

**DOCUMENTS ON  
GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY  
1918-1945**

**FROM THE ARCHIVES OF THE  
GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTRY**

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<sup>1</sup>This list shows the composition of the Board of Editors at the time of the final editorial work on this volume (early 1950). Former editors, all of whom contributed to the preparation of this volume, were:

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**DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY**  
**1918-1945**

**SERIES D (1937-1945)**

**VOLUME III**

**GERMANY AND THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR**  
**1936-1939**

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## GENERAL INTRODUCTION

In June 1946 the British Foreign Office and the United States Department of State agreed to publish jointly documents from captured archives of the German Foreign Ministry and the Reich Chancellery. Although the captured archives go back to the year 1867, it was decided to limit the present publication to papers relating to the years after 1918, since the object of the publication was "to establish the record of German foreign policy preceding and during World War II." The editorial work was to be performed "on the basis of the highest scholarly objectivity." The editors were to have complete independence in the selection and editing of the documents. Publication was to begin and be concluded as soon as possible. Each Government was "free to publish separately any portion of the documents."<sup>1</sup> In April 1947 the French Government, having requested the right to participate in the project, accepted the terms of this agreement.

The three Governments realized the unique nature of the enterprise. Captured enemy documents had been published in the past, and especially by the Germans themselves, but only documents which supported a propaganda thesis. Never had three victorious powers set out to establish the full record of the diplomacy of a vanquished power from captured archives "on the basis of the highest scholarly objectivity."

The editors wish to state at the outset that they have not only been permitted, but enjoined, to make their selection on this basis alone. In the selection of documents for publication, and in the editing of the documents, the editors have had complete freedom. No effort has been made at any time by any of the participating Governments to influence their work. The editors, therefore, accept complete responsibility for the volumes as published.

## II

The archives of the German Foreign Ministry came into Anglo-American custody partly as a result of planning, partly by accident, but chiefly through the incomplete execution of orders to destroy the most important portions. During hostilities, the Allied military forces were instructed to keep close watch for enemy archives, and

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<sup>1</sup> It was in accordance with this provision that the Department of State, in January 1948, published the volume of documents entitled *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941*.

teams of experts were assembled behind the lines so that the examination of captured documents might begin without delay. In April 1945 units of the United States First Army discovered more than 300 tons of Foreign Ministry papers in various storage places in the Harz Mountains. The Anglo-American experts were immediately summoned. They located other parts of the archives in the Harz Mountains and Thuringia. Their most important discoveries were a box containing memoranda summarizing conversations of Hitler and Ribbentrop with foreign statesmen, and a quantity of German microfilm which, when made into continuous rolls and printed at the Air Ministry in London, was found to record some 10,000 pages of the working files of the Foreign Minister (*Büro RAM*).

Under the supervision of the Anglo-American experts, the captured archives were assembled at Marburg Castle, in the American zone of Germany. Later the collection was moved to Berlin. Finally, in the summer of 1948, the archives were moved to England, where they are to remain until conditions in Germany become more stable. Between 1945 and 1948 the collection was augmented by many tons of Reich Chancellery documents and other smaller collections.

### III

When the Foreign Ministry archives were captured in April 1945, the question was considered whether they had been deliberately placed in the path of the Anglo-American armies and spurious documents added to the collection, with the purpose of sowing discord among the enemies of Germany. Documentary evidence and interrogation of surviving German officials have completely dispelled these suspicions. Actually, the German Government made efforts to prevent the capture of the documents, both by moving them from place to place and by ordering the destruction of the files for the Nazi period only a few days before the arrival of the American First Army.

The dispersal of the archives began in 1943, when the air attacks on German cities had become intense. It was then decided to keep only a skeleton staff and the current files of the Foreign Ministry in Berlin; the rest of the staff with their files were moved to less vulnerable parts of Germany. Most went to Krummhübel, a resort in the Riesengebirge, but some branch offices were sent as far away as Lake Constance. The archives were also dispersed to castles in the Harz and south and east of Berlin. In the summer and autumn of 1944 the Soviet advance enforced the transfer of those archives which had been stored south and east of Berlin to the Harz region. Orders were given for the destruction of the non-essential secret documents at Krummhübel and for the removal of the remainder to Thuringia. It is impossible to determine with precision what was destroyed by acci-

dent or design in the hurried movement which followed. It is known that these transfers were not entirely completed before the arrival of Soviet troops. Only in the early months of 1945, therefore, were the Foreign Ministry archives concentrated in the west.

By spring the German armies were in full retreat. Early in April 1945 the evacuation center at Meisdorf received a list of categories of documents which were to be prepared for destruction. These included all important files for the Nazi period. On April 10 an order was received by telephone to commence immediately the destruction of these categories. When the American troops arrived a few days later, only a small fraction had actually been destroyed.

#### IV

Including the accessions received since April 1945, the captured documents now in the joint custody of the United States Department of State and the British Foreign Office weigh about 400 tons. The tens of thousands of bundles of papers have been repeatedly packed, moved by train, truck, or plane, and then unpacked and shelved. The packing, the moving, the unpacking, and the shelving were done hurriedly, under war conditions. Until the contents of every bundle in the collection have been examined, therefore, it will not be possible to be certain that the selection for publication has been made from all the surviving documents on a particular problem or year.

An analysis of the files in Anglo-American custody is appended to volumes I (p. 1177) and II (p. 1021) of this series. A summary of this analysis reveals the following situation: For the years from 1867 to 1920 the collection seems complete; there are gaps in the files dealing with 1920-1936, but they appear to be relatively unimportant. Thereafter, the gaps become increasingly a problem. Fortunately many copies were made of most documents, and it is possible to find enough papers in other files to fill in the significant lines of the picture. This or that document may be lost completely, but other documents give the essential material. That is not always true, but until 1940 it is usually true. After 1940, and until 1943, one is continually reminded of a half-finished picture: the outlines are obvious; some parts are completed with minute detail; other parts are only sketched in; there are blank spaces. From 1943 the materials are fragmentary, but peculiarly valuable because there is so little other evidence on these years.

The most important defect of the captured archives for the period from 1936 is the absence of the registers and journals in which were recorded the departmental file number and the distribution of each paper, with a summary of its contents. The captured Foreign Ministry archives are not a single, coherently organized file of the Min-



istry as a whole. They are the working files of officials, such as the Foreign Minister and the State Secretary; of parts of the Ministry, such as those of the Political Department and the Legal Department. The documents in these captured files are arranged so as to facilitate the work of these individual departments and officials: sometimes the arrangement is alphabetical (by countries, by subjects, or by individuals), sometimes it is chronological, sometimes it is topical. Sometimes secret papers are segregated; sometimes they are not. The captured documents do not, therefore, constitute a central Ministerial file, and there is no uniform filing system. There is no place where, for instance, all the telegrams from the Embassy in London may be found. Ten or twenty copies of one telegram may be found in various files; the only surviving copy of another telegram may be found in the file of another mission abroad to which it was sent for information (bearing the departmental file number, and not the telegram number given in London); occasionally no copy can be found.

Theoretically, the registers and journals could be reconstructed by collating the surviving files, but the resources for this gigantic task are not available. As their work in the Foreign Ministry archives progresses, the editors are learning from experience which departments, individuals, and missions abroad were likely to receive copies of papers, and where the papers were likely to be filed. Beginning with series D, volume III, it is possible to make a clear distinction between papers which are not printed because unimportant, and papers not printed because not found. In volumes I and II of series D it was not possible to make this distinction with confidence, so the footnote "Not printed" was used for both categories of omission.

Some of the documents missing from the Foreign Ministry archives are in the possession of the Soviet Government, but the extent of its collection is not known. Beginning in June 1946 the Soviet Government published several volumes of German Foreign Ministry documents. Usually, but not always, other copies of these documents are in the Foreign Ministry files, together with other much more voluminous material on the same subject.

## V

The editors learned only by trial and error the limitations of the available material and the difficulties inherent in exploiting disordered and incomplete archives. The filming of the Foreign Ministry archives, begun in 1945 by American and British experts for intelligence purposes, and continued by historians representing the three Governments participating in the publication of these records, will facilitate scholarly investigation in the future. More than a million pages of the most important documents for the years from 1914 to 1945 have by now been preserved on microfilm.

At the outset, the selection of documents for publication was made from these microfilms by historians working in London, Paris, and Washington. It was found, however, that this method was too cumbersome, and all except the final selection is now made by an international team of American, British, and French historians working on the original files. In the work of the tripartite team, and in the periodic conferences of the editors-in-chief, the international character of historical scholarship is convincingly demonstrated.

## VI

In selecting documents for publication the fundamental test has been their value for an understanding of German foreign policy. Since the German estimate of the policy of other powers was one of the most important factors shaping German policy, these estimates have been included. They should, of course, be viewed with caution. Very often German diplomats wrote what they thought would please Hitler. Even those who wished to convey unpleasant truths used language which would carry conviction to the Nazi Party leaders.

Even so far as German foreign policy is concerned it is necessary to remember the peculiar characteristics of Nazi diplomacy. A large proportion of the officials in the Foreign Ministry and of the German representatives abroad were career diplomats who were kept at their posts only because Hitler found them indispensable. He did not trust them, sometimes with reason, and he often kept them in ignorance of his intentions. The attentive reader will frequently see evidence of this situation and will realize that their reports and instructions do not always reflect the actual policy of the Reich.

Two categories of evidence which bulk large in the archives of the German Foreign Ministry find little place in these volumes: the press summary and the intelligence report. Undoubtedly a minute examination of the material in the press summaries and of the rumor and gossip set down in tens of thousands of reports by confidential agents will some day yield results of significance for an understanding of German policy. But such an examination requires study of all the evidence, and all the evidence would fill hundreds of volumes. This is true also of the analyses produced by the prolific and imaginative members of Ribbentrop's private information service, the *Dienststelle Ribbentrop*. The editors have agreed, therefore, that press summaries, intelligence reports, and the analyses prepared in the *Dienststelle Ribbentrop* will be included only where there is clear evidence that they directly influenced German policy.

Even after excluding all but a few examples from this material, the sheer mass of evidence presents baffling problems. In this age of shorthand and the typewriter, documents grow in number and length.

Bismarck's conversations were usually summarized in a few hundred words; the summaries of Hitler's conversations often run to thousands of words. When Embassy reports are dictated, a lengthy report requires less thought and time than a brief report. The editors have often been tempted to summarize, or to print excerpts, but they have decided to do neither. Except in a few cases, which are clearly indicated, every document has been printed without omissions or alterations. In every case, too, significant material such as file numbers and marginal comments have been included. Where there is no important difference between the preliminary draft and the dispatch as sent, the latter has been preferred; where there are differences, they have been described. To save space the telegraphic summary has been used if it includes all essential points; otherwise, the detailed report has been used; if the telegraphic summary is not complete, but action was taken before the report was received, both the telegram and the report are printed.

The order in which documents should be presented in a collection such as this has long been a disputed subject among historians. The editors agreed that documents should be grouped by topics, but within each topic they are presented in the chronological order in which they originated. In this volume the Spanish Civil War is considered a single topic, and the chronological order of the documents has been followed. It should be borne in mind that a report from a mission abroad might be received after action had been taken in Berlin, although the report bears an earlier date than the document recording the action. Where the date of receipt in Berlin can be determined, it is given. Each document is preceded by an editorial heading and by reference to the serial number of the film and the frame number on the film.<sup>2</sup> A list of film serial numbers is appended to each volume, showing the description of the corresponding German Foreign Ministry file; this permits identification of the location in the archives of the copy of the document published. As each volume is published, the pertinent films will be made available for study by scholars so that the specialist may be able to fill in the details of the record.

Because the immediate origins of the Second World War, and the course of the war, are of most immediate interest and of most obvious importance, the editors have decided to begin their work with the fourth series (D). This series will include documents dating from 1936 or 1937, the starting point depending on the topic, and continuing through the war. The three series of volumes to be published subsequently will include the documents for the earlier years.

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<sup>2</sup> For an explanation of these terms, see appendix II.

## VII

After the joint selection of documents to be included in a volume is completed, the task of preparing the editorial notes is entrusted to the editors in one of the three capitals, subject to review by the other editors. Similarly, the task of preparing the English translation is divided by volumes, or sections of a volume. Each volume will contain a statement on responsibility for the notes and translations.

Translation from the German presents peculiar difficulties, particularly since, under Hitler, there was no one style of diplomatic German, as there had been under Bismarck. Some of the writers use "Nazi German," which conveys only a foggy impression in German and translates into completely opaque English. The translation is therefore often inelegant, but the editors believe that where the meaning is clear in German the English can be understood. In general, they have preferred to sacrifice grace to precision. Paraphrase has been used only where the German is clear but exact translation resulted in ambiguity.

The parallel series in German, giving the original text of the documents, will enable those interested to check the translation.

In printing the translated version of the documents the editors have not aimed at giving a facsimile reproduction of the German original as regards arrangement and spacing. All important notes and marginalia are, however, included either in the text or as footnotes, the only exception being purely routine notations.

The editorial notes have been kept to the minimum necessary for the factual elucidation of the text. They do not attempt interpretation except where this is necessary to establish the date or identity of a document. No attempt is made to correct German reports by reference to other sources, even when the German reports present a false or one-sided picture. It is as a source-book for the study of history, and not as a finished interpretation of history, that these documents are presented.

## PREFACE TO VOLUME III, SERIES D

The documents printed in this volume have been selected by the British, French, and United States editors acting jointly. The translations were made in the Division of Language Services of the Department of State and reviewed by the British and United States editors, who are also responsible jointly for the editorial notes and footnotes.

Although series D of this publication is, in general, intended to provide knowledge of German foreign policy from the autumn of 1937 to the end of World War II in 1945, a volume dealing with the policy pursued by Germany during the Spanish Civil War logically begins in July 1936, when the Civil War broke out. It extends to July 1939.

The documents first make clear the German attitude toward the revolt against the Spanish Government by certain generals, pass on to the appeal of General Franco to Hitler for assistance, which was conveyed by a German businessman, Johannes Bernhardt, and then indicate Hitler's reply; they also describe the organization of the Spanish trading company Hisma, and its German counterpart Rowak, to promote the exchange of German military supplies for Spanish raw materials and concessions. Other subjects illustrated are the beginnings of German military aid to the Franco regime, the recognition of that Government by Germany, and the proposals for securing the non-intervention of the powers in the Spanish conflict. After these issues, the documents deal with the alleged attacks on German naval vessels off the coasts of Spain and with the Nyon conference of September 1937, which met to consider the attacks on merchant vessels by submarines.

It is clear from the documents that relations were not always smooth between the Germans and their Italian allies in Spain and that the Germans exerted extreme pressure on the Franco regime in order to be assured of economic advantages, especially mining concessions, in Spain after a Franco victory. The documents also indicate that the Germans were not always satisfied with General Franco's attitude, particularly during the Munich crisis of September 1938, and that they did not feel fully assured of Franco's victory until the final Catalonian offensive of the Nationalists which began late in December 1938.

For the final period of the Civil War, the documents are concerned with German efforts to secure repayment for assistance, Spanish ad-

herence to the Anti-Comintern Pact, the victory celebration of the Condor Legion, and the failure of arrangements for the widely heralded meeting of Göring and Franco.

In spite of its obvious interest it has not been possible, from lack of space, to cover fully the extended negotiations in which Germany had a part by reason of membership in the Non-Intervention Committee, though numerous documents have been printed. Some further information on these negotiations has been supplied in editorial notes.

# ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS

## CHAPTER I. THE FIRST PHASE: JULY 19—NOVEMBER 18, 1936

Date and Doc. No.	Subject	Page
	<i>Editors' Note</i> Outbreak of the revolt, July 18 and 19, 1936; the question of German participation in the conspiracy; the organization of German aid in response to Franco's appeal.	
1936 July 19 1	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> The expected military revolts broke out yesterday over all Spain, beginning in Morocco; the Government claims to be in control of the situation.	3
July 22 2	<i>The Consul at Tetuán to the Foreign Ministry</i> Franco directs a request for transport planes to the German Military Attaché.	3
July 23 3	<i>The Ambassador in France to the Foreign Ministry</i> France has promised to deliver arms to the Spanish Government; the offer of bombers particularly endangers Franco.	4
July 23 4	<i>The Embassy in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> A summary of the military assets of both parties in Spain leads to the conclusion that the struggle will be prolonged; victory for the Government will menace German interests in Spain.	5
July 24 5	<i>The Foreign Ministry to the War Ministry, Foreign Department</i> It is recommended that Franco's request for transport planes be refused.	7
July 24 6	<i>The Consulate at Tetuán to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Lufthansa plane seized by the Nationalists will bring two German nationals to Berlin with a letter from Franco to Hitler.	7
July 24 7	<i>The Consulate at Tetuán to the Foreign Ministry</i> In an interview with the German Consul Franco says the uprising was necessary to forestall a Soviet dictatorship; the Consul protests against seizure of German planes.	8
July 24 8	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Portugal to the Foreign Ministry</i> An agent of the Burgos military regime has inquired of a representative of the German airplane industry whether the latter would be willing to make early deliveries of matériel.	8
July 25 9	<i>The Consul at Tetuán to the Foreign Ministry</i> In an account of the uprising in Morocco it is stated that a military revolt had been planned for some time, but action was begun when Russian ships carrying arms for a Communist insurrection arrived in Spanish ports.	9
July 25 10	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Dieckhoff urges that no official negotiations be undertaken by either party or governmental authorities with the two Spanish rebel officers who have arrived in Berlin and that no arms shipments to the rebels be considered.	10

## CHAPTER I. THE FIRST PHASE: JULY 19-NOVEMBER 18, 1936—Continued

Date and Doc. No.	Subject	Page
1936 July 25 11	<i>The Embassy in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> The military successes and more effective propaganda of the Government make it appear doubtful that the military revolt can succeed.	11
July 26 12	<i>The Chargé d' Affaires in Portugal to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Provisional Government at Burgos requests delivery of 10 transport planes and up to 20 bombers, the transaction to be under a private Portuguese sales contract.	14
July 28 13	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division III</i> The Airplane Industry Association is given a "modified version" of the telegrams of its representative in Lisbon and told that the Foreign Ministry does not favor deliveries of planes.	14
July 28 14	<i>The Chargé d' Affaires in Portugal to the Foreign Ministry</i> General Queipo de Llano requests 15 planes; for camouflage they should be flown in singly by Lufthansa on its regular mail service to Seville, where they would then be confiscated.	15
July 29 15	<i>The Embassy in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Spanish Government requests an explanation of the delivery of German planes to the rebels.	15
July 29 16	<i>The Consulate at Tetuán to the Foreign Ministry</i> The local Nazi leader conveys to Göring, after a conversation with Franco, that the latter is to head a provisional government in the form of a military directorate and that he fully shares the German view on future German-Spanish relations.	16
July 30 17	<i>The Ambassador in France to the Foreign Ministry</i> Inquiry at the Quai d'Orsay brought a firm denial of any arms shipments to the Spanish Government, but the Ambassador has no doubt that shipments were made and that more may be made.	16
July 31 18	<i>The Ambassador in France to the Foreign Ministry</i> Press reports that the Italian planes which crashed in French Morocco were military planes are confirmed from a reliable source.	17
July 31 19	<i>The Embassy in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> British opinion reflects growing uneasiness over events in Spain; a crisis between France and Italy is feared; concern is felt that a Spanish Government victory would mean gains for Communism, while a rebel victory would menace British Mediterranean interests.	17
July 31 20	<i>Memorandum by the Head of the European Section of the Political Department</i> To a query by the Portuguese Minister, Woermann replied that the German standpoint was strictly that of non-intervention in Spain.	19
Aug. 1 21	<i>The Embassy in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Spanish Foreign Minister has asked the representative of the German airplane industry in Madrid to transmit a request for purchase of bombing and pursuit planes and aerial bombs, payment to be made in gold.	20



## CHAPTER I. THE FIRST PHASE: JULY 19—NOVEMBER 18, 1936—Continued

Date and Doc. No.	Subject	Page
1936 Aug. 1 22	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division III</i> Acknowledgment of a letter from General Mola containing notification of the formation of a military government at Burgos was refused on the ground that Germany still maintains relations with the Spanish Government at Madrid.	20
Aug. 2 23	<i>The Embassy in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> The military situation has developed further in favor of the rebels; the Government's appeals to Germany for arms should be handled in a dilatory manner as there is no German interest in a Government victory.	21
Aug. 2 24	<i>The Ambassador in France to the Foreign Ministry</i> The French Government is increasingly concerned that the Spanish struggle may involve the Great Powers; victory for the rebels appears possible if they are supplied with planes, but Germany should consider mediation at an appropriate moment.	22
Aug. 2 25	<i>The Ambassador in France to the Director of the Political Department</i> Welczeck gives an account of the contacts established by the Embassy with the Spanish rebels in Paris; to hold out, the rebel forces need at least as many planes as are being sent by the French to the Spanish Government.	24
Aug. 3 26	<i>The Chargé d' Affaires in Portugal to the Foreign Ministry</i> Franco's brother Nicolás is in Lisbon under a cover-name and asks that prices and delivery dates on gas masks be quoted him.	26
Aug. 3 27	<i>The Consul at Tetuán to the Foreign Ministry</i> The surprise visit of a German naval squadron to Morocco was received with enthusiasm; Franco expressed to its commander his gratitude for Germany's moral support.	26
Aug. 4 28	<i>The Chargé d' Affaires in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reprisals are threatened by the Spanish Government unless a reply is made to their request for planes.	28
Aug. 4 29	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Neurath told the French Ambassador that, since Germany was not intervening in Spain, she did not need to enter into the joint declaration of non-intervention which France proposed; Germany was willing to enter discussions to prevent the extension of the Civil War if the Soviet Union was included.	29
Aug. 6 30	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> From a conversation with Foreign Minister Ciano it is clear that the Italian response to the French initiative is similar to the German; Ciano says French-Soviet action in Spain threatens to divide Europe and that Italy is prepared to take joint defense measures with Germany.	30
Aug. 6 31	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department for the Foreign Minister</i> No information is available to confirm reports that there was a secret agreement between Italy and Primo de Rivera for the contingency of a French-Italian war or that it is Italy's aim to revive this arrangement with the rebels.	31

## CHAPTER I. THE FIRST PHASE: JULY 19-NOVEMBER 18, 1936—Continued

Date and Doc. No.	Subject	Page
1936 Aug. 7 32	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Neurath agrees to study a draft declaration for non-intervention in Spain submitted by the French Ambassador but points out the difficulties of enforcement, especially in view of the activities of the Comintern.	32
Aug. 8 33	<i>The Ambassador in France to the Foreign Ministry</i> An agent's report for Admiral Canaris states that General Mola is optimistic but would like supplies of rifle ammunition shipped at once.	34
Aug. 8 34	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Urged by the British Ambassador to give a favorable reply to the French non-intervention proposal, Neurath stated that Germany was studying the proposal but repeated the objections expressed to the French Ambassador.	34
Aug. 10 35	<i>The Ambassador in France to the Foreign Ministry</i> Foreign Minister Delbos expressed the hope that German-French collaboration in isolating the Spanish conflagration was a favorable omen for the future; he gave assurances that France would be able to prevent arms smuggling across her frontier with Spain.	35
Aug. 11 36	<i>The Ambassador in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> American opinion has reacted unfavorably against alleged German intervention in Spain.	36
Aug. 12 37	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division III</i> The French Ambassador has been told that Germany's failure to reply to the French arms embargo proposal is due not to dilatory tactics but to the incident provoked by the Spanish Government in seizing a German plane.	36
Aug. 13 38	<i>Editors' Note</i> Confiscation of a German plane by the Spanish Government; the German threat to break off relations.	
Aug. 13 38	<i>Note from the Embassy in Spain to the Spanish Foreign Minister</i> Germany demands release of the plane and crew being detained by the Spanish Government.	37
Aug. 14 39	<i>The Consul at Seville to the Foreign Ministry</i> The wearing of their own uniforms by Germans delivering planes makes it impossible to keep the enterprise secret.	38
Aug. 14 40	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Italy is trying to delay a non-intervention agreement as long as possible in order to deliver additional arms to the rebels.	38
Aug. 15 41	<i>The Ambassador in France to the Foreign Ministry</i> General Mola's agent reports for transmission to Admiral Canaris that planes and ammunition are urgently needed on the northern front, which has no contact with Franco.	40
Aug. 15 42	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Intervention by the French has persuaded the Spanish Government to release the crew but not the seized plane; the German demand has been maintained.	41
Aug. 16 43	<i>The Ambassador in France to the Foreign Ministry</i> An agent transmits for Admiral Canaris the information that Franco is clearly head of the rebel forces; aid both for him and for General Mola should be directed from Paris.	42

## CHAPTER I. THE FIRST PHASE: JULY 19—NOVEMBER 18, 1936—Continued

Date and Doc. No.	Subject	Page
1936 Aug. 17 44	<i>The Ambassador in France to the Foreign Ministry</i> Admiral Canaris is to be informed that French volunteers are being dispatched to join the Spanish Red Militia.	44
Aug. 17 45	<i>Note to the French Embassy</i> Germany is willing to join in a ban on shipment of arms to Spain provided that the German transport plane detained by the Spanish Government is released and provided that all states possessing arms industries join the ban.	44
Aug. 19 46	<i>Memorandum by the Acting State Secretary</i> Dieckhoff refuses an appeal by the French Ambassador that Germany abandon its demand for release of the transport plane in order to place the arms embargo in effect.	45
Aug. 20 47	<i>The Chargé d' Affaires in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Germany's reply to the French embargo proposal pleases Italy since it will delay further the conclusion of a non-intervention agreement.	47
Aug. 20 48	<i>The Acting State Secretary to Various German Missions Abroad</i> Germany will insist on its demand in the plane incident as a condition of adherence to an embargo; interference by the Spanish Government with German shipping imposes a further obstacle.	47
Aug. 21 49	<i>The Ambassador in France to the Foreign Ministry</i> Blum and Delbos believe only an arms embargo can prevent an open struggle of Fascist and anti-Fascist powers in Spain; Welzeck argues that delay of the embargo will encourage French interventionists and work to the disadvantage of the Spanish rebels.	49
Aug. 22 50	<i>Memorandum by the Acting State Secretary</i> Admiral Raeder informs Dieckhoff that he has asked the Führer for a decision on Spanish policy; he has urged the view that the military prospects of the rebels are unfavorable and that Germany cannot assume the risks of a major intervention.	50
Aug. 22 51	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Schulenburg has protested to Litvinov against the Russian propaganda attacks on German officials in Spain.	52
Aug. 22 52	<i>The Chargé d' Affaires in Portugal to the Foreign Ministry</i> Prime Minister Salazar has given every assistance in the moving of matériel for Spain which arrived in Lisbon on German ships.	53
Aug. 22 53	<i>The Chargé d' Affaires in Portugal to the Foreign Ministry</i> Believing that a Spanish Government victory would bring Communism to Portugal in a matter of months, the Salazar Government, despite British pressure, has given full support to the rebels; an opportunity for German influence is evident.	54
Aug. 24 54	<i>Note to the French Embassy</i> Germany in the interest of an early international agreement has decided to adhere to the French embargo declaration.	56
Aug. 24 55	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Acting State Secretary (Excerpt)</i> Neurath had convinced the Führer it was necessary to adhere to the neutrality declaration on Spain before announcement of the 2-year military service plan in order to avoid the suspicion of an intention to sabotage the entire action.	56

