

LENIN

This edition consists of thirty volumes, of which this is Volume XXI; the only authorised translation of Lenin's works, it is based on the texts revised and adopted by the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute. The present book covers the period from the July days to the Revolution of October 1917, when Lenin was guiding the struggle towards the culminating point of the Bolshevik Revolution.

This Book II contains the documents and speeches of Lenin in the period immediately before the seizure of power and includes, among much other matter, the famous pamphlet *State and Revolution*.

There are full Appendices, a calendar of events, and a diary of the life of Lenin.

TOWARD THE SEIZURE OF POWER

V. I. LENIN
TOWARD THE SEIZURE OF POWER



COLLECTED WORKS

OF

V. I. LENIN

VOLUME XXI

**Completely revised, edited and annotated.
The only edition authorised by the
Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute, Moscow.**

LENIN

TOWARD THE SEIZURE OF POWER

THE REVOLUTION OF 1917:
FROM THE JULY DAYS TO THE
OCTOBER REVOLUTION

BOOK II



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PREFATORY NOTE

THIS book completes the writings and speeches of V. I. Lenin from the July Days, 1917—the first open conflict with the Provisional Government—to the October Revolution. The material in Book I contains Lenin's articles and letters written between July 16 and September 29 and this book covers the rest of the period. With the exception of the first essay, "Will the Bolsheviks Retain State Power?" and the classic, "State and Revolution," the writings were penned as letters to members and leading committees of the Bolshevik Party and dealt with preparations for the uprising. Reports of Lenin's remarks at two meetings of the Bolshevik Central Committee, at which the question of the uprising was definitely decided upon, are also included.

Aside from the explanatory notes which refer exclusively to the text of this book, although they continue the numeration of the notes in Book I, the appendices at the end of the book are for the volume as a whole. The page numbers at the end of each biographical note are intended as an index to the names mentioned in both books. The documentary section which is greatly enlarged in this volume contains proclamations and resolutions of the Central Committee, the resolutions of the Sixth Party Congress, the statement of Kamenev and Zinoviev, the minutes of meetings of the Central Committee and other important material. As in previous volumes the appendices include chronological accounts of outstanding events in the developing revolution and in the life of Lenin.

APPENDICES

EXPLANATORY NOTES

100. At the session of the first conference of the Soviets, June 21, during the speech of Tsereteli, who said: "At the present moment there is no political party in Russia that would say: Give the power into our hands, go away, we will take your place. There is no such party in Russia." Lenin shouted from his seat: "Yes, there is!" (*Ryech*, No. 130, June 19, 1917.)—p. 15.

101. Lenin quotes from an editorial in *Ryech*, No. 218 (3960), September 29, 1917, devoted to the Democratic Conference.—p. 16.

102. Lenin quotes from an editorial in *Dyelo Naroda*, No. 160, October 4, 1917, under the title "Ways of Conciliation."—p. 16.

103. The resolution of the Democratic Conference on the organisation of power, proposed on October 3, 1917, by Tsereteli, demanded "the creation of a strong revolutionary power," "realisation of the programme of August 27, an active foreign policy aiming to achieve universal peace, and the responsibility of the government to a representative body up to the Constituent Assembly that represents the will of the country." The resolution further provides for the creation by the Conference of the "pre-parliament" (Provisional Soviet of the Russian Republic) as a body which must "co-operate in the creation of a power on the indicated foundations with the provision that in case the property-owning elements should be attracted into the Provisional Government, that body can and must be completed by delegates from the bourgeois groups," keeping a majority for the democratic elements. The government was to be responsible to the pre-parliament.

"The platform of August 27" was read by Chkheidze in the name of "revolutionary democracy" at the Moscow State Conference.—p. 17.

104. Lenin quotes from an editorial in *Novaya Zhizn*, No. 135, October 6, 1917, entitled, "In the Clutches of Power."—p. 18.

105. *Znamya Truda*, a newspaper published in 1917 by the Petrograd Committee of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. After the 7th general city conference, which took place on September 23, the Committee was taken over by the Lefts. The chief collaborators on the newspaper were B. Kamkov, A. Kalegayev, S. Mstislavsky, R. Ivanov-Razumnik and others. Lenin refers to a note in No. 25 of *Znamya Truda* entitled, "The Voice of the Peasantry on the Question of Coalition."—p. 21.

106. The Conference of the Executive Committees of the Soviets of Peasant Deputies, convoked by the Executive Committee of the All-Russian Soviet of Peasant Deputies, took place in Petrograd, September 29 to October 1, 1917.

In addition to many provincial peasant Soviets which declared against a coalition with the bourgeoisie and are mentioned in Lenin's article, the Bessarabian, Ufa and Kherson provincial Soviets voted for the Soviets as the seat of power.—p. 22.

107. In September, 1917, Chernov and his adherents held a centrist position in the S.-R. group; to the left of them was a considerable Left Wing headed by Spiridonova and Kamkov, which in November, 1917, formed an independent party of Left S.-R.-Internationalists; to the right of them stood a considerable mass of arch-Right S.-R.'s, members of co-operatives, Narodniks of a liberal hue, etc. After the October uprising the Chernov centre was quickly absorbed within the mass of the Right S.-R.'s.—p. 24.

108. Martov's declaration was read by him in the name of "the majority of the Soviet delegation" at the Democratic Conference on October 1, 1917. The declaration said, among other things:

. . . all political self-government of the great people which threw off the chains of tsarist slavery has been performed and is performed through the Soviets; by this very fact the Soviets all over Russia are the immediate carriers of the ideas of the power by the people, the bodies which carry to realisation in fact the democratic republic and are actually concentrating in their hands state power in the local communities. . . . At the time this live tissue of the new revolutionary state was being developed and was gaining strength in the local communities, there functioned in the centre a government built up on the basis of coalition with the undemocratic propertied classes. . . . This condition was the cause of hindrances coming from the census groups in the carrying out of the urgent economic, financial and social reforms. . . . The government in fact became ever more irresponsible, ever more independent of the control of organised democracy, and because of this it in fact became ever more dependent upon the capitalist classes.

The declaration therefore thought it necessary "decisively to reject any agreement with the census elements" and proposed "to make every effort for the cause of creating a truly revolutionary government" pending the convocation of the Constituent Assembly.—p. 26.

109. The growth of the party in the epoch of revolution may be seen by the following figures: at the All-Russian April Conference of the R. S.-D. L. P. (Bolsheviks), 1917, 76,000 members were represented; at the Sixth Congress, in July, 1917 (according to its proceedings), over 177,000.—p. 34.

110. Lenin refers to an editorial in *Dyelo Naroda*, No. 168, October 13, 1917, entitled, "A New Revolution or the Constituent Assembly?"—p. 43.

111. Lenin refers to an editorial in *Dyelo Naroda*, No. 167, October 12, 1917, entitled, "First Restoration of Order and Then Reforms."—p. 44.

112. A paraphrase of the words of Plekhanov: "Our economists contemplate the behind of the working class." (Preface to "*Vademecum* for the Editorial Board of the *Rabocheye Dyelo*.")—p. 51.

113. Quoted from an editorial in *Novaya Zhizn*, No. 142, October 14, 1917, entitled, "Congress of Soviets and Constituent Assembly."—p. 51.

114. "We have two: moderation and accuracy"—the words of Molchalin, in the comedy of A. Griboyedov, *Woe from Being Too Wise*.—p. 52.

115. December 12, 1917—the date to which the Provisional Government had postponed the convocation of the Constituent Assembly.—p. 55.

116. The Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies was located at the Smolny Institute. From October 8 on the Soviet was controlled by the Bolsheviks.—p. 56.

117. *Prosveshcheniye*, a Bolshevik monthly journal, was published legally in Petrograd under tsarism in the years of reaction as a "Marxian social, political, literary journal." No. 1 appeared in December, 1911, the last number in the summer of 1913, on the eve of the war. In 1917 the publication of *Prosveshcheniye* was renewed as "theoretical organ of the R. S.-D. L. P." However, only one double number appeared, with articles by N. Lenin, V. Milyutin, G. Zinoviev, F. Mehring, G. Lomov, R. Arsky, N. Glebov, K. Zalevsky and V. Nevsky.—p. 56.

118. The present theses, written by Lenin in connection with the party Congress called for October 30, 1917, but the convocation of which was later revoked by the Central Committee, were considered by the Petrograd city conference. The Petrograd city conference took place October 20 to 24, 1917. Several of its sessions, out of considerations of conspiracy, were closed sessions (without the participation of visitors or delegates having a voice but no vote). At the conference 49,000 party members were represented. The basic questions on the agenda were: the report of the Petrograd Committee (G. Boky and O. Ravich), the report of the military organisation (N. Podvoisky), the Constituent Assembly (J. Fenigstein-Doletsky), the municipal question and the present situation. The conference nominated a list of candidates to the Constituent Assembly from Petrograd headed by Lenin, adopted resolutions on the present situation, on the municipal question, etc. The concluding part of the resolution on the present situation stated:

The conference therefore declares that only the overthrow of the Kerensky government and of the packed Soviet of the Republic and the substitution for it of a workers' and peasants' revolutionary government is capable of: (a) giving the land to the peasants instead of suppressing the peasant uprising; (b) offering an immediate just peace and thus giving faith in the truth to our entire army; (c) adopting the most decisive revolutionary measures against the capitalists in order to secure for the army bread, clothing and footwear and in order to fight against economic ruin.

The minutes of the commission that were preserved are far from complete. The newspaper reports which were published in *Rasbochy Put* are likewise extremely fragmentary.—p. 61.

119. The letter to the Petrograd city conference was read at a session of the conference on October 24, 1917. Whether this letter was discussed by

the conference is not known, as the minutes of the session were not preserved.
—p. 65.

120. The Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies of the Northern Region, called by the Regional Executive Committee of the army, navy and workers of Finland at its session of October 21 in Helsingfors, took place in Petrograd on October 24 to 26. Since the overwhelming majority of this congress consisted of Bolsheviks and Left S.-R.'s, the Menshevik-S.-R. C. E. C. declared the congress "a private conference." The small Menshevik fraction did not take part in the work of the congress, and remained there only for purposes of information. The congress declared itself in favour of the immediate transfer of power to the Soviets, an immediate offer of peace, the immediate transfer of the land to the peasants and the convening of the Constituent Assembly at the appointed time. The congress addressed a radio telegram "to all, to all," declaring that the Second Congress of Soviets had been called for October 20 and that its task was to bring about an immediate truce on all fronts, the transfer of all the land to the peasants and the assuring of the convocation of the Constituent Assembly; the telegram called for taking up the struggle against the disruption of the congress by the bourgeoisie and the conciliators and proposed that all organisations make sure to be represented at the congress.—p. 66.

121. The Soldiers' Section of the Petrograd Soviet, at its session on October 19, 1917, discussed the question of the events at the front and of the possibility, in connection with them, of transferring the Provisional Government from Petrograd to Moscow. The Section categorically declared against the moving of the government, since that would be tantamount to leaving the revolutionary capital to its fate and preparing for its surrender to the German army.—p. 66.

122. The minutes of the Central Committee of the Bolsheviks, published in *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* in 1927, do not contain any indications that the "Letter to the C. C., M. C., P. C., and Bolshevik members of the Petrograd and Moscow Soviets," sent by Lenin from Finland, was discussed by the Central Committee. Likewise the editors have no material on the attitude of the Petrograd Committee to the letter, but upon receipt of the letter in Moscow it was discussed at a meeting of the leading Moscow party workers. At the meeting were present: N. Bukharin, N. Osinsky, A. Rykov, P. Smidovich, E. Yaroslavsky, V. Obukh, N. Ovsyannikov and V. Solovyev. The meeting declared itself in accord with Lenin's letter, and those present decided to advocate in the party organisations concerned "the course towards an uprising." A few days after the meeting the Moscow Committee, acting on the reports of Bukharin and Osinsky, adopted for its guidance the theses proposed in the letter.—p. 69.

123. Officer Dubasov spoke at the session of the Petrograd Soviet on October 5, 1917, during the discussion of the report on the Democratic Conference. *Rabochy Put*, No. 18, October 6, reports his speech as follows:

"Comrade Dubasov, who returned from the front, states during his speech that the soldiers at present do not want either liberty or land. They want only one thing—the end of the war. Whatever you may say here, the soldiers will not fight any longer." "This statement," adds the paper, "made a strong impression upon the audience."—p. 69.

124. The railroad and postal and telegraph employees unsuccessfully demanded during the several months of the summer of 1917 an increase in wages, which has been extremely reduced due to the depreciation of the paper ruble. The commission appointed by the Provisional Government under the chairmanship of G. V. Plekhanov refused to grant the demands of the railroad employees. As a result the railroad workers and employees declared a general strike on all Russian railroads; the strike began on the night of October 6-7, 1917. After the Provisional Government granted the demand of the railroad workers and employees, the strike was called off on the night of October 10.—p. 69.

125. Lenin's advice about the *Russkoye Slovo* was carried out by the Moscow Soviet immediately after the victory of the October Revolution, and the printing plant of the newspaper was confiscated. The publication of the *Izvestiya* of the Moscow Soviet was transferred to the printing plant of the *Russkoye Slovo*; in March, 1918, after the seat of the government was transferred to Moscow, the *Pravda* was transferred to the same printing plant.—p. 70.

126. The article "Towards the Revision of the Party Programme" was written by Lenin for the party conference which was called by the Central Committee for October 30 (later this conference was called off and its place was taken by a series of local party conferences). At the session of October 18, the C. C. elected a special commission to prepare a draft of a party programme for the conference. The commission was headed by Lenin and included Bukharin, Trotsky, Kamenev, Sokolnikov and Kollontai.—p. 71.

127. Quotation from the article by Friedrich Engels—"Zur Kritik des Sozialdemokratischen Programmentwurfes 1891" ("Critique of the Draft of the Social-Democratic Programme of 1891"), published in *Die Neue Zeit*, XX Jahrgang, 1 Band, 1901-1902.—p. 79.

128. The *Spartakusbund* (Spartacus League)—an illegal organisation in Germany, established at the beginning of the imperialist war by Karl Liebknecht, Leo Jogiches, Rosa Luxemburg and Franz Mehring to fight opportunism within the German Social-Democracy, which had betrayed the International. After its split from the official S.-D. Party, the Spartacus League for technical reasons joined the Independent S.-D. Party of Germany, but kept its own organisation as a separate group. After the November Revolution in 1918 and the formation of a united S.-D. government of Scheidemannites and Independents, the League severed connections with the Independents and in December of the same year ceased to exist, having formed together with several other organisations the German Communist Party. The programme

of the Spartacus League was written by R. Luxemburg ("What Are the Aims of Spartacus?").

The theses of the Spartacus League were written by Rosa Luxemburg and unanimously adopted at a conspirative conference of the "International" Group (which joined the Spartacus League) on the first of January, 1916, in Berlin in Karl Liebknecht's apartment. Originally the theses were published in *Die Spartakus Briefe (Spartacus Letters)*, No. 3, February 3, 1916, entitled "Guiding Principles"; the theses were hectographed and were illegally distributed throughout Germany; later the theses were several times reprinted in separate leaflets.

The fifth thesis of the "Guiding Principles" reads:

The World War does not serve the purpose of national defence, nor the economic or political interests of the masses of the people; it is only a result of imperialist rivalry between the capitalist classes of the various countries in their struggle for world domination and monopolistic exploitation of the enslaved regions not yet conquered by capital. In the epoch of this reckless imperialism there can no longer be national wars. National interests serve merely as a means of deception in order to compel the toiling masses to serve their mortal enemy, imperialism.—p. 80.

129. The Punic Wars—three wars between Rome and Carthage from 264 to 146 B.C., which ended in the destruction of Carthage and the conquest of its colonies. The fundamental cause of the wars was the struggle for domination of the shores of the Mediterranean Sea, mainly in Africa and Spain.—p. 81.

130. Lenin refers here to the article by N. Bukharin "On the Revision of the Party Programme" (*Spartak*, No. 4, August 23, 1917), and to the article by V. Smirnov, "On the Revision of the Economic Minimum Programme."—p. 88.

131. Lenin refers to an editorial in *Rabochy Put*, No. 26, October 16, 1917, entitled, "Congress of Soviets and Constituent Assembly."—p. 90.

132. The Sixth Congress of the R. S.-D. L. P. (Bolsheviks), at its session of August 16, 1917, approved the following minutes of the section on the revision of the party programme:

The section, having studied the materials on the revision of the programme that were published under the editorship of Comrade Lenin and the Moscow Regional Bureau and having heard a report by Comrade Sokolnikov on this question, decided:

1. To approve the decision of the conference of April 14-20, on the necessity of revising the party programme in the direction indicated by the conference.
2. In view of the fact that there was not sufficient preliminary discussion on the question of the revision of the programme, and also in view of the very unfavourable conditions for the work of the conference, preparation of a new text of the programme at the present conference is recognised as impossible.
3. It is necessary to convoke in the near future a special conference to prepare a new party programme.
4. Until this conference convenes the C. C. of the party and all party organs must organise as wide a discussion as possible on the question of

the revision of the programme and must take measures to supply the members of the party with literature on this question.

5. For the purposes of practical party work, the section considers it necessary to prepare a special platform, taking as its foundation the resolution of the present conference and the decisions of the April Conference which have not yet lost their effect.

The section proposes that the C. C. be instructed to prepare the platform.—p. 92.

133. The "Tribunists" were Left Dutch Social-Democrats, who were expelled from the official party in 1907 and who in 1909 established the newspaper *De Tribune* (Pannekoek, Goeter, Wynkoop, Henrietta Roland-Holst and others). In 1919 the Tribunists formed the Dutch Communist Party and entered the Third International, where they occupied an ultra-Left position. At present the majority of the former leaders of the Tribunists are outside of the Comintern.—p. 93.

134. The Socialist Propaganda League was an internationalist organisation in America during the imperialist war, formed by members of the American Socialist Party and consisting in its majority of immigrant workers.—p. 93.

135. The Socialist Labour Party—established in 1877 as a final consolidation of the various Socialist elements belonging in the main to the different American sections of the First International which were organised under the influence of the immigrant German workers. After the split in 1899, which resulted in the formation of the rival Socialist Party, continued under the leadership of Daniel DeLeon its opposition to reformism on the parliamentary and trade union fields, developing at the same time still further its already well established sectarian policies. After the October Revolution and the formation of the Communist International, its revolutionary elements joined the Communist movement. The S. L. P. has been reduced to a very small organisation. Its present leadership is bitterly opposed to the Communist Party of the U. S. A., and in its attacks goes to the extent of questioning the revolutionary integrity of the leadership of the C. P.—p. 93.

136. § 9 of the programme of the R. S.-D. L. P., adopted by the Second Party Congress in 1903 reads: "The right of self-determination for all nations constituting the state." Lenin in the pamphlet *Materials Relating to the Revision of the Party Programme*, which appeared in June, 1917, proposed that it read: "The right of nationalities which are now parts of the Russian state freely to separate and to form independent states. The republic of the Russian people should draw to itself other peoples or nationalities not by violence, but through voluntary and mutual agreement to build a common state. The common aims and brotherly union of the workers of all countries are incompatible with either direct or indirect violence practiced upon other nationalities." (*Revolution of 1917, Collected Works*, Volume XX, Book I, p. 329.)—p. 93.

137. The article of J. Larin, "Labour Demands in Our Programme," was published in *Rabochy Put*, No. 31, October 28, 1917, and in addition to the

demand for the cancellation of state debts it made the following demands in the field of labour legislation and control over production: legalisation of factory committees, "constitutional order in the factories," collective agreements, extension of labour legislation to state employees, domestic servants and agricultural workers, "correct distribution of working forces on the basis of democratic self-government by the workers in the distribution of their persons," minimum wage, annual vacation, payment of wages every week and criminal responsibility of the employers for the violation of labour laws.—p. 94.

138. For amendments made to the labour sections of the party programme by the sub-section on labour legislation at the All-Russian April Conference of the R. S.-D. L. P., see the article, "Materials Relating to the Revision of the Party Programme." (*Revolution of 1917, Collected Works, Volume XX, Book I, pp. 325-343.*)—p. 95.

139. The "Letter to the Bolshevik Comrades Participating in the Regional Congress of the Soviets of the Northern Region" was written by Lenin on October 21, 1917, in Vyborg. No data are available about the circumstances under which the discussion on this letter took place in the fraction.—p. 100.

140. In the cities of Bohemia and Móravia (in Prague, Pilsen, Brünn, Witkowitz and others) strikes broke out during the summer of 1917, provoked by starvation, and in protest against the war. The original demands were concerned with putting a stop to requisitions and the export of food products to Germany and Vienna; later, demands were put forth for stopping the war and for the release of political prisoners. In some places this movement took the character of open revolutionary mass actions. In Brünn, armed struggles continued for several days. The insurrection was cruelly suppressed.

In Turin, Italy, a strike broke out in August, 1917, provoked by starvation and the continuation of the war. Over 40,000 workers went out on strike. The strike was accompanied by demonstrations.

In the naval fortress Wilhelmshafen, in Germany, a mutiny of the sailors on four cruisers broke out in September, 1917. The mutineers threw several officers overboard and then landed on shore. Marines who were instructed to attack them refused to obey orders. The mutiny was suppressed by infantry detachments. One of the mutinous cruisers went to Norway with the purpose of interning, but it was surrounded with destroyers and was compelled to surrender, and the mutiny was brutally suppressed. Several sailors were executed and others were sentenced to hard labour for many years.—p. 100.

141. Speech by E. Breshko-Breshkovskaya on October 20, in the Soviet of the Republic, published in *Dyelo Naroda*, No. 175, October 21, 1917.—p. 102.

142. The meeting of the Central Committee of the R. S.-D. L. P. on October 23, 1917, took place at the rooms of G. K. Sukhanova, and was devoted mainly to the question of the armed uprising. Lenin, who had apparently come to Petrograd from Vyborg only the day before, was present

for the first time after the July events at the meeting of the C. C. At this session were also present Zinoviev, Kamenev, Trotsky, Stalin, Sverdlov, Uritsky, Dzerzhinsky, Kollontai, Bubnov, Sokolnikov and Lomov. Sverdlov was chairman. The minutes are brief, do not contain a report of all the discussions, and outside of the basic report of Lenin mention merely brief information by Lomov on the state of affairs in the Moscow industrial region and by Sverdlov on the situation in other localities. They report very briefly the objections of Uritsky, which came down to pointing out the weakness of the armed forces of the revolution. The resolution proposed by Lenin was adopted by 10 votes against 2 (Zinoviev and Kamenev). In the minutes there is also a proposal by Dzerzhinsky "to create a Political Bureau out of members of the C. C. for political guidance during the immediate future." A Political Bureau was created consisting of 7 members: Lenin, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Trotsky, Stalin, Sokolnikov and Bubnov. Zinoviev and Kamenev, who voted against the resolution for an armed uprising, submitted to the C. C. on the following day, a statement in which they protested against the adopted decision; this statement was also sent to the local party organisations (see Appendices, Documents, Nos. 11 and 12).—p. 106.

143. The representatives of the Minsk Bolshevik organisation informed the Central Committee, as may be seen from the report of Sverdlov to the meeting of the C. C. on October 23, 1917, that the High Command of the army was preparing to surround Minsk with Cossacks with the view of suppressing the revolutionary movement, but that the sentiment on the western front was such that there was not only no danger to Minsk, but it was also possible to send to Petrograd a revolutionary corps with a view of supporting the planned uprising (Minutes of meeting of the C. C. of the R. S.-D. L. P., *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya*, No. 10 (69), 1927).—p. 107.

144. The minutes of the meeting of the Central Committee with the representatives of the leading party organisations on October 29, 1917, contain a brief secretarial summary of the reports and discussions on the question of preparing for an armed uprising. The meeting, which took place in the Lesnaya borough Duma, had for its purpose the securing of exact information as to the sentiment of the masses of workers and soldiers and the clearing up of the attitude of the active Petrograd and Moscow workers towards an uprising. The first part of the session was therefore devoted to listening to reports. General information from the localities was supplied by Sverdlov. The secretary of the Petrograd committee, Boky, reported on the situation in Petrograd by separate districts. After some supplementary reports by other comrades the meeting passed to a discussion of the present situation. Two points of view clashed: that of Lenin, for an uprising within the next few days, and that of Zinoviev and Kamenev, against an uprising, or at any rate in favour of the postponement of the question until the Congress of Soviets. The overwhelming majority of those present, including the members of the C. C., decisively supported Lenin's point of view. Stalin, Kalinin, Sverdlov, Skrypnik, Dzerzhinsky, Ravich, Sokolnikov, Milyutin, Joffe, Schmidt, Latsis ("Uncle"), and others all spoke in favour of the uprising. After

repeated objections on the part of Kamenev and Zinoviev the meeting adopted the resolution submitted by Lenin. At the end of the session the Central Committee appointed a military-political centre consisting of Sverdlov, Stalin, Bubnov, Uritsky and Dzerzhinsky.

Kamenev and Zinoviev, who were left in the minority, submitted the same day the following statement to the C. C.:

"We insistently demand the immediate telegraphic convocation of a plenum of the C. C. G. Zinoviev, U. Kamenev." Kamenev also made the following statement on his resignation from the C. C.:

"To the C. C. of the R. S.-D. L. P.: Not being able to support the point of view expressed in the latest decisions of the C. C. which define the character of its work, and considering that this position is leading the party of the proletariat to defeat, I ask the C. C. to recognise that I am no longer a member of the C. C. U. Kamenev."

For minutes of the session of C. C. on October 29, 1917, see Appendices, Documents No. XIII.—p. 108.

145. A "very important Bolshevik gathering in Petrograd"—the meeting of the C. C. on October 29, 1917, in which Lenin participated. The references to a comrade who allegedly informed Lenin about this meeting, and the change of the date of the meeting, "on the eve," that is, October 28, were probably made for the purpose of conspiracy, since Lenin at that time remained under cover and could not reveal his presence in Petrograd. The expression "this little pair of comrades" refers to Zinoviev and Kamenev, who at the meeting opposed Lenin. The formulation of the objections of the opponents of the uprising, which Lenin treats in the present article, is in all probability an exact transcript of the objections of Zinoviev and Kamenev, made by Lenin during the session of the C. C.—p. 111.

146. In an editorial in *Rabochy Put*, October 25, 1917, entitled, "Wanted: Bread," it was stated: "None other than the bourgeois paper *Russkaya Volya* acknowledged the other day that the peasant movement in the Kozlov county had the unexpected result that all the railroad stations of the county were literally swamped with grain. The landowners whose estates had not yet been ransacked were making haste to save their property. . . ."—p. 113.

147. The reference is to the speech of G. Sokolnikov. The minutes of the meeting of the C. C. of the R. S.-D. L. P. on October 29, 1917, contain the following fragmentary entry on the speech of Sokolnikov:

The objections of Kamenev are not convincing. He accuses us of having made noise regarding our uprising, that is, he demands a conspiracy. Our greatest peculiarity and our strength is that we openly prepare the uprising. It reminds one of the February events, when, too, nothing was prepared, yet the revolution was victorious. It is impossible to expect a more favourable interrelationship of forces. . . .

To this Zinoviev objected:

Comparisons were made between this revolution and the February Revolution. They should not be compared, for at that time there was nothing on the side of the old power, while now it is war against the entire bourgeois world. . . . (Appendices, Documents, No. XIII.)—p. 121.

148. *Novoye Vremya*, No. 14787, June 9, 1917, during the elections to the Petrograd municipal council, published an "appeal by the editors" entitled "Give Us the Ticket of the Party of People's Freedom."—p. 125.

149. Lenin refers to an article by V. Bazarov "The Marxian Attitude to an Uprising" (*Novaya Zhizn*, No. 155, October 30, 1917).—p. 127.

150. The "Letter to Members of the Bolshevik Party" was written by Lenin on the morning of October 31, 1917, in connection with the note in *Novaya Zhizn*, No. 156, of the same date, under the headline: "U. Kamenev, About the Uprising" in which Kamenev in his own name and that of Zinoviev stated that they were obliged "under these conditions, to declare themselves against any attempt to take the initiative of an armed uprising which would be doomed to defeat and which would have the most dangerous effect on the party, the proletariat, the fate of the revolution. To stake everything on the card of an uprising within the next few days would be tantamount to making a step of desperation." Lenin's letter and also a letter to the C. C. of the R. S.-D. L. P. and a statement by Kamenev of October 29 about his resignation from the C. C. were discussed at a session of the C. C. on November 2, 1917. After a long discussion the C. C. decided to accept the resignation of Kamenev and to impose "upon Kamenev and Zinoviev the obligation not to make any statements against the decisions of the C. C. and the line of work laid out by it." "The proposition of Milyutin that no member of the C. C. shall have the right to speak against the adopted decisions of the C. C." was also adopted. (Minutes of the session of the C. C. of the R.S.-D.L.P., *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya*, No. 10 (69), 1927).—p. 129.

151. This refers to the propaganda of G. V. Plekhanov in 1906-1907 in favour of a bloc with the Cadets in the newspaper *Tovarishch*, which was published by E. D. Kuskova and which was close to the Left Wing of the Cadet Party.—p. 130.

152. At the session of the Petrograd Soviet on October 31, 1917, Trotsky, referring to the information in the bourgeois press about the planned uprising, stated that neither the Bolsheviks nor the Petrograd Soviet were preparing an uprising for the next few days and that no armed demonstrations had been decided upon, but that they could not permit the withdrawal of the revolutionary garrison from Petrograd, and that at the first attempt of the counter-revolution to disrupt the Congress of Soviets, "all revolutionary Russia will answer with the most decisive counter-attack, which will be ruthless and which we will carry out to the end." Kamenev, who spoke after him, said that he subscribed to every word of the statement made by Trotsky (*Rabochy Put*, Nos. 40 and 41, November 1 and 2, 1927). At the meeting of the C. C. on November 2, Trotsky declared that his statement was made necessary by Kamenev's threat to introduce a resolution in the session of the Soviet against the uprising (Minutes of session of C. C. of R. S.-D. L. P., *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya*, No. 10 (69), 1927).—p. 133.

153. In *Dyelo Naroda*, No. 183, October 31, 1917, there were published the following bills introduced by the Minister of Agriculture, the Socialist-Revolutionary S. L. Maslov; rules on the regulation of agricultural land relationships by the land committees, on the formation of a provisional fund of leasehold land, on the distribution of the leasehold land fund, on the settlement of disputes with regard to existing leasehold contracts, etc.

On the following day *Dyelo Naroda*, No. 184, November 1, published the following decision of the Central Committee of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party:

The Minister of Agriculture submitted to the Provisional Government a bill on the transfer of agricultural lands to the land committees, the first draft of which is published in *Dyelo Naroda*. In view of the immense importance of this bill, which is the first great step towards the realisation of the agrarian programme of the party, the C. C. urges all party organisations to carry on energetic propaganda in favour of the bill in order to make it popular among the masses.—p. 133.

154. The land committees, consisting of the head committee, provincial, county and village committees, were formed by a decision of the Provisional Government of May 4, 1917, and had as their purpose the collection of materials on land reform and preparation for this reform for the Constituent Assembly.—p. 138.

