

THE CASE
FOR
INDIAN HOME RULE

Being a general introduction to the Congress-League Scheme
of political reforms in India

*"A Nation's liberty could not be meted and parcelled out in
gratitude. No man can be grateful at the expense of his
conscience ; no woman at the expense of her honour ; no
nation at the expense of its liberty."*

—H. Grattan.

BY

BSINHA CHINTAMAN KELKAR, B.A., LL.B.

Secretary, Indian Home Rule League, Poona

(Published under the authority of the Indian Home Rule League, Poona)

PŌONA :

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PREFACE



THE present pamphlet is issued under the authority of the Indian Home Rule League, Poona. It is an attempt to put together some of the main arguments in what may be called, in forensic language, the 'Case' for Self-Government or Home Rule in India.

Copious literature is being issued for the last two or three years on the subject. But of literature of this sort there can never perhaps be too much. The whole country is waiting for political education. Even 'enlightened' statesmen in England apparently require an amount of enlightenment on this particular topic.

The welcome visit of the State Secretary for India has naturally given one more stimulus to the advocates of Indian Home Rule to put their arguments on paper. Mr. Montagu, while in India, will probably make it a point to collect, preserve, and digest everything that is intended to be read by him with reference to the object of his visit. May we not hope that he will be able to bring a fresh and an unbiased mind to bear upon whatever he reads in this connection?

The present pamphlet had to be produced practically under an inexorable time limit of ten weeks. Being myself hustled, I could not help hustling my readers over this panoramic subject.

I should like to express my thanks to my assistants Messrs. V. M. Bhat, B. A., J. S. Karandikar, B. A. LL.B. and D. V. Gokhale, B. A. LL. B. and particularly to Mr. Bhat, for carefully seeing the pamphlet through the press.

HOME RULE LEAGUE OFFICE,
Poona, 20th December 1917.

} N. C. KELKAR, B. A., LL. B.

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THE CASE FOR INDIAN HOME RULE

Chapter I

The Ancient Civilisation of India

THE Resolution passed by the Indian National Congress at Lucknow in December 1916, on the subject of Self-government for India, runs thus:—

(a) That having regard to the fact that the great communities of India are the inheritors of ancient civilisation and have shown great capacity for government and administration, and to the progress of education and public spirit made by them during a century of British rule; and further having regard to the fact that the present system of government does not satisfy the legitimate aspirations of the people and has become unsuited to the existing conditions and requirements; this Congress is of opinion that time has come when His Majesty should be pleased to issue a proclamation announcing that it is the aim and intention of British policy to confer self-government on India at an early date.

(b) That this Congress demands that a definite step should be taken towards self-government by granting the reforms contained in the scheme prepared by the All-India Congress Committee, in concert with the Reform Committee appointed by the All-India Moslem League.

(c) That in the reconstruction of the Empire, India shall be lifted from the position of a dependency to that of an equal partner in the Empire with the self-governing dominions.

2 This resolution puts the demand of the Indian Nation for self-government in a nutshell. An analysis of the resolution shows that it contains the following propositions:—

- (1) That Indians have deserved self-government.
- (2) That their present position is a negation of self-government.
- (3) That a declaration of a policy of self-government should be made at once.
- (4) That, as an earnest of carrying out that policy, a first instalment of a minimum of political reforms should be granted as embodied in the scheme.

3 It is a matter for satisfaction that one at least of these demands has been already granted, in that, in an extra-ordinary issue of the *Gazette of India* at Simla on 20th August last, the following announcement was declared to have been made by the Secretary of State for India in the House of Commons:—

“The policy of His Majesty’s Government, with which the Government of India are in complete accord, is that of increasing the association of Indians in every branch of administration and the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realisation of responsible government in India, as an integral part of the British Empire. They have decided that substantial steps in this direction should be taken as soon as possible; and that it is of the highest importance, as a preliminary to considering what these steps should be, that there should be a free and informal exchange of opinion between those in authority at Home and in India. His Majesty’s Government have accordingly decided, with His Majesty’s approval, that I should accept the Viceroy’s invitation to proceed to India to discuss these matters with the Viceroy and the Government of India, to consider with the Viceroy the views of Local Governments and to receive the suggestions of representative bodies and others. I would add that

progress in this policy can only be achieved by successive stages. The British Government and the Government of India, on whom the responsibility lies for the welfare and advancement of the Indian peoples, must be judges of the time and measure of each advance, and they must be guided by the co-operation received from those upon whom new opportunities of service will thus be conferred, and by the extent to which it is found that confidence can be reposed in their sense of responsibility. Ample opportunity will be afforded for the public discussion of the proposals, which will be submitted in due course to Parliament."

4 But it yet remains to be seen whether, and how far, the Secretary of State for India accepts the other positions and grants the demands in the above analysis. It is, therefore, proposed in the following pages to examine them with a view to see how far they are both valid and solid.

5 If there is one thing, more than another, which has passed unchallenged by the most unfriendly critic of India, it is the claim that India inherits a great and ancient civilisation. In an introductory lecture addressed to the candidates for the Indian Civil Service in 1882, Professor Max Muller passed the following panegyric upon India. "If I were," he said, "to look over the whole world to find out the country most richly endowed with all the wealth, power, and beauty that Nature can bestow—in some parts a very Paradise on earth,—I should point to India. If I were asked under what sky, the human mind has most fully developed some of its choicest gifts, has most deeply pondered on the greatest problems of life, and has found solutions of some of them which will deserve the attention even of those who have studied Plato and Kant, I should point to India. And if I were to ask myself from what literature we, here in Europe, we who have been nurtured almost exclusively on the thoughts of Greeks and Romans, and of one Semitic race the Jewish, may draw that corrective which is most wanted in order to make our inner life more perfect, more comprehensive, more universal, in fact more truly human—a life not for this life only, but a transfigured and eternal life—again I should point to India."

"Whatever sphere of the human mind you select for your special study, whether it be language, or religion, or mythology, or philosophy; whether it be laws or customs, primitive art or primitive science, everywhere you have to go to India, whether you like it or not, because some of the most valuable and most instructive materials in the history of man are treasured up in India and in India only."

6 It may perhaps be contended that Prof. Max Muller was only an absentee admirer of India, being morbidly enslaved by the grace and the charm of Indian Literature and Philosophy, and that Literature and Philosophy is not after all the whole of a nation's civilisation. We shall therefore give below a brief review of the position and the achievements of the Indian people, including the Aryan as well as the non-Aryan races who have permanently settled in India and made this country their home, in respect of civilisation, i. e. everything that goes to make up civilisation, and by which any claim to civilisation may be tested.

7 And first with regard to the Hindus. The antiquity of Hindu civilisation is so remote that it may be described as immemorial or without beginning as it were. We need not, however, dwell here on the old Vedic or Pauranic civilisation. Even the records of the purely historical period take us far back to a time when, as Macaulay has facetiously put it, the people of England were still wearing raw skins on their painted bodies and wildly roaming in the forest. Even rejecting innumerable *facts* of the highest scientific value regarding India, simply because they were not amenable to chronology, Mr. Vincent Smith has been able to fix the time of the beginning of the historical period in India as early as the 7th century B. C. And even at this period he finds evidence not only of the political unity of India as a nation, but a nation, again, marked by the development of maritime commerce and the diffusion of the knowledge of the art of writing. The earliest *historical* records show that the country between the Himalayas and the Narmada was settled and was divided into a multitude of independent states, some monarchies and some tribal republics. In the 6th century B. C. Kosala was the premier political state and it had also the proud distinction

of possessing one of the greatest religious teachers of the world, Gautama Buddha. It may be further noted that many or most of these States were often brought under, or formed parts of, a Hindu Empire without losing their autonomous character.

8 Among the great monarchs of the early period may be mentioned Bimbisara and Ajatshastu, both contemporaries of Darius; Udaya, the founder of the famous city of Patliputra; Mahapadma Nanda, the owner of fabulous wealth; Chandragupta Mayura, the famous revolutionist and disciple of the Bramhan politician Chanakya; Bindusara, the friend of the Greek Satrap Antiochus; Asoka the conqueror of the Indian world and the royal propagandist of the Dhamma—'the law of piety', or the glorious ethical and moral teachings of Buddhism; Hala, the patron of the Prakrit literature; Yajna Shri, who probably had a navy of his own and who is famous for his silver coins; Chandragupta I, who founded a new era; Samudra Gupta who has earned the name of the Indian Napoleon by reason of his conquests from the Ganges in the north to the Malabar and Conjeevarum in the South, and who received embassies from Ceylon; Chandragupta II, who waged wars on the Indus in the west and Bengal in the east, who conquered Kathiawad and advanced to the Arabian sea, and whose court was famous for its learned men; Skandagupta who obtained a great victory over the white Huns and delivered the country from barbarian tyranny; Pratapgupta, famous for his currency reforms; Siladitya who advocated sanitary reforms to the length of providing pure filtered water even for horses and elephants; Prabhaker Wardhan who waged wars upon the Huns; and Harsha, who had the ambition of bringing "all India under one umbrella", who put 60,000 war elephants and 100,000 cavalry in the field, who was at the same time famous for his learning and devotion, and was fortunate enough to be the subject of Hiuen Tsang's sincere panegyrics.

9 So also among the comparatively modern Hindu kings we may mention Anangpala who conquered Delhi; Prithwi Raj Chawan who supplied endless themes to inspiring bards as a chivalrous lover and a doughty champion; Kalechuri, whose sovereignty was recognised in distant Tirhut; and the Great Bhoja of Malva who is said to have been a model Hindu King, and cultivated the arts of war and peace with equal assiduity. There were, again, equally famous kings in the Sen and Pal dynasties in northern and eastern India. And among the kings in the Deccan we may mention Pulkeshi of the Karnatic, who received an embassy from Persia; and Vikramaditya of Kalyani who founded a new era. Mr. Vincent Smith has also given an account of the Pandya, Chera, Kerala and Satiyaputra kingdoms in Southern India. It is not necessary to give details about these; but it may be mentioned in passing that one of the Pandya kings is said to have sent an embassy to Augustus Caesar; King Parantaka of the Chola dynasty carried his victorious arms into Ceylon; Raj-rama of the same dynasty not only completed the conquest of that island but ruled a realm which included nearly the whole of the Madras Presidency and a large part of Mysore and also some such ocean islands as Lakhdivs and Maldivs. The magnificent temple of Tanjore which he built still bears on its walls the accounts and illustrations of his exploits. Rajendu Chola Dev extended his sovereignty to Orissa and Bengal and sent a naval expedition to the Indo-Chinese peninsula. And lastly we may mention the kingdoms in the Deccan proper, an account of whom is to be found in Dr. Bhandarkar's *History of the Deccan* or the later Empire of Vijayanagar, an account of which is given in Mr. Sewell's *Forgotten Empire*. Mr. Sewell says that the Empire was "far larger than Austria" and Vijayanagar, its capital, is declared by Europeans who visited it in the sixteenth and seventeenth century to have been "a city with which for richness and magnificence no known western capital could compare."

10 Coming to still more modern times we may mention at least three races which produced great kings and warriors and royal statesmen; we mean the Rajputs, the Marathas and the Sikhs.

11 The Rajputs were a royal race whose chivalry, valour, and faithfulness have been eternal themes of Indian bards. They proudly traced their origin to Divinity itself; and as Colonel Todd says in his *Rajasthan*, "If we compare the

antiquity and illustrious descent of the dynasties which have ruled, and some which continue to rule, the small sovereignties of Rajastan, with many of celebrity in Europe, superiority will often attach to the Rajput. From the most remote periods we can trace nothing ignoble nor any vestige of vassal origin. Reduced in power, circumscribed in territory, compelled to yield much of their splendour and many of the dignities of birth, they have not abandoned an iota of the pride and high bearing arising from a knowledge of their illustrious and regal descent. On this principle the various revolutions of the Rana's family never encroached and the mighty Jahangir himself, the Emperor of the Moguls, became, like Caesar, the commentator of the history of the tribe of Sesodia." We have the evidence of Sir Thomes Roe, the ambassador of Elizabeth to Jehangir, as to the splendour of this race. It appears throughout their annals and those of their neighbours. The martial Rajputs were not strangers to armorial bearings which were not known in Europe till the period of the crusades, and which were copied from the Saracens. The Rajputs were proud to use these emblems of glory even before the war of Troy. The Rajputs, though weakened by internal quarrels, were never completely subdued either by the Mahomedans or by the Marathas. Their martial achievements, their proud bearing, their generosity, their courtesy, and their hospitality have won the admiration even of the foreigners. These Rajput virtues are yet extant inspite of all their revolutions, and have survived ages of Mahomedan bigotry and power. Endless would be the series of Rajput princes who have earned an immortal fame by their noble lives and valorous deeds. Of the great Pratap the historian Col. Todd has said "there is not a pass in the Alpine Aravali that is not sanctified by some deed of Pratap—some brilliant victory, or oftener more glorious defeat. Haldighat is the Thermopylæ of Mewar; the field of Dewiar her Marathon..." When he lay to death he was asked what afflicted his soul that it would not depart in peace, he replied, "It lingered for some consolatory pledge that his country should not be abandoned to the Turk."

12 Of the modern Marathas the earliest were the Yadavs of Deogiri who ruled till the 13th century, and who have been immortalised by their connection with the world-famous Yellora caves. Next we have the Vijayanagar kings whose glowing accounts have been written by the Portuguese writers, and the idea of whose splendour may be formed by a visit to the monumental ruins still to be seen near Hampi. The connection of the Maratha kings, who ruled in still later times between the Narmada and the Kaveri, with the Rajputs of the north is a point of dispute, but their achievements are beyond cavil. The most illustrious among them all was Shivaji the Great, who established a Maratha kingdom after a brave struggle with the Mahomedans, and whose descendants are still regarded as the pillars of the British government. As observed by Mr. Elphinstone in his classical work the *History of India*, "The celebrity of the Marathas was reserved for recent times when they were destined to act a greater part than all other Hindu nations and to make a nearer approach to universal sovereignty than any of those to whom modern writers have ascribed the enjoyment of the Empire of India." Of the Marathas, again, has Sir William Hunter, the historian of India, written that "the British won India not from the Moguls but from the Hindus. Before we appeared as conquerors the Mogul Empire had broken up...Our conclusive wars were neither with the Delhi King nor with his revolted governors, but with the two Hindu confederacies, the Marathas and the Sikhs. The last Maratha wars were fought as late as 1818."

13 Shahaji the father of Shivaji may be a soldier of fortune; but it was due to his statesmanship that he checked the power of the Moguls in the Deccan through the agency of the Bijapur and the Ahmednagar kingdoms alternately. He proved practically a king-maker, and himself ruled over the Mahomedan Kingdom of Ahmednagar though a puppet king nominally reigned. Though he left to his son the actual work of laying the foundation of the Maratha empire still it was he who really did the spade-work necessary for the laying up of that foundation. The title of Raja which he enjoyed was more than formal, though Shivaji afterwards improved upon it and became the 'Maharaja Chhatrapati.' As for Shivaji, though his name is well-known to Europeans, many of them are ignorant of his real

character; they know of him more as the bandit or the bandicoot of the hills from the malicious descriptions given by prejudiced historians. We may therefore quote the following from Grant Duff who has written a monumental work on the *History of the Marathas*. He says: "Shiwaji was certainly a most extraordinary person. And however justly many of his acts may be censured, his claim to high rank in the page of history must be admitted. To form an estimate of his character, let us consider him assembling and conducting a band of half-naked Mavlis through the wild tracks, unmindful of the obstruction from the elements, turning the most inclement seasons to advantage, and inspiring the mind of such followers with undaunted enthusiasm. Let us also observe the singular plans of policy he commenced and which we must admit to have been altogether novel and most fit for acquiring power at such a period. Let us examine his internal regulations, the great progress he made in arranging every department in the midst of almost perpetual warfare, and his successful stratagems for escaping or extricating himself from difficulties. And whether planning the capture of a fort or the conquest of a distant country; heading an attack or conducting a retreat; regulating the discipline to be observed amongst a hundred horse or laying down arrangements for governing a country; we view his talents with admiration and his genius with wonder. For a popular leader his frugality was a remarkable feature of his character, and the richest plunder never made him deviate from the rules he had laid down for its appropriation. Let us contrast his craft, pliancy and humility with his boldness, firmness and ambition; his power of inspiring enthusiasm while he showed the coolest attention to his own interests; the dash of a partisan adventurer with the order and economy of a statesman; and lastly the wisdom of his plans which raised the despised Hindu to sovereignty and brought about their own accomplishment when the hand that had framed them was low in the dust". As the late Mr. Justice Ranade observes in his *Rise of the Maratha Power*, "The history of Shiwaji's military exploits presents to our view only one side of the working of his master mind, and we are too apt to forget that he had other and stronger claims upon our attention as a civil ruler. Like Napoleon I, Shiwaji in his time was the great organiser and builder of civil institutions which conduced largely to the success of the movement initiated by him, and which alone enabled the country to pass unscathed through the dangers which overwhelmed it and helped it to assert its claim to national independence after a 20 years' struggle with the whole power of the Mogul empire". Shivaji had the skill to combine a grateful revival of the classical traditions of the early Hindu kingdoms with a system of national government appropriate to the peculiar times in which he lived. Though his career was meteoric he was not an upstart. He inherited traditions as much as he left traditions to be inherited after him.

14 The Sikhs were the last of the Hindus to be brought under the sway of the British. They fought bravely with the Mahomedans for about two centuries and the most illustrious of them was Ranjitsing, known as the Lion of the Punjab, who was the Governor of Lahore in his twentieth year, and who formed under European officers well-disciplined corps of troops who, for their valour and militant religious fervour, could be aptly compared with Cromwell's Ironsides.

15 The next point to be considered in connection with the political civilisation of the Hindus is the extent of their kingdoms. A glimpse into the extent of the territorial possessions of some of the ancient Hindu kings will be obtained in the brief references made above to some of the more important Hindu kings. But a few instances may again be as well given. Thus Mr. Vincent Smith says of Ashoka as follows:—

"The extent of the enormous empire governed by Ashoka can be ascertained with approximate accuracy. On the *north-west* it extended to the *Hindukush* mountains and included most of the territory now under the rule of the Ameer of Afgani-stan, as well as the whole, or a large part, of Baluchistan and all Sind. The secluded valleys of Suwat and Bajaur were probably...and the valleys of Kashmir and Nepal were certainly, integral parts of the empire."

"Eastwards the empire comprised the whole of Bengal as far as the mouths of the Ganges.....The strip of coast to the north of the Godavari river, known as Kalinga, was annexed in 261 B. C. Further south the Andhra kingdom, between the Godavari and the Krishna, appears to have been treated as a protected state, administered by its own Rajas."

"On the south-east the Palar river, the northern frontier of the Tamil race, may be regarded as the limit of the imperial jurisdiction.....The empire comprised, therefore, in modern terminology Afganistan, south of the Hindukush, Baluchistan, Sind, the valley of Kashmir, Nepal, the lower Himalaya and the whole of India proper except the southern extremity."

Of the extent of the realm of Samudragupta the same writer says:—

"The dominion under the direct government of Samudragupta in the middle of the 4th century thus comprised all the most populous and fertile countries of Northern India. It extended from the Hooghly on the east to the Jamna and Chambal on the west; and from the foot of the Himalayas on the north to the Narmada on the South...The empire thus defined was by far the greatest that had been seen in India since the days of Ashoka six centuries before, and its possession naturally entitled Samudragupta to the respect of foreign powers...He maintained diplomatic relations with the Kushan king of Gandhar and Kabul, the greater sovereign of the Oxus, that of the Ceylon and other distant islands."

16 Kingdoms like these could not of course be either conquered or maintained without military strength or organisation, and we need not wonder if we are told that the ancient Hindu kings possessed very large, powerful and efficient armies.

Thus the army, to which Chandragupta owed his throne and empire, was, we are told, maintained at enormous numerical strength, and so organised, equipped and administered as to attain a high degree of efficiency as measured by an oriental standard. It was not a militia, but a standing army, drawing liberal and regular pay, and supplied by the government with horses, arms, equipment, and stores (Diodorus). The force at the command of Mahapadma Nanda is said to have numbered 80,000 horse, 200,000 foot, 8000 chariots, and 6000 fighting elephants. This huge force was greatly augmented by Chandragupta, who raised the numbers of the infantry to 600,000 and he also had 30,000 horse, and 9000 elephants, besides chariots, all permanently enrolled in a regularly paid establishment.

The 9000 elephants therefore implied a force of 36,000 men, and the 8000 chariots, supposing them to be no more numerous than those kept by Mahapadma Nanda, required 24,000 men to work them. The total number of soldiers in the army would thus have been 600,000 infantry, 30,000 horsemen, 36,000 men with the elephants, and 24,000 with chariots, or 690,000 in all, excluding followers and attendants.

These high figures may seem incredible at first sight, but are justified by our knowledge of the unwieldy hosts used in war by Indian kings in later ages. For instance, Nunez, the Portuguese chronicler, who was contemporary with Krishna Deva, the Raja of Vijayanagar, in the 16th century (1509-30) affirms that that prince led against Raichur an army consisting of 703,000 foot, 32,600 horse, and 551 elephants besides camp followers.

All Indian armies had been regarded from time immemorial as normally comprising the four arms: cavalry, infantry, elephants and chariots; and each of these arms would naturally fall under the control of a distinct authority; but the addition of *co-ordinate supply and admiralty departments* appears to be an innovation due to the genius of *Chandragupta*. His organisation must have been as efficient in practice as it was systematic on paper, for it enabled him in the words of Plutarch 'not only, to overrun and subdue all India' but also to expel the Macedonian garrisons, and to repel the invasion of Seleukos.

17 As regards the Hindu principles of political government the reader is invited to study the exhaustive treatment of this subject in Babu Pramath Nath Bannerjee's *Public Administration in Ancient India*. He therein tells us that "in the early Vedic

ages the structure of society was a simple one, and there were no class distinctions, each person being regarded as the full equal of every other. The patriarchal system was in existence with regard to the family government, but the Aryan father was not the master of the family, and, like the Roman *pater familias*, had no powers of life and death over his dependents. Slavery as such, i. e. in such rigorous forms as it existed in some of the western countries, was not in force. Megasthenes has borne testimony to the fact that "none of the Indians employed slaves." The unit of the political community was the village panchayat, and the bond of common interest united the whole aggregation of families included therein. The political sovereignty was territorial, and though it is customary among western writers to speak as if the old Hindu State was a theocracy, the assertion is mostly ill founded; for, the political ruler was never regarded as the head of the religion, and the object of the State government was never spiritual salvation but only political and social well-being. No doubt positive law was yet to be as finely differentiated from religious precepts as in the most modern times; but the king was the supreme magistrate entrusted with the duty of enforcing the law, and the status of political subjects was not dependent upon their religious duties, though the rights of man were regarded as resting more in the group collectively to which he belonged than to himself as an individual. It is true that the king is often spoken of as Divine in Hindu works on polity. But it is a mistake to suppose therefrom, as some European writers have done, that he wielded full despotic powers, or that he was utterly irresponsible to his subjects even in those ancient days; for, it must be remembered that the king had no legislative powers. Law as based on custom was always promulgated by the learned of the land, or the heads of the different communities themselves; and the king had only to enforce the same. In other words he was the Head Executive Officer of the kingdom and never a legislator or a law-giver himself. Similarly even in matters of administration and revenue, the king's power was very much limited by village communities, different castes and trade communities in the kingdom, every one of which always insisted on the enforcement of their customary rights.

18 Nor was monarchy the only form of government known to the Hindus; for, there is abundant testimony borne by such scholars as Prof. Rhys Davids, Mr. Vincent Smith, Dr. Sir Bhandarkar, McCrindle and others to the fact that oligarchies, and even republics, tribal if not statal, existed in India from times immemorial and we quote some extracts from their works here to prove the same.

"The administrative and judicial business of the clan (Sakiyas) was carried out in public assembly at which young and old were alike present, in their common mote Hall (Santhāgāra) at Kapilvastu. It was at such a *Parliament* or *Palaver* that king Pasenodi's proposition was discussed...A single *chief*...was *elected* as office-holder presiding over the sessions, and if no sessions were sitting, over the state. He bore the title of *Raja* which must have meant something like the Roman consul or the Greek archon."

"The earliest Buddhist records reveal the survival, side by side with more or less powerful monarchies, of *republics* with either complete or modified independence...The Buddhist records, amply confirmed in these respects by the somewhat later Jain ones, leave no doubt upon the point.

—(*Buddhist India*, Prof. Rhys Davids.)

The Punjab, Eastern Rajputana and Malwa for the most part were in possession of tribes or clans living under republican institutions.

Dr. Hoernule, in the address on Jainism that he delivered in 1898 as President of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, stated that Mahavira, the founder of Jainism, was born in a state which was an *oligarchic republic* which is a half way house between monarchy and a pure democracy. "Vaisali was an *oligarchic republic*, its government was vested in a senate, composed of the heads of the resident Kshatriya clans."

"Some of them (the states) were governed by Princes, while others were oligarchies or *Republics*. In the Mahabharata the Vrishnis, for instance, framed an Oligarchy ruled by many chiefs of whom Krishna was one. In fact almost all the Indian nations of these times possessed *popular institutions* of some type or other."

"In the Mandasor Inscription of Kumar Gupta and Bandhuvarman (sixth century A. D.) the *Malavas* are referred to as living *under a republican form of government.*"

"The Ambashthas (Sambastai)...dwelt in cities in which the *democratic form of government* prevailed. Curtius mentions a tribe called Sabarcae, 'a powerful Indian tribe where the form of government was democratic.'...When the *Malloi* tendered their submission to Alexander they told him that they were attached more than any others to freedom and *autonomy*, and that they had preserved their freedom intact from the time Dionysos came to India until Alexander's invasion."

"The most striking instance of an *oligarchy* was that of the Lichhavis whose chiefs were all called Rajas."

—(*Public Administration in Ancient India*, P. Bannerjee).

The Indian Aryans had like their European brethren the rudiments of free political institutions. And actually the existence of aristocratic republics is alluded to in Buddhist Pali books.

19 Nor was the Hindu political system, above stated, wanting in good fruitful results. Not only was then no anarchy but on the contrary peace and contentment prevailed, so that little was heard of crime, social strife, or revolution; and probably there was no cause for breach of national peace except the political ambition of kings who aspired to paramount power. The particulars, as collected and narrated by the earliest Chinese traveller in India, permit of no doubt that the dominions of Chandragupta Vikramaditya were well governed, the authorities interfering as little as possible with the subject, and leaving him free to prosper in his own way. Probably India was never governed better, after the oriental manner, than it was during the reign of Vikramaditya. The government did not attempt to do too much; but let the people alone, and therefore popular liberty and the liberty of individual conscience was assured.

Hiuen Tsang, like his predecessor Fa-hien, more than two centuries earlier, was favourably impressed by the character of the civil administration, which he considered to be founded on benign principles. The principal source of revenue was the rent of the crown lands, amounting to one-sixth of the produce. Taxes were light.

20 As regards the machinery of executive government, the theory of responsible ministry was developed early enough, and the early Hindu law-givers advised the king not only to appoint ministers but act according to their advice. In the *Sukraniti* we find a practical differentiation of departments and distinct special names for ministers such as the priest, the regent, the premier, the finance minister, the president of the privy council, the chief judge, the legal remembrancer, the minister for peace and war, the secretary of state and the ambassador. It is curious to find that even the theory that 'the king can do no wrong' was accepted, as for example in the Sanskrit drama *Mudrarakshas* wherein the author says, 'when anything wrong is done by the king the fault is that of the minister; for, it is through the negligence of the driver that an elephant goes mad.'

21 The departmental system was evidently followed in the administration by the subordinate executive. Thus accounts, treasury, mints, metals, mining, forests, commerce, tolls, weights and measures, shipping, irrigation, agriculture, weaving, stables and the dairy appear to be mentioned as headings of departmental administration for which separate superintendents or overseers were appointed. It is needless to say that the police department was in existence; but what is perhaps remarkable is that the police were pecuniarily responsible for at least one of their duties viz, the recovery of the stolen goods. And this view of the police duties need not be considered as over-hard, for the king applied the same high standard of duty to himself and made good from the treasury the value of stolen articles if dereliction of duty could not be brought home to the police. Even the Hindu kings were not without their secret reporters who were regarded as the 'eyes and ears of the executive government.' Of course human nature is the same everywhere; and corruption was regarded as inevitable in spite of checks and counter-

checks. For as Chanakya has observed "it is impossible for a king's revenue officer to refrain from tasting even a little of the royal revenue". The salaries of officials were paid either in cash or in kind or partly in cash and partly in kind. A code of pensions and subsistence or compassionate allowance for bereaved families was in existence and permanent grants of land or revenue were not an uncommon method of rewarding honest service.

22 The promulgation of law was, as pointed out above, left to a few learned in law and religion. But law was conspicuous for its brevity and much was left to the operation of local or tribal custom which, after all, as Sir Henry Maine says, is the main origin of law. But the defects of the system of legislation were made up by the agency of the execution of those laws. Though the learned law-givers were few, and the codes were not drawn up in profuse detail, still the spirit of the laws was accepted as having sovereign power, and the tribal juries or the caste juries almost unfailingly enforced this spirit in rendering summary but substantial justice. The king was nominally the fountain of justice, but private juries mostly relieved him of that task. There were Courts and Judges but their function was more that of legal and judicial advisers than judges in a cause. The judge investigated the merits of the cause when it was beyond the scope of the private or semi-official juries, and it was reserved for the king to pass and execute the sentence. The Civil and Criminal sides of the law and law-courts were not finely differentiated, but it mattered very little for practical purposes. Each village had its local court composed of the headman and the elders of the village. The Communal courts had extensive powers, but the jurisdiction of the village courts was restricted to minor matters. Justice by arbitration was regarded of great importance and it was specially recommended by the law-givers for persons following particular occupations. A system of appeals and counter-appeals was unknown; and while wrong-doers had a short shrift, litigation could not be indulged in as a fashionable vice. The local courts were of course permanent recognised institutions but there were also itinerent courts for persons drawn away from cities or villages. In short the sacred law, the secular law, the customary law, and the law of royal ordinances had its own executive agency, and there was neither delay nor excessive cost involved in the administration of justice.

23 The existence of local self-government in ancient, mediæval or historical India is a recognised fact. The village community had large and extensive powers in local administration, and though material civilisation was not far advanced, and the methods of urban living were not highly refined, the village community was the master of the situation regarding what little was to be done by way of local administration. The communities were however not absolutely free from central control. In a paper on *Village Government in Southern India* contributed by the present Indian Minister of Education, Sir Shankaran Nair, to the *Modern Review* of March 1914 in order to dispel the idea that representative government is abhorrent to the spirit of the East, he has quoted *in extenso* the rules for election for a village assembly from the report of the Archæological Department for 1904-05. These rules appear to be promulgated for the years 908-921 A. D. and go into minutest details as to the franchise, the procedure of election etc., and we may as well quote the concluding words of Sir Shankaran Nair, "It is interesting to observe that ladies were eligible for election and a lady was a member in a committee of justice..... After this who can say that representative institutions and self-government are foreign importations?"

Of course the development of municipal government as seen herein could not be the work of a day and must have had an antecedent tradition centuries long. In fact the tradition can be taken so far back as centuries before Christ, and the following extracts from Mr. Vincent Smith's *Early History of India*, relating to the existence of local government in the time of Chandragupta, will therefore be read with interest:

"The administration of the capital city, Pataliputra, was regarded as a matter of the highest importance and was provided for by the formation of a Municipal Commission consisting of *thirty members*, divided like the War office Com-

mission of equal members into *six Boards* or Committees of five members each. These boards may be regarded as the official development of the ordinary non-official *Panchayat* or committee of 5 members, by which every caste and trade in India has been accustomed to regulate its internal affairs from time immemorial."

"The first Municipal Board, which was entrusted with the superintendence of everything relating to the industrial arts, was doubtless responsible for fixing the rates of wages etc."

"The second Board devoted its energies to the case of foreign residents and visitors....All foreigners were closely watched by officials who provided suitable lodgings, escorts, and in case of need, medical assistance....The existence of these elaborate regulations is conclusive proof that the Maurya empire in the third century B. C. was in constant intercourse with foreign states."

"The third Board was responsible for the systematic registration of births and deaths, and we are expressly informed that the system of registration was enforced for the information of Government. as well as for levying the taxes....Even the Anglo-Indian administration with its complex organisations and European notions of the value of statistical information, did not attempt the collection of vital statistics until very recent times, and has always experienced great difficulty in securing reasonable accuracy in the figures."

24 Public works, as they are now understood, were familiar to the Hindus in olden times and the dimensions of public buildings were in tune with the large size of cities and towns. Pataliputra e. g. one of the Imperial cities founded in the fifth century B.C., measured about nine miles by a mile and a half. "It was defended by a massive timber palisade pierced by sixty four gates, crowned by 570 towers and protected externally by a broad and deep moat filled with waters of the Son." The royal palace of Chandragupta was a magnificent structure situated in an extensive park studded with fishponds and furnished with a great variety of ornamental trees and shrubs, the gilded pillars of the palace being adorned with golden vines and silver birds. Ujjani of the seventh century A.D. was an equally large city. Its description by Kalidasa may be passed over as perhaps a poetical extravagance, but no one could doubt the testimony about the city of Kanoj given by the famous Chinese traveller : "The city was three miles and a half long and three quarters of a mile broad. It had a ditch round it with strong and lofty towers facing one another. The flowers and woods were reflected in lakes and ponds, bright and pure, shining like mirrors. Valuable merchandise is collected here in great quantities. The people are well off and contented, the houses are rich and well formed. Flowers and fruit abound in every place." The description of the city of Vijayanagar, in the fifteenth century, by the Italian and Portuguese travellers is equally grand. It is said by eye-witnesses, that the circumference of the city was 60 miles, and there were no less than 90,000 men fit to bear arms therein. Its magnificence can be judged even now by its ruins near Hospet in the Madras Presidency.

"The art of architecture", says Mr. Smith "in the age of Ashoka had undoubtedly attained a high standard of excellence. Sculpture was the hand-maid of architecture, and all buildings of importance were lavishly decorated with a profusion of ornamental patterns, and infinite variety of spirited bass reliefs, and meritorious statues of men and animals."

25 But the useful side of public works was equally developed. Public streets 48 feet wide are expressly mentioned; Megasthenes saw pillars set up on the main road to mark distances and to show the bye-roads. The edicts of Ashoka prescribed the planting of road-side trees and the building of rest-houses for travellers and pilgrims. The art of bridge-construction was in its infancy. But small wooden or masonry bridges were thrown across small rivulets and the larger streams could be crossed by bridges of boats. Tank irrigation was conspicuous, and the idea had already taken root of giving special remission of taxation in consideration of the construction of new, and repairs to old, tanks. The *Rajtarangini*, regarded more as a historical document than a poem, mentions dams built to prevent floods and the draining of marshes. Mr. Vincent Smith says :—

"The fact that so much pains and expense were lavished upon this irrigation work in a remote dependency of the Empire is conclusive evidence that the provision of water for the fields was recognised as an imperative duty by the great Maurya emperors and is a striking illustration of the accuracy of Megasthenes' remark that imperial officers were wont to measure the land, as in Egypt, and inspect the sluices by which water is distributed into the branch canals, so that everyone may enjoy his fair share of the benefit."

Those who are acquainted with the charitable tendencies of the Indians need not be surprised at the existence of charitable hospitals, even in ancient India, and, Mr. Vincent Smith Says:—

"The animal hospitals which existed recently, and may still exist, at Bombay and Surat, may be regarded as either survivals or copies of the institutions founded by the Maurya Monarch."

26 There are express references in Hindu works to the care which it was regarded as the duty of the king to bestow upon the development of trade and commerce, and we meet with mention of State departments of dairy-farming, cattle-breeding, mining and metal manufacture etc. The manufacture of salt and the brewing of liquors are mentioned as government monopolies. The art of navigation and ship-building were developed to a great extent and we may pass over the topic by a general reference to the excellent work of Babu Radha Kumud Mukerji on this subject.

27 Lastly we may mention the art of spinning and weaving, which had attained such high pitch of excellence that India may be said to be without a rival in the world in this respect. Government gave patronage and encouragement to this industry; and it could not be said of the olden times, as it is sometimes said today, that India was essentially, and deserves to be only, an agricultural country. Of course agriculture was one of the principal industries, and this industry had reached that perfection which was possible in those days when science was not so well advanced as it is now. But the idea that Indian agriculture was crude or unsystematic has no foundation in fact. Dr. Voelkar, consulting Agricultural Chemist to the Government of India, has put it on record that "On one subject there can be no question viz. the ideas generally entertained in England that Indian agriculture is, as a whole, primitive and backward, and that little has been done to try and remedy it, are altogether erroneous. At his best the Indian ryot or cultivator is quite as good as, and in some respects the superior of, the average British farmer; whilst at his worst, it can only be said that this state is brought about largely by an absence of facilities for improvement which is probably unequalled in any other country and that the ryot will struggle on patiently and uncomplainingly in the face of difficulties in a way that no one else would....So take the ordinary acts of husbandary. No one could find better instances of keeping land scrupulously clean from weeds, of ingenuity in device of water-raising appliances, of knowledge of soils and their capacities, as well as the exact time to sow and to reap, as one would in Indian agriculture, and this not at its best alone, but at its ordinary level. It is wonderful, too, how much is known of rotation, the system of mixed crops and fallowing; certain it is that I have never seen a more perfect picture of cultivation, contrived with hard labour, perseverance, and fertility of resources than I have seen at many of the halting places in my town".

28 India cultivated most of the important food grains and other crops, and served as a granary even for foreign countries. But the manufacturing trade of India was equally important. We need not go here into the facts of the ancient fabulous wealth of India, though the comparison between the ancient and the present condition of the material condition of India is a challenging topic that arrests attention. But it would at any rate be pertinent to note how much of her wealth had remained in India on the eve of the British advent. That the commercial adventurers of Europe were irresistibly drawn to India as soon as the bold spirit of navigation led Europeans to undertake long and perilous voyages is in itself a conclusive testimony to the material wealth of India in the 17th century. As soon as the high seas were opened, all routes led to India even before the shortest and

the safest route was discovered. The Europeans had known through the merchants on the Mediterranean sea the fame of India, and they found it true when they themselves made a first hand acquaintance with that country. About the year 77 A. D. the elder Pliny complained that "the annual drain of gold from the Roman Empire to India, Arabia and China was never less than 100,000,000 sesteria giving back her own wares in exchange which are sold at fully 100 times their prime cost." So also Bernier writing in the 17th century says "This Hindustan is an abyss into which a great part of the gold and silver of the world finds plenty of ways of going in from all sides and hardly one way out." Tavernier speaking of the Indian manufactured goods at a single place viz. Kassimbazar says "A village in the kingdom of Bengal exported 22,000 bales of silk weighing 22,00,000 lbs. at 16 ozs to the pound." Carpets of silk and gold, satins with streaks of gold and silver, endless lists of exquisite works of minute carvings and other choice objects of art were the stock-in-trade of India." The Dacca muslin was so fine that sometimes it was valued at its weight in gold.

As regards Indian Art we need only mention the beautiful paintings of the Indian experts that are carefully preserved in some of the Indian Museums under the care of the Government, and are cherished as the most valuable possessions. The pure style of Hindu art is to be seen in the magnificent buildings in Southern India, and the rock-cut temples in middle India.

29 Finally, speaking of Hindu civilisation in a general way we may quote the following testimonials of one or two British statesmen and rulers of India in the 19th century. Thus Sir Thomas Munro speaking of Hindu Civilisation says:—"I do not understand what is meant by the civilisation of the Hindus. In the higher branches of science, in the knowledge of the practice and theory of good government, and in education which, by banishing prejudice and superstition, opens the mind to receive instruction of every kind from every quarter, they are much inferior to Europeans. But if a good system of agriculture, unrivalled manufacturing skill, a capacity to produce whatever can contribute to convenience or luxury, schools established in every village for teaching reading writing and arithmetic, the general practice of hospitality and charity among each other, and above all, a treatment of the female sex full of confidence, respect and delicacy are among the signs which denote a civilized people, then the Hindus are not inferior to the nations of Europe. And if civilization is to become an article of trade between the two countries I am convinced that this country (England) will gain by the important cargo"

30 Next to the Hindus the Mahomedans formed the most important class of the Indian people, and like the Hindus also they have given a good account of themselves so far as civilization in all its branches and aspects is concerned. We need not here go into the antiquities of the Mahomedan race, and may, for practical purposes, treat the entire body of the disciples of Mahomed as one whole people. The Arab civilization is admitted to be responsible for a number of valuable ideas and ideals that slowly made their impression and took root in the European soil. The religion of the Arabs, as much as their arms, did much to revivify the eastern Europeans when the Roman Empire was broken and dismembered by the barbarians, and Christianity was degraded by corruptions and weakened by controversies of irreconcilable sects. The Mahomedans steered their course of conquest to the west even earlier than to the east, and the Saracen conquest of the European races and countries is an integral chapter in European history. In the eighth century the Mahomedans, after conquering the countries bordering the Mediterranean, reached Gibraltar, and within ten years they completely conquered Spain and penetrated far into France, i. e. upto the walls of Poitiers. As Gibbon says "A victorious line of march had been prolonged above a thousand miles from the rock of Gibraltar to the banks of the Loire. The repetition of an equal space would have carried the Saracens to the confines of Poland and the Highlands of Scotland. The Rhine is not more impassable than the Nile or Euphrates, and the Arabian fleets might have sailed without a naval combat into the mouth of the Thames. Perhaps the interpretation of the Kuran would now be taught in the schools of Oxford, and

her pulpits might demonstrate to a circumcised people the sanctity and truth of the revelation of Mahomed."

31 The culture of the Saracens was not inferior to the valour of their arms. In Spain they have left traditions of their arts of peace and their love of learning which have not been outdone by any other, even modern, European conquerors. The Universities of Cordova and Bagdad are remembered by the lovers of learning to this day. The Royal seat of Cordova contained 600 mosques, 900 baths, and 200,000 houses. The Mahomedan ruler of Spain gave laws, to 80 cities of the first and 300 cities of the second and third order. The era was an era of prosperity and riches and cultivation. Those of the Spaniards who accepted Mahomedanism, whether subjects or slaves, arose in a moment the free and equal companions of the victorious Moslems. The magnificence of the Khalip of Bagdad has been painted by historians in brilliant colours. Bagdad was called the city of peace. The Khaliph-hall of audience was incrustated with gold and pearls. Buildings were sustained or adorned by hundreds of columns of Spanish, African, Greek or Italian marble. In a lofty position in his gardens one of the basins and fountains was replenished not with water but with purest quick silver. Munificent endowments were given for colleges and a Vazir of a Sultan consecrated a sum of 200,000 pieces of gold to the foundation of a College at Bagdad which he endowed with an annual revenue of 50,000 dinars. The fruits of instruction were communicated to 6000 disciples of every degree from the son of the noble to that of the mechanic; a sufficient allowance was provided for the indigent scholars and the merit or industry of the professors was repaid with adequate stipends. The Royal library of the Fatimites (Egypt) consisted of 100,000 manuscripts elegantly transcribed and splendidly bound which were lent to the students of Cairo. Yet this collection must appear moderate if we believe that the Omariads of Spain had formed a library of 600,000 volumes, 44 of which were employed in the mere catalogue. Their capital Cordova with some adjacent towns had given birth to more than 300 writers, and above 70 public libraries were opened in the cities of the Andalusian kingdom. The age of Arabian learning continued about 500 years till the great eruption of the Moguls and was coeval with the darkest and most slothful period of European annals."

32 Let us now turn to the Mahomedans in India. We need not dwell on the early Mahomedan Houses and Dynasties though it is impossible to pass without mention the political ambition of Mahomed of Gazani who made daring raids into India as far as Somnath and carried back huge quantities of Indian wealth; or of Allauddin whose foreign conquests were said to be the greatest ever made in India and whose governmental administration was said to be equally successful; or of Shikandar Lodi whose administration was reported to be just and vigorous. But coming to the Mogul House of Timur we meet with a wonderful race of rulers. Mr. Sydney Owen observes in his *India on the eve of British conquest*, "But what royal dynasty can exhibit a prouder or more remarkable muster-roll of six consecutive fighting sovereigns among whom the first is Babar, the precocious, ubiquitous, and irrepressible founder of the empire; the third Akbar who refounded and extended it in wars that may challenge comparison with those of Charles the Great, and who thoroughly remodelled the military system; the sixth Alamgir, who, a warrior from his youth upwards, wore out the last 23 years of a long and agitated life in the one, continuous, and laborious campaign and died in harness unsated with war at the advanced age of eighty eight." No eastern monarch has perhaps, so much received and deserved the praise as Akbar at the hands of the western writers and it must be superflous to dwell at length upon the qualities of the Mahomedan race as displayed in this the ripest fruit of its civilization. But mention must be made, even in passing, to his fiscal measures, his system of land settlement, his land revenue policy, his measures for protecting the people, his enlightened respect for public opinion, and last but not least his spirit of religious toleration which secured to him the love of the contemporary, and the admiration of succeeding, generations. The Aini-Akbari is a living testimony to his insight into economic principles and details which he had fully mastered. Those who read the vivid description of Terry's account of the entertainment given

by Asafkhan, a brother-in-law of Jehangir to the British ambassador will get a good idea of the high general level of culture and civilisation which the Mahomedans of the upper classes had reached in the time of Akbar. He says: "But all considered, our feast in that place, was better than Apicius, that famous Epicure of Rome, with all his witty gluttony, could have made with all provisions he had from the earth, air and sea." The Mogul emperors paid special attention to the encouragement of trade and commerce, and it was in their regime that not only the East India Company but a number of other European merchants obtained generous permission to trade in India. The customs duties were not high, though restrictions were put upon traders carrying away quantities of silver. The Moguls had a particular taste for Chinese porcelain, and Akbar is said to have left in Agra alone at the time of his death more than two millions and a half of rupees worth of most elegant vessels of every kind in porcelain and coloured glass, imported from China in the east to Venice in the west. Evidently commerce at this high scale could not exist unless there were peace and prosperity in the country; and as Mr. Vincent Smith has pointed out in his work on *Akbar* that in his reign the roads must have been fairly secure, for, the Ambassador Terry made a long journey of 400 miles from Surat into the heart of Hindustan very safely, though his company was small, comprising only of four other Englishmen and twenty natives of the country: That Akbar was illiterate in the sense of not being able to read and write may or may not be true, but that can not discount from the fact that he had made his own all that can be seen and read in books and that his court was one of the choicest gardens of literary culture like the Hindu Kings Bhoj and Vikramaditya. His taste was so fine that he prepared beautiful manuscripts into mechanical print, and the library he left behind him, in extremely valuable buildings enriched with costly illustrations by the best artists, is said to have contained 24,000 volumes valued at 6½ millions of rupees, as estimated by two independent European authors. The style of architecture introduced by Akbar and executed for him by a Hindu architect is called the eclectic style and is regarded as the best model on which to work as being a really national Indian style, combining the best features of Hindu and Mahomedan architecture.


33 As observed by Macaulay in his essay on *Lord Clive*, "the Empire which Babar and his Moguls reared in the sixteenth century was long, one of the most extensive, and splendid in the world. In no European kingdom was so large a population subject to a single prince, or so large a revenue poured into the treasury. The beauty and magnificence of the buildings erected by the sovereigns of Hindustan amazed even travellers who had seen St. Peter's. The innumerable retinues and gorgeous decorations which surrounded the throne of Delhi, dazzled even eyes which were accustomed to the pomp of Versailles. Some of the great Viceroys who held their posts by virtue of commissions from the Moguls, ruled as many subjects and enjoyed as large an income as the king of France or the Emperor of Germany. Even the deputies of these deputies might well rank, as to extent of territory and amount of revenue, with the grand Duke of Tuscany or the Elector of Saxony."

34 A summary as it were may be given of the condition of India as the joint result of the Hindu and Mahomedan civilisations at the advent of the English in India in the following words of the author of *Colonies and Dependencies*. (English Citizen series).

"All early visitors to India—Greek, Arabian, or Italian—marvelled at the high degree of civilisation which the Indians had attained. Crowded cities, laborious agriculture, skilful manufactures, brisk commerce, graceful architecture—all these are indigenous to the soil. As in ancient Egypt or ancient Babylonia many centuries of traditional culture had produced a social organisation that was eminently adapted to the race and to the country.....Social life was, indeed, more varied in those days than it is now. The numerous native courts were so many centres for the satisfaction of ambition and encouragement of enterprise. All the arts flourished, and with them urban life. Colonies of workmen settled in the large towns, and acquired a skill in manipulation that seems wonderful at the present day.'

Traders and bankers accumulated wealth, which they could not have done had property been altogether insecure. During the eighteenth century Surat was the great emporium of trade with Europe; and the estimates of its population at that time vary from 400,000 to 800,000 souls. When Clive entered Murshidabad the capital of Bengal in 1757, he wrote of it:—"This city is as extensive, populous and rich as the city of London, with this difference, that there are individuals in the first possessing infinitely greater property than in the last city." India probably reached her zenith of prosperity during the seventeenth century.

35 Such in brief were the people and such were their kingdoms and empires. It is no wonder, therefore, that the descendants of these people should, after being reinforced with Western education and civilisation, aspire to become equal partners in political sovereignty and enjoy the rights of self-government on the eve of the final consolidation of the British and Indian races into one common Empire.



Chapter II

India Under British Rule

THE foregoing will give a general idea of the condition of this country at the time when it passed into the hands of the East India Company; and the British rulers of India could not legitimately object to be judged by the admitted results of that rule during the last two hundred years. And in this respect we may rely upon the testimony of some of the best Indian thinkers, who could not possibly be accused of either disloyalty to the British Government or ingratitude to the British race in regard to the obvious blessings of their rule in this country. Of course there are different view-points from which the general condition of a country may be judged; and in this, as in any other account, there must be a credit as well as a debit side to the ledger. For, who can be so perverse or wilfully ungrateful as to deny that altogether a new chapter has been opened in the national history of India owing to the operation of that decree of inscrutable Providence, by which India lost her political power and freedom and was subjected to the rule of a foreign country like England?

2 It is profitless to indulge in a speculation as to what might have been the state of India to-day if the British had not, by quite fortuitous circumstances, turned upon the scene. One view, and the most loudly and persistently proclaimed view, is that perfect anarchy and chaos might have reigned in India in that event, so that the Hindus and the Mahomedans might have been eternally wrangling and running at each other's throats; that local despots might have carved out petty principalities for themselves; that life and property would have been absolutely insecure; that agriculture, trade, and commerce might have woefully degenerated; that the gates being shut against knowledge of western science and the refined appliances of western culture and civilisation, the material condition of the country as a whole might not only have stood still but even retrogressed; and that India would have been a sink of all the filth of social and religious bigotry and fanaticism—in fact a byword, among all the nations of the world, for degradation and depravity of mankind. The only relieving alternative suggested by many is that some foreign invader and conqueror like Gengizkhan or Timurlang might have come and enslaved India, or perhaps some ambitious and progressive foreign nation, like France, might have established an Empire in this cursed land, eternally doomed to be a subject nation.

3 Perhaps it would not be altogether overburdening the theme if we put forward in this connection a theory of our own as to what might have happened in India if the British were not here. We have, in another place, already referred to the observation of Sir William Hunter, who in his *History of India*, has said "the British won India not from the Moguls but from the Hindus. Before we appeared as conquerors the Mogul Empire had broken up. Our conclusive wars were neither with the Delhi King nor with his revolted Governors, but with the two Hindu confederacies, the Marathas and the Sikhs. Our last Maratha war dates as late as 1818 and the Sikh confederation was not finally overcome until 1849." It is thus evident that the Marathas were, in the absence of the English, the real heir-apparent to succeed to Imperial sovereignty in India. The death of Aurangzeb was the signal for the disruption of the Mogul Empire, and its subsequent history is a mere record of ruin. Already in 1720 had powerful military captains, like the Nizam, carved independent kingdoms for themselves out of the Mogul territory; and the Governor of Oudh, who was the Vazir of the Empire, became practically independent of Delhi within the next ten years. The imbecility, the pitiable weakness, of a succession of six Mogul puppet kings, aggravated by the machinations of alternately successful king-makers, resulted in an absolute negation of anything like a central authority at Delhi; and the consequent cataclysm of the break-up of the empire may fancifully

be compared to the event which represents the disintegration of the main solar system. The centrifugal activity had been run to death and the invasion of Nadir Shah of Persia in 1739 and his horrible massacres in the Mogul capital are a clear index to the contemporary situation.

