

*Vanguard Studies
of Soviet Russia*

SOVIET RUSSIA
AND HER NEIGHBORS

R. PAGE ARNOT



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VANGUARD STUDIES OF SOVIET RUSSIA

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Vanguard Studies of Soviet Russia

Soviet Russia and Her Neighbors

By R. PAGE ARNOT



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*To the sincere men and women of Russia who, despite
prison, exile, and death, burned out their
lives trying to attain freedom, peace,
and brotherhood for the
common people.*

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

R. PAGE ARNOT

Born in Greenock, Scotland, in 1890; after leaving the University of Glasgow in 1914, became secretary of the Fabian Research Department in London, the foundation of the present Labor Research Department, of which he was secretary until 1925, and since that time has been director. The following works have been produced by him or under his guidance: *The Labour Year Book*, 1916; *Trade Unionism on the Railways* (with G. D. H. Cole), 1917; *The Russian Revolution*, 1923; *The Politics of Oil*, 1924; *The General Strike: Origin and History*, 1926. Mr. Arnot is, also, a regular contributor to *The Labour Monthly*, a British labor review.

EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION

THE Russian Revolution startled a war-diseased world and ushered in the most daring political and economic experiment of the twentieth century. Considering the vast territory affected, the radical changes inaugurated, and the influence which has been and still is being exerted on international relations, there is probably no greater event in modern history, whether for good or evil. Most Americans forget that a decade has already passed since Lenin and his Communistic followers assumed the power. The period of rapid revolutionary change has gone. Russia is painstakingly, step by step, building something different, something unique, something whose final destination is unpredictable.

America has been a land of discovery from its foundation. Not only in the realm of scientific invention, but in first attaining the coveted North Pole and in exploring other unknown areas of the world, Americans have given generously of life and treasure. Today we are uninformed about a great nation covering one-sixth of the land surface of the world. Russia is cut off by an Atlantic Ocean of prejudice, misunderstanding, and propaganda. We still maintain a rigid official quarantine about the Soviet Government. The result is ignorance frankly admitted by one "of the highest authorities in our Government," who declares this inevitable "in the absence of diplomatic relations." Judge Gary corroborates this verdict, "Like many other Americans, I am ignorant in regard to many of the

conditions which exist in Russia at the present time."*

Every scientist realizes that ignorance is one of the most dangerous forces in the world today. No matter how good or how bad the Soviet system, we should know all about it. Instead, we have been ruled by propaganda and hearsay.

The fact is that for the past ten years the Bolshevik government has been operated on, dissected, and laid in its coffin amidst loud applause and rejoicing by distinguished orators in all parts of the world; yet today it is stronger, more stable, than ever before in its history and its leaders have been longer in power than any other ruling cabinet in the world. It is high time that we appraise this government as scientifically and impartially as possible, without indulging in violent epithets or questionable and controversial dogmas. Surely the world is not so abysmally ignorant that after ten years of the rule of the Soviet we cannot discover a common core of truth about Russia.

Whether the Communists are thought to be "dangerous enemies of society" or the "saviors of humanity," the facts should be known before judgment is pronounced. No matter what our conviction, we have to admit that the Bolsheviki are hammering out a startling new mechanism in the field of political control. Their experiment deserves scientific study, not hostile armies; intelligent criticism, not damning epithets.

In the past, America has been flooded with propaganda of all shades. Dr. E. A. Ross dedicates his last volume on Russia "To my fellow-Americans who have become weary of being fed lies and propaganda about Russia." In his chapter on the "Poison Gas Attack"

* *Current History*, February, 1926.

he lists forty-nine stories broadcast throughout America which have been proved totally false. Other writers have pointed out similar facts. Walter Lippman, Editor-in-Chief of *The New York World*, in his illuminating study of all Russian news which appeared in *The New York Times* in the early period of the Revolution, has proved the stupidity, inaccuracy, and falsehood of the "facts and fabrications" which have passed as news. Even those articles and books which have tried to deal honestly with the subject have usually been inadequate. They have either been too general or they have been specific but too brief to be of more than passing value. In all too many cases they are based on only a few weeks of observation in Russia by someone who did not know the native language.

The present series is designed to meet the need for reliable, accurate information on the major aspects of present-day Russia. We have tried to make it as scientifically accurate as is possible in the treatment of contemporary phenomena. It has been our aim in selecting each author to choose someone who because of previous experience and training was peculiarly well qualified as an authority on the particular subject to which he was assigned. In every case we have chosen those who either have made a prolonged stay in Russia, actually writing their volumes while in the country, or those who have made a special trip to Russia to secure the facts about which they write. We have tried to make the series inclusive, covering the more important aspects of the many-sided developments in Russia. Each volume is devoted to one major subject alone. People want detailed, accurate facts in readable form. Here they can be found, ranging all the way from an

analysis of the governmental machinery to the school system. Within this series some repetition has been inevitable. The editor believes that this is distinctly desirable since each author expounds his subject in his own way, with an emphasis original to him and in the light of his own data. No effort has been made to eliminate contradictions, yet they are surprisingly few. Where the testimony of all is unanimous, the conclusions reached are overwhelmingly strong. Where differences exist, they should stimulate the reader to weigh the evidence even more carefully.

It is probably too much to hope that propaganda organizations will not endeavor to discredit any such genuine effort to arrive at the truth. Perhaps it is sufficient to say in refutation that no similar attempt to secure the facts about Russia from trained experts has yet been made in America or elsewhere, so far as the writer is aware. There is scant ground for intelligent criticism unless similar scientific studies have been made with conflicting results; even then time alone can proclaim the final truth. No sincere and unprejudiced scientist will deplore an effort to study and describe what has happened in the first experiment the world has ever seen in applied communism, even if mistakes have been made in the analysis.

These volumes on the whole not only contain the most valuable data so far available, but they will probably remain of permanent worth. In the future no real historian endeavoring to master the facts about the great political upheaval in Russia will care to ignore them. Is Russia the most tyrannical dictatorship of bloody despots that the world has ever seen? Is Russia the first step in the building of a new world order whose keynote will be industrial democracy? We do

not pretend to give here the final judgment of history, but we do claim to have made a sincere effort to portray the facts.

Thanks are due to the authors who have so painstakingly sought to present the truth as they found it, to the publishers for their assistance in making this a notable and usable series, and to all those whose labor, whether by hand or brain, has helped to give these volumes to the American public.

JEROME DAVIS,
Yale University.

PREFACE

MR. ARNOT has written authoritatively about the international relationships of the Soviet Union. He has perhaps described more in detail the activities of foreign powers towards Russia than the activities of Russia towards foreign powers. Because he recognizes and accepts the distinction between the Communist International and the Soviet Government and was concentrating attention on the latter, the former necessarily received summary treatment.

It is generally known that the Communist International is the international organ of the Communist parties of the world. It was created following the Russian Revolution and held its first congress in 1919. At present it has representatives from sixty-six different countries. About half of these parties have been driven underground by the various national governments in power. The Communist International usually gives financial aid to those parties which have been declared outside the law. It should therefore be clear to conservative governments throughout the world that in making Communistic parties illegal, they are in actual effect increasing the assistance likely to be given them by Moscow.

In 1919, 1920, and 1921 the American movement received some financial help from Russia. Now it is self-supporting and receives no financial aid from the Third International. On the contrary, today it is actually

sending some money back to Russia, according to a statement of Zinoviev.

In order that the official position of the Russian Government towards the Third International might be clear, I interviewed A. N. Mikoyan, the People's Commissar for Foreign and Domestic Trade, who is also a member of the all-powerful Political Bureau of the Communist Party. My questions and his official answers follow herewith.—JEROME DAVIS.

First Question: It is known that the Komintern* is located in Moscow, that it is sending small amounts of money and sometimes agents of the Communist Party to other countries. It is the aim of the communist parties of other countries to seize power by violence overthrowing the capitalist governments. Naturally, this is furthering the revolutionary movement in China, India, Germany and other countries. If the Soviet Government wants to be left alone, why does it not leave other countries alone? Why does the Soviet Government tolerate the existence of the Komintern in Moscow?

Answer: The Soviet Government must not be identified with the Komintern and I as a member of the Government cannot speak in the name of the Komintern. The Communist International exists by itself, apart and independent from the Soviet Government. It is difficult to understand on what "principles of freedom and justice" the Komintern should not be permitted to remain in Moscow. The Komintern does not receive any financial aid from the Soviet Government. We have enforced the strictest laws against any kind of propaganda by agents of the Soviet Government in any country and anyone who would violate these rules would be discharged. Even the raid by the English

* Communist International.

Police on the Arcos and the Russian Trade Delegation in London proved the fact that neither the Trade Delegation nor Arcos is in any way connected with the Third International. It is true England claims to have found a certain list of names on one of the employees. We doubt whether this is true, but even if it were, it is purely a personal affair of that particular clerk and such an employee would be held strictly accountable. Even the English authorities had to confess that there was nothing else found on anybody. If anyone on the staff of the Soviet Delegation were found guilty of carrying on propaganda, he would be immediately discharged.

In America today there exists the Amtorg Company* which has in its staff some Soviet employees. It is said that you have in the United States a very experienced police force and there is nothing which can be hidden from it. If the employees of the Amtorg were engaged in propaganda, your police would have soon found it out. The fact that no one of the employees of the Amtorg has ever been accused of carrying on propaganda shows how false all such accusations are.

Some time ago the British Government made a protest against the transmission of money by the Russian Trade Unions to the striking English coal-miners. The Soviet Government cannot interfere when the workers or the people of the Soviet Union wish to collect and transmit money for kindred organizations abroad which are in need of money to carry on their fight for the betterment of their conditions. A similar collection was made in the United States, of course not to the same extent, but it did not occur to England to send any notes of protest to the American Government on this account.

* The official Russian-American trading corporation.

The only country to whom England sent a hostile note was the Soviet Union.

It is impossible for the Soviet Government to interfere in the mutual relations between the Komintern and the Communist Parties of other countries. Communist parties exist in all countries. In a number of countries communists carry on their work quite openly and without any interference, having their representatives in the Parliament; as, for instance, in Germany, England, France, Czecho-Slovakia, etc. It is therefore quite incomprehensible why the Soviet Government alone should place obstacles in the way of the activities of communist organizations, when even the conservative bourgeois governments of various countries are compelled to tolerate the existence of legal communist parties.

The Soviet Government is asked to exercise pressure upon the communist organizations of other countries in order to limit their activities and their propaganda. In addition to the fact that the Komintern and the Communist organizations are not subordinated to the Soviet Government, such acts would actually mean interference in the internal affairs of foreign states. The Soviet Government which has not allowed heretofore and will not allow henceforth any interference in its internal affairs, is in general against the interference of one state in the internal affairs of another.

At the same time we cannot be induced to restrict our workers' organizations in expressions of sympathy or in assistance to communists of other countries, just as the American Government could not keep their citizens from sympathizing with and helping, let us say, the Sinn Fein party in Ireland. I know, for instance, that a loan was obtained in America to help the Sinn Fein

party and that the money was used for purchasing arms and ammunition. The Soviet Government has given no financial aid to the Komintern and the communist parties of other countries. It is true, that some of the Soviet officials are at the same time members of the Komintern, but in this respect they do not differ from members of other governments. Mr. Vandervelde, Prime Minister of Belgium, is at the same time one of the leaders of the Second International. When he goes to the League of Nations, he appears there at one and the same time as head of the Second International and as Prime Minister of Belgium. Yet this does not raise objections from any one. We are in possession of proofs that some of the members of the Second International made attempts to organize a rebellion in Georgia, yet it did not occur to us to send notes to the Government of Belgium requesting them to stop the Second International from maintaining its offices in Belgium, or to prohibit members of their government from being members of the Second International.

In conclusion, I wish to refer to the fact that the Soviet Government in its notes to foreign powers has repeatedly emphasized the falsity of the assertion of identity between the Soviet Government and the Third International. I will cite, for instance, part of the official note of the Assistant People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs to the British Minister of Foreign Affairs of September 27, 1921:

"The Russian Government wishes to take this opportunity of emphasizing once more, as it has repeatedly done before, that the Third International, for very obvious reasons, chose Russia as the headquarters for its Executive Committee, this being the

only country giving full freedom for the spreading of communist ideas and also personal freedom to communists.”

Second Question: Inasmuch as the Soviet Government and the Komintern are under the control of the Communist Party, is it not true that the policies of the Soviet Government and the Komintern will be identical?

Answer: This question is not quite clear to me. The Soviet Government is at the present time composed chiefly of members of the All-Union Communist Party, but the Soviet Government should by no means be identified either with the Communist Party or with the Komintern. The majority of the English Government are members of the Conservative Party, which, however, does not lead to the assertion that the British Government and the Conservative Party is the same thing. The same is true of your Government, which is composed of members of the Republican Party, yet it acts quite separately from the Republican Party. It is also said that Soviet Officials, who belong to the Communist Party, are supporting by their membership dues the Communist Party and through the latter, the Komintern. I do not see that there is anything to this which should raise questions in any one's mind. I was told that Mr. Coolidge, President of the United States, is donating money for foreign missionaries. It is believed by many people that the foreign missionaries have provoked unrest in China and that in particular during the "Boxer" rebellion, the Chinese tried to rid themselves of foreign missionaries. Even though Mr. Coolidge, or his Government officials have been financially helping Chinese missionaries, the American Government is by no means responsible for the deeds of missionaries, inasmuch as

this financial aid was a private affair of the members of the American Government, and inasmuch as this subsidy was not expended from the funds of the United States Treasury. The same applies to the Soviet Government. Inasmuch as the Soviet Government has not been extending any financial aid to communist organizations from the State treasury, the Soviet Government cannot be held responsible for the actions of communist organizations.

What I have said, I am sure, will convince you that America has been given false information about our policy. All the propaganda against the Komintern and its seeming connection with the Soviet Government is merely a pretext. Had the Communist International chosen another country for its headquarters, our enemies would surely have found some other pretext to hinder the building of a Socialist State in the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics.

Before closing, I want to remind you that at the Geneva Conference of 1927 the question of the possibilities of peaceful cooperation and the coexistence of the capitalist and the socialist systems of national economy was discussed. The Conference, having fully and thoroughly analyzed this problem, decided:

“Considering the importance of peaceful trade and the desirability of abstaining from politics, the Conference thinks the participation of members of all countries present—*irrespective of all the differences in their economic systems*—is a happy sign for future *peaceful trade relations* between all nations.”

One of the best means to check all the falsehoods which are being spread against the Soviet Union by all its enemies, is the maintenance of direct contact between

American business men and the Soviet Union, and their visiting our country, where they can see for themselves the vast possibilities for economic *rapprochement* between these two countries. This is especially true since there are no antagonistic interests and no direct causes for conflict involved.

The experience of many Americans, who have visited this country for business purposes, has shown that upon their return to America they gave up their former prejudices against the Soviet Union and, while they did not hide the shortcomings which still exist in our economic structure, they none the less fully contradicted all the assaults and calumnies spread broadcast against the Soviet Union.

I believe that if representatives of our trade and industry will, on the other hand, visit America, it will help us to better learn and know the achievements of American science and technique, as well as facilitate the establishment of normal trade and cultural relations with the United States, which will be beneficial to both countries.

FOREWORD

I HAVE not attempted in this book to do more than sketch the main outlines of the subject, while I have given prominence chiefly to those features whose recital illuminates the whole course of foreign relations. But, naturally, within the limits given, it has been impossible to present a complete record of diplomatic exchanges; or to give more than a brief selection of representative documents. The treatment of Asiatic questions, in particular, is highly compressed. But any attempt to unravel the very complex foreign policy of Britain, or to trace its working out in relation to the Soviet Union in Asia, or to set forth in order the rapidly changing actions and reactions of the seething peoples of China and the Middle East, would involve such a mass of events as to demand a separate book for the treatment to be adequate.

I have to acknowledge the very great help I obtained from Mrs. Pollard in the preparations of materials for this book.

R. PAGE ARNOT

June, 1927.

CONTENTS

<i>Chapter</i>	<i>Page</i>
EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION	vii
PREFACE	xiii
FOREWORD	xxi
I. BREST LITOVSK: THE FIRST PERIOD OF SOVIET DEMOCRACY	1
II. INTERVENTION AND CIVIL WAR	13
Soviet-German Relations in 1918	18
War on Soviet Russia	22
III. THE FORMATION AND GROWTH OF THE COM- MUNIST INTERNATIONAL	26
IV. THE OUTLOOK OF SOVIET RUSSIA ON THE WORLD	31
Foreign Relations in General	31
V. AMERICA AND SOVIET RUSSIA	39
VI. THE BRITISH EMPIRE CALLS A TRUCE	48
VII. FROM THE VOLGA FAMINE TO THE GENOA FIASCO	60
VIII. THE FLUCTUATIONS OF BRITISH POLICY	71
The First Attempt to Break the Agreement	71
Recognition	74
The General Treaty of Peace and Its Collapse	75
The Second Attempt to Break the Agreement	78

<i>Chapter</i>	<i>Page</i>
IX. RELATIONS WITH THE FRENCH REPUBLIC AND	
ITALY	87
Soviet Russia and the French Republic . .	87
Soviet Russia and Italy	95
X. JAPAN AND SIBERIA	98
XI. RELATIONS WITH GERMANY AND THE BORDER	
STATES	104
Germany	104
The Treaty of Rapallo	108
The Berlin Treaty	112
The Border States	113
Rumania	117
Soviet Russia and the Lesser European States	118
XII. SOVIET RUSSIA AND THE SEMI-COLONIAL COUN-	
TRIES	120
Afghanistan	122
Persia	123
Turkey	125
XIII. SOVIET RUSSIA AND THE CHINESE REVOLUTION	130
APPENDIX	141
Official Statement of the United States Gov-	
ernment on Intervention	141
Chicherin's Note to Woodrow Wilson . . .	143
Text of Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement,	
March 16, 1921	153
Four Clauses from the Soviet-Persian Treaty	162
Soviet Russia's Relations with America .	164

SOVIET RUSSIA AND HER NEIGHBORS

CHAPTER I

BREST LITOVSK: THE FIRST PERIOD OF SOVIET DEMOCRACY

IN 1917, when the Russian Revolution broke out, it was welcomed by the Allies as they welcomed the invention of a new kind of tank. For them it was an instrument for winning the War. For many people, this remained the only standpoint by which everything that fell within the years 1917, 1918, and even 1919, was judged. No one among the Allies troubles to analyze what the Revolution was in its essence—the overthrow of one class by another. No one took the trouble to understand that the Revolution meant different things to different people: that for the worker the Revolution meant bread, for the peasant the Revolution meant land; and for the soldier the Revolution meant peace.

Consequently, when power was taken by a party which was prepared to make the revolution a real thing to the masses of the Russian people, that party and the government it formed was regarded simply as an obstacle in the Allied project of crushing Prussia and her associates. The new Bolshevik government of November 7, 1917 would, they felt, not last. It was composed, many of them believed, of German spies. Under these

circumstances it must not be recognized; the refusal of recognition alone would help to bring it tumbling to the ground, within a few days, or a few weeks at most. Meantime such patriotic pro-Allied elements as existed in the country must be discreetly helped with money and munitions. Sooner or later the Bolsheviks would be overthrown and the Soviets subdued. As and when that took place the war against Germany could be resumed, the front rebuilt, and the whole of the actions of the revolutionaries blotted out so that everything would be as if these Soviets had never been. This was the standpoint of the Allied Embassies in the closing months of 1917. It was the standpoint that led them from non-recognition into the fostering of sabotage, from sabotage to the giving of subsidies to the counter revolution, and from that to the encouragement of counter-revolution and the waging of war on an extensive scale.

The position of the United States of America was slightly different from that of the Allies. The United States had not entered the war until after the February Revolution: her armies were not to arrive in Europe until after Russia was out of the war. The United States was not a party to the secret treaties that bound the Czardom to the British monarchy and the French Republic. The Government of the United States was not "Allied" with the other powers fighting against the Central Empires, but "Associated," and thus it was possible for it to have a policy of its own, both as regards Germany and as regards Russia. In the closing months of 1917 and the opening months of 1918 it appeared as though this freedom of policy and action would be exercised. The Bolsheviks had approached the negotiations—or rather the *pourparlers*—for an armis-

tice with a demand for definite agreement on the principles to be negotiated. The Russian peace formula had been laid down at the session of the Second All Russian Congress of Soviets which met on November 7. It had been made more precise in a note sent by Trotsky, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, despatched on November 20, in which he announced that the Congress of Workmen's, Soldiers' and Peasants' Delegates of All the Russias, had instituted on November 8th a new Government of the Republic of All the Russias, and that this Congress had approved proposals for a truce and for a democratic peace without annexations and without indemnities, based on the principle of the independence of nations and of their right to determine for themselves the nature of their own development.

These proposals were met by the Allies with silent scorn. The Germans took another line. The German Chancellor, Count von Hertling, in his speech to the Reichstag on November 29th, declared that a discussable basis for the opening of negotiations might be found in these proposals. The Government of the United States, in its turn, made a response which was none the less a response though it took the form not of a reply to the Soviet Government, but the beginning of a new statement of Government policy. The peace formula enunciated as the Soviet Government's policy had been currently put forward in Russia for the previous nine months. President Woodrow Wilson, in his Address to Congress on December 17, 1917, said: "You catch with me the voices of humanity that are in the air. They grow daily more audible, more articulate, more comprehensive, and they come from the hearts of men everywhere. They insist that war shall not end in vindictive action of any kind; that no nation or people

shall be robbed or punished because the irresponsible rulers of a single country have themselves done a deep and abominable wrong. It is this thought that has been expressed in the formula 'No Annexations: No Punitive Indemnities.'" He then referred to the way the people of Russia had been led astray by the diligent German use of this formula, and ended by saying, "The fact that a wrong use has been made of a just idea is no reason why a right use should not be made of it. It ought to be brought under the patronage of its real friends."

Thus the Russian revolutionary Government had enunciated the peace formula, the German Chancellor had accepted it, and the President of the United States had taken it over. On the basis of this formula the Soviet Government proceeded first to negotiate a truce, then a formal armistice, and finally to enter on peace negotiations with the representatives of the Central Empires. Each stage of the negotiations was public; this had been insisted upon by the Russians. Between each stage they formally notified the Allies of the progress of these negotiations. The truce negotiations were interrupted for a week to enable the Allies to take part in the negotiations. "In case of a refusal" said Trotsky's Note of December 6, "they must declare clearly and definitely before all mankind the aims for which the people of Europe may have to lose their blood during a fourth year of the war." Again on December 17, Trotsky notified the Allied Embassies that the Armistice negotiations had reached definite results, and peace negotiations would begin, and asked them to participate or to state whether they wished peace or not. On December 22, the Russian Delegation put forward its six peace points, being an expansion of the peace formula, to which Count Czernin replied with acceptance

of the general principles. Thereafter on the proposal of the Russians there was a further suspension of negotiations for a fortnight to enable the new principles of peace to be communicated to all the belligerents, in order that general peace negotiations might start on this basis. Only if the Allies refused to participate would negotiations for a separate peace go forward.

Meantime it had become clear that the representatives of the Central Empires had accepted the peace formula only in order to put forward under cover of its phrases a purely annexationalist peace of plunder and robbery. When this became clear there was much discussion in Moscow. Was it possible to break the armistice and resume war? In view of this possibility, informal negotiations were established through the medium of Colonel Raymond Robins, head of the American Red Cross, between the head of the Soviet Government and the American ambassador. It was stated that if the war was resumed the United States would furnish munitions and the ambassador would urge the recognition of the Soviet Government. But resumption at that point was hopeless—as indeed it had been hopeless for many months previous. The Czarist war machine had almost completely broken down by the middle of 1916. The famous offensive of July, 1917 had ended in utter rout and in a demonstration of the unwillingness of the Russian soldiers to advance another step or fire another shot.

Then the unexpected happened. Instead of going back and humbly accepting the Germans' terms, the Russian delegation returned to Brest Litovsk, headed this time by Trotsky, and there used the Peace Negotiations (broadcast each day by wireless) as a sounding board from which to appeal to the masses of Germany and Austria to rise against their Governments. Instead

of accepting humbly, they used all their powers of argument and denunciation to expose the emissaries of the Kaiser and the Austrian Emperor in their true colors. For days the debate went on. It was at this point that President Wilson addressed Congress and outlined his famous Fourteen Points. He referred to the parleys in progress at Brest Litovsk, and praised the Russians not only for presenting a definite statement of principles, but a definite program for the concrete application of these principles. On the other hand he pointed out that the program of their adversaries meant any way "that the Central Empires were to hold every foot of territory their armed forces had occupied, every province, every city, every point of vantage, as a permanent addition to their territories and their power." He then said, "The Russian representatives have insisted, very justly, very wisely, and in the true spirit of modern democracy, that the conferences they have been holding with the Teutonic and Turkish statesmen, should be held with open, not closed doors. And all the world has been audience,* as they desired." He then made his statement on world peace, partly in answer to the Central Empires, but chiefly as a response to the Bolshevik peace formula. "There is, moreover, a voice calling for the definitions of principle and of purpose, which is, it seems to me, more thrilling and more compelling than any of the more moving voices with which the troubled air of the world is filled. It is the voice of the Russian people. . . . They call to us to say what it is we desire, in what if in anything our purpose and spirit differed from theirs; and I believe that the people of the United States would wish me to respond with utter sincerity

* That is, only to the extent allowed by the censorship in France and other countries.

and frankness. Whether their present leaders believe it or not it is our heartfelt desire and hope that some way may be opened whereby we may be privileged to assist the people of Russia to attain their utmost hope of liberty and ordered peace."

Then came the famous Fourteen Points, beginning with "open covenants of peace, openly arrived at." Amongst these points it is necessary here to quote the Sixth, the Acid Test:

"The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest cooperation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unembarrassed and unhampered opportunity for the independent determination of her own political and national policy, and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing, and, more than a welcome, assistance of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their good will, of their appreciation of her needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy."

Meantime at Brest Litovsk a struggle of an extraordinary nature was going on. The delegates of the Central Empires confronted the representatives of Soviet Russia and discussions were carried on in a tone that became more and more acrimonious. General Hoffman protested against the wireless appeals that were being launched by the Soviet Government to the peoples of Austria and Germany to rise in rebellion against the Kaiser and their other rulers, to which protest Trotsky curtly replied "Neither the conditions of the armistice

nor the character of the peace negotiations limit freedom of speech." Actually the negotiations were rapidly becoming unreal, as every shred of conciliation between the two parties vanished; and they were continued for the time being only with the object on each side of carrying through an ulterior purpose.

The ulterior purpose of the Bolsheviks was to rouse a revolt among the German troops and the civil population against the Kaiser and the military chiefs. The object of the German and Austrian military chiefs on the other hand was to break the Russian front by detaching from it the representatives of the Ukraine. The Ukraine had been recognized by the Bolsheviks as an independent Republic; free to enter or to leave the Russian Federation of Republics. The Ukraine Rada, or National Assembly, was in the beginning of December the representative authority for the Ukraine, but by the time the negotiations at Brest Litovsk were resumed in January they had no longer the same authority. The development of the revolution in their rear had placed in power at Kiev a Government of Soviets of the same kind as held power in Moscow. As the Ukrainian delegation had already shown itself much more manageable than the Bolsheviks, the Central Powers, particularly the representatives of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, showed a special eagerness to conclude peace with the Ukrainian Rada delegation before it was replaced by a Ukrainian Soviet Delegation which was likely to stand pat along with the Soviet representatives from Moscow. These then, were the ulterior motives of the two parties now engaged in the negotiations struggle at Brest Litovsk, the one striving to break the front of the Central monarchies, the other to cause a defection of the Ukraine from Great Russia.

an[The Allies, apparently unaware of these wheels within wheels, accorded to the Rada the *de facto* recognition which they steadfastly denied to the Soviets, in the apparent belief that the former would put up a stiffer fight against the Germans, and would refuse to make separate peace. Actually the reverse was what happened. The Ukrainian Rada representatives accepted the *de facto* recognition of the Allies, discussed the question of a loan from the French Government, and at the same time—at the end of January—began, at first secretly and then openly, to abandon their support of the Bolshevik delegation and to negotiate separate terms on a basis particularly favorable to the Central Empires.

Meantime the object of the Bolsheviks looked as if it too might be achieved. Just at the end of January a series of strikes for peace, for bread and for liberty broke out in Berlin and other chief towns in Germany and Austria. For a moment it looked as if the daring plan of the Bolsheviks might succeed; but only for a moment: it was not until nine months later that the revolution broke out that overthrew the Hohenzollerns and the Hapsburgs. The strikes in Berlin were quieted by the issue of extra food rations, and the German front, though shaken, was now reestablished.

The German delegates now dropped every pretense at the language of conciliation and nakedly put forward their annexationist proposals. The Bolsheviks, faced by the failure of their attempt to break the German front, and by the defection of the Ukraine from their own side, were at length confronted with the issue of signing the Treaty or renewing the war. In truth, however, this alternative did not exist. The old Czarist Army—or such portions of it as had not demobilized itself—was in no mood to fight. The peasant

soldiers of whom it consisted were anxious for nothing but to return to their homes. But sign the peace of annexations the Soviet representatives would not. They issued a decree of demobilization and declared the war at an end.

