

INFORMATION NOTES

EAST PRUSSIA
AND
DANZIG

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THE POLISH MINISTRY OF PREPARATORY WORK
CONCERNING THE PEACE CONFERENCE

The following Notes are prepared by experts and are designed to give the basic facts essential to the settlement of Polish post-war problems. They are primarily intended for the use of students and writers on international affairs. They may be obtained direct from The Ministry of Preparatory Work Concerning the Peace Conference, 73, Portland Place, London, W.1.

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CONTENTS

	PAGE
SECURITY OF POLAND AND THE PEACE OF EUROPE	5
HISTORICAL AND ETHNICAL FACTS	6
ECONOMIC UNITY OF POLAND, DANZIG AND EAST PRUSSIA	7
RELATIONS OF GERMANY TO EAST PRUSSIA	8
THE ATTITUDE OF POLAND	11
CONCLUSIONS	13
 ANNEXES :	
AREA AND POPULATION	15
(a) East Prussia	
(b) Free City of Danzig	
(c) Number of Households in East Prussia in 1933	
EMIGRATION FROM EAST PRUSSIA	15
INCREASE OF POPULATION AND MIGRATION IN THE COUNTIES OF EAST PRUSSIA DURING THE PERIOD FROM 1925-1933	16
NATIONALITIES IN EAST PRUSSIA	17
(a) Poles	
(b) Lithuanians	
(c) Foreign Workers	
(d) Germanization	
(e) Plebiscite	
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF EAST PRUSSIA	23
(a) Occupations	
(b) Social Structure	
(c) Industry and Crafts	
(d) Agrarian System	
(e) Participation in the National Income of Germany	
(f) Participation in Income Tax	
(g) Wages	
(h) A British View	
EAST PRUSSIA AS A SOURCE OF MILITARY MAN POWER	25
(a) Natural Increase of Population	
(b) Children under 15 according to 1933 Census	
(c) Recruitment of Soldiers	
SOME VIEWS CONCERNING THE POLISH OUTLET TO THE SEA	26
THE TURNOVER OF THE PORT OF DANZIG	28
(a) After the First Partition of Poland	
(b) After the Liberation of Poland in 1918	
THE GROWTH OF THE PORT OF GDYNIA	28
THE AREA AND POPULATION OF POLAND	28
 MAPS	
POLAND AND GERMANY IN EUROPE	4
EAST PRUSSIA. ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS BEFORE 1939	29
EAST PRUSSIA. GERMAN ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS AFTER INCORPORATION OF POLISH AND LITHUANIAN AREAS	30
EAST PRUSSIA AS A MILITARY BASE IN 1939	31
EAST PRUSSIA AS OPERATIONAL BASE IN SEPTEMBER 1939	32



I

The Security of Poland and the Peace of Europe

The frontier of East Prussia¹ is less than sixty miles from Warsaw, as the crow flies. Licbark (Heilsberg), the key point of the powerful fortifications built by the Germans in East Prussia facing Poland, is only 130 miles from Warsaw. Cutting deeply into Polish territory, the frontier of East Prussia forms a broad sweep or bend of about 350 miles. The whole frontier is heavily fortified, dominates the lower Vistula—the main waterway of Poland—and touches the principal railway lines connecting the country with the Baltic.

The seaboard allocated to Poland by the Treaty of Versailles, is very short—only 90 miles. The city of Gdańsk (Danzig)², situated at the mouth of the Vistula, was not given to Poland, although 90.9 per cent. of the basin of the Vistula belongs to her; moreover, it should be noticed that 77.7 per cent. of Poland's total tonnage of foreign trade was seaborne already in 1938.

Robert Lansing, U.S.A. Secretary of State under President Wilson wrote:

“International boundaries may be drawn along ethnic, economic, geographic, historic or strategic lines. One or all of these elements may influence the decision, but whatever argument may be urged in favour of any of these factors, the chief object in the determination of the sovereignty to be exercised within a certain territory is national safety. National safety is as dominant in the life of a nation as self-preservation is in the life of an individual. . . . With national safety as the primary object to be attained in territorial settlements, the factors of the problems assume generally the following order of importance: the strategic, to which is closely allied the geographic and historic, the economic, affecting the commercial and industrial life of a nation; and lastly the ethnic, including in the terms such conditions as consanguinity, common language, and similar social and religious institutions.”²

The Polish delegation to the Peace Conference in Paris stressed very strongly the strategic danger to Poland resulting from the German control of East Prussia and the placing of Danzig outside the Polish frontiers. The representations of the Polish delegates, however, passed unheeded. They were negated by arguments to the effect that the disarmament of Germany and the demilitarization of East Prussia were sufficient guarantees of Poland's security. The Treaty of Versailles, though formally granting Poland free access to the sea, did not make provision for the strategic safeguarding of this access, and, besides that, the Polish State as a whole was not granted frontiers which could offer it any possibilities of defence.

The population of Poland increased from 27.4 millions in 1921 to 35.1 millions in 1939. The events of September, 1939, proved that not only the existence of the whole community, but the life of every individual Pole, was menaced by frontiers which favoured German aggression. East Prussia and Danzig came to be used as Germany's striking bases for her invasion of Polish soil.

Poland can never be considered safe as long as the enclave of East Prussia threatens her security and, therefore, her integrity. East Prussia is not a matter of concern for Poland alone. It is, together with Danzig, a danger zone for the whole of Europe. The solution of the problem of East Prussia is imperative for European peace.

¹ Statistical data about East Prussia and Danzig are given in the annexes.

² *The Peace Negotiations*, London, 1921; p. 91.

II

The Historical and Ethnical Facts

East Prussia and Danzig have belonged to Poland during long periods of their history. The Poles were the first colonists of that country. East Prussia was a fief of the Polish Crown until 1657, while the part known as Warmia (Ermeland) belonged to Poland as late as 1772. Danzig was Polish until 1793. The city enjoyed a certain measure of autonomy, but the inhabitants of East Prussia and Danzig were regarded in international law as Polish subjects.

The German Order of the Teutonic Knights endeavoured to separate East Prussia and Danzig from Poland. In the beginning of the 13th century one of the Polish princes charged the Knights to undertake the converting of the heathen Prussians to Christianity. The Prussians were not a Germanic tribe, but related to the Latvians and Lithuanians while having bonds of kinship with the Slavs. The Teutonic Knights, who exterminated the Prussians instead of converting them, began to threaten Polish territories by treachery and violence. A typical example of their activities is provided by the massacre of 1308, in the course of which they slaughtered the Slav and Polish population of Danzig.

The Polish kings did not succeed in expelling the Teutonic Knights altogether, but made them their vassals. The secularization of the Order in 1525 subordinated East Prussia to the House of Hohenzollern, the Princes of Brandenburg, who remained until 1657 the vassals of Poland. The Great Elector still paid homage to the King of Poland, but seized the opportunity of the Polish-Swedish war to evade his obligations towards Poland and break the bond of vassalage.

In spite of the Germanizing efforts of the Teutonic Knights and the Hohenzollerns, the cultural influence of Poland was very strong in East Prussia. In fact, the Teutonic Knights came across many villages founded previously by Polish settlers, and in various parts of the country Polish law had already been accepted. Although the Teutonic Knights and later the Hohenzollerns did their utmost to encourage only German settlers, Polish colonization continued steadily until the end of the 18th century. Along with the political links connecting East Prussia and Poland, and the constant stream of Polish colonization, there also spread a considerable Polish cultural influence throughout East Prussia, an influence which made itself felt not only by the remnants of the Prussians—almost exterminated by the Teutonic Knights—and Lithuanians, but even by a number of German settlers.

The University of Królewiec (Koenigsberg) was a centre of Polish culture. It was founded under a charter of Zygmunt August, King of Poland. Many Polish books were published by Królewiec printers. A Polish newspaper appeared there until the 18th century. In the middle of the 16th century the first Polish secondary school was founded in Elbląg (Lyck), while the second was founded soon afterwards in Osterode. Danzig children were educated in Polish until the beginning of the 19th century. East Prussia is still filled with the works of Polish painters, sculptors and architects. Polish protestants in East Prussia use to this day a prayer book written in the 16th century by an eminent Polish ecclesiastic. This suggests that in East Prussia even Protestantism was promoted by Polish rather than German culture. The 19th century German philosopher

Konstantin Frantz characterized the cultural atmosphere of East Prussia in the following words:

"I maintain that Koenigsberg is not part of Germany, although German is spoken there."³

Polish influence was increased by the fact that Poland was at the time perhaps the most liberal and tolerant country of the continent. The attempts of the Teutonic Knights and the Hohenzollerns to restrict the civil rights and liberties of the people of East Prussia were resolutely opposed by the Polish kings, who were the overlords of the province. The inhabitants of East Prussia frequently appealed for protection to the Polish King or Parliament on the ground of Polish sovereignty over the province. The control exercised by the Polish Parliament tempered the autocratic ambitions of the Hohenzollerns while they were the vassals of Poland.