## CHAPTER I. THE FIRST PHASE: JULY 19—NOVEMBER 18, 1936—Continued

Date and Doc. No.	Subject	Page
1936 Aug. 25 56	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Cadogan says that England will agree to a commission to supervise enforcement of the embargo; the British have no clear picture of the military prospects in Spain.	57
Aug. 27 57	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> The use of Junkers planes to attack Madrid should not be repeated, at least as long as Lufthansa traffic continues.	58
Aug. 27 58	<i>Memorandum by the Chargé d'Affaires in Portugal</i> An NSDAP representative proposes that aerial bombs be delivered to the rebels through Holland, which is not a party to the neutrality declaration.	59
Aug. 27 59	<i>The Acting State Secretary to the Ambassador in France</i> To insure secrecy the reports from Spain for the War Ministry should be transmitted by courier rather than telegraph.	59
Aug. 28 60	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Italy's acceptance of non-intervention was occasioned by fear that delay would aid the Spanish Government; there is no intention to abide by the declaration in any case.	60
Aug. 28 61	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Portugal to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Legation has assisted the representative of the Export Cartel for War Matériel to get to Seville.	61
Aug. 29 62	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> The feeling aroused in Madrid by the presence of German planes in the air forces attacking the city threatens to endanger the security of the mission and the German colony.	61
Aug. 29 63	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Schulenburg has again protested against Russian propaganda attacks on Germans in Spain; Foreign Commissar Litvinov replied that Russia would be glad to cease the propaganda warfare, which had been provoked by Germany.	62
Aug. 29 64	<i>The Acting State Secretary to the Foreign Minister</i> Dieckhoff advises that, since it appears the London committee on non-intervention is to serve only for exchange of information and not for control, Germany could participate without embarrassment.	63
Aug. 31 65	<i>The Acting Director of the Political Department to Various German Missions Abroad</i> Germany has proposed that the missions in London form a committee for the exchange of information under the neutrality declaration; this is to forestall the development of a separate agency with control functions.	65
Sept. 1 66	<i>Memorandum by the Acting State Secretary</i> The French Ambassador expressed disappointment at the German insistence on limiting the work of the London committee; he also urged that in the forthcoming discussion of a Western Pact Germany not insist on denunciation of the French-Soviet pact.	66
Sept. 2 67	<i>The Ambassador in France to the Acting State Secretary</i> Only British pressure can halt French deliveries to the Spanish Government; England might bring such pressure if Franco gave assurances against concessions to Italy in the Mediterranean.	68

## CHAPTER I. THE FIRST PHASE: JULY 19—NOVEMBER 18, 1936—Continued

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1936 Sept. 2 68	<i>Memorandum by the Acting State Secretary</i> The British Chargé d'Affaires argued that the proposed London committee must be separate from the missions but would not become a control agency; Dieckhoff promised re-consideration of the German position.	68
Sept. 3 69	<i>Memorandum by the Acting Director of the Political Department</i> The French Chargé d'Affaires stated that France was concerned primarily to effect a speedy exchange of information on embargo enforcement and was not interested in any precise procedure for the London committee.	69
Sept. 4 70	<i>The Minister in Portugal to the Foreign Ministry</i> Foreign Minister Monteiro stated that Portugal has refused to participate in arms embargo enforcement on British terms and regrets the failure of the German press to understand the Portuguese attitude.	70
Sept. 4 71	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Legal Department</i> The British Chargé d'Affaires presented a copy of his instructions intended to assure Germany that the work of the London committee would not expand in an undesirable manner.	72
Sept. 5 72	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Legal Department</i> Acting on the Foreign Minister's instructions, Gaus informed the British Chargé d'Affaires that Germany would participate in the London committee on the terms set forth in the British explanation of the previous day.	74
Sept. 5 73	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Legal Department</i> Gaus informed the Italian Chargé d'Affaires that the German representative on the London committee would keep in touch with Ambassador Grandi; Magistrati replied that Grandi was instructed to keep the committee activities on a platonic level.	75
Sept. 5 74	<i>The Director of the Legal Department to the Embassy in Great Britain</i> Instructions are sent to participate in the London committee, but within the strict limits that no decisions are to be taken and no questions other than the embargo are to be discussed.	75
Sept. 6 75	<i>Memorandum by the Head of the European Section of the Political Department</i> The French Chargé d'Affaires reported that France accepts the British formula for the functioning of the London committee.	77
Sept. 7 76	<i>Memorandum by the Head of the European Section of the Political Department</i> The Portuguese Minister stated that Portugal will not join the London committee until its demands for restrictions against volunteers and collection of funds are met.	77
Sept. 7 77	<i>The Director of the Legal Department to the Legation in Portugal</i> Does the refusal of Portugal to permit the unloading of "certain" cargo at Lisbon, reportedly under British pressure, mean that the Portuguese attitude has changed?	78
Sept. 8 78	<i>The Head of the European Section of the Political Department to the Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain</i> The German representative on the London committee is to play a reserved role, to resist any developments in the direction of controls, and to refer all matters to Berlin.	78

## CHAPTER I. THE FIRST PHASE: JULY 19—NOVEMBER 18, 1930—Continued

Date and Doc. No.	Subject	Page
	<i>Editors' Note</i> Initial proceedings in the Non-Intervention Committee.	
1936 Sept. 9 79	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> At the organizing session of the Non-Intervention Committee the impression left was that France and England would not propose any immediate action; their aim appears to be to pacify their Leftist parties.	82
Sept. 11 80	<i>The Minister in Portugal to the Foreign Ministry</i> On an exploratory mission to Spain the AGK representative, Messerschmidt, concluded that Franco is politically sound but that the Falange is an uncertain quantity; he criticizes failure of Hisma to obtain economic concessions for economic aid given.	84
Sept. 16 81	<i>The Consul General at Barcelona to the Foreign Ministry</i> Russian and French planes and Russian pilots have arrived to aid the Government; the latter is removing gold to France.	89
Sept. 18 82	<i>The Acting State Secretary to the Embassy in Great Britain</i> Any discussion in the committee of the inclusion of Portugal in the embargo is to be rejected; British and French pressure in Lisbon has thus far failed.	90
Sept. 21 83	<i>The War Minister to the Foreign Ministry</i> Intelligence requests all copies of the Messerschmidt report of September 8, which is to be removed from circulation.	91
Sept. 21 84	<i>The Acting Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in Italy</i> The Italian Government is to be requested to have Grandi conform to the German line that the refusal of Portugal to join the embargo should not be discussed in the committee.	91
Sept. 22 85	<i>Memorandum by the Acting State Secretary</i> The Italian Chargé d'Affaires explained that Italy's insistence on strict enforcement of the embargo was due to the fact that the Nationalists now had arms superiority over the Spanish Government.	92
Sept. 22 86	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Grandi has been given instructions to follow the line that no pressure is to be applied to Portugal to participate in the committee and the embargo.	93
Sept. 23 87	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Spain to the Head of the European Section of the Political Department</i> Although its troops are poorly trained, the Government is massing large quantities of arms for an offensive; Franco's slowness to act after the initial disorganization of the revolt leaves the issue in doubt.	94
Sept. 28 88	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> An intense propaganda campaign has mobilized "humanitarian" assistance for Spain in the Soviet Union; evidence of arms shipments has thus far not been found.	97
Sept. 29 89	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> A Russian vessel announced as a food ship actually delivered arms and ammunition, according to a port official.	100

## CHAPTER I. THE FIRST PHASE: JULY 19—NOVEMBER 18, 1936—Continued

Date and Doc. No.	Subject	Page
1936 Sept. 30 90	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Encirclement by four rebel columns makes the fall of Madrid certain; the Government is badly split over the decision to defend the city and some ministers have fled.	101
Oct. 1 91	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in France to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Burgos Government conveys for transmission to Berlin its concern that the removal of Spanish gold to France endangers the economic future of Spain.	102
Oct. 3 92	<i>The Acting State Secretary to the Legation in Portugal</i> A member of the Legation is to deliver orally to Franco the Führer's congratulations on the Generalissimo's assumption of power; to avoid the charge of having extended recognition, which would compromise German activities in Spain, no written message is sent.	103
Oct. 3 93	<i>An Official of Political Division I to the Minister in Portugal</i> All copies of the Messerschmidt report of September 8 and related papers are to be sent to Berlin as they have been placed in an especially secret category.	104
Oct. 8 94	<i>The Minister in Portugal to the Foreign Ministry</i> On receiving the Führer's oral message, Franco expressed his complete admiration for him and the new Germany and sent his thanks for Germany's material and moral aid.	104
Oct. 8 95	<i>The Acting Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in France</i> Mussolini has agreed to a German suggestion that Italy and Germany grant <i>de facto</i> recognition to Nationalist Spain after the capture of Madrid.	105
Oct. 10 96	<i>The Minister in Portugal to the Foreign Ministry</i> As the first foreign diplomat to be received since Franco's elevation to Chief of State, the German emissary found Franco optimistic about the military situation and concerned to develop a common ideology for the various groups supporting the revolt.	105
Oct. 12 97	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Russian threat to withdraw from the Non-Intervention Committee arises from concern for the desperate position of the Madrid Government and is an attempt to force England and France to a more active policy.	108
Oct. 13 98	<i>Minute by an Official of the Economic Policy Department</i> The Burgos Government has indicated a desire for economic talks, and the Economics Ministry believes a representative should be sent.	110
Oct. 15 99	<i>Minute by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> A large staff has been assembled from the AO and is working on economic relations with Spain under Göring's direction.	111
Oct. 16 100	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Spain to the Acting Director of the Political Department</i> The increase in deliveries of arms by the Russians is accompanied by full political control; the indicated increase of the German military commitment raises the question of more decisive influence by Germans on military matters.	111

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1936		
Oct. 16 101	<i>Minute by an Official of the Economic Policy Department</i> The Economics Ministry has abandoned its plans for trade promotion in Spain on discovering that the monopoly firms Rowak and Hisma are already operating under Göring's direction.	113
Oct. 17 102	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Plans for the forcible liberation of Primo de Rivera on the ground that his leadership is essential to give the revolt a National Socialist character are ill-advised; they will compromise the Embassy and endanger his life.	114
Oct. 17 103	<i>Minute by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> In War Minister Blomberg's view a "quasi" chargé d'affaires of sufficient rank should be sent to Burgos to relieve General Warlimont of the full responsibility of representing Germany there.	116
Oct. 19 104	<i>The Acting Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in Spain (at Alicante)</i> The attitude of the Embassy on action to free Primo de Rivera forcibly is approved.	116
	<i>Editors' Note</i> Ciano's conversations with Neurath and Hitler, October 21 and 24, on the subject of aid to Franco.	
Oct. 22 105	<i>The Ambassador in France to the Foreign Ministry</i> Internal divisions in France are likely to prevent recognition of the Nationalist Government in Spain despite the desire of the Quai d'Orsay to protect French interests.	117
Oct. 23 106	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> In a conversation with Ciano it was agreed that no hasty steps should be taken if Russia withdraws from the London committee; French and British reaction should be awaited.	119
Oct. 26 107	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Consulate at Odessa reports movements of ships with camouflaged cargoes of arms for Spain.	120
Oct. 26 108	<i>The Acting Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in Spain</i> No authorization has been given by the Party to work for a National Socialist revolution in Spain.	120
Oct. 27 109	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy</i> Preparatory discussions are to be undertaken with Italy for coordination of action on <i>de facto</i> recognition of Franco after the fall of Madrid.	121
Oct. 28 110	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ciano would prefer full recognition at once but will proceed only in agreement with Germany; Italy is observing Russian shipping in the Mediterranean and has provided two submarines for Franco.	122
Oct. 29 111	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Italians argue that diplomatic representation should be sent to Burgos immediately, since the fall of Madrid may be delayed; full recognition could follow that event.	122



## CHAPTER I. THE FIRST PHASE: JULY 19—NOVEMBER 18, 1936—Continued

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1936 Oct. 29 112	<i>The Consul General at Barcelona to the Foreign Ministry</i> A reliable agent reports that the Russians have brought in additional planes and crews but their operations are conducted without collaboration with the Spanish Government.	123
Oct. 30 113	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Ambassador in Italy</i> Germany will insist that no steps be taken toward recognition of Franco before Madrid is captured; Canaris will convey a warning to Franco against further delay of offensive action.	123
Nov. — 114	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires (Draft Note)</i> With the capture of Madrid General Franco has been accorded diplomatic recognition by the German Government; relations with the Spanish mission in Berlin are terminated.	125
Nov. 6 115	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> A list of Russian and Spanish vessels carrying arms from Odessa to Spanish Government ports is submitted.	126
Nov. 10 116	<i>The Ambassador in France to the Foreign Ministry</i> It is unlikely that France would allow herself to be drawn in if the Spanish Government or Russia declares war on Germany, but there are signs of increased material aid to the Spanish Government.	127
Nov. 11 117	<i>The Head of Political Division III to the Embassy in France</i> Spanish Government purchases of war matériel from Russia are arranged through the Soviet Embassy in Paris.	128
Nov. 13 118	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> The nationality of camouflaged ships loading at Odessa is probably Spanish; Greek vessels are also carrying Russian war matériel.	128
[Nov. 16] 119	<i>The Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in Italy</i> In view of the Spanish Government's blockade of German shipping to White ports, it is proposed to recognize Franco at once without awaiting the fall of Madrid; parallel action by Italy is sought.	128
Nov. 16 120	<i>The Consul at Odessa to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Although the Soviet press no longer carries accounts of "food" ships for Spain, the movement of ships carrying arms from Black Sea ports to Spain continues undiminished.	129
Nov. 17 121	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division III</i> The Embassy in Italy telephoned Mussolini's approval of immediate joint recognition of Franco; Italy will act as soon as the German decision is final.	131
Nov. 17 122	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Portugal</i> A member of the Legation is to be dispatched to Franco at once to inform him that recognition will be announced on November 18 and that a chargé d'affaires will be sent shortly.	132
Nov. 17 123	<i>The Acting State Secretary to German Diplomatic Missions (except the Embassies in Italy and Spain and the Legation in Portugal) and the Consulate at Geneva</i> In explanation of the recognition of the Franco Government it is to be stated that no other authority any longer exists in Spain capable of protecting the lives and interests of German citizens.	132

## CHAPTER I. THE FIRST PHASE: JULY 19—NOVEMBER 18, 1936—Continued

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1936 Nov. 18 124	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division III</i> Ambassador Hassell conveyed by telephone from Rome that Ciano had promised to follow in every respect the German procedure on recognition of Franco.	133

## CHAPTER II. GERMAN RECOGNITION OF THE FRANCO REGIME, AND ITS RESULTS; NOVEMBER 18, 1936—MARCH 20, 1937

1936 Nov. 18 125	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> General Faupel has been designated as Germany's representative to Franco; his staff will include experts on propaganda and on the Falange, but he will have no military authority.	134
Nov. 21 126	<i>The Ambassador in France to the Foreign Ministry</i> German and Italian recognition of Franco was expected in France but has increased uneasiness, the Left now predicting undisguised intervention by the two countries; but public opinion wants no war over Spain.	135
Nov. 23 127	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Press Department</i> The Führer has ordered that the Spanish belligerents shall be referred to in German propaganda as the Spanish Nationalist Government and the Spanish Bolsheviks.	136
Nov. 24 128	<i>The Embassy in Spain (at Seville) to the Foreign Ministry</i> First impressions of White Spain indicate that there is a frivolous optimism, inadequate military mobilization, and factional disunity; steps must be taken to safeguard German economic interests for the future.	137
Nov. 25 129	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Mussolini expressed dissatisfaction with the Nationalists' lack of offensive spirit and personal bravery; he indicated the next step for Germany and Italy would be to provide naval assistance in the Mediterranean.	139
Nov. 27 130	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ciano said that, in view of the situation in Spain, Italy would send an entire Black Shirt division but a guaranty would be demanded from Franco that in the future Spain would coordinate her policy with Italy in the Mediterranean.	139
Nov. 27 131	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> It is the primary aim of British policy to use the embargo committee to effect a settlement in Spain; refusal to grant belligerent rights on the high seas is a part of the effort to prevent the conflict from spreading.	140
Nov. 27 132	<i>Minute by an Official of the Economic Policy Department</i> Faupel stated that Hitler's instructions to him were to use the present favorable moment to develop German-Spanish economic relations; later on, British capital might capture the Spanish market.	142
Nov. 28 133	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> On receiving the text of a comprehensive political agreement which would be proposed to Franco in return for Italian aid, Hassell was told that it would not preclude a similar Spanish agreement with Germany.	143

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1936 Nov. 28 134	<i>Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Cultural Policy Department</i> To Protestant leaders who asked German intervention with Franco against mistreatment of Protestants in White Spain, it was suggested that an approach be made to the Spanish mission in Berlin.	144
Nov. 28 135	<i>Minute by the Acting Director of the Political Department</i> The Italian Chargé d'Affaires expressed doubt of Germany's full enthusiasm for the Spanish venture; Weizsäcker replied that Germany shared Mussolini's view that Franco would need more aid but would also have to move more rapidly.	145
Dec. 1 136	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Mussolini will review the Spanish problem in a conference with his military chiefs on December 6 and would like to have German military observers present.	146
Dec. 1 137	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Hassell transmits the text of the secret Spanish-Italian agreement which provides for continued Italian aid, cooperation in the western Mediterranean, "benevolent neutrality" in case of collective action against one of the parties under article 16 of the League Covenant, and development of economic relations.	147
Dec. 2 138	<i>The Chief of the Armed Forces Office in the War Ministry to the Acting Director of the Political Department</i> Keitel prefers that coordination of military strategy and diplomacy be achieved by conferences of the Foreign Ministry with OKW only, rather than with all three service branches.	149
Dec. 2 139	<i>The Acting State Secretary to the Embassy in Italy</i> Canaris will be sent to participate in the Italian military discussion on Spain; Germany reserves comment on the Spanish-Italian agreement.	149
	<i>Editors' Note</i> Action of the Non-Intervention Committee to establish controls over shipment of arms and volunteers to Spain.	
Dec. 3 140	<i>The Acting Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in Great Britain</i> Germany would be willing to participate in preventing access of volunteers to Spain provided effective supervised control was set up; the number of German volunteers in Spain is unknown.	150
Dec. 5 141	<i>The Acting Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in Italy</i> To British and French <i>démarches</i> , made also to Portugal, Italy, and Russia, that a joint mediation be attempted in Spain, Neurath has replied provisionally that Franco could not be expected to negotiate on an equal footing with the Anarchists and Bolsheviks.	151
Dec. 5 142	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy</i> Although Italy has greater interests in Spain than Germany, the Spanish-Italian agreement is so comprehensive and exclusive that Germany should have been consulted beforehand; in the light of it, Italy will have to bear a larger part of aid to Franco than Germany.	152

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1936 Dec. 5 143	<i>Memorandum by the Acting State Secretary</i> Dieckhoff told the American Ambassador that new disarmament proposals arising out of concern over the Spanish crisis would not find much response in Germany; he denied knowledge of a secret Spanish-Italian agreement.	153
Dec. 5 144	<i>The Chargé d' Affaires in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Franco's forces are unable to take Madrid against the reinforced Reds; one division each sent by Italy and Germany might insure an early Franco victory; at a later date a larger commitment would be required.	154
Undated 145	Undated <i>Memorandum by the Acting State Secretary</i> The sending of the German and Italian troops Faupel advises would not insure a Franco victory and would arouse the Spanish people and world opinion against Germany.	155
Dec. 7 146	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> The Führer having declined, Neurath received the French and British Ambassadors, who presented proposals for tightening non-intervention; he told them frankly that Germany favored Franco and that neither control of volunteers nor mediation was any longer practical.	156
Dec. 8 147	<i>The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ribbentrop expressed skepticism to Foreign Secretary Eden concerning the mediation plan which the latter outlined to him.	158
Dec. 10 148	<i>The Chargé d' Affaires in Spain to the Foreign Minister</i> Despite Franco's frivolous optimism, the military position is perilous; the Reds' build-up for an offensive is more rapid; German and Italian troops and training officers are desperately needed.	159
Dec. 11 149	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Italy has declined a British proposal that the Spanish problem be settled by France, Italy, and England alone.	163
Dec. 11 150	<i>The Chargé d' Affaires in France to the Foreign Ministry</i> Delbos urged that steps toward mediation in Spain, beginning with strict prohibition of all intervention, would provide a favorable atmosphere for the development of French-German collaboration.	163
Dec. 11 151	<i>Memorandum by the Acting State Secretary</i> To the Italian Ambassador's query whether Franco had requested Italian and German divisions, Dieckhoff evaded a direct reply, saying that the upshot of Canaris' conversations in Rome was that no complete units would be sent.	165
Dec. 12 152	<i>Memorandum to the British and French Embassies</i> In reply to the British and French memoranda of December 5 the German Government states that, contrary to its earlier view, it no longer considers control of volunteers in Spain feasible; Franco cannot be expected to accept a mediated peace with Anarchist elements; Germany remains ready to continue discussions, however.	165

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1936 Dec. 14 153	<i>The Acting Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in Italy</i> Germany will insist in the embargo committee that the question of volunteers not be discussed separately but only in conjunction with other forms of indirect intervention, including financial aid.	167
Dec. 15 154	<i>The Ambassador in France to the Foreign Ministry</i> Premier Blum stated that, if effective international control against outside aid was established promptly and the French frontier was included, there was good hope that the conflagration in Spain would die out of its own accord.	167
Dec. 15 155	<i>The Foreign Minister to the War Minister</i> Neurath informs Blomberg that he would not favor sending a German division to Spain while the Great Powers are attempting to limit the conflict and bring about mediation.	168
Dec. 17 156	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> While understanding German reluctance, Mussolini stated that he believed more troops were needed in Spain and that he was sending 3,000; they would fight as a separate unit; he stressed the need for naval action against Russian deliveries.	169
Dec. 18 157	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> If Italy is allowed to take the lead in guiding the course of the Spanish revolt while obtaining every German aid to prevent a stalemate in Spain, the danger of an Italian reconciliation with the Western powers can be overcome.	170
Dec. 20 158	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Italy will send a group of bombers, 3,000 additional troops, and another division later if necessary to force a victory in Spain; despite British concern, the Balearics would not be evacuated until the Nationalist victory was secure.	173
Dec. 21 159	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Russian domestic propaganda, while promoting humanitarian aid and bitterly attacking the Fascist states for their role in Spain, has never mentioned any Russian military aid.	174
Dec. 22 160	<i>The Ambassador in France to the Foreign Ministry</i> A French staff officer has conveyed the hint that the landings of German troops in Spain, if continued, would in the Cabinet's view surely lead to a general war.	177
Dec. 23 161	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ciano believes the situation in Spain is improving; naval action has decreased Soviet deliveries; in his view neither Italy nor Germany can reach an understanding with the present French Government.	178
Dec. 23 162	<i>The Head of the Extra-European Section of the Political Department to the Embassy in France</i> On the Führer's instructions, any accusations Delbos may make as to the sending of German troops to Spain are to be rejected as completely unjustified.	178

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1936 Dec. 23 163	<i>The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy in Spain</i> A 3-month extension of the March 9, 1936, German-Spanish trade agreement, together with negotiations for a new agreement, is to be proposed; a reciprocal preferential arrangement similar to that between Spain and Italy will be sought.	179
Dec. 24 164	<i>The Ambassador in France to the Foreign Ministry</i> Delbos pleaded France's desire for an understanding with Germany; she could not tolerate a third power in control of Spain; she would like to proceed from a Spanish settlement to a general political truce under which Germany's claims for colonies and loans could also be considered.	180
Dec. 26 165	<i>Note from the British Embassy</i> In a note presented also to Italy, Portugal, and Russia the British Government urges each Government separately to ban movement of volunteers to Spain without awaiting prolonged negotiations in the London committee.	183
Dec. 26 166	<i>Aide-Mémoire from the French Embassy</i> France is prepared to impose an immediate ban on volunteers before discussion of other control measures if other governments do likewise.	185
Dec. 26 167	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Legal Department</i> Although the French Ambassador urged that acceptance of the French proposal would permit resumption of the Schacht-Blum talks for German-French collaboration, Gaus implied that the proposal was an affront to Germany.	186
Dec. 27 168	<i>The Embassy in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Franco has complained of the refusal of the Pope to condemn the Basque Catholics for opposing his cause.	189
Dec. 28 169	<i>The Ambassador in France to the Head of the Extra-European Section of the Political Department</i> Welczeck regrets that there has been no German response to the French proposal to make a Spanish settlement the basis for a general German-French understanding.	190
Dec. 29 170	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> At a staff conference on January 10 Mussolini intends to adopt measures to effect a final decision in Spain; he would like to have present a German representative with authority to act.	191
Dec. 29 171	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ciano wishes to draft an identical German-Italian reply to the Anglo-French proposal on volunteers, its sense to be positive in principle but allowing for delaying tactics.	191
Dec. 30 172	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> The 3,000 Black Shirts who have arrived in Cádiz are being sent into action under Italian officers but in uniforms of the Spanish Foreign Legion.	192
Dec. 30 173	<i>The Ambassador in France to the Foreign Ministry</i> Failure to respond to French overtures for a general settlement beginning with Spain will undermine Blum and Delbos, who have shown themselves sincere advocates of German-French understanding.	193

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1936 Dec. 30 174	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in France</i> An instruction on the hysterical Delbos overtures is being prepared; it may be pointed out that the Führer's repeated offers for a German-French understanding have hitherto had no reply.	194
Dec. 30 175	<i>The Director of the Legal Department to the Embassy in Italy</i> The draft of a reply to the British proposal for a ban on volunteers is submitted for Italian approval.	194
Dec. 31 176	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ciano approves the German draft in substance but thinks it might be more conciliatory in tone; he also thinks it might prove embarrassing if the proposal for removal of non-Spaniards from Spain should be taken seriously.	196
Dec. 31 177	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Neurath in a preliminary oral reply told the British and French Ambassadors that their proposals to control volunteers seemed designed to preserve an advantage for the Spanish Reds; Germany was willing to help to localize the conflict but would never tolerate a Communist Spain.	197
Dec. 31 178	<i>Memorandum by the Head of the Extra-European Section of the Political Department</i> A communication from the United States Government regrets that no legal basis existed for preventing a shipment of planes to Bilbao by the one American firm which has violated the spirit of the non-intervention policy.	198
Dec. 31 179	<i>The Head of the Extra-European Section of the Political Department to the Ambassador in France</i> The inclination in Berlin seems to be not to exceed the aid already given to Franco and to let Italy take the lead.	198
	<i>Editors' Note</i> The Anglo-Italian declaration of January 2, 1937, "concerning assurances with regard to the Mediterranean."	
1937 Jan. 1 180	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Nationalist Government wishes a German commission sent to Spain to carry out the protocol of December 31, 1936, for negotiation of a new trade agreement.	199
Jan. 2 181	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Franco's diplomatic chief, Sangroniz, stated that he is in regular diplomatic contact with the British; he does not believe they are serious about a ban on volunteers, which was a French idea.	200
Jan. 3 182	<i>Memorandum of Political Division I</i> The Navy is considering measures of retaliation for seizure of a German ship by the Spanish Government; a note by Neurath rejects bombardment of a Spanish port.	201
Jan. 4 183	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Legal Department</i> General Keitel and the Navy agreed with the Foreign Minister's view that retaliation should not exceed intensified raids on Spanish ships.	203