4 The Peshwa Bajirao I. was by this time well known at the Delhi Court as a powerful Maratha commander, and was appealed to for help against Nadir Shah. Bajirao actually started for Delhi in response to this appeal; but Nadir Shah had already withdrawn before Bajirao reached the Narmada. Then followed four successive invasions by Ahmed Shah Durani and the plunders of the Mogul capital. In 1751 the aid of the Marathas was again invoked by the Delhi Emperor to crush the Rohilla insurrection in Oudh, and it was promptly put down by the Maratha arms. In 1759 the Marathas had completed their organisation for the conquest of Hindustan, and as a matter of fact they captured Delhi itself. The defeat of the Marathas at Panipat in 1761 naturally impeded for the time the fulfilment of the Maratha ambition to some extent; but the Mogul power at Delhi itself was so weakened, and such hopeless complications had set in, that the Marathas within a few years not only re-established their relations with the Delhi Court but did so with a vengeance, as it were. The prominent Maratha captain, Mahadaji Scindia, wielded power enough at the Delhi Court to be called the king-maker, and the Delhi Emperor was a puppet in his hands almost till Mahadaji's death. The Maratha invasions had also begun before 1740 upon other provinces beyond the Deccan. The Bhonsalas plundered Murshidabad in 1741; and the Maratha ditch in Calcutta still bears witness to the daring expedition of the Maratha cavalry in north eastern India; and curiously enough the fond Bengali mother still tries to frighten and send her child to sleep by singing a lullaby in which the terror of the Maratha invasion is poetically depicted. The Bhonsalas again invaded Bengal in 1743 and in 1751; they obtained from the Viceroy of Oudh a formal grant of the Chauth, or the quarter revenue of Bengal together with the cession of Orissa. In 1760 the Marathas had invaded the Punjab and the horses of the daring captain Raghoba were actually watered at the Indus. The Nizam in the Deccan had been repeatedly defeated, and the Marathas were co-sharers with the English in the defeat of Tipu, and the first partition of his territories. Towards the end of the eighteenth century, therefore, the fate of Indian sovereignty was, as it were, hanging in the balance; and things might have been very different to-day if, subsequent to the deaths of Mahadaji Scindia and Nana Fadanavis, the great confederacy of the Marathas had not been broken up by internal disunion and strife. As Colonel Chesney has said in his *Indian Polity* "the Mogul Empire was practically dissolved, the Emperor being held a prisoner at Delhi by the Marathas. The Maratha confederacy...were still the most powerful body in India." The Marathas, although their empire had not yet reached its furthest limits, had already spread themselves nearly across the peninsula reaching from the west coast to the borders of Bengal and from the source of the Tungbhadra to the neighbourhood of Agra. Nor were the Marathas without any insight into the benefit from keeping relations with foreign powers. By the time of the advent of Napoleon the Maratha confederacy had been weakened, if not actually broken; and the earlier treaties between the Marathas and the English had the result of removing the French from the path of the latter. But Mahadaji Scindia had always in his employ French Military men who drilled his armies and were made hereditary Sardars of his court. The break-down of the French power in India was an event parallel to the breaking up of the Maratha confederacy; and but for these two events it is possible that the Marathas might have come to occupy nearly the same position in India as the British do to-day. For eighty years the Marathas cherished and professed an imperial ambition; and though their career in this respect was shorter-lived than that of the Mahomedans, none can say that they had not nearly reached the top of the imperial bent, and were not prevented from actually being peaceful sovereigns of India by unexpected and extraneous rather than necessary and inherent causes. And if the Marathas had achieved their purpose it would not have been something strange or unaccountable; for, as Mr. Vincent Smith has pointed out in his *Early History of India*, Imperial sovereignty in India as a whole was not unknown to the Hindus. Before the advent of the Mahomedans

the whole of India was Hindu territory, and, as we have already seen, there were Hindu sovereigns who owned as their realm a territory nearly equal to that now held by the British government in India. India, encircled as she is by the seas and mountains, is indisputably a natural geographical unit and is designated by one name. Further, there is an accomplished homogeneity of civilisation in her people, though some classes among them may have entered India at different periods in the dim antiquity. Then, again, as Sir Herbert Risley said, at the Royal Asiatic Society in London in 1910, on the authority of Sir Henry Maine, "The idea of nationality was first derived from India; and it travelled westwards. Political unity is the natural product of three constituent unities; and who knows that if the British in India had been less successful the Marathas might not have soldered the provinces of India into one nation."

5 It is, again, often assumed that if the British were not here the Indian people would have remained strangers to the western arts and sciences, and would not have made any progress in their material civilisation. But this is by no means a reasonable view. For one thing, we have the parallel example of Japan which had remained still more secluded and insensitive to foreign civilisation right up to the time in the nineteenth century, when the American Commodore Perry bombarded the Japanese shores and violently shook that country out of its slumbers. As for Indians, they had shown ample susceptibility to the good points of foreign knowledge and civilisation. Since long India had proved a capacious market for the products of the English and the French arts and sciences; and it is not at all fantastic to imagine that, like the Japanese or the Chinese or the Afgan rulers, Indian rulers, for the time being, either Hindu or Mahomedan, would have requisitioned foreign mechanics, and foreign engineers as they had already cheerfully accomodated foreign merchants. But, as we have already said, speculation in these matters is profitless. For the one fact accomplished viz. the establishment of British rule in India, is greater and more conclusive than all the speculative probabilities put together. And if we adverted to the capacity of the Indian people, Hindu or Moslem, for material civilisation and political power, as illustrated by recognised historical precedents, it is not with the object of disputing in any way the title of the British to be in India, but with the object of showing that, even under native rule the Indian people should have been obviously in as good a condition in many respects, as they are now. For, in India the British had not to deal with barbarous races as in Africa or America, but with a people whose culture was, in certain respects at any rate, superior to that of their rulers. The English teachers in India had apt and intelligent pupils in both the Hindus and Mahomedans. The impact of the two intellects and civilisations should certainly have given better results; and if it could be shown that things are not what they should have been under such fortunate auspices, the judgment must be against the teacher rather than the disciple.

6 We have already observed that no one can be so perverse or ungrateful as to deny the blessings of British rule in a general way. That peace and restfulness of a kind have come in the wake of British rule is an undoubted fact. We are practically rid of the life of everyday struggle and the anxious uncertainties due to local eruptions of violence. There has been no actual foreign invasion of India during the last hundred and fifty years, though the advance of Russia on the North-Western Frontier was, till recently, never a negligible menace. There has been a steady though slow development of the arts of peace; and, as among the natives at any rate, an equal opportunity of rising from the social depth to social surface, and from social surface to social eminence, has been secured to the meanest of the mean. Government have observed almost scrupulously religious toleration, though there is an official ecclesiastical establishment maintained in India at public cost. There has been a steady growth in population, the means of communication, the postal and telegraphic facilities, irrigation, foreign trade, commerce and public credit, so far as the changed circumstances would allow. But perhaps more precious than any of these are the blessings of the stimulus and the leaven which has been supplied to the Indian intellect, and the facilities by which the whole world of western knowledge, as interpreted at any rate through the English language, has been thrown open to the Indian mind. As observed by the late Hon'ble Mr. Gokhale, there is a great deal

In the moral results of British rule which the Indian people may regard with satisfaction and even with pride. "The blessings of peace, the establishment of law and order, the introduction of western education, the freedom of speech, and the appreciation of liberal institutions that have followed in its wake—all these things stand to the credit of British Rule." A more sincere and truth-speaking witness to the glory of British rule in a general way than the late Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji can not be imagined. And what he said, as the President of the second Indian National Congress at Calcutta, could be truthfully assented to: "Let us speak out like men and proclaim that we are loyal to the backbone; that we understand the benefits English rule has conferred upon us; that we thoroughly appreciate the education that has been given to us; the new light which has been poured upon us, turning us from darkness into light and teaching us the new lesson that kings are made for the people, not people for their kings, and this new lesson we have learned amidst the darkness of Asiatic despotism only by the light of free English civilisation."

7 To discriminate, we must mention with special gratitude the boon of political status which we have received under British government; and which, more than any other, is, we believe, the really distinctive point in favour of British government as compared with the old Indian governments, either Hindu or Mahomedan. This political status consists of various liberties e.g. in the matter of the inviolability of person and property, except as provided by law; freedom of opinion, both religious and political; equality of person before law; freedom of assembly; and freedom of movement. Then, again, we have secured the right to be represented in the councils of government, and thus to have a voice in the administration. Within certain limitations governments in India that preceded British rule were mostly autocracies, and the great body of people had no direct hand in legislation. Our present public associations and political congresses would not have been possible under the old regimes; nor could we have had the benefits of at least that limited freedom of the press which we at present enjoy. The British Government must unhesitatingly be given credit for the new political ideas which we have imbibed from the western political literature, and which we have been permitted to openly advocate. An organised opposition, on strictly constitutional lines, to measures of government, and the organisation, by education and agitation, of public opinion on political matters, would not have been possible under the old conditions. The idea of a common Indian nationality, though it was not altogether absent in the olden times, has been materially developed, and a common bond of interest has been created; so that the people in the distant parts of India feel that they have been brought together more than ever before. As Mr. Bernard Houghton, one of the severest critics of bureaucratic administration, has observed in his book on that very subject: "Perhaps the greatest boon, albeit an indirect one, which India has received at the hands of England, has been the birth of a genuine spirit of patriotism. It is a patriotism which seeks its ideals not in military glory or the apotheosis of a king, but in the advancement of the people. Informed by this spirit, and strong in the material benefits flowing from British rule, India now knocks at the portal of Democracy." This is no small contribution to the glory of India as a nation among nations in the world; and though the whole future is of course on the knees of the Gods, still no future historian of India could write about her without giving this meed of praise to the British rulers.

8 But there is of course the other side of the shield to be considered. Let us, therefore, examine the entries on the debit side of the ledger in the account of the British administration of India; and first with regard to the allegation of the material advancement of India. Among the Indian publicists, who have devoted their thought to this subject, the late Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji stands pre-eminent. So early as 1876 Mr. Dadabhai had dealt with the subject exhaustively in his Notes, submitted to the Select Committee on Indian Finance, and had proved that as a result of the many-sided financial and economic drain from their country, the Indian people had been extremely impoverished; so that the total income in India per head of population was, roughly speaking, 40 s. or

20 rupees at the then rate of calculation, which was obviously less than the amount required for maintaining a single individual even in India i. e. an individual with the simplest wants. In 1882 an inquiry was taken up in this matter on behalf of the Government, but Sir Evelyn Baring, the then Indian Finance Minister, and subsequently known as Lord Cromer, the administrator of Egypt, could not carry the figure of the annual income to more than 27 rupees. Major Baring said: "Though I am not prepared to pledge myself to the absolute accuracy of the calculation of this sort, it is sufficiently accurate to justify the conclusion that the tax-paying community is exceedingly poor. It was quite sufficient to show the extreme poverty of the mass of the people." Another attempt at an official calculation in this matter was made by Lord Curzon but he could not carry the figure farther than Rs. 30. But assuming the income to be at this higher rate, it is evident that it can not serve as even a starving maintenance, and the conclusion is inevitable that the Indian population must be anything but prosperous. This explains the assertion made by such an high authority as Sir William Hunter that "one fifth of the population or 40 million persons go in India through life with one meal a day or at any rate very insufficient food". So also Mr. S.S. Thorburn, Financial Commissioner of the Punjab, declared that "70 millions of Indian peasants are in such a condition of hopeless poverty that no reforms can do them any good." The late Mr. Digby had worked some budgets of the actual cost of the living of typical individual peasants and labourers of India, and they pointed to the same conclusion. Mr. Digby further proved that whereas the non-officially estimated income of an average Indian amounted in 1882 to 2d. per day, the officially estimated income was 1½d per head per day. An inquiry in 1900 showed that the income had fallen down to ¾d per head per day. Perhaps it is extremely difficult to estimate with unerring accuracy in a matter like this. But taking the official and non-official estimates together it could be safely said that the figure of the average income of an Indian hovers round a pittance which can not give him substantial maintenance, or a maintenance even equal to that which is allowed, under the strictest regulations, to an inmate of any of the Indian jails.

9 The taxable capacity of a subject is a significant index to his economic position under a particular government. And in this respect it has been completely proved that in India the margin of taxation has already been exhausted, and the furthest limit of taxation reached. If India be, as a matter of fact, lightly taxed as judged by shillings and pence, it is not because the Indian tax-payer has been mercifully spared, but that it is economically impossible to make him pay more. A comparison of the average income of an Indian and of his tax-paying capacity with the same of the people of some other countries, as set out in the following table, will convince any fair-minded person that the alleged material prosperity of the Indian people is more or less a myth; especially when we see it against the background of the material condition of the Indian people in pre-British times as indicated by some of the verified and authentic accounts about it.

Country.	Annual average income.	Average wealth.	Revenue per head.		
	£	£	£	s.	d.
Argentina	24	140	3	17	0
Australia	40	370	4	0	0
Austria	15.5	105	4	6	0
Belgium	28	170	4	8	0
Denmark	32.5	230	3	8	0
France	27.8	240	4	15	0
Germany	31	160	2	8	0
Greece	?	75	2	0	0
India	2	9½	0	5	0
Italy	12.2	95	3	5	0
Netherlands	22.6	240	2	17	0
Roumania	?	95	3	3	0
Servia	?	85	1	15	0
Spain	16.5	105	2	2	0
Sweden	22	140	2	11	0
Switzerland	19	150	1	17	0
United Kingdom	39	300	4	2	0
United States America	40	210	5	0	0

10 Of course a number of causes could be assigned for this deplorable state of things, such as (1) the drain in the form of exploitations of specie and natural wealth by foreign merchants (2) the Home charges, though alleged to represent the inevitable cost of the administration of India in England and the improvement effected in India with the aid of foreign capital, (3) the high cost of the civil administration in India mainly made up of the pay and pensions of the Covenanted and other Civil Servants, (4) the costly public works including strategical railways ; and last but not least (5) the maintenance of the military establishment which absorbs, roughly speaking, about 30 to 35 percent of the net revenue of India. We need not go here into the details of each of these topics or enter into an exhaustive examination of their pros and cons. But it is sufficient for our present purpose to show that, whatever the causes, there is almost a consensus of opinion among Indian thinkers that the material prosperity of the Indian people has not so far advanced under British rule that the British rulers may plume themselves upon it. And this negative result must be taken together with the positive fact that as the result of the British connection, since the days of the East India Company, an enormous amount of wealth has been actually bodily taken out of the country without practically any return or a return of a very questionable character. Propositions based merely on the balance of trade, or on the excess of imports over exports or *vice-versa*, are not universally true ; and instances of either kind could be cited to prove exactly opposite conclusions.

11 But there are other and almost unfailing indications by which the growth of poverty or opulence may be judged. And we may, therefore, content ourselves with citing opinions of certain high authorities to indicate the direction in which the economic position of India has been gradually shifting since the advent of the East India Company. In 1787 Sir John Shore said: "The Company are merchants as well as sovereigns of the country. In the former capacity they engross its trade, whilst in the latter it appropriates the revenues. The remittances to Europe of revenues are made in the commodities of the country which are purchased by them. Whatever allowance we may make for the increased industry of the subjects of the state, owing to the enhanced demand for the produce of it, there is reason to conclude that the benefits are more than counterbalanced by evils inseparable from the system of foreign dominion. From 1765 the Company's trade produced no equivalent returns and specie was rarely imported by the foreign companies. If we were to suppose the internal trade of Hindustan again revived, the export of the production of the country by the Company must still prevent these returns which trade formerly poured in. This is an evil inseparable from European government. A large proportion of the rents of the country are paid into the Company's treasury and the manufactures are applied to remit to England the surplus which remains after discharging the claims on this government and to augment the commerce and revenue of Great Britain." In 1790, Lord Cornwallis remarked as follows:—"The consequence of the heavy drain of wealth, with the addition of that which has been occasioned by the remittances of private fortunes, have been for many years past, and are now, severely felt by the great diminution of the current specie and by the langour which has thereby been thrown upon the cultivation and general commerce of the country." In 1816 Mr. Montgomerie Martin, summing up the result of certain official minutes, says: "The annual drain of £ 3,000,000 on British India has amounted in 30 years, at the usual Indian rate of interest to the enormous sum of about £ 724,000,000. So constant and accumulating a drain, even in England, would soon impoverish her." In 1837 Sir John Shore again wrote as follows: "But the halcyon days of India are over. She has been drained of a large proportion of the wealth she once possessed, and her energies have been cramped by a sordid system of misrule to which the interests of millions have been sacrificed for the benefit of the few. The gradual impoverishment of the people and the country, under the mode of rule established by the British Government, has hastened the fall of the old merchant princes. The grinding extortion of the English Government has effected the impoverishment of the people to an extent almost unparalleled." In 1836 Mr. Saville Marriot, one of

the Commissioners of revenue in the Deccan, after reviewing the position says: "Almost everything forces the conviction that we have before us a harrowing progress to utter pauperism. Most of the evils of our rule in India arise directly from, or may be traced to, the heavy tribute which that country pays to England." In 1848 Mr. Robert Knight wrote: "Mr. Jiberne, after an absence of 14 years from Guzerat, returned to it as Judge in 1840 and wrote 'I marked deterioration. I did not see so many of the more wealthy classes of the natives. The aristocracy when we first had the country used to have their gay carts, horses and attendants and a great deal of finery about them; and now there seems to be an absence of all that. The ryots all complain that they had money once but they have none now.' In 1854 Mr. Bourdillon, one of the Revenue officers of the Madras Civil Service, wrote: "It may certainly be said of almost the whole of the ryots, paying even the highest sums that, they are always in poverty and generally in debt." In 1869 Sir George Campbell, in his paper on the tenures of land in India, quotes a Madras official as follows: "The bulk of the people are paupers. They can just pay the cesses in a good year and fail altogether when the season is bad." In 1873 Mr. W. G. Pedder of the C. P. Civil Service wrote: "If an almost universal consensus of opinion may be relied on, the people are rapidly going from bad to worse under our rule. This is a most serious question and one well-deserving the attention of Government." Lord Lawrence writing in 1864 remarked: "I believe that Mr. Grant Duff had good grounds for the statement he made, and I wish to say with reference to it that we are perfectly cognisant of the relative poverty of this country as compared with European states." In fact, as Mr. Dadabhai Navroji has pointed out, the drain of India under British Rule may be compared to the parallel drain of England itself under the rule of the Romans as depicted by Draper in his *Intellectual Development of Europe*.

And lastly we shall quote the late Hon. Mr. Gokhale who, in a lecture in London delivered in 1905 at the National Liberal Club, succinctly summarised the material condition of India as the result of a long study of the question. He said: "Let us now turn to the material results; and here I am sorry to say the verdict is even more emphatic against your rule. I firmly believe and I say this after a careful study of about 20 years of the question, that the economic results of British rule in India have been *absolutely disastrous*. That the mass of the people in India are at present sunk in frightful poverty is now admitted by all including the most inveterate official optimist."

12 It is often alleged that the rise in prices in India is an index of her prosperity. But the rise of prices is not perhaps always unequivocal in its significance. For when prices rise it means a direct gain to certain classes of the society as corresponding to an equivalent loss to certain other classes in the same society. But it could be easily demonstrated, with reference to the growth of prices in India during the last half a century, that while the rise has been more than proportionate to the earning capacity of the Indian people during that period, it does not mean an unmixed gain even to those classes who are apparently benefitted by that rise. The fluctuation in Indian prices is due mostly to causes which are not under the control of the Indian people themselves and are operated by agencies outside the country.

13 The decline of the indigenous industries in India, however, is the greatest factor in the economic degeneration of India under British rule. As pointed out by Mr. Romesh Chunder Dutt in his book *India Under Early British Rule*, the policy of the East India Company was not to foster Indian industries but to put them down in the hope that ultimately England should be profitted by the raw materials of India and that India in her turn should be dependent upon the manufactures of England. This policy the Company consistently and rigorously pursued till the end of its regime; and even under the direct rule of the Crown the policy never underwent a change, the only difference being that instead of a monopolist exploitation by a chartered body of merchants, India was thrown open, under the patronage of the Government, to the whole body of English merchants whether residing in England or in India. With regard to the silk manufactures in Bengal, the first use which the company made of the powers acquired by it under the Diwani was

to prohibit the manufacture of silk goods by weavers except those that would work in the Company's own factories, and the prohibition was enforced under severe penalties by the authority of Government. The result was that within a certain number of years the manufacture of silk by Indian weavers rapidly declined; and the very people who had exported these goods to the markets of Europe and Asia in previous centuries began to import them from England. The same was the case with the manufacture of cotton goods. In 1794 the value of cotton goods sent out from England to the East was £ 156 only. In 1813 the figure reached £ 1,108, 824. At the time of the inquiry previous to the renewal of the Company's charter in 1813, special care was taken to ascertain how Indian manufactures could be replaced by British manufactures, and how British industries could be promoted at the expense of Indian industries! After the renewal of the Charter British manufactures were forced into India through the agency of the Company's Governor-General and commercial Residents, while Indian manufactures were shut out from England by heavy prohibitive tariffs. On calicoes while the revenue duty was £ 3, the protective duties upon them against home consumption was £ 68. The figures in the case of muslins were 10 and 27. There was a further duty of 20 per cent. on consolidated duties which raised these figures to £ 78 for calicoes and £ 31 for muslins. With regard to these duties H. H. Wilson, the historian of India, has remarked: "But for these high protective duties the mills of Paisley and Manchester would have been stopped and could scarcely have been set in motion even by the power of steam. *They were maintained by the sacrifice of Indian manufactures.* Had India been independent she would have retaliated, but this act of self-defence was not available to her. British goods were forced upon India without paying any duty and the foreign manufacturer employed the arm of political injustice to keep down and ultimately strangle a competitor with whom he could not have contended on equal terms." In India the revenues of the Company derived from the Indian people were spent upon the Company's investments, that is to say, on the purchase of Indian goods for exportation and sale in Europe, without any commercial return, to the average of £ 13,32,877. The weavers residing in villages under the Company's rule were held in subjection, as it were, to the Company's factories under legal regulations. If the weavers sold their goods to any other merchants they could be prosecuted in the Diwani Adalat; and the landlords and tenants were prohibited from coming in any way between the weavers and the commercial agents of the Company. In the interior of the country the conduct of Englishmen towards indigo-planters was a disgrace to the British name. There were practically slave-laws to regulate the relations between English merchants and Indian producers. In 1813 the commercial monopoly of the Company was practically abolished and all the above evils only grew in proportion to the influx of British merchants in India. Since 1813 private British trade was substituted in the place of Company's trade. One of the objects of the periodical inquiries made into Indian affairs at the instance of Parliament was always to ascertain 'how Indian trade could be put down and the British trade encouraged in its place'. No doubt the abolition of the Company's monopoly led to an increase in the Indian trade with England; but it was an increase in the export of Indian raw produce and the import of manufactured goods. These figures of a nominal increase in the trade really meant the extinction of the Indian industries and the loss of industrial profits to India; but this was interpreted in England to mean an increase of prosperity in India! The Parliamentary inquiry was practically limited to industries in which British capital was employed; the humbler industries did not interest the Parliament at all.

14 On the other hand the financial results of the Indian administration during this period show a surplus of millions of pounds but this money was not saved in India or spent upon useful public works like irrigation. It went as a continuous tribute to England to pay dividends to Company's shareholders.

15 The transfer of the Indian Government from the Company to the Crown in 1858 brought no relief. Before the Mutiny Lord William Bentinck attempted to equitably interfere in this state of things but a howl was immediately raised against him. After the mutiny Lord Canning made the first attempt to reform

the tariff so as to equalise duties on British and foreign goods. He wished to abolish export duties and to increase import duties. But the financial disturbance owing to the Mutiny prevented his intentions being carried out. Under the pretence of free trade all attempts to reform the Indian tariff in favour of Indian, and against British, manufactures were put down with all the gusto and the fury of economic theorists. The ratio between imports to, and exports from, India, which reached a common level two years after the Mutiny, began to change, and since 1863 there has been a gradual and continuous increase of the exports over imports. Within ten years from the change in the administration, this economic drain from India has reached fourfold, and the significance of the balance of trade will be appreciated by referring to particular articles of trade. Thus cotton goods which were imported in India in 1859 to the value of £8,000,000 went up to £16,000,000 by 1877, silk goods from £147,000 to £584,000 and woollen goods from £294,000 to £811,000. The Indian people might have begun to obtain slightly cheaper goods but their loss must have been much greater on the whole owing to the fact that the whole weaving industry in the country was lost and no other compensating industry was set up in its place. The result naturally was that millions of people were thrown back upon agriculture and became liable to severe distress at the first touch of scarcity or the failure of seasonable rains.

16 The only change to be noted in this industrial policy of Government is that which is reflected in the changes from time to time in the customs tariffs. In 1858 the import duties consisted of $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. upon cotton twist and yarn, and 5 per cent. on other British goods including piece goods. In 1859 all differential tariffs were abolished and duties on all articles of luxury were raised to 20 per cent. while duties on other goods were raised to 10 per cent. and on cotton twist and yarn to 5 per cent. In 1860 the 20 per cent. duty on luxuries was reduced to 10 per cent. and the 5 per cent. duty on cotton twist and yarn was raised to 10 per cent. so that the import tariff consisted of a uniform rate of 10 per cent. In 1861 the import duty on cotton twist and yarn was reduced to 5 per cent and in 1862 to $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent, and the duty on cotton and other manufacture was reduced to 5 per cent. In 1864 the general rate of import duties was reduced from 10 to $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. In 1871 the import duty on cotton twist remained at $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent, on and the piece goods at 5 per cent, so that the extra financial character of the tariff ceased and the import duties assumed, like other duties, a strictly revenue character. In 1874 the British manufactures raised a hue and cry even against these moderate duties, as there was a prospect of a number of mills being erected in India, with the result that though the import duty of 5 per cent on cotton goods was maintained, a special 5 per cent. duty on the import of long stapled cotton was imposed to prevent Indian mills competing at an advantage in the production of the finer goods and also the valuation of imported piece goods was largely reduced. In 1875 the Duke of Argyll, acting under Cabinet compulsion to conciliate Lancashire, recommended a reduction of the import duty both on economic and political grounds, but Lord Northbrook would not agree, and he eventually resigned his office next year. Lord Lytton succeeded him and making use of his extraordinary powers as Viceroy exempted from import duty all imported cotton goods up to 30 counts though a majority of his Council was opposed to this action. This was a clear instance of how important Indian economic interests were sacrificed to party politics.

17 The import of cotton manufactures in 1878 amounted to 17.3 crores of rupees. It went up in 1901 to 27.3 crores. Only cotton twist and yarn was kept under control to a certain extent owing to the development of mill industry in India. In 1882 all the remaining import duties except on salt and liquors were abolished. In 1894 the import duties were again imposed at 5 per cent owing to financial stress in India. The next year the Lancashire manufacturers went in deputation to the State Secretary for India and the matter was again taken up and, in order to satisfy them, a duty of $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent on all goods woven in India, known as the excise duty, was imposed. This measure was naturally opposed by the British merchants in India who were interested in the local mill-industry. It was pointed out that India possessed only $1/12$ th part of Great Britain's spindles and $1/19$ th of

her looms, and pitifully did Mr. Playfair, as representing the European merchantile community of Calcutta, appeal to the Viceroy in the Legislative Council and said: "May not India have even this little ewe-lamb? Because Lancashire masters may be alarmed and discontented I see no reason why Government should unjustly attack a separate industry in India." The Tariff Bill of 1896 virtually meant a remission of taxation of 51 lacs of rupees to Manchester goods and an increase of 11 lacs of taxation on Indian-made goods. Well might Mr. Dutt say, "As an instance of fiscal injustice, the Indian Act of 1896 is unexampled in any civilised country in modern times." The latest important amendment of the Tariff Act, we must in fairness add, was made only this year when the import duty on cotton goods has been raised to 7½, and a promise has been given of the excise duties being abolished. But no one can say with certainty what will be actually done when the war is over and party politics once more come into full play in England.

18 The above, though it is a brief and rapid review of the policy of the Government towards Indian industries, clearly brings out two facts: (1) that the state of things under the Company's rule was bad enough and (2) it has not improved even under the direct rule of the Crown. The economic condition of a nation is naturally regarded as the very basis of its well-being; and as Mr. Morley has observed: "If Government meddle wrongly with economic things then it goes to the very life, to the heart, to the core of national existence." We have refrained from giving the heart-rending details of the treatment given by the East India Company to the native manufacturers in Bengal to crush the Indian industries in the interest of the British trade and commerce; nor do we wish to endorse word for word the severe censure passed by Englishmen like Mr. Hyndman on this subject of Indian poverty and economic ruin. We are aware that there are certain aspects of the "drain" theory which might allow of things to be plausibly said on either side of the question; and we are also prepared to make due allowance for the play of human nature and instincts in a matter like this. But after all that could be said by way of extenuation, the fact remains that the economic policy of the British Government towards India has been simply disastrous, and such as an indigenous, or really national, or a really unselfish and enlightened foreign, government would not be expected to pursue. As the Hon. Mr. Gokhale has observed:—

"When we come to this question of India's industrial domination by England we come to what may be described as the most deplorable feature of British rule in this country. In other matters there are things on the credit side and things on the debit side. But when you come to the Industrial field you will find that the results have been disastrous. You find very little here on the credit side and nearly all the entries on the debit side."

19 The emasculation of the Indian people under British rule is to be seen in the loss of their employment in the higher Civil administration, about which we shall speak later on in another chapter; but it is to be seen even in a more marked degree with respect to military service than with respect to civil-employment. And one broad outstanding fact in this connection may at once be stated that we are much worse off under the direct rule of the Crown than we were under the rule of the East India Company.

20 The Company's *Indian Army* was first established at Madras in 1748, when, in imitation of the French, the English merchants raised a small body of Sepoys. At the same time a small European force was raised, being composed of sailors off duty and men smuggled on the English coast by crimps and forcibly brought to India. The Madras Army was rapidly increased during the next seven years; and it was with the help of the Madras troops that Clive won the battle of Plassey. When the Company became the masters in Bengal, a Sepoy force was raised in that province. In 1772 the Bengal Army amounted to 3500 Europeans and 24,000 Indians. In 1778 columns of Bengal troops could be sent by the Calcutta Government across India to fight against the Marathas in co-operation with the Bombay troops. There was, however, not much discipline in the army at the time and the officers' emoluments were derived from irregular perquisites. There were, frequent mutinies in which black

and white troops were alternately used to coerce each other. The Native battalions were mostly officered by Native officers under a European captain. The Madras Army was augmented about this time to 3000 European infantry and 16,000 Native Sepoys at the cost of the Nabab of Carnatak in view of the wars with the Marathas and Hyder Ali. The Bombay Army in 1772 consisted of 2500 Europeans and 3500 Sepoys, and its cost was mainly borne by the Bengal Government. In 1773 when the first Governor General was appointed for India, the Company's Indian Army stood at 9000 Europeans and 45,000 Natives. The Royal troops from England first came to India in 1754 but in very small numbers. Till 1797 there were only 9 battalions of Royal troops in India. The total strength of the Indian Army about this time was 70,000 of which only 13,500 were British. The era of war and conquest under the regime of the Marquis of Wellesley led to a further augmentation of the Company's troops; the total in 1808 coming to 24,500 British and 1,30,000 Native troops. In 1857 the numbers were 45,000 British and 23,5000 Native troops, besides contingents of Native State troops at the disposal of the Company, having a strength of about 35,000 men. Till the Mutiny three things appear to be remarkable relating to the Indian Army: (1) the large proportion of Native to British troops in India; (2) the small proportion of Royal troops from England; and (3) the large proportion of Native officers commanding Native regiments.

21 The Mutiny could not be said to have been mainly due to any of these three causes. And yet, since the Mutiny, all these things were changed. The strength of the Army was again increased in 1885. The present Indian Army consists of 78,349 European and 184,779 Native troops. It is claimed that "there is no country in the Eastern Hemisphere where the military force bears so small a proportion to the population' and that even large cities are so lightly guarded that city for city, the military garrisons are smaller in India than even those of England." This may be true in one sense; but there are several other aspects of the situation which we shall presently see. The above remarks were made by General Chesney in 1896 i. e. before the present war. But the fact that almost the whole of the Indian Army could be safely sent out of India at a time when Germany not only expected but had hopefully made preparations for encouraging a rebellion in India, completely proves that such a large *standing* army need not be entertained in India.

22 The proportion of Native to British troops in India was 5 to 1 or at times even more in the pre-Mutiny days. The Royal Commission of 1859 fixed this proportion at 2 to 1 in Bengal and 3 to 1 in Bombay and Madras respectively. But even this recommendation has been ignored, so that the proportion of 2 to 1 has been enforced not only for Bengal but also for Bombay and Madras. Thus over 11,000 European troops are too many in India, even on the basis of the proportion fixed by the Royal Commission within 2 years of the Mutiny. Till a few years ago there was the excuse of the Russian menace for maintaining the standing Army in such total strength and the British troops in such large proportions. But the Russian ghost has been permanently laid by the heels, and while Russia was now actually an ally of England, fighting on her side, the revolution in Russia is itself a guarantee that Russia will never in future follow a policy of territorial aggrandisement at least in the direction of India. Further, the number of the present Indian troops is 30,000 in excess of the standard strength which was fixed after mature consideration by a Royal Commission appointed in 1879, which had fully adverted to the contingency, happily now no more, of Russia and Afganistan making a common cause against India.

23 This large army, though too large for a peace footing, is certainly inadequate for an actual emergency of war, unless it is augmented and strengthened by a national army, temporarily raised, in the country. But even this army, as it is, is costly out of all proportion to the revenues of the country. In European countries an equal amount of military expenditure is made to guarantee a much larger army in war time, thanks to the spirit of economy and to the system of giving military education to the entire population, so that both a permanent reserve for foreign service and a temporary national army for home defence can be secured.

The following table, compiled from figures taken from *Whitaker's Almanack*, 1917, shows how much India spends on her military establishment in comparison with the other countries :—

Country.	Population.	Standing Army.	Military Expenditure: Army Budget.	Revenue.	Percentage of Military expenditure.
India ...	315,000,000	236,600	£ 18,000,000	£ 82,000,000	22
Great Britain..	45,407,037	162,250 Standing 251,200 Territoria	} 28,220,000	186,000,000	15
Japan ...	50,000,000	230,000	9,966,000	54,000,000	18.5
Austria ...	29,000,000	425,800	22,193,000	215,000,000	10
France ...	40,000,000	620,800	36,550,000	196,000,000	18.5
U. S. America	92,000,000	216,000	30,000,000	207,000,000	15
Italy ...	35,000,000	306,300	16,825,000	1140,00,000	16
Australia ...	5,000,000	105,000	2,500,000	20,000,000	12.5
Canada ...	7,250,000	71,200	1,520,000	24,000,000	6.3
S. Africa ...	6,000,000	20,000	1,150,000	17,000,000	6.8

24 In India we have either an army on a war footing for all time or nothing ; so that while the cost is a useless burden to us in peace time, it does not secure to us in war time an adequate army which can rely upon itself absolutely for the protection of the country. The amalgamation of the British troops in India with the British troops in England after the Mutiny, has added to the cost and made India only more dependent upon England than ever before. The short service system is the peculiar feature of this amalgamation, but the system mostly benefits England at the cost of India. The reserve which it creates remains in England and not immediately at the call of India; and further India does not get the well-seasoned soldier. The standard of efficiency for which India is made to pay is the English standard but that standard of efficiency is not available for practical use in India.

25 The British soldiers in India are to the Indian sepoy in the ratio of 1 to 2, but they more than make up for the difference by their cost; for it is computed that 7 Native soldiers are financially equal to 3 European soldiers. Before the Mutiny the average cost per combatant to the Company was Rs. 775; the same has now gone up to about Rs. 1500. As regards the native troops they are ill paid when compared with the British troops in India. Their training is not up to the European standard, and they are entirely debarred from an important arm in the army viz. the artillery which is entirely in the keeping of the British troops. Being to a large extent recruited in trans-frontier countries, they cannot regard India as their own country and are mere mercenaries, bound either to the Government or to the country by no better tie than the bondage of the salt. Even when recruitment is made in India itself, it is made more from the hungry rabble in the bazaar than from the indigenous people who have real military traditions in their families. The fields for military recruitment are not developed with a view to bring the past in a line with the present and the future. The military service therefore is mostly mechanical and has no national feeling. The higher and the better classes are deliberately excluded from military service; and it is only a year or two since the bar sinister has been removed from the Maratha Brahman and the Bengali Babu by the formation of a few regimental companies for their benefit. Nor are the conditions of pay

pension etc. and the prospects of a career such as to attract to the military service the higher classes among the martial races to whom recruitment is happily open. Before the Mutiny the command of the companies of troops was vested in a native officer, but he has now lost it. In 1796 a sepoy batallion had only 9 European officers attached to it; in 1848 the regiment had a complement of 24 European officers, and a regiment of regular cavalry of, 20 officers; but at least half the number of these officers was really not there, being nominally shown to the credit of the batallion, but being actually away in civil and other departments. In the irregular regiments with the exception of 3 British officers the rest of the Staff of officers was native. In 1861 this number was raised from 3 to 7 and it has been since increased to 8. The native officer is thus nowhere and cannot rise above the post of a Subhedar or Risaldar, i.e. the native officer virtually ends where the European officer begins his career.

26 The late Henry St. George Tucker, himself a Director of the East India Company, writing in 1848 had observed as follows: "In considering the proper complement of officers for our native corps we must not forget that the native officers (the Subhedars in particular) are highly efficient and can be most usefully employed in maintaining discipline and in promoting the efficiency of the service. Indeed I am inclined to doubt whether the multiplication of young European officers may not in some respects have had a prejudicial tendency. Inexperienced as they are for some time, and ignorant of the native languages, their interposition is sometimes galling to the veteran Soubhedar of forty or fifty years' standing in the service, who has been present in many a well-fought field, and who cannot understand the fitness of unfledged youngsters for military command. Moreover the multiplication of numbers renders the Europeans independent of native society. They congregate in their messes and clubs, write for newspapers, and are absorbed in pursuits strictly and exclusively of a European character. Too many of them marry at an early age, and this becomes another cause of alienation from their native associates. Formerly the Subhedar paid his respects regularly to his commanding officer, attended often at his break-fast table, and gave an account of every thing which was passing in his regiment; so that the commanding officer became familiar with the character and conduct of every sepoy under his command. He was enabled often to do them little services and he obtained an influence, the effect of personal attachment, which rendered the exercise of authority easy. Our military officers too, secluded as they were from European society, and mixing more with the natives, acquired the colloquial dialects; and some of our best linguists of that day were found among our sepoy officers. Just now some of them, no doubt, go through a formal examination in the native languages to qualify for staff situations; but the knowledge they acquire is generally from books, and not from men." This alienation or hiatus between the life of the native and the British Military officer, and the galling distinction of superiority and inferiority, and also the ill-treatment of native officers were certainly some of the most offending of the deeper causes of the mutiny; the greased cartridges and the usurpatory annexations of Native States being only the superficial or immediate of them.

27 General Chesney in his book on *Indian Polity* has observed that, "while the judicial service has long been mainly filled by natives, who are represented also on the bench of the highest courts, and while under the most recent changes every branch of the service, judicial and executive, has now been thrown open to them, the army...continues to be what it always has been—an army of peasants or a class little removed above them; an army of native soldiers commanded by English officers. So far indeed it may be said to be organised like the British army, in which the men and the officers form two separate classes; but then that is a British army led by British officers and this makes all the difference. In the cavalry the position of the native officer has even gone back, for whereas formerly he could rise to the command of a squadron, the squadrons are now commanded by British officers, the most junior of whom takes precedence over the oldest native officer. So far then as the army is concerned, the Queen's Proclamation...is a dead letter...to a very large number of a most important class of Indian gentlemen descended in many cases from ancestors who held high military office under former

rulers, the only palatable and indeed the only form of public service practicable and possible for them is the military, and that is closed to them. While this is the case it cannot be said that the promise held out in the Proclamation is fully acted upon. It may be replied, indeed, that the class in question is excluded from service by the condition of fitness laid down, that is by reason of their defective education. Yet men labouring under the same deficiency have carved out kingdoms for themselves. A man of this sort, thorough gentleman in manner and feeling, if illiterate, with all the pride and bearing of birth and high family tradition, leading his own kinsmen like the Highland chief of old, will by his chivalrous example show his men the way to victory, and that, after all, is what has to be aimed at in choosing officers."

28 The same author has not been unmindful of the stock argument, that if "men of rank and influence in India were raised to high military position they might take advantage of that position," and he openly declares that Government studiously excludes Indians from all but the humblest places in the army obviously because they are afraid to trust them. "The danger from one point of view," says General Chesney, "may be freely admitted", but he gives an almost conclusive reply to this argument of distrust in the following words: "When in almost every country of Europe men are found plotting against their fellow-countrymen; with the experience of Ireland before us, it would be absurd to expect that loyalty in India should take a higher form than expediency—the recognition that our rule is the best available at present, and that it is too firmly established to be attacked without risk. But apart from any question of justice or good faith, it is surely safer as a matter of policy to have men of talent and ambition with you, their interests enlisted in our system as offering possibilities of high advancements, than that their only chance of escape from a life of obscurity and inaction should be felt to lie in subversion of our rule and the anarchy attendant on such a revolution. There can be little room for doubt on which side the choice should be taken. Too much time has already been lost before entering on the course indicated by policy as well as good faith."

29 Such is the case when the officering of only the native troops by native officers is concerned. What hope can there be then of the racial distinction between a European and the native in the Military service, being so far removed that a native officer of proved merit and ability should command even a company of British Soldiers? The rawest subaltern, if he is a European, is quite good and fit to command the oldest and the most senior native officer though he may have a dozen scars on his body or a dozen medals of honour on his breast. But King Prestige rules so supreme that Englishmen, howsoever enlightened, will not even for a moment bear the very idea of the position being reversed, and such a high native officer coming into a position of direct or indirect command over not only the lowest class of European officers, but over even a common British soldier. We have noticed General Chesney's views about giving native soldiers high military offices; but even he has not been able to reconcile his mind to this terrible idea of an Indian commanding an European in the military service. For while suggesting a number of expedients for avoiding this awful catastrophe, he has even gone the length of keeping certain regiments entirely separate so that natives, even when raised to the status of Commissioned Officers, should be in a position only to command native troops and not Europeans; though he has incidentally remarked that perhaps within the course of 50 years during which this novel experiment would be tried the British soldier might become familiar with the idea of a native commanding him.

30 The policy of distrust of the people by the Government has been scandalously obvious in the military service even more than in the executive or judicial service. It is here that the impudent doctrine of keeping India by the sword speaks in unmistakable action if not in words. And the reproach is indelible against British rule in this respect; because in pre-British days in India though there were cases of foreign rule, the policy of excluding the people from high military posts of honour and emoluments was not carried to such an absurd pitch as it has been under the British Government. Under the Marathas the command of the entire

artillery was entrusted to a Mahomedan, while under the enlightened Akbar and the bigotted Aurangzeb, Hindu Rajas combined in themselves the offices of Civil Governors and Military Commanders-in-Chief over whole provinces. Even in Russia the non-Christian subjects are admitted to high military office. Says Sir Henry Cotton :

“The Mogul emperors adopted heartily and completely the policy of trust; Akbars’ greatest generals and most devoted adherents were children of the very men his grand-father had conquered...The British Government, on the contrary, has adopted a policy of suspicion...The Russians can get from the territories they have absorbed in central Asia an Alikhanoff or a Loris Melikoff. We can only produce men who rise to the rank of a Naik, Havaldar or Resaldar.”

31 It is only after the ramming of the Government by Indian public opinion for nearly half a century, and after the bravery of the Indian troops was indisputably manifested on the battle-fields of Flanders, that Government have been persuaded to admit the claim of the Indian people to the removal of the bar against them in respect of the military offices, and that, while declaring that the policy of the British Government in India was to develop self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realisation of responsible government, the Right Hon. the Secretary of State for India announced that the nine Cadetships which were formerly given to selected Indians in an imaginary army would now be materialised into regular Commissions in the real Indian army. The barrier has thus at last been broken, but who knows that the progress of the promotion of native officers to the higher posts in the military service may not be as slow as, or even slower than, their progress in the civil appointments in fulfilment of the pledges contained in the Charter Act of 1833 and the Proclamation of 1853.

32 And lastly we must mention the restrictions which have been placed in the way of the Indian people in the matter of Volunteering. In this connection we would rather cite the testimony of Sir Henry Harrison who, in a pamphlet specially devoted to the subject, has given the reasons why the Indians wish to enlist themselves as Volunteers, even when the Government is apparently unwilling to concede them that privilege. Says Sir Henry Harrison :

“The desire to be enrolled as volunteers arises (1) from a wish for political equality, a desire not to be regarded as Helots while other sections of the community are regarded as Spartans; (2) from a conviction that those who claim their share in the prizes of administration must show their willingness to bear their share of the burdens of the citizenship, (3) from a knowledge that the Bengalees and other Indian races are physically degenerate, and a desire to do something, however little, to make them less effeminate; (4) from a pride in association with a noble Empire like that over which Her Majesty presides, and a desire to share in its glories by being numbered among its defenders; (5) from a conviction that a struggle may be imminent in India between the forces of retrogression led by Russia and those of progress led by England, and that their sympathies and their fortunes must unhesitatingly and unwaveringly be thrown in with the latter.” The privilege has been practically confined so far to the Anglo-Indians and Europeans, though no doubt a few Parsees also have been happy recipients of admission into this charmed circle. The citizen-soldier is after all the back-bone of national defence, if not the entire military system, and there is no country in the world except India in which government not only do not take into account, but also rely upon, the civil population as part of their defensive military organisation. But the British Government have carried the idea of their duty of protecting the people in India to an absurd excess and they would rather import the available army from England, accept the services of colonial contingents, or perhaps even invite Japan, under the terms of a friendly alliance with her, to spare a portion of her gallant army. But they would on no account trouble the Indian people themselves for defending their hearths and homes. This is obviously distrust carried too far. The Indian mind cannot be so abased as not to take this as a slur both upon their intelligence and their sentiments of loyalty, or as to treat their exclusion from the toils of war as a dispensation of beneficence. It is easy to understand and explain the paradox that

while government send round recruiting agents to obtain recruits for the native standing army, they should refuse the offer of high-souled and respectable Indians to voluntarily bear arms and enter military service for the defence of their country. The same policy has been perceptible in the matter of recruitment since the commencement of the war. While recruiting sergents will be tolerated in doing anything to swell the ranks of the regular native army, the men applying for admission into the Defence of India Force have been treated with jealousy. Government no doubt want men to swell their military ranks, but they want men who care for nothing but their pay, and who know nothing higher than military discipline. Government affect to see unfathomable dangers in admitting to military education men who are not mercenaries and who are moved by an impulse arising from patriotism.

33 "Even Machiavelli, the high priest of cunning statesmanship, says, "A wise prince was never known to disarm his subjects; rather finding them unfurnished he puts arms into their hands, for by arming them and innuring them to warlike exercise those arms are surely your own. They who were suspicious to you will become faithful; they who are faithful are confirmed, and all your subjects become of your party. And because the whole multitude which submits to your government is not capable of being armed, if you be beneficial and obliging to those you do arm, you may make the bolder with the rest, for the difference of your behaviour to the soldier binds him more firmly to your service. But when you disarm, you disgust them and imply a diffidence in them, either for cowardice or treachery, and the one or the other is sufficient to give them an impression of hatred against you."

34 As regards the martial emasculation of the Indians we can not but observe that the whole world is free to keep arms and use arms. Every civilised nation is interested in giving a martial training to its boys and citizens and in teaching them the use of arms and other military tactics. Some countries do this by conscription, others do it on voluntary system. No Government entitled to be called wise thinks of refusing arms to such of its people as want to use them for legitimate purposes. The free possession of arms and free training in military tactics for purposes of individual and the country's defence is the birthright of every son of a nation. Even the Amir of Kabul does not refuse that to his people. China also is thinking of introducing compulsion. In Japan the military training is compulsory. In some countries even girls learn the use of arms and practise fencing. In the United States as well as other States of America the Negroes and the American Indians can keep arms and receive military training. But the Indians in India cannot keep arms. Every country is interested in the manufacture of munitions and in inventing effective methods of dealing with her enemies. All this is denied to Indians.

35 Never before the introduction of British rule in India was the sense of helplessness, that arises out of the consciousness of being a disarmed people, brought home to the people of India so vividly and strongly as during the present War. We cannot make even a show of resistance if attacked. A people so helpless and dependent deserve to be despised by the world. The War has made the Indian feel that as a British subject he is really a despicable creature entitled to no consideration at the hands of other people of the world. Even the Negroes, whether in Africa or America, are much better placed than he is. As Mr. Watch says, "We all devoutly hope that profiting by this great war, Great Britain will not deny any further to the Indian people the exercise of arms the want of which for so many years has led to their emasculation."


36 This word "emasculation" affords the key to the situation in India from the purely Indian point of view. Political, physical, and economic "emasculation" is the key-note of British rule in India.

37 Speaking of the effects of peace—of the peculiar peace under the British Government, which not only protects but protects with a vengeance, and eventually emasculates the manly qualities of the Indian subjects by a denial of full scope

to their play, Colonel Todd observes with special reference to the Rajputs as follows: "Never were their (Rajputs) national characteristics so much endangered as in the seducing calm which followed the tempestuous agitations in which they had so long floated; doubtful whether 'the gift of our friendship or our arms'...were fraught with greater evil. The latter they could not withstand; though it must never be lost sight of that, like ancient Rome when her glory was fading, we use 'the arms of the barbarians' to defend our conquests against them...Is their no mind above the level of £ 10 monthly pay in all the native legions of the three presidencies of India? No Odoacer, no Shivaji again to revive? Is the book of knowledge and of truth, which we hold up, only to teach them submission and perpetuate their weakness?...When so many nations are called upon to make over to a foreigner, their opposite in every thing, their superior in most, the control of their forces in time of war...and a share in the fruits of their renovating prosperity what must be the result? When each Rajput may hang up his lance in the hall, convert his sword to a plough-share, and make a basket of his buckler? What but the prostration of every virtue? It commences with the basis of the Rajputs,—the martial virtues. Extinguish these and they will soon cease to respect themselves. Sloth, low-cunning and meanness will follow. What nation ever maintained its character that devolved on the stranger the power of protection! To be great, to be independent, its martial spirit must be cherished." The late Mr. Gokhale has with reference to the same subject, observed in one of his speeches that "the entire population is kept disarmed and, as though it was not enough humiliation to the Indians to be deprived thus of their natural right to bear arms in defence of their hearth and homes, England has recently entered into an alliance with another oriental nation, to repel foreign aggression on the borders of India, and, incidentally, to perpetuate the present state of bondage for the Indians themselves."