In the 17th century Otto von Graben, the East Prussian representative in the Polish Senate, made a speech against the rule in East Prussia of the Hohenzollerns of Brandenburg, whom he described as "foreigners." He said :

"The Duchy of Prussia does not demand any treasures, any riches, it demands only the liberty which so splendidly adorns the whole body of the Commonwealth. The Duchy also is a component part of it. We believe in our common mother, the Polish Commonwealth, and we are ready to give our life and possessions for it."⁴

The decline of Poland's political power and her eventual downfall sealed the fate of East Prussia. Germanization, hitherto held in check by the political prestige and military strength of Poland, increased. Frederick the Great and his successors began a series of campaigns aiming at the suppression of the Polish language (Annexe No.4). Economic pressure forced many Poles to abandon their homesteads. Thus, German colonization, carried out by brutal methods, pushed Polish culture back.

Nevertheless, Polish tradition has survived, and the Poles of East Prussia have not lost their national character, nor have the Lithuanians living in certain parts of that province. At the outbreak of the present war in 1939, about 300,000 Poles still inhabited the southern part of East Prussia, while the number of Lithuanians in the north-eastern districts was estimated at about 50,000.

III

The Economic Unity of Poland, Danzig and East Prussia

As already observed, Warsaw is situated very close to East Prussia (60 miles), whereas Berlin is 240 miles away. The Polish industrial districts of Katowice and Sandomierz are about 215 miles from East Prussia, while the principal German industrial region of Westphalia is 480 miles distant. Geographically as well as economically Poland and East Prussia form a whole.

In 1913, 35.4 per cent of the exports of East Prussia went to the western provinces of Poland—Pomorze and Poznania, which on the other hand supplied 14.8 per cent of the imports of East Prussia. Coal was supplied mainly from Polish Silesia. East Prussia also had a considerable trade with the provinces of central and eastern Poland before 1914.

In the period between 1840 and 1939 nearly 1,500,000 persons emigrated from East Prussia (Annexes No. 2 and No. 3). The annual emigration from East Prussia accounts regularly for about 80 per cent of the

³ K. Frantz, *Das Neue Deutschland*, Leipzig, 1871 ; p. 203.

⁴ Robert Machray, *East Prussia*, London, 1943 ; p. 37.

natural increase of population. There are in consequence 12 districts in East Prussia which have a steadily declining population and the whole province is the most sparsely populated in Germany. All the adjoining Polish provinces are much more densely populated. East Prussian agriculture, therefore, suffers from a permanent shortage of labour, which is met by an influx of foreign labourers (Annexe No. 4), mainly from the adjoining Polish provinces.

Shortly before the present war, German authors (H. Aubin, Werner Horn) expressed considerable alarm on this account:

"Who could imagine a paper frontier, a frontier of boundary posts, resisting any pressure from nations of high fertility?"⁵

"The heart of East Prussia . . . is so sparsely populated that there would appear to be some justification for those Poles . . . who represent our Eastern provinces as the coveted object of Polish land-hunger."⁶

The bonds of unity between Danzig and Poland are even more conspicuous (Annexes No. 7 and No. 8). As soon as Danzig was separated from Poland at the end of the 18th century, the number of ships using the harbour decreased. Until 1919 Danzig remained in German hands and the Berlin Government neglected the economic interests of Danzig, while they favoured Szczecin (Stettin) and Królewiec (Koenigsberg). Danzig under German rule was one of a secondary port. It found new prosperity when after 1920 it was incorporated in the Polish customs area. Danzig was left, however, outside the political frontiers of Poland and, in consequence, a situation arose which led to the events of 1939. There are scores of articles in the German and Danzig Press, during the years 1940-1942, deploring the economic decline of Danzig after its renewed incorporation into Germany.

Some Germans, therefore, appreciated the importance of the economic links between East Prussia, Danzig and Poland. For instance Fritz Simon, the Syndic of the Koenigsberg Chamber of Commerce, suggested in 1919 a customs union of Poland and East Prussia:

"The idea of a customs union between East Prussia and Poland imposes itself as a necessity. . . . By the same measure all the inconveniences in which this province is involved by incorporation in the economic system of the Reich would be done away with."⁷

Dr. Mahrholz, writing in the *Vossische Zeitung* of August 19th, 1928, stated:

"The citizens of Danzig are German in sentiment, but they know that economically they stand for nothing without Poland."

Such objective views, however, never found favour in the public opinion of Germany, or in her political pronouncements. Germany wants to hold East Prussia for strategic and political reasons and prefers to ignore the geographic, historical, ethnographic and economic bonds existing between that province and Poland.

IV

The Relation of Germany to East Prussia

The dynastic association of East Prussia with the March of Brandenburg strengthened the Hohenzollerns within the Reich and laid the foundation for the power of Prussia which served as the main driving force of

⁵ H. Aubin, *Von Raum and Grenzen des Deutschen Volkes*, Breslau, 1938.

⁶ W. Horn, *Die Bevoelkerungsverteilung in Ostpreussen und ihre Veraenderungen*, Koenigsberg, 1931; p. 139.

⁷ cf. C. Smogorzewski, *Poland's Access to the Sea*, London, 1934.

the imperialism of the Second Reich and the Nazi Third Reich. East Prussia was thus linked with the myth of "German Mission." The Germans are not the autochthonous inhabitants of East Prussia, but colonists, who established their position by the extermination and oppression of the native population. East Prussia, therefore, was the breeding ground of the *Herrenvolk* theory. As the most easterly province of Germany, it is invaluable as a base for attack against either Poland or Russia. That is why East Prussia is strongly associated in German minds with the doctrine of the *Drang nach Osten*, menacing not only Poland, but the whole of Central and Eastern Europe.

The main importance of East Prussia from the German point of view is political and strategic. It has, however, also a certain economic value, as a granary supplying the industrialized parts of Germany with food. If Germany were a peaceful nation, prepared to exchange its industrial products for food imported from other countries, it could dispense with East Prussia. But military ambitions have made economic self-sufficiency essential and the food produced by East Prussia is necessary for the German war machine.

It has been calculated by the Polish scholar, S. Srokowski⁸ that, in spite of war damage, East Prussia was feeding during the First World War, apart from its own population:

Approximately 3,650,000 inhabitants of the Reich with cattle				
" 3,390,000	"	"	"	" grain
" 2,870,000	"	"	"	" cheese
" 2,500,000	"	"	"	" potatoes
" 2,290,000	"	"	"	" bread

In view of the high birth rate of its Slav population East Prussia has always provided the German Army with a large quota of its recruits (Annexe No. 6).

For all these reasons Germany was prepared to subsidize a province which really belonged to a historic, geographic and economic area outside the Reich. The distance (*Marktferne*) of East Prussia from Germany proper was overcome by preferential railway tariffs. This was an expensive method, especially as East Prussia had to be supplied with absolutely everything—not only cement, but also paving stones, drainage tubes and all kinds of materials. The production of East Prussia is mainly agricultural, but the delivery of the products of Prussian farms to Germany is difficult owing to the distances. The agriculture of this area could not pay its way and it was heavily in debt. In 1902, 35 per cent of the East Prussian farmers had mortgaged their land to over 50 per cent of its value. In 1926, 42 per cent of the farms in East Prussia were mortgaged over 100 per cent of their value⁹.

The German Treasury had to assist East Prussian economy with credits and subsidies to save it from bankruptcy.

The scandal of the *Osthilfe*, the greatest scheme of financial assistance to the German East, disclosed the social and political background of the Treasury's subsidizing activity. More than half of the subsidies were given to big landlords.

Out of the total utilized land of East Prussia 46.9 per cent is owned by 4,111 persons (Annexe No.5), i.e. the *Junkers*. The type of Prussian *Junker* is inseparable from the class which directed German policy

⁸ S. Srokowski, *Prusy Wschodnie*, Warsaw, 1929.

