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NATIONAL MINORITIES IN CENTRAL EUROPE

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By

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INTRODUCTION

In the area extending from the North Sea to the Adriatic and from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea and which we can call *Central Europe* in the wider sense of that term, the trend of history has crowded together several races and cultures. This historical development has found expression in a mixture of individual languages, religions and nationalities.

The pre-War political map of Europe which represented this part of Europe chiefly by two great States, Germany and Austria-Hungary, bordered to the East by the great Russian Empire and limited to the South by Italy and the four small Balkan States, led to the concealment of this Central European mixture of nations and nationalities by the simple conception of four Great Powers, each with a single foreign, economic and commercial policy.

It could not escape the careful observer, however, who penetrated to the ethnographic core of the Powers mentioned, and to their internal political life, that this external unity concealed profound internal complexity, that within the State frontiers which that Central Europe presented to the external world, an ever more extensive and sharper process of cultural and political growth was taking place. Dozens of small and medium-sized nations and nationalities struggling with the greatest energy for the fundamental conditions of self-expression in cultural life, testifying ever more expressively to unyielding determination to collaborate in the political life of the State, were displaying with increasing articulation their discontent with a régime consisting in domination by the privileged classes of a single nation.

In Austria-Hungary German domination in the Austrian and Magyar domination in the Hungarian halves of the Empire led to a struggle for better conditions of existence on the part of Czechs and Slovaks, Poles, Ruthenians, Serbs with Slovenes and Croats, Italians and Rumanians. In an Empire which numbered fifty million inhabitants, there was a majority of almost thirty-two millions of discontented souls, that is in reality, the majority of the total population of the whole Monarchy, divided nationally and lingually and subdivided also by the many orientations of party politics and political tactics, who represented the principal problem of the State by their desire for independent life and even for revolution.

To these masses, of whom one part were attracted by the ideal of national union nourished by their Mother-States neighbouring on Austria-Hungary and of whom a second part—and this is true particularly of the Czechs and the Poles—were ever mindful of the fact that in the past they had enjoyed independent State life, there must, of course, be added the variegated mosaic of the nations and nationalities of Germany and Russia who could not remain alien to the ideological currents of pre-War Europe resuscitating the national consciousness and will to independent cultural and political life of all the nations and nationalities of the Central European area.

German statisticians listing the mother-tongues of the population in 1910 ascertained that in the German Empire alone there were four million of Poles with Mazurians and Kasubians, they registered more than 200,000 French, 150,000 Danes, about 100,000 Lithuanians besides 90,000 Lusatian Serbs, more than 100,000 Dutch and 110,000 Czechs. In the districts on the periphery of Russia belonging to the Central European area there dwelt, at a sober estimate, some seven million Poles, eight million Ukrainians, more than five million White Russians, about three million Lithuanians, one and a half million of Latvians, about one million Esthonians, more than three million Finns, more than a quarter of a million of Swedes and more than one million of Rumanians. These were, together, more than thirty million inhabitants, leaving out of count the small, more or less scattered nationality groups in the interior of European Russia.

Even these rough figures shew that in addition to the thirty-two millions of the discontented nations and nationalities in the Habsburg Monarchy there lived, in a wide Central European belt, a further thirty million souls nationally discontented, dominated by foreign régimes, but not unaffected by the spiritual re-birth which, at the beginning of the 19th century, stimulated all the small nations of Europe to national consciousness and to a political and cultural life of their own.

The sixty million and more of souls belonging to about twenty nations and lingual groups within the limits of the State frontiers of three Great Powers thus developed with an irrepressible will for life and growth, with a continually more definite national consciousness, with ever increasing cultural and political maturity. What a huge army of malcontents! What a penetrating force and what a terrible anxiety for the three States which represented the Central European zone.

Only a prudent, democratic understanding of the existence and requirements of these nations, only the introduction of a synthetic policy could perhaps have weakened the natural dynamic forces of these discontented millions drawn from twenty nationalities and have given them an impulse to disembogue in a new form of collective, harmonious life within the State. Such a policy was foreign to those Powers, for Germany endeavoured by a policy of extermination to break the life-force of the strongest of the national minorities, the Poles, evidently hoping that all the others, being weaker, would fall into her arms of themselves; such a policy was pushed far by imperial Russia, and in Austria-Hungary also the desire for a German and Magyar hegemony triumphed over occasional divergences in the direction of a more equitable regulation of the Habsburg Empire from the standpoint of nationality. For this reason none of these Great Powers survived the great upheavals of the World War. For this reason Austria-Hungary disintegrated into its national components and all the nations of Germany and Russia that pertained to the Central European zone of nationalities fell away from those countries.

The post-War map of the wider Central European area is politically more complicated. Independent Czechoslovakia, Poland, Austria and Hungary with an enlarged Rumania and Yugoslavia and the zone of the border States of Finland, Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania linking up to a smaller Germany and a new Poland—that is certainly a system characterized not only by an immeasurable increase of frontiers but also by legal, political, tariff and economic zones. Nevertheless, this is a more natural, logical and healthier expression of the true state of affairs in the Central European area than any conception of pre-War Central Europe. It is an inevitable stage of the political and national development of Europe; it is a far-reaching, decisive progress!

This new situation in the Central European zone from the North and the Baltic to the Adriatic and the Black Seas does not, of course, mean that all national minorities have disappeared and that the new States which the post-War map shows to us in this region are ethnically and nationally homogeneous. Their national homogeneity is, beyond doubt, smaller than was expected by all those who, during the historic years of 1918 and 1919 collaborated in the reconstruction of this part of Europe and who first became aware of the ethnographic complexity of Central Europe and of the difficulty connected with definitive nationality frontiers; they limited their efforts to the laying down those frontiers in harmony with the complicated geographic conditions and with the practical interests determined by the vital requirements of the new States.

If we attempted to express numerically and compare the number of nationals who, in the wide Central European area, were under foreign dominion before the War with the number of national and lingual minorities in post-War Central Europe, we should come to the conclusion that a whole third of the minorities and nationals living under a foreign government did not attain, and the majority could not attain, their independence. If we estimate the numbers of the subjugated nations at approximately sixty million souls before the War then there are still twenty million malcontents in the Central European zone. Although this, perhaps, does not detract from the great political and moral significance of the revolution which created the conditions of independent State life and new cultural and political development for a forty million population in Central Europe, nevertheless these twenty millions represent a serious disadvantage for the New Europe.

For an equitable evaluation of this fact it is, of course, essential to analyse this number more closely and not be content merely with assessing it quantitively. Several facts result from this analysis and all of them contribute to a more sober opinion on the solution of the nationality question in Central Europe. The most important of these facts is that the greater portion of the national minorities who together number twenty millions of malcontents is split up into separated groups, that is, enclaves wholly within the areas occupied by the majority nations. Their junction with their mother nations and States would not simplify the situation, but would render it more complicated, because the satisfaction of their desires would mean the creation of new, much more numerous minorities within the framework of foreign States. To this category belong the German and Magyar minority groups in Czechoslovakia, the predominant part of the Magyar minority in Rumania, the German and the Slovak minorities in Hungary and several small minority groups, among whom are the Lusatian Serbs (a distinct nation) in Germany, also belong to this category. A second fact is that the figures quoted also include scattered minorities, such as the Jewish minority, very important in their total, whose adherents live in larger or smaller numbers in all the Central European States and who represent a problem incapable of solution by any territorial change whatsoever. A further very important fact in the evaluation of the new situation is that the national minorities in the new Central European political system are, for the most part, the overflow into foreign lingual and territorial areas of fractions of such nations as have already attained independence so far as their main body is concerned, or that the new arrangement gave freedom to almost all the complete nations under foreign rule.

In this respect the Ukrainians are, of course, an exception. Their national identity has been disputed for long, but of their will for independent State life there cannot be any dispute. To them the new territorial system brought neither unification nor liberty. They were divided anew between Poland and Russia even though under the Soviet government in Russia they have attained a certain degree of autonomy. Another exception are the Lusatian Serbs. The 140,000 Lusatian Serbs in Germany represent the remnant of an independent nation whose liberation is hindered not only by their insignificant numbers but also by their geographical position.

If it is possible, on the whole, to say that the nationality changes affected in the Central European area by the political revolution of 1918 and 1919 fulfilled all the demands, with a few exceptions, of the formerly subjugated national groups, realistic geographic, economic and political prerequisites for this fulfillment were in existence, and if, in this direction, it can be shown that the remaining twenty millions of minorities composed of fractions of about twenty nations, could not be equally satisfied only because of the complexity of the nationality frontiers resulting from the conglomeration of races, languages and nations in the Central European area, this does not mean that there should be any undervaluation whatsoever of the fact that in the new political redistribution of Central Europe there also remain about twenty million people belonging to the lingual and national minorities. That is a mass which even by its distribution among the total number of the population of the Central European area we have in mind, represents, and will always represent, a political factor which cannot be overlooked.

It is a meritorious characteristic of the revolution which in the years 1918 and 1919 created the basis of the new Central Europe and the basis of the internal policy which sanctioned that new Central Europe at the Peace Conference, that it arose ideologically from the conviction of the necessity for realizing national justice in the highest possible degree, and that from the will to assure liberty to the small nations of Central and Eastern Europe there also issued a desire to safeguard the cultural existence and the fundamental conditions for development of those fractions of nations and nationalities who could not attain full liberty and who, for geographic, economic or political reasons remained or became national minorities. Expression to this desire was given in the minority principles incorporated in the Peace Treaties (the treaties with Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria) or formulated in the independent minorities treaties (in the case of Czechoslovakia and Poland) and proclaimed (Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania) or finally expressed in diplomatic Notes and in generally accepted resolutions (Germany and Italy). These principles, representing in reality a sort of minimum of existence necessary for the well-being and the cultural and political development of every minority, will be for us one of the chief standards in the gradual investigation of the position of national minorities in the individual States of the Central European area after the almost eighteen years existence of the new Central European order, in the evaluation of the importance of the minority problem for the internal development of those States, and for the mutual relations as well as contemporary political situation of the whole of Europe.

I.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

The Czechoslovak Republic ranks among the States whose nationality make-up is apparently most complicated and in which the numbers of the national minorities, if we judge by the official statistics of the Central European and the Eastern European States, are the highest of all those States, for they reach 33.8 per cent, that is, almost an entire third of the total population of the State; of the 14,729,536 total population according to the 1930 census, minorities reached the notable figure of 4,978,000 souls.

This circumstance is only an illustration of the racial and national complication of the Central European and Eastern European areas to which reference has already been made. At the same time, it is natural that this mixture should be greatest in the territories held by Czechoslovakia in view of the fact that those territories represent the real, geographic centre of Central Europe wherein for centuries the races of the East and the West, the North and the South, came into contact, as did their cultures, religions and customs. The historic development and the geographic compactness of the individual territorial components of the Czechoslovak Republic and the political and economic necessities of the State, determined the demarcation of the Czechoslovak frontiers and did not allow of a closer approach to ethnographic frontiers than that which actually took place. This is also confirmed by a more detailed analysis of the distribution of individual national minorities in Czechoslovakia.

According to the last census, the *German* minorities in Czechoslovakia number 3,231,000 souls for the whole of the Republic. But this great mass of German inhabitants is divided on the one hand into eight different areas along the Czechoslovak frontier, defined in the main by the mountain ridges which throughout the ages have divided Germany, Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia, on the other hand scattered in lingual enclaves among the Czech and Slovak inhabitants. This *geographical distribution of the Germans* is a most highly important factor in their destiny. *They are connected*—and by no means only since yesterday, but since a distant period at the time when these German inhabitants migrated to, or were summoned by the ruler to, the Czech lands—*with the Czech population and it is not possible to sever them from the Czechs and to form them into any kind of an independent State-political body whatsoever.* The German leader, Joseph Seliger, very justly characterized this in the historic October of 1918 in his study of the future of the Sudete Germans when he wrote: "The eight territorial fragments in which Germans are settled, eight territorial fragments separated from each other by wide gulf of Czech lingual districts, cannot form a single State or a single administrative area, for such State or area must after all be a united economic area. To form the German districts into a unit would be without parallel in the whole world and would be the greatest State-political nonsense!"

The *Magyar* minority according to the same census of 1930 numbers 692,000 members and is similarly distributed in the Eastern districts of Slovakia and the South-eastern part of Carpathian Ruthenia in three areas surrounded by Slovak zones. The first is drawn from Bratislava across Rye Island and the plain on the left bank of the Danube as far as Galanta, Nové Zámky and Levice; the second forms a narrow frontier zone as far as the Košice district and the third completes the South-eastern end of Slovakia and the South-western part of Carpathian Ruthenia. These areas were joined to Czechoslovakia on the one hand because this was a demand of geography and of transport in the demarcation of the frontiers and on the other hand because the areas in question were more or less permeated with elements either purely Slovak, or Magyarized during the last century.

The *Ruthenian* minority numbering 549,000 and settled for the greater part in Carpathian Ruthenia, became part of the Czechoslovak Republic as a result of the fact that the whole of this Carpathian country, on the basis of the wishes of the inhabitants of Ruthenia and in accordance with the decision of the Peace Conference was joined to Czechoslovakia.

Finally the *Polish* minority numbering 81,000 souls represents about twelve per cent of that portion of the Czech territories for centuries included in Silesia which by the decision of the Conference of Ambassadors in 1920 was recognized as Czechoslovak.

