

ADAM  
PRAGIER



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PEACE  
AIMS

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# POLISH PEACE AIMS

By

ADAM PRAGIER

L.L.D., D.Sc., Ec.

Professor at the Universal College, Warsaw,  
and at the Polish Faculty of Law, Oxford



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## INTRODUCTION

Peace aims, or the picture of the world which the warring States would like to see, are of two kinds. On the one hand are the aims of those countries which have long made war an instrument of national policy; on the other, those of the countries taken by surprise by it. The peace aims of aggressor States are formulated before hostilities begin, and this formulation is one of the important elements in their general preparations. While the war is in progress its clearly-realized aims arouse the national effort and encourage the people to endure. But for a State which has not prepared for offence, war usually comes as both a political and a military surprise. Such a State has from the beginning only one aim, the successful defence and the preservation, or restoration, of the political *status quo*. It is only during the course of the war, and not infrequently comparatively late in it, that the victim of aggression formulates its own, fresh and positive, aims, under the influence of the changes brought about by the war (changes which were not obvious at once) and in the steadily growing conviction that these changes are already too fundamental to leave any hope of a return to the conditions of the past.

Poland never regarded war as an instrument of its national policy. Situated as it was in a very exposed section of Europe, it contented itself with preparing—insufficiently, as afterwards appeared—for defence. It based its safety in the East on the Treaty of Riga of March 18, 1921, and in the West on the agreement with Germany of January 26, 1934. Neither of these two diplomatic instruments was questioned by any of the three powers which concluded them until they were virtually torn to pieces by the aggression of the German armies on September 1 and of the Soviet armies on September 17, 1939. To North and South Poland was adjoined by small States, too weak to secure their own defence unaided, yet too quarrelsome and distrustful to collaborate successfully in either the political or the military field for the defence of the whole threatened Central European zone. The efforts of France to convert the dream of collective security throughout the Continent into reality were doomed to failure, and at the end of twenty years' armistice between two world wars the much more modest French attempt to arrange an "Eastern Locarno" likewise came to nothing. Poland accord-

ingly remained completely isolated at the moment of the outbreak of war. The British guarantee of August 25, 1939, was of paramount importance only in so far, as it was a pledge for the future and a promise of a new ordering of European relations after the war. Throughout the Polish campaign the guarantee could never become a practical factor in military events.

In Poland the Government was well aware of the weakness resulting from the country's geographical situation, and the consequent political dangers, and efforts were made to escape from isolation ; but they were insufficient and unsuccessful. Poland was not powerful enough in Europe successfully to undertake single-handed the task of organizing collective security, even only in the central-eastern zone, where France had failed. Indeed the possibility of anything effective being done in this direction was small, owing to the attitude of Great Britain, which long kept Russia isolated from European affairs. This attitude was based on a false conception of the requirements of the Balance of Power by certain British circles, as well as on the hope that the Third Reich would constitute a sufficient protection against the social influence of Soviet Russia. The Agreement of 1934 with Germany, unfavourably viewed though it was from the beginning by the majority of Polish opinion was intended by the government which signed it to be a palliative measure, serving to gain time until the general position of political affairs should improve.

Although it seems strange, it is incontrovertible that Poland did not reckon upon an early outbreak of war. The public did not realize the nearness of the danger, nor did the political or military authorities believe in it. For some years they had become accustomed to the unstable equilibrium on which the security of Poland was based, and closed their eyes to the arrival of such changes in Germany as threatened a speedy end to it. Poland was neither militarily nor politically prepared. (It was soon to appear that the Western-European countries were in much the same state.)

Nevertheless, when the war actually broke out, Poland brought to it that determination to fight for its existence which it had always shown, no matter how great the emergency. This determination required no period of previous preparation, nor was it weakened by a bad system of government. It had always been present in the whole mass of the Polish nation through all the changes and chances of fortune, and it was still there. In this second world war it at once gave fixed and final definition to Poland's attitude : an attitude which was both active and uncompromising. Poland wishes to

exist after the war as an independent State, preserving the integrity of its territory and assuring its existence for the future. This desire is so deeply implanted in the Polish nation, and so clearly expresses the eternal reality of its aspirations, that it cannot be regarded as an item of any particular political programme. It is a fact, like that of the existence of the Polish nation.

The course of the present war, the establishment of the political fronts, and the manifestation of the tendencies which will prevail in the post-war world, all have their effect upon Poland's war aim. It is not enough now to say that Poland was taken unawares, both politically and militarily, by the war, and that it desires to return to the *status quo ante*. In the days before it was attacked Poland was a component of a political structure, which has ceased to exist and can never be restored. Accordingly, its will to exist must now find expression in the attempt so to shape the world that its future may be assured under the new, post-war conditions. Poland is, accordingly, interested not only in the questions which directly concern it, but also, no less, in the formulation of the general principles which are to govern the future life of nations. Reconstructing its own foundations after the war, it will desire to strengthen them by serious collaboration with the other nations of the world. It must visualize its own place in the post-war world against the background of world-structure as a whole.

Bearing in mind the situation of Poland in the centre of Europe between Germany and Russia, and the particular character of that central-eastern zone to which it belongs, we must approach the study of the country's war aims by the discussion of the four following problems : (1) the attitude of Poland to Germany ; (2) the attitude of Poland to the U.S.S.R. ; (3) the future organization of the Central-Eastern European zone ; and (4) the general organization of world-relations, political and economic. Such discussion is the aim of the present treatise.

# POLISH PEACE AIMS

## I. POLAND AND GERMANY

The establishment of a permanent and indivisible peace at the end of the present war will have to be based on the conclusion that it is the Germans who are the disturbers of Europe. The initial step, if anything successful in this direction is to be achieved, will therefore have to be the prevention of Germany, in whatever form it exists, from waging a fresh war of aggression. It is no new thing for the German nation, established as it is in the centre of Europe and endowed with technical and organizing talent, and imbued as it is with the belief in its own superiority over other nations, to make war the main instrument of its policy. For centuries the Germans have waged wars of aggression against their weaker neighbours. Several generations have been brought up in the idea that Germany is predestined by Providence to be the ruler of the globe. In the course of rather less than a century five wars have been begun by the Germans on the Continent of Europe. During this time their armies have marched through France three times. Two world wars have sprung from conflicts in the Central-European zone which were fanned into a blaze by Germany. As the scope of German desire has widened, German aggression has stirred the embers of civil and internal wars in all parts of the world. Thus, Germany has become the centre of unrest everywhere.

Accordingly, the present war must end with the complete destruction of Germany's power to assume the aggression. Further, those influences must be overcome which have degraded so many of the lesser States of Europe to the position of vassals of Germany. This problem must be met by arrangements for the complete disarmament of Germany, by a wise treatment of the question of war-indemnities, by such a determination of the frontiers of Germany as will make it difficult for it to attack its neighbours, and finally by the political and economic unification of the Central-Eastern European zone, assuring it of the possibility of successful defence. The final bulwark of the new, post-war order must consist of a scheme of collective security, based, not as hitherto on timid half-measures, but on a strong and close-knit international organization, capable of united action to carry out its decisions.

## 1. DISARMAMENT

If Germany is to be prevented from waging fresh wars of aggression, its war-potential will have to be greatly and permanently decreased. The provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, and especially the interpretation that was put upon them, were rather negative in character : instructions as to what might not be done. The military clauses in particular were carelessly drawn, and soon the victorious States lightly consented to abandon them, without receiving any other satisfactory guarantee in return. Those provisions which were apparently unfavourable for Germany did not actually diminish its readiness for aggression. As a result of the exaggerated importance attached to purely ethnic considerations, when the new boundaries in the Central European zone were drawn, their strategic side was completely ignored. The defensive possibilities for Poland and Czechoslovakia were greatly reduced. The retention of East Prussia to the north, and of the Silesian wedge driven between Poland and Czechoslovakia, gave the Germans from the outset the power to exercise pressure on these two countries by directly threatening their most highly industrialized regions, which were also the most difficult to defend. Thus, Germany secured freedom of movement in Western Europe, while the bonds of alliance between France on the one hand and Poland and Czechoslovakia on the other were loosened, and French efforts to organize collective security on the Continent of Europe were consequently frustrated.

Confining themselves to the delusive hope of weakening Germany by detaching certain territories from the Reich, and by exacting large war indemnities, which they yet soon consented to abandon, the Allies left Germany full freedom of economic development, thereby enabling it very quickly to restore its war-potential in preparation for a war of revenge. Great Britain showed itself particularly favourable to the preservation and growth of German economic prosperity, for both ideal and practical reasons. The former postulated that the level of material culture and of the standard of living should never and nowhere be lowered ; while the practical reason was that Germany was the largest purchaser of the products of British industry, and at the same time a large supplier of its own products to Great Britain.

One outcome of the present war must be the complete destruction of Germany's war preparedness, not only for a short period, but permanently. The United Nations must not confine themselves to abolishing its land, sea, and air forces, together with their armaments; it must be made impossible for Germany to rearm, at least



for a generation. A country's war-potential depends on its natural resources, its industrial undertakings, the level of its investments in communications, the technical qualifications of its workers, and other like factors. Modern technical methods render it possible for industrial countries rapidly to build up again the materials for armament, the more easily, the more developed are their metallurgical, engineering, and chemical industries, and their production of electrical power. Of late Germany has fully developed its armament industry in the space of seven years (1933-39), Great Britain in the space of four years (1939-42), and the United States in three years (1940-42). From this it follows that if German industry is to cease to be a danger to peace, it will have to be completely deprived of its productivity in those branches which are specially adapted to war purposes, and its productivity must be greatly reduced in those branches whose excessive development is not justified by economic needs. There must be a strict control of power production (electric current, natural and synthetic fuel-oil). The mining of coal, as a basic raw material, metal-founding, the light-metal industry, and some branches of the chemical industry, must all be restricted. The production of high-grade steel and light metals must be completely stopped. The production of ordinary steel and machine tools must be proportioned to the actual needs of German consumption. Within the chemical industry there should be a marked reduction in the manufacture of nitrogen compounds (which are particularly adaptable to chemical warfare), and of synthetic raw materials (petrol, rubber, artificial fibre, and plastic materials). Similar arrangements should also be made in the field of communications. The manufacture of aircraft in Germany should be completely forbidden, as well as the maintenance of German civil aviation. The production of motor cars and buses should be strictly proportioned to economic needs. Such factories as are closed down should be transferred to the victor countries, or if that is impossible, should be pulled down. Of course, German foreign trade will have to be controlled, particularly imports. There must be a ban on the import of any kind of goods in excess of economic requirements, from which a war reserve might be built up. This applies especially to iron-ore and steel, non-ferrous metals, steel-alloys, light metals and ore, rubber, petroleum and its products, machine-tools, internal combustion engines, motor cars, aircraft, and certain kinds of foodstuffs which are suited for long-time storage.

The successful disarmament of Germany will assuredly bring with

it far-reaching economic, social, and political consequences. It would be a mistake to count on the complete de-industrialization of Germany and its transformation into an agricultural country. But it would also be a mistake to overlook the necessity for making fundamental changes in its industrial structure. The experience of the Treaty of Versailles shows that no system of control can prevent heavy industry, though it be "disarmed" by the clauses of a treaty, from being again adapted to war needs when the government of the "disarmed" country so wishes.

It should further be remembered that, even if no economic restrictions were to be applied to Germany, even so the end of the war will bring with it the necessity for a fundamental reconstruction of almost the whole of German industry, if only because at the present time about 75 per cent of it is working for war needs. If the war is protracted this percentage will be increased. The demobilization of heavy industry will be inevitable in any case. In practice it will mean the closing of many iron and steel works, the establishment of many other, quite new, factories, and the fundamental transformation of those that remain. Moreover, a considerable number of factories will be destroyed in the course of military operations. Consequently, when the war ends, German industry will be undergoing vital changes. That will be the right moment for the Allies to exercise their influence, in deciding the direction these changes are to take.

The above-outlined changes in the structure of German industry will be followed by corresponding changes in the industrial structure of the world. When the Germans lose their hitherto-existing supremacy in the metallurgical, engineering, and chemical industries, they will doubtless develop other branches which will not threaten international security, and consequently will not be subject to any restriction. They will also have an opportunity to develop their export trade on a large scale. The result of this will be a certain measure of industrial reorganization in other countries. Some branches of British, American, and other production will undoubtedly be increased, to meet an increased demand in world markets for goods formerly manufactured in Germany. In other branches the Germans will be able to export without limit, thereby exercising strong pressure on world markets and leading to the decrease of corresponding production in the Allied countries. The present division of labour which has sprung up naturally throughout the world, whereby certain areas have a monopoly of the production of raw materials, foreign capital seeks investment in certain directions

and manufacture is centralized in certain traditionally determined regions, must be replaced by a planned economy which will allow for change and leave room for new developments, particularly in certain important branches. It will not be at all easy or simple to carry out this redistribution of production on a world scale, particularly since considerations not only of economics, but also of collective security will have to be regarded. But it must be remembered that unless it is done we shall be faced, without choice, by the prospect of a third world war and final chaos.

## 2. REPARATIONS

With the questions of remodelling the German economic structure and bringing Germany into suitable contact with world markets is closely bound up the question of reparations. Before discussing it, it is necessary to have one's ideas clear and in order. The provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, in the fields alike of reparations and of politics, betray all too obviously the circumstances under which it was signed. The main factors which made themselves felt when its clauses were drafted were the following : war-weariness, the Russian revolution, America's desire to withdraw from European entanglements, and Great Britain's fear of a French hegemony in Europe. Despite the apparent determination, and even sternness, with which the clauses were worded, they did not prevent the rapid return of an atmosphere of reconciliation, of which Germany contrived to take full advantage. It has also to be borne in mind that there was a grave difference of opinion between France and the rest of the Allies concerning reparations. In Great Britain the view prevailed that the amount of the reparations to be demanded of conquered Germany should be proportioned to that country's capacity to pay, assuming its return to economic prosperity. It is not difficult to understand the reasoning underlying this view. A diminution in the purchasing-power of the German market was not in the interests of the City of London ; and further, the weakening of Germany would leave France in a dominating position on the Continent, the more, that Russia, in the throes of revolution, seemed to be incapable of exercising any active influence on European affairs for some time to come. Britain's traditional policy of maintaining the Balance of Power had led it for three centuries to oppose the strongest continental power. The German navy and mercantile marine had both alike been virtually destroyed by the war. The remains of the navy, interned on the conclusion of hostilities at Scapa Flow, was there scuttled by its crews. The

British peacemakers at Versailles took care that the provisions of the treaty should make the regeneration of German sea-power as difficult as possible. When that was done, Great Britain felt safe and attached no importance to the continued disarmament of Germany on land, France, on the other hand, much more gravely threatened by Germany, its next neighbour, more exhausted by the sacrifices it had made in the war, and less interested in the German market, aimed at a more comprehensive system of insurance : by diminishing the territory of Germany, by organizing a system of collective security on the Continent, and by imposing on Germany the payment of a huge indemnity, which should be measured, not by its "capacity to pay," but by the amount of the damage which Germany had inflicted on all the Allies.

The original Reparations sum, fixed by the Allied Supreme Council on May 5, 1921, was 132 milliard gold marks (£6,600 million pounds sterling) : not quite a quarter of the war expenditure of the Allies. Later developments led to numerous successive revisions of this figure, and in the course of twelve years it was gradually reduced—to 38 milliard, then to 15, and finally to 3. When this last amount was fixed at Lausanne in 1932, Chancellor von Papen remarked as he was leaving the conference chamber : "And we shan't pay that either."

This indeed was the only promise which the Germans kept. According to the calculations of the Reparations Commission the total amount paid by the Germans in money and in kind, up to that time, was equivalent to 22,070 milliard gold marks (£1,038 million). The money payments came to only 5,055 milliard gold marks (£253 million), the remainder being paid in kind or in equivalents : coal, ships, State lands and other property in the ceded areas, expenses of maintaining the armies of occupation, and so on : all of which were covered by home production and required no transference of bills or bullion.

It should not be forgotten that in the period during which Germany was paying reparations, and in connection with each new revision of the total amount demanded, the German Reich or German economic bodies obtained large foreign loans, of which half at least came from America, and the remainder mainly from Great Britain, Holland, Switzerland, and even France, when the Dawes Plan was launched Germany borrowed 800 million gold marks (£40 million); and when the Young Plan took its place a further 1,200 million gold marks (£60 million). If these two loans are subtracted from the total amount of reparations paid by Germany in money, it

transpires that the latter was thus reduced from 5,055 million gold marks (£253 million) to 3,055 (£153 million). Moreover, these two "political" loans constituted but a small part of the total sum borrowed by Germany abroad during that period. The *Statistisches Reichsamt* gives the total amount of the foreign loans contracted by it up to the date of the Hoover Moratorium (June 30, 1931) as 29,700 million gold marks. These loans were all in money, consisting of transfers of foreign currencies for the use of the German Government or of German industry. As has been seen that they amounted to almost five times as much as the money payments made by Germany under the head of reparations, while if payments in kind are also taken into account, it appears that both they and the money payments together were less by 7,630 million gold marks than the amount obtained by Germany in foreign loans during the same period. The final conclusion therefore is that Germany not only paid the Allies no reparations at all, but actually received 7,630 million gold marks from them. For it should be remembered that it never repaid these loans, nor did they pay any interest on them.

It is noteworthy that these foreign loans contracted by Germany were intended from the first to be applied to the reorganization of war industry. The first private loan, of \$10 million, was contracted in the United States at the end of 1924, by Krupps, and the second, of \$12 million, by Thyssens'. Large sums borrowed from abroad were invested in non-paying communal enterprises. Inflation enabled Germany to get rid of its whole internal debt, as well as of its prewar indebtedness in German currency abroad, which amounted to 150 milliard gold marks (£7,500 million). At the moment when the German Government was demanding a decrease in the reparations payments it had to make to the Allies—and was granted it—the reserve of gold and securities in the Reichbank had more than trebled, reaching 3 milliard gold marks. Simultaneously Germany's national income had increased. In 1929, when the Young Plan made still further concessions in its favour, its income had reached 76 milliard gold marks, over 60 per cent more than in 1915. In other words, at the period when Germany was complaining of the burden of reparations, its economic power had grown proportionately much more than that of the Allies. One factor of importance, also, was that the war expenditure of Germany and its allies had been only half as great as that of the victorious coalition. And further, a considerable portion of the German war expenditure had been met by internal loans, which were soon wiped out by inflation: whereas that of the Allies had been covered to a great

extent by loans which they made to one another. The chief creditor countries were the United States, Great Britain, and France, who also made loans to one another. All this left behind the troublesome problem of inter-allied war debts. As the payment of these was dependent on the receipt of reparations from Germany, the problem was really insoluble. But its mere existence did much to spoil the good relations between the chief Allied powers, and in particular to encourage distrust of Europe in the United States.

The final result was favourable to Germany, alike in the political and in the economic sphere.



The whole conception of Reparations, so injurious in its results, was based on the ideas of Civil Law. Much importance was attached to the incorporation in the Treaty of Versailles of a German confession of war guilt. The legal deduction from that was that Germany, having begun the war "of malice prepense" and having thereby injured other States, was under the obligation to make good the damage done. But when the attempt to assess the damage was made, the amount was found to be so enormous that "for practical reasons" it was reduced to a quarter. But the practical possibility of Germany's paying even 132 milliard gold marks was not taken into account, nor were the economic consequences of such payment if it had been made. No account was taken of the fact that there is a wide difference between damages for breaking a window and reparations for devastating a continent. The latter can never be paid in full by the guilty party.

The imposition upon Germany of an enormous war indemnity, payable by means of assignments over a long period of time, led in the sequel to the paradoxical result that Germany rejected all the economic obligations laid upon it. The Germans declared—in conformity with the ideas of civil law—that they had been burdened with "obligations impossible of fulfilment." In such circumstances a private citizen is exempted from them, even though they were included in the contract he himself signed. France now attempted to prove that the obligations of the treaty were in principle quite possible of fulfilment, but that the German contracting party showed lack of goodwill. France accordingly sent an army to occupy the Ruhr Basin as a bailiff might seize the furniture of a defaulting debtor. It soon appeared, however, that the two situations are not parallel. The bailiff was unable to realize any property belonging to the debtor, and France had to relinquish its claims—not, indeed, formally, but none the less really—in view of the further fact that

Great Britain, till recently its ally, and now its fellow-claimant, exercised no pressure to ensure their satisfaction, and indeed showed increasing impatience at France's obstinacy. The civil-law view of reparations led at last to the paradoxical situation of France finding itself a defaulting debtor ; for, being unable to secure payment from Germany, it had no means with which to pay America and Great Britain.

At the same time Germany contrived to turn the reparations situation to its own account by obtaining the Allies permission to develop its export trade, under the plea that thus it would acquire the necessary resources to pay. This permission facilitated the extension and renovation of its industrial plant, and Germany rapidly entered foreign markets as a competitor of its conquerors, and a particularly serious competitor, since its production costs were much lower than those of the Allies, owing to inflation, and also thanks to the credits which it had obtained without any intention to repay, and which therefore were not a charge upon its overhead. Germany's position was thus strengthened to such a degree that after a certain time it could successfully refuse all further payments on reparations account. Too late the authors of the Treaty of Versailles realized that the more easily a defeated enemy is able to pay reparations, the less likely he is to do so.

The moral of the story of reparations is, therefore, obvious. It suggests that the whole conception of a war indemnity must be subjected to revision. The mistakes made after the last war must on no account be repeated. The whole question must be seriously studied, and a solution must be found corresponding to the facts of the situation on the conclusion of war. This solution, unburdened by precedents and analogies from history and civil law, must be such that it will both provide for the reparation of the damage done by Germany in the Allied countries, and prevent the recreation of Germany's war potential.

The amount of damage done may be made the measure of reparation payments only when it is relatively small. In such a case the author of the damage may be capable of making it good without threatening his own existence. But the destruction caused by modern war is so enormous that it can never be measured, or paid for, in money. It is something parallel in the history of mankind to geological catastrophes in the history of the earth. It is impossible to assess the monetary value of a continent.

But, this being so, are we therefore to conclude that the author of war damage is to be exempt from all responsibility ? No. Only

that the responsibility cannot be assessed in terms of money corresponding in any way to the amount of the damage, caused by the war.

What then is to be the standard by which reparations can be measured. It may be found, no longer in the concept of damage and "damages" but in the concept of victory, inherent in war itself, War is waged in for victory : to defeat the enemy and render it impossible for him to take revenge. His defeat must find expression in every field in which the conqueror desires to annihilate or weaken him.

The Germans, in accordance with their present doctrine of war, demand the annihilation of the enemy, not only in the military and economic fields, but also in those of culture and even population. Civilized nations do not desire the destruction of culture in any of its manifestations, nor do they desire to exterminate any nation. This being the case, they voluntarily renounce the desire completely to annihilate a defeated enemy, and aim only at diminishing his power ; and in the pursuit of this end they will always restrict themselves to the military and economic fields ; and in the latter to what may effect the enemy's future war-potential. But in these two fields they must always and unhesitatingly be guided by their ultimate war-aims. They will accordingly destroy the armed forces of the enemy to the utmost of their power, breaking his resistance and completely destroying his will to continue the struggle. And similarly in the economic sphere they must aim at diminishing his power to the degree necessary to break his resistance and destroy his capacity for revenge. That is the real standard for measuring reparations when they are looked at from the standpoint, not of civil law, but of war. They cannot be measured by the amount of damage caused, nor by the defeated enemy's future "capacity to pay," as was done in by the drafters of the Treaty of Versailles, for such capacity is dependent on the free growth of his economic power, and this cannot be allowed. The standard of reparations, or rather of tribute, to be exacted from a defeated State should therefore be the degree of disarmament and economic weakness to which it is desired to bring it, for a length of time previously foreseen.

The indemnity, or tribute, to be exacted from a defeated State must therefore be decided with the full consciousness that it cannot in any case cover the damage done. Further, and particularly when dealing with Germany, it will be necessary to treat the subject of reparations in the closest connection with that of the remodelling of Germany's industrial economy and the permanent reduction of its war-potential. War indemnities must now be regarded princip-



ally as a concept of international law, and must be related to the main political and economic ends which it is proposed to attain through them. Economic methods must, of course, be applied but should be regarded as means only to the realization of political ends. The total amount of reparations to be exacted from Germany must of course be related also to the extent of the damage which has to be made good. None the less, the size and nature of the tribute which it is proposed to lay on the defeated enemy must be completely subordinated to the main requirements of the end in view. Thus regarded, war indemnities will constitute an integral part, and indeed the very crown of all military operations and peace conditions, territorial and other.

Reparations payments will not be exacted from Germany in the form of currency, for German money will have no value. Nor will it be possible to exact them in foreign currency, which Germany could obtain only by increasing its export-trade; for thereby it would increase its economic power, and as a result would in no long time renounce all its obligations, as it did after the last war. The conclusion to be drawn is therefore that tribute should be exacted from Germany as far as possible on one occasion only, by taking over existing German stocks of raw materials and manufactured goods, rolling stock, factories, gold, and capital and rights in foreign countries. A certain portion of the tribute may be taken in short-term periodic deliveries, but only of materials the manufacture of which develops no threat to peace. Single payments by Germany in kind—that is to say the transfer to Allied countries of its stocks of raw materials, partly-manufactured, and manufactured, goods, rolling-stock, machinery and equipment, and plant—would greatly diminish its productive capacity. Tribute of this kind should be levied particularly on those branches of industry which directly serve war purposes. On the other hand, periodical payments in kind, while they promote the continued existence and growth of particular industries, yet tend to diminish the tempo of capitalization and investment. When, however, we take into account the fact that Germany's economic life will not in future be burdened by that expenditure on armaments which during the last decade has swallowed up a much larger percentage of the national income in Germany than in other countries, it becomes apparent that the Reich will still possess a considerable reserve of economic and manufacturing capacity; all the greater, that other countries will still have to bear a burden of armaments, albeit lighter than formerly, for the maintenance of general security. That portion of Germany's revenue,

therefore, which has hitherto been devoted to armament, may properly be earmarked for reparations without further lowering the standard of living of the population. Indeed, if it were not, the paradoxical situation would arise of Germany's being less burdened with uneconomic expenditure after the war than the victorious Allies. So it was after the last war.

Special importance must be attached to the drastic restriction of heavy industry, which can be most easily achieved by the proper application of the reparations tribute. The value and capacity of German heavy industry has become almost legendary, mainly owing to the close connexion maintained between its leaders and industrial and financial circles in other countries, but in a lesser degree also owing to idly preconceived opinions and readiness to believe German arguments. The idea was spread that this industry could not be restricted without permanently impoverishing not only Germany, but also Europe and indeed the whole world. It was regarded as one of the bases of general prosperity. Consequently even those who really desire to avert a third world war will seek a formula by which to prevent the exploitation of this industry for war purposes in the future, while at the same time leaving it in existence, with unrestricted possibilities of growth. But they will be greatly disappointed. In the first place, no formulas, legal or other, can prevent the use by the Germans of their war-potential if it seems necessary to them in the future. No formulas prevented the re-militarization of the Rhineland, the restoration of conscription, or the re-armament of Germany, while the Treaty of Versailles was supposed to be still in force. Secondly, the mere existence of this industry, working though it may be only for peace needs, but easily divertible to war ends, would give the Germans in the future a powerful trump card with which to support their policy. And finally, one should remember the commonplace and indubitable, but often forgotten, truth that this industry does not depend on Germany's natural resources, but is a purely artificial construction. Its beginning goes back to the *Gründerperiode* after the Franco-Prussian War, and it developed alike under the Hohenzollerns, the Weimar Republic, and the Third Reich, not so much in satisfaction of the country's economic needs as because it was an instrument of German political expansion. It makes use entirely of imported ore, the only natural resource at its disposal being coal. It was always the main obstacle in the way of German co-operation with the rest of the world, and the main basis of German imperialism. Anglo-Saxon capitalist circles regarded German expansion on the Continent of

Europe not only without objection, but actually with benevolence, in the conviction that the creation of a German colonial empire in Europe would contribute to world peace—such a world peace as they desired. They did not foresee that very soon the export of the products of German heavy industry would surpass all bounds and would be directed to their own countries, without respect for commercial treaties. To-day German shells and bombs are delivered to all countries without paying any duty or observing any quota regulations.

If it is accepted that the total disarmament of Germany must be one of the fundamental conditions for maintaining future peace, then the restriction not only of German armaments, but also of their source in German heavy industry must be accepted as a *sine qua non*.

The reparations tribute, so conceived, will serve not only to diminish Germany's economic preparedness for a war of revenge, but also to facilitate the industrialization of the States of Central and South-Eastern Europe. It will also be advantageous politically, for it will help to thwart the German aim of subordinating the economic interests of the adjacent eastern countries to those of the Reich.