⁹ cf. *Die Lage der Landwirtschaft in Ostpreussen. Ausschuss zur Untersuchung der Erzeugungs- und Absatzbedingungen der deutschen Wirtschaft (Enquete — Ausschuss)*, vol. 8, Berlin, 1929.

towards aggression, both under the Kaiser and under Hitler. The influence and power of the *Junkers* is based on their estates. East Prussia, together with Pomerania and Mecklenburg, is the province in which most of the *Junker* estates exist.

The *Junker* dominates the social structure of East Prussia. All the attempts at carrying out an agrarian reform in East Prussia were frustrated by the *Junker* class. It is interesting to compare the results achieved by agrarian reform in East Prussia (14,280 sq. miles) with those attained in the neighbouring Polish Pomorze (9,916 sq. miles):

In East Prussia, in 1936, 6,068 hectares of land were parcellated and 306 new farms were formed.

In Polish Pomorze, in 1938, 21,000 hectares were parcellated and 2,000 new farms were formed.¹⁰

The wages paid in East Prussia were the lowest in Germany (Annexe No. 5). No wonder that the people of East Prussia were eager to migrate. They realised that there was no future for them under the rule of the *Junkers*. The migration from East Prussia was not exclusively confined to the normal, familiar movement of population from rural areas to towns, for peasants from East Prussia often migrated to rural areas in other parts of Germany.

In such conditions the province which has the lowest rate of income per head in Germany (Annexe No.5) could only achieve prosperity through industrialisation. The attempts of von Gossler in the end of the 19th century and those of the Nazis in recent times have failed. The distance of East Prussia from the sources of raw materials and from markets, rendered the development of industry impracticable. German capitalists¹¹ were reluctant to invest their funds in this area. That is why East Prussia, although a maritime province, did not have even a fish canning industry, nor—in spite of its agricultural production—a preserves industry¹²

The political aims of Germany, which make it imperative for her to keep the invasion base of East Prussia, are in complete contradiction with the natural conditions of that province connecting it with an entirely different hinterland. The same applies to Danzig, a fact which has been aptly pointed out by Mr. Wickham Steed on the eve of the present war (Annexe No. 7). As to Danzig, the aggressive intentions of the Germans with regard to that port had been obvious ever since it was established as a Free City. The first Senate of the "Free City of Danzig" consisted entirely of German subjects. The political parties in Danzig were branches of the great parties in Germany. About 10 per cent of Danzig's civil servants, especially among the higher ranks, were German subjects. Retired German officers and civil servants, engaging in political activities in favour of Germany, formed 10 per cent of the population of the Free City. The citizens of Danzig served in the German Army. In June, 1939, a German general was appointed commander of the Danzig police, which had the strength of a full division, with full military equipment. All these activities had nothing in common with the economical interests of Danzig. On the contrary, the German activities in Danzig disturbed, if not prevented, the collaboration between the Free City and Poland.

¹⁰cf. Edgar Mowrer, *Germany Puts the Clock Back*, Penguin Books, 1938 ; pp. 80, 109, 224.

¹¹cf. H. B. v. Gruenberg, *Industrialisierung im Osten*, *Warschauer Zeitung*, No. 303, of Dec. 25-27, 1940.

¹²cf. *Europa's Schicksal im Osten*, edited by H. Hagemayer, Breslau, 1938.

V

The Attitude of Poland

Impartial experts agree (Annexe No. 5) that the economic situation of East Prussia was no better before the First World War than after 1918. It was rendered difficult by the abnormal position of East Prussia, belonging politically to Germany, but distant geographically from the metropolitan territory. German propaganda, striving to discredit the Treaty of Versailles at all costs, made East Prussia and Danzig its favourite subjects, in spite of the fact that the final decisions of the authors of the Treaty largely took the German view into account, ignoring the observations made by the commissions of experts (Annexe No. 7). German propagandists tried to account for all the troubles of East Prussia by the existence of the so-called "Corridor," separating that province from Germany. The area described by the Germans as Corridor is the Polish province of Pomorze, which was allocated to Poland under the Treaty of Versailles for two principal reasons: (1) in order to give Poland a free access to the sea, and (2) because of its Polish population.

The first of these two motives was eventually fully vindicated by the remarkable growth of the two ports (Gdynia and Danzig) handling Polish overseas trade (Annexe No. 8 and No. 9) as well as by the increase of Poland's population from 27,400,000 inhabitants in 1921 to over 35,000,000 in 1939 (Annexe No. 10) which all the more necessitated such an access.

Even the biased German pre-1914 statistics could not conceal the fact that the population of Pomorze was Polish. A new and unexpected confirmation of the purely Polish character of Pomorze was provided by the Germans themselves in the course of the present war. In the years 1940-1942 the Germans, with their usual police methods, carried out in Poland a census of persons of German nationality and origin. They compiled the so-called *Deutsche Volksliste*. In Polish Pomorze the number of Germans on the *Volksliste* was 200,000,¹³ while the Polish official statistics recorded in the same territory 191,000 Germans in 1931. The total population at that time amounted to 1,884,000—including 1,657,000 Poles, and, therefore, the percentage of Germans was only negligible. The very close accord of the Polish and German figures (Polish statistics: 191,000 Germans in 1931, German statistics: 200,000 Germans in 1940) proves that Polish nationality censuses were strictly accurate. It also confirms the fact that Pomorze is a purely Polish province and that the former German claims to the Corridor were completely without foundation.

German propaganda blamed the Corridor for the economic conditions in East Prussia and it was alleged that it hampered transport between Germany and that province. This was not true, for, both before 1914 and after 1921, one third of the export and import of East Prussia were carried by sea, while Poland offered to the Germans every assistance for rail and road transit across Pomorze. The volume of overland traffic between Germany and East Prussia has actually increased after 1918.¹⁴

¹³Muenchner Neueste Nachrichten, of August 18th, 1942; article *Volkstumsfragen im einstigen "Korridor."*

¹⁴A. von Muchlenfels, *Ostpreussen, Danzig und der polnische Korridor als Verkehrsproblem*, Koehnigsberg, 1930.

Poland went so far as to accept payment in goods for transport services in Pomorze. The German economic expert and ex-president of the province of East Prussia, Batocki, wrote:

"The Polish Corridor damages our national feelings far more than our economic interests."¹⁵

German propaganda against Poland on the subject of Pomorze was dictated by political and not economic motives. The incorporation of Pomorze into Germany, which would put an end to the "separation" of East Prussia, would not improve its economic situation in the least. It would, on the other hand, cut Poland off from the sea and make her completely dependent on Germany. The economic situation of the area can be improved only by the union of the province with its natural hinterland, Poland, with her 35 million inhabitants and 150,550 square miles of territory surrounding East Prussia practically on all sides. In the course of the present war the Germans achieved this union by the occupation of the whole of Poland. It is significant that the Germans immediately incorporated into East Prussia the northern part of the province of Warsaw and a part of the province of Bialystok. German official circles stressed the economic necessity of this step.

After the present war East Prussia should be incorporated into Poland completely and unconditionally.

From the Polish point of view strategic security is the main reason for the incorporation of East Prussia. There is also ground for believing that the loss of this area may have a favourable influence on the political make-up of the German nation. East Prussia as an advanced invasion base, encouraged plans of aggression, which were especially directed against Poland, for the reason that Polish territory only could solve the economic problems of this province so remote from the centre of Germany. The cause, therefore, of the actual Polish-German tension was not Pomorze, but in reality East Prussia. Germany conducted her Corridor campaigns and political activities in Danzig for no other reason than for East Prussia. The danger of leaving this province in German hands was fully realized by the Polish delegates at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919:

"If East Prussia should be left in German hands, as a separated Prussian possession, cut off by Polish territory from the main bulk of Germany, the result would be an unending conflict between Poland and Germany. The Germans would continually strive to establish junction with East Prussia at the expense of Poland."¹⁶

The loss of East Prussia by Germany would put an end to the influence of the *Junker* class, which has always instigated anti-Polish and aggressive policies, both before 1914 and after 1918, when they inspired the campaigns against the Treaty of Versailles and the Customs Wars against Poland.

The incorporation of East Prussia into Poland may contribute to an improvement of Polish-German relations. The German public as a whole never took much interest in East Prussia which was described as a German colony. It was known that this colony placed a heavy burden on all taxpayers in Germany proper. Officials and army officers had to be paid

¹⁵ von Batocki, *Ostpreussens wirtschaftliche Lage vor und nach dem Weltkriege*, Berlin, 1920.