155. *State and Revolution* was written by Lenin during August-September, 1917, in Helsingfors. The materials, comprising numerous extracts from the works of Marx and Engels, were prepared by Lenin in Switzerland during the war. On the first page of the manuscript the author signs the pseudonym F. F. Ivanovsky. This was an entirely new pen name which had never been used by Lenin before, and was absolutely necessary, as the Provisional Government would undoubtedly have confiscated any book signed by the name of Lenin or by any of his known pen names. However, since the printing plants were working at full capacity in 1917 and all printing work took a long time, the pamphlet did not appear till 1918 and the necessity for any pen name disappeared. According to the draft of the original plan made by Lenin, which has been kept in the archives of the Lenin Institute, the work was to contain not only a theoretical analysis of the theory of the state by Marx and Engels, but also a consideration of "the experience of the Russian Revolutions of 1905 and 1917" from the point of view of this theory. It was proposed to devote Chapter VII of the pamphlet to this last question, but the October Revolution and the necessity to devote every effort to the immediate practical work interfered with the conclusion of the work begun. There was preserved only a draft of the plan of Chapter VII worked out in detail.—p. 147.

156. The Thirty Years' War (1618-1648), which was caused by the struggle of the European powers for hegemony within feudally dismembered Germany and on the coast of the Baltic Sea, resulted in complete ruin and disaster for Germany.—p. 165.

157. *The Gotha Programme* was adopted in 1875 at the unity congress in Gotha at which the two factions of German Socialists, the Lassalleans and the Eisenachers, merged into the Social-Democratic Workers' Party of Germany. The programme adopted was a compromise between the Lassalleans and the Eisenachers. The former brought into the programme all their fighting points: the full product of labour to the workers, the iron law of wages, productive associations based on state credit, and declaring the bourgeoisie to be "a single reactionary mass." The programme officially remained in force until the convention of the party in Erfurt in 1891, when it was replaced with a new programme (the Erfurt Programme).

Marx and Engels subjected the Gotha Programme to most severe criticism, the former in a letter to Bracke dated May 5, 1875, and the latter in a letter to Bebel, March 28, 1875 (K. Marx, "Ein Brief an Bracke," 5 Mai, 1875, London, in *Die Neue Zeit*, 1891, IX Jahrgang, I Band; Engels' letter was first published in August Bebel's book, *Aus meinem Leben [From My Life]*, Part Two, 1911).—p. 166.

158. "They should not have taken up arms"—the words of G. Plekhanov about the December, 1905, armed uprising in "The Diary of a Social-Democrat," No. 4, December, 1905.—p. 178.

159. Marx's letters to Kugelmann were first published in German in *Die Neue Zeit*, XX Jahrgang, I and II Band, 1901-1902. Lenin refers to the following Russian editions of the letters: (1) K. Marx, *Letters to L. Kugelmann*, with a preface by the editors of *Die Neue Zeit*. Translation from the German by M. Pleana, edited and with a preface by N. Lenin. Published by *Novaya Duma*, St. Petersburg, 1907. (2) *Letters of Karl Marx to the Member of the International, Kugelmann*, with a preface by Karl Kautsky. Library of Scientific Socialism, 1907.—p. 179.

160. Lenin refers to Eduard Bernstein's book, *Evolutionary Socialism*. In German the book first appeared in 1899 in Stuttgart, under the title *Die Voraussetzungen des Sozialismus und die Aufgaben der Sozialdemokratie*.—p. 184.

161. Lenin here refers to the editorial, "Overhauling of Governmental Institutions and Democracy," in the organ of the S.-R.'s, *Dyelo Naroda*, No. 113, July 29, 1917.—p. 187.

162. The articles of Marx and Engels against the Proudhonists, the first entitled "L'indifferenza in materia politica" and the second "Dell' Autorità," marked: "London, January, 1873," were published in the Italian symposium, *Almanacco Repubblicano per l'anno 1874* (Republican Almanac for the Year 1874), Lodi, 1873. A German translation appeared in *Die Neue Zeit*, 1913-1914, XXXII Jahrgang, I Band, entitled: K. Marx, "Der politische Indifferentismus" and Fr. Engels, "Ueber das Autoritätsprinzip" (K. Marx, "Political Indifference," and Fr. Engels "On the Authoritarian Principle").—p. 197.

163. The Erfurt Programme, which in the epoch of the II International was considered the most consistent programme from the point of view of Marxism and which for a long time served as a model for all other Social-Democratic parties, including the R. S.-D. L. P., was adopted at the congress of the German Social-Democracy in Erfurt, October 14-20, 1891, in place of the obsolete Gotha Programme (1875), which was the result of a compromise of two trends in German Socialism (Lassalleans and Eisenachers).

The draft of the programme, which was written by Kautsky, was first sent by him to several prominent workers in the labour movement, including Engels. Upon the perusal of the draft Engels made a number of notes which he sent to Kautsky on July 29, 1891. These notes were published ten years later in *Die Neue Zeit* (XX Jahrgang, 1901-1902, I Band, No. 1, pp. 5-13) under the title "Zur Kritik des Socialdemokratischen Programmwurfes 1891" ("Critique of the Draft of the Social-Democratic Programme of 1891").—p. 203.

164. See Engels' Introduction to the 1891 edition of the *Civil War in France*.—p. 208.

165. Lenin here and further on makes a slip of the pen: the "historic" speech of Tsereteli was made not on June 22, but on June 24. For further details about this speech, see V. I. Lenin, *Revolution of 1917, Collected Works*, Volume XX, note 255.—p. 209.

166. It must be kept in mind that the figures quoted by Lenin as possible rates of wages are given in the paper currency of the second half of 1917. *State and Revolution* was written in August, 1917, when the value of the Russian paper ruble had fallen to less than a third of its face value.—p. 210.

167. Lenin refers to the Russian translation of the article by Karl Marx, "Critique of the Gotha Programme," edited by Vera Zasulich, St. Petersburg, 1906.—p. 215.

168. The Hague (V) Congress of the First International (1872), attended by Marx and Engels, was almost entirely devoted to the struggle with the Bakuninists. On the motion of Vaillant, the Congress adopted a resolution recognising the necessity of political struggle, contrary to the opinion of the Bakuninists. Bakunin and several of his adherents were expelled from the International. The Hague Congress was the last congress of the First International in Europe.—p. 233.

169. *Zarya*—a theoretical organ of the Russian Social-Democracy, published in 1901-1902 in Stuttgart under the editorship of G. Plekhanov, N. Lenin, P. Axelrod, U. Martov, V. Zasulich and A. Potresov. Altogether three issues of *Zarya* appeared: No. 1, April, 1901; Nos. 2-3, December, 1901; No. 4, August, 1902.—p. 234.

170. Concerning the Fifth International Socialist Congress held in Paris (1901), and the Kautsky resolution on Millerandism adopted by it, see V. I.

Lenin, *The Iskra Period, Collected Works*, Volume IV, note 35. An article by Plekhanov in No. 1 of *Zarya* was devoted to the congress, entitled, "A Few Words on the Last Paris International Socialist Congress."—p. 234.

171. Lenin refers to Karl Kautsky's book *Die Soziale Revolution*, I. *Sozialreform und Soziale Revolution*, II. *Am Tage nach der Sozialen Revolution* (Social Revolution, I. Social Reform and Social Revolution, II. On the Morrow of the Social Revolution), published in 1902 in Berlin by "Vorwärts." In Russian it appeared in 1903, in Geneva, in a translation edited by Lenin.

Throughout the entire book, *State and Revolution*, Lenin almost everywhere quotes foreign authors from the original, making his own translations from German for each quotation, apparently not being satisfied with the existing translations.—p. 236.

172. Lenin refers to Kautsky's book; *Der Weg zur Macht. Politische Betrachtungen in die Revolution (The Road to Power. Political Considerations in the Revolution)*, Berlin, 1909. Published by "Vorwärts."—p. 238.

173. The article of K. Kautsky against Pannekoek, "Die Neue Taktik" ("New Tactics"), was published in *Die Neue Zeit*, XXX Jahrgang, II Band, 1911-1912.—p. 240.

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES *

A.

ADLER, FRIEDRICH (born 1879)—General Secretary of the Second International. See Vol. XX.—I 271.

ADLER, VICTOR (1852-1918)—Founder and leader of Austrian Social-Democracy. See Vol. XX.—I 59, 271.

ALEXANDER III (1845-1894)—Tsar of Russia.—I 116.

ALEXEYEV, N. V. (1857-1918)—General. Officially the chief of staff of Commander-in-Chief Nicholas II, but from the fall of 1915 to March, 1917, was actually commander-in-chief. At the time of the February Revolution, even after the abdication of Nicholas II, issued orders to the front for the arrest of "malicious" agitators sowing rebellion in the army. Notwithstanding his participation in August, 1917, in the Moscow Conference which prepared the Kornilov revolt, he was appointed commander-in-chief after the suppression of the revolt. At the end of 1918 he started the formation of the "Volunteer Army" on the Don, which after his death was commanded by Denikin.—I 161, 168, 230, 257.

ALEXINSKY, G. A. (born 1879)—In his youth took part in the revolutionary student movement. Since the end of 1905, worked in the Moscow Social-Democratic organisation. He was elected to the Second State Duma in 1907 and took part in the London Conference of the R.S.-D.L.P. the same year. After the dissolution of the Second State Duma and the arrest of the S.-D. fraction, he became a fugitive, despite the opinion of the fraction that it was necessary not to evade trial and severe sentence (hard labour for the majority of its members). Abroad, he joined the "*Vperyod*" group. From the beginning of the war, Alexinsky took an ultra-chauvinist position and together with Plekhanov and the S.-R.'s Avksentyev and Bunakov joined the editorial board of the social-patriotic *Prizyv* and broke with the party. While with the Paris *Prizyv* Alexinsky collaborated on the *Russkaya Volya*, published in Petrograd in 1917 by the Octobrist Protopopov, later a Minister of Nicholas II, on money received from banks, as a result of which the Menshevik Yordansky, the editor of the defensist *Sovremennyy Mir*, was compelled to announce in print the exclusion of Alexinsky as an associate editor of that journal. Upon his return to Russia in 1917, Alexinsky joined the Plekhanov social-patriotic "*Yedinstvo*" group. The defensist C.E.C. did not consider it

* Names mentioned in previously published volumes of Lenin's *Collected Works* are given here with short characterisations and references to Biographical Notes of the volumes in which fuller descriptions are given.—Ed.

possible to admit him to membership. At the time of the July days, Alexinsky, in agreement with the secret service, published forged documents aiming to compromise Lenin and the Bolsheviks as German agents in order to undermine the movement. In 1919 Alexinsky was arrested by the Cheka; released on bond, he fled abroad where he joined the leaders of extreme reaction, and, together with Burtsev, became one of the chief literary agents of Baron Wrangel. In émigré circles Alexinsky acquired the deserved reputation of a shady and unscrupulous intriguer.—I 17, 18, 22, 34, 40 ff., 51, 55, 58 ff., 70, 73, 74; II 53.

AVKSENTYEV, N. D. (born 1878)—One of the oldest leaders of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. See Vol. XX.—I 76, 79, 101, 102, 105, 106, 122 ff., 130, 132, 145, 191, 192; II 17, 101, 112, 120, 160, 187.

B.

BAGRATON, D. P. (born 1863)—Count, general in tsarist army, closest collaborator of Kerensky in the War Ministry, and at the same time close to Kornilov.—I 168, 257.

BAKUNIN, M. A. (1814-1876)—Famous Russian revolutionary and Anarchist. In 1840 went abroad, participated in the German Revolution of 1848, was one of the leaders of the armed uprising in Dresden and Prague; after his arrest he was extradited by the Austrian authorities at the request of the Russian government, imprisoned in the Fortresses of Peter and Paul and Schlüsselburg; after being exiled to Siberia, he fled abroad where he renewed his revolutionary activity. In 1863, rendered assistance to the Polish insurgents. Participated in the activities of the First International, attempting to organise within it a secret union of his adherents. The "Union" was quite popular in the Latin countries, and Bakunin became the actual head of the Anarchist movement in Europe. Was expelled at the insistence of Marx from the International in 1872 for his disruptive activities. In the 'seventies Bakunin's ideas had a dominating position among the Russian revolutionary intellectuals. Russian Social-Democracy developed in the struggle against Bakunin's ideas.—II 192, 202, 233.

BASOK (Melenevsky)—Ukrainian Social-Democrat. See Vol. XVIII.—I 135, 136.

BAZAROV, V. (V. A. Rudnev, born 1874)—Russian economist and philosophical essayist. See Vol. XX.—II 37 ff., 127, 128, 135.

BEBEL, AUGUST (1840-1913)—One of the founders and leader of the German Social-Democratic Party. See Vol. XX.—II 200 ff., 215 ff.

BEILIS, MENDEL—Jewish tailor, tried in 1913 by the Kiev district court on the charge of murdering a Christian boy, Andrei Yushchinsky, allegedly for

ritual purposes; as a matter of fact, Yushchinsky was murdered by a band of thieves who were connected with the police, for fear he might inform against them. The trial was staged by the tsarist government in order to strengthen reaction in Russia, to develop anti-Semitic agitation and to organise pogroms upon Jews, thus strengthening the autocracy. Nicholas II personally gave instructions to the authorities on this affair. To give the prosecution the desired direction, the Minister of Justice Shcheglovitov exerted the strongest pressure upon the court, dismissing the district attorneys and prosecutors who attempted to find the real perpetrators of the crime. The jury was selected from the most ignorant group of the Kiev population. All the forces of the "Union of the Russian People" were mobilised for the trial. In spite of the efforts of the Black Hundreds and the tsarist government, the jury acquitted Beilis.—I 41, 52, 58, 60.

BERKENHEIM, A. M.—Socialist-Revolutionary, worker in the co-operative movement, instructor in women's high schools in Moscow; before the October Revolution, member of the Moscow committee of social organisations, councillor of the Moscow city Duma and member of the city council, 1917.—II 17.

BERNATSKY, M. V. (born 1876)—Professor of political economy. Minister of Finance in the last Kerensky Cabinet and in the White Guard governments of Denikin and Wrangel. During the period of the First Russian Revolution he was close to the Marxists and collaborated in the legal Marxist press. At present an émigré and monarchist adherent.—I 189.

BERNSTEIN, EDUARD (born 1850)—Prominent German Social-Democrat and revisionist of Marxism. See Vol. IV.—I 224; II 190 ff., 224 ff., 241, 243.

BISMARCK, OTTO VON (1815-1898)—Chancellor at time of formation of German Empire. See Vol. XX.—II 159.

BISSOLATI, L. (1857-1919)—Italian Socialist leader. See Vol. XX.—II 186.

BLANC, LOUIS (1811-1882)—French Socialist. See Vol. XX.—I 67, 101, 167.

BOBRINSKY, V. A. (born 1868)—Leader of Nationalists in the Duma. See Vol. XX.—I 191.

BONAPARTE, LOUIS—See *Napoleon III.*

BRACKE, V. (1842-1880)—Prominent German Social-Democrat who was first with the Lassalleans. After some hesitation he took an anti-war position during the Franco-Prussian War. Took active part in the publication by the Central Committee of the Social-Democratic Party of an appeal to the workers, calling upon them to start a struggle against the war, for which he was imprisoned in a fortress. Member of the Reichstag. Author of popular pamphlet, "Down with the Social-Democrats!" which was translated into many languages.—II 200, 215.

BRAMSON, L. M. (born 1869)—People's Socialist, member of the first C.E.C. of the Soviets, litterateur and Petrograd lawyer. At present an émigré.—I 103.

BRANTING, HJALMAR (1860-1925)—Swedish Socialist leader. See Vol. XX.—I 122 ff.; II 186, 246.

BRESHKO-BRESHKOVSKAYA, E. K. (born 1844)—Prominent S.-R. Started revolutionary activity in 1873. Upon return from the Karian hard labour prison (sentenced during the trial of 193), became active organiser and worker of the S.-R. Party. An adherent of terror, she belonged to the extreme Right Wing of the party, favouring a union with the liberal intellectuals. After the February Revolution conducted a struggle both with the Left and with the Chernov C.C., being in favour of war to victory. After October, took an extremely hostile attitude towards the Soviet power. In 1919 was sent by the Socialist-Revolutionary Party to the U.S.A. to agitate against the Bolsheviks and the proletarian revolution, supporting from there the counter-revolutionary activity of the S.-R. Party. Since 1927, lives in Paris, collaborating on the S.R. organ *Dni*.—I 237, 242, 245 ff.; II 24, 35, 36, 48, 50, 66, 102, 149.

BRIAND, ARISTIDE (1862-1931)—Repeatedly premier and foreign minister of French Government. See Vol. XVIII.—II 30.

BRONZOV—Member of the first C.E.C. of the Soviets.—I 103.

BUBLIKOV, A. A. (born 1875)—Engineer, member of the Soviet and the Committee of the congresses of trade and industry. Deputy in Fourth State Duma, progressive, member Provisional Committee of the State Duma after the February Revolution. Participated in the State Conference at Moscow, cementing by a public handshake with Tsereteli the coalition of the bourgeoisie with the Socialist conciliators.—I 183, 197.

BUCHANAN, GEORGE (1854-1924)—British Ambassador to Russia, 1910-1918. See Vol. XX.—I 238; II 102.

BUKHARIN, N. I. (born 1888)—Prominent Bolshevik, economist. In 1906 worked as propagandist, organiser and agitator in various districts of Moscow; in 1908 was co-opted by the Moscow Committee of the Party. In 1911, after a third arrest, was tried by the Moscow Judicial Chamber; released on bond, emigrated abroad. Lived in Cracow, from where he was exiled shortly before the war to Switzerland. Took part in the Berne Conference of the foreign sections of the Bolsheviks. In the summer of 1915, went to Sweden and took part in the work of the Swedish Left Social-Democrats. Put on trial in the case of Höglund and others for anti-militarist propaganda and was exiled. In New York took part together with L. Trotsky in editing the Russian socialist paper, *Novy Mir*. During the period of the war maintained anti-Leninist "left" views on the national question, the state, programme-

minimum, etc. After the February Revolution, upon his return to Russia, became member of Moscow Committee, the Moscow Regional Bureau, and joined the editorial staff of *Sotsial-Demokrat*. At the Sixth Party Congress in July, 1917, was elected to the Central Committee, of which he has been a member to the present time. After the October Revolution, editor of the *Pravda*. At the time of the discussion about the Brest-Litovsk peace and the subsequent inter-Party struggle, was the head of the "Left Communists" and published the journal, *Kommunist* (after having left the *Pravda*). After the November Revolution in Germany, acknowledged his mistake. At the Eighth Party Congress maintained his mistaken views of the war period in a somewhat modified form on the question of the programme. In the discussion on the trade union question in 1920-1921 held at the beginning a "buffer" position and then joined with the Trotsky group. Shared the views of A. Bogdanov on proletarian culture; in 1923-1927 took part in the party struggle against Trotskyism and the "new" (united) opposition (Trotsky, Kamenev, Zinoviev). Since 1928 began to show deviations from the general line of the Party which soon shaped themselves into the opportunistic platform of the Right opposition, as a result of which the April Plenum of the Central Committee (1929) removed Bukharin from the office of responsible editor of the central organ, the *Pravda*, as well as from his work in the Comintern; the Tenth Enlarged Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International removed him from office as a member of the praesidium of the Comintern. The November Plenum of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U. removed Bukharin from the Political Bureau of the C.C. as the ideologist of the Right opposition. Upon conclusion of the Plenum Bukharin, together with A. Rykov and M. Tomsky, submitted a declaration to the Political Bureau acknowledging his mistakes. Since 1930 has been chief of the Planning Sector of the Scientific Division of the Supreme Council of National Economy.—I 97; II 71, 88, 91 ff.

C.

CAVAIGNAC, EUGÈNE LOUIS (1802-1857)—French General. See Vol. XX.—I 36, 46, 47; II 209.

CHAIKOVSKY, N. V. (1850-1926)—Populist. In 1869-1871 grouped around himself a circle of St. Petersburg student youth which devoted itself to self-education and to propaganda among the intelligentsia and which later laid the foundation for the movement of "going among the people." In 1874 emigrated to America, together with the sectarian Malikov, who attempted to organise an agricultural colony there. After the failure of this attempt Chaikovsky settled in London. In the 'nineties took part in the publication of the leaflets of the "Fund for a Free Russian Press" of a moderately Populist standpoint; afterward gradually withdrew from political activity. After the February Revolution returned to Russia. Was member of the defensist C.E.C.; later a member of the White Guard government at Archangel which was formed under the protection of an English naval unit (1918-1919). After the evacuation of Archangel by the English and the collapse of the Northern front, he again emigrated abroad.—I 25, II 17.

CHERNOV, V. M. (born 1876)—S.-R. leader. Began political activity in the 'nineties in the ranks of the "Party of the People's Rights." Emigrated in 1899; abroad he became the head first of the Union and later of the Party of the Socialist-Revolutionaries as its ideologist and leader (was a permanent member of the C.C. and editor of the central organ *Revolyutsionnaya Rossiya*). Spoke and wrote continually in "criticism" of Marxism and particularly attempted to show its "inconsistency" as applied to agriculture (these articles are analysed by Lenin in his work: "The Agrarian Question and 'Critics of Marx'"—see *The Iskra Period, Collected Works, Volume IV*). During the war held a vacillating position between internationalism and defensism, took part in the Zimmerwald Conference (abstained from voting on its manifesto). Arch-defensist upon his return to Russia after the February Revolution. Minister of Agriculture in the first Coalition Cabinet of the Provisional Government, which fought against the peasants who were seizing the land of the great estates. Resigned after the July days. On January 18, 1918, was elected chairman of the Constituent Assembly. Took active part in the Czecho-Slovakian-S.-R. uprising on the Volga in 1918; headed the congress of the members of the Constituent Assembly in Ufa; was arrested by Kolchak but soon released. Took part in the Paris Congress of the members of the Constituent Assembly (February, 1921), which appointed a committee consisting of S.-R.'s and Cadets; attempted to give energetic aid to the Cronstadt uprising from Reval whither he had gone for this special purpose.—I 15, 36, 46, 47, 60, 63, 74, 76, 77, 81, 87 ff., 111, 122, 130, 132, 145, 162, 167, 168, 182, 198, 204, 211, 212, 226, 242, 244 ff.; II 24, 27, 28, 48, 120, 124, 149, 160, 187, 212, 226, 245.

CHKHEIDZE, N. S. (1864-1926)—Menshevik leader. See Vol. XX.—I 17, 18, 20, 22.

CORNELISSEN—Dutch anarchist-communist of the syndicalist type. One of the followers of Kropotkin, adherent of the materialist conception of history, opponent of parliamentarism. Considered it possible to accomplish revolution by means of the general strike; considered the existence of a revolutionary army permissible during the transition period. During the imperialist war, was with those favouring the defense of the fatherland.—II 227.

D.

DAN, THEODORE (born 1871)—Menshevik leader. See Vol. XX.—I 46, 55, 76, 103, 111, 112, 145, 211, 244 ff., 250, 252, 276 ff.; II 27, 44, 69, 115, 116, 120, 121, 124, 136.

DANTON, GEORGES-JACQUES (1759-1794)—One of the leaders and organisers of the great French Revolution. On June 17, 1791, Danton appeared as a Republican, appealing to the people on the Champ de Mars to sign a petition to depose the king. Chairman of Jacobin Club during its first period and prominent worker in the commune of Paris. Took active part in deposing

the king and seizing the Tuileries (August 10, 1791); later a member of the government as Minister of Justice and deputy from Paris to the National Convention. Together with Robespierre headed the "Mountain" and fought the Girondists. One of the inspirers of the Revolution, a splendid and flaming orator who enjoyed immense popularity among the masses. He exerted his greatest influence from April to September, 1793. In 1793 formed a moderate group that fought the dictatorship of Robespierre and the Committee of Public Safety. At the demand of Robespierre Danton was put on trial in 1794 before the Revolutionary Tribunal by the National Convention and was executed.—II 98.

DAVID, EDUARD (born 1863)—German Social-Democrat. See Vol. XX.—II 149, 186, 245, 246.

DREYFUS, ALFRED (born 1859)—Officer of French general staff, Jew; though innocent, was convicted in 1894 by a court martial on a false accusation of treason and sentenced to solitary confinement for life. Dreyfus was sentenced under the pressure of the general staff under the leadership of monarchists, clericals and anti-Semites—officers belonging to the most reactionary groups of the French army—seeking to protect those who were really responsible for the betraying of military secrets to Germany. At the same time the trial was intended to deal a moral blow at the Republican régime which had given Jews the right to serve as officers in the French army. In the fall of 1897 the Socialists and the more progressive elements of the bourgeois democracy started a campaign for a rehearing of the Dreyfus case, and the question assumed a political aspect, for under the slogans "For and Against a Rehearing" a struggle was really going on between the republicans and the monarchists, who made several attempts at a military coup d'état. The case caused immense excitement in the country and was accompanied by mass demonstrations, excited press disputes, etc. Under the pressure of public opinion Dreyfus was pardoned and released in 1899.—I 26, 27, 41, 52.

DUBASOV—Non-partisan officer, served at the front.—I 274; II 56, 69.

DÜHRING, E. (1833-1901)—German economist and philosopher. Arch-opponent of Marx and of scientific Socialism; attempted to create his own "philosophy of actuality"; in political economy repeated the thesis of Cary about the share of the working class in distribution increasing with social progress and the conciliation of class antagonism in the process of production. Eclectic, declaring himself a "restorer of science" and "unifier of truth," he enjoyed, however, great, though short-lived, popularity in Germany. Marx and Engels gave an annihilating criticism of Dühring's views in their *Anti-Dühring*.—II 165, 197.

F.

FALKNER, M. N. (M. Smith)—Economist and statistician. In 1917 she collaborated on the *Novaya Zhizn*. At present a Communist, member of the

Central Statistical Department of the U.S.S.R., member of the Communist Academy, instructor in several schools of higher education.—I 205.

FÜRSTENBERG, JACOB—See *Hanecki, J. S.*

G.

GAGARIN—General in tsarist army; actively supported Kornilov revolt.—I 168, 257.

GE, ALEXANDER—Russian anarchist-communist. Favoured Soviet power; was member of All-Union Central Executive Committee; executed by Whites in the Caucasus in 1918.—II 227.

GRAVE, J.—French anarchist-communist, follower of Kropotkin and E. Reclus; anti-parliamentarian, favouring the general strike and terror (with reservations). Agitated for revolutionary overthrow on an international scale. During the war became an anarcho-patriot and defender of the French Republic.—II 227.

GUCHKOV, A. I. (born 1862)—Big Moscow capitalist and president of the Third Duma. See Vol. XX.—I 89, 235 ff., 253, 262; II 140.

GUESDE, JULES (1845-1922)—French Socialist leader. See Vol. XX.—I 119, 124; II 149.

GVOZDEV, K. A. (born 1883)—Menshevik-Liquidator. See Vol. XX.—I 273; II 28, 125.

H.

HANECKI, J. S. (born 1879)—One of the oldest members of the Social-Democracy of Poland and Lithuania and member of the Central Committee, and after the split in it, member of the Regional Committee. Delegate of the Polish Social-Democracy to the Second, Fourth, and Fifth Congresses of the R.S.-D.L.P. At the Fifth, became a member of the Russian C.C. Participated in the Basle International Congress in 1912. After the February Revolution, lived in Stockholm, keeping up communication between the Russian Bolsheviks and revolutionary Social-Democrats abroad. Later worked in the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. At present member of the Collegium of the Commissariat of Trade of the U.S.S.R.—I 19 ff., 39, 59, 60.

HEGEL, G. (1770-1831)—Famous German idealist philosopher. The dialectic method of Hegelian philosophy exerted great influence on Marx, who developed the materialistic basis for the dialectic process. Hegel's philosophy was in its time a great success and had many followers in Germany and Russia. At present there has again arisen an interest in Hegel's philosophy.—II 154.

HENDERSON, ARTHUR (born 1863)—British trade union leader. See Vol. XX.—I 124; II 186.

HESSEN, I. V. (born 1866)—Lawyer; one of the leaders of Cadet Party; editor of newspaper *Ryech* and magazine *Pravo*; member of Second State Duma from Petrograd. After October Revolution, emigrated abroad and published newspaper *Rul* and *The Archives of the Russian Revolution*.—I 111 ff.

HILFERDING, RUDOLF (born 1877)—One of the leaders of German Social-Democracy, prominent theoretician and representative of so-called "Austrian Marxism." As a student of the medical faculty of the Vienna University became member of Austrian Social-Democratic Party. In 1906 went to Germany where he took an active part in directing the Social-Democratic Party school, collaborated in the theoretical journal of the German Social-Democracy, *Neue Zeit*, and edited the *Vorwärts* (1907-1915). In 1910 published his major work, *Finanzkapital* in which he revealed a tendency to reconcile Marxism with opportunism. Was always close to Kautsky; during war was a centrist. Joined Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany in 1917 and as the editor of its central organ, *Die Freiheit*, and member of C.C., became major representative of bourgeois reformist policy of party. After November Revolution of 1918 was member of government commission on socialisation. In 1919-1920 fought against Independents joining Communist International. In 1923 Minister of Finance in the coalition cabinet of Stresemann; in 1928-1929 member of coalition cabinet of Social-Democrat Müller. At the Kiel Conference of the Social-Democracy (1927) defended theory of "organised capitalism." At present one of the ideologists of social-fascism. Publishes journal, *Die Gesellschaft (Society)*, which is a successor to *Neue Zeit*.—II 84.

HINDENBURG, PAUL VON (born 1847)—President of German Republic. See Vol. XVIII.—I 39, 202.

HUTTUNEN—Finnish Social-Democrat; deputy in the Sejm, 1917. Rendered services to the Bolsheviks in the first period of the revolution, later, during the period of civil war in Finland, passed to the side of the bourgeoisie.—I 268.

HYNDMAN, H. M. (1842-1921)—One of the founders of British Socialist Party. See Vol. XVIII.—I 119, 124; II 149.

J.

JAURÈS, JEAN (1859-1914)—One of the most prominent leaders of the French Socialist movement. Originally a professor of philosophy in Toulouse and an idealist in philosophy. By a process of gradual evolution he later was converted to Socialism and attempted to reconcile Marxism with idealist philosophy. In general, stood in the Right Wing of French Socialism and at the beginning of the twentieth century supported the Socialist Millerand, who accepted a portfolio in the radical bourgeois Cabinet of Waldeck-Rousseau

(1899). The dispute arising on this action in the French party between the opportunists and the Marxists headed by Guesde, was decided by the International Socialist Congress of 1904 at Amsterdam in favour of the Marxists. Jaurès was first elected to parliament in 1885 as a Left Radical; in 1892 he was elected as an "Independent Socialist"; from 1902 he was the official representative of the Socialist Party and the leader of its parliamentary fraction. In 1897 Jaurès, together with Zola and Clemenceau, took an active part in the famous Dreyfus case and in 1904 he established the central organ of the party, *l'Humanité*, which he edited until his death. He was one of the best orators in Europe and a skilful parliamentarian. He fought with special energy against militarism, demanding a people's militia. He was a strong adherent of a Franco-German rapprochement. On August 1, 1914, on the eve of the war, Jaurès was murdered by the chauvinist Villain. The murderer of Jaurès was acquitted by the court.—II 234, 246.

JORDANIA, NOE (An Kostrov, born 1869)—Georgian Social-Democrat. See Vol. XVIII.—II 25.

K.