38 And the last but not the least, the moral loss which we have sustained by our connection with England is the loss of our position as a nation in the world of nations. Before the advent of the British rule in India there may indeed have been local strife and struggle, and perhaps even anarchy. But in the eyes of the world India had not ceased to be a great nation. Anarchy or misrule is not the monopoly of India as almost every nation in the world knows it to its cost. But the British occupation of India has changed the whole aspect of things, and the ignominious stamp of a dependency put on it by England at once degraded it beyond measure. Has not anarchy existed in other eastern nations like Turkey and China? But simply for the reason that they were independent nations they did not forfeit respectful recognition or treatment by the leading nations of the world. So also anarchy has admittedly prevailed in some of the small nations in eastern Europe, for example the Balkan States, and yet for the simple reason that they were independent States and not dependencies they had to be treated with respect due to them. In fact their right to nationhood has been expressly made *causus belli* by the foremost powers in the world, and their restoration to their status after the war is probably the only condition on which peace will be concluded by England, France and America with the Central Powers of Europe. But because India is a dependency or a mere appanage to the British Empire, it does not count, and is not mentioned in the present struggle with any consideration, and curiously enough, England herself, who has voluntarily rushed into the vortex of a life and death struggle with Germany with the old knight-errant's chivalrous sympathy for the rights of insignificant nations like Belgium and Serbia, does not seem to be alive in any way to her own responsibility towards a great nation like India, a nation that is as much an ornament as a store-house of resources to the British Empire. This accounts for the insulting treatment which India has received at the hands of the colonies themselves of the British Empire, where Indians are treated as people outside the pale of civilisation, and where the law of emigration is so framed as to practically discriminate and exclude Indians, of all the people in the world. When the members themselves of the Empire give this sort of treatment to India simply because she is a dependency and not a self-governing colony, we need not wonder that other nations of the world have run their pencil through the name of India as a nation not entitled to any respect or even recognition. Her connection with England has thus brought

upon India the loss of political status in the eyes of the nations of the world; and those who appreciate the fact that reputation and good name is the most valuable possession that a nation, like an individual, can have, will admit that this loss of prestige is the greatest moral loss that India has suffered at the hands of England. A nation of 300 millions, with the most ancient civilisation to its credit, has been wiped off from the roll of nations, as if it never existed, and what is worse is that if some regard it as still existing, it exists for them only to point their finger of scorn at her.



Chapter III

Failure of Parliamentary Control.

HAVING seen what the effects of British rule have been upon India, one may naturally inquire, on whom the responsibility really rests for this state of things. There was as well a Government of India in England as a Government of India in India itself. But the British Parliament was, and is, the original source of all legislative power concerning India, and the primary responsibility, therefore, for the mis-government of India lies on the head of Parliament rather than on that of the Government of India. But perhaps the most remarkable, and the most regrettable, fact in the whole history of the British Rule in India is the failure on the part of the British Parliament to realise its duty and responsibility towards India. As a preliminary to the discussion of this subject let us briefly review the course and progress of British occupation of India and the acquisition of territorial possessions.

2 The British Government in India originated in a Royal Charter to a Company of English merchants. The opening of the seas and the discovery of a passage by sea to India at the close of the 15th century, was immediately made use of by the Portuguese who were the first to acquire seats of trade and dominion in India. They maintained their ascendancy and captured almost the whole of the Asiatic commerce till the end of the 16th century. The Dutch followed the Portuguese, soon became their rivals, and ultimately very nearly subverted their power in the East. The example of the Portuguese and the Dutch stimulated a similar desire in the minds of the English merchants who eventually succeeded in obtaining a Charter from Queen Elizabeth to pursue and to monopolise the trade with the East. The Charter incorporated two hundred and fifteen Knights, Aldermen, and Burgesses, authorising them to elect one governor and twenty-four committees for holding court in any place within Her Majesty's dominions, and to regulate voyages, trade, and commerce and every thing connected therewith. They were also authorised, for this purpose, to ordain laws and regulations not contrary or repugnant to the laws and customs of the English Realm. The Company was not authorised in the beginning to make any territorial annexations. But they could secure to themselves trading grounds. And for this purpose they could and did negotiate with native Princes in India. These trading grounds contained habitations of some natives of India, and the Company also naturally required the services of others for their business. The native inhabitants of these ceded trading grounds and the natives in the Company's service were thus the first batch of Indians to come directly under the operation of the Company's laws and regulations, and indirectly under the rule of the British sovereign.

3 For about fifty years after the grant of the Charter to the East India Company, its affairs were practically free from any sort of control by the Parliament. On the other hand, the decay of the Mogul power in India led to double government and anarchy in the territories adjoining the Company's trading grounds, and this state of things was availed of by the Company for making a beginning in erecting fortifications round their settlements. In 1661, the Company was authorised not only to build but to garrison fortresses in India, to appoint governors for administering the trading grounds, and to make peace and war with non-Christian people and princes in India. By the end of the 17th century the company had acquired a number of trading grounds in India and their trade was firmly established. In Bengal, the Company's trade commenced in 1634 by a furman from the Mogul Emperor. The first factory in Bengal was established at Hugly in 1640, and the second at Balasore in 1642. The factory at Cassimbazar was built in 1658, and Calcutta was founded in 1686. In 1699, the first fort was ordered to be erected in Bengal. In Madras the Company's trade was extended to the Karomandel coast in 1625 and the first cargo vessel was unloaded at Musalipattam. In 1638, Madras was selected for the erection of a fort at the invitation of the Nayak of the place

who promised exemption from all customs duties on trade. In 1653, Fort St. George was raised to the rank of a Presidency and, in 1681 Madras was separated from Bengal. In the Bombay Presidency the first factory was built at Surat in 1612. In 1668 the island of Bombay was obtained by the Company from the Crown and became the chief seat of British Government in India, the other settlements being declared subordinate to it.

4 The trade operations from these various centres led to the gradual growth of the Company's revenue, and in 1689 the Company passed a resolution declaring, for the first time, that the increase of revenue in India should be as much a subject of their care as their trade. It was revenue which, the Company said, "must maintain our forts and make us a nation in India." The idea was to guard the Company's commercial supremacy on the basis of its territorial sovereignty. This resolution was the beginning of a policy by which the Company's clerks and factors throughout India were turned into conquerors and pro-consuls, and which eventually led to systematic annexations in the 19th century. But the growth of revenue, while it strengthened on the one hand the Company's position in India, led to a corresponding debit so far as their strength in England was concerned. The East India Company had many rivals even in England; and though it survived them all, as being perhaps the fittest, the growing mass of wealth gradually acquired by the Company's shareholders and also by its servants caused an amount of heart-burning among the British public. The result was that in 1691, a great constitutional question was raised for the first time in Parliament, as to whether the Crown could grant a monopoly of trade to any one, even a chartered company, without the authority of Parliament. In 1693, the question was finally decided in the negative; and the subject of granting trading privileges to companies was removed from the chamber of the King's Council to the House of Parliament, and thus began the era of control by Acts of Parliament over the affairs of the East India Company.

5 The 18th century saw the occupation and consolidation of Indian territories by the East India Company greatly developed. The death of Aurangzeb in 1707 led to a disruption of the Mogul Empire, and independent kingdoms or principalities were being set up by adventurous military captains in every part of the country. The East India Company could hardly be expected to resist the temptation afforded by this golden opportunity for pushing on their own interests, and an extraneous stimulus was given to their activity by the reactionary tumult due to the wars in Europe between the English and the French. The struggle was limited to Madras and Bengal, but after two prolonged wars, and after numerous possessions of either party were taken and retaken, the English achieved a decisive triumph. By the battle of Plassey in 1757, the foundation of the British Empire was laid in the East. In 1758, the first governor of Bengal was appointed. In 1759, British influence was permanently established throughout the Northern Circars and the Court of Hyderabad; and in 1761 by the surrender of the fortress of Ginji, it could be said that not a single ensign of the French nation, owned by the authority of its government, was left in any part of India. In Bengal the Company had already acquired the Zamindari of the district of the twenty-four parganas with an area of about 900 square miles, and in 1765 the Company obtained a reversion of the big jaha-gir given by the Delhi Emperor to Lord Clive personally. The final stroke of this policy came in the same year when the Company obtained from the Mogul Emperor of Delhi the grant of the famous Diwani. According to this grant the Company was to receive revenues and maintain the army for the Mogul Emperor. This practically amounted to the foundation of the Company's territorial sovereignty in Bengal.

6 Within about 10 years from this event the Company came into relations with the Marathas in central and southern India, which eventually terminated in the beginning of the 19th century in the fall of the Peshwai, and the acquisition by the Company of territorial sovereignty over the Deccan. The Company's struggle with Hyder Alli and Tippu in the south also resulted in their favour; and the death of Tippu in 1799 made them complete masters of the southern peninsula. In

1803 Scindia, the greatest Maratha military captain, was defeated and the Company acquired big territories to the north of the Jumna. The Sikhs also had their troubles, and after two bloody wars the Punjab was annexed in 1849. In the middle of the 19th century, the work of territorial acquisition was further advanced by the policy of what may be called unconstitutional, though peaceful, conquests. Lord Dalhousie was responsible for a number of annexations, and the famous doctrine of 'Lapse' was made to serve as a handle for the deprivation of many native rulers of their principalities, such as, Satara in 1849, Zansi and Nagpur in 1853. The mal-administration of Oudh was made the ground of the annexation of that Raj in 1856. Next year the great Mutiny broke out, and the anniversary of Plassey witnessed terrible scenes of carnage especially in northern India. The Mutiny was a furious cataclysm but it produced two important results. One was that the policy of annexations was peremptorily checked, and practically a new lease of life was given to the Native States in India which together account for 1/3rd of the total area, and 1/5th of the total population of this country. The second result was the transfer of the administration of the British Indian territory from the East India Company to the Crown. The Burmese War in 1885, added indeed another province to India, and no one can indeed say that the chapter of territorial conquest or annexation by the British Government in or near India, has been definitely closed. But we may put out of our mind all speculation as to the future policy of Government in this connection.

7 We shall now proceed to see, from a constitutional point of view, the course of relations between India and Parliament: first through the medium of the E. I. Company and then directly through its own agency *viz.* the Home and Indian Governments. It is true that the British Empire in India originated in a Royal Charter obtained from the Sovereign of England by a company of mere merchants. But within about 60 years from the foundation of the Company commenced the financial relations between the Company and the British Parliament as representing the state. Thus in 1655, Oliver Cromwell borrowed from the Company a loan of £ 50,000 for the expense of the State and few years afterwards, the Chancellors of the British Exchequer continued regularly to compel the Company to grant public loans. But these financial relations had a *corresponding political aspect*. For, while on the one hand the Company went on securing valuable privileges to itself including the privilege of going beyond the legitimate purposes of the Charter, making territorial conquests and imposing political rule over alien people, the Company had to submit to corresponding restrictions on their internal constitution. Loans to the public Exchequer began to be substituted for presents to the King personally or to his favourite ministers; and the renewal of the Charter at fixed intervals was invariably the occasion for a further penetration of the hand of Parliament in the Company's affairs.

8 For a number of years the interference by Parliament was confined to satisfy the demands of the home rivals of the Company, for making the Company surrender a share of the enormous profits they were making by their Eastern trade. But a time eventually came when Parliament began to enforce its claim to go deeper into the Company's affairs, and to make the Directors of the Company submit statements and accounts to be laid before itself. The Charter to the United East India Company, granted in 1698, was granted by the King, but not before Parliament had given its sanction thereto. In 1736, however, actually began the era of active and vigilant inquiry by Parliament into the affairs of the Company as affecting the administration of India. The order was for the first time given for the printing of the correspondence of a public character between the Company and its servants in India. Also it was now argued for the first time that the Company had no right by the Charter to make any territorial conquest, that such possessions in the hands of a trading corporation were improper and dangerous, and that even if it were legally and politically right that they should hold these territories, yet the vast expenditure of government in the protection of the Company gave it a fair and equitable right to the revenues arising from the conquests. A system of periodical leases of the possessions to the Company by

Parliament was then inaugurated. In 1769, complaints about the mismanagement of the Company's affairs in India reached England. Three gentlemen were appointed as supervisors to inquire into and rectify the concerns of every department in India. Yet there was no material change for the better. In 1772, His Majesty in opening the Parliament observed as follows:—"The concerns of India are so various and extensive as to require the most vigilant and active attention, and some of them as well from the remoteness of the place as from other circumstances are so peculiarly liable to abuses and exposed to danger, that the interposition of the Legislature for their protection may become necessary." The ministers openly regretted that they had not sufficient powers in their hands to control their servants who made enormous fortunes at the expense of the masters and were guilty of such exorbitancy in other respects as to hazard the total loss of the valuable possessions in India.

9 The tide of the financial prosperity of the Company had also turned by this time, and in the year 1772 the Company was on the brink of bankruptcy owing to expensive wars, the failure of harvests, and, more than all, the corruption of its servants. Whereas so long the Company could give public loans and accommodate the British Exchequer, it was now the turn of the Company to ask for a loan from the public treasury. The opportunity was availed of by shrewd British statesmen to introduce extensive alterations into the system of governing the Company's Indian possessions. With the loan, therefore, from the Treasury came far-reaching interferences by Parliament in the Company's internal affairs. Thus their dividends were limited by statute, they had to submit their accounts every six months to the treasury; they were to accept Bills only to a limited amount and they were to export to British settlements British goods of a specified value. The financial embarrassment of the Company was availed of for passing a constitutional enactment viz. the Regulation Act of 1773. The Act no doubt effected a certain orderly arrangement in the administration of the Company; but it could not be said that the Act had a far-reaching effect so far as the amelioration of the grievances of the Indian people as caused by the Company's mal-administration was concerned. By the grant of the Diwani in 1765, the Mogul empire, as recognised by the Act of 1773, resembled what is known in modern International Law as a protectorate, and though the country, over which the Company collected the Imperial revenue as Dewan, was not definitely annexed, yet the attributes of sovereignty over the territory were so unevenly distributed between the Emperor and the Company, that while the substance had passed to the Company only a shadow remained with the Emperor. But it was a shadow with which potent conjuring tricks could be performed. Whenever the Company found it convenient, they could play off the authority derived from the Mogul against the authority derived from the British law, and justify under the one proceedings which it would have been difficult for them to justify under the other. In one capacity the Company were the all-powerful agents of an irresponsible despot; in the other, they were tied and bound by the provisions of Charters and Acts of Parliament. It was natural that the Company's servants should prefer to act in the former capacity. All this was going on before the Regulating Act. But, as events proved soon after, even the Act could not prevent despotism by the Company's servants over the Indian people, not excluding even Princes and Chiefs.

10 The more real purpose of Parliament in bringing the Company to account and subject them to further laws and regulations was, among other things, to share in the Indian spoil and to assert its rights to control the sovereignty of Indian territories acquired by the East India Company. Thus within four years Parliament had to hear of the scandalous proceedings of Lord Pigott, the Governor of Madras, against the Raja of Tanjore. Then came the great impeachment of Warren Hastings, which, though it ended in his acquittal, completely demonstrated the depth to which individual as well as collective wrong-doing of the men of the E. I. Company had reached in India. Righteous men like Burke were watching "with rising wonder, amazement and indignation that long train of intrigue and crime which had ended in the consolidation of a new Empire." (*Morley on Burke*) The British ministers were not loth to take the aid of potent Indian interests for grinding their own axes on the Parliamentary stone as often as occa-

sion arose. But their watchfulness easily subsided into neglect and apathy as soon as their own purpose was served. Thus the proceedings against Hastings were taken up as a sequel to the struggle over Fox's India Bill; and though Burke and a few of his colleagues looked at Indian affairs more from the point of view of India than anything else, the enthusiasm of his party soon waned; and Burke alone stood for about fourteen years as a solitary and, in the eyes of very many perhaps a ridiculous, figure in the arena against the exalted criminal. It is almost pathetic to imagine even at this day, how the great storm of Burke's glorious oratory and righteous indignation must have been seen running to waste. The cause was great as it involved the reputation of England; and the cause was great also from the point of view of India. For, Warren Hastings was a type of unscrupulous men who, while in India, had "tossed about, subverted, and torn to pieces, as if it were, in the gambols of boyish unluckiness and malice, the most established rights and the most ancient and most revered institutions of ages and nations." India ever glowed before Burke's vision as "the land of princes, once of great dignity authority and opulence; of an ancient and venerable priesthood, the guides of the people while living and their consolation after death; of a nobility of antiquity and renown; of millions of ingenious mechanics, and millions of diligent tillers of the earth; and finally the land where might be found almost all the religions professed by men, the Brahmanical, the Musalman, the Eastern and the Western Christians." In no case would, as Mr. Morley has said, the impeachment have been pressed upon Parliament by the Opposition and assented to by Ministers, if Burke had not been there with his prodigious industry, his commanding comprehensive vision, his burning zeal and his power of kindling enthusiasm in men so different from him. The effect of the case, as put by Burke, is described by eye-witnesses in these terms—"Every listener, including the great criminal, held his breath in an agony of horror; that women were carried out fainting; that the speaker himself became incapable of saying "another word and the spectators began to wonder, whether he would not like the mighty Chatham, actually die in the exertion of his overwhelming powers." But it was all wasted on a Court of Judges who were bent upon Hastings' acquittal. It is no doubt said that the moral victory lay with the prosecutor though the accused escaped punishment, because the trial had the effect of overthrowing a system and stamping its principles with lasting censure and shame. But the system can not be said to have been permanently overthrown so far as the relations between England and India, taken collectively on either side, are concerned. No doubt individual oppression, both subjectively and objectively, has long since disappeared. There are no more instances of oppression such as Warren Hastings practised on the Begum of Oudh, or on the Rohillas; and the lesson is now deeply impressed upon the mind of an average Englishman that even Asiatics have individual rights, and even Europeans have individual obligations; and that even a superior race is bound to observe the highest current morality of the time in its individual dealings with the subject race. But no thorough-going assertion of this kind can, we are afraid, be made when it comes to the subsequent treatment by England, as a nation, of India, as a nation.

II By Pitt's Act of 1784, a great constitutional change was no doubt brought about in the Government of India, inasmuch as the Company was placed in direct and permanent subordination to a body representing the British Government, and only the patronage of office was kept in the hands of the Company. The Board of Control was the new governing body. It consisted of the Chancellor of the British Exchequer, one Secretary of State and four Privy Councillors. At the same time a secret Committee of three out of the Board of Directors was permanently appointed to co-operate with the Board of Control. The Company's shareholders thus lost their governing capacity. They could no longer revoke or modify any proceeding of the Court of Directors which had been approved by the Board of Control. The Governor-General or the Commander-in-Chief could no doubt be appointed by the Board of Directors, but they could be removed by the Crown. As a policy for the future Government of India, it was at the same time declared that schemes of conquest and extension of dominion were repugnant to the wish, honour and policy of England. A new start was thus made with the intention of securing

better Government in India; and what was regarded as a proper and adequate machinery for a just and efficient government was provided. In fact this new system of government practically remained in force till the enactment of the Government of India Act of 1858; and though the Government of India was, as a matter of fact, transferred formally from the E. I. Company to the Crown after the Mutiny of 1857, still the Crown may be said to have directly assumed that government through a Secretary of State from the year in which Pitt's India Act was enacted viz 1784. No doubt a large number of statutes were enacted by the British Parliament between 1784 and 1858, but the changes brought about by them in the constitution of the government of India were immaterial. Thus by the Act of 1786, power was given to the Governor-General to overrule his Council in special cases and it enabled the Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief to be united in the same person. By the Act of 1793, the pay of the members and the staff of the Board of Control was declared to be a charge on the Indian revenues. By the Act of 1799, the Company was authorised to raise troops in India upto 2000 and the Crown was to transfer recruits to India at an agreed sum of rupees, upto a maximum number of 3000, and so on. But these Acts provided for only minor details of administration.

12 In 1813 began the series of Acts which are well known as the Charter Acts. But as the name itself shows they dealt more with the financial relations between the Company and the British Exchequer than with the constitution of the government of India. The dissatisfaction with the management of the affairs of the Company, reinforced by the jealousy on the part of the State in respect of the Company's territorial possessions, had the effect of raising the whole question as to whether the Company deserved to have its Charter, which was always limited in point of time, renewed to it. A secret committee was for the first time appointed by Parliament to inquire into the Company's affairs, with the result that, by the first of the series of the Charter Acts the trade monopoly of the Company was abolished, and European merchants, not connected with the Company, were allowed to reside in India under a system of license. The only reference in this Act to the well-being of the Indian people was contained in the provision therein that a beginning be made in educating the people.

13 The first Parliamentary Act which contains any real reference to the recognition of British Indian subjects, as units of a State, is the Charter Act of 1833. But before we dwell upon its contents, it would be as well to review the general results of the British Indian administration from the date of the Charter of 1600, up to that point of time, that is to say, a period of about 233 years. And for this purpose we can not do better than quote the words of an eminent Anglo-Indian judge and statesman, we mean the Hon'ble Mr. Frederick John Shore. In his *Notes on Indian affairs* dated 14th February 1832, Hon'ble Mr. Shore observes that the feelings of the natives of this country were not really so cordial towards the British government in India as they were generally supposed, and that the British tenure in India was less firm than might be desired. And in the course of explaining the causes of this state of things he gives an illustration or a sort of metaphor to indicate those causes. He says:—

“Suppose then that, about the beginning of the last century, a few African merchants received permission from the English Government to erect a factory somewhere on the South Coast of England; that, some years after, an English revenue defaulter, or criminal, took refuge in the factory; that the Africans refused to give him up; and that the English took possession of the factory, and confined the Africans; that their government sent ships and troops to attack the English, and force them to give up a small portion of territory.”

“The Africans find that a member of the royal family has a strong party in his favour, (Prince Charles Edward, commonly called the Pretender, would have well suited their purpose,) and persuade him to mount the throne, which, with their assistance, in addition to his own party, there is a probability of effecting. They then pick up a quarrel, go to war with the English, depose the king, and establish the other. A short time afterwards, they treat the new king in the same manner, and set up another; and not long after, depose this last, and establish the one they had first made king; the chiefs, in each case not only receiving large private bribes, but being guilty of treachery and forgery.

"The Africans then, having very small pay from their own masters, try to make a profit by trading; they not only insist on the English king's exempting their goods from payment of duty, but on his imposing a high one on those of his subjects. They send factors and agents all over the country, each of whom erects himself into a petty chief, and forces people to sell him their goods and buy his, at his own price, until the people are so distressed, that the king abolishes all duties altogether. This the Africans consider a crime, and, after some negotiation and altercations, finish by deposing that king, who is succeeded by another of their own creation."

"They next persuade the existing king to disband his own troops or the greater part of them, and to rely on those of the Africans to protect him and his dominions, he paying their expenses. Shortly after, they make out that his payments are in arrears, or they say that they apprehend that this will be the case, and insist on a part of his territory being assigned to them to secure regular payment. The nobles and upper classes they gain over, by promises of support and protection. This done, they take away the estates from the Lord-Lieutenants of counties and the great noblemen, on the plea of some flaw in the original grant by the Crown, or that the holders of the estates had not complied with the conditions of the feudal tenure on which they had been granted, or some equally good reason; giving them pensions, which they hold out hopes are to be hereditary, but which are subsequently reduced, or discontinued altogether."

"The land-tax is then indefinitely increased to such a pitch that the proprietors of estates are reduced to beggary, and, being unable to pay the demand, their estates are sold, till scarcely an ancient land-holder possesses the land of his fathers, the new purchasers being clerks and menial servants who have been attending on the Africans. If the people complained, the Africans would say, that although our own Government did not act thus, they possessed the right to do so, and that they, having succeeded to the government, acquired that right which they choose to exercise."

"They then take every opportunity to acquire more territory, much in the same way that they acquired the first portion, till at last they get possession of the whole of the British isles; treat the people as above mentioned; and giving the king a pension, shut him up in Windsor Castle."

"If the king and other pensioners urged, that they had lost their influence with, and respectability in the eyes of the people, and that having nothing to occupy their attention, they were in danger of degenerating, which would be insured by their not having enough to support their families, they are told that they are much better off than before, that their dignity and that of their families is now secured by their being certain to receive their pensions regularly under the stability of the African government; whereas, formerly they had much trouble in realising their incomes, and were obliged to have recourse to much bribery to secure a sufficient number of votes in the Commons."

"On the first acquisition of the southern provinces of England, the Africans allowed the customs of the country (not laws exactly, for, being ignorant of them, they disregard them,) to remain, and from time to time introduced regulations of their own, forming a code. On successively gaining possession of the Northern provinces,—Scotland, Wales, Ireland, the Hebrides, Shetland and the Orkney islands,—that code of regulations is put in force all over the country, without any inquiry or consideration how different the people of the several countries were from each other in manners and customs, and even language."

"At first they leave us our justices of the peace, periodical courts of justice, and other local authorities; but on finding one or two instances of those in office turning their power to their own advantage, the Africans declare that the natives are so corrupt that they are not fit to be trusted; and that some provision must be made by appointing African judges and magistrates, who would properly administer justice. They accordingly abolish forthwith every local authority, and establish, on an average, one court for each county; in which one person with one or two assistants, and sometimes without any at all, is sole judge and Magistrate. To assist him in the details of his office, some of the natives are employed; but the salaries are fixed at so low a scale that none but the lower classes will accept the offices. Under the Magistrates, upper-constables, with a proportion of inferior ones under them, are distributed over each district; their pay and the sort of people chosen, being as above-mentioned; and these men are intrusted with, on the whole, directly or indirectly, greater power than the former magistrates possessed."

"These courts would be bad enough under any circumstances, more especially if the Africans should choose to order the business to be conducted in *Norman French*; but under each, the extent of country is such, that the people would have to go, on an average, twenty miles to settle the most trivial matter,—sometimes more than an hundred. The delay is so great, that a petty complaint before the magistrate, or petty theft case, is often a fortnight or three weeks before it is decided; and small money causes of a few pounds value, are often pending a year or more, before the first decision,—to say nothing of the subsequent delays by appeals. Suppose the Africans behaved to us in a haughty supercilious manner, and treated us with slights, and even insults, to such a degree that it had almost become a saying with us, that "to have any transaction with an African is to be insulted"; that the greater number of them were in the habit of abusing their servants, or even beating them for the

most trivial fault,—often for no other reason than their not understanding a jargon of broken English; that they neglect to learn our language contenting themselves, in the first instance, with having one or two of the worst of the natives about them, who interpret for them, and afterwards with merely learning a low jargon "....."

"Suppose in fine, that after the above treatment of us by both Government and individuals, (when they were told that the English were discontented with their Government, some of the Africans denied that it were possible; others asserted, that it was a proof of the badness of our disposition, that we ought to be grateful to them, that we had been constantly fighting either with our neighbours or among ourselves in consequence of rebellions, and that we ought to be thankful that we had at last got a stable government under which justice was secure etc. "

To be more realistic, Mr. Shore has in another note given a summary of the facts described in the above illustration. It is as follows:—

(1) The habitual and inordinate idea of our own superiority and the equally strong impression of the corruption and the inefficiency of the natives.

(2) Their consequent exclusion from all offices which it was possible to procure Englishmen to accept, and the attempt to conduct all affairs by European agency.

(3) The annihilation of almost all existing institutions and the total inadequacy of those which have been substituted for the administration of justice.

(4) The gradual impoverishment of the country by a system of taxation and extortion unparalleled in the annals of any country.

(5) The ruin of the old aristocracy and of all the respectable landholders which has been systematically effected in order to increase the government revenue.

14 Let us now proceed to consider the Charter Act of 1833. By reason of the fact that this Charter Act is often quoted and relied on as embodying the real beginning of a change of their angle of vision by British statesmen towards India, the Act is regarded as a Charter, as it were, granted to India. It was, however, nothing of the kind. It was only one term in a series of Charter Acts which were mainly intended to legally renew the Charter to the East India Company for a further period of years and was incidentally used to introduce measures of administrative reform discovered to be necessary in the light of a previous inquiry by a select or secret committee. The Act no doubt did much for the commercial classes in England as well as the British government itself; for by the operation of this Act, the East India Company was finally deprived of commercial functions, though it was allowed to retain administrative and political power and the coveted patronage of Indian appointments. Further the Act declared that the Company held its territorial possessions in trust for the Crown and gave notice to the Company to wind up its business. The Act further declared that Parliament alone had the power to legislate for India, and to approve or disapprove Indian laws which must be placed before Parliament. The Act enlarged the rights of European settlers in India and called upon the Governor-General to make legal provision for the protection of the natives from insult and outrage on their persons, religions and opinions. This salutary provision had become absolutely necessary. For, according to the Company's own admission, "experience had proved that it was difficult to impress upon even the servants of the Company a due regard for the feelings and habits of the people of India; and Englishmen of all classes, unless under the observation of supreme authorities, were notorious for the contempt with which in their natural arrogance and ignorance they contemplated the usages and the institutions of the Natives, and for their frequent disregard of the dictates of humanity and justice in their dealings with the people of India. The natives although timid and feeble in some places, were not without strength and resolution in others, and instances had occurred where their resentment had proved formidable to their oppressors." As Mr. Charles Grant had spoken out in a debate upon the subject in the House of Commons, there was a great danger of "letting loose among the people of India a host of desperate needy adventurers, whose atrocious conduct in America afforded sufficient indication of the evil they would inflict upon India."

15 Before coming to the provision of this Charter relating to the Natives of India in respect of their employment in service it will be as well to complete our observations upon the main character of that Act, which was, as observed above, enacted more for the benefit of the English people. The Act was the result of "the disgusting selfishness of all the parties concerned." The British public had in mind the object of opening the China trade. The Court of proprietors had the object of securing the regular payment of their dividends. And the ministry had been 'tackling and trimming' between them, willing to do anything that should please both and gain a little popularity. But it was "lamentable to see the utter indifference displayed by all to the welfare of a hundred million of the people of India. Some of the speakers even openly avowed that, in their opinion, it was a minor object compared to the profits of a few English merchants. Provided each party could gain its selfish and shortsighted objects, the Government of India was thrown into the bargain with as much indifference as if the people in question had been a herd of cattle. The Natives were aware of the discussions which were going on in Parliament; and in order to make it appear that the East India Company had gained their point, a grand display of fire works, costing some twenty thousand rupees, was exhibited in Calcutta. This display, however, was looked upon by the Natives with a somewhat malicious delight as an entertainment given by a reckless ruined merchant on the eve of his bankruptcy. In the language of the natives who witnessed the fireworks, "the display blazed up like the thorns and died away; but the smell therein remained in their nostrils."

16 The one section in the Charter Act of 1833, which really affected and was intended to benefit the natives of India directly, is section 87 which declared, that "No native of the Indian territories, nor any natural born subject of His Majesty resident therein, shall, by reason of his religion, place of birth, descent, colour or any of them, be disabled from holding any office or employment under the Company." As Sir Courtney Ilbert says, "The policy of freely admitting natives of India to a share in the administration of the country has never been more broadly or emphatically enunciated." What kind of operation this section received for a number of years afterwards will be presently seen. But the declaration of policy contained in this section may very properly be described as the bed-rock foundation of the national demand for self-government in India. "Any office or employment under the Company"—these words are wide enough to cover the appointment of the natives of India right upto the post of a Governor or Governor-General, because this office was in the gift of the Company, so long as the Company was in existence, and in the gift of the Crown, that is to say the State Secretary for India, since 1858. As no representative institutions were thought of for the Indian people in 1833, the word 'office' could not have been then directly intended to cover the office of the president of urban or rural corporations, or the member of a Legislative Council. But the words have been construed to be wide enough even to cover posts of offices under representative institutions, for, these were neither repeated nor altered nor substituted by other words of a similar import in the Government of India Act of 1858 by which the Government of India was transferred from the Company to the Crown directly. This section may, therefore, be taken to have served for the natives of India the same purpose as the Catholic Emancipation Act, for instance, did for the Roman Catholics in the British realm. It was on the strength of this section that Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji and Sir M. M. Bhavnagri could enter the British Parliament as its members, and still more fortunate natives might enter the Cabinet of British ministers at some future time! The true character of this section was pointedly shown by Mill in his famous despatch accompanying the text of the Charter Act of 1833 when it was sent to India for compliance and guidance. Says the despatch, "The true object is not to ascertain qualification but to remove disqualification....The meaning of the enactment we take to be that there shall be no governing caste in British India....That whatever tests of qualifications may be adopted, distinction of race or religion shall not be one of the number. ...In effect the free access to office is chiefly valuable when it is a part of *general freedom*." The enactment, was thus part of a general scheme of freedom and rights of citizenship which Parliament had already either given, and intended to complete at a future time, to the Natives of India.

17 This was thus a splendid beginning made by the British Parliament of the realisation of its duty and responsibility towards the Indian people as a nation. But even the reforms introduced by the Charter Act of 1833, were found to be inadequate for the purpose of preventing mal-administration of India by the E.I. Company. In 1853 the twenty years period of the Company's Charter ended once more ; and this opportunity was availed of at the time of renewal of the lease for introducing further reforms. By the Charter Act of 1853, the Board of Directors were made to forfeit their patronage and the Civil Service was thrown open to competition. The new Act did not fix any definite term for the continuance of the powers of the Company, but simply provided that the territories should remain under the government of the Company in trust for the Crown until Parliament should otherwise direct. The Act reduced the number of the Directors of the Company from 24 to 18, and provided that 6 of these be appointed by the Crown. In 1854 the Governor-General, as representing the Crown, was authorised to take under his charge any part of the territories under the government of the E. I. Company.

18 The Mutiny, however, soon came and it was the last straw that broke the back of the Company's mal-administration. We do not stop here to consider the causes of the Mutiny, or even the question as to how far the Company was really responsible for it. For it is patent that, though a system of double government was nominally in existence, nothing but a shadow of political power was clinging to the Company as such, the substance having already passed to Parliament to whom the Government of India was almost directly responsible through the Board of Control which was practically an instrument of the British ministry. The fact, however, remains that whoever was mainly responsible for the Mutiny, the Mutiny gave the death-blow to the system of double government of India, with its peculiar division of powers and responsibilities; and by the Act of 1858, there remained no one between the Indian subjects of the Crown and the Crown itself. The country came, since the time, to be *governed directly by the Crown and in the name of the Crown*, acting through a Secretary of State who combined all the powers of the Board of Directors and the Board of Control and who was, like all other Secretaries of State, directly responsible to British Parliament. Hereafter at any rate there was no valid excuse for Parliament to plead in the matter of its relations with, or attitude towards, India ; and we shall next consider the question as to how Parliament has discharged its duty and responsibility to India during the last 60 years.

19 In the discussion in Parliament during the debate on Lord Palmerston's Bill, Parliament appeared to be full of gushing enthusiasm as to the part it would take in the novel business of governing India directly from the House. Mr. Disraeli indeed suggested that the principles of representative government should be applied to India. And he proposed an enlargement of the India Council from eight to eighteen members, half of whom were to be elected and to be entirely independent of Government. But Lord Palmerston regretted that the unsettled state of the country did not permit of a representation of the people in India itself. They were to be no doubt represented in the Council, but partly by retired Civilian and Military officers, and partly by the nominees of certain commercial constituencies of Parliament such as London, Belfast, Liverpool, Manchester and Glasgow. The Opposition in Parliament openly ridiculed this method of giving representation to India and appealed to the Government not to play this practical joke upon the Indian people by giving them a stone when they had asked for bread. The Bill was thereupon withdrawn and another took its place which was passed into law. The Act did not give the Parliament fullest satisfaction. It was treated as merely a tentative arrangement which was soon to be worked upto the proper constitutional standard. In the meanwhile the Queen's Proclamation had been issued and members of Parliament were naturally led to believe, that with the rapid spread of education and the drafting of natives into the responsible posts of service, the ground would soon be prepared for the grant of a full-fledged representative government. In the absence of a representative government in India, Parliament had offered to take up that role upon itself on behalf of India, and

to work it as a great and solemn trust committed to it by an all-wise and inscrutable Providence.

20 But with the passing of the Act of 1858, the enthusiasm of Parliament apparently subsided. And the want of a real Parliamentary check upon the Government of India has been since an unfailing ground of complaint in every generation. Lord Palmerston said in the debate upon the Bill that, "We had a great duty to fulfil in India and he was sure that that duty would be best discharged if we committed its performance to the hands of *men who will be accountable to Parliament* for their conduct." But how could the account be rendered, and the duty to render account enforced, if Parliament itself came to treat the affairs of India as a bore? No doubt Parliamentary Committees or Commissions have, now and then, been appointed to consider and report upon Indian questions, but the result was practically nil, so far as the progress of Indian interests was concerned. And this was so because Parliament itself was known to be absolutely indifferent or apathetic towards Indian questions. By the seventies of the last century, things were pretty much the same as before the Act of 1858. As observed by the late Mr. Fawcett in 1872, "the most trumpery question ever brought before Parliament, say, a wrangle over the purchase of a picture or a road through a park excited more interest than the welfare of 180 millions of our Indian subjects. The people of India have not votes and so they can not bring so much pressure to bear upon Parliament as can be brought by one of our Railway Companies."

21 Mr. Fawcett was, perhaps, the only member of Parliament in his generation who devoted any attention to Indian affairs, but he could do so because his own constituency happened to be sympathetic to India like himself. But to profess to be a member for India, as Mr. Fawcett did, was calculated to make both a Parliamentary candidate and a member to lose his popularity. Often did Mr. Fawcett receive, warnings, from newspapers at the time of elections that by advocating the interests of India he was undermining his own chances of success. In the House itself he had to encounter the active dislike of some members even of the Liberal government. In his early years, he was met with a kind of contemptuous treatment, with which the genuine official attempts to suppress the rash outsider who dares to question the wisdom and omniscience of his rulers, and Mr. Fawcett could eventually get a hearing only when by his undaunted courage and his uphill work, he was able to prove both the sincerity of his purpose and the soundness of his judgment. It was owing to his single-handed exertions that the Parliamentary Committee, known as the Fawcett Committee, came to be appointed. It was also owing to his vigilant scrutiny that instances of the colossal waste of Indian money such as the Sultan's Ball, the Duke of Edinburgh's presents, the cable scandal, were exposed. He pointed out cases in which the uncommonly sharp practice of preparing a false balance sheet, as it were, was resorted to by the British Government in dealing with India. "You borrow money to buy a thing," Mr. Fawcett made a witness before the Commission to admit, "sell it at an enormous loss and then put down the result to income." These facts were exceptional, and like all exceptions they only proved in this case the rule that Parliament was given to neglect the affairs of India in a most deplorable manner. The individual torch that Mr. Fawcett held aloft made the surrounding darkness look only the more gloomy and dreadful.

22 In the next generations, men like the late Mr. Bradlaugh, the late Mr. Caine and others, indeed, worthily followed Mr. Fawcett's example, and the succession of individual members, standing up in Parliament to fight the battles of unbefriended India, has not altogether stopped. But after all, these men had to cry in the wilderness, and the only consolation to their minds was but the poor one of having done their duty. About thirty years ago, an attempt was made to form a British Parliamentary Committee in the interests of India; and at one time, it was said to have included over a hundred members. But the sum total of their exertions was practically nil again, partly because the sympathy of some of them for India was greater than their knowledge of this country, and partly because, even when coached drilled and combined, the Indian Party in Parliament could not hope to materially influence their own party, whether in office or outside, because they were not sure-

of being backed in the country by the voters, when matters might come to an issue on Indian question. The Indian Party in the House of Commons, even when at its best, could not bear comparison with the Irish Party which, though always dependent in one sense upon either of the great Parliamentary parties, so far as Ireland was concerned, could, in its turn, make either of the parties dependent upon itself and hold the balance in its hands, so far as the affairs of the United Kingdom were concerned. The Irish Party was always an independent body and had absolutely no party ties either as an integral part of, or as an adjunct to, the Conservative or the Liberal Party. The Indian Parliamentary party, on the other hand, was a part and parcel of the Liberal Party and had to vote with it whether the leaders would or would not accommodate or bargain with them on Indian questions. The result has been simply deplorable. As observed by Mr. George Yule in his address as President of the Indian National Congress in 1888, the position is this: "The Government of India has no power, the Council in London has no power, the House of Commons has the power but it refuses or neglects to exercise it. The 658 odd members, who were to be the palladium of India's rights and liberties, have thrown the great and solemn trust of an inscrutable Providence back upon the hands of Providence to be looked after as Providence itself thinks best."

23 The rising of Burke to address the House of Commons on Indian question is said to have served as a dinner-bell to the hungry members of the House of Commons. Nearly the same fate now awaits the Secretary of State for India when he rises to move that the House do go into Committee of Ways and Means on the East India Revenue Accounts, or in other words, to make his annual statement on the Indian Budget and administration in the House of Commons. Brave indeed must be the individual who, as Secretary of State for India, can warm himself up to deliver an oration on Indian affairs in the chilling atmosphere of the House of Commons, when not even forty members think it either their duty or their pleasure to remain in the House to listen to or criticise it. As the present State Secretary has put it in his Budget speech in 1911, as Under-Secretary in the House of Commons, "The House in its relation to India has primarily to perform for that country the functions proper to an elected assembly in a self-governing country." And yet as Mr. Montagu himself has put it to the Hon. Members in the course of the same speech "It is only a matter of time for questions of supreme importance in connection with our Indian Empire to come through the outer Lobby into the inner Lobby and knock irresistibly at the door of this Chamber. Are we prepared to meet them? Have we the knowledge, the sympathy, the breadth of view that they demand for a satisfactory and statesmanlike solution? How many members of this House are able to say that they are in a position to discuss with knowledge and decide with wisdom the great problems of India?...On how many of these questions can Honourable members honestly say that they are fitted to form any views at all?...I am bound to admit that there is lacking that first requisite for the efficient discharge of our Imperial duties—time for study and mature consideration. But apart from this, when I ask myself the question, what is the present attitude of this House towards Indian questions, I am bound to answer frankly that the salient characteristic of that attitude appears to me to be...something approaching apathy."

24 These being the facts of the relations between the British Parliament and India for the last two centuries and more, the question naturally arises whether there is ever likely to be any improvement in the same in the near or distant future? The answer must, we are afraid, be mostly in the negative. And for a very good reason. For though it is all very well to talk of the duty and responsibility of Parliament to India, still, it is against human nature itself to expect that the English members of Parliament would ever rise to such a height of dutifulness as to watch and fight for the interest of India as vigilantly and vigorously as they would for the interests of England itself or their own individual constituencies. In the first place it cannot be denied that a certain amount of incompatibility of interests as between England and India is always inevitable; and when questions of mixed or conflicting interests arise in the House, few members will be found who could forget their constituency or their country and to vote for justice being done

to India. The Imperial interests of India and England are indeed identical; but not the national interests, as may be realised when the question arises as to whether import duties may be levied in India on British goods or whether the excise duties in India may be abolished, or whether England may not rather be made to undertake a greater share of the military charges in India than she actually does at present, and so on. The conflict of national interests in these cases is so real, and the duty to India so peremptory, that even the Indian Government, though till lately it consisted only of Englishmen, had often to stand up for justice to India as against their own country. But the Indian Government is responsible only to the Home government, and there is no chance of such opposition ending in dismissals or recalls. But with the English members of Parliament it is otherwise. For, apart from the mandate which they have to obey from their electors, their own primary duty is to fight for the interests of England just as much as it is the primary duty of the Government of India to fight for the interests of India. That the members of Parliament can not be good and impartial judges when they are themselves suitors or defendants in the same cause against India, is really no fault of theirs. It is an obvious anomaly that they should be called upon to discharge these conflicting duties simultaneously. Human nature can not possibly stand such a strain.

25 Then, again, even assuming that the questions for decision do not directly raise a conflict of interests between England and India, there will still be the difficulty that, however hard a member of Parliament may study Indian questions, he will not be able to know all that would be necessary to know about them. A second-hand or third-hand acquaintance with Indian problems can not stand much in stead when intricate questions arise, and are tinged with racial or local colour. Humorous instances could be cited in which members of Parliament had betrayed woeful ignorance of the essentials of Indian questions; and very often Indian problems defy a mere academic treatment or a platitude dressing. But even assuming the greatest knowledge, the greatest industry, the greatest enthusiasm and the greatest influence on the part of members of Parliament in matters Indian, still, the insuperable difficulty confronts them, viz. of congestion of work in the House of Commons which must be expected to give precedence to a large extent to English over Indian questions. Even apart from wilful apathy, one may easily imagine how difficult it may be for the leader of the House of Commons to so frame the Orders of the Day, as to give either more time or more prominence to purely Indian questions. Ireland's complaint against the Union is partly based on this ground of top-heaviness of Parliament as a business body. As Mr. Robert Harcourt has observed, "Union means congestion. It means hæmorrhage of the brain and paralysis of the limbs. The Unionist politician is an Atlas who tries to balance the globe on the end of a walking stick. Not unnaturally he fails. The British empire has outgrown the Unionist perambulator." These remarks also apply *mutatis mutandis* to the case of India as administered by Parliament in England.

26 The only remedy for this state of things is, what may be called the Emancipation of the Indian Government, by the operation of a very large scheme of delegation of its powers by Parliament to the Indian people. As the present Secretary of State himself has remarked in his budget speech in 1911, "The course of the relations between the House of Commons and the people of India must take the form of a gradual delegation, from itself to the people of India, of the power to criticise and control the government." But what is the amount of actual delegation effected so far? To answer that question, we have practically to pass in review, though briefly, the constitutional history of the Indian Government since England put her hand to it.

27 The E.I. Company started in 1600 A.D. with powers analagous to those of a corporation in England. In 1661, they were authorised to make rules and regulations and to try judicially persons under governors according to the laws of England. But it was not until 1765, *i. e.* the grant of the Diwani, that the Company possessed or exercised any powers of technical sovereignty in India. By the Regulating Act of 1773,

a Governor-general and four councillors were appointed for Bengal, and the Supremacy of Bengal over other Presidencies was declared. Each of the Presidencies was upto this time under an independent governor, assisted by a council of 12 to 16 members. In 1784, the Board of Control was constituted in England to consist of 6 members including the Chancellor of the British Exchequer, one of the Secretaries of State and four Privy Councillors. This scheme remained practically in force till 1858. In the meanwhile, minor changes were introduced in the constitution. In 1833, a fifth member was added to the Governor General's Council, viz. the Law member, and the Governor General in Council was exclusively authorised to make or approve laws for the whole of India, without violating the prerogative of the Crown reserved under the Charter Act of 1813. By the same Act, Parliament was declared to have power to legislate for India and to approve or disapprove laws placed before it by the State Secretary. In 1853, the Law-member was made an ordinary member of the Governor General's Council. The Legislative Council was enlarged from 4 to 12 members, including the Governor General, the Commander-in-Chief, 4 ordinary members of the Executive Council, 2 Judges of the High Court, and 4 paid representative members from the Provinces of Bengal, Madras, Bombay and the N. W. Province. The Council began to hold its meetings in public and to publish its proceedings. In 1861 the power of legislation which had been taken away from the Provincial Councils by the Charter Act of 1833, was restored to them. The Provincial Legislative Councils were enlarged so as to include the Advocate General and additional nominated members from 6 to 12. The Act of 1861 also authorised the Governor General in Council to create new Provinces and new Legislative Councils. "The Indian High Courts Act of 1861 closed the series of constitutional statutes consequent on the transfer of the Government of India from the Company to the Crown." And such Acts of Parliament, as have since then been passed for India, have done little more than amending, with reference to minor points, the Acts of 1858 and 1861. In 1874, a sixth member was added to the Governor General's Council for P. W. D. In 1892, the Indian Councils Act authorised an increase in the number of members of the Indian Legislative Councils, and introduced the principle of election by implication. In 1909, the Indian Councils Act was passed, by which the principle of election of additional members of the Legislative Councils was expressly recognised; the number of members of the Council was increased, by over 100 per cent.; and enlarged the powers of members in the matter of financial debates. Finally the Act of 1912, empowered the Governor General to create Legislative Councils even for Provinces under the rule of Chief Commissioners.

28 The above summary shows the steps taken by Parliament from time to time to bring the administration of the territories in British India under the control of a single central agency viz. the Governor General in Council assisted by Provincial Governors and their Councils. But the centre of responsibility has not been in any way shifted from England to India. The State Secretary for India is still the master of the situation, and the Indian Governments are controlled from above in even small matters of detail. The State Secretary himself, however, is practically a despot in the sense that he is only nominally responsible to Parliament. Parliament neither liberally gives away nor itself vigorously exercises its powers of controlling the State Secretary and Indian Governments. It is practically the bureaucracy that governs the country; for, even the Secretary of State, despot though he be, is surrounded and guided by the opinion of old bureaucrats who have served in India for a long time, and who try to maintain the traditions of the service to which they belong. It is no wonder if under such a system the Government of India, far from being a national government, engaged in the work of raising India to the status of a civilised nation, degenerated into a machinery for keeping down the aspirations of the people and maintaining the country in a state of perpetual dependence or tutelege to be guided, controlled, and governed in a manner by which the ascendancy of the governing caste, and also of the interests they represent, could forever be maintained. The Parliamentary control of the Government of India even in England and through a State Secretary responsible to itself has thus been a melancholy failure!



Chapter IV

Failure of the Government in India

IN the previous chapter we have stated at some length how the British Parliament failed to do its appointed duty towards India as a trustee of Indian interests, and to exercise adequate and effective control over British Indian administration, whether in the days of the East India Company, or even during the period in which the Crown and Parliament assumed the direct government of this country through their own State Secretary. We now propose to see how the Indian Government under the State Secretary for India, the Viceroy and the Civil Service has also failed to do its duty towards India, and has been mainly responsible for its deplorable condition. In extenuation of the failure of Parliament it could, perhaps reasonably be said that it was, in the very nature of things, physically impossible for the six hundred and odd members of Parliament to apply their minds to the question of Indian administration as closely as the needs of the case would require. But the Indian Government, as administered through the State Secretary, cannot claim the benefit of such an excuse. The State Secretary for India, being a member of Parliament, has to be elected by one of the British constituencies and is, therefore, primarily responsible to them. He lives only a corporate existence viz. as a member of the Cabinet, and, as such, is collectively responsible to the country, and shares also the collective fortunes of that body. His place, therefore, is more or less uncertain; and though he is supposed to administer India from a vantage ground of detachment, removed from the immediate conflict of party politics, still, we can scarcely imagine him to do his duty without one of his eyes being rivetted to Home affairs. His position is somewhat analogous to the position of the Colonial Secretary, but there are one or two points of difference between these two positions which justify the more exacting standard of duty to India being applied to him than might be applied to the duty of the Secretary to the colonies. In the first place the Colonial Secretary is not the governor of the colonies, but more or less an agent paid and maintained by the Home Government, for keeping communication between itself and the Colonial Governments. Of course, there is a distinction in this respect between the major and minor colonies. In the case of the latter *i. e.* the Crown Colonies, the colonial Secretary practically occupies the same position in relation to them as the State Secretary for India does in relation to this country. But the Crown colonies are, after all, an insignificant fraction in the British Colonial empire. The major colonies have all been, by this time, given responsible government. The colonies which possess responsible government are almost entirely peopled by white men, and the British government has practically no great share in directing their affairs, and the chief business of the Cabinet in relation to these colonies, therefore, ends with nominating a governor or a governor general. And secondly, the salary of the Colonial Secretary is paid from British Treasury. It is, however, otherwise in the case of the Secretary of State for India. His salary is charged to the Indian revenues and, unlike the Colonial Secretary, he is the centre of the whole Indian administration.

2 His position is best described by the late Hon. Mr. Gokhale in his evidence before the Welby Commission, and since then, it has remained unchanged. Mr. Gokhale said: "The administration of Indian revenues is now practically entrusted to a Cabinet minister assisted by a Council of his own nomination,—a Minister who brings us no special knowledge or experience of Indian affairs to the discharge of his duties, who, as a member of the Imperial executive, has an eye to Imperial politics rather than to Indian interests...All financial power is centred in his hands and with all the vast concentrated power he has really no responsibility, except to the Cabinet, of which he is a member and of whose support he is always assured, and to Parliament, where he has a safe majority behind him in virtue of his position as a Cabinet Minister"—a majority of the supremely indifferent House, which, as Mr. Montagu himself has described, is always empty at the time when Indian questions are

debated, or, which as he said in 1911, knows nothing about India and is not fitted to form any opinion upon Indian questions. The Secretary of State is thus not really responsible to any body, not to India, as he is her master, although it pays him, and not to Parliament as it does not pay him. Suggestions were time and again made to Parliament that the salary of the State Secretary for India should be placed on the British budget but they were unheeded. Besides as Mr. Montagu himself has said in his speech in the Mesopotamia debate "he is not his own master." In matters vitally affecting India he can be overruled by a majority of the Cabinet. But we need not be surprised if he is so overruled, for, by a tacit understanding, the office of the Secretary of State for India is reserved for one who is regarded as the least important member of the Cabinet with the exception of one or two others such as the holder of the Privy Seal or of the Duchy of Lancaster. The State Secretary for India is supposed to be the most docile, if not the most inept, of the members of the Cabinet; and if he possesses the merit of ability, he has at least agreed to hide his light under a bushel, or if he has powers of self-assertion, to use them sparingly, because, by the patronage of the Prime Minister he has accepted his post as a stepping stone to his ambition, and, as a sphere of action, in which he may exhibit the possibilities of his statesmanship without being inconvenient to the Cabinet. More often than not the State Secretary for India is a junior member who has yet to make his mark. It is a sphere of action in which no revolutions or even sudden and far-reaching changes could be conceived as possible. And we can fancy the Prime Minister and his more important colleagues, if they actually attend the debate in the House incidental to the annual presentation of the East India Revenue Accounts, looking upon the whole affair with a patronising eye, but with the mildest of interest as upon the pugilistic performance of the youngest hopeful among the troupe of the Cabinet gladiators.

