necessary to include as preamble to the period of reconstruction some survey of certain phases of the war period which have direct bearing on what followed. These are mainly concerned with the economic and political weaknesses of Austria which were intensified by the War, and which were inadequately met by the War Government. It has seemed advisable to consider primarily the lack of internal harmony in the Austrian Empire and its relation to fundamental problems rather than military and diplomatic events of this period, which were symptomatic rather than basic. What immediately follows, therefore, is a consideration of such events of the war period as cannot be separated from the autumn and winter months of 1918-1919.

The separatist movements which eventuated in the appearance of the Succession States in 1918 were negligible if not entirely



absent in 1914.<sup>1</sup> This does not imply that all was running smoothly in the Habsburg territories. Far from it. But whatever of nationalistic sentiment existed among the minorities was directed toward the attainment of equality with the dominant groups in the two halves of the Monarchy, the Germans of Austria, and the Magyars of Hungary, rather than toward an independent existence.<sup>2</sup>

But quite aside from the effect of the war years on the minorities, this same period accentuated the latent hostility of the two dominant peoples, especially because Hungary, the granary of the Habsburg monarchies, had, in the eyes of the Austrians, withheld a fair share of its food supply. In the story which follows, we must keep in mind this underlying source of irritation. For the Central Powers, the War was a process of strangulation under blockade, and it was the privations involved in this which ultimately forced them to surrender.

The link which held together the Austrian Empire and the Kingdom of Hungary was the *Ausgleich* of 1867. The difficulty of combining these two parts of the Habsburg dominions was registered in the ingenious devices by which each sought to hold its own against the other. In the years before the War, there was an almost chronic disagreement in policy between the two governments, and the *Ausgleich* which was made for ten years at a time was last renewed in 1907. It was therefore due for renewal again in 1917.

#### THE *Ausgleich* OF 1867

The provisions of the *Ausgleich* were the result of a bargain whereby the Emperor and the Vienna Court, with certain preconceived ideas of government, conceded in 1867 only what was necessary to gain the support of the Magyars, while the latter demanded their former constitution and a free hand in maintaining their feudal position in the territories of the Crown of St. Stephen. Dividing the Empire into two autonomous parts,

<sup>1</sup> Redlich, *J. Austrian War Government*, pp. 68-69, 75-76.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 65, 70, 72, 79. On Pan-Slavinism, see Fischel, A. *Der pan-slavismus bis zum Weltkrieg*, pp. 474-504.

this *Ausgleich* was the foundation stone upon which the government of the Dual Monarchy subsequently reposed. Unfortunately, it contained defects which were brought into sharp relief during the decades which followed. The three outstanding drawbacks to this arrangement proved to be, first, that Hungary was geographically compact while Austria was not; second, that Magyars and Germans were given disproportionate political advantages; and third, that the provision for handling joint or common problems was inadequate.

The geographical factor had divergent results in the Dual Monarchy created by the *Ausgleich*. The western, or Austrian half, was composed of a collection of Crownlands having almost no geographical unity and cut off from Vienna by various mountain and river systems.<sup>3</sup> These were held together in an irregular horseshoe formation, with Dalmatia, detached from the other Crownlands at the southwestern extremity and Galicia and Bukowina at the northeastern. Thus, whatever influences geographical continuity might have exerted upon national consolidation were, in the case of the Austrian half, exerted away from Vienna.

Contrasted with the sprawling, disjointed sections of Austria, Hungary with Transylvania was geographically compact. This eastern half of the empire had a broad plain in the center, with highlands forming natural frontiers on the outer rim. Budapest became the natural focal point in this arrangement. The contrast was further emphasized by the fact that Hungary with Croatia-Slavonia was surrounded on three sides by Austrian territory. As one observer wrote:

Since 1867, Austria was that which remained of the amorphous mass of the Habsburg Possessions, the "home farm" of the dynasty, after the national states had arisen in Germany, Italy, and in certain aspects, in Hungary; for nearly fifty years this residuum, which

<sup>3</sup> The crownlands consisted of the former archduchies of Upper and Lower Austria; the duchies of Salzburg, Styria, Carniola, and Bukowina; the counties of Tyrol and Vorarlberg; the kingdoms of Bohemia, Galicia and Dalmatia; the margravates of Moravia and Istria; the city of Trieste.

in proportion to its size displayed more frontier and less coherence than any state in Europe, went officially by the colorless designation of the Kingdoms and Provinces respresented in the Reichsrat.<sup>4</sup>

The second important weakness of the *Ausgleich* lay in the fact that Germans and Magyars were given disproportionate advantages. In 1867, the price which the Crown had to pay for Hungarian support was the restitution of the Hungarian Constitution of 1848 and freedom from outside, *i.e.*, Austrian, control in internal Hungarian affairs. The Magyars were assured of their domination over the Minorities within Hungary who composed approximately half of the population.<sup>5</sup> This ascendancy was maintained by a complicated system of gerrymandering in the electoral districts, supplemented by the forceful exclusion of non-Magyar elements from the elections when such action was deemed necessary.<sup>6</sup>

In the negotiations which culminated in the *Ausgleich*, Francis Deák insisted that a constitutional Hungary could cooperate only with an Austria similarly governed.<sup>7</sup> Accordingly, the Emperor revived the former short-lived Schmerling Constitution (1861-65) which, with a few constitutional amendments, became the Constitution of 1867. In three particulars, this Constitution was significant. Paragraph 13 of the Schmerling Constitution became the famous Paragraph 14, the "dictatorship

<sup>4</sup> Namier, L. B., "Downfall of the Habsburg Monarchy," in Temperley, H.W.V. (Ed.) *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, Vol. IV, p. 58.

<sup>5</sup> Ficker, Adolf, "Die Völkerstämme der Oesterreichische-Ungarische Monarchie," *Mittheilung aus dem Gebiete der Statistik*, Jahrg. 15, Heft 4, p. 91, estimates the minorities of Hungary at 51 per cent of the population. On the other hand, Jászi, Oszkár in *The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy*, p. 315, estimates that at the time there were six million Magyars and seven and a half million non-Magyars.

<sup>6</sup> When subtler methods of intimidation failed, the army was used with effect. In 1910, in reply to an accusation that troops had been used to influence the voting in 380 of 413 constituencies, the Hungarian Government replied officially that "only 194 battalions of infantry and 114 squadrons of cavalry had been used to maintain order." Jászi, O., *op. cit.*, pp. 333-334; also, Street, Cecil J. C., *Hungary and Democracy*, pp. 58-61.

<sup>7</sup> Jászi, O. *The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy*, p. 107.

paragraph," whereby in case of necessity when the *Reichsrat* was not in session the Emperor could govern by decree. Further, election to the *Reichsrat* at Vienna was indirect and the property qualification for voting was such as to favor the Germans in the mixed language areas of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia, the Poles in Ruthenia, and the Italians in Italo-Slav areas.<sup>8</sup> And lastly, it was provided that measures of a constitutional nature required a two-thirds vote for passage through the lower chamber. In the first of these three, the authority of the Emperor was assured as a last resort; in the second, it was expected that so long as the Slavs of Austria remained in an inferior economic state their representatives in the *Reichsrat* would not be too numerous; and by the third, the Germans were doubly entrenched, for except in the event of an increase in the Slav deputies beyond anything that the most optimistic of the time might hope for, it would be inconceivable that they might capture more than two-thirds of the votes and thus effect constitutional changes. The necessary two-thirds thus protected Dualism from Trialism.<sup>9</sup>

Perhaps the outstanding weakness in the *Ausgleich* of 1867 was the vague and inadequate provision for the solution of mutual problems. Although in 1867, a temporary *modus vivendi* had been obtained, the conflicting ideologies of the two parties to the Compromise were not brought into line, and the period from 1867 to 1918 witnessed the recurring conflict of their opposing principles. The Magyars periodically demanded concessions to the principle of autonomy, while the Emperor of Austria, acting as King of Hungary, was very resourceful in

<sup>8</sup> Redlich, *op cit.*, p. 12. In *Kaiser Franz Joseph von Oesterreich*, p. 301 Redlich remarks, "The Magyars repeatedly declared through Andr ssy that they could not give their consent to a federal constitution for the western half of the realm."

<sup>9</sup> Of the Slavic peoples in the Austrian half of the Monarchy, the Poles of Galicia were favored above the others by the Central Government and in a *de facto* manner approximated the position of the Magyars of Hungary. This was achieved by a tacit understanding that in exchange for a free hand in Galicia, the Polish delegation to the *Reichsrat* in Vienna would support the Crown. Redlich, *J. Austrian War Government*, p. 78.

bringing pressure to bear on the Hungarian governing circles to induce them to respect the *status quo*. Ample opportunity for disagreement was offered in the provisions of the *Ausgleich* for handling matters of joint concern.<sup>10</sup> A semblance of unity was to be found in the Joint Departments of Finance, Foreign Affairs, and the Joint Army. The Emperor, Francis Joseph, reserved for himself the direction and regulation of the Military.<sup>11</sup> Although responsible to the Emperor, the Joint Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Finance reported on their activities to deliberative bodies known as the Delegations.

The composition and functioning of these Delegations serve as an example of the underlying antagonism under which the *Ausgleich* was adopted and the insistence upon independent action wherever possible, for there were two Delegations, an Austrian and an Hungarian. Each was composed of sixty members, twenty elected by the upper and forty by the lower chambers of Parliament in each half of the Monarchy. The Delegations were to meet alternate years in Vienna and Budapest, were to deliberate separately, but were to exchange views in writing using both languages, and if agreement could not be reached in this manner, after the third exchange of notes, the Delegations were to meet in a joint session for the purpose of voting only, without debate. It was by this method of procedure that Hungary whose Delegation presented a united front was in fact able to dominate Austria.

The chief function of the Delegations was the adoption of the budget for joint expenses. The proportion which each half of the Monarchy contributed, the so-called Quota, was to be decided every ten years, and in the event of failure to agree, the Emperor was empowered to apportion the expenses for one year.<sup>12</sup> Other matters of common concern not included in the

10 By the Law of December 21, 1867. *Reichsgesetzblatt*, 1867, No. 146, p. 401. Hereafter this government publication will be referred to under the official abbreviation of *R.G.Bl.*

11 *Ibid.*, Paragraph 5.

12 *Ibid.*

three Joint Ministries were to be arranged by the two Parliaments every decade. In this category were placed certain commercial matters, especially those pertaining to foreign trade,<sup>13</sup> laws affecting commercial production and indirect taxation, measures pertaining to coinage, and legislation involving railway lines of vital concern to both halves of the Monarchy.<sup>14</sup> Thus, every ten years, the very existence of the Empire was called into question. The debates in the Delegations, especially in connection with the Quotas, were colored and exaggerated by a jingo element of the press of both nations and, before the negotiations had reached the final stage of agreement, a feeling of animosity was likely to be engendered on both sides.

#### THE LAST *Ausgleich*

The *Ausgleich* of 1907 was due for renewal December 31, 1917. The difficulties encountered in arranging this all-important agreement were complicated, on the one hand, by the irritations which the War had brought in its wake and, on the other, by plans for an economic union with Germany after the close of the War—in short, *Mittel-Europa*. Under the circumstances of 1916 and 1917, the catch-phrase cynically coined in Vienna when the terms of the original *Ausgleich* were revealed became a reality—“*Monarchie auf Kündigung*.”<sup>15</sup>

Negotiations looking to renewal were begun January 28, 1916, with the presentation of the Austrian demands by Count Stürgkh, the Austrian Minister President, followed within a few days by the Hungarian demands presented by Count Tisza, the Hungarian Minister President. Upon examination, it was evident that, above all else, the Austrian Delegation desired an

<sup>13</sup> The policy of free trade between Austria and Hungary as established in 1850 was continued under the *Ausgleich*. This liberal policy with respect to trade also resulted in a commercial treaty with Italy in 1867 and one with the German *Zollverein* in 1868, by which grain and many agricultural products were admitted free of duty. Gratz, G. and Schüller, R., *Der Wirtschaftliche Zusammenbruch Oesterreich-Ungarns*, pp. 25, 27.

<sup>14</sup> Law of December 24, 1867, *R.G.Bl.* 1868, No. 4, p. 7.

<sup>15</sup> Redlich, J., *Kaiser Franz Joseph von Oesterreich*, p. 306.

*Ausgleich* which should run for at least twenty years in the hope that thereby the crises which from past experience inevitably attended the renewal of the *Ausgleich* might recur less frequently.<sup>16</sup> Count Tisza made it clear that a longer *Ausgleich* could be obtained only at the price of substantial concessions to Hungary.<sup>17</sup>

This brought to the fore a conflict of interests in the tariff schedule. Austria was desirous of raising the duties on a number of manufactured articles which, since 1907, had suffered from foreign competition, especially those of German manufacture. In general, since Hungary received the bulk of her manufactured articles from Austria, opposition was to be expected to such a proposal for it would mean increased costs to the Hungarian consumer. Hungarian industry, however, was in the infancy stage of development and needed protection, and Hungary consented to an increase in the import duties on twenty-six classes of manufactured goods.

In the matter of raw iron imports, Austria favored a reduction in tariffs, but Hungary opposed. The largest share of the iron industry was located in Austria, while one of the few iron works in Hungary, the property of the government, was an unprofitable undertaking. Hungarian objections to a lowering of the import duties on iron were finally overcome by granting to Hungarian oil refineries greatly reduced duties on Roumanian crude oil, to the disadvantage, to be sure, of the Galician producers in the Austrian half of the Monarchy.<sup>18</sup>

Thus, agreement on proposed import duties for industrial products was easily obtained since important Hungarian interests were not vitally affected. In the matter of agricultural products, which in the future were to be admitted to the Empire, the case was quite otherwise, for here Hungarian agrarian inter-

16 Graz, G. and Schüller, R., *The Economic Policy of Austria-Hungary During the War*, pp. 14-15, 17-18.

17 *Ibid.*, p. 15. The terms "longer *Ausgleich*" and "shorter *Ausgleich*" are here used to indicate the twenty-year or the ten-year period in which the *Ausgleich* was to remain in force.

18 *Ibid.*, pp. 19-20.

ests were at stake and the Hungarian Administration in negotiations with the Austrian Administration remained adamant on certain classifications.<sup>19</sup> In principle, because of the shortage of food during the war years, in no small part due to the failure of Hungary to permit the export of food to Austria, the Austrian Administration was in favor of lower duties on foodstuffs, while the Hungarian Administration under pressure from the landed interests advocated the retention of existent, or even higher, duties.

On the question of the importation of livestock and meat, a heated controversy developed not only between the negotiators but between the two governments through their respective Ministers President. In Austria, even before the War, there had developed strong sentiment in favor of lifting the embargo on livestock from the neighboring Balkan states and of increasing the quota on meat. During the War, this sentiment became ever stronger. But the Hungarian government was determined on a policy of protection for its stock-raising industry while retaining the convenient Austrian market. Finally, Count Stephen Tisza, the Hungarian Minister President, silenced the Austrian objections by announcing bluntly that there would be an increase in the duties on livestock or there would be no *Ausgleich*. With the alternative expressed in this fashion, the Hungarian demand was accepted in principle by the two Ministries of Agriculture charged with drawing up the details.<sup>20</sup> But when these details were divulged to the other Austrian negotiators, they were declared to be impossible of acceptance. Debate on the matter began all over again and continued for months.<sup>21</sup> The attempt to effect a final acceptable agreement on the question of livestock was postponed while the negotiations on another matter of joint concern, the Quota, approached a crisis.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 21. It should be noted that the numerically small but active Austrian Agrarian Movement supported the Hungarian contentions in this respect.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 22-24.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 24.



By the *Ausgleich* of 1907, Austria's share of the joint expenses had been set at 63.6 per cent, while that of Hungary had been 36.4 per cent. Up for renewal, the Quota afforded another opportunity for bargaining. The language was couched in economic phraseology, but the motivation behind the arguments was political. Neither wished to yield to the other. Austria desired the twenty-year *Ausgleich*, and was therefore less inclined to shoulder more of a financial load than heretofore; Hungary appeared indifferent to a longer or shorter *Ausgleich*, using this attitude as a lever to pry concessions from Austria.

Negotiations on the *Ausgleich* were still in the discussion stage when they were interrupted in October, 1916, by the assassination of Count Stürgkh, the Austrian Minister President. A month later the Emperor Francis Joseph was dead. His successor, the Emperor Charles, inherited the *Ausgleich* as one of the most pressing problems of government.

Negotiations were resumed and the knotty problem of a twenty-year *Ausgleich*, the controversy on livestock and the Quotas were finally adjusted and the documents signed February 24, 1917.<sup>22</sup> Although the way had been long, and the difficulties great, agreements had been reached which involved concessions by both parties but, chiefly, by Austria. There remained still the problem of ratification by the two Parliaments.

In exchange for a longer *Ausgleich*, Austria accepted a higher Quota than formerly. By 1937, when the *Ausgleich* would be up for renewal under the new arrangement, Hungary would be paying 34.4 per cent instead of the previous 36.4 per cent. So far as could be estimated on the basis of past experience, and without attempting to include an estimate of future increased expenses, 1 per cent in the Quota for Austria was equivalent to an annual sum of 3,000,000 kronen. Thus without an increase in other expenses, the budget would have to be increased by

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 25-26. The authors' comment on this is as follows: "The instrument thus executed is exceedingly difficult to understand, even for experts, partly because of the complicated mass of material with which it deals, but more particularly because all the agreements are in the form of amendments of, or additions to, the *Ausgleich* of 1907."

6,000,000 kronen in Austria to cover the additional expenses of the Quota alone. And there were other costs, particularly for Austria, in the new agreements. The collections of the customs were allocated to the common budget, but Austria consumed 80 per cent of the dutiable goods and the estimated cost to the people of Austria in the increased duties and necessary indirect taxes has been placed at 15 to 18 million kronen annually.<sup>23</sup>

On the problem of agrarian protection, an agreement was finally obtained, although one not very satisfactory to the Austrian negotiators and by no means sure of adoption by the Austrian Parliament. Austria, in exchange for a twenty-year *Ausgleich*, had to accept an increase in the import duties on agricultural products, especially livestock. Hungary abandoned the earlier insistence on a restriction in the number of cattle that might be imported, but retained a limit of 200,000 for hogs. Hungary also dropped the former refusal to consider a reduction in the duties during the life of the *Ausgleich*, but, at the same time, offset this concession by the inclusion of the demand that any importation of livestock from the Balkan States was to be made contingent upon Austro-Hungarian supervision of the veterinary police of those States, a stipulation practically impossible to carry out.<sup>24</sup>

In theory, there existed free trade within the Empire, but increasingly from the beginning of the War Hungary had restricted the shipment of foodstuffs to Austria. In an attempt to prevent such a situation in the future, the Austrian Government proposed that the new *Ausgleich* should contain the statement that in war time such restrictions might be imposed only with the consent of both parties. The Hungarian Government agreed to this in principle, but at the same time inserted a clause to the effect that, in a case of emergency, such restrictions might be provisionally established by one party.<sup>25</sup>

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 27-8.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 29.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 29.

In the new *Ausgleich* there was little change in the agreement on matters pertaining to railway traffic in the two halves of the Monarchy. Identical policies with respect to schedules and rates were to be maintained by the two Railway Administrations, and changes were to be effected only by common consent. However, in two instances, the failure to come to an agreement presaged the continuation of irritations which had at times disturbed the friendly relations between the two Railway Administrations and, thus, the National Administrations. For political reasons, the Hungarian Railway Administration had for years placed difficulties in the way of satisfactory railway communication between Austria and Dalmatia as well as Bosnia. In the negotiations on railway matters looking to the new *Ausgleich*, the Austrian Government was unable to obtain any sort of definite assurance that the service in question would be improved. Hungary, on the other hand, had long desired direct railway connection through Slovakia with the Prussian railway system. This would have been possible had the Austrian Railway Administration been willing to build a connecting link of 70 kilometers over Austrian territory to Annaberg in Prussian Silesia. But since the absence of this direct communication gave the Austrian Railway Administration a valuable bargaining point, in its relations with the Hungarian and Prussian Railway Administrations on matters pertaining to through traffic, the request was refused. The further demand that this strip of territory be handed over outright to Hungary for the purpose of building the short railway connection was rejected. There the matter was left. In fact, both problems were left unsolved.<sup>26</sup>

In view of the difficulties which had been encountered in framing the new *Ausgleich*, and the frayed nerves of the politicians and peoples of both halves of the Monarchy, it was agreed that merely the signing of the *Ausgleich* should be announced and the terms be kept secret until the treaty with Germany, still under negotiation, might be presented simultaneously with the *Ausgleich*. Sufficient information of a general nature

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 30-31.

leaked out, however, and the storm broke in both Vienna and Budapest. Whereas the twenty-year provision provided a source of great satisfaction to the Austrians, the knowledge of increased financial burdens from the duties on livestock and additions to the Quota soon brought out a powerful opposition. In Hungary, opposition centered chiefly on the twenty-year provision, while a change in the Ministry injected even greater uncertainty into the problem of adoption. On May 23, 1917, the Tisza government in Hungary was dismissed, and there appeared some question as to whether a new ministry could be formed that would accept the proposed *Ausgleich*. Yet acceptance was necessary since neither time nor the patience of the negotiators would permit a reconsideration of the entire problem. It would also have been dangerous, for "The whole problem of Dualism would then have had to be faced over again, and it would have been all but impossible to bring a new *Ausgleich* into being. This would have made the crisis permanent; the negotiations with Germany would have been made impossible; and the Monarchy would have been paralyzed in all its external relations."<sup>27</sup>

A Minister President for Hungary who agreed to support the *Ausgleich* as it had been drawn up was eventually found in the person of Dr. Wekerle. However, this did not guarantee a solution, for the treaty with Germany had not been completed, the *Ausgleich* of 1907 was to expire on December 31, 1917, and an *ad interim* arrangement had to be made. On November 17, 1917, a treaty was drawn up prolonging the life of the *Ausgleich* of 1907 for two years—to December 31, 1919. But on the question of the Quota, the two Parliaments were again unable to agree. The Hungarian Parliament insisted that the Quota should be fixed for the duration of the *Ausgleich*, thus for two years. This, the Austrian Parliament refused to accept. The Quota was therefore set for one year, and the Quota for the second year would be established by the Emperor.<sup>28</sup> When the time came for

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 34.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 34-35.

this exercise of the Imperial authority there was no longer an Emperor.

#### GERMANY AND *Mittel-Europa*

Difficult as was the task of drawing up the terms of a new *Ausgleich* between Austria and Hungary, the matter was further complicated by the knowledge that other negotiations were being conducted with Germany. These envisaged the creation after the War of a customs or tariff union, or even an economic alliance between Germany and Austria-Hungary, with the subsequent adherence of other Central European states as a distinct possibility. Although the actual negotiations were confined to the problems of Germany and the Dual Monarchy, evidence of the possibilities of creating a great Central European bloc is to be inferred from the discussion between the representatives of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Roumania prior to the Peace of Bucharest. In the preliminary negotiations, the German and Austrian delegates were warmly in favor of including Roumania in a customs union. In the end, however, due to Hungarian opposition, the plan was abandoned. The most that could be obtained was the signing of agreements to the effect that when invited, Roumania would enter negotiations intended to include Roumania in the Central European economic alliance. Actually, and here one sees the weight of the agrarian interests of Germany and Hungary, the opposite and apparently contradictory principle was adopted.<sup>29</sup> For in the treaties drawn up in 1917-1918 between Germany and Austria-Hungary, on the one hand, and Roumania, Finland, the Ukrainian People's Republic, and Russia, on the other, reciprocal clauses appeared waiving the most-favored-nation principle.<sup>30</sup> In other words, whatever advantageous agreements might be arrived at between Germany and Austria-Hungary were not to be shared with the near or distant neighbors to the east.

<sup>29</sup> For the manner in which Hungary guarded against the importation, and therefore competition, of agricultural products from the Balkans when the terms of the new *Ausgleich* were being arranged, see pp. 23, 25.

<sup>30</sup> Gratz, and Schüller, *op. cit.*, pp. 54-58.

Agitation for a formidable economic union of Central European and Balkan States was by no means a product of the War, nor was the idea abandoned after the War. In the earlier days, in its popular and sometimes exaggerated form, it was known as *Mittel-Europa*, while in the post-war period, although the term *Anschluss* was restricted to Germany and Austria, the extent of the unification implied in the term far exceeded the usual interpretation of the expression *Mittel-Europa*.

The earliest definite proposal of this sort was made in 1850 when von Bruck, the Austrian Minister of Commerce, proposed that the Empire of Austria be included in the German *Zollverein*, but since such a plan was vigorously opposed by Prussia for political, as well as economic reasons, official action was not forthcoming. The suggestion was not forgotten, however. Between 1850 and 1914, various groups publicly supported the idea, while others opposed it. Thus, in 1885, at Budapest an international congress of agriculturists at which the Germans were represented, passed a resolution favoring a system of Central European trade treaties which would protect these markets from the inroads of foreign competition. But the interest of the agriculturists of Austria-Hungary waned in the face of an expanded domestic market, while the German agriculturists abandoned the scheme because of the rapid increase in Hungarian agricultural production.<sup>31</sup>

In 1899, the industrialists of both countries were by no means solidly behind the plan. Those of Austria-Hungary declared against it, while the industrialists in Germany at their meeting the following year were so divided on the idea that a statement was postponed. The whole subject was discussed more and more earnestly, especially in Germany where Central European Economics Clubs were founded to keep alive and promote the scheme.<sup>32</sup>

During the War, and with the realization that even in the event of victory Germany's markets would be for some time lost,

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 4-5.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 5.

agitation for *Mittel-Europa* became intensified.<sup>33</sup> By early 1915 there was, especially in Germany, a veritable epidemic of pamphlets, books, lectures, and conferences. In November of the same year, the German government took up the question, largely as the result of the pressure of public opinion.<sup>34</sup>

On November 13, the German Foreign Office sent a confidential note to the Joint Ministry of Foreign Affairs suggesting that conversations be opened on the matter of an economic union as a means of further cementing the political alliance. Both the ultimate and the more immediate aims of such a policy were outlined in the note. Thus, whereas the governments of the two countries should look to the eventual abolition of tariff barriers between the states concerned, a transitional period would doubtless be necessary. Discussions should first be confined to the problems of granting mutual preferences, with the significant comment that in the peace treaties following the War both countries should agree to have inserted clauses which, while granting most-favored-nation treatment to former enemy or neutral states, definitely exempted from this category concessions which Germany or Austria-Hungary might give each other.<sup>35</sup> Further, the note makes clear the importance of the possibility of the adherence of other states to a customs union.<sup>36</sup>

The Austro-Hungarian reply to the German proposal was cautious. While admitting the advisability of drawing closer the ties which bound the two countries, and the necessity of including other states, there was, nevertheless, both expressed and implied a fear of the probable resentment of other states entitled to commercial treaties, concern for the economic welfare of Austrian industry in the face of more powerful German competition, and a hesitancy to participate in any arrangement that might place Austria-Hungary in a politically subordinate posi-

33 "In the debates on the subject, however, it was not political, but economic arguments that played the most important part." *Ibid.*, p. 7.

34 *Ibid.*, p. 6.

35 In other words, under the plan Austria-Hungary would accord France the same treatment as Great Britain, but not the same as Germany.

36 *Ibid.*, p. 10.

tion. In any event, as the Joint Ministry of Foreign Affairs pointed out, the details of a customs union could not be adopted until the future relations between Austria and Hungary had been decided in the new *Ausgleich*.<sup>37</sup> And the negotiations for a renewal of the *Ausgleich* of 1907 had not as yet been undertaken.

On March 8, 1916, a little more than a month after the beginning of negotiations between Austria and Hungary for the new *Ausgleich*, the German Foreign Office again broached the subject of a customs union. On the assumption that Austria and Hungary would eventually reach an agreement, this second note suggested that because of the complexity of the problems and multiplicity of detail involved, discussions connected with a customs union ought not to be postponed until the completion of the *Ausgleich* but might well be conducted concurrently. This time, the Austro-Hungarian reply was favorable, and the first meeting between the representatives of the two States was held April 27, 1916.<sup>38</sup> Between this date and the close of the final meeting of the commissioners October 11, 1918, two important and fundamental principles were established and an almost complete tariff schedule was drawn up.

It was accepted by the negotiators that the trade alliance under consideration was to be understood as but a step toward the goal—completely free trade between Germany and Austria-Hungary. It was further recognized that Austria-Hungary was not as developed as Germany and that during a transition period Austro-Hungarian industry in particular would need protection from the competition of German industry.<sup>39</sup> This protection was obtained by the retaining of “intermediary” duties, duties on goods exchanged between the two states as distinguished from “foreign” duties or those placed on goods from a third state. Thus, with very few intermediary duties, Germany accepted goods from Austria-Hungary on what was to all intents and

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 11-12.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 37.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 60.



purposes a free-trade basis while Austria-Hungary placed intermediary duties on approximately half of the categories of goods entering from Germany. In every instance, however, the intermediary duty was less than the foreign duty on the same article. Under this simple formula, preference was given by one state to the goods of the other, and there was eliminated a possibility that foreign goods might avoid the payment of part of the duty and enter Austria-Hungary, for example, by way of Germany in case the German foreign duty was less than that of Austria-Hungary. A simple example has been offered in illustration. "Austria-Hungary levied, for instance, a duty of 300 marks on cotton goods, Germany one of 200 marks. According to the formula, Austria-Hungary would have retained as against Germany a duty of 300 marks—200 marks = 100 marks, and Germany would have admitted Austro-Hungarian cotton goods free."<sup>40</sup>

Bearing in mind that Austria-Hungary placed preferential duties on about half of the imports from Germany, the following partial classification serves us as an indication of what was agreed upon:<sup>41</sup>

German Intermediary Duties on	Free of Duty in Either Direction	Austro-Hungarian Intermediary Duties on
Barley	Grains, except barley	Starch
Hops	Seeds	Oils and Margerine
Malt	Vegetables	Soaps
Meal	Horticultural Products	Patent Medicines
	Flowers	Sulphuric Acid
	Fruit	Aniline dyes
	Wine	
	Cattle	
	Game	
	Fish	
	Eggs	
	Milk and animal products in general	
	Provisions	
	Luxury Products	

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 67.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 65-66.

Wood and Lumber  
 Tanning Materials  
 Earth  
 Stone  
 Ores  
 Coal  
 Candles  
 Dyes, except Aniline  
 Chemicals with certain exceptions for  
     Austria-Hungary  
 Scents  
 Drugs, except Patent Medicines for  
     Austria-Hungary  
 Matches  
 Artificial Manures  
 Jute  
 Hemp Yarns  
 Linen  
 Hats  
 Umbrellas

As matters stood in October, 1918, this treaty intended to run for twenty years was incomplete in some details, but two years of interrupted negotiations had brought it almost to its final stage. Then, as two men who participated throughout the trying negotiations have noted, "A few weeks later the old order collapsed, and the work lies buried under its ruins."<sup>42</sup>

#### WAR ADMINISTRATION IN AUSTRIA

In addition to the fundamental problems of Austria's constitutional and economic relations with Hungary and the German Empire, the War brought new administrative problems, which hastened the collapse. From the granting of universal manhood suffrage in 1907, the Austrian Administration had shown a tendency to rely more than ever upon the two traditional supports of the Crown—the Bureaucracy and the Military. But from this same time onward, the Social Democratic Party won adherents in increasing numbers in the lower grades of the Bureaucracy. This meant that in these ranks blind obedience to superiors and loyalty to the Crown were modified by a sense of

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 69.

party discipline and class loyalty.<sup>43</sup> This situation indicated a weakening in one of the two services upon which the Crown depended for administration, with the resultant emphasis upon the other—the Military. Furthermore, representative government on a national scale had apparently broken down; for, as the result of violent scenes and paralyzing obstruction, the Austrian Parliament was prorogued in March, 1914, by Count Stürgkh, the Minister President.<sup>44</sup>

#### INFLUENCE OF THE MILITARY

Reliance on the military had been emphasized by preparation for war in the years just prior to 1914. Huge sums of money had been expended in increasing the efficiency of the military establishment. Especially after 1908, it was felt that war with one or another of the neighboring states was inevitable. Partial mobilizations in 1908 and 1912 convinced the Supreme Command that under arrangements as they then existed a general mobilization could not be smoothly and effectively carried through. To overcome the apparent difficulties and to forestall as many as possible of those that might arise, an elaborate and detailed plan was secretly drawn up in 1912 by the Supreme Command with the cooperation of the Ministry of War and the various departments of the civil administration concerned.<sup>45</sup>

In view of the indispensable part which railways play in the rapid movement of great numbers of men and equipment, the military authorities took a keen interest not only in the laying of trackage but in the broader field of railway administration. As the network of lines within the Empire increased, so, proportionately, was the interest of the military authorities in these

<sup>43</sup> Redlich, J., *The Austrian War Government*, pp. 51-52.

<sup>44</sup> John Gignoux, Secretary of the Swiss Legation at Vienna, records the following remark by Count Stürgkh, as they were passing the Parliament buildings: "The greatest work of my period in office has been to transform this building into a hospital. My colleague Briand ought to be jealous on this account. But my work will not be complete until I have converted it permanently into an asylum for incurables." John Gignoux to William Martin, "Notes de Guerre," Ms., Hoover War Library, Stanford University.

<sup>45</sup> Redlich, *op. cit.*, pp. 58-59.

matters heightened. Following the Annexation Crisis of 1908, intense activity was noted in both state and private railway circles in the matter of collecting all manner of necessary war materials and railway supplies in depots which had been carefully selected for their strategic value. These preparations were based on the findings of the officers of the General Staff who, for a decade, had studied the technical problems of mobilization.<sup>46</sup>

The legal basis for the activity of the General Staff in the affairs of the several railway administrations was to be found in a series of enactments beginning as far back as November 16, 1851. The most important of these was an Imperial letter to the Austrian and Hungarian Ministers President, dated March 28, 1872, which stipulated that in railway affairs, anything which pertained, or was of interest, to the Military must be agreed upon by the Department of Commerce and the Ministry of War. Furthermore, in case the demands of the War Ministry were not met, or in cases where no agreement could be reached, the matter would be decided by the Imperial Will.<sup>47</sup>

On the part of the Military, a tendency was evident to place the broadest possible interpretation on this letter, and over the years, the coordination between the Military and the Austrian and Hungarian central railway offices became a matter of record. These records formed a basis for precedent, and among the provisions of the highly important War Service Act, passed in 1912, the interests of the Military in the affairs of the railways of the Empire was amply protected.<sup>48</sup> Since the chief interest of the Military in the railway network of the Monarchy lay in the problems of the defense of the realm, attention was directed to the extension of trackage to vital frontiers, the building of tunnels, improvement of rolling-stock, and the construction of strategic stations.<sup>49</sup>

<sup>46</sup> Enderes, B., Ratzenhofer, E., Höger, P., *Verkehrswesen im Kriege*, pp. 18, 153.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 152.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 153. For a further discussion of the War Service Act, see below p. 36 ff.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 156-167.

Just as the railways of the Monarchy were brought to a state of advanced preparation, so were arrangements made in advance to bring the full industrial strength of the country to the support of the armed forces when need should arise. In this particular the influence of the War Ministry was less apparent than in the case of the railways, but the influence was real, nevertheless.

First to be considered were the series of contracts which the Army Administration had arranged during peace time for delivery of specified quantities of equipment. These contracts were drawn up with large individual firms or with an association of contractors whose members represented the leading producers in any given field. In Austria there were two such associations for cloth and finished uniform materials; for linen and cotton textiles, two; and for shoes and leatherware, three. In Hungary for each of the above categories there was but one association.<sup>50</sup>

The price at which articles were to be delivered under these contracts was frequently stipulated, and this was calculated on the basis of a fixed and a variable factor. The variable was the cost to the manufacturer of the raw materials, a cost which was published quarterly by the Department of Commerce. The fixed factor was the cost of the labor which went into the manufacture of the article, and this cost, or wage rate, was stipulated in the contract. A result of this practice was to draw the attention of the Army Administration to the problem of keeping down the costs of production in the war industries, and a two-fold justification was usually offered for such activity. First, the general financial burden to the state would be lessened, and second, by setting a maximum price and by inflicting penalties on violators of this price, profiteering would be discouraged.<sup>51</sup>

#### THE WAR SERVICE ACT

Of greater significance to the population in general was the passage of the War Service Act by the Austrian Parliament in

<sup>50</sup> Riedl, R., *Die Industrie Oesterreichs Während des Krieges*, p. 3.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 6-7.

September, 1912.<sup>52</sup> This act merely incorporated in legal form the theory that in time of war all things and all people are and of necessity must be subordinated to the "Interests of State" and in this law, Austria-Hungary was merely following the lead of Germany, France, Italy, and Switzerland.<sup>53</sup> The scope of this "war service" was comprehensive as is indicated by the following eight categories:<sup>54</sup>

1. The rendering of personal service, or labor.
2. The furnishing of carriages or carts, draught animals of all varieties, motor vehicles, boats, steamships and aircraft including their personnel.
3. The use of streets, roads, railways, private telegraph and telephone equipment.
4. The yielding of the management of an industrial establishment, or giving it up altogether.
5. The use of real estate and immovable property for military purposes.
6. The billeting of troops.
7. The furnishing of food and fodder.
8. The surrendering of all other goods or wares necessary to the Military, be they for momentary use or as a permanent cession.

In effect, through this enactment, the rights of the private individual to the enjoyment of his possessions, when those possessions were needed by the Military, were non-existent, although payment for goods confiscated or commandeered might be made on the basis of the findings of special commissions composed chiefly of officers or bureaucratic officials.<sup>55</sup> And for the whole matter of war economics, the placing of the entire industrial establishment of the Empire within the range of the War Service Act was of the utmost importance.<sup>56</sup>

<sup>52</sup> The law was forced through the Austrian *Reichsrat* despite bitter opposition. An identical law was passed by the Hungarian *Reichstag*, and the law was decreed for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Redlich, *op. cit.*, pp. 57-58.

<sup>53</sup> Riedl, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 8.

<sup>55</sup> Redlich, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

<sup>56</sup> Riedl, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

An additional aid in centralization of authority lay in the fact that the Austrian Parliament had been prorogued in March, 1914, and necessary laws were thereafter promulgated as provided for under Paragraph 14 of the constitution, popularly termed "the Dictatorship Paragraph." There were 181 such Imperial Decrees from March 16, 1914, to May 30, 1917, when Parliament again met.<sup>57</sup>

Centralization of control and regimentation of the population was carried even further by decrees issued during the first months of the war period. Thus, on July 31, 1914, the political administration in the war zones was supplanted by the military administration. This provision was at first applicable to the war zones on the southern and eastern fronts. But with the entry of Italy, a similar zone was established to the southwest as well. On July 25 many minor offenses and all crimes committed in these zones were transferred from the civil to the military courts, and on November 4, trial by jury was abolished for the entire realm. At the same time, a War Surveillance Office was established, the exact nature of which is even now not clear for it functioned secretly. One of its duties was known to be the careful supervision of press censorship<sup>58</sup>

Once war started, the various measures which had been prepared in advance were applied in the economic field.<sup>59</sup> The War Service Act was applied to a wide section of industry with varying results. For the employer, the placing of his business

<sup>57</sup> Redlich, *op. cit.*, p. 101.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 80-85. Redlich comments that the extreme caution exercised in this respect was very short-sighted, for the most rigid censorship did not prevent the knowledge that there existed friction in the various departments of the government, or that certain outstanding political leaders had been arrested, etc. More detrimental still, he believes, was the fact that by such strict censorship, the government was deprived of the support of public opinion. *Ibid.*, p. 102.

<sup>59</sup> No attempt will here be made to give a complete picture of the economic and social conditions which existed in the Empire during the war. Attention should, however, be drawn to the bibliographical work by Dr. Othmar Spann, *Bibliographie der Wirtschafts-und Sozialgeschichte des Weltkrieges*.

under the act meant a guarantee against competition, stability of prices, and preference in case of stringency, which was the usual state, in the matter of raw materials. For the employees, the prospect was not as comforting, for although there existed the same stability in industry as was enjoyed by the employer, the workers were placed under military supervision, and any dereliction would be corrected by the findings of a military court. Often, the military managers of industrial establishments which were included in the categories of the War Service Act were tactful and skillful. More frequently, the reverse was the case. Regimentation and the military concept of discipline as applied by these factory managers created resentment among the employees and destroyed the efficiency and esprit de corps which the system was designed to effect.<sup>60</sup>

#### IMPORTS AND THE CENTRALES

One indication that responsible circles in both Germany and Austria-Hungary failed to realize the magnitude of the conflict which had begun is to be found in the establishment of embargos on imports and exports. Germany directed several against Austria-Hungary and vice versa. These prohibitions were enacted first against weapons, explosives of all varieties, and pigeons, but as the first few weeks passed, and as the number of enemy powers increased, the categories of prohibited goods were enlarged and the list of countries augmented.<sup>61</sup> The effect of these measures on the industrial production, in Austria in particular, was crippling, for with the exception of a few items such as coffee, fruit, and other goods from the Levant which could yet be imported, the bulk of the raw materials needed for Austrian industry came either from Germany or through German and Dutch ports. German industry was adversely affected, although to a less degree.<sup>62</sup> Since both allies suffered from the stringent regulations, it was less difficult to come to terms, and

<sup>60</sup> Riedl, *op. cit.*, pp. 10-11.

<sup>61</sup> Riedl, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 25.



on September 24, 1914, an agreement was concluded whereby goods would be accepted for transit across both countries. Austria-Hungary could once more obtain shipments from the Scandinavian countries and from Holland, while Germany could avail herself of the ports of Trieste and Fiume on the Adriatic. As to exports, from either country to the other, three categories were established. All goods which had been ordered or shipped prior to the outbreak of hostilities were to be delivered. After that date all goods which, originating in one country, were shipped to the other for processing and were destined to return to the country of origin were to be admitted free. And lastly, a list was drawn up specifying products which were to be admitted to each country. For Germany, this list included food-stuffs for the most part; for Austria-Hungary, industrial materials such as cotton, wool, metals, saltpeter, and chemicals.<sup>63</sup>

In order to facilitate the importation and distribution within the country of goods included in the September agreement with Germany, there were established a series of Centrales in Austria-Hungary. The first of these, The United Austro-Hungarian Cotton Centrale, was organized by the Austrian Cotton Textile Association, October 1, and having received the approval of the Austrian Minister of Commerce, began to function October 3, 1914. The declared intention of the organizers of this Centrale was to assure a supply of cotton for the war industries and to allocate any surplus to other industries not designated as war industries.

Shortly after the organization of the Cotton Centrale, two others were set up under slightly different circumstances. These were the Wool Centrale, Inc., October 29, and the Metal Centrale, Inc., November 17, 1914. These were organized on the initiative of the administration, and in these the government shared in the financing, either directly or by a guarantee through the Austrian Creditanstalt.<sup>64</sup>

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 26.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 31; Redlich gives the date for the establishment of the Metal Centrale, Inc. as February, 1915. He comments that in seeking all available metal, the organization began with the factories and ended in January, 1918,

Following the initial success in obtaining and distributing raw materials on the part of the first three Centrales, the idea was applied in a wide variety of products, and Centrales, or organizations functioning as Centrales under a different name, were being established as late as September, 1918.<sup>65</sup> Beginning with the Hide and Leather Centrale of January, 1915, a very significant departure was made in organization.

When first organized, it was thought that the Centrales would be purely economic. The initiative in establishing the first of the series was taken by business-men, and by including representatives of Hungarian business, as well as a delegate from the Hungarian Department of Commerce, it was hoped that a two-fold purpose would be achieved. First, the war industries would be able to operate with greater certainty, a situation which at the time was thought to be of common concern to both halves of the Empire, and secondly, closer cooperation and beneficial integration would develop between the industries of Austria and those of Hungary. And in this opinion the Hungarian administration concurred at the outset. With the passage of time, however, the political potentialities outweighed the economic in the matter of the Centrales. The war was looked upon as a welcome opportunity to further the independence of Hungary from Austria in the economic as well as the political field, and war economics was used as an excuse to advance Hungarian political development. Joint industrial development suffered in consequence, and the situation in Austrian industry became increasingly serious. As a result of this gradual change in attitude, the Centrales established after the spring of 1915 had no Hungarian representation, and Hungary had her own competitive organizations.<sup>66</sup>

The most that can be said in behalf of the Centrales is that they simplified the importation and collection of industrial materials. As to producing an adequate supply of goods for the by removing locks and latches from private dwellings. Redlich, *op. cit.*, p. 121.

<sup>65</sup> Riedl, *op. cit.*, pp. 33-36, lists 19 such Centrales.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 32-33.

factories, especially the war industries, they were successful for a few months, after which time they failed of their intended purpose.<sup>67</sup> The explanation for so disappointing a situation is not hard to find. The increased industrial tempo for which the conduct of the war was responsible augmented the demand for imports, and, at a time when this demand was increasing, the ever-tightening blockade of the Central Powers made it increasingly difficult to obtain supplies beyond the frontiers. If to such a situation be added the blockade of Austria by Hungary, the position of industry in Austria appears to have been doubly difficult. By 1916, in spite of the activities of the Centrales, imports of vital products were alarmingly below the peace-time figures of 1913<sup>68</sup> and efforts were redoubled in an attempt to find at least a part of the necessary supplies within the country. This, in turn, carried with it an even more extended supervision of industry and control over private individuals, with consequences which will be discussed subsequently.<sup>69</sup>

#### FOOD AND THE ADMINISTRATION

Because of the increasing shortage in industrial materials, the Administration became progressively involved in the various stages of production. In the dearth which became almost immediately evident, the Administration concerned itself with the collection and distribution of food supplies, first of grain and shortly thereafter of all types of food. The policy adopted led to price-fixing and, in time, to requisitioning from the producer, rationing of the consumer, and to drastic legal measures for punishing the apparently inevitable smuggler and profiteer. The enormity of the task begun by the War Grain Control Board in 1915 was little realized, and the signal failure of the government in feeding the population, especially in the provision of grain, was one of the most important causes of the collapse of the Empire. The extreme privation suffered by the peoples

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 47-49.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 62.

<sup>69</sup> See pages 66, 68, 71 note 142.

of the Empire, particularly of the Austrian half, raised a host of grievances and eventually turned hitherto loyal sections of the population against the government.<sup>70</sup>

If the Dual Monarchy be considered as an economic unit, it is quite evident that there existed, in the years prior to the War, a surplus of manufactured articles. Conversely, the same area was not self-sufficient in certain important agricultural products, such as flour, beef, pork, milk, butter, cheese, and potatoes. As matters stood, there was a deficit—small, to be sure in some products—which had to be made up by imports from beyond the frontier. Note should also be taken of the fact that the Austrian half of the Monarchy created the deficit of the Empire as a whole; moreover the industrial and mountainous Alpine Provinces fell behind the other large productive areas of the Austrian half of the Empire and were dependent upon these for the food supplies which they did not produce.

DISTRIBUTION OF THE PRODUCTION IN ESSENTIAL FOOD PRODUCTS FOR THE AUSTRIAN HALF OF THE MONARCHY 1909-1913, ON THE BASIS OF PERCENTAGE<sup>71</sup>

	Sudeten- länder	Karpathen- länder	Alpen- länder	Karst- länder
Wheat .....	38.83%	38.40%	19.03%	3.74%
Rye .....	49.33	28.32	21.84	0.51
Barley .....	61.42	25.85	11.05	1.68
Oats .....	47.40	34.09	17.77	0.74
Potatoes .....	36.62	48.75	12.14	2.94

A roughly analogous situation prevailed in livestock. The chief difference was that the Alpine Provinces did not fall into the third place in the scale of production in all categories. Estimates for December 31, 1910.<sup>72</sup>

Horses .....	23.47%	54.13%	18.70%	3.70%
Beef .....	35.90	29.83	29.13	5.14
Hogs .....	27.84	31.95	34.61	5.60
Sheep .....	7.53	22.59	17.56	52.32
Goats .....	51.69	1.80	25.11	21.40

<sup>70</sup> Redlich, *op. cit.*, p. 134.

<sup>71</sup> Löwenfeld-Russ, Hans, *Die Regelung der Volksernährung im Kriege*, pp. 7-8.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 9.

Average Deficit in Food for the Austrian Half of the Monarchy 1909-1913 and Proportional Coverage<sup>73</sup>

Product	Amount needed	Austrian Production		Deficit		Deficit covered by Hungarian contribution		Foreign imports
		Amount	%	Amount	%	Amount	% of Deficit	% of Deficit
Flour ....	41,338,605 q	27,992,462	67.72	13,346,143	32.28	12,243,184	91.74	8.26
Beef .....	271,772 h	78,939	29.10	192,833	70.90	186,760	96.85	.44
Hogs ....	846,759 h	406,091	47.90	440,668	52.10	443,168	99.43	.19
Milk .....	5,818,539.173 l	5,737,411,948	98.61	81,127,225	1.39	68,828,220	84.84	15.16
Butter ...	446,816 q	404,720	90.57	42,096	9.43	30,089	71.48	28.52
Cheese ...	771,599 q	708,260	91.79	63,339	8.21	21,023	33.19	66.81
Potatoes .	51,498,100 q	50,048,040	97.18	1,450,060	2.82	577,860	39.85	60.15
Maize ...	9,248,330 q	3,625,908	39.21	5,622,422	60.79	3,136,233	55.78	44.22

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 31. In this table, q = 1 quintal, or 220.46 lbs.

h = head

l = litre, or 1.0567 liquid quarts

The extent to which the Austrian half of the Monarchy, and thus by implication, the Alpine Provinces with the industrial cities of Vienna, Wiener-Neustadt, Graz, and Linz, were dependent upon supplies from Hungary or from foreign sources, may be surmised from the table on page 44. It will be seen that in certain of the essential foods here listed, the total deficit for the Monarchy was inconsequential, but at the same time, attention should be directed to the amounts of food which Hungary shipped to Austria, or to the proportion of the Austrian deficit which was supplied by Hungary. It is of the utmost importance to an understanding of the privation which existed in Inner Austria during the later years of the War and the first year of the Republic to understand the location of the pre-war production areas of foods. For it was one thing so long as the Empire remained intact and the flow of goods remained normal or, at least, calculable. It was an entirely different matter for the unproductive parts of the Empire when, because of the strain of war, the striving for political independence, or natural concern for the future, the erstwhile productive regions failed to supply the accustomed foods.

The most vital single problem which confronted the Administration of the Austrian half of the Monarchy during the War was not the control of the minorities or the failure of the Military but the provisioning of the population on a subsistence level. Upon the success or failure in this endeavour depended the settlement of other pressing war-time problems. That there would be a stringency was to be expected, but that serious shortage in the all-important matter of grain should be evident in Austria within a month after the beginning of hostilities was not. This problem warranted the concerted attention of several departments in the Administration.

The reasons for the shortage in foods were all too obvious, the remedies were quite otherwise. In the first place, the harvest of the summer and autumn of 1914 was below normal in both halves of the Monarchy.<sup>74</sup> And this sub-normal condition in

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 51; Gratz, G. and Schüller, R., *Der Wirtschaftliche Zusammen-*

grain production, in spite of efforts in both halves of the Monarchy to reverse the trend, became steadily more acute as the war years passed, as may be gathered from the table below:<sup>75</sup>

(The normal needs, including seed, may be considered as 100 million quintals)

	Total Production for Austria-Hungary	Austro- Hungarian Deficit
1914 .....	90.2	9.8
1915 .....	79.4	20.6
1916 .....	62.9	37.1
1917 .....	62.2	37.8
1918 .....	52.7	47.3

(1 quintal = 220.46 lbs.)

For Austria, this meant that there would be forthcoming no supply from Hungary to counterbalance the Austrian shortage, and, under normal conditions, the deficit would have been made up by importation from beyond the frontiers. With the War in progress, however, foreign imports of grain could at best be meager.

Moreover, it was the irony of fate, or perhaps more properly the fortunes of war, that at the very time when a shortage was beginning to be felt extraordinary burdens should be placed upon the agencies whose business it was to supply the civil population of Austria. One complication was the independent action of the Military. With its enormous and preferential demands and an organization for obtaining supplies independent of the civil administration, it placed the governmental bureaus concerned in an unsuccessfully competitive position.<sup>76</sup>

Some understanding of the manner in which the Army demands increased the problem of supplying the populations with flour may be gathered from the fact that in peace time the per-head per-day quota of flour averaged 375 grams, while the

*bruch Oesterreich-Ungarns*, pp. 42, 45, point out that the reduced harvest was not due to mobilization, for the harvest was in before the call to mobilization was issued. Poor weather conditions are given as the reason.

<sup>75</sup> Gratz, G. and Schüller, R., *Ibid.*, p. 46.

<sup>76</sup> Löwenfeld-Russ, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

Army, mobilizing many thousands, set 500 grams as its quota.<sup>77</sup> Bread was of prime concern, but a similar situation applied to meat. Peasant boys who at home ate meat only once or twice a week found that in the army they were given meat once or twice a day. Since the demands of the Army were not to be denied, the civil population was placed on sharply reduced rations almost immediately.

In addition an important source of the Austrian grain supply was more or less permanently jeopardized by the invasion of Galicia by Russian forces and the prospect that Galicia would be an intermittent battlefield, while the burden on the domestic supply was increased by swarms of refugees who streamed into Inner Austria from Galicia and Bukowina.<sup>78</sup>

Serious as an increased demand on a reduced supply may have been for Austria, the prospect was not as disheartening as the realization that the supplies from Hungary would not be forthcoming as formerly to counterbalance the Austrian shortage. In this connection, Professor Redlich presents the Austrian case in rather bald and bitter terms, when he says :

Now . . . in the supreme hour of danger, Hungary erected a prohibitive barrier against the export of grain to Austria. When Hungary required Austrian goods, then, and only then, were small consignments of food or raw materials allowed to pass through to pay for them. That was all . . . Hungary did not yield. It maintained its barrier to the very end.<sup>79</sup>

<sup>77</sup> Gratz and Schüller, *Der Wirtschaftliche Zusammenbruch Oesterreich-Ungarns*, p. 48. As statistics for pre-war consumption included women and children, the two figures are not comparable, but they show that the demands of the army during the early periods of the war were at peace time maximum even when the civilians had begun to suffer shortage.

<sup>78</sup> Winkler, W., *Die Einkommensverschiebungen in Oesterreich Während des Weltkrieges*, p. 25, lists the refugees as of the middle of 1915 at 450,000 from the northeast battlefields, and 150,000 from the southwest. Of these 200,000 were to be found in Vienna. By September 1, 1915, 250,000 had been returned home. In 1917, not including 150,000 sent home, the number of dependent refugees increased to a total of 760,000.

<sup>79</sup> Redlich, *op. cit.*, p. 109.



In effect, this statement is true. The particularistic strainings of dominating circles in the Hungarian Administration became all too evident in the economic or military fields during the war. So severe an indictment needs further explanation.

It was difficult for the man in the street in a city such as Vienna to realize that Hungary, the traditional land of plenty, might be in straightened circumstances. It was equally difficult to understand why Hungarians should not also be underfed and hungry, since the two halves of the Monarchy were in the War together. The average man in Vienna was probably ignorant of the true situation in two respects, that there was a progressive decline in Hungarian production during the War, and that Hungary was contributing supplies to Austria, although not in sufficient quantity. Further, the average Viennese lacked an adequate understanding of the psychological, and, therefore, political, reactions of the average Hungarian. The Austrian was hungry and the Hungarian was on short rations and thus they were in a sense brothers in misery. The Hungarian was at no time as desperately hungry as the Austrian but he was little inclined to surrender some of his small stores to place himself on a level of privation with his Austrian brother. This attitude was held to be rank ingratitude if not absolute inhumanity by the Austrian. This natural but emotional approach to the problem of supply had a direct bearing on the increasing lack of cordiality and cooperation between the governments and people of the two halves of the Monarchy as the War progressed.

#### FOOD SHORTAGE IN HUNGARY

Under normal conditions, the production of wheat and rye in Hungary was estimated at about 60 million quintals, and in this figure must be included seed for the following year. In 1914, although the planting was normal; because of weather conditions the harvest was estimated at 43.7 million quintals or roughly 73 per cent of the 1913 harvest. Since the normal needs for Hungary were estimated at 45.5 million quintals, of which 6.5 millions were for seed, there was a deficit in Hungary in these

important grains of 1.8 million quintals. The 1915 harvest showed a definite improvement at 55 million quintals, or approximately 90 per cent of the 1913 estimate. The harvest of 1916 was again disappointing with only 42.6 million quintals, an inadequate amount for Hungary if seed be deducted. The 1917 harvest was slightly better than that of the previous year with 43.6 million quintals. The record low for the war years was registered in 1918 with 34.1 million quintals.<sup>80</sup> On the basis of the official Hungarian statistics, production in these two important grains was considerably below the level necessary to offset the shortage in Austria, where the recession was proportionately greater as may be seen from the following table.<sup>81</sup>

Austria		Hungary
1914 .....	46.5 million quintals	43.7 million quintals
1915 .....	24.4	55.
1916 .....	20.3	42.6
1917 .....	18.6	43.6
1918 .....	19.	34.1

For Austria the significance of the loss of the Galician supplies because of occupation and war activities is very evident in the figures for 1914 as compared with those of the following year.

It has been maintained that Hungary abandoned the *Ausgleich* immediately after the outbreak of the War. This is a broad assertion and true only in part. In the summer of 1914, the Customs Union of 1850, incorporated in the *Ausgleich* of 1867, was in fact inoperative insofar as it meant the unrestricted flow of goods in both directions. There can be no denial of the fact that Hungary husbanded her agricultural supplies, and that a superior position in the matter of food was used constantly as a lever to gain political or military advantages. Nevertheless, food in considerable quantities, although below peace-time schedules and steadily less as the war years passed, did cross the frontier into Austria from Hungary. The quantities of Austrian imports from Hungary in a selected number of vital foods may be seen

80 Gratz, and Schüller, *op. cit.*, pp. 42-44.

81 *Ibid.*, pp. 42-45.

from the following table.<sup>82</sup> Note should be made of the precipitate decrease between 1913 and 1917.

Imports of Foodstuffs from Hungary  
(Annual Average in Thousands of Meterzentner)  
(1 Meterzentner = 11.02 lbs)

	1909-13	1914	1915	1916	1917
Grain (chiefly wheat, rye, } barley, maize, oats) . . . . . }	13,928.1	10,212.3	5,198.6	463.7	276.8
Flour . . . . .	7,316.1	5,627.7	2,085.9	567.9	234.2
Vegetables . . . . .	1,519.7	1,032.5	1,607.2	1,233.3	556.3
Livestock (in thousands)					
Beef . . . . .	327.0	352.1	139.1	42.1	95.0
Hogs . . . . .	595.0	779.7	539.3	396.2	113.7
Slaughter Horses . . . . .	12.0	13.2	10.2	17.7	44.0
Milk . . . . .	704.5	656.0	465.5	315.7	117.9
Butter . . . . .	32.8	21.6	10.5	7.5	4.7

#### OFFICIAL FOOD CONTROL IN AUSTRIA

The causes which led to the intervention on the part of the Austrian Administration, first, in the field of foreign imports of raw materials and, then, in domestic industrial production, as well as the methods adopted have already been indicated. Similar motives—a planned production, coordinated collection and an equitable distribution of supplies—led the Administration ever deeper into this phase of economic life as privation became more widespread. With the passage of time, the producer saw the death of free enterprise in the transition from government supervision of his efforts to the requisitioning of his products at a fixed price. The urban consumer became all too familiar with empty shelves in his favorite retail shops, the establishment of government dispensaries, where “per-head per-week” rations advertised in the morning papers were unobtainable, or the familiar army soup-kitchen at the curb. Such extremes, of course, developed gradually, and privation was fought by the administration at home in as determined a manner as was the enemy at the front, but, be it noted, until the middle of September, 1918, with far less success.

<sup>82</sup> Löwenfeld-Russ, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

In the confusion and panic which prevailed immediately following the outbreak of hostilities, the Austrian Administration issued an emergency decree, August 1, 1914. This decree provided that a survey was to be made of the existing supplies; requisitioning by the authorities might be made with compensation to the owner; and refusal to surrender supplies, or hiding of provisions, was punishable by law.<sup>83</sup>

Other measures followed shortly. On August 5, steps were taken to safeguard the harvest and to draft farm hands from other activities. To this end, and with a view to closer contact with harvest conditions and available man power, a committee was formed in each rural community.<sup>84</sup>

A series of export prohibitions was placed on vital food products early in August, and the soaring prices for these items produced a widespread demand in Austria for the lifting of the Empire tariffs, on grain in particular, while supplies might still be brought from Roumania and Italy. But under the *Ausgleich* any adjustment in tariff schedules was a matter of joint concern, and concurrence of Hungary was needed. It was not until October 9 that Hungarian agreement could be obtained to this vital Austrian request, and by that time, most if not all the advantage hoped for by Austria was nullified by the practical evacuation of Trieste, the crippling of the railway service to Italy, and most important of all, the placing of an export prohibition on grain by Roumania.<sup>85</sup>

By October, 1914, although the economic life of the country had become fairly well adjusted to War conditions, the blockade was definitely felt. At the end of that month, temporary measures were taken to conserve bread flours by the admixture of substitutes.<sup>86</sup> This "temporary" resort to "War Bread" became one of the permanent institutions of the War for the people of Austria.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 47.

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 47.

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 48; Winkler, *op. cit.*, p. 84.

<sup>86</sup> Löwenfeld-Russ, *op. cit.*, p. 49; Winkler, *W.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 84-85.

During the month of October, the Administration became ever more concerned over the available supply of flour, but the population, ignorant of the true situation with regard to the lack of reserve supplies, was chiefly agitated over the mounting prices. Loud demands were made for the establishment of a maximum price, and since Germany had done this on October 28, the Austrian Administration was inclined to follow its example. The chief obstacle here as elsewhere was Hungary's attitude. In case a maximum could be simultaneously established in both Austria and Hungary, all might be well. But if a maximum were set for grain or flour in Austria, it was feared that the sale of Hungarian grains would no longer be profitable in Austria. Further shortage would result from the indifference of the Hungarian producers to the Austrian market, and Austrian manufacturers would also suffer from the loss of Hungarian orders. Negotiations were conducted with the Hungarian Administration and agreement was reached November 28, not only on a maximum, but also on a unified plan for the conservation of supplies.<sup>87</sup>

The next step took the form of an Imperial order of February 21 suspending all transactions in grain pending the taking of inventory. This step was deemed necessary for the better operation of a new organization which was established February 27, 1915, the War Grain Control Board. The primary purpose of this department was the "efficient distribution of supplies under State supervision,"<sup>88</sup> and one of the earliest evidences of its activity was the rationing of the population by means of a bread-card system.<sup>89</sup>

#### FOOD AND THE CENTRALES

The War Grain Control Board was in a position analogous to the Cotton Centrale in the field of industry.<sup>90</sup> In both instances,

87 Löwenfeld-Russ, *op. cit.*, pp. 49-50.

88 *Ibid.*, p. 51; Winkler, *op. cit.*, p. 85.

89 Löwenfeld-Russ, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

90 See page 40.

the Administration was the sponsor; in each, the aims were similar; and each was a quasi-administrative department of the government. Furthermore, just as the organization of the Cotton Centrale was followed by the establishment of Centrales in a wide variety of industries, so in the field of agriculture, the War Grain Control Board was the first of many similar bodies.<sup>91</sup> With the bureaucratic tradition as strong as it was in Austria, the idea of establishing these Centrales as a means of solving the problems took hold until by the close of the War there were ninety-one.<sup>92</sup>

The increasing number of governmental agencies developed disadvantages. The War Grain Control Board had a monopoly in the handling of grain and flour, but operated under the jurisdiction of the Department of the Interior. But both the Department of Agriculture and the Department of the Interior had special departments concerned solely with food. As a result, in spite of good intentions and constant inter-departmental conferences, there existed an overlapping in jurisdiction.<sup>93</sup> Severe criticism of this lack of unity in the food agencies was frequently permitted by the censor.<sup>94</sup> But it was not until the assassination of Count Stürgkh in the fall, 1916, and the death a month later of the Emperor Franz Joseph, that the new regime<sup>95</sup> brought about the long overdue centralization of the various food agencies of Austria and of Hungary.

#### THE JOINT FOOD MINISTRY

Although under discussion before the War, the organization of a Department of State to regulate production and distribution of food for Austria, with a position in the Cabinet for the responsible head, was a result of war emergency. By the second year of the War, in spite of commendable esprit de corps and

<sup>91</sup> Löwenfeld-Russ, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

<sup>92</sup> Redlich, *op. cit.*, p. 117.

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 115.

<sup>94</sup> Löwenfeld-Russ, *op. cit.*, pp. 55, 289.

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 56.

patriotic self-sacrifice on the part of individuals, it was obvious that the various agencies were working at cross purposes. It was then decided to coordinate these bureaus in the interest of efficiency and May 30, 1916, the Interdepartmental Food Commission, including representatives of the Military, held its first sitting.<sup>96</sup> Composed as it was of representatives of various departments, there was confusion in the application of the legislative side of the Commission's activities. Increasing and public criticism of the bad food situation was noted daily and this criticism tended to place the blame on the economic divisions, such as the Departments of Commerce, or Agriculture, which consumers felt favored the producer.

By the end of September, 1916, the Administration considered it necessary to reorganize the unsatisfactory administrative arrangements involved in the production and distribution of food supply, and a shuffle rather than a drastic centralization of control resulted. An Imperial Decree on October 6, 1916, called for the erection of a Department of Food Supply for Austria, and a similar body was established for Hungary October 26, 1916. It should be noted that when this Department was called into being in Austria, it was not an independent Department of State but was placed under the Department of the Interior. When, however, a former Minister President of Austria, Baron Beck, was asked to take charge of the new organization, he objected to the dependent position in which he would be placed. He argued that without a free hand in an independent department there could be little hope of correcting the evils of the past, and what was more significant, as a subordinate in the Department of the Interior, he would be at a disadvantage in dealing with the corresponding head of a similar but independent department in Hungary. These points influenced von Koerber, the Minister President, who was charged with setting up the Department of Food, and a straddle resulted. Baron Beck was not appointed, and the new department was not placed under the Department of the Interior. When formally announced, the new

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 289.