The disarmament of German industry and its reform, the restoration of the devastated countries of Europe, and the industrialization of the countries of the Central-Eastern European zone, must therefore be treated together. A great part of German heavy industry, and particularly of the metallurgical and engineering branches, and also a part of the electrical and chemical industries, must be transferred to the countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe. Germany is, as a matter of fact, even now gradually transferring great industrial works of these kinds to the eastern sections of the Reich and to occupied countries, and is thus demonstrating that such a transfer is not only possible, but even technically not too difficult. The transfer, then, of a portion of German industry to the Central-Eastern European zone, together with other steps, will facilitate the industrialization of the countries in that area, which hitherto have been purely agricultural, and render possible their emancipation from German industrial and commercial domination. Thereby it will create a much-to-be-desired counterpoise in the case of the restoration of Germany's war-potential in future years, and at the same time it will close the path of German expansion towards the Near East. It will raise the standard of living of the population in that part of Europe, and will assuredly contribute to the growth of

a cultural equilibrium, which in its turn will provide a basis for a federation of European States.

Poland is interested to a special degree in the distribution of the German reparations tribute. The devastation wrought in Poland during warlike operations, and still more during the period of occupation, was greater than in any other occupied country. Undoubtedly Russia also has suffered enormous war damage, but it must be remembered that warlike operations and the German occupation have touched only a portion of the area of the U.S.S.R., whereas in Poland they have embraced the whole of the nation's reserves, material and moral. Poland will assert her claims to the return of everything that was stolen during the occupation. Particular weight will be attached to the return of works of art, libraries, scientific equipment, and of every object, artistic, scientific, or historic, significance. If any cannot be found, Poland will demand the surrender of objects of equal significance from Germany's stocks. For the rebuilding of its industry, it will demand the transference from Germany of such complete industrial plants as are adaptable to Polish use, together with machinery and technical equipment of all kinds. Ruined roads, rail- and water-ways in Poland will be repaired with the aid of material delivered by Germany: rolling stock, motor cars and lorries, aircraft, and river craft and ships. The restoration of agriculture will require large deliveries of livestock and machinery of all kinds. Houses will be rebuilt with the aid of cement and timber from Germany. Yet, notwithstanding the urgency and greatness of the compensation required by Poland, in one sum or periodically, its demands from Germany will have to be definitely limited. It will not be permissible to demand deliveries by such branches of German industry as might by their existence and development render possible the future restoration of the German war-potential. It will not be permissible, either, to provide for periodic deliveries over too long a time, since experience has shown that only tribute exacted immediately after defeat is effective.

### 3. OCCUPATION

The effectual disarmament of Germany, the liquidation of its war industries, and the prevention of the reconstruction of such industries in the future, are difficult tasks, requiring alert and unceasing control. Similarly, the obtainment of periodical reparations payments, if only over the space of a few years, will certainly require considerable pressure. It is therefore necessary to realize at once

that the numerous methods of control employed after the last war—control commissions and reparations agencies—will this time not suffice. This time there must be effectual control, allowing of the breaking of any resistance that may be offered, and of the immediate execution of orders. In practice such control will only be possible if the whole of Germany is occupied for a considerable length of time.

Such occupation by the armed forces of the Allies will be necessary primarily as a measure of political education. It was not carried into effect after the last war, and much harm resulted. The legend was allowed to arise and gain wide currency that the German armies had not been defeated in the field, but that Germany collapsed after a stab in the back on the home front, and was further betrayed by President Wilson who cunningly drew it into peace negotiations. The occupation of the whole area of the fatherland will be necessary this time to convince the German people that all their efforts to attain world domination have failed, and that the rest of the inhabitants of the world are stronger than they. Thus conceived, it will be the first step in the re-education of the German people. It will also be a necessary condition for fulfilling one of the main war aims of the Allies: namely, the discovery and punishment of war criminals, who otherwise would undoubtedly escape. But the main purpose of the occupation must be to see that the provisions of the peace treaties—the preliminary one and the final one—concerning disarmament, reparations, and the liquidation and restriction of those branches of German industry which are recognised as dangerous to peace, are properly carried out.

Accordingly, the occupation of German territory ought to be twofold in character. There should be a general occupation of such areas as will undoubtedly remain part of the German Reich; and there should be a stricter occupation of such border districts as may be separated from the Reich by the final peace treaty, or may be left in it under special regulations. In the area of general occupation the occupying authorities will confine themselves to supervising the execution of the provisions laid down in the peace treaties and watching over the general political and economic tendencies of the Reich. Internal administration will be left in the hands of German authorities, chosen on democratic principles. In any case, however, the occupying authorities will have the right of direct intervention if the German authorities cannot or will not carry out necessary activities. Key points, such as the main centres of political life, important strategic points, and junctions of lines of

communication, should be occupied by the armed forces of the Allies. The necessary garrisons will doubtless be supplied in great part by the Anglo-Saxon powers, though in some localities political considerations will require the additional presence of forces from other allied countries. In the Polish-German and the Czechoslovak-German borders districts there must be Polish and Czechoslovak forces respectively, to obviate the danger of the organization of terrorist and partisan bands such as operated unchecked in those areas after the last war.

The tasks of the occupation authorities will consist, as already said, in supervising the execution of the provisions of the treaties, and directly intervening should it be necessary to enforce these provisions or in the general interests of safety. For these purposes a control organization must be set up, embracing different branches of Germany's economic life, and more particularly the following : (1) all activities coming under the head of disarmament ; (2) rail, water, and main-road communications, and likewise postal, telegraphic, and telephonic services, and broadcasting ; (3) foreign trade ; (4) the bank of issue, and some other large banks ; and (5) the budget, together with some indirect taxes and customs duties.

The stricter form of occupation will have to be applied in certain of the border districts of Germany, by the neighbouring States which are most interested in their fate. In these areas the occupying authorities will have to take over both the military and civil administration, to such extent as may be found necessary, for the period of transition. On the eastern side one of the occupying powers must be Poland. Just as in the west the stricter form of occupation should embrace the Rhineland, so in the east the natural limit of such occupation will be the line of the Oder and the Neisse (in Lusatia).

During the period of occupation the decentralization of German political and economic administration should be carried as far as possible. Modern Germany was intended, according to the programme of the Frankfort Parliament of 1848, to be a federation, and this plan was realized alike by the Empire of 1871 and by the Weimar Republic of 1918, which left a large degree of independence to the component parts. It is only the Third Reich which has ruthlessly centralized the whole administration. The abolition of the Third Reich will therefore mean the restoration of the former state of affairs.

#### 4. FRONTIERS

One of the measures to obviate aggression by the German State and people must be the determination of the frontiers of Germany in such a way as to give its neighbours the conditions for successful defence. Experience shows that it is delusive to base any hopes of security on the peaceful disposition of the Germans, or on any treaties or obligations to which they may pledge themselves. Consequently the new peace treaty must aim at rendering aggression on their part physically impossible, and the delimitation of the frontiers will be an important instrument for this purpose.

For a thousand years German aggression has been obstinately turned towards the east. The States most exposed to it are the two Western-Slavonic ones, of Poland and Czechoslovakia. For centuries their *Drang nach Osten* has led the Germans to aim at the destruction of foreign peoples living to the east of Prussia, and the permanent occupation of their territory. The first to succumb were the Czechs, who lost their political independence at the beginning of the seventeenth century. They regained it only after the lapse of three centuries. The three partitions of Poland were carried out in the later part of the eighteenth century, on the initiative of Prussia and with its powerful co-operation. Throughout the period of Polish subjugation Prussian policy was strongly opposed to anything which might promote the restoration of Poland as a State, and supported the sometimes wavering policy of Russia to the same end. During the last war, it is true, the Germans tried to secure Polish co-operation in the war with Russia by issuing a declaration promising to restore Poland. But what they actually had in mind was the creation of a small vassal State, corresponding more or less to the area of the present *General-Gouvernement*. Their policy is carried on under varying conditions, but always with unwavering consistence. German statesmen, historians, and publicists have been collecting arguments in its support for a hundred and fifty years, and asserting the necessity for the occupation of Polish soil and the extermination of the population which at present lives on it. This plan is now being executed.

Poland's line of defence against German pressure has lain for centuries in its western provinces, the cradle of its political power : Pomerania, Posnania, and Silesia. Their population is the most purely Polish of any throughout the Republic. According to the latest census, taken in 1931, the percentage of Poles in Silesia is 92.3, in Posnania 90.5, and in Pomerania (Pomorze, the province called by the Germans Pommerellen) 89.9. When the frontiers of

Poland were determined by the Treaty of Versailles, too much weight was given to ethnic considerations, and consequently considerable Polish areas which had been only partially and freshly Germanized were left within the German boundary. Moreover, both economic and more particularly strategic considerations were neglected, and thus Germany obtained a new frontier in the east which gave it immediately a great advantage over Poland, and favourable bases for waging future war.

The new peace treaty must so delimit the western frontier of Poland and so connect it strategically to the western and northern frontiers of Czechoslovakia that it may be able to constitute a strong line of defence for the whole of Eastern Europe, not excluding Russia. The security of this region requires also the abolition of the German enclave which extends so far to the north-east, between Poland and Lithuania. East Prussia is in fact a great bridge-head, from which attacks may be made either to the east or to the south. This has been its value to Germany in two world wars. The *Ordensland*, an anachronistic survival from the times of the Teutonic Order, cut off from its natural *Hinterland* in Poland and Lithuania, is the one region in Europe which is still distinctively colonial in its economic and demographic character. It has even that troublesome colonial characteristic of requiring continual outlay of capital and giving no corresponding return. Further, Gdańsk (Danzig) must return to its centuries-old role of a Polish port. It has always enjoyed prosperity when the destructive influence of Germany has not hampered it in the fulfilment of its true economic function. After the last war it became nominally a Free City, but in reality it was mainly an instrument of German intrigue, and served the political ends of Germany rather than the economic ends of Poland. This situation must not be allowed to recur. Poland must be in a position to utilize its own Baltic coast to an extent sufficient to satisfy not only its own needs, but also those of the other Central-Eastern States with which it will be in economic collaboration. The abolition of the East Prussian enclave and the union of Gdańsk (Danzig) with its Polish *Hinterland* will shorten the Polish-German frontier from 1,263 miles to 785. For comparison it should be borne in mind that the Franco-German frontier is only 210 miles in length, more than half of which distance corresponds with the course of the Rhine. A further shortening of the Polish-German frontier will be required in the interests of defence, so it must be advanced still more to the west. To the south-west the German wedge driven between Poland and Czecho-



slovakia must be eliminated, or at least greatly reduced in size. In the first stage of the present war it played a decisive part both in the partition of Czechoslovakia and in the attack on Poland. If it is blunted, the whole of Silesia can be united, and the incorporation of Opole Silesia with the present Polish voivodeship of Silesia will contribute to the maintenance of peace by reducing the extent of the German mining and metallurgical industries.

#### A. East Prussia

The province of East Prussia embraces an area of 14,284 square miles : 7.6 per cent of the area of the German Reich. Its population is 2,333,000 : or 3.6 per cent of the population of Germany. It is a mainly agricultural region, 55.7 per cent of its inhabitants being engaged in agriculture and forestry, 19.2 per cent in industry and handicrafts, and 12.2 per cent in trade and communications.

Until the seventeenth century East Prussia remained directly or indirectly under the political influence of Poland. In the thirteenth century Poland had invited the Teutonic Knights to spread the Christian faith in those parts ; but the Knights rapidly exterminated the natives and replaced them by colonists, mainly from Germany. After bitter fighting with Poland, in which the Teutonic Order suffered a decisive defeat in 1410, the western part of the province fell to Poland, while the eastern part was retained by the Order as a fief of Poland. The duchy was secularised in 1525, and afterwards fell to the Elector (of Brandenburg), who did homage for it to the king of Poland in 1641. Poland lost its sovereignty over the district by the Peace of Oliva, on the conclusion of the Swedish wars in 1660. But one portion of East Prussia, namely, Warmia (Ermeland), remained Polish until the Partitions.

Under German rule various Germanizing methods were tried from time to time, with the result that East Prussia was given a markedly German appearance. Nevertheless, even to-day the population is not purely German. There is a German majority only in the regency of Königsberg. In that of Allenstein (Olsztyn) the Poles are in the majority ; and there are considerable numbers of Poles also in the regency of Marienwerder (Kwidzyna). In that of Gumbinnen (Gabin) adjacent to Lithuania, there are considerable numbers of Lithuanians. The prevailing influence in East Prussia is German, since not only is the administration in solely German hands, but the Germans enjoy also a privileged social position. The large landed estates, almost feudal in character, are owned exclusively by German *Junkers*. It was they who con-

stituted the strongest support of the imperial regime, and it was they who at the time of the Weimar Republic offered the strongest resistance to the democratization of Germany. In the Third Reich, allied with heavy industry and the General Staff, they constitute the real social basis of the dictatorship.

East Prussia, owing to its distance from the centres of German industry and its artificial separation from its Polish *Hinterland*, presents an object-lesson in economic decline. During the century from 1840 to 1939 emigration from it to the eastern and central parts of the Reich amounted to 1,100,000 persons. German legislators endeavoured to find means to check this efflux, but neither increased pay, nor better housing, nor abundant streams of credit, nor tax rebates, nor even subsidies paid direct to craftsmen and professional men, sufficed. Nor were the numerous attempts of any avail which were made to strengthen the bonds attaching the peasants to the soil. In the eight years between 1925 and 1933, 55 per cent of the natural increase of population in East Prussia was lost by emigration. In eighteen out of the thirty-seven administrative divisions this loss was so serious as to cause an actual fall in population. East-Prussian agriculture, mainly in the hands of large landowners, was unable to find enough workers at home and was compelled to rely on a seasonal influx from Poland. At the present moment it is utilizing the forced labour of Poles and Czechs deported to Germany. In any case this agriculture, with its extensive cultivation and old-fashioned methods, does not pay. It is kept alive by a constant and enormous flow of state subsidies, which, though economically unjustified, are dictated by the political necessity of maintaining the ruling *Junker* caste in power and influence. The widespread graft in connexion with the administration of the *Osthilfe* (eastern help), as these funds are called (in 1932), was one of the causes of Hitler's rapid rise to power. The industry of East Prussia is obviously one of regional importance, intended to meet the most urgent demands of an agricultural district; it has, in comparison with other German provinces, the characteristics of small industry. The figures showing the size of plants and the scope of their production are on the average lower than for any other part of the Reich.

The income per head of the population is lower in East Prussia than anywhere else in the German Reich. So also is the revenue from taxation. Agricultural indebtedness, on the other hand, is three times as great as anywhere else. The national wealth of the province is estimated at 5.5 milliard gold marks, which is not quite

2 per cent of the national wealth of Germany. As far as savings is concerned, East Prussia also comes much below the general level. In 1936 in all Prussian territories there were 311 Reichmarks per head of population, in East Prussia the figure was only 113,8 Reichmarks.

The position of East Prussia, far away from the rest of the Reich, and particularly from its central and western industrial areas, is a sufficient explanation of the province's economic decline. The distance from its markets (*Marktferne*) was a problem which German economists regarded for decades as the main difficulty in the proper incorporation of East Prussia in the Reich. But they never solved it, for it was insoluble. The distance from the East-Prussian border to Warsaw is 75 miles ; to Berlin 230 miles. The distance from the East-Prussian border to the Rhineland is over 500 miles, but to the industrialized Central District in Poland 190 miles. Now, during the war, the Germans have given practical evidence of their recognition that East Prussia cannot develop without close relations with its Polish *Hinterland*, for they have attached to it for purposes of administration that part of occupied Poland lying to the north of the Vistula. After the war this union must be maintained—reversely, by the attachment of East Prussia to Poland.

Strategically, East Prussia in the hands of Germany is a regular fortress, constituting a base for aggressive operations to the east and to the south. During the war of 1914-18 it was from there that the main attack on Russia was delivered. It was there that the German *Freikorps* operated in the later stages of the war. It was there that the Third Reich concentrated its strongest forces on the eve of the present war. And it was thence that the German armies marched into Polish Pomerania and on Warsaw, on September 1, 1939. The military defeat of Germany would be incomplete if East Prussia remained in its hands.

### B. Danzig

Danzig embraces an area of 371 square miles, with a population of 400,000. Down to the end of the eighteenth century the city belonged to Poland, as a free port. Originally it had been inhabited by Slavs, but in 1308 the Teutonic Knights, after capturing the town, carried out one of the greatest massacres in the history of German warfare. Thirty thousand men, women, and children were put to the sword. After that Danzig was inhabited mainly by Germans. Nevertheless, the port, lying at the mouth of the Vistula, was so closely connected with Polish trade and commerce

that the town, despite its German culture, always felt its community of interests with Poland. Indeed it repeatedly opposed German attempts to detach it. During the period from 1397 to 1813 Danzig demonstrated its will to remain in close relations with Poland no less than seven times by force of arms ; and this was natural enough. United to Poland, Danzig was the chief port of a great State. Separated from Poland and attached to Germany, it would have become the least important port of the latter country. So it was from 1813 to 1919, when it was exposed to the competition of the East-German ports of Stettin and Königsberg, to say nothing of the great ocean ports of Hamburg and Bremen. Before the last war the annual turnover of cargoes at the port of Danzig amounted to about 2½ million tons. The incorporation of Danzig in the Polish customs area in 1919 caused a sudden increase in the port's annual turnover, of nearly 300 per cent, and just before the outbreak of the present war it had risen to 6 million tons. This tendency had not been affected by the construction of the new Polish port of Gdynia, which also developed rapidly and soon became the greatest port on the Baltic, with a turnover in 1938 of 8.7 million tons. The economic development of Poland promised continued prosperity to both ports alike. At the present time, after a comparatively short period of German occupation, the turnover of Danzig has fallen very considerably, in competition with Stettin, which has better communications with the rest of Germany.

The creation of the Free City of Danzig allowed Poland to utilize the port, but did not assure it of any influence on the life of the city itself. The Germans accordingly took care that, in spite of the changed legal forms, it should continue to be a Prussian city, serving the German policy of revenge. The Germans increased their influence in it artificially, by a new and strange form of colonization. Before long there appeared at Danzig about 36,000 retired German officials and army officers, who formed a group constituting 10 per cent of the population ; well-trying supporters of German government policy. A considerable number of the officials of the Free City as well as all the officers of the police, which was organised on a military footing, came from Germany and remained in active German service. On the eve of the war there was organized at Danzig the nucleus of a fifth column, which afterwards played a considerable part in the military operations against Poland. At the same time, with the aid of the Danzig senate, large stocks of arms were collected at Danzig and strong military formations were raised. Finally it should be remembered

that the German battleship *Schleswig-Holstein*, which began the bombardment of the Polish naval bases on the Hel peninsula and at Westerplatte on September 1, 1939, had arrived in the Gulf of Danzig ostensibly on a courtesy visit to the Free City a few days before.

After the present war Danzig, as a port at the mouth of the Vistula, the main river of Poland, united by the closest economic relations to its Polish *Hinterland*, must recover its natural and historical position as a port of Poland, integrally incorporated in the Republic.

### C. *Opole-Silesia*

Opole-Silesia, that part of Upper Silesia which was left under German rule, comprises 3,751 square miles and has a population of 1,480,000, 43 per cent of whom are engaged in agriculture and forestry, 34.7 per cent in industry and handicrafts, and 12 per cent in trade and communications. Down to the fourteenth century Opole-Silesia, comprising the whole of the present industrial region of Beuthen (Bytom), Gleiwitz (Gliwice), and Hindenburg (Zabrze), belonged to Poland. Later, although it continued to be ruled by dukes of the Polish house of Piast, it was a feudal dependency of Bohemia. In the sixteenth century it passed by marriage contracts under Habsburg rule, and in the eighteenth century was conquered by Prussia.

The population of Opole-Silesia is entirely of Polish origin and has preserved its national consciousness to a considerable degree. As late as the middle of last century Prussian statistics, tendentious though they always were, gave the Polish population of this part of Silesia as 61 per cent. In 1910, that is to say sixty years later, the census showed the Poles as 54.6 of the total population. It should be added that both these figures, although they confirmed the existence of a Polish majority in this part of Silesia, yet did not reflect its true size; for, besides "Poles" and "Germans", Prussian statisticians presumed the existence of two other categories of inhabitants, viz., "Silesians" and "Bilinguals". In reality both of these were Poles who, under pressure from German employers and administrative officials, failed to state their true nationality. There is no such thing as a "Silesian" language or a "Silesian" ethnic group. And those who were put down as speaking two languages, i.e. Polish and German, were in every case Poles. For the Germans, under German rule, were disinclined to learn Polish, and there was never a case of one of them acknowledging it as his mother tongue alongside of German. The striking

preservation of their Polish character by the population of Silesia, despite six centuries' separation from the Republic, is to be ascribed to the fact that the province did not belong directly to the German Reich, but was one of the Habsburg crown lands. The Habsburgs did not try to Germanize their dominions, least of all a province of such subordinate importance and so poor as the Silesia of those days. It was only comparatively late, under Prussian rule in the nineteenth century, that the systematic Germanization of Silesia was put in hand.

Economically Opole-Silesia, owing to its situation remote from German markets, showed a marked affinity for the much nearer Polish market. Immediately before the outbreak of war in 1914, of 43.3 million tons of coal mined in the Silesian basin only 12.5 million tons were sold in Germany, while 25 million tons were exported to those districts of Poland, Russian and Austrian, which were incorporated in the Polish State after 1918. In 1924 only 31 per cent of the pig-iron manufactured in Silesia was sold in Germany, and by 1929 this figure had fallen to 8.3 per cent.

Opole-Silesia occupied a position in German heavy industry very similar to that of Danzig in the shipping trade. It is a secondary producing-centre, subordinate to the more concentrated and better situated industrial area of Westphalia and the Rhineland, It has been artificially maintained by means of tariff rebates, export bounties, and recently even by direct subsidies under the heading of *Osthilfe*.

The full development of Opole-Silesian industry is only possible if the district is in touch with its natural Polish economic *Hinterland*. As part of Poland Opole-Silesia will be a centre of heavy industry of the first importance, just as Danzig has been able to prosper only in co-operation with the country behind it. German industrialists who are interested in it know this perfectly well. Even before the last war experts in Silesian industrial conditions complained of the expense of bringing iron ore from distant German mines instead of from the near-by Polish sources. At the end of that war they demanded an economic unification of Silesia and its Polish market. And now, during the German occupation, the necessity for the economic union of the province with Poland has been once again confirmed. The whole Silesian basin, comprising both Opole-Silesia and the Polish voivodeship of Upper Silesia, together with the coal-mining region of Sosnowiec, have been united for administrative and economic purposes with part of the voivodeship of Cracow in a single unit, with the seat of its adminis-

tration at Katowice. After the war this state of things should continue ; Opole-Silesia must be incorporated with the rest of Upper Silesia as an integral part of Poland.

Militarily, Opole-Silesia forms part of the deep wedge driven between Poland and Czechoslovakia. This wedge, strongly fortified and heavily garrisoned even in time of peace, was intended as a base of operations against both these countries. From it the German armies marched on Prague in March, 1939. From it, and from Breslau to the rear, the attack on Central and Southern Poland was launched in September of the same year. The removal of this Silesian wedge is an indispensable condition of security for both Poland and Czechoslovakia, since it alone allows of the junction of the two countries' lines of defence. On the other hand, the separation of Opole-Silesia from Germany will help to diminish Germany's war-potential, divertible to warlike preparations.

#### *D. The Problem of the German Minority in Poland*

The proper ordering of Polish-German relations for the future requires a thorough solution of the problem presented by the Germans living in Poland both those who have been there for long, to the number of 800,000, and such as have been brought in by the occupying authorities as settlers during the present war ; and finally the German population of the districts which will be newly incorporated in Poland.

There will undoubtedly be certain difficulties to be overcome before this solution can be reached. Experience has shown that a German population is incapable of loyally fulfilling its duties as citizens in a State which it does not itself govern. On the eve of the present war almost the entire German population in Poland constituted a great fifth column, which carried out important tasks in aid of the invading Germany Army. This was the case notwithstanding that the Germans in Poland enjoyed not only full civic rights and particular minority concessions, but actual privileges as well, which were granted them in accordance with the tendencies most recently prevailing in Polish foreign policy. For the future Poland, like other States, must be assured against a repetition of such diversions from within its borders ; and this means that the Germans now introduced by the occupying authorities to take the place of dispossessed Polish peasants must be in their turn removed, as well as all but a very few, proved loyal, of those who were living in the country before the war. The German inhabitants of the

districts incorporated in Poland by the peace treaty will also have to be transferred

This evacuation of the German population of Poland can be arranged in the form of an exchange, for simultaneous steps will have to be taken to facilitate the return to Poland of the Poles now resident in Germany. Doubtless also a considerable number of Germans from the districts newly incorporated with Poland will return to the Fatherland of their own free will, as happened after the last war.

#### *E. The Baltic*

The question of the Baltic presents a separate problem, for Poland is interested not only in the assurance of its access to this sea, which has to serve the communications, of the Central-Eastern European zone in general, but also in the assurance of free exit from the Baltic to the North Sea and the Atlantic. A proper length of coastline will ensure Poland its due place on the Baltic, alongside of Russia, Germany and the other coastal countries. It has, however, to be remembered that the Baltic Sea and the straits leading out of it have hitherto been dominated, directly or indirectly, by Germany.

The foundations of German domination on the Baltic were laid in the second half of the nineteenth century. The Prusso-Danish War of 1864 gave Prussia Schleswig and Holstein, and thereby assured Germany's strategic hold of the Danish straits. The construction of the Kiel Canal in its turn was equivalent to the doubling of the strength of the German Fleet, enabling it, as it did, to transfer units quickly from the Baltic to the North Sea and the Atlantic, or, on the other hand, to move the whole fleet to safety in the Baltic. Thus the Baltic became in fact a German lake, which has proved of the first strategic importance in both world wars. During the first this base shielded the German operations against Russia, and in the second, German hold on the Baltic made it impossible for Great Britain to come to the aid of Poland in 1939 by sea, while in 1940 it contributed to the rapid conquest of Denmark and Norway. In 1941 the German Baltic Fleet was able to take a share in the operations against Latvia and Esthonia and the attack on Leningrad without fear of resistance from any quarter. Without its domination of this sea Germany would have been unable so easily to hold down Norway. This is the reason why the German have been able to take the greatest advantage of Swedish iron ore, without which the German metallurgical industry would not have been able to reach its dominating position in Europe.



From all this the conclusion is clear that as long as Germany retains its hold over the exit from the Baltic, so long will that sea remain a German lake. This fact has far-reaching consequences. German domination of the Baltic will always enable Germany to interrupt the communications between Eastern and Western Europe, thereby seriously threatening the security of Poland and the whole central-eastern zone, and at the same time permanently endangering Great Britain's communications with its allies in Central and Eastern Europe, and even directly menacing the British north-east coast.

Hence it will be essential, on the conclusion of the present war, for the British Fleet to maintain equilibrium in the Baltic, as it has done for so long in the Mediterranean. The latter is the main artery of communication between Great Britain, through the Suez Canal, and its most important overseas possessions. Consequently British public opinion fully appreciates its importance in world strategy. No proclamations to the effect that the Mediterranean is regarded by Italy as *mare nostrum* can change the situation. In the light of war experience British opinion will now doubtless begin to appreciate the significance of the Baltic as a German base for attacks on Central and Eastern Europe, on Scandinavia, and even on Britain itself; and will consequently appreciate the necessity for a strong British Fleet to share in the defence of the freedom of that sea and of the straits connecting it with the Atlantic. After the war the Kiel Canal, together with a strip of land of suitable width on either side, must be put under the direct control of the strongest European sea power: Great Britain. It is a matter of secondary importance whether this is effected by international mandate, or by some other legal form. The air and sea bases on the islands of the North Sea and the Baltic which dominate the Kiel Canal and the Danish straits must be held by Great Britain and other States interested in the Baltic. The defences of the actual Polish coast must be reinforced by Polish bases in the Western Baltic. The north-eastern portion of the Baltic will have to be secured in the same way by other coastal powers.

## II. POLAND AND THE U.S.S.R.

With respect to Soviet Russia Poland cannot, strictly speaking, be said to have any reason for formulating war aims. At the outbreak of the present war Polish-Russian relations were perfectly normal. Indeed they seemed to have been finally stabilized. But these neighbourly relations which existed on the eve of the present catastrophe were the outcome of centuries of history and struggles between the two powers, and likewise of the understanding reached by them at the end of the war of 1914-18. To understand their present state, therefore, it is necessary to examine the circumstances which decisively influenced the form they took.

