

THE MODERN WORLD
A SURVEY OF HISTORICAL FORCES
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EGYPT

GEORGE YOUNG

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EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION

MR. GEORGE YOUNG'S wide first-hand knowledge of Levantine conditions coupled with his authoritative work on Ottoman Law (*Corps de Droit Ottoman*, 7 volumes, published by the Clarendon Press, first edition 1905-1906) entitle him to be heard with respect on the political problems of the Near East. In the present volume Mr. Young brings a fresh and always independent judgment to bear on the growth of Egyptian nationalism, discovering in the history of the recent past ampler grounds for hope than his countrymen are wont to conceive. In his last two chapters Mr. Young quits the past for the future and enters the frankly controversial field of the relations hereafter to be established between Britain, Egypt, and the Sudan. Not every reader will agree with the policies which are recommended, but as the argument is presented with skill and fairness the dissenter is unlikely to complain.

H. F.

May 24, 1927.

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AUTHOR'S INTRODUCTION

AN interesting monument to Modern Egypt now confronts the newly arrived traveller in the Station Square of Cairo. Egypt is represented as a Sphinx staring in its stony trance. The Spirit of Egypt, a female figure, stands beside it stretching out a hand to rouse it from its age-long apathy. That is modern Egypt's conception of itself—a conception to which we shall again and again return in answering the questions of the Sphinx.

What Modern Egypt is regionally can be easily defined. It is the lower valley and the delta of the Nile—a belt of irrigable land broadening as it goes northward, bordered by desert on either side, and bounded by the Red Sea on the east and by the Sahara on the west. But what modern Egypt is racially is more difficult to describe. For the various races that have at different times settled in this region have only, during the last few years, begun to fuse into what can be called an Egyptian. And of all the new nations that emerged in Eastern Europe and Western Asia out of the world wars that precluded the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the Egyptian is the most elusive and enigmatical.

A century ago, after the Napoleonic wars, Egypt burst into the field of European politics, like a flaming comet, to the utter disorganisation of the political system of the day, much as did Turkey after the Great War. Egypt then represented a force that baffled Western rulers and broke up European alliances, much as did Turkey a few years ago. Even so did the Egypt question cause a

rupture in an Anglo-French *entente* and the fall of M. Thiers, just as Turkey caused a rupture in a later Anglo-French *entente* and the fall of Mr. Lloyd George. But the uprisal of Turkey was clearly a retarded national renaissance. To what force are we to attribute the upheaval caused a century ago by the Egyptian expansion? For there was no Egyptian national consciousness inspiring the campaigns of Mehemet Ali. The establishment of Egypt as an independent State by an alien adventurer compels us to believe that there is a force of nationality that can do its work before there is any national consciousness.

A first difficulty, therefore, in writing an account of Modern Egypt is knowing where to start. Nearly all national movements—for example, those of Turkey, Greece, Ireland, and other modern nations—begin with a renaissance of the national language, legends, and literature. This, in time, leads to a political rebellion against the alien authority or *ancien régime*. But Modern Egypt has no language, no literature, no legends of its own. The art of Ancient Egypt may possibly survive vestigially in Modern Egypt. Certainly designs and decorations may be seen in the Muski that look like degenerate descendants of those in the Museum. For example, the designs of the arabesques in lattice-work balconies can be seen on Pharaonic works of art, and one of these balconies is represented on a tomb of Amenophis IV. of the sixteenth century B.C. But a similar connection has never been traced in the literature. Maspero once heard a tale being told in a village that he recognised as a Pharaonic theme. Investigating its origin with creditable caution, he traced it back to a small girl who had got it out of one of his own translations in a school primer.

Owing probably to foreign conquests, there was nothing in Egypt corresponding to the Keltic bardic schools, or to the Romance ballad singers, that was capable of carrying on a literary tradition through an illiterate age. The Egyptian stock of folk stories is certainly a very rich one; for the main amusement in Egypt, as all over the East, has always been listening to professional story-tellers. But these stories seem to be all importations. They have been analysed by Yakub Artin Pasha (*Contes populaires inédites du Nil*) into four groups: The Turco-Persian, which are picturesque and poetic, peopled with djinns, fairies, fair ladies, and handsome princes. The Græco-European, which have a Byzantine setting, or are animal fables. The Arabo-Berber, mostly with a religious motif and with the familiar scenery of Bagdad. Finally, negro tales of black magic and "ghouls." Of later literary sources the *Thousand and One Nights* and similar collections are much in evidence.

But Yakub Artin also claims that one class of tale is typically Egyptian, a class which he distinguishes as such by three characteristics; that they are picaresque, feminist, and pantheist. In this class he includes borrowed themes that have been worked over to suit the local taste. And this class of tale is certainly interesting to students of the Egyptian national character as suggesting that it is even more curiously feminine than that of other peoples long ruled by an alien authority. Moreover, the details of these Egyptian stories give us some interesting sidelights on the national mind; while in their general point of view we find very useful clues to the reactions of Egypt in respect of her successive alien masters, whether Greeks, Romans, Arabs, Mamelukes, Turks, Arnauts, or British.

As an example of an illuminating detail, we may note that in these Egyptian stories the "Black Man" or bogieman—the "Arap" of Oriental fiction—becomes a man in a black coat, black hat, and black boots. For the negro was a familiar and a friendly figure in Egypt, and so the "Black Man" was converted into the unfamiliar and formidable foreigner. While as an example of point of view, we may observe that the Turk generally appears in one of two rôles, respectively characteristic of the contempt of an Egyptian Cleopatra for the stupidity of her lord and master, and of her respect for his strength. Innumerable are the stories in which the Turk is deceived by the cleverness of an unscrupulous Egyptian mistress, but these are mostly too long and too broad for reproduction. Here is one in which the feminine part is played by a man.

A Copt who was clerk to a Turkish Pasha accounted for money he had stolen by charging it—to shoeing camels and shearing horses. "What is this?" said the Pasha. "Who shoes camels and shears horses?" "Oh, Pasha," said the Copt, "thou knowest all, and nothing escapes thee. Shall I, then, write it as to shoeing horses and shearing camels?" "But no camels have been shorn nor horses shod," objected the Pasha. "Oh, Pasha, thou art always in the right," said the Copt, "and that is why thy servant so wrote it in the account." Which satisfied the Pasha, who settled the account.

Now for another tale expressive of a feminine admiration for men of action.

Allah, looking one day on the Garden of Eden, saw that Adam and Eve had sinned. So he summoned an angel, and said to him: "Go thou and show clearly to these twain how they have sinned, and why, therefore, they must go out from My garden." So the angel went

and found Adam and Eve sleeping, and he showed them fully how they had sinned and why they must go. "Allah is just," said Adam. "We will go," said Eve, "as soon as the day dawns." After many days Allah looked again and saw Adam and Eve still in the garden. So he summoned the Archangel Gabriel, and said to him: "Go thou, gird on thy sword, and show them all the power of Allah that they may go." So Gabriel went and found them eating, and he showed them all the power of Allah to make them go. "Allah is great," said Adam. "We go," said Eve, "as soon as the meal is over." Long after Allah looked again, and they were there still. So he sent for Shaitan, and said to him: "Adam and Eve are delivered into thy hand. Thou hast power to take them out of My garden wherever and whenever thou wilt." So Shaitan went and found them walking. And he showed them how he had command from Allah to take them from Eden into Jehannum. "Allah has spoken," said Adam. "Oh, Shaitan, fly on and we follow," said Eve. And Allah looked again, and they were still there. So he sent a Turkish Chaoush, who found them bathing, and said: "*Git.*" And they went just as they were.

This story-telling still goes on, though the settings of the stories are modernised and Western themes introduced. And it is to this village habit of gathering to listen to anyone who will hold forth that may be attributed the sudden growth of the power of the Press. Unhappily the gathering now, as often as not, listens to the reading aloud of a leading article in which the British Lion takes the place of the "ghoul" and Sa'ad the Blessed that of the hero. But the identification of Egypt, with its favourite heroine—the designing minx—holds good. And in the story of Modern Egypt, as told in the follow-

ing pages, much that is puzzling will become plain if we read it as the story of a captive Cleopatra and of a conquering Antony or Cæsar.

The first difficulty in telling this story is to know where to begin. For a conscious Egypt appears for the first time in the movement or mutiny under Arabi in 1882. But the national character even of this movement is violently contested by nearly all contemporary authorities. Probably there would be no general agreement as to the existence of an Egyptian nation before the Great War. Yet it is obvious that there had been an independent Egyptian State for over a century before that. How was it that Egypt, which was the first of the Eastern border-lands to emerge from the Islamic State, was apparently the last to acquire a national consciousness? That the Turks have only just arrived at national independence is explained by their having been involved as a ruling race in maintaining the imperial and international institutions of the Ottoman Empire. That the Arabs have not yet achieved a national State is explained by their devotion to tribal and traditional systems, and by their being still divided between the European eclecticism of Irak and the Eastern exclusiveness of Nejd. The Berbers of North Africa are divided between French, Spanish, and Italian States. The peoples of Syria are racially, regionally, and religiously divided among themselves. But the Egyptians were united a century ago in a prosperous and powerful State that defeated and nearly destroyed both the reformed Ottoman Empire, the resurgent Greek nation, and the Arab renaissance of the Wahabis. How is it that Egypt could not only develop its own independence, but delay the national development of its neighbours for two generations before there were any Egyptians?

The explanation that will be advanced in the following pages is that a mass-mind and mass-movements did exist in Egypt from its first emergence as a State over a century ago ; that this mind and these movements were always obscurely operating thereafter, and did eventually create the modern nation as we now see it ; but that, owing to peculiarities in the people of Egypt and in its position, these operations were subconscious ; and that the development of a national consciousness was the last, instead of, as usual, the first phase of national development. Thus, during all the earlier part of its passage into our political system, we can only calculate the position of this new comet by noting how it affects the courses of those known spheres into whose orbit it enters.

The story of Modern Egypt must therefore begin from the Napoleonic wars, and not from the Great War. And it will have to indicate the nature of the new nation indirectly through its effects on the personalities and Powers with which it comes in contact. It must show how, from Napoleon and Mehemet Ali down to Cromer and Allenby, the power of foreign rulers in Egypt has been partly personal and partly popular. And how they succeeded only in so far as they conformed to an Egyptian public opinion that was often entirely overlooked and never enough understood. Wherefore the modern method of writing history, which is to ignore personalities and policies, to illustrate developments from the lives of the common people, and to explain it by economic factors and moral forces is inapplicable to Egypt. For except that cotton has replaced corn, the economics of Egypt are very much as they were in the days of Pharaoh and his foreign financial adviser Joseph. Its implements and industries are nearly all the same—the plough, the hoe, the shadouf. Until a very few years

ago the Egyptian peasantry—nine-tenths of the people—lived much the same lives as they did under the Pharaohs. Yet the status of the people and the story of the nation was, all through the last century, changing rapidly in all manner of vicissitudes. The story of Modern Egypt must therefore be told in the old manner, mainly through the careers of its rulers and the political events of the day. In a word, it is in talking about Kings, and not about cabbages, that an author must tell the real story of Modern Egypt.

But the picturesque characters and careers of these "kings" of Egypt must not be allowed to obscure those cross-currents of Egyptian nationalism and of European Imperialism on which they were floated to fortune or drifted to destruction. So when we read how Mehemet Ali made Egypt, we must also be reminded how Egypt made Mehemet Ali. When we review with pride how Cromer rehabilitated Egypt, we must also realise that this was very largely the natural convalescence of a laborious people from an imported disorder. When we realise how Kitchener could control Egypt because he had conquered the Sudan, we must remember that this was because Egypt knew that the reconquest had been done by Egyptians. When we rejoice with even more pride that Allenby prevented a war of independence against our protectorate, such as those which have disgraced other European Powers in Morocco, Tripoli, and Syria, we must recollect that the Egyptian is not like a Riffi, a Senussi, or a Druse; and that, nevertheless, we, too, have had our troubles. In short, we must bear in mind that in this story of Georgian, Arnaut and British rule in Egypt, it is Egypt that is really counting all the time. It will, indeed, be rather like writing the life of a public man with a clever wife. While she helps him he

flourishes, and as soon as she doesn't he falls, but it is not easy to show how this happened. Moreover, the people of Egypt have been, on the whole, so inarticulate and inactive, and their rulers so highly coloured and clear-cut that it will be hard to keep these supermen in their proper place as sub-titles. It is not easy to exhibit a Mehemet Ali or a Kitchener as only the manifestation of a mood in those masses of blue-clad, brown-skinned *fellaheen*.

Then we come to the second difficulty in telling the story of Modern Egypt—that is, the very tortuous track along which the new nation has reached its goal. New nations generally have to fight their way to independence. It has often been a long fight with heavy loss. But the line followed has been fairly straight and progress, though fluctuating, fairly steady. But in the case of Egypt, the first fight for national independence was fought by Napoleon when he broke up the Mamelukes and broke Egypt off from the Islamic State in order to get a base for a new European Empire of the East. The next fight was when Mehemet Ali drove out both French and English so as to get a base for a new Asiatic Empire of the East. Neither of these was a direct or even an easily discernible advance towards an Egyptian nation. The third fight was the military rebellion of Arabi that, whatever its intentions, ended by making Egypt a part of the British Empire. The fourth fight was that of the Great War that established a formal British Protectorate, and thereby, even more paradoxically, brought about the birth of an Egyptian nation. There is in all this, with the exception of the lamentable catastrophe of Tel-el-Kebir, not one straight fight for independence. And the final rebellion by which the goal was won was a mere *mêlée* of mobs and murders. There is no material in this from which an author can create a national epic.

Yet Egypt, if it gives no theme for an epic, certainly gives a thesis for a study of a very curious national development. For the national spirit of Egypt has revealed itself in a strange succession of avatars. Still more strangely these embodiments have for a century become ever younger and less mature. Thus its first exponent, when Egyptian nationalism itself was still an embryo, was Mehemet Ali, an old warrior who combined the ideas of Peter the Great with those of Pharaoh. Not even with the help of Jeremy Bentham could Mehemet Ali make a national renaissance that would survive himself. Next came middle-aged reformers like Sherif and Arabi, who tried to combine the ideas of Contism with the Koran, and also failed. Thereafter followed the young men, Abbas Hilmi and Mustapha Kamil, who tried to combine the methods of Abdul Hamid with those of O'Connell, and also broke apart and broke down. Finally, came schoolboys and students who had no idea other than that of pushing out the British and of putting in their schoolmaster Zaglul, in which simple task they succeeded.

In all these phases we English had a leading part. Palmerston and Napier put a stop to the ambitions of Mehemet Ali. Gladstone and Wolseley put a stop to the constitution of Sherif and to the conscription of Arabi. Cromer and Kitchener put a stop to the conspiracies of Abbas Hilmi and of Mustapha Kamil. Wherefore Egyptian nationalism bears us a formidable grudge. It should be grateful. We only postponed the birth of an Egyptian nation until the proper time. Until not Turks and Arnauts, not a *Turcophil effendina* or a *Gallophil effendiat*, but the first true-bred young Egyptians could establish for themselves the new nation.

Thereafter we come to the last and worst difficulty in

writing an account of Modern Egypt. The subject has hitherto almost always been approached from the angle of the British occupation. Some of the most interesting and important works, such as those of Milner, Cromer, Colvin, and other proconsuls or their partisans, have been written not only from that angle, but on the assumption that Modern Egypt has been made by the British. Again other works are an inverted form of these Anglo-Saxon attitudes, and argue that the British ruling class have spoiled the Egyptians as ruthlessly as did the Mamelukes. Such is the attitude adopted by a few English authors like Mr. Wilfred Blunt, by a majority of French and foreign writers, and by most native authors. In either case, much more attention is paid to the English, to what they have or have not done, to their difficulties, and to their disinterested or diplomatic motives, than to the Egyptian nation itself.

Now, although we are naturally most attracted by this aspect of Egyptian affairs, yet it is none the less superficial. The general course of developments in Egypt would not have been so very different in its broad lines if the British Empire had never existed. In an earlier phase it made little difference whether rule over Egypt was, for the moment, in the hands of a Circassian like Ibrahim or of an Albanian like Mehemet Ali. And in a later phase it would have made no very great difference to the course of history in Egypt if, instead of a Cromer and a Kitchener, there had been a de Blignières or a Lyautey. If this be doubted we have only to compare the course of events in Egypt with that in other North African countries. For Egypt is only a sector of the long front between the European and Eastern political systems; and the rise of the Egyptian nation takes its proper place geographically and historically in the long

political process by which the European system of racial and regional national States has, race by race and region by region, encroached on the Eastern system of the religious Super-State.

It is indeed curious to note how closely the course of events coincides in each of these contiguous countries from the end of the eighteenth century, when the expanding European system first began to invade the declining Islamic State. Take, for example, the close parallel between the early history of the Egyptian and of the Turkish nations. We see Mehemet Ali, an Albanian Turk, breaking up the Asiatic *ancien régime* of the Mamelukes and Janissaries at the same time that Mahmoud II., another Europeanised Turk, was breaking up that of the Phanariotes and Janissaries. Both these despots forced Western fashions and Western forms on their reluctant subjects. Both started European financial, military, and educational systems that were not sustained by their successors. Both were followed by a short reaction, which was itself followed by a "golden age," in which their successors squandered the millions of credit acquired by Europeanisation. In both countries spendthrift autocrats—Abdul Medjid and Abdul Aziz in Turkey, Said and Ismail in Egypt—first pawned the independence of their State to European moneylenders, and then vainly endeavoured to restore their authority and their credit by conceding constitutional liberties. In both cases a measure of foreign occupation was the result; but in Turkey this was restricted to a financial control by the cleverness of Abdul Hamid and by the competition between the Powers. Whereas in Egypt the British Empire eventually bought out its rivals.

- This parallel might be a coincidence if it were not that we find the same course of events in other regions where

industrialised Europe and islamised Asia came into contact. Thus in Tunis it is the extravagance of the Beys Ahmed (1837-1855) and Saddok (1859-1882) that ended in a European protectorate. In between came Mahomed, who granted a constitution which, however, did not save the State from foreign financial control (1869). In 1878, at the Congress of Berlin, Great Britain, for diplomatic reasons, retired from competition with France in Tunis; and a French protectorate was declared over Tunis (1881) at about the same time that the British established a *de facto* protectorate in Egypt (1882).

Morocco travelled the same road, but a little later. The Sultan Muley Hassan (1873-1894) profited by his predecessor's experiences, and was well aware of the danger. He so established the authority of the Maghzen and so excluded European penetration, that Morocco remained an outpost of Asia half a century after Turkey and Egypt had been Europeanised. But the inevitable end only came all the more swiftly when his successor, Abdul Aziz, began borrowing. Thereafter the process of establishing Spanish and French protectorates went rapidly forward, and has recently been completed by the surrender of the Riff after a siege of five years by the armies of two European Powers. So that after studying the stories of these various neighbours of Egypt we cannot but conclude that our own part in it has been one that, had we not been there, would have been played by someone else in much the same way with much the same results. But not in quite such a gentlemanly way, nor with quite such good results. Tel-el-Kebir was a murderous business, but it was a fair fight, and nothing like the massacres that went with the establishment of foreign rule in Tripoli and Algeria. The bombardment of

Alexandria was a small matter compared with that of Damascus, and our coercion of Egyptian nationalists a very insignificant affair beside the campaigns against Riff and Druses. While our recognitions of Egyptian rights of late years have been generous gestures.

This book will, indeed, have served its purpose if it convince any Egyptian who happens to read it that he owes a double debt to the English, not only for many years' economic and efficient administration during the nation's minority, but also for sparing Egypt the many years of fighting for independence that it would have had to face had it been included in the military empires with which Mediterranean Powers have expanded over North Africa and Syria. It will have served a no less useful purpose if it convinces any Englishman who reads it that he owes a debt to Egypt not only for services to the Empire and to Europe in constructing the Suez Canal, suppressing the Slave Trade, and supporting us in the Great War, but also because of England's mistakes in unnecessarily crushing the nationalist movement in its infancy, and in unjustifiably neglecting its education during a long and profitable trusteeship. But happily the relations between Egypt and the Empire are now on a sound basis. Resolution of the difficulties that still remain only requires that there should be Governments on either side capable of expressing the mutual generosity and good will of two peaceable peoples, and that on our side more especially we should have Empire builders who can—

“ Build within the mind of man
The Empire that abides.”

CHAPTER I

THE BIRTH OF MODERN EGYPT

NAPOLEON — MEHEMET ALI — PALMERSTON

“And the Egyptians will I give over into the hand of a cruel lord; and a fierce king shall rule over them, saith the Lord, the Lord of Hosts.”—ISA. xix. 4.

MODERN Egypt as a nation dates only from the Great War. But Modern Egypt as a self-governing State derives from the Great War of a century ago. Therefore the adventures of our Cleopatra with her Turkish Antony and with her British Cæsar begin in that springtime of present-day politics, when the hot blast of the French Revolution broke up the ice-bound political systems of the eighteenth century. For those Hounds of Spring, the Napoleonic armies, brought a rain of new ideas and new institutions on the parched provinces of the Ottoman Empire, then still occupying Eastern Europe and North Africa. Under this fertilising shower new nations began to spring up and armed men to assemble where before there had been only the silence of the desert and valleys of dry bones. And it is a striking tribute to the undying charm of our heroine that it was none other than Napoleon himself who first came a-wooing.

Since the ancient Pharaonic civilisation fell into a decline and died, Egypt had been governed by alien conquerors. And, after the Arab conquest, this alien rule had been exercised by that very interesting institution, the slave soldiery of the Mamelukes. A *mamluk* was originally a male white slave, and this institution of what

was at first a servile militia, then a military caste, and finally a ruling class, was introduced by the Saracens when at the height of their power under Saladin, and was afterwards imitated by the Turks in their Janissaries. Slavery had indeed been from the earliest days of Islam the short cut to power, and Saladin himself, like many of the early Sultans, began life as a slave. But in Egypt we find one of the most extraordinary examples of a body of alien slave-guards becoming a governing aristocracy simply through not assimilating or even associating with the native population. Already in 1250 the Mamelukes were strong enough to murder the Fatimite Sultan, and nominate future Sultans from among their own chiefs.

That the Mamelukes were able to maintain their alien authority over Egypt for no less than five centuries was due to their regularly recruiting their ranks from the pick of emancipated slaves belonging to the white races of the Caucasus, than which there are no finer types in the world. The majority were Georgians, and "Gorz," the Egyptian word for their régime, is clearly a corruption of "Grouz," their name in their own language. They married invariably women of their own race, but this would not alone have saved their type and tyranny without fresh blood. For their families, like those of all other Aryan races in Egypt, degenerated and died out in the second or third generation. Thus, though they acquired a semi-feudal, semi-fiscal hold on the land, they never became a hereditary class, while their alien authority and their association with the no less alien Turks fused in a common subjection the Egyptian Arabs, Nubians, and even Copts, in spite of differences of race and religion.

Taxation of the fertile soil of Egypt and of the submissive *fellaheen*, supplemented by toll-takings from the transit trade between Europe and Asia, produced enough

to maintain the Mamelukes in sufficient strength to defend their power until the Turks established themselves in command of the Straits and of an East-European and West-Asiatic Empire. The last Mameluke Sultan was hanged by Selim the Cruel in 1517. But the Ottoman Sultans only took over the prestige and position of the Mamelukes in the East, and did not destroy their political power in Egypt. They merely subordinated that power to their own Ottoman Pasha, and supplemented the Mameluke cavaliers with their own slave infantry, the Janissaries. The Chief of the Mamelukes as Bey of Cairo soon rivalled the Pasha, and the Divan of Egypt was composed of the Mameluke Beys of the twenty-four provinces and of the commanders of the seven corps of Janissaries. And as the Ottoman power declined, the Mamelukes reduced the authority of the Pasha of Egypt to much the same insignificance as that to which the British later reduced the Khedive. The Mameluke procedure with an unsatisfactory Pasha was even more summary than ours. An emissary robed ominously in black appeared before the Pasha and pronounced the one word, *enzel* (get out). And whither the Pasha then went depended on how long he took in starting. Moreover, the Janissaries, not being so carefully recruited and segregated, did not keep their moral vigour and military value as did the Mamelukes.

The Mamelukes represented an alien authority and administration that it is interesting to compare with our own. That their rule lasted five centuries and ours only five decades is due to their having found how to maintain not merely a garrison and a government, but a whole ruling class and landed gentry in a country where white stock cannot take root. The contribution of the Mamelukes to Egypt was artistic, while ours has been

scientific. And who shall say that our Nile dams and land banks and agricultural experts are of greater value than their palaces and mosques and artistic traditions? Our cotton has brought foreign trade to Egypt, but it is their culture that has brought the tourist traffic. Yet there is no doubt but that they cost the native Egyptian far more than we did. They took in taxation practically the whole produce of the soil beyond the barest livelihood of the *fellaheen*. Their tolls on the transit trade, equivalent to the original cost of the goods, prevented any competition with the sea route round the Cape. Their struggle with the Turks for the right to exploit Egypt caused perpetual disturbance, while their acceptance of Islam cut the country off from participation in European progress.

It looked at one time as though this Mameluke system of white slave rule over Asiatic and African races might win the world for the Eastern Islamic State, much as our system of commercial colonisation has subsequently won it for European industrial civilisation. At the time of their overthrow by the Turks a Mameluke fleet was disputing the future Empire of India with the Portuguese, and late in the eighteenth century the Mamelukes under Ali looked like becoming the successors of the Turks in the Ottoman Empire. But thereafter their day was over. The war-slave was succeeded by the wage-slave in the empire of the world, and India was ruled by the Griffin, not the Grouz; moreover, the military art of the Mamelukes became antiquated. Their armies were still made up of feudal contingents, commanded by a chief, and composed of lesser beys or barons, of Mamelukes or men-at-arms, and of swarms of foot soldiers and followers. Their military art was that of the Crusades, and their arms were copied or even captured from those of

Crusaders. Even in the days of pikes and firelocks the Mamelukes were magnificent, but no longer war. And we who still to-day maintain our costly cavalry regiments and still model our warfare on the Battle of Balaklava may have some fellow-feeling for the dashing and decorative Mamelukes charging against Napoleon.

The Mamelukes were undoubtedly the most expensive and least efficient of the many foreign rulers that have reigned in Egypt. Everyone of the twelve to fifteen thousand Mameluke cavaliers cost at an estimate and on an average about a thousand a year. Their invasion of Syria under Ali Bey in 1769 cost Egypt about twenty-six millions sterling. Ali Bey's dagger handle was valued at two hundred thousand pounds. The population of Egypt was then between two and three millions, and it is clear that the whole wealth they won from the mud of Egypt was absorbed by those gorgeous dragon-flies, the Mameluke Multezim or manorial lords. Moreover, the arrogance and ignorance of these gentry were proof against any pacific pressure from the eastward march of industrial civilisation. Owing to their extortions, Egypt had ceased to be a trade route between Asia and Europe, and Alexandria had sunk to a fishing town of eight thousand inhabitants. Yet they would accept no alien assistance. They stopped the British attempt to reopen the overland route between the Mediterranean and Red Sea, and expelled the French colony, which was keeping the local commerce going (1779).

France had long had a watchful eye on the opportunities offered by the overland route in the contest between French and British for Indian empire. The German Leibnitz had urged the occupation of Egypt on Louis XIV. with a view to diverting him from expansion on the Rhine (*Die Werke von Leibnitz*, vol. ii.). Volney

a century later had pointed out that a French Egypt would restore the French Empire in India, and that Mameluke military power was a myth. It was inevitable, therefore, that the world war between the French Revolution and the *Anciens Régimes* should sooner or later be fought out in this ante-room to the throne of Asia.

The object of Napoleon's Egyptian Expedition (1798) was professedly to attack the British Empire. It was described by Napoleon to the Directory as "the left wing of the invasion of England." But his real purpose was to use Egypt as a battlefield from which he might rebound to an empire of the West, or failing that, as a base on which to build an empire of the East. His political prospects in Paris were at this time dubious. The Directory for their part were only too pleased to let him use the resources of France on a remote adventure that would rid the Republic of the inconvenient victor of Italy and of his uncompliant veterans. Certainly the equipment of his expedition, which included one hundred and twenty-two experts and egyptologists, suggests an empire-building enterprise rather than a mere military excursus. "L'expédition assure la destruction de la Puissance Britannique dans l'Inde," wrote Talleyrand to the Directory (July 10, 1798). But Talleyrand was probably more concerned with getting rid of Napoleon than with subverting the British Raj. And though Napoleon entered into correspondence with Tippoo Sahib and the Marattas, who were still fighting us, it is hard to see how throwing a French force into Egypt without command of the sea could drive us from India. Our communications went round by the Cape, and our command of the Mediterranean cut all but casual communications between France and Egypt. Indeed, the French expedition itself only escaped the thirteen British seventy-

fours because the Admiralty had allowed Nelson only one frigate. As it was, the British fleet missed the French flotilla by a few hours only off Malta, again off Crete, and again off Alexandria, and did capture the vessel containing all the apparatus of the hundred and twenty-two egyptologists, a calamity which, though ominous, was not overwhelming. But if there be any of us who doubts the difference between British sea-power with and without a Nelson, we have but to compare what happened after the British fleet had let the French slip through their fingers into Cairo with what happened a century later after they had let the Germans slip through their fingers into Constantinople. For Nelson was not the man to let a second chance slip. The French fleet was at once pursued to its moorings in Aboukir Bay off Alexandria and destroyed there (August 1, 1798).

Napoleon, thus left "in the air," lost no time, and found little trouble in the military occupation of Egypt. The French army of forty thousand veterans marched on Cairo across the desert in hollow square, with the hundred and twenty-two missionaries of modern civilisation safe in the middle, while the gorgeous magnates of medieval Islam caracoled on the horizon in scornful observation. At last one, confident that the age of chivalry still lived, rode in full panoply of damascened armour and embroidered silk to within a few yards of the marching troops, and challenged their Colonel to single combat. But irritated with heat, hunger, and thirst, for the swarming Bedawin had cut them off from their commissariat boats, the French only replied with a volley that blew the champion of chivalry into blood-stained loot.

The ensuing Battle of the Pyramids, in which the Mamelukes tried to bar French entry into Cairo, was only

a repetition of this incident on a large scale. Ten thousand Mameluke horse, thousands of Janissary foot, and swarms of native levies were defeated and driven into the Nile to drown, at a cost to the French of about a hundred casualties. The Mameluke Beys not only charged home, but actually broke into the squares of Desaix and Reynier. Yet their desperate courage could only achieve their own more complete destruction. Thenceforward, as a military force, this Caucasian Free Company was no more important than the corps of Albanian bashi-bozouks, or the contingents of Turkish Janissaries. But as a political faction the Mamelukes remained predominant until broken by Mehemet Ali; while, as a landed gentry, their descendants lead a parliamentary party at the present day. Not that they now have any importance as a caste, for once their peculiar method of recruitment was ended degeneracy swiftly did its deadly work.

The French, having entered Cairo (July 27, 1798), Napoleon at once began establishing his embryo Empire in that ancient capital of the Khalif. Great efforts were made both to conciliate religious prejudice and to instil revolutionary principles. Napoleon's proclamations began with the consecrated Islamic forms, and copied the phraseology of Mahomedan rulers. The conversion to Islam of the whole French force and of Napoleon himself was propounded; and, as an instalment, Menou, his third in command, became a Mahomedan and bought a harem. The building of a mosque was begun, and in all formalities and festivities Mahomet and "Marianne" were given equal honours. The French, anticipating Russian revolutionaries of to-day, represented themselves as being the liberators of Egypt from the alien rule of Circassian Mamelukes and of Turkish pashas.

They claimed credit for having overthrown those old enemies of Islam, the Pope of Rome and the Knights of Malta. They also presented themselves as missionaries of European civilisation. The egyptologists and experts were set to work. An Institute of Egypt was founded on the model of the Institute of France. Plans for a canal across the isthmus were drawn up. The administration was reorganised, and the old Islamic fiscal system was soon functioning under French supervision with an efficiency that was more profitable than popular.

But pro-Islamic propaganda did not long prevent, and French fiscal efficiency very soon provoked, the inevitable revolt. Egyptian national consciousness as yet only existed in the negative form of antipathy to an unaccustomed foreign and infidel administration. A rising in Cairo (October 21, 1798) showed that the French had not conquered Egypt by crushing its oppressors. It was suppressed by Junot with such severity as to discourage further armed risings. "Every day I have five or six heads cut off in the streets of Cairo," wrote Napoleon to Menou (July 31, 1798). But it was the fiercest fight that the French had had to face. And in the siege of El Azhar, the university culture centre of Islam, the Egyptians lost as heavily as had the Mamelukes in the Battle of the Pyramids. Thus did "Egyptians" first appear, fighting for a national cause, in what has ever since been the citadel of their nationalism.

Egypt was thereafter subjugated, but Napoleon had still to deal with the British and Ottoman Empires. Though probably he could have dealt with either singly, together they proved too much for him. For British diplomacy, ever partial to coalitions and not over particular as to its allies, had little difficulty in rousing the Turks for the recovery of their most profitable province

(September, 1798). Napoleon, expecting only to have to deal with Turkey, at once invaded Syria (March, 1799) and marched on Constantinople. At Jaffa, the murder of a French flag-of-truce and the massacre in reprisals of many thousands of Turkish prisoners gave the campaign a ferocity that contributed to the eventual failure of the French. Jaffa was sacked, but had its revenge by infecting the French army with plague. Acre was next attacked, whence a Mameluke, Ahmed the Butcher, had long terrorised Syria. But at this point British sea-power intervened with the arrival of the squadron under Sydney Smith that had been blockading Alexandria. The "Butcher," at the end of his resources, was re-victualled and his garrison reinforced with French *émigré* officers, who organised the defence. A Turkish army simultaneously crossed the Jordan and threatened the French rear. Whereupon Napoleon, with the help of Kleber and Junot, destroyed the Turks at Mount Tabor, and shortly after carried the walls of Acre by storm (April, 1799).

But that was the nearest that Napoleon ever got to his Empire of the East. Acre saw its only escape from the fate of Jaffa in a desperate defence. Exhausted by street fighting, the French were again expelled. Decimated by the plague and threatened by another Turkish army, after a last and fourteenth assault the siege was abandoned. Napoleon was not only defeated but discredited. For, exasperated with the English, he ignored Sydney Smith's offer to evacuate the twelve thousand French wounded, and abandoned them to the Turks, who massacred them to a man. It was his generals, Lannes and Murat, who saved him by a brilliant victory of six thousand French over eighteen thousand Janissaries at Aboukir (July 14, 1799).

Napoleon himself, after a study of the French newspapers, which were diplomatically delivered to him by the English, decided to return to France, and sailed (August 22, 1799) with most of his lieutenants, leaving Kleber in command. But Egypt and the Empire of the East dominated his imagination until the end. He flattered his dream with Mameluke body-guards, Arab chargers, and Oriental intrigues, while the old campaigners of Egypt always had a sure claim on his favour.¹

Acre ended the Egyptian enterprise so far as concerned Europe. It would also have ended it in Egypt had not the British Government refused to ratify Sydney Smith's Convention of El Arish (January 24, 1800) providing for the repatriation of the French troops in Turkish ships. In consequence of this refusal, the French occupation took another lease of life. At Heliopolis (March 20, 1800) ten thousand French defeated eighty thousand Turks. Another rising in Cairo, after several weeks' siege, was suppressed with sack and slaughter. Egypt was in bitter revolt, and the tragedies of a century later were anticipated when Kleber, a hard-headed, heavy-handed soldier, was assassinated by an Azharite student. French authority and administration were eventually restored, and those egyptologists who had survived the riots indomitably resumed their cataloguing and collecting. Menou, the Mahomedan, succeeded to the command, and attempted a régime of conciliation and concessions. But it is unlikely that fat, clever little Menou, with his sham Orientalism, would have fared any better than did British Liberals a century later in similar flirtations.

¹ For subsequent dreams of Oriental conquest *v.* Vandal, *Napoléon et Alexandre I.*, vol i, Paris, 1891; Driault, *La pol. or. de Napoléon*, Paris, 1904; Roloff, *Die Orientalpolitik Napoléons I.*, Weimar, 1916.

There is indeed so curious a coincidence between the experiences of the French in this war epoch and of ourselves in the emergencies of the Great War that it is difficult not to believe that there was a nationalist spirit active in Egypt a century ago, even though it then found no definite nationalist expression.

The end of the French experiment came when an English expedition of sixteen thousand men under Abercrombie disembarked at Alexandria (March 8, 1801) and defeated Menou at the Battle of Canopus, at which Abercrombie was killed and Sir John Moore wounded. There followed a confused campaign and much complicated negotiation until the French at Cairo capitulated (June 27, 1801) and those under Menou at Alexandria two months later, on much the same terms as those of the unratified Convention of El Arish. The capitulation called for the surrender of the scientific catalogue and collections, but against this the egyptologists mutinied so stoutly that these trophies, at least, were saved for France. Egypt itself was restored to the Ottoman Empire, though the British troops were not withdrawn until a fresh outbreak of European war in 1803 made a breach with Turkey impolitic.

In this first chapter of the story of Modern Egypt we see the international importance of the country so recognised by the genius of Napoleon that his concentration on its conquest almost altered the course of European history. For had British sea-power not prevented Napoleon from re-establishing the Latin Empire of the East, European civilisation in the nineteenth century would have suffered neither the shock of the sudden rise of the French Empire nor the strain of the slow decline of the Ottoman Empire. "Had I taken Acre I should have reached Constantinople and there founded a dynasty,"

said Napoleon at St. Helena. Perhaps it was the worse for England, for Egypt, and for Europe that he was stopped.

It was not long before Napoleon's place was filled and his policy followed by another adventurer. Mehemet Ali is accepted by most historians as the founder of Modern Egypt. But he himself in character and career belongs rather to medieval Europe. Like his contemporaries, the founders of free nations in Servia and Greece, he secured for the future Egyptian nation the first foundation of national sovereignty—administrative separation from the Ottoman Empire. But, unlike them, he was not himself a national of the new nation, and his policy was as personal and as predatory as that of Napoleon. For, like Napoleon, he aimed at making Egypt a stepping-stone to the Empire of the East. Cairo had been the capital of the Khalifate until Selim transferred it to Constantinople. There was no political or geographical reason why Cairo, commanding the land bridge between Asia and Africa and the sea communications between the British Empire and Asia, should not become the capital of the East instead of Constantinople on its land bridge between Europe and Asia and on the sea passage between the Russian Empire and Europe. But Mehemet Ali had not even that ideal for or interest in Egypt. And had he conquered Constantinople he would, like Napoleon, have centred his reformed empire there and not at Cairo.

Mehemet Ali failed, as did Napoleon, in reaching Constantinople, and for the same reason. The nearer he got to Constantinople the more he imperilled his position in Egypt, and the more he incurred opposition from England. But he came nearer to success than did Napoleon. For his armies reached the gates of Constantinople,

and his descendants reign to-day as independent kings in Cairo. His better success with a much worse start may be explained in the first place by his being a Mahomedan, not merely a Moslemophil; in the second place, by the Powers and the Porte being occupied during his advent with the final struggle against Napoleon; and in the third place, by his obtaining the support of the Egyptians themselves. His success in uniting all Egyptians behind him for the establishment of an Egypt independent of the Porte and of the Powers has been insufficiently appreciated in the historical accounts of his adventure. It was indeed his shady accomplishments as a demagogue rather than his more showy achievements as a despot that made him the founder of Modern Egypt. In other words, Egypt made Mehemet Ali quite as much as Mehemet Ali made Modern Egypt.

Like later reformers of the Ottoman Empire, Mehemet Ali was a Macedonian Mahomedan, the son of an Arnaut watchman, born at Kavalla in 1769. Brought up by the Turkish Pasha, he served the usual apprenticeship of Ottoman administrators. He did well for his patron as a tax-collector, and even better for himself as a tobacco trader. Sent to Syria with the first expedition against Napoleon, he attached himself to Khosrew Pasha, his future lifelong enemy, and intrigued himself into command of an Albanian contingent. These Albanians were the backbone of the Ottoman army, and the buttress of Turkish authority in Egypt; so any prominent commander became *ex-officio* a power in Egyptian politics.

The French were no sooner gone than the various political parties in Egypt began to struggle for power. These parties were the Mamelukes, the Albanians, and the Turks, with the British supporting and subsidising

the Mamelukes, the French favouring the Albanians. The Egyptians themselves only appear at this early epoch as occasionally acclaiming or attacking one or other faction.

The Mamelukes had lost their military prestige, but they still retained their pomp and panoply. They also had a political power based on their hold over the land and on their inheritance of political ability from that Georgian race to which their leaders mostly belonged. But their power as a separate party was doomed, for the "Gorz" was detested by all Egyptians. And it was characteristic of British diplomacy that it should have selected this moribund aristocracy for its ally. The British candidate for Pasha of Egypt was the most gorgeous and most greedy of the Mameluke Beys, one Elfi. Diabasti (*Chroniques*, vol. viii.) tells us that this personage was distinguished for taking about with him a portable kiosk when he travelled; also for having put up a splendid palace in Cairo only to pull it down and then to put it up again. His Mamelukian magnificence had much impressed London, where a company was floated to finance his fortunes in Egypt, which funds were, however, intercepted by that Bolshevik, Mehemet Ali, and invested by him in attaching the Albanians to himself and in detaching them from Khosrew, the Pasha of Egypt, whom he deported (May, 1803). At the same time he had his friend and only possible rival, Tahir, murdered by his Albanian officers.

It would not be worth while to unravel in detail the intricate intrigues by which Mehemet Ali made himself sole ruler of Egypt. The main masterstrokes by which he overthrew his principal opponents are perhaps worth noting. He had got sole command of the only reliable military force, the Albanians, but had no control over the

only recognisable political party, that of the Mamelukes. So he forced the Mameluke leader, Bardissi, to raise taxes to pay the Albanians, until Cairo rose in riot. He then appeased the riot by forcing Bardissi to remit the taxes. Having thus become a popular hero, he expelled Bardissi and his Mamelukes and took their place. When the Turks, alarmed at his aggrandisement, ordered him and his Albanians out of Egypt, he raised another riot, and forced the new Pasha, Kurshid, to withdraw the order. Kurshid then, having got him out of Cairo on a campaign against the provincial Mamelukes, took the opportunity to occupy the capital behind his back with a Kurdish contingent. These wild men, however, with their birdlike faces and their beastly manners, soon made Cairo sincerely regret their old tyrants, the Albanians. A deputation brought back Mehemet Ali, and demanded the deposition of Kurshid. Mehemet Ali was elected Pasha, and besieged Kurshid in the Cairo citadel. Kurshid was recalled, and Mehemet Ali occupied the citadel (August, 1805), and was confirmed as Pasha of Egypt with general applause (November, 1805). Applause became even more hearty approval when his first measure was to solve the financial problems of the State by plundering the Copts, who had grown wealthy as the tax-collectors for and moneylenders to the Mamelukes and Turks.

But in the Ottoman Empire it was a good deal easier for an obscure tobacco trader to become ruler of a province in six years than for that ruler to keep his position for six months. The Capoudan Pasha appeared at Alexandria with an Ottoman fleet and an imperial firman transferring Mehemet Ali to Salonica. Whereupon both Alexandria and Cairo declared so demonstratively for Mehemet Ali that the Pasha was glad to take instead a

bribe of four thousand purses, which was the greater part of the private fortune of one Georges Gohari, a Coptic financier and tax farmer expropriated by Mehemet Ali. So Constantinople, which had little concern with Cairo beyond getting a share in the plunder of Egypt, decided that more money seemed likely to come through Mehemet Ali than through the Mamelukes.

A working arrangement thus established with the Turks, Mehemet Ali started to rid Egypt of the British. They were still subsidising the Mameluke chiefs, Bardissi and Elfi, who were campaigning respectively in Upper Egypt and the Delta. Both these chieftains now died of "indigestion" summarily and simultaneously, and the British were left to fight their own battles. A *coup de main* against Constantinople having failed, Rear Admiral Louis appeared off Alexandria with a small force of four thousand men under General Frazer (March 17, 1807). But by then the Mamelukes in the Delta had been dispersed and those in Upper Egypt driven up the Nile to Assiout. None the less, the British disembarked and occupied Rosetta, where their garrison was soon afterwards forced to capitulate, while their force in the field was defeated by Mehemet Ali with the loss of half its number. Five hundred British soldiers were marched as prisoners into Cairo slave market between the heads of as many of their dead comrades set up on poles. The British evacuated Alexandria (September 14, 1807) and made a separate peace with Egypt. Mehemet Ali, who had helped the British to humiliate the French in 1801, had now, without help, inflicted an even greater humiliation upon the British. The Pasha of Egypt became thereby the champion of Islam, who had vanquished the foreign victors of Turks and Mamelukes. But, thanks to sea-power, this reverse had little reaction on the

European situation, as little news of it got through the blockade. Thus Driault notes that all French consular reports from Egypt between April and October, 1807, are missing. No doubt they are somewhere in Whitehall.

Mehemet Ali had thus rid himself of all his enemies, but he was ever one to "mak' siccer." The Mamelukes had been finally driven out of Upper Egypt by 1810; but, having shortly afterwards to undertake an expedition into Arabia, Mehemet Ali decided to destroy them not only as a force, but as a faction. The four hundred principal Beys were accordingly invited to attend the ceremonious departure of the Arabian expedition (February, 1811). The aged Mameluke chief Ibrahim was too wary to leave his fastness at Beni Suef, and, like the fox in the fable, he sent a reply enumerating those whose footsteps had led into the lions' cave. But the young successor of Elfi, Shahin, was tempted by a prospect of a return to the delights of Cairo. So he, with his splendid retinue and four hundred other Beys, were received by Mehemet Ali in the Cairo citadel with coffee and polite conversation. In the procession that followed, the Mamelukes rode between Albanians and Turks; and, in a hollow lane under the citadel whence there was no escape, these troops opened fire on the Mamelukes. Some of the bolder threw off their robes and jewels and died fighting, some met their fate with dignity in the posture of prayer, but not one escaped. A thousand more were killed in Cairo and in the provinces, and their palaces were plundered. The East has, indeed, a short and sharp way of dealing with ruling classes that are no longer functional. "This is indeed a proud day for your Highness," said his Genoese doctor to Mehemet Ali, who was waiting for news in a back room of the citadel. Mehemet

Ali asked for a glass of water, but said nothing. He was never a man of words.¹

French, British, Turks, and Mamelukes had thus all been cleared out of Egypt, and there remained only one alien authority there—Mehemet Ali's own Albanians. And we shall see how these in their turn were got rid of as soon as he was able to supply their place with native Egyptian and Sudanese regiments. Not the least service of Mehemet Ali to Egypt is that he rid it so swiftly and so cheaply of other foreign adventurers who had fastened on it. But though these foreigners no longer existed as distinct castes, though the Turkish Pasha, the Georgian Mameluke, the Circassian bravo, and the Albanian bashi-bozouk were no longer rival ruling classes, the remnants of them remained and coalesced into a new ruling class. Hereafter, in Egyptian politics, we find the country being ruled by an Oriental autocrat, helped or hindered by an Oriental aristocracy that we call for convenience "Turks," recruited from a middle-class of Armenians, Jews, and Copts. It will be found to be a good guide to the character of later Egyptian statesmen if we can find to which of these races each one belongs—remembering that Georgians are generally called Circassians, though they are their opposite in character and capacity.

Mehemet Ali is generally credited with having Europeanised Egypt. He certainly exploited European experience, in so far as he could understand it, to strengthen his position. But he remained an Asiatic autocrat, and his system of government was Oriental, with

¹ For contemporary accounts, see Gabarti, *op. cit.*, vol. viii., and Galley Knight in Lane Poole's *Life of Stratford Canning*, vol. i., London, 1888. The story of a leap from the citadel wall, by a mounted Mameluke, is a legend.

very curious anticipations of what we now know as Bolshevism. The popular element in his government was the Asiatic form of franchise—namely, facilities for access and appeal to the autocrat. Thus he learnt to read and speak Arabic late in life so as to have direct contact with petitioners. “The only books I ever read,” said he, “are men’s faces, and they never mislead me.” He spoke Turkish, the language of the ruling class, and retained the typical virtues and vices of that Albanian race that has supplied so many statesmen to Europe. In his prejudices he was a Turk, and he detested the Arabs as a race as much as he despised the Copts for their religion.

The “Constitution” that he introduced in 1826 was only the old “Divan” reorganised as a Council of State, Privy Council, and Cabinet of Ministers. The ancient Provinces, reduced to twelve, became Governments. But the Mudir and the Meemur never really assimilated their new French titles of Governor and Prefect. The working officials were, as before, the harmless, necessary Copts. The Government itself remained as it had always been, mainly fiscal and judicial. The fiscal system was administered as before, with the *kurbash*, tempered by *baksheesh*. One of the greatest benefits of the new régime was the substitution of one Mehemet Ali for twenty thousand Mamelukes.

But if political institutions remained much the same, there were interesting innovations in economics. Aided by the ancient Islamic system that makes no clear distinction between private and public property, between the share of profit due to the producer and that due to the State, Mehemet Ali made himself the sole titular landlord, the sole tax farmer, and the sole foreign trader of Egypt. All the produce and property of the country was centralised in and controlled by the State. And this

economic revolution, which has only of late been paralleled in Communist Russia, was effected under the authority of the strictest interpretation of Islamic Law. Not that Mehemet Ali allowed Islamic principle to hamper his secular purpose. For example, he ousted the Ulema, the clergy, from administration of the Wakf, the Charitable Trusts, which thereafter became practically the private property of the dynasty. Private property in land, on the other hand, was attacked in principle, but was less affected in practice. The immense Mameluke estates were, of course, confiscated ; but other landed proprietors had only to surrender their titles to the State and get in return a fixed tenure at a small fixed ground-rent. Village communal ownership was carefully preserved, and a new general Land Survey allotted the area to be attached to each village and to be allocated among its inhabitants by the Omdeh or Mayor.

State control of produce was as carefully organised. The choice of crop was prescribed, and the Omdeh collected the whole produce of the fellah and deducted the proportion equivalent to ground-rent taxes and cost of collection. So far there was no drastic departure from the fiscal system of the Islamic State ; but under Mehemet Ali the remaining produce was bought at a periodically fixed rate by the State from the producer. The State then resold it at a rather higher rate for home consumption, or at a still higher rate for exportation. These trading profits were intended to be used for further agricultural or industrial development, but were eventually mostly absorbed for military purposes. The peasant, secured in his tenure and in a share of the return, was better off than if he had had himself to market his produce and pay in money.

The difficulty in making this sort of State Socialism

work has always been in finding suitable men to run the new machinery. Mehemet Ali made little attempt to train his own Egyptians. For his foreign trading operations he went into partnerships with the trading consuls of Foreign Powers. This had the additional advantage of putting the local diplomatic representatives in his pocket. The Treaty of 1818 between the Powers and the Porte had freed trade in Egypt with the exception of small *ad valorem* duties. But, with the help of his consular partners, dodges were devised that enabled Mehemet Ali to drive his State monopolies between the lines of the Treaty.

But developing new industries is a more difficult matter than dodging international obligations. The model factories were, from the first, run at a loss, though this was not recognised at the time owing to the absence of any real accountancy. The more expensive enterprises were successively abandoned as war made money scarce. Yet in agriculture, the true industry of Egypt, permanent and important improvements were made. A French mechanic, employed to set up looms, suggested the planting of foreign cotton, of which the exportation by 1838 had reached sixty thousand balas. A Hindu introduced opium and indigo. Armenians spread the growing of hemp, hitherto only used as an intoxicant, but that Mehemet Ali required for his fleet. Wages in the lower ranks of labour quadrupled, while food prices only slightly increased. Certainly, prices of imported products rose swiftly; for example, coffee doubled and sugar was ten times dearer. But the aggregate wealth of the country increased rapidly. The land-tax, which in 1821 had brought in £650,000, was worth double ten years later. Customs receipts doubled, and trade profits rose from about £100,000 to over four times that amount in the

same period. The total revenue, which was less than £1,000,000 in 1821, doubled in the next ten years, and doubled again in the following five years.

Mehemet Ali's system of State monopolies developed some new forms of production, and did not at first discourage private enterprise. It was only when corruption crept in and when the cost of foreign war forced the State into excessive profiteering that the system began to break down. When the peasant's share in his produce was reduced to only one-sixth, when Ibrahim paid for this share, not in good money but in bad molasses from his sugar mills, and when false weights and frauds of every sort destroyed all confidence, then the *jellaheen* began to restrict production. This forced Mehemet Ali into conscripting labour on State farms—a logical solution that the Egyptians endured longer than would any European community. Nor was Mehemet Ali successful, even with the assistance of his foreign partners, in developing ambitious State trading schemes without occasional ruinous losses. For example, in 1816, he sold a million bushels of wheat at 3s. 6d. a bushel, but could not give delivery until the price had fallen to 1s. 6d., when the shippers refused it, and it was left to rot on the wharfs. But on the whole the system was profitable to the State and not oppressive to the peasant. And an incidental improvement due to this State trading was the Mahmoudiyeh Canal from the Nile to Alexandria to save the grain barges from going to Rosetta and thence by sea.

This State Socialism, that has even in our day found little foreign support when born of a popular revolution, got a good press in the Europe of a century ago as the work of an adventurous potentate. The official reports have a familiar ring: "When I arrived in 1826," writes

Consul Barker in 1831, "everyone was convinced that the Viceroy could not go on for six months longer, and that he was driving to ruin with mad projects out of all proportion to his means. Yet the projects deemed impracticable were not one-fifth so considerable as those since put in effect, nor one-tenth so gigantic as those now in contemplation. Since, therefore, we have witnessed the completion of some and the progress of other projects which seemed four years ago the dreams of a madman, it is fair to infer that we are unacquainted with the extent of his resources, and that these are adequate to his designs."

For foreign expert assistance Mehemet Ali relied chiefly on the French. Their empire in North Africa was as yet only a punitive expedition against Algiers. Whereas British sea-power lay ever in wait at the gates of Egypt, both at the front gate, Alexandria, and at the back gate, Suez. Moreover, the French maintained their scientific interest in Egypt, and were pre-eminent in the art of war. So Champollion, instead of his competitor Young, became the father of egyptology, while Colonel Sève, who as a sailor had fought us at Trafalgar, and as a soldier at Waterloo, now as Suleiman Pasha, organised the Egyptian army that nearly again sent us to war with the French.

An able Frenchman, Clot Bey, undertook an ambitious scheme of national education. According to contemporary reports, one might assume that, by 1830, the Egyptian educational system was little behind that of Western Europe. There was a Ministry of Education and an imposing mechanism of primary, secondary, and technical schools. The latter alone had, on paper at least, nine thousand pupils. But the value of the product of this machinery seems to have been doubtful. The

classes had to be filled by conscription with weeping youths torn from indignant parents, and what happened to them when they left school is not clear. Possibly, however, the swifter pace of political development in Egypt, as compared with that of other African provinces of the Ottoman Empire, may be in part attributed to these educational experiments of Mehemet Ali.