If we add to the foregoing a further minority, the *Jews*, scattered throughout all areas of the State and numbering 186,000, of whom about half are settled in Carpathian Ruthenia, we have a survey of all the minorities in the Czechoslovak Republic, if, of course, we leave out of count several settlements of Rumanians in the East of the State and several Croats in Southern Moravia.

The Czechoslovak nation, for whose use as a State the Czechoslovak Republic was created, is very well aware that minorities so numerous and to a large extent, economically and culturally mature, complicate that nation's internal political tasks and increase its responsibility. From the beginning of the independent State life of the Czechoslovak nation this responsibility was comprehended as being, firstly the need of assuring to the minorities within the State all the essential conditions for existence and cultural and economic development in the same degree as to the majority of the population. In this sense also the State undertook to observe the international safeguards laid down for the benefit of minorities. The fulfilment of these two standards was facilitated by the fact that Czechoslovakia was instituted as a democratic State in which civil liberty and political equality, applied even in cultural life, form the basis of all the institutions and all the political acts of the State.

What, then, is the situation of the minorities in Czechoslovakia? If we desire to have a simple answer to this question not only as regards Czechoslovakia but as regards any State having national minorities, it is sufficient to turn one's attention to several fundamental, objective and statistically expressed facts in which is generally reflected the political, cultural and national life of the minority. That means ascertaining what possibilities the minority has of taking part in the political life of the State, what parliamentary representation it has and what are its facilities of using its native tongue in dealing with administrative offices, what opportunities it has of educating its youth in schools with instruction in the native tongue and what its opportunities are of maintaining itself economically. Thus we obtain the clearest possible picture of its real situation.

Civil and political liberty in Czechoslovakia enables the minorities there to enjoy political life in equal degree with the majority and the democratic electoral code gives them the opportunity of utilizing these liberties for the attainment of political representation in all the legislative and administrative bodies. The German minority organized in several political parties according to occupational and cultural distribution has a total of seventy-two representatives in the Chamber of Deputies, thirty-seven in the Senate; the Magyar minority has ten deputies and seven senators; the Ruthenians and Ukrainians have eight deputies and three senators while the Poles are represented by two deputies, and the Jews have an equal number.*)

If this representation gives to all, and especially to the two strongest minorities in Czechoslovakia, wide opportunities for participation in legislative work in the State and thereby also equal opportunity of protecting minority interests and if this participation can extend—as it does in the case of the German minority—to active collaboration in the cabinet of the State, no less value should be apportioned to the fact that the representation of the minorities in the provincial representational bodies and in the parishes enables them to effect a decisive or at least a co-determinative influence on a wide circle of activities connected with the social, humanist, health, technical and economic interests of the minority population.

Another important criterion for the assessment of the position of the minorities is the handling of the language question. To what extent are the minorities in Czechoslovakia given opportunities for the employment of their own language? Obviously, there is no limit so far as the use of that language in private or commercial life is concerned and the same is true of religious life. The free use of the minority languages in the press is testified to by the statistics relating to the minority press; it does not suffer from any limitation which would not have equal general application, and equal liberty of association and of assembly enables the minorities to develop their social, cultural and political life.

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*) According to the elections of 1935.

In the limits of this article we cannot refer to details of how the lingual question of minorities has been settled. We must content ourselves with the statement that the language law of Czecho-slovakia with its appropriate prescriptions gives the right of employing the minority language of each minority which numbers more than twenty per cent of the population in any given parish or district. Moreover, under the terms of the prescriptions three régimes are in force: in parishes where a national minority numbers more than two-thirds of the population representing a special majority, all oral and written communications and documents in the State and public offices and courts made or issued to members of a minority are couched in the language of that minority. In parishes where the minority is more than twenty per cent of the population but less than two-thirds, communications are regularly made also in the minority language but documents executed for members of the minority are naturally bi-lingual. Finally in parishes where the minority does not reach twenty per cent of the population it is, it is true, prescribed that papers, oral communications and deeds should be in the State language, but at the same time the offices have been instructed that cases where one of the parties is ignorant of the State language should be dealt with as far as possible in offices where helpful information and explanations can be given in the minority language.

Uni-lingual minority offices serving parishes with minorities numbering more than two-thirds comprise together according to the data of the

1930 census about 2,338,000 Germans, 393,000 Magyars and 20,000 Poles. Bi-lingual offices serve 632,000 Germans, 213,000 Magyars and 51,000 Poles. The régime of the State language affects only minorities distributed aboute the territories populated by the majority to the number of 250,000 Germans, 85,000 Magyars and 10,000 Poles. This solution of the language question in Czechoslovakia is as equitable as possible.

So far as the satisfaction of *scholastic requirements* of the minorities in Czechoslovakia is concerned a decisive factor is that almost all the children of minority members are given the opportunity of being educated in schools where their own language is employed for instructional purposes, where the teachers are members of that minority, and where text-books are written in the minority language. Moreover, school supervision and school administration is to a prevailing extent in the hands of the minority itself or is intrusted to a corporation in which that minority has its equitable representation.

We must quote at least the basic figures. Of 446,815 German children of school age in 1934/35 423,203 attended German elementary and upper elementary schools. Of 124,529 Magyar children 97,933 attended Magyar schools. Of 114,772 Ruthenian children 96,545 children attended Ruthenian schools and of 14,734 Polish children 12,340 attended Polish schools. That practically means that children of members of the minorities attended foreign schools only where these minority members lived isolated from a large group of that minority or where it was a matter of the parents' own selection made so that the child could acquire the State language.

The national minorities in Czechoslovakia, according to their size and their requirements, are also equipped with schools of higher categories: secondary, specialist and continuation, and the strongest minority, the Germans, has also one University and two technical high schools and their own sections of art and music academies.

In Czechoslovakia the economic life is only very slightly subject to authoritative intervention on the part of the State power and so far as it is regulated by legislation, the character of the matter demands that such legislation must be, and is, of an exclusively general and neutral nature. In this field the development of the minorities is directed by the same laws as those regulating the economic life of the majority nation and the whole State experiences equal waves of prosperity and crisis. Its wealth is mirrored on the one hand by the number of economic institutions, financial undertakings and institutes and, of course, an endless series of organizations of a public, cooperative and private character whose mere estimation would exceed the limits of our sober dissertation.

It remains to answer the question which is the main one for the assessment of the present importance of minority problems in the Central European area and which will be addressed to Czechoslovakia as to all the other States: are the national minorities in Czechoslovakia contented and can they not represent a problem menacing the stability of the State and the peace of this complicated part of Europe?

For a just answer, it is necessary again to recall that Czechoslovakia is a democratic State whose inhabitants, intensively politically active, are divided into many political parties and groups according to their various interests and economic, social, cultural and national programmes. Each of these parties or groups aims with its programme at broader or narrower reform of the existing state of affairs, to a fuller satisfaction of its interests and needs—which holds good of course in regard to the various parties and groups of the national minorities. If the racial, linguistic and minority questions in the programmes and politic aims of these groups occupy a more prominent place than in the programmes and aims of the parties, this is very natural and cannot by itself be considered as an expression of distrust towards the State, especially because the political tactics of the majority of the group is not a negativistic one and does not exclude direct cooperation with the parties of the Government.

If nevertheless there exist in the minority groups, whether German, Magyar and Polish, some elements whose dissatisfaction is apparently of a more dangerous character, it is necessary to state that they represent only the extreme fragment of the minority with aims which are only a reflex of foreign aggressive tendencies and do not represent a real danger to the State in the present international situation.

II.

POLAND

The restoration of the independence of the Polish State which had disappeared from the map of Europe in 1795 when the last remnants of its territory were divided between Russia, Prussia and Austria-Hungary, was an act of justice from the nationality angle. The political leaders of the restored State endeavoured, in the maelstrom of the post-War revolutions, to assure to the State frontiers which would approximate as far as possible to the ideal of the historic Greater Poland; they collided, of course, with the young Eastern nations situated between the Polish and Russian ethnical elements—the Ukrainians, the White Russians and the Lithuanians—who, in the meanwhile had come to national and political consciousness and who also endeavoured to obtain the greatest possible degree of independence. The Polish leaders succeeded, nevertheless, in defeating first the military forces of the rebellious Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia and then in subduing the Lithuanian-White Russian Soviet Republic and after a victory over the Red Army, by the Riga Peace in March 1921 a large portion of the ethnical White Russian and Ukrainian territories were included in the new Polish State.

Because, in addition, Poland gained a German minority with Polish Pomerania and Poznań, the country became a State with very large national minorities totalling almost one third of the whole population. According to the last census in 1931, it was ascertained that 22,208,076 people in Poland spoke Polish as their mother-tongue and that 9,924,860 persons spoke "languages other than the Polish language". Thus minorities in Poland represent 30.9 per cent of the population. The Polish Statistical Office has so far not published complete data concerning the national minorities from 1931 census, so that it is impossible to state precisely how this group of almost ten million minority members are divided among the individual minority groups. No alternative is left other than estimating their numbers on the basis of data from 1921 and on the basis of the 1931 census as far, of course, as the partial results from individual counties have already been made known. But in doing so we must be careful not to be misled by the Polish official results which include in the census figures at the expense of the national minorities a group of people under the title "tutejszy", speaking the transitional Polish-Ukrainian dialects and having, according to the Polish assertion, no marked national consciousness.

The strongest Polish national minority is formed by the *Ukrainians* who preponderate in the territories of Eastern Galicia and in Volhynia. In Eastern Galicia (in its three counties of Stanislawów, Tarnopol and Lwów) they number more than two and three-quarter million souls, representing more than half of the local population. In Volhynia they number about a million souls, which is not quite seventy per cent of the population. In Polesie and in the Lublin and Cracow counties there are a smaller number of Ukrainians. The official statistics for 1921 shew a total of 3,898,431 Ukrainians in Poland. If we apply to the whole minority the seven per cent increase which is shown by the Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia in 1931, we should arrive at the figure of 4,200,000 Ukrainians in that year. The Ukrainians themselves estimate their numbers much higher, up to seven millions. The political importance of these minority inhabitants of Poland is increased by the fact that the territory they occupy is directly connected with the extensive fringe of Soviet Ukraine.

An analogous geographic situation is occupied also by the *White Russians* who represent almost a half of the population in the Wilno and Polesie counties and who make up forty per cent of the population in the county of Nowogrod. In addition they are to be found also in the Bialystok county. The official census figures of 1921 gave the number of White Russians as 1,060,237 (the White Russians themselves state that there are at least two millions of them living in Poland); for 1931 estimates must be made even according to Polish sources (Kaz. Kierski, Krasyński) of at least 1,500,000 White Russians in view of the fact that after 1921 more than 300,000 repatriated White Russians returned to Poland.

The *German* minority in Poland also attain marked numbers. The census of 1921 ascertained that there were 1,059,194 (3.9 per cent) of Germans in Poland, of whom the greater portion, 318,786 live in Upper Silesia, forming 28.3 per cent of the local population; in addition there are 327,846 Germans representing 16.7 per cent of the population in the Poznań county and in Pomerania there are 175,771 Germans representing 18.8 per cent of the local population. Smaller numbers of Germans live in the Lodż, Warsaw and Volhynia counties. From the results of the census of 1931 the majority of Polish authors expect, in view of the partial results already made known, a substantial decrease in the numbers of the German minority: it is said they will not total more than 700,000 souls. The Germans themselves regard the figures published in 1921 as low and claim that there are at least 1,700,000 Germans in Poland.

Of lesser importance is the *Lithuanian* minority which in 1921 counted not more than 68,667 people concentrated in the main in the Wilno and Nowogrod counties and by 1931 they had grown, according to Polish sources, to at least 80,000—the Lithuanians themselves speak of 300,000 Lithuanians in Poland. Further, there is the *Russian* minority numbering only 56,239 souls according to the data of 1921, living on the frontiers of the Eastern counties and a *Czech* minority concentrated mainly in Volhynia of whom the published figures state there are 30,628, to which, of course, must be added the several thousands of Spiš Slovaks whom the Poles unjustly count as Poles.

Special reference must be made to the *Jews* who have a very well marked national character in Poland; they are scattered throughout the State and together, after the Ukrainians, form the strongest Polish minority, for they attained 2,110,448 souls (7.8 per cent of the total population) according to the census figures of 1921 and according to estimates they had grown to at least 2,700,000 souls by 1931.

Poland was one of the first States to conclude a special treaty for the defence of minorities. Its general principles for the Polish territories of Upper Silesia were drawn up in detail by the German-Polish Treaty of 1922, valid for fifteen years.

If we proceed to a consideration of the political and cultural position of the national minorities in Poland and if we investigate first of all what possibilities these minorities have of participating in political life and of protecting their own interests in the legislative and administrative bodies, then we must obviously admit that the opportunities in this respect which were assured to the minorities in Poland after the War by the democratic system of general franchise rights, have been substantially narrowed by the abrogation of the general franchise in June 1935 and the introduction of indirect election in the form of block lists of candidates which are drawn up by the district electoral collegium made up of the elected representatives of parishes, districts and municipalities as well as of the public corporations, Universities and so on. The Senate is nominated to the extent of one third of its members. The results of this radical change showed themselves in the August elections of 1935, when the national minorities, who should have a third of the total seats according to their numbers, that is sixty-six seats out of a total of two hundred, obtained only twenty-four (the Ukrainians obtained nineteen, the Jews five, the White Russians, the Lithuanians, the Czechs and the Germans being entirely without representation). In the Senate composed of ninety-six members the minorities, in place of thirty-two seats, obtained only ten (six went to the Ukrainians, two to the Germans and two to the Jews). The development of the political life of the minorities was not checked in any other way; nevertheless the political parties and organizations in which these minorities were grouped were, by the new franchise law, deprived of their main reason of existence, the attainment and defence of the parliamentary representation of the minorities.