### 1. POLAND AND RUSSIA BEFORE THE REVOLUTION

Although the chief instigator of the three Partitions of Poland was Prussia, and although it was Prussia which most strengthened its position in Eastern Europe by those partitions, nevertheless Russia was regarded as the chief partitioning power, since it took the largest area for itself. Further, Russia ruled over extensive areas in the Ukraine, conquered from Poland in the seventeenth century, which retained strong traces of Polish influence until quite recently.

The Polish people never acquiesced in the partitions of the Republic. Kościuszko's insurrection in 1794, the share of the Polish Legions under General Henryk Dąbrowski in Napoleon's campaign against Russia, the Polish-Russian War of 1830-31, the Polish Rising of 1863, the revolution of 1905 (which in Russian Poland took on the character of partisan warfare against Russia), and finally the share of the Polish Legions under Józef Piłsudski in the struggle against Russia during the war of 1914-18, all these were evidences of Poland's unceasing desire for national emancipation and the recovery of political independence.

This desire had a strong social colouring, which was shown in phenomena such as Kościuszko's Połaniec manifesto, promising emancipation of the serfs; or General Dąbrowski's declarations and the watchword of his legions, "Free Men are Brothers"; or the National Government's declaration in 1863 concerning the right of the peasants to hold property; or the connexion of the question of national emancipation with the tenets of Socialism in 1905; or, finally, the radical social inspiration of Piłsudski's military action in 1914-1918.

These movements aroused the sympathy of Russian radical circles. The best elements of the Russian nation realized that aggression and the oppression of other peoples strengthened the arm of absolutism and put obstacles in the way of domestic reform ; so they supported the movement for Polish liberation, acknowledging that the liberation of conquered Poland would be as just and proper as the abolition of Czarist absolutism in Russia.

As early as the first quarter of the nineteenth century the Decabrist Revolutionary Movement proclaimed its readiness to emancipate Poland from Czarist oppression, and attempted to lend active support to Polish revolutionary movements. At the time of the Polish insurrection of 1863 Russian radical publicists, the most eminent of whom was Alexander Herzen, roused widespread sympathy for the insurgents. The first Socialist Party to come into existence in Russia, the *Narodnaja Wola* (National Will), undertook systematic co-operation with the Polish Revolutionary Socialist Party, the *Proletariat*, and in 1884 concluded an agreement with it providing for regular co-operation between the Russian and Polish revolutionary governments which it was hoped would soon come into being. And at the time of the revolution in 1905 there was a complete understanding between the Russian and the Polish Socialists. There were frequent congresses of Russian Socialist and revolutionary organizations and the Polish Socialist Party. Just before the revolution the Russian Socialists, alike in Russia itself and in their publications issued abroad, and at the meetings of the Second International, proclaimed the right of Poland to regain its independence. So did Lenin, Camille Huysmans, speaking not long ago of these declarations of Lenin, said : “ The liberty of Poland was a slogan for all Socialists of every country. The comrade who was most insistent on this matter, whenever he was present, was Lenin. He accepted no compromise on this question, either with the Germans, or with the Austrians or above all with the Russians. Complete liberty for Poland was a refrain that occurred in all his Socialist utterances. I am not quite sure that Marshal Stalin would sing the same tune to-day, with the same conviction and the same refrain.”

## 2. POLAND AND REVOLUTIONARY RUSSIA.

The Bolshivik Revolution in its early phase was strongly coloured by the separatist sentiments of the nations conquered by Russia. Yet only those countries—Poland and Finland—whose desire for independence was of long standing and firmly established were able actually to recover it. These two countries, more “Western” in

type than any of the others which were forcibly incorporated with Russia, never really united with Russia and never ceased to be a serious problem for the Russian administration. In times of adversity for Russia they were always liable to rise in revolt. Their geographical situation, outside the compact block of the rest of Russia, meant that their separation from the Russian State did not threaten any of the vital interests of the latter. Hence revolutionary Russia was able to reconcile itself to the independence of Poland and Finland without risk either to the State interests of Russia or to the chances of success for the revolution. The Ukraine filled too important a place in the economy and the defence of Russia for any Russian government to reconcile itself to its loss. And so the Soviet Government determinedly put down the Ukrainian Separist Movement and forcibly repelled outside aggression against the province. Georgia, rich in oil deposits and situated in the Caucasus, opening (or closing) the way to the Near East, was likewise too valuable an acquisition of Czarist Russia for its heir, the Soviets, to be willing to renounce it. Accordingly, although after the revolution in 1917 Georgia had a purely Socialist government and proclaimed its friendship towards Russia, it was nevertheless again conquered by the Soviet armies and forcibly incorporated in the U.S.S.R. Thus Russia, even under the Soviets, continued to follow the policy of the previous regime. Such weak separatist movements as existed were easily put down by the centralizing government at Moscow by purely administrative measures.

The Bolshevik Revolution maintained the principle of emancipation for the conquered nations just so long as it was engaged in the struggle for power at home. But when it found itself at the helm, it began to consider the interests of its own State rather than any abstract liberal principles. For the rest, it took the edge off various separatist movements within the Union by granting a wide measure of linguistic and cultural autonomy to the non-Russian nations. Thus it wished to separate the question of the development of national cultures from that of the development of political statehood, and in general may be said to have succeeded.

At this time Soviet Russia sternly condemned all conquests or annexations of foreign territory and renounced them for the future. A resolution passed by the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets on November 18, 1917, left no doubt at all on this question. "By the word annexation," it said "or conquest of foreign territory the Soviet Government means—in harmony with the conception of law held by democracies in general and the working classes in particular

—every incorporation in a larger and stronger State of a small or weak nation, without its own assent and desire, expressed unambiguously, clearly, and voluntarily, independently of when such a compulsory incorporation is carried out ; independently also of the degree of civilization or backwardness of the nation incorporated or retained by force within such a State ; and, finally, independently of the geographical situation of such a nation, in Europe or in distant countries oversea. If any nation is retained by force within any State and, contrary to its expressed will—no matter whether that will is or was expressed in print, at public meetings, by resolutions of parties, or by protests and risings against national oppression—is denied the right to question the form of its political existence, without any compulsion, by free vote, unhampered by the presence of the army of the incorporating or in general stronger nation, then such incorporation is annexation, is conquest and violence.”



The question of the former border lands of the Polish Republic was dealt with by the Soviet Government during an early stage of the revolution, and consequently from the point of view of abstract principles. A declaration was issued on August 29, 1918, signed by Lenin and Karachan, cancelling all the treaties concluded by the Czarist Government with other countries concerning the partitions of Poland in 1772, 1793, and 1795, and all later government acts concerning Poland until 1833. The Soviet Government notified the German Government of this declaration on October 3, 1918. That is to say that it was issued before a government of independent Poland took office. Soviet Russia made the renunciation, not in favour of the Polish State, which was not yet formally in existence, but in favour of a Poland which was to arise in the near future, and it did it freely, without pressure from any quarter. The provisions of this declaration were afterwards repeated by the Soviet Government in a note of January 30, 1920, to the Polish Government, signed by Lenin.

But since the time of the Partitions political and social realities in the former border-lands of the Republic had brought about considerable changes. Accordingly, the key to the solution of the question of the future Polish-Soviet frontier had to be found, not in legal documents, but in these realities.


Until almost the end of the nineteenth century the national character of a country in Central or Eastern Europe was decided by the nationality of the upper classes of its society. The mass of the people had no political life, nor did its habits and customs find

political expression. Hence the border-lands of the Polish Republic were regarded as unquestionably Polish, since they were dominated socially and economically by the Polish landowning class.

The end of the last century and the beginning of the present one, however, brought changes. The peasants of the Ukraine were awakened to consciousness by the convulsions of the Russian Revolution; and the Polish community, who until recently has almost identified itself with the Ukraine, gradually found themselves in the uneasy position of a national minority. They still ruled, though hampered by a foreign power, but were unable to divert the course of history. Similarly, at the same period, the English upper class lost its dominating position in Ireland, the Swedish in Finland, the German in Latvia and in Bohemia, and the Hungarian in Slovakia.

Accordingly Poland, rising again after the World War, was faced with the task of delimiting its frontiers with the Soviets, not from the point of view of its historical rights, although these were recognized by the declaration of the Soviet Government, but from the point of view of the present interests of the Polish State. And these interests required that Poland should retain in the East only so much of the area it once held as was necessary to its existence as a political entity.

Such a frontier was given to Poland by the Treaty of Riga, concluded on March 18, 1921, which put an end by compromise alike to the war and to the centuries-old boundary dispute. When it was signed, both parties were sincerely desirous of finding a solution in harmony with their common interests. By it Poland renounced all claim to 120,000 square miles of territory which had once been part of the Republic, and left 1,120,000 Poles behind the Soviet barrier; while for their part Russia and the Ukraine gave up all claims to the territories to the West of the new frontier, and formally proclaimed their disinterestedness in the question of the Polish-Lithuanian border. Poland was disinclined to exploit its military victory over Russia, very properly counting on the future restoration of Russian power. This conciliatory attitude of Poland was fully appreciated on the Soviet side. The President of the Soviet delegation, Yoffe, said on signing the Treaty: "This Treaty does neither leave any problem unsolved or solved merely on the basis of relative strength of the Contracting Parties, as was formerly done at the expense of some of the nations concluding such treaties. Nations which receive all that they genuinely need, will take care to see that the peace shall be durable."



BALTIC SEA

KONIGSBERG  
 GDAŃSK  
 DANZIG  
 TORUŃ  
 WILNO  
 MINSK

BERLIN

TORUŃ

WARSZAWA  
 WARSAW

BARANOWICZE

P O L A N D

PINSK

CZESTOCHOWA

ZAMOSC

ROWNE

KRAKOW  
 CRACOW

KRZEMIENIEC

LWOW

TARNOPOL

*Curzon line*  
*Armistice line proposed by USSR in 1920*  
*Polish Frontier fixed by the Treaty of Riga in 1921*  
*Ribbentrop-Molotov line 1939*

100 0 100 200 300

This new Polish-Soviet frontier, despite the difference in regime between the two States, and despite the dramatic events which accompanied its delimitation, remained permanent and peaceful. Neither side made any attempt to disturb it. Its legal bases, throughout its length, were never questioned either by Russia or any other State. What is more, it was considered by Russia as a result of compromise, and expressly commended for that very reason. It was twice confirmed: Firstly, by the pacts of non-aggression of July 30, 1932, and May 5, 1934; and secondly, by the agreement defining an aggressor, of July 3, 1933. At the Polish-Soviet negotiations leading up to the conclusion of the Treaty of Riga the Ukraine was represented by a delegation of its own, and the peace was concluded by Poland with both the Russian and the Ukrainian Soviet Republics. After the amendment of the Soviet constitution and the creation, on June 6, 1923, of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, the Soviet of People's Commissars on December 14, 1923, took over all the obligations resulting from the Treaty of Riga, concluded as it had been by the republics incorporated in the U.S.S.R.

### 3. THE CURZON LINE.

In connexion with the question of the eastern frontier of Poland mention is often made by publicists and politicians of the so-called "Curzon Line." It is usually considered to have been a boundary line dividing Poland from Russia according to ethnologic principles, and therefore the occupation of a portion of Poland by Soviet Russia in September, 1939, is looked upon as a realization of a project put forward by the Great Powers towards the end of the last war, but rejected by Poland and renounced later by Russia also in the Treaty of Riga.—This conception, however, is largely mischievous or inaccurate, and it will be well to recall exactly what the "Curzon Line" was, and what it signified.

The Treaty of Versailles did not fix the Polish-Russian frontier. The Allied and Associated Powers at the time of the signing of the treaty did not recognize Soviet Russia. Great Britain and France seriously considered the possibility of the restoration of the Czarist regime in Russia, and were unwilling to put difficulties in its way by an unfavourable delimitation of its western frontier. France only a few days before the outbreak of the first Russian revolution, in March, 1918, undertook to treat the Polish question as an internal one of the Russian State. After the success of the revolution this agreement was terminated, not by France but by Karensky, who cancelled all the secret treaties which had been made by the Czars,



and recognized the independence of Poland without any reservations.

Article 87 of the Treaty of Versailles left it to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers to determine, at some later date, those frontiers of Poland which were not fixed by the Treaty itself. Consequently the frontier between Poland and Soviet Russia remained undetermined. In order to some extent to avert the ill consequences of this provisional state of things, which promised to last for some time, the Allied Supreme Council on December 8, 1919, empowered Poland to establish a normal administration in the eastern border areas left under the rule of the Polish Republic, up to a provisional line of demarcation fixed for the purpose. Two circumstances in this measure strike the attention: (1) The line of demarcation did not divide Poland from Russia throughout the adjacent areas of the two countries, but left the frontier between Little-Poland (Galicia) and Russia still uncertain; and (2) when fixing this line the Supreme Council expressly reserved to Poland the right to put forward claims to areas still further east. From this it is clear that the Supreme Council desired to keep a free hand for itself in dealing with the Polish-Russian frontier question in the future, being still not sure whether Russia would remain a Soviet Republic or would return to its allegiance to the Czar. Eastern Galicia had never formed part of the Russian dominions, and so no boundary decision of the Supreme Council's could be equivalent to a diminution of Russian territory. Accordingly, in this matter the Supreme Council could leave Poland a free hand. Hence it is impossible to suppose that the Supreme Council could regard that line of demarcation, passing through only a part of the border region, in which, moreover, Poland was reserved the right to claim areas further east, as the future Polish-Russian frontier.

This line of demarcation, fixed by the Supreme Council, runs northwards from the point where the old Russian and Austro-Hungarian frontier met the Bug to the point where it is cut by the administrative boundary between the districts of Bielsk and Brześć Litewski (Brest-Litovsk); thence down the Bug to a point to the south of the great bend in the administrative boundary of the northern district of Suwałki; and thence along the boundary of that district to the point where it meets the old Russo-German frontier.

It was called the "Curzon Line" only later, in completely different circumstances. During the Polish-Soviet War Lord Curzon, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, during the mediation between the warring parties undertaken by his government, approached the

Soviet and Polish Governments on July 11, 1920, with the proposal that a truce should be signed and the Polish Army should withdraw to the above line (which began, however, only at the town of Grodno) while the Russian Army should stop 50 kilometres to the east of it. His suggestion for an armistice line in Eastern Galicia was particularly noteworthy. Here there was no previously-projected line of demarcation, and he accordingly proposed that each army should stop where it happened to be on the day the armistice was signed.

The course of the British Government's mediation and of the Curzon Line connected with it was peculiar. The Soviet Government had not forgotten how the Allied and Associated Powers had quite recently been supporting the counter-revolutionary armies in Russia and even sending expeditionary forces of their own to join them. It likewise remembered that the Allies had not permitted the Polish-Russian frontier to be fixed by the Treaty of Versailles because they did not recognize the Soviets and counted on the return of the Czars. It therefore regarded the mediation proposal of the British Government and Lord Curzon's projected demarcation line as political acts directed against itself, and indeed as a kind of posthumous intervention in favour of imperial Russia.

Still earlier, immediately after the decision of the Supreme Council, the Soviet of People's Commissars of the Russian Federative Socialist Republic, in a declaration addressed "to the Polish Government and the Polish People" of January 28, 1920, had recognised "unconditionally and without any reservations the independence and sovereignty of the Polish Republic," and expressed its readiness to stop the Soviet armies on a line running considerably east of that proposed by the Supreme Council (and later called the "Curzon Line"). It was to run along the river Drissa, through Polotsk, Borysów, Cudów, and Bar (*i.e.* to the east of the present frontier). Thus the Curzon Line had been anticipated by Soviet Russia with the Lenin, Chicherin and Trotsky Line; and revolutionary Russia understood very well that the Western Powers were drawing their line in favour, not of them, but of a Czarist Russia which they expected in the future.

Accordingly, when at a later date the same line of demarcation appeared in connexion with Lord Curzon's attempt at mediation, the Soviet Government hastened to decline the latter almost rudely, the very same day on which they received the proposal, alleging by way of explanation the share which the British Government had taken only recently in military intervention in Russia; and at the same time expressed its readiness to give Poland a frontier running

eastward of the line proposed by Lord Curzon, following the Supreme Council's resolution of December 8, 1919. Moreover, in the very proposition of Lord Curzon the Soviet Government saw the influence of Russian counter-revolutionary circles on the Foreign Office and did not fail to inform the British Government with this. Not long afterwards, on August 5, 1920, the People's Commissar Kameneff informed Lloyd George in a despatch that the Soviet Government "held strongly to its recognition of the liberty and independence of Poland, and likewise to its ready acknowledgment of wider frontiers for the Polish State"; wider, that is, than those proposed by the Supreme Council. It should, incidentally, be noticed that the Soviet Government's attitude in this matter was obviously inspired by abstract principles, and did not depend in any way on the changing war-situation. The Soviet Government's first despatch to the British Government was of the same tenor as the second, though the first was sent when the Soviet Army was meeting with success, and the second when that success had turned completely to the side of the Poles.

Again, during the direct negotiations carried on at Minsk concerning an armistice and peace, the head of the Soviet delegation, Danishevsky, took no account of the Curzon Line. On August 19, 1920, he put forward a proposal for a new frontier, considerably to the east of that line, in the important areas of Bialystok and Chełm. At the moment when he did so the Soviet delegation had not yet received information of the sudden change of the victorious advance of the Soviet Army on Warsaw into a disorderly retreat, and consequently regarded the situation as very favourable to themselves. Later, of course, after the defeat of the Soviet Army, the Soviet delegation had the less reason to propose a frontier unfavourable to Poland. Yet it is noteworthy, all the same, that after the renewal of the peace negotiations at Riga the new chief of the Soviet delegation, Joffe, when making his declaration of readiness to sign a treaty of armistice and peace, renewed the already repeated Soviet rejection of the Curzon Line and asserted that the Polish-Soviet frontier ought to run further to the east. And in point of fact the new frontier, fixed by the Treaty of Riga, which was signed on March 18, 1921, does run east of that line. Yet it does not anywhere reach that other line, proposed to Poland on January 28, 1920, by Lenin, Chicherin and Trotsky, which would have given Poland still further areas to the east. This moderation in defining the frontier between the two States as lying between two such different provisional lines of demarcation, affords the clearest proof that Poland

desired to conclude at Riga a peace resting, not on compulsion, but on compromise, which should secure good relations in the future with its powerful neighbour.

So too the Peace of Riga was understood by the Great Powers. The eastern frontier of Poland, though it had not been fixed by the Treaty of Versailles, and though the Supreme Council likewise had been unwilling to define it, was finally recognised when the Eastern European situation had become stabilized of itself, without the aid of the Great Powers. When Soviet Russia had shown itself a sufficiently permanent political creation, and the dream of a return of Czarist rule had ceased to disturb the minds of politicians in London and Paris, the Powers recognized the eastern frontier of Poland without any reservations on March 15, 1923. On April 5 it was recognized also by the United States of America. The Curzon Line thenceforth disappeared from the political horizon.

The above considerations indubitably justify the following conclusions : (1) The "Curzon Line" was never meant to be the frontier between Poland and Soviet Russia. At first it was thought of as a temporary line, within which the Great Powers authorized Poland to set up a normal administration, before the final determination of the frontier. Later, at the time of Lord Curzon's proposed mediation, it was again thought of, not as a frontier, but as a line on which the Polish Army should halt. (2) When the Allied Supreme Council made their delimitation, they expressly reserved to Poland the right to put forward claims to territory east of this line. (3) At all times when this line was under discussion Soviet Russia acknowledged Poland's right to a line drawn considerably to the east of it ; while at the same time it openly and firmly opposed the Curzon proposal, and described it in official documents as a result of intrigues by Russian counter-revolutionary circles in London and Paris. (4) Throughout the peace negotiations between Poland and Soviet Russia this line was never mentioned by either party, nor was it ever even indirectly the subject of negotiation. (5) The Curzon Line, alike when it was suggested by the Supreme Council and when it was put forward by Lord Curzon at the time of his attempted mediation, was an expression of practical needs : the first time to provide for the expected return of the Czarist regime, and the second, for the stoppage of military operations on the front. It accordingly had no connexion with political and national conditions in the areas through which it was to run.



Since the view is often met with in British publications that the

Curzon Line formed a proper boundary between the areas inhabited by Poles and Russians respectively, the question deserves a short examination. The truth is that on either side of this line the Polish population is mixed with Ukrainian and White-Ruthenian\*. The size of the Russian population is insignificant. The area between the Curzon Line and the Polish-Russian frontier, embracing (without East Galicia) about 51,700 square miles, is inhabited by 6 millions of people. Of these the Poles constitute the largest group: 2 millions, while there are 1½ million Ukrainians, 900,000 White Ruthenians, 550,000 Jews, and not quite 100,000 Russians. The remainder is made up of various small groups. The area cannot, therefore, possibly be described as prevalently Russian in ethnic character, and if any of the nationalities inhabiting it is to be described as the leading one, it must be the Polish.

Finally, one more remark. Some British publicists sometimes write as if the Russian occupation of Polish territory in September, 1939, had been confined to the area east of the Curzon Line, which was regarded as a line of demarcation between the two populations: that of Russian, and that of Polish, nationality, specially designed by Providence to offer an ideal solution of all Polish-Russian difficulties; rejected for a time by the obstinacy of the Poles; but at last forcing itself, by its sheer merit, on both Russia and Germany, when, on September 28, 1939, they sealed their pact of friendship by the establishment of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Line. This view is quite without foundation. The Soviet occupation of Poland was not guided by nationalistic, but by strategic, considerations, the aim of it being to secure a base on Polish soil for either attack or defence, according to what might be the state of relations with its then German ally. Accordingly, the limit of Soviet occupation coincided with the Curzon Line only along the middle Bug, while to the north and south it bent considerably to the west. The population of the occupied area was more than twice as large as that of the area bounded by the Curzon Line, numbering as it did 13.2 million. The Poles were in the majority, and the number of Russians was insignificant. The figures were: Poles, 5.2 million; Ukrainians, 4½ million; White Ruthenians, 1.1 million; Jews, 1.1 million; and Russians, scarcely 135,000. The large national groups of Ukrainians and White Ruthenians are each smaller than the Polish, and economically weaker. This region, it should be noted, has

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\*) As Polish historians clearly distinguish *Ruś* from *Rosja*, and the distinction appears in every way desirable, the reader is asked to take "Ruthenia" as the equivalent of the former, and "Russia" of the latter.

belonged to Poland either from the very beginning of its national existence (the northern portion of Mazovia with Lomża and Ostrołęka, and—apart from the Austrian interruption—Eastern Galicia with Lwów), or at least for four centuries. East Galicia never belonged to Russia, and the remainder of the occupied region only for a short time when Poland was partitioned.

#### 4. POLAND AND THE U.S.S.R. IN THE PERIOD BETWEEN THE TWO WARS.

The growth of satisfactory political relations in Central and Eastern Europe was greatly hampered by the fact that there was no friendly co-operation between Poland and Soviet Russia in the period between the last war and the present one, either in “neighbourly” matters or in politics. For the rest, it was not only with Poland that Russia failed to co-operate, but with other countries also. Russia was particularly distrustful of Poland, fearing that it would lead the attack on Russia which (as it seemed) the Western Powers were preparing. Experience afterwards convincingly proved that this fear was groundless. On the other hand, Poland’s distrust was aroused by frequent cases of intervention by the Comintern in the country’s domestic affairs, sometimes almost to the extent of hostile manoeuvres and likewise by repeated cases of secret or open co-operation between Russia and Germany. That this distrust was not groundless was clearly proved by Russia’s aggression against Poland on September 17, 1939, preceded as it was by the Russo-German pact of August 23, 1939. This aggression was further destined to prove that co-operation with Germany is not a good thing for Russia. In any case, however, the question of the frontier never played the slightest part in aggravating Polish-Soviet relations; nor did the problem of the national minorities in the Polish eastern provinces ever lead to a dispute between the two countries.

The legend of Poland’s anti-Soviet policy has long been blazoned far and wide ; but in reality Poland regarded the Treaty of Riga as having definitely settled all its points of dispute with Russia. By this treaty, it should be remembered, Poland was the first country to recognize the Soviet Union *de iure*. In 1920 Poland paid no attention to the French suggestion that it should march on Moscow and thus lead to victory the armies of intervention dispatched at that time by France and Great Britain. The non-aggression pacts with Soviet Russia were concluded in 1932 and 1934 on the initiative of Poland. Poland did not agree to Germany’s repeated proposals for a common expedition against Russia, even

at the time of the *rapprochement* with Germany, after the signing of the Polish-German Pact of January 26, 1934. And despite German suggestions Poland refused to join the anti-Comintern Pact. Thanks to this attitude on the part of Poland, to its geographical situation, and to the pacts signed with Russia (scrupulously observed by Poland, but afterwards torn up by Russia), the latter country was for twenty years shielded from German aggression.

During this same period successive British governments looked on inactively while Hitler strengthened his power in Germany, and thereby they aroused suspicion in Moscow of being hostilely disposed to the Soviets. France, after the failure of its attempts to create a system of collective security on the Continent, accommodated itself in its own way to the British policy of appeasement, the culminating point of which was the Munich Agreement of September 28, 1938. Poland took no part in this and had no influence on the negotiations which preceded it. Great Britain and France at the same time excluded Russia from all influence on the affairs of Europe, desiring to deal only with the Third Reich and Italy. In these circumstances Soviet Russia found grounds for the suspicion that certain circles in Great Britain and France would prefer war on the side of Germany against Russia to war on the side of Russia against Germany. Poland, during this period of marked anti-Soviet policy on the part of the Western Powers, took care not to join the anti-Soviet front, since that would have been equivalent to joining the pro-German front. Accordingly, immediately after the Munich Conference the Polish Government began negotiations with Russia—which at that time was completely isolated—for the purpose of clarifying their mutual relations. The result of this Polish initiative was a combined declaration issued by both countries on November 26, 1938, to the effect that the existing pacts between them, and particularly the Non-Aggression Pact, continued to be the basis of good neighbourly relations. An increase in Polish-Russian trade was also provided for, which was intended further to confirm the peaceful aims of both States. At the same time the Soviet Government promised to conclude a transit agreement with Poland, expressing its readiness to allow the transit of goods to Poland in case that country should be at war with Germany.



The Russo-German Pact of Non-Aggression of August 23, 1939, surprised the world and was capable of many different interpretations. It was generally supposed that Germany offered the pact in order to avert trouble on the part of Russia when, by the attack on

Poland, Germany would become Russia's neighbour and at the same time would have to reckon with a war on its western frontier. But the designs of Stalin when he accepted such a pact, without which Hitler could not have begun war against Poland and against the Franco-British combination under circumstances favourable to himself—these were another matter. He might have refused Hitler's proposal and rendered impossible the way of German aggression. At that very time French and British military missions were at Moscow to discuss the terms of an alliance with Russia.

But Stalin argued differently. He knew, of course, that if he came to an understanding with Great Britain and France he would thereby hamper the Germans in their plans for making war—but for that very reason he was unwilling to do it. He calculated that the dynamism of the German military machine, aiming as it did at world-domination, would make the direction of its first discharge a matter of subordinate importance. Consequently he aimed at directing this discharge against the Western Powers, in order to divert it from Russia. This course gave him several advantages. It allowed him to increase his own forces for defence, or attack, as the future turn of the war might require. It likewise promised him the possibility of throwing those forces into the scale at the moment when Germany, France and Great Britain alike should be exhausted.

At that time the conclusion of an alliance with the Western Powers offered no attraction to Stalin, nor indeed had he sufficient confidence in them to justify it. The direct result would, indeed, have been the fettering of Germany, but Stalin was justified in thinking that it would not have been permanent. The result of such an alliance might, paradoxically enough, have been a *rapprochement* between Germany and the Western Powers. Germany would have still desired to put its excessively developed war-potential to use, and in agreement with certain circles in Western Europe, and with their support, would have, at the suitable moment, commenced war as the mandatory of all Europe against the Soviets. In that case Russia would have found itself in a difficult position, faced by the united power of the capitalistic world.

Thus conceived, Stalin's decision to plunge the world into the whirlpool of war, by concluding a pact of non-aggression with Germany, is seen to have been a manifestation neither of friendship for Germany, nor of particular hostility to the Western Powers. It was simply a coldly calculated measure of strategic defence. The occupation by Russia of the eastern districts of Poland was intended to prevent the unwelcome approach of the German armies to the



exposed region of the Ukraine. Hence is to be explained the well-known fact that, whereas according to the agreement with the Germans Russia was to send 20 divisions to the German-Soviet line of demarcation in Poland, it actually sent more than 100. It preferred to go to meet its new friend rather than allow the latter to come too near to Russia.

Similar acts of aggression were committed by Stalin, as part of his defensive strategy, against his neighbours to north and south of the Polish front. It is now generally admitted that each of these acts was prompted by its tactical, as well as its political, effect. Portions of Finland, the Baltic States, and Lithuania, were to check the German march on Leningrad ; the occupation of Poland was to break the German Panzer divisions before they could strike too deeply into Russian territory in their drive on Moscow ; while the occupation of Southern-Eastern Poland and Bessarabia was to block the route to Kiev, Odessa, the Crimea and the Caucasus. Thus, when Stalin had succeeded in turning the point of the German attack from the east to the west, he made the best use of his opportunity to protect his western frontier by tearing a strip of territory from his neighbours.