It was, however, by way of the army that this despotic revolution did its best service for the development of an Egyptian nation. Egypt had remained throughout the Middle Ages a mere province because the Egyptian never had fought, nor, in his own or anyone else's opinion, ever would fight. Yet the first essential for the establishment of the new régime was an army on the European model. This Mehemet Ali, at first, set about fashioning out of the most military material at hand, his own Albanians. But drilling Albanian bashi-bozouks proved a different matter from disciplining Coptic schoolboys. The attempt to form these mercenaries into regular troops ended as disastrously as did the first attempt of Mahmoud II. at enlisting Janissaries. Mehemet Ali only mastered the mutiny by cutting the dykes and flooding Cairo. Having dispersed the Albanians in country garrisons and decimated them in desert campaigns, he then tried again, after diluting them with survivors of the Mamelukes. From these some regular regiments were formed; but even the presence in the ranks of the Pasha's sons as privates did not prevent bullets from constantly whistling past the ears of the French drill sergeants. As a possible substitute Sudanese were swept up in thousands by Ibrahim and shut up in barracks, whereupon they simply died like caged wild animals. Of twenty thousand, only three thousand found life in the army worth living. Then only did Mehemet

Ali turn as a last resort to the native Egyptian. The poorer villagers, or those offensive to the Omdeh, were marched into barracks in chain-gangs. Many died of the experience, but the stouter hearted made excellent infantry. When finally six smart regiments of Egyptian regulars with French officers marched one day into Cairo, the Albanian chiefs saw their day was ended, and abandoned Egypt for pastures new.

By 1823 Mehemet Ali had twenty thousand regulars, and by 1826 ninety thousand. The artillery train and staff were brought by the French up to European standard. With French help Egypt got a fleet, first on the Red Sea and then on the Mediterranean, and the vessels, in looks at least, formed a navy worthy of a second-class Power. The first fleet, that which was destroyed at Navarino, was purchased, but the second was built in Egypt. In 1832 it comprised eight battle-ships, fifteen frigates, and twelve thousand sailors. The Red Sea squadron, of which the timbers were carried across the isthmus on camels eight abreast, cleared those waters for the first time of corsairs.

Thus did Egypt undergo a revolution that raised it from a despised province of a decadent empire into a military Power and a progressive State. Europe, indeed, became quite excited over the Socialist experiments of this Oriental despot. We have a pleasant picture of the ferocious Pasha, with his shaggy eyebrows and pointed white beard, turbaned fez, and baggy trousers, a jewelled armoury in his sash, listening to long letters of political philosophy written for his edification by Jeremy Bentham. Nevertheless, he did not allow Western philosophers to cramp his style. When a village baker complained to him of oppression by the Omdeh he had the bully baked in the baker's oven. On the other hand, he

pardoned a poor half-starved wretch who tried to assassinate him when he found that his appeals had not been duly answered. He spent his days in the saddle or on the council divan, and he slept on a carpet beside his French four-poster bed.

But the effect of this Egyptian revolution upon Europe was not confined to the interest it aroused. It had a definite influence upon the course of European events, and very nearly caused a European war. But as we are concerned less with European history than with the story of Egypt, this aspect of Mehemet Ali's activities will find less space here than usual. For his invasions of Arabia, of Anatolia, and of the Ægean, his victories over Arab fanatics and Greek insurgents, and his defeats by British admirals and aristocrats, did not in the end materially affect the history of Egypt.

The principle of Mehemet Ali's foreign policy was to bribe or bully the Sultan into recognising his own hereditary authority over an autonomous Egypt, and to secure Egyptian independence of the Powers by playing them off against one another and against the Porte. The best way to get what he wanted from Constantinople was to make himself both invincible and indispensable. His fellow-reformer, Mahmoud, the Khalif Sultan, was having even greater difficulties to overcome, and was always in want of such military and monetary help as Egypt could now give. While Mehemet Ali, who was a faithful upholder of the unity of Islam, was ready to help so far as this could be reconciled with his own interests.

The first foreign campaign of the Egyptian army was accordingly undertaken against the Arabs who had become a menace to the Empire and to Egypt. The revival of primitive Islamic doctrine and ritual, preached by Mahomed-ibn-Abd-el-Wahab (1695-1791), had uni-

fied the tribes of Arabia under the leadership of the family of Ibn Saud. This movement had reached its highest point under Ibn Saud II., who captured the Sacred Cities and threatened Bagdad and Damascus. By 1806 all Arabia was Wahabite, and was closed to other Mahomedans even as pilgrims. Their corsairs closed the Red Sea and covered the Indian Ocean. The Wahabites thus pin-pricked two empires in their tender points—the Ottoman Empire in its spiritual authority, and the British Empire in its sea-power. This brought invitations to Mehemet Ali from the British for a naval alliance against the Arabs. But Mehemet Ali was too wary. "The great sea-fish swallows the small," said he to Burckhardt, the emissary of the British Africa Society. "England," he went on, "will take Egypt some day as her share of the Ottoman Empire." He had no intention of hastening that day.

On the other hand, he readily responded to the Sultan's appeal for assistance by despatching all his most troublesome Albanians to recapture the Holy Cities. In this enterprisé they were led into an ambush, and lost two-thirds of their number. And thus relieved of his inconvenient compatriots, Mehemet Ali thereupon rid Egypt itself of the remainder of these troublesome mercenaries. He then felt safe enough to send his new native regulars to Arabia, where they retook Mecca and restored the pilgrimage (1812). We may note with interest that one of his new Arabian governors was a Scotchman Keith, a prisoner from Frazer's force, who had islamised and fought his way to the front. Ibn Saud, however, had recourse to guerilla warfare with such success that Mehemet Ali was forced to take command himself, a mistake that nearly cost him dear, and that was not repeated. For in his absence the Turks got

control of Cairo, and arranged for his assassination. Mehemet Ali rushed back and restored his authority by the usual means, leaving Ibrahim to command in Arabia. The great Ibn Saud having died, Ibrahim crushed the Wahabites with appalling cruelty and sent their leader, Abdulla Ibn Saud, to Constantinople for execution (1816).

Having thus cleared his eastern frontier, Mehemet Ali turned his attention to the south. The mysterious regions of Central Africa, from which there flowed along the Nile waterway into Egypt a steady stream of slaves, ivory, and gold, now attracted his adventurous ambition. The lucrative stream had of late been blocked by Mameluke refugees, who had established themselves in the Sudan. And to set it flowing again and tap its legendary sources, a small Egyptian force under Ismail was pushed up the Nile. But the phantom golden cities fled before it until the noisome swamps and swarming savages of Equatoria compelled a return (1812). While Ismail was establishing Egyptian administration in the Eastern Sudan, another force annexed the Western Sudan after hard fighting near Kordofan. There followed, however, one revolt after another, in one of which Ismail was burnt alive with his staff at Shindi. Thereafter the Sudan was ravaged as ruthlessly as Arabia had been, and the Egyptians established themselves there permanently. New capitals were founded at Khartum and Kassala, and trade routes opened with Suakim and Massowa on the Red Sea. Under British influence the slave trade was eventually declared illegal on the occasion of a visit by Mehemet Ali to Khartum (1838), but, nevertheless, remained the principal industry of the province. By 1842 Egyptian expeditions had reached Gondokoro, and Egypt had extended its frontiers to include territories

with which it had no real racial or regional relationship. Egypt, in fact, became an empire before it became a nation.

But Mehemet Ali's principal ambition was the Napoleonic policy of using Egypt as a stepping-stone to the Ottoman Empire. It was expansion towards the north that drew him most irresistibly. There were two roads leading north to Constantinople—one the sea road by the Ægean, the other the land road by Anatolia. He therefore responded readily enough to Mahmoud's request for help against the Greeks, who were fighting their way to independence through insurrection. For the combined naval and military operations necessary against the Greeks, the Egyptian forces and fleet were far more effective than the half-remodelled and wholly unreliable Ottoman army and navy. Crete was subdued without difficulty (1823). Ibrahim's first invasion of the Morea (1824) failed, but the second (1825) broke the back of the insurrection, and in the following year a fresh expedition was prepared to finish the insurrection in this last stronghold at Missolonghi. After a long siege the town capitulated, the garrison cut its way out, and the townsfolk were massacred. All seemed over when suddenly the Morea rose again behind Ibrahim. The Turks and Egyptians fell out, the Turks being commanded by Khosrew, Mehemet Ali's old enemy. The British fleet began to express the resentment of an aristocracy whose education had not excluded Greece, and whose emotions had been excited by Lord Byron. Therefore, when Ibrahim began to apply to Greece the policy of extermination that had crushed Arabia and the Sudan, he found himself encountering a sentiment that had the means to make itself felt. Moreover, British religious feeling, that was only mildly disturbed by the wholesale destruc-

tion of Greeks, became violently indignant when Ibrahim began deporting them as slaves to Cairo. It was, in fact, to stop this slave trade that the British arranged the naval demonstration of allied fleets at Navarino that ended in the destruction of the Egyptian and Turkish fleets (October 20, 1827). Which disaster was not without compensation for Mehemet Ali. For as he suspected, and soon afterwards ascertained, the Turkish fleet were at Navarino with orders to deport Ibrahim's army to Constantinople. Freed from the Turks, Ibrahim went on sacking Greece and sending the Greeks as slaves to Egypt, arrogantly ignoring the sharp warnings of the British Admiral Codrington. "I never saw such a lout or heard such language," complained Ibrahim to his French interpreter. This was, in fact, the first, but by no means the last, collision between the Egyptian and the English temperament. And the inevitable end came when Codrington appeared off Alexandria and delivered an ultimatum under threat of bombardment; while a French expedition disembarked in the Morea (September, 1828). The Egyptian troops then evacuated the Morea by agreement between the British and Mehemet Ali—his first formal recognition. The Egyptian revolution thus equalled the feat of the French Revolution in uniting the Great Powers for the limitation of its imperial expansion.

Thereupon followed the ten years' struggle between Mehemet Ali and Mahmoud, in which the armies of Egypt overran the Ottoman Empire and almost overthrew the peace of Europe. The Sultan had never abandoned attempts to rid himself of his all too powerful Pasha; the Grand Vizier Khosrew had never forgiven his discomfiture and deportation from Egypt. So Mehemet Ali, being absent at Mecca on the Sultan's

service, a Pasha, Latif Bey, was sent to Cairo to arrange again for his assassination ; while Ibrahim was made a Prince of Mecca, and so the superior in rank of his father. The quarrel between Mehemet Ali and Mahmoud then became acute. Crete was substituted for Syria, which had been the agreed reward for Egypt's services in Greece and occupied (1830-1841). But resenting this and taking advantage of the Porte's defeats in the Russo-Turkish War, Mehemet Ali anticipated an attack on himself by invading Syria. Acre, that had defeated Napoleon, fell to Ibrahim (May, 1832). The prestige of this success gave the Egyptian invasion an impetus that carried it from victory to victory across Syria and Anatolia right to the gates of Constantinople (February, 1833). Whereupon the Russians intervened, covering the capital with a fleet and a force. The Egyptians withdrew, and the Russians exacted from the Turks, in return, the Treaty of Hunkiar-Skelessi, that put the Empire under Russian protection (July 8, 1833). Mehemet Ali had to content himself with the acquisition of Syria and Adana under the Treaty of Kutahia, and a firman confirming him as Pasha (May 6, 1833).

An Empire of Egypt in the Near East had, indeed, become morally a possibility when armies of *fellaheen* could defeat their Turkish oppressors in three pitched battles—Homs, Beylan, and Koniah. The Ottoman armies were disorganised by the reforms of Mahmoud, disheartened by the Russian defeats, and disabled by the treason of Khosrew, who had been denied the supreme command. But the welcome given to the Egyptians by the oppressed populations of the Empire was soon worn out. Syria and Palestine revolted against Egypt, and the Druses and Maronites were not reduced until 1836. Moreover, the effort was exhausting Egypt

almost beyond endurance. Any other people would have risen against the exactions of Mehemet Ali. The *fellaheen* only died, fled, or mutilated themselves by thousands to escape the hated conscription.

Mehemet Ali, if left to himself, would very possibly not have renewed the struggle. But the British did not want a strong Oriental State blocking the overland route, and Mehemet Ali, fearful that if he gave an inch they would take an ell, had refused them the concession of a trans-isthmian railway (1837). The extension of Egyptian authority right across Arabia to the Persian Gulf was highly disapproved at London, which became an ardent supporter of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and itself occupied Aden as an outpost and O. P. against Egypt. The French, on the other hand, encouraged Egyptian expansion. The crisis came when the Anglo-Turkish Treaty of Commerce of 1838 threatened the whole Egyptian system of State trading. Mehemet Ali, in view of the fact that Ottoman treaties were applicable to Egypt, demanded commercial independence from the Empire, to which Mahmoud replied by proclaiming him a rebel and invading Syria. Ibrahim repeated his former victories, in spite of the great von Moltke being with the Turks. Mahmoud opened negotiations with Mehemet Ali, but died, probably poisoned by Khosrew, who thereby recovered the Vizierate under the new Sultan Abdul Medjid. Khosrew's rival, the Capoudan Pasha, at French instigation, then declared for Mehemet Ali and took the Ottoman fleet over to the Egyptians, while the Ottoman armies wavered in their allegiance (July, 1839). The Empire seemed to have become an easy prize for the all-powerful Pasha.

It was as unfortunate for Mehemet Ali's imperial

ambitions as it was fortunate for the development of Egypt as a nation, that British foreign policy in this crisis was the spirited but spasmodic plunging peculiar to Palmerston. Our traditional aim being the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire against Russian ambition by alliance with France, it would have seemed an obvious solution to allow Mehemet Ali to reach Constantinople and reconstruct the Empire. But this would have involved a change in the attitude of disapproval adopted towards Mehemet Ali by Palmerston that would have been as displeasing to his personality as damaging to his prestige. He believed, moreover, that Mehemet Ali's economic system was on the point of collapse. Dr. Bowring, one of those special agents responsible for so much in our foreign relations, had written: "The Pasha's power is a sham, and he is incapable of serious resistance" ("Report on Egypt and Candia," Parliamentary Papers, 1840). The consular reports of the day, reflecting possibly official opinion at home, persistently stressed the evils and ignored the ends of his economic experiments. Moreover, Palmerston was the first of the imperialists, and he was ready to force a realignment or even a rupture of international relations with the risk of European war, on a point of imperial prestige. Whether it was sound policy, even in the imperial interest, to join with the militarist Tzar in humiliating the friendly and peaceable government of Louis Philippe and in hectoring the only progressive Oriental State is a point that does not concern us. Palmerston, anyhow, addressed the British Ambassador in Paris as follows (June 5, 1838): "We ought to support the Sultan vigorously with France, if France will act with us; without her if she declines." Later (June 8, 1838) he added: "The Cabinet agreed it would not do to let Mehemet Ali declare his independence and separate

Egypt and Syria from the Turkish Empire . . . we are prepared to give naval aid to the Sultan against Mehemet Ali, and intend to order our fleet to Alexandria. I write this on the supposition that France is honest and can be trusted." But France, as it happened, was neither. While professedly asking no more than the recognition of Mehemet Ali as hereditary Pasha of Egypt and Syria, and while acting in concert with the other Powers, France was secretly negotiating on its own account in favour of Mehemet Ali with the Porte. On ascertaining this, Palmerston, under a threat of resignation, forced Melbourne to sanction a ten-day ultimatum to Mehemet Ali depriving him of Syria. The French tried to reopen negotiations, but Palmerston was determined to dictate a settlement. Admiral Napier was sent to attack Ibrahim in Syria, and a landing was made at Beirout (September, 1840), while the Porte joyfully proclaimed the deposition of the Pasha. France declared that it would consider as a *casus belli* any attempt to dispossess him (October 8, 1840). Palmerston replied through his Ambassador: "Tell M. Thiers that if France throws down the gauntlet, we shall not refuse to pick it up; and that if she begins a war she will lose, to a certainty, her ships, colonies, and commerce; that her army in Algiers will cease to give her anxiety, and that Mehemet Ali will just be chucked into the Nile."

Thus, by trying first to overreach, and then to outface one another, Palmerston and Thiers brought two friendly Western people to the verge of war on a point of Oriental prestige. One was, of course, bluffing and the other bullying. But the risk of war was none the less real, and was only removed by the good sense of Louis Philippe, who replaced Thiers by Guizot. This success for our spirited foreign policy was followed by a no less gratifying

success for our sea-power. The deserting Ottoman fleet had proved to be no reinforcement for Egypt, as the Egyptian fleet had to stand guard over it and its discontented crews. Syria was by now as hostile to the Egyptians as it had been friendly on their first arrival. The Egyptians were defeated in engagements with the Turks, and a British squadron bombarding Acre blew up Ibrahim's magazines. His disastrous retreat from Damascus to Gaza coincided with the appearance of Napier's fleet off Alexandria. Calling on Mehemet Ali in his palace at Ras-el-Tin, Napier concluded his interview thus: "If Your Highness will not listen to my unofficial appeal, by God, I will bombard you and put a bomb right where you are sitting." This bombast was probably for home consumption, as the Pasha had only to retire to Cairo out of range. But he was statesman enough to let the other side have the last word, provided he got what he most wanted. So he made his formal submission to the Padishah and to Pam, surrendered Syria that was already lost, and Crete that was useless, and got in return such formal recognition of his hereditary dynasty as secured for ever Egypt's economic independence from the Empire. What he thus gave up Egypt was better without, but Egypt could not do without that which he got.

But much water was to flow down the Bosphorus and Nile, much ink was to run in the Chanceries, and some blood was still to be shed before this solution was finally enforced. For Palmerston had broken up the Concert, and the Porte refused to comply. It was Austria that eventually obtained from the Porte the Hatti Sheriffs establishing the independence of Egypt (April 13 and April 19, 1841). The Treaty of London (July 13, 1841) gave, under international guarantee, the government of Egypt to Mehemet Ali and to the eldest male of his

House, subject to ratification by Constantinople, and fixed the Egyptian tribute. But the army was limited to eighteen thousand men, the superior ranks being reserved for the Turkish ruling class by requiring the Sultan's approval of such appointments. The first secured Egypt its economic independence, the second subordinated it politically. The Porte had had to accept Egyptian autonomy, but cleverly exploiting British hostility to Mehemet Ali, it retained the right of intervening in Egypt. What was worse, this restriction checked the growth of an Egyptian democracy. For the first stage of democratic development from an Oriental despotism, whether of Padishah or of Pasha, must be the army. The British and their allies, the Turks, had thus seriously stunted the growth of the Egyptian nation. And these restrictions will appear again as one of the principal causes of collision with Egyptian nationalism under Arabi.

It is often assumed by historians that the career of Mehemet Ali closed with this diplomatic dissolution of his imperial schemes, and that he died eight years later under the shadow of this defeat. This is, however, an English rather than an Egyptian estimate of the settlement. When we read the negotiations that led up to it, and realise that Palmerston was using the whole power of the British Empire, and that the Porte was trying, in turn, every device of its imperial diplomacy, for the deposition of the Egyptian dynasty and the destruction of Egyptian independence, we have to recognise that Mehemet Ali, in securing the permanent establishment of both with an international guarantee, got very good value for Egypt in return for the surrender of conquests far too costly to retain. As to the restrictions referred to, the army had done its work for the time and he could not be expected to see in it a political importance that

escaped statesmen even a generation later. Nor did he accept British dictation after this defeat any more than before. The army was disbanded and the Ottoman fleet returned, but Alexandria was so fortified that any further naval coercion was impossible until these defences had fallen out of date a generation later.

His foreign policy was maintained unchanged. A far-sighted fear of British intervention prevented any concession of a canal or of a railway. But within four years of the Palmerstonian bludgeonings he allowed Lieutenant Waghorn to organise the overland route that reduced the Indian mail to one month and brought annually fifteen thousand travellers through Egypt.

Thus the long warfare of the old bashi-bozouk was accomplished, and it was from no surrender to the blows of circumstance that he resigned the reins more and more to Ibrahim, who eventually became Regent (1847).¹ For he probably knew that his mind was failing, as indeed appeared when he proposed to send an expedition to Marseilles to restore his friend Louis Philippe. He employed the first leisure of his long life in very human enjoyments. He laid the foundation stone of the great Nile barrage that crowned his reconstruction of the ancient irrigation system of Egypt, and founded a new system that was to be completed by his enemies. He revisited the scenes of his childhood at Salonica, and made a ceremonial visit to Constantinople, where he paid a friendly call on Khosrew. The two old rascals, whose rivalry had set the East in flames, spent hours together chuckling over their failures to assassinate one another.

The death of the founder of Egyptian independence

¹ The health of the Pasha was first affected in July, 1844, and failed altogether in the autumn of 1847. His mind began to go in the spring of 1848.—*Vide* Benedetti, *Rev. des deux Mondes*, 1895.

(August, 1849) appropriately closes the first chapter of the story of the nation. There are, indeed, few stranger stories in the history of nationalism than that of how Egypt, long before the awakening of its national conscience, made itself a corporate and self-contained nation through the ambition of an alien adventurer. It is especially interesting to observe how, when that adventurous ambition overstepped the bounds of true national growth, it was driven back on to safe ground again by such strange guardian angels as Nicholas, Mahmoud, and Palmerston. Mehemet Ali has, in consequence, been accepted by Egypt as its founder. And one of the first public ceremonies of the new nation was the celebration of his centenary. He was certainly the most interesting of the reforming rulers that have appeared in all the border countries from Morocco to Turkey. If in one aspect he was an unscrupulous scoundrel, in another he was the Napoleon of the East and the national hero of Egypt, and, in the words of the Koran, "his works will plead for him."

CHAPTER II

BANKRUPTS AND BROKERS

ABBAS—SAID—ISMAIL

“And they spoiled the Egyptians.”—Exod. xii. 36.

“MY grandchildren will reap what I have sown,” said the dying Mehemet Ali. Unfortunately they reaped all too recklessly, and sowed no crops other than wild oats.

The advantage of revolution by dictatorship is that it can go farther and faster with less expenditure of force than can a revolution by democratic committees. It is no doubt true that in a multitude of councils there is wisdom ; but it is no less true that there is much waste. On the other hand, the disadvantage is that with the deposition or death of the dictator the movement loses driving power and direction. The reaction that lies in wait for any loss of political impetus then takes effect ; and though the original momentum accumulates and eventually reasserts itself there is a period of conflict and confusion before direction is recovered and the delay made good. In the end, the loss of time and effort by either method possibly works out at much the same.

The ability of Mehemet Ali appears in his having recognised that the two essentials for all real progress in any province of the Ottoman Empire were separation from the Porte and security from the Powers. He had obtained both by getting a financial autonomy for a hereditary dynasty that was guarded by an Ottoman

suzerainty and guaranteed by an international treaty. All that was required was an autocrat of enough ability to preserve this international status and to prepare the first stage in the transition from Eastern autocracy to Western democracy. Ibrahim, who had as much character as, though much less ability than, his father, might have done this. His rule in Syria (1832-1841) and his administration of his estates had both been highly successful. But Ibrahim died during his regency (November 10, 1848), and the succession of Abbas (1849-1854) was a calamity.

Mehemet Ali had broken the Turko-Mameluke tyranny over Egypt, but he had also broken the Moslem supremacy that had kept the foreign colonies, the cosmopolitan concessionaires, and the Christian communities from exploiting a Moslem society that was still in medieval simplicity. The revolt of the reactionary Abbas against his grandfather's modernism overweighted one scale of this balance, but did represent a real Egyptian resentment against exploitation by the foreigner in any form, whether as Mameluke or money-lender. This reaction would have come anyway, but Abbas was a born reactionary. As a boy he refused to learn foreign languages, and rejected all European education. As a man he retired, a solitary sluggard, into the darkest depths of Moslem obscurantism. Sir C. Napier (*The War in Syria*, vol. ii., 1842) and Sir Ch. Murray (*A short memoir of Mehemet Ali*) give us an unpleasant picture of Abbas. He flogged and drowned his women, lived with his horses and dogs, enriched his palaces, and impoverished his peasantry like any Mameluke. He allowed his financiers, among them one Nubar, an Armenian, to amass money for him by highly modern speculations, but squandered it mediievally on building a gloomy

barracks in the desert where he could bury himself among his Mameluke bodyguards.

The first act of Abbas on accession was to sweep out all the advisers, native and foreign, of his father and grandfather. Many were certainly not worth much, but they were indispensable to the working of the administrative machine and the State monopolies. Hitherto the confusion between the Privy purse and the public Treasury had not much mattered. But Abbas replaced the cash in the Treasury by credit notes of his own, which then were put in circulation and came back in payment of taxes. He then suppressed all the schools and most of the other public institutions of European character. He surrounded himself with Albanian and Mameluke guards, destroyed the national and Egyptian character of the army, and reduced it to a few thousand men. Having thus dangerously deteriorated the native and national foundations of the State, he still more gravely imperilled its independence by excessive subservience to the Sultan.

“If I must be governed by someone, let it be by the Khalif rather than by the consuls,” said he. But, as a matter of fact, both Khalif and consuls got all they wanted out of him. The Porte forced on him the “Tanzimat” that the British had forced on Turkey. This involved, professedly only, acceptance of the abolition both of the *kurbash* and of the *corvée*. Practically, it involved an admission of the right both of Turks and of British to interfere in the administration of Egypt. Thereafter, in virtue of the Anglo-Turkish Treaty of 1838, foreign traders could buy produce direct from the peasantry; and the commercial monopoly of Mehemet Ali, though it survived some time after, had no longer any real substance. Further, the British got a footing in control of the overland route that Mehemet Ali never would have

allowed, by securing the concession for a railway from Alexandria to Cairo. Moreover, Abbas, though he cut himself off from all Europeans as much as possible, accepted the advice of the British rather than that of the French. And the British party in Egypt was that of the Turkish "ruling class" and of the landed Beys, who took advantage of the reaction to revive all their old oppressions of the peasantry. So that when Abbas died of "a stroke"—the stroke being administered by his own bodyguard—the Egyptians endured with fortitude a coincident heat-wave in the belief that it was the opening of Hell's Gates for the reception of their ruler.

Said (1854-1863), the youngest son of Mehemet Ali, and uncle of Abbas, was, in all respects, the antithesis of Abbas, and as modern as Abbas had been medieval. And his easy-going Europeanisation of Egypt was a welcome relief from the reactionary and irrational Abbas. Said was French in culture, and a great patron of distinguished foreigners. His friend, Edmond About, leaves us a pen-picture of Said: "*Un de ces colosses débonnaires, bons vivants, gros plaisants, grands mangeurs; et buveurs mirifiques. Sa main était de taille à souffleter des éléphants; sa face large, haute en couleur, hérissée d'une barbe à tous crins, exprime la bonté la franchise, le courage, et le cynisme.*" There was a Rabelaisian humour about this Gargantua of twenty-five stone, who incorporated all that is most comic to the West in the East, or to the East in the West. For he was a Khalif of the *Arabian Nights*, doubled with a *cabotin* of the Quartier Latin. He jovially decapitated misbehaving sheikhs and made a jolly bonfire of claims for eighty million piastres of village tax arrears. He entertained foreign sovereigns with funny French stories, and made his Pashas wade with him through

loose gunpowder, candle in hand, to test their nerves. He built the Suez Canal, and thereby altered the trade routes of the world, and he covered his parade-ground with iron plates to keep the dust off his Paris clothes. Life with Said was never dull. "Give him two hundred," he would shout, without explaining whether he meant *kurbash* or *baksheesh*. He was as popular as a gross joke, and some of his reforms, such as the abolition of slavery (1856), of corporal punishment (1863), and of conscription, were much appreciated jests.

Said's share in the pawning of Egypt has been rather eclipsed by that of Ismail. But it was Said that first called the tune, though Ismail finally paid the piper. His personal extravagance was almost as fantastic as that of Ismail. But his embezzlements of the State's profits that should have been put back into the business would not have mattered had he maintained the machine. His final abolition of the monopolies, which was much applauded by foreign traders, his exaction of taxes in cash instead of in kind, which was highly approved by foreign financiers, together with his restoration of private ownership in the land (1858), which was very popular with the peasantry, were, when thus imposed all together and at once, simply disastrous. For both the peasant and his property fell an easy prey to the Greek moneylender who lent the necessary cash, and to the foreign trader who bought up his crops at forced sale prices. While the disorganisation of the fiscal system made the State more and more dependent on loans from foreign financiers at ruinous rates. The abolition of internal Customs was economically beneficial, but again a blow to the Budget. Said is represented in most histories as the emancipator of Egypt from the economic experiments of his father. But these enterprises were based on the estab-

lished economic system of Egypt and of the East. Experiments in Free Trade and *laissez-faire* that were possibly beneficial to the Early Victorian English, were baleful to the Pharaonic agricultural arrangements of the *fellaheen*. Foreign trade, of course, grew rapidly with the abolition of the monopolies, but it could not be taxed in view of the capitulations, and it killed such infant industries as were still alive. Said's political Liberalism and personal liberalities were, indeed, burning the candle at both ends. His experiments in European engineering were too expensive to be combined with his Asiatic extravagances. His drawing-room in the Abdin Palace cost 10,000,000 francs to decorate; but his public enterprises in the end cost the country even more. For, to build a railway from Alexandria to Cairo and Suez, he had recourse to a private loan in Paris (1858). His Suez Canal commitment cost Egypt its first public loan from Fröhling and Goschen in London (1862). The terms of this loan—£E3,300,000 at seven per cent., taken at seventy-five—were ominous. When Said died (1863) there was a foreign debt negotiated on this sort of terms amounting to about £10,000,000. Some British writers, including Lord Cromer, assess it at only some £3,000,000. But this seems to leave out of account the floating debt.

As much of the proceeds of this debt had been spent upon the Suez Canal, there was nothing in the amount of the total at this date that was very detrimental to the future Egyptian nation from a financial point of view. But from a political point of view, it would have been better for Egypt had Said spent all the money in drawing-room decoration. For the Suez Canal concession had converted British interest in Egypt from a vague realisation of the possible importance of the country in empire

politics into very concrete considerations of strategic and commercial problems profoundly affecting British sea-power and British supremacy in India. Until then the British had been content to keep the French from dominating Cairo, as they had kept the Russians from dominating in Constantinople. But thereafter it became of vital interest to them to control Cairo to the exclusion of other Powers. It was, indeed, some time before this new imperialist point of view penetrated our policy towards Egypt. And so far from there being any evidence of a preconceived plan to encourage or exploit the financial difficulties of Egypt so as to get control of the Canal, there is ample proof that British Governments of both parties were, at this time, averse from assuming any responsibilities in Egypt. For example, the refusal of H.M.G. to respond to the Tzar's offer of Egypt and Crete in the famous "sick man" conversation with Seymour (February 21, 1853). But the mood of public opinion that looked on colonies as an encumbrance and on armaments as Antichrist did not last long. Disraeli, with his *flair* for the way the cat was going to jump, only slightly anticipated and accelerated another epoch of empire-building; and to the structure of the Victorian Empire Egypt was thereafter indispensable.

The construction of the Suez Canal was, no doubt, inevitable, but by an adherence to the policy of Mehemet Ali it might have been postponed until Egypt had been so established as a State that the foreign and financial liabilities of the enterprise were no longer so dangerous to its independence. The British at this period did not want a canal, preferring, for strategic reasons, the slower but surer Cape route. And the overland route met sufficiently their demand for a rapid postal service to the East. As for the French, their interest in the scheme was

only sentimental and scientific. It was the megalomania of the Egyptian dynasty and the resources put at its disposal, both by the last years of forced labour in Egypt and by the first years of free loans in Europe, that brought this project to completion at the very worst moment for the interests of the future Egyptian nation.

The international involvements of the Suez Canal have been from the first, and still are to-day, one of the two obstacles to the full sovereignty of an Egyptian nation; the other being the imperial interests of Egypt in the Sudan. It was, moreover, mainly the Suez Canal that brought Egypt for a quarter of a century under British administration. And it is therefore due to the British to make it clear that it was not they who forced the Canal on Egypt. The project was first put in hand by Napoleon's engineers. But their arithmetical error, which represented the Mediterranean as thirty feet below the Red Sea instead of, as it is, on a level with it, was not finally corrected till 1847. This imaginary obstacle to a sea-level canal, combined with the political opposition of Mehemet Ali and the strategic opposition of the British, postponed any attempt to realise the project. Moreover, until steam had replaced sails in passenger traffic and until the narrow seas were cleared of corsairs, the Red Sea was almost as great an obstacle to navigation as was the Isthmus. In 1801 Baird's transports took three months for the passage from Bombay to Kosseir; and later reinforcements were sent round by the Cape.

M. de Lesseps, who had become interested in the scheme as French Consul-General and who had befriended Said when exiled in Paris by Abbas, had, by an importunity that in a lesser cause would have been impudent, induced the good-natured giant to give him a

concession for the Canal. At any other conjuncture Palmerston would have seen to it that the concession never became a canal. But when Said asked our Consul-General whether the British would support him in opposing the French project, the answer had to be in the negative, because the French had then just joined us in invading the Crimea to keep the Russians out of Constantinople. All that Palmerston could do was to delay the Sultan's formal ratification of the concession for two years. As compensation to us, Said gave us the Cairo-Alexandria railway concession that his father had so resolutely refused, and permitted the establishment of the Bank of Egypt (1856). He also allowed us to send troops through to the Indian Mutiny by the overland route.

The conditions under which the Canal was constructed were no more creditable to Europe than were those of the other concessions and credits in which Egypt was subsequently involved. De Lesseps, in his repudiations of the original promoters of the scheme, the St. Simonians and the British group, and in his reckonings with his friend and patron, Said, was no more scrupulous than any other Egyptian concessionaire. And if the Suez scandal never became such an *esclandre* as did that of Panama, it was probably because the Egyptians, not the French, were the sufferers. For the credits were so easily obtained, and the construction had so few engineering obstacles, that with any reasonable efficiency and economy the enterprise should never have got into difficulties. The construction was simply scooping sand, the climate healthy, local labour good and gratis, and the capital value of the concession enormous. For it comprised a lease for ninety-nine years of valuable land and mineral rights, with a right to forced labour for four-

fifths of the work. The construction was to take six years, the tolls to be fixed at ten francs per passenger or per ton, the profits being divided, seventy-five per cent. to the shareholders, ten per cent. to the promoters, and fifteen per cent. to the Egyptian Government. A loan of 200,000,000 francs was floated (1858), of which France subscribed half and the remainder was divided between Turkey and Egypt. Without waiting for the Porte's authorisation, work was started (April 25, 1859), and the scheme was already in difficulties when Said died (1863).

With the accession of Ismail came a revision of the concession and a reconsideration of the whole enterprise. For the dissolution of the personal partnership between Said and de Lesseps encouraged the enemies of the scheme to further efforts. "No one is more 'Canaliste' than myself," said Ismail, "but I want the Canal to belong to Egypt, not Egypt to the Canal." The British Government were only too glad to get an opportunity of stopping construction, and they now had something of a case. For forced labour, used on so large a scale and with so little scruple, had resulted in scandalous inhumanities that had shocked not only British, but even French public opinion. The Porte, for its own reasons, was very ready to move in demanding the abandonment of the *corvée* for canal construction as being contrary to the imperial reforms recorded in the *Tanzimat*. While Ismail demanded the retrocession of the adjoining lands and minerals conceded by Said as a concession incompatible with Egyptian sovereignty. The consequent claims for compensation by the Company were referred to the arbitration of Napoleon III., whose award (July, 1864) mulcted Egypt to the amount of £3,360,000. Of this, £1,520,000 was in compensation for the *corvée*;

£1,200,000 for all concessions outside two hundred metres from the Canal bank, and £640,000 for the Company's rights in the Freshwater Canal. This was all paid off by 1869. The Canal was then finished with paid and mostly imported labour and with modern machinery; and it was opened with festivities of appropriate extravagance (November 17, 1869). No less extravagant were the anticipations of the advantages that were to accrue to Egypt from this service to Europe. For, first of all, Egypt lost the considerable profits from travellers by the overland route, and then it lost even such share as the concession allotted to Egypt in the future profits of the Canal.

By 1871 the £20 Canal shares were worth less than £7, and no dividend had been paid. The Constantinople Conference then allowed a surtax toll of thirty per cent., and the Canal thereafter rapidly became a highly profitable property. But not for Egypt that had built it. For, in 1875, Disraeli, on behalf of the British Government, had taken advantage of Ismail's insolvency to buy through Rothschilds for £4,000,000 Ismail's founders' shares, which he was then offering in Paris as security for a loan; while Egypt's fifteen per cent. share of the profits was later ceded in payment of a debt of £700,000 to French financiers, who in the following seven years collected therefrom about double the total of their original loan. These two properties are now estimated as being worth somewhere about £30,000,000.

Such, very briefly, is the history of this transaction, disastrous for Egypt, financially, economically, and politically. Europe should have constructed this enterprise, that served its own economic interests only, by acquiring the concession to do so from Egypt at a price that would have paid off the Egyptian debt, and by com-

pensating Egypt for its loss of traffic with a share in the profits. As it was, Egypt was made to pay heavily both for the concession of the site and for the construction of the greater part of the Canal, and was left with no share in the concern. The sufferings of the Egyptian *fellaheen*, both in the years of forced labour and in the subsequent fiscal exactions to meet interest on the Canal debt, put Europe heavily in their debt, a debt of honour of Europe to Egypt as to which we have not heard so much as we have of the less worthy liabilities of Egypt to Europe. The pride of Frenchmen in the flotation feat of de Lesseps, or of the English in the financial coup of Disraeli, should not make them forget that Egypt deserved well of Europe in this matter, and was in return most ruthlessly defrauded. Moreover, the construction of the Canal changed for the worse the relations between the British Empire and Egypt by shifting the main objective of British sea-power, and the main interest of British Imperialism in the Near East from Constantinople to Cairo. Thereafter it would have been difficult for Egypt, even with the most diplomatic of princes and with the most democratic of governments, to prevent the British Empire from guarding so vital and vulnerable a line of communication by garrisoning at least the isthmus. As it was, Ismail hurried his country into bankruptcy and a foreign receivership even faster than did any of his princely colleagues in the border lands between East and West from Fez to Stamboul. Such bankruptcy followed by foreign occupation is a phenomenon to be observed in Morocco, Algeria, Tunis, Egypt, and Turkey at this phase of their development from the Islamic state into Western nations. But in Cairo the financial crisis would, owing to international rivalries, have been solved, as it was in Constantinople, by some form of financial control,

but for the Canal. It was the Canal that divided Gladstone's Cabinet and decided a British occupation.

Ismail's financial failure is very puzzling, for he began well in his finance, and in other respects did not do at all badly. Said had allowed him a training in public affairs, and he had shown himself a good business man in the administration of the immense estates left him by his father, Ibrahim, and in the accumulation of a considerable private fortune. Indeed, he succeeded in increasing these estates from sixty thousand to a million acres, covered them with factories and railroads. He treated his peasantry well enough to earn the title, "Prince of the Fellaheen." On his accession he showed an appreciation of the necessity for economy. Thus he separated the public and private revenues, assigning himself a civil list of £700,000 a year, which, though double that of Queen Victoria, was yet much less than the annual cost of Said. On the other hand, progressive enterprises were pressed forward, communications, agriculture, commerce, industry, education, judicature, all benefited by reconstructions and extensions. Even the necessity of some democratic development was recognised; while the territory of Egypt was usefully extended and its independence from Turkey finally assured. And yet all this was thrown away owing to the strangest financial folly.

There is the same curious incongruity in Ismail's personality. His appearance was not an asset. Short and ungainly, he had neither dignity nor deportment. He would waddle aimlessly about the room or sit cross-legged on a divan playing with his toes. His face was grotesque, half covered with tufts of red beard. His eyes were not a pair, for the one was fixed and half closed, while the other revolved restlessly. His ears were mis-

shapen, and he covered them with a loose fez, several sizes too large. His hands were as bad, and he wore his sleeves long over them. He dressed carelessly in a black "stambouli," or curate's coat, baggy-kneed trousers and enormous elastic-sided boots. But these uncouthnesses served only to accentuate the charm of his conversation and to conceal his uncanny cleverness in personal intercourse. He had a *fou succès* with the *beau monde* of Europe, and he was no less popular with his own primitive peasantry in Egypt.

In examining the extravagance that ruined him, it is very difficult to assess the amount that may fairly be allocated to his deliberate policy of buying for Egypt an international status and independence from Constantinople. For, owing to British policy, Egypt was still in international law an Ottoman province. The provision securing the Egyptian succession to the eldest male instead of to the eldest son, gave very obvious opportunities for Constantinopolitan intrigue, and was an obstacle to continuity. But a reform of this provision would be opposed not only by Constantinople and possibly by London, but also by the Turkish ruling class in Egypt and by the princes of the ruling House. Nevertheless, in return for a doubling of the tribute to Turkey, a million in cash and a jewelled gold dinner service for the Sultan, and about a hundred thousand pounds more in bribes, Ismail secured firmans (1866 and 1873), which not only settled the succession on his eldest son, but recognised fully and formally the administrative autonomy of Egypt. As he also secured the removal of the restriction on Egyptian naval and military armaments and the right to make treaties, subject to those of the empire, as well as the right to contract State loans, he did, in effect, secure for Egypt sovereign status. He had, however, great diffi-

culty in obtaining from the Sultan a suitable title for his dynasty, getting eventually to his great disgust nothing better than the obscure Persian dignity of "Khedive." This was unfortunate, as it encouraged him to assert his sovereign dignity in the eyes of Europe by extravagant expenditure. But, taken altogether, this completion of the work of his grandfather was probably well worth the outlay, and cost far less than the military methods of Mehemet Ali.

The cutting off of Egypt from the drain of Ottoman corruption was a great service, and scarcely less so was the first step that he made towards freeing Egypt from the ever-growing interference by foreign colonies and of foreign commerce under cover of the capitulations. The foreigners in Egypt had multiplied by ten to over two hundred thousand, and their extra-territorial privileges had become a serious embarrassment. Realising that the only way of getting rid of the foreign *imperium in imperio* created by the consular jurisdictions and by the capitulatory privileges was the creation of a judicature capable of applying the principles and procedures of European justice, he instituted, with the help of Nubar, a new "mixed" judicature. This involved a conflict with the Ulema, and was only carried after the Sheikh-ul-Islam had been deposed. It also involved a controversy with the French, whose opposition was so obstinate that the formation and functioning of the three mixed Tribunals at Cairo, Alexandria and Mansoura, and of their Appeal Court, was delayed for many years (1877). It is all the more pleasant to record the hearty support given to this reform by the British who helped in overcoming the objections of the Porte and of the other Powers to any interference in the capitulations. Thus, Lord Stanley writes (October 18, 1867) : " His Majesty's Government

have no fondness for an extra-territorial jurisdiction, and would hail with the utmost satisfaction such an improvement in the judicial system as would justify their altogether renouncing any judicial action in Egypt." And after dwelling on the "great abuses and encroachments of extra-territorial jurisdiction," the despatch goes on: "His Majesty's Government is certainly not inclined to hold out for a jurisdiction to which they have no Treaty right, which they admit to be a usurpation, though brought about by force of circumstances, and which is as injurious to British interests as it is derogatory to the character and wellbeing of Egyptian administration." It is, on the other hand, melancholy to record that it was Ismail and his British successors in Egyptian reform who had most to regret the opening given to foreign interference by this international institution—that still exists and still exposes Egypt to foreign interventions. As a Judge of these Tribunals has himself admitted (*L'Egypt et l'Europe*, p. 21), "*Leur justice a merveilleusement servi la coalition étrangère qui exploitait le pays.*" It is all the more regrettable that the reform of the native Civil Court, with the coincident restriction of the Sheriat Courts to matters of Moslem concern, that would in time have made the Mixed Tribunals unnecessary and that was initiated by Ismail, was unfortunately interrupted by his deposition.

In education the energies of Ismail's régime were remarkable. The system of primary, secondary, and technical schools, organised under the Law of 1868, would have done credit to any European State. The number of schools was increased from one hundred and eighty-five in 1862 to five thousand eight hundred and twenty in 1878, with an attendance of over a hundred thousand scholars. Only a year later the financial

stringency had reduced these figures to a quarter. Of this school attendance about half was supported as well as educated, and the rest mostly got one meal. The old conscription required to fill Mehemet Ali's schools had given place to keen competition for education. Youths clubbed together to maintain one of themselves at school so that he might teach the rest at an evening class. Which sudden awakening of the Egyptians to the advantages of a European education had, of course, some incongruous results. For the Egyptian mind is rather receptive than ratiocinative. The formulas of mathematics were got by rote as the magic charms of the foreign wizards, and pupils learnt their French grammar by heart as they learnt their Koran, without acquiring any acquaintance with French. But, after all, boys in British public schools were, at the same time, learning their Euclid by heart and memorising Latin elegiacs. Ismail himself took an active initiative. He not only gave education a fair share in the Budget, but endowed schools from his private property, founded a national library with very valuable manuscripts and books of his own, and sent all the princes to school.

There was also an instalment of political reform. Mehemet Ali had made a step towards representative institutions by strengthening the Medjliss or Assembly of Notables and the Divan or Privy Council. The Medjliss had been abolished by Abbas, but was now revived by Ismail. True, it met only once a year to approve an annual report from the Privy Council, which it never criticised ; and election to it was only a formality and often compulsory, the members being the village sheikhs, and other notables. But it was none the less an interesting native institution, that was to be given a further development by Ismail just before his deposition.

Meantime, the country was governed autocratically. Ismail, in spite of his European culture, ruled as an Oriental despot. His Foreign Minister, Nubar, was no more than a financial agent. His principal administrator was the Inspector-General (Mufettish) Ismail Sadik, who was only a collector of taxes, and a very cruel and corrupt one at that. When the Mufettish had become too wealthy and too wily, Ismail took him for a drive and deposited him on a steamer, where he was despatched. Ismail's government was still that of the bowstring and the *kurbash*.

But though *Effendina* was an Oriental tyrant, he none the less forced on a modern reconstruction of the medieval Moslem social system of Egypt. The social structure was still wholly based on domestic slavery, on seclusion of women, on patriarchal power over the family, and on the other foundations of the Islamic State. Slavery, that had so long kept alive Mameluke rule, was still the taproot of the ruling class. Slave boys, bought for some £40, had an open career to power and wealth. Slave girls, divided into four classes—Caucasian, Abyssinian, Galla, and Negro—were the mothers, mistresses, and maids of the rulers. Domestic slavery, with its release after seven years and its good prospects, was still much preferred to domestic service. But the harem and the slave market were already being superseded by a change of economic conditions. An educated wife and an emancipated working girl were becoming better value than a harem full of elderly female relations and unruly young slaves all entitled to maintenance for life. Slavery was bound to die a natural death from economics and education. But meantime the campaign of our philanthropists against the slave trade—a campaign that could neither cut off the sources of supply nor convert the centres of demand—often did little more than aggravate the abuses

of the trade by driving it into secret and circuitous channels.

It was Egypt that now gave a lead to the East in this suppression of the slave trade. Slavery had been abolished as a legal institution by Said. Ismail now signed a series of international conventions against the slave trade (Conventions with Great Britain, August 4 and September 7, 1877, and Decrees of August 4, 1877, and January 1, 1878). And it was no small matter for an Islamic autocrat to decree that a fundamental principle of Islam and one of its main forms of property was illegal, and to join with Christian States for suppressing it internationally. But Ismail went further than decrees, and did succeed in striking a real blow at the root of the evil at great risk to his own power. For the slave trade was of more importance to Egypt than to any other Eastern State. The Nile and the Red Sea were the natural channels by which the slaves of Central Africa reached Asia Minor and Arabia. Some fifty thousand slaves, the survivors of probably four times that number wasted in collection and transport, passed annually along that *via dolorosa*, and of these some ten thousand at most survived mutilation and the miseries of being marketed to enter a comparatively happy life in the households of the Near East. Which traffic was not only a source of much private profit to Egypt, but was a part of the whole structure of public and private property. If Egypt wanted recruits or revenue either could be got by a slave raid in the Sudan. The Sudanese Pashas were paid, or rather paid themselves in slaves. The slave dealers (*djellähs*) and their mercenaries were the real government of the Sudan. In 1864 the Governor of Kassala was besieged for two months by slavers. Slave traders had the Pashas of Egypt in their pay.

When, therefore, we read that Ismail, at the instance of the Prince of Wales, took effective measures for stopping the slave trade down the Nile, and for stopping slave raids in the Sudan, we realise that he was making considerable sacrifices and taking some risks in order to establish Egypt and himself as enlightened and Europeanised. It is true that Sir Samuel Baker, whom he sent to the Sudan for this purpose (1869-1873), could only make a beginning by extending Egyptian authority up to Gondokoro, and by establishing posts on the Upper Nile. But Gordon, who followed, penetrated Uganda and asserted a real authority over the Sudan. As Governor-General at Khartum, with Lupton Bey in Bahr-el-Ghazal, Slatin at Darfur, and Emin (Schnitzler) in Equatoria, he slowly but surely repressed both slave raiding and slave trading. The most powerful of the slave traders, Zobeir, who had made himself ruler of Darfur (1875), was first flattered by being made Pasha, then lured to Cairo and imprisoned. His son, Suleiman, rose, but Gordon defeated and killed him (1879). The Abyssinians, resenting resistance to their slave raids, invaded Massowa, but were repulsed. A counter-invasion of Abyssinia, though it resulted in a serious disaster to the Egyptian expedition, yet checked Abyssinian slaving as it has not been checked before or since. But even the dæmonic energy of Gordon could do no more than slowly drive the traders off the main routes to the north and the raiders into the remoter regions of the south. Slavery could only be killed by a more effective economic exploitation of the economic resources of the Sudan than the hunting of slaves and elephants. White and black ivory would remain the only exportable produce of the region until better communications were provided than the Upper Nile, with its cataracts and *sudd*. A rail-

way would make it more profitable to employ the Sudanese for raising cattle and cotton, which latter was selling for two dollars at Khartum and for sixteen at Cairo. So the first section of a railway from Wady Halfa to Khartum (one thousand one hundred miles) was begun. This enterprise was stopped, after £400,000 had been spent, by the financial crisis; and thereafter followed the surrender of the Sudan to another twenty years of slavery.

Egypt, as personified by Ismail, has been generally regarded by us as a spendthrift, so ruined by senseless extravagance as to require reconstruction by England on behalf of European creditors, and for the benefit of Egyptian civilisation. But this is not fair either to Ismail or to Egypt. Had Ismail been such a worthless waster as he is represented, Egypt would have got rid of him itself as it did of his predecessor Abbas, or as Turkey did of his contemporary, Abdul Aziz. As a matter of fact, putting aside for the moment the price paid, the progress achieved during this reign of twelve years was really a very creditable performance. Thus, Egypt's railways were increased by thirteen hundred, its roads by several thousand miles. The telegraphs, some six hundred miles in 1862, were nearly six thousand miles in 1878; and a postal service was organised with over two hundred offices. Some five hundred bridges were built, and fifteen lighthouses. Port Said was founded, Alexandria supplied with a harbour, and, with Cairo, provided with gas, water, and drainage. The Nile got a steamboat service, and a Mediterranean line was started. There were two hundred new canals, and an increase of irrigation channels from forty-four thousand to fifty-two thousand four hundred miles, while the whole irrigation system was reorganised. Land-banks were established

to check the growing exploitation of the *fellaheen* by foreign usurers, and money was liberally, indeed, all too lavishly spent on all manner of commercial and industrial enterprises.

That the expenditure for these purposes, estimated as amounting to about fifty millions, was, on the whole, a remunerative investment is evident from a few figures. Revenue increased from under five million in 1862 to eight and a half in 1879; and Mr. Cave estimated that as late as 1875 Egypt was solvent even without squeezing out the water which was swamping Ismail's financial flotations. The population rose from 4·8 millions to 5·5, and cultivated acreage from four million to five and a half. Cattle similarly increased, and it will be observed that with the gradual dissolution of large estates, the *fellah* is not far off the coveted acre and a cow. And if the English farm-worker might find some reason to envy the Egyptian *fellah*, in spite of *kurbash* and *corvée* the Lancashire cotton operative had good reason to bless Egypt; for Delta cotton saved Lancashire from complete ruin during the American Civil War. And not only did the cotton export quadruple in value, but exports rose from about four to nearly fourteen millions, and imports from under two to over five and a half. In a word, the stimulus of foreign capital, combined with native industry, was developing the national economy at a remarkable rate. The American Consul-General, de Leon, wrote (*The Khedive's Egypt*, 1882): "The improvements in the last twelve years are remarkable." *The Times* (January 6, 1876) reported: "Egypt is a marvellous instance of progress. She has advanced as much in seventy years as other countries have in five hundred."

But no progress or profits could possibly pay the terms

of Ismail's transactions with foreign financiers. Egypt got into the hopeless position of a small sound business that has borrowed for its development from unscrupulous usurers. That Ismail should have been tempted, as were contemporary Oriental rulers, to exploit the new credit of his State with European capitalists, and that they should have treated Egypt no better than any other Eastern State, is comprehensible enough. But Ismail had made himself an expert in the technique of high finance as few rulers Eastern or European have done. He went into all the details of each transaction. He disgraced Nubar for several years for a loan, on which he had worked out the interest to be fourteen per cent. ; and at the same time he was himself having Treasury Bills discounted at thirty per cent. How, knowing as much as he did, he got into such a mess is a matter rather for psychologists than for political students. Anyhow, the morass of liability in which he involved himself was bottomless. The State loans placed with Goschens (1862, 1864, 1866), Oppenheim's (1873), Bischofsheim's (1870), and Rothschild's (1879), show that for a liability of seventy-seven millions Egypt actually received about fifty millions. In one Oppenheim loan (1873), for a liability of thirty-two millions, involving an annual charge of three and a half millions, Egypt received less than eighteen millions. The less official transactions were even more leonine. Never has there been such a spoiling of the Egyptians by the chosen people.

Moreover, a very large proportion of the produce of the loans went abroad again as profit on foreign contracts. Take the Alexandria harbour works as one of the better examples, for they were duly completed and well constructed by competent British contractors. But, of the contract price of £3,000,000, one half would, in the

opinion of Sir Rivers Wilson, have paid for the work. Yet it was the claim under this contract that forced on the final crisis.

What made this financial failure especially ruinous was that Ismail had revived much of Mehemet Ali's system of State trading. He had made himself owner of a fifth of the cultivated area of Egypt, and he had tried to market the produce on speculative lines. His favourite operation was selling a bear in wheat, and he never seemed to learn from his losses. He also ran a sugar monopoly and several shipping lines. Mehemet Ali's system might be called State Socialism, for the whole national economy was organised as a business entity. Ismail's system was rather an overgrown "vertical trust," such as those which have bankrupted even first-class business brains with the best assistance. And Ismail had neither. He was just an explorer, and he fell among thieves.