¹⁶ *Acts and Documents concerning the Frontiers of Poland Peace Conference in Paris, 1918-1919*, Paris, 1925; part I, p. 51 (Polish text).

special "eastern allowances" in order to be induced to serve in East Prussia.¹⁷ The Germans of East Prussia preferred to migrate to the western provinces, where they found a more congenial atmosphere. The loss of East Prussia would be opposed only by the Army, the *Junkers* and the nationalists emotionally fired by such watchwords as *The Prussian Spirit*, *Herrenvolk* and *Drang nach Osten*.

East Prussia has been ruled successively by the Teutonic Knights, the Hohenzollerns and the influential class of Prussian landlords; during all this time political oppression was accompanied by social subjection of its inhabitants. The coincidence of these two factors speeded the change of the ethnical structure of East Prussia over several centuries. That is why the plebiscite carried out in July, 1920, in the Regencies of Olsztyn and Kwidzyna was unfavourable to Poland (Annexe No. 4). The majority of the population, although Polish by language and tradition, was not allowed to express its feelings, because of a brutal class and political intimidation.

Viewed from a Polish angle, East Prussia will have a tremendous value for Poland which is overcrowded with agricultural labour. In 1939, the number of unemployed peasants was estimated at 4 million, while eight million Poles had to live abroad.

VI

Conclusions

The present policy of Poland with regard to East Prussia goes further than the demands made at the Peace Conference of 1919. At that time Poland only asked for Danzig and those parts of East Prussia inhabited by Poles, with a certain measure of strategic security for her main lines of communication. As to the rest of East Prussia it was suggested that "East Prussia, as the *German Republic of Koenigsberg*, could only be a perfectly neutral state under the protection and close control of the League of Nations or of a mandatory. This mandatory ought to be the Polish Republic, which has a historical right to East Prussia and has never done any wrong to its inhabitants."¹⁸

The case of the Free City of Danzig proved that League of Nations control cannot prevent the Germans using a supposedly neutralized territory for their own purpose, provided they predominate. The remilitarization of the Rhineland proved that determination, and force may override treaty obligations. The campaigns launched by the German Corridor propaganda leave little doubt as to what would happen if the main problems were left unsolved or incompletely settled. Therefore Poland demands to-day a thorough and definite solution of the problem of East Prussia and Danzig.

The incorporation of East Prussia and Danzig into Poland is justified on the following grounds:

(1) The territory concerned forms geographically, historically and economically a unit with Poland.

¹⁷ J. M. Winiewicz, *Aims and Failures of German New Order*, Polish Research Centre, London, 1934.

¹⁸ *East Prussia*, Polish Commission of Preparatory Work for the Conference of Peace, Paris, 1919; p. 22.

(2) East Prussia, as a German military base dominating Poland, constitutes a permanent danger to her security as well as to that of whole Eastern Europe.

(3) East Prussia became the political symbol of the German *Drang nach Osten*, the main excuse of the German territorial claims against Poland and the stronghold of the reactionary *Junker* class. Its incorporation into Poland, together with Danzig, will help to clear the atmosphere of Polish-German relations.

(4) The incorporation of East Prussia into Poland will make Germany more dependent on food imported from abroad, and will deprive the German Army of a considerable reserve of man power.

(5) The loss of East Prussia will weaken Germany politically and strategically, correspondingly strengthening Poland. From an economic point of view, the gain for Poland will be far greater than the loss for Germany.

(6) The final settlement of the problem of East Prussia and Danzig will remove one of the principal causes of friction and unrest in European policy, thus consolidating peace.

Annexe No. 1

AREA AND POPULATION

(a) East Prussia.

Regency	Area in sq. miles	Population		Inhabitants per sq. mile in 1933
		1933	1939	
Królewiec (Koenigsberg) ..	5,076	957,363	1,059,085	188
Gąbin (Gumbinnen) ..	3,628	546,057	559,205	150.5
Olsztyn (Allenstein) ..	4,447	552,541	568,024	124
Kwidzyń (Marienwerder) ..	1,130	277,340	301,808	245
Total	14,281	2,333,301	2,488,122	163.5
Whole of Germany (1933 frontiers)	181,632	66,031,580	69,316,526	363.4

(b) Free City of Danzig.

Area	731 sq. miles
Population	407,517
Urban population ..	293,657
Rural population ..	113,860
Density of population ..	565.8 inhabitants per sq. mile

(c) Number of households in East Prussia in 1933.

Regency	Households	Inhabitants	Persons per household
Królewiec	236,910	957,363	3.95
Gąbin	130,636	546,057	4.13
Olsztyn	119,970	552,541	4.53
Kwidzyń	70,364	277,340	3.88
Total	557,880	2,333,301	
In the whole Reich	17,951,378		3.62

Annexe No. 2

EMIGRATION FROM EAST PRUSSIA

BALANCE OF MIGRATIONS

Regency	1840-1871	1871-1910	1910-1933	1933-1939	Total
Królewiec	+8,214	-367,155	-30,423	+36,695	-352,669
Gąbin	-26,953	-287,857	-63,154	-18,684	-396,648
Olsztyn	—	-59,296	-92,386	-28,964	-180,646
Kwidzyń	-38,634	-429,398	-20,420	+3,428	-485,024
Danzig	+15,697	-159,589			
The eastern pro- vinces of Germany	-523,000	-3,460,000	-422,000	-250,000	-4,655,000

The above figures merely illustrate a general tendency, as the boundaries of the Regencies of East Prussia were changed several times during the period between 1840 and 1939. At any rate, about 1,500,000 people emigrated in the course of a century from the four Regencies, constituting in 1939 the province of East Prussia.

Sources: Heinz Rogman, *Die Bevoelkerungsentwicklung im preussischen Osten in den letzten hundert Jahren*, Berlin 1937, p. 91; *Ostdeutscher Beobachter*, article *Deutsche Wanderung* in the issue of November 15th, 1940; *Die Bevoelkerung des deutschen Reiches nach den Ergebnissen der Volkszaehlung, 1939. Statistik des deutschen Reiches*, Vol. 552, 1, Berlin, 1943; p. 38.

**INCREASE OF POPULATION AND MIGRATION IN THE
COUNTIES OF EAST PRUSSIA DURING THE PERIOD
1925-1933**

Counties	Natural	Actual increase in per cent.	Result of Migration
REGENCY OF KOENIGSBERG—	6.6	5.0	1.6
Bartoszyce (Bartenstein)	9.0	4.2	4.8—
Braniewo (Braunsberg)	7.7	3.7	—4.0
Gerdawy (Gerdauen)	9.7	—0.2	—9.9
Ilawa (Wehlau)	3.9	1.5	—2.4
Ilawka (Pr. Eylau)	9.2	2.2	—7.0
Królewiec (Koenigsberg)	11.2	12.8	1.6
Królewiec (Urban district)	2.5	9.9	7.4
Labiawa (Labiau)	8.2	2.0	—6.2
Licbark (Heilsberg)	9.4	1.7	—7.7
Morağ (Mohrunge)	8.5	—0.2	—8.7
Pasłęka (Preussisch Holland)	7.0	—2.5	—9.5
Raścibórz (Rastenburg)	8.8	0.8	—8.0
Rybaki (Fischhausen)	9.2	5.8	—3.4
Sw. Siewierka (Heiligenbeil)	9.2	2.8	—6.4
REGENCY GABIN	6.7	1.1	—5.6
Darkiejmy (Darkehmen, now Angerapp)	9.4	—3.6	—13.0
Gąbin (Gumbinnen)	5.7	1.7	—4.0
Goldapia (Goldap)	6.5	1.9	—4.6
Olecko (Treiburg)	7.3	—0.4	—7.7
Piłkawy (Pillkallen, now Schlossberg)	6.9	—0.5	—7.4
Stolupiany (Stallupoenen)	5.8	—3.0	—8.8
Tylża (Tilsit, Urban District)	1.5	12.7	11.2
Tylża-Ragneta (Tilsit-Ragnit)	7.0	0.2	—6.8
Węgorbork (Angerburg)	7.4	2.9	—4.5
Wystruć (Insterburg, Urban District)	11.7	4.9	—6.8
Wystruć	7.8	—2.9	—10.7
Zuławy (Niederung, now Elchniederung)	6.1	—1.7	—7.8
REGENCY OLSZTYN	10.1	2.3	—7.8
Elk (Lyck)	7.9	—1.0	—8.9
Jańsbork (Johannisburg)	10.8	—1.7	12.5
Lec (Loetzen)	8.3	0.8	—7.5
Nibork (Neidenburg)	12.2	3.5	—8.7
Olsztyn (Allenstein, Urban District)	7.9	13.0	5.1
Olsztyn	12.1	2.1	—10.0
Ostroda (Osterode)	10.2	0.7	—9.5
Reszel (Roessel)	9.2	2.7	—6.5
Szczytno (Ortelsburg)	10.8	2.6	—8.2
Ządzbork (Sensburg)	11.2	4.2	—7.0
REGENCY KWIDZYN	7.6	4.9	—2.7
Elbląg (Elbing ; Urban District)	3.0	6.2	3.2
Elbląg	7.6	—0.7	—8.3
Kwidzyń (Marienwerder)	8.4	4.6	—3.8
Malbork (Marienburg)	8.3	11.9	3.6
Susz (Rosenberg)	9.8	2.5	—7.3
Sztum (Stuhm)	11.6	4.4	—7.2
East Prussia total	7.4	3.4	—4.2
Eastern Provinces of the Reich	6.4	3.1	—3.3