So far as lingual rights are concerned, it must be taken into consideration that the State language in Poland is Polish; the minorities in the districts which are their principal settlements are, however, assured of the right of employing minority languages in the State offices and the administrative offices as well as before the courts. Such right is guaranteed to the Ukrainians in the Lwów, Tarnopol, Stanislawów, Volhynia and Polesie counties, the White Russians in the Polesie, Nowogrod and Volhynia counties and also in two parishes of the Bialystok county, and the Lithuanians in several parts of the administrative district of Volhynia. Lingual rights for the German minority are fixed for Upper Silesia by the stipulations of the Polish-German Treaty for the administrative area of the Poznań and Toruń Appeal Courts by a special law of March 1925. Adherents of the German minority can address themselves to the authorities and courts in their own language, but they must, of course, give proof of their State and lingual nationality.

The minorities who are not included in the appropriate treaty stipulations and lingual prescriptions—that is, in particular, the Russian and the Czech minorities—or who dwell outside the areas included in these provisions, have no right to use the minority languages before the authorities and the courts.

What provision is made in Poland for the elementary and, in turn, the higher *education* of the national minorities? So far as elementary schools are concerned, a right to them is admitted only for the Ukranian minority in the counties of Lwów, Stanislawów, Tarnopol, Volhynia and Polesie counties, for the White Russians in the Polesie, Nowogrod and Wilno counties, for the Lithuanians in the Wilno county, of course only in districts where the adherents of the minority number more than twenty-five per cent of the population and where parents of at least forty minority children demand the provision of a school. In each school where a minority language is the language of instruction, Polish must also be taught as a syllabus subject so far as schools of one to three grades are concerned; if it is a case of a school having a fourth to seventh class, history, geography and civics must be taught in

Polish. If in such a minority school there are a minimum of twenty children whose parents request that instruction should be given in the State language, bi-lingual instruction must be introduced. If the parish, in addition to a minority school, contains a Polish State school, the two must be united as a joint two-language school. The bi-lingual type of school in the minority districts is in general the chief type of elementary school since the issue of the minorities lingual law of 1924. In the German minority districts the establishment of minority schools is subject to the law of March 1919 which liquidated the local pre-War Germanization system in the schools, and to the regulation of March 1920 which permitted German schools in parishes where the parents of at least forty German children requested their institution. In the Polish part of Upper Silesia the question was adjusted in a very similar manner by the Polish-German treaty already referred to, so that, in addition to the minority schools, instruction in a minority language can be introduced if there are at least eighteen German children in the school, and German can be used for religious instruction even for twelve children.

The minorities in Poland can found private schools in Poland on the same footing as the Poles; since 1934, of course, the conditions for their institution have been made much more stringent and the foundation of such schools has been rendered difficult, which bears all the heavier on the minorities in Poland, because the introduction of the bi-lingual system of minority schools is superseding the purely minority schools more and more, and from the point of view of the minorities and from that of education they are being regarded as unadvantageous and, to a large extent, as instruments of Polonization.

The actual position of the scholastic equipment of the individual minorities can be characterised by the following figures from official Polish statistics: during the school year 1934/1935 the Ukrainians had only 457 of their own elementary schools despite the fact that they had 2,754 Polish-Ukrainian (bi-lingual) schools; the White Russians had only sixteen schools, the Germans 490, the Jews had 87 Jewish schools and 172 Hebrew schools, the Lithuanians 72 schools, the Czechs eighteen and the Russians eight. To what extent the children of the members of the minorities can attend schools employing the mother-tongue, and to what extent they attend bi-lingual schools and to what extent they must attend Polish schools cannot be ascertained, because the Polish statistics do not provide data concerning the nationalities of the pupils. So far as secondary schools are concerned the Ukrainians, according to official data had twenty-six secondary schools during the school year 1934/1935 besides two bi-lingual schools; the White Russians had one school, the Germans twenty, the Jews eleven, the Lithuanians two and the Russians five. The Ukrainians had seven teachers' colleges as well as one bi-lingual training centre, the Germans four, the Jews three and the other minorities had no provision for the training of teachers.

Up to the present none of the Polish minorities have a University.

The *cultural and economic* life of the national minorities in Poland is very active. This applies especially to the Ukrainian, German and Jewish minorities, and is mirrored in the large number of cultural institutions, newspapers and, of course, in the economic organizations they possess. The well-developed cooperative organizations are an especially important support for the Ukrainian and German minorities and also even for a minority as small as the Czech minority.

If, in conclusion, we investigate the relation of individual minorities in Poland to the State and their importance for its political stability, we cannot, in the first place, entertain any doubt of the absolute loyalty of the Jews and, equally, of the Czechs. The orientation of the other minorities is determined by very many factors and is therefore neither simple nor constant. On the *Germans* in Poland, just as on the Germans in other States, the Hitlerism of Germany asserts a far-reaching spiritual influence and in truth their relations to the State are, and will be, determined to a large extent by the urgency with which the Germans of the *Reich* will assert their policy of expansion, not excluding even Upper Silesia and Pomerania from their plans. The January Polish-German Treaty of the year 1934 undoubtedly indicated the abandonment of this aim. That this abandonment was not a definitive one was shown recently by the speech of Dr. Schacht proclaiming fresh aspirations with regard to the Polish part of Upper Silesia.

The most serious nationality problem for Poland, however, is presented by the *Ukrainians*. They are divided into several political camps which, nevertheless, cling to a common Ukrainian national consciousness, the content of which is a desire for political independence and liberty. Because the majority of these Ukrainian political tendencies have, of course, an anti-Bolshevist orientation at the same time, the attraction of the independent Ukraine of the Soviets does not play a very marked part. Especially of late, Polish policy seeking agreement with the Ukrainians in the sense of reconciling their efforts at independence with the conception of the Polish State and its political aims has endeavoured to exploit this fact. In the meanwhile it is impossible to state a definitive opinion as to whether these efforts will meet with success. The *White Russian* minority has not, as yet, sufficient political maturity and the *Russian* and the *Lithuanian* minorities are too insignificant numerically to be able to play a rôle similar to that of the Ukrainians. It is certain that the minorities of Poland represent a continually growing number of problems in which a decisive influence will be exerted by the further political development in Eastern Europe.

III.

RUMANIA

Post-War Greater Rumania was created by the extension of the former kingdom of Rumania to include Transylvania, the Bukovina, Bessarabia and several of the smaller districts of former Hungary, thus uniting those Rumanians who, long before the War, had struggled against the denationalizing system of Hungary, Austria and Russia in their yearning for incorporation with their mother-State. With the Rumanians who were thus freed from a foreign yoke Rumania, of course, also received fairly numerous national minorities, whose total strength according to the census findings for 1930 reaches twenty-five per cent of the whole population, that is to say, more than four and a half million souls. The largest of these minorities is the *Magyar* minority, which numbers 1,386,777 (7.68 per cent) the great bulk of whom—1,353,675 people—live in Transylvania, representing one quarter of the local population there. This great mass of the Magyar population of a province, for years under Magyar dominion, is not, of course, so distributed as to form a single geographic unit which could have been joined to

Hungary. On the contrary, the largest compact group of the Magyar minority in Transylvania, the Sekels, numbering about 530,000 are concentrated in the Odorhei, Ciuc and Trei-Scaune counties and partially also in the Mures, Brasov and Tarnava-Mica counties, and they are divided from the Hungarian frontiers by a large body of the Rumanian population. In the Transylvanian counties which march with Hungary there is, it is true, a second group of the Magyar minority numbering altogether about 330,000, but these Magyars in the frontier counties of Arad, Bihar, Satu-Mare and Salaj are only a fraction of the population there; in two of these counties they form a quarter and in a second two-fifths of the population. The balance of the Magyar minority, that is about half a million people, is scattered in various parts of Transylvania, particularly in the towns, among the Rumanian and German inhabitants where they obtained a certain position in consequence of the Magyarization policy of former Hungary, for under the old régime all offices and institutions were filled by Magyars. Thus the Magyar minority in Rumania, despite its numbers, represents a scattered minority.

This, of course, is even to a greater degree the character of the second minority in the Kingdom of Rumania, ranking minorities according to their numerical strength—the *Jews*. According to the last official figures these number 828,816 (4.59 per cent) or almost a complete million, scattered almost evenly throughout all the territory of Greater Rumania and particularly concentrated in the towns.

The third minority group in Rumania is formed by the *Germans* who number 774,645 (4.29 per cent) and who represent the result of the German colonization, the origins of which must be sought in the XII and subsequent centuries. The largest German group are the Transylvanian Saxons who are concentrated in the county of Brasov (where they form twenty-two per cent of the population), the counties of Tarnava-Mare, Tarnava-Mica, Nasaud, Fagaras and Cluj. They are followed by the Swabians in the Arad and Banat counties who migrated as late as the XVIII century, and there are smaller groups of German colonists in the counties of Satu-Mare, Maramures and Salaj. The total number of the Germans in Transylvania is given as 540,000. In the Bukovina, which in the course of the XVIII century became the goal of German colonization supported by German industrialists and officials, the number of Germans is 70,000 and in Bessarabia, 80,000. A small number of Germans also live in the old Kingdom and in Rumanian Dobrudža, totalling together about 30,000 head of population. German statistical estimates give a larger total number to the Germans in Rumania, as for instance, Wintgens quoting from the private census of German organizations, gives the figure as 812,000.

In addition to the foregoing the *Ruthenians* rank among the larger minorities of Greater Rumania, their number being 456,842 (2.1 per cent). A small group of Ruthenians live in the Maramures county, being connected with the Ruthenians of the Carpathian Ruthenia of to-day, while the actual core of this minority is compactly settled on the one hand in northern part of the Bukovina and on the other hand in northern Bessarabia. In the Bukovina the Ruthenians compose about twenty-eight per cent of the population and about 9.57 per cent in Bessarabia. The Ruthenians of the Bukovina and Bessarabia concentrated in the northern sections of these provinces are thus linked with the Ruthenians districts of the Soviet Ukraine.

An important minority in Rumania is formed by the *Bulgars* the number of whom is given at 370,163 and who, except for a small fraction in southern Bessarabia, are concentrated mainly in Dobrudža where they form a quarter of the population. Dobrudža is also the chief centre of the *Turkish* and the *Tartar* minorities who number 230,000. Among the smaller minority groups in Rumania are the *Russians,* who number 306,969 living in Bessarabia and in Dobrudža, the *Poles* of whom 35,000 live in the Bukovina, the *Serbs* of whom there are 48,000 scattered throughout the Banat and the *Slovaks,* numbering 27,000 are in scattered groups in the Banat and in the counties of Arad, Bihor and Salaj.

The national minorities in Rumania represent—except for the small minority groups—closed minorities (enclaves), without geographic connection with their mother-States. This simplifies the task of the Rumanian minority policy, but on the other hand it is complicated by the numbers of the minority groups, and in addition, by the position which the most important of these, the Magyars, occupied before the World War, for they then represented the dominating element in Transylvania at the cost of the majority Rumanian element.

If we first investigate the position of the national minorities in Rumania by the index of political representation which gives these minorities votes in the legislative bodies as well as in the parishes and the counties, we notice first that without regard to the changes which have been made in the franchise, the most important of the minorities in Rumania always had representation either gained by putting forward independent candidates of its own or campaigning in conjuction with prominent Rumanian parties. Since the last elections in December 1933 the Magyars have had eight seats in the Rumanian Chamber of Deputies and three representatives in the Senate; the Germans have likewise had eight Deputies and three Senators as their representatives. The law of 3rd August 1929 concerning local administration entrusted parish administration to the rural parish councils elected by general franchise in which the minorities participate. In the urban districts and in the boroughs two-thirds of the representative body is elected while the remaining third is appointed from various intellectual and specialist institutions. In the scope of this system the minorities are afforded wide opportunities of taking part in the administration. They avail themselves fully of these opportunities.

The *lingual* rights of the national minorities in Rumania are not determined by special laws and thus depend solely on the Constitution which guarantees equal rights to all Rumanian citizens without religious, racial or lingual difference. In practice the minority languages are employed not only in district offices but in the courts of first instance in all districts inhabited by minorites.

An important factor in the cultural, religious and also in the political life of the national minorities in Rumania, and particularly in Transylvania, are the minority churches. Their position and their rôle in this direction resulted from former Hungary. The autonomy preserved under the Magyar régime was also guaranteed by the Minorities Treaty which in its thirteenth article bound Rumania "to permit autonomous administration, of course under the supervision of the Rumanian State, to the Transylvanian parishes of the Sekels and the Saxons so far as religious and school questions are concerned". The Rumanian State solved the question by the religious law of 12th April 1928 by which full equality and the widest autonomy were assured to all the Churches and they were invested with the right of founding and administering their intellectual and charitable institutions. The State also assures to the minority Churches material means and affords them their share in the Budget, though this obviously varies with the financial position of the State. The Councillor of the Archiepiscopal see of Sibin, M. Nistor, writing in the *Revue de Transylvanie* calculated that the minority (non-orthodox) Churches should receive about a quarter of the total which the Rumanian State Church receives. Since 1922 their receipts from the State budget have regularly exceeded this calculation.