When we examine the more personal expenditures of Ismail, such as his jewelled gold services for the Sultan, or his gorgeous entertainments for the French Empress and the Emperor of Austria, we are shocked at the shameless swindling of his foreign caterers and contractors. Though it must be admitted that when a business man tries to bolster up his credit by ostentatious expenditure, he undoubtedly invites this sort of exploitation. Moreover, Ismail's advertising was itself almost fraudulent. To impress a foreign capitalist he would erect a sugar refinery and equip it with modern machinery, which was then left to rust. To impress a crowned head he would run up a Louis XIV. palace, fill it with bewigged valets in appropriate costume, and then leave it to rot. Nor did he confine his efforts to impressing visitors to Egypt. The *clou* of the Paris Exhibition of 1867 was his

city of pyramids and pavilions, peopled with real Bedawin on white camels. Yet the total of his expenditures for this purpose, including the eleemosynary embassies to Constantinople, the expedition to Crete, and the entertaining of Europe, did not reach the fifteen millions which was the value of the domain lands (*daira*) that he eventually surrendered to his creditors. While the sixteen millions spent on the Suez Canal and the two millions for suppressing slavery in the Sudan were services to Europe, if not so to Egypt.

As Ismail's extravagance eventually led to a quarter century of British occupation of Egypt, the accounts of his administration are nearly all coloured either into a defence or into an indictment of British policy. In the first case, Ismail appears as the villain, in the other as the victim of the piece. But this would seem to be giving him an undue importance. He takes his proper place between Abdul Aziz of Constantinople and Abdul Aziz of Morocco just as the Egyptian crisis takes its place between the course of events in Tunis and that in Turkey. That it was the British and not the French that occupied Egypt was due to no superiority of British over French statesmanship in enterprise or in intrigue, but to the force of circumstances having driven the British rather than the French into action. Ismail's personality only counts in so far as Egypt may complain of him that, if he had had as much courage as he had cleverness, he might have saved Cairo from foreign occupation even as Constantinople was saved.

The foreign occupation of Egypt began almost imperceptibly as a part of Ismail's financial operations. For, by 1873, in spite of a buoyant revenue and the bumper prices of cotton, the Khedive was already heavily, though not yet hopelessly, dipped. The revenues

of the railways and royal domains had been already pledged, the funded debt was already more than the country could bear, and, as the Franco-Prussian war had prevented further loans, the floating debt was accumulating dangerously. He was therefore forced to anticipate his revenues. A device for this purpose was the *moukabala*, by which anyone paying half of his next six years' property tax in advance acquired the fee simple of his holding. With the proceeds, sixteen millions, the floating debt was funded, and two millions more were raised by a forced loan. But by November, 1875, the Egyptian funds had fallen to fifty-four, and its Treasury Bills were being discounted at thirty per cent. By April, 1876, the foreign debt charges could no longer be flogged out of the *fellaheen*, and payment was for the first time postponed.

A decree (May 2, 1876) thereupon responded to the representations of the foreign creditors by appointing a foreign receivership—the Commission of the Debt. The French, Austrian, and Italian Governments accepted representation, but the British refused it. They sent out a banker, Mr. Cave, who reported that Egypt could be made solvent; and Lord Derby was very emphatic that: “Mr. Cave’s mission implies no desire to interfere in the internal affairs of Egypt” (*State Papers LXXXIII.*, 1876, p. 2). The British holders of the domain debt were less scrupulous. Being dissatisfied with the decree of consolidation (May 7, 1876) they demanded a separate settlement, and got from the Mixed Tribunals a decision allowing them to foreclose. They then sent out Mr. Goschen, who effected a fresh consolidation that was much to their advantage (November 18, 1876). But no further turns of the screw could extort from the *fellaheen* the annuities of the funded and float-

ing debts or further advances on the outstanding claims. So Ismail, having apparently decided to shift the responsibility of repudiation on to foreign shoulders, appointed (November 18, 1876) Mr. Rivers Wilson and M. de Blignieres as financial controllers, with limited executive powers. The British Government refused his proposals for an extension of the executive employment of foreigners, but nominated Major Baring (Lord Cromer) to the Debt Commission (March, 1877). The Debt Commissioners, the Controllers, and others, sitting as a Commission of Inquiry, then produced a report (August, 1878) severely criticising the Government and calling for various reforms. Ismail responded by announcing that he would become a constitutional ruler, and by appointing Wilson as Minister of Finance and de Blignieres as Minister of Works in a responsible Cabinet. Wilson, in return, relieved the financial crisis by getting from Messrs. Rothschild a loan for eight and a half millions on the security of the domain lands of the Khedival family that had been separated by Ismail from his own property.

By thus appointing European Ministers and by reducing himself to a constitutional prince, the Khedive had, in fact, pawned the only thing left him—his personal power. But he had no real intention of parting with that any more than he had of parting with the eminent domain in the land that he had pledged under the *moukabala*. He only wanted to shift on to his Foreign Ministers the onus abroad of the inevitable repudiation and the odium at home of reducing expenditure and raising revenue. In this the Europeans played into his hands. For attributing all trouble to the personal power of Ismail, and not realising that it was the only sanction for their own position, they simplified their administrative task by ex-

cluding the Khedive from their councils. In this they got useful support from Nubar, the Armenian, who had encouraged both Abbas in his reactionary excesses and Ismail in his reckless extravagance. "An Armenian Vizier and ruin is near," says the Turkish proverb. In the eyes of Egypt, Nubar was as much a foreigner as Wilson, and a Wilson or a de Bignieres were no different from the foreign vermin who had been battenning on Egypt. To the Egyptian, these controllers and commissioners were just king vultures that had settled on the carcass after the concession hunters and such like carrion crows had picked out the eyes.

It is surprising that the sufferings of the Egyptian peasantry did not cause a rising against their oppressors, European and Egyptian. The Europeans drew their high salaries and lived in their extra-territorial and tax-exempted communities. The "Turkish" upper class collected their rents, and were almost as tax-exempt. The Khedive smuggled revenues past the Control to an amount estimated in 1878 at two millions. But it all had to be got out of the *fellaheen*, who were ground to the dust. Of the nine millions flogged out of them in 1878, seven went to the foreign creditors. What the *fellah* paid was limited only by what he possessed. The Omdeh went round, *kurbash* in hand, in company with the Greek usurer. As the *fellah* never had cash his sticks of furniture, his stores of seed-corn, even his clothes were taken. Such coin as came in at this time was from women's ornaments.

The British officials were honest enough to see, and bold enough to say, that in the interest of the population both repudiation and reconstruction were essential. The process of killing the goose that laid golden eggs by plucking it alive offended them as both barbarous and un-

businesslike. But the French did not agree. They considered that Ismail still had large secret hoards, as he undoubtedly had. Their representatives were more under the thumb of their Government, and their Government much under the heel of Egypt's creditors. The position at the Congress of Berlin, especially after the divulgence of Disraeli's secret Cyprus Convention, was such as to make opposition to French policy in Egypt impolitic. Nothing could be done, therefore, but somehow to raise revenue and reduce expenditure. And the only possibility of this kind was to tax the Egyptian upper class and turn off the army officers.

It would have been difficult for Ismail to support such measures at the dictation of foreign officials dressed up as Egyptian Ministers. But he had no intention of doing so. He had quite enough Oriental statecraft to "let pigs at sea cut their own throats." He at once began intriguing with the Notables against any increase of the *ushuri* tax and encouraging the officers to resist dismissals. Thus some two thousand officers under notice were invited by the Minister of War to Cairo on a flimsy pretext. These, with five hundred other similarly afflicted comrades in Cairo, made a mob of malcontents more than a match for the Cairo garrison. When these angry men, mostly Circassians and similar spadassins, came to him demanding their arrears of pay, Ismail referred them to "his Ministers," with the result that Nubar was mobbed, and Wilson, coming to his rescue, both were maltreated and made prisoners. Ismail then came down and dramatically extricated them, both troops and mutineers being wounded in the scuffle (February 18, 1879).

Next day Ismail demanded the restoration of his governmental authority and the dismissal of Nubar "so

that order might be re-established." The British, on the advice of Lord Vivian and Major Baring, supported him against Wilson and the French. Finally, not Ismail, but his heir, Tewfik, was made President of the Council. Nubar was dropped, but in return Vivian was recalled.

Encouraged by this success, Ismail tried again. He had recovered half his power through the army. He now resolved to recover the rest with the help of the Assembly of Notables. A long expected report of the Commission of Inquiry, though not yet submitted to the Powers, was known to recommend a reduction of interest on the debt to five per cent. and a scaling down of all claims by fifty per cent. ; also, a repudiation of the liabilities to land-owners under the *moukabala* and an increase of the *ushuri* tax on the well-to-do. And while it was obvious that the foreign creditors would move heaven and earth against the first two proposals, it was no less likely that the landed class would be disposed to raise hell against the second two. Which hell would equally probably take the form of a Moslem anti-Christian agitation. Then the Khedive and the Assembly would intervene to save the situation. Accordingly we find the British agent, Lascelles, reporting (April 1, 1879) : "Considerable agitation exists here. The Sheikh-el-Bekhri (Head of the Religious Corporations) holds meetings with the Notables and Ulema, exciting religious animosity against the European Ministers." He adds (April 4) : "There is constant communication between the Khedive and the more influential persons who attend the meetings. Their object is to obtain support for the financial plan which the Khedive is preparing in opposition to that of Sir Rivers Wilson, and to get up petitions to H.H. to put in force the Turkish Constitution promulgated here in 1877, but

which has remained a dead letter. The arguments addressed to the wealthy were that if Sir R. Wilson's plan came into force the taxes on *ushuri* lands would be increased and the benefits conferred by the *moukabala* law lost, and that . . . it is the intention of the European Ministers to hand over the country to Europeans, and thus jeopardise the Moslem faith."

When the European Ministers, in their turn, called Ismail's attention to the danger of the agitation, he considered the time had come to act. He convoked the Diplomatic Corps, and said that the situation required prompt action (April 9). Prince Tewfik resigned, and the two European Ministers were told by Ismail that in obedience to the wishes of the nation he had entrusted Sherif Pasha with the formation of an all-Egyptian Ministry (April 22). Major Baring and the French Commissioner were then invited to resume the duties of Controllers, but refused. Baring resigned, as did many other British officials. Sherif was instructed to prepare a Constitution, which the Khedive calculated would serve as a lightning conductor.

But Ismail this time had gone too far and too fast. It was a clever game, and much the same as was then successfully being played at Constantinople by Abdul Hamid. But Abdul Hamid was a "dark horse," and he slipped out of the Concert's corral and then got rid of his constitutional trappings very discreetly. Everyone knew that Ismail was a "rogue," and when he thus pitched his European jockey right into the grand-stand, it was clear that his constitutional leading-rein wouldn't long hold him. And yet the British opened negotiations. Lord Salisbury's despatch demanding a restoration of the European Ministers (April 25) was followed by a discussion of other plans. The improved technique of to-day

in arranging "invisible" occupations would have easily evolved a working compromise. But the problem was complicated by the competition between British and French and by the conviction of both their representatives that there was nothing to be made of the Assembly and nothing to be done with the Khedive. It was, indeed, too readily assumed that Ismail, as a constitutional ruler, was a wolf in sheep's clothing. He was much more like a fox taking refuge among sheep from the hounds.

Moreover, Ismail's financial proposals were more favourable to foreign creditors than those of the Commission of Inquiry, as Ismail knew when he excluded the Commission's Report from the mail bags so that his own proposals might reach Europe first. The financial criticisms of Ismail's project, even as argued by Lord Cromer, are quite unconvincing. The real issue was not the measure of financial repudiation, but the measure of political reform. Political reform required time; and so reluctant were both British and French at this time to assume direct responsibility for the Government of Egypt that time might have been allowed but for the intervention of a third party that forced their hand.

Bismarck had more than once boasted that he would make Great Britain and France quarrel over Egypt, and he had no intention of letting the Egyptian question settle itself. Here now was an opportunity for putting the British and French at loggerheads, for letting Germany play the lead in high politics, and for placing high finance under an obligation. Mr. Wilfrid Blunt (*Secret History of the Occupation*, p. 65) tells a well authenticated story of how Wilson resented his dismissal by "that little scoundrel" Ismail, and his desertion by

the British Government, of how he went to Rothschilds and frightened them with the possible loss of their loan, half of which they still held, and of how Rothschilds, failing to move the British and French Governments, appealed to Bismarck. Whatever his reasons may have been, Bismarck suddenly produced a declaration accusing Ismail of "an open and direct violation of an international engagement." This forced Great Britain and France to take action in order to recover their position. So they took the plunge and called on Ismail to abdicate (June 19, 1879).

Had Ismail been a man of courage he might yet have saved himself from exile and Egypt from foreign occupation. For the Sultan, through whom alone the Powers could act, was very reluctant to intervene against a Moslem ruler at the instigation of two Christian States, both of which were at that time at war with the Faithful. The Sultan would therefore have stood aside had the Khedive showed fight. And Ismail did issue a decree calling for a hundred and fifty thousand men (June 25). But no one believed in his campaign any more than they had believed in his Constitution. Sir F. Lascelles had written (April 26): "The discontent in the army has given rise to a feeling of hostility towards the Khedive . . . as being responsible for the disastrous condition of the country." Every one knew that Ismail had fled to Italy from the Asiatic cholera in 1865, and that he was now getting ready to fly there again from the European consolos. When the Sultan deposed him (June 26) his last hold on Egypt was taken away. For he was a Turk who had ruled Egypt through Turks, and who had ruined it *à la Turca*.

When Ismail embarked on his costly yacht (June 30) with a cargo of crown jewels and other public property,

he took with him no regrets of the Egyptian people. If he was unfairly used by Europe, some posthumous reparation has been made by giving to his son that title of King of Egypt to which he himself had so ardently aspired.

CHAPTER III
THE BRITISH OCCUPATION
TEWFIK—ARABI—GLADSTONE

“Then spake Azariah the son of Hoshaiab, and Johanan the son of Kareah, and all the proud men, saying unto Jeremiah, Thou speakest falsely : the Lord our God hath not sent thee to say, Go not into Egypt to sojourn there.”—JER. xliii. 2.

THE time had now come when, in the words of Jeremiah, “the daughter of Egypt was to be delivered into the hands of the children of the north,” and if Jeremiah be really buried in the ancient tomb that is shown as his in Cairo, this is an unkind irony of fate, in view of his statesmanlike efforts to keep his fellow-countrymen out of Egypt. But perhaps fate treated him more kindly than it did our Liberal prophet, whose reputation it buried there.

The deposition of Ismail by the Powers led to a period of confusion, not unlike that which followed the destruction of the Mamelukes by Napoleon. For there was no personality or authority to take the place of *effendina*—the personal all-powerful government that Egypt then understood. The foreign *condominium* of British and French officials could not take its place, nor could the native *condominium* of a Khedive in leading-strings, and of a Khalif on a leash.

The new Khedive, Ismail's son Tewfik, was inexperienced and unenterprising. The Powers had prevented the Sultan from repudiating the firman of 1873 and from nominating Prince Abdul Halim, a man of parts and of

personality. Tewfik, both from personality and from policy, preferred keeping in the background and moving by the backstairs. It would, indeed, take a book by itself to trace the tortuosities of Tewfik ; for his procedure was that of the Oriental when oppressed—to truckle to the most powerful and betray them to the next most powerful. Tewfik was, in fact, a type of that feminine temperament that is especially Egyptian—a temperament that is best ruled through its admiration for the forcible and through its aspiration for their favours. By his forcible foreign advisers he was accepted as a correct and conscientious partner. In his private life and public duties he was unexceptionable. He deceived everyone, did nothing, and died Khedive.

As for the Sultan, Abdul Hamid, he, too, was accepted at that time as a correct and constitutional reformer, a reputation which he considerably outlived. If Tewfik had the cleverness of a hunted hare, Abdul had the cunning but also the cowardice of a hunting fox. Greedy to get his teeth into the fat revenues of Egypt, he feared to swallow a poisoned bait or to get chopped in the pack of the Powers. He had the help of the leading "Turks" in Egypt, which included the Pashas and general officers ; but he had the hatred of the Arabs, Nubians, and Copts, and of the army regimental officers, with the rank and file. Moreover, the modernised minority of the "Turkish" ruling class, including all the non-Turkish elements, were already organised in a Nationalist Constitutional Party that looked on all Turks as their enemies.

The Powers, by deferring the deposition of Ismail to the Sultan, had given him an opportunity of reasserting his authority, of which he did not fail to avail himself. His attempt to repeal the firman of 1873 was opposed

strongly by the French and less strongly by the British. And both eventually agreed in insisting on a maintenance of the succession as provided in the firman ; while the French secured a maintenance of the right of Egypt to make treaties, and the British secured a restoration of the restrictions on the size of the army and on the contraction of loans—which difference in the policies of British and French is easily explained by their divergent imperial objects. Thus the British were protecting internationally their communications by the Canal. The French were preparing further extensions for their empire in North Africa. And the future Egyptian historian will no doubt draw a moral from the miscarriage of policies that were little concerned with the interests of Egypt itself. For the consequence of either policy was the contrary of its purpose. The French, as it turned out, had facilitated the future British occupation, while the British had heavily handicapped it.

The Sultan thus put in his place, there remained the reorganisation of the Dual Control. The Egyptian Constitutional Nationalists, under Sherif, strongly opposed a reappointment of European Ministers or a reassignment of executive powers to the Controllers. So it was eventually settled that the British and French Controllers were to have advisory powers only and a consultative voice in the Cabinet. But they were no longer to be revocable by the Egyptian Government, and in that respect, as Mr. Gladstone later pointed out (House of Commons, July 27, 1882), the foreign financial control had become political. The division of functions between them, which had previously favoured the British, was left undefined. They were generally charged with helping Egypt to pay its debt, while payment itself was in charge of the Debt Commission, on which Germany now got

representation (April 2, 1880), and of which Rivers Wilson became President. In respect of debt payment, the Controllors thus represented the Egyptian contributor, the Commission represented the European creditor.

It was a misfortune that Major Baring was at this crisis transferred to India as Financial Secretary (June, 1880), for he had already done much to convince Egyptians that a British official could be not only disinterested but could even be devoted to Egyptian interests as distinct from those of England. Moreover, as a Liberal with a lively though limited recognition of Egypt's rights, direct contact with this first phase of the Nationalist movement might have modified his contempt as a *proconsul* for the Constitutional Party or even his condemnation as a Liberal for any political action by the army. But he was succeeded by Sir Auckland Colvin, an Anglo-Indian administrator whose attitude towards educated Egyptians was that of the Burra Sahib to the Babu, and who approached the Nationalist agitation in the army as though it were an incipient and insignificant Indian Mutiny.

If Egypt was treated with contempt as a backward and bankrupt Native State by such ex-Indian officials, this was tempered by the correctness with which it was treated by the British Agency as a foreign State in diplomatic relations. But Sir E. Malet was new to the post, and was left to form his own policy. For Gladstone and Granville had now succeeded Disraeli and Salisbury, and no one, themselves included, knew what our policy really was. Malet in these conditions was naturally most concerned to avoid the fate of his French colleague, M. de Ring, who was so heavily backing the Nationalists that he eventually broke himself. Indeed, whatever line the

one Agency took, the other was likely to take the opposite.

“Have you ever seen a dog and a cat taking a mouse for a walk?” was the description by an Egyptian of the *condominium*. And it was indeed a complicated balance of power on which this international government was based—a balance between the Concert of Europe and the Anglo-French *condominium*, between the *condominium* and Constantinople, between the British and French, and between the old native régime and the new Nationalist movement. Much time and trouble were lost in working out the compromises and least common multiples of these various factors. Yet somehow something was done by the Controllers, who, without friction between themselves or recourse to foreign pressure, secured a large instalment of the reforms recommended by the Commission of Inquiry. Thus *ushuri* land was taxed and the *moukabala* repealed. Poll-tax, octroi, and a score of petty indirect taxes were abolished. The salt and land taxes were reformed. And the burden of taxation was thereby shifted in part from the workers to the well-to-do. The rate of interest on the debt was reduced from six per cent. to four per cent., and the Budget to eight and a half millions, of which half only was to be reserved for debt repayments and *chârges*. The taxes were so carefully collected that the *kurbash* and *corvée* lost much of their terrors. The rate of interest of usurers fell by half, and the value of land doubled. And when we consider that this was only the first stage of convalescence from complete collapse, we shall conclude that this experiment in international government does not deserve its general contemporary condemnation as unworkable. True everything was starved and much was strangled altogether in the struggle to pay foreign debts,

many of them fraudulent. But the Dual Control would have deserved well of Egypt if it could only have carried on until an Egyptian constitutional government had had time to organise. Unluckily the Control came into sharp collision with the Nationalist movement in its first stage.

The first movement of the Egyptian people towards self-government is represented by the campaigns of Mehemet Ali. The second, which we now approach, was more pacific but less successful. Possibly because it was more popular, and acted not through an autocracy or even through an aristocracy, but mainly through the army, and also because it had to overcome the opposition of the Powers, and not that of the Porte. That the movement never was recognised in Europe as a national renaissance was due to the two liberal Powers, England and France, being preoccupied with their strategic and financial interests in Egypt, and to their being persuaded that this political movement was irreconcilable therewith. Misconception of the movement was also due to its own incomplete and unconvincing character. For after fifty years of practically independent existence the Egyptians were only just beginning to give their nationalism political expression. And any other expression it never had had and has not yet had. Moreover, like all national movements, that of Egypt derived from different currents of opinion, and was divided into different channels of expression. And none of these was strong enough by itself to wash down the weirs with which vested interests had obstructed its course. Finally, the Dual Control had removed real grievances that might have raised such a head of revolt as would have united all its currents and swept all obstacles away.

The three components of Egyptian nationalism that would have had to unite to form a national government

were much the same as in other Oriental nations then in the making. There was in the first place the movement for reform of Islamic ideals and institutions. This had always had its centre in Egypt, just as the Wahabite movement for a puritan reaction has always been confined to Arabia. Islamic reform was at this time headed by a remarkable man, Jemal-ed-Din, by origin an Afghan. His philosophy taught that all progress can not only be reconciled with, but is revealed in the principles of Islam. Which doctrine was about as welcome to the rulers of Islam as would be to our rulers the doctrine that Communism is applied Christianity. So as soon as his intellectual gifts and spiritual power had made him the leading influence with the young Softas at Constantinople he was exiled, and came to el Azhar (1871). There, though a Sunnite of the Hanefite school, he had even greater success with the more liberal Malekite and Shafiite Moslem. And as the political bearing of his philosophy was hostile to the Ottoman Khalifate he was not interfered with by Ismail. His following was indeed used by Ismail in his last efforts to excite an anti-foreign agitation. Consequently, on the accession of Tewfik and the Dual Control, one of their first acts was the exile of "el Afghani." But his following by then included the Sheikh Mohamed Abdu, afterwards Grand Mufti, and all the active minds of el Azhar. These spiritual leaders inspired the new national movement with an Islamic and Asiatic philosophy, and invested it with a moral sanction for Moslem minds. Even more material service was also rendered by Sheikh Mohamed Abdu, who as press censor, with the aid of British Liberalism, allowed a freedom of speech previously unheard of in the Near East. At least, these Moslem reformers neutralised the reactionary Turcophil Ulema.

Next in order to the religious reformers came the Constitutionalists, headed by Sherif Pasha "el Franzawi" (the Frenchman). These saw salvation in the adoption of a Western Constitution, which should incorporate as far as possible existing Eastern institutions. They did not much differ from their colleagues and contemporaries in Turkey under Ali Fuad and Midhat. They were members, though a minority, of the "Turkish" ruling class, and had therefore to overcome the growing antagonism of the native Egyptians to that oligarchy. Moreover, the old "Turkish" reactionaries of this class had entered into an unholy alliance with the now dominant foreigner. This made things very difficult for these constitutionalist progressives. They had to fight, on the one side their natural associates of the old ruling class, and on the other side their natural allies, the representatives of Western Liberalism. Besides this, relations between the Constitutionalists and the foreign control had been falsified from the first by Ismail having called the Constitutionalists to power as part of his conflict with the foreigner. Another difficulty was that foreign officials anxious to help the *fellaheen* were no friends of the Chamber of Notables, which represented merely the ruling class. And Foreign Liberals, the Controllers among them, were more concerned with protecting the Egyptian peasantry against that class. All these facts must be remembered before we condemn off-hand the cavalier treatment of the Constitutionalists by the Dual Control.

Tewfik on his accession had kept Sherif, who at once submitted to him a draft Constitution. This the Khedive rejected, and Sherif thereupon resigned (August 18, 1878). Tewfik explained that he considered the Constitution a mere *décor de théâtre*, and that he intended to

return to a personal despotism. His foreign advisers approved his rejection of the Constitution, but drew the line at his restoration of despotism. He was accordingly induced to recognise Ismail's rescript (August 28, 1878), establishing responsible Ministers. He was told to appoint as President of the Council Riaz Pasha, a Moslem of Jewish race belonging to the "Turkish" party, who had the confidence of the British. The Ministry was a Coalition. Headed by Riaz—it included Osman Rifky as War Minister—a reactionary, who despised the Egyptian regimental officers, and also two Constitutionalist Nationalists, one of whom was Mahmoud Bey Sami, of whom more anon. The Khedive was given the right of presiding over the Council, and the change may be summarised as a reaction to the old triumvirate of autocratic Khedive, "Turkish" oligarchy, and foreign controllers.

But the elimination of the Constitutionals and of the Chamber resulted in relegating the sole representation of the national movement to the army. And here again we find an unfortunate misconception by foreign opinion. It was assumed that the nationalist activities of the army that now ensued were the same in cause and in character as the military mutiny previously excited by Ismail. Thus the mobbing of Nubar and Wilson is generally referred to as the First Mutiny and the military actions under Arabi at Khasr-el-Nil and at Abdin as Second and Third Mutinies. But the second two were quite distinct from the first. The disorders in 1878 were made by Turco-Circassian officers of the old military caste for pay and privilege. They were really the last of the old mutinies of mercenaries common in the days of Mehemet Ali. The demonstrations under Arabi were orderly political operations with popular support. They were performed

by native Egyptian regiments led by native Egyptian Colonels in alliance with the Constitutionals. And the army, it must be remembered, was the only representation allowed to the native *fellaheen*, who provided not only the ranks but the regimental officers of these "Egyptian" regiments. There were, no doubt, grievances involved. Under Said the colonelcies had been open to Egyptians, but Ismail had promoted only Circassians, Syrians, and Arabs, as being more showy. The general officers had always been Turks. Thus the Egyptian regimental officers found themselves relegated with their rank and file to working as navvies on canals and roads. Or if they had to fight, found their lives thrown away, as in Abyssinia, by the bad strategy and staffwork of the palace protégés. And the accession of Tewfik brought no redress but only reductions of pay and promotion to pay the foreign control and the foreign creditors.

Of the three *fellah* Colonels of the Egyptian regiments one soon became conspicuous, not so much by his ability as by being a typical *fellah*. This was Ahmed Bey Arabi, the son of a village sheikh, a student of el Azhar and an A.D.C. under Said. Simple and slow, but with a shrewd eye for essentials—impressive from his bigness and benevolence and a sincere speaker of the religious rhetorical class—a *fellah* who could overcome the temperament and tradition of his race enough to take action against authority—Arabi had all the makings of a Garibaldi, except the military eye and experience. He and his colleagues had been opposed to Ismail and to the "Turkish" ruling class, and they were at no time anti-Christian or anti-foreign. Their real sanction and support was not so much from the soldiers they commanded as from their own class mates, the village

sheikhs. These sheikhs, often petty tyrants themselves, could ensure the Colonels' popular support for a campaign against the tyranny of the "Turkish" Khedive and of the Frankish creditor.

We have, then, in these three factions all the elements of a national party not as yet properly fused. All these three elements were acting independently in their own interest. Thus, the exile of the Islamic "el Afghani" provoked no protest from the Constitutionalists; and the dismissal of the constitutional "el Franzawi" aroused no agitation in the army. But the elimination both of the religious and political elements concentrated the nationalist energies in the army, and it was not long before both pamphlets and petitions were circulating among the Egyptian regiments, making appeals both to Moslem fanaticism and to modern constitutionalism.

The first appearance of the army in politics was, however, reasonable enough, and even received the approval of the foreign consuls. A petition for redress of grievances as to pay and promotion was presented by the *fellah* officers (May 20, 1880). The French Agent, M. de Ring, patronised the petitioners, and the Khedive opened communication with them through a *fellah* A.D.C., Ali Bey Fehmy. They were also advised and assisted by the two constitutional Ministers. The next move was a demand for the dismissal of Osman Rifki the Turk, courageously presented to Riaz in person by the two Colonels Arabi and Abd-el-Aal. It was as great a marvel as though two sheep had suggested a change of butchers. "Your petition is *muhlik*—a hanging matter—are you going to change the Government?" bullied the enraged old Turk. "Is Egypt, then, a woman who has borne but eight sons?" retorted Arabi, alluding to the eight Ministers (January 15, 1881).

The Khedive thereupon called a Council of Ministers, to which the Controllers were not summoned, and it was decided to arrest the *fellah* Colonels. They were summoned to the Kasr-el-Nil Palace, and on arrival were disarmed by Osman Rifki and his following of Circassian officers (February 3, 1881). El Franzawi and the Constitutionalists had been as easily despatched as was el Afghani and the Islamists. It was no doubt now intended that the Colonels should be exiled to the top of the Nile or to the bottom. But they had been warned, and had arranged a rescue by one of the *fellah* regiments. These jolly fellows burst in on the court-martial, upset them off their chairs, emptied the inkpots on their heads, and chased them with roars of laughter out of the windows. It looked as though Turkish prestige had lost its power. Arabi became a national hero and Osman Rifki retired. Riaz would have had to go, too, but for British support. M. de Ring, who had supported the Colonels, was recalled, but Malet took up their grievances and got concessions to their demands. While their constitutionalist protector in the Ministry, Mahmoud Bey Sami, became Minister of War.

This Kasr-el-Nil incident not only made the *fellah* Colonels and their regiments the spokesmen and spearhead of the national movement, but decided the time-serving Tewfik to give it his secret support. The relations between Arabi, Mahmoud Sami, and Tewfik can at this time be compared to those of Garibaldi, Cavour, and Victor Emmanuel. The demands of the army also assumed a national character. The Colonels called for an increase of effectives to the full eighteen thousand allowed. To this they added a demand for a Constitution, which probably they chiefly valued as a protection for themselves. Finally, they appended a programme

of reforms such as were subsequently realised, including abolition of the *corvée*, restrictions on usury, regulation of water rights, etc. Which programme was the work of Mahmoud Bey Sami el Baroudi, so called after his powder-mills. He was a typical Georgian Mameluke, with all the artistic, literary, and political talents of his race. He had served Ismail in somewhat dubious capacities, and had been implicated in the murder of the Mufettish. But his political ability and knowledge of foreign affairs were invaluable to the Nationalists, and his official capacity as Minister enabled him to warn the Colonels of intrigues against their lives.

Though the Colonels had temporarily made peace with the Khedive, yet they did not trust him. "There was no doubt, in the mind of Arabi, that he was to be murdered," writes Sir E. Malet (*Modern Egypt*, p. 183). Any doubts that he might have had were removed when Tewfik, instead of taking the obvious course of restoring Sherif and the Constitutionals to power, suddenly replaced Mahmoud Sami as Minister of War by Daoud Pasha Yeghen, the Khedive's brother-in-law and a reactionary Circassian of the most violent type. This happened, moreover, when the foreign protectors of the Colonel were absent, de Ring having been recalled and Malet being on leave. So when Arabi and Abd-el-Aal were ordered to remove their regiments from Cairo they believed their hour was come. What thereafter passed through go-betweens is obscure, but eventually the Colonels marched their regiments to the Abdin Palace (September 10, 1881), sending a message to Tewfik to meet them there, as they did not want to go to his residence "so as not to frighten the ladies."

The account most generally followed of the dramatic scene in the court of the Abdin Palace is that of Colvin.

He was sent for by the Khedive, and accompanied Tewfik into the hollow square of the insurgent regiments. His report of the leading part he played brought him much kudos ; but he knew no Arabic and the talking was done by Cookson, the British Consul. Colvin did, however, do his best to induce the Khedive to arrest or even shoot Arabi. His version suggests that the Khedive showed cowardice, though to us it seems more like common sense. Colvin reports : " I said to the Viceroy, ' Now is your moment.' He replied : ' We are between four fires.' I said, ' Have courage.' He said, ' We shall all be killed.' " This represents the Khedive and the crisis as seen by a " boy of the bulldog breed." But Arabi gives a picture that seems more true to life in his account : " If the Khedive had shot me the guns would have fired on him, and there would have been bad work. But he was quite well pleased with what passed." And it seems quite possible that the whole programme was prearranged—that the Khedive, having realised the strength of army nationalism, had, for the time, gone over to it, and had only brought Colvin to bear witness that he was under *force majeure*. Indeed, when we read that the troops which were to have ambushed the mutineers from the Palace windows were those same guards under Ali Fehmy that had rescued the Colonels from Osman Rifky, we must suspect that the Khedive was in the plot. The account given by Arabi, who was truthful, suggests throughout a concerted comedy, played with a ruler capable of turning it into a Wat Tyler tragedy. He writes : " We knew that the Khedive was with us. He wished to rid himself of Riaz. . . . His contact with us was through Ali Fehmy, who had brought us this message from him : ' You three are soldiers, with me you make four.' "

Arabi then continues : " You ask me was he sincere ? He never was sincere." Arabi's account of the scene is characteristic : " The Khedive called on me to dismount, and I dismounted. He called on me to put up my sword, and I put up my sword. But my friends the officers then came up to prevent treachery, and some got between him and the Palace. And when I had made my three demands to the Khedive, he said : ' I am Khedive, and my will is law.' I replied : ' We are no slaves, and cannot be willed away.' He said no more, but went into the Palace." Probably this repartee was not according to programme. But all ended well. " The same evening the Khedive sent for me, and I went to the Ismailia Palace and thanked him for agreeing to our requests. But he said only : ' That is enough. Go now and garrison Abdin Palace. But don't let the band play.' " But no one could stop the band playing when it became known that the Khedive had convoked the Chamber of Notables, and had recalled Sherif " el Franzawi " to prepare a Constitution. There ensued such a joy-feast and general fraternisation, as has always celebrated the birth of a free nation. Feuds and factions for the moment disappeared. Sherif took office to oblige the Controllers and Colvin. The Notables joined with the army in supporting the new Ministry. The Colonels promised to be constitutional—having first secured Mahmoud Sami as Minister of War and an increase of the army to eighteen thousand. Egypt seemed to have entered a new era.

This Sherif Ministry (September 14, 1881) offered one more opportunity for a concordat between the European control and constitutional Egypt. The opportunity was lost for two reasons. The Khedive by his treachery forced Arabi and the army to further action,

and the foreign Controllers failed to work with the Constitutional Nationalists. Colvin and Malet, if left to themselves, could have done so. For Colvin, Anglo-Indian autocrat as he was, had by now learnt what the movement meant. In a memorandum written at this time, he says: "The Liberal movement should be in no wise discouraged. Though, in its origin anti-Turk, it is in itself an Egyptian national movement." He had also been won by Arabi's simplicity and sincerity. He reports of an interview: "Arabi, who spoke with great moderation, calmness, and conciliation, is sincere and resolute, but not a practical man." But the general foreign attitude towards the Constitutionals is expressed by Cromer, then absent from Egypt. "There were two parties in opposition to the Khedive—a mutinous army half mad with fear of punishment, and a party the offspring of Ismail's dalliance with constitutionalism, with vague national aspirations. . . . The main thing was to prevent amalgamation" (*Modern Egypt*, p. 188). And not long after (July 27, 1882) Mr. Gladstone, defending military intervention, could go so far as to assert: "It has been charitably believed, even in this country, that the military party was the popular party, and was struggling for the liberties of Egypt. There is not the smallest rag or shred of evidence to support that contention." Thus between the devil of Khedivial intrigue and the deep sea of Gladstonian ignorance, the Constitutionals had little chance of escaping shipwreck.

Tewfik, anxious to rid himself as quickly of Sherif and the Egyptian reformers as he had got rid of Riaz and the "Turkish" reactionaries, had telegraphed to the Sultan for twenty battalions of Turkish troops. Arabi, learning this also, petitioned for Ottoman interven-

tion, with a view to getting rid of Tewfik. Both assumed that the British and French would support an assertion of Ottoman suzerainty. But the policy of both the British and French Governments in the meantime had changed. The French were in difficulties with Tunis, and feared lest the Egyptian Nationalist movement might still further embarrass them there if supported by Ottoman Pan-Islamism. The British general election had just returned a large Liberal majority, elected on anti-Turkish propaganda. So Sherif was assured that Great Britain "would avert from Egypt an occupation by an Ottoman army." And the Sultan was instructed to do nothing. He none the less sent a mission under Ali Nizami to intrigue with Arabi against Tewfik in the interests of the Ottoman Khedival candidate, Prince Halim. This the British and French countered by sending cruisers to Alexandria "as a refuge for foreigners" (*Egypt*, No. 3, 1882, p. 38). Thereupon by arrangement the Ottoman Mission withdrew from Egypt, the Egyptian regiments withdrew from Cairo, and the foreign cruisers withdrew from Alexandria. The more offensive organs, both of the Pan-Islamic and of the anti-Moslem Press, were suppressed under a new Press Law. And the Egyptian Constitutionalist-Nationalists had for the moment a clear course.

As the foreign control persisted in regarding the Khedive as the sole governmental authority, the success of the Constitutionlists depended on the Khedive keeping the confidence of the Colonels so as to prevent them from predominating politically. But the Khedive and the Colonels were soon at daggers drawn. Throughout the winter (1881-1882) Arabi asserted his authority more and more over appointments and in administration. At last, so as to bring him under political control, he was made

Under-Secretary of War. The demand for an increase in the army, which meant almost doubling the army estimates, also brought the Colonels into conflict with the foreign Controllers, who eventually granted two-thirds of the amount asked for.

This collision between the Colonels and the foreign control was aggravated by a conflict between the Controllers and the Constitutionalists. The Chamber of Notables had met (December 26, 1881) to vote the new Constitution. The Constitutionalists claimed for the Chamber the right of voting that half of the Budget that was concerned with revenues not affected by the debt. The Controllers claimed the right to control the whole Budget without reference to the Chamber. This has, indeed, been the crux in all States under foreign financial control, and is the criterion between foreign administration and autonomy. It could have been compromised for the time by giving the Chamber a consultative voice, as the British suggested. The British officials were sensibly working for such a settlement. And Colvin, in a memorandum of this date (*Modern Egypt*, p. 221), lays down principles for a "partnership of three" that would have avoided all subsequent troubles. But, unfortunately, the French were at this time working for a conflict, and not for a compromise.

Gambetta had come to power (November 15, 1881) with a policy of pushing French imperialism in North Africa and of extending the occupation of Tunis to Egypt. Gladstone and his Liberals were bound to acceptance of French policy by the agreements of the Congress of Berlin, and were themselves averse from active intervention in Egypt. So the French, who were already preparing a mysterious military expedition at Toulon, now drafted a Joint Note that was intended to

initiate intervention. This draft was accepted by Dilke, our Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, who was then negotiating a commercial treaty in Paris, and was forced by him on Granville and on Gladstone. Their adherence to this threat of intervention, which was repugnant in every respect to the principles of their foreign policy, can certainly best be explained by their anxiety to score off the Protectionist Conservatives through getting a favourable commercial treaty with France on Free Trade lines. But in view of the official denial of any connection between the French Commercial Treaty and the Egyptian Joint Note, we can only assume that the Note was sent because Gladstone was too busy and Granville too lazy to stop it.

Gambetta's Note was, indeed, well calculated to create a crisis. It stated that: "Recent circumstances, especially the meeting of the Chamber of Notables," had caused the two Governments to exchange views. That, as a result, they "consider the maintenance of the Khedive on the throne . . . as alone able to guarantee the order and prosperity of Egypt," and that they will "guard by their united efforts against all cause of complication, internal or external, which might menace the established order in Egypt." What Gambetta meant by that everybody knew. What Gladstone meant no one could guess. And in vain did Lord Granville add a rider to the Note that: "Her Majesty's Government must not be considered as committing themselves thereby to any particular mode of action." In vain did Malet explain that the "cause of complication" was really Abdul Hamid and not Arabi. In vain did Blunt, Gregory, and other British patrons of the Nationalists protest that Gladstonian Liberals would never try to conquer Egypt. For were not those Liberals at the moment coercing

Ireland? Were not their French allies at the moment conquering Tunis? What was the objective of the Toulon expedition? "Let them come," said Arabi. "Every man and child in Egypt will fight them." And thereafter the army became the only hope of Egyptian Nationalists, and Arabi became "el Wahid" (the Only One).

The Joint Note ended all possibility of a constitutional settlement. Colvin's view, as expressed by John Morley (*Fortnightly*, July, 1882), was "That it was mischievous in the highest degree. The Khedive was encouraged in his opposition to the Chamber. The military or popular party was alarmed. The Sultan was irritated. The other European Powers made uneasy. Every element of disturbance was aroused to activity." Mr. Blunt, who tried to reconcile Arabi to its terms, found that the Nationalists had been irretrievably alienated (*Secret History*, p. 190). Lord Cromer writes: "From the moment the Joint Note was issued, intervention became an almost unavoidable necessity" (*Modern Egypt*, p. 285). Unavoidable perhaps; but it was never in any respect necessary.

The first result of the Note was that the militarist Nationalists stiffened the Chamber to insisting on its full claim to budgetary control. The British were prepared to concede this, and pressed the French to do so (January 25, 1882). Gambetta refused, and eventually a Joint Note was presented claiming that the Chamber could not vote on the Budget without infringing the decrees establishing control. This Note went on to propose negotiations; but the Chamber, holding that Sherif had been unduly diplomatic, made the Khedive dismiss him and appoint Mahmoud Sami Premier, with Arabi as Minister of War. All the other Ministers were Nation-

alists, except Mustapha Fehmy at Foreign Affairs. The new Constitution was then introduced (for text see Blunt's *Secret History*).

The throwing over of Sherif by the radical Nationalists was a grave blunder. It was in no way compensated by a stroke of luck when Gambetta left office and was replaced by de Freycinet, a non-interventionist. For any advantage in this for Egypt was counterbalanced by an even more startling change in British policy. Thereafter we find the British Liberals fighting a losing battle against the growing pressure for British intervention. They opened negotiations as to the new Constitution, but now no longer got any encouragement from their representatives in Egypt. Colvin wrote: "Until civil authority is restored and the military despotism destroyed, discussion of the organic law seems useless." Cookson reported: "The pretended aspirations for legality and constitutional liberty have ended in substituting the indisputable will of the army for all legal authority." Malet considered that the control existed only in name. It was the same chorus in a new note as when the Palmerstonian Foreign Office had decided on intervening against Mehemet Ali. Granville told Blunt (March 10) that as the Chamber would not give up their claim to vote the Budget "it must end by their being put down by force." Mediating proposals that Granville subsequently made, under Liberal pressure, for the despatch of dual commissioners were ridiculed by his subordinates. A section of the Cabinet, the Foreign Office, and the local officials henceforth worked energetically for a British intervention. The London Press began a regular *hetze* against Arabi, whom it painted as a blood-thirsty mutineer and a treacherous fanatic.

The main accusation against Arabi was that he was

preparing an Indian mutiny and a British massacre. Evidence for this was seen in his raising fresh battalions in preparation for national resistance against intervention. While his severe suppression of a rather shadowy plot among the Circassian officers of the army, due, no doubt, to his determination to eliminate all non-Egyptian elements, was made the ground for a regular "atrocities" campaign. Moreover, when the Khedive and Malet very properly insisted on the penalties being mitigated, the Nationalists interpreted their intervention as evidence of their complicity in the plot (May 9). The Nationalists thereafter decided to work for the deposition of the Khedive and for alliance with the Sultan. The Chamber was convoked without the Khedive's authority, and a very confused crisis ensued. Some of the more pacifist and progressive notables, under Sultan Pasha, President of the Chamber, now followed Sherif into opposition to militant nationalism, which secession, subsequently bitterly regretted by its leaders, was represented abroad as a complete breach between Constitutionalists and militarists. Finally, the fears of a massacre in the foreign colonies and the Christian communities, always easily excited in the East, became acute in view of an agitation headed by the local Sheikh-ul-Islam and by an incendiary orator, Nadim.

The British Government, now renouncing all further efforts at reconciliation with the Nationalists, began discussion with the French as to what form intervention should take. The line of least resistance between the personal opposition to intervention of Gladstone and Bright and the pressure for it among their colleagues and in the country, led to an attempt to organise an Ottoman intervention under international sanction. The French disliked any action at all, but agreed (May 21)

to the despatch of a joint naval squadron for the protection of foreigners with a view to subsequent Turkish military action. But this did not suit the Sultan, who could not act as policeman for the Christian Powers against what had become a Pan-Islamic movement. He was moreover, through an agent, Essad Pasha, already in treaty with Arabi. The British and French warships duly arrived (May 20), but such naval demonstrations, however effective against weak Governments, merely inflame popular movements. Arabi called out the *redifs* (reservists) and began raising batteries at Alexandria (June 3). Thereupon an attempt was made to impose terms on the Nationalists under threat of the warships. An ultimatum was sent to the President of the Council (May 25) demanding the demission of the Ministry and the deportation of the three Colonels. The Ministry resigned, but in doing so denounced Tewfik for subservience to foreign Powers and of the Sultan's firman. Tewfik, who had wanted to take refuge in Alexandria under the guns of the fleet, but had failed to get away, was then forced to reinstate Arabi and the Ministry, in response to petitions from the Ulema, Notables, and leading Christians, and under menace of a rising in Cairo. None the less, his deposition was now openly discussed.

The result of our "ultimatum" had thus been to make Arabi ruler of Egypt and Tewfik his hostage. It also gave the Nationalist movement an even more Moslem and militarist tendency. Business was at a standstill. There was an exodus of foreigners and Christians. Malet reported (May 31): "A collision might at any moment occur between Moslem and Christian." The Powers had, in fact, themselves created the militarism that they now felt themselves compelled to crush.

The obvious and, diplomatically speaking, least

objectionable weapon with which the Powers could crush the Egyptian Nationalist forces was an Ottoman army. The British wanted such Ottoman intervention for the suppression of Arabi and the restoration of foreign authority. But Arabi wanted it also for the deposition of Tewfik and for resistance to foreign control. Gladstone very properly would only allow a Turkish force if it were clearly under foreign control. While the Sultan would only intervene as Khalif and Commander of the Faithful, and could not do so as a gendarme of the *ghiaours*. Abdul Hamid accordingly arrived at a characteristic compromise by sending a mission composed of Dervish Pasha, who was notorious for his cruelty to rebellious rayahs, and of Sheikh Ahmed Essad, a Pan-Islamic propagandist. Dervish was accredited to Tewfik and the Turkish ruling class. The Sheikh had been already closely associated with the Colonels and Egyptians. Both had independent cipher communication with the Sultan. Dervish was instructed to support Tewfik, arrest Arabi, abolish the Chamber, and call for troops if necessary. Essad was to act with Arabi and assure the Chamber that the Sultan would respect Egyptian autonomy and refuse armed intervention. For which duplicity "Abdul the Damned" has been very generally condemned. Authors like Lord Cromer argue that he thereby lost the last chance of recovering Egypt for the Empire that a strong and straightforward intervention would have secured. But Abdul was between the devil of a Pan-Islamic *djehad* and the deep sea of British sea-power. It would have been fatal for him to commit himself to the deep sea, but the devil was not unfamiliar.

This Egyptian crisis offers us a very interesting example of how an imperialist impulse can change abruptly the whole tone and tendency of the foreign

policy of a British party. Thus we find even the Liberal Press, and that, too, while the thunders of the Midlothian campaign still reverberated, welcoming the despatch of Dervish to Egypt with such war-whoops as that the "revolution in Egypt has found its master" in a man "as capable of ordering a massacre of the Mamelukes as was Mehemet Ali," and who "would succeed with Arabi as he had succeeded with Lazes and Albanians," whom, be it observed, he had half exterminated (John Morley, *Pall Mall Gazette*, June 15, 1882). But Dervish, who was old, had been impressed and intimidated by the Alexandria deputations and demonstrations with their shouts of "Up the Sultan," "Down with the Ultimatum," "Away with the Fleet," "No foreign troops." He did not venture to do more than try to persuade Arabi to go to Constantinople, an invitation to walk into the spider's parlour that was politely declined. Moreover, his authority disappeared altogether on the outbreak of a serious riot in Alexandria the day after his interview with Arabi and Mahmoud Sami (June 10, 1882).

In this Alexandria rioting fifty Christians were killed, including a British naval officer; the British Consul, Cookson, was seriously injured; the Italian and Greek Consuls were grossly maltreated. It had long been anticipated, and was accepted by British officials, as proving that all Egypt was in a state of anarchy. Arabi was at the time condemned as criminally responsible for it, and is still considered by historians as indirectly implicated. And this, although Arabi's regulars restored order and the indictment of Arabi for complicity was dropped at his trial. On the other hand, the counter accusation that the Khedive was involved has never been satisfactorily disproved, and the evidence of Tewfik's complicity with Omar Lutfy is very damaging (Blunt,

Secret History, pp. 497-534). The culprit is now known to have been Omar Lutfy, a Circassian who was Governor of Alexandria. He had been offered by the Khedive Arabi's place as Secretary of War just before the ultimatum, a post which he later obtained and lost (May, 1883) when the case against him was published by Lord Randolph Churchill. Certain it is that the riot could serve neither Abdul Hamid nor Arabi; but could, and did, save Tewfik, whose only hope now lay in immediate foreign intervention.

Arabi and his advisers had not recognised that their series of sensational successes over European diplomacy was forcing the British to armed action. They believed that Gladstone and Bright would be able to uphold their political principles in spite of interventionist influences in the Liberal Government, and that British financial interests would prevent a war which, they were ingenuous enough to believe, would, under international law, cancel foreign pecuniary claims over Egypt. They could not, however, fail to realise that the Alexandria riots had created a crisis that called for concessions. So a peace was patched up with Tewfik; and Mahmoud Sami, as Secretary of War, gave way to Raghib, an anti-militarist. Meantime, the Powers in the Conference at Constantinople were making a last effort to arrange armed action by the Sultan. This Conference met (June 23), and eventually (July 6) invited the Sultan to send troops.

But at Alexandria matters had come to that point at which guns go off by themselves. Arabi's work on the batteries had been stopped by the Sultan. It was again resumed, the Alexandria garrison was reinforced, and the Nationalists called a *levée en masse*. The British admiral, Sir Beauchamp Seymour, was then ordered "to destroy the earthworks and silence the batteries if they opened

fire," an equivocal instruction which the French refused to send to their squadron. Seymour demanded that all work be stopped (July 6), though at the moment none was being done. Three days later, on information that work was being resumed, the Admiral notified the Consuls that he would open fire in twenty-four hours unless all the forts were surrendered. The Powers and the Porte were informed, and the Sultan begged for more time to consider his action, which was refused. At 7 a.m. on July 11 fire was opened, and by 5.30 p.m. the forts were practically destroyed. The Egyptian troops then retired, leaving Alexandria in flames to be looted by the mob, during which disorders several Europeans were murdered. Thereafter (July 13 and 14) British marines were landed and order was restored. Arabi was later charged with having fired the town to cover his retreat, and for this the commander of the rear guard, Suleiman Pasha Sami, was hanged. But there was evidence that the fire began with Seymour's shells and was spread by the mob, which included disbanded soldiers. There seems also to be little in the other charge that the Egyptian troops escaped by misuse of the white flag, for there was no desire to prevent their withdrawal, and the white flag had been the required signal for surrender of the forts.

Sir Beauchamp Seymour's guns shattered more important structures than the ancient stone forts of Mehemet Ali. The bombardment almost shook down the British Government. Bright resigned, and Gladstone was forced by Chamberlain and Hartington to abandon his pacifist principles, as usual covering his change of direction with a smoke-screen of verbiage. He assured Parliament, for example, that England was not engaging in war with Egypt, but in "the operations of war," a

distinction that relieved the minds of Egypt's creditors and removed any risk of international complications. But had he, as Premier, resigned and gone into Opposition, there would have been no further "operations of war." For the bombardment had allayed the superficial irritation against Egypt excited by the Press and had aroused sounder instincts. The English people had begun to realise that in the interests of moneylenders they were forcing a petty people of peaceable peasants to fight for very reasonable rights. Which feeling could, however, find no expression with Gladstone preaching a crusade against anti-Christian anarchy. So when he called for £2,500,000—"to convert the state of Egypt from anarchy and conflict to peace and order"—and announced that—"failing the co-operation of Europe, this great work will be undertaken by the single power of England"—Parliament supported such a comforting combination of Palmerston and Pecksniff by a majority of two hundred and seventy-five to nineteen. So fifteen thousand men sailed from England and five thousand from India under command of Sir Garnet Wolseley, whose instructions were "to suppress a military revolt in Egypt."

The policy of de Freycinet, that France should associate herself in armed action with England in a secondary rôle, satisfied nobody in France. Bismarck, with Austria in tow, anxious to divide Great Britain and France over Egypt, on the one hand encouraged us in independent intervention; and on the other hand took such diplomatic action in Paris as to cause a panic there that he was trying to involve French military resources in an African adventure. Clemenceau denounced this danger, and, on the proposal that France should occupy the northern bank of the Canal and Great Britain the southern (where, of course, all the fighting would be), the French Govern-

ment was defeated by four hundred and sixteen to seventy-five (July 29, 1882). The new Government accepted this as a definite decision against any French intervention. Meantime, Italy was so far conciliated by an invitation to co-operate that was notoriously impossible of acceptance as to suggest to the Constantinople Conference that Great Britain be given a "mandate" in Egypt—the first appearance of this term in Egyptian affairs (Mackenzie Wallace, *Egypt*, 1883, p. 373).

As for Turkey, the bombardment had forced the Sultan to be represented on the Conference, but had not made it easier for him to send Ottoman troops. His long negotiations with our Ambassador, Lord Dufferin, turned on two points. The British required him to proclaim Arabi a rebel and to proceed only as regulated by a military convention with Great Britain. He, however, desired to disembark his troops at Alexandria so that they should garrison it instead of the British. Without the first we obviously could not let loose Turks on Egypt. Without the second he could not appear there as the Liberator of the Faithful from the infidel. Which negotiations continued revolving in their Oriental orbits, raising as they went all manner of side issues, among which a ship load of mules from Smyrna assumed prominence, until the Conference, disregarding Turkish protests, adjourned indefinitely, and events in Egypt were left to take their course.