"independent" Department of Food, coequal with the other Departments of State and competent to deal with all matters pertaining to the food supply in war, was in reality placed directly under the Austrian Minister President. It was not, then, on an equal status with the other Departments of State, when it began to function December 1, 1916.<sup>97</sup>

Both Austria and Hungary now had unified organizations, the better to combat increasing food-shortages, but there was still lacking the machinery for direct contact between the similar organizations in each state looking to an ordered continuous division between the two states of the available supplies within the Empire.<sup>98</sup> Joint control was blocked for too long by Count Tisza, the Hungarian Minister President, who was unalterably opposed to such a move. Ultimately, however, Count Tisza did an about-face on this question, and himself proposed the establishment of a central organization on lines which he had opposed so recently.<sup>99</sup> In this matter there was powerful support from another quarter, the new Emperor.

When he ascended the throne, the Emperor Charles attempted to plot a new course, although the fundamental political, social, and economic problems were in no wise altered by the change of ruler. Thus, by moving headquarters from Teschen to Badenbei-Wien, the impression was given that Austria-Hungary, while willing to continue a policy of cooperation with Germany, would in future be less dependent upon the German ally. And yet Austria-Hungary at the very moment needed Germany more than ever. So it was, also, with the proposed new ministries. The establishment of full-fledged departments of Public Health,

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 289-293. The constitutional position of the Chief of this new department was apparently never defined. Depending on the attitude of the Minister President, the executive in charge of the Department of Food was a responsible Minister, or a subordinate of the Minister President who in that case assumed responsibility for the Department.

<sup>98</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 296.

<sup>99</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 302-304. Löwenfeld-Russ comments on this change of heart by Count Tisza as follows: "It belongs to one of those miracles in which the political and economic history of Austria-Hungary is so rich."



Social Welfare, and a department to cope with the food problems jointly with Hungary would at least indicate a change of policy on the part of the Crown.<sup>100</sup> Any bid for popular support which may have induced the Emperor to urge the formation of a Joint Food Ministry and to give it his continued support was powerfully seconded by his knowledge of conditions at the time. These presented a gloomy picture according to the confidential report which Count Czernin submitted to the Emperor April 12, 1917. Among other things, Count Czernin said:

It is quite obvious that our military strength is coming to an end. . . . I allude only to the decrease in raw materials for the production of munitions, to the thoroughly exhausted human material, and, above all, to the dull despair that pervades all classes owing to under-nourishment and renders impossible any further endurance of the sufferings from the war. . . . I am convinced that another winter campaign would be out of the question. . . . The statesman who is neither blind nor deaf must be aware how the dull despair of the population increases day by day; he is bound to hear the sullen grumbling of the great masses.<sup>101</sup>

Such were the motives and the steps which led to the establishment by Imperial Decree of the Joint Food Ministry on February 27, 1917, with Ottakar Landwehr von Pragenau in charge.<sup>102</sup>

The establishment of an organization to centralize and co-ordinate the collection and distribution of food followed in general the coordination effected in industry. But there was one

<sup>100</sup> Redlich, *op. cit.*, p. 150, suggests that the Emperor gave his enthusiastic support to these proposals "to prove to the world that the change in the Monarchy had brought with it a great change in the spirit and nature of the state."

<sup>101</sup> Czernin, Count Ottakar, *In the World War*, pp. 164-165.

<sup>102</sup> Löwenfeld-Russ, *op. cit.*, p. 304, explains that in spite of the importance of the Joint Food Committee and the wide range of activities in which its subordinates engaged, the department was not dignified with the rank of a Department of State, nor was von Pragenau ranked as a Minister, although the term "Joint Food Ministry" and "Joint Food Minister" was in current usage.

important difference. Whereas measures looking to the regimentation of the industrial life of the Empire were enacted in certain instances before the advent of the War, corresponding measures relating to food came belatedly and under pressure of necessity. In part because of this delay, the Military was able to exact a disproportionate share in the considerations of the Joint Food Ministry. Also, because of the delay, the Provinces had been able to build up a resistance to the demands of the Central Government, and profiteers and smugglers were able to operate successfully despite special inspectors, police, and citizens' organizations formed to combat these extra-legal activities.<sup>103</sup>

Upon occasion, the independent action of the military authorities disrupted the calculations of the civil food administrators. Thus in early 1917, the Austrian Food Administration received from Germany 350 carloads of rye flour only to have the entire shipment seized by the Army.<sup>104</sup> At other times, the contributions of the Military were of considerable help.

#### SUPPLIES FROM THE OCCUPIED AREAS

With a view to relieving the strain in the hinterland, either by direct shipments, or indirectly by shipments to the various armies, great care was taken to exploit those regions which had been conquered by the combined German and Austro-Hungarian Armies; in particular, Russian Poland, Serbia, Roumania, and the Ukraine.

During 1915, the German and the Austro-Hungarian Armies for the second time occupied Congress Poland. For administrative purposes, the country was divided into two parts of which the southern fell to the Austro-Hungarian Command. The line of demarcation was drawn in an easy curve from the *Dreikaiserecke*<sup>105</sup> up and eastward to a point approximately one-third of the distance between Lublin and Warsaw, thence in the same

<sup>103</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 308-318.

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 301.

<sup>105</sup> The point roughly 40 kilometers northwest of Cracow where the frontiers of the three Empires met.

curve to the Bug near Opalin. The area contained some 45,000 square kilometers with a population according to the last census of 4½ million.<sup>106</sup> When the Military Government held a census November 15, 1916, however, it was found that the population was 3,506,967, fifty per cent of those over sixteen years of age being illiterate. The difference, important under the circumstances, was explained as the result of recruiting of troops for the Russian Army, and the withdrawal of government officials and their families in the face of the impending occupation by the Central Powers.<sup>107</sup>

In spite of military regulation of the distribution of seed, supervision of cultivation and harvest, price regulation and insistence upon the delivery of produce at designated depots, the harvest of 1915 was disappointing to the military authorities. The single exception was potatoes, but even here, the shortage of man power in the fields and the shortage of vehicles for transport resulted in a loss of most of the crop.

Nor were the harvests of 1916 and 1917 abundant, in spite of redoubled effort on the part of the authorities which took the form of rationing the population for flour, bread, potatoes, fat, sugar, and meat, as well as the prohibition against either the slaughter or fattening for slaughter of calves, cows before the fourth calf, hogs under 100 kilograms on the hoof, and all domestic animals in gestation.<sup>108</sup>

A further handicap to efficient farming was to be found in the shortage of horses, and for two reasons. In 1916, a small number of diseased horses was discovered, but in spite of the efforts of the veterinary corps the epidemic spread. This was chiefly due to the impossibility of establishing an effective quarantine. The peasants were urged to report to the authorities the presence of sickly horses in a village, but when it was found that the animals were seized and destroyed, the peasants

106 Mitzka, R., in Kerchnawe, H. *et al*, *Die Militärverwaltung in den von den Oesterreichisch-Ungarischen Truppen Besetzten Gebieten*. p. 10. Hereafter, this work will be cited as Kerchnawe, H., *Die Militärverwaltung*, etc.

107 *Ibid.*, pp. 17-18.

108 *Ibid.*, p. 21.

refused to make further reports. The other drain on the supply of horses came from the demands of the Military at home. In 1917, 37,941 horses were purchased for the army and shipped out of the occupied territory. In an attempt to overcome the shortage created, the Army of Occupation in Russian Poland organized ox-trains and lent horses and carts to the farmers.<sup>109</sup>

Food was sorely needed in the Monarchy, but with the possible exception of the horses mentioned above, food in appreciable quantities was not sent out of Russian Poland to Austria-Hungary.<sup>110</sup>

Greater success attended the attempt to send industrial products to the hinterland. Production of the coal mines in the Dombrowa region was increased from 100 cars daily in May, 1915, to 553 cars daily three months later. The dire need for raw materials and machines within the Monarchy led to the stripping of machines from factories not operating or which would not be placed in operation by the military government. During 1916 a variety of industrially valuable ores were shipped out: 565 carloads of zinc, 346 of lead, 149 of sulphur, 137 of pyrites, 107 of copper, and 2,904 of iron.<sup>111</sup>

In general, however, production was retarded for reasons difficult to overcome. There was a psychological deterrent in the belief that the Russian Army might reoccupy the region and the fear that any effort expended in reestablishing production would be fruitless in view of the certain destruction from renewed military operations. To this feeling was added the usual shortage in such circumstances: lack of capital, lack of workers and managers, the impossibility of reconstruction in some instances in the twice-fought-over area, and finally, in June, 1918, the almost complete cessation of industrial activity as the result of shipping the entire Dombrowa coal output to the Monarchy.<sup>112</sup>

<sup>109</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 23.

<sup>110</sup> The disposition of these horses is not given. However, horses were used for food at the time. In reports on the available meat supplies, the term "*Schlachtpferde*", (slaughter-horses) frequently appears.

<sup>111</sup> Mitzka, R., in Kerchnawe, H., *op. cit.*, pp. 23-24.

<sup>112</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 25-26.

When the Military Government for Serbia was established January 1, 1916,<sup>113</sup> that country presented an interesting problem for the administrator who desired to obtain supplies for the Army of Occupation and if possible a surplus to ship to the hungry peoples at home. This region of 29,664 square kilometers appeared potentially capable of reasonably high productivity, but the long Turkish domination, followed by the internal political struggles, and lastly almost five years of warfare preceding the Austro-Hungarian occupation, had created situations which had made intensive cultivation difficult, if not impossible. A census taken by the Army of Occupation indicated a population of 1,373,511, or 46 to the square kilometer, as against the pre-War density of 66, with 40 per cent more women than men. A further obstacle was to be found in the natural disinclination of the Serbians to produce a surplus for the benefit of the conqueror.<sup>114</sup>

The immediate tasks confronting the Military Administration, before the question of production could be solved, was the alleviation of suffering within the country, the clearing away of debris in the War-torn districts, especially along the Save and Danube Rivers where fighting had been heaviest, and the repair of what meager means of communication there had been before the invasion. Even more important, and more difficult in view of the backwardness of the rural districts and the disorganization of communication and transport, was the battle which was waged against disease by the Sanitary Corps. It was estimated that from the autumn of 1914 to the time of the occupation, 300,000 had died of typhoid and spotted fever, and this figure did not include the epidemic which carried off approximately 50,000 Austro-Hungarian prisoners of war. Nevertheless, within six months, the epidemic was reported under control.<sup>115</sup>

The attack on the economic problem was carried out on three fronts: (1) a general revival of production on the land and in the forests; (2) increase in productivity through more intensive

113 Kerchnawe, H., *Die Militärverwaltung*, etc., p. 56.

114 *Ibid.*, p. 53-54.

115 *Ibid.*, pp. 63-64.

farming, introduction of new products, and the placing of new land under cultivation; and (3) the final disposition of the products.

As this program was developed, with the use of troops in the fields, decrees calling for compulsory labor of the population in the harvest, and finally, under pressure of need at home during 1917, the requisitioning of farm products, definite surpluses were obtained. The following table indicates the deliveries actually made by the spring of 1918 as well as estimates for the harvest of 1918, which, as was not the case in Poland, was garnered before the breakdown of the Central Powers.<sup>116</sup>

	For the Army of Occupation	For the Army in the Hinterland
Wheat and Rye .....	216,900 quintals	616,000 quintals
Maize .....	48,900 "	13,500 "
Oats and prepared feed .....	129,100 "	2,100 "
Barley .....	6,700 "	6,800 "
Hay .....	284,800 "	266,000 "
Beeves .....	97,400 head	150,700 head
Sheep .....	98,000 "	205,300 "
Hogs .....	51,800 "	70,100 "
Milch Goats .....		27,400 "

In the military occupation of Roumania, the situation differed in important respects from that in Serbia. On December 6, 1916, control of Bucharest and Wallachia was assumed by the Central Powers. The Military Administration was entirely monopolized by the German Army,<sup>117</sup> but Austria-Hungary was given representation on the eighteen Commissions organized to exploit the economic resources of the territory with the understanding that the spoils of war were to be divided.<sup>118</sup> Collection from the three

<sup>116</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 168-169. The inclination to treat more completely Kerchnawe's report on the multifarious activities which were carried out under his jurisdiction in Serbia must here be resisted. Of genuine interest were the problems encountered in the attempt to educate the peasantry in agricultural matters, the failure to improve the runty cattle, the organization of the school children into foraging parties to collect flower seeds, and many other matters of a similarly wide variety.

<sup>117</sup> Sobotka, F., in Kerchnawe, H., *Die Militärverwaltung*, etc., pp. 305-6.

<sup>118</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 310-311.

and one-fourth million agrarian populace of what remained of the preceding harvest was immediately undertaken with the result that of the grain, maize, and vegetables, such as dried peas and beans and legumes, about 50,000 carloads were shipped to Austria-Hungary, 40,000 to Germany, and several thousand carloads each to Bulgaria and Turkey. No contribution of meat could be made to the hinterland from the occupied area of Roumania since the requisitioning by the Roumanian Army had greatly reduced the supply of cattle, sheep, and hogs. In spite of this fact, care was taken not to reduce further the total livestock belonging to the Roumanian peasantry.

Of a variety of industrial products, one received particular attention, and that was oil. Before the arrival of the invaders, the refineries, the wells, and the more than 300 million lei reserves of petroleum, had been destroyed. By the end of the occupation, 200 wells were in operation with a daily output of 100 carloads. At first, through German insistence that this oil was needed for German U-boats, Austria-Hungary was excluded from a share of the product. By May, 1917, however, Austria-Hungary was allotted a small area for exploitation, but production was negligible.<sup>119</sup>

From the spring of 1917 on, it was increasingly apparent that nothing short of a miracle could save the Dual Monarchy, and especially the Austrian half. By the end of the year, the food shortage had become so great that it was a determining factor in Austria's participation in the Brest-Litovsk negotiations with Russia.

The demand of the Ukrainian Delegates on January 10, 1918, for a separate peace coincided with news from Vienna of conditions approaching starvation accompanied by strikes and revolutionary movements. The Emperor himself telegraphed to Czernin January 17th that if peace were not made quickly there would be revolution and that the whole fate of the Monarchy and the Dynasty depended upon the immediate conclusion of a treaty.

<sup>119</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 312-315.

The members of the Ukrainian *Rada*, or National Assembly, who carried on the negotiations for the Ukraine from the middle of January, were fully aware of Austria's need. They stated that there were at least a million tons of foodstuffs in the Ukraine which could be exchanged for the manufactured articles of the Central Powers.

On February 9, the Ukrainian Treaty was signed; but Count Czernin warned Vienna against raising too high hopes of immediate relief on that account because of the almost insurmountable difficulties of transport and the progress of the Bolshevik Movement in the Ukraine which made it unlikely that the Provisional Government there would be able to fulfill its treaty obligations. Trotsky, meanwhile, well aware of the developing situation, broke off negotiations asserting that Russia would cease hostilities but would not conclude a peace treaty on the terms offered it by the Central Powers.<sup>120</sup>

While the peace negotiations were being conducted at Brest-Litovsk between the Central Powers and Bolshevik Russia and the Ukraine, representatives of Germany and Austria-Hungary were conferring at Berlin on the proportional division of the supplies which it was expected would come from the Ukraine. The ratio for Austria-Hungary and Germany in the matter of wool was to be 38 to 62; flax 45 to 55; silk 1 to 2; cotton goods 5 to 8; mineral oil products 1 to 2; hides 4 to 7; etc. But these plans were rudely interrupted on February 10 by the withdrawal of Trotsky from the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk. Therefore, instead of establishing commercial relations on the basis of a treaty with the Ukrainian People's Republic, Germany, on February 18, followed ten days later by Austria-Hungary, invaded the Ukraine.<sup>121</sup> By the first week of May, 1918, the entire Ukraine had been overrun by the Central Powers. The Austro-Hungarian Armies occupied the three governments of Podolia, Cherson and Jekaterinoslav bordering the Black Sea and the

<sup>120</sup> Gratz and Schüller, *The Economic Policy of Austria-Hungary*, pp. 87-109.

<sup>121</sup> Krauss, A. in Kerchnawe, H., *Die Militärverwaltung*, etc., pp. 361-365



Sea of Azov, an area equal to the Empire of Austria without Galicia, while the German Army controlled the remainder.

The military invasion of the Ukraine was effected by both armies with ease and precision—a “railway invasion,” according to General Krauss.<sup>122</sup> The next step, once headquarters had been established at Odessa, that of establishing contact with the Ukrainian Administration looking to the fulfillment of the terms of the Treaty of Peace, was anything but simple. It was highly disconcerting to the Austro-Hungarian Command in the Ukraine to discover that, whereas the diplomats at Brest-Litovsk had signed a document of tremendous importance to Austria-Hungary, within the Ukraine there was no apparent administration, little national sentiment, and no national army.<sup>123</sup> The Bolsheviks had swept all this away before they in turn were swept away by the armies of the Central Powers. The “Bread Peace,” as the treaty with the Ukrainian People’s Republic was popularly called in Vienna, was thus meaningless so far as accomplishing the delivery of supplies by the agencies of one government to the representatives of another. Disorganization went even farther. Odessa refused to be considered as part of the Ukrainian Republic, and paid no heed to instructions from Kiev. Factories were closed for lack of fuel and the unemployed formed a hostile and dangerous element. Supplies were entirely in the hands of the peasants who would only give them up on a barter basis. With the exception of a few officials maintained in office by the Austro-Hungarian Military, the people were uncooperative and hostile.<sup>124</sup>

The disappointment felt at home over the failure to obtain large quantities of vital foodstuffs may be gathered from the telegram which the Emperor Charles sent to the Commander of the Austro-Hungarian Army in the Ukraine April 1.

The collections in the Ukraine are insufficient. The continuation of the War is in question if the results of the requisitioning are not

<sup>122</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 365.

<sup>123</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 366.

<sup>124</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 368-369.

soon substantially better. The most important task of the troops in the Ukraine is the seizure and shipment of food. Provisioning of the army is not alone involved, but of first importance is the alleviation of hunger in the hinterland.<sup>125</sup>

In spite of official pressure, the food deliveries effected by 120,000 men were relatively insignificant. In all fairness, however, it should be noted that the energies of these men were increasingly expended on the suppression of minor insurrections and in the maintenance of order.

Accurate statistics are not available on the amount of food which reached Austria-Hungary from the Ukraine. The individual soldiers sent home parcel-post packages, whenever they could, containing flour, sugar, rice, bacon, soap and canned fish. Borrowing from the example of the German authorities who first saw the possibilities in this traffic, the Austro-Hungarian Command gave the troops four extra kronen a day to be expended in this manner. But this method of indirect assistance to the homeland was handicapped by the shortage of adequate containers. In any event, beginning in June, ten carloads of food packages were sent out daily.<sup>126</sup>

To the unofficial package traffic should be added the equally unofficial, but welcome, activity of the smugglers. Estimates place the amount thus received at 15,000 carloads, or 150,000 tons, of assorted foods.<sup>127</sup>

Official figures present the following as having been imported into the Monarchy from the Ukraine up to November, 1918:

46,225	tonne	of grain and flour (one million tons were needed)
11,157	"	of vegetables, fodder and seeds
2,170	"	of butter, fat, and bacon
977	"	of oil and cooking fat
325	"	of cheese
473	"	of fish and fish products

<sup>125</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 371.

<sup>126</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 385.

<sup>127</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 390. The author does not give further details. Presumably this was an unofficial border traffic which, since it brought food out of the Ukraine, was not restrained by the authorities.

24,973	"	of sugar	
7,836	"	of assorted foods	
1,571	"	of corned beef	
55,421		beeves	
40,027		horses	
32,433		cases of eggs	(1 Tonne = 2,204.62 lbs.)

General Krauss, Austro-Hungarian Military Governor of the Ukraine, makes a significant comparison between the results of his efforts in the Ukraine and those of Major General Kerchnaw, the Military Governor for Serbia. Serbia, with one-twentieth of the area under cultivation, and with less than one-twentieth of the cattle, was able to contribute from the poor harvest of 1916 alone 47,680 tons of grain, as against 46,225 from the Ukraine; 50,891 oxen, 1,869 hogs and 43,584 sheep, as against 55,421 steers from the Ukraine.<sup>128</sup>

The failure of the "Bread Peace" was all too obvious.

The apparently endless privation which was intensified with the passage of time, the shortage of dwellings, especially for the urban workers with the attendant inconvenience and dangerous social consequences, the intolerable working conditions within the war industries and, lastly, the regimentation necessitated by War regulations, had a profound effect upon the psychology of the people of Austria. Those very characteristics which made the working classes of Austria in general immune to chauvinistic exhortations and war fever in 1908, and again in the Balkan Wars,<sup>129</sup> produced under the attendant conditions of the World War a passive despair devoid of enthusiasm in spite of the efforts of the Administration. And finally, when the government realized that improvements in the living and labor conditions of the working people, both men and women, would have to be made, the damage had been done. The establishment of a Ministry of Public Health and another of Social Welfare, not to mention numerous regulations covering wages and hours in the

<sup>128</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 389-390.

<sup>129</sup> Hanusch, F., and Adler, E., *Die Regelung der Arbeitsverhältnisse im Kriege*, p. 4-5.

war industries, could effect little improvement in the time remaining and under the prevailing conditions.<sup>130</sup>

It was in truth a question as to how long human endurance in the aggregate would or could accept intolerable conditions. It was a question as to where and when social and economic crumbling would appear. A weakening of the social fabric, largely induced by the economic situation, is shown by the increase in crime. For the few months following the outbreak of the War, there was less evidence of crime than in peace time. During 1916, there was a slight increase as compared to the pre-war rate; in 1917 there was a sharp increase, especially in sexual crimes, robbery, and vagrancy; while during 1918, although statistics are lacking for the months following the breakdown, a reasonable estimate places the increase at 40 per cent.<sup>131</sup>

No less important and significant than the steady increase in crime, but more startling by far and more effective as an indication of the handwriting on the wall, was the epidemic of spontaneous strikes which broke out in January, 1918.

On January 6, it was found necessary to reduce the already meager flour ration by 50 per cent. This was followed by a further reduction of 50 per cent announced January 12.<sup>132</sup> The announcement of this second reduction was apparently the last straw; the factory workers mutinied.<sup>133</sup> Spontaneous strikes

<sup>130</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 17-18.

<sup>131</sup> Exner, F., *Krieg und Kriminalität in Oesterreich*, pp. 17-20.

Dr. Exner indicates that just as the complexion of the population changed by the drafting for war service, so did the criminal element change, the latter being a social and psychological evidence of the Group. The phases of this change in criminal statistics follow the changes in the psychology of the population. The author observes the following psychological periods:

1. Period of war enthusiasm, roughly to the beginning of 1915. Following the crest of this wave, came
2. Period of fulfilment of duty, or the "carrying on" in spite of difficulties. This to 1917. Then came
3. Period of exhaustion when resistance began to ebb, and
4. Period of the breakdown representing a fearful social collapse which continued until the stabilization in the autumn of 1922.

<sup>132</sup> *Der Oesterreichische Volkswirt.*, Jan. 6 and Jan. 12, 1918.

<sup>133</sup> Factory workers were under the supervision of the War Department,

broke out January 15 in Wiener-Neustadt, St. Pölten, and Trieste. By the 17th, they had spread to Vienna and other important cities. At the outset, mass demonstrations by the workers gave the appearance of the beginning of a revolution, but the military authorities rushed troops of different nationalities into the affected areas and the strikes remained strikes.<sup>134</sup> On the 19th, the government appealed to the leaders of the Social Democratic Party, promising an increase in the supply of food, the immediate resumption of peace negotiations, and the abolition of militarization in industry. In order to encourage the workers to return to the factories, the Minister of War promised that no punitive measures would be taken against those who resumed work immediately.<sup>135</sup>

Similar strikes continued to break out in widely separated districts, and the industrial life of the country, sufficiently weakened by the loss of man power and widespread under-nourishment, was thereby increasingly crippled during the remainder of the year. Dr. Julius Deutsch, one of the Social Democratic leaders, has pointed out that these strikes were caused chiefly by hunger, and that they broke out in different industries in any given district and then became general within the region. The Social Democratic Party, as an organization, opposed these strikes on the ground that the time had not yet come for a general strike throughout the entire country, and that these sporadic strikes might unduly and prematurely weaken the cause of the workers.<sup>136</sup>

As a result of the strikes in January, a small restitution in the flour ration was made to the factory workers, but in order to do this, the flour had to be taken from the ration of some

and the discipline of the barracks had been maintained in the factories by army officers. The action of the workers was indicative of their desperate plight and the extent to which disintegration had crept into the military field.

<sup>134</sup> Bauer, O., *The Austrian Revolution*, pp. 34-35.

<sup>135</sup> See *Der Oesterreichische Volkswirt*. Kalendarium, for these dates.

<sup>136</sup> Deutsch, J., *Geschichte der österreichischen Gewerkschaftsbewegung*, Vol. II, pp. 45-46.

other group. In this case, the necessary adjustment was made at the expense of the troops at the front. And here, more difficulty was encountered, for a wave of mutinies resulted.

#### MASS DESERTIONS IN THE ARMY

Mass desertions in the army became more noticeable. Nationalistic opposition was sharpened by privation and war weariness at home and was reflected in the hungry ill-clad troops at the front.<sup>137</sup> There had been embarrassing desertions in the early days of the War, but the significant feature of the desertions of 1918 was the fact that they were not confined to any particular nationality. It was no longer chiefly the Czechs who refused to fight. Moreover, trouble of this nature broke out not only in the front line, but in the interior as well. The mutineers were, wherever possible, surrounded and captured, sometimes only after a pitched battle in which machine guns and even field pieces were brought into play, but frequently the number who escaped exceeded those captured. Difficulties of this nature in the army itself, while numerous after January, increased as a result of the failure of the June offensive against Italy on the Piave. The following examples indicate the nationality representation among the disaffected, the extent of territory involved, and the methods used in coping with the situation.<sup>138</sup>

In February, what had been considered a thoroughly loyal Hungarian unit stationed on the Piave left the line and marched toward Livenna. It was overpowered by a German detachment at the cost of many lives. At the end of February, a mutiny in the fleet at Cattaro was suppressed by a detachment of marines brought up from Pola. At about the same time, the 22nd In-

<sup>137</sup> The civilian population got along with old clothes, but the conditions in the army were deplorable by the winter of 1917-18. Many of the soldiers were barefoot. Frozen hands and feet were the order of the day. In some sectors, only those in the front line were properly clad, while those in the rear were but half-clad, having loaned shirts, trousers, and shoes to those who were called for front-line duty. See Graz, and Schüller. *Der Wirtschaftliche Zusammenbruch Oesterreich-Ungarns*, p. 145.

<sup>138</sup> Examples taken from Ingram, E.M.B., in Temperley, H., (Ed.), *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, Vol. IV, pp. 50-52.

fantry Regiment (Serbo-Croat) deserted at Mostar, and 8,000 Poles deserted at Temesvar and started for Roumania. A loyal Croat regiment was sent in pursuit of the latter who were captured after a pitched battle. From the depots behind the lines, desertions increased, but these were largely individual cases, which, however, amounted to a considerable number. In March, the police of Budapest rounded up 600 and, during April, 1,000 more such deserters. In February, when the 14th Infantry Regiment (German) started from Linz to the Southern Front, more than 200 soldiers escaped. In this same movement of reinforcements, the 34th Infantry Regiment (Magyar-Slovak) also mutinied and started in the opposite direction. In Slavonia- and Bosnia-Herzegovina there were an estimated 17,000 deserters, while conservative opinion placed the total number for the entire country at over 100,000. Quite apart from the effect on the other troops, these men presented a serious problem to the countryside where they roamed and of necessity lived by plunder.

#### GROWING INFLUENCE OF THE SOCIALISTS

As the economic and military disintegration pursued its course throughout 1918, the Austrian administrative leaders had been forced to recognize the increasing importance of the Social Democratic Party and its representatives in the *Reichsrat*. In the January strikes of 1918, it was the party leaders who were able to induce the workers to return to their tasks. Further, the breakdown in military discipline in the interior as it applied to both barracks and factories made possible the formation of Workers' and Soldiers' Councils which, together with the Peasants' Councils subsequently organized, took matters into their own hands and worked or not as they saw fit; coercion by the government was out of the question. Only the authority of the party leaders was effective as a restraining influence.<sup>139</sup>

With defeat imminent, the upper-class parties remained discreetly passive, depending upon the Social Democratic leadership

<sup>139</sup> Bauer, O., *op. cit.*, pp. 60, 86.

to hold the lower classes in check.<sup>140</sup> Consequently, when in mid-October, 1918, definite steps were taken toward the formation of a new government for what was to be known as German-Austria, it was politically expedient to concede leadership to the Social Democratic Party, a leadership which had been growing ever since the Emperor convened the Austrian Parliament May 30, 1917. Aside from the vacancies created by death or illness, this was the same body which had been prorogued in the spring of 1914. Although the old divisions along national lines reappeared, the Social Democratic Party made common cause with the Minorities in attacking the government. The opposition in Parliament, under the leadership of the Socialists, undertook to relieve the general situation by insistence upon the withdrawal of the most obnoxious of the Imperial Decrees which had been issued during the first two and a half years of the War under Paragraph 14, in restraining the activities of the War Surveillance Office, and in partially removing the restrictions on meetings and assemblies.<sup>141</sup>

#### THE MINORITIES

Economic privation needed no exposition in the daily press after May, 1917, to be fully realized, while the reports of the debates in the lower house of the *Reichsrat* merely brought to general knowledge conditions which were known locally in the several parts of Austria. The administrative and military repression of the minority groups, at the beginning justified by the government and the Military as protective measures, produced two important results.<sup>142</sup> In the first place, leaders of the oppressed peoples slipped over the frontiers in the early days of

140 Eisenmenger, A., *Blockade, The Diary of an Austrian Middle Class Woman, 1914-1924*, p. 72.

141 Redlich, *op. cit.*, p. 149.

142 On this matter, Redlich is most emphatic: "The unfortunate political administration of the military, the Supreme Command, the General Staff, and General Headquarters, contributed more than any other single factor to the political and national breakup of the monarchical machine and its infallible ruin." Redlich, *op. cit.*, p. 79.



the War. In the various national colonies of neutral cities and enemy capitals they worked out plans for the union of kindred peoples of the Empire and their eventual liberation. In the second place, those who remained at home were filled with despair and indignation, with the result that anti-Habsburg propaganda found fertile soil. And, significantly, this was particularly true of the peasants.<sup>143</sup>

By the time Parliament was convened on May 30, 1917, two important events had taken place outside the Monarchy which had bearing on the aspirations of the nationalities of Austria-Hungary. The first was the outbreak of the Russian Revolution, and the second was the entrance of the United States into the European conflict.<sup>144</sup> As to the first, much of the support which the Austrian Poles had given the Monarchy was due to the favored position which these Poles enjoyed. Such treatment was in direct contrast to that accorded the Poles of Russia or Germany. As a natural result, fear of a Russian victory led them to support Austria-Hungary in the War and also to lend their support to the Monarchy in its resistance to German domination.

However, when the Czarist regime was overthrown, when the Entente made the independence of Poland a war aim, and when, on March 30, the Russian Revolutionary Government renounced all claim to territory inhabited by Poles and insisted on their right to self-determination, the Poles generally, and the Austrian Poles particularly, saw the realization of their dreams almost within their grasp. And this was accomplished by other than Habsburg assistance.<sup>145</sup> From this time onward, the Polish Delegation in the Austrian *Reichsrat*, so necessary for a government majority, became increasingly unreliable. From a position of questionable support, these Poles shifted to one of definite opposition to the government when on February 9, 1918, the terms

<sup>143</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 70, 90, 97-98.

<sup>144</sup> War was not declared on Austria-Hungary until December 7, 1917. *Congressional Record* (65th Congress, 2nd Session, 1917-1918), Vol. 56, Part I, p. 80.

<sup>145</sup> Bauer, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk became known.<sup>146</sup> And in the opposition they remained.

In the early days of the War, the mere suggestion that the Southern Slavs of the Monarchy might be united with the Slavs of Serbia would have raised a variety of apparently insoluble problems. Even Berchtold's apprehensions of Serbian developments did not extend to the actual loss of territory long under Habsburg sovereignty. But under the stimulus of wartime repression and persecution, disaffection grew among Croats and Slovenes, and many Slav leaders fled. Among these were Supilo and Trumbič, subsequently influential in the movement for unification. A Yugoslav Committee was formed by them in London in 1915 which issued a call for a free and united Jugoslavia. But Great Britain and France were not at the time prepared to support a program involving the breaking up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and the Yugoslav declaration was given slight consideration. Finally, however, on January 10, 1917, the Entente Powers, in their reply to President Wilson's request for their statement of war aims, included proposals for the restoration of Serbia and Montenegro and the liberation of the Southern Slavs of the Monarchy.

Within Austria, an opportunity for voicing the cause of Southern Slav solidarity was presented in the convening of the *Reichsrat*, May 30, 1917. Under the leadership of a Roman Catholic priest, Father Koroseč, the thirty-three Southern Slav Deputies issued a Manifesto which demanded the union of all

<sup>146</sup> *United States, Treaties, Texts of the Ukraine Peace.*

Particularly irritating to the Austrian Poles was the secret clause which set up "a special crown-land of Bukowina and that part of East Galicia which is preponderantly inhabited by Ukrainians." The Poles had anticipated the addition of a large non-Polish region rather than the loss of it. Such a storm of opposition was raised by the Poles that the negotiations had to be reopened March 3. However, in the new treaty, secret clauses gave the Little Russian parts of Galicia and Bukowina to the Ukraine. When the Poles found out about this, there was another tempest. The Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office had to cancel these clauses. The net result was ill-feeling on the part of the Ukrainians from whom the Austrians needed food, and anger on the part of the Poles and loss of Polish support in the *Reichsrat*.

territories within the Monarchy inhabited by Serbs, Croats, or Slovenes. According to the wording of this document, a form of Trialism was demanded, but it is doubtful whether many serious-minded or responsible Austrian leaders were deceived by that part of the Manifesto which concerned the future relations with the Monarchy.

A very important advance in the Yugoslav cause came with the Declaration of Corfu, July 20, 1917. Drawn up by Trumbić the President of the Yugoslav Committee, and Pasić, the Serb Premier, this Declaration made the union of the Southern Slavs an official Serb war aim. It rejected any partial unification and provided for a democratic and parliamentary government under the Karageorgevič Dynasty. The Declaration provided for equality of religions and alphabets, and stated that a constitution would be drawn up by a Constituent Assembly to be elected on the basis of universal suffrage. A concession to Croatian particularism was indicated in the promise that local autonomous administrations would be permitted within the framework of the central administration.

After the Declaration of Corfu, the Southern Slav leaders within the Monarchy abandoned all serious thought of cooperating with either the Austrian or the Hungarian Administration. The Southern Slav Deputies in the Austrian *Reichsrat* conferred frequently with the Czech Deputies; and supported the latter in their parliamentary opposition and obstruction.

For the Czechs, the fall of the old Russian Government meant a simplification of their problems. Previously, certain influential Czech leaders had believed that their future lay in the hands of Russia, that the best they could expect might be autonomy under Russian influence. This feeling was not held by Masaryk or the Czech National Council abroad, however, and the failure of the Czarist Government facilitated the carrying out of their plans with the people at home.<sup>147</sup> A further simplification of the Czech problems came in an unexpected manner from an unexpected source. It was none other than the Emperor of Austria

<sup>147</sup> Masaryk, T.G., *The Making of a State*, p. xviii.

who placed before the Czech people two alternatives, and there was little doubt by the spring of 1918 which of these alternatives would be chosen.

Unquestionably, the Emperor Charles hoped to reduce the friction and improve the situation in Bohemia when on May 19, 1918, he issued an Imperial Rescript providing for the separation of the dominantly German from the dominantly Czech districts of Bohemia, effective January 1, 1919.<sup>148</sup> During the early days of the War, there had been talk in certain Czech political circles of the possibility of federalization within the framework of the Austrian State at the close of the War, but between May 30, 1917, when such a plan was presented by the Czech deputies in the *Reichsrat*,<sup>149</sup> and May 19, 1918, when the Emperor's Rescript was made known, sentiment among the Czechs of Bohemia had shifted definitely away from federalization. It was now clear to the Czechs that the dream of years, the restoration of the lands of the Bohemian Crown, would be dissipated in the event of a victory by the Central Powers. Henceforth, it was to be either complete independence or partition for Bohemia. An additional effect of this Rescript was to be found in the closer cooperation between the Czech leaders at home and the National Council at Paris.

Beginning with the strikes of January, 1918, the forces of dissolution, so long in the making, received encouragement from the outside, and rapidly passed beyond the control of the government. One of the extraordinary features of the period from January to mid-October of 1918 was the manner in which the man in the street, as evidenced by the almost daily comments of the press, was aware of the realities of the situation, whereas responsible members of the government were blind to the march of events. In general it may be said that the Czech National

<sup>148</sup> *Reichsgesetzblatt*, 1918, p. 453.

<sup>149</sup> The failure of the Czech deputies at home to support the more advanced program of Masaryk and Beneš abroad frequently caused Masaryk great embarrassment and concern. This was especially true with the publication of a "disavowal" of their work by the Czech Deputies Nov. 19, 1916. Masaryk, *op. cit.*, pp. 128-129, 374.

Council at Paris, working with the tacit encouragement of the Entente, and later with its benediction, represented the most advanced position, while the Czech leaders at home followed their fellows in Paris. Next, with the Czech National Council representing the advance-guard, came the more enlightened sections of opinion among the Germans of Austria, in particular, the leaders of the Social Democratic Party. Bringing up the rear were the members of the Austrian Administration, forced by circumstance into a policy of compromise after the time for compromise had passed.

Finally, by October, 1918, after the representatives of all the subject peoples of the Monarchy had amply illustrated their refusal to treat further with the Central Government under any circumstances, and while the Social Democrats of Austria and the Viennese press generally and openly admitted that the Empire could not be held together by any human agency, the Administration was willing to offer unsatisfactory half-measures vaguely worded and highly inadequate.

The mileposts along this road to ruin may be briefly indicated. Encouragement from beyond the frontiers was of prime importance. An example of this was to be found in President Wilson's "Fourteen Points" of January 8, 1918. Of these, three bore directly on the future of Austria-Hungary. The ninth stipulated that "a readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality," the tenth stated that "the peoples of Austria-Hungary . . . should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development,"<sup>150</sup> and the thirteenth stipulated that "an independent Polish State should be erected which should include territory inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic inde-

150 This tenth point was immediately taken up in Austria and subsequently referred to as "the right of self-determination," but, as Miss Wambaugh has pointed out, the principle of self-determination was not one of the Fourteen Points. The rights and interests of nationalities were to be considered, but this did not imply that the people themselves were to decide. Wambaugh, S., *Plebiscites Since the World War*, Vol. I, p. 11.

pendence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant."<sup>151</sup> Specifically, the Italians and the Poles were thus singled out, and the other nationalities were cared for under a general classification. This pronouncement gave heart to the various national groups within the Monarchy and encouraged the Czech National Council in Paris to renewed efforts in propaganda activities, not to mention the encouragement which was given to the various colonies in the United States and elsewhere which were loyally supporting the causes of their respective peoples under Habsburg rule.

Judging by the effects of this statement of war aims, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office was completely numb. The Joint Foreign Minister was already in possession of the terms of the Treaty of London, 1915, with the supplementary clauses which covered the Roumanian claims; and the fate of South Tyrol and Istria was obvious, even if Roumania was at the moment out of the war, should the Entente be victorious. Furthermore, domestic matters of more importance needed settlement. The negotiations at Brest-Litovsk were holding the center of interest for the Joint Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and then, in mid-January, came the strikes.

#### SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC MANIFESTO

In the negotiations which followed the first epidemic of strikes, slight concessions to the principle of nationality were made by the government on the one hand, and a more complete recognition of the necessity of federalization was admitted by the various party leaders on the other. On January 16, the *Arbeiter Zeitung* published, uncensored, an official Manifesto of the Social Democratic Party which declared that the people would not continue the War for the sole purpose of setting the Emperor of Austria on the throne of Poland or of making it possible for the King of Prussia to establish an economic and military dictatorship over Lithuania and Courland.<sup>152</sup>

<sup>151</sup> Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *Official Statements of War Aims and Peace Proposals*, pp. 237-238.

<sup>152</sup> *Arbeiter Zeitung*, Jan. 16, 1918, p. 1.

The Manifesto further exhorted the workers to fight for an immediate peace without conquest, on the basis of the right of the various peoples within and without the Monarchy to self-determination.<sup>153</sup> On January 19, the Minister President of Austria handed to a delegation of the Workers' Councils a statement by the Joint Minister of Foreign Affairs which promised that peace negotiations would not be allowed to fail because of territorial questions, and that he, as Foreign Minister, unreservedly recognized the right of the Poles to self-determination. Also, the food rations were to be increased. These promises were accepted as such by the majority of the party leaders in attendance.<sup>154</sup>

On January 20, there was a meeting of the German, Czech, Polish, and Slovene Social Democratic leaders in the *Reichsrat*. It was agreed that the time for a revolution had not yet come. It was further admitted at this meeting that the Slavs of the Monarchy would no longer remain under alien (Habsburg) domination. As a result of these conversations there was drawn up "The Nationality Program of the Left." This program, subsequently adopted officially by the Austrian Social Democratic Party, called for the establishment of constituent assemblies for every area in which a specific language was spoken. According to the plan, federalization might be smoothly and quickly effected, for the members of the various assemblies could be chosen from the language areas by free and universal suffrage. In this way, Austria would be divided into seven parts: German, Czech, Polish, Ukrainian, Southern Slav, Italian, and Roumanian.<sup>155</sup> This plan was far in advance of anything the govern-

<sup>153</sup> Bauer, O., *op. cit.*, p. 33.

<sup>154</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 37. In this case, a small group of the more radical workers refused to accept the promises of the government as being sufficient for resuming work. This group was later to be identified with the Austrian Communists.

<sup>155</sup> *Der Kampf*, 1918, p. 269. The "Nationality Program of the Left" had its origin in the Brünn Program. This was introduced at a Socialist congress held at Brünn in 1899 and was adopted as a program in 1900. It contained the following points:

(Footnote continued on p. 79)

ment was at that time prepared to consider, although it was adopted in all its essentials by the Emperor in the middle of October, when in a decree he called for the reorganization of Austria. In January, as the "Nationality Program of the Left" or in October as an Imperial Manifesto, the plan was fundamentally inadequate since it applied to the peoples of Austria without Hungary. Nor could it, under the *Ausgleich*, have been otherwise.

While the Minorities were winning recognition abroad,<sup>156</sup>

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1. Austria is to be reorganized as a federation of national states.
  2. In place of the historic Crownlands, national administrations are to be established as a result of elections based on universal suffrage.
  3. The rights of national minorities are to be fully protected by law.
  4. All autonomous areas are to be united in a federation which will thus be composed of autonomous national states.
  5. National priority is not to be recognized and therefore there is to be no official state language. Brügel, L., *Geschichte der österreichischen Sozialdemokratie*, Vol. IV, p. 339.

In view of the subsequent emphasis by Austrians, both in and out of official circles, on the "right of self-determination," it is interesting that the term did not appear either in the Brünn Program, the "Nationality Program of the Left," nor as has been pointed out, in President Wilson's Fourteen Points. The term is however found in the following Communist proclamation published in *Izvestia*, November 16, 1917:

"In compliance with the will of these Congresses, the Soviet of People's Commissars has resolved to adopt as the basis of its activity on the problem of nationalities in Russia the following principles:

1. Equality and sovereignty of the peoples of Russia.
2. The right to free self-determination of peoples even to the point of separating and forming independent states.
3. Abolition of each and every privilege or limitation based on nationality or religion.
4. Free development of national minorities and ethnographic groups inhabiting Russian territory.

Iosif Dzhugashvili [Stalin]  
(Commissar of Nationalities)

V. Ulianov [Lenin]  
(President of the Soviet of  
People's Commissars)

Bunyan, J., and Fisher, H. H., *The Bolsheviki Revolution, 1917-1918*, p. 283.

<sup>156</sup> A Pan-Slav Congress, the so-called "Congress of Oppressed Nationalities," met in Rome, April 8, 9, and 10. The delegates engaged in



events at home were taking a more serious turn. Economic distress was acute. The Peace Treaties signed at Brest-Litovsk and at Bucharest had not produced the expected supplies. Privation and starvation were everywhere evident. The suffering of the populace might have been borne with less grumbling had success crowned the efforts of the General Staff of the Joint Army. But such was not the case. By the middle of June, when it was evident that the carefully planned drive against the Entente on the Italian Front had failed, opposition, recrimination, and despair arose from all sides. In the latter part of June, government officials found that their tasks were becoming more arduous because of the new political alignments which were being formed. Representatives of the Minorities were of course desirous of obtaining more food, but of greater significance was the fact that the Germans of Austria, divided earlier into several hitherto irreconcilable blocs, were now uniting on the principle of more food and an early peace, a peace at first without annexation, and later a peace at any price.<sup>157</sup>

For their part, the Minorities were playing a waiting game, confident that Austria-Hungary could not continue long in the war. Generally speaking, the Minorities were in favor of continuing the War and thus bringing down the Monarchy, while the Germans of Austria would have preferred an immediate peace in the hope that as much of the Empire as possible might be salvaged.

heated denunciation of the Habsburg Monarchy, and upheld the usual "rights" of which the Slavs of the Empire had been deprived. The meetings did not greatly further the cause of Slav union, but the reports of the meetings furthered the cause of the Slavs. On May 31, Senator King submitted two resolutions in Congress which were adopted. One approved the nationalistic aspirations which had been voiced at the Congress of Oppressed Nationalities at Rome, and the other approved the aspirations of the Bohemians specifically, and promised them a welcome into the community of nations. *Congressional Record*, 65th Congress 2nd Session, 1918, Vol. 56, Part 7, p. 7231.

<sup>157</sup> Burián, Count Stephen, *Austria in Dissolution*, p. 374, cites the visit of a delegation of Social Democratic Party leaders in which they demanded increased food and peace. Burián was Joint Minister for Foreign Affairs at that time.

The possibilities of obtaining a peace on the basis of the *status quo ante* were made increasingly difficult with the reiteration of his peace terms by President Wilson on July 4. This time, four points were presented,<sup>158</sup> general principles which should serve as a guide, rather than any detailed stipulations. Although the language was veiled, the intent was clear. The first point stipulated the "destruction of any arbitrary power anywhere that can separately, secretly, and of its single choice, disturb the peace of the world; or if not presently destroyed, at least its reduction to virtual impotence." Autocracy was the target. And, as subsequent events proved, the removal of the German Emperor and, if necessary, the Austrian Emperor, was indicated. The second point was most encouraging to the subject races of the Monarchy, for it demanded: "The settlement of every question, whether of territory, of sovereignty, or of political relationship, upon the basis of the free acceptance of that settlement by the people concerned, and not upon the basis of material interest or advantage of any other nation or people which may desire a different settlement for the sake of its own exterior influence or mastery." The significance of this second point was not lost on the Austro-Hungarian Government, for on July 16, Count Burián, the Joint Minister for Foreign Affairs, remarked that he and President Wilson saw eye to eye, that the government of the Monarchy was willing to fight "for the great interests of humanity, for justice," and that "President Wilson's new points of July 4 shall not, apart from certain exaggerations, arouse our opposition," and that "we are prepared on our own to discuss everything, but not the cession of territory."<sup>159</sup> Aside from the dangers involved in arriving at a separate peace without the consent of the German Ally, the alternatives in mid-July were the continuation of the War or admission of the necessity for constitutional reorganization of the Empire, a situation which no Joint Minister could consider in the face of Hungarian opposi-

158 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *Official Statements of War Aims and Peace Proposals*, pp. 350-351.

159 *Ibid.*, p. 354.

tion. The War thus had to be continued, but for this, the budget must be voted.

The primary purpose, then, in convening the Austrian *Reichsrat* on July 16 was to have the budget adopted. The Administration expected difficulties, for Minister President von Seidler had become increasingly unpopular since his dismissal of the *Reichsrat* on May 4th and his subsequent dictatorship under Paragraph 14.<sup>160</sup> There was, in fact, serious doubt in advance as to whether he could obtain a majority to support him. Anticipating opposition, the Administration expected to face what might be called a normal Austrian *Reichsrat*, an arena famous for its disorder. On this occasion, the opposition was voiced by blocs which had hitherto been on the government side. This was unexpected and significant.<sup>161</sup> When the Minister President opened the first meeting, he was greeted with shouts of "Resign!" by the Czech Deputies, and when he began his address, the Czechs, Southern Slavs and many Poles stamped out of the hall. A few German and Polish Deputies, and the crowded galleries, remained to hear the address which was directed especially to the nationalities in the hope of winning their support.<sup>162</sup> But Dr. von Seidler could not obtain a majority and tendered his resignation July 22.<sup>163</sup> A Minister President in the person of von Hussarek was finally found who could obtain a majority and the necessary credits were voted. He was opposed, nevertheless, by the Czech, Southern Slav, Ukrainian, and Social Democratic Deputies.<sup>164</sup>

#### BARGAINING FOR PEACE

During mid-summer, even the government realized that something had to be done. Economic conditions had not improved, the military situation was stalled, and on all sides there was the

160 Nowak, K.F., *The Collapse of Central Europe*, p. III.

161 Allowance must be made for the fact that parliamentary immunity and a less rigid censorship of the published debates encouraged chauvinism.

162 *Arbeiter Zeitung*, July 17, 1918, pp. 1-2.

163 *Ibid*, July 23, 1918, p. 2.

164 *Ibid*, July 27, 1918, pp. 3-4.

discussion of the new states which would soon be formed.<sup>165</sup> Very cautiously, Count Burián, the Joint Minister for Foreign Affairs, on September 14 released his trial balloon. This was in the form of a note to President Wilson suggesting that a conference of representatives from all the belligerent powers meet in a neutral state to discuss the terms of peace. Hostilities were, of course, to continue meanwhile. As a first step in relieving the tension at home, this note was a failure, for the suggestion was immediately rejected by President Wilson who pointed to his frank and repeated statements regarding the terms on which he would consider peace.<sup>166</sup>

The American note forced the government of the Monarchy to consider officially the question of satisfying the demands of the Minorities within the Empire. Internal reorganization was forced upon the government as a preliminary to obtaining an armistice. But reorganization, *i.e.*, federalization, along the lines indicated by President Wilson, raised the specter of the age-old attitude of Hungary toward the Southern Slavs within her territory, not to mention the Slovaks and Roumanians. The relations between Austria and Hungary had been sorely strained during the course of the War and any raising of the Bosnian or Croatian question, for example, was a delicate, if not a dangerous, move.

Nevertheless, with a view to exploring the possibilities, the Emperor suggested that Count Tisza go down into the Southern Slav lands and study the situation. The selection of Count Tisza for this important task was most unfortunate so far as placating the Southern Slavs was concerned, but quite necessary if the cooperation of Hungary was to be obtained. Although at the moment out of office in Hungary, Count Tisza still remained the most influential statesman of that country. But conciliation was not his forte. He was practically incapable of approaching any question save from the standpoint of Magyar interests. While

<sup>165</sup> The *Arbeiter Zeitung* for Aug. 2, 3, 23 and 25 carried editorials to this effect. That for the 25th was suppressed in its entirety.

<sup>166</sup> Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *Official Statements of War Aims and Peace Proposals*, p. 396.

willing to admit that the Southern Slav problem had reached the point where some solution was necessary, he could see no more satisfactory solution than the transfer, by Imperial Decree or some similar fiat method, of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Hungary, and the union of Dalmatia to Croatia, which would be tantamount to union with Hungary.<sup>167</sup>

It is evident that as he pursued his journey, he became increasingly irritated at the demands of the various Southern Slav leaders. It has been suggested that he was unaware of the reasons for the stiffening in the attitude of these leaders. For just prior to his arrival, a Yugoslav Committee had been formed to direct the efforts toward union and independence, and the Southern Slav leaders were in possession of the very important information that the Bulgarian lines had broken.<sup>168</sup> In any event, at Sarajevo Count Tisza could restrain himself no longer and in a fury he informed the Slav leaders that he was not down there to listen to their demands which were in line with what was being said at Prague, at Laibach, and in the Entente countries. He called self-determination a false principle and declared that he had come to make a survey preliminary to joining those countries to the Crown of St. Stephen.<sup>169</sup> Perhaps the most unfortunate outburst was, "It may be that we shall go under. But before we do so, we shall summon enough power to grind you to pieces." The Southern Slav leaders were thereafter more than ever determined to work for independence, and the presentation of formal protests in the parliaments of the two halves of the Empire, in Vienna by the Slovene deputies and in Budapest by the Croatian leaders, emphasized and advertised the unfortunate incident.<sup>170</sup>

167 Nowak, *op. cit.*, pp. 245-6.

168 *Ibid.*, p. 247.

169 *Reichspost* (Mittagsblatt), Sept. 30, 1918, p. 4.

170 *Reichspost* (Mittagsblatt), Sept. 30, 1918, p. 4. The *Arbeiter Zeitung* September 25, 1918, p. 1, railed editorially at the mere thought of sending what it called a Junker and Hungarian on such a mission, adding that a new deal would come only with new men and a new approach.

During the last days of September two more events, although primarily military in nature, made inevitable the collapse of the Habsburg Empire. On the 24th Bulgaria requested an armistice which was signed on the 29th. By the terms of this armistice, the immediate demobilization of the Bulgarian Army was to be effected; German and Austro-Hungarian troops, diplomatic corps, and citizens, were to be evacuated within four weeks. In short, Bulgarian facilities were to be turned over to the Allies for the continued prosecution of the War against Austria-Hungary from Bulgaria.<sup>171</sup>

On September 28th, the day before the signing of the Bulgarian Armistice, a treaty of alliance between France and Czechoslovakia, the first for the new State, was signed at Paris. By this treaty, the Czechoslovak people were committed to continue to lend their army to the support of France on the various fronts. Direction of this army was vested in the Czech National Council at Paris. For her part, France recognized, in the same manner as the other Allies, the Czechoslovak people as an allied and warring power with a *de facto* government residing in Paris. In addition, France promised in due time to assist in reconstructing the Czechoslovak State in accordance with its former historical boundaries.<sup>172</sup> The Czechoslovak leaders abroad knew definitely what was desired and went about obtaining the goal in a direct and effective manner. At home, the leaders of this

<sup>171</sup> Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *Official Statement of War Aims and Peace Proposals*, pp. 405-6. The chief features of the secret articles were as follows:

1. Free passage of Allied military forces over Bulgarian territory; agreements to be signed within three days at the most covering Allied use of the railways, waterways, telephone and telegraph facilities.
2. Strategic points in the interior to be occupied. This to be considered as a provisional arrangement to serve as a guarantee. Sofia not to be occupied.
3. The General In Chief of the Allied Forces reserves the right to demand the absolute cessation of every relation between Bulgaria and her former allies.
4. The opening of Bulgarian ports to vessels of the Allied and neutral powers.

<sup>172</sup> *Reichspost*, Jan. 15, 1919, p. 4.

group, while eloquent in their denunciation of the Monarchy, were less concrete in their plans. Thus at Paris the dismemberment not only of Austria but also of Hungary took the form of a contractual obligation.

The inability of the Austrian Government to grasp the realities of the general situation was well illustrated on October 1 when the *Reichsrat* again convened. The only concession to reality in the opening address delivered by Minister President von Hussarek was that the government was willing to admit that a certain amount of federalization might be necessary.<sup>173</sup> The consensus of the press opinion in Vienna was that a speech which a year earlier would have been wildly applauded now came too late. The German Deputies were sufficiently disrespectful to term it a "noodle speech." The Hungarians, both in the Budapest Parliament and in the street, were at one in asking how long it had been possible for the Minister President of Austria to make plans for the disposition of what was considered Hungarian territory.<sup>174</sup>

The debate on this message in the Austrian *Reichsrat*, the last of a long line of noisy sessions of this most unruly group, again subjected the Administration to scathing denunciation. The Social Democratic members submitted their memorandum which was more moderate than the demands of some of the Minorities, but even these erstwhile radicals were behind the times. They demanded immediate peace, and pointed out that Austria-Hungary must announce to the world what the conditions of such a peace would be. In addition, the party recommended for adoption seven resolutions which were a *melange* of Entente ideas for the establishing of peace and the "Nationality Program of the Left" for coping with the internal problems.<sup>175</sup>

<sup>173</sup> *Stenographischē Protokolle über die Sitzungen der Provisorischen Nationalversammlung für Deutschösterreich*, Oct. 1, 1918, pp. 4296-7. This report of the proceedings is hereafter abbreviated as *S.P.*

<sup>174</sup> *Reichspost*, Oct. 2, 1918, p. 2.

<sup>175</sup> *S.P.* Oct. 2, 1918, p. 4308-9. They are as follows:

(Footnote continued on p. 87)

From the spectacular angle, the high point of the session came when Stanek, the Czech Deputy, hurled his defiance at all things pertaining to the old order. His words were significant as indicating how far the Czechs had gone along the road to independence. Among other matters, he shouted :

The turning point in this terrible war, which we Czechs did not want and which we fought against, has been passed. The war is approaching an end. The day of judgment is at hand . . . . The time is coming when all races must consider what their attitude is to be toward Austria and Hungary. And we? We have suffered most under the Austrian yoke. Not one drop of blood have we shed will-

1. Establishment of a League of Nations to supervise demobilization and settle questions between states.
2. Avoidance of all forms of economic war, and equal treatment of all nations in economic relations.
3. No annexations. The reestablishment of Serbia, Montenegro and Belgium.
4. No reparations. The reconstruction of small countries which have been destroyed to be effected by raising an international fund among all the warring powers.
5. (The fifth and sixth paragraphs were suppressed by the censor, but were printed the following day in the press.) The eastern question to be settled on the basis of self-determination. The treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest to be revised by a congress to which the Soviet and Roumanian Governments are to be invited. Self-determination for the peoples of the Ukraine, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Esthonia, to be carried out under the supervision of the League of Nations. As to Poland, Austria-Hungary declares that her future will not be settled by secret agreement with Germany, but by the findings of a Constituent Assembly elected by universal manhood suffrage and sitting at Warsaw.
6. Territorial concessions to Italy as in the note of 1915 and as approved by the letter from the Pope in August 1917 should be made. Austria-Hungary thus is willing to settle questions to the south on the basis of self-determination of the Italian and Southern Slav peoples.
7. The relations to each other of the nations of Austria-Hungary is their own affair. In case certain of the powers doubt the intention of the government, Austria-Hungary is again to reiterate that they will have a free hand and to this end, special representative bodies are to be set up to negotiate and to establish the various administrations.

To this last paragraph, the other German-Austrian parties subscribed on October 4, thereby reversing their previous stand for a united Austria. *Arbeiter Zeitung*, Oct. 5, 1918, p. 3.



ingly for the Central Powers. Our co-nationals, however, as an indication of our willingness, are present in all the Entente armies. There we have shed blood gladly, there we have fought for an ideal, have done our part. Reports indicate that France is no longer ravaged by Germany, that the heart of Paris and Calais are not to be German booty. We have helped to bring that about.

At this point, the stenographic report gives a picture of one of those scenes for which the *Reichsrat* was notorious. As Stanek continued, disorder broke out in the chamber. Applause from some deputies, shouts from others, cries of "Treason" from the German deputy Teufel, constant clanging of the gong by the presiding officer in a futile attempt to restore order; Deputy Soukoup threw a brief-case at Teufel, while Deputy Lisy hurled some sort of a metal object, probably an ink-stand, at him.<sup>176</sup>

Following scenes such as this—to the petitions of the Southern Slavs, to speeches like that of Stanek—Baron von Hussarek, the Minister President, could stand on the rostrum and by way of reply voice the following: "After all, this House is here to deal with practical questions. The minority matters which I have just explained are a side issue."<sup>177</sup>

After October 2, the lower house<sup>178</sup> of the Austrian *Reichsrat* assumed more and more the appearance of a German-Austrian body. It became in fact what was suggested in the "Nationality Program of the Left" and what was eventually ordered by Imperial Decree. Although sittings were held regularly, the Czech Deputies were almost invariably absent; so also the Southern Slavs, while a few Poles and a Ukrainian or two might appear. Little was accomplished even by the German members, aside from debating the terrible food situation.<sup>179</sup>

176 *S.P.*, Oct. 1, 1918, p. 4315-4321.

177 *Ibid.*, Oct. 1, 1918, p. 4297.

178 The Upper Chamber or *Herrenhaus* had adjourned *sine die* July 29. It met again October 21, 23, 24, and 30 and accomplished nothing.

179 *Arbeiter Zeitung*, Oct. 9, 1918, p. 2. The only entries in the *Reichsgesetzblatt*, the official register, are departmental orders or regulations. No law passed by Parliament appears. *R.G.Bl.* Jahrg. 1918, pp. 949-1031.

**PART II**  
**GERMAN-AUSTRIA UNDER THE**  
**PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT**

## CHAPTER I

### ESTABLISHMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF GERMAN-AUSTRIA

It was no treaty that set up separate governments at Prague, at Budapest, and at Vienna, for those separate governments had existed since before the German Armistice. And no Peace Conference could have joined together the fragments of an empire which its peoples had put asunder.<sup>1</sup>

This period of Austrian history must be presented in terms of economic and social confusion and not in the outlines of a purely political narrative. In the political impotence of the time, the problems of government were mostly those of liquidating a vast, indeterminate bankruptcy. To describe the events in chronological order would be to reproduce the confusion which was baffling to observers at the time. A topical treatment gives some consistency to the narrative although this approach entails covering the same period more than once from different points of view. But even occasional repetition helps to clarify and lend perspective to the interlocking problems of Austrian reconstruction.

During the summer of 1918, the independent attitude of the stronger national groups within the Austrian Empire became increasingly evident. A stalemate was apparent on all military fronts. The prolonged and drastic shortage of raw materials for industry, of food for the civil and military populations, was taking heavy toll of the physical and spiritual life of the people. And the events of September, particularly the Franco-Czech Treaty of Alliance and the Bulgarian Armistice, finally forced upon the Emperor Charles and his advisers the realization that, if even a part of the Empire were to be salvaged, decisive action and not vague declarations was needed.

<sup>1</sup> Miller, D.H., *The Adriatic Negotiations at Paris*, p. 4.

On October 4, after consulting with his Ministers, the Emperor asked President Wilson for an armistice on the basis of his statements of January 8, July 4, and September 27, 1918.<sup>2</sup> This message, sent via Sweden, was received a day later than the similar German request sent via Switzerland. President Wilson's reply to Germany was received October 9, and demanded the immediate evacuation of France and Belgium as a preliminary to negotiations. Austria-Hungary did not receive a reply until October 19.

In the meantime, the Emperor summoned twenty-eight party leaders of the Austrian Lower Chamber, and four from the Upper Chamber, to meet him October 12 at Baden to discuss federalization for Austria. His overtures were not enthusiastically received. The Germans were attentive, the Poles were sympathetic and respectful, the Czechs and Southern Slavs were not interested in federalization and talked and thought solely of independence.<sup>3</sup> In truth, the Emperor was talking about something which no longer existed. By October 12, there was no Austro-Hungarian Empire, there was only a truncated half. The non-German groups were already launched on their new course, or were making final preparations for it.

On October 7, the Poles assumed control of their own affairs, and the Hungarian Social Democratic Party issued a Manifesto demanding independence for Hungary and the abdication of the old regime.<sup>4</sup> The German National Party of the Austrian Lower Chamber issued a demand for the independence of German-Austria<sup>5</sup> and a national assembly composed of German

<sup>2</sup> Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *Official Statements of War Aims and Peace Proposals*, p. 418.

<sup>3</sup> *Der Oesterreichische Volkswirt*, Kalendarium, Oct. 12, 1918; Nowak, *op. cit.*, p. 255, gives the number as 29; *Neue Freie Presse* (Abend), Oct. 11, 1918, p. 1, and Oct. 12, 1918, pp. 1-2, gives it as 23.

<sup>4</sup> *Arbeiter Zeitung*, Oct. 9, 1918, p. 2; Gratz and Schüller, *The Economic Policy of Austria-Hungary*, p. 276. The Polish Council of Regency issued a proclamation announcing the union of all Polish territories, the summoning of a National Assembly, and the formation of a government representing all parties.

<sup>5</sup> The expression "German-Austria" was used officially in the new State until the Peace Conference of Paris insisted upon the simpler form, Austria.

deputies only.<sup>6</sup> An even better indication of the true direction of the political currents in Hungary was the address by the Hungarian Minister President, Wekerle, delivered before the 1848 Independence Party on October 11. In it he stated that Hungary's relation to Austria had changed, that she would have to be represented independently at the impending peace conference, and that the future tie with Austria would be limited to the Monarch.<sup>7</sup>

From Zurich on October 12, the Yugoslav Committee issued a joint statement which reaffirmed the racial affinity of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. The statement declared that no peace would be acceptable which did not provide for self-determination, that they would themselves decide what their future form of government should be, and that they would recognize no peace agreements in which they had not participated.<sup>8</sup> In addition, the Czech deputy and Vice President of the Lower Chamber of the Austrian *Reichsrat* sensed a plot in the Emperor's proposals at Baden. He pointed out that the intention was to form a liquidations ministry in which representatives of all the nationalities would enter for the purpose of working out a new constitution. Then, he explained, it would be pointed out to the world, and especially to the Peace Conference, that all was harmony and order in Austria-Hungary and that the Entente need not be further concerned. With such a plan, the Czechs would have nothing to do. They were determined to have their own state.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>6</sup> *Neue Freie Presse*, Oct. 8, 1918, p. 6.

<sup>7</sup> In that part of his speech which touched on the minorities, he may have been voicing the opinions of those in power, but he was not as keen in sensing the direction of events. Thus, "We cannot oppose the union of Dalmatia with Croatia. Our laws already provide for that." And as for Bosnia-Herzegovina, ". . . we are inclined to leave the matter to them whether they join us or Croatia." As to nationality, ". . . in principle and at the Peace Conference, or the League of Nations, we will accept this if it applies to all countries . . . . Many of the Slovak districts have already registered their opposition to union with the Czechs. Others are expected to follow." *Reichspost*, October 12, 1918, p. 5.

<sup>8</sup> *Journal des Débats*, Oct. 16, 1918, p. 2.

<sup>9</sup> *Neue Freie Presse* (Abend) Oct. 12, 1918, p. 2.