3 The position of the State Secretary for India, being thus bad enough from the point of view of ministerial support or Parliamentary control, is further aggravated for practical purposes by the statutory Council with which he is encumbered. It is true that the members of the Council are nominated by him and are men of his own selection; further that it is more or less a mere advisory Council, the last word remaining, in most matters, with himself. We need not go into the past developments of this Council, but according to the Government of India Act of 1915, all powers of the Council of India shall be exercised at meetings of the Council at which not less than 5 members are present. A majority of the Council may overrule the Secretary in financial matters but in other matters he may overrule the Council. Further, in specially urgent or secret affairs he need not even place his orders or communications before the Council but act independently. But on the other hand there are hardly any matters of state which have no financial aspect, and if the councillors choose to use the tactics of obstruction or fight him in a spirit of opposition, they can bring the State Secretary easily to his knees. There is thus a complete interlocking of the functions of the head of the Council and the members thereof which results practically to the detriment of the Indian administration. If the State Secretary for India were without a Council like the Secretary for the Colonies and, for instance, were assisted only by permanent officials, he would have been at least the master of himself; and left to himself, there are more chances of the State Secretary doing his duty, if not necessarily in a liberal spirit, still in a spirit, at any rate, in which the average British statesman goes to his work. The State Secretary's ignorance of India would be bliss itself, if it were not aggravated by the mischievous knowledge of the members of his Council, nine of whom must have, according to the statute, served or resided in British India for at least 10 years. Till lately, Anglo-Indian officials had almost the monopoly of these councillorships, and it can be easily imagined how these could carry the Vendetta against popular Indian opinion from India to White Hall. As necessary result of party government in Parliament, India cannot always expect to have a Liberal statesman in office as State Secretary for India. But a Conservative statesman by himself, brought up as he is in Parliamentary traditions, would be perhaps ten times better than a Liberal State Secretary, encumbered and controlled by such a coterie of Anglo-Indian officials. With such a Council the odds are almost ten to one against the State

Secretary even if he were radical in his opinions. But it is not only the vote but also their insidious influence, which they indirectly exercise over the State Secretary, which is the real cause, in most cases, of the phenomenon that even a radical British statesman, who gloriously figures as an enlightened and liberal-minded man in British politics, assumes the role of an enemy of liberty as soon as he begins to sit at the India Office. As Mr. Eardley Norton once described the Council at the Indian National Congress at Madras in 1894, "the Council is a secret body; its discussions are not public; its conclusions do not see the light of day; it is not open to the influence of outside criticism; it is not responsible to Parliament; and it can not be affected by public opinion." The State Secretary himself is in a way responsible to Parliament, but that responsibility is torn to shreds by the fact that his Council consists of a majority of councillors who are not responsible to the Parliament or to the Indian people. The power to be dismissed from office is the only test or the only guarantee of the holder of the post being responsible, and in the case of the members of the India Council the statute provides that a member of the Council may be removed from office, but only by His Majesty, and on the joint address of both Houses of Parliament! This makes the position of the members of the State Secretary's Council obviously even more secure than that of the State Secretary himself; for, the State Secretary for India, like any other Secretary of State, can be removed by the Crown without reference to Parliament. Even supposing that the State Secretary's insistence upon the removal of an individual councillor may ordinarily prevail, it is almost impossible to think that he can, by this elaborate process, secure the dismissal of as many members of Council as may be necessary for securing a majority favourable to his own view. The presence of irresponsible Anglo-Indians in the Council is thus the crux of the whole Indian situation. As Mr. Norton observed "you can not have a worse body than that to rule or misrule you. Let it be decapitated and its head decently buried in another continent to that in which lies interred its trunk, lest the two baneful things reunite and the monster be resuscitated." As Mr. Montagu has himself put it "the whole system is designed to prevent control by the House of Commons for fear that there might be too advanced a Secretary of State."

4 The present condition of divided responsibility between the Secretary of State for India and his Council makes it difficult for the Indian people to decide in any given case how far the blame for the failure of a particular measure is attachable to the State Secretary himself and how much to his Council. But they know that between them they are responsible for a number of such failures; and they are eventually driven to demand that the Council of the Secretary of State should be abolished and the Secretary of State for India should occupy the same position as the Secretary of State for the Colonies. The Congress-League scheme says the last word in this respect from the point of view of the Indian people when it demands that (1) The Council of the Secretary of State for India should be abolished, (2) The salary of the Secretary of State should be placed on the British estimates, (3) The Secretary of State should, as far as possible, occupy the same position in relation to the Government of India, as the Secretary of State for the Colonies does in relation to the Governments of the self-governing dominions, and (4) The Secretary of State for India should be assisted by two permanent under-secretaries one of whom should always be an Indian. This arrangement will remove what is a now a fifth wheel in the coach of the Indian administration at the top. It will retain the Secretary of State for India as the Parliamentary agent of Indian administration, it will make him personally responsible to Parliament and will afford many more opportunities to the members of Parliament to make their voice felt upon Indian affairs than can at present be the case. And lastly it will emancipate the Government of India in India, after it is reformed in the way suggested in the Congress-League-Scheme, from the vexatious and ignominious servitude to which it is subjected at present at the hands of a body of irresponsible superiors who are neither controlled by the Parliament nor are susceptible to the influence of Indian public opinion. A number of instances could be given in which the State Secretary, as advised by his Council, has either flouted the mandate of Parliament on the one hand, or frustrated the benevolent intentions of the Government

of India on the other. In 1893, the House of Commons passed a Resolution in favour of the Civil Service Examination being held simultaneously in England and in India. But the Secretary of State practically refused to carry out that resolution, and yet the House of Commons, we know, had not self-respect enough to inquire why a Resolution passed by it should have been treated with such scant courtesy! On the other hand the abolition of the import duties on British manufactures in the seventies of the last century may be cited as an instance in which the State Secretary deliberately compelled the Indian Government to adopt a measure to which a Viceroy, backed by his Council and the entire body of Indian public opinion, was opposed! But if the Government of India in England is so modified as has been suggested in the Congress League Scheme, incidents like these will hardly take place.

5 The suggested reform is all the more necessary at a time when the Indian Government is being given a direct voice in the Imperial Cabinet. Coming good events are silently heralded by good omens, and the presence of the Maharaja of Bikaner and Sir Satyendra Sinha at the sittings of the Imperial Cabinet in February and March last along with the Secretary of State for India, is an indication that in future India will be raised to the status of a self-governing dominion. If the presence of the Colonial Ministers in the Imperial Cabinet can be consistent with the position of the Colonial Secretary in the same body, so must also be then the presence of the representatives of the Indian Government. It will mean that the Indian Government has reached the status of a National Government for India being practically independent of all control in internal affairs, and yet co-operating, like the Colonies, with the Imperial Government in all matters relating to the well-being of the Empire. In this view of things the State Secretary for India necessarily dwindles into practical insignificance, being entrusted with only the minor duties appertaining to the office of a business-agent between the Home Government and the Indian Government. The situation however need not be regarded with dismay; for, the State Secretary for India will still remain the representative of the Crown, and will thus have not only the right of veto upon Indian legislation vested in His Majesty, but will discharge various other functions which are to be discharged in the name of His Majesty the King Emperor. The coming change in the status of the State Secretary may be not inaptly compared to a similar change which took place in the year 1784 when, by Pitt's Government of India Bill, the E. I. Company was deprived of its political power but was allowed to keep the patronage of office in its hands. There will thereafter be only two important centres of responsible administration: one in the Imperial Cabinet where the State Secretary for India will co-operate with, and will have the co-operation of, the delegates of the Indian Government in deciding matters of Imperial importance and the other in the Supreme Legislative Council in India which will finally decide all matters relating to the national well-being of this country. The State Secretary for India is after all but a means to an end, and the expected diminution of his influence need not deter any one from accepting the inevitable, because the change in this matter of detail is but a change intended to help the yet greater change which is to be brought about in the general relations between England and India or in the relations between the different parts of the Empire itself. The change proposed is not a destructive change but is a part of a great constructive scheme which does not aim at weakening the bonds of the Empire but only strengthening them.

6 The State Secretary for India could not as we have already said, claim the benefit of any extenuating plea in the matter of his failure like the six hundred and odd members of Parliament. And by the same reasoning it will be obvious that the Government of India can claim still less extenuation than the State Secretary in Council. The Government of India in India is vested in the Governor-General and Viceroy, assisted by the Executive Council at the head-quarters, and subordinate Governors, Lieutenant-Governors or Chief Commissioners with or without Executive Councils for provincial administrations. The Governor-General and the Governors are, as a rule, independent British statesmen imported from England. Indian public opinion has agreed with the policy of the British government in this respect

and appreciated the wisdom of that policy. The experiment no doubt sometimes fails, for the custom has been generally to select only Lords, *i. e.*, men who occupy a social position above a certain level, irrespective of the consideration whether they possess the necessary training or experience of high office, and in that way many a mediocrity has been shoved off from England into India as Governor-Generals or Governors. The power of patronage is often times misused even in England, and consequently, we in India have had as Governors Englishmen who would not have been efficient even as county councillors. But things are distinctly improving in this respect and Indian public opinion wishes the policy to be continued of bringing out suitable men from England to occupy the posts of the heads of provincial administrations. Independent Englishmen come out to India without an official bias. In many cases they come deeply imbued with the culture of Parliamentary traditions and of the ideas of English liberty. They have probably already heard in England of the great civilisation of Indian people; and their first-hand acquaintance with the Indian people, when they arrive in India, only bears out and confirms what they may have heard at home. Though heads of the executive administration, they are not directly concerned with specific departments. Their role is not to administer in detail but to govern with reference to general principles. They might even look upon themselves as independent arbitrators to a certain extent between local administrators and the people governed by them. The salaries paid to them are very handsome. The Governor-General draws Rs. 256,000 and the provincial Governors Rs. 128,000 each as their annual salary. All this warrants the expectation that they would make the happiness and progress of Indian people their sole care.

7 But there are considerations to the contrary which practically outweigh these advantages, and, on the whole, neither the Governor General nor the provincial Governors have always been able to do justice to the high conception of their duties. They are generally found to be courteous and free from an obtrusive racial bias against the Indian people. And had it not been for them even that small flicker of genuine British statesmanship and British love of liberty, which is still discernible in India amidst the gloom of Anglo-Indian prejudice, hatred and bigoted conservatism, would be unhappily extinct. But so far as practical administration is concerned very few of these have come up to the mark, and have been found able to rise to the occasion and assert their principles. The reasons for this failure are manifold. In the first place their term of office is limited to five years so that by the time they are due for retirement from office in India they have been just able to grasp the variety of intricate problems which lie at the core of successful administration in India. Secondly, many of them succumb to the soporific influence of a high position in which the mere maintenance of personal dignity and the discharge of a number of social and other functions appertaining to their office, require, an appearance of restfulness of spirit. But that is not all. The greatest cause of their failure really lies in their inability to battle with a well-drilled, finely equipped, and highly powerful Anglo-Indian official garrison which always stands at 'shoulder arms' to defend the strong-box in which are locked up the precious assets of administrative power. Before them always stands the dead-wall of opposition of the Civil Servants who terrorise them by an overdrawn picture of the inherent difficulty of administrative problems and who may even threaten them with organised withdrawal of co-operation and a consequent deadlock in the administration. Under these circumstances only a heroic mind can overcome the opposition or repress the actively mischievous tendencies of the subordinate officialdom. The Governor-General and the Governors are, like the Secretary of State, encumbered with Councils which can outvote them and thus nullify all their good intentions. The *esprit de corps* is remarkably strong among the Indian Civil Servants from whom the Executive Councils were hitherto exclusively, and even now are largely, recruited. It is therefore impossible that the Governor-General or the provincial Governors should find the fullest scope for the play of the liberal principles, if they have any, unless they were removed from the dominating and pernicious influence of the Civil Service which have learnt to jealously protect the power of monopoly in its hands. It is with this end in

view that the Congress-League Scheme provides that the Executive Councils of both the Imperial and provincial governments should not be ordinarily recruited from the Civil Service and that one half of them should be elected by the reformed Legislative Council.

8 This may look like a sweeping and drastic criticism upon the remarkable body of efficient administrators which has been developed during the last sixty years and more in India. And perhaps it is necessary to say a few words in order to demonstrate that this criticism, though it could be truthfully redeemed by an appreciation of the great merits of the Civil Service, is yet true and fully justified when we view it from a somewhat broader point of view and with special reference to the disastrous results which a thorough-going Civilian administration untempered, by the touch of Indian public opinion, has entailed upon this country. Sir William Wedderburn says the something in his *Life of A. O. Hume*: "The old company's system of nomination," and training at Haileybury College, which kept the Civil Service in the hands of families traditionally connected with India, had its defects; but it also tended to maintain among the members of the service a certain atmosphere of friendly sympathy with the people. This atmosphere of sympathy was dissipated by the adoption of competitive examinations which brought into the service a new class of men, self-confident, ambitious and usually unconnected with India. These young men coming to India fresh from their academic studies, without experience of English public life, and placed almost at once in positions of authority over men of another race, formed exactly the material needed to produce an extreme bureaucrat. Nor does their subsequent experience in a close service tend to correct failings appurtenant to this character, for, the conditions of promotion to high office are peculiar owing to the violent oscillation of policy to which Government of India is subject. Octopus-like these centralised departments extend their tentacles into every district and every village, paralysing the district administrators and crushing the village organisation. If on the one hand the deadly tentacles have reached down to the rayat in his village, they have with equally baneful effect, taken hold of the Supreme Government at Simla and the Secretary of State at Whitehall, perverting to their own use the control of the House of Commons. They have thus been able to direct policy, and manipulate the Indian Legislature, which for many years has been simply an instrument for consolidating official authority. Indian public opinion has little or nothing to do with the course of legislation. It is only consulted after the Supreme Executive has made up its mind under the direction of the department interested. Hence the Government of India has been called a tyranny of office-boxes, only tempered by an occasional loss of the key. It is in these office-boxes that projects of law are incubated, and that ingenious devices are matured to close all loop-holes of escape and effectually to curb the liberty of the subject."

9 The Civil Servants are generally drawn from the pick of the University men in England, and, even in cases where they have not earned high academic distinctions, their special training eminently fits them to be good administrators. They are also generally men with great energy, probity, and sincerity of purpose, and their devotion to duty is indeed highly admirable. And well may the admirers of that service like Lord Lytton say that 'no body of men in the world ever conferred more splendid benefits upon any community' so far as mere administration is concerned. It is they who have established order and laid the foundations of progress, and they may look with pardonable pride upon the great administrative machine which they have slowly but successfully constructed and which, either for its fine appearance or for its smooth polish or for the faultlessness of its working, may hold its own against any similar machine to be met with in the civilised Governments of ancient and modern times.

10 But great as are the merits of the Civil Service as a working body, its defects are even greater when viewed from the standpoint of moral results upon the people for whose benefit it is supposed to have been brought into being. Even Lord Curzon could not be blind to some of these defects and we all know how in his speech at the dinner given to him by the United Service Club at Simla in September 1905 he wittily rebuked and ridiculed the habit of the Indian

administration to unnecessarily prolong and augment correspondence and to procrastinate decisive results. "Our methods were dignified", he said, "our procedure very elaborate and highly organised, but the pace was apt to be the reverse of speedy. I remember in my first year settling a case that had been pursuing the even tenor of its way without, as far as I could ascertain, exciting the surprise or ruffling the temper of an individual for 61 years. I drove my pen like a stiletto into its bosom. I buried it with exultation and I almost danced upon the grave". Similarly, Lord Curzon was of opinion that the administrative machine had grown excessively powerful and therefore injurious. In his budget speech in 1900 he said:—"There is a concensus of opinion among those who are qualified to speak that the engine has become so powerful as to have got the better of its driver, and that those who should be the masters of the system have become its slaves". The departmental system and the system of government by report-writing was run to death and was a symptom rather of inefficiency than anything else. "It is no exaggeration to say" said he, "that the system of report-writing that prevails in India is at once the most perfect and the most pernicious in the world: the most perfect in its orderly marshalling of facts and figures and in the vast range of its operation; the most pernicious in the remorseless consumption of time, not to mention print and paper that it involves, and in its stifling independence of thought and judgment".

II But to live and rule by report-making is perhaps the most insignificant feature of the system of administration set up and perfected by the Civil Service during the last sixty years and more. The Civil Service has always kept before its eye only one ideal, viz. efficiency; and it knows only one method by which it may attain that ideal viz. official centralisation. For a hundred long years this process of centralisation has gone on, being developed year after year, always progressing and never receding, till we have reached a point when the whole machinery of administration has grown into a lifeless automaton, which works by strings being pulled by unseen hands as in a puppet-show, and which takes absolutely no account of the living millions which are affected by that administration. For the Civilian the millions do not exist. What exists for him is only his pet administrative machine; and he is never so well pleased and self-complacent as when he finds it working smoothly and without any hitch arising from outside interference or criticism. Personally the Civilian is an average well-meaning man; but he has been enslaved by the system which he has himself created; and of which he is naturally inordinately fond. As the late Hon. Mr. Gokhale observed in his Presidential address at the Benares Congress in 1905, "No one denies that a large proportion of the bureaucracy bring to their work a high level of ability, a keen sense of duty and a conscientious desire, within the limits of the restricted opportunities permitted by the predominance of other interests, to do what good they can to the people. It is the system that is really at fault—a system which relegates the interests of the people to a very subordinate place, and which, by putting too much power into the hands of these men, impairs their sense of responsibility and develops in them a spirit of intolerance of criticism.....To the Civilian, as it was also to Lord Curzon, India was a country where the Englishman was to monopolise for all times all power and talk all the while of duty. The Indian's only business was to be governed and it was a sacrilege on his part to have any other aspiration. In this scheme of things, there was no room for the educated classes of the country. (Nor, we may add, the millions of the uneducated masses.) India exists only as a scene of the Englishman's labours with the toiling millions of the country—eighty per cent. of the population—in the background. The remaining 20 per cent. for aught they are worth, might as well be gently swept into the sea." So also the late Mr. Dadabhai Navroji, though he fully appreciated the good qualities of the personnel of the Civil Service, was convinced that the system of Civilian administration itself must be changed. Speaking at a meeting of the East Indian Association in London in 1887 Mr. Dadabhai remarked: "A foreign rule can never be but a curse to any nation on the face of the earth except so far as it approaches a native rule, be the foreigners angels themselves....I do not mean to say a word against the general personnel of the (Civil) services as they are at the present time; they are doing what they can in the *false groove* in which they are placed. To them there is every

honour due for the ability and integrity with which most of them have carried on their work. But what I say is this. This *system* must be changed. The administration must be native under the supreme control of the English nation." The fault of the system is that the Civilian rule is an excessively self-centred and irresponsible rule, which has killed all the nerve-centres of the indigenous population as active participators in the administration; which has destroyed all the genius and the capacity of the people themselves for initiative and constructive work; which has rooted out of them all the spirit of self-reliance and all the sense of responsibility; and made every thing to depend upon the sole and the sweet will of the foreign Civil Service. If the old indigenous government of India by Indians be stigmatised as despotism, what has been so far substituted for that government but a foreign despotism? The new system of administration has given us the old poison intact, but deprived us of the antidote which we could use against it,—the antidote viz. that the Indian despots at least lived in the land amongst the people themselves, and were susceptible to their social influence and punishment. The change between the old indigenous autocrat and the new foreign bureaucracy is nothing but a change in the name, and a change for the worse, so far as it is a real change at all.

12 The Act of 1858 put an end to one kind of evil; but it directly set up another in its place. The vicious system of the double government in the time of the E. I. Company was abolished; but a policy of excessive centralisation soon took its place. For fifty long years, from that Act to the time when the idea of Decentralisation was fairly started, the administration became more and more centralised day by day, till in Lord Curzon's time the fatal summit was reached. The English middle-class man ousted the bloated aristocrat at home; but a new aristocracy was established in India. The departments were increased rapidly and Civilian was added to Civilian in quick succession. But all went to sweep the retinue and the paraphernalia of the central secretariat which, sitting in secrecy, whether on the mountain top or on the plain, like the veiled prophet of Khorasan, mysteriously dispensed both patronage and administration. The Government in India was begun in right earnest; but also with a vengeance. The fire of jealousy was no doubt put out in England; but Parliament was turned into a sleepy hollow so far as Indian affairs were concerned. As for a check in India itself there was absolutely none. Even apart from a check, things might have been better if the Provincial Governments were given the full power of initiative and at least a limited power of final disposal. But the idea gained ground that India was to be ruled like one Empire from the heights of Simla; and self-respecting Provincial Governors like Lord Clare resigned their posts because they could not stand the minute supervision of the Supreme Government. As Mr. Kaye has observed, this system of excessive centralisation bore its accustomed fruits, and while it threw upon the central authority an unnecessarily accumulated burden, it dissipated and enervated the Local Governments. If such was the fate of the Provincial Governments themselves it might be easily imagined what fate awaited the people themselves. The municipal or local institutions are the real centres of the nation's life and bulwarks of constitutional liberty in every country, and these had proved their worth in India for centuries. But in its mad frenzy the Demon of centralisation so crushed these institutions in every part of India, that not a trace of them was left anywhere, and the Olympian Gods at Simla had to be moved and propitiated if the smallest concerns of villages in the jungle in the remotest parts of India were to be regulated by law. Clear-sighted men both in England and India had seen the mischief likely to result from excessive centralisation. And it is interesting to find that so long ago as 1858 Barrister John Bruce Norton of Madras had, in one of his *Papers on the Government of India* outlined a scheme of Provincial autonomy similar to what the Congress-League Scheme now demands in 1917. He says:—"For the command of armies, the power of legislation, the framing of treaties, the declaration of peace and war, the imposition of taxes, the settlement of traffic, the origination of main trunk lines of road, railways and electric telegraphs, all those things in short which are from their nature Imperial, require some one central controlling authority; but in those matters which may be called the domestic affairs of Government each Presidency may well be left to itself. It should have the entire management

of its own administration, judicial, police and financial. It should raise its own loans, carry out its own public works, conduct and correct its own revenue system, and be directly responsible to the Home government for its conduct in all these matters—just as in Australia, the several colonies are permitted to manage their own internal administration in all respects notwithstanding the existence of a Governor-General.”

13 Mr. Bernard Houghton, himself a Civilian, points out how a Civilian is made in his book *Bureaucratic Government*, “In...the bureaucratic system, the rulers sit aloof. They repose like Gods in splendid isolation.... Because of their aloofness they picture themselves, not unnaturally, as supermen viewing from their high places the work-a-day world with the impartial scrutiny of Olympic gods.... In nine cases out of ten a bureaucrat starts his official career with strong oligarchic leanings.... The deference of the more educated Indians and the cringing obsequiousness of the baser sort convince him that he really is a Heaven-sent mentor for the guidance of a people-walking in Egyptian darkness. Being worshipped by others he ends by worshipping himself.... The chief force moulding the young official is the great bureaucratic-machine. He finds himself, even at the commencement, placed so to speak as a cogwheel amongst cogwheels. His superiors delight in honouring the bondsman of a faultless routine who understands the rules and gives no trouble.... Originality is frowned upon.... From being constantly occupied with the manipulation of the machine, he regards its smooth working as the highest service he can render to the country of his adoption.... Like the Monks of old, he cherishes a benevolent interest in the commonalty.... if only they do not display initiative or assert themselves in opposition to him. There is much in this proviso. Having come to regard his own judgment as almost Divine, and the hierarchy of which he forms a part as a sacrosanct institution, he tolerates the laity so long as they do not presume to intermeddle in high matters of State. That is the heinous offence. And frank criticism of official acts, touches a lower depth still, *lese majeste*’.... The bureaucrats find it difficult to take generous and foresighted views of a nation’s destiny. The traditions and pre-possessions of a life-time of official routine must distort their vision of the more distant horizon. They suffer in short from an incurable political myopia..... A bureaucrat, like your thoroughgoing militarist, suffers from a kind of political dyspepsia. He takes the dyspeptic’s gloomy view of further eventualities. If in India a Native in all good faith denounces some rather obvious defect in our rule, he is clearly the instigator of disaffection, the pre-runner of another Indian Mutiny. These worthy people confuse mainly independence with disloyalty. They cannot conceive of Natives except either as rebels or as timid sheep”.

14 But not only is the Civil Service not responsible to the people, but it is practically not responsible to the Government itself, for the simple reason that the Civil Service itself, more than the Viceroy or the Provincial Governors, is the government. As Professor Fisher a non-official European member of the latest Public Services Commission, has observed in his pamphlet on *Indian Administration*, “In India the Administration, i. e., the Civil Service is the government and nothing else particularly matters..... The large lines of Indian policy may be shaped by a Secretary of State in the India Office ; a powerful Secretary of State may make his influence felt very strongly on the direction of Indian affairs, if he encounters no serious opposition from the Government of India. But in reality the last word lies with the Indian official opinion, in the sense that a measure would not be forced upon India against the united opinion of the Indian bureaucracy .-The work of administration in India is not done in London. It is done in India itself. The Indian Councils can not turn out a government and can not make a government. *The Indian Civil Service is the Government*. It may accept amendments, it may withdraw a measure in face of criticism which it judges to be well-founded; it may profit by the suggestions of non-official members, but *it is master in its own house*..... The supremacy of the Indian Civil Service among the services in India is one of the leading facts which every student of Indian administration has to take into account. The Civil Service is the governing service of the country. The other services are excrescences, later developments due to the increase of specialisation, grafts upon the parent.

tree which is the Civil Service of John Company, now for many years taken over by the Imperial government.....The departments do possess official heads, but they are not part of the Provincial Government. Their work comes up in the first place before a Secretary to Government who is always a member of the Indian Civil Service, and no large proposal can be carried into effect without the imprimatur of the premier service" Whereas in other countries bureaucracy is only an approved mode of administration, in India alone it has grown into a form of government. It is a sinister extension of personal autocracy. An autocrat is a human being subject to all the impulses, noble and otherwise, of an individual. But a bureaucracy is a corporation entrenched behind its power and prestige. Like a corporation it never dies, and has no soul either to be saved or lost. It is irresponsible. It is responsible only to itself; nay, as Mr. W. C. Bonnerjee described it in his speech before a Croydon meeting in 1898, "The government itself is responsible to the Civil Service, and to none other."

15 The results of this irresponsible system of government through the close corporation of a foreign Civil Service have naturally been very disastrous. To quote Mr. Bernard Houghton once more, "By the inculcation of submission and the crushing of personal initiative the bureaucracy is inflicting the gravest moral injury with which it is possible for one people to curse another. To deprive a people by conquest of its political independence is an evil—for it wounds its self-respect and enfeebles its vitality. But it is an evil which material prosperity may counterbalance. But to maintain them after conquest in a state of perpetual tutelage, to treat them as children who shall have no will of their own, whose chief glory shall lie in servile obedience to commands—that is more than a wrong. It is a sin against humanity. It is as though after making a man captive we drugged him with opium in order to keep him quiet and obedient to orders....But one should not indeed expect condolence from a piston-rod nor look for the exercise of loving kindness in a locomotive. And therein lies the flaw in its armour whereby a bureaucracy fails to inspire the sense of loyalty which is so often the birthright of an autocrat. Men, even the most virile and independent, love to have as their chieftain a human being like themselves, greater, wiser, more prescient, if you will, but still a human being subject to the same passions, tarnished even with some of the same weaknesses as themselves. It is this emotion which supplies the well-spring of loyalty....The coldly correct formalism of a bureaucracy chills all feeling of devotion to the Government....Men obey it as they obey the time-table of a railway, but without enthusiasm and with a dreary sense of impotent dislike....In addition to the necessary bane of a foreign domination and the gratuitous evils springing from its system of repression and tutelage, it is destitute of the human touch that can link the sympathies of the ruled to the rulers and that atones for so many short-comings."

16 It is easy to demonstrate, with reference to specific instances, the objective results of the rigid system of bureaucratic rule in India which has been responsible for systematically hampering or putting down administrative reforms which should have been effected long ago and which are essential to the well-being of a nation like India. The blighting hand of the Civil Service is to be seen in the working of almost every department of Government, from the policy of liberalising political institutions down to the details of such a small concession as the revival of the village panchayats in this country.

17 The resolutions of the Indian National Congress for over-thirty years are, as it were, a running record of the defects of British Indian administration under the Civilian rule. Nothing would perhaps be more pathetic than to see the Congress going on, year after year, passing almost identical resolutions on almost identical subjects with changes and innovations here and there for a variety. The Civil Service can say with credit to its strength of purpose that it has remained unmoved by the steady out-pour of the wailings and reasonings of the chosen representatives of the millions of the Indian people; and further, that the defects pointed out in these resolutions were, even before that, not a matter of years but of generations together. The Congress was at first openly reviled, then subjected to official hostilities, and was eventually recognised with some marks of attention and patronage when the coun-

try was ablaze with well-reasoned and yet fiery denunciation of the Government for its continuous non-feasance, or mis-feasance, or mal-feasance, when the critics of Government seemed to be on the point of proceeding to make the administration impossible, and then the need for rallying the moderates, became evident. But a change in the official attitude towards the Congress did not mean a change in the attitude towards the demands made by that body. The fact that the Congress had to be recognised as a loyal and constitutional national body did not necessarily involve the conclusion that what the Congress said was right and reasonable; nor did the recognition of the reasonableness of its demands involve the still more distasteful conclusion that the demands were worthy of concessions. Could not the Queen's or the King's Government go on on its own path of despotism without paying any heed to what the Congress might clamour for? If the Legislative Councils were unfit to demand any thing as a matter of right, much more so was the Congress which was a merely a non-official body without a legal backbone to it. But what of flouting the Congress or the Legislative Councils, when the Civil Service can legitimately claim that it has set at naught even resolutions of Parliament or practically nullified the solemn pledges, or charters given by the Crown? In its wanton career of despotism, the Civil Service has shown even high-handed disregard to its superiors as well as critics. Self complacency has been the only sheet anchor of its policy and 'impossible' has been its only watchword throughout the history of the Civilian administration in India. It proved itself master of both skilful strategy and skilful tactics; and it has stabbed many a reform in the darkness of official confidence and secrecy, which it could not openly condemn as unreasonable or impracticable. It killed with delay and procrastination what it could not attack or resist on principle. Its arm of executive destruction has proved more powerful on the whole than the armour of legislative protection which was ever conferred upon the Indian people by the Crown or Parliament in the matter of political progress in administrative reform. And the Civil Service has often even frankly avowed that it likes no role in India better than the role of the opponent of popular opinion or popular aspirations. Its words may sometimes be shrouded in darkness under the seal of official confidence; but its deeds at any rate are there, silently proclaiming to the world, the hollowness of its beneficence.

18 Let us take a typical case of the Separation of the Judicial and Executive functions. In this case we find that the soundness of the principle involved in this reform has been admitted by many Viceroys of India and numberless other official authorities. And it goes without saying that the non-official public opinion in India has always been unanimous in its favour. Even so early as 1793, the Government of India under Lord Cornwallis recognised the dangers of the combination of these two functions in one and the same individual. In 1831, the late Raja Ram Mohan Rai gave evidence before a Committee of the House of Commons in which, as a pioneer of the race of agitators that was to come clamouring for this reform, he completely demonstrated the desirability of the separation of the two functions. In 1833 a regulation was actually passed by which Deputy Collectors and their assistants were provided exclusively for revenue work, and, in 1839, in Madras, the functions were separated. In 1854 the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, in a letter to the Government of India, wrote that the only separation of functions which is really desirable is that of the executive and the judicial. In the same year a member of the Council of the Governor General, Sir J. P. Grant, wrote in a minute saying that the combination of the Superintendent of Police and the public prosecutor with the functions of a criminal judge was objectionable in principle, and the practical objections to it have been greatly aggravated by the course of legislation which has raised the judicial powers of a magistrate six times higher than they were in the days of Lord Cornwallis. It ought to be the fixed intention of the Government to dis sever as soon as possible the functions of a criminal judge from those of a thief-catcher and public prosecutor, now combined in the office of a magistrate. That seems to be indispensable as a step towards any great improvement in our criminal jurisprudence." In 1858, however, the functions were again reunited, the collector being re-invested with magisterial powers and deputy collectors and deputy magistrates being amalga-

mated into what is now known as the subordinate executive service. The Police Commission appointed in 1860, arrived at the conclusion that, as a rule, there should be complete severance of the two functions. The recommendations of the Commission were adopted by the Government of India and in the discussion on the Police Bill of 1860, Sir Bartle Frere gave a public assurance that, though for the time-being, and as a matter of expediency, the union of the functions was tolerated in the exceptional case of the District Magistrate, at no distant period the golden rule and principle of the separation would be completely acted upon throughout India. But that assurance was never realised till to-day.

19 In their petition to Lord George Hamilton, the then State Secretary for India, dated 1st July 1899, the petitioners, among whom were such distinguished judges as Hobhouse, Garth, Couch, Sergeant, Markby, Phear, West, Scott, Wedderburn and others, cited a number of cases in which the dangers arising from the combination of the two functions were clearly demonstrated and proved. The National Congress took up the question in 1886 and has gone passing resolutions upon the subject almost continuously from year to year. Since the Congress took up the question, at least one Viceroy and two State Secretaries openly admitted the desirability of this reform. Lord Cross said that he thought the subject to be so important that he was anxious to deal with it himself. Lord Kimberley declared that the fusion of the two functions was contrary to right and good principles. Lord Dufferin pronounced upon the reform as a counsel of perfection. Lord Lansdowne referred to the demand for the separation of the two functions, as made by the Congress, as a perfectly legitimate movement. The objections arising to the reform out of financial and other considerations have been very forcibly answered, time and again, in the Congress and also outside, by individual reformers. Further, experienced administrators like Mr. Dutt and experienced lawyers like Sir Pherozshah Mehta and the late Mr. Manmohun Ghose have prepared and published able and practical schemes by which the reform could be carried out. The reform was even practically carried out, though to a limited extent, in the Madras Presidency by the separation of the subordinate judicial and executive branches, and the Madras Government had admitted in one of their reports that while the separation, as partially effected, had worked satisfactorily, it was also effected at little or no additional cost. But all this to no purpose! The Indian Civil Service has set its face dead against the reform and on the plausible ground of the want of finances has effectively prevented the realisation of reform for nearly a century. The National Congress has now practically given up the subject in utter weariness and disgust. Nor have the efforts made by some of the members of Legislative Councils borne any better fruit.

20 We shall take another subject of a similar kind viz., the growth of Local Self-Government. It was not till 1850 that the Government of India thought of regulating the creation and the work of local bodies for local purposes. Act XXII of 1850 of the Supreme Legislative Council first authorised the creation of municipal bodies in towns other than the Presidency towns of Calcutta, Bombay and Madras, for which municipalities had already been created in the earlier days of the East India Company. The Act empowered local Governments to raise taxes from the inhabitants of mofussil areas to be applied for the purposes of local administration. The policy underlying the Act, however, was not a uniform one and resulted in 'a glorious diversity', respecting everything connected with local administration. It was not till after 1861, when the Indian Councils Act was passed and Local Legislatures were created, that a systematic attempt was made to bring into being local bodies on a larger scale. In 1870, the fiat had gone forth from Lord Mayo that as part of a scheme of decentralisation of finance, the establishment and development of local self-government were among the greatest and wisest objects connected with such decentralisation, contemplated since the time of Lord William Bentinck. Lord Mayo hoped that the creation of local bodies would afford opportunities for the development of local self-government for strengthening municipal institutions, and for the association of the natives and Europeans to a greater extent than hithertofore in the administration of affairs.

21 But the resolution was acted upon in a different spirit by different Provincial Governments. Between 1881 and 1884, new Municipal Acts were passed by different Provincial Legislatures. And they were so worded as to enable the Civil Service, if it wished, to extend the elective principle among the local bodies, old and new, so that they could be really local self-governing bodies. In 1882, Lord Ripon issued his famous resolution on Local Self-Government. Para five of the Resolution is remarkable for the breadth of view disclosed therein. It says: "This measure is chiefly desirable as an instrument of political and popular education. If the officers of Government only set themselves, as the Governor General in Council believes they will, to foster sedulously the small beginnings of the independent political life; if they will accept loyally and as their own, the policy of the Government, and if they come to realise that the system really opens to them a fairer field for the exercise of administrative tact and directive energy than the more autocratic system which it supersedes, then it may be hoped that the period of failures will be short and that real and substantial progress will very soon become manifest." But Provincial Governments, run by the Civil Service, had no sympathetic imagination like Lord Ripon and they took no trouble about carrying out the Resolution in its true spirit. The Bombay Government were perhaps the most obdurate in this respect, and they resisted the suggestions that a majority of members should be elected non-officials; that their powers should be enlarged; that educational funds and institutions should be transferred to them; and that non-officials should be appointed to chairmanships and vice-chairmanships of local bodies. The Civil Service in the Bombay Presidency had the boldness to reply to this Resolution in a fault-finding and advisorial spirit. The Government of India were told that they were insisting upon premature and radical measures; that the political education was a slender plant of a very slow growth; and that their Government would have liked to proceed more cautiously to create and educate a public spirit and to ascertain the fitness of local committees to exercise more extended powers. This elicited a somewhat sharp reply from the Government of India who ridiculed the idea of creating and educating the public spirit before entrusting more extended powers to local bodies. The Bombay Government had thereupon to yield, but the Local Self Government Act of 1884 passed in the Bombay Legislative Council was so worded that it failed to fulfil the expectations formed by the public from Lord Ripon's Resolution. The Act was opposed in the Council by such enlightened men as the late Rao saheb V. N. Mandlik, the late Mr. Justice Baddrudin Tayabji and the late Mr. Justice Telang. The principal ground of dissatisfaction was the limited measure of elective franchise actually guaranteed and the preponderance of official control. And these were for the first time removed to a certain extent only in 1911 by a Resolution of the Provincial Government though in the meanwhile by the District Municipal Act of 1901 a number of other material improvements were made in the working of municipal bodies. In fact the Civil Service in the Bombay Presidency were the last to be brought into a line with the other presidencies in the matter of elective majorities in municipal bodies; and, even now that elective majorities and non-official presidents are granted to municipal bodies, the element of indirect official control has made itself obtrusive in the statutory provisions relating to chief executive officers and municipal commissioners who are made the chief operative agency, irresponsible to the corporations, which are practically reduced to the position of mere deliberative bodies. The Assistant Collector and the Mamlatdar still have the power to interfere with, and dominate, the work of municipalities in the mofussil; and they are found to be giving a desperate battle before yielding up their cherished powers in what they consider the last line of the trenches. The grievance is, however, by no means limited to the Bombay Presidency; and revenue officers throughout India have still to be taught that local and municipal bodies are really meant exclusively for the local people, who, though they may make mistakes in the beginning, have ultimately to rely on themselves for a satisfactory discharge of municipal duties.

22 As regards Rural Boards they are still in a rudimentary condition, and Provincial Governments i. e. the Civil Service still pretends to regard it as an

overbold experiment when a demand is made for the appointment of non-official elected presidents of local boards. And that is the progress made in a country in which in the early thirties of the last century, according to Sir Charles Metcalfe, "the village communities were little republics having nearly everything they wanted within themselves and almost independent of foreign relations. They seemed to last where nothing else lasted. Dynasty after dynasty tumbled down; revolution succeeded to revolution; Hindu, Pathan, Mogul, Maratha, Sikh, English were all masters in turn, but the village community remained the same." But things have progressed only backwards since Sir Charles Metcalfe wrote. The time-honoured and the time-tried village community is now no more, and the achievement of its destruction was reserved for the Indian Civil Service whose evil inspiration did not give it rest till it did what the Hindu, the Pathan, the Mogul, the Maratha or the Sikh had not done before them. The non-official public opinion in India has been ever clamouring for the revival of the village communities; and the Royal Commission on Decentralisation in their report in 1907 has declared in their favour. The Government of India, in their Resolution on local Self-Government issued in 1915, have admitted that there is some material with which village panchayats may be built in India, and have expressed their desire that a full experiment should be made. But the Civil Service is still opposed even to making the experiment; and under the pretext of using care, discrimination, patience etc. they are sure to delay the experiment indefinitely, simply because they do not like the idea of independent village-life growing in this country. They cannot bear the notion that even to this small extent the direction and control of revenue officers should pass away into popular hands.

23 The same story has got to be told about Education. Even in such an important and yet simple matter as primary education the progress has been very slow and disappointing. The modern educational system in India dates from the State Secretary's despatch in 1854. In that despatch the education of the whole people was definitely accepted as a State duty. In 1882, by the time of Lord Ripon's Education Commission about 1·2 per cent. of the whole population was receiving primary education. The Commission said in their report that, "While every branch of education can justly claim the fostering care of the State, it is desirable in the present circumstances of the country to declare the elementary education of the masses, its provision, extension and improvement to be that part of the educational system to which the strenuous efforts of the State should now be directed in a still larger manner than heretofore." The Commission further directed that "an attempt be made to secure the fullest possible provision *by legislation* suited to the circumstances of each Province." A quarter of a century elapsed after this, and yet in 1907 we find the percentage of pupils receiving primary education in India to be so low as 1·9. After fifty years of civilian administration, since the famous despatch of Sir Charles Wood, only about 27 per cent. of the boys and 4½ per cent. of the girls that should have been at school, were actually attending the school. In 1910 this percentage rose only to 31 for boys and 5¾ for girls. This means only a percentage of 1·9 of the whole population. In 1916 the total number of literates in India was only 59 per thousand i. e. still less than 6 per cent. There are in India about 1594 large cities and 5,82,728 villages; and the total number of schools is only 1,23,578. This means that we have about one school for every five villages! The real proportion of schools for the villages is, however, much smaller, because the cities and towns absorb a large number of these 1,23,578 schools. The Civilian is a lover of female education. But he has not yet been able to provide in India more than one girl-school for every 45 villages!

24 These figures for India may be fairly contrasted against similar figures for other countries. In many European countries, as also in the United States of America, Canada and Australia, almost the entire population is now able to read and write. Even in the most notoriously backward country in Europe viz., Russia the proportion of literates to the whole population was 25 per cent. In most of these countries primary education is both compulsory and free. In India alone it is neither. As regards expenditure on primary education India is absolutely nowhere in comparison with the other countries in the world. As the late

Mr. Gokhale pointed out in his speech in the Supreme Legislative Council in 1910, in America the expenditure per head of the population was 16 shillings; in Switzerland 13; in Australia 11; in England and Wales 10; in Scotland 9; in Germany and Ireland and the Netherlands 6; in Sweden, Belgium and Norway 5; in France 4; in Austria 3; in Spain, Italy, Servia and Japan 1 shilling. Even in Russia it is 7½ pence but in India alone it is barely one penny! In the Phillipines within 13 years of American rule the progress of education had been much greater than in India in 150 years of British rule! Even in the Crown Colony of Ceylon the proportion of literates was higher than in India. In India itself, education has made much greater progress in Baroda and Mysore under native rule than in British India under the civilian rule. The difficulty of funds is often alleged against the demand for making education compulsory and free; but as Mr. Gokhale pointed out in his speech, there have been large surpluses and Government did not know what to do with the money on their hands. Further Mr. Gokhale's Bill provided that the money required for compulsory and free education should come partly out of the pockets of the people who wanted it. But Government were not prepared to accept it simply because it would entail some increased expenditure on their part by increase in the grants-in-aid that would have to be made. The worst enemy of the Good was the Best; and when Mr. Gokhale really asked for only a modest advance, the civilians wanted him to go to the farthest point possible straight away and then frightened the Council by calculations based on that assumption.

25 As regards secondary education we find that many districts have still to go without a single High School. Several Divisions have no Colleges, and the time is yet to come for each Province to have its own independent University. The provision for professional education is extremely meagre. There are only two or three Agricultural Colleges in the whole of India, a country which is essentially agricultural. And Government have yet done absolutely nothing for the education in non-agricultural pursuits. In the whole length and breadth of the country there is not a single efficient Technological Institute. The private or semi-private technological schools can be given that name only by courtesy. There is absolutely no provision yet made for teaching modern languages excepting English. While Germans, Australians, Italians and Americans can learn Hindustani in their own country in order to further their trade with India, the Government of India have never given a thought to the necessity of making any provision for the teaching of German or French to the Indian people.

26 As regards Sanitation we find that the rate of mortality, even apart from the ravages of plague and cholera and such other special diseases in India, is far higher than in any other civilised country. Large sanitary projects may be costly, but even the ordinary arrangements for the preservation of the public health are neglected because of the alleged want of funds. But whereas Government never lacks money for the army and a top-heavy civil administration and railways, they are always short of funds for sanitary reforms. This is evidently not a question really of funds but of policy; and for this short-sighted and stingy policy in sanitary and other matters relating to the well-being of the people, the Civil Service are primarily responsible.

27 As regards the administration of Justice it is well known that justice is both tardy and costly in India. The delays of justice are proverbial, but nowhere so as in India. The combination of the judicial and executive functions is responsible for the delays on the lower plane, because the convenience of revenue officers is always the first consideration with the administration; and enormous and endless is the worry caused to litigants in criminal matters mainly owing to the fact that the bulk of the administration of criminal justice is in the hands of magistrates who are also executive i. e. revenue officers; and litigants have to march from one end of the district or the subdivision to the other in the train of touring revenue officers. And as for the cost of justice, we shall be content to quote the following, from an issue of the *Times of India*, the leading Anglo-Indian journal of the Western Presidency. In an article on this subject in November 1916 the *Times* observes:—

"But we can re-call the opinion of a High Court Judge, not less experienced than Sir John Stanley, that he wondered the people did not tear down the High Court stone by stone as a protest against the cost of obtaining justice in India... Recently the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, in dealing with a Ceylon case where a decision was delayed for seven years, said they were determined, as far as lay in their power, to prevent the repetition of the scandal, which had become only too common in appeals from India and Ceylon.... And it will not be seriously denied that the cost of obtaining a legal decision in India, the time occupied in many cases, quite apart from the uncertainties of the law do in many cases amount to a denial of justice... Recently we have seen in Bombay Police Courts, sittings extending over many months and expenses running into thousands of pounds in order to obtain a decision in a criminal case, which in England would not have cost more than a ten pound note. In a recent case from the mofussil the costs ran into thousands of rupees in a trade-mark case, where the defence was so feeble that it had to consent to an injunction; otherwise the case might have been going on now."

28 And lastly we may mention in the topic of the Employment of the Natives of India in the Civil Services, higher or lower. This subject has been dealt with at some length in the next chapter, and we simply refer to it here to show that though much could have been done in this matter by the Civilian Government by a judicious and sympathetic exercise of its executive functions without the aid of legislation, very little has actually been done, mainly owing to the peculiar tendencies of the Civil Service to which we have alluded in a general way. The patronage of office is mostly in the hands of the executive government; and even with regard to the higher civil services there was nothing to prevent the Government in India to make provision for giving the necessary training and holding the necessary examinations in India.

29 The history of the National Debt of India exemplifies, in figures, the failure of the Government in India in the gravest possible manner. National Debt is no creation of wealth. At best it can only be 'additive' and give greater energy to production provided it is used in assisting the creation of fresh wealth. Where the debt serves merely some other object which is not conducive to economic production, then there is so much loss of material wealth. Non-productive expenditure ought to be primarily met out of income, and unless it can be so done, it ought not to be incurred at all. These are the essential first principles to be scrupulously observed by finance-ministers wishing well of the country. But unfortunately all these first principles are set at naught by those who are responsible for the management of Indian finances.

30 Whatever might be the faults of the East India Company's rule in India the Company deserves our gratitude for carrying on the administration of the country more economically than at present, and trying to avoid running into debt, as far as possible. Up to the year 1792 the East India Company's debt did not exceed £ 7 millions. The Mysore and the Maratha wars added some £ 14 millions and when Lord William Bentinck took up the reins of Government it bordered on £ 30 millions. This noble ruler by his persistent economy reduced it to £ 27 millions.

31 Then followed the dismal record of the forward policy and foreign wars attended with disasters. The Afgan war added 15 millions to the debt. The Sikh war made a further addition of 15 millions and thus the total stood at £ 60 millions before the outbreak of the Indian Mutiny.

32 That great soldier, India's friend, Lord Roberts has expressed his opinion that 'if there was ever a justifiable excuse for a mutiny there clearly was one for the Sepoy Mutiny.' Thus though the mutiny was caused by the sad mistakes committed by British Officers, both civil and military, India was saddled with the burden of expenses incurred in checking it, and thus India's debt rose up to £ 70 millions. This was followed by a greater injustice. By the Act of 1858 the Government of India was transferred from the Company to the British Crown and thus India, the Jewel in the British Crown, became the property of the British nation. But who paid the price of this Jewel? Not the British nation; but, through the sad irony of

fate, India herself was made to pay the price of her own purchase! The entire capital stock and debts of the E. I. Company were added to the Public debt of India, which now swelled to the enormous sum of 100 millions sterling. This paying off of the Company's stock at India's expense was carried out in such a way that it added one more dangerous feature to the iniquity of the act. Upto this time the major portion of the Public debt was a rupee debt and was held in India. Consequently the 'Drain' by way of payment of interest in England was negligible, being only £4 millions in the year 1851. But since the Company's stock was bought out of borrowings in England the sterling debt in that country jumped upto £32 millions in 1862.

33 This was followed by a period of comparative economy, and in the year 1869, the rupee debt stood at 50 crores in India and 15 crores in England, while the sterling debt in England was 35 millions. In 1869 the Government of India abandoned its policy of guarantee system of railways, and began to borrow capital for railways, but of course, in England. So the tide began to rise, and in 1879 the rupee debt stood at 78·83 crores while the sterling debt had risen to 59 millions. The Imperialistic policy of Lord Beaconsfield involved India in the disastrous Afgan war, and India's burden was augmented by 10 crores rupee debt and 10 millions sterling debt!

34 Through the strenuous efforts of the noble-hearted Mr. Fawcett, who was nicknamed the 'Member for India' a Committee was appointed to devise some check upon the Indian expenditure which was growing at an alarmingly rapid rate. But the efforts of the Committee ended in smoke. At one time a limit was set down to the borrowing programme in England, but being without any effective control either from the English or the Indian public, the State Secretary was not bound to observe the limit. The Burma war was responsible for the addition of a sum not less than 10 millions; and the continuous large borrowings for railways, and the exchange compensation muddle raised the rupee debt to 103 crores and the sterling debt to 115 millions when the advent of the great famine of 1896 made matters worse.

35 The famines and scarcities between 1896 and 1905 added considerable sums to the public debt, but even during these dire days, the railway borrowings remained unchecked. Nay, the State Secretary, with a light heart, allowed himself to be committed to a programme of 12 millions sterling to be spent every year on railways; and besides the construction of new railway lines, old lines were also to be bought from companies at an additional burden of big annuities. The State Secretary for India did not think of buying up the railways when any amount of money could be had at 2½ per cent. in London, but chose such inopportune time as to make the burden of the annuities unnecessarily heavy and harassing.

36 The position on 31st March 1916 stood thus: Rupee debt 153·89 crores, sterling debt 182·63 millions; interest payable in India Rs. 5·70 crores and that in England Rs. 9·27 crores. We have specially omitted any reference to the big war-loan of £ 100 millions for obvious reasons. Yet even excluding that exceptionally unusual big sum, we have to bear the burden of 426·84 crores of rupees, on which we have to pay 5·70 crores of rupees in India and Rs. 9·27 crores in England by way of interest. Besides this, we have to pay by way of annuities 5 crores of rupees, the earliest annuity terminating in 1948 and the latest in 1958.