In Egypt the bombardment had blown away all the bridges that had kept communications open between the conflicting camps. The proof of overwhelming military superiority given by the destruction of the forts had had its political effect. Up till then both the Khedive and Dervish had associated themselves with the Council's decision to reject Seymour's ultimatum; and in the sub-

sequent resistance to the British, Arabi had been acting under the Khedive's authority. Tewfik had even refused to take refuge in the fleet when warned (July 6) of the impending bombardment. But when, from his roof at Ramleh, he had seen weighty reasons for believing that the British meant business, he bribed his guards to take him by train to Alexandria instead of, as arranged by Arabi, to Cairo. There, in the Ras-el-Tin Palace, where Mehemet Ali had been bullied by Napier, he waited, under guard of British marines, the final defeat of his subjects. Dervish returned to Constantinople, where he was put under arrest, while Sherif, Sultan, and other pacific Constitutionalists joined Tewfik under protection of the British. A triple treason that greatly weakened the Egyptian cause, for the army could no longer claim to be fighting either a *djehad* for the Khalif and the Khedive or a war for a national Constitution. No doubt, in strict Islamic doctrine, the Khalif and the Khedive, by taking sides with the infidel, had divested themselves of all authority over the Faithful. But the fact remained that both had proclaimed the Nationalists to be rebels and mutineers, which exposed them to treatment as such not only by foreign armies, but by fellow Moslems. We have since seen the Turkish Nationalists defy a similar denunciation by Sultan and Khalif with a sublime contempt and complete success. But Egyptians are not Turks, and the prestige both of British arms and of the Khalif's authority was greater before than it was after the Great War. Nor was the defection of the Constitutional leaders any less injurious in that it reduced the Nationalists to a mere military faction. Others, who did not openly desert to the enemy, only remained at Cairo the better to betray the Nationalist cause. For Tewfik and his associates could command not only the backing of foreign steel, but

that of foreign gold. It does not increase our respect for Tewfik's clique that the bribes they now freely distributed in Cairo were many of them subsequently found to be false coin. But it is this corruption of political and military leaders that largely accounts for the complete collapse of the Nationalist cause.

British intervention in general, and the military invasion in particular, was then, and still is, generally accepted as having been a necessary action against Egyptian anarchy. The wildest atrocity stories appeared in the Press, and have since been repeated; but there is very little evidence of any disorder, and what there was is suspect of having been deliberately fomented as an excuse for intervention. Thus, in the two days following the bombardment of Alexandria, there were disorders in three neighbouring villages, in which altogether about a hundred Christians were killed.¹ These excesses were due to enraged refugees from Alexandria, encouraged by Mudirs, who had been tampered with by the Khedival faction. But the riots were sharply repressed, and there was no recurrence during the remaining two months of the Nationalist régime. Europeans in Cairo were protected and sent to Port Said under escort if they wished. The machinery of administration and justice worked as usual, and the Treasury accounts were found to be in order and without defalcation when they were later taken over. The Government was carried on by a General Council of religious and civil dignitaries and by a Committee of Defence under Yakoub Pasha Sami. Arabi remained the popular head of the movement; but did as little then towards organising defence as he did later

¹ At Tanta about seventy were killed—mostly Greeks and Syrians. At Mehallet eight Italians. At Damanhur fourteen Christians and a Jew.

in directing it. Private prayer and public receptions occupied his time.

Meantime the army was covering Cairo in a very strong position prepared by Mustapha Fehmy, the engineer, at Kafr-Dawar. A force of several thousand British advancing from Alexandria under General Allison was repulsed, and the army's morale was thereby restored. But no proper preparation was made against the arrival of the main force under Wolseley, which would allow the British to invade Egypt from whichever point they chose. Arabi had been warned that the British would enter the Canal and turn the flank of his position, and Mustapha Fehmy had laid out defensive works at Tel-el-Kebir, but little was done to them. For Arabi had not realised that the day of diplomatising was over. He was relying on the French not to let the Canal be used by the British. And de Lesseps, in order to prevent Arabi from damaging the Canal, had promised that France would maintain its neutrality. The Egyptian army engineers, aware of the danger, had pressed on all the preparations for obstructing the Canal; but Arabi refused his permission until too late. The same evening that his colleagues at last got the order out of him, Wolseley was steaming through the Canal to disembark at Ismailia (August 21, 1882). When de Lesseps posted himself on the quay at Port Said to oppose in person the British violation of his Canal, the marines only saw a fat little Frenchman excitedly jabbering, and brushed him aside.

The first conflict was at Kassasin (August 28), where the Egyptians did fairly well, and the British lost some guns. But the defection of Mahomet Shukry, in face of the enemy, the capture of Mustapha Fehmy, while reconnoitring, and retention of Abd-el-Aal at Damietta, caused a loss of confidence in the Nationalist camp. Then came

the final blow. An adventurous night march enabled the British to surprise the Egyptian army lying inert in its lines at Tel-el-Kebir. The surprise, and possibly treachery, brought the British bayonet attack right through the Egyptian camp (September 2). "The actual fighting ended thirty-five minutes after the first gun was fired," writes Sir William Butler, who was an eyewitness. He goes on to describe how, "complete surprise though it was, the Egyptians, nevertheless, fought with the greatest determination against overwhelming odds. The assault fell on them as a thunderbolt might fall on a man asleep. They were betrayed on every side. Peace be to them—ten thousand, it is said—they died the good death."

The shock shattered the Nationalist army into a mere mob that streamed across the desert in all directions. There was no attempt to rally it. Arabi flung himself upon a horse, and then fled on an engine into Cairo. Two squadrons of British dragoons, riding hard all day through the stream of fugitives, reached Cairo close on his heels, and accepted the surrender of the city and of Arabi. A week later a laconic decree formulated what was already a fact.

"Nous, Khedive d'Égypte, considerant la rebellion militaire. Décrétons—

Art. I. L'armée égyptienne est dissoute.

Signé MEHEMET TEWFIK,

September 1, 1882."

But the Khedive had done more than that. It was Wolseley who had dissolved the Egyptian army. Tewfik had dissolved the Egyptian nation.

The Nationalists had, after Tel-el-Kebir, only two

methods open to them of continuing the struggle—either street-fighting in Cairo or a guerilla campaign in Upper Egypt. The first had been prevented by the promptitude of the British pursuit and by the pusillanimity of Arabi. Any chance there may have been of the second was prevented by the authority in Upper Egypt of Sultan Pasha, who with other provincial notables had joined the Khedival party. But, above all, the nationalist movement, having become mainly military, had received a complete knock-out at Tel-el-Kebir. Its ten thousand half-drilled regulars and as many more undisciplined reservists had been called on to show “two o’clock in the morning courage” against a surprise bayonet attack by an equal number of the pick of the British Army. “I hope to hit Arabi very hard,” Lord Wolseley had written to Lord Cromer in India before the action. And he had. It was, perhaps, the most merciful method. But when the first exultation of the knock-out was over, the feeling that we had not hit a man of our own size brought a reaction in favour of Arabi. So it came about, while the fickle mob of Cairo acclaimed the Khedive and clamoured for the blood of the Nationalist leaders, British public opinion by no means approved the demands of their jingo journals for the execution of Arabi.

The restoration of the Khedive was accompanied by the usual severities of an Oriental reaction. The village sheikhs were again reduced to being tax collectors for the Pashas and the more active Arabists among them were arrested or assassinated. The Turco-Circassian “terror” was, however, soon checked by British authority. Arabi, after unpleasant experiences at the hands of the Khedive’s eunuchs, escaped execution out of hand. Mr. Blunt and his British friends sent him counsel, and his British enemies secured him a State trial. But

this no one was prepared to face. Arabi clearly could not legally be condemned as a rebel for continuing resistance to a foreign invasion when resistance had been begun with the support of his sovereign ruler and of the Sultan's representative ; while revelations of what had really happened would have been most unwelcome to the new régime. Prompt liquidation of the situation was advisable, and that past-master in diplomacy, Lord Dufferin, was for that purpose hurriedly despatched from Constantinople to Cairo. He compromised the Arabi prosecution by arranging for a conviction and for a death sentence that had been commuted in advance to exile in Ceylon. Special Commissions and Courts Martial thereafter imprisoned a good many Nationalists, executed a few, and were then abolished (October, 1883). Within a few months the nationalist movement might never have existed, and Egypt had accepted British administration.

It is the fate of public movements to be gauged by the personality of their most prominent leader. Arabi was a personification of the *fellaheen*, the worthiest and also the weakest factor in the nationalist movement. It was not Egypt but Europe that had forced him into a position for which he was quite unfitted. He, good easy man, had ventured far beyond his depth, and when he fell he fell like Lucifer. But no one can follow his career or read his commentary on the course of events without believing that in overthrowing him we lost the first and best opportunity of bringing Egyptian national sovereignty into permanent and peaceful alliance with British naval supremacy.

CHAPTER IV
EGYPT AND THE SUDAN

THE MAHDI—GORDON

“And they shall be afraid and ashamed of Ethiopia their expectation, and of Egypt their glory.”—ISA. xx. 5.

THOSE who draw morals from history will get a good text for a sermon on the advantages of courage and candour in politics from the policy of British Liberalism in respect of Egypt and the Sudan. For British Liberalism, in the person of its greatest exponent, Gladstone, had succeeded to its own satisfaction in reconciling the occupation of Egypt with its principles by representing what was really a peaceable and progressive national movement and entitled as such to Liberal support, as being an anarchy of Islamic fanatics that Liberalism was entitled to suppress. This was neither clear-sighted nor candid. And, curiously enough, it provided its own penalty by creating what was a real anarchy of Islamic fanaticism in the neighbouring Sudan. Now, the occupation of Egypt was a popular and profitable enterprise, but a campaign in and a conquest of the Sudan, with its wild tribes and empty wastes, would have been highly unpopular, and at that time unprofitable. Accordingly, Gladstonian Liberalism abandoned the Egyptian Sudan to savagery and slavery; and, in trying to camouflage this want of courage and consistency, got into difficulties that badly discredited it at a very critical time in its history. We can trace the turning-point in the fortunes

of British Liberalism to the Egyptian imbroglio of the early eighties.

That the European intervention in Egypt in general and the English invasion in particular created the Mahdist movement in the Sudan cannot be proved, but seems probable. The deposition of the Khedive and the domination of the Khalif by the Powers caused a subversion of Turco-Egyptian authority over the Sudanese tribes that was bound to result in anarchy and in attempts to set up a new Islamic autocracy. The principal conditions for the coming of a "Mahdi" are that there should be civil conflict after the death of a Khalif. Other Mahdis had already appeared on the Upper Nile, but the conditions not being suitable, they had been easily suppressed by the Khedive. Now, however, when a Mahdi was proclaimed (1881) in the person of a Dongola boatbuilder, there was no sword of Osman to nip the rising in the bud. Even so, it was some time before the new Mahdi became a serious menace.

This Mohamed Ahmed was a sheikh of imposing presence and an eloquent preacher of a Moslem millennium. He had from the first the support of the *fikis*, or wizards, and of the warlike Baggara tribes. But his programme of "driving the Turk into the sea" appealed to all native elements in the Sudan, where the Egyptian immigrants and troops were hated as much as the Turkish officials and officers. Thus Colonel Stewart reports (February 27, 1883): "It is impossible to criticise too severely the conduct of the Egyptian troops, both officers and men, towards the natives . . . in itself almost sufficient to cause a rebellion. The Government is almost universally hated." Wherefore, not only did the fighting tribes and slave-dealing chiefs rally round the Mahdi, but the more peaceable population were ready to help in

ending the Turco-Egyptian régime. This to some extent accounts for the first disasters to the Egyptian garrison. Sennar was besieged by the Mahdi and a force of six thousand Egyptians sent to relieve it was surrounded and surrendered (June, 1882). In Kordofan, the Mahdi took the capital, El Obeid, after a three months' siege (January, 1883). Thereafter, Mahdism was a political power.

The new Anglo-Egyptian Government were, for reasons of prestige, anxious to recover as much as possible of the Egyptian Empire in Africa. They believed they could do so with Egyptian troops under British officers. But the British Government were disillusioned on this point by their representatives, Cromer at Cairo and Stewart at Khartum. They had no intention of sending British troops to fight fierce savages for these arid wastes. Though by now deeply involved in Egyptian affairs, they believed they could keep clear of Sudanese complications by formally disassociating themselves from them. "His Majesty's Government are in no way responsible for operations in the Sudan," wrote Granville (May 7, 1883). On the other hand, they feared to face the outcry both from philanthropists and imperialists if they made themselves responsible for surrendering the Sudan again to slavery and savagery. So, although they knew that the Egyptians could not hold the Sudan alone, they let them send Hicks Pasha with an improvised army of ex-Arabists on an expedition for the reconquest of Kordofan. This Egyptian army, led astray by its guides in the forests south of El Obeid, and perishing of thirst within a mile of water, was overwhelmed by forty thousand Dervishes, and of the whole fifteen thousand barely three hundred survived (November 20, 1883).

Even before definite news of this disaster reached

Cairo, Cromer, who had succeeded Dufferin, had forced the British Government to face the alternative of either sending an expedition or insisting on evacuation. They elected for the latter course. "We cannot lend English or Indian troops. . . . It would not be for the advantage of Egypt to invite Turkish troops into the Sudan. If consulted, recommend the abandonment of Sudan within certain limits," so wrote Granville (November 20, 1883). But what were the limits to be? Was Khartum to be held, and, if so, how? Faced with this problem, the British Government sanctioned the use of Turkish troops, provided they paid for themselves. As this was obviously somewhat optimistic, Cairo was told to abandon Khartum. But this was such unwelcome wisdom that the "Turkish" ruling class, that had now returned to power, feared to force it upon Egypt. Sherif "the Frenchman" resigned, Riaz "the Turk" refused the responsibility, and recourse had to be had to Nubar, the servile Armenian (January 7, 1884).

But by then the question had become not so much whether the Sudan garrisons were to be evacuated as by what miracle this could be done. Besides the garrison at Khartum there were others in the Eastern Sudan at Kassala, Tokar, Sinkat, and elsewhere. There were also garrisons in Darfur, under Slatin Pasha; in Equatoria, under Emin Bey; in Bahr-el-Ghazal, under Lupton Bey; also in Sennar and along the Abyssinian frontier. Evacuation, if possible at all, would be a protracted and perilous operation. And it became almost impossible with the reflux of Mahdism from Kordofan back across the Nile as far as the Red Sea. Since 1883 the Eastern Sudan had been conquered for the Mahdi by a slave dealer, Osman Digma. The operations of Baker Pasha from Suakim against him only led to disaster, and Tokar, with

Sinkat, fell after long sieges. A British force, organised for their relief, had advanced from Suakim as far as Tokar, defeated the Dervishes at El Teb and Tamai (February 29 and March 13, 1884), and withdrawn again, not without difficulty. This campaign was, in fact, an anticipation of the catastrophe that was to follow at Khartum.

When the British Government in this difficulty decided to send General Gordon to effect the evacuation of Khartum, the only public criticism was that they should have sent him sooner. But the appointment was arranged by those members of the Cabinet least opposed to a Sudanese campaign; and the consent of Cromer, who knew Sudanese conditions and Gordon's character, was only with difficulty obtained. The appointment, however, appealed to the Government because Gordon's public popularity and his prestige as a philanthropist protected them against criticism of evacuation from their anti-slavery supporters.

The question as to what Gordon's instructions were has been much debated; but is, as Cromer points out, of little real importance. Because Gordon was notoriously not a man to be bound by any instructions. The British Government seems to have assumed that he was only sent out to report; but the Egyptian Government, still anxious to avoid evacuation, gave him full powers as Governor-General. He was, however, prevented by Cromer from taking with him his old enemy, the slave dealer Zobeir. One of his first proclamations was to the effect that he would not again attack slavery. He was received at Khartum with acclamation (February 18, 1884), and made himself popular by remitting taxes, releasing prisoners, and reorganising the administration. He had announced that he was coming to evacuate the

Sudan, and his most practical plan seems to have been that Zobeir should succeed him and hold Khartum until the garrisons had been withdrawn. This Cromer supported, but the British Government, still suffering from their anti-slavery complex, could not swallow Zobeir. Which was, indeed, unfortunate. For the one chance of getting Gordon away was to let him name a successor who would relieve him of what he considered his moral responsibility: "I declare, once for all, I will not leave the Sudan until every one who wants to go down is given the chance, unless a Government is established that relieves me of the charge," was what he wrote in his journal. He quite underrated the danger he was in, and overlooked the difficulty in which he was involving the Government. He believed that the Mahdi could be "smashed" as easily as Arabi, even by a Turco-Egyptian force. But it is difficult to detect any permanent policy in the telegrams, of which he sent as many as thirty a day. Thus Cromer reports (February 29, 1884): "I have received a fresh batch of telegrams from Gordon. His statements and proposals are hopelessly bewildering and contradictory."

Meantime the tribes between Berber and Khartum rose for the Mahdi. Khartum was cut off, and the question now became, how to get Gordon himself out; for the remoter garrisons, and even that of Khartum, were clearly lost. Possibly the best chance now would have been to let him go as he suggested to see the Mahdi, which would have solved the situation one way or the other. It might even have succeeded, as he had a genius in dealing with Orientals. But the Liberal Solomons, who had let the genius out of the bottle, were incapable of getting it back again.

By April Cromer had realised that a British expedition

would have eventually to be sent. But the Cabinet held out against the force of facts until late in the summer. At last a credit was voted (August 8), and plans of campaign discussed ; but it was not until Lord Wolseley left Cairo (October 5) that it was officially recognised that the expedition was to extricate Gordon. "The main responsibility for the delay rests on Mr. Gladstone," writes Lord Cromer (*Modern Egypt*, Vol. I., p. 583). If Gladstone had only shown as much stiffness against interfering with "a people rightly struggling to be free" when the struggling people were civilised constitutionalist Arabists, as he now showed in favour of those slave-dealing savages, the Mahdists, he would have saved his own career and his country from a catastrophe.

When a very great man makes a very grave mistake Fortune abandons him to the Furies. The Khartum expedition was, from the first, dogged by ill-luck. The steamer sent by Gordon down the Nile in September with General Stewart, went ashore after safely running the gauntlet of the gorges, and the invaluable Stewart was murdered by treacherous villagers. The expedition, starting too late, was still more delayed by an early fall of the Nile. At Khorti it divided, one force under Sir Herbert Stewart pushing across the desert direct, the other following the Nile round to take Berber. Stewart's force encountered the Dervishes at Abou Klea, where the square was broken, and Burnaby, the second-in-command, was killed (January 17, 1885) ; Stewart himself was sniped just before reaching the Nile at Gubat (January 20). There the expedition met four steamers sent down by Gordon, who reported the Fall of Khartum imminent. But the impetus and initiative of the expedition were exhausted. Precious days were lost, and when the steamers with reinforcements reached Khartum

(January 28) they found that the city had fallen two days before. It had been closely besieged since September 1, and reduced to starvation. With the capture of Omdurman on the other bank and the emptying of the moats as the Nile fell, it had become indefensible. It could thereafter have been carried any day, and it was the approach of the steamers that caused the assault. Gordon was killed against the orders of the Mahdi, who had been anxious to come to terms with him.

The death of the popular hero under such dramatic conditions was so energetically exploited that the Government was very nearly driven from office. In the hope of propitiating public anger Wolseley, who had taken command, was encouraged to proclaim his intention of "smashing the Mahdi." But his operations for taking Berber failed, as did those against Osman Digma. At Tofrik the Dervishes again broke the square and caused heavy loss (March 22). Summer then brought a stop to the campaign and cooler counsels. Great Britain was threatened with a war against Russia in Central Asia (April, 1885), and the Sudan expedition became unpopular. The Government decided to fix the frontier at Wadi Halfa; which prudent decision was maintained when Lord Salisbury's Government took their place (June 24, 1885). The Mahdi died (June 20), and was succeeded by the Khalifa, who tried to invade Egypt, but was defeated at Ginnis (December 30, 1885). The frontier was thereafter held by Egyptian troops at Wadi Halfa, backed by British at Assouan.

Meantime the Egyptian Empire in Africa was being liquidated. Great Britain, France, and Italy divided between themselves its territories on the Somali coast. Kassala was occupied by the Italians (1894), but re-

verted later (1897) to the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. Harrar was annexed by Abyssinia. Sennar, Kordofan, and Darfur were ruled by the Khalifa. Equatoria relapsed into the unknown, whence Emin was extricated some years later. Of the sixty thousand soldiers and officials in the Sudan, about half were absorbed by Mahdism, a quarter were killed, and a quarter made their way back to Egypt.

It was not until 1889 that the Dervishes, under their most daring leader, Nejumi, conqueror of Hicks and of Gordon, again attempted to invade Egypt. They were then for the first time decisively defeated by Egyptian troops at Toski (August 2). Nejumi was killed, and of his six thousand fighting men barely a thousand escaped. Egyptians under British officers had thus dealt the first real blow to the Dervish power. Two years later Osman Digma was defeated and Tokat recovered (February, 1891).

It was by now evident that this new Anglo-Egyptian army, backed by the resources of civilisation, such as railways, telegraphs, and machine-guns, was more than a match for the medieval valour of the Dervishes, and that they could now be safely "smashed." The Conservatives were less averse from such enterprises than their Liberal predecessors, and British enthusiasm could easily be excited for a campaign for civilisation. It was the jealousies of other Powers in the growing scramble for Africa that were the main obstacle to an advance. But, as it happened, Italy, trying to conquer Abyssinia, had got into difficulties. A diversion against the Dervishes would oblige Italy and the Triple Alliance. Their approval was obtained for an advance as far as Dongola. An expedition under Kitchener was accordingly launched into the Sudan, laying a desert railway

as it went. And, after the Battle of Ferkat (June 6, 1896), in which the Dervishes were heavily defeated with an Egyptian loss of only twenty killed, Dongola was occupied (September 23). The whole operation worked like clockwork, and cost only fifty-nine killed, and £750,000 sterling. In the following year Berber was reoccupied, and became the railhead.

The next stage, the reconquest of Khartum, was considered beyond the unaided strength of Egypt. Public opinion in England was accordingly prepared for a blow at the "baleful power of the Khalifa" (Sir M. Hicks Beach, February 5, 1897). In March, 1898, a force of one British and two Egyptian brigades, twenty-four guns, and, most important of all, twelve machine-guns, advanced up the Atbara against twelve thousand Dervishes and defeated them with heavy loss on both sides. The Egyptian troops bore the brunt of the fighting. Thereafter, reinforced by a second British brigade, and with Kitchener in command, the expedition of twenty-two thousand men advanced on Khartum. At Omdurman they engaged in a decisive battle against double their number of Dervishes. The desperate bravery of the enemy only made his destruction complete. The Emirs, waving their ancient crusaders' swords and charging under their green banners, the "fuzzies," with their broad-bladed spears that had broken so many British squares, were swept down in swathes by the Maxims. Nearly eleven thousand were killed and sixteen thousand wounded, while the British lost fourteen officers and one hundred and twenty-two men, and the Egyptians nine officers and two hundred and forty-one men. The Khalifa escaped, but was later surprised by Wingate, and perished with his surviving Emirs (November 24, 1899). Osman Digma soon after

surrendered (January, 1900), and the whole Sudan was recovered.

It would be difficult to apportion responsibility for the loss of the Sudan as between England and Egypt. It is as difficult to apportion between them the credit for its recovery. Its reconquest was directly attributable to the unexpected successes of the Egyptian troops; and to the no less surprising surplus in the Egyptian Treasury. But both these can be ascribed in turn to the efficiency of British officers and to the economy of British officials. Moreover, owing to French and Russian opposition, which secured rulings from the Mixed Courts, the use of this surplus for the Sudan expedition was prevented. The cost of the campaign was partly covered by a British loan to Egypt at a low rate of interest—two and a quarter per cent. The total cost of wiping out Dervishism was no more than £2,500,000, of which £1,500,000 were spent on railways, telegraphs, etc., leaving only £1,000,000 of purely military expenditure. Thus the Sudan was recovered for much what Ismail had spent on one of his more expensive entertainments. But if this extraordinary economy was due to the efficiency of the English advisers in general, and of the Sirdar Kitchener in particular, it was also due to the fact that this was an Egyptian campaign with which the War Office had nothing to do. The campaign was a typical Anglo-Egyptian enterprise, run as a business operation with engineering exactitude. And if the cost both in men and money was borne largely by Egypt, Egypt was amply repaid for the outlay by getting an open frontier in the south, a share in control of the Upper Nile, and trade with a progressive and peaceable hinterland.

There would, therefore, have been nothing unfair to Egypt had Great Britain at once annexed the Sudan.

But this simple solution was impossible for political reasons. It would have meant much opposition in England, which then had no realisation of the value of the Sudan; in Egypt, which had nominally effected its reconquest; and in Europe, where jealous rivals would at once have required compensation in Africa. The alternative of reannexation by Egypt was undesirable. For it would have meant extending over the Sudan the régime of the Capitulations with all their internal and international complications that had so hampered reconstruction in Egypt. The solution, an Anglo-Egyptian *condominium*, had been prepared in advance, and was proclaimed by the hoisting of the British and Egyptian flags over a recaptured Khartum. This new *condominium* was based on an agreement between the British Empire and Egypt (January 19, 1899): "To give effect to the claims which have accrued to His Britannic Majesty's Government by right of conquest, to share in the present settlement and in the future working and development of the Sudan." Which subordination of the British Empire to Egypt, involved in Egypt delegating to the Empire a share only in the working of the partnership, was intended to avoid claims for compensation from other Powers, especially France. And it may be assumed that, had the authors of this juristic juggling anticipated an early collision between Egypt and the Empire as to their respective rights in the Sudan, the *de facto* dominance of the British partner would have been more distinctly defined. As it was, after some growls from Continental Chanceries as to an innovation in international law, and some grumblings from the Sultan about his sovereignty having been ignored, the *condominium* was accepted as a *fait accompli*.

It was very clear from the first that the British must

have a free hand in the Sudan, and meant to have it. For reconstruction in the Sudan had to begin from the foundations. Dervish rule had not only swept away all trace of the old Egyptian Government, but had laid waste the country itself. The original population of about eight millions had lost three millions in war and another three in disease and famine. Not only were flocks and herds all gone, but even the date-trees and wells had been destroyed. The first budget (1898) showed a revenue of £35,000 and an expenditure of £235,000. But in ten years the Sudan was beginning to be able to pay interest on its debts to Egypt for covering its deficits. Such subventions, combined with supplying the necessary troops, were, however, the extent of Egypt's share in the partnership. The administration of the Sudan became more and more British, and a special British Civil Service was created for it. And with financial and administrative independence from Egypt came economic independence when the railway was completed to Port Sudan on the Red Sea (1906). The sovereignty of Cairo at Khartum soon became as shadowy as that of Constantinople at Cairo (*vide* Chapter XI.).

The annexation of the Sudan to the British Empire had been camouflaged by a political *condominium*. The British administration of Egypt had similarly been camouflaged by a financial *condominium*. There was certainly, in both cases, justification for some shoulder shrugging and sneers at *perfidie Albion*. But by now the scramble for Africa had become a "scrum" beyond the concealment of diplomatic disguises. British policy under the Conservative Government had become purposefully imperialist. Acquisition of the Sudan opened up possibilities of linking up Egypt with East Africa and the Cape with Cairo. This grandiose idea was pursued with per-

spicacity and determination. A barrier was built against French expansion eastward towards the Nile by leasing, in the name of the Khedive, the Bahr-el-Ghazal province to the Congo Free State and Belgium. In return, a zone fifteen miles wide was obtained along the frontier between the Congo Free State and German East Africa for the future railway and telegraph (Convention of May 12, 1894). This scheme was, however, scuppered by a temporary coalition of France and Germany. Germany forced Belgium to realign the Free State frontier and repudiate the railway concession (Convention of August 14, 1894), while France pushed an expedition into the Bahr-el-Ghazal (February, 1896). This French effort to extend its North African Empire into Equatoria was countered by our Sudan expedition. A collision became inevitable between the Anglo-Egyptian penetration pressing southward and the French Senegalese forces pushing eastward. When Kitchener, hurrying on by steamer from Khartum, reached Fashoda on the Upper Nile (September 19, 1898), expecting to join hands with Major Macdonald and a small British expedition from Uganda, he found installed there instead Major Marchand and a French expedition from the Oubanghy.

The expedition of Marchand, forcing a way through the forests and swamps of unknown equatorial Africa, and fighting as he went the Dervish power in a region where it had not before been challenged, was a *tour de force* unequalled even in French exploration. While his arrival on the Nile a few weeks before Kitchener was a *coup de foudre* such as even French diplomacy can scarcely parallel. But British imperialism had no intention of letting such a claim-jumping adventurer snatch its hard-won hinterland and cloud the roseate dawn of an All-Red Africa. By a rupture with France and a

rapprochement with Germany that almost altered the course of European history, Marchand was forced to withdraw. The only importance of this incident to-day is that it reduces any claim that Egypt may have, as against the Empire, for the Equatorial Sudan.

It was fortunate that before this collision had strained Anglo-French relations a settlement had been reached over another matter that, with the Sudan, still complicates the Egyptian question. The British occupation of Egypt had made it necessary to define the status of the Suez Canal in the interests both of Egypt and of the Empire. The British wished to secure such control of the Canal as would be consonant with their control over Egypt itself, with their contribution of seven-tenths of the dues, and with their co-partnership in the shares. They were willing to concede "neutralisation" in the sense of freedom of navigation, but were against the "internationalisation" desired by France and the other Powers. A Commission was convened at Paris (March 30, 1885), but came to nothing. The Anglo-Turkish Convention (May 22, 1887) embodied the British view in its third Art., but this was never ratified. A Convention (April 29, 1888) negotiated a compromise, but as this was only to take effect after the British evacuation of Egypt, its importance was inconsiderable. Another Convention (April 8, 1904) settled the matter, and was put into force with the exception of the International Board it provided. The practical effect was that the Canal was "neutralised," and not "internationalised"—that the British obtained a fair representation on its management—and that the dues were reduced as they desired. In this, again, the British fought the battle for the Egyptians, and secured for them a success over Europe that they both afterwards have had reason to regret.

CHAPTER V FINANCIAL RECONSTRUCTION

CROMER

“And Pharaoh said unto Joseph, See, I have set thee over all the land of Egypt.”—GEN. xli. 41.

THE smashing of Arabi-ism in Egypt was an easier enterprise than the smashing of Mahdi-ism in the Sudan. But it proved a much simpler task for the British to regrow a new civilisation from the wasted ground in the Sudan than to clear away the rubbish and ruins which were smothering the ancient cultivations of civilisation in Egypt. For that was really the essence of our task in Egypt—to enable a progressive and productive people to recover prosperity in spite of the bonds in which it had been fettered by Islamic and international institutions and in spite of the burdens forced on it by European moneylenders and Ottoman landlords. As Lord Cromer generously admits (*Mod. Eg.*, vol. i., p. 58): “Our financial success is indeed mainly due to the remarkable recuperative power of the country and the industry of the inhabitants.”

In the first part of their task—breaking the grip of the dead hand of Islam—the British were handicapped by being foreigners and infidels. Islam, it must be remembered, is not merely a religion; it is a rigid régime of public and private life. It regulates all social relations by rules, many of them incompatible with modern civilisation. Islamic reformers have argued that the funda-

mental ideas and institutions of Islam could not only be reconciled with the modern reconstruction of Moslem society, but could be made the inspiration of a spontaneous revolution. It may be so. But, so far, Moslem communities have, without exception, been modernised by adopting and adapting Western models. Curiously enough, when this process has been carried out by alien authority, whether British, French, Italian, or German, it has been much less radical and rapid than when carried out by native reformers. The British have been especially conservative, and have made it a principle of their policy in the East that Islamic ideas and institutions must be respected and retained wherever possible. The English empire-builder in Egypt was prepared to enter the service of the Khedive and to uphold the authority of the Khalif ; to put on slippers when he entered a mosque and to wear a fez at the risk of sunstroke ; to make the best of the anomalies of Sheri Courts and of the absurdities of Customary Law ; to maintain the subjection of women, and even to tolerate domestic slavery. Whereas the Turkish reformer swept all these obstacles to progress away with a sweep of the sword and a stroke of the pen. He reduced Islam from a régime to a religion, and he could undertake this spring-cleaning because he was working with the new broom of a nationalist movement. The Englishman could not do it because he was working against that movement with Mrs. Partington's mop.

The British people honestly believed that Arabi-ism and Mahdi-ism were much of a muchness, and that Wolseley restored civilisation in Egypt as Kitchener undoubtedly did in the Sudan. But Anglo-Egyptian official observers were too clear-sighted and candid to delude themselves so grossly. They appear to have recognised at once that we had been in collision with a nationalist

and reformist movement.¹ But they justified our intervention and occupation by a justifiable confidence in their own exceptional, though exotic, efficiency; and by a less justified conviction that the Egyptians had shown themselves incapable of self-government, and would, if left to themselves, continue to be as incompetent. We to-day, judging from the analogous case of Turkey, can see that this second assumption was very questionable. We may even ask ourselves whether the natural conservatism of the British and their necessary conformity to existing conditions did not galvanise much that might otherwise have been got rid of. And whether the Egyptian Nationalists, but for the British régime in Egypt, might not have carried through a full and final social reconstruction like that of Turkey in the time that the British took to effect only a financial rehabilitation.

The presumption that because Egypt, since the coming of the Ptolemies, had always been governed by aliens, it would therefore always be so governed until the coming of the Coquecigrues, which was accepted as axiomatic by our fathers, has been rejected as a principle of policy by English and Egyptians since they have seen how swiftly a nationalist movement can revolutionise and revitalise a subject Oriental people. And to us the best argument in favour of the assumption that a term of British administration in Egypt was inevitable and not injurious, is the ready acceptance of it by all the Egyptians of that day.

It would appear, indeed, as though British Imperialism did indeed for long deprive Egyptian nationalism of its

¹ See Cromer, *Modern Egypt*, vol. i., p. 324; also Mackenzie Wallace (Lord Dufferin's private secretary), *Egypt*, p. 365. But Sir V. Chirol, then in Egypt as a journalist, apparently retains the popular view, *The Egyptian Problem*, p. 65.

appeal by convincing Egyptians that British officials like Cromer and officers like Kitchener were as anxious and better able to carry out the required reforms than was any "Turkish" Constitutionalist like Sherif or *fellah* Colonel like Arabi. When, in addition to that, it became clear that a British occupation meant a subordination of French, Turkish, and other more suspect foreign influences, and that the British supremacy would only be exercised diplomatically and indirectly, then the nationalist movement collapsed. In other words, Egyptian nationalism was put to sleep for twenty years, not so much by the knock-out at Tel-el-Kebir as by the knowledge that it had very little to gain by coming up for another round. It was perhaps well for us that the Egyptian Nationalist had not the love of a fight for fighting's sake nor the fuller growth reached in another generation, that kept the Turkish movement on its feet against apparently hopeless odds. The Egyptians of that day could not know that had they stuck to their guns they might have swept away in Cairo, as the Turks later swept away in Constantinople, all those barriers and burdens, whether Islamic or international, financial or legal, Capitulatory or Koranic, that for another generation were to stunt the growth of Egypt and stifle its vitality.

The English of that day could not know that a radical reconstruction in Egypt, impossible to themselves, was within the power of Egyptians. We, however, review to-day the difficulties of the British reformers and their ingenious diplomacies in circumventing them with admiration, no doubt, but with a certain sense of their artificiality. There is a suggestion in it all of the ingenuity of the Hodja Nasredin Effendi, who carried his donkey over the stream on his back so that it shouldn't throw

him off in the water. There is no doubt that the stream of difficulties with which the British had to struggle was formidable. But the difficulties consisted chiefly in barriers which they themselves had built higher and in burdens which they themselves had bound more tightly upon Egypt.

For example, the status and structure of the new Anglo-Egyptian State had been laid down on general lines by Lord Dufferin before Lord Cromer arrived and reconstruction began. Lord Dufferin was an experienced and excellent diplomat dealing with a diplomatic problem of exceptional difficulty. He extracted with great skill the least common multiple from the various factors and evolved with no less skill lines of least resistance. With an insight far beyond that of the British proconsuls succeeding him, and still farther beyond that of the bulk of his profession, he saw that the real driving force with which British reformers had to work was that of Egyptian nationalism. And in so far as the settlement outlined in his brilliantly sketched scheme was not diplomatic, it was democratic. No doubt the democratic basis was diplomatically concealed, but it was none the less fundamental. Thus the Organic Law (May 1, 1883), which embodied the Dufferin scheme, established (a) a Legislative Council of thirty members, of whom fourteen were nominated by the Egyptian Government—that is, by its English advisers—while of the remainder, fourteen were elected by the Provincial Councils, and the remaining two by Cairo and Alexandria. This Council could only discuss and recommend, and it could not discuss financial charges based on international arrangements. The scheme also provided (b) a Legislative Assembly consisting of the Council, the six Ministers, and forty-two directly elected delegates. No new direct tax might

be imposed without its approval, but otherwise it could only discuss and recommend. There was also to be (c) a Council of State to prepare laws for admission to the legislature. Fourthly, there were to be (d) Provincial Councils of three to eight members elected by universal suffrage for local affairs. These institutions, imitated from the more liberal legislations of French North Africa, were a sufficient instalment of self-government, and were capable of easy expansion.

But this embryo of a democracy never had a real existence, still less an expansion. For the Anglo-Egyptian officials had no sympathy with Egyptian self-government and no sense of its indirect advantages. At the instance of Lord Dufferin's successor, Lord Cromer, then Sir Evelyn Baring, and on the ground that it would be used for international intrigue, the Council of State was dropped and the initiation of all legislation was assumed by the British advisers. The Legislative Council functioned after a fashion, but never had anything like the vitality shown by its predecessor, the Chamber of Notables. Lord Cromer at the end of his twenty years of administration was not opposed to "cautious steps" towards increasing its powers, though "any attempt to confer full parliamentary powers would for a long time to come be the extreme of folly" (*Mod. Eg.*, vol. ii., p. 277). As for the Legislative Assembly it was treated by this Victorian guardian as a troublesome child who, when allowed to appear at all, was to be seen and not heard. Lord Cromer considered it "in advance of the requirements and political education of the country." According to him, its main defect was one "shared with representative bodies in other countries in that it was too apt to recommend fiscal changes without considering their financial consequences," and that "it was too

much under the influence of the Press, whose licence should be restricted." The insignificance of the Provincial Councils appears in his recommendation a quarter of a century later (1908), that they should be made "real working bodies acting as advisers to the Mudir."

It is clear, therefore, that Dufferin's conception of a balance of power between English administration and Egyptian autonomy, which would allow self-government the ground and growth it required, was not a system that the Agent-General Cromer and the Conservative Government were prepared to work. The sanction on which they relied was not a "power of attorney" for Egyptian democracy, but the military power of the British Empire and the moral prestige of its representatives. As Cromer himself says: "The motive power (of Egyptian government) was furnished by the British officials" (vol. ii., p. 279). But for a governmental structure of this character a different status was essential from that which was provided in the Dufferin settlement. If the real governmental sanction was the military occupation, then the first essential was an assurance that this occupation would be maintained. But no such assurance was obtainable during all the difficult period of reconstruction. On the contrary, France had to be conciliated in crisis after crisis with promises of an early evacuation. A French critic (Cocheris, p. 531) has unkindly enumerated no less than forty formal official undertakings between 1899 and 1900 to evacuate Egypt, and even he has omitted more than one. That Cromerism should in such conditions have been able to do as much as it did is a good example of the Englishman's preference for forcing his own way to a very limited practical objective, when by making use of foreign facilities he might have gone much farther and faster with less time and trouble. Our Han-

nibals would always sooner climb one pass *summâ diligentiâ* than cross the Alps on the top of a diligence.

The policy of the Gladstone Government had been to "crush the military mutiny," then to introduce such reforms as might be immediately applicable, and thereafter to withdraw altogether. But this policy could not be put through against the philanthropic, financial, and patriotic opposition to withdrawal, and in view of the danger that the Mahdi might replace Arabi. In this difficulty they summoned a conference in London (April 19, 1884), of which the agenda was agreed with France, which renounced the re-establishment of the control in return for our undertaking to evacuate by 1888. This conference met, but was broken up by Bismarck (August 2, 1884)—the German representative insisting on introducing awkward issues not on the agenda (Fitzmaurice, vol. ii., p. 334). The Government then had recourse to the usual expedient, and sent out Lord Northbrook as Special Commissioner, to suggest a solution (November, 1884). His report pleased no one. The immediate financial pressure was relieved by the Powers agreeing to guarantee a loan of £9,000,000 at three per cent. (March, 1885), and soon after the Liberal Government went out of office.

Lord Salisbury, on succeeding (June, 1885), again had recourse to Turkish sovereignty and soldiery. It seems possible that in this his object was rather to gain time than to get a real solution. Sir H. Drummond Wolff was sent as Special Commissioner to negotiate with the Sultan an arrangement by which, broadly speaking, Turkish authority and the Turkish army were to keep down Arabi-ism and to keep out Mahdi-ism, while the Powers were to revise the Capitulations in return for a British promise to evacuate. A preliminary convention on

these lines was signed with the Sultan (October 24, 1885). The short Liberal interregnum (1886) made no difference, and it was eighteen months before the tortuous and interminable negotiations at Constantinople and Cairo were completed in a final Convention and Protocol (May 22, 1887). But by that time we had no longer any use for Turkish sovereignty or soldiery either in Egypt or in the Sudan. For the Sudan was no longer a danger and Egypt was politically and financially in course of reconstruction. Moreover, the Triple Alliance had been renewed and rallied to our support. So the new Convention was found to stipulate that the British garrison would evacuate in three years and the British officers in Egyptian service two years later, leaving Egypt a neutralised territory. But that (Art. 5) we would refuse to evacuate "if there was any appearance of danger in the interior or without," and (Art. 6) that we should resume occupation "if order and security in the interior were disturbed." As this seemed to be rather a regularisation of our occupation than a regulation of our evacuation, France and Russia not only rejected the Convention, but prevented the Sultan from ratifying it. The immediate result of the negotiation was the permanent addition of a Turkish "Commissioner" as a factor in the international intrigues at Cairo. The indirect result was the establishment of a *de facto* British occupation based on the Balance of Power in Europe. Unfortunately, in Egypt there was a balance of impotence. For whenever we put our shoulder to a wheel the French put a spoke in it, and whenever we got together with the French the Germans set us by the ears again.

The other main difficulty of the British, besides the insecurity of their footing, was the way in which their hands were tied. The main motive of the British occupa-

tion was to see that Egypt paid its debts. Its European mandate, to use a modern term, was that of a receivership for the European creditors of Egypt. Reforms could only be effected in so far as they contributed—or at least were in no way contrary to the fullest liquidation of Egypt's extravagant liabilities. But any real financial reconstruction obviously required as a first step a thorough revision of these liabilities and a reduction of them within reasonable limits. As Egyptian solvency had now practically a British guarantee, European creditors ought to have allowed in return a squeezing out of water and a scaling down of the more extortionate claims. For, if Egypt was to become a paying proposition, it was essential that all real profits should be applied to remunerative replacements of the plant and to promoting production. But none of these essential powers were in possession of the British receivers owing to the international mortgages placed upon Egypt, and to the deliberate use of them made by the French for putting every possible difficulty in the way of a British reconstruction.

The French still held two-thirds of the debt. They had, under protest, acquiesced in the abolition of the French controller at the beginning of the British occupation (January 4, 1883). But soon after they adopted the policy they thereafter maintained until 1904, of using the International Debt Commission and its powers under the Law of Liquidation, in conjunction with the international Mixed Tribunals, for thwarting whenever possible, by legal proceedings, the British efforts to avoid another bankruptcy with its further development of financial bondage. It has been shown that the burden of the debt, even as provisionally reduced under the *condominium*, was more than the country could bear without loss of recuperative power. To this had been

subsequently added claims due to the burning of Alexandria (£4,000,000), the cost of Sudan operations (£2,500,000), and a contribution to the Egyptian expedition (£3,000,000).

The London Conference (April, 1884) had failed to get a revision of the debt. The Conference of a year later had secured a temporary relief in the new guaranteed loan, but had incurred thereby a considerable permanent extension of the powers of the international control, and consequently of the possibilities of French obstruction. For the Convention in question, embodied in a decree (July 27, 1885), added German and Russian Debt Commissioners to the original British, Austrian, Italian, and French. And it augmented the foreign control from one intended to prevent further extravagance to one that involved a power of veto on all expenditure outside a fixed annuity of "non-affected" revenues. The effect of the arrangement was that for every £1 of surplus by which the authorised revenue of £E5,237,000 was exceeded, £2 had to be raised in taxes; and that the surplus even then could not be usefully expended. Thus, by 1892, the revenue was shown as £E10,364,000 and expenditure as £E9,595,000. Yet the surplus available under the arrangement was not £E769,000, but only £E179,000. Nor was this surplus, taken by the Commission, applied to the immediate reduction of debt capital and debt charges. It went to swell a reserve fund to as much as £2,000,000, the use of which was controlled by the Commission. And when, in 1896, the Commission, by a majority, granted £500,000 from the Fund to the Sudan expedition, the French, by appealing to the Mixed Tribunal, enforced a refund.

This international control would have been less of an embarrassment if it had not been that French policy was

using this power of the purse strings to force on Egyptian bankruptcy and secure thereby a revision of the terms of the British occupation. It was a high price to pay for the guaranteed loan of 1884, but as the British Government had refused Northbrook's recommendation of a British guaranteed loan, they had no cause to complain. And this fetter did not represent all the chains in which the British reformers were expected to dance. There was also an International Control of British and French over the railways, telegraphs, and the Port of Alexandria, all of whose revenues were "affected" (Decree, November 18, 1876). A similar Board administered the Domains, and again another one administered the Dairé estates.

Under these conditions began what Lord Milner has described as the "race against bankruptcy," which was, indeed, a sort of three-legged obstacle race. It was only won by a short neck, or perhaps we are entitled to say by a long head. For this was Lord Cromer's principal contribution to that Egyptian nation, whose existence he questioned to the very end. When his Budget of 1886-1887 showed a small surplus of £E20,000, it was clear that the British Jack the Giant-Killer had successfully climbed the beanstalk and got the better of the Ogre of bankruptcy. True, this success was obtained rather like Jack's by the resourcefulness of Sir E. Vincent, and by what has been described euphemistically as "a variety of financial expedients" (*Encycl. Brit.*, vol. ix., p. 35). These expedients included the postponement of payments amounting to £E200,000 due on December 31 of one year to January 1 of the next, and the writing off £E250,000 worth of bad debts and counting it as a substantial remission of taxation. Such proceedings are permissible in the first period of a reconstruction. The same may be said of the fiscal use made of exemption

from military service, by which the far too lightly taxed wealthy families were made to pay from £40 to £100 to free their young men. By calling up two hundred and sixty-two thousand conscripts to replenish an army of eighteen thousand, £250,000 was raised from the wealthier recruits in 1886. A more questionable, though more conventional, resource was the new tobacco duties. For to obtain this new and "unaffected" revenue a promising native industry was sacrificed by a prohibition of tobacco cultivation. It was even more unfortunate that nothing effective could be done to redistribute the incidence of taxation, which still fell almost entirely on the land-worker, leaving his landlord very lightly burdened, and the foreigner almost entirely exempt. Agreement was, however, obtained (1885) for subjecting foreigners to certain taxes.

Nor can Cromerism claim to have reduced the débt. The reduction it effected corresponded pretty closely to the £9,000,000 that had been added, mostly to pay off the expenses of British intervention. Thus, at the end of Cromerism the capital value of the debt was much the same as at the beginning. What Cromerism can claim is that it saved Egypt from bankruptcy and from the consequent increase of foreign control, and gave it time to become so economically convalescent that it could bear the burden of the debt without breaking the back of the *fellah*. It is, of course, open to Egyptian Nationalists to claim that if we had let the national movement alone it could have got from Europe an equitable reduction of an usurious debt and a revision of the Capitulations and Conventions that aggravated the burden of its charges (Dass Mahomed, *Land of the Pharaohs*, p. 290). Also they may contend that the reforms of Cromerism could have been equally well carried out by Egyptian Con-

stitutionalists, and had all been adopted by Arabi. That Sherif, during the "anarchy" of 1882, had produced a Budget surplus of £E400,000, and that Ismail had reduced the debt more than Cromer ever did. That Cromer's early deficits were due to the expenses of crushing Arabi, while his difficulties were all derived from an extension of international control caused by British intervention. To which we can reply that the militarist régime under Arabi would not have been economical; and that though a revolutionary cut might have been made of the various anomalies and abuses, yet that our evolutionary cure had advantages over such a surgical operation.

The *kurbash* or hippopotamus hide whip had been the main instrument of Egyptian administration since the days when Pharaoh and the hippopotamus ruled the Nile. Whenever anything was wanted—recruits for the army, evidence by judges, or taxes for the Government—the Pasha *kurbashed* the Sheikh and the Sheikh *kurbashed* the *fellaheen*. The *kurbash* had again and again been prohibited; but in vain. The British made an effective effort to put it down. Under them that trodden worm the *fellah* did at last turn. "You cannot *kurbash* me," he would say to his Sheikh. "I will tell the English." Its abolition, even so, took time. "I am not prepared to state confidently that the use of the *kurbash* and other forms of torture have altogether disappeared," wrote Lord Cromer as late as 1891 (*Egypt*, No. III., p. 53). But in time the Government of Egypt became as exemplary, if also as exotic, as that of Gibraltar. And it was a later generation of Egyptians, and one that had never felt the *kurbash*, who complained that they would sooner have been chastised with whips than with "scorpions."

Lord Cromer speaks of the abuses he abolished as the "Three C's"—the *kurbash*, the *corvée*, and corruption. The *corvée*, or forced labour, was a tax that fell very heavily on the poorest *fellaheen*; but one that was very difficult to remit owing to the necessity of maintaining the irrigation system on which Egyptian cultivation depends. This work of keeping up dykes and clearing out ditches was estimated to employ one-eighth of the population for a quarter of the year. And so laborious was the labour of "scooping mud with the hand from the bottom of a clay drain," that it had become difficult to get it done even under the *kurbash*. Yet payment for the work would require £E400,000 a year, for which international authorisation was necessary. Negotiations for this purpose dragged on for years, as the French required in return control by the Debt Commission of all public works expenditure. This was refused, and at last the British Government provided certain moneys by postponing the dividend on their Suez Canal shares. Other moneys were subsequently collected, and the *corvée* gradually reduced from two hundred and two thousand men for one hundred days in 1883 to eighty-seven thousand men in 1887. But it was not until 1892 that an agreement was reached with the French, allowing for £E150,000 annually from the surplus, that made further calling out of the *corvée* for irrigation unnecessary. The *corvée* thereafter survived only as the "Nile Register," or list, of riparian peasants liable to be called out for patrolling and patching the dykes during the inundation. It was also later resorted to for recruiting a hundred thousand children to destroy cotton worm (*Egypt*, No. I., 1909, p. 21, and 1910, p. 18). The Nationalists argue that no credit should be claimed for this reform because the *corvée* had already been abolished legally

and had become uneconomic, and because under the British the *fellah* was, in fact, paying himself out of an excessive land-tax that should have been reduced. But the fact remains that it was the British who abolished it.

It is curious that if financial reconstruction was the first of the contributions of Cromerism to the future Egyptian nation, the second was the reconstruction of the army. The campaigns of Mehemet Ali had shown that Egyptians could be made good troops even when conscripted and drilled under the *kurbash*. The catastrophes of Ismail in the Sudan had suggested that their efficiency had depended on their being officered by foreigners such as Turks, Circassians, and Albanians. For it was no doubt largely the disappearance of these alien officers under Said and Ismail that accounted for the failure of Egyptian troops fighting under Arabi or against the Mahdi. But British officers and drill-sergeants now became available, and about six thousand men were recruited by a reformed conscription. These were divided into two brigades, one with British officers and the other with Egyptian officers of Arabi. The improved conditions of service, such as regular pay and periods of engagement, made the army as popular as it is ever likely to be with this peaceable people. Later this force was strengthened with black regiments from the fighting races of the Sudan, after experiments with Turks and Arnauts had failed. The first tests of the new Anglo-Egyptian force against their old conquerors, the Sudanese, at once rehabilitated the reputation of the Egyptian Army. And the moral importance of this rehabilitation to the self-respect and self-reliance of the future Egyptian nation cannot well be overestimated. It is no coincidence that the two British officers to which it may chiefly be credited, Kitchener and Wingate, were

both subsequently called to play political parts of the first importance in Egypt. But the possible political risk of the new army was not overlooked. The capital was garrisoned by the British force of some two to four thousand men—only one Egyptian battalion being kept there for parade purposes. While munitions and material were kept in British charge, and the bulk of the troops were stationed in the Sudan.

The reform of the *corvée*, of conscription, and of tax-collection reduced that worst stratum of corruption where the official structure came into contact with the peasantry. But the whole system of Egyptian administration as taken over from Ismail was a mixture of Oriental and Occidental corruption. Nor was there any general realisation or reprobation of this evil by public opinion such as would have brought about reform in this respect in the case of a native Government inspired by nationalist idealism. To the Oriental of the Ottoman Empire public funds are fair game, and the taking of refreshers by a judge, whose living it was, need be no more immoral than their acceptance by an advocate. But, in the end, the introduction by the British of proper accounts and audits, of proper payment of salaries, and, not least, of British moral standards did materially reduce this cancer.

With another "C," and that not the least of the plagues of Egypt, Cromerism was less successful. The extra-territorial Capitulations, judicial and commercial, have been the first obstacle encountered by any reformed régime in the East. Wherever a new Oriental State has established itself on Occidental lines, these privileges of the foreign communities and of foreign commerce have had to be encountered and ended. It makes no difference to this difficulty whether the new régime is Imperialist

or Nationalist. For the system is as intolerable to a progressive Imperialism, like that of the French in Algiers, as it is to a militarist Nationalism like that of the Turks in Constantinople, or to a Socialist Nationalism like that of the Chinese. The one condition essential for the revision of such Capitulations is that the reformed régime has good promise of permanence. This was, however, the one condition lacking in the British occupation of Egypt. Consequently, though British responsibility for Egypt obviously justified a demand for the surrender of such privileges, foreign Governments which, for diplomatic reasons, had no desire to make our task easier could advance good ground for refusing any concession. In order to get any relief at all from the Capitulations it was necessary to set up a sort of auxiliary Assembly of foreigners by giving certain powers of approval in respect of legislation affecting the Capitulations to a "General Assembly" of the judges of the Mixed Tribunals (Decree of January 31, 1889). Under these conditions a rapid reform of the judicial system was not realisable. Not only was there foreign opposition to this from the French and other interests firmly entrenched in capitulatory privilege, but also from the native lawyers, headed by Nubar, who feared a remodelling of the existing French system on British lines. Thus all attempts to make the French procedures and codes more simple and suitable by adaptations on Anglo-Indian lines, were successfully resisted. The reforms effected by Sir J. Scott and Sir M. McIlwraith were limited to practical improvements in procedure. The Consular Courts, the Mixed Tribunals, the Egyptian Courts with their French Codes, and the Mahomedan Courts with their Sheri law all continued. And the results were more adapted to the encouragement of litigation than to the enforcement of

the law. This would have mattered less were it not that the Egyptians, though a peaceable folk, were, and are still, both litigious and lawless. Annual charge-sheets under Cromerism of four thousand serious crimes and eight hundred murders suggests that its policing was less effective than that of Ismail. Nor are its special repressive measures attractive, such as the unsatisfactory Brigandage Commissions abolished in 1888.