But he miscalculated. He overestimated the power of resistance of the western countries, and underestimated the strength of the German attack. When he decided to push Germany into war with the Western Powers he expected that both sides would slowly become exhausted without either gaining a decisive victory, and that when the war at last ended the only military power left would be his own. But things turned out otherwise. When the German *Blitzkrieg* had overcome the resistance of Poland in three weeks, of Belgium and Holland in one, of France in less than four, and of Norway and Denmark in a few days, the military operations undertaken by Russia, by way of insurance as it were, at the beginning of the war turned out to be very urgent and very necessary. Instead of a crusade of the Western Powers in alliance with Hitler, Russia was threatened with a crusade by Hitler alone—now grown to the dimensions of the victorious apocalyptic beast.

However, the short war looked forward to by the Germans proved likewise a delusion, in face of the resistance of Great Britain, and a long and obstinate war began, the result of which must be the total defeat of the enemy. The one resource left to Germany was to barricade itself within the "fortress of Europe" if catastrophe was to be avoided, or at least deferred. But it would have been very dangerous for Germany to leave the armies and natural resources

of Russia untouched on its borders. The preservation of the military power of Germany after the easy conquest of the Continent of Europe ; the successful resistance of Great Britain ; and the entrance of America into the war ; these were things which Stalin did not foresee. And they made the attack on Russia a desperate necessity for Germany, which felt itself still strong enough to attempt it with good hopes of success before the Anglo-Saxon powers could undertake the offensive on the European Continent.

Thus Soviet policy, inaugurated by the conclusion of the Non-Aggression Pact with Germany, broke down after less than a year. Stalin, following the same illusions as Beck and Chamberlain, met with the same disappointment. He was unable for long to avert from himself the German blow. Soviet Russia lost its neutrality and with it the hope of being arbiter of the world after the war. It became, though against its will, one of the warring powers. Hitler caused the 22nd of June, 1941, to be the date not only of German aggression against Russia, but also of Russia's entrance into the ranks of the United Nations. When the episode of "Russo-German friendship" was past, Russia was compelled to accept aid from Britain and America against its late friend. But it still contrived to preserve its separate attitude, and to get the phrase "Hitlerite Germany" inserted as the designation of the common enemy in the Polish-Soviet declaration of December 4, 1941, and the British-Soviet Agreement of May 26, 1942. Thus it retains its freedom, in case of a real or apparent change of government and political programme in Germany, to take up an independent attitude towards it.

##### 5. THE U.S.S.R.'S MILITARY ACTION AGAINST POLAND.

The circumstances preceding and accompanying the Soviet aggression against Poland require some explanation.

At the end of April, 1939, the Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Potemkin, while in Warsaw, stated that the U.S.S.R. regarded its relations with Poland as perfectly satisfactory ; that it knew that Poland did not intend to engage itself with either of its great neighbours against the other ; and that in case of a war between Poland and Germany the U.S.S.R. would take up an attitude friendly to Poland. These consolatory declarations were given an ironic tinge by the fact that while Potemkin was making them at Warsaw his government was already far advanced in its negotiations with Germany for a pact of non-aggression, the immediate and conscious aim of which was to enable Germany to attack Poland.

On May 8, 1939, the Polish Ambassador to Moscow, Grzybowski,

informed the Soviet Government that the Polish Government looked favourably on the negotiations which were then being carried on between the U.S.S.R. and Great Britain and France; and that for its own part, after their completion, it wished to commence negotiations with the Soviet Government to promote closer co-operation. Simultaneously Ambassador Grzybowski stated that in case of a German attack on Poland the Polish Government was inclined to accept aid from the Soviet Government. The latter replied in July, 1939, that in case of the outbreak of war between Poland and Germany, Poland would be able to count on the transit of goods through the territory of the U.S.S.R. Of the negotiations then proceeding between the U.S.S.R. and Germany not a word was said and Poland knew no more about them than did Great Britain or France.

On August 23, 1939, the U.S.S.R. concluded its non-aggression pact with Germany. The German attack on Poland, the war between Germany and the Allies, Great Britain and France, and the neutrality of Russia, or rather, its non-belligerence, favourable to Germany, thus became inevitable. But even then the government of the U.S.S.R. desired, if only for a short time, to preserve the appearance of loyalty to Poland. Marshal Voroshilov declared in a press interview of August 27, 1939, that the pact with Germany could not stand in the way of aid being given to Poland by the U.S.S.R. in the event of a Polish-German war, in the form of the sale of arms, munitions, and raw materials.

After the outbreak of war, on September 8, 1939, Mr. Wacław Grzybowski, the Polish Ambassador at Moscow, appealed to Molotov, Commissar for Foreign Affairs to permit the transit of goods as previously promised, and the sale of munitions and raw materials under the existing commercial treaty. Molotov, however, refused, declaring that the situation had changed. "The intervention of Great Britain and France—he said—has created an entirely new situation. For us Poland is now synonymous with England."

On September 17, 1939, the Soviet invasion of Polish territory began. It was preceded by a conversation between the Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Potemkin, and the Ambassador Grzybowski. The former declared that in view of the abandonment of Warsaw by the Polish Government, the Soviet Government considered that Poland had ceased to exist as a State. Consequently every Polish-Soviet Agreement had lost its validity. However, the Soviet Government was interested in the fate of the Ukrainian and White-Ruthenian population in the area of the former Polish

Republic, deprived as they now were of the protection of the Polish authorities, and exposed to persecution in the course of military operations. Accordingly, the Soviet Government had issued the order for its armies to enter former Poland. An hour after this conversation the Soviet forces actually crossed the Polish border, in breach of the Non-Aggression Pact concluded with Poland on May 5, 1934 ; and thus completely fulfilled the definition of "aggression" agreed upon by the two powers on July 3, 1933.

It is noteworthy that this last diplomatic conversation between Polish and Soviet representatives, just before the Soviet invasion of Poland, was the first occasion on which the Soviet Government advanced the thesis that it was specially interested in the fate of the Ukrainian and White-Ruthenian nations inhabiting Polish territory. This question had never, since the signing of the Treaty of Riga eighteen years before, been in dispute, or even the subject of discussion, between the U.S.S.R. and Poland. But now it was brought forward as a screen, quite useless, one would think, for the real motives of Soviet action. Allusion was even made to it in the orders issued to the armies at the moment they entered Polish territory. Later again, on October 31, 1939, that is to say after the aggression had been carried out, Premier Molotov stated that "at the moment of the complete collapse of the Polish State the Soviet Government was compelled to stretch out its hand to its Ukrainian and White-Ruthenian brothers inhabiting the areas of Western Ukraine and Western White-Ruthenia." The same motif was to be repeated still later, as Soviet policy took its further course. At one time it was to serve as the basis for territorial demands on Poland at another to develop into the wider motif of a renewed Pan-Slavism, which should open the way for Soviet domination of Central Europe and the Balkans. In his speech of October 31, 1939, Premier Molotov called Poland "the deformed bastard of the Treaty of Versailles," and affirmed that it had fallen "under the united blows of the German and Soviet armies." He added that "according to Russian views, the power of Germany has always been the indispensable condition for the stability of a European peace."

#### 6. THE "WORLD REVOLUTION" AND RUSSIAN POLICY OF EXPANSION.

It is doubtful whether it was at any time possible to take seriously Soviet Russia's desire to foment world revolution, and judge its policy from that point of view. In the early phase of Bolshevism, when Trotsky coined the watchword and Lenin seemed to support

it, Soviet Russia was incapable of waging aggressive war. It was defending itself desperately against the armies of intervention and the "White" Russian divisions. It was hungry and in rags, and almost without war material and communications. It may be, and indeed it is very probable, that Trotsky himself regarded the watchword as an instrument of practical policy. But if he did, he broke away, or perhaps we should say he was cast away, from the realities of the situation. For the rest, to whom was Russia to "stretch out her hands in the West"? Nowadays we know how weak were the Communist revolts in Germany and Hungary at the close of the last war. Both of them collapsed after a short struggle with forces which were themselves small and narrow in their range—as later events showed. And when Russia, after the conclusion of its civil war, began to take breath, it realized at once that it could repel the foreign invasion which awaited it only after several years devoted to the reconstruction of its own war-potential. This was disguise before the world and the Russian people themselves as "the realization of Socialism in a single State." This preparation, as the future was to show, enabled Russia to stand up against the long-awaited attack from the West. It meant, of course, the disappearance for a long time, not only of the idea of world revolution, but also of the prospect of any Russian expansion in Europe—except as fore-shadowed in the stupid intrigues of the Comintern. Soviet Russia's first political step in Europe, the conclusion of the Rapallo Pact with Germany in 1922, was not an act of offence (on the Russian side, though it facilitated the political offensive of Germany), but rather a diversion with the object of supporting Germany against the victorious Allies and securing a breathing-space for Russia. Later Russian policy, though preserving the revolutionary forms of the heroic age, differed little from the policy of Baldwin or Chamberlain. Following its age-old tradition, Russia prepared itself seriously to defeat the enemy on his own territory—in its own defence.

This does not mean that Russia was a power with no lust of conquest. But its lust for conquest, had, in the first place, nothing to do with any revolution, world or other; and, in the second, none of the characteristics of modern imperialism; but rather something of the primitive universalism of the period of the Tartar inroads. Russia was never a capitalist state, but passed direct from the pre-capitalist to the post-capitalist economy. Imperialism is a manifestation of the rivalry of great industrial States in the period of over-ripe capitalism. It is dynamic in form and selective in aim.

The imperialist lust of conquest is not satisfied with conquering anything that offers, but pursues with the greatest determination a preconceived aim : the destruction of the enemy's sources of power and the seizure of his place in the markets of the world. The war of 1914-18 was from this point of view a struggle between German and British imperialism. In the present war Germany no longer appears as one of several rivals for world markets, but as the only claimant to universal domination. Its ambition and its aim are greater than they were, and so is its dynamism. In comparison with this dynamism, which recalls the explosive force of a shell, the Russian lust of conquest is more like the inundation of a swollen river. German lust of conquest springs from the actual nature and the deeply-rooted economic and social structure of the German nation, out of which has grown its desire for world power. Russian lust of conquest, on the other hand, has no foundation either in the intrinsic structure of the State, or in the moral attitude of the "Soviet nation," but derives rather from the still living tradition of the times of Peter and Catharine, now continued by Marshal Stalin and from the weakness of its neighbours. Russia, possessing enormous areas, as yet insufficiently developed, in two continents, and disposing of as yet unexplored, immeasurable natural resources, has no real need to increase its territory. But it is always inclined to do so if an easy opportunity seems to present itself.



This is how the U.S.S.R. seems to consider her present situation. When her system of government has, in spite of heavy losses, given proof of its solidity and of its aptitude to resist the German aggressor, Russia became not only certain of defeating her former ally but she became also firmly convinced that she will, to a large extent, be able to supersede Germany in the European Middle Zone and establish there her own *Lebensraum*. This belief soon found expression in Russia's attitude with regard to the entire Middle Zone area lying east of Germany. Soviet propaganda aims at creating such appearances as would tend to prove that the Central European nations see their deliverance, both now and after the war, in the closest possible union with Russia. The same propaganda minimizes the rôles to be played by Great Britain and the United States as factors of the post-war order, while it gives to understand that Russia represents the only real power capable both of resisting the Germans during this war and of taking their place as factor of the post-war equilibrium.

In support of its designs Russia desires to keep in its hands

permanent bases for attack upon its future *Lebensraum*, by the annexation of those border provinces which it occupied for a time in 1940 and 1941. It no longer, of course, points to its pact with Germany in justification of its proceedings, but to other events, such as the elections to so-called "National Assemblies," the resolutions of parliamentary bodies in some of the occupied countries, and even to amendments of the Soviet Constitution made during the period of the German alliance. Recently these legal arguments have been reinforced by fresh reasons: the moral obligation lying upon Russia to protect the smaller Slavonic nations, and the historic right of the latter to unite with their kinsmen in Russia. Sometimes also we hear of the necessity for emancipating the proletariat in various foreign countries from the oppression of their upper-class fellow-countrymen.



Such is the background against which may be distinguished the true aim of the U.S.S.R., which is to assert territorial claims against Poland and other countries. Marshal Stalin and the representatives of Soviet policy abroad have indeed repeatedly declared on various occasions that Russia does not desire to increase its territory, and has no aggressive designs against its neighbours. This declaration was well received everywhere, the more that it agreed almost word for word with the declaration of the Anglo-Saxon Powers embodied in the Atlantic Charter. But, as on other occasions, the world was deceived by the ambiguous magnanimity of Marshal Stalin. Russia in its public statements remains ever faithful to the principle of ambiguity. The words of Stalin, though they sound like those of Roosevelt and Churchill, actually mean something quite different. For Russia, when declaring that it has no desire to increase its territory, is referring, not to the extent of territory which it possessed before the war, but to that extent increased by its occupation of areas along the whole of its frontier, from Finland to Rumania. In the minds of Soviet politicians those areas, though lost again, are still to-day part of the U.S.S.R. The claim to incorporate them formally, therefore, is not equivalent to a desire for territorial expansion—as the Russians understand words. And so, though using the same words as Great Britain and America, Russia means something quite different.

The Soviets' intentions are not limited merely to Poland. In one way or another Russia desires to annex strips of territory throughout the length of its western frontier, in order to create for itself a new, Soviet, *Lebensraum* in the Central European zone. The key position

in that zone, geographically and politically, is held by Poland ; and consequently Poland has to meet the first Soviet attack. When the German plan for invading that same zone from the West ripened in 1938, the first German attack was directed against Czechoslovakia. In the political strategy of Russia, Poland now occupies the same place as Czechoslovakia did in German strategy in 1938.

#### 7. POLAND AND THE U.S.S.R. AFTER THE WAR.

None the less, good neighbourly relations between Poland and Russia, based on honest political and economic co-operation, will not only be absolutely necessary after the war, but will be quite attainable in principle. There is no real conflict of interests between the two countries, despite the present contention, while there is a community of interest in the desire of both to secure themselves against attack from the West. Poland must, therefore, aim constantly and unweariedly at the establishment of good relations with Russia, without which it cannot give sufficient attention to the security of its western frontier. And this attention, vigilant and unweakening, is needed for the sake not only of Poland itself, but also of the whole Central-Eastern European zone. For only a compact and politically consolidated defence-bloc to the east of Germany can discourage that country from further attempts at conquest. For that reason sound Polish-Russian relations after the war are needed as a constructive factor for peace throughout the Continent.

It goes without saying, however, that sincere and friendly co-operation between the States of the Central European zone and Russia will only be possible if none of the former feel themselves threatened by the latter. Russia's most effective contribution to the maintenance of peace in this zone would be to satisfy its neighbour that it would not intend to endanger their existence and had no wish to interfere in their domestic affairs. On the other hand it is obviously in the interests of Russia that no one of these States, and no combination of them, should become a base for possible attack against itself. And, further, Russia will desire to see to it that these States do not attempt, on their own initiative or by the inspiration of some Great Power, to create a "barbed-wire entanglement" or a "security zone" along its western frontier, thus isolating it politically from Europe. With that Russia's properly justified interests end. Any further pretensions put forward by the U.S.S.R. must be considered as manifestations of the aggressiveness aiming at domination over other States and nations.

The conclusion to be drawn is therefore this : The true interests



of Russia require it to respect those States which border upon it to the West; and they in their turn must so shape their policy, towards one another, towards their western neighbour, towards the Anglo-Saxon powers, and finally towards Russia, as to secure the perfect stabilization of their mutual relations. Russia, for its part, must facilitate this process by freeing itself from all suspicion of predacity. Experience shows that neither declarations of intentions, nor treaties of alliance suffice to this end. International relations can be successfully stabilized only by the aid of some new international organizations, to take the place of the League of Nations. These organizations, will be able to create permanent structures, whose power will be great enough to prevent individual members from transgressing against the international law. A provision for creating these organizations with Russia's participation, is contained in the Moscow declaration of November 1, 1943.

It will be necessary for Russia to take part along with all the other States in this new organization of the post-war world, sincerely and loyally, with an eye to the security of the community of peoples, and not only to the extension of its own dominions and the increase of its own influence. Hitherto it has shown no inclination to do this.

Nevertheless Russia does not remain inactive. It is busying itself energetically on its own account and preparing for its new role in Europe and the world. Its direct actions do not as yet reflect the whole range of its designs. These are at present in their initial phase. Soviet propaganda so far merely issues warnings against a premature definition of war aims, and declares that these are to be determined only at the end of the war by "the will of the nations concerned" and by "the actual balance of forces." It accordingly describes all the efforts being made to create a federal union of the Central European States as "premature," or outright "fantastic." These statements, it will be observed, are very general, and at the same time liberal, in character. This is surprising in a country whose most fundamental principle of government is planning. For the rest, they are mutually contradictory. The will of nations to exist and develop is not at all the same, in the meaning of present-day politicians, as "the actual balance of forces." Indeed it is often enough of no avail in conflict with the latter. And in fact, when speaking of "the actual balance of forces," what Russia really means is its own preponderant force; or in other words that after the war Russia (as it hopes) will decide what is to happen in Europe, and particularly in the Central and Eastern European zones.

But as yet it does not say a word of its own proposed leadership in this area. It is only trying to create conditions in which that leadership must inevitably result. It is clear that if a bloc of federated States with a total population of 110 million were to arise in the region between Russia and Germany, and between the Baltic on the one hand and the Adriatic, Aegean and Black Seas on the other, it would be capable of co-ordinated action which would assure it of political and economic independence. But if no such bloc makes its appearance, and this troublesome zone is again to relapse into a chaos of weak and quarrelsome small States, then some exterior factor of co-ordination will become essential. This is why Russia now speaks of the right of small States to separate existence, and the absence of necessity for them to come to mutual understandings ; but of the absolute necessity, on the other hand, for each of them singly to come into the closest relations with Russia ; and sometimes, though very rarely, of the great blessing it is to belong to the U.S.S.R.



In the early stages of the present war Stalin kept Russia neutral as long as he could, and afterwards in a stage of non-belligerence favourable to Germany. This he did in the conviction that all the armies in the world would eventually collapse—except his own. Then he would say what he would have to say, on the basis of “ the actual balance of forces.” Now his design is more modest, but it remains based on the same hypothesis. Stalin calculates that when the war ends he will be in a position to dictate to his neighbours, at least in Central and South-Eastern Europe, without opposition from the Anglo-Saxons, who will be too weary after crushing the Germans.

### III. SOVIET LEADERSHIP

Russia's role in the post-world war is being studied keenly and thoroughly in Anglo-Saxon countries.

The U.S.A. are giving Russia aid in the shape of large quantities of war material, and latterly of food also. Responsible American political circles are convinced that Russia ought to be given a place in the post-war world corresponding to its real importance. The political ostracism which was at one time applied to it is condemned for the unsatisfactory consequences to which it led. But at the same time America is somewhat more reserved in its attitude to Russia than is Great Britain. One important reason for this is that Russia has not declared war on Japan, and even maintains quite friendly relations with it. For Great Britain Russia is first and foremost a fellow-combatant who is holding down more than 200 German divisions. For America it is an ally fighting against one of America's enemies, but remaining neutral in relation to the other.

The general outlines of the post-war order were sketched by the Vice-President of the United States, Henry A. Wallace, in a speech delivered on November 8, 1942, on the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Russian Revolution. He said, among other things: "The splendid free world of the future cannot be built only by Russia and the United States. China will undoubtedly have great influence on the shape it will take. The British Commonwealth of Nations, England itself, the democracies of North-Western Europe, Latin America—all the United Nations will play a great part in it." In this statement a characteristic gradation is noticeable. At first two powers are mentioned: Russia and the United States; which is to be explained by the occasion on which, and the person by whom, the speech was delivered. Next come China and the British Commonwealth—the remaining two members of the United Nations. Of the European nations particular reference is made to the Western ones, presumably on account of their high level of democratic development. Further, Wallace speaks of "England itself," as a European State, and of the "democracies of North-Western Europe," by which he doubtless means the Scandinavian countries, Belgium, and Holland. The remaining European nations, and in particular the countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe, are covered by the phrase "all the United

Nations." But, despite the grades in his hierarchy, Wallace does assign "a great part" to all these States, and thereby conveys that they have to co-operate in one way or another, and that none is to be subject to the domination or control of another.

The mutual relations of the United Nations were dealt with a little later—on November 17, 1942, by the Under-Secretary of State in the State Department, Sumner Welles. He laid particular stress on the necessity for getting rid of all the prejudices, suspicions, and rivalries existent between them; and pointed to the imperative need for clarifying the aims they set before themselves; as well as for sketching the general outline of the future international organization which is to assure as far as may be possible the general security. He appealed to the Atlantic Charter and the obligations arising out of existing pacts of mutual aid and other agreements between members of the United Nations. The core of Sumner Welles's speech is to be found in the sentence: "If we are to attain our free world, the world of the four freedoms, to the extent practicable, the essential principles of international political and economic relations in that new world must be agreed upon in advance and with the full support of each one of the United Nations," Accordingly, from this speech, too, one may conclude that co-operation among the United Nations is to be based on their harmonious mutual understanding and the reconciliation of their separate interests, with the proviso that no State is to be predominant over others.

The American Secretary of State, Mr. Cordell Hull, gave very clear expression to similar views in a speech broadcast on September, 1943. The main principles which he considered should be applied in international relations can be summarised as follows:

1. All nations capable of meeting the obligations arising out of liberty are entitled to have liberty.
2. All sovereign nations, whether large or small, are equal before international law.
3. All sovereign nations, whether large or small, are entitled to manage their own internal affairs, without the interference of other nations.
4. All nations should observe international law and refrain from using force in settling mutual conflicts.
5. Nations should grant one another economic advantages on principles identical for all.

Mr. Cordell Hull declared that on these bases should be built up "a system of international law for the maintenance of peace, capable of functioning." He added that "it is necessary to be ready to

use force, in so far as that proves necessary in order to maintain peace." This declaration, one must conclude, presages the creation of a general international organization for the defence of peace, with the exclusion of any hegemony in mutual relations between large and small States, and excluding any division of the world into spheres of interests.

Later, in June, 1944, these views were given expression in the five point draft plan which it is said will be America's contribution to world discussions on post-war security. The five points are as follows :

A council of the Great Powers with certain smaller nations also represented.

A United Nations Assembly.

Policing by National Authorities directed by the Assembly.

A World Court.

Machinery for Mediation.

Mr. Cordell Hull clearly indicated that America is in no mood to set up a Great Power condominium.

President Roosevelt has so far shown great moderation in his utterances on post-war relations. According to his custom he has confined himself to preparing public opinion by the speeches and declarations of his closest collaborators. He himself first referred to this question only on June 15th, 1944, and even then he confined himself to general remarks, signifying that he shared the views expressed by the State Department. Yet even now one may form a general idea of his standpoint. The Atlantic Charter, which was drawn up on his initiative and largely by himself, contains these which apply equally well to present relations between the United Nations and to their relations in the future, after the war. And one of its fundamental principles is equality of status between the United Nations and common standards in the constitutional structure of the post-war world. This principle admits of no hegemony, open or secret, of stronger powers over weaker ones, nor of any division of the world into spheres of influence or particular powers.

There exist, however, in the United States other, and very influential, circles, which formerly professed the policy of isolationism, but now proclaim a new American imperialism. Their interests are directed mainly to the vast spaces of the Pacific and the markets of the great continent of Asia. It is they who now complain of "British imperialism," lament the unhappy fate of India, and show particular interest in the affairs of China. It is they, too, who originated the

view that America ought to regard this war as first and foremost its own war against Japan, and not to expend too great effort in other theatres, either by military operations on too large a scale, or by too abundant material aid to its allies. It seems like a combination of imperialist and isolationist elements; and those who hold it are disinclined to express themselves concerning the post-war prospects of Europe. In general they are little interested in them. However, we are not justified in concluding from this cautious attitude that it is a matter of complete indifference to them what will happen in Europe after the war. They are quite conscious that Europe has been the source of those tensions which twice in the lifetime of a single generation have led to world-wide war. They understand also very well that the influence of the Great Powers in Europe opens the way for them to influence other continents also. So their caution in approaching European questions is by no means synonymous with indifference. They would simply like to spare America as far as possible direct contact with those questions. Their attitude, moreover, is partially affected by their lukewarmness in relation to Russia. Of all American political circles it is especially these which are never inclined to forget that Russia is not at war with Japan. They are doubtless also prejudiced against the Russian social system; whereas in Great Britain such prejudice either does not exist, or is not mentioned. Hence, it may be concluded that these circles, though in other directions they may show affinities with British isolationist circles, are not at all inclined to give way to Russia—or indeed to any other power—in Europe. If their policy of detachment from Europe does not succeed, they will be compelled like the representatives of all the other currents of American policy, to attend to the solution of European problems, in close connexion with the whole question of the future world organization. That they do reckon seriously with this possibility is evidenced by the importance they attach to the clarification of Russia's attitude and war aims. They would like to know what those aims are, in order to be able to take account of them in their future calculations. They do not like the enigmatic attitude of Russia, from which no one knows what may emerge. Hence, it is that the representatives of these views demand in the Congress that President Roosevelt should directly ask Stalin at what he really aims and what he wants, and what are the points of contact between his own designs and the war aims of the other United Nations.

Responsible political leaders in the United States are working, it is clear, in every field to establish such a form of post-war order as

may enable all the United Nations to co-operate in realizing the "four freedoms" mentioned in the Atlantic Charter. The principles of this Charter are taken really seriously in America. In accordance with them the desire is widespread to so shape the mutual relations of the United Nations that their existence and development may be assured, and that each of them may fulfil the active role corresponding to its real capacity.



For British policy the Continent of Europe still remains outside the pale. For three centuries, down to the most recent times, Britain's continental policy has been based on the Balance of Power. The island which ruled the seas did not find itself closely bound up with the affairs of the mainland. "Splendid isolation" and "wait and see" were until lately not only the slogans of publicists, but the guiding principles of British statesmen. In the last resort it was necessary to know what was happening on the Continent of Europe in order to be able in case of emergency to avert danger ; but prudence counselled that one should not penetrate too deep into such matters. The more, that European equilibrium maintained itself to a great extent automatically. The forces of the Continent compensated one another and prevented the excessive elevation of one Power above the others. Sometimes tension became great, but Great Britain could always treat it calmly, as an internal affair of the Continent. Its own position in the world was not thereby threatened. This unstable form of European equilibrium was very convenient for Great Britain, which could be the friend of all parties, could act as arbitrator in disputes without being suspected of territorial designs, and could do good business with every one.

Meanwhile the opinion gained ground that Great Britain's policy was hostile to whatever power in turn was the strongest in Europe. This was taken to explain the attitude of Great Britain to Germany before 1914, and to France at the period of the Treaty of Versailles and later. But in reality it was not so. Actually these examples were activities sometimes leading to serious consequences—whose sole aim was the strengthening of the Continent at a certain point, or the re-poising of the threatened balance of forces ; activities comparable to those of a merchant who now puts weights in one of the scales of his balance, and now puts goods in the other. Great Britain simply wanted to be left in peace and not become involved in the internal affairs of Europe. The only affairs it treated seriously were those of its own Empire. The Victorian gentleman type directed politics and commerce, and indeed retained his hold for

half-a-century after the end of his epoch, certain examples surviving until very recently.

But meanwhile changes came to pass which completely upset the equilibrium of Europe as it had been hitherto understood. Nowadays it is obvious to every one that the ordering of the affairs of Europe cannot continue to be left to the automatic action of continental forces. What is now required is the direct intervention of British policy ; no longer, however, as a disinterested arbitrator, but as one of the forces actually interested and directly operative. The wars which have now twice threatened the existence of the British Empire did not originate within it, but in Continental Europe; and in that part of it in which Great Britain was never interested : the central-eastern zone. The League of Nations, which in practice showed itself to be merely another formula for disguising British lack of interest in the affairs of Europe, at last broke down, and cannot be restored in its former shape. Hence, the need for Britain to consider the problems of its policy in Europe anew, and for the first time to treat European affairs as its own direct concern.



It is intelligible that British opinion should be taken somewhat aback by the proposal that Great Britain should henceforth take an active interest in the affairs of the Continent, for it runs counter to centuries-old tradition. Hence attempts were soon made to interpret Great Britain's task in such a way as to give it the least trouble, and entangle it as little as possible in the thicket of complicated and controversial questions and interests which constitutes "European affairs," allowing it to keep at least a little of its traditional distance.

