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GERMANY AND WESTERN UNION

by Lionel Birch

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by Lionel Birch*

I.

DEFINING THE TERMS

EVER SINCE the end of the recent war against Germany, people of goodwill, and some others as well, have been saying that, as a result of that war, Western Europe would never be an effective political or economic factor again, unless it 'united'. Moreover, since about 1947, they have been in the habit of adding a rider to the effect that even a United Western Europe would never be effective unless Germany, or as large an area of it as possible, was 'integrated' into Western Europe.

'Unite' and 'integrate'! Nearly everybody was using these words, however few paused to consider what they meant. Mr. Churchill called upon Europe to unite, but as early as 1946 he gave his definition of unity in these words: 'Two or three hundred millions of

people in Europe have only got to wake up one morning and resolve to be happy and free by becoming one family of nations, banded together from the Atlantic to the Black Sea for mutual aid and protection. *One spasm of resolve! One single gesture!*' To Mr. Churchill, for Europe to 'unite' meant for Europe to 'become one family of nations'.

As long ago as 1939, Mr. Attlee had been even more specific, when he said: 'Europe must federate or perish'. In his previous sentence he had defined what he meant by 'federate', and indicated what sort of 'uniting' he considered necessary. 'There must be acceptance of the principle that international anarchy is incompatible with peace,' he said, 'and that in the common interest there must be recog-

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nition of an international authority superior to the individual states and endowed not only with rights over them, but with power to make them effective, operating not only in the political, but in the economic sphere. Europe must federate or perish.' To Mr. Attlee in those days, for Europe to federate or 'unite' meant for European countries to accept an international authority with certain rights and powers over them.

In so far as they usually attempt to define the terms they use in this context, Mr. Churchill and Mr. Attlee are distinct from most other British and Continental politicians, who have tended simply to use the words 'unite' and 'integrate' without giving any indication of what they meant by them. It was just that, from 1946 onwards, speakers of all political parties and of most Western European countries found these by far the most convenient words to use when Western Union attitudes to Germany were under discussion. And finally, early in November 1949, the Conference of Foreign Ministers of the United States, Britain and France officially enshrined Three-Power policy towards Germany in the awkward word 'integration'.

'The Ministers,' as the communiqué put it, 'considered it appropriate to support and foster the progressive integration of the German people into the European community.'

What does it mean?

How many readers of British newspapers, reading this communiqué, would have a clear picture of what such a 'progressive integration' might involve? Would the dictionary have helped them? To integrate, says the *Pocket Oxford Dictionary*, is 'to complete, combine into a whole. . . .' Then what about the word 'unite'? To unite, says the *Dictionary*, is to 'join together, make or become one, combine, consolidate, amalgamate. . . .' So the phrase 'Germany must be integrated into Western Europe' may be interpreted as 'Germany must be combined into a whole with Western Europe'. And 'Europe must unite' becomes 'Europe must become one, must amalgamate'. (It does not mean just 'work together', but *become one, amalgamate*.) Read like this, the word 'unite' takes on a fairly precise and rather formidable meaning; and it is perhaps significant that Western European *Governments* have lately preferred the word 'co-

operate' to the word 'unite'. (The dictionary meaning of 'co-operate' is 'to make joint efforts'.)

So when eminent private individuals began to make speeches which used the word 'unite' in the sense of 'amalgamate', the Governments promptly made it clear that they were already quietly *co-operating* (making joint efforts) with each other in Paris, London, Brussels, The Hague. But it was not until May 1948 that the advocates of 'Union', as distinct from 'Co-operation', were able to start to do something more than talk.

The Congress of Europe

It is necessary to recall that spring meeting, in order to appreciate how far we have travelled since May 1948 and to discover, if possible, which direction we have been travelling in. In May 1948, the scene was the Hall of Knights at The Hague, Holland. The event was the 'Congress of Europe': a distinguished, but entirely unofficial, gathering—at least, as far as the British Government was concerned. The Government evidently took the view that the Congress of Europe, which was blessed and inspired by Mr. Winston Churchill, was likely to be full of sound and phantasy only. They apparently held that the really significant spade-work was being done, patiently and unobtrusively, by authorised statesmen, responsible politicians, and accredited experts, in the back-rooms of Brussels, London, Paris, and Washington. Nevertheless, a number of quite strong unofficial delegations turned up at The Hague from most of the former Western European Allies, and so, purely as observers, did an invited team from Western Germany.

Return visit?

On the third afternoon of the Congress of Europe a young Dutchman, who had played a lively part in the Dutch Resistance Movement, was showing myself and a colleague round The Hague. 'This morning,' said our guide, suddenly, 'I saw one of the party of German observers hesitating—or so I thought—at this street corner here. I asked him if I could show him the way to the Ridderzaal. He thanked me very much for the offer, and then added: "But no, thank you very much, all the same. I know my way around this town. I was here in 1943."' The young Dutchman paused and glanced at

our faces. 'You *are* English?' he said; and we nodded. 'Well,' he continued, 'I can tell you it gave me a funny feeling. Certainly those gentry were here in 1943. But why are they here today, in 1948?'