This, however, did not suit the Germans. They knew very well that the Soviet authorities had been discussing ways and means of raising a new army that could be depended upon to fight. If they had accepted the line taken up by the Bolsheviks it might merely have meant that as soon as a Red Army was constituted with new equipment and new morale they would find their seizure of Lithuania, Courland and the other border provinces endangered. They insisted on their full program of a dictated peace being signed. They denounced the armistice and set their troops in motion. The war was resumed; the German invasion of Russia began. At first the Bolsheviks attempted a resistance, but in doing so they were hoping against hope. As it turned out, their earlier fears were right; the broken and demoralized troops of the Czar refused to fight or gave way without resistance to the invaders. There was no help for it; they would have to sign the dictated peace. They sent their delegations once more to meet the Germans, and the peace of Brest Litovsk with new and onerous terms was signed on March 3, 1918. Two days later the Peace Treaty was signed by Roumania and the Central Powers at Bucharest, and the day after that between Finland and Germany.

The peace was yet to be ratified by the Soviet Congress, but that ratification was a foregone conclusion, in spite of the opposition of the Left Social Revolutionaries. The peace delegation had said in its statement on signing the Peace: "We openly state before the face of

all workmen, peasants and soldiers of Russia and Germany, before the face of the laboring and exploited masses of the whole world, that we are compelled to accept the ultimatum dictated by the side which is at the present time most powerful, and are signing immediately the peace treaty presented to us by ultimatum, desisting from any deliberations on it whatsoever." It was in this spirit that the ratification of the Treaty of Brest Litovsk was carried through. Lenin, in making the principal speech for ratification used the words: "We are compelled to sign a Tilsit peace. We must not deceive ourselves. We must have courage to face the unadorned, bitter truth. We must measure in full, to the very bottom, the abyss of defeat, partition, enslavement, humiliation, into which we have been thrown. The nearer we understand this, the firmer, the more hardened and inflexible will become our will for liberation, our desire to arise anew from enslavement to independence, our firm determination to see at all costs that Russia shall cease to be poor and weak, that she may become truly powerful and prosperous."

Meantime the Allies in spite of unofficial negotiations had still withheld their recognition from the Bolsheviks though they had so readily plunged into recognition of the evanescent rulers of the Ukraine. To this policy there was one exception. America was not yet in the toils of the Entente diplomacy, and though the Ambassador at Moscow had not accorded formal recognition, the equivalent of this recognition appeared to be given by the special message sent by President Woodrow Wilson to the Congress of Soviets on March 11. The message ran as follows: "May I not take advantage of the Congress of the Soviets to express the sincere sympathy which the people of the United States feel for the Rus-

sian people at this moment when the German power has been thrust in to interrupt and turn back the whole struggle for freedom and substitute the wishes of Germany for the purposes of the people of Russia? Although the Government of the United States is, unhappily, not now in a position to render the direct and effective aid it would wish to render, I beg to assure the people of Russia through the Congress that it will avail itself of every opportunity to secure for Russia once more complete sovereignty and independence in her own affairs and full restoration to her great role in the life of Europe and the modern world. The whole heart of the people of the United States is with the people of Russia in the attempt to free themselves forever from autocratic government and become masters of their own lives."

To this the Congress of Soviets sent the following reply: "The Congress expresses its gratitude to the American people, above all to the laboring and exploited masses of the United States, for the sympathy expressed to the Russian people by President Wilson through the Congress of Soviets in the days of severe trials.

"The Russian Socialist Federative Republic of Soviets takes advantage of President Wilson's communication to express to all peoples perishing and suffering from the horrors of imperialistic war its warm sympathy and firm belief that the happy time is not far distant when the laboring masses of all countries will throw off the yoke of capitalism and will establish a Socialist state of society, which alone is capable of securing a just and lasting peace as well as the culture and well being of all laboring people."

Thus ended the Brest Litovsk stage of the relations between Soviet Russia and her neighbors.

CHAPTER II

INTERVENTION AND CIVIL WAR

THE stage was set at Brest Litovsk. In the center of the drama is the new Soviet Power, and grouped about it in varying degrees of hostility, and in various relations, are the anti-Bolshevik forces within Russia, ranging from the international socialists headed by Martov on the extreme left, to the monarchists and Constitutional Democrats who were already beginning to muster their forces in the South and South East. Then there are the Central Powers on one side; the Powers of the Entente together with America on the other. Both German and Entente Powers exhibit varying degrees of friendliness to the anti-Bolshevik forces. But it is clear that Bolsheviks are disliked, both as friends and as enemies. On the German side, the aversion felt for the Bolsheviks by the partisans of the Hohenzollerns and the Hapsburgs is covered for the moment by a veneer of diplomatic relationship; while the aversion felt by the Allies is for the moment colored by the friendly approaches of President Woodrow Wilson.

But besides the Allied Powers and the enemy Powers, there are also the neutrals such as Spain, Sweden, etcetera. It might be thought that they, not being directly concerned with peace or war, would be able to extend to the Bolsheviks the recognition that was held back—ostensibly for military reasons—by the Powers of the Entente. This, however, is not so. The revolu-

tionary program of the Bolsheviks had aroused a very decided antipathy towards them on the part of the minor European States, who are only too glad to follow the example of the Allies and make their communications with the new Soviet Power as distant and shadowy as might be.

We may now survey the various stages in the relations of Soviet Russia with her neighbors:

(i) The first stage covers the period from the Bolshevik Revolution on November 7, 1917, to the end of 1918 and is characterized by the dying away of the previously existing foreign relations. In this period Brest Litovsk is by far the most significant episode.

(ii) The second period is that of direct foreign intervention which, beginning before the armistice, is developed and continued mainly during 1919 and 1920.

(iii) Out of the third or truce period, lasting from 1921 to the end of 1923, there comes the movement towards trade and the growth of recognition. This truce period is characterized by three features: firstly, the building up of new economic relations inside Russia as well as outside, which developed from the spring of 1921 onwards; secondly, by the occurrence of great international conferences, such as Genoa, the Hague, and Lausanne; thirdly, by the failure, despite the efforts of certain powers, to break the relations that were growing up in 1923.

(iv) Lastly, we have the period of Recognition. This begins with the year 1924, and within twelve months it embraces the majority of the European States. It is from this point, after recognition has

been accorded and while trading relations are being built up, that we are mainly concerned to show the exact nature of those relations between Soviet Russia and her neighbors.

All the time, however, these new relations of the last three years are conditioned by the history of the first seven years after the revolution. It is necessary, therefore, in the remainder of this chapter to sketch out the vicissitudes of the months that followed immediately upon Brest Litovsk. The later history of the Intervention, and the beginnings of the Truce period are told in the chapter dealing with Anglo-Soviet relations.

During the whole process of the Brest Litovsk negotiations, from the end of November to the beginning of March, there had been local struggles going on throughout all the former territory of the Czardom; for the revolution in Russia had not occurred simultaneously, but in one district after another. By the March Congress of Soviets at which Brest Litovsk was ratified, and to which President Wilson's greeting was read, it appeared as though there would now be a brief respite during which a new revolutionary army could be built up (application was made to the Allies for a military mission for this purpose), the works of peace begun, and the economic reconstruction of the country carried through. There was, however, to be no respite. Only a few weeks elapsed before the Allies, or at any rate a section of the Allies, began an intervention which was presently to develop into war against Soviet Russia.

In May, 1918, a very large number of Czecho-Slovak prisoners were induced to revolt on the understanding that their revolt would be part of the price of the Republic of Czecho-Slovakia. In June the British landed

a force at Murmansk, ostensibly to prevent the Murmansk coast from being used by the Germans and the White Finns as a base for submarines; but it soon became clear that the British authorities were hostile to the local Soviets. Archangel was presently occupied, the Bolsheviks expelled, and an anti-Bolshevik Government set up and maintained by British bayonets. In the forces that held Archangel were Americans, Serbians, French and British soldiers, with the latter predominant.

From the spring of 1918 onwards Japan had been attempting to gain a footing in Siberia. The Japanese Empire had had very little to do in the war beyond securing for its own use those parts of China and of the Pacific which had previously been in the hands of the Germans. No one regarded the Japanese as very staunch allies in the latter part of the war. It was universally recognized that they were in the war for what they could get out of it. The new turn of affairs in Russia seemed to offer them a chance of territorial expansion. But the Allies were not particularly willing to see Japan in control of Siberia. It would be easier to get her in than to get her out. Of all those who were fighting against Germany the power least inclined to acquiesce in a Japanese occupation of Siberia was the United States. But amongst American Governments, that of which Woodrow Wilson was the head had shown itself much more complacent towards Japan's schemes than any other Government before or after. In 1915 the Lansing-Ishii correspondence had assisted Japan to acquire an enormous sphere of influence in China, a sphere that was little modified until the Washington Conference of 1921. Now it was a question of a sphere of influence in Siberia, and as it turned out, it was not until seven

years later, in 1925, that the Japanese finally withdrew all their troops.

At the moment, however, the scruples of the American Government were gradually overcome, and in August, 1918, the State Department issued a Note in which they agreed to a *joint* occupation of Siberia by the Allied troops. It will be seen from this statement (printed in the Appendix) that the troops in Siberia were to be present in equal numbers, limited to 7,000 on each side. Actually within a short time the Japanese had got the better of the bargain. In the first place they appointed officers who were senior to all other officers in the Allied command, and who therefore took precedence; so that General Otama became Commander-in-Chief. In the second place the Japanese army was increased to the number of 77,000 in a countryside which contained no more than a two million population in the vast stretch from the Ural mountains to the sea of Okhotsk. Under the protection of these Siberian Allied forces the Soviets were dispersed, the Bolshevik Governments or bodies overthrown and others set up in their place. These others were at first composed of partisans of the various Parties that had formed the revolutionary democracy of the spring and summer of 1917, but as the occupation advanced those anti-Soviet parties were extinguished one by one, and in their place there appeared open partisans of the Czarism. The most notorious was Admiral Kolchak. He gathered his forces, comprised of Monarchist Russians, a stiffening of the Allied troops in which the British largely predominated, together with an army conscripted from the population of the regions over which he advanced. By November, 1918, his forces had advanced almost to the Urals where a number of representatives of the dissolved Constituent

Assembly under the leadership of Avxentsief had formed a Government. This government was dissolved by a *coup d'etat* by Admiral Kolchak, who cast its members in prison and executed several, whereupon Admiral Kolchak secured still more hearty support from the Supreme Council of the Allies.

In the meantime throughout the spring and summer of 1918 the Germans had been making similar attacks on the territory of Soviet Russia. They had occupied the Ukraine, and had advanced beyond Ukrainian territory into the territory of Soviet Russia and down towards the Caucasus. At the same time they equipped and maintained a section of Czarist Russians who were to operate against the Russians. This Germanophile section of Czarist Russians maintained friendly relations with an Ententeophile section which relied on the support of the Allies advancing from the South into the Caspian. Thus in the spring and summer of 1918 Soviet Russia was being ringed round with enemies, and there seemed to be a tacit agreement between the two great world coalitions then locked in warfare, that Soviet Russia was a neutral power which could not be allowed to survive. The only difference was that the Allies for all this period refused to recognize the Soviet Government, while the Central Powers extended to it a nominal recognition.

SOVIET-GERMAN RELATIONS IN 1918

Immediately after Brest Litovsk, peace having been declared, ambassadors were exchanged. The German ambassador in Moscow, Count Mirbach, found himself the representative of a power which still appeared strong and united in a country where the central authority was only gradually being built up. Further, this cen-

tral authority had not only difficulties with those who had not yet acknowledged the sovereignty of the Soviets (I am speaking now of the brief period of weeks after Brest Litovsk), but internally within the Soviets there were great differences. One of the Parties within the Soviets, the Left Social Revolutionaries, was, up to the Brest Litovsk Congress, by far the most numerous. After Brest Litovsk its representatives left the Government and formed an opposition inside the Soviets, an opposition for the moment in the sense that oppositions exist in Britain or America, between parties which accept the fundamental laws of the State but which are divided from the Government party on questions of immediate policy. There were several points on which the Left Social Revolutionaries differed very deeply from the Soviets, the most important being on the question of the land. But the question on which they chose to force an issue was that of foreign policy.

After Brest Litovsk the Germans had occupied the Ukraine, had not only driven out or murdered the Soviet Ukrainians but had dissolved the middle-class government that had taken their place, and set up instead a Hetman called Skoropadsky, who was, of course, a mere puppet in the hands of the Germans. The regime of Skoropadsky was one of internal terror against the peasants and workers of the Ukraine. Under this German rule the big landlords were brought back and it became clear that so far as the Germans were able, they were going to restore the institutions of Czardom. Further, in various parts of Russia, beyond the Ukraine which had been arbitrarily occupied by German forces—the German military authorities, in fixing a provisional frontier with the Soviet authorities, had insisted on leaving open the Donetz frontier—the same regime was

enacted and combined the worst features of an alien invasion with the worst features of the regime they had overthrown. No party in the Congress of Soviets or in its Central Executive Committee had anything but detestation for these events, but the Bolsheviks were unwilling to force a rupture until their respite had enabled them to carry out reconstruction: the Social Revolutionaries, on the other hand, desired a rupture at once.

The position of Ukrainian-Russian relations was indeed peculiar. By the terms of the Treaty of Brest Litovsk, the Soviet Power was obliged to recognize the Ukrainian Rada and to negotiate a Soviet-Ukrainian Treaty. For this purpose, a Soviet delegation proceeded to Kiev, to carry on negotiations, first with the Rada and then with Skoropadsky. But they were not intent on carrying out treaty negotiations so much as on rallying the Ukrainian peasantry and town workers against Skoropadsky. And so the negotiations were dragged out throughout all the summer of 1918, at which time the German power was steadily becoming weaker and weaker.

The Germans, however, were not inactive. They were preparing to overthrow the Soviet power in Great Russia just as the Soviet delegation were busy sapping the German ascendancy in the Ukraine. Accordingly, the German general staffs in Kiev and Minsk prepared three monarchist armies:

1. the North Russian Army, afterwards transformed into the armies of Yudenitch,
2. the South Russian Army,
3. the Astrakhan Army.

Apart from these, Denikin was in the Kuban, where he maintained a certain freedom of decision. Krassnov,

released on *parole d'honneur* by the Bolsheviks, was building up an anti-Bolshevik force in the Don region, just where the Ukrainian border was left open. In addition to military preparations, the Germans found that they could rally to their side several of the most prominent Russian civilians. Amongst them was Professor Miliukoff, the pro-Ally Minister for Foreign Affairs in the first days of the Revolution, who had now gone over to the German side.

Altogether, the situation was one which from the Soviet standpoint required careful handling and forbade any premature break. The Social Revolutionaries, however, were bent on a break.

When they found in the Soviet Congress of July, 1918, that they were outvoted on the question of foreign policy, they resolved to force the hands of the government by an act that could not be smoothed over. They assassinated Count Mirbach, the German Ambassador. At the same time, they proclaimed a new revolt against the Bolsheviks. That revolt was liquidated within a few hours or a few days at most, and the Bolsheviks became the sole organized party within the Soviets. But the assassination of the Ambassador was not something that could be passed over. The Germans, after Brest Litovsk, had made several demands, some of them outrageous, to which the People's Commissars had agreed. The Germans now made a new series of demands as reparation for the assassination of Mirbach, amongst which was the stipulation that a couple of battalions of German Guards should be brought to Moscow to protect the Ambassador. The Bolsheviks unhesitatingly refused, and offered instead protection by voluntary companies of soldiers drawn from the German colonists on the Volga, established some scores of years before in the

time of Catherine the Great and other rulers. The successors of Mirbach accepted this compromise; but when they found the German colonists mostly of a Bolshevik outlook they decided that it would be easier to conduct the duties of a German Embassy within the territory guarded by German soldiers, and accordingly withdrew to the Western border.

As each month of the summer passed, the German military powers were becoming weaker and the Bolsheviks stronger. A supplementary Treaty of September 6, 1918, modified the harshness of the Brest Litovsk terms. Finally on November 5, a few days before the conclusion of the armistice, the Russian Ambassador was expelled from Berlin and the German diplomatic representative withdrawn from Russia. That is to say, a few days before the armistice was signed, Germany and Soviet Russia were within measurable distance of war. And immediately after the armistice, the German officers and military authorities readily agreed with the Allies that they would not retreat from territories occupied by them until the territories in question were taken over by armies of the Allies or recognized by the Allies.

WAR ON SOVIET RUSSIA

The armistice was marked by two significant steps in foreign relations. On October 24, Chicherin, People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs, sent to President Wilson a note in which he took up the use of American soldiers and American munitions against the Soviet Government for the preceding months, and made a comparison of this intervention with the views expressed by President Wilson in the Fourteen Points of January 18, in the greeting to the Congress of Soviets which

ratified Brest Litovsk on March 11th, and in the note to Germany on the armistice conditions. The note was written caustically enough, and was mainly an attempt to subject the actions of the Woodrow Wilson administration in regard to Russia to the same acid test for which Wilson himself had called. The second event of importance was the repudiation by the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet Congress on November 13 of the Brest Litovsk Treaty. The note to President Wilson met with no response; there was no move towards peace on the part of the Allied and associated Governments. On the contrary, it may be said that it was only with the coming of the Armistice on November 11, that the war on Soviet Russia began to develop in earnest. Not only were all communications broken off, both on the part of the Allies and on the part of the Central Powers, but one after another the embassies of the neutral powers were withdrawn from Russia. The Soviet Republic was becoming a pariah amongst the nations.

On November 7, 1918, the Sixth Congress of Soviets made a solemn offer to the Entente powers to begin peace negotiations. No reply was received to this communication. In the next twelve months that offer was repeated ten times, but did not appear on any occasion to have any effect. The Russians supposed at first that if a cessation of hostilities did not come with the Armistice, at any rate the opening of the Peace Conference in January, 1919, would bring a move towards peace. Two of the big figures of the Peace Conference appeared to be in favor of such a move. President Wilson had an idealistic program which included the establishment of peace in every country of the world, both then and for the future. His schemes for world peace, for a

League of Nations, were viewed with aversion by the chief military powers, but once his opponents learned that acceptance of the Wilsonian principles was the easiest method of obtaining a modification of their practical application, it was easy to carry out policies which appeared directly opposed to all that Wilson had proclaimed. Mr. Lloyd George was in a different position. He it was who with the assistance of President Wilson initiated a proposal for the cessation of hostilities in Russia and for a Conference of all the warring parties at the island of Prinkipo in the Sea of Marmora. This proposal, however, fell to the ground; it was not accepted by any of the various White Russian Governments, although the Soviet Government accepted it. A similar fate befell the Bullitt Mission, and later, in the spring, the offer of Fridtjof Nansen, the famous explorer. For in each case Mr. Lloyd George's aspirations for peace were brought to the ground by a revolt of his own party in parliament. These schemes gave frequent hopes of peace, but in retrospect it can be seen they merely ruffled the surface of the main current of open warfare.

During this period of open warfare—at first between the Allies and the associated powers and the soldiers of the Soviet Government, then between the various Czarist generals and Soviet Russia, and lastly between the border States and Soviet Russia—the relations of the Soviet Government to her neighbors were all of an abnormal nature. First there were notes or communications sent through unofficial agents, mainly consisting of negotiations on the exchange of prisoners and repudiations of the Soviet peace offer. Secondly, there were protests sent by wireless. Thirdly, there were appeals, not to the Governments which refused to recognize the

Soviets, but to the working classes of the Allied countries or to the working classes of the world as a whole. It was in this period when Soviet Russia was ringed round by hostile States that the Third International—or Communist International as it is now usually called—was formed.

CHAPTER III

THE FORMATION AND GROWTH OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

To regard the Communist International as a propagandist organization set up by the Soviet Government for its own purposes would be a complete misreading of history, for this revolutionary international organization had its origin in events that happened before the Russian Revolution took place. After the International Association of Working Men (usually called the First International) in which Karl Marx was the chief figure had run its ten years' course from 1864 onwards, there were various scattered international meetings of working class organizations, of trade unions, and of political parties, but it was not until 1889 that the various Socialist Parties and Trade Unions came together in an international congress which was considered to have re-founded the international organization. To this was given the name of the Second International. This Second International held congresses at three-year intervals up to the eve of the war in 1914.

During the first twelve years of the twentieth century it had become apparent that there were two main tendencies inside this Second International, the Reformist and the Revolutionary. In the half dozen years that preceded the war the Reformist section was getting stronger. On several questions the division of opinion was acute: on the question of the colonies of the Great

Powers, on the question of participation in capitalist governments, on the question of war. Harmony appeared, however, to be reached on this last question, and it was generally understood that if war broke out the various Socialist Parties that made up the International would strive against it, and if their attempts were not successful would continue to fight against their Governments participating in such a war. By some of the European Governments this organization, the Second International, was regarded as a serious obstacle, but when war actually broke out in 1914 it became clear that in each country most of the sections—practically all the sections dubbed "Opportunist"—together with certain groups from the revolutionary section, were wholeheartedly in the struggle alongside their Governments. In Germany the Social-Democrats supported their Kaiser's Government; in France the Socialist Party actually participated in the Government.

In the months that followed this collapse of the Second International, there were not a few of the writers of the revolutionary section of the International who said in each country that the collapse was irremediable, and that a new or third international must be built. The Third International indeed was heralded as soon as the war began, and the idea of such an International was put forward at Conferences of Anti-War Socialists. Within three years after the outbreak of war it was clear that there would be no reestablishment on a united basis of the old Second International, and that the revolutionary section would form a new International to take the place of that which had collapsed in 1914. The actual formation of the Third International (Communist International) dates from the news of the attempt made at the time of the Paris Peace Conference to hold

a meeting of Socialist Parties at Berne. This attempt to resuscitate the Second International led at once to the summons of a meeting to prepare the next meeting of the revolutionary International, which became the first congress of the Third or Communist International, held in Moscow in March, 1919. This first congress discussed the thesis put forward by Lenin under the title "Bourgeois Democracy and Proletarian Dictatorship" in direct contrast to the Berne discussion of "Democracy versus Dictatorship."

The next fifteen months were marked by a struggle between these two international gatherings for the allegiance of the various socialist parties throughout the world. The Italian Socialist Party gave its adherence to the Third International; and so many of the important socialist parties, in France, in Germany and in other countries gave either an unconditional or a provisional adherence that it appeared as if many parties containing views mid-way between the old Opportunists and the old Revolutionary sections would be included in the new Communist International. For this reason the second Congress of the Communist International, held in the summer months of 1920, was devoted to the laying down of positive and negative proposals. The positive proposals outlined the theory of revolutionary socialism; the negative proposals made arrangements whereby all Reformist elements were to be excluded from the Parties before they could be accepted by the Communist International. This second gathering was the real formative Congress of the Third International. Its statutes and rules were here laid down, and also the main lines of its program. The parties of which it was composed were of varying strength. In some cases, as in Great Britain and the United States, they were feeble in num-

bers; in other cases, such as Germany and France, they included an enormous membership. Its headquarters were established at Moscow, on the anticipation that in no other country would free play be allowed for its activities. This second congress was followed in July, 1921, by a third congress, in November, 1922, by a fourth congress and in June, 1924, by a fifth congress. It is anticipated that the sixth congress of this International will be held in the summer of 1928.

From the time of the formation of the International in 1920 onwards, protests were made by the various governments against the activities and the subversive propaganda of the Third International, and the Soviet Government was charged with the responsibility for this organization. To these accusations the Soviet Government replied that the headquarters of the Communist International happened to be in Moscow just as the headquarters of the Second International happened to be in London, but that the Soviet Government would not make this latter fact a cause for upbraiding Lord Curzon. At another time it was pointed out that leading members of the Soviet Government were also leading members of the Communist International, and it was retorted that leading members of the Second International had held the highest positions in Germany (Ebert was President of the Reich and there were a succession of Social Democratic Chancellors), that Ramsay MacDonald, a member of the Executive of the Second International had become Prime Minister in Great Britain, and that the secretary of the Second International had become the Secretary of State for Home Affairs in the British Government. These reproaches and retorts were regularly exchanged each time the strained relations between the Soviet Government and another government

led to an interchange of notes. Ramsay Macdonald, Labor Prime Minister in 1924, and the Tory Foreign Secretary in May, 1927, made such protests to the Soviet Government. The attempts to identify the Soviet Government with the Communist International and the repudiations of that identity by the Soviet Government have invariably been part of the arguments exchanged between Soviet Russia and her neighbors. But if Soviet Russia is not the same as the Communist International, it still requires to be asked what is the standpoint of Soviet Russia towards her neighbors, what is the outlook of this revolutionary State after years of war and intervention, towards the countries with whom she states her desire to be at peace.

CHAPTER IV

THE OUTLOOK OF SOVIET RUSSIA ON THE WORLD

FOREIGN RELATIONS IN GENERAL

SITUATED in the middle and north of the heartland of the Old World, with ports opening on the Arctic Ocean and on the Baltic Sea in the far west, with Odessa and other Black Sea ports on the southwest, with her eastern shores lapped by the waters of the Bering Sea, the sea of Okhotsk and the Sea of Japan, the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics stretches from the 26th parallel of longitude to the 190th parallel of longitude—nearly half way round the northern world—and finds itself nearest to the great populations of Europe, of India and of China. The peoples of Africa and the states of North America are remote from her; Australia and South America remoter still. Geographically the closest relations are on the west with a group of states most of which were part of the former Czarist Empire: from Finland on the extreme northwest to Roumania on the extreme southwest; and on the south with the states of the Middle East (Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan) over which the Czarist and the British Empire contended for influence. Further east, after a point where the plateau of the High Pamirs just touches the confines of the Indian Empire, the southern border of the U. S. S. R. runs with the northern marches of China by Sinkiang

(Chinese Turkestan), Outer Mongolia and Manchuria, until it reaches the port of Vladivostok looking out towards the islands of Japan.

But geographical relations are extended to economic relations by shipping and transport. The Union of Socialist Soviet Republics is fundamentally an agricultural country, and this would naturally make for particularly close relations with such countries as Great Britain and Germany, to whom agricultural produce would be traded in return for machinery and metal manufactures. It would be possible, therefore, to compile a list of states which because of their relatively high industrial development would have a natural economic relationship with the Soviet Union. But "natural" economic relationships are colored by past history and present political policy. Thus the question of the repudiated Czarist debts on the one hand, or the damage done by the intervention of 1918 to 1922 on the other hand may cause an atmosphere hostile to economic relations.

But primarily, the outlook of Soviet Russia on the surrounding world is one of historical perspective in the light of Marxist theory. (The Russian Revolution is not, like the American Declaration of Independence, based upon a simple statement of the right and duty of insurrection against any Government which fails to secure to men "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.") Its philosophy is that of the Materialist Conception of History. The class divisions in human society are regarded as a fundamental characteristic of mankind during the historic period, and the struggle between those classes is considered the motive force in historic development. Thus the Puritan Revolution in England in the seventeenth century is regarded as a struggle of the rising middle class against the feudal monarchy of the Stuarts,

the French Revolution as the struggle of the French bourgeoisie against the Feudal classes represented by the noblesse, the monarchy and the church, and the American Revolution is similarly explained.

The Russian Revolution is regarded as an acute class struggle in which to the proletariat in alliance with the peasantry has come victory over all the other classes, big landlords, small landlords, bourgeoisie (capitalists) and urban petty bourgeoisie. The rest of the world is seen as an arena of class struggle in which the protagonists are the capitalist class and the proletarian class, with the remaining classes and orders of society aiding one class or other. This standpoint is fundamental. It is written into the Constitution of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, which opens with the following declaration:

Since the time of the formation of the Soviet Republics, the states of the world have divided into two camps: the camp of capitalism and the camp of socialism.

There—in the camp of capitalism—national enmity and inequality, colonial slavery and chauvinism, national oppression and pogroms, imperialist brutalities and wars.

Here—in the camp of socialism—mutual confidence and peace, national freedom and equality, dwelling together in peace and the brotherly collaboration of peoples.

The attempts of the capitalist world for a number of decades to settle the question of nationality by the combination of the free development of peoples with the system of the exploitation of man by man have proved fruitless. On the contrary, the skein of national contradictions is becoming more and

more tangled, threatening the very existence of capitalism. The bourgeoisie has been incapable of organizing the collaboration of peoples.

Only in the camp of the Soviets, only under the conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat, mustering round itself the majority of the population, has it proved itself possible to destroy national oppression at the roots, to establish an atmosphere of mutual confidence and lay the foundation of the brotherly collaboration of peoples.

Only thanks to these circumstances have the Soviet Republics been able to beat off the attacks of the imperialists of the whole world, internal and external, only thanks to these circumstances have they been able successfully to liquidate the Civil War, and to secure their own existence and commence economic reconstruction.

This Constitution of 1923 follows on the Declaration of Rights of the Exploited and Laboring Masses of 1918 in a way somewhat similar to the sequence from the Declaration of 1776 to the Constitution of 1787. The Declaration goes on to give the reasons why the various Soviet Republics should come together in one Union, and among the reasons given is that "the instability of the international situation and the danger of new attacks renders inevitable the creation of a united front of Soviet Republics in the face of its capitalist environment."

Thus the risk of new attacks is actually one of the chief reasons for the binding together of the very diverse Soviet Republics into a single Union. That this should take so prominent a place in the minds of the Soviet legislators is a measure, both of their past experience and their present outlook. In the past they look

back on the record of the Civil War and the intervention: they see that intervention, when unsuccessful, gives place to economic isolation and blockade. Even after there is a break in the blockade, the itch for intervention continues. Proposals are made for Treaty Ports to be established on the model of nineteenth century China. Then, when the great famine caused by the drought in the Volga provinces results in an appeal for aid, the American Relief Administration, stands alone—along with voluntary organizations—in giving aid without any stipulations as to political or economic concessions. Later the Conference of Genoa appeared to many to be largely an attempt to argue Soviet Russia out of concessions which it had not proved possible to extort with the bayonet. At the present day half of the chief states of the world have no diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia, and among that half are the two most powerful Governments of the world, the United States of America and the British Empire. The experiences of the intervention and its sequel burnt deep, and is not to be eradicated by a merely negative attitude on the part of the other states, or by the mere cessation or slackening of active intervention. Even had there been no Marxist theory to guide them there would, on the most purely empirical grounds, be a strong case for a suspicious outlook on the world across the borders of the Soviet Union.