37 These are our liabilities. But what about the assets? Do they counter-balance the liabilities? Evidently they do, as say they, who hold a brief for the Government. But let us see what are the actual facts. The capital outlay on all the state-owned railways by the end of 1915-16 amounted to £ 365·04 while the Irrigation outlay upto 31st March 1916 was Rs. 64 crores. This makes the assets amount to 547 + 64 = 611 crores of rupees. How could 611 crores be spent when all your borrowings amount only to 426 crores? Evidently we must add the capitalised value of the annuity that we are paying, besides adding those large sums spent out of surpluses. But are the railway lines and irrigation works worth 611 crores *at present*? Obviously not. And since there is no separate depreciation-fund reserved, we have to reduce the value of the assets by at least 10 per cent, if not more. That reduces the amount of assets to 550 crores of rupees. Nor is this all. For some fifty years the railways were not a paying concern, but were worked at a loss and the loss amounted to nothing; less than Rs. 50 crores. Who paid this

amount? Undoubtedly the dumb masses of India paid it year after year out of the surplus of the annual revenue. The Indian ryot is overtaxed, and whenever there is a surplus it is swallowed up by such non-paying works—white elephants—as the great N. W. Railway or some pet military scheme.

38 From the paltry net gain from railways during recent years some economists make bold to say that no 'unproductive national debt' burdens India. But the fallacy is patent on the very face of it. For, the question is not how much India earns on its capital outlay on railways, but how much it ought to have earned. If every railway programme had been undertaken after mature consideration, there would have been no 'white elephants' to be fed from the net earnings of really profitable lines. And thus there would have been no loss to be compensated for. The great N. W. Railway has cost us Rs. 62 crores by way of capital, and 25 crores more by way of its annual losses. The same might be said of some other lines. But mixing up the accounts of the remunerative with the unremunerative lines in one hotch pot the Government conceals from the public view the fact that the national debt would have been really more productive if it had been well-managed.

39 Besides, no amount of railway gains would shut out from our view the gross injustice in saddling India with the burden of paying off of the capital stock of East India company, the expenses incurred by the outbreak of the Mutiny, the expenditure of the wars outside India undertaken solely for Imperial purposes, and the growing military expenditure necessitated by the same mad forward policy. If England be made to pay all these above mentioned counts, as she was legally and morally bound to pay, India's Public debt would be reduced by not less than 100 millions sterling or 150 crores of rupees. If only such railway lines had been undertaken as would be economically paying, that policy also would have saved us from an unnecessarily heavy burden. The policy of raising sterling loans in England instead of trying rupee loans in India has also been a cause of great loss through 'Drain'. No provision has been made for any sinking funds or depreciation fund, and consequently there has never been any serious attempt to reduce the national debt. England by her sound financial policy began to reduce her national debt after the close of Napoleonic wars and succeeded in reducing it by nearly £200 millions, while during the same period, India, that was nearly free from any debt, has piled up a pyramid of national debt reaching an alarming total of 426 crores of rupees! What a striking contrast and what a sad comment on the financial policy of England in India!

40 We may go on in this manner over the whole gamut of the Civilian administration in India, and yet we shall find the same tone of unsympathetic administration pervading everywhere. There is here much good government which does not suit the people; there is much efficiency which does not soothe them or raise them in the eyes of themselves or others. British Government in India is civilised, but it is not popular; It has no doubt established peace in the land, but it is an emasculating peace intended only to keep a nation in perpetual tutelege. And perhaps of a Government like this, characterised as it is by misdirected efficiency, impoverishing progress, harmful energy, and soul-crushing organisation, it was said that 'good government cannot be a substitute for self-government.'



Chapter V

Declared Intentions and their Fulfilment

WE have shown in the first place that India has deserved self-government so far as the possession of a great and ancient civilisation may entitle a great and ancient people to deserve it, and in the second place, that the present system of British rule, at the end of a century and a half, has resulted in a situation which is practically not only an antithesis of self-government but which has positively harmed India's progress in material as well as moral aspects. We may now proceed to consider how far this result accords with the professed intentions of England towards India.

2 What have been the intentions of England towards India? Of course it has been the fashion to describe the occupation of India by England as a conquest. But the idea of a conquest is a later development, if not exactly an afterthought. And it could be safely said that when Englishmen first adverted to India in their thoughts, they had absolutely no idea of conquering it. As Prof. Seely in his *Expansion of England* says: "Our acquisition of India was made blindy. Nothing great that has ever been done by Englishmen was done so unintentionally, so accidentally as the conquest of India. In India we meant one thing and did quite another. Our object was trade and in this we were not particularly successful. War with the native states we did not think of at all till a hundred years after our first settlement. And then we thought only of such war as might support our trade. After this time, again, more than half a century passed before we thought of any considerable territorial acquisitions; the nineteenth century had almost begun before the policy of acquiring an ascendancy over the native states was entered upon, and, our present supreme position can not be said to have been attained before the Governor Generalship of Lord Dalhousie (*i. e.* the middle of the nineteenth century). All along we have been looking one way and moving another." No doubt the British occupation of India is a conquest in the sense that at a later stage of it Englishmen in India were involved in wars with some of the Native States. But there is, at all events, a residue of British territory which was acquired neither by war, nor by settlement, nor by colonisation. Many of the cessions of territory to the East India Company by the native Princes were voluntary, though evidently in a state of imprudent inadvertance of mind as to what the ultimate consequences of such cessions would be. Many other cessions again were made which, though partial and limited for a particular purpose in the beginning, eventually ripened into full-fledged possessions, simply as the result of prescription *i. e.* continued culpable laches on the one hand, and a gradual self-assertion or aggrandisement on the other. And lastly, there was also a class of possessions of territory which Englishmen in India obtained by means more questionable than in any of the above cases *viz.* by fraud or deceit, or generally speaking, conduct which is not far removed from either.

3 Some of the British statesmen who came to India in the times of the East India Company were astute tacticians and not very scrupulous men; they knew very well the art of profitting themselves by other mens' quarrels. and they even deliberately sowed the seed of disunion where it did not already exist. It is difficult to say which is more discreditable to the Indians: whether to have been quarrelsome fools and be caught in the meshes of the unscrupulous deceiver, or to have been defeated on the battlefield? For ourselves, we wish it could have been unquestionably said of us that we were really a conquered nation. But that unfortunately is not an unqualified fact. The military equipment of the East India Company was never so full or so efficient as to enable it, unaided or single-handed, to cope with the armies of any of the native military Powers in India. The first establishment of the Company's Indian army dates only from the year 1748 when a small body of sepoys was raised at Madras, after the example set by the French, for the defence of that settlement. At the same time a small European force was raised for the first time, but only of such sailors as could be spared from the ships on the coast, and of men smuggled on board the Company's vessels in England. It was the native sepoys in the employ of the Company

who always out-numbered the English, and kept pace with them in efficiency as soldiers. In 1787, the Company made the first arrangements with the Home Government for occasional loans of companies of British soldiers, at the rate of 2 lacs of rupees annually for each regiment of 100 men sent from England. In 1799, the Company was authorised to raise European troops in India upto a maximum of 2000 men and it was arranged that the Crown should also transfer to the Company's service British recruits at an agreed sum per head upto a maximum of 3000 men. The Indian people were conquered in the few battles in which they were pitched against the Company's troops by an army of which, on an average, only a fifth part was English, and the remaining four-fifths were drawn from the natives themselves. Truly, therefore, could it be said that India was not all conquered by foreigners but by herself. It may be that the natives of India thus helped the conquest of India to put an end to anarchy, as some allege, by submitting themselves to a single government though it might go into the hands of foreigners. This view is supported by the author of *The Passing of the Empire* and he says: "We are in India because the people had accepted us. We conquered and have governed India by the consent of the people. In fact, she conquered herself and gave herself to us. We never had to fight peoples except in Upper Burma." Or it may be that the natives of India who fought on the side of the Company were after all mercenaries, the like of whom might be seen in any country in those times, but of whom India might have had a greater proportion than anywhere else. Europe itself was not without its contemporary parallel in this matter. For, both Italy and Germany were conquered by Napoleon with the aid of mercenaries. In fighting with Austria or Prussia, Napoleon had Bavaria and Wurtemberg for his allies. The French under Dupleix saw on the death of Nizam-ul-Muluk that it was a very good opportunity to profit by the quarrels of the native people, and with their interference in the war of Hydrabad succession, and from that time, really commences the whole history of the European Empire in India. The English troops were not in any sense superior to the native troops at the time, and had it not been for the supply of mercenaries and the quarrels among the native potentates, England would not have been able to permanently occupy India. British occupation of India was thus practically an occupation by acquiescence rather than by conquest. Nor did England as a State make the acquisition of India, but the acquisition was simply thrust upon England. As soon as the Company obtained the Diwani from the Mogul Emperor, the British Parliament stepped in at once to claim the territory as belonging, in point of sovereignty, to England, and the Company itself had no go but to meekly submit to this counter usurpation.

4 Historians freely admit that the British occupation of India was almost a miracle. But the question whether India could be kept by England in a miraculous, i. e. a non-rational manner, did engage the minds of British statesmen from the very beginning. And it would be, in their opinion, tantamount to looking to heaven for a miracle again to expect that England would be able to retain India eternally except under a particular hypothesis which is certainly exclusive of the sword. It is idle to expect that the question of the future of India in the British hands, could have ever troubled men like Clive or Warren Hastings whose minds were engrossed by the sole purpose of going on making acquisitions in India. They were spoliators in a hurry, and had no leisure to stop even for a moment to consider how they should or could keep what they were acquiring. They were themselves so deeply immersed in spoils that they could not, even if they wished, command the vantage ground of detachment from which they could calmly look at the British possessions in India. The British statesmen in England, however, stood at an agreeable distance, and were able to observe the game of British occupation and appreciate its consequences better than the men who were themselves engaged in playing the game. Their doubts and misgivings are not so apparent in the discussions on the Regulating Act of 1773 which was an Act mainly directed towards the organisation of internal administration in India itself; but we see them troubling the minds of British statesmen in the discussions on the Government of India Act of 1784, the purpose of which was to create an agency in England itself for controlling the Company's administration in India. By this Act the only thing practically left to the Company was the patronage of office under it, while the Company itself was placed in direct

and permanent subordination to a body representing the British Government viz. the Board of Control.

5 As Pitt put it in his speech in support of his own Bill, "The prosperity and the strength of England were as much involved in the Government of India and also the constitution of England as the happiness of the natives of India itself." "Nothing could be more difficult", he said, "than to digest a plan which should at once confirm and enlarge the advantages derived by England from its connection with India, to render that connection a blessing to native Indians and at the same time preserve inviolate the essence and spirit of our constitution from the injuries to which this connection might eventually expose it." The Ministers no doubt felt that they were bound by certain obligations to the Company arising out of the Royal Charter. And they were loth to wantonly violate that Charter. But they also felt that though charters like these were sacred things, they ought not to stand in the way of the general good and the safety of India. The first object of Pitt's Bill was to take care to prevent the Company's Government from being ambitious and bent on conquest. "Commerce was our object," he said, "and with a view to its extension a pacific system should prevail and a system of defence and conciliation." That was the key-note of the British policy towards India as accepted by Parliament so early as 1784, and there is no reason to suppose that Parliament ever wished afterwards to change that policy for worse. For, Pitt's Act of 1784 substantially endured for three quarters of a century afterwards; and the great change that was introduced into the system of Government of India in 1858, was professed not to impair but only accentuate and strengthen that policy.

6 It would be tedious to multiply quotations indicating the real Parliamentary Policy towards India from that time onwards. But we may give a few which, like mile-stones on the road, indicate the progress of that beneficent policy. Thus the Marquis of Hastings, writing in his private journal, at a time when he was about to engage in a war with the Marathas, has observed as follows: "A time, not very remote, will arrive when England will, on sound principles of policy, wish to relinquish the domination which she has gradually and unintentionally assumed over this country (India) and from which, at present, she can not recede. In that hour it would be the proudest boast and most delightful reflection that she had used her sovereignty towards enlightening her *temporary* subjects so as to enable the native communities to walk *alone* in the paths of justice, and to maintain with probity, towards their benefactors, that commercial intercourse in which we should then find a solid interest." Sentiments like these were only gaining ground in course of time. and by 1833, the policy, so far nebulous and inchoate, had begun to crystallise. Only this can account for the wonderful outburst of generous sentiments which were evoked in England from all quarters when the Charter Act of 1833 was being discussed in Parliament. By that Act the Company was given notice to wind up its business, and the territorial possessions in India were declared to be held (by the Company in *trust* for the Crown. And further it was declared that, No Native of India should, by reason of his religion, place of birth, descent, or colour, be disabled from holding any place, office, or employment under the said Company." What the ultimate expectations were formed from a consistent and systematic pursuit of this policy would be seen, for example, from the following passage from Macaulay's speech in Parliament on that subject in 1833: "It may be that the public mind of India may expand under our system till it has outgrown that system; that by good government we may educate our subjects into a capacity for better government; that having become instructed in the European knowledge, they may in some future age demand European institutions. Whether such a day will ever come I know not. But never will I attempt to avert or retard it. Whenever it comes, it will be the proudest day in English history. To have found a great people sunk in the lowest depths of slavery and superstition, to have so ruled them as to have made them desirous and capable of all the privileges of citizens, would indeed be a title to glory all our own. The sceptre may pass away from us. Unforeseen accidents may derange our most profound schemes of policy. Victory may be inconsistent to our arms. But there are triumphs which are followed by no reverses.

There is an empire exempt from all natural causes of decay. These triumphs are the pacific triumphs of reason over barbarism; that empire is the imperishable empire of our arts and our morals, our literature and our law."

7 The negative character of the Charter Act of 1833 was not of course calculated by its own force to bring about the realisation of ideals like those depicted in the above extract. In fact, we shall have presently to show how the Charter Act remained practically a dead letter for a number of years afterwards, owing to certain patent defects in the machinery of administration which was entrusted with the operation of that statute. But it is enough for our present purpose to show the glorious background of beneficent intentions upon which the statute was written. Onwards we go, and yet there is not only no deflection, from these intentions, but we see them further clinched and emphasised by the time we come to the Charter Act of 1853, by which Parliament was declared to have power to legislate for India and to approve or disapprove the Company's laws which were to be thereafter placed before Parliament. During the Parliamentary discussion on this Act, the question of the employment of natives in the Company's service was debated upon; and we meet with no important declarations about the ultimate ideal of British Government of India. Then we come to 1858, and speaking of that time, the policy of Government must be assumed to be that which is found in the words of the Queen's Proclamation itself rather than in the speeches of Parliamentary members who took part in the debate on the Government of India Act of 1858. The difference is almost obvious to the reader who reads both these speeches and the Proclamation together. For, while in the speeches we find only words of legal acumen straining at dry accuracy or perspicuity of language as to the detailed provisions relating to the body of the new machine of administration designed by the Act, in the Proclamation we find the real soul and the spirit of a generous sovereign policy bubbling out in words which apparently struggle not for preciseness or exactitude but for the expression of sentiments to which words alone could never do sufficient justice.

8 By the Proclamation, the Sovereign accepted all legal and moral obligations created by the Company and gave a promise of a scrupulous fulfilment of the same. In the Proclamation, again, we find the same secret self-introspection and self-censure over conduct in the past, which could not prevent the Company from making territorial acquisitions in India which certain antecedent statutes declared to be repugnant to the intentions of the Sovereign and Parliament. For we find the Sovereign saying, "We desire no extension of our present territorial possessions; We shall sanction no encroachment on those of others." The native Princes who, next to the British Government, are the pillars of the country, had suffered by unjust annexations and various kinds of ill-treatment; and though the Act of 1858, has not a word in it about these, the Proclamation declares for the Sovereign that, "We shall respect the rights, dignity, and honour of Native Princes as our own." Next with regard to the general population of the Indian subjects, the Proclamation makes an important extra-statutory declaration when it says, "We hold ourselves bound to the natives in our Indian territories by the same obligations and duty which bind us to all our other subjects." The Proclamation practically pronounces a Royal censure upon those who had prevented the Charter Act of 1833 from having a free and impartial operation in respect of the employment of the natives in high posts of service. The Statute declares that the Sovereign will pay due regard to the ancient rights, usages and customs of India, and lastly the Proclamation promises that India would be administered for the benefit of all the subjects resident therein. And fearing that these detailed promises and assurances might have left some loop-hole for the good intentions of the Sovereign remaining unfulfilled the Proclamation handsomely winds up by a general declaration of good intentions which, while filling every latent or patent crevice or cavity of policy, crowns the body of antecedent declarations with these words, "In their prosperity will be our strength; in their contentment our security; and in their gratitude our best reward." Nor should we in this connection pass over Queen Victoria's letter to the Earl of Derby in which the gracious Sovereign generously tries to transcend even her own Proclamation and to buttress it by a further enunciation of the object of the Proclamation viz., an expression of feelings of generosity and benevolence, pointing

out the privileges which the Indians will receive in being placed on an equality with the subjects of the British Crown. The Act of 1858, backed by the Proclamation, was considered by Lord Palmerston to be as much a source of increased strength to the Government as if a large reinforcement of troops had been permanently secured; and by the people of India, as if they had obtained a Parliament for themselves to protect their rights and privileges as British citizens.

9 The Indian Councils Acts of 1861, 1869, 1892 and 1909 may be passed over in the present connection, because neither in their provisions, nor in the speeches of British statesmen during the discussions on Bills leading to those Acts, do we find any declaration of policy transcending those contained in the Proclamation. These Acts have certainly an importance of their own in another respect, but we shall consider them when we come to the discussion of the Legislative Councils in India. We may in this place dismiss them with the remark that so far as the intentions of the Sovereign or the British Parliament are concerned, these Acts do not carry us much farther than the Proclamation of 1858, but bring a supplementary constitutional body of Government into existence to carry out a part of those intentions.

10 The Proclamation of 1877 related only to the change effected in the style and the titles of the Sovereign, by the addition of the words 'Empress of India.' The change in title was, however, not to apply to Charters, Commissions, Letters Patent, Grants or Appointments, and other like instruments, not extending their operation beyond the United Kingdom. The change was not without its political significance so far as the Indian people were concerned. And though Mr. Disraeli pretended in the House of Commons that the change in title was made at the desire of the Indian Princes and people, that was not a fact. The change had a deeper, and we must say, also a sinister meaning. The title 'Empress' obviously meant more than 'Queen.' It was represented that while the colonials, being a fluctuating population, and having an opportunity of plighting their troth personally to the Sovereign, were content with the title 'Queen,' the Indian subjects had no such opportunity and they felt they would be elevated in dignity by being ruled over by an Empress rather than a British Queen. But all this was moon-shine. Mr. Gladstone pointed this out in the course of his speech upon the Royal Titles Bill: "If it be true, and it is true, that we govern India without the restraints of law except such laws as we make ourselves; if it be true, and it is true, that we have not been able to give to India the benefits and blessing of free institutions, I leave it to the Right Hon. gentleman (Mr. Disraeli) by this Bill to boast that he is about to place the fact solemnly on record by the assumption of the title of the Empress. I, for one, will not attempt to turn into glory that which, so far as it is true, I feel to be our weakness, and our calamity." Mr. Gladstone further pointed out that to that day there were Princes and States in India over which they had never assumed dominion, whatever may have been their superiority of strength. "We are now," he said "going by Act of Parliament to assume that dominion, the possible consequences of which no man can foresee. And when the Right Hon. gentleman tells us the Princes of India desire this change to be made, does he really mean to assure us that this is the case? If so I require distinct evidence of the fact. There are Princes of India who, no doubt, have hitherto enjoyed no more than a theoretical political supremacy, but do they desire to surrender even that under the provisions of this Bill? If there is a political change effected in the condition of the native Princes of India, I do not hesitate to say, I do not think it would be possible, to offer too determined an opposition to the proposal of the government." The Right Hon. Mr. Low pointed out that "as the nation improved, and liberty increased, they in England fell back from the title of the Emperor to the good old title of the King. The title of King denotes the subservience of the ruler to law, that of Emperor denotes that the ruler's will is supreme above all. An Emperor was one who had gained his power by the sword and held it by the sword." In Mr. Low's opinion the new title made a marked distinction between England and India by giving to the Sovereign of England a title which implied obedience to law, and to the Sovereign of India a title which implied the supremacy of the sword. Sir George

Campbell, a famous Indian Administrator, who was then in Parliament, pointed out "that the new title was inconsistent with the control of Parliament over the Government of India and could not come within the four corners of the constitution of the realm." Sir Edward Colebrooke feared that the new title meant an assumption of extra power or authority over India, and, if that was what was really meant, they should have the courage to declare that it was so. But the whole was a mean plot concocted between Mr. Disraeli and Lord Lytton, and, when called upon to produce the papers on the authority of which it was said that the change in the title was desired by the Indian people themselves, Mr. Disraeli refused to place the papers before the House on the usual pretext that it would be contrary to the public policy to do so. It will be seen from this that the Royal Proclamation of 1877, while it could not possibly carry the noble purpose of the Proclamation of 1858 farther in any way, successfully carried out an attempt to defeat the purpose of the earlier Proclamation in at least two respects viz. (1) the relations with the native Princes of India and (2) the status of the ordinary Indian people as subjects declared, by the earlier Proclamation, to have been given the same status, as in other parts of the Empire. And this left-handed stroke of policy came within 18 years of the promulgation of the great Proclamation!

11 The next Proclamation was that issued by King Edward VII, on 2nd November 1908. It was really more like a speech from the throne at one of the openings of the sessions of Parliament, and, while being far from inspiring in spirit, was melancholy and apologetic in tone. Reviewing the progress of the Proclamation of 1858, this new Proclamation could only say that the journey of the new era was arduous, and the advance may have sometimes seemed slow, but that the incorporation of the nationalities was proceeding steadfastly and without pause. If errors had occurred the agents of Government had spared no pains and no self-sacrifice to correct them. The obliteration of distinctions of race was being slowly carried out, and it was time that the principle of representative institutions, which had begun to be gradually introduced, should be prudently extended. The politic satisfaction of such a claim would, it was said, strengthen and not impair existing authority and power.

12 Reviewing thus the political progress of the Indian people under the British Government, four landmarks stand out conspicuously. The Proclamation of 1858 marks the point of culmination of the good intentions of the British Government, and the Proclamation of 1917, coming nearly 60 years after the first, gives a definite shape to them and marks a definite ideal so far as the practical operation of these intentions is concerned. On the other hand, while the Charter Act of 1833 removed all disqualification from the natives of India for holding any posts under the State, and thus participate, as officials, in a practical way in the operation of the administrative machine, the Councils Act of 1892, marks the beginning of the policy of giving actually representative institutions to India enabling them to participate in the government of the country in an unofficial capacity. But after all, a mere enunciation of intentions or ideals does not, by itself, go far enough. These good intentions were being expressed, though in a more or less complete fashion, even in the times of the Company's administration, but we have seen that the results of the Company's rule only proved the truth of the somewhat nasty paradox that the "way to hell is paved with good intention." The Government of India Act of 1858 was based on the obvious admission that the indirect rule through the E. I. Company had proved a failure. But a more pertinent question may be asked, has the direct rule itself succeeded? In the days of the Company, Parliamentary control over Indian administration could only be indirectly enforced. Since 1858, this excuse of an indirect operation has disappeared. But has the direct operation been an unquestionable success so as to give full effect to the declared intentions?

13 The sum and substance of all Royal Proclamations and less formal pronouncements of the policy of the British Government towards India is that the Indian people are to be given a status of British citizens like that enjoyed by the British subjects in Great Britain or the Colonies and Dominions. We shall, therefore, proceed to consider what is the true nature and scope of this status of British

citizenship, the extent to which the Indian people have so far actually realised it, and what further steps are necessary to enable them to realise it to the fullest extent.

14 Citizenship is a bundle of rights. The idea of citizenship is generally supposed to include the following :—(1) personal liberty, (2) personal security, (3) right to hold private property, (4) equality before law, (5) liberty of conscience, (6) freedom of opinion and speech, (7) right of assembly, (8) right of representation in the country's government, and (9) right to hold office under the State. Out of these constituents two scales of citizenship may be formed: the one a lower, and the other a higher scale. The lower scale may be said to include 1, 2, 3, and 5, and the higher scale the remaining. The Indian people practically enjoy at present all the constituents in the first scale almost to the fullest extent. But that does not carry things very far after all. It only means that they have emerged out of the stage of slavery, or, that the British rulers are not animated by the spirit of the Spanish Inquisition. In fact the Indian people practically enjoyed these benefits since they first came under the British rule *i. e.* the rule of the East India Company.

15 Speaking of the British rule in India we can say that we do enjoy (1) personal liberty. We are not liable to be arrested or imprisoned by the Government except in accordance with the law. No doubt certain regulations are still in force by which a man may be arrested, and kept in confinement without trial, upon a warrant granted under the order of the highest executive authority in the province. But these regulations are very seldom used, and what is done under them is, at any rate, professed to be under law. These regulations, like the power vested in the Governor General of India to issue ordinances tenable for a period of six months without the consent of the Legislative Council, strongly savour of despotism and are unpleasant reminders of a state of things which has nearly passed away. But their use is very rare, and under extremely extraordinary circumstances, and may therefore be left out of consideration. We enjoy (2) personal security in the sense that we have a right to be protected by the State against harm threatened or actually done to us by another. And in this respect we may note that the law in India does not exempt anyone, howsoever exalted by office or social position, from liability to legal penalty for infringing the lawful rights of a subject. The liability is there; it may be enforced upon the wrong-doer himself individually or upon the State, if the wrong-doer happens to be a servant or agent of the State and could claim to have acted in his capacity as such servant or agent. We enjoy (3) the right of private property and, only under severe limitations and under the operation of law, can we be dispossessed of property, but not without compensation under the operation of laws like the Land Acquisition Act, or without compensation as in the case of penal forfeiture under the operation of the Penal Code etc. As regards (5) liberty of conscience, we have it to the fullest extent under British rule, and neutrality in religious matters has been happily a cardinal principle of the British Government since the beginning. No doubt there is provision made in the Government Budget for the maintenance of a Church Establishment, and in this sense, and in this sense only, can the State in India be said to have an official Church. The Ecclesiastical establishment of Government dates from the early times when Englishmen first came out to India, and is regulated rather by English statutes than Indian law. It has been all along a matter within the prerogative of the Crown as exercised through the Secretary of State by Letters Patent. The establishment was first created for the religious well-being of Englishmen in India with particular reference to the provision for their baptism, marriage, divorce, etc. But there have never been any official or state-aided attempts for the spread of Christianity in India, except such as may be traceable to the generally partial treatment given to Christian Missionaries in India who, alone, rather than the official Church establishment, have been responsible for religious propagandism conducted more often under cover of education and medical aid given to the natives of India. But we must remember on the other hand that the Government also has itself made new, or continued old, grants of the alienation of revenue for Hindu Devasthanans and Mahomedan Mosques and such like native religious institutions.

16 This practically exhausts the categories in the first or the lower scale of the liberties of citizenship which we have all along enjoyed under the British rule. Coming now to the second or the higher scale of liberties, we find that we enjoy them to a smaller degree, and under very great limitations. Now (4) equality before law is an essential right of citizenship; and in this respect, as between natives and natives, we enjoy that equality to the fullest extent. But when we come to Europeans in India, we at once find that, both in point of law, and in point of the operation of law, there is a difference between them and the natives of India. The superior right of the European British subject in India, to be tried by a jury of the men of his own race, is not available to the natives except in a very limited measure; and the policy of the executive Government has always been to extend that right to the natives very slowly and also very grudgingly. Then again, there is a difference between the natives and Englishmen in India, in respect of the tribunals which may try them in certain matters. The most exalted native may be tried by the meanest European magistrate; but the meanest European may refuse to be tried, in certain cases, by the most exalted native. The same distinction is to be met with in respect of the treatment of Europeans and natives in a jail. Barring this, there may be said to be equality of persons in India before the Law.

17 As regards (6) the freedom of opinion, speech and writing has been a matter of a comparatively recent growth. There was no liberty of press in India till 1834. And it has been from time to time subjected to restrictive legislation. The Vernacular Press Act of Lord Lytton was a frankly discriminating measure of law which, though not in terms, yet in obvious effect, had deprived the natives of India of a valuable civic right which was allowed to be enjoyed by the Europeans in India. That Act was abolished long ago, but it has been substituted, very recently, by the Press Act of 1910 which is mainly, if not uniformly, directed in its operation against native editors. European or Anglo-Indian editors and publishers have enjoyed a practical immunity from the operation of the Act, though they have often grossly violated it. Another measure of law, affecting the liberty of speech and writing, is in the Penal Code, specially sections 124 A and 153 A. These sections do not differentiate in terms between natives and Europeans, but the operation of this legal lever rests with the Executive Government, and it is in practice so operated as to check the liberty only of the natives. Often have questions been asked in the Legislative Councils why particular European or Anglo Indian journals, manifestly offending against the letter or the spirit of these sections, have not been prosecuted; but Government have always relied on their prerogative in this matter and refused being drawn into setting the law in motion against them. The Newspapers (Incitement to Offences) Act of 1908, the Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1908, again, are illustrations of a policy of repression which has resulted in a material narrowing of this particular item of civic liberty of the Indian people.

18 As for (7) the right of assembly, the law governing it is contained in section 147 of the Indian Penal Code which enables Government to treat a meeting of more than five persons as an unlawful assembly, if they can show, however distantly, that the object of the meeting was to commit or instigate some offence under the Penal Code. But not content with this general provision, Government have added to the statute book the Seditious Meetings Act of 1908, by which a meeting of more than 20 persons, if convened without notice, is liable to be dispersed, under certain conditions, by an order of the Police. The Act was at first offered as a temporary measure, but it has since then permanently remained on the statute-book. Even the most moderate men like the Hon. Mr. Gokhale and the Hon. Dr. Rash Behari Ghose opposed this measure as being dangerous and uncalled for. But their protest was not heeded by those who were bent upon passing it. The Act has indeed been sparingly used; but the executive Government has added permanently to its armoury a repressive weapon which an irresponsible police and magistracy may, at any time, very drastically use against popular liberty inasmuch as it can be very lightly set in motion.

19 And lastly we come to the remaining two and the most important categories in the higher scale of the civic liberties of the people in India, viz. (8) the right to be

represented in the government of the country and (9) the right to hold office under the State. The history of both these rights is disappointing and saddening in all conscience, and we propose to dwell on the same at some length because, with the realisation of these two rights is associated the realisation of the national aspirations of the people in this, as in any other, country.

20 And first with regard to (9) the right of the Indian people to hold office under the State. Till the year 1833, that is to say, for nearly a hundred years since the advent of the British Government in certain parts of India, Indians were as a rule excluded from all posts of service. No doubt, clerks and darogas drawing perhaps a pay of 25 rupees were drawn from the indigenous population in the administrative branch of the service. So also were there in the judicial line native Munsiffs who could try petty civil cases. They had no pay but were paid small commissions on the value of the suits tried by them. The work of administration was increasing every day, and as no Europeans were found willing to do the clerical work on a small pay the wheels of Government soon became clogged; more than half the business of the country remained unperformed; and at last it became necessary for Government to abandon the plan and policy of excluding natives from the service which had, after a fair trial, completely broken down. As Sir John Shore has put it, "All natives of respectability having been excluded, and an inferior class of people only being employed on salaries totally inadequate to support a decent subsistence, incapacity and roguery on their part was the natural consequence. The natives were, therefore, declared to be unfit to be appointed to any situations of trust, and it was decided to appoint European agency in their place. The Europeans proved equally corrupt, though better paid; but the Court of Directors always wished to provide for as many as possible of their friends and relations; and there was, again, the vanity of the English which led them to imagine themselves so infinitely superior to the natives. The result was that at one fell swoop were annihilated the institutions under which India had existed for ages; and under the pretence of ameliorating the condition of the people, and of protecting the poor and the weak from the oppressions of the rich and the powerful, the Company established the system of administration by which districts as large as Yorkshire or Wales and containing a population more than double that of Scotland were delivered over to the government of inexperienced young men, strangers from a distant land, and ignorant of the language and customs of the people they were to rule; while the object had been constantly and systematically to extort as much as possible from those subject to them."

21 But such a state of things could not indefinitely go on without a reaction, and Government at length saw the necessity of selecting some of the respectable portion of the native community to posts of service. Eventually the Court of Directors saw their mistake. The Charter Act of 1833 was passed declaring that no native was disqualified, as a native, from holding any post under Government, and the operation of the Act fortunately fell to such a liberal-minded Viceroy as Lord William Bentinck. The sentiments contained in the dispatch by the State Secretary, accompanying the text of the Charter Act of 1833, were generous, and if they had been followed in practice, all the grievances in the matter of the employment of natives in service should have disappeared long ago. But the Government of India admitted those sentiments to only a grudging operation. The pledge of equal treatment to Englishmen and natives of India in the Charter Act of 1833, was given by Parliament without any agitation therefor in India, and of its own free-will, when western education was not generally introduced into India. But the pledge remains unredeemed to this day, even after western education has made rapid strides, and as much material as may be required for completely manning even the highest services can be easily available among the natives. In 1854, the old Haileybury College was abolished, and the system of open competition was introduced. The measure was intended more for the whole class of aspirants for service in India among the English people than for the Indians themselves. For, if it had not been so, Government would have made some suitable arrangement for recruiting the service in India itself. As it was, the services were thrown open to competition, but as the competitive examinations were to be held only in England, the

competition was practically thrown open only to Englishmen in England. In 1860, a Committee, appointed by the State Secretary, reported that, if justice was to be done to the claims of Indians, simultaneous examinations should be held in England and India, as being the fairest method, and most in accordance with the principles of a general competition for a common object." But nothing came out of this.

22 We in India can not be blind to the fact that since the time Englishmen in England realised that they had irrevocably committed themselves to the government of India, they made great and earnest efforts to purify and improve the administration. But we cannot also forget that the main trend of this improvement was directed towards breaking the monopoly of the East India Company in respect of the various benefits which were already obviously accruing, and which were sure to accrue in future, from the possession of India. Englishmen soon made up their minds that India was not to be colonised by English settlers. There were many reasons for such a conclusion. She was already thickly populated and there was not much virgin soil for cultivation. The climate of India was hot and unsuitable for a race acclimatised to the temperate zone in Europe. It was highly inconvenient to Englishmen to remain in perpetual contact with races like the Hindoos and Mahomedans. Their extermination was impossible as was done of the natives of America or Australia; but fusion with them was equally unthinkable. The high quality of their civilisation would not be denied, and yet, it was a civilisation not quite to the taste of Englishmen. And lastly there was the danger that if Englishmen settled in India they might set up an independent colony, following the example of the Americans.

23 But even if India was not wanted for colonisation she was wanted for trade and the employment for England's boys. The East India Company was monopolising both; but the nation at large felt jealous. And the restrictions put upon the Company are directly traceable to this jealousy. It was not that the Company was favouring Indian interests to the detriment of English interests. But the emoluments of both trade and office went to enrich particular classes of people and were not available to the nation at large. If the territories acquired by the Company could be claimed for the nation, why not the benefits as well of trade and employment? The proprietors or shareholders of the Company were more than compensated for their initiative and enterprise by the fortunes they had already made. And as the company was indebted to the Royal prerogative for all their possession of actual and potential wealth it was thought but right that the Royal prerogative should benefit all the classes in the nation equally. It was evidently this line of thinking that led to the abolition of the Company's trade monopoly; and it was also this same line of thinking that led to the establishment of a competitive Civil Service for India. Neither of these measures, it must be clearly perceived, was inspired by any thought for the sole benefit of the Indian people. The establishment of the Civil Service was no more intended to give employment to the Indian boys, than the abolition of the trade monopoly to lead to the foundation of Indian firms for export and import. The creation of the Civil Service is, according to Graham Wallas, the one great political invention in the nineteenth century in England. But as the same writer points out, the invention was due to the anxiety of the English nation about the patronage of office. In his Bill relating to the Government of India, Fox proposed to make Indian appointments part of the ordinary system of Parliamentary patronage. But the expedient of administering an oath to the Company's Directors, that they would make their appointments honestly, proved to be useless and Fox's Bill left the main evil of patronage untouched. The report of Sir Charles Trevelyan, who was the chief promoter of the competitive Civil Service, shows that the patronage Secretary of the Treasury distributed appointments in the Civil Service among those members of Parliament whose votes were to be influenced or rewarded. The deprivation of Parliament of the patronage was afterwards a part of the struggle which the Liberals as a political party, carried to triumph against the Tory ministers who used patronage for corrupting Parliament. The old governing classes felt that the patronage which they could not retain in their hands, after Lord Derby's Reform Act of 1867 had removed the control of the House of Commons from the

Borough voters to the working men, would be safer in the hands of an independent Civil Service Commission. The establishment of the Civil Service was thus made not because India should be ruled by better men who could understand the good of India better, or because Indians should get an entrance into the service, but because the monopoly of patronage should be abolished for the benefit of Englishmen at large. If the measure had anything to do with *Indian* interests, steps would have been taken to organise a competitive examination in India simultaneously with an examination in England. The establishment of a competitive Civil Service examination put an end to the impudent plea of the East India Company that all Englishmen, who did not pass into India through its own portals of patronage, were interlopers. But what of the fact that the system of the Civil Service is even now so designed that under it the Indians themselves are no better than interlopers in their own land, and they must qualify themselves for entering into the service of their own country through an examination set up under peculiarly difficult conditions in a country 6000 miles away?

24. But, to our subject now. In 1868, Sir Stafford Northcote declared that the main difficulty was how to carry out the pledge of 1833,—as if the pledges were really impracticable. The men required for the services were to be not only the cleverest, but must, it was contended, have many other qualifications as well. But it was not shown that natives did not possess these qualifications of birth, wealth or education. In 1870, the Duke of Argyll admitted that he always felt that the regulations, laid down for the competitive examinations, rendered nugatory the declaration of the Act of 1833. The Government of India being unwilling to put the statute of 1870 into operation took nine long years to frame workable rules under it! And it was with reference to this that Lord Lytton himself observed, "I do not hesitate to say that both the Government of England and of India appear to me upto the present moment unable to answer satisfactorily the charge of having taken up every means in their power of breaking to the heart the words of promise they had uttered to the ear." In 1878, the Government of India formed the Statutory Civil Service which, however, failed to give satisfaction, as more importance was attached, in the recruitment to this service, to birth and social position than to intellectual equipment. In 1886, with a determination to give finality to this vexed question, and to devise a scheme which may reasonably be hoped to do full justice to the claims of natives of India to higher posts in the services, a Public Services Commission was appointed. Their labours produced nothing better than the Provincial Services scheme,—a scheme which completely established a colour bar in effect and invested the Provincial Service with the ignominious character of a Pariah Service. This scheme of 1886, made the position of the Indians worse than that under the statutory service scheme. On the other hand, Government practically disregarded the recommendations of the Commission and whittled them down both in quantity and quality. The attempt of the Government had all along been to reserve a *class* of posts for a *class* of men; and though there was herein no reference in terms to the racial distinction between Englishmen and Indians, the tortuous operation of this ingenious arrangement practically nullified the spirit of the declarations of the Statute of 1833. And regarding this, Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji has said—"For the first time in the history of India it has become a political disqualification to be an Indian. In all offices of State, the direction and control of armies, the administration of revenues, of divisions of districts, the coining of money, the Indians are excluded from higher posts."

25 In 1893, the House of Commons passed a resolution in favour of the simultaneous Civil Service examinations. The next year, the Secretary of State for India promised that he would carry out the resolution, but nothing came out of this promise. In 1904, Lord Curzon, instead of widening the scope for the employment of the Indians in the public service, only sought to justify the narrow sphere to which they were condemned. Whereas Lord Curzon claimed that Indians had been treated with a liberality unexampled in the history of the world, the Hon. Mr. Gokhale demonstrated in his reply to his Lordship by figures, that the Indians

were practically nowhere in the higher services, and that never before, in the long and chequered history of India, was Indian talent so largely divorced from the controlling centres of authority, and urged a further inquiry into the matter. Lord Cromer described it thus: "The position of India at the present time is almost unique. It is, so far as I know, the only important country in the world where education has considerably advanced, which is governed in all essential particulars, by non-resident foreigners. It is also the only country where the Civil Service in all its higher administrative branches is in the hands of the aliens, appointed by a foreign country, under stringent educational tests." During the 25 years, since the Public Services Commission of 1886 was appointed, the position of Indians in certain branches of service was rendered even worse than before. Regarding this, Mr. Cotton has said in his *Colonies and Dependencies* that "According to constitutional theory, there is no reason why a Hindu or a Mahomedan should not be made a Viceroy, or why white troops should not be commanded by black officers. As a matter of fact, the proportion of natives who enter the covenanted Civil Service now is less than it was a few years ago; not more than two or three natives have as yet risen to the rank of collector; and the native army is entirely officered in its higher ranks by Englishmen. Practice is stronger than precept. The *personnel* of the government remains as predominantly English as it was under Lord Dalhousie. In some respects it may be said to have become more English as it has become mere bureaucratic."

26 And then we had the Public Services Commission of 1912. The judgment passed by the Indian public upon the report of this Commission is too fresh to be stated at length. We shall quote here an extract, summarising the present position, from the dissenting minute of one member of the Commission, viz. the Hon. Sir M. B. Chaulal. He says: "Out of 11,064 number of posts, 6491 or 58 per cent. are held by the members of the Anglo-Indian community who stand to the total Indian population as 1 to 3000 in number and 1 to 13 in literacy. As regards posts of Rs. 500 and above, out of a total of 4,984 posts they hold 4042 *i. e.* 81 per cent. and as regards posts of Rs. 800 and above, out of a total of 2501 they hold 2259 or 90 per cent posts." He further says that, "the too limited employment of Indians in the higher service is one of the main causes of the discontent and unrest which has recently become so marked among the educated classes about which so much has been heard and written....The young man of the present day took the blessings of British Rule as his birthright...he began to study eagerly the history and literature of free and advanced western countries and biographies of great men and how they struggled for freedom and liberty...and he began to contrast their state with his own helpless dependence. A vague discontent took possession of his mind...and he fancied that his progress in every direction was hampered...The phenomenon of practically all the higher offices in the State being monopolised by the foreigner and the European loomed large in his view.....The question, therefore, of the proportions in which indigenous agency is to be utilised in the near future, in the higher service of the State, is of vital importance. These proportions must be such as will, cumulatively throughout the services, help to create the feeling that we Indians are in a substantial degree carrying on the government of the country. At present the Indians are far and few; and every Indian officer whether high or low feels that he is not serving himself for his country but is an individual hired to labour for somebody else. He can rarely put his whole heart into the work because he is always conscious of the presence of his taskmaster and never works but with his eyes upon his superior officer and always thinking of what he will say of the work turned out by him. To dispel this feeling, there must, in the higher service in all departments of the administration, be present a large number of Indians. So that they may collectively feel that the responsibility for a strong and wise government of the people rests mainly on them...A much more sympathetic treatment by, and a far more liberal association with, Englishmen is required before that sense of subjection is appreciably reduced, and before the desired sentiment of a common citizenship is created." Otherwise as Mr. J. E. S. Cotton remarks "The Indians will never believe at heart in our good intentions so long as we keep all the good berths to ourselves. A more genuine obstacle to innovation is

presented by the circumstances of the Civil Service...They possess a monopoly of all the most valuable appointments...Yet, after all, the Civil Service exists for India, not India for the Civil Service...The admission of natives without competition to certain grades of subordinate office is an idle device so long as the phalanx of the Covenanted Service remains unbroken...Granting that...some degree of European control will be necessary for years to come, the Indians may fairly claim to be entrusted at once with a share of the higher posts—executive as well as judicial. Considerations of economy here coincide with the demands of justice." The same author further says: "Countries have often ere now been conquered and obeyed their conquerors, but the rule of an alien bureaucracy is an attempt foredoomed to failure ...Together with our own language we have taught them the lessons of industrial prosperity and of constitutional freedom. By so doing we have indirectly, but not less surely, sapped the foundations of our own supremacy. A stationary India, governed by Anglo-Indians, might conceivably remain stable. A progressive India, with rulers selected by competitive examination from English and natives indiscriminately, has entered upon an era of change the end of which none can foresee."

27 And lastly we come to the most important category of the rights of citizenship, viz. the right to be represented in the government of the country. The claim of the Indian people for this representation rests on even a much more solid foundation of reason than their claim to hold the highest posts of honour, responsibility and emolument under the Government. For even supposing that the fullest effect was given by the Government to the sentiments contained in the Charter Act of 1833 and the Proclamation of 1858, as regards the employment of natives in the services, the thing by itself does not go far enough. It is, of course, important that the Indians should themselves carry on the executive Government of their country by holding the highest posts under it; but it is far more important that the Indian people as a whole should have a preponderant share not only in framing the laws by which the country is to be governed, but also in enforcing responsibility for carrying out those laws in a proper manner and in a faithful spirit upon the executive agency entrusted with the administration of those laws. The legislative authority which gives sanction to the executive government is of far greater consequence than executive power. The substitution of the native for the foreign agency in the executive service would, no doubt, serve to diminish the present colossal cost of the official establishments, but it would not affect the despotic character of the government; it would not make the government of the country a reflection of the ideas of the people if there were no representative institutions in which the freely elected representatives of the people have an opportunity to express the views of the people, and have the power not only to sanction laws according to the wishes of the majority, but also the power to effectively control the working of the executive machinery. In the pre-British days the entire official establishments were manned by the natives, and yet the form and also the spirit of government was largely despotic, in the sense, that the will of the people as a whole had neither voice nor power. The despotism was, no doubt, tempered by the fact that the services were recruited from indigenous people, and also by the existence of such institutions as the village communities, but such influence and reflection of the popular will as could be so secured was only indirect and attenuated. With the advent of western education under British rule, the Indian people have learnt that to be represented in the councils of government, in their own right, is a much higher aspiration than merely to hold posts of service under government; and the declared policy of the British Government have taught the Indian people to expect that this higher aspiration should be duly realised. More than 20 years have elapsed since Lord Cromer said the same thing "It is only what ought to be expected by every thoughtful man, that, after fifty years of free press and thirty years of expanding education, with European ideas flowing into the country on every side, and old indigenous customs habits and prejudices breaking down, changes should be taking place in the thoughts, the desires, the aims of the intelligent and educated men of the country which no wise and cautious government can afford to disregard, and to which they must gradually adapt their system

of administration if they do not wish to see it shattered by forces which they have themselves called into being, but which they have failed to guide and control." Indians are conscious that the Sovereign and the British Parliament have pledged themselves to make the Indian people citizens of the British Empire in the highest sense, and they now naturally demand that they should be enabled to realise the first and most essential right of citizenship viz. the right to govern themselves through their own elected representatives.

28 Let us, therefore, see how far this aspiration of theirs has been realised. We need not concern ourselves with the history of the gradual development of the Legislatures in India before the Charter Act of 1833. We shall take up the theme only at this point, because that Charter for the first time expressly removed the disqualification, under which the Indian people had laboured, for participating in the government of the country. The Legislative Council of the Governor General of India was first constituted in the year 1853, when a fourth or a legislative member of the Council was placed on the same footing with the older or ordinary members of the Council, and further the Council was enlarged for legislative purposes by the addition of two judges of the High Court of Bengal and four nominated official representatives (paid) from Bengal, Madras, Bombay and the N. W. P. Governments. The sittings of the Legislative Council were now made public for the first time and their proceedings began to be officially published. The Council was remodelled in 1861, and its powers were extended. By this Act, a fifth ordinary official member was added to the Council and provision was also made for the nomination of additional members from 6 to 12 in number, of whom not less than one half were to be non-officials, that is to say, persons not in the civil or military service of the Crown. But it is to be remarked that as soon as the non-official element was allowed to enter the Legislative Council, the power of interpellation was taken away from the Council members. In 1853, the procedure of the Indian Legislative Council was modelled on the procedure of Parliament, and the Executive Government had found within the course of the eight intervening years that even official members, who did not themselves form part of the executive government, had effectively used the power of asking questions. An inconvenient degree of independence and inquiry had been shown by them by asking questions as to, and discussing the propriety of, measures of the Executive Government. Simultaneously, therefore, with the expansion of the Council, measures were taken by the Government to restrict the scope of the additional members, and the functions of the new Legislative Council were strictly limited to *Legislation*, it being expressly forbidden to transact any other business except the consideration and enactment of *legislative measures*, or to entertain any motion except a motion for leave to introduce a Bill or having reference to a Bill actually introduced.

29 The history of the Provincial Legislative Councils is also very similar. These Councils originally only co-extended with Executive Councils, consisting of a governor and some ordinary members, and they had the power to frame and enact laws; *i. e.* Regulations for their respective Provinces. Their powers of legislation were withdrawn in 1833, the Governor-General's Legislative Council being authorised exclusively to make or approve Regulations for the whole of India, but only so far as would not touch the Crown prerogative or violate the Charter Act of 1833. The Act of 1861 restored the legislative powers to the Provincial Governments but required them to be exercised through the Provincial Legislative Councils under the same restrictions as the Indian Legislative Council. Under the powers conferred by the Act of 1861, the Executive Governments sometimes nominated very able Indians to the Councils; but sometimes also they nominated men of merely high social position who had no acquaintance with the principles of legislation or government, or had a very slight acquaintance with the English language itself, or generally men who learned to look up to the authorities in a spirit of toadyism, or slavish sycophancy and whose business in the Council consisted of mainly saying ditto to whatever the authorities said, and of singing their praises like courtly flatterers. The Legislative Councils were thus, in spite of their numerical expansion, mere ornamental bodies which simply registered the decrees of the

Executive Government. No doubt the abler non-official members of the Council made their presence felt by well-reasoned and informed criticism of legislative measures, and were perhaps listened to with respect. But neither their voice nor their vote had any the slightest effect by way of deflecting the policy of the Executive Governments in the minutest degree from their set purpose.

30 This, however, was a manifestly scandalous state of things, and especially so when education had made rapid progress, journalism had taken root in the country, public and political associations were formed by men of light and leading, and public affairs were publicly discussed both in the press and on the platform in a manner which showed that a race of critics had come into existence who could hold their own against the officials, both in point of the grasp of principles and details underlying questions of public weal and importance. The Indian National Congress was founded in 1885, and one of the first questions which that body took into its hand was the question of the reform of the Legislative Councils in India. It was contended by the Congress that a considerable number of people had come into existence in India who were fit enough to be given the franchise for electing members to the Legislative Councils; and that time had, therefore, come for putting the Councils on a fairly elective basis. In 1888, the Congress drafted a scheme for the reform of the Legislative Councils which was affirmed by the Congress in 1889 and formed the basis of a Bill, which the late Mr. Charles Bradlaugh introduced into Parliament, known as "an Act to amend the India Councils Act of 1861." "This Bill had the effect," as the late Sir P. M. Mehta put it, "of dispelling the fit of profound cogitation in which gentlemen at the head of Indian affairs had lost themselves, and from which they could not spontaneously recover." Mr. Bradlaugh's Bill could not, of course, be carried through, but it compelled Government to frame a Bill of their own. This was Lord Cross's Bill of 1892 which was introduced into the House of Lords and was piloted through by Mr. G. N. Curzon in the Commons. The Bill was intended to widen the basis and expand the functions of the Government of India and to give further opportunities to the non-official and native element in Indian society to take part in the work of government, and in that way to lend official recognition to that remarkable development both in political interest and capacity which had been visible among the higher classes of Indian society since the government was taken over by the Crown in 1858. The Bill was intended, according to Lord Lansdowne, to secure a satisfactory advance in the representation of the people in the Legislative Councils; and yet, it did not travel beyond recognising only the principle of selection "upon the advice of such sections of the community as are likely to be capable of assisting in that matter." The selection was to be an election under a cover, and yet selection entirely in the hands of the executive government.