As if to emphasize this assertion of one of the Czech leaders, a general strike broke out in Bohemia on October 14, two days after the meeting with the Emperor at Baden. As a result of the strike, a formal blockade was erected against Austria and the front. Thus, in addition to the almost total blockade of food products from Hungary, Austria now faced a blockade, not only of food but of industrial products from Bohemia. It was not an accident that Beneš, in Paris, chose the same day to announce the formation of the first Czechoslovak Government, a government which was recognized by France the following day.<sup>10</sup>

#### IMPERIAL MANIFESTO—OCTOBER 16

Since reorganization on the basis of mutual agreement seemed impossible, the alternative was to attempt it by fiat. Following a succession of Crown Councils and discussions attended by the two Ministers President and the Joint Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Emperor issued an Imperial Manifesto which authorized the formation of a federal state. By this proclamation it was hoped that the demands of President Wilson would be met and that the separatist movements in Bohemia and the Southern Slav lands would be quieted.

The vague wording and the lack of concrete suggestions in this historic document merely emphasized the difficulties of this complex problem. The Emperor-King announced that Austria,

<sup>10</sup> Masaryk, *op. cit.*, pp. 508-9, gives the sequence as follows: "October 14, 1918 Dr. Beneš informs the Allied Governments that the National Council has constituted itself in Paris as a Provisional Government and accredits Czechoslovak representatives to them. Next day (October 15) France recognizes the Provisional Government. On October 18th Masaryk, on behalf of the Provisional Government, proclaims Czechoslovak independence at Washington. President Wilson informs Austria-Hungary that the United States has recognized the Czechoslovak Provisional Government, which Italy also recognizes on October 24th. On November 4th Dr. Beneš is invited to take part in the Allied Armistice negotiations at Paris; and on November 15th the first French and British Military Missions are appointed to Prague. Greece and Belgium recognize the Czechoslovak Government on November 22nd and 23rd. On December 4th the Allies recognize the Czechoslovak State, and authorize its troops to occupy Slovakia and to supervise the administration in the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy."

"as its people desire," should be converted into a federal state. Each nation or race within Austria should form its own constitution. The transition was to be smoothly and easily effected by the method already suggested in the Social Democratic Nationality Program: national councils were to be established in the various districts composed of the deputies who had already been duly elected to the *Reichsrat*. Thus the confusion of a general election would be avoided. The Councils could facilitate the negotiations necessary for working out the mutual relationships of the one member-state with another, or with the Central Government. Certain exceptions were made. The city of Trieste with its surrounding territory would be given "a special position in accordance with the wishes of the population." The purely Polish districts of Austria, however, were not to be allowed to join the new independent Poland.<sup>11</sup>

Most significant of all was the sentence near the close of the Manifesto which stated that "the integrity of the territory belonging to the Hungarian Crown shall in no way be affected" by the provisions of the Manifesto. That sentence, added by the Emperor without the knowledge of the Crown Council or the Austrian Minister President, rendered the entire plan worse than useless. It had been inserted upon the insistence of Count Burián, the Joint Minister of Foreign Affairs, and chiefly because the Hungarian Minister President had informed the Emperor that, "if the clause concerning the 'integrity' is not contained in the manifesto, I shall deprive Austria of Hungarian foodstuffs."<sup>12</sup>

The Emperor was attempting the impossible.<sup>13</sup> And yet it

11 *Deutscher Geschichtskalender*, 1918, II, p. 637.

12 Nowak, K.F., *op. cit.*, p. 263.

13 Kelsen commented that every one knew of the Manifesto the day of its release, and that every one considered it a "fruitless attempt" on two grounds contained in the Manifesto itself. Thus:

1. The integrity of the Hungarian Crown was not involved, and
2. The reorganization was to be effected "in a constitutional manner," or by a two-thirds vote in the *Reichsrat*. Since the Polish Delegation had departed, this was out of the question. Kelsen, H. *Oesterreichisches Staatsrecht*, pp. 75-76.

was abundantly clear that in order to obtain peace he must put his house in order. But he could not satisfy the Minorities without offending the Magyars of Hungary. Of this he was well aware before the Manifesto was seriously considered. And in the face of this he attempted to maintain the *Ausgleich*. On the other hand, the possibility was explored that President Wilson might bring about a reorganization of the Empire along lines indicated in his address of January 8, thus accomplishing from the outside what the Emperor found difficult to effect from within. Feelers were even put out on this line of approach. Professor Herron, confidant of President Wilson in Switzerland during the war years, reports a conversation which he had with Professor Lammasch as the unofficial envoy of the Emperor Charles. As quoted by Professor Herron, Lammasch said: "We, and I am always speaking of 'we' as 'Austria', have two great enemies. They are the Magyars, the Hungarians proper, who dominate the whole Empire and whose power is so great that we can do nothing. Our second great enemy, I think maybe equal enemy, is Prussia who because of our internal situation establishes practically a hegemony over us. America must save us from these two enemies. But how? By making it the explicit requirement or condition of peace that Austria shall give integration and autonomy to all the existing national groups within the boundaries of the Austrian Empire."<sup>14</sup>

The Manifesto, addressed to the civil population October 16, was followed by a similar announcement to the armed forces on the following day. The troops were told that the country for which they had fought so loyally was about to be split into national groups. Appreciation was expressed for the devotion of the military forces who were then called upon to continue their support in the difficult period of reorganization which was ahead.<sup>15</sup>

But Masaryk, in Washington, had already settled the fate of the Manifesto. In his own words:

14 "Herron Papers," Verbatim Copies, Austria Vol. I, Document IV, Ms., Hoover War Library.

15 *Deutscher Geschichtskalender*, 1918, II, p. 638.



I heard that the Emperor Charles was preparing a manifesto in which he would promise to transform Austria—not Hungary—into a federal State. He was a drowning man clutching at a straw. Nevertheless his idea was dangerous, and it was necessary to forestall the effect which the manifesto might have in quarters that still retained considerable sympathy for Austria. Therefore I issued at that moment the Declaration of Independence which I had long had in mind. Logically, the Declaration was a consequence of the establishment of our Provisional Government. . . . It also had a tactical value; for by the time the Emperor Charles's manifesto was published, the colors of the free Czechoslovak State were already flying from the house where I lived as President of our Provisional Government. . . . I handed an advance copy of the Declaration to the Secretary of State, Mr. Lansing, so as to secure the approval of the American Government and also in order to remind President Wilson of our standpoint on the eve of his reply to Austria-Hungary.<sup>16</sup>

The effect of the Manifesto on the civil population was hardly what had been desired. Coming as a belated concession on the part of the government, it appeared to one and all as an admission of defeat.<sup>17</sup> The nationalities were, for the most part, past the point where they might be won over to the idea of federalization.

One additional example of the manner in which they again snubbed the government may be given to emphasize the point. As has been suggested, the wording of the Manifesto was vague. The Emperor and his advisers thought best to state merely the principle and to leave the working out of details to a committee. Such a committee, composed of the leaders of the various nationalities represented in the *Reichsrat*, was invited to confer on the matter on October 16. Count Silva-Tarouca who, as Minister of Agriculture for Austria was informed of the general principles which the Emperor had in mind, was to preside, and if possible direct the line of procedure.

<sup>16</sup> Masaryk, *op. cit.*, pp. 294-295. See also p. 394, "I checkmated the Manifesto by declaring our independence October 18."

<sup>17</sup> Burián, Count Stephen, *Austria in Dissolution*, pp. 408-409.

This meeting, so important for the success of the whole plan of federalizing the Austrian half of the Monarchy, was a complete failure for the following reasons: The Czechs refused to attend; the Germans were receptive to the idea, but could not be drawn into a commitment until they had deliberated and reported; the Southern Slavs attended, then withdrew, and after consulting with the Czech leaders who were in the city, refused to cooperate; the Ukranian delegates flatly refused to consider the plan; the leader of the Polish Club was in Warsaw, but it was generally conceded that the Poles of the Monarchy were thinking of nothing other than the new independent Poland; the Roumanians were suspicious of the attitude which Hungary might take to the Manifesto, and with a thought for the Roumanians of Hungary, the Austrian Roumanians refused to cooperate; and the Italians not only refused to attend, but refused to consider that the Manifesto applied to them.<sup>18</sup>

If the plan, foredoomed to failure in Austria, had gone awry, the intent of preserving the *Ausgleich* by excepting the lands of the Hungarian Crown from the provisions of the Manifesto was also frustrated. With the threatening attitude of the Roumanian, Slovakian, and Croatian delegates to the Hungarian Parliament in mind,<sup>19</sup> Minister President Wekerle deliberately buried the *Ausgleich* in the following words: "Now that Austria has organized upon a federal basis, we propose to stand upon the platform of Personal Union, and we shall therefore organize our political life, both with reference to economic affairs and to defense, independently and autonomously."<sup>20</sup>

The Manifesto was most unfortunate in its effect upon the army. The morale of the troops was low, and the increasing number of desertions and mutinies bore witness to the breakdown in discipline. But the wording of the Manifesto to the army created dismay among both officers and men. They were,

18 *Neue Freie Presse*, (Abend), p. 1; Oct. 17, 1918, pp. 1-2.

19 *Oesterreichische Rundschau*, "E pluribus unum von besondere Seite," Nov. 1, 1918, p. 100.

20 Nowak, *op. cit.*, p. 268.

as they thought, fighting for the Fatherland, but the question was immediately raised as to which one. The old Fatherland was being divided and the disposition of their several native towns and villages became an immediate and absorbing source of concern to the men.<sup>21</sup> Additional confusion was produced when the different national councils began to recall their co-nationals from the fighting lines, leaving the burden of defense to those who remained.<sup>22</sup> General Ernst Horsetsky, Commander of the *K.u.K.* 26th Army Corps, comments that great excitement and confusion in the ranks followed the realization that there was no longer a Joint Army, and that the way was opened for nationalistic agitators, while, he continues, "It was clear as daylight what the action of the Hungarian Army would be."<sup>23</sup>

#### DEATH WARRANT OF THE EMPIRE

By October 16, the Austro-Hungarian Empire was in reality broken into its various national groups. Certain events which occurred after that day might rather be considered as finishing touches than as important steps in the disintegration. Chief among these was the reply from President Wilson, on October 19,<sup>24</sup> to the Austro-Hungarian request for an armistice based on his various peace proposals. The President pointed out briefly that the situation had changed since January 8 when he announced his fourteen points. Thus, Article X, which demanded autonomy for the nationalities of the Empire was no longer applicable, for the Czechoslovak National Council in Paris had been recognized as the *de facto* government of a belligerent nation. Furthermore, the justice of the nationalistic aspirations of the Jugoslavs for freedom had in the interim likewise been recognized. The Austro-Hungarian Government

<sup>21</sup> Hayes, C.J.H., *A Brief History of the Great War*, p. 349.

<sup>22</sup> Liechtenstein, E. von und zu, "Deutschösterreich," in *Oesterreichische Rundschau*, Nov. 15, 1918, p. 146.

<sup>23</sup> Horsetsky, E., *Die Vier Letzten Kriegswochen*, (24 Oktober bis 21 November 1918) p. 5.

<sup>24</sup> Not published in Vienna until October 21, see *Reichspost*, Oct. 21, 1918 (Mittagsblatt), p. 1.

would therefore have to satisfy the demands of these two nations before an armistice could be arranged with the Entente.<sup>25</sup>

This could mean but one thing: an armistice could be obtained only by the official recognition of the independence, not only of the Poles, as had been agreed, but also of a Czechoslovak state, involving a loss to Austria of Bohemia and Moravia, and a loss to Hungary of Slovakia, as well as the complete separation of the Southern Slav lands of both halves of the Monarchy, to mention the larger blocs only.<sup>26</sup>

While the Central Government hesitated to sign its own death warrant in this manner, the various heirs and executors were busy establishing their own administrations. In line with the suggestion contained in the Manifesto, the nationalities within the Empire were setting up national councils which were gradually assuming authority in their respective language districts—not, as had been suggested in the Manifesto, in cooperation with the Central Government. At Agram on October 15, a Southern Slav Council had met and proclaimed the independence of Croatia; October 18, the Ukrainian National Council at Lemberg took over the administration of Eastern Galicia; October 20, the Czech National Council from Prague proclaimed the independence of Czechoslovakia; while the Germans in Vienna on the 21, and the Hungarians in Budapest on the 25, set up National Councils and declared independence.<sup>27</sup> There were thus numerous governments within the Empire, and the resultant confusion defies description. The old government was attempting to continue the War, while the various new Administrations in the different language areas were receiving the popular interest and support.

<sup>25</sup> Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *Official Statement of War Aims and Peace Proposals*, p. 428.

<sup>26</sup> Italian claims to South Tyrol and Illyria had been cared for in the London Agreement of 1915, while Roumania had been promised Transylvania by the Bucharest Agreement. Although out of the conflict and dismembered early in 1918, Roumania managed to reenter the War at the last minute, thus avoiding the risk of losing her claim to Transylvania on the grounds of not having been a belligerent at the close of the War.

<sup>27</sup> *Der Oesterreichische Volkswirt*, Kalendarium, Oct. 18, 20, 21, and 25.

## MILITARY COLLAPSE

Although the Central Government, now existent in name only, hesitated to comply with President Wilson's most recent stipulation, and thus grant official sanction to the breaking up of the empire, it did not have long to ponder the matter. The end was near on the southern front. On October 20, the Hungarian Parliament ordered the withdrawal and the return home of all Hungarian troops, and appointed Archduke Joseph as Commander in Chief of the new Hungarian Army.<sup>28</sup> On October 24, General Diaz, in command of the Entente armies on the Southern Front, began his offensive on the Piave. He had delayed until late in the season to avail himself to the fullest extent of the progress of internal disruption and its consequent weakening effect on the forces of the Dual Monarchy. Although the fighting the first two days was sharp, the resistance of the Austro-Hungarian troops was so weakened by privation and the defection of minority units that the first important reverse soon turned into a rout. With Diaz and the Italian forces advancing from the south and west, and Franchet d'Esperey, in command of the Entente Army of the East, approaching the borders of Hungary, foreign invasion appeared to be merely a matter of time. Worse than that, with these two armies cooperating in a concerted drive upon Germany, Austria-Hungary would in all probability be the battle-ground.<sup>29</sup>

## BREAKING THE DUAL ALLIANCE OF 1879

Such an eventuality must be forestalled, and peace had to be concluded no matter the price. Accordingly, on October 27, 1918, Count Andrassy who had succeeded Count Burián as Joint Minister of Foreign Affairs asked President Wilson for

<sup>28</sup> Ingram, E.M.B., "The Military Disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy," in Temperley, (Ed.), *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, Vol. IV, p. 55.

<sup>29</sup> A situation which Joint Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Burián, predicted in a confidential memorandum addressed to the Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Embassy in Berlin, October 18, 1918. Germany, Reichskanzlei. *Preliminary History of the Armistice*, No. 60, p. 103.

an armistice "without waiting for the outcome of other negotiations," at the same time promising the adherence of the Austro-Hungarian government to the previous declaration of the President and his demands regarding the rights of the Czechoslovaks and the Jugoslavs.<sup>30</sup> In this request, the Joint Minister of Foreign Affairs not only admitted the claims to independence of the Minorities and cut them loose from the Monarchy, but he also broke the Dual Alliance, which his father had been instrumental in negotiating. By breaking at the last minute the bond which had united the two countries since 1879, Count Andrassy hoped to salvage something from the existent wreckage and to avoid invasion. More than this, by breaking with Germany, it was hoped that the abolition of the Monarchy, either by insistence from without,<sup>31</sup> or by revolution from within, might also be avoided by the early cessation of hostilities. It was hoped, furthermore, that by throwing over the German ally, the Hungarian fears of invasion might be calmed and their increasing resentment of Germany diminished. If the move were successful, credit should redound to the Emperor-King and his Ministers.<sup>32</sup> But only part of this plan succeeded, for although a separate armistice was obtained on November 3, the loyalty of Hungary was not retained.

As to the argument that Germany was not given "sufficient warning," something may be said for the German point of view. Such independent action was, however, predicted by Field Marshal von Hindenburg a week before the event. At 1:00 A.M., October 20, 1918, in a telephone message to the Imperial Chancellor, von Hindenburg warned: "The situation has not changed. Turkey has commenced separate negotiations. Austria-

<sup>30</sup> Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *Official Statement of War Aims and Peace Proposals*, p. 441.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 422. See President Wilson's refusal to negotiate peace with Germany so long as Emperor William II was allowed to remain.

<sup>32</sup> Glaise-Horstenau, E. von, *The Collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire*, p. 294.

Hungary will follow soon. We shall very soon stand alone in Europe."<sup>33</sup>

For his part, the Emperor Charles may have been precipitate. He had already appointed Count Andrassy as Joint Minister of Foreign Affairs whose most important task was admittedly that of asking for a separate peace. Then on October 27, the Emperor addressed the German Kaiser as follows: "Dear Friend: It is my duty to inform you that my people are neither in condition nor are they willing to continue the war. Therefore I give you notice that I have come to the irrevocable determination to make proposals within twenty-four hours for a separate peace and for an immediate armistice."<sup>34</sup>

Notification of the step taken presents a problem of dates. The armistice and separate peace were requested October 27, but a telegram from the Emperor Charles to the German Kaiser dated October 30 reads: "I was prepared this morning to propose an armistice to the Italians, as the military situation has become untenable."<sup>35</sup>

#### THE MINISTRY OF LIQUIDATION

Helpless, but apparently not as yet hopeless, the old government lingered on and claimed authority where authority no longer existed. In an attempt to ease the separation of some parts of the Empire as he was bound to do by the Andrassy note, the Emperor Charles accepted the resignation of the Hussarek Ministry and, on the 26th, asked Professor Lammasch to form a ministry.<sup>36</sup> According to Professor Lammasch, this was his second invitation, for he had been approached on the matter by the Emperor in July, 1917.<sup>37</sup> At that time Professor Lammasch based his acceptance upon three conditions: the

<sup>33</sup> Germany, Reichskanzlei, *Preliminary History of the Armistice*, No. 63, p. 104.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 83, pp. 119-120.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 88, p. 128.

<sup>36</sup> *Der Oesterreichische Volkswirt*, Kalendarium for October 26.

<sup>37</sup> Professor Lammasch to William Martin, "Notes de Guerre," Ms., Hoover War Library. See pp. 96, 104 note 38.

abandonment of Germany in the War, a rapprochement with the Western Powers looking to a separate peace, and federalization of the Empire.<sup>38</sup> The same evening, the Emperor Charles departed for Galicia where he met the Emperor William II and Ludendorff. Three days later, Lammasch was informed that the Emperor Charles had changed his mind and was appointing Baron von Seidler.<sup>39</sup> Between July, 1917, and late October, 1918, the military situation at the front and the disintegration of the Empire at home had effected two of the three conditions which Professor Lammasch had made previously. Thus when Professor Lammasch was finally appointed, a new course was clearly indicated, for Lammasch and at least one of his colleagues, Professor Joseph Redlich, were known in Entente countries, especially in England. Professor Lammasch had at one time served as a member of the Hague Tribunal and had attempted to maintain his contacts even during the War with his colleagues in Germany and, through Switzerland, with those in enemy countries. He was also known to favor the general principles of the League of Nations.<sup>40</sup> Professor Redlich, his Minister of Finance, was also well known in England, in part because of his authoritative study of the British Parliament.

This short-lived government (October 26–November 11) has been frequently called the "Ministry of Liquidation", for its chief function was to facilitate the transfer of administration from the old form of state to the new. As this Ministry was for the Austrian half of the Monarchy, and since the nationalities had for years been gradually filling the administrative positions

<sup>38</sup> Professor Herron to William Martin, "Notes de Guerre," Ms. in the Hoover War Library. In this letter, Professor Herron says that the plan was to establish a federation of six states: German, Magyar, Czech, Polish, Jugoslav, and Italian. Germany was to be presented with a *fait accompli*, and if approval were not obtained the alliance would be dropped. Professor Herron does not indicate how Lammasch would effect this major internal operation during the War or whether, indeed, it would have been possible to "drop" the German ally at that point in the War.

<sup>39</sup> Professor Lammasch to William Martin, "Notes de Guerre," Ms., Hoover War Library.

<sup>40</sup> *Reichspost*, Oct. 30, 1918, p. 6.



with their own nationals, there was a competent civil service ready at hand.<sup>41</sup> Liquidation, then, resolved itself into the mere recognition of the supplanting of the old authority in any given district by the new. For this reason, liquidation proceeded rapidly and smoothly.

Nor was this last Imperial Ministry in a position to prevent the breaking away of lands or territories which no longer desired to remain with Austria. The Slav peoples to the north and south had already completely thrown off the yoke, while the right to manage its own affairs in matters pertaining to finance, the Military, and foreign relations—the three fields of activity which had under the *Ausgleich* been considered as of Joint concern—was granted to Hungary by Emperor Charles on October 24.<sup>42</sup> Thus, by a process of elimination, the only sections of the old Empire which remained to be liquidated were the so-called Alpine Lands of Austria, together with certain other sections in which there was a predominantly German population. It was not a foregone conclusion that even these wished to remain together as a unit.<sup>43</sup>

#### THE PROVISIONAL ASSEMBLY MEETS

The political terrain had been thoroughly explored and the methods of procedure had been agreed upon by the various party leaders when, following a regular sitting of the Lower Chamber of the *Reichsrat*, the German deputies went to the assembly hall of the Lower Austrian Provincial Legislature in the *Herrengasse* and there held their first meeting as the Provisional National Assembly for German-Austria.<sup>44</sup>

In his opening address, President Seitz said:<sup>45</sup> "It is a worthy historic setting in which the first national assembly of German-

41 Redlich, *op. cit.*, Introduction, p. xii.

42 *Der Oesterreichische Volkswirt*, Kalendarium, Oct. 24.

43 Separatist tendencies were evinced at an early date by such provinces as Tyrol and Vorarlberg. See pp. 125ff., 192ff., 259.

44 Glaise-Horstenau, *op. cit.*, p. 210. The author comments that in this same chamber began the revolution of 1848. The implication is that the deputies selected this meeting-place for that very reason.

45 *S.P.*, Oct. 21, 1918, p. 4.

Austria meets. More than seventy years ago there went forth from the building of Provincial Legislature of Lower Austria that great popular movement which had as its goal the self-determination of the peoples. This ideal could long be denied, the popular movement could be suppressed, but these always survived."

The provisional constitution took form gradually in the sessions which were held on October 21, October 30, November 12, and December 19, and the evolutionary nature of this change over the period of approximately two months included a revolutionary change as well. On October 21, a beginning only was made in the establishment of the new government, because the deputies were fully aware that the war was nearing a close and the situation might change from day to day. In addition, although the Social Democratic Party stood by its principles, the leaders of this important section of the population were inclined to await the natural development of events rather than to force measures which they considered vital and thereby arouse opposition which at a later time might not develop.<sup>46</sup>

Before the assembled deputies settled down to the business of organizing themselves as a body, preliminary remarks were made by various members. The three presidents *pro tem*, representing the three largest parties, in turn emphasized certain phases of the problems confronting the Assembly. The lack of a fresh mandate from the people was pointed out and the possible inadequacy of representation was suggested. The necessity for considering legislation passed by the body as provisional only was emphasized.<sup>47</sup> Above all, it was urged, came the duty of the Provisional Assembly to bend every effort to the main-

<sup>46</sup> Bauer expresses the attitude of the Social Democratic leaders as follows: "During those decisive weeks from the 3rd of October to the 12th of November, we only demanded each day what was already ripe for the plucking, and only executed what could be accomplished without heavy sacrifice." Bauer, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

<sup>47</sup> This point was undoubtedly made in all sincerity, but one of the first acts of the Constituent National Assembly was to adopt verbatim all the enactments of the Provisional Assembly.

tenance of peace and the care of the needy. In a similar vein the different party leaders placed their supporters on record with respect to certain aims and principles. Since, between October 21 and November 12, certain of these principles were modified by one or another of the major parties it may be significant to indicate their positions on October 21.

Dr. Viktor Adler, representing the Social Democratic Party, said that his followers stood for a republic founded on a broad franchise and incorporating the principles of Socialism in its various activities. As to her relations with the neighboring states, he suggested that German-Austria should enter into a league or federation on an equal footing with the Succession States for the purpose of maintaining the old lines of trade. However, he added, as an alternative, that should the neighbor states be unwilling to consider such a plan, or should they stipulate conditions which were not in accord with economic and national needs, German-Austria would then be inclined to federate with Germany. The significance of his remarks was clear. The party made no provision, in its plans, for the Crown, and *Anschluss* with Germany was here considered as an alternative. Dr. Adler was chosen the first Foreign Secretary of the new government, and his treatment of *Anschluss* as an alternative to a Danubian Federation was in marked contrast to the uncompromising attitude of Dr. Otto Bauer, his assistant and successor in the foreign office, who advocated *Anschluss* at any cost.<sup>48</sup>

On October 21 the Christian Social Party was apparently midway in a metamorphosis induced by political expediency. In the past, Christian, Catholic, and monarchical, the party at this sitting advocated, none too strongly, a democratic, constitutional monarchy on the English model.<sup>49</sup> (By November 26, the Christian Social Party had officially shifted to a position where it could support a democratic state in which the people, through elected representatives, would decide political, economic

<sup>48</sup> For all of these Party platforms, see *S.P.*, Oct. 21, 1918, pp. 4-10.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 8; also *Reichspost*, Oct. 22, 1918, p. 3.

and cultural matters, and the republican form of state was recognized as decided by the Provisional National Assembly.<sup>50</sup>)

The German National Party, recently formed from several small parties, had no definite party platform. Nevertheless, the leaders of these component units were given an opportunity to express themselves.<sup>51</sup>

Following these official statements of party principles which were already well known to the deputies, the real business of the meeting was taken up, and the dispatch with which this business was transacted indicated the extent to which matters had previously been agreed upon by the party leaders.

#### FRAMEWORK OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT

In the sittings of October 21 and 30, the framework of the new government was pieced together. Because of the uncertainties of the times, positions—and with them, responsibilities—were divided among the parties. The three Presidents of the Assembly, one selected from each of the major parties and nominated *viva voce* on October 21,<sup>52</sup> were elected without debate October 30. A Council of State composed of twenty deputies, a Chancellor to represent the Council of State and to steer measures approved by the Council through the Provisional Assembly, and a Notary to validate all enactments were provided for October 30. Responsibility for the administration of laws passed by the Assembly devolved upon the Council of State,

<sup>50</sup> Resolution of the Christian Social Parteitag, Nov. 26, 1918, in *Reichspost*, Nov. 27, 1918, p. 1. In a Pastoral Letter, Bishop Gföllner of Linz pointed out that the republican form of government according to Catholic teaching was as legal as a monarchy, and that allegiance formerly given the Emperor might be accorded the Republic by good Catholics. *Reichspost* Dec. 5, 1918, p. 3.

<sup>51</sup> These pronouncements tended to confuse rather than to clarify. For example: The Independence Party advocated a constitutional monarchy with the closest possible relations with Germany. The German National Party held to a constitutional monarchy with no *Anschluss*. The National Socialist Workers Party discarded monarchy completely as well as federation with the Succession States in favor of *Anschluss*. *S.P.*, Oct. 21, 1918, p. 8-10.

<sup>52</sup> *S.P.*, Oct. 21, 1918, p. 4.

various members of which served as heads of Departments of State with the title of Secretary of State.<sup>53</sup>

In addition to building an administration, these two sittings saw the adoption of resolutions and one fundamental law. A resolution of October 21 represents the hopes and desires of the deputies rather than a realistic conception of conditions as they existed.

The German peoples of Austria have decided to settle the future form of state themselves and to negotiate their relations with the neighboring states.

German-Austria includes all German-speaking territories of the former monarchy, including the Sudetic lands, and the annexation of any territory containing German workers, peasants, or burghers will be resisted.

Access to the Adriatic will be arranged with neighboring states.

A Constituent Assembly will be elected on the basis of a general and equal suffrage. In the interim, the German deputies of the *Reichsrat* will represent the state, the total of these constituting the Provisional National Assembly, which shall represent the people of Austria in the peace negotiations up to the establishment of the Constituent Assembly. This applies to foreign powers and in particular to neighboring states.<sup>54</sup>

On October 30, the Assembly passed a law defining the relative powers of the Council of State, the Departments of State, and the Assembly.<sup>55</sup>

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, Oct. 30, 1918, Anhang 61.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, Oct. 21, 1918, p. 5.

<sup>55</sup> Law of October 30, 1918, *Staatsgesetzblatt* No. 1. This official register in which all laws had to be printed in order to be valid supplanted the *Reichsgesetzblatt*. Hereafter it will be referred to in the official abbreviated form of *St.G.Bl.*

The following Departments of State were established, the names of appointees were announced in the sitting of November 12.

Foreign Affairs

War, to include the marine section of the old department.

Interior

Instruction

Justice

Finance

(Footnote continued on p. 110)

By this law the supreme authority in the State and the right to enact laws were retained by the Provisional National Assembly. Dr. Hans Kelsen, a former Professor of Constitutional Law at the University of Vienna, has pointed out that with the passage of this law the revolution was legally effected. Inasmuch as it was not possible to consider the Provisional National Assembly as a "national council" in the sense demanded by the Imperial Manifesto, the legal continuity was broken and that constituted the revolution. There was an attempt made nevertheless to retain a material continuity by the inclusion in this fundamental law of Paragraph 16 wherein all laws and establishments not abolished or altered by the act should remain in force. Thus most of the old legal structure was retained.<sup>56</sup>

In order to obtain the maximum of support for the new government from the electorate, as well as to spread the burden of responsibility, it was decided that executive positions should be scattered among the different political parties and that no single party should be favored above the others. Thus for the first time members of the Social Democratic Party were given charge of a Department of State.<sup>57</sup> In addition to the Chancellorship which was given to Karl Renner, the Social Democratic Party had four members on the Council of State,<sup>58</sup> two Secretaries of State, Viktor Adler in Foreign Affairs, Ferdinand Hanusch in Public Welfare, and two Under Secretaries, those for Interior

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Agriculture, corresponding to the former Ministry of Forestry.

Public Works

Commerce

Traffic, corresponding to the former Ministry of Railways.

Food Relief

Public Welfare

Health

Reconstruction

*S.P.*, Oct. 30, 1918, Anhang, pp. 63-64, and for individual Secretaries, *S.P.*, Nov. 12, 1918, p. 64.

<sup>56</sup> Kelsen, Hans, *Oesterreichisches Staatsrecht*, pp. 79-82.

<sup>57</sup> Bauer, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

<sup>58</sup> The German National Party was given 8 members, and the Christian Social Party 6, in the Council of State. Kunschak, L., *Oesterreich 1918-1934*, p. 35.

and for War.<sup>59</sup> In view of the generally admitted but unverified momentary popularity of the Social Democratic Party, its share in the new administration was small numerically, but it was an important share, for party members were in a strategic position either for the purpose of effecting Socialist principles through departmental decrees, as in the case of the under-secretaryships, or for seizing hold of the administration should occasion demand.<sup>60</sup>

#### FORM OF STATE

By October 30, not only had the important departments of administration been established, but the form of state as well. Although the Emperor and the various Imperial Ministries were still theoretically in existence and functioning, the enactments of the Provisional National Assembly in its first two sittings had indirectly set up a republican form of government, a single-chamber legislative body,<sup>61</sup> an executive in the form of a committee with suspensive veto power,<sup>62</sup> and departments which in general duplicated the imperial ministries. The position of the Crown in the future government was not seriously considered in the Assembly, partly because the bourgeois parties were hardly in a position to take a strong line in defense of an institution which was tottering and too intimately connected with defeat and ruin, and partly because the Social Democratic leadership did not deem it necessary to make an issue of the matter. Replying to an interpellation from the floor of the Assembly on this subject, on October 30, Chancellor Renner remarked that

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 36; Bauer, *op. cit.* 55.

<sup>60</sup> Glaise-Horstenau, *op. cit.* p. 289.

<sup>61</sup> Froehlich, G., in Adamovich, L. and Froehlich, G., *Die Oesterreichische Verfassungsgesetze des Bundes und der Länder*, p. XXV. By establishing itself as the only law-giving body, the Provisional National Assembly, without further legislation being necessary, legalized the single chamber. It allowed no concurrent body, such as the *Herrenhaus*.

<sup>62</sup> Kelsen, *op. cit.*, p. 22. There was no veto as such given the Council of State. However, since there was no time limit specified within which a law passed by the Assembly had to be published in the Gazette, there existed the possibility of exercising what was in fact a suspensive veto.

the question had not been raised in the Council of State while this law was under consideration by that body, but that it was his conviction that the Council felt that the dynasty and all that went with it was a thing of the past. He added:<sup>63</sup> "How and when this shall be terminated does not rest solely with Austria to decide."

The final transition from monarchy to republic came swiftly. This step had been expected for some time. Early in August, Friedrich Austerlitz<sup>64</sup> had, by using rather veiled language, succeeded in getting two leading articles<sup>65</sup> in the *Arbeiter Zeitung* past the censor. In these he pointed out that a new orientation would be necessary, that the Minorities would never, after the War, return to their old position, and in fact, that the national movements in these parts of the Empire were heading toward democracy and independence.

Similarly, although the Provisional National Assembly had, as a body, refrained from committing itself on this question in its meetings of October 21 and 30, the same newspaper ran two leading articles October 31,<sup>66</sup> one of which was entitled, "The German Republic," and the other, "The Workingmen for the Republic." That republican sentiments were not confined to the Social Democratic Party members is illustrated by an article written by Walter Feder, editor of an influential economic weekly, in which he pointed out that a change of government was to be expected as a result of the War, and at the same time took occasion to ridicule the censor for attempting to block social or national movements merely by slashing columns from the daily press.<sup>67</sup>

<sup>63</sup> *S.P.*, Oct. 30, 1918, p. 48.

<sup>64</sup> Member of the younger and more radical wing of the Social Democratic Party. Editor and important contributor, in the early days of the Republic, to the *Arbeiter Zeitung*.

<sup>65</sup> *Arbeiter Zeitung*, Aug. 2, 1918, p. 1; Aug. 3, p. 2.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, Oct. 31, 1918, p. 1.

<sup>67</sup> *Der Oesterreichische Volkswirt*, "Umsturz oder soziale Reform," Nov. 16, 1918, p. 97. This article although written before the declaration of the republic, appeared afterward.



Thus Dr. Renner might well have been less cautious and added that the revolution was at hand. At that very time, the Austro-Hungarian army on the Italian front was in a state of collapse, and with the collapse of the army at the front also fell the already weakened military discipline, within the factories. Many of the workers left the factories of their own volition, and more were out of work due to the closing of the War Industries. The streets were filled with milling crowds, with here and there a group which advocated a Republic, while other groups talked of more extreme measures.<sup>68</sup> Returned soldiers in uniform were in evidence, and it was not unusual to find that some of the soldiers had stripped the Imperial insignia from their uniforms and had forced officers to do the same.<sup>69</sup>

Into this confused and potentially dangerous situation was injected the news of the abdication of the Emperor William II of Germany on November 9, and the establishment of a government under the Social Democrat, Ebert.<sup>70</sup> This news was the deciding factor in the situation in Vienna; the direction which political developments took in Germany influenced events in German-Austria.<sup>71</sup>

#### THE LAST HABSBURG

The situation in Vienna became so ominous that, on the evening of November 10, Professor Lammasch was informed by the Socialist leaders Renner and Seitz that, unless the Emperor were to abdicate immediately, no prediction could be made as to what might happen. Lammasch then reported to the Emperor who after a few hours signed what was in effect an abdication. This was in the early morning hours of November 11, 1918.

<sup>68</sup> The *Reichspost* appealed to its readers to pay no heed to alarmist rumours and suggested that the best way to help maintain peace and order was to keep off the streets and to encourage others to do the same. *Das Reichspost*, Nov. 1, 1918, p. 3, and Nov. 3, 1918, p. 7.

<sup>69</sup> Bauer, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

<sup>70</sup> *Der Oesterreichische Volkswirt*, Kalendarium Oct. 7, 8, and 9, 1918.

<sup>71</sup> Kunschak, L., *op. cit.*, p. 44.

But the withdrawal of the Emperor was inconclusive. Thus, when Charles said in his Manifesto, "We shall not let Our Person stand in the way of a free choice," he was only stepping aside without renouncing his ancient rights. If German-Austria eventually decided upon a republican form of government, his statement would be practically an abdication, but if monarchy were retained, or at some future date preferred, none but his house could hold the position.<sup>72</sup> This withdrawal, addressed to German-Austria, was followed on November 13 by a similar proclamation to the Hungarian people.<sup>73</sup>

Thus passed the last of the House of Habsburg-Lorraine, a figure to arouse the sympathy of intimate friend and political foe alike. Charles was only thirty years of age when he ascended a throne which was in reality the vortex of a gigantic maelstrom. In the World War, the bases of that throne were shaken, while around the throne swarmed the politicians of both Austria and Hungary who had so successfully, and to their own political advantage, kept the Emperor Francis Joseph apart from the world.<sup>74</sup> However good his intentions may have been, there was little that Charles could do in the two turbulent years of his reign. And circumstances beyond his control forced him to leave Austria to seek asylum in Switzerland.<sup>75</sup>

<sup>72</sup> Kelsen, Hans, *op. cit.*, 9-10; 79.

<sup>73</sup> *Deutscher Geschichtskalender*, 1918, II, p. 11.

<sup>74</sup> In *The Emperor Karl*, Count Polzer-Hoditz devotes considerable space to the fascinating but sordid stories of political intrigue which surrounded both Emperors.

<sup>75</sup> Once in exile, his actions were most regrettable. They present one who had been Emperor in a ridiculous light and, to an extent, detract from his more estimable qualities. The manner of his attempt to return from exile is a case in point. On the evening of Good Friday, 1921, Count Erdödy heard a spirited wrangling outside his home in the Landeskronngasse in Vienna. It appeared that a cab driver did not wish to be paid in Swiss francs and that his passenger had nothing else. The house porter settled the argument and the visitor entered the house. It was the former Emperor who, without preliminary arrangements, had come by an ordinary train from Switzerland, thanks to the passport of his gardener, Roderigo Sanquez, who resembled the Emperor only slightly. Practically his first demand was for good food since as he said "I have eaten nothing except salami and

## PROCLAMATION OF THE REPUBLIC

By November 12, then, when the Provisional National Assembly met for its third sitting, the Emperor and with him the Ministry of Liquidation had passed from the political scene.<sup>76</sup> The Council of State had prepared numerous laws which looked to the further clarification of the administrative situation,<sup>77</sup> but the chief interest of the deputies, assembled for the

dry bread for two days." Count Erdödy was able to obtain a Hungarian visa on the Swiss passport of this "Spanish gardener" and "smuggled" him into Hungary. Interviews with the Hungarian leaders were fruitless, and the former Emperor met with nothing but evasions or discouraging advice on his plan for a restoration in Hungary. He therefore returned to Switzerland.

A second attempt was made in October of the same year, at a time when the Province of West Hungary, or the *Burgenland*, was in the throes of a small civil war over the proposed union with Austria. Count Erdödy had organized armed bands of Hungarian sympathizers who terrorized the pro-Austrian population and made largely impossible the administration of the province from Vienna. One evening, a Swiss airplane landed in a field in the Burgenland, and out climbed the ex-Emperor Charles and the ex-Empress Zita. The reception committee was composed of two small boys who were evidently far more interested in the airplane than in the passengers.

This attempt proved even less successful than the first. Admiral Horthy, the Hungarian Regent, with a *Honved* regiment stationed at Budapest, scattered the armed Burgenlanders, and the royal pair was captured.

At this point the British Government intervened. The prisoners were placed on a British destroyer moored in the Danube near Budapest, and although some of the more excitable leaders in the Little Entente countries advocated St. Helena as a proper residence, the former Emperor and Empress were taken to Madeira. There, forsaken by all but his immediate family, the Emperor died April 1, 1922. *Habsburgs Weg von Wilhelm zu Briand, Die Memoiren des Grafen Tomás von Erdödy*, pp. 212-290.

<sup>76</sup> The Christian Social *Reichspost* of November 10, 1918, p. 1, objected strenuously to the manner in which the change of government was being effected. It asserted that the people were not consulted, nor was it left to the Constituent to decide. The editorial asserted that a majority of the Council of State had decided upon a Republic, drew up a law to that effect and was setting the stage for its adoption.

<sup>77</sup> The six measures introduced at this time and the date of their final passage are as follows:

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|--|----------|
| 1. Law Defining the Form of Government .....           | Nov. 12. |
| 2. Law Establishing the <i>Staatsgesetzblatt</i> ..... | " "      |
- This was merely the continuance under another name of the *Reichsgesetzblatt*, the Official Gazette, in which all laws,

third sitting of the Provisional National Assembly on November 12, was in the law which established German-Austria as a democratic republic. Certain articles of this law were also to be considered as part of the provisional constitution under which the country was to be administered until such time as the Constituent Assembly might be called together.

Although there was not the slightest doubt that this law would be adopted by the Assembly, Chancellor Renner nevertheless delivered a stirring appeal in behalf of the measure and closed with the following remark which, in view of the subsequent course of events in Austria and in the world in general, carries a slightly ironic touch:<sup>78</sup>

Today, democracy has become the fundamental law of the entire world, and we cannot do otherwise, we do not wish to do otherwise, we must not do otherwise than keep abreast of the methods of modern civilization.

Immediately thereafter, to the accompaniment of stormy applause from the packed galleries and other evidences of popular enthusiasm, the measure passed the second and third readings by unanimous vote. The excited enthusiasm within the assembly hall was duplicated outside the building when the Chancellor, accompanied by the deputies, made public announcement of the birth of the Republic to the crowds waiting in the Ringstrasse. Thus, on November 12, German-Austria abolished Monarchy and political privilege in favor of a Republic and democracy.

public announcements, decisions of the National Assembly, or decrees of the various Secretaries of State had to be published and made available for public inspection before these enactments, etc., could be considered valid and in effect. St.G.Bl., 1918, No. 7, and S.P., 3 Sitz., Nov. 12, 1918, Beilage No. 7.

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|--|---------|
| 3. Law Defining the Territorial Extent of German-Austria....                         | Nov. 22 |
| 4. Law Defining Citizenship in German-Austria .....                                  | Dec. 5  |
| 5. Law to Assure Independence of Judges .....  | Nov. 22 |
| 6. Law Regulating the Assumption of Administrative Control<br>in the Provinces ..... | " 14    |
- S.P., Nov. 12, 1918, p. 65.  
78 S.P. Nov. 12, 1918, p. 65.

DECLARATION OF *Anschluss*

The most unusual part of the Law defining the Form of Government was Article II, which declared German-Austria to be an integral part of the German Republic. This Article, inserted at the demand of the Social Democratic members of the Council of State<sup>79</sup> against the advice of Count Botho Wedel, the German Ambassador to Vienna,<sup>80</sup> was to be a statement of principle only. If unchallenged, it would embody in constitutional form the right of the Austrian people, as well as the Minorities of the Empire, to self-determination. Thus, although a stirring appeal was made in the Assembly to have this article specifically include certain districts at the moment being contested—districts which “since Charlemagne and even longer . . . have been German”<sup>81</sup>—it was deemed wiser to leave the first official declaration of *Anschluss* as a statement of principle. The provinces and territories which were to be included in the new German-Austria would be enumerated in a subsequent law, and it was held that the provinces and territories so named, as being a part of German-Austria, would be automatically included when *Anschluss* became effective.

The various articles of this Law Defining the Form of State comprise what might be called a legal justification for a situation which already existed in fact, as well as a political platform for future guidance.

<sup>79</sup> Bauer, *op. cit.*, 64. The whole-hearted conversion to *Anschluss* on the part of the Social Democratic leaders was due to the inauguration of a Socialist regime in Germany.

<sup>80</sup> Count Botho Wedel to Dinghofer, one of the three Presidents of the Provisional National Assembly, who repeated it to the Council of State October 23, 1918, as follows: “Mann solle den Gedanken des Zusammenschlusses mit dem Deutschen Reich jetzt nicht zum Ausdruck bringen, weil es beim Friedensschluss schaden könnte.” Brügel, L., *Geschichte der österreichischen Sozialdemokratie*, Vol. V, p. 377, footnote. Similar warning was repeated in the *Reichspost* of November 18, 1918 (Mittagsausgabe), p. 1.

<sup>81</sup> Dr. Heilingner spoke especially in behalf of the districts of Wieselburg, Oedenburg, Eisenstadt, and parts of Pressburg. His contention was that since Czechoslovakia had already taken between 13 and 19 districts from Hungary, German-Austria ought to act at once to save these ancient German strongholds. *S.P.*, Nov. 12, 1918, p. 79.

- Article 1. German-Austria is a democratic Republic. All public authority resides in the people.
- Article 2. German-Austria is an integral part of the German Republic. Special laws will subsequently be enacted to regulate the unification of the administrative and legal systems.
- Article 3. All rights previously held by the Emperor are to be vested in the Council of State until the Constituent Assembly has definitely allocated them.
- Article 4. All Imperial Ministries are dissolved and their duties transferred to the German-Austrian officials.
- Article 5. All political rights and privileges of the Emperor and his household are abolished.
- Article 6. All civil servants including the personnel of the military establishments are released from their oaths.
- Article 7. The confiscation of Crown property will be regulated by subsequent legislation.
- Article 8. All government bodies based upon political priority, including the *Herrenhaus*, the Delegations, and the former Provincial Legislatures are abolished.
- Article 9. The Constituent National Assembly will meet in January, 1919. The regulations regarding voting for this body will be drawn up by the Provisional National Assembly and will include universal suffrage, direct and secret balloting.
- Article 10. Similar fundamental principles will be applied in regulations to be issued by the Provisional Assembly for the provincial and municipal elections which will be held within three months.<sup>82</sup>

Many of the provisions were unnecessary or theatrical.<sup>83</sup>

<sup>82</sup> *St.G.Bl.*, 1918, No. 5.

<sup>83</sup> Kelsen, H. *op. cit.*, pp. 35-36 passes judgment on certain of the articles as follows:

- Art. 1. This is merely a declaration, for the law of October 30, *St.G.Bl.* 1918 §1 established the legal form of a republic.
- Art. 2. This expresses a hope rather than anything else. It does not go far enough. Nothing is said about the position of Austria in the new state, whether a sister state, an autonomous province, or what. In spite of the declaration, German-Austria is not an integral part of the German Republic. This could not be until Germany made the same declaration. Until that time, German-Austria might be considered an integral part of the German Republic according to the German-Austrian constitution,

Nonetheless, the law was deemed necessary for the launching of the Republic.

To the various subject races of the old Empire, the close of the war meant a liberation from oppression and the beginning of a new era. To the Germans of Austria, however, the wreckage visible on all sides was symbolic of defeat and filled them with dismay and despair. During the last weeks of October and into November, huge crowds collected daily on the *Ringstrasse*, crowds composed in part of demonstrators voicing indignation over the action of the government, or the continuance of war, starvation rations, or the cost of living.<sup>84</sup> When the news arrived that the War was at an end, relief and joy were expressed in the streets of the capital, but there was lacking the feeling of hope and courage to face the future.

For the most part, the daily press of Vienna sang a song of woe—woe in defeat and in anticipation of what was to come.<sup>85</sup>

but according to the constitution of the German Republic, until this assertion was similarly made, German-Austria was a sovereign state.

Articles 3, 4, and 5 were unnecessary since the powers referred to would pass with the monarchy.

Art. 6. The oath to the old constitution need not have been abolished, since the abolition of the old form of government, and with it the constitution would automatically release them from their oath.

Art. 7. Crown property in the true sense of the term did not exist in German-Austrian territory. The so-called Court-administered property was a part of the former state property

Art. 8. This was unnecessary. It was directed particularly at the *Herrenhaus*, but by the law of October 30, *St.G.Bl.* 1918, §1, the *Reichsrat* and the Provincial Legislatures were abolished.

<sup>84</sup> These were what Bauer, in his *The Austrian Revolution* p. 51, calls "enormous crowds" indicating the desire of the masses for a republic. Although the leadership in many of these demonstrations was Social Democratic, in others it was not, and in none of these could the large number of spectators be justly included as entirely sympathetic. See Glaise-Horstenaus, *op. cit.*, p. 288.

<sup>85</sup> Dr. Gustav Stolper comments editorially under the title "The New Austria" in the *Der Oesterreichische Volkswirt*, Oct. 26, 1918, p. 49, as follows: "The foundation of the new government has been laid. It is not an exciting performance. There is no background of aspiration, of tradition, etc., as with the Czechs and Southern Slavs. This is not an 'emancipation'. This is not the big moment in the history of the German people. In fact, the

The *Arbeiter Zeitung*, official organ of the Social Democratic Party, alone of the important Vienna papers, assumed a courageous, or perhaps defiant, attitude and summoned the party as well as its political opponents to take heart, to meet the situation squarely, and to build a truly German state; possible now for the first time.<sup>86</sup> That the *Arbeiter Zeitung* should hold and encourage this feeling is not surprising. By accepting responsibility for the solution of impending problems, the Social Democratic Party would have an opportunity to come into its own politically. It remained to be seen whether the party could carry to completion a program drawn up when there was little prospect that it might come to fruition. There were those who doubted such a possibility even before the attempt had been made.<sup>87</sup>

It is customary to refer to the events in German-Austria which culminated in the proclamation of the Republic on November 12, 1918, as revolutionary in nature. It should be borne in mind, however, that the "revolution" in German-Austria bore something of the unpolitical character of Vienna itself.<sup>88</sup> True, the Emperor withdrew on November 11, but by that time, he was Emperor of German-Austria only, and aside from the limited number in court circles, the presence or the absence of the Emperor was a matter of indifference to a majority of the people. In German-Austria as in France, the elected representatives of the people continued in office for the time being, although the cabinet, or its equivalent in German-Austria,

German people have not in a thousand years been so cast down. . . . The lot of the helot is in store for at least ten years."

<sup>86</sup> *Arbeiter Zeitung*, Editorials for Nov. 10, 1918, p. 1; Nov. 12, p. 4; Nov. 13, p. 1.

<sup>87</sup> Many writers of the period comment on this. For instance, Walter Feder, in *Oesterreichische Rundschau*, Feb. 1, 1919, p. 137; also *Der Oesterreichische Volkswirt*, Nov. 16, 1918, p. 97, to the effect: "The worker's party is alone able to carry on, but unfortunately, the goal and the methods are a bit hazy in the minds of the leaders."

<sup>88</sup> Bauer, *op cit.*, p. 59, makes the point that force was all-important in effecting the revolution, but that the force which in revolutions of the past had been expended at barricades in the streets, was here expended on the battlefields of the Southern Front.



was changed. The legal structure of an earlier day was retained, and perhaps most important, the Bureaucracy continued to function under the trying conditions. The revolution in German-Austria was "gemütlich."

There were certain important characteristics of this change which not only affected the new form of state but also influenced further developments. In the first place, the new State was German for the simple reason that the other nationalities of the former Empire had turned their backs on the Germans. For a few weeks following the proclamation of the Republic, it was thought that all the Germans of the Empire were to be members of German-Austria. This was found to be an erroneous conception, but on the other hand, those who eventually found themselves in German-Austria were mainly Germans.

Another important change was that German-Austria joined the ranks of the democracies. The Head of the House of Habsburg no longer ruled, and institutions connected with social privilege such as the *Herrenhaus*, or Upper Chamber of Parliament, were either swept aside or allowed to exist unnoticed. This change to a more democratic state was accompanied by a definite shift to the Left. In theory at least, the Social Democratic Party had opposed the War, and with the defeat of the Austro-Hungarian armies and the breaking away of the nationalities, the other large political group, the Christian Social Party, found itself in the unenviable position of having supported the losing cause. Power was in the hands of the Social Democratic leaders, who were content to move slowly, consolidating the gains as they were made rather than forcing the issues.<sup>89</sup> On their part, the leaders of the Christian Social Party were willing to allow their opponents to assume responsibility in an exceedingly difficult period.

<sup>89</sup> In Bohemia, the Socialists attempted to seize power and were easily thwarted. See Opočenský, J. *Collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Rise of the Czechoslovak State*, p. 42. In Bohemia, moreover, the defeat of the Habsburgs was a vindication of nationalist opposition to the Crown and the War rather than of the Socialist opposition as was the case in German-Austria.

The change in form of state was thus effected peacefully. This passive acceptance of the change, whether from a fear of incurring a reaction, or from fear of a possible Entente occupation of the City of Vienna in case of civil strife, or as is most likely from sheer war weariness and the inability to become aroused over political issues of the moment, was a definite characteristic of the early governments of German-Austria.

## CHAPTER II

### PROBLEMS OF ADMINISTRATION

WITH the chief agencies of the Central Administration and the form of state provisionally established by October 30, there immediately arose the question of effecting administrative control over German-Austria. With conditions chaotic in the extreme, specific problems had to be solved before the national Administration in Vienna could be considered a government. In the first place, it was essential that one of the two Central Governments be abolished. Then there arose the problem of the extent of territory comprising the new State, with the attendant citizenship stipulations. Further, the new government was hampered by particularistic leanings in the old Provinces. And finally, with these various matters settled, there followed the difficulty of enforcing the laws passed by the Provisional National Assembly.

Although it constituted itself the sole authority of German-Austria on October 30, the new government was not alone in the field, for the last vestiges of the Imperial Administration remained in the form of the Ministry of Liquidation. German-Austria alone, of all the various national groups of the old Empire, fell heir to this dualism of authority. Fortunately, due chiefly to the personality of Professor Lammasch as Minister President in charge of the Ministry of Liquidation, the transfer of functions from the old regime to the new was made in a spirit of sincere cooperation.<sup>1</sup> As Redlich indicates:

With a view to sparing officials a painful conflict of conscience, the Lammasch Government released the civil service from its oath of allegiance to the Monarch; officials in the ministries in Vienna and other central departments, who by race belonged to one of the new States, were, if they wished, at once released and sent home. In the new States then forming, the entire structure of courts and authorities hitherto imperial, passed, broadly speaking, directly into

<sup>1</sup> Glaise-Horstenau, *op. cit.*, p. 323.

the hands of the new party governments which were being set up in Prague, Lemberg, and Laibach.<sup>2</sup>

The problem of divided authority was solved with the withdrawal of the Emperor and his regime on November 11. This action relieved the situation, so far as the Central Administration in Vienna was concerned, although it can hardly be said that any of the other serious problems which confronted the new Republic had thereby been solved.

#### TERRITORIAL EXTENT OF GERMAN-AUSTRIA

The right of self-determination proved to be a very convenient doctrine. It was advocated by the non-German nationalities of the Empire in their desire to become independent. It was used by the national administration of German-Austria to support the argument in favor of Anschluss with Germany, and the same argument was used by certain of the Provinces of German-Austria in their desire to break away from the new State and throw in their lot with a neighboring state.

It was not enough to set up a central administration. The problem of extending administrative control beyond the confines of the city of Vienna was obviously bound up with the question of just how extensive German-Austria might be and who were to be considered its citizens. As Chancellor Renner remarked in the Provisional National Assembly on November 14, "We need to decide what is the territorial extent in order to be able to administer. We cannot collect taxes until we establish where they are collectable."<sup>3</sup>

With this question settled, there might then be established the legal relationship between the Central Government and the provinces, for although the law of October 30 envisioned a

<sup>2</sup> Redlich, *op. cit.*, p. 166.

<sup>3</sup> *S.P.*, November 14, 1918, p. 107. Later, May 8, 1919, during a meeting of Foreign Ministers at the Peace Conference, Mr. Balfour held a similar view, suggesting that before particular problems were discussed, it might be well to decide what constituted Austria in terms of territory. Miller, D. H., *My Diary at the Conference of Paris*, Vol. XVI, p. 223.

centralized state, certain of the Provinces by November 12 were assuming an independent attitude which made imperative a general clarification of their constitutional position. The problem was not settled easily or quickly, and the Provisional Administration could make only a beginning.<sup>4</sup>

There were understandable reasons why certain of the provinces indicated particularistic tendencies. In economic and administrative matters, German-Austria was still in the War, for the Provisional Government inherited and, of necessity, maintained in force, the economic provisions which had prevailed under the military absolutism of the war days. Similarly, opposition on the part of the Provinces to centralization under the Republic was an unbroken carry-over from the Empire. Again, as formerly, the peasant farmers resented too extensive control by the administration which apparently cared more for the welfare of the city populations than for the rural.<sup>5</sup> Another consideration, sentimental to a degree, was the fact that the Emperor was no longer present to serve as a symbol of unity and a tie to Vienna.<sup>6</sup> Further, the economic future was highly problematical and if conserving the food resources of the province necessitated an independent attitude toward the Central Administration, the provincials did not hesitate.<sup>7</sup> And finally, there should not be overlooked the fact that the great majority of the people, in the western Provinces, particularly, were either peasants or peasant proprietors and Roman Catholic in religion. They were none too inclined to support a provincial administration which cooperated too cordially with a Socialist-dominated Central Administration.<sup>8</sup> The two Provinces most

<sup>4</sup> In November, 1920, the Provincial Assembly of Vorarlberg appealed to the League of Nations to permit the Province to join Switzerland. Wambaugh, S., *Plebiscites since the World War*, Vol. I, p. 515.

<sup>5</sup> Redlich, J., "The Problem of the Austrian Republic," Ms. in the Hoover War Library.

<sup>6</sup> *Reichspost*, Nov. 20, 1918 (Nachmittagsausgabe), p. 2.

<sup>7</sup> For further discussion on this phase of the problem, see below.

<sup>8</sup> *Reichspost*, Nov. 22, 1918, p. 1.

thoroughly peasant and Catholic, Tyrol and Vorarlberg, evinced in fact the strongest separatist leanings.

In the early days of the Republic, the sole connection between the Central Administrations and the Provinces was through the Bureaucracy which had carried over from the Empire. As officials these men had been brought up in a tradition which was out of sympathy with the new state of affairs, nor were they recently elected or appointed to their positions. It was therefore often a matter of personal taste whether the provincial officers cooperated with the Central Administration.<sup>9</sup> This was probably what Chancellor Renner had in mind when he reported to the Assembly, November 12, that "there are certain problems in establishing effective administrative control. This is not the case in Upper Austria, Lower Austria, or Salzburg, for the chief men there are working with us."<sup>10</sup>

Such cooperation apparently did not prevent the Provincial Administration of Salzburg from independently dispatching a delegation to Prague, November 30, to negotiate with the Czechoslovak Administration concerning food.<sup>11</sup>

Even greater uncertainty as to the future connection with the Central Government was indicated by the action taken in the Province of Tyrol. Immediately after the Armistice, and independently of the Vienna officials, Tyrol was negotiating directly with Germany, or rather with the Bavarian Headquarters, and later with the Italian Headquarters.<sup>12</sup> It was quite openly admitted that Tyrol might go along with German-Austria either as an independent state, or in *Anschluss* with Germany, or might prefer to enter some form of federal union with either Switzerland or Bavaria. At any rate, Chancellor Renner freely admitted in Parliament that, unless the Provinces were carefully handled,

<sup>9</sup> *S.P.*, Nov. 12, 1918, p. 76.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 77.

<sup>11</sup> *Arbeiter Zeitung*, Dec. 1, 1918, p. 3.

<sup>12</sup> Glaise-Horstenau, *E.*, *op. cit.*, p. 319; *Neue Freie Presse*, Nov. 30, 1918, p. 1; Bauer, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

German-Austria might not incorporate Tyrol, nor for that matter Styria.<sup>13</sup>

Even more drastic was the action taken November 3, 1918, by the Provincial Legislature of Vorarlberg in declaring complete independence, but maintaining a temporary union with German-Austria. Shortly thereafter the Swiss Federal Council was approached on the possibility of an *Anschluss*. The latter suggested that it would be best to hold a plebiscite before any serious discussions were held.<sup>14</sup> A resolution to hold a plebiscite was passed by the Provisional Provincial Assembly April 25.<sup>15</sup>

By the law of October 30, the Provisional National Assembly, as a single-chamber legislative body, claimed sole and supreme authority in the State. When, however, the more detailed problem of the composition of the Republic was under consideration on November 12, the Chancellor said that the "foundation of our governmental activity is to be found in the Provinces and Circles which of their own free will have indicated their adhesion to the German-Austrian state."<sup>16</sup> He further remarked that the seven Alpine Provinces had already indicated their willingness to join. These were Lower Austria, Upper Austria, Styria, Carinthia, Salzburg, Tyrol and Vorarlberg.

From the constitutional and practical point of view, it was a serious mistake to recognize officially that the Provinces of their own volition agreed to join a federated German-Austrian state, for in recognizing that they had a free choice in the matter, there lay the danger that at another time and under changed conditions this free choice might find expression in a different

13 *S.P.*, Nov. 12, 1918, pp. 77-78.

14 Wambaugh, S., *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 513.

15 This plebiscite was to decide whether or not the Provincial Administration should take steps to negotiate the matter with the Swiss Federal Council. *Stenographische Sitzungsberichte der Provisorischen Vorarlberger Landesversammlung zu Bregenz*. April 25, 1919, pp. 11-13.

The affirmative vote was 70 percent. See Miller, D. H. *My Diary at the Conference of Paris*, Vol. VI, pp. 16-20.

16 *Ibid.*, Nov. 12, 1918, p. 77.

direction. What was to prevent their withdrawal later from such a voluntary arrangement? Furthermore, apparently the law passed November 12 admitting that the foundation of the new State was laid on the voluntary adherence of the Provinces had no more concrete backing than the assertion by Chancellor Renner that the various Provinces which he named had so decided. In addressing Parliament, he commented that Tyrol had only that morning signified its willingness to join,<sup>17</sup> and as for the remainder, there is no documentary evidence that acceptance had officially been given. Indeed, Professor Kelsen points out that at that date, it had not officially been given.<sup>18</sup> The assumption is that there was an exchange of telegrams between individuals, with the sender confident that he expressed the desires of the Province.

As a matter of fact, the adherence of two districts outside the confines of Inner Austria was pledged by their deputies in the former *Reichsrat*. These were the German districts of Bohemia and the similar districts of Moravia. Unfortunately for German-Austria, these German deputies were unable to effect this union in the absence of a thoroughgoing nationalist sentiment with which to oppose Czech occupation.<sup>19</sup>

It is interesting to note that when, on November 12, he enumerated the Provinces which would constitute the new State, the Chancellor did not list the Province of German-Bohemia although he discoursed upon its problems during the sitting, while Moravia may not have been included separately since it specifically indicated a desire to join Lower Austria, a fact which was mentioned.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 78.

<sup>18</sup> Kelsen, *op. cit.*, p. 101 footnote.

<sup>19</sup> As early as October 21, 1918, the German deputies from Bohemia met in the Lower Austrian parliament building in Vienna and constituted themselves as the Provisional Provincial Assembly for German-Bohemia. They then drew up a provisional constitution, appointed committees and informed the Provisional National Assembly of what they had done. *S.P.*, Oct. 30, 1918, p. 15. Similarly southern Moravia was anxious to become a part of Lower Austria, but did not go about it as methodically as did German-Bohemia. *Ibid.*, Nov. 12, 1918, p. 77.



In any event, the Assembly accepted Renner's statement and issued a proclamation in which recognition was given this willingness to join the new state, and in which the Provinces were placed under the protection of the entire nation.<sup>20</sup> This proclamation has been variously called a birthmark of the new Republic,<sup>21</sup> a measure creating a false impression, and a legal absurdity.<sup>22</sup>

#### PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION

Before carrying the question of the territorial extent of the new State to a legal conclusion in the form of a constitutional article,<sup>23</sup> the Provisional National Assembly turned aside to deal with the problem of administration within the Provinces. By the law of November 14, "Assumption of Control in the Provinces,"<sup>24</sup> it was provided that provisional provincial legislatures to replace the former provincial bodies were to be elected on the basis of a universal suffrage. The members of these legislatures were empowered to elect one of their members to act as Provisional Provincial Governor. This officer was to be held respon-

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 80; *St.G.Bl.*, 1918, No. 23; Froehlich indicates that here the impression is given that the founding of the new State was the result of an agreement between the separate Provinces. He adds that this marks the beginning of the centrifugal tendencies which might have completely wrecked the new State. See Froehlich, G., in Froehlich, G., and Adamovich, L., *op. cit.*, pp. XXI-XXII.

<sup>21</sup> Kelsen remarks that the Provinces wrongly imagined that the country was put together by the Pragmatic Sanction of Charles VI and thus with the Monarch gone, a new treaty became necessary. After citing the wording of the Provisional Constitution of Carinthia as a case in point, Kelsen concludes: "The contradiction in principle between a centralized and an extremely federalized state which harassed the political development of the new State was, so to speak a *Geburtsfehler*." Kelsen, *op. cit.*, pp. 100-102.

The Pragmatic Sanction was accepted by the Bohemian and the Moravian Landtags in 1721. The Hungarian Landtag in 1722 agreed to accept an identical monarch for the entire Realm. The Provinces of German-Austria which indicated the most active separatist tendencies had no choice at the time of the Pragmatic Sanction and had to accept it as an Imperial Decree. See Turba, G. "Die Grundlagen der Pragmatischen Sanktion" II, in *Wiener Staatswissenschaftliche Studien*, Bd. XI, Heft 1.

<sup>22</sup> Kelsen, *op. cit.*, pp. 97-98.

<sup>23</sup> This did not pass in final form until November 22, 1918.

<sup>24</sup> *S.P.*, Nov. 14, 1918, *Beilage* No. 5; *St.G.Bl.*, 1928, No. 24.

sible for the affairs of the Province to the Council of State. For the rest, the buildings, administrative officers and civil servants of the former regime were to be transferred to the new.

It is generally admitted that this was an attempt to stem the revolutionary activities of the Provinces which were setting up provincial legislatures and assuming autonomous powers without consulting the Provisional National Assembly. A drastic curbing of these bodies was not attempted by the Council of State, and thus at a crucial stage, the matter of relative jurisdiction was left in the air. The result was that many of the Provinces considered themselves completely independent of the Central Government in the matter of legislation.<sup>25</sup> And in this striving for autonomy and the right to regulate their future relations with their neighbors, the Provinces, especially Tyrol, Vorarlberg, Salzburg and Styria, had an effective weapon with which to combat the avowed intentions of the Social Democratic leaders to create a centralized state with no provinces, in the old sense of the term, but one large election district which would include the entire country.<sup>26</sup>

On the ill-advised action taken in this connection by the Provisional Government, Professor Kelsen is emphatic:

The law that took over the control of the provinces is one of the worst things the Provisional National Assembly ever passed. The central government gave legal recognition to the insurrectionary attitude of the provinces. No wonder the provinces looked upon themselves as sovereign states and upon Austria as a loose association of pieces. From the point of view of the action of the Provisional Assembly on October 30 and November 14, the Declarations of Adherence to the new state are unconstitutional and meaningless.<sup>27</sup>

<sup>25</sup> Kelsen, *op. cit.*, pp. 84-85.