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1937 Jan. 6 184	<i>Note from the British Embassy</i> Taking "the gravest view" of the continued flow of volunteers to Spain, the British Government requests an early reply to its note of December 26.	203
Jan. 6 185	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Legal Department</i> Gaus told the British Ambassador that the new British note was a "superfluous reminder" and regrettable, since it gave the appearance of British pressure on Germany.	204
Jan. 7 186	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Eden pointed out that the Anglo-Italian pact did not mean that England was any the less interested in stopping the flow of volunteers to Spain, as was apparently inferred in Germany.	205
Jan. 7 187	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> The military situation has improved with the arrival of Italian troops and German instructors and arms; the moment is favorable for pressing political and economic agreements with Spain.	206
Jan. 7 188	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> The American ban on the export of arms to Spain has been ineffective.	208
Jan. 7 189	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Legal Department</i> Magistrati stated that Ciano frankly told the British Ambassador that Italian volunteers, who were going to Spain without pressure from the Government, would not be halted unless all countries took similar action.	210
Jan. 7 190	<i>Memorandum to the British Embassy</i> While questioning the motives of the British and French Governments and protesting against the pressure applied to Germany, the German Government consents to the ban on volunteers proposed in the note of December 26, provided effective guaranties are given.	210
Jan. 8 191	<i>The Ambassador in France to the Foreign Minister</i> Because of his long experience in Spain, Welczeck is accepted by the French as an expert and can exercise a moderating influence in France, but he needs fuller information on German activity in Spain.	212
Jan. 9 192	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> There are no German troops in Spanish Morocco to justify the French charge of violation of the French-Spanish convention of 1912.	214
Jan. 9 193	<i>The Ambassador in France to the Head of the Extra-European Section of the Political Department</i> Secretary-General Léger of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs complained of the unconciliatory tone of the German reply to the proposal to ban volunteers; Welczeck replied that the note was positive in spirit but that plain speaking was necessary.	215
Jan. 10 194	<i>Note from the British Embassy</i> England proposes that each power take measures to ban volunteering for Spain, in advance of the control measures to be elaborated in the London committee.	216



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1937 Jan. 11 195	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Neurath acceded to the French Ambassador's wish to publish the Führer's statement to him that Germany had no designs on Spanish Morocco.	218
Jan. 12 196	<i>The Chargé d' Affaires in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Since, with the imminent commitment of large Italian units in Spain, Italian political influence will tend to displace Germany's, it would be well to speed the pending economic negotiations.	219
Jan. 12 197	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy</i> Germany will accept the British proposal that each power act separately to ban volunteers, provided that all states do so on the same terms and that there is no delay in the introduction of collective control measures.	220
Jan. 13 198	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ciano has told England that Italy would not take separate measures to ban volunteers; he would like to reply to the British note jointly with Germany but only after some delay, as further large contingents will soon be shipped to Spain.	221
Jan. 13 199	<i>The Chargé d' Affaires in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> A large body of Italian troops with heavy equipment has arrived in Cádiz and will be formed into a division under an Italian general.	222
Jan. 13 200	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Neurath told Attolico that Germany had agreed to the plan for controlling volunteers because she did not wish to send more troops to Spain and run the risk of a European war.	222
Jan. 14 201	<i>The Chargé d' Affaires in France to the Foreign Ministry</i> While it is the concern of French policy to show Germany that no more <i>faits accomplis</i> will be accepted, responsible men feel that the press threats over Spanish Morocco went too far.	223
Jan. 14 202	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy</i> Franco's intention to reject a control system will compromise Germany and Italy; it would be better if he accepted in principle and then imposed delaying conditions.	225
Jan. 15 203	<i>Memorandum of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop</i> Weizsäcker is reported to have said that the Spanish enterprise will be abandoned, but an intimate of Göring reported that the latter in his Rome talks stated that Germany would not tolerate a Red Spain.	225
Jan. 15 204	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> It was agreed in Göring's Rome talks that a final effort to aid Franco should be completed by January 31 and that dilatory tactics should be applied to the British control proposals until then.	226
Jan. 15 205	<i>The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in Spain</i> Information is requested as to the division of the output of the Rio Tinto mines between Germany and England.	227

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1937 Jan. 16 206	<i>The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy in Spain</i> Discussion of a political agreement with Spain is not desired for the present, but the sending of an economic delegation will be hastened.	228
Jan. 18 207	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> About 20,000 Italians will go into action shortly and the military outlook is improved; although Italy has spent 800 million lire, Germany has won more concessions.	229
Jan. 20 208	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Nationalist Government rejected a British plan for division of Rio Tinto output and retains full freedom of action; Hisma has been promised 60 percent.	230
Jan. 25 209	<i>Editors' Note</i> The understanding on Spanish policy arranged in Göring's conversations in Rome, January 23, 1937.	
Jan. 25 210	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Franco has received the memorandum agreed on in Rome as to the extent and duration of German and Italian assistance.	230
Jan. 25 211	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Nationalist reply to the German-Italian memorandum presents a list of arms required, chiefly from Germany, which exceeds those promised in the memorandum.	231
Jan. 26 212	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> The text of the Nationalist reply to the German-Italian memorandum argues that a control system against aid sent to Spain will work to the Nationalists' disadvantage and bring the danger of incidents.	231
Jan. 26 213	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Great Britain</i> Germany and Italy are prepared to agree in the London committee to an effective control plan but do not wish it to take effect before the middle of February.	232
Jan. 26 214	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Political Division I</i> A misunderstanding has arisen over the demand put to Franco by Bernhardt of Hisma that Spain apply all available foreign exchange to payment on the arms delivered by Germany.	233
Jan. 27 215	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Franco stated that the German and Italian experts had set his supply requirements too low; he agreed to the plan for a joint German-Italian general staff.	236
Jan. 28 216	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Spain</i> Germany and Italy are in full agreement on supporting an effective control plan, though not within Spain; Franco's negative reply was a surprise after the advice Italy gave him.	237
Jan. 30 217	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Nationalist Government denies that it rejected the control plan entirely; it is evident that its reply was framed in the knowledge that continuing arms aid would be necessary.	238

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1937 Feb. 2 217	<i>The Acting State Secretary to the Legation in Portugal</i> Portugal is to be informed that Germany, while not wishing to bring any pressure, would like to see Portugal abandon its objections to the British-proposed control measures.	238
Feb. 4 218	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department</i> The British Embassy interceded for return of or compensation for quantities of copper seized by the Spanish Nationalist Government from the British-owned Rio Tinto Company and sold to Germany.	240
Feb. 6 219	<i>The Acting State Secretary to the Embassy in Great Britain</i> The German position in the London committee will be to insist on simultaneous implementation of control plans for land and sea traffic to Spain, since closing of the Pyrenees frontier is essential.	241
Feb. 8 220	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ciano is optimistic about the military prospects in Spain after the success at Málaga with only nine Italian battalions; Italy will support the control plans in London, but the earlier proposal for withdrawal of all non-Spaniards must be evaded.	242
Feb. 21 221	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Franco reported an offer by France to take up commercial relations but said he had refused; Faupel urged that the return of Spanish gold now in France be made a condition in reply to any future overtures.	243
Feb. 23 222	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Franco insisted on the necessity of all promised matériel arriving by March 6.	244
Feb. 23 223	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department</i> In connection with the projected negotiation of a payments agreement it will be necessary to decide whether the monopoly position of the Rowak-Hisma firms is to be continued or Spanish trade opened to others.	245
Feb. 27 224	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Soviet reversal in withdrawing from naval patrol plans is due to the fear that their forces are inadequate for the Biscay zone and to the unwillingness of the powers to assign another zone.	247
Mar. 2 225	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Tactics for delaying the proposals in the London committee for withdrawal of volunteers from Spain have been agreed upon with the Italian representative.	248
Mar. 4 226	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Great Britain</i> The Italian representative is to be allowed to take the lead in delaying plans for withdrawal of volunteers; also, practical difficulties will be relied on to prevent a "premature solution."	249
Mar. 5 227	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ciano implied concern over the role of the German representative on the London committee and asked that he be instructed to sabotage the plans on volunteers; he said England's main concern was to get Italian troops out after the war ended.	250

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1937 Mar. 6 228	<i>The Acting State Secretary to the Embassy in Great Britain</i> Franco states that the expected 2-week delay in applying control measures will be a disadvantage to him; an early application of controls should be sought.	251
Mar. 10 229	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ciano expressed satisfaction with the military situation in Spain, of which he is now in direct charge; but he reported that Red resistance is stiffening and there have been some losses.	251
Mar. 17 230	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ciano showed concern over the strong Red resistance and the Spanish failure at Guadalajara, though he believed there was no cause for alarm; he mentioned the possibility that further supplies might be needed.	252
Mar. 17 231	<i>Minute by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> It has been decided not to negotiate a general trade and clearing agreement with Spain which would permit resumption of the activity of private traders.	252
Mar. 18 232	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Mussolini is quoted as saying that Italy would abide by a ban on volunteers but, if there were violations, would send 100 Italians for every man reaching the Red side.	254
Mar. 20 233	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Neurath told the British Ambassador that Germany would proceed with the discussions on volunteers only if the Russians would agree to discuss the question of the Spanish gold.	254

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PROTOCOLS: MARCH 20—JULY 16, 1937

1937 Mar. 20 234	<i>Protocol Signed at Salamanca March 20, 1937</i> By secret agreement "guiding principles" are laid down for future German-Spanish relations: cooperation against Communism; no agreements with or aid to a third power directed against one of the parties; intensification of economic relations.	256
Mar. 25 235	<i>The Ambassador in France to the Foreign Ministry</i> Delbos warned that France would not tolerate the flagrant Italian violations of the non-intervention agreement; Italy would not be allowed to determine the fate of Spain in disregard of France.	257
Mar. 25 236	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Mussolini was greatly agitated over the Italian reverse at Guadalajara but insisted it was of no military consequence; he would send no more troops, and the Spaniards would have to do their share in the future.	258
Mar. 27 237	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Grandi exceeded his instructions in the London committee in stating Italian volunteers would remain in Spain; Italy will not flatly oppose withdrawal but wants a delay until the setback at Guadalajara has been made good.	260

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1937 Mar. 29 238	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ciano informed Hassell of Grandi's instructions to obtain technical delays on withdrawal of volunteers; after the military situation had been restored, withdrawal might be to the advantage of the Whites; antiforeign sentiment in Spain might develop.	261
Mar. 30 239	<i>The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Italian refusal to consider withdrawal of volunteers should be supported in the London committee only if Franco cannot win without foreign troops; England would restrain France from sending her own troops.	262
Apr. 1 240	<i>The Acting State Secretary to the Embassy in Great Britain</i> Italy will not refuse to discuss the withdrawal of volunteers but will delay the matter until she has won a military victory in Spain to wipe out the recent defeat.	265
Apr. 9 241	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ciano stated that the Italian commander in Spain was being replaced and Italian fighter planes were being sent; 50 German bombers were needed.	266
Apr. 9 242	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Hassell complained to Ciano of the Vatican's sharp policy against Germany and its ineffectual policy in Spain; Ciano said he had already had a discussion with the Nuncio on this.	267
Apr. 14 243	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Franco stated that he will form a unity party to bring together the divergent elements on the Nationalist side, but the question of the monarchy will be set aside indefinitely; he stressed the usefulness of the German military instructors.	267
Apr. 14 244	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Laval is reported to have sought contact with Franco and offered his support; he is said to believe France can be saved from Communism by a Nationalist government under Pétain.	270
Apr. 16 245	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department</i> British claims against Germany in connection with the confiscation of copper ores in Spain having been rejected, negotiations have been taken up between the British and German firms concerned.	271
Apr. 21 246	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division III</i> There is agreement with Italy to delay discussion of the withdrawal of volunteers until the Italian military position in Spain is restored; in order to forestall attacks, evidence on violations by other states after the effective date of the control plan, April 19, should be compiled.	273
Apr. 21 247	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Faupel and General Mancini of the Italian command have agreed that it is necessary to tell Franco plainly that he must act on German and Italian military advice if he is to receive further help.	274
May 1 248	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Following Franco's forcible intervention against the Falange and arrest of its leaders, Faupel urged him to proclaim a social program to conciliate the recalcitrants.	277

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1937 May 4 249	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in Spain</i> Franco is to be requested to issue a strong denial that German fliers were responsible for the bombing of Guernica; the German press has offered proof that it was done by Bolsheviks.	279
May 5 250	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in Great Britain</i> While not wishing to oppose an appeal against the bombing of open cities, Germany will insist that no precedent be implied and that there be no mention of the Guernica episode.	280
May 5 251	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> No additional denial has been issued by Franco since the Nationalist press has already absolved German fliers and attributed the destruction of Guernica to Basque Reds.	281
May 5 252	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Franco stated that his disciplining of the Falange had restored its loyalty; he denied any possibility of a compromise peace and expressed the view that England aimed to separate Germany and Italy from Nationalist Spain.	281
May 6 253	<i>The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Eden refused to issue a communiqué on Ribbentrop's representations against the false reports concerning Guernica, but the Ambassador had a statement published in the British press; Eden may propose an international investigation.	283
May 11 254	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> A compromise settlement is rejected by both parties in Spain; elections would result in defeat for Franco's supporters; Serrano Suñer appears to be the coming leader in the Falange and the Government.	284
May 13 255	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in France</i> Mussolini has told Neurath that he intends to warn Franco soon that unless the war is prosecuted more energetically the Italian troops will be withdrawn.	286
May 13 256	<i>The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy in Spain</i> Franco is to be asked whether he supports his economic experts' insistence on a clearing agreement which would open up German-Spanish trade to private operators; Germany prefers to retain the monopoly position of the Rowak-Hisma firms.	287
May 15 257	<i>The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Eden told Ribbentrop and Blomberg that he was preparing a plan for cessation of hostilities in Spain and would circulate it through diplomatic channels.	289
May 15 258	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> The Führer has expressed the view that Germany could not consider an investigation of the Guernica incident.	290
May 16 259	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ciano's reaction to a British approach to arrange a kind of truce in Spain seemed to be conciliatory.	290
May 17 260	<i>The British Ambassador to the Foreign Minister</i> England suggests that the parties in Spain be induced to agree to an armistice to facilitate the withdrawal of volunteers from both sides.	290

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1937 May 19 261	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Italy is disposed to reject the British suggestion for an armistice on the ground that it is a maneuver to forestall a Fascist victory in Spain.	291
May 21 262	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Neurath told the British Ambassador that there was no chance the Spanish parties would agree to an armistice, and it would be preferable to continue discussion in the London committee on withdrawal of volunteers.	292
May 21 263	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Franco said his delegates had exceeded instructions in insisting on a clearing agreement in the economic negotiations; he was greatly concerned to promote economic ties with Germany.	293
May 23 264	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Franco stated that he would reject the British armistice proposal, which was inspired by the Red side; he agreed with Faupel that Vatican interference in Spain should be resisted.	293
May 24 265	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Neurath assured the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires that Germany had refused the British armistice proposal; he urged that the attack on Bilbao be continued energetically.	295
May 26 266	<i>The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy in Spain</i> Since Franco abandoned the Spanish demand for a clearing agreement, it has been decided to make certain concessions in the economic negotiations.	295
May 30 267	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Great Britain</i> The German Government intends to take countermeasures in view of the attack by Red planes on the <i>Deutschland</i> off Iviza.	296
May 30 268	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Great Britain</i> The Non-Intervention Committee is to be informed that Germany will not participate in the committee or the naval patrol until guaranties are obtained against attacks on German vessels.	297
May 31 269	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Neurath told the Italian Ambassador that Germany did not wish Italy to join her in withdrawing from the Non-Intervention Committee; he did not tell him what reprisals would be taken for the attack on the <i>Deutschland</i> .	297
May 31 270	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Neurath told the French Ambassador that Germany considered the <i>Deutschland</i> incident closed with the retaliatory bombardment of Almería, but energetic steps by the other powers to prevent other such incidents would be expected.	298
May 31 271	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> To the British Ambassador, who expressed concern that the Almería bombardment might lead to the widening of the Civil War into a general war, Neurath replied that would depend on England; she could revise her benevolent attitude toward the Valencia Reds.	299

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1937 May 31 272	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> The Italian Ambassador reported that, contrary to the German wish, Mussolini thought it better for Italy to follow Germany out of the Non-Intervention Committee and the naval patrol.	299
May 31 273	<i>Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Political Department</i> Woermann telephoned from London that in Eden's view the reprisal at Almeria was too extreme; he had stated that the situation was dangerous and he hoped Germany would not go further.	300
May 31 274	<i>The Ambassador in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Secretary of State Hull expressed the hope that Germany would take no further action after the Almeria bombardment but would continue to do everything possible to preserve peace.	302
June 1 275	<i>The Consul at Geneva to the Foreign Ministry</i> Anglo-French opposition has defeated an attempt of Litvinov and Spanish Foreign Minister del Vayo to summon the League Council over the Almeria incident.	303
June 2 276	<i>The Ambassador in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> The German Military Attaché, who enjoys the confidence of the American armed forces, has found a friendly reception for his explanations of the German action at Almeria.	304
June 3 277	<i>The British Ambassador to the Foreign Minister</i> As a basis for German and Italian return to the Non-Intervention Committee and the naval patrol, England proposes assurances by the Spanish parties against further armed attacks and the provision of safety zones in Spanish harbors.	305
June 4 278	<i>The Supreme Command of the Navy to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Navy proposes changes in the British formula permitting separate action prior to consultation by any power which may be the victim of an attack.	306
June 4 279	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> The British Ambassador stated that he believed the revised German draft providing for freedom of action would be acceptable in London.	307
June 7 280	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Legal Department</i> The Italian Ambassador complained that in accepting British revisions Germany had abandoned her basic stand in the Almeria incident.	307
June 8 281	<i>The State Secretary to the Legation in Yugoslavia</i> Neurath, on a visit to Belgrade, is informed of a British invitation to visit London; there would be no "negotiations," only an "exchange of views."	308
June 8 282	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division III</i> In the War Ministry the belief is held that in accepting the British formula for guaranties against attacks on patrol ships Germany has abandoned the right to take reprisals for such attacks.	309



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1937 June 8 283	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> It was arranged with the British Ambassador that agreement on the final text of the statement to be made to the Spanish parties, calling for guaranties against attacks on patrol ships, will be worked out between Eden and the German, Italian, and French Ambassadors in London.	310
June 9 284	<i>The British Ambassador to the State Secretary</i> Henderson asks that no advance hints be given out on the proposed Neurath visit to London.	311
June 9 285	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Legal Department</i> Gaus explained to Ribbentrop that the formula tentatively agreed upon with England for guaranties against attacks on patrol ships would not prevent but only delay reprisals.	311
June 9 286	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Faupel suggests that Germany advise Franco against executing the Falange leaders; their trial was of doubtful fairness and is a victory for the elements around Franco which oppose all social reforms.	312
June 9 287	<i>The Foreign Minister to the State Secretary</i> Neurath approves a London visit for June 23, but the announcement must omit reference to the Spanish problem and the guaranty question must first be settled in a manner satisfactory to Germany.	313
June 10 288	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> The British Ambassador accepted the German revisions in the text of the announcement of Neurath's London visit and again urged an early release to avoid indiscretions.	314
June 10 289	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Mackensen agreed with the British Ambassador that Germany and Italy would return to the London committee immediately after the note on guaranties against attacks on patrol ships had been delivered to the Spanish parties.	314
June 10 290	<i>The British Ambassador to the State Secretary</i> Henderson asks whether Neurath could be induced to abandon his conditions for the London visit as he fears a bad impression if they are communicated to London.	315
June 10 291	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Mackensen confirms that Neurath shares his view that the Iviza incident must be settled before the London visit.	316
June 10 292	<i>The State Secretary to the Foreign Minister</i> Mackensen finds Henderson's request "incomprehensible," since it would be awkward to cancel the visit after its announcement should the Iviza incident not be settled.	316
June 10 293	<i>The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Eden said that the Spanish question and the general international situation were the topics intended for discussion during the Neurath visit; when Ribbentrop suggested the colonial question, he hesitated but promised to consider it.	317

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1937 June 10 294	<i>The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ribbentrop explained to Eden that Germany's agreement to consult in the event of attacks on patrol ships meant only that the right to independent reprisals would be placed in abeyance for a "reasonable time."	317
June 10 295	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Russia has condemned British efforts to settle the Almeria incident outside the London committee and without Russia as an attempt to revive the idea of a four-power pact.	318
June 10 296	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in Spain</i> The idea of a formal intervention by Germany on behalf of the condemned Falangist leader, Hedilla, is considered politically inadvisable.	319
June 10 297	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> According to General Wilberg of OKW, Germany's claims against Spain for deliveries of arms amount to 150 million RM to the end of May.	320
June 11 298	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in Great Britain</i> The British Ambassador in Berlin has been informed that Neurath will come to London on June 23 but only on condition that the Iviza incident is satisfactorily settled.	320
June 11 299	<i>The Minister Counselor of Embassy in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> The text of a formula for guaranties against attacks on ships of the naval patrol is virtually completed in talks with Eden; by its terms Germany and Italy retain freedom of action in case consultation fails.	321
June 11 300	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Neurath assented to Mackensen's view that Germany should return to the Non-Intervention Committee as soon as the joint note to the Spanish parties on guaranty of naval patrol vessels had been dispatched.	321
June 11 301	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Göring reaffirmed his view that the monopoly position of the Rowak-Hisma firms in Spanish trade should be retained for the present; it will insure a stronger bargaining position with Franco, particularly with a view to iron ore at Bilbao.	322
June 12 302	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in Great Britain</i> Germany will return to the Non-Intervention Committee as soon as the guaranty formula is accepted by all four naval patrol powers.	323
June 12 303	<i>The State Secretary to the Legation in Hungary</i> Neurath is informed that Eden considers that making settlement of the Iviza incident a condition for the London visit is incompatible with the friendly spirit in which the visit was proposed; he also wants the Spanish question mentioned in the announcement.	323

## CHAPTER III. GERMAN-NATIONALIST TIES STRENGTHENED; THE MARCH AND JULY PROTOCOLS: MARCH 20-JULY 16, 1937—Continued

Date and Doc. No.	Subject	Page
1937 June 12 304	<i>The Minister Counselor of Embassy in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> The statement of guaranties for the safety of patrol vessels having been approved by the four naval powers, the German Ambassador stated that Germany would return to the Non-Intervention Committee only when the Spanish parties notified acceptance.	324
June 12 305	<i>The Minister Counselor of Embassy in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> The text of the four-power agreement on guaranties for naval patrol vessels is transmitted.	326
June 12 306	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Mussolini told Hassell that, with France and Russia internally weakened, England was the principal antagonist; he wanted a political settlement, not war; the firm solidarity of Berlin and Rome was necessary to gain their ends vis-à-vis England.	327
June 13 307	<i>The Foreign Minister to the State Secretary</i> Neurath approves a reference to discussions on Spain in the announcement of his London visit but wishes the Iviza incident settled in principle before his final acceptance.	329
June 13 308	<i>The Foreign Minister to the State Secretary</i> Neurath will confer with the Führer on his way back from Budapest.	330
June 13 309	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in Italy</i> The Italians are to be informed confidentially that Neurath intends to visit London and that he believes the visit will be useful for Anglo-Italian relations also.	330
June 13 310	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Mackensen informed the British Ambassador that Spain could be mentioned in the announcement of the London visit; he omitted mention of settlement of the Iviza incident as a condition in the hope agreement would be reached before final acceptance.	330
June 14 311	<i>The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ribbentrop argues against the instructions to return to the Non-Intervention Committee on approval of the guaranty proposal by the four powers; he favors awaiting acceptance by the Valencia Government.	331
June 14 312	<i>The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in Spain</i> Franco is to be requested to respond favorably to the London proposals for guaranteeing the safety of naval patrol vessels.	332
June 14 313	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Neurath agrees that the completion of the guaranty understanding among the four naval powers in London fulfills his condition for the London visit, and the British Ambassador may be told to present the official invitation.	332

## CHAPTER III. GERMAN-NATIONALIST TIES STRENGTHENED; THE MARCH AND JULY PROTOCOLS: MARCH 20-JULY 16, 1937—Continued

Date and Doc. No.	Subject	Page
1937 June 14 314	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Neurath disapproves Ribbentrop's failure to follow instructions and return to the Non-Intervention Committee after agreement among the four powers on naval guaranties; the matter may be referred to the Führer.	333
June 14 315	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Mackensen informed the British Ambassador of Neurath's final acceptance of the London invitation; they agreed on the earliest possible announcement to avoid further indiscretions.	333
June 14 316	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> The British Ambassador has been unable to reach Eden by telephone but will let Mackensen know about release of the announcement the following morning.	334
June 14 317	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Weizsäcker outlines a possible course to be followed in Neurath's London conversations which would inaugurate a gradual improvement in Anglo-German relations without doing injury to relations with Italy.	335
June 14 318	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> The Italian Ambassador received with good grace the news of Neurath's London visit; he said he favored a <i>rapprochement</i> with England, although he admitted that Mussolini was not so favorably disposed.	336
June 14 319	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy</i> An effort is to be made to convince Mussolini that no Anglo-German understanding is in the making; Neurath assents to Mussolini's principle that there should be no agreements between London and Berlin without Rome and between London and Rome without Berlin.	338
June 14 320	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ciano was taken aback at the news of the London visit; he thought it would be interpreted as a weakening of the Axis.	339
June 15 321	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Mackensen told the Italian Ambassador that Ribbentrop would be told to alter his view and return to the Non-Intervention Committee on acceptance of the guaranty agreement by the naval powers; Attolico said this was also the Italian position.	340
June 15 322	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> The British Ambassador telephoned his agreement to release the following morning of the press announcement on Neurath's London visit.	341
June 15 323	<i>The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ribbentrop complains to Neurath after a talk with Eden that he has been insufficiently informed concerning the London visit and the discussions which are planned.	341
June 15 324	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Mackensen told Ribbentrop by telephone that the decision to return to the Non-Intervention Committee at once would be held to, and that the press announcement of this should not appear simultaneously with the announcement of Neurath's visit.	342

## CHAPTER III. GERMAN-NATIONALIST TIES STRENGTHENED; THE MARCH AND JULY PROTOCOLS: MARCH 20-JULY 16, 1937—Continued

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1937 June 15 325	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Ribbentrop telephoned that the British planned to release the news of the Neurath visit the same evening; he was told to persuade them to conform to the agreement for release the next morning.	343
June 15 326	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Mackensen arranged with Ribbentrop by telephone the announcement of the German representative's return to the Non-Intervention Committee.	343
June 15 327	<i>Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Political Department</i> Clarifying by telephone a confused exchange of telegrams, Bismarck stressed to the Rome Embassy the importance of giving the Italians an immediate explanation of the London visit.	344
June 16 328	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> The Italian Ambassador complained of the "shock" felt in Rome over Germany's failure to inform Italy earlier of the London visit; he stressed also the concern felt in Rome about separate Anglo-German discussion of Spain.	345
June 16 329	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ciano suggested that Neurath stress in London Italy's desire for an understanding with England, which would have to begin, however, with recognition of the Italian Empire.	346
June 16 330	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in Great Britain</i> It should be made clear to Eden that no commitments have been made as to the agenda for Neurath's discussions in London; there can be no "negotiations" on a Western Pact.	347
June 16 331	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Admiral Raeder is reluctant to allow German ships to rejoin the naval patrol until Red Spain has confirmed the guaranties for their safety agreed by the four naval powers in London.	348
June 16 332	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Mackensen told General Keitel that on legal grounds and for reasons of prestige the return of German ships to the naval patrol could not be long delayed.	349
[ca. June 16] 333	<i>Memorandum for the Foreign Minister</i> A preliminary opinion is rendered that, if the British press for the withdrawal of volunteers from Spain during Neurath's London visit, Germany will be able to go along with such a plan.	350
June 16 334	<i>The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Eden told Ribbentrop that it was understood in London that the program for Neurath's London talks was not final, but he would like to include the question of a Western Pact, at least in general outline, and withdrawal of volunteers; he would not object to discussing colonies.	351
June 17 335	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Franco government intends to give its approval to the guaranty proposals for naval patrol vessels agreed in London.	352