KALEDIN, A. M. (1861-1918)—General. In August, 1917, was elected by the Cossack army council as hetman of the Don army. During Kornilov revolt, attempted to support him by an uprising on the Don but was too late. After October, started civil war against the Soviets. Was defeated by partisan detachments of Red Guards consisting mainly of Moscow workers, and shot himself. During the struggle a part of the Cossacks at the front broke away from him and accepted the Soviet power.—I 105 ff., 144, 145, 168, 234, 235, 262.

KAMENEV, L. V. (Rosenfeld, born, 1883)—Joined the Social-Democratic organisation in 1901. After the split in the party in 1903 joined the Bolsheviks. After his arrest in St. Petersburg in 1908 went abroad where he joined the editorial staff of *Proletary* and collaborated on *Sotsial-Demokrat*. At the beginning of 1914 was sent by the C.C. to Russia to take charge of the work of the Social-Democratic fraction of the State Duma and the editorship of *Pravda*. Was arrested at a conference of the Bolshevik Duma fraction with representatives of party organisations and together with five deputies was exiled to Siberia (1915). He returned to Petrograd after the February Revolution and joined the editorial board of *Pravda*, where, in disagreement with the majority of the party, attempted to carry out an opportunistic line (defensism, limitation of tasks of working class to those of bourgeois-democratic revolution). At the All-Russian April Conference spoke against Lenin's "Theses"; was elected member of the C.C. In the fall of 1917 was against the uprising; his conduct during that period was branded by Lenin as strike-breaking. After the victory of the October Revolution insisted on necessity of immediate agreement and formation of Soviet Government together with Mensheviks and S.-R.'s. Disagreeing with the fundamental line of the party on this question, resigned from the C.C. on November 17. In the spring of 1919, as the Chairman of the Moscow Soviet, worked in the Ukraine to

arrange the military and provisioning apparatus. Fought Trotskyism energetically in 1923-1924; in 1925 headed the "new opposition" together with Zinoviev; in 1926 joined the "opposition bloc" headed by Trotsky. In November, 1927, expelled from the C.C. and in December, 1928, at the Fifteenth Congress of the Party, acknowledged his mistake and was reinstated as member of the Communist Party. Since 1929 chairman of the Concessions Committee. In the fall of 1932 again expelled from the party for continued opposition to decisions of party and supporting anti-party elements.—I 28, 40, 47, 94 ff., 112; II 129, 133 ff.

KAMENEV, U.—See *Kamenev, L. B.*

KAMKOV, B. D.—Left-Wing Socialist-Revolutionary. See Vol. XX.—I 147; II 120.

KATKOV, M. N. (1818-1887)—Publicist, representing the nobility-monarchist reaction of the 'sixties to 'eighties. In his student years was close to Belinsky, Herzen, and Bakunin. From 1851 editor of *Moskovskiy Vyedomosti*, originally edited in a liberal spirit; beginning with the 'sixties, especially after the Polish uprising of 1863, an archdefender of autocracy, police régime and every kind of reaction; fought vigorously against the slightest concessions to liberalism, the intellectuals, the "parlor radicals"; opposed the zemstvos, trial by jury and other institutions created by the reforms of the 'sixties. Katkov enjoyed great influence among the higher bureaucracy and the nobility at the end of the reign of Alexander II and during the reign of Alexander III.—I 116.

KAUTSKY, KARL (born 1854)—German Social-Democrat. Most prominent theoretician of Marxism of the epoch of the Second International; economist, historian. Joined the Social-Democracy in 1874. Became a Marxist under the direct influence of Marx and Engels. Since 1883 has been the editor of the scientific Marxist journal, *Die Neue Zeit* which he founded. Fought against the revisionism of Bernstein and maintained an orthodox position, although even then he showed in many of his writings deviations from Marxism on dialectics, proletarian dictatorship, attitude towards Machism, etc. In his evaluation of the 1905 Revolution stood closer to the Bolsheviks than to the Mensheviks. In his *Road to Power*, written in 1909, expressed yet a Marxist point of view. Since that time opportunistic and centrist tendencies began to influence his political activity and theoretical work. During the war, Kautsky broke with Marxism altogether, and covered up his social-chauvinist position with internationalist phrases. Helped to found the Independent Social-Democratic Party and belonged to its Right Wing. After the October Revolution came out against the Soviet power, defending "pure" democracy and parliamentarism. After the November (1918) Revolution in Germany entered as Associate-Minister of Foreign Affairs into the Scheidemann cabinet. One of founders of Vienna (2½) International and in 1922 aided in bringing these centrist elements back into the Second International. In his recent writings, especially *Materialist Interpretation of History* (1927) showed complete deser-

tion of Marxism. A bitter enemy of the Soviet Union, Kautsky openly advocates intervention and war against it. See Lenin's *Proletarian Revolution and Renegade Kautsky*.—I 120; II 80, 149, 156, 159, 171, 176, 186, 191, 202, 203, 210, 232 ff.

KERENSKY, A. F. (born 1881)—Socialist-Revolutionist and premier of Russian Provisional Government. See Vol. XX.—I 20, 22, 35, 36, 47, 48, 53, 54, 60, 61, 74, 76, 78, 79, 85 ff., 105, 106, 137 ff., 157, 161, 168, 172 ff., 189, 191, 197, 204 ff., 226, 239, 242, 244 ff., 252, 258 ff., 265, 266, 273 ff.; II 22 ff., 42 ff., 59 ff., 101 ff., 114, 116, 118, 121, 124 ff., 130, 132, 135, 142, 144, 159, 208.

KISHKIN, N. M. (born 1864)—Physician, one of the leaders of the Cadet Party. In the summer of 1917 was elected by the bourgeois "Committee of Social Organisations" as Commissar of Moscow. Was a member in the last Cabinet of the Provisional Government. On the eve of the October Revolution, was appointed dictator of Petrograd to fight the Bolsheviks. Was arrested together with the Provisional Government at the Winter Palace on November 7, 1917; after his release, he energetically continued his counter-revolutionary work against the Soviet power. In 1919 was arrested as one of the leaders of the "tactical centre," a Denikin organisation in Moscow. In 1921 took part in social organisations established to fight the famine. At present works in the People's Commissariat of Health.—I 254, 277; II 17, 24, 25, 44.

KLEMBOVSKY, V. N. (born 1860)—General. Commander on the Northern front, sided with Kornilov. At the time of the Kornilov revolt, received an offer from the Provisional Government to take over the duties of commander-in-chief of the whole army. Klembovsky refused on the pretext of the danger involved in changing the supreme command. During the civil war Klembovsky entered the service of the Red Army and was executed for treason to the Soviet power.—I 161, 168, 257; II 67.

KOLB, W. (1870-1918)—German Social-Democrat. See Vol. XVIII.—II 246.

KOLLONTAI, A. M. (born 1872)—Bolshevik; in Soviet diplomatic service. See Vol. XVIII.—I 74.

KONOVALOV, A. I. (born 1875)—Large Russian textile manufacturer. See Vol. XX.—II 17.

KORNILOV, L. G. (1870-1918)—General. In 1915 commanded one of the Russian armies in Galicia; surrounded by the enemy, surrendered to the Austrians and later fled from their prison camp. In the spring of 1917, as commander of the armies of the Petrograd military district, ordered out the artillery against the workers during the April demonstrations; was compelled to resign at the demand of the Soviet. After the July days was appointed commander-in-chief of the Russian army. At the demand of Kornilov and the General Staff supporting him, the Provisional Government reintroduced capital punishment at the front, reduced the rights of the elected committees

practically to nothing, and undertook an energetic struggle against Bolshevik sentiment in the army. Thousands of soldiers were imprisoned. During the period of the Moscow State Conference, Kornilov was the idol of the bourgeoisie as the only man who could establish "order." In September, 1917, he started a march on Petrograd for the purpose of establishing a military dictatorship; the march ended in total failure. He then fled to the Don where, together with General Alexeyev, he became the head of the Volunteer Army, but was defeated by the Red Guards; retreated into the steppes at the beginning of 1918, and was killed in the battle of Ekaterinodar.—I 76, 92, 137, 138, 140, 145, 146, 155, 158, 160 ff., 189, 193, 202, 211, 212, 225 ff., 246 ff., 262; II 15, 43, 50, 54, 59 ff., 101 ff., 144.

KOZLOVSKY, M. U. (1876-1927)—Bolshevik, formerly a member of the S.-D. of Poland and Lithuania. Lawyer. In 1917, member of the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet and the first Central Executive Committee, chairman of the Vyborg district Duma. Later, worked in the Cheka, in the People's Commissariat of Justice, and in the Council of People's Commissars. During his last years he remained outside the party.—I 19 ff., 26, 39.

KРОПОТКИН, P. A. (1842-1921)—Founder of Anarcho-Communism. See Vol. XVIII.—II 227, 242.

KRYLENKO, N. V. (born 1885)—Old Bolshevik; Soviet Commissar of Justice. See Vol. XX.—II 64.

KUGELMANN, L. (1828-1902)—Hanover gynecologist, member of the First International, admirer and correspondent of Karl Marx in the period of 1864-1872, distributor of first volume of *Capital*. After the Hague Congress to which he was elected a delegate, Kugelmann became estranged from Marx, believing that Marx as a worker in politics imperiled himself as a scientist.—II 179 ff.

KUSKOVA, E. D. (born 1869)—Active in politics and a publicist. Began her social activity as a Marxist. At the end of the 'nineties active member of the "Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad." Afterward opposed the ideas of revolutionary Marxism, having adopted fully Bernstein's revision of Marxism. Author of the *Credo*. On the eve of Revolution of 1905, joined the liberal "Union of Liberation" and supported Struve's *Osvobozhdeniye*. However, when the Cadet Party was formed she did not join, and together with a group of persons with the same views (Prokopovich, Bogucharsky and others) established the journal, *Bez Zaglaviya (Without a Title)*, which stated its intention to be the organ of the "consistent Russian Bernsteinists." This journal and the newspaper *Tovarishch*, published by the same group, were open opponents of the class policy of the proletariat and while criticising here and there the too moderate tactics of the Cadets, really supported liberalism in the struggle against the proletarian party, as well as the Mensheviks in the struggle against the Bolsheviks. After the defeat of the 1905 Revolution, Kuskova worked in the co-operative movement. During the Revolution

of 1917, she adopted a liberal position and vigorously opposed the Bolsheviks and the Soviet power. At present, an émigré and collaborates on émigré papers. Lately, she has become, together with Peshekhonov, the head of the so-called "returners"—a movement favouring the return to the U.S.S.R. which gained ground among petty-bourgeois circles of émigrés.—II 17.

L.

LARIN, Y. (M. A. Lurie, born 1882)—Bolshevik writer and publicist. See Vol. XVIII.—II 63, 64, 94 ff.

LASSALLE, FERDINAND (1825-1864)—One of the most prominent leaders of the German labour movement, great orator and publicist. In 1848 took part in the revolutionary movement on the Rhine and collaborated on the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, which was edited by Marx. Taking as his premise the incorrect theory of the "iron law of wages," he assigned no significance to the economic struggle and trade union organisations of the proletariat and devoted his attention mainly to the conquest of universal suffrage, so as to enable the workers to exert influence upon the government with a view to receiving state credit for free workers' producing associations, these latter serving as a transitory stage for the gradual passage to a Socialist régime. For this purpose, entered into negotiations with Bismarck, which called forth the most vigorous protest from Marx and Engels. In 1863 founded the "General German Workers' Union" which for a long time fought the Social-Democratic Labour Party founded by A. Bebel and W. Liebknecht, but in the end the Union merged with the Social-Democrats in 1875, forming the United Socialist Labour Party of Germany, which subsequently adopted the name of Social-Democratic Party of Germany.—II 216, 222 ff.

LECIEN, KARL (1861-1920)—Reformist leader of German trade unions. See Vol. XX.—II 149, 186, 188, 245 ff.

LENSCH, PAUL (born 1873)—Left Social-Democrat, later German chauvinist. See Vol. XVIII.—I 210.

LIBER (M. I. Goldman, born 1880)—Menshevik leader. See Vol. XX.—I 102, 145, 244, 250, 252, 276 ff.; II 27, 69, 115 ff., 120, 124, 136.

LIEBKNECHT, KARL (1871-1919)—Militant internationalist and one of founders of German Communist Party. See Vol. XX.—I 119, 123, 271; II 100, 119, 121.

LIEBKNECHT, WILHELM (1826-1900)—One of founders of German Social-Democratic Party. See Vol. XX.—II 202, 204.

LINDE—Ensign, Social-Democrat-Internationalist, headed the soldiers' demonstrations in the April days in 1917. Later was commissar at the front, where he was killed in an attempt to induce the soldiers into battle.—I 232.

ЛОМОВ-ОПРОВОК (pen-name, A. Lomov, born 1888)—Prominent Bolshevik, economist, writer. Began his revolutionary activity in 1905. During the years of reaction worked in Moscow and Petrograd. Belonged for a time to the "Vperyod" group. During the war worked in Saratov and was exiled to Eastern Siberia in 1916. Worked in the Moscow Regional Bureau of the C.C. in 1917 and in the same year elected to the C.C. Took an active part in the October uprising in Moscow. Later belonged to the "Left" Communists. At present director of the coal industry in the Donnetz Basin.—II 71 n.

LUXEMBURG, ROSA (1871-1919)—Leader of the Lefts of German Social-Democracy and one of founders of Communist Party of Germany. Took part in the German, Polish and Russian labour movements, author of many theoretical works on economic and other questions. Was born in Poland; emigrated to Zurich in 1889. Took part in the formation of the Social-Democratic Party of Poland (later the Social-Democratic Party of Poland and Lithuania) in 1889. Since 1897 took a most active and prominent part in the German Social-Democratic movement and in the Second International, remaining always in the Left Wing of the party and fighting Bernsteinism and its French counterpart, Millerandism. In 1904, favoured the point of view of the Mensheviks on the organisational question, but left them at the London Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. in 1907, joining with the Bolsheviks in the fight against the Mensheviks. In the fall of the same year joined with Lenin at the Stuttgart Congress in introducing revolutionary Marxian amendments to the resolution on war. Long before the world war, fought Kautsky and the other representatives of the "centre" and headed the left opposition in the party, without however raising the question of breaking with it. During the struggle of the Bolsheviks against the Liquidators held a conciliatory position, supporting the Mensheviks on many questions of principle. From the very beginning of the imperialist war took an internationalist position, without being ready however to break with the Social-Democracy. Was in prison practically during the entire period of the war (from February, 1915). Collaborated in the underground "Letters of Spartacus," prepared the "Guiding Principles"—the platform of the Internationalists—adopted in January, 1916, by the German conference of the Internationalist group (K. Liebknecht, Mehring and others). In the spring of the same year under the pen-name of Junius she wrote the pamphlet *Crisis of Social-Democracy*, in which she pointed out the necessity of forming the Third International. In the pamphlet *Russian Revolution*, written in prison (September, 1918), made several mistakes in the evaluation of the October Revolution, the majority of which were later corrected by her. After the November Revolution in Germany she broke with the Social-Democracy, established and edited the *Rote Fahne* and took an active part in the organisation congress of the Communist Party of Germany. After the suppression of the January uprising of 1919 she was arrested by the Scheidemann Socialist Government and murdered. While her revolutionary services to the labour movement of the world were really great, she allowed many serious mistakes of a semi-Menshevik nature in her theoretical and tactical views (Luxemburgism on questions of rôle of party, of imperialism, on national,

colonial and peasant problems, on questions of permanent revolution, etc.).—II 239.

LVOV, PRINCE G. J. (1861-1925)—Large landowner and member of Provisional Government. See Vol. XX.—I 15; II 138, 140 ff.

M.

MACLEAN, JOHN (1879-1923)—English Left Socialist. See Vol. XX.—I 119, 123, 271.

MACMAHON, M. (1808-1893)—Marshal of France, active in politics. Commanded army during the Franco-Prussian War in 1870, suffered severe defeat and was compelled to entrench in the fortress of Sedan, where he soon surrendered his entire army, although the possibilities for further resistance were by no means exhausted. Released by the Prussians after the truce, he took an active part in the struggle against the Paris Commune. In 1873 was elected President of the Republic by the votes of the three monarchist parties that were predominant in the Legislative Chambers of the Third Republic but was unable to come to an understanding with the pretender to the throne. In November of the same year his authority as the head of the state was continued for another term of seven years. In 1879 MacMahon resigned.—I 155.

MAKLAKOV, V. A. (born 1869)—Kerensky's ambassador to Paris in 1917. See Vol. XX.—I 236, 262; II 65, 67.

MARKOV, N. J. (born 1866)—Member of reactionary Union of Russian People. See Vol. XVIII.—I 40.

MARTOV, L.—(1873-1923)—Menshevik leader. See Vol. XVIII.—I 71, 98 ff., 115, 147, 150, 156, 256; II 26, 120.

MARX, KARL (1818-1883)—The founder of scientific Socialism. See biography of him written by Lenin in 1914 (*The Imperialist War, Collected Works*, Vol. XVIII).—I 66, 68, 133, 141, 222, 224, 227; II 25, 26, 41, 52, 77, 95, 97 ff., 126, 149 *et seq.*

MASLOV, S. L.—Right-Wing Socialist-Revolutionary. See Vol. XX.—II 138 ff., 142.

MEHRING, FRANZ (1846-1919)—Marxist historian and one of founders of German Communist Party. See Vol. IV.—II 175.

MIKHAILOVSKY, N. K. (1842-1904)—Most prominent theoretician of Populism, "dominator of thoughts" of the Russian intelligentsia of the 'eighties and 'nineties; he gave it his own theory of "historical process." At the beginning of the 'eighties he was close to the *Narodovoltsi* (People's Will Party), sponsoring and editing their publication. Was one of the editors of the *Otechest-*

venniye Zapiski (*Notes of the Fatherland*) in 1869-1884; from 1894 on was an editor of *Russkoye Bogatstvo* (*Russian Wealth*), and in this, from the 'nineties to his very death, conducted an extremely embittered polemic against the Marxists. The S.-R.'s consider Mikhailovsky and P. L. Lavrov the ones who laid the foundation for their party.—II 157.

MILLERAND, A. (1859-1931)—Former premier and president of French Republic. See Vol. XVIII.—II 234.

MILYUKOV, PAUL (born 1859)—Leader of Constitutional-Democratic Party. See Vol. XX.—I 32, 40, 42, 70, 76, 111, 112, 135, 138, 188, 211, 235 *ff.*, 240, 253, 262; II 125, 140.

MILYUTIN, V. P. (born 1887)—Bolshevik. Originally worked with the Mensheviks but broke with them before the war. At the April Conference in 1917 was elected to the C.C.; wrote for the *Pravda* and the other Bolshevik papers which took its place. After the October Revolution became a member of the Council of People's Commissars in the capacity of People's Commissar of Agriculture. After October withdrew together with Rykov, Nogin and others from the Council of People's Commissars; later was vice-chairman of the Supreme Council of National Economy, member of the Central Control Commission.—II 71 *n.*, 109.

M—IN, V.—See *Milyutin, V. P.*

MONTESQUIEU, CHARLES L. (1684-1765)—French philosopher and liberal political writer. In his chief work, *The Spirit of the Law*, he gives a sociological interpretation of the different social institutions and demands the organisation of the state based on law and the separation of powers (legislative, executive and judicial) and the safeguarding of the rights of the individual. His principles of the state became the foundation of most of the constitutions of the European states, and particularly of the Constitution of the United States of America.—II 193.

N.

NAPOLEON I (Bonaparte, 1769-1821)—French Emperor, 1804-1815.—II 171.

NAPOLEON, LOUIS—See *Napoleon III.*

NAPOLEON III (1808-1873)—French Emperor, 1852-1870.—I 116; II 170.

NEKRASOV, N. V. (born 1879)—Left Constitutional-Democrat. See Vol. XX.—I 76, 189.

NICHOLAS II (1868-1918)—Last Tsar of Russia.—I 64, 81, 83, 89, 151, 245.

NIKITIN, A. M.—Menshevik. See Vol. XVIII.—I 273, 275; II 28, 44, 125.

P.

PALCHINSKY, P.—Big Russian industrialist. See Vol. XX.—I 88, 168 ff., 203; II 160.

PANEKOEK, ANTON (K. Horner)—Left Dutch Socialist. See Vol. XX.—II 239 ff.

PANINA, S. V.—Countess, member C.C. of Cadet Party. Associate Minister in last Kerensky Cabinet. At the end of 1917 was put on trial before the Petrograd tribunal for failure to give up government money and was sentenced to public censure (first trial before the Revolutionary Tribunal).—I 82.

PARVUS (A. L. Helphand, 1869-1924)—Russian, active in German Social-Democracy. See Vol. XX.—I 26, 27, 39, 59.

PEREVERZEV, P. N.—Trudovik; Minister of Justice in first Coalition Cabinet. See Vol. XX.—I 34, 41 ff., 73; II 53.

PESHEKHONOV, A. V. (born 1867)—Leader of the People's Socialists. See Vol. XX.—I 17, 132, 162, 168, 169, 203, 204, 242; II 30, 48 ff.

PETROVSKY, G. I. (born 1879)—Old Bolshevik; Chairman All-Ukrainian C.E.C. of Soviets and of C.E.C. of Soviet Union. See Vol. XVIII.—II 64.

PIROGOV, N. I. (1810-1881)—Famous surgeon and pedagogue, prominent social worker, author of many books on medicine.—I 116.

PLANSON, A. A.—St. Petersburg lawyer, People's Socialist, member of first C.E.C. Defensist, an adherent of the Coalition Cabinet in 1917. One of the leaders of the All-Russian railroad union, an organisation which was in the hands of the conciliators.—II 121.

PLEKHANOV, G. V. (1856-1918)—One of the founders and chief theoreticians of Russian Marxism. At the beginning took part in the *Zemlya i Volya* (Land and Liberty) Party; after its split at the Voronezh Conference, headed the *Chorny Peredyel* (Black Redistribution [of Land]). After emigrating abroad, broke with populism and together with Axelrod, Zasulich, Deutsch, and Ignatov, founded abroad in 1883 the first Russian Social-Democratic organisation, the Emancipation of Labour Group. In the 'nineties conducted energetic struggle against populism, Bernsteinism and its counterpart on Russian soil, "Economism." In the 1900's he became one of the editors of *Iskra* (*Spark*) and *Zarya* (*Dawn*), at whose instruction he prepared a draft of the Party programme which was subjected to severe criticism by Lenin and after its correction by Plekhanov became the principle or theoretical part of the draft of the *Iskra* Party programme (agrarian part written mostly by Lenin), which was adopted by the Second Party Congress with minor changes. After the split in 1903 he adhered first to the Bolsheviks and then to the Men-

sheviks, but soon also left the latter, remaining, however, ideologically close to them. With the development of the Liquidators he again came closer to the Bolsheviks in the struggle with the former. During the imperialist war became the head of the extreme Right of the defensists (*Prizyv*) and continued the same line after the February Revolution (*Yedinstvo*), at the same time favouring the giving of decisive support to the Provisional Government. After the July days took an open counter-revolutionary position, in favour of the establishment of a "strong government." Maintained a hostile attitude towards the October Revolution. Lenin valued highly the theoretical and philosophical works of Plekhanov, but pointed out many of his serious mistakes (recognition of theory of hieroglyphs, incorrect understanding of the substance of dialectics, etc.).—I 27, 31, 59, 87, 119, 120, 124, 165, 169, 188, 211, 212, 230, 237 ff.; II 24, 48, 50, 66, 130, 149, 178, 180, 186, 188, 191, 227, 232 ff.

POLOVTSEV, P.—General, commander of the armies of Petrograd military district in the summer of 1917. In the July days took charge of the suppression of the movement and the wrecking of the *Pravda*.—I 20, 23, 24, 73, 74.

POTRESOV, A. N. (Starover, born 1869)—One of the leaders of the Mensheviks. In the 'nineties became a Marxist, in 1894-1896 collaborated in the publication of the legal Marxist collection, *Materials* (with an article by Lenin-Tulin), and the book by Beltov (Plekhanov) *On the Question of the Development of the Monistic Conception of History* and was in close contact with the St. Petersburg "League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class." In 1899 was exiled to Vyatka province and while there collaborated in the Marxian journals *Novoye Slovo* and *Nachalo*. After completing his term of exile, emigrated abroad in 1900 and participated together with Lenin in the organisation of *Iskra* and *Zarya*. At the Second Congress of the R.S.-D.L.P. (1903), joined the Mensheviks and since that time has been one of the most prominent collaborators and editors of the Menshevik publications. After the 1905 Revolution, stayed in Russia and played a leading part in the legal Menshevik press (*Nasha Zarya*). One of the leaders of liquidationism. In 1908 edited together with Martov and Maslov the five-volume work *Social Movements in Russia at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century*. During the war was one of the most open defenders of social-patriotism. In 1917 was one of the chief collaborators on the bourgeois paper *Dyen*, which conducted a raging campaign against the Bolsheviks.—I 165, 169, 188, 230, 238, 246; II 125, 149, 245.

PRLEZHAYEV, I.—Populist, collaborator on the S.-R. paper *Dyelo Naroda*.—I 169, 170.

PROKOPOVICH, S. N. (born 1871)—Economist and social worker; for some time was member of "Union of Russian Social-Democrats," extremely Right "Economist." Soon left Social-Democracy for the liberals and joined the "Union of Liberation." Member C.C. Cadet Party in 1906; later took position "to the Left of the Cadets." In 1906 published small radical journal *Ber Zaglaviya*. Minister of Supplies in Kerensky's government in 1917. Author

of several works on the labour question from a bourgeois-democratic point of view.—I 189; II 28.

PROUDHON, P. J. (1809-1865)—Ideologist of the petty bourgeoisie, French theoretician of Anarchism. Believing that the cause of all the evils of capitalist society is the modern commodity form of exchange, he proposed a Utopian system as a method to reorganise the social order. His system of society is built on the principles of mutuality by means of organising free credit and exchange banks, thus perpetuating small-scale private property. *The Poverty of Philosophy*, by Karl Marx, is devoted to an analysis of Proudhon's views. His chief works are: *The Philosophy of Poverty*, *System of Economic Contradictions*, *What is Property?* etc.—II 86, 191 ff., 232.

R.

RADEK, K. B. (born 1883)—Left Social-Democrat, then Communist; prominent publicist. Was active worker of Social-Democracy in Galicia since 1901. Worked with the Polish Social-Democracy in 1904-1908, then went to Germany where he joined the Left Wing of the German S.-D. As disciple of R. Luxemburg shared her mistakes on the national question and other questions. Took part in the Zimmerwald and Kienthal Conferences, was member of Bureau of the "Zimmerwald Left." Ideological leader of the so-called "Left radicals" (Bremen). In 1917 worked in Stockholm to establish connections between the C.C. of the Bolsheviks and foreign revolutionary internationalists. In October, 1917, came to Petrograd and joined the Communist Party. In 1918 adhered to the "Left Communists." After conclusion of Brest-Litovsk peace, headed the Central European Department of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. In November, 1918, went to Germany illegally, as member of Soviet delegation to First German Congress of Soviets. Took part in organisation congress of German Communist Party and was arrested by the Scheidemann Government. After his release from prison in December of the same year returned to Russia. Member of delegation of Communist International to Congress of Three Internationals in 1922. Joined the Trotsky Opposition in 1924 and became one of its leaders. Was expelled from the C.P.S.U. by the Fifteenth Congress of the party in 1927. He acknowledged his mistakes in 1929 and was reinstated as a member of the party. Member of editorial staff of the *Izvestiya* since 1931.—II 239.

RAKITNIKOV, N. I. (born 1864)—Populist, member of Socialist-Revolutionary Party from its foundation and member of its C.C. Publicist and editor of S.-R. papers in Russia and abroad, defensist, favoured a coalition. In 1918, during the Czecho-Slovakian uprising worked with the S.-R.'s; after Kolchak dispersed the Ufa Directory, returned to Moscow, accepted the Soviet power and took part in the organisation of the Left S.-R. group "Narod" (Rakitnikov, Svyatitsky, Volsky and others).—I 46; II 125.

RENAUDEL, PAUL (born 1871)—French Socialist leader. See Vol. XX.—I 119, 123; II 118 ff., 149, 186.

RODBERTUS-JACETZOW, K. (1805-1875)—Big Prussian landowner, economist. Adhered to the classical school of political economy; one of the major theoreticians of "state" Socialism (as Marx called it, "Prussian-Junker" Socialism). His views were summarised and analysed as early as the 'eighties by Plekhanov in *Notes of the Fatherland*.—II 78.

RODZIANKO, M. V. (1859-1924)—Russian reactionary leader. See Vol. XX.—I 138, 246; II 67, 116 ff., 121 ff., 125, 131, 132, 135.

ROLOVICH—Member of Central Supply Committee, 1917; representative of the interests of private capital.—I 205.

ROVIO, GUSTAV—Finnish Social-Democrat, worker; in connection with the revolutionary events in September, 1917, was put up by labour organisations as "Red" chief of police of Helsingfors. Lenin hid in his house after the July days. Now a Communist.—I 268.

RUBANOVICH, I. A. (1860-1920)—Socialist-Revolutionary leader. See Vol. XVIII.—II 149.

RUSANOV, N. S. (pen-name Tarasov Kudrin, born 1859)—Publicist, author of many popular books and pamphlets. In his youth a member of the People's Will; later took part in the organisation of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. Spent many years among the émigrés; organised in 1893 in Paris "Group of Old Members of the People's Will," which later entered the organisation of the Socialist-Revolutionaries. In 1901 edited in Paris the journal *Vestnik Russkoi Revolyutsii* (*Harbinger of the Russian Revolution*) and other Populist publications; later was closely connected with the central organ of the S.-R. Party, *Revolyutsionaya Rossiya*, published abroad; at the same time collaborated in the journal *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, founded by Mikhailovsky. In 1917 was, together with Chernov, a member of the editorial board of *Dyelo Naroda* in Petrograd, the central organ of the Socialist-Revolutionaries after the February Revolution. At present an émigré.—II 187.

RYABUSHINSKY, P. P.—One of the biggest Moscow capitalists and banker. At the Second All-Russian Conference of Industrialists, during the summer of 1917, appealed to the "bony hand of famine" to put down the revolutionary workers. At present lives in Paris, taking part in the "Union of Russian Industrialists," continuing his counter-revolutionary activities.—I 183, 235, 236, 262; II 125.

RYAZANOV (D. B. Goldendach, born 1870)—One of the oldest Russian Social-Democrats; organised labour circles in Odessa during the first half of the 'nineties. After completing a five-year term in the "Kresti" prison, emigrated abroad. One of the founders of the Social-Democratic group "Borba" (Struggle) abroad at the beginning of the 1900's; in the *Iskra* period this group took an intermediary position between the Economists and the *Iskra*-ists, attempting to conciliate these two currents. During the first revolution,

worked for some time in Odessa and then in organising trade unions in St. Petersburg. Was compelled to go abroad again where he devoted most of his time to the foreign Social-Democratic movement and to the publication of the works of Marx and Engels, as well as to the history of the First International. Writer in many Russian and German party publications. During the war, a centrist and collaborator on the newspapers *Golos* and *Nashe Slovo*. After the February Revolution returned to Russia and joined the Bolshevik Party. Took prominent part in the trade union movement but because of his deviation on some questions of trade unionism from the party line, was in May, 1921, removed from work in that field. Organiser of the Institute of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, of which he was director until his expulsion from the Communist Party in 1931.—II 128.

S.