This vision of the world as sundered in twain between the republics of the Soviet Union and the republics and monarchies of the outside world does not lump together all the inhabitants of the world external to the Soviet Union as predatory and inimical. On the contrary, the world outside is considered as fundamentally divided against itself into governing classes on the one hand, and subject peoples and classes on the other, with the latter

of whom the U. S. S. R. has expressed and continues to express a strong sympathy. Under the title "colonial peoples" they include not merely subject races like the Koreans under the Japanese Empire, or nominally independent nations like Egypt (actually under British control), but also all nations or countries which by their backward condition of development industrially are easily subjected to the financial domination of neighboring Great Powers. "Colonial peoples" includes the peoples of China, of Persia, of Arabia, etc., etc. In a sense the Russians at one point just missed themselves becoming a colonial people at the time when the penetration of western European capital, either by force of investment or by force of bayonets, was at its deepest.

It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that because the relations between the Soviet world and the capitalist world are set out so nakedly in terms of class that it must needs follow that in the conception of the Soviet leaders the logical conclusion is perpetual war between the U. S. S. R. and her neighbors. We have had the Russian Revolution likened to the rise of Islam, or to the Conquests of Jenghiz-Khan. On the basis of these analogies, without any more particular examination of the conditions of the Russian Revolution, it is assumed that revolutionary principles in opposition to the rest of the world must necessarily result in the issuing forth of armies, as the soil of France in 1793 gave birth to armed men, and as the riders of Islam poured forth from Araby and Persia in the seventh century to conquer the effete civilizations of the Mediterranean and the Middle East. To accept these analogies as valid prognostications is to turn politics and the movements of society into a fairy tale or film drama.

The Soviet peoples have a positive and unusual in-

terest in continued peace. It is true that every country desires peace, and more certainly that the inhabitants of every country desire peace; nevertheless, within each country there are sections whose interests may bring the States of which they are members perilously near the war explosion. Are there such interests in the U. S. S. R.? It is difficult to find them. More important still is the economic position of the small peasant farmers, who make up the vast majority of the Russian population. The enormous demands of the armies from 1914 to 1918 stimulated agriculture in most countries; under the Czar it ruined agriculture. The peasant was taken from his fields, and no one was left to plough them. The grain was not brought to market, because the draught cattle had been taken away. On top of the Czarist war came three more years of Civil Wars that created devastated regions vaster than the fields of Northern France and Flanders. Apart from the pacific sentiment which he shares with the tiller of the soil in every country, the Russian peasant does not look on war as something that brings high prices, but as a measure of personal calamity and ruin. This interest of the peasantry in peace has been expressed time and again by the Soviet Government. I do not mean merely passionate declamations in favor of peace—in which art the statesmen of every country are virtuosi—but the practical applications of these sentiments. By the end of 1923 the Red Army, which had demobilized in 1921-2 in spite of the risks involved, was reduced from over 5,000,000 down to under 600,000—less than half the standard considered necessary by the Czars. This actual disarmament has been accompanied by definite proposals for disarmament at every Conference or negotiations of any magnitude since the end of the Civil War. Thus

the first session of the Conference at Genoa was marked by the proposal of the Russian delegates that disarmament should be discussed, while the first meeting of the Anglo-Russian Conference of 1924 found Rakovsky, the Soviet Plenipotentiary, putting forward his plea as a step for the maintenance of World peace.

The position may be summed up thus:

1. A fundamental antipathy exists between Soviet Russia and her neighbors.
2. But "the neighbors" are not likely to unite in a World coalition against Soviet Russia.
3. Further, the interests of the Soviet peoples is in continued peace and extended trade.
4. Therefore the antipathy, though not resolved, is prevented from issuing in war.
5. An equilibrium can be maintained between two coexisting though contradictory economic systems.
6. The maintenance of this equilibrium depends on trade and commerce, on credits and investments.
7. The corollary to foreign trade is the apparatus of trade delegations and embassies of general and commercial treaties.
8. General and commercial treaties are the skeletal structure of the relationships between Soviet Russia and her neighbors.

CHAPTER V

AMERICA AND SOVIET RUSSIA

THE independent sovereign states of the world, as listed in the reference books, number some sixty-five. These are the neighbors of Soviet Russia, and diplomatic relations may be entertained with each of them. Nevertheless, it is not necessary to think of the equation of Soviet policy as possessing sixty-five variants. For in practice these sovereign states arrange themselves in several well marked groupings. Amid all the ebb and flow, the eddies and backwaters of commerce and shipping, of investment and finance, of economics and politics, there is a well marked tendency for the currents to flow in and out of various centers—whirlpools or vortices, as it were, in the world stream. The center of one such vortex is the United States of America, of another Great Britain, and so on. Each of these world centers is marked, to begin with, by a threefold rhythm of raw materials sucked in, goods manufactured, and merchandise exported and exchanged. On this simple threefold rhythm there is imposed in modern times a more complicated movement of loan and investment capital. As this movement prevails more and more, the search for raw materials is transformed into an attempt to industrialize the country containing the raw materials, and with the help of cheap labor to build up local manufactures. Wherever this happens, the political influence of the world center from which the capital is being

furnished begins to be exerted. Where an undeveloped country receives the investment of more than one of the world centers an equilibrium may be established between their respective influences, and the developed country may retain a precarious independent sovereignty. At the same time the rivalry of the investors may lead to strained relations between the world centers of which they are citizens. This rivalry, however, may be smoothed over by common agreement between the powers, or in some cases by a consortium of the banking houses especially interested. Even when this happens there remains a certain amount of mutual jealousy and watchfulness.

It is not only on the undeveloped countries that the world centers exert their financial, political and economic influence; wherever conditions bring one of the smaller states, though it be of long standing and of a fairly high degree of industrial development, into specially close relations with a single one of the world centers, its foreign policy is apt to coincide with that of its powerful neighbor. For example, shipping and other relations of Great Britain with certain of the European states have resulted in a subtle connection so that the foreign policy of Greece, Portugal and Norway, is seldom inharmonious with the aims of British foreign policy.

If then the world of states outside Soviet Russia be viewed from this dynamic standpoint, it is possible to range them in groupings as set forth below. The first five are actual or potential world centers.

1. The States of the New World, centered in the U. S. A.;

2. the British Empire, including dominions, crown colonies and dependencies;
3. the French Republic and its colonies and allies;
4. the Japanese Empire;
5. the Kingdom of Italy and its dependencies such as Tripoli, Albania, etc.
6. the German Republic, seeking an orbit of its own;
7. the lesser States of Europe, usually planetary to one or other of the world centers;
8. the Western Border States, formerly dependencies of the Czarist Empire;
9. the colonial border states of the Middle East (Persia, Turkey, Afghanistan);
10. China.

Of the principal groupings among the sixty-five neighbors of the Soviet Union, the first and largest grouping is the New World, with the United States of America as world center. This center comprises not only the forty-eight States of the U. S. A. and Alaska, but the outlying territories of the Pacific, such as the Phillipines, Samoa and Hawaii, which from the standpoint of the Soviet Union would be described as colonial countries. At the same time the Republics of Cuba, Haiti and Costa Rica are viewed with so personal a regard by Washington that one British book of reference describes Haiti as a "virtual protectorate" of the U. S. A. In Central America, where the capital of the United States has been very largely invested, the influence of Washington is strongly felt, and recently in the case of Nicaragua has been openly demonstrated in the elections

and the civil war. Alone of these Central American States, Mexico has from time to time pursued an independent policy; but it is obvious that a large section of United States opinion finds it intolerable that this contiguous state, in which American interests are so strong, should not frame a policy in consonance with the outlook of the State Department. The South American Republics are not so closely linked with the U. S. A. They have been and are still a great field of investment for the European Powers. But when in 1917 the United States declared war upon Germany, the whole of South America vibrated in harmony with Washington, and one after another most of the South American Republics followed suit. The only State of this grouping which has recognized the Soviet Union and entered into diplomatic relations with it is the Mexican Republic. The declaration of recognition took place on August 4, 1924, and was contemporaneous with similar action on the part of many European States. In this, Mexico's policy was in strong contrast with that of the other states of the New World, so much so that its action has been regarded in certain quarters of the U. S. A. as another example of the desire on the part of Mexico to mark off a sharp line of difference from the policy of her nearest neighbor.

Canada, as part of the British Empire, shared in the recognition of Soviet Russia and had besides added its signature to the Trade Agreement which was in force between the U. S. S. R. and Great Britain from 1921 to 1927. But Canada, though appreciably influenced by the United States, is more properly dealt with in the chapters dealing with Anglo-Soviet relations.

The United States of America has not had any diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, nor has it ac-

corded recognition save for the messages of President Woodrow Wilson in the spring of 1918. After this first friendly greeting to the Russian Revolution, the policy of intervention was adopted by Wilson, and at Versailles he was one of the Supreme Council who directed and stimulated the intervention of 1919. Until the end of his period of office the policy remained the same, and the reversal by the Senate of the Wilsonian adherence to the Versailles Treaty, while it broke off any further American support to intervention did not substitute any positive friendly action. The Republican administration, first under President Harding and then under President Coolidge, have so far made no alterations in the policy of non-recognition. On the other hand without diplomatic or consular representation a large amount of trading has been carried on. Concessions have been granted to American citizens in the Soviet Union, and purchases have been made of machinery and other goods on behalf of the Soviet Union. The other States of the New World have but little commercial relations with the Soviet Union. They are, like the Soviet Union, preponderantly agricultural countries, which gives little basis for an exchange of products. The arguments against recognition have been first, that it is unnecessary; secondly, that it would have dangerous internal reactions. It was considered unnecessary because America had no pressing need of the great potential market of the Soviet Union. Sufficient outlet for its goods are found in closer neighbors, and above all in the enormous home market. Again, on the side of capital investment, the very large reserves of capital that mounted up after the slump of 1921 have in recent years found an outlet on the continent of Europe. The Dawes Plan of 1924 meant a huge spreading over of American

loans and American capital into Germany; while Italy and France, though to a lesser extent, have both received American investments. Even Britain, the financial rival of Wall Street, found it desirable to open a large credit with the United States in the spring of 1925 when the gold standard was restored. Australia, hitherto the reserve of the English capital market, has begun to take up American loans in recent years. From this point of view it is clear that only a severe depression of trade on the one hand or a glutting of the European and South American investment market on the other would make it *necessary* to initiate a policy of close friendship with Soviet Russia and at the same time secure concessions and opportunities for capital investment and open up a market for American goods among the hundred and fifty million inhabitants of the Soviet Union.

One of the explanations commonly offered for the attitude of the American Government towards the Soviet Union is that the two countries are rivals in the oil trade. Before the war Russia was, next to the United States, the largest producer of petroleum in the world. The share of Russia has dominated since then, but in the last few years Russian production has been steadily mounting up again, and in certain markets Russian oil products have been competing not unsuccessfully with the products of other oil-producing countries. It is asserted that the shares belonging to the former owners of Russian oil fields have been largely bought up by the various oil trusts outside the Soviet Union, and this it is held would be a further reason for hostility on the part of American oil companies to any recognition of Soviet Russia—unless at the price of their participation in Soviet oil fields.

The second main argument against recognition is that

it would lead to an increase of radical sentiments in the United States; that it would "open the door to Bolshevism." This fear was most strongly entertained in the years immediately following the war, when the anti-Red agitation took place, and when numerous convictions were obtained against persons holding socialistic or communistic views. Among them were two Italians, Sacco and Vanzetti, the agitation for whose release among people who believe them to have been innocent of the crime with which they were charged, led to their names being more widely known among the populations of Europe than that of the American President. Furthermore, apart from those sections of business men who would oppose recognition on the ground of its "opening the door to Bolshevism," there are a considerable number of Czarist and other anti-Bolshevik Russian émigrés, who exercise a certain anti-Soviet influence in the circles with which they are connected. Again the attitude of the American Federation of Labor is strongly hostile to recognition of the Soviets; but it may be surmised that any alteration in the policy of the State Department would be followed by modification of the attitude of the American Federation of Labor.

Similarly, two main reasons, one economic and one political, are advanced in favor of recognition. The economic argument advanced is that even though there be other markets both for goods and capital, and even though a certain amount of exchange of trade is taking place without recognition, there are sections of American industry which would receive great benefit from extended trade with Russia. Further, that recognition and diplomatic and consular representation would make the trading representatives of Soviet Russia much more ready to enter into relations with American business

men. Again, given recognition and guarantees, the large credits which particularly determine the distribution of Soviet trade orders, could be more easily furnished by the U. S. A. than by any other country, and that this would give a corresponding advantage to American manufacturers over the manufacturers of other countries. It is pointed out by those who take this attitude, that European Russia, Siberia, and the Far Eastern Provinces, are still countries wanting to be opened up by the building of railroads and other means of transport. They are thus in a somewhat similar position to the territories of the Middle West and the Pacific States some fifty or sixty years ago. England, they say, played a great part in financing and the building of railroads after the Civil War: why should America not play the same part in the territories of the Soviet Union?

The political argument is of a very different nature. It would seem that the problems of the Pacific may be enormously complicated if relations with Soviet Russia are allowed to drift. Japan is acutely aware of the isolation into which she was thrust by the breaking of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. But here, holding a long coast line, and with an illimitable hinterland, is the Soviet Union, also a Pacific Power and also like Japan, in a state of isolation. There is little affinity between the Japanese Empire and the Soviet Union, save in their circumstances. But just because of these circumstances, Japan might find it to her interest to cultivate a close friendship with the U. S. S. R. In such a case, the refusal of the U. S. A. to cultivate a counter-balancing friendship with the Soviet Power might lead to a situation which the State Department could not view with complacency. Thus the future possibilities and dangers of the Pacific may become at any moment an ar-

gument for good relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Another and much less self-regarding argument is the effect that recognition and friendly relations would have upon the peace of the World. In the last chapter it was shown that the people of the Soviet Union feel that they are in a beleaguered city to such an extent that they have written it into their constitution. The withholding of friendly relations on the part of any state whatever, must add to this feeling. When the state in question is America, the effect is much more serious, for withholding of recognition acts as a continual stimulus to all the forces in Europe that make for war. Each little group of war-mongers beholding the aloofness of America, feels that in the same proportion that recognition is refused to Soviet Russia, recognition is given to their own attitude of belligerency. War at the present time is never very far away in Europe, and particularly in eastern Europe. The influence and example of America extends widely and beyond even the activities of its consular and commercial agents. A decision on the part of America to open up friendly relations with the workers and peasants of Soviet Russia would materially diminish the danger of war in every country of the globe.

CHAPTER VI

THE BRITISH EMPIRE CALLS A TRUCE

THE story of the relations between Soviet Russia and the British Empire is a study in antagonism. The two States could not avoid the acutest clash of interests in field after field. Yet, at the same time, they had mutual needs which could only be satisfied by entering into close relations with one another. In the case of other countries, it might be possible for no relations to subsist between them and the Soviet Union. This was not possible for the British Empire. Logically, it must either enter on a struggle to exterminate the Soviet Power, or it must, on one question after another, make truce with it; out of which truce friendly relations would tend to grow.

The equilibrium established between Soviet Russia and other states has been precarious, but in no instance more precarious than in Anglo-Soviet Relations. The story of these relations, therefore, brings out, in strong light, all the difficulties which have appeared in greater or less degree with other States. At the same time, since the net of British influence is so far flung, the story of Anglo-Soviet Relations must include, in the telling, the history of other countries as well.

France and Britain had been the main-spring of the coalition against Soviet Russia. French policy, once it had entered upon a phase of hostility with the Soviet Union, could continue unchanged without causing any

great danger to the French empire. This was not the case with His Britannic Majesty's Government, which in any struggle with a Power holding half the lands of Asia, must leave many flanks exposed to attack. For Britain is not merely a World center of trade situated off the Atlantic Coast of Europe: Britain is also an Asiatic Power and has interests stretching along the South of that great continent—not only in India, but in the Far East and in the Middle and Near East as well. The number of native British in Asia is comparatively small, and Britain's position there is the maintenance of a vast Dominion, covering over one-fifth of mankind, by means of a relatively small military force and a prestige unchallenged in the last hundred years.

In the half century that followed the Crimean War, during which time the Czardom had been pushing the frontiers of its dominions ever nearer to India, Persia and Turkey, British Governments had looked with increasing anxiety upon the Southward movement: and it was known to them that any disturbance of the peace that had lasted during these fifty years would mean a shock to British prestige among the peoples of Asia. Therefore, as soon as it became clear that the crushing of the Soviets was not going to be such an easy business, a section of the British Cabinet, headed by Mr. Lloyd George, began to cast about for some way of reaching an agreement with the Soviet Power.

By the year 1919, the British Empire appeared to be at its zenith. It had emerged victorious from a war in which its closest commercial rival had been humbled and destroyed. The powerful German Fleet had been sunk in Scapa Flow and neither France nor any other of the Allied Powers might lay claim to it. The ingenious coinage of "Mandated Territories" had supplied

a phrase in which its Empire was extended and consolidated. The African territories of the German Empire that had lain athwart the British route from Cairo to Cape Town were handed over. The Turkish Empire was torn to pieces and Britain received the Mandate over Mesopotamia and Palestine, while Egypt, which before the War had been but lightly in the grasp of Britain, was now ruled by martial law under a strict Protectorate. By the action of the United States Senate in reversing the Wilsonian Triple Pact, Britain was released from the onerous obligation of a binding alliance with France, against Germany. Alone of all the belligerent European nations, her currency, public funds and financial power were still relatively unimpaired. With the withdrawal of America from participation in the troubled waters of Europe, Britain seemed in a fair way to become sole financial arbiter. But at this very moment the British Empire found itself threatened by revolt from within. On the one hand, the working class agitation for higher wages, shorter hours, and cessation of interventionist wars was rapidly growing and finding expression in widespread strikes. On the other hand, the peoples of India, whose miserable conditions had reached a point that can be measured by the death of thirteen millions in the influenza epidemic of 1919, were stirring in revolt against the autocratic rule to which they were subjected. Not only in India, but beyond its borders, wherever Indian immigrants were found, the same wave of revolt spread. In Egypt, the Nationalist Movement was becoming stronger and stronger. Most dangerous of all, in Ireland, the election of 1918 had returned an enormous majority of Sinn Fein M. P.'s who did not go to Westminster, but proceeded within Ireland to organize the

Irish Republic. Against this, British troops were contending with fire and sword.

In the history of the relations between Britain and Soviet Russia, after the troops were withdrawn, four periods can be clearly distinguished:

1. The period when the British Government began to move towards a truce with Soviet Russia at the beginning of 1920, ending with the downfall of Lloyd George in the Autumn of 1922.
2. The period of the first Baldwin Government—marked, chiefly, by an unsuccessful attempt to break the Provisional Agreement reached under Lloyd George.
3. The period of the Ramsay Macdonald Government of the first nine months of 1924—that of recognition and peace negotiations.
4. The period of the second Baldwin Government—that of progressive reversal of policy towards a rupture of relations—a step finally taken in May, 1927.

Within each of these periods, however, the policy was extremely fluctuating. When news came of success of the Red Army, the Lloyd Georgian policy of reconciliation was pushed forward. When the military news was unfavorable to the Red Army, the policy of conciliation cooled down and negotiations were retarded. The first period can be divided into five parts. The first is from January, 1920, until July, when the lines of the Trade Agreement as a preliminary to peace are laid down. The second period is that of the Russo-Polish war, accompanied by a renewal of the Civil War in which

the Czarist troops are led by Baron Wrangel. The third period runs from the defeat of Wrangel and the conclusion of peace with Poland up to the signature of the Trade Agreement in March, 1921. The fourth period runs from the decision to change the economic policy of Soviet Russia in the Spring of 1921 and covers the months of the famine on the Volga. The fifth period—that of the first half of 1922—runs to the end of the Conference of Genoa and the Hague.

The change in the British policy had been heralded by Mr. Lloyd George's Guildhall speech on November 8, 1919. By the end of December, it was clear that Kolchak and Denikin had suffered irremediable defeat, and on January 16, 1920, the Supreme Council of the Allies announced that in view of the Russian famine, facilities would be granted to the Russian cooperative organizations to "arrange for the import into Russia of clothing, medicines, agricultural machinery and the other necessities of which the Russian people are in sore need, in exchange for grain, flax, etc., of which Russia has surplus supplies. These arrangements imply no change in the policy of the Allied Governments towards the Soviet Government."

Within the next few weeks, it became clear, however, that the British and French Governments placed different interpretations on their common decision. The British Government was prepared to accept Soviet cooperators as coming within the terms of the Supreme Council's decision. It was arranged that a trading delegation should visit that country and that a Trade Agreement should be drawn up. On March 7, the United States Government announced the lifting of the Russian trade embargo. On April 7, the Russian Cooperative Commission met the inter-allied representatives at Co-

penhagen. A hitch occurred through the demand of the Allies that the Soviet Government should first recognize the debts of the former Czarist State and guarantee compensation for confiscated foreign property. This, the Russian delegates replied, was a question for negotiation with the Soviet Government and not with the cooperative representatives. Meantime, a Russo-Italian Trade Convention had been signed on March 31st between Litvinov, representing the Central Union of Russian cooperatives, and Cabrini on behalf of the National League of Italian Cooperatives. On April 11, the British Foreign Office asked the Soviet Government to grant an amnesty to the remainder of Denikin's Army then in the Crimea.

Meantime, very extensive military preparations had been made for a Spring offensive. This offensive began in April. It covered (i) a Polish-Ukrainian combination (Pilsudski and Petlura) in the West and South-West; (ii) the remains of Denikin's forces under General Wrangel in the South, supported by Allied warships and equipped with ammunition from the Allies; (iii) a Japanese offensive in Eastern Siberia. On April 4, the Japanese seized Vladivostok and began offensive operations with continual reinforcements. On April 24, the Polish-Ukrainian attack was launched on a 250-mile front and reached Kiev, the old capital of the Ukraine, on May 8. A telegram of congratulations "on the occasion of the chief national holiday in Poland" was sent by King George V to Marshal Pilsudski on May 3. Allied complicity was at first denied, but afterwards admitted by degrees. On May 6, Mr. Bonar Law—Mr. Lloyd George's lieutenant—denied that the Government was giving moral or material support to Poland. On May 11, Mr. Churchill admitted that the British and French

Governments had "helped to strengthen and equip the Polish Army." Finally, the discovery in the London docks of munitions actually in process of despatch to Poland and the refusal of the dockers to handle them led to the admission that these munitions had been given free to Poland by the British Government as far back as October. The Polish Foreign Minister in the same month was reported to have declared that the "Entente Powers regarded the Polish offensive as a necessary measure," while a Reuter message of May 3, quoted Japan's official representative at Vladivostok as saying that "Japan was not acting separately but that her policy had the approval of the Allies." It was clear that a two-handed game was being played, which was perhaps a reflection of conflicting opinions within the British coalition Government.

While the war movements were proceeding, the trade negotiations continued. By the end of May a Trade Delegation headed by Krassin had arrived in London. At the beginning of June it was stated by Lloyd George that Wrangel's offensive had nothing to do with the British, that British representatives had been recalled, and that no money, gold or munitions would be supplied; to which Chicherin replied on June 11 by radio, that Wrangel's offensive had only been possible because of previous British help, and urged immediate negotiations. On June 29, Krassin handed a note to Lloyd George in which he stated that should the British Government be unwilling at the moment to enter into official negotiations for the resumption of peace, an immediate resumption of economic and commercial relations would nevertheless be possible on the following basis:

1. All questions of foreign policy or material claims of Governments and subjects to be postponed to a Peace Conference.
2. Each Government to proclaim resumption of economic and commercial relations.
3. The fundamental principles of resumption to be (a) removal of mines in the Baltic, etc., (b) complete freedom of navigation to and from Russian Ports; (c) commercial relations on a basis of reciprocity and immunity; (d) validity of passports and other documents to be recognized.

"In conclusion, on behalf of the Government of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic, I have the honor once more to bring to the notice of the British Government and the entire British people, and particularly the British laboring masses, that it is the most urgent and earnest wish of the Government of Soviet Russia and of the entire Russian peoples, to conclude, at the earliest possible date, a full and general peace without reservation, with all the Powers who in recent years have taken part in hostile acts against her."

On July 1, Krassin embarked on a British destroyer en route for Moscow with a reply from Lloyd George, in which the following conditions were laid down:

1. No propaganda by either party, particularly not by the Soviet Government, among Asiatics, against the interests of the British Empire.
2. The immediate repatriation of British and Russian subjects.
3. Each Government to recognize the liability for

compensation to private citizens for goods and services rendered. Determination of liabilities to be left to a Peace Conference.

4. The conditions as to commercial facilities, etc., accepted.

It will be noted that the danger to British prestige in Asia was one of the causes driving the British Government towards a truce. It will be seen later that the Trade Agreement, when finally signed, embodied the conditions put forward by each side.

On July 10, Chicherin replied accepting the conditions, but not without a protest against the "affirmation contrary to the real facts relative to the presumed attacks of Soviet Russia upon the British Empire." On July 11, Lord Curzon replied from Spa, intimating that the negotiations would be resumed as soon as the delegates could return. To this he added a further proposal with regard to an armistice between Russia and Poland; (during June and July the Polish troops had suffered a severe reverse and the Red Army was now advancing into Poland). In a note to Chicherin on July 20, Lord Curzon said that the delegation must now delay their return until the Russo-Polish Armistice had been agreed to. In his reply of July 24 (referred to below) Chicherin protested against this violation of the Agreement and stated that the establishment of durable relations would be rendered difficult if agreements, after being adopted, were to be supplemented by new and unexpected conditions not stipulated before. The armistice note, mentioned above, sent on July 11 by Curzon, had stipulated what the frontier of Poland was to be: where the Russian armies were to stop: that a peace conference was to be held in London between Russia and all the

western border states: that an armistice with Wrangel was to be signed: that the Crimea should be left in Wrangel's hands, and that if the Russians went farther into Poland, the Allies, under the Covenant of the League of Nations, would assist the Poles with all the means at their disposal.

To this, on July 19, Chicherin replied with a note in which, after expressing pleasure at the new-found desire of the British Government for peace in Eastern Europe, he pointed out that the British, being still in a state of war with the Soviets, were not qualified to act as mediators. He referred to an error of fact in that "the British Government was deprived of all information regarding the peace between Russia and Lithuania when in its ultimatum of July 11 it pointed to Lithuania as one of the Border States with which Russia has still to obtain peace." He added that Russia was prepared to make peace at once by direct negotiations with Poland: offered Poland a better frontier than that proposed by the Allies: offered personal security for all Wrangel's troops and all civilians in return for complete capitulation: declined the proposal of the London Conference as unnecessary: declined to admit the right to interfere of the "group of Governments called the League of Nations, from which the Russian Government had never received any communication as to its creation and existence and has never had the opportunity of adopting a decision as to the recognition or non-recognition of this association of states." Lord Curzon replied on July 20, stating that the Polish Government was being urged by the Allies to apply for an armistice. This the Poles did on the 23rd, and the Soviet Government thereupon directed its supreme command to make arrangements for an armistice. The Russo-Polish armistice negotia-

tions, thus initiated, broke down on August 1, and therewith a rapid change took place in the situation. The French Government had now turned every effort to pouring munitions and officers into Poland in order to stiffen the resistance to the Soviet advance. At the same time, the military chiefs of the British forces began concerted measures for British military and naval operations. Notes and Memoranda of an ultimatory character were sent by Britain to Russia. For a moment, the peace of all Europe was threatened. On August 11, the French Government issued an official recognition of Wrangel. It appeared certain that the European nations would once more be plunged into war. All the progress towards peace was reversed. The possibility of another war, however, was so repugnant to the feelings of the masses of the population in Britain that spontaneous demonstrations of workers took place in various industrial centers; and when the Labor Party issued a call for effective demonstrations against war, it was responded to in every locality and councils of action were formed with the object of stopping war. This action on the part of the trade unionists received unmistakable tokens of sympathy from the shopkeeping and small trading class and indeed from all who had been but recently released from the horrors of the war of 1914-1918. Popular feeling was too obvious and too vehement for the Government to proceed, and the danger of war was staved off. Meantime, the reinforcements brought to the Poles had enabled them to inflict a severe defeat on the Red Army. The armistice negotiations were once more taken up, and eventually, by October 12, the Russo-Polish armistice and peace preliminaries between Russia, the Ukraine and Poland were signed. Wrangel, however, still remained, but by the end of November, after

severe fighting; his forces were driven out of the Crimea and safely conveyed, with French help, to the Balkan States.

While these military operations were going on and the issue still was unsettled, the trade negotiations were hung up. Relations between the two parties underwent a severe strain and the notes exchanged were acrid in tone. Eventually, after long delays, the parties came together and in the middle of March, 1921, the Anglo-Russian Trade Agreement was signed. The substance of the first paragraphs, which were a sort of substitute for the declaration of a peace treaty, has already been given in the account of the notes exchanged between Krassin and Lloyd George in the early summer of the previous year, but since this Trade Agreement both marked a distinct stage in the relations between Soviet Russia and other governments and since it was also the precedent for similar agreements with other nations, it is reprinted in full in the Appendix.