31 Mr. Gladstone, who was then in opposition, criticised the halting provisions of the Bill, saying that "what we want to get at is the real heart and the mind, the most upright sentiments, and the most enlightened thoughts of the people of India"; and he expressed the hope that the people would be given not a nominal but a real living representation in the Councils. But the rules and regulations for putting the Councils Act of 1892 into operation, were left to be framed by the Executive, who betrayed their official bias, and so, both in point of the rules and the actual practice beyond those rules, the working of the Act was found to be most unsatisfactory. As for the Presidency of Bombay, this unsatisfactory character had reached its climax, and the remarks of the Hon. Mr. Gokhale had ample justification when he said, "In regard to these rules, I will not say that they have been deliberately so framed as to defeat the object of the Act of 1892, but I will say this that if the officer who drafted them had been asked to sit down with the deliberate purpose of framing a scheme to defeat that object, he could not have done better." The bodies to which partial nomination had been entrusted were themselves elected on a very narrow and exclusive franchise, and a successful attempt was made to deprive from this franchise the very classes who should have been the first to be admitted to it. The Congress of 1904 agitated for the right to divide the Legislative Councils on all financial matters coming before them and it also demanded that the strength of elected non-official members be increased.

32 It was not, however, before Lord Morley became the State Secretary for India that the reform of the Legislative Councils was again taken in hand. For about five years before, a great popular agitation had stirred the depths of the national mind, and the despotic administration of Lord Curzon had driven even peaceful and thoughtful minds into despair so that the people were persuaded that nothing but a policy of self-help and severe aloofness from Government would enable them to effect national regeneration. The Government of India was advised that their only hope of keeping peace in the country remained in a large and bold scheme of political reform. The new Liberal State Secretary also saw the wisdom of inaugurating a liberal policy, and the combined proposals of the Government of India and the Home Government had such a plausible appearance that the National Congress of 1908 was persuaded to think that they constituted "a large and liberal instalment of reforms needed to give the people of this country a substantial share in the management of their affairs and to bring the administration into closer touch with their wants and feelings." The self-congratulations of the Congress were, however, somewhat premature, for, once more was the working out of the details of the proposed reforms left to the Executive Governments; and once more did those Governments play their usual trick of nullifying the liberal spirit of the new policy by framing cramping rules and regulations. Within four years since the Congress expressed its almost over-flowing gratitude for the new reforms, the Congress was driven in 1912, to record its keen sense of disappointment about the council regulations which were full of anomalies and inequalities, so that, even before the war broke out and opened altogether a new vista of hope and aspiration for the Indian people, even the moderate section of Indian politicians was convinced that the new scheme of reforms, which they had fondly hoped would have the effect of soothing down popular discontent, and would give more than enough work to the non-official members to familiarise themselves with their new powers and privileges and exercise them to the fullest extent of their capacity, were after all of very little practical value; and far from advising the people to tone down their demands, they were themselves foremost in demanding that nothing but the essential rights of self-government would satisfy the nation any longer. In 1915 the Congress demanded "an expansion and reform of the Legislative Councils so as to make them truly and adequately representative of all sections of the people and to give them an *effective control* over the acts of the executive government."

33 The war moreover had the effect of bringing England and India closer to each other than ever before. If England realised the value of India as a source of military strength, she realised even more the genuineness of Indian loyalty which allowed the Government to rule the country without the aid of a single European soldier. On the other hand, India realised that if England was capable of undergoing such enormous self-sacrifice for maintaining the integrity and freedom of small insignificant nations like Belgium and Servia, to whom she owed absolutely nothing, it should be a far easier matter for England to recognise the national aspirations of the people of India who were the divinely entrusted ward of England and who had emptied their treasury and shed their blood for England. England was driven day by day, for the sake of herself and her allies, to proclaim her disinterested solicitude for the liberties of even the smallest nations, and the Indian people felt, more than ever before, that these professions and proclamations of faith by England in the cause of liberty must be mere froth or wasted breath if they could not stand the test on the Indian touchstone. They were confidently conscious that they had earned and deserved a more effective voice in the administration of their own affairs, but that the disposition of the bureaucracy had alone stood in their path so long. But now that the English nation had vehemently declaimed against the bureaucratic rule in Germany and had openly expressed its sympathy with the Revolution in Russia which triumphantly trampled under its foot Russian despotism, there remained nothing for them to get a wider measure of political liberty in their own country but only to earnestly demand it in the name of their nation. The nation was thus completely awakened out of the enchantment of the bureaucracy, and it felt perfectly justified in making that large demand for the reform of the Legislative Councils which is now embodied in the Congress

scheme passed at Lucknow, and, which practically amounts to making the voice of the people supreme in the Provincial as well as in the Imperial Legislative Council, not only in matters of legislation and finance but also in that of enforcing responsibility upon the executive government.

34 If, as Lord Morley's dispatch had anticipated, the reformed Councils had enabled the representatives of all classes of population to be in a position to take effective part in shaping the policy of government and to exert a real influence upon the actual work of administration and had really and effectively associated the people of India with the government in the work not only of occasional legislation but of actual every day administration; if, as Mr. Asquith, while speaking on the second reading of the India Councils Bill of 1909, had said that the people of India had really felt that the Legislative Councils were not mere automatons, the wires of which were pulled by the official hierarchy: or that the non-official element in the Councils was really in the ascendant, subject of course to proper safeguards; or the legislation passing through the mills of the Legislative Councils had truly reflected the opinion of the community, a demand like the one now embodied in the scheme might have been delayed for sometime. But whatever may be the intentions of British statesmen like Lord Morley or Mr. Asquith, the Indian people have realised that the Morley-Minto Reforms were after all a mere hollow boast, and that practically a very insignificant measure of power has come down to their hands owing to the operation of a triple filter of bureaucracy which intercepts those intentions first, in interpreting the words of despatches, secondly, in framing inconvenient or reactionary rules for working, and thirdly again in giving practical effect to those rules.

35 In the year 1909, Mr. Surendranath Banerji declared in the Congress as follows: "It is no exaggeration to say that the rules and regulations have practically wrecked the reform scheme as originally conceived with a beneficence of purpose and a statesmanlike grasp. Who wrecked the scheme? Who converted that promising experiment into a dismal failure? The responsibility rests upon the shoulders of the bureaucracy. Is the bureaucracy having its revenge on us for the part we have played in securing these concessions?" So also the Hon. Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya declared that: "The conclusion is forced on our mind that those who have the power are unwilling to part with that power, and unless we have a potent and determining voice in the administration of our country's affairs, there is not much hope for that progress which it is the birth-right of every civilised people to achieve." The Hon. Mr. Fazal-ul-Huq of Bengal has declared: "We are in theory the chosen representatives of the people, but in shaping the policy of the administration, our voice in the Councils of government is of hardly more weight and value than that of the man in the moon." The Hon. Mr. Subba Rao has declared that, "the deep disappointment caused by the regulations and the narrow interpretation put upon them is writ large in the pages of the proceedings of the Legislative Council and the columns of the Indian press. The constitution of the Provincial Councils has been so manipulated that, even where an elected majority is given, the official continues to dominate over the Council, and non-official majority has in practice become a minority. As the scheme is at present worked, nothing can be carried in our Provincial Councils against the will of the officials who, in combination with the elected European members and nominated non-official Indians, specially selected to keep up the power and prestige of the government, lord it over them and make the position of the elected representatives of the people helpless. The elected members not infrequently try to save their face by accepting the suggestions or amendments of the Government, and proceed to vote or call for a division, though certain of defeat, to secure a moral victory, and show to the public the perversity of the attitude of the Government who would not, by the weight of numbers, and sometimes by the influence of the head of the government, allow even a recommendation be made to themselves. Important schemes of expenditure are shut out of discussion on the ground that the subject is under correspondence, and the powers of the Council with regard to the framing of the budget are nil. A feeling of helplessness is felt by the elected members at every step and they are placed entirely at the mercy of the Government." The Hon. Rao Bahadur V.K. Ramanujachariar of Madras has declared as follows: "We see shackles placed on our

representations in regard to many points in which we are much interested. The Government have a practical majority in the Council. Our resolutions are mere recommendations, and there is no danger of Government being turned out of office. I wish to point out that the cumulative effect is to discourage us in our attempt to work with Government in their every-day administration which is the basis of the Morley-Minto Reforms." The Hon. Rao Bahadur M. Ramchandra Rao of Madras also has made this well-informed criticism. "In 1912, ten resolutions were brought forward; only one proposing a diversion of expenditure of about Rs. 50,000 was found acceptable to the Government. In 1913, thirty-one resolutions were brought forward; none of them was agreeable to the Government. In 1914, there were twenty resolutions which raised various points of financial administration but not even one was carried in the Council. In 1915, there were 23 resolutions, not a single one having been accepted. We have done our best to persuade Government to adopt a different financial policy, but we have not as yet succeeded in our attempt. The Hon. Mr. N. K. Kelker of C. P. has remarked that, "Unless the composition of the Councils themselves is first thoroughly overhauled, a good deal of the advantage which might be expected from the criticism of these Councils would be mostly of an illusory character." The Hon. Pandit Bishan Narayan Dhar of the United Provinces has stated, "Nearly every resolution moved by the non-official Indian members of the United Provinces Council has been rejected, and rejected by overwhelming majorities; for, besides some of the elected members, the nominated members were always ready to support the Government." The *Hindu* of Madras gives the following table of the financial resolutions moved in the different Legislative Councils during the Budget debates in one year together with the result of the debates on them.

Legislative Council.	No. of Resolutions.	Withdrawn.	Rejected.	Accepted.
Supreme	3	2	1	0
Madras	32	26	6	0
Bengal	38	26	12	0
United Provinces	22	10	12	0
Behar and Orissa	5	5	0	0
Central Provinces	4	2	2	0

"The result," says the *Hindu*, "exhibits a deplorable lack, on the part of officials, of appreciation of public point of view of questions brought forward, uncommon imperviousness to non-official suggestions, and a mistaken faith in its own infallibility on the part of the Executive Government." The *Bengali* has remarked, "The prevailing note of the non-official Indian members is one of pessimism, and we fear that it is not confined to the Bengal Legislative Council. Throughout the country, in every province with a Legislative Council, the feeling of the non-official Indian members is that the measure of their performance is wholly inadequate to the measure of their efforts—there is much cry but there is little wool. In the position in which they now are, that is to say in the position of minority, even when there is a non-official majority, they feel that they can do very little; and there is a growing sense in the country, that these legislative assemblies are mere academic bodies which have to wait upon the pleasure of the Government for carrying out the popular behests."

36 Great are the difficulties and pit-falls in the way of the popular elected members to make their voice effective in the Legislative Councils. To begin with, Government may disallow any question put to them; and even if they accept a question, they can either indefinitely delay or entirely refuse the information asked for on the broadest ground that it would not serve the public interest to give it or

on the very special pretext that Government do not feel justified to waste the time and energy of public servants to prepare or collate the facts and figures asked for. If they at all answer a question, they may simply give a curt monosyllabic categorical affirmative or negative in reply, and thus imply a kind of contempt through open discourtesy, or they may mystify the interpellator by giving misleading or vague information, so that, the powers of interpellation being limited, the opportunity may be lost and the scent of the question may disappear, unless the interpellator pursues his quest with an extraordinary persistence. Often have Government been found out to deny the truth of facts which the public positively know to be true. But the limited power of interpellation cannot help the discomfited interpellator. As regards Resolutions, these again may be rejected without any reasons being given, and even when they are taken up, the member moving it has scarcely any other satisfaction than that of having his say. The general fate of Resolutions has already been described, but even if a Resolution be carried by a majority, Government may simply refuse to act upon it. The right to introduce Bills in the Councils, is hedged round with peculiar limitations; and there is hardly any hope of a Bill being allowed for which an enormous spade-work has not already been done, and Government have not been, in one way or another, indirectly committed to its principles. The actual total number of days on which the business of the Legislative Councils is done are very limited, and important matters are either completely barred or hustled away for want of time. The number of non-official members in the Councils is at present very small when compared either with the present number of electors in the country, or with the importance of the interests which demand a discussion in the Councils. And as for the spirit of obstruction which alone can sometimes bring the bureaucracy to the knees under the present circumstances, it is at present simply non-existent. And yet the agenda papers in the different Legislative Councils are already so crowded that a good deal of business always remains in arrears. All this, and much more else that we have left unnoticed for want of space, spells helplessness for the non-official elected member of the Legislative Council; and the Executive Government could legitimately boast that, notwithstanding the expanded and reformed Councils containing elected representatives of the people, their course of despotism has remained quite unaffected as before, and that while they may flourish the Legislative Councils like gilded tinsel ornaments in the face of the constitutional theorists, they do not feel any liking or respect for them in their mind, or, their slightest weight upon their own body.

37 Under the operation of the Morley-Minto Reforms the Legislative Councils were no doubt expanded, and the total number of their members has been increased from 146 to 230. But this does not go as far as the needs of the case require. The ratio which the number of the members in the Indian Legislative Councils, taken all together, to the total population of India is roughly 330 : 330,000,000 or one member to every ten lakhs of persons. The significance of this ratio can be well understood if we say that on this basis England should have a Parliament consisting of about 45 members for England, Scotland, Ireland and Wales all put together.

38 But that is not all. For, out of these 330 members 169 are officials, 34 are nominated i. e. semi-official members, while only about 127 members are elected, so that the real ratio is still much lower i. e. about 1 to 30 lakhs of people. Even if we take only the figures of the literate population of India which is 18.5 millions we get on that basis the ratio of $\frac{127}{18,500,000}$ or $1\frac{1}{2}$ to one lakh of literates or 3 members to every two lakhs of people. Going still higher up, or lower down, as it may be regarded, we have a fraction of $\frac{127}{20,000}$ or about 3 members for every 20,000 people who could be called literate in English, i. e. who have received western education. And this is the portion of representative government which has been vouchsafed to the Indian people under these boasted reforms. In 1861, when the first Councils' Act was passed Sir Charles Wood, the then Secretary of State for India, remarked: "I anticipate the introduction of intelligent Indian gentlemen into the Councils will bring to their deliberations a knowledge of the wishes and feelings of the native population, which cannot fail to improve the laws

passed by the Councils by adapting them to the wants of the great mass of the population of India." What shall we say of the progress thus made within the last 55 years in the matter of the representation of the Indian people in the Legislative Councils? And what can be the net amount of improvement in laws and administration through these Councils when one single member is supposed to represent a million of persons?

39 There is again a further consideration appertaining to the same line of thought. Out of 127, the total number of the elected representatives in the different Councils, 14 represent special constituencies whose membership is after all very small though they may be regarded as representing a somewhat important interest; as for example, Municipal Corporations in Presidency towns, Universities and Trusts. Then again there are 21 members representing special interests most of which do not concern the direct well-being of the Indian population, but are in a certain sense alien interests in the land; e. g. European Chambers of Commerce and Planters. Out of the remaining, superior land-holders in India have about 22 seats, and the interests of special classes are represented through special electorates by 18 members, so that practically about 52 seats fall to the share of the millions of the masses of the Indian population! That the distribution of seats in the Legislative Councils so made is unfair may be seen when we consider that the total number of voters, among whom all the seats except these 52 are distributed, comes approximately to only a few hundred!

40 And lastly we find that not only have Government not kept themselves above recognising distinctions of race and religion, which they themselves regard as anathema when seen in the minds of the Indian people, but they have not been able to hold the scales even as between the classes whom they affect to look down upon and the masses whom they profess to love. While Government condemn racial distinctions between Hindus, Mahomedans and others, as showing the want of a spirit of common nationality, they themselves have succumbed either to the force of the Mahomedan demand for communal representation or to their own policy of encouraging a hiatus between the different sections of the Indian population pursued for a number of years before for other purposes. No doubt, the Mahomedans had pressed Government hard for a special recognition of their interests, but surely Government could have, if they had willed it, resisted the demand, if they were really of opinion that the recognition of racial and religious distinctions in political matters was prejudicial to the best interests of the country under their charge. It was for them, and not for the Mahomedans, as it would not be admitted to be for the Hindus also, to decide what was the best for the country as a whole. They might have framed their own scheme according to their own lights after hearing what the Mahomedans had to say for themselves, and have left the scheme there leaving it to the Mahomedans as well as the Hindus either to accept it or reject it. This would have been quite in keeping with their general policy which heeds not what the people have to, or may, say in any matters of administration. The most perfect reasoning in the Legislative Council, or the fiercest agitation outside it, have, in 99 cases out of 100, left the Government unperturbed in their determination to carry out any measure or policy on which they may have set their heart; and those, who know the strength of mind of the Government in other matters, may well be pardoned if similar suggestions occur to their mind in their attempt to explain the weakness of spirit which Government exhibited for once, and in this one, of all matters, viz. the concession of communal representation to the Mahomedans, while ignoring the claims, in a most illogical manner, of other minorities and special interests of which there are admittedly so many in India. The Mahomedans wanted a representation out of proportion to their number, but they did not insist upon communal electorates with the same obstinacy as they did upon disproportionate representation. Further, Lord Morley held the view that though a concession might be made to the Mahomedans in respect of their demand for excessive representation, the demand for communal electorates might be avoided by a scheme of mixed electorate and electoral colleges. The Hon. Mr. Jinnah [for example, in a letter to the *Times of India* dated 20th February 1909, had declared that "if the Mahomedans

were given a representation in proportion of 1 to 3 of the Hindus, mixed electorates would as well serve the purpose of the Mahomedans." As Lord Morley himself had said: "The object of Government was that the Legislative Councils should represent truly and effectively with reasonable approach to the balance of real social forces, the wishes and needs of the communities concerned. This could not be done by Algebra, Arithmetic, Geometry or Logic but by a wide outlook. He saw no harm as to a compromise that while numbers should be the main factor in determining the extent of representation, modifying causes might influence the number of representatives." But it was the Government of India who, willingly or unwillingly, went in finally for communal electorates.

41 The only territorial electorates now re-organised are the Municipalities and the District Local Boards; but in this respect it must be stated that here, again there is an inequality as to the division of seats since while the total population under the municipal area is 1, 68, 29, 929 the total population under the Local Board area is 21,41,69,723; and these unequal numbers of population get exactly the same number of representatives. Further whereas direct representation has been allowed to the Mahomedan voters, the territorial electors have to vote indirectly *i. e.* only through electoral Colleges. Government have practically blown hot and cold with the same breath in the matter of the masses in India. Thus when it suits them to belittle the importance of the educated classes as political leaders, they try to put a discount upon them as a microscopic minority; but when, as on the occasion of the last scheme of reforms, they have an opportunity really to do something to emancipate the masses from the intellectual thralldom of the educated classes, they quietly give the go-by to them saying that "no means can for the present be devised of giving the masses of the people direct representation on the Councils," and they coolly declare that "for the present, at any rate, the needs and sentiments of the masses of the people must find expression through those whether official or non-official, who are acquainted with their daily life and are qualified to speak with authority on their behalf." Here, at any rate, was a golden opportunity for Government to put their solicitude for the masses to the test, and compensate, by revivifying the village panchayats, for the incalculable harm they had done to the rural population at large, by suppressing all village institutions and thus cutting down or atrophying the very nerve centres, as it were, of the national life. A much wider expansion of the Indian Legislative Councils is thus required not only for giving a larger representation to the educated classes, but even much more so for giving the dumb millions an adequate voice in the Councils of Government.

42 Another ingenious device of the last scheme of reforms was that while the semblance of a non-official majority was conceded in the Provincial Councils, an official majority was maintained in the Supreme Legislative Council. The reason is obvious. The Provincial Councils dealt with Provincial Governments; and these were, as they had been all along, under the direct thralldom of the Supreme Government for most of the administrative purposes. We have already shown that despair was writ large on the doors of even Provincial Legislative Councils; but even supposing that the elected representatives could miraculously succeed at times to overwhelm Government, they could touch but the fringe of the entire scheme of government in the country. The Government of India still reigns and rules supreme in most matters of government upto the smallest detail; and as for the Imperial Legislative Council, thanks to the official majority therein, the Council really becomes a close official chamber tempered only by a slight ventilation of non-official views. It simply records the ultimate decrees of the Supreme Secretariat, and the nation must remain as before content with the administration of the country, managed or even mismanaged before its very eyes, without having the satisfaction of exercising a direct control over the most insignificant detail of it. And so after going through a consideration of the whole scheme of the Morley-Minto Reforms, we practically come back to the position that it is the will of the Civil Service and their will alone that rules and governs India.

43 The above, in brief, is the position of the Indian people so far as the rights of citizenship are concerned. The out-standing features of the situation are that (1)

while they enjoy, to a large extent, the rights of citizenship included in the lower scale, (2) they enjoy the rights included in the higher scale only to a very nominal degree. The rights in the lower scale, however, are rights which are due to, and generally realised by, a subject even under an uncivilised government; and their possession, therefore, can be said to do credit neither to the enlightenment of the British rulers nor to the self-respect of the Indian people. The description of their present position can hardly go beyond this that they are under a Rule of Law under the British Government. But the mere Rule of Law does not go far enough when we consider the position of the Indian people, as citizens of the British Empire. In strict theory, the status that we have already secured by the Charter Act of 1833 and the Proclamation of 1858, is so broad-based, that a fully responsible and a thoroughly representative or democratic self-government for India may be supported upon it. Yet in practice, we are a mere subject people, condemned to be aliens in our own country, and to be mere 'hewers of wood and drawers of water' for the British Empire.

44 The Rule of Law is a fine phrase and has a sonorous sound; but the Law, in the present case of India, means absolutely nothing more than the expression of the views and the policy of the official world in India. The Rule of Law is thus not far removed from despotism pure and simple, though, unlike in the pre-British days, the despotism is not centred at one place viz. the Supreme Executive Government, but distributed for the sake of convenience among half a dozen Civilian Secretaries to Government. It is impossible that the Indian people should be persuaded to take any other view of the situation simply because the new despotism, unlike the old, has embellished it apparently with legislative refinements. The Indian people are not children to be dazzled or mystified by the profuse display of constitutional fireworks. The old Indian despots were indeed ignorant of the sovereign virtues that are supposed to be imbedded in spacious preambles and a logically artistic arrangement of sections. But when we remember that they lived permanently in this land, that their interests were virtually connected with the interests of the people, that they stood or fell with them, that the spoils of their rapacity or despotism were at least left in the land itself to manure it, and that though, not in strict form yet in appreciable substance, their policy was influenced, if not governed, by the unelected leaders of the community armed with an unwritten constitution, the results of their government could not after all fall far short of the boasted results of constitutional British Government, established by Law. The old governments, being native or indigenous to the soil, perhaps, needed no such artificial buttress of validity as is conveyed by the words 'government as established by law', and supposing the art of constitutional draftsmanship had been so developed and refined as it is in these days, it is quite easy to imagine that tomes of written constitutions and constitutional laws could have been put together out of the living facts of the governments as actually administered, which might stand on the shelves of the modern constitutional lawyer with the same self-confident and dignified bearing towards their western companions, as the institutes of Manu and Yādnyavalkya for example actually do. The practical test of any despotism, whether eastern or western, lies after all in the degree of the effective control which the political community can possibly exercise upon its actual work of administration; and, judged by this test, the present rule of the British bureaucracy does not compare very favourably with the despotism of the Indian Rajas or Nababs. If anything, the very want of efficiency was a thing in their favour; for the mischief of their despotism did not get a harmful momentum by the combination of the weight and the energy of a supercilious and over-active Secretariat. In the field of eastern despotism, the poisonous herb of power and its antidote germinated and grew together: whereas, in the case of the present alien despotism and a self-centred secretariat, a fatal hiatus has been produced between the poison and its antidote, as says a well-known Sanskrit dramatist "the Divine curative herbs grow on the top of the Himalaya mountain, but the serpent is sitting at my head with his fangs opened."

45 No doubt, in India the Reign of Law now prevails and can be appreciated to a certain extent by the Indian people, as we have already pointed out, so far as the minor

scale of the rights of citizenship is concerned; but, when viewed from a broader point of view, this reign of Law entirely fails to give satisfaction and can hardly evoke any gratitude. And this for two reasons; for, in the first place the Indian Legislature is after all a mere subordinate legislature and the range of the external limits to its power is very wide indeed; and, secondly, the Reign of Law is absolutely barren in point of those constitutional rights which are after all the essence of a free and a living nation.

46 Constitutionally speaking, there is an internal as well as an external limit to the powers of the Indian Legislature; but this limit does not go farther than the limit which a human despot—perhaps an enlightened despot—may willingly set to his own despotism. As Prof. Dicey says, "Even a despot exercises his powers in accordance with his character which is itself moulded by the circumstances under which he lives, including under that head the moral feelings of the time and the society to which he belongs. The Sultan could not, if he would, change the religion of the Mahomedan world, but if he could do so, it is in the very highest degree improbable that the head of Mahomedanism should wish to overthrow the religion of Mahomet; for, the internal check on the exercise of the Sultan's power is, at least, as strong as the external limitation. People sometimes ask the idle question why the Pope does not introduce this or that reform? The true answer is that a revolutionist is not the kind of man who becomes a Pope, and that the man who becomes a Pope has no wish to become a revolutionist. Parliament could not prudently tax the colonists, but it is hardly conceivable that a modern Parliament, with the history of the last century before its eyes, should wish to tax the colonies." Or again, as Leslie Stephen points out in the *Science of Ethics*, "The power of the legislature is limited from within, because the legislature is the product of a certain social condition and determined by whatever determines the Society. If a legislature decided that all blue-eyed babies should be murdered, the preservation of blue-eyed babies would be illegal; but legislatures must go mad before they could pass such a law, and subjects be idiotic before they could submit to it." These theoretical external and internal limits more or less coincide in countries which enjoy a representative and responsible government; and to that extent, and for that reason, the internal limit to the powers of the Indian Legislature cannot be so far-reaching as in self-governing nations. But we shall gladly recognise that even in India the natural internal limit, as described above by Prof. Dicey, is realised to a certain extent. Thus even in India, though, as we have seen, truly popular representation in the Councils is almost non-existent and entirely ineffective so far as it exists, a limit is discernible beyond which legislation will not go. The limit has, of course, already been realised to be narrow enough to have enabled the Indian Legislative Council to pass a law like the Arms Act or the Press Act or the Seditious Meetings Act or the Revenue Jurisdiction Act. But we may concede that it is almost inconceivable, even in conditions under which India exists at present, that the legislature should pass an act ordaining that every Indian should fall on his knees before an Anglo-Indian whenever he meets the latter in the street; or that every Indian householder shall be bound upon penalty to pay for and consume so many rupees-worth of English goods in twelve calendar months; or that no Indian shall hold in reserve or saving any amount of money exceeding one thousand rupees; or that particular surnames shall not be borne on the ground that they have a dismal sound or a revolutionary sense. The limitations in these cases arise more from the enlightenment, which the Civilians possess or the reputation for civilisation which they have at stake. The eulogy, which we have already willingly bestowed upon the men of the Civil Service in another part of this book, need not be here repeated. The average Civilian is a man of education and culture and is also susceptible to the influence of the society which he governs. He would not, therefore, be guilty of such antics even if the Reformed Legislative Council totally ceased to exist or the Law Courts were entirely abolished. But our good opinion of the Civilian as a man cannot and ought not to blind us to the fact that when it comes to vital administrative or political questions, the only internal limit, governing his action in the Legislative Council, becomes the measure-

of his own political sanity or the volume of his country's self-interest, but never the opinion or the sentiment of the *Indian* people, however well reasoned or strong it may be.

47 Even from this aspect of the Reign of Law, we find that the Colonial Legislatures stand in a much better position than the Indian Legislature, though Parliament has, as in the case of the Indian Legislature, certain powers of legislative veto over them, and thus makes them technically subordinate legislatures. The conflict between the Colonial Legislatures and Parliament is real to a degree and has a meaning, whereas a conflict between the Indian Legislature and Parliament is almost unthinkable; for, the reason is that the Colonial Legislatures enjoy on the whole much greater powers than the Indian Legislature. Moreover, the tendency of the Imperial Government is, as a matter of policy, to interfere less and less day by day with the action of the Colonies whether in the nature of law-making or otherwise.

48 The Reign of Law no doubt prevails in India, but it is almost barren of nourishing results from the point of view of the Indian nation. The value of the crop alone can justify the cost of the hedging; and if it be true, as many eminent Indian and also other thinkers have held, that the net result of the British rule in India has been an all-round emasculation of the Indian people, then they would be perfectly justified in refusing to regard that Reign of Law as a blessing of Providence or as a political dispensation for which they may feel grateful to the British Government. A mere Reign of Law will be useless if it is not accompanied by the three 'P's which are the essentials of national life viz. Peace, Plenty and Power. Now we have the three 'P's, under British Rule, in a descending scale. Of the first viz. Peace, we have quite an abundance; of Plenty we have less as has already been considered in a previous chapter. And as for Power, we have absolutely none as we have presently shown. The Indian people naturally aspire to get a full measure of Plenty and Power, while retaining Peace. But they cannot reasonably hope to materialise that aspiration so long as they have not got Self-Government. Not only is it their birth-right to have it as human beings, but it is also due to them, both by reason of the declared policy of the British Sovereign and the British nation, and also by reason of the services they have rendered to the Empire. The honour of the Indian people and the duty of the British Government both point towards that same ideal, and the relations between England and India will not be justified so long as that ideal has not been realised.



Chapter VI

The Shibboleth of Unfitness

ENGLISHMEN, who admit in a general way that Self-Government is the only right form of Government for any nation, change their front at once and resort to special pleading as soon as they are brought face to face with the demand for Self-Government by the Indian people. It immediately dawns upon them that the Indian people are included among the oriental people; and that oriental people are as a rule unfit for Self-Government. But they have a further difficulty to encounter in this direction; for they know that some oriental people like those in Japan and China have now definitely gone in for representative institutions. So confronted, they ask us sapiently to wait and see the result of those rash experiments; in the expectation, if not the hope, that the experiments must turn out failures. And as for India, why, they must prevent even the experiment itself being made here for the simple reason that they are the masters of the situation.

2 Even the strongest champions of the rule of the advanced over backward races admit the evil of despotism; yet there are despotisms and despotisms; and the British Imperialist pretends that British rule, though despotic, is much better for the Indians than the Native despotism which would be the only alternative. Now even supposing that British despotism is better than Native despotism, why, we ask, should we be made to content ourselves with only British despotism, and not be allowed to wish for a desirable change in the form of Government as well as we had a definite change in the rulers? If every thing western has taken the place of every thing eastern about us in all other matters, then why should not a representative and responsible Government be as well substituted for despotism? If our minds and intellects must be westernised by English education for one purpose, *e. g.* religion, and social life, why should not they be westernised as well for another purpose, *viz.*, politics? To be made to read Mill and Burke for our political philosophers and yet to be made to accept Machiavelli as our ruler is the height of inconsistency. We must be hopelessly 'brutalised or prostrated' if, notwithstanding the efficient thinking we have learnt through a perusal of the literature of liberalism, we could retain, even supposing we ever had it, a settled belief in the entire beneficence or the utter infallibility of our British rulers, or not acquire a desire to try our hand at our own Government.

3 Do not the British know that as rulers or administrators they are not infallible? Evidently they do; the very essence of the system of party-government at home is the possibility of making mistakes. In England a change of Government *i. e.*, the going out of the party which has erred and the coming in of the party which asserts that it can do better, or rather the party which has detected the mistake and hit the nail on the head, is regarded as a sign of healthy, political, national life. But it is quite the other thing when India is concerned. For, here the Civilians, good bad or indifferent, are not only all quite fit to administer the country, but even to monopolise the administration. A change in Government is unthinkable, for, there is no alternative set of capable administrators in the country! But this convenient scheme of aggrandisement cannot be allowed to pass unchallenged. As Prof. Robertson has put it, "To exercise an absolute control over community or a congeries of communities in the belief that one is absolutely infallible, is to tread the path of insanity; and to know that one is politically fallible and yet never to care for the opinion of those whom one may be at any moment misgoverning is to set conscience aside. Either way demoralisation or deterioration follows as inevitably for the rulers as for the ruled. All history proclaims the lesson. Whether we take ancient despots ruling empires through Satraps, or States playing the despot to other States, the sequence is infallibly evil. Never is there any continuity of sound life. In the absence of control from the governed, the despotisms invariably grew corrupt and feeble. On the substitution of despotic rule for self-rule, all the forces of civilisation began to

fail. The State imperialism of Rome was even more utterly fatal than the personal imperialism of Alexander and his successors; it destroyed alike the primary power of self-defence and the higher life throughout nearly its whole sphere. The arbitrary rule of England over Scotland in the 14th century and over France in the 15th, was followed by periods of humiliation and decadence. The harm may be more perceptible or less, but the principle of harm can never be eliminated where the unsound relation exists." The dilemma which Prof. Robertson propounds is perfectly logical. If the subject races of today are progressing, they must be on the way to a measure of Self-Government; if not, the domination of the advanced races is a plain failure, and the talk of beneficent rule becomes an idle hypocrisy. The only lame and halting answer which the Imperialist can give is that though the British rulers in India are beneficent and are quite ready and willing to teach, the Indians themselves are inherently incapable of progress along the line of representative institutions. Or that, in other words, the faculty of Self-Government is only local and confined to the regions west of a particular longitude, and personal in the sense of being peculiar to particular races in those regions.

4 The dividing line between the East and the West is of course an imaginary line; and those who indulge in platitudes about 'the East and the West' will rarely be able to tell you at what longitude exactly the line may be drawn. Societies every where merge on the border line almost as indistinguishably as the colours of of the rain-bow; you cannot say exactly where the one ends and the other begins. Moreover, there is no theory of the variation of political habits and ideas which can consistently explain the resemblances in societies on either side of the line or differences between societies on the same side of it. It is a patent fact that neither of the hemispheres on each side of the line has been entirely inhabited by the men of a single race. On the other hand, the inevitable habit of migration can be shown to have resulted in racial stocks of descent having gone to the East from the West or to the West from the East across this imaginary line. The name of the political types in the world is legion; and by no feat of philosophical classification or generalisation can all these be compressed under only two main generic types so that one of these may be truly or wholly assigned for the East and another for the West. As Walter Bagehot has remarked, "Granted the beginning of the type we may explain its development and aggravation; but we cannot in the least explain why the incipient type of curious characters broke out in one place rather than in another. Climate and physical surroundings in the largest sense have unquestionably much influence. They are one factor in the cause, but they are not the only factor. For we find most dissimilar races of men living in the same climate and affected by the same surroundings, and we have every reason to believe that those unlike races have so lived as neighbours for ages. The causes for types must be something outside the tribe acting on something within,—something inherited by the tribe."

5 In reply to the claim that there is such a thing as an ascertained and exclusive class of people as the inhabitants of the West who alone possess certain mental or intellectual excellences, we need not go so far as to point out that a great majority of modern authorities now claim a monogenetic origin for all mankind. We may be content with the proposition, as stated by Dr. Felix Von Luschan at the first session of the Universal Races Congress, viz. that, "The number of human races has quite lost its *raison d'être* and has become a subject rather of philosophical speculation than of scientific research. It is of no more importance now to know how many human races there are than to know how many Angles can dance on the point of a needle." The modern Australian is regarded as being not essentially different from the palæolithic man of Europe. The difference between the modern civilisation of Europe and the primitive condition of Australia can perhaps be explained by the fact that Australia was insulated from the rest of the world through an early geological catastrophe soon after the emigration of palæolithic man and that every impulse and incentive from without ceased and human life began to petrify. But the difference has not been so marked with reference to the peoples who did not suffer from such irredeemable isolation. From the Western end of Europe

right upto the eastern end of Asia people have lived in close contact for thousands of years; and if there have been variations in their character, each type so developed has had its special qualities as well as special defects. But the sum total has been nearly even. The variation, however, has never resulted in absolutely unchangeable characters; and a slight change of environment has always been seen to evoke the inherent quality of adaptability so that the peculiar features of these characters have often been exchanged. As the same writer has observed, "The European races can only be understood by considering Europe as a small peninsular annexe to ancient India." There was constant coming and going between Asia, Africa and Europe, six centuries before the invasion of the Vandals; Hannibal sent his soldiers from Africa to Europe and from Europe to Africa and in the early middle ages the African Mahomedans reigned in Western Europe for more than 500 years.

6 The interconnection and migration as between the supposed East and the West can be continuously traced to thousands of years not only through natural history but also through art and literature. One type of development might be more refined and another may be less refined; but if both are thorough-bred or good types, however they may differ, one is not necessarily inferior to the other. Certain white men may be on a lower intellectual and moral level than certain coloured Africans. Christianity which has covered Europe has an Asiatic birth, and the compliment is only being returned when Western civilisation is now spreading over Asia. Certain political ideas may appear to enjoy a luxurious life in one country rather than in another, but political wisdom is not certainly the monopoly of any one of them; and approved forms of Government can be easily constructed and successfully worked on the broad and sound basis of this political wisdom. As Mr. Israel Zangwil has put it in his paper on the Jewish race, "In the treatment of dependent peoples and communities the modern conscience rejects as a fallacy the claim of Western civilisation to a monopoly of the capacity of Self-Government based on an indivisible interrelation between European descent, Christianity and the so-called white colour. It recognises that while this interrelation has evolved a capacity for Self-Government in an appropriate environment, a similar capacity has been evolved by an inter-relation of other races, creeds and colours appropriate to other environments. It maintains, therefore, that the conflict between the West and the East must be adjusted on the same principle that has adjusted the conflicts of race and creed in the West: viz. the principle of freedom, interpreted as liberty of person and conscience, an equality of opportunity for all, without distinction of race, creed or colour, under a settled government. History, reason and recent experience in Japan warn us that the adjustment must be made, not in the spirit of the popular refrain "East is East and West is West," but in the spirit of a nobler poetic formula, "God's is the occident, God's is the orient." Dr. Charles S. Myers, Professor of Experimental Psychology in the Cambridge University, in his paper on the Permanence of Racial mental differences, read before the Universal Races Congress, affirmed the proposition that the mental characters of the majority of the peasant class throughout Europe are essentially the same as those of primitive communities, and that as organism and environment is the ultimate cause of variation, the possibility of the progressive development of all primitive peoples must be conceded, if only the environment can be appropriately changed. And if this could be said of primitive races there should be no hesitation in admitting that, even supposing the eastern people were not familiar with exactly the present forms of popular Government before, their present environment will enable them to be familiar with them in a very short time. Till recently, despotic rule was supposed to hall-mark the east; but today representative Government is clamoured for even in the few oriental countries outside India where it did not exist already.

7 The demand of the so-called Eastern people for Self-Government is merely repeating in the 20th century the story of Europe's emergence from an autocratic regime in the 19th century. The principle of representative Government was known in antiquity almost to all nations whether eastern or western. But its application in the olden time was not vivid in any of those nations. It was only

in the Middle Ages that the representative system developed, more particularly only among those countries even in Europe in which the states happened to be of a feudal character, so that the component parts of the State claimed a certain independence within the general body. The history of autocracy, however, extends over a much larger period in Europe than the history of representative Government. Only in countries like England, Sweden and the Netherlands, representative Governments had a kind of a continuous life; but even here representative Government had a very chequered career. After the fall of Napoleon in 1815, very few of the countries of Europe were found to have representative institutions. In countries like Hungary, Poland, Finland there were constitutions, but they existed only on paper. Most of the European States remained autocratic. It was only in 1848 that the era of representative Government really dawned for the first time in Europe. But the results of the popular revolutions in that year were obliterated within the next three years. Germany was still divided under despotic rulers; Austria had a commanding position throughout Europe but was notorious as the high-priest of absolutism. Italy was only a motley collection of petty principalities under the heel of Austria, and the stories of misrule and despotism in some of the Italian States in the middle of the 19th century could hardly be equalled in hatefulness by any stories that could be told of despotism of native rulers in India. It was only when Austria was humbled in 1866 that real representative Government began to lift its head among the European nations.

8 Russia is an admittedly European country, but oriental countries like Japan, China, Persia and Turkey had obtained constitutions and even Parliaments before the Russian people could make any impression upon the autocracy of the Tsar. In 1905 once more did popular Government make an effort to assert itself. The Russo-Japanese War had the effect of stirring the embers of popular life in Russia and the Duma was established, which is now soon going to be transformed into a full-fledged national Parliament of the Russian Republic. In 1906, a popular revolution forced the Shah of Persia to grant a constitution. In 1908 the Young Turks put an end to the despotic rule of the Turkish Sultan and established not only a constitutional but a Parliamentary Government. Within five years from this, the Chinese Emperor had to concede a constitution to his people and the Chinese Republic was not long in following. The difference of from 50 to 100 years in the beginning of the popular unrest, on the ground of a desire for popular government, in Europe and in Asia cannot be regarded as being of material significance; nor can the impotence of the popular movement in Asia suffer by the allegation that the popular movement in Asia is an imitation of the popular movement in Europe. Nothing in the political world is absolutely original; and if the torch of the popular movement in India has been really lighted directly from the torch which has burned so steadily and brightly for centuries in England, one should only conclude that the popular movement in India would show all the qualities of the original model, especially as there is to be a continuous living connection between the representative institutions in India and the mother of Parliaments, and that the development of a democracy in India is to take place under the direct supervision of a liberty-loving nation like England.

9 People, who have had no political development whatever, may not be fit for representative institutions and responsible government all at once. They may have to pass through a long period of apprenticeship. But such is not the case with the Indian people who, in the days immediately preceding British rule, carried on civil governments and were admittedly successful in that line. As the author of the *Passing of Empire* says: "Some hundreds of years ago there were in India kingdoms that were stable strong and free. The peoples were enterprising, active and intelligent, and a high degree of civilisation was common throughout all classes. I don't think it is generally realised that five or six hundred years ago India was ahead of Europe in most matters. And Englishmen themselves must admit that they have borrowed not a little from the administrative systems which were already in operation when they came." The Land Revenue system under British Government was based on those of Todar Mul in the north

and Malikamber in the south. The recognition of the use of these pre-British systems of administration has of course decreased in later times; but what is historically true cannot be destroyed by mere convenient forgetfulness. "

IO Mr. G. W. Forrest, in his biography of the Hon. Mount Stuart Elphinstone Governor of Bombay, who took over the administration of the Mahratha country from the Marathas, says that "Elphinstone's success as an administrator was chiefly due to the fact that he saw that political institutions and social usages which had lasted for centuries could not be entirely devoid of merit. His endeavour in the Civil administration was to show the people that they are to expect no change but in the better administration of their own former laws." He wrote to the Governor General that "even just government will not be a blessing if it is at variance with the habits and character of the people. The system of government introduced by Elphinstone did not essentially differ from the comparatively patriarchal scheme of management of Nana Fadanvis by which the agents of the Government directly settled with the people. He ordered the Collectors to administer without the restraint of any regulations but those which they found established. He did all that lay in his power to revive the public spirit which once animated the village communities—ancient institutions which had existed from time immemorial and which centuries of alternating tyranny and anarchy had never been able entirely to extinguish. He preserved the influence of village officers, for he knew what other English administrators have been ignorant of—that the task of really governing India down to the villages and the people is too great for a foreign government and can be done only through native agency and communal self-government. He trusted the administration of justice in small matters to the village panchayat or the assembly of the village elders." And Elphinstone did not stand alone in this respect. Munros, Malcolms, Metcalfes could not be said to have been less efficient rulers than the present Civilians; yet their success was due to a respect for the old systems of administration which stood the test very well in their hands. And it is only because these time-honoured and time-tested systems were set aside by the latter-day administrators that while there is more show than reality of efficiency, the administration has failed to be popular. Says Mr. Forrest, "Every centralised bureaucracy has been a failure, because it regards and treats men as things and not as persons. One of the reasons why the English Raj has not won favour of the people is that there is too much of the powerful machine and too little of humanity in us. We try to be just and we are unjust and cruel, because we believe our system of government to be adapted to all races and conditions of life. We have forgotten the principles which Elphinstone enforced in his report." The success of the early British administrators who made use of the pre-British systems of administration, thus contrasted with the failure of the later British administrators who abandoned them, affords, in our opinion, independent testimony to the fitness of the pre-British Indians to be rulers and administrators at least in their own country. The testimony of Elphinstone himself to the indigenous system of the Police and Judicial administration is highly valuable; for he says that, "with all the defects of these systems the Mahratta country flourished," and the people seem to have been exempt from some of the evils which exist under our more perfect government. There must, therefore, have been some advantages in the system to counter-balance its obvious defects. The advantage was particularly felt in the lower orders who are most out of reach of their rulers and most apt to be neglected under all governments. "

II Even under the British Government it could not be said that the Natives have forgotten the art of government. For with the exception that, while in the pre-British days they did the work of administration on their own responsibility and as authoritative heads of department, they perform almost the same functions now under the British Government as mere low paid inferiors or subordinates, there has been practically no break in the continuity of their touch with administrative business. The present day Shirastedars and Head Clerks and Clerks of Courts are experienced administrators; and if they could only get the chance they would ably discharge the duties of the very superiors whose orders they now seem to carry out. Most of the detailed work in the original stage is done almost

to perfection by these men; and it is an almost open secret of the official chamber that the British superior often contents himself with putting to the final draft his initials or his signature as the case may require. The valuable assistance rendered by the expert head-assistants and deputies is, no doubt, sometimes rewarded by a patronizing smile or a certificate of merit by the superiors; but the former have never any chance of playing the roll of the superiors themselves. The dwarfing of merit thus goes on indefinitely, while one raw superior succeeds another and utilises for his benefit the increasingly valuable assistance of the native deputies. It is sometimes very amusing to see how, in the executive line, a native Deputy-Collector takes the place of a European Assistant Collector and is in due course again replaced by him without any the slightest change for the worse in the administration, and yet involving an enormous difference in the amount of public money debited for the work done. The same is true, and perhaps in a greater degree, of the judicial service. No service can be admittedly more efficient than the Subordinate Judicial Service which almost wholly is manned by the natives of India; and not a single note or minute of dissatisfaction with or disapproval of the work of that service can be found in the records of Government relating to that department. We may content ourselves in this respect with only one piece of testimony and that of a late Lord Chancellor, we mean the Earl of Selborne, who was reported in the *London Times* of the 10th of April 1883, to have made these remarks: "My Lords, for some years I practised in Indian cases before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, and during those years there were few cases of any imperial importance in which I was not concerned. I had considerable opportunities of observing the manner in which, in civil cases, the Native judges did their duty, and I have no hesitation in saying—and I know this was also the opinion of the judges during that time—that the judgment of the Native judges bore most favourable comparison, as a general rule, with the judgments of the English judges. I should be sorry to say anything in disparagement of English judges, who, as a class, are most anxious carefully to discharge their duty; but I repeat that I have no hesitation in saying that in every instance, in respect of integrity, of learning, of knowledge, of the soundness and satisfactory character of the judgments arrived at, the Native judgments were quite as good as those of English judges."

12 The trick of the trade is to keep the native out of the higher and the responsible work so that he could not take the credit for the work to himself, and only to use him as an intellectual drudge. The Hon. Mr. Gokhale, during the course of a debate on the subject of the Public Services in the Supreme Legislative Council in the year 1911, practically bombed the Council with an extract from a report by one Colonel De Pree, the head at one time of the Survey Department. The report says: "My numerous late inspections show me that the tendency of the European surveyors is to stand and look on while the natives are made to do the drawing and hand-printing as if they thought themselves quite above that sort of thing. This is a mistake and cannot be permitted for the future. Besides, it is suicidal for the European to admit that natives can do anything better than themselves. *They should claim to be superior in everything and only allow the natives to take a secondary or subordinate part.* In my old parties I never permitted a native to touch a theodolite or an original computation, on the principle that the triangulation or the scientific work was the prerogative of the highly paid European, and this reservation of the scientific work was the only way by which I could keep a distinction so as to justify the different figures respectively drawn by the two classes—the European in office time and the native who ran him so close in all the office duties as well as in the field duties. Yet I see that natives commonly do the computation work and the Europeans some other inferior duties."

13 The natives, wherever appointed to higher posts, have always done justice to the work and earned credit for themselves. But the proof of the intelligence and abilities which they actually possess and the possibility of their expansion and development are inexorably limited by the paucity of opportunities which they get for distinguishing themselves in British India. On the other hand they invariably justify the opportunities they get in the Native States which afford a contrast to the British Government so far at least as fair opportunities for proving worth and earning

distinction are concerned. Indian Statesmen like Raja Dinkar Rao, Sir T. Madhav Rao, Diwan Bahadur R. Rangnath Rao, Sir Salerjung, Diwan Purnayya, Ranga Charlu, Sir Sheshadri Ayar could prove their capacity as administrators only because they were in Natives States. The instructive example may in this connection be given of Sir M. Vishweshwar Ayya, who was not fit enough in British India to hold the post of the Superintending Engineer in charge of a Division, but discharged satisfactorily the duties of the Chief Engineer as soon as he was transferred to Mysore and has now proved himself to be one of the most capable and progressive Dewans of that State. To give a concrete instance of the scope for professional distinction in a Native State, we may name the Kaveri Dam, which is under construction and which when completed will rank as the third greatest work of that kind in the world. And yet, everything connected with this work, from the original conception of it to its actual execution in detail, has been done by natives, in fact humble graduates of Engineering who passed from the Poona Engineering College. In most other Native States also there is just a sprinkling of Europeans, appointed more as a matter of patronage than anything else, whereas all the highest offices are manned and satisfactorily discharged by natives. The words of Mr. J. E. S. Cotton echo the same sentiments and we quote them here. "The case of Mysore is still stronger. The whole staff of English officials has been superseded by natives...For if Mysore prospers under native administration, as Travancore has long prospered, why should English Collectors be necessary for the adjoining districts of the Madras Presidency." He further says. "Nothing is more commonly heard than that natives are unfit for high executive office, and that Englishmen cannot be expected to serve under natives. Both assertions may be disproved by history and by the contemporary experience of Native States. A people that has produced Todar Mal and Murshid Kuli Khan, Haidar Ali and Ranjit Sing (not to mention living names) cannot be destitute of administrative talent. This talent may not be the same as that displayed by Europeans, but neither is the talent of all Europeans nations identical in kind...A native administration can never be the same thing as an English administration. To wait for that to come about would be to wait till the Ethiopian shall have changed his skin."

14 Coming back to the British Government we may note that since the era of the appointment of natives to higher councils was opened by Lord Morley in 1909, men like Sir K. G. Gupta, Sir S. P. Sinha, Sir Syed Alli Imam, Hon. Mr. Krishna Swami Aiyer and others have given excellent account of themselves in their new unaccustomed office and have won the highest praise from Government. Sir K. G. Gupta was one of the first to be appointed to the State Secretary's Council ; and his work, according to Mr. Charles Roberts compelled Government to regard such a high appointment as no longer an experiment but an accomplished and undoubted success. The work of Sir S. P. Sinha reconciled even such an inveterate enemy of Indian aspirations as Sir Valentine Chirol to the innovation of putting natives in the highest places. In S. P. Sinha, again, we have a man of whom it could be truly said that he underwent enormous self-sacrifice in accepting the Law-Membership of the Government of India. And of Mr. Krishnaswami Aiyer, Sir Murrey Hamric said, "His genius and sound judgment impressed us all. His mastery over the details of complicated matters astonished every one".

15 And what applies to filling the higher posts of Government service, also applies to the claim of the Indian people for representative institutions. As observed by Mr. Cotton, the people of India possess an instinctive capacity for Self-government, which centuries of oppression have not eradicated. This is found even among the hill-tribes to such an extent as to have caused students to doubt whether the village community be, after all, an "Aryan" institution. It lies at the root of the custom of caste, and it has been adapted to found trade guilds scarcely less influential than those in Europe during the middle ages." Even to-day our Local Self-Government, so far as really we have got it, is proved a success; though Government only grudgingly admits the fact, as a confession of that sort would irresistibly lead to the demand for the presidentships of Municipalities and Local-Boards to be thrown open to elected non-officials and the councils themselves to be almost wholly elective. Of the men collectively, who worked in the reformed Legislative

Councils, again Lord Hardinge remarked : " I can say, from experience gained in different parts of the world, that this Council is second to none in the dignity of its proceedings and the good feeling that animates its members." All this proves that the natives are hampered only by the want of suitable opportunities. As for Parliament, at least two Indians were found to be fit to be trusted with the suffrage of British constituencies. And can any one doubt that a hundred people at any rate can not be found in India to-day to be members of the British Parliament and prove themselves equals of the average member of that body, if it was not almost a hopeless business, even for the ablest, the richest and the most enterprising men among the educated Indians, to maintain themselves in England and to successfully woo a British constituency? But as things stand at present we have to content ourselves with only fancifully indulging in a profitless speculation as to the theoretical possibilities of the Charter Act of 1833. In strict theory, by the force of this Act, an Indian may not only be a member of Parliament but even the Prime Minister himself; but when tested on the touchstone of practice, the Charter is, in this respect, nothing better than a Dead-Sea-fruit. The intentions embodied in the Act are a good horse in the stable but an arrant jade on a journey. While in India we can neither enter Parliament nor vote for election to it, yet as observed by Mr. George Yule as President of the 4th Indian National Congress, if thousands of Hindus, Mahomedans, Eurasians, Parsees and others in this country, were to transfer their persons to England for twelve months or more, and pay certain rates, they would be qualified to enjoy all the rights and privileges of British subjects " If you and I go to England we are qualified. If we return to India our character changes, and we are not qualified. In England we should be trusted citizens. In India, well, the charitably-minded among our opponents say that we are incipient traitors !"