But there is one contribution that we made to Egypt that would have been clearly out of reach of a National Government newly emerged from a drastic writing down of its liabilities. Such a National Government could not have commanded the credit that was obtained by Cromerism for the extension of irrigation enterprises and of the cultivated area. Those schemes previously carried out under Ismail and Mehemet Ali had been both costly and faulty. The first British enterprise was the experimental patching up by Scott Moncrieff of Mehemet Ali's barrage at Cairo. This was followed by the building of a barrage at Assiut and Zifta. Then followed the great Assouan Dam, completed in 1902. As a result, for a comparatively small outlay and within ten years, the cotton crop was trebled, the sugar crop more than doubled, and the country covered with light railways and roads for marketing its produce. And with the increase of irrigation went an improved regulation of the all-important water rights. The peasant was no longer left at the mercy of the Pasha, for a British inspector saw that he got his share of water. At the same time he was no longer plundered to the same extent by the Greek usurer, whose ravages were checked by the Law Courts and Land Banks. Lord Cromer's claim to have increased the number of small proprietors by nearly half a million to a total of one and a quarter million is open

to criticism, as the increase of small holdings was partly due to a resurvey and partly to a subdivision of joint holdings for mortgage purposes (*Egypt*, No. I., 1910, p. 12). But it is none the less incontestable that the peasants' position was greatly improved.

Another service to Egypt deserving of honourable mention is that chief contribution of the British to European civilisation—domestic sanitation. So much was this associated with our occupation that, recently, patriotic Nationalists have been restoring their houses to a septic simplicity. But it is none the less certain that not only did the health of Egypt improve immensely under the spring-cleaning administered by the British, but that both the moral and material benefits therefrom have been lasting.

It will be seen that, apart from speculative calculations, an audit of Cromerist administration shows a good balance of material advantage to Egypt. It is difficult to show a similar balance in moral assets on account of the heavy deficiency on the score of education, both scholastic and political. The British are, indeed, in this respect rather in the position of a guardian who, being himself a creditor of the estate, has made it a paying business, but has neglected the education of his ward—the heir.

It is best to admit frankly the failure of Cromerism in respect of Egyptian education. It is admitted by even such stanch supporters of the British occupation as Sir V. Chirol, who writes: "In no other field has British guidance failed so signally as in that of education" (*Egyptian Problem*, p. 77). The first result of British intervention was the complete disappearance of what remained of Mehemet Ali's educational enterprises. Then the concentration of the British on the "race against bankruptcy," their conservative retention of Islamic in-

fluence over education, their conviction that an Egyptian intelligentsia could only be an embarrassment, and their contempt for any form of education other than that of a British public school—an institution clearly inapplicable to Orientals—all combined in causing them to overlook what they should have realised was their main responsibility. The expenditure on education as late as 1890, when the financial stress was over, was only £E81,000 annually ; whereas an annual expenditure of £E2,000,000 would not have been excessive. And if, by the end of Cromerism (1906), one hundred and sixty-five thousand pupils were being taught in four thousand five hundred and fifty-four schools at an annual cost of £E374,000, this represents the beginning of a new régime inaugurated by the appointment as Minister of Education of Said Pasha Zagloul, the future Nationalist leader.

The British policy of respecting Islam, not only as a State religion, but as a social régime, postponed any reform of social life in regard to slavery and the subjection of women. Slave trading was effectively stopped ; but domestic slavery was tolerated. Under a new Convention (1895) the emancipation and the escape of slaves were made easier. But slavery remained an essential element of Egyptian society. As late as 1894 no less a person than a President of the Council got into trouble for buying slaves. Slavery that would have disappeared of itself in Egypt, as elsewhere, on the establishment of a national democracy, could not be dealt with by an authority that was itself based on conquest and caste.

Education was neglected not only scholastically, but in the larger field of schooling in affairs. Education in self-government by development of democratic institutions had, as we have seen, been suspended. Even the ancient Islamic institutions of Medjliss and Mudir were

barely functioning. But there remained the possibility of education in administration, and, as Nubar Pasha remarked,—“The Government of Egypt is an administration.” Association of suitable individuals in administrative responsibility would have provided a future nation with leaders of some experience in public affairs. And it had been intended that this should be done. But instead of a larger and larger contingent of native officials their numbers became less and less. An Englishman could do the work of several natives more efficiently and economically, even though paid five or six times more. There was a steady pressure to employ an Englishman both for political and personal reasons. Vacancies came to be almost invariably filled by Englishmen—at first as experts, but finally just because they were English. Efforts were at times made to check this process. But in the end the contingent of “advisers” and “experts” was transformed into a pretty complete Civil Service, in which Egyptians either held sinecures or second division posts. This Anglo-Egyptian Civil Service was thereafter regularly recruited in England, and came to be entitled to permanent employment and pension. The direct results were good. But the whole *raison d'être* of the British officials had become administrative and not advisory. The fiction was maintained that Egypt was being educated by experts; but, in fact, it was employing more members of the British ruling class than was compatible with its own political education.

The introduction of advisers and of experts was a necessary development of the responsibility thrown upon the British Agent and Consul-General. His position, with which British prestige was involved, had to be protected by associating responsible officials with the various departments. The first of these was necessarily an adviser

of the Finance Department, who became, in fact, Minister of Finance. And this process was extended until every important Egyptian Minister was in much the same relation to his British Adviser as was the Khedive to Lord Cromer. The system only began to fail in its results when the campaign against corruption and coercion in the lower stratum of the official pyramid, where it came into direct contact with the population, led to British subordinate officials being associated as inspectors in the functions of the Mudir. Such responsibilities required a local and a linguistic *expertise* quite beyond most of these young Englishmen, whose well meant efforts only too often resulted merely in causing resentment and ridicule. The best work done by the British in those lower ranks of the administration was in combating pests like the cattle plague, the cotton worm, and brigandage.

At the head of this British hierarchy Lord Cromer rapidly increased his personal authority until it was accepted not only by successive British Governments, but by a succession of local competitors. His first collision was with the wily Armenian Nubar, who had succeeded Sherif (1884). Nubar was something of a statesman who saw that what Egypt required first was a restoration of law and order. Order, he was prepared to admit, depended on the retention of a British garrison. But law, as he understood it, was incompatible with the usurpation by British administrators of all real governmental power. Against this he was prepared to fight with the stubborn subtlety of an Armenian, with the statecraft of an Oriental courtier, and with the chicane of a Levantine lawyer. It is largely due to him that, during the first ten years of the occupation, the tendency to develop an Anglo-Indian bureaucracy was checked.

His principal struggle was over the attempt to transfer

the administrative and judicial functions of the Mudirs to British inspector magistrates of Anglo-Indian type. And it is worth noting Nubar's fight for the Mudirs, because it is the first successful effort on behalf of Egypt to set bounds to the absorption by the British of all governmental functions. The position of the Mudirs had already been somewhat impaired by the introduction of the French Codes and Parquet. Taking advantage of this, Mr. Clifford Lloyd, charged with organising a constabulary, introduced a sort of Anglo-Indian magistrature to supervise and partly supersede both Mudir and Parquet (December 31, 1883). Nubar, on becoming Prime Minister (1884), at once attacked this scheme. Lord Cromer, occupied with the Sudan, left Lloyd to fight his own battles. His appeal to Cæsar against Cleopatra found no favour in London, and he resigned (May, 1884). Thereafter the gendarmerie remained a highly ornate semi-military body without magisterial powers until the death of its Inspector-General, Baker Pasha (1887). Nubar then still further reduced their powers in the provinces. Kitchener, on becoming Inspector-General (1891), got these powers back, on which Nubar resigned. He resumed the fight on returning to office (1894), and got the Inspector-General abolished in return for accepting an adviser, Gorst, the future Agent-General, at a new Ministry of the Interior. The British thus controlled local affairs, but from the top, not at the bottom, of the pyramid.

In the judicial region Nubar's resistance to Anglo-Indianising was even more successful. The attempt of Sir R. West to substitute the Indian codes, judicature and procedures for the French system was defeated and not again renewed.

The cause of "Egypt for the Egyptians" was main-

tained in these dark days by Nubar, the Armenian, and by Riaz, the Jew. Riaz, who alternated in office with Nubar, though of Jewish race was a typical representative, like his contemporary, Kamil Pasha, at Constantinople, of the Turkish ruling class and of Moslem conservatism. He, like all Old Turks, got on well with the British, but opposed them when he thought fit with an astute obstinacy. He was, accordingly, eventually dropped as too independent and undiplomatic, and was replaced (1891) by an amiable Anglophil nonentity, Mustapha Fehmy.

Cromerism having thus come into conflict with the two typical representatives of the old ruling class, was now to collide with the Khedivate, for Tewfik, our submissive supporter, was to leave his friends in the lurch for the last time. His death, in the prime of life (January, 1892), brought to the Khedivate Abbas Hilmi, a boy of eighteen, whose temperament and training tempted him to a trial of strength with Cromer. And that such a conflict should have occurred and taken the course it did is not the least of our educational failures in Egypt.

Abbas was educated at Vienna as a compromise between a British and a French schooling. Had he been sent to France he would, no doubt, have come back anti-British, but at least with such instruction and ideas as would have made him a constitutional leader both of the old and the new nationalism and one who might have steadied the movement into Home Rule by stages. Had he gone to an English school he would have come back capable of co-operating with British Liberals to that end. As it was, he acquired from the Hofburg an excessive estimate of the power and position of princes. He tried to take his stand on a shadow throne, and fell between two stools.

The Sultan gave Abbas and his British mentor a good start together, for he tried to alter the terms of the new firman in Turkey's favour. Cromer delighted Abbas by his repulse of this interference, and also by relieving him of a Council of Regency for the few months of his minority. He was counted as being eighteen by calculating his age in Mahomedan years of two hundred and fifty-four days. But the boy soon began to get into mischief. "The Khedive is going to be very *Egyptian*," wrote Lord Cromer to Lord Salisbury (February 21, 1892). And this dangerous game was, of course, encouraged by interested parties like the French and the Turks and by no less interested politicians like Tigrane and Mustapha Kamil. This new nationalist gesture, for it was not yet a movement, was still further encouraged by the return of the Liberals to power in London (August, 1892). For the Egyptians were unaware that Liberal Imperialism; as represented by Lord Rosebery at the Foreign Office, would observe a Conservative continuity of foreign policy in respect of Egypt. The Khedive accordingly opened fire (November, 1892) with a list of complaints as to disrespect shown for his own dignity. When this was ignored, he followed it up by an assertion of himself that could not be overlooked. For he dismissed the Anglophil Mustapha Fehmy and the no less Anglophil Ministers of Finance and Justice (January 15, 1893). Cromer at once countered by an increase of the British garrison—a rough reminder of the sword of Damocles that stopped the growing anti-British agitation. Having then secured from the Liberal Government a declaration that: "His Majesty's Government expects to be consulted on such important matters as a change of Ministers," Lord Cromer dictated to the Khedive an undertaking "to adopt the advice of His Majesty's Government on all

questions of importance in future," and to substitute as Premier the British nominee, Riaz, for Fakhry, already appointed by the Khedive.

Cromerism had thus publicly humiliated the young Khedive in his own eyes, but had not hurt him in the eyes of his supporters. Indeed, Riaz, recognising that Egyptian opinion was supporting Abbas in his stand against the British, at once went over to his side. Abbas himself, breaking finally with Cromer, went to Constantinople with a deputation of village sheikhs to appeal for support to the Sultan. But Abdul Hamid knew his limitations better than did Abbas, and little more came of the venture than a deepening of the breach with the British.

The next move of the young Khedive was even more adventurous and even less well advised. It was nothing less than an attempt to detach the Egyptian troops from their British officers. During a tour of inspection up the Nile to Wady Halfa, Abbas, to quote Lord Cromer, "poured forth a stream of childish criticism on everything he saw. He insulted British officers. He did his utmost to sow dissension in all ranks of the army" (*Abbas II.*, p. 51). It was a blow at a very tender spot, but one that exposed Abbas himself. Kitchener, the Sirdar, at once submitted his resignation. Cromer, armed with instructions from Rosebery, demanded the dismissal of Maher Pasha, the Khedivist War Minister, and dictated to the Khedive another declaration of dependence. Abbas, deserted by Riaz, the French, and the Turks, none of whom wanted a resuscitation of militarist nationalism, was forced to publish in the *Official Journal* that he was "*heureux de constater les services rendus par les officiers anglais à mon armée.*" (January 14, 1894). Without accepting the story that the Khedive only submitted on being shown from the window the

brougham that was waiting to drive him into exile, it is clear that Cromer, having caught him in an unsupported position, forced on him a capitulation that discredited him as champion of the Egyptian cause by convicting him of a want of courage. Nowadays we no longer believe in spanking spirited children, and our old spare-the-rod spoil-the-child form of education is inapplicable to the East. An Oriental has the delicacy of life-long childhood and the dignity of age-long culture. Like a child, he readily forgets an injury, but never forgives an insult. In this episode that so tickled our jingo journalists, we can see an epitome of all the tragedies of British Cæsars with their Eastern Cleopatras.

The incipient nationalist movement thus broken up, Riaz was replaced by Nubar, and he again by Mustapha Fermi (1895). The Conservatives resumed office in London, and Abbas, realising that his open opposition only brought him defeat and discredit, began to undermine British authority through the provincial politicians and the Pan-Islamic propagandists. But here again he found himself headed off. The establishment of a new Ministry of the Interior with a British Adviser (1894) interrupted his communications through the Central Government. Other precautions (1898) cut him off from direct contact with the provincial authorities. Before the end of Cromerism he was an embittered, but an encircled, enemy, driven to the backstairs of palace intrigue and into the burrows of Pan-Islamic conspiracies. It was not until 1906 that these intrigues produced a practical result in a Turkish move against the peninsula of Sinai. Then a British ultimatum roughly shattered the alliance between Khedive and Sultan (May, 1906) and ended any hope of support from Turkey.

It never seems to have occurred to Cromerism that

the young Khedive might have been educated on rather more kindly lines, and might have been converted into a useful instrument for the inevitable transition towards Home Rule. Cromer at about this time did begin to cultivate the moderate Home Rulers of the landed interests and leaders with liberal views like Said Zagloul. But in this he was rather seeking to build barriers against the Khedive and the Nationalists than to build bridges towards Egyptian self-government. Before leaving he does seem to have realised that we had neglected the political education of our ward and had made for ourselves very serious difficulties in the next phase when concession and co-operation would become inevitable. But for the time Cromer's Cromwellian solutions no doubt simplified the Egyptian situation and very well satisfied his British employers.

The situation was still further simplified with the final elimination of the French interest and intervention in Egypt. For the French, largely through Cromer's influence, were bought out with great advantage to the Egyptians at the cost of their fellow Moslem in North Africa. By the Anglo-French agreement of 1904 France gave the British a free hand in Egypt, getting for itself a free hand in Morocco. The agreement declared that the French "will not obstruct the action of Great Britain in Egypt by asking that a limit of time be fixed for the British occupation or in any other manner." The British, by thus buying off their only serious rival for the protection of Cleopatra, did a service to Egypt that Egyptians have not sufficiently appreciated. While, on the other hand, the service to the British Empire rendered by this rather cynical trafficking has been somewhat over-estimated by English writers. For what we thereby won in Egypt on the roundabouts of European Imperialism we

lost on the swings of Egyptian nationalism, because this removal of the French menace from the Nile Valley had much the same effect on the movement for Egyptian independence as the removal of the French from the Mississippi Valley had on the independence of the United States. Thereafter, the British were the sole obstacles between that movement and its objective.

We therefore come now to the first serious collision between Egyptians and English as such, as distinct from conflicts between their governors. Which collision was the result of the virulence of a nationalism that had been refused all proper expression, and therefore had had recourse to a campaign of Press calumny against the English. For this campaign, though not the cause of violence by the Egyptians, at that time so scared the English as to frighten them into vigorous action. The Denshawi incident was significant in itself. Some British officers in uniform, shooting pigeons by invitation of a village sheikh, accidentally shot a woman and came to blows with the villagers (June 13, 1906). They had to run for it, and, though unpursued, one of them fell dead on the road from shock and sunstroke. An innocent young villager, who hurried up to help, was found by the body, and angry soldiers of the dead officer's regiment clubbed him to death. The British colony, as liable to panic as are all communities who govern others without their consent, interpreted the incident as the beginning of an insurrection. As in 1882 it was commonly believed that a general massacre was imminent. Similar incidents in the past, such as the collision between British officers out shooting and villagers at Ghizeh in 1887, were forgotten. The Press did its deadly work, and the foreign papers of Cairo, followed by the London "heavies," bombarded the Government with demands for exemplary

punishment. A "Special Tribunal" of three British officials and two Egyptians, presided by Boutros Pasha, a Copt, thereupon condemned four of the villagers to death and others to severe sentences of hard labour, flogging, etc. These sentences were executed, and the atmosphere which led to this crime can be appreciated by reading the contemporary Press. Thus the *Daily Chronicle* of June 21, two days before the trial, reports: "Everything indicates that the outrage was much more serious than at first supposed, and that it was pre-arranged. Fortunately, this time Lord Cromer is convinced of the bad faith of the natives. They will be severely dealt with, and sentences will be carried out immediately, those condemned to death being shot in public. There will be no appeal." And, unfortunately, Lord Cromer was convinced, if not of the bad faith of the natives, at least of the bad funk of his own nationals. Whereby a cruel wound was inflicted on the relations between the English and Egyptian peoples that was never healed. Moreover, the incident was politically important as showing that Cromerism, after crushing all Egyptian opposition from the Khedive downwards, had at last come into collision with that peasantry which it had so long and laboriously protected.

This disaster darkened the last days of Lord Cromer in Egypt and hastened his final departure. Cairo, that had so often acclaimed the great proconsul, now let him drive away through deserted streets, protected by hedges of British bayonets, from the people he had so disinterestedly and devotedly served. It is to be hoped that future Egyptian historians will treat this last, but not least, of the alien autocrats of Egypt with greater generosity than we can reasonably expect from Egyptian writers to-day.

CHAPTER VI
NATIONALIST RENASCENCE

ABBAS—GORST—KITCHENER

“ Now there arose up a new king over Egypt, which knew no Joseph.”—Exod. i. 8.

THE first foreign financial adviser in Egypt of which we have a record was Joseph. His nationalisation of agricultural land, based on State trading in corn, and his colonisation of the most fertile province of Egypt with his fellow-countrymen were not likely to be sustained once he and his patron were gone. Cromerism and its patron British Conservatism had now to face the same reaction. For Egyptian nationalism with the new century took on a new form. Under Mehemet Ali it had appeared merely as riotings of the town mob in connection with the struggles for power between factions of the foreign ruling class—Mamelukes, Turks, Arnauts, etc. Later it appeared more recognisably in an insurrection of the army, as representing the peasantry, in co-operation with the Constitutionalists progressives of the ruling class. But both these manifestations of nationalism were centred in and practically confined to the upper and lower strata of the nation. The new form of nationalism, that which is still to the fore, is a movement originating in a new middle class. This nationalism of the *effendiat* is certainly less attractive than that of the *fellaheen* under Arabi or of the Beys under Mehemet Ali. The Beys were gallant, and many of them cultured gentlemen, whose feats of arms raised Egypt to the level of a European Power.

Arabi and the *fellah* Colonels were the gentlest Moslem warriors that ever preached morality, and were swept away by modern arms of precision. The new Nationalists under Mustapha Kamil were the most virulent Press propagandists that ever regurgitated half-digested Chauvinism or vomited abuse of their betters.

The British occupation that had killed Arabist nationalism, with which it might have co-operated, had indirectly created a new nationalism with which co-operation was almost impossible. For the growth of population and of prosperity during the British occupation had called into existence a new middle class sufficiently literate to read and write political propaganda and leisured enough to give up their lives to politics of the Press and of the platform. This new intelligentsia was, however, uneducated in politics and inexperienced in affairs. Most nationalist movements have begun by educating themselves to some extent through a revival of the native language, literature, law, and legend. But Egypt had no national genius to revive, no national glories to recall—at least, none since the days of the Pharaohs, and *faraon* is still in Egypt a term of abuse for tyranny.

Indeed, the British might have got some useful hints from Egyptian folk-lore about the Pharaohs. For example, the parable in which Pharaoh, choosing his vizier, ordered candidates to carry rats in sacks round the Great Pyramid. The rats gnawed their way out of all the sacks except that of the successful candidate, who had kept them well shaken up all the way. The thousands of years during which Egypt under the Pharaohs dominated the world had to be expiated by centuries of subjection during which Egypt had lost all consciousness of its own existence. So when the time came for its renaissance Egypt had no national legend, no national

literature, and not even a national language. The Copts or "Gypts," the survivors of the ancient Egyptians, had become no more than a minority of about a million, or one-tenth of the population, belonging to the despised Christian religion, and to the no less despised clerical class. The mass of the population were Moslem, of mixed race, mostly of a Nubian type and speaking Arabic. The ruling class, as we have seen, were of foreign race like the Georgian Mamelukes or the Arnaut mercenaries, and all spoke Turkish and some French. Of the new middle class, the *effendiat*, three-quarters spoke both French and Arabic. Arabic was slowly superseding Turkish, and subsequently English was to some extent supplementing French. For the British, with characteristic long-suffering or short-sightedness, did not for the first twenty years of their occupation encourage education in English. British officers dutifully drilled the army in Turkish, while British officials laboriously corresponded with one another in French. Under these circumstances the new Egyptian nationalism, excluded as it was from all expression in either the Legislature or in literature, found vent in leading articles. Worse than that, it had to be not only purely political, but purely polemical. It could not extol indefinitely the glories of Egypt, but it could indefinitely execrate the crimes of England. So its main activity became a vituperative anti-British agitation in French and Arabic journals, which were discussed in the town cafés and declaimed aloud in the villages. Its spokesmen were journalists, its thinkers were lawyers, and its fighting men were propagandists. The Press Law of 1881 was so leniently enforced that there was practically complete liberty of the Press—a condition unknown in any country of North Africa or Western Asia. Newspapers and journals multiplied, and

already in 1898 nearly two hundred were being published in Egypt. Previous nationalist movements had been Pan-Islamistic, future nationalist movements were socialistic ; this one was purely journalistic.

The new movement was from the first divided into moderates of the "popular" party (*hasb-el-oumm*) and extremists of the "patriotic" party (*hasb-el-watan*). The former accepted co-operation with the British as a means to independence, and were the survivors and successors of the old Constitutionalists. They were many of them members of the old ruling class like Mustapha Fehmy, and owed some of them a limited enjoyment of power and some political experience to their association with the British. To this party belonged most of the Egyptian Ministers under Cromerism. With them were associated the older leaders of the Moslem movement at el Azhar, who carried on the tradition of el Afghani and Sheikh Mohammed Abdu. Their principal publicist was Sheikh Ali Yusef, editor of the *Moayyah*. They represented the political stage that should have been normally reached in the transition from dependence to independence. Had they been given real responsibility and allowed to recruit their ranks from the younger men by admitting them to junior posts, this party might have imposed its policy of co-operation on the whole movement. But the pressure for the employment of British and the prejudice of Cromerism against extensions of self-government heavily handicapped these co-operators in their competition with the extremists.

The extreme party of non-co-operators had a simple task. They had found a suitable leader in a young gallicised Egyptian, Mustapha Kamil, "a man of superfine manners and charming address" (Nevinson, *More Changes*, p. 178). But neither in his portraits nor in his

record does this chinless and Chauvinist young *effendi* seem a real representative of the strong-featured, simple-minded Egyptian peasantry—a representative such as was, for example, his predecessor in the Nationalist leadership, Arabi, or his successor, Saad Zaglul. He was, however, the man of the moment. The moment demanded an Anglophobe agitation, and Mustapha Kamil, through his Arabic newspaper *El Lewa* (The Standard), with its French and English editions, irrigated all Egypt with inundations of vitriolic vituperation. He was also unceasingly active in propagandist missions to Paris and in Pan-Islamic missions to Constantinople. In France he secured for the new Nationalists a ready sympathy and support. Educated at Toulouse, he was taken up by Madame Adam of the *Nouvelle Revue*, introduced into Parisian literary and political circles, and given a prominent place in the anti-British agitation excited by the Fashoda incident. This pedestal, together with his considerable powers as writer and speaker, put him at the head of the Egyptian extremists as president of the general assembly of the Nationalist party. At Cairo he was taken up by the Khedive in defiance of Cromer's interdict on all intercourse between the two young men (December, 1901). He was made a Bey by favour of Abbas (1901) and a Pasha by grace of Abdul Hamid (1904). Probably his principal service to Egyptian nationalism was the alliance he arranged between Moslems and Copts, while his most practical activity, outside propaganda campaigns, was his penetration of the schools.

In the early years of the century the British awoke to the danger of further neglecting education in general and English instruction in particular. But even so the percentage of total expenditure on education between 1907 and 1912 never rose above 3·4, and of this one-third to one-half

was raised in fees, whereas during this period public revenue was raised from £14,000,000 to over £40,000,000. Moreover, the quality of English teachers had declined after Cromer's creation of the Civil Service that closed promotion from educational to governmental posts. Now, however, a Ministry of Public Education was established under a British adviser. Instruction in English was added to instruction in French, and the amenable Egyptians emigrated *en masse* from the French to the English class-rooms. But while they were still thus reducing the French hold on Egyptian education, the British found themselves embarrassed by an outbreak of nationalism among the students. These boys saw in Mustapha Kamil the champion of Young Egypt, and in themselves the advance guard of an Egyptian nation. There was a movement to replace English instruction by Arabic and English teachers by Egyptians. To meet this Saad Zaglul was made Minister of Education, and tried unsuccessfully to restore discipline and free the schools from propaganda. The next move was that voluntary schools were started for young Nationalists with subscriptions obtained by *El Lewa* (1901). A national university was stopped by Cromer (1905), but was started successfully under his successor (1908). That it was not then, and has not since been, a success may be attributed to the failure of its founders to realise that a system of national education is not the same thing as a system of education in nationalism. But that such enterprises were even attempted is evidence of our own failure to realise that the systematic exclusion of a nation from political education will make their educational system political.

The British authorities, in the last phase of Cromerism, proved quite unable to deal with this nationalist agitation,

even though it had no real root either in a racial, a religious, or a reformist movement. For the Nationalist *effendi*, though he was probably the first conscious "Egyptian," had no special connection with any of those racial communities that will some day coalesce into a homogeneous Egypt. Nor, being notoriously irreligious and gallicised, could the Nationalist effectively appeal to the old religious solidarity of Islam. And he had not even a practical programme of reform. For the reforms required by one section of the community were strongly resisted by the other, while, on the whole, the country was more prosperous and there was less pressure for any reorganisation than ever before in its history. Their lack of any strong pressure for reform together with their ignorance of affairs explains the emptiness of the Nationalists' attacks on the British administration. British officials, finding no real criticism and nothing but rhetorical invective in the diatribes of the Nationalist Press, ignored the whole movement as insignificant and impotent. They looked on such Press propaganda as merely blowing-off steam and on an unrestricted liberty of the Press as a better safety-valve than a responsible and representative Parliament. But undoubtedly it would have been better for the British if Cromerism had put a curb on the Nationalist Press and given a looser rein to Parliamentary representation. Unfortunately, the traditional tenderness of British Liberalism for free speech, combined with an Anglo-Indian distrust of free institutions, diverted the Nationalist movement into that most dangerous of channels—irresponsible incitements of hatred.

British authority in Egypt was based on military power, and built up round the personality of Cromer and of his colleagues. With Cromer many of the

secondary personalities left the stage. Sir William Garstin, the influential Adviser to Public Works, and other real experts whose public services to Egypt had earned general recognition, followed their chief into retirement. The Financial Adviser and the Adviser to the Interior had to be replaced under circumstances prejudicial to our prestige. The survivors of the old ruling class like Nubar, Riaz, and Mustapha Fehmy were passing and leaving no successors on whom we could similarly rely. The old social relations, always so easily established between representatives of the British and the Turkish ruling classes, were rapidly losing all political importance in an Egypt that was taking its leaders from a new middle class. With the *effendiat* of lawyers and journalists British officers and officials had no even less social than political contacts.

Moreover, the British official himself was changing in character. Instead of a few Anglo-Indians of Eastern experience, accustomed to a ceremonial and occasionally cordial intercourse with Oriental notables, there was a flood of minor officials, mostly young, whose interest in Egypt did not extend beyond the playgrounds of Ghezireh and the gaities of the great hotels that were converting Cairo, Heliopolis, and Helouan into winter resorts for tourists. Ghezireh, with its three polo-grounds, its two race-courses and golf-course, its tennis and squash courts, its turf and sports clubs, and its wholly insular interests, had, indeed, little in common with Egypt. Even the Egyptian aristocracy did not enjoy that honorary membership as guests extended by Anglo-Indian communities to especially favoured natives. "With the exception of Yasri Pasha, a Turk educated in England, I never saw an Egyptian play polo," writes Coles Pasha (*Recollections*, p. 163). The British in-

spector or engineer of early Cromerism, riding on his donkey or his pony through the fields, camping in the villages and chatting to sheikhs and *fellaheen*, had become an official or officer hurrying out in a motor and back again for his tennis, and seldom setting foot in the country except to shoot quails. There were still strenuous souls in a hurry to cure the plagues of Egypt, but there were many more that merely hankered after its flesh-pots.

The departure of Lord Cromer was rightly interpreted by the Nationalists as the deposition of Cromerism. They were further greatly encouraged by the success of Japanese nationalism against Russian imperialism, and by the substitution of a Liberal for a Conservative Government in Great Britain (1906). Under these conditions the new Agent-General, Sir Eldon Gorst, undertook the very difficult task of establishing a new relationship between the Empire and Egypt. The new régime that he introduced has been so confidently represented as a complete failure that it is well to point out here how very near it came to complete success. It is not clear, however, even to-day how far the large measure of success achieved by Gorst was due to a considered diplomacy and how far it was due to a policy of general conciliation. We can, for example, question whether the new ruler of Egypt was consulting his personal taste or creating a new political tradition in renouncing all the outward and visible symbols of power usually considered indispensable in the East, and by restoring the old *sans façon* and informalities of the early occupation. Riding his pony into the country or driving his two-seater unattended about Cairo, exchanging repartees in the vernacular with the crowd, often hatless and collarless, he seemed to invite the contempt of the Egyptians, and certainly incurred the criticism of his fellow-Englishmen.

But if Cromer had made the mistake of despising his enemy the Nationalist, the Nationalist now made the mistake of despising Gorst. For this studious little man in round spectacles had learnt his Egypt as Secretary in the Agency (1886), as Controller of Revenue (1890), as Adviser to the Interior (1894), as Financial Adviser (1898), and as negotiator of the agreement with France (1904). He knew the composite character of the extremist party and how to rule nationalism by dividing it.

With this very possibly in view, Gorst first restored friendly relations with the young Khedive Abbas, who found the new Agent-General's overtures very soothing to a crowned head still smarting under the bludgeonings of Cromer. The relationship, begun on both sides for a political purpose, seems to have ripened into a real friendship, for a few years later, when Gorst lay dying in England, the Khedive travelled all the way from Egypt to take farewell of his friend. From which we may infer that the personality of Abbas had possibilities that Cromer and Kitchener were unable to develop.

In thus detaching the Khedive from non-co-operating nationalism, Gorst was no doubt helped by the rupture between Abbas and Mustapha Kamil (1904), and by the Young Turk revolution (1908) that showed the Khedive the untoward turn that a nationalist movement might take. But in any case, whether intentionally or no, Gorst broke thereby the united front of nationalism. For the association between the Agency and Abbas discredited the Khedive with the Nationalists, who accused him of disloyalty and declared for his deposition. In consequence of this the more intransigent and timid had to fly to Constantinople (1911), while another section made submission and started a Khedivist faction of less extreme Nationalists.

The next Nationalist split effected by Gorst might also have been an unintentional consequence of a conciliatory policy. For any British authority seeking some association with nationalism would naturally first approach the Copts. As a Christian community, compact in itself and conscious of interests distinct from those of the Moslem and Arabic-speaking politicians, the Copts, though allied, were not amalgamated with nationalism. Their vestigial traces of Pharaonic culture had made them the clerical class of Egypt, but they had found their monopoly threatened by the preference of British officials for the more adaptable Syrians. Spurred by this grievance, they had agreed to an alliance with nationalism; but out of deference to Moslem prejudice the Nationalists had kept them subordinate and segregated. And after the death of Mustapha Kamil, el Azhar, under guidance of Sheikh Shawish, offensively reasserted the old Moslem contempt for this Christian sect of clerks. It was at this juncture that Gorst, when looking for a successor to Mustapha Fehmy as Premier, made an unprecedented promotion by giving the post to Boutros Pasha. He was not only a Copt, but the Copt who had presided over the Denshawi trial. This at once diverted the offensive of Moslem nationalism away from their British antagonists and against their Coptic allies. The appointment was a challenge to nationalist Pan-Islamism, and Gorst rubbed it in: "The first genuine Egyptian who has risen to the highest position in the country," was his reference to Boutros in his report for 1909. Which was more aggravating than accurate. But the policy succeeded, and the rupture between the Moslem and Christian Nationalists became irreparable for the time being, when Boutros was assassinated (1910) by Wardani, a Mahomedan Nationalist. So completely had

Gorst by then broken the power of nationalism that he was able to secure the murderer's execution by ordinary process of law. For Gorst was no weakling, and an increase of crime with a reappearance of brigandage, both directly attributable to the unrest caused by the Nationalist agitation, was successfully repressed. His "exile laws," with their penalty of internment in criminal colonies among the oases of the western desert, much impressed the imagination of the lawless. So that there was no commotion when his *coup de grâce* was given to Nationalist agitators by the reimposition of the Press Laws (1919) and by the repression of inflammatory propaganda. Mustapha Kamil had already burnt himself out and died (1908), and the conflagration he had kindled, though it still smouldered and now and then flickered up, was thereafter mastered, and no longer a serious menace.

Gorst's policy was to detach from the ranks of the extremists anyone capable of useful co-operation by offering him a career. As early as 1893, when Adviser to the Interior, he had instituted the Local Commissions and mixed Municipalities. He now gave increased powers, notably in educational affairs, to the Provincial Councils. A more real responsibility was given to the Legislative Council; but as it at once used them to come into conflict with the native Ministers, the Council was again pushed into the background. Even the General Assembly was roused from its long sleep, and asked to give a real decision. For the Canal Corporation had proposed that Egypt should extend its concession by forty years in return for an increased share in the profits. The British Government readily agreed, and so very reluctantly did the Egyptian Ministers. The Nationalist Press violently opposed. Gorst referred the matter to the General

Assembly, which, without going into its merits at all, rejected the proposal by a straight Nationalist vote. Only one member had the courage to vote for it, and two days later the Premier, Boutros, who had proposed it, was assassinated. The General Assembly was not again convoked. In the administration Egyptian Ministers were given greater freedom from control by their advisers and on these latter, in some cases, objecting they were removed. While at the bottom of the bureaucratic pyramid the intrusive Syrians were again removed in favour of the indigenous Copt.

It was, however, in respect to the rights of the Anglo-Egyptian Civil Service that Gorst's policy of "Egypt for the Egyptians" caused most criticism. It was Gorst himself who, in 1898, when at the finance Ministry, had sanctioned the selection of young University men for permanent Egyptian employment. Some of these same men were now among those summoned by Gorst to a meeting at the Residency for what was, in their view, a massacre as perfidious as that of their predecessors, the Mamelukes. This involved, of course, a pretty sharp collision with the British ruling class at home. In which Gorst showed as much courage as he had in dealing with the Nationalists. But the inevitable result was a bad Press in London and what at times almost amounted to a social boycott of the Agency by Cairo. Any stick was good enough to beat the British reformer. Roosevelt, visiting Egypt, was encouraged to make an attack that would normally have been angrily resented as an impertinence. "If you can't keep order in Egypt, get out of Egypt," barked the American energumen on a public occasion. By this sort of attack Gorst was embarrassed and embittered during the last years of his life. And by this time his sufferings from cancer were such as would have

incapacitated him but for his determination to deal effectively with his difficulties before he died. When he left Egypt (1911) everyone knew that he was dying, but only those few who knew Egypt could see that what he had set himself to do was done. "The killing of the nationalist movement was Sir Eldon Gorst's," wrote Al Ahram. "He had fought his fight, and, where the world saw failure, had succeeded," wrote Sir R. Storrs, Oriental Secretary to the Agency.

The arrival of Lord Kitchener (November, 1911) as Sir Eldon Gorst's successor was at once recognised in Egypt as meaning a return to the dictatorial methods of Cromerism and a renunciation of the diplomatic methods of Gorst. Nationalism was thereafter handled with the iron hand of the last phase of Gorst's administration, not with the velvet glove of his first phase. A Criminal Conspiracy Act, a Press Censorship Act, and a School Discipline Act show by their titles the line of attack against nationalism. And this special legislation was not a mere rod in pickle. Many active nationalists found themselves interned under the "exile act" introduced a few years before to check an outbreak of brigandage. The nationalist leader, Farid Bey, was made an example of. For writing a preface to a book of nationalist verse by a young patriot, Ghayati Bey, Farid was tried by a special Assize Court set up under a Bill (May, 1910) intended for brigandage cases and rejected by the Legislative Council but passed by decree. This special Court gave him six months. Soon after, on coming out, he made a speech, which seems mild enough to-day, but which got him a sentence of twelve months. He, however, escaped to Switzerland, and resigned a leadership that was proving too exacting after our Liberal Foreign Secretary had somewhat shocked some of his party by applying for

extradition. Nor did his lieutenant and the leading journalist, Sheikh Shawish, editor of *El Alam*, fare any better. Having fled to Constantinople, he was sentenced to three months for a literary offence. At Constantinople he was arrested by the Turkish police at our request and handed over to Egyptian police agents for deportation to Cairo.

Nor was any distinction made between anti-British nationalists and home-rulers who were ready to co-operate. The General Assembly, on meeting (March, 1912), pressed for a constitution, and was at once dismissed. Soufani Bey, one of its prominent members and a moderate, was prosecuted.

Zaglul Bey, another co-operator, whom Cromer had recommended to his successors, was dismissed. And as to the general effect of all this on the nationalist movement, it may be of interest to record the parting speech of a disappointed constitutionalist co-operator, Ismail Pasha Abaza. "I take the British Agent to task for—the Press Laws, which mean a reaction to conditions of thirty years ago—for treating journalists as brigands, and for attacking the authority of the Legislative Council. We are progressing in brutality, loquacity, drink, and debts. In 1884 we imported flour to a value of £134,000, in 1909 to £1,836,000. Under Mehemet Ali we sent nine hundred and five students to Europe, under Ismail we sent one hundred and fifty-five, under Abbas we send forty-three. What is the remedy? Self-government! And for the last thirty years we have not moved an inch towards self-government."

History will probably decide that British Statesmen were wrong in using the superior military power of the Empire to break down the Egyptian Nationalist movement under Arabi and Sherif in the 'eighties. It will, on

the other hand, probably decide that they were justified in using their superiority in the art of democracy and in the craft of diplomacy to break up this nationalist movement of the *effendiat* a quarter of a century later. For co-operation, such as would have been possible with the Constitutionals and Colonels of the earlier movement, was almost inconceivable with these later *café* politicians and boulevard propagandists. While the complete independence of Egypt under their guidance would have been almost certainly a calamity. Nor does the precedent of the Young Turk revolution contradict this conclusion. For in 1908 the Young Turk Committee kept itself in the background and left the reins in the hands of elder statesmen with a diffidence that was not in the make-up of the Egyptian Nationalists. And Turkish nationalism, after the war, was a military mass-movement, very different from any superficial ebullition of the Egyptian *effendiat*.

Lord Kitchener, who came back to Egypt as Gorst's successor, is generally credited with having put an end to this phase of Egyptian nationalism. But Gorst had already so dismembered it that it easily disintegrated under the heavy heel of the successful soldier. And it was curiously enough international, not internal, difficulties that called for all the prestige acquired by the Sirdar in reconstructing the Egyptian army and in reconquering the Sudan. For his arrival coincided to a day with the declaration of war on Turkey by Italy. And the consequent institution of an Italian buffer state in Tripoli between Tunis and Egypt, acceptable as it was to British interests in Egypt, was distinctly awkward in view of the nominal suzerainty over Egypt still retained by the Sultan. For the Egyptian army was still, in name, an Ottoman force. The very title of Sirdar was an invention

to circumvent the right of the Sultan to appoint all general officers. Egyptian territory and troops were formally at the disposal of the Sultan in time of war, and Egypt was the only possible base for Turkish operations against the Italian invasion of the Empire in Tripoli. A declaration of Egyptian neutrality would mean an abrupt repudiation of the Ottoman Empire's rights over Egypt—a refusal to allow Egyptian Moslem to join a *djehad* for the defence of their fellow Moslem—and quite possibly a recrudescence of fanatical opposition to our occupation. But the difficulty was disposed of in detail without disturbing diplomacy by practical decisions of the military problems as they arose. When Egyptian officers applied for leave to volunteer with the Turkish forces they were told that it would be impossible to keep their places unfilled. When Bedawin tribes asked leave to join the *djehad* they were told that such fire-eaters could obviously no longer claim exemption as nomads from conscription. When the Syrian Bedawin tried to march into Tripoli across Egypt they were stopped at the Canal on police grounds. When Turkish officers tried to travel through in disguise they disappeared until they disembarked weeks later at some remote port. When the Alexandria mob celebrated an imaginary Turkish victory by hustling Italian workmen the fire hoses quenched their enthusiasm. That Egypt, though *de jure* an integral part of the Ottoman Empire, was *de facto* part of the British Empire became very plain to all.

Such difficulties as arose in the internal situation were dealt with on the same lines. Both from policy and from preference Kitchener reversed Gorst's plan of self-effacement and self-government and presented himself as the sort of personal ruler that Egypt has always been ready to accept. But it would be a mistake to see in the auto-

cratic authority acquired by Kitchener merely the subservience of a servile race to a successful soldier. Egyptians could feel that Kitchener, as a public personage, was Egyptian. Egypt had made him. For Egypt had raised him, as it raised Mehemet Ali, from the ranks to a world-wide reputation, and, like Mehemet Ali, he was adopted by and adapted himself to Egypt. His mastery of the minds of his Egyptian subjects was the delight of the bazaars even as his masterful ways with his British subordinates were the dismay of the bureaucracy. He made progresses through the provinces, receiving and replying to petitions in the vernacular with the condescension of an Oriental autocrat. His own mind had shaped itself into that baffling blend of despotic decision and diplomatic duplicity peculiar to Oriental princes. And, like them, he was a *poseur*. For example, Coles Pasha speaks of interpreting for him "as his Arabic was often incomprehensible to village sheikhs." But he put it across all the same. "He put his hands on my shoulders," cried an old Sheikh, "and said to me: 'Am I not your father? Will a father forget his children?'" (Weigall, *Egypt*, p. 358). He was no less idolised by foreigners. That anomalous foreign body, the Cairo Municipality (*Tanzim*), could refuse him nothing. The local Press ascribed all legislation to him personally. We read of "Lord Kitchener's Great Project"—the new public square. "Lord Kitchener's Agricultural Syndicates." "Lord Kitchener's Reform of the Wakf." "Lord Kitchener's Five Feddan Law." When the long deferred concessions to demands for self-government came in the shape of the new Legislature and Constitution (1913), they were gratefully accepted as gifts from Kitchener, and the elections were loyally postponed until his return from leave. He personally

supervised even the seating arrangements of the new Chamber, and it gratefully passed his measures.

Kitchener played up well to his part. Money was now easy, and the old campaigner of the Sudan who had set an example of frugality to the British officer, now set a new standard of display to the British official. The Residency blazed out in scarlet liveries, a new ballroom and a service of gold plate. The British administration that had been so *mesquin* in its economy launched into public expenditures that seemed to some sheer megalomania. Sir Paul Harvey, Financial Adviser, trying to assert the power of the purse, was forced to give place to the more tactful Lord Edward Cecil. Lord Kitchener, in symposia with Cecil Rhodes, was indulging in visions of an all-red Africa. The Egyptian Nation seemed destined to be embedded in a new extension of the British Empire.

Meantime Gorst's "Egypt for the Egyptians" disappeared. The complete dependence of Egyptian Ministers on the Agency and on their Advisers was restored. British officials again filled every vacancy. But this reaction seems to have passed almost unnoticed by Egyptians; or, perhaps, was compensated by Kitchener's efforts to break down the social barriers between English and Egyptians. For the Residency receptions were well attended by Egyptian notables, and an Anglo-Egyptian Society seemed in a fair way to replace the old racial segregation.

One recalcitrant, however, still resisted. There was clearly not room enough in Egypt for two potentates, and Kitchener soon came into collision with the Khedive. Kitchener was liked and feared. The Khedive was feared and loathed. For Abbas, denied the prominent place in the public eye to which he aspired, had taken to assert-

ing his power behind the scenes. The Khedive had become a hidden hand—a hand that pulled wires and tightened bowstrings in the dark. Abroad the Khedive machinated with the enemies of England; at home he manipulated Ministries. For example, he pushed his nominee, Mohamed Said, into the important Ministry of the Interior, while the more independent Saad Zaglul was put off with the perilous Ministry of Justice. Until at last this growing power of the Khedive reacted on the old divisions of the Nationalists. The line between extremists and co-operators faded, and soon most of the leaders were mainly concerned with opposing the power of the Khedive. While Abbas, having accumulated a considerable fortune, having control of the Charitable Trusts, and being able to confer decorations, managed by methods much like those of George III., to make and maintain a “Khedive’s Party.” The British before long felt called to put a curb on Abbas, and it would seem that the new Constitution was granted quite as much to counteract the Khedive as to conciliate the Nationalists. The establishment of a representative Assembly, to which the Khedive was notoriously hostile, was the first serious blow Abbas suffered. The second was the election of his enemy, Saad Zaglul, as first Vice-President, just after Khedival displeasure had driven him from office. Then the sale by Abbas of the Mariout railway through the Khedival estates to the Banco di Roma, acting in German interest, was stopped by Kitchener. At last the very taproot of his financial resources was cut by the law reforming the Charitable Trusts (*Wakf*), until then under Khedival administration. In vain did Abbas retaliate with intrigues among the Ministers which forced the Premier to resign. Kitchener merely replaced him with Hussein Rushdi Pasha, and Abbas lost, rather than

gained, on the exchange. Kitchener was, in fact, only waiting for a suitable opportunity to depose Abbas, and the outbreak of war only hastened this inevitable end to their duel. Probably by that time the Khedive had become as impossible for our purposes and from our point of view as he is generally represented. Even Gorst before leaving had apparently almost given him up. But it is not fair to refuse Abbas credit for acting under patriotic and public-spirited motives.

In other respects, Kitchener's régime was so well received that but for its interruption by the war it might have saved us from the rebellion. Though it is probable that something of the sort must have come when Kitchener went; and that, too, with all the more violence the longer it was postponed. But under the new Constitution the Provincial Councils and Municipalities had been given real powers of local government, which might have occupied provincial politicians with developing their educational and administrative machinery for many years. The new Legislative Assembly, which had replaced the old Legislative Council and General Assembly, had provided really representative institutions which would soon have educated the electorate in the use of the vote and the elected in the exercise of a new right of suspensory veto. The Organic Law was, in fact, an example of cautious approach to self-government much like the India Councils Act of 1909.

The Assembly was composed of sixty-six members, elected, as before, by indirect suffrage, and of seventeen governmental members representing minorities and various interests. Its powers were only consultative, and even more confined than those of the old Legislative Council; excluding, as they did, all international affairs and the Civil List—the latter a small sop to the Khedive.

But its proceedings were now public, and it had new powers of suspension and initiation. The debates were from the start lively, though at first mainly concerned with the new Standing Orders. Its large majority of co-operators was principally composed of responsible and substantial landowners and lawyers, whose nationalism was too reasonable to obstruct useful measures merely because they were British.

Legislation was mostly concerned with agriculture and its two ancillary services, irrigation and transportation. The Five Feddan Law freed the holding of the *fellah* from foreclosure by the local moneylender; whose ravages were still further checked by the development of agricultural syndicates and savings banks. A Ministry of Agriculture was established, cotton-growing was extended, and great irrigation schemes undertaken. Never since the first years of our intervention had the British occupation had firmer foundations in Egypt than when the outbreak of the Great War thrust suddenly its terrific strains on the structure of their government.

On the outbreak of war (August 4, 1914) both parties in Egypt were leaderless. The Khedive was on holiday in Constantinople, and Lord Kitchener on leave in England. Neither were ever to return. For the Khedive was informed that he had better remain where he was. While Kitchener, hurrying back to his post, was intercepted *en route* and recalled for larger responsibilities. He was replaced by an Anglo-Indian "political," Sir Henry MacMahon, who had no knowledge of Egypt, and who was in turn succeeded (1916) by Sir R. Wingate, Governor of the Sudan and Sirdar. Wingate's twenty years' experience of arms and affairs in Egypt were a strong tower that stood well the strain of the war. The Premier throughout the war was Hussein Rushdi, acting

as Regent, and aided by a capable Cabinet, including Adli, Sarwat, Serri, Yusuf Wahba, and Ismail Sidki. The Egyptian civil authorities were at first left very much to themselves; but as war conditions developed both English and Egyptian civilians came to be more and more subordinated to the military organisation.

It is sometimes assumed that the war materially changed the relations of Egypt to the Empire. Whereas the only change that the war effected was that it cleared away the diplomatic figments and altruistic fig-leaves that decorously apparelled what would otherwise have been a naked military occupation. The Great War clearly showed what the Italo-Turkish war had already suggested—that the English were not in Egypt as officials and officers of an Ottoman Sultan or even of an Egyptian Khedive. Though they wore fezzes and observed the forms of the Khedive's sovereignty and of the Khalif's suzerainty, they were, as a matter of fact, there by right of sea-power to guard the main waterway to the Asiatic possessions of the Empire and to garrison the main base of its African provinces. They were there, secondarily, to develop the resources of Egypt to the advantage of Europe in general and of England in particular, and to convert both Egypt and the Sudan into profitable dependencies of the Empire. Thirdly, they were there to continue educating the Egyptians until they became English.

CHAPTER VII

THE WAR

HUSSEIN—RUSHDI

“For the Egyptians shall help in vain, and to no purpose; therefore have I cried concerning this, Their strength is to sit still.”—ISA. xxx. 7.

THE war created just the crisis contemplated by those who justified our occupation of Egypt as being an indispensable protection for the Canal and for our Imperial communications in case of war. Yet it is difficult to see how establishing a British administration of Egypt in time of peace in any way facilitated our use, during the war, either of the Canal as a line of communication or of Cairo as a base of operations. Protectorate or no protectorate, peace occupation or no peace occupation, we should in any case have taken the necessary military and naval measures to secure such a strategic point, even if we had to do so by as cynical a *coup* as that of the Germans at Constantinople. We could, in that case, have defended the Canal without hampering ourselves with more political responsibility in Egypt than was assumed by the Germans in Turkey. In fact, our defensive in Egypt might have been converted into an offensive much earlier had not G.H.Q. become so involved in relations with, and in responsibilities for, the government of the country. While the use that we made in 1914-15 of States then neutral, like Portugal, suggests that an independent Egyptian Government could have given us all the military and

naval facilities we required, without our incurring the responsibility of forcing belligerency on a peaceful people or of involving ourselves in the regulation of Egyptian economics during the war. It looks, indeed, as though the whole argument, still confidently advanced, that our Imperial interests in the Canal require an administrative or military control over Egypt during peace is very clearly contradicted by the severest practical test to which those arguments could have been put. And as this consideration is still of crucial importance in our relations with Egypt it should be borne in mind while reading the record that follows of our war experiences in Egypt.

The British Government, on the outbreak of war, seems to have hoped it might keep Egypt neutral in spite of the fact that it was in British occupation. Thus they declared that they "did not propose to alter the status of Egypt" if Turkey stayed neutral. But any weight this may have had as a bribe for Turkish neutrality was discounted by what had to be done owing to our responsibility for the government of Egypt. For, at the same time, there was published (August 6, 1914), in the name of the Egyptian Government, and on the ground that "the presence of the British army of occupation in Egypt renders the country liable to attack," such hostile measures against enemy subjects and shipping as made Egypt *de facto* a belligerent. Egypt, being still *de jure* a neutral as a province of the Ottoman Empire, these measures did therefore effect in fact a most essential alteration of status. And the practical grounds for this action do not seem to have been such as made it indispensable. A German police officer in the Egyptian service was convicted for incitement to insurrection. German political agents, like Dr. Pruffer, were becoming active, and a Pan-Islamist propaganda in favour of the

Kaiser and the Khalif was being started. But all that could have been dealt with by an Anglophil Egyptian Government as measures for the maintenance of neutrality.

Meantime, the Turks began to threaten invasion from Syria (September, 1914). When our Government inquired what so many Turkish troops were doing on the frontiers of Egypt, the Ottoman Government replied by asking what so many British troops were doing in a province of the Empire. In fact, the Turks can claim to have had the best of these preliminary manœuvres for position.

But such diplomatic amenities had little to do with the actualities that were soon imperiously calling on either side for action. Unfortunately, our enemies began acting while we were still attitudinising. German diplomacy had already decided that if Cairo and the Canal were secured by our sea-power to be a strong point and a stage in the British line of communication, Constantinople and its isthmus should be seized by their sea-power as a strong point and stage on the line of communication between the Central Powers and Asia. The danger that we might encircle them by joining hands with Russia through the Straits was indeed far more deadly to them than any damage they could do to us by blocking the Canal and diverting our communications round the Cape.

The secret acceptance by the British Government (1912-13) of the Russian Empire's claim to Constantinople had been followed very naturally by a secret defensive alliance between the German and Turkish Governments. But concluding these secret diplomatic decisions, which were, of course, only "secrets" in so far as the public on either side were concerned, was one thing; carrying them into effect against public opinion

in the British and Ottoman Empires was quite another. It would not have been easy to reconcile the British to a surrender of Constantinople to Tzarism. It was almost as difficult for the Committee of Union and Progress to rally the Turks into alliance with the German armies and against the British fleet. The committee might have good reasons for its policy, but to the Turk the British had fought for a century to maintain the integrity of the Ottoman Empire.

With the outbreak of war the British were given an obvious opportunity of countering this conspiracy of the committee by a naval *coup de main*. If, instead of confiscating the two Turkish battleships, built by public subscription in British yards, we had sent them to Constantinople under British crews, we could have acquired a position of such power and popularity that Constantinople might have been converted into a second Cairo and the Committee suppressed. But, unfortunately, it was the Germans, holding very inferior cards, who brought off this "grand slam" by rushing their *Goeben* and *Breslau* to Constantinople and there "selling" them to the Turks. The Young Turks then easily brought off their gunpowder treason and plot, and Turkey declared war on November 5, 1914.

There is, therefore, no reason for the fears frequently expressed that our earlier belligerent activities in Egypt drove Turkey into the war against us. That had been decided when our diplomats surrendered Constantinople to Russia. Any chance of defeating it at the eleventh hour disappeared when our admirals commandeered the Turkish battleships for the Grand Fleet. But we may fairly note that a State which embarks on such ambitious and arbitrary diplomacy, as was the admission of Tzardom to "Tzargrad," must be prepared to back it promptly

with such adventurous action as would have been the naval occupation of the Straits on the outbreak of war. As it was, we departed from a sound and secular foreign policy, and let the most formidable enemy we have ever encountered in the most fearful war in which we have ever engaged snatch an advantage that probably doubled the duration and damage of the war.