SAVINKOV, B. V. (Pseudonym Ropshin, 1879-1925)—Prominent worker of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. Started revolutionary activity as a Social-Democrat. In 1901 was member of the group of propagandists of the St. Petersburg "League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class" and after his arrest was exiled to Vologda province. During his stay in exile was converted from Marxism to Populism and joined the Socialist-Revolutionaries; in 1903 became a member of the military organisation of the S.-R.'s. Took most active part in the killing of Minister von Plehve (1904) and Grand Duke Sergei Romanov (1905). In his terroristic work was closely connected with the notorious provocateur Azef. The activity of Savinkov always had, even at the time of his sincere enthusiasm for the revolution, many elements of adventurism. During the years of reaction, took up belles lettres (under the pen-name V. Ropshin) and wrote several novels of revolutionary life, breathing mysticism and disappointment in the revolutionary movement. During the war, a defensist, entered as a volunteer into the French army, served as correspondent of patriotic newspapers. In the summer of 1917, commissar at headquarters at the front, Associate War Minister under Kerensky; played the part of intermediary between Kerensky and Kornilov in the preparation of the counter-revolutionary revolt and energetically co-operated with Kornilov. After the October Revolution, an active enemy of the Soviet power, organiser of White Guard conspiracies and uprisings, émigré. Arrested in 1924 while stealing over the frontier of the U.S.S.R. While on trial, he renounced the struggle against the Soviet power. Was sentenced to imprisonment for ten years. Committed suicide in 1925.—I 76, 246.

SCHUIDEMANN, PHILIP (born 1865)—Right-Wing German Socialist leader and chancellor. See Vol. XX.—I 119, 122 ff., 210; II 118 ff., 149, 185, 188, 245.

SEMBAT, M. (1862-1922)—French Socialist leader. See Vol. XVIII.—II 186, 188.

SHINGAREV, A. I. (1869-1918)—Leader of Constitutional-Democrats. See Vol. XX.—I 189; II 31, 140.

SHOTMAN, A. V. (Gorsky, born 1880)—Prominent Bolshevik, metal worker. Began his revolutionary activity in 1899 in the St. Petersburg "League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class." Took part in the "Obukhov defence" (1901). In 1902-1903 was member of the St. Petersburg committee (the *Iskra*-ist) from which he was a delegate to the Second Congress of the R.S.-D.L.P., where he was a member of the "majority." After the Second Congress he was sent to Smolensk and put at the disposal of the C.C. member Noskov. Later worked in the Northern committee of the party. At the beginning of 1904 was arrested, got out of prison in February, 1905, later worked in Odessa, in St. Petersburg and in Helsingfors (1910-1912), where he entered the Helsingfors Committee of the Finnish S.-D. Party. In 1912 went to see Lenin in Paris. In 1913 went to Vienna on instructions from the Bolshevik centre; took part in one of the Poronin conferences, was co-opted into the C.C. and sent to work in South Russia. In November, 1913, was arrested in Ekaterinoslav and exiled to the Narim region, where he stayed until the February Revolution. During the war held an internationalist position (defeatist). In June, 1917, worked in Petrograd and maintained connections with the Finnish S.-D. Party. In July and up to October, using his Finnish connections, he organised Lenin's trip to Finland. After the victory of the October Revolution and up to January, 1918, was a member of the collegium of the People's Commissariat of Post and Telegraph, then member of the presidium of the Supreme Council of National Economy, chairman of the Ural-Siberian Commission of the Council of Labour and Defence (in Omsk) and at the same time member of the Siberian Revolutionary Committee, chairman of the Karelian Autonomous S.S.R. (1922-1925), chairman of the Society of Radio Communication. Beginning with the Thirteenth Party Congress, member of the Central Control Commission. At present member of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R.—II 109.

SKOBELEV, M. I. (born 1855)—Leading Menshevik. See Vol. XX.—I 87, 88, 96, 105, 106, 122 ff., 130, 140, 145, 191, 204; II 160, 187.

SKOROPIS-YOLTUKHOVSKY, A.—Ukrainian nationalist, leader of the "Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine," a bourgeois-nationalist organisation spreading propaganda at the bidding of the German military staff among captured Ukrainians of the Russian army who were in German concentration camps.—I 18, 135.

SMILGA, I. T. (Born 1892)—Entered Social-Democratic Party in 1907. Twice suffered exile. Elected to Central Committee at the April, 1917, Party Conference. Member of Revolutionary Military Council during civil war and participated at the front. Later transferred to Supreme Economic Council. As one of the leaders of Trotsky opposition was expelled from the party by the Fifteenth Party Congress in 1927. After issuing a statement in 1929 acknowledging his mistakes and renouncing his participation in the factional struggle, was readmitted to membership in the party.—II 165.

SMIRNOV, V. M.—Worked in Moscow in 1917; one of the editors of the Moscow *Sotsial-Demokrat*; member Military-Revolutionary Committee of the

Moscow Soviet during the October days; took part in the civil war on the eastern front. Afterward worked on economic journals. "Left", Communist in 1918, later joined the opposition group of "democratic centralism"; after 1923 took part in the Trotsky Opposition. In 1926, after having broken with the Trotskyists, formed together with Sapronov a new opposition group which issued the so-called "Platform of 15." In December, 1927, at the Fifteenth Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik) was expelled from the party.—II 71 n., 88, 91.

SMITH, M.—See *Falkner, M. N.*

SOKOLNIKOV, G. A. (born 1888)—Prominent Bolshevik. From 1905 to 1907 worked in the Moscow organisation. Emigrated abroad in 1909. During the war, internationalist. After February Revolution did party work in the Moscow Regional Bureau of the R.S.-D.L.P. and in the Moscow Soviet, then in Petrograd; edited *Pravda* and the other papers that took its place after the July days; was chairman of the Soviet delegation in Brest-Litovsk in March, 1918, and signed the peace agreement there. During the civil war worked at the fronts as one of the most responsible military workers. Was People's Commissar of Finance of the U.S.S.R.; repeatedly elected to the C.C. In 1925 at the Fourteenth Congress joined the "New Opposition"; but soon broke with it. In 1928-1929 was chairman of the Oil Syndicate and later plenipotentiary representative of the U.S.S.R. in Great Britain. Candidate to membership in the C.C. of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.—II 71 ff.

SOKOLNIKOV, V.—See *Sokolnikov, G. A.*

SPENCER, HERBERT (1820-1903)—English bourgeois philosopher and sociologist; in his works (*System of Synthetic Philosophy and Foundations of Sociology*) supplied a philosophical and sociological foundation for the theory of evolution; attempted to apply the laws of biology to social phenomena. Was opponent of Socialism, considering it the greatest calamity to the world.—II 157.

SPIRIDONOVA, M. A. (born 1889)—Member of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party; in 1906, in accordance with decision of the Tambov Committee of the S.-R. Party, she assassinated Luzhenovsky, who suppressed the peasant movement in Tambov province. She was arrested and subjected to savage violence and torture. Released from long years at the hard labour prison (Akatui) by the February Revolution in 1917. Soon became the head of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries-Internationalists and afterwards also of the Left S.-R. Party. At the Constituent Assembly was nominated as chairman in opposition to the candidacy of Chernov, who represented the Right S.-R.'s, Cadets and Mensheviks, and received over one-third of all the votes. The Bolsheviks and the Left S.-R.'s voted for Spiridonova. After the Left S.-R.'s broke with the Bolsheviks because of the Brest-Litovsk peace, took charge of the preparation of the Left S.-R. uprising on July 18-19, 1918. After she was

arrested and pardoned by a decree of the All-Union Central Executive Committee, continued to support the policy of her party towards the Soviet power. —I 30, 147, 156, 256.

STALIN, J. V. (Djugashvili, born 1879)—The most prominent continuer of Lenin's cause and his most orthodox disciple, the inspirer of all the most important measures taken by the Communist Party in its struggle for building up Socialism, the greatest theoretician of Marxism-Leninism and the leader of the party and of the Communist International since Lenin's death. In 1897 while still a student of the secondary school, he attended Marxist circles; later on he joined an illegal Social-Democratic organisation and conducted energetic propaganda among the workers. When, in 1900, the Tiflis Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party was founded, Stalin became one of its leading members; after a raid on his house he concealed himself from the police and continued his work as a professional revolutionary. In 1901 he went to Batum where he led a number of strikes, but soon afterwards (in 1902) he was arrested, and after an imprisonment lasting one year and a half, was exiled to Eastern Siberia from where he soon afterwards made his escape. On his return from Siberia he worked as a member of the Trans-Caucasian Joint Committee. From the very beginning of the party split, he assumed the leadership of the Trans-Caucasian Bolsheviks, directing the publication of the illegal organ *Borba Proletariata* (*The Struggle of the Proletariat*) and taking part in the preparations for the Third Party Congress. At the end of 1905 he attended the Bolshevik Conference in Tammerfors, and was a delegate at the Stockholm and London congresses of the party. In 1907 started to work in Baku. After two arrests and exiles in 1908 and 1910 the Central Committee transferred him to St. Petersburg. In 1912 at the Prague Conference he was elected in his absence as member of the Central Committee. In 1912-1913 took part in guidance of the illegal newspapers *Zvezda* (*Star*) and *Prawda* (*Truth*) in Petrograd and in the work of the Bolshevik fraction of the State Duma. In 1913, after another arrest, he was exiled to the Turukhansk region from where he returned after the October Revolution. At the All-Russian April Conference, at which two tendencies within the party asserted themselves on the question of the revolution and the tasks of the proletariat, he staunchly supported Lenin. When in May, 1917, a Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the party was formed, Stalin became one of its members and has remained a member of this body ever since. When in July, 1917, Lenin had to hide himself from the police, Stalin became the actual head of the Central Organ of the party. Together with Sverdlov he was one of the guiding spirits of the Sixth Party Congress. In the days of the October Revolution the Central Committee elected him member of the "Committee of 5" and the "Committee of 7," the leading organs of the uprising. After the victory of the proletarian revolution he became People's Commissar of Nationalities (1917-1922) and of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection (1919-1922). Spent the period of Civil War mostly at the war fronts, being one of the most important organisers of the defence of the republic and inspirer of the most important strategic plans. From 1920 to 1923 was member of the Military Revolutionary Council of the Re-

public and since 1922 General Secretary of the Central Committee of the party. Since 1925 has been member of the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Comintern. In 1923-1924 Stalin directed the struggle of the party against the Trotskyist Opposition and then against the so-called "Leningrad" (Kamenev, Zinoviev) and United Opposition, exposing their anti-Leninist and opportunist nature. At the Fourteenth Party Congress (1925) Stalin, developing the basic ideas of Lenin, advanced the slogan of the industrialisation of the country as the most important task of the party. At the Fifteenth Congress (1927), the party under the guidance of Stalin effected a decisive change towards the collectivisation of agriculture and the development of a Socialist offensive against the capitalist elements in town and country. In 1928 Stalin in proper time mobilised the party and the working class for a struggle against the Right deviation (Bukharin, Rykov, Tomsky), which resulted in the utter defeat and bankruptcy of the Right Opposition. At all stages of this struggle on two fronts which the party is conducting, Stalin consistently and with an iron persistence and firmness, and exceptional clear-sightedness, is defending the Leninist policy of the party against all attempts to revise or attack it, not making the least concessions to revisionism and opportunism, under whatsoever banner they may act, whether within the party itself or in the ranks of the Communist International. Author of a number of works: *Marxism and the National Question*, *On the Road to October*, *Foundations of Leninism*, *Leninism* Vols. I and II, (collections of articles and speeches, etc.)—I 17, 18.

STAROSTIN, P. I.—Bolshevik, member C.E.C. of the first Soviets.—I 95.

STAUNING, T. (born 1873)—Danish Socialist leader, many times premier. See Vol. XX.—I 122 ff.; II 186, 246.

STEINBERG—Russian émigré, member of the émigré committee in Stockholm.—I 59.

STIRNER, MAX (Kaspar Schmidt, 1806-1856)—Anarchist-individualist, Left Hegelian, considering personal welfare the highest principle; believed that there cannot be any authority above personality, doing away with authority of religion, God, government, state, fatherland, morality, honour. Future anarchistic society was considered by him as a voluntary union of egotists. Chief work of Stirner: *The Ego and His Own*.—II 232.

STRUVE, P. B. (born 1870)—Former Russian Socialist publicist, now a monarchist. See Vol. XX.—I 210; II 28, 180.

SUKHANOV, H. (born 1882)—"Non-factional" Social-Democrat, working at present in Soviet economic organisations. See Vol. XX.—I 140 ff.; II 120.

SUMENSON—Private citizen who lived in Stockholm and had no relationship either to the Russian or international labour movement. The prosecutor attempted to interpret the commercial correspondence between Mrs. Sumenson and Hanecki as coded and to use it as evidence against Lenin.—I 39, 59, 60.

SOVORIN, A. S. (1834-1912)—Journalist, originally a liberal, later editor of the *Novoye Vremya*, influential organ of conservatives and nobility, advocate of anti-Semitism and subservient to the bureaucracy.—II 125.

T.

TERESCHENKO, M. I.—Russian financier and minister in Provisional Government. See Vol. XX.—I 76, 183, 189, 191, 197, 206, 246.

TREVES, C.—Italian Socialist leader. See Vol. XX.—II 246.

TRIA (V. D. Mgeladze)—Georgian Menshevik. See Vol. XVIII.—I 135 ff.

TROELSTRA, PETER (born 1860)—Leader of the Dutch Socialist Party and leader of its parliamentary group; was member of the International Socialist Bureau of the Second International. Within the party fought its Left Wing (the so-called "Tribunists" who were expelled from the official Socialist Party in 1907). Lately, because of sickness, withdrew from political activity.—I 122, 124.

TROTSKY, L. D. (Bronstein, born 1879)—Social-Democrat, who within the Russian Social-Democracy headed the "centrists" (Trotskyism), which subsequently degenerated into the part of "advanced detachment of counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie." Took part in the Southern Russian Labour Union and was arrested and exiled in 1898. Fled abroad in 1902 and was member of the *Iskra* group. Took part in Second Congress of R.S.-D.L.P.; after the split became a vehement Menshevik; declared that "there is a gulf between the old and the new *Iskra*." Chairman of the St. Petersburg Soviet of Workers' Deputies, 1905. Adherent of the semi-Menshevik Parvus theory of permanent revolution. While in Vienna formed a group of his own, the ideological expression of which was the non-factional paper *Pravda* published by him (1908-1912). In 1912 after long "non-factional" hesitations, organised the so-called August bloc to fight the Bolsheviks. During the war was member of the editorial board of the Paris organ, *Nashe Slovo*. Took part in the Zimmerwald Conference (Centre). Rejected the slogan of civil war, defeatism, and necessity of an organisational break with social-chauvinists. In 1916 was exiled from France to Spain and from there to America where he opposed the joining of the internationalist elements to the "Zimmerwald Left." Came back to Petrograd in 1917 and joined the internationalist organisation of the "Interboroughites"; together with them joined the R.S.-D.L.P. (Bolsheviks) at the Sixth Congress of the party and was elected to the C.C. After the Bolsheviks gained control of the Petrograd Soviet in September, 1917, he became its chairman. After October, People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs. During the dispute about the Brest-Litovsk peace was first in favour of tactics of "neither peace nor war" and then, upon renewal of the offensive, of a revolutionary war. After the Brest-Litovsk peace, Commissar of War and chairman of the Revolutionary Military Soviet of the Republic (until 1924). During the discussion of 1920-1921, insisted on necessity of converting trade

unions into state-controlled bodies, and organised a faction on that platform. In 1923-1924 headed opposition; from 1926 on leader of "United Opposition" (Trotsky, Kamenev, Zinoviev). Conducted violent factional struggle against Communist Party and Communist International. In November, 1927, attempted together with his adherents to arrange anti-Soviet demonstrations in Moscow and Leningrad. Defended the view that it is impossible to build Socialism in the U.S.S.R. and that the transformation of the Bolshevik Party and the Soviet power is inevitable with the probable return of capitalism. At the Fifteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U. was expelled from the party. In 1929 was banished abroad for anti-Soviet activities. Abroad he became, like the White Guards, one of the centres of gravitation for counter-revolutionary forces within and outside the U.S.S.R.—I 52, 254; II 43, 64, 133.

TSERETELI, I. G. (born 1882)—Menshevik leader. See Vol. XX.—I 16, 18, 20, 36, 46, 47, 51 ff., 58, 60, 65, 74, 76, 77, 87, 88, 95, 98 ff., 105, 106, 108, 114, 122, 130, 140, 145, 150, 167, 182, 204, 212, 226, 237, 240 ff., 250, 252 ff., 274; II 15, 21, 27, 28, 35, 36, 43 ff., 48, 54, 61, 149, 160, 187, 188, 209, 212, 226, 245.

TUGAN—See *Tugan-Baranovsky, M. I.*

TUGAN-BARANOVSKY, M. I. (1865-1919)—Economist and one of the prominent representatives of "legal Marxism," who soon passed into the ranks of the "critics of Marx" and slid down into the camp of the liberals. Collaborated in the journals *Novoye Slovo* (1897) and *Nachalo* (1899). Co-fighter with Struve in the first clashes with the Populists. In 1894 published book: *The Industrial Crisis in Contemporary Great Britain*. In 1898 published chief work: *Russian Factory, Past and Present*, with a criticism of the Populist views on the development of capitalism in Russia. Afterward published several works directed against the politico-economic teachings of Marx. His peculiar "theory of crises" had at one time great influence among the "critics of Marx" and bourgeois scientists. During the Revolution of 1905 and after it was with the Cadet Party, and during the civil war took part in the government of the Central Rada in the Ukraine.—II 223.

TURATI, FILIPPO (1857-1932)—Italian Socialist leader. See Vol. XX.—II 246.

U.

UMANSKY, A. M.—Journalist, official editor of the Black Hundred newspaper *Zhivoye Slovo*, the first of the Petrograd papers to publish the libelous statements of Alexinsky and Pankratov against Lenin during the July days of 1917.—I 18.

V.

VANDERVELDE, EMILE (born 1866)—Belgian Socialist leader and chairman of Second International. See Vol. XX.—II 149, 186, 188, 245 ff.

VERKHOVSKY, A. I.—Colonel of the old army, during the summer of 1917 commander of the armies of the Moscow military district, later War Minister in the last Provisional Government. Several days before the October uprising was compelled to resign because, together with the Minister of the Navy, Admiral Verderevsky, he reported to pre-parliament that the Russian army could not continue the war any longer and that it was therefore necessary to conclude peace. At present works in the Red Army as an instructor in military academies.—II 144.

VIKLYAEV, P. A. (born 1869)—Socialist-Revolutionary. See Vol. XX.—II 125.

VOINOV, I. A.—Worker, Bolshevik, writer and distributor of the *Pravda*. Was killed on July 19, 1917, at Shpalernaya Street, by Cossacks and military students, while attempting to distribute the *Pravda*.—I 57.

VOLODARSKY, V. (1891-1918)—In his early years a Bundist, later a Menshevik. In 1911 exiled to province of Archangel, from where emigrated in 1913 to America, where he became member of American Socialist Party. During the war, internationalist. After February Revolution returned to Russia and after staying a while with the "Interboroughites," joined the Bolsheviks. Became speedily very popular among the workers as a fiery agitator. Member Petrograd Committee, member All-Union Central Executive Committee. After the government left Petrograd, he was appointed Petrograd Commissar of Press, Propaganda and Agitation. In this capacity gained the raging hatred of all enemies of the Soviet power. In June, 1918, was murdered by the Socialist-Revolutionaries.—I 137, 139.

V—SKY—See *Volodarsky, V.*

W.

WEBB, BEATRICE (B. Potter, born 1858)—Wife of Sidney Webb and his closest collaborator; Right Wing Socialist, writer. The literary works of the Webbs bear the names of both Webbs. Member of the Fabian Society.—II 243.

WEBB, SIDNEY (born 1859)—English Fabian Socialist. See Vol. XVIII.—II 243.

WEYDEMEYER, JOSEPH (1818-1866)—Participated in German Revolution of 1848, after its defeat was compelled to flee. Was close to K. Marx; member of the "Union of Communists." After settling in the United States in 1861, took active part in the American labour movement. In the magazine *Revolution* issued by him, Marx published his celebrated work, *The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*. Fought in the United States Civil War on the side of the North.—II 175.

WILHELM II (born 1859)—German Kaiser from 1888 to 1918.—II 102, 117, 122.

Y.

YEFREMOV, I. A. (born 1867)—Member of Third and Fourth State Duma, from Stavropol province. Member of "Union of the Seventeenth of October."—I 53.

YERMOLENKO, D.—Military spy, non-commissioned officer, served with the Vladivostok police in 1900. Was on trial before the Irkutsk Judicial Chamber for malfeasance in office but was acquitted. During the Russo-Japanese War served as a volunteer. According to other reports, he served during that war in the intelligence service and remained in that service until 1913 when he was honourably discharged and "by order of His Majesty" was made a non-commissioned officer. In 1914 he again entered military service and while a prisoner of war in Germany spied in the concentration camps on the Ukrainians and the "Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine" abroad. In April, 1917, he again appeared on the Russian front and stated to the scouting post that the German General Staff had gotten him across the front, supplied him with money and instructed him to conduct a "defeatist" agitation in the Russian army; he stated that similar agitation was also being conducted at the instruction of the German Staff by the Bolshevik Lenin.—I 18, 19, 26, 39.

Z.

ZAMYSLOVSKY, G. G. (born 1872)—Member of Third and Fourth State Duma, one of the leaders of the Black Hundreds, active anti-Semite; in the Beilis trial, actively supported in the capacity of plaintiff in a special civil suit the accusations made against the Jews of using Christian blood for ritual purposes. Former prosecutor.—I 40.

ZARUDNY, A. S. (born 1864)—Petrograd lawyer who became known as counsel in political cases; Trudovik. Minister of Justice in the second Coalition Cabinet of Kerensky, formed after the July days. Succeeded Pereverzev in the case against Lenin which was started by the former, pushed the case vigorously, keeping in prison Kamenev, Raskolnikov, Kollontai, Lunacharsky and other Bolsheviks. Issued several orders to find and seize Lenin and Zinoviev, demanding that they should give themselves up.—I 77, 102, 246 ff.

ZASLAVSKY, D. O.—Menshevik-Liquidator during the years of reaction, defensist during the imperialist war. One of the editors of the newspaper *Dyen* and collaborator on the Menshevik *Rabochaya Gazeta* in 1917. At present works in the Soviet press.—I 111, 112; II 125.

ZENZINOV, V. M.—Member of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party; in 1905 was one of the leading members of the Moscow Committee of the S.-R. Party, took part in the December uprising and was later closely connected with the military terroristic organisation. After the resignation of the Central Com-

mittee, caused by the discovery that Azef was a provocateur, he was elected by the Fifth Council of the party as a member of the C.C. and took charge of the illegal work in Russia till his arrest in 1910. In 1917 was a member of the editorial board of *Dyelo Naroda*, the central organ of the party, which represented the Chernov centre. At present he is abroad, with the extreme Right Wing of the S.-R. organisations, carrying on a campaign against Soviet Russia.—II 187.

ZINOVIEV, G. E. (Radomislky, born 1883)—Joined the Social-Democratic organisation in Elisavetgrad in 1901; after the Second Congress and the split of the party, joined the Bolsheviks. During the Revolution of 1905 was member of Petrograd Committee. After his arrest, emigrated abroad. At the Fifth (London) Congress of the R.S.-D.L.P. was elected member of the Central Committee. In 1908, after he was again arrested, was compelled to emigrate abroad, where he became a member of the board of editors of the *Proletary*, the central organ of the Bolsheviks, and collaborated in the *Sotsial Demokrat*. Took part in the Zimmerwald and Kienthal Conferences. Member of the Bureau of the Zimmerwald Left. In April, 1917, together with Lenin and others, returned to St. Petersburg. After October, was chairman of the Petrograd Soviet. In 1919-1926 was chairman of the Executive Committee of the Communist International. During the preparatory period of the October uprising, and later, he repeatedly showed hesitation; in the fall of 1917, was against the uprising; his conduct during that period was branded by Lenin as strike-breaking. After the October Revolution, insisted on necessity of immediate agreement and formation of Soviet government together with the Mensheviks and Social-Revolutionaries. Differing from the fundamental line of the party, resigned from the Central Committee on November 17. Decisively fought against "Trotskyism" in 1923-1924; in 1925 headed the "new opposition" and in 1926 entered into the "opposition bloc" headed by Trotsky. In his book *Leninism* (end of 1925) subjected fundamental positions of Leninism to revision. In November, 1927, was expelled from party. In 1928 acknowledged his mistakes and was reinstated as member of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks). In the fall of 1932 again expelled from party for continued opposition to decisions of party and supporting anti-party elements.—I 28, 40, 42, 52, 58; II 109, 110, 129 ff.

DOCUMENTS AND OTHER MATERIAL

I

PROCLAMATION OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC LABOUR PARTY ON THE NIGHT OF JULY 17, 1917.*

FELLOW WORKERS AND SOLDIERS OF PETROGRAD!

Since the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie has already come out openly against the revolution, the All-Russian Soviet of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies must take all power into its own hands.

This is the will of the revolutionary population of Petrograd, which has the right to bring this will by means of a *peaceful* and *organised* demonstration to the attention of the Executive Committee of the All-Russian Soviet of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies now in session.

Long live the will of the revolutionary workers and revolutionary soldiers!

Long live the power of the Soviets!

The coalition government has collapsed: it fell to pieces because it was unable to carry out the tasks for which it was created. The revolution is faced with most tremendous and difficult problems. A new power is needed which, united with the revolutionary proletariat, revolutionary army and revolutionary peasants, will decisively take up the task of consolidating and extending the victories already gained by the people. This power can be only the power of the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies.

Yesterday the revolutionary garrison and the workers of Petrograd demonstrated and proclaimed this slogan: All power to the Soviets! We call upon this movement that arose in the regiments and factories to become a peaceful, organised expression of the will of all the workers, soldiers and peasants of Petrograd.

CENTRAL COMMITTEE, RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC LABOUR PARTY.

PETROGRAD COMMITTEE, R.S.-D.L.P.

INTERBOROUGH COMMITTEE, R.S.-D.L.P.

MILITARY ORGANISATION OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE, R.S.-D.L.P.

COMMISSION OF THE WORKERS' SECTION OF THE SOVIET OF WORKERS' AND
SOLDIERS' DEPUTIES.

Published as a separate leaflet, July 17, 1917.

II

PROCLAMATION OF THE C.C. OF THE R.S.-D.L.P. ON THE NIGHT OF JULY 18, 1917 *

COMRADES! On Monday you came out on the streets. On Tuesday you decided to continue the demonstration. We called you to a *peaceful* demon-

* See pp. 29 and 73, Book I of this volume.—Ed.

stration yesterday. The object of this demonstration was to show to all the toiling and exploited masses the strength of our slogans, their weight, their significance and their necessity for the liberation of the peoples from war, hunger and ruin.

The object of the demonstration was achieved. The slogans of the vanguard of the working class and of the army were imposingly and worthily proclaimed. The scattered firing of the counter-revolutionaries on the demonstrators could not disturb the general character of the demonstration.

Comrades! For the present political crisis, our aim has been accomplished. We have therefore decided to end the demonstration. Let each and every one peacefully and in an organised manner bring the strike and the demonstration to a close.

Let us await the further development of the crisis. Let us continue to prepare our forces. Life is with us, the course of events shows the correctness of our slogans.

CENTRAL COMMITTEE, R.S.-D.L.P.

PETROGRAD COMMITTEE, R.S.-D.L.P.

INTERBOROUGH COMMITTEE, R.S.-D.L.P.

MILITARY ORGANISATION OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE, R.S.-D.L.P.

COMMISSION OF THE WORKERS' SECTION OF THE SOVIET OF WORKERS' AND SOLDIERS' DEPUTIES.

Pravda, No. 99, July 18, 1917.

III

PROCLAMATION OF THE C.C. OF THE R.S.-D.L.P. CONCERNING THE SLANDER AGAINST LENIN *

TO THE POPULATION OF PETROGRAD! TO THE WORKERS! TO THE SOLDIERS!
TO ALL HONEST CITIZENS!

The slander must be exposed!

The slanderers must be haled to trial!

An unheard-of accusation has been brought against *Comrade Lenin*: it is alleged that he has received and is still receiving money from German sources for his agitation. The newspapers have given wide publicity to this monstrous slander. Underground leaflets are already being printed, indicating former Deputy Alexinsky as the source of their information. Cries for the death of the Bolsheviks are already being heard. Lists of those who are to be killed are already being circulated among the deceived soldiers.

The purpose is clear: the counter-revolution seeks in the simplest fashion to behead the revolution by instilling alarm into the masses, by inciting them against the most popular leaders, against the most loyal fighters for the revolution.

We declare that all that is being said about financial and other relations of Comrade Lenin with German government circles is a lie and a slander.

The initiator of the affair is Alexinsky, a notorious slanderer, who has accused a great many people of being in the pay of the Germans and who has himself been convicted of dishonest actions by the unions of Russian, English, Italian and neutral journalists in France; who was expelled from all

* See p. 28, Book I of this volume.—*Ed.*

democratic organisations in Paris for a malicious slander, and who was not admitted to the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.

We demand that the Provisional Government and the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies immediately and publicly investigate all the circumstances of this vile conspiracy of the pogrom-makers and hired slanderers against the honour and life of the leaders of the working class.

It is necessary to bring this whole affair into the full light of day. And the whole people will be convinced, by this investigation, that there is not the slightest blemish on the revolutionary honour of Comrade Lenin.

To court with these calumniators and spreaders of slander! To the scaffold with the pogrom-makers and liars!

CENTRAL COMMITTEE, R.S.-D.L.P.

Published as a separate leaflet.

IV

RESOLUTIONS OF THE SIXTH CONGRESS OF THE R.S.-D.L.P. *

I. THE PRESENT SITUATION AND THE WAR

1. Recently the war has been taking on more and more the sweep of an all-embracing world conflagration. There has appeared on the scene a new giant of imperialism and pretender to world hegemony—America. Under the pressure of America and the Allies, China enters the war. The fight of the imperialist powers spreads to all lands. In addition to the widening of the sphere of war, the struggle of the world bourgeoisie against the ripening of the proletarian revolution also helps to prolong the war by keeping up the régime of military dictatorship and splitting up the forces of the international proletariat.

2. The most dangerous thing for the imperialists of all countries is the Russian Revolution as the first appearance on the scene of the masses, which, in the course of development, threatens to become transformed into immediate action against the war and imperialism and draw into this struggle the proletarian masses of other countries.

3. From the very beginning of the revolution, the imperialists of the Allied countries started a crusade against it (playing with the deposed Nicholas II, hounding the Soviets, arresting Russian internationalists, etc.). This crusade became a direct attack upon the revolution, finding expression in an open bloc between the bankers of the Allied countries and the counter-revolutionary forces in Russia, in the financing of the latter with English capital, in direct intervention by the "allied" powers in the internal affairs of Russia, and finally in the demand to undertake an offensive, despite the fact that the Russian army was totally unprepared for it.

4. The victory of the adherents of the policy of an offensive in Russia brought about a new upsurge of chauvinism in all countries, the strengthening of the imperialist dictatorship and the creation of conditions that impeded the work of the internationalist Socialists.