CHAPTER VII

FROM THE VOLGA FAMINE TO THE GENOA FIASCO

THE General Treaty of Peace, foreshadowed in the Preamble to the Trade Agreement, was not brought any nearer during the remainder of 1921. The famine on the Volga, which began in the summer of that year, seemed to have put a new complexion on the situation. The Western Powers met in the Council of the League of Nations and discussed schemes of financial aid, but that aid was conditioned on the concession of economic and commercial privileges and when it was made clear that no question of economic or political concessions in return for aid to the famine stricken peasants of the Volga would be considered, the proposals fell to the ground. Here the attitude of the Allies was thrown up in high contrast with that of the American Relief Administration in return for which no privileges, economic or otherwise, were demanded by the United States. The contrast was noted by the people of Russia. Undoubtedly a friendlier feeling was felt towards the United States with whose Government they had no official relations than towards the European Governments with whom Provisional Agreements had been reached.

This position of Provisional Agreement suddenly seemed to have reached the point of rupture once more, when in September, 1921, a note was sent by Lord Curzon to Chicherin, complaining of infringements of the

Trade Agreement and giving instances of propaganda alleged to have been carried on in India and Afghanistan. Chicherin, in his reply, sent on September 27th, was able to say that the British Note was founded largely on documents published by a notorious group of political forgers in Berlin; and the British Government was compelled to let the matter drop. This was the first, but it was not to be the last occasion when forgeries of this kind formed the basis of notes addressed to the Soviet Government. Meantime, throughout the autumn and winter, negotiations went on with regard to the question of Russian debts, and at the end of it, nothing was settled. It seemed as though negotiations might drag on interminably.

Two factors, however, were making for a settlement; one was the increasingly difficult situation of the British Government which was faced by a triple problem. The attempt to crush the Sinn Fein Revolt in Ireland had been so far unsuccessful that it had been found necessary to open negotiations with President De Valera and then with a body of negotiators. In India, the Mass Civil Disobedience Movement under the leadership of Ghandi was reaching a stage where a ceremonial procession of the Prince of Wales, the Heir Apparent to the Indian Empire, was met with an organized boycott. Finally the brief prosperity of 1919-1920 had been succeeded by a depression in trade worse than any within living memory in Britain.

The other factor was a belief, or at any rate a hope, that the Russian Revolution had changed the essence of its being and required but a little encouragement to alter the direction of its progress and move forward along lines not entirely dissimilar to those of Western European nations. The cause of this belief was the great

change of economic policy that had been resolved upon in the Soviet Congress in the spring of 1921. During the period of the Civil War, a comprehensive extension of State ownership and control over the whole domain of industry had been the cardinal feature of war economics. This was known under the name of "military communism." The Russian Revolution was regarded as an alliance between the peasantry and the town workers, and the link between these two was intended to be that the products of industry should be freely exchanged for the corn raised by the peasants. During the Civil War, this intention could not be carried out because the products of industry were entirely diverted to the munitioning and provisioning of the Red Army which stood at a figure above five million strong at the end of 1920. The economic basis of "military communism" was therefore held to be that the alliance of workers and peasants rested on an implicit bargain, namely, that the conquest of the land by the peasants should be defended by the Red Army against the White Russian invaders, and it was in this sense undoubtedly that the peasants understood they had a bond with the town workers. With the end of the Civil Wars, the Red Army was no longer felt to be so urgent and the continuation of the method by which all the peasants' surplus was requisitioned for the use of the Army and the town workers began to be felt as a burden by the peasants. The discontent grew rapidly amongst the peasant population and revolts in Kronstadt and in other regions, showing that the flash point had been reached, convinced the Bolsheviki that it was necessary to reconstitute the alliance of peasants and workers on a new basis.

This basis was found in the agricultural tax. No longer was the surplus of agricultural products (after

the peasant had fed his own family) to be requisitioned by the Government, but the peasants were to be left free to dispose of their surplus, provided that they paid a tax either in money or in kind. But the right given to the peasants to dispose of their surplus meant the revival of buying and selling, of free trade in corn and other products. It meant the opening of private trade, the growth of individual traders, the opening of shops; in a word, the revival of capitalism within limits. It meant that while on the military field the Soviets had been victorious, on the economic field they had suffered a severe defeat. Not only was private trading to be allowed, but with the removal of State management of the smaller factories and the mitigation of State control, State aid was also to disappear over what was anticipated would be a large field of industry. State institutions, State-owned factories, Cooperative Societies, etcetera, had all to prove themselves by their capacity to survive in the ordinary commercial struggle.

Capitalism, expelled by the pitchfork, had returned. There was, however, this very great though not immediately apparent difference from the capitalism of the Western States: that private trading and private enterprise and industry were subjected to the very strictest control, while the banks, monopolist industry, the means of transportation and above all, foreign trade, were retained in the hands of the State.

Resting on this economic basis, it was felt that the dictatorship of the proletariat remained unalterable whatever immediate concessions might be given to private enterprise.

The means chosen to extricate themselves from this defeat was given the name of New Economic Policy, familiarly referred to as NEP. With the difficulties

caused by the Volga Famine, the New Economic Policy was rapidly pushed forward and by the beginning of 1922, it appeared as though capitalism would soon be reestablished in Soviet Russia. The arguments with which Lenin urged and defended this turn about in Soviet economics are intrinsically of the greatest interest and were able to satisfy the Soviet Congress that there was no deviation therein from Marxist theory. To Lloyd George and other observers in Western Europe, however, it appeared that while communism and the dictatorship of the proletariat might be maintained in words, in substance capitalism was recovering and about to take its place as the dominant driving force of Soviet Russia as of every other land. A little encouragement, a little chaffering and above all, a little show of conciliation, and Russia could once more be admitted to the capitalist comity of nations. Some such reasoning as this was a powerful factor which, added to the other factor of the difficulties confronting the British Empire at home and abroad, sufficed to convince the Allies that the time had come for a general reconstruction of Europe. The Washington Conference of 1921 had been confined in its scope. It had dealt with the limitation of armaments, with problems of the Pacific, of China, and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The moment, it seemed, had come for a World Conference, on a wider scale, which should heal the wounds of war and reestablish the pre-war order of civilization.

With this object in view, at a meeting of the Supreme Council of the Allies at Cannes in January, 1922, it was decided to call a conference at Genoa in two months' time, to which all the Powers of Europe and the chief Powers of the World should be invited. There were numerous smaller problems to be settled and every Power,

it was thought, would have an interest in being present; but above all, it was desired to have the presence of the U. S. A. and the R. S. F. S. R. It must be understood that from the moment Congress had reversed the Woodrow Wilson policy and had declared for non-intervention in European affairs, one of the continual objects of British and of Allied diplomacy generally was to bring America back into the position once more of an "associated Power." For this purpose, it would seem, the financial conference of Brussels in the autumn of 1920 cast up all its reckonings in terms of dollars, and when in the autumn of 1921 the Powers had obeyed the behests of America and attended the Washington Conference, it was felt that America could not do less than grant the request of the Allies that wished to participate as a sort of elder brother in the affairs of Europe. But the State Department would not hearken to the voice of the charmer charming never so wisely. It was not until the time was judged to be right, over two years later, that America once again could be said to have intervened in the affairs of Europe; and even then, only in a limited manner. Nevertheless, throughout all this period, even when attempts to bring the United States in directly had failed, close regard was paid to what the State Department might do, or say, or think, so that even before the Dawes Report of 1924 was made operative and to a great extent after, America had at once a great influence and a great responsibility in the play upon the European Chessboard.

But while the Conference of Cannes failed to entice the U. S. A. into going to Genoa, the resolutions passed at Cannes were so framed as to make it possible for the Russians to accept the invitation. The resolutions ran as follows:

"The Allied Powers in Conference are unanimously of opinion that an Economic and Financial Conference should be summoned in February or early March, to which all the powers of Europe, including Germany, Russia, Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria, should be invited to send representatives. They regard such a conference as an urgent and essential step towards the economic reconstruction of Central and Eastern Europe, and they are strongly of the opinion that the Prime Ministers of every nation should, if possible, attend it in person in order that action may be taken as promptly as possible upon its recommendations.

"The Allied Powers consider that the resumption of international trade throughout Europe and the development of the resources of all countries are necessary to increase the volume of productive employment and to relieve the widespread suffering of the European peoples. A united effort by the stronger Powers is necessary to remedy the paralysis of the European system. This effort must include the removal of all obstacles in the way of trade, the provision of substantial credits for the weaker countries and the cooperation of all nations in the restoration of formal prosperity.

"The Allied Powers consider that the fundamental conditions upon which alone this effort can be made with hope of success may be broadly stated as follows:

1. Nations can claim no right to dictate to each other regarding the principles on which they are to regulate their system of ownership, internal economy and government. It is for every nation to

choose for itself the system which it prefers in this respect.

2. Before, however, foreign capital can be made available to assist a country, foreign investors must be assured that their property and rights will be respected and the fruits of their enterprises secured to them.

3. The sense of security cannot be reestablished unless the Governments of countries desiring foreign credit freely undertake:

(a) that they will reorganize all public debts and obligations which may have been or may be undertaken or guaranteed by the State, by municipalities, or by other public bodies, as well as the obligation to restore or compensate all foreign interests for loss or damage caused to them where property has been confiscated or withheld.

(b) That they will establish a legal and juridical system which sanctions and enforces commercial and other contracts with impartiality.

4. An adequate means of exchange must be available, and, generally, there must be financial and currency conditions which afford sufficient security for trade.

5. All nations should undertake to refrain from propaganda subversive of order and the established political system in other countries than their own.

6. All countries should join in an undertaking to refrain from aggression against their neighbors.

If in order to secure the conditions necessary for the development of trade in Russia, the Russian Government demands official recognition, the Allied Powers will be prepared to accord such recog-

dition only if the Russian Government accepts the foregoing stipulations."

[Resolutions moved at Cannes by the British Prime Minister on January 6, 1922.]

In response to this invitation, there was held a conference of all the States of Europe (with the exception of Turkey) and amongst the Pacific Powers, Japan. It was enthusiastically described at the time as an Ecumenical Council, greater than Versailles, greater than any since the Council of Nicaea in the fifth century A. D. For the first time since the end of the War, Germany and the other vanquished Powers were admitted on free and equal terms. But in practice the equality was not so obvious as it had been on paper, with the result that on April 16, 1922, two Powers concluded a separate agreement; Russia, at whom the Conference was aimed, and Germany, who had felt left out in the cold. This was the Treaty of Rapallo, the details and significance of which will be dealt with in the section dealing with Russo-German relations. The signature of the Treaty of Rapallo, while it strengthened the Soviet Power, put an end, at the same time, to the palaver.

The Allies, thereupon, compressed their attitude into a note. This note proposed an acknowledgment of debts both to States and subjects, and promised, in return, the flotation of more or less large loans for the economic reconstruction of Russia, wasted by civil war and famine. When ten days later the Bolshevik Delegation replied with a note in which they maintained the claim of the Russians that State debts must be balanced against damages (amounting to some £5,000,000,000) caused by intervention, and that acknowledgment and payment of other debts would be contingent upon cash down, the

Genoa Conference was finished. A proposal by the Bolsheviks to have details examined by a Committee of Experts at a further conference was agreed upon largely as a method of enabling the actors in this unsuccessful conference to retire from the stage with a good grace.

The proposed Conference of Experts was duly held at the Hague in June, 1922, but as was expected, nothing came of it. The bubble of Genoa had burst and had left nothing behind but an agreement to stop all war-like operations for a period of eight months, and the Russo-German Treaty of Rapallo, which had not been part of the Conference. Had Genoa succeeded, it would have been followed by treaties of peace between each of the Powers and Soviet Russia; and at the same time, the results of the Revolution would have been quietly liquidated. It did not succeed, and for another year and a half, the ostracism of Soviet Russia continued.

The Conference of Genoa marks a very definite stage in the evolution of the relations between Soviet Russia and her neighbors. Soviet diplomacy had learned its first lesson at Brest Litovsk; the second lesson was learned, and taught, at Genoa. There is more than a superficial resemblance between these two sets of negotiations. In each case, the Powers opposed to the principles of the Russian Revolution, as they understood them, had come to the conclusion that circumstances had reduced these principles to mere formulae requiring only a masterly interpretation to make them yield the same results as would naturally follow from opposite principles. If concessions in words were necessary, then concessions could be made. The formulae would be allowed to remain untouched, provided the substance was duly modified. Accordingly, the Germans expressed themselves ready to accept the principle of "no annexa-

tions and no indemnities", reserving the right to interpretate these formulae in a manner most convenient to themselves. The Allies, similarly, were prepared, if not to accept the formulae of the Revolution, at any rate to acknowledge it in the terms of the first numbered clause of the Cannes resolutions, viz:

"Nations can claim no right to dictate to each other regarding the principles on which they are to regulate their system of ownership, internal economy, and government. It is for every nation to choose for itself the system which it prefers in this respect."

But while they made this acknowledgment, which indeed was necessary if the Russians were to be brought to the Conference at all, they reserved the right to interpret it in such a way as would nullify their acknowledgment. Genoa failed, just as Brest Litovsk had failed, to tame the Bolsheviks. But whereas the Hohenzollerns and the Hapsburgs were in a position to force their interpretation upon beaten Russia, the new Russia that emerged from the Civil War could not be so roughly handled. The weapon of war could not be wielded by the Allies, and the weapon of ostracism, though powerful, was one at which the Soviet Power could snap its fingers.

CHAPTER VIII

THE FLUCTUATIONS OF BRITISH POLICY

THE FIRST ATTEMPT TO BREAK THE AGREEMENT

THE fiasco of Genoa and the Hague was followed by extreme coldness and growing hostility between Britain and Soviet Russia. This hostility was accentuated by the refusal of the Allied Powers to allow Russia full participation in the Lausanne Conference called to discuss the differences between the new Turkish Republic, headed by Kemal Pasha, and the Powers, and to settle the question of the Straits of Constantinople. Soviet Russia, as one of the Black Sea Powers, considered that she was especially interested in any question affecting the Straits, but the Soviet Republic was allowed to be present only as an observer and not as a full participator. The Conference of Lausanne was protracted, broken up, and again renewed. In the course of its deliberations, Vorovsky, the Soviet Representative at Rome, who acted as observer on behalf of Soviet Russia, was assassinated by a Swiss who acted in concert with Russian émigrés, an act which was considered by the Soviet Government to have been made possible only by the exclusive attitude adopted towards Vorovsky by the Allied Powers. The hostility grew greater.

Meantime, the Lloyd George Government in Britain had fallen in the late autumn of 1922, and a Conservative Government, headed by Bonar Law took its place.

The Conservative Government found itself bound by a Trade Agreement which, it is safe to say, it would never have consented to originate and from which not a few of the Governments were eager to be free. An agitation began in the spring of 1923, in the British Press, about the alleged repressive measures undertaken against religious bodies and persons in Soviet Russia. One London paper headed its editorial "War Against Heaven". At this time, a Prelate of the Catholic Church was being charged with espionage or the fostering of Polish secret agents on Soviet territory. But the Soviet Foreign Minister made it abundantly clear that no interference in this internal matter would be permitted from any outside Power. The agitation, however, served to create an atmosphere of tension in both countries.

When this atmosphere was at its height, at the beginning of May, 1923, a British Memorandum was sent to Soviet Russia. On May 12, a note was sent by Litvinov to the British Government, saying that the British Memorandum threatened a rupture of peaceful economic relations: that the two countries had received mutual benefits from trade: that normal relations were necessary but that a final settlement had been avoided by Great Britain: that recriminations were useless, but that the Soviet Government possessed numerous proofs of a breach of the Trade Agreement on the British side. Finally, it proposed a conference to settle all outstanding differences. On May 29, the British Government sent a further Memorandum in an ultimatory tone in which it was demanded that the Soviet Government should settle the Fisheries Dispute on the Murmansk Coast by admitting the right of non-Russian vessels to fish up to the three mile limit (the Soviet Government had con-

tended that the three mile limit of territorial waters was obsolete and should be replaced by a twelve mile limit, a contention which was afterwards successfully made by the United States Government on the question of liquor smuggling into the United States) and that the Soviet Government should pay amounts fixed by the British Government in compensation for the case of Mr. Davison and Mrs. Stan Harding, two British subjects who were alleged to have been wrongfully dealt with by the Soviet Government; that an enlarged and revised text as regards propaganda should be added to the Trade Agreement; that the Soviet Representatives at Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan, and Teheran, the capital of Persia, should be recalled. This note was treated throughout Europe as a threat of war. It caused angry demonstrations in Soviet Russia and the military apparatus of the Republic began to be overhauled. The language of the British Note had been stern and uncompromising. But the Soviet Government was not prepared to risk an outbreak of war or even the rupture of friendly relations because of hard words, and on June 11th, it replied accepting the main stipulations of the British Note, except as regards the removal of the Soviet Ambassadors in Persia and Afghanistan who were *personae non gratae* to Britain. The crisis passed over. There was no sign, however, of any approach to the General Peace Conference named in the Trade Agreement two years earlier, while relations continued so cool that the British Foreign Minister, Lord Curzon, refused to meet the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires personally. On the other hand, the difficulties in Europe caused by the French invasion of the Ruhr were such as to make it undesirable for Britain to go forward further on the policy of hostility.

RECOGNITION

The General Election which took place in Britain in December, 1923, resulted in a Labor Administration, the first in the history of that country. Ramsay Macdonald and his Party were pledged to friendly relations and one of their first acts after they had formally assumed Office was a British Note sent on February 1, 1924, in which *de jure* recognition was granted and a Chargé d'Affaires appointed to each country. At the same time, Soviet representatives were invited to come to London to draw up the basis of a General Treaty of Peace. The negotiators were to begin their work in April.

With the coming of the Labor Government in Britain, there began an entire change in Soviet Relations with other countries. The act of recognition by Britain was not the first. Germany had recognized Soviet Russia and exchanged Ambassadors two years before, at the time of the Treaty of Rapallo, while formal relations with the Border States of the West and with the states of the Near and Middle East, had existed for three years or more. But Germany, herself a pariah among the Nations after the Versailles Treaty, was in a unique position; while in the case of the Border States contiguous frontiers necessitated formal relations. The Note of Recognition by Great Britain gave impetus to an all-round movement, in the following order:

	1924	
Great Britain	February	1
Italy	"	7
Norway	"	13
Austria	"	20

Greece	March	8
Danzig	"	13
Sweden	"	15
Denmark	June	18
Mexico	August	4
Hungary	September	18
France	October	28

The Far East was also affected and China signed a Treaty on May 31st, while negotiations went on with Japan, which resulted in full recognition being accorded in the Convention signed on January 1, 1925. Thirteen states, several of them of major importance, had entered into full diplomatic relations with Russia in the course of twelve months. When the year 1925 opened, there were some two dozen states in full relations with the Soviet Power. Out of all the states of the world, more than a third part, including therein all the most important states, except the U. S. A., were at last approaching peace with the U. S. S. R. So far, however, there was no recognition by any of the states of the new world except Mexico, while Spain, Holland, Belgium, and half-a-dozen other of the smaller states of Central Europe and the Balkans remained aloof. The position except for England has not materially altered since then until the present day.

THE GENERAL TREATY OF PEACE AND ITS COLLAPSE

The London Conference which opened in April was long drawn out over four months. The main stumbling block was the question of debts, which term included the war debts of Czarism and of the Provisional Gov-

ernment, to the British Treasury: the Czarist loans raised on the British Stock Exchange: loss caused to British citizens by the nationalization without compensation of properties owned by British nationals. The chief Czarist loan was that raised by the Czar during the Russian Revolution of 1905, for the purpose of evading the constitutional regime to which the autocrat had been committed. A meeting of most of the Duma parties, including Liberals and Constitutionalists had, on behalf of any future government of Russia, repudiated any obligation for this loan whatsoever. At the beginning of 1918, the Bolsheviks, amongst other measures had proclaimed the repudiation both of this loan and of other loans and war debts. The British representatives raised the question of the repayment of all these debts, and the Labor Government was acclaimed by the *Manchester Guardian* as having showed itself as completely capable of defending the interests of the British Banks and investors, as "any capitalist Government". The arguments in reply of the Soviet Delegation were (i) as regards the war debts, that Russia had done her part for three years in the war and that since she had neither claimed nor received any of the spoils of the Versailles Treaty, this should liquidate any question of these debts; (ii) that counter claim of over £5,000,000,000 lay at the door of the Allies by damage caused by intervention and Civil War in Russia, for the purpose of which argument detailed accounts of the devastations caused were brought forward; (iii) that the Soviet Government would acknowledge the debt to private investors especially to holders of small amounts whose claims should be satisfied first if in return the British Government would guarantee the interest of a loan amounting in the first place to £30,000,000, to be raised on the British

Stock Exchange. All other questions than debts appeared capable of easy solution. The argument went on for months. Eventually, two treaties were signed at the beginning of August, one a general treaty, the other commercial, by which treaties all outstanding differences between the parties were settled. There was, however, an exception to this. The actual question of figures and debt arrangements on either side was left to be determined in detail by a subsequent treaty. But this subsequent treaty was to be on the basis that recognition of debts would be met by a guarantee loan and that State debts would be offset by reparation claims for the devastation of the Civil War.

The Treaty, though signed, had yet to be ratified by the British Parliament, an exceptional procedure which had been promised in this case by Ramsay Macdonald. It soon became apparent that neither the Liberals nor the Conservatives were prepared to ratify the Treaty as it stood and since these two parties together had a majority in the British House of Commons, the signed Treaty was in considerable jeopardy. Before the debate on ratification began, the Labor Government was defeated on an issue of domestic policy and the British Premier asked the King to dissolve Parliament in order that a general election might be held. During the general election, the newspapers published the text of a letter alleged to be from Zinoviev, President of the Communist International, which contained what purported to be instructions to the British Communist Party as to their conduct during the elections. Together with this was published a stern note from the Foreign Secretary, Ramsay Macdonald. Several Members of the Labor Government at once denounced this letter as a forgery; but their own Premier had, at least at first, accepted it as

genuine. The excitement caused by this in the last days of the election was sufficient to turn the tide, and the Conservatives returned to power with a great majority, with the Labor Party in a minority and with the Liberal Party almost extinguished. Before Baldwin took office as Premier for the second time, the Labor Government appointed a Cabinet Committee to examine the "Red Letter," which pronounced that they could not find sufficient evidence to say whether it was genuine or not. The new Conservative Government pronounced it genuine, as was to be expected since they had come into power largely on the strength of it. At the same time, they notified the Soviet Government that the Treaties would not be ratified.

Was the Zinoviev letter a forgery? For many people, this still remains unsettled. A Delegation of representative trade unionists, including the President of the International Federation of Trade Unions, visited Russia in the Winter of 1924-1925, and came to the conclusion, after examination of many documents, that the letter was a forgery from start to finish. The matter thereafter became a party issue; the Conservatives upholding the letter as genuine and the trade unionists and the Labor Party being convinced that it was a forgery.

THE SECOND ATTEMPT TO BREAK THE AGREEMENT

With the coming to power of the second Baldwin Government, there began a series of events which led step by step to the breaking of the Agreement. In Europe it was said that Britain was once more taking up a policy of isolation of Soviet Russia, and if Sir Austen Chamberlain was prepared to disclaim any such conscious policy, he at any rate had no scruple about making it clear that

there would neither be a resumption of treaty negotiations with Soviet Russia nor of any sort of cordial relations. This was in striking contrast to the attitude of the British trade unions whose central body, the General Council of the Trades Union Congress entered this year into the most fraternal relations with the Central Council of the Russian Trade Unions. Equally in contrast to the attitude of Sir Austen Chamberlain was the signature by the Japanese of a Treaty with Soviet Russia. Immediately after this there began, especially in Germany, to be wild talk of the possibilities of a great alliance of Japan, China, Russia and Germany. The bogey of 1919 of a Germano-Soviet bloc was being conjured up once more, now upon a vaster scale. How far these apprehensions spread it is impossible to say, but it is certain that in place of the Macdonald Government's scheme for a Protocol among the Powers signatory to the Versailles Treaty, a new proposal was put forward for a Pact of Security by which Germany would be drawn away from any possibilities of association with Soviet Russia. And just while these new diplomatic efforts were beginning to be made, news of shootings at Shanghai seemed to give a meaning to the terrible vision of Asia in arms.

What was the position of the Western European Powers? The differences that had broken out between France and Britain over the former's unrestrained use of military power in the effort to maintain the French leadership in Europe had been rendered still more acute by the attempt of France to solve all difficulties through the military occupation of the Ruhr. But as the Ruhr adventure proved in its repercussions upon the French franc almost as damaging to the French Republic as to the German Reich, and as the collapse of the mark

brought bankruptcy in Germany within measurable distance, a provisional settlement of Europe and a stabilization of currencies was reached, through the Dawes Plan.

It was under the financial protection of the U. S. A. that the reparations provisions of the Treaty of Versailles were reformulated in a manner that brought apparent stability. But the financial protection extended by America had the consequence of making the European Powers feel themselves, however voluntarily they had requested it, more than ever debtors and liegemen of America. The Powers of Western Europe had done homage to the United States. In the disturbed conditions of 1923-24, all sorts of world combinations, however fantastic, had appeared possible. With the drawing together of the Western Powers of Britain, France, Belgium, Italy, Germany, (together with Poland and Czecho-Slovakia), the vague and terrifying possibilities would disappear. On the other hand, any such new grouping was bound to contrast sharply with the States that were not included. If the Western Powers came together at Locarno in order to avoid quarrels among themselves, it at once opened out the possibility of them quarrelling together with other Powers, and it opened out the possibility of a conflict with the Republics of the Soviet Union and more remotely with their financial superior and suzerain the U. S. A.

So clear was this position that immediately the Pact of Locarno was signed in the middle of October, despite its entirely harmless, nay, entirely laudable objects, it was at once treated as a triumph over Soviet Russia, while at the same time journalists took the occasion to expostulate with America on the stipulation for repayment of war debts. A year and a half later, Mr. Lloyd George recalled the description of Locarno by a member

of the British Government, Mr. Ormesby Gore. Mr. Ormesby Gore had explained Locarno at the time, by saying that "the solidarity of Christian civilization is necessary to stem the most sinister growth that has arisen in European history . . . the struggle at Locarno, as I see it, was this: is Germany to regard her future as bound up with the fate of the great Western Powers, or is she going to work with Russia for the destruction of Western civilization? . . . Locarno means that so far as the present Government of Germany is concerned, it is detached from Russia and is throwing in its lot with the Western party."

The Soviet Power felt Locarno to be something hostile and was concerned immediately to build up some system of disarmament or pacification which could not be used as a hostile instrument. The method followed was to conclude treaties of mutual non-aggression and neutrality with neighboring states. Such a treaty was signed in the month of December, 1925, between Soviet Russia and Turkey.

At the moment when this Turko-Soviet Treaty of Mutual Non-Aggression was signed, the relations between Turkey and the British Empire were so strained and the talk of war so imminent that the Prime Minister was forced to make a public disclaimer of any intention of war-like operations by Great Britain. This, however, naturally could not be held to apply to the Allies of Great Britain; and among the Locarno Allies was Fascist Italy who apparently never ceased to regret the abandonment by Italy of Southern Asia Minor in the year 1919. Thus, on the one hand, the relations of Soviet Russia to Turkey and of Britain to Turkey stood in complete contrast in the winter of 1925-26, while on the other hand, it looked as if Turkey was presently to

be "brought to reason" by the mailed fist of Fascist Italy. Besides the threat to Turkey, there was also a policy of conciliation by which large loans of perhaps £30,000,000 sterling would cement a new close friendship between Great Britain and Turkey. At the same time, any such close friendship, it was known, would make the Turko-Soviet Treaty largely meaningless. This larger aim of British policy, however, was not successful, and Great Britain had to be content with a minor treaty by which peaceful relations were renewed with Turkey and the question of the Mosul Border settled. Turko-Soviet friendship remained stronger than ever.

When the seven Powers had met at Locarno in October 1925, it had been understood that Germany would not only be admitted to the League of Nations in the spring, but would be given a seat on the League Council. This, it was felt, would set the seal of the understanding by which, incidentally, Germany would be severed from Soviet Russia. But the plans of Locarno went astray at Geneva. One after another of the smaller states proved recalcitrant. Sir Austen Chamberlain tried all his blandishments and finally was left with Brazil alone in opposition. But since the decisions must be unanimous, the opposition of Brazil was completely effective; and Sir Austen retired in defeat to London where his countrymen, after the model of the Roman Senate receiving the generals who had been vanquished at Cannae, entertained him with a public banquet. What on earth could have caused the opposition of Brazil, nobody knew for certain, but there were many who hazarded the guess that the United States was quite aware that Locarno might any time become the germ of an anti-American coalition.

In any case, from Germany's point of view, it meant

that the situation of 1922 had been repeated. In 1922, coldly treated at Genoa, Germany had signed the Treaty of Rapallo with Soviet Russia. Now in March, 1926, Germany had been "bilked" at Geneva; the result was a Soviet-German treaty of Mutual Non-Aggression, signed in March. (Quoted in Chapter XI).

These two treaties of Mutual Non-Aggression, on the West with Germany, and on the South-West with Turkey (and presently to be reinforced in August, 1926, by a similar Pact with Afghanistan) represented a maximum success attained by the Soviet Power in warding itself against what it felt to be the "encirclement" policy of Britain—a conception of British foreign policy regularly and strenuously repudiated by the British Foreign Office.

The strain in the relations between Soviet Russia and the British Empire that had begun with the coming to power of the Baldwin Government was now to be brought to a breaking point by two sets of events. These were the long drawn out British Miners Lockout of 1926 and the progress of the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement in China.

When the million British miners, (the largest single trade union organization in the world) were locked out on May 1, 1926, there followed a partial General Strike of unions acting in sympathy. The Soviet trade unions at once sent money to aid the strikers. Although the money was declined by the British Trades Union Congress, the gift was treated as an act of offense and a sharp Note was sent to the Soviet Government, to which the Soviet Government replied by pointing out that the money had not been sent by the Government, but by the unions, who were perfectly entitled to do so by Soviet Law.