The British-Soviet Agreement of May 26, 1942, is a treaty of alliance concluded between two States, and in its general character does not differ from other such bilateral agreements concluded heretofore. Its novelty resides in the following points : (1) It provides for close co-operation between Great Britain and not only the U.S.S.R. but *the other allied States* in determining the conditions of peace and in post-war reconstruction ; and (2) it states that both countries, when working in common on the post-war task of securing public order and economic prosperity throughout Europe, will *take account of the interests of the other allied countries*, and will not seek territorial acquisitions for themselves, nor interfere in the internal affairs of those countries. From this agreement it may be concluded that Great Britain desires to take part, together and on equal terms with Soviet Russia, in determining the shape of things in post-war Europe, and intends in the future to be active on the



Continent. In relation to "the other allied countries" both parties to the agreement express their disinterestedness. This does not mean, however, that they are prepared to leave them to their fate, but on the contrary that they desire, together and in harmony, to influence the form of their mutual relations.

But if one likes, one may take this agreement in a completely different sense. It may be taken as an agreement between two Powers who have determined the conditions of their future co-operation on the Continent, strictly between themselves and for their own common advantage; defining their respective spheres of interest and avoiding the danger of conflicts. In that case the sentence about "the other allied nations" would have to be understood as mere embellishment, such as is not uncommon in diplomatic documents. Or at most it might be taken as a promise of patriarchal guardianship of the smaller countries by the Great Powers, such as is generally called hegemony. Further it is to be observed that the text of the agreement contains nothing to show whether a such hegemony would be exercised over the whole Continent by Great Britain and Russia in concert, or whether these two Powers would fix zones in which each separately would be dominant. Yet this is by no means a matter of indifference, seeing that, whereas one of the presumed hegemonic leaders, viz., Great Britain, has no territorial claims or interests in Continental Europe, the reverse is the case with the other.

The true interpretation of Great Britain's intentions towards the Continent, and at the same time of the provisions of the Anglo-Soviet Agreement, must be sought in a speech delivered to the House of Commons by Foreign Secretary Mr. Eden on December 3, 1942. Eden declared without the least ambiguity that Great Britain does not aim at the establishment of a dictatorship of the Four Great Powers. "When the fighting is over," he said, "those Great Powers, particularly ourselves, the United States, and Russia, would have a virtual monopoly of armed strength, which must be used in the name of the United Nations to prevent a repetition of aggression. The other Powers, great and small, if they were willing to play their part, would be secured in the enjoyment of that independence for which they had fought and suffered." As to Britain's relations with Continental Europe, Eden's declaration is also quite clear. He condemned isolationism and formulated a practical programme for British policy, calling to the nations of Europe: "Whatever we can do to help you to re-establish your ruined economies, we will do. The first need of Europe will be to build up an enduring system of

defence against the possibility of renewed German aggression. We are prepared to make our contribution to that system, and to do this because we understand full well that the peace and security of Europe are part our own peace and security. Never again shall we turn our backs on Europe. That, I hope, is our message." He further added that this new task which Great Britain will have to take upon itself in Europe will require the common action of the British Commonwealth, the United States, and Russia. For this reason then, great importance must be attached to the Anglo-Soviet Agreement, since in it Great Britain and Russia have pledged themselves to political co-operation for the next twenty years. Eden finally stated that after the war Great Britain will have to give the support of its armed forces to the United Nations to enable them to keep the peace.

Mr. Eden's speech, which constituted the general foundation for Churchill's later, more concrete, statement, contained one leading idea, expressed though it be in two phases. Peace and security throughout the world are one and indivisible. The essential condition for their maintenance in the future is the co-operation of all States, great, medium-sized, and small. But a sober estimate of the situation requires us to take account of the fact that in warlike conflict only the large States have recently shown themselves capable of successful defence; States, that is, which have at their disposal large areas, large economic reserves, and large armies. Hence the Four Powers, viz., the British Commonwealth, the United States, Russia, and China, will have to play a particularly important part in the work of establishing peace. This does not mean that other States are to be excluded from co-operation; on the contrary, according to their powers, and "*if they are willing to play their part,*" they are to share in the task. Nevertheless, future peace must not be endangered by the indecision or irresolution of such States. It will accordingly depend on them how far they will exercise effective influence in the future. In any case, even if it proved impossible to count on the full co-operation of the small and medium-sized States, the four Great Powers will not decline to take upon themselves the obligation to guarantee peace; an obligation which they will fulfil together, after coming to a common understanding on all the chief questions at issue.



Traditionalist elements among British politicians of Conservative and other wings have not been able to draw any support for their old isolationist policy from the speeches of British statesmen; but

they have tried, none the less, to find in Mr. Eden's words concerning the special tasks awaiting the Great Powers after the war a promise of hegemony by those Powers over the small and medium-sized States. How such an idea came to burgeon in their heads can only be fully understood if reference is made to the views they held immediately before the present war.

Those same British political circles which before this war held obstinately to the policy of the Balance of Power, threw it aside readily enough only a few years before 1939, in favour of what at first sight appeared to be its very opposite : the supporting of German expansion in the Central-Eastern European zone. Yet they not only tolerated this expansion, they were ready actively to aid it. The contradiction between the old policy and the new, however, was only superficial. Both were alike inasmuch as they exempted Great Britain from the necessity of direct intervention in Europe. When it became evident that the Balance of Power had ceased to function, these circles came to believe that there was no way out but to entrust the organization of the Central-Eastern European zone to Germany. In the Western zone Great Britain, with the aid of France, would always be able to gain its ends, particularly as this zone was free from the many problems tormenting the central-eastern zone. To the East, somewhat further off, there was only Soviet Russia, a power absorbed in its own affairs, and for the time constituting no direct danger, though always threatening in the future. All the more, then, was it necessary for Great Britain to hold aloof from it. Russia should be held in check by Germany, supported and strengthened for the task by Great Britain. It was like raising the old maxim of the Balance of Power to a higher level. For the future it was the influences no longer of States, but of Zones : Russian, German, and Western, which were to be maintained in equilibrium. Only the last-named concerned Great Britain.

Germany, for its part, did not wait for this European mandate, but decided on its own account consistently to follow its traditional policy of extending the range of its power at the expense of its neighbours. Britain's tacit consent made things easier for Germany, but was far from having a decisive influence on its policy. For the rest, Germany knew very well that peace in Europe is one and indivisible. It therefore took note that Central Europe was handed over to it as it were on lease ; but at the same time it endeavoured stubbornly to dominate the whole of Europe, and secure a one and indivisible, German, peace. The Germans are naturally inclined to theorising. Accordingly, they soon found learned designations

for their designs : at first the "Anti-Comintern Pact," a temporary and practical attempt to organize the nations of Europe for defence against the grinning teeth of Bolshevism ; then the *Lebensraum*, a zone of influence required by every nation so that it may broadcast its culture over the adjacent peoples ; and finally the *Grossraumpolitik*, whereby whole continents are to be massed under the control of one Great Power and for its advantage. The introductory "Anti-Comintern" formula was still universal in character, and was calculated to appeal to all nations. Its special use to Germany was that it enabled that country to appear on the mandatory of Europe against Russia. The two later formulas openly proclaimed the supremacy of Germany, first over Europe and then over the world. Their ideological basis was found in the myths of racial supremacy and geopolitical necessity, from which were deduced the exclusive right of Germany to rule the world. All things therefore considered, the Anti-Comintern Pact was approved of in certain English circles; the *Lebensraum* project was looked upon with suspicion ; and the *Grossraumpolitik* called forth the decision to resist. Its first result was the guarantee given to Poland.

Now, however, incredible though it may seem, this German *Grossraum* doctrine has succeeded, while the war is in progress, in penetrating all the fronts and reaching the very camp of the United Nations. It there continues to fulfil its purpose, no longer, indeed, in the service of Germany, but in that of Russia and other "large areas." It is a kind of ideological fifth column, the purpose of which is to disfigure the fair vision of future peace.



The British version of the *Grossraum* doctrine, taken over by some British quarters, has been formulated in a striking series of articles published in *The Times*, the authorship of which is ascribed to Prof. E. H. Carr. It should be borne in mind that *The Times* was once an advocate of the policy of "appeasement," which led to the Munich humiliation. In the changed situation of to-day the circles represented by that paper are looking for a new formula, which would permit them—at the cost of a fresh appeasement, of certain Continental Powers—to hold aloof from the affairs of Europe. Accordingly they imagine that peace may be assured in the future regionally, by means of the hegemony of various powers in various zones throughout the world. The expression "United Nations," according to this view, would imply a delimitation of the spheres of influence of the various Great Powers. This new plan for producing peace on earth by dividing it up among the Great Powers is put

forward, like the one which preceded it, as a fruit of realistic thought. It is based on the belief that it would be neither possible nor desirable to include all the United Nations in a common organization for untied action in the post-war world. The idea is regarded as a vain and harmful dream, and is compared to the unsatisfactory formulas which led ultimately to the break-down of the League of Nations. But are these plans of *The Times* any more realistic? One may be permitted to doubt it. During the whole twenty-years' armistice *The Times* and the circles behind it stood constantly for a "realistic policy"—until they stumbled unawares into a second world war. It was due in no small measure to them that Great Britain entered the war unprepared either politically or militarily.

On August 1, 1941, in a leading article *The Times* expressed the view that in Eastern Europe the leadership ought to be entrusted to Soviet Russia. This declaration was the more noticeable that it followed immediately upon the signing of the Polish-Soviet Treaty, of July 30, 1941. The assignment to Russia of the role of leader in Eastern Europe results from the assumption that neither Great Britain nor America either desire or will be able to show activity in this zone, while the smaller States in it are not capable of maintaining equilibrium by themselves. In the opinion of *The Times* to entrust the leadership to Russia would be at the same time the most effective means of preventing its falling into the hands of Germany.

These views were set out in greater detail in another article in *The Times* of March 10, 1943. There it is asserted—more than ten years too late—that security in Western Europe is closely bound up with security in Eastern Europe, and that the stabilization of relations over the whole Continent requires the permanent co-operation of Britain and Russia. Regret is expressed—some twenty years too late—that Russia was excluded from participation in the shaping of peace at the end of the last war. These expressions are followed by the presentation of a definite programme: Eastern Europe should be placed under the guardianship of Russia. The argument here is developed purely on the lines of power politics. Only now does it become fully intelligible why Eden's speech of December 3, 1942, was taken by *The Times* as foreshadowing a hegemony of the Great Powers. *The Times* quotes the sentence in which Eden assigns to the Four Powers the initiative in the organization and armed assurance of peace. Two only of them, it asserts, are in close contact with Europe, viz., Great Britain and Russia. If, then, the security of Europe is not to be based on a fiction, these two alone must take upon themselves the whole responsibility for the ordering of its

affairs. It then explains how that is to be done in practice. If, as Baldwin said, the frontier of Great Britain lies on the Rhine, then, in the same meaning of the word, the frontier of Russia lies on the Oder. To this explanation it adds the remark that this, and no other must be the meaning of the Anglo-Soviet Agreement of May 26, 1942. For the rest, *The Times* does not even now forget the medium-sized and small nations—any more than it forgot them at the time of Munich. It comforts them that Russia is concerned only with the security of its Western frontier. Accordingly it will depend on the States themselves, situated between Russia and Germany, whether they can so shape their good relations with the former that it may be able to trust them. In any case, the writer of the article adds resignedly, Russia will do what it likes in this zone, for no one will stand in its way there. So why should Great Britain oppose it? Would it not be better to come to an understanding with Russia in advance, and acknowledge that country's right to do what it likes, rather than to have later to accept a Russian *fait accompli* with a sour smile?

These conclusions are further developed in an article in *The Times* of March 23, 1943, rather apologetic in character, attempting to withdraw certain glaring assertions made before. But it is only from its own too sharply formulated theory of European regionalism from which *The Times* wishes to withdraw, fearing that it may displease American opinion. So it says that the interest of America in European affairs would be, certainly, very desirable, and even welcome. But it points out at the same time that the security of each zone must be based on a "nucleus of military and economic power." The organization of security throughout the world "will" nevertheless, "remain a matter of common and world-wide concern." But in Eastern Europe the guarantor of security must be in the first place Russia, since Russia is the only State to the east of Germany possessing sufficient economic resources and powers of growth to enable it to fulfil such a task. In order to season its remarks to American taste, *The Times* recalls that the defence of the Panama Canal is left in the hands of the U.S.A. Why, then, should the defence of the Central European zone not be left in the hands of the U.S.S.R.?

Finally on the 18th, 19th and 20th of November, 1943, a series of articles appeared in *The Times* discussing British foreign policy of the past 50 years and drawing thence directives for the future. Towards the close of the last century, when it became clear that the policy of "splendid isolation" could not be maintained any

longer, Great Britain strengthened her position both in the Far East by means of an alliance with Japan in 1902, and in Europe through an alliance with France in 1904. After the first World-War, Great Britain has too hastily believed in the weakening of Germany and consequently did not look for new alliances, although in fact she was in great need of them. Such is the reason why, at the end of twenty years armistice she found herself alone. The League of Nations has already previously broken down, because its founders and sponsors imagined they could at the same time both disarm and contract far-reaching international obligations, which, of course, proved an impossibility. France and the small nations in alliance with her could not ensure any effective system of security. Such a system if it is not to be a delusion must be either based upon single alliance or upon a series of alliances concluded by the Great Powers determined to use their force in support of it. Hence in future Great Britain must above all think of renewing her alliance system, without which she could not fulfil the obligations appending to her rank of Great Power. She must have a strong ally on the other side of the Ocean, as she had half a century ago, and another one on the European Continent. The alliance with Japan should now be replaced by an alliance with the United States who will play their part of an ally both on the Atlantic and the Pacific. On the Continent of Europe the only State to be a possible ally is Russia. There can be no agreement with Germany for it would ensue in a further strengthening of German power which would bring catastrophic results. There can be no relying on the support of France since that country will not be able to give it for long years to come. Agreement with smaller nations would lead nowhere. The alliance with Russia has already been inaugurated by the twenty-years treaty of alliance of May 26th, 1942. This alliance will alone be able to exert a sufficient pressure on Germany, without which there can be no question of any security in Europe. European unity must, of course, repose on a wider basis and cannot be analogous to an Anglo-Russian hegemony. Great Britain will have to become a more active factor in European affairs than she has been so far. France will keep her importance as a guarantee of security for Great Britain and of the integrity of the Continent. In any way "The Anglo-Russian alliance presupposes that Britain will not intervene in Eastern Europe except in agreement with Russia, any more than Russia will intervene in Western Europe except in agreement with Britain." This last sentence is only a replica, though in a different combination of problems of the old

theory of *The Times* on the division of Europe into British and Russian spheres of influence.



These arguments of *The Times* contain, albeit not too clearly, a repetition of the old idea of the Four-Power Pact, now extended to cover the whole world. The Four-Power Pact was really the first attempt to give practical application to the principle of the hegemony of the Great Powers in Europe. It was originated by Mussolini, and for some time enabled him, with German support, to play the part of arbitrator in the conflict between Germany on the one hand and France and Britain on the other. Germany accepted it willingly enough, for it sufficed to give it time to undermine the influence of the Democratic Powers. In Britain and France it was well received by those circles only who were already disposed to make concessions to Germany. The Four-Power Pact never became a formal diplomatic instrument. In fact, however, its underlying principle was realized, once only, at an unusually dramatic moment : when the Munich Agreements were drawn up. These agreements proved—if proof were necessary—that understandings between Great Powers at the expense of smaller ones do not lead to peace.

In *The Times'* version the Four-Power Pact is to be extended to cover the whole world. This being so, however, it become necessary to modify its fundamental principle. The original Pact was confined, at least in practice, to Europe. It was therefore possible to a certain extent to rely on the promise it contained of whole-hearted co-operation on the part of the Powers in Europe. But if a new Four-Power Pact is to be brought into being, that possibility will not exist, if only for the reason that the Powers concerned are not equally interested or capable of action in all parts of the world. Hence results the obvious necessity for introducing some kind of regional delimitation (although *The Times* expressly rejects it). The solidarity of the Powers would have to be based on the proper delimitation of these zones and on their loyal observance.

It is not mere chance that *The Times* recalls with great approval the Congress of Vienna of 1815 and the resultant Holy Alliance. Those, says *The Times*, who signed the Treaty of Vienna “were less affected by sentiment and took less account of abstract ideals than the peace-makers of Versailles” ; and accordingly “their settlement proved more enduring because it was based on a shrewder estimate of the relative strength of the principal European Powers.” But it will be well to remember that the Holy Alliance was designed to push the world back. It was concluded, on the proposal of Czar



Alexander I, between old monarchs in order to preserve those remains of traditional institutions, political and social, which the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars had been unable to destroy. The Holy Alliance was to be a common guarantee by the dynastic Powers against the emancipation of the oppressed nation in Europe. It was a bulwark of the Europe of yesterday against the Europe of to-day—and to-morrow. Yet it was not capable of turning Europe for long from the path to democracy, and by democracy it was swept from the surface of the earth. It ensured peace neither between nations, nor between the governing classes and the governed. If *The Times* in its search for “realism” has been able to find nothing better than a return to the memories of the Holy Alliance, we must conclude that it is indeed in desperate plight.



Another weak point in the *Grossraum* doctrine as adapted by certain British politicians is that if consistently thought out it leads to absurdity. In German hands it is nothing more than a theoretic implement of aggression. Germany is the strongest State in the centre of Europe, and for that reason arrogates to itself the right to dominate over the whole of Europe, and later over the whole world. This desire finds strong support in German “geopolitics” and in the German racial myth. Geopolitics is supposed to prove by arguments drawn from economics and from geography that the world would be most happy if the whole of it were under German domination. And the racial myth is supposed to show that the Germans as a nation are foreordained to rule the world. They are the Chosen People, the best—indeed the only good one—among all the nations. Hence the whole earth belongs rightly to them, and conquest is merely the realization of this innate right. They are a *Führungsvolk*: the only one, indeed. Deprived of its support in geopolitics and the racial myth, the *Grossraumpolitik* loses very much of its substance.

In Great Britain, despite the fact that the British are really a *Führungsvolk* in their great colonial empire, geopolitics and racial myths are not the foundations of policy. As understood by Prof. E. H. Carr and set out in his book and in the *Times* articles, the *Grossraum* doctrine is not to be a formula concealing the desire to dominate the world. It aims at supporting peace on the co-operation of the Great Powers fighting against the aggressor States, and hopes to gather the medium-sized and small States round them. It ascribes to these Powers, irrespective of their character, internal constitution, and political aspirations, such decisive importance

that their economic prosperity and their capacity for defence require the sacrifice of the interests, and indeed of the very existence, of the small and medium-sized States lying within their spheres of influence. But the consideration that the Prof. Carr's version of the *Grossraum* doctrine applies not to Great Britain alone, but also to the three other United Nations, suggests the question why only these four Powers should be included. The reason why Great Powers play the specific part they do in world affairs is just that they are Great Powers. Their large area, large population, large economic potential, and great readiness for war, enable them to carry out tasks which others are unable to shoulder. But these same features characterize the enemy Powers as well. They are quite independent of their constitution and political attitude. Since, then, these innate characteristics make the Great Powers into pillars supporting the vault of the world structure, how can recognition be refused to those which are to-day on the other side in this world conflict? Germany and Japan are indubitably Great Powers. France whose precise status as a Great Power is not yet clear, has every chance of regaining its former importance sooner or later. If, therefore, Prof. Carr's formula is to be regarded as a really constructive suggestion, of universal application, it must somehow be made to cover them as well.

But it does not do this. In reality it is not at all a suggestion of universal application, but a practical attempt to find a way out of the embarrassment in which certain financial circles unexpectedly find themselves in consequence of the second world war. It is an attempt theoretically to prolong a temporary coalition of heterogeneous Powers, whom circumstances have ranged on the same side in this war. Hence arises the idea of completing the system of security based on the co-operation of these Powers by assigning to them particular regional spheres of influence. According to this conception the United States is to return to its Monroe Doctrine of 1823. No one will interfere in American affairs, but it is not expected, either, that the United States will take an active interest in Europe. China, to which the status of a Great Power is now granted by courtesy, is to remain alone in face of the rest of Asia and its own difficulties. And in Europe there is to be a division, after the model of Locarno, into a western and an eastern zone. But now the controlling influence in the eastern zone is to be that of Russia, instead of Germany's.



Solutions and views of the future such as these threaten to lead only to disillusionment.

A return to the principles of the Holy Alliance, though in modernized forms, is nowadays unthinkable. At the epoch of the Holy Alliance Democracy was non-existent, either in the countries whose rulers created it or anywhere else. Nowadays, on the other hand, Democracy is a strong force in the lives of nations, whether it be already realized or an aspiration for the future, and the world would not permit its extinguishment. The nations of Europe are so deeply attached to their own ways of life that a new system of totalitarian force would have to be built up *against* them in order to make them renounce them. This they would resist as stubbornly as they do the German "New Order," though it had behind it the sanction of all the Great Powers. But indeed such a system could not arise, for it would be impossible to reconcile with democracy in the Anglo-Saxon countries. One cannot imagine that Great Britain and the United States could ever, so long as they retain their present institutions, be tempted to establish world peace on the basis of force. It would not be peace, of course, for it would end in a war of all against all.

The permanent value of the Treaty of Versailles lies in the fact that it was the first attempt to base peace on legal principles, applicable to all States alike. The Treaty led to disappointment, as did the League of Nations connected with it. But this was not because the tasks undertaken was too great, or actually impossible of fulfilment, but because the strength to fulfil it, failed to work. The task always faces the world. To-day it is more urgent than ever. Total war will have to be followed by total peace. After the victory of the United Nations over the aggressor States the peace cannot be based on the principle of force between nations, any more than it can between individuals in social life. Its foundation must be law, exalted above force and supported by the organised strength of the Democratic States. The peace must introduce the principle of democracy into international relations, and thus extend its substance and range. The realism underlying this peace must show itself in the righteous organization of the strength upholding it, and in the accompanying guarantee of existence and opportunity for free development for all States alike, large, medium-sized, and small. The task is very difficult, but it must now be taken up and carried through, if the world is not to relapse into chaos.



The recognition of a Russian hegemony in Eastern Europe would

inexorably lead to the recognition, in the not distant future, of a similar German hegemony in Central and South-Eastern Europe. For what is the actual meaning of Prof. Carr's remark about Russia's frontier being the Oder? Like the Rhine, in Baldwin's conception, in the West, the Oder is to form a line of demarcation of German power in the East. But, as every one knows, this Baldwin's Rhine frontier failed to hold. The Germans broke through it, after securing themselves in the East by their pact with Russia and their conquest of Poland. The question must therefore be faced: What force in Europe is to keep the Germans in future permanently within the limits assigned to them, and guarantee that these shall not be passed? Is it to be that of only two countries, Britain and Russia? What part is to be played by the other European countries, with their two hundred millions of inhabitants? If the areas occupied by the medium-sized and small States are to remain in their present condition, separate and at odds with one another, while the only Great Power is Russia, there can be no doubt at all but that Germany will soon regain its former strength and importance. Great Britain would not be in a position to prevent it, the Continental countries would be helpless, and Russia would—as always—pursue its own interests.

Such prospects are not in any way contradicted by the future aspect of Europe as outlined in Marshal Smut's well-known speech of November 25th, 1943. The gist of the speech lies in statement that "Russia is the New Colossus in Europe." The other Continental powers—states Marshal Smuts—have ceased to exist. "Italy has completely disappeared and may never be a Great Power again," "France has gone and will be gone in our day and perhaps for many a day." Germany, by the end of the war will have disappeared also and probably will never rise again in its old form. When, however, Marshal Smuts speaks of the disappearance of France and Italy, he is satisfied with a dry acknowledgment of their inglorious end. Where as he refers to Germany with no concealed respect: "The Germans are a great people, with great qualities and Germany is inherently a great country." For this very reason he prudently advises that Great Britain, in her European policy after the war, should be content with a closer rapprochement to the small Western European democracies. The rest of Europe is not mentioned. The remaining parts lie precisely to the West and South of Russia, and to the East and South of Germany. From this one may be surely allowed to infer that, according to Marshal Smuts, the rule of the "Russian Colossus" is to extend over these

territories, and that there also in future the new German influence will have to recover its ground.



There are already many signs indicating that the revival of German power in post-war Europe would not be unwelcome to Russia. In a speech delivered on the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Revolution, on November 6, 1942, Stalin said: " Our aim is not to destroy all armed force in Germany, because any intelligent man will understand that this is as impossible as in the case of Russia. It would be unreasonable on the part of the victor to do so. To destroy Hitler's army is possible and necessary." From these words one may conclude that Russia would like to preserve Germany in Europe, as an independent political factor. Germany is necessary to Russia, as a country sufficiently strong to be able to serve in case of need as a counterpoise to other factors in world politics. This conception is a sort of Russian version of the British doctrine of the Balance of Power, turned against its original authors ; and it would not be the first time that Russia employed it. In 1922, April 16, shortly after the last war, Russia concluded in Rapallo a treaty with Germany, in order to oppose the Western European Powers. Why, then, should it not repeat this attempt in the future, on a much larger scale ? In that case it would no longer be the watchman guarding Germany in the East in the name of the Anglo-Soviet Agreement. It would be more like Germany's ally, and afterwards its partner in ruling Europe.

It must not be forgotten that Stalin has until now kept a perfectly free hand to deal with post-war problems, irrespective of the desires of his allies. This attitude he emphasized still further by founding at Moscow on July 13, 1943, a " National Committee of Free Germany." The committee's manifesto, of course, makes no mention of " unconditional surrender." On the contrary, it is declared that when the German nation has overthrown Hitler " it will win for itself the right to decide its own fate, and other countries will have to reckon with it." The German revolutionary government will enjoy the confidence " of the peoples of the Powers at war with Germany," and will be able to " enter into negotiations for peace." Of the disarmament of Germany after the war the manifesto says not a word. In fact it gives the Germans the assurance that their territory will remain intact. For the rest the " National Committee of Free Germany " appeals not so much to the revolutionary elements as to the army. The hall in

which it met at Moscow was decorated with the "Black-White-Red" of the German Empire.

The *Tribune* wrote of this committee shortly after its foundation: "The policy of the Free German Committee was not revolutionary, or in any way outspokenly Left. It appealed to the patriotic Germans in the name of Clausewitz, Stein, and Arndt, who led the rising against Napoleon a hundred and thirty years ago. They appealed in the name of Bismarck for Germany's true foreign policy of friendship with Russia above all else. They appealed to the Germans to avert another 1918 and save German integrity, independence, strength, and the German Army."

What basis is there, therefore, for the belief that Russia will be content to confine itself to the role assigned to it, and will not extend it in accordance with its own designs?



One wonders why those circles which are in close touch with *The Times* are so opposed to any post-war settlement which would ensure to all countries alike the chance of development, and at the same time at exercising co-ordinating influence in all zones? Why do they continue to reject the principle of collective security? The answer would seem to be that the British financial circles have grown up in an atmosphere, not of co-operation, but of competition. Hence Big Business would prefer that the world should continue to be governed by the principle of the "free play of forces." Since, however, that liberal idea, transferred to international relations, can no longer hold its ground, Big Business draws the same conclusion as in the commercial sphere when free competition ceases to be advantageous: it has recourse to the idea of a *Kartell*. To dominate the market all that is necessary is an agreement between the large competitors. To preserve world peace, then, all that is necessary is an agreement between the Great Powers. The interests of the medium-sized and small nations must be cheerfully subordinated to the requirements of such an agreement.

But there is also another answer, much more practical in character. Great Britain has now ceased to be the leading world-power, its place having been taken by the United States, competition with which in the future will be hardly possible. But in Russia there will still be an enormous field for British economic activity. And the closer is the understanding between Britain and Russia, the greater will this field be. Russia accommodates both its foreign trade and the economic concessions it may grant to the changing posture of international affairs. Close friendship with

Russia would give British commercial circles greater freedom in their future dealings with their American competitors. Accordingly these circles have come to think that a *rapprochement* with Russia, even at the cost of a certain advancement of its frontier towards the West, might in certain circumstances be decidedly advantageous. Very similar arguments affected the same circles, no long time since, in their attitude to Germany:



Also in some sections of the Left there are in Great Britain circles inclined to recognize the principle of the predominance of the Great Powers over the smaller States, and to divide Europe into separate zones, in which the former may exercise individual influence. In the train of the great political and social movements, Socialist or Liberal in tendency, there are always idealists to be found, ready to solve the most difficult problems by the aid of abstract reasoning. Seeking a clew to lead them through the labyrinth of reality, they gladly grasp at various formulas promising salvation, particularly when they are recommended by an appearance of "realism" or "progressivism." In face of actual European problems they are as helpless as children. They ignore these problems on purely abstract notions. They easily indulge in fictive reasoning far from reality. Their motives are humanitarian and economic. Their argumentation is pacifist and progressive. But the final conclusions which they draw do not differ much from those put forward by the supporters of the principle of force, the out-and-out reactionaries, and the advocates of capitalist interests.