5. The upper strata of the petty bourgeoisie and peasantry as well as a small section of the workers who still had petty-bourgeois illusions and who

* See p. 120, Book I of this volume.—Ed.

politically were members of the S.-R. and Menshevik Parties, supported the offensive and so fell into the net of the imperialist big bourgeoisie.

On the basis of common military tasks a close bond grew up between them and the social-imperialists of the West, which was inevitably converted into a union of active support to the imperialism of the Entente countries.

6. The Russian petty-bourgeois democracy, in the person of the S.-R. and Menshevik Parties, was dragged into the rut of the general imperialist policy. On this point there came about a complete agreement in the policy of the social-patriots of all countries, who in Russia became transformed into direct agents of imperialism. In this way the Mensheviks and S.-R.'s helped counter-revolutionary finance capital to weaken the significance of Russia as the fatherland of the international revolution.

7. The further prolongation of the war on the one hand hastens the process of the destruction of productive forces; on the other hand it leads to an extreme concentration of production and its centralisation in the hands of the militarist state. At the same time the prolongation of the war proletarianises to an unprecedented degree the middle strata, converts the proletariat into serfs of the imperialist state, brings about the absolute pauperisation of the workers, and police repression against them, etc., which inevitably leads to the growth of the elements of the proletarian revolution.

8. The campaign for peace by means of "pressure" upon the Allied governments and of agreements with the social-imperialists, which was undertaken by the Soviets, who refused to really break with imperialism, could not but end in a terrible collapse. That collapse confirmed the correctness of the position of the revolutionary Social-Democracy, that only a revolutionary struggle of the masses of all countries against imperialism, an international proletarian revolution, can bring about a democratic peace.

9. The liquidation of imperialist domination puts before the working class of that country which shall first achieve the dictatorship of the proletarians and semi-proletarians the task of supporting by every means (including armed force) the struggling proletariat of the other countries. This problem will become especially urgent for Russia, if, as is quite probable, a new inevitable upsurge of the Russian Revolution places the workers and the poorest peasants in power before the revolution takes place in the capitalist countries of the West.

10. The sole means for a really democratic liquidation of the war is the conquest of power by the international proletariat, and in Russia the conquest of power by the workers and poorest peasants. Only these classes will be in a position to break with the capitalists of all countries and actually advance the development of the international proletarian revolution which must liquidate not only war but also capitalist slavery.

2. CONCERNING THE POLITICAL SITUATION

1. The development of the class struggle and the interrelationship of the parties under the conditions of the imperialist war, in connection with the crisis at the front and the increasing dependence of Russia upon Allied capital, has brought about the dictatorship of the counter-revolutionary imperialist bourgeoisie, which relies on the military clique of army commanders for support, and which is covered up with a revolutionary screen by the leaders of petty-bourgeois Socialism.

2. Upon the overthrow of tsarism the power passed to the bourgeoisie, because of its economic strength and because it was politically organised.

But trying to continue the imperialist war and safeguard the predatory high profits of capital and landowners, the bourgeoisie could not retain power under conditions of complete political freedom and with the masses armed, which were the results of the revolution. The proletariat and the peasantry, organised in Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, inevitably strove to stop the imperialist slaughter of the peoples in the interests of the capitalists, to bridle their rapacity mainly in military contracts, and to transfer the landowners' lands to the peasants.

The first crisis, which broke out on May 3-4, would have inevitably resulted in the downfall of the bourgeois Provisional Government and the peaceful transfer of power into the hands of the Soviets, if their leaders, the S.-R.'s and the Mensheviks, had not saved the government of the capitalists by tying the Soviets to the fate of the government by means of the Coalition Cabinet.

3. The domination of the petty-bourgeois, S.-R. and Menshevik Parties over the representatives of the peasantry and the small property-owners in general, as well as over those workers who had not yet freed themselves from the influence of the bourgeoisie, came about naturally as a result of the petty-bourgeois character of the overwhelming majority of the population of Russia. Taking into consideration the trusting and uncritical attitude of these masses towards the capitalists, it was quite natural that for a time they should be taken in by the dream of replacing the acute class struggle with peaceful collaboration between the workers and the capitalists, between the peasants and the landowners.

4. Under the domination of these parties the Soviets inevitably sank lower and lower, they ceased to be organs of uprising, as well as organs of state power, and their decisions were inevitably converted into impotent resolutions and pious wishes. And during this time the bourgeoisie played around with the "Socialist" Ministers, delayed the elections to the Constituent Assembly, obstructed the transfer of the land to the peasants, sabotaged every kind of struggle against economic ruin, prepared—with the sanction of the majority of the Soviets—an offensive at the front, *i.e.*, the renewal of the imperialist war, and by all these actions organised the forces of the counter-revolution.

5. The growing discontent of the masses with the high cost of living, with the economic ruin, with the continuation of the war, found its expression in the intensification of the struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, which the revolution drove forward and which was irreconcilably hostile to the imperialist war. In face of this sharpening of the class struggle, the S.-R.'s and Mensheviks, entangled in their policy of compromise with the bourgeoisie and in their support of the policy of an offensive, inevitably passed over to the support of the counter-revolutionary Cadets against the proletariat.

As early as the crisis of June 22, Tsereteli proposed to disarm the Petrograd workers and the revolutionary regiments. The demonstration of July 1 made it especially evident that the S.-R.'s and the Mensheviks had definitely broken away from the strivings of the masses. And when the spontaneous movement of July 16-17 broke out, when the party of the proletariat, fulfilling its revolutionary duty, took its place on the side of the justly indignant and aroused masses, the S.-R.'s and Mensheviks, faced with the necessity of finally breaking with the bourgeoisie but fearing such a break most of all, responded by decisively going over to an open struggle against the revolutionary proletariat and revolutionary troops, called non-class-conscious troops into Petrograd, approved the destruction and suppression of the internationalist newspapers, approved the disarming of the revolutionary troops and workers, capital punishment at the front, the arrest of the Bolsheviks, etc., etc.

6. As a result of this course of events, the state power is at this time in fact in the hands of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie, supported by the military clique. It is just this imperialist dictatorship that has passed and is passing all the above-enumerated measures to destroy political liberty, use violence against the masses, and ruthlessly persecute the internationalist proletariat, while the central body of the Soviets, the Central Executive Committee, is entirely powerless and inactive.

The Soviets are passing through agonising torture, disintegrating because they failed to take state power into their own hands at the proper time.

7. The slogan advanced by our Party of the transfer of power to the Soviets which had been set up during the first upsurge of the revolution, was a slogan of the peaceful development of the revolution, of the painless transfer of power from the bourgeoisie to the workers and peasants, of the gradual overcoming by the petty bourgeoisie of its illusions.

At the present time peaceful development and painless transfer of power to the Soviets have become impossible, for power has already actually passed into the hands of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie.

The correct slogan at the present time can be only complete liquidation of the dictatorship of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie. Only the revolutionary proletariat, provided it is supported by the poorest peasantry, is strong enough to carry out this task, the task of a new upsurge.

8. The success of this upsurge depends upon whether the majority of the people will soon enough and firmly enough understand the full danger involved in the hopes of compromise with the bourgeoisie, hopes expressed and supported by the S.-R. and Menshevik Parties. The course of events mercilessly refutes these hopes.

The Party must take upon itself the rôle of front-line fighter against counter-revolution; it must energetically defend all the conquered liberties and the rights won by direct action; it must defend all mass organisations (Soviets, factory committees, committees of soldiers and peasants) and above all the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies against counter-revolutionary attacks; with all its might safeguard and strengthen the positions conquered within these organs by the internationalist wing; energetically fight for influence within them, uniting around itself all the elements which are going over to the position of consistent struggle against the counter-revolution.

9. The proletariat must not permit itself to be provoked by the bourgeoisie, which is very anxious to provoke the proletariat at the present moment into a premature battle. It must direct its every effort towards the organisation and preparation of its forces for the moment when the general national crisis and a profound stirring of the masses will create favourable conditions for the *passing over* of the city and village poor to the side of the workers, against the bourgeoisie.

10. The task of these revolutionary classes will then be to strain every effort to take state power into their own hands and direct it, in alliance with the revolutionary proletariat of the advanced countries, towards peace and the Socialist reconstruction of society.

3. THE ECONOMIC SITUATION

1. The fundamental cause of economic disintegration is the disproportion between the condition of productive forces and the demands of the imperialist war. The disproportion is especially great in Russia due to the relatively

low level of development of the productive forces and the faultiness of their economic and technical organisation.

As a result, after three years of war, the economic situation in Russia is as follows: complete exhaustion in the sphere of productive labour and disorganisation of production, total disorganisation and disintegration of means of transportation, a situation approaching complete collapse in state finance and, as a result of all this, a food supply crisis bordering on famine, an absolute shortage of fuel and of means of production in general, growing unemployment, rapid pauperisation of the masses, etc. The country is already falling into the abyss of total economic collapse and ruin.

2. This crisis, which is becoming more acute every day, is further intensified by the policy of the bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie fears that along with political power it will also lose the power over organised production, and instead of organising production practices a policy of sabotage, of virtual lockouts, of stopping production, etc., deliberately promoting economic chaos with a view to taking advantage of it for the purposes of counter-revolution.

3. A similar economic policy is being carried out by the representatives of "trade and industry" and in the Cabinet. The tactics of sabotage of the state power and of every effort tending to regulate production, as well as the stubborn resistance to self-appointed organisations which to a certain degree regulate economic life, could not but lead in practice to still greater disorganisation. Not a single serious reform was carried out either in the field of social or state economy.

4. The continuation of the war, the chronic crises of power resulting from the collaboration policy of the petty-bourgeois parties, and the fear of the bourgeoisie of the growing onslaught of the proletariat make impossible even a militaristic, state-capitalistic organisation of economy, enslaving the working class to the imperialist state.

5. The only way out of this critical situation is, therefore, the liquidation of the war, and the organisation of production not for war, but for the rehabilitation of everything that was destroyed by the war; not in the interests of a handful of financial oligarchs, but in the interests of the workers and the poorest peasants.

Such a regulation of production in Russia can be carried out only by an organisation which is entirely in the hands of the proletarians and semi-proletarians, which demands the transfer of state power into their hands. For this purpose it is necessary to carry out a number of decisive revolutionary measures.

6. It is necessary to go into the field of production, with a view to a planned regulation of production and distribution, and it is also necessary to nationalise and centralise the banks, and to nationalise a number of trusts (for example, oil, coal, sugar, metallurgy, and transport).

7. The organisation of satisfactory exchange between city and country, based upon the co-operatives and food supply committees, with a view to supplying the cities with the necessary agricultural products and the villages with the necessary manufactured products, agricultural implements and machinery, etc.

8. The establishment of real workers' control. These organs of control must consist for the most part of representatives of the Soviets of Workers' Deputies, trade unions and factory committees. Representatives of scientific, educational and technical personnel must also be drawn into these organs.

9. Workers' control must be broadened by means of gradually developed measures into complete regulation of production.

10. To carry out workers' control it is necessary to introduce, as preliminary measures: abolition of commercial secrets; opening the books of traders, industrialists and banks for control; declaring the concealment of documents a criminal offence; periodic registration of stocks, and publication of information of the available supplies indicating the enterprises where these supplies are located.

In order to combat concealed and open lockouts, a law must be enacted prohibiting the closing of factories or the reduction of production without the permission of the Soviets of Workers' Deputies, the trade unions and the central factory committees.

11. In order to combat financial collapse the following measures are necessary: the immediate stopping of further issuance of paper money; stopping payments on state debts, both foreign and internal—however, the interests of the small holders of state paper must be safeguarded—reorganisation of the system of taxation by the introduction of a tax on property; a tax on the increment of property and high indirect taxes on all luxuries; a reform in the system of income taxes and a real control over the appraisal of incomes from property both in the centre and in the provinces.

12. In order to raise the forces of production to a higher level, a proper distribution of labour forces is necessary: their transfer from the war industries and enterprises to industries and enterprises working to meet the needs of the country.

13. Upon the execution of all the above-indicated conditions and upon the transfer of power into the hands of the proletariat and semi-proletariat it will be necessary with a view to the proper distribution of labour forces and the raising of production to a higher level to introduce obligatory universal labour duty. It is only under such conditions that universal labour duty will make possible the greatest development of the forces of production and will not serve as another method for the enslavement of the workers.

14. The task of the labour organisations (trade unions, factory committees, Soviets of Workers' Deputies) must be to promote the carrying out of similar measures in the provinces, the development of initiative in that direction, and the acceleration of such steps with a view to making them assume a general character on a national scale.

15. The introduction and realisation of all the above-mentioned measures will be possible only if the workers strain all their forces and with the support of the poorest strata of the peasantry put these measures into practice, and decisively repel and combat the policy of force of the imperialist bourgeoisie and its counter-revolutionary pressure.

4. PRE-ELECTION CAMPAIGN FOR THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

I. PRE-ELECTION ORGANS

1. The Central Committee organises a Central Election Commission to which delegates are sent by the regional organisations.

2. The regional organisations create Regional Election Commissions to which delegates are sent by the local organisations.

3. At all the consecutive stages of party groups and organisations and in each one of them it is recommended to establish similar local pre-election committees under the guidance of the general collectives for election campaign work.

4. In large industrial centres it is desirable to have for this work organisations existing among groups of workers (and soldiers) coming from the same provinces.

II. FINANCES

5. Funds for election campaign work are to be raised by:

- (a) the organisation of simultaneous contributions of one day's pay;
- (b) collection of contributions (by means of boxes and subscription lists), the arrangement of lectures, concerts, parties, with paid admission, the publication of one-day newspapers, etc.

6. The funds raised by these means are to be distributed as follows:

- (a) 40% into the treasury of the Central Commission;
- (b) 60% to remain in the local organisations.

III. AGITATION

7. *Written:*

- (a) publication of a peasant newspaper;
- (b) issuing of popular leaflets and handbills explaining in a simple way all the fundamental planks in our platform;
- (c) publication by the Central Commission of a handbook for agitators, giving subjects, a plan and contents for speeches, as well as indicating the necessary literary sources. In addition, the handbook must contain the basic provisions of the election law, its peculiarities and the methods of election technique.

8. *Oral:* Its carriers should be cadres of well trained functionaries. For this purpose short courses for agitators should be organised by the Central Commission as well as in the provinces. In addition, it should be the practice to send class-conscious workers and soldiers into the villages during the election campaign.

IV. BLOCS AND AGREEMENTS

9. Blocs are permitted only with parties that stand upon the principle of internationalism, and which have broken with the defensists not merely in words, but in deeds.

10. Election agreements are permitted also with non-party revolutionary organisations (for instance, with Soviets of Deputies, land committees, committees of sowers, etc.) *which fully accept our platform.*

11. Election agreements must be sanctioned by the Central Committee.

V. LISTS OF CANDIDATES

12. Candidates are nominated by provincial conferences or by local organisations.

13. The Central Committee reserves the right to withdraw any candidate.

14. The Central Committee also reserves the right to propose to the local organisations its own candidates.

VI. PRE-ELECTION CAMPAIGN WORK IN THE ARMY AND AT THE FRONT

15. The Congress expresses the wish that the military organisation of the Central Committee immediately start working out a plan of party election campaign work within the army and especially at the front.

5. THE TASKS OF THE TRADE UNION MOVEMENT

1. The development of the class struggle in the epoch of bitter struggles among the imperialist bourgeoisie for possession of the world markets while not removing the fundamental task before the trade union movement—the guidance of the economic struggle of the proletariat as one of the forms of the class struggle of the proletariat, puts before it new and complex problems, the radical solution of which is possible only provided the capitalist order is replaced by a Socialist order.

2. The fratricidal three years' war and the criminal policy of the ruling classes of all countries have led to an economic catastrophe which, under the counter-revolutionary dictatorship of the Cadet-defensist bloc, threatens the working masses of Russia with especially grave consequences.

3. Unemployment, increased by open and covert lockouts organised by the bourgeoisie for the purpose of combating the revolutionary gains of the working class, combined with the approaching demobilisation of industry and the demobilisation of the army, threatens the very existence of the trade unions and the revolution.

4. The unbearable working conditions created during the war by means of the actual wiping out of the miserable gains in the field of labour protection which were secured before the war, put forward the task of struggling for the most elaborate, comprehensive labour legislation.

5. The trade unions, being drawn ever more by the logic of events into the struggle for Socialism, must *in all their activities* be guided by the *principles of consistent class struggle*, must energetically and in a planned manner stand up for the general interests of the working class, rejecting every attempt to limit the trade union movement or to subordinate it to the interests of the war and the ruling classes.

6. The trade unions, as the militant organisations of the working class, vitally interested in bringing the revolution to a victorious conclusion, must in close contact with the political party of the proletariat organise economic and political resistance against the counter-revolution, which is taking advantage of the economic ruin to completely enslave the broad masses of the people.

7. For the struggle against the economic ruin of the country, which is becoming more acute due to the growing counter-revolution, and for the purpose of bringing the revolution to a victorious conclusion, the trade unions must insist on state intervention in the organisation of production and distribution of goods, remembering at the same time that only with the upsurge of a new revolutionary wave, and the dictatorship of the proletariat supported by the poorest strata of the peasantry, can these measures be carried out in the interests of the broad masses of the people.

Taking all this into consideration, the Congress states:

All these responsible tasks can be fulfilled by the trade unions of Russia only in case they remain *militant class organisations* and conduct their struggle in close organic co-operation with the political class party of the proletariat; if during the elections to the Constituent Assembly they energetically fight

for the victory of the Socialist party which has always stood up for the class interests of the proletariat and fights for the immediate liquidation of the war by means of revolutionary mass struggle against the ruling classes of all countries; if they, with the object of bringing about the speediest conclusion of the war and the establishment of the International, immediately enter into relations with all the trade unions which in various countries conduct a war against war and together with them work out a general plan of struggle against the international slaughter and for Socialism; if they adapt their everyday struggle for the improvement of economic conditions to the epoch of giant Socialist battles we are living through, and if, finally, they emphasise in all their activities that the solution of the problems that history has placed before the Russian proletariat is possible only on an international scale.

International revolutionary Socialism against international imperialism!

6. THE STATUTES OF THE RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC LABOUR PARTY

1. Every one who accepts the Party programme belongs to one of its organisations, obeys all the decisions of the Party and pays membership dues, is considered a member of the Party.

2. New members are admitted by local Party organisations on the recommendation of two Party members and are confirmed as such by the next general membership meeting of the organisation.

3. The amount of dues is determined by the local organisation and must not be less than one per cent of the wages.

New members pay an initiation fee of 50 kopeks.

Note. Party members failing to pay their dues for three months without sufficient cause are considered to have dropped out of the organisation, which fact is announced at the general membership meeting.

4. The question of the expulsion of a Party member is decided upon at the general meeting of the local organisation of which he is a member. An appeal may be made from the decision of the general membership meeting to a higher Party institution—to the district or regional (in the capital-city) conference.

The body of last resort is the Party Congress.

Note. The names of members expelled from the Party are published in the Party press.

5. All Party organisations are organised on the principles of democratic centralism.

6. All organisations are autonomous in their internal activities. Every Party organisation has the right to publish Party literature in its own name.

7. Party organisations are united in districts and regions. The district and regional committees are elected at district and regional conferences.

The boundaries of districts and regions are determined at district conferences. In case of misunderstanding between neighbouring regions the question is referred to the Central Committee for decision.

8. New Party organisations are ratified by the regional committees and, in the absence of such, by the Central Committee. The control over their ratification lies with the Central Committee.

The Central Committee announces the establishment of every new organisation in the Party press.

9. All local organisations pay to the Central Committee 10 per cent of

all membership dues and other receipts which are not assigned for any special purpose.

Note. In localities where the organisation is subdivided into district and sub-district organisations the district and sub-district committees are considered "local organisations."

10. The highest organ of the Party is the Party Congress. Regular Congresses are convened annually. Extraordinary Party Congresses are convened by the Central Committee on its own initiative or on the demand of not less than one-third of the general membership represented at the preceding Party Congress. The call for the Party Congress and the order of business are issued not later than one and a half months before the Congress. Extraordinary Congresses convene within two months. The Congress is considered effective if not less than half of all the members of the Party are represented.

Representation at the Party Congress is determined by the Central Committee in agreement with the regional committees and with the observance of the principles of proportional representation.

11. In case the Central Committee fails to convene an extraordinary Party Congress within the time specified in Section 10, the organisations demanding its convening have the right to form an Organisation Committee, which has all the rights enjoyed by the Central Committee with regard to convening of the Congress.

12. The Party Congress (a) considers and approves the reports of the Central Committee, Auditing Commission and other central bodies; (b) revises and changes the Party programme; (c) determines the tactical line of the Party on current questions; and (d) elects the Central Committee and the Auditing Commission.

13. The Central Committee is elected annually at the Party Congress. For its current work the Central Committee appoints a smaller C.C. group from its members.

Plenary sessions of the Central Committee convene not less than once in two months. The Central Committee represents the Party in all relations with other parties and institutions, organises the various institutions of the Party and guides their activities, appoints the editors of the Central Organ, which works under its control, organises and runs undertakings of a general Party character, distributes the forces and resources of the Party and handles the central treasury of the Party.

In case of a member of the Central Committee dropping out, he is replaced by one of the candidates elected by the Party Congress in the order determined by the Congress.

14. The Auditing Commission is elected annually at the Party Congress. It examines the treasury and all the undertakings of the Central Committee and submits a report to the next Party Congress.

7. ON YOUTH ORGANISATIONS

From the first days of the revolution, in many cities of Russia and especially in Petrograd there grew up a broad movement of working-class youth, the aim of which was to build independent proletarian organisations of young workers, men and women. The Russian bourgeoisie, like that of Western Europe, understands very well the immense significance of the growing generation of the working class for the entire course of development of the class struggle. The bourgeoisie therefore will attempt—and some such attempts have already been made—to use these organisations for winning over

the young proletarians to its bourgeois ideology, implanting in their minds and consciousness the conception of "society," "patriotism," etc., and diverting the working-class youth, at least for a time, from active participation in the economic and political struggles of the working class. The Party of the proletariat in its turn is aware of the immense significance of the working-class youth for the labour movement as a whole.

The Party Congress therefore considers it necessary that local Party organisations pay the most serious attention to the question of organising the youth. *The intervention of the Party in the organisational building of the working-class youth must not have the character of guardianship over it.* Taking into consideration the experience of Western Europe, where *independent* organisations of Socialist working-class youth, in contradistinction to such as are under guardianship of the official parties, are almost everywhere supporters of the Left internationalist wing of the labour movement, our Party must also in Russia try to have the proletarian youth form independent organisations which are only connected ideologically with the Party and are not organisationally subordinated to it. At the same time, however, the Party must try to see that these organisations from their very inception have a Socialist character, so that the future Socialist Union of Working-Class Youth of Russia shall at its very inception join the Youth International, and that its local sections should pursue mainly the aim of developing the class consciousness of the proletarian youth by means of propaganda for the ideas of Socialism, by energetic struggle against chauvinism and militarism and simultaneous defence of the economic, political and legal interests of working minors, boys and girls. At the present time, when the struggle of the working class is passing into the phase of immediate struggle for Socialism, the Party Congress considers co-operation in the creation of Socialist class organisations of proletarian youth one of the urgent tasks of the moment and demands that Party organisations devote the maximum attention possible to this work.

8. ON UNITING THE PARTIES

The split between the social-patriots and the revolutionary internationalists in Russia, which has also occurred on a world-wide scale, is growing deeper every day. The road of the Mensheviks leads them from "defence of the fatherland" to the most disgraceful union with the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie, to inciting and sanctioning the persecution of the internationalist organisations, the working-class press, etc. The Mensheviks have become the lackeys of Russian and Allied imperialism, they have gone over completely to the camp of the enemies of the proletariat.

Under these conditions the first task of the revolutionary Social-Democracy is the persistent exposure of the treacherous policy of the Menshevik-imperialists before the wide masses of the working class, to isolate them completely from all elements of the working class that are revolutionary to any degree. For this reason every attempt to conciliate the imperialist with the revolutionary-internationalist elements of Socialism through a "unity congress" for the purpose of creating a united Social-Democratic Party (the plan of the group of intellectuals of the *Novaya Zhizn* who have no base among the masses), is a serious blow to the interests of the proletariat. Recognising the necessity of a complete and irrevocable break with the Menshevik-imperialists, the Party Congress goes on record in the most decisive manner against all such attempts. As against the dangerous slogan of the unity of all, the Social-Democracy advances the revolutionary class slogan of the unity of all

internationalists who have actually broken with the Menshevik-imperialists. Considering such unity necessary and inevitable, the Congress calls upon all the revolutionary elements of Social-Democracy immediately to break every organisational connection with the defensists and to rally to the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party.

9. ON THE FAILURE OF LENIN TO APPEAR IN COURT

Considering that the present methods of persecution by the police and secret service and the activities of the public prosecutor are re-establishing the practices of the Shcheglovitov régime, as has already been recognised also by the Central Executive Committee of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, and feeling that under such conditions there is absolutely no guarantee either of the impartiality of the court procedure, or even of the elementary safety of those summoned before the court, the Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party expresses its vehement protest against the outrageous hounding by the state prosecutor, spies and police, of the leaders of the revolutionary proletariat, extends its greetings to Comrades Lenin, Zinoviev, Trotsky and others, and hopes to see them again within the ranks of the Party of the revolutionary proletariat.

Proceedings of the Sixth Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party (Bolsheviks)
Communist Publishing House, 1919.

V

MANIFESTO OF THE RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC LABOUR PARTY *

TO ALL TOILERS, TO ALL WORKERS, SOLDIERS AND PEASANTS OF RUSSIA.

COMRADES! Five months have passed since the revolutionary proletariat and the troops overthrew the rule of the knout and club and put Nicholas Romanov under lock and key. The workers have thrown off the chains which have been fastened upon them by the police régime. The soldier became a free citizen. In the midst of universal barbarism and bestiality the voice of the Russian Revolution resounded mightily: "Peace and Brotherhood of Peoples."

At the head of the revolutionary fighters marched the *proletariat*. From the very beginning the Russian proletariat understood that the success of the Russian Revolution, the cause of peace, the cause of freedom demanded the mutual support of the workers of all countries, the international rising of the enslaved and bleeding proletarians of Europe. The battle cry of the Russian proletariat became the slogan: "Long Live the International Revolution!"

International capital answered this call with a *conspiracy* against the Russian Revolution. The Russian Revolution meant for international capital a breach in the imperialist front. The Russian Revolution threatened to kindle the flame of a world-wide uprising, to shatter and destroy the domination of

* Drawn up by decision of the Sixth Congress of the R.S.-D.L.P. by the Central Committee in the name of the Congress. See p. 120 *f.*, Book I of this volume.—*Ed.*

capital, to throw the golden calf down into the dust. Before the international stock-exchange wolves and bank magnates this problem arose: to strangle the Russian Revolution at all costs, to destroy its power, to behead the international proletariat, to slaughter its Party.

The *Russian plunderers* entered into a close alliance with them, established secret links. Even in the very first days of the revolution the Russian finance bourgeoisie and its party—the so-called People's Freedom Party—concluded an agreement with the plunderers of Western European imperialism. The Russian bourgeoisie had no objection to the overthrow of the autocracy of the Tsar, whose rule made impossible even the conduct of the war (it was interfered with by the thievery and corruption of the tsarist Ministers). But the further course of the revolution threatened the Russian bourgeoisie with countless "terrors": the revolution was to give land to the peasants, to curb capital, to arm the workers, to put an end to the policy of annexation. *By the dirty secret agreements of the bloody Tsar, the "Allied" bankers swore to be faithful to the common cause of annexation and the strangling of the Russian Revolution.* The entrance of America into the war has given wings to the Allied imperialists. They knew very well the value of this "great democracy" which executes its Socialists in the electric chair, suppresses small nations by force of arms, and which, through the lips of its diplomats who are unsurpassed in their audacious cynicism, twaddles about eternal peace. The American multi-millionaires who have just filled their cellars with gold coined from the blood of the dying in the fields of devastated Europe, have now sent their arms, their financial resources, their secret service and their diplomats to smash their German colleagues in the business of international plunder, but at the same time to draw the noose tighter around the neck of the Russian Revolution.

The Russian bourgeoisie proved to be tied to the capitalists of Europe and America by common aims as well as by a heavy gold chain, the ends of which are held in the banking houses of London and New York. Thus was the *capitalist bloc against the revolution* organised.

The *petty bourgeoisie* of Russia, the upper strata of the peasantry, a part of the workers and village poor who were deceived by capital, did not see and did not want to see the whole danger of the capitalist conspiracy. Their parties, the Mensheviks and the S.-R.'s, which have the majority in the Soviets, trailed after the big bourgeoisie. They accepted the position of defencism, without understanding that the bourgeoisie of all countries is deceiving the workers with this word, talking about defence while thinking of annexations. They did not make up their minds to take all power into their own hands, and gave it back in trust to the bourgeoisie. They welcomed the "social-patriotic" agents of Western European capital, those deceivers and poisoners of the people. Every day they became more and more entangled in the nets cast by international capital.

Only the revolutionary proletariat and its party, supported by the poorest peasants and soldiers, sounded the alarm. The party of proletarian Socialism, the party of international revolution, incontrovertibly and consistently tore the false peace-loving mask from the imperialist plunderers. It exposed all the schemes of the bourgeoisie, it criticised the cowardice, the indecisiveness and helplessness of the Menshevik-S.-R. tactics. It demanded with all its might the transfer of power into the hands of the democracy, a break with the capitalists of all countries, publication of all secret agreements which had been concealed from the people. It demanded the immediate transfer of the land to the peasants, workers' control over production, universal peace concluded

by the peoples themselves. "Bread, peace, freedom" was written on its red banner.

In the country, writhing in the clutches of three years of war, an unprecedented *economic and financial crisis* was advancing like an avalanche. The cruel hammer of the war crushed and converted into dust whatever remnants of the accumulated labour of the producers still remained. With every day the country became more like a paralytic. The destruction of the forces of production, the barbarous plundering of these forces, led to a crash. The war, just like an immense vampire, sucked all the sap from the country, robbed it of all its strength. No fuel, no raw materials, no bread. The spectre of famine stalked in the cities, in the homes of the poor. A bottomless gulf of destruction opened up before the country.

Capital is consciously pushing the people into this gulf.

The big bourgeoisie made the crisis more acute, increased the anarchy, closed down enterprises, disorganised production. While they shouted about patriotism and the fatherland and deceived the revolutionary workers, the united trust magnates stubbornly and systematically retarded the process of production in accordance with the plan perfected at their secret conferences so that they could put the blame for the resulting chaos and confusion upon the workers and take all power into their own grasping hands. On the ruins of the national economy contracted by the war convulsions, on the bones of the countless ruined small owners, the hyenas of big capital that were greedily engaged in making fabulous profits on war contracts and in speculating in the starvation of the pauperised masses, conducted their brazen policy of an offensive against the working class. In the lower strata were ripening a dull discontent and revolt against capital and its ministers. Ever louder became the murmur of the many millions of the army of labour.

They were answered by the *policy of an offensive*. The united capital of the Allies collected all its forces to storm the Russian Revolution. The English and American capitalists, who in the capacity of creditors became the bosses of Russian life, united with their faithful Russian lackeys and decided to drive into battle an army admittedly unprepared. The outcome of the battle was of no importance to them. What was important to them was the breaking down of the truce, the renewal of military operations, the strengthening of the power of the commanders. What they wanted was again to harness the worn-out army to the chariot of the war. With the roar of cannon they wanted to drown out the thunderous roar of the class struggle and the revolution.