<sup>26</sup> Kunschak, L., *Oesterreich 1918-1934*, p. 48. In January, 1919, Chancellor Renner failed to induce the provincial governors to adopt uniform election laws. It was argued that diversity of social and economic conditions made necessary the retention of different regulations in the various Provinces. Great Britain War Office, *Enemy Press Supplement to the Daily Review of the Foreign Press*, Feb. 20, 1919, p. 883.

<sup>27</sup> Kelsen, *op. cit.*, pp. 100-101.

## LAW OF NOVEMBER 22

The legal basis for the assertion of claims to territory, both disputed and otherwise, was finally established on November 22.<sup>28</sup> Whereas the law regulating the administrative control of the Provinces may have been technically faulty, this particular piece of legislation was naive in the extreme. It can be considered only as a pious wish. Defining the territorial extent of German-Austria, the law elaborates in detail the underlying principle of the note from the Provisional National Assembly to President Wilson, October 30:<sup>29</sup> that the Assembly recognized the right of all peoples to self-determination as outlined by the American President, and since the other nations of the Monarchy were setting up independent states, the Germans would do likewise. By claiming only such territory as had a German majority in the population, there would be a population of approximately 9,200,000. Had the Entente and the Succession States been willing to permit German-Austria to be territorially constituted as here provided, the subsequent history of the new State might have been entirely different. For although problems of administration would unquestionably have arisen, and, from the military angle, adequate defense have been impossible, the State would have possessed valuable resources, and would have contained practically all the Germans of the former Empire instead of the two-thirds included by the final settlement.

By this law, German-Austria was declared to consist of Lower Austria, including the German sections of Southern Moravia and German Neubistritz; Upper Austria, including the adjacent German-Bohemian circle; Salzburg; Styria; the German parts of Carinthia; Vorarlberg, and Tyrol exclusive of the definitely Italian districts. In addition to these old Provinces, the contemplated Province of German-Bohemia and Sudetenland was to be included. Also to be included were any cities or language islands which were thoroughly German or with a German majority. Certain difficulty was encountered in provid-

<sup>28</sup> *St.G.Bl.*, 1918, No. 40.

<sup>29</sup> See pages below.

ing for the inclusion within the new State of the industrial regions of northeastern Moravia and eastern Silesia. It was therefore stipulated that since "these form an economic unit, vital to Austria, and of interest to Poland and Czechoslovakia, this territory was to be administered jointly by the three states." From Hungary the thoroughly German regions adjacent to German-Austria were to be taken. And finally, it was solemnly declared that by virtue of age-old custom and because of the utter dependence of the State upon it, the free flow of traffic over the Alpine passes to the Adriatic and down the Danube must continue.<sup>30</sup>

Considering the universal attitude of suspicion, distrust, and hatred which the Minorities had for the old regime, and to a less degree for the Germans of the Monarchy, this law can be considered as little more than a statement of what, on a purely ethnographic basis, might fall to German-Austria were her neighbors willing to pare down their own demands. However, fine-spun arguments, historical or ethnographic, for including German-Bohemia and German-Moravia in the new Republic should not becloud the fact that the very regions in which Germans were in a majority were, on the whole, the most valuable economically, a point which Eduard Beneš admitted when stating the case for Czechoslovakia before the Supreme Council, March 5, 1919.<sup>31</sup> So, although German-Austria claimed these impor-

30 *St.G.Bl.*, 1918, No. 40. Appended to the general provisions is a list of local administrative districts which were demanded in what might be called, and were admitted to be, doubtful regions—in Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia and West Hungary. January 3, 1919, an amendment was made to this law in the form of a detailed enumeration of the entire territory of the new state. *Ibid.*, 1919, No. 4.

31 Secretary's Notes of the Meeting held in M. Pichon's Room, Wednesday, 5th February, 1919. American Mission to Negotiate Peace. Ms., Hoover War Library. Czech claims were based on a mixture of arguments, racial, historical and economic. Dr. Beneš claimed Bohemia, Moravia, Austrian Silesia, and Slovakia on ethnographic grounds, asserted that the historical argument applied to the first three, and said that all were needed to form a bulwark against eighty million Germans. The number of Germans within the proposed Czechoslovak State were placed at one and a half million, a number admittedly below the German estimate. The best argument, accord-

tant districts as rightfully hers, only an ability to protect the Germans of these districts and to guarantee their constitutional rights could make these regions a part of the new state.<sup>32</sup> And such ability, confronted by forceful opposition in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Jugoslavia, was totally lacking to German-Austria. This law may thus be considered as a formal statement of territorial ambitions, passed in part for the benefit of the nationals of the new State, but in part for the benefit of the Entente and the future Peace Conference.

With Czechoslovakia occupying Bohemia, Sudetenland and the Znaim Circle, and Jugoslavia in control of parts of Carinthia and Styria, the Austrian Foreign Office protested officially to the Entente and the United States, and proposed waiting for peace provisions and the results of a plebiscite in these contested regions. On December 20, came a categorical answer from the French Foreign Minister, via the Swiss ambassador, to the effect that the frontiers could be defined only at the Peace Conference. In the meantime, the provisional boundaries would have to conform to the old administrative frontiers.<sup>33</sup> This was a blow to German-Austrian hopes.

ing to Dr. Beneš, on which to base the rights of the Czechs, was the economic. By his admission, the German regions of Bohemia contained nearly all the industry, although the workingmen were mainly Czech, especially in the mines. Claims for Slovakia were weak historically since one must go back to the tenth century, but strong enough ethnographically. As to the Ruthenes of Hungary, Czechoslovakia had no claim. They were of the same racial stock as the Ruthenes of East Galicia but were divided from them by the Carpathian Mountains. They were neighbors of the Slovaks, were in some matters similar socially and economically, and transitional dialects were to be found. He was however, voicing their desires when he said they did not wish to remain under Hungary, and although he had no claim on them that he wished to place before the Conference, were they included in Czechoslovakia, a common frontier would exist with Roumania, which would be an advantage.

<sup>32</sup> Kelsen, H. *Die Verfassungsgesetze der Republik Deutsch-Oesterreich*, Erster Teil, p. 70.

<sup>33</sup> *Arbeiter Zeitung*, January 15, 1919, p. 4.

In this connection, Eduard Beneš, Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, at the time in Paris looking after the interests of his young country, has a few interesting details:

(Footnote continued on p. 134)

## NEW FRONTIERS ESTABLISHED

As a matter of fact, within fifteen days after the Armistice German-Austria comprised, with two exceptions,<sup>34</sup> what had formerly been called the Alpine Provinces. It was with this territory, essentially unaltered in the Treaty of St. Germain (signed October 16, 1919), that the government of the new State had to deal and from which it strove to find the means of subsistence and reconstruction for the population. The line of evacuation indicated in the armistice subsequently became the Austro-Italian frontier of the treaty, and by it, German-Austria abandoned not only the Italian populations of Trieste and vicinity, and of the Trentino, but the German population of South Tyrol as well. Although the loss of the most important seaport of the old Monarchy, together with complete control of the railway lines which connected Trieste and Vienna, was a serious blow to the prospects of future trade development, adjustments elsewhere were of more immediate and vital concern.

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“Having been informed of this matter (Bauer’s protest), I at once intervened with the French, English, and Americans, both verbally and in writing. I submitted a memorandum based upon our juridical position as a recognized Allied State with historical frontiers, and I further pointed out that around us, in Germany, Vienna, and Hungary there was a menace of Bolshevism. I also mentioned that with a view to consolidating our economic affairs rapidly, we were preparing a currency reform, but all our plans were frustrated by the fact that hitherto not even our provisional frontiers had been defined. It was therefore, I said, unconditionally necessary to confirm at least for the time being, our historical frontiers, since upon this depended the peace and order around us in Central Europe. This step taken by the Austrian Government provided a good opportunity of doing this.

“M. Pichon agreed that my argument was right and promised to reply to the Austrian Government in this sense. . . . As early as December 22, I . . . notified Dr. Kramář of this decision. . . . The government thereupon carried out the occupation in due course.” Beneš, Eduard, *My War Memoirs*, pp. 482-483.

<sup>34</sup>The fate of the Klagenfurt Basin of Carinthia and the Burgenland, here referred to, was settled by plebiscites on October 10, 1920, and December 18, 1921, respectively. The Klagenfurt Basin as an area, voted for German-Austria, while of the Burgenland, all save the capital and chief city elected to join German-Austria. See Wambaugh, *op. cit.*, Vol. I p. 163 ff. for Klagenfurt and 271 ff. for the Burgenland.

To the north and east, the old provincial boundaries of Bohemia and Moravia were adopted by the Czechoslovak government without regard for the ethnographic factors in the situation. Galicia was claimed by Poland, while Bukowina went to Roumania. Although the government of German-Austria, up to the last, claimed the solidly German territories of Bohemia and Moravia on the basis of the right to self-determination of the populations involved, this thesis was not admitted as justification for breaking down the "historic claims of the Kingdom of Bohemia."<sup>35</sup>

To the southeast, the former "frontier" between Austria and Hungary was retained, modified eventually by German-Austria's acquisition of the Burgenland, but without its capital which Hungary retained. The Southern-Slav territories, including disconnected Dalmatia, went to Jugoslavia.

Whereas the final determination of the frontiers of German-Austria did not take place until the signing of the Treaty of St. Germain, the claims of the various nationalities had been essentially recognized earlier. More important than this, however, was the fact that German-Austria was not in a position to make good a claim to territory no matter how thoroughly German or how vitally important to her economic life, in the face of armed opposition by the neighbor states. Although the separation from Hungary evoked at least one expression of "good riddance",<sup>36</sup> protest was widespread when it was realized that some three and a half million Germans were to be incorporated in the new Czechoslovak State. And the sentimental ties of nationality at this time were to the fore. A fuller realization of what this division of territory meant to the economic life of German-Austria came later.

<sup>35</sup> Claims generally rejected by German historians. For a typical German attitude, see Dopsch, Alfons, *Die historische Stellung der Deutschen in Böhmen*.

<sup>36</sup> Stolper, G., "Die Neue Oesterreich" in *Der Oesterrichische Volkswirt*, Oct. 26, 1918, p. 51.

## DEFINITION OF CITIZENSHIP

With the territorial extent of German-Austria indicated in legal form, the problem of determining citizenship was in part facilitated.<sup>37</sup> It was necessary to define citizenship before the elections to the Constituent National Assembly could be held. Moreover, recognition had to be made of the manner in which the Empire was divided and provision had to be made for German nationals who found themselves in an inhospitable region of the former Empire and wished to opt in favor of German-Austria. An attempt was made to settle these problems easily and quickly by the law of December 5, 1918. Thus, for those who were already within the confines of German-Austria as established by law, no declaration of intention or action was necessary if they were satisfied to become citizens of the German-Austrian Republic. Others had until June 30, 1919, to decide in favor of different States, which had formerly been a part of the Empire. Under the positive option clause, simplicity was again intended, for merely a formal "declaration" was required which depended upon no official sanction to become effective. However, under this classification, citizenship was not available to those domiciled in specified areas of the former Austrian half of the Monarchy, viz., Dalmatia, Istria, and Galicia, or to those who in the terminology of pre-war Austria would be classified as foreigners, such as the Hungarians and Reich-Germans.<sup>38</sup>

## UNUSUAL ADMINISTRATIVE DEVICES

By the end of 1918, the legal framework of the Administration had been laid, and the enormous tasks confronting the new government were being faced. Yet, the authority of the Central Administration was precariously weak, since in general there was but a feeble link between the passage of legislation in Vienna, and making such legislation effective in, for example, Vorarlberg.

<sup>37</sup> Law of December 5, 1918, *St.G.Bl.*, 1918, No. 91.

<sup>38</sup> Froelich, G., in Adamovich, and Froelich, *op. cit.*, pp. LVI-LXI.



In this difficulty, the Administration received important and unofficial assistance from proletarian groups in the form of the Councils. During the first months of the republican regime, much of the energy of the Administration was exerted in behalf of the proletariat. The Councils were formed to safeguard the interests of the lower classes, whether industrial, military, or agrarian. Because the individuals were scattered, and because of their conservatism, little success was met with in this period in the attempt to organize the Peasants' Councils. So also, the Works Councils, formed with the avowed purpose of serving as an important link between employer and employee for the correction of abuses in any individual plant, were largely ineffectual<sup>39</sup> until a socialization of industry might take place which was not done under the Provisional Government. Of real importance, however, were the Workers' and the Soldiers' Councils.

From the background of war-time economic and political disruption, the Workers' Councils were the first to emerge in the January strikes of 1918. Their purpose was twofold: to organize territorially for the purpose of exerting political pressure, as in the case of an election district or a county, and to organize the workers within a given type of industry. In this period of administrative confusion the Workers' Councils as a rule cooperated with the legal authorities. In theory the authorities used the Workers' Councils as organs for controlling of the workers. In reality, the authorities were in large measure subject to the dictates of the Councils.<sup>40</sup>

The Workers' Councils, modeled after similar bodies in Soviet Russia, grew out of organized workers' groups in Vienna and other industrial centers. Primarily intended to promote solidarity between the workers and the Social Democratic leaders

<sup>39</sup> Macartney, C. A., *The Social Revolution in Austria*, pp. 156-157. The author suggests certain defects which were obvious from the beginning, such as the facility with which a balance sheet might be "fixed" to the utter confusion of the shop inspector, the difficulty involved in discharging an employee, and the consequent overstaffing of the organization.

<sup>40</sup> Bauer, *op. cit.*, p. 86 The author remarks: "At times, however, the Councils acted independently and in opposition to the administration."

in the Provisional National Assembly, these Workers' Councils were, by March 1, 1919, organized on a national basis. The National Conference of Workers' Councils held at Linz on that date included all shades of proletarian opinion. Despite organization on a national scale, it is obvious that the strength of the movement lay in the industrial districts, but the framework had been so constructed that members might be drawn from any part of German-Austria.

Of these Workers' Councils, the units lowest in rank were located in the municipalities. In Vienna, because of its size, these were designated according to district or *Bezirk*. From these local councils, representatives were sent to the County Workers' Councils; thence members were elected to the Provincial Councils; and from them to the National Council which had a central committee of twenty representatives and an executive of ten.<sup>41</sup>

Although primarily of a military nature, the Soldiers' Councils gave their cooperation freely to the Workers' Councils for the general protection and betterment of the proletariat.<sup>42</sup> In the universal chaos which was the inevitable result of the return of the troops from the battlefields without any well-ordered plan of demobilization, Provisional Soldiers' Councils were formed. These became a feature of the newly organized Republican Army, or *Volkswehr*, when it was established after November 3.

Just as the workers and the soldiers bore a grudge against the old order, and just as these two classes were interested in preserving the gains of the revolution and protecting their own interests, so it was with the peasants. But the common ground upon which these three might meet was limited. The Peasants' Councils cooperated on the basis of class interest, and their support was of no great duration. As Roman Catholics, they found little consolation in the continuance, to cite one grievance, of

<sup>41</sup> Braunthal, Julius, "Die Arbeiterräte in Deutschösterreich," in *Sozialistische Bücherei*, (1919), Heft 13, pp. 1-9.

<sup>42</sup> A more detailed discussion of the military establishment of the early republic will be found subsequently.

the food requisitioning of the war days in behalf of what they considered a godless class of urban parasites. Yet, their Councils, for obvious reasons less disciplined and more particularistic, cooperated for a time with the Soldiers' and Workers' Councils to form what were in fact local economic commissions. Bauer suggests that the competence of the Councils was wide, especially the Peasants' Councils, for "they controlled the garnering of the harvest, the raising of cattle, the requests for and allocation of dwellings. They attempted to terrorize the profiteer, and they prevented the exportation of food from their districts."<sup>43</sup>

#### FUNCTIONAL DEMOCRACY

The influence of the Councils was most significant in matters of local concern, but their importance did not cease there. Upon the willingness of these Councils to cooperate depended the administration of laws and departmental decrees issued in Vienna, and it is not surprising to find that, for the sake of efficiency, the Councils were utilized in the matter of initiating legislation. Bauer indicated the attitude of the government in Vienna in this respect when he said :

The government was compelled to act upon the principle that no legislation could be embarked upon except in agreement with the organization of those immediately affected by it.<sup>44</sup>

In other words, in view of the fact that the Central Government lacked power to enforce its decrees, the passage of legislation which might run counter to the opinions and desires represented through the Councils could have been nothing but futile.

As a result, there developed a policy of cooperation between the administration and the dominant group in labor. Bauer has called this "functional democracy" for, as he remarks:<sup>45</sup>

<sup>43</sup> Bauer, *op. cit.*, p. 68. This last proved highly irritating to the Councils located in urban districts, especially in Vienna.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 164.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 170.

While political democracy requires that the government should rule in agreement with parliament, which is chosen by the electorate once every few years, functional democracy requires that the government in each branch of its activity should remain in constant touch with the citizens directly affected by this branch of government, organized according to their workplaces or their social and economic functions.

Thus, whenever important legislation was to be introduced before the Provisional National Assembly which might affect the interests of the workers, or the soldiers and peasants, the Social Democratic members of the Council of State found it expedient to consult the leaders of the various labor organizations which might be involved. These labor leaders then conferred with representatives of the trade unions, and the spokesmen of the Workers' and Soldiers' Councils. Suggestions and amendments might be made all along the line until the measure was deemed acceptable by the leaders.

This cooperation was necessary, for it was the task of the Social Democratic members of the Assembly to steer legislation through that body, while it was the duty of the leaders of the Councils to induce these various bodies to agree to abide by the law when once it was passed. The task of the former was child's play compared to that of the latter. Invariably, measures submitted to the workers were not sufficiently radical for the Left Wing of whatever group might be consulted. Indeed, the importance of these meetings cannot be overemphasized. Frequently excitement ran high; the Communists were granted every opportunity to air their views. So far as internal policies may be segregated from external forces in the new German-Austria, it was here within the confines of the Workers' Councils that the solidarity of the Social Democratic Party prevailed over the elements in favor of Communism.<sup>46</sup> The task of the delegate in defending the various provisions of a law was, indeed, not an easy one. As Dr. Friedrich Adler, the son of the founder of

<sup>46</sup> For further discussion see pp. 143-144.

Austrian Social Democracy, once remarked.<sup>47</sup> "Popularity is capital which has only to be employed for this purpose to be consumed."

Although the above procedure was applicable to bills of major importance which were to be submitted to the Provisional National Assembly, a more immediate contact between government and the governed was found among the various Secretaries of State in the conduct of their departments. For example, since only the concurrence of the soldiers in their Councils made possible the carrying out of orders issued by the Secretary of War, it was found feasible for the Secretary or one of his immediate subordinates to confer with the soldiers' representatives in order to win their approval of a departmental order before it was issued. Ultimate compliance depended upon the ability of the leaders in the Soldiers' Councils to induce the enlisted men to cooperate, rather than on military discipline.

Similarly, since only the influence of the Works Councils was able to keep employees at their tasks in the key industries under the conditions of privation which existed after the War, the Secretary of the Interior found that the conduct of affairs in this department was facilitated by consulting the representatives of the workers, either through the Works Councils or the Workers' Councils, before releasing a departmental order.<sup>48</sup>

There were both disadvantages and advantages in this informal system of legislation and administration. That celerity and departmental efficiency were impeded cannot be denied. On the other hand, a semblance of authority was maintained and a government was allowed to exist until such time as the political, economic, and military atmosphere was clarified. By this method, also, the discontented lower classes felt that they were sharing in the government. Also, the dependence of the administration upon the good will of this section of the population led to the enactment of labor legislation. And of no slight importance was the fact that in the debates of the Workers' and Soldiers'

<sup>47</sup> Bauer, *op. cit.*, p. 167.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 164.

Councils over decrees and legislative enactments there existed a political safety-valve for the more outspokenly disgruntled elements of the proletariat.

#### POLITICAL BIAS OF THE COUNCILS

The local councils of workers and soldiers concerned themselves with local matters like food, housing and fuel, and with reviewing and debating provincial or national legislation submitted to them. But when the representatives of these Councils met in a national conference, an opportunity was afforded to consider the progress made in expanding and coordinating the movement and for debating the direction which the movement should take. In this respect, the Councils were more than mere advisory bodies. A tendency was evident in the direction of policy-making.

Since, with the growth of the movement, it was deemed expedient to include within the council structure all those who favored a social revolution, instead of limiting membership to regular Social Democratic members, it was inevitable that Communists should also be included. At national conferences the Communists were usually loud in their demands for a broadening of the revolution. Debates would follow, the safety-valve proved effective, and when a vote was taken, the extremists found themselves in the minority but less exasperated about it.<sup>49</sup>

And so it was that at the first National Conference of German-Austrian Workers' and Soldiers' Councils, held March 1, 1919, a majority of the 137 delegates in attendance drew up a list of aims which were moderate in nature. It was decided that what gains had been made should be held and that further recruiting should be more active in the Bureaucracy, among the farmers and farm-laborers, but that under no circumstances should blood be spilled as it had been in Russia and Germany.<sup>50</sup>

The importance of this policy-making activity on the part of this National Conference was perhaps never better illustrated

<sup>49</sup> Braunthal, *op. cit.*, pp. 3-5.

<sup>50</sup> *Arbeiter Zeitung*, March 2, 1919, p. 3.

than at the second meeting March 22, 1919, when the newly established Soviet government in Hungary invited the German-Austrian workers and soldiers to revolt and conclude an *Anschluss* with their fellow proletarians to the east. The Communist delegates were noisy in their insistence that German-Austria should take that opportunity of completing the revolution, but the Social Democratic Party, with Friedrich Adler as chief spokesman, developed a different line of reasoning. Adler pointed out that no such sudden change could be made without the support of the peasants. In Russia and Hungary, the urban workers could offer the peasants land which had been confiscated from the great estates of the nobles. In German-Austria, however, there were no such extensive tracts save for forest lands and peasants were not interested in more holdings of that type.<sup>51</sup>

Of even greater interest were the opinions of the chances of success for an immediate revolution voiced by individual delegates from different sections of German-Austria. Pichler, a delegate from Styria, expressed his opposition to Communism. While revolution might be brought about in the inner part of his province, in the remaining districts there were 8,000 workers and 70,000 peasants and the proportion was not at all in favor of the workers.<sup>52</sup> Similarly, Sedlacek, from Lower Austria, informed the Conference that by merely looking around one could see how generally the agrarian population had exchanged loaves of bread for rifles which would immediately be turned on the workers. As he emphasized, the peasant is the last person to be dictated to by the proletariat, and behind the peasant would stand the bourgeoisie which was just waiting for some such false step.<sup>53</sup> Emminger, from Salzburg, commented on the sturdiness of the Alpine peasant and the malnutrition of the workers in his Province.<sup>54</sup> Linder, of Vorarlberg, admitted that a Communist regime might be set up in Upper and Lower Austria and Styria,

<sup>51</sup> Braunthal, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 18.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 19.

but that when the Communists started toward Tyrol, they would not get there. They would never get as far as Vorarlberg, with the result that the Socialists of that region as well as Tyrol would be cut off from their fellows in the rest of German-Austria.<sup>55</sup> Even the Vienna Soldiers' Council opposed the change. Frey, as spokesman for this important group, suggested that the time had not as yet come. He proposed rather the building of a red army, with a few red soldiers in each village, and then an active campaign to organize the various rural occupational groups. Only then, with these nuclei scattered over the land, would there be any hope for a successful overturn.<sup>56</sup>

These and other similar opinions prevailed, and as a result of the balloting, the Hungarian regime was notified that German-Austria would not consider the invitation.

#### PROBLEM OF GENERAL DISORDER

While the deputies in the Provisional National Assembly were struggling to erect a framework for the new State, they were constantly under the necessity of turning aside to grapple with some new problem which, if it were not soon solved, might bring down the entire structure. One such problem demanding immediate attention was the protection of life and property and the maintenance of some semblance of order.

During the last weeks of October and the entire month of November, property and, at times, life were menaced by a large floating population driven by hunger. The dangers inherent in collective action by prisoners of war who had from the beginning of the year been returning from Russia, many of them fired with enthusiasm for the Soviet Government, were present even before the final collapse. The sudden cessation of hostilities threw into the streets approximately 600,000 workers who had been employed in war industries.<sup>57</sup> This number was further augmented by men and women who were in enforced govern-

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 20.

<sup>57</sup> *S.P.*, Oct. 30, 1918, p. 51.



ment service during the War, and who, the moment the Armistice was signed, quit their tasks.<sup>58</sup>

As a potential threat of civil disturbance, these idle and hungry people were as nothing compared to the returning soldiers. The final drive on the Italian front caught the High Command without any well-conceived plan of retreat. Furthermore, there was no attempt at a planned demobilization. When the break came on the southern front, the hundreds of thousands of soldiers found themselves in a bottle-neck, with the only possible exit over the mountain passes. The demobilization was terrific in its completeness and its speed, for the men abandoned everything, regardless of its value, and thought of but one thing—to get over the mountains and home.<sup>59</sup> There ensued a mad scramble for places in any sort of conveyance which was moving north, irrespective of the capacity of the cars.<sup>60</sup> It was estimated on November 7, that more than thirty thousand dishevelled, hungry, disorganized and undisciplined troops were pouring into Innsbruck daily.<sup>61</sup> These soldiers were given little consideration and found it difficult even to obtain food. At first they tried exchanging what few things of value they had with them,<sup>62</sup> and, when these were gone, resorted to theft or violence. The result of this was the formation of Soldiers' Councils to devise means of collective action for their mutual good. "Mutual good" took the form of seizing control of the railway stations and searching the arriving or departing civilians for supplies, and of indiscriminate plundering.<sup>63</sup>

58 Eisenmenger, A., *Blockade*, p. 54.

59 *Reichspost*, Dec. 1, 1918, p. 1.

60 Eisenmenger, *op. cit.*, p. 41, comments: "Unpopular officers were trampled down, transport trains were besieged, military stores plundered, 100 men crowded in a car intended for 40. Men sat on the buffers and on the roofs of the carriages." The *Neue Freie Presse*, Nov. 7, 1918, p. 3, adds this gruesome comment on those who chose the roofs of the cars: "Within the last few days the bodies of 297 soldiers have been found in the tunnels of the Südbahn."

61 *Ibid.*

62 Braunthal, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

63 Eisenmenger, *op. cit.*, pp. 59-60.

Further cause for alarm was found in the prisoners of war who were in concentration camps scattered about the country, but particularly feared was the large group of Italian prisoners located near Vienna. With the evaporation of military discipline, there was imminent danger that these prisoners might break loose.<sup>64</sup> The greatest offenders in plundering were those non-German troops who, because of the manner in which the railway network converged on Vienna, must of necessity cross German-Austria to reach their homelands from the various battlefields.<sup>65</sup> It was estimated that 920,000 soldiers had arrived in Vienna the first three weeks in November, and that 1,065,000 people had passed through since late October.<sup>66</sup>

Into this confused and turbulent situation was injected still another disconcerting development. This was the "Red Guard", organized in one of the Vienna barracks, the *Rossauer*. Small detachments from this group marched about seizing ammunition and food stores. At this critical moment there set in what Bauer has called a "desertion en masse to home and family," and although the Council of State encouraged the men to form Soldiers' Councils they would not remain. This left ammunition dumps, food depots, and prisoners of war perilously unguarded.<sup>67</sup>

In the other Succession States, the returning soldiers were cordially received and were promptly incorporated in the national

64 *Arbeiter Zeitung*, Nov. 3, 1918, p. 1.

65 *Reichspost*, Nov. 3, p. 7. From the following, one gathers that the Germans were equally unpopular with the Hungarians: "Yesterday at Fehring, the frontier station, Reich German troops arrived who were completely naked. During their passage through Hungary, their clothing including their underwear had been taken from them.

This may have been an extreme example. A more reasonable and trustworthy picture is given by General Horstzky: "Wir kamen mit Wäsche und Kleidern, Waffen und Pferden nach Hause. Es war ein besonderer Glücksfall; denn viele Kameraden retteten aus den gierigen Händen der 'Bahnhofwachen' kaum das, was sie am Leibe trugen." Horstzky, E., *Die Vier Letzten Kriegswochen*, p. 53.

66 *Reichspost*, Nov. 22, 1918, p. 4.

67 Bauer, *op. cit.*, 56-57.

armies of these new states, armies which were for this reason, at least in part, composed of seasoned veterans.<sup>68</sup> But in German-Austria, the civilian population regarded the returning troops as symbols of defeat and so, at a critical moment, failed to win their whole-hearted support for the new government.<sup>69</sup> Because of the unsettled conditions in late October, committees of public safety composed of middle-class property owners, ex-army officers and some sympathetic soldiers, were being organized independently in the various communities and were obtaining arms and ammunition. These bodies assisted the police in guarding property and patrolling the streets. And when the Supreme Command and the War Office notified the Council of State on October 30 that neither was in a position to hold the frontiers and protect life and limb within the country,<sup>70</sup> the Council of State on November 3 decided to exercise its military authority and build a new, and it was hoped, popular army called the *Volkswehr*.<sup>71</sup> The independent, armed committees of public safety were then declared outlawed and theoretically passed out of existence.<sup>72</sup>

Owing to the peculiar circumstances attending the recruiting of this volunteer, paid army, the *Volkswehr* emerged as a proletarian armed force. A very limited number of soldiers from the regular army entered this new body. For the most part, the bourgeoisie were not attracted by the prospect, while the peasants saw greater opportunities for obtaining food by returning to the land. By the process of elimination, the one group willing to serve was that of the industrial workers who had been discharged with the sudden closing of the war industries. Proletarian in sympathy, these men found little reason to hesitate over taking an oath to support the Republic, the chief requirement for enlistment. Although the mass of the recruits were

68 *Arbeiter Zeitung*, Nov. 3, 1918, p. 1; Eisenmenger, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

69 *Reichspost*, Dec. 1, 1918, p. 1.

70 *S.P.*, Oct. 30, 1918, p. 42.

71 Bauer, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

72 Macartney, *op. cit.*, p. 185.

not disciplined Social Democrats, there was a nucleus of party members in each battalion of the *Volkswehr*. Shortly, these regular party members became the recognized leaders in their respective units and thus the Social Democratic Party of German-Austria had "great influence if not complete control."<sup>73</sup>

In its organization, the *Volkswehr* was patterned on the Councils, which in turn were patterned on the Russian Soviet. Coming so soon after four years of military discipline, which was extended to the factories, it is not surprising to find the inauguration of its very antithesis. In the *Volkswehr*, the enlisted man, through his elected representative on one or another of the various Councils, was the ultimate authority. The officers served a probationary period of a month after which the Soldiers' Council decided whether or not the officer enjoyed the confidence of the men. On this basis, his tenure was continued or not according to the vote in the Council.<sup>74</sup> The interests and problems arising in the daily routine of the enlisted men were similarly cared for by the Councils. Councillors were elected to safeguard the economic and political interests of the enlisted men, and discipline was maintained, where indeed it existed at all, by the Councils. Without the consent of the Central Executive Committee of the Soldiers' Councils, no orders could be carried out even if they originated in the person of the Secretary of State for War.<sup>75</sup>

A great deal of criticism was directed against the *Volkswehr*, but for every critic, there came forward a defender. As might be expected, both criticism and defense were largely, although not entirely, drawn on class lines. No history of this period can be written without due consideration of *Volkswehr* activities. In

<sup>73</sup> Bauer, *op. cit.*, p. 58; Gedye, G.E.R., in *Heirs to the Habsburgs*, p. 71, comments: "A non-Socialist stood no chance of admission . . . (and) The Socialists have had bitter reason to regret the fact that they did not make the Army a sound republican body instead of a party guard. With themselves in the opposition, it should have been obvious that sooner or later the Government of the day would remodel the force to its own pattern."

<sup>74</sup> Macartney, *op. cit.*, p. 136.

<sup>75</sup> *Loc. cit.*

the days immediately following its formation, the *Volkswehr* was used to patrol the streets in cooperation with the police of the different municipalities. It assumed almost entirely the task of guarding military depots and magazines.<sup>76</sup> It was almost daily called upon to cope with disturbances at the railway stations caused by the arrival or departure of troops of the other nationalities,<sup>77</sup> of necessity intent on plundering. And of no little importance in this early period, the *Volkswehr* absorbed, as Battalion 41, the armed Communists or "Red Guard" curbing and giving direction to this group at a crucial time.<sup>78</sup> However, the subsequent activity of this make-shift army raised a great hue and cry against it.

By the middle of December, the danger from non-German troops passing through Vienna and other cities was largely over and this particular task was eliminated. But the *Volkswehr* was used throughout its short but eventful life as a means of increasing the food supply, and of supervising the distribution of the available stores and dwellings among people forced to live crowded in dank unheated basements or even box-cars. Into this work, the members of the *Volkswehr* entered with enthusiasm, for the work was for the ultimate benefit of the masses, to which they themselves belonged.

<sup>76</sup> In writing to William Martin, Editor of the *Journal de Genève*, Dr. Klein, an Austrian journalist comments:

"A Vienne, la situation est terrible, surtout pour les officiers . . . Ils n'ont absolument plus rien et pour la plupart s'engagent dans la garde rouge pour avoir au moins à manger et à dormir. On leur donne quinze couronnes pour monter la garde devant les bâtiments, le fusil sur épaule. Quant aux chefs de la garde populaire, ce sont des gens qui n'ont jamais vu un fusil, même de loin . . ." "Notes de Guerre," Ms. in the Hoover War Library.

<sup>77</sup> Instances of this sort were too numerous to cite. The daily press was full of reports of such incidents which sometimes assumed the semblance of pitched battles between the armed non-Germans in the railway carriages and the *Volkswehr* on the station platforms.

<sup>78</sup> The "Red Guard" was disbanded without bloodshed in the summer of 1919 because of an attempted *putsch*. Bauer, *op. cit.*, p. 59; *One Year of Freedom, 1918-1919*, p. 7. (This is the title of the first of a series of official publications which, after 1920, was called *The Austrian Yearbook*.)

When the peasant farmer was given assistance and advice by the Councils in planting his crops, he may have been grateful, albeit a little suspicious. But when it came to forceful requisition of the fruits of his toil by the *Volkswehr*, the revolution assumed a different color in his eye. Unsympathetic as ever to persuasion that the city population was starving, the peasants as a class became progressively hostile to the Social Democratic Party<sup>79</sup> which they held responsible for the continuance of this war-time practice. And, as in the War, the peasant grew more wily than ever in concealing his produce in order to obtain higher prices from profiteers, smugglers, or individuals who journeyed from the city to the country districts to purchase directly.

In the effort to uncover any surplus which might exist, or, in the terminology of the day, to find "hoarders," detachments of the *Volkswehr* were effectively active. Private dwellings were searched for supplies no matter how little above the ration they might be. Especially fruitful were the results of searching tourist hotels and those hostels known to be the headquarters of smugglers and profiteers, not to mention the discoveries made in monasteries and religious houses of supplies destined for charity.<sup>80</sup>

<sup>79</sup> *Neue Freie Presse*, Nov. 22, 1918, p. 1.

<sup>80</sup> Again, instances are too numerous to cite. In general the *Arbeiter Zeitung* took pains to report any successful raids and to mention the fact that supplies were turned over to the Department of Food Supply. Thus, of a Sunday afternoon, Battalion 4 cruising on the Ringstrasses tarried long enough at the Cafe Heinrichshof to find 400 kilograms of coffee, 22 of sugar, 12 of cocoa, 150 eggs, and 150 pieces of chocolate pastry. *Arbeiter Zeitung*, Mar. 11, 1919, p. 6. Referring to the searching of private homes, the *Reichspost* demands, "If this must continue, let the police do it. There are a sufficient number of 'legitimate officers' ". (Nov. 24, 1918, p. 4.) The irritation and wrath aroused, not to mention the subterfuge resorted to in coping with *Volkswehr* visitations, may be gathered from the daily entries in her diary, *Blockade*, by Frau Doctor Eisenmenger.

A foreign observer comments: "Hard workers' get an extra allowance. The *Volkswehr* collect this ration because it cannot be refused them, but they certainly cannot be called 'hard workers' and will certainly be the nucleus of any Bolshevik movement that may develop. At present, they raid for concealed food private houses, restaurants, etc., with the authority of the Minister of War . . . and they are accused of selling their 'hauls'

Sporadic plundering continued as long as the extreme privation lasted, but widespread plundering was reduced save in certain episodes. Typical was the occasion at Linz early in February, 1919, when a deputation of workers came in orderly fashion to the Headquarters of the Provincial Government to protest the shortage of meat and milk and the increasing bootlegging. In the midst of this protestation, a crowd of half-grown boys swarmed into a restaurant in search of food. That was the beginning of an orgy of plundering which left hardly an hotel or shop intact in the heart of the city.<sup>81</sup>

There were other occasions when the situation got out of hand even for the police of Vienna, who used force only in emergency cases. Such was the ugly disturbance before the Parliament Building, on "Maunday Thursday," April 17, 1919. Hunger was the cause of this disturbance as well.<sup>82</sup> A foreign

surreptitiously and then promptly raiding the purchasers." John Bannister to C. K. Butler, "Not Enough to Live on and Not Quite Little Enough to Die On," a report to the British Delegation at Trieste 23/3/1919. Ms., A.R.A. archives of the Hoover War Library.

81 The *Arbeiter Zeitung*, Feb. 5, 1919, p. 4, attributes the restoration of order to the *Volkswehr*, while Frau Dr. Eisenmenger, *op. cit.*, 157, commenting on riots in Linz and plundering of the neighboring farms in mid-January asserts that the *Volkswehr* was inclined to sympathize with and protect the mob. Her assertion here may be indicative of her attitude toward the *Volkswehr* in general, for she attributes the maintenance of order in Vienna to the police. Thus: "Here in Vienna, the labour leaders on the whole have the masses well in hand. Attempted revolts of the Communists are, thank Heaven, only passing episodes. This comparative security of life and property in Vienna is mainly due to the efforts of the Viennese police under Police President Schober, who have thereby earned the lasting gratitude of the citizens of Vienna. The Viennese police remained almost entirely unaffected by the poison of party politics and were constantly faced with the difficult task of quelling outbreaks of party feeling."

Professor Coolidge, of the American Mission in Vienna reported to Paris as follows: "During serious riot at Linz stores and hotels looted in which press reports government troops joined." Stovall to Ammission, Paris, February 6, 1919, Ms., A.R.A. Archives, Hoover War Library.

82 Oskison, J. M., *A. R. A. Bulletin* No. 9:29 (May 13, 1919). There were fatalities among both the Police and citizenry, while the police horses were felled. "The demonstrators threw themselves upon the fallen horses of the police, tore out pieces of flesh from the still warm bodies of the dead

observer of these incidents is of the opinion that the police were unable to cope with the situation and that order was finally restored by the *Volkswehr* members, who succeeded by the frequent use of the word "Comrade" and a persuasive tone of voice where the cudgels of the police had failed.<sup>83</sup> Opinion as to where the credit belongs for handling this situation, as well as the quelling of the attempted Communist Putsch of June 15 of the same year, seems to be a matter of party sentiment.<sup>84</sup>

#### DEFENSE OF THE FRONTIERS

Effective to a degree as the *Volkswehr* may have been in guarding military stores, patrolling the streets, curbing plundering, and absorbing and opposing the Communists, this organization was of little value in its other important purpose—"The defense of the frontiers." At its maximum in December, 1918, it contained 56,000 men and 1,700 officers, but by September 30, 1919, elimination of the less desirable members reduced the numbers to 26,000 men and 3,000 officers.<sup>85</sup> Evidently it was one thing to bully the local and native population, and quite another to face the organized and seasoned troops of the neighboring states. A few square kilometers might have been saved for the republic as well as frontier railway stations, if the *Volkswehr* hadn't shown clearly that it had no stomach for real fighting.

The Vienna press was conspicuously silent on the fiascos of the *Volkswehr* on the borders, but variously confirmed reports circulated freely. As a recent writer on this period has put it, "The stories still told of the indiscipline of the first Red Army are incredible."<sup>86</sup> An Englishman who lived and traveled in

animals and carried them home as delicacies which had not been enjoyed for a long time." Bauer, *op. cit.*, 106.

<sup>83</sup> Brailsford, H. N., *Across the Blockade*, pp. 51-59.

<sup>84</sup> The *Neue Freie Presse* for April 17, 1924, p. 2, gives the credit for both to the Vienna police, thus: ". . . the police alone saved the Republic from Bolshevism or worse."

<sup>85</sup> *Oesterreichisches Jahrbuch*. 1920, p. 45.

<sup>86</sup> Gedye, *op. cit.*, p. 71. The non-socialists both within and without the



German-Austria in this trying period cites,<sup>87</sup> with a tinge of scorn, a few incidents to illustrate the manner in which the frontiers were protected.

In one case, a detachment of the *Volkswehr* was mobilized against the Czechs, but with orders to retire in case Czech opposition proved too strong. While they were billeted for the night in the disputed territory, the Czechs caught some of the *Volkswehr* units asleep. Other units put off in haste and plundered the Austrian countryside with the result that the local populace appealed to the Czechs to defend them from the *Volkswehr*. Again, in February, 1919, a battalion of *Volkswehr* was dispatched toward the Czech frontier to defend a railway station. When the Soldiers' Council learned against whom the men were being sent, the battalion was recalled. There seems to have been no more enthusiasm displayed for fighting the Yugoslavs, for the commander of one battalion ordered all those to fall out whose principles did not warrant their entering the engagement. The unit was immediately reduced to one hundred and forty men. Again, when a picked detachment was needed for what appeared to be a hazardous undertaking, the commander called for volunteers who were "morally and physically up to the task." He obtained eighty men and had to abandon his plans.<sup>88</sup>

Although the *Volkswehr* was undisciplined and its members often pursued their individual or party interests in a thinly veiled official capacity, the establishment of this body was a

country frequently referred to the *Volkswehr* as the "Red Army". Just as the Social Democratic party members strenuously combatted the accusation that they were Communists, so did they resent the charge that the *Volkswehr* was "red". For arguments on this point, see *One Year of Freedom*, p. 8; Braunthal, J. *Der Kampf*, 1919, p. 31; *Arbeiter Zeitung*, Jan. 1, 1919, p. 8.

<sup>87</sup> Macartney, *op. cit.*, p. 138.

<sup>88</sup> The really effective opposition to Yugoslav encroachment in the Klagenfurt region seems to have come from the native Germans of the district. Townsmen and peasants volunteered to serve, were organized by a certain General Hülgerth, and succeeded in driving the Yugoslav forces south of Villach and Klagenfurt. Marburg was firmly held by the Yugoslavs, however. Schneefuss, W., *Oesterreich, Zerfall und Werden eines Staates*, p. 107.

fairly effective method of absorbing and partially controlling the most dangerous elements of the population. Undisciplined as it was, ineffective in defense of the frontiers and hated by those strata of society which suffered at its hands, the *Volkswehr* served as a sponge—an expensive sponge.

By the middle of November, faltering progress had been made in the problem of building a state. The outlines of an administration had been sketched, and an army of sorts had been organized. For the nationals of many of the belligerent countries, the Armistice signified a break in the extreme conditions which the late years of the War had produced. It had seemed that peace would make possible the resumption of normal activities following the necessary adjustments to altered conditions. Such reconstruction was not possible for German-Austria, because conditions which had contributed so largely to the breakdown of the economic and political life of the country continued to increase in severity. Although a situation worse than that of November, 1918, seemed difficult to imagine, the number of problems increased and became more serious as time passed.

## CHAPTER III

### FOOD, FUEL, AND FRONTIERS

ONE of the most urgent problems of the new State was the settlement of boundary disputes with the various Succession States. In the negotiations looking to this end, the scanty supplies of food or fuel from the neighbor states, so necessary to bare subsistence, were seriously jeopardized.<sup>1</sup> As for increasing these supplies, the new Republic could not hope for help if it insisted too strongly on its claims to disputed provinces. In this way the desperate economic situation took away any vestiges of bargaining power that German-Austria might otherwise have had. And for lack of a little more economic power at a crucial period, it had to renounce political rights to provinces whose economic resources might have saved its political independence. Such was the vicious circle around German-Austria.

For example, the claim to German-Bohemia and Moravia could not be too actively advanced by German-Austria without the full expectation of being cut off from whatever food and fuel might otherwise come out of Czechoslovakia. The case was similar with respect to the disputed territory in the Slovene country, especially Marburg and the Klagenfurt area claimed by Jugoslavia, as well as German West Hungary, subsequently called the Burgenland, traditionally a part of Hungary but with a predominantly German population in the rural areas.

This dependence upon the neighbors for food forced German-Austria to adopt a meticulously legal attitude toward territorial questions. Under the circumstances, it was hoped that the Entente would draw the frontiers in accordance with principles of nationality. The Entente would then be the object of whatever

<sup>1</sup> November 12, 1918, Chancellor Renner remarked in Parliament: "The Council of State has negotiated with the neighboring states day after day for weeks, but these efforts have been unfortunately in vain." *S.P.*, Nov. 12, 1918, p. 66. This is one of the few official evidences of such negotiations. For the most part reliance must be placed in administrative leaders as they reported their activities to Parliament.

ill-feeling might be raised in the Succession States and the food supply from these sources would continue to flow in. A policy of compromise dominated the relationship of the new state with its neighbors, for the alternative was suicide, either as the result of failure in armed conflict, or from starvation.

#### BLOCKADES IN FORCE

In relation to the problem of immediate existence in German-Austria, the most significant clause of the Armistice of Villa Giusti, which terminated hostilities between Austria-Hungary and the Allied and Associated Powers, was Article 5 of the Naval Clauses, which stipulated that the blockade was to remain in force save for exceptions which might be granted by the Allied and Associated Powers.<sup>2</sup> These exceptions, incidentally, were not granted subsequently. Immediate relief from the conditions of semi-starvation was therefore not to be had from afar.

Nor was this all. To the continued war-time blockade of the Entente were added the export restrictions of the new neighbor states which, in effect, were comparable to blockades. And these *de facto* blockades by Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Jugoslavia, to mention the most important, were particularly disastrous for German-Austria, for although the exchange of goods within the Empire had been drastically reduced by October, 1918, Vienna and the Alpine Provinces were still obtaining supplies from the agricultural regions of Bohemia, Moravia, and Hungary up to the time of the Manifesto of October 16. With the break-up of the Empire officially sanctioned, the release of these supplies became of political significance to the new governments being established on all sides.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup> United States Department of State, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1918 Supplement I, Vol. 1, p. 433 f.

<sup>3</sup> To what extent this blockade of German-Austria by the erstwhile subject peoples of the Empire was due to ill-will or spite is very difficult to estimate. That this feeling did exist is incontrovertible, and yet at the same time, as will be subsequently indicated, there was a strong tendency on the part of small rural communities to keep what supplies were available and

So far as concerned the economic situation in German-Austria, the major provisions of the Treaty of Saint Germain were in force months before it was actually signed, without the salutary effect which the acceptance by all parties might have had in stabilizing the relations between the neighbor states. German-Austria laid claim to German language areas occupied by her neighbors: the German districts of Bohemia and Moravia held by Czechoslovakia; similar districts in southern Carinthia, especially Marburg, held by Jugoslavia; and German West Hungary. As might be expected, dissension over these territories stood in the way of a satisfactory accord between the states and was frequently the cause of friction which found its most immediate effect in the stoppage of food deliveries to German-Austria, in spite of prior agreements.

And yet, of the four countries, German-Austria, Czechoslovakia, Jugoslavia, and Hungary, each had products which the others needed. Czechoslovakia had sugar and potatoes to offer German-Austria in exchange for manufactured articles and munitions; Hungary could spare food in exchange for timber and industrial products from German-Austria; and Jugoslavia with a surplus in the Banat, could give German-Austria food in exchange for salt.<sup>4</sup> The problem was to get these and other goods moving in international exchange.

Because of the economic integration in the former Empire, those Provinces which were destined to constitute German-Austria could not, when considered as an aggregate, have been called self-sufficient in any sense of the term.<sup>5</sup> Nor, under the Empire, was there any necessity that they should be. Compared

not to allow them to be shipped out of reach. In some instances, while the administrations in the neighboring states agreed to deliver supplies to the official agencies in German-Austria, it was discovered that these supplies could not be collected. See *S.P.*, Oct. 30, 1918, p. 55.

<sup>4</sup> Gregory, Capt. T.T.C., "General Report for Central Europe, Relief of the Austro-Hungarian Succession States," pp. 7, 26. Ms., A.R.A. Archives, Hoover War Library.

<sup>5</sup> The advantage which Upper and Lower Austria had in this matter was more than offset by the requirements of Vienna.

to the broad expanse of farm land in Galicia, Bohemia, and Hungary of the pre-war period, the small patches of arable land separated by forests or formidable mountain ranges gave to German-Austria a truly Alpine character. The industrial urban centers of Carinthia, Styria, and above all, the city of Vienna depended largely, if not almost entirely, upon the products of the more favored agricultural districts of the Monarchy. When these regions with their supplies were suddenly cut off, a fearful dislocation resulted.

The first blow was delivered immediately after the Armistice. Then, after endless diplomatic negotiations, when a small amount of food was beginning to trickle across the frontiers, the blockade was almost universally restored because of shortages in the countries of origin. Milk so urgently needed in Vienna is a case in point. By November 4, 1918, there had been no deliveries of milk to the city for several days from either Moravia or Hungary.<sup>6</sup> A small amount was eventually agreed upon for delivery, but on December 27, Tušar representing Czechoslovakia in Vienna, announced that because of the shortage of milk at home further deliveries could not be expected in Vienna.<sup>7</sup> It was added that in several cities of Czechoslovakia the situation was quite as serious as in Vienna. On January 27, 1919, Dr. Franz Nagy, Food Minister for Hungary, announced that further shipments of milk for Vienna would have to be suspended for similar reasons.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>6</sup> *Neue Freie Presse*, Nov. 5, 1918, p. 4.

<sup>7</sup> *Arbeiter Zeitung*, Jan. 5, 1919, p. 8.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, Jan. 28, 1919, p. 7.

It is not to be assumed that German-Austria alone had food problems. Dr. A.E. Taylor, of the Inter-Allied Mission as well as the American Relief Administration Mission, pointed out that "The basic problem of middle Europe rises from the fact that fundamental phases of economic and industrial life cannot be intersected by boundaries any more than we can unscramble an egg." A.R.A. *Bulletin* No. 70, April 29, 1919, p. 4.

## HUNGARY

Back in the days of late October and early November when the various fragments of what had once been the Empire were bidding farewell to each other, Count Karolyi, in his capacity as newly elected President of the Hungarian National Council, sent a message of good will to the new government of German-Austria. He suggested that since the feudal regime had been overthrown in Hungary, a policy of cooperation between the two states would be possible, and Hungary would supply German-Austria with food so far as it was able.<sup>9</sup> At the time, much was hoped for in this direction, for the Germans of Austria were convinced that Hungary was well provisioned, and the friction over German-West-Hungary had not yet developed. A delegation was therefore promptly dispatched to Budapest to negotiate for supplies. Two agreements were concluded, one November 5,<sup>10</sup> the other November 26.<sup>11</sup> Although much may have been hoped for from these agreements, only the first one was carried out with any appreciable success.<sup>12</sup>

A short month after the Karolyi message, and a few days before the conclusion of the second trade agreement, friction developed over the disposition of German-West-Hungary, or the Burgenland. Hungary claimed this region as being a part of the former Hungarian territory. In his note to the Hungarian Government, Chancellor Renner countered with the proposal that the German inhabitants be permitted to decide the matter of allegiance themselves on the basis of the right of self-

<sup>9</sup> *Arbeiter Zeitung*, October 29, 1918, p. 1.

<sup>10</sup> *S.P.*, Dec. 4, 1918, p. 211. In exchange for textiles, paper, and metal goods, Hungary was to send 20,000 sheep, "an undetermined number" of steers and slaughter horses and about 100 carloads of flour. Up to December 4, there had been delivered 19,000 sheep, 1,200 horses, 4,800 steers, and very little flour.

<sup>11</sup> In exchange for manufactured or processed goods such as textiles, leather, metals, chemicals, paper and paper products, Hungary agreed to deliver before December 31, 40,000 sheep, 5,000 cattle, 1,000 slaughter horses, 500 carloads of grain, 300 carloads of potatoes. *Arbeiter Zeitung*, Nov. 30, 1918, p. 6; *S.P.*, Dec. 4, 1918, p. 311.

<sup>12</sup> *Arbeiter Zeitung*, Jan. 1, 1919, p. 9.

determination. He further stipulated that German-Austria would not draw on the supplies of the Burgenland without the consent of Hungary.<sup>13</sup> In replying to an interpellation on this matter in Parliament, the Chancellor reminded the deputies that German-Austria was in no position to take a strong stand on disputed territory, that armed conflict was out of the question and that a strictly legal approach was at all times to be maintained, while Hungary must be pacified as much as possible because of the effect of her attitude on the delivery of supplies.<sup>14</sup> Nevertheless, friction there was, and this together with other matters which proved highly embarrassing to the Karolyi regime, affected the outcome of what had at first blush appeared to be a happy arrangement. These other matters included organization of effective control within Hungary, control which was never real and yet which was essential for the collection of supplies, not to mention the problem of organizing resistance to the Czech occupation of Slovakia which began in earnest November 17.<sup>15</sup> Deliveries were made irregularly, and in quantities smaller than had been stipulated, up to December 20. On that day, notice was given that there would be no more supplies forthcoming from Hungary for an indefinite period.<sup>16</sup>

#### JUGOSLAVIA

Offhand it was hoped that next to Hungary, Jugoslavia would afford the greatest relief in the matter of provisions. In the early days of the Republic there was no particular source of friction visible, and it was believed that Serbia, being essentially agricultural, would have abundant supplies, while Croatia, voluntarily adhering to Serbia, and once a part of the Empire, had been a source of agricultural products before and during the war.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>13</sup> *Neue Freie Presse*, (Abend) Nov. 22, 1918, p. 2.

<sup>14</sup> *S.P.*, Nov. 22, 1918, p. 148.

<sup>15</sup> *Arbeiter Zeitung*, Nov. 18, 1918, p. 3.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, Dec. 21, 1918, p. 6.

<sup>17</sup> See Stolper, G. "Deutschösterreich" in *Der Oesterreichische Volkswirt*, Oct. 26, 1918, p. 51.—"If one excepts the small German minority in Southern Carinthia, there is nowhere in the world the slightest possibility of friction."



Nevertheless, in spite of this optimistic forecast, difficulties were encountered in the delivery of supplies, although the actual friction between German-Austria and the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes seems to have been less acute than in other cases involving German-Austria and her neighbors.<sup>18</sup> Squabbling developed between the German and Slovene residents over the ultimate fate of the Klagenfurt basin. In an attempt to iron out the difficulties, or at least to establish a *modus vivendi*, delegates from German-Austria and Jugoslavia met at Graz November 7 and 8.<sup>19</sup> Discussions were carried on intermittently until a solution was announced on the 25th, which provided that the area was to be divided for purposes of administration, until the final disposition of the region by the Peace Conference. Thus an arbitrary line was established which followed the river Gail from Gailitz to its confluence with the Drau. Although not entirely satisfactory to all concerned, it was hoped that the majority of the people involved might be satisfied with the arrangement, for the Germans bulked large in the areas north of the line which was ceded to German-Austria, while the Slovenes were in a majority in the southern part tentatively awarded to Jugoslavia.<sup>20</sup>

In the meantime, negotiations were undertaken for the exchange of goods on a barter basis, but these became difficult and, although two agreements were reached, the results were disappointing indeed. In the case of Jugoslavia, coal was contracted for as well as food. A small amount of coal, amounting to about ten cars a day, crossed the frontier during the period of extreme shortage, but very little food.<sup>21</sup>

The reasons for this failure were not hard to find. Delivery of supplies suffered simultaneously from three major difficulties. In the first place, the Croatians and the Slovenes were in a state of high indignation over the aggressive attitude of the Italian

18 See pp. 170 ff., 223 ff.

19 *Der Oesterreichische Volkswirt*, Nov. 12, 1918, p. 6.

20 *Ibid.*, Nov. 26, 1918, p. 5.

21 *Ibid.*, Feb. 2, 1919, p. 9.

government following the Armistice. It was reported that, on November 19, the President of the Southern Slav National Council induced the Serb Foreign Minister to protest vigorously against the occupation of Fiume.<sup>22</sup> Feeling ran high, and Vienna was greatly concerned over the report two days later of Southern Slav mobilization.<sup>23</sup> While German-Austria was not directly involved in this issue, any disturbance in Laibach would effect the delivery of supplies from Croatia-Slavonia and, in addition, would seriously affect the most important railway line to Trieste which ran through Laibach.<sup>24</sup>

In the second place, German-Austria suffered from ineffective administrative control by the Yugoslav central administration over the newly acquired territories. Thus, whereas shipments were loaded for delivery, and dispatched, they might be held up at almost any intermediate station between the point of origin and the German-Austrian frontier. Early in February it was reported that although coal was not coming through in the expected quantities, small shipments were arriving daily, whereas food was very hard to get out of Yugoslavia because of the particularism and independent action of certain Slavs who, in view of their own shortage, were unwilling to see supplies leave the country. The Slovenes were accused of holding up the shipment of one hundred and ten carloads of assorted foodstuffs and ten cars of meat which were destined to relieve the shortage in Vienna.<sup>25</sup>

In the third place, whereas the tentative administrative arrangements for the Klagenfurt area which had been agreed upon in late November may have seemed satisfactory to both Vienna and Belgrade, they were apparently anything but satisfactory for those living in the district, and local friction led to open hostilities in which the central governments finally became involved. Although the situation was treated on the whole in a rational

<sup>22</sup> *Neue Freie Presse*, (Abend) Nov. 20, 1918, p. 2.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.* (Abend) Nov. 21, 1918, p. 1.

<sup>24</sup> See Chapter Five, page 230 for a discussion of the "Laibach Affair."

<sup>25</sup> *Arbeiter Zeitung*, Feb. 2, 1919, p. 9.

manner, appeal being made by both parties to the Conference at Paris which dispatched a delegation of American officers to try to iron out the difficulties on the ground,<sup>26</sup> the friction was an additional barrier in the way of international equanimity and the all-important delivery of foodstuffs for German-Austria.

#### POLAND

The manner in which German-Austria was balked in her attempts to obtain supplies is well illustrated by the course of negotiations with Poland. This agrarian landlords' paradise, once so well disposed to the Imperial government and so comfortable a source of staple agricultural products for the Alpine Provinces, was now separated from German-Austria by a broad strip of alien territory: Bohemia, momentarily hostile; Slovakia, in turmoil and in the throes of occupation by the Czechs; and Hungary, disorganized and on the brink of social upheaval. In spite of this obvious barrier, the German-Austrian authorities optimistically concluded a treaty with Poland, on November 19, which provided for the immediate delivery of considerable quantities of potatoes, eggs, smoked meats, and horse sausage. Yet, by December 4, no more than one carload of eggs had appeared at the frontier.<sup>27</sup>

#### CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Since Czechoslovakia fell heir to some of the best agricultural areas of the old Empire, German-Austria looked to Czechoslovakia for certain farm products which had formerly been produced in these regions, a considerable amount of which, it was believed in German-Austria, was still available for export. Grain, beet sugar, kraut, dairy products and fruit were of chief

<sup>26</sup> The dispute in the Klagenfurt Basin was settled by a plebiscite conducted under the supervision of the League of Nations, October, 1920. See Wambaugh, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, Chapter 5.

<sup>27</sup> *S.P.*, Dec. 4, 1918, p. 212. The new Poland could hardly have been expected to follow the traditional trend of the former Austrian-Polish territory.

consideration.<sup>28</sup> Czechoslovakia was in a position to supply, to withhold, or to prevent the passage across Czech territory of one other product which was of greater importance to German-Austria, and largely unobtainable elsewhere, and that was coal.<sup>29</sup> German-Austrian railways functioned, industry limped along, tramways were in service, gas for heating and cooking was available and homes were lighted, or the reverse was the case, depending on the amount and regularity of the deliveries of coal at the Czechoslovak frontier.

Because of the circumstances attendant upon the death of the Empire and the birth of the Czechoslovak state, there was more acute friction and more bitterness between these two states than between German-Austria and any of her other neighbors in the early months of the republican regime.<sup>30</sup> And for this each state was in part responsible. The usual dislocation encountered elsewhere owing to lack of effective administrative control and local particularism played their part, and in addition, each government acted in a manner to make peace-time intercourse difficult.

But, while the products of Czechoslovakia were vital to the existence of German-Austria, the latter country had less to offer Czechoslovakia in the exchange of goods than Hungary or Jugoslavia, for in the latter instance, agricultural products might be offered on a barter basis for manufactured articles. Czechoslovakia, however, had developed a considerable industry of her own in the years prior to the War, particularly in the region of the Bohemian, Moravian and Silesian coal fields,<sup>31</sup> and had less need of the products of German-Austrian factories than Hungary or Jugoslavia.

28 Pasvolsky, L., *Economic Nationalism of the Danubian States*, p. 33-35.

29 *Ibid.*, p. 35.

30 The question may well be raised at this point as to the Austro-Italian relations, to be treated later. In this case, although there was enmity and despair in abundance on the German-Austrian side, the issues were quickly and apparently definitely settled. There was not the prolonged irritation which existed between German-Austria and Czechoslovakia.

31 Pasvolsky. *op. cit.*, pp. 33-34.

Of the various sources of disagreement between the two states, the question of disputed territory was by far the most important. Of less vital significance were the insistence on the part of German-Austria that the new Czechoslovakia share the indebtedness which the government of the Empire had built up, the prorated division of the war profiteers' tax as demanded by the Czechoslovak Administration, the bickering over the allocation of rolling-stock of the Imperial Railways, and other details which persisted in cropping up to confuse the situation.<sup>32</sup> All these various factors made more difficult the attempts of the German-Austrian authorities to break through the independent blockade inaugurated by the Slavs of Bohemia and Moravia on October 14, and reenforced by the inclusion of Czechoslovakia as one of the Allied and Associated Powers which continued the blockade of the Central Powers after the Armistice of Villa Giusti.

#### DISPUTE OVER SUDETENLANDS

In the first session of the German-Austrian National Assembly on October 21, 1918, a resolution was passed claiming all territory of the old Empire which was inhabited by a predominantly German population. In this connection, the German areas of the Sudetenlands were specified.<sup>33</sup> Following this statement of general principles, the deputies representing the German element of Bohemia in the old *Reichsrat*, now transformed into the Provisional National Assembly for German-Austria, met October 29 in Vienna and constituted themselves the Provisional Landtag for the new province of German-Bohemia which they proceeded to establish at that meeting. They immediately set up an administration and designated Reichenberg as their capital. And although the new Province was placed under the protection of German-Austria, the Provisional Provincial Administration announced its intention of cooperating with the Czechoslovak Administration wherever mixed language areas were involved.<sup>34</sup>

<sup>32</sup> *Neue Freie Presse*, Dec. 18, 1918, p. 3.

<sup>33</sup> *S.P.*, Oct. 21, 1918, p. 5.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, Oct. 30, 1918, p. 15.

This Provisional Provincial Administration set about its tasks and achieved moderate success in that its Food Department was able to scrape together enough food to supply the Province for two and one-half months. On the other hand, any cooperation with the authorities at Prague proved to be difficult. Finally, Seliger, the Provisional First Vice-Governor of the Province, went to Prague where he was told that the Czechoslovak administration would not treat with rebels.<sup>35</sup>

Meanwhile, almost from the beginning, disturbing reports were brought to the attention of the National Assembly of German-Austria regarding coercive measures adopted by the Czechs against Germans in Bohemia, and especially, it would appear, against Germans in administrative positions. It was therefore decided in the second meeting of the Provisional Assembly, October 30, to appeal to President Wilson. The Assembly informed him at the same time that hereafter the Assembly was to be considered the sole authority in the State.<sup>36</sup> In this appeal, the President was informed that in Bohemia, according to the census of 1910, there existed about 134 Judicial Districts in which the Czechs were in a majority, while by the same listing there were 93 in which Germans had a majority, and that in these 93 districts there were 2,395,541 persons who used the German language daily while there were but 80,143 who used Czech. In the entire Sudetenland there were 3,512,682 German nationals who were in imminent danger of being swallowed up by the new Czechoslovak State. Surely the good President would not create another irredenta of such potentialities!<sup>37</sup>

Evidently the American President was deaf to these importunities. The lot of those Germans who opposed the occupation of the disputed territory by the Czechoslovak Administration became difficult. And if certain ardent German nationalists in Bohemia and Moravia came too close for comfort to the bay-

35 Strauss, E., "Der Kampf um das Selbstbestimmungsrecht Deutschböhmens," in *Der Kampf*, 1919, p. 23.

36 *S.P.*, Oct. 30, 1918, p. 27.

37 *S.P.*, Oct. 30, 1918, p. 20-21.

onets of Czech troops, a vague resolution of encouragement adopted by the National Assembly, December 5, without adequate proffer of support, may be considered in part responsible. This resolution read as follows:<sup>38</sup>

We recognize the right of self-determination for all peoples and this applies to all Germans cut off from us by arbitrary frontiers, when they have said they wanted to join us. We protest against the armed coercion of German districts to the north and to the south, especially the seizure of territory since the signing of the armistice. We encourage the Germans to keep up the struggle until a world tribunal shall grant us as well as others the right to freedom and unity.

Germans were thereby encouraged to resist, but nothing was, nor in fact could be done, by German-Austria to support those offering resistance.

The occupation of contested regions by the Czechs was not effectively blocked by memorials and petitions. The Czech military forces began moving into the more obstreperous regions on November 28. On December 11, the Provisional Provincial Administration for German-Bohemia moved out of the country, and by December 16, the Bohemian question was settled.

Certain resistance, however, was offered to this method of forceful pacification, and the thermometer of popular indignation rose or fell in Vienna according to the frequency with which the press of that city published accounts of civil disturbances accompanied, as they frequently were, by shootings and casualties.<sup>39</sup> At two different periods this feeling ran extremely high,

<sup>38</sup> *S.P.*, Dec. 5, 1918, p. 281.