'Look . . .', I began, and glanced at my colleague for assistance. 'Look. In the first place, a whole lot of the present German party were *not* here in 1943; they were inside Germany, and behind wire. In the second place, you surely must have heard from Mr. Churchill and others in the Ridderzaal this morning that the Germans are here as observers, observers only. It's true that eventually they will be taking part in these sort of proceedings in their own right. But that is precisely because we need the best elements of their culture, and because we need to have their peaceful industrial economy integrated with Western Europe. *That's* what was said in the Ridderzaal this morning, if you remember.' 'And,' said the young Dutchman, 'because we need their armoured divisions.' Once more, I looked for help to my colleague, who had been through two German wars, and who wasn't giving any help. 'Well,' I said to the Dutchman, at last, 'such a thing was certainly never said in the Ridderzaal this morning.'

Cultural and economic reasons

That was quite true. Indeed, at that time, May 1948, the idea of a new German Army was not even mooted in the lobbies and corridors of the Hall of Knights, or in any of the bars of The Hague. (As a matter of fact, I do remember hearing the word 'Panzer-division' fall from the lips of one gentleman, rather late on the last evening, when people were discussing whether or not the Congress had omitted any subject of vital importance; but the speaker was promptly hushed by other members of his discussion group. At this time, nearly everyone was aware that there were certain things which the French could not be expected to stand for; and that one of those things was the re-creation of a German Army.)

Even in private at that time the integration of Germany (or as much of Germany as could be made available) was said to be eventually desirable on cultural and economic grounds only. And certainly, the party of German observers, who were sponsored by a Swiss author and a French countess, and were accompanied by a kind of civil escorting officer from General

Sir Brian Robertson's staff, *happily* looked the stuff from which armoured divisions are recruited.

Time, and the European Movement, marched on. Mr. Churchill, one of the principal sponsors of the Congress of Europe at The Hague in May 1948, felt able to raise in the House of Commons, in March 1950, the question of the desirability of a German military contribution to Western Defence. In other words, two years ago the talk was mainly of economic union and industrial integration; and the notion of promoting a new German army was unthinkable, or, at least, unmentionable. Today, elder British statesmen and elder American generals and elder German industrialists feel impelled to speak about it openly, urgently, and as something which should be given high priority. And even Governments—which either do not speak about it at all or speak about the notion only to describe it as 'unthinkable' or 'unofficial', or both—must be making it a subject for serious thought.

So we have indeed *moved* between May 1948 and March 1950; and moved fast. Various questions that look worthy of investigation seem to arise from this. For instance, by what stages have we moved from the loose use of the words 'unite' and 'integrate' to the precise demand for a German military contribution? In what direction are we moving?

Which way do we want to go?

A question worth asking ourselves at this point seems to be: is this the direction that we desire? If not, what *is* the direction of our preference? Can we still set about going that way? And, if so, how? Or has our course now been finally set for us—by authorized statesmen and responsible politicians and accredited experts? Is this, this 1950 model, really the *kind* of Western Union and the *kind* of German integration into Western Europe that we wanted or expected, when we first listened, more or less approvingly, to the words 'Union' and 'Integration' being offered to us as the most helpful remedies available, five epoch-making years ago? What other kinds of 'union' and 'integration' are there? What other kind did we expect, or feel that we were being led to expect?

The truth is, probably, that most of us did not ever stop to define what we expected. When Mr. Churchill said resoundingly:



NO, NO! KEEP TO THE SCALES, FRAULEIN!

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'Europe, Unite!' or when Mr. Attlee said quietly: 'Europe must federate or perish', and when the politicians and publicists of all Western European nations kept saying that all Western European Governments *must* start to co-operate, we probably just expected another series of international conferences, more or less on the Geneva pattern.

Moreover, for at least twelve months after V.J. Day, many people still hoped that such conferences would not have to be confined to representatives of Western Europe and the United States only. Up till the time of the 1946 Paris Conference, which was intended to conclude peace treaties with the ex-satellite enemy countries, and which was advertised, perhaps rashly, as 'The Peace Conference', it seemed at least possible that the state of war could be concluded and the foundations of peace laid, on a world-wide basis. But, as the tortuous debates grew shriller in Paris, it became evident that the Conference was doing no more than

provide 'noises off' for the real struggle that was already getting under way between the Eastern and Western Allies in Germany—a struggle for the body of the vanquished, as an insurance against the day when the victors might decide that they really could not make peace with each other.

Balance of power

The end of the Paris Conference was, in fact, the signal for a return to Balance of Power politics. In the East and the West, an awareness grew that, sooner or later, the one Power that would be capable of tipping that Balance, either to East or West, would be Germany. Therefore attention must be paid to Germany, and directed, ideally, towards bringing the whole of Germany into one's own orbit. Should that prove impracticable, the object should be to make quite sure that the half of divided Germany which was under one's own occupation did not slide off into the opposing

orbit, or that it was not lost, or rendered valueless to one's own side, by sheer economic stagnation.