The collapse of the General Strike left the miners still on the field; and presently there began a contest, unexampled in British history, between the million miners and the Government, of whose constituents they with their families were rather more than a tenth part. Appeals were sent out to every country in the world, asking for help for the starving children of the British miners. Although the Prince of Wales had contributed, the Prime Minister sent a message to America in which he alleged that the children were not starving nor near it. The Soviet trade unions were not approached with any counter message by Baldwin, but in any case, it is doubtful that they would have paid much heed to him. They responded to the appeal from the British miners by sending over £1,000,000 in the course of the seven months during which the lockout lasted. There is no doubt that this gift helped, along with contributions from other countries, including America, to prolong the resistance of the miners.

The British Government could not officially take exception to the sending of relief money in this way, but from the speeches of individual Ministers, it was clear that the Government had become still more hostile to the Soviet Government because of this action on the part of the Soviet trade unionists. They did not hesitate to say that the motive of the gift was not help to the miners, but a desire to prolong the strike in order to ruin British trade. From the autumn of 1926 onwards, several of the more oratorical members of the British Cabinet became quite unrestrained in the language they used towards Soviet Russia; and the only parallel to be found for their utterances would be in war-time speeches against the Kaiser.

Hardly had the Miners Lockout ended when the at-

tention of the British Government was drawn to the success of the Nationalist Revolutionary armies in China. The Chinese Nationalist Government was friendly to Soviet Russia and hostile to Britain. Possibly the reason for this may be found in the renunciation of all special privileges in China by the Soviet Government, on the one hand, and the failure of the British Government, on the other hand, to restore any of her nineteenth century encroachments on Chinese territory and sovereignty. The British Cabinet Ministers, however, took another view. They held that the hostile attitude of the Chinese Nationalists must be the result of Soviet propaganda, and if the contrast between the policies of the two Powers was adduced at any time as a reason for the state of affairs, the British appeared to think that this was simply the most devilish kind of propaganda that works by example rather than by precept.

The British Government gave official expression to these feelings through a Note sent to the Soviet Government in February, 1927, in which it complained not of specific breaches of the Trade Agreement, but of articles in Russian newspapers and in particular of a cartoon offensive to Sir Austen Chamberlain; to which the Soviet replied by citing some of the less sober utterances of Lord Birkenhead and Mr. Churchill against Soviet Russia. The two Notes were merely evidence of the deep degree of ill-feeling that had now been aroused between the two countries. It was clear that a breach in relations was due at any moment.

When it came, it was in the shape of a melodramatic incident. The premises of the Russian Trade Delegation in London were raided by a large force of police (in spite of the fact that the Head of the Trade Delegation enjoyed diplomatic immunity) on the ground that an

important War Office document was believed to be there. The document was not found and the Soviet Government sent a Note of protest against the infringement of a section of the Trade Agreement. It was clear that the reply to the Soviet Government must either take the shape of an intimation that the British Home Secretary (Head of the Police) had been asked to resign, or of an intimation that relations were to be broken off. After discussion in the Cabinet it was decided to break off relations and accordingly on May 24, diplomatic relations were severed and the Trade Agreement was broken. It had lasted just a little over six years.

At the June meeting of the League of Nations the question of Soviet Russia was discussed among the Powers signatory to Locarno, but it appeared that neither Monsieur Briand, the French Foreign Minister, nor Herr Stresemann, the German Foreign Minister, were in the least inclined to follow the suit of Sir Austen Chamberlain. In any case, the British Government let it be known that it had no hostile intentions towards the Soviet Government. But in spite of these disclaimers, the Continent of Europe spent the summer of 1927 in apprehension of what might come out of the break between Great Britain and Soviet Russia.

CHAPTER IX

RELATIONS WITH THE FRENCH REPUBLIC AND ITALY

SOVIET RUSSIA AND THE FRENCH REPUBLIC

THE relations of Soviet Russia with the French Republic are comparatively simple and straightforward. There are no complicated motives and interests as arise in the case of Great Britain; the relations both economic and political are easy to understand. The natural economic relations between France and Russia are not very strong: each is an agricultural country; the Soviet Union predominantly so. Germany and England with their emphasis on heavy industry and monopolist undertakings may be considered the complement of an agricultural country like Russia, but France is to a curious extent her own complement; while the acquisition of Alsace and Lorraine and the Valley of the Saar after the war enabled her to become almost entirely self-dependent.

Not only was France in this self-sufficient position economically, but her economy, in strong contrast to her neighbors, functioned at its best in the years immediately succeeding the war. There were devastated areas, it is true, but the earth was healed of the wounds of war with marvellous quickness, and in the healing, employment was given to many thousands, not only Frenchmen, but Italians, Poles and other nationalities who poured into France to meet the demand for labor

for which her own laboring population was inadequate. The English Lord Derby when Ambassador in Paris told his hosts when he pointed to the 2,000,000 unemployed in Great Britain "These are our devastated areas." After seven years there is as yet no certainty that this form of devastation will ever be swept away. France was free from all this. She had no *need* to consider trade with Russia.

There was no such stirring of revolt in the colonial countries of the French Empire as had been witnessed in the case of Britain. It is true that from 1918 to 1920 there was continual world-wide unrest of which France had her share, but the French Republic had no Irish Republic to suppress, no troublous Egyptian question, no India. Troubles similar to these were to arrive later, in the Moroccan War and the Syrian risings, but from the end of the war up to 1924 the colonies and dependencies were quiet. To an extent unknown among the British (and it may be among the Americans, too) the French Republic has learned the old Roman method of mingling populations of different race and color with considerable success. All these causes combined to enable France to present an invulnerable front to the economic storm that was bursting across Europe and unroofing whole stretches of English industry. This economic invulnerability made it possible for relations with Soviet Russia to become something in which manufacturers were relatively uninterested, and in which the financial powers could do as they wished. What was the attitude of the bankers and financiers? They, together with the little group of politicians who had nursed the Third Republic in its infancy, had entered into an extremely close alliance with the Czardom against Germany. As soon as Bismarck's "reinsurance" policy, by which the Ro-

manoffs were kept friendly to the Hohenzollerns, had lapsed in the early nineties, the Czar's distaste for the republican form of government was overcome and the strategic railways began to be built with the money provided by the French peasant investors. It was the peasants of France who made the world safe for Czarism for twenty-five years or more, and armed it with their money against its enemies, not least those within its own gates, the workers and peasants of Russia. From the point of view of the Government of the French Republic, from the pockets of whose citizens these loans had gone to the Czarism, Russia was not merely an ally in the war against Germany such as Italy or Rumania; there was a feeling that Russia was much more strictly *bound* to wage war—almost as if indeed the twelve million Russian soldiers had been hired by France to fight against Germany. For this reason the exit of Russia from the world war roused the utmost indignation in the circles of the French Government, an indignation which shut their minds to any possibility of an understanding of the position of the Russian people. The Bolsheviks who were the responsible government under which this gigantic desertion, as they viewed it, took place must be punished accordingly. From 1917 onwards, this resolve was foremost in the minds of the leaders of the French Government and the French Army. The policy thus resolved upon received tremendous reinforcement from the repudiation of Czarist and other debts by the Soviet Government at the beginning of 1918. Unremittingly thereafter the object of French policy was to set up a Government in Russia which would take up again the burden of these debts and recompense the small investors of France. Consequently it was the Government of France during the meeting

of the Allies in January, 1919 and onwards which acted in concert with the section of British opinion most intent on crushing the Bolsheviks and frustrated the efforts of the American President and the British Premier to bring about a peace settlement in Russia. It is said that the French felt the British policy tentatively put forward in the Prinkipo Proposals of 1919 as one which aimed not merely at peace, but at partition of the former Czarist Empire. Some held that British policy would be best satisfied by a Balkanization of the Russian territories, in which case British shipping under the guns of the British Admiralty would benefit largely from the trade of the Baltic States and Northern Russia. To certain interests in France, also, partition might also have appealed, in which case the French sphere of influence would be from the Baltic Sea upwards. But a larger and more influential section of the French were in favor of a united Russia (though not united under Bolshevism), which alone would be able to take up the burden of the debt. This standpoint continued to be firmly held.

In the autumn of 1919 Clemenceau was the driving force for the extermination of Bolshevism by means of the *Cordon Sanitaire* and the economic blockade. When the British Empire in 1920 began to coquette with the Bolsheviks, the French Government remained hard set against any recognition or formal negotiations whatever. It was French officers and French Missions which openly took part in the Polish war against Soviet Russia, and at the very moment when Lloyd George was assuring the Bolshevik representatives that Britain utterly disowned Baron Wrangel, the French Government for its part extended an official recognition to him in the beginning of August, 1920. In October, 1920, Chicherin was com-

plaining that the French were now arming and equipping the troops of Petlura who was fighting against the Bolsheviks in the Ukraine. It was not any representations from the Soviet Government, but only the revolt of French soldiers and sailors in the Black Sea that caused the withdrawal of the French navy from Soviet waters, and when they did withdraw they took with them all of the Russian fleet that had been with them in the Black Sea.

The year 1921 wore on without any further incident but without any diminution of hostile feelings. The hostility felt to Soviet Russia was expressed in a series of Notes addressed to the English Government just before and after the conclusion of the Trade Agreement. On November 25, 1920, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs transmitted a lengthy Note to the British Government in which he endeavored to secure agreement to the principle that no separate negotiations should go forward as regards debts, nationalized properties etcetera. It was also suggested that if and when an agreement was made for the payment of debts and compensations, the States carved out of the former territories of the Russian Empire should bear a proportionate share, and that an international commission with powers of supervision should be appointed to collect and distribute these monies, (an organization on the lines of that subsequently set up with regard to Germany as a result of the Dawes Plan). The suggestions further specified that owners of nationalized property and rights should receive restitution and full reinstatement and ownership for nationalized or damaged property held by non-Russian citizens. To this Note the British Government returned no answer. After the conclusion of the Trade Agreement between Britain and Soviet Russia on March

16, 1921, the French Government sent a series of Notes, on March 31, on April 6, and on May 24, in each of which they raised questions concerning the Trade Agreement. In particular they took exception to Article IX, of which the first paragraph ran:

"The British Government declares that it will not initiate any steps with a view to attach or to take possession of any gold, funds, securities or mortgages, not being articles indentifiable as the property of the British Government which may be exported from Russia in payment for imports or as securities for such payment; or of any moveable or immoveable property which may be acquired by the Russian Government within the United Kingdom."

The Soviets, it was complained, would have the right to import freely into England goods and scrip of all kinds, even if they could be identified as property belonging to nationals of another country. . . . "A situation calculated to inflict the maximum amount of damage to the interests of foreigners suffering an injury in Russia, and the French Government in so far as it effects the safeguarding of the rights of its nationals, would not be able to look on with indifference." The tone of the conclusion of the Note almost suggested that the French Government was concerned to warn the English Government against it or its citizens being considered receivers of stolen goods. To these series of Notes the British Government replied on June 14, 1921 with a Note in which they said curtly with reference to the view of the French Government that the resumption of trade with Russia and the recognition of Russian debts should not be dealt with independently, "His Majesty's Government were unable to agree with this view." The Note went on blandly to state that French

subjects who have lost property or rights in Russia would have full right to sue in the British Courts should any of their property be sold in this country by or through the Russian Trade Delegation. His Majesty's Government are, however, powerless to prevent the fact that judgment will probably be given against such claims. Finally the Note stated that the British Government had deliberately refrained from endeavoring to secure any preferential treatment for British claims, and that "they will continue to adopt this attitude so long as there is a reasonable chance of obtaining French cooperation in the General Treaty between Russia and such of the Western Powers as are willing to negotiate with Soviet Russia." The last sentence can be interpreted as bringing pressure to bear on France to adopt an attitude in consonance with the British Government at that time.

A few months later, after the fruitless attempt to use the occasion of the famine as a basis for negotiations, the French Government was induced to negotiate along with the other Western Powers in the Conference of Genoa, but the cooperation of the French at Genoa was limited and cautious, if not to say suspicious. The fall of the Briand Government in January, 1922, after the Cannes resolution, and the accession to power of Poincaré, had meant a stiffening of the French attitude. Consequently, in the Genoese negotiations (already related in the chapter dealing with Anglo-Soviet relations), the sharpest conflict was evident between the speeches of the Russian and French representatives. For instance, when the Russian delegation proposed that disarmament should be part of the Agenda it was the French representative, M. Barthou, who at once protested in the most unequivocal language. So far was

this evident that it was felt in Britain and in Italy that France was but an unwilling participator in Genoa, and that the failure of that Conference was not a blow to French policy.

After Genoa there was the same absence of Franco-Soviet relations as before, but later, in 1922, M. Herriot, Mayor of Lyons, one of the most prominent French politicians (and two years later the Premier of France) made a journey of investigation to Russia. The report he brought back had the effect of preparing a more friendly atmosphere. Nothing, however, was done immediately, and the following year, 1923, was entirely occupied with the invasion of the Ruhr and the collapse of the franc which followed upon that invasion. The French General Election of the spring of 1924 returned M. Herriot to power at the head of the Bloc des Gauches, and the result was a new orientation of French policy. After some months had been devoted to the question of German reparations, the French Government, on October 28, sent a Note of recognition to the Soviet Government and exchanged ambassadors.

At the same time a Commission headed by M. de Monzie was appointed to consider financial relations with Russia. This Commission carried on its work for many months, and eventually in the spring of 1926 a Soviet Delegation headed by Rakovsky came to Paris and brought the negotiations closer. An agreement, however, was not reached at that time. Later on, discussions with the Soviet delegation came to be narrowed down to a question of the exact figure for debts, etcetera, for which the Soviet Government was prepared to assume responsibility. No final settlement of these negotiations have been reached at the moment of writing, but even if one were in sight, the "renewal of the En-

tente" between France and Britain in May, 1927, with its corollary that the French Government would take no action towards Russia that would contrast with the action of the British Government, was bound to have the effect of postponing any definite conclusion of an agreement. It is, however, a fact that by this time the attitude of the French Government stood in contrast to that of Britain, as was shown by the careful distinction the French drew between the Soviet Government and the Communist International just at the moment when not only the British Foreign Office, but also the Labor ex-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Ramsay Macdonald, was seeking to identify the Soviet Government and the Communist International.

SOVIET RUSSIA AND ITALY

Italy, unlike France, is a country depending largely upon imports for the full conduct of her economic activity, while in recent years a determined effort has been made to develop the industries of North Italy into an export trade. Of the Allies who published a Note in January, 1920, contemplating an exchange of Russian grain and other products, Italy was perhaps the most interested. In the spring of 1920 an agreement was signed for trading relations between Italian and Russian Cooperators. In the same year Vorovsky arrived as Soviet representative in Rome and at the end of the year—December 26—a Preliminary Commercial Agreement between Russia and Italy was signed, together with a similar Convention between Italy and the Ukrainian Soviet Government. The preamble of the agreement ran:

"As it is in the interests of Russia and Italy imme-

diately to resume peaceful commercial interests between the two countries and as in the interval before the conclusion of a Commercial Convention and a formal general treaty between the Governments of these countries to regularize their trading relations in the future, it is necessary to establish a Preliminary Agreement between the Italian Government and the Government of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, the above named parties have concluded the following Preliminary Agreement with the object of resuming traffic and commerce between them."

The terms of the agreement follow closely upon the lines of the Anglo-Soviet Agreement signed nine months before.

In the early part of 1922 a more formal and extended commercial agreement was drawn up between the two countries and signed. It gave Italy important privileges; but after considerable discussion the necessary ratification was refused by the Soviet Government. In the autumn of the same year, the Fascist *coup d'état* of Mussolini put the whole of Italian policy, internal and external, into the melting pot, but in December, 1923, the Italian parliament approved the Commercial Agreement of 1921 and Mussolini stated in addition that Italy would not oppose *de jure* recognition. On February 7, 1924 *de jure* recognition was granted and a Commercial Treaty signed, while a further Italian-Soviet Treaty of Commerce and Navigation was entered upon the next month. A brisk trade was now being developed between Soviet Russia and Italy, and certain further mutual concessions were made by an Agreement at the opening of 1926. Meantime, however, British foreign policy had reached a point of close understanding with Italy. There was bargaining about the Italian debt to

Britain in December, 1925, and agreements to cede certain territory in Africa to Italian Somaliland, and further bargaining on the Near Eastern questions. It is generally understood that it was due to this consonance between British policy (now extremely hostile to Soviet Russia) that Italy in the course of 1926 ratified the Protocol of the Allies by which the former Czarist territory of Bessarabia was adjudged part of the Rumanian State. A coolness developed over this incident, but there was no disturbance of trade or any approach to a rupture.

CHAPTER X

JAPAN AND SIBERIA

FROM the beginning the relations between the Japanese Government and the Soviets took the form of military intervention. The story of the beginning of that intervention in the summer of 1918 in conjunction with the American and other troops has already been told in the earlier chapters. It will be remembered that the Japanese though bound by the agreement with the Allies to send only a maximum of 7,000 men had rapidly increased their forces in Eastern Siberia until there were at least ten times as many. It presently became clear that Japan looked upon Siberia as a Japanese sphere of influence. Her troops were in effective occupation and there was even a point at the end of 1918 when according to at least one authority the militarist section of the Japanese Government contemplated returning a blunt refusal to the representations of Secretary Lansing, even though that should involve a breach with the United States. After the debacle of Kolchak's army, one Semenov proclaimed himself ruler of Siberia at the beginning of January, 1920. Semenov's rule was so arbitrary that the Allied representatives were forced to send Notes of protest. In these Japan joined, but it was stated later that Japan had concluded a treaty with Semenov at the end of September, 1919, in which it was agreed on the part of Japan that they would receive Siberia; that they would support Semenov financially (as against Kol-

chak); that they would receive leasing rights, and if and when the Japanese army reached the Urals the Japanese would receive full ownership rights in the Ural mines.

From this and from the subsequent course of events it is clear that Japan saw in the intervention in Siberia something more than a mere demonstration against the Russian Bolsheviks. By the end of the spring of 1920 the occupation of the American, British and French troops had ceased: the intervention of the Japanese had not ceased. Local pressure for the withdrawal of Japanese troops, however, was strong, and eventually a combined Russo-Japanese Conciliation Commission was formed between the representatives of all the local authorities and the Japanese Supreme Command. The Russian side of this body, however, was practically helpless, and it was forced to accept the Japanese terms which conceded that there should be a Japanese zone of occupation out of which the Russian troops should be withdrawn. It is to be remembered that these Russian troops were not under the command of the Bolsheviks, but were local levies. Meantime, at the end of May, Nikolaievsk was burnt to the ground, and among the buildings was the jail in which some 134 Japanese officers and men were confined. At once it was announced by the Japanese Government that Japan would occupy the Russian half of the island of Saghalin until satisfaction was received for the Nikolaievsk affair from some government which Japan could recognize. The whole of the Siberian coast from Shantung, by Korea and South Manchuria up to the sea of Okhotsk was in the Japanese occupation. The United States Government at once protested against the Japanese occupation of Saghalin, but the Japanese shrewdly reckoning that

the Americans would not at that moment take any effective steps to cause the Japanese to withdraw, maintained their hold on this important island.

In the meantime the scattered local Russian authorities in the Eastern half of Siberia had united together to form a government to which the name was given "Far Eastern Republic." This was an independent democratic state with a frontier between it and the territory of the U. S. S. R. It was clear to many far sighted leaders in Siberia that so long as the Japanese were in occupation of Eastern Siberia no form of Soviet Government would be permitted. On the other hand if some form of government existed the Japanese would no longer have an excuse for remaining in occupation. Therefore, although the sentiments of the localities was obviously Sovietist, a majority of the representatives of local bodies were at length persuaded that whether they wished to be ruled by Soviets or not the indispensable thing to do first was to form a government which, not being Sovietist would be recognized by the Japanese, and by means of which the Japanese might be compelled to release their hold on Eastern Siberia. The Japanese on their side, having experienced many vicissitudes and difficulties in the two years of their occupation, welcomed the idea of a Far Eastern Republic apart from Moscow which would not only be a buffer state, but which might be brought under Japanese influence. Accordingly on May 11, 1920, the Japanese recognized the Democratic Far Eastern Republic. Five days later on May 16th a Note arrived from Chicherin recognizing the Far Eastern Republic as a separate democratic state. The new state made rapid headway. Its recognition ended the career of Semenov and also of Semenov's successor Baron

Ungern, with whom, however, there was considerable fighting for some twelve months.

A constituent assembly (with some four hundred members) of the Far Eastern Republic, met in the middle of February 1921. They consisted mainly of peasants belonging to no party. By the end of April a permanent government was elected and a constitution was in process of being drawn up. The new government had many problems to deal with. Here we are only concerned with its foreign affairs. At the beginning of April the Constituent Assembly of the Far Eastern Republic demanded that Japan withdraw her troops from Siberia and cease all interference.

A little later the United States Government had issued its summons to meet at Washington to discuss problems of the Pacific. It might be necessary for Japan to answer awkward questions. Accordingly the Japanese Government agreed to negotiations which began in August between the two parties, continued during the Washington Conference, and finally broke down. They were opened again in April, 1922, and broken off within a few days. By this time, however, Genoa had taken place; Soviet Russia had been effectively if not formally recognized by most of the European Powers, and it was now believed, insisted on participating in any further conference on Far Eastern affairs. Accordingly on September 4, 1922 a conference opened between representatives of Japan, Soviet Russia and the Far Eastern Republic, but within a fortnight the negotiations broke off owing to the refusal of the Japanese to evacuate Saghalin. But though Saghalin had proved a stumbling block to complete agreement, the position of Japan on the mainland of Siberia had now become untenable, and

by November, 1922, the last Japanese troops evacuated Vladivostok.

This marked the end for the time being of intervention by Allied troops on the territories of the former Russian Empire. During the period of the provisional government the Sovietist sentiments of the population had not diminished but increased. Accordingly within a few days of the evacuation of Vladivostok the National Assembly of the Far Eastern Republic met at its capital, Chita, and unanimously adopted a resolution dissolving the Assembly and establishing Soviets as the governing authority, and at the same time uniting the Soviets of the Far Eastern Republic with the Russian Socialist Soviet Republic. The buffer state on which the Japanese had counted so much to assure them dominance in Eastern Siberia had only had the effect of facilitating the exclusion of the Japanese troops.

There remained the question of North Saghalin, still in Japanese occupation. The Soviet Government in February, 1923 granted large concessions of oil bearing areas to the American Sinclair interests, a step to which Japan took strong exception; but within a month or two thereafter Japan in April 1923 made proposals for the resumption of negotiations. In August 1923 the Soviet representative Yoffe, was carrying on negotiations at Tokyo, and on August tenth a preliminary agreement was reached. These negotiations, however, reached no final stage, and by the early months of 1924 the feeling between the two powers had reached an acute point of hostility. By August, however, negotiations were resumed, and this time they were successful. Full recognition was conceded by Japan on January 1, 1925, and on January 20 a treaty was signed at Peking by which the Japanese undertook to evacuate Saghalin by the

middle of May in return for fifty percent of the oil concessions in the northern half of the island. From this period onward, though there were various minor difficulties, the relations between the two powers became more friendly, and when, in the winter of 1925-6, hostilities were on the point of breaking out between Chang tso lin, the war lord of Manchuria, and the Soviet Government, it was Japan that restrained Chang tso lin and forced him to make reparations to the Soviet power. The attitude of the Japanese state towards Soviet Russia at the present time seems to vary according to which party is in power in Japan. The trading interests of Japan speaking through the mouth of Baron Shidehara took an extremely friendly attitude to the Soviet Union in the winter of 1926-7; but with the accession to power of the military party headed by Baron Tanaka, a stiffening of tone was perceptible, but not to such a degree as would make a rupture likely in the near future. There the situation rests at the moment.

CHAPTER XI

RELATIONS WITH GERMANY AND THE BORDER STATES

GERMANY

HITHERTO we have dealt with the relations of Soviet Russia to the victors in the war of 1914-18. What were her relations to the vanquished powers? Of the Central Empires and other allies the only one which could be treated in this category is Germany. The old Austria-Hungary was burst asunder into its component nationalities, between whom and the dual monarchy of the Austro-Hungarian Empire there was little communication or continuity; while the Angora Republic which took the place of the Turkish Empire did not recognize the Treaty of Sevres and had but little continuity with the Turkish Empire.

For the first ten months of 1918, that is during the period of Brest Litovsk and from Brest Litovsk to the German revolution, diplomatic relations had existed between the two countries. These, it will be remembered, were broken, first by the severance of relations on November 5, 1918, and secondly by the denunciation by the Russian Government of the Brest Litovsk Treaty about the same time. After some ten months in which the German Government appeared to share the general expectation of the early collapse of Soviet Russia, the first overt step was taken:

in connection with the Allies demand of October 9 that Germany should join in the blockade of Soviet Russia. To this demand the German Government on October 30 refused to accede. What was the position in Germany? Not only in this period was it between two fires, but in a sense Germany was made up of two or more fires, or even conflagrations. Everything was unsettled. The defeated militarist section had the most intense hatred of Soviet Russia, and Ludendorff, it is reported, even thought that they might buy better terms from the Allies by selling the German sword to be wielded against the Bolsheviks. But the Allies were unwilling to see Ludendorff or any other of his group at the head of an army on active service: they proposed to do the job themselves. On the other hand the Socialist Democratic Government of Germany, though pacifist, was almost equally hostile to the Bolsheviks. And besides they felt that any association with the Bolsheviks would both incense the Allies against them and finally, as has been said above, they looked upon the Bolshevik Government as one that was bound to topple over at any moment. It seems, however, that during the period of the Armistice and then of the Versailles negotiations, there was no real likelihood of the danger that was so closely present to the minds of the Allies, that defeated Germany and ostracised Russia might throw in their lot together. This fear had been most poignantly expressed by Mr. Lloyd George in the Memorandum he presented to the Peace Conference on March 25, 1919, in which he wrote:

"The greatest danger I see in the present situation is that Germany may throw in her lot with Bolshevism and place her resources, her brains and her vast organizing power at the disposal of the revolutionary fanatics

whose dream it is to conquer the world for Bolshevism by force of arms. This danger is no mere chimera." While later he drew a picture of "nearly three million people organized into a vast Red Army under German instructors and German generals, equipped with German cannon and German machine guns and prepared for a renewal of the attack on Western Europe."

Such a prospect would only have been a possibility had there been a Soviet Revolution throughout the whole of Germany corresponding to the Soviet Revolutions in Hungary and Bavaria in the spring of 1919. By the autumn of 1919 with the end of Soviet Hungary, and with a better appreciation of the internal politics of Germany it had become possible for the Allies to ask that Germany should help them in their anti-Bolshevik crusade. But Germany was not prepared to act as cats' paw for the Allies if it could be avoided, and accordingly the request was turned down, and for a year and a half Germany sat tight waiting the course of events. Had the Poles not been rescued by Allied help in the war of the summer of 1920 the disappearance of one pillar of the Versailles Treaty would have had incalculable consequences in Germany. But the moment passed, and it was not until the British Government had signed its Trade Agreement with Soviet Russia that Germany took any overt step towards renewal of relations. Once this had been done Germany promptly, on May 6, 1921, signed an Agreement with Soviet Russia. In the years that followed the relations between the two countries as far as Germany was concerned depended largely on a balancing of political and economic considerations; the political considerations being largely determined by the effect of Russo-German relations on the Allies.

In the sphere of economics there was every reason for the closest bond between Germany and Russia: between a country predominantly industrial and a country predominantly agricultural. While the governmental aristocratic and professional circles of Czarist Russia had mainly spoken French, the trading and business community was rapidly absorbing German culture and using German as their second language. Before the war the Germans had entrenched themselves as the chief trading and exporting country in Czarist Russia. After the war, as before, Germany was still bound to depend largely on Soviet Russia for her imports of grain and timber as well as other imports of raw materials, such as oil and manganese. The need for reestablishing trade relations was urgent for Germany.

At the same time, however, the Germans were acutely aware of the Allied fear of a Russo-German combination, and this held back any closer rapprochement. Even when in the winter of 1921-22 negotiations for a political treaty were being carried through, signature to this treaty was withheld until it could be seen what was the attitude of the Allies at the Genoa Conference. Had the Allies taken then the step of welcoming Germany into the League of Nations (an event that came to pass four years later), it is doubtful whether the Treaty of Rapallo would have been signed. But Germany was treated with marked coldness at Genoa and felt herself to be excluded. Accordingly within a few days after the opening of the Conference the Soviet-German Treaty of Rapallo was signed. By this Treaty the provisions of Versailles were ignored, and all debts and claims between the two nations were cancelled. The two outcasts from the comity of nations had agreed to recognize one another on a footing of complete equality

and cancellation of outstanding claims. The text of this short but extremely important Treaty is as follows:

The Treaty of Rapallo

The German Government, represented by Herr Rathenau, and the Government of the Soviet Republic represented by the People's Commissar, Chicherin, have agreed on the following Treaty:

Clause I

The two Governments agree that all questions resulting from the state of war between Germany and Russia shall be settled between the Reich and the Federal Republic of Soviets in the following manner:

(a) The Reich and the Republic of Soviets mutually renounce repayment for their war expenses and for damages arising out of the war, that is to say damages caused to them and their nationals in the zone of the war, operations by military measures, including all requisitions effected in a hostile country. They renounce in the same way repayment for civil damages inflicted on civilians, that is to say, damages caused to the nationals of the two countries by exceptional measures or by violent measures taken by an authority of the State of either side.

(b) All questions of public or private law resulting from the state of war, including the question of the merchant ships acquired by one or the other side during the war, shall be settled on a principle of reciprocity.