The S.-R.'s and the Mensheviks approved the policy of an offensive and by that action endangered themselves and the revolution. By continuous compromise with the imperialists and the absence of any hint of decisive action they delivered themselves into the hands of the inveterate plunderers. With their own hands they gave over power to the counter-revolutionary military clique. And the triumphant magnates of the banks and stock exchange are now impudently challenging the democracy, openly declaring their wish to conduct the war "to the bitter end," that is, without an end, until such time as the cellars of the American Morgans burst with gold, until the bloody dew soaks the fields of the tortured earth.

The bourgeoisie has temporarily accomplished its purpose. Where are the proud appeals to the brotherhood of all peoples? Where are the unfurled banners of the world revolution? The S.-R.'s and Mensheviks have replaced these appeals with appeals to continue the slaughter. The servants of the bourgeoisie have spat upon the revolutionary banners, they have delivered

them to the heroes of the offensive to be desecrated, they have dragged them through the mire.

Growing resentment and indignation was the response of the proletariat and the advanced soldiers to this policy. And a stormy, spontaneous outburst of this indignation carried the workers and soldiers into the streets when the Cadet Ministers, after they received a secret report about the breakdown of the offensive, hastened to resign and put all the responsibility upon their "Socialist" lackeys. *The days of July 16 and 17* put before the leaders of petty-bourgeois "Socialism," before the Soviet majority, the great historical question: Are they with the proletariat against the counter-revolution, or with the counter-revolution against the proletariat? In those days it was necessary to decide. Here it was necessary to choose clearly and definitely. And they chose those ministerial Socialists: against the workers and soldiers who wrote on their banner the slogan: "All power to the Soviets!" The leaders of the Soviets called out troops against them. Entangled in compromises with the counter-revolution, they supported this counter-revolution and directed the rifles against the workers' battalions, against the flower of the revolutionary forces, against the *party of the proletariat*. This party alone, our party, remained at its post. This party alone in this fatal hour of freedom did not desert the working class districts. This party alone made every effort to have the demonstration assume a peaceful and organised character and to march shoulder to shoulder with the masses. This was its revolutionary duty. This was demanded by its revolutionary honour.

The Mensheviks and S.-R.'s, carrying out the will of the bourgeoisie disarmed the revolution and thereby armed the counter-revolution. The bourgeoisie entrusted them with the dirty work of putting down and crushing the uprising. With their silent consent, they let loose the mad dogs of the vilest bourgeois slander against the glorious leaders of our party. It was they who conducted the disgraceful and shameful trade in the heads of the proletarian leaders, delivering them one after another to the infuriated bourgeoisie. It was they who delivered the heart of the revolution beating for the entire world, the capital of Russia, to the military cadets and Cossacks, to be torn into pieces. It was with their co-operation that the *Pravda* was wrecked and that a ferocious attack was started upon the Left Wing of the revolution.

The *July days* opened a new page in history. For the first time a decisive victory was temporarily gained by the counter-revolution and the power passed into the hands of the bourgeoisie and the General Staff. Up to that time there was dual power. Up to that time the Soviets had a great deal of power. Behind them stood the armed masses of soldiers and workers, the free people. Then the Soviets weakened themselves. They disarmed the workers, disbanded the revolutionary regiments, filled the capital with Cossacks, tied themselves hand and foot and became an appendage of the bourgeois government. The mouths of the "Socialist" Ministers were closed. Their bourgeois colleagues put them in chains. They are made use of when it is necessary to put down the workers but they are spat upon when they make an attempt to protest.

Having delivered the power into the hands of the counter-revolution and having betrayed the revolution, the leaders of philistinism, the S.-R.'s and Mensheviks, began to sign almost every counter-revolutionary measure of the government. The red flag of freedom was lowered. In its place waves the black flag of *capital punishment*. The shooting down of soldiers and workers, censorship, slander through court action, the secret service, arrests, the re-introduction of the hateful tsarist laws against political crimes, the dirty slan-

ders of the political secret police—all these charming measures of the old régime were again introduced by the new government to “save the revolution”—by the government that imprisons revolutionists and liberates tsarist Ministers and agent-provocateurs, that postpones again and again the convening of the Constituent Assembly and at present convenes in its place the counter-revolutionary “Moscow Conference” of magnates of industry and trade. Having strengthened its position within the country, the counter-revolution returned to its old methods in all other questions. A heavy attack is conducted against the Ukraine, not only by decrees but also by cavalry. The Finnish Sejm has been dissolved and armed force is threatened against that very right of self-determination which was proclaimed so solemnly in the official declarations. Through the government ambassadors a sinister intrigue is conducted at Stockholm against the meeting even of the most moderate “Socialists.”

The slogan “peace without annexations” has been relegated to the archives, and in its place has appeared the Milyukov-Guchkov slogan, “War to complete victory.” Kerensky has proclaimed the slogan, “Annihilation of the Bolsheviks,” and has sent “in the name of the Russian people” a telegram to the English King George, a very close relative of Wilhelm Hohenzollern and Nicholas Romanov. The revolutionary slogan, “Peace to the cottages, war to the palaces,” has been replaced by the slogan, “Peace to the palaces, war to the cottages.”

But the counter-revolution is celebrating its victory too early. Bullets will not feed the hungry; cossacks’ lashes will not dry the tears of mothers and wives; the lasso and the noose will not dry up the sea of suffering; the bayonet will not pacify the peoples; generals’ orders will not stop the collapse of industry.

The subterranean forces of history are at work. Among the very depths of the masses of the people dull discontent is ripening. The peasants want land, the workers want bread, and they both want peace. Over the entire globe the stormy petrels are flying. In Great Britain the workers have already started an open struggle to check capital; in France the soldiers are agitating for peace and revolution; in Germany there is continuous unrest and strikes; in America the bourgeoisie has started shooting down Socialists who raise the banner of struggle against war. Spain is aflame with revolutionary clashes among the classes. The financiers of all countries are already gathering at secret conferences to discuss the general problem of the approaching danger. For they already hear the iron step of the marching workers’ revolution. They already see the inevitable.

Into this clash our party is going with unfurled banners. It firmly grasps its banners. It did not lower them before the oppressors and dirty slanderers, before traitors to the revolution and servants of capital. It will hold them high in the future, in the struggle for Socialism, for the brotherhood of peoples. For it knows a new movement is rising and that the hour of the death of the old world is near.

Prepare for new battles, militant comrades! Firmly, courageously, and calmly, without giving in to provocations, gather strength and form fighting columns! Under the banner of the Party, proletarians and soldiers! Under our banner, oppressed of the villages!

Long live the revolutionary proletariat!

Long live the alliance of the workers and the village poor!

Down with the counter-revolution and its “Moscow Conference”!

Long live the workers’ world revolution!

Long live Socialism!

Long live the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party (Bolsheviks)!

SIXTH CONGRESS OF THE RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC
LABOUR PARTY (BOLSHEVIKS).

Petrograd, August 12, 1917.

*Proceedings of the Sixth Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour
Party (Bolsheviks).*

Communist Publishing House, 1919.

VI

RESOLUTION OF THE C.C. OF THE R.S.-D.L.P. ON THE MOSCOW
CONFERENCE *

STATE power in Russia is now passing entirely into the hands of the counter-revolutionary imperialist bourgeoisie, which is openly supported by the petty-bourgeois S.-R. and Menshevik Parties. The policy of inflaming and prolonging the war, of refusing to give land to the peasants, of taking away rights from the soldiers, of re-establishing capital punishment, of violence against Finland and the Ukraine, and finally of furious crusading against the revolutionary part of the proletariat, the internationalist Social-Democrats—these are the most patent expressions of the domination of counter-revolutionary policies. In order to strengthen its influence and its position the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie is attempting to create a strong all-Russian centre, to unite its forces, and then, armed to the teeth, to move against the proletariat, against democracy. The Moscow Conference which has been called for August 25 is also to serve this purpose.

The Moscow Conference, the overwhelming majority of which is made up of representatives from such institutions of the régime overthrown by the revolution as the tsarist State Duma, a nest of counter-revolution, and of representatives of numerous organisations of the big bourgeoisie, has as its task to falsify the opinion of the people and in that way to mislead and deceive the great masses of the people. At a time when by the very convening of the Moscow Conference a centre of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie is being organised, the Soviets, the soldier and peasant committees, are systematically reduced to the rôle of mere appendages of the imperialist apparatus. While the Moscow Conference is convening, the Constituent Assembly is postponed again and again.

The bourgeoisie is cautiously but steadily marching towards its goal, the undermining of the Constituent Assembly and its replacement by organs in which the domination of the bourgeoisie will be assured.

As a result the Moscow Conference has as its task the sanctioning of counter-revolutionary policies, the supporting of the prolongation of the imperialist war; it is to stand up for the interests of the bourgeoisie and landowners and to lend its authority to the persecution of the revolutionary workers and peasants. Thus the Moscow Conference, which is screened and supported by the

* See p. 74, Book I of this volume.—Ed.

petty-bourgeois parties, the S.-R.'s and Mensheviks, is in reality a conspiracy against the revolution, against the people.

Proceeding from the above considerations, the C.C. of the R.S.-D.I.P. proposes to the party organisations: first, to expose the conference convening in Moscow as an organ of the conspiracy of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie against the revolution; second, to expose the counter-revolutionary policy of the S.-R.'s and Mensheviks who are supporting this conference; third, to organise mass protests of workers, peasants and soldiers against the conference.

Rabochy i Soldat, No. 14, August 21, 1917.

VII

PROCLAMATION OF THE C.C. OF THE RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC LABOUR PARTY ON THE KORNILOV REVOLT *

TO ALL TOILERS, TO ALL WORKERS AND SOLDIERS OF PETROGRAD.

COUNTER-REVOLUTION advances on Petrograd. The traitor to the revolution, the enemy of the people, Kornilov, leads to Petrograd troops deceived by him. The entire bourgeoisie, headed by the Cadet Party, which has ceaselessly sown slander against workers and soldiers, is now welcoming the traitor and betrayer and is ready to applaud whole-heartedly when Kornilov paints the streets of Petrograd red with the blood of workers and revolutionary soldiers, when he suppresses, by the hands of the ignorant people he deceives, the proletarian, peasants' and soldiers' revolution. To facilitate for Kornilov the slaughter of the proletariat, the bourgeoisie has thought up the invention that in Petrograd a workers' rebellion has triumphed. Now you see that the rebellion was started not by the workers but by the bourgeoisie and the generals headed by Kornilov. The triumph of Kornilov means the loss of liberty, the loss of the land, the triumph and omnipotence of the landowner over the peasant, of the capitalist over the worker, of the general over the soldier.

The Provisional Government fell to pieces at the very beginning of Kornilov's counter-revolution. This government, in whom a part of the democracy repeatedly expressed their confidence, whom it entrusted with all the power, this government proved unable to accomplish its first and immediate task: to suppress at the very root the counter-revolution of the generals and bourgeoisie. The attempts at compromise with the bourgeoisie have weakened the democracy, inflamed the appetites of the bourgeoisie, encouraged it to undertake an open revolt against the revolution, against the people.

The salvation of the people, the salvation of the revolution, lies in the revolutionary energy of the masses of the proletarians and soldiers themselves. We can trust only our own strength, our own discipline, our own organised power. We entrust the leadership of the decisive struggle for the salvation of the entire revolution, its conquests and its future, to that power which unqualifiedly, unremittingly will take upon itself to put through fully the demands of the proletarian and soldier-peasant masses. Only that power will save the revolution, will save it from the attack of the counter-revolution, will save it in spite of the hesitations, waverings, spinelessness of the vacillating section of the democracy.

* See p. 137, Book I of this volume.—*Ed.*

People of Petrograd! We call you to most decisive struggle with the counter-revolution! Behind Petrograd stands all of revolutionary Russia!

Soldiers! In the name of the revolution—forward against General Kornilov!

Workers! With united ranks defend the city of the revolution against the attack of the bourgeois counter-revolution!

Soldiers and workers! In brotherly union, cemented by the blood of the February days, show the Kornilovists that it will not be the Kornilovists who will suppress the revolution, but the revolution that will break and wipe off the face of the earth the attempts of the bourgeois counter-revolution.

In the name of the interests of the revolution, in the name of the power of the proletariat and peasantry of liberated Russia and the world over, as one united family, with closed ranks, hand in hand, all as one man, meet the enemy of the people, the traitor to the revolution, the murderer of liberty!

You were able to overthrow tsarism; show that you will not tolerate the rule of the creature of the landowners and the bourgeoisie—Kornilov.

C.C., R.S.-D.L.P. (BOLSHEVIKS)

P.C., R.S.-D.L.P. (BOLSHEVIKS)

MILITARY ORGANISATION OF THE C.C., R.S.-D.L.P.

CENTRAL SOVIET OF FACTORY COMMITTEES

BOLSHEVIK FRACTION OF THE PETROGRAD AND CENTRAL SOVIETS OF WORKERS' AND SOLDIERS' DEPUTIES.

Rabochy, No. 8, September 12, 1917.

VIII

DECLARATION OF BOLSHEVIK FRACTION READ AT THE DEMOCRATIC CONFERENCE, OCTOBER 1, 1917 *

THE revolution approaches its most critical stage. What follows is either a new rise or a disastrous fall. The people are exhausted by the war, but they are hardly less weary of the indecisiveness, torn by the vacillations in the policies pursued by the leading political parties. Within something over six months after the overthrow of tsarism, after several attempts to build up a revolutionary power on the basis of a coalition of the representatives of democracy with the representatives of the property-owning bourgeoisie; after the pitiful acts of the personal régime which led directly to the Kornilov affair, the moving forces of the revolution are again acutely confronted with the problem of power.

Every new government combination started with a declaration of the programme of measures to be adopted by the state, and within a few weeks it revealed its total inability to make a single serious step forward. Every new deal with the property-owning elements which followed after the disastrousness of coalition became self-evident, raised the greatest confusion, alarm and perplexity in the minds of all the toiling and oppressed classes of the country. Not only the city worker, not only the soldier who has been languishing for three years in the trenches, but also the peasant of the most remote and backward village, cannot fail to understand that the land problem cannot be solved by agreements with the Lvovs and Rodzyankos. The

* See p. 248, Book I of this volume.—*Ed.*

democratisation of the army cannot be entrusted to generals who were serf-owners under the old régime, the Kornilovs and Alexeyevs; control over industry cannot be realised through Minister-industrialists, nor financial reforms through bankers and military marauders and their immediate protégés, the Konovalovs, Palchinskys, Tretyakovs or Buryshkins. Finally, not a single serious measure for the regulation of the food supply and transportation or a single reform of the judiciary, school system, etc., can actually be carried out, while in an epoch of the greatest upheavals, both in the centre and locally, the old officialdom and the old make-up of the government with its anti-democratic spirit and stupid bureaucracy are preserved.

In spite of all the efforts of the government to drive out the Soviets and render them impotent; in spite of the suicidal policy of the official defensist leaders of the Soviets, the Soviets have shown all the invincibility of the revolutionary power and the initiative of the masses of the people, which find their expression through the Soviets, during the period of the suppression of the Kornilov revolt, while the Provisional Government has condemned itself forever before the court of the people and history—one of its parts by directly lending aid and comfort to the Kornilov affair, and the other by its readiness to deliver into the hands of Kornilov the conquests of the revolution. After this new test, which nothing can any longer erase from the minds of the workers, soldiers and peasants, the call sounded by our party at the very beginning of the revolution: "All power to the Soviets, both in the centre and locally"—became the voice of the entire revolutionary country.

Only such a power as will be based directly upon the proletariat and poor peasantry, a power that will take into account all the material wealth of the country and its economic possibilities, that will not stop the measures it is taking at the threshold of the self-seeking interests of groups of property owners, that will mobilise all the forces with scientific preparation and technical knowledge for social and economic ends will be able to introduce into the disintegrating economy the maximum of planning possible at the present moment, will be able to help the peasantry and the agricultural labourers to use the available means of agricultural production to the greatest possible productivity, will be able to limit profits, to maintain wages and assure genuine labour discipline in accord with the regulation of production—discipline based on the self-government of the toilers and their centralised control over industry—and will be able with a minimum of upheaval to assure the demobilisation of the whole national economy.

Since the counter-revolutionary Cadet Party, which fears the passing of power to the Soviets more than anything else, is continually raising fears among the less class-conscious elements of the democracy by the spectre of an armed uprising by the Bolsheviks, we consider it necessary again to declare here, before the entire country, that in its struggle for power in order to carry out its programme, our party has never strived, and does not strive, to seize power *against* the organised will of the majority of the toiling masses of the country. The transfer of all power to the Soviets would do away neither with the class struggle nor with the struggle of the parties within the camp of the democracy. But *given full and unlimited freedom of agitation* and with the composition of the Soviets constantly renewed from below, the struggle for influence and power would develop within the framework of the Soviet organisations. On the other hand, the continuation of the present policy of violence and repression towards the working class, the revolutionary elements of the army and peasantry, with the aim of arresting the further development of the revolution, must inevitably, and entirely independently of the wishes of the

revolutionary organisations, lead to a terrific clash, the like of which has seldom been seen.

Under present conditions the coalition government is inevitably a government of violence and repression by the upper strata against the lower. Only he who wants to provoke a civil war at any price, in order to be able after it to throw the responsibility for it upon the working masses and our party, can propose to the democracy, after all that has been gone through, the conclusion of a new alliance with the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie.

The people thirst for peace. A coalition government means the continuation of the imperialist war. The composition of the Provisional Government has up to now been adapting itself to the demands of the Allied imperialists, the mortal enemies of the Russian revolutionary democracy. The disastrous offensive of July 1, against the undertaking of which our party so consistently warned; the Kornilov methods of keeping the army in check, which were carried out with direct participation of the conciliationist Ministers—all of it was directly or indirectly inspired by the Allied imperialists. On this road the Russian Revolution has already succeeded in wasting an immense part of its moral authority, without strengthening in the least its physical forces. It is becoming ever more clear that having undermined the internal forces of the Russian Revolution, the Allied imperialists will not stop at the conclusion of peace at the expense of the Russian people. At the same time the further half-hearted prolongation of the war, without the confidence of the people in the purposes of the war and of the Provisional Government conducting it, gives an immense advantage into the hands of the counter-revolution, which may attempt to stake its chances on a separate peace with predatory German imperialism. The establishment of a Soviet power means first of all a direct, open and decisive offer to all the nations of an immediate, honourable, just, democratic peace. The revolutionary army would be able to recognise the inevitability of war only in case such a peace were rejected. However, everything indicates that the offer of the revolutionary government would find such a mighty echo from the long-suffering working masses of all the belligerent nations that the further continuation of the war would become impossible. Soviet power means peace.

Enough of hesitation! Enough of the policy of indecision and cowardice! You cannot torment and worry the peasants for half a year with impunity, promising them land and freedom, and refusing in fact to abolish at once the right of private property in the landowners' land without compensation, refusing to transfer these lands at once to the management of local peasant committees until the convening of the Constituent Assembly.

Enough of wavering! Enough of that policy of equivocation that has been carried on till now by the leaders of the S.-R.'s and Mensheviks. Enough of dragging! Enough of words! The last decisive hour has struck.

The following measures, promulgated by many influential revolutionary organisations headed by the Petrograd and Moscow Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies must be made the basis of the activity of the revolutionary government:

1. The abolition of private property in landowners' land without compensation and its transfer to the management of peasant committees until the Constituent Assembly makes a decision, the poorest peasants to be provided with the necessary equipment.

2. The introduction of workers' control over both production and distribution on a state-wide scale, the centralisation of banking, control over the banks and the nationalisation of the most important industries, such as oil, coal,

and metals; universal labour duty; immediate measures to demobilise industry, and organisation of supplying the village with industrial products at fixed prices. The merciless taxation of large capital accumulations and properties and the confiscation of war profits for the purpose of saving the country from economic ruin.

3. Declaring secret agreements to be void, and the immediate offer of a universal democratic peace to all the peoples of the belligerent nations.

4. Safeguarding the rights of the nationalities inhabiting Russia to self-determination. The immediate abolition of all repressive measures against Finland and the Ukraine.

The following must be decreed as immediate measures:

1. Stopping all repressions directed against the working class and its organisations. Abolition of capital punishment at the front and the re-establishment of full freedom of agitation and of all democratic organisations within the army. Cleansing the army of counter-revolutionary elements.

2. Commissars and other officials to be elected by local organisations.

3. General arming of the workers and the organisation of a Red Guard.

4. Dissolution of the State Council and State Duma. The immediate convening of the Constituent Assembly.

5. Abolition of all the privileges of the estates (of the nobility, etc.), complete equality of rights for all citizens.

6. Introduction of the eight-hour day and of a comprehensive system of social insurance.

As a special measure necessary to purify the political atmosphere and to reveal the evils of the courts, we demand the immediate appointment of an investigation commission, which has authority with the democracy, for a thorough investigation of the events of July 16-18 and for the examination of the actions of all judicial authorities—the agents of the old régime in whose hands are at present concentrated the proceedings against the proletariat. The immediate release of all arrested revolutionaries and the designation of a near date for an open trial of all the cases already begun.

We deem it necessary to state that the present conference was convoked on a basis of thoroughly arbitrary methods of representation, the cumulative effect of which was to allot to the least revolutionary, the conciliationist elements of the democracy, a representation to which they have not the least claim, by virtue of their actual political rôle. The army organisations are entirely inadequately represented and even then only in persons from the top, who are removed from the masses of the soldiers and have not been elected for half a year. The Dumas and the Zemstvos, which have been only partially reformed, and because of the special task allotted to them, reflect only to an extremely unsatisfactory degree the revolutionary political experience and point of view of the democracy, and this is true even to a greater extent of the co-operative organisations, in which the selection of the persons at the helm is far removed from the political aspirations of the democratic masses and from the evolution of the sentiment of the masses. As compared with that of the Dumas, Zemstvos and co-operatives, the representation from the Soviets is extremely curtailed. Still, it is these very organisations which represent most accurately the political will of the workers, soldiers and peasants. It was the Soviets which took control of the entire situation and in many places also of the entire power during the critical days of the Kornilov revolt. That is why we believe that only those decisions and proposals of the

present conference, which are directed toward the total elimination of the personal régime of Kerensky, and are recognised by the All-Russian Congress of Workers', Peasants' and Soldiers' Deputies, can be realised. The convening of such a congress without delay is the most important task of the present moment.

Rabochy Put, No. 15, October 3, 1917.

IX

DECLARATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK FRACTION READ IN THE PRE-PARLIAMENT, OCTOBER 20, 1917 *

THE officially declared purposes of the Democratic Conference, which was called together by the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, were the abolition of the irresponsible personal régime that made possible the Kornilov affair and the establishment of a government accountable to the democracy and able to liquidate the war and to assure the convening of the Constituent Assembly at the appointed time.

However, behind the back of the Democratic Conference and by means of backstage deals between Kerensky, the Cadets and the leaders of the S.-R.'s and Mensheviks, results were achieved which are in direct contradiction to the officially proclaimed purposes.

A government was created in which and about which avowed and secret Kornilovists are playing a leading part. The irresponsibility of that power is from now on fixed and proclaimed officially.

The Council of the Russian Republic has been declared a consultative institution; during the eighth month of the revolution the irresponsible government has created for itself a screen consisting of a new edition of the Bulygin Duma. The property-owning elements enter the Provisional Council in numbers to which they have not the slightest right, as shown by the elections all over the country. In spite of this, it was the Cadet Party that was attempting to make sure and did make sure that the government should not be responsible even to this pre-parliament that was mutilated in favour of the census bourgeoisie.

That very Cadet Party which until yesterday insisted that the Provisional Government be made dependent upon the Duma of Mr. Rodzyanko, succeeded in securing the independence of the Provisional Government from the Council of the Republic.

In the Constituent Assembly the property-owning elements will occupy an incomparably less favourable position than the Provisional Council. It will be impossible for the government not to be responsible to the Constituent Assembly. If the property-owning elements were really preparing for a Constituent Assembly that were to meet within a month and a half, there would be no reason for them to fight for the present lack of responsibility of the government. The crux of the situation is that the bourgeois classes which are directing the policy of the political government have made it their purpose to *undermine* the Constituent Assembly. This is at present the basic task of the property-owning elements, to which all their policy, both internal and foreign, is subordinated.

* See p. 61 of this book.—*Ed.*

In the fields of industry, agriculture and provisioning, the policy of the government and the propertied classes aggravates the natural disintegration resulting from the war. The census classes, having provoked a peasant uprising, are now beginning to suppress it, and are openly directing their course towards the "gaunt hand of famine," which is to stifle the revolution, and, first of all, the Constituent Assembly.

No less criminal is the foreign policy of the bourgeoisie and its government.

After forty months of war the capital is threatened with mortal danger. To meet this danger the plan is advanced of transferring the government to Moscow. The idea of surrendering the revolutionary capital to the German troops does not cause the slightest resentment upon the part of the bourgeois classes; on the contrary, it is accepted by them as a natural link in their general policy which is to facilitate for them their counter-revolutionary conspiracy.

Instead of recognising that the salvation of the country lies in the conclusion of peace, instead of openly throwing out the offer of immediate peace, over the heads of all imperialist governments and diplomatic offices, to all the nations exhausted by the war and thus actually making possible the further waging of the war, the Provisional Government, following the lead of the Cadet counter-revolutionaries and the Allied imperialists, is dragging along the murderous yoke of the war without sense, without strength, without a plan, dooming to purposeless destruction ever new hundreds of thousands of soldiers and sailors, and preparing the surrender of Petrograd and the stifling of the revolution. At a time when the Bolshevik soldiers and sailors are perishing together with the other sailors and soldiers as a result of mistakes and crimes of others, the so-called Supreme Commander-in-Chief continues to wreck the Bolshevik press (*Molot* has been suppressed in Minsk).

The leading parties of the Provisional Council serve as a voluntary screen for this whole policy.

We, the fraction of Social-Democrats-Bolsheviks, declare: with this government of traitors to the people and with this council of counter-revolutionary connivance we have nothing in common. We do not wish to cover up, directly or indirectly, not even for a single day, that work which is being carried out behind the official screen and which is fatal to the people.

The revolution is in danger! While the armies of Wilhelm are threatening Petrograd, the government of Kerensky-Konovalov is preparing to flee from Petrograd, so as to convert Moscow into a bulwark of the counter-revolution.

We appeal to the Moscow workers and soldiers to be on their guard!

In withdrawing from the Provisional Council we appeal to the vigilance and courage of the workers, soldiers and peasants of all Russia.

Petrograd is in danger! The revolution is in danger! The people are in danger!

The government aggravates this danger. The ruling parties help the government.

Only the people themselves can save themselves and the country. We appeal to the people.

All power to the Soviets!

All the land to the people!

Long live the immediate, honourable, democratic peace!

Long live the Constituent Assembly!

Rabochy Put, No. 31, October 21, 1917.

X

RESOLUTION ON THE PRESENT SITUATION, ADOPTED BY THE
THIRD PETROGRAD CITY CONFERENCE OF THE RUSSIAN
SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC LABOUR PARTY, OCTOBER 23, 1917 *

1. THE bourgeois-imperialist counter-revolutionary power, supported by the S.R. and Menshevik Parties, which have lost all influence over the masses, has definitely discredited itself in the eyes of the workers, soldiers and peasants.

2. Having freed themselves entirely of illusions about the possibility of a peaceful development of the Russian Revolution, the masses have again spontaneously entered on the road of revolutionary struggle; this is evidenced by the growing agrarian movement, the increasing discontent and the spontaneous outbursts in the cities, as well as in the radical change of sentiment at the front.

3. In this struggle now begun, the masses place all their hopes in the revolutionary party of the proletariat and upon the Petrograd, Moscow and other Soviets led by that party.

4. The imperialist power, being afraid of the growing influence of the revolutionary Soviets of the capitals, and having met defeat in its attempt to create in the person of the Council of the Russian Republic a body able to replace the open revolutionary struggle with parliamentary chatter, is preparing to leave the revolutionary capital so that it may finally and the more easily deal a mortal blow to the revolution.

5. On the other hand, the Allied and Russian imperialists, frightened to death by the growth of revolution in Western Europe, are attempting to stifle the Russian Revolution.

The attack of the German fleet, unhindered by the fleet of the Allies, the demand of the Allied imperialists that the revolutionary capital be evacuated, and the readiness of the government to surrender this capital—all this is evidence that an active crusade has been started against the Russian Revolution—a crusade that has as its purpose the crushing of the revolution in Western Europe.

The revolutionary movement in Western Europe is increasing the chances of the revolutionary proletariat for victory. All these circumstances clearly indicate that the moment has arrived for the last decisive clash that must determine the fate, not only of the Russian Revolution, but also of the world revolution.

In view of the above the Conference declares that only the replacement of the government of Kerensky, together with the packed Council of the Republic, by a workers' and peasants' revolutionary government will be able:

(a) to give over the land to the peasants instead of suppressing the uprising of the peasants;

(b) immediately to propose a just peace, thereby giving all our army faith in the truth;

(c) to adopt the most decisive revolutionary measures against the capitalists in order to provide the army with bread, clothing and shoes, as well as for the struggle against economic disintegration.

Second and Third Petrograd Conferences of the Bolsheviks, July and September, 1917, State Publishing House, 1927.

* See p. 66 of this book.—Ed.

XI

MINUTES OF SESSION OF THE C.C. OF THE R.S.-D.L.P.,
OCTOBER 23, 1917 *

Present: Lenin, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Trotsky, Stalin, Sverdlov, Uritsky, Dzerzhinsky, Kollontai, Bubnov, Sokolnikov, Lomov.

Chairman: Sverdlov.

Order of Business: 1. Rumanian front. 2. Lithuanians. 3. Minsk and northern front. 4. Present situation. 5. Regional congress. 6. Evacuation of troops.

1. *Rumanian Front*

Report submitted by *Sverdlov*. On the Rumanian front a conference of Social-Democrats of all shades took place. A mixed list was prepared. Submitted to the Central Committee (united). Was approved. They ask what the attitude of our Central Committee is on this. Out of 20 candidates 4 Bolsheviks were put up.

Decided: taking into consideration the decision of the Congress, no blocs are permitted.

2. *Lithuanians*

Report by *Sverdlov*.

The Lithuanians had a conference in Minsk, where, it appeared, defensists frequently speak in the name of the party. In order to counteract this practice, it was decided to elect a temporary centre which is to put itself, as well as the entire conference, under the banner of the Bolsheviks. This centre should be confirmed.

Comrade Lomov thinks it should be confirmed. But attention should be called to the fact that defensist organisations were also present.

The temporary bureau is approved.

3. *Minsk and Northern Front*

Report by *Sverdlov*.

Representatives of several armies of the northern front came and stated that on that front some shady affair is being prepared with regard to the evacuation of the troops into the interior.

It is reported from Minsk that a new Kornilov affair is in preparation there. Because of the character of the garrison Minsk is surrounded by Cossack detachments. There are some negotiations of a suspicious nature going on between the staff and headquarters. Agitation is being conducted among the Osetians and several parts of the army against the Bolsheviks. At the front, however, sentiment is for the Bolsheviks. They will follow them against Kerensky. There are no documents at all. They can be obtained by seizing the staff, which is technically altogether possible in Minsk; in that case the local garrison can disarm all the troops around. All the artillery has been driven into the Pinsk marshes. A corps can be sent from Minsk to Petrograd.