From the point of view of the West, this meant that the Western half of divided Germany had to be helped on to its feet again. So, too, had the Western half of divided Europe, and that, in turn, meant the bringing of Western Germany, as well as Western Europe, into the sphere of Dollar Aid. That, in turn, meant the revival of apprehensions in several Western European countries that a German industry, rehabilitated by American capital, would be the death of some of their own home industries. On the other hand, the providers of dollar aid felt that if each small sovereign State used it to stimulate its own favourite lines of production without reference to what its neighbours were producing, then the States would simply

be cutting each other's throats, and the dollars would be frittered away. To the Americans, the only possible answer seemed to be the working out of a Joint Recovery Programme. It was in this way, and at this point, that the agencies that were working for the 'uniting' of Western Europe and for the 'integration' of West Germany into Western Europe, received a new and decisive impulse from outside the frontiers of Europe: from the United States of America.

Something, of course, had been done already. There had been two main sequences of development: the official sequence, consisting of things done and agreements made on the Government level, and the unofficial sequence, consisting of pressures applied and leads given by private individuals and 'unofficial' groups and movements.

2.

TOWARDS WESTERN UNION?

First, what has been done since the beginning by Governments to bring us to whatever state of union, integration, or co-operation we may find we have reached today?

Oddly enough, the first act performed by Governments to give flesh and bones to a policy for Western Union, was the signature of a Treaty which was mainly concerned with Defence: the Treaty of Brussels, signed on 17th March 1948, between Britain, France, Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg. The primary purpose of this Treaty was to co-ordinate the development of the armed forces of these five Powers; but, as a useful by-product, the same five Powers have been exploring ways of bringing their respective schemes of social service into line with each other. And it was, in fact, the Committee of Ministers which meets periodically under the terms of this Treaty, that was responsible for taking the first Governmental or official steps (after a good deal of clearing the air and preparing the ground had been done by the unofficial movements) towards the setting up of the Council of Europe at Strasbourg.

This Brussels Treaty, in general Western Union terms, was a start. But in terms of pure defence, if such an element can be isolated, the combined armies, navies and air forces of

Britain, France, Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg, however well co-ordinated, were clearly incapable of holding Western Europe against all comers. So, in April 1949, the Brussels Treaty was extended and supplemented by the Atlantic Pact, which involved most other Western European countries—and the United States. That alliance looked considerably more formidable, from a defence point of view, than the old Brussels grouping; although there was still a noticeable lack of divisions actually on the ground between the rivers Elbe and Rhine. But, at any rate for the time being, the architects of the Atlantic Defence strategy had to let that pass.

So much, so far, for Defence. The Governments provided a framework for an economic structure by signing, on 16th April 1948, the Convention for European Economic Co-operation. All European Governments who were in receipt of Marshall Aid signed the Convention, and an Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (known as OEEC) was set up in Paris, with a Council, an Executive Committee, and a Secretary-General. On top of this, each of the Marshall Aid countries signed a private treaty with the United States, and the Economic Co-operation Administration was set up in Washington. The intention



PEACE THE MESSENGER

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behind the creation of both these bodies was that they should enable all the Marshall Aid Governments to work increasingly closely together in the sphere of economic affairs, and, in particular, to work out and execute a joint recovery programme.

Such were the official steps taken, in matters of defence and economics, by Governments. The unofficial apostles of Western Union and the 'unofficial' movements scrutinized the various bits of machinery that had been provided by the Governments, passed over—for the time being—the Defence machinery, and concentrated on the machinery for economic co-operation. This they tended to consider inadequate for the task of integrating the economy of Western Europe in the time that was likely to be available for the job. And the economic arrangements were, they felt, inadequate precisely because there was no European political authority which could force the economic experts of various nations to accept on behalf of their several countries those

majority decisions by which alone, perhaps, a true integration of Europe's economy could be achieved.

In OEEC, the critics claimed, co-operation *by consent* was the most that was possible. No power in, or behind, OEEC could force any nation to modify, for instance, its coal or its steel programme, unless it felt inclined to do so of its own free will. The only agency that could enforce the co-ordination of national coal programmes, so as to bring about a real integration of Europe's coal industry, would be a *European Ministry of Fuel and Power*, deriving its authority direct from a *European Government*: in fact, a supra-national Government with limited functions but real powers. So, said the critics, some act of political union *must* precede any authentic economic integration of Western Europe.

A political union? A surrender of some portion of each Western European country's sovereignty? The Governments of the Marshall Aid countries—some of them social democrat,

some of them capitalist, others of them operating an economy that was half-controlled, half-free—instinctively shied away from such an idea. To endanger the full-employment policy of Britain by agreeing to bow to economic decisions which may be arrived at by a majority of the free-enterprise Governments of Western Europe? To endanger the traditional freedom of French free *entrepreneurs* by agreeing to bow to economic decisions which *might*, one day, be taken by a majority of Western European Governments which *might*, one day, be Socialist? It seemed to be quite a decisive step to take, and one which should certainly not be taken in too much of a hurry.