(c) Germany and Russia mutually renounce re-

payment of the expenses caused by prisoners of war. In the same way as the Reich renounces repayment of the expenses caused by the internment of soldiers of the Russian Army, the Russian Government renounces repayment of the sums Germany has derived from the sale of Russian Army material transported into Germany.

Clause II

Germany renounces all claims resulting from the enforcement of the laws and measures of the Soviet Republic as it has affected German nationals or their private rights or the rights of the German Reich itself, as well as claims resulting from measures taken by the Soviet Republic or its authorities in any other way against subjects of the German Reich or their private rights, provided that the Soviet Republic shall not satisfy similar claims made by any third State.

Clause III

Consular and diplomatic relations between the Reich and the Federal Republic of Soviets shall be resumed immediately. The admission of consuls to both countries shall be arranged by special agreement.

Clause IV

Both Governments agree furthermore that the rights of the nationals of either of the two parties on the other's territory as well as the regulation of commercial relations shall be based on the most-favored-nation principle. This principle does not include rights and facilities granted by the Soviet

Government to another Soviet State or to any State that formerly formed part of the Russian Empire.

Clause V

The two Governments undertake to give each other mutual assistance for the alleviation of their economic difficulties in the most benevolent spirit. In the event of a general settlement of this question on an international basis they undertake to have a preliminary exchange of views. The German Government declares itself ready to facilitate as far as possible the conclusion and the execution of economic contracts between private enterprises in the two countries.

Clause VI

Clause I, paragraph b, and Clause IV of this Agreement will come into force after the ratification of this document. The other Clauses will come into force immediately.

Done in triplicate at Rapallo, April 16, 1922.
Chicherin—Rathenau.

In the autumn of 1922 Krestinsky, the Russian Ambassador, was formally received by President Ebert, while in November of the same year an Agreement was signed extending the provisions of the Rapallo Treaty to the other Soviet Republics. Trade developed rapidly during the next two years, but was suddenly brought to an abrupt termination by an incident in Berlin. In May, 1924 the Chief of Police, searching for some fugitive from justice, raided the offices of the Soviet Commercial Mission. Trade was broken off immediately, but by the end of July a draft agreement was signed settling the

differences that had arisen, and granting extra-territoriality to part of the Trade Delegation. Trade went ahead once more and was further developed as a result of a Treaty signed on October 12, 1925. This Trade Treaty included seven separate agreements.

1. An Agreement giving nationals of each country the right of settlement and protection for trade;
2. An Economic Agreement—the most favored nation clause (providing for the negotiation of a separate customs treaty);
3. A Railway Agreement;
4. Navigation Agreement;
5. Taxes Agreement;
6. Agreement for Trade Treaty Courts to settle civil and trade disputes;
7. Agreement for protection of industrial property (patents and trade marks).

The autumn of 1925 was marked by the gathering together by Britain of the Western European States including Germany, and the signature of the Pact of Locarno. Locarno was celebrated as the dawn of a new peaceful epoch, but for Soviet Russia it seemed the building up of a hostile bloc—as indeed it was proclaimed to be by one British Minister. At the meeting in Locarno it was understood that Germany would be admitted to the League of Nations with a seat on the Council at the forthcoming March meeting of the League in Geneva. But in March, 1926 the meeting of the League of Nations broke up without Germany having been allowed a seat. The Soviet Union, for its part, seeing in Locarno not a token of peace but a menace of

war, had been endeavoring to conclude treaties of mutual non-aggression and neutrality with the nearest States. Negotiations for such a treaty were opened with Germany, and in the month after Germany had been refused a seat on the League Council a treaty was signed at Berlin, providing for mutual non-aggression, arbitration and neutrality.

The Berlin Treaty

Article I

The Treaty of Rapallo remains the basis of the relations between Germany and the U. S. S. R. The German Government and the Government of the U. S. S. R. will remain in friendly contact with each other so as to bring about an understanding in all political and economic questions touching both countries in common.

Article II

Should one of the contracting parties in spite of peaceful conduct (*Friedlichen Verhaltens*) be attacked by a third power or by several third powers the other contracting party will observe neutrality throughout the whole duration of the conflict.

Article III

If as a result of a conflict of the kind mentioned in Article II or at any time when neither of the contracting parties is involved in war-like measures, there should be concluded a coalition between third powers for the purpose of proclaiming financial or economic boycott against one of the contracting parties, then the other contracting party will not join such a coalition.

Article IV

This Treaty shall be ratified and the ratification shall be exchanged in Berlin. The Treaty comes into force with the exchange of ratifications and is valid for a period of five years. The two contracting parties will come to an understanding with regard to the further character of their political relations in good time before the lapse of this period.

The effect of this on the Locarno policy is dealt with in a chapter on British relations. The friendly relations thus established were maintained throughout the next winter, and when in the spring of 1927 the relations of the Soviet Union and the British Empire were broken, it was Germany who consented to take over the Soviet Embassy in London and act as Agent for the Soviet Union in British territories.

THE BORDER STATES

If Germany felt herself between two fires and followed the policy of carefully balancing advantages and disadvantages and weighing economic against political effects, the same holds true in a greater degree of the Border States formerly part of the Czarist Empire. Finland, Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland were bound to have relations with the power that ruled in place of the Czar. The Governments of these small countries were naturally hostile to the revolutionary regime during the period of the civil war, and had besides to gain recognition from the Allies by proving themselves useful in the crusade against Bolshevism. On the other hand, they had the utmost anxiety to get back to

peaceful relations in order to settle their newly formed states on a firm basis. Thus we find that in the 1918 and 1919 period, while they were ready to act in concert with the British admiralty and the Allied forces, they very soon, with the exception of Poland, began to move towards a truce if not towards peace. The main fear that held them back from signing peace was that the influence of the Czarist Russians (who would not agree to the establishment of these new states) might prevent their full recognition by the Allies. As this danger diminished, peace treaties came into effect. The first treaty was signed between tiny Esthonia and Russia on February 2, 1920. This Treaty begins after an Article agreeing that the war shall cease from the date of the Treaty becoming effective, with the Article:

"In accordance with the declaration of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic of the right of nations to self-determination, even as far as a complete severance from the State they were a part of, Russia recognizes the absolute independence and separate existence of the Esthonian State, renouncing completely and for ever claims according to the laws of the State and International Treaties, over the Esthonian people and land, which shall be for ever null and void."

This Treaty was followed by a Soviet-Latvian Treaty of Peace signed at Dorpat on June 13, 1920. A month later, on July 12th, peace was signed between Soviet Russia and Lithuania. At this moment the war between Soviet Russia and Poland was at its height, and something resembling a state of war existed between Lithuania and Poland over the question of which should possess Vilna. The reflection of this state is seen in the Soviet Lithuanian Treaty by which Russian troops would be allowed to cross Lithuania in order to fight the Poles.

On October 14, after some four months of negotiations, a Soviet-Finnish Treaty of Peace was signed. By this Treaty Russia ceded a portion of territory so as to give Finland access to the Arctic Ocean.

All this while Poland and Russia were in close locked grip. The story of this has already been told under the chapter dealing with British relations. The peace between Poland and Soviet Russia was finally signed in the spring of 1921, on March 18, immediately after the news had come of the Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement. By the end of 1920 Russia was at peace on her western border.

In October 1921 an Economic Conference began at Riga between Russia and the Baltic States, Esthonia, Lithuania, Latvia, at which it was agreed that before the end of the year courts to settle disputes should be set up, and mutual financial and trade commissions would elaborate systems of navigation and port services. In the summer of 1922 Soviet Russia, which had been steadily demobilizing her army from the five million strength it had reached at the end of 1920, proposed a disarmament conference to the neighboring States. The proposal, however, hung fire over questions of procedure. Finally on December 2, 1922, a Disarmament Conference met in which all the border States with the exception of Rumania participated. Russia proposed a mutual reduction of armaments, and offered to reduce the strength of the Russian forces by 75 percent. To this Lithuania was ready to agree, but the other states would only agree to a pact of non-aggression without reduction of armaments. The situation at that moment can best be shown by a small table giving the Border States apart from Lithuania, and showing the proportions of the armies in relation to the populations:

Country	Population	Size of Army	Length of Service	Citizens per Soldier
Finland.....	3,364,000	33,000	1 year	111.9
Esthonia.....	1,200,000	14,000	19 months	85.7
Latvia.....	1,850,000	19,500	18 months	94.8
Poland.....	27,256,000	320,000	2 years	85.1
Rumania.....	17,393,000	256,000	2 years	67.9
Soviet Russia.....	130,000,000	800,000	18 months	162.5

In a declaration to the League of Nations the Polish Government stated that the present strength of its army was only 294,000; at the Moscow Disarmament Conference the Polish delegation put it at 373,000.

A British official statement on December 12, 1922 gave the Finnish army as 121,600.

With the exception of Lithuania, however, the Border States would not agree to any immediate proportionate reduction of armaments, and since the Soviet Union would not agree to a pact of non-aggression unless accompanied by proportionate reduction of armaments, the conference broke down. But in the course of the next year Soviet Russia reduced her army to a strength of 610,000 men, and it at present stands at considerably less than half the pre-war strength of the Czarist army. Nevertheless, though the Disarmament Conference had broken down, relations between Soviet Russia and the former territories of the Czarist Empire continued peaceful and even friendly up to the spring of 1926.

In May, 1926 a *coup d'etat* was carried out in Poland by Marshal Pilsudski, a revolutionary step which was viewed benignantly by the British press. It was Pilsudski who had been the spear head of anti-Soviet feeling from the formation of the Polish State. He had been in power when the Russo-Polish war was carried on in

1920, and his new accession to power by a revolutionary *coup d'état* boded ill for the continuance of friendly relations. Before the year was out this was followed by a Fascist *coup d'état* in Lithuania, and it was clear that a Fascist Government in this little country might be very ready to purchase stability for its regime by joining the greater Powers in acts of aggression on Soviet Russia. Thus, by the beginning of 1927 the possibilities of an anti-Russian bloc among the Western European countries were reinforced by the existence of Fascist or semi-Fascist regimes on two of the states bordering on Soviet Russia.

RUMANIA

Rumania, though a western border state has always stood in a different relation to Soviet Russia from the republics on the western border. In the midst of the revolutionary upheaval of 1918 Rumania, which had concluded a separate peace with Germany, was suddenly released from her engagements by the terms of the Armistice. Her armies, reequipped and backed by the northward advance of the Allies from the Black Sea region, advanced into Bessarabia, a piece of Ukrainian territory lying on her Eastern frontier. The occupation of Bessarabia has continued ever since, and one after another the chief Western Powers ratified this territory as having been ceded to Rumania. The Soviet power refused to acknowledge this occupation, and while there never has been war between the two countries there never has been peace. Until the Bessarabian question has been settled the relations of Rumania and Soviet Russia are likely to remain unfriendly. Rumania and Poland, particularly at the periods when Poland has been least friendly to Soviet Russia, have tended to act together,

and the frontier between Soviet Russia and Rumania is one which might at any moment be crossed by hostile armies. The occupation of Bessarabia has been marked by more than one insurrection among the Bessarabian peasants. This, together with the difficulties Rumania experiences with the Hungarian and Bulgarian populations included within her borders, makes it necessary for her to maintain a relatively large army. Needless to say there has been neither Trade Agreement, nor Treaty of Peace or Mutual Relations between the Government of Soviet Russia and the Kingdom of Rumania.

SOVIET RUSSIA AND THE LESSER EUROPEAN STATES

The lesser European States that have recognized Soviet Russia did so in each case after the recognition by Great Britain. Trade has developed between these lesser states and Soviet Russia, but as regards foreign policy they are none of them likely to take either an extremely independent line of friendship or hostility, nor is their attitude sufficient to make any substantial difference except in so far as they may act in consort with one of the greater powers. Of the three Scandinavian countries Norway was the first to conclude a Treaty with the Soviet Union—on September 2, 1921. The Trade Agreement between Denmark and the Soviet Union was ratified on June 8, 1923. In the case of Sweden a preliminary Trade Agreement of March 1, 1922, was rejected in the summer of that year, and up to the spring of 1923 there was considerable friction between the two countries. Thereafter trade developed, and at the end of 1923 negotiations for a Trade Agreement began and were afterwards carried through to a successful conclusion.

Austria followed Germany in an early resumption of trade relations with the Soviet Union, and concluded a political and commercial treaty on December 7, 1921.

During the brief rule of the Hungarian Soviet Government in the summer of 1918-19, the most cordial relations existed between it and the Russian Republic: with the overthrow of this government and the establishment of a government of the regency under Admiral Horthy relations were broken off. The four agreements concluded in later years related almost entirely to the exchange of prisoners. Czecho-Slovakia concluded a Trade Agreement on June 5, 1922; but no recognition has followed on this.

The only remaining Government of Europe apart from Danzig which has recognized the Soviet Union is the Greek Republic, whose policy in this matter followed hard on the British recognition. In the case of Holland and Belgium a development of trade might lead to a renewal of relations; in the case of the other countries an alteration of internal politics. Equally, hostile action either by some of the greater powers or by the League of Nations might lead to the ending of relations on the part of some of the lesser states now friendly with the Soviet Union.

CHAPTER XII

SOVIET RUSSIA AND THE SEMI-COLONIAL COUNTRIES

IN the years before the war, Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan were subject to pressure either from Czarist Russia or Great Britain or both. Afghanistan was semi-dependent upon Britain. Turkey was never free from the menace of Czarist foreign policy aiming at the possession of Constantinople and the Straits. Persia was actually divided in 1907 into two spheres of influence, Czarist in the North, British in the South. The revolution renounced all Czarist claims on these countries. The Secret Treaty of 1915 by which Britain and France agreed that Czardom would receive Constantinople as one of the spoils of victory, was published by the Bolsheviks and at the same time repudiated. During the nineteenth century and up to 1914 these Asiatic powers had felt themselves more and more squeezed between the pressure of Czardom and the British Empire. The sudden liberation movement in Russia had, therefore, a great effect on all the Asiatic peoples of the East. Delegations and Missions began to arrive in Moscow during 1919 from the East, at a time when contact with the West was barred. These delegations were welcomed, and in that year it was part of the express policy of Soviet Russia to stimulate a movement among the Eastern peoples against those who were felt to be the

common enemies of both. In a report submitted (December, 1919) by the People's Commissary for Foreign Affairs to the Seventh Congress of Soviets of All the Russias, the following words occurred:

"We addressed the Governments of North and South China, the Mongolian Government, the Persian Government and the revolutionary organization of Korea, stating our concrete program and giving up the entire legacy of the Czarist regime and its continuation by the Kerensky Government. We solemnly announced to the Turkish and Moslem world our desire to help the Moslem race in its fight for its lost liberties."

One immediate effect of the convulsion of Europe and North Asia was that in the mountain state of Afghanistan the Amir was overthrown, and under his successor war broke out between Afghanistan and Britain. India at this moment was nearer revolt than at any time since 1857, and the British Government was presently forced to conclude a peace with Afghanistan in which its full independence was recognized and the pension previously paid to the Amirs was withdrawn. In November of the same year an Afghan Mission was received by Lenin in Moscow, and Soviet representatives proceeded to Cabul. The report on foreign affairs, already quoted, concluded:

"To whatever Eastern country we turn our eyes, whether Persia, China, Turkey or Egypt we observe a deep fermentation which is assuming more and more the concrete form of a movement against European and American capitalism. This movement has for its ultimate object the attainment of our ideals."

These things were noted also by the Government of the British Empire and were a powerful argument for concluding an agreement with Soviet Russia.

AFGHANISTAN

The relations between Great Britain and Afghanistan were further regulated by the Treaty of November 22, 1921, by which an interchange of diplomatic representatives was arranged, and from this time onwards relations between the British Empire and Afghanistan became more friendly. But the crisis of 1921 had resulted in a new status for Afghanistan both internally and externally. Internally it became a constitutional monarchy, and the Amir in 1926 adopted the title King. Externally it meant that besides Soviet Russia and England the other Western powers (Germany, France, Italy) together with the neighboring Eastern powers (Turkey and Persia) were able to send their representatives to Cabul. This was a great change from the position of the Anglo-Czarist Agreement of August 31, 1907, by which Great Britain undertook neither to annex nor to occupy any portion of Afghanistan, nor to interfere with the internal conditions of the country, *providing the Amir fulfilled his engagements towards the British Government* (among which was the control of foreign relations by Britain): while the Russian Government declared that Afghanistan was outside the sphere of Russian influence and engaged that political relations with Afghanistan should be conducted through the British Government.

The friendly relations between Soviet Russia and Afghanistan continued and were finally confirmed by the Treaty of August 31, 1926, by which it was agreed that there should be:

1. Neutrality in the case of conflict of one party with another State;

2. Mutual non-aggression, and non-participation in hostile agreements with other powers;
3. Non-interference with internal affairs of either party and prohibition in each territory of elements hostile to the other party.

PERSIA

By the above mentioned Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 Persia had been—apart from a small neutral sphere—partitioned between the Czarism and the British Empire, though no formal change in the sovereignty of Persia was made. The Russian sphere was much the larger and included a population ten times as large as that of the British sphere; but the British sphere contained the Southern oilfields, then beginning to be explored by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, in which some years later the British Government was to become the chief shareholder. During the war of 1914 onwards the Czarist armies were freely moving in Persian territories. With the revolution the British troops advanced right up through Persia to the Caspian, and the war ended with Persia effectively in the position of a British satrapy. This position was registered by an Anglo-Persian agreement which was complete except for ratification in the autumn of 1920. The Persian parliament, however, was not anxious to ratify the agreement, and in the same year negotiations for a Soviet-Persian agreement were begun. The Soviet influence grew steadily through the winter and spring of 1920-21, and on February 26, 1921, the new Cabinet of Zia-ed-Din annulled the Anglo-Persian Agreement and at the same time signed the Soviet-Persian Agreement. The tables had been turned. The terms of the Treaty were:

1. All treaties, etcetera, imposed on Persia by the Czarist Government declared null and void;
2. All treaties of Czardom with other powers to the detriment of Persia declared null and void;
3. All the loans of the Czarist Government cancelled;
4. No internal interference of any kind, except
5. If any Power uses Persia as a base for attack, Soviet troops may enter Persia solely to prevent this danger;
6. Commercial relations to be resumed.

The actual terminology of the Treaty is of some interest, and four clauses are quoted in the Appendix.

The diplomatic defeat thus sustained by Britain was made clear by the remaining events of 1921. In April, London declared that the British troops would evacuate North Persia by the summer. In September the British Financial Advisers were discharged. The South Persian Rifles were disbanded and British officers left the country. But in this case the strategy of Britain was that of *reculer pour mieux sauter*. The influence of the British Government's Anglo-Persian Oil Company in the South continued strong. That influence continued to be exercised on the Sheiks of the South. On the western border of Persia stretched the new mandated territory of Iraq, while on the extreme south-east the Persian border marched with the western frontier of British India. During the period from 1921 to 1926, a silent struggle was being waged in which the main internal factors were the disturbed condition of Persian politics and the existence of oil bearing areas within her borders. Into the details of those intrigues (including the part played by American oil interests) it is impossible to enter. It is

enough to say that the financial weight of Great Britain began to tell very heavily, and at the present time, while Persia is friendly both to her northern and her southern neighbor, British influence on the whole predominates.

Nevertheless among a large section of the Persians, particularly in the north of that country, an extremely friendly feeling is felt towards Soviet Russia whose renunciation of Czarist claims enabled Persia to regain the measure of independence she now possesses.

TURKEY

The victory of the Allies in the war of 1914-18 brought about the destruction of the old Ottoman Empire, a process that had been going on throughout the nineteenth century and had been accelerated in the Turko-Italian war of 1911-12. Practically all the regions not containing a Turkish population were torn away. Cyprus and Egypt fell into the hands of the British; Palestine and Mesopotamia became British Mandates. Syria became a Federation of States under the French Mandate, and the huge peninsula of Arabia, whose petty sultans and Kings in many cases owed allegiance to the Caliph, now came under British influence. Turkey had almost disappeared from the map. But just as under the defeats inflicted by Napoleon on the ramshackle German States there resulted the formation of the Tugendbund which gave the impetus to the resurrection of Prussia, so the complete dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire and the discrediting of the Sultanate led to the rise of a new revolutionary government. At Angora in April, 1920, a new government was set up under the name of the "Government of the Great National Assembly of Turkey," under the leader-

ship of Ghazi Mustafa Kemal Pasha. It was unrecognized by the Allies, but in June, 1920, a Note was sent from Chicherin congratulating the new government on its accession to power and asking for consular and diplomatic relations. The new government, however, nervous of the consequences of any Allied hostility that might result from immediate relations with Soviet Russia, at this time an outcast, did not at once agree. Besides, an acute difference had arisen over the frontiers and the governments of Armenia and Georgia. But in the spring of the next year, March 16, 1921, a Russo-Turkish treaty was signed, and the community of interest felt between the two powers, both unrecognized by Western Europe, was evidenced in the first paragraph, running as follows:

"The Government of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic and the Government of the Great National Assembly of Turkey adhering to the principles of brotherly relations between nations and self-determination of peoples, and recognizing the solidarity existing between them in the struggle against imperialism as well as the fact that difficulties of any kind affecting one of the two countries will endanger also the situation of the other, being fully and wholly animated by the desire to bring about friendly relations and unswervingly upright friendship based on mutual interest of the two parties, have decided to conclude a treaty of amity and brotherhood between them."

This treaty was followed in the autumn of 1921 by a Conference of Turkey, Soviet Russia and the three Caucasian Republics at Kars, at which a treaty was signed regulating all contentious questions.

From this time onward the new power of Angora went from strength to strength, both in her internal and

external affairs. On November 1, 1922, the Sultanate was dissolved. On October 29, 1923, Turkey was proclaimed a Republic with Kemal Pasha as President. On March 2, 1924, the Caliphate was abolished and all male members of the House of Osman were expelled from Turkish territory. A complete process of westernization began to be carried through. With the abolition of the Caliphate and the Sultanate went the practice of polygamy, the wearing of the fez and other supposedly "Oriental" characteristics. The process was strictly analogous to the westernizing of Japan half a century earlier, and the process is still being vigorously carried through, and is resulting in a new national life and a higher international status.

This higher status began with the expulsion of the Greek army in 1922 and the opening of the Conference of Lausanne. At this Conference the question of the Straits had to be discussed, and with the concurrence of Turkey Soviet Russia claimed the right to be present. As the Conference dragged on with interruptions during the winter of 1922-23, Soviet Russia was crowded out by the Allies, a policy which was held responsible by Soviet Russia for the murder of their representative, Vorovsky, on May 10, 1923.

The Lausanne Conference, however, did not settle all outstanding questions between Turkey and the Allied Powers. On the south-east there was a dispute between Britain and Turkey over the boundary of the coveted oil bearing area of Mosul. On the Syrian frontier Turkey's neighbor France, or at any rate the representatives of France, showed a ready disposition to check-mate British diplomacy at Angora. The southern part of the peninsula of Asia Minor had been within the grasp of Italy in 1918-19, and the power which had taken away

Tripoli in 1912 was ready at any moment for a further dismemberment of the old Ottoman Empire. Greece hankered after the valley of Smyrna, from which she had been driven in 1922. All these questions came to a head in the winter of 1925-26, and when a decision of the League of Nations had been sought and the verdict given against Turkey, and when Turkey refused to accept the fiat of the League of Nations, it seemed as though war might break out once more. In December, 1925 the British press was full of alarms about the possibility of a new war with Turkey, and it was at this time, two months after the signature of the Locarno Treaties on December 17, 1925, that a treaty of Mutual Non-Aggression was concluded at Paris between the Soviet Union and the Turkish Republic, to run for a period of at least three years. British diplomacy, however, remained sanguine. It was felt that an understanding could be reached with Turkey such as would render nugatory the Turkish-Soviet Pact, and bring Turkey by means of larger loans effectively within the sphere of British influence. After months of negotiations an agreement indeed was reached, but it was limited to the Mosul frontier question, and the friendship of Turkey with Soviet Russia remained unbroken. A commercial treaty presently followed, and in the survey made to the Fourth Congress of Soviets of the Soviet Union, in the spring of 1927, Rykov, chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, was able to say:

"The relations with Turkey, the most important country of the Near East, since the conclusion of the Treaty of 1921, the neutral treaty of 17th December 1925, and the Financial and Commercial Treaty of 1927, leave scarcely anything better to be desired. It will be necessary in the future to achieve even greater results

in developing the economic relations between the two States. These peaceable, friendly relations with Turkey proved all the more justified as Turkey is conducting a peaceful policy not only towards our Soviet Union, but towards the other countries including the Balkan countries.”

CHAPTER XIII

SOVIET RUSSIA AND THE CHINESE REVOLUTION

HITHERTO the story of the relations of Soviet Russia and her neighbors has perforce had to treat of each group separately, and in a somewhat detached manner. The study of the relations between Soviet Russia and China involves the rest of the world, and thus gives the picture in its most up-to-date and comprehensive shape. It is necessary in this chapter to take some account as briefly as possible of the previous relations of all the powers with China prior to the revival of the revolutionary movement in 1926-27.

China, within whose borders are found about a quarter of the entire race of mankind, became towards the end of the nineteenth century the happy hunting ground for concessionaires of all countries. By loans, concessions and acquisition of territory, the Great Powers staked out their privileges and spheres of influence all round the borders of the lands under the worn-out Manchu dynasty. The process was accelerated in the twentieth century. An anti-foreign rising (the Boxer Rebellion) took place in 1900, and the legations in Peking were besieged, the Powers exacted enormous indemnities, while at the same time they confirmed their hold on various territories and concession areas. Alone among the Great Powers America asked no territory from China, and used the Boxer Indemnity for the

building of schools and the furtherance of Chinese education. The Russo-Japanese war of 1904-05 had little other effect on China than to confirm the Japanese occupation of Korea, and to displace Russian by Japanese influence in Manchuria. When the long-expected Revolution broke out and swept away the Manchu dynasty, when on June 1, 1912, the Chinese Republic was proclaimed under the leadership of Sun Yat-sen, it appeared as though China might regain self government. But under the presidency of Yuan Shih-kai (1912-16) the grasp of the Powers on Chinese revenues was increased, and the loans given to Yuan Shih-kai enabled him to snap his fingers at Parliament and stamp out the revolution. The hopes that the Chinese revolutionists had—educated as many of them were in Europe and America—of assistance from the Great Powers fell to the ground also. Hardly had the Republic been proclaimed when Czarist Russia informed Peking that Mongolia must be given full autonomy, and Britain simultaneously insisted on the autonomy of Tibet. This meant that those extensive though thinly populated portions of the Chinese Republic were brought under the influence of the Czardom and the British Empire respectively. Hatred against those imperialist powers began to burn strongly among the Chinese students and revolutionaries.

With the outbreak of the war in 1914 the Powers had enough to do with their own conflict. Japan saw her opportunity in China while the others were busy elsewhere. The United States was not then involved but by the Lansing-Ishii Agreement (one of the strangest acts of Woodrow Wilson's administration) Japan was left unhindered to carry out her intentions towards China. What these intentions were was soon to be seen. In

March, 1915, Japan made twenty-one demands on China, almost converting it into a Japanese protectorate. Japan now became the object of hatred among the Chinese intelligentsia.

In 1917, China, following the lead of the United States, and with the reluctant consent of Japan, joined the war on the side of the Allies. But when at the Peace Conference the Chinese representatives sought to free their country from the Japanese grasp, and in particular to ensure that the previously German territory on the Shantung Peninsula should be returned to China rather than confirmed to Japan, their plea was unheeded, and they were told blandly that the matter could be brought up before the League of Nations—when that body came into existence. They were then asked to sign the Treaty of Versailles. They refused.

But the Washington Conference, of 1921, held at the instance of the United States, had among its foremost questions the position of China. At the insistence of America the Anglo-Japanese Treaty was broken. The Japanese were forced to renounce their more extravagant claims, and the principle of the "Open Door" in China was restated. The Great Powers promised to restore to Chinese sovereignty certain territories held by them, and it was agreed that conferences would be held to discuss the abolition of the more onerous restrictions under which the Chinese labored. The promises, however, were not kept, and the conferences were postponed year after year, and when eventually held, ended in fiasco. Soviet Russia was not invited to the Washington Conference and sent protests before and after, in the latter of which she refused to recognize its decisions.

What had been the relations of Soviet Russia with China in these years? Formal relations there had been

none, for the Peking Government was keeping step with Japan, but declarations there had been in plenty. When in 1919 the Red Army in pursuit of Kolchak crossed the Urals a special declaration was issued to all the peoples of Asia proclaiming that the Red Army came as liberators, and in particular announcing to China that the Soviet Government rejected all claims to the Boxer Indemnity and other special privileges. Again in September, 1922, a Russian Declaration denounced all treaties of the former Czarist Government with China and expressed themselves "willing to return to China without compensation all Chinese territory seized by the Czar."