* See pp. 106-107 of this book.—*Ed.*

4. Present Situation

Lenin takes the floor.

He states that since the beginning of September a certain indifference towards the question of uprising has been noted. He says that this is inadmissible, if we earnestly raise the slogan of seizure of power by the Soviets. It is, therefore, high time to turn attention to the technical side of the question. Much time has obviously been lost.

Nevertheless the question is very urgent and the decisive moment is near.

The international situation is such that we must take the initiative.

What is being planned, surrendering as far as Narva and even as far as Petrograd, compels us still more to take decisive action.

The political situation is also effectively working in this direction. On July 16-18, decisive action on our part would have been defeated because we had no majority with us. Since then, our upsurge has been making gigantic strides.

The absenteeism and the indifference of the masses can be explained by the fact that the masses are tired of words and resolutions.

The majority is now with us. Politically, the situation has become entirely ripe for the transfer of power.

The agrarian movement also goes in this direction, for it is clear that enormous efforts are needed to subdue this movement. The slogan of transferring the entire land has become the general slogan of the peasants. The political background is thus ready. It is necessary to speak of the technical side. This is the whole matter. Meanwhile we, together with the defensists, are inclined to consider a systematic preparation for an uprising as something like a political sin.

To wait for the Constituent Assembly, which will obviously not be for us, is senseless, because it would make our task more complex.

We must utilise the regional congress and the proposal from Minsk to begin decisive action.

Comrade Lomov takes the floor, giving information concerning the attitude of the Moscow regional bureau and the Moscow Committee, as well as about the situation in Moscow in general.

Comrade Uritsky states that we are weak not only in a technical sense but also in all other spheres of our work. We have carried a mass of resolutions. Actions, none whatever. The Petrograd Soviet is disorganised, few meetings, etc.

On what forces do we base ourselves?

The workers in Petrograd have 40,000 rifles, but this will not decide the issue; this is nothing.

The garrison after the July days cannot inspire great hopes. However, in any case, if the course is held for an uprising, then it is really necessary to do something in that direction. We must *make up our mind* with regard to definite action.

Comrade Sverdlov gives information concerning what he knows about the state of affairs throughout Russia.

Comrade Dzerzhinsky proposes that for the purpose of political guidance during the immediate future, a Political Bureau be created, composed of members of the C.C.

After an exchange of opinion, the proposal is carried. A Political Bureau of 7 is created (the editors + two + Bubnov).

A resolution was accepted, reading as follows [see page 107.—*Ed.*].

Ten express themselves for it, and two against. The question is then raised of establishing a Political Bureau of the C.C. It is decided to form a bureau of 7: Lenin, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Trotsky, Stalin, Sokolnikov, Bubnov.

Archives of the C.C.

XII

STATEMENT BY G. ZINOVIEV AND U. KAMENEV *

October 24, 1917.

DEAR COMRADES:

At the last session of the C.C. we were in the minority and the two of us voted against the theses adopted. In view of the importance of the question we found it necessary to expound in the special statement attached hereto a brief résumé of the speeches made by us during the session, and we request you to attach this statement to the minutes of the meeting. We consider it our duty to acquaint the Petrograd Committee, the Moscow Committee, the Moscow Regional Committee and the Finnish Regional Committee with this statement. The form which we have given to the statement you will of course understand without comment.

G. ZINOVIEV.
U. KAMENEV.

To the Petrograd, Moscow, Moscow Regional, and Finnish Regional Committees of the R.S.-D.L.P., the Bolshevik fraction of the C.E.C. of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, the Bolshevik fraction of the congress of the Soviets of the Northern Region:

On the Present Situation

In connection with the political situation, the withdrawal of the Bolsheviks from the pre-parliament put before our party the question:

What next?

In labour circles there is developing and growing a current of thought which sees the only outcome in the immediate declaration of an armed uprising. The interaction of all the conditions at present is such that if we are to speak of such an uprising a definite date must be set for it, and that within the next few days. In one or another form this question is already being discussed by the entire press and at workers' meetings, and is occupying the minds of a substantial group of party workers. We on our part consider it our duty and our right to express ourselves on this question with complete frankness.

We are deeply convinced that to call at present for an armed uprising means to stake on one card not only the fate of our party, but also the fate of the Russian and international revolution.

There is no doubt that there are historical situations when an oppressed class must recognise that it is better to go forward to defeat than to give up

* See p. 111 *f.* of this book and note 150.—*Ed.*

without a battle. Does the Russian working class find itself at present in such a situation? *No, and a thousand times no!!!*

As a result of the immense growth of the influence of our party in the cities, and particularly in the army, there has come about at present a situation such that it is becoming more and more impossible for the bourgeoisie to obstruct the Constituent Assembly. Through the army, through the workers, we hold a revolver at the temple of the bourgeoisie: the bourgeoisie is put in such a position that if it should undertake now to attempt to obstruct the Constituent Assembly, it would again push the petty-bourgeois parties to one side, and the revolver would go off.

The chances of our party in the elections to the Constituent Assembly are excellent. The talk that the influence of Bolshevism is beginning to wane, etc., we consider to have absolutely no foundation. In the mouths of our political opponents this assertion is simply a move in the political game, having as its purpose this very thing, to provoke an uprising of the Bolsheviks under conditions favourable to our enemies. The influence of the Bolsheviks is increasing. Whole strata of the labouring population are only now beginning to be drawn in by it. With correct tactics we can get a third and even more of the seats in the Constituent Assembly. The attitude of the petty-bourgeois parties in the Constituent Assembly can not possibly be the same then as it is now. In the first place their slogan: "For land, for freedom, wait for the Constituent Assembly," will drop out. And aggravation of want, hunger, and the peasant movement, will exert more and more pressure on them and will compel them to seek an alliance with the proletarian party against the landowners and capitalists represented by the Cadet Party.

The Constituent Assembly, by itself, cannot of course abolish the present camouflaging of these interrelations. The Soviets, which have become rooted in life, can not be destroyed. The Constituent Assembly will be able to find support for its revolutionary work only in the Soviets. The Constituent Assembly plus the Soviets—this is that combined type of state institutions towards which we are going. It is on this political basis that our party is acquiring enormous chances for a real victory.

We have never said that the Russian working class *alone*, by its own forces, would be able to bring the present revolution to a victorious conclusion. We have not forgotten, must not forget even now, that between us and the bourgeoisie there stands a huge third camp: the petty bourgeoisie. This camp joined us during the days of the Kornilov affair and gave us victory. It will join us many times more. We must not permit ourselves to be hypnotised by what is the case at the present moment. Undoubtedly, at present this camp is much nearer to the bourgeoisie than to us. But the present situation is not eternal, nor even durable. And only by a careless step, by some hasty action which will make the whole fate of the revolution dependent upon an immediate uprising, will the proletarian party push the petty bourgeoisie into the arms of Milyukov *for a long time*.

We are told: (1) that the majority of the people of Russia is already with us, and (2) that the majority of the international proletariat is with us. Alas!—neither the one nor the other is true, and this is the crux of the entire situation.

In Russia a majority of the workers and a substantial part of the soldiers are with us. But all the rest is dubious. We are all convinced, for instance, that if elections to the Constituent Assembly were to take place now, a majority of the peasants would vote for the S.R.'s. What is this, an accident? The masses of the soldiers support us not because of the slogan of war, but because of the slogan of peace. This is an extremely important circumstance and unless we take it into consideration we would be risking building on sand. If, having taken power at present by ourselves, we should come to the conclusion (in view of the whole world situation) that it is necessary to wage a revolutionary war, the masses of the soldiers will rush away from us. The best part of the army youth will, of course, remain with us, but the masses of the soldiers will turn away. The criminality of the imperialist government

consists in the very fact that by serving the interests of the Russian and the Allied bourgeoisie, it undermined the economic forces of the country at their very root, it disorganised the country and thereby deprived the revolutionary people of the possibility of defending itself against the appetites of world imperialism by means of a revolutionary war. After forty months of imperialist war in a country ruined by the rule of marauders, under conditions of economic ruin that were created by tsarism and continued by the rule of the bourgeoisie, the exhausted soldiers are less and less able to carry through a victorious war against international capitalism.

Those same delegates from the front who are now conducting such agitation against the war, are directly asking our orators not to speak about revolutionary war, for that will estrange the soldiers. This is an extremely important symptom.

There is no doubt that a proletarian government would immediately undertake to pass the economic burdens of the war on to the bourgeoisie, would leave for the bourgeoisie "only crumbs of bread" and "take away its shoes." This ought to raise the enthusiasm of the masses. But this does not yet guarantee victory over German imperialism in a revolutionary war. Present-day Russia, which in spite of the working class permitted itself to be drained by the imperialist war, would still remain a country with comparatively backward technique, with a dilapidated railroad system, without commodities, without the necessary military technical equipment, etc. Having taken power, the workers' party thereby undoubtedly deals a blow to Wilhelm. It will be harder for him to carry on a war against revolutionary Russia, offering an immediate democratic peace. This is so. But will this blow under present conditions, after Riga, etc., be sufficiently powerful to turn away the hand of German imperialism from Russia? If separate negotiations between German and English imperialisms have begun—and this is almost beyond doubt—would they not then continue these negotiations further even after our victory, and would not Wilhelm then still succeed in getting to Petrograd? Where then are the data which indicate that the proletarian party alone, and while the petty-bourgeois democracy is resisting, must take the responsibility for such a state of affairs and its inevitable consequences upon itself and upon itself alone.

And here we come to the second assertion—that the majority of the international proletariat allegedly is already with us. Unfortunately this is not so. The mutiny in the German navy has an immense symptomatic significance. There are portents of a serious movement in Italy. But from that to any sort of active support of the proletarian revolution in Russia which is declaring war on the entire bourgeois world is still very far. It is extremely harmful to overestimate forces. Undoubtedly much is given to us and much will be demanded from us. But if we now, having staked the entire game upon one card, suffer defeat, we shall deal a cruel blow to the international proletarian revolution, which is developing extremely slowly, but which is nevertheless developing. Moreover, the development of the revolution in Europe will make it obligatory for us, without any hesitation whatever, immediately to take power into our own hands. This is also the only guarantee of the victory of an uprising of the proletariat in Russia. It will come, but it is not yet here.

In what perspective then does the immediate future present itself to us? Here is our answer.

It stands to reason that our path does not depend upon ourselves alone. The enemy *may compel* us to accept decisive battle before the elections to the Constituent Assembly. Attempts at a new Kornilov affair will of course not leave us even the elections. We will then, of course, be unanimous in the only possible decision. But at that time a substantial part of the petty-bourgeois camp too will surely support us again. The flight of the government to Moscow will push the masses of the petty bourgeoisie over to us. And then the conditions will have been created for our victory; then we shall not be defeated, but our opponents will be defeated.

But in so far as the choice depends upon us, we can and we must limit ourselves to a *defensive position*. The Provisional Government is often powerless to carry into execution its counter-revolutionary intentions. It is going to pieces. The strength of the soldiers and workers is sufficient to prevent the realisation of such steps by Kerensky and Company. The peasant movement has only just begun. The mass suppression of the peasant movement by the Cadets cannot succeed with the sentiment of the army as it now is. The Provisional Government is powerless to fix up the elections to the Constituent Assembly. Sympathy with our party will grow. The bloc of the Cadets, the Mensheviks and the S.-R.'s will fall apart. In the Constituent Assembly we shall be such a strong opposition party that in a country of universal suffrage our opponents will be compelled to make concessions to us at every step, or we will form, together with the Left S.-R.'s, non-party peasants, etc., a ruling bloc which will fundamentally have to carry out our programme. This is our opinion.

Before history, before the international proletariat, before the Russian Revolution and the Russian working class, we have no right to stake the whole future on the card of an armed uprising. It would be a mistake to think that such action now would, if it were unsuccessful, lead only to such consequences as did July 16-18. Now it is a question of something more. It is a question of decisive battle, and defeat in *that* battle would spell defeat to the revolution.

This is the general situation. But every one who does not want merely to talk about uprising must carefully weigh its chances. And here we consider it our duty to say that at the present moment it would be most harmful to underestimate the forces of our opponent and overestimate our own forces. The forces of the opponent are greater than they appear. Petrograd is decisive, and in Petrograd the enemies of the proletarian party have accumulated substantial forces: 5,000 military cadets, *excellently* armed, *organised*, *anxious* (because of their class position) and able to fight, also the staff, shock troops, Cossacks, a substantial part of the garrison, and very considerable artillery, which has taken up a position in fan-like formation around Petrograd. Then our adversaries will undoubtedly attempt, with the aid of the C.E.C, to bring troops from the front. The proletarian party at the present time would have to fight under an entirely different interrelationship of forces than in the days of the Kornilov affair. At that time we fought together with the S.-R.'s, the Mensheviks, and to some extent, even with the adherents of Kerensky. Now, however, the proletarian party would have to fight against the Black Hundreds, plus the Cadets, plus Kerensky and the Provisional Government, plus the C.E.C. (S.-R.'s and Mensheviks).

The forces of the proletarian party are, of course, very substantial, but the decisive question is, is the sentiment among the workers and soldiers of the capital really such that they see salvation only in street fighting, that they are impatient to go into the streets? No. There is no such sentiment. Even those in favour of the uprising state that the sentiment of the masses of workers and soldiers is not at all even like their sentiments upon the eve of July 16. If among the great masses of the poor of the capital there were a militant sentiment burning to go into the streets, it might have served as a guarantee that an uprising initiated by them would draw in the biggest organisations (railroad unions, unions of postoffice and telegraph workers, etc.), where the influence of our party is weak. But since there is no such sentiment even in the factories and barracks, it would be a self-deception to build any plans on it.

We are told: but the railroad workers and the postoffice and telegraph employees are starving, are crushed by poverty, are exasperated with the Provisional Government. All this is so, of course. But all this is still no guarantee that they will support an uprising against the government, in spite of the S.-R.'s and Mensheviks. The railroad workers and employees were crushed by poverty also in 1906, even as they are now in Germany and France. And still this does not provide assurance of support for the uprising. If all

these people who are crushed by poverty were always ready to support the armed uprising of the Socialists, we would have won Socialism long ago.

This emphasises our immediate task. The Congress of Soviets, has been called for November 2. It must be convened, no matter what the cost. It must organisationally consolidate the growing influence of the proletarian party. It must become the centre of the consolidation around the Soviets of all proletarian and semi-proletarian organisations, such as those same railroad unions, unions of postoffice and telegraph employees, bank employees, etc. As yet there is no firm organisational connection between these organisations and the Soviets. This cannot be considered as other than a symptom of the organisational weakness of the proletarian party. But such a connection is in any case a preliminary condition for the actual carrying out of the slogan, "All power to the Soviets." For any given moment this slogan naturally signifies the most decisive resistance to the slightest encroachment on the rights of the Soviets and organisations created by them, on the part of the government.

Under these conditions it would be a serious historical untruth to formulate the question of the transfer of power into the hands of the proletarian party in the terms: either now or never.

No. The party of the proletariat will grow. Its programme will become known to broader and broader masses. It will have the opportunity to continue on an even larger scale the merciless exposure of the policy of the Mensheviks and S.-R.'s who stand in the way of actual transfer of the power into the hands of the majority of the people. And there is only one way in which the proletarian party can interrupt its successes, and that is if under present conditions it takes upon itself to initiate an uprising and thus expose the proletariat to the blows of the entire consolidated counter-revolution, supported by the petty-bourgeois democracy.

Against this perilous policy we raise our voice in warning.

G. ZINOVIEV.
U. KAMENEV.

Archives of the C.C.

XIII

MINUTES OF SESSION OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.-D.L.P., EXECUTIVE COMMISSION OF THE PETROGRAD COMMITTEE, MILITARY ORGANISATION, PETROGRAD SOVIET, TRADE UNIONS, FACTORY COMMITTEES, RAILROAD WORKERS, PETROGRAD REGIONAL COMMITTEE, OCTOBER 29, 1917 *

CHAIRMAN: Comrade Sverdlov.

Comrade Sverdlov proposes the order of business: 1. Report on last session of C.C. 2. Brief reports by representatives. 3. Present situation.

1. Report on Last Session of C.C.

Comrade L.** reads the resolution that was adopted by the Central Committee at the previous session. He says that the resolution was adopted with two voting against. If the comrades who disagree wish to express themselves, he says, discussion may be opened; in the meantime, however, he gives the reasons for this resolution.

Had the Menshevik and the Socialist-Revolutionary Parties broken with

* See p. 108 of this book.—Ed.

** Lenin.—Ed.

conciliationism, it would have been possible to offer them a compromise. This offer was made; it is obvious, however, that this compromise has been rejected by the above-named parties. On the other hand it has become clear at this period that the masses are following us. It was so even before the Kornilov affair; he proves it by statistics of the elections in Petrograd and in Moscow. The Kornilov affair has pushed the masses still closer to us. Interrelation of forces at the Democratic Conference. Situation is clearly either a dictatorship of Kornilov, or a dictatorship of the proletariat and the poorest strata of the peasantry. Sentiment cannot serve as guide, since it is changeable and cannot be measured; we must be guided by an objective analysis and an appraisal of the revolution. The masses have expressed confidence in the Bolsheviks and they demand of them not words, but deeds, a decisive policy both in the struggle against the war and in the struggle against economic ruin. If we make our basis a political analysis of the revolution, it will become perfectly clear that this is now being proven even by anarchistic actions.

He analyses further the situation in Europe and proves that a revolution there is still more difficult than here. If, in a country like Germany, there has been a mutiny in the navy, this proves that things there have gone very far. The international situation gives us a good deal of objective data showing that if we act now, we will have on our side all of proletarian Europe. He proves that the bourgeoisie wishes to surrender Petrograd. We can save ourselves from this only by taking Petrograd into our hands. The conclusion from all this is clear, namely, that the armed uprising of which the Central Committee resolution speaks is on the order of the day.

As to practical conclusions from the resolution, it is more convenient to make them after listening to the reports of the representatives of the centres.

From a political analysis of the class struggle, both in Russia and in Europe, follows the necessity of a most decisive, most active policy, which can be only an armed uprising.

2. Reports by Representatives

Comrade Sverdlov of the C.C. reports in the name of the Secretariat of the C.C. on the situation in the various localities.

The growth of the party has made giant strides; it may be considered that the party at present comprises no less than 400,000 (submits proof).

Our influence has increased in the same degree, particularly in the Soviets (proofs); the same is true of the army and navy. Gives more facts about the mobilisation of counter-revolutionary forces (Donetz Basin, Minsk, Northern front).

Comrade Boky of the Petrograd Committee. Reports on city districts:

Vasilyev Island—there is no fighting sentiment, military preparations are taking place.

Vyborg district, same, but is preparing for the uprising; a military Soviet has been formed; in case of uprising will be supported by masses. Think that the initiative should come from above.

1st City district. Difficult to estimate the sentiment. There are Red Guards.

2nd City district. Better sentiment.

Moscow district. Reckless sentiment, will go out at the call of the Soviet but not of the party.

Narva district. No desire for action, but no decline in the authority of the party. In the Putilov plant Anarchists gaining strength.

Neva district. Sentiment turned strongly in our favour. Everyone will follow the Soviet.

Okhta district. Bad situation.

Petrograd district. Sentiment of expectancy.

Rozhdestvensky district. Same; doubt whether to rise or not; strong influence of Anarchists.

Porokhov district. Sentiment has improved in our favour.

Schlüsselburg. Sentiment in our favour.

Comrade Krylenko of the Military Bureau. States that in the Bureau there is great difference of opinion in estimation of sentiment.

Personal observations lead to the conclusion that sentiment in the regiments is entirely with us, but information from comrades working in the districts differs: they say that for the uprising something decisive must supply the stimulus, namely, withdrawing the troops. Bureau thinks that sentiment is on the decline. Majority of Bureau thinks that it is not necessary to accentuate the question in practice, while a minority thinks that it is possible to take the initiative.

Comrade Stepanov of Regional Organisation. In Sestroretsk and Kolpin, the workers are arming, have fighting sentiment, are preparing for the rising. In Kolpin, Anarchist sentiment is to be observed.

In Narva, sentiment is grave because of discharges. 3,000 already discharged.

As to the garrisons, sentiment there is depressed, but Bolshevik influence is very strong (2 machine gun regiments). In New Peterhof, work in the regiment has very much declined, the regiment is disorganised. *Krasnoye Syelo*: 176th regiment is absolutely Bolshevik, 172nd regiment almost, but besides, there is cavalry there. Luga—garrison of 30,000. Soviet is defensist. Sentiment is Bolshevik; re-elections to take place.

In Gdov—the regiment is Bolshevik.

Comrade Boky adds that according to available information, the situation in *Krasnoye Syelo* is not so good.

In Cronstadt sentiment has declined, and in a fighting sense the local garrison is not fit for anything.

Comrade Volodarsky of the Petrograd Soviet. General impression that no one is very anxious to go out on the street but at the call of the Soviets all will appear.

Comrade Ravich confirms this and adds that some have indicated that they would go out also at the call of the party.

Comrade Schmidt of the Trade Unions. Total number organised exceeds 500,000. Influence of our party prevailing, but in the unions composed mostly of artisans, our influence is weak (especially among clerks and printers), but even there it is beginning to increase, especially because of the dissatisfaction with wages. Sentiment is such that no real action should be expected, especially because of the fear of discharge. To some extent this is a restraining factor. As a result of definite economic conditions we may expect huge unemployment in the near future; in connection with this there is a sentiment of expectancy. All acknowledge that outside of the struggle for power there is no way out of the situation, and they demand all power to the Soviets.

Comrade Shlyapnikov adds that in the metal workers' union, influence of Bolsheviks prevails, but the Bolshevik uprising is not popular; rumours about it even caused a panic. Prevailing sentiment of metal workers all over Russia is also Bolshevik; Bolshevik resolutions are adopted but there is no appreciation of the possibility of organising production themselves. Before the union is the question of the struggle for increased wages. In connection with this struggle the question of control will be raised.

Skrypnik, from the Factory Committees, states that everywhere gravitation towards practical results may be noticed; resolutions no longer satisfy. It is felt that the leaders do not fully express the sentiment of the masses; the former are more conservative. The growth of the influence of the anarcho-syndicalists may be noted, especially in the Narva and Moscow districts.

Comrade Sverdlov adds that in Moscow, in connection with the resolution of the C.C., steps were taken to determine the situation as to the possibility of an uprising.

A comrade from the railroad workers. Railroad workers are starving, are exasperated, organisation is weak, especially among the telegraph employees.

Comrade Schmidt adds that in connection with the strike of the railroad workers there was a turn in sentiment. At the Moscow junction in particular may be observed dissatisfaction with the Committee. In general, the railroad centres at Petrograd and Moscow are closer to the Bolsheviks.

Comrade Boky. About the postoffice and telegraph employees. There is no separate organisation. Telegraph operators are mostly Cadets. The postmen state that in a decisive moment they will be able to seize the postoffice.

Comrade Schmidt. Union of postal workers is more radical than that of railroad workers. The lower employees are really Bolsheviks but higher employees are not; we must fight against the latter as long as they hold the union in their hands.

3. The Present Situation

Comrade Milyutin thinks that on the basis of all the reports it is necessary to concretise resolution to a greater extent. Believes that slogan "All power to the Soviets" is already fully matured, especially in the provinces, where the power in certain places is actually in the hands of the Soviets. Question is really not of agitation; deeds are necessary and not words. Question is decided not by sentiments, not by bulletins, but by organised forces. Either we make the first step, or that step will be made by our enemies. The resolution does not take into consideration sufficiently the second perspective, that is, the possibility *not* of an uprising, which presupposes that we take the initiative, but of a clash which is the result of *objective* conditions. His own opinion is that we are not ready to deal the first blow.

We are not in a position to overthrow and arrest the government within the next few days.

Another perspective arises: an armed clash; shows that it is developing, possibility of it is approaching. And for this clash we must be ready. But this perspective is different from an uprising. Considers it necessary to expand the resolution in this sense.

Comrade Shotman says that at the city conference, and in the Petrograd Committee and in the military committee the sentiment is much more pessimistic. Shows that we cannot start the uprising but we must prepare.

*Comrade L.** disagrees with Milyutin and Shotman and points out that it is not a question of armed forces, not a question of fighting against the troops, but of one part of the troops fighting against another. He sees no pessimism in what has been said here. He argues that the forces on the side of the bourgeoisie are not large. Facts prove that we have a preponderance over the enemy. Why cannot the Central Committee begin? This does not follow from all the data. To reject the Central Committee's resolution, one must show that there is no economic ruin, that the international situation is not leading to complications. If the trade union functionaries demand all power,

* Lenin.—Ed.

they understand very well what they want. Objective conditions show that the peasantry must be led; it will follow the proletariat.

Some are afraid that we would not retain power; but just now we have particular chances of retaining power.

He expresses a wish that the discussion should be conducted on the level of analysing the resolution on its merits.

Comrade Krylenko declares that on one point the whole Bureau is agreed, namely, that the water has boiled enough; to pass a resolution which would withdraw this resolution would be the greatest mistake. Our task is to support the uprising with armed force if it should break out anywhere. But the sentiment which was described here is a result of our mistakes.

On the question as to who will begin, and how, he differs from Vladimir Plich.* Considers it unnecessary to enter into too great technical details of the uprising, and on the other hand thinks it also inadvisable to fix a definite date for it. But the question of the withdrawal of troops is just that fighting situation upon which a battle will take place. At the Cheremisov Conference it will be shown that it is necessary to withdraw the troops; our answer to this will be that even though it is necessary it will not be done, for there is no confidence in the generals; the fact of an offensive against us is thus already there and advantage may be taken of this. Agitation must not be diminished and there is no reason to worry about who will begin, as a beginning has already been made.

Comrade Rakhia shows that the masses are consciously preparing for an uprising. If the Petrograd proletariat were armed it would already be on the streets, in spite of all decisions of the C.C. There is no pessimism. It is useless to wait for the offensive of the counter-revolution, for it is already here. The masses wait for the call and for arms. The masses will pour out into the streets, for they are facing starvation. Apparently our slogan is already late, for there is doubt whether we will do what we are calling for. Our task is not to change our decision, but, on the contrary, to reaffirm it.

*Comrade Gregory.*** Apparently the resolution is not considered an order, otherwise it could not be discussed.

On the merits, expresses doubt concerning the certainty of the success of the uprising. In the first place, the machinery of the railroads, postoffice and telegraph apparatus is not in our hands. Influence of C.E.C. is still quite strong.

The question will be decided on the first day also in Petrograd, for otherwise demoralisation will set in. We cannot expect reinforcement from Finland and Cronstadt. And in Petrograd we do not have such great forces. Besides, our enemies have an immense organisational staff.

Our noise lately is incorrect even from the point of view of the resolution of the C.C. Why give an opportunity to prepare? The sentiment in the factories at present is not the same as it was in June. It is clear that now the sentiment is not such as it was in June.

We are told that we are in such a position that there is no way out; I think that no such position exists yet. I think that our attitude towards the Constituent Assembly is incorrect. To be sure, it cannot be looked upon as a cure-all, but the Constituent Assembly will take place in an atmosphere that is revolutionary to the highest degree. Meanwhile, we shall strengthen our forces. The possibility is not eliminated that we, together with the Left S.-R.'s, shall be in the majority there. It is impossible that the peasant will

* Lenin's first name and patronymic.—*Ed.*

** G. Zinoviev.—*Ed.*

waver on the land question. I was in favour of withdrawing from the pre-parliament, but I do not think that this mass will never follow us. Speaks of international relations and shows that it is our duty to the international proletariat as well to be extremely careful: our influence continues to grow. There is no reason to expect that Petrograd will be surrendered before the Constituent Assembly. We have no right to risk, to stake everything on one card.

I propose: if the congress takes place on the 2nd we must propose that it should not disband until the Constituent Assembly convenes. There must be a defensive, waiting tactic on the background of the total inactivity of the Provisional Government. We must not put ourselves in the position of total isolation. Neither does the Constituent Assembly free us from a civil war, but it is a very important milestone. It is necessary to reconsider, if possible, the resolution of the C.C. We must definitely tell ourselves that we do not plan an uprising within the next five days.

Comrade Kamenev. A week has passed since the resolution was adopted, and this resolution therefore shows how not to carry out an uprising: during this week nothing has been done and we only spoiled the disposition [of forces—*Ed.*] which was to take place. The results for the week indicate that there are no facts favouring a rising. It cannot be said that the resolution merely aroused thought; it demanded a transition from words to deeds. But this is not the case. We have no apparatus for an uprising; our enemies have a much stronger apparatus, and it has probably further increased during this week. Shows that we did nothing during this week, either in the military technical sphere, or in the sphere of provisioning and supplies. However, by this resolution an opportunity was given to the government to organise its forces. The entire mass that is not with us at present is on their side. We strengthen them at our expense. The question is more serious than in the July days. From a social point of view the crisis has matured, but there is no evidence that we must give battle before the 2nd. The question is not: either now or never. I have more faith in the Russian Revolution; we are facing social battles, and in preparing for the Constituent Assembly we do not at all embrace the road of parliamentarism. We are not strong enough to go into an uprising with assurance of victory, but we are strong enough not to permit extreme expressions of reaction. Two tactics are fighting here: the tactic of conspiracy and the tactic of faith in the moving forces of the Russian Revolution.

Fenigstein thinks that the question of an armed uprising is a question not of weeks but of days. This is a political attitude; he agrees with it but he does not agree with an immediate transition to bayonets. Shows further that technically an armed uprising has not been prepared by us. We do not yet even have a centre. We are marching on, half-consciously, to defeat. There are moments when it is necessary to go on just the same. But if that is not the case it is necessary to approach the question from the practical point of view.

Stalin. The day of the uprising must be chosen expediently. Only thus must the resolution be understood.

It may be said that it is necessary to wait for an attack, but it must be understood what an attack is; the raising of the price of bread, the sending of Cossacks to the Donetz Basin, etc., all this is an attack which has already come. Till when, then, are we to wait if there is not going to be an armed attack? What is offered by Kamenev and Zinoview objectively leads to the possibility for the counter-revolution to organise its forces; we shall retreat

endlessly and we shall lose the whole revolution. Why not imagine the possibility of selecting the day and the conditions, so as not to give the counter-revolution a chance to organise its forces? Passing to an analysis of international relations, shows that now we must have more faith. There are two lines here: one line charts its course for the victory of the revolution and looks to Europe, the other does not believe in the revolution and expects to be merely an opposition. The Petrograd Soviet has already started on the road to an uprising, by refusing to sanction the withdrawal of the troops. The navy has already mutinied, inasmuch as it went against Kerensky.

T.* interprets the resolution that it does not mean an uprising tomorrow, but it transfers the question from politics into strategy and calls for definite action. There is no reason to fear conspiracies, conspiracy must always be kept in mind; it is not necessary to turn off to the road of parliamentary struggle, this would be incorrect. Neither should we wait until we are attacked for the very fact of an offensive creates chances of victory.

Comrade Sverdlov characterises the resolution. On the one hand it was an order, but it is correct that the question has passed from the sphere of politics into that of technique. Speaks of counter-revolutionary preparations. Argues against Kamenev's assertion that the weak aspect of the resolution is its failure to have been carried out until now. The conclusion to be drawn from this is that more energetic work must be undertaken. There is no reason to speak about how the majority is not against us; it is merely as yet not with us. In Petrograd, however, the forces are ours; the military cadets are not terrible, especially if we attack first. Does not share that pessimistic sentiment with regard to the garrison which was expressed here. The interrelation of forces is in our favour. No reason to repeal the resolution, but it should be corrected to the effect that technical preparation must be more energetic.