Political union

On the other hand, there was Germany, and Western European statesmen had by now got used to the idea, or the phrase, that there could be no real or permanent solution of 'the German problem', except through a political union of Europe which should embrace and absorb Germany. The situation as it had developed so far was summed up in a broadcast made at the beginning of 1949 by R. H. Crossman, M.P. 'The only way to solve the German problem,' he said, 'is to create a political union of Western Europe, of which Germany is a part, and to impose permanently on the Germans only those sacrifices of sovereignty which we are prepared to impose on ourselves. We see, therefore, that the solution of the German problem is to be found not in Germany, but in Paris and Brussels and London. Belgian and French statesmen are pressing for a European Assembly as the first stage in the advance to Federal Union. British statesmen are arguing for a functional approach which avoids directly tackling the fundamental political problem.'

Unofficial compromise

So, by the beginning of 1949, official feeling in France and Belgium, and unofficial feeling among interested parties in Britain, was that some first step towards political union ought to be taken as soon as possible. Official feeling in Britain was that economic relations between the Western European Governments should continue on a basis of co-operation by consent. In the spring of 1949, however, a kind of unofficial compromise was reached, and, in May 1949, the Statute of the Council of Europe was

signed by the Governments concerned. This, in itself, did not bring Western Europe any closer to political union. The Statute simply laid it down that the aim of the Council was to achieve a greater unity between its member-States for the purpose of safeguarding and realizing the ideals and principles which are their common heritage and for facilitating their economic and social progress.

The European Assembly, so much desired by the unofficial movements in Britain, so little thought of by official circles in Britain, when the idea had been first mooted, was, for the time being, to be a *Consultative* Assembly only. But at least it would be a place where the official representatives of Britain, who favoured a continuation of *co-operation* by consent, and the British unofficial apostles of European unity, who favoured political *union*, could meet officially for the first time, in company with Continental supporters, both official and unofficial, of the United Europe idea. And at least the Consultative Assembly could be a place where both functionalists and federalists might, if the Committee of Ministers permitted, at least raise the question of the desirability or non-desirability of political union sooner or later.

Where does Germany come in?

So, in August 1949, the Council of Europe met in Strasbourg. For the first few days the tug-of-war between the functionalists and the federalists—the advocates of co-operation by consent and the advocates of political union—continued, on the floor of the Chamber, in the corridors of the Chamber, and round and about in the hotels and the cafés of the town. Oddly enough, it was mainly the Conservatives who appeared now to be in favour of a sufficient amount of political union to enable certain basic industries of Europe to be planned on a European scale; and it was mainly the British Socialists who opposed the idea of any integrated European planning (except by consent) for the time being. The reason for this appeared to be that, since some eighty per cent of Western European industry was still in private ownership and control, any planning for, say, an integrated European steel industry was likely to be executed mainly by private steel industrialists.

But, gradually, after the first week or so of discussion and debate, it appeared to be borne

On both functionalists and federalists alike that any scheme for the integration (whether by co-operation or as a result of political union) of Europe's steel or any other industry, would be completely unrealistic unless it took account of Germany and Germany's industry. Germany, after all, had been, before the latest war, Europe's most important manufacturing and trading nation. It was impossible, all the delegates quietly agreed, to leave Germany out. But exactly how—and when—was one to bring Germany in? Reports of hotel-room conversations gave rise to rumours that some of the British were keen on the idea of trying to get an invitation sent to Germany from this meeting, the very first session of the Council of Europe.

How about the Saar ?

Counter-reports of French hotel-room conversations declared that, if Germany was going to be invited, then the Saar must be given an invitation to membership of the Council of Europe at the very same time. Whereupon, the leader of the German Social Democratic Party, Dr. Kurt Schumacher, who was then engaged in a strenuous election campaign, announced that, if the Saar was going to be invited, then Germany simply would not come. Never before had a spokesman of the recently vanquished enemy country given such explicit expression to the German feeling that Germany was an indispensable element in the chosen programme of their late conquerors; and that the days of unconditional surrender were gone for ever. It had never happened before, but there was a good deal more of this sort of thing to come. Meanwhile, however, the Council of Europe, evidently considering that the question of German membership was temporarily too hot to handle, let the matter lie.

Adenauer and European Union


The German general election results showed a victory for Dr. Adenauer and his coalition of Christian Democrats and 'Free Democrats'. Once he was safely installed as Federal Chancellor, Dr. Adenauer declared that he hoped that nobody abroad would take too seriously any apparently nationalistic utterances which might have dropped from the lips of any candidate in the German general election campaign. The Chancellor let it be known among foreign newspapermen that he himself was a veteran

supporter of the idea of European Union, and that he believed that the sole hope for Western Europe lay in co-operation among all its member-nations and an integration of its industry. This was the man who was head of the German Government to whom any invitation to join the Council of Europe would in due course be addressed; so it seemed likely that any such invitation that might be sent would be welcomed with alacrity and pleasure.

But, as the weeks went by, and the German Parliament began to find its feet and its voice, there appeared to be certain preliminary matters which seemed to be exercising the mind of the Chancellor and his Cabinet—preliminary, that is to say, to any decision which the German Cabinet might be able to make as to whether or not to accept an invitation to become an associate member of the Council of Europe, if such an invitation should eventually be sent. There was, for instance, the question of the Ruhr Authority: presumably, if Germany joined the Council of Europe, the form of international control laid down in the Ruhr Statute would not continue to be applied indefinitely to, or against, German heavy industry alone? Presumably, the intention would be to extend such international control to cover the whole of Europe's heavy industry?