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Date and Doc. No.	Subject	Page
1937 June 17 336	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department</i> At an interministerial conference it was agreed that goods might be sold to Red Spain provided they did not strengthen the powers of resistance there and provided payment was in foreign exchange.	352
June 17 337	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Mackensen conferred with the British Ambassador on the Foreign Minister's social program during his London visit.	353
June 18 338	<i>The Minister Counselor of Embassy in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> The British chairman, Lord Plymouth, managed the return of the German and Italian Ambassadors to the Non-Intervention Committee without an outbreak of recriminations by other members.	353
[June 19] 339	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassies in Great Britain, France, and Italy</i> Announcing submarine attacks on the German ship, <i>Leipzig</i> , the German Government demands convening of the representatives of the naval powers in London at once.	354
June 19 340	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Informed of the <i>Leipzig</i> incident, the Italian Ambassador agreed that his view that Italian ships should rejoin the naval patrol immediately was no longer pertinent.	356
June 19 341	<i>The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ribbentrop proposed as a reply to the alleged attack on the <i>Leipzig</i> that the four naval powers stage a joint naval demonstration off Valencia and demand surrender of the Valencia Government's submarines; French and British reaction was reserved.	356
June 20 342	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Great Britain</i> A proposal for surrender of Nationalist submarines should be made; a naval demonstration off Valencia will be insisted upon; if doubt is raised as to the veracity of the report concerning the attempt on the <i>Leipzig</i> , the Ambassador is to withdraw from the discussions.	358
June 21 343	<i>The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Britain and France reject an immediate naval demonstration but propose an inquiry as to the identity of the submarines which attacked the <i>Leipzig</i> , also a warning to both Spanish parties.	359
June 21 344	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> At a Führer conference it was decided to reject the proposal for an inquiry and to stand on the demand for a naval demonstration.	360
June 21 345	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division III</i> The Paris Embassy telephoned that the French press is making much of a German radio report of June 15 which denied that the <i>Leipzig</i> had been involved in an incident.	361

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1937 June 21 346	<p><i>The State Secretary to the Embassies in Great Britain, France, Italy, Spain, Poland, the United States, and the Soviet Union</i></p> <p>The Foreign Minister has had to postpone his planned visit to London because the situation arising from Red Spanish attacks on German warships requires his presence in Berlin.</p>	361
June 21 347	<p><i>The Embassy in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>The Italians request abandonment of the demand for surrender of Spanish submarines; they fear a precedent authorizing an international commission to demobilize single units might apply to volunteer forces.</p>	362
June 22 348	<p><i>The Minister Counselor of Embassy in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>The British have proposed to the Non-Intervention Committee that they be empowered to negotiate with the Spanish parties the withdrawal of an equal number of volunteers from both sides.</p>	362
June 22 349	<p><i>The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>France and England refuse to agree to a naval demonstration in the wake of the <i>Leipzig</i> incident without a prior investigation; the discussions ended in a stalemate.</p>	364
June 22 350	<p><i>The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>During a private talk between the Ambassador and Eden the possibility of a compromise on the demand for a naval demonstration appeared; the demonstration might take place along the Franco-held Spanish coast as well as off Valencia.</p>	365
June 22 351	<p><i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i></p> <p>At a Führer conference it was decided that no simultaneous demonstration off the coast of White Spain would be accepted; foreign observers on patrol vessels and any linking of the <i>Leipzig</i> case with evacuation of volunteers are to be rejected.</p>	366
June 22 352	<p><i>The Foreign Minister to the Führer and Chancellor</i></p> <p>The demand for a naval demonstration having been finally refused, Ribbentrop was informed that Germany had recovered freedom of action, would withdraw from the committee of the naval powers, and would inform them of the unilateral measures planned.</p>	367
June 22 353	<p><i>The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>It was evident in the final session of the naval powers that France and England were impervious to the moderate German demands; the question of the continuing validity of the June 12 agreement will require settlement.</p>	368
June 23 354	<p><i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Great Britain</i></p> <p>A note is to be presented to the British Government announcing Germany's withdrawal from the control system; therewith, the June 12 agreement is rendered invalid.</p>	369
June 23 355	<p><i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i></p> <p>The British Ambassador urged that Germany take no independent measures against the Valencia Government; Neurath stated to Henderson's visible relief that withdrawal from the control system was the only action intended.</p>	369

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1937 June 23 356	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division III</i> The War Ministry notified that after withdrawal of the patrol vessels certain German ships would cruise in the Mediterranean for the protection of merchant shipping.	370
June 23 357	<i>The British Ambassador to the Foreign Minister</i> Henderson asks for confirmation that Germany will take no action other than withdrawal from the naval patrol, since Eden intends to make a statement to Commons in this sense.	370
June 23 358	<i>The Foreign Minister to the British Ambassador</i> Neurath informs Henderson that Germany has recovered freedom of action and the measures taken to protect its naval forces are its own concern.	371
June 26 359	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in Spain</i> Franco's views are solicited on the British proposal to withdraw, as a first step, an equal number of volunteers from both sides in Spain.	371
June 26 360	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ciano stated that withdrawal of volunteers from Spain was out of the question and that obstructive tactics would have to be pursued in the London committee; also, Franco was at a disadvantage if England and France continued the naval patrol.	372
June 26 361	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> In Mussolini's view, to avoid leaving France and England in charge of the naval patrol and blockading Franco, a new system would have to be proposed permitting German and Italian participation.	374
June 27 362	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Mussolini's view might be supported if an entirely new control formula were found; France and England would inspire more confidence as control powers if Franco had belligerent rights; a decision on withdrawing volunteers must be left to the Spanish parties.	375
June 27 363	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> While not opposed in principle to withdrawal of volunteers, Franco is skeptical of a guaranty to close the French border; in view of their low combat value, he would not object to withdrawal of the Italians but insists on keeping his Moroccans.	375
June 27 364	<i>The Foreign Minister to the British Ambassador</i> Germany is unable to accept a new British proposal on reorganizing the naval patrol; German personnel are being withdrawn from the patrol service.	376
June 28 365	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Neurath told the British Ambassador that Germany would have no confidence in a naval patrol conducted by England and France alone; in view of the British attitude in the <i>Leipzig</i> incident he had no new proposals to make.	377
June 28 366	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Great Britain</i> The German line in the Non-Intervention Committee is to be reserved, with the lead left to Italy and Portugal; withdrawal of volunteers is to be termed premature and a continuation of the naval patrol by France and England rejected as not an impartial solution.	378



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1937 June 29 367	<i>Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Political Department</i> Woermann telephoned from London that it is now proposed to have England patrol the coast of Red Spain, France that of White Spain, with neutral observers aboard the ships.	380
June 29 368	<i>Memorandum by the Ambassador in Great Britain</i> Ribbentrop suggests for consideration as a possible counter-proposal the granting of belligerent rights to the Spanish parties; this would presumably work out favorably for Franco.	381
July 1 369	<i>The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Eden told Ribbentrop that he did not believe the British would consider granting belligerent rights for the present, as they wished to preserve the principle of non-intervention.	384
July 1 370	<i>Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Political Department</i> Hassell telephoned from Rome that Mussolini considers the possibility of granting belligerent rights should be explored, but he believes that some sort of supervision by the London committee should be continued.	385
July 1 371	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Neurath rejected an appeal by the French Ambassador to approved temporary continuation of the naval patrol by France and England; the Ambassador said his Government was unlikely to concede belligerent rights to Franco.	385
July 1 372	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Neurath pointed out to the British Ambassador that the plan to extend belligerent rights included a pledge to continue a non-intervention policy; Henderson said he approved personally but did not think his Government would.	386
July 1 373	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Great Britain</i> There appear to be no military or other objections to the granting of belligerent rights to the Spanish parties; the proposal can be brought forward in the London committee but without a commitment on details.	387
	<i>Editors' Note</i> The German and Italian proposals in the Non-Intervention Committee on July 2, 1937, for granting of belligerent rights and continuation of a system of supervision.	
July 2 374	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Although the Italian press gives that impression, Hassell does not believe Italian policy aims to sharpen the conflict with England.	390
[July 4] 375	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> A diplomatic alinement against Germany has developed from the Spanish crisis; German policy should now be to prevent a general conflict rather than to work for an unconditional Franco victory.	391
July 4 376	<i>The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Führer and Chancellor</i> Ribbentrop does not believe that England and France will risk a general war over Spain, but a complete break-down of non-intervention and shipment of more Germans and Italians to Spain would bring a dangerous situation; a compromise on non-intervention controls may become necessary.	392

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1937 July 5 377	<i>The Ambassador in France to the Foreign Ministry</i> France considered opening the frontier to full aid for Red Spain in the recent break-down of the patrol system but was restrained by England; the present disposition is to discuss some plan for the withdrawal of volunteers.	396
July 5 378	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Neurath told the British Ambassador that Germany would withdraw from the Non-Intervention Committee if England attempted to operate an Anglo-French naval patrol on the authority of only a majority vote in the committee.	397
July 6 379	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Great Britain</i> Any British proposals for a compromise solution should be received and forwarded to Berlin; it remains German policy to have non-intervention obligations continued in some form.	397
July 6 380	<i>The Ambassador in France to the Foreign Ministry</i> Premier Chautemps is quoted to the effect that France would not refuse a <i>rapprochement</i> on ideological grounds; her policy on Spain was determined by vital interests, not ideological motives.	398
July 7 381	<i>Note from the British Embassy</i> A more conciliatory attitude is urged on the part of the German representatives in London discussing distribution of the products of the Rio Tinto Company.	399
July 7 382	<i>The Ambassador in France to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Quai d'Orsay entertains the belief that England stands a good chance of weaning Franco away from Italian influence.	400
July 7 383	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Neurath again rejected an appeal by the British Ambassador for Germany to return to the naval patrol or to approve Anglo-French continuation of it; he also refused any discussion of the withdrawal of volunteers until the Spanish parties were consulted.	401
July 7 384	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in Spain</i> Franco is to be asked to explain his aims in connection with various recent evidences that he is developing a <i>rapprochement</i> with England.	402
July 7 385	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ciano said Italy was standing firm on its refusal to discuss the question of volunteers for the present; there was no sign that Franco wanted withdrawal, and military gains were imminent.	403
July 7 386	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> General Sander's tactless utterances against Hisma and derogatory remarks on Spanish conduct of the war have become known among Spaniards and undermine the German position in Spain.	404
July 8 387	<i>The Deputy Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in Spain</i> The instruction Ribbentrop has received for the next session of the Non-Intervention Committee is to gain time and make no proposals himself.	406

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1937 July 9 388	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the State Secretary's Secretariat</i> The Foreign Minister's instructions are that any new British proposals in the Non-Intervention Committee are to be welcomed, but Germany is to remain non-committal for the present.	406
July 9 389	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Faupel received assurances that Franco did not intend to alter his policy toward Germany or make an approach to England; such reports were an attempt to drive a wedge between them; withdrawal of volunteers would not be considered seriously.	407
July 9 390	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> An advance of 40 kilometers and capture of Bilbao required 11 weeks despite superiority in planes and artillery; quarrels over the use of Italian troops are partly responsible; Spanish assault divisions must be trained to speed operations.	408
July 10 391	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department</i> It is expected that Germany can obtain almost the full output of the iron mines around Bilbao for the foreseeable future, although it is not intended to exclude the British in the long run.	412
July 12 392	<i>Protocol Signed at Burgos on July 12, 1937</i> A comprehensive trade treaty is postponed, but Germany is to be the first state considered for such a treaty; Spain will inform Germany of any comprehensive economic negotiations with third states.	413
[July 14] 393	<i>The Minister Counselor of Embassy in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> New British proposals are transmitted covering termination of the naval patrol, stationing of control officers in Spanish ports, limited recognition of belligerency rights, and commissions to supervise withdrawal of volunteers.	414
July 15 394	<i>Protocol Signed at Burgos on July 15, 1937</i> Although Germany and Nationalist Spain refrain for the present from concluding any new trade agreement, they affirm their intention to expand their mutual trade to the maximum extent and particularly to facilitate private trading.	417
July 15 395	<i>The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> The new British proposals for reestablishing a control system around Spain seem to provide a suitable basis for discussion, but the linking of this scheme with one for withdrawal of volunteers should be opposed.	418
July 15 396	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in London</i> While the British proposals may be accepted as a basis for discussion, the German line on details must be reserved; Italy is unlikely to accept withdrawal of volunteers, but blame for a failure must be avoided.	420
	<i>Editors' Note</i> The rejection in the Non-Intervention Committee, July 16-20, 1937, of British proposals for reestablishing a non-intervention control system around Spain.	

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1937 July 16 397	<i>Protocol Signed at Burgos on July 16, 1937</i> Nationalist Spain's debt to Germany for special deliveries will be met by the assumption of 4-percent obligations in reichsmarks, periodic delivery of raw materials, and provision of funds for German investment in Spain.	421

## CHAPTER IV. THE POWERS AND NON-INTERVENTION: JULY 19-NOVEMBER 1, 1937

1937 July 19 398	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in Great Britain</i> Germany would prefer to continue the present situation rather than permit a tightening of the naval controls without simultaneously getting a strict land control.	423
July 20 399	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Ambassador Faupel told Mackensen that his relations with General Sander had become intolerable; from another source Mackensen notes that Faupel is no longer acceptable to Franco and that the War Ministry may withdraw Sander.	423
July 22 400	<i>The Ambassador in France to the Foreign Ministry</i> French opinion regards chances for an effective control scheme as slight, is convinced Germany and Italy overestimate Franco's strength, and is disposed to take a firmer stand.	425
July 22 401	<i>The Foreign Ministry to the Embassies in Spain and Great Britain and to the Economics Ministry</i> Following negotiations with British representatives of the Rio Tinto Company, the British Embassy was informed that Germany stood on her rejection of any claims based on confiscation of copper ores by the Franco government and delivery to German firms.	426
July 24 402	<i>Minute by the Director of the Political Department</i> The Propaganda Ministry's use of an unverified report of the presence of French Foreign Legion troops in Red Spain has brought an embarrassing reaction which shows the need to consult the Foreign Ministry on press policy.	429
July 24 403	<i>The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in Great Britain</i> From a confidential source it is learned that Italy would be willing to withdraw volunteers from Spain but wishes Franco to make the first move in this direction.	430
July 29 404	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ciano said the stalemate in the London committee was not unfavorable, and he seemed at least resigned to the military stalemate in Spain; Italian troops there were not being used, he said.	430
July 31 405	<i>The Head of Political Division III to Secretary of Legation Brückmeier of the Embassy in Great Britain</i> The relations of the Italian troops in Spain with the Franco forces are at a low ebb because of the unwillingness of the Italians to engage in offensive actions.	431

## CHAPTER IV. THE POWERS AND NON-INTERVENTION: JULY 19—NOVEMBER 1, 1937—Continued

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1937 Aug. 3 406	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Franco's diplomatic chief, Sangroniz, stated that the Vatican had asked the Spanish Nationalists to give their mission in Rome official status, which would imply recognition, and England had promised to accord belligerent status.	431
Aug. 4 407	<i>The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in Italy</i> The German Embassy at Salamanca reports that Franco has appealed to Rome for naval assistance against a large convoy of reinforcements alleged to be en route from Russia to Red Spain.	432
Aug. 5 408	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ciano said Mussolini was inclined to dispatch Italian submarines against the Russian transports; they would raise a Spanish Nationalist flag if they had to surface.	433
Aug. 13 409	<i>The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in Italy</i> The Embassy at Salamanca reports that Franco has been promised by Mussolini that the Russian supply ships will be intercepted.	433
Aug. 16 410	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ciano was optimistic over military developments; a promising operation against Santander was in progress, and seven ships had been sunk off the Spanish coast; he thought the Far Eastern conflict would divert England and Russia from Spain.	434
Aug. 21 411	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Franco told Faupel on the latter's farewell visit that France and Russia were internally weakened, implying that Germany would run no risks in aiding him on a larger scale; he also showed great interest in an Anglo-German <i>rapprochement</i> .	434
Sept. 2 412	<i>Editors' Note</i> Action of the Non-Intervention Committee on August 27, 1937, recommending replacement of the naval patrol with observers in Spanish ports.	
	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Quai d'Orsay hesitates in the face of French opinion to renew the law banning volunteers for Spain; a German and Italian threat to annul their own regulations might constitute effective pressure.	437
Sept. 3 413	<i>Editors' Note</i> Action of the British Government on September 2, 1937, to deal with submarine piracy in the Mediterranean.	
	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Eden explained to Woermann that the projected conference of Mediterranean powers was intended to consider only practical measures to deal with the dangerous incidents which had occurred there; there was no desire to exclude Germany.	438
	<i>Editors' Note</i> The British and French summoning of the Nyon conference on September 6, 1937.	

## CHAPTER IV. THE POWERS AND NON-INTERVENTION: JULY 19—NOVEMBER 1, 1937—Continued

Date and Doc. No.	Subject	Page
1937 Sept. 6 414	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Personnel Department</i> The British Embassy presented the invitation to a conference at Nyon with the explanation that it would deal only with the problem of unidentified submarine and plane attacks in the Mediterranean.	440
Sept. 6 415	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Personnel Department</i> The Italian Chargé d'Affaires said that Italian participation in the Nyon conference was unlikely in view of the charge made by Russia in an official note that Italy was responsible for the sinking of a Russian ship off Greece.	440
Sept. 6 416	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Political Division I</i> The War Ministry has ruled that the Foreign Ministry should have responsibility for German representation at Nyon, with only technical advice to be provided by the Navy.	441
Sept. 9 417	<i>Memorandum to the British and French Embassies</i> The German Government proposes that the Non-Intervention Committee rather than a special conference at Nyon deal with the problem of security in the Mediterranean.	442
Sept. 12 418	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy</i> Ciano is to be informed that the British appear to have intercepted radio messages of Italian submarines operating in the Mediterranean.	443
Sept. 16 419	<i>Editors' Note</i> The agreement signed at Nyon on September 14, 1937. <i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Italian Ambassador in Nationalist Spain said that the Nyon agreement would make interference with Russian deliveries to Red Spain extremely difficult; Germany and Italy might have to increase their aid to Franco.	443
Sept. 18 420	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Weizsäcker told the Spanish Ambassador that German warships would not help to enforce the Nyon agreement; Italy would be allowed to take the lead in coping with the problems raised.	444
Sept. 23 421	<i>The Consul at Geneva to the Foreign Ministry</i> Sensational reports of negotiations between Delbos and the Italian delegate in Geneva are fabrications intended to disturb the atmosphere during Mussolini's visit to Berlin.	444
Sept. 25 422	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in France to the Foreign Ministry</i> The permanent concern of French policy is to prevent Italy from developing close ties with Germany; Nyon was an attempt to check Italy in the Mediterranean without alienating her; an Anglo-French-Italian understanding with economic features may be attempted.	445
Sept. 28 423	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> France and England are preparing an approach to Italy on the Spanish problem. Neurath's marginal comment quotes Mussolini and Ciano to the effect that they rejected the soundings for a conference.	449

## CHAPTER IV. THE POWERS AND NON-INTERVENTION: JULY 19—NOVEMBER 1, 1937—Continued

Date and Doc. No.	Subject	Page
1937 Sept. 29 424	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Chamberlain is reported to take a lively interest in an Anglo-French approach to Italy; the Counselor of the Italian Embassy in London has advised the British to exchange views with Rome before sending a formal note.	449
Sept. 30 425	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Great Britain</i> If German advice is asked, the British should be told that diplomatic preparation in Rome would be advisable before a note is dispatched.	450
Oct. 2 426	<i>The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Russia's reaction to the London committee's decision to end the naval patrol implies she may denounce non-intervention; the position Germany has taken will deposit blame for the break-down clearly at Russia's door.	450
Oct. 4 427	<i>Editors' Note</i> The Anglo-French note to Italy of October 2, 1937, proposing examination of the Spanish problem by the three powers.	
Oct. 4 427	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division III</i> The French Ambassador stated that the initiative for Anglo-French-Italian talks on Spain had come from Italy.	451
Oct. 4 428	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Asking for German advice on the reply to be made to the Anglo-French note, the Italian Ambassador said that Italy would answer that Germany must be included in such discussions and that the Non-Intervention Committee was the proper forum.	452
Oct. 5 429	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> The Foreign Minister has no further suggestions for the Italian reply to the Anglo-French note beyond reaffirming that the Spanish parties must be consulted before withdrawal of volunteers is discussed.	453
Oct. 5 430	<i>The Foreign Ministry to the Embassies in Great Britain, Italy, and Spain</i> The French Ambassador has told the State Secretary that, in representing the proposed three-power conference as an attempt to undermine Axis solidarity, the Italians reversed themselves, for they originated the idea in the first place.	453
Oct. 7 431	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> It is reported that a negative Italian reply to the Anglo-French note will lead, after one further appeal, to counter-measures beginning with the opening of the French frontier.	454
Oct. 7 432	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> England has agreed to admit semiofficial consular agents from Nationalist Spain in return for release of certain British ships and settlement of some economic questions.	455
Oct. 8 433	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Mackensen conveyed to the Italian Ambassador German approval of the Italian reply to the Anglo-French note.	455

CHAPTER IV. THE POWERS AND NON-INTERVENTION: JULY 19—NOVEMBER 1,  
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Date and Doc. No.	Subject	Page
1937 Oct. 8 434	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ciano said that the reaction to the Italian reply would show whether France and England wanted an agreement or were trying to end non-intervention; to avoid aggravating the situation, submarine activity was suspended and no more troops were being sent to Spain.	456
Oct. 9 435	<i>Spanish Decree of October 9, 1937, on Mining Concessions</i> All transactions involving the transfer of mining property are suspended, and all titles to such property acquired after July 18, 1936, are declared null and void.	457
Oct. 13 436	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Woermann asks instructions in the event the question of volunteers is again raised in the Non-Intervention Committee; diplomatic preparations should be made to avoid dangerous developments in the committee.	457
Oct. 13 437	<i>The Ambassador in France to the Foreign Ministry</i> French policy, motivated principally by a concern for the territorial integrity of Spain, shows signs of retreating from the sharp measures against Italy recently contemplated.	458
Oct. 14 438	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in Great Britain</i> Italy should be allowed to take the lead when the question of volunteers comes up again in the Non-Intervention Committee; Germany would insist only on consulting the Spanish parties as a first step.	459
Oct. 15 439	<i>The Minister Counselor of Embassy in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Grandi has learned from Eden that England would approach the problem of volunteers by proposing a symbolic withdrawal to start with and a renewed pledge not to send any more; he agreed in principle pending instructions.	460
Oct. 16 440	<i>The Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in Spain</i> The pending Anglo-Spanish economic talks will bear close watching to preserve Germany's preeminent position as consumer of Spanish raw materials and to insure Franco's adherence to the secret protocol of July 12, 1937.	461
Oct. 17 441	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Various conditions may need to be attached to acceptance of the plan for symbolic withdrawal of volunteers; resistance by Franco or Russia can be counted on in any case to cause difficulties.	463
Oct. 18 442	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Great Britain</i> There is no reason why full support should not be given to a symbolic withdrawal of volunteers; an equal number should be taken from each side, belligerent rights extended immediately thereafter, and the consent of the Spanish parties obtained.	465
Oct. 18 443	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in Great Britain</i> Franco has indicated that he would not be interested in only limited belligerent rights and in no case would he permit the Moroccans to be classed as volunteers.	467



## CHAPTER IV. THE POWERS AND NON-INTERVENTION: JULY 19—NOVEMBER 1, 1937—Continued

Date and Doc. No.	Subject	Page
1937 Oct. 19 444	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Mussolini said that he had reluctantly dispatched another division to Spain at Franco's request; he does not believe the Spaniards understand modern warfare.	468
Oct. 19 445	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Progress in the Non-Intervention Committee was blocked by disagreement as to which of alternative plans for withdrawing volunteers should be discussed; the unyielding Italian attitude was tactically unwise.	468
Oct. 19 446	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> It is learned reliably that the British are not so much concerned about territorial concessions by Franco to Italy as they are about possible lease of bases or an alliance which would be a strategic menace to England.	470
Oct. 20 447	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Franco Government has stated that in an extreme case it would consent to withdrawal of volunteers but only under certain conditions including full recognition as a belligerent.	471
Oct. 20 448	<i>Minute by the Director of the Political Department</i> The Italian Ambassador said an Italian division had been transferred from the Aragón to the Asturias front, but he knew nothing about sending another division to Spain, as Hassell had reported.	472
Oct. 20 449	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Neurath told Ambassador Attolico a more conciliatory line by Italy on procedural matters in the London committee was desirable; the Russians could be counted on to sabotage any serious treatment of the volunteer question.	472
Oct. 21 450	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Italy's more conciliatory line in the Non-Intervention Committee resulted in agreement to send a commission to Spain to determine how and in what ratio volunteers could be withdrawn.	472
Oct. 21 451	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Great Britain</i> Russian participation in any plan for withdrawal of volunteers from Spain must be insisted upon.	474
Oct. 22 452	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ambassador Maisky stated that Russia wished to continue in the Non-Intervention Committee, would not object to a policy of non-intervention pursued by other members, but would assume no responsibility for it.	474
Oct. 23 453	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> It has been agreed with the Italian and Portuguese representatives that the question of Russian participation rather than details of the withdrawal scheme should be made an issue in the Non-Intervention Committee.	476
Oct. 24 454	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Assurances have been obtained that the consular agreement negotiated between England and Nationalist Spain was not accompanied by any new economic concessions.	478

## CHAPTER IV. THE POWERS AND NON-INTERVENTION: JULY 19—NOVEMBER 1, 1937—Continued

Date and Doc. No.	Subject	Page
1937 Oct. 25 455	<i>Memorandum by the Ambassador in Spain</i> Stohrer finds the military situation favorable but no prospects of an early Franco victory; factional divisions on the White side remain a danger; the German standing in Spanish opinion is good; steps should be taken to restore the German community in Spain and give freer play to its economic activities.	480
Oct. 25 456	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Great Britain</i> No obstacles should be placed in the way of a symbolical withdrawal of volunteers, since Germany does not desire an early collapse of non-intervention; a further gain of time will aid Franco.	484
Oct. 26 457	<i>The Minister Counselor of Embassy in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Woermann rejected Eden's plea that the other powers should continue to work out a non-intervention policy even if Russia withdrew.	486
Oct. 26 458	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in France</i> The attention of the French Government should be called to the fact that the renewed commitment to send no volunteers to Spain, which is under consideration in London, cannot be undertaken unless the expired French law banning volunteers is renewed.	488
Oct. 27 459	<i>The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Italian and German representatives having accepted the British control and volunteer-withdrawal plan of July 14, it remains to clarify the question of Russian participation; possibilities for technical delays remain open.	489
Oct. 28 460	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Great Britain</i> It is not desired to bring about a collapse of non-intervention over Russian non-participation; safeguards will have to be provided if all powers except Russia grant Franco belligerent rights.	490
Oct. 30 461	<i>The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ribbentrop recommends either that all discussion of the British plan be dropped or that consent not be given to its execution until the Russian attitude is clarified.	491
Nov. 1 462	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Great Britain</i> No pressure which would isolate Germany in the London committee is to be undertaken in an attempt to clarify the Russian attitude; if they refuse to grant belligerent rights, they should at least be denied protection of the Nyon agreement.	493
	<i>Editors' Note</i> Adoption of the British control plan of July 14, 1937, in the Non-Intervention Committee on November 4, 1937.	