For these Left Wing circles Soviet Russia is both a myth and a symbol. They assume that everything that happens in Russia is directed to the promotion of Socialism in its most perfect form. Russia is the home of the Proletariate, which amid difficulties, struggles, and sufferings is creating for the world a model of future human society. There is no capitalism there left, and there never will be. There is general equality. Russia has succeeded in uniting many nationalities, speaking more than a hundred languages, in a harmonious community, based on the principles of Socialism and Federalism.

It is true that accounts come through of life in Soviet Russia which are hard to explain, and not seldom all but incredible. No freedom of conscience, of speech, or of the press; interference of the Ogpu in public and private life; no independent judiciary; deportation of whole nations into the distant Steppes of Asia;

millions forced to work in labour camps ; exploitation of workers recalling the worst days of early capitalism ;—all these show the exalted ideal in a curious and uncertain light. The imagination fails to form a concrete picture of what is happening ; but what does penetrate the mind is sufficient to start one thinking and seeking an explanation. It is difficult indeed to find one, though in principle it is not impossible. Fate caused Socialism to find its first realization in a very primitive country. It must therefore, if it is to exist at all, reckon with its actual groundwork. Consequently it cannot but show not only symptoms of diseases natural to the young, but also features due to local and pre-capitalist shortcomings, unforeseen by Marx. One must therefore show sympathetic understanding of them, which is all the easier that these shortcomings do not detract from the value of this basic Soviet experiment, nor destroy its chances of development. Moreover, throughout the world of white men there is no other State like Russia, at the same time primitive and Socialist. There is accordingly no fear of the ugly sides of the Soviet system repeating themselves anywhere else. Considered with these reservations, the picture afforded by Russia seems to keep all its positive values.

But the consciences of the pro-Soviet enthusiasts are not entirely at rest. The events and manifestations of Soviet life are sometimes so unlike what are regarded as the minimum standards of community life in the civilized world, that they suggest the startling question whether what is happening in Russia is to be regarded merely as a symptom of immaturity, or whether it is not rather a symptom of degeneration. But this question can only be answered after a serious reconsideration of the whole problem. So it has been quickly suppressed. Those who have approached it have told themselves that at all costs the symbol at least must be preserved, though there be nothing actual behind it. For the symbol, itself alone, has far-reaching significance. If it were cast aside, catastrophe might threaten the whole idea. Thus a wide gulf has come into being between the theoretically deduced, exaggerated idea of Russia's value, and its actual essence and activities. Thus the pusillanimous attempt has been made to save the truth of the ideal by concealing the falseness of the symbol. Thus the self-delusion produced by averting the eyes from the Soviet reality has obtained ideological sanction and become a tactical requirement.

These plays of thought are not, for the rest, completely devoid of practical significance. For one thing, Soviet experience justifies the conclusion that Socialism in its totalitarian form would not be



suitcd to countries which have ripened to Democracy. It would not be in the least fitted for introduction into Great Britain. Nor would the other countries of Western Europe find it acceptable.

Logically, this argument should appeal to every country which has no desire to become a satellite of Russia. But in practice we find that the States and nations of the Central European zone reject it, since they are not tacitly included in the tacit defence of Western Democratic culture. Many of the Left Wing publicists in Britain presumably think that if any sacrifice to the Soviet symbol must be made, it had better be one or two of these nations of the second rank. Thus pro-Soviet propaganda as carried on by a certain section of Liberal and Labour publicists in Britain runs on twofold lines: for internal listeners Russia is only "our gallant Ally," while for the countries of Central Europe it is to be protector, ally, and guarantor of their development towards Socialism. Hence results an inevitable conflict with the desires of the Central European nations involved. For Russia for them is not a phantom of the imagination, or a symbol, or a myth; it is a powerful neighbour with predatory inclinations. The protection and guardianship of a weak country by a strong one has most frequently been of doubtful value. The alliance of a strong Power with a weak one has always hitherto throughout the course of history turned to the advantages of the stronger, whenever there was any difference of interests between them. And the guidance of Russia on the road to Socialism would be tolerable only to such countries as desired to have exactly the same form of Socialism as is to be found to-day in Russia. Moreover, it must always be borne in mind that the Western frontier of Russia is not, like other frontiers, merely a border-line between two States, but is a line separating two areas with quite different cultures. Russia, apart altogether from its governmental and social institutions, is a specifically Eurasian area, quite unlike Europe. Surrendering the Central European nations to the control and influence of Moscow would be equivalent to trying to force them to give up their way of life, learnt from Europe.

The pro-Soviet orientation of these Left-Wing circles in Great Britain leads them in practice to much the same point as *The Times* to reviving the ideas of Locarno, and dividing Europe into a western zone, deserving protection and actually getting it, and an eastern one, not deserving protection and thrown to the wolves. The difference is merely that at Locarno the wolves were the Germans, sponsored by French and British capitalists; whereas now, in the

intention of these British Left-Wing publicists, they are to be the Russians.



Soviet propaganda has whole rich range of colours at its disposal. It clothes its designs and intentions in all the hues of the rainbow, variously combined. It speaks to everyone and tries to address each in his own language. An interval of only a few minutes separates Moscow's "Christian" and "Slavonic" broadcasts, and both of these, in turn, from Polish or German talks. In the "Christian" broadcasts a Soviet Christian recommends to the care of the Blessed Virgin a Europe tormented by Hitler, the anti-Christ; absolves Roman Catholics from scruples of conscience in their struggle with the irreconcilable enemy of Christ; and calls upon them to liberate the Holy Father from Satans oppression. In the Slavonic broadcasts, a Soviet Slav calls upon all Slavs to unite under the wing of Russia, the greatest Slav nation, in the name of racial brotherhood; it urges them to fight against Germany, the eternal foes of the Slavs, and recalls the struggles of the Slavonic world against the Germanic avalanche, from the early Middle Ages, through the victories of Alexander Nevsky and Ladislas Jagellon over the Teutonic Knights, down to the victories of Stalin. In the Polish broadcasts a Soviet Pole, pretending to speak on behalf of the Polish nation, proclaims the readiness of Poland to incorporate with Russia under the guardianship of Stalin, the father of the oppressed. He calls "all our fellow-countrymen," "irrespective of status or political views," to agree together in the one idea of uniting in brotherhood with their great Soviet neighbour, their only saviour and guardian. In the German broadcasts it is promised that after the victory of Russia, Germany will rise again in her full might and greatness and will be, besides Russia, the strongest State in Europe.

British Left-Wing circles, on the other hand, are approached in a different tone. Appeal is made to their revolutionary sentiments. Russia it is said is the home of the victorious social revolution, and for that very reason was treated with injustice at the end of the last war. Regions were torn from it to build up a series of small States, reactionary and nationalistic, along its Western frontier. Thus it was fenced off from Europe and excluded from co-operation with the Western Democracies, while Germany was strengthened. Now Russia must regain its influence over Central Europe, in order to be able to defend it against fresh German aggression, and at the same time become the leader of the peoples of Europe in their

progress towards Socialism. If Russia is to be able to do this, the "Versailles barrier" extending from the Baltic to the Black Sea must be abolished. In point of fact (it is said) the States conterminous with Russia desire to belong to the family of Soviet nations. Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have already incorporated themselves with Russia. After the occupation of Poland (it is said) the eastern half of the country did the same. The governments of the U.K. and the U.S.A. decline to recognise this action. The task of the left wing in these countries is therefore to force their governments to agree to these changes, in the interests of the victory of the international proletariat. In the Balkans also the revolutionary elements in Rumania, Bulgaria, Jugoslavia, and Greece, desire a closer understanding between those countries and Russia. The Left Wing in Britain should force the government to support this desire. When Russia has thus strengthened its western frontier, it will at last be able to breathe freely, without fear of attack from the West. In this way, pleading the needs of revolution and defence, Russia presents its friends in Great Britain with its old programme of expansion in Europe, the foundations of which were laid by Peter the Great.



Comprehended as part of this scheme, the dissolution of the Comintern in May, 1943, must be regarded as not too successful a proceeding. The Comintern had long ceased to be the central point of the world revolution, and had become merely an instrument of Soviet State policy. Its last activity as such, planned on a large scale, was to hamper the British and French war efforts, during the opening stages of the present war. At that time Russia was allied with Germany, and the Comintern's propaganda against "imperialist war" in the Democratic countries was one of the means to manifest the collaboration of Russia with the Reich. At present Russia desires to obtain British and American consent to the extension of its influence in Europe. It has accordingly come to the conclusion that the more timid elements of public opinion, particularly in America, must be reassured, and told that a Russian *Lobensraum* in Europe is not equivalent to a threat of world revolution. This step, however, is not of great practical significance. Responsible political circles are well aware that the Soviet world revolution has long ceased to be a political factor to be reckoned with. It still retains a certain nuisance value; it may even some time cause confusion; but nowadays it is less threatening than ever, even from this point of view. The fact that Russia now courteously

demonstrates its renunciation of the slogan does to a certain extent help to clear the atmosphere. Russian expansionist claims will no longer be bolstered up behind a smoke-screen of universalist phrases. They can be treated as what in fact they are: an expression of the traditional Russian policy of conquest.

Quite unexpectedly the truth was realized by that branch of the British Left Wing press which usually greeted with enthusiasm anything that happened in Russia. *The New Statesman and Nation* wrote concerning the decision to dissolve the Comintern: "In short, Stalin scrapped the Third International because he is a tough realist who wants something from the United States, and he knows that the Comintern bred suspicion."



Some publicists of the British Left Wing, readily influenced as they are by the myth of Soviet Russia, are at least as readily accessible to its propaganda. Nor is this, after all, difficult to understand. Since they have agreed in their hearts to the opening of a way for Russia into the centre of Europe, they find it convenient to employ the arguments offered them by Russia in support of such a policy. Accordingly numerous articles may be read, in such in representative Left-Wing periodicals as the *New Statesman and Nation* or the *Tribune*, arguing that it is essential for Russia's security that it should advance its western frontier and obtain a decisive influence on the east of Europe. A Soviet hegemony over this zone will secure it once for all against attack from the West, and at the same time will increase the happiness of the States and nations within its range. Such argumentation implies the triumph of the imaginary Russia, myth and symbol, over the real one. The role of good-natured guardian of small nations is assigned to Russia solely because it plays it in the myth.

As these circles conceive it, the idea of Russian leadership in Eastern Europe is bound up with the hope that German Democracy will play a useful part in the post-war world. They firmly believe that it is only under the pressure of Hitler's dictatorship that the German nation agrees to the waging of war. When that dictatorship has fallen, it will return to peaceful co-operation with its neighbours, and carry on the democratic policy of the Weimar Republic, interrupted by the Nazi episode. So it is necessary to disarm Germany, but not to destroy its heavy industry, which at present serves the purposes of war. One has to believe that the democratization of Germany will turn it to the pursuit of peaceful aims. The German nation should not be humiliated by severe

conditions of peace and oppressive reparation indemnities. That would lower the standard of living in Germany, would encourage nationalist instincts among both victors and vanquished, and hamper the moral renaissance after the war.

It is amazing to find how close these views come to the main theme not only of Soviet propaganda, but also of German. The Germans have their own Third-Reich propaganda, which will now be increasingly out of harmony with the world at large ; but beside it there exists also a Fourth-Reich propaganda, boosting a Reich which does not yet exist, but which will begin to do so immediately after the war. Its advocates are drawn from various classes of "good Germans," from mutinous Nazis who have quarrelled with their Fuehrer, through Conservatives and Catholics, to Socialists and Communists. They all speak in different tones, but say the same: the collapse of the Third Reich ought not to be followed by the destruction of Germany as a Great Power. The Germans are the largest nation and the most industrialized State in Europe. As a Great Power it is necessary to Europe and the world. In the future it will disseminate the principles of order, progress and culture among the other nations. The closer the co-operation between the victorious powers and vanquished Germany, the greater will be the resulting advantage for all. In certain circles of the British Left Wing these propagandist statements of the Fourth Reich are taken at their face value and repeated as the final expression of political wisdom.

The union of Soviet and German influences, affecting the ideology of certain politicians and publicists of the Left Wing, produces an outlook on the post-war world which does not much differ from that professed by financial circles in the City. The fate of Europe in the eastern zone is to be entrusted to Russia; while in the West Germany is to maintain its importance and strength. The medium-sized and small States are to be subject to the guardianship—which means subordinated to the interests—of the Great Powers. This harmony however paradoxical it may seem, is not affected by the difference in phraseology of argumentation. The arguments employed by the Left Wing consist in appeals to realism, economic nationalism, social progress, cosmopolitanism, pacifism, and sometimes to downright socialism and revolutionary theory. But even so the concurrence is sometimes revealed in a rather amusing way. For example, once when *The Times* withdrew some of its exaggerated praise of the principles of the Holy Alliance and some of its arguments in favour of reviving it in a modernized form, the

*New Statesman and Nation* expressed its regret at the opportunism exhibited by *The Times* and sharply rebuked it.



One wonders how it is that a certain section of Left-Wing publicists has come to take such a peculiar view. Everywhere in the world the natural role of radicalism is the defence of the weak against the strong, and instinctive resistance to the principle of force. To support the future balance of post-war forces on nothing but the superior strength of the Great Powers is not progress, nor is it new. It is merely the consecration of a world-old principle, and an admission of anarchy in international relations. The lack of any higher code of conduct between States leads to the stronger dominating the weaker, and the more powerful subjugating or swallowing up the less powerful ; whereas progress in the common life of nations, as of individuals, means the subordination of brute force to the principle of law, supported by force. Such was the ideal of the creators of the League of Nations, and the Atlantic Charter points in the same direction. A return to the principle of force is a symptom of retrogression.

In appearance the belief in it is supported by realistic considerations. For what can be more convincing in politics than an actually existent force ? And yet, on closer observation, the whole argumentation in favour of entrusting the fortunes of Europe to Russia and Germany turns out to be based on an unbroken series of illusions. It is an illusion, in the first place, to suppose Russia capable of tolerating within its sphere of influence any social structure, or any way of life, differing from its own. In virtue of its very essence as a totalitarian State, Russia is universalistic. Hence its inclination to territorial expansion and to the destruction of all manifestations of social life unlike its own. For this reason Russia may swallow up other States whenever a favourable opportunity offers, but it cannot co-ordinate their varying types with its own. No comforting declarations by Soviet rulers can alter this fact. It is an illusion, again, to suppose that Germany could fill such a role after the war in Central or Western Europe without danger to those zones. The belief in German Democracy turned out to be delusive after the last war. What grounds are there for putting trust in it to-day, when the last traces of democratic movements have been blotted out ? There is no doubt that twenty years of Nazi agitation and ten years of Hitler's rule have not inclined Germany to sincere and active acceptance of democratic principles immediately after losing a second war. Still less credible is it that

any socialist regime can soon take root there. And finally it is the worst illusion of all to imagine that, if Europe were divided into German and Russian spheres of influence, an understanding between those States could in any way promote the spread of socialism. The vanquished totalitarian system of Hitler and the victorious one of Stalin might at most, if united, give birth to some monstrous mean between the two. That would be a peculiar "re-education" of Germany on Russian totalitarian principles, leading to a new kind of social structure in Europe, hostile to democracy. Socialism, both as an ideal and as a movement, would be threatened with complete catastrophe.

Again it is perfectly illusory to count on the sluggishness and inactivity of the nations subjected to the hegemony of Russia or of Germany. Their histories are different, as are their present levels of development and their aspirations. But all alike are devoted to their own mode of existence and their own forms of life. For many of them that form is democracy. These nations have proved in years, sometimes centuries, of struggle that they are capable of resisting superior force. The technique of government as applied by the totalitarian States does indeed permit the exercise of violence against millions of people, and the physical destruction of very great centres of resistance. But if such a task had to be undertaken against the two hundred millions who constitute the population of Eastern Europe, it would be equivalent to the renewal of war, in somewhat altered form, for none knows how long a time.

These illusions, and many others which are bound up with them, did not affect so many Left-Wing publicists in Great Britain without some reason. The Munich front cut across all ideological divisions. On the Right were "guilty men," defenders of British vested interests in Germany, ideologists and representatives of the "traitor class," who defended Hitler and Mussolini, Franco and the Japanese *samurai*, in the hope that these in turn would defend their privileges, not only against Russian Communism, but, still more, against their own class opponents. And on the Left, the advocates of British disarmament—themselves morally completely disarmed—proclaimed that Germany had been wronged by the Treaty of Versailles, that Nazism was a manifestation of protest on the part of the German people, that Germany's rearmament was to be tolerated in the name of equal rights as between nations, and other such nonsense. Between the representatives of these two wings of British Appeasement policy, which existed long before it reached its culminating point at Munich, there was very much in

common. Both groups alike felt a natural aloofness from European affairs. Both shuddered at the ever more pressing necessity for taking a decision which would plunge Great Britain directly into the European maelstrom. On the Right this attitude was presented as a "struggle for peace," ostentatious sacrifices were made to secure it, and here and there it was even sincerely believed that "peace in our time" could be attained. On the Left, this traditional, conservative, and fundamentally reactionary, policy was disguised under a thick veil of fine words: cosmopolitanism, pacifism, humanitarianism, or socialism. Both wings alike based their policy on the tacit assumption that Hitler's word could be trusted: the most serious illusion of all.

The idea of appeasement dies hard. It still exists in Great Britain as it has done for so many years, and from time to time it makes itself vocal. It is this idea which now inspires Right and Left Wings alike with their desire to settle the affairs of Europe and the world by proxy, through the mediation of the most likely agents, the Continental Powers. It is this, too, which inspires the desire to apply the principles of Locarno to the future, and divide the security of Europe into an eastern and a western zone. The advocates of this fresh appeasement, from whichever political party they come, are terrified at the thought that the war is shaking Europe so deeply that Great Britain will be compelled to renounce all the traditions of its former policy. They would like to save what they can of their country's insularity, as they did at Munich. They cannot bring themselves to see the new vision of Europe and the world, or the consequent vision of Great Britain's new tasks in a changed world. They would prefer, though they do not admit it, that Great Britain should abdicate in Europe.

Churchill takes a more sober view of the future of British policy. He said as early as 1940: "The palm of victory in this war will be the responsibility for the fate of the world."



#### IV. CENTRAL-EASTERN EUROPE

The area of Central-Eastern Europe is one of the most sensitive politically in the whole of Europe. It has for centuries been the meeting-ground of manifold influences from all the four quarters of the earth. In the later part of the seventeenth and in the eighteenth century Russian pressure upon it increased in the East, and German in the West. Russia designed to dominate it and thereby to extend its influence in Central and Western Europe and obtain access to the Mediterranean. For Germany the conquest of the area meant the opening of the way for expansion towards the Near East. German and Russian influences combined to keep central-eastern Europe politically disunited and economically stagnant throughout the nineteenth and the early part of the twentieth century. To the rivalry between these two countries was due the continually increasing Balkanization, not only of the Balkan Peninsula itself, but also of the whole broad strip of territory between the Baltic and the Black Sea and Mediterranean.

This state of affairs lasted almost unchanged through the period between the two world wars. The Treaty-makers of Versailles had confined themselves to restoring the independence of some nations which had at one time or another lost it, and to the creation of a number of new independent national States. But they never thought of undertaking the task of grouping all the States in the area in such a way as to ensure their independence and capacity to resist their powerful neighbours, nor did they aim at facilitating their economic development. Accordingly Central-Eastern Europe continued to be contentious, internally weak, and politically dependent. It was incapable either of defending itself, or of taking a useful part in the maintenance of collective security.

To-day the problem of Central-Eastern Europe remains essentially unchanged. One of the war aims of the Third Reich is to open the path for German expansion to the Near East, just as it was a quarter of a century ago. Russia openly admits its design of acquiring a strategic frontier in the West, which is equivalent to political domination of Central-Eastern Europe. And the States situated in that region manifest ever-increasing disquiet concerning their future prospects of existence and development in a changed world.

The integration of the central-eastern zone is one of the essential conditions for the maintenance of peace and security, not only in



Europe, but throughout the world. After the defeat of Germany, Russia will still continue to put forward claims to influence in that zone ; and Germany, excluded for a time from any share in great political decisions, will still not cease to be a potential factor of great importance. For Great Britain the idea of direct action on the Continent is quite new, and for that reason is received in some circles with extreme caution. If Great Britain is unwilling to show a strong enough initiative in Continental affairs, America can hardly be expected to show greater readiness. Consequently the political stabilization of the European Continent *from within* not only must be one of the war aims of the United Nations, but is at the same time the chief condition of their practical co-operation in the future. The main outlines of this stabilization must be sketched now, if the future peace is not to bring a series of still greater disillusionments and disappointments than did the Treaty of Versailles.



Among the problems connected with the stabilization of Europe that of Germany takes the key position. Even a defeated Germany will not lose its central geographical position, nor such features as its large population, its great technical and organizing ability, and its extensive system of communications. In this respect it will be necessary to take account of it as a permanent element in Europe. Its military occupation after the war, even though it last for long years, will be essentially a temporary measure, the purpose of which will be limited to ensuring that the provisions of the peace treaty are carried out. Disarmament and economic reparations will undoubtedly weaken Germany for a certain time, and render it incapable of soon waging a war of revenge. But by themselves these measures will be insufficient to prevent the country from again preparing for war at a later time. The permanent assurance of Europe against renewed German aggression requires not only suitable action against Germany, but also, perhaps to a still greater degree, the political and economic strengthening of the countries adjacent to it. In particular the Central European zone must be so constructed in the future as to convince any potential aggressor in advance of the hopelessness of aggression.

Here and there the idea finds favour that Germany might be divided up into several smaller States, and its existence as a Great Power thereby ended. Such an expedient, however, would assuredly fail in the long run. Germany is undoubtedly a nation. Symptoms of local or dynastic separation belong to the past and are of minor significance. The effect of any attempts to desintegrate Germany

would be the raising in the German people of a strong tendency to strive once more for unity. In such a effort for reunion, which has its precedents in the German history of the previous century, all vindictive tendencies would focus themselves. Any disintegration of Germany could certainly not endure. It might, on the contrary, prove harmful in so far as certain victorious powers might be induced to believe of his disintegration to be a sufficient guarantee of security against German aggressiveness. It would provide the Germans with a pretext to elude any really effective clauses of the Treaty.

The difficulty of solving the problem of the future position of Germany in Europe, added to the fact that the interests of certain British circles are bound up with those of Germany, has led to the budding of a directly opposite idea : that, namely, of preserving the power of Germany undiminished in the future. The *Grossraum* doctrine, as served up to suit the Anglo-Saxon taste by Prof. E. H. Carr, is a manifestation of this tendency. Of course, it is hoped that it will be "a different Germany" that will be thus perpetuated. G. D. M. Cole, again, asserts that the unity of Europe has become an accomplished fact during the course of the present war, and that it would be an act of barbarism to destroy it again, merely because it was realized by Hitler. It would be better to get rid of what is bad in that unity : viz., the oppression and exploitation of other nations by Germany, while preserving the principle.

This view however, takes no account of the obvious fact that the Europe united during the war by Germany would remain in future under German hegemony if Germany were allowed to continue its co-ordinating activity. Throughout the Continent the economics, technical development, and finances of all the occupied and satellite countries are now subordinated to the requirements of the German war effort, and constitute part of the great European war machine led by Germany. Not one of these countries has preserved a trace of independence, either political or economic. Not one of them, without great changes, would now be capable of independent existence and development, if Germany's predominance were ended. What Hitler calls the unification of Europe was designed among other things to make hitherto independent countries into differentiated components of a German colonial empire in Europe. This aim has been realized. But such a state of things can be maintained only so long as these countries are forced to serve Germany. When the German directing centre ceases to exist, their political orientation and their economics must accommodate themselves to the new situation. The collapse of German power will mean not only the

diminution of Germany's preparedness for war, but also the abolition of that artificial unity of servitude which it has created to bolster up its own dominion. If that unity were to be preserved at all, in any form, then Germany would continue to be the dominating nation in Europe. No political provisions of a peace treaty, no long occupation of territory, no territorial diminution, and no partitioning of Germany into small States, could alter that fact. And on the other hand, the economic domination of Germany over the remainder of the Continent would soon deprive such measures of all sense and render them meaningless.

There is no other way of preventing such a course of events, save only the fundamental transformation of Europe, economic and political, so that it shall in future be independent of Germany. It will not be sufficient merely to destroy the German system built up during this war. The medium-sized and small States, left to themselves, would indubitably be incapable of preserving their freedom in a changed world. They must therefore now be integrated, on a basis of free co-operation; and above all this is true of the central-eastern zone, the most broken, ravaged, and economically backward area in the whole Continent. The proper integration of this zone will mean the rise, in the centre of Europe, between Germany and Russia, of a strong bloc of solidly united nations, capable of an independent existence and large enough to take its share in the future organization of the world. At the same time it will form a barrier sufficiently strong to prevent future German penetration into the Near East. The existence of such a bloc cannot, of course, be reconciled with German plans for exercising a hegemony over Europe, in whatever form. For that very reason such a bloc, properly constituted and strongly armed, would be a more successful and permanent means for securing the future peace of Europe than any other which could be devised.



The desire of Soviet Russia to extend its influence over the Central European zone is expressed in its demand for a "strategic frontier," as an assurance against aggression from the West. It is not, of course, the medium-sized and small States within that zone of which Russia is afraid. The only danger that threatens is from the side of Germany. If the Central-European zone were destined to remain in that state of political and economic disorganization in which it was before the present war, it would be incapable of resisting German pressure, or of successfully shielding Russia on the West. On the other hand, if "European unity" were to be preserved in the future

no matter in what form, that zone would be completely dependent on Germany, which would still further increase the danger. In that case Russia would have to expect strong, and permanent, German pressure on its Western frontier. The result would be, probably at once after the war, a desire on the part of Russia to come to an understanding with Germany for the purpose of averting a direct conflict and establishing zones of influence in Europe, at least for some time. Nevertheless, the possibility of conflict would always be there, and would set its stamp on the whole of European policy. Very similar relations existed between Russia and Germany when the Non-Aggression Pact was signed on August 23, 1939.

The domination by Russia over the Central European zone on its western frontier, whether brought about by annexation, or by some indirect formula, would not, despite appearances, lead to any favourable result. It would not in the least increase the security of Russia. Nor would it strengthen the European structure. The nations inhabiting those regions have a strong feeling for their own distinct national characters and cultures. Their way of life is completely different from the Russian. In the course of long centuries they have learnt successfully to defend themselves against absorption by stronger neighbours. Long periods of foreign rule, German, Russian, or Turkish, have proved insufficient to make them lose their nationality. Any attempt to put them under Russian domination after the present war would meet with the most decided opposition on their part, and that in turn would lead to the increase of Russian pressure. This, again, would open a field for German intrigue, designed to encourage decentralizing and anti-Russian movements in the frontier region. Russia would not be willing to tolerate such a state of things in its own "security zone," and would try to combat it. The resulting ferment would rather weaken than strengthen Russia in the zone adjacent to Germany.

From the economic point of view also, Russian hegemony in the central-eastern zone would be disadvantageous in its results. The security of Russia requires the development of its economic strength in regions lying far to the east of its European frontier. The course of the present war has shown the advisability of such a transference, and has hastened its process. Accordingly, it would be in the interests of Russia to discourage, rather than promote, the economic development of the whole western zone subject to its influence. Hence it would doubtless aim at preventing industrial growth, not only in the western provinces which it might annex, but also in those which it might bring into indirect dependence. A peculiar "secu-

rity belt" would be established ; a kind of economic no man's land, insulating it from its western neighbours. The effect of such a policy on that part of Central-Eastern Europe which was not directly incorporated in the U.S.S.R. would be paradoxical : a fresh increase of German influence. Deprived for the future of all opportunity for industrialization, the zone would continue to be complementary to the German industrial economy.

Moreover, Russia is one of the few States in the world really inclined to a policy of economic autarky. The extension of its influence and the occupation by it of fresh territories would therefore not increase world trade, but would actually diminish it. For the countries of Central-Eastern Europe their inclusion within the framework of a primitive Soviet autarkic system would be equivalent to their withdrawal from Europe. This again would indirectly contribute to the strengthening of Germany. The zone can only play its part successfully as a factor of security if the economic forces which it possesses can be purposefully developed in close union with those of the world as a whole, in order to create the material basis for resistance to German expansion.