<sup>39</sup> Either because of careless reporting, or for purposes of propaganda, minor incidents were distorted and magnified in the Vienna press, not without effect.

An incident of this sort occurred in November, 1918, when the Austrian Red Cross asked the International Commission to protest against the unjust accusation and arrest of the President and members of the Prague section of the Austrian Red Cross. Inquiry at Prague, January 20, 1919, revealed that no officers of the Red Cross had been arrested, but that two women workers had been. *Bulletin International des Sociétés de la Croix-Rouge*, March 15, 1919, p. 353.

and armed conflict nearly came to a head between German-Austria and Czechoslovakia.<sup>40</sup>

The realization of the significance of military occupation produced a debate in the German-Austrian Parliament where it was decided to draw up a strong protest. If this had no effect, other measures would be decided on, but what these were to be was not at that time divulged.<sup>41</sup> On November 25, Foreign Minister Bauer for German-Austria handed this sharp protest to Tušar, the Czechoslovak representative in Vienna.<sup>42</sup> Occupation of the Sudetenlands began on November 28. On December 2 another sharp note was sent to Prague over the occupation of the town of Brüx, because Bauer maintained that he had it in writing in a note from the Czechoslovak regime that there would be no military occupation of German-Bohemia.<sup>43</sup>

Appeals and threats to the Prague officials were of no avail, and the German-Austrian Foreign Office appealed to the leading Entente Powers and to the United States. A note protesting the occupation also suggested that a plebiscite, supervised by foreign troops, should be held in the Sudetenlands to ascertain the desires of the populations involved.<sup>44</sup> For the most part, this appeal fell on deaf ears. But in one instance, Pichon, the French Foreign Minister, sent a reply which, although discouraging, might well have been given more consideration by German-Austria as an indication of the ultimate arrangement. Pichon sent word through the Swiss Ambassador, December 20, to the effect that whereas the frontiers of German-Austria could be defined only at the Peace Conference, until a final settlement was reached the provisional boundaries would be the administrative divisions of the former Empire.<sup>45</sup> In the end, this principle was adopted,

<sup>40</sup> Bauer, *op. cit.*, p. 100.

<sup>41</sup> *Arbeiter Zeitung*, Nov. 21, 1918, p. 3.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, Nov. 26, 1918, p. 3.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, Dec. 2, 1918, p. 3. Dec. 2, 1918, *Mittagsblatt*, p. 4. Dec. 3, 1918, p. 3.

<sup>44</sup> *Arbeiter Zeitung*, Dec. 14, 1918, pp. 1-2.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, Jan. 15, 1919, p. 4.



and after the Treaty was signed, the Sudetenlands were officially incorporated in Bohemia.

Significant comment on the controversy was contributed from two other sources about this time. Eduard Beneš, Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Affairs, while still in Paris, told a reporter for the *Lausanne Gazette* that it was settled that Bohemia (the inference was that all of it was included) would belong to Czechoslovakia, that there were only two and a half million Germans resident in the territory instead of three and a half as the German-Austrian authorities maintained, and that they would be given special privileges in the matter of schools and a university at Prague.<sup>46</sup> A fortnight later, the President of the Czechoslovak Republic gave an address which did not tend to allay the friction between the two countries. In an outspoken manner, he suggested that Czechoslovakia had much to offer German-Austria, but that friendly relations could be established only if the latter country abandoned its Pan-German agitation, which in this case applied not only to German-Bohemia and Moravia, but to *Anschluss* as well.<sup>47</sup>

There were more serious reasons for friction than that mentioned above. It was to be expected that the Czechoslovak leaders should frown upon the prospect of an *Anschluss* between German-Austria and Germany, in part because of the cordial relations which existed between Czechoslovakia and France, and in part because, in the event of *Anschluss*, Bohemia would ap-

<sup>46</sup> *Arbeiter Zeitung*, Dec. 3, 1918, p. 4.

<sup>47</sup> *Neue Freie Presse* (Nachmittag), Dec. 23, 1918, p. 1. This address was resented in Vienna, and an explanation of a sort was given out at Prague. The text of the address was released to all the newspapers in Prague, while the text received by the German newspapers outside the country was a translation rendered by the official Czech Press Bureau. In the following quotation, the words italicized appeared in the Prague German-language paper, *Bohemia* but not in the German translation released to papers outside Czechoslovakia: "If the Austrian-Germans abandon their greed for power, if they abandon their Pan-German schemes, if they are loyal to us, and if they do not meddle in our affairs, then decent neighborly relations would be possible. *Austria would then be able to preserve its independence.*" Great Britain, War Office, *Enemy Press Supplement to the Review of the Foreign Press*. Jan. 9, 1919, p. 550.

pear to be a Czech sea in a German ocean. However, it is interesting to find that before the proposal was actively encouraged in German-Austria, Eduard Benes approved of the theory of *Anschluss* on purely Czech grounds. He felt that, at the time, the attraction of Germany for the Germans of Bohemia would be less strong than the attraction of Austria for these same Germans.<sup>48</sup>

Further, the Czechoslovak authorities were none too anxious to assist German-Austria with food as long as arms and ammunition were being smuggled into German-Bohemia to resist Czech occupation.<sup>49</sup> How far the Administration in German-Austria was responsible for this traffic, or whether it was being directed by the Provisional Provincial Administration of German-Bohemia, cannot be determined. These charges were not effectively refuted by the German-Austrian Administration, but the traffic in these materials apparently stopped shortly after March 5, 1919.<sup>50</sup>

However, there was at no time any serious question as to the *de facto* possession of these contested areas. The Administration of German-Austria was forced into a position, here as elsewhere, of appealing to the much quoted right of self-determination on the part of the inhabitants, or the equally vague "morality" of the European Concert of Powers. By the end of 1918 the Czechoslovak authorities had the situation rather generally under control. The sporadic attempts made by some Bohemian Germans to vote for representatives to the new National Assembly for German-Austria on February 16 proved completely abortive in the face of Czechoslovak policing, while the pro-Austrian uprising of the Sudeten Germans, scheduled for the date of the convening of the new Parliament in Vienna, took

48 In a letter to William Martin, Beneš writes as follows: "Enfin, quant a l'Autriche allemand, nous croyons, que pour tout le monde le mieux serait que l'Autriche devint allemande tout de suite; pour nous, parce que l'irredentisme sera beaucoup moins fort parmi nos Allemands a l'égard de l'Allemagne que de l'Autriche." "Notes de Guerre," Ms. Hoover War Library.

49 See letter of Masaryk to Hoover, p. 249.

50 *Neue Freie Presse* (Nachmittag), Dec. 23, 1918, p. 1.

the form of unorganized civil disturbances which were easily suppressed.<sup>51</sup> The casualties were chiefly among the working classes.

That such casualties as did result were to be found among the workers deserves a word of comment. They would naturally expect their interests to be furthered more by a government which was at the moment strongly influenced by labor leaders than by a government, no matter how enlightened, which represented a bourgeois domination. And, yet, resistance was unorganized and sporadic, while Social Democracy in German-Austria looked upon this feeble show of resentment against the Czechs as a breakdown not only in party but in class solidarity. In reply, the Bohemian Socialists could only reaffirm their loyalty to class and party and point to the obvious fact that they were impotent to accomplish anything under such drastic action by the Czechoslovak Administration.<sup>52</sup>

The Province of German Bohemia was contiguous to the German Reich on the west and to the Alpine Provinces of the old Empire on the south. There was no outstanding natural frontier to separate it from the remainder of Bohemia, but, as post-war frontiers were drawn, the lack of a natural frontier was no insuperable obstacle. It was true that an indeterminate number of German-Bohemians were descended from Reich Germans rather than from Austrian Germans, but even they might

<sup>51</sup> The *Arbeiter Zeitung*, March 5, 6, published the following as a partial list:

In Eger	.....	Several men and young women killed
Sternberg	....	More than ten dead (later reported at 45)
Reichenberg	..	Numerous shots, no fatalities
Karlsbad	.....	Two dead, six wounded
Prague	.....	Germans on the run, not many visible
Kaaden	.....	Eighteen dead, fifteen severely wounded
Mies	.....	One woman killed for singing <i>Deutschland über Alles</i>
Aussig	.....	Numerous shots, no fatalities.

<sup>52</sup> Strauss, *op. cit.*, 1919, p. 26. The author asserts that the Entente had invited the Czechs to subdue Bohemia and what could the Germans have done in the face of this backing?

have considered cordially the idea of union with German-Austria under more favorable circumstances.

As early as October 26, Dr. Gustav Stolper, writing in the *Volkswirt*, commented shrewdly on the situation in Bohemia, and subsequent developments bore out his main contentions. He remarked that the difficulties in the way of coming to an understanding with the Czechs in matters of food and fuel were increased by the Bohemian question. This problem was confused by the fact that the Germans as well as some thoughtful Czechs were of two minds with respect to the best solution. Some Germans, including influential business men, had already pledged themselves to support the Czechoslovak regime in German-Bohemia. Their motivation was obvious, for they considered the new Czechoslovakia, especially under bourgeois control, a better business prospect than German-Austria. The writer also added that the Czechoslovak regime would build golden bridges for these influential Germans, which would include wide nationality privileges of the usual sort<sup>53</sup> and a large share in the raw materials of the district, *after* the peace treaty was signed. Similarly, the olive branch would be extended to German workers. On the other hand, Dr. Stolper remarks, it should be stated in all justice that a few Czechs, the number equally impossible to estimate, looked with concern upon the inclusion of German-Bohemia and Moravia in the new Czechoslovakia on the ground that it meant abandoning the idea of a truly national state and creating a new irredenta.<sup>54</sup> To these explanations for the spineless resistance to the Slav occupation of German-Bohemia might be added the generally admitted fact that many of the influential German families in Bohemia were of long standing and apparently well satisfied to continue their local contacts. They were, in fact, partially slavized and had long lost the threads of that

<sup>53</sup> Cf. p. 169 the remarks to this effect attributed to Beneš, the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister and reported December 3, 1918.

<sup>54</sup> "Deutschösterreich" in *Der Oesterreichische Volkswirt*, Oct. 26, 1918, pp. 50-51.

sentimental attachment for the Homeland which lends itself so easily to the propaganda of ardent nationalists.

In short, the fate of German-Bohemia and Moravia was sealed in part by the diplomacy of such men as Masaryk, Beneš, and Krámař in Paris and elsewhere, and in part by the prominent Germans, in the contested regions, who for their own reasons did not throw the weight of their support either behind the constitutional move to set up Provisional Provincial Assemblies or the workingmen who offered a show of resistance to Czech troops.<sup>55</sup>

The Administration of German-Austria, in spite of its inability to make effective its claims to the disputed territories, continued to keep the issue alive. Pursuit of this policy, unquestionably detrimental to German-Austria at the time, was doubtless motivated by a too literal reading of Pichon's statement that the final boundaries would be determined at the Peace Conference,<sup>56</sup> as well as by the now almost incredible tenacity with which the leaders in German-Austria pinned their hopes on the Wilsonian phrase "open covenants openly arrived at."<sup>57</sup>

#### FOOD AND FUEL FROM CZECHOSLOVAKIA

As long as the tension between the two States over the disposition of Bohemia and Moravia remained acute, the delivery of food or fuel was irregular and distinctly meager. The Czech occupation of Bohemia and Moravia and the application within that area of the blockade against the Monarchy had created havoc with the supply of fresh vegetables, sugar, and fresh milk, and it was with the utmost difficulty that the new government of the Republic was able to obtain even limited supplies. Daily

<sup>55</sup> Lammasch to William Martin, "Notes de Guerre," Ms., Hoover War Library. See also Brož, A., *Three Years of the Czecho-Slovak Republic*, p. 40, and Borošovička, J., *Ten Years of Czecho-Slovak Politics*, p. 9.

<sup>56</sup> See above, p. 168.

<sup>57</sup> Shotwell, James T., *At the Paris Peace Conference*, has an interesting chapter on how "experts" became "negotiators" at the Peace Conference and how a negotiated peace was impossible under the circumstances.

negotiations on the matter were made more difficult in that while Czechoslovakia had a representative in Vienna, German-Austria had no official in Prague.<sup>58</sup> In spite of repeated efforts, and in spite of promises of future delivery, sugar could not be obtained from Czechoslovakia, potatoes crossed the frontier only in small quantities at infrequent intervals, and the once considerable flow of milk to the City of Vienna was reduced to a trickle, so small, in fact, that only infants up to one year of age received milk.<sup>59</sup> In the autumn and winter of 1918–1919, the failure of the Central Government was so complete in this respect that the Mayor of Vienna led a deputation to Prague in an attempt to negotiate directly with the Czechoslovak authorities on behalf of the city population. Even by this unusual procedure, the most that could be obtained was a shipment of apples in exchange for telephones and electrical equipment.<sup>60</sup>

The explanation for the difficulties encountered in attempting to obtain provisions from Czechoslovakia is found in the fact that “surplus” supplies within the country did not exist. Realization of this situation was difficult for the people of German-Austria, and especially Vienna, and was not entirely accepted even after the first Inter-Allied Mission had reported a food shortage in both Czechoslovakia and Hungary early in January, 1919.<sup>61</sup>

<sup>58</sup> *S.P.*, Dec. 4, 1918, p. 201.

<sup>59</sup> *S.P.*, Dec. 4, 1918, pp. 214–215.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, Dec. 4, 1918, p. 211.

<sup>61</sup> See below, p. 256 ff. It is interesting to observe that while the American Relief Administration considered the needs of Prague as taking precedence over those of Vienna, and shipped more supplies to Czechoslovakia than to German-Austria during the winter and spring months of 1918–19, Foreign Minister Beneš wrote to Colonel Anderson of the American Red Cross, December 18, as follows: “*Foodstuffs*—Thanks to the productive wealth of our soil, thanks to the spirit of economy which has been shown by the population, there is no need to consider this important question. The local resources will meet the needs.” He did however ask for clothing, shoes, medical and surgical supplies, and “chemistry articles.” Eduard Beneš to Colonel Anderson. (Copy for Mr. Herbert C. Hoover from Lt. Col. Gibson, A.R.C.), Ms., A.R.A. Archives, Hoover War Library.

As a result of the manner in which the old Empire was divided after the Manifesto of October 16, Czechoslovakia obtained the most extensive and valuable coal deposits. It was natural therefore that German-Austria should depend upon Czechoslovakia for a supply of this all-important product.<sup>62</sup>

Certain difficulties, however, had to be surmounted before the coal appeared at the pit-heads, and further difficulties had to be overcome before the coal could reach its destination in German-Austria. In the first place, the coal mining industry, like every other in the Empire, had suffered from the effects of the War. Machinery was in need of repair, and the productivity of the miners was reduced because of under-nourishment and the resulting lack of energy. Moreover, following the years in which the miners were subjected to military discipline, the end of the War brought a relief from forced labor, and a disinclination to work, an attitude attributed by the Czechoslovak authorities to German and Polish agitation, and by members of the Inter-Allied Mission to communists.<sup>63</sup> And finally, the ownership of the mines, especially in Silesia, was not definitely settled in these early months of the Republic, so that it was not always possible for the Czechoslovak Administration to obtain coal for delivery to German-Austria. Another problem which presented itself to German-Austrian industry was that, while any sort of coal was more than welcome, much of that received was brown coal and therefore difficult to use in the many industrial establishments equipped for hard coal.

In November, 1918, Dr. Burger for Czechoslovakia signed an agreement with the representatives of German-Austria whereby the latter was to receive a daily total of 4,800 tons of

<sup>62</sup> For a brief discussion of the location of the mines in the Empire, the types of coal, and the annual output, see p. 185 ff.

<sup>63</sup> Statement by Stanek to Hutchinson, in "History of the A.R.A. at Prague," Ms., A.R.A. Archives, Hoover War Library; Beneš to Hoover, Letter of Jan. 7, 1919, A.R.A. Archives, Hoover War Library; Gregory, Capt. T.T.C., "General Report for Central Europe. Relief of the Austro-Hungarian Succession States." p. 46, Mss., A.R.A. Archives, Hoover War Library.

brown coal. At the same time, a separate agreement was made between the railway administrations of the two countries for supplying the German-Austrian railways with coal. These deliveries were, of course, subject to the many and varied influences already suggested, political friction, inability to get the coal out of the ground, and above all, difficulties of transportation.<sup>64</sup>

As an example of the uncertainty in transportation, there is the case cited by Foreign Secretary Bauer in the Assembly, in

64 When questioned as to the reason for the failure to maintain the scheduled deliveries of coal, the Czechoslovak Minister of Public Works claimed that the agreement of November to deliver coal to Vienna provided for a reduction in the schedules if the output of the mines was reduced by strikes or for any other reason, and that since the output had been reduced, 32% the daily delivery of 750 tons was reasonable. Colonel Causey, Chief of the Inter-Allied Railway Mission, when this report was made presented different statistics to the effect that in the period April 6-12, coal deliveries for gas were 41%, for electricity, 68% and for domestic use, 49% of the agreed amount. History of the A.R.A. at Prague, Ms., A.R.A. Archives, Hoover War Library.

Beneš placed the blame for irregular deliveries on the shortage of railway cars and locomotives, and then joined the ranks of the responsible men of most of the Succession States by claiming that the neighbors had held back the rolling-stock: "The Austrians themselves have stripped us of them, very nearly completely, and it is they who clamour loudest for coal. And yet they refuse to hear us when we ask to be provided first with means of transportation." Letter of Beneš to Hoover, Jan. 7, 1919, Ms., A.R.A. Archives Hoover War Library.

The findings of the A.R.A. Mission at Prague bore Beneš out in certain particulars while differing with him in others. Thus, the difficulties in the way of Czechoslovak transportation were listed as follows:

1. Czechoslovakia had no control over the rolling-stock of the Empire, and cars marked *K.K.St.B.* were seized by the Italians upon entering their territory and not returned.
2. A great shortage of locomotives exists in addition to the fact that 50% of those in Czechoslovak territory are not usable. The Italian government promised to help and sent in 10 locomotives but nine were in poor condition.
3. Existence of a shortage of coal for the railways.
4. Of 657 locomotives in Slovakia when the Hungarians invaded, 191 remained when they left. Most of these were unfit for use, some having been sabotaged. History of the A.R.A. in Prague, Ms., A.R.A. Archives, Hoover War Library.

This report covers the period from February 15 to August 1919.



this instance of Silesian coal. Arrangements had been made for delivery of a consignment of coal to come from Prussian Silesia to Vienna. After long negotiations with the Czechoslovak authorities, a promise was given that the coal would be permitted to pass through Czech territory unhindered. The cars were loaded, and the shipment was permitted to enter Bohemia without difficulty. The first of two trains reached Lundenburg November 27 and was there detained for some unknown reason. When Dr. Bauer learned of the fact on December 28, he immediately appealed to Tušar, the Czechoslovak Minister in Vienna. Tušar got in touch with the authorities in Lundenburg, but by noon of the same day, Bauer found that the train was still held up. Appeal was again made to Tušar, who said that the railway officials at Lundenburg would not act without instructions from Prague. Tušar was then induced to communicate with Prague and reported that the railway administration would order the train released immediately. On the 29th, Bauer learned that not only this first train of thirty-four cars but the second of forty-five cars had left Lundenburg but had been either misdirected or sidetracked to Brünn. Again he appealed to Tušar who reported reassuringly that Prague had straightened out the matter and that the trains were en route to Vienna. This was the 29th. by December 4, when Bauer gave his report to Parliament, the trains had not succeeded in covering the distance between Brünn and Vienna, approximately seventy miles.

In order, if possible, to prevent a repetition of the confusion, a delegation set out for Prague, held discussions with the Czechoslovak Administration, December 9, 10 and 11th, and on the 12th signed a treaty whereby German-Austria, and especially Vienna, should receive more adequate and more regular supplies of coal, oil and benzine. Delivery was to begin at once.<sup>65</sup> Apparently the situation was improved momentarily,<sup>66</sup> although the supply was still far below the actual needs, as is evidenced by the unusual suffering from cold during January, 1919.

<sup>65</sup> *S.P.*, Dec. 4, 1918, p. 200 f.

<sup>66</sup> *Arbeiter Zeitung*, Dec. 14, 1918.

By mid February difficulties were again encountered in the delivery of fuel. The trouble this time was over the Czechs' claim that they could not make deliveries unless the German-Austrians supplied them with their own cars; that Czechoslovak rolling-stock was not available for this purpose. Immediately, German-Austrian delegates hurried off to Prague where they proved to the satisfaction of the Czech Railway Administration that the cars in question had been returned to Czechoslovakia and were somewhere in that country. The authorities at Prague promised that within two days the normal flow of traffic would be resumed.<sup>67</sup>

As a matter of fact, it was hardly more than two days before there was absolutely no coal crossing the frontier and, for a short period, no contact whatever over the frontier. On February 26, obviously without warning, the Czechoslovak frontiers were not only closed but sealed. Export and import of all manner of goods were suspended, mails were held up and, so far as possible, contact with the outside world was effectively cut off while the national currency was being established. The actual stamping took place between February 26 and March 9<sup>68</sup> and the period was one of extreme uncertainty for the Viennese who were threatened with the complete absence of gas for cooking and heating, and further reduction in the use of electricity in the home.<sup>69</sup>

Thus time and again, negotiations between German-Austria and the neighbor states proved insufficient as a means of obtaining the barest essentials in food and fuel, due partly to the economic dislocation in each country concerned, and partly to national antagonisms inherited from the Monarchy and the war period. An appreciable improvement was to come only with the

<sup>67</sup> *Arbeiter Zeitung*, Feb. 25, 1919, p. 5.

<sup>68</sup> *Arbeiter Zeitung*, Feb. 27, 1919, p. 3.

<sup>69</sup> The stamping of the currencies is discussed in more detail in Chapter Four, p. 210 ff.

steadying hand of Inter-Allied supervision and the supplies of the American Relief Administration.<sup>70</sup>

<sup>70</sup> Captain T.T.C. Gregory, member of the Inter-Allied Trieste Mission and in charge of the American Relief Administration operating out of Trieste, is definite on this point. After passing in review the chief manifestations in the economic dislocation which came with the dissolution of the Empire, he points out that with the arrival of winter and no work came also wild-eyed reformers who shouted their pet theories, smart Bolsheviks with pockets full of money for individuals and the press and, continues Gregory, "had it not been for the firm hand that was laid upon them from above by the American control which was superimposed on the whole structure, there is no question but that there would have been a social, economic and political debacle in Central Europe." Gregory, Captain T.T.C. "General Report for Central Europe. The Relief of the Austro-Hungarian Succession States." p. 13, Ms., A.R.A. Archives, Hoover War Library.

## CHAPTER IV

### ECONOMIC MALADJUSTMENT

IN the first days of the Republic, evidences of privation in German-Austria, and especially in Vienna, were everywhere manifest.<sup>1</sup> Because of the various blockades, the chaos in transportation, and the particularism of the Provinces, there was acute shortage of food and fuel. This shortage vitally affected the daily life of the people and eventually had far-reaching economic and political repercussions. Broadly speaking, there was a shortage of everything except money at this period in German-Austria,<sup>2</sup> and conditions were intensified in the capital. As an American observer remarked: "The Viennese are in the position of a shipwrecked traveler on a rocky island with his stocks and bonds in his pocket, but no lunches at hand nor the means of communication or transportation to get them."<sup>3</sup>

The critical situation which existed in Vienna was complicated by the fact that the population was increasing. Many non-Germans left to take up their residence in one or another of the new States. Yet, the number of bureaucrats and their families returning to Vienna from non-German territories where they had been in the service of the Imperial Administration far ex-

1 A detailed description of the conditions in Vienna in the winter of 1918-1919 and for some time thereafter would constitute a long and dreary narrative. Reference may be had to the reports of eye-witnesses, such as C.A. Macartney and H.N. Brailsford, British correspondents. The most detailed of the contemporary accounts is *Blockade*, previously cited. Allowing for Frau Eisenmenger's attitude as the well-to-do widow of a Court physician, her journal is most illuminating, touching as it does on the intimate aspects of food prices, smuggling, shortage of fuel and electricity, and other matters affecting the private citizen.

2 Eisenmenger, A. *Blockade*, p. 149, reports that by the end of the year, the government would still accept its own money at food depots, but that the private tradesman, who was the only one having what the housewife really needed, would not accept money as payment.

3 Gregory, Captain T.T.C. "General Report for Central Europe. Relief of the Austro-Hungarian Succession States." p. 52, Ms., A.R.A. Archives, Hoover War Library.

ceeded the number who left Vienna.<sup>4</sup> The numerical gain in this exchange was well on the side of German-Austria, and the food ration per head had to be reduced accordingly.

This movement had hardly ceased when there appeared a recurrence of the familiar war-time phenomenon—the influx of refugees to Vienna. In what might be termed a Christmas review of the problems confronting the City of Vienna, the Mayor, Richard Weisskirchner, emphasized this point particularly. He pointed out that in addition to those who had already arrived in Vienna from Bohemia, there were thousands of refugees en route. These refugees, with hardly an exception, were Jews from Poland, Eastern Galicia, and the Ukraine who were being forced out of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Roumania.<sup>5</sup>

At a meeting of the City Council, January 28, 1919, serious consideration was given to the continued invasion of hordes of refugees from the north and east. The Mayor twice appealed to the Chancellor without effect. It was noted that Turkey had ejected them, that Budapest had told them to leave between February 1 and 14, and that they would probably move on to Vienna.<sup>6</sup> These individuals, for the most part destitute, afforded an additional complication of the already serious problems of food, housing, and unemployment, and were more than a little instrumental in precipitating the crisis of early 1919.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Pasvolsky, L., *Economic Nationalism of the Danubian States*, p. 96.

<sup>5</sup> *Reichspost*, Dec. 25, 1918, p. 3. See also the appeal by Dr. Rudolf Ritter von Schwarz-Hiller, Vienna City Councillor, to President Wilson to prevent the expulsion of Jews from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Roumania. Berne, Dec. 2, 1918, Ms. in the Alonzo E. Taylor Collection, A.R.A. Archives, Hoover War Library. Beneš, commenting on President Masaryk's attitude toward them in Czechoslovakia reported: "Due to his intervention, the rigorous measures taken against certain Jewish elements have been done away with." Beneš to Sokolow, Paris, Jan. 7, 1919. Letter in the A.R.A. Archives, Hoover War Library.

<sup>6</sup> *Neue Freie Presse*, Jan. 29, 1919, p. 8.

<sup>7</sup> The Vienna *Reichspost* repeatedly maintained that the Social Democratic Party received much support from eastern refugees, especially Polish and Galician Jews. In the morning edition of Jan. 29, 1919, p. 7, it cited the refusal of Chancellor Renner to take action in this matter as vindication of its contention.

## SHORTAGE OF VITAL FOODS

Due in part to its own ineffectiveness, the administration of German-Austria continued the system of war-time economy. Often, the defects inherited with the system raised the specter not only of economic strife but of social conflict as well. The Inter-Allied Commissioners who made a study of conditions in Central Europe at the end of 1918 indicated one of these defects:

One of the worst features of the situation from a commercial point of view, lies in the fact that distribution of agricultural products from the producers to the consumers was never correctly organized during the war.

The authorities contented themselves with requisitioning for the army and with such demands for agricultural products from the Provinces as would enable them to offer a card ration of from 700-1000 calories, leaving the supply of the remainder to trade. In other words, the authorities never pretended to supply over a third of the diet. This worked well enough for two years, but when the production fell greatly, the system was not only intolerable to the consumer, but led to speculation and illicit handling on the part of the producer.

Of the 55 per cent of a normal crop supposed to have been raised, we may be sure that the producers, apart from their diminished count of stock, retained per capita as much as before the War, leaving of course to the inhabitants of the cities and industrial classes in general a greatly reduced ration.

There are already indications of the development of that chasm between the peasants and the Social Democrats of the cities that has been one of the worst features of the situation in Russia. While with the Social Democrats, the tendency in the direction of socialization of industry becomes daily more fervent entirely apart from any Bolshevik tendencies, with the peasant who before the war was in large part merely a tenant, the belief in private ownership of property has become a veritable fetish.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>8</sup> "Report on the countries that have arisen from Austria-Hungary, by the Inter-Allied Committee to Investigate Conditions in Austria-Hungary. Jan. 21, 1919." Ms., A.R.A. Archives, Hoover War Library.

The issuance of food cards intended to permit a bare subsistence was one thing, but obtaining food adequate to cover the demand of those possessing cards was a different matter. This discrepancy was particularly tragic in the supply of milk. Pre-war deliveries of milk to Vienna were approximately 900,000 litres daily. During the War, this amount was reduced to 145,000 litres and was limited to those most in need of milk. By January, 1919, the amount had sunk to 75,000, and by February was down to 30,000 litres daily. This reduced amount was insufficient for the care of the infant population of the city, and an arbitrary limit of one year was established for those children entitled to milk.<sup>9</sup> Milk was listed on the ration cards, but it was unobtainable for adults or even invalids.

The shortage was by no means confined to milk. It extended to all forms of food. The government needlessly declared one "meatless week" after another in a dreary succession broken only by an occasional windfall, such as that of early November, 1918, when, because of a lack of fodder a number of cavalry horses had to be slaughtered. This permitted an allowance of three and one-half ounces per head per week for those who arrived at the food depot early. Since this was the first meat available for some time, a housewives' riot resulted at the dispensary, broken up only by the arrival of mounted police.<sup>10</sup>

The dejection resulting from defeat in the War was not easily or quickly shaken off, while the years of existence on foods of low nutrition value were equally important in affecting the general attitude. This was particularly evident in the cities where passive despair was interrupted occasionally by hunger riots. As a consequence, the industrial life of the country was handicapped by its dependence upon an enfeebled working class.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>9</sup> Second Report by Sir William Goode, "Economic Conditions in Central Europe," 1920, Cmd., 641, Miscellaneous No. 6.

<sup>10</sup> Eisenmenger, *op. cit.*, pp. 66-68.

<sup>11</sup> In the files of the A.R.A., the reports submitted by British and American observers in German-Austria and Czechoslovakia repeatedly emphasize the necessity of making adequate food available to the workers, especially the coal miners who could then produce more coal, which in turn would

The years of privation had rendered the population extraordinarily vulnerable to disease. Deaths from tuberculosis nearly doubled,<sup>12</sup> and it was estimated that insufficient nourishment accounted for 20 per cent of all deaths.<sup>13</sup> There was heavy toll in the early fall and winter of 1918-19 from an epidemic of Spanish grippe or influenza.<sup>14</sup> And, although there was no apparent increase in infant mortality,<sup>15</sup> there was every evidence of startling increase among children of severe cases of rickets and other forms of malnutrition.<sup>16</sup>

make possible the revival of industry. Better nourished industrial workers, with coal to run the factories, would then change the aspect of the economic life of the suffering countries.

<sup>12</sup> In Bundesamt für Statistik, *Statistisches Handbuch für die Republik Oesterreich*, III Jahrgang, Wien, 1923, pp. 7-11 are found the following statistics for Vienna:

	1913	1918	1919
Births .....	39,155	19,574	25,315
(Still born) .....	1,523	652	776
Total Deaths .....	32,655	46,655	39,616
	(1914)		
Deaths from Tuberculosis .....	5,804	9,633	9,438

<sup>13</sup> Report submitted to Dr. A. E. Taylor, in Alonzo E. Taylor Collection, A.R.A. Archives, Hoover War Library. Dr. Siegfried Rosenfeld, Chairman of the Bureau of Vital Statistics in the Bureau of Public Health, bears out this same point when he says that with the exception of dysentery and influenza, the increase of mortality in Vienna, 1914-19, was not due to infection or to causes which the medical profession could combat, but rather to causes over which the doctors had no control,—privation and overwork. Rosenfeld, Dr. Siegfried "Die Wirkung des Krieges auf die Sterblichkeit in Wien," p. 17-30 in *Veröffentlichungen des Volksgesundheitsamtes im Staatsamte für Soziale Verwaltung*, VIII.

<sup>14</sup> *Oesterreichisches Jahrbuch* 1920, pp. 24-25.

<sup>15</sup> Rosenfeld, Dr. Siegfried, *op. cit.*, 27 gives official figures for infants as:

	1912	1913	1914	1915	1916	1917	1918	1919
Living births	39,801	37,632	36,442	29,257	23,491	20,688	19,257	24,347
Deaths up to 1 year .....	5,922	5,833	5,074	4,459	3,320	3,161	2,941	3,625
Infant mortal- ity .....	14.88%	15.50%	13.92%	15.24%	14.13%	15.28%	15.27%	14.89%

<sup>16</sup> *The American Relief Administration European Children's Fund in Austria*. Based on scientific studies made and practical experiences gained by Dr. Clemens Pirquet and Dr. Ernst Mayerhofer. Translated by Hubert W. Tschirf, A.R.A. Archives, Hoover War Library.



The condition of the people might have been alleviated had the domestic harvest of 1918 been normal. A number of factors contributed to bring about the low yield of that year. Agriculture as well as industry was left with the curse of the war demands which had been laid upon it. The soil, with the exception of the ever narrowing Danube valley from Passau to Melk, and again from Vienna to Pressburg, was comparatively poor, and the shortage of livestock as a result of war-time requisitioning involved a dearth of natural fertilizer at a time when artificial fertilizer was practically non-existent.<sup>17</sup> Further, although the army had withdrawn men from the fighting units for work in the fields, not to mention the prisoners of war similarly engaged, there was a shortage of labor for these workers were assigned to the more highly productive agricultural areas of the Empire.<sup>18</sup> Even when the producers did not withhold their supplies from the collectors for the Central Government, the domestic supply was inadequate. The harvest of 1918, on which German-Austria was supposed to exist until the harvest of the next summer, has been estimated as one fourth of the cereal needs, one fifth of potatoes, one third of meat, one twentieth of fat, and one fourteenth of sugar.<sup>19</sup>

#### FUEL SHORTAGE IN INDUSTRY

In fuel as in food, German-Austria was faced with the problem of adjustment made necessary by the loss of natural resources to the neighboring states.<sup>20</sup> The shortage of fuel placed a serious obstacle in the way of operating business houses and industrial plants, and the consequent retardation of industry was an important factor in delaying economic rehabilitation.

<sup>17</sup> *One Year of Freedom*, p. 9.

<sup>18</sup> Winkler, *op. cit.*, pp. 35-36, comments that at the end of the war more than a million prisoners of war were used in agriculture in the hinterland and, of these, more than half were employed in the Hungarian harvest.

<sup>19</sup> Bauer, *op. cit.*, 82. Cf. Gratz, G. and Schüller, R. *Der Wirtschaftliche Zusammenbruch Oesterreich-Ungarns*, p. 45.

<sup>20</sup> Pasvolsky, L., *op. cit.*, pp. 33-34.

The most important anthracite deposits in the Austrian half of the Empire were in the *Ostrau-Karwiner Revier* of northern Moravia and eastern Silesia. The 51 mines and furnaces of this district produced, in 1913, 9.4 million tons of anthracite and 2.1 million tons of coke. Next in importance came the coal fields of western Galicia, located to the east of the *Ostrau-Karwiner* beds and, in fact, a part of the *Dombrowa* deposits of Russian Poland. The Galician mines had a production of 2 million tons. Trailing the production of these two areas by a wide margin came the output of the *Rossitz-Oslawaner Steinkohlenreviere* of central Moravia with a total of .5 million tons. The remaining deposits of anthracite were all within Bohemia: the *Kladno-Schlaner Steinkohlenrevier* northwest of Prague with an annual production of 2.6 million tons, the *Pilsen-Mieser Steinkohlenrevier* of western Bohemia in the vicinity of Pilsen with a production of 1.3 million tons, the *Schatzlar-Schwadowitzer Revier* in northeastern Bohemia adjoining the lower Silesian fields with an output of .4 million tons.<sup>21</sup>

The lignite deposits were also to be found for the most part in the Sudeten territories. Out of the total of 27.5 millions tons of lignite produced in 1913, the mines of Bohemia contributed 22.7 million tons, and those of Moravia and Silesia .3 million. Of the remaining 4.5 million tons produced, the fields of Upper Austria, Styria and Dalmatia accounted for 4.4 million tons and the remaining .1 million tons came from Galicia and Bukowina.

In Bohemia, the largest producer of lignite, the mines were to be found in two general regions; in the vicinity of the towns of Brüx, Dux, Teplitz, and Komotau to the northwest, and to the west between the cities of Karlsbad and Eger.<sup>22</sup>

Nevertheless, the coal production in Austria, using 1913 as a typical year, was insufficient, and coal was imported in small quantities from England, but chiefly from Germany. The deficit

21 Homann-Herimberg, Emil. *Die Kohlenversorgung in Oesterreich Während des Krieges*, pp. 1-2.

22 *Ibid.*, pp. 2-3.

in the domestic supply was not attributable to the net export to Hungary of 89,718 tons a month since the net imports from Germany were 223,076 tons a month.<sup>23</sup> It is evident, then, that Austria and Hungary were both dependent upon Germany on the eve of the War for a normal peace-time supply of an essential commodity.

Because of the importance of coal in the economic life of the country, especially as it affected the War industries, the greatest efforts were expended by the Administration in an attempt to maintain and if possible increase production during the War. By a decree issued November 11, 1914, the Minister of Public Works was empowered to take over the control of mines which were not producing what was considered the maximum, to open new mines, compel the necessary number of miners and breakers to work on Sunday, and in short, to become a czar in the coal industry.<sup>24</sup> Further regimentation came with the militarization of the important mines as a result of the return to the mines of 30,863 men who had earlier been called to the colors.<sup>25</sup>

In addition to maintaining military discipline in the most important mining areas, the Austro-Hungarian Army engaged in independent coal production in the occupied territory of Russian Poland, the *Dombrowa Revier*. Although the retreating Russian armies had destroyed much of the machinery and the mines were flooded, it was decided for two reasons to attempt a resumption in mining activity. The deposits were of the richest in the area and coal was indispensable. Employment would be given to approximately 12,000 miners who under conditions of enforced idleness might present a serious threat to the maintenance of law and order. On January 25, 1915, the Dombrowa Military Mining Board was set up, composed of officers of the Joint Army

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 6-11. In 1913 Austria exported 639,570 tons to Germany a month, and imported 862,646 tons from Germany a month. At the same time, Austria exported 109,981 tons a month to Hungary while importing 20,200 tons a month.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 12-14.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 18-22.

and subject to the Quartermaster division of the Austro-Hungarian Supreme Command. Necessary repairs were made, new machinery installed, mines pumped out, and eventually fourteen mines were in operation. Complete statistics on production in this field are not available, but it is known that while most of the output was reserved for the army, a part was forwarded to the hinterland.<sup>26</sup>

As the War continued, a serious coal famine developed despite the efforts of various governmental agencies to maintain a production schedule comparable to that of 1913. This lack of an adequate supply was reflected in a slowing down of industrial production within the country and eventually threatened to cripple the industries. Rationing of coal was resorted to by the spring of 1917. Consumers big and little were divided into groups depending upon their relative importance, while within each group, preference in delivery was accorded to certain industries or types of consumers.<sup>27</sup> A similar plan was applied to the allocation of railway coal cars, the shortage of which became an increasing obstacle to the delivery of coal already above ground.<sup>28</sup>

The reason for the serious condition which developed in the supply of coal in Austria by the end of the War is not hard to find. The domestic production of anthracite, which normally was approximately half that of lignite on a tonnage basis, was 1.55 per cent above the 1913 output for the years 1914-1917, while that of lignite by the same standard was down 17.48 per cent.<sup>29</sup> This reduction in lignite is hardly sufficient to serve as an explanation for the shortage which existed within Austria and other factors need to be considered. As has been indicated, Hungary in pre-war days was dependent upon Austria for coal, while Austria, unable to produce enough for both, was dependent upon Germany. A glance at statistics covering the movement of

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 116-119.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 60 ff.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 56-57.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 4.

coal across these frontiers during the War reveals the most plausible explanation for the coal famine in the Dual Monarchy, a famine which was passed on in all its magnitude to German-Austria in the early weeks of that Republic.

The net export of coal from Austria to Hungary in 1913 was 1,076,616 tons, while the net export, Austria to Hungary in 1917, the last year for which complete figures are available, was 1,438,488 tons, a net increase in Hungary's favor of 357,872 tons. Normally, an increase of this sort might be offset by increased domestic production or by greater imports from Germany. However, Austrian production was reduced, and in addition imports from Germany fell off alarmingly. In 1913, the net imports from Germany were 2,886,912 tons, while in 1917 they amounted to 1,840,920 tons, a decrease of 1,045,992 tons. It is evident that, after caring for the needs of Hungary in 1913, Austria had a balance of coal from Germany of 1,810,296 tons with which to supplement domestic needs, while in 1917, a bad year for Austrian production, there remained after the Hungarian shipments were deducted a balance of 402,432 tons.<sup>30</sup> The point, of course, is not so much that Austria was determined to fulfill her obligations to the fullest extent<sup>31</sup> as that Austria needed food which Hungary would release only on a barter basis.<sup>32</sup>

As a result of war-time practices, German-Austria was launched as an independent state with an existent coal shortage of a very serious nature. Nor was that all, for by the division of the Empire into the Succession States, Austria was deprived of all the anthracite deposits, and practically all the lignite fields which had been accessible. The mines within German-Austria produced less than 4.4 per cent of the pre-war Austrian supply and these gave up an inferior grade of lignite, which is in itself inferior.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 9-10.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 10-11.

<sup>32</sup> Löwenfeld-Russ, *op. cit.*, pp. 70-71.

The problem of finding ready substitutes for coal was even more difficult than for agricultural products. In the latter, by careful coordination, by encouragement and education of the peasant farmers, the yield might be, and eventually was, increased, and the gap between native supply and demand was reduced. In fuel, however, German-Austria faced an absolute lack of certain essential products, nor could she reduce the deficit by use of water-power or wood. It is generally admitted that the available water-power if properly exploited could provide an abundant supply of electric power, but such a program was impracticable in 1918-1919 because of the time required and the absence of capital for such development.<sup>33</sup> The forests of German-Austria are extensive, but in the early months of the Republic, there was no organized service for cutting and preparing the timber for fuel use, much less a possibility of dependable railway transportation after the wood had been brought to the depots.

The prospects of worrying along on native coal were even less bright. German-Austria was left with deposits of inferior coal (lignite) unfit for the manufacture of coke.<sup>34</sup> Whereas the monthly requirements of coal were estimated at approximately 1,150,000 tons, the native mines could under the most favorable condition produce a mere 155,000 tons.<sup>35</sup> This inability to cover a bare 15 per cent of the needed supply, in addition to the fact that as an inferior coal it was not suited to all purposes, resulted in what Bauer has called a "fearful coal famine,"<sup>36</sup> a situation which was not confined to German-Austria alone but was experienced by the industrial regions of both Czechoslovakia and Hungary as well.

Although the need for coal was imperative, the mines which were being operated were producing but 50 per cent of their

33 Stolper, G., "Unsere wirtschaftliche Zukunft II", in *Der Oesterreichische Volkswirt*, Nov. 30, 1918, p. 130. See also, *One Year of Freedom*, p. 9.

34 Pasvolsky, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

35 Bauer, *op. cit.*, p. 81.

36 *Ibid.*, p. 81.

normal capacity. Production in some coal districts was suspended for a variety of reasons. Bolshevik agitators were blamed for the epidemic of strikes which swept through the coal fields; shortage of food and clothing, and impaired vitality of the miners reduced production; wage legislation in Czechoslovakia served to remove the incentive for greater production on the part of the individual miner in the collieries of that country; and finally, international warfare was being waged for the possession of certain important coal regions. The Czechoslovaks were fighting the Hungarians for the mines of Salgotarjan in northern Hungary, the Jugoslavs and the Hungarians were fighting for the mines at Pecs in southern Hungary, the Poles and Czechoslovaks for Teschen, and the Poles and Germans for Upper Silesia.<sup>37</sup>

Contributing to the general economic dislocation was the chaos which existed in the closely related fields of communication and transportation. Postal service, other than intra-city, depended upon the regularity of the train service, which at the time was non-existent. Nor was the situation much better in the telegraphic service, for frequently, if not invariably, telegrams reached their destination from one to two weeks late, or not at all.<sup>38</sup>

<sup>37</sup> Gregory, Captain T.T.C. "General Report for Central Europe. The Relief of the Austro-Hungarian Succession States." pp. 8, 47, Ms., A.R.A. Archives, Hoover War Library.

<sup>38</sup> Professor Coolidge of the American Peace Mission arrived in Vienna in early January. He found that an ordinary letter or telegram required frequently as much as two weeks for delivery. Others, he found were not delivered at all. He therefore organized a courier service to handle his communications. This method was deemed too slow by Capt. Gregory of the A.R.A. and Inter-Allied Missions in Trieste. Gregory obtained the use of specified military telegraph lines. A central office was established in Vienna. These lines were free from international control and in time the various Allied representatives were using this system at the rate of 400-500 messages a day. Vienna was in direct communication with Trieste, Zagreb (Agram), Belgrade, Budapest, Bucharest, Warsaw, Prague, Hamburg, Berlin, Coblenz, and Paris. Gregory, Capt. T.T.C. "The General Report for Central Europe, Relief of the Austro-Hungarian Succession States," pp. 17-18, Ms., A.R.A. Archives, Hoover War Library.

Similarly, railway transportation over the entire network of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire, as well as Serbia, was badly demoralized. Although the roadbeds were in surprisingly good condition, the necessary cars and locomotives to maintain service were lacking for very definite reasons. In the first place, anything approximating an adequate supply of coal either to run the trains or to supply the repair shops was lacking. There was a scarcity of cars and locomotives in sufficient repair. Had there been coal for the shops, there were lacking materials to make the necessary repairs. Of great importance was the absence of energy and initiative on the part of the railway employees, due to undernourishment and the low purchasing power of wages. Anything approximating through international express service was practically withdrawn because of the universal fear that once railway equipment had crossed the frontier into a nearby state, it would not be returned.<sup>39</sup>

#### ATTITUDE OF THE PROVINCES

Still another contributing factor may be added to those already mentioned as responsible for the serious straits in which the city of Vienna found itself. This was the independent attitude of the Provinces and communities outside that city.

As early as October 30, Dr. Eldersch, reporting to the Provisional National Assembly on the situation in the Department of Food Supply, complained<sup>40</sup> bitterly that the provincial municipalities which were situated on railway lines were constantly seizing supply trains consigned to Vienna. As the central administrative authority began to take shape, it found that the provincial governments were already jealous of their rights, and whereas previously seizures had been made with no more excuse than that the rural cities needed the supplies, at a later date the same end was accomplished by local or provincial ordinances affecting the freedom of transport. Thus, late in January, 1919, when Vienna was in one of its periodic food crises, the Pro-

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 19.

<sup>40</sup> *S.P.*, Oct. 30, 1918, p. 55.



vincial Administration of Upper Austria, justifying its action on the grounds that it was preventing the food from falling into the hands of smugglers, stipulated that individuals carrying food out of the Province would be required to obtain permits, and that large amounts which were to be shipped out would be allowed to leave only when accompanied by a permit.<sup>41</sup>

In the extreme shortage and resultant privation, the inability of the administration to bring under control the available supplies produced at home was most patent. In this respect, the administration had to contend with a situation which had come down intact from the war period. And as the system of war-time emergency was continued, the vices of the war-time measures also carried over.

The initiative in the organization of the Food Administration in the early months of the Republic seems to have been taken by the self-appointed and rather independent Provincial Administrations. Here there was obviously developing a movement intended to retain what food they had rather than to permit it to be sent out of the Province for the relief of distant communities. In general, this method worked to the satisfaction of the dwellers in the less densely populated rural regions, but the problem of supply, and with it the issue of administrative authority, became acute in the larger urban areas. Thus Upper Austria or Salzburg might conceivably organize local relief on a scale adequate to care for the needy in a preponderantly rural Province, but it was an entirely different matter for Lower Austria to care for the populations of Vienna and Wiener-Neustadt in addition to the needs of its rural inhabitants.

It is not surprising, therefore, that while theoretically the Austrian administration strove to relieve the privation generally throughout German-Austria, the larger cities received the major share of attention. Naturally the city of Vienna, where conditions were worst of all, became the focal point for all relief efforts. In part as the result of attempts made to force the rural districts to give up supplies for the provisioning of Vienna, there

<sup>41</sup> *Arbeiter Zeitung*, Jan. 28, 1919, p. 6.

grew up a feeling of rebellion, during this early period, within the ranks of the agriculturalists. Later, other grievances were added which increased the clerico-peasant-bourgeois opposition to the urban-socialist domination of Vienna, a controversy which became more acute and was eventually to influence national politics.<sup>42</sup>

The unpopular war-time policy of rationing the population on the basis of the estimated food and fuel supply had to be continued, and also the very unpopular system of reduced prices at the source combined with the inevitable requisitioning of supplies. This method proved unsatisfactory, for the producers merely continued the devious methods employed in the war years to prevent the supplies from reaching the official channels for distribution.<sup>43</sup> The opposition of the peasant producers to this system of distribution stiffened more and more. In the end it became of major importance in the breakdown of the coalition between the peasant wing of the Christian Social Party and the Social Democratic Party, and brought about the fall of the second Renner cabinet on July 7, 1920.

Another source of embarrassment to the Department of Food Supply was the independent action taken by the various provincial governments to keep supplies within their respective terri-

<sup>42</sup> This question of the burden of relief for Vienna which was placed on the Provincial Administration of Lower Austria was one of the arguments used in the effort to separate Vienna from Lower Austria and make of the capital an autonomous province.

<sup>43</sup> Significant as illustrating the weakness in the administrative channels for supplying the population of Vienna is the following "Appeal to the Farmers."

Landlords! Help the urban industrial population until help can come from outside!

Landlords! Don't let Vienna starve! Deliver grain, meat, fat! Deliver soon!  
Don't deal with Smugglers!

(signed) Dinghofer, Hauser, Seitz for the  
National Assembly, Stöckler for the  
Department of Agriculture, Löwen-  
feld-Russ for the Department of  
Food. *Reichspost*, Nov. 15, 1918,  
p. 2.

tories, although it was admitted by Dr. Löwenfeld-Russ, Secretary for this department, that the provincial relief organizations, because of the almost complete breakdown of transportation and communications had to act independently at times. A conference held between the department and the provincial governors late in November greatly improved liaison with the provincial administrations. But even after these had promised to cooperate more sincerely with the national departments, the difficulty of obtaining food at the source remained. The authority of the provincial administrations was only loosely effective in the rural districts. A distressing tendency on the part of single communes to blockade even nearby communities still obtained.<sup>44</sup>

In spite of pressure brought to bear by the central Department of Food Supply, and in spite of the gusto with which Soldiers' Councils, Workers' Councils, and *Volkswehr* contingents entered into the business of uncovering "surplus" supplies, the amount of food needed to meet the meager ration theoretically available upon presentation of a food card remained deplorably inadequate.

#### EFFORTS OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF VIENNA

As early as August, 1917, the Municipality of Vienna purchased 400 milch cows and farmed them out. The same year the city entered the hog business, and stocked nearby lakes with trout and carp. Since the supervision of these various activities had at the beginning been divided between various city agencies, and since the endeavor was assuming greater proportions, the Mayor decided that the city should have a Department of Agriculture. This was established March 1, 1918,<sup>45</sup> and the business

<sup>44</sup> Report on his department by Dr. Löwenfeld-Russ to the National Assembly, Dec. 4, 1918. To quote one passage: "In many districts placards are posted urging the landlords to give up no more grain. All around, resolutions were passed which made an ordered collection difficult. Many provinces set up an iron-clad export and import system based on compensation." *S. P.*, Dec. 4, 1918, pp. 209-210; Eisenmenger, *op. cit.*, p. 176; Bauer, *op. cit.*, p. 89.

<sup>45</sup> *Die Gemeinde Verwaltung der Stadt Wien*, 1919, pp. 434-5.

had prospered so that by the end of 1918, city-owned cows were supplying 4,600 litres of milk daily to the city hospitals and a limited supply of slaughter animals was also available.<sup>46</sup> And this at a time when there was to be noted a very sharp reduction in the supply of meat throughout the country.<sup>47</sup>

The activities of the Municipal Department of Agriculture were not confined to animal husbandry. Prior to its inauguration, and as a result of the War, there had developed without central guidance or assistance a movement for the cultivation of vegetable gardens. The Municipal Department of Agriculture took charge of these, and increased the area by the end of 1918 from 1,700,000 to 2,800,000 square meters. The harvest for 1918 amounted to 1100 carloads of vegetables. Following the privation of the winter of 1918-19 the movement assumed even greater proportions. The city, through the Department of Agriculture, donated 6,000,000 vegetable plants, 300,000 kg. of seed potatoes and supplied the necessary water. During the spring and summer of 1919, 17,000 families worked 5,000,000 square meters of city land, 14,000 families worked 4,500,000 square meters of private land, while 9,000 school children worked 280,000 square meters in school gardens.<sup>48</sup>

#### ILLEGAL DISTRIBUTORS

Food control was further complicated by extra-legal methods of distribution. Schooled in his business during the later years of the War, the smuggler was practically unhampered in the early days of the Republic. In fact his position in the economic life of the urban centers was recognized publicly, though by no

<sup>46</sup> Such as: 29 bulls, 300 heifers, 187 calves, 53 oxen, 82 horses, 7 colts, 1061 sheep, 2600 hogs in addition to 1690 milch cows.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 436. See also p. 452 for the drop in the amount of dressed meats by June, 1919.

	Beef	Hogs
November 1918 .....	1,243,960 kg.	90,780 kg.
June 1919 .....	122,810 "	18,705 "

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 437-8.

means officially condoned.<sup>49</sup> At the close of a gloomy survey of the economic condition in late October and early November, 1918, Walter Feder commented: "At least there is some comfort afforded to some people from the fact that many things otherwise unobtainable can be had at a price from smugglers."<sup>50</sup>

Smuggling was practiced widely and by four different types of people. There were what might be called the purveyors, regular and irregular; then the producer; and finally, the ultimate consumer. There were first of all the professional smugglers<sup>51</sup> who had well-established businesses with headquarters usually in hotels—rendezvous known to the authorities and gleefully raided at intervals by the *Volkswehr*. These professionals had their business contacts and regular clientele. They could offer provisions, otherwise unobtainable, to the housewife able to pay the premium, which was, needless to say, far above the official price at the government dispensaries. "My smuggler" was a familiar household expression.<sup>52</sup>

Although currency may have been acceptable at first, by the end of the year the smuggler demanded "real value" in preference to an inflated currency. A gold watch chain brought four sacks of potatoes. Fifty cigars, of a superior quality because purchased before tobacco was rationed, brought four pounds of pork and ten pounds of lard—a considerable amount in view of the fact that it was unobtainable through the authorized channels.<sup>53</sup>

<sup>49</sup> An official report on the shrinkage in the milk supply for the City of Vienna attributes this to the loss of important milk sheds in Southern Moravia, Bohemia, and Hungary. That the official statistics underestimate the amount of milk which actually reached the city is implied by the comment: "One answer was the smuggler, and the 'system' had grown so that for large sections of the population in 1919 this trade was the usual one." *Gemeinde Verwaltung der Stadt Wien*, 1919, pp. 426-427.

<sup>50</sup> *Oesterreichische Rundschau*, Nov. 1, 1918. p. 137.

<sup>51</sup> The exact number at any one time is unknown.

<sup>52</sup> It was the observation of Captain Fitzwilliams that the rich in Vienna had everything they wanted and were taking it away from the poor. Report of Captain Fitzwilliams, Feb. 20, 1919. Ms., A.R.A. Archives, Hoover War Library.

<sup>53</sup> Eisenmenger, *op. cit.*, pp. 91, 149.

At a time when the queues were long before the government dispensaries, and when all that was given out was bread and pickled cabbage, the smuggler could supply the following:<sup>54</sup>

Fat .....	150-200	Kronen a ki- logramme	(£ 3-4 a pound)
Butter .....	200-250	"	(£ 4-5 " )
Beef and corned beef .....	80-120	"	(£ 1/13-2/10 " )
Poor quality Czech or Hun- garian sausage .....	90-120	"	(£ 1/18-2/10 " )
Linen or woolen clothing was unobtainable, but paper suits brought .....	300-400	"	(£12/10-16/10 )

In fact, the administration played directly into the hands of the smuggler, for during official "meatless weeks"<sup>55</sup> the well-to-do housewife naturally patronized the smuggler. In these frequent periods, he did a thriving business.

A second type of purveyor was the house-porter, or the son of the house-porter who might be a member of the *Volkswehr*. His deliveries were irregular but important, and smuggling was carried on as an adjunct to other employment. These functionaries frequently had access to the slaughterhouses or warehouses and whatever foods they obtained were removed surreptitiously from more legitimate uses.<sup>56</sup>

The third form of recognized irregular distribution was represented by the activities of the producers themselves. Fortunate indeed was the farmer who was situated near the outskirts of a municipality and who at the same time was sufficiently ingenious at concealing his farm products from governmental agencies. Fortunate also was the housewife who could list such a farmer as a "friend." There seems to have been no promiscuous peddling of wares, and the personal element was a necessary factor in the delivery of supplies which might be confiscated at the source were the client too scrupulous in abiding by the law. At

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 152. Entry for Jan. 1, 1919. The equivalent prices in English currency were supplied by the translator.

<sup>55</sup> *Arbeiter Zeitung*, Feb. 18, 1919, p. 7.

<sup>56</sup> Eisenmenger, *op. cit.*, p. 96.

best, the difficulties were great, for they involved the hiding of supplies on the farm, the evasion of *octroi* in transit, and the concealing of the products after delivery. It was usually good practice to offer the house-porter a percentage of the products received. This gave a certain assurance to the housewife that the house-porter would not report the transaction, or at least that he would warn her of any impending visitation by the police or *Volkswehr*.<sup>57</sup>

The fourth type of procedure resorted to in view of the all too obvious inability of the Department of Food Supply to care for the barest minimum of existence was that of the housewife or householder who, armed with a gold watch, a clock, valuables of any sort, or even money, and a rucksack, boarded a tramway or if the destination were reasonably far, a train. As the food shortage became more pronounced in December, reaching a crisis early in the year, this practice became ever more general and was eventually honored by a name—"Rucksack Traffic."<sup>58</sup> Only the more intrepid would venture an estimate as to the amount of goods which were brought from the countryside in this manner. Walter Feder, a recognized authority in the economic field, hazarded a rough estimate as to one item. At a time when the official shortage of the reduced quota of meat was running at 300,000 kilograms a month, he reckoned that 400,000 kilograms of meat came into the city over the same period.<sup>59</sup>

The difficulties inherent in the situation are evident. In the face of a serious food shortage, aggravated by the sudden disruption in communications and transportation, the Department

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 149-150. It has already been suggested that much of this business was conducted on the basis of barter. Certain aspects of this phase of the matter stimulate the curiosity as to the method of effecting a trade. Frau Eisenmenger comments that a farmer in Laxenburg offered to supply all the family might desire for three months in exchange for a grand piano.

<sup>58</sup> Macartney, *op. cit.*, 189 ff., lists the most extraordinary variety of objects which he found in the homes of peasants and agrarian landlords.

<sup>59</sup> "Die Neuorganization der deutschösterreichischen Lebensmitteleinfuhr," *Der Oesterreichische Volkswirt*, March 1, 1919. p. 373.

of Food Supply strove to distribute available supplies equitably to all sections of the population. The producer, however, found that he could obtain a much better price from smugglers or from the consumer directly, and consequently withheld his goods. The prestige of the new administration suffered accordingly, since it was neither willing to raise the retail price at the dispensaries to a level that could compete with illicit transactions, nor was it possessed of sufficient police power effectively to check either smuggling or hoarding. Hence, there arose a great hue and cry against the administration, both for failing to check smuggling and for inability to provide the minimum listed on the ration cards.

Of great significance was the fact that the system seemed unjust to many. There were hundreds of thousands in the city in dire financial straits, and thousands who were actually starving. Under the manner of distribution outlined above, propertied elements in the population could obtain additional food supplies in exchange for valuables of one sort or another, but there were also thousands who had no such means of lessening their suffering. These thousands begrudged the others their relative opulence, cursed the smugglers for their part in the shortage, looked with suspicion upon the farmers, and appealed fervently to the Social Democratic leaders to remedy the situation.

#### THE "COLD BLOCKADE"

The problem of maintaining even minimum standards of public health, in the face of a depressingly curtailed food ration and an almost complete exhaustion of medical supplies was made even more difficult by the shortage of fuel, especially coal and coke. This phase of the post-war period in German-Austria was called the "Cold Blockade."<sup>60</sup> Attempts at conserving fuel re-

<sup>60</sup> *Arbeiter Zeitung*, Dec. 5, 1918, p. 1. Eisenmenger, *op. cit.*, p. 106. In an entry for Dec. 3, 1918, lists what was available for an eight room apartment as follows: one 25-candlepower electric light; one candle and  $\frac{1}{4}$  litre of petroleum,—the weekly ration; one gas heater which might be used one hour each day. On December 25, she complained that she could not get the tem-



sulted in regulations which closed all the taverns and coffee-houses after nine o'clock in the evening, while shops and larger stores closed at four o'clock and the cinemas, theatres, and lecture halls did not open their doors at all.<sup>61</sup> The transportation facilities of the city of Vienna were curtailed and cessation of the *Stadtbahn* and street railways was frequent.<sup>62</sup> On December 25, 1918, the "Christmas Present" from the city government to the people of Vienna took the form of a complete shut-off of the electric supply, complete stoppage of the gas service, discontinuance of the street railway service, and suspension of traffic on the state railways.<sup>63</sup>

The urban population was particularly affected by the fuel shortage, for while certain classes in the municipalities could add to the meager food rations by patronizing the smuggler, equality reigned when it came to fuel. This was true of such municipal services as gas and electricity, street-car facilities and the rapid transits. Similarly, there was no class discrimination when the railway services had to be suspended.

Wood, as a substitute for coal in domestic use, was the object of constant foraging. Because this effort was undirected or poorly supervised, waste of material resulted and, frequently, casualties to the citizens. The temporary wooden structures erected during the war as barracks were considered legitimate booty, but it was reported that obtaining wood in this manner was fraught with danger. On February 8, 12, and 17, there were accidents, some of which resulted in death. Apparently it often happened that while one group was engaged in ripping up a

perature of the only room which she was attempting to heat above eleven degrees Réaumur (equivalent to 57° F.) *op. cit.*, 135. (A convenient formula for translating one thermal system to the terms of another is:  $X^{\circ} R = 10/80 X^{\circ} C$ , or  $9/4X^{\circ} + 32 F.$ )

61 *Arbeiter Zeitung*, Dec. 5, 1918, p. 1.

62 *Ibid.*, p. 6. Municipal ordinances regulating the consumption of gas and electricity in the private homes as well as the schedules for the transit services were issued and withdrawn or modified every few days depending upon the supply of coal available for the municipal gas and electric plants.

63 Eisenmenger, *op. cit.*, p. 132, entry for Dec. 25, 1918.

floor, another was busy tearing out the walls and posts, thereby letting the roof down on those working below.<sup>64</sup>

Similarly, it was to be expected that the *Wienerwald*, that broad band of beautiful forest which encircles Vienna on three sides, should be subject to indiscriminate destruction. During late October and through November, people went into the *Wienerwald* and chopped hither and yon in a most distressing manner. Young trees were trampled under foot while some large trees were left half-sawed, presumably because they were too difficult to work up and take away.<sup>65</sup> It was not until well into February, 1919, that the Department of the Interior organized this activity. By the end of the month, the Secretary announced that there were 28,000 cubic meters of wood on hand which could be used to relieve the shortage in coal. At the same time, the Vienna authorities reported that after February 20, wood would be given out along with what coal there was for use in kitchen stoves.<sup>66</sup>

#### FINANCE

In general, the various attempts at finding supplies either within German-Austria or from the Succession States proved inadequate. And there were other issues equally disheartening to those attempting to make a going concern of German-Austria. Government finance was one of the most insoluble problems. The expenses of the War had been largely met by means of the printing presses. An Imperial Decree of August 4, 1914, suspended the law which required the maintenance of the gold cover for notes. And during the War, a vicious double action took place whereby new notes, without backing, were issued, while the gold supply was used for foreign purchases. On July 23,

<sup>64</sup> *Arbeiter Zeitung*, Feb. 18, 1919, p. 6.

<sup>65</sup> Eisenmenger, *op. cit.*, p. 81. The damage did not stop with the destruction of trees, for the municipality of Vienna found that so many windows in the Stadtbahn were smashed by those bringing home wood, that it eventually was forced to restrict the wood foragers to certain trains which had no windows in the cars.

<sup>66</sup> *Arbeiter Zeitung*, Feb. 21, 1919, p. 6.

1914, note circulation was 2,130 million with a 74.6 per cent cover in gold; on October 26, 1918, the circulation was 33,529 millions with 1.0 per cent gold cover.<sup>67</sup> Along with censorship of the news went a censorship on the financial condition, for when the legal requirement for maintaining the gold coverage for notes was set aside, the requirement that the bank of issue publish a statement of condition every ten days was likewise abandoned.<sup>68</sup>

The Provisional Government inherited a ruined financial structure, and the period during which this government was in office constitutes merely one loop in the dizzy spiral of financial ruin which began in the first days of the War and was ultimately checked only by international assistance under the League of Nations.

To the curse of a depreciating currency were added diminishing sources of revenue both national and private. The collapse of industry dried up one source of income in the form of industrial taxes and, just as surely, reduced the possibility of personal income revenue. In the confusion which followed the dissolution of the Empire, much in the way of taxable capital and goods found a way out of the country, and the longer an inefficient Department of Finance delayed in the collection of war profits taxes, the more difficult became their collection.

The question of currency was, of course, closely connected with other difficulties which cropped up, chiefly in Vienna. The other states could get along one way or another without manufactured articles, but Vienna could not exist without food, and close contact with the producing areas had been lost to the city in the break-up of the Empire.<sup>69</sup>

No small item in the general expense of government came from the loss sustained by the administration in the difference

<sup>67</sup> Pasvolsky, L., *op. cit.*, pp. 29-30.

<sup>68</sup> Rašin, A. *Financial Policy of Czechoslovakia During the First Year of its History*, p. 7. See also Popovics, A., *Das Geldwesen im Kriege*, pp. 152-156.

<sup>69</sup> Second Report by Sir William Goode, "Economic Conditions in Central Europe," 1920, Cmd. No. 641, Miscellaneous. No. 6. pp. 4-6.

between what was paid for food for general distribution at the food depots and what the government received for this same food.