CHAPTER V. GERMAN ECONOMIC PRESSURE ON FRANCO: NOVEMBER 4, 1937-  
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1937 Nov. 4 463	<i>Memorandum of the German Embassy in Spain</i> German mining interests have encountered difficulties with the Spanish authorities, who interpret the decree of October 9, 1937, as permitting only a minority interest by foreigners in such enterprises.	496
Nov. 4 464	<i>Memorandum of the German Embassy in Spain</i> The director of Hisma argues that every pressure must be brought to bear to overcome Spanish resistance to German acquisition of a permanent ownership interest in Spanish mines; only this result would justify the aid given to Franco.	499
Nov. 8 465	<i>Editors' Note</i> Hitler's views on the implications of the Spanish Civil War for German policy as stated on November 5, 1937. <i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in Spain</i> Franco is to be urged to respond affirmatively to the London committee plan for withdrawal of volunteers but to impose certain conditions.	503
Nov. 9 466	<i>The Foreign Ministry to Various German Diplomatic Missions and the Consulate at Geneva</i> In a review of recent developments in the Non-Intervention Committee for guidance in conversations, it is stated that Germany has given full support to non-intervention despite Russian obstructionism.	504
Nov. 13 467	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Franco agreed to follow German advice in his reply to the Non-Intervention Committee proposals; he does not attach importance to the Soviet refusal to grant belligerent rights.	507
Nov. 17 468	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Franco doubts whether the granting of belligerent rights will bring him any advantages.	507
Nov. 17 469	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Franco promised that German interests would be protected under the recent mining decree; its purpose had been to forestall a sell-out of mining rights by the Red Government.	508
Nov. 25 470	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Göring, under the impression that Franco is granting rights to the British and that German mining interests are endangered, wishes to "hold a pistol to General Franco's breast"; a more moderate approach is to be urged on him.	508
Nov. 27 471	<i>Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> It was agreed with Göring's subordinates that the Ambassador in Spain should undertake a <i>démarche</i> in the interest of the mining concessions and against Anglo-Spanish agreements detrimental to Germany.	511
Nov. 27 472	<i>The Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in Spain</i> To overcome skepticism concerning the general assurances given by Franco on mining rights, he is to be asked to give a binding pledge of protection for a list of concessions already held by Hisma.	511

CHAPTER V. GERMAN ECONOMIC PRESSURE ON FRANCO: NOVEMBER 4, 1937-  
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Date and Doc. No.	Subject	Page
1937 Nov. 27 473	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> The increasing number of recognitions extended to Nationalist Spain means that other countries are getting into the Spanish market; Germany will have to decide shortly on a credit and trade policy if she is not to lose ground.	512
Nov. 30 474	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Göring's special representative, whose task is to secure the German economic position in Spain, should not be authorized to negotiate with the Nationalist Government in matters which are the concern of the Embassy.	516
Nov. 30 475	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Spain</i> Franco's concessions to England appear to exceed those he has admitted; he is to be told that unless guaranties are given for certain vital economic interests Germany will reconsider her policy.	518
Dec. 3 476	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Informal negotiations between the Spanish parties for ending the Civil War have broken down because of Franco's demand for unconditional surrender; they explain the delay in military operations.	519
Dec. 3 477	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Conduct of Italians both at and behind the front has given the Spaniards "their fill of the entire Italian military aid"; the reputation of the Germans for soldierly conduct remains good.	521
Dec. 3 478	<i>The State Secretary to the State Secretary in the Office of the Commissioner for the Four Year Plan</i> In response to the query of the German Ambassador, Franco has stated emphatically that all reports of economic concessions by him to England are "pure fabrications."	522
Dec. 3 479	<i>The State Secretary to the Ambassador in Spain</i> Mackensen gives Stohrer an account of Göring's suspicions of Franco's dealings with England which led to the instruction that Franco be asked to give assurances on German economic interests.	522
Dec. 4 480	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Franco appeared entirely sincere in his denial that economic concessions had been made to England; he promised friendly consideration for the list of mining concessions demanded by Germany.	524
Dec. 10 481	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Despite the earlier failure, representatives of Red Spain have continued to seek contacts for discussion of a negotiated peace.	525
Dec. 13 482	<i>The Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in Spain</i> Although mutual trust has been the rule followed hitherto, Franco's delay in approving German mining rights justifies an appeal to the specific obligations of the July 16 secret protocol.	525
Dec. 16 483	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary (Excerpt)</i> The Italian Ambassador stated that concern was also felt in Rome over Franco's dealings with England.	527

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1937 Dec. 16 484	<i>Memorandum by the Ambassador in Spain</i> The demand for approval of 73 mining concessions listed by Germany has continued to be met with delay on grounds of old Spanish laws and the provisional character of the regime.	527
Dec. 18 485	<i>The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in Italy</i> Germany would be prepared to withdraw 5,000 volunteers from Spain at once provided Franco agreed.	529
Dec. 18 486	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Spanish attitude appears cooperative, but legal delays continue to interfere with granting of approval for German mining rights; no special pressure is recommended for the present.	530
Dec. 19 487	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Spanish business interests have made known their desire for a freeing of German-Spanish trade from the Hisma monopoly; the alternative for Spanish enterprise would be to turn to other countries.	530
Dec. 19 488	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Duke of Alba, Spanish Nationalist representative in London, is working for closer ties with England and a lessening of German and Italian influence in Spain.	532
Dec. 20 489	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ciano stated that Franco has been told that, if operations continued slow, troops would be withdrawn; under such conditions the 40,000 Italians there could not indefinitely serve a cause in which they had little interest.	533
Dec. 21 490	<i>Memorandum by the Ambassador in Spain</i> In a discussion with representatives of the Hisma firm of the Spanish resistance to granting German mining rights, it was decided to clarify the legal situation and to make a direct appeal to Franco.	534
Undated 491	<i>Memorandum by the Ambassador in Spain</i> Franco admitted annoyance at what he thought was the secret acquisition of mining rights by Hisma and insisted he was limited by Spanish law; he agreed to a conference of experts to examine the legal situation.	538
Dec. 22 492	<i>Memorandum of the Embassy in Spain</i> In summary, the Spanish position is that they do not deny Germans the right to acquire ownership of mines, but they object to these being bought up without consulting the authorities and without conforming with the law.	540
Dec. 22 493	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department</i> A study of the Hisma monopoly and the conditions under which German-Spanish trade operates shows that it is still too early to restore private trade.	541
Dec. 29 494	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Mussolini has informed Franco that Italian troops could remain in Spain for the present, but a military decision had to be sought at an early date and a unified command must be set up.	543

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1938 Jan. 2 495	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Weizsäcker told Italian Chargé d'Affaires Magistrati that Germany would not favor a unified command in Spain; it would involve too much responsibility for operations; direct personal influence on Franco was preferable.	544
Jan. 5 496	<i>Minute by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> It was agreed at a conference of interested officials to press further for recognition of German mining rights in Spain, arguing that Germany's moral claims should be taken into account; an ultimatum will be delivered only as a last resort.	545
Jan. 5 497	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Magistrati gave more details on Mussolini's latest message to Franco in which he insisted that operations must be speeded and Italians must be used in decisive actions, not in battles of attrition.	547
Jan. 10 498	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Keitel stated that Blomberg had also told Magistrati that Germany was not interested in the unified command in Spain which Mussolini advocated.	548
Jan. 10 499	<i>Memorandum of the Embassy in Spain</i> The Ambassador urged the Hisma representatives to speed the preparation of their case on mining rights for the pending legal discussions with the Spaniards.	549
Jan. 13 500	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> It is likely that the British and French will not consent to granting of belligerent rights until at least half of the volunteers in Spain have been withdrawn.	550
Jan. 13 501	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Red victory at Teruel confirms reports of their improved organization and matériel situation; the additional aid Franco will need if he is to break the stalemate should be given only if greater influence on the conduct of the war is obtained.	551
Jan. 15 502	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division IIIa</i> An end to the Civil War is put off indefinitely by the Red victory at Teruel; a mediated peace would ultimately mean a Red victory; Franco must mobilize his largely untapped manpower reserves and receive more equipment.	554
Jan. 15 503	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the State Secretary</i> German and Italian military opinion believes that only by greatly increased aid can Franco's victory be assured.	557
Jan. 17 504	<i>Minute by an Official of the Economic Policy Department</i> The possibility of developing agricultural enterprises in Spain under German ownership or control is being studied by several ministries.	559
Jan. 18 505	<i>The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in Italy</i> Germany and Italy should reach agreement on the question about to be debated in the London committee as to what percentage of volunteers is to be withdrawn before belligerent rights are accorded.	561

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1938 Jan. 20 506	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Axis solidarity in the London committee has been effective against the divergent policies of other powers; Russian obstructionism has been a help; the question of volunteers can be protracted further if necessary.	562
Jan. 21 507	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ore shipments from Spain to Germany reached a record total of 260,000 tons in December; Hisma has supplied data to correct misleading figures of other agencies.	565
Jan. 28 508	<i>Memorandum of the Embassy in Spain</i> General Jordana told the Ambassador that he was unable to fix a date by which German mining rights would be approved; Stohrer warned that sentiment in Berlin toward Nationalist Spain might undergo a change.	567
Jan. 26 509	<i>Memorandum of the Embassy in Spain</i> Sangroniz told Stohrer that it was Germany's hasty and tactless amassing of mining concessions which had aroused Spanish resistance.	569
Jan. 26 510	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the President of the Junta Técnica</i> Stohrer requests Jordana to confirm that, despite legalistic delays, the question of German mining rights in Spain will be handled in terms of the spirit of cooperation envisaged in the July protocol.	571
Jan. 28 511	<i>The Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in Great Britain</i> Since Franco's defeat at Teruel sets back his prospects of an early military victory, German policy in the London committee should seek to delay further an agreement on withdrawal of volunteers.	572
Jan. 28 512	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain to the Director of the Political Department</i> Altering his optimistic view of a week earlier, Woermann sees prospects of trouble in the London committee, partly in view of reports of new Italian troop shipments to Spain.	573
Jan. 28 513	<i>Minute by the Head of Political Division IIIa</i> The Navy refused to endorse the British plan for control officers in Spanish ports but agreed not to oppose acceptance of it in the London committee.	574
Jan. 29 514	<i>The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in Great Britain</i> The British plan for control officers in Spanish ports may be accepted but on the basis that they are to inspect only ships flying flags of treaty powers.	575
Feb. 1 515	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the State Secretary</i> Stohrer wishes to know whether Germany will follow Italy and give Franco more aid following the Teruel reverse; if so, counterdemands with respect to the conduct of the war should be put, for Franco will continue to shrink from the risk of any major action.	575

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1938 Feb. 2 516	<i>The Director of the Political Department to the Ambassador in Spain</i> No decision has yet been made on military policy in Spain, pending a judgment on how Franco recovers from the Teruel defeat.	577
Feb. 2 517	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Following the sinking of a British patrol vessel, Eden informed Italy and France that England would "reserve the right" to sink any submerged submarine in her patrol zone.	578
Feb. 4 518	<i>The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in Great Britain</i> Italy will argue in the London committee that belligerent rights should be granted after 20 percent of the volunteers are withdrawn but will bargain up to 30 percent; the German line should conform.	579
Feb. 4 519	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> According to Grandi, Italian volunteers in Spain numbered 60,000 to 70,000 in March 1937 but had been reduced to 30,000.	580
Feb. 7 520	<i>Minute by the Head of Political Division IIIa</i> The Navy advises that German submarines will not be affected by Anglo-French measures since they have orders to operate only in the Atlantic.	581
Feb. 7 521	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> A letter of Mussolini to Franco demanding more energetic military action was not delivered in view of the Nationalist offensive near Teruel.	581
Feb. 8 522	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in Great Britain</i> A legal reservation is to be registered with the British Government against its intention to attack submerged submarines; unilateral measures in the open sea have no legal force.	582
Feb. 9 523	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Progress in the Non-Intervention Committee remains blocked over the question as to whether the investigating commissions should be empowered to fix dates for withdrawal of volunteers.	582
Feb. 10 524	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Identical instructions from Berlin and Rome are required to insure a common front on various proposals before the London committee as to the date for withdrawal and the number of volunteers to be withdrawn.	584
Feb. 10 525	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Eden has persuaded Grandi that a new proposal for withdrawal of a minimum fixed number of volunteers might be considered.	586
Feb. 10 526	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Although delay in the recognition of German mining rights in Spain continues, it has been possible to get written assurances of "economic collaboration" in accordance with the agreements of July 1937.	586



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1938 Feb. 11 527	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Attolico was not able to offer any clear account of Italian intentions in view of Franco's confused conduct of the war; he thought that, in the absence of an early victory, a new policy would be needed to remove Spain as a source of tension.	588
Feb. 14 528	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Franco has presented extensive requests to Italy for new war matériel, but the Italian Ambassador has no instructions on future Italian policy in Spain.	589
Feb. — 529	<i>Memorandum by the Ambassador in Spain</i> A review of agreements with Nationalist Spain reveals that Germany has received promises but few concrete advantages in return for aid given; a list of German demands should be negotiated but undue pressure would result in later repudiation.	590
Feb. 17 530	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> The German Naval Attaché in Rome was told that Italy had to go along with the Anglo-French measures against submarine piracy to avoid suspicion, but it was thought no serious damage would be done.	599
Feb. 17 531	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> There are reports of new efforts at a negotiated peace in Spain; England is said to be involved, with the hope of persuading Germany and Italy that their aims could be met by such a peace.	600
Feb. 17 532	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Minister for Commerce and Industry in the new Nationalist Government takes a cautious view on mining rights for Germany; he stresses the danger that charges of alienation of national property might be made.	601
Feb. 21 533	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Grandi intends to take advantage of Eden's resignation; he will see Chamberlain at once and begin by offering to accept one of the compromise proposals on volunteers.	603
Feb. 21 534	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Ribbentrop assured the Spanish Ambassador that Germany would continue her policy of support to Nationalist Spain; the Ambassador presented a note denying any differences between Italy and Spain on withdrawal of volunteers.	603
Feb. 24 535	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Woermann has supported Italian acceptance of the British compromise on withdrawal of volunteers; belligerent rights are to be conceded after withdrawal of 10,000 men.	604
Feb. 26 536	<i>Minute by the Director of the Political Department</i> In part to facilitate results from Stohrer's next talk with Franco, Weizsäcker did not entirely allay the fears of the Spanish Ambassador that the new agreement in London on withdrawal of volunteers might move too rapidly to execution.	606

**CHAPTER V. GERMAN ECONOMIC PRESSURE ON FRANCO: NOVEMBER 4, 1937-  
MARCH 10, 1938—Continued**

Date and Doc. No.	Subject	Page
1938 Feb. 28 537	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Magistrati notified that Italian troops in Spain were standing inactive until Franco replied to Mussolini's letter demanding more energetic military action.	607
Feb. 28 538	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division IIIa</i> The German and Italian troops in Spain could hardly be exposed to any process for sorting out volunteers; their prior withdrawal would be an admission that they were sent officially as units.	608
Feb. 28 539	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in Spain</i> Developments in the London committee and in Anglo-Italian relations make continuance of aid to Franco uncertain; this fact should be used to move Franco to action and to obtain concessions desired by Germany.	610
Mar. 2 540	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division IIIa</i> In a review of agreements signed with Nationalist Spain it is stated that the aim of future negotiations should be to give the principles of these agreements more concrete form.	612
Mar. 4 541	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Franco said that guerrilla resistance and the failure of the local commander at Teruel had delayed his operations; he thought his present strategic plans would end the war before the issue of volunteers became acute.	613
Mar. 4 542	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Franco stated that his forces had taken 14,500 prisoners at Teruel but had found very few foreigners among them.	615
Mar. 9 543	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Mussolini replied amiably to Franco's explanations of his military situation and said he hoped the Italians would still give good service before they had to be withdrawn.	615
Mar. 10 544	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division IIIa</i> The view of the Ambassador in Spain is endorsed that no pressure should be applied to conclude favorable agreements with Spain; ideological affinity should be relied on and negotiations for German aims undertaken as opportunity offers.	615

**CHAPTER VI. CONTINUED AID TO FRANCO AND NEGOTIATIONS FOR A TREATY:  
MARCH 16-DECEMBER 19, 1938**

1938 Mar. 16 545	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> The Spanish Ambassador expressed alarm over reports that the French Government was about to undertake active intervention on the side of Red Spain.	620
Mar. 17 546	<i>The Ambassador in France to the Foreign Ministry</i> France is reported to have decided on precautionary military dispositions on the Pyrenees frontier and in the western Mediterranean.	621
Mar. 17 547	<i>Memorandum for the Führer by the Foreign Minister</i> Magistrati said that Italy would answer French intervention with troops and equipment in Spain with similar measures on a large scale.	621

CHAPTER VI. CONTINUED AID TO FRANCO AND NEGOTIATIONS FOR A TREATY:  
MARCH 16—DECEMBER 19, 1938—Continued

Date and Doc. No.	Subject	Page
1938 Mar. 21 548	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Ciano, according to Magistrati, replied to British protests of the bombing of Barcelona that French intervention in Spain would bring Italian retaliation; Ribbentrop said that he did not believe France would embark on such an adventure.	622
Mar. 22 549	<i>The Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht to the Foreign Ministry</i> It is considered doubtful that it is within French military capabilities to undertake intervention in Spain with troops.	623
Mar. 23 550	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Stohrer warns that bombing attacks on civilian populations as at Barcelona will increase resistance; Spaniards on both sides would ultimately blame Germany and Italy.	624
Mar. 24 551	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> The German command, which had no planes over Barcelona, reports that Franco is indignant at the bombing, which was done on Mussolini's order by Italian planes from Majorca.	626
Mar. 25 552	<i>Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Political Department</i> The Italians were informed that, in view of the French reaction, Franco would be requested not to use German forces within 50 kilometers of the French-Spanish frontier.	627
Mar. 26 553	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Vatican has intervened with the Italian Embassy to use its influence against further air raids on open cities; the Italian Ambassador has told Rome that such raids were politically unwise.	627
Mar. 30 554	<i>The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in Spain</i> Franco is to be urged to continue his operations against Catalonia and not to halt them in favor of offensives elsewhere, not even against Madrid.	628
Mar. 31 555	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Italy has agreed to request Franco not to allow Italian troops to approach closer than 50 kilometers to the French frontier.	628
Mar. 31 556	<i>The Chargé d' Affaires in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Although partial agreement has been obtained on the latest plan for withdrawal of volunteers, there appear to be doubts that it could actually be made to work.	629
Apr. 5 557	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Canaris reports that Franco raised cautiously the question of the removal of the Condor Legion if military developments continue favorable; he appeared to desire a free hand and a minimum of military cooperation in peacetime.	630
Undated 558	<i>Memorandum for the Führer by the Foreign Minister</i> Ribbentrop considers the time has come to clarify future political relations with Franco; he submits a draft treaty designed to bind Franco to the Axis and to insure that France and England could obtain no military support from Spain.	631

CHAPTER VI. CONTINUED AID TO FRANCO AND NEGOTIATIONS FOR A TREATY:  
MARCH 16-DECEMBER 19, 1938—Continued

Date and Doc. No.	Subject	Page
1938 Apr. 6 559	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> The Führer thought the draft treaty would be of little value and would prefer a commercial treaty; he stated his desire to get troops and air forces out of Spain at an early date; they could not learn more there and were needed in Austria.	634
Apr. 6 560	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Spain</i> Franco is to be sounded out on a political treaty which would provide for close association of Spain with the Axis but would not compromise her relations with other powers.	635
Apr. 6 561	<i>The Director of Hisma to the Ambassador in Spain</i> The Ambassador is provided with arguments to use against too great restrictions on foreign capital in Spanish mining enterprises.	637
Apr. 7 562	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Franco agrees not to interrupt his present offensive and also not to use foreign volunteers in the vicinity of the French frontier.	638
Apr. 7 563	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in Great Britain</i> The prospects for an early Franco victory make it unnecessary to impose any further obstacles to the Non-Intervention Committee's plan for withdrawal of volunteers.	639
Apr. 8 564	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Weizsäcker asked Magistrati to obtain the Italian reaction to Franco's recent remark that he could soon dispense with foreign troops; Germany would like to withdraw her air forces to use in expanded training at home.	640
Apr. 8 565	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Former Ambassador Faupel advised close contact with the Falange as a basis for future policy in Spain; Weizsäcker does not share this view because of the Falange's anticlerical tendencies, which he thinks Franco will reject.	640
Apr. 8 566	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> From assurances offered by Franco on the new mining law, Stohrer got the impression there would be no percentage limitation on foreign participation.	641
Apr. 8 567	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Franco appears to have in mind retaining the equipment of the Condor Legion, especially planes, when the personnel is sent home; thus far, his views on postwar military cooperation are unsatisfactory.	641
Apr. 8 568	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in Spain</i> The draft of a political treaty with Spain is sent for the Ambassador's personal information; the Führer has not yet decided whether it should be taken up with Franco.	642
Apr. 11 569	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the State Secretary</i> Stohrer thinks that some of the articles in the draft treaty should be given more specific content and that provision should be made for promotion of cultural relations.	642

CHAPTER VI. CONTINUED AID TO FRANCO AND NEGOTIATIONS FOR A TREATY:  
MARCH 16-DECEMBER 19, 1938—Continued

Date and Doc. No.	Subject	Page
1938 Apr. 11 570	<i>The Deputy Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in Spain</i> The Italian Chargé d'Affaires reports that Italy has not yet received any indication from Franco that he desires withdrawal of Italian troops.	643
Apr. 12 571	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Instructions are requested as to whether the recall of German troops from Spain should be taken up in the Ambassador's next talk with Franco.	644
Apr. 14 572	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Weizsäcker told the Spanish Ambassador, who expressed anxiety over the possibility of French military intervention in Spain, that this was hardly possible without British approval, which was not likely to be given.	644
Apr. 22 573	<i>Memorandum by the Ambassador to Spain</i> A reliable source reports: Barcelona has been encouraged by heavy shipments of war matériel; the strategic menace of a Nationalist Spain motivates French attempts to delay a Franco victory; the American Ambassador is supporting the Reds.	644
Apr. 25 574	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> England seems reconciled to a Franco victory; hints are received that German influence should be exerted for a moderate peace, including autonomy for Catalonia.	646
Apr. 27 575	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Asked for his view as to when the Condor Legion might be recalled, Foreign Minister Jordana replied that he hoped the Germans could remain until final victory was assured.	647
Apr. 30 576	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> According to the Italian Ambassador, Franco, far from discussing the recall of Italian troops, has recently spoken of further uses to which they would be put.	647
Apr. 30 577	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department</i> Of the 338 million RM expended in military aid to Spain to the end of March, 100 million should be recovered in ore deliveries and another 100 million covered by investments for which Spain would make funds available.	648
Apr. 30 578	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Nationalist advance has been halted on all fronts, partly by weather, partly as a result of new military supplies obtained by the Reds.	651
Apr. 30 579	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> A letter from Franco to the Italian commander, General Berti, is transmitted; Franco objects to the Italian desire to withdraw troops from operations and not to have Italians used north of the Ebro.	651
May 4 580	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Spanish Foreign Minister stated that recent huge shipments of arms from France were the only thing that made further Red resistance possible.	653

CHAPTER VI. CONTINUED AID TO FRANCO AND NEGOTIATIONS FOR A TREATY:  
MARCH 16-DECEMBER 19, 1938—Continued

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1938 May 4 581	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Franco has altered his view and, in expectation of further tough resistance, would like to retain the Condor Legion for the present.	653
May 4 582	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> In an atmosphere of mutual confidence and friendship Franco indicated his entire agreement to negotiation of a political treaty with Germany; adherence to the Anti-Comintern Pact he did not consider practical in view of British pressure.	654
May 7 583	<i>The State Secretary to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Ambassador in Spain is to be authorized to commence negotiations for a treaty at once; he may inform his Italian colleague in general but without giving details of the treaty draft.	655
May 12 584	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Weizsäcker assured the Spanish Ambassador that the recall of German troops from Spain was not, in deference to Franco's change of mind, being considered for the present.	655
May 16 585	<i>The Ambassador in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> The movement in Congress for repeal of the embargo on arms for Spain has been checked by the President and the Secretary of State; the British attitude and internal political forces played a role.	656
May 19 586	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Factional disunity has reappeared in the wake of recent military checks; Franco still holds all parties in careful balance, though clerical influence has gained; pending outcome of the social struggle, Germany should not be identified with the Falange.	657
May 19 587	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Jordana stated that he and Franco approved the German draft treaty in substance but preferred a secret agreement; they also thought the moment inappropriate, as they were now counting on British pressure to stop French aid to Red Spain.	664
May 31 588	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Stohrer has requested opportunity to make a <i>démarche</i> with Franco concerning a proposed new mining law which is understood to limit foreign participation to 25 percent.	567
May 31 589	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Instructions are requested as to whether Franco can be informed that Germany would accept a secret protocol in place of the political treaty the Spaniards are reluctant to conclude.	667
May 31 590	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Spain</i> Germany's aim in seeking a treaty would not be attained if it were kept secret; it will be better not to press the Spaniards but to await a more opportune moment.	668
June 1 591	<i>Memorandum</i> The efforts of Hisma to obtain mining concessions for Germany are reviewed, and an <i>aide-mémoire</i> asks that Spain give full consideration to these rights in her new mining law.	668

CHAPTER VI. CONTINUED AID TO FRANCO AND NEGOTIATIONS FOR A TREATY:  
MARCH 16-DECEMBER 19, 1938—Continued

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1938 June 2 592	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Political Division I</i> Keitel has told the Führer that a decision is urgent on the Condor Legion; if it remains in Spain, it must have new equipment; Hitler replied that the Italians would have to be sounded out first as to their intentions.	670
June 4 593	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> On the basis of military advice that Franco has no prospect of completing military operations before winter, Weizsäcker advises that the German and Italian military effort be maintained at present levels with adequate replacements.	671
June 4 594	<i>The British Ambassador to the State Secretary</i> England requests that Germany exercise influence on Franco to halt the indiscriminate bombing of towns and villages.	674
June 5 595	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Exceptions for German interests are included in the new mining law, according to the Spanish Foreign Minister; it will be shown to the Germans before publication but not before it is signed.	674
June 6 596	<i>Memorandum by the Ambassador in Spain</i> Stohrer in a heated interview with Jordana protested sharply against Franco's refusal to receive him while the new mining law was under consideration and also the failure to reveal its text to Germany before the signing.	675
June 8 597	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> According to Attolico, Mussolini has no present intention of recalling Italian troops from Spain; therefore, the German effort cannot be liquidated either, though it might be tacitly reduced.	681
June 9 598	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> The Spanish Ambassador cited Red crimes as sufficient reply to British efforts to halt Nationalist bombings but hinted that it was the Axis air forces and not Franco who were responsible for the bombings.	682
June 9 599	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ciano stated that he had rebuffed the British suggestion that Italy influence Franco to halt aerial bombings; he confided that Italian pilots and technicians were again being sent to Spain in "little groups of two to three hundred."	683
June 9 600	<i>The Ambassador in Great Britain to the State Secretary (Excerpt)</i> Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax pointed out very cautiously and discreetly that the possible participation of German volunteers in the bombings in Spain had a bad effect on British public opinion.	684
June 10 601	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Ribbentrop told the British Ambassador that Germany could not give advice to Franco on aerial bombings, which were an inevitable hazard of war and not to be compared with the half million murders for which the Reds were responsible.	684
June 10 602	<i>The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Grandi favors acceptance of a new British plan for sorting out volunteers in Spain; the Russians would likely block it anyway and could be blamed; he is also concerned that Chamberlain should have a show of success to forestall the return of Eden.	685