16 We may now turn to another aspect of this question. The history of constitutional reform in European and other countries shows that the equipment of either education, enlightenment, or public spirit required for a valid claim to representative institutions and responsible popular government, was not necessarily of a higher standard than what is at present in India. And for the sake of convenience we will briefly consider the question under the following sub-heads: (1) education, (2) racial and religious differences, (3) differences of language, manners and customs and other elements of nationality, (4) public spirit, (5) capacity for local self-government, (6) efficiency of the representative system, and (7) general.

17 Regarding the educational progress in England and the colonies, either immediately before or after the grant of self-government, we content ourselves with quoting the following extracts:

"In the first place it must be said that the only qualification (of a voter) ever known to the British constitution has been the possession of a stake, as it is called, in the country. Educational qualification has never formed a test of fitness within the British dominions" (George Yule, 1888, 4th Indian National Congress).

About the state of education in England during the 18th century, Prof. Thorold Rogers says in his book the *British Citizen* : " I do not believe that 100 years ago more than one man in ten or one woman in twenty knew how to read and write... Going another century or two back, the people of England.....with the exception of a mere handful were steeped in the grossest ignorance and yet there was a House of Commons ".

Henry Craik in his *State and Education* says that. " In the year 1845 only about one in six, even of the children at school, was found able to read scriptures with any ease. Even for these the power of reading often left them when they tried a secular book."

About the *teachers* he says: " The teaching of the schools was in the hands of men who had scarcely any training and who had often turned to the work because all other work had turned away from them !"

He further says: " In some parts of the kingdom (and these by no means the most backward) it was calculated that (in 1845) about 5 per cent of the population only were at school."

He gives some interesting statistics:—" In 1803 statistics had shown 1 boy in 17½ at school; in 1833, 1 in 11¼, in 1851, 1 in 8·36, and in 1858, 1 in 7·7."

From a Parliamentary return, published in February 1887, it appeared that, with a total recorded poll of 2,969,381 in the United Kingdom at the general election of the previous year, there were 80,145 *illiterate voters*. In England and Wales there were 2,416,272 voters and 38,587 illiterate voters; in Scotland 358,115 and 4,836; and in Ireland 194,994 and 36,722 respectively.

Canada has the same woeful story to tell about education just before she was granted self-government. Lord Durham says in his report:—" It is impossible to exaggerate the want of education among the habitants. No means of instruction have ever been provided for them and they are almost, and universally, destitute of the qualifications even of reading and writing. A great proportion of the teachers could neither read nor write." Bourinot says in his *Canada*:—" But, in 1838, there were only 24,000 children at school out of a total population of 400,000." i. e. only 6 per cent.

In New South Wales (Australia), when the elective principle was introduced into the new constitution in 1842, there was not a single University in the whole of the Australian Commonwealth. The first University was founded in 1848 i. e. six years *after* the constitution was granted.

Speaking about the condition of the United States of America before the revolution, Webster says:—" Education is sunk to a level with the most menial services..... Will it be denied that before the war it was a frequent practice for gentlemen to purchase convicts, who had been transported for their crimes, and employ them as private tutors in their families? "

From this it will be seen that literacy is not the test of a nation's fitness for self-government. As Mr. Cotton remarks: " A nation must be judged by its leading class, especially when that class is in all important respects homogeneous with the rest..... To wait until India shall have become English would be to put off her liberation to the Greek calends.... But men who speak better English than most Englishmen, who read Mill and Comte, Max Muller and Maine, who occupy with distinction seats on the judicial bench, who administer the affairs of Native States with many millions of inhabitants, who manage cotton mills and conduct the boldest operations of commerce, who edit newspapers in English and correspond on equal terms with the scholars of Europe"—these, we say, can no longer be treated as unfit for self-government.

IS The Anglo-Indian attempts to discount from the leadership of the educated classes in India only to usurp that place for himself. Himself, a highly educated man, and habitually neglectful of the proletariat in India, the Anglo-Indian feels a sudden impulse to play the role of the real representative of the masses. Despotic in his tendencies as a rule, the Anglo-Indian Bureaucrat can, when it suits his purpose, excellently play the part of a demagogue; and then he does not stop at any vulgarity. As Graham Wallas remarks in his book on *Human Nature in Politics*, " the choice of the Civilian's means of Government on all questions involving popular opinion depends, even more completely than if he were a party politician at home, not on things as they are, but on things as they may be made to seem. The avowed tactics of our Empire in the East have therefore always been based by many of our high officials upon psychological and not logical considerations. We hold Durbars and issue Proclamations, we blow men from guns and insist stiffly on our own interpretation of our rights in dealing with neighbouring powers;—all with reference to the 'moral effect upon the native mind.' And if half of what is hinted at by some ultra-imperialistic writers and talkers is true, racial and religious antipathy between Hindus and Mahomedans, is some times welcomed, if not encouraged, by those who feel themselves bound at all costs to maintain our dominant position. It is when a Czar or a Bureaucracy find themselves forced to govern in opposition to a vague national feeling, which may at any moment create an overwhelming national purpose, that the facts of man's sublogical nature are most ruthlessly exploited. The autocrat then becomes the most

unscrupulous of demagogues, and stirs up religious or social hatred or the lust for foreign war with less scruple than does the proprietor of the worst newspaper in a democratic state." The official bid to the claim of government being better representatives of the people than the people themselves, is obviously one of these tactics of the Empire in the East. It is pretended that the Indian people under the present alive bureaucracy are, or would for ever be, much better off than under the rule of a representative government; the reason assigned being that there exist religious and racial differences among the different sections of the people. But as pointed out by the Hon. Mr. Justice Abdur Rahim and Sir M.B. Chaubal in their dissenting minutes to the report of the Public Services Commission of 1913 this pretence is quite a hollow one. Says Sir M. B. Chaubal "One cannot help being struck with the assumption that the capacity to represent the masses is taken for granted in the European and the Anglo-Indian. It is difficult to understand exactly what is intended to be conveyed by the word 'represent.' If it implies a knowledge of the conditions of life of the masses, their habits, their ways of living and thinking, their wants and grievances, the ability to enter into their thoughts and appreciate what is necessary to educate them, to give them higher ideas of life and make them realise their duties towards all about them, there ought to be no doubt that the educated Indian has all these in a far higher degree than any European or Anglo-Indian can claim to have. The charge really is that the educated Indian has a class bias, a sort of clannishness, a tendency to favour his own class or community in the discharge of his official duties which detract from his usefulness in the higher service, and therefore the presence of the European in large numbers is necessary to hold the scales evenly between these few educated thousands and the dumb and the ignorant millions who would otherwise be oppressed by them. This is rather shallow pretence...and I think it only fair to state that the class of educated Indians from which only the higher posts can be filled is singularly free from this narrow-mindedness and class or caste bias. No instances of complaint on this score as against any of the Indian members of the Indian Civil Service would be available... and the interests of the masses are likely to be far better understood and taken care of by the educated Indian than by the foreigner. As a matter of fact all the measures proposed for the regeneration of the lower and the depressed classes have emanated from the educated Indians of the higher castes. The scheme for the free and compulsory education of the masses was proposed by an educated Indian of a high caste and supported mainly by the western educated classes. High-souled and self-sacrificing men are every day coming forward from this class to work wholeheartedly in improving the condition of the masses. Perhaps the truth, however unpalatable, is that there are still a number of the average English officials in India who have a distrust and suspicion about the educated Indian."

19 Now let us see about (2) the racial and religious differences. These are not found in India alone. Englishmen may now laugh at our castes and our sects and urge that as a sign of our unfitness for representative government. But they forget that hardly two centuries ago, as Macaulay says in his *History of England*, they had so many sects among them that when a census was taken, population was reckoned only by sects in religion and politics. Many of our readers must have read how the King of Brobdingnag laughed at Gulliver's arithmetic when the latter told him that the numbers of the people of his country meaning England were counted by counting the people in different sects. Again, so late as in 1877 in England, the number of all Churches and Chapels of the various dissenting religious denominations was, according to the 38th annual report of the Registrar-General issued in that year, no less than 122." (*Encyclopædia Britannica*). The religious differences, especially between the Roman Catholics and Protestants, were, not very long ago, so keen that the former were regularly persecuted and disqualified from enjoying the equal rights of British citizenship. The story of their cruel treatment is too well-known to the students of English history, and need not be told here.

In Canada, things were no better before the grant of responsible government to that Colony. Lord Durham says in his report that he found there "a struggle not

of principles but of *races*." He found "two nations warring in the bosom of a single state." "It is scarcely possible," he says further in his report, "to conceive descendants of any of the great European nations more unlike each other in character and temperament, more totally separated from each other by language, laws and modes of life, or placed in circumstances more calculated to produce natural misunderstanding, jealousy or hatred than the English and the French."

If we turn to the history of the United States of America, we find that the colonists there, before the War of Independence, were not of one race. The historian Lecky says: "Great bodies of Dutch, Germans, French, Swedes, Scots and Irish, scattered among the descendants of the English, contributed to the heterogeneous character of the colonies, and they comprised so many varieties of government, *religious* belief, commercial interest and social type that their union appeared to many incredible on the very eve of the revolution." Otis said in 1765, that "were these colonies left to themselves to-morrow, America would be a mere shambles of blood and confusion, before little petty states could be settled."

Burnaby has pointedly remarked that "Fire and water are not more heterogeneous than the different colonies in North America;" and yet, in spite of all these differences, the colonies could win and have been enjoying full Self-Government.

Woodrow Wilson in his book *The State* remarks that the "Swiss confederacy has, by slow processes of cautious federation, drawn together into a real union, communities the most diverse, alike in point of race, of language and of institutions without destroying their individuality. They (the Swiss) went on to show the world how Germans, Frenchmen, and Italians, if only they respect each the other's liberties, as they would have their own respected, may by mutual helpfulness and forbearance build up a union at once stable and free." The same author again says that "a variety of races has been embraced within the domain of the Dual Monarchy. First and most prominent is the three sided contrast between German, Slav and Magyar...Again a Slav differs from Slav (as Hindu differs from a Hindu in India) by reason of many sharp divergencies of history, of speech, and of religion; and outside this classification there is added a miscellany of Italians, Croats, Serbs, Roumanians, Jews—men of almost every race and people of eastern Europe."

The enemies of Indian Self-Government who are fond of harping upon the so-called diversity of races and religions in India may take a lesson from this. Those are little-minded men who are unable to conceive that such a vast territory and population as in India can really be united in a common national feeling. It is not perhaps their fault, because nearer home in Europe they see nothing but small fragments of humanity setting up as nations within small areas. The Lilliputians could not look upon a man of average stature except as a monster, or an unnatural deformity of Nature. They are either blinded by self-interest, or are deficient in imagination rather than in logic or ethics. We are all familiar with the contemptuous saying of Metternich, the Prince among Despots, that Italy was a mere geographical expression. History has given us proof that even among apparently different communities, complete unity is effected as soon the communities begin to feel that they are at liberty to do whatever they like with themselves, and that their lot is cast in one boat. Enjoying the gift of responsible government, French and British despite all historical quarrels and differences of religious belief, language and social structure have fused into the nation of Canada. India is, notwithstanding her castes, certainly a more real nation to day than Germany only a century ago.

20 Canada and South Africa are living examples in the British Empire to show that (3) differences in languages, customs and manners and other elements of nationality do not stand in the way of getting or granting real self-government. French Canada, even to-day, boasts of having its motto as *nos institutiones, notre langue et nos lois*. Bourinot says in his *Canada* that "At the present time the records and statutes of the Dominion are always given in two languages, French and English, and the same is true of all motions put by the speaker....In the legislature of the province of Quebec, French has almost excluded English.....In the supreme court

of the Dominion, the arguments may be in French and the two Quebec Judges give their decisions in their own tongue....In the country in some remote communities English is never spoken and is understood only by the cure or notary."

About manners and customs, the same author says that "away from the St. Lawrence, the French Canadians remain, relatively speaking, untouched by English customs."

Speaking about the United States of America, Lecky says: "Twenty-one years before New York fell into the hands of the English, it was computed that no less than eighteen different languages were spoken in or near the town."

The figures of Switzerland speak for themselves. Mrs. Hug and Mr. Stead in their book on *Switzerland* have quoted the following figures "Of the 2,934,057 people, 2,092,530 were German speaking, 637,972 French speaking, 156,606 Italian speaking, 38,375 Romansch speaking 8,574 were of other nationalities. 1,724,957 were Protestants, 1,190,008 Catholics and 19,092 of other religions or none." And yet Switzerland had found no difficulty in gaining political rights from foreign overlords or from native aristocracies.

21 In India it is supposed that very few persons have (4) public spirit and therefore she is said to be unfit for Home Rule. But this lack of public spirit is everywhere to be seen, and can be seen more glaringly in the History of England itself. About the House of Lords, Erskine May says in his *Constitutional History of England* that "The political weight of the House of Peers has been much affected by the passive indifference which it ordinarily displays to the business of legislation..... Unless great party questions have been under discussion, the House has ordinarily presented the appearance of a select committee. Three peers may wield all the authority of the House."

About the masses in England after the passing of the Reform Bill of 1832, Mr. Pollard says in his *British Empire* that "the landed class was the ruling class; the other classes had no continuous interest in politics and did not actively demand a franchise which they had not learned to value".

Lord Bryce says: "Though it is usually assumed in platform speeches that the audience addressed are citizens of the attractive type, everybody knows that in all communities, not only in Chicago but even in Liverpool, let us say, or in Lyons or in Leipzig, a large proportion of the voters are so indifferent or so ignorant that it is necessary to rouse them, to drill them to bring them up to vote."

About the United States of America, before they won their independence, Lecky says: "A country, where so large a proportion of the inhabitants were recent immigrants, drawn from different nations, and professing different creeds.....and where the money-making spirit was peculiarly intense, was not likely to produce much patriotism or community of feeling."

Adams says the same: "Every way in the world is sought to get and save money; land-jobbers, speculators in land; little generosity to the public, little public spirit".

22 Now coming to the head (5) of capacity for local self-government we will, for comparison take and examine the public life in England as exhibited in her various corporations, which were as much the seed-beds of their political life and the nurseries of their civic freedom, as Parliament itself. Now theoretically every parish in England was, from times immemorial, and under hypotheses warranted by the Common Law, an image and a reflection of the State. The citizens in every parish were supposed to tax themselves on a voluntary basis, through their chosen representatives, and for local objects. But this theory of a representative government was a miserable fiction and completely belied in practice. For centuries together, an exclusive system of local government prevailed, under which, a few self-elected and irresponsible inhabitants imposed and administered taxes, and exercised local authority. The usurpation was so long acquiesced in, that it became a custom, so as to create local exceptions to the Common Law of England. It was only in 1831 that the first attempt was made at municipal reform. The history of municipal government in England was, till a

later period, a history of encroachment upon popular rights. The municipalities were suffered to be under the direct influence of the Crown and of the Nobility under the Tudors and the Stuarts. Even under George III, corporations were composed of local hereditary cliques, and family connections, who were absolute masters over their own townsmen. Generally, of one political party, they excluded men of different opinions, whether in politics or religion, and wielded all the influence of their office for maintaining the ascendancy of their own party. Elected for life, it was not difficult to consolidate their interest; and they acted without any sense of responsibility. Their proceedings were generally secret: nay, secrecy was sometimes enjoined by an oath! They neglected their proper functions, and thought only of the personal interests attached to their office. They grasped all patronage for their relatives and political partisans, and wasted the corporation funds in greasy feasts and vulgar revelry. Many corporations were absolutely insolvent. Charities were despoiled and public trusts misapplied: jobbery and corruption in every form was fostered. The favoured class also enjoyed trading privileges, which provoked jealousy and fettered commerce. The corporations were, moreover, the stronghold of Parliamentary interest and corruption. The freedom of a city was valued according to the length of the candidate's purse.

The same sad story must be told about the corporations in Scotland. These had for centuries no popular constitution. Their property was corruptly alienated and despoiled, sold to the nobles and other favoured persons at inadequate prices, leased at nominal rent to members of Council, and improvidently charged with debts. Revenues were wasted by extravagant salaries, and jobbing contracts, and civic entertainments. Incompetent persons, and even boys, were appointed to offices of trust. An idiot actually performed the duties of a town clerk in one city for twenty years. Judicature was exercised without fitness or responsibility. As for Ireland, close self-election and irresponsible power were the basis of nearly all Irish corporations. In many boroughs, patrons filled the council with their own dependents and exercised uncontrolled authority over the property, revenues, and government of the municipality. (Macaulay's *History of England*).

But the real significance of this miserable condition of the corporations in England, Scotland and Ireland cannot be understood unless we remember that they were Parliamentary constituencies! The boroughs represented the aristocratic, and the towns the democratic principles of the constitution; and yet both these were, as we have seen, hot-beds of corruption and cliquism of the worst sort. You can therefore easily imagine the character of the British Parliament itself whose members were recruited from them!

It was not till late in the middle of the 19th century, that municipal government in Great Britain and Ireland was appreciably reformed. And we are indebted to the outspoken reports of Royal Commissions after Commissions, for an impartial exposure of the shameful condition in which self-governing Englishmen had allowed their municipal, and other corporations, to rot for centuries. We shall content ourselves with only one small extract from the report of the Royal Commission which sat in 1833, and which gave the following judgment upon the fitness of Englishmen for local self-government.

Sir J. J. R. Sommers-Vine summed up the condition of municipal corporations in England in the following, and yet what were regarded as moderate, terms:

"Municipal Corporations were for the most part in the hands of narrow self-elected cliques who administered local affairs for their own advantage rather than for that of the borough. The inhabitants were practically deprived of all power of Local Self-Government and were ruled by those whom they had not chosen, and in whom they had no confidence. The Corporate funds were wasted, the interests and improvements of towns were not cared for, local courts were too often corrupted by party influence and failed to render impartial justice; Municipal institutions, instead of strengthening and supporting the political framework of the country, were a source of weakness and a fertile cause of discontent." Redlich and Hirst in their work on *Local Self-Government in England* observe: "In general the corporate funds are but partially applied to Municipal purposes.....but they

are frequently expended in feasting and in paying the salaries of unimportant officers.....The revenues that ought to be applied for the public advantage are sometimes wastefully bestowed for the benefit of individuals, sometimes squandered for purposes injurious to the character and morals of the people." They further say that "the picture presented by the report is that of a complete break-down of administrative efficiency, joined with a decay of the elementary rules of local self-government."

If we look to the history of Canada we find that this stepping stone was not at all needed for the people to get full self-government. There, local self-government was introduced by Lord Sydenham *not before, but after*, national self-government was established.

We do not hold a brief as Devil's advocate to declaim against the British people and to say any thing and every thing that could be possibly said against their past history. Why, we go further and say that we yield to none in our appreciation of the high standard that they have set, on the whole, for us, the people of India to imitate and follow in respect of the efficiency of their corporate life and their political character. But while replying to the argument of unfitness, so recklessly hurled against the Indian people, it is only pertinent to point out that even the British people have not always been what they are to-day in this respect from the very beginning; but have had, like every other nation, to wade through a career of apprenticeship marked by scandalous incompetency and ignominious failure.

Now we fully recognise that wonderful reforms have been since made in the life of British corporations. But our point is, would the Englishman have admitted his unfitness for self-government even in the face of such incontrovertible and crushing evidence of incompetence? And yet he would, in fact he does, point a finger of scorn to our corporate life which, under the new conditions, has not had a fair trial even for half a century, and seeks to deduce therefrom an argument of our unfitness for self-government. We are by no means blind to the failings and short-comings of our Indian municipalities and rural boards. But we may claim, even on the authority of the Government reports, that our present bodies are, on the whole, much better than the past corporations in Great Britain and Ireland, in point of even those functions and duties which they have to discharge on their own initiative and responsibility. In these schools of civic life, we have shown quite a fair amount of success in our studies, and have eminently deserved our promotion to the higher class, where we might imbibe our real political education by actually carrying on higher administration.

23 So also if we turn our eyes to (6) the efficiency of representation in England and elsewhere, we shall be sadly disappointed. At a conference of Liberal Association held in the city of London, in December 1883, Lord Granville said: "With regard to the mode of electing members to the House of Commons, it was hoped by some that a self-acting process of purification is going on; but that notion was rudely dispelled by the last election in 1880.....A greater number of individuals were bribed than had ever been bribed before, and some constituencies were so notoriously corrupt that no one belonging to them ventured to lodge a petition on the subject.....The result showed a frightful extent of bribery and corruption and...an immense demoralisation in the tone and sentiment with which these practices were regarded." The Parliamentary Commission which then sat at Macclesfield gave it as their opinion that "out of 6000 voters more than 5000 had been operated on by bribery." "Magistrates and aldermen were scheduled among the guilty persons."

M. Benoist, a French writer, declares bluntly in his *La Crise de l'Etat Moderne* that "Corruption of the candidate by the elector, and of the elector by the candidate" is the normal state of things in France. Mr. Lowell, an acute American observer says, "the favours which the deputies demand and exact as the price of their votes extend over a large field; nor do they show any false modesty about making their desires known." (*Governments and Parties in Continental Europe*) Mr. Lilly is no less emphatic in saying that "The corruption of the State by

false democracy is as great in Spain, in Portugal, in Italy; nay, in the last mentioned country it is perhaps greater."

The state of things in America, especially the United States, is no better, and Bryce's *American Commonwealth* teems with instances of corruption and jobbery. We will quote here only a few sentences. "Elections are entirely in the hands of party managers and the people have little to say in the matter." Politics in America, as Lilly puts it, is in fact "a squabble over offices and jobs."

24 Anglo-Indians always laugh at our social condition. But what the social life of England was in the 17th century has been well-described by Macaulay in his *History of England*. He says: "Even at the end of the 17th century lawlessness was rampant throughout England, and even in London. In some counties no one could travel without making his will. Men despaired of any protection from the state, and each town had to employ armed men and ferocious dogs to protect them from robbers and bandits. And huge stones and boiling water were always kept ready by this garrison to crush and scald the plunderers. Certain parts of England were, till the 19th century, inhabited by a race scarcely less savage than the Indians of California and half-naked women chanted a wild measure, while the men with brandished dirks danced a war-dance. In London itself darkness and danger ruled the roads at night with all the horrors of the Rome of Juvenal. Lamps flickered in some of the better streets; and link boys drove a busy trade in lighting belated wanderers to their homes saving them from perils of places where pavement was taken up or open sewers yawned. The streets were infested by dangerous revellers who levied blackmail in defiance of law. In Covent Garden a noisy and filthy market was held close to the dwellings of the great. Fruit women screamed, carters fought, and rotten apples were accumulated in heaps at the thresholds of countesses. The beggars were noisy and importunate. St. James Square was a receptacle for all the offal and the cinders, for all the dead cats and the dead dogs of Westminster. The pavement of the city was detestable. The drainage was so bad that in rainy weather the gutters soon became torrents. When the evening closed in, the difficulty and danger of walking about London became great indeed. The garret windows were opened and pails of dirty water were emptied upon passers by. Streets were ill-lighted. There was one light before one house in ten, during a small part of one night in three. And Londoners strenuously opposed all schemes of lighting. The penny post was regarded as a popish contrivance. The public conveyances were not numbered because no one could read them."

"As for the vices of Government, they were many. The ministers were corrupt. The public services were starved so that the courtiers and the favourites of ministers should be pampered. Some of the Revenues were farmed and unjust exactions were scandalous. Ministers took bribes and made illegal gains enough to support dukedoms."

"The squire or a gentleman of the time was little better than a rustic miller or an alehouse keeper. His accomplishments were no better than of a clown. He lived very shabbily and the litter of a farm yard gathered under the windows of his bed-chamber and cabbages and bushes grew close to his hall door."

The English have been ridiculously conservative and opposed to change, even when the change was obviously and unmistakably for the better. According to Syngé, the author of *History of Social life in England*, "one of the most striking points in the study of material progress in England is the sturdy opposition experienced in every age to inevitable advance. Thus in 1571 Holinshed, a cultured author, groaned over the new-fashioned chimney because it sent smoke up a given channel instead of allowing it to escape through any chance-crack in the roof."

"English people bitterly opposed the introduction of steam. They abused railway trains; revolted against gas lighting, and opposed the motor car."


With regard to the general argument that Europe is after all more civilised than India, it is indeed very difficult to meet it. But meeting general argument by a general reply we may say that the word civilisation has a number of meanings,

and that the same fact of alleged civilisation is likely to be alternately pronounced to be good or evil, if we present it to the judgment of a number of people with varying cultures or temperaments. A situation may lend itself to a number of phases, none of which could be pronounced definitely to be superior or inferior to another, or better or worse than another. If civilisation means a mode of practical happiness or comfort, views about civilisation must vary exactly in the same proportion as the number of theories about comfort and happiness. To give a few concrete instances. We all say that while the outlook of the European is generally strictly secular, that of the Indian is tinged with spirituality. Europeans exhibit a taste for complexity of life, whereas the Indians lean towards simplicity. In Europe "not only the mental atmosphere but the social life are based upon the idea that a man who wishes for a pleasant life will shew energy in its pursuit, will take endless small trouble, will not feel an exertion of mind and will, any more than the piston of a steam-engine feels rising and falling." That, however, says Meredith Townsend, is not the basis of society in Asia, where the root idea is that those who have not to live by labour are to enjoy a certain exemption from worry, to do as they please, and, while respecting certain immutable but few and definite laws, are to be released in a great measure from the atmospheric pressure of opinion. Mr. Senior has pithily remarked about the difference of life in Paris and Constantinople: "My Liberal friends here complain of the want of political liberty. What I complain of is the want of social liberty it is far the more important. Few people suffer from the despotism of a Government, and those suffer only occasionally. But this social despotism, this despotism of salons, this code of arbitrary little regulations, observances, prohibitions and exigencies affects everybody, every day and every hour." Standards of comfort may easily vary. The European cannot do without furniture, for example, but an Indian very well may. If the European wastes his money on dress, the Indian wastes his on ornaments. Again, as observed by Mr. Meredith Townsend, "To raise the Indian's standard of comfort and so fill all India with discontent in order that furniture-dealers and clothiers and confectioners may make great business—this effort to revolutionise the habits of a continent seems hardly worth while."

25 Lastly, it is sometimes urged that India is incapable of self-government as she could not defend herself against foreign invasions. But Mr. George Bernard Shaw has given a crushing reply to this argument in the columns of the *Commonweal*. He says: "The truth is, all nations have been conquered; and all peoples have submitted to tyrannies which would provoke sheep or spaniels to insurrection. I know nothing in the history of India that cannot be paralleled from the histories of Europe. The Pole, whitest, handsomest, most operatically heroic of Europeans, has eaten dirt in the East, as the equally romantic Irishman has in the West. Germany has given such exhibitions of helpless political disintegration accompanied by every atrocity or internecine warfare as India at her worst can never hope to surpass. If India is incapable of Self-Government, all nations are incapable of it; for the evidence of history is the same everywhere".

26 It is absurd to fix a deductive ideal standard of fitness for liberty. For it would be so high that no human society in history would be found to have reached it before attaining liberty. Liberty is a birth-right, and it can not be allowed to be made conditional upon any arbitrary qualification. As Gladstone had said 'It is liberty alone that fits men for liberty.' And political liberty is the fulcrum on which man's improvement hangs—improvement almost in every direction. As Mr. Fielding-Hall has remarked in *The Passing of Empire*: "For an individual to reform, his whole environment must be reformed as well. For example, take widow remarriage. How can widows remarry in comfort till the whole structure of Hindu convention is changed? Not one individual, nor a million individuals can break a convention. There is a strong feeling, as we know, amongst Hindus against this and many other conventions that stifle, but every effort to break these chains has failed. Why? Because to break fetters bound upon society by religion or convention takes the combined effort of society, and even then it is difficult. But we have not allowed the collective instinct any opportunity of developing. There are no nuclei, there is nothing to draw the people together.

Only self-governing institutions do tend to remove the differences created by races, religions, castes. In the village communal life they are to a considerable extent ignored. The organism of the village, when healthy and free, forces men to disregard artificial barriers of this sort and meet on common ground for common business. Solidarity comes from the sense of the necessity for solidarity in order to get on. No other influence can do it. History shows this clearly. It was this influence in England that rendered Catholic emancipation possible and brought creeds politically together. Did we in England live still under an aristocracy as we did a hundred years ago, the divisions between Catholic and Protestant Churchmen and Dissenters, Christian and Agnostic, would still be as sharp as they were. These artificial barriers of creed and race give way only under the pressure of a stream of national life. That is beginning already to flow in India; be ours the task to help it flow in true and widening channels so that it may become a great river, fertilising all things." And now for those who express doubts as to the success of a democracy in oriental countries we shall reply in the following words of Prof. Hobhouse:—"The success of democracy depends on the response of the voters to the opportunities given them. But conversely the opportunities must be given in order to call forth the response. The exercise of popular government is itself an education...Enfranchisement itself may precisely be the stimulus needed to awaken interest...The ballot alone effectively liberates the quiet citizen from the tyranny of the shouter and the wire-puller. An impression of existing inertness alone is not a sufficient reason for withholding responsible government or restricting the area of the suffrage....That which is most apt to frighten a governing class or race—a clamour on the part of an unenfranchised people for political rights—is to the democrat precisely the strongest reason that he can have for believing them fit for the exercise of civic responsibility. Nothing has been more encouraging to the Liberalism of Western Europe in recent years than the signs of political awakening in the East. Until yesterday, it seemed as though it would in the end be impossible to resist the ultimate destiny of the white races to be masters of the rest of the world. The awakening of the orient from Constantinople to Peking is the greatest and most hopeful fact of our time".



Chapter VII

India and the Empire

WE have attempted so far to show that the grant of self-government by England to India is necessitated by the following considerations. viz. (1) The fitness of the Indian people for self-government by reason of their great and ancient civilisation, and even their present education and capacity for administration; (2) The declared policy of the British Sovereign and the British Parliament; (3) The complete failure of Parliamentary control and of the India Government to do full justice to that policy and to the national ambition of the Indian people. But there is yet perhaps a far more important and transcendental reason why India must be immediately put on a self-containing, self-governing, and self-respecting footing. This reason is derived from the position of England as well as India in the world-empire; and in order to be able to understand and appreciate that reason we must briefly advert to the trend of the world-politics as we now see it developing.

2 The *insular* position of England is its most important feature. And that insular position was a point more of strength than weakness to England in the early period of her history. As Freeman has said, "In all ages, and among all changes of inhabitants, the insular character of Britain has been one of the ruling facts of its history. Its people of whatever race or speech, whatever their political condition at home or their political relation to other countries, have been, above all things, pre-eminently islanders". "In the third and fourth century, Tutoic tribes, themselves free from Romanic influence, invaded and settled in England; and for fourteen hundred years afterwards, the development of England as a nation went on uninterrupted by foreigners, owing to its secluded and protected position she enjoyed behind the shelter of the water walls that surrounded her on all sides. English social and political life, indeed, changed from inherent causes from time to time; but it never completely exchanged itself for any other system. It indeed borrowed now and then from foreign services, but it only assimilated what it borrowed with its own essence. It often changed its outward form, but its substance remained untouched." The Norman invaders, though foreigners in one sense, permanently settled in the land, and only helped to accomplish that national unity in England which the Saxons had failed to establish. The light of the Reformation indeed reached England from outside; its seeds were sown by the six thousand copies of the New Testament sent by Luther to the shores of England; but its development and complete fruition was brought about in England by her own efforts and without any interference by foreign political powers. Henry VIII. claimed to be supreme in religious as well as political government; and he accomplished the Reformation with the same masterful hand as he accomplished the apotheosis of personal rule or autocracy by King as a Divine deputy on the earth.

3 The Seven Year's War proved a turning point in the history of England. The war was scarcely ended before a spirit of restlessness became visible in English sea-men, and the consciousness began to dawn upon England that she was destined to be a great sea-power. English sea-men began to penetrate into far off seas. By the year 1768, while the foundation of territorial sovereignty was established in India by the grant of the Dewani to the E. I. Company by the Great Mogul, the Atlantic had already become a mere strait within the British Empire; the first fruit of English Colonisation in America had become too ripe and heavy to be sustained any longer on the slender branch of statutory connection between the Americans and the British sovereign; and Captain Cook had traversed the Pacific from end to end, claiming the soil for the Crown at every place he touched in New Zealand and Australia, and thus opened a second new world for the *expansion* of the English race. In the words of Edmund Burke:

"The Parliament of Britain began to claim an *imperial* character in which as from the throne of Heaven, she superintends all the several inferior legislatures and guides and controls them all, without annihilating any."

4 The general drift or goal of English history since the 18th century has been territorial expansion and the foundation of Greater Britain, though the English people were not sufficiently conscious of this fact. The Little Englander, who could think of Englishmen as nothing but a race inhabiting an island off the northern coast of the continent of Europe, was in very much evidence till late in the 19th century. But he is now fast disappearing. The Great Englander has taken his place, and also the Imperial Englander. The Englishman has now definitely discovered that he was 'talking prose all the while' in the matter of expansion of England without knowing it. While the expansion itself was going on he was unconscious of the process. Like a somnambulist he was moving and acting in sleep; and like a somnambulist also he was wonder-struck to see, when he woke, the results of his own movements and actions. But the Englishman is certainly not willing to give up the gains made by himself in sleep or absent-mindedness. And he is right. Why should he give up these gains? Not only that they are legitimately his own, but what is of more consequence is that he sorely needs them in the present hour of his difficulty, and will need them even more sorely forever afterwards because times threaten to be more and more anxious and perilous for him. If what is now made could possibly be wholly unmade, and the Englishman were given a fresh option to choose, he might conceivably refuse to accept the expansion of England in the colonies and in the Indian Empire, burdened if it must be with such enormous cares and responsibilities. But what has happened is irrevocable.

5 Not only has the actual fact of expansion been accomplished, but also most of its intellectual and moral consequences. As Prof. Seely observes, "People cannot change their abodes, pass from an island into a continent, from the 50th degree of north latitude to the tropics or the Southern Hemisphere, from an ancient community to a new colony, from vast manufacturing cities to sugar plantations or to lonely sheep walks in countries where aboriginal savage tribes still wander, without changing their ideas and habits and ways of thinking, nay, without somewhat modifying their physical type." And similarly with reference to the Indian Empire also we can say that people cannot found empires and rule and exploit alien races and countries without building up political habits, material interests and moral prestige which eventually become vital, so that an Imperial set-back must mean national death. If England had cared only for the growth of her own civilisation and her own liberty or liberties, she could certainly have accomplished that growth by remaining cooped up within England itself. She might not then have caused jealousy or heart-burning to any continental nation; and might have been more free from the fear of foreign invasion without any effort than she is now in spite of her supreme efforts and preparations. But Englishmen were ambitious, and not self-contained. They felt an inner prompting that to live in stagnation, in a small island like England, was not to do justice to their full capacity as merchants, as administrators, as soldiers, as statesmen and as God's own human agents for the purpose of spreading civilisation, enlightenment and political freedom upon the surface of this wide world. They, therefore, entered upon a quest of expansion or self-realisation, which, though the means used by them in the process have been more than often questionable, has certainly ended in results which are really wonderful and do them immense credit.

6 In her pursuit of a colonial empire, England began late but she soon outstripped all her rivals. She had no originality and merely imitated her neighbours; but she proved that genius is nothing but a capacity for taking infinite pains. Even at the end of the 16th century the English were quite beginners in the maritime career whereas, the Spanish had already carved out Viceroyalties in the American continent and Spanish missionaries had visited Japan. France came after Spain and Portugal, but she was superior to England in maritime enterprise. Till the time of Elizabeth England was behind her neighbours also in point of manufacturing skill or knowledge. "She was being seldom fatigued with hard labour; she led a life, (like India) more spiritual than refined." Business had then its centre in central Europe, in Italy and Germany. She was simply despised in the chief commercial centres. It was only in the eighteenth century that England made headway, and

she has since then maintained successfully the lead that she got. The opening of the Atlantic ocean and the insular position of England combined to give her peculiar advantages over her rivals. Like France or Spain, England was not involved in European politics; like Holland and Portugal, she was not torn by internal conflicts. The result was that, in the end, out of the five states which competed for the New World, success fell to only one viz., England, which did not show the strongest vocation for colonisation and did not surpass others in daring invention or energy. The progress of England in colonisation proved, in the end, so swift and sure that though, at the end of the 18th century, she lost such a great colonial empire as the United States of America, she immediately founded another in Canada and Australia. And today, England stands first among her peers in point of the extent and the value of her colonial possessions.

7 The dimensions of the present British Empire are simply astounding. There is no integral part of the world in which England has not a possession of her own. The total area of the British Empire is 13,153,712 square miles, while she has, under direct or indirect rule, a total population of 435 millions. The revenue of the Empire comes to about £ 340,750,000, the greatest that falls to the lot of any nation of the world of the modern or ancient times.

8 But to keep and maintain an empire is perhaps a more serious task than to acquire it. For, while the keeping of it requires almost a superhuman effort, the loss of an empire like this is bound to result in a harmful reaction which would go farther than the mere loss of the accretion, and involve a dwindling of the original body of the British Commonwealth. It is almost too terrible for words to say what the loss of the Empire would mean to England. Even looking at the situation merely from a material point of view, we find that the stake of England in the Empire is enormous. It is computed that a capital of some 1 thousand millions of pounds has been locked up by England in India, Canada, Australia and the other parts of the Empire. The loss of this capital alone is calculated to ruin England considerably, though we know that her resources are appreciably great. On the other hand, the dangers in the path of England, already great enough, are sure to increase in course of time. Writing in the year 1890, the late Sir Charles Dilke in his *Problems of Greater Britain* observed as follows:-“The enormous forces of European militarism may crush the old country and destroy the integrity of our Empire before the growth of the newer communities that it contains, has made it too strong for the attack. It is conceivable that within the next few years, Great Britain might be drawn into war, and receive in that war, at the hands of a coalition, a blow from which she would not recover, and one of the consequences of which would be the loss of Canada and of India and the proclamation of Australian independence. Enormous as are our military resources for a prolonged conflict, they are inadequate to meet the unprecedented necessities of a sudden war. We import half of our food; we import the immense masses of our raw materials which are essential to our industry. The vulnerability of the United Kingdom has become greater with the extension of her trade; and, by the universal admission of her naval authorities, it would be either difficult or impossible to defend that trade against a sudden attack by France aided by another considerable naval power. Our enormous resources would be almost useless in the case of such a sudden attack because we should not have time to call them forth”. Dilke has proved practically to be a true prophet. For, though the danger anticipated by him has come not from France or Russia but from the central continental powers, and though England has been able to rally her resources of strength quite in time, still we may remember two things: (1) that the danger pointed by Dilke has been realised to be true and not merely imaginary; and (2) that political alliances of nations are fleeting and fitful things, so that the allies of to-day may become the enemies of to-morrow. During the last twenty or thirty years, the possibility of England having to go to war with America, France and Russia was ever adverted to, though all these nations are now fighting on the side of England. But who knows what the whirligig of time may bring during the next twenty or thirty years? Political Expediency is a master-juggler who holds in his hand a magic kaleidoscope, and takes malicious delight in making and breaking

combinations and even sworn alliances. The protection of the Empire is, therefore, an eternal problem so far as England is concerned, though her enemies may change from time to time according to the puzzle of circumstances. England will, therefore, for all time in future, need the friendship and the assistance of the Colonies as well as India.

9 To secure this end, British statesmen have already been moving during the last twenty or twenty-five years, as the records of the Imperial Conference will show. The Imperial Conference, somewhat academic in its discussions before the war, has begun to be more practical since that event. The problem before the Conference has been how to secure for the members of the British Empire the closer union described by the President of 1911 Conference in the words "Units indeed, but units in a greater Unity." The exact form of the relations between England and the other members of the Imperial body can not be yet said to have been finally decided; but a radical change has been definitely introduced into the old relations under which the Imperial Conference was regarded as a mere advisory body. An Imperial Cabinet has taken the place of an Imperial Conference; the representatives of the Colonies no longer merely advise, but actually vote, on questions of Imperial policy; and lovers of the Commonwealth are devising schemes by which imperial taxation may be levied in order that the imperial tax-payers may be the more entitled to claim not only due representation but an effective control in the management of the relations of England with the other nations of the world. The trustee-ship of the Empire over the Commonwealth, including India and other dependencies, is to be a more real and more living thing; and the principle of the responsibility of the Cabinet is to be extended to the external as well as the internal affairs of the Empire.

10 We have thus indicated the general trend of the new policy which has been inaugurated for the better protection of the Empire. But we need not dwell upon the relations between the Colonies and England for the reason that the Colonists themselves have taken the problem in their own hands most earnestly, and may be trusted to take care of their business. The case of India, however, stands on a different footing in many respects; and we propose, therefore, to specially consider the position of India in relation to England in view of the dangers which threaten the Empire. The interests of both these countries are mutual; and the object of any inquiry into their future relations must be to estimate the consequences to either of them arising from a break-up of the Empire.

11 That India should pass away from British rule is simply unthinkable from the point of view of India herself. The plain fact must be admitted that India, if left to herself in the present state of world-politics, will not be able to protect herself against foreign invasion. The nation, though it is in a process of unification, is not yet completely united. And even supposing it were completely united in mind and action, it will not be able to take such concerted military measures as will enable it to successfully oppose the invading army of a powerful nation, if the latter succeeds in securing a naval or a land base in India. As for naval defence, India has no Navy, not even a sufficient number of steamers for the purpose of carrying on its own coasting trade and passenger traffic. The old ship-building industry in India has been destroyed since the advent of the British rule; and no sailing ship above a few tons, and adapted to anything but carrying ordinary cargo, can be built at any of the few Indian ship-yards. The British Government has maintained no Navy for India; and there is now not a single Indian who may be said to have even an idea of what a practical naval-battle-operation means. In the times of the Marathas, i. e. in the 18th century, the people on the western coast of India knew how to fight on the sea. But all that is gone during the last hundred years. England has always expected that she would be able to protect India with the aid of the British Navy thousands of miles away; but under the hypothetical conditions of British rulers abandoning—, that is to say having to abandon India by necessity—this possession, India has to be at the mercy of any foreign naval power that may choose to invade her, provided she is able to take care of England, or has no reason to fear from England owing to the circumstances of the time.

12 As for a land-battle, India is of course in a much better condition. She has quite an abundance of martial material. Under British rule, Indians have forgotten what it is to command on a battle-field, as the entire duty of command has been reserved for British officers. But as soldiers, they can still render a good account of themselves, as the battle fields, famous in the present war in any of its theatres, can testify. But it must also be remembered that soldiers can not fight without arms. Arms have been, however, conspicuous by their disappearance in India since the Mutiny. Except men who have had the good fortune to serve in the Indian army, no Indian can now claim, thanks to the Arms Act and its drastic operation, any acquaintance with arms of any kind. If, under the above-mentioned hypothesis, British rule were to disappear and anarchy were to prevail, or a provisional government for the defence of India were to take its place, arms might be imported from foreign countries. But it would not be possible to import these in sufficient quantities to equip the large garrison that will have to be raised to oppose an invading army. Then, again, the quality of arms is a great factor in these times. Every military nation in the world has its own factories of arms, and every such nation has made some arm or another its speciality, so that it possesses secrets of arms-manufacture which are not known to other countries. Presumably, therefore, a hastily raised army of defence, armed with such weapons as it may get, will not be able to hold its own against a determined invader who may be expected to arm his drilled men with the latest and the best arms. In olden times, when only the numbers of fighting men decided battles, India could hope to, and often did, defend herself against invaders. So also in the days of the Mogul rule, it became possible for the Marathas, who were armed with swords and spears, to successfully fight the Mogul armies, because, it was then a question not of superior arms but of the mere strength of numbers and the personal bravery and skill of individual soldiers. But they were not able to defend themselves against the British army in the nineteenth century, because of the superior arms, also and the superior military organisation, of the British. The halcyon primitive days are gone when the Indian peasant, called upon to fight in the cause of his king or his country, would walk straight from his agricultural field to the battlefield, and show his valour with such rustic arms as might come handy. The Indian peasant is still ready, when occasion calls, to beat his plough-shear into the sword; but he knows he has not now much chance to win, as he had in the good old days, against a foreign invader if the latter bears superior arms. He may be willing to give up his life, but his life can hardly bring a commensurate return. He is ready to take his place in the improvised patriotic garrison; but a whole garrison may now be swept off the field by a single machine gun.

13 The only chance of defence for an Indian army, under the hypothesis, remains in a guerilla warfare when the enemy has penetrated into the land. But guerilla warfare has its limitations. Millions of Indians, if fired and roused up by patriotism, can be depended upon for doing a good deal by way of harassing the invader and carrying on a pitiless war of attrition. But that can after all come to very little. The Marathas did nearly the whole of their warfare in their struggle for independence, after the death of Shivaji and often times even in his own days, by these very guerilla methods. But their success was due more to the incapacity of the Mogul armies; and even this success took long in crowning their arms. Then, again, the guerilla warfare was not always an uninterrupted story of success. Even the Marathas had to give up forts after forts when hard pressed by the determined commanders of the Mogul army; and the struggle eventually ended in favour of the Marathas, mainly because the Mogul armies, on the whole, were either bereft of good leadership, or because they themselves became corrupt and degenerate. The Boers in South Africa resorted to guerilla warfare when they had to retreat before the superior numbers of the British armies armed with powerful artillery; and they did wonders indeed with this kind of warfare. But they had eventually to surrender and accept defeat. In short, the chances of India defending herself successfully against the armies of a modern nation, armed with modern arms of destruction, are very small indeed. And under our hypothesis, there is no other conclusion but that if the British withdrew from

India, she must eventually be prepared to lie low at the foot of a foreign invader who has kept his own nation on a war-footing, and is possessed of sufficient naval strength to effect a landing and establish a base on the Indian shore.

14 And what will the substitution of any other rule for British rule mean to India? The answer is a simple one. It will mean absolute ruin. The first results after a change of rulers are invariably injustice, oppression, confiscation, and carnage on a colossal scale. The twilight of revolution is a temptation for bold and adventurous spirits who move out to try their hands at risings and rebellions. But these, if unsuccessful, rebound with a vengeance, as has been witnessed even in the present war. And then think of the weary process of pacification and settlement! A change of rulers necessarily means a change of policy, and a change of the administrative machinery; and it must be a long time again before an established civil government begins to operate like a clock-work. The whole of the old order must change, involving a destruction of the institutions which had perhaps taken centuries to take root in the country,—institutions, again, which, in some cases at any rate, had taken root so deep as to touch the very heart of the people, so that the uprooting of them must mean almost an uprooting of the nation's heart. And then, who can say what sort of rulers the new ones may be? And herein lies the crux of the whole question. The British rulers have been bad enough from some points of view, as we have already attempted to show. But what guarantee is there that the new rulers, under the hypothesis, will not be worse? Invaders never invade for seeking spiritual salvation. Their first object is material gain for themselves and their kith and kin. And when we know that India has been already so impoverished, can we not imagine what it will mean for India to be subjected to the thirst for wealth in a newcomer? We speak frankly, and perhaps also bluntly, when we say that it is already enough for India to have been subjected to the bleeding process of foreign exploitation for the last one or two centuries. Can she stand the operation again at the hands of another nation? If England has exploited India, she has, we think, by now, done it to her heart's content. If, for one thing, her hunger is satiated to a degree, her duty, on the other hand, has also called a halt; and she has already commenced to take measures which may replenish the economic blood in India's veins in course of time. But a newcomer will come with a fresh hunger without any sense of a moral duty towards India; and it is likely that the gruesome scenes of Spanish rapacity in Mexico, or the Belgian atrocities in the Congo, may be reenacted in India on only a larger scale.

15 But there is yet another consideration in the matter of this hypothetical change of rulers. And it is, in our opinion, the greatest of them all. India now knows pretty well, though at second hand, the political opinions and creeds of most of the leading nations of the world; and she is absolutely convinced that she can not possibly fare better under any other rulers, Asiatic or European, except perhaps the French and the Americans. The Americans had so far no great dependencies under them, and their treatment of the Filipinos is reported to be very fair and just on the whole. The freedom-loving people of the far West are credited with an instinctive repulsion against being concerned with the government of backward communities. But in India the United States may perhaps find a people more congenial to their temper and in greater harmony with their political impulses. It is, therefore, possible that, supposing India were to pass under the rule of the Americans, she might possibly make even swifter political progress than she has so far made under the British rule. Similarly, the French have, by this time, their republican tendencies consolidated and confirmed; and judging by the treatment which they have given to the Indian subjects in the tiny remnants of territorial possessions to which they still cling with tenacity in India, the French may make of India, sooner or later, a self-governing partner. But the evidence of the treatment by the French of the people in their dependencies in other parts of the world is not of an unmixed character. For, in Algeria and Morocco they have not been free from an imperial bias; and their critics can legitimately say that even the people, who were the first in the world to raise the standard of Equality, Liberty and Fraternity, have, in practice, two different standards of humanity, one for themselves and another for

some of the coloured people under their rule. But the possibility of either America or France invading and conquering India may be safely laid aside as beyond the pale of the practical. The maritime power of France is neither in the ascendent at the present moments or likely to augment appreciably in the near future. And as for America, she has only just begun to put on the naval armour, and the power that she may acquire in a reasonable time will probably all be needed for her own defensive purposes. The Monroe Doctrine has the character more of a symptom of the consciousness that America is liable to foreign interference and invasion than of an empty proposition in the philosophy of the territorial or national integrity. Moreover, America has ample elbow-room for expansion in her own territory; and by way of development of her own resources, and in the maintenance of the lead in peaceful commerce which she has, in certain respects, already secured she has enough and more to do to keep her busy for generations to come.

16 The only other ambitious nations that we can think of in this respect are Germany, Russia, Japan or China. But the mere mention of these names is enough to convince any well-read Indian that, under any of these, India cannot possibly hope to get that national liberty or attain that national greatness which she may hope to have under the British rule. England may be slower in these matters than America, or less impulsive than France. But we may be confident that, judging by the present signs, England is not going to turn her face back from the goal which she has laid before her eyes—the goal of making India a self-governing nation under the ægis of British rule, and a partner on an equal footing with the Colonies in the great British Empire. It is impossible to think of a reaction in this matter; and the tide of self-government is bound to flow on, though individual waves may seem to recede after reaching the shore or even break down before reaching it. It is difficult to say what destiny may have actually in store either for England or India; but assuming that England is not wiped off from the surface of the globe by a physical cataclysm, or that India is not conquered by some other powerful nation after defeating England, we can see no other picture than that of India being a living nation, great as she was great before, and an equal partner in the Empire. For these reasons Indians can have no other wish to entertain, or no other prayer to offer to the Almighty, than that the connection between England and India should never cease, and that under British rule itself India should, for all practical purposes, get national independence.