So far as schools are concerned, the position of the national minorities can be illustrated by statistics for the school year 1930-1931 from which it can be seen that the State maintained 335 elementary schools for the minorities and 425 parallel courses for the minorities in Rumanian schools with a total of 1,514 teachers, in addition to twelve minority secondary schools. The minorities themselves, in the same school year, maintained 1,525 elementary and 136 secondary schools, all with State support.

In Transylvania alone the Magyars had in the school year 1929-1930, according to official statistics 483 elementary schools, some of them independent, some of them auxiliary, and in addition they had 879 elementary church schools, with five State and fifty-two confessional secondary schools. The Germans in this province had, in the same year, 106 State elementary schools, 411 Church schools and seven State and 36 Church secondary schools. The Jews had thirty-two elementary and five secondary schools. In addition to these minority schools one elementary school was allotted to the Czechs in Transylvania in the same year, three to the Slovaks, one to the Croats and one to the Armenians, without reckoning the Church schools.

The national minorities in Rumania have no Universities, but they attend the Rumanian Universities, which is particularly true of the Jews who form 34 per cent of the graduates at Cluj, while the Magyars prefer to look towards Universities abroad—in Hungary.

The intensity of the cultural and the political life of the national minorities in Rumania can be judged from the great number of political and non-political newspapers, of political and cultural organizations, societies and institutions. According to the statistics of the last few years the Magyars themselves publish 312 periodicals in Transylvania of which 258 have been founded since the War. Among these publications are thirty-eight dailies. The Germans have 119 periodicals of which 87 date from the post-War era. The Jews have thirty periodical newspapers, the Russians twelve, the Ukrainians eight, the Serbs and the Poles two each. Of the Magyar literary institutions attention can be drawn at least to the Transylvanian Literary Society which has been functioning since 1888, to the Sigismond Kemény Society, the I. Aranyi, to the Literary Society "Helikon" founded in 1926 and so on.

The Germans too have a large number of scientific and cultural organizations and develop therefrom an activity immeasurably more intense than they could pursue in former Hungary. Since 1931 they have had a Cultural Headquarters at Sibin which concentrates all the cultural societies and directs their activities.

In the *economic field* the national minorities and particularly the Magyars take some of the results of the land reform heavily, for it did not halt even at minority Church property nor at the holdings of large Magyar landed proprietors; on the other hand, however, the reform produced advantages also for the members of the minorities. In economic life the national minorities in Rumania can develop freely and because they represented and still represent, especially in Transylvania, an element prevailingly urban, they are more numerously represented in trade than the Rumanians are, and they can greatly profit from the general economic development of the Rumanian State. Their predominance is evident from the statistics of 1927 which showed that in Transylvania there are 145 Rumanian banks and 350 minority banks; Rumanians own seventy industrial enterprises and the minorities have 375 while there are thirty-five Rumanian trade undertakings and 105 minorities undertakings.

This predominance of the Magyars and the Germans naturally forces Rumanian public factors to endeavour to catch up with the minority elements in industry and trade and it has led to more intense competition between the majority nation and these two economically highly developed minorities. To such competition the minorities, of course, must reconcile themselves. Competition so long as it does not consist of methods which might militate against the minorities demands for equality—only the extreme Rumanian elements coquette now and then with such methods in their programmes—certainly cannot complicate the good relations existing between the minorities and the majority in Rumania.

The peaceful development of normal life encounters difficulties much more from the political tendencies which are asserting themselves in the Magyar camp and of late in the German camp also. Among the Magyar minority these are the Greater Hungary tendencies of the old political generation not yet desirous of severing the old bonds with the Budapest revisionist dreams of the restoration of Greater Hungary which would dominate the whole of the Danubian Valley.

Among the German minority the disruptive tendencies are those of German Hitlerism which reveal themselves here in the form of efforts to unite the German minority—which could not be prevented, if it were brought about by normal methods—but also in the form of a policy which, in place of the Rumanian State, visualizes "Deutschland über alles" which would willingly extend its sphere of interest in Rumania. Against these tendencies Rumania must, obviously, defend herself, not because they threaten the existence of the State but because they hinder its peaceful internal development. The basic relations of the Rumanian majority and attitude of their State towards the minorities despite this remains positive.

IV.

YUGOSLAVIA

The unification of the three branches of the Yugoslav nation, the Serbs, the Croats and the Slovenes formerly divided by the frontiers of three or four States (Serbia, Montenegro and Austria, that is the Cis-Leithan half of the Habsburg Monarchy and Hungary, its Trans-Leithan half) also responded to the demands of national equity and was the result of the joint efforts of those three branches. The demarcation of the frontiers of the new united State was directed by ethnographic considerations and, of course between the German and Yugoslav elements in Carniola, Carinthia and Styria it was just as difficult to lay down an ideally defined line as it was between the Hungarian and the Yugoslav elements at Bačka and in the Banat. For this reason German and Hungarian minorities remained in Yugoslavia, just as Serbian and Slovene minorities remained in Austria and Hungary. In the Banat the situation was complicated still further by the fact that the local Serbian elements were mixed with Rumanians, so that Yugoslavia also obtained a Rumanian minority, and these added to the number of Rumanians already living in Old Serbia.

According to the census of 1931 the national composition of Yugoslavia is as follows: The Yugoslavs themselves numbered 9,931,506 souls, or almost eighty-three per cent of the total population. This figure obviously includes the inhabitants belonging to all three branches: the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, whose religious and cultural differences, arising from long years passed under various State systems, could in no way change their national unity even though it created a passing political difficulty. The Serbian population of Macedonia is also included in this total, for Serbian ethnographic experts and of course also Serbian official circles and the Statistical bureaux contend in dispute with Bulgarian authorities that this latter group is part of the Yugoslav nation and, in essence, of the Yugoslav lingual group.

The Germans were the strongest national minority in 1931, the census returns showing them as totalling 499,326 (three point fifty-nine per cent of the total population) and of these the greater part are the descendents of groups of colonists who migrated from Hungary in the 17th and 18th centuries and under Maria Theresa and Joseph II settled in Bačka and the Banat, which they occupied alongside the Serbs and Rumanians already settled there. A small group of Germans, numbering about 40,000 were incorporated with Yugoslavia when Lower Styria was included in that country.

The Magyars in Yugoslavia also form a rather numerous minority. They number 468,185 people

(3.36% of the total population) of whom the greater part in the Banat (Serbian Vojvodina) and a smaller number in Bačka. The Albanians or Arnauts who follow the Magyars in the list of Yugoslav minorities numbered 342,000 souls (two point five per cent) being divided territorially on the one hand in the Serbian districts of Macedonia and on the other hand in former Montenegro. The Rumanian minority numbering 63,853 souls (zero point five per cent) is dispersed, as already stated, along the Rumanian frontier of Old Serbia on the one hand and in the Banat on the other hand. The Czechoslovak minority, numbering 176,482 adherents (one point three per cent) represent a colonist element chiefly in Croatia. The Turks number 132,322 (one point one per cent) and are scattered mainly in Southern Serbia. There is an insignificant number of Italians in Yugoslavia (they total about 9,396) scattered along the Dalmatian coast, and in addition the Yugoslav statistics reveal about 46,000 Russians and Ruthenians, 15,000 Poles and about 5,000 Bulgars.

From this data it is clear that the minorities in Yugoslavia represent on the whole merely small fragments and that only the Magyars, the Germans, the Albanians and the Rumanians are numerically important. According to the situation of these minorities it is possible to make a practical examination of the Yugoslav minority policy, for Yugoslavia signed a special minority Treaty with the same obligations and the same guarantees (the League of Nations) as hold good for the other Central and Eastern European States. In addition, of course, a decisive factor in the position of individual minorities is their state of development and the interest displayed by Yugoslavia's neighbours in the individual minorities. Thus, for instance, the position of the Rumanian minority is influenced by the interest Rumania shows in that minority. It is to a large extent regulated by Treaty between the two States—just as the position of the Czechoslovak minority depends on friendly, systematic Czechoslovak interest in the Czechoslovak minority on the part of Czechoslovakia as provided for in the Czechoslovak-Yugoslav Declarations of 1929 and 1930.

The gravitational centre of minority life in the case of Yugoslav minorities is not to be sought in politics but first and foremost in the cultural and scholastic spheres. The general, direct, secret and proportional franchise rights introduced into Yugoslavia in 1921 gave, it is true, to all citizens—including the members of the minorities—the opportunity of participating in the political life of the country, but practically only the Germans and later the Magyars utilized this opportunity and organized themselves politically, while the remaining minority groups, too scattered and too small, participate as members of Yugoslav political parties. The Constitution decreed by the King in 1931 forbade the formation of societies for party political purposes on a religious, racial and regional basis. The franchise law of 1931 issued in connection with the Constitution abolished regional candidature and instituted State candidature for the whole country. This *de facto* made it impossible for the minority groups, usually concentrated in a single area or in a few small areas to put forward independent candidates, but it opened up another path for their political representation: through the all-State candidature list of the majority nation. The Germans followed this path and thus retained at least two deputies of the original eight they had after the War. The Magyars returned one deputy, Dr. Szanto, an "activist" member.

Parishes, municipalities and *banovinas* in Yugoslavia are administered by nominated councils. Nationality statistics of the composition of these administrations do not exist, but it appears that the members of the minorities are not neglected, and that their smallest interests are respected.

For the position of the minorities in the scholastic field a decisive factor is the law of 1929 which unified all elementary schools and brought them under State control. It stipulated that at each school a minority section must be instituted if the school contained a minimum of thirty children of the appropriate school age whose parents belonged to a minority and requested that the language of instruction should be the children's mother-tongue. Private schools are only allowed exceptionally in Yugoslavia. For the rest, the school questions of individual minorities in Yugoslavia are settled by special instructions. A decisive factor for the minority school policy in Yugoslavia is that in minority schools the children are taught in their mother-tongue and the State language is only taught as an additional subject in the third year and onwards. Another factor is that in these schools teachers who are members of the minority concerned preponderate and use special text-books printed in the minority language.

It can be deduced from figures published in 1933 that in practice the Germans then had 154 elementary schools with 570 classes, one secondary school and one teachers' college and (private) six upper-elementary schools, that they published twenty-six periodicals and possessed forty-five cultural societies in addition to a federation of cultural societies with many branches.

The Magyars in Yugoslavia had 103 elementary schools with 531 classes and 530 teachers of whom 493 were of Magyar nationality. They also had thirty-seven kindergarten schools with thirty-nine classes, five State and three private upper-elementary schools, and finally three secondary schools with eight classes. The Magyars have 190 various cultural societies and issue twenty-five periodicals, five of which are dailies.

The school requirements of the Rumanian minority have been settled since 1934 by a special Yugoslav-Rumanian convention which assures to the Rumanian minority in the Banàt not only the institution of Rumanian school-sections wherever there is a minimum of twenty Rumanian school-children but also permits the foundation of private schools —not otherwise permitted in Yugoslavia—and it also contains stipulations concerning the use of Rumanian text-books and employment of Rumanian teachers.

Yugoslav statistics also refer to Albanian schools. That even the numerically weak minorities are assured of their share of schools is testified to by the data concerning Czech and Slovak schools. In the 1933-1934 school year there were forty of these of which twenty-one were independent elementary schools and 19 were school-sections. in addition eleven supplementary language schools, one secondary school and two Winter-term agricultural lower schools.

Yugoslavia ranks among the States in which religious questions play an important rôle, and in connection with the defence of national minorities it is essential to mention the protection of the religions of the minorities. The total population of less than fourteen millions (13,934,038)* includes 48.7 per cent Orthodox (that is mainly the population of Old Serbia), 37.45 per cent Catholic (these include the Croats especially and a large portion of the Slovenes) and 11.2 per cent Mahomedan mainly Turks, Albanians and also a large portion of the population of Southern Serbia. The Protestants have less numerical importance, totalling 1.66 per cent and the Jews are 0.49 per cent. Even according to the original Constitution of 1921 religious freedom existed in Yugoslavia. All religions and their clerical and cultural institutions enjoy equality of rights. The Mahomedans, who are the main religious minority, have their own department in the Ministry of Religions, have their own cultural organization (dzhemist), and represent an independent element in political life also, having, since the beginning of Yugoslav unification, grouped themselves beside or within the all-State parties (formerly the regular Radical Party), and have regularly obtained representation in the Cabinet through a Minister of their own.

If we raise the question of the relation of the

* According to the 1931 census.

other national and religious minorites in Yugoslavia to the majority nation and to the State we must first of all turn to the orientation of the largest minorities, the Germans and the Magyars, because the others are, on the whole, too small and scattered to be able to play a rôle as a collective entity outside the scope of the political and cultural life of the majority nation. The Germans, aware of the fact that they form an enclave geographically firmly linked to the Serbo-Croat and Slovene element, have always represented a loyal fraction and have endeavoured to assert their cultural, economic and political requirements in harmony with the majority and with the Government. Since the rise of Hitlerism in Germany, it is true, the influence of National-Socialist ideology has made itself felt among the Germans in Yugoslavia, particularly among the younger generation with the result that radical political slogans have been advanced, and the Government organs have been compelled to put a stop to the activities of cultural societies which were fostering Hitler politics in place of cultural ends, but the main leadership of the German minority preserves even now a positive activist attitude towards the State and its régime.