This consideration must have at the same time a decisive effect on the whole course of Central-Eastern European policy. The attention of all the nations inhabiting the zone must be directed to the preservation of peace in the West. It is unthinkable that they should take up an attitude of hostility, or even of uncertainty, towards Russia. An area lying between two great Continental powers cannot afford to repeat the mistake of trying to preserve an "unstable equilibrium" and balance helplessly between its neighbours. The basis of Central European foreign policy must therefore be the maintenance of close relations with Russia, founded on political pacts and on permanent economic co-operation on predetermined lines. If the Central European zone becomes well-knit and permanent in its structure, it will be capable not only of ensuring the existence and development of the nations composing it, but also of fulfilling its task of maintaining the balance of Europe, and thus of the world. In that case Russia will not be compelled to seek a *rapprochement* with Germany, which would only be another impermanent form of unstable equilibrium, masking the ever-present threat of armed conflict hanging over both countries. It would attain permanent equilibrium if it had on its western frontier a strong and friendly combination of States, capable and determined to resist German aggression.

The political and economic organization of the central-eastern

zone as a homogenous area is indubitably one of the most difficult tasks which the present war has brought into prominence. The burden of it will rest above all on the nations inhabiting the area. It will be the more difficult, that hitherto all federations of States have arisen either on account of dynastic interests, or as a result of conquest. Now for the first time the establishment of a large new political entity will have to be accomplished by the nations composing it themselves, for their own good. The support of Great Britain and the United States will be of the highest importance to those States of the central-eastern zone which take upon themselves the pioneer role in the work of integrating this whole zone. If the zone is to be really independent of both its neighbours, to west and east, all decentralizing tendencies within it must be sternly discouraged. It is impossible to be blind to the fact that the nations inhabiting this zone are troubled by many unsettled disputes, but they result from problems not connected with the present, still less with the future ; they are the relics of a past age. None the less they are still capable of producing strong emotional tensions, which result in fresh irritations. On the other hand, the range and significance of these disputes, when compared with the dimensions of the world conflict at present going on, bid us suppose that they will be satisfactorily settled. Constructive thought must surely overcome particularist differences, even though they be sometimes very exciting to the emotions for they are essentially of secondary significance. Constructive thought must point the way to the discovery of new forms of political and social international life, which shall ensure peace, security, and favourable conditions of development for all alike. The determination and concrete embodiment of these forms will be the task of all those bodies which are interested in the shaping of the post-war world, and ought to be one of the main subjects before the Peace Conference. The more the need is understood—even before the conclusion of the war—and the more advanced is the preparatory work in this field, the more certain will be the right functioning of the new political and economic entity in the future.



The area of Central-Eastern Europe extends from Germany in the west to Russia in the east, and from the Baltic in the north to the Adriatic, Aegæan, and Black Sea in the south. It communicates with the great ocean routes through the ports of Danzig and Gdynia, Trieste, Salonica, the Piræus, and Constanza, as well as numerous minor ones. In the north it includes Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania,



and Poland; in the centre, Czechoslovakia, Jugoslavia, and Rumania; and in the south, Bulgaria, Greece, and Albania.

A separate problem is presented by Austria. This small relic of the old Habsburg Monarchy is incapable of an independent economic existence. Yet its incorporation in Germany would be fraught with danger to the central-eastern zone, since in the hands of Germany it might be used as a base for attacks on that zone, as indeed it was once already, in 1938. On the other hand, its incorporation with the central-eastern zone might prove unwise, since it might promote the penetration of that area by German influence. Hence the preservation of Austrian political independence seems advisable, accompanied, however, by its close economic union with the central-eastern zone.

In its declaration of November 1st, 1943, the Moscow Conference made a preliminary decision on the question of Austria by stating that Austria was to recover her independence. This, of course, does not prejudice anything more than that Austria will be separated from Germany. The question of the place Austria would have in the new structure of Europe remained open.

The total area of the zone amounts to about 600,000 square miles, and its population to about 110 million. It includes both small States of not much more than a million inhabitants, and medium-sized ones of over 15 million. The largest is Poland, whose population in 1939 amounted to 35 million. Yet none of these States is strong enough to play a part in the future confederation like that of Prussia in the German Reich. This lack of any State capable of exercising the leadership will undoubtedly hamper and delay the proper shaping of the federation. On the other hand, however, the permanency of a federation capable of functioning in reality and not only in appearance is only possible if there is no fear of one member's possessing such a predominance as would enable it to crush others. In a area populated by heterogeneous communities such a predominance of one group would be doubly dangerous.

A federation of States situated between Germany and Russia must have its own internal centre of gravity. For this reason it must be a structure completely different in conception from the German *Mittleuropa*. During the last war, and later, Germany put forward several proposals for establishing to the east and south a zone of States politically and economically dependent on itself. If such a plan were realized, Germany would be not only geographically, but also in a political sense, the centre of a whole structure reaching to the Russian frontier in the East and to the Mediterranean in the

South; and even over the Mediterranean to the Near East. Hence the whole region, including both Germany and the countries to the east and south of it, was called by Germans "Central Europe." But the countries lying between Germany and Russia cannot justifiably be reckoned as belonging to the Central European zone. Nor would it be correct to designate the area in which they lie as "Eastern Europe," as is sometimes done, for that term would naturally include European Russia, which yet is totally different, politically, economically, and socially. The area, regarded as a separate and independent whole, destined to develop on lines of its own, should have a specific name, and the best would seem to be "Central-Eastern Europe." When the Germans tried to call it *Mittleuropa*, they thereby proclaimed their intention of absorbing it within the sphere of their own interests. A confederation of "Central-Eastern Europe," on the other hand, is not aggressive in conception, but defensive and constructive.



In their economic and social characteristics the countries of the central-eastern zone show many mutual resemblances. About 65 per cent of their inhabitants are engaged in agriculture, chiefly on small farms. There are, it is true, considerable differences in this respect between particular countries, Czechoslovakia, for example, is highly industrialized, and its agricultural population is only 35 per cent of the whole, whereas in Jugoslavia it is 76 per cent. Poland and Hungary may be described as agricultural and industrial countries. The density of population varies from 104 persons per square mile in Albania to 234 in Poland and 292 in Czechoslovakia. The fact that the economic and social structure of all these countries alike rests mainly on the peasantry will lead to a fundamental similarity in their development. The peasants are everywhere attached to their own individual pieces of land, are little inclined to political extremes, and are essentially democratic in their outlook. If favourable conditions of existence are guaranteed, there will be a broad basis for the stabilization of the whole area, both politically and economically.

The impossibility of satisfactorily employing the excess of agricultural workers in the villages, as well as the insufficient development, and in some countries even the complete lack, of native industry diminishes the total income of the community and hampers capitalization. A very considerable portion of the income of the community is expended on primitive wants, leaving very little for investment and accumulation. Hence these countries have hitherto

taken a very small part in international trade. Not only was their share in the exchange of commodities with the great world-markets negligible, but their dealings with one another were also very limited. Involuntarily they found themselves compelled to follow a policy of "autarky through poverty."

The causes for the backwardness of these countries are to be sought in their history. They all lost their political independence in the pre-capitalist period and regained it in the recent past. This meant that at the very time of the industrial revolution, when the main outlines of the new social structure were being determined in Europe, these countries were dependent on the economic policy of foreign governments. The Great Powers in whose ambit they lay treated them as border-lands and purposely neglected them. Their role was to produce raw materials and offer markets for the products of the industrialized regions. The countries which remained under Turkish rule shared till the end in that stagnation which was characteristic of the whole Ottoman Empire. It was not till the nineteenth or even twentieth century that all these countries regained their independence; and they continued to be affected by the consequences of long years of neglect.

The similarity in their history, which has produced economic stagnation and social under-development throughout all these countries, leads to a similarity in the remedies which may be applied to all of them.

The countries of this area can only attain real independence of their great neighbours by unhampered economic development and close political union. Economically the area should be rendered capable of carrying out a common policy of its own, calculated to promote the utilization of all its powers and natural resources; and politically it should boldly and fundamentally transform its structure integrating its separate parts to such a degree that it may become an organic whole, capable of following an independent policy, and at the same time of forming a constituent part in the new Pan-European structure.



- In the minds of the Germans the Central-Eastern European zone has long played a part of its own. Germany has contrived to secure a privileged position for itself in it. It has become the chief importer of its own products, and at the same time has secured almost a monopoly as intermediary in the import of important raw materials from overseas. It has also obtained a monopoly in the export of the chief raw materials produced in the zone, and has further established an

ascendancy in the money markets of the zone, and made itself the chief agent through whom foreign credits may be obtained. This position it has won for itself by means of the most ruthless pressure, by rendering it impossible for the various countries in the zone to develop their native industries, and even by deforming the structure of their agriculture and forcing them—particularly in South-Eastern Europe—to cultivate a single main crop, designed to satisfy exclusively German requirements. The attachment of the central-eastern zone to Germany was already, shortly before the outbreak of the present war, so close that South-Eastern Europe in particular was completely dominated economically by Germany, before military operations had begun. The share of Germany in the foreign trade of particular countries in the zone in 1937 was as follows :—

	Percentage of exports from	i.e. Percentage of Germany's imports
Esthonia .. .. .	26.1	0.4
Latvia .. .. .	27.1	0.8
Lithuania .. .. .	21.8	0.2*
Poland .. .. .	14.5	1.6
Czechoslovakia .. .. .	15.5	2.6
Hungary .. .. .	25.9	1.9
Rumania .. .. .	28.9	2.2
Jugoslavia .. .. .	32.4	2.3
Bulgaria .. .. .	54.8	1.2
Greece ... .. .	27.2	1.9

	Percentage of imports to	i.e. Percentage of Germany's exports
Esthonia .. .. .	30.5	0.3
Latvia .. .. .	35.4	0.5
Lithuania .. .. .	16.7	0.3*
Poland .. .. .	14.5	1.4
Czechoslovakia .. .. .	13.7	2.6
Hungary .. .. .	24.0	2.1
Rumania .. .. .	19.2	3.3
Jugoslavia .. .. .	21.7	2.4
Bulgaria .. .. .	43.1	1.3
Greece .. .. .	31.0	1.4

These figures show that the relation between this whole zone and Germany was very one-sided, for whereas Germany's share of the

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\*) Excluding the Memel district.

foreign trade of most of the countries in it was very considerable, the share of each of them in Germany's foreign trade was insignificant. Only one or two of them succeeded during the inter-war period in emancipating themselves from the economic control of Germany. Poland made the greatest effort, and its success was proved by the considerable diminution of Germany's share in Polish foreign trade. In 1924 Germany sent 34.5 per cent of Poland's imports, and took 43.2 per cent of its exports. By 1937 these ratios had fallen to 14.5 per cent for both imports and exports. The same period saw a very considerable increase in the share of Great Britain and the United States in Polish trade, which continued until the outbreak of war. There was a similar process also in the Balkan States. Czechoslovakia, thanks to the variety of its foreign trade in comparison with that of the other countries in the zone, found it easier to resist the economic pressure of Germany. It was felt most by the countries of South-Eastern Europe, which did not even attempt to resist.

The great overseas countries exporting industrial raw materials, and Great Britain likewise, took no direct interest in the central-eastern zone of Europe, and did not even attempt to enter its market. The agricultural character of the region prevented it from offering much of a market for those countries in any case, and it was therefore regarded by them as a subordinate German economic domain. Germany was better known, and its mediation was accordingly preferred to direct dealings with the central-eastern zone. The countries situated further to the east and south offered no possibilities even worth exploring. This view, intelligible perhaps from the standpoint of particular commercial interests, for long found no counterpoise in a sober assessment of the political role of Germany on the continent of Europe. It was not realized that the economic weakness of the central-eastern zone and its consequent dependence on Germany gave the latter political as well as economic power much greater than it could have attained by its own strength and resources. Now the bonds forged during the period of Germany's predominance must be broken. If the central-eastern zone is enabled to develop all its dormant powers, Germany will be deprived of a source of raw materials and a market for finished products in which it has hitherto enjoyed a privileged status, and will thus be compelled to enter the sphere of world co-operation, on equal terms with other countries, and with no privileges secured by political pressure.

Attempts to establish closer economic relations between particular

countries in the central-eastern zone have hitherto been unfruitful, mainly owing to the similarity in their economic structures, which has prevented particular portions of the region from being commercially complementary to one another. Political disorganization has further hampered these attempts, and thus increased the region's dependence on Germany.

The breaking of the economic bonds hitherto binding the zone to Germany will naturally cause changes, not only in the zone and in Germany, but also in other industrial countries. The most industrialized States in the zone, viz., Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary, will not be able immediately after the war to supply their neighbours with all the products formerly furnished by those branches of German industry which will have to be cut down. This applies chiefly to the products of the metallurgical, engineering, and chemical industries. So a considerable, and for a long time an increasing, field will be offered for the export of the corresponding branches of British and American industry, and for those of such overseas countries (the British dominions and some South American Republics) as have greatly developed their manufactures since the war began.



The economic policy of the central-eastern zone should be directed to the promotion of more intensive agricultural production and of more rapid industrialization. The opinion formerly received, that the world was naturally divided into agricultural and industrial countries is now out of date. Many overseas countries, hitherto purely agricultural, have developed their industry to a high degree, while in the old agricultural countries of Europe some branches of agricultural production no longer pay. The value of industrial production per worker employed is in general much higher than the value of agricultural production per worker employed. Consequently the total income of industrial communities is much higher than that of agricultural communities. Further, industrialized countries maintain more active economic exchange, particularly of industrial products than do agricultural countries; for industrialization at first brings with it a need for imported equipment, while later it increases and differentiates consumption to such a degree that, notwithstanding the growth of home production, imports of ever more various products from ever more various countries are continually on the increase.

The level of agriculture in the central-eastern zone has hitherto been low and production not intensive. The value of production

per worker employed is much lower than in the West. Indeed, according to Western standards, it would not be enough to meet the food needs of the population. Yet large quantities of produce are exported in order to obtain foreign currency, and so the population is still less sufficiently nourished and the purchasing power of the agricultural workers, who form the majority of it, is diminished. This leads to agrarian over-population—a phenomenon which, indeed, quite apart from the present low level of agriculture, is endemic in the zone under discussion. The number of the agricultural population per hectare of cultivated land is more than twice as large here as in Central and Western Europe. Improvement in this respect is only possible if the surplus workers are transferred from agriculture to other occupations, particularly to industry, transport, and commerce.

In future agriculture in these countries ought not to rely chiefly, as it has done hitherto, on the export of grain and livestock, which is economically unjustifiable. It should aim rather at greater differentiation of crops (root crops, industrial crops, fruit, and vegetable, at increasing the yield and at raising the standard of stock-breeding. The marked differences of climate within the limits of the central-eastern zone facilitate the introduction of the most varying types of cultivation. The prevalence of quite small farms and the large number of workers render possible the practice of intensive cultivation, laborious though it be. As industrialization progresses the former export surpluses of field produce will be diminished, owing to increased domestic consumption. In course of time the export of grain and livestock will cease altogether, being gradually replaced by a new and superior type of export, viz., of various products ready for consumption. If agriculture is reformed on these lines, the pressure of the rural population on the land will be diminished and the total income of the community will be increased.



The natural riches of the Central-Eastern European zone have not yet been fully investigated and have been only partially exploited. There is, however, no doubt that they are considerable. The zone to-day produces 91 per cent of Europe's oil (excluding Russia's), 66 per cent of its antimony, 50 per cent of its bauxite, 33 per cent of its chromium ore, 31 per cent of its graphite, 26 per cent of its copper, and 24 per cent of its zinc. It possesses the second largest coal deposits on the Continent. It exports coal, certain metal ores, and oil; but here, as in the case of its export of agricultural produce,

the reason is mainly the low level so far reached by the zone's economic development. If industry is properly fostered and domestic purchasing power increased, not only will these exports be absorbed at home, but considerable quantities of oil and ore will have to be imported. Insufficient use has hitherto been made of the water-power resources of the zone. Owing to the mountainous character of many regions, the extensive network of rivers, and the numerous lakes, the possibilities here are great. The zone possesses large reserves of growing timber, a large percentage of its total area being occupied by forests : in Czechoslovakia 33 per cent, in Yugoslavia 30.6 per cent and in Poland 22.2 per cent. Timber is exported mostly in the log, or partially manufactured. In the future it should be the raw material for various branches of home industry.

The particular countries of the zone should encourage those branches of industry which best suit their special conditions. They should avoid one-sidedness, however, and foster a lively exchange, both with their neighbours and with countries outside the zone. Owing to the existence of rural over-population, particular emphasis should be laid on the fostering of those branches of industry which absorb a large amount of labour. On the other hand, shortage of domestic capital will hamper the development of those branches which require large initial investments. Probably those branches will have the best chance of development which engage in the processing of agricultural produce and the manufacture of local raw materials. The output of staple commodities for the consumption within the zone will also be of considerable importance. In the period immediately following the war large investments will have to be made in order to establish heavy industry, favourable natural conditions for which exist particularly in Silesia and Moravia. The existence of non-ferrous metal ores will facilitate the development of various kinds of metallurgy, iron-foundries, and steel-works. Coal, oil, and salt, and potassic salt as well as timber and some agricultural products, will provide a sound basis for the chemical industry.

Industry should as far as possible be distributed equally throughout the zone, and the creation of artificial industrial centres should be avoided. One reason for this is that production should be based on native raw materials, which are very different both in character and amount in different parts of the area. A considerable number of industries, moreover, will be closely connected with agriculture, and will accordingly not need to be centralised. Decentralization is, further, required by considerations of defence.



If industry is widely distributed throughout the whole federated area, it will be much harder for an enemy to destroy than if it were concentrated in large centres. In any case, however, mining and a portion of heavy industry will have to remain concentrated in areas determined for it by nature.

The general aim should be so to organise the federation that it may produce intensively and equally in the two fields of industry and agriculture. The ratio of the one to the other might be taken from that at present existing in Czechoslovakia, or, more strictly speaking, in its Western part.



The foreign trade of the central-eastern zone before the war amounted to scarcely half that of Germany, although its population is nearly twice as large as Germany's. Hitherto its main exports have consisted of foodstuffs, Rumanian oil, and Polish coal and timber. Its chief imports have been cotton, wool, textiles, metals, and machinery. The foreign trade of Czechoslovakia, the most highly industrialized country in the zone, alone was differentiated to a degree approaching that customary in the countries of Western Europe. In future the zone as a whole will doubtless export far more industrial products, especially of low and medium class; at the same time importing large quantities of such products of the higher class, both complicated technical installations and goods intended for consumption.



Communications in Central-Eastern Europe have hitherto been neglected, although by reason of its geographical situation the region ought to play an important part in the through transport of goods across Europe. Though there are several mountain ranges and several river basins in it, the system of inland waterways provides a convenient method of transit to and from the ports. The low general level of the watersheds allows of the construction, with no great difficulty, of a homogeneous system of communications, answering the requirements both of the region itself and of through traffic. The necessary investments will not be larger than similar investments in Western Europe, and offer prospects of satisfactory returns. At the present time all the main railway routes from west to east pass through Central-Eastern Europe. But they do not fully meet the needs of the zone, considered as an independent area, for they were laid out at a time when lines of communication were built by foreign administrations to suit their

own ends. What the zone actually requires is the development of routes between the Baltic in the north and the Adriatic, Aegean, and Black Sea in the south. Certain sections of such railway routes already exist, though they need extending and perfecting. The question of carriage and motor roads throughout the zone, but particularly in the south, is urgent, and the investments which will be necessary are very large.



These fundamental undertakings, together with the manufactures they may be expected to encourage, will have, especially at first, to be built up with the aid of foreign imports, including both industrial installations and machinery, and raw materials. Later also, when the economy of the zone as a whole has reached a higher level, there will doubtless be a wider and more permanent exchange of goods and commodities with other countries. Owing to the investments extended mainly by the Anglo-Saxon countries, the processes of economic reconstruction in the various countries of the zone will be closely connected with these industries. In place of the former dependence on Germany, there will be co-operation with Great Britain and America, which will tend to become permanent because the increase of the total income of the community resulting from industrial prosperity will lead to a continuous rise in imports; and these will naturally come mainly from the creditor countries. Thus investments in the Central-Eastern European zone will open fresh and ever-growing markets to these countries.

In the period immediately following the war the trade balance of nearly all the countries of the central-eastern zone will show a deficit. But this will be due principally to economically justified imports, which will indirectly contribute to an increase of productive capacity and an increase of purchasing power. This consideration alone should convince the creditor countries of the advisability of investing capital in the zone. But there are other considerations also, of a more general and serious kind, pointing in the same direction. The economic consolidation and close political union of the countries of the zone under discussion is an indispensable factor in the establishment of security in this part of Europe. Accordingly, if peace is to be lasting, it is incumbent upon the Anglo-Saxon powers to aid in developing the resources of this long-neglected and uncared-for region. Its integration and admission to collaboration as an independent partner in world economy is both possible and essential. The process will be greatly hastened if it is supported not only on the individual strength of

the States directly interested, but on the well-planned investments from outside.

The financial policy of the States which will be in a position to give economic aid to the Central-Eastern European zone will have to be adapted to the specific requirements of the case. If the classical principles of finance as observed in the international world of credit are to hold good, there is reason to fear that the aid given will be both little and costly. But if this aid takes the form of credits in kind and is regarded from the wider point of view, as contributing to make a considerable portion of Europe, hitherto artificially hampered in its development, into one of the important, independent elements in the political and economic structure of the world, then these principles are likely to be found so that the aid may be efficacious.

In general it is to be expected that there will be great changes in the forms and methods of international credit after the war. In particular they will not be affected as much as hitherto by technical considerations and by the particular interests of financial groups. Probably political considerations will have more weight than hitherto in decisions as to where investments are to be made. The Lease-Lend Bill opened the way to far-reaching consequences, the full range of which cannot as yet be perceived, but which will undoubtedly find expression in the shaping of international credit after the war. When the Bill was first passed, it was regarded as an exceptional and abnormal war measure. For it was the first example in history of the arrangement of a great international credit, exclusively in goods, to be repaid likewise exclusively in goods and services, with no term fixed in advance. Now this form has been still further developed by the introduction of mutual "Lease-Lend" credits, also reckoned exclusively in goods and services, with no provisions laid down in advance concerning methods and terms of repayment. This form will doubtless be applied more widely in the future, not only (it may be supposed) bilaterally, but also multilaterally. Thus a new kind of multilateral Clearing-House transaction will come into being, whereby (instead of cheques and bills) goods will be exchanged, and money will be used only as a standard of measurement. Arrangements like these, which to-day are already visible in outline, will facilitate much more active economic co-operation between States than has been feasible hitherto. Consequently we may hope that the central-eastern zone will be able to carry through the necessary changes in its economic structure so smoothly that it may in a com-

paratively short time become an efficient factor in the stabilisation of Europe and the world.



The economic integration of the central-eastern zone must be based on corresponding political agreements between the States within it. The task is undoubtedly hard, but extremely important, for on proper political co-ordination depends the vitality of all relations, economic and political, in the zone, and even the possibility of its proper integration.

International unions, in various forms, have long been known, and lawyers and historians have devoted much attention to them. Yet the problem facing us to-day is completely new. For there has been no example in history hitherto of the conscious creation of a great federal structure, the bond of union in which was only the good of all the component nations. There has always hitherto been some external factor of compulsion, or else some centre of attraction sufficiently powerful to neutralise decentralising tendencies. Accordingly, the establishment of the new federal union cannot be based strictly on historical precedents, nor take its principles from accepted legal concepts. The form of the edifice must be determined mainly by the aim inspiring its construction : viz., the ensurance of the existence and opportunity for sound development of the medium-sized and small States comprised within it, by common measures of economics and defence.

How is such a structure to be pictured ? and the functioning of such a union as has no precedent in history or international law ? The question cannot be answered yet in detail, and many problems must be left for future solution. Nevertheless, the main principles may be deduced already from the purpose in the minds of those who set about founding such a union.

The future federation must be a permanent and organic whole, not a mere temporary alliance. Its structure must be so compact that it may be recognised as an independent body corporate by international law. The agreements framed between the various States composing it should therefore be designed to assure them the possibility of mutual adaptation, so that in due course of time the area of the federation may be both economically and politically compacted. On the other hand, the fact will have to be taken into account that the federation will include countries with a strong feeling of their own individuality, with different pasts, and different characters. It must therefore interfere as little as possible with the expression of this individuality, while at the same time uniting

its components as closely as is necessary if it is to have real strength and unity in action. It must therefore consciously limit the range of its functions to the most essential matters : defence, foreign policy, and the chief economic and social tasks. In principle the sovereignty of the component States should be limited only in so far as may be essential to the proper functioning of the federation as a whole.

We must resist the temptation of discussing which of the known legal forms the new edifice may take. It would be quite fruitless to discuss whether it should be called a federation, or a confederation, or a confederacy ; whether its sovereignty should be divided between the member States and the union, or whether it should be partially delegated. It is enough to recall that almost every federation in Europe was without precedent at the time of its foundation, and provided fresh material for the theorists of international law to classify. The most instructive example is the unique British Commonwealth of Nations. The federation in the central-eastern zone will certainly not be an imitation of any form at present known. It will have to fulfil its specific tasks, and find its own special form. Doubtless when crystallized it will show certain features common to former federations and confederacies.

The main tasks to be accomplished will be integration of defence and foreign policy, and co-ordination of economic effort, for it is in these fields that action is most essential. It would be unsatisfactory if every decision had to be the result of a separate agreement between the States. It would neither be a far-sighted decision, nor would it be efficiently implemented. All matters of common interest must therefore be placed under the control of special federal authorities, appointed to execute the will of the federation as a homogeneous unit. If the federation were unable efficiently to express and execute its will in this way, it would be but a loose association of States, unfruitful in action and incapable of a long existence.

The central executive authorities of the federation, whether they be called secretaries of state, or ministers, or something else, will together constitute the federal government and manage its common affairs; while the administrations of the separate States will deal with all matters not regarded as of common interest. It may be supposed that the federal government will consist of ministries of foreign affairs, national defence, economic co-ordination, and finance, under the guidance of a premier.

As a corporate body within the meaning of international law,

the federation will have the right to conclude international agreements, political and economic, and to become a member of international institutions. There may, however, be separate representation for the component States in the field of diplomatic and consular activity. The experience of Great Britain shows that such separate representation of dominions may even be an advantage, not only in domestic politics, but even in the pursuit of foreign policy. In any case, however, the federation as a whole must be diplomatically represented everywhere, since it alone can carry out foreign policy in the full sense of the term. It is true that, besides the federal ministry of foreign affairs, there will probably be similar departments in each of the States composing the federation. Their main task, however, will be not so much the maintenance of direct relations with foreign powers, as the representation of specific points and requirements within the framework of common federal policy.

In the field of national defence, a common minister will deal with the organization of federal defence forces, the leadership of which will be in the hands of a common general staff. The basis of these forces will probably continue to be national armies, raised by the particular States and administered by their own ministers. Perhaps some branches of the land forces, as well as the air force and the navy, will be common to all the States. There are precedents for this arrangement, which has given good results. In the Austro-Hungarian Empire, besides the separate land armies there was a common army as well, and the navy was shared in common by Austria and Hungary. Military administration was in the hands of a common minister and two others, Austrian and Hungarian, whose respective functions were efficiently co-ordinated. In the German Empire the land armies were raised and maintained exclusively by the separate States, whereas the navy was maintained by them all together. Military operations as a whole were controlled by a single general staff.

The economic policies of the various States composing the federation should be so developed as to lead to the ever closer union of their wealth and resources, while at the same time respecting their particular interests. Hence the field of common federal economic activity should be wide. It would be the task of the minister in charge of this branch of the administration to co-ordinate the economic institutions of all the Federated States, and to conduct a common economic foreign policy.

As the federation will thus be required to act as a whole in certain spheres, it must have its own income and expenditure, apart from

those of the particular States. The federal budget must therefore be drawn up by a separate treasury administration, presided over by a federal minister of finance. The federal treasury will defray expenditure incurred in connexion with foreign policy and defence, as well as for such economic purposes, particularly in the field of investment, as are approved by the Federated States as a whole. Revenue for these purposes, as experience shows, may be raised either by means of payments made by the separate States, or by special federal taxation, or by both means together. Suitable sources in the case under discussion would be customs duties and some indirect taxes. Sometimes direct taxes also have been applied to these purposes ; but this requires a close administrative union of the component parts of the federation, and would not be easy to carry through in the Central-Eastern European zone. The federal treasury should also undertake the task of negotiating the principal foreign credits, earmarked for capital projects, the payment of interest on these debts, and also in certain cases the control of manner in which the money is spent.

The federal government, headed by the premier, should function in the usual democratic manner. That is to say, there should be cabinet responsibility to parliament, under the provisions of the constitution.