CHAPTER VI. CONTINUED AID TO FRANCO AND NEGOTIATIONS FOR A TREATY:  
MARCH 16-DECEMBER 19, 1938—Continued

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1938 June 10 603	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Despite the uncooperative attitude of the Spaniards in keeping the new mining law secret, the law itself appears loose enough, so that, if it is rightly applied, German interests can be secured.	687
June 11 604	<i>Minute by the Head of Political Division IIIa</i> The commander of the Condor Legion told the State Secretary that either new equipment should be supplied or the unit should be withdrawn; the latter decision would have serious military consequences.	689
June 11 605	<i>The State Secretary to the British Ambassador</i> While supporting every effort to humanize the war in Spain, Germany rejects a one-sided approach to Franco as this would be interference in his conduct of the war, the more so in view of the inhumanities practiced by the Reds.	690
June 11 606	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> On the basis of military advice and in deference to Italian views, the Foreign Minister will recommend to the Führer that the Condor Legion remain in Spain and be reequipped; the War Ministry concurs.	691
June 13 607	<i>Memorandum by the Under State Secretary</i> Magistrati explained that acceptance of the British plan for withdrawing volunteers did not mean Italy was prepared to leave Spain, but in view of the Anglo-Italian agreement of April 16 disagreement with England on Spain had to be avoided.	691
June 13 608	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department</i> An industry representative requested intervention with the Spanish Government against its change in the peseta-pound rate, which had led British-owned pyrites mines in Spain to raise prices to German buyers.	692
June 16 609	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division IIIa</i> The Supreme Command was assured that the tighter naval patrol envisaged in the new British plan accepted by Germany would not endanger supplies for the Condor Legion, since Russian opposition or Franco's delays would prevent the plan's coming into operation.	694
June 16 610	<i>The Under State Secretary to the Embassy in Spain</i> The decision to provide replacements for the Condor Legion has been made; Franco should be told that this involves considerable sacrifice by Germany.	695
June 17 611	<i>The Under State Secretary to the Embassy in Great Britain</i> Germany will accept the British plan but will not make up payments refused by Russia; this presupposes withdrawal of German and Italian volunteers before the plan could be implemented.	695
June 18 612	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Stohrer wishes to know whether replacements for the Condor Legion are sent at Franco's request or on German initiative, as this will determine whether he can ask compensation.	696



CHAPTER VI. CONTINUED AID TO FRANCO AND NEGOTIATIONS FOR A TREATY:  
MARCH 16-DECEMBER 19, 1938—Continued

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1938 June 20 613	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in Spain</i> It is not intended to ask direct compensation for reinforcement of the Condor Legion, but Franco might be reminded of Germany's standing wishes when he is informed of the decision.	696
June 20 614	<i>Minute by the Head of Political Division IIIa</i> Through military channels Franco has requested closer cooperation in military training; the success of German training in Spain is tending to displace the Italian influence.	697
June 20 615	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Soviet press comment and reported remarks by Litvinov suggest that Russia is prepared to liquidate the Spanish adventure on the basis of a compromise peace which would get all foreigners out of Spain.	698
June 23 616	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> In a discussion of possible advice to Franco on the British withdrawal plan, Attolico said that Italy wished to get her troops out of Spain but did not wish to leave Franco in the lurch; he displayed less than his usual concern for Franco and less hostility toward England, however.	699
June 28 617	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Weizsäcker told the Spanish Ambassador that it would be more appropriate if Franco rather than Germany would deny that German planes bombed British ships at Valencia on orders from Berlin.	700
June 28 618	<i>Memorandum from the Spanish Embassy</i> To ease Chamberlain's concern and calm British opinion, which believes German planes attack British ships on orders from Berlin, Spain is prepared to designate a neutral harbor.	702
June 29 619	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Attolico denied that Mussolini had sent a telegram to Prime Minister Chamberlain concerning bombing of British ships but admitted the Italians had discussed the matter in London, a fact which Weizsäcker notes is embarrassing for Germany.	702
June 29 620	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Weizsäcker warned the Spanish Ambassador that the rumors allowed to circulate in Spain that German fliers were carrying out willful destruction would have to be silenced.	703
June 29 621	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Political Division I</i> The military authorities state that the bombings of Red Spanish harbors were carried out under general orders of Franco and that it was not possible to distinguish the nationality of ships attacked.	704
June 30 622	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Ribbentrop told Attolico that it was unfortunate that the impression had been allowed to arise, in part assisted by the Italian press, that German fliers were mainly responsible for the bombings in Spain.	705
June 30 623	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in Spain</i> Franco is to be told that Germany expects that the Spanish authorities will see to it that the odium for the bombings is not shifted to the German fliers.	706

CHAPTER VI. CONTINUED AID TO FRANCO AND NEGOTIATIONS FOR A TREATY:  
MARCH 16-DECEMBER 19, 1938—Continued

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1938 June 30 624	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Spaniards have asked to man several squadrons of the Condor Legion with Spanish crews; the German air commander advised Berlin that, if this is accepted, they should remain under German command.	708
July 1 625	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Weizsäcker told Attolico that if, as a result of Italian support for the British withdrawal plan, it actually came into operation, the German volunteers would be removed from Spain at once.	708
July 1 626	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Spanish Reds are relying on international events to permit reaching a compromise peace; the discontent of the Falange with Franco's regime offers some basis for this possibility.	709
July 2 627	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in Spain</i> The Spanish proposal to man several squadrons of the Condor Legion with Spanish fliers is to be accepted but on the condition that they remain under German command.	712
July 5 628	<i>Minute by the Head of Political Division IIIa</i> A German officer who has served at Franco's headquarters expressed high regard for his energy and political skill; he thought the influence of the Church was on the increase.	712
July 5 629	<i>The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> According to Grandi, Italy, with a view to strengthening Chamberlain's position, has advised Franco to stop bombing British ships in Spanish harbors.	713
July 5 630	<i>Memorandum by the Ambassador in the Soviet Union</i> Having involved itself in Spain reluctantly and mainly at the urging of foreign Communist parties, the Politburo appears now to have decided to prepare opinion for a Red defeat.	713
July 6 631	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in Italy</i> Germany does not intend to advise Franco against accepting the British withdrawal plan but, if he accepts it, will inform him that German volunteers must be removed before the sorting out of volunteers begins.	715
July 6 632	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> On informing Franco of the new replacements for the Condor Legion, Stohrer took occasion to remind him that Germany hoped for a liberal interpretation of the new mining law on behalf of German interests.	716
July 7 633	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ciano promised to consult Germany on the question of advising Franco as to his attitude toward the British withdrawal plan; with new military operations impending, he preferred not to hurry the matter.	718
July 9 634	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department</i> The director of Hisma believes that majority control in Spanish mining enterprises can be insured despite the 40 per cent limit on foreign participation.	719

CHAPTER VI. CONTINUED AID TO FRANCO AND NEGOTIATIONS FOR A TREATY:  
MARCH 16-DECEMBER 19, 1938—Continued

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1938 July 13 635	<i>Memorandum by the Under State Secretary</i> To the Spanish Ambassador's request for advice on a reply to the Non-Intervention Committee, Woermann answered that Germany wished first to hear Franco's views.	720
July 13 636	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Jordana asked for advice on Spain's reply to the British withdrawal plan, which he thought might be awkward for the Nationalists; he would like to gain time but not to seem to sabotage the plan.	720
July 14 637	<i>The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Chamberlain's position and the continuance of his "realistic" policy depend on the success of the withdrawal plan for volunteers in Spain; Franco should be careful not to acquire blame for its failure as this would strengthen the anti-Axis party in England.	722
July 15 638	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Jordana said that, in order to strengthen Chamberlain, the British plan must be accepted in principle but skillful reservations must be found because they cannot dispense with the Condor Legion for the present.	725
July 16 639	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> To Franco's urgent request for advice on the London withdrawal plan, Italy suggests he be told to accept in principle and then raise questions and objections later.	726
July 19 640	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Italy has suggested to Franco certain objections which he might raise to the London plan and has advised him not to hurry his answer.	727
July 21 641	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in Spain</i> Germany endorses the Italian advice to Franco; after acceptance in principle he should formulate his reservations so that British opinion would not blame him and the Axis for failure of the plan.	728
Aug. 2 642	<i>The Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy in Spain</i> Negotiations are to be opened to get funds which are owed on account of war matériel deliveries made available for German investment in Spain.	729
Aug. 4 643	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> The sum of 15 million RM has been requested to be made available by the Spanish Government in pesetas for investment in mining companies.	729
Aug. 11 644	<i>The Under State Secretary to the Embassy in Spain</i> While not wishing to raise any objections to the draft note containing the proposed Nationalist reply to the London committee, Germany feels it could have been more accommodating.	730
Aug. 11 645	<i>The Under State Secretary to the Embassy in Great Britain</i> Difficulties are to be expected in the London committee when Franco's reply to the British plan is received; the draft is decidedly negative and demands immediate granting of belligerent rights.	730

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1938 Aug. 11 646	<i>The Under State Secretary to the Embassy in Italy</i> Agreement has been reached with the Italian Embassy in Berlin that no objections are to be raised to the Nationalist draft note.	731
Aug. 11 647	<i>Memorandum by the Ambassador in Spain</i> Majority German control is desired in four of five mining companies which have been set up by Hisma; if Spain refuses to make exceptions to the 40-percent foreign ownership rule, dummy shareholders will be employed.	731
Aug. 11 648	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Total Italian volunteers who would be affected by the withdrawal plan numbered 40,075 on July 1, 1938, and 8,000 others have arrived since that date.	733
Aug. 12 649	<i>Memorandum by the Under State Secretary</i> Certain concessions were made to Italian views in considering the advice which ought to be given Franco on his draft reply to the London committee.	733
Aug. 12 650	<i>The Under State Secretary to the Embassy in Spain</i> It should be made clear to the Spaniards that Germany assumes that the statement in the reply to the London committee—that no lien on Spanish territory or economy will be permitted—is not meant to prejudice German-Spanish economic negotiations.	734
Aug. 14 651	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Spain may halt non-military imports from Germany unless an additional credit of 25 million RM is given to cover urgently needed plane motors and artillery ammunition.	735
Aug. 20 652	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Foreign Minister gave assurances that the statement about no liens on Spanish territory or economy in the reply to London was only intended to counter Red propaganda and would not prejudice close economic cooperation between Spain and Germany.	735
Aug. 22 653	<i>Memorandum by the Under State Secretary</i> Woermann promised the Spanish Ambassador that Germany would give press and diplomatic support as far as possible in the difficulties raised by the reception of the Spanish note in London.	736
Aug. 22 654	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Mussolini has demanded from Franco efforts to bring the war to an early end; Italy would send several new divisions if she were permitted a strong influence on the command.	736
Aug. 27 655	<i>The Director of Hisma to the Ambassador in Spain</i> Bernhardt has delivered a strong warning to the Spaniards that failure to act promptly and favorably on German mining interests was raising grave doubts in Germany as to Spain's real desire for cooperation and friendship.	737
Sept. 8 656	<i>The Chargé d' Affaires in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Franco is reported to be very much concerned about the crisis over Czechoslovakia and has begun work on fortifications at the Moroccan and Pyrenees borders.	739

CHAPTER VI. CONTINUED AID TO FRANCO AND NEGOTIATIONS FOR A TREATY:  
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Date and Doc. No.	Subject	Page
1938 Sept. 12 657	<i>The Chargé d' Affaires in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Spanish Nationalists fear that a European war will cut them off from German and Italian aid, while Red Spain would obtain extensive military support from France, England, and Russia.	740
Sept. 16 658	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Jordana expressed grave misgivings over the effect of warlike developments in central Europe on the Spanish National cause; France would invade Catalonia at once in the event of war.	741
Sept. 19 659	<i>Memorandum by the Under State Secretary</i> Woermann told the Spanish Ambassador that Spanish expressions of concern over the war danger sounded as if Germany was held responsible for wanting to precipitate a war.	741
Sept. 19 660	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Military reverses and internal dissension have made pessimism predominant in Nationalist Spain; if the military stalemate continues, there may be a revival of efforts for a compromise peace.	742
Sept. 21 661	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Franco is understood to have expressed fears to his ministers that a peaceful solution of the Sudeten problem might be at the expense of Spain, taking the form of intervention by the powers.	746
Sept. 22 662	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Italy intends to send home a division of troops after the present Ebro operations; the men are disqualified for further combat, and it would be a good-will gesture to the Non-Intervention Committee.	746
Sept. 23 663	<i>Memorandum by the Ambassador in Spain</i> Stohrer told Bernhardt that Spain had already been asked to provide 15 million RM in pesetas for German investment; the latter requested that no demands for exceptions to the 40-percent rule on foreign ownership be put for the present.	746
Sept. 25 664	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Franco complained of the absence of contact with Berlin during the Czech crisis; as a friendly power, he should have been informed on political and military intentions in case of war.	747
Sept. 26 665	<i>The Director of Hisma to the Ambassador in Spain</i> Franco expressed concern over the decline in German arms deliveries and over the likelihood of French intervention in Spain in case of a general war.	748
	<i>Editors' Note</i> Documents contained in volume II concerning diplomatic contacts with Spain during the last days of the crisis over Czechoslovakia.	
Sept. 28 666	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Jordana conveyed that Spain would reply to an Anglo-French query on her policy in case of war with a promise of neutrality; he thought this was also in Germany's interest and would be relieved to know that Germany approved.	749

CHAPTER VI. CONTINUED AID TO FRANCO AND NEGOTIATIONS FOR A TREATY:  
MARCH 16—DECEMBER 19, 1938—Continued.

Date and Doc. No.	Subject	Page
1938 Sept. 28 667	<i>The Head of Political Division IIIa to the Embassy in Great Britain</i> In accordance with a request of the Nationalists, Germany would oppose in the London committee the suggestion that the League of Nations assist in the removal of volunteers.	750
Sept. 28 668	<i>The Consul at Tetuán to the Foreign Ministry</i> Countermeasures, including arming of the Riffs, have been taken in Spanish Morocco against alleged French troop concentrations.	751
Sept. 28 669	<i>The Under State Secretary to the Embassy in Spain</i> Woermann told the Spanish Ambassador that Germany would understand Spain's remaining neutral in a European war but expected her not to negotiate on this with England and France and also expected a neutrality benevolent to Germany.	752
Sept. 30 670	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Jordana said that France and England, not Spain, had taken the initiative in the discussion of Spanish neutrality.	753
Sept. 30 671	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Stohrer suggests that following settlement of the Czech crisis consideration be given to rapid and extensive arms deliveries to Franco.	753
Oct. 2 672	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the State Secretary</i> Franco cannot gain a military victory without a large new Axis military effort; the alternative, a peace by mediation of the powers, which many on both sides in Spain desire, would not necessarily be harmful to German interests.	753
Oct. 3 673	<i>Memorandum by the Under State Secretary</i> Woermann told the Spanish Ambassador that Germany would not discuss Spain with other powers without consulting Franco and had not done so at Munich; he added that Spain's hasty declaration of neutrality had left a "nasty taste" in Berlin and Rome.	757
Oct. 5 674	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division IIIa</i> A compromise peace would result in a weak Spain which would not be in Germany's strategic interest vis-à-vis France and England, but further aid to Franco sufficient to end the war must be on the basis of agreed military plans and a clear commitment on concessions desired by Germany.	758
Oct. 6 675	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Jordana urged that the end of the Czech crisis offered an opportunity to end the Civil War by military means if Germany and Italy would provide additional aid.	760
Oct. 7 676	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division IIIa</i> Further aid to Franco to achieve a quick victory, to be followed by a rebuilding of Spanish power in association with the Axis, would seriously alter the balance of power to the disadvantage of France and England.	761
Oct. 10 677	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> The violent rejection by Spanish Nationalist leaders of the idea of mediation, which gained currency following the recall of some Italian volunteers, need not be taken too seriously.	764

CHAPTER VI. CONTINUED AID TO FRANCO AND NEGOTIATIONS FOR A TREATY:  
MARCH 16-DECEMBER 19, 1938—Continued

Date and Doc. No.	Subject	Page
1938 Oct. 12 678	<i>The Foreign Ministry to the Embassies in Spain, Italy, Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and the United States, the Legation in Portugal, and the Consulate at Geneva</i> Italy has explained that the withdrawal of 10,000 men from Spain was not a concession to England but was by agreement with Franco, whose victory Italy still desired.	765
Oct. 14 679	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Franco might consider, in the light of rumors of mediation by the powers, demands for compensation for new arms aid as a pretext to abandon him; an informal reminder on Spain's uncooperative response to former demands might be in order, however.	767
Oct. 15 680	<i>The Under State Secretary to the Embassy in Spain</i> No <i>démarche</i> should be made to Franco on concessions to Germany until a decision has been made on the extent of further arms aid.	768
Oct. 15 681	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Weizsäcker told Canaris, who said the Wehrmacht favored meeting Franco's additional arms requests, that the present line agreed with Italy called only for maintaining existing units at full strength.	768
Oct. 18 682	<i>The Economics Minister to the Foreign Ministry</i> In the view of the Economics Ministry any further military aid to Franco should be given only on the condition that German majority control in mining companies under the Montana development project be guaranteed.	769
Oct. 19 683	<i>Memorandum by the Ambassador in Spain</i> Jordana said that payments to the Montana mining project of sums owed to Germany had been approved by the Cabinet; the decree only awaited formal signature.	771
Oct. 19 684	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Military victory by Franco remains impossible without more outside aid; a mediated peace might be accepted by the Nationalists but not if it restored a parliamentary regime or the monarchy.	771
Oct. 20 685	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division IIIa</i> The Military Attaché in Spain, reporting details of Franco's arms requests, which he said were in part approved by the War Ministry, was told that the decision on further aid remained open pending discussion with Italy.	775
Oct. 22 686	<i>Memorandum by the Under State Secretary</i> A favorable decision on additional military aid to Franco is indicated since failure to give it would mean that he would be obliged eventually to seek a compromise peace.	777
Oct. 27 687	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Canaris doubts Franco's claim that the additional arms requested by him would bring a military decision; they might bring a tactical victory under the impact of which the powers could mediate a peace favorable to the Nationalists.	779

CHAPTER VI. CONTINUED AID TO FRANCO AND NEGOTIATIONS FOR A TREATY:  
MARCH 16-DECEMBER 19, 1938—Continued

Date and Doc. No.	Subject	Page
1938 Nov. 2 688	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> The Spanish Ambassador stated that his Government had no disposition to cooperate further with the Non-Intervention Committee on withdrawal of volunteers.	780
Nov. 2 689	<i>The Director of Hisma to the Ambassador in Spain</i> Representations should be made against the extension to Morocco of the law limiting foreign ownership in mines, since a wholly German-owned company was being set up there.	781
Nov. 3 690	<i>Memorandum by the Ambassador in Spain</i> Stohrer told Jordana that favorable action on the latest arms requests would be facilitated if he could report in Berlin that Spain was taking a more cooperative attitude on economic concessions to Germany.	782
Nov. 7 691	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in Spain</i> Franco is to be told that acknowledgment of the debt for previous deliveries and exceptions to the mining law to permit majority control by German capital in some mines are absolute conditions to full compliance with his latest arms requests.	784
Nov. 11 692	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Franco and Jordana made a favorable impression with their promises to meet the German conditions attached to further arms aid, but only limited deliveries should be made until more concrete results are obtained.	787
Nov. 12 693	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> The memoranda presented to the Spanish Nationalist Government setting out German demands for exceptions to the mining law are transmitted.	788
Nov. 12 694	<i>The Consul at Geneva to the Foreign Ministry</i> The contacts of League of Nations officials with Franco's representatives on the subject of refugee relief in Red Spain suggest that British and French plans to get Spain into the League after a Franco victory may succeed.	792
Nov. 13 695	<i>Memorandum by the Under State Secretary</i> General von Richthofen, the Condor Legion commander, has advised Göring that to win the war in Spain the Legion needed to be tripled, that this could be done, and that it would be useful to German rearmament.	793
Nov. 14 696	<i>The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Secretary General of the Non-Intervention Committee after a visit to Nationalist Spain believes that a new plan for withdrawal of volunteers will be needed.	794
Nov. 18 697	<i>Minute by the Head of Political Division IIIa</i> The Führer has decided against General von Richthofen's proposal to send more units to Spain.	795
Nov. 19 698	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Jordana stated that the Spanish Government had decided to accept German demands for majority control in Hisma mining enterprises; he also promised orientation of Spanish policy toward Germany politically and economically after the war.	795



CHAPTER VI. CONTINUED AID TO FRANCO AND NEGOTIATIONS FOR A TREATY:  
MARCH 16-DECEMBER 19, 1938—Continued

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1938 Nov. 19 699	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Recent local gains by the Whites have not broken the military stalemate; if Franco cannot force a decision with the new arms being sent him, Germany must be ready to adjust her policy quickly to a compromise peace, bases for which exist on both sides.	796
Nov. 21 700	<i>Memorandum by the Under State Secretary</i> The Spanish Ambassador presented a note conveying the Spanish decision to authorize German majority control in certain mines as exceptions to Spanish law; Woermann told him that new arms deliveries would now get under way very soon.	802
Dec. 3 701	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division IIIa</i> The Non-Intervention Committee, following the frustration of the withdrawal plan which would have interfered with continued military aid, must be kept alive as a platform for diplomatic aid to Franco and as a means of tying down French and British policy.	803
Dec. 18 702	<i>Memorandum by the Ambassador in Spain</i> Very satisfactory concessions have been won from Spain by negotiation in the last year; among other aims still to be pursued, a long-term guaranty of ore imports from Spain and participation in economic reconstruction seem most important.	804
Dec. 19 703	<i>The Spanish Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in Spain</i> In a <i>note verbale</i> the Ministry gives formal acknowledgment of approval for German capital participation up to 75 percent in certain mining enterprises.	808
Dec. 19 704	<i>Memorandum by the Ambassador in Spain</i> Berlin's dissatisfaction with Franco in the Czech crisis should be cleared up or it will cloud future relations; he did inform Germany belatedly of his neutrality commitment to France and England, but the allegation that he promised to intern the Condor Legion is not proved.	809

CHAPTER VII. THE CATALONIAN CAMPAIGN AND THE END OF THE WAR:  
DECEMBER 23, 1938-MARCH 31, 1939

1938 Dec. 23 705	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> The Spanish Ambassador stated that Franco would write to the Führer to dispel misunderstanding over the Czech crisis, that the story that Spain promised to intern Axis volunteers was false, and that Spain was ready to discuss a political treaty.	811
Dec. 29 706	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division IIIa</i> Axis successes of the last year have taught the Spaniards that the best hope for a strong Spain lies in close association with the Axis; the April draft of a political treaty should be taken up again without substantial change.	811
Dec. 29 707	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division IIIa</i> The initiative taken by the Spaniards themselves for a political treaty improves the prospect for attainment of certain objectives recently outlined by Ambassador Stohrer.	813

CHAPTER VII. THE CATALONIAN CAMPAIGN AND THE END OF THE WAR:  
DECEMBER 23, 1938—MARCH 31, 1939—Continued

Date and Doc. No.	Subject	Page
1939 Jan. 4 708	<i>Memorandum by the Under State Secretary</i> The Ambassador to Spain was instructed at a conference with the State Secretary to resume negotiation of a treaty of friendship with Spain on the basis of the earlier draft; Italy would be informed only when agreement in principle was attained.	814
Jan. 6 709	<i>Minute by the Head of Political Division IIIa</i> The Foreign Ministry rejected a suggestion of the Condor Legion's commander to return 1,000 men to Germany on the ground that this should be done at a moment when it could be politically exploited; the Führer supported this view.	815
Jan. 10 710	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Postwar economic aims of Germany in Spain are a debt settlement, guaranteed ore deliveries, and a major part in reconstruction; it is suggested that Spanish officials be invited to Berlin to facilitate negotiations.	816
Jan. 14 711	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Franco's preoccupation at the front delayed until yesterday completion of his message to the Führer.	817
Jan. 14 712	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Mussolini reported meager results from Chamberlain's visit; the Duce had taken a strong line on Spain, warning that French aid to the Reds would be met with drastic measures by Italy.	817
Jan. 20 713	<i>Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Cultural Policy Department</i> Completion of negotiations for a cultural agreement, which have had a relatively smooth course, is near at San Sebastián; with the increase of clerical influence it would have been more difficult later.	818
Jan. 23 714	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division IIIa</i> Franco has given the commander of the Condor Legion a convincing account of his neutrality policy during the Czech crisis and of his intentions for the future; he considers Germany a better partner for Spain than England, France, or Italy.	818
Jan. 23 715	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> The unsatisfactory sentiment of the broad masses in Spain toward Germany might be improved if food shipments were made and followed by skillful propaganda exploitation.	820
Jan. 24 716.	<i>Agreement Between the German Reich and Spain for Intellectual and Cultural Cooperation, Signed at Burgos January 24, 1939</i> The principle of reciprocity is emphasized in outlining an extensive program of cultural exchange activities.	821
Jan. 25 717	<i>The Foreign Ministry to the Embassies in Italy, Spain, Japan, and the Soviet Union, and the Legation in Hungary</i> Japan has urged that Spain be pressed for early adherence to the Anti-Comintern Pact, since British influence would work against it after the end of the Civil War; Italy has advised postponement of the issue.	826

CHAPTER VII. THE CATALONIAN CAMPAIGN AND THE END OF THE WAR:  
DECEMBER 23, 1938—MARCH 31, 1939—Continued

Date and Doc. No.	Subject	Page
1939 Jan. 25 718	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> The only difficulty which seems likely to develop in the negotiations for a treaty of friendship is the Spanish desire not to make the treaty public except by agreement at a later date.	827
Jan. 28 719	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Weizsäcker replied to Attolico's query that no agreement had been reached on publication of the treaty with Spain, but Germany favored publication.	827
Jan. 28 720	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the State Secretary</i> Spain will probably agree to eventual, though not immediate, publication of the treaty; negotiations should be completed quickly as cabinet changes and a less favorable Foreign Minister may follow the successful Catalonian campaign.	828
Jan. 31 721	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Italian Ambassador has instructions to approach Spain on her accession to the Anti-Comintern Pact, provided the German Embassy is similarly instructed.	829
Feb. 1 722	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> To the Japanese Minister, who inquired whether adherence to the Anti-Comintern Pact had been discussed with Spain, Stohrer acknowledged only informal explorations which revealed that Spain wished to delay.	829
Feb. 1 723	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in Spain</i> Authorization is given to join the Italian Ambassador in extending an official invitation to Spain to join the Anti-Comintern Pact.	830
Feb. 1 724	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in Spain</i> Hungary is not to be associated with Germany, Italy, and Japan in extending an invitation to join the Anti-Comintern Pact.	830
Feb. 2 725	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Foreign Minister agreed to omit mention of the protocols of July 1937 in the treaty of friendship, as Italy was not informed of them.	830
Feb. 5 726	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Jordana, speaking for Franco, provisionally declined the invitation to join the Anti-Comintern Pact; he feared provoking England and France to last-minute aid for the Reds which would prevent final victory.	831
Feb. 6 727	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Political Division IIIa</i> Arrangements were made at a conference of interested ministries for relief shipments to Barcelona.	832
Feb. 9 728	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> The Spanish Ambassador stated that it was his Government's view that Spain should await the end of the Civil War before joining the Anti-Comintern Pact.	834
Feb. 9 729	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Ciano conveyed through Attolico in a somewhat "laconic" manner his hopes for the success of the German-Spanish negotiations for a treaty of friendship.	834

CHAPTER VII. THE CATALONIAN CAMPAIGN AND THE END OF THE WAR:  
DECEMBER 23, 1938—MARCH 31, 1939—Continued

Date and Doc. No.	Subject	Page
1939 Feb. 9 730	<i>The Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in Spain</i> Information is requested on Anglo-French mediation activities in connection with the surrender of Minorca to the Nationalists.	835
Feb. 10 731	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> The British did assist in arranging the Minorca surrender but have made no general mediation proposal to the Spanish.	835
Feb. 12 732	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Foreign Minister stressed the value of obtaining <i>de jure</i> recognition from France and England to effect the final capitulation but denied that Spain "was approaching its former foes with open arms."	836
Feb. 13 733	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Foreign Minister stated that he had strenuous objections to adherence to the Anti-Comintern Pact so long as the difficult negotiations with England and France for <i>de jure</i> recognition were in progress.	838
Feb. 15 734	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in Spain</i> There is agreement with Italy on the importance of pressing Spain's adherence to the Anti-Comintern Pact; this aim should suffer no disadvantage through the parallel discussion of the treaty of friendship.	838
Feb. 16 735	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> The Spanish Ambassador presented memoranda on the recent conversations of Jordana with French Senator Bérard.	839
Feb. 16 736	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Weizsäcker assured the Spanish Ambassador that he had not made himself <i>persona non grata</i> by failure to follow protocol in the delivery of Franco's letter to the Führer.	839
Feb. 16 737	<i>The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Out of consideration for American opinion England will let France take the lead in recognizing Franco; the French are seeking a commitment from Franco to send volunteers home at once and to issue an amnesty.	840
Feb. 17 738	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the State Secretary</i> Franco has delayed receiving the German and Italian Ambassadors in the matter of the Anti-Comintern Pact because he wishes neither to decline nor to accept the invitation at present.	841
Feb. 18 739	<i>The Foreign Ministry to the Embassies in Italy, France, and Spain and at the Holy See</i> According to the Spanish Ambassador, the Vatican has protested to Spain concerning the German-Spanish cultural agreement.	843
Feb. 19 740	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> With military victory near, the political picture among the Nationalist factions remains confused; the Falange has lost ground and the monarchists have gained, but Franco and Minister of Interior Serrano Suñer may wish to prolong their personal power.	843