This snap victory of German over British sea-power changed the character of the war in the East from an investment of the Central Powers at the Straits to a defence of our own communications at the Canal. The inclusion of Turkey within the German lines made Egypt a sector of the Eastern Front. Our declaration of Martial Law in Egypt (November 2, 1914) had promised that we would bear the whole burden of war in Egypt without calling on Egypt for help. But within three days the military emergency repealed this self-denying ordinance, and the Egyptian artillery were sent to defend the Canal.

The war, so far as Egypt is concerned, is best considered as three campaigns. These are well expressed under the designations of their military organisations as the campaign of the Canal Defence Force (1914-15); that of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force at the Levant Base (1915-16); and that of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force (1916-17). They represent respectively, in character, a defensive, an offensive, and a defensive ending in an offensive.

The first campaign, that of Canal Defence, though a modest and makeshift affair compared with the later war machines operating in Egypt, was perhaps the most important contribution of Egypt to the Allied cause. For the secret Turco-German alliance had stolen a long march, not only on our diplomacy in the Near East, but

on our defence of the Canal. One hesitates to imagine what would have happened had that spinal cord, the Canal, been cut even temporarily in those early days of emergency, when the British genius for improvisation was everywhere fighting forlorn hopes against the German genius for preparation.

The conquest of Egypt was the main political object and military objective of Turkish belligerency. The "precautionary" mobilisation of the Ottoman forces (August 2, 1914) had been accompanied and indeed anticipated, by military preparations for an invasion of Egypt. These preparations were the final cause of the definite breach with Great Britain and furnished the *casus belli*. Our relations with Turkey were definitely broken off on receipt of a communication from Constantinople (October 2, 1914) claiming Egypt as an integral part of the Ottoman Empire. Djemal, the ablest of the Young Turk triumvirate that had carried Turkey into the German camp, took command of the army assembled in Syria as "the Saviour of Egypt." On stepping into the train at Haidar Pasha to go to the front, he told his friends: "I shall return by sea from Cairo." Nor was this mere braggadocio. The attraction of the wealth of Egypt and the alliance with Sheikh Shawish and other Egyptian extremists would, it was calculated, carry the Turks across the improvised defences of the Canal and into Cairo, that would rise to receive them. Thereafter, the great drive of the German armies into France, then proceeding, would bring an early conclusion of the war that would confirm the easy conquest.

The main difficulty for the Turks was one of distance. From the Straits to the Canal meant one thousand miles rail transport of a sort. Then two hundred miles of roadless, waterless desert. The rail communications were

broken by gaps both in the Taurus and Amanus ranges, and in the second break the only good road was under fire from the sea. This exposure interfered with later reinforcements of the expedition ; but not with the earlier, owing to a British oversight. For the last push across the Sinai desert, the usual military and mercantile route by el Arish along the coast, was rejected as being too near the sea and too heavy with sand. The invasion was accordingly planned to advance from a rail-base at Beer-sheba, across the hard limestone central plateau against Ismailia and the Canal centre, with false attacks against either flank of the Canal. The expeditionary force was originally fixed at forty thousand rifles and thirty batteries, but eventually no more than twenty thousand rifles and ten batteries left their rail-base (January, 1915). The expedition dealt very successfully with the difficulties of the desert march, though suffering much from cold. It was then faced by the main line of defence, the Canal itself, strengthened with inundations and defended in places by warships. Though fear lest big ships might be sunk and block the Channel caused little use to be made of this obvious method of defence. The British regulars had left Egypt and the defence force consisted of a division of Lancashire territorials, the first contingent from Australasia, and two divisions of Indian infantry, with French and British aeroplanes and the Egyptian artillery ; some fifty thousand in all of good troops, though mostly untrained. As air observation prevented any surprise attack, it seems as though a more decisive defeat might have been delivered on the invaders by facing them at Egypt's first line of defence—the desert—rather than by waiting for them behind the "ditch." As it was, a few units of the Turkish force had the satisfaction of crossing the Canal in the Tous-

southern sector on the pontoons brought from Constantinople and on improvised petroleum-tin rafts (February 2, 1915). But the steadiness of the defence, the fire of the French cruisers, *Requin* and *d'Entrecasteaux*, and a severe sandstorm broke the force of the attack. The Turks, after considerable loss, retired in good order unpursued, and recrossed the desert at a heavy cost of transport camels. The following day, traffic through the Canal was resumed.

The result of this repulse was to put the Turks politically on the defensive and to substitute the Canal for Cairo as the Turkish military objective. For Egypt had given no indication of any inclination to rise in support of the Turkish invasion. While the object of the Germans was not to divert large Turkish forces for the conquest and control of Egypt, but to immobilise as large forces of the enemy as possible in that remote region, by raids on the Canal and by risings in its neighbourhood. In which they were greatly aided by the character of the wild tribes and territories in the neighbourhood of the Canal, and by the fact that the Indian regiments had shown themselves not impervious to Pan-Islamic propaganda. With these advantages, the activities of their very able military leader in the Sinai peninsula, Kress von Kressenstein, kept the British defence occupied resisting native raids both on and behind the Canal; and through that highly sensitive spot so irritated the nervous centres of war control in London, that eventually no less than three army corps were massed in Egypt as the British Expeditionary Force (1916).

Meantime the Turkish blow against Cairo had been closely followed by the British counter-stroke against Constantinople, for which Egypt served as a base. This

British attempt to encircle the Central Powers by a *coup de main* against the Straits was destined to be as unsuccessful as had been the German attack to cut British communications through the Canal, though it was much harder contested. The facilities offered by Egypt as a base may indeed be considered to have contributed to its failure. For, instead of a surprise descent delivered by an expedition despatched to a secret destination, everything was sent to Egypt for reorganisation and reshipment thence. This delayed an attack until the defences at Gallipoli were complete and the Turkish armies had been concentrated there (May, 1915). Thereafter, the choice of an assault on Gallipoli rather than of a war of manœuvre on the mainland gave Egypt a second and a sadder function as a hospital for the holocaust of casualties. Another service of the same sort, as tragic and far more troublesome, was taking charge of some five thousand Armenian refugees—the survivors of massacres picked up by French cruisers on the coast of Syria. When, later (1917-18), the British wanted accommodation for five times that number of Armenians evacuated from Palestine and Mesopotamia, the Egyptian Government refused to admit them. For by then the enthusiasms of the early war had been exhausted in Egypt, as elsewhere.

The failure of the attack on Gallipoli brought the Turkish armies back to Syria and again made the Canal an important sector, if not, as some supposed, an imperilled salient of the Eastern Front. The bulk of the survivors of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force was therefore established in Egypt as the Egyptian Expeditionary Force under Sir A. Murray. The Canal Defence Force disappeared, and Sir J. Maxwell left (March, 1916) to face in Ireland a rebellion of Nationalists more

distrustful of British gratitude than were those in Egypt. Or possibly Egypt was doing better out of the war than Ireland. Certainly the British forces then in Egypt were large enough to discourage any disloyalty. For there were at times as many as two hundred thousand British troops there. So disproportionate, indeed, was this war machine to its military task that it consumed a good deal of energy in making its own wheels go round.

Quite possibly the most important result of this re-organisation of the command in Egypt and of its transfer from Ismailia to Cairo was that it shook a certain young second lieutenant out of the Maps Department of the Cairo Intelligence and set him free to make war on his own account. Mr. Lawrence very soon recovered for the British the initiative on this front that the M.E.F. had let pass over to the Germans.

Kress von Kressenstein, that bold Bavarian, had deserved well of his country by immobilising such a mass of men so far from the seat of war. As Cairo had become the centre of the vast spider's web of our Near Eastern Intelligence Service, there was little risk of any surprise revolt. But, unfortunately, the Germans had allies in Egypt more deadly to us than spies or conspirators. That Port Said had quarters more infamous and filthy even than other Levantine towns, while Cairo and Alexandria were little better, was more the fault of the Capitulations than of Egypt. Any responsibility that the British may have had for not relieving Egypt of these restrictions now met with heavy retribution. Drink and drugs the British military authorities could deal with; disease, such as dysentery or cholera, only gave a passing anxiety. But in combating venereal diseases they were so hampered by the Capitulations and by conventional prejudices, and so vacillated between prohibitions and prophylactics, that

eventually twelve per cent. of the total force were incapacitated and certain units lost a quarter of their strength.

Supporting and supplying this enormous garrison meant wealth for Egypt, but it also meant work. As usual, the wealth went mostly to the few, and they not the best, while the work fell heavily on the many, and heaviest on the best. An elaborate system of pipelines, railways, and roads had to be built to connect Egypt with the Canal, and, later on, with Syria. The work required was soon beyond the strength of the depleted Civil Administration, on whose powers the military authorities more and more encroached. The British Government had formally undertaken not to call on Egyptians for war service, but this had now to be ignored. The Egyptian Government agreed to call up army reservists for railway construction (January 20, 1916), and the Egyptian Labour Corps, originally organised for Gallipoli (August, 1915), was enormously expanded and employed for foreign service. By the winter of 1915-16 eight thousand five hundred Egyptians were being recruited for the Mesopotamian Labour Corps and ten thousand for Labour Corps Service in France. Service was voluntary at high pay and for a three months' contract. The Egyptian *fellah*, though he enlisted without enthusiasm, proved a most energetic navvy. A "gippy" digging was a revelation to the much more powerful English soldier. Later, Egyptians were recruited for the camel transport of the Syrian campaign. This service of considerable hardship, often under fire, was work for which Egyptians alone were competent. All of which war employments, valuable as they were, did little to enlist Egyptian national sentiment in support of the English.

If the menace of the Turks on the Eastern frontier of Egypt was overestimated, the same may be said of the menace of the Senussi on its Western frontier. This organisation had, since its foundation a century before, occupied the desert oases of the Eastern Sahara and the coastal villages between Egypt and Tripoli. Its remote seclusion and sinister reputation had imposed on the imagination both of East and West, and had impressed the world with an importance justified neither by its military strength of some thousand savage warriors nor by its fanatical faith in a puritanical Mahomedanism, nor by its political programme—an exclusion of everything European. The French had come into collision with it in the south, the Italians in the north. Both had found it sufficiently formidable to leave unmolested in its desert fastness. But the possibilities of the "brotherhood" as a weapon for irritating and immobilising British forces in Egypt was not overlooked by the Germans. The Senussi Chief, Sid Ahmed, was conceited, and put a high price on his co-operation. The British had neglected to subsidise him, and German submarine power in the Mediterranean was by 1915 able to supply the Senussi with munitions and money. The Cairo Intelligence Service, occupied with its ramifications in more distant fields, was caught napping. The Senussi struck at Sollum and other Egyptian posts on the coast, which they occupied (November, 1915). These points were, however, recovered without difficulty (March, 1916) after a series of skirmishes, in which the modern machinery of war decisively demonstrated that desert guerilla had had its day. Thereafter the Senussi were only important as occupying large forces in patrolling the Western frontier against raids.

Meantime, after a visit of Enver to the Sinai front,

Djemaal had been reinforced, and Kress von Kressenstein had decided that it was time to give the Egyptian Expeditionary Force a better justification for its rather excessive existence than squibbing off at German aeroplanes or scouring after Bedawin raiders. So he led a small Turkish force of fifteen thousand men to Katyia and attacked some thirty thousand British and nine batteries in their entrenchments near Kantara (August, 1916). The Turks retired with a loss of some four thousand prisoners, and the British, stung to activity by this audacity, slowly advanced, and occupied el Arish (December, 1916). Thence they attacked Gaza (March 27 and April 17, 1917), but were heavily repulsed. The Expeditionary Force then again sank into a supine defensive, its long inertia having deprived it of all initiative. From this lethargy it was roused by the substitution of General Allenby for General Murray (June, 1917), by a transference of G.H.Q. from Egypt to Palestine, and by the beginning of an offensive campaign to relieve pressure on Russia in the Caucasus and on the British in Mesopotamia. Under this new commander in this new campaign the Egyptian Expeditionary Force recovered its *morale* and its mobility. But thereafter Egypt was only concerned in so far as it contributed the camel transport and labour corps. Allenby's advance excited no enthusiasm in Egypt, and the further the force went into Syria the less money there was to be made out of it by Egyptians and the more men it required from Egypt for its auxiliary services. Allenby's victories did little to remove the unfortunate impression left by Gallipoli, Kut, and by Gaza.

The departure of G.H.Q. and of the bulk of the garrison allowed the Egyptian Government to recover some power of self-assertion. But by then the political

status of the Egyptian Government had been definitely changed for the worse by the establishment of a British Protectorate. Something of the sort was probably inevitable. There had been no great difficulty either in form or in fact in keeping Egypt a neutral, *de facto*, during the Tripoli and Balkan wars, even though as an Ottoman province it was, *de jure*, a belligerent. But with Constantinople and Cairo respectively strong points in lines of communication vital to Germany on the one side, and to Great Britain on the other, and with the British and German peoples in a death grapple, there was, in technical terms, a derogation of Ottoman sovereignty that swept away the fictions veiling our occupation of Egypt. The ten years' old bargain with France by which we had surrendered our rights in Morocco in return for a recognition of our rights over Egypt, and the more recent bargain with Russia by which we surrendered our rights in Constantinople for a similar recognition, may have been in themselves good or bad business. But in any case, they removed any possibility of an objection from our Allies to a proclamation of a British protectorate over Egypt. As for our antagonists, there was a distinct advantage in removing Egypt both from any inclusion in the peace negotiations as a make-weight and from any interference in them as a marplot. While, in view of these completed transactions, and in view of the secret partitions of the Ottoman Empire already contemplated between the Allies, a simple substitution of Great Britain for Turkey as suzerain of Egypt could not be considered as a breach of their self-denying ordinance not to anticipate the general peace by any particular annexations. Therefore, the proclamation of a British protectorate (December 18, 1914) does not seem to deserve the criticisms it has encountered in so far as

concerns any ground within the purview of our professional diplomacy. It was quite in the picture and very much too all of a piece with our diplomacy both before, after, and during the war.

This defence of our protectorate in principle cannot, however, be extended to the method of its proclamation ; seeing that this was so unnecessarily provocative of offence to Egyptian nationalism that it can best be explained by assuming that our diplomacy was unaware that the Egyptian Nationalist sentiment was extending or even that it still existed. It was, perhaps, excusable that we should not have known that the Arabic word for protectorate (*himaya*) is especially offensive to Moslems, as having been in common use for the "protection" of foreign subjects, which is one of the worst abuses of extra-territoriality, and a term of opprobrium as between Moslems and Christians. One might also excuse such ignorance of the true position of the Khalif in the Islamic State as was shown in the Note accompanying the proclamation when it attributed to the Khalifate "spiritual authority" in Egypt and alleged that the country was already politically independent. For this is a common mistake, and one that might easily be made by minds more familiar with the position of the Papacy than with that of the Prophet ; though one much resented by Moslems. But ignorance of Arabic or of Islamic institutions does not explain the general political atmosphere and attitude adopted in the vapid and verbose Note which notified the protectorate to the Egyptian Government. The only advantage to Egypt that it ascribed to the protectorate was a revision of the Capitulations after the war. There was no promise even of an extension of self-government. His Majesty's Government might be "convinced that the clearer definition of Great Britain's

position in the country will accelerate progress towards self-government"; but there was nothing in the Note that would convey such a conviction to the Egyptian Government. Rushdi and the other Ministers accepted its invitation to continue in office, but without comment. None was in the circumstances advisable or advantageous. The educated Nationalist, never a man to ride the storm, had been either cowed by its apocalyptic thunderings and lightnings, or had convinced himself that the right policy was to wait till the clouds rolled by.

Sir John Maxwell had been sent out to Egypt to take control, and his local experience, combined with great energy, soon made him the real ruler. The first war measures taken in Egypt were, indeed, no better considered than elsewhere, and showed even less consideration than elsewhere for local sentiment. For example, the saving of food effected by prohibiting the sacrifices of sheep at Kurban Bairam seemed scarcely worth interfering with a religious observance and a form of charity as popular in Egypt as would be a free distribution of plum-puddings at Christmas in England. While the attempt at drawing gold bullion by accepting gold ornaments for twice their bullion value in payment of taxes caused a general disturbance of domestic harmony through husbands robbing their wives of their dowries. There was more to be said for the ordinances restricting the cultivation of cotton in favour of cereals; though this was a heavy blow to the cotton boom that had built up a new well-to-do middle-class in the country. In 1913 the cotton export had been valued at £E26,000,000, and the new rich who were threatened with a check to this influx of wealth were all recruits for the new Nationalism. On the other hand, some war measures, such as the

restriction of the sale of alcohol and the prohibition of absinthe, though passed for special purposes, were recognised as in the general interest. On the whole, the quiet reception of these intimate interferences with the public and private economies of Egypt was such as to justify an assumption that the nationalist movement, if not dead, was at least heavily dormant.

The same conclusion was suggested by the tacit approval of the proclamation deposing the Khedive, Abbas Hilmi, and replacing him with a Sultan, Hussein Kamil. But in this, as a matter of fact, nationalism was little concerned. For the Khedive, in spite of his nationalism, was hated and feared, while the new Sultan, who was his uncle, and the oldest prince of the family, was popular. And if the substitution of the more dignified title of Sultan was intended as a sop to nationalism, it showed another misconception of that movement. For Egyptian nationalism was hostile to any aggrandisement of Egyptian princes on account both of their despotic traditions and of their tendency to be dependent on British protection.

Hussein Kamil was a man of high character and of considerable capacity, who did his duty by those who had promoted him. He restored the tone of the Court, demoralised by the secret intrigues and the sinister entourage of his predecessor. And he earned the increase of the civil list from £100,000 to £150,000 for which he stipulated. The hideous "Stambouli" buttoned up black coat, associated with the spy systems of Abbas Hilmi and of Abdul Hamid, was replaced by Court uniforms gorgeous with gold lace. Ismail Sidki, an able Nationalist Minister, was dismissed in disgrace, and Hussein let it be known that he was going to be the original and only "Father of the *Fellaheen*." Meantime

the Nationalists lay low and looked on all these new dignities as mere camouflage for a reinforcement of British rule.

The British protectorate, martial law, and military administration marked the end of the second phase of Egyptian nationalism. This phase, as we have seen, was a feverish and ineffective anti-British agitation of pressmen and propagandists. Driven still deeper underground and still further afield by the repression of war regulations, Egyptian nationalism now entered its final "activist" phase. Press and platform agitation was to be replaced by carefully plotted aggressions, and by no less carefully promoted anarchy. For revolutions, whether nationalist or socialist or both, are a new wine that does not become milder and more mature by bottling. The Egyptian movement, that had been safe in the hands of elderly Constitutionalists and Colonels, like Sherif and Arabi, and that had been insignificant in the hands of young journalists and intriguers like Mustapha Kamil and Abbas Hilmi, was to achieve a sinister success through student assassins and schoolboy anarchists.

We have now to see how the war, by its economic and political exigencies, converted the Egyptians from allies into antagonists. The argument here advanced is that we could have fought the Turks and Germans equally well, indeed, even better, in the Near East without any pre-war occupation of Egypt. And that we should not, in that case, have had afterwards to fight the Egyptians.

The "war" between the English and the Egyptians, that broke out in 1919, originated in our pre-war occupation and in our consequent obstruction of Egyptian nationalist aspirations. But the actual rupture was the

result of a want of precaution on the part of the British authorities that was excusable in the emergency, as well as of more preparation on the part of the Egyptians than they have as yet been given credit for. It was, for example, a mistake on our part, though a very natural one, to make the war an excuse for shutting down such constitutional safety-valves as there were for expressing political opinions. Thus, the new Legislative Assembly was suspended and every political activity was suppressed. So heavy was the hand of the military authorities, and so long the arm of their secret service, that prisons were soon full of hundreds of political suspects. No more than five persons could meet anywhere without incurring arrest. The Nationalist newspapers were suppressed, and the remainder were not allowed to publish political news. *The Times* condemned the Egyptian censorship as "the most incompetent, the most inept, and the most savagely ruthless in any country under British control." Yet, at the same time, these same authorities spoon-fed the local papers with war propaganda as to the liberties of lesser nations and crusades for self-determination that were in the circumstances about as dangerous as anything could be. The effect of this was to drive nationalism into the only region where it defied all regulation—to say nothing of repression. The nationalist movement among the students and schoolboys soon became formidable. Each school or college became a centre of violent anti-British agitation. In the East adolescents are more reckless in action than adults, and in Egypt such youthful recklessness inflamed the native hue of resolution. The Sultan was twice attacked (April 9 and July 9, 1915), his first assailant being executed, his second escaping. The Prime Minister narrowly escaped (August 10). Yet,

even so, this new phase of Egyptian nationalism was not taken seriously by British authorities.

The Sultan Hussein did not live long to assert his new dignity against the insubordination of his youthful subjects or against, what he minded much more, the unceremoniousness of his British advisers. He was succeeded (October 19, 1917) by his brother, Ahmed Fuad, who was at that time too unknown and insignificant to draw fire. Thereafter the nationalist activists turned their attention exclusively to the British.

All the old grievances against the British had been aggravated by the war. The employment of British officials in posts previously held by natives, a process that had been interrupted early in the war by recruitment for war organisations, now revived, with a reflux of British war unemployed. In place of the three to four hundred of British officials under Cromerism, there were at the end of the war one thousand six hundred to one thousand seven hundred. The percentage of Egyptian executive employés sank from twenty-seven per cent. in 1905 to twenty-three per cent. in 1920. The new war organisations were staffed by British, and the old peace departments were swamped with new British appointments. British officials also occupied all the posts outside the administration itself, which provided pay on which a European could live. The middle-class Egyptian had received an education that fitted him solely for subordinate official employment. He now saw himself deprived of all possible promotion and of many posts that had hitherto been his.

Moreover, the new British officials were obviously appointed because they wanted a job, not because there was a job wanting them. There was no longer any question of their being experts, and only too often some

question of their efficiency. Nor was the new contempt for the British official counteracted by any new respect for the British officer. The Egyptian had been accustomed to officers carefully selected by Kitchener and Wingate. Any impression that might have been made on him by the immense masses of British troops in Egypt was injured by the absurdities and abuses perpetrated by the inevitable percentage of fools and frauds. He could not appreciate the amazing feat of this immense military improvisation by a peaceful people. On the other hand, he was very unfavourably impressed by our failure at Gallipoli and by the passive apathy of our armies against the Turco-German attacks on the Canal front, as well as by the foolish attempt to conceal our reverses at Gaza. The submarine challenge to our sea-power was sinking convoys in sight of Egyptian ports. The new factor of air-power was bringing German airships to bomb London and German aeroplanes to bomb Cairo. Egyptians might well assume that British supremacy in the pre-war world might not survive in post-war conditions.

Then there was the growing realisation that a war proclaimed for the liberties of lesser nations was being pursued in order to partition the lesser nations of the East among the Western Powers. Egypt had received no promise of further liberty in return for its loyalty. On the contrary, its dependence had been more clearly defined by the protectorate ; whereas India had received an appropriate reward. The Indian Legislative and Provincial Councils had been taken into consultation by the Imperial Government, and a larger measure of self-government was formally promised (August 20, 1917). Later, India was admitted to an equality with the Dominions in the Imperial War Conferences (November,

1917). An Indian was given a seat in the House of Lords, and no opportunity was lost of engaging the interest of Indian notables in the war. The only similar attention to Egyptians seems to have been a visit of notables to the Canal defences in 1915, and an invitation of leading legislators to lunch with G.H.Q. in 1916. The sole explanation of our very different treatment of India and of our discrimination against the Egyptians is that we were afraid of India and felt no alarm about Egypt.

For Egypt had proportionately as strong a claim as India on our gratitude and generosity. Contrary to our express undertaking, we had used Egyptians for making war on their co-religionists and neighbours just as it suited our convenience without any consideration for their prejudices or any concession to their pride. Yet Indian regiments in Egypt had been so affected by Pan-Islamic propaganda as to become unreliable. Whereas the Egyptian army of thirty thousand men maintained loyally through the war its arduous and unattractive task of policing the Sudan against the effects of that propaganda. It was Egyptian artillerymen who drove their Turkish co-religionists from the Canal on the only occasion when our position in Egypt was imperilled, while Egyptian officers were used for all manner of useful services. Anti-British agitation never had the least effect on the reliability even of Labour Corps and camel drivers. Though this immunity may, it is true, have been partly due to nationalist policy in confining anti-British agitation to schools where it could not easily be dealt with by such methods as military authorities understand. Yet this, if so, did not decrease our debt.

The change of character in the campaign from a defence of Egypt against Turks and Senussi into a British

conquest of Syria did not affect the allegiance of the Egyptian force, though it made heavier and heavier calls on its endurance. There were eventually about one hundred and thirty-five thousand men engaged on six months' contracts—that is about a quarter of a million per year, not including those sent on foreign service. This, out of a male military-age population of one and a half million. Transport, both camel and rail, water and food supply, entrenching and camps all depended on Egyptian labour. Official records and Lord Allenby's despatches bear enthusiastic witness to its reliability.

By 1917 there were twenty-one thousand Egyptians serving in camel transport—a service of hardship, in which two hundred and twenty were killed, fourteen thousand were wounded, and four thousand died in hospital. Service in the Labour Corps was less exacting. But, even so, the "Saidi," or central Egyptian, would never re-enlist, though of finer physique than the Delta *fellaheen*. Consequently, by the summer of 1917 voluntary recruiting was failing, and the difficulty of repatriating time-expired men from Palestine within the term of their contract caused general complaint and gave volunteering the *coup de grâce*. Various inducements failed to provide the seventeen thousand men required. The Egyptian Government were then asked to supply conscripts from the one hundred and thirty thousand youths annually liable for conscription, of whom about half were balloted to supply the three thousand recruits required for the standing army. This would have got the men without unfairness or friction. But instead, the Egyptian Government took the curious step of re-introducing the old *corvée* system with all its abuses. The provincial Mudir was ordered to produce a quota of conscripts, and the village Omdeh selected them as of old,

with due regard to his own interests and enmities. The old evils of denunciation and corruption again disturbed the villages. Victims fought or fled. The whole country population was upset. Time-expired conscripts returned to take vengeance on the Omdeh. The Egyptian Government gave no reason for thus preferring *corvée* to conscription. But we may assume they did not wish to render their own conscription odious for no benefit to Egypt; while they saw no objection to rendering the British odious by restoring the *corvée* for their benefit. If this was so, we cannot justly complain. For if the military emergency forced us to recall our undertaking not to require military service from the Egyptians, we could have offered some *quid pro quo* to Egypt that would have got us all the camel drivers and camels we wanted.

But the commandeering of camels and donkeys caused almost as much complaint as the conscription of young men. The wastage was extravagant, and the agriculture of Egypt suffered accordingly. Purchase soon failed to produce animals, and pressure had to be applied. Those of the poorer peasantry which could least well be spared were, of course, the first to be taken. There were difficulties and delays in distributing compensation, and, as a matter of fact, no compensation could make up to the *fellah* for the loss of his camel.

Another measure that caused a revulsion of opinion was the Disarmament Act (May 17, 1917). There was a precedent for this in a measure of 1904, when an outbreak of brigandage had called for special repression. But there does not seem to have been any particular justification for its revival during the war. Yet it was enforced with considerable severity by domiciliary visits, which are even more objectionable in the East than in the West. An Englishman's house may be his castle,

though it is to-day a castle very much in ruins, but the Egyptian's harem is his Ark of the Covenant. There were, moreover, still medieval traditions in the bearing of arms among the landowning class, while the farmers had trained themselves to carry arms as a protection against the new criminal class in the provinces. Indiscriminate disarmament was much resented as an unnecessary injury and as an undeserved insult. Its adoption at this moment has never been explained. The preamble of the Act says it was on the "advice of the military authorities," but there seems some reason for suspecting that it was another Egyptian experiment in practical anti-British propaganda.

The war had brought wealth to a large number of Egyptians and had not injured the welfare of the country as a whole. A money contribution levied on war profits might fairly have been exacted for purposes of war philanthropy. But, unfortunately, as in the case of conscription, we again took refuge from the responsibility of definitely imposing a war burden. We let the Egyptian Government have recourse in our name to the voluntary principle in a community where that principle only opens the door to arbitrary exactions and petty abuse. Egypt had become a great hospital camp, and had contributed its schools and other buildings without resentment, though not without realising the sacrifice. Monetary subscriptions would have been a very proper corresponding contribution from the foreign colonies. But the extension of such voluntary contributions to the natives was a different matter. When the Sultan and other Anglophil notables handsomely headed subscription lists, and expressed their wish that compatriots of every class should contribute, the result was an informal assessment by the Mudir on every village, which was very in-

formally allotted by that local despot the Omdeh. The total collected, some £E600,000, was insignificant in terms of war finance, and disproportionately injurious to our position in Egypt. Such moneys raised by the hated Omdehs for the hated Christian symbol were very dearly come by. Again, the Egyptian Government ungrudgingly gave to the British and to their friends at Court all the rope that they wanted.

The commandeering of corn need have produced no hardship, but did in effect do so. The same quota that was easily supplied from his surplus by the large producer of the Delta, forced the "Saidi" of Upper Egypt to buy at war prices from his more prosperous neighbours. Moreover, payment, though ample, was not prompt, and at first only a percentage of such payment reached the producers themselves. Another grievance was the control of cotton. Cotton was both the main source of Egyptian wealth and one of the raw materials of most importance, both as a possible aid and comfort to the enemy and as an indispensable supply to our munition and army-clothing factories. Cotton control was first established to check enemy trading through Switzerland; but the Swiss Commercial Trust proved more commercial than trustworthy, and the black list of Swiss firms grew ever longer and blacker. By 1917 it was decided, for this and other reasons, to purchase the whole Egyptian crop at a price slightly above the ruling rate. The Egyptian Government contended for a price of \$60 a kantar as against that of \$42 fixed by proclamation (June 18, 1918). This, combined with the rise in price during the winter of 1919-20 to \$200, created the impression that Egypt had been bested over a deal in futures. Whereas the cotton control, so far from deserving condemnation, seems to have done well by the Egyptian grower by checking

speculation at his expense, and the million or so of profit made by the Control was returned to Egypt as war pensions. But State trading has its political dangers in relationships such as that between the British Empire and Egypt. Socialism and imperialism are incompatible.

To these specific grievances must be added the general disturbance and discontent that the war produced in Egypt, as elsewhere, and that in Egypt, as elsewhere, found a revolutionary expression. But in Egypt the only expression available was through nationalism, not, as elsewhere, through socialism. When the Egyptian had to buy low quality Japanese tobacco at high prices he cast the blame on the British war control. When the war blockades brought home to the Egyptians their neglect of industrial development, they cast the blame on the British for starving technical education and for draining away local capital for foreign creditors. When a spirited experiment in the subsidising of home industries by the Nationalist Minister, Sidki, had little result, it was not Egyptian indolence that was held to be responsible, but British malevolence. When the necessary food and fuel control, police and sanitary regulations, or other workings of the war machine caused inconvenience, the Egyptian Government succeeded invariably in transferring the blame to the broad shoulders of the British.

The burdens of war would have been more cheerfully borne by Egypt but for the constant suspicion that they were being used to bring the Egyptian people under permanent bondage. Nor were these suspicions without excuse. For example, Aboukir, near Alexandria, celebrated as the scene of the assertion of British sea-power in Egypt, had become, as a base for the Royal Air Force, the centre of a new British command of the air. The Army Council had approved it as a permanent air base

(March, 1917). Permanent buildings had been provisionally erected on land, for which the proprietors, of course, demanded fancy prices. The land was then requisitioned at a British valuation (August 19, 1918). The consequent agitation of aggrieved proprietors grew rapidly into a nationalist protest against the new menace to Egyptian sovereignty and self-government.

Further designs against Egyptian independence were read into the report of the Commission appointed (March, 1917) to recommend as to revision of the Capitulations. This Commission was adequately representative, and its reference included power to draft new laws. Unfortunately, the proposals put forward through it by Sir W. Brunyate, the Judicial Adviser, reflected a somewhat insular interpretation of the problems and an insufficient recollection of previous failures. They were, indeed, yet another attempt to substitute British for French principles of procedure; and were, as before, strongly opposed by the foreign communities and by the Egyptians themselves. Egyptian lawyers saw in them a design to favour their British competitors. While the Nationalists interpreted them as a dodge to rivet British hold on the judicial system. In this connection an anecdote that is clearly apocryphal, and is a characteristic specimen of anti-British propaganda, illustrates the bad relations between English and Egyptians at the end of the war. It is that when Rushdi protested to Brunyate that his proposals would set the country in a blaze, the latter replied that "*Je l'éteindrai avec un crachat.*" As Rushdi had a ready wit, and Sir William's French was not colloquial, the anecdote can be safely ascribed to propaganda.

But there was no need of propaganda to revive the nationalist movement. The *fellaheen* were alienated and had become anti-British. A doggerel chant of the day

may be quoted as a historic document in which one hears again the voice of Piers Plowman :

“ Woe on us, Wingate,
Who has carried off corn,
Carried off cattle,
Carried off camels,
Carried off children,
Leaving only our lives.
For love of Allah, now let us alone.”

CHAPTER VIII

REBELLION AND INDEPENDENCE

WINGATE—ALLENBY

“ And the Lord said unto Joshua, This day have I rolled away the reproach of Egypt from off you.”—JOSH. v. 9.

AS the thunder of the guns and the flares of the battle fronts died away in the West there came ominous growlings and gleamings from the lowering Eastern horizon, where storm clouds had long been banking up unnoticed. The passive, but purely politic, acceptance by Egypt of the complete subjection imposed by the war entirely misled British opinion as to the growth of the nationalist movement that had been going on during the war. Our rulers either overlooked the movement altogether or underestimated it. To them it was a petty faction best treated with contempt, or, when necessary, by short and sharp coercion. While our writers, even to this day, explain the rebellion as a sudden explosion of exasperation with war grievances such as those above enumerated. Whereas in reality the explosion would have come sooner or later, war or no war. For the rebellion of 1919 was a natural development of the nationalist movement of the whole previous century. It was merely that movement making good in a month or two the ground it had lost and the growth of which it had been robbed, not only by war coercion, but also by pre-war Cromerism.

There were, no doubt, new features and factors in this last phase of the nationalist movement. The population had doubled during the British occupation from six and

a half to thirteen millions. The general wealth of the country had probably been doubled by the war. Certain forms of wealth had decupled. Thus the total rentable value of land rose from seventeen millions early in the century to over one hundred millions after the war. During the boom in cotton that followed the war, land fetched as much as £1,000 an acre, and quite illiterate *fellaheen* made large fortunes. There were such cases of sudden affluence as that of Mohamed Bedrawi Ashur Pasha, who rapidly amassed an income of over £250,000. Or that of the illiterate porter of the Zagaziz ginning mills who, speculating with his life's savings of £40, bought the factory and re-equipped it with modern machinery. By such anarchical aggrandisements did the fertilising flood of British gold bring riches to an irresponsible middle-class. For it is estimated that at least £200,000,000 were poured into Egypt during the war. Europe had certainly made a handsome reparation for its jewing of Egypt in the previous century.

As a result of these enrichments there was a shifting of the centre of political power. An old village sheikh, riding his donkey to market, might be drawing the income of a British duke and might be supporting a son at Oxford. Unfortunately, this newly-gilded *jeunesse dorée* often turned out badly. We get a glimpse of the strange lives they led in that of Ali Bey Fahmy, who built his French mistress a palace at Gezireh and was shot by her in the Savoy Hotel. Another result of this revolution was that the old racial distinctions between the Turco-Circassian-Georgian upper-class, the Syrian-Coptic-Arabic middle-class, and the Nubian-Bedawin-Arabic peasantry began to disappear. Class began to differentiate into the Western divisions of profiteer, professional, and proletarian. Or, expressed in English, into

wealthy, well-to-do, and workers. Egypt was still an agricultural community, but it had now incipient industries. It had also small bodies of better-class workers—railwaymen, dockers, etc.—who were organised and capable of strike action. Last, but not least, the Nationalist party, which included all lively political elements, had improved both its organisation and its objective by a study of the methods of the Turkish Committee and of the Russian Communists. The movement, in consequence, contained a new republican and a new revolutionary element, though it was still, in the main, straight nationalism. In its motives, though not in its methods, it was the true product of its Kemalist and Arabist progenitors.

The nationalist movement that in 1914 had deliberately retired into a funk-hole reappeared on the field in 1919 as a far more formidable affair than anything that the British occupation had previously encountered. Before the war the movement had been a demand for some sort of self-government. It now reappeared as a demand for complete sovereignty. Its active membership had previously been confined to speakers and writers of the lawyer-journalist class, but it now included the whole polity, from old co-operators and Cabinet Ministers, such as Saad Zaglul, down to the boys in the schools and the elders in the villages. Its procedure was no longer to be confined to Press and platform propaganda, but was to combine a clever and cautious strategic direction of affairs by leaders as experienced in the weaknesses of their Egyptian supporters as in those of their English opponents, with a resolute tactical use of such formidable weapons as Moslem fanaticism and mob violence, lightning strikes, and moral boycotts.

Nor was there now any class in Egypt who would join with the British authorities in discouraging their com-

patriots from recourse to such dangerous weapons. We had neglected the political education of a conservative ruling-class. The legislature under our rule had offered no career, scarcely even a curriculum, to native statesmen. The only practical education given to Egyptians had been through the Bar and the Bench. Almost without exception the Ministers of the new nation have been promoted lawyers, like Saad Zaglul, Mohamed Said, Hussein Rushdi, Abdul Khalih Sarwat, Youssef Wahba, Tewfik Nessim, and Yehia Ibrahim. But lawyers do not make good rulers in the conditions that were now to arise in Egypt. These men became either like Zaglul, truculent public prosecutors of the British, or, like Youssef Wahba, counsel for the defence so supine as to be suspect.

Nevertheless, these puppet premiers were not such ciphers as they seemed, and the previous chapter will have already suggested occasions when Egyptian statecraft in no way deterred British stupidity from filling up the cup of war grievances.

When the Armistice came it found Egypt prepared by counsel with a strong case for independence, built up on the principles of peace as laid down by President Wilson, and on the promises made by ourselves to neighbouring nations, like Arabia, whose war services and stage of civilisation gave them less claim to our consideration than had Egypt. No sooner was the Armistice signed than Saad Zaglul, at the head of a deputation representative of all points of view, asked the High Commissioner, Sir R. Wingate, for leave to submit Egypt's case in London. This request, though recommended by the High Commissioner, was curtly rejected by the Foreign Office (December 1, 1918). Zaglul's reply (December 3) was carefully reasoned and quite reasonable; and reconsideration of the refusal was urged by Wingate, whose

exceptional experience in Egypt showed him the mistake that was being made. But this, too, was refused.

Of course the rebuff only roused the Nationalists to further efforts. In Saad Zaglul they had a spokesman whose career inspired confidence in every class. He had made his political *début* as a follower of Arabi; he later became leader of the *Hassb-el-Oum*, and in 1905 joined the *Hassb-el-Watan*. Like Arabi, a son of the people of *fellah* origin, and not unlike him in appearance—like him also, Zaglul had educated himself in middle life, when he learnt French and took a French Law degree. As son-in-law of the Premier, Mustapha Fehmy, he, too, had owed his start in life to marriage. He also had been educated at el Azhar, but chose the law and not, like Arabi, the army. He had the same facility in rhetorical appeal but had also, what Arabi had not, experience in political affairs and the power of command. He seems to have been the one Egyptian that really impressed Cromer, who, in his farewell speech, recommended him to Egypt as one of its future rulers: "Lastly, gentlemen, I should like to mention the name of one with whom I have only recently co-operated, but for whom in that short time I have learned to entertain a high regard. Unless I am much mistaken, a career of great public usefulness lies before the Minister of Education, Saad Zaglul Pasha. He possesses all the qualities necessary to save his country. He is honest, he is capable; he has the courage of his convictions; he has been abused by many of the less worthy of his countrymen. These are high qualifications. He should go far." He certainly did.

This, the most able of the co-operators with the British in Egypt—one who had been driven from the Ministry of Justice by their enemy, Abbas Hilmy—now

came forward as the most courageous and capable opponent the British had yet encountered. The refusal to receive him in London had probably decided any doubts he might have had as to the use of further attempts at co-operation. For in January he proclaimed the programme of the Nationalists in a fiery oration, frantically applauded by a great public meeting. The programme was one of national independence, and propaganda soon began to spread through the whole country from secret printing presses. Subterranean organisations spread their ramifications to the remotest villages. Martial law was still in force—the Assembly was still suspended—and the Press was still muzzled. But this only gave a revolutionary agitation a more effective appeal. Its immediate objective at this time did not professedly go beyond securing from England leave for the “Wafd,” the nationalist delegation, in the first place to appear not only in London but in Paris on behalf of Egypt, and in the second place to obtain such public “mandate” to represent Egypt as the peculiar circumstances allowed. But without awaiting the inevitable refusal, the whole country was circulated with lists of the Wafd delegates for signature by the electors. And though the British authorities seized as many of these forms as they could get, they were signed and returned in a sufficient number to establish the status of the delegation.

In attempting to treat Egypt as though it were an Ireland rather than an India, our foreign policy made a mistake. A mistake, too, not only in those new regions of democracy where it has so far always been blind, but in that ancient realm of diplomacy where it has less excuse for blundering. Thus it was a “democratic” mistake not to see that the contemptuous cold shoulder

that was no doubt intended to put Zaglul and the Wafd in their place, and to exalt the co-operators at their expense, would be taken by Egypt as an insult to the nation as a whole. It consequently produced just the opposite result to what was intended. For it enabled Zaglul to do what he had been unsuccessfully designing throughout the war, and effect a lining up of all political sections and public opinion behind the extreme Watan faction and the Wafd delegation. Thus we find that, on receipt of the first rebuff from the Foreign Office, Rushdi had tried to resign, and that the position of the Egyptian Government and of all other moderate and mediating factors thereafter rapidly became impossible. Sultan Fuad, the notables of the old landed gentry, the Syrian, Greek, and Armenian plutocrats, the Coptic clerks, the Bedawin chieftains, probably all had their doubts as to the effect that national independence would have upon their interests. But they had no doubts as to what the effect would be if they opposed it. The foreign colonies, as usual, clamoured for coercion, and did not conceal their contempt for British blundering. The great war machines of the Secret Service and of the Press Censorship still busily whirled their wheels within wheels, but had not properly adapted themselves to the new front. Such British officials as the war had left were ignored and discouraged. The British officers were without personal authority or political ability. The man who could have saved the situation, the High Commissioner, Sir R. Wingate, had no support from either the Foreign Office or War Office. On pressing his remonstrances against the policy that was being pursued, he was recalled "to report." But when he reached Paris he was not received, and he did not return to Egypt.

Then it was a bad "diplomatic" mistake to refuse

admission of the Egyptian delegation to the purlieus of the Paris Peace Conference. For the original objection to the inclusion of Egypt in the peace settlement no longer obtained. We had a control of the central workings of the Conference so complete as to let us exclude Egyptian claims altogether from its councils. By allowing the delegates to waste time with fruitless lobbyings in Paris, we should have removed from Egypt our worst enemies and given our friends there a better chance by depriving Egypt of a real grievance. And, if our suppression of the Wafd was unsound, suspension of the Assembly was even more so. For by letting the Assembly meet we should have exposed through party jealousy both the political weakness of extreme nationalism and the want of solidarity in the whole movement. In a word, some loyalty, even some lip-service to the professed principles of peace in respect of Egypt—some liberality in letting Egypt argue its case before the packed jury at Paris, might at this period have broken up the nationalist movement and saved the Protectorate.

As it was, Zaglul, having got his mandate, made far more effective use of it in Egypt than ever he could have done in Paris. As head of the Wafd, he addressed well-argued appeals to President Wilson, Mr. Lloyd George, M. Clemenceau, and Sr. Orlando. As soon as the Peace Conference met, the Wafd submitted to it a statement in which the Egyptian case was fully and quite fairly set forth. It ended with a protest against the British prohibition of any Egyptian representation at Paris—a prohibition all the more arbitrary in that Egypt's neighbours were very differently treated. For example, the Hedjaz and Abyssinia were officially represented, while deputations from the most savage and insignificant communities were allowed to appear.

The Egyptian Government had since December been giving the Foreign Office a good chance of splitting the nationalist front by pressing for passports on behalf of the Premier, Rushdi, and the Minister of Justice, Adli, so that they might confer in London before the Peace Conference met. The object of the Conference was to be elaboration of such further instalment of self-government as would enable the moderate Ministry to make head against the Wafd. For this purpose Ministers had in 1918 obtained the appointment of an Anglo-Egyptian Commission to report on Constitutional reforms. No report was as yet ready, but the Judicial Adviser, Sir W. Brunyate, at the request of the Ministry, drafted certain recommendations for a new Constitution. In view of the storm that had been raised shortly before by this official's proposals for revision of extra-territoriality, his selection by Rushdi for this far more difficult and delicate task seems suspect of a preconceived plan. For the document, though confidential, was published by Rushdi after the first refusal of his request to be received in London. As was to be expected, in view of its author's personality, its proposals raised a fierce squall. Its suggestion to subordinate the National Assembly to a Senate which would mainly represent the foreign communities was especially offensive. The Ministry, having thus recovered some of the limelight, made a final request to be received in London, which was as firmly refused. Upon which Rushdi resigned (March 1, 1919) and left the field to Zaglul. Thereafter, the political position was simplified in that the nationalist organisation was face to face with the British Army without intervening authorities.

General Watson had by now become awake to the existence of an agitation, and he was, of course, aware

what is the action appropriate to a military authority in respect of agitations. He sent for Zaglul and the leaders of the Wafd (March 6, 1919) in order to warn them that the country was still under martial law, and that any action against authority would be severely dealt with. The delegates said nothing, nor were they asked to. But the next day they published a protest so lively that it led to the immediate arrest of their four most prominent spokesmen (March 8, 1919). Those selected for arrest were Saad Pasha Zaglul; Hamid Pasha el Bassal, a leader of the Bedawin; Ismail Pasha Sidki, the ablest of the Egyptian administrators; and Mohamed Pasha Mahmoud, a Balliol man and a provincial Governor. Which fairly representative collection was immediately shipped off to Malta (March 9). And this measure had just the same effect on Cairo as it had had in similar circumstances on Constantinople. It fairly blew the lid off the whole seething pot of sedition, which boiled over and went up in a blaze.

The Egyptian Nationalists had pressed their claim on us which we had repudiated—they had presented a case to the Peace Conference which, at our instigation, it had refused—they now set to work to produce such a condition of chaos in the country itself as would compel attention. Pre-war nationalism had been safely ignored because it could only assert itself through the Press. Post-war nationalism, owing to the growth of popular grievances during the war, could get action through the proletariat and even through the peasantry. Moreover, it could not only provoke such action, but could direct and control it. In the reports of the rising that now broke out we can read between the lines evidence not only of an organising head, but also of a restraining hand.

The first move came, of course, from the students

and schoolboys. First, the medieval Moslem university el Azhar, then the Modern Law School, the Schools of Medicine and Technical Colleges, and thereafter the secondary schools, all struck work and streamed about the streets. The day on which the delegates were deported passed off with nothing worse than noisy demonstrations and some destruction of trams and lamps. But next day the strike spread, and mobs of students, strikers, and street gangs wrecked Anglophil newspaper offices, stoned trains, and damaged or destroyed public property until the British troops were called out and several rioters shot. The next day (March 11) disorder spread to the Government Bureaux and to the Law Courts, and all business in Cairo was stopped. The day after that mobs of peasants appeared in the provinces and began everywhere tearing up rails and tearing down wires. There was rioting at Damanhur, Zazazig, Mansura, and other provincial towns; at Tanta the soldiers defending the railway station from destruction shot fifteen and wounded fifty rioters. Alexandria then joined in, to the great alarm of the foreign community. Little risings and riots broke out in all directions. The younger Nationalist leaders preached rebellion; the more prominent or pusillanimous passed resolutions. The army of occupation could do no more for the moment than patrol the lines with armoured trains and pepper the rioters with handbills from aeroplanes. The rioters then began assaulting all trains and motor-lorries transporting troops. One such attack in Cairo was only repulsed with a loss to the rebels of thirteen killed and thirty wounded (March 14). Thereafter the wrecking of trains and stations, railways and telegraphs, and public buildings became general; assaults on isolated British officers and men began (March 15). The Bedawin now joined in and

besieged the British residents at Assiut for several days. These disorders continued on March 16 and 17, with casualties to the rioters of thirty killed at Minet el Kam, fourteen at Alexandria, and twelve, mostly Bedawin, at Damanhur. Provisional Governments were proclaimed at various provincial centres. Nationalist Committees of Public Safety were set up in the towns and Nationalist Councils of Sheikhs in the villages. Cairo was isolated. The military authorities there summoned the Committee of Independence and a Conference of Notables to be rated and threatened, but had lost all political control. The two slogans, "Mafish Hukema" (Down with the Government) and "Yehii el Watan" (Up the Nation) swept the country.

So far, practically all destruction had been done to public property, and all the casualties had been incurred by the rioters. The foreign communities were, of course, panic-stricken and hourly expected to be massacred; but had as yet received no molestation except from the Bedawin. In no case were women and children menaced. But now, at Deirut, a mob got out of hand in attacking a train and very brutally murdered two British officers, an official, and five soldiers (March 18). There would seem to have been on this occasion scenes of medieval savagery, including the blood-drinking ritual practised on the bodies of murderers by the relatives of the murdered—a custom that survived in Egypt officially down to the sixties, and that was, of course, misunderstood by the foreign Press. For in the eyes of the mob the British officers were the murderers of their relatives killed in Syria. But, even in this frenzy of hate, the humanity of the Egyptian asserted itself. Hanem Areef, a courtesan of Mellawi, who braved the fury of the mob to ease the last moments of a dying British officer, deserves honourable

mention in any history of the rebellion. For these murders nearly thirty people were eventually executed (April 9)—among them members of the political and professional class. There is evidence, however, that such leaders on all occasions but this succeeded in restraining organised mobs from murder. The isolated murders of British officers and men were carried out in cold blood by desperadoes and disapproved by the organisation. For example, the arrival of this blood-stained train at Minieh might have excited a massacre of the British there had not an Egyptian doctor, a member of the local revolutionary committee, risked his life to restrain the mob. Which, however, did not save him from three years' penal servitude.

The rising remained therefore, with few exceptions, a demonstration restricted to the destruction of public property and to the dislocation of all public business. The murders were restricted to officers and soldiers and to a few civilian officials in uniform or in company with the troops. British officials attended their offices and even intervened to stop rioting without being injured or insulted. Private property suffered, but there was no general looting and licence such as would have occurred had the Cairo mob or the country Bedawin been uncontrolled. The Egyptian Army and the Labour Corps were not allowed to demonstrate, for obviously by so doing they would only have uselessly drawn on themselves the severest disciplining by the British. Some special corps were raised by nationalist committees but professedly for police purposes. So that in the absence of any attempt to organise armed resistance, the British, after the first confusion, soon began to recover control. By March 25 patrols were policing the cities, mobile columns were marching through the Delta, and a puni-

tive expedition was pushing its way up the Nile. War conditions were by now definitely established; aeroplanes bombed any suspected gathering, armoured cars and trains fired at any suspicious parties near the roads and railways. The British soldiery behaved with disciplined restraint; though, angered by great provocation and by postponement of their demobilisation, they occasionally gave a taste of their temper. Sir William Hayter, a legal official, reports a conversation with a British corporal (*Const. Dev. in Egypt*, p. 27): "What we all want," he said, "is to go home. We are all due to be demobilised now, and if we are kept other men will get our jobs. If we were allowed to shoot hard for ten minutes we should kill a few thousand gippos and the whole thing would be over. We have had plenty of provocation, and a lot of us have been caught alone unarmed and killed. So that's what we would all like to do. But General Allenby has been round to all the barracks and he has asked us to go slow and kill as few as possible."

The army of occupation, swollen with troops held up in Egypt on their way home, was now reinforced by what was urgently required—a controlling civil authority. General Allenby, as conqueror of Palestine, had a prestige in Egypt comparable to that of Kitchener, and the sort of personality that Egyptians could appreciate. He had been summoned to Paris to unravel there the tangle of the contradictory contracts concluded by our diplomacy with conflicting interests in Syria. Following our usual sensible procedure when we get ourselves into a mess, he was now sent out to Egypt as the biggest man that could be found, and to do the best that he could. As "Special High Commissioner" he had to "order and administrate in all matters as required by

the necessity of maintaining in force the King's Protectorate of Egypt." That is, he had a free hand to deal with the rebellion, but was tied by the leg to the main cause of it—the Protectorate. In these circumstances it was perhaps fortunate that the rebellion had practically run its course and was being called off by the time he arrived (March 25, 1919). It was no less fortunate that under General Allenby the military repressions and the judicial reprisals, though severe, were not such as to provoke a fresh outbreak. For in that case the movement might have escaped from the control of its leaders and taken its own course.

The swiftness of General Allenby's success in restoring a working relationship between English and Egyptians in the further government of Egypt, shows that the situation was under control of the nationalists. For there was at the moment no government at all other than the revolutionary committees and councils. The British administration was barely working at all. Native officials and employees, like railwaymen, postal workers, etc., were being rapidly enlisted for a general strike. And as the movement changed its character from active rebellion to passive resistance it became all the more difficult to deal with.

General Allenby at once set about renewing relations by inviting representatives of all interests to the Residency, and by appealing to them for assistance in restoring order and in redressing grievances. As a result, various religious and political authorities circulated manifestos calling for a return to normal conditions. Then, after consultation with the ex-Cabinet and with the Cairo Committee of Independence, the High Commissioner issued a proclamation releasing Zaglul and his colleagues from Malta and leaving them at liberty to

go to Paris (April 7, 1919). Upon which Rushdi and the Cabinet resumed office, and there was another of those amazing millennial fraternisations that signalise the success of a revolution. Only a few days before (April 3) Cairo rioters, raiding Armenians, had been fired on by the British troops and had lost nine killed and sixty wounded. Now the embarrassed Rushdi was smothered in the embraces of his extremist enemies, British soldiers were cheered, and even Sultan Fuad was, for once in his life, acclaimed.

But these millennial amiabilities proved even shorter and more shallow than had been the *mêlée* they succeeded. The Nationalists had had a most encouraging success, but their real objective, the abolition of the Protectorate, though obviously now realisable, was not yet realised. These palm-leaf processions and all-round presentations of olive branches only marked a truce, during which the general strategy of the nationalists was changed, though for the moment no change in their tactics was apparent. For the rioting was almost immediately resumed, apparently much where it was broken off. For example, the interrupted attack on the Cairo Armenians was resumed, and seven were killed (April 9). Isolated British soldiers were again attacked, and eight were killed, while four officers and fifteen men were wounded. But, all the same, the rebellion had entered a new phase—that of passive resistance. Sabotage was to give place to strike action. Even before Allenby's arrival the nationalist organisation had recognised that activist disorder and destruction had served its purpose. It could not be carried further without armed resistance; but any calling up of the Egyptian Army would only invite a knock-out. They had won first round and had scored heavily on points. They had learnt the lesson of

Tel-el-Kebir and of Dublin Easter Week. Wherefore, the campaign was now cleverly transferred to a fresh front and transformed into a new offensive.