Though the Chinese Government did not move, the effect upon the Chinese people of these declarations and of the Soviet Revolution was enormous and continuous. It was at its greatest in the portions of China that were most revolutionary, namely, in the extreme South. It was an effect that increased steadily and was strengthened by the Soviet-Chinese Treaty of May 31, 1924, by which the renunciations of Soviet Russia were written into a binding agreement. One other small fact had great significance. China had hitherto been treated only as a power of the second rank, and had received only envoys and ministers. Karakhan, the Soviet envoy, was sent as plenipotentiary ambassador, a step which recognized China as a power on an equal footing with Germany or France. It was not merely that a former oppressor of China had turned into a brotherly neighbor, but that a great portion of mankind had taken up a struggle against the imperialists, especially against Great Britain and Japan, and had succeeded in driving them away. Soviet Russia became, if not exactly a model to follow, at any rate an inspiration to those who hoped

for Chinese liberation. The foremost leader of the Chinese revolution was still Dr. Sun Yat-sen, who after his break with Yuan Shih-kai in 1916 had established a revolutionary government at Canton. This government underwent many turns of fortune, but by 1923 Sun Yat-sen was firmly in power in Canton, and was also head of the Chinese People's Party, the Kuomintang, whose adherents were scattered throughout China. The Kuomintang under Sun Yat-sen proclaimed three principles: Democracy, Nationalism and Socialism. Increasingly, the Cantonese came into conflict with the British entrenched at Hongkong, the Nationalist struggle became more and more anti-imperialist; and of the imperialist powers Britain was regarded as the worst. Sun Yat-sen appointed a Soviet citizen, Michael Borodin, as adviser to his government, and the lessons of the Russian Revolution soon began to take concrete shape. In March, 1925 Sun Yat-sen died. But his death left his three principles indelibly fixed in the minds of his adherents; while the Soviet Government gave a graceful recognition of his worth as a revolutionary leader by the foundation of a Sun Yat-sen University at Moscow.

In May, 1925, an industrial dispute in Shanghai led to the shooting by British policemen of thirty demonstrating, unarmed students and workmen. This lit the torch of revolution throughout China. A boycott of British trade was proclaimed and it dwindled rapidly in the last half of 1925. Even a comparison between the whole years 1924 and 1925 shows a drop in British trade with China from 593,000,000 Haikwan taels to 431,000,000, which makes it seem probable that during the latter part of 1925 it had gone down by over 50 percent. Hongkong became an almost dead city. Early in the boycott another shooting affair occurred in Canton,

where British and French guns killed fifty Chinese; and in the summer of 1926 a dispute on the Upper Yangtse between one of the Chinese generals and a British gunboat was suddenly settled by a British bombardment of the open town of Wanhsien with the slaughter of a thousand civilians. If British imperialism had been hated before it was nothing to the fury roused by the affairs of 1925-26. A Cantonese Army marched northward in 1926 and without much resistance occupied the country between Canton and Hankow on the Yangtse River. Hankow now became the seat of nationalist government and the revolution rapidly developed. Hitherto the Kuomintang had been largely an affair of the educated classes; now the smaller trading sections, the artisans, the working class and even the peasantry began to be enrolled in its ranks. Its enemies were found in the ranks of feudalism, of the big landlords, and of the merchant traders whose interest was linked up with the British Empire, the Japanese Empire and the other powers. As the revolution developed and triumphed the movement among the masses of the Chinese population gathered strength and volume, and presently reached a stage where "awkward incidents" began to occur. Of these incidents the most spectacular was the seizure of the British concession at Hankow. At the same time the Chinese demonstrations that bore on their banners slogans hostile to Britain bore others expressing friendliness to Soviet Russia. The British Government accepted the defeat and recognized the retrocession to the Chinese of the territory held by them in Hankow, while it entered on friendly conversations with the Nationalist Government.

But Britain was now thoroughly alarmed. The incident of Hankow had been a tremendous blow to

British prestige in the Near East and the Pacific. That prestige was no mere question of pride: it was largely by the power of prestige that Britain was able to maintain dominion in India and the Far East. If Shanghai, largely a British City, was similarly to come under the control of the Kuomintang forces, British prestige and British interests as well might receive a fatal blow. Accordingly an army of some 30,000 troops was hurried out to Hongkong and Shanghai. Anxious efforts were made to induce France, Japan and America to take common action along with the British. To begin with, however, Japan and America and France showed themselves curiously reluctant to join forces with Britain. Warships, indeed, were sent to protect life and property in the disturbed conditions owing to the Civil War, but for a time there was no disposition to follow Britain's example of landing troops.

In any war neutrals are bound to suffer. In a Civil War with all the cruelties it lets loose, neutrals cannot possibly live unscathed in the war area. "Incidents" became more frequent, and in the advance of the Kuomintang armies down the Yangtse Kiang to the capture of Shanghai and Nanking and in the retreat of the Northern troops the Chinese populations suffered terribly. The neutrals suffered too. One American citizen was killed at Nanking and American warships opened fire on part of the town. This led to a joint note of the Powers to the Hankow Government, but when the British Government wished to follow up this note with sterner measures, the American Government refused to agree; all it would do was to send warships and troops where it seemed to them that American lives or property might be endangered.

A little later the Chinese Government under Chang

Tso-lin carried out a counter move to the nationalist seizure of the British Concession at Hankow, but a move of a more serious kind. The Soviet Legation at Peking was entered and many arrests made. The Soviet Government met this attack by a note in which they stated the Soviet representative would be withdrawn until reparation was made, and contrasted its own mild action with the steps which it alleged would have been taken by any of the imperialist powers in face of an outrage on territory possessing diplomatic immunity.

Meantime the mutual friendship of the Nationalist Government and the Soviet Government and the mutual hostility between the Nationalist Government and Great Britain had reached such a point of contrast that speeches began to be made implying that the real force against which the British troops were being sent to China was not the Chinese but the Soviet Union. Cartoons were published in which the civil war in China was depicted as a fight between two combatants, each with Chinese faces, but whose bodies were respectively those of a Russian and British soldier. Though each government proclaimed its neutrality to the combatants in the Chinese Civil War, the hatred of the British Government for the Nationalist revolutionaries was just as faithfully voiced in the British press as the sympathy of the Soviet population was voiced in the Russian papers. It seemed for a time as if the terrible drama of 1917 onwards was to be played again, this time on the stage of the Chinese Revolution. A new emphasis was given to the expression in the Constitution of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics of the contrast felt between "here in the camp of Socialism" and "there in the camp of capitalism." But within the "camp of capitalism" there are considerable differences. America can still stand for

the policy of the open door in China as against the policy of concessions. America can use her financial weight where others must have immediate resource to armed force. For, economically, America is on the upgrade.

Britain, economically in a state of decline, is forced to hold to what she has already got, and in that to become herself reactionary and the support of reaction throughout the world.

Even the forms of Government point the contrast. Of all the monarchies that were in the world at the beginning of the twentieth century the British monarchy alone remains strong in its prestige and proud antiquity. At the beginning of the twentieth century, some 125 years after the American Revolution, the world was still predominantly monarchical, the Old World almost entirely so—with the exception of the French Republic. Even the Dutch Republics of South Africa were being extinguished and brought under the sway of the British Crown. From the Pacific to the Atlantic ran the dominions of the Manchu Emperor, the Czar of Russia, the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire, the Dual Monarchy of Austro-Hungary, the Kaiser and the King Emperor of Britain. Now the Manchu dynasty, the Romanoffs, the Hohenzollerns, the Hapsburgs and the House of Osman have all been swept away. The House of Windsor alone remains, and remains as a buttress to all the smaller, newer monarchies, to the hopes of monarchist-restoration in Germany and Russia and to the monarchical governments of millions within Hindustan.

It is clear that the features which distinguish Britain from America "within the camp of capitalism," as well as the geographical situation of the British Empire, are bound to make the relations between Britain and the Soviet Union reach an acuter point of contradiction

than in any other case. Given a change in economic circumstances, and given the avoidance of war, the next decade might well see friendly relations developing between the United States and the Soviet Union, in proportion as each recedes from close connection with the British Empire. But all these and other possibilities hang upon the issue of the struggle that is now going on among about one quarter of all mankind in the plains and river valleys of China.

APPENDIX

OFFICIAL STATEMENT OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IN REGARD TO INTERVENTION

Vladivostok,
August 5, 1918.

IN the judgment of the Government of the United States, a judgment arrived at after repeated and very searching consideration of the whole situation, military intervention in Russia would be more likely to add to the present sad confusion there than to cure it and would injure Russia rather than help her out of her distress. Such military intervention as has been frequently proposed, even supposing it to be efficacious in its immediate object of delivering an attack upon Germany from the East, would, in its judgment, be more likely to turn out to be merely a method of making use of Russia than to be a method of serving her. Her people, if they profited by it at all, could not profit by it in time to deliver them from their present desperate difficulties and their substance would meantime be used to maintain foreign armies, not to reconstitute their own, or to feed their own men, women and children. We are bending all our energies now to the purpose of winning on the western front and it would, in the judgment of the Government of the United States, be most unwise to divide or dissipate our forces. As the United States sees the present circumstances, therefore, military action is admissible in Russia now only to render such protection and help as is possible to the Czecho-Slovaks against the armed Austrian and German prisoners who are attacking them and to steady any efforts at self-government or self-defense in which the Russians themselves may be willing to accept assistance. Whether from Vladivostok or from Murmansk and Archangel, the only present object for which American troops will be employed will be to guard military stores which may

be subsequently needed by Russian forces and to render such aid as may be acceptable to the Russians in the organization of their own self-defense. With such object in view, the Government of the United States is now cooperating with the Governments of France and Great Britain in the neighborhood of Murmansk and Archangel. The United States and Japan are the only Powers which are just now in a position to act in Siberia in sufficient force to accomplish even such modest objects as those that have been outlined.

The Government of the United States has therefore proposed to the Government of Japan that each of the Governments send a force of seven thousand men to Vladivostok with the purpose of cooperating as a single force in the occupation of Vladivostok and in safeguarding so far as it may, the country to the rear of the westward-moving Czechoslovaks, and the Japanese Government has consented.

In taking this action, the Government of the United States wishes to announce to the people of Russia in the most public and solemn manner that it contemplates no interference with the political sovereignty of Russia, no intervention in her internal affairs, not even in the local affairs of the limited areas which her military forces may be obliged to occupy, and no impairment of Russian territorial integrity, either now or hereafter; but that what we are about to do has as its single and only object the rendering of such aid as shall be acceptable to the Russian people themselves in their endeavors to regain control of their own affairs, their own territory and their own destiny.

The Japanese Government, it is understood, will issue a similar assurance.

These plans and purposes of the Government of the United States have been communicated to the Governments of Great Britain, France and Italy, and those Governments have advised the Department of State that they assent to them in principle. No conclusion that the Government of the United States has arrived at in this important matter is intended, however, as an effort to restrict the actions or interfere with the independent judgment of the Governments with which we are now associated in the war.

It is also the hope and the purpose of the Government of

the United States to take advantage of the earliest opportunity to send to Siberia a commission of merchants, agricultural experts, labor advisers, Red Cross representatives, and agents of the Young Men's Christian Association, accustomed to organizing the best methods of spreading useful information and rendering educational help of a modest kind in order in some sympathetic way to relieve the immediate economic necessities of the people there in every way for which an opportunity may open. The execution of this plan will not be permitted to embarrass the military assistance rendered to the Czecho-Slovaks. It is the hope and expectation of the Government of the United States that the Governments with which it is associated will wherever necessary or possible lend their active aid in the execution of these military and economic plans.

(Signed) POLK,

Acting Secretary of State.

NOTE OF CHICHERIN, PEOPLE'S COMMISSARY FOR FOREIGN
AFFAIRS OF THE RUSSIAN SOCIALIST FEDERAL SOVIET
REPUBLIC, TO PRESIDENT WILSON, DATED
OCTOBER 24, 1918.

To Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States of North
America.

Mr. President:

In your message to the Congress of the United States of North America on January 18, you expressed, in paragraph 6, your deep sympathy with Russia, which at that time was carrying on negotiations face to face with the powerful German imperialism. Your program, you said, is to secure the liberation of the entire Russian territory, and such a solution of all questions affecting Russia as would guarantee her 1) the most complete and free assistance on the part of other nations in the matter of securing full and unhindered opportunity for adopting independent decision with regard to her own political development and her national policy; 2) as would secure for her—whatever be the form of government

she may choose for herself—a welcome reception in the family of free nations; and 3) as would likewise secure for her every assistance she may need and may herself desire. And you have also added that “the attitude of the other great powers towards Russia in the course of the coming months will be the acid test of their good feelings towards her, their understanding of her needs as distinct from their own interests, as well as their wisdom and the unselfishness of their sympathies.”

The desperate struggle which we were engaged in at Brest Litovsk against German imperialism apparently only increased your sympathies for Soviet Russia, for you sent to the Convention of Soviets which ratified under the threat of German offensive, the outrageous treaty of Brest, your greetings and the assurance that Soviet Russia could rely on the help of America.

Six months have passed since then and the people of Russia have had ample time to test by experience the good feelings entertained towards them by your Government and that of the Allies, as well as their understanding of Russia's needs, their wisdom and the unselfishness of their sympathies.

This attitude of your government and that of your Allies towards the Russian people has first of all manifested itself in the fact that the financial assistance of your French Allies with the diplomatic aid also of your own government a plot was organized on Russian territory by the Czecho-Slovaks to whom your government is rendering all possible aid. For some time attempts were made to create a pretext for war between Russia and the United States of America and for that purpose stories were circulated to the effect that German war prisoners had seized the Siberian railroad. But your own officers and later Colonel Robins, the head of your Red Cross Mission, were able to satisfy themselves that the whole thing was pure invention. The Czecho-Slovak uprising was organized under the pretext of saving these unfortunate dupes from being delivered into the hands of Germany and Austria. But you can learn among other things from the open letter of Captain Sadoul, member of the French Military Mission, to what extent this invention is devoid of all real foundation in fact. The only reason why the Czecho-Slovaks had not

departed from Russia already at the beginning of the year was that the French government had not supplied any vessels for them. For several months we were waiting in vain for your allies to enable the Czecho-Slovaks to depart. Evidently for these governments it was much more desirable that the Czecho-Slovaks should stay in Russia—for what purpose was shown by what followed—than that they should go to France to participate in the war on the French front. The true character of the Czecho-Slovakian rebellion is best shown by the fact that, having got the Siberian railroad in their hands, they did not use it for their departure, but by order of the governments of the Entente powers which were directing them, they preferred to become in Russia itself the main-support of the Russian counter-revolution.

Their counter-revolutionary insurrection which has rendered impossible the transport of oil and grain along the Volga, has cut off the working men and peasants of Russia from the bread and other supplies of Siberia, and has doomed them to famine—this was the first thing that the working men and peasants of Russia experienced in practice from your government and that of your allies after the promises made by you in the beginning of the year. And after that they experienced another thing—the invasion of the North of Russia by the troops of your allies in which American troops participated; the occupation of Russian territory without any cause and without any declaration of war; the executions of the Soviet officials and all kinds of acts of violence perpetrated upon the peaceful population of Russia.

You have promised, Mr. President, to help Russia to secure full and unhindered opportunity for the adoption by her of independent decision with regard to her own political development and her national policy. But in reality this assistance expressed itself in the fact that the Czecho-Slovakian troops and soon afterwards your own troops and those of your allies attempted at Archangel, at Murmansk, in the Far East to force upon the Russian people the government of the oppressors, of those exploiting classes whose yoke the working men and peasants of Russia had already thrown off in October of last year. The revival of the counter-revolution, which had already been transformed into a corpse; attempts by means of

violence to reestablish its bloody domination over the people of Russia—this is what the latter have experienced instead of help for unhindered expression of their will, which was promised to them, Mr. President, in your declarations.

Likewise you promised, Mr. President, to help the Russian people in their struggle for independence. In reality what happened was that at a time when the Russian people were engaged on the southern front in a struggle against the counter-revolutionary elements, which had sold themselves to German imperialism and were threatening the Russian people's independence; at a time when on their Western front the Russian people were straining all their energy for the organization of their territory, they were compelled to throw their troops to the East against the Czecho-Slovaks, who were bringing for them oppression and enslavement, and to the North against the troops of your allies and your own troops, which were invading the Russian people's territory, and against the counter-revolution that was being organized by these troops.

The acid test of the relations between the United States and Russia has not given exactly the kind of results that one would have expected after your message to Congress, Mr. President. But we have cause to be not entirely dissatisfied even with these results, for the outrages of the counter-revolutionaries in the East and in the North have shown to the Russian working men and peasants what the Russian counter-revolution and its foreign supporters are aiming at, and as a result of this there has been created among the Russian masses an iron will to defend their freedom, to defend the conquests of the revolution—the land, which has now been given to the peasants, the factories, which have now been given to the workers. After the fall of Kazan, Simbirsk, Sizrán, Samara, the effect upon us of the deeds, into which in reality the promises made by you on January 18 were translated, must be clear to you too, Mr. President.

Our experience has helped us to create a firmly-welded, disciplined Red Army which is growing every day in strength and power and is learning to defend the revolution. The attitude towards us, which was shown in reality by your government and your allies, could not destroy us. On the con-

trary, we are stronger now than we were several months ago, and the international negotiations for a general peace, which you are proposing now, find us alive and strong, and permit us in the name of Russia to express our consent to participate in them.

As a condition for armistice, during which peace negotiations should begin, you in your note to Germany have made the demand that troops must be withdrawn from occupied territories. We are ready, Mr. President, to conclude an armistice on these conditions and we request you to inform us as to the time when you, Mr. President, and your allies intend to remove your troops from Murmansk, from Archangel and from Siberia. You are not willing, Mr. President, to permit an armistice to take place, unless Germany, while withdrawing her troops from the territories occupied by her, abstains from outrages, looting, etcetera. We take the liberty to conclude from this therefore that you and your allies will order the Czecho-Slovaks to return to us that part of our gold reserve which they have stolen from Kazan; and that you will prohibit them during their forced withdrawal—for we will force them to a most speedy withdrawal without waiting for your order—from continuing their robber activities and from committing against the working men and peasants the same acts of violence as heretofore.

As to your further peace conditions, namely, that the governments which conclude the peace must express the will of the masses of the people, our government as you know fully corresponds to this requirement. Our government expresses the will of the Soviets of Workers, Peasants and Red Army Deputies, representing at least eighty percent of the Russian people; which is more than can be said of your government, Mr. President. But we in the name of humanity and peace do not make it a condition of general peace negotiations that all peoples participating in them must necessarily be represented by Soviets of People's Commissars, elected at Congresses of Soviets of Workers', Peasants' and Soldiers' Deputies. We know that this form of government will soon be the universal form and that it is exactly this general peace that will free the peoples from the oncoming disaster; that will untie their hands to enable them to demolish that social order

and those cliques, which precipitated the world slaughter of humanity; that will lead the tortured masses of the world spontaneously to establish Soviet Governments, which will exactly express their will.

Agreeing at the present time to participate in negotiations even with those governments that do not as yet express the will of the people, we on our side would like to learn from you, Mr. President, exactly how you picture to yourself that League of Nations which in your opinion must crown the work of peace.

You demand the independence of Poland, Serbia, Belgium, and freedom for the peoples of Austria-Hungary. Probably you want to say thereby that the masses of the people must first take everywhere into their own hands the decision of their own destinies, in order later on to unite in a free league of nations. But strangely we do not notice in your demands any mention of freedom for Ireland, Egypt, India or even for the Philippine Islands. And we would wish very much that these peoples should have the opportunity to participate together with us through their freely elected representatives in the establishment of the League of Nations.

We would likewise wish very much to learn, Mr. President, before the beginning of the negotiations for the establishment of the League of Nations, how you represent to yourself the solution of many questions of an economic character, which have substantial bearing on the cause of future peace. You make no mention of the war expenses, of that crushing burden which would be placed upon the shoulders of the popular masses, if the League of Nations should not renounce the payment of loans due to the capitalists of all countries. You know no less than we do, Mr. President, that this war is the result of the policy of all capitalist states; that the governments of all countries vied with each other in armaments; that the ruling classes of all civilized nations participated in the policy of conquests, and that therefore it would be extremely unjust if the masses of the people, who have paid for this policy with the blood of millions, who have suffered from this policy in the general economic ruin, should, in addition to all this, have to pay to people actually responsible for the war, tribute for that policy which has brought on all this

incalculable suffering. We therefore propose, Mr. President, that the League of Nations should adopt, as one of its basic principles, the repudiation of war loans.

As to the reconstruction of the countries devastated by the war, we consider it entirely just that all peoples should in this respect help unfortunate Belgium, Poland and Serbia. And no matter how poor and ruined Russia may be, she on her part is ready to help these victims of the war in whatever way she can and she expects that American capital, which did not in any way suffer from this war, but which has even benefited by it to the extent of many billions of war profits, will on its part help these nations liberally.

But the League of Nations must not only settle the present war. It must make all wars in the future impossible. It cannot be unknown to you, Mr. President, that the capitalists of your country contemplate continuing in the future the same policy of conquests, and of exaction of high profits from China and Siberia, and that fearing the competition on the part of Japanese capitalists they are making military preparations in order to overcome the resistance which may be offered them by Japan. You undoubtedly know of similar plans of the ruling capitalist circles of other countries with regard to other territories and other nations. Knowing this you will have to agree with us that it is not possible to leave the factories, mines, banks in the hands of private individuals, who always use the great means of production created by the masses of the people to export the products and capital to foreign countries, to extract from them excessive profits, provoking imperialist wars by their struggle over the booty. We propose, therefore, Mr. President, that the expropriation of the capitalists of all countries be adopted as another of the basic principles of the League of Nations. In your country the banks and the industries are in the hands of such an insignificant group of capitalists that, according to the assertion of your personal friend, Colonel Robins, it will be sufficient to arrest twenty leaders of capitalist cliques and to put into the hands of the popular masses that which the capitalists have concentrated in their own hands by the usual methods of the capitalist world, in order to destroy the main source of new wars. If you agree to this, Mr. President, if the sources

of wars in the future are thus to be destroyed, then without doubt it will be easy to put down all economic barriers; and all nations, having in their hands the means of production, will be vitally interested in exchanging among themselves that which they do not need for what they do need. In such a case the problem will concern the exchange of products among nations, each of which will produce whatever it can best produce, and the League of Nations will be a league of mutual aid among the toiling masses. It will then be easy to reduce the armed forces to the level necessary for the maintenance of internal security. We know full well that the greedy class of capitalists will endeavor to create this internal danger, just as at present the Russian landlords, the Russian capitalists, aided by American, English and French armed forces, are endeavoring to take away the factories from the workmen and the land from the peasants. But if the American working men, enthused by your idea of the League of Nations, will break the resistance of the American capitalists, as we have broken the resistance of the Russian capitalists, then neither the German nor any other capitalists will be a source of sufficiently serious danger for the victorious working class. Then it will suffice if every member of the community, working six hours in a factory, will in the course of a few months study for two hours a day how to handle arms, and all the people will then know how to take care of internal danger.

Thus, Mr. President, though we know from experience what your promises mean, still we have placed ourselves upon the ground of your propositions with regard to international peace and the League of Nations, only we have endeavored so to deepen your propositions that they could not bring results contradictory to your promises, as has happened with your promise of help for Russia. We have tried to formulate your proposition for the League of Nations so specifically as to prevent the League of Nations from turning out to be a league of capitalists against the nations. If you do not agree with us, we have nothing against "open discussion of your peace terms," as it is provided for in the first paragraph of your peace program. We can easily agree upon details, if you place yourself upon the ground of our propositions.

But something else is possible too. We have had to do with

the President of the assault upon Archangel and of the invasion into Siberia. We have also had to do with the President of the Peace Program of the League of Nations. Is not the first of the two the real President, who actually directs the policy of the American capitalist Government? Is not the American Government the government of the American Joint Stock Banks, of American industrial, commercial, railroad trusts, of American banks—in short the Government of American capitalists? And could not the propositions made by this government with regard to the establishment of a League of Nations result in the putting of new chains upon the people, in the organization of an international trust for the exploitation of working men and for the suppression of weak nations? If that is the case, Mr. President, you will not be able to answer our questions and we will say to the workers of all countries: Look out! Millions of your brothers, set one against the other by the capitalists of all countries, are still perishing in the war, and the capitalist chiefs are already coming to an agreement among themselves, in order to suppress by their combined force the survivors, who are demanding an account from the men responsible for the war.

However, we have no desire whatever, Mr. President, to be at war with America, even at a time when your Government is not yet replaced by a Soviet of People's Commissars, and your office is not yet occupied by Eugene V. Debs, whom you are now keeping in prison. We have no desire whatever to be at war with Great Britain, even at a time when the Cabinet of Mr. Lloyd George is not yet replaced by a Soviet of People's Commissars, headed by Maclean. We have no desire whatever to be at war with France, even at a time when the capitalist government of Clemenceau is not yet replaced by a workers' government of Merheim. Therefore, just as we have concluded peace with the imperialist government of Germany headed by Kaiser Wilhelm, upon whom you, Mr. President, look not with more favor than we the Revolutionary Workers' and Peasants' government look upon you, we propose to you, Mr. President, to consider jointly with your allies the following questions and to give us exact and entirely business-like answers.

Do the Governments of America, Great Britain and France

intend to stop calling for the blood of Russian people and the lives of Russian citizens, if the Russian people will agree to pay them for it and to buy themselves off by ransom, as a man who, suddenly assaulted, ransoms himself from an assailant? And if so what kind of tribute from the Russian people is it that the Governments of America, Great Britain and France demand? Do they demand franchises, the turning over to them of the railroads, or mines, gold-mines etcetera, on certain conditions, or territorial concessions, some part of Siberia, of the Caucasus or of the Murmansk shorelands?

We expect from you, Mr. President, that you will declare definitely what exactly are the demands that you and your allies present, and that you will also state whether the union between your government and those of the other Entente powers has the character of a combination comparable to a stock company formed to secure dividends from Russia, or whether your government and the other governments of the Entente powers are presenting to us, each for itself, separate demands, and what exactly these demands are.

We would especially like to learn what are the demands of your French allies with regard to those milliards of roubles which the Paris bankers advanced as loans to the oppressor of Russia, to the enemy of his own people, to the criminal government of the Czar. And in this connection you, Mr. President, as well as your French allies, cannot help knowing that the Russian people who are exhausted by war and who have not yet had time to enjoy the benefits of the popular Soviet Government and to improve their economic affairs, will not be able to pay in full to the bankers of France the tribute for the milliards spent by the Czar's government against the interests of the people. And they will not be able to pay it even if you and your allies succeeded in enslaving and drenching with blood the entire territory of Russia—a thing which our heroic Red Army will not permit.

Do your French allies present the demand for the payment to them of a part of this tribute in installments, and if so of what part; and do they realize that their claims will lead to the presentation of similar demands by other creditors of the infamous government of the Czar, overthrown by the Russian people?

We cannot for a minute think that your government and those of your allies should not have a ready answer to these questions, at a time your and their troops are attempting to advance on our territory with the evident purpose of seizing and enslaving our country. The people of Russia, in the person of the popular Red Army, are standing guard over their territory and are gloriously fighting against your invasion and the attack of your Allies. But your government and those of the other Entente powers must surely have ready prepared plans, for the sake of which you are shedding the blood of your soldiers. We expect that you will make known to us your demands with full clearness and definiteness.

But if we should be disappointed in this, if you should give us no answer to our fully definite and specific questions, we will draw from it the entirely undeniable conclusion that our supposition is correct, that your government and those of your allies intend to get out of the Russian people tribute both in cash and in the natural wealth of Russia and in territorial aggrandisement. We will say this to the Russian people, as well as to the toiling masses of other countries, and the absence of an answer on your part will be to us a silent answer. The Russian people will understand that the demands of your government and of those of your allies are so heavy and so considerable that you do not even wish to communicate them to the Russian Government.

(Signed) CHICHERIN,
People's Commissary for Foreign Affairs.

TRADE AGREEMENT BETWEEN HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S
GOVERNMENT AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
RUSSIAN SOCIALIST FEDERAL SOVIET REPUBLIC

WHEREAS it is desirable in the interests both of Russia and the United Kingdom that peaceful trade and commerce should be resumed forthwith between these countries, and whereas for this purpose it is necessary pending the conclusion of a formal general Peace Treaty between the Governments of these countries by which their economic and political relations shall be regulated in the future that a preliminary Agreement

should be arrived at between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic, hereinafter referred to as the Russian Soviet Government.

The aforesaid parties have accordingly entered into the present Agreement for the resumption of trade and commerce between the countries.

The present Agreement is subject to the fulfilment of the following conditions, namely:—

- (a) That each party refrains from hostile action or undertakings against the other and from conducting outside of its own borders any official propaganda direct or indirect against the institutions of the British Empire or the Russian Soviet Republic respectively, and more particularly that the Russian Soviet Government refrains from any attempt by military or diplomatic or any other form of action or propaganda to encourage any of the peoples of Asia in any form of hostile action against British interests or the British Empire, especially in India and in the Independent State of Afghanistan. The British Government gives a similar particular undertaking to the Russian Soviet Government in respect of the countries which formed part of the former Russian Empire and which have now become independent.
- (b) That all British subjects in Russia are immediately permitted to return home, and that all Russian citizens in Great Britain or other parts of the British Empire who desire to return to Russia are similarly released.

It is understood that the term "conducting any official propaganda" includes the giving by either party of assistance or encouragement to any propaganda conducted outside its own borders.

The parties undertake to give forthwith all necessary instructions to their agents and to all persons under their authority to conform to the stipulations undertaken above.

I

Both parties agree not to impose or maintain any form of blockade against each other and to remove forthwith all ob-

stacles hitherto placed in the way of the resumption of trade between the United Kingdom and Russia in any commodities which may be legally exported from or imported into their respective territories to or from any other foreign country, and not to exercise any discrimination against such trade, as compared with that carried on with any other foreign country or to place any impediments in the way of banking, credit and financial operations for the purpose of such trade, but subject always to legislation generally applicable in the respective countries. It is understood that nothing in this Article shall prevent either party from regulating the trade in arms and ammunition under general provisions of law which are applicable to the import of arms and ammunition from or their export to foreign countries.

Nothing in this Article shall be construed as overriding the provisions of any general International Convention which is binding on either party by which the trade in any particular article is or may be regulated (as for example, the Opium Convention).