CHAPTER VII. THE CATALONIAN CAMPAIGN AND THE END OF THE WAR:  
DECEMBER 23, 1938—MARCH 31, 1939—Continued

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1939 Feb. 20 741	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Spain has decided to join the Anti-Comintern Pact but asks that the signing be kept secret until the end of the war; Franco has also approved the text of the German-Spanish treaty of friendship.	852
Feb. 22 742	<i>The State Secretary to the Ambassador in Italy</i> The Italians have been particularly insistent on including Spain in the Anti-Comintern Pact, from what motives is not entirely clear—certainly not from envy of the German-Spanish treaty.	852
Feb. 23 743	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in Spain</i> Spain's offer to sign the Anti-Comintern Pact is to be taken up at once; Franco is to be told that secrecy need not be maintained beyond his next major victory, which would mark the virtual end of the war; France and England would be more, not less, inclined to recognize him.	853
Feb. 24 744	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> An informant in the Palazzo Chigi reports that the Italian satisfaction with events in Spain is great; it is felt that to preserve Spain's close association with the Axis and the strategic advantages of that connection for Italy Franco must remain as Chief of State.	854
Feb. 26 745	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Jordana stated that in negotiations with France for <i>de jure</i> recognition Spain had won all her demands and accepted no conditions.	855
Feb. 26 746	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the State Secretary</i> Stohrer infers from a conversation with Franco that it was Jordana who opposed adherence to the Anti-Comintern Pact, that Franco himself may not even oppose early publication.	856
Mar. 1 747	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in Spain</i> The commander of the Condor Legion has been asked to anticipate a suitable date for withdrawal from Spain; agreement with Franco and the Italians would need to be obtained.	857
Mar. 1 748	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Franco has refused to consider early announcement of Spain's adherence to the Anti-Comintern Pact on the ground that more fighting remains and France and England, if alarmed by this new policy, would still be in a position to harm his cause.	857
Mar. 1 749	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Jordana admitted that Franco had sent a personal communication to Chamberlain but denied that its contents had been of any political importance.	858
Mar. 2 750	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Weizsäcker told Attolico that the German-Spanish treaty of friendship would not be signed before Spain's adherence to the Anti-Comintern Pact; Attolico stated unequivocally that Italy was not negotiating a similar treaty.	859

CHAPTER VII. THE CATALONIAN CAMPAIGN AND THE END OF THE WAR:  
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1939 Mar. 2 751	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in Spain</i> Instructions are given as to the formalities of Spain's adherence to the Anti-Comintern Pact; the question of her participation in the commissions visualized under the original pact is to be avoided.	860
Mar. 4 752	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Ciano notified that Japan's demand for immediate announcement of Spain's adherence to the Anti-Comintern Pact was strengthening the opponents of the pact in Spain; it was agreed to ask Japan to let Franco determine the date of publication after his victory.	861
Mar. 11 753	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division IIIa</i> The approaching end of the Civil War in Spain and reports of a French commercial delegation in Burgos suggest that preparations should be made to negotiate a commercial treaty with Spain before other states do so.	862
Mar. 11 754	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Before economic negotiations with Spain are begun, decisions should be made on debt reduction and on the future of the Hisma organization; on the latter point, the views of other businessmen should be obtained in addition to those of Bernhardt.	863
Mar. 13 755	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> In an exchange of views with Mussolini Franco stated that, until her recovery was complete, Spain would have to be neutral in a European war, that Germany and Italy should agree as to how they would share in building up Spain militarily, and that there was no question of restoring the monarchy for a number of years.	865
Mar. 15 756	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Spain desires economic negotiations at once so that Germany's role in reconstruction and in future Spanish trade may be clarified before negotiations are taken up with other countries.	866
Mar. 15 757	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> In outlining the economic questions which should be negotiated between Spain and Germany, the Minister of Commerce made it clear that Spain's reconstruction needs would be so great that other countries beside Germany and Italy would be asked to participate also.	867
Mar. 17 758	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division IIIa</i> Spain has rejected the Japanese-proposed text of the protocol for Spain's adherence to the Anti-Comintern Pact on the ground that it puts Spain on the same plane as Manchukuo and Hungary; Berlin has asked Tokyo to modify the text.	870
Mar. 18 759	<i>The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy in Spain</i> The Economics Ministry is reluctant to enter into negotiations which might alter the present satisfactory arrangements for trade with Spain and urges that a pretext be found for delay.	871

CHAPTER VII. THE CATALONIAN CAMPAIGN AND THE END OF THE WAR:  
DECEMBER 23, 1938—MARCH 31, 1939—Continued

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1939 Mar. 18 760	<i>The Under State Secretary to the Embassy in Spain</i> Japan has agreed to drop references to Manchukuo and Hungary in the protocol for Spain's adherence to the Anti-Comintern Pact.	872
Mar. 19 761	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> After a futile effort to obtain Spanish acceptance for the addition to the protocol text desired by Japan, the Japanese Minister received instructions to conform to Spanish wishes.	872
Mar. 20 762	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> In Stohrer's view the fear of the Economics Ministry that negotiations with Spain would affect adversely existing trade arrangements is unfounded; Spain should be given no pretext for beginning comprehensive talks with France and England first.	873
Mar. 20 763	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Military Attaché has been pressed by the Italian military to consider plans for obtaining a decisive influence by the Axis, before other countries do so, on Spanish military training, weapons, and arms industry after the war.	874
Mar. 22 764	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Stohrer urges that plans for participation in Spain's reconstruction be coordinated in Berlin; the separate projects for plane and arms industries which have been reported may lead to a waste of resources.	876
Mar. 23 765	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> In view of reports of an imminent Red surrender, the sending of a delegation to Spain for the preliminary talks on new post-war trade arrangements is urgent.	877
Mar. 23 766	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Marshal Pétain's mission as Ambassador following French recognition of Nationalist Spain got off to a bad start because of French handling of Red refugees and failure to return ships and other equipment which fell into French hands.	877
Mar. 27 767	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> The ceremony accomplishing Spain's adherence to the Anti-Comintern Pact took place inconspicuously in accordance with the Spanish desire to preserve secrecy for the present.	880
Mar. 27 768	<i>Protocol Signed at Burgos on March 27, 1939</i> Spain adheres to the pact against the Communist International of November 25, 1936.	881
Mar. 28 769	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> The German-Spanish treaty of friendship is to be signed on March 31; the Italian Ambassador has been informed of its contents.	882
Mar. 29 770	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in Spain</i> The consent of the Spanish Government to announcement of its adherence to the Anti-Comintern Pact is to be requested; the fall of Madrid provides the occasion of a decisive military victory which Spain had wished to await.	882

CHAPTER VII. THE CATALONIAN CAMPAIGN AND THE END OF THE WAR:  
DECEMBER 23, 1938—MARCH 31, 1939—Continued

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1939 Mar. 30 771	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in Italy</i> Italy is to be approached concerning a joint withdrawal of volunteers from Spain; the German military authorities would like to recall the Condor Legion at once.	883
Mar. 31 772	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Foreign Minister was reluctant to agree to immediate announcement of Spain's membership in the Anti-Comintern but consented to obtain Franco's decision as soon as possible.	883
Mar. 31 773	<i>German-Spanish Treaty of Friendship Signed at Burgos on March 31, 1939</i> Spain and Germany agree to consult and inform each other continuously concerning their common interests, to lend mutual diplomatic support, and to refrain from aiding a third party against the other treaty partner.	884

CHAPTER VIII. GERMAN WITHDRAWAL FROM SPAIN: APRIL 2—JULY 8, 1939

1939 Apr. 2 774	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ciano stated that Italy would be in no hurry to withdraw her troops from Spain, in fact saw some advantage in leaving them there for a time; he had no objection to an immediate German withdrawal, however.	887
Apr. 3 775	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Spain</i> All reasons for delay in announcing Spain's adherence to the Anti-Comintern have disappeared; reluctance can only be due to certain elements in the Spanish Government; immediate consent is to be demanded, as the tense political situation requires this step.	837
Apr. 3 776	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Jordana stated that Franco shared his objections to immediate announcement of Spain's adherence to the Anti-Comintern.	888
Apr. 3 777	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Franco told Canaris that he needed a delay of 2 or 3 weeks before announcing Spain's membership in the Anti-Comintern; he hoped that by then France would hand over Red war matériel and merchant vessels.	889
Apr. 4 778	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Stohrer does not believe the Spaniards are attempting to evade their commitment on the Anti-Comintern but will make another attempt in accordance with instructions.	889
Apr. 4 779	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in Spain</i> France would be more, not less, ready to make the concessions Franco seeks if Spain's adherence to the Anti-Comintern were announced; energetic representations are to be repeated and action within the week insisted upon.	890
Apr. 4 780	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Political Division I</i> The Wehrmacht still desires the earliest possible withdrawal of the Condor Legion; factors determining the date are ceremonial parades in Madrid and Berlin and the question of how much equipment should be brought back.	890



## CHAPTER VIII. GERMAN WITHDRAWAL FROM SPAIN: APRIL 2-JULY 8, 1939—Con.

Date and Doc. No.	Subject	Page
1939 Apr. 4 781	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Jordana insisted that negotiations with France for return of Spanish gold, the fishing fleet, and Red arms would be prejudiced by announcement of Spain's joining the Anti-Comintern but promised to ask Franco and the Council of Ministers once more.	891
Apr. 5 782	<i>The Under State Secretary to the Embassy in Spain</i> It is to be pointed out in support of the German argument that full and correct accounts of Spain's entry into the Anti-Comintern have already appeared in the foreign press.	892
Undated 783	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department</i> Total German expenditures in Spain approached 500,000,000 RM; various methods for calculating the Spanish debt to Germany and for effecting partial recovery are suggested.	892
Apr. 6 784	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department</i> The delegation named for economic talks with Spain is to treat the Spaniards chivalrously, not to appear to demand payment for German blood expended, and not to appear as competing with the Italians.	895
Apr. 12 785	<i>Memorandum by the Under State Secretary</i> The Führer has scheduled reception of the Condor Legion in Berlin on June 5, so that departure from Spain would not take place before May 25.	896
Apr. 14 786	<i>Memorandum by the Ambassador in Spain</i> In view of the numerous concessions won by Germany in the last year—far more than Italy obtained—Stohrer urges that no more demands be put and that a generous tone be adopted in economic talks and efforts for military cooperation; humanitarian efforts to win the Spanish people, still largely Red, are also indicated.	896
	<i>Editors' Note</i> Göring's visit to Rome on April 16, 1939, and German-Italian discussions of possible Axis use of Spanish bases in a general war.	
Apr. 27 787	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the State Secretary</i> Stohrer conveys confidentially reports of efforts by the German military and the Propaganda Ministry delegation in Spain to undermine his position.	900
May 2 788	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in Spain</i> Göring would welcome an invitation to Spain to participate in the victory parade.	902
May 2 789	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in Spain</i> The Spaniards doubt that they can insure Göring's safety and also fear a slight to the Italians; a Franco-Göring shipboard meeting is under consideration.	902
May 5 790	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in Spain</i> Göring will probably meet Franco on a German ship off the Spanish coast; preparations should be made in case Franco, as is unlikely, asks Göring to visit Spain.	903

## CHAPTER VIII. GERMAN WITHDRAWAL FROM SPAIN: APRIL 2-JULY 8, 1939—Con.

Date and Doc. No.	Subject	Page
1939 May 5 791	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the State Secretary</i> Having learned that he was excluded from arrangements for the Göring visit, Stohrer informs Weizsäcker that he will resign his post unless the Embassy's authority over press, military, and other agencies, as normal in a peacetime mission, is restored.	903
May 6 792	<i>The State Secretary to the Ambassador in Spain</i> The Propaganda Ministry has consented to recall its Special Staff from Spain.	904
May 8 793	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Stohrer learned belatedly that Bernhardt had been negotiating for some time for the Göring visit; the Spaniards refused at first but under renewed pressure consented to a private Franco-Göring meeting.	905
May 8 794	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in Spain</i> Stohrer is to summon General von Richthofen and Bernhardt to tell them most distinctly that negotiations with the Spanish Government are the business of the Ambassador alone; he is to inform the Spanish Government that he is taking over all arrangements for the Göring visit.	906
May 9 795	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in Spain</i> Lack of discipline among her representatives in Spain injures Germany's prestige; Bernhardt is to be warned of serious consequences for himself, and a full report is to be made after Göring's visit.	907
May 9 796	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Stohrer spent several hours persuading Franco to alter his plans once more and to arrange to be at Göring's disposal on May 11.	907
May 10 797	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Bernhardt has been excluded from any dealings with the Spaniards on Göring's visit, but the latter has designated him as interpreter; Stohrer will not attend the meeting unless ordered by Berlin to do so.	908
May 10 798	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Stohrer reviews the bungled negotiations for Göring's visit, on which no final arrangements have yet been made, blaming Bernhardt for unauthorized interference and Jordana for not informing him.	909
May 10 799	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Göring refused to come to Saragossa and Franco to come to the coast; Stohrer told the perplexed Jordana that he would take no responsibility if the meeting did not take place, and that it was preposterous for Göring to cruise off the coast without meeting Franco.	911
May 10 800	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Franco rejected Göring's last suggestion for a meeting place; the press publicity had turned a private meeting into a political action; for this, time would be needed for preparations and Italy would have to be informed in advance.	912

## CHAPTER VIII. GERMAN WITHDRAWAL FROM SPAIN: APRIL 2-JULY 8, 1939—Con.

Date and Doc. No.	Subject	Page
1939 May 10 801	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Bernhardt has also intervened in the matter of Spanish representation at the Condor Legion's victory parade in Berlin, having invited General Queipo de Llano on his own authority.	913
Undated 802	<i>The Foreign Minister to Field Marshal Göring (Draft Letter)</i> In a letter ultimately not sent, Göring is rebuked for attempting to arrange a visit to Spain through private channels, circumventing the Foreign Ministry, and doing injury to Germany's and the Führer's prestige; Bernhardt's recall is demanded.	913
May 22 803	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> The farewell parade of the Condor Legion was a brilliant occasion, with cordial expressions of friendship among the Spanish, Italian, and German comrades in arms.	915
June 2 804	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> The staff of the Propaganda Ministry in Spain is being re-organized but in effect without meeting the objections to its personnel and activities.	916
June 9 805	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the State Secretary</i> Serrano Suñer left the impression on his Rome visit that he is more violently anti-British and anti-French than the Axis leaders; he also failed in his speech at a formal dinner to make any mention of German aid in the Civil War.	916
June 16 806	<i>The State Secretary to State Secretary Hanke of the Propaganda Ministry</i> The Propaganda Ministry is requested to liquidate its entire Special Staff in Spain as previously agreed.	918
June 22 807	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> A reported plan to remove the Special Staff and its Spanish employees to Germany and to continue press and propaganda work for Spain and South America from there would also jeopardize the uniformity of Germany's Spanish policy.	918
July 2 808	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> A part of the Special Staff has set itself up in Madrid in violation of the Propaganda Ministry's promises; its immediate recall is necessary unless the Spaniards are to become aware of quarrels among the Germans.	919
Undated 809	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Economics Ministry</i> In preliminary talks covering debt settlement and new post-war trade arrangements the Spaniards were cooperative but vague as to the form of future economic relations; application of the debt to new German investment is not desired; a survey of present German firms indicates their prospects are good.	919
July 7 810	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Propaganda Ministry Attaché remained under the impression that he could continue in Spain indefinitely; he was enlightened, but he should be instructed by his own Ministry to leave.	931

## CHAPTER VIII. GERMAN WITHDRAWAL FROM SPAIN: APRIL 2-JULY 8, 1939—Con.

Date and Doc. No.	Subject	Page
1939 July 8 811	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Spanish Government has finally authorized the supplying of up to 5 million RM in machinery and materials to a German firm operating in Morocco.  <i>Editors' Note</i> Hitler's judgment on Spain and Germany's role in the Spanish Civil War as stated to Ciano on September 28, 1940.	932

## **APPENDICES**

## Appendix I

### ORGANIZATION OF THE GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTRY SEPTEMBER 1936<sup>1</sup>

THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER

Baron von Neurath

THE STATE SECRETARY OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY

Acting: Ministerialdirektor Dr. Dieckhoff

#### *Protocol Department*

Diplomatic corps in Berlin, foreign consuls in the German Reich, audiences with the Führer and Reich Chancellor, ceremonial, decorations:	Counselor of Legation Minister von Bülow-Schwante.
Internal German affairs (German Section):	Counselor of Legation Minister von Bülow-Schwante.

#### PERSONNEL AND BUDGET DEPARTMENT (PERS.)

Director of Department:	Ministerialdirektor Dr. Prüfer.
Deputy Director of Department:	Counselor of Legation Dr. Dienstmann.
Head of budget and financial affairs:	Counselor of Legation Schellert.
Special duties:	Counselor of Legation (unassigned) Schroetter.
Pers. H Organization of the foreign service, training for the foreign service, personal data of higher officials, of honorary consuls, experts, etc., information center:	Counselor of Legation Dr. Mayr.
Pers. M Personal data on other officials and employees, organization and efficiency of the working of the Ministry:	Counselor of Legation Dr. Schmidt-Rolke.
Pers. R Preparation and general administration of the budget, and general questions relating thereto:	Counselor of Legation Kamm-ler.
Pers. B Salaries and wages, welfare and maintenance, travel and removal expenses of officials and employees of the foreign service and other persons:	Counselor of Legation Dr. Bischof.
Pers. D Administration of funds for official requirements:	Counselor of Legation Dr. Hempel.

<sup>1</sup> This organization plan has been translated and condensed from a German Foreign Ministry organization circular of September 1936, filmed as serial 1780, frames 406764-78. A similar table of organization for Dec. 1, 1937, is printed in vol. I; for June 1, 1938, in vol. II; and for Feb. 15, 1939, in vol. IV.

Library:	Dr. Holleck-Weithmann.
Political archives, historical section:	Dr. Frauendienst.
Cipher and communications:	Counselor Selchow.
Language services:	Counselor Gautier.

**POLITICAL DEPARTMENT (POL.)**

Director of Department:	Acting: Minister Baron von Weizsäcker.
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**A. European Section**

Head: Minister Dr. Woermann

Pol. I	League of Nations, military questions, armaments, aviation, defense:	Counselor of Legation von Kamphoever.
Pol. II	Western Europe (Great Britain, Ireland, British possessions—unless dealt with elsewhere—France—North Africa, Morocco, Tunis—Belgium, Netherlands, Switzerland, Luxembourg):	Counselor of Legation von Rintelen.
Pol. III	Southern Europe (Spain, Portugal, Vatican):	Counselor of Legation Dr. Dumont.
Pol. IV	Southeast Europe (Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, Libya, Yugoslavia, Austria, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary):	Counselor of Legation Dr. Heiburg.
Pol. V	Eastern Europe (a) Poland, Danzig:  (b) Soviet Union:	Counselor of Legation von Lieres und Wilkau.  Counselor of Legation Dr. Schliep.
Pol. VI	Scandinavia and bordering states (Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Iceland, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania—Memel Territory):	Counselor of Legation Dr. von Grundherr.

**B. Extra-European Section**

Head: Minister Dr. von Erdmannsdorff

Pol. VII	Near and Middle East (Egypt, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Arabia, Ceylon, Cyprus, Palestine, South Africa, Syria, Turkey, India, Iraq, Iran, Sudan):	Counselor of Legation Pilger.
Pol. VIII	East Asia and Australia (Japan, Japanese mandated territories, China, Manchukuo, Mongolia, French Indochina, Siam, Straits Settlements, Malay States, Netherlands East Indies, Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, South Sea territories):	Counselor of Legation Dr. Rohde.

- Pol. IX America  
 (a) North America (United States with possessions—except Philippines; Canada): Counselor of Legation Leitner.  
 (b) Central and South America, Cuba, Haiti, Dominican Republic: Counselor of Legation Dr. Poensgen.
- Pol. X Colonial questions; Africa, except Union of South Africa; colonial policy: Counselor of Legation Gunzert.

ECONOMIC POLICY DEPARTMENT (W)

- Director of Department: Ministerialdirektor Dr. Ritter.  
 Deputy Director of Department: Counselor of Legation Benzler.  
 Directly subordinate to Director of Department:  
 Leader of delegation for negotiation of commercial treaties: Counselor of Embassy Dr. Hemmen.
- W I General section for questions concerning economics and finance: Counselor of Legation Dr. Knoll.
- W II Western and Southern Europe—except Great Britain and Italy—France, including colonies, protectorates, and mandated territories, Portugal, including colonies, Spain, including colonies: Counselor of Legation Sabath.  
 Belgium, including colonies and mandated territories, Luxembourg, Netherlands, including colonies, Switzerland: Counselor of Legation Dr. Wingen.
- W III Southeast Europe with Italy and Near East (Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy with colonies, Yugoslavia, Austria, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Afghanistan, Egypt, Arabia, Ethiopia, Cyprus, Iraq, Iran, Palestine, Sudan, Turkey): Counselor of Legation Dr. Clodius.
- W IV Eastern Europe (Danzig, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Memel, Poland, Soviet Russia): Counselor of Legation Dr. Schnurre.
- W V Northern Europe (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden); monopolies: Counselor of Legation Dr. van Scherpenberg.
- W VI Great Britain, Dominions and British possessions except Canada (Australia, Ceylon, Great Britain, British India, Ireland, New Zealand, South Africa): Counselor of Legation Ritter.
- W VII East Asia (China, Japan, Manchukuo, Siam): Counselor of Legation Dr. Voss.



## W VIII America

- (a) North America including Canada and Mexico (Canada, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Liberia, Mexico, United States, also trade promotion): Counselor of Legation Dr. Davidsen.
- (b) South America including Central America (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Salvador, Uruguay, Venezuela): Counselor of Legation Fricke.
- W IX Shipping: Counselor of Legation Bleyert.
- W X Reich Office for Foreign Trade (economic news and information service; chambers of commerce abroad): Counselor of Legation Dr. Bozenick.

## LEGAL DEPARTMENT (R)

- Director of Department: Ministerialdirektor Dr. Gaus.
- Deputy Director of Department: Counselor of Legation Dr. Barandon.
- R I International law, cooperation in conclusion of treaties: Counselor of Legation Albrecht.
- R II Trade treaties and concessions. International traffic law except international motor vehicle traffic. Extraterritorial rights. Custom matters affecting German and foreign diplomats. Taxation laws: Counselor of Legation Busch.
- R III Nationality. Constitutional and administrative law. Ecclesiastical law. Penal law: Counselor of Legation Siedler.
- R IV Compulsory military service. Compulsory labor service: Consul (unassigned) Dr. Sethe.
- R V Labor law. International aspects of German Labor Front and the Strength through Joy organization. International Labor Office: Counselor of Legation Rödiger.
- R VI Consular jurisdiction in matters of civil law and lawsuits. International legal protection and legal aid in civil matters. International private law: Secretary of Legation von Haeften.

## CULTURAL POLICY DEPARTMENT (KULT.)

- Director of Department: Minister Dr. Stieve.
- Deputy Director of Department: Counselor of Legation Dr. von Twardowski.
- Kult. A Position of German racial groups abroad and of minorities in the Reich: Counselor of Legation Langmann.

Kult. B	Economic questions relating to Germanization:	Counselor of Legation Schwager.	Dr.
Kult. E	Emigration and repatriation. Settling abroad. Germanism in Russia. Inquiries abroad about Reich Germans and foreign nationals:	Counselor of Legation Kundt.	Dr.
Kult. W	General cultural policy. Scientific relations with foreign countries:	Counselor of Legation Roth.	Dr.
Kult. S	German educational system abroad. Youth movement:	Counselor of Legation Böhme.	Dr.
Kult. H	Administration of funds of department:	Counselor of Legation Roth.	Dr.

PRESS DEPARTMENT (P)

Director of Department:	Minister Aschmann.
Deputy Director of Department:	Counselor of Legation Wolf.
Southeast Europe (Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Yugoslavia, Austria, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary); German minorities:	Counselor of Legation Wolf.
Western Europe—except Netherlands and Switzerland (Belgium and colonies, France and colonies, Italy, Luxembourg, Morocco, Vatican, League of Nations), also <i>Deutsche diplomatisch-politische Korrespondenz</i> :	Counselor of Legation Braun von Stumm.
East and Near East (Baltic States—Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania—Danzig, Poland, Soviet Russia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Palestine, Syria, Turkey):	Consul (unassigned) Dr. Schönberg.
England with Dominions, protectorates and colonies, Portugal, Spain, United States of America, Central and South America:	Secretary of Legation von Stempel.
Scandinavia (Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Finland):	Secretary of Legation Dr. Schlemann.
Far East, also Netherlands and Switzerland (China, Japan, Siam, India, Netherlands Indies, Netherlands, Switzerland); currency matters:	Counselor of Legation (unassigned) Dr. Katzenberger.
Reporting on the press:	Dr. Schacht.

## Appendix II

### LIST OF GERMAN FILES USED

The following table identifies the German file from which each document has been derived. The documents of the Foreign Ministry were bound into volumes by the Germans. The documents in these volumes have been microfilmed, and each film of a file has been identified by a film serial number, while each page of the documents has been identified by a frame number stamped on the original at the time of filming. The documents published in this collection are identified by the film serial number and frame numbers in the upper left-hand corner of each document. By reference to the following table of film serial numbers the location in the German Foreign Ministry archives of the copy of the document used in this publication may be determined.

<i>Film Serial Numbers</i>	<i>German Title of File</i>
33	Reich Foreign Minister: Memoranda on Visits of Foreign Statesmen.
43	<i>Dienststelle Ribbentrop</i> : Confidential Reports.
47	<i>Pol. geheim</i> : Spain.
54	State Secretary: Memoranda on Visits of Non-Diplomatic Personages.
100	German Embassy in Italy: Mackensen's Papers.
109	State Secretary: Anglo-Italian Relations.
136	State Secretary: German-Spanish Relations.
137	Under State Secretary: Spain.
139	State Secretary: Czechoslovakia.
168	Under State Secretary: Spain.
307	Under State Secretary: Non-Intervention.
309	Under State Secretary: Non-Intervention.
322	Economic Policy Department: Wiehl, Spain.
332	Economic Policy Department: Clodius, Spain.
336	Economic Policy Department: Clodius, Spain.
395	State Secretary: Memoranda on Visits of Diplomats.
424	State Secretary: Non-Intervention Committee.
428	State Secretary: Non-Intervention Committee.
435	State Secretary: Non-Intervention Committee.
442	State Secretary: Correspondence of State Secretary with German Diplomatic Representatives Abroad.
462	German Embassy in Spain: Secret Papers on Anti-Comintern Pact.
472	State Secretary: Correspondence of State Secretary with German Diplomatic Representatives Abroad.
485	State Secretary: Memoranda on Visits of Diplomats.
586	State Secretary: Non-Intervention Committee.
614	State Secretary: Visit of Göring to Spain, April-May 1939.
629	<i>Pol. III</i> : Spain, Political Relations of Spain with Germany.
630	<i>Pol. III</i> : Spain, Political Relations of Spain with Germany.
632	State Secretary: Non-Intervention Committee.
643	<i>Pol. III</i> : Spain, Political Relations of Spain with Germany.