Source : Dr. Ludwik Grodzicki in *Biuletyn Zachodnio-Słowiański* (West Slavonic Bulletin), No. 4-5, 1941.

Annexe No. 4

NATIONALITIES IN EAST PRUSSIA

(a) Poles

I. According to *East and West Prussia*.—Handbooks prepared under the direction of the Historical Section of the Foreign Office, 1920.

County	Polish language		Bilingual (Polish and German)		Total	
	1900	1910	1900	1910	1900	1910
Poles, 10-33 per cent.						
Reszel	14.2	13.1	1.5	1.4	15.7	14.5
Olsztyn (urban district)	—	8.4	—	4.7	—	13.1
Poles, 33-50 per cent.						
Sztum	—	42.5	—	—	—	42.5
Kwidzyń	—	37.3	—	1.2	—	38.5
Ostroda	45.3	39.8	3.9	3.1	49.2	42.9
Olecko	33.5	33.4	4.5	4.4	38.0	37.8
Lec	38.7	32.1	8.1	4.4	46.8	36.5
Poles, above 50 per cent.						
Szczytno	75.2	68.0	2.5	3.6	77.7	71.6
Jańsbork	70.4	64.8	4.4	3.1	74.8	67.9
Nibork	70.0	60.5	2.0	4.4	—	64.9
Olsztyn ¹	49.5	57.4	3.7	3.0	53.2	60.4
Elk	55.1	48.0	5.5	4.8	60.6	52.8
Ządzbork	51.2	46.4	6.3	4.7	57.5	51.1

The source quoted makes the following comment :

“ In the greater part of West Prussia² and the Regierungsbezirk of Allenstein (i.e. the south of East Prussia), a majority of the inhabitants speak Polish. To the north of the Polish speaking districts of East Prussia lies a further zone in which over one-third of the population speak Polish. . . . In the south of East Prussia the Polish dialect is known as Mazurian, and in this case the divergence from ordinary Polish is very slight.”

“ The census figures are normally rendered somewhat unreliable by three factors : (1) the tendency to allow national sentiment to outweigh fear of authority varies in strength from one census year to another ; (2) the census tables are based on ‘ mother tongue,’ not on the language actually used at home ; (3) the regiments recruited from Polish provinces are usually quartered in other parts of Prussia, and vice versa . . . The persons speaking both Polish and German may be considered as virtually all Poles.”

“ In 1910 there is reason to believe that a more serious source of error was introduced, as the figures for the Polish population are some 100,000 lower than would be expected, the figures for the German population being higher by a similar amount. . . . It must be concluded that the figures have been deliberately falsified in order to give the impression that the Poles are diminishing in numbers relatively to the Germans. The falsification appears to have extended to Poznan and Upper Silesia.”

¹ Rural, in 1900 also urban district.

² To which before 1918 the Regency of Kwidzyń (Marienwerder) belonged.

II. *Ostpreussen, Land und Volk*, 5 voll. Stuttgart 1898-99; 1902, makes the following remarks concerning the national character of Masovia, (Southern East Prussia) :

" The colonisation of the territory was largely undertaken by Poles besides Prussians, Germans and a few Lithuanians. The fourteenth century already gives evidence of Polish population in Masovia. During the Reformation the South-Eastern parts of Masovia were entirely Polish. The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries show a steady spread of Polish Nationality towards the north so that in 1694 there are registered 2,567 Polish Communicants and only 426 German ones in the congregation of Angerburg. The Language border of the nineteenth century ran from Loyen via Dubeningken, Kotziolken, Ostrowen and Angerau to Nordenburg, but Polish elements went far beyond that line. In Pillu-poenen, Insterburg and Bartenstein sermons were held in the Polish language as late as in the nineteenth century ; even in Koenigsberg divine services were conducted in Polish. In the middle of the nineteenth century the Church of Rastenburg was filled with reverend Poles and the Secondary School for girls was visited by 44 Polish and 46 German children. . . . In 1895 53 per cent. of the population of Masovia were Poles " (p. 172-177).

According to Rudolf Lawin's *Die Bevoelkerung von Ostpreussen* (Koenigsberg, 1930) the ethnographic structure of the eleven Polish counties of East Prussia has been undergoing the following changes :

Out of the 100 inhabitants the following number reported their native language to be :

Year	German	Polish	Mazur	Polish and German	German and Mazur
1890	41.09	37.31	17.76	2.83	0.86
1900	45.87	26.53	23.34	2.69	1.40
1905	47.38	10.66	39.25	0.67	1.87
1910	52.45	12.85	30.87	2.24	1.37
1925	82.89	2.40	7.13	3.14	4.12

As there can be no doubt that the " Mazurs " as well as the bi-lingual population were Poles, the testimony of the German author, in spite of his obvious anti-Polish bias, is the following :

	Poles	Germans
1890	59 per cent.	41 per cent.
1900	54 "	46 "
1905	42 "	47 "
1910	47 "	52 "
1925	17 "	83 "

The sudden drop in the number of Poles recorded by the German author does not denote an actual decrease. It simply reflects statistical fraud and the effect of the administrative pressure referred to in the above-mentioned British publication.

The inaccuracy of the German statistics of nationality was commented upon by Ludwig Bernhard in his preface to Paul Weber's book *Die Polen in Oberschlesien* (Berlin, 1914). He entitled his observation *Die Fehlerquellen in der Statistik der Nationalitaeten* and said about the official German statistics : " It is a strange fact that German censuses are used, especially in their least reliable parts, for most significant political con-

clusions. . . . But these just politically so important figures are not absolutely reliable in Germany to-day. Only after close and critical examination can they be utilized for the practice of policy.

III. Polish research (E. Romer and others), based on official statistics and the lists of the nationality of schoolchildren, established the percentage of Poles in the counties concerned as follows :

1910-1911	Rural district	Urban	Total
Reszel	24.6	7.4	19.2
Sztum	50.3	22.7	46.5
Kwidzyna	49.4	22.3	43.0
Ostroda	71.2	21.0	58.5
Olecko	66.2	8.5	61.0
Lec	76.0	21.0	64.0
Szczytno	92.7	61.4	89.0
Jańsbork	91.6	18.8	79.9
Nibork	89.1	33.4	81.0
Olsztyn	64.2	47.1	64.0
Elk	85.0	20.8	72.0
Zadzobork	78.2	44.1	73.5

There was also at that time a considerable Polish population in two other counties in rural districts :

Susz (Kwidzyna Regency)	20.7 per cent.
Goldapia (Gabin Regency)	22.2 ..

In 1825 the county of Węgorbork in the regency of Gąbin had a plain majority of Polish population. In 1919 Polish sources estimated the number of Poles in the whole of East Prussia at more than 400,000.