In other ways, also, the expenses of the Administration were inordinately increased at the same time that taxes and valuable taxable areas were reduced. There were the unemployed and the refugees to be cared for. This problem was met in part by the creation of the *Volkswehr* and smaller special groups such as the *Stadtschutzwache*. Able-bodied but unemployed men who did not join organizations of this sort received direct financial relief. Refugees and their dependents eked out a terrible existence at the public soup-kitchens. To the small army of bureaucratic officials who were entitled either to government posts or pensions were added the German officers of the former Army and Navy, who likewise received pensions. It was hoped that ultimately many of the younger men of this type might be absorbed in a rejuvenated industry, but in the winter of 1918-1919, industry was decidedly enfeebled. To be sure, some were absorbed in new government bureaus<sup>70</sup> while the old departments of both the State and the Municipality of Vienna were so overstaffed as to be positively swollen.

In another direction, the body politic showed signs of serious disintegration. Administrative instability and the uncertain economic future, coupled with the let-down after the War, produced in certain sections of the population a post-war psychosis which had to be taken into account in any attempted restoration of normal conditions. There was the specter of valueless War Bonds which haunted the middle class.<sup>71</sup> Bureaucratic efficiency had broken down and disillusion was widespread among the personnel. A certain fatalism and indifference as to the future became evident with the resultant lack of initiative and energy. The returned soldiers who remained in the municipalities ex-

<sup>70</sup> Walter Feder in, "Aus der Woche"—Deutschoesterreichs Finanzen, *Oesterreichische Volkswirt*, Nov. 30, 1918, pp. 136-137.

<sup>71</sup> Frau Eisenmenger attempted to realize on some which she held but found that they were unsalable. *Op. Cit.*, p. 118.

hibited little desire for work of any sort, feeling that society should now do its bit for them. In addition it was found that a handsome profit could be made from speculation in depreciated currency. A "speculation mania" swept over the city of Vienna. This, with the measures adopted by the Central Government to produce revenue, tended to widen the natural cleavage which existed between country and city.<sup>72</sup>

One serious source of friction may be attributed to the habit of government by decree, which was a carry-over from the Empire. This lent itself to alternating pressure from various parties or influential groups. Also, the dole for the unemployed, naturally a convenient means of obtaining Party support in Vienna, was, for that very reason, a source of irritation to the rural districts.<sup>73</sup>

Here is a typical example of irritation over "pork-barrel" politics. Late in January Herr Reumann, the Social Democratic Vice Mayor of Vienna, estimated the unemployed in that city at one hundred thousand and stated that benefit of the dole was predicated on the willingness to work. The next day, the *Arbeiter Zeitung* published a statement by the Vice Mayor to the effect that such a stipulation was the policy of the municipal department concerned, and not his personal attitude. On the following day, at a meeting of those workers who had been discharged from the arsenal, it was announced that they would receive two-thirds of their maximum wages. The contribution was to run

<sup>72</sup> *One Year of Freedom*, p. 9.

<sup>73</sup> Stolper, Dr. Gustav, "Soziales Kraftspiel", in *Der Oesterreichische Volkswirt*, Feb. 1, 1919, pp. 290-292, indicates that the fatal error behind this goes back into the Empire. Under the dynasty a Tyroler felt as a Tyroler, a Styrian as a Styrian. None of them felt primarily Austrian. Special interest dominated and so was it in the immediate postwar period. And in the new parliament, soon to be elected, there would be two Parties. One for Vienna and one for the country. That this should be was not to be wondered at, for few of the peasants or small villagers had ever been to Vienna or had any conception of the city and its dwellers. Result: in the conditions of the moment, they looked upon Vienna as being a misplaced city of Jews, Socialists, and bankers where state indebtedness was piled up and socialist edicts were promulgated. "Los von Wien" now meant "los" from taxes.

for nine weeks and was available to all who had been taken out of their regular employment for service in the fighting forces. At the same meeting, a report was submitted by the Secretary of the Metal Trades Workers to the effect that twenty-eight thousand of this group were unemployed. Dr. Stolper, writing in the *Volkswirt*,<sup>74</sup> suggested that 45 per cent of these last mentioned were unskilled, had entered the trade during the War as helpers, had come in from the country and might well return to the country, save for the fact that they were a potential source of support for the regime, albeit a drain on the finances.

#### REMEDIAL EFFORTS

In attempting to cope with the financial situation, the first government of the new State resorted to numerous expedients, none of which proved adequate to turn the tide which was carrying the country toward unbridled inflation. As a matter of fact, one of these emergency measures, the parliamentary authorization for the printing of bank notes,<sup>75</sup> accelerated the whole process.

Shortly after the beginning of 1919, the government indebtedness was estimated at what, for this country of six and one half million people, might be termed the astronomical figure of 54,-081,765,681 kronen, of which 29,250,000,000 was war indebtedness. The interest amounted to over two billions.<sup>76</sup> Since this indebtedness was contracted by the Empire, the German-Austrian holders of these bonds reasoned that the governments of the new states, created all or in part from the Empire, should share in the indebtedness. In a fit of foolish optimism, it was argued that these governments might be induced to assume such obligations voluntarily, and negotiations to this end were begun the middle of December with representatives of the

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*, Feb. 1, 1919, p. 292.

<sup>75</sup> See p. 209 below.

<sup>76</sup> *New International Yearbook*, 1919, p. 72. War debts—29,274,603,300 *Kronen*; interest—2,195,106,214 *Kronen*.

Czechoslovak regime.<sup>77</sup> Obviously, the neighbor states were in no great haste to assume such obligations and the matter got no farther along than the "negotiation stage" for many a dreary month.

The squabbling of the heirs over the division of the estate involved more than government bonds. Professor Coolidge reported that demands were made by the various governments for the division of materials and stores which had been concentrated in Austria and Hungary. Although a Liquidation Committee was at work on the matter, no agreement had been reached by February 10. The question was a complicated one since the territorial extent of each country was not definitely settled, and since the Czechs with their factories felt that they deserved a larger share in proportion to their population than the agricultural regions. The Czechs were very bitter toward the Austrians because of their attitude, and accused the Austrians of selling materials without informing the others. The question was further complicated by the inclusion of the public buildings in a liquidation of the former Empire, a point which Austria apparently admitted in principle. The demand was even made for the division of scientific and artistic museums which would have led to endless disputes as the question of origin would have been very difficult to determine. Many Czechs, it is asserted, and among them a prominent Minister, advocated this reprisal against former oppression. If liquidation were carried out to such an extent, the report continued, Vienna would resemble a sacked city. The Austrian counter-proposal was a joint administration of museums, libraries, etc., with the possible transfer of entire collections to the different new capitals.<sup>78</sup>

<sup>77</sup> Walter Feder, "Die finanzielle Auseinandersetzung," *Des Oesterreichische Volkswirt*, Dec. 21, 1918, p. 183.

<sup>78</sup> Ammission, Paris, Feb. 20, 1919 to Secretary of State, Washington. Ms. in A.R.A. Archives, Hoover War Library.

By Article 203 of the Treaty of St. Germain, part of the Austro-Hungarian debt as of July 28, 1914, was to be assumed by the Succession States. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *The Treaties of Peace, 1919-1923*, pp. 356-361.

Before these negotiations were commenced, an effort was made to stop the leaks in the prevailing system and to improve the opportunities for collection of past taxes. With this in view, a law was passed prohibiting the removal beyond the frontier of valuables of a historical, artistic, or cultural nature,<sup>79</sup> as well as valuable paper and securities.<sup>80</sup> And since it was estimated that of 700 million kronen due from the war-profits tax, only 300 million had been collected, a law was passed making more severe the punishments for delinquency and raising the rate on the defaulted taxes.<sup>81</sup> Along with these various measures, provision was made to prevent the flight of individuals over the frontier to avoid payment of taxes, and, in an attempt to make the ruling effective, relatives of those owing money were included.<sup>82</sup> *In extremis*, as it were, war-time censorship in a moderate form was reestablished in the post and telegraph branches in an attempt to enforce this law.<sup>83</sup>

Other sources of revenue were taken up which bore more directly on the general public. The stock-transfer tax was in-

79 *S. P.*, Dec. 5, 1918, pp. 285-286. The economist, Walter Feder, commented in *Der Oesterreichische Volkswirt*, Dec. 21, 1918, p. 186, that this was a much needed law, but that it might be difficult to enforce since a network of railways led out of Vienna and, in some instances, the frontier was hardly more than an hour distant.

80 *St. G. Bl.*, No. 122. This latter was amended Jan. 3, 1919, to permit export of securities and commercial paper under government supervision, —handled by Treasury and Postal Departments in designated bureaus. *Ibid.*, Jan. 5, 1919, No. 5.

81 *St. G. Bl.*, Dec. 12, 1918, No. 12.

82 This law was criticized as being thoroughly faulty in certain of its provisions and vague in its wording. Thus, where is the distinction to be drawn between "wegziehe" "abreise" and "reise"? How is it possible to make a son responsible for his father's indebtedness? What is to be the ruling on the following situation: A son returns from the front. He has no job, and therefore pays no taxes. He wishes to visit his father who is in Germany and has been there for some time. He applies for a visa. The police consult the tax officials and find that the father owes something in taxes which the son cannot pay. The son cannot visit the father.

Postelberg, Emil, "Steuerfluchtgesetz und Praxis," in *Der Oesterreichische Volkswirt*, January 25, 1919, pp. 267-268.

83 *St. G. Bl.*, February 6, 1919, No. 89.



creased.<sup>84</sup> In addition to an increase in the basic tax rate and a provision for making it progressive, the statement to the government of the annual gross income and total property value, which had been declared only every other year, was changed to an annual statement.<sup>85</sup> This was to facilitate the more immediate revision of assessments and collections. Much of the effectiveness of the progressive principle in this law was already nullified because of the fact that the really large taxable establishments, chiefly great estates, were no longer within the territory of German-Austria.<sup>86</sup> Even the judiciary was involved in the adjustment upward of the scale of fines to keep pace with the rising prices and falling money.<sup>87</sup> And finally, in an attempt to broaden the base, there came a series of individual measures either reviving war-time taxes, or increasing those already in existence, on beverages, alcoholic and otherwise.<sup>88</sup> This fiscal shower produced in the city of Vienna a series of demonstrations, strikes, shop-closings and the like.

The law of November 27, authorizing credit inflation, was significant as an indication of the situation and the hopelessness of the government in attempting to encompass it. Faced with an estimated income of 4,854,789,000 kronen and expenditures of 24,321,140,000<sup>89</sup>—a discrepancy of some twenty billions—the National Assembly empowered the Secretary of the Treasury to float loans up to 2,000 million kronen to meet expenditures not covered by income for the period November 1, 1918, to June 30, 1919.<sup>90</sup> This involved, of course, merely a fresh mandate

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 127.

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*, Feb. 5, 1919, No. 149.

<sup>86</sup> Walter Feder, *Der Oesterreichische Volkswirt*, Dec. 28, 1918, p. 204.

<sup>87</sup> *St. G. Bl.*, Dec. 5, 1918, No. 92.

<sup>88</sup> On beer, *St. G. Bl.*, Feb. 6, 1919, No. 112.

“ wine, *Ibid.*, No. 125.

“ brandy, *Ibid.*, No. 134.

“ sparkling wines, *Ibid.*, No. 126.

“ mineral and soda water, *Ibid.*, No. 154.

<sup>89</sup> *New International Yearbook*, 1919, p. 72.

<sup>90</sup> Law of Nov. 27, 1918, *St. G. Bl.*, No. 74.

to continue the operation of, if not to accelerate, the printing-presses which had been found so convenient during the war in meeting expenses. At that time, the emergency was given as an excuse. Now, in addition to the emergency, it was justified on the ground that depreciation of the currency would stimulate production and thus decrease unemployment. The fate of the fixed-income groups in the population and the future of the state itself, if this situation were allowed to continue, were topics too unpleasant to be considered seriously—and besides, something might turn up.

There were other indications that the financial situation was out of hand. One of these was note-stamping in the neighbor states and its attendant circumstances. Czechoslovakia was the first of the Succession States to take this step in an attempted solution of the currency problem, and aside from interrupting food and coal deliveries between German-Austria and Czechoslovakia for several days, Czech note-stamping affected the German-Austrian financial arrangements.

In a secret session, February 25, 1919, the Czechoslovak National Assembly passed an act giving authority to the Minister of Finance to conduct the note-stamping. The same evening, all frontiers were closed and placed under military guard. To prevent possible transfer of funds by mail, all postal communications with foreign countries were suspended, February 26–March 9. The actual stamping took place March 3–9, for the operations were preceded by an educational campaign on a national scale.

Currency was brought to the designated bureaus by the heads of families. There it was counted, the 10, 20, 50, 100, and 1000 kronen notes were stamped, identifying them as new currency belonging to the Czechoslovak State. The second point of attack on the problem of circulation was found in the forced surrender to the government of 50 per cent of the currency turned in for stamping. In the nature of a forced loan, this money, withdrawn from circulation, returnable only if the government so desired,

drew interest at 1 per cent. Small amounts of 300 kronen or under were exempt from the forced loan.<sup>91</sup>

At the close of this period, however, when stamping ceased and when the old currency was no longer valid in Czechoslovakia, an unestimated number of notes were turned up from obscure and presumably forgotten deposits, and these were sent into German-Austria.<sup>92</sup>

Warning was not lacking that this would happen,<sup>93</sup> and yet the German-Austrian administration delayed until March 12, thus being the last of the Succession States to stamp.<sup>94</sup> Aside from the influx of unstamped notes from the other states, an additional complication came, not so much with the tardiness in stamping as in the very fact itself. Prior to the stamping, in Czechoslovakia in particular, whatever could be picked up in the way of sugar and coal from the northern neighbor had been paid for in the old Austro-Hungarian notes. With the stamping, these were no longer accepted.<sup>95</sup> They then became, when indeed they were accepted at all, since barter was the preferred method of exchange, a foreign currency, and one which was distrusted beyond the frontier more than within German-Austria—which is saying a good deal.<sup>96</sup>

91 Rašín, *op. cit.* 25-29; *Arbeiter Zeitung*, Feb. 26, 1918, p. 4; Vondracek, F. J. *The Foreign Policy of Czechoslovakia, 1918-1935*, p. 66.

92 This situation did not hold for Hungary which already had a different currency, but it was to a minor degree so charged with respect to the former Austrian territories of Jugoslavia when stamping had been completed in the latter country on February 3.

93 *Arbeiter Zeitung*, Feb. 13, 1919, p. 2.

94 *Ibid.*, March 8, 1919, p. 4.

95 *Arbeiter Zeitung*, Feb. 13, 1919, p. 2. It was advocated by this pro-*Anschluss* organ that the new German-Austrian currency should be tied to the German mark for the double purpose of assuring stability and of effecting a very considerable advance toward *Anschluss*.

96 A "Cabinet Minister",—name not given, commented that when German-Austria finally stamped her notes, the only immediate result was that the unstamped notes were actually worth more in Vienna than the stamped notes. "Not Enough To Live On And Not Quite Little Enough To Die On," John Banister to Cyril K. Butler. Report to British Delegation at Trieste, Dated March 23, 1919. Ms., A.R.A. Archives, Hoover War Library.

The apparent answer to these various warnings and suggestions was that the department of finance had already given up hope of stemming the rising tide of inflation and had shut its eyes to the future.

A contemporary authority, writing in the winter of 1919<sup>97</sup> gave a brief survey of the general situation within the confines of a once well-integrated economic area—the old Empire. The Armistice, he wrote, brought anything but peace and quiet. Fighting was to be found on some frontiers, while others were occupied without resistance. More than that, the erstwhile “Allies” were fighting among themselves. The Inter-Allied Committee to Investigate Conditions in Austria-Hungary, among other matters, reported that in January, 1919, there were ten separate fields of military operations, as follows:<sup>98</sup>

- |                   |            |                    |
|-------------------|------------|--------------------|
| 1. Czechoslovaks  | <i>vs.</i> | Silesian Prussians |
| 2. Poles          | <i>vs.</i> | Silesian Prussians |
| 3. Galician Poles | <i>vs.</i> | Czechoslovaks      |
| 4. Ruthenians     | <i>vs.</i> | Galician Poles     |
| 5. Czechoslovaks  | <i>vs.</i> | Hungarians         |
| 6. Roumanians     | <i>vs.</i> | Hungarians         |
| 7. Jugoslavs      | <i>vs.</i> | Hungarians         |
| 8. Jugoslavs      | <i>vs.</i> | German-Austrians   |
| 9. Italians       | <i>vs.</i> | German-Austrians   |
| 10. Jugoslavs     | <i>vs.</i> | Italians           |

And yet peace and order of a sort reigned in the interior of German-Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Jugoslavia. In contrast to these, Hungary had not begun to set up an effective administration. Poland and the Ukraine were in a chaotic state. Internally, the obstacles in the way of the resumption of normal activity in German-Austria were in part intangible but were nevertheless real. The apathy and listlessness of the population was a formidable problem and tended to result in undue reliance

<sup>97</sup> Walter Feder, “Volkswirtschaftliche Rundschau”, in *Oesterreichische Rundschau*, Feb. 1, 1919, pp. 136 ff.

<sup>98</sup> “Report of the Inter-Allied Committee to Investigate Conditions in Austria-Hungary. Jan. 21, 1919.” Ms., A.R.A. Archives, Hoover War Library.

on the Socialist leaders. The continuance of the blockade necessitated dependence upon donations by peoples who in the past had been unfriendly, and that these donations were insufficient was in part the result of ill-will and in part the result of negligence.

On the financial side, the writer found a situation equally deplorable, but unavoidable in certain aspects. Thus, the wages to the workers were out of all proportion to production and financial assistance to the unemployed was a continuous drain. The crash on the stock exchange was partially due to the uncertainty as to the fate of the government war loans, an uncertainty which was causing concern to all those who had subscribed. Of lesser importance, but still an element in the general financial confusion, was the fact that the krone was given a different value in different parts of the country. "Peace-time economic development," remarked Walter Feder, "is impossible under these conditions."<sup>99</sup>

<sup>99</sup> "Volkswirtschaftliche Rundschau" in *Oesterreichische Rundschau*, Feb. 1, 1919, pp. 135 ff.

## CHAPTER V

### THE ARMISTICE COMMISSION

THE building of an administration and the maintenance of order was further complicated by the necessity for compliance with the terms of the Armistice of Villa Giusti. It was small comfort to German-Austria that the armistice, while presented in the name of the Allied and Associated Powers, had to come from the traditional enemy, Italy. And the group selected to supervise the carrying out of the terms of the Armistice was generally referred to as the Italian Armistice Commission, or more simply, the Italian Mission.

#### THE ARMISTICE BLUNDER

To the bitterness of defeat was added a general feeling of helpless indignation over the accusations made in the Vienna Press that the Italian armies on the Southern Front had not lived up to the terms of the original armistice which had been accepted by the Austro-Hungarian Command. Without an adequate understanding of the conditions during the rout, it was held in Vienna that the enemy continued to advance twenty-four hours after the Austro-Hungarian forces had ceased resistance.<sup>1</sup> By this action it has been estimated that 300,000 men were taken prisoner and an unknown quantity of war materials fell into enemy hands.<sup>2</sup> It is difficult to know where to place the blame, if blame there was, nor is it at all evident that the Austro-Hungarian armies could have rallied sufficiently to retard the advancing foe during this disastrous twenty-four hours. It is to be hoped that with the publication of the final volume of the official military history, *Oesterreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg*, more light may be shed on what took place at Austro-Hungarian

<sup>1</sup> *Reichspost*, Nov. 6, 1918, p. 1.

<sup>2</sup> Schneefuss, W., *Oesterreich, Zerfall und Werden Eines Staates*, p. 93.

Headquarters in connection with this blunder, if such it was. A review of the facts now available may be pertinent.

The rough draft of the Armistice was handed the Austro-Hungarian representatives at 10 A.M. November 1, with the verbal assurance, so it is asserted, by General Badoglio that the authentic and final text, promised for the next day, would contain no important changes. This draft provided for the "immediate cessation of hostilities on land, sea, and in the air." The Austro-Hungarian commissioners delayed in accepting the terms, questioned phraseology and referred back to Austro-Hungarian Headquarters at Baden for advice. This delay was fatal, for at 11 P.M. on the same day, Béla Linder, the Hungarian Minister of War, telegraphed Fieldmarshal Boroevic in Bozen, Fieldmarshal von Kövess in Odessa, and the staff officers in Bucharest that the situation in Hungary was impossible for further continuance of the War and that he, acting on the decision of the Hungarian Government, ordered the immediate laying down of arms and the acceptance of Wilson's stipulations.

Meanwhile, according to the Austrian sources, fully armed and "fully intoxicated" bands of Hungarian soldiers began plundering behind the lines and, worst of all, mingling with loyal troops under the command of von Kövess and von Mackensen in Hungarian territory. During the night of November 2, the "loyal" troops began to leave. No. were alarming reports confined to the military zones, for on November 2, the German-Austrian National Council issued a proclamation that the country was in danger and the army disintegrating, while the Southern Slav National Council declared its territory neutral and stated that soldiers not belonging to Jugoslavia would have to surrender their arms before entering the country. On November 1 and 2, anarchy reigned in Trieste and Laibach, and by the afternoon of November 2, plundering had extended to the troops just behind the actual front line in the Italian sector. Finally, at 2 A.M. November 3, telegrams were sent from Baden to the Austro-Hungarian commanders to the effect that the Armistice terms had been accepted—all hostilities to cease immediately. A

half hour later, this order was cancelled, whereat the reply came back to Baden that it was too late for cancellation since the orders had already been issued. At 3:35 A.M. word was again received at the various field headquarters that the conditions had been accepted. Then, at 11:04 A.M. on November 3, General von Weber telegraphed that the Chief of the Italian General Staff had stated that the armistice would be effective from midnight of November 4, not November 3 as the Austro-Hungarian commanders had assumed.<sup>3</sup>

It should be borne in mind that agreement upon a definite lapse of time after the signing of an armistice before hostilities are to cease is the usual practice. Nevertheless, whether through oversight, or because the detail was taken for granted, the secret "Conditions of Armistice with Austria-Hungary" drawn up by the Supreme War Council at Versailles, dated October 31, 1918, and delivered to the Italian Government for transmission to General Diaz contained no twenty-four-hour clause.<sup>4</sup> General von Weber, with his associates representing the Austro-Hungarian Supreme Command, on November 3, signed the Armistice which incorporated the terms drawn up by the Supreme War Council and, as well, signed a protocol elaborating the manner in which the provisions were to be executed. Paragraph 1 of the Military Clauses of this protocol contained the twenty-four-hour provision.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Kerchnawe, General Hugo, *Der Zusammenbruch der Oesterr.-Ungar. Wehrmacht im Herbst 1918*, pp. 128-149.

<sup>4</sup> Ms. in the A.R.A. Archives of the Hoover War Library.

<sup>5</sup> Ms. in the A.R.A. Archives entitled "Comando Supremo R. Esercito Italiano. Armistizio di Villa Giusti, 3 Novembre 1918, Sezione Tipo-Litografica del Comanda Supremo, Novembre, 1918.

The "Final Proposal of the Austrian Armistice" as transmitted to the State Department is without the Protocol and the 24-hour clause. United States Department of State, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1918, Supplement 1, Vol. I, p. 433-4.

However, in the British Documents the Protocol appears but with one interesting detail. Following the signatures of the clauses of the Armistice there appears the following:

"Note.—Dans le texte de l'armistice apres le No. XI on a écrit par main les



## AIMS OF ITALIAN ARMISTICE COMMISSION

Although resentment against the Italians was still running strong, the crest of the wave of indignation had passed when, on December 28, 1918, the Italian Armistice Commission arrived in Vienna.<sup>6</sup> (This group was not the first to take up a temporary residence in German-Austria; an estimated 15,000 Italian officers and men had been stationed in and about Innsbruck since November 24.<sup>7</sup>) It was with this Armistice Commission that the government of the Republic had to deal. The original personnel of the Mission under the leadership of General Roberto Segre consisted of 25 officers and 112 enlisted men,<sup>8</sup> while the full complement was attained only as late as August, 1919, when there were 125 officials both civil and military, and 400 troops.<sup>9</sup> The headquarters of the Mission were located in Vienna where the Secretariat also was located. In addition to the Secretariat the members of the Mission were divided into Commissions,<sup>10</sup> for the most part resident in Vienna. A further division was made into delegations, which were sent out to various cities of the former Empire when the interests of local resident Italians or of the Kingdom of Italy were involved, such as Trieste, Laibach, Klagenfurt, and so forth.

The aims of the Mission were manifold, and all of them were not included in the general instructions given to General Segre

mots suivants: 'On reconnaît l'adjonction de cinq mots écrits par main dans la première page.' Il s'agit de la phrase: 'Annexes: 1 protocole avec croquis.'

Great Britain Foreign Office, *British and Foreign State Papers*, Vol. III, p. 594.

<sup>6</sup> Segre, General Roberto, *La missione militare italiana per l'armistizio*, p. 6.

<sup>7</sup> *Arbeiter Zeitung*, Nov. 25, 1918, p. 3.

<sup>8</sup> *Neue Freie Presse*, Dec. 24, 1918, p. 4.

<sup>9</sup> Segre, *op. cit.* p. 24.

<sup>10</sup> Those discussed in detail by Segre in addition to the Secretariat are the Commissions for Political Affairs; Civil Affairs; Demobilization; Disarmament; Railways; Naval Affairs; Aeronautics; Art. Since friction developed between the German-Austrian Administration and the Armistice Commission over the activities of only a few of these Commissions, no attempt will be made here to go into detail with regard to all of them.

by the Italian Supreme Command. Summarized briefly these orders were:

1. To see that the Austro-Hungarian Supreme Command complied with the terms of the Armistice, especially in the cession of certain war materials.
2. To observe the demobilization of the Austro-Hungarian Army, paying especial attention to the Imperial German troops in the area.
3. To see that the naval clauses were enforced.
4. To repatriate Italian prisoners of war.
5. To make an inventory of war materials and to gather other data on the maltreatment of peoples, acts of violence, or other acts which might be of interest to the Peace Conference.<sup>11</sup>

The full nature of General Segre's sojourn in German-Austria, however, was revealed to the people only with the passage of time and the development of changing situations. Segre's concern for the prestige of his entourage was instrumental in causing a delay in selecting headquarters. To some, this attitude may have seemed unimportant. It evidently was not to General Segre, for the matter had to be settled before the next assignment, that of feeding and repatriating the thousands of Italian prisoners of war encamped in German-Austria and the Succession States. This attitude unquestionably had an effect upon the fiery German-Austrian Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs who nowhere has a good word to say for the chief of the Italian Mission.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>11</sup> Segre, *op. cit.* p. 4.

<sup>12</sup> Because Dr. Otto Bauer was Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, as well as an active member of the Social Democratic Party, his point of view, however, biased, should be considered. He wrote:

"From the first days of the revolution, the Austrian bourgeoisie was urging the Italian general to occupy Vienna with Italian troops. Fear of the working class dispelled their hostility to the hereditary enemy. During the first months succeeding the Armistice, scarcely a week went by without an ultimatum from General Segre. Thus under threats of stopping food, and sending Italian troops to Vienna, because of a slight to an Italian messenger, he extorted war materials, paintings, and even cash payments. The threat of occupation by Italian troops hung constantly over our heads. We knew that

The fact remains that there were certain advantages, evident even to Dr. Bauer, in a policy of reasonable cooperation with Italy. In the first place, Italy was in a position to do German-Austria a considerable amount of harm, directly, through the occupation of the railway lines or the hindering of transport from Trieste. Indirectly, Italy was in a position to help or hinder German-Austria at the council tables at Paris where the interests of the newly liberated Slavic peoples were being pushed. For although "Austria" was the hereditary enemy, the Italians reserved their choicest hatred at the time for the Southern Slavs. These peoples, especially the Croats and the Slovenes, had been intentionally used to garrison Lombardy and Venetia in the period of Austrian domination from 1815-66. After the loss of these Provinces to Italy, the policy of the Imperial Administration had been to keep alive the national rivalries in the territory bordering on the important cities of Trieste and Fiume (at the time either claimed or coveted by Italy), while their control was being contested by the Southern Slavs.<sup>13</sup> Italy, therefore, once her own claims were satisfied, might be considered as having common cause with German-Austria in checking the general drive for territory by their Slav neighbors.

As to the official Italian attitude toward German-Austria, a policy of friendliness was the only rational attitude. The terms of the Armistice threw open the country to Italian penetration, the blockade remained in force, and thus Italy was in a position to give favors whenever the German-Austrian attitude warranted. True, there were certain things which Italy meant to demand before the peace treaty was signed. These were matters in which Italy alone and not the Entente was interested and so there was really little that German-Austria, however indignant, could do about it. Furthermore, Italy was near at hand, and

its execution would have meant the defeat of the proletariat with the assistance of foreign bayonets." Bauer, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

General Segre says that he issued one ultimatum only. See page 225 below.

<sup>13</sup> E. von R., (only initials given) "Italien und Oesterreich" *Der Oesterreichische Volkswirt.* Feb. 15, 1919, p. 332.

although German-Austria was a small country, a friendly policy toward the Republic would in effect have the advantage of giving Italy a wedge in the Danubian basin.

#### ITALIAN ASSISTANCE

For the most part, until the end of 1918, the Armistice Commission was busy evacuating the prisoners of war and easing the situation of the Italian population of Vienna.<sup>14</sup> During this period certain gestures of good will were exhibited. A large "buffet" reception was tendered those prominent in the political and social life of the capital. The Mission was able to divert part of the supplies destined originally for the Italian residents of Vienna to some of the most pitiable cases of starvation among the non-Italian residents, and this procedure, in the words of General Segre, culminated in the "Easter Offering" of Italian rice "to all the Viennese families most in need."<sup>15</sup> Similarly, a considerable amount of food was made available in Vienna after long negotiations between Weisskirchner, Mayor of Vienna, and the Italian Foreign Secretary, Sonnino, who in turn consulted the Italian Supreme Command, as well as the King. These supplies had been brought in by the Italian Red Cross for the Italian prisoners of war encamped at Sigmundsherberg, but had not been consumed by them before they were repatriated. Negotiations were begun in November, but what with red-tape, and difficulties of transport, these supplies were not available in Vienna until the first of the year when they were distributed to the poor of the city as a delayed Christmas present from the King of Italy.<sup>16</sup>

14 In appreciation of the special attention which was rendered them, the Italians of Vienna had a medal struck for General Segre. Segre, *op. cit.*, opposite p. 302.

15 Segre. *op. cit.*, 68.

16 Segre, *op. cit.*, pp. 15-16, 68, quoting Weisskirchner. Segre gives "more than half a million" as an estimated number of beneficiaries while the mayor places it at one million. No mention is made of the amounts distributed to individuals.

In other ways, perhaps less appreciated by the hungry, the Chief of the Italian Mission was of service to the German-Austrian administration. A case in point was the trouble which developed in the Province of Carinthia, in particular that part known as the Klagenfurt Basin. This area formed an economic unit, but the population was German in what might roughly be called the upper half, including the city of Klagenfurt, Slovene in the lower half—and Yugoslav troops were attempting to take over the entire Basin. The American experts at Paris, January 21, 1919, recommended a division of the basin along ethnographic lines,<sup>17</sup> and to this General Segre objected. In principle, Italy was opposed to the cession of this territory to Yugoslavia, and there was the additional argument that such cession would bring the Yugoslavs within easy striking distance, near Villach, of an important railway line on one of the Trieste-Vienna routes. In supporting the claims of German-Austria, Segre accused "the American observer at Vienna" of being biased, anti-Italian, and pro-Yugoslav and telegraphed the Italian Peace Mission at Paris to that effect.<sup>18</sup>

Again, during the first days of March, prior to the convening of the Constituent National Assembly in German-Austria, serious friction developed between German-Austria and Czechoslovakia over the suppressions in German-Bohemia and the Sudeten regions of sympathetic demonstrations in favor of union with German-Austria. The ex-Czech Deputy, Tušar, representing the interests of his country in Vienna, presented formal charges against German-Austria before General Segre. The latter, according to his version, was on friendly terms with Tušar, and was able to convince him that the information on which his charges were based was unfounded.<sup>19</sup> For his part, Foreign Minister Bauer passes over the activity of Segre in the

17 Wambaugh, S., *Plebiscite Since the War*, Vol. I, p. 171.

18 Segre, *op. cit.*, pp. 33-35. Segre here quotes a letter from W. R. Castle, Jr., to R. U. Johnson to support his contention that Italy was suspected of being anti-Yugoslav in sympathy.

19 Segre, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

matter and takes credit for the successful negotiations.<sup>20</sup> In any case, the friction subsided so far as officialdom was concerned, although there had been fatalities in some of the strongly German districts of Bohemia and Moravia.

In another manner, a contribution was made by the Italian Mission, a contribution welcomed by some sections of the Viennese people and definitely resented by others, chiefly the Social Democratic leaders.<sup>21</sup> This had to do with the element of reassurance, the feeling that there were some, even though few, non-political armed forces in the city. The sense of security felt by the bourgeois elements in this respect was more apparent than real, for at no time could the small force of Italians attached to the Mission have maintained martial law in the face of armed opposition by the Socialists and the *Volkswehr*.<sup>22</sup> Upon the occasion of the threat of a Communist coup, when certain representatives of the Entente powers in Vienna telegraphed Paris requesting that a battalion of French troops stationed at Schwatz, South Tyrol, be sent to Vienna, word came back that the problem of maintaining order in Vienna was entirely up to the Mission.<sup>23</sup> As a matter of fact, the coup was frustrated by the German-Austrian authorities. But afterwards, General Segre assigned one platoon to the French Embassy, one to the English, and maintained the usual small patrol at the Imperial Restaurant where the foreign representatives sought relaxation amid the company of Viennese friends.

20 Bauer, *op. cit.*, p. 100, explains: "Thanks to the confidential personal relations, which had been formed during years of comradeship, between the Czech Ambassador Tušar and myself, and thanks to the support of English and American representatives in Vienna, we managed to avert these dangers," i.e., of war.

21 See footnote, p. 171, above.

22 It should, however, be recalled that a considerable force of Italians was stationed at Innsbruck.

23 Segre, *op. cit.*, p. 12. The author comments that this element of reassurance was most appreciated during the brief period of Communist ascendancy in Hungary and Bavaria. *Ibid.*, p. 13.

## DEMANDS MADE BY ITALY

The Italian Mission had not long been in German-Austria before it was realized that Italian prisoners of war were not all that was to be repatriated. These were merely one phase of a general repatriation which included construction materials, documents, works of art and anything else which might have been of Italian origin or at one time located in Italy proper, or even in the new Italian acquisitions, Trieste and Trentino.<sup>24</sup> On the initiative of the Governor of Trieste, the Commission for International Civil Affairs, one of the numerous commissions into which the Mission was divided, claimed that in 1914 quantities of valuable *objects d'art*, bonds, and money were removed from a branch bank in Trieste to the home bank in Vienna lest they be taken as a result of a possible Franco-British naval raid on Trieste. These were valued at 1500 million crowns at the 1914 rate. Payment was demanded of the German-Austrian treasury, and in spite of the "bureaucratic obstinacy which attempted all manner of obstruction" General Segre's "tenacious opposition" carried the day. On February 10, the German-Austrian Administration capitulated and shortly thereafter cash and securities were on their way, under heavy guard, to Trieste by way of Innsbruck and the Brenner Pass.<sup>25</sup> The financial exaction, while naturally resented, was not as serious as might be expected, for if German-Austria had a superabundance of anything at this time, it was cash. In fact, paper money was accepted by the government, but almost anything else was preferred by the regular tradesmen. If Italian demands could be satisfied by a cash payment, no matter how large, that was bearable, and if such withdrawals made an appreciable effect on note circulation, the treasury printing presses could always take up the slack.

Other Italian demands were not to be so lightly passed off, and this was particularly true of railway rolling-stock. The demand for this valuable equipment was based on that clause of the Armistice which stipulated, "all military and railway equip-

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 57-59.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 54-55.

ment of all kinds (including coal) are to be left *in situ*."<sup>26</sup> General Segre makes the point that this was not at all an unreasonable demand, since General d'Esperey in concluding the Convention with Hungary, November 13, in addition to the railway materials then located in the territory to be evacuated, demanded additional cars and locomotives.<sup>27</sup> The difficulties were obvious. The armies were to evacuate the territory south of the Alps along the entire line from Switzerland to the Adriatic, but transport equipment was to be left behind. Thus when General Segre demanded 123 locomotives, 2,460 cars, 420 tons of bridge materials and a further large amount of other materials as reparation, to a total value of fifty million gold lira,<sup>28</sup> he was merely demanding what the Railway Commission estimated had been removed from "*in situ*" by the retreating Austro-Hungarian armies.

The reaction of the German-Austrian railway administration and the Foreign Office was immediate.<sup>29</sup> While admitting the legal justification for the demand, it was contended that it would be impossible to comply since rolling-stock was hard to find owing to the action of the neighbor states in failing to return cars and locomotives which had been sent out of German-Austria to facilitate the importation of indispensable raw materials. It was asserted that German-Austria would be glad to comply with the demand if the neighbors would consent to an

<sup>26</sup> United States. Department of State, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1918, Supplement I, Vol. 1, p. 434.

<sup>27</sup> Segre, *op. cit.*, p. 102; see also Great Britain Foreign Office, *British and Foreign State Papers*, 1917-1918, Vol. 111, p. 625, Military Convention with Hungary. Belgrade, November 13, 1918. Hungary was to surrender 2000 cars, 100 locomotives standard gauge, 600 cars, 50 locomotives narrow gauge.

<sup>28</sup> Segre, *op. cit.*, 106; *Arbeiter Zeitung*, Feb. 18, 1919, p. 4, gives the number originally demanded as 100 locomotives and 2,000 cars to be delivered at Innsbruck beginning February 27. The same paper, Feb. 22, 1919, p. 4, notes that in the face of hesitancy to comply on the part of the German-Austrian Administration the demand was increased. i.e., to the figures given by Segre.

<sup>29</sup> As was also that of the A.R.A. Mission in Trieste whose duty it was to maintain a regular schedule of food deliveries on the railways out of Triesté. For further discussion on this subject, see pp. 227 ff., 264 ff.



equitable division of the rolling-stock of the former Imperial Railways, but that if these cars and locomotives were handed over, the provisioning of Vienna would be completely broken down. Civil disturbances would then follow in the wake of starvation. An attempt by the Administration to gain moral support in its refusal to comply with Italian demands is seen in the sending of copies of the reply to Major Cunningham, the English representative, and to Professor Coolidge, the American representative of the Paris Peace Conference at that time in Vienna.<sup>30</sup>

General Segre, unmoved by this refusal, was convinced that the German-Austrian Administration thought that he was bluffing. He consequently delivered what he termed a precise ultimatum, and the only one which he did issue, Secretary Bauer to the contrary, and reported the situation to the Italian Supreme Command. The latter, on the strength of Segre's information, suspended the departure of one of the four daily food trains out of Trieste for Vienna.<sup>31</sup> This action immediately produced the delivery of the stipulated number of locomotives and cars at Innsbruck.

Acquiescence in the demand for this railway equipment, and the manner in which the demand was enforced—the suspension of one of four food trains a day with a threat to suspend the others—was one of two important considerations in the immediate settlement of the problem of food transportation to the stricken areas of Central Europe. The second consideration, the result of a scuffle at about this same time between Italy and Jugoslavia at Laibach, was the closing of the Italian frontier below that city with the consequent suspension of all train service in both directions on the important Southern Railway out of Trieste on the route to Vienna and Prague. The question at issue, and one overdue for solution, was whether or not the Inter-Allied Mission at Trieste<sup>32</sup> was to have its schedules of

<sup>30</sup> *Arbeiter Zeitung*, Feb. 18, 1919, p. 4.

<sup>31</sup> Segre. *op. cit.*, pp. 103-5.

<sup>32</sup> For further discussion of this Mission, see pp. 227, 264 ff.

food deliveries to the interior hampered or even blocked by the action of the Italian military authorities stationed in Trieste and along the railway to the north.<sup>33</sup>

#### INTERRUPTED FOOD DELIVERIES

Difficulties of this nature were symptomatic of what might, and did, occur elsewhere. The railway line, Trieste, Laibach, Vienna, although the most direct, was not the only route to German-Austria and Czechoslovakia. Other routes were used once the goods had been cleared from Trieste. Of much greater seriousness were the complications which developed almost the moment the American Relief Administration and the Inter-Allied Mission attempted to use the port of Trieste as a base from which to supply relief to Central Europe.

Italo-Yugoslav rivalry in the country behind Trieste and Fiume was by no means settled, and troop movements constantly hampered the Mission in its efforts to obtain cars and locomotives, or even a right of way.<sup>34</sup> Then, too, especially in Trieste and in the railway terminus, the Italians were active in removing experienced German-Austrian or Yugoslav railway employees and replacing them with Italians, who immediately went on strike for higher wages, and the expulsion of the remaining non-Italian railway workers.<sup>35</sup>

In addition to these difficulties in effecting a schedule of deliveries inland, there was the attitude of the Italian military authorities stationed at Trieste. These officials were naturally more concerned with the problem of military occupation than

<sup>33</sup> It is interesting to consider to what extent international friction as it developed between the agencies of different governments was due to personal animosities which grew out of irritability which in turn was the result of physical surroundings. A man who was in the region at the time told the writer that everybody's nerves were frayed, that the buildings were not adequately heated, and that a good breakfast was not to be had from one month to the next.

<sup>34</sup> Segre, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

<sup>35</sup> Col. J. W. McIntosh to U. S. Food Administrator, Feb. 4, 1919, letter in A.R.A. Archives, Hoover War Library.

with supplying food to Czechoslovakia and German-Austria. It had been decided by representatives of the Allied and Associated governments meeting at Berne, December 27, to send 30,000 tons of foodstuffs at the time in Trieste to Vienna.<sup>36</sup> In spite of the fact that these supplies were in storage, Colonel Causey, in Vienna, reported to Captain Gregory that up to January 31, 1919, only 4,497 tons had been delivered. One excuse was the lack of coal to fire the locomotives. It was suggested that the Austro-Hungarian naval coal stores at Pola might be made available for this purpose,<sup>37</sup> but this plan had to be dropped because of Italian opposition.<sup>38</sup> Obstruction in one form or another was particularly discouraging to the Trieste Mission, for it was more urgent than ever to get the supplies already in Trieste out of the way to make room for additional supplies at the moment en route.<sup>39</sup> But here again efficiency and expedition were thwarted by the Italian Military in control of Trieste.

On February 8, 1919, a memorandum was drawn up at a meeting of the Inter-Allied Commissioners which embodied their complaints and suggestions.<sup>40</sup> The substance of this memorandum was recast into vigorous but hardly diplomatic language by Captain Gregory and sent to Mr. Hoover. The report, here given, presents the reactions of the man who was responsible for carrying through the program of deliveries, and also may

<sup>36</sup> Berne Conference Meeting, Dec. 27, 1918. Ms. A.R.A.Archives, Hoover War Library.

For a discussion of food deliveries, see Chapter VI.

<sup>37</sup> Causey to Gregory, Jan. 31, 1919. Ms. in A.R.A.Archives, Hoover War Library.

<sup>38</sup> Capt. E.H. Hart, Paris, to Col. W.B.Causey, Vienna, Feb. 14, 1919, Ms. in A.R.A.Archives, Hoover War Library.

<sup>39</sup> Before he left for Europe, November 18, 1918, Mr. Hoover arranged for the financing and shipping by the War Department of some 250,000 tons of American foodstuffs. "The wisdom of shipping these advance supplies was amply demonstrated in the strenuous months which followed. Without these readily available supplies, the suffering in these countries would have been vastly greater during the early months of 1919." Surface, F.M., and Bland, R.L., *American Food in the World War and Reconstruction Period*, p. 25.

<sup>40</sup> Ms., A.R.A.Archives, Hoover War Library.

throw some light on the cause of Italian obstruction. Paragraph 4 is significant in that it indicated a procedure which was subsequently followed:

1. Up to date there is a clearly sensed attitude of hostility on the part of the Military. They consider us intruders and that we are interfering with them. Their Chief of Staff told McIntosh the other day before our arrival, that we would be responsible for the next war. He was very discourteous today to the French Representative and to one of the English and our Lt. Pottle who were trying to arrange place for offices. His treatment of the Czech Officer who is here to expedite food is scandalous.

2. With the Italians in control of the railroads radiating from Trieste, and trying to get in the interior as large a military force as possible, with the strike which has been on since the first of the month, nothing has been shipped to the Czechs up to the time of our arrival. The cars which had been shipped by the Czechs, had not been delivered here by the Italians, nor was any labor available for unloading.

3. I promptly informed the Italian representative that I wanted 50 cars to be spotted next day for loading for the Czechs, and that if the Italian authorities were not prepared to load these cars I would ask for Czech troops to load, requesting immediate replies on both propositions. These I received in an unofficial manner; they not recognizing the Inter-Allied Commission because of the absence of Giuffrida, stating that both requests would be complied with and that Italian troops would be used to load the cars if necessary. . . .

4. It is clear that on these food movements passing through Italian hands, they can be held up and delayed until we have a great surplus on hand here without the ability to move it out due to lack of willingness or ability on the part of the Italians to cooperate, unless we place a strong control on the railway. This, I'm going to insist upon at once.

5. Our being here has had a substantial effect on the strike and resulted in so far as our interests are concerned in its being settled for loading and expediting train movements.

6. I propose to get Colonel Causey down from Vienna and if necessary to put officers at each of the important railroad points from here to the boundary now held by the Italians so that they

cannot hold cars up that are destined into Trieste or disturb outgoing trains.

7. The removal of American troops from Fiume has left us without guards but General Treat advises that Czech troops will be here to be used for that purpose.

8. Until today there has not been a single Czech car delivered here at Trieste by the Italians, nor would there have been any unless we made demands upon them. Enclosed herewith I am sending a statement made by the Czech Captain to me which is only for the purpose of giving you the picture. The interesting part is that the poor Czech couldn't get enough money out of the bank at which he has credit to pay freight without permission of the Government and the Government won't give him permission to get it. Likewise, he was told by the Chief of Staff here that it depended on the decision of the local Governor whether he would buy wire for telegraphic lines, woolen goods, etc., and furthermore if he didn't like this port he could look for another where he could get permission easier.

9. And so it goes, the Czech hates the Pole and the Pole hates the Czech, the Austrian hates the Czech and Hungarian hates both of them. The Italian hates the Yugoslav and the Yugoslav hates the Italian. And now, in order to complete the merry little circle, the Czech and Italian are starting a hating contest which is the present state of our difficulty. We say that all the world loves a lover and it is about time over here to show these people that all the world hates a hater, and the Inter-Allied Commission at Trieste is about ready to politely but firmly tell the Italians where to head in. Mind you this is not an appeal to Paris for assistance, it is just to inform you that if conditions are not changed upon Giuffrida's arrival, we shall ask you to support us in our endeavor to have the point of view of the Military changed. This can be done by their Government putting some new ideas in their heads or in taking the heads off.<sup>41</sup>

Mr. Hoover, on receipt of Captain Gregory's letter, called the attention of "the highest Italian authorities" in Paris to the situation and reported back to Gregory that a change of attitude

<sup>41</sup> Captain Gregory to Herbert Hoover, Trieste, Feb. 11, 1919. Ms., A.R.A. Archives, Hoover War Library.

might be expected.<sup>42</sup> And the situation did improve momentarily. Giuffrida, the Italian member of the Inter-Allied Mission, arrived in Trieste for a meeting of the members February 15, and a more satisfactory cooperation developed between the Mission and the Italian Military authorities in Trieste.

International relations and Captain Gregory's temper were not destined to remain long unruffled. The Italians had demanded and received the rolling-stock from German-Austria and shortly thereafter closed the frontier between Laibach and Trieste as a result of the "Laibach Affair." This "Affair" was in reality a series of incidents which allegedly involved national prestige and which might have appeared amusing at a different time.

The official Italian version was that on February 12, a train of Italian refugees while passing through Saloch was fired upon by men in Serb uniforms. Several passengers were injured, Italian flags torn from the train and burned. Major di Giorgi, in charge of the Italian Armistice Sub-Committee stationed at Laibach, demanded satisfaction in behalf of the Italian government. On the 14th he was told by the Yugoslav authorities that an investigation was under way. On the 17th, upon further inquiry, he received no reply. On the 18th he was asked to show his passports, and on the 20th he was told to leave the city immediately with his delegation since his passports were not in order and since the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was not subject to the terms of the Armistice of Villa Giusti. He left forthwith.

The same day, the 20th, friction flared between the two countries in a different location. French and American officers were busy with the problem of the Yugoslav frontier near Marburg. General Segre in charge of the Italian Armistice Commission in Vienna sent certain Italian officers to join the French and Americans already on the ground. The Yugoslav authorities ordered these Italian officers to leave, which they refused to do.

<sup>42</sup> Hoover to Gregory, Feb. 16, 1919. Ms., A.R.A. Archives, Hoover War Library.

The Italian Military were willing to close the incident, but on terms which could be accepted. Until satisfaction might be obtained, two courses of action were open. To occupy Laibach with Italian troops, or to close the frontier. The latter was adopted.

Meanwhile, Cyril K. Butler of the Inter-Allied Mission at Trieste went to Belgrade in an attempt to induce the Yugoslav administration to accord the Italian delegation a proper reception upon the return to Laibach. But Belgrade was slow in comprehending this line of reasoning.

While all this was going on, food was piling up at Trieste, deliveries were behind schedule to Vienna and Prague, and Mr. Hoover was making good use of the incidents to further his plan for an unhampered Inter-Allied Railway Mission.<sup>43</sup>

By way of glossing over and thus disposing of the whole matter, the Supreme Council decided to send a delegation of four Allied generals to conduct an investigation at Laibach and to submit a report with recommendations for "punishments, reparations, compensations, or satisfactions" in connection with the guilty person or persons. Generals Treat, Gordon, Savy, and Segre were selected to represent the United States, Great Britain, France and Italy, respectively. The Generals investigated and reported that the Yugoslav General Smilianitch at Laibach had exceeded his authority in ordering the Italian Commission to depart.<sup>44</sup>

These added hindrances to transportation, the demand for rolling-stock and the closing of the Italo-Yugoslav frontier, brought further complaints from the Inter-Allied Mission at Trieste, particularly from the representatives of the American

<sup>43</sup> Miller, *op. cit.*, Vol. XV. pp. 34-5, 251.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, In theory, the play was over, the curtain lowered, but the epilogue was yet to come.

April 19, N.P. Pachitch wrote to Clemenceau pointing out that the report of the generals had to do only with the order of expulsion from Laibach, February 20, that no "guilty persons" were indicated, no punishments recommended, that the original incident at Saloch was passed over, and that therefore, the generals apparently failed to verify the fact that such an incident took place, thus making it "nothing more than an Italian invention." *Ibid.*, Vol. XVIII, pp. 164-5.

Relief Administration, as well as a demand for freedom of action in railway matters in which the Mission was interested.

In the meantime, Herbert Hoover, with the "Laibach Affair" serving as an excellent case in point, approached President Wilson, suggesting that "the operation of such docks and railways as we need for feeding these interior peoples shall be placed under the direction of the Inter-Allied Food Commission sitting at Trieste and the actual executive control vested in the American Member. Their attitude (*i.e.*, the Italians') on this question and many others is such that I want to protest most strongly against any further Treasury advances to the Italian Government until this matter of fearful injustice is put right. If you approve, I will ask Mr. Davis to make it a condition of further advances with the Treasury that the situation shall be straightened out to my satisfaction."<sup>45</sup> President Wilson approved the suggestion.<sup>46</sup>

With this support definitely promised, the Director General of Relief carried the matter further. At a meeting February 24, 1919, of the Supreme Council of Supply and Relief, Mr. Hoover outlined his plan for securing rolling stock on the railway out of Trieste, and, at the time received the approval of the Permanent Committee, for submitting the scheme to the Supreme Economic Council.<sup>47</sup>

Before this was done, Mr. Hoover brought the matter of Italian obstruction and his proposals for a solution before the Supreme Council at its meeting March 5, 1919. He there proposed that :

1. All states of the old Austrian Empire, including the areas held by the Italians on the Adriatic, should be called upon to furnish a definite contribution of railway rolling-stock;

<sup>45</sup> Herbert Hoover to President Wilson, Paris, Feb. 12, 1919. Ms. A.R.A. Archives, Hoover War Library.

<sup>46</sup> Woodrow Wilson to Hoover, Paris, Feb. 14, 1919. Ms., A.R.A. Archives, Hoover War Library.

<sup>47</sup> Minutes of the Twelfth Meeting of the Permanent Committee of the Supreme Council for Supply and Relief, Feb. 24, 1919. Ms. A.R.A. Archives, Hoover War Library.



2. This rolling-stock should be marked as belonging to the Relief Administration and used solely for its purposes;
3. The Director General of Relief should be made the mandatory for the disposition of this rolling-stock;
4. A regular train service should be established under his direction that will carry out the necessary programs of food to the different localities;
5. This service should have entire freedom of movement over all railways regardless of political boundaries and in complete priority to other services;
6. The railway servants of any nationality may be employed in operations over any territory regardless of nationality or political boundaries;
7. Definite portions of port facilities should be assigned to the Relief Administration at Trieste and Fiume for the consummation of these ends;
8. The rolling-stock should not be demanded by any of the Allied Governments until this service is completely equipped;
9. That the railway officials of each state, and port officials of each state, and port officials in each port should be called upon to co-operate in maintenance of this service. . . .<sup>48</sup>

<sup>48</sup> American Mission to Negotiate Peace, Meeting at M.Pichon's Room, Mar. 5, 1919. Ms. in A.R.A.Archives Hoover War Library.

This meeting produced some interesting points in another direction. Senor Crespi, the Italian Food Minister, having previously attempted to show that Vienna and Prague were being adequately provisioned over the Brenner route, asked permission to read a letter which Dr. Beneš had written expressing satisfaction and gratitude with the manner in which the Italians were maintaining food deliveries in spite of the Laibach difficulties. He added that he had received a similar letter from Kramář, Czech Premier.

It need hardly be suggested that when Capt. Gregory heard of this letter he was beside himself, commenting in his usual style,—“Beneš is either not in touch with the situation or for some petty political reason was willing to sign such a statement. It made me mad for two days, . . . after all hands and the cook both in Paris and Trieste had been on the job for his hungry constituents for three weeks.” Gregory to Hoover, Mar. 3, 1919. Ms. A.R.A. Archives, Hoover War Library.

In two letters, March 4, Hoover demanded of Beneš whether he did consider the food deliveries to Czechoslovakia satisfactory, and whether or not he wished the A.R.A. to continue its efforts to increase the deliveries. Her-

At the next meeting of the Supreme Council, March 7, 1919, Mr. Hoover's plan for managing the railways of the former Dual Monarchy and Serbia was adopted with but one modification. In Paragraph 5, priority was to be given to this service, except for military trains.<sup>49</sup> Colonel Causey was placed in charge of this important service and the Inter-Allied Railway Mission began to function the middle of March. The difficulties which remained were innumerable, but the plan as it was worked out was a vast improvement. There still remained the handicap of international suspicion between the Czechoslovaks and German-Austrians, the Hungarians and the Jugoslavs, as well as the problem of coal.

#### REMOVAL OF ART TREASURES

A serious blow was dealt to Austrian sensitiveness by the demand for paintings from the Vienna galleries as well as manuscripts and documents from the archives. This touched the Viennese on the raw, since poor and hungry as the Viennese may have been, at least their cultural heritage had been maintained intact. Here was no momentary hardship which after a period of post-war adjustment might work itself out, but rather an irreparable national loss.

This demand should not have come as a total surprise, for from mid-January articles in Italian papers advocating some form of cultural "repatriation" were reprinted in the Vienna press, and as early as January 20, it was rumored in responsible Italian circles at Innsbruck that shortly the return of all art

bert Hoover to Dr. Beneš, Paris, Mar. 4, 1919. A.R.A. Archives, Hoover War Library.

In reply, March 5, Beneš, referring only to a letter which he addressed to the Italian Ambassador at Paris, insisted that he merely meant to express gratitude for what food was being shipped in, and that by all means the Laibach route should be opened as soon as possible, for deliveries over the alternate route were insufficient to fend off starvation in Prague. Dr. Eduard Beneš to Mr. Hoover, Paris March 5, 1919. A.R.A. Archives, Hoover War Library.

<sup>49</sup> American Mission to Negotiate Peace, Meeting of the Supreme Council, March 7, 1919. Ms. A.R.A. Archives, Hoover War Library.

treasures which had been removed from the war zones occupied by Italy, would be demanded. Moreover, included in the list would be all art treasures which, since 1816, had been removed from Italy and taken to Austria.<sup>50</sup>

Another straw in the wind came with the claim by the Laibach delegation of the Italian Mission that Austro-Hungarian officers had removed Italian works of art which might be in the Laibach area; the local administration was asked to institute an intensive search.<sup>51</sup> Still another warning was found in the report that since an air bomb dropped by a German flier had damaged a fresco by Tiepolo in the Scalzi Cathedral at Venice, the proper compensation would consist of the "Sistine Madonna" by Raphael, "Night" by Coreggio, and "Venus" by Giorgione, all of which were in Dresden.<sup>52</sup> For damage done to Italian art elsewhere in Venice, and in Ravenna and Ancona, the Italian masterpieces in the Vienna gallery would be acceptable as compensation.<sup>53</sup> Such claims illustrate the Italian point of view.

General Segre admitted that the task of the Committee on Art was not an easy one. Some of the most famous works of an earlier period, as well as documents and manuscripts which it was claimed had been removed from Italian territory after Caporetto, had left the country in various directions, chiefly con-

<sup>50</sup> *Reichspost*, Jan. 21, 1919, p. 3.

<sup>51</sup> *Neue Freie Presse*, Jan. 29, 1919, p. 8.

<sup>52</sup> *Neue Freie Presse*, Feb. 1, 1919, p. 8. F.R.von Schubert-Soldern, Chairman of the Art Section of the Central Committee for the Care of National Monuments commented on the demands made by the Italian Newspaper, *Corriere della Sera* of January 14, 1919. Von Schubert-Soldern points out that the ceiling by Tiepolo might be worth one to one-and-a-half million francs while the pictures demanded in compensation for this would be worth not less than twenty million francs, if, indeed an estimate could be placed on them at all. Moreover, the mere fact that certain pictures in the Vienna galleries were by Italian masters did not mean that they were taken to Vienna directly from the Italian Provinces. Most of them came via Paris and London, the leading art markets of the 19th century. *Reichspost*, January 26, 1919, pp. 1-2.

<sup>53</sup> Reprinted from *Corriere della Sera* of Jan. 14 in the *Reichspost*, Jan 26, 1919, p. 1.

signed to Germany, Bohemia, Jugoslavia and Hungary.<sup>54</sup> However, in spite of the difficulty, a formidable list was compiled, and the Mission's Committee on Art set out the morning of February 12 on a foraging expedition. Before evening, visits had been paid to the National Gallery, the *Hofbibliothek*, and the *Hof-und Staats-archiv*. At the National Gallery a list was presented which included roughly one hundred and fifty famous paintings, either by Italian masters or paintings which it was claimed had been taken from Venice to Vienna in 1816 and 1838 and had not been returned in accordance with the terms of the treaty of 1866.<sup>55</sup> At the *Hofbibliothek*, so large a number of manuscripts and codicils were removed that it took all morning to get them out of the cases. While at the *Hof-und Staats-archiv*, a broad demand was made for everything which had reasonably important bearing on the Provinces of Trieste, Trentino, Lombardy, and Venice.<sup>56</sup> The gleanings from the National Gallery were obviously of the nature of a national heritage. The manuscripts from the library and especially the material taken from the *Staats-archiv* could be placed in the libraries of the Lycee of Gorizia and the Technical Institute of Udine, while any further windfalls—*i.e.*, maps, geological reports, etc.—could be used in working out the administration of the new Provinces.<sup>57</sup>

Indignation ran high in Vienna when these articles, particularly the pictures, were removed. When documentary evidence was produced by the director of the National Galleries to show that the paintings were legitimately there, the Mission announced that further protests would bring on the suspension of the food deliveries from Trieste.<sup>58</sup> The art treasures followed the rolling-

<sup>54</sup> Segre, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

<sup>55</sup> *Neue Freie Presse*, Feb. 12, 1919, p. 8; Eisenmenger, *op. cit.* pp. 181-1.

<sup>56</sup> *Neue Freie Presse*, (Abend) p. 3, Feb. 12, 1919.

<sup>57</sup> Segre, *op. cit.*, pp. 57-58.

<sup>58</sup> *Neue Freie Presse*, Feb. 12, 1919, p. 8. The *Reichspost* corrects an impression created by the *Presse*. Segre did not give an ultimatum, he merely pointed out that while Italy was taking part of the paintings, he hoped that nothing would make it more difficult to effect the delivery of food to the City of Vienna. *Reichspost*, Feb. 15, 1919, p. 7.

stock over the Brenner Pass. Segre mentions some valuable things which were missed.<sup>59</sup> Article 93 of the Peace Treaty provided only for the transfer of essential archival material.<sup>60</sup>

#### ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES OF THE MISSION

In addition to the outright removal of materials and works of art, as well as the preparation of lists of scientific equipment which might in due time be demanded by the terms of the Peace Treaty, the Chief of the officially designated Inter-Allied Armistice Commission reconnoitered in behalf of his Italian co-nationals. The purpose was obviously to further Italian trade with the new State either by direct and advantageous purchase at the time or to begin negotiations which might lead to subsequent economic penetration.

But there were three chief difficulties in the way of immediate trade between German-Austria and Italy. In the first place, the "Zentralen" or the government controlled joint-purchasing agencies, which had been used during the War as a means of more efficient organization of foreign importation, still lingered on. Since foreign trade would be expected to flow through these bureaus, direct contact between Segre or his aides with the German-Austrian firms was made more difficult. Even then, with contact established, there remained the problem of transportation. Added to the shortage of rolling-stock was the inadvisability, not to say the impossibility, of using the direct lines to Trieste because of the permanent friction between Jugoslavia and Italy, and the sporadic difficulties between Jugoslavia and German-Austria. And the enforced canalization of traffic over the one line via Tarviso resulted in congestion of the most acute

<sup>59</sup> Segre, *op. cit.* p. 61, e.g. the Teglio collection of antique snuffboxes, and the unique Tappo collection of Roman amber from Aquileia.

<sup>60</sup> The first sentence of Article 93 reads: "Austria will hand over without delay to the Allied and Associated Governments concerned archives, registers, plans, title-deeds and documents of every kind belonging to the civil, military, financial, judicial, or other forms of administration in the ceded territories." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *The Treaties of Peace 1919-1923*, p. 208.

nature. Finally, there was no effective credit arrangement in force between the two countries.<sup>61</sup>

The chaotic condition apparent on the Southern Railway arising from general depletion and international rivalries needed no official report to bring them to light. Italy was of necessity interested in the future of this railway line, so important to the development of Trieste, but the matter was settled by agencies other than the Inter-Allied Armistice Commission and at a later time.<sup>62</sup>

Nor were Segre's efforts to effect the purchase and the delivery of industrial materials crowned with immediate success, largely because of the indifference exhibited in Rome. Thus opportunities to obtain varying amounts of crude petroleum, manganese, and pine planking, all at bargain prices, were allowed to pass.<sup>63</sup>

In another connection, more in line with the general instructions which he received from the Italian Supreme Command, the head of the Mission was evidently more successful. This was in the gathering of facts for future reference, with a view either to reparations or to penetration.

Leading industrialists of German-Austria, or their representatives in Vienna, apparently deluged the Mission with statistical information in connection with offers to sell their wares. Thus without any effort, the Mission obtained an estimate of the amount of the supplies of various goods on hand, their quality, the productive capacity of different plants, and the price which in every case was more advantageous to Italy than could be found in any other market, largely as the result of the depreciation of the krone in comparison to the lire.<sup>64</sup>

<sup>61</sup> Segre. *op. cit.*, pp. 76-77.

<sup>62</sup> Segre, *op. cit.* pp. 81-2.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 82. Segre is not specific either as to amounts or prices. Thus he "turned up a quantity of manganese," in Carinthia, and a "large offering of pine planking." This was in February, 1919. The "several million metric tons of crude petroleum" were located in Galicia in November, 1918. But the Mission did not arrive until the end of December.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 76. Segre gives a partial list: timber, wrought-iron work, electrical apparatus, paint, knives, photographic and chemical products.

Far more important as a source of subsequent repercussions in internal political affairs of German-Austria, was the penetration of the Italians in the great *Alpine-Montangesellschaft*. This company, the largest and most important left to German-Austria, owned the valuable iron ore deposits of the *Steirische Erzberg* near Eisenerz, Styria, and the *Hüttenberger Erzberg* near Hüttenberg, Carinthia. Ore from these ranges was a valuable source of supply for the Roman Empire, and was in demand down through the Middle Ages. The *Alpine-Montangesellschaft* in addition to extracting the ore, used most of its product in its own furnaces for the manufacture of cast iron and steel. At the very time that certain Pan-German circles in Vienna, as well as German-Austrian optimists, were attempting to present the silver lining of the immediate post-war situation by suggesting that Reich German industry would turn to the *Alpine-Montangesellschaft* because of the loss of the ore deposits of Alsace-Lorraine, General Segre was negotiating for the purchase of the controlling interest in this company. As he suggests, on the basis of studies made before the War, here would be available an abundance of ore which Italy lacked. And the price in view of the exchange was cheap. Moreover this concern might serve as an important link in the German lands for the chain of concerns which were to figure in the ambitious plans for Italian penetration in eastern Europe. With the assistance of the Mission, a great *Società di spedizioni* (Hoffman) was organized which had more than thirty branch offices or representatives (*filiali*) in the Balkans, around the Black Sea, in Asia Minor, and had a strong representation on the management of the *compagnie di navigazione Levante e Adria*. Further to link up these various fields of penetration, negotiations were conducted with the English for obtaining the Danubian Commercial fleet, since the lower Danube would be important in furthering Italian interests in the Balkans and the Black Sea.<sup>65</sup> Italian penetration during the

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 80-81. On the matter of economic penetration in German-Austria Captain Gregory commented in the summer of 1919 as follows: "French influence is strong in the old Empire and Poland. Italians offer

period of extreme inflation was so successful as to cause Bauer to say that German-Austria had been "*ausverkauft*"—sold out.