The passive resistance of this second period of the rebellion required a more general response from the public than did the sporadic riotings of the first phase. A few rioters could wreck a train, but the railwaymen as a whole must strike to stop it running. The release of Zaglul and the recognition exacted from Allenby had greatly strengthened the Wafd. And they hastened to enhance these laurel wreaths with a whole triumphal arch of fabrications : how the Paris Conference was devoting itself to the claims of Egypt, how it had called on the British Government to evacuate in three months, and how Rushdi was to be summoned to Paris to witness their discomfiture. With the help of such exhilarating fictions and of a flood of leaflets and unlicensed newspapers, the Wafd were able to carry out a very fair approach to a general strike in Cairo and Alexandria. The students and lawyers, of course, came out first and dispersed through the country, exhorting and organising. Then followed the postal, telegraph, tram, and railway employés, so that the whole system of communications was for some days suspended. Every sort of fraud was used to get the men out, and sometimes force. The railwaymen came out mainly because of a rumour that they were to be replaced by British soldiers ; which was based on some railway shops having been used to train British soldiers awaiting demobilisation. Intimidation by picket reached the pitch of vitriol-throwing. But this stopped when it was made a capital offence under martial law (April 16). A force, calling itself the "National Police," organised nominally to keep order, carried out the orders of the Strike Committees. Finally, the nationalists succeeded in bringing

out that most timid of trade unionists, the native official. For the poor *effendi* had, indeed, a valid grievance, seeing that, in view of post-war prices, his pay was reduced to one-third of its pre-war value. So when, on reaching his office in the morning, he was confronted by a nationalist crowd at the door, he was easily persuaded to take a day off. Though some few, more frightened of their British chief than of the nationalist picket, did force their way in to their accustomed desks with screaming women and boys hanging on to their coat-tails. Under such pressure the strike of officials was soon general in Cairo and approximately so in Alexandria—an achievement that the Nationalists at once turned to advantage. They set up a Special Committee of officials, who entered into negotiations with Rushdi for a withdrawal of the strike on acceptance by the Government of the following programme :

1. Recognition of the Wafd's mandate.
2. Non-recognition of the British Protectorate.
3. Replacement of British sentries by Egyptians.

Day after day negotiations continued between a harassed Cabinet and a hectoring Committee. Appeals from the Government to resume work, even threats of arrest against the leading strikers, had no effect. The strikers knew that their cause was morally that of the Government, and that they could count on its leniency. Eventually, General Allenby had to intervene, and issue, in the name of the Ministry, a proclamation which, in virtue of martial law, dismissed all officials who remained absent, and threatened with prosecution all those who persuaded others to do so (April 20, 1919). Whereupon the officials' strike collapsed and the *effendis* returned to their desks, the elder with sighs of relief, the younger in sullen resentment.

The surrender of the officials was soon followed by that of the other strikers. Isolation of the provincial strikers from the central organisation and the absence of any provision for strike pay had more to do with returns to work than the improvised services and the menacing proclamations of the British. The Bar alone held out, in spite of a proclamation which allowed cases to be conducted without its co-operation. A proclamation threatening to close the schools brought Young Egypt to book. And with the submission of these hotheads passive resistance as definitely came to an end as had the earlier active rebellion. At which point the Egyptian revolution might possibly have been stopped had the High Commissioner not been tied to a reassertion of the Protectorate. For it was such a reassertion of the hated bugbear that gave the rebellion a fresh start.

The proclamation (April 20, 1919) that ended the Civil Service strike had the following in its preamble: "Whereas a number of officials and employés have deserted their posts and it has been made clear that they have taken this action with the object of dictating a course of policy to the Government of H.H. the Sultan and of repudiating the Protectorate which H.M. Government have established over Egypt." Now Rushdi's Cabinet were prepared to co-operate in ending the strikes, but not to be formally associated in a reassertion of the Protectorate. So the next day Rushdi resigned, and co-operation was again broken off. This was all the more unfortunate in that Zaglul and the Delegation were meantime being very active in Paris, and were sending from thence optimistic manifestos and reports. At last any illusions that they or their supporters in Egypt may have had that their presence in Paris was doing any good was dispelled by the confirmation of the Protectorate in Art. 147 of the

Treaty of Versailles. While further reliance on any pronouncements of President Wilson was useless after the formal recognition of the Protectorate by the United States, which was published by the U.S. Consul-General on the same day as Allenby's proclamation (April 20, 1919). Egyptian nationalism was therefore thrown back on its own resources and its front was transferred from Paris to Cairo. With which the rebellion entered its third phase, which may be distinguished as that of the "boycott."

This was not a trade boycott like that of the Indian Nationalists. For that would have required a control of the commercial community, of which Egyptian nationalism was still incapable. Nor was it in the circumstances necessary. For they realised that government, whether autocratic or democratic, whether alien or autonomous, rests not only on the expressed or implicit consent of the governed, but also on a certain measure of co-operation. Besides the more obvious forms of rebellion like the sabotages in March and the strikes in April, there remained another resource even more difficult to deal with—namely, a refusal of all assistance to, or acceptance of, the objectionable authority. And though the negative nature of this form of fighting makes it difficult to describe in terms of events, yet those who have been exposed to its moral pressure bear testimony to its discouraging and disintegrating effect on the authorities that it attacks.

At first, of course, little impression was produced. The riots and strikes were over and normal conditions restored. The British carried on without Egyptian co-operation, and apparently without inconvenience. After some weeks, one, Mohamed Said, was found prepared to form a government. The Budget was put in force and necessary bills were passed under martial law. The

British administration was thoroughly overhauled at the top, and the leading posts filled with active and able men. It looked as though the Protectorate had taken a new lease of life. But yet it was clear that there was no real life in it. Some attempt had to be made some time to restore real co-operation, and the first attempt that was made gave a telling opportunity to the boycott.

It had been generally recognised by us that a working relationship must be restored between English and Egyptians as soon as the strikes were over. The High Commissioner had made use of the lull for leave, and had made use of his leave to get a sop that might bring his Cerberus to hand. But it was wrongly assumed at home that the rebellion was over. Consequently, his proclamation (November 10, 1919) declared that our policy in Egypt was "to preserve autonomy under British protection and to develop the system of self-government under Egyptian rule; to establish a constitutional system in which, under British guidance, as far as may be necessary, the Sultan, his Ministers, and the elected representatives of the people may . . . co-operate in the management of Egyptian affairs;" and, finally, "to send to Egypt a Mission to work out the details of a Constitution, and, in consultation with the Sultan's Ministers and representative Egyptians, to undertake the preliminary work." In plain English, the Protectorate and the subordination of Egyptians was to be maintained as the basis of a new Constitution which, it was recognised, could only be imposed with the co-operation and consent of Egypt.

Zaglul in Paris, and his Nationalist supporters in Cairo, saw at once the opportunity that was offered them by the sending of a Mission which depended for its success on co-operation, yet made no real concession

in principle. The order was given for the boycotting of the Mission, and a barrage of anti-British propaganda was laid down against it. This agitation was in no way discouraged by the internment of the President and prominent members of the Committee of Independence and by the suspension of Nationalist newspapers. Members of the suspended Legislative Assembly and Provincial Councils met and protested. So did the Ulema, the Notables, the Omdehs, the Bar, the Colleges, and the schools. The agitation could not, indeed, be kept within the limits of the boycott. Public demonstrations raged, the schools rebelled, the mobs again began to riot. The villages, where the repression had been severest, could be kept quiet. But the town mobs that had been let off easy began to break loose. There was looting, followed by loss of life when the troops cleared the streets. The most serious riots were just outside the Abdin Palace and in the Muski (November 16), where over a hundred rioters were killed and wounded. Foreign shops were sacked, foreign heads broken, and the mob showed itself more irresponsible and less purposeful than in the earlier disorders. For these outbreaks were mainly formidable as showing that the use of mob violence was getting out of control. But they achieved their immediate object. Mohamed Said took advantage of the rejection of his representations against the despatch of the proposed Mission to resign (November 15). The only substitute who could be found was a Copt, Yussef Wahab, who had represented that community in almost every Cabinet since the murder of Boutros in 1910. An attempt was also made to form a party of Independent Liberals to carry on co-operation, but the infant proved still-born. Yussef and his Ministers lived anxious lives, and narrowly escaped assassination more than once. His "Govern-

ment" was satisfied with remaining in existence, and risked no further exertion.

His Majesty's Government was seriously displeased but undismayed. Mr. Balfour in the House of Commons declared that: "British supremacy exists in Egypt, British supremacy is going to be maintained. Let no one in Egypt or out of Egypt make any mistake on that cardinal principle." Lord Curzon in the House of Lords contrasted the savagery of Egypt with the civilisation of the Sudan. Under cover of these "heavies" the Milner Mission arrived (December 10, 1919), itself carrying big guns. Besides Lord Milner, there was Sir John Maxwell, Sir Rennel Rodd, and Mr. Lloyd, the Secretary, all with good Egyptian records. Also a representative of Liberalism, another of Labour, and a third of International Law. But no Egyptian.

From the first it was evident that the boycott of the Mission was going to be an even more sensational success than had been the sabotages and the strikes. For the Commission found itself subjected to a picketing worthy of Poplar, a boycott that would have done credit to Tipperary, and a taboo of Polynesian rigour. Its members, even on individual excursions, found themselves cold-storaged by a frigid escort and cold-shouldered by all and sundry. If the legal member went to witness a sitting of the Law Court the Bar got up and left in a body. When the Liberal member successfully evaded a hostile demonstration at Tanta there was a riot. The Commission left after three months (March, 1920), having learnt more about Egyptian nationalism and less about the Egyptian nation than it had hoped. But it had at least been wholly convinced as to the necessity of restoring co-operation—a necessity not only political, but also economic. For the visit of the Com-

mission had coincided with a sudden doubling of food prices, while at the same time land already sowed for food crops was being reploughed and planted with cotton to take advantage of the rise in cotton prices from £4 a kantar in 1916 to £20 in 1919, and to nearly £40 in 1920. The result was that huge fortunes were being made by financiers, and the *fellah* was well-to-do as never before ; while more than a million urban and landless proletariat were starving. Flour was imported and relief distributed by the authorities ; though the Nationalist Co-operative Association, started by Amin Yusef in Damietta and extended throughout the Delta, showed itself more efficient and energetic in dealing with distress. It was, indeed, obvious that a country passing through such political changes and economic crises as was Egypt could not be indefinitely governed by martial law, however mild in its application.

The departure of the Commission was celebrated by the meeting at Zaglul's house of five-sixths of the members of the old Legislative Assembly, who unanimously passed a resolution nullifying all measures enforced since the prorogation of the Assembly, including the decree proclaiming the Protectorate. Other resolutions proclaimed national independence, the mandate of the Wafd, and Egyptian sovereignty over the Sudan. The rather ineffective retort of the British was the re-introduction of the preventive Press censorship, relaxed since the restoration of order.

The recommendations of the Commission when they appeared came as a shock to those British who had been living in a Fool's Paradise and looking on it as eternal. For the Commission recognised in principle that the relationship between the Empire and Egypt could only be made to work by a bilateral bargain. The Empire must

recognise Egypt as a nation, and Egypt should in return recognise the Empire as the mandatory for European interests. The boycott had thus brought the conflict a stage nearer settlement by establishing that a settlement could only be secured by negotiation as between two Sovereign States, and not by the dictation of a Suzerain.

This negotiation was opened at once in London between Zaglul and the Wafd of the one part as against Milner and the Commission of the other. It resulted in an agreement which was to be the basis of a treaty, and was itself based on the following bargain: Egypt was to be recognised as an independent constitutional monarchy with representative institutions and the right of diplomatic representation. The Empire was to reserve the right of maintaining a military force for the protection of its imperial communications, "which was not to constitute a military occupation nor prejudice the rights of the Government of Egypt." The Empire was also to reserve the right of retaining British judicial and financial advisers for the safeguarding of foreign interests after suppression of the Capitulations and of the Debt Commission. Other British and foreign officials were to be retained or retired as might be agreed. The Sudan was excluded from the transaction. The treaty was to come into force after its approval by an Egyptian Parliament and after agreement with other Powers as to renunciation of their international rights.

British imperialists had scarcely recovered from the disagreeable shock of these revolutionary proposals when they were agreeably surprised at their apparent rejection by Egyptian Nationalists. Yet the resolutions passed by order at Nationalist meetings were not, as generally represented, flat rejections, but acceptances conditional on

immediate abolition of the Protectorate and an abandonment of the proposal to substitute a British mandate for the international Capitulations. As the first was implied in the bargain, and the second, the abolition of the Capitulations, was only indirectly involved, it might have been wise to have accepted these conditions and to have postponed substituting the British mandate for the international Capitulations until some confidence in us had been restored. Had this been done at once and Zaglul definitely pledged to the draft treaty a satisfactory settlement might at this stage have been secured.

But such a surrender to their worst enemy was more than the Foreign Office could face, or possibly more than they could force on a Conservative Government. There was a long delay before the Milner report was officially submitted, and then Lord Curzon opened negotiations, not as Lord Milner had done with Zaglul and the Wafd, but with Adli Yeghen Pasha and the new Government. For one result of the *détente* caused by the Milner concessions had been the restoration of an Egyptian Government which represented the moderating and mediating elements of nationalism. Unhappily, this faction which was inclined to co-operation was not in control of the movement. And when Zaglul returned from Paris (April 5, 1921) he was given an ovation that proclaimed him the leading political personality of the day. He at once disassociated himself from co-operation, refused to call on Sultan Fuad, and claimed the right to head the delegation to London. When he was rejected in favour of Adli he denounced the Premier as a traitor. And though we had thereby undoubtedly split the nationalist movement, yet the fraction we had broken off was of little use to us. "We want Saad, not Adli," became the slogan of the day.

Saad Zaglul and the Wafd honestly believed themselves to be the only possible saviours of Egypt, and their intransigence the only possible policy for establishing an Egyptian nation. They had, indeed, initiated this policy of intransigent insistence on a full programme of complete independence (*Istiklal el tam*) and of meeting every fresh concession with a fresh claim. It was later followed with complete success by Turkish nationalists and with considerable success by those of Iraq. They now advertised that they were in control of Egypt by a renewal of agitation that culminated in "Red Monday" at Alexandria (May 23, 1921). There the mob ran amok, killing many Greeks and Italians, while alarming preparations were made for more serious disorders. An eye-witness (Travers Symonds, *Britain and Egypt*, 1918, p. 128) speaks of seeing "municipal dustcarts and waggons borrowed for the occasion filled with huge stones and cans of petroleum." But if the intention was to provoke European intervention it failed of its purpose. On the contrary, it so alarmed those foreign colonies who had sympathised with or even supported the rising of 1919 that they now detached themselves from the Nationalists.

This attitude and action of the Wafd had, however, the result of making it impossible for Adli to accept the Treaty terms proposed by Lord Curzon after several weeks' negotiation. Yet these terms went further even than the Milner proposals. For they provided that the Protectorate should be abolished on signature of the Treaty, and this concession was further emphasised in a letter addressed to the Sultan by Lord Allenby (December 3, 1921), which declared that there was no intention involving "the continuance of an actual or virtual Protectorate. On the contrary, the ideal was that

of an Egypt enjoying the national prerogatives and international position of a Sovereign State, but closely wedded to the British Empire by a treaty guarantee of common aims and interests." Nevertheless, this concession of the whole principle of national sovereignty did not conceal certain very practical derogations from it. Thus the Treaty maintained British troops in Egypt. Whereas the Egyptians demanded that they should be restricted to the Canal zone. It transferred to British financial and judicial advisers—that is, to British imperial control—the international controls of the Debt Commission and of the Judicial Capitulations. Whereas Egyptians had come to look upon these international institutions as a protection against British imperialism. It modified the Anglo-Egyptian *condominium* over the Sudan by putting all the Egyptian forces there under the British Governor-General. Whereas Egyptians saw in the unworkable arrangement by which the British Governor of the Sudan was also the Commander-in-Chief in Egypt (Sirdar), a valuable survival of the sovereign rights that they claimed over the Sudan. It provided for the Egyptian interests in the Nile waters of the Sudan by a board of three Conservators representing Egypt, the Sudan, and Uganda; which, though in appearance fair enough, did actually secure to the British a permanent majority.

All these provisions had not only reasonable but almost irrefutable arguments in their favour. But Egyptian nationalism, under guidance of the Wafd, was now in opposition and more concerned with asserting itself than with arranging as to conflicting rights and responsibilities. Opposition had also declared itself in Great Britain to a dilatory diplomatising that was being continually driven by fresh disorders into fresh discomfitures. The

British Labour Party had succeeded to the traditions of Liberalism in Egypt without as yet subscribing to its transactions with its principles. A group of Labour M.P.'s visited Egypt (October, 1921), and their excursion was exploited as a capital excuse for nationalist demonstrations. It is interesting to remark that they were everywhere presented to the public as "Liberals," and that their ingenuous inquiries as to practical grievances were everywhere answered to the effect that the grievance was the presence of British troops in Egypt. Under these circumstances their attempts to end the deadlock were fruitless. Adli resigned, and no Cabinet could be formed to pass the treaty. Yet a restoration of co-operation had somehow to be got in order to end martial law and reduce the Wafd to its appropriate position as an extremist Ginger Group.

Lord Allenby had by now begun to press privately for an immediate and unconditional abolition of the Protectorate. He was, however, met by Foreign Office futilities as to whether we had already given an "undertaking" or an "offer" to that effect. Meantime, affairs in Egypt again became alarming. When Zaglul organised a great demonstration in Cairo (December 23, 1921) it and all other political meetings had on police grounds to be prohibited. Disorders thereupon broke out in Cairo, and two British soldiers were murdered. In consequence, Zaglul and other Wafdists were ordered under martial law to desist from all political activity. They defied the order and were deported, first to Suez and then to Aden until their ultimate destination in Ceylon or the Seychelles should be decided. Egypt at once exploded in another frenzy of emotion for the "blessed Zaglul." Rioting became general, railways were damaged, wires destroyed, and another rebellion seemed

to be boiling up. Mobile columns were organised, armoured trains, steamers, and cars were again ordered out, warships arrived at the ports, aeroplanes demonstrated overhead, and the country was cowed into sullen submission. But all prospect of political co-operation, even of passive consent, disappeared. Sarwat Pasha abandoned his attempts to form a Government.

Lord Allenby, who had patiently persisted in presenting the Coalition Government with a choice between immediately renouncing the Protectorate or heavily reinforcing the army of occupation, was now recalled to report. Egyptian moderates, remembering the recall of Wingate under very similar conditions, took leave as sadly of "Allah-nebi" (the prophet of God) as did Egyptian extremists of the "blessed martyr," Saad, who simultaneously left for an exile in the Seychelles, which he was not expected to survive. But these doughty champions were destined to try yet another bout together. Zaglul was shortly removed to Gibraltar, and was then released after British doctors had restored his health, injured by over exertions in twisting the lion's tail, an exercise that he at once resumed in Paris. Allenby, who had left with his resignation in his pocket, was back in Egypt well within a month; but he now brought in that pocket the national independence of Egypt. Fast as he travelled, rumour had outrun him. He was swept from the station to the Residency on a wave of public enthusiasm. For the moment he displaced even Zaglul in the affection and admiration of their fickle mistress, Cleopatra.

The Declaration, published the day after his arrival (February 28, 1922), is a conveyance of straightforward common sense and courage. It is, indeed, a document worthy of a high place in our diplomatic archives.

Instead of the usual official lucubration in which a jam made up of a pontifical lecture, a leading article and a legal pleading conceals a powder which the patient strongly suspects of being poison, we have here the gift of a whole loaf, both short and sweet. It is worth giving in full as an example to those who still believe in jam-and-powder and half-a-loaf diplomacy :

“Whereas His Majesty’s Government, in accordance with their declared intentions, desire forthwith to recognise Egypt as an independent sovereign State ; and

“Whereas the relations between His Majesty’s Government and Egypt are of vital interest to the British Empire ;

“The following principles are hereby declared :

“1. The British Protectorate over Egypt is terminated, and Egypt is declared to be an independent sovereign State.

“2. So soon as the Government of His Highness shall pass an Act of Indemnity with application to all inhabitants of Egypt, martial law, as proclaimed on November 2, 1914, shall be withdrawn.

“3. The following matters are absolutely reserved to the discretion of His Majesty’s Government until such time as it may be possible by free discussion and friendly accommodation on both sides to conclude agreements in regard thereto between His Majesty’s Government and the Government of Egypt :

“(a) The security of the communications of the British Empire in Egypt.

“(b) The defence of Egypt against all foreign aggression or interference, direct or indirect.

“(c) The protection of foreign interests in Egypt and the protection of minorities.

“(d) The Sudan.

“Pending the conclusion of such agreements, the *status quo* in all these matters shall remain intact.”

This declaration has been condemned as a surrender of the whole basis of our position and of the whole of our bargaining power. To it has been attributed the unfortunate fact that five years later we are still without a final settlement of our relations with Egypt. While it is even more unfortunate that this generosity should have been succeeded by some of the worst crimes committed in the name of Egyptian Nationalism. Yet, honest and generous as the gift to Egypt was, we must, in fairness, admit that we gave less than we got. We gave up the Protectorate and martial law ; but then it was already quite clear that we could no longer avoid doing so. We could only stay in Egypt on the basis of a bargain, and we could not bargain until we had someone to bargain with. That, we now got, for Sarwat was at once able to form a Government ; not, indeed, for the specific purpose of co-operation, but for the purpose of constructing the new State and the new Constitution. We also gave up most of our intervention in the internal affairs of Egypt through British officials. But our command of Egypt was based on our military occupation, while our civil control was based on our financial and judicial agency for European interests there. Both these were amply covered by the two first reserved points. There was, indeed, some ground for the criticisms of the extreme nationalists that the British garrison, with the British financial and judicial advisers at Cairo, put it in our power to exercise influences over, and even interventions in, Egyptian affairs. This, however, could give no justification for the method that was now adopted of getting rid of any remaining representatives of British supremacy by a campaign of assassination against British officials and officers. In the

year following the Declaration of Independence four officials were killed, six wounded, and numerous attempts were made on the lives of British soldiers. These excesses could only be explained—they cannot be excused—by the fact that the division of the nationalist front and the departure of Zaglul had broken the control of the organisation over its most extreme elements. This last phase of the rebellion, that of individual assassinations, was a consequence, no doubt, of the movement, but not one of its concerted campaigns.

The Declaration of Independence had, in fact, disorganised and almost disintegrated the nationalist movement. For example: of the fifteen signatories of the original Wafd declaration, more than half, including Ismail Sidki, Mahomed Mahmoud, and other prominent personalities, now joined the Liberal-Constitutionalist party and resumed co-operation. Of the three Pashas deported to Malta with Zaglul, only the Bedawin, Mohamed-el-Bassal, still stayed with him in opposition. Zaglul had, in fact, been put into the same position as de Valera after conclusion of the Treaty with Ireland. But as British troops were withdrawn from Ireland and not from Egypt, while de Valera failed to recover power, Zaglul soon succeeded in doing so.

In the meantime Egypt was well occupied with organising its new State. The Anglo-Egyptian Government was at last dead, after a lingering decline, and the new nation had been born after a long labour. Unfortunately both death and birth take a lot of clearing up.

CHAPTER IX
THE KINGDOM OF EGYPT

FUAD—ZAGLUL

“ They did cry there, Pharaoh, king of Egypt, is but a noise ; he hath passed the time appointed.”—JER. xlvi. 17.

THE day that Egypt was declared a sovereign and independent State, Sultan Fuad took the title of King, and a Commission was set up by the Sarwat Government to draft a democratic constitution. At once a pretty sharp conflict arose between the King and the Constitution-
alists. But for the concentration of most of the latter in combating the English, it might have led to such a deposition of the dynasty as was considered necessary by Turkish Nationalists.

King Fuad came into power at the age of fifty, without any sort of previous experience in government, or even any acquaintance with Egypt. As a son of the exiled Ismail, he had no especial claim on the affections of his subjects, while he was in speech and outlook an Italian. He came to the throne in circumstances of great difficulty, when his patrons, the British, were practically at war with his subjects. Conscious, probably, of his false position and of the prejudice against him as a foreigner, he at first made no attempt to canvass for popularity or to get contacts with his people. He reduced to a minimum his relations with the public and his Ministers, while he worked hard to post himself in affairs and to make personal friends with anyone who might be useful. At last the tide turned in his favour. The change of the Royal title from

Eastern to European terminology had a result that was probably intended. It confirmed the growing tendency to regard the dynasty more as a symbol of the new nation and less as a survival of the old Turkish régime, while it encouraged the moderate nationalists to see in the kingly dignity a crowning of Egyptian independence.

King Fuad had certain difficulties to deal with that the earlier Khedives had not. There was now a declared republican faction secured from suppression by democratic institutions. There was a general inclination among Nationalists to regard the dynasty as the enemy of those institutions and the ally of the British. On the other hand, he had not to face, as had his predecessors, the ambitions of rivals among the princes of the House favoured by intrigues of the Ottoman Suzerain. The succession was now constitutionally regulated beyond question. Moreover, with a few honourable exceptions, such as Omar Toussoum, his brother Mohamed, and Prince Kemal-éd-Din, the princes of the House of Mehemet Ali showed the degeneration usual to Arnaut stock when several generations removed from its native rocks. They were all either run to seed or to a too exuberant efflorescence. Fuad's career was indeed very nearly cut short by his brother-in-law, Saif-ed-Din, son of the half-mad Ibrahim, who took his sister's side in a quarrel with her husband by shooting four bullets into Fuad as he sat at dinner in the Khedival Club.¹

There was only one competitor whose claims might cause anxiety to King Fuad. The ex-Khedive, Abbas

¹ Saif-ed-Din was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment, during which his homicidal violence and royal immunity gave great trouble to his warders. After he had been nearly smothered in a doo-mat he was certified as a lunatic and transferred to a private asylum in England. Thence he recently escaped. His large fortune was "administered" by the then Khedive Abbas.

Hilmi, in his palace at Tchiboukli on the Bosphorus, had better claims on Egyptian Nationalists than any member of the family; and on occasions his restoration was mooted as a move that would give check to the British. But those leaders like Zaglul, who had personal experience of the difficulty, and even danger, of dealings with Abbas, were not in a hurry to put their necks into the noose again. Moreover, the ex-Khedive had been crippled by the confiscation of his estates, for which he had received in compensation only £500,000, that being one-fifth of the value that he claimed. On the whole, therefore, King Fuad was in a pretty strong position for forcing on the Constitutionalists those constitutional amendments that suited his autocratic ambition.

The first collision between the Crown and the Constitutionalists ended with the resignation of Sarwat's Ministry and the promotion in their place of the Palace candidate, Tewfik Nessim (October, 1922). This success was achieved by a temporary alliance between the Palace and the Wafd against the central block of more moderate Nationalists and Constitutionalists, which unholy alliance was due to the absence from public life of Zaglul and to the acerbity of the final phase of the struggle between British and Nationalists that caused the latter to grasp at any weapon, however two-edged. And this transitory political transaction has left a permanent impression on the politics of Egypt. For, thereby, King Fuad succeeded in getting such powers under the new constitution as will enable any prince of personality and prudence to make himself the practical ruler of a State with such undeveloped traditions and training in democracy as has Egypt. That this is not as yet the case is due to King Fuad not having so far acquired the personal ascendancy and popularity to which he aspires;

while Zaglul still retains an extra-constitutional position and power comparable to that of Mustapha Kemal or Mussolini.

The Constitution was not finally passed without another struggle; but this time not with an Egyptian Sultan, newly promoted King, but with a British Protector, now become a plenipotentiary. For the first draft declared that Egyptian territory included the Sudan and that Fuad's title should be "King of Egypt and the Sudan." This was an ingenious nationalist device for dividing the British and the King and for challenging the British on an issue of intense interest to the nation. That it was a new departure, ignoring the basis of the Sudanese *condominium* of 1899 and of the Declaration of Independence of 1922, did not so much matter. But when it was found that it might result in a British annexation of the Sudan the objectionable clauses were withdrawn (February 3, 1923). The dispute served, however, for a renewal of disorders. Tewfik Nessim resigned, and a number of British soldiers were injured by bombs (February 27, March 4). There was thereafter some difficulty in finding a co-operator courageous enough to complete the constituent task. This was finally accomplished by Yehia Ibrahim Pasha, an ex-Minister of Education.

The new Constitution was based on the ground plan of that of Belgium, but in course of construction grew in a way that is very significant of the King's efforts to retain the Khedival prerogatives. The choice of Belgium was obvious as being a constitutional monarchy with French culture and of allied, but not British, associations. Its first article defines the new nation as "a sovereign State, free and independent." Its rights of sovereignty are indivisible and inalienable. Its government is that of a hereditary monarchy with representative institutions.

The guarantees of individual liberty are as usual, but liberty of the Press (Art. 15) and of public meeting (Art. 20) is to be only so far as not otherwise required by measures "for the protection of social order." Of which exception very free use has subsequently been made by the Nationalist Party of Independence. All public and military employment is restricted to natives (Art. 3), except as otherwise provided by law, which exception is to include the arrangement with the British. The legislative power is exercised by the King concurrently with the Senate and Chamber (Art. 24), and the executive power by the King, subject to the Constitution (Art. 29). The King has a suspensory veto, but the two Chambers may pass a measure over the veto by a two-thirds vote in each Chamber within a month, or by a plain majority in the following session (Arts. 35 and 36). The King has the right of dissolution (Art. 38), but not twice for the same reason (Art. 80), as well as of adjournment once for not more than a month in each session. The King has the power of declaring war or a state of siege (Arts. 45 and 46) and of making peace, though certain peace provisions require Parliamentary assent. The Ministers are appointed by the King and responsible to the Chamber of Deputies, where they have a right to speak, but not to vote unless members. They can be tried by a special court (Art. 66). The Senate is two-fifths nominated by the Crown and three-fifths elected by universal suffrage from among those duly qualified by public service or by private means (Art. 74). Senators are elected for ten years, renewable by half every five years, and are re-eligible (Art. 79). The deputies are elected for five years, and Parliament meets in November for six months (Art. 96). Deputies are paid (Art. 118). On occasions the two Houses unite as a

Congress. From all of which it will be observed that the Crown comes down into the political arena in a way that is not unlikely to bring it into collision with popular movements.

The State religion is Islam, the official language Arabic, and the capital Cairo (Arts. 149-150). The Constitution does not prevail as against treaty rights (Art. 154), an important provision in a State where international "servitudes" still survive as they do in Egypt. The Constitution is applicable to the Kingdom of Egypt only, but this without prejudice to Egyptian rights over the Sudan; and the Royal title is to be "established after the authorised delegations have fixed the final status of the Sudan" (Arts. 159 and 160).

The Constitution was followed by the Act of Indemnity, required under the Declaration of Independence as a condition for the abolition of martial law, and which ratified the legislation imposed under martial law. This was followed by an electoral law that was to be a field of future battles. A mixed commission arranged for concluding and compensating the employment of British officials on liberal lines (July 22, 1923). And this law was given the force of an international contract by an exchange of Notes. So swiftly and, on the whole, smoothly did the constituent work proceed that the old order was liquidated and the new laid down by the end of 1923. But it was not realised outside Egypt how very weak was the popular mandate with which the moderate Nationalists were working. Egypt, in fact, owes as great a debt to Yehia and his colleagues as does England to Lord Allenby and the British moderates for restoring co-operation long enough to set the new kingdom on a solid constitutional basis and to establish a sound relationship between Egypt and the Empire. For this work was done under a rain of

abuse from the Nationalists and at no small risk to the workers. On their side, intransigent Nationalism considered itself as still at war with the British, and looked on all co-operators, including the King, as traitors to their country. On our side, by keeping Zaglul out of Egypt until the Constitution and the general reconstruction was complete, we undoubtedly avoided the risk of fresh ruptures. But, on the other hand, we ran very great danger of having the whole work repudiated, or at least revised, as soon as public opinion and popular representation was again set free.

The realisation that "traitors" like the King, and the co-operators and "tyrants" like the British, were establishing the institution of the new nation on lines that they would have great difficulty in changing caused the most bitter resentment in the nationalist ranks. This expressed itself in a "hate" against the British more violent than any that had gone before. This seems to have been the explanation—it is no excuse—for the last phase of Egyptian rebellion, a phase that was wholly criminal in its methods, and all the more culpable in that, apparently, the main objective of the rebellion had been already obtained. The campaign of assassination against British officials that began with attacks on British officers in the autumn of 1921, and broke out again in May, 1922, was carried on during 1923, costing in that year some thirteen lives. The murder of Dr. Newby Robson (December 22, 1922) had caused the prolongation of martial law; and the whole campaign created an atmosphere most unfavourable to the task of constitution making. It was the work of a secret organisation of extremists, whose object was no doubt to provoke the British to such reprisals as would cause a fresh rebellion. It was not apparently the policy of the

Wafd, violent as its language was. Though the vituperations of the extreme Nationalists gave countenance to, and were perhaps partly the cause of, these crimes. As, for example, when they clamoured that Zaglul was being tortured at Gibraltar, and called on Egyptians to avenge him by violence. It is true that when Zaglul was released (March, 1923) there was a suspension of murderous outrages, but there was another lapse again later, and eventually Zaglul himself became the object of such a terrorist attack.

Nor is the general shielding of the criminals by the public evidence of a general approval of the murder campaign. Egypt is in that transition stage from medieval to modern civilisation that has always and everywhere been accompanied by an increase in crime. Moreover, whenever Governments have resorted to martial law against nationalist and socialist movements there has been a conspiracy of sentiment against judicial authority. This was aggravated in Egypt, where authority had always been associated with alien rule. Turkish justice had been an instrument of cruel oppression and extortion. British justice, though conscientious and incorruptible, had been even more antipathetic. It had been too rigorous, too remote from the humanities of the society it regulated, and without any recognised sanction. To the Egyptian Turkish justice was occasionally inhumane, but British justice was essentially inhuman. The Egyptian was quite prepared to protect himself against the local brigand, and he did not see why the Englishman could not protect himself against the political assassin.

It was therefore eighteen months before the murder gang was broken up. During that time seventeen British officials were murdered, and over twenty attacked in broad daylight and in crowded streets with complete

immunity. At last, assassins, lying in wait for Mr. Anderson, Oriental Secretary to the Residency, were given away by his native servant. The ambush was ambushed, a conspirator turned King's evidence, and the "Society for Revenge" met its deserts. Fifteen suspects were tried, three executed, and the rest imprisoned. But the organisation that had paid for and promoted these attacks remained undiscovered.

Zaglul being restored to Egypt, Nationalism again took the field as a political party, and lost no time in making full use of its new constitutional liberties. At the first elections in the autumn of 1923 Zaglul's Party of Independence swept the country, getting ninety per cent. of the votes and one hundred and seventy-seven seats out of two hundred and fourteen. Zaglul accordingly took office (January 27, 1924).

The Egyptian electoral system has peculiarities that favour organisation, and the only party organisation in the field was that of the Nationalists. But this does not alone explain the elimination of the Liberal Constitutionalists. The country considered their co-operation with the British while the Constitution was being framed as being, if not a treachery, at least a transaction with the enemy. The reduction of the Moderates to a small handful in the Chamber had, however, this advantage—that it imposed on Zaglul and his followers the whole responsibility for that further co-operation with the British without which Government could clearly not be carried on. For until the reserved points were settled and the relations between the Empire and Egypt defined, the Constitution was undoubtedly an insufficient guarantee against a British supremacy not fundamentally different from that of the Protectorate. Which settlement could only be reached by negotiation with the

British. Zaglul's public pronouncements were none the less, or shall we say all the more, uncompromising. For example, in one speech he denounced the Declaration of Independence as being the worst of calamities for Egypt and mere camouflage for a Protectorate. It was none the less doubtful whether he could by such professions of faith retain the confidence of and control over his extremist followers, while carrying out what must necessarily be in practice a policy of co-operation.

It seemed as though Zaglul's personality and popularity would be sufficient to carry him through this difficult and delicate enterprise. For this tall, angular, ungainly *fellah* in many ways recalls another provincial lawyer, who brought his country through as difficult a crisis. Like Lincoln, Zaglul is very human. For example, he likes gambling, bad jokes, and good food. But his career shows that he can gamble without losing his head and that he can lead his people from the fleshpots of Egypt into the wilderness. He is wholly of the people and for the people. His house is Beit el Watan (the House of the Nation). His wife, who brought him a small fortune, is a leading feminist. He only learnt French late in life, and now, a good omen, he is learning English. He is in some ways the first really representative Egyptian and one racy of the soil. Whether he thunders like a minor prophet or chaffs in dialect like a man of the people, he speaks a language that every Egyptian can understand. Conscious of his power as he is, he has none the less a disarming humility and humour. When shot in the shoulder while speaking at a railway station, he was saying: "I pray Allah He will curb any pride that I may feel at this great gathering," and, as he fell, he added with a smile: "Allah has granted my prayer."

The conjunction of the first British Labour Ministry with Zaglul's first Wafd Ministry under the new Constitution would have seemed to be a coincidence most favourable for a settlement. For it brought to power on the one hand an Egyptian Government so representative of nationalism that it could afford to make the necessary concessions, and on the other hand, an Imperial Government whose policy it was to allow the fullest possible independence to Egypt. Moreover, there were on both sides Premiers with a public position among their own peoples and a personal relationship between themselves that made approaches to a real peace possible. That the opportunity was missed was more the fault of Egypt than of England. But there were failures on both sides. Mr. Ramsay MacDonald was a Premier without a party majority in the House of Commons who, in the circumstances, did not feel justified in revolutionising our official attitude towards Egypt, while he was too much otherwise occupied to be able to revitalise the moral atmosphere in Egypt as well as in Europe. The Labour Party, in the election of December, 1923, had declared for the full independence of Egypt, and on coming into power their Cabinet decided that this was compatible with maintaining the Declaration of Independence and its reservations. If Mr. MacDonald thereby made the mistake of not sufficiently disassociating himself from his predecessors, Zaglul, without the same excuse, for he had a vast majority, made the worse mistake of not dissociating his Government from the previous campaign of extremism and excesses. And it was not long before these attitudes on both sides had made a very unfavourable atmosphere for settlement. So that no approach could be made towards compromising or circumventing the very fundamental issues involved in the reserved

points. Indeed, Zaglul, by demanding from us an unconditional capitulation on all of them, closed those avenues of approach that might otherwise have been explored. Because the Labour Government, far from being, as he supposed, more amenable to such pressure as had obtained the Declaration of Independence, was, owing to its peculiar position, less capable of making concessions to pressure than its predecessors. The one chance of settlement was such a generous gesture on either side as would have restored some measure of mutual confidence.

As soon as it was clear that the Labour Government would not immediately evacuate Egypt and the Sudan, the Egyptian Parliament began to take hostile action. It struck out (June 28, 1924) the credit of £150,000 for maintenance of the British garrison under the arrangement of 1882—a pinprick which, of course, was within its rights. It then (July 30) stopped payments on certain Ottoman loans secured on the Egyptian tribute on the ground that since 1922 Egypt was not liable. The British Government protested, and the bondholders eventually got a judgment in their favour from the Mixed Tribunals, to which the Egyptian Government subsequently gave effect (1925).

Meantime, the British Labour Party continued trying to get the two Governments into negotiation for a settlement of the reserved points. But Zaglul, in order to get his extremists to allow him to negotiate, found himself forced to take up a position that made negotiation hopeless. He declared (May 8) that he "rejected the Declaration," and that the presence of British troops in Egypt was "incompatible with Egyptian independence." He demanded "complete independence of Egypt and the Sudan." He insisted that the condition

precedent of negotiations must be an undertaking from us to evacuate the Sudan. This last drew statements from Mr. MacDonald (June 30, July 10) that the Sudan would not be evacuated. Zaglul, as a protest, resigned, but returned to office at the King's request. He was then shot at and wounded (July 12), presumably to frighten him off further co-operation. It did not, however, do so, but did show that his intransigence was political rather than personal.

The Nationalists, instead of keeping the main question of the British garrison in the forefront of the fight, that being the reserved point in which they had the best case and where we might have made the most concessions, now preferred to concentrate on Egypt's claim to the Sudan. As this claim was imperialist and not nationalist, and as they had even less right, though, perhaps, more reason, to rule the Sudan than we had, their choice suggests that they were not so much seeking a settlement as keeping up a controversy that served their turn in party politics. They now organised mutinies among the Egyptian troops in the Sudan (August 9 and 10). At Khartum, Atbara, and Port Sudan the railway battalion and other corps began rioting. At Atbara the Sudanese troops fired on the Egyptian rioters, and several were killed. The Sudanese regiments were unaffected, and the disaffected Egyptians were easily disbanded.

Zaglul, having recovered from his wound, came to London to negotiate with Mr. MacDonald (September 23). But as he was bound by a promise to his party to make no concession as to the Sudan, the conversations came to nothing (October 3). It looked as though Egypt—that acid test under which the great Liberal leader had failed—might prove equally damaging

to the reputation of Labour leaders. For the disappointment in Egypt at what they saw as the Jingoism of Labour and the disapproval of Labour with what seemed to be the Chauvinism of Egypt banished any hopes of a settlement. Zaglul, on his return, at once advertised a more aggressive policy by giving appointments to two notorious anti-British agitators—one, Mahmoud Nekrashi who, as Vice-Governor of Cairo, had been suspected of obstructing police prosecutions of the murder gangs; and the other, Abdul Rahman Fahmy, who had been condemned to death for the rebellion of 1920, a sentence commuted to penal servitude, and who had been recently released by Zaglul. While from our side fire was opened by a Foreign Office Note (October 17) complaining that five months before "Zaglul Pasha had stated that the fact that a foreign officer was Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian army and the retention in the army of British officers were inconsistent with the dignity of independent Egypt." "Which," the Note observed, "placed Sir Lee Stack as Sirdar and all British officers attached to the Egyptian army in a difficult position." Difficult was, indeed, a mild word for the position of Sir Lee Stack, who had to combine being Commander-in-Chief of the army of an independent Egypt with being Governor-General of the Sudan—a British dependency to which Egypt laid claim. But this difficulty had been the creation of the Foreign Office for diplomatic reasons; and this singling out of the Sirdar as a bone of contention, concentrated nationalist attention upon him, and made his position not only one of even greater difficulty, but of great danger. Just as it is enough when a mob is worked up to a certain pitch of madness for anyone to point at a man to ensure all turning upon him and tearing him to pieces.

Zaglul's reply was merely to resign (November 15) so as to secure another vote of confidence. But Sir Lee Stack, on his way in a car from the War Office to his house, received a volley from seven men dressed like students lined up along the side-walk (November 19, 1924). He, his aide-de-camp, and chauffeur were all wounded, and next day he died. Zaglul within an hour had hurried to the Residency to express his profound sorrow, the Egyptian Government at once put £10,000 blood-money on the murderers' heads, and there was some reason to suppose that the crime might be ascribed to the activities of foreign agents.

But the new Conservative Government were in no mood to admit any mitigating circumstances. On the afternoon of the Sirdar's funeral, Lord Allenby, with a military escort, drove down to the Council and delivered an ultimatum. It demanded an apology, punishment of the criminals, prohibitions of all political demonstrations, and payment of an indemnity of £500,000. It also required the withdrawal within twenty-four hours of all Egyptian troops from the Sudan, removal of the limitation that had, in the interests of Egypt, been placed on the area to be irrigated in the Sudan "Gezireh," and withdrawal of further opposition to the assumption by H.M. Government of the right to protect all foreigners in Egypt. This last point was amplified in an annexed Note as covering such revision as we might require of the conditions for foreign employées whether still retained or retired, and recognition of the authority of the British in the departments of Finance, Justice, and the Interior. Of these demands the Egyptian Government at once accepted all except those two that concerned the Sudan, and the indemnity was paid within twenty-four hours. Lord Allenby then announced that these two Sudan re-

quirements would none the less be put in force, and that in view of their rejection the Alexandria Customs would be occupied.

Zaglul thereupon resigned (November 24). Ziwar Pasha took office, and accepted the demands as to the Sudan. The Zaglulists, Ahmed Maher, Minister of Education, Mahmoud Nkrashi, Secretary of the Interior, and Abdul Rahman Fahmy were arrested. The Egyptian Parliament, by a unanimous vote, appealed to the League of Nations against "the exploitation of a tragic incident for imperialist purposes." Therewith the crisis was closed and co-operation was to some extent restored. But it was no longer co-operation with the Egyptian national representatives. For Parliament was dissolved (December 24) and Egypt reverted to the conditions of 1923, being again governed by the King and a nominated Premier legislating by decree.

It may be questioned whether it was either justifiable or judicious to enforce, as to points at issue, an *ex parte* settlement that was purely provisional and unlikely to be ever constitutionally ratified as a penalty for a public crime. Both the Sudan and the Capitulations were, of course, indirectly involved in the crime, but Sir Lee Stack was murdered in Cairo as Sirdar, not as Governor-General in the Sudan; and the crime was a political coup that had no real connection with the general safety of foreigners in Egypt. Nor was the final settlement of the reserved points, a settlement that had to be by mutual consent, in any way furthered by being made part of the penalty for this abominable crime. That crime was clearly due to a conspiracy to injure Anglo-Egyptian relations, and we played the conspirators' game by involving in it all the unsettled issues of this relationship. That it was a mistake was, indeed, practically acknow-

ledged in debate by the Conservative Government when indignation had somewhat cooled down (November 15, 1924).

Egypt did not accept the loss of the Sudan without a struggle. Representations from Ziwar to the British Government produced the assurance that we "had no intention of trespassing on the natural historic rights of Egypt in the Nile." As earnest of this intention a Commission was appointed under a neutral President to inquire into Egyptian interests in the upper waters of the Nile. None the less the Nationalists succeeded in causing another mutiny, and this time in a Sudanese battalion (November 27, 1924). There was some severe fighting in which artillery was used. Three British officers were killed and three Sudanese officers were executed. But the Sudan showed no inclination to support the movement. The Sudan was evidently lost to Egypt, and it seemed quite likely that any further aggravation of the British would lead to a loss of the new independence of Egypt itself and a restoration of martial law. The elections were held under this apprehension, and Zaglulism kept well in the background. Accordingly, in these elections (February and March, 1925) anti-Zaglulist factions obtained, apparently, a small majority—one hundred and eight to one hundred and two—over the Zaglulists. A Coalition Cabinet was formed under Ziwar, which included all anti-Zaglulists except the Watanist faction, who had opposed Zaglul's co-operation. But when it came to the election of the Parliamentary President and other officers it appeared that the majority contained a large number of disguised Zaglulists, and that the Wafd had really a majority of about forty. This resulted in Zaglul being elected President of the Chamber instead of Sarwat, the Government candidate, and in

Zaglulists obtaining all the elective offices. Parliament was, therefore, immediately dissolved and fresh elections were called for May, 1925, but were abandoned when it became evident that they would inevitably result in Zaglulism again sweeping the country.

For Zaglulism had by now received its first clearance of the crippling suspicion that it had been responsible for the murder of the Sirdar in particular, and for the murder campaign in general. A gang of eight men had been arrested, of whom one was a leading Wafdist, the ex-deputy, Dr. Shafik Mansur, and it had been difficult to get any evidence against them owing to this connection with the Wafd. But eventually one confessed and gave evidence that led to the execution of the other seven, while clearing the Wafd organisation of any complicity with this gang.

Zaglulism had been in its origin a creation of the conflict with the British. It had so far had no objectives outside that conflict ; but now a new opponent appeared who was to cause a realignment of its front and something very like a *rapprochement* with its old British foes. Among the factions composing the anti-Zaglulist coalition under Ziwar there was one that called itself Ittihad (Unionist), the others being mainly Constitutionalists of various complexions. This Ittihad party, which professed to represent the Conservative landowners, was a product of the intrigues of one Neshat Pasha, Director of the Royal Cabinet and an astute politician. Neshat and his party of " King's Friends " made the Palace first powerful, and then predominant in politics. Government by decree had, in fact, given to King Fuad the opportunity for acquiring personal power that he had long been waiting for, and one that the Palace clique made the most of. Ziwar, the Premier, being absent in Europe, the

Ittihad replaced a Constitutionalist Cabinet Minister with one of themselves and forced the resignation of the Nationalist Sidki and two others. There were thereafter five "King's Friends" in the Cabinet as against two Constitutionlists. When Ziwar returned and tried to restore the balance he was curtly checked by the Palace (November 17). Ziwar then appealed to Cæsar, first to King Fuad, and then, getting no satisfaction, to the new High Commissioner, Lord Lloyd, who had just replaced Lord Allenby (October, 1925).

This Palace *coup d'état* brought about a general reconciliation of all Parliamentary parties to make head against Neshat and the Ittihad, and to maintain the Constitution against the King. Their attempts to assemble in Parliament, which was still dissolved, were prevented, as all approaches to the Parliament House were blocked by troops. They thereupon met in a hotel, constituted themselves a session, and passed a vote of censure. Ziwar was thereby stimulated to reconstruct his Cabinet, taking many posts himself, and to transfer Neshat from the Palace to a diplomatic post to which, however, he did not proceed (December 3, 1925). Which, being popularly interpreted as a decisive defeat for the Palace, had the curious result of causing an outburst of public enthusiasm for the new High Commissioner, to whom the victory for constitutionalism was generally attributed. Upon which favourable and unforeseen flood of popularity Lord Lloyd, a rather angular Anglo-Indian, was carried a long way towards direct co-operation with Zaglulism.

Before any real co-operation could be resumed Government by the Palace and by Decree had to be ended and a reunited nationalist block restored to office. But this by no means suited those in power. So the

electoral law was gingered up and gerrymandered so as to keep Zaglulism as long as possible out of power. The original two stage election by primaries proposed in the Constitution, but abandoned in the original electoral law, was restored. Property and educational qualifications for males under thirty were added so as to diminish the vote of the young Nationalists. But all in vain, for the Nationalist factions simply refused to participate in elections under this "decreed" electoral law. The village Omdehs refused to put it into force, and judicial action against them failed of its effect. The new law was accordingly abandoned, and the elections were held under the original act.

These elections, which did not pass off without some rioting and loss of life, returned Zaglul with a huge majority (200 to 14), the Wafd faction alone numbering two-thirds of the Chamber. The question then arose whether Zaglul could take office and the onus of co-operating with the British without splitting his party and spoiling his own position in the country. On the other hand, could he take office and oppose the British without risking the restoration of the Protectorate and martial law, or, at best, a return to Palace government by decree? Zaglul was reluctant to accept either alternative, but was eventually decided in taking office by his party being acquitted of complicity in the assassination campaign. For now the two Wafdists, Mahmoud Nekrashi and Ahmed Maher, were acquitted of complicity in the conspiracy, for which one of the seven accused, Mohamed Fehmy Ali, was condemned to death. This satisfactory result relieved Zaglul of the risk of a possible reprisal by the British, should a faction under suspicion of complicity in the Sirdar's murder take office. The new High Commissioner, who was still in

high favour with the Constitutionalists and moderate Nationalists, on learning that Zaglul contemplated office, invited him to a friendly consultation as to the conditions under which this would be acceptable to the British. It was denied in the House of Commons that any conditions at all had been imposed (June 7). But the general circumstances attending this interview (May 30) may perhaps be not incorrectly thus expressed. In any case the first step had been taken towards co-operation with Zaglulism.

Zaglul himself had wished his ally Adli to form a Government. But his party rejected this and insisted on the lately acquitted Ahmed Maher being included in the Government. Fortunately this provocation to the British was made impossible by the resignation (June 2) of Judge Kershaw owing to disapproval of this acquittal, which proved to have been by a majority only of a Tribunal composed of himself and two Egyptian Judges. This was followed up by a Note from the British Government declining to accept the verdict as clearing the accused. Zaglulism being thus again cast under the shadow of suspicion of conspiring with assassins, a Zaglulist Government became obviously impossible. After another interview with Lord Lloyd (June 1, 1926), Zaglul, with the approval of his party, advised the King to send for Adli.

Adli then formed a Government, in which there were six Zaglulist Wafdists and one anti-Zaglulist Watanist or extreme Nationalist, the remaining three, the Premier himself, Sarwat, and Mohamed Mahmud Pashas, being Liberals allied to Zaglul.

The situation therefore was and still is that Egyptian nationalism, which up to 1924 was rapidly disintegrating into factions representing various ideals and interests,

while being broadly divided into co-operators and intransigents, is now for the time being reunited. Moreover, as King Fuad has by no means abandoned his ambition to restore personal government, and Lord Lloyd has attempted to revive the patriarchal proconsulates of Cromer and Kitchener, this coalition is likely to continue. But to avoid risking a restoration of the Protectorate or a return to Palace government, the Nationalist coalition is maintaining co-operation with the British through Moderate Ministers like Adli and Sarwat. The question now is whether this Concordat can be kept going until exercise of the rights of self-government has educated the Egyptian nationalists into a more reasonable relation with British interests.

There seems to be a good prospect of such a *rapprochement*. For in the exercise of its new self-governing powers the Egyptian Parliament is showing itself both efficient and energetic. It is not only rapidly educating itself, but it is slowly educating an emancipated Egypt. Thus, in the matter of school education, Egypt has made commendable advances that compare well on the whole with those of other new nations. In 1922 the Budget vote for education was for £1,144,385, raised in 1924 by Zaglul to £1,714,689, and thereafter annually augmented. In 1922, out of a population of 13·3 millions, nearly half a million children were being educated in the Egyptian schools, some fifty thousand in foreign schools, and about five hundred students in Europe. In 1892 there were two hundred and twenty-nine students receiving higher education; to-day there are ten times that number. Nevertheless, higher education in Egypt is still below the European standard, and, as the report of the University Commission remarks, still too exclusively concerned with professional training. El

Azhar, with five to six thousand students, is still a medieval Moslem university teaching the Koran and Arabic grammar, and like it are the five other colleges attached to mosques. The National or rather Nationalist University, in spite of repeated reorganisation, is still important rather as a centre of agitation than as a seat of learning. It gives a few lectures but no degrees.

Undoubtedly the language difficulty greatly hampers literary expression. The substitution of English for French as the first foreign language in schools did not survive the Protectorate, and British foreign schools in Egypt have never been comparable to the French or even to the German. French in the Near East is the national language of the scientific, legal, literary, professional, and business world, just as Arabic is still the international language of religion. But as Europeanisation develops and Islam declines, Arabic becomes more and more unsuitable as a medium of expression. The cumbrous business of learning this most difficult of literary languages merely in order to read such Western literature as has been translated into it will certainly be short circuited. It is not impossible that in the distant future Egypt will substitute French for Arabic, as other future nations of North Africa are already doing. For Coptic, which has the best claim to be a native national language, has been extinct as a spoken language for three centuries, and cannot be considered a serious competitor.