The question of defence

Then, again, there was the question of defence. Presumably, if Western Germany were finally to throw in her lot with the West by joining the Council of Europe, that body would either undertake to defend Germany on the Elbe; or else it would permit the Germans to arrange to defend themselves. If the Council of Europe is undertaking the defence of Germany, might one ask how it proposes to set about it? If the Germans are in due course to be allowed to arrange to help to defend themselves, might one ask when they are to be allowed to *begin* to make such arrangements? Then there is the question of the Saar. Presumably the Council of Europe appreciates that if *either* the French attempt to make permanent their present exclusive economic conventions with the Saar territory, *or* if the Council itself extends an offer of membership in the Council to the Saar Administration, it might be very difficult to find a majority of members of the German Federal Government who would still be in favour of Germany's



'Ach, Herr Acheson! You're just in time to see our democracy lesson' [Daily Express]

accepting membership in those circumstances.

What sort of Union?

What sort of European Union, then, and what kind of German integration into that Union, is it that the present German Government has in mind? The German Chancellor's aspiration that international control, as now practised in the Ruhr, should be extended to the whole of Europe's heavy industry, probably gives the clue to the answer to both questions. The Ruhr Authority is basically a body for allocating the coal, coke and steel of the Ruhr 'on an equitable basis to countries co-operating in the economic good...' Voting rights on the Ruhr Authority are as follows: Belgium 1, France 3, Germany 3, Luxembourg 1, Holland 1, Britain 3, United States 3.

In addition to an extension of this joint control to the rest of Europe's heavy industry, the German Government has periodically expressed the hope that very substantial amounts of French and American capital should be put into German industry—and particularly into the German steel industry. Last autumn, for instance, Dr. Adenauer told the newspaper, *Die Zeit*, that he favoured a forty per cent non-German participation in Ruhr industries. And on 19th November the Chancellor permitted to be added to a set of Governmental proposals which were being forwarded to the Allied High Commission, a non-Governmental memorandum suggesting that 225 million of the 300 million marks

needed to restore the vast Vereinigte Stahlwerke should be supplied by foreign capital.

These aspirations, if carried into practice, would certainly bring about one kind of integration of German and Western European industry. It would be a kind of high-level integration which is detested by, for instance, the German Social Democrats, precisely because it looks as if it could make permanently impossible the opposite kind of integration which they themselves favour—namely, a 'low-level' integration of European heavy industry on the basis of public ownership and control.

The Social Democrats' argument

If Europe's industry starts to be planned and integrated by private enterprise for private enterprise, if a new kind of private international cartel is created for Europe's steel and coal industries, if enough American and French capital is sunk in Germany's heavy industries, then—so the German Social Democrats contend—it will be impossible for German Socialists *ever* to socialise their own industries, or for European Socialists *ever* to plan a true integration of Europe's economy on the basis of common ownership. Not only that, say the German Social Democrats, but once this kind of private international cartel has become set and fixed, then a process of industrial mobilization which has already been the essential preliminary to two European wars, will once more have been initiated—and by much the same kind of people who were doing the job in the years leading up to 1914 and 1939.

3.

ANOTHER GERMAN ARMY?

Simultaneously with, and parallel to, the internal German controversy as to what kind of integration of Germany and Europe is desirable, there proceeds the perhaps not altogether unrelated internal controversy as to whether or not a new German Army is desirable. All last autumn and winter the German Government tended to claim that the main pressure for a new German Army, as such, was not coming from inside Germany; and German Social Democrats kept repeating that the only people who were already hankering after a West German Army were 'the brasshats of the Western Allies'. At the same time, German Government spokesmen were usually careful to add that the recruitment of an armed People's Police and the formation of training cadres of former *Wehrmacht* officers and N.C.O.s in the Eastern Zone did seem to call for the attention both of the Federal Government and of the Western Allies, and perhaps even for the formation of similar contingents in Western Germany. Otherwise, it was argued, the West German Government would be at a permanent disadvantage as against the East German Administration, in the event of, for instance, the Berlin-Helmstedt railway track falling once more into a state of dangerous disrepair.

Thus there are two separate points of origin from which pressure for the formation of *some* German divisions or contingents is at present coming. There is, firstly, a purely German pressure coming from people who, for various reasons do not want to see Western Germany placed at a permanent disadvantage in the cold civil war against Eastern Germany. There is, secondly, a non-German pressure coming from various military and civilian strategists of the West, who, adding up the number of divisions actually on the ground on either side of the Stettin-Trieste line, cannot see how on earth the traditional sum can be made to work out, unless a certain number of German divisions can be made available 'as one element in a Western European Army'. By and large, the German Social Democrats claim that the people, both inside and outside Germany, who are in favour of the formation of some German

military contingents now, are the same people who are in favour of the 'integration' of German and Western European industry on a *high-level* basis.