Although the Italian Mission remained in German-Austria until the summer of 1919, it attracted progressively less attention as time passed. This may be explained by the fact that most of the points which caused friction between the Mission and the German-Austrian administration were settled during the period of the first government and subsequently there was less material for conflict. In addition, early in 1919, other commissions representing the Entente arrived on the scene, so that the Italian Mission was not the only important group from the former enemy powers. But the claims put forward by the Italian Mission and the necessity for satisfying them at the earliest possible moment made more difficult the solution of other internal problems.

competition in Hungary and Austria. But unless American capital enters the field and takes the best of the opportunities offered, German capital will take hold and reorganize the befuddled country. First, commercially, then financially, and before you know it, in 10 or 15 years, *Mittel Europa* will be a reality in a commercial sense if not in a military one. The Germans are beginning to penetrate into Hungary, Jugoslavia and Austria, and if the initial stiff Czecho-Slovak policy towards her Danubian and other neighbors is not modified, she is going to find herself isolated in the center of a ring of nations who didn't care much for her to start with, and who have lost no love for her during the Armistice period." Gregory, Captain T.T.C., "General Report for Central Europe. Relief of the Austro-Hungarian Succession States," p. 52, Ms., A.R.A.Archives, Hoover War Library.



## CHAPTER VI

### FOREIGN RELIEF

DURING the life of the Provisional Government of German-Austria, its most consistent and absorbing efforts in foreign affairs had to do with getting the problem of German-Austria before the foreign public and thus obtaining supplies and, perhaps, credits. That German-Austria, as of November 1918, was incapable of independent existence was accepted as axiomatic in administrative circles and served as one of the excuses for an early declaration in favor of *Anschluss* with Germany. Until this, or a similar international attachment could be made, there remained the problem of food, and the foreign relations of the new State were strongly influenced by the necessity of obtaining food and fuel. Since domestic resources for feeding and warming the people were so woefully inadequate, appeal was made in the early days of the Republic almost simultaneously to the Succession States, to Germany, and to the Entente.

The irritation which marked the relations between Germany and Austria in the last years of the war carried over into the period of the Liquidation Ministry, and although it was slightly tempered by the breakdown in the Dual Monarchy, a sense of mutual understanding was still lacking. But, in spite of this lack of cooperation, the Council of State in German-Austria appealed to Germany on October 30 to help defend the frontiers.<sup>1</sup> When this request was complied with and the Bavarian Minister of War occupied Innsbruck and Salzburg on November 5,<sup>2</sup> the Tyrolian *Nationalrat* and the German-Austrian administration were thoroughly alarmed. Only then were the consequences of the ill-considered appeal really understood. There was every prospect that the Italian armies south of the Brenner might advance and meet the German armies on Austrian soil. This was

<sup>1</sup> *S.P.*, Oct. 30, 1918, p. 42.

<sup>2</sup> *Arbeiter Zeitung*, Nov. 7, 1918, pp. 1-2.

to be avoided at all costs and the Tyrolian *Nationalrat* as well as the central government of German-Austria sent frantic communications, first to Berlin and Munich and then to Paris to have the Germans withdrawn.<sup>3</sup> The hitch in this arrangement was that between the time of the appeal to Germany and the arrival of German troops on Austrian soil, German-Austria had signed the Armistice of Villa Giusti.

In the matter of food, also, there was considerable strain and no appreciable success. Near the end of October, a deputation set out for Berlin in search of whatever food might be available. They found some surplus grain in Germany and were told that along the Danube there were barges loaded with grain which, if located, might be consigned to German-Austria. At first, Germany assured the Austrian delegation that 10,000 carloads could be had, but this amount was reduced to 1,000 two days later. Before delivery was made, this grain was in part allocated to various sections most in need. Among these, German Bohemia was to get 125 carloads.<sup>4</sup> By early December, the aforementioned barges had been found in the Hungarian Danube, and all told Germany promised to supply a month's needs, or roughly 30,000 tons, if it were possible to make deliveries with the reduced rolling-stock of the German railways. At the time the report was given, December 4, Germany had to her credit 290 carloads which had already crossed the frontier and the 23 barges with the equivalent of about 818 cars, making a grand total of some 10,000 tons<sup>5</sup> or a third of the necessary supply for a month. At the time German-Austria needed 80 cars a day for an absolute minimum and 100-120 cars a day to keep up the quota, in addition to what could be extracted locally.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>3</sup> This was carried out Nov. 9, *Deutscher Geschichtskalender*, 1918, Vol II, part 2, p. 770.

<sup>4</sup> *S.P.*, Oct. 30, 1918, pp. 55-56.

<sup>5</sup> Report of Dr. Löwenfeld-Russ, Secretary of State for Food, *S.P.*, Dec. 4, 1918, p. 210.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 212.

## APPEALS TO ENTENTE

Since this was about the most that could be obtained from Germany through official channels, renewed and more urgent appeals were made to the Entente. When the provisioning of German-Austria was finally considered seriously by the victorious powers, it was treated as part of the relief of Central Europe generally. Available supplies were canvassed the world over, and delivery involved not only the location of the materials within or without Europe, but the smooth functioning of the means of transportation.

The approach to the problem in its larger aspects was not made until German-Austria had demonstrated the inability of one state, alone, to cope with the problem. But the increasing amount of assistance rendered German-Austria from beyond the frontiers, culminating in the activities of the League of Nations, necessitated German-Austria's compliance with certain stipulations laid down by the assisting powers, until finally, as the Party in opposition to the German-Austrian Administration at the time expressed it, German-Austria surrendered her sovereignty.

The provisioning of German-Austria by the Entente, or the Succession States upon the insistence of the Entente, involved certain motives not given general publicity at the time. It is difficult to draw a distinct line but, in general, there may be listed two sources of food: contributions provided by individuals or various humanitarian organizations, and the assistance sponsored by foreign governments. Donations by private individuals and organizations were irregular. The assistance rendered by the Entente was of far greater proportions, for it included poverty-stricken areas other than German-Austria, and required a small army of executives to supervise the expenditure of millions of dollars. The humanitarian motives in this vaster and more effective form of relief cannot be denied and perhaps should not be impugned, but there were political motives also.

A double-stranded thread, weaving in and out of the official reports of heads of delegations sent to examine conditions in

German-Austria, works its way into the committee rooms at Paris and St. Germain, and finds its way back to Vienna in official communiques. One strand of this thread was the realization that unless something of a constructive nature were done for German-Austria and Hungary, they would draw closer to Germany—a development which, in the atmosphere of Paris, 1919, was to be checked at all costs. The other strand was the admitted fear that unless something were done for German-Austria, that small but vital member of the Central European family of nations might become a convert to Communism. And when a Soviet regime was set up in Budapest on the one side, and at Munich on the other, the future of the Vienna area, if not all of German-Austria, became momentarily doubtful. For their part, the Social Democratic leaders in the early governments, realizing this apprehension on the part of the Entente as well as among the bourgeois elements in Vienna, did little to dispel these fears and at times played upon the threat of Communism in order to further their own plans.

In whatever degree the threat of Communism might be used for political purposes, the Austrian Social Democratic leadership realized that under the conditions which prevailed in German-Austria, the advent of Communism would act as a boomerang on the fortunes of the Social Democratic Party. Captain Gregory, who took a serious view of the situation in Communist Hungary and its effects on German-Austria and Central Europe, talked frequently with Foreign Secretary Bauer and characterized him as "one of the strongest and cleverest men in Austria. . . . I became convinced that he is not a Bolshevik at heart, although a Socialist of radical ideas. . . . He correctly stated that the position of Austria with its large and fairly well-educated middle class did not represent the opportunity that existed in Hungary . . . and he realized that the effect of Communism would be in the immediate separation of all the outlying Provinces from Vienna, leaving a great city of two million people without food, coal, or work. Bauer could have thrown Vienna

to the dogs . . . and the fact that he did not is in itself the best evidence of his purposes and intentions.”<sup>7</sup>

On November 5, the day after the Armistice became effective, an appeal for food was sent to President Wilson by the last Imperial Minister of Foreign Affairs, on the ground that no matter what might be unearthed in German-Austria or the adjoining territories, the food supply would be inadequate. It was suggested that, since Article 5 of the Naval Clauses of the Armistice provided for a modification of the blockade by an inter-allied commission, the Imperial and Royal Government would greatly appreciate the setting up of such a commission at a point where it could cooperate with the government in exploring the possibility of using idle Austrian merchant ships to transport grain from the Argentine.<sup>8</sup>

Shortly thereafter, the new Foreign Office dispatched its own appeal to President Wilson, November 9. In the meantime, or before the reply was received, the matter of assisting the Eastern European sufferers was taken up at Paris. A resolution proposed by Colonel House was adopted by the Supreme War Council. Thus :

If the peoples of Bulgaria, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey appeal to the Allied and Associated Powers for the supply of Provisions, the Allied and Associated Powers will do all they can to assist in a spirit of humanity.<sup>9</sup>

#### STIPULATIONS OF PEACE AND ORDER

On November 24, the German-Austrian Ambassador at Berne was informed by the Swiss government of the intention of the

<sup>7</sup> Gregory, Captain T.T.C. "General Report for Central Europe; Relief to the Austro-Hungarian Succession States," submitted to Herbert C. Hoover, Director General of Relief, p. 62, Ms., A.R.A. Archives, Hoover War Library.

<sup>8</sup> *Mitteilungen des Staatsamtes für Volksernährung über die Verhandlungen mit den alliierten Hauptmächten über die Lebensmittelversorgung der Republik Oesterreich*, p. 7 (Hereafter this report has been referred to as *Staatsamt für Volksernährung: Mitteilungen*) This request was not granted. For a discussion of similar proposals by the Municipality of Vienna, see p. 248, below.

<sup>9</sup> Almond, N., and Lutz, R.H., *The Treaty of St. Germain*, p. 87.

Allied and Associated Powers and of the reply which President Wilson gave to the direct appeal of the Austrian Government.<sup>10</sup> This promised food upon condition that unquestioned peace and order be maintained.<sup>11</sup> On November 27, reversing the emphasis, Bauer sent both an appeal and a warning to President Wilson to the effect that no food could be obtained from the former food-producing areas of the Monarchy, that stocks on hand were practically depleted, and that the government which represented all Parties was in a position to maintain peace and order only if a sufficient supply of food was assured.<sup>12</sup>

The next step of the German-Austrian government was to send a delegation off to Berne at the end of November in the hope that personal contact might be established with the representatives of the Entente.<sup>13</sup> But at Berne, they found the representatives of the Entente without authority to treat. Appeal was then made to the Supreme Economic Council and to the Director General of Relief, stating that a delegation was at Berne to negotiate on matters of food. While waiting for a reply, the delegation obtained from the department in Vienna a schedule of the estimated needs for the next month (which, optimistically enough, included the provisioning of Bohemia and the Sudetenlands), and talked to any one who was available and interested about the plight of German-Austria and the conditions in Vienna.<sup>14</sup> These conversations, as will be seen shortly, were instrumental in bringing help from an unexpected source.<sup>15</sup>

10 This was presumably the reply to the first appeal of November 5.

11 *Staatsamt für Volksernährung: Mitteilungen* 8. Bauer, *op. cit.*, p. 80, is inclined to make something of this point. Writing after the failure of the Social Democratic Party to remain in office, Bauer offers this as a partial reason. "Wilson's note of the 18th of October unchained the National Revolution. Wilson's note of the 24th of November demanded the closure of the Social Revolution."

12 *Staatsamt für Volksernährung: Mitteilungen*, p. 9.

13 *Staatsamt für Volksernährung: Mitteilungen*, p. 9; Freiherr von Haupt-Buchenrode, a former member of the Department of Commerce (*Handelsministerium*) was in charge.

14 *Ibid.*

15 See p. 251, below.

Even before the German-Austrian delegation arrived at Berne, the situation, especially in Vienna, had been brought to the attention of responsible men at Paris and initial measures had been taken toward relief. As already indicated, there were the official appeals sent by the last Imperial Ministry as well as that by the Provisional National Assembly. In addition there were the reports sent to Paris, usually via Berne, giving the results of the observations of foreigners in an official or semi-official capacity.<sup>16</sup> Christian A. Herter, special Attaché of the United States Department of State, telegraphed Joseph Clark Grew in Paris on December 2, 1918, as follows :

Going from bad to worse (in Vienna) perchance you can use your influence in order some measures may be taken in near future . . . . If only pressure could be placed on Czechoslovaks to release coal which was destined for Austria. Whether out of politics or out of revenge, Czechs are doing best to make lives of German-Austrians and Magyars miserable. Impossible to persuade them that maltreatment of their neighbors is not going to give them prestige at the peace table.<sup>17</sup>

Of a more pressing nature, and important in the determination of a policy, were the attempts made by the German-Austrian authorities to obtain food, with the permission of the Entente, in neutral countries. German-Austria and the city of Vienna had available enough cash to cover payment for the supplies, but so long as the blockade remained in force,<sup>18</sup> permission to use ships

<sup>16</sup> Such as: Reinick, in Vienna, to Hugh Wilson in Berne, passed on to Hugh Gibson in Paris, Berne, Nov. 26, 1918. "One thing is sure, unless quick help is received from one part or another, plundering will have to begin; for the poor people can't be expected to go hungry." Ms., A.R.A. Archives, Hoover War Library.

Thierry Doman of the American Red Cross to Hugh Gibson. "Vienna, Nov. 26, 1918. People on brink of Bolshevik volcano. Witnessed low class misery. Visited 10 charity kitchens 6,000 daily each. Half litre sickening soup (cabbage, potatoes and flour like sawdust). Sundays a little horsemeat. Ungettable grease. Forbidden to fry eggs and potatoes. Met British girl soapless three months." etc. Ms., A.R.A. Archives, Hoover War Library.

<sup>17</sup> Ms., A.R.A. Archives, Hoover War Library.

<sup>18</sup> The blockade of the Adriatic Ports was lifted Feb. 28, 1919. Telegram of Vance McCormick, Chairman of War Trade Board, Washington, Ms., A.R.A. Archives, Hoover War Library.

of the former Empire, or to transport goods across Germany, had to be obtained. Negotiations were started with the Danish Government for the purchase of several thousand tons of food-stuffs.<sup>19</sup> Permission was requested to ship grain which had been purchased by the Austro-Hungarian Army of the East and was lying in Odessa and other Black Sea ports, as well as to permit barges laden with Ukrainian grain, which were somewhere in the lower Danube, to continue to Vienna.<sup>20</sup> The City of Vienna purchased 5,000 tons of grain and attempted to arrange for payments through the Bank of Holland.<sup>21</sup> There was the matter of some 60 carloads of bacon, ordered at the Hague to be delivered at the port of New York, with the understanding that the Red Cross Society would care for the shipment to German-Austria provided permission were granted. All of these attempts were frustrated by the refusal of the Entente to grant permission for the shipment of the goods on the ground that it constituted enemy trade and that it would be preferable to handle such matters through the regular channels of an Inter-Allied Commission.<sup>22</sup>

Meanwhile, at Paris, possibilities were being explored. On November 29, 1918, Admiral Benson, in reply to a query, pointed out that Article 5 of the Naval Clauses had been inserted to make possible the shipments of food to German-Austria.<sup>23</sup>

<sup>19</sup> Information from the Legation at Copenhagen, sent by Strauss to Hoover, via London to the American Embassy, Paris, Nov. 26, 1918, signed, Laughlin. Ms., A.R.A.Archives, Hoover War Library.

<sup>20</sup> Note to the Political Division of the Swiss Federal Council from the German-Austrian Ambassador to Switzerland, Dec. 14, 1918. Alonzo E. Taylor Collection, A.R.A.Archives, Hoover War Library. The same request was made via the Italian Supreme Command, sent to Italian Embassy in Washington, referred to the State Department which sent it to the American Embassy in Paris for the attention of Colonel House and Herbert C. Hoover. Polk, in Washington to American Embassy, Paris, Dec. 16, 1918. Ms., A.R.A. Archives, Hoover War Library.

<sup>21</sup> Instructions of Herbert C. Hoover to Capt. T.T.C.Gregory, Paris Feb. 2, 1919. Ms., A.R.A.Archives, Hoover War Library.

<sup>22</sup> A. Scholl, Member of the Austrian Commission at Berne, to R. Slatin, to Col. House. Explanation of refusal, by Robert Taft, attached. Berne, Dec. 19, 1918. Mss., A.R.A.Archives, Hoover War Library.

<sup>23</sup> Miller, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 137.



For his part, Mr. Hoover raised the question of financing payments in the United States by crediting the government of German-Austria with the value of the property of its nationals held by the Alien Property Custodian. The reply was that such assets could not be used as a basis for relief work, and that the ultimate distribution of such funds would depend upon the action of Congress and possibly international negotiations.<sup>24</sup>

Without awaiting the answer to the question regarding a possible use of Enemy Alien credits, since the need was imperative, other leads were followed. On December 19, Mr. Hoover, on the basis of information supplied by his own agents, urged President Masaryk to use his influence to supply coal and potatoes from Bohemia to the City of Vienna.<sup>25</sup> In reply, President Masaryk stated that he had sent orders to send to Vienna all the available coal and that when he arrived in Prague (he was still in Paris) he would take charge of the matter personally. He went on, however, to outline certain difficulties. While admitting the seriousness of the situation in Vienna, he questioned the sincerity of the Vienna Government on the grounds that he had had evidence to prove that Vienna was shipping arms to the German population of Bohemia and Moravia, and that the mines in Silesia had been occupied by Germans and Poles. To these difficulties were added the problems of transportation, for, he pointed out, many thousands of cars and locomotives had been taken by the Italians. Finally, he suggested that information which reached Paris regarding the situation in German-Austria was strongly influenced by German propagandists.<sup>26</sup>

<sup>24</sup> Memorandum to Secretary Lansing (pencilled note in the handwriting of T. H. Dickenson). Lansing, Paris, Dec. 20, 1918, to Department of State, Washington. Hoover to Rickard, Food Administrator, Washington, Dec. 29, 1918. Reply giving opinions of Palmer and the Treasury Department, Edgar Rickard's Office to Ammission, Paris, Jan. 11, 1919. Mss., A.R.A.Archives, Hoover War Library.

<sup>25</sup> Herbert C. Hoover to President Masaryk, Paris, Dec. 13, 1918. Ms., A.R.A.Archives, Hoover War Library.

<sup>26</sup> T.G.Masaryk to Mr. Hoover, Paris, Dec. 14, 1918. Ms., A.R.A.Archives, Hoover War Library. Similar phraseology is found in a note from the French Embassy in Washington addressed to Secretary Lansing, a copy of

## UNEXPECTED SOURCES OF RELIEF

Before a general plan for the relief of German-Austria and the neighboring states could be worked out by representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers and deliveries in any considerable quantity could be made, relief, small but immediate, was forthcoming from another quarter.

On November 12, 1918, information was received at the British Embassy at Berne that foodstuffs amounting to 800 tons of flour and 300–500 tons of assorted foods were being pledged to the City of Vienna by the people of Switzerland, and that since no compensation was involved, only the permission to ship the food stood in the way of delivery.<sup>27</sup> By December 24, A. E. Taylor, chief of the Inter-Allied Mission, had obtained the consent of the Blockade Committee sitting at Berne for the shipment of these foods,<sup>28</sup> and delivery was effected in installments between February 9 and June 7, 1919. There is no exact record of the amounts, which included flour, rice, condensed milk and chocolate and which were transported by the Swiss military authorities and dispensed by the Swiss Red Cross in Vienna.<sup>29</sup>

From another source also the city of Vienna received an unexpected windfall. In the middle of December, 1918, Lord Cavan, Commander of the British contingents on the Italian Front, sent a subordinate, Major Bethell, to study the situation in Vienna. On the strength of the report submitted, Lord Cavan immediately dispatched a 27-car train to Vienna with surplus army supplies.<sup>30</sup> This was followed about a month later by a

which was sent to Mr. Hoover, and in which a warning is implied against too great a feeling of sympathy for German-Austria. Ms., A.R.A. Archives, Hoover War Library.

<sup>27</sup> Memorandum signed G.C.D. (Gertrude C. Dixon?) Ms., A.R.A. Archives, Hoover War Library.

<sup>28</sup> A.E. Taylor to H.C. Hoover, Dec. 24, 1918. Ms., A.R.A. Archives, Hoover War Library.

<sup>29</sup> *Staatsamt für Volksernährung: Mitteilungen*, p. 10. A.E. Taylor in his memorandum to Mr. Hoover, cited above, lists 600 tons of flour, 400 tons of rice, 60 tons of fat, and 60 tons of condensed milk.

<sup>30</sup> This shipment was apparently resented in Italian quarters as being highly irregular, as the following suggests:

(Footnote continued on p. 251)

second train carrying an equal amount. These supplies were placed in the general fund and helped to maintain the allotted rations.<sup>31</sup>

While the German-Austrian delegates were awaiting the arrival at Berne of the Entente representatives, there was ample time to exchange views with the Swiss hosts. Although the possibility of obtaining a loan from Switzerland was immediately dismissed, the Swiss authorities agreed to dispatch an unspecified amount of the most essential foods to the stricken Viennese, especially cereals and fat.<sup>32</sup> These supplies of over 1000 tons were delivered in three trains over the period of December 27-January 9 and consisted of powdered chocolate, condensed milk, fat, rice and flour. The cost of these supplies<sup>33</sup> was carried by the municipality of Vienna while distribution was worked out by representatives of the Swiss government, the municipality of Vienna and the Department of Food Supply.

It is interesting to follow the effect which these supplies had on the domestic situation, and by implication, one is given in-

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Friday Evening,  
January 3, 1919.

Dear Chief:

We have just learned that the British General in Italy has sent in here 300 tons of food to be turned over by the British Major (in charge of British civilian relief) to the Food Controller in Vienna without any reference to us. The Italian delegates went up into the air at once and we sat tight. Beveridge is trying to swing this in under Inter-Allied relief.

Yours,

Taylor

A.E.Taylor to H.C.Hoover, Ms., A.R.A.Archives, Hoover War Library.

<sup>31</sup> *Arbeiter Zeitung*, Jan. 4, 1919, p. 6. Jan. 31, 1919, p. 6. The contents of the first train is not given, but the second, which is stated as being similar to the first, carried zwieback, condensed milk, beans, rice and flour.

<sup>32</sup> *Staatsamt für Volkernährung: Mitteilungen*, p. 10. Verification of the serious conditions described by the Austrian delegates was to be found in the report and recommendations for assistance which had been submitted by Dr. Ferrière of the Swiss Red Cross who in early December conducted a survey of the hospitals, particularly those of Tyrol. *Ibid.*, p. 10; *Arbeiter Zeitung* Dec. 7, 1918, p. 5.

<sup>33</sup> Estimated at two and one-half million francs. *Staatsamt für Volkernährung: Mitteilungen*, 10.

sight into the situation prior to the arrival of the Swiss food. The flour was placed in the general supply and thereby swelled the amount to such an extent that half of the ration-card allowances could actually be available for one week. The fat, together with the meager supply on hand, would raise the quota from 40 grams to 60 grams per head per week. The rice was to be reserved for children under six years and for hospitals and charity feeding stations.<sup>34</sup> Most of the powdered chocolate was set aside for the "Warm Breakfast for the School Children Association." As a result, more than 17,500 children could have hot chocolate for breakfast every other day for twenty days.<sup>35</sup>

In addition to these emergency shipments, the Swiss Federal Council had already assumed the burden of provisioning the two western Provinces of Tyrol and Vorarlberg. Indeed when the final arrangements were made for covering the needs of German-Austria, these two Provinces were left out of the calculations since they were being cared for by the Swiss.

Cordial relations had long existed between the people of Vorarlberg and Switzerland, partly because of similarity of racial stock, and partly because Vorarlberg was geographically cut off from the rest of Austria. On November 8, 1918, the Swiss Federal Council offered to provision the people of Vorarlberg on the same basis as the Swiss, namely, for a population of 140,000, 1,092 tons of flour, 126 tons of rice, 42 tons of fat per month in addition to small amounts of chocolate, soups, and sardines. Payment was to be made in Swiss francs, or hay and lumber.<sup>36</sup> Upon the withdrawal of the Bavarian troops from north Tyrol, this province was added to the care of Switzerland which was given the much needed assurance that the stocks shipped to these Provinces might be replaced.<sup>37</sup> As the obligations of the Entente increased in the matter of relief in Central

<sup>34</sup> *Arbeiter Zeitung*, Jan. 1, 1919, p. 10.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, Jan. 19, 1919, p. 10.

<sup>36</sup> Stovall to Secretary of State, Washington, Nov. 8. Ms., A.R.A. Archives, Hoover War Library.

<sup>37</sup> Minutes of the Supreme Council for Supply and Relief, Meetings of January 29, and Feb. 14. Ms., A.R.A. Archives, Hoover War Library.

Europe, the urgency for the continuance of what had at first been a voluntary offer on the part of Switzerland was recognized, and Switzerland was encouraged to assume entire responsibility for the relief of Vorarlberg and Tyrol, (to which had been added Liechtenstein) until the harvest of 1919.<sup>38</sup>

#### RESULTS OF THE BERNE CONFERENCE

Eventually, on December 24, 1918, an Inter-Allied Mission arrived at Berne<sup>39</sup> and an audience was immediately granted the German-Austrian delegation in the American Embassy. After listening to reports of conditions in German-Austria, and Vienna in particular, it was decided that 30,000 tons of flour or corresponding cereals should be sent as soon as possible without waiting to work out an advance agreement as to methods of payment. The shipment, already begun, of food from Switzerland to Vienna, was formally approved, and 4000 tons of wheat, an unspecified amount of condensed milk and lemons, available in Italy were to be sent as an advance shipment to be charged against the larger amount of food when the time came for casting up accounts.<sup>40</sup>

38 Herbert C. Hoover to the United States Minister at Berne for the Swiss Federal Council: "The governments of France, Great Britain, Italy and the United States, while fully appreciating the action already taken by the Swiss Government urgently request that government to assume entire responsibility until the next harvest." Ms., A.R.A.Archives, Hoover War Library.

39 Representing the United States: Dr.A.E.Taylor (Chief of the Mission)  
 Capt. T.T.C.Gregory Lt.Col. Causey  
 Hugh Gibson Major Peasley  
 Mr. Loree (did not go beyond Berne)  
 France: M.Genestal M.Haguénin  
 Italy: Sig. Giuffrida Sig. Obliight  
 the United Kingdom: Sir William Beveridge

Almond, and Lutz, *op. cit.*, p. 90.

40 *Staatsamt für Volksernährung: Mitteilungen*, p. 10; Official Statement of the Berne Meeting, Dec. 30, 1918, Ms., A.R.A.Archives, Hoover War Library; Shipments to Austria Recommended at Berne Meeting, Dec. 27,

There were certain "strings" attached to the shipment of this advance of 4,000 tons from Italy, stipulations which serve to illustrate the problems of transportation at a time when each country blamed its neighbors for placing obstacles in the way of the delivery of goods.<sup>41</sup>

1. The goods to be moved via Innsbruck.
2. The first thousand tons of grain, fifty of milk and lemons to be delivered in Italian cars, but these cars must not pass the frontier until an equal number of Austrian cars have been delivered at the frontier to Italian officials, and the Italian cars must be returned as soon as possible. The remaining three thousand tons to be delivered in cars which with Austrian locomotives must be sent in advance to Trieste, Venice, or other designated points. If these engines have not sufficient coal for the entire trip, the Italian officials may supply coal sufficient for the entire trip from the frontier to the loading-point and back to the frontier.
3. Trains to have an Italian military escort to the point of destination. Austrian authorities to supply all possible comforts as well as return passage to the frontier.
4. The cost of transportation from the harbor to the Austrian frontier to be charged to the account of German-Austria.
5. If the sacks are not sent in advance by Austria, they may be supplied by Italy. In this case they must be returned within a month in the same condition in which they crossed the frontier.
6. Of the 4,000 ton total, 3,000 tons of grain are to be sent to Vienna, the remainder to be distributed to other destitute areas. The Allies retain the right to supervise the distribution.
7. As a guarantee of payment, and until some general plan for financing the entire relief burden is arranged, German-Austria is to deposit 18 million kronen with the commander of the Italian Army of Occupation in Innsbruck. This sum may be released when the general plan is adopted.

1918, unsigned, but in the handwriting of Dr.A.E.Taylor, Ms., A.R.A. Archives, Hoover War Library. The total amount of 30,000 tons given by Dr. Taylor is usually listed as 24,000 tons by the German-Austrian authorities.

<sup>41</sup> *Staatsamt für Volksernährung: Mitteilungen*, pp. 10-12.

At the conclusion of the meetings at Berne, the delegates from the United States, Britain, France and Italy decided to go to Vienna to make their own study of conditions. Accompanied by the German-Austrian representatives, this Inter-Allied Mission arrived in Vienna January 2, 1919.<sup>42</sup> Here a more detailed account of the situation was obtained, with the advantage of conferences with the various heads of departments concerned in the problem of supply. The German-Austrian authorities informed the Mission that the middle of January would see the end of the food supplies for Vienna at least, and that the minimum needs of the city for a month would be 20,700 tons of flour.<sup>43</sup>

Having studied the situation in Vienna, the Mission went to Prague to investigate, and then to Budapest where further details of the general area were added to the picture.<sup>44</sup>

A similar delegation arrived in Vienna January 5, composed of members of the American Mission to Negotiate Peace, headed by Professor Coolidge. This delegation was sent to study and report on the political and economic situation in German-Austria and the neighboring states.<sup>45</sup>

<sup>42</sup> *Arbeiter Zeitung*, Jan. 3, 1919, p. 4; *Staatsamt für Volksernährung: Mitteilungen*, p. 12.

<sup>43</sup> In addition there were listed, 2,000 tons of fat, 2,300 tons of meat, and as much condensed milk as might be obtained. Since potatoes were not available, 2,300 tons of rice would be needed. *Ibid*, p. 12; Almond, and Lutz, *op. cit.*, p. 90.

<sup>44</sup> This was no pleasure jaunt for the members of the committee in consideration of the task before them. Arrived in Vienna January 2, the group went to Prague January 5, returning January 8. Off to Budapest the same night for two days, and then back to Vienna. Dr. Taylor and the two French members left for Paris January 12, and on the same day Capt. Gregory and Mr. Gibson left for Trieste, Agram and Belgrade to check on the assertions of the Hungarians as to food supplies in South Hungary, then occupied by the Serbs. A subcommittee was left in Vienna to supervise the carrying out of the plans. *Arbeiter Zeitung*, Jan. 12, 1919, p. 9; Almond, and Lutz, *op. cit.*, p. 91.

<sup>45</sup> *Arbeiter Zeitung*, Jan. 7, 1919, p. 3.

## REPORT OF INTER-ALLIED MISSION TO VIENNA

With the information gleaned on these short trips from Vienna and back, Dr. Taylor was in a better position to estimate the needs of German-Austria and the neighboring states than were the Vienna officials who stayed at home. Thus he could point out what the average German-Austrian found hard to believe: namely, that there were other cities and countries which were suffering from a food shortage. Although admitting the impossibility of obtaining an accurate picture of conditions without a longer and more methodical study of the various countries, Dr. Taylor and his associates obtained certain definite impressions on which to base a report to the Director General of Relief.

## ABSTRACT OF REPORT OF DR. TAYLOR, JANUARY, 1919

*Hungary.* I am convinced that nutrition in these areas can be maintained at a much lower figure than the pre-war consumption. I am convinced that Hungary possesses a surplus of 500,000 tons of bread grain beyond the amount necessary to carry her people reasonably and properly into the next harvest. Notwithstanding that Hungary presents vociferous appeals to the other fractions, she ought to be compelled to divert 500,000 tons to her neighbors rather than be permitted to feed it to her domesticated animals. The layman in agricultural practice cannot conceive the insistence on the part of the owners of cattle and swine at this time to feed up for the period of peace; and the landowners of Hungary will do everything in their power to maintain the production of livestock rather than divert grain to their neighbors. The grain figures presented were those submitted by Karolyi and were apparently accepted by the Hungarian authorities. On the basis of these, Hungary needs 200,000 tons, and if the Slav boundaries are allowed to remain, 500,000 tons. In both instances, camouflaged as bread grains are grains for animal feed. I am unable to secure any other idea than that Hungary ought to have 500,000 tons of grain to export which she is holding back for political purposes. Hungarian grain is at present an article of barter which is being used in the political struggle between German-Austria and Hungary for the possession of the German Comitates of West Hungary. In considering the needs of German-Austria, it is important to establish the amount of supplies Vienna



can get from Hungary. This is difficult because of politics. About mid-November, it was agreed between the Hungarian Foreign Office and the Austrian Secretary of State for Food that negotiations would commence soon to clear up details for the urgent food deliveries, probably on the basis of grain and cattle for industrial articles. But about the beginning of November, the Hungarian Minister of Agriculture stated to the City of Vienna that delivery of cattle would depend upon Hungary's receiving cloth, linen, shoes, and paper in proportion at pre-war prices.

The fuel situation in Hungary is serious. The mines at Funfkirchen have been seized by the Serbs. The Hungarians claim that Czechoslovakia is holding up the delivery of coal to induce Hungary to relinquish territory near Pressburg. There is little petroleum coming in from Roumania. The data presented is so nondescript in quality and, in general, the tone of protest against German-Austria, Czechoslovakia, the Army of Occupation, and the Allies, so vitriolic and unrestrained as to cast grave doubts as to their entire situation.

*Czechoslovakia.* Czechoslovakia is long on potatoes and sugar, although the extent is not determined. The country is short in bread grains with a probable 280,000 tons needed. A surplus of coal exists, and the country has the best railway equipment of the Empire. There exists the least difficulty with labour, and a loyal relationship between people and government. A moderate amount of fats will be needed.

*Jugoslavia.* Having been twice fought over, the population is reduced and short crops are to be expected. Probably 300,000 tons of grain will be needed. One of the biggest problems in Jugoslavia is the matter of transportation.

*German-Austria.* The country can at best produce about 50 per cent of its food requirements, and in 1918-19 a reasonable estimate would be 40 per cent. The normal flow of supplies has stopped. Czechoslovakia and Hungary have placed embargoes on goods to German-Austria, while the Jugoslavs and Serbs have no food to send upon the first occasion in their history when they might send it under the conditions of a free market. A food shortage exists everywhere, especially in Vienna. The authorities optimistically believe that the city will not be faced with starvation before January 25. The Viennese does not respond readily to Bolshevism, but unless aid is rendered

- a. The city will be plunged into riot, anarchy, and lawlessness, or
- b. Large sections of the population will quietly await death by starvation, or
- c. The people will scatter to the country, as was the case in Russia.

If the latter should be the case, it would stretch out the food supplies, defer starvation momentarily, but extend starvation to the peasant who would otherwise escape. If *all* the domesticated animals were slaughtered, starvation would be postponed several months only.

Czechoslovakia and Jugoslavia are evening up old scores and the Viennese realize that they must expect this. But the Hungarians, who never suffered the injustices of the others at the hands of the Austrians, are merely taking out a profit while Austria is helpless.

A surplus of sugar and potatoes exists in Bohemia and Moravia, and a probable surplus of bread grains could be found in Hungary. In German-Austria, 6 or 700,000 tons of bread grains would relieve the situation to a considerable extent until the next harvest.

In German-Austria coal is needed in a way and to a definite extent more than food. The Prussian owners of the Silesian coal fields are willing to sell to Vienna, and the financing is satisfactory, but the Czechoslovaks have closed the frontier, while an embargo in substance has been placed on coal from the Czechoslovak Ostrau and Moravian fields. Reserves in Vienna are very low.<sup>46</sup>

Finally, Dr. Taylor, for the Inter-Allied Mission, recommended that definite amounts of grain be shipped to the following indicated stricken areas. The needs were based on a consumption of 10 kl. per head per month, although the peacetime rate of 1913 was estimated at 190 kl. per head per year.

<sup>46</sup> "On the Nutritional Situation in Austria-Hungary, together with Political, Financial, and Transportational Considerations." A.E. Taylor, Jan. 1919. A report submitted to Mr. Herbert C. Hoover. Ms., A.R.A. Archives, Hoover War Library.

## MONTHLY REQUIREMENTS OF WHEAT AND RYE

German-Austria .....	76,200	tons
Silesia .....	7,700	"
Czechoslovakia, including the German border areas ..	119,700	"
Jugoslav countries .....	65,000	"
Galicia .....	81,500	"
Bukowina .....	8,100	"
Total .....	358,200	"

A total of 360,000 tons a month was recommended for the entire area.

Recommendations for German-Austria were based on the requirements of the various Provinces as follows:

Lower Austria (including Vienna) .....	36,000	tons
Upper Austria .....	8,540	"
Salzburg .....	2,180	"
Carinthia .....	3,980	"
Styria .....	14,500	"
Tyrol .....	9,500	"
Vorarlberg .....	1,500	"
	<hr/>	
	76,200	

In addition to the amounts recommended for German-Austria, suggestions were made, in view of the peculiar situation in that country, regarding distribution. As Dr. Taylor pointed out, in Vienna, German-Austria was proclaimed a constituted state, but the country was still amorphous. Some Provinces had not, in January, 1919, made up their minds definitely about their ultimate allegiance. With respect to food, it was important to realize that the Provinces had established their own food bureaus and wished to negotiate with the Entente and America independently of the Vienna government, while Vienna wished to act as spokesman for the entire country. The Inter-Allied Mission was of the opinion that the wishes of the Provinces should be considered, for the German-Austrian administration was not in a position to guarantee that American food would be distributed among the various Provinces in a way which would satisfy their needs. It was therefore suggested that American officials be detailed to distribute the supplies for "so far, [the German-Austrian people] have been deceived and robbed by a

caste of corrupt, feudal grafters." This applied to the old subordinates, not to the new higher officials in Vienna and the Provinces who appeared to be men of integrity.<sup>47</sup>

In the final session, before the delegates departed for Paris, the chief topic under discussion was transportation. The difficulties in this connection were given point by the report that even while the matter was being considered, a snowslide in the Brenner Pass had held up the first supply train. As a result, the slim food reserve in Vienna had to be drawn against, and the daily ration reduced. This mishap served as a timely warning of the ease with which communication might be disrupted as well as the narrow margin, the hand-to-mouth calculation, on which the authorities in Vienna were forced to depend.

The report drafted by the Inter-Allied Mission after the first general survey of the area was anything but encouraging and presented German-Austria largely as a problem for charity. In substance, the report is as follows :

Vienna, once the capital of the Empire is now the chief city of a state of less than six millions. The territory, let alone its size, is little qualified to support a large capital. It has a relatively small industrial area (Styria and Vienna) and the rural areas are relatively unproductive, being mountainous. The Czechs claim only about one-third of the population but they have 90% of the coal, 80% of the iron and steel, 90% of the cotton, 95% of the sugar, and practically all of the wool and ceramics trades.

Vienna was industrially prominent for the manufacture of clothing and ornaments. Its real importance was in its central position with respect to government, culture, finance, commerce and transport. There is no demand for any of this now. "It is not clear to what extent the world will have use for Vienna in the future."

Even if the Allied and Associated Governments grant a loan, which is necessary to get its industries started as well as supply food, there is quite an open question whether adequate security is available either in contemporary property or in prospect of future earnings.

<sup>47</sup> "The Food Needs of Central Europe," A.E.Taylor, Jan. 7, 1919, A Report Submitted to Herbert C. Hoover, Ms., A.R.A.Archives, Hoover War Library.

The brightest outlook for Vienna as well as its creditors lies in restoring Vienna as a transport and trading center, which in turn would mean a restoration of the old lines of trade, or an Economic Confederation of the Danube and thus a pulling away from Germany. "Meanwhile separation goes on apace with the provinces striving to cut themselves free from Vienna."<sup>48</sup>

General as the report was, so were the recommendations which followed:

The Allies must call the war finished with all parts of Austria and Hungary, and give positive help in reconstruction, if the fate of Russia is to be avoided. No special consideration for Austria-Hungary prompts this, but rather the situation as viewed from the following reasons:

1. These countries are so completely smashed that war-time standards of inhumanity are no longer possible;
2. A further spread of disorder in Europe is a danger to the Allied countries themselves;
3. Both Austrian and Hungarian leaders assert that if they are forced to stand alone with their neighbor states as hostile as they were, they would of necessity draw closer to Germany.

When the majority of the Inter-Allied Mission departed for Paris, January 12, the German-Austrian authorities felt reasonably assured of the necessary supplies for one month, provided deliveries ran smoothly. This was not to say that German-Austria was supplied with the minimum for subsistence until the next harvest, but at least the prospect of completely empty warehouses was postponed. One important phase of even the temporary provisioning had been left completely in the air; whenever the German-Austrian Government had attempted to obtain some information on the point, it was put off.<sup>49</sup> That had to do

<sup>48</sup> Taylor, A.E., "On the Nutritional Situation in Austria-Hungary, Together with Political, Financial, and Transportational Considerations. Jan., 1919." Ms., A.R.A. Archives, Hoover War Library. See also: Almond, and Lutz, *op. cit.*, p. 93.

<sup>49</sup> Until a final plan could be worked out, the government agreed to deposit at Innsbruck an additional 132 million kronen. This with the 18 already deposited as surety for the original 4,000 tons promised at Berne brought

with the price to be paid for the supplies and the manner of financing the payments.

#### SECOND PARIS CONFERENCE

Responsible members of the German-Austrian administration were requested to come to Paris to take up the matter of financing the food deliveries.<sup>50</sup> Arriving in Paris, February 13, the delegation was immediately received by Mr. Herbert Hoover, Director General of Relief, and was informed without delay that financing of the deliveries by a loan from the United States was out of the question. It therefore devolved upon the German-Austrian delegates to present schemes of their own for further study by the Supreme Economic Council.<sup>51</sup>

Although the possibility of raising money in the United States was definitely closed, nothing had as yet been said about the impossibility of receiving credits from the Entente, and certain of the suggestions offered by the German-Austrian representatives presupposed the floating of a loan. Most appealing, because of the ultimate benefit to the country after the food bill had been paid, was the suggestion that a capital investment be set up and used by a company to develop the hydroelectric possibilities in the mountain districts. It was estimated that there was energy to the extent of three million horsepower and, considering the mounting costs of coal for industrial uses, a profit on this enterprise could not fail. In view of the particularism of the Provinces, the proposed company would include members of the federal government and of the Provinces in which the sites were

the total to 150 million. Subsequently the Italians demanded that this sum be increased to 382 millions. *Staatsamt für Volkernährung: Mitteilungen*, p. 13 footnote.

<sup>50</sup> Dr. Schüller for the Foreign Office; Dr. Grünberger for the Department of Food Supply; Dr. Brauneis for the Department of Finance; and, Dr. Adler representing the *Wiener Bankverein*. The latter did not go beyond Berne, as his presence was not deemed essential to the conferees at Paris. Dr. Schwarz-Hiller joined the group as the representative of the mayor of Vienna. *Staatsamt für Volkernährung: Mitteilungen*, p. 15.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 16.

located. By considering the interests of the Provinces in the scheme, a monopoly might thus be obtained.

Another possibility put forward at the time was that the company organized to develop the waterpower, or another company similarly financed, might exploit the state forests. Here, it was submitted, was available under proper management 1,157,000 cubic meters of wood annually. Of this 70-80 per cent would be available for industry and some 20 per cent for firewood. Much of this timber would be exported, and foreign credits could be accumulated to pay for food.

Since the bulk of the relief was destined for the city of Vienna, it was also proposed that the municipality might pledge its tax-exempt income amounting to a billion francs against a loan equivalent to twenty million dollars.

Another suggestion for financing food deliveries involved the salt monopoly. From the Salzkammergut and adjacent territories which were uncontested, the state derived an annual income of ten to twelve million kronen. During 1915, there were mined 1,650,000 Meterzente of salt, and ordinary peace-time production would normally be higher. Since most of this production was for export, here again the income as determined by the world market for salt might be pledged against the cost of supplies.

Finally, and less acceptable to the German-Austrian delegates, there was the possibility of pledging foreign securities both in German-Austria or held by German-Austrians. The difficulties in using this type of security for financing food deliveries were unpleasant in prospect, and the amount available was at the time in doubt. In fact, no one was willing to hazard a guess.<sup>52</sup> With the presentation of these various schemes, the real business of the Second Paris Conference was completed, and after some informal discussions, the delegates returned to Vienna March 2, there to await some action by the Entente.

<sup>52</sup> *Staatsamt für Volksernährung: Mitteilungen*, pp. 16-17.

## ACTIVITIES OF THE TRIESTE MISSION

Since early February, the combined Inter-Allied and American Relief Administration Mission in Trieste<sup>53</sup> had been wrestling with the colossal task of effecting the deliveries of foodstuffs to the stricken districts of Central Europe. Before settling down to the details of food distribution, the members of the Trieste Mission scattered to make a second and more intensive study of conditions in the territories under consideration. On the basis of their findings, a plan was drawn up which in a more detailed form was an elaboration of suggestions made earlier by Mr. Hoover.<sup>54</sup> The needs of Austria and Hungary were to be considered as secondary to those of Czechoslovakia, Jugoslavia, and Montenegro, and although the Congress of the United States had forbidden the lending of money directly to Germany and Austria, Mr. Hoover suggested that the Grain Corporation at Trieste would sell any amount for exchange, negotiable into American money; in other words, direct American credits or neutral money.<sup>55</sup>

The activities of the Trieste Mission were divided among four general fields: the stimulation in production and improvement in

<sup>53</sup> This Mission had a different composition from that which had gone to Vienna in early January. The head of each delegation had a large staff, that of the American Relief Administration at one time numbering 250. The members of the Inter-Allied Mission were:

Representing the United States (American Relief Administration) and at the same time, Chief of the Inter-Allied Mission, Capt. T.T.C. Gregory.

Representing Great Britain, Cyril K. Butler, who was an expert on food matters in Britain during the war.

Representing Italy, Sig. Giuffrida, Italian Assistant Food Minister.

Representing France, Col. Olivari, who had trained an American division in France, and been awarded the D.S.M.

Gregory, Capt. T.T.C. "General Report for Central Europe. The Relief of the Austro-Hungarian Succession States." p. 16. Ms., the A.R.A. Archives, Hoover War Library.

<sup>54</sup> Herbert Hoover, Paris, Feb. 2, 1919, to Captain T.T.C. Gregory, "Instructions on the Supervision of Relief Works radiating from the Adriatic." Ms., A.R.A. Archives, Hoover War Library.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, Surface, and Bland, *op. cit.*, p. 26, Memorandum by E.M. House.



distribution of coal; the improvement in transportation;<sup>56</sup> the distribution of food; and, since the relief supplies destined for Central Europe were insufficient to provide for all the needs, the stimulation of economic exchanges as a means of supplementing the Entente relief was to be encouraged whenever possible, particularly in the matter of raw materials.<sup>57</sup>

Quite aside from the importance of coal production<sup>58</sup> to the revival of industrial life in Central Europe, the members of the Trieste Mission saw in the reduced supply coming from the pits a serious obstacle to the maintenance of food-train schedules and other economic activities which the Mission contemplated. Following the survey made by the Mission early in February, Captain Gregory and Colonel Causey recommended in the strongest terms the immediate, if temporary, delimitation of frontiers as a way of easing international tension in the coal areas, and the occupation of the regions by Entente troops. Gregory, who felt strongly on this matter early in 1919, did not change his opinion as is evidenced by his remarks: "There is no doubt . . . had the coal areas been occupied in the month of January, that the economic and social situation in Central Europe would be far better than it is today (September, 1919), and the fear of the coming winter and what it may bring would not cause such despair as it does at the present time."<sup>59</sup> Although a delimitation of frontiers was subsequently effected,

<sup>56</sup> The difficulties encountered in the attempt to improve transportation especially from Trieste to Prague and Vienna, and the steps which led to the internationalizing of necessary rolling-stock under the Inter-Allied Railway Mission have been discussed on pages 226-234.

<sup>57</sup> Gregory, Captain T.T.C. "General Report for Central Europe. The Relief of the Austro-Hungarian Succession States," p. 15. Ms., A.R.A. Archives, Hoover War Library. It should be noted that the events and activities recorded in Captain Gregory's report, undated but apparently written early in September, 1919, took place during and after the time of the Provisional National Government in German-Austria. So far as the Trieste Mission was concerned, this distinction was inconsequential since the political and economic problems involved in relief remained.

<sup>58</sup> For a discussion of the location of the coal fields of the Empire, type of coal and annual output, see page 186 above.

<sup>59</sup> Gregory, Captain T.T.C. "General Report for Central Europe, etc.," pp. 8-9. Ms., A.R.A. Archives, Hoover War Library. See also earlier reports.

the benefits to be hoped for from an "immediate" settlement were lost, and while an Inter-Allied Coal Mission, under the Chairmanship of Colonel Goodyear, took over the supervision of the most important mines,<sup>60</sup> August, 1919, the Trieste Mission had to perform its tasks as best it could under the conditions which prevailed in the winter and spring of 1919.

Deprived of any form of direct control over the production of coal, the commissioners had recourse to persuasion or to the inclusion of coal as one element in what sometimes became a complicated process of barter involving problems in international politics, international finance, threats and cajolery.

Gregory reported that he arrived in Prague one day in January, 1919, just after a Council of Ministers had unanimously voted to prohibit the further export of coal to German-Austria. As Gregory saw that such a decision would bring Bolshevism to Vienna in no time, conferences were held with the Czech leaders and it was agreed to continue the shipments, limited as they were. In fact, according to Gregory, so many conferences were held with the Czechoslovak authorities in an attempt to obtain sufficient coal to run the food trains that they raised their hands in disgust whenever they saw a member of the Mission approaching.<sup>61</sup>

Similar difficulties developed with Jugoslavia in an attempt to utilize an agricultural surplus in the Banat. While western Jugoslavia was in dire straits, the district which had formerly been the Banat of Hungary seemed to be a land flowing with milk and honey. The fields were in a state of beautiful cultivation, the winter grain had a fine stand, "cattle, sheep, goats, horses, pigs, and poultry literally dot the landscape in every direction."

<sup>60</sup> Gregory disapproved of the manner in which certain of the frontiers were drawn, for in Teschen, the mines were on one side of the frontier while the miners were on the other, and at Pecs, the mines were given to Hungary, while the railway which served the mines was awarded to Jugoslavia. Gregory, Captain T.T.C. "General Report for Central Europe, etc.," pp. 47-48. Ms., A.R.A.Archives, Hoover War Library.

<sup>61</sup> Gregory, Captain T.T.C., "General Report for Central Europe. Relief of the Austro-Hungarian Succession States." p. 48, Ms., A.R.A.Archives, Hoover War Library.

There was not the slightest attempt at food control and prices were down. German peasants, enrolled in a cooperative called "Agricola," were ready to sell 80,000 tons of grain to Vienna if a satisfactory price could be arranged.<sup>62</sup> That these supplies did not move was not the fault of the producers but rather that of the Yugoslav Administration. Here again there was the problem of transport and lack of cooperation.

The stamping of the currencies was also an inconvenience, because each new currency had a different value and fluctuated at a different rate. Furthermore, in this instance, the Danube which had provided convenient transportation between these two regions was closed because of the Communist regime in Hungary. But the goods had to be moved from the Banat, for the maximum schedule of relief supplies from the Entente and America were not enough to maintain subsistence without the full use of available stores in Central Europe.<sup>63</sup>

The Yugoslav Administration was approached, and objections were immediately raised because the Yugoslav authorities lacked data on the situation in the Banat, were inexperienced in office, and could not understand why supplies from the Banat should be allowed to go out of the country when food was being imported with money borrowed in the United States. It was explained that the food which was being imported was being distributed along the Dalmatian coast where there was privation which could be relieved more easily from the Adriatic than from the surplus in the hinterland.

Export licenses were finally promised for 1,000 tons of food. At the Vienna end, the German-Austrian authorities were persuaded to draw up a list of goods available for exchange. Since the Yugoslav Minister of Finance wanted to keep his stamped currency as small as possible against the time when it would be exchanged for dinars, he would not accept German-Austrian kronen. Such squeamishness was circumvented in the following manner. The American Relief Administration took 50 million

<sup>62</sup> A.R.A. *Bulletin* No. 7, April 29, 1919, pp. 9-10.

<sup>63</sup> Gregory, Capt. T.T.C. "General Report for Central Europe. The Relief of the Austro-Hungarian Succession States." pp. 24-26 Ms., the A.R.A. Archives, Hoover War Library.

unstamped Austrian kronen to the Austro-Hungarian Bank at Zagreb. These were there stamped with the Yugoslav stamp and given to the German-Austrian representatives to be deposited in Vienna and used for the purchase of Yugoslav goods. Other problems developed. The Yugoslav Administration while agreeing in theory was slow to carry out its promises. Appeal was made to Mr. Hoover in Paris. Finally, the export licenses were granted, but on the basis of one permit for each car. Then convoys had to be arranged, for without a show of military authority the goods would never reach their destination.

Then the problem of coal came up. There was not enough available to move the supplies. The American Relief Administration attempted to get coal from Petrozeny Mines in Transylvania, but these were in the hands of the Roumanians, and deals had to be made both with the practically autonomous government of Transylvania located at Hermanstadt, and with the owners of the mines who were in Budapest. When the various authorities had finally been won over, it was found that the mines had been flooded and that production was low because the miners lacked food and clothing. A contract was eventually arranged with the various governments and companies. The Yugoslav government agreed to send in food, the American Relief Administration agreed to send clothing to the miners, and the latter agreed to dig. The Yugoslav government contracted to turn over a part of the coal obtained to the American Relief Administration which could then run its trains. Success was apparently achieved. But friction had in the meanwhile developed between Jugoslavia and German-Austria over the possession of the Klagenfurt region and the export permits were cancelled by the Yugoslav Government.

Discouraged, but not hopeless, a different approach was made by the Trieste Mission, or more properly by Captain Gregory. Jugoslavia was in desperate need of salt, while German-Austria had a large supply on hand. Gregory therefore induced the German-Austrian administration to send 30 carloads of salt to Jugoslavia. Taking difficulties in their stride, the members of the Mission were able to move 40,000 tons of foodstuffs, 1,000

head of cattle, and 2,000 horses. The livestock, especially the horses, were the cause of great vexation, for although they were inspected and released at the point of purchase, they were re-inspected at almost every station. As Captain Gregory remarks, at one time there were over 1,000 held up at Marburg "while inspectors, veterinarians, military authorities and purchasing agents rowed with one another, each carrying out the orders of his superior. Petty officialdom for some time blocked the definite orders from Belgrade."<sup>64</sup>

Upon occasion, the measures adopted to further the exchange of goods assumed the appearance of what might be termed international skulduggery. Such was the case with Czechoslovak sugar which was needed in German-Austria. It was agreed that German-Austria would acquire Czechoslovak currency to pay for this sugar, since the currency of German-Austria was unacceptable. Difficulties were apparently smoothed out when trouble loomed from another quarter.

Béla Kun, the Hungarian Communist, had roused the national spirit in Hungary, in part by parading Czech prisoners through the streets of Budapest, and had forced the Czechoslovak troops back on a wide sector in Slovakia. As a result of this defeat, the Italian officers of the Czechoslovak troops were removed and supplanted by French officers. A contributing cause in these reverses was the lack of munitions of which considerable quantities were to be found in German-Austria, left there as part of the army stores. The Czechoslovak Administration demanded the right to purchase a supply of these munitions and intimated that delivery of sugar to German-Austria would depend upon the granting of the request.

The German-Austrian Administration was thereby placed in an awkward position because of the proximity and influence of Bolshevik Hungary. Hungarian spies were ubiquitous, the Communists were particularly numerous in the arsenals at Wiener-Neustadt and Vienna, and these were in constant touch with Budapest by airplane. Foreign Secretary Bauer knew of a

<sup>64</sup> Gregory, Captain T.T.C. "General Report for Central Europe. Relief of the Austro-Hungarian Succession States." pp. 27-33. Ms., A.R.A. Archives, Hoover War Library.

planned Bolshevik invasion of German-Austria from Hungary, and quite aside from opposition within his own Social Democratic Party to supplying Hungary's enemy with munitions, he realized that the first shipment of arms to the Czechoslovak government would be the signal either for blowing up the arsenals or for the seizure of Wiener-Neustadt by the Hungarian Communists. It was finally arranged that the Italian Armistice Commission would purchase the munitions and ship them to Innsbruck where the Czechoslovak Government would obtain them from the Italian Armistice Commission.<sup>65</sup>

These few examples show how complicated was the problem of effecting exchange of goods among the Succession States. Mutual advantage was lost sight of because of political obstinacy and general distrust. Endless negotiations were followed by practical difficulties in transportation so that often what should have been a simple transaction dragged out for weeks.

#### REPORT ON FOOD DELIVERIES

Obviously, under the circumstances, the situation in Vienna became steadily worse. The deliveries promised by the Inter-Allied Food Commission were most irregular and were not coming through fast enough. Thus in the first Vienna Conference of January 3-11, 24,000 tons of grain and 2,000 tons of fat, the needs for just a month, or until February 10, were promised. The final installment of this allotment of grain, did not come in until February 23, and the last of the fat until March 11.

In view of this situation, appeal was made again to Mr. Hoover who in February had sent a delegation<sup>66</sup> of the Inter-Allied Food Commission to Trieste to supervise the loading and dispatching of food to German-Austria and Eastern Europe. At the entreaties of the Austrians, Mr. Hoover ordered this delegation to go to Vienna and set up a permanent organization. This became the Inter-Allied Railway Mission, in charge of

<sup>65</sup> Gregory, Capt. T.T.C. "General Report for Central Europe. The Relief of the Austro-Hungarian Succession States." pp. 30-38. Ms., the A.R.A. Archives, Hoover War Library.

<sup>66</sup> See

Colonel Causey. This delegation arrived March 12 and was almost immediately given a gloomy report. The potato, the chief article of diet, was conspicuous by its absence; meatless weeks had been reestablished; and the milk situation was worse than in January when it was reported as being as bad as possible. Of the condensed milk promised to supplement the regular supply for infants and the sick, only half had turned up.<sup>67</sup>

Specifically, the Austrian representatives pointed out that, not counting Tyrol and Vorarlberg, which were being supplied by Switzerland,<sup>68</sup> and Upper Austria which had sufficient supplies on hand for immediate needs, grain relief alone would have to be estimated at a minimum of 36,960 tons a month, of which Vienna would take 22,650. As to fat, that which had been promised in January came along at the end of February, and in January the quota should have been doubled, which would mean 4,000 tons a month. In addition, the meat situation was completely hopeless. The animal stock of the country was depleted, and it was impossible to import meat. There was no meat on hand; in short, there was no meat anywhere. Vienna alone needed 2,000 tons a month at the lowest estimate.

Lack of meat was bad enough, but lack of milk was worse still. The schedule of deliveries called for 750 tons of condensed milk for the period January 15–February 15. Up to March 10, only 420 tons had come in. The entire supply had been intended for children and invalids, chiefly in Vienna, and they received only about half of what had been expected. In view of the fact that fresh milk for infants under one year was unobtainable, the estimate for condensed milk should be increased to 1,000 tons a month.

In January, it had been promised that rice would be sent as a substitute for potatoes. But only 714 tons of rice were received which was equal to one-half of a kilogram per head per month. Thus instead of 714 tons for two months, the need was now 3,000 for one month.<sup>69</sup>

67 *Staatsamt für Volksernährung: Mitteilungen*, p. 21.

68 See above, p. 253.

69 *Staatsamt für Volksernährung: Mitteilungen*, pp. 21-22.

## LONG-TERM FOOD AGREEMENT

After this brief but emphatic presentation of the situation, the commissioners from Trieste expressed the usual sympathy and promise of their good intentions and retired well armed with statistics supplied by the German-Austrian government. When they had communicated with Paris, the Allied representatives responded with the most complete and definite commitment as yet made and one which held promise of a dependable schedule—if facilities of transport permitted—rather than the stop-gap deliveries which had previously been the order of the day. Thus, Great Britain, France and Italy were ready to grant credits, divided equally between them, up to thirty million dollars, to finance food deliveries to German-Austria under the direction of the Supreme Economic Council.

As regards security for this loan, the Commissioners followed the suggestions of the German-Austrian delegates at the second Paris Conference, more or less in the order of preference there outlined. A lien was to be placed on the salt industry in German-Austria, and on the property of the City of Vienna. Should these prove inadequate or unreliable, further property in German-Austria was to be pledged at the discretion of the Inter-Allied Committee which would be set up to supervise the repayment of the loan from these sources of income; the loan was to take priority over any other indebtedness which might exist in German-Austria. The Inter-Allied regime agreed to the import of thirty thousand tons of cereals from the Argentine provided German-Austria could finance the transport. All arrangements in this matter must come under the approval of the Finance Section of the Supreme Economic Council.<sup>70</sup>

So much for the official communication. The Commissioners, speaking off the record, promised to take steps to increase the current deliveries from Italy up to 1,500 tons daily. This would necessitate the clearance of five trains a day instead of four.<sup>71</sup>

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 22.

<sup>71</sup> As follows: 2 from Trieste over Laibach of 650 tons each, the remainder divided between 1 over Tarvis-Villach 2 over the Brenner.



As a matter of fact, a considerable increase in deliveries for March was made in comparison with the preceding months. Mr. Hoover noted that 10,000 tons had been delivered in January, 22,000 tons in February, 37,000 tons in March. This represented a total value of fifteen million dollars, but in view of the exhaustion of domestic supplies, it was necessary that even larger monthly shipments be made.<sup>72</sup>

By its efforts, the Provisional Government had succeeded in obtaining not only a series of temporary agreements for the immediate staving off of starvation, but had finally been rewarded with a long-term arrangement which, it was hoped, would suffice until the next harvest. One important detail, however, had to be left for the next administration. Until March 12, repeated inquiries as to the cost of these goods to German-Austria had been unavailing.<sup>73</sup>

There are no complete figures available for deliveries made during the life of the Provisional Government. But if the period of the Armistice be considered as a whole, a period which included the Provisional National Assembly and the Constituent National Assembly as well, the following amounts were delivered:<sup>74</sup>

American Relief .....	9,226.6	metric tons
Joint Allied Finance (France, Italy, and Great Britain) .....	345,839.8	" "
Countries other than the United States and the Joint Allied Finance (Great Britain, France, Italy, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Jugoslavia, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Switzerland) .....	206,639.3	" "
<b>Total from all countries .....</b>	<b>561,705.7</b>	<b>metric tons</b>
(a metric ton, or 1,000 kilograms = 2,204.6 pounds)		

<sup>72</sup> Memorandum by Mr. Hoover, Paris, April 8, 1919. Ms., A.R.A. Archives, Hoover War Library.

<sup>73</sup> *Staatsamt für Volksernährung: Mitteilungen*, p. 22.

<sup>74</sup> Surface, and Bland, *op. cit.*, pp. 414-415. The total deliveries to neighbor states were:

Czechoslovakia .....	545,134.6	metric tons	<i>Ibid</i> , pp. 464-5
Hungary .....	319.1	" "	" " 634-5
Jugoslavia .....	121,249.8	" "	" " 658-9

## CHAPTER VII

### PARTY CONFLICT

THE admitted responsibilities of the Provisional National Assembly were to carry on as well as might be under existing conditions, and to arrange for the election of a new body which might better represent the will of the electorate than that called up in 1911. In addition, while the Provisional National Assembly adopted certain provisional measures of a constitutional nature, the permanent constitution would have to be drawn up by the new Assembly.

Accordingly, two measures were enacted December 18, 1918, which contained certain novel provisions.<sup>1</sup> Unlike the old *Reichsrat*, the Constituent was to have a single chamber. The deputies were to assemble fourteen days after the election and to sit for two years.<sup>2</sup> In a law passed November 12, it was stipulated that the entire population would vote for a Constituent Assembly "early in January." On December 18, this date was changed to the more indefinite "Sunday, early in the year," the particular Sunday to be announced by the Council of State. The point here was the fact that in Germany, Sunday, February 16th, had been designated as the date for the general election in that country, and the German-Austrians wished to leave open the possibility of holding their election the same day.<sup>3</sup> This was done. Additional meaning was given to this provision by the granting of voting privileges to German citizens resident in German-Austria who could qualify as to age.<sup>4</sup>

The Constituent Assembly was to consist of 255 members, among whom were to be representatives from the occupied and

<sup>1</sup> Laws of December 18, 1918, *St.G.Bl.* Nos. 114-115.

<sup>2</sup> Kelsen, H., *Die Verfassungsgesetze der Republik Deutschösterreich*, Part II, pp. 1-7.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 8.

<sup>4</sup> Article II, Law of December 18, 1918, *St.G.Bl.* No. 114, amplified by Law of January 9, 1919, *St.G.Bl.* No. 15.

contested areas. In expectation of trouble, there was inserted the following curious provision:<sup>5</sup>

In case of war, catastrophe, unrest, etc. which hinders the carrying out of this law, and thus threatens to cripple the representation of the people, especially in occupied territory, the Council of State can take irregular steps to deliver the ballots to the people in other than regular places. In extreme necessity, the Council of State may summon the proper number of representatives from the occupied districts. In this case, regular elections shall be held as soon as possible thereafter.

As to voting regulations, departure was made from the old law of 1907 in that proportional representation was adopted, discrimination on the basis of sex abolished, any citizen twenty-one years of age by January 1, 1919, was eligible to vote, and any citizen twenty-nine years old by the same date was eligible to hold office.<sup>6</sup> Perhaps the most important change was to be found in the setting-up of equal electoral districts. The former unequal system, whereby the agricultural districts were favored over the industrial, and whereby Vienna had almost no representation, was set aside.<sup>7</sup> In its stead, a straight basis of one representative to forty thousand inhabitants was instituted, and the Social Democratic Party stood to gain thereby.

<sup>5</sup> Kelsen, *op. cit.*, p. 30; Law of December 18, 1918, *St.G.Bl.* No. 115, Article VII, paragraph 40.

<sup>6</sup> Kunschak, L., *op. cit.*, p. 48, points out that the new election regulations broadened the electoral base by more than 120% and gave rise to the saying that "The people of Austria did not grow up in Democracy, they were thrown into it."