(b) The Lithuanians

The German statistics recorded the following percentage of Lithuanians in East Prussia :

District	1890	1900	1910	1925
KRÓLEWIEC REGENCY—	per cent.	per cent.	per cent.	per cent.
Labiawa (Labiau)	16.3	12.3	8.2	1.9
GABIN REGENCY—				
Niziny (Niederung)	21.9	17.1	10.2	2.1
Piłkały (Pillkallen, now known as Schlossberg)	12.0	10.5	6.9	2.0
Tylża Town (Tilsit)	9.9	8.9	5.7	1.0
Tylża-Ragneta (Ragnit)	24.5	19.6	13.0	1.9
Total average	18.0	14.0	9.0	2.0

The publication of the Historical Section of the British Foreign Office, referred to above, contains the following observation on the subject : " The Lithuanian language was formerly spoken in the whole of East Prussia to the north-east of a line drawn from Labiau to Goldap. . . . The number of Lithuanians in East Prussia, according to the census figures of 1910, was 95,470. This shows a drop of 16,000 since 1900, instead of the expected natural increase of 12,000. It is probable that this discrepancy of 28,000 (—25 per cent) is partly due to some form of falsification of the figures, similar to that which appears to have occurred in the figures affecting the Poles."

In the district of Klaipeda (Memel), which belonged to Lithuania until March, 1939, the German census of 1925 recorded the following ethnographical groups (according to *Huebner's Weltstatistik* for 1939) :

Lithuanians	38,000
" Memellanders "	34,000
Germans	59,000
Others and aliens	10,000

The district of Memel has an area of 1,081 square miles.

(c) Foreign Workers in East Prussia

The following numbers of foreign workmen came to East Prussia in

				per 1,000 of population
1910	..	13,635	..	6.3
1925	..	22,721	..	10.1
1933	..	24,283	..	10.4

Rudolf Lawin (l.c.p. 46) wrote : " The need for foreign labour in East Prussia is growing, because of the continuous outflow of people leaving that already sparsely populated province and emigrating westwards."

According to data referred to by Ian F. D. Morrow, about 30,000 Polish labourers came to East Prussia annually before 1914. They worked there for several weeks, during the harvest and the potato digging season.

(d) Germanization

Extract from the Reply of the Preacher Mrongowius of Danzig to His Excellency the Minister of State Eichorn.

Danzig, 20th September, 1842.

" Following your highly esteemed instructions of 9th inst., I have the honour to quote some facts and figures about the hard oppressed mother tongue of my countrymen. Admittedly you can hear from all quarters, Polish Prussia, Silesia, Lithuania, even from the Cassubians, complaints about linguistic oppression ; but I shall only refer to incidents in which I am most closely concerned . . . In the village of Marwalde in East Prussia where my deceased father was a Polish protestant preacher I noticed last year when on a visit that a teacher completely ignorant of the Polish language was employed among an entirely Polish population. He could only employ the children by teaching them to read German, but was unable to explain to them the meaning of the German words in Polish. The local inhabitants came weeping to me and the scene instead of filling my heart with joy as I had expected, caused me great grief . . .

At Gluckau near Danzig the teacher P. was prohibited to teach Polish children to read Polish, although the parents desired the contrary. A teacher, named L., reports the same to me from the village of Rinin, near Danzig. Several such cases occur in the village of Charbrow, near Leborg (Lauenburg), in Cecynow, near Glowitz and also in Osseken, Saulin, Bohlschau, etc. In Krokow a German preacher by the name of E. was employed, he was entirely ignorant of the Polish language and when taking office found on the first Sunday among 100 members of his congregation 30 speaking German and 70 Polish, the latter ones were deeply distressed at not being able to have their divine service.

In the village of Rauden near Mewe, where half of the important congregation speaks Polish, the completely German preacher L. was engaged ; at the most he very imperfectly reads one sermon in Polish in four weeks. Similar complaints are expressed in Cylau, where the examiner G. offers those teachers rewards who teach many Polish children

to babble in German, and threatens others with dismissal, if they have not according to his opinion Germanized sufficiently many Polish children.

If one expresses surprise at such linguistic pressure that only German teachers are employed among a Polish population, the usual reply is to the effect that there are not sufficient applicants for the teaching and clerical offices who are conversant in both languages. Thus it would seem desirable to introduce the teaching of the Polish language in higher schools and colleges such as in Danzig, Elbing, Thorn, etc.

Even the late Bishop of Warmia (Ermeland) a prince of the House of Hohenzollern complained to me in Oliva, near Danzig, during the translation into Polish of his pastoral letters and the German reading books for the schools, that the government of Danzig—probably Herr von Schön, the then Lord Lieutenant—abused him for editing a Polish reading book (which he had printed at his own expense for the benefit of the Polish youth). However, this instructive Polish reading book in which morality, religiousness and devotion to the Crown are taught, has brought great blessing—and would have brought even greater blessings if the instruction in reading Polish had not been prohibited in this area by the order of Herr von Schön to the examiners and school inspectors . . .

Concerning the Government's plan to suppress the Polish and Lithuanian languages entirely in the Prussian State the views have always been divided. Some are in accord with this step, others oppose it. The introduction to Mielke's Lithuanian Dictionary contains three essays, one by the Berlin preacher J., the second by V.H., member of the War Council, and one by Professor Kant, all of which stress the detriments of a violent suppression of the vernacular (Lithuanian as well as Polish).

Will your Excellency permit me to add at this moment, that in 1817 at the re-organization of the High School the Chair of the Polish Language was taken away from me, without its having been filled by anybody else, in spite of the fact that I had been given the post of Polish preacher and the Chair of the Polish Language at the local High School in 1798, thus already under Prussian sovereignty. I made remonstrances to the then Lord Lieutenant Herr v. Schön, and said that the State required intermediaries conversant in Polish and expressed the view how good it would be if the future preacher could by his knowledge of the Polish language serve his congregation, the solicitor his clients, the physician his patients, the officer the state by instructing the soldiers who frequently speak only Polish. The same could be said for many other officials and merchants. Herr v. Schön replied that this study would have to remain a purely personal matter (although it is obvious that a knowledge of Polish which is one of the languages of the country is more necessary and useful to us than for example French).

The necessity for a chair of the Polish language at the University of Königsberg was already seen by the late Minister von Ostau in the 1790's, when I was teacher at the Cathedral School in Königsberg; he requested me to draft him a written plan about this: the well-meaning man, however, was overruled.

The antipathy against the Polish language may perhaps be explained by the fact that the Poles were united with the French against Prussian Government."

Source: Die polnische Sprachfrage in Preussen, Leipzig, 1845.

(e) The Plebiscite

The East Prussian plebiscite zone of Allenstein (Olsztyn) comprised ten districts in the Regency of Allenstein and one district in the Regency of Gumbinnen, namely Treuburg (Olecko). The zone had a total area of 4,800 sq. miles with 565,000 inhabitants, of whom 70 per cent used Polish as their mother-tongue.

The West Prussian plebiscite zone of Marienwerder (Kwidzyna) comprised the whole of the districts of Stuhm and Rosenberg (Susz), that part of the Marienburg district lying east of the Nogat (the eastern estuary of the Vistula) and the Marienwerder district east of the Vistula. In this zone of 1,036 sq. miles there was a population of 174,000, of whom 32 per cent spoke Polish. Here, as in Danzig, Germanization had made great progress, a fact which was never denied by the Polish delegation to the Peace Conference. They nevertheless claimed the region of Kwidzyna in order that the railway line Warsaw-Mława-Danzig should run in its entirety on Polish territory.

On July 5, 1919, immediately after the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, the Polish delegation sent to the Secretariat of the Conference its observations on the measures to be taken by the Inter-Allied Commissions for the plebiscites. It was suggested that all Prussian civil servants should be evacuated for the duration of the plebiscite and free municipal elections be held. It may be recalled that directly after the fall of the German Imperial rule, democratic communal elections were held throughout the Prussian State except in provinces where the Polish population predominated. The Socialist Government in Berlin frankly admitted that this exception was made for fear that the communal administration should be "invaded by the Poles." The Polish suggestions were turned down and German civil servants remained at their posts. The municipal authorities, elected under the old laws, remained strongholds of the Germanic spirit on Polish soil. Indeed, General Albrecht, commanding the 20th Army Corps, organized "security troops" (*Sicherheitswehr*) in the two plebiscite territories.

The President of the Allenstein Inter-Allied Commission, Mr. E. A. Rennie, seemed to regard the plebiscite as a mere formality to be gone through as quickly as possible. And the Marienwerder Commission was presided over by Signor Angelo Pavia, who never concealed his pro-German sympathies. The Allenstein Commission brought with it 700 British soldiers, of whom 600 stayed in Allenstein; 600 Italians arrived later in Marienwerder. Thus in all there were 1,300 Allied troops, not a great number for a territory half the size of Belgium.