The general structure of the State will require the existence of a legislature competent to deal with questions of federal importance, and of a body exercising parliamentary control of the federal executive. That is to say, there must be a federal parliament to exercise this double function. It may be composed either of delegations from the separate State parliaments, or of members directly elected by the constituencies. In the former case it would be something like the so-called common delegations which existed in Austria-Hungary. In the second—found in federations of classical type—the direct appeal to public opinion throughout the area of the federation, in matters of general interest, would undoubtedly help to increase the feeling of unity. In practice the form of delegations would probably prove the more convenient arrangement. In view of the differences of national character and social conditions in the various component States, it would doubtless be better-suited for the creation of an efficient federal parliament, capable of taking decisions. In any case, however, the members of the federal parliament, whether even though sent to it as delegations, should be completely free to speak and vote without reference to the corporations which sent them.

There must also be an authority to represent the sovereignty of the federation as a whole. In federations of the classical type this task was performed by either monarch or president. In confederations of the classical type the person of the monarch was always the bond uniting the component States; and he it was who represented the confederation as a whole. But in Switzerland a peculiar solution of this problem has been adopted. The Swiss Constitution does not recognize any single person as representing the Confederation as a whole, but only the *Conseil Fédéral*, which at the same time fulfils the functions of Government. The president of this Council represents it in dealings with foreign States. Probably such a collegiate sovereign body would be the most suitable for the federation of the Central-Eastern European zone, composed as this will be of republics and monarchies side by side. Both types are attached to their own forms of government, and would not agree to their alteration; nor would the republics agree to the sovereignty of the federation being represented by a monarch of one of the other States belonging to it. A collegiate Chief Federal Council would be exposed to no such objection. Its authority would in any case be purely representative, like that of a monarch or a president in parliamentary States.

The parallel existence of different legal and administrative systems within the framework of the federation—the federal system on the one hand and those of the separate States on the other—would make it essential for a very careful watch to be kept to ensure harmony between the laws of the various States, and to prevent the authorities of either system from overstepping the limits of their jurisdiction. There must therefore be a Constitutional Tribunal, which can be summoned to pronounce upon the concurrence of laws and regulations promulgated in the various States, and their constitutionality; and also to decide disputes over jurisdiction between the federation and particular States. Such a Tribunal will exercise great influence over the whole of the legal and administrative activity of the federation.

The organization and working of the federal government should be based on a written Constitution, applying both to the union and to its component States. This would give the structure much more permanence than any form of inter-state agreement; and at the same time it would enable all the states belonging to the federation to take their part directly in preserving its legal and political character unchanged.





The political union of the States of the Central-Eastern European zone must be reinforced by the assimilation of their economic systems to the degree necessary for the assurance of their due common development. Within the framework of the commonwealth which it is desired to create, each of the States must have the power to preserve and fully develop its own economic resources. This is the more essential, that hitherto these States have developed under very varying conditions, and that they have suffered and are suffering to various degrees the ravages of war, so that some have more ground to make up than others.

The mutual economic relations of the States, after their political integration, should be so shaped as to enable the equalizing process between them to be carried on gradually and without disturbance. This will mean the drawing up of a common plan for the economic development of all of them, by following which the vital interests of all may be satisfied. This plan should aim at raising the economic level of the whole zone, not merely of some better-endowed parts of it. In the initial period, therefore, it will be necessary to protect certain branches of production in every State against too strong competition from the others States. This arrangement, however, should last only so long as is absolutely necessary if the end in view is to be attained. This end is not the maintenance of economic differences between particular States, but on the contrary, the equalization of their levels, without the production of unfavourable symptoms.

It would be a mistake immediately to introduce a complete economic union, which would assuredly have a bad effect on the growth of industry in those States where it is in its infancy, and further, would expose the agriculture of the more industrialized countries to injurious competition, at least in some branches, from the purely agricultural countries. It would therefore be necessary for the time being to repeal certain economic restrictive measures in force against countries outside the central-eastern zone : restrictions on the transfer of foreign currency, for example, or on the movement of populations ; or on the import and export of certain classes of goods.

Inter-State trade within the zone should be based on principles other than those governing trade with outside countries. Two systems are possible : preferential tariffs, or a customs union. The first of these, attractive though it may be by virtue of its seeming simplicity, would in practice not tend to bring about the desired economic assimilation of the component States. For foreign

countries are always able to force countries with preferential tariffs to grant them the same or similar preferences, thus frustrating the whole purpose of the system. The British Commonwealth of Nations, the strong economic foundation of which consists of preferential tariffs decided upon at Ottawa in 1932, is an exceptional phenomenon, which assuredly could not be reproduced in Central-Eastern Europe. A customs union, on the other hand, is possible without evil consequences only between States on similar economic level. In face of the marked differences existing between the States of the central-eastern zone, the unfavourable accompaniments of this form of economic synthesis would outweigh the good ones. Another form must accordingly be sought, answering better to the actual conditions and at the same time facilitating gradual approximation in the future. It will be a unique kind of customs union, presenting a united face to the outside world, and conducting a single policy in the fields alike of customs duties and commercial treaty-making, but permitting the existence of inter-state customs duties on some articles, during the transition period until all the component States are on much the same economic level. Such internal duties ought, however, to be imposed only on articles the production of which really needs protection, and only so long as is actually essential. They ought, accordingly, to be periodically revised ; and as time goes on, gradually abolished. Gradually, as the volume of duty-free goods increases, a full customs union will come into working.

The external federal customs tariff will provide for different rates of duty on articles which pay internal duty, according to the requirements of the branches of industry concerned. Those articles which pay no internal duty will be subject to a uniform rate of federal customs duty. The internal rates must always be lower than the federal rates, and the aim must be to keep them as low as possible. In no case ought they to be regarded as means for producing revenue. Such a system will facilitate certain flexibility of tariff protection, both for some of the Federated States against others, and for the federation as a whole against foreign countries ; and at the same time it will enable the federation to carry out a unified commercial policy, which is essential if it is to be a permanent political organism.

Again, there should be no restriction on payments within the federated area, for the existence of any form of financial regulation would be contrary to the conception of an economic unit. The rates of exchange between currencies of the various Federated States

should be fixed. For this purpose the banks of issue in the Federated States should constantly co-operate and harmonize their currency and credit policies. It may even prove necessary to set up a common co-ordinating authority. On the other hand it is not absolutely necessary to create a single bank of issue, or to introduce a common currency. Within the boundaries of the federation the currency of each component State should enjoy the same protection, in transactions with foreign countries, as it does in its own State. If there is to be complete freedom of payment throughout the area of the federation, there must be equality in the balances due from one component State to another. So long as such equality is unattainable in the course of organic development, it must be maintained by control of commercial transactions. Much influence can be exercised in this direction by the federal treasury, which will draw its revenue from all the States within the union, and spend money likewise in all the States. Both the financial turnover and the exchange of goods within the federation should remain under the constant control of the competent federal economic authority, so that the cash balances due between the particular States may be kept in equilibrium, as they must be if there is to be freedom of commerce between the component States.

One of the main conditions of economic assimilation is that the standards of living of the broad masses throughout the federated area should closely approximate. Practically speaking this means that the standards in the insufficiently developed countries must be speedily raised. This is in the interests of the federation as a whole, for otherwise the markets of those countries would be able to absorb but a small proportion of the exports of the more highly developed countries, and this would hamper the process of their economic integration. Further, the more industrialized countries would find themselves inundated with cheap labour from the agricultural countries, which would have a bad effect on labour conditions in general. Both labour and investment policy must be directed to the solution of this problem. The question of the movement of population within the federated area must be solved by a means of a sensible employment policy. In principle, such movement should be as free as possible. Doubtless federal expenditure on communications, public works, and national defence, as well as expenditure on the development of industry according to a prearranged economic plan would facilitate the formulation and execution of such a policy. It would be further desirable that at least a portion of the work undertaken in order to raise the

economic level in the less developed countries should be regarded as the common responsibility of the federation as a whole.

In the field of communications the federation should aim at the creation of a homogeneous system of railways, waterways, roads, and airlines, answering the growing needs of the federated area and of transit traffic. It should also influence tariff policy, both internal and external. It is not absolutely necessary for the federal authorities directly to administer the communications system. The task may well be left either to the separate States, or to groups of them. So it was in the German Empire, and the results experience proved to be satisfactory. They show that the integration of the communications system will proceed slowly and gradually as economic assimilation is accomplished. Accordingly the main importance should be attached rather to the proper planning and financing of communications projects. When a complete network of federal communications has been constructed on these lines, various forms of administration will be admissible, out of which in time an organic whole will naturally take shape.



It would seem most advisable to create a homogeneous bloc of all the countries situated in the central-eastern zone. But an essential condition of its existence and prosperous development would be that the internal bonds uniting it should be—from the very beginning—close and its structure compact. And as it is not open to doubt that the ethnic and social conditions in the area greatly vary, and the economic level is far from being the same throughout, there may be obstacles in the way of attaining such closeness and compactness. It would not be well for the federation to sacrifice compactness for the sake of enlarging its area. Accordingly, if insuperable difficulties should arise in the way of creating a really compact union of the whole central-eastern area of Europe, the erection of two federal blocs—a northern and a southern—might be considered. The central core of the northern bloc would consist of Poland and Czechoslovakia. Discussions which have taken place between these two countries, and the resulting declarations by both governments, November 11, 1940, and January 22, 1942, respectively, seem to promise such a role for them; and even if at present, for temporary reasons, a veil of uncertainty conceals their future, at the end of the war they will assuredly regain their full importance. The southern bloc would comprise the Balkan States. Here too a beginning has been made, in the shape of a declaration (January 15, 1942) foreshadowing some form of federa-

tion between Yugoslavia and Greece. The northern bloc would unite two expressly industrial and agricultural countries (differing indeed in level), viz., Poland and Czechoslovakia, with others, agriculturally advanced, and possessing the beginnings of native industry. The southern bloc would comprise the Balkan States, which are almost entirely agricultural, and possess the means to raise the level of their production and also to develop certain branches of industry, based on their own raw materials. Each of these two blocs should create its own particular form of close political union, in harmony with existing conditions and historical tradition.

Economically, each should aim at rapidly transforming itself into a homogeneous organism. Within the limits of the northern bloc there is marked inequality of industrial production, and much difference in the intensiveness and cost of agricultural production. In consequence the exchange of goods between the component countries should be encouraged in principle by means of a customs union, complemented by temporary internal duties on certain classes of goods, the production costs of which differ too much in the different countries. Within the limits of the southern bloc a customs union of the classical type would not be difficult to arrange, but would also not be of great use; for these countries, owing to their great similarity of economic structure, have smaller quantities of goods to interchange.

The two blocs would have to remain in close political touch with one another, in order to ensure their capacity for common action. Economically also contact between the two should be very close. This goal may be reached by means of harmonious codification of law, by currency agreements, by the co-ordination of economic plans, and by commercial treaties, facilitating the interchange of goods, and by similar economic policy relating to outside countries.

## V. POST-WAR WORLD ORGANISATION

The reconstruction of collective life after the war will require enormous efforts on the part of all the nations, which must be directed to two ends : the prevention of future wars and economic reconstruction. These ends—which are closely bound up the one with the other—were indeed roughly formulated in the Atlantic Charter. But the Charter naturally confined itself to pointing the way. After the war the nations will have to co-operate in order to find the best ways to attain them.

The future organization of the post-war world will have to be based on experience drawn from the twenty years' armistice and the present war. The League of Nations failed, not because the tasks laid upon it were too great, but because it really had not the courage to undertake them. Thus, as time went on, it found itself quite outstripped by events. It could not, indeed, be otherwise, since from its very beginning the League was an institution supposed to promote the common political aims of the whole civilized world—when in fact there were no such common aims. The new organisation which takes its place will have to be truly capable of action. And only such matters should be entrusted to it as it can actually and decisively handle. Above all it must have executive power to enable it to give effect to its decisions and overcome possible resistance.

In the political sphere it must be able to take firm decisions, not necessarily unanimous, but passed rather by a qualified majority of votes ; but these decisions should concern only matters of general and overriding importance. All those of merely regional interest should be left to other bodies, more nearly and directly connected with the local circumstances. The new organization will be able to fulfil its task of preserving peace only if it has the necessary force at its disposal. The Atlantic Charter foreshadows the disarmament of aggressor States, while arms are to be left to the peacefully disposed countries threatened with aggression. This scheme might perhaps be connected with that for creating an international army for the defence of peace, under the control of a superior organization uniting all the peace-loving States. Besides this international army there may still be to a certain extent, national armies, properly controlled.

In the economic sphere the principal world organization will be

faced with various tasks. It will have the final voice in dealing with problems of economic planning in their highest stages. This will be the more important, that planning must include not only the problem of the distribution and price of basic raw materials, but, also, in certain important branches, that of the proper division of production. The organisation also will doubtless take decisions of world-wide effect concerning the movement of capital, goods, and labour. The questions of the industrialization of the economically backward area of Central-Eastern Europe, and of the better settlement and exploitation of colonial areas, will call for a wide programme of investment, on an international scale. The relative priority of these works, their co-ordination and financing, will require close attention over a period of years. The principal world organization will doubtless be composed of several institutions, devoted to particular groups of problems, and in close mutual touch. The territorial range of these institutions' activities need not be in every case the same, but should be determined by the special function which each has to perform. In this way the organization will come into active contact with reality, and will develop its activities in accordance with the demands of ever new situations.



The builders of the new world organization should draw as much as possible on fresh experience gained during the course of the present war. This experience indicates that some political, and still more, some economic, problems can be successfully solved only on a world-wide scale; whereas others require regional treatment.

Experience indicates also that not every problem, of general interest though it may be, should be tackled by all countries without exception together. There should be a select committee, as it were. Accordingly, the new principal world organization should be designed without pedantry and doctrinairism. Above all, apparent and illusory universalism should be avoided. The organization might be made to embrace all countries without exception, as the League of Nations was intended to do; but if it were, it would be incapable of action and would have no practical importance. At first, then, immediately after the return of peace, it should comprise only the United Nations, together with such neutral countries as already apply the principles of the Atlantic Charter in their policy, and pledge themselves to observe them in the future. The aggressor States should be excluded from the

organization for a long period ; though they should be admitted to economic co-operation with the rest of the world, with only such reservations as may be necessary to prevent them again preparing for war. They should not, however, be admitted to deliberations on equal terms with the United Nations on the most important questions of general interest until they have profoundly changed both their political structure and the moral basis on which it rests.

In this connexion the so-called problem of Germany comes to the front. This problem cannot be rightly treated or successfully solved unless it is taken as part of the general problem of organising the world as a whole after the war. That organization must not be dependent on the solution of the " German problem " ; on the contrary, the treatment of Germany after the war must be subordinated to the proper functioning of an organised world. The question must therefore be treated realistically, and the organization must be based on sufficient force to guarantee the preservation of peace. A new system of collective security must accordingly be devised, and from a proper consideration of its structure indications should be drawn regarding the changes, political and economic, which must be introduced in Germany and—to a lesser degree—in the other aggressor States.



In his broadcast of March 21, 1943, Churchill broadly outlined the principles on which the future organization of the world should be based. These principles are in close agreement with the essential points of the Atlantic Charter, to which they are to some extent complementary. Churchill desires " the lofty conception of freedom, law and morality which was the spirit of the League " to be the firm basis of future international relations. On it will be raised " a world institution embodying or representing the United Nations, and some day all nations " Within the framework of this world institution Churchill foresees territorial organizations, such as a European Council and an Asiatic Council, with their own administrative authorities. The European Council is to be in many fields of action a real Government, called upon to take independent action, provided with all the essential organs of government, and at the same time organically connected with the States which will be its members. It is to be " a really effective League, with all the strongest forces concerned woven into its texture, with a High Court to adjust disputes, and with forces, armed forces, national or international or both, held ready to enforce its decisions and prevent renewed aggression and the preparation of future



wars." In the future all the European States are to be comprised in this organization. Churchill does not expressly say that the aggressor States are to be excluded for the present, but it is obvious from the further course of his argument. As for the so-called small nations, "whose rights and interests must be safeguarded," Churchill desires to bring them into the framework of the general organization in federated groups. Suitably constructed groups of small States are to have their representatives on the European Council, speaking in their name, on equal terms with the Great Powers. Churchill says about this: "It would therefore seem, to me at any rate, worthy of patient study that side by side with the Great Powers there should be a number of groupings of States or confederations which would express themselves through their own chosen representatives, the whole making a Council of great States and groups of States."

Churchill's opinion, although expressed in a very cautious and general terms, yet gives a perfectly clear perspective of the state of things which he imagines in the world and Europe after the war:

(1) A supreme world organization, established by a common understanding between the States penetrated with the spirit of Democracy which inspired the creation of the League of Nations. The universality of the organization will not be affected in principle by the fact that the aggressor States will only be included in it later, when they have gone through the necessary political and economic (and also moral) changes.

(2) On a lower stage of this world organization, more limited territorial organizations, embracing nevertheless *en principe* whole continents.

(3) These organizations to comprise the Great Powers and the medium-sized and smaller States on equal terms; but the aggressor States to be admitted to them only at a later date.

The above picture of the future political structure of the world expressly excludes the idea of the division of the Continent into spheres of interest dominated by particular Powers, and likewise that of the Balance of Power. The guiding principle of the structure must be the co-operation of all States on equal terms; the medium-sized and small States sharing in it, not directly, but through regional groupings, this measure being dictated by purely practical considerations.

The declaration made by the Moscow Conference on November 1st, 1943, is much more general in its references to the question of organization of collective security than previous statements by

British and American statesmen. It is confined to the declaration that the Governments of the United States of North America, the United Kingdom, the U.S.S.R. and China "recognise the necessity to create as soon as possible an international organization based on the principle of the sovereignty of all peace-loving nations, in which all such States, whether large or small, will be able to take part, in order to maintain international peace and security." This statement does not mean anything more than that the agreeing parties recognise in principle the need to create an international organization for the co-ordination of the efforts of peace-loving States, in order to avoid the danger of a violation of the peace. The declaration makes no mention whatever of how this organization is to be constructed and how it is to function.

Mr. Churchill's statement made in the House of Commons on May 25th, 1944—and so in the new phase of relations between the great allies—is far less precise than previous pronouncements of his. He in fact confined himself to stating in principle the necessity to create a general international organization immediately after victory. On the structure of this organization he said only (1) " . . . there must be a world council composing the greatest States which emerge victorious from the war, who will be obligated to keep, within certain minimum standards, armaments for the purpose of preserving peace." (2) " . . . there must be also a world assembly of Powers," and (3) "We must arm our world organization and make sure that, within the limits assigned to it, it has overwhelming military power." As can be seen, this statement contains no hint of the integration of small States into a large group, in order to maintain their independent existence in international relations. Mr. Churchill desires to base the security of the weaker States exclusively on "the rule of law which upholds the principles of justice and fair play, which protects the weak against the strong, if the weak have justice on their side." This rule is to make it impossible for the strong nations to subject weaker nations to their predominance: " . . . they will not be allowed by armed force to gratify appetites of aggrandisement at the expense of other countries just because they are smaller, weaker, or less well prepared; and measures will be taken to have ample armies, fleets and air forces available to prevent anything of that kind coming about."



In actual fact only a general international organization, embracing all the peace-loving nations and working systematically to

bring in the aggressor States also in the future, after they have suffered the necessary changes, will be competent to discharge its great tasks.

The foundation of such a world organization on continental unions only would not, however, lead to the desired results. In the Western hemisphere the co-operation of all the American countries is already far advanced. Closer political unions would no doubt perfect it, but would introduce no essential changes. For it has been shown beyond a doubt that the security and prosperity of the American Continent are dependent upon, and indeed very closely bound up with, the security and prosperity of Europe and Asia. Any tendency to break these relations would be equivalent to an attempt to return to isolationism in another form—an attempt harmful alike to the American Continent and to the world as a whole. In Europe a continental federation would mean, in one form or another, the preponderance of Germany; in Asia, of Japan. This alone would constitute sufficient reason for rejecting the idea of federations of this type, which would indeed be nothing else than the realization of the war aims of the aggressor States, and the starting point for their further efforts to attain world domination. But there is another reason also making against the idea of such federations. They would doubtless foster the hope of attaining continent-wide economic autarky, the result of which could only be strong political tension. This, in its turn, would lead, not to security and prosperity, but to the threat of military conflict and impoverishment.

In certain American, and British, circles the plan is favoured of an Anglo-Saxon federation, or of a wider variant of the same conception—an Atlantic Federation. Marshall Smuts in his well known speech of November 25th, 1934, has put forward the idea of a closer linking of the British Empire with certain small States, in Western Europe. These projects aim at a closer union between States of similar culture, in a similar stage of economic and social development. At first sight they seem attractive and simple, since in the States which would compose the federation—viz., the United States and the British Commonwealth, and perhaps the countries of Western Europe—there is undoubtedly a similarity of social ideals, and an absence of many problems which trouble other countries and other parts of the world. But none the less they fail to take account of the fact that all the States which would enter the federation, Anglo-Saxon or Atlantic, are organically connected with other States and parts of the world which would be left outside.

Such a construction, therefore, would not only be artificial, but would inevitably lead to far-reaching changes throughout the world : changes, moreover, which would be destructive in character. The idea of it is at bottom a transference to European conditions of the American principle of isolationism with all its characteristic features.



Within the framework of the general international organization prefigured by Churchill in his broadcast on March 21st, 1943, the shape and structure of the federal constitutions should be subordinated to their main purpose. This is the ensurance to all nations of the chance of unhampered development, in security and prosperity, within the framework of the organization. Hence in practice the first necessity is the creation of regional federations in which the medium-sized and small States may be grouped, so as to be able to take their share in international co-operation. The basic units of which these regional federations will be composed, will be the already-existing independent national States. In principle they will continue to be independent, sovereign States as heretofore. But their sovereignty will in practice be functionally divided, by the assignment of some of its attributes to superior organizations : the regional federation, or the general international organization and its component institutions. The question what portion of its sovereignty is to remain with the national State, and what delegated, and to whom, should be decided by purely practical considerations. The higher organization should take over from the national States only those portions of their sovereign authority which cannot be successfully exercised by them. Such a limitation of the sovereignty of small and medium-sized States in favour of regional federations and a general international organization, and of the sovereignty of Great Powers in favour of the latter only, does not at all import the abolition or calling in question of the actual principle of sovereignty. The evolution of this legal concept, begun long since and strikingly manifested on the eve of the present war, recalls the evolution of the concept of private property, which also has gone through various modifications in the course of time, without losing any of its essential significance. It is, however, most important that any limitations of sovereignty in favour of superior organizations should apply in equal measure to all the States comprised in those organizations without exception. The principle of equality must be observed at all costs. Its violation would mean the subordina-

tion of some States to others, and would hamper their whole-hearted co-operation.



The central-eastern zone of Europe, integrated into a federal organism, will form one of the independent members of the general international organization; and one may look forward to the establishment of similar bodies in other parts of Europe; other political and economic aggregations of States in geographical proximity to one another and standing in various mutual relationships. The particular European federations will also doubtless be bound together by a network of close relations, which will find expression in a superior European Council. In course of time this Council will embrace all the European States, but from the very beginning of its existence it will take full part in the activities of the general international organization, where it will give expression to the needs and aspirations of the European States.

It is clear enough that the task of reconstructing the world, sketched out above, surpasses in range and dimensions any problem of organization with which humanity has hitherto been faced. None the less, the present generation will have to undertake it and carry it through, in the interests of all posterity, since there is no other way of escape from the chaos into which the world has fallen.

Undoubtedly there will be numerous difficulties in the way, which as yet it is impossible to foresee, just as the war faced mankind with problems unsuspected before. Man has long accustomed himself to the efforts demanded by the waging of war. War is not regarded as an automatic process; it is always "waged"; not only total war, but every kind. Peace, on the other hand, has come to be regarded as something static, which will maintain itself so long as it is not upset by some unexpected incident of war. But the reality is quite different. Peace must also be "waged." As much, and frequently even more effort must be put forth to bring about conditions which will secure the organic permanence of peace. Peace, no less than war, is dynamic, not static, in its nature, and ceaseless watch must be kept on the direction of its dynamic, if it is to be kept in more or less permanent equilibrium. This necessity follows perforce from total war, and henceforth every war will have to be total. This form of war is waged not only with the help of the most varied means and methods, but also over the widest possible area. It tends constantly to spread. Hence the efforts needed for the economic and political rebuilding of the world when peace returns must also be total. After a total war only a total peace can have any hope of permanence.

## VI. CONCLUSION

The aim of the present war is not merely military victory. The United Nations are waging it, as is asserted in the Atlantic Charter, in order to compass "the complete destruction of Nazi tyranny." This, of course, implies the breaking of the military power of Germany and the occupation of the countries of Europe by the forces of the United Nations, but these steps will be only the prelude to complete reconstruction. The whole system of German domination over Europe must be destroyed, together with the economic and social foundations on which it is based. If there were no such reconstruction, it would be impossible to prevent new wars in the future, and to base international relations on a strong foundation of permanent peace. In that case the war would be actually lost, despite all military victories, since its real and fundamental aim would not have been attained.

The "Four Freedoms" proclaimed by President Roosevelt point the way and define the principal tasks of reconstruction which will have to be accomplished after the war. These tasks must be undertaken and carried out by the broadest masses of the people in the European countries. Everything, therefore, which would hamper the free development of the people's powers must be cleared from the way. The nations wish to be free not only from the threat of external aggression, but they are also for an unimpeded chance to work and to attain better conditions of life. The pattern of that life, alike in the political, economic, and social spheres, must be democratic.

Not all the countries of Europe, however, are ripe for democracy in equal degree. In Western Europe, where social development is most advanced, post-war reconstruction will not meet with any special difficulties. The stratification of society in those countries and their old democratic traditions constitute a sufficient guarantee of the success of reconstruction. In Central-Eastern Europe, on the other hand, the integration of which is one of the important aims of the war and at the same time one of the more difficult tasks of post-war reconstruction, there must be fundamental changes before that reconstruction is complete. The area comprises countries of widely-differing social structure, widely-differing historical traditions, and widely-differing present political conditions. The one most like the countries of Western Europe is Czechoslovakia.

Poland, despite its unhappy episodes of authoritarian government, has a strong democratic tradition, which did not permit the establishment of a totalitarian system. In Hungary and Rumania the governing classes represent the interests of an agrarian, military, and official oligarchy. In the Balkan States, in the period immediately preceding the war, the masses of the people were completely excluded from influence on the governments; a state of affairs which was reflected in the attitude of those countries in face of the threat of war, and also during the course of the war. To a certain extent the situation in the Baltic States is similar.

But in all these countries, nevertheless, the conditions for a strong and permanent democratic order do exist. The great majority of their population is composed of the peasantry. This class is not at all inclined to revolutionary movements, but is deeply interested in the possibility of emancipating itself both from the remains of feudalism wherever it still survives and from its bad military and bureaucratic governments. The "Four Freedoms" imply for these countries democratic regime, based on essential social reforms which will open the way for all to economic prosperity, social advancement, and intellectual culture. The achievement of such a regime in some of these countries will have to be preceded by drastic political changes. It will be inevitable particularly in countries where the ruling classes have either not offered sufficient resistance to Germany, or have actually co-operated with it, or have made their countries subservient to the German war-effort. The fall of Germany will bring with it their fall also.

It is impossible to imagine that after victory the newly-integrated Central-Eastern Europe is to be built up by the United Nations in reliance on reactionary forces which might still be found in some occupied or satellite countries. The work must be done, in friendly co-operation with the allied Powers, in the interests of the broad masses of the people and by those same masses themselves. A better social and economic order will be their reward for the sufferings and fatigues of war. Such is their present hope.

It is noteworthy that during the Polish-Czechoslovak discussions regarding a possible federation of the two countries, which took place in 1942, when the end of the war still seemed remote, the negotiators realized very well that integration requires the establishment of a certain common denominator of democratic attainment. Article 12 of the Polish-Czechoslovak Declaration of January 22, 1942, requires the constitutions of the two countries to contain provisions guaranteeing their democratic structure. This

is the only international document up to now in which two States bind themselves to certain defined constitutional standards. The article runs as follows : “ The constitutions of the individual States included in the confederation will guarantee to the citizens of these States the following rights : Freedom of conscience, personal freedom, freedom of learning, freedom of the spoken and written word, freedom of organization and association, equality of all citizens for the performance of all State functions, the independence of the courts of law, and the control of government by representative national bodies elected by means of free elections.” Since the establishment of a Polish-Czechoslovak Federation is regarded as the starting-point for the erection of a wider federal structure in Central-Eastern Europe, these democratic guarantees will have to apply also to all the other countries in the integrated zone.

The United Nations, who have vowed the overthrow of Nazi tyranny, have thereby taken upon themselves the duty of supporting those social forces in Europe which will be capable of carrying out its reconstruction and maintaining its democratic structure to the fullest extent in the future. The moment the war is transferred to the Continent of Europe, it will indubitably, in some countries, take on the character of an internal upheaval, in which the forces of the people endeavouring to overthrow their own oligarchies will be the allies of the United Nations in their war against Germany and its associates.

At that point the question of war aims will come to be identified with that of the strategy and tactics of political warfare.