So far as the Magyars in Yugoslavia are concerned, their activist attitude, just as in Czechoslovakia and Rumania, is a traditional problem. The political leaders of the minority who remember the Magyar era in the territories adjoined to Yugoslavia and who belonged to the ruling class dominating the Serbs and the Croats, do not adjust themselves readily to the new conditions, being influenced by the revisionist tendencies of Budapest;

they therefore represent even a gradually increasing fraction in the sphere of Yugoslav political life with an oppositional tendency or with passive qualities at the very least. They do not, of course, thereby set up a problem which could complicate the development towards the consolidation and the definitive stability of the Yugoslav State, a trend whose centre does not at all lie in the relation of the minorities to the State, but in the attainment of equality between the individual branches forming the Yugoslav nation, especially the Croats and Serbs.

V.

HUNGARY

Post-War Hungary with its 8,683,740 inhabitants represents ethnographically the Magyar kernel of the former Hungarian kingdom and even in its present form, it is not a State composed exclusively of a single nationality. The number of its national minorities, according to 1930 official data represents, it is true, only eight per cent or less of the total population, but there are several typical national groups which have preserved their distinct national, lingual and cultural character despite the denationalization policy pursued during the last pre-War decades against all minorities in former Hungary. These minorities are protected by the same minority obligations of the Peace Treaty of Trianon as apply to all the other national and lingual minorities of Central and South Eastern Europe.

The largest of these minority groups in Hungary consists of the *Germans,* who are located on the one hand in the zone between Lake Balaton and the Danube, and on the other hand in small groups interspersed among the Magyar element around Budapest and from the capital to Veszprém on the west and further in the strip between Austria and Czechoslovakia. According to the last census there is a total of 478,630 Germans, representing five and a half per cent of the total population of Hungary. Even ten years ago official statistics accorded the Germans a figure substantially higher, that is 551,211 souls, or 6.9 per cent of the population. Like the Germans in Yugoslavia and Rumania, the Germans in Hungary are settlers who took up their present positions for the most part after the Turkish occupation of the areas of present-day Hungary.

The second national group in Hungary, according to numerical strength, are the *Slovaks* who in 1920 were reckoned officially as totalling 141,882 souls, but at the last census had been reduced to only 104,819. Their largest group is fairly compactly settled in the Békés county in the largest towns of which, Békéscsaba, Komlós and Szarvas, they represent an absolute majority; a second, smaller group is scattered in the parishes to the north, north-east and the east of Budapest and a third is composed of the Slovak parishes abutting, in several places on the Slovak-Hungarian frontier; especially in the Novohrad-Hont and the Komárno-Esztergom districts they are in proximity to the Slovak territories of Czechoslovakia. Like the Germans, the Slovaks of the first two groups are settlers.

The *Serbs* and the *Croats* form small national groups in Hungary located in several agglomerations along the Hungarian-Yugoslav frontier. Official statistics give their number as 34,714, although ten years ago they still numbered 51,981.

Further, there are the *Rumanians*, also in several groups along the Rumanian frontier, totalling 16,221—ten years ago they still numbered 23,760—and a small number of Ruthenians and other nationalities. The Jews in Hungary are not shown separately in nationality statistics, being for the greater part counted as Magyars.

If the position of the national minorities in present-day Hungary is to be justly characterised, and with it also the minority policy of that State, reference must be made to the nationality policy pursued by the Magyar Government in pre-War Hungary. By the nationality law of 1868 the concept of "a single and indivisible Magyar nation" was created, and all the population of the State, without regard to the language which they spoke, were included in that nation. Thus, within Hungary, there was no recognition of either the Slovak, Rumanian, Serb or German nationality but only of the Magyar race which in practice as time went on more and more obviously identified the minorities with the Magyar nation. The government's nationality policy in theory reserved certain lingual rights to the nationalities but in practice it became a policy of Magyarization which gradually destroyed all the cultural institutions of the nationalities, especially the schools, and endeavoured to absorb the minorities.

The legacy of this policy, a policy which in the World War drove all the Hungarian nationalities into a struggle against the Magyars and which was the cause of the break-up of Greater Hungary into its national components, is a burden also on present-day, post-War Hungary. Although it is Hungary's duty to respect the national minorities of that State in the sense of the international protection of minorities and to recognize the whole field of ideas arising from that protection, and although Hungary understands this ideology when she interests herself in the Magyar minorities in the neighbouring States, in her attitude to her own national minorities she persists in adhering to pre-War ideas and conduct.

The national minorities in Hungary, then, are not treated as fractions of the nations differing from the Magyars and as having the right to maintain and develop their ethnological individuality and particularly to foster their independent culture and language; they are regarded as groups of citizens speaking another language who are to be acclimatized to their Magyar milieu, from whom Magyar patriotism is demanded and who, finally, must reconcile themselves to amalgamation with the Magyar nation in one corporate body. Hence it arises that the national minorities in Hungary have no political representation, no independent political life, as the minorities have, for instance, in Czechoslovakia, Poland and Rumania or the small Baltic States. In the camp of the German minority currents have from time to time revealed themselves seeking the creation of an independent German political organization in Hungary, but these efforts are regarded as a crime against Magyar unity and come to grief before they can assume a definite form. So far as the parliamentary defence of their rights is concerned, the national minorities are compelled to rely on deputies of the Magyar Parties, to the extent that interest in the retention of the votes of the minorities prompts these deputies from time to time to remember the existence of the minorities and their needs.

The position of the national minorities in the sphere of *education* is also determined to a great degree by the special Magyar conditions and the special Magyar minority policy. The basic principle that the minorities must be assured of schools in which their children can be instructed in their mother tongue and taught by teachers of their own nationality remains a remote ideal in Hungary. The Hungarian educational laws have provided for three types of school for the national minorities; types of real minority schools in which instruction is given in the appropriate minority language and where Hungarian is to be taught only as a subject. The Slovak minority, however, has not been equipped with even one such school; for the Germans such schools have been founded only in forty-six parishes. The second type of minority school is a mixed school in which some subjects are taught in Hungarian and some in the minority language. Hitherto the Slovak minority has had only two such schools and the Germans have had 232. As a third type of minority school in Hungary there is the school in which the language of instruction is Hungarian but in which the minority language also is to be taught, of course only as a special subject. According to Magyar data the Slovaks have fifty of such schools, the Germans 220. It is clear that this third type of school cannot at all be regarded as a real minority school and that the mixed schools also have a very problematic importance both from the pedagogic point of view and from the standpoint of the preservation and the development of national minority language and culture, especially in view of the fact that the majority of the teachers at such schools are Magyars. In Hungary there are no institutions for the training of non-Magyar teachers where instruction is given in minority languages. Almost all the children of Slovak parents must attend Magyar schools. The children of German parentage attend German schools to the extent of ten per cent of their numbers. The remainder are compelled to attend Magyar schools.

The scholastic conditions of the comparatively small *Rumanian* minority as regards education is no less deplorable. Whereas in 1919 this minority had twenty-one elementary schools of the Orthodox confession and seventeen schools belonging to the Rumanian Greek Catholic Church, today there remain only five of the Orthodox Rumanian schools and not one of the Rumanian Greek Catholic schools.

At Christmas of 1934 the Hungarian Ministry of Education published new instructions which are to alter the condition of affairs just described to the extent that in place of the three types hitherto in existence a single type of minority mixed school is to be introduced. The law is to become valid in 1938. Should it be carried into practice it will, it is true, mark an improvement in the position with regard to Slovak schools, for the Slovaks have never had their own schools at all; it will give these groups mixed schools, but it will certainly worsen the position of the Germans because the law will put an end to the last forty-six schools with German as the language of instruction, and replace them by German-Magyar schools. If we remember that apart from the above-mentioned equipment of elementary schools, obviously inadequate and far from answering to normal conditions of minority scholastic needs, the national minorities in Hungary have not a single kindergarten nor upper-elementary school, still less a secondary school, then the unsatisfactory state of minority schools in Hungary becomes even more apparent.

The position with regard to the other organs of the cultural life of the minorities in Hungary is no better. The Germans have a single cultural organization: this is the German Cultural Union of Hungary which has a substantial number of branches, but whose activities can develop only within limits approved by the Hungarian régime. The Magyar authorities permit the activities of the Union only on the condition that German supporters of the Government are elected to its leadership. The local authorities, moreover, place the most varied difficulties in the way of the branches. Similar to the German Cultural Union, there exists at Budapest a Slovak Provincial Cultural Union. It is composed, however, only of Slovaks who no longer possess any Slovak national consciousness and it works for the Magyarization of the Slovak minority. The Union has no branches. All the attempts of the Slovaks in the Békés district, where the Slovaks have a centre, to form a cultural society which they themselves would direct, have come to grief, and the same fate has overtaken the attempts at the foundation of a Slovak cultural periodical which would systematically pursue the aim of raising the cultural level of the Slovak population. The Slovaks, therefore, have only one periodical, published monthly, the Evangelical *Hlásnik*. In Budapest, it is true, the weekly *Slovenské Noviny* is published, but this paper, issued with the support of the Government and imbued with the spirit of the Slovak Union, does not aim at the preservation and the development of the Slovak minority in Hungary. The German minority has several periodicals which can better fulfil a cultural mission among the Germans, although they must eschew all politics. The principal German organ is the weekly *Sonntagsblatt*.

The Church has great importance for the existence and the development of the national minorities in Hungary—on the one hand in view of the fact that the rural minority elements preserve deep religious feelings and that, therefore, church and religious exercises are an important factor in their lives, and on the other hand because in Hungary Church schools predominate in the general scheme of education. In this field also, under the influence of the Magyar Church authorities, an increasingly penetrating Magyarizing tendency is asserting itself and is suppressing the use of minority languages in the churches and the schools, and thus is depriving the national minorities of the chief foundation of an independent cultural life.

The economic life of the national minorities in Hungary develops within the scope of the economic life of the Magyar majority, and in no sphere does it form an independent minority organization; it cannot, then, play any kind of rôle either as conservator or pioneer of national independence or cultural self-expression for the individual minorities. It is, on the contrary, rather a factor supporting their Magyarization.

The national minorities in present-day Hungary would certainly not have formed a serious problem for the State in view of their comparatively insignificant numbers, even had they been more enlightened and more nationally self-conscious than was permitted by the minority policy of the post-War Magyar government which has forgotten nothing of the Magyarization methods of pre-War Hungary. Their de facto helplessness and their practical lack of rights—a state of affairs which threaten to submerge them in a few decades in the Magyar majority— contrasts tragically with the democratic principles of international minority protection; they are only a living argument of the justice of the process which led the nationalities of former Hungary to cut themselves asunder from the Magyars, and of the determination with which any attempts whatsoever at the revision of the Hungarian frontiers so as to increase these unfortunate minority groups in anyway must be rejected.

VI.

AUSTRIA

The Austrian Republic was created from the German territories of the Habsburg monarchy following the break-up of that monarchy into its national components. Austria lost only Southern Tyrol, which was annexed by Italy, because its German population was intermingled with Italians, but on the other hand Austria gained the larger portion of Burgenland, formerly part of Hungary. Of all the Central European States, Austria is the most united from the point of view of nationality. According to the census for 1934 only 175,686 head of population speaks a mother-tongue other than German, the total population being 6,760,233. The lingual qualification in Austria is determined by the "language of the cultural medium to which the person included in the census feels himself bound" which need not, of course, be the same as ethnical membership. There is no doubt that persons of non-Germanic origin in Austria are much more numerous than those who do not regard German as their mother-tongue; unless we wish to estimate their numbers by guesswork we must, of course, adhere to the data provided by the official lingual statistics.

The largest national minority in Austria is the *Yugoslav* minority which is formed on the one hand by the Croats concentrated mainly in Burgenland, numbering 42,354 persons according to the published lingual figures, and on the other hand by the Slovenes concentrated in Carinthia, who are given as numbering 31,703 persons. After the Revolution there was a dispute between Yugoslavia and Austria concerning Southern Carinthia with its Slovene population, and this was settled by a plebiscite on 20th October, 1920, when fifty-nine per cent declared for adherence to Austria. Even to-day the Austrian Slovenes reject the official figures as inaccurate and point out that in Carinthia itself, where according to the present statistics there are 26,738 Austrian Slovenes, 66,000 Slovenes were returned in 1910 and in 1923 there were still 37,224 Slovenes. They characterize the present figures as the outcome of Germanizing political and statistical methods.

The second national minority group in Austria is formed by the *Czechoslovaks* who represent the remnants of a once very numerous immigrational element inhabiting the capital and the adjacent districts of Lower Austria. In 1910 a total of 120,236 Czechs and Slovaks was returned for the territories of the Austria of to-day. By 1923 this number had fallen to 98,723 persons and in 1934 to 51,866. In all these official figures only those elements of declared nationality are included and by no means all the members of the ethnical Czechoslovak group. Private estimates based on the immigration figures made out the number as being far above the official figures even before the War.

In addition to these two nationality groups mention can be made only of a small *Magyar* minority which numbers 18,076 people—in 1923 they still numbered 25,071 and they are recruited to the extent of half their strength from the Magyar elements in Burgenland and half from the Magyar inhabitants in various parts of Vienna.

The Jews in Austria are not shown in the nationality statistics partly because those statistics are based on lingual considerations and partly because the Jews are not regarded as a nationality but as a religious confession.