<i>Film Serial Numbers</i>	<i>German Title of File</i>
650	<i>Pol. III: Spain, Political Relations of Spain with Germany.</i>
654	<i>Pol. III: Spain, Internal Politics, Parliament and Parties.</i>
660	<i>Pol. III: Spain, Internal Politics, Parliament and Parties.</i>
665	<i>Pol. III: Spain, Internal Politics, Parliament and Parties.</i>
666	<i>Pol. III: Spain, Internal Politics, Parliament and Parties.</i>
667	<i>Pol. III: Spain, Control Plan, Non-Intervention Agreement, Arms Embargo.</i>
682	<i>Pol. III: Spain, Internal Politics, Parliament and Parties.</i>
690	<i>Pol. III: Spain, Internal Politics, Parliament and Parties.</i>
696	<i>Pol. III: Spain, German Diplomatic and Consular Representation in Spain.</i>
701	<i>German Embassy in Italy: Secret Papers.</i>
860	<i>State Secretary: German Foreign Minister's Visit to London.</i>
1534	<i>Reich Chancellery: Spain, 1935-1939.</i>
1547	<i>Pol. IV: Italy, Political Relations of Italy with Spain.</i>
1557	<i>Pol. geheim: Spain.</i>
1568	<i>Pol. geheim: Spain.</i>
1573	<i>Pol. geheim: Spain.</i>
1588	<i>Pol. geheim: Spain.</i>
1606	<i>Pol. geheim: Spain.</i>
1629	<i>Pol. III: Spanish Morocco, Internal Politics.</i>
1758	<i>Pol. III: Spain, Non-Intervention Agreement, Arms Embargo.</i>
1759	<i>Pol. III: Spain, Non-Intervention Agreement, Arms Embargo.</i>
1810	<i>German Embassy in the Soviet Union: Spain, Political Relations of Spain with the Soviet Union.</i>
1819	<i>German Embassy in France: Spain.</i>
1877	<i>State Secretary: Shelling of Cruiser Leipzig.</i>
2128	<i>German Embassy in Italy: Secret Papers.</i>
2129	<i>German Embassy in Italy: Secret Papers.</i>
2130	<i>German Embassy in Italy: Secret Papers.</i>
2134	<i>State Secretary: Memoranda on Visits of Diplomats.</i>
2442	<i>Pol. II: England, Political Relations of England with Spain.</i>
2646	<i>Pol. III: Spain, Internal Politics, Parliament and Parties.</i>
2650	<i>Pol. III: Spain, Non-Intervention Agreement, Arms Embargo, New Control Plan.</i>
2655	<i>German Embassy in France: Spain.</i>
2661	<i>Pol. III: Spain, Non-Intervention Agreement, Arms Embargo.</i>
2662	<i>Economic Policy Department: Clodius, Spain.</i>
2666	<i>Economic Policy Department: Wiehl, Spain.</i>
2685	<i>German Embassy in Spain: Secret Papers on Sudeten German Question and Central European Crisis.</i>
2871	<i>Political Department: Treaties, 1936-1944.</i>
2929	<i>State Secretary: Göring's Trip to Spain.</i>
2937	<i>German Legation in Portugal: Spain and the Spanish Civil War.</i>
2938	<i>Economic Policy Department: Spain, Industry, Mining.</i>
2946	<i>German Embassy in Spain: Secret Papers, Montana.</i>
2948	<i>German Embassy in Spain: Secret Papers, Condor Legion.</i>
3162	<i>Pol. III: Spain, Internal Politics, Parliament and Parties.</i>
3174	<i>Pol. III: Spain, Non-Intervention Agreement, Arms Embargo.</i>
3176	<i>Economic Policy Department: Clodius, Spain.</i>
3204	<i>Economic Policy Department: Wiehl, Spain.</i>

<i>Film Serial Numbers</i>	<i>German Title of File</i>
3205	Economic Policy Department: Treaties, Spain.
3206	German Embassy in France: Spain.
3207	German Embassy in Spain: Nationalist Uprising.
3242	Secretariat of the Foreign Minister: Spanish Non-Intervention Question up to the Case of the <i>Leipzig</i> .
3253	<i>Pol. III</i> : Spain, Non-Intervention Agreement, Arms Embargo.
3357	<i>Pol. III</i> : Spain, Non-Intervention Agreement, Arms Embargo.
3359	<i>Pol. II</i> : England, Political Relations of England with Spain.
3360	<i>Pol. III</i> : Spain, Non-Intervention Agreement, Arms Embargo, New Control Plan.
3361	<i>Pol. III</i> : Spain, Non-Intervention Agreement, Arms Embargo, New Control Plan.
3362	<i>Pol. III</i> : Spain, Non-Intervention Agreement, Arms Embargo, New Control Plan.
3363	<i>Pol. III</i> : Spain, Non-Intervention Agreement, Arms Embargo, New Control Plan.
3364	<i>Pol. III</i> : Spain, Non-Intervention Agreement, Arms Embargo, New Control Plan.
3366	<i>Pol. III</i> : Spain, Internal Politics, Parliament and Parties.
3367	Economic Policy Department: Spain, Industry, Mining.
3368	<i>Pol. IV</i> : Mediterranean (Nyon) Agreement.
3369	German Legation in Portugal: Non-Intervention Agreement, Arms Embargo.
3370	Economic Policy Department: Wiehl, Spain.
3371	German Legation in Portugal: Delivery of Arms to Spain.
3372	German Embassy in Spain: Non-Intervention Policy.
3373	<i>Pol. III</i> : Spain, Non-Intervention Agreement, Arms Embargo.
3374	<i>Pol. III</i> : Spain, Non-Intervention Agreement, Arms Embargo.
3376	German Embassy in Spain: Morocco.
3406	<i>Pol. II</i> : France, Political Relations of France with Germany.
3414	<i>Pol. III</i> : Spain, Internal Politics, Parliament and Parties.
3416	<i>Pol. III</i> : Spain, Non-Intervention Agreement, Arms Embargo.
4078	<i>Pol. III</i> : Holy See, Relations of the Holy See with Spain.
4445	German Embassy in Spain: Papers on Montana.
4446	<i>Pol. III</i> : Spain, Internal Politics, Parliament and Parties.
4793	<i>Ha. Pol. geheim</i> : Trade in War Matériel: Europe.
5194	German Embassy in Spain: Secret Papers.
5205	Cultural Policy Department: Treaties.
F 3, 6, 8, 14, 19	German Foreign Ministry Film of Files of the Reich Foreign Minister's Secretariat.

## Appendix III

### LIST OF PERSONS<sup>1</sup>

- ALBA AND BEBWICK**, Duke of, Jacobo María del Pilar Carlos Manuel Fitz-James Stuart, agent of General Franco's government in Great Britain, 1937; Ambassador in Great Britain, 1939.
- ALVAREZ DEL VAYO**, Julio, Spanish Socialist leader and journalist; chief political commissioner of Republican Army, 1937; Foreign Minister, 1936-1937, 1938.
- ASCHMANN**, Dr. Gottfried, Minister, Director of the Press Department of the German Foreign Ministry, 1933-1939.
- ATTLEE**, Clement Richard, British Labor M.P. since 1922; Leader of the Labor Party since 1935; Leader of the Opposition, 1935-1939.
- ATTOLICO**, Dr. Bernardo, Italian Ambassador in Germany, 1935-1940.
- AZAÑA DÍAZ**, Manuel, Spanish Republican leader; President of the Council of Ministers, February-May 1936; President of the Republic, May 1936.
- BALDWIN**, Stanley, Earl Baldwin of Bewdley, British Prime Minister, 1935-1937.
- BASTIANINI**, Giuseppe, Italian Under Secretary of State in the Italian Foreign Office, 1936-1943.
- BENZLER**, Felix, Counselor of Legation, Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department of the German Foreign Ministry; Consul General at Amsterdam, 1937-1940.
- BERNHARDT**, Johannes, German merchant in the Spanish zone of Morocco; organizer and director of Hisma (*see* Editors' Note, pp. 1 ff.).
- BETHKE**, Friedrich, department head in the German Economics Ministry; director of Rowak (*see* Editors' Note, pp. 1 ff.).
- BISMARCK**, Otto Christian, Prince von, Counselor of the German Embassy in Great Britain, 1928-1936; Deputy Director of the Political Department of the Foreign Ministry, 1936-1939.
- BLOMBERG**, Werner von, Field Marshal, German War Minister and Commander in Chief of the Wehrmacht, 1935-1938.
- BLUM**, Léon, President of the French Socialist Party, President of the Council of Ministers, June 1936-June 1937; Vice President of the Cabinet, June 1937-January 1938; President of the Council, March-April 1938.
- BOHLE**, Ernst Wilhelm, Gauleiter and Head of the Auslandsorganisation of the Nazi Party, 1933-1945; also State Secretary in the German Foreign Ministry, 1937-1941.
- CABANELLAS**, San Miguel, Spanish General, member and for a time president of original Junta of National Defense set up at Burgos, July 25, 1936.
- CADOGAN**, Sir Alexander, Deputy Under Secretary of State in the British Foreign Office, 1936; Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1938-1946.
- CANARIS**, Wilhelm, German Admiral, in the Secret Intelligence Branch of the Reichswehr, 1934; later head of the Intelligence Service of the OKW.
- CARLS**, Rolf, Rear Admiral, Commander of German fleet off Spanish coast, 1936.

<sup>1</sup> The biographical details given relate principally to the period and subjects covered by the documents in this volume.

- CHAMBERLAIN**, Neville, British Conservative M.P., 1918-1940; leader of the Conservative Party; Prime Minister, 1937-1940.
- CHAUTEMPs**, Camille, President of Radical Socialist Group of the French Chamber; Minister of State in Blum cabinet, 1936-1937; President of the Council of Ministers, June 22, 1937-January 15, 1938, and January 18-March 10, 1938; Vice President of Council of Ministers and Minister of Coordination in Daladier cabinet, 1938-1939; Minister of State, 1939-1940.
- CHILSTON**, Viscount, Aretas Akers-Douglas, British Ambassador in the Soviet Union, 1933-1938.
- CHILTON**, Sir Henry Getty, British Ambassador in Spain, 1935-1938.
- CHURCHILL**, Winston Spencer, British Liberal and Conservative M.P. since 1900.
- CIANO DE CORTELLAZZO**, Count Galeazzo, son-in-law of Mussolini; Italian Foreign Minister, 1936-1943.
- COMPANYS**, Luis, Spanish Republican, leader of Catalonian Left, President of Catalonian Government (Generalidad), 1936-1939.
- CORBIN**, Charles, French Ambassador in Great Britain, 1933-1940.
- COT**, Pierre, French Radical Socialist Deputy from 1923; Minister for Air in Blum cabinet, 1936-1937, and in Chautemps cabinet, 1937-1938; Minister of Commerce, January-April 1938.
- CRANBORNE**, Viscount, Robert Arthur James Cecil, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the British Foreign Office, 1935-1938.
- DALADIER**, Édouard, French Radical Socialist Deputy since 1919; Minister of National Defense, 1936-1938; President of the Council of Ministers and Minister of National Defense, April 1938-March 1940.
- DELSOS**, Yvon, French Radical Socialist Deputy since 1924; Foreign Minister in Blum cabinet, 1936-1937, and in two Chautemps cabinets, 1937-1938.
- DIECKHOFF**, Dr. Hans Heinrich, Director of the Political Department of the German Foreign Ministry, April-August 1936; Acting State Secretary, August 1936-April 1937; Ambassador in the United States, May 1937; was recalled to Berlin for consultation November 1938 and did not return to his post.
- DIRKSEN**, Dr. Herbert von, German Ambassador in Japan, 1933-1938, and in Great Britain, May 1938-August 1939.
- DÖRNBURG**, Alexander von, Secretary of Legation in Political Division I of the German Foreign Ministry, 1936; in the Embassy in Great Britain, 1937; in the Protocol Department of the Foreign Ministry, 1938; Counselor of Legation, 1938; Minister, 1939.
- DUMONT**, Dr. Karl, Counselor of Legation, head of Political Division III of the German Foreign Ministry, 1936-1937.
- DU MOULIN-ECKART**, Count, Counselor of the German Legation in Portugal; later in Political Division III of the Foreign Ministry.
- EDEN**, Anthony, British Conservative M.P. since 1923; Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1935-1938.
- EDMANNSDORFF**, Otto von, head of the Extra-European Section of the Political Department of the German Foreign Ministry, 1936-1937; Minister in Hungary, May 1937-July 1941.
- FAPPEL**, Wilhelm, Lieutenant General (Ret.), head of Ibero-Amerikanisches Institut; German Chargé d' Affaires in Spain, November 1936-February 1937; Ambassador to the Spanish Nationalist Government, February-September 1937.
- FORSTER**, Dr. D., Counselor of the German Embassy in France, 1936-1938.

- FRANCO Y BAHAMONDE, Francisco**, Spanish General, Chief of the General Staff, 1935; Chief of State, October 1, 1936.
- FRANCO, Nicolás**, brother of General Franco, at head of General State Secretariat (political department) of the Spanish Nationalist Government; later Ambassador in Portugal.
- FRANÇOIS-PONCET, André**, French Ambassador in Germany, 1931-1938; Ambassador in Italy, 1938-1940.
- FUNCK, Baron von**, Colonel (General Staff), Military Attaché of the German Embassy in Spain.
- GAUS, Dr. Friedrich**, Ministerialdirektor, Director of the Legal Department of the German Foreign Ministry.
- GOEBBELS, Dr. Josef**, German Minister of Propaganda, 1933-1945; Gauleiter of Berlin.
- GÖRING, Hermann Wilhelm**, Field Marshal, National Socialist member of the German Reichstag from 1928; President of the Reichstag from 1932; Minister President of Prussia and Reich Minister for Air from 1933; Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe from 1935; Commissioner for the Four Year Plan, 1936.
- GRANDI, Count Dino**, Italian Ambassador in Great Britain, 1933-1939.
- HALIFAX, Viscount, Edward Wood**, British statesman; Lord Privy Seal, 1935-1937; Lord President of the Council, 1937-38; Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1938-1940.
- HASELL, Ulrich von**, German Ambassador in Italy, November 1932-February 1938.
- HEBERLEIN, Dr. Erich**, Counselor of the German Embassy to the Spanish Nationalist Government.
- HEMMING, Francis**, British official; secretary of the Economic Advisory Council; secretary of the Non-Intervention Committee.
- HENDERSON, Sir Neville**, British Ambassador in Germany, 1937-1939.
- HESS, Rudolf**, German National Socialist leader, member of the Nazi Party from 1920; chairman of the Central Committee of the Party from 1932; Hitler's Deputy, 1933-1941; member of the Reichstag; Minister without Portfolio, 1933-1941; member of the Secret Cabinet Council, 1938-1941.
- HESSE, Prince Philip of**, German nobleman, son-in-law of the King of Italy, employed as a special envoy between Hitler and Mussolini.
- HEYDEN-RYNSCH, Dr. Bernd Otto**, Baron von der, Counselor of Legation, official in Political Division I of the German Foreign Ministry.
- HITLER, Adolf**, German National Socialist leader, Führer and Chancellor of the German Reich, 1933-1945.
- HODGSON, Sir Robert**, British diplomat, appointed agent to the Spanish Nationalist Government, November 1937.
- HOYNINGEN-HUENE, Dr. Oswald**, Baron von, German Minister in Portugal, 1934-1944.
- HULL, Cordell**, United States Secretary of State, 1933-1944.
- JAGWITZ, Eberhard von**, official of the Auslandsorganisation; leading figure in the organization of Rowak; Under State Secretary in the German Economics Ministry.
- JORDANA, Count Francisco Gómez**, General, President of the Junta Técnica, 1938; Vice President and Foreign Minister of the Spanish Nationalist Government, 1938-1939.
- KEITEL, Wilhelm**, General, Chief of the Wehrmachtsamt in the Reich War Ministry, 1935-1938; Chief of the OKW, 1938-1945.



- KINDELAN DUANY**, Alfredo, Lieutenant General, Commander of Spanish Nationalist Air Force in the Civil War; Minister for Air in the Nationalist Government of January 30, 1933.
- KÖCHER**, Dr. Otto Carl Albrecht, German Minister in Switzerland, 1937-1945.
- KORDT**, Dr. Erich, First Secretary of the German Embassy in Great Britain, 1936-1938; head of Ribbentrop's Secretariat (Büro RAM), 1938-1941.
- KOTZE**, Herr, Counselor of Legation on the staff of German Foreign Minister von Neurath.
- KRAUEL**, Dr. Wolfgang, German Consul at Geneva.
- LAMMERS**, Dr. Hans, State Secretary and Chief of the Reich Chancellery, 1934-1937; Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery, 1937-1945; member and Executive Secretary of the Secret Cabinet Council, 1938-1945.
- LANGENHEIM**, Adolf P., German National Socialist Ortsgruppenleiter of Tetuán area of Spanish Morocco; a leading figure in early negotiations for German assistance to Franco (*see* Editors' Note, pp. 1 ff.).
- LARGO CABALLERO**, Francisco, Spanish Socialist and trade-union leader; President of the Council of Ministers, 1936-1937.
- LAVAL**, Pierre, French statesman, Senator, 1926-1940.
- LEBRUN**, Albert, President of the French Republic, 1932-1940.
- LITVINOV**, Maxim Maximovich, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, 1930-1939.
- MACKENSEN**, Hans Georg von, son of Field Marshal von Mackensen; German Minister in Hungary, 1933-1937; State Secretary in the Foreign Ministry, Berlin, 1937-1938; Ambassador in Italy, April 1938-September 1943.
- MAGAZ Y PERS**, Antonio, Marquis de, Spanish Nationalist Ambassador in Berlin, 1937-1940.
- MAGISTRATI**, Count Massimo, Counselor of the Italian Embassy in Germany.
- MAISKY**, Ivan Mikhailovich, Soviet Ambassador in Great Britain, 1932-1943.
- MARCH ORDINAS**, Juan, Spanish industrialist with interests in many fields of the Spanish economy; deputy in the Cortes during the Republican period; supporter of and large contributor to Franco's Nationalist movement.
- MIAJA**, José, Spanish General in charge of defense of Madrid, October 1936; Commander in Chief of Loyalist forces; participated in *coup d'état* of March 1939, which overthrew Negrín government and prepared capitulation.
- MILCH**, Erhard, General, German Secretary of State for Air, 1933-1945.
- MOLA Y VIDAL**, Emilio, Spanish Nationalist General; one of original members of Junta of National Defense; Commander of Nationalist northern armies; killed in airplane accident, June 3, 1937.
- MOLOTOV**, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich, chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union, 1930-1941.
- MORRISON**, William Shepherd, British Conservative M.P.; Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries, 1936-1939; first chairman of the Non-Intervention Committee, September 1936.
- MUSSOLINI**, Benito, founder of the Italian Fascist Party; Head of the Government and Prime Minister, 1922; Commander of the Armed Forces, 1938.
- NEGRÍN**, Dr. Juan, Spanish Socialist leader; Minister of Finance, 1936; President of the Council of Ministers, 1937-1939; Minister of National Defense, 1938-1939.
- NEURATH**, Constantin, Baron von, German Foreign Minister, June 2, 1932-February 4, 1938; Reich Minister and President of the Secret Cabinet Council, 1938-1945.
- NEWTON**, Basil, Minister in British Embassy in Germany, 1935-1937; Minister in Czechoslovakia, 1937-1939.

- OLIVEIRA SALAZAR, Antonio de**, President of the Portuguese Council of Ministers since 1932; also Minister of Foreign Affairs and of War, 1936.
- PERTH, Earl of, Sir Eric Drummond**, British Ambassador in Italy, 1933-1939.
- PÉTAİN, Henri Philippe**, Marshal of France; Ambassador in Spain, 1939-1940.
- PHIPPS, Sir Eric**, British Ambassador in Germany, 1933-1937; in France, 1937-1939.
- PLESSEN, Dr. Johann, Baron von**, Counselor of the German Embassy in Italy.
- PLYMOUTH, Earl of, Ivor Miles Windsor-Clive**, British Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1936-1939; chairman of the Non-Intervention Committee.
- PRIETO, Indalecio**, Spanish Socialist leader; Minister of Marine and Air in Largo Caballero cabinet, 1936-1937; Minister of National Defense in Negrín cabinet, 1937-1938.
- PRIMO DE RIVERA, José Antonio**, Spanish Rightist leader, son of General Miguel Primo de Rivera (Dictator of Spain 1923-1930); founder of Falange, 1932; in prison at Alicante at outbreak of Civil War; executed by Loyalists, November 20, 1936.
- QUEIPO DE LLANO, Gonzalo**, Spanish General; Inspector General of Carabineers at beginning of Civil War; occupied Seville for Nationalists; in charge of operations in Andalusia.
- QUIÑONES DE LEÓN, José María**, Spanish Ambassador in France during last years of monarchy; agent of Nationalist Government.
- RAEDER, Erich**, Admiral, Commander in Chief of German Navy, 1935-1943.
- RIBBENTROP, Joachim von**, German National Socialist leader; Ambassador-at-large, 1935-1938; Ambassador in Great Britain, 1936-1938; Reich Foreign Minister, February 4, 1938-1945.
- RICHTHOFEN, Baron von**, German General, Chief of Staff, Condor Legion, January 1937-October 1938; Commander, Condor Legion, November 1, 1938.
- RINTELEN, Emil von**, Counselor of Legation, Head of Political Division II in the German Foreign Ministry.
- RÍOS, Fernando de los**, Spanish Republican leader; Ambassador in the United States, 1936-1939.
- RIPKEN, Dr.**, Secretary of Legation; official of the Economic Policy Department of the German Foreign Ministry.
- RITTER, Dr. Karl**, Ministerialdirektor in the German Foreign Ministry, 1924-1937; Ambassador in Brazil, 1937-1938; Ambassador on special assignment in the Foreign Ministry, 1938-1945.
- ROOSEVELT, Franklin Delano**, President of the United States, March 4, 1933-April 12, 1945.
- SABATH, Hermann Friedrich**, Counselor of Legation, an official of the Economic Policy Department of the German Foreign Ministry.
- SANGRONIZ Y CASTRO, José Antonio de, Marquis de Desio**, Chef de Cabinet in the Spanish Nationalist Ministry of Foreign Affairs; later Ambassador in France and in Italy.
- SCHACHT, Dr. Hjalmar**, President of the German Reichsbank, 1933-1939; Minister of Economics, 1934-1937.
- SCHMIDT, Dr. Paul**, Director of the Press Department of the German Foreign Ministry, 1939-1945.
- SCHWENDEMANN, Dr. Karl**, Counselor in the German Embassy in Spain at outbreak of Civil War; later head of Political Division IIIa (Spain and Portugal) in the Foreign Ministry.
- SELZAM, Dr. Eduard von**, Secretary of Legation and Press Attaché in the German Embassy in Great Britain.

- SCHULENBURG, Friedrich Werner, Count von der, German Ambassador in the Soviet Union, October 1934-June 1941.**
- SERRANO, SUÑER, Ramón, brother-in-law of General Franco, lawyer; Minister of Interior, Press, and Propaganda in the Spanish Nationalist Government of January 30, 1938.**
- SPEERLE, Hugo, German General of Aviation, Commander of the Condor Legion, November 6, 1936-October 31, 1937.**
- STALIN, Josef Vissarionovich, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, member of the Politburo and Orgburo since 1922.**
- STOBER, Dr. Eberhard von, German Ambassador in Spain, September 1937-January 1943.**
- SUANCES Y FERNÁNDEZ, Juan, Minister of Industry and Commerce in the Spanish Nationalist Government.**
- VEITH, General, in command of the German air force in Spain.**
- VIOLA DI CAMPALTO, Count Guido, Italian Ambassador to the Spanish Nationalist Government, 1937-1939.**
- VOELCKERS, Hans Hermann, Counselor of the German Embassy in Spain, 1933-1936, and Chargé d'Affaires, April-November 1936.**
- VOLMANN, Hellmuth, German General of Aviation, Commander of the Condor Legion, November 1, 1937-November 1, 1938.**
- WARLMONT, Walter, German General, on special mission in Spain, July-December 1936; later Deputy Chief of the Operations Staff in the War Ministry and Supreme Headquarters of the Wehrmacht.**
- WEIZSÄCKER, Ernst, Baron von, Director of the Political Department of the German Foreign Ministry, 1936-1938; State Secretary, 1938-1943.**
- WELCZECK, Johannes, Count von, German Ambassador in Spain, 1926-1936; Ambassador in France, April 1936-September 1939.**
- WIEHL, Emil Karl Josef, Director of the Economic Policy Department of the German Foreign Ministry, 1937.**
- WILBERG, Hellmuth, German General of Aviation, head of Sonderstab W in the War Ministry and in the Supreme Headquarters of the Wehrmacht.**
- WORMANN, Dr. Ernst, official in the German Foreign Ministry, 1933-1936; Counselor of Embassy in Great Britain with the rank of Minister, 1936-1938; Ministerialdirektor and Director of the Political Department of the Foreign Ministry with the title of Under State Secretary, 1938-1943.**
- WOHLTHAT, Helmut, official of the German Economics Ministry; appointed by Göring to collaborate in the Four Year Plan, 1938; on economic mission in Spain, 1939.**
- WUCHER, Dr. Theodor, Ministerialdirektor in the German Ministry of Finance.**

## Appendix IV

### LIST OF GERMAN ABBREVIATIONS<sup>1</sup>

- AA**, Auswärtiges Amt, German Foreign Ministry
- AGK**, Ausführungsgemeinschaft für Kriegsgerät, Export Cartel for War Matériel
- AO**, Auslandsorganisation, Foreign Organization of the Nazi Party concerned with German nationals living abroad
- DNB**, Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro, German News Agency, owned by the Ministry of Propaganda
- e.o.**, *ex officio*; where this precedes the file number, it indicates a draft for which there are no preceding papers (*see zu*)
- g**, geheim, secret
- g Rs**, geheime Reichssache, top secret
- Ha Pol**, Handelspolitik, Handelspolitische Abteilung, Economic Policy Department of the Foreign Ministry; renamed Wirtschaftspolitische Abteilung between March and June 1938
- Kult.**, Kulturpolitische Abteilung, Cultural Policy Department of the Foreign Ministry
- NSDAP**, Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei, National Socialist German Workers' Party, the full title of the Nazi Party
- OKH**, Oberkommando des Heeres. High Command of the Army; Supreme Headquarters of the Army
- OKM**, Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine, Supreme Command of the Navy
- OKW**, Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht; Supreme Headquarters of the Wehrmacht
- Pol.**, Politische Abteilung, Political Department of the Foreign Ministry; subdivided according to geographical areas, each designated by a Roman numeral, e. g. Pol. IV (*see appendix I*)
- Qu**, Quirinal; thus "Rom (Qu)" in addresses to distinguish the German Embassy to the Kingdom of Italy from that to the Holy See
- RAM**, Reichsaussenminister, Reich Foreign Minister
- RM**, Reichsminister, Reich Minister; any member of the Reich Cabinet but in Foreign Ministry documents usually the Reich Foreign Minister; reichsmark
- St.S.**, Staatssekretär, State Secretary; the Permanent Head of a Reich Ministry
- U.St.S.**, Unterstaatssekretär, Under State Secretary
- v.**, von
- W.**, Wirtschaftspolitische Abteilung, Economic Policy Department of the Foreign Ministry
- zu**, to, in connection with; where this precedes the file number, it indicates that the previous papers on the subject have this file number.

<sup>1</sup>This list includes such German abbreviations as are found in the text of documents appearing in this volume. For an explanation of a number of other terms appearing in Foreign Ministry documents see vol. I, pp. 1215-1220, and vol. II, pp. 1061-1070.