<sup>7</sup> Kelsen, *op. cit.*, pp. 42-43, suggests that the situation whereby ten thousand rural voters had as much power as several hundred thousand in Vienna was the work of the jealous Minorities, chiefly the Slavs of the old Empire. Of the 516 deputies in the old *Reichsrat*, Lower Austria which included Vienna and Wiener-Neustadt had a representation of 64 as against 130 for Bohemia and 106 for Galicia. Freund, F., *Das Oesterreichische Abgeordnetenhaus*, pp. 16-17.

## CAMPAIGN ISSUES

No sooner had the Provisional National Assembly passed the enabling legislation for the general elections, without, to be sure, setting a definite date, than the campaign was under way. Begun before the first of the year, the campaign was significant in that latent forces and irreconcilable attitudes were brought into the open for the first time in the life of the Republic. These attitudes were deeply rooted in social and economic convictions which at the time and for some years were expressed through the medium of the ballot-box.

In the early and uncertain days of the new government, the Social Democratic Party was elevated to a position of importance largely because it was able to say, "We told you so." There then followed a period of quiescence during which those who had placed their money on the wrong horse were too busy nursing their losses to come forward, or else were drafted into the public service against what might have been called their political preference. Once the campaign was launched, however, these same elements which had acquiesced in the ascendancy of the former opposition party, suddenly reappeared upon the political scene with an extraordinary energy. This renaissance was important, for in the heat of political battle issues were raised vital not only to the future of German-Austria, but to Europe in general.

From the welter of accusations, denials, and counter-charges, a general classification of the issues can be arranged. The battle was waged chiefly by the two largest parties—the Social Democratic and the Christian Social. Both were in agreement on the necessity of increasing the food supply and caring for the indigent; both recognized the inadequacy of the contemporary administrative arrangements; but on the manner of effecting reform they were poles apart.

## CHRISTIAN SOCIAL PARTY PLATFORM

Officially, at least, the Christian Social Party did not appear as reactionary as was charged by its opponents. This is evident from the platform, authorized for publication. The most sig-

nificant differences in party issues were three: Anti-Semitism, as stated in their platform, was advocated by the Christian Social Party leaders, while Socialization and *Anschluss*, backed by the Social Democratic Party, were omitted in the platform of the Christian Social Party.<sup>8</sup>

1. To uphold the republican form of state.
2. To oppose dictatorship in any form.
3. To endorse autonomy for provinces and municipalities.
4. To grant full protection to Christian families.
5. To provide for religious instruction, but not in schools.
6. To combat mortality in childbirth.
7. To stamp out wide-spread corruption and Jewish domination in the new state. To recognize the Jews as a nation, but not as masters of the German nation.
8. To work for free access to the Adriatic, and to join the League of Nations.
9. To care for the war invalids and orphans.
10. To effect reconstruction in business and agriculture.
11. To support agrarian reform and housing laws.
12. To support the doctrine of equality of the sexes in all those activities and professions for which women are fitted.
13. To grant state aid for mothers, protection for youth and children, and equal pay for equal work for women.

Anti-Semitism had long been one of the major tenets of the Christian Social Party and was used effectively by Karl Lueger in his rise to leadership in the Party. It is permissible to question the sincerity of his anti-Semitism, for once in power as Mayor of the city of Vienna, he abandoned anti-Semitism as a battle-cry, took several Jews into his office, and throughout his life numbered many Jews as his personal friends. It has been asserted that Lueger combatted the forms of Jewish political and industrial enterprise rather than the Jews as a race.<sup>9</sup> The manner in which he rose to leadership tends to substantiate this belief.

<sup>8</sup> *Reichspost*, Dec. 25, 1918, p. 1.

<sup>9</sup> *London Times*, March 11, 1910, p. 5.

As a result of the financial crash in 1873, a wave of anti-Semitism swept the Monarchy, and especially Vienna, largely because of the superior skill of certain Jews in speculation. The Liberal press of Vienna, which was largely Jewish-owned, made matters worse by denouncing as religious intolerance what was actually a social and economic phenomenon. Karl Lueger, a Liberal of an earlier day and elected to the *Reichsrat* as a Democrat in 1885, eventually deserted the Democrats to become a leader in this movement. In 1888, at a celebration for the Pope, Lueger made a violent speech denouncing the German Liberals as false prophets. He was by that time in the Christian Social Party and wanted the support of the Church.<sup>10</sup> Furthermore, as Hermann Bahr remarked, "Austrian liberalism was born in the drawing-room and remained there . . . for which reason Austrian Liberalism melted away as soon as a man came who talked Viennese to the people of Vienna and put Viennese ideas in Viennese words." And therein lay Lueger's magic.<sup>11</sup> Under his leadership, the Christian Social Party grew and became important. He won over the middle class of Vienna, and the small business men whose economic lives were threatened by big business. In 1889 he led a strike of the Vienna Street Railway employees, apparently in the hope of drawing some of these workers away from the Social Democratic Party.

In addition to retaining his seat in the *Reichsrat*, Lueger stood for election as Mayor of the City of Vienna. Four times he was elected, and four times the Emperor refused to accept him. When he was elected the fifth time, the Emperor capitulated and Lueger became Mayor in 1897. From then until his death, it is no exaggeration to say that he not only dominated the Christian Social Party, but the political life of Vienna as well.

In the *Reichsrat*, Lueger attacked certain large-scale businesses, as the *Nordbahn* and the *Donaudampfschiffahrtsgesell-*

<sup>10</sup> Charmatz, Richard, in *Biographisches Jahrbuch und Deutscher Nekrologie*. Bd. XIV, pp. 115-125. An additional factor in Lueger's conversion was the anti-Clerical attitude of the Austrian Liberals.

<sup>11</sup> *The London Times*, March 11, 1910, p. 5.

*schaft*, but his greatest successes were won as Mayor of Vienna.<sup>12</sup> In this capacity he led his party along the way of reform, and in forcing through municipal ownership of the Vienna street-railways, the gas and electric plants, the slaughterhouses supplying the city, and the laying out of innumerable parks,<sup>13</sup> he was doing what the Social Democratic Party of his day would have liked to do had it been able. He was also accomplishing things similar to those for which at a later day his party denounced the Social Democratic Party. And in the Social Democratic Party, Lueger saw probably his only irreconcilable foe. In a political testament, he urged his followers to realize after his death that their strength lay in Vienna, that they must never become an agrarian party, and that they must maintain loyalty to the Church and the Habsburgs.<sup>14</sup>

In the years intervening between the death of Karl Lueger, March 10, 1910, and the end of the War, important changes took place in the Christian Social Party. Although the Party continued its staunch support of the Church throughout, and of the Habsburgs less strongly as the War went into its fourth year, the municipal socialism of Lueger was abandoned and the Christian Social Party more and more assumed the attitude of conservatism. This development tended to bring out more clearly the cleavage between the two most powerful groups.

In yet another manner, a change was to be observed. While the Social Democratic Party gained adherents from among the proletariat of the urban and industrial centers of the Empire, the Christian Social Party, ignoring part of Lueger's Political Testament, developed a following in the rural villages and agrarian districts of the Austrian half of the Monarchy, especially in the Alpine Provinces.<sup>15</sup> This broadening of the Christian Social Party base centering it in the Alpine Provinces

<sup>12</sup> Charmatz, Richard, *loc. cit.*

<sup>13</sup> *The London Times*, March 11, 1910, p. 5.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>15</sup> The distribution of party strength as of 1911 is graphically illustrated in a map attached to Freund, Fritz, *Das Oesterreichische Abgeordnetenhaus.*

had an interesting result so far as party rivalry was concerned. Because of the manner in which the Empire dissolved, leaving German-Austria a state composed of the Alpine Provinces and little else, the Christian Social Party strength in the Provisional National Assembly remained essentially what it had been in 1911, while the Social Democratic Party which had invaded the industrial areas of the Empire suffered a 50 per cent loss of strength with the formation of the Succession States.<sup>16</sup>

The Christian Social Party platform presents a liberal appearance, and in certain points, the two main Parties would seem to meet on common ground. This might account for the lack of opposition to social legislation sponsored by the Social Democratic Party. But as the campaign progressed, a great hue and cry was raised over certain other measures suggested by the Social Democratic Party either for immediate adoption during the campaign or in the future. So violent at times was the language used by the *Reichspost* in opposing these measures, with similar language used by the *Arbeiter Zeitung* in defense, that the Christian Social Party upon first impression would seem to have lacked sincerity in publishing its platform. A more reasonable explanation is to be found in the unwillingness of the Christian Social Party to stretch the "radicalism" of its platform far enough to include radical Social Democratic measures, such as the socialization of industry. Moreover, great ill-will was stirred up by the tactical error of the Socialists in introducing so controversial a measure as the Marriage Law Reform during the campaign. And finally, admitting the Semitism of the Social Democratic Party, the anti-Semitism of the Christian Social Party, the apparent common ground on some proposals and the wide divergence on others, the goal was control of the Constituent National Assembly where each party hoped to win a two-thirds majority which would enable it to work out the salvation of German-Austria.

<sup>16</sup> For further details, see p. 307 below.



## SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PROGRAM

The fundamental differences between the Social Democratic and the Christian Social Parties became increasingly obvious as the social legislation sponsored by the Social Democratic Party passed Parliament. These measures were introduced as soon as the emergency legislation establishing the Republic was passed, and included such matters as the regulation of working hours and conditions, judicial reforms, and municipal housing.

In considering this legislation, several points might well be borne in mind. As the Provisional National Assembly usually functioned, initiative in legislation was practically monopolized by the Council of State. Thus of seventy-eight laws passed, only thirteen were introduced from the floor. Furthermore, the Social Democratic Party had only five members out of twenty-four on the Council of State and forty-three as against seventy-two Christian Social deputies in the Assembly. Yet, in spite of this minority position, the Social Democratic Party was able to get enacted into law important social and party legislation. It may well be asked why, with the exception of the Marriage Law Reform, there was so little comment in opposition by important daily papers such as the *Neue Freie Presse* and the *Reichspost*. Was it the control which the labor leaders exercised over those who might quickly be called into the streets?

For the most part, the legislative mill of the Provisional Assembly ran smoothly and bills submitted in plenary session were reported out of committee and speedily adopted. In the light of such willingness to pass everything which came before it, it is interesting to observe that one of the chief aims of the Social Democratic Party was not actually submitted in legislative form to the Assembly. This cardinal principle was a broad socialization of means of production.

By an executive order, rather than a bill presented to the Assembly, the Council of State, on November 4, established labor exchanges to facilitate the adjustment of the labor market to the demands of industry. At the same time the Council of State issued regulations for the setting up of district industrial

committees composed of an equal number of representatives of labor and capital. These industrial committees were intended only to supervise the functioning of the labor exchanges. But the Department of Social Welfare recognized them as excellent instruments for the local administration of social measures, with the result that their activities were expanded beyond the original intent of the Council of State.<sup>17</sup> This was merely the first step toward socialization.

No more tangible progress was made under the first government, but active propaganda was carried on to prepare the public mind for further measures when the time seemed more appropriate. Dr. Gustav Stolper, writing in the influential *Oesterreichische Volkswirt* of December 7, 1918.<sup>18</sup> while admitting that the fifty-year-old ambition of the Socialists was about to be realized, also pointed out that the time for broad socialization was actually passed. Much of the effect of socialization would be lost with the *de facto* cession of Bohemia and Moravia to Czechoslovakia, since it left German-Austria a small agrarian and petit bourgeois country. In fact, the electorate found difficulty in distinguishing between socialization and bolshevism, in spite of the efforts of the Social Democratic publications to educate them to the difference.

Over the period of January 5-22, 1919, the *Arbeiter Zeitung* published a series of eight articles entitled, "*Der Weg zum Sozialismus*,"<sup>19</sup> setting forth definitely the position of the Social Democrats. Summarized briefly, the articles ran as follows:

1. Social revolution to follow the political revolution.
2. Socialization of industry through control of the boards of directors.

<sup>17</sup> Bauer, *op. cit.*, p. 132. Such committees were set up in Vienna, Wiener-Neustadt, St. Pölten, Linz, Graz, Leoben, Klagenfurt, Innsbruck, Reichenberg, Komotau, and Mährisch-Schönberg. "Die Sozialpolitischen Aufgaben", by Prof. Walter Schiff. *Der Oesterreichische Volkswirt*, Nov. 16, 1918, p. 101.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, "Sozialisierung," Dec. 7, 1918, p. 145.

<sup>19</sup> *Arbeiter Zeitung*, "Der Weg zum Sozialismus," Jan. 5, p. 1; Jan. 9, pp. 1-2; Jan. 10, p. 2; Jan. 14, p. 2; Jan. 16, pp. 1-2; Jan. 16, pp. 1-2; Jan. 19, pp. 1-2; Jan. 22, p. 1.

3. Organization of industries into cartels, controlled through industrial boards containing representatives of the government, of the workers, of the consumers' organizations, and of the employers.
4. Establishment of arbitration tribunals.
5. Socialization of private and church estates.
6. Socialization of peasant holdings, and the establishment of farm bureaus.
7. Socialization of land and dwellings.
8. Socialization of banks and control of credit.

These articles served a double purpose. In the first place, they explained specifically what was meant by socialization. In the second, being given a prominent position in the official organ of the Social Democratic Party, they indicated the direction, sequence, and extent to which socialization would be carried if the Party was returned in the coming election with a definite mandate from the people.

#### SOCIAL LEGISLATION

Some of the earliest legislation passed by the Provisional Government had to do with the protection of workers and was carried out under the *aegis* of the Department of Social Welfare, at the head of which was a Social Democrat. Of such a nature was the law limiting to eight the number of working hours in stores and factories.<sup>20</sup> In the same category was the Sunday Rest Law, the forerunner of a more comprehensive Vacation Act.<sup>21</sup> To extend protection to those employed in home work, inspectors were to be sent out by the Department of Social Welfare who were to oversee working conditions, hours, and regulate remuneration.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>20</sup> Law of Dec. 19, 1918, *St.G.Bl.*, No. 138. Time and a half was stipulated for over-time work. Exception to the law was made possible by application to the Department of Social Welfare. A ten-hour day was allowed in certain seasonal occupations.

<sup>21</sup> *Arbeiter Zeitung*, Dec. 25, 1918, p. 4. Bauer, *op. cit.*, p. 134. Bauer emphasized the significance of these measures for the health of the general population.

<sup>22</sup> Apprentices and unskilled labor were under no circumstances to be used in this Domestic System. Law of December 19, 1918, *St. G. Bl.*, No. 140.

Nor were the children neglected. On December 19, a Child Labor Law was passed by the National Assembly,<sup>23</sup> while on February 4, a system of bureaus and officers of various rank was set up to supervise the treatment accorded foster children and illegitimate children who were farmed out. In view of the inability of some municipalities to offer this service, it was taken over by the Federal Government and henceforth permission to keep farmed-out children, and supervision of conditions in which they were placed, was to be the concern of the national Administration.

The foregoing enactments<sup>24</sup> for the protection of children were given added support by the establishment of juvenile courts aiming to adapt punishment to the culprit. Provisions were also made for cooperation between the juvenile courts and agencies devoted to child welfare work, in an attempt to introduce an educational element into the handling of court cases.<sup>25</sup>

In addition to the setting up of juvenile courts, reforms were introduced in the existent judicial system. Inclusion of women on juries and the abolition of property qualifications for such service, repeatedly defeated by the *Herrenhaus* in the days of the Monarchy, were finally put into effect with the old exceptions in force.<sup>26</sup> Furthermore, an attempt was made to increase the independence of judges. By taking their advancement out of the jurisdiction of the Secretary of State for Justice, it was hoped that "influence" might be lessened, and by assigning cases to a judge for one year in advance, it was hoped that the shifting of cases from a judge who enjoyed the reputation of being severe to one who was known to be lenient might be avoided.<sup>27</sup>

<sup>23</sup> *St. G. Bl.*, No. 141.

<sup>24</sup> The specific provisions of the Law of February 4, 1919, are set forth in *St.G.Bl.*, No. 76.

<sup>25</sup> Law of January 25, 1919, *St.G.Bl.*, No. 46.

<sup>26</sup> Law of January 23, 1919, *St.G.Bl.*, No. 37; *Arbeiter Zeitung*, Jan. 10, 1919, p. 4.

<sup>27</sup> Law of November 22, 1918, *St.G.Bl.*, No. 38, and Beilage No. 22.

Along with this liberalizing and equalizing of the courts, went humanizing of sentences. Since it was abundantly shown that the prisons were not adequately supplied, a long prison sentence was tantamount to a sentence of death by starvation. By an act of the National Assembly, provision was made for the drastic reduction of sentences already meted out, and for the scaling down of punishments in the future for offenses of varying degrees.<sup>28</sup>

Certain other measures bear the stamp of undeniable party legislation. Although the first government was in theory a national government composed of representatives of all Parties, in operation the Social Democratic Party remained the dominant Party in it. Many of the planks in the platform, drawn up years before there was the slightest hope that the Party might come to power, were not enacted into legislation. Some were, however, and in so far as these benefited the Social Democrats above the general good, they were denounced as being class or party legislation.

In this category falls the revision of the Sickness Insurance Statutes. While ostensibly applying to the population generally, on a numerical basis, it benefited the workers more than the upper classes. No drastic overhauling was attempted at this time—merely a beginning—in that the agencies handling this type of insurance were consolidated for greater efficiency. Along with this reorganization went an easing of the restrictions, abolishing the former limitations placed on family insurance.<sup>29</sup>

Displaying the same bias was the act which lowered the voting age from twenty-four to twenty-one. While this applied to the whole population, it made available through the ballot-box the support of the most enthusiastic element of the Social Democratic Party, the young workers of both sexes.<sup>30</sup>

A law passed January 23, 1919, also benefited the Social Democratic Party. Introduced by the Council of State, sup-

<sup>28</sup> Law of February 4, 1919, *St.G.Bl.*, No. 80.

<sup>29</sup> Law of February 6, 1919, *St.G.Bl.*, No. 86.

<sup>30</sup> Law of February 6, 1919, *St.G.Bl.*, No. 96.

ported by the Secretary of State for Food Supply, and approved by the Economics Committee of the Assembly, this law gave the Administration the right to requisition food and feed and in return to pay the producer the officially quoted price.<sup>31</sup> The reason given for the wholehearted support by the Provisional National Assembly of this law, which in reality merely continued a drastic war emergency measure, was the extreme condition of privation in the cities. And since it purposed the relief of the poorest sections of the city population, it favored a stronghold of the Social Democratic Party. As the law was applied, it turned out to be something of a disappointment; collections were hardly more successful under its operation than they had been in the late years of the War.

By selling supplies to the consumer at or below the purchase price, the financial burden on the state was seriously augmented. And the "official price" paid the producer when his supplies were requisitioned was not sufficiently high to prevent smugglers from easily topping it and still realizing a profit. Producers then became even more expert in concealing their supplies, or indeed, in not producing any surplus at all. More important still, the attempt at forced requisition was one of the chief factors in the withdrawal of support from the Social Democratic Party by the peasant proprietors. When the support of the rural deputies in the National Assembly was no longer to be counted upon by the Social Democratic leadership, the Cabinet resigned and the Second Renner Coalition Government, as it was called, dissolved. The Social Democratic Party then took up its old position as a Party of opposition, and concentrated its efforts on making of the City of Vienna a modern Socialist Utopia.<sup>32</sup>

. While some of the important measures passed by the Provisional National Assembly were so phrased that they did not appear to be class legislation, two laws were not so disguised. The first of these abolished the unpopular "livret system" for

<sup>31</sup> Law of January 23, 1919, *St.G.Bl.*, No. 36.

<sup>32</sup> This second Christian Social-Social Democratic Coalition coalition broke up June 11, 1920.

workers.<sup>33</sup> Hitherto, each worker had been obliged to keep a form of work pass-book without which he was unable to obtain employment. The chief distinction between this work-book and a passport, and the chief reason for the resentment of the worker against it, lay in the fact that the employer might and did make comments in the book as to the owner's diligence or lack of it. As an additional benefit and a part of the same law, the workers were placed on an equal basis with the employers in case of liability for breach of contract. Previously, the worker had been considered *ipso facto* the more liable and had suffered in consequence. The two provisions of this measure corrected what were considered indignities and injustices to the workers and as such were adopted without much controversy.

The other measure passed for the benefit of the lower classes was immediately denounced by the middle and upper strata as a "red" measure. Due to the lack of construction during the War and the influx of ex-officials and refugees from other parts of the former Empire, the housing situation in several of the cities, but most evident in Vienna, was deplorable. With this in mind, a law was enacted which made possible the expropriation of land as well as the confiscation of old buildings in order that new and sanitary structures might be erected. The price to be paid for such confiscated property was to be established by the courts.<sup>34</sup> For reasons largely economic rather than political, not much was done in the way of improvement on the strength of this law. It was significant chiefly as a harbinger of similar but more drastic ordinances of the municipality of Vienna pursuant to an ambitious building program. This was undertaken for the benefit of the Social Democratic workers, as it turned out.

#### THE NEW ARMY

It is generally admitted that in a political crisis of great magnitude, the individual or party within a country which can depend upon the support of the army has a distinct advantage.

<sup>33</sup> Law of January 25, 1919, *St.G.Bl.*, No. 42.

<sup>34</sup> Law of February 4, 1919, *St.G.Bl.*, No. 82.

This was amply illustrated in the case of the *Volkswehr* which so often exhibited its greatest energy in the service of "the Party." And in the new army which was provided by law February 6, 1919,<sup>35</sup> and was intended eventually to supplant the *Volkswehr*, this political advantage was not to be lost. Complete statistics as to size and composition of the new army are not available, but from the law which established the new army it is safe to draw certain conclusions. It was obviously intended to prevent any repetition of the situation under Francis Joseph when the Emperor could rightly refer to "My Army." The control of the new army was vested in the *Staatsdirektorium*, or the three presidents of the Provisional National Assembly; the supervision of the organization was entrusted to the Council of State. These functions were discharged, on the one hand, by the Presidents through the Commander-in-Chief, and on the other, by the Council of State through the Secretary of War.<sup>36</sup> The Presidents were given power to dismiss or appoint the Commander-in-Chief and to indicate to him when the army was to be used.<sup>37</sup>

In other matters there was even less to attract the officers of the former Imperial armies who had left the service at the end of the War and who were not induced to continue a military career in the disorganized *Volkswehr*. The Under Secretary of War was Julius Deutsch, a leading Socialist, and to him was entrusted the carrying out of much of the detail of that department. The army was intended to be democratic in its composition and direction. The rights and duties enjoyed by civilians were to be enjoyed by the enlisted men as well. Contact with the Socialist Party was thus maintained and the privilege of voting in national or provincial elections was assured.<sup>38</sup> Such matters

<sup>35</sup> *St.G.Bl.*, 1919, No. 91.

<sup>36</sup> Beilage 87 to *S.P.*, 1919, paragraph 2.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, paragraph 3. In the first paragraph it was stated that the army was to be used to protect the Fatherland from without, to maintain order within, and to be called upon if natural forces threatened the citizens.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, paragraph 14.



as clothing, conditions within the barracks, and discipline were placed under the direction of the Soldiers' Councils elected by the soldiers from their own companies.<sup>39</sup> Incidentally, but significantly, the army thus became the potential tool of the Social Democratic Party which often attempted to create the impression that it was the only Party wholeheartedly desiring the maintenance of the Republic.

Although the Army Law was subsequently modified to conform to the provisions of the Treaty of St. Germain, and although the Social Democratic Party lost ground steadily after 1918, the sense of "class solidarity" continued sufficiently strong in the army so that later, in the serious rioting of mid-July, 1927, it was deemed inadvisable to call in the army for the purpose of establishing public order on the *Ringstrasse*.

#### FAILURE OF THE MARRIAGE LAW REFORM

Upon one occasion, the rubber-stamp character of the Provisional National Assembly was definitely lacking. A bill reported out January 9, 1919, by the Council of State with the approval of the Department of Justice, sought a revision of the Marriage Law. This measure provided for the legitimizing of bastards through legal proceedings, and placed divorce for all religions on the same grounds as those admitted in the case of civil marriage divorces. These were: infidelity, a jail sentence of five years or more, intentional desertion when one party remains away for a year in spite of public notice to return, dangerous threats to life and health, repeated physical violence, and in the new law, spiritual incompatibility.<sup>40</sup> The storm that broke over this bill was heightened by the fact that it came in the midst of the campaign for the election of deputies to the Constituent Assembly. From the beginning of January, the clerical *Reichspost* fulminated almost daily against what it termed an unholy

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, paragraph 15.

<sup>40</sup> *Reichspost*, Jan. 10, 1919, p. 4.

measure, claiming that, in effect, it was an attempt to undermine the Faith.<sup>41</sup>

The bill was championed by the socialist *Arbeiter Zeitung* with equal warmth on the grounds that the measure would be beneficial to the lower classes. The liberal *Neue Freie Presse* remained neutral, contenting itself with reprinting in diluted phraseology the remarks of the more extreme papers. Pressure applied by the Church was not lost on the Christian Social deputies from Vienna, and especially from the Provinces. On January 22, the *Reichspost* published a list of fifteen Catholic organizations opposed to the Marriage Law Reform;<sup>42</sup> the next day an additional list of twenty-two Catholic women's organizations, classified according to their respective Provinces, all opposed to the measure;<sup>43</sup> while on the day when the measure was to be put to a vote, the same paper devoted two and one-third pages to a Joint Pastoral Letter by the Catholic Bishops of German-Austria in which the bill was roundly denounced.<sup>44</sup>

The bill was defeated by the Christian Social deputies, January 24. The *Reichspost* gloated, while the *Neue Freie Presse* came out with an able editorial the day after the defeat of the measure, commenting on its good features, and suggesting that in reality it was "mild as lemonade."<sup>45</sup> It pointed out that since there had been no civil marriage provision as in Catholic Bavaria or just across the river in Pressburg, and since the rich could evade the old law by leaving the country, the defeated measure would have been used largely by the poor. As might be expected, the *Arbeiter Zeitung* was cynically bitter,<sup>46</sup> remarking that "the truth to be read in this defeat is that the bishops and archbishops

41 *Neue Freie Presse* (Nachmittag), Jan. 20, 1919, p. 6, quoting the *Reichspost*. An intimation of the emotional appeal stirred up at this time may be gleaned from the caption of an editorial in the *Reichspost* which ran as follows: "Jewish Reform of Catholic Marriage," Jan. 17, 1919, p. 1.

42 *Reichspost*, Jan. 22, 1919 (Mittagblatt), p. 3.

43 *Ibid.*, Jan. 23, 1919, p. 7.

44 *Ibid.*, Jan. 24, 1919, pp. 8-10.

45 *Neue Freie Presse*, Jan. 25, 1919, p. 1.

46 *Arbeiter Zeitung*, Jan. 25, 1919, p. 1.

dictate and the republic carries out their instructions." As a result, it continued, "thousands will continue to live in concubinage, and thousands will grow up under the stigma of illegitimacy. 'So geht es nicht weiter'—There is supposed to be a coalition between the Social Democratic, Christian Social and Gross Deutsch Parties, but it does not work. Hence break up the coalition!"

The minor measure which became a major issue was significant as indicating a trend. For the most part, during the first months of the Republic, the Social Democratic Party had its way. Yet imperceptibly the other parties, admittedly cast down and repudiated in October, had been gaining strength. Their opportunity was increased by the approval of the Church. Caught almost unawares by the sudden and determined opposition which this measure aroused, the Socialists accepted the challenge, and for the first time since the founding of the Republic, the cudgels were taken up by both sides. In the outcome, the Socialists had suffered a minor reverse. The opposition by this first success was encouraged to greater efforts in the campaign which was then in full swing.

As the campaign got under way, almost anything which might be construed as a concession to the upper or lower classes, to Christians or Jews, or disturbances of public order, was twisted into propaganda by one side or the other.<sup>47</sup> The Marriage Law and socialization proposals of the Social Democrats, already mentioned, were violently attacked by the Christian Social Party. To combat socialization, the Christian Social Party offered the doctrines of the sanctity of private property, reiterated the accusation of "Red" Vienna, and reaffirmed the racial and religious charges.<sup>48</sup> As an example of the technique employed in the early days of the campaign, the following "Elec-

<sup>47</sup> Thus the *Reichspost* was horrified over the fact that freemasonry was allowed to return to Vienna, and predicted the destruction of Church and State by this "organization of conspirators and evil plotters." Jan. 11, 1919, p. 5.

<sup>48</sup> See the *Reichspost*, Jan. 3, 1919, p. 1; Jan. 22, 1919, p. 1; Jan. 26, 1919, p. 8; Jan. 29, 1919, p. 7, for typical examples.

tion Advice" published by the official newspaper of the Christian Social Party is typical:<sup>49</sup>

Catholic Christian Women, Attention! You have a new right and duty—to vote. Vote for those who represent the following:

1. The land belongs to German Christians. We do not want alien despoilers.
2. Better conditions must be had for all, especially the poor. We should not now be so starved had it not been for profiteers who sucked the life-blood of the poor.
3. Private property must be respected. The Social Democrats would communize everything.
4. The Christian character of our people must be maintained, in family, church, and school. Hands off the Church!

*The Very Existence of Christian Germans is at Stake.*

Another object of attack by the Christian Socialists was the *Volkswehr* and its most loyal defender, Bauer. The usual method was to publish a dispatch from outside the country telling of reports which one or another of the Inter-Allied or separate Missions had sent to Paris urging that drastic steps be taken to get rid of the *Frankenstein*. In language which differed only in minor details, the *Arbeiter Zeitung*<sup>50</sup> usually sprang to the defense with the charge of treason, claiming that the report had been run down and found groundless and that the bourgeois parties were merely trying to poison the minds of the Allies against Bauer and to misrepresent the true conditions within the country—all for election propaganda.

The generally unsettled conditions in German-Austria made the protagonists of different political theories more vehement in their claims and more heated in their denunciations. Conflict of principles and party animosity became especially bitter in the arguments for and against *Anschluss* with Germany.

<sup>49</sup> *Reichspost* Jan. 1, 1919, p. 9.

<sup>50</sup> *Arbeiter Zeitung*, Jan. 21, 1919, p. 3, is an example. In this instance both the *Reichspost* and the *Volkswirt* reprinted a dispatch "Aus dem Haag."

*Anschluss* AND THE CAMPAIGN

In the first weeks following the proclamation of the Republic, *Anschluss* received no great amount of attention, although there were articles in periodicals or notices in the daily papers telling of "progress" made. With the campaign, however, the question came to the fore both in the daily press and in periodicals. In the former, there was much heat and very little light. The most bitter comment came early in the campaign on the report that Pichon, the French Foreign Minister, had objected to the assertion that German-Austria was an integral part of the German Reich. The *Arbeiter Zeitung* commented editorially: "Why shouldn't he? Why should Germany be rewarded for losing the war? We were just waiting for that!" And then the editorial writer, in this case undoubtedly Otto Bauer, returns to the familiar attack on the *Reichspost* and the Christian Social Party on the ground that they were responsible for the statement of the French Foreign Secretary. Thus the whole affair is called "real diplomacy, for when Pichon winks, they wink. Why should Habsburg monarchists want the Republic strengthened by *Anschluss*, and how they would shout if the Entente should proclaim the Republic illegal altogether."<sup>51</sup>

In spite of the objection raised by the French Foreign Minister, Bauer refused to be discouraged and conferred with the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, in Berlin late in January, 1919. Since these conversations were of a general nature, a bare outline was proposed which should serve as a basis for later amplification. A treaty was proposed in which German-Austria's industrial and financial structures would be protected.<sup>52</sup> Again, on March 3, just prior to the convening of the newly elected Constituent Assembly of German-Austria, Bauer had further conversations with Brockdorff-Rantzau, following which slightly more concrete proposals were announced. As was agreed before, a treaty was

<sup>51</sup> *Arbeiter Zeitung*, Jan. 2, 1919, p. 1.

<sup>52</sup> *Arbeiter Zeitung*, Jan. 26, 1919, p. 3, reprinted from the *Berliner Tageblatt* of Jan. 25.

to be put into force which would regulate the conditions of relationship between the two countries. The legal structure was to be brought into line gradually. A transitional period of undetermined duration would be needed to bring German-Austria smoothly into the German tariff system, with Vienna as a second capital. It was generally admitted at the time that perhaps the most serious problem then visible would be the aligning of the currencies of the two countries.<sup>53</sup>

Out of these two meetings came the most that could be claimed as the beginning of the momentous *Anschluss*; nothing more tangible than the direction along which cooperation might be made. Subsequently, in spite of such obstacles as clauses in both the Treaties of Versailles and St. Germain guaranteeing the independence of German-Austria, unbridled inflation first in German-Austria and then Germany, and finally the decision of the World Court, an ever closer understanding was to be seen between the two countries, as in the relaxing of frontier customs restrictions and in the coordination of the legal systems.

In general, at the time under consideration, *Anschluss* was opposed or advocated along party lines. Whereas it might be considered as a subject confined to foreign policy, it nevertheless potentially affected certain classes in society. In the opposition, naturally were to be found the industrialists who felt that, uncertain as the future might appear, their success would be less problematical under an independent German-Austria or one which might be included in a shadowy Danubian Confederation. Closely akin to this economic group were the financiers with branch banks scattered about what had been the old Monarchy but as yet tied to the central banks in Vienna. To these might be added a considerable number of monarchists, who, although repudiated at the moment, came out strongly in opposition to *Anschluss*. Nor could the propertied classes, in general, stir up enthusiasm for union with Socialist Germany. And lastly, the clericals opposed *Anschluss* for the same, if for no other, reason. The large majority of these objectors were members of the

<sup>53</sup> *Arbeiter Zeitung*, March 4, 1919, p. 4.

Christian Social Party, although a few belonged to the German National Party made up of several small groups which had coalesced when the Republic was in process of building.

Numerically about equal but far better organized was the group which favored *Anschluss*. These were the workers, the small shopkeepers, a scattering of farm laborers, and Jewish intellectuals all ranged under the *aegis* of the Social Democratic Party. And in this matter, the Party had a most energetic and forceful advocate in the person of Dr. Otto Bauer who was also Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. There can be no question that Dr. Bauer led his party in this particular issue.<sup>54</sup>

To the Foreign Secretary and to the Socialists, *Anschluss* was not only desirable but absolutely necessary. In addition to its effect on party and class solidarity between the working-men of the two countries, *Anschluss* appeared the logical solution of an impossible economic problem. For the sake of supporting his argument, Bauer took an extreme view and reasoned that as a result of the War there had been created seven political units, seven new economic entities all or in part composed of territory which had been in the old Empire. The logical approach, he admitted, would be to continue trade associations along the old lines. However, for effective reconstruction, certain other agreements would be necessary. Economic unity implies unified legal codes, unified or similar administrative systems. But these in turn need unified organs of government. Thus there would have to be a unified parliament or administration. A mere customs union, so the argument ran, would not prove adequate, and uniting seven parliaments under the circumstances of the moment was obviously out of the question. It would mean at least a partial surrender of long-desired and much prized sovereignty. Only by political as well as economic cooperation, on the model of Imperial Germany or the United States of America, could a Danubian Federation function. Since

<sup>54</sup> The biting sarcasm and violence of language which Bauer employed in furthering his favorite theme, directed not only at the opposition within the country but at the Entente, had more than a little to do with his resignation from the Foreign Office on the eve of the peace negotiations.

this was unlikely and improbable, the answer was logically *Anschluss*.<sup>55</sup>

Another commentator, important because of his position, was General Segre of the Italian Armistice Mission in German-Austria at the time. It is very evident from the writings of both Foreign Secretary Bauer and General Segre that, whereas there may have been a certain mutual respect of the one for the other, there was very little cordiality. Dr. Bauer frequently pictured General Segre as some sort of twentieth-century ogre, while the Italian general presented Dr. Bauer in Machiavellian hues. Avoiding any detailed treatment of *Anschluss*, General Segre offered a few opinions in scattered passages. Conceding that a political confederation of the Danubian States would be difficult although not impossible, he believed some sort of economic arrangement advisable. He injected an additional element of confusion by suggesting that whereas a Danubian Confederation might be highly advantageous, only the eastern part of the new and truncated Austria might be vitally drawn toward the east and south, while the western and southern portions exhibited a definite tendency to break away and align themselves with the western and southern neighbors.<sup>56</sup> In any case, in Bauer's strenuous efforts to achieve an immediate *Anschluss*, General Segre saw an attempt to present a *fait accompli* at the Peace Conference which might then be used for bargaining purposes in an attempt to retain South Tyrol and the German-speaking districts which had been incorporated in the new Czechoslovakia.<sup>57</sup>

#### ARGUMENTS FOR DANUBIAN FEDERATION

In theory, the restitution of the old economic relationships was admitted as the most logical by both Parties, but it was difficult for the supporters of a Danubian Confederation to point

<sup>55</sup> *Arbeiter Zeitung*, Dec. 25, 1918, pp. 2-3.

<sup>56</sup> Segre, *op. cit.*, p. 40. Specifically, he gives, Vorarlberg, Tyrol, Carinthia, Styria, and Salzburg.

<sup>57</sup> Segre, *op. cit.*, p. 28; footnotes 1 and 2, p. 39.



to far-reaching agreements or economic developments to support their point of view considering the failure of the government to obtain economic assistance, especially in the matter of food, from the various neighbors. One reason given for the reluctance of the nearby states, especially the Slavs, to commit themselves to a policy of federalization in advance of the Peace Conference was that none of them wished to assume obligations lest they lose some tactical advantage at what they presumed would be a bargain-counter at Paris.<sup>58</sup> Probably more important was the fact that privation existed in the entire Danubian area with a few minor exceptions, and the administrative control necessary for the delivery of what in German-Austria were considered as "surplus" products was lacking among the neighbor states to a degree only slightly less than in German-Austria. Finally, the populations of the new states were composed, for the most part, of peoples who for decades had been developing a hatred of things Habsburg and German, and were exasperatingly obtuse when told that German-Austria was no longer Habsburg and that the Germans of the Alpine Provinces had had a change of heart. Arguments or no arguments, the Provisional Administration did make attempts to set up economic connections and consistent failure resulted.<sup>59</sup> But throughout, the opponents of *Anschluss* attempted to keep alive their idea. When it was seen that German-Austria herself was not succeeding in economic federation with the Danubian States, they resorted to unconfirmed rumors from beyond the frontier in an attempt to bolster up their plans.<sup>60</sup>

<sup>58</sup> *Der Oesterreichische Volkswirt*, Oct. 12, 1918, p. 19.

<sup>59</sup> See Chancellor Renner's statement before the Assembly, p. 155, footnote.

<sup>60</sup> As an example, the *Fremdenblatt* printed a dispatch "from the Hague" to the effect that the French were about to establish a Danubian Confederation. The *Reichspost* reprinted the report from the *Fremdenblatt*, the *Neue Freie Presse* quoted both papers, while the *Arbeiter Zeitung* announced that after investigation it was established that the report was unfounded. See *Der Oesterreichische Volkswirt*, Dec. 28, 1918, p. 200.

ARGUMENTS FOR *Anschluss*

The proponents of *Anschluss*, on the other hand, could point to actual steps taken<sup>61</sup> and, in addition, could bring to the question arguments worthy of consideration. Granted the initial premise of the pro-*Anschluss* standpoint, that German-Austria could not exist independently, they claimed certain advantages would result from a close connection with Germany.

One of the leading writers on this side of the debate was Dr. Gustav Stolper, Editor of the *Oesterreichische Volkswirt*. In the issue of January 4, 1919,<sup>62</sup> he offered an interesting *resumé* of the situation to date. He felt that the statement of two months before, that German-Austria was an integral part of the German Reich, had been premature. In the interim, certain monarchist sympathizers in Switzerland as well as three French and one, as he referred to it, unfriendly German paper had run articles to the effect that if the union were pushed, the peace terms would of necessity be more severe for both countries. On the other hand, despite the agitation on both sides, very little had been definitely settled. There was much criticism of the present German-Austrian Administration; many people were not sure that the provisional form of government was satisfactory; the economic situation was in utter confusion. As Dr. Stolper reviewed the conditions, important decisions would have to be arrived at in the near future and three main issues presented themselves: (1) the future form of state, (2) the future form of social and economic organization, and (3) the future relations with Germany and the Succession States.

As to the first of these, he suggested that the republican form seemed most likely since no political party cared to advocate openly a restoration of the Monarchy. The second was more complicated because of the unsettled conditions in Germany at the time. However, Dr. Stolper attempted to point out one important difference between Germany and German-Austria

61 As Bauer's conferences with Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, see p. 293 above.

62 Pp. 209-212.

with reference to this second point. He suggested that in German-Austria the revolution was chiefly political as anyone who knew both the German and German-Austrian brands of Social Democracy would agree. In German-Austria, the party was one of reform rather than revolution, and as such, unexpectedly placed in an influential position the party was faced with the problem of carrying out a program drawn up when there was slight prospect of an opportunity to put it into effect. Conditions had changed. The opportunity for thoroughgoing socialization had passed, and therefore the political struggle focused more and more upon the third point—the economic and political relationship with one or another of the neighbors. A tariff union, or close economic cooperation, presupposed friendly relationship between two contracting states. At the time and under the circumstances, this was possible in but one direction, toward Germany.

Dr. Stolper further cited certain bright prospects for such a connection. Admitting that some heavy industries had been lost to the Czechs, there still remained possibilities for Vienna and the Alpine Lands. The machine and motor products of Vienna, Wiener-Neustadt and Styria he felt would be in demand. The important *Alpine-Montangesellschaft* which was state-owned was still important and Germany would undoubtedly turn there because of the loss of the iron ore of Lorraine. The locomotive and car industry was considerable as were also the textile industries in the Wiener-Neustadt area, the Salzkammergut, and Vorarlberg. But German-Austria's future lay not so much in existing industry, as in what could be created, especially in the agricultural lands. An almost total dependence on foreign coal could be converted into almost total independence by developing the water-power of the mountain districts and the Danube River.<sup>63</sup> As for Vienna, it could still be a great

<sup>63</sup> An interesting discussion of this problem has been presented by Dr. Friedrich Herz, Viennese economist. He has estimated that although many desirable streams were lost to Italy in South Tyrol and to Jugo-Slavia in the Marburg region, there yet could be developed power equivalent to 7.5 million tons of black, or 11.25 million tons of brown coal. Although coal would

financial center, and the Vienna Banks supported by the German banks could do everything in Danubia. On the other hand, Vienna as a trade center could thrive in close connection with Germany. Buyers from the south and east would come only as far as Vienna and find samples of wares from both countries.<sup>64</sup>

The opinion of foreign observers throws light on the drift in sentiment towards this all-absorbing question. At the end of December, 1918, the Swiss, Dr. Ferrière, Vice President of the International Red Cross Society, reported, among other matters, that save for the leaders of the Social Democratic Party, the people of German-Austria were not in favor of *Anschluss*; that they were opposed to the possibility of further German domination, that they were satisfied to be rid of the Slav and Magyar nationalities, and that a Danubian Confederation was the logical solution.<sup>65</sup> Less than a week before the election, Professor Coolidge reported to the American Mission at Paris that the sentiment for *Anschluss* had grown much stronger as the time for voting drew near. This he noted in all political parties and pointed out that the *Neue Freie Presse* had veered completely around to a support of the idea of union. The explanation for the change in sentiment was four-fold, according to Professor Coolidge. First, there was the attitude of the Czechoslovak Government which made possible "ill-treatment of the German element in Bohemia, and the apparent determination to crowd Austria in every way especially in finance, and to make Austrian capitalistic enterprises in Bohemia impossible." Second, the "Marburg incidents and the feeling against the Jugo-slavs. This still have to be imported for industrial heating and domestic cooking, the dependence on foreign coal would be greatly reduced, were the domestic resources exploited. Hertz, Dr. Friedrich, "The Water Power Question in Austria," Ms., the Hoover War Library.

64 Stolper, Dr. Gustav, in *Der Oesterreichische Volkswirt*, Nov. 30, 1918, pp. 129-132.

65 "Herron Papers," Verbatim Copies, Austria I, Document XLIV, in the Hoover War Library. Dr. Ferrière also indicated that the entire future depended upon immediate relief, and further, that 95% of the people would welcome an American or an Anglo-American occupation of Vienna and German-Austria.

and the first makes Austria believe that a Danube Confederation is impossible. Third, the recent awakening of interest in Germany to union and the favorable reception to Austrian advances. Fourth, the excitement of the election and the unwillingness of the other Parties to let the Social Democratic platform overwhelm the sole advantage of this popular issue."<sup>66</sup>

#### ARGUMENTS FOR AN INDEPENDENT GERMAN-AUSTRIA

For the most part, those who had opinions as to what should be done with German-Austria were divided into the two camps already indicated. Very infrequently, there was raised a voice in the wilderness which suggested that German-Austria might simply remain German-Austria.

These pariahs maintained that the tie of language should not be over-emphasized, and cited Great Britain and the United States as examples. Temperamentally, there was a great difference between the *Reichsdeutscher* and the German-Austrian, and the contempt in which the German held the average German-Austrian during the war was used as an illustration. Then, although the German National and the Social Democratic Parties in German-Austria favored *Anschluss*, these did not represent the entire population by any means. It was also suggested that neither German-Austrian industry nor agriculture could compete with German efficiency, and that, finally, German-Austria faced east. Her interest lay in that direction.<sup>67</sup>

<sup>66</sup> Stovall, Berne, to Ammission, Paris, Feb. 11, 1919. Ms., A.R.A. Archives, Hoover War Library. Stovall also reported to the American Mission that the Vienna *National Zeitung* reported from Weimar that the German government had reserved 35 seats in the new German National Assembly for the delegation from German-Austria which was expected to attend. Stovall, Berne, to Ammission, Paris, Jan. 30, 1919, Ms., A.R.A. Archives, Hoover War Library.

Of a more definite nature was the invitation received by the Constituent National Assembly of German-Austria, reported by Chancellor Renner April 24, 1919 to send five delegates to assist in drawing up the new constitution for Germany. Trampler, Kurt, *Deutschösterreich 1918-1919*, p. 77.

<sup>67</sup> Princig-Herwalt, W. von, in *Oesterreichische Rundschau*, Feb. 15, 1919, pp. 146-150.

The foregoing might be considered as a negative statement. An affirmative attitude was more difficult to support with arguments, and yet it was not entirely non-existent. At least one individual, Dr. Kurt Frieberger, saw in the situation an opportunity to develop a sense of nationalism, something which had been entirely lacking. Thus, with German-Austria independent, there could develop a thoroughly homogeneous population, even if very few could prove that their grandparents had been residents of the City of Vienna. Under the Monarchy, the average individual had a sense of local pride, especially if he lived in Vienna, but he had no sense of national pride. The Republic offered this opportunity. Should it happen that German-Austria obtained the various contested regions, she would have a population of approximately ten millions, and even without these, a population of about seven millions—more than many successful states had.

To the oft-heard cry, "We are only a sort of Switzerland," there were numerous answers. German-Austria lacked an international guarantee of neutrality, lacked the advantageous situation and the high general cultural level enjoyed by Switzerland. But German-Austria possessed more than double the territory, double the man power, had one people speaking one language. And German-Austria, although without a seaport, was strategically located with respect to the railway network in eastern Europe. Scenic attractions equaled those of Switzerland, and as a by-product of scenery, there was plenty of water-power. In population, German-Austria compared favorably with other small European states. It had one million more people than Belgium, two and a half more than Holland, two million more than Sweden. Denmark or Norway had less than a third. To the contention that, "We have no heat; we have no coal," it might be pointed out that there was a wealth of undeveloped water-power. Switzerland, Norway, and Sweden had little or no coal, and yet the last two mentioned had considerable merchant marines. The example of Bavaria might be cited—a region with

one million fewer people and primarily agricultural, and yet it had made great progress in the last forty years.<sup>68</sup>

For those who advocated leaving German-Austria as she was to work out her own destiny, there was one serious objection very difficult to circumvent. That had to do with the City of Vienna, the residence of the Emperors, the seat of the government, but technically only the capital of Lower Austria. Here was a city possessed of a third of the population of the entire state, and of such proportions that the state could not supply the needs of the capital. To be the capital of the new Republic of German-Austria, it should be reduced in size—but how? If German-Austria were to remain as established, something drastic would have to be done with Vienna.

In the first place, it should be made the capital of the nation. In the second, it should be made a free city and accorded wide powers of initiative. In fact, although belonging to German-Austria, it should be practically cut off from German-Austria. As a free city, it might be able to thrive on an international Balkan trade. Granted reasonable sovereignty, it could make trade agreements independently of the national government. In this connection it would have to be granted the privilege of enjoying two different sets of law, one applicable to Germany and German-Austria, or *Gross-Deutschland*, and the other based on German-Austrian law and adapted to the needs of the various nationals no longer in the empire, or a code for *Gross-Balkans*.<sup>69</sup> Short of some drastic action such as this, the particular problem of the city of Vienna appeared overwhelming.

Speculation may be fruitless, but in this instance it is attractive. In view of the apparently irreconcilable conflict which developed during the decade after the Armistice between the ideologies of the Christian Social and the Social Democratic Parties, this radical proposal to detach Vienna from German-Austria may not have been as hare-brained as it was supposed to be at the time.

<sup>68</sup> Frieberger, Dr. Kurt, in *Oesterreichische Rundschau*, March 15, 1919, pp. 280-282.

<sup>69</sup> Kübl, Dr. Fritz, in *Oesterreichische Rundschau*, Jan. 1, 1919, p. 38.

## THE ELECTION

Such were the chief issues which were debated in the campaign, a campaign notable for the manner in which the two newspapers, the *Arbeiter Zeitung* and the *Reichspost* played the role of gladiators and won the questionable honor of a high rating among the muck-raking press fraternity, while the populace remained calm.<sup>70</sup> The usual precautions were taken for the election during which the balloting in German-Austria was unexpectedly well ordered.

The election itself was to almost all voters a disappointment for various reasons. In the first place, as has been noted, it was the original intention of the framers of the electoral laws that all German-Austrians should vote for a Constituent National Assembly, and that the voters would include residents in the various contested areas. As planned, there were to be thirty-eight election districts which should send up 255 deputies. On February 16, the voters in only twenty-five districts were able to cast their ballots.

The Germans of Bohemia, Moravia, and other districts within Czechoslovakia and Poland, were not allowed to vote while the Germans of South Tyrol and Middle and Lower Styria had difficulty in voting. In the case of the latter, the Constituent National Assembly resorted to one of the provisions of the election law and appointed the requisite number of deputies to represent these regions.<sup>71</sup> Because of these circumstances attendant upon the election, the Constituent National Assembly was a rump of 159 deputies, and for this reason an official censure was proclaimed March 12, not only over the rioting and bloodshed which took place in Bohemia the day the Constituent Assembly convened, but also because it was deprived of the members from the

<sup>70</sup> Professor Coolidge telegraphed "All parties held rallies yesterday. Scant interest shown. Leading Social Democrat and chronic (sic) Socialist papers continue mutual recriminations preparation for coming election. Coolidge." Stovall, Berne, to Ammission, Paris, Feb. 12, 1919, Ms., A.R.A. Archives, Hoover War Library.

<sup>71</sup> See page 275, above.



regions to the north and was thus hampered in its chief function which was to draw up a permanent constitution.<sup>72</sup>

There can be no doubt that the campaign and the election for the National Assembly held the attention of the electorate to the partial, if not complete, exclusion of other contests. There was held at the same time, however, an election in the City of Vienna, which, in retrospect, appears of vital significance, since the Social Democratic Party obtained control of the Municipal Council for the first time. This was the first step in a program which aimed at making the City of Vienna a Socialist paradise, and in the process, largely because of the fiscal policies adopted by this Socialist-controlled Municipal Council, caused despair and a hatred which at times reached frenzied proportions on the part of those property owners and others who were not of "the party."<sup>73</sup>

#### RESULTS OF THE ELECTION

When the full returns were in, it was found that the Social Democratic Party had, by a slight margin, the largest delegation in the Constituent National Assembly with sixty-nine members. The Christian Social Party came next with sixty-three, while the German National Party trailed at some distance with twenty-five. In addition to the fact that the two rival parties were almost evenly divided numerically, it should be noted that the Social Democratic Party drew much of its strength from the City of Vienna, while the Christian Social Party was strong in the country at large as the following tabulation indicates:<sup>74</sup>

<sup>72</sup> Kelsen, H. *Oesterreichisches Staatsrecht*, "Die konstituierende Nationalversammlung," pp. 109-115.

<sup>73</sup> An interesting if critical commentary on this situation may be found in Patzelt, Julius, *Sozialdemokratie in Oesterreich*.

<sup>74</sup> *Beiträge zur Statistik Deutschösterreichs*. Herausgegeben von der Statistische Zentralkommission, Wien, 1919, Heft 1. "Die Wahlen für die konstituierenden Nationalversammlung," p. 40.

## AUSTRIA

	Social Democratic	Christian Social	German National	Others
Vienna .....	32	11	3	2
Lower Austria without Vienna ..	15	16	6	
Upper Austria .....	5	11	6	
Salzburg .....	2	3	2	
Styria .....	8	12	4	
Carinthia .....	4	2	3	
Tyrol .....	2	5	1	
Vorarlberg .....	1	3		
Total .....	69	63	25	2

A realization of the geographical element in the party alignments in German-Austria is all-important to an understanding of the violent party conflicts which were to plague the life of the new Republic, particularly after 1920 when the Socialists withdrew from the coalition and concentrated their efforts on the City of Vienna. With the exception of Carinthia where none was held, the elections for the Provincial Legislatures which followed the election to the Constituent National Assembly indicate clearly the rural strength of the Christian Social Party.<sup>75</sup>

	Social Democratic	Christian Social	Others
Vienna .....	44	19	5
Lower Austria without Vienna .....	20	26	6
Upper Austria .....	22	38	12
Salzburg .....	12	19	9
Styria .....	24	35	11
Tyrol .....	11	38 (Volkspartei)	7
Vorarlberg .....	22	5	3

The apparent equality in strength of the two chief parties came as a surprise to some and a disappointment to others. Although statistics are lacking, it was generally conceded that on November 11, the Socialists could claim the support of far more than a majority of the population. This preponderance may have been more apparent than real, and such an impression may have been created by the street demonstrations held under the

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*, Heft 3, 1920. "Statistik der Landtagswahlen im Jahre, 1919," pp. 19-47.

auspices of the Party; or it may have been due to the fact that in the general crash those who had stood for the old order remained in so far as possible discreetly silent on their earlier allegiance. However it had come about, the apparent strength of the Social Democratic Party had in the light of cold figures evaporated between November 11, 1918, and February 16, 1919.

Partial explanations may be given for this shift in sentiment during the early days of the Republic. It must be remembered that of the two major parties, the Social Democratic lost more than half its deputies by the break-up of the Empire, as is evident from the following table.<sup>76</sup> From six lost Provinces returning seventy deputies in 1911, sixty-eight were Social Democrats.

*Party Distribution 1911-1917*

	Social Democratic	Christian Social
*Bohemia .....	23	1
*Bukovina .....	11	1
Lower Austria .....	11	25
*Görz and Gradiska .....	8	
*Krain .....	1	
Upper Austria .....	25	18
Salzburg .....	1	4
*Silesia .....	3	
Styria .....	4	12
Tyrol .....	2	12
*Trieste .....	22	
Vorarlberg .....		3
	91	74

\*Not included in German-Austria

.As for the electorate, the confusion caused by the returning troops in the weeks following the Armistice, the lack of specific knowledge regarding the fate of other parts of the Empire, the shortage of food, and the general uncertainty as to the future, inclined many toward the Social Democratic Party. The actual number of party followers at this time is not known, but the Social Democratic leaders asserted, and the leaders of other

<sup>76</sup> Freund, F., *op. cit.*, pp. 16, 19. The table is based upon the elections to Parliament in 1911.

parties admitted, that the Socialists were under-represented in the Provisional Assembly. With the passage of time and the perceptible clarification of the situation both at home and abroad, many of these waverers apparently cooled in their recently acquired enthusiasm and failed to support the Socialists in the election. Others there were who undoubtedly withdrew their support because of a distaste for certain demonstrated Socialist policies, and these too would help to account for the decline in Party fortunes.

In any case, the result of the election was such that neither of the two rival major parties could alone command the two-thirds necessary for the passage of constitutional measures through the Assembly. In theory, three possibilities were open to the leaders of the Social Democratic Party. The Socialists might return to their former situation as the Party of opposition; they might seize control of the State and establish a dictatorship of the proletariat; they might form a coalition with their hated rivals, the Christian Social Party.

As the largest party, by a small margin, the possibility of assuming the rôle of an opposition party was not seriously considered for to do so would be tantamount to inviting a reaction on measures which were not of a constitutional nature. The international situation would not permit of a dictatorship of the proletariat had the Party been willing to risk the attempt.<sup>77</sup> Thus the third and only real possibility was followed.

The necessary allies in this case were to be found, as with the Provisional Government, in the peasant wing of the Christian Social Party. Whereas the preceding Administration had been in theory, at least, a national government including all Parties, a coalition was now formed between one and a segment of another which under favorable conditions could muster ninety-five votes. There still remained the necessity of unearthing fifteen votes from among the lesser groups, in case a measure under consideration was of a constitutional nature. In the fol-

<sup>77</sup> Bauer, Otto, "Die alte und die neue Linke," in *Der Kampf*, July, 1920, p. 255.

lowing table, the numerical strength of the Parties is indicated, together with the occupational representation in each group.<sup>78</sup>

*Deputies and Occupational Electorate*

	Social Democrat	Christian Social	German National	Others	Total
Agrarian .....		23*	9		32
Business & Industry .....	38**	8	5	1	52
Civil Service & Professional ..	34	38	12	2	86
Totals .....	72	69	26	3	170

\* Laborer 1, Proprietors 22.

\*\* Workers, 27.

The differences in totals between this table and that on page 306 is due to the addition of eight deputies from South Tyrol and three from Lower Styria. Because of the difficulties encountered in the attempt to hold elections in these areas, the deputies were selected without the formality of an election.

Although by March, 1919, the form of state was no longer open to serious doubt, there remained problems of vital importance. Was *Anschluss* with Germany to be carried through, and if not, what arrangements might be made with the neighbor states? Where was food to be obtained when the Allied and Associated Powers ceased operations in this field? What about the army of the unemployed who must be cared for no matter which party prevailed in Parliament? And finances? Where was the money coming from to pay the Army, the army of the unemployed, the army of pensioners, the war widows and orphans? How was the dizzy dive of the krone to be arrested, and if it were not, what was to be used in place of money?

• These and other problems were pressing for solution, and a practical deadlock existed in the Constituent National Assembly. Drastic steps needed to be taken and without delay, and in the critical state of the new Republic, it made no great difference whether these were of a conservative or a radical nature. A major operation was needed, but the prospects of effecting it were dim indeed.

<sup>78</sup> *Beitrage zur Statistik, etc.*, p. 44.

## IN RETROSPECT

The election and the formation of the new government in March, 1919, bring to a close the detailed study of conditions within German-Austria during the life of the Provisional Government. The difficulties under which the young State laboured were by no means settled with the convening of the National Assembly, the first such body to be elected since 1911. Viewing the Austrian scene in retrospect, it is now clear that several vital issues, inherited from the War but evaded by the Provisional Government, continued to plague the Austrian leaders until the country went into a form of voluntary bankruptcy in October, 1922, and obtained a receivership under the League of Nations. For the purposes of a general survey, these issues may be classified as follows: economic; administrative, involving the relations between the central government and the provinces; and political, or the consequences of party maneuvering.

Food, of primary consideration in the weeks immediately following the Armistice, remained a serious problem. The very considerable deliveries of the American Relief Administration ceased in the summer of 1919. However, further official assistance was given to the children of Austria by the American Children's Relief, while valiant work in feeding the needy, especially among the salaried, professional and student groups, as well as in rehabilitation, was done by such private organizations as the Friends Society of both England and America.

The industrial life of the country continued to suffer from the dislocation of the War and the formation of the Succession States. A rational balance between industry and agriculture was not obtainable. Under the disastrous inflation of the currency, industry was partially stimulated, only to be checked by the unreasonably high tariffs which the neighbor states raised against Austrian products thus making more difficult the payment of foodstuffs which had to be purchased beyond the frontiers.

Under the Provisional Government, food had been of primary importance. Under the administrations which followed, ques-

tions of finance superseded those of food supply. Inflation, begun during the War and continued under the Provisional Government, became uncontrollable by 1922. Otto Bauer has justified the inflation, insofar as it took place while the Austrian Socialists were dominant in the Administration, on the ground that it made possible the payment of government expenses which at the time were inordinately large, and that it stimulated the industrial activity of the country. It cannot be denied that in absorbing the whole German personnel of the Bureaucracy of the old Empire into the government services of the new State the ranks of the state employees were swollen beyond reason. Nor can it be denied that the pensions of former German officials, together with the dole which was paid to the unemployed, constituted a burden which the finances of the new State could not provide for in the usual manner.

There was another angle to the argument that unbridled inflation stimulated the economic life of the country. It is quite true that there was an adequate supply of currency, but prices rose rapidly. And then came the time when Austria was "sold out," a time in which real values were lost sight of in the blizzard of paper money. As an example, one of the Viennese newspapers told of a foreign investor who entered a shop of moderate size in Vienna and asked the proprietor how much he wanted for the business. The Viennese made a hasty mental calculation of the value of his goods, lease, and good will, multiplied by three and gave the result as his reply. The stranger immediately and without hesitation closed the deal at that price. Foreigners with "real money" reaped a harvest at the expense of the native Austrians, and Austria lost immeasurably in actual value. Questionable as this policy may have been as a stimulus to commerce, it was the cause of financial ruin to wide sections of the population, particularly those in the white-collar class dependent upon fixed incomes. Factory workers were more fortunate, for in the period of extreme inflation wages were increased daily and additional time was granted at the noon hour so that the daily wage might be spent immediately, before the rise in prices which the after-

noon would surely bring. But the professor at the University of Vienna and all those whose salaries were regulated by law were less fortunate. In the winter and spring of 1922, the annual salary of a top-rank professor at the University of Vienna, would, on the basis of the 1914 salary scale, buy a pair of shoes of none too excellent quality.

The chief administrative problem in this period resulted from the independent attitude of the Provinces. Serious difficulties from this source developed immediately after the Armistice, and quite aside from the confusion which it caused in the Central Government of Vienna, the problem of obtaining relief for the city population was further complicated. The Provinces, in no mind to be dominated by the City of Vienna, insisted upon the right to independent action, which usually took the form of plebiscites and declarations of their intention to join one or another of the neighboring states. This was particularly true of Vorarlberg, Tyrol and Salzburg. Chancellor Renner remarked in Parliament that the particularism of the Provinces reminded him of the rats that leave a doomed ship. Recognition of the demands of the Provinces was granted in the constitution which was adopted October 1, 1920. The Provisional National Assembly and the Constituent National Assembly which followed it had both been single-chamber bodies. However, the Constitution of October 1, 1920, provided for a lower chamber, and in addition, an upper chamber in which the Provinces were represented. Austria was thus organized as a federal state composed of nine Provinces, one of which was the City of Vienna. But this concession to provincial susceptibilities was not sufficient. The chief reason for the fall of the Mayr Cabinet June 1, 1921, was the inability of the Vienna government to prevent, as requested by the Entente Commission, the holding of plebiscites in Tyrol and Salzburg on the proposal for *Anschluss* with Germany. A further curious incident should be mentioned in this connection. The Austrian Administration in Vienna appealed to the Entente to discourage independent action by the Austrian Provinces. In reply it was pointed out that the frontiers of the new Austria



had been fixed by the provisions of the Treaty of St. Germain and that the holding of plebiscites in an attempt to alter these frontiers was fruitless.

The political rivalry of the two major Parties was serious in its consequences. In certain fundamental principles, the Christian Social Party and the Social Democratic Party were widely separated. In addition, there was the understandable feeling shared by members of both Parties that the economic situation could be improved only by the domination in the government of their Party, the choice depending upon the point of view. But in the first three governments, neither Party alone could claim the necessary two-thirds to enact constitutional measures, while either Party could block such measures proposed by the other. During the Provisional Government, an attempt was made to include all Parties, thus giving a national appearance to the administration. In each of the second and third governments with Renner as Chancellor, a coalition had been formed between the two major Parties. On June 11, 1920, the Renner Cabinet resigned, the coalition was broken up and the Social Democratic Party went into the opposition.

As long as they lasted, these coalitions were mutually unsatisfactory to the participating groups. Friction was constant and inevitable, and with each election animosities increased. It is not from a survey of the national administrations that an explanation is to be found for the deep and abiding hatred that developed between the members of these two Parties and poisoned the political atmosphere of post-war Austria. The answer is rather in the situation which existed in Vienna, the capital and most important city with one-third of the entire population of the country.

In the elections of February 16, 1919, the Social Democratic Party obtained an impressive majority in the Vienna Municipal Council. This was important, but perhaps of greater significance was the fact that by the provisions of the Federal Constitution of October 1, 1920, the City of Vienna became also the Province of Vienna, enjoying the same wide privileges granted to the

other Provinces. Therefore from 1920 until 1929, when an amendment to the Constitution limited the hitherto complete provincial freedom in matters of taxation and building, the Social Democratic Party undertook to make of the City of Vienna a workers' paradise. The serious shortage in dwellings for the workers was overcome by the construction of huge apartment houses, not to mention the equally large municipal bath, the *Amalienbad*. Municipal employees, in particular those engaged in the gas and electric works as well as on the street-railways, were well paid. They were given increases in wages at a time when the Federal Administration was unable to grant a corresponding increase to its employees. But this program required much money, and the fiscal policies of the Vienna Municipal Council drew down upon it the wrath of practically the entire property-owning section of society. One man in particular, Stadtrat Breitner, proved to be most ingenious in devising taxes, both indirect and direct, on home owners and independent businesses alike. Those directly affected in the City of Vienna complained bitterly of their financial burdens and saw in this policy a highly effective method of class warfare. To those Austrians living outside the city and out of sympathy with the aims of the Social Democratic Party, this fiscal policy appeared as a means of strangling not only the chief city of the country, but important businesses located in the city and vital to the welfare of the country as a whole.

It may well be argued that the Socialist leaders in Vienna pushed their advantage too far. They sowed the wind from 1920 to 1929, but the whirlwind which they reaped under Chancellor Dollfuss, in February, 1934, soon destroyed the destroyer. The door was then opened to forces destined to write upon a blurred and crumpled page of history the fateful words:

*FINIS AUSTRIAE*

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