Austria also is bound by the Peace Treaty of Saint-Germain to protect national, lingual and religious minorities in the same degree as the majority of the other Central European States. An expression of the good will to effect those obligations satisfactorily is to be found in the treaty concluded with Czechoslovakia in 1920 (known as the Brno Treaty) which contains, especially, detailed stipulations for the execution of the treaty provisions for the Czechoslovak minority in the educational sphere and which is up to to-day the basis of the Czechoslovak school system in Austria.

The numerical weakness and the dispersion of the members of the national minorities limits their opportunities for achieving political influence in the State. So far as political representation is concerned, it is, of course, necessary to recognize two stages of development. Up to February 1934 when the parliamentary régime was set aside and the Social Democrat Party in Austria was dissolved, the national minorities could enjoy representation on the one hand by reason of the democratic franchise laws and on the other hand as a result of the good relations existing between them and the Social Democrat Party which, on the whole, displayed understanding for the needs of the minorities. The Czechoslovak minority, dominated by virtue of its energetic political organization, was presented in the Vienna Provincial Diet, on the Vienna City Council, on the Municipal School Council, on the district local school and social welfare councils and also in several parishes of Lower Austria. The Slovenes in Carinthia and the Croats in Burgenland also were represented both in the Provincial Diet and in the local administration. The *putsch* of February 1934 fundamentally altered the situation and worsened it for the national minorities. The "Patriotic Front" was recognized as the sole organization in the State for the formation of the "political will of the nation". All other organizations, and with them minority organizations, lost the right of existence and there was nothing left to the minorities but recognition of the fact that they were excluded from collaboration in public life or alternatively organization with the German and Christian movement of the "Patriotic Front". The Socialist element among the minorities was compelled to follow the first path, the remaining elements were compelled to pursue the second path, of course, without thereby obtaining any real influence in public life. In the State cultural and economic councils, which were created on the basis of the corporative idea, only the Croats and the Slovenes are respected to a certain extent, the Czechoslovaks being ignored.

The application of the lingual rights of the national minorities in Austria also is effected only in narrow limits in view of the dispersion of those minorities. In practice even in the minority districts the official German language predominates and only exceptionally are claims for interpreters of the minority languages admitted in the case of minority members ignorant of German.

The cultural and scholastic requirements of the minorities in Austria are satisfactorily met, on the whole, so far as the Czechoslovak minority is concerned, but it is impossible to speak of this satisfactory state of affairs with regard to the Slovene minority.

The basis of the Czechoslovak minority schools is, as has already been stated, the Brno Treaty which on the one hand assures Czechoslovaks in Vienna of public elementary schools with Czechoslovak as the language of instruction and on the other hand it permits that minority itself to found, maintain and administer private elementary, upper elementary and even secondary schools. In the school year 1933/1934 this minority had ten public elementary schools in Vienna attended by 699 pupils. In addition, through the "Komenský" (Comenius) Society, they maintained six private elementary schools with 820 pupils, seven upper elementary schools with 1,383 pupils and two secondary schools with 683 pupils, two specialist schools (a commercial school and a school for women's professions) with 212 pupils in addition to seventeen kindergartens with 892 children and twelve language schools, of which two are in Vienna and ten in towns in Lower Austria and Styria.

The Czechoslovak minority, it is true, is not wholly satisfied with the public schools, complaining that they are conducted too much in a German spirit, but disregarding this aspect of the affair (which results in the minority endeavouring to continue the maintenance of their private schools) the scholastic requirements of the Czechoslovak minority in Austria are adequately met. Their cultural influence is strengthened, moreover, by the out-of-school education of members of the Czechoslovak minority, fostered on the whole without interruption by lending libraries, the press, and physical culture, social, specialist and educational organizations.

The situation of the Slovene and Croat minorities is far from being as favourable as that of the Czechoslovak minority. The Slovenes complain that only about four schools in Carinthia can be designated as Slovene to a certain degree; in the majority of the schools in Slovene parishes, the Slovene language is employed only as an auxiliary language in the lower classes. The great majority of Slovene children must attend bi-lingual schools, of which there are about eighty in Carinthia, and these really differ very little from purely German schools. In the first, and to some extent also in the second class, some subjects are taught in Slovene. In the third school year the use of the Slovene tongue is limited to three hours per week. The majority of the teachers in these bi-lingual schools are Germans who have gained the qualification for giving instruction in Slovene by virtue of the fact that they have attended a compulsory course of Slovene at the German Teachers' Institute at Klagenfurt, or they are Germanized Slovenes. The Slovenes, moreover, complain very bitterly that even religious instruction in the Slovene district schools is being replaced by German and that Slovene pastors are systematically excluded from Slovene parishes and are being replaced by Germans called in frequently from Germany. In defence of their attitude, the Austrian authorities have invented a theory of the "Wend"*) inhabitants of Carinthia who cannot be classed with the Slovenes and who speak the Wend language, closely related to German. In reality the Wends are Slovenes who by the systematic denationalizing policy of the Austrian authorities, have been brought into the German cultural sphere.

In the former Carinthian Provincial Diet attempts were made on several occasions to solve the problems of the cultural, and particularly the scholastic, needs of the Slovene minority by a sort of cultural autonomy, but because German factors excluded from the scope of that autonomy precisely the elements known as Wends, the Slovenes themselves opposed autonomy.

*) Not to be confused with the Wends, a Slavonic people of Eastern Germany, chiefly peasants of Lusatia.

Despite the fact that the representatives of the Slovene minority in Austria are to a great extent Catholic priests, no change in the destiny of the minority was brought about even after February 1934 which saw Dr. Dollfuss and later Dr. Schuschnigg in control of a Christian Socialist Austria. Both, it is true, made several declarations favourable to the minorities, but these never became more than declarations.

The Croat minority in Burgenland, numerically stronger than the Carinthian Slovenes, represent an almost exclusively agrarian element. Although their educational requirements are not met by measures corresponding to a perfect minority policy, this minority does not show any signs of discontent; a fact not unconnected with the circumstance that under the Magyar régime this minority had experienced a worse and more ruthless policy in nationality questions.

In sum, it is evident that the national minorities in Austria, in view of their lack of numbers, do not represent for the State elements that could seriously complicate its internal policy, its cultural development or its foreign relations. In this direction, only the Slovene minority in Carinthia has a certain importance, chiefly because it is settled in the Austro-Yugoslav frontier territories which have been a subject of dispute between the two States and because of the fact that among the nationally conscious Slovene inhabitants of these territories, and also in Yugoslavia, the conviction remains that the inclusion of these areas in Yugoslavia would have been the most equitable solution of the Slovene minority question in Austria. The Germanizing policy of the Austrian authorities is mainly responsible for the existence of this conviction. Greater benevolence towards the Carinthian Slovenes particularly in the cultural sphere would assuredly also have a definitively stabilizing influence on this part of the Austrian frontier.

VII.

ITALY

Not even Italians were lacking in the agglomeration of nationalities in Austro-Hungary. They numbered more than 800,000 and were concentrated in the Tyrol where they formed forty-two per cent of the population and in the Littoral (Istria with Gorizia, Gradisca and Trieste) where they totalled about forty-three per cent of the population. These Austrian Italians had long had a keen national consciousness and in the World War they very soon ranged themselves alongside the non-German and the non-Magyar nations of Austro-Hungary who strove after liberty and independence. The collapse of Austro-Hungary gave them that freedom. At the Peace negotiations, however, the Italian Government was not satisfied with the territory occupied by an Italian element: the whole of the Littoral and the whole of Southern Tyrol up to the Brenner Pass was demanded; on the basis of the promises contained in the London Treaty of 1915 this aim was attained.

Thus it occurred that the national unification of Italy proceeded to new life after the War with two important national minorities. These were the Littoral *Slovenes and Croats* numbering 525,000 and the *Germans* of the Southern Tyrol numbering about 257,000.

Both these minority groups live for the most part in frontier areas in contact with their co-nationals in Yugoslavia and Austria even though the Germans of Southern Tyrol are separated from the Germans of Northern Tyrol by the high rampart of the Alpine mountain zone. The post-War Italian census gives the number of members of the two minorities referred to as substantially less than the figures given in the Austrian statistics of 1910. These census figures already show the results of the post-War Italianization process to which further reference will be made. *French and Albanians* also form small minority groups, but their numbers are comparatively insignificant and their dispersal so great that they cannot be considered as distinct minority groups like the Germans, and the Slovenes and Croats.

First of all, reference must be made to the fact that Italy is one of the States that have no international obligations with regard to their minorities. Italy, however, is not without moral obligations. These are based particularly on the speech made by the Italian Delegate to the Peace Conference, M. Tittoni, who on 17th September 1919 declared in Parliament in an address to the other nationalities included in Italy that Italy was far from any oppressive intentions and that she would respect the lingual and cultural endowment of those nationalities. King Victor Emmanuel in a Speech from the Throne on 1st December 1919 also referred to the tasks which faced Italy in connection with the new provinces and said that the Italian Liberal tradition indicated the path which would lead to the fulfilment of those tasks with the greatest of respect for local autonomous institutions and customs. In addition to this, Italy undertook all the moral obligations with regard to minorities accepted by all members of the League of Nations by the adoption of the famous resolution of 1922 referring to minority régimes.

An examination of the situation of the national minorities in Italy seventeen years after the statements quoted were made, reveals one of the saddest pictures of minority policies in the Central European region. Neither the German nor the Slavonic minority in Italy has had parliamentary representation since the moment the Fascist régime came into power although both had representation before the Fascist revolution. Even worse than this deficiency, the importance of which was substantially lessened by the fundamental alteration of the parliamentary régime in Italy, is the fact that local autonomy for the minorities was also suspended *de facto*, for office in the minority territories was occupied by Italian mayors and even secretaries whose salaries had to be paid by the parishes and whose chief aim is to assure the organization of the parish in the Italian Fascist spirit. Both the national minorities were gradually deprived of all lingual rights whatsoever. By a whole system of laws, enactments and prescriptions not only were all the public offices in the minority territories Italianized but all undertakings, cooperatives and institutions connected with the State or parish offices were also submitted to that process. Members of the German, Slovene and Croat minorities are compelled to use Italian not only in written but also in verbal contact with the authorities: at the most, interpreters are permitted for the members of the minorities in the courts. All local names must also be Italianized in the minority territories as well as all personal names, all inscriptions, placards, announcements and time-tables; even the inscriptions on tombstones cannot be executed in a minority language. The Italian lingual policy in the minority territories has only one aim: the Italianization of the territories and the suppression of all media of the minority character of these territories externally as well as internally.

What is the Italian scholastic policy like in the minority territories? What is the situation of the minorities in this sphere? Under the Austrian régime, the Germans in the Tyrol, like the Slovenes and the Croats in the Littoral, had their own schools of all types. The number of Croat schools in the Littoral before the Revolution was 222 (with 335 classes) and the number of Slovene schools in the school year 1922-1923 still stood at 300 with 622 classes attended by 38,500 children. All these schools were swept away by the scholastic reform of the Fascist Government in 1923 and were replaced by Italian schools. In the Southern Tyrol German as the language of education was replaced by Italian in all schools in 1926. The Italian scholastic policy, of course, was not satisfied merely by altering the language of instruction from that of the national minority tongues to

Italian; all the teachers who formerly functioned in the minority schools were either transferred to the interior, or were dismissed or replaced by Italian teachers without any knowledge of the minority languages. The minority languages were gradually excluded from all secondary schools also and so far as they were retained as curriculum subjects they were also excluded from the teacher's training institutes so that the teaching body and pupil teachers had no opportunity of becoming acquainted with the minority languages which would enable them to exercise an influence in the sphere of minority affairs.

In order that the Italianization aim of this policy should be attained most rapidly the Italian authorities also prohibited all private teaching of the minority languages, a measure which particularly affected the German minority in Southern Tyrol. A slight relief was to have been introduced by the decree of 1934 which permitted the organization of private language courses in the Bolzano province. This was done under the influence of Austria and at the suggestion made by the Austrian Chancellor, Dr. Dollfuss, to the Italian Premier. The execution of this decree was, of course, entrusted to the Fascist cultural institution in Bolzano and it had the minimum effect in practice because that institute gave permission for teaching in those courses only to Italian teachers, so that of the 28,000 children enrolled for the courses, only 5,000 kept up attendance as a result of the unsuccessful methods of the Italian teachers.

The last support of the national minorities and of their languages in Italy was religious life and religious instruction in the schools where the mother-tongue of the children was employed. The efforts of the Italian authorities were also directed to this field. It was first of all laid down that even religious instruction in the schools must be given in Italian. Where priests evaded this instruction they were replaced by lay teachers in religious instruction. They could not, of course, be forbidden to employ minority languages in the instruction of children in the churches and the presbyteries. Pastors who followed this course and who continued to employ the minority languages in religious life were proceeded against by the Italian authorities with extreme severity as soon as the slightest excuse presented itself of charging them with political activity. In the Italian Alps district during the post-War years 112 priests were expelled. Many German priests, too, have been expelled from Southern Tyrol or imprisoned. To-day the situation is such that the State authorities have already forbidden the use of minority languages in religious life wherever it oversteps the limits of an actual religious service, that is they are forbidden at all ceremonies, processions and religious exercises and of course on all banners, flags and standards. Under the pressure of ecclesiastical superiors—the majority being of Italian nationality—minority languages are also being thrust from the churches and from the most intimate moments of religious life.