II

British and Russian ships, their masters, crews and cargoes shall, in ports of Russia and the United Kingdom respectively, receive in all respects the treatment, privileges, facilities, immunities and protections which are usually accorded by the established practice of commercial nations to foreign merchant ships, their masters, crews and cargoes, visiting their ports, including the facilities usually accorded in respect of coal and water, pilotage, berthing, dry docks, cranes, repairs, warehouses and generally all services, appliances and premises connected with merchant shipping.

Moreover, the British Government undertakes not to take part in, or to support, any measures restricting or hindering, or tending to restrict or hinder, Russian ships from exercising the rights of free navigation of the high seas, straits and navigable water-ways, which are enjoyed by ships of other nationalities.

Provided that nothing in this Article shall impair the right of either party to take such precautions as are authorized by

their respective laws with regard to the admission of aliens into their territories.

III

The British and other Governments having already undertaken the clearance of the seas adjacent to their own coasts and also certain parts of the Baltic from mines for the benefit of all nations, the Russian Soviet Government on their part undertake to clear the sea passages to their own ports.

The British Government will give the Russian Soviet Government any information in their power as to the position of mines which will assist them in clearing passages to the ports and shores of Russia.

The Russian Government, like other nations, will give all information to the International Mine Clearance Committee about the areas they have swept and also what areas still remain dangerous. They will also give all information in their possession about the mine fields laid down by the late Russian Governments since the outbreak of war in 1914 outside Russian territorial waters, in order to assist in their clearance.

Provided that nothing in this section shall be understood to prevent the Russian Government from taking or require them to disclose any measures they may consider necessary for the protection of their ports.

IV

Each party may nominate such number of its nationals as may be agreed from time to time as being reasonably necessary to enable proper effect to be given to this Agreement, having regard to the conditions under which trade is carried on in its territories, and the other party shall permit such persons to enter its territories, and to sojourn and carry on trade there, provided that either party may restrict the admittance of any such persons into any specified areas, and may refuse admittance to or sojourn in its territories to any individual who is *persona non grata* to itself, or who does not comply with this Agreement or with the conditions precedent thereto.

Persons admitted in pursuance of this Article into the territories of either party shall, while sojourning therein for purposes of trade, be exempted from all compulsory services whatsoever, whether civil, naval, military or other, and from any contributions whether pecuniary or in kind imposed as an equivalent for personal service and shall have right of egress.

They shall be at liberty to communicate freely by post, telegraph and wireless telegraphy, and to use telegraph codes under the conditions and subject to the regulations laid down in the International Telegraph Convention of St. Petersburg, 1875 (Lisbon Revision of 1908).

Each party undertakes to account for and to pay all balances due to the other in respect of terminal and transit telegrams and in respect of transit letter mails in accordance with the provisions of the International Telegraph Convention and Regulations and of the Convention and Regulations of the Universal Postal Union respectively. The above balances when due shall be paid in the currency of either party at the option of the receiving party.

Persons admitted into Russia under this Agreement shall be permitted freely to import commodities (except commodities, such as alcoholic liquors, of which both the importation and the manufacture are or may be prohibited in Russia) destined solely for their household use or consumption to an amount reasonably required for such purposes.

V

Either party may appoint one or more official agents to a number to be mutually agreed upon, to reside and exercise their functions in the territories of the other, who shall personally enjoy all the rights and immunities set forth in the preceding Article and also immunity from arrest and search provided that either party may refuse to admit any individual as an official agent who is *persona non grata* to itself or may require the other party to withdraw him should it find it necessary to do so on grounds of public interest or security. Such agents shall have access to the authorities of the country in which they reside for the purpose of facilitating the carrying out of this Agreement and of protecting the interests of their nationals.

Official agents shall be at liberty to communicate freely with their own Government and with other official representatives of their Government in other countries by post, by telegraph and wireless telegraphy in cipher and to receive and despatch couriers with sealed bags subject to a limitation of 3 kilograms per week, which shall be exempt from examination.

Telegrams and radiotelegrams of official agents shall enjoy any right of priority over private messages that may be generally accorded to messages of the official representatives of foreign Governments in the United Kingdom and Russia respectively.

Russian official agents in the United Kingdom shall enjoy the same privileges in respect of exemption from taxation, central or local, as are accorded to the official representatives of other foreign Governments. British official agents in Russia shall enjoy equivalent privileges, which, moreover, shall in no case be less than those accorded to the official agents of any other country.

The official agents shall be the competent authorities to visa the passports of persons seeking admission in pursuance of the preceding Article into the territories of the parties.

VI

Each party undertakes generally to ensure that persons admitted into its territories under the two preceding Articles shall enjoy all protection, rights and facilities which are necessary to enable them to carry on trade, but subject always to any legislation generally applicable in the respective countries.

VII

Both contracting parties agree simultaneously with the conclusion of the present Trade Agreement to renew exchange of private postal and telegraphic correspondence between both countries as well as despatch and acceptance of wireless messages and parcels by post in accordance with the rules and regulations which were in existence up to 1914.

VIII

Passports, documents of identity, Powers of Attorney and similar documents issued or certified by the competent authorities in either country for the purpose of enabling trade to be carried on in pursuance of this Agreement shall be treated in the other country as if they were issued or certified by the authorities of a recognized foreign Government.

IX

The British Government declares that it will not initiate any steps with a view to attach or to take possession of any gold, funds, securities or commodities not being articles identifiable as the property of the British Government which may be exported from Russia in payment for imports or as securities for such payment, or of any movable or immovable property which may be acquired by the Russian Soviet Government within the United Kingdom.

It will not take steps to obtain any special legislation not applicable to other countries against the importation into the United Kingdom of precious metals from Russia whether specie (other than British or Allied) or bullion or manufactures or the storing, analyzing, refining, melting, mortgaging or disposing thereof in the United Kingdom, and will not requisition such metals.

X

The Russian Soviet Government undertakes to make no claim to dispose in any way of the funds or other property of the late Imperial and Provisional Russian Governments in the United Kingdom. The British Government gives a corresponding undertaking as regards British Government funds and property in Russia. This Article is not to prejudice the inclusion in the general Treaty referred to in the Preamble of any provision dealing with the subject-matter of this Article.

Both parties agree to protect and not to transfer to any claimants pending the conclusion of the aforesaid Treaty any of the above funds or property which may be subject to their control.

XI

Merchandise, the produce or manufacture of one country imported into the other in pursuance of this Agreement, shall not be subjected therein to compulsory requisition on the part of the Government or of any local authority.

XII

It is agreed that all questions relating to the rights and claims of nationals of either party in respect of Patents, Trade Marks, Designs and Copyrights in the territory of the other party shall be equitably dealt with in the Treaty referred to in the Preamble.

XIII

The present Agreement shall come into force immediately and both parties shall at once take all necessary measures to give effect to it. It shall continue in force unless and until replaced by the Treaty contemplated in the Preamble so long as the conditions laid down both in the Articles of the Agreement and in the Preamble are observed by both sides. Provided that at any time after the expiration of twelve months from the date on which the Agreement comes into force either party may give notice to terminate the provisions of the preceding Articles, and on the expiration of six months from the date of such notice those Articles shall terminate accordingly.

Provided also that if as the result of any action in the Courts of the United Kingdom dealing with the attachment or arrest of any gold, funds, securities, property or commodities not being identifiable as the exclusive property of a British subject, consigned to the United Kingdom by the Russian Soviet Government or its representatives judgment is delivered by the Court under which such gold, funds, securities, property or commodities are held to be validly attached on account of obligations incurred by the Russian Soviet Government or by any previous Russian Government before the date of the signature of this Agreement, the Russian Soviet Government shall have the right to terminate the Agreement forthwith.

Provided also that in the event of the infringement by either party at any time of any of the provisions of this Agreement or of the conditions referred to in the Preamble, the other party shall immediately be free from the obligations of the Agreement. Nevertheless it is agreed that before taking any action inconsistent with the Agreement, the aggrieved party shall give the other party a reasonable opportunity of furnishing an explanation or remedying the default.

It is mutually agreed that in any of the events contemplated in the above provisos, the parties will afford all necessary facilities for the winding up in accordance with the principles of the Agreement of any transactions already entered into thereunder, and for the withdrawal and egress from their territories of the nationals of the other party and for the withdrawal of their movable property.

As from the date when six months' notice of termination shall have been given under this Article, the only new transactions which shall be entered into under the Agreement shall be those which can be completed within the six months. In all other respects the provisions of the Agreement will remain fully in force up to the date of termination.

XIV

This Agreement is drawn up and signed in the English language. But it is agreed that as soon as may be a translation shall be made into the Russian language and agreed between the Parties. Both texts shall then be considered authentic for all purposes.

Signed at London, this sixteenth day of March, nineteen hundred and twenty-one.

R. S. HORNE.

L. KRASSIN.

Declaration of Recognition of Claims

At the moment of signature of the preceding Trade Agreement both parties declare that all claims of either party or of its nationals against the other party in respect of property or rights or in respect of obligations incurred by the existing or former Governments of either country shall be equitably dealt

with in the formal general Peace Treaty referred to in the Preamble.

In the meantime and without prejudice to the generality of the above stipulation the Russian Soviet Government declares that it recognizes in principle that it is liable to pay compensation to private persons who have supplied goods or services to Russia for which they have not been paid. The detailed mode of discharging this liability shall be regulated by the Treaty referred to in the Preamble.

The British Government hereby makes a corresponding declaration.

It is clearly understood that the above declarations in no way imply that the claims referred to therein will have preferential treatment in the aforesaid Treaty as compared with any other classes of claims which are to be dealt with in that Treaty.

Signed at London, this sixteenth day of March, nineteen hundred and twenty-one.

R. S. HORNE.

L. KRASSIN.

FOUR CLAUSES FROM THE SOVIET-PERSIAN TREATY

Clause I

The Government of the R.S.F.S.R. in accordance with its declarations set forth in Notes of January 14, 1918, and June 26, 1919, on the principles of the R.S.F.S.R.'s policy with regard to the Persian people, once more solemnly declares Russia's immutable renunciation of the policy of force with regard to Persia pursued by the imperialist governments of Russia that have been overthrown by the will of her workmen and peasants.

Accordingly, wishing to see the Persian people independent, flourishing and freely controlling the whole of its own possessions, the Government of the R.S.F.S.R. declares all tracts, treaties, conventions and agreements concluded by the late Czarist Government with Persia, and tending to the diminution of the rights of the Persian people completely null and void.

Clause II

The Government of the R.S.F.S.R. brands (as criminal) the policy of the governments of Czarist Russia, which, without the agreement of the peoples of Asia and under the guise of assuring the independence of these peoples concluded with other States of Europe treaties concerning the East which had as their ultimate object its gradual seizure. The Government of the R.S.F.S.R. unconditionally rejects that criminal policy as not only violating the sovereignty of the States of Asia, but also leading to organized brutal violence of European robbers on the living body of the peoples of the East.

Wherefore and in accordance with the principles set out in Clauses I and IV of the present treaty, the Government of the R.S.F.S.R. declares its refusal to take part in any measures whatsoever tending to weaken or violate the sovereignty of Persia and declares completely null and void all conventions and agreements concluded by the late Government of Russia with third powers for the harm of Persia and concerning her.

Clause VIII

The Government of the R.S.F.S.R. declares its complete rejection of that financial policy which the Czarist Government of Russia pursued in the East, supplying the Government of Persia with financial means not in order to assist the economic development and flourishing of the Persian people but in the form of a political enfeeblement of Persia. The Government of the R.S.F.S.R. therefore resigns all rights to the loans furnished to Persia by the Czarist Government, and declares such loans null and not to be repaid. It similarly resigns all demands for the use of those State revenues of Persia by which the said loans were guaranteed.

Clause IX

The Government of the R.S.F.S.R. in accordance with its expressed condemnation of the colonial policy of capitalism, which served and is serving as a reason for innumerable miseries and sheddings of blood, renounces the use of those financial

undertakings of Czarist Russia which had as their object the economical enfeeblement of Persia. It therefore hands over to the Persian people the financial sums, valuables and in general, the assets and liabilities of the Discount Credit Bank of Persia, and similarly the movable and immovable property of the said Bank existing on the territory of Persia.

SOVIET RUSSIA'S RELATIONS WITH AMERICA

By Jerome Davis, Ph.D., Yale University

In March, 1917, the Russian Revolution broke out. On March 22 the United States was the first to formally recognize the Provisional Government. Later they granted credit for the purchase of war material in the United States to the extent of \$283,100,000. Five days after the Revolution began, the Petrograd Soviet, which actually had more military power than the Provisional Government, sent out a proclamation to the "Peoples of the World" in which it said:

"Conscious of its revolutionary power the Russian democracy announces that it will, by every means, resist the policy of conquest of its ruling classes, and it calls upon the peoples of Europe for concerted decisive actions in favor of peace."

On May 15, this same Soviet sent an appeal to the socialists of all countries which said:

"You must force your Governments to state definitely and clearly that the platform of peace without annexations or indemnities, on the basis of self-determination of peoples, is also their platform. . . . In order to unite these efforts the Petrograd Soviet has decided to take the initiative in calling for an international conference of all the Socialist parties and factions in every country."

The Provisional Government which we had recognized gave the stamp of its approval to this by declaring on May 18 that its aim was:

"To bring about, at the earliest possible date, a general peace . . . without annexations, without indemnities, and on the basis of self-determination of peoples."

Secretary of State Lansing met this appeal by stating that no passports would be issued for Americans desiring to attend the Stockholm Peace Conference. The State Department looked with disfavor on the possibility of its spreading peace sentiments in the countries participating.

On May 12 the State Department announced a *Special Diplomatic Mission* to Russia headed by Elihu Root of New York. In Moscow on June 22, 1917, Mr. Root said:

"It is a cause of joy to the democratic people of the United States if they can help to give to the Russian people the opportunity to work out their own system of government in accordance with the genius of Russian Character."

On June 22 he said to the Moscow Duma:

"You will make mistakes; you will have to retrace your steps here and there; you will find imperfections, but you will step by step go on to develop a structure of competent and successful free self-government. . . . *We will stay with you to the end.*"

On June 23 he said to the Russian War Industries Board:

"A very cheering incident is the action recently taken in Petrograd by the General Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates. . . . That resolution [welcoming cooperation between capital and labor] may well be accepted as the authoritative declaration of the people of Russia, so far as they have yet been able to secure a representative assembly."

Mr. Duncan, another member of the Root Commission, said to the All-Russian Trade Union Convention on July 5:

"We advise that in addition to these political activities the working men and women of Russia should thoroughly and strongly organize into trade and labor unions. . . . Organize now into militant trade and employment associations. Take co-equal interest in economic as in political organization."

This, Mr. Duncan assured them, was necessary because without it government officials would be careless in enforcing the law.

Still another member of the United States Government Commission told the Russian people that he was a socialist:

"I come from the workers, the radicals, the American socialists, the champions of democracy. For freedom and the emancipation of man the Russian revolution is the greatest event in human history."

When the Russian people followed their reasonable interpretation of these official messages from America and organized the government on the basis of a union labor system—on the authority of occupational units, or Socialistic Soviets, America refused to deal with them.

On June 16 the Russian Provisional Government sent a note asking for a conference of Allied Powers to revise the ultimate aims of the war. On the whole, these first few months were characterized by peace and friendship between Russia and her allies.

But the ensuing period was marked by the growing misunderstanding with foreign powers.

On November 6, after the people had elected Bolsheviks to a majority control in most of the Soviets throughout Russia, the Communistic Party seized control of the national government. Two days later the All-Russian Convention of Soviets passed a resolution proposing to all the warring peoples a peace based on the formula "no annexation and no indemnities." The Soviet Government on November 22 sent a note to the Allied Ambassadors proposing such a peace. The Spanish, Norwegian, Swedish, and Swiss ministers sent replies saying that they were taking "proper steps."

General Judson, the ranking United States military representative, on November 28, sent a letter to the Chief of the Russian General Staff in which he said that America did not wish to aid any one political party in Russia against another, and that "it is certainly within the rights of Russia to bring up the question of a general peace."

The same day Trotsky sent a note to the diplomatic representatives of the Allied countries informing them that

hostilities had ceased on the Russian front and urging them to join in negotiations for a speedy armistice.

Trotsky protested on December 1 that the representative of the United States, Lieutenant-Colonel Kerth, had urged the Russian General Dukhonin to carry out a policy "directly contrary" to that of the Russian Government, and was consequently interfering in the internal affairs of the country. It was on that same day that General Judson called on Trotsky and stated: "The time of protests and threats addressed to the Soviet Government has passed, if that time ever existed." Because of his willingness to treat with the Bolsheviks, General Judson was recalled to the United States and kept here for the duration of the war.

On December 29 Trotsky once more appealed to the Allies to participate in the peace conferences. On January 2, 1918, Ambassador Francis, of the United States, in a written communication stated: "If the Russian armies now under the command of the People's Commissars commence and seriously conduct hostilities against the forces of Germany and her allies, I will recommend to my Government the formal recognition of the *de facto* government of the People's Commissars."

President Wilson, in his address to Congress on January 8, complimented the Soviet Government, saying:

"The Russian representatives have insisted, very justly, very wisely, and in the true spirit of modern democracy, that the conferences they have been holding with the Teutonic and Turkish statesmen should be held within open, not closed, doors, and all the world has been the audience, as was desired. . . . Their power [that of the Russian people] is shattered. And yet their soul is not subservient. They will not yield either in principle or in action. Their conception of what is right, of what it is humane and honorable for them to accept, has been stated with a frankness, a largeness of view, a generosity of spirit, and a universal human sympathy which must challenge the admiration of every friend of mankind."

On January 18 the Constituent Assembly met and was disbanded by the Soviet Government. On January 23 Colonel Raymond Robins, Commander of the American Red Cross,

cabled America stating that in consequence of the dissolution of the Constitutional Assembly the Soviet Government was stronger than ever before and that he strongly urged recognition.

After waiting three months for Allied recognition, the Bolsheviks on February 8 repudiated Russia's foreign debts. Yet on February 28 the American Ambassador, who had removed his headquarters to Vologda, wired to Raymond Robins, of the American Red Cross, who had remained in the Russian capital, to "Express gratitude Council People's Commissars for cooperation."

On March 5 Trotsky gave a note for transmission to the American Government asking what support they could count on from the United States if they continued to fight Germany. And on March 9 the American Ambassador cabled the Secretary of State against Japanese intervention saying, among other things:

"Trotsky furthermore asserted that neither his government nor the Russian people would object to the supervision by America of all shipments from Vladivostok into Russia and a virtual control of the operations of the Siberian railway."

On March 14 President Wilson sent a message for the Russian people through the Congress of Soviets, thus to that extent recognizing the Bolshevik Government.

Shortly afterwards Secretary Polk stated that Japanese intervention in Siberia could be justified solely with a view to "holding it safe against Germany. . . . Otherwise the Central Powers could and would make it appear that Japan was doing in the East exactly what Germany is doing in the West, and so seek to counter the condemnation which all the world must pronounce against Germany's invasions of Russia which she attempts to justify on the pretext of restoring order." All the world now knows that we did not limit intervention in Russia "to holding it safe against Germany."

On March 18 Trotsky officially asked America for officers to help train the Soviet Army and also for an American railroad commission.

During this same month the American Ambassador became alarmed about the reported arming of prisoners of war. These

reports were later shown to be largely false by official American and British officers appointed to investigate the matter. On March 23 the American Ambassador in Tokio cabled that the Japanese Government had no present intention of intervening in Siberia. Less than two weeks later Japan began landing military forces in Vladivostok. All the Allied military attachés in Moscow cabled on April 4 against Japanese intervention.

On March 29 Foreign Commissar Chicherin formally asked the United States Government for the appointment of its representative on each of six commissions to settle Rumanian-Russian affairs. During this period the Soviet Government permitted our officials to purchase platinum for the use of the United States. But, although the United States Ambassador requested our railroad commission to come on, they were held in Japan by the State Department on the theory that the Soviet leaders were "acting under the direction of the German General Staff."

On April 9 Ambassador Francis was advised by the Secretary of State that Admiral Kato had landed troops in Siberia solely on his own responsibility. The Ambassador thereupon advised the British and American admirals and consuls that this had been done "purely for the protection of Japanese life and property."

On April 12, at the request of the Commander of the American Red Cross who had had his automobile stolen, the Bolsheviks attacked and captured all the armed anarchist clubs in Russia, which the Kerensky Government had not dared to attack.

On April 17 the Commander of the American Red Cross protested because of the methods used by our consular representatives against the Bolshevik Government. He wired to the American Ambassador, who was still in Vologda,

"Business relations not usually strengthened through policy kicking people in the face. Constant desire and expectation overthrow Soviet power poor foundation business cooperation."

On April 18 the American Red Cross Commander again reiterated his belief that unless the United States would create

a commission with power to work with the Soviet Government for economic cooperation, all useful work in Russia was over.

On April 21 the Soviet Government claimed to have uncovered a conspiracy against the Siberian Soviet Government by Admiral Knight of the United States and the American Consul at Vladivostok. The American Red Cross admitted that it looked as if the Consul was at least indiscreet. The Soviet Government asked for the recall of the American Consul in Vladivostok.

On May 3 the American Ambassador wired Colonel Robins asking him if he thought "the Soviet Government would oppose Allied intervention if they knew it was inevitable."

On May 14, when Colonel Robins left for America, Lenin gave him a complete memorandum concerning "Russian-American Commercial Relations," guaranteeing that the military stores in Russia would not be sold to Germany and offering unusual concessions to America.

On May 31 the American Ambassador gave an official statement to the Russian people:

"The policy of my Government is not to intervene in the internal affairs of Russia—and this policy has never been violated."

On June 1 he added another public declaration, in which he said:

"In other words, the policy of my Government consists in non-intervention in the internal affairs of Russia and in giving the opportunity to the people of this great country to select their own form of government, make their own laws, and elect their own officials."

The American Ambassador, however, had already been working for intervention nearly a month, since on May 2 he had sent the Secretary of State this cablegram: "In my opinion the time has arrived for Allied intervention."

By July 13 United States marines had landed at Murmansk and British, French, and Serbian forces were moving into the interior, arresting Soviet officials on the way. Chicherin felt

called upon to make an official protest to the United States.

On July 25, after the Bolshevik Government had requested the American Ambassador to leave Vologda because of the possibility of military operations, Ambassador Francis sent a message to Chicherin, in which he said: "Do you expect a German siege of Archangel? Certainly you do not anticipate an Allied siege of that city." Scarcely a week later General Poole took Archangel and began moving down towards Vologda!

There followed months of warfare and bitter hostility.

On August 3, 1918, the United States Government at Washington officially made the following statement:

"In the judgment of the Government of the United States—a judgment arrived at after repeated and very searching consideration of the whole situation—military intervention in Russia would be more likely to add to the present sad confusion there than to cure it, and would injure Russia, rather than help her out of her distress. . . . As the Government of the United States sees the present circumstances, therefore, military action is admissible in Russia now only to render such protection and help as is possible to the Czechoslovaks against the armed Austrian and German prisoners who are attacking them, and to steady any efforts at self-government or self-defense in which the Russians themselves may be willing to accept assistance."

As we have noted, Colonel Robins had already proved through Captain Webster and Captain Hicks the falsity of the reports regarding serious menace from armed prisoners of war. On August 23 Trotsky protested against this prisoner-of-war charge, calling it "an American lie."

The official American statement of policy continued:

"Whether from Vladivostok or from Murmansk or Archangel, the only present object for which American troops will be employed will be to guard military stores which may be needed by Russian forces and to render such aid as may be acceptable to the Russians in the organization of their own self-defence. . . . In taking

this action the Government of the United States wishes to announce to the people of Russia in the most public and solemn manner that it contemplates no interference with the political sovereignty of Russia, no intervention in her internal affairs—not even in the local affairs of the limited areas which her military force may be obliged to occupy.”

Yet United States troops were sent hundreds of miles into the interior of Russia under an allied force in which Russians played a subordinate role. In Archangel all the ministers of the new Northern Government were arrested and, in spite of the efforts of the American Ambassador to bring them back, they found it impossible to function because “the British officers together with some of the French officers had planned a *coup d'état*.” Tchaikovsky, the head of the Archangel “Government,” was not permitted to publish his own material and, according to the report which Ambassador Francis himself reproduces, the Allied censor commission “had condemned over half of the matter in the proposed issue of the Russian governmental paper, and consequently it was not issued.”

No wonder that on August 6 the Soviet Government protested to the American Consul in Moscow:

“We therefore request you to inform your government and peoples abroad that a completely unjustifiable attack and a pronounced act of violence is being committed upon us. . . . Without a declaration of war and without the existence of a state of war, hostilities are opened against us and our national property is pillaged.”

On October 24 the Russian Soviet Government addressed a note to President Wilson in which they expressed their belief that intervention to protect Czechoslovak soldiers was mere hypocrisy. They said:

“The best proof of the real object of the Czechoslovak rebellion is the fact that, although in control of the Siberian railway, the Czechoslovaks have not taken advantage of this to leave Russia, but by order of the Entente Governments, whose directions they follow,

have remained in Russia to become the mainstay of the Russian counter-revolution."

On September 3 the Soviet Government disclosed an attempted bribery of Soviet troops by the English and French missions in Moscow. According to the Soviet Government, the purpose of the conspiracy was the seizure of the People's Commissars. A British Lieutenant, Riley, paid over a million roubles in this attempt.

In October, 1918, rumors of an approaching armistice reached North Russia. Ambassador Francis in Archangel was forced to cable on the 18th of that month that the French troops would not now fight any more and that American soldiers "were partially inoculated with the same sentiment."

But the Armistice in France did not end Russia's difficulties with America and the Allies. Russia sought peace, but in vain.

On December 2 Chicherin sent to the Allied Governments an offer of peace. On December 24 Litvinoff appealed to President Wilson formally offering "to enter into negotiations for a peaceful settlement of all questions making for hostilities against Russia."

On January 12 Chicherin sent a note to the American Government attacking former war arguments which had been used to justify American intervention, because by this time the war with Germany was over.

On January 21, 1919, the President of the United States admitted that Russia had been invaded by the Allies because they "were all repelled by Bolshevism." He went on to state that "one of the things that was clear in the Russian situation was that by opposing Bolshevism with arms they were in reality serving the cause of Bolshevism."

Before the President made this statement and while he was making it, the American Ambassador was asking that he be allowed to return to Petrograd with fifty thousand American troops! "This," he said, "would mean the extinction of Bolshevism, would save our faces, and would probably induce troops to obey orders."

On January 22 the Allied representatives at the Peace Conference proposed a meeting of all the Russian factions at Prinkipo. They again reiterated, "It is not their [the Allied]

wish or purpose to favor or assist any one of the organized groups now contending for the leadership and guidance of Russia as against the others." The Bolsheviks accepted this invitation, but all the other factions refused and the meeting was never held. President Wilson instead sent William C. Bullitt and Lincoln Steffens to Russia to observe conditions at first hand.

On March 14, 1919, the Soviet Government sent out by the Bullitt Commission an offer of peace which included recognizing all its foreign debts. To this offer the Allies never replied.

Russia then attempted direct negotiations. It sent L. C. A. K. Martens as representative to the United States. On March 19 his credentials were sent to the State Department, but they were not accepted. On June 12, the State of New York raided his offices in New York City, but found nothing incriminating. In January, 1920, a Senate Committee made exhaustive investigations into his activities, and again nothing against him was discovered. Nevertheless, he was ordered deported in December, 1920, on the sole ground that he represented the Russian Bolshevik Government.

In October, 1919, the Allies asked all neutral governments, as well as Germany, to participate in the Blockade of Bolshevik Russia. Among other things clearance papers were to be refused to every ship going into Russian ports. The United States declared on November 4 that it was not participating in the blockade. It only refused "export licenses for shipments to Russian territory under Bolshevik control and clearance papers to American vessels seeking to depart for Petrograd, the only remaining Bolshevik port." There followed Allied help to Yudenitch, Wrangel, Denikin, Petlura, and yet each and every one of these military adventures was a dismal failure.

On December 5 the seventh All-Russian Congress of Soviets, after reiterating ten distinct proposals for peace made by Russia, passed another resolution proposing peace with the Allies.

On January 16, 1920, over a year after the Armistice, the United States Secretary of State issued a statement declaring that it was the intention of the government to withdraw the American military forces from Siberia in the near future.

On the same date the Supreme Council decided to lift the blockade of Russia. Nevertheless, the United States continued to warn business men that they would refuse to protect Americans who engaged in Russian trade.

Since 1920 the United States has practiced a policy of quarantining the Russian Soviet Government, with curious spasmodic interruptions. The American Relief Administration, under Mr. Hoover, worked in Russia from October, 1921, to July, 1923, sending in tens of millions of dollars worth of grain to relieve starvation. But the policy of non-recognition continues.

In August, 1922, America offered to send "an expert technical commission to study and report on the economic situation" in Russia. The Soviet Government accepted the proposal, provided she could send a reciprocal mission to America. This proposal we refused. President Coolidge in December, 1923, suggested settling with Russia, and again the Soviet Government accepted the proposal, but the Secretary of State, in a cold unfriendly note made new demands and refused the offer.

Russian business agents are, however, welcomed, and several American banks have financed the growing Russo-American commerce. For the year ending September 30, 1926, the All-Russian Textile Syndicate purchased over \$33,000,000 worth of cotton in the United States. In three years, it purchased \$116,815,282.42 worth of cotton, dyes, machinery, and other merchandise in the United States. The total turnover of imports and exports from Russia during the year ending September 30, 1926, was over seventy-eight million dollars. But while America was entertaining Bolshevik emissaries who had gold, and while Ford was shipping 10,000 tractors to Russia on partial credit, the United States Secretary of State refused a transit visa to the Russian Ambassador to Mexico. The "quarantine" has not been ended; so far as the United States Government is concerned, officially and formally, there is no government in Russia!