In the region of Allenstein 353,655 votes were cast for Germany, and 7,408 (2.5 per cent) for Poland, in the Marienwerder zone 97,634 votes were cast for Germany and 7,682 (8 per cent) for Poland.

Three important factors gave the Germans an unfair advantage :

(1) At the beginning of June, 1920, when the Polish Army was retreating in the East, the Conference of Ambassadors fixed the East Prussian plebiscite for July 11. The vote was taken when the Soviet forces were at the gates of Warsaw, a fact which was duly exploited by German propaganda.

(2) More important, however, was the fact that the Poles had no freedom of speech or propaganda. The Germans stopped at nothing to terrorize the Polish population. For example, they arrested the four Polish national leaders, Bogumil Linka, his son, and the brothers Adam and Joseph Zapatka, who went to the Peace Conference to demand the return of their district to Poland. On returning home they were each sentenced to one and a half year's imprisonment. Linka senior was beaten up at the time of his arrest and died soon after. The Inter-Allied Commission ignored such incidents. It is easy to imagine the intimidating effect of these events on the Polish peasants in Mazovia.

(3) Not only the residents took part in the plebiscite. The Treaty stipulated that the right to vote should be extended to persons who had at some time resided in the district for twenty years or who had been born there. Thus emigrants who had left the province for good had the right to vote. For a fortnight seven trains daily arrived in the plebiscite area bringing thousands of "emigrants," mostly members of different German nationalist *Free Corps*. They totalled 45,500. Even more "emigrants" came by sea. The German Admiralty brought from Swinemuende and Stolpmuende to Pillau 157,273 people. "In certain communes," said the *Kreuzzeitung* on July 11, 1930, "the emigrants made up nearly half of the voters."

Deducting the number of emigrant votes (202,700) from the total number of votes cast in the two plebiscite territories (466,400) we see that only 263,500 votes were cast by residents, although the total number of residents was 739,000.

Source : K. Smogorzewski, *The Farce of Plebiscites in Free Europe*, April 24, 1942.

Annexe No. 5

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF EAST PRUSSIA

(a) Occupations

In every 100 inhabitants, including families :

Agriculture and forestry	42.2
Industry and crafts	21.6
Commerce and transport	12.4
Public service	7.2
Domestic service	1.7
Independent without occupation (including pensioners)	14.9

(b) Social structure

In every 100 inhabitants of East Prussia, including families :

Independent (including higher civil servants) ..	19.2
Members of family assisting in work	10.9
Civil servants (including soldiers)	5.6
Employees	6.2
Labourers	41.6
Domestic servants	1.6
Without definite occupation, but independent ..	14.9
Unemployed	11.9

(c) Industry and crafts (according to 1933 census)

Branch of industry	Number of establishments
Clothing	13,290
Food	6,116
Wood working	5,009
Building	4,943
Metal working	4,479
Leather	1,037
Stone	490
Textile	488
Electric	288
Paper	266
Mining	162
Printing	141
Chemical	42

Most of the establishments are very small, the average size being much smaller than in Germany. For instance, 64.3 per cent of the clothing industry consists of small tailoring shops and 24 per cent of shoemakers.

(d) Agrarian system**(1) Percentage of land under different classes of agricultural holdings :**

	0.5-2 ha.	2-5 ha.	5-20 ha.	20-100 ha.	Over 100 ha.
East Prussia	0.7	2.5	18.3	31.6	46.9
Germany	2.3	6.3	25.6	27.9	37.9
Rhineland	4.0	11.4	34.1	20.5	30.0
Oldenburg	1.8	6.5	32.8	45.2	13.7

In Poland only 25.8 per cent of the area utilized for agriculture was occupied by farms of more than 50 hectares (a hectare is equivalent to 2.47 acres). This proves that the large estates in Germany, especially East Prussia, covered a much larger share of the land than in Poland.

(2) Number of holdings of various sizes

0.5 ha — 2 ha	19,370
2 ha — 5 ha	26,257
5 ha — 20 ha	59,333
20 ha — 100 ha	27,072
over 100 ha	4,111
Total	136,143

(e) Participation in the National Income of Germany

National income per inhabitant in marks p.a.

	1913	1928	1934
East Prussia	486	814	612
Brandenburg	—	1,140	799
Whole of Prussia	775	1,174	794
Bavaria	629	1,041	733
Whole of Germany	766	1,185	804

(f) Participation in Income Tax

Income tax (Einkommen- Lohn- und Koerperschaftssteuer) paid in marks in the following fiscal regions :

	Koenigsberg	Stettin	Prussia
1925	13	22	39
1926	13	22	42
1927	17	25	52
1928	17	25	60

(g) Wages

Comparative wages of workers in some industries in East Prussia and in the rest of Germany show :

(1) Wages of skilled workmen, per hour, in 1937, in pfennigs :

	East Prussia	Brandenburg	Hamburg region	Rhineland
Timber industry	75.4	87.1	95.0	83.2
Breweries	78.0	85.0	114.7	106.9
Paper mills	56.7	64.4	68.5	82.1
Clothing industry	64.0	88.0	84.9	85.1

(2) Wages of free farm labourers (Freiarbeiter) in 1936, per annum, in marks. These labourers received no payment in kind, or if they did, it was so insignificant as to make no appreciable difference in the calculation.

East Prussia	695.52-753.48
Baden	916.72
Rhineland	1,128.80
Schleswig-Holstein	1,157.60

(3) Wages of railway craftsmen, per hour, in 1937, in pfennigs :

Krölewic (Koenigsberg)	71.9
Cologne	84.4
Munich	86.9
Berlin	99.3
Hamburg	104.8

(h) A British View

Ian F. D. Morrow says of the economic situation of East Prussia : " There is little hope that an agricultural province lying on the farthest frontier of a great State will be able to compete on equal terms in the central markets with other and far richer agricultural districts less remote from these markets." (page 345). " Agrarian indebtedness in East Prussia in contradistinction to other parts of Germany has been more or less a permanent condition for a century past . . ." (page 417).

" It is clear from any examination of economic conditions in East Prussia prior to the World War that its present economic plight is not a new phenomenon " (page 357).

Source : Ian F. D. Morrow, The Peace Settlement in the German-Polish Borderlands, London, 1936.

Statistisches Jahrbuch fuer das Deutsche Reich 1935, 1936, 1937.

Annexe No. 6

EAST PRUSSIA AS A SOURCE OF MILITARY POWER**(a) Natural increase of population**

Year	Per 1,000 inhabitants	
	East Prussia	Germany
1922	11.6	8.5
1923	10.0	7.1
1924	11.5	8.2
1925	12.6	8.8
1926	10.8	7.9
1927	9.0	6.4
1928	10.3	7.0
1929	9.1	5.3
1930	9.6	6.5
1933	8.2	3.5
1935	10.7	7.0

(b) Children under 15, according to the 1933 census.

Percentage of children under 15 in the population of :

East Prussia	29.2 per cent
Berlin	14.1 ..
Whole of Germany	24.2 ..

(c) Recruitment of soldiers

According to German sources of 1907, there were in that year, for every 140 soldiers from East Prussia 92 soldiers from the Rhineland, 39 from Berlin and 114 from all the other provinces of the Reich.

The actual number of East Prussians serving in the German forces in the years 1882, 1895 and 1907 was as follows :

Year	No. of soldiers	Population of East Prussia
1882	13,088	1,933,936
1895	30,977	2,006,689
1907	36,264	2,030,176

Source : *Statistisches Jahrbuch 1924-1936* ; I. J. D. Morrow : *The Peace Settlement in the Polish-German Borderlands*, London, 1936.

Annexe No. 7

SOME VIEWS CONCERNING THE POLISH OUTLET TO THE SEA

I. *Proposed New Boundaries for Germany*.—Prepared in 1919 by the American Intelligence Section. Document 441 in David Hunter Miller : *My Diary at the Conference of Peace* (New York, 1924) :

“ It is recommended that the city of Danzig should be included into Poland.

“ Danzig is to-day unquestionably a German city, with a population of 170,000 (in 1910), of which the Poles do not number 10 per cent. It is incontestable, however, that Danzig owed its own importance in the past to its position as the natural port of the great Polish hinterland behind it, and that if the principle of the Polish corridor to the sea is accepted at all, it must almost inevitably involve the inclusion of Danzig in that corridor . . . It seems clear that there is here a major economic and geographic necessity, and that there is no other solution of the problem, which would be more than a half measure unsatisfactory in the long run to both sides.”