17 We have seen so far how the severance of the connection between England and India is almost unthinkable from the point of view of India herself. *England is indispensable to India; but is not India equally indispensable to England?* Can Englishmen serenely contemplate a state of things in which India has been dismembered from the Empire? Or, to put it in another way, can the British Empire itself be said to be an Empire without India, or can it even endure as an Empire, for the matter of that, without India? If India is proudly characterised as the brightest jewel in the British Crown, how will that crown look when that jewel has been knocked off from it? Also, will the material prosperity of England remain what it is if she has been deprived of the advantages of commerce with India and the strength of the resources derived from India? And first, with regard to these material considerations we have to point out that, even apart from the wealth which England has already exploited from India, her present commerce with India is in itself a highly valuable British asset. In this respect it may be claimed that India is nearly twice as valuable to England as any of her two great colonies put together. The following figures, quoted from the *Statistical Abstract*, of Imports and Exports to and from the United Kingdom for the year 1912 (a typical year before the war) will prove the truth of this observation.

Countries.	Imports, excluding imports of diamonds from the Union of South Africa.	Exports.	Per-cent age	
			Imports.	Exports.
	£	£		
Total British Possessions.	186,013,374	175,354,759		
India	52,148,731	57,628,072	28	33
Australia	36,111,737	34,840,701	20	19
Canada	26,880,830	23,531,311	14	13
New Zealand	20,302,062	10,390,334	11	6

18 We are aware that England could conceivably carry on her commerce with India even if she were dismembered from the Empire. But it is almost a self-evident truth that England's commerce with India must necessarily be far greater when she is within the Empire than if she be out of it. Of course the maxim that 'trade follows the flag' must be taken to be true only in a limited sense, for there can be trade and commercial intercourse between independent nations who can not tolerate the appearance of each other's flag in their own country. But the maxim is certainly true in this special sense that the flag has an infinitely greater power of attraction for trade than anything else, for the obvious reason that the flag carries with it a tacit assurance of protection for trade. There are also other considerations in this matter. Trade and commerce between independent nations are limited by the action and reaction of rivalry or jealousy between them, and readers of the history of tariff wars that have been waged in the world hitherto need not be told that trade and commerce often meet with dead walls, which they cannot either pull down or climb over, and thus receive a definite set-back. Similarly also it has been proved by experience that between friendly nations, and much more so between members of the same nation or empire, tariff schedules may be so framed as to afford preference to selected constituents and thus give an artificial stimulus or encouragement to the mutual trade and commerce between themselves. Protection and preference in some form or other have had, after all, a longer life-history than free trade in the economic chronicles of the world; and though it is often a difficult problem to completely reconcile the somewhat conflicting interests between different members of the same nation or empire, still the community of their political interests never fails to suggest a practical solution. If sacrifices have to be made for bringing about this reconciliation, they have, at least, the consolation that the sacrifices are made willingly and consciously for the well-being of the state as a whole. But the point is perhaps so obvious that we need not elaborate it any more.

19 Adverting to the special case of the trade relations between India and England, one finds from a reference to the import and export tables that England draws its supply of food, drink and tobacco from India more than from Canada, and that the British Indian supply in this respect is at least equal to the supply afforded by Australia and New Zealand together. But the importance of India stands out very clearly when we advert to the supply of raw materials and articles partly manufactured. In 1912, while this supply from India was valued at £ 13 millions that from Canada came to only £ 4 millions and that from Australia and New Zealand came to £ 7 and 6 millions respectively. So that here again we find that India singly is equal to two of the great British Colonies. Then again we know that England has irrevocably assumed the character of a manufacturing country and that her textile and other industries are the soul of her industrial prosperity; and for this reason she has largely to depend for raw materials, required by these industries, upon India. To take only one example, India supplies to England the largest quantity of raw cotton (excepting of course U. S. A. and Egypt which are, however, foreign countries). The second in rank among the British possessions supplying raw cotton, is British East Africa; but its supply comes to less than 25 per cent. of the supply from British India. But raw cotton is not the only valuable raw material supplied by India. For, India's fibres, oils and seeds, indigo are all playing a daily increasing part in the export trade of India. England also has to depend upon India to a large extent for wheat, and tea, coffee, cinchona and such other valuable agricultural products.

20 Nor is India less important to England as a market for English manufactures and other merchandise. In the year 1913, India imported from England merchandise valued at Rs. 1,175 millions which nearly equals the value of all the merchandise put together which she imported from all other countries. She imported merchandise valued at only 126 millions of rupees from Germany which comes second in rank. Then follow Java with 107, United States 47, Japan 47, Austria 42, Belgium 42—all millions of rupees—and so on. The growth of imports from England into India has been great indeed during the last few years. And yet

this growth is by no means yet finished. At present the Indian population is England's customer to the extent of about 4 rupees per head per year. But with the growth of the prosperity of the Indian people their buying capacity is bound to grow, and so also the demand for England's manufactures and merchandise.

21 But when we advert to the fact that the Eastern policy of England is an integral part of her world-policy, and that India occupies a highly strategical position in the East, then only we see that the value of India to England from this point of view easily dwarfs any importance she may have from the point of view of trade and commerce. Sir Charles Dilke has observed in his *Problems of Greater Britain* that there are dreamers in England who appear to think that Englishmen should leave India to itself and that they would be content to face the loss of trade that may be caused to England by the possible adoption of a protectionist policy in England. To them he replies by saying that "Besides trade there is the interest upon capital and India remits so much money for various purposes to England that in this sense too a peaceful and friendly India seems almost necessary for our existence." Further, by way of illustrating what he calls the *higher* evils resulting from the loss of India, he says "I would bid them reflect upon the hopeless insularity that would overtake the British people if deprived of the romantic interest that the possession of India lends to our national life...There can be no two opinions among reasonable men as to the necessities of every kind that force us to link our fate to our continued domination throughout India." A more eloquent exponent in this matter is Lord Curzon. In his book *The Problems of the Far East*, Lord Curzon (then Mr. Curzon) says: "Within the borders of India may be studied every one of the problems with which the East of Asia challenges our concern. But her central and commanding position is nowhere better than in the political influence which she exercises over the destinies of her neighbours near and far, and the extent to which their fortunes revolve upon an Indian axis. The independence of Afganistan, the continued national existence of Persia, the maintenance of Turkish rule at Bagdad are, one and all, dependent upon Calcutta. Nay, the radiating circle of her influence overlaps the adjoining continents and affects alike the fate of the Bosphorus and the destinies of Egypt. Nor is the effect less remarkable if examined upon the eastern side. It is from the jealousy of India, and to impair the position which India gives to Great Britain in the Far East, that France has again embarked upon an Asiatic career. It is advancing from the South East with steps that faithfully correspond with those of Russia upon the North West. Heritage of the Indian Empire has within the last 10 years made us the land neighbours of China and has multiplied three-fold the area of our diplomacy at Peking. Even the futures of remote Korea are in a manner bound up with the politics of Hindustan, seeing that it is by the same foe that in the last resort both are threatened, and that the tactics which aim at the appropriation of the smaller unit have as their ulterior object the detriment of the greater. Such, and so supreme, is the position enjoyed in the Asian continent by the Empire of the Kaiser-I-Hind. Towards her, or into her orbit, a centripetal force, which none appear able to resist, draws every wandering star. Just as it may be said that the Eastern question in Europe turns upon the dismemberment of Turkey, so the Eastern question in Asia turns upon the continued solidarity of Hindustan."

22 Lord Curzon in this same book had expressed fears about Japan; and these have been partly realised to be well-founded since he published his book in 1896. This was written immediately after the China-Japanese war. But Japan was destined soon to make another and yet a more glorious war viz. that upon Russia. Japanese success in that war has given her absolute and unquestioned supremacy over Korea. And what is more, it has secured to Japan a towering position in the Far East generally. In the present war Japan made an easy morsel of the German possessions in China and has vindicated her claim to be the Great Britain of the Far East. "Placed at a maritime coign of vantage upon the flank of Asia, precisely analogous to that occupied by Great Britain on the flank of Europe but not necessarily involved in its responsibilities, she sets before herself the supreme ambition of becoming, on a smaller scale, the Britain of the Far East. By means of an army strong enough to defend our shores and to render invasion unlikely, and still

more, of a navy sufficiently powerful to sweep the seas, she sees that England has retained that unique and commanding position in the west which was won for us by the industry and force of character of our people, by the universal wealth of these islands, by the stability of our government, and by the colonising genius of our sons. By similar methods Japan hopes to arrive at a more modest edition of the same result in the east. Like the English, her people are stubborn fighters and born sailors. If she can but intimidate any would-be enemy from attempting a landing upon her shores, and can fly an unchallenged flag over the surrounding waters, while from her own resources she provides occupation, sustenance, clothing and wages for her people, she will fulfill her role in the international politics of the future."

23 It was formerly supposed that China would be the foremost rival and enemy of England in the Far East. The disparity however, since discovered, between the progress made by China and Japan, shows that China's place in this respect has been definitely taken by Japan. Lord Curzon, when he wrote his book in 1896, seemed to doubt that Japan would be the triumphant bearer of the yellow flag, which she had torn from the hands of China, in the impending campaign against the white ensign in the Asiatic tropics though Japan would, as, he admitted, play the role of England in the far east. But indications and omens are changing. The Anglo-Japanese alliance was a great event; but who knows that Anglo-Japanese hostilities might not be a greater event still? By this alliance, Japan successfully eliminated Russia and Germany from China. But if Japan finds tomorrow i. e. after the expiry of the present alliance, that her national interests would be better served by not continuing it, she will claim the right not to hamper herself by renewing that alliance. A Japanese friend of India writing in this year's February number of the *Modern Review*, testifies that the Japanese people to-day regard Great Britain as their first rival in Asia. "Hundreds of articles are said to have been published in Japan, even during the present war, by responsible persons, expressing the opinion that the Anglo-Japanese alliance should not be continued after its expiry. And some of them have gone so far as to demand its abrogation even during this war. Many Japanese think, that a Russo-Japanese alliance is now more suited to their interest for the obvious reason perhaps, that as Japan eliminated Russia from China with the help of England, so would she now be able to eliminate England from China with the aid of Russia in her turn. Already does Russia seem to have forgotten her humiliation at Japan's hands; and Japan, too, on her part, has been making amends by standing in good stead to Russia in her present struggle and liberally supplying her with the munitions of war. It is useless to speculate whether Russia will again so far recover as to be able to take up the threads of her aggressive policy towards India; but if she does, it seems to be granted by those who should know that Japan will rather side with Russia than England in that enterprise".

24 Nor is this all. This Japanese friend of India further suggests even more terrible happenings. "The other day," he says, "we heard from Prof. Munsterberg of Harvard that after this war is over, there will be a German-Russian-Japanese-alliance. Let us hope that this will never come about. But it is absolutely desirable for the people of India to prepare for the worst viz. a combination of Japan Russia and Germany with her adjuncts Austria and Turkey on the one hand, and, the British Empire with her allies Italy and France and probably U. S. A. on the other. In this case would India be safe?...Imperial interests demand that the Indian leaders and the British Indian Government should wake up to the necessity of a thorough-going preparedness for the future, so that the people of India may not have to repent and say 'Ah! it is too late.' If ever it be too late to carry out a programme of defence by taking the Indian people into equal confidence, as it has been done in the case of Canada, Australia, and South Africa, then the fate of the Indian people would be disastrous...viz a changing of the yoke, and the fate of the glorious British Empire may be its disintegration."

25 In the same connection, the following summary, appearing in the September number of the *Review of Reviews*, of an article on 'Japan and Germany' in the August issue of *Nord and Sud* by Dr. Paul Ostwald, will be found interesting. "Dr. Ostwald maintains that Japan, notwithstanding her alliance with England, is politically

isolated. Shortly before the present war, Japan was faced with the danger of a war with America, and the possibility of England ranging herself on the American side. Men of insight, realising the danger of Japan's isolation, indicated then the desirability of a rapprochement between Japan and Germany. Meanwhile things have greatly changed; and in Tokio the possibility of any further alliance between England and Japan is looked upon as more than doubtful. England will not acknowledge all Japan's claims with regard to China, nor will she support Japan in a war with America. Rather, the War has demonstrated a definite agreement between the two English great powers, and it is argued that as England and America are united against Germany, they will, in future also, act in accord against Japan. Consequently in Japan the removal of her political isolation has again become a burning question. The rapprochement of Japan and Russia by the treaty of July 16, 1916 is stated to be insufficient. Ever since the beginning of 1916, the Japanese press has declared more and more in favour of a union with Germany as the only safe foundation for the future of Japan. The writer says it would be a great mistake for Germany to decline, for reasons of wounded pride, to consider plans for an understanding with Japan. People do not make politics with the heart. For Japan, a union with Germany is a question of existence. Without it she runs serious risk of isolation and menace to her future."

26 Now, in the event of any such untoward development, India would be a priceless asset to England. Sir Charles Dilke, in stating his views on the question of Imperial Defence, has said "If we pursue a prudent policy in Hindustan and unmistakably evince our power to defend it against attack, no war-dangers seem to threaten the peaceful progress of the outlying portions of the Queen's dominions." In any eastern complication, though India may serve as a handy military and naval depot for England, an invasion of India by an aggressive power will be one of the first things to be thought of, and a sound defence of India must ever be the first item in a series of defensive or offensive measures, contemplated by England in the east. But, England can never hope to successfully defend India merely with the aid of British troops. And as for the native troops, they could not be in future thoroughly relied upon unless they are contented. The prudent policy, which Sir Charles Dilke recommended for India, has been carried out by Lord Kitchener, so far as the purely military aspect of it was concerned, by abandoning the Presidency military system and by other measures of re-organisation. But this prudent policy has also a political aspect; and in the coming days the troubled waters of Indian ambition will not be soothed unless the oil of large political reforms be profusely poured upon them. With this aspect of the question, however, we have already dealt in an earlier chapter and so we shall not pursue the theme here further. We just adverted to it in this connection only to indicate the great inherent difficulties in the position of England in the east and the almost heroic measures that will be necessary for England to take if England would retain India, and through it, her influence in the east. We shall once more quote Lord Curzon who observes as follows in his *Problems of the Far East*. "Perhaps the most gratifying reflection, suggested by the observations on the more distant kingdoms of the Asiatic continent, is the part that must inevitably be played in their future by this country (England). The inhabitants of a small island on the face of the northern seas, we exercise, owing to the valour of our ancestors and intrepid spirit of our merchants, a controlling suffrage in the destinies of the far east..... Whatever the future may bring forth to this country, it can not fail to be a matter of capital importance, seeing that the Empire of Great Britain, though a European, Canadian and an Australian, is, before all else, an Asiatic dominion. We still are, and have it in our hands, to remain the first power in the East. Just as De Tocqueville remarked that the conquest and government of India are really the achievements which have given to England her place in the opinion of the world, so it is the prestige and the wealth arising from her Asiatic position that are the foundation-stones of the British Empire. There in the heart of the old Asian continent she sits upon the throne that has always ruled the East. Her sceptre has outstretched over land and sea. God-like, she grasps the triple forks, and king-like wears the crown."

27 India is admittedly the pivot of the British Empire in the east. But that pivot can not stand the combined strain of foreign complications against England and the prevalence of deep political discontent in India. If contented and self-governing, India, on the other hand, can be a source of infinite strength to England, military or otherwise. As observed by Sir Charles Dilke in his *Problems of Greater Britain*, "India, under a better organisation of internal defence, would become the eastern centre of defence from which our garrisons in half the world would be raised, and upon which rather than upon home arsenals, they would depend for their supplies.....On a logical system of Imperial defence, India would possess the dock-yards and the arsenals of the British East, and the creation of an eastern Woolwich is an Imperial need." In an earlier chapter we have given certain facts about the strength of the armies which certain Hindu kings could lead into the field. The martial spirit and the tradition of military service can evidently be preserved in India; for, after the lapse of about 1500 years, native kings, there is evidence to believe, could again lead similarly large armies to battle. Nuniz, who is supposed to have been present at the Hindu camp during the siege and the battle of Raichur, in the year 1521 A. D., has recorded that the Vijayanagar army consisted of 703,000 foot, 32,600 horse, and 551 elephants, besides camp-followers, merchants etc. We share Mr. Robert Sewell's incredulity in accepting this as a correct figure; but what Mr. Sewell remarks in criticising Nuniz in this connection can be easily accepted viz. that 'large armies seem to have always been the rule in India.' Testimony is almost insistent in indicating that the Vijayanagar kings could always command enormous forces. In Scott's *History of the Deccan*, we find from a translation of a journal kept by a Bundela officer who served the Mogul government under Aurangzeb in 1690 that the Hindu kings of Vijayanagar kept an army of 30,000 horse and a million of infantry. Conti, who was in India about a century earlier than the military event referred to above, has recorded that the Vijayanagar army consisted of a million of men and upwards. One Abdur Razak, writing in 1442, puts the number at 11 lakhs of men and 1000 elephants. Writing in 1462, one Nikitin states that the Mahomedan forces, on the other hand, belonging to the Gulberga king marching to attack the Hindus, amounted to 900,000 foot 119,000 horse, and 575 elephants. Going farther back we find Lord Egerton of Tatton stating in his *Hand book of Indian Arms* that an army of Hindu confederated states mustered for the defence of northern India against the Mahomedan invasion in 1192 A. D. amounted, "according to the most moderate estimate" to 3,00,000 horse, 3,000 elephants and a great number of infantry. In 1259 a Mogul embassy in said to have been received at Delhi by an escort of 50,000 horse and was led past lines of infantry numbering as many as 200,000 in their ranks. According to Ferista, Mahomed Taghlakh had raised an army of 3,70,000 men for the conquest of Persia. Shahbuddin has declared that Mahomed Taghlakh had in all an army of 900,000 horse. Faria De Souza writing in the seventeenth century estimated that the forces of Bahadur, king of Cambay in 1534, were 1,00,000 horse, 4,15,000 foot and 600 elephants. The figures in the above estimates must, of course, be subjected to a reasonable discount. But even after such a deduction it could not be unreasonable to suppose that large armies had been the order of the day in India throughout, whether the kings concerned were Hindus or Mahomedans.

28 Nor is there any reason to suppose that even at the present day, enormous armies could not be raised in India, if there was need for them, and if there was organisation and encouragement like that which, in the old days, made the Indian soil everywhere bristle with soliders. In his book *Asia and Europe* Meredith Townsend, in the course of pessimistic remarks in speculating as to whether England would retain India or not, has observed as follows:—

"The fighting peoples of India, whose males are as big as ourselves, as brave as ourselves, and more regardless of death than ourselves, number at least a hundred and twenty millions, equal to Gibbon's calculation of the population of the Roman Empire. There are 400,000 trained brown soliders in native service and at least 2 millions of men who think their proper profession is arms, who would live

by arms if they could, and of whom we in England never hear a word. If the Prussian conscription were applied in India, we should, without counting reserves or landwehr or any force not summoned in times of peace, have 2 and a half millions of soliders actually in barracks, with 8,00,000 recruits coming up every year—a force with which not only Asia but the world might be subdued.”

That the Indian soldiers should lend themselves to the ambition of a foreign usurper for a world-conquest and the deprivation of the liberties of other nations, is an uncomfortable thought. But the fact remains that what Meredith Townsendsays about the military capacity of the Indian nation, is perfectly true. If France, which has a population somewhat less than that of Bengal, can raise over 3 millions of soliders; if Italy, which has a population almost equal to that of Behar and Orissa, can raise over 3 millions of soliders; if the united kingdom which has a population less than that of the United Provinces can raise an army of 4 millions; if Russia with a population equal to that of the Indian people speaking only the three Indian languages viz. Hindi, Bengale and the Punjabi, or in other words the people inhabiting only the northern India, can raise an army of 5 millions and be regarded as the military terror of the world, surely India can supply, under proper conditions, an army of 10 millions, even assuming, that whereas 10 per cent. of the population in European countries can be mobilised for bearing arms, only 3 per cent. are called upon to do that duty in India. With an army of 10 million people either on the field or in reserve, England can defy not only any single nation but even a strong combination of the nations of the world, in any military venture. With such an army in the background, England can confidently rely upon a peaceful preservation of her Asiatic Empire and may cheerfully face any eventualities in Europe. The only condition, of course, of all this coming true is that the Indian people must be made to feel and realise that the British Empire belongs *as much* to them as they now belong to the Empire, and that in shedding their blood for England they are really serving their own national cause.

29 The grant of self-government to India will decidedly benefit England herself even more than India by putting a stop to the double life which England has been living as a champion of liberty in Europe and not only not a champion but the most cynical practicer of despotism in Asia. The best among the British Liberals have never been able to conceal the shame they felt, when, at the beginning of the present war, England began to eject magical platitudes of the national liberty of peoples from her mouth which was stuffed with the ruins of popular liberties in India. Was it not a feat of hypocrisy, they must have said to themselves, that England should wax so eloquent and righteously indignant over the temporary subjugation of Belgium by Germany, when she herself has kept under her heel a country whose area is 164 times, and whose population is 40 times, as much as that of Belgium? Why should the liberties of Belgium be regarded as more sacred than those of gium. India? The glaring contradiction between the growth of democracy in England and the deliberate maintenance of despotism in India was always regarded by the attentive student of the British political constitution as a standing menace to domestic freedom. “The Assyrian conqueror,” Mr. Herbert Spencer has said, “who is depicted in the bass-reliefs as leading his captive by a chord, is bound with that chord himself. He forfeits his freedom as long as he retains his power”. Is not England going to liberate herself by liberating India?

30 England must remember that the day of the impudent and optimistic Imperialist was a short-lived day. The well-known creed of the Imperialist was: “The Englishman was the born ruler of the world. He might hold out a hand of friendship to the German and the American, whom he recognised as his kindred and who lived within the law. The rest of the world was peopled by dying nations whose manifest destiny was to be ‘administered’ by the coming races and exploited by their commercial syndicates.” But as pointed out by Prof. Hobhouse in his book on *Liberalism*, “this mood of optimism did not survive the South African War. It received its death-blow at Colenso and Magersfontein, and, within a few years, fear had definitely taken the place of ambition as the main spring of the movement to national and imperial consolidation. The Tariff reform movement was largely

inspired by a sense of insecurity in our commercial position. The half patronising friendship for Germany rapidly gave way first to commercial jealousy and then to unconcealed alarm for our national safety. All the powers of society were bent on lavish naval expenditure and on imposing the idea of compulsory service upon a reluctant people. The disciplined nation was needed no longer to dominate the world but to maintain its own territory." Professor Hobhouse's book was written before the year 1914, and the lesson of his remarks has been only grievously accentuated by the present war, which may be taken to have given a quietus to the dream of dominating British Imperialism. There are certain military successes which are moral defeats; and though England may possibly win the war she will take years to recover, if she may at all completely recover, from the nervous tremor which has set in as the result of the first stunning impact with the mailed fist of Germany. Every victory that England won with the aid of Indian or colonial troops has been a Colenso in disguise, it has revealed to England how helpless she would be without the aid of others. Conciliation, and not domination, must therefore be the essence of England's colonial policy in future. She can no longer afford to spurn the military assistance and co-operation of sincere friends, simply because there is just a little more pigment in their blood than in their own. The false pride of race has been already humbled, why should not England then at least make a virtue of the necessity, which is now unavoidable, of giving a great and a helpful people like those in India, rights of self-government, when England knows that from their exercising those rights no harm will result to the larger valid interests of the Empire?

31 No doubt a few pampered gluttons who have fed fat on India's civic blood, and India's wealth might magnify the prospect of the immediate loss to themselves. Thus it is alleged that if India were given self-government the interest of British capitalists would be endangered. Nothing can be more untrue. And the allegation was most effectively refuted at a recent public meeting held in Bombay where Mr. S. R. Bomanji, himself an India merchant, remarked as follows :—

"Coming to the question of English capital invested in India, it was, according to Sir George Paish, £ 365 millions. Against this sum there was the £ 40 millions currency reserve and £ 30 millions gold standard reserve; there were also about £ 30 millions invested by Indians during the last three years in Treasury Bills, exchequer bonds, etc., altogether about £ 100 millions. This left a balance of £ 265 millions. England had invested £ 3,200 millions all over the world; even in Chili, Paraguay, Uruguay and such other countries they had invested £ 620 millions where nobody could say the administration was British. Had they got any guarantees there? Coming to the great steamship companies of P. and O. and the British India the first could not be absolutely called an organisation working in India, and the latter had made all its colossal pile in the coasting trade, although lately they had vessels running to China and other countries. The British India Company was started with a capital of six hundred thousand pounds, and to-day their fleet was worth, at the current price, about £ 20 millions, which together with their investments made about £ 25 to 30 millions. That was the value of their investment to-day. All the money they had made was out of Indians, and he would ask them whether they had a higher paid Indian officer than Rs. 70 per month,—the head serang. He wanted to ask the Company whether they could not find a single Indian during these 50 or 60 years to whom to give the post of a Covenanted servant. With regard to the question of the Exchange Banks, the National Bank's shares were to-day worth three times their original value, and they had not a single Indian who had been appointed as a Covenanted officer during these so many years. Jute mill shares were to-day worth six times their original value."

32 So long as the question of granting of self-government to India is not solved to the satisfaction of the Indian people, there can be no abiding *peace* in this country, using of course that word in the larger sense. Agitation, and even violent political agitation, such as was witnessed in India during the last few years, must unhappily be the order of the day. And even when there may be a temporary lull in agitation, under-currents of restlessness will be working silently for a coming storm.

It is bootless to expect that the other thousand and one points of contact between Englishmen and Indians would come to the rescue in this matter. No doubt the routine business of the country will, in the meanwhile, go on; the departments of administration will follow their clock-work system; the agriculturist will sow and reap; the mechanic will hammer away; the mills will keep up their whir; the railways and the steam-ships will ply their lucrative trade; the European and Indian merchants will meet on the Exchange and in the market, shake hands, and transact profitable business; the good work of giving and receiving useful instruction in Schools, Colleges and Universities will proceed without impediment; the man of research in the library as well as the laboratory will discover new truths and forge new bonds of knowledge and mutual literary sympathy; and the functions in Government Houses and the exchange of amenities among Englishmen and Indians, as private friends, will otherwise keep social intercourse between them in full swing. But behind and beyond all this, the political struggle in all its keenness will remain unabated. The Indians would no doubt all along be conscious that they owe a debt of gratitude to Englishmen for what the latter have done for them in the past, and may be expected to do even in the future by way of education in civilisation and practical help in their own uplift. But even gratitude cannot put a damper on national aspirations. As the great Irish patriot had remarked, "No man need be grateful at the expense of his honour; no woman need be grateful at the expense of her chastity; and no nation need be grateful at the expense of its political liberty." The only correct angle of vision from which we can look at Englishmen in India is not that which shows us their non-political deeds and achievements, here or anywhere else in the world, but only that which reveals to us their political attitude towards India. As the Hon. Mr. Gokhale has pithily remarked: "Wrong in the one thing rare, what mattered it to the Indians what Englishmen did or how they conducted themselves in other respects? The question how to promote the most friendly feelings between the East and West in India resolves itself largely into how England may assist India's political advancement."

33 And we shall quote here *in extenso* the sentiments of Mr. Fielding Hall, the author of *The Passing of Empire*, as evidence coming from a stranger viewing the situation from the vantage ground of detachment: "You cannot hold India by force alone. Without the acquiescence of Indians we could have done nothing. This must be thoroughly realised, for it is an essential truth. Anyone can see it for himself. Given any superiority you like to assume of Englishman over Indian, could a handful of English officials and seventy thousand or less British troops conquer and rule three hundred and fifty millions of people, living in a climate suitable to them but deadly to us, against their will? It is impossible, incredible, absurd."

"There has been always a tacit and generally an active consent. Now that consent is disappearing. Why? And what is to be done?"

"The English government is more foreign than the Mogul domination. Like the Mogul system it is a government from above. It hangs, as if suspended from the Viceroy and Council. It has no roots in the soil of India. It is not indigenous in any way. Its vitality is derived from England, transmitted through the Secretary of State and the Viceroy. The Government of India has no existence apart from England. It is only 'Indian' inasmuch as it governs India; not that it proceeds from India or is composed of Indians. The truth by which it lives is that it is purely English. The whole system of the Government of India down to the last detail is alien, is exotic."

"The Indian people accepted the English government because they wanted peace. For two centuries or more they had been torn with wars, with insurrections, with internal anarchy, and with their consequences. They wanted rest to plough, to sow, to reap, to trade in peace. We gave them that. They wanted courts, criminal and civil, that were not corrupt. We gave them honest judges. They wanted facilities for trade—roads, posts, and such things—which we provided. They could, therefore, expand and use some of their energies. But the field was a narrow one. Men are not born to sow and reap and trade alone. They have other

emotions which seek for outlet, other energies which require a vent. Man is gregarious, and he is so made that he cannot fully develop himself except in larger and again larger communities. To reach his full stature in any way he must develop in all ways. He must feel himself part of ever greater organisms, the village first, the district, and the nation, finally of humanity. But in India all this is impossible. Except the village there is no community that exists even in name, and the Government has injured, almost destroyed even that. Thus an Indian has no means of growth. He cannot be a citizen of anything at all. Half his sympathies and abilities lie entirely fallow, therefore he cannot fully develop the other half. A man is a complete organism, and if you keep half in inaction you affect the other half too. A man is not a worse but a better merchant, or lawyer, or landowner, or soldier, because he is interested in his locality, his community, his nation. It gives him wider views, makes him more tolerant, more humane, more wise. But in India there is no nation, no community at all, save very weakened communities. As far as the Indian is concerned no larger community exists."

... ..

"It is the slowly growing consciousness of an energy that has no outlet, of a desire for advance in every direction, that causes the unrest. In some ways the educated classes feel it most. Everywhere they see men of their class cultivating patriotism, increasing that sense of being and working for others, of being valuable to the world at large, showing capacity for leading, ruling, thinking, advancing in a thousand ways, while none of it is for them. They want to express the genius of their races in wider forms than mere individuality, but they are not able to do so. They want a national science and literature and law; they cannot have it. No individual as an individual can achieve anything. Not till he feels he is a cell in a greater and more enduring life can he develop. But this is not for India."

... ..

"It is a piece of advice often addressed to India when she expresses her desire for some share in her government that she should first reform herself socially and intellectually. The status of women in zenanas and harems, infant marriage, the sad condition of widows, the degradation of caste, polygamy, the fanaticism of religions, are, she is told, to be mended before she can show herself fit for self-government in any form. Only to a free people, it is said, can self-government be safely entrusted, and she is so wrapped up in prejudice and ignorance that she is unfit for any freedom. "Mend your divisions first; reform yourself, and we will see what we can do." Such advice comes from ignorance alone."

34 Again as Mr. J. E. S. Cotton observes in his book on *Colonies and Dependencies*—

"Down to Lord Dalhousie's time, the received theory, even of the most enlightened administrators, was—*everything for the people, nothing by them*. The English standard of good government was held infallible; and native opinion was assumed to be either non-existent or perverse. In this case it was the *Mutiny* that caused the awakening. *By that terrible shock the lesson was taught that a race habituated to centuries of subjection still retains some national aspirations, which are dangerous if they do not find a peaceful vent.*"

35 It is a remarkable fact that the establishment by England of a Colonial Empire in the West and the establishment of the Indian Empire in the East were begun nearly at the same time and that they have wonderfully progressed on parallel lines in point of time. But what a great contrast do the two Empires present to even the most cursory observer of things! The first charter to the East India Company was given in 1600 A. D. by Queen Elizabeth. Only 28 years later King Charles. I gave a similar charter to the Massachusetts Company for trading with America. We have already seen the vicissitudes of fortune through which the East India Company passed. The Massachusetts Company also passed through vicissitudes of another kind. Its charter was replaced by another charter in 1691 which was of a less commercial and more political character and which is said to have eventually influenced the Convention of American colonists in preparing the federal constitution of the United States in 1787. As Sir Courtney Ilbert observes:

"The two charters were thus to have different destinies; for while the charter of the Massachusetts Company led to the foundation of an *independent* republic in the West, the charter of the East India Company led to the foundation of a *dependent* Empire in the East." Already, about 135 years ago, the American colonists declared their complete independence of British Rule. To-day the Indian people seek only to get a limited form of self-government i. e. power within certain limits to legislate for themselves and to exercise a limited control over those entrusted with the duty of carrying out laws and carrying on the administration generally. But even this is being denied to them.

36 The Anglo-Indian Civilian, now threatened with deprivation of power, is holding out threats in return, much in the same manner as the East India Company did when threatened with the deprivation of their power and patronage. To use the language of Mr. Henry St. George Tucker, "His egotism lies veiled under a very flimsy mock-humility." Deprive me of power, the Civilian says, and the country will be ruined. He alone is the repository of administrative knowledge; he alone can be safely trusted with India, he alone has done everything for India. His intentions are the purest; his deeds the most benevolent; his reforming action the most rapid in the world. He is so beloved by the poor ryot that Heaven alone knows what will be the consequence of abolishing his rule. The 'talking bird' and the 'golden water' are in safe custody of a terrible wizard on the top of a perilous mountain; all those who attempt to reach them, as in the story in the *Arabian Nights*, shall be turned into black stones! There are plenty of mocking voices, it is true; but a few have at last stuffed their ears with cotton and will succeed."

37 Time presses; and we must now conclude this pamphlet, which is intended only as a general introduction to the Congress-League Scheme. We shall, therefore, very briefly summarise the whole situation and forge what is called 'the spear-point of the argument.' And in doing so we shall be as frank as possible.

[India is grateful for what England has done for her so far. But India believes in the definition of gratitude as 'a lively expectation of favours yet to come.' And she is determined that she will not herself take rest nor allow rest to England so long as she has not obtained her heart's desire viz. Self-Government within the British Empire and equal partnership with the self-governing Colonies in the British Commonwealth. Her aspiration has been definitely formulated; and there can be now no going back from it. India will not, and cannot, accept any half-way house to her ambition; and if that ambition is not to be realised in full, she will rather prefer to be as, she was, in true oriental fashion!

The East bowed before the blast
In patient deep disdain;
She let the legions thunder past
Then plunged in thought again.


Why should India care who rules her if she is not to have under him a self-respectful status as a nation? She refuses to regard her present position of a milch-cow to the British empire as dignified. She cannot appreciate the argument that she has got what she had not got before, viz. internal peace and contact with a civilised nation like England. There is no glory in being a bondsman, though attached to the retinue of the most illustrious master in the world. If India had internecine wars, she was living in an atmosphere which favoured the fullest growth of at least individual persons and communities. The clash of arms is much better for mankind than emasculating peace. Erring but responsible manhood is preferable to a life-long, though secure, tutelage. The rugged national life, the uneven social surface in pre-British times, was certainly preferable to the dead level and the dull uniformity, established by the steam-roller of British Rule, in which first class eminence is impossible and aspiring tall poppies are always in danger of being cut down. In pre-British times there was ever room at the top for whomsoever that possessed eminent qualities. A shepherd like Malharrao Holkar, who in his childhood spun wool and tended the flock in the field, could carve out, by his sword and statesmanship, a principality worth a crore and a half by the time he reached the

middle age. Mahadaji Scindia, who was for twenty years the successful rival of the English at the Imperial Court of Delhi in the last quarter of the 18th century, was the son of a mere page who took care of the Peshva's slippers. Under the British rule for over 150 years there has not arisen a man who was deemed able or distinguished enough to be a Revenue Commissioner in Civil service or a second Lieutenant in the army. Even a Shivaji could not, as was once observed by Babu Surendranath Banerji, hope under the British rulers to rise above the rank of a Subhedar-Major. What has British rule, it may again be asked, done for the agriculturist either beyond ensuring peace so that he may reap the corn he has sown? The rural population under British rule has been deprived of even such self-government as it enjoyed in pre-British days.

Evidently this could not have gone on for a long time, even if the great war had not come. But now that the war *has* come, now that the British Government has realised the possibilities of the strength to be derived from a contented and self-governing India to the empire in the future, and has also declared itself to be the natural guardian of the political freedom of nations in the world, small or great, India is inclined to put point-blank the challenging question to England: "Are you or are you not going to give political freedom to India just as you say you are going to win it by war for Belgium or Serbia? Has or has not India any claims upon you in that respect? If yes, then what is the scheme by which you are going to restore political freedom to this great nation? Despairing of a constructive policy and an honest scheme spontaneously emanating from you, the best brains in India have voluntarily framed a scheme of their own; and the Indian nation now demands that it should be at once put into operation as affording a wide enough workable basis for a fair experiment of nation-making in this country, and embodying a minimum of political reforms, a minimum, that is to say, of political power which the country thinks and feels is unreservedly or unconditionally due to her, a minimum which can not be divided into parts without destroying its desired efficacy or without disappointing the people to such an extent as to make them lose faith in British statesmanship. And England would be judged by the response which she may give to this challenge.

The Congress-League Scheme, reserving as it does to the Government of India the fullest measure of control and administration in most of the great imperial departments, cannot itself be valued at more than eight annas in the whole rupee of national self-government such as the British Colonies at present actually enjoy. That scheme, therefore, does not admit of any more cheese-paring economy or instalments. The State Secretary for India would entirely misunderstand his mission to this land, if he thought that his presence was required only to arbitrate between a close-fisted bureaucracy and an extravagant educated class as regards a claim for decentralisation of mere administrative business. Mr. Montagu is not looked to by India as a shrewd umpire who knows how best to settle a small bargain between two petty dealers. His task is not to apply the differential calculus so skilfully as to seem to be giving to the Indian people something without really taking away anything of value from the bureaucracy. He would be doing injustice to himself if he did not regard himself in as responsible a position with regard to India as Lord Durham was with regard to Canada or Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman with regard to South Africa. Here were instances in which political discontent was as deep as it is now in India, and in which the grant of full responsible government was recognised as the *only* real and abiding solution of the problem of pacifying the nation. There the theory of instalments was regarded as simply out of the question, and the same must be the case with India also. The minimum as embodied in the Congress-League Scheme is the minimum that India must receive if she should begin to feel that she is really a partner in the Empire and not a menial drudge; if she should rise to the required pitch of enthusiasm to put forth all her energy and resources for the cause of the Empire and share, in her own right, in the glory of the Empire. The minimum embodied in the Scheme is that portion of the edifice of self-government which can not admit of being done in parts. It contains just that measure, and no more, of the power of the purse and of the control of administration, which is necessary to inspire India with respect for herself and love for the Empire. If the

bureaucracy does not possess imagination enough to perceive, it is our business to teach it to them, that the mere establishment of a barren peace, and the mechanical consolidation of territorial acquisitions, can not entitle any rulers to the esteem, much less to the love, of a people who had a glorious political past and who legitimately aspire to a glorious political future. With a liberated and a loving India England may overcome any dangers that threaten the British Empire. But in a discontented and emasculated India England may find only a mill-stone round her neck, heavy enough in its turn to drown her in the seething and surging waters of an international struggle; for, as was once observed by the late Sir Pherozshah Mehta, a policy of force and despotism can not fail to bring on its attending Nemesis. England's experience of discontented Ireland has not been pleasant enough; and India, if not conciliated by the grant of self-government, is sure to prove another Ireland. A saner politician than Dr. Rash Behari Ghose can not be imagined; and yet he could not help saying in the course of his speech as Chairman of the Reception Committee of the 22nd I.N. Congress held at Calcutta: "The pinch-beck Imperialism in England is made up of barbarous ambitions, passions and sentiments wholly alien to the culture and civilisation of the 20th century. To those brummagem imperialists I would say: Do not misread the signs of the times. Do not be deluded by theories of racial inferiority. The choice lies before you between a contented people, proud to be the citizens of the greatest empire the world has ever seen and another Ireland in the East, or—I am uttering no idle threat, I am not speaking at random, for I knew something of the present temper of the rising generation in Bengal—perhaps another Russia." A situation like this can be adequately dealt with only by the sympathetic imagination of a generous statesman, who can think in large dimensions, and not by the subtlety of a pettifogging politician whose skill lies only in investigating mathematical or evolutionary minima in political concessions. May we not hope that Mr. Montagu will rise to the occasion and transform India from a dangerously discontented dependent into a cordial co-operator and a faithful friend of the British Empire?



APPENDIX

A SCHEME* OF REFORMS

PASSED BY

THE INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS

On December 29th, 1916

AND BY

THE ALL-INDIA MUSLIM LEAGUE

On December 31st, 1916

CONGRESS RESOLUTION XII.

(a) That having regard to the fact that the great communities of India are the inheritors of ancient civilisations and have shown great capacity for government and administration, and to the progress in education and public spirit made by them during a century of British Rule, and further having regard to the fact that the present system of Government does not satisfy the legitimate aspirations of the people and has become unsuited to the existing conditions and requirements, this Congress is of opinion that the time has come when His Majesty the King-Emperor should be pleased to issue a proclamation announcing that it is the aim and intention of British policy to confer self-government on India at an early date.

(b) That this Congress demands that a definite step should be taken towards self-government by granting the reforms contained in the scheme prepared by the All-India Congress Committee in concert with the Reform Committee appointed by the All-India Muslim League (*detailed below*).

(c) That in the re-construction of the Empire, India shall be lifted from the position of a Dependency to that of an equal partner in the Empire with the self-governing Dominions.

RESOLUTION XIII.

That this Congress urges the Congress Committees, Home Rule Leagues, and other Associations, which have as their object the attainment of Self-Government within the Empire, to carry on through the year an educative propaganda on law-abiding and constitutional lines in support of the reforms put forward by the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League.

Reform Scheme.

I—PROVINCIAL LEGISLATIVE COUNCILS.

1. Provincial Legislative Councils shall consist of four-fifths elected and of one-fifth nominated members.
2. Their strength shall be not less than 125 members in the major provinces, and from 50 to 75 in the minor provinces.
3. The members of Councils should be elected directly by the people on as broad a franchise as possible.
4. Adequate provision should be made for the representation of important minorities by election, and the Muhammadans should be represented through special electorates on the Provincial Legislative Councils in the following proportions :—

PUNJAB—One-half of the elected Indian Members.		
UNITED PROVINCES—30 p. c.	”	”
BENGAL—40 p. c.	”	”
BIHAR—25 p. c.	”	”
CENTRAL PROVINCES—15 p. c.	”	”
MADRAS—15 p. c.	”	”
BOMBAY—One-third	”	”

* This scheme has been adopted by both the Home Rule Leagues, now working in India, as embodying an irreducible minimum of political reforms which must be immediately granted to India in full, as a first instalment of self-government or Home Rule which is declared to be the goal of British policy in this country.

Provided that no Muhammadan shall participate in any of the other elections to the Imperial or Provincial Legislative Councils, save and except those by electorates representing special interests.

Provided further that no Bill, nor any clause thereof, nor a resolution introduced by a non-official member affecting one or the other community, which question is to be determined by the members of that community in the Legislative Council concerned, shall be proceeded with, if three-fourths of the members of that community in the particular Council, Imperial or Provincial, oppose the Bill or any clause thereof or the resolution.

5. The head of the Provincial Government should not be the President of the Legislative Council but the Council should have the right of electing its President.

6. The right of asking supplementary questions should not be restricted to the member putting the original question, but should be allowed to be exercised by any other member.

7. (a) Except customs, post, telegraph, mint, salt, opium, railways, army and navy, and tributes from Indian States, all other sources of revenue should be Provincial.

(b) There should be no divided heads of revenue. The Government of India should be provided with fixed contributions from the Provincial Governments, such fixed contributions being liable to revision when extraordinary and unforeseen contingencies render such revision necessary.

(c) The Provincial Council should have full authority to deal with all matters affecting the internal administration of the Province, including the power to raise loans, to impose and alter taxation and to vote on the Budget. All items of expenditure, and all proposals concerning ways and means for raising the necessary revenue, should be embodied in Bills and submitted to the Provincial Council for adoption.

(d) Resolutions on all matters within the purview of the Provincial Government should be allowed for discussion in accordance with rules made in that behalf by the Council itself.

(e) A resolution passed by the Provincial Legislative Council shall be binding on the Executive Government, unless vetoed by the Governor in Council, provided, however, that if the resolution is again passed by the Council after an interval of not less than one year, it must be given effect to.

(f) A motion for adjournment may be brought forward for the discussion of a definite matter of urgent public importance, if supported by not less than one-eighth of the members present.

8. A special meeting of the Provincial Council may be summoned, on a requisition by not less than one-eighth of the members.

9. A Bill, other than a Money Bill, may be introduced in Council in accordance with rules made in that behalf by the Council itself, and the consent of the Government should not be required therefor.

10. All Bills passed by Provincial Legislatures shall have to receive the assent of the Governor before they become law, but may be vetoed by the Governor-General.

11. The term of office of the members shall be five years.

II.—PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS.

1. The head of every Provincial Government shall be a Governor who shall not ordinarily belong to the Indian Civil Service or any of the permanent services.

2. There shall be in every Province an Executive Council which, with the Governor, shall constitute the Executive Government of the Province.

3. Members of the Indian Civil Service shall not ordinarily be appointed to the Executive Councils.

4. Not less than one-half of the members of the Executive Council shall consist of Indians to be elected by the elected members of the Provincial Legislative Council.

5. The term of office of the members shall be five years.

III.—IMPERIAL LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL.

1. The strength of the Imperial Legislative Council shall be 150.

2. Four-fifths of the members shall be elected.

3. The franchise for the Imperial Legislative Council should be widened as far as possible on the lines of the electorates for Muhammadans for the Provincial Legislative Councils, and the elected members of the Provincial Legislative Councils should also form an electorate for the return of members to the Imperial Legislative Council.

4. One-third of the Indian elected members should be Muhammadans elected by separate Muhammadan electorates in the several Provinces, in the proportion, as nearly as may be, in which they are represented on the Provincial Legislative Councils by separate Muhammadan electorates.

Vide provisos to section, I, clause 4.

5. The President of the Council shall be elected by the Council itself.

6. The right of asking supplementary questions shall not be restricted to the member putting the original question but should be allowed to be exercised by any other member.

7. A special meeting of the Council may be summoned on a requisition by not less than one-eighth of the members.

8. A Bill, other than a Money Bill, may be introduced in Council in accordance with rules made in that behalf by the Council itself, and the consent of the Executive Government should not be required therefor.

9. All Bills passed by the Council shall have to receive the assent of the Governor-General before they become law.

10. All financial proposals relating to sources of income and items of expenditure shall be embodied in Bills. Every such Bill and the Budget as a whole shall be submitted for the vote of the Imperial Legislative Council.

11. The term of office of members shall be five years.

12. The matters mentioned herein below shall be exclusively under the control of the Imperial Legislative Council:

(a) Matters in regard to which uniform legislation for the whole of India is desirable.

(b) Provincial legislation in so far as it may affect inter-provincial fiscal relations.

(c) Questions affecting purely Imperial Revenue, excepting tributes from Indian States.

(d) Questions affecting purely Imperial expenditure, except that no resolution of the Imperial Legislative Council shall be binding on the Governor-General in Council in respect of military charges for the defence of the country.

(e) The right of revising Indian tariffs and customs duties, of imposing, altering or removing any tax or cess, modifying the existing system of currency and banking, and granting any aids or bounties to any or all deserving and nascent industries of the country.

(f) Resolutions on all matters relating to the administration of the country as a whole.

13. A Resolution passed by the Legislative Council should be binding on the Executive Government, unless vetoed by the Governor-General in Council; provided, however, that if the resolution is again passed by the Council after an interval of not less than one year, it must be given effect to.

14. A motion for adjournment may be brought forward for the discussion of a definite matter of urgent public importance if supported by not less than one-eighth of the members present.

15. When the Crown chooses to exercise its power of veto in regard to a Bill passed by a Provincial Legislative Council or by the Imperial Legislative Council, it should be exercised within twelve months from the date on which it is passed, and the Bill shall cease to have effect as from the date on which the fact of such veto is made known to the Legislative Council concerned.

16. The Imperial Legislative Council shall have no power to interfere with the Government of India's direction of the military affairs and the foreign and political relations of India, including the declaration of war, the making of peace and the entering into treaties.

IV. THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

1. The Governor-General of India will be the head of the Government of India.

2. He will have an Executive Council, half of whom shall be Indians.

3. The Indian members should be elected by the elected members of the Imperial Legislative Council.

4. Members of the Indian Civil Service shall not ordinarily be appointed to the Executive Council of the Governor-General.

5. The power of making all appointments in the Imperial Civil Services shall vest in the Government of India, as constituted under this scheme, due regard being paid to existing interests, subject to any laws that may be made by the Imperial Legislative Council.

6. The Government of India shall not ordinarily interfere in the local affairs of a Province, and powers not specifically given to a Provincial Government, shall be deemed to be vested in the former. The authority of the Government of India will ordinarily be limited to general supervision and superintendence over the Provincial Governments.

7. In legislative and administrative matters the Government of India, as constituted under this scheme, shall, as far as possible, be independent of the Secretary of State.

8. A system of independent audit of the accounts of the Government of India should be instituted.

V.—THE SECRETARY OF STATE IN COUNCIL.

1. The Council of the Secretary of State for India should be abolished.

2. The salary of the Secretary of State should be placed on the British Estimates.

3. The Secretary of State should, as far as possible, occupy the same position in relation to the Government of India, as the Secretary of State for the Colonies does in relation to the Government of the Self-Governing Dominions.

4. The Secretary of State for India should be assisted by two permanent Under-Secretaries, one of whom should always be an Indian.

VI.—INDIA AND THE EMPIRE.

1. In any Council or other body which may be constituted or convened for settlement or control of Imperial affairs, India shall be adequately represented in like manner with the Dominions and with equal rights.


2. Indians should be placed on a footing of equality in respect of status and rights of citizenship with other subjects of His Majesty the King throughout the Empire.

VII.—MILITARY AND OTHER MATTERS.

1. The military and naval services of His Majesty, both in their commissioned and non-commissioned ranks, should be thrown open to Indians and adequate provision should be made for their selection, training and instruction in India.

2. Indians should be allowed to enlist as volunteers.

3. Executive Officers in India shall have no judicial powers entrusted to them, and the judiciary in every Province shall be placed under the highest Court of the Province.



Indian Home Rule League

Head Office :-486, Narayan Peth, Poona City

I. OBJECTS.

(i) To attain Home Rule or Self-Government for India within the British Empire by all constitutional means.

(ii) To educate and organize public opinion in India, the United Kingdom and elsewhere towards the attainment of the same.

II. MEMBERSHIP.

The Membership of the Indian Home Rule League shall be open to all men and women of over twenty one years of age who sign a declaration to the effect that he or she accepts the objects and the constitution of the League.

III. SUBSCRIPTION.

(i) Every member shall pay Re. one as annual subscription of the League.

(ii) Any one who pays a subscription of Rs. 100 or more in one lump sum shall be considered a life-member and such members shall not be required to pay the annual subscription.

IV. OFFICE-BEARERS.

The following gentlemen are elected as Office-bearers for the year (1917-18).

President

Mr. Joseph Baptista, B. A., LL. B. (Cantab), Bar-at-Law, L. C. E. (Bombay).

Vice-Presidents

1. Mr. Bai Gangadhar Tilak, B. A., LL. B. (Poona).
2. The Hon'ble Mr. Ganesh Shrikrishna Khaparde, B. A., LL. B. (Amraoti),
Member of the Supreme Legislative Council.
3. The Hon'ble Mr. Dattatraya Venkatesh Belvi, B. A., LL. B. (Belgaum).
Member of the Bombay Legislative Council.

Treasurers

1. Prof. Shivaram Mahadeo Paranjape, M. A. (Poona)
2. Mr. Teshwant Vishwanath (Bombay)

General Secretary

Mr. Narsinh Chintaman Kelkar, B. A., LL. B., Editor, the *Kesari* and the *Mahratta*. (Poona)

Assistant Secretary

Mr. Damodar Vishwanath Gokhale, B. A., LL. B. (Poona).

V. EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE.

A committee of the following gentlemen is appointed to execute the work of the League.

- (1) President. (2-3-4) Vice-Presidents. (5-6) Treasurers. (7) Secretary.
- (8) Mr. Raghunath Pandurang Karandikar, High Court Pleader (Satara).
- (9) Mr. Gangadhar Balvant Deshpande, B. A., LL. B. (Belgaum).
- (10) Dr. Dinkar Dhonddev Sathaye, F. R. F. P. S. (Bombay).
- (11) Mr. Narayan Ranganath Alekar, B. A., LL. B. (Nagpur).
- (12) Mr. Wasudev Laxman Chiplonkar, B. A., LL. B. (Akola).