Possible solutions

The most articulate resistance, inside Germany, to the formation of German military contingents is coming at present from the German Social Democrats. And they happen to be the same people who are most vocally opposed to the 'integration' of German and Western European industry on a *high-level* basis. They argue that no German divisions that could possibly be formed in the time could do more than hold up the invader for a couple of weeks 'while the French Army made its way to North Africa'. They go on to suggest that the only way to restore the unity of Germany and to prevent it ever falling finally into the Soviet orbit, and indeed the only way to 'defend' Western Europe these days, is to make Western Europe a magnetic example to both Russia and America, precisely by means of a *low-level* integration of the national industries of all Western European countries, on the basis of public ownership and control.

So there, for the moment, the matter rests. Some Germans are in favour of forming some German divisions in order to help hold off an attack from the East; and a certain number of people in Britain and America agree with them. Some other Germans are against the formation of any such contingents, because, just for one thing, they say, such contingents would be totally inadequate. And a certain number of people in Britain and France seem to agree with them, too.

There exists also a third type of proposal: a proposal for the neutralization of a United Germany. This proposal has been mooted by a number of miscellaneous people from a wide variety of motives. The form it usually takes is that all occupation forces should be withdrawn to certain selected points on Germany's frontier or across them; that an all-German general election should be held under Four-Power supervision; and that Germany should thereafter be declared—and should declare

herself—neutral in perpetuity.

After four or five years of talk about 'Union' and 'Integration' there seem to be three possible alternative lines of advance confronting Germany, and therefore confronting Europe.

But there are two things which are still sometimes left out of consideration by those who count on Germany either for an access of military strength or for a reinforcement of the economic and political power of Western Europe. The first thing is the possibility that, as things are, there will not be sufficient young men in Western Germany willing to provide the raw material for that access of military strength. The second thing is the possibility that the German Parliament may still be unwilling to enter the Council of Europe, except, perhaps, on terms which cannot be accepted; or, alternatively, it may finally enter the Council of Europe in something like the mood that the pre-Home Rule Irish members entered the British Parliament.

Young Germans and the Army

It is worth looking a little closer into both these possibilities. First of all, would the young Western German of today be willing to join a German Army—or the German Legion of a European Army? Last autumn the Institute for Market Research and Observation, at Bielefeld, took an opinion poll on this question. These were the results:

8.8 per cent of those Germans questioned said they would be willing to serve in a military force;

60.2 per cent wanted no military service under any conditions;

12.2 per cent made no reply;

18.8 per cent said they would be willing to serve under certain conditions. (Some of those questioned appeared to be willing to serve in order to help bring the Soviet Zone into the Western Republic's orbit.)

In other words, last autumn nearly all young Western Germans of military age appeared to be unwilling to be used as troops, except in a cause which they could be persuaded was their own. One or two remarks made to me at that time by young Germans between the ages of 20 and 25 may serve to indicate the emotional climate out of which the foregoing percentages arose. For instance: 'We have no ambitions at all, just now. Certainly we have no ambitions to be used as mercenaries, either by the East

or the West.' And 'Somehow or other, during the course of this November (1949), the Eastern Defence Frontier of Western Europe seems to have got over to the Elbe, after being on the Rhine. To us Germans, this seems pleasant, but unreal.' And 'If a new German Army was to be any use it would have to be a massive affair. A mere ten German divisions would simply annoy the beast. No, thank you.' And 'Come, now—you can't defend the Elbe with the British Navy.'

The question of unemployment

It so happened that the young German who made that last remark was an unemployed building labourer. During that same week the correspondent in Germany of the American magazine, *Time*, reported: 'A tired old civil servant declared: "Unemployment is intentional. It will rise, too. Meanwhile, we will get steadily increasing reports about a re-militarization of Germany—and, of course, they'll all be carefully denied. The people are being prepared gradually. After they've been out of work long enough, the men will be willing to grab a gun in order to eat and have something to do".'

So the answer to the question: 'Will enough young Germans be willing to participate in the military sense?' seems to be: 'Not at present, not unless substantial unemployment starts to look as if it has become chronic again in Germany.' It is worth noting in this connexion that the German Government's Economic Minister, Dr. Erhard, profoundly mistrusts all full-employment theories, and that the German Government has recently indicated that it feels that a hard core of unemployment is inevitable for some time to come.

Germany's invitation

Secondly, will the West German Government be willing to take part, politically and economically? Will it finally accept the invitation to become an associate member of the Council of Europe without any conditions? Let us try to assess the probabilities by looking at the evidence up to date.

In August 1949, at the first session of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, the question of an invitation to Germany was allowed to lie on the table. Three months later, in the House of Commons, Mr. Churchill expressed



'For just this once,' Herr Colonel-General, can't you FORGET the panzer strategy through the Low Countries to Dunkirk?'
[Daily Express]

his anxiety lest, even if Germany's admission to the Council of Europe were to become a fact, Germany still might not take her seat until August or September of 1950. Mr. Churchill felt that 1950 might well prove to be a critical year; and he considered that it would be a great benefit if the meeting of the next Assembly could be brought forward so that German representatives might be introduced at the earliest moment.