II. *Report No. 1 of the Commission on Polish Affairs*, March 12th, 1919. Document 498, David Hunter Miller's *Diary* :

“ The question of the town and port of Danzig has been the subject of very careful consideration by the Commission, who are unanimously of the opinion that both town and port should be given to Poland in unrestricted ownership . . . The legitimate aspirations of the Polish people for an outlet to the sea, as endorsed by Allied statesmen, cannot be fulfilled unless Danzig becomes a Polish port.”

III. H. W. V. Temperley, *A History of The Peace Conference of Paris*, London, 1924 ; vol. VI., p. 258 :

“ Every law of geography insists that the natural outlet for this country, possessed of all sorts of economic possibilities and now in process of being industrialized, is by the mouth of the river (Vistula) around which and upon which the whole fabric of Polish society has been built . . .

Poland cannot live with a German finger in her throat. For the Polish nation the possession of Danzig, in some form or other, is a matter not of mere economic convenience but rather of life and death."

IV. Leon Dominian, *The Frontiers of Language and Nationality in Europe*—Published for the American Geographical Society of New York, 1917 :

"The advance of the area of Polish speech . . . to the Baltic coast is a proof of intimate dependence between Polish nationality and the basin of the Vistula . . . The city of Danzig itself, with a Polish element of only 10 per cent., still gives strong evidence of its Polish institutions. Its monuments are memorials of Poland's, and many of its families bear Polish names even though their members use German as a vernacular."

V. Wickham Steed in *The New Statesman and Nation* of May 27th, 1939, *Danzig* :

"What is really at stake at Danzig and in the Polish "Corridor" ? Nothing less than Polish independence on the one hand, and German domination of Poland and the Baltic on the other. Frederick the Great said truly that whoever holds Danzig has more power in Poland than the King of Poland himself ; and Herr Rauschning, the former Nazi President of Danzig Senate, wrote on May 6th that :

'To-day the occupation of Danzig by German troops would give Germany a most important strategical key-position, enabling her to seize the Vistula Corridor. A transfer of Danzig to the Reich would amount to a fourth partition of Poland . . . Hence the fate of Poland and even the future of the Western Powers is the problem at issue, not simply an isolated action against Danzig.'

Hitler and the German General Staff care just as much, and just as little, for the welfare of Danzig as they cared for the welfare of the Sudeten Germans last year. They cared much for the possession of the Czechoslovak fortifications and arsenals ; and they care much for the strategic encirclement of Poland by the control of Danzig and the Corridor and unhampered military access to East Prussia. When M. Zaleski, the Polish Foreign Minister, offered publicly in February, 1929, to demilitarize the Corridor and the whole frontier region, on condition that East Prussia were also demilitarized and allowed to trade freely with Poland, pre-Nazi Germany turned a deaf ear. The German aim is neither racial nor economic, it is strategic."

VI. J. H. Harley, *Danzig and the Corridor*, in the *National Review*, July, 1925 :

"Polish Pomerania, the northern part of which is situated on the Baltic and is called by the Germans for propaganda purposes by the name of the "Corridor," has a population of about one million. Historically speaking, it is of Slavonic and not of German origin. It was seized by Prussia at the First Partition of Poland in 1772, and before that had been in the possession of Poland for 318 years. There can be no question of the huge preponderance of Polish feeling which remained throughout all the period of Prussian usurpation. From 1871 to 1918 there were 15 elections to the German Reichstag, and every time, without exception, this province, consisting of six districts, returned only Polish representatives to the central authority of Berlin. By no process of Coalition, however cleverly staged, was it possible to break the solidarity of the compact Polish phalanx

(p. 5-6).

"No one who has gone carefully into the question can doubt that not only is the so-called Corridor indisputably Polish, but that East Prussia, from its geographical position and historical associations, partakes more of the nature of a colony than of a contiguous portion of the Reich. It is a remarkable fact in this connection that East Prussia was excluded from the German Federation which functioned from 1815 to 1866, and that it was only in 1867 that it became an integral part of Germany" (page 8).

*Annexe No. 8***THE TURNOVER OF THE PORT OF DANZIG****(a) After the First Partition of Poland (1772)**

The number of ships entering the harbour :

1770	1,988 ships
1774	533 "
1782	145 "

(b) After the liberation of Poland in 1918

						Turnover
1913	2,910 ships	..	2,112,101 tons
1924	3,312 "	..	2,374,557 "
1926	5,967 "	..	6,300,301 "
1937	5,935 "	..	7,201,000 "
1938	6,601 "	..	7,127,000 "

Source : C. Smogorzewski, *Poland's Access to the Sea*, London, 1934. *Huebner's Weltstatistik—1939*, Wien, 1939. *Polish Statistical Yearbook*, Warsaw, 1939.

*Annexe No. 9***THE GROWTH OF THE PORT OF GDYNIA**




						Turnover
1928	1,108 ships	..	1,958,000 tons
1937	5,766 "	..	9,006,000 "
1938	6,498 "	..	9,174,000 "

*Annexe No. 10***THE AREA AND POPULATION OF POLAND**


Area in	1024	128,570 sq. miles
	1492	430,480 "
	1770	283,180 "
	1939	150,470 "
Population in	1870	17,000,000
	1900	25,200,000
	1921	27,400,000
	1931	32,300,000
	1939	35,100,000

EAST PRUSSIA

ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS BEFORE 1939

 BOUNDARY OF PROVINCE
 BOUNDARIES OF REGENCIES
 BOUNDARIES OF COUNTIES

KRALEWIEC CAPITAL OF PROVINCE
GABIN CAPITAL OF REGENCY
ZUCAWY NAMES OF COUNTIES AS USED PRIOR TO SOME ALTERATIONS BEFORE THE PRESENT WAR




EAST PRUSSIA

GERMAN ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS
AFTER INCORPORATION
OF POLISH AND LITHUANIAN AREAS



EAST PRUSSIA AS A MILITARY BASE IN 1939




M.P.K.

<p>ARMS</p> <table border="0" style="width: 100%;"> <tr> <td style="text-align: center;"> INFANTRY </td> <td style="text-align: center;"> ARTILLERY </td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: center;"> TANKS </td> <td style="text-align: center;"> OTHER UNITS </td> </tr> </table>	 INFANTRY	 ARTILLERY	 TANKS	 OTHER UNITS	<p>NUMERICAL DISTRIBUTION OF UNITS</p>	<p>HEADQUARTERS OF UNITS</p> <table border="0" style="width: 100%;"> <tr> <td style="text-align: center;"> AIRFIELD AND LUFTWAFFE UNITS </td> <td style="text-align: center;"> CORPS </td> <td style="text-align: center;"> DIVISION </td> <td style="text-align: center;"> CAVALRY BRIGADE </td> </tr> </table>	 AIRFIELD AND LUFTWAFFE UNITS	 CORPS	 DIVISION	 CAVALRY BRIGADE
 INFANTRY	 ARTILLERY									
 TANKS	 OTHER UNITS									
 AIRFIELD AND LUFTWAFFE UNITS	 CORPS	 DIVISION	 CAVALRY BRIGADE							
<p> RAILWAYS RIVERS </p>	<p> CAPITAL OF STATE CHIEF TOWN OF REGENCY </p>	<p> COUNTY TOWNS OTHER TOWNS </p>	<p> BOUNDARIES OF STATES BOUNDARY OF THE FREE CITY OF DANZIG </p>							
<p>SCALE OF MILES 0 30</p>										

EAST PRUSSIA

AS OPERATIONAL BASE IN SEPTEMBER 1939



M.P.K.

J.D. INFANTRY DIVISION
 J.D.R.1 INFANTRY DIVISION 1ST RESERVE
 J.D.R.2 INFANTRY DIVISION 2ND RESERVE

A.D.S.S. ARMoured DIVISION S.S.
 A.D. ARMoured DIVISION
 C.B. CAVALRY BRIGADE

↓ ↓
 DIRECTIONS OF ATTACK



LUFTWAFFE UNITS AND AIRFIELDS

— RAILWAYS
 ~ RIVERS

⊙ CAPITAL OF STATE
 ⊙ CHIEF TOWN OF REGENCY
 ⊙ COUNTY TOWNS
 ⊙ OTHER TOWNS

— BOUNDARIES OF STATES
 - - - BOUNDARY OF THE FREE CITY OF DANZIG

SCALE OF MILES 30