The extra-school and extra-church cultural life of the two minorities is equally under the pressure of the Italianization policy and shows steadily diminishing development. The rich *press* of the

Slovenes in Julian Venice which functioned before the Revolution has gradually disappeared. Of the fifteen dailies appearing in Trieste, Gorizia and other places not one is left. The remainder of the press has been gradually suppressed and to-day only modest publication with religious contents appears under difficulties. The situation is similar in Southern Tyrol where, besides the German daily serving the Italian Fascist régime only a few colourless or Catholic papers appear. The greater part of the cultural organizations and societies which served the purpose of enlightenment and of the cultural and political education of the two minorities have been gradually dissolved or have been compelled to cease activity themselves. The *Opera nazionale di Assistare all' Italia Reduta* serves Italianizing aims in both the Italian minority territories.

This Italian denationalizing policy obviously casts its shadow also on the *economic life* of the minority. It has deprived the Slovenes of the chief types of their flourishing economic cooperatives, "National Homes" and printing presses. The Germans in the Tyrol suffer especially serious official intervention in their economic enterprises and complain of the harm inflicted particularly on the German hotel trade; their greatest burden is that since 1924 all landed property in the Southern Tyrol has been under the control of the Italian military administration.

Italy, then, belongs to the States with the most typical and open *denationalizing policy* with regard to her minorities. She has no desire to respect any international obligations, either legal or moral and all appeals which have been addressed to the Fascist leaders from the most varied international forums, especially Minorities Congresses and Congresses allied to the League of Nations, have been ignored. The Italian Fascist Government is endeavouring to attach her new territories to her by a ruthless system of Italianization. She has an advantage in the fact that in the neighbouring State and especially in the States nationally related to her two minorities she possesses no minorities of any size. Italy thus has no interest in bi-lateral minority treaties. Her interest in good relations with Austria and Germany could be a factor influencing her in the direction of improving the lot of the German minority in Italy, but the results of this have shown themselves so far only in an insignificant degree. The Slovene and the Croat minority in Julian Venice do not have even this support: Italy's relations to Yugoslavia are not friendly and it is comprehensible that in these circumstances she does not desire to honour Yugoslavia by changing her minority policy. The Italian minority policy of denationalization has not, as yet, broken up either the Slovene and Croat or the German minority. Both have, however, been very substantially weakened, and the problem of these minorities in Italy therefore remains primarily a problem of international morals which must not disappear from the daily programme.

VIII.

GERMANY

The census of 1925 showed that the national minorities in Germany were not numerous in proportion to the total population of 62,410,619. They form a little more than two per cent (1,279,397) if we include those members of the population speaking Polish, Lusatian Serb, Danish, Lithuanian and Frisian either exclusively or as well as German. The Jews who used to number more than 600,000 in Germany are not, of course, included in these minority figures. The comparatively slight importance of the national minorities referred to increases when we take into consideration the fact that except for the Danish minority, the Polish colony in the Ruhr and the group of Lusatian Serbs in Saxony, all these minorities are concentrated in *Prussia* and the majority of them in the Polish-German and German-Lithuanian frontier zones. In their numbers they balance completely German population detached from the former German Empire and embodied in neighbouring States when the new Europe was created.

The largest national minority in Germany is the *Polish minority* numbering 721,000 according to the 1925 census, based, of course, on lingual ability and not at all on nationality; if we add the Kasubians and the Mazurians, whom German authors usually treat separately or else group them with the German stock, the Polish minority total 800,000. The Poles themselves, regarding the German methods inadequate for ascertaining ethnographic membership, estimate the Polish minority as 1,200,000. Two-thirds of these live in the German portion of Upper Silesia and the remaining third in the other departments of Prussia, a remnant being formed by the Polish colony, mainly employed as miners, in the Ruhr.

The *Lusatian Serbs,* the second national minority in Germany according to numbers, are the remnants of an independent Slavonic tribe with an independent language and a characteristic culture; they are distributed territorially in Germany in the Saxon group which, according to official statistical data based on lingual knowledge, number 28,225 people and the Prussian group numbering 52,804. Even German sources admit that in the middle of last century the Lusatian Serbs in Germany numbered more than 150,000. Lusatian Serb authors estimate their numbers to-day at 160,000, not denying, of course, that surrounded on all sides by a German milieu and affected by systematic German cultural and social influences, they resist with difficulty and are succumbing more and more to Germanization.

If we disregard the Jewish element which, as we have said, some years ago numbered 600,000 souls and who became aware of their minority character only in consequence of the exceptional legislation introduced against them by the National Socialist régime, all the other national minorities in Germany are only small and unimportant fractions. They consist of the *Czechs* shown by German statistics to number 11,200 populating the frontier area of former Glatz (private estimates refer to between twenty and forty thousand Czechs), the *Danes* in the southern portion of Slesvig which remained to Germany after the plebiscite (German statistics give their number as 7,511, and private estimates at fifteen to twenty thousand), the 8,000 *Frisians* in the German-Dutch frontier zone and finally the *Lithuanians* in the remotest corner of East Prussia, whom the German statistics recognize as being about 6,000 strong while the Lithuanians themselves assert that in reality at least ten times that number live there.

With regard to her minorities, Germany has not the same legal obligations as Poland, Czechoslovakia and the other States of Central and South Eastern Europe. It is, of course, possible to speak of the moral obligation of Germany in her conduct with regard to her minorities just as the other States are bound to maintain minority régimes. In the note to the Peace Conference in which she requested international protection for her minorities in foreign States, Germany expressed her willingness to respect the same principles within her own frontiers. The Polish population of the German part of Upper Silesia only are protected legally—by the treaty which Germany, under the aegis of the League of Nations, concluded with Poland in 1922—to the same degree as the German minority in the Polish portion of Upper Silesia are protected. The treaty, of course, was concluded only for fifteen years. It made a very detailed regulation of the minority régime and it loses validity in 1937, so that the Poles of Upper Silesia will also be without any kind of protection.

What is the position of the national minorities in Germany and what is the German régime for the minorities? If we take these questions from the aspect of civil and political rights, in the first place we must admit that for some years following the introduction of the Weimar Constitution with its democratic political system, the Poles at least were represented in the Prussian Provincial Diet by two deputies, although they made vain efforts for representation in the German Parliament. The Lusatian Serbs, although they put forward their candidates on several occasions, both for the Saxon and the Prussian Diets, never obtained representation. The lure of party-political programmes linked with the natural pressure of the German milieu was always stronger than the solidarity of the members of the individual minorities, so that the number of votes cast for their candidates never tallied with the total strength of the minorities, either in the case of the Poles or of the Lusatian Serbs. After the National Socialist revolution in Germany, the Provincial Diets disappeared and thus even the Poles lost their sole representation. Under the Hitler régime the national minorities could not participate in the parliamentary elections independently in view of the fact that the new régime allowed only National Socialist candidates.

The Weimar Constitution contained stipulations in its 113th paragraph to the effect that the national minorities were not to suffer reductions of their free national development either by the legislation or the administration especially with regard to the use of their own language in education, in internal administration and in legal defence. The practical effects of these stipulations, it is true, were somewhat insignificant in the Germany of the Weimar Constitution. They were visible, to some extent, only in the scholastic sphere, but after the Hitler revolution the situation was much worse, even though Hitler very frequently expressed himself publicly against the Germanization of the national minority groups. Only the Poles of Upper Silesia have practical opportunities for using their own language. Nothing, in practice, is left of the Weimar Constitution's lingual provision for the remaining minorities.

What is the position with regard to the minority *schools,* which could have been and were to have been the basis of the national existence and development of the national minorities even in Germany? Even if official German data were taken as a basis, the Poles without the Mazurians, numbering 700,000 of whom more than 600,000 live in compact groups in Upper Silesia and in East Prussia, would require, for the satisfaction of their scholastic needs, several hundreds of Polish elementary schools. The Poles, however, estimate that of the 260,000 Polish children in

Germany only 1,636 can attend Polish schools and that of the 110,000 children under school age only 435 can attend Polish kindergartens. The number of public schools for Poles has dropped in recent years from twenty-seven to ten and the number of private schools also dropped continually until the minimum of ten schools was reached. The Poles in Germany have a single secondary school, the Gymnasium in Bytom, which is maintained only by the threat that German schools in Poland will be shut down by way of reprisal. This sorry picture is completed by the fact that of the Catholic vicars in the Polish areas only six are Poles and that there are no Polish pastors at all for the Polish Protestants. The press of the Polish minority is seriously threatened by persecution, which is also true of the other cultural institutions of the Poles.

The second national minority in Germany, the Lusatian Serbs, do not enjoy any better cultural conditions. Even though the school laws of Saxony and Prussia alike permit the foundation of purely Lusatian Serb elementary schools not even a single school of this class yet exists, and the Lusatian Serb institutions vainly endeavour to found them. In Prussia, Lusatian Serb children are educated in purely German schools; in Saxony, at least a proportion of them attend mixed schools. There are no higher schools for the Lusatian Serbs. The German official circles of to-day display no more understanding for the needs of this minority than was shown by earlier régimes. On the contrary, under the present régime the Lusatian Serbs were compelled first to disband their physical culture organizations, then to give up their press and finally it was demanded of them that they change their sole cultural society, the "Domovina", into the "Union of German-Speaking Lusatian Serbs". The German authorities hold the view that the Lusatian Serbs are a branch of the German nation speaking the Serbian language. Thus the Lusatian Serbs, representing the last fragment of a characteristic Slavonic nation, are to be totally eliminated from the list of the individual nations and from the number of the national minorities in Germany.

Of the other national groups in Germany, only the small Danish minority in Slesvig is equipped with its own schools. The basis of this is the Prussian decree of 1926 which allows the foundation of Danish public schools for even twenty-four Danish children and private schools for as few as ten children. This extraordinarily favourable position is, of course, the result of reciprocity with Denmark which permits of a similar favourable regulation of the position of German schools in Denmark. The Czech, Lithuanian and Frisian minorities have no schools and the children belonging to those minorities must attend German schools.

Only the Poles have facilities for an independent economic life. They possess developed financial and cooperative organizations and the Central Polish Bank in Berlin endeavours to lay the foundations for the national existence of the Polish minority in the German State. These endeavours also, of late, have met with the opposition of official and unofficial German institutions. The resultant pressure affects the whole economic life of the Polish minority and endeavours are made to weaken that minority through the penetration of Polish areas by colonies of German citizens with the aim of depriving those areas of their Polish minority character.

In the whole it can be said that Germany's minority problems have a *moral* character for the greater part. It is a question whether Germany will recognize the right of existence for small national groups which never have been and are not now dangerous. The answer to this question, so far, has not been favourable.

The Polish minority, in view of its numbers and its location, has the greatest importance. The existence of this minority clearly marks the ethnographic frontier of the German element and corrects the frequently repeated German complaint that the establishment of the new frontiers on the East was an act of injustice against Germany which should, perhaps, be corrected by expansion in the direction of Pomerania and Upper Silesia.

IX.

BALTIC STATES

(Lithuania, Esthonia and Latvia)

The most northerly point of the Central European area, which during the World War was swept by a wave of national emancipation and given a new form, is the region taken up by the Baltic States, Lithuania, Esthonia and Latvia. The three nations, crowded together on the coast-line from the Gulf of Finland to the waters of the Nemen, whom the pressure of the Russian colossus, demanding an exit on the Baltic Sea, retained for centuries under the Imperial government, took advantage of the weakness of Russia in 1917 and 1918, and stirred by the ideals of self-determination and national freedom, set up independent State-forms. The new States include the major portion of the territory populated in the remote past by those three nations and held by them up to the present. Of course the political and economic conditions which these territories had experienced for several centuries had not left them their original national purity. An element belonging to the dominating nation had penetrated all the three States each of which thus has a numerous *Russian* minority. In Lithuania there are more than 50,000 (two per cent), in Esthonia 92,000 (8.2 per cent) and in Latvia 233,000 (12 per cent) of Russians who are mainly a rural element. All three States have also *German* minorities who are the proof and the result of the long years of the German expansion to the Baltic Sea. The Germans are for the greater part an urban element, of a commercial character. Before the land reform in these countries the Germans also formed a large fraction of the large landed proprietors' group. In figures, Lithuania has approximately 35,000 Germans, Esthonia more than 16,000 and Latvia more than 62,000. The *Jews* form fairly large minorities in these States. Lithuania has more than 150,000 (7.5 per cent), Latvia over 93,000 (4.7 per cent) and Esthonia only 4,500. These, of course, are not the full tally of the national minorities of these countries. In Lithuania and Latvia there are *Polish* minorities; in the first State there are about 65,000 (3.3 per cent) and in the second almost 50,000 (3 per cent) of Poles. In both, the Poles are concentrated in areas on the Polish frontier. Poland exercises a cultural influence especially on the Poles of Lithuania, paralysing by this influence the Lithuanian claims to the Vilna territory partially populated by Lithuanians. In addition there are small minorities of *Latvians* and *White Russians* in Lithuania, *Swedes* in Esthonia and *Lithuanians* (more than 22,000) in Latvia, where there are also *Esthonians* (7,000). In sum, Lithuania with a two million population has minorities to the extent of fifteen per cent, the minorities in Esthonia form 11.5

per cent of a population of 1,126,413, and in Latvia the minorities form 26.5 per cent of a population of 1,472,000. In the figures quoted concerning Lithuania, Memel is not taken into consideration. It has its own Statutes, being an autonomous unit under Lithuanian sovereignty and is half German and half Lithuanian.