It was not, however, until the end of March 1950 that the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe met in Strasbourg to deal with the question of sending an invitation to Germany—and to the Saar. Meanwhile, Dr. Adenauer had put in a request to the Allied High Commission for a formal invitation. Mr. Ernest Bevin had made it clear that there was to be no bargaining over Germany's acceptance of the Statute of the Council of Europe, and the French had indicated that they might agree to the invitation to Germany being sent out slightly before the invitation to the Saar.

The final invitation to Germany to become an Associate Member of the Council of Europe (that is, to be represented in the Consultative Assembly, but not on the Committee of Ministers) was handed to Dr. Adenauer on 2nd April 1950. It confirmed that Germany would be entitled to eighteen seats in the Assembly—the maximum number permitted to any one country—and that her annual financial contribution would be about £126,000. The fact that the allocation of seats was the same as that for Britain and France pleased many Germans. But the fact that a simul-

taneous invitation had gone out to the Saar maddened the German Social Democrats. Nevertheless, at this time—the first week in April—Dr. Adenauer indicated that he thought he could still get a Parliamentary majority for acceptance of the invitation; but he evidently decided to move slowly in the hope that, after a time, the Social Democrats would decide at least not to vote against acceptance.

However, on 13th April, the German Social Democrats let it be known that even if Adenauer got a majority for acceptance in Parliament, they would boycott the delegation of the eighteen German representatives to Strasbourg unless and until the Saar questions were settled. On 20th April Dr. Schumacher elaborated the Social Democrat attitude. He asserted that German acceptance of the invitation would almost automatically raise a whole series of questions, including that of the relationship of Germany to the Atlantic Pact. 'If we are to assume risks,' he said, 'we should be accepted into the European family, and not as a delinquent into a reformatory. Moreover, we ought not to have to pay for our keep there by giving up a part of our property.'

Almost on the same day, Dr. Adenauer, speaking in Berlin, had declared that, at the forthcoming meeting of British, French, and American Foreign Ministers in London, it would be 'necessary, clever, and wise to bring the Federal Republic into the West European system as soon as possible, as a member possessing equality of rights.'

Evidently, the question of 'equality of rights' was by now very much on the minds of

the German Government and of the German Opposition. Just at this point, the Allied High Commission in Germany announced its provisional disapproval of the West German Government's proposed new income-tax law. Dr. Adenauer promptly announced that this was 'an extraordinary psychological mistake in dealing with the German people', and declared that he was at a loss to understand how people could speak simultaneously of Germany's being recognized as an equal member in Europe. He expressed his conviction that, if a vote were taken in the German Parliament at this point, 'these vetoes' would lead to a rejection of the invitation to join the Council of Europe.

The French plan

However, this trouble was cleared up within a couple of days at a round-table Conference between German and Allied representatives, where the question of the new income-tax law was settled, apparently to everybody's satisfaction. Still, the invitation to join the Council of Europe continued to lie on the table of the German Cabinet at Bonn. Then, suddenly, on 9th May, the French Government proposed that French and German coal and steel production should be placed under a single authority, within an organization open to the other countries of Europe. This scheme was said to aim at solving the problem of Franco-German relations and at laying the basis for a wider European federation. It was also evidently felt to solve the Franco-German problem of the economics of the Saar.

Immediately, on the very same day, 9th May, the German Cabinet unanimously decided to accept the invitation to join the Council of Europe, and a Bill was prepared for presentation to the German Parliament. But what of the German Opposition inside that Parliament? They did not seem to be nearly so impressed by the French proposal. That proposal, they said, was only a frame. Everything depended on what kind of a picture was going inside that frame—in other words, everything, in their view, depended on the question of ownership and control. Was it to be public or private; a high-level cartel-type integration of Europe's heavy industry; or a low-level integration on the basis of public ownership and control? These were the old, familiar questions; but the French proposal meant that, at least,

they would have to be answered—one way or another.

Four last questions

Such, up to the time of writing, are the facts about the efforts to 'unite' Europe and to 'integrate' Germany into a united Western Europe. What are the future implications of those facts? Where do we go from here? Where can we go from here? Four last questions may be useful in helping everyone to work out the answer for themselves.

(1) What happens to *Western Europe*, if Western Germany decides not to come in, politically, economically, or perhaps militarily, into Western Union? Can the 'Union', in any sense, of Western Europe be effective, if Western Germany does not 'integrate' herself, in any sense, into Western Europe?

(2) What happens to *Western Germany* if Western Germany decides not to integrate herself into Western Europe? Where does she go instead—to the East—or does she stay central and neutral? Can she stay central and neutral, and still survive, even in simple terms of trade?

(3) What happens to Western Europe if Dr. Adenauer's Western Germany does come into the Council of Europe, bringing with it its preconceptions in favour of the high-level integration of Europe's heavy industry, its attitude that German unemployment is inevitable, its hankering after some German military force, its concern—in an atomic age—for ground defence on the Elbe, its aspirations for the recovering of the Soviet-occupied zone of Germany, and of the Saar, and of the former Eastern Province, at present in Polish hands?

(4) Alternatively, what happens to the Council of Europe—most of whose representatives come, at the moment, from free-enterprise countries—if the only apparent short-term alternative Germany, that is, one governed by a coalition of Social Democrats and left-wing Christian Democrats, comes into the Council of Europe, bringing with it its aspirations for the recovery of the Saar, and the Soviet-occupied zone, and the former Eastern Provinces; bringing with it its refusal to countenance the recreation of any German military force, its notions of low-level integration of Europe's industry on the basis of public ownership and control, and its ideas for the conscious planning of full employment in Germany?