Comrade Skrypnik. If we have no forces, we shall not get any more later; if we do not retain power now it will be still worse later. We are told that it pays to be on the defensive—perhaps! but later we will have no strength even for defence.

All arguments which have been made here are merely for postponement. There is no guarantee of victory. There has been repeated here what the Mensheviks and S.-R.'s said when the proposal to take over the power was made to them. At present we talk too much when it is necessary to act. The masses make demands of us, and they think that if we do not give them anything we are committing a crime; it is necessary to prepare for the uprising and to issue a call to the masses.

Volodarsky. If the resolution is an order, it has not been carried out. If the question of an uprising is put forth as a question for tomorrow we must say frankly that we have nothing ready for it. I spoke before . . .** but I assure you that the masses received our appeal with perplexity; during this week a change has taken place.

If there were no trend in the C.C. which wanted to reduce the class struggle to a parliamentary struggle, we would be ready now for an uprising, but not at this moment. The positive side of the resolution is that it compelled us to go to the masses with a new slogan. The resolution must be understood as the route to an uprising; we must not stop our technical preparations.

Concrete proposal: to continue technical preparation and to submit this question to the Congress, but not to consider that the moment has already passed.

* The name is omitted from the minutes.—*Ed.*

** There is an omission in the original.—*Ed.*

Dzerzhinsky thinks that *Volodarsky* is mistaken when he thinks that the party made a mistake when it carried on, as he expressed it, a parliamentary tactic. Quite on the contrary, the changed situation resulted in a change of our decision. Two months ago these illusions had not yet been discarded and were still there, and therefore it was impossible to raise the question of an uprising. The demand that everything should be technically prepared for the uprising is just a conservative policy. When the uprising comes, then technical forces will also appear. The same is true of provisioning.

Comrade Ravich. Abrogation of the resolution would amount to an abrogation of all our slogans and our entire policy. The masses have already absorbed the view that the uprising is inevitable. If the masses were too revolutionary, then it would start from below, but it is also possible that the call will come from above, and nobody doubts that in that case the masses will support it. We must not refuse.

Comrade Sokolnikov. The objections of *Kamenev* are not convincing. He accuses us of having made noise regarding our uprising, that is, he demands a conspiracy. Our greatest peculiarity and our strength is that we openly prepare the uprising. It reminds one of the February events, when, too, nothing was prepared, yet the revolution was victorious. It is impossible to expect a more favourable interrelationship of forces.

As to the resolution, it was absolutely useless to interpret it as an order to act.

If it should turn out that events will secure a postponement for us, we shall certainly take advantage of it. It is possible that the Congress will take place sooner. If the Congress decides on all power to the Soviets, then it will be necessary to raise the question of what to do, to appeal to the masses or not.

Comrade Skalov shows that in order that the power shall pass to the Soviets, a certain interrelation of forces is necessary. The power of the Soviets will solve the supply question. At present we are becoming defensists; if we do not take power, then perhaps the navy will leave its positions, and the army too. He speaks of the breaking of agreements, etc. Thinks that before the convening of the Congress of Soviets the uprising should not be arranged, but at the Congress power should be taken.

Milyutin. The resolution was written differently from the way it is now interpreted; it is interpreted so that the question is about the movement towards an uprising. This was laid out as early as September. What all are speaking about is not the technical but the political aspect of the question. As to the course, nobody disagrees. Those who speak of an uprising think of it merely in a primitive way. It is first of all necessary to take over the power and replace the old power, but to act according to blueprint is absurd. We gained from the fact that there was no uprising on [July] 16-18, and if there is none now, we shall not perish. This resolution should be for internal use.

Joffe shows that the resolution must not be understood as an order to act; it is a rejection of the tactic of refraining from uprising and a recognition of the possibility and compulsoriness of an uprising at the first opportune moment. In this sense it should be welcomed. But on the other hand it is not true that the question now is purely technical; now too the moment of the uprising must be examined from a political point of view. The sense of the resolution is the necessity of taking advantage of the first opportune moment for seizing power, and for this reason it should be welcomed.

Schmidt. The question is now becoming clearer, and there is no reason to object against preparing for the revolution.

*Uncle.** It is too bad that the resolution was not put in circulation until now. I am convinced that the resolution will be adopted. I took the floor to make a correction in the estimation of the sentiment of the masses. An indicator of the sentiment of the masses is the readiness with which they take up arms. Ours is a strange strategy. As for the military cadets, as I have said already, they may be left out of consideration.

*L.*** If all resolutions fell through in this way, one wouldn't wish for anything better. Now Zinoviev says down with the slogan, "Power to the Soviets," and pressure on the government. If it is said that the uprising is "of the people" there is no need of speaking of conspiracies. If politically the uprising is inevitable, we must treat the uprising as an art. Politically, it has already matured.

Precisely because there is bread for one day only, we cannot wait for the Constituent Assembly. He proposes to endorse the resolution, to energetically push the preparations and to leave it to the Central Committee and the Soviet to decide when.

Zinoviev. Comparisons were made between this revolution and the February Revolution. They should not be compared, for at that time there was nothing on the side of the old power, while now it is war against the entire bourgeois world. The slogan "Power to the Soviets" was not advanced by us abstractly. If the Congress exerts pressure on the Constituent Assembly, this cannot be compared with a Menshevik policy. If the uprising is put forth as a perspective, then there can be no objection, but if it is an order for tomorrow or the day after tomorrow, then it is an adventure. Until our comrades come together and we have consulted them we must not start an uprising.

Stepanov. The resolution has historical significance; I have been looking upon it as upon a barometer indicating the storm. Further, objects to Kamenev regarding his arguments about the lack of provisions.

Besides the Chermisov Conference the reduction of the soldiers' rations may be a factor in favour of the uprising.

The objective situation is developing every minute, and this resolution has played a great part. It has made a great deal clear to us. Shows that the masses distinguish between the C.E.C., and the Petrograd Soviet; proposes to keep the resolution in the capacity of a barometric indicator.

Kamenev shows that the present interpretation of the resolution is a retreat, for previously it was said that the uprising must be on the 2nd, while now there is talk about the movement towards the revolution. The question is raised politically. Fixing a date for the uprising is adventurism. We are obliged to explain to the masses that we do not call upon them to rise during these three days, but we consider that the uprising is inevitable.

Proposes to have a vote on the resolution and to take up the proposal that the Central Organ should state that before the Congress no appeal to uprising will be made.

Skrypnik proposes to address an appeal to the masses to prepare for the uprising.

Arguing against Zinoviev, *Lenin* says that it is wrong to contrast the present revolution with the February Revolution.

As to the matter under consideration, he proposes the resolution [see p. 110.—*Ed.*].

* Latsis.—*Ed.*

** Lenin.—*Ed.*

Zinoviev answers Lenin with regard to the February Revolution. These two months will not appear as the worst page in the history of our party. He offers his resolution: "Without delaying the reconnoitring preparatory steps, it is considered that such uprisings are inadmissible until a conference with the Bolshevik part of the Congress of Soviets."

A vote is taken with the resolution of Comrade Lenin as a basis. For, 20; against, 2; abstaining, 3. The amendment of Comrade Milyutin to change by using the expression "armed clash," is rejected. Amendment by Comrade Skrypnik to eliminate the words "expressing conviction," etc. Rejected.

Amendment by Comrade Fenigstein: to substitute the word "action" for the word "attack." Rejected.

An amendment is proposed by Comrade Volodarsky:

That resolution of Comrade Zinoviev be added as an amendment to the resolution adopted. Rejected.

Amendment by Comrade Fenigstein:

"Centre made up of executive committee and military bureau." Withdrawn. Resolution as a whole.

For, 19; against, 2; abstained, 4.

Resolution of Comrade Zinoviev: for, 6; against, 15; abstained, 3.

C.C. continues in session alone and adopts the following decision: the C.C. organises a military revolutionary centre of the following composition: Sverdlov, Stalin, Bubnov, Uritsky, and Dzerzhinsky. This centre becomes a part of the revolutionary committee of the Soviet.

Archives of the C.C.

CALENDAR OF EVENTS

FROM MIDDLE OF JULY TO BEGINNING OF NOVEMBER, 1917

July 16. Opening of second city conference of Petrograd organisation of Bolsheviks. Resignation of Cadet Ministers under pretext of protesting against Provisional Government's deciding question of autonomy for Ukraine before convocation of Constituent Assembly. Government crisis. Beginning of spontaneous movement among workers and soldiers of Petrograd under slogan "All power to the Soviets!" Strikes in factories, armed clashes in the streets. Demonstration of workers at the Tauride Palace demanding decision of All-Union C.E.C. on question of power. Throughout night, conferences of representatives of factory, army, party and other organisations. Late in the evening is published appeal of Bolshevik C.C., "To Workers and Soldiers of Petrograd," calling for peaceful and organised expression of their will on question of organisation of power.

July 17. Strikes in factories and plants continued. Sailors arrive from Cronstadt. Huge manifestations of armed workers and soldiers with slogans: "Down with the Ten Capitalist Ministers! All Power to the Soviets!", converging on Tauride Palace. Military cadets and Cossack detachments called out by Provisional Government. Shooting on demonstrators. In the evening, a joint session of the All-Russian C.E.C. and Executive Committee of Peasants' Soviets with representatives of factory delegations considers question of organisation of power. Decision adopted for convening within two weeks of plenum of Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies. Bolshevik resolution on necessity of transferring all power to government of delegates of the central Soviet organs is rejected. At night *Pravda* publishes appeal of Bolsheviks calling for stoppage of demonstrations. Armed demonstrations in Moscow. Punitive expeditions in Ryazan and Nizhni-Novgorod in connection with refusal of soldiers to go to the front.

July 18. Wrecking of printing plant and editorial office of *Pravda* by military cadets. Publication by Alexinsky and Pankratov of libelous document about Lenin's spying, fabricated by secret service. Arrival of Helsingfors delegation of Baltic fleet to find out why some ships of the Baltic fleet had been called to Petrograd by Provisional Government. Return of sailors to Cronstadt. Cossack detachments on the streets of Petrograd. Movement suppressed.

July 19. Government troops occupy headquarters of C.C. of Bolsheviks and the Fortress of Peter and Paul. *Pravda Bulletin* appears announcing end of demonstrations of July 16-18. Worker Voinov murdered while distributing *Pravda Bulletin*. Protest of central Soviet of factory committees and executive boards of trade unions of Petrograd against the wrecking of the *Pravda* and appeal to boycott counter-revolutionary press. Decree of Provisional Government for arrest of Lenin, Zinoviev and Kamenev. Strike of metal workers in Moscow. Demonstrations of workers in Ivanovo-Voznesensk. Outbreaks among sailors of the Black Sea fleet. Breaking of the Russian front near Tarnopol. Bill of Finnish Sejm on autonomy for Finland.

July 20. Arrest of delegation of the Baltic fleet in Petrograd. Decree of Provisional Government to disband all military detachments who took part

in demonstrations of July 16-18. Resignation of Prime Minister Prince Lvov. Suppression of demonstration of workers and soldiers in Nizhni-Novgorod.

July 21. Declaration of Provisional Government "Immediate measures for the realisation of principles proclaimed by declaration of May 6." Appointment of Kerensky as Prime Minister. Decree of Provisional Government giving Minister of War authority to prohibit the distribution among the army at the front of the newspapers *Pravda*, *Soldatskaya Pravda*, and *Okopnaya Pravda*.

July 22. Arrest of Kamenev. Joint session of All-Russian C.E.C. and Executive Committee of Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies decides to proclaim Provisional Government as "government of preservation of the revolution" with unlimited authority. Publication of declaration of Bolsheviks and internationalists on the necessity of transferring all power to Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies. Opening of Moscow Regional Conference of Bolsheviks. Huge demonstration of workers and soldiers at Krasnoyarsk under slogan: "All power to the Soviets."

July 24. Tarnopol taken by Germans.

July 25. Decree of Provisional Government reintroducing capital punishment at the front.

July 28. Order by Kerensky to suppress newspapers *Pravda* and *Okopnaya Pravda*. Prohibition of meetings at the front. Reval newspapers *Kiyr* and *Utro Pravy* suppressed. Arrest of Bolsheviks in Helsingfors. Opening of railroad workers' conference in Moscow.

July 29. Helsingfors Bolshevik newspaper *Volna* suppressed. All-Russian conference of commercial and industrial employees opens in Moscow.

July 31. Decree of Provisional Government dissolving the Finnish Sejm. Resolution of conference of members of State Duma demanding strong power. Appointment of General Kornilov as supreme commander-in-chief. Savinkov appointed Assistant Minister of War.

August 2. Outbreaks in Tver garrison.

August 3. Provisional Government, together with representatives of Mensheviks, S.-R.'s and Cadets, gives Kerensky authority to form Cabinet at his discretion.

August 4. Arrest of Trotsky and Lunacharsky.

August 5. Appearance of No. 1 of *Rabochny i Soldat*. Opening of Moscow city conference of factory committees. Opening of Ninth Congress of Cadet Party.

August 6. New coalition of Provisional Government, with Kerensky as Prime Minister, approved. Punitive expedition and arrests of Bolsheviks in Tver.

August 7. Resolution of Moscow Soviet of Workers' Deputies against re-introduction of capital punishment.

August 8. Opening of Sixth Congress of R.S.-D.L.P. (Bolsheviks) in Petrograd.

August 9. Report by Stalin at Sixth Congress of R.S.-D.L.P. (B.) on policy of C.C. Punitive expedition and arrest of Bolsheviks in Tsaritsyn.

August 10. Ministers of Internal Affairs and War given authority to prohibit congresses and meetings. Resolution of Moscow Regional Conference of factory committees on necessity of transferring all power to the Soviets. Tsaritsyn Bolshevik paper *Borba* suppressed.

August 11. Opening of Ukrainian Army Rada.

August 12. Reports of Bukharin and Stalin at Sixth Congress of R.S.-D.L.P.

(B.) on present situation. Opening in Moscow of congress of All-Russian Peasant Union.

August 14. Exile of Nicholas II and family to Tobolsk. General strike in Helsingfors.

August 16. Conclusion of Sixth Congress of R.S.-D.L.P. (B.). Opening of Second Trade and Industry Congress in Moscow.

August 18. Publication by Provisional Government of law on criminal responsibility for insulting representatives of Allied powers. Decree of C.E.C. of Soviets postponing elections to the Constituent Assembly to the end of October.

August 20. Resolution of workers' section of the Petrograd Soviet of W. and S.D. against re-introduction of capital punishment at the front and arrests of Bolsheviks. Kazan Bolshevik paper *Rabochy* suppressed. Opening of Petrograd conference of factory committees. Session of Soviet (conference) of Socialist-Revolutionary Party on question of elections to Constituent Assembly.

August 21. Publication of resolution of C.C. of R.S.-D.L.P. (B.) on Moscow State Conference (August 25) calling for exposure of Conference as organ of counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie, for exposure of counter-revolutionary policy of S.-R.'s and Mensheviks supporting Conference, and for organisation of mass protest against it.

August 22. Postponement by Provisional Government of elections to Constituent Assembly to November 25 and of convocation of Assembly to December 11. Telegram of greetings by Moscow "Conference of Social Workers" headed by Rodzyanko to General Kornilov with promise of support to his authority in the army. Newspaper *Rabochy i Soldat* suppressed.

August 25. Publication of manifesto by Sixth Congress of R.S.-D.L.P. (B.) to all toilers, workers, soldiers and peasants. Opening of Moscow State Conference. Strike in Moscow—protest against Moscow Conference. Meetings at factories and plants. One-day strikes in Kiev, Kostroma and other cities.

August 26. Triumphant arrival of General Kornilov in Moscow. Addresses by Kerensky, Prokopovich and Nekrasov at State Conference. Appearance in Petrograd of Bolshevik newspaper *Proletary*. Opening in Kiev of First All-Russian Conference of workers of sugar industry, demanding transfer of all landowners' land to peasant committees.

August 27. Addresses at State Conference by Generals Kornilov and Kaledin.

August 28. Closing of State Conference.

August 29. Occupation by Russian troops of building of Finnish Sejm in Helsingfors in connection with attempt to open session despite dissolution of Sejm by Provisional Government. Opening of All-Russian Church Assembly in Moscow. Address of greetings by Moscow mayor, the S.-R. Rudnov, at session of assembly.

August 31. Resolution of Petrograd Soviet of Soldiers' and Workers' Deputies against capital punishment. Formation in Kiev of defence committee for struggle against counter-revolution. Political conference at army headquarters at front on question of proclaiming military dictatorship.

September 1. Opening in Petrograd of united congress of R.S.-D.L.P. (Mensheviks, "unificationists" and "non-factionists"). Piercing of the Riga front by the Germans.

September 2. Elections to the Petrograd municipal дума. Conference of members of State Duma carries resolution against bread monopoly. Riots in Moscow because of provisioning arrangements.

September 3. Riga occupied by German army.

September 5. Negotiations at army headquarters at the front between Savinkov and General Kornilov, by instructions of Kerensky, about sending a corps of cavalry to Petrograd to support Provisional Government in case of Bolshevik uprising.

September 6. Petrograd newspaper *Proletary* suppressed.

September 7. Beginning of movement of Kornilov troops on Petrograd. Formation by the C.E.C. of Soviets of committee for struggle with counter-revolution. Appeal of General Kornilov to army.

September 8. Appearance in Petrograd of Bolshevik newspaper *Rabochy*. Order by Kornilov appointing General Krymov commander-in-chief of corps moving on Petrograd. V. N. Lvov addresses demand to Kerensky in the name of Kornilov to entrust latter with unlimited authority. Arrest of Lvov by Kerensky. Resignation of Cadet Ministers.

September 9. Appeal of Kerensky "to population" calling for struggle against Kornilov. Proclamation of state of war in Petrograd and appointment of Savinkov as Governor-General of Petrograd. Appeal by Kornilov "to all Russian people."

September 10. Provisional Government declares General Kornilov a traitor to the fatherland. Arrest of Kornilovists. Milyukov offers his good offices as intermediary between Kerensky and Kornilov. "Committee for Struggle Against Counter-Revolution" organises, under guidance of "Bureau of Military Organisation of Bolsheviks," armed workers' detachments for the protection and defence of Petrograd. Workers of most factories and plants of Petrograd engaged in digging trenches. Organisation of workers' militia—legalisation of the nuclei of the Red Guard, already in existence.

September 11. Proclamation of martial law in Moscow. Disintegration of Kornilov troops.

September 12. Arrest of General Krymov. Liquidation of Kornilov revolt. Resignation of Savinkov. Kerensky appointed Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

September 13. Resignation of Ministers Nekrasov, Chernov and others. Suicide of General Krymov. "Committees for Defence of Revolution" organised in Vyatka, Lugansk and other cities. All civil and military authority of Krasnoyarsk in the hands of the Executive Committee of the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies. Meeting of executive boards of all trade unions in Minsk decides to organise Red Guard groups.

September 14. Russian Republic proclaimed by Provisional Government. Resignation of Ministers Skobelev, Zarudny and Avksentyev. Formation of Directory consisting of Kerensky, Nikitin, Tereshchenko, Verkhovsky and Verderevsky. Generals Kornilov, Lukomsky and Romanovsky arrested in Mogilev. Refusal by government of Don military region to carry out the order of Provisional Government to arrest General Kaledin. Order by revolutionary staff of Tsaritsyn to arm workers.

September 15. Petrograd newspaper *Rabochy* suppressed. Workers of factories and plants in Moscow demand Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies issue arms to them. Organisation of Cronstadt Red Guards.

September 16. Bolshevik newspaper *Rabochy Put* appears in Petrograd.

September 18. Decision of Moscow Soviet of Workers' Deputies to organise Red Guards. Resolution of Moscow Soviet of W. and S.D. on necessity of decisive struggle for conquest of power by revolutionary proletariat and peasantry. Tereshchenko appointed Associate Prime Minister.

September 19. Menshevik-S.-R. presidium of Petrograd Soviet of W. and S.D. resigns because of adoption by Petrograd Soviet of Bolshevik resolution on organisation of power.

September 21. Election of Bolshevik presidium by workers' section of Petrograd Soviet of W. and S.D.

September 23. Appointment of General Dukhonin as chief of staff of the supreme commander-in-chief.

September 24. Petrograd conference of factory committees.

September 25. Editorial staff of Moscow newspaper *Sotsial-Demokrat* put on trial for insulting British Ambassador Buchanan. Outbreaks in Tambov, Lipetsk, Astrakhan and Ufa. In Tashkent power passes to the Soviets.

September 26. Strike on the Windau-Rybinsk railroad. Presidium of soldiers' section of Petrograd Soviet of W. and S. D. re-elected. Agrarian movement in province of Kishinev.

September 27. Opening of All-Russian Democratic Conference in Petrograd. Proclamation of martial law in province of Tambov. Punitive expedition sent from Moscow.

September 28. Outbreaks among soldiers of Orlov garrison. Agrarian riots in Kirsanov county of Tambov province.

October 1. Dissolution of Central Committee of the Baltic fleet by Provisional Government. Conference of Soviets of Peasant Deputies in Petrograd.

October 2. Election of Bolshevik Executive Committee by Moscow Soviet of W.D. Agrarian disorders in Taganrog region.

October 4. Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies adopts resolution for a negative attitude to Democratic Conference and the necessity to rally the masses around the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies. Democratic Conference decides to organise pre-parliament. General strike in Tashkent, arrival of Cossacks, introduction of martial law. Decision by Odessa Soviet of W. and S.D. to organise Red Guard.

October 5. Closing of Democratic Conference in Petrograd. Repeal by Provisional Government of order to dissolve Central Committee of Baltic fleet. Joint session of Vyborg Soviet of W.S. and P.D., regimental and company commanders, decides to demand that All-Russian C.E.C. immediately convene congress of Soviets to decide the question of power.

October 6. Central strike committee of railroad workers declares All-Russian railroad strike.

October 7. Joint session of C.C. and Petrograd Committee of R.S.-D.L.P. participated in by Bolshevik members of Democratic Conference. Report by Bukharin on present situation.

October 8. New coalition of Provisional Government with Kerensky as Prime Minister, with participation of Moscow industrialists. Trotsky elected chairman of Petrograd Soviet of W. and S.D. Victory of Bolsheviks in elections to district Dumas. Agrarian movement in Saratov province.

October 10. Strike at Baku oil works.

October 12. German landing party on the Baltic Sea. Agrarian movement in Volhynia province.

October 13. Appeal by C.C. of Bolsheviks calling for struggle for Congress of Soviets.

October 15. Resolution of Petrograd Soviet on necessity of transferring power to Soviets and proposing immediate peace on all fronts.

October 18. Decision of Provisional Government on necessity of transferring capital to Moscow.

October 19. Dissolution of State Duma and State Soviet by Provisional Government.

October 20. Opening of Council of Russian Republic (pre-parliament).

Declaration by Bolsheviks and their withdrawal from pre-parliament. Agrarian movement in Voronezh province.

October 23. Session of C.C. of Bolsheviks with Lenin present. Resolution adopted for preparing armed uprising. Political bureau elected consisting of Lenin, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Trotsky, Stalin, Sokolnikov and Bubnov.

October 24. Congress of Soviets of Northern Region in Petrograd. Nikolayev Soviet of Workers' Deputies (Saratov province) started confiscation of privately owned lands.

October 25. Resolution of Congress of Soviets of Northern Region recognising necessity of transferring all power to the Soviets in the centre and locally.

October 26. Decision of Executive Committee of Petrograd Soviet to form Military Revolutionary Committee.

October 27. Tenth Cadet Party Congress in Moscow.

October 29. Session of C.C. of Bolsheviks, participated in by Lenin and representatives of party organisations. Resolution adopted to intensify preparations for armed uprising. Petrograd Soviet of W. and S.D. approves draft of organisation of Military Revolutionary Committee. Ivanovo-Voznesensk Congress of Soviets elects Military Revolutionary Committee for preparation of uprising.

October 30. Bureau of C.E.C. of Soviets decides to postpone opening of Second Congress of Soviets to November 7.

October 31. Kaluga occupied by Cossack detachment coming from the front. Soviet of Soldiers' Deputies fired on; dispersal of Soviet and arrests.

November 1. Resolution by All-Russian conference of factory committees on necessity of transferring power to Soviets. Formation in pre-parliament of fraction of Left-S.-R.-Internationalists.

November 3. Meeting of regimental committees recognises Petrograd Military Revolutionary Committee as the leading organ of the troops in Petrograd.

November 4. Decision of meeting of representatives of regiments in Petrograd not to obey orders of the staff unless sanctioned by signature of Military Revolutionary Committee. On "Day of Petrograd Soviet" big meetings at factories and among military detachments.

November 5. Appointment by Military Revolutionary Committee of commissars for military detachments. Executive Committee of Moscow Soviet of W.D. adopts decree No. 1 "On hiring and discharging workers, with consent of factory committees." Refusal by Mensheviks and S.-R.'s to take part in discussion of this decree.

November 6. Detachments of the Military Revolutionary Committee stand guard at printing plants of the newspapers *Rabochy Put* and *Soldat*, which were suppressed by the Provisional Government. Decision of Provisional Government to put on trial members of Military Revolutionary Committee. Orders of commander of the Petrograd district prohibiting the carrying out of orders of Military Revolutionary Committee, ordering the arrest of its commissars, prohibiting the carrying of arms in the streets, etc. Call by Provisional Government of military cadet schools to the Winter Palace. Adoption by pre-parliament of resolution that a decree be immediately issued to transfer the land to the land committees and to secure a speedy agreement with the Allies on the question of peace. Formation of counter-revolutionary "Committee of Public Safety." Order of Military Revolutionary Committee to put troops in readiness for action. Session of Moscow municipal Duma controlled by S.-R.'s on question of organisation of Committee of Public Safety. Beginning of organisation of White Guards in Moscow.

EVENTS IN THE LIFE OF V. I. LENIN

FROM MIDDLE OF JULY TO BEGINNING OF NOVEMBER, 1917

July 12-17. Lenin spends several days near the Mustamyki station near Petrograd.

July 17. Upon receipt of information about demonstrations in Petrograd, Lenin returns to the city in the morning and takes charge of the movement. Addresses demonstrators from balcony of Kshesinskaya's house. Participates in night session of C.C., which decides to address an appeal to workers and soldiers to stop the demonstrations. As a precaution Lenin spends the night away from home.

July 18. Lenin takes measures for most painless liquidation of movement. Publication of libelous charges by Alexinsky and Pankratov against Lenin. Lenin answers slander with series of articles published next day in the *Pravda Bulletin*.

July 19. Lenin takes part in session of Executive Commission of Petrograd Committee in guard house of Reno plant and opposes the general strike, proposed by some comrades. Late at night Provisional Government issues orders to arrest Lenin and he goes into hiding.

July 19-21. Lenin hides in rooms of worker S. Alliluyev.

July 20. Statement by All-Russian C.E.C. appointing a commission to investigate charges brought against Lenin. Publication of orders of Provisional Government to arrest Lenin and others. Search of rooms of Lenin and Krupskaya.

July 20-21. Lenin consults several comrades (Stalin, Zinoviev, Krupskaya, Nogin, Yakovleva, Orjonikidze, Stasova) on the question of appearing in court.

July 22. Lenin leaves Alliluyev's rooms and temporarily, together with Zinoviev, settles at the worker N. Yemelyanov's, in the garret of a stable in the environs of Sestroretsk. Next day Lenin moves into tent near a haystack a few miles from the Razliv station.

July 24. *Novaya Zhizn* publishes "Letter to the Editor" by Lenin, Zinoviev and Kamenev about charges of spying.

July 28. Cronstadt *Proletarskoye Dyelo* publishes "Letter to the Editor" by Lenin and Zinoviev, stating that they refuse to submit to order of Provisional Government for their arrest.

July-October. Lenin, while under cover, continues to collaborate on Bolshevik papers, sending in leading political articles and smaller notes, and at the same time keeps in close touch with the C.C.

August 3. By decree of the prosecutor of the Petrograd Judicial Chamber Lenin is indicted under Articles 51, 100 and 108, Part 1, of the Criminal Code (treason and organisation of armed uprising).

August 8. Sixth Congress of R.S.-D.L.P. elects Lenin honorary chairman of Congress. Lenin from underground guides the work of the Congress.

August 16. Sixth Congress of R.S.-D.L.P. elects Lenin member of C.C.

Beginning of September. With the beginning of frosts Lenin leaves tent and after staying overnight at Comrade Kalsk's on the Vyborg Chaussée in Petro-

grad, crosses the Finnish frontier as a fireman on an engine. (Engineer—Comrade Yalava.) Lenin lives in Helsingfors, first at Finnish S.-D. Rovio's (chief of militia), then with a Finnish Social-Democratic worker.

August-September. Lenin writes *State and Revolution*.

September 12. Lenin writes letter to C.C. on the Kornilov revolt.

September 14-16. Lenin writes article, "On Compromises."

September 25. Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies elects Lenin one of its delegates to the Democratic Conference.

September 23-27. Lenin writes "The Threatening Catastrophe and How to Fight It."

September 25-27. Lenin writes letters to C.C.: "Bolsheviks Must Assume Power" and "Marxism and Uprising."

September 29. Lenin writes article, "The Russian Revolution and Civil War."

Beginning of October. Lenin goes from Helsingfors to Vyborg to be nearer to Petrograd.

October 7-14. Lenin writes "Will the Bolsheviks Retain State Power?"

October 10. From Vyborg Lenin writes letter to I. Smilga.

October 12. Lenin writes article, "The Crisis Has Matured."

October 16. C.C. agrees to Lenin's coming to Petrograd.

October 18. C.C. elects Lenin to commission for preparing draft of party programme.

October 14-20. Lenin takes charge from underground of work of Petrograd Conference of R.S.-D.L.P. (Bolsheviks), writes "Theses" for it, "Instructions for Party Congress," and "Letter to Conference."

October 16-20. Lenin writes letter to C.C., Moscow Committee and Petrograd Committee and Bolshevik members of Soviets of Petrograd and Moscow in which he proposes that power be seized immediately.

October 21. Lenin writes from Vyborg "Letter to Comrade Bolsheviks Who Participated in the Regional Conference of the Soviets of the Northern Region" and letter-article "Advice from an Outsider."

October 22. Lenin goes from Vyborg to Lesnoye, near Petrograd.

October 23. Lenin takes part in C.C. session and carries resolution on necessity of armed uprising.

October 29. Lenin takes part in C.C. session with representatives of organisations on question of armed uprising.

October 29-30. Lenin writes "Letter to Comrades" in which he subjects to annihilating criticism objections of Zinoviev and Kamenev against uprising.

October 31. Lenin writes "Letter to Party Members" on "strike-breaking" of Kamenev and Zinoviev, who came out in the non-party press against C.C. decision on armed uprising.

November 1. Lenin writes "Letter to C.C." demanding expulsion of Zinoviev and Kamenev from party.

November 3. Lenin takes part in Party Conference on question of armed uprising.

November 6. In the evening Lenin writes "Letter to C.C. Members" demanding immediate armed uprising. Late in the evening, disguised, Lenin comes from Lesnoye to Smolny and takes direct charge of the uprising.

THE END

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