What is the position of the national minorities in the Baltic States? All three Baltic States originated as democratic States, and the Constitutions they adopted during the early years of their existence gave extensive civic and political freedom to the whole population inclusive of the minorities. Democratic franchise laws, assuring proportional representation to the minorities, have given them all a notable share of representation in the legislative bodies and have assured them of influence on the political and cultural life of the State. In actual fact in the first Parliaments of these States the Germans had two representatives in Lithuania, three in Esthonia and six in Latvia; the Russians had one in Lithuania, four in Esthonia and four in Latvia; the Jews had seven in Lithuania and six in Latvia and the Poles had four in Lithuania and one in Latvia. In addition they had appropriate influence everywhere in parish and the district administration, wherever they had a local majority. The position of the minorities, of course, has been altered by the internal political development of these States, which have proceeded to a gradual limitation of their initial democracy and have also made changes in the franchise. This was brought about on the one hand by internal authoritative tendencies and on the other hand by a reflex of the crisis which democracy has experienced in neighbouring States, especially Poland and Germany. The nationalist character of the new tendencies in the internal policies of all the three Baltic States was revealed in a hardening of the policy with regard to minorities as a result of the spread to the German minorities of those States of the National-Socialist ideals of the triumphant Hitler régime in Germany, thus provoking local irredentism which was answered by a reinforcement of the nationalism of the dominating nation. The democratic parliamentary representation of the minorities was first set aside in Lithuania as a result of the *coup d'État* of 1926. From April 1927 Parliament suspended sittings and the legislative power was transferred to the President. Only in 1936 were new elections held on a new basis: in the new Parliament the minorities, of course, did not obtain representation. Memel only is represented also by a German deputy in the Lithuanian Parliament. In Esthonia a democratic parliamentary régime was maintained until March 1933. The military régime of General Laidoner was recently liquidated, it is true, but the non-parliamentary nature of the régime will not be terminated until after the elections of the Autumn of 1936. The eighty members of the first chamber will be elected on the basis of universal suffrage while the forty members of the second chamber will be nominated. It is somewhat doubtful in view of the reduced number of seats that the minorities will succeed in obtaining representation in the first chamber, so that they could only be represented in the second chamber by delegations from cultural-administrative units. In Latvia the activity of Parliament was suspended and the authoritative régime of the Prime Minister, M. Ulmanis was introduced in May 1934 so that for the present the minorities are excluded from legislative activity. The political life of the minorities is obviously ignored during the period of the authoritative régimes of these States just as the political life of the majority nations is ignored.

The changes in régime have, in all three States, unfavorably affected the practical use of the minority languages, or expressed in another way, have led to a greater emphasis of the State language. In Lithuania, which still does not possess detailed lingual legislation, this is revealed in daily practice. The national minorities complain of the Lithuanization of all spheres of public life. A reflection of this practice is to be seen, for instance, in the prescription of January 1935 which introduced the Lithuanian style of writing the names of places, streets and persons throughout the State. In Esthonia the small nationality groups had full lingual freedom in private, commercial and cultural life, and also fairly wide lingual rights in contact with the authorities. This was especially true of the German, Russian and Swedish minorities. The new language law of April 1934 clearly diminished these rights. That law proclaimed Esthonian to be the State language and the language to be employed in State and administrative offices, and it limited, at the same time, the possibility of using the minority languages only to persons who are ignorant of Esthonian and to offices where there are officials who understand the minority languages. Even in Latvia there is a tendency to suppress the use of the minority languages and to emphasize the State language in the minority districts.

The cultural position of the national minorities in the Baltic States, especially in Esthonia and Latvia, were until recently regarded as ideals, particularly because their characteristic feature was a *cultural autonomy*. The authoritative régimes in these States in many directions have disturbed the legal basis on which this cultural autonomy was built, and they have also affected the cultural institutions of the minorities. Lithuania expressed the principle of cultural autonomy for the minorities in her Constitution, but it was never put into practice even with the Jews to whom it was particularly promised. The national minorities are provided for unequally by the scholastic system. The more mature and the richer minorities like the Germans and the Jews are comparatively better equipped than, for instance, the Russians, although the Germans also have many complaints. They complain particularly that only children who are qualified by their nationality can be accepted at minority schools and at the same time the description must agree with the passport register of nationality, which is confused too often in practice with State citizenship. In Esthonia the idea of cultural autonomy is most completely expressed in the legislation. The law concerning the cultural autonomy of the minorities justifies each minority numbering more than 3,000 to constitute themselves into an administrative body to deal with cultural affairs. In practice only the German minority has taken advantage of this law and administers and supports its own schools. The other minorities, so far as scholastic requirements are concerned, are left to the care of the State, based on very liberal laws. Under an authoritative régime the standards for determining nationality have been tightened up, but otherwise the advantages for the minorities under the school laws have remained unchanged, and the application of the laws is not in reality unfavorable to the minorities. In Latvia a sort of cultural autonomy for the minorities had been realized by the fact that in the Ministry of Education there were separate cultural administrations for the individual minorities and these had considerable jurisdiction. The authoritative régime set aside these minority administrations and replaced them by minority cultural officials with advisory powers. Formerly children had been accepted by minority schools if their *family language* was that of a minority. Now it is necessary that they should actually belong to national minorities. Children of mixed marriages cannot be accepted by minority schools. All these new regulations combined with a more economic State régime have produced a decrease in the minority schools of almost all the minorities. New minority schools can only be founded for a minimum number of eighty pupils. Even under this new régime of the minorities scholastic policy, all the minorities are provided with elementary and secondary schools.

Wide possibilities are open for the economic life of the minorities in the Baltic States and participation in them, such as that taken for instance by the German and the Jewish minorities, certainly corresponds with the numerical strength of the minorities. The Germans, and to a certain extent also the Russians, do not willingly become reconciled to the land reform which was carried out in Lithuania, Esthonia and Latvia—a reform which deprived the Germans of the support of the large estate owning element, the "Baltic barons"—but for all three States the reform had been a social necessity and nothing remains for the minorities but reconciliation with it in all its economic and national consequences. In Latvia an authoritative régime and in Lithuania a nationalist régime brought in their wake serious intervention in the economic life of the German minority by breaking up the wealthy and ancient centres of German crafts and commercial life known as guilds so as to avoid hindering the concentration of commercial and industrial life in State chambers.

All the national minorities in the Baltic States represent, on the whole, elements whose relation to the State in which they live is positive. In reality there is no separationist tendency. The Polish minority in Latvia concentrated at the Lettgali frontier with Poland is, it is true, open to an agitation which the Latvia press sometimes characterizes as irredentist, but their numbers are too small to enable them to play any great rôle. The German minorities of all the Baltic States are affected by the National-Socialist agitation of Germany, but their distribution is not of a nature to allow them to assert separationist force, which is, moreover, rendered impossible by the geography of the Baltic States. By their Hitler tendencies they could, of course, be an instrument of the foreign political expansion of Germany.

CONCLUSION

From the brief reviews we have given of the situation of national minorities in the individual States of Central Europe we shall now attempt, as far as it is possible, to sum up the deductions concerning the contemporary nationality policy and the present-day significance of the national minorities in that region.

It is obvious, in the first place, that the ideal of nationality justice which was a co-determinating factor to so great an extent of the territorial changes in Central Europe, and which promised to become a deciding force in the internal life of States with national minorities, has not maintained its young revolutionary fervour. It did not penetrate so deeply into the practical, political life of the States in the Central European area as to become permanent and to assure everywhere the free development of all national minorities.

It is a fact which is in close connection with the post-War political development of Europe: the revolution that took place in 1918 and 1919 by the application of democracy in the States and between the States, indicated a victory for the régimes of political liberty and thus also national justice. Not all States have remained in the circle of political ideology which created the new Central Europe, or at least not all States remained in that circle truly and consistently.

Even a few years after the World War and the introduction of the new order, some States in Central Europe abandoned democracy for authoritative and nationalistic régimes. These régimes are unfavourable for the development of a nationality and minority policy, chiefly because they advocate an egocentric government of the nation and endeavour not only to aim at a concentration of that nation in itself, but also at making the whole State homogenous without regard to its other-national components. The ideal of the international protection of minorities obviously suffers also through this internal political trend, the more so that this trend is pursued, at the same time, in sharp antagonism to the method of the League of Nations with which the international protection of the minorities is closely connected.

In practice, it is possible to indicate, after eighteen years of the new Europe, several types of minority régimes. There are, first of all, the countries that very openly apply a ruthless régime of denationalization. To this class belong two States with admittedly authoritative régimes: Italy and Germany, whose policy is facilitated by the fact that they have no formal international obligations towards their racial, lingual and religious minorities. Italy does not even conceal her policy of denationalization; Germany masks it under the theory of non-assimilation in the case of the Jews and by the theory of assimilation in the case of the Lusatian Serbs, to whom only distinctions of costume and custom are allowed, while their independent national character is never admitted. The Poles cannot be denied their separate national character, but this admission makes no difference to the policy of assimilation and denationalization pursued with regard to them.

The Hungarian minority policy pursues substantially the same aim, although that policy has developed from the pre-War Hungarian ideology which always identified the State and the nation, and always admitted only a lingual and never a national differentiation among the Non-Magyar nationalities. In the States with this type of régime, there is an absence of any sort of political representation for the minorities; they lack free political and cultural organization, and if there are any minority schools, they are only of the most primitive lingual character.

The nationality régimes of the group of states which have preserved at least an external appearance of parliamentary government, even though they have partially or entirely set aside their democracy, is of a mixed character. The situation of the minorities in these States, which include especially Poland, Austria and Yugoslavia, is distinguished by the fact that there is only a fractional political representation and that, apart from such exceptions as those of the Czech schools in Vienna, the bi-lingual type of school predominates.

A third type of minority régime exists in the democratic States which have preserved the internal characteristics of democracy in freely elected parliaments with proportional representation of the minorities and which also maintain the conditions for the existence and development of the minorities through civic and political freedom. Among these States it is certainly possible to rank Czechoslovakia, and to large extent Rumania also. Of late the majority of the Balkan States have qualified for inclusion in this category. In these States the minorities are assured of representation in the legislative and local government bodies, they have the basis for their regular cultural and economic organization and, what is most important, they have their full quota of minority schools, that is schools with a complete curriculum given in the appropriate minority language by teachers who are members of that minority.

An objective outlook on the situation of the Central European national minorities, as it appears in the scope of the types of nationality policy indicated, demands with obvious logic that attention should be turned in the first place to the national minorities who are the object of a policy of denationalization, that is, those who are—in the face of all the principles of political democracy and the international protection of minorities—exposed to endless oppression and, in more than one instance, to slow annihilation. This applies to the Slavonic and the German minorities in Italy. It applies to the Lusatian Serbs, who represent the last traces of a characteristical Slavonic nation in Germany and it applies largely to the Slovaks and the Germans in Hungary.

The interest of the European public in Central

European minority problems is unfortunately in inverse ratio to the nature of the minority régimes of the Central European States. The worse the minority conditions are, the more ruthlessly the minorities are decimated by the régime, the more indifferent and silent the great mass of the political public is with regard to the fate of those minorities. It is a situation contributed to by the fact that such minorities are small and weak; they are national fractions whose aspirations and relations cannot be a danger to the States in which they live and who, therefore, are not an international danger in any shape or form.

In spite of this, the problem of these minorities cries out for consideration when an objective comparison of the minority policies of the Central European States is made. It is impossible to evade the question, if these minorities are not to be condemned to death, because they find themselves in the grip of a ruthless nationalist régime and because, from the aspect and the principles of justice, liberty and humanity they have not yet found an adequate place in European and international policy.

Contrast to the oppressed minorities threatened with denationalization in the authoritative States is provided by the large and mature minority groups of the democratic States of Central Europe, especially the German and the Magyar groups. These enjoy the considerable freedom allowed them by the democratic States, not only in the advancement of their own cultural, political and economic powers within their States but even in their opportunities for the expression of discontent and the furtherance of not rarely very far-reaching political and cultural aspirations which dangerously affect the unity of the States of whose population they are a part. The policy of these groups often issues from the fact that these groups were formerly a component of the dominating nation and adapt themselves only with difficulty to their new position as minorities. It is often also a reflex or even a component of the schemes of political expansion fostered by their mother-nations. Thus the German minorities in their fractions easily succumb to the Pan-Germanic tendencies which focus in the radical programme of the foreign policy of the Reich, and whose propagators are various aggressive societies and unions in the German Reich. The Magyar minorities similarly lend themselves to the disruptive tendencies of the revisionist policy rooted in Budapest. To give ear to the aspirations of these minority elements, who are very skilful at attracting international notice, would mean to overthrow order in Central Europe and to open the way to imperialistic political programmes and endeavours at the restoration of the pre-War order. This would hand over whole nations to the dominion of some single nation.

The investigation and comparison of the treatment of minorities in Central Europe also shows very objectively that for that area, so varied ethnographically, there is but one *danger:* the nationalist and imperialist tendency which asserts itself in a ruthless policy with regard to weak minorities on the one hand, and in the exploitation of minorities in the realization of aggressive plans, on the other hand, and that the sole *method* of obviating this danger is the method of democracy, that is, the mutual respect and the collaboration of all the Central European nations and States and an equitable nationality policy and loyalty between majority and minority nations.

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

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