FOR THE TEACHER

Whether Western Europe is to be federated, integrated, united or to remain a collection of sovereign states is of some real significance to the professional politician with his axe to grind. However, the issues involved in the debate are too complicated for most classrooms, and any attempt to treat all arguments alike would impose an intolerable strain on the teacher's integrity. Our previous pamphlet also had Germany as its subject, but there are further treatments of this theme that are worth while in school.

PREPARING FOR WAR

We suggested in our earlier pamphlet that Germany be regarded first as a geographical unit and that pupils be made familiar with its size, shape, towns, and so on. The next stage might be to provide a brief historical survey of the years before the war. If pupils have the maps before them they will be able to see more clearly the implications of national aggression. Events and dates can be transferred to the map so that Germany's boundaries can be seen throughout their process of expansion—the Remilitarization of the Rhineland, the Saar Plebiscite, the Anschluss, the Sudeten question in Czechoslovakia, the Free Port of Danzig, the invasion of Poland, and so on. The German explanation of all this—the need for living space—and the Allied weakness in allowing it to happen over a period of years, are points to be explained. How it was done—militarily by making armaments in the Ruhr towns and by building a large and powerful army, and politically by bluff, must also be told.

FROM WAR TO PEACE

Map Review No. 106 shows the boundary changes indicated above, as well as the present division of Germany into occupation zones. The implications of this division require some explanation if they are to be understood. For instance, the Ruhr with its industries and war potential is wholly in the British Zone; the Russian Zone has a surplus of certain food supplies available for export to other parts of Germany. The four-power occupation of Berlin, its situation deep in the Russian Zone, and the airlift, emphasize the difficulties of agreement and the complications that can arise when negotiations break down.

THE FUTURE

Here pupils may perhaps offer their own ideas on the future of Germany in Europe. Even so, they should be encouraged to see the problem as others see it, too. If they were pupils in a school in Strasbourg or in a frontier village of Belgium or Holland, what feelings would they have towards the Germans? Would they want Germany to be united and powerful in Europe once again? How can German rearmament be controlled once the allies have left the country? These are some of the questions to which pupils will have their own answers. With the map before them they will have some chance of understanding the international nature of the problem of Germany.

Current Affairs Outline No. 106, 'Rudolf and Maria' and No. 107, 'Berlin 1945-1950' contain background reading for pupils. These are available by single issues (minimum 12 for 1/-) or by annual subscription 25s. for 26 issues (one dozen of each).

FOR FURTHER READING

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|------------------|---|--|
| Goothby, Robert | <i>What do you think about Western Union?</i> | (Conservative Political Centre pamphlet 1949, 4d.) |
| Carr, E. H. | <i>Nationalization and After</i> | (Macmillan & Co., 1945, 3s. 6d.) |
| Mackay, R. W. G. | <i>Western Union in Crisis</i> | (Basil Blackwell, 1949, 5s.) |
| Ward, Barbara | <i>The West at Bay</i> | (Allen & Unwin, 1948, 12s. 6d.) |
| | <i>A Survey of the Economic Situation and Prospects of Europe</i> | (United Nations, March 1948, 12s. 6d., obtainable from H.M.S.O.) |

DISCUSSION NOTES

Lionel Birch concludes this, the second of our pamphlets on Germany, by posing a number of questions for discussion. Even since the pamphlet was written we have had the Schuman plan, and the joint declaration by the Foreign Ministers of the United States, Great Britain and France. Thus any discussion on the position of Germany in Western Europe is bound to be of immediate topical interest.

For a series of discussions the leader might take the author's four questions listed on page 14, but it would be worth while to ascertain whether the group was clear about the Congress of Europe (page 3), the Treaty of Brussels (page 6), O.E.E.C. (page 6), the Atlantic Pact (page 6), and the Council of Europe (page 8). All these influence the attitude of Germany and give a clearer picture of the political, economic and military plans and ideas the statesmen of Western Europe are considering in order to bring about effective co-operation. A map is essential in order to see Germany's position, and also those of the various countries which signed these pacts.

WHAT PLACE SHOULD GERMANY TAKE IN WESTERN EUROPE?

The group will probably know that Western Germany has been invited to join the Council of Europe as an associate member, and the Federal Government has just accepted the invitation.

1. Could Western Union be effective without Western Germany, politically, economically, and militarily?

2. Now that she has accepted, what about the Saar? The Oder-Neisse line? Will she want some sort of defence guarantee on the Elbe? What about Eastern Germany? Can international control of the Ruhr remain? In other words, if Germany brings with her these difficulties, will the Council of Europe be able to deal with them effectively?

3. Pointers to many of these questions can be found throughout the pamphlet, but the leader will have to keep abreast of the latest developments, and rely on responsible daily newspapers for some of the answers. He might perhaps give members of the group some of the questions and ask them to come to the discussion armed with appropriate newspaper cuttings.

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