The Press still remains the principal means of education. Cairo has two hundred and seventeen printing presses, which turn out on an average one book or brochure a day. Much of this is translation into Arabic of Western fiction, which is rapidly resulting in a new philosophy of life. The old Islamic ideals and inhibitions

are giving place to a cheap materialism and agnosticism even more rapidly than the native customs and costumes are being replaced. For the taste of the Egyptian in the outward things of life seems more reliable and refined than his taste in its philosophies. As the factory chimney replaces the minaret, and the steam siren the muezzin, the charity and chivalry that was born of a common citizenship in the Islamic State has to be replaced by a civic conscience and a national self-respect. But this will be a slow process. For the Egyptian mind is too composite and too cosmopolitan for such a simple creed as that of the Turkish poet who sings : " Turkish am I, Turkish my language, Turkish my land, therefore am I great."

Cairo is still the intellectual centre of the modern Moslem world. Its principal papers circulate from Fez to Peking. Some dailies have a circulation of as much as forty thousand, which is a considerable figure, seeing that Cairo alone has ninety-six different dailies, and Alexandria twenty-eight. There are some ninety periodicals published in Egypt, five in Arabic, twelve in French, eight in Greek, four in English, four in Italian, three in Armenian, one in Hebrew, and one in Maltese. The monthly, *El Manar*, founded by Mohamed Abdu, is still a leading light to Islamic religious reformers. For the schools of new thought in the East—both Western and Eastern—the Egyptian intellect acts as pioneer. From this fertilising flood of new ideas, turgid and turbulent as it may seem to us, there will grow in due course refreshing fruits of national literature in prose and poetry.

Art will, no doubt, revive with the emancipations from the ancient interdict of Islam and with inspiration from the ancient inheritance of Pharaonic culture. There is already

a revival of Egyptian craftsmanship and decorative design. Silk weaving, wood carving, metal working and inlaying, and carpet making are still living crafts in Cairo, though languishing under competition with Western machine-made rubbish. The process of industrialising the more important of these, such as carpet weaving, by introduction of power-looms, is being carefully conducted under the present Government. Schools of Arts and of Artistic Crafts have been founded. A grant of £10,000 has been voted for a Committee of Fine Arts appointed to advise the Minister of Education. Other grants have been made to music, to the drama, and to a history of art in Arabic. Liberal allocations have been made to industrial schools, and new schools are being built. The Ministry of Public Works is to exercise control over building and planning, and a native style of architecture is being sought. A good example of such an experiment is the new Court House at Assiut. Another possibility is the Arabic style favoured by Kitchener and followed by the French in Morocco. A third school finds its models in Pharaonic Egypt. So strong, indeed, is artistic taste and tradition in Egypt that present day prosperity seems likely to produce before long something of worth to the world. In any case the conversion of the medieval Islamic state into a modern industrial nation has not yet had the depressing effects in Egypt that it has had elsewhere. Colour, costume, and character have so far survived, and efforts are being made to save them instead of, as in Turkey and China, to sweep them away.

This book began by calling attention to a modern work of art in Cairo which represents Modern Egypt as a woman awakening the Sphinx. The part played by Egyptian women from the first arousings of the national consciousness to the riots of the final rebellion has been

even more prominent than the participation of women in neighbouring national movements. If, on the other hand, the emancipation of women has not been so complete in Egypt as elsewhere, it is because the revolution there has not been so radical or so rapid. For the Egyptian feminist movement has a deep root and has borne good fruit. Emancipation of women was one of the reforms preached by Jemal-ed-Din and by Mansur Fahmy in the days of Arabi. The poetess Aishat, at Temour, first gave it spiritual expression (1896). It was pressed by Kasim Amin, who wrote *The Emancipation of Women* (1898) and dedicated his *New Woman* (1900) to Saad Zaglul, a supporter of the movement.

The first girls' school was opened by an American Mission (1856). Ismail established the first Government school for girls (1873). Before the war there were about thirty-three thousand girls at school, and to-day there are nearly one hundred thousand. Nevertheless, there are to-day only fifteen women in a thousand who can read, and that is double the pre-war percentage. But this matters less than that leading women should be given opportunities for development. In this respect much is being done. For example, in 1924 there were twenty-one young women studying in England at the cost of the Ministry of Education.

There are now three leading feminist associations with good membership, magazines, etc. In March, 1923, a Women's Suffrage Union was formed with an interesting programme of social reform, including: equal opportunities for women, reforms of the marriage law, raising the age of consent to sixteen, public hygiene, and child welfare. The Union has already brought these matters up in Parliament, and reforms are under discussion. But the old Islamic society will die hard in the lower strata,

where some third, probably, of the households are still polygamous. In the higher ranks of society there is a strong conservative opposition, and there the harem still confers a certain social status. A Conservative Coalition between the Court, the ex-ruling class, and the Islamic clergy makes it dangerous to force reforms on the *fellaheen*, which are clearly contrary to the Koran.

The first act of the Adli Coalition Government had been to follow the example of Angora in repealing all the legislation by decree passed by its unpopular predecessors. But its revolutionary action did not go beyond this negative assertion. It will be observed from what has been written above that Modern Egypt is being much more moderate than Modern Turkey in its work of reconstruction, which rapid acquisition by Egypt of a more mature mentality is already affecting for good the relations between Egypt and the British Empire. Various developments, both internal and international, are contributing to this *détente*. Zaglul, as President of the Chamber, has used his personal power to divert it from further anti-British agitation to more useful activities. The striking evidence in recent events that Egypt enjoys great advantages as compared with its western neighbour, Tripoli, under Italian rule, or its eastern neighbour, Syria, under French rule, is beginning to have an effect. The Empire is recognised as a protection against French and Italian militarism that may at any moment become a menace from the Sahara or from Abyssinia. Internally, the High Commissioner is recognised as a protection against the King. Wherefore Nationalists no longer assert at every possible opportunity Egypt's abstract right to complete independence, nor announce whenever given a chance that the Declaration of Independence of 1922 is invalid and valueless. They have shown them-

selves ready to operate the institutions established under that Declaration, and even to co-operate with the British in so doing. We, for our part, must, none the less, or rather, all the more, realise that they have a case, and will sooner or later claim consideration of it. We must recognise that the sovereign rights of Egypt can only be a legal fiction, and its rights of self-government little more than a licensed faculty, as long as an alien army occupies the seat of Government and an alien authority maintains such rights of intervention as might be construed into the reserved points.

CHAPTER X

ENGLAND AND EGYPT

“Where are they? Where are thy wise men? Let them tell thee now, and let them know what the Lord of hosts hath purposed upon Egypt.”—ISA. xix. 12.

THE case of *Cleopatra v. Cæsar* has now been reported to date. Mutual incompatibility has been proved, and a *decree nisi* pronounced. But before a final settlement can be reached between the two parties, each must make satisfactory provision for the interests of the other as at present declared, but not defined, in the “reserved points.” Unless this can be done, both parties may in the end lose the benefit of the decree, and until it is done they have both indefinite liabilities.

The importance of such a settlement has been somewhat overlooked on our side, because Egypt appears to the superficial observer as already sovereign and independent; whereas, as a matter of fact, Egypt has at present less assurance of its status as a nation than many of its neighbours. So long as the relationship of the Empire to Egypt, its right of intervention in Egyptian affairs, and its retention of military control, all remain undefined, Egypt has not the real independence that has been reached, for example, by Irak. There has been, moreover, of late an increasing tendency in the imperialist Press and among politicians to assume that Egypt, in spite of the Declaration of 1922, remains in some undefined way a part of the Empire. There

has also been an increasing tendency on the part of Egyptians to look at the relationship between the two peoples rather in the light of the reservations of British control than in that of their formal renunciation of it.

What, in fact, do these reserved points amount to?

(a) The security of the communications of the British Empire in Egypt—is verbiage for the Canal.

(b) The defence of Egypt against all foreign aggression, direct or indirect—is camouflage for the garrison.

(c) The protection of foreign interests and the protection of minorities—covers the High Commissionership with the Financial and Judicial Advisers and the Director of Security.

(d) The Sudan—is a complex of divergent interests respecting cotton and water.

None of these, even the last, would offer any great difficulties to professional negotiators seeking a practical compromise, and not primarily concerned with the principles either of British supremacy or of Egyptian sovereignty. But so long as negotiation is considered by politicians on either side as an opportunity for pressing these principles, there is no common ground for agreement. The position of Nationalist politicians has so far been that the British garrison, the Financial and Judicial Advisers, control over foreign affairs, and the claim to protect foreigners and minorities should all be unconditionally withdrawn, while Egyptian sovereignty over the Sudan should be unconditionally recognised. Such a surrender on the part of the British is claimed on grounds of abstract right. This implies a refusal to negotiate as to the reservations in the Declaration of 1922, which the Nationalists, though operating *de facto*, do not recognise *de jure*. For, according to strict

nationalist doctrine, the present Constitution is not an emancipation of Egypt in virtue of a British declaration, but an emanation of an inherent Egyptian sovereignty. On the other hand, the British Foreign Office, while quite prepared for an abstract argument as to British rights and responsibilities under treaties, is, since 1924, in a position to claim that an Egyptian Government has accepted any interpretation that the British have chosen to put on the reserved points and have specifically accepted both the British adviserships in Egypt and the British administration of the Sudan.

Assuming that negotiation can be engaged with a will to agree on either side, it seems obvious that the general line of least resistance towards a bargain would lead to a real evacuation of Egypt by the British as against the renunciation of the Sudan by Egypt, with recourse to the League of Nations to get the guarantees required for British interests in the Canal and for Egyptian interests in the Nile. For the League offers an avenue as yet unexplored for arriving at an agreed arrangement of an international character between British Imperialism and Egyptian Nationalism. But such a solution would involve a much larger concession from the British, who have recently assumed protection of all international interests in Egypt, than it would from the Egyptians, who have accepted a prolongation of the Capitulations, and are anxious for association with the League. Thus Egyptian Nationalists appealed to the League in the crisis of 1924, and the King's Speech opening Parliament in 1926 proposed that Egypt should become a member of it. The British position, on the other hand, is governed by the Note communicating to Foreign Powers the Declaration of 1922. This declares that our special interest in Egypt has been generally

recognised,¹ that the reserved points are vital interests of the Empire not to be discussed by any Foreign Power, and that we should consider any intervention by a Foreign Power in Egyptian affairs as an unfriendly act. This is quite sufficient in itself to deter any third party from bringing an Egyptian question before the League; and any possible doubt as to our attitude was removed by the special reserve of the British Government (November 19, 1924) to the Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of Disputes. This stated that if the Protocol was signed by Egypt the British Government would allow of no appeal to the League as to the reserved points. There is therefore no means of bringing in the League without the approval of the British Government. But with that approval there appears to be nothing in the dependent position of Egypt to prevent its becoming a member. For example, Cuba is a member in spite of relations with the United States somewhat similar to those between Egypt and ourselves. But even membership would not of itself give Egypt the right to raise under Art. 18 of the Covenant its relations with Great Britain, they being of the nature of internal affairs of the Empire. Thus, an effort by Ireland to bring its Treaty of 1921 before the League was successfully opposed by us. We could of course, none the less, accept if we chose the assistance of the League in arranging a future relationship between the Empire and Egypt. But this would not only be a very drastic departure in principle from our previous policy and a precedent with far-reaching consequences on imperial relations, but also a proceeding that might

¹ The British Protectorate was recognised by France in 1914, by the United States in 1919, and by other Allied States at intervening dates. It was recognised by the enemy Powers at the Peace Treaties and by Turkey in the Treaty of Lausanne.

encounter considerable opposition from self-governing Dominions susceptible as they are to any loss of control over commercial communications.

Nevertheless, the British Empire is not based on constitutional principle or even on conformity with precedents ; but has been built up out of practical solutions for the settlement of each particular case. If it is found that recourse to the League promises a more prompt and practical agreement on the issues involved in the reserved points than can otherwise be got, it would be contrary to the sensible practice of British policy to let considerations of principle or precedent prevent its adoption.

Assuming, then, that the League can be used, and taking the reserved points in turn, we find that there seems to be no real reason for keeping British troops in Egypt to secure either (a) imperial communications, or (b) the defence of Egypt, or (c) the protection of foreigners and minorities. For the military advantage of guarding the Canal by a garrison has already been shown to have no real existence. British sea and air supremacy combined with League guarantees and possibly some form of British mandate for the Canal zone would remove any risk of the national independence of Egypt in any way prejudicing the international independence of the Canal. As for the defence of Egypt against foreign aggression, that also can be better secured by international guarantees and by an Anglo-Egyptian defensive alliance than by a garrison of a few thousand British infantry. Since, if actual foreign invasion is to be guarded against, though it is difficult to see where it could come from, then any British troops in Egypt will be lost if we lose control of sea and air ; and if we retain that control they will be superfluous for its defence. The whole conception of garrisoning Egypt for its

defence seems indeed to belong to ideas of imperialist strategy long out of date. So long as the British Empire commands sea and air and controls the Sudan, imperial communications are secure whether there are British troops in the Cairo citadel or no. The right to maintain an air base in the Canal zone would, in the military sense, be far more valuable than the right to maintain battalions of infantry in Cairo.

When we come, however, to the retention of British troops as a protection for the treaty rights of foreigners and the traditional rights of minorities we have to recognise that this does no doubt give a guarantee that cannot otherwise be got. We have, then, to examine the question as to how far such a guarantee is now necessary and how far such protection compensates for the prejudices that it causes to the relations between the English and Egyptian peoples. We must note in the first place that all such rights have been abandoned both in form and in fact in respect of Constantinople and the Christians of Turkey, and that that city and those communities are of more international and of almost as much imperial importance as are Cairo and the foreign or Christian communities of Egypt. It must be admitted that this abandonment has certainly not yet been generally approved, nor has it as yet proved altogether satisfactory in application. Also that if a plebiscite were to be taken of the foreign colonies of Cairo and Alexandria it would probably show as large a majority in favour of maintaining the British garrison as the majority that the native Christian communities would produce against its retention. Which preference of the foreign communities for British military protection would be due in part to the impression left by recent disorders ; seeing that on these and similar less serious occasions the mere appearance

of British troops has been enough to save the persons and properties of the foreign colonies from further apprehension. But on the other hand it must not be forgotten that these disorders were in every case primarily caused by the presence of British armed forces in Egypt. And that there is every reason to suppose that were those armed forces removed such disorders would not recur.

If all cause for anti-foreign agitation on the part of Nationalists were thus removed, there are only two possible impulses to serious disorder left operative in Egypt. One such impulse is ancient and oriental, the other novel and now common to every European State. The first is Islamic fanaticism, and danger from this source grows daily less as the last echoes of Pan-Islamism die away and Egypt slowly follows the lead of Turkey in reducing Islam from a political creed and a social code to nothing more than a religious ritual subordinated to the requirements of a Western civilisation. Moslem fanaticism might still conceivably be fired to revolt in the deserts of the Sahara or in the Sudan. But in the lower valley of the Nile it can never again be a fuel with which to superheat Egyptian nationalism as in the revolts of 1882 and 1919.

The other danger of disorder, that which is common to Europe in general, is the risk that labour disputes and discontent among the workers may lead to revolutionary socialism. But in spite of the suspicion that the campaign of assassination which disgraced the last period of nationalism had a "Red" origin there seems to be less connection in Egypt between the nationalist revival and the socialist revolution than in Turkey, China, or elsewhere in the East. There was as elsewhere "unrest" in Egypt after the war owing to the high prices and the contrasts between the war profits of the few and the

war poverty of the many. This social discontent was used to some extent by the nationalist organisers, and contributed, as we have seen, to the success of their strike tactics. It is also clear that during the general ferment of the years after the war Bolshevik ideas made for a short time some impression both on the foreign workers and on the more class-conscious of the native proletariat. But there never was established in Egypt, as in Turkey and China, a definite alliance between the Communist International and the local nationalist leaders. Egyptian nationalism had indeed scarcely any socialism in its propaganda. It never, as in China, organised the workers as such for a definite programme. It is remarkable that the principal effort to cope with real grievances should have come from the foreign communities. These set up a Conciliation Board in Alexandria (1919) that did good work in settling disputes, principally those between employers and workers in the European enterprises. This Board during its first quarter settled no less than twenty-four important disputes, and applications for its assistance multiplied so much that it had eventually to be divided into two sections. Again, to go further back, it was Mr. Brailsford's report on conditions of child labour in the ginning mills (1908) that first caused legislation to be passed in spite of the difficulties due to the Capitulations. And this legislation, all too little as it is, is to-day very laxly enforced. Mrs. Travers Symons, writing of recent conditions (*British and Egypt*, p. 267) reports: "I have seen rows of very small children from five to seven years old at the machines, nibbling their food in the dinner hour when they ought to have been out of doors, and walking up and down between them a giant with a *kurbash*." It is an unfortunate fact that, so far, the Egyptian Govern-

ment has shown no interest in labour legislation, and that Trades Unionism in Egypt has not yet obtained legal status. There were in 1922 thirty-eight Trades Unions in Cairo, thirty-three in Alexandria, eighteen in the Canal zone, and six in the rest of the country which had been recognised by the Conciliation Board. In two cases difficulties due to the defective status of Trades Unionism have had to be overcome by affiliation with the British Workers' Union. Federation has so far failed in face of difficulties of language, race, and religion.

Under these conditions it is not surprising that when the new Nationalist Government took office in 1923 and showed no inclination to improve the status of labour, there were disturbances indirectly against it, though directly against the foreign employers. Assaults on works managers, attacks on their houses, and attempts to seize the factories caused the foreign communities great alarm. Strong representations were made by them to Zaglul, and he preferred sharp measures of repression to reforms that would only have brought Egyptian labour legislation to the level of that of European States. Troops were employed against the striking Gabary dockers, and hundreds of workers were kept for months in prison without a trial. Which severity may have been due partly to the fact that not only the employers, but also many of the workers and most of their leaders, were foreigners. Because, in dealing with disputes, which were mainly between British, French, or Belgian firms and Italian, Greek, Syrian, or Armenian workers, the Egyptian Government would naturally take the line of least resistance and support the employers. In any case, it seems clear that foreign employers so far from having to fear that alliance between nationalism and communism, that causes them so much alarm to-day in Canton and Shanghai, have rather to

fear lest concentration on issues of national sovereignty may make the Egyptian Government overslow in necessary concessions to social reform. There is here, in any case, no condition calling for a protection of foreign interests from outside.

The other fear that perpetually festers in the mind of the foreign residents in Egypt is that of losing not only the protection, but the privileges accorded them by the Capitulations. Under these legacies of "the Sick Man"—now happily deceased—there are four distinct judicial systems operating in Egypt under four different sanctions. Consular Courts for the penal and personal cases concerning foreigners; Mixed Tribunals for commercial cases concerning foreigners; Religious Courts for the personal status of native Moslems, Jews, and Christians; and finally, Egyptian Courts. In some fully nationalised Eastern States, such as Japan and Turkey, this judicial extra-territoriality has been already swept away, and in others, such as China, it is going. In the North African States the abolition of this extra-territoriality has been accepted by the Treaty Powers in consideration of the guarantee for efficient judicatures and equal justice given by the Occupying Power, France or Italy. A similar arrangement was pursued by Great Britain as Occupying Power in Egypt, and was pressed after the declaration of the Protectorate. But for reasons that have already been reviewed, our attempts to rid Egypt of the judicial Capitulations failed. Subsequently, the capitulatory régime in Egypt, instead of being attacked by the Nationalists, as it has been in Turkey and China for being an intolerable "servitude" on national sovereignty, has actually come to be accepted as an international safeguard against any restoration of British control over Egyptian internal affairs.

This is all the more remarkable in that the capitulatory régime in Egypt has, in course of time, come to be more onerous than anywhere else. Take, for example, the present organisation of the Mixed Tribunals. They were proposed by Nubar (1876) as a reform that should lead to the renunciation of the Consular Courts. They have not as yet had this result, though half a century has passed since their foundation. Even those German and other Consular Courts closed during the war have since been reopened. Besides that, these Mixed Tribunals have led to permanent institutions for giving the Treaty Powers a veto over modifications of the judicatures and jurisprudence. Thus, Art. 12 of the Civil Code provided that a Commission de la Magistrature was to be consulted as to any alteration of the Mixed Courts Codes. With the British occupation the Mixed Courts rapidly assumed a political rôle by constant refusals to carry out Anglo-Egyptian legislation—notably the Police Regulations of 1887. This led to the establishment of a General Assembly of the Mixed Court (January 31, 1889) with the right of recording whether proposed measures were (a) generally applicable and (b) agreeable to treaty rights. Confirmation of this curious institution was got in an amendment to Art. 12 of the Civil Code in 1911. It is open to the Egyptian Government to consult the Assembly or no, and the latter has itself no suspensory veto. But the Assembly is, in fact, a sort of Supreme Court with foreign representation ratifying or rejecting domestic legislation affecting foreigners. Rejection by the Assembly gives ground for diplomatic representation as to a breach of treaty right. And though this is no doubt a very practical procedure for dealing with these peculiar privileges of foreigners, yet it is one scarcely reconcilable with the strict principle of national sovereignty.

Moreover, not only has this institution been used as against Cromerism, but it has also been used against Zaglulism in the matter already mentioned of the Tribute debts. Yet all the same, the Mixed Courts have been heartily accepted by the Egyptian Nationalists, who advocate the transfer to them of the surviving consular jurisdiction. Thus, the political programme of the Wafd (1918) says "We should welcome the enlargement of the competence of the Mixed Courts over all criminal cases concerning foreigners." Which, fortunately, is also the solution that was suggested by the Milner Mission, and that seems likely to be generally acceptable. So that, in view of this agreement as to a new arrangement in principle, points of detail should cause no difficulty. Such details are in dispute over a recent proposal (November, 1926) of the General Assembly of the Mixed Tribunals for the establishment of another Appeal Court. The proposal has been favourably received by the Government, but they want to reduce the councillors from five to three, an economy unwelcome to the Powers.

There is, therefore, no serious difference in respect to the judicial Capitulations between Egyptian national idealism and European business interests. And there is nothing about the judicial Capitulations to require the retention of a British garrison. Nor has there been as yet any interference by Egypt with the far less justifiable fiscal privileges of foreigners. Even if there were it would be impossible for us to resist proposals for the equitable and equal taxation of foreigners, seeing that we have ourselves unsuccessfully sought this reform throughout our occupation. It was we who advocated the one unimportant derogation from foreign immunity—the payment by foreigners of the "Ghafir" tax. And this small tax for police protection is now paid by the British, but by

few other foreigners. Shortly before the war the Mixed Tribunals ruled that an addition of five per cent. to the land tax for primary education was not applicable to foreigners, as the schools were of no use to them. And this ruling was duly accepted. We still see, therefore, whole colonies of merchants who are native Egyptians in everything but nationality, and who profit from residence in Egypt to the extent of making large fortunes out of the country, yet who are still exempt from all rates and taxes except the limited land tax and very low import duties. Is this a situation which we could use a British garrison to maintain?

Finally, before leaving this question of foreign protection, it will be observed that once this question is cleared of all considerations of protection for imperial communications that are peculiar to Egypt, and as soon as it is considered, not as a strategic, but as a political matter, that it becomes evident how the whole argument for military protection is based on an obsolete outlook. Egypt has been less subject to disorder, and is much more exposed to our diplomatic pressure, than countries with far more important British and foreign commercial connections in which we have accepted new native courts and codes and liability to local taxation without even the mitigation of a mixed judicature. Moreover, unless the intention is to establish any minority eventually as a separate nation, its protection by any particular great Power is objectionable as doing it more harm than good. Our protection of Ottoman Christians under the Treaty of Berlin in no way prevented, but rather provoked, their oppression and ended in their complete elimination by the "exchange of populations" sanctioned at Lausanne.

Nor is there any community in Egypt requiring pro-

tection either on racial or religious grounds. The Copts, as a race, have a better claim than any other to be considered autochthonous Egyptians. Since the mass moslemisation of Copts in the thirteenth century they are not racially distinct from the Egyptian Moslem originally of Arabic and Nubian stock. It is, however, among the Copts that is still to be found most clearly the old Pharaonic type, thin waisted, broad shouldered, straight limbed, thick lipped, and almond eyed. As a Christian community, the Copts are a minority of perhaps one-twelfth of the population, and they have a life apart in so far as there is no intermarriage and not much social intercourse with the Moslems. But there are no discriminations against them such as disable minorities in Europe. For example, the *Kuttabs*, or Government schools, are open to Copts who can arrange for their own religious instruction there. In provinces where Copts are numerous a proper proportion of Coptic schools are State supported. Where the Coptic minority fails to get representatives in local government, Copts are generally co-opted. Nor has there been any persecution of them for centuries, and the history of the community shows that they have suffered on the whole less from their Moslem fellow-citizens than from their Orthodox and Catholic fellow-Christians. Curiously enough it has been mainly in religious ceremonial that the closest relations have been maintained between this primitive Christian Church and its Moslem conquerors. Copts have built mosques and Moslems have restored Coptic churches. Priests and Mullahs still hold joint religious ceremonies, which are survivals of the original ritual of Nile worship. In this, the real religion of the *fellaheen*, it is the Coptic calendar that is followed, in which the New Year is in September, the season of the Nile flood. Both

Copts and Moslems flock to the fairs of the same local saints. They tell the same stories and sing the same songs. They live in separate villages, but have the same views of life, the same virtues, and the same vices. So that the fraternisation of Copts and Moslems in the last phase of nationalism had nothing in it either novel or phenomenal, and merely showed that nationalism had come to take the same place in the life of the people as the Nile flood or a local fair.

Nor do the Copts suffer under any disabilities which they require our help in redressing. Their most difficult time was probably under the later Mamelukes when defections to Islam had reduced them from six millions at the Arab conquest to a few hundred thousand. But even then, though debarred from bearing arms, they had a position of considerable power as the clerical class. Mehemet Ali allowed them to bear arms and admitted them to the highest offices of State. Ismail even had a Coptic Minister of War. By then they had grown greatly in numbers and in influence. It was, as above reported, the advent of the British that, so far from being an advantage to these fellow-Christians, again reduced their community to a subordinate status. For the British, desiring to conciliate the Moslems and disliking the less independent and more intelligent Copts, excluded them from their previous employments. Their grievances, as put forward by the Coptic Congress in 1911, are directed rather against the English than against the Egyptians. They then demanded equal pay with Moslems in Government service, proportional representation in elected Councils, a proper share of appointments as Mudirs, and a rest day on Sundays. But these differences with their Moslem fellow-citizens, due mainly to a British discrimination against them that was partly political and partly

personal, do not appear to have survived the end of British control over the administration.

Another very ancient community in Egypt is that of the Jews. Of them it will be enough to say that they appear to have the same financial and social prominence as in England. We may note, in evidence, that the Chairman of the National Bank and of the Sugar Trust is Harrari Pasha, and that Madame Cattawi is a lady-in-waiting and a leader of society. Jewish firms are predominant in the coal and cotton markets and very prominent generally in commerce.

The Syrian Christians are scarcely less powerful. European in their energy and efficiency, they are wholly Egyptian in their sentiment and association. They have even acquired a strong hold over the land and own great estates, from which many have made large fortunes, like the Lutfallahs. They have much of the retail trade in their hands, and the multiple shops of the Sednawi family compete successfully with those of France. In industry the cotton-seed presses of the Abu Shenab family are notable. They are also prominent in the professions, especially in the Press—the *Ahram*, *Mokattam*, and other newspapers having Syrian editors. With such a position, even though they have of late lost their supremacy in the Civil Service, they can scarcely be considered in need of protection.

The Armenians, as a community, are less important, and, since the British went, they are not so likely to produce a political successor to Nubar Pasha. But they have families highly influential in finance and commerce, especially in the tobacco trade, in which the firms of Matossian and Melkonian have a world-wide range and reputation.

The Greeks are mostly small merchants and money-

lenders, but have also their princes of commerce. As the local retailer and usurer they perform the rather unpopular function filled further north by the Jews. They are on the border-line between a foreign colony and a native community, and are clever at exploiting the advantages of both characters.

Nowhere in this short category can we find any community that, owing to its being regionally segregated or suspected by the ruling race and religion, could be classed as a national minority requiring special protection. If any such were to be so classed, protection could clearly be better afforded, as elsewhere, through League guarantees and not through a British garrison. Of course, if it be assumed that the protection of foreigners requires the retention of a High Commissioner with some undefined extra-diplomatic authority, of Judicial and Financial Advisers and of a Director of Security with even less defined rights of intervention—then there may be grounds for keeping a garrison to assert their authority. But, even so, it would be worth considering whether such support could not be better given by diplomatic representation and by political pressure.

For it is obvious that the presence of a garrison must undoubtedly deter and defer the establishment of friendly relations with Egypt and a settlement of the reserved points. A fair and free reconciliation and resettlement are both almost impossible while one of the negotiating parties is in military occupation of the other. That the British Empire, in dealing with Egypt, should have to fortify its diplomacy by remaining in occupation of Cairo, is itself almost an admission that its case is weak, and certainly it is an unfair advantage that is likely to be met by intransigence.

The main justification for retaining the garrison so long

has been given by Egypt itself in the criminal attacks on British officers and officials. So long as any Egyptian faction, however insignificant, pursued this terrorism the garrison could not be withdrawn and negotiations could not be begun. But it looks as though during this last year (1926) Egyptian Nationalism had been recovering from its war psychosis. Assassination has disappeared and agitation has greatly diminished. Egypt has again become a resort for the elderly pleasure-seekers of our ruling class, though it is no longer a refuge for its younger sons. A new working relationship is gradually growing up between the British authorities and the Egyptian Government. Zaglul himself has had personal understandings with Lord Lloyd, and Bute House is a good deal nearer Downing Street than was the Beit-el-Watan. Egypt is coming out of its entrenchments to parley, and we might well come out of the Cairo Citadel to meet them.

When negotiations begin the extent of the concessions that we can make must depend on the evidence that has by then been given that Egyptians can govern Egypt without English supervision. In which respect there is still an assumption as to an essential superiority of British rule and rulers that may not seem so axiomatic to an Egyptian as to an Englishman. An Egyptian studying social and political conditions in England to-day (1926) might question whether the English were fit to govern England. And in reply to our doubts as to whether an Egyptian can be trusted to continue in Egypt the teachings and traditions of his British pastors and masters, he might question whether we were being true in England to the teachings of that Eastern Master whose followers we profess to be. But, apart from such controversial points of view, we cannot to-day maintain the old

Cromerist conviction that the recovery of Egypt is wholly due to us, and that the country would rapidly be ruined if left to itself. We now recognise that the recovery of Egypt was so rapid largely because it was the convalescence of a healthy and hard-working community from disorder for which it was only indirectly responsible ; also that this convalescence being now complete, the present rate of progress cannot be more than the natural growth of an agricultural community that is rapidly approaching its maximum output. We have, moreover, now before us the surprising successes of self-government in other new nations of the Near East that have freed themselves from Western tutelage. And if the results so far recorded in Egypt are not quite so remarkable, we have to recognise that this (1926) has been the first year in which Egyptian self-government has had full opportunity of showing what it can do. Because the preceding four years after the Declaration of 1922 were occupied with fighting for further independence. So that it is only now that Egypt is beginning to use the large measure of liberty it then obtained.

The caution shown by the Egyptian Government in its reconstruction when compared with the precipitancy of neighbouring new nations has already been remarked. Political parties are developing in Egypt on normal constitutional lines into a Progressive and Conservative two-party system ; and there is no tendency towards a class war between revolutionaries and reactionaries. The democratic, almost diplomatic character assumed by Egyptian politics has necessarily involved a loss of driving power for reconstruction. Whereas such a revolutionary revitalisation was possibly the only substitute for British rule that would have prevented a certain loss of ground and loosening of grip in the transition from

British to Egyptian rule. There is certainly evidence of a decrease in efficiency dating not from the declaration of independence in 1922, but from the first substitution of Egyptian for English responsibility in administration. This has been noted above in respect of the experiments made under Gorst, many of which were subsequently abandoned. It was to be expected that the *baksheesh* evil would again reappear, an evil especially dangerous to Egypt. For Egypt is a country in which the main source of wealth is the water supply. Not only the prosperity of the community as a whole, but the profits of each individual cultivator depend on the fair distribution of irrigation. Where it is in the power of an underpaid official to acquire a competence for life by merely overlooking the opening of a ditch-sluice on dark nights, a very high standard of integrity is required. That standard was obtainable through English inspectors; but whether it can ever be got through Egyptians, however highly educated, so much more exposed as they must be to the influences of their social surroundings, is still questionable.

Apart from integrity, there must be for a time a loss of efficiency. This, to take one example only, is already noticeable in the main produce of Egypt—cotton. Within the memory of man Egypt, once the corn-producer for Europe, has become its cotton-producer. Egypt provides one-half of the world's supply of the long staple cotton that is essential to modern mills. The maintenance of this position, almost amounting to a monopoly, depends on scientific supervision of the seed supply—a responsibility very efficiently discharged by British, Italian, and other foreign experts. But the deterioration of *sakel* cotton, due to wholesale hybridisation of types and unscientific seed-production, that had already caused com-

plaint before the war, has of late been greatly accelerated by the reckless extension of cotton cultivation owing to exaggerated post-war prices. Deterioration is already reaching dimensions very damaging to the reputation of Egyptian cotton, and the present Government have so far found no remedy other than the restriction of cultivation and the guaranteeing of prices. A reorganisation of scientific supervision is essential if this main source of Egyptian prosperity is not, in the end, to pass to the more efficient foreign cotton-growing syndicates of the Sudan. There is still, however, time to reform, as the Sudanese production is as yet less than one per cent. of the Egyptian.

In other less important regions of national activity a falling away from English, and even occasionally from European, standards may be traced to overhasty substitution of the *beledi* for the *franghi*. The railway services are not so punctual nor so plentiful; and foreign managers get on with difficulty and even go off in disgust. The Egyptians at first did not realise that expenditure on upkeep and renewals is an economy, and thinking that they were cutting down British extravagance, rather starved the railway system. But some new construction, such as the doubling of the Luxor-Assuan line, has been well done, and more is included in the proposed outlay on the railways, which amounts to some £9,000,000.

A more serious question is whether Egypt will maintain the English campaign against dirt and disease. For it must be confessed that we did not succeed in educating the nation as a whole out of its Eastern indifference to these evils by the example that we set it in the European quarters of its cities or in our campaigns against endemics like malaria or against epidemics like cholera and plague.

A Commission on Public Health appointed during the war reported that "the greater part of Egypt is filthy and plagued by disease. The infant mortality is appalling, one-third dying in infancy. The verminous condition of the *fellaheen* shows no improvement, though lice are now known to convey the typhus and relapsing fevers that account for so many deaths." In Egypt there are as yet no signs of a national campaign against disease and dirt, such as that which has achieved so much in Russia and has attempted great things in Turkey. There is, on the contrary, rather a slackening of effort. The European quarters are not so clean, the Egyptian quarters are even dirtier. The organisation for fighting disease has been dangerously impaired. But Egyptians are becoming acutely alive to the necessity of activity against such national scourges as bilharzia and ankylostomiasis. Improvement in this respect, failing hygienic campaigns like those of Russian communism, can only come slowly with the education of women.

When we come to general evidence of progress the figures of foreign trade and fiscal returns suggest that the nationalist revolution in Egypt having been only political, one might say almost only polemical, has not disturbed the economic existence in Egypt as such revolutions have elsewhere. Business remains as yet mainly in foreign hands, either in those of the foreign colonies or of the semi-native communities. The Bank of Egypt, a Nationalist institution, is as yet unimportant, and banking is mostly in the hands of either the British or the Jews. Wholesale trade is mostly carried on by foreigners, and retail trade by Greeks or by Syrians. The British are to the fore in the cotton trade, in coal, in Manchester goods, and in machinery. The French are the largest creditors, and their main enterprises are the

Sugar Trust, the Heliopolis Company, Tramways, Gas Companies, etc. The Italians, who are the most numerous foreign colony, except the Greeks, supply skilled artisans and import motors. The Swiss are the hotel-keepers, an influential class where the tourist traffic is so large an asset in the economic balance-sheet. The native Egyptian is but little represented in finance and commerce; and the Government is making no effort to force native partnerships on foreign enterprises either by the Russian or by the Turkish methods.

The establishment of the new nation has, therefore, had little or no outward effect on Egyptian economics. Alexandria is not dormant or dead, like Leningrad or Constantinople, but is doing very well. Cairo, though it has not the impressive new power-houses or the latest inventions in the machinery of Government that Moscow has installed, is working the old Anglo-French mechanisms without any serious reduction of output. So that if the success of Egyptians in governing is to be judged by their success in continuing the system of government evolved by the British, we may consider that they have passed their preliminary with credit. In any case, they have not done, and are not likely to do, anything that will prevent or even prejudice negotiations as to a final settlement.

A satisfactory settlement of the reserved points will, however, depend, in the first place, on both Governments abandoning the attitudes they have hitherto adopted, and on someone doing something to create a new atmosphere between the two peoples. Fortunately, recent circumstances have facilitated such a change of atmosphere in our relations with Egyptian nationalism. The menace of Mussolini, both from Tripoli and from Eritrea, has relieved our relations with Egyptian nationalism as remark-

ably as it relieved our relations with Turkish nationalism. Moreover, French militarism in Syria has relegated us to the rôle of a Second Murderer "of milder mood." Finally, the despised Constitution, and even the detested High Commissionership, have acquired a value as safeguards against the autocratic ambitions of the King.

In peaceably accepting co-operation, and in allowing it to proceed for a comparatively long period undisturbed, Egyptian Nationalism has made as large a contribution to a change in atmosphere as can fairly be expected. It is now up to us to respond by a generous gesture. And in view of the absence of any recent pressure, we need not fear that it will be misinterpreted as weakness. Such a gesture would be the admission of Egypt to the League and a reference to the League of all the reserved points. If the arguments above advanced and the view of events above adopted are correct, we should stand to lose nothing serious except in the case of the Sudan, which is dealt with in the following chapter. On the other hand, we should thereby get the acceptance by Egypt of terms that, however equitable, we could never impose on them either arbitrarily or by agreement.

With the reserved points thus cleared out of the way, either by direct concessions on our part or by reference to the League, a new possibility presents itself in future relations. Egyptian Nationalists, or a sufficiently large majority of them, might thereafter be able to realise the disadvantages of finally seceding from the Empire. For the advantages that Egypt would obtain by becoming a self-governing Dominion within the Empire are apparently already acknowledged by the Liberal-Constitutionalists and Nationalist-Co-operators now in office. These advantages, very briefly summarised, are : Security from the Italian imperialism that so impresses at present all Near

Eastern peoples ; a more favourable settlement of the Capitulations and Canal questions than would otherwise be obtainable ; and, above all, the acquisition by Egypt eventually of such rights over the Sudan as other Dominions have obtained over their imperial hinterlands. It is, indeed, obvious that Egypt, as a Dominion of the Empire and a member of the League, would have internationally a better position than as an independent third-class State.

Whether such a solution becomes practical politics will depend on how far Egyptian Nationalism, as represented by Zaglul and the Wafdists, adopts the point of view and policy of the Liberal Co-operators and alienates itself from the Watanist extremists. So far it is only possible to say that the idea is opposed by such Nationalists, but not spurned with opprobrium. If it were ever supported by Zaglul he could probably get a majority for it ; but such support is no more than a remote possibility at present.

Gratifying as it would be to our pride to prevent the first secession from the Empire in a century, yet the practical advantages to us would be much less than to Egypt. The transfer of our disputes with Egypt back to the imperial relationship would mean that we should have to make surrenders in practice that would more than outbalance our success on the point of principle. Debt control, Capitulations, Canal, and even the Sudan would all in time be surrendered to an Egypt that was *de facto* independent, though *de jure* a Dominion. In fact, the present position would be just reversed. And even in principle it seems more sound that Dominion status should be reserved for States that are culturally in a real racial relationship with us and with each other. Egypt, with its Oriental race and a culture half French, half Arabic,

would be an anomaly within the Empire, as is India. The relationship between British and Egyptian peoples is one that would be better regulated by definite contracts than left to the undefined solidarity suitable as between kindred peoples with common interests and ideals.

It is to be hoped, therefore, that the future relations of England and Egypt will be those of two foreign but friendly nations sharing certain responsibilities of international importance regulated by international treaties, such as the Canal and the Nile. Nor is there any reason to fear that in this relationship there will be any aftermath of the whirlwind that we have lately been reaping in Egypt. For, as we have seen, the Egyptian nation is no Phœnix like those unfamiliar and formidable fowls in Moscow and Angora that frighten us as much as did the conflagration from which they emerged. Egypt is still the Magic Hen that is as ready to lay golden eggs for Jack as for the Giant. The only question for us to decide is whether we are going to play Jack or the Giant.

GROWTH OF FOREIGN TRADE.

	IMPORTS IN THOUSAND POUNDS STERLING.		EXPORTS IN THOUSAND POUNDS STERLING.		PERCENTAGE OF 1884.	
	<i>Merchandise and Tobacco</i>	<i>Gold and Silver Specie.</i>	<i>Merchandise and Tobacco.</i>	<i>Gold and Silver Specie.</i>	<i>Imports.</i>	<i>Exports.</i>
1884 ..	—	—	—	—	100	100
1885 ..	£E 8,989	3,914	11,454	1,293	110	91
1890 ..	8,081	2,971	12,004	2,085	99	96
1895 ..	8,389	4,319	12,816	2,322	103	102
1900 ..	14,112	4,114	17,124	2,602	172	136
1905 ..	21,564	4,782	20,360	3,869	264	162
1910 ..	23,552	12,964	28,944	7,046	288	231
1915 ..	19,364	721	27,046	132	237	215
1920 ..	101,880	399	85,467	12	1,245	681
1925 ..	58,224	617	59,198	93	712	472

DISTRIBUTION OF FOREIGN TRADE (IMPORTS).
PER THOUSAND PROPORTION OF PRINCIPAL COUNTRIES.

Quinquennial Average	U.K.	Other British.	America. U.S.A.		France.	Germany.	Italy.	Russia.	Turkey.	
1889-1893	351	81	0.5		97	15	32	42	204	
1894-1898	331	68	12		109	27	38	40	188	
1899-1903	368	65	18		92	37	51	39	145	
1904-1908	329	52	21		110	49	52	31	130	
1909-1913	308	56	33		106	55	50	30	111	
1914	325	78	46		75	63	67	23	88	
War period	1915	452	114		51	0.1	84	0.2	9	
	1916	488	132		44	0.3	80	0.5	2	
	1917	444	175		61	0.1	69	0.1	2	
	1918	529	155		13	—	47	0.1	—	
	1919	461	121		91	—	53	0.1	13	
	1920	372	107		163	62	12	56	0.9	11
	1921	305	94		195	77	30	56	0.4	14
1922	340	64	37	37	93	65	73	0.7	53	
1923	326	83	26	38	84	59	99	12	52	
1924	276	84	39	35	92	58	103	16	53	
1925	252	118	39	36	93	58	105	14	53	

DISTRIBUTION OF FOREIGN TRADE (EXPORTS).

Quinquennial Average	United Kingdom	Other British.	U.S.A.	France	Germany.	Italy.	Russia.	Turkey.	
1889-1893	616	3	8	76	14	55	107	32	
1894-1898	517	7	57	86	36	35	130	29	
1899-1903	521	11	65	83	66	34	81	18	
1904-1908	531	8	57	80	84	34	59	17	
1909-1913	476	4	82	84	110	29	62	20	
1914	434	7	121	65	95	40	67	18	
War period	1915	516	11	183	56	—	66	40	2
	1916	532	5	185	70	—	48	50	1
	1917	595	13	124	63	—	60	22	—
	1918	673	10	95	45	—	53	—	—
	1919	530	9	221	78	3	46	—	4
	1920	425	12	310	94	15	39	—	4
	1921	469	6	180	78	41	34	—	11
1922	473	5	189	101	39	54	—	30	
1923	486	6	124	114	43	62	2	22	
1924	486	6	108	131	60	62	1	17	
1925	442	4	142	126	60	61	3	13	

TABLE SHOWING THE VALUE OF PRINCIPAL IMPORTS FROM EACH COUNTRY IN THOUSANDTHS OF THE TOTAL VALUE OF IMPORTS FROM THAT COUNTRY DURING THE YEAR 1925.

<i>Country whence Consigned and Value in Thousandths of the Total Value of Imports.</i>	<i>Value for Each Article in Thousandths of the Total Value.</i>
United Kingdom 252	Cotton piece goods 391.—Coal 123.—Machines and parts 54.—Iron or steel, wrought 50.—Woollen textiles 35.—Gold bullion 30.—Copper and brass, manufactured 20.—Cotton yarn 17.—Other articles 280.
Italy 105	Cotton piece goods 391.—Woollen textiles 45.—Motor vehicles 36.—Silk shawls, handkerchiefs and scarves 26.—Silk yarn and thread 24.—Cotton yarn 24.—Hosiery 22.—Potatoes 17.—Other articles 415.
France 93	Silk textiles 78.—Machines and parts 61.—Iron or steel, wrought 57.—Wheat flour 46.—Woollen textiles 46.—Copper and brass, manufactured 30.—Ready-made clothing 29.—Motor vehicles 29.—Vegetable oils 26.—Furniture, wooden 24.—Medicinal preparations 24.—Hosiery 23.—Cotton piece goods 20.—Brandy 18.—Tyres, rubber, for motor-cycles 16.—Gold bullion 16.—Other articles 457.
Germany 58	Iron or steel, wrought 160.—Machines and parts 87.—Hosiery 59.—Copper and brass, manufactured 58.—Chemical manures 41.—Cardboard and wrapping paper 26.—Glassware 22.—Woollen textiles 21.—Sugar beetroot 21.—China-ware, porcelain and earthenware 16.—Beer, stout and ale 15.—Writing and printing paper 15.—Medicinal preparations 15.—Wrapping paper 15.—Other articles 429.
British India 49	Sacks, empty 219.—Rice 179.—Wheat 143.—Wheat flour 109.—Cotton yarn 79.—Jute piece goods 44.—Chick peas 43.—Tea 40.—Cotton piece goods dyed in the yarn 28.—Sesame 26.—Other articles 90.

England and Egypt

TABLE SHOWING THE VALUE OF PRINCIPAL IMPORTS, ETC.—Continued.

Country whence Consigned and Value in Thousandths of the Total Value of Imports.	Value for Each Article in Thousandths of the Total Value.
Australia 42	Wheat flour 834.—Wheat 133.—Other articles 33.
Belgium 36	Iron or steel, wrought 289.—Cotton piece goods 147.—Chemical manures 75.—Glassware 73.—Cement 51.—Sugar beetroot 28.—Linen piece goods 18.—Maize flour 17.—Cotton yarn 17.—Zinc oxide 16.—Woollen textiles 16.—Chocolate and confectionery containing chocolate 15.—Other articles 238.
United States of America .. 36	Wheat flour 260.—Motor vehicles 142.—Mineral oils 84.—Machines and parts 66.—Iron or steel, wrought 46.—Spare parts for motors 43.—Leather 35.—Kerosene 34.—Timber 32.—Furniture woods 26.—Starch 19.—Coal 16.—Other articles 197.
Chile 32	Nitrate of soda 1,000.
Holland and Dutch Possessions 24	Sugar, raw and refined 401.—Chemical manures 81.—Machines and parts 79.—Coffee 43.—Cardboard and wrapping paper 33.—Hosiery 27.—Beer, stout and ale 21.—Vegetable oils 16.—Other articles 299.
Rumania 23	Timber 577.—Kerosene 237.—Benzene 126.—Maize 17.—Other articles 43.
Czecho-Slovakia 21	Sugar beetroot 483.—Glassware 102.—Tarbinshes 54.—Woollen textiles 39.—Iron or steel, wrought 36.—Malt 21.—Chinaware, porcelain and earthenware 20.—Ready-made clothing 19.—Cotton piece goods 18.—Furniture, wooden 16.—Other articles 192.
Turkey 19	Tobacco 246.—Railway sleeper 220.—Timber 109.—Cheese 107.—Dried fruits 92.—Carpets and floor rugs 40.—Fresh fruits 32.—Other articles 154.
Japan 19	Cotton piece goods 374.—Hosiery 151.—Tobacco 140.—Silk textiles 105.—Cotton yarn 67.—Silk shawls, handkerchiefs and scarves 27.—Chinaware, porcelain and earthenware 16.—Glassware 15.—Iron or steel, wrought 15.—Other articles 90.

TABLE SHOWING THE VALUE OF PRINCIPAL EXPORTS TO EACH COUNTRY IN THOUSANDTHS OF THE TOTAL VALUE OF EXPORTS TO THAT COUNTRY DURING THE YEAR 1925.

<i>Country to which Consigned and Value in Thousandths of the Total Value of Exports.</i>	<i>Value for Each Article in Thousandths of the Total Value</i>
United Kingdom 442	Cotton, raw 848—Cotton seed 86.—Cotton seed cake 27.—Eggs 15—Onions 13—Other articles 11.
United States of America .. 142	Cotton, raw 966—Onions 15.—Wool, raw 10.—Other articles 9.
France 126	Cotton, raw 955—Benzene 10—Silver bullion 8.—Onions 7.—Rice 5.—Eggs 5.—Other articles 10.
Italy 61	Cotton, raw 906—Onions 57.—Molasses 9.—Untanned hides and skins 6.—Other articles 22.
Germany 60	Cotton, raw 880.—Cotton seed 64.—Onions 34—Cotton seed cake 8.—Metallic ores 5.—Other articles 9.
Switzerland 38	Cotton, raw 991.—Cigarettes 5.—Other articles 4.
Japan 37	Cotton, raw 989—Phosphate 6—Other articles 5.
Spain 20	Cotton, raw 946—Benzene 25.—Phosphate 13.—Other articles 16.
Czecho-Slovakia 18	Cotton, raw 999.—Other articles 1.

England and Egypt

CHAPTER XI

EGYPT AND THE SUDAN

“Behold, I am against thee Pharaoh, king of Egypt, which hath said, My river is mine own and I have made it for myself.”—*EZEK. xxix. 3.*

THE respective rights of the British Empire and of the Egyptian Nation in the wastes of the Sudan and in the waters of the Nile would require a whole book for their proper consideration. Here the question can only be treated as an appendix—but as an appendix that has already given much trouble, and that unless adequately dealt with will certainly give more.

The last of the reserved points which covers discreetly the claim of the British Empire to sole sovereignty over the Sudan comprises a dispute with Egypt that differs altogether in character from the differences contained in the preceding points. It is not, as they are, a conflict between British Imperialism and Egyptian Nationalism, but a collision between two rival imperialisms. For though Egyptian national interests are vitally concerned in respect of rights in Nile water, yet issue has not so far been joined on this count, but on the Egyptian claim to sole sovereignty over the Sudan. This claim was first put forward twenty years ago by Mustapha Kamil in the *Lewa*; it led to the conflict in 1923 over the King's title; and was last strongly pressed by Zaglul Pasha in his negotiations with Mr. MacDonald in 1924. It was this claim that prevented any approach even to a negotiation, and it was a strategic blunder on the part of the Wafd to have so insisted on it. On our side it

was a tactical blunder that the British Government included the Sudan in its ultimatum of November, 1924. It should have made a separate declaration of its policy in regard to the Sudan instead of leaving this matter as one of the reserved points. For negotiation on the other reserved points concerns the future status of Egypt. Whereas negotiation as to the future Status of the Sudan can best be settled as between two friendly and fully independent States after the other reserved points have been cleared out of the way. It may be hoped that the Egyptian Government will now see the advantage of such a procedure and not again press their full claim to the Sudan to the prevention of a negotiation on the other points. It may be hoped that the British Government will make such concessions on those points as will allow of a settlement satisfactory to the interests of the Sudan.

Such claims to contiguous territory are especially difficult to deal with in the case of new nations on their first emergence, and in their first ebullience. We have seen for example how the somewhat similar Mossul dispute brought us to the verge of war with a new Turkish nation. And we have had another territorial question in the same region as the Sudan, that was perhaps fortunately settled by us out of hand over the head of Egyptian objections. The Jarabub oasis in the Sahara was within that section of the desert ascribed to Egypt, but it had long been coveted by Italy as being the main base of their enemy, the Senussi. Under the Treaty of London (1915) Italy was promised a rectification of frontier in this region. In 1919 we agreed that Jarabub should be Italian, and negotiations for the transfer began with the Egyptian Protectorate. The end of the Protectorate (1922) terminated these negotiations. But hostilities

between Italy and the Senussi broke out again in 1924, and in February, 1925 the Italians pressed the Zihar Government for execution of the Milner-Scialoja agreement of 1919. The nationalists opposed violently, but constitutional government was suspended at the time, and the Zihar Government, just before going out of office, signed a frontier agreement (December 6, 1925), which gave Italy Jarabub in return for a rectification in favour of Egypt near Sollum on the coast. As it is difficult to see how Jarabub could ever have been of any use to Egypt, and the suppression of the Senussi was a great advantage, Egypt has nothing materially to complain of. But the accusation that we were paying our debts to Italy at the expense of Egypt might under nationalist cultivation have grown into a great grievance.

Under the sidelights thrown from Mossul and Jarabub we can see more clearly how the Egyptian claim to the Sudan really originates. For in substance the Egyptian claim to rule this territory as of right, and without regard to ourselves and the Sudanese, is very weak. It rests mainly on the conquest of Mehemet Ali in the picturesque but rather primitive pursuit of gold, ivory, and slaves. The occupation was given a more philanthropic and progressive colour by the attempts of Said to promote cotton cultivation and of Ismail to prevent slave trading. But it remained essentially an exploitation of the resources of the Sudan in raw materials for the benefit of Egypt. Nor was it ever recognised formally by Europe. For the Convention establishing the *condominium* (1899), an arrangement described by Lord Cromer as "a hybrid sort of government hitherto unknown to jurisprudence," gave Egypt only a rather undefined share in the sovereignty of the Sudan, and so, if anything, bars its claim to sole sovereignty. As to the

claim by right of conquest—Mehemet Ali, no doubt, conquered the Sudan. But the Mahdi reconquered it, and might have conquered Egypt but for British intervention. It was the English who again recovered it, for reasons only partly connected with Egypt; though principally at the cost of Egypt in men and money. The expense of its recovery and of its reconstruction has cost Egypt altogether some £10,000,000, of which £7,000,000 represent interest-bearing loans. This modest outlay has, as has been already pointed out, brought a good return to Egypt in removing a serious menace from her land frontiers as well as in certain revenues and rake-offs from the commercial and political connections. Egypt's contribution, in fact, constitutes a good claim for compensation, but not for the control of these vast territories unless they can also be recognised as either racially or regionally a part of Egypt. Yet notoriously they are neither. The Sudan is, no doubt, a *hinterland* of great importance to Egypt, but in no sense is it a part of its homeland.

The Sudan, as now delimited by the political partition of Africa between the Powers, is a geographical region including nearly all the drainage basin of the White Nile. It ranges from the highlands of Equatorial Africa, which constitute its southernmost zone—a country wholly negro and wholly outside the range of Moslem civilisation and Arabic penetration. In its general conditions it may be classed with Uganda. Next towards the North comes the swamp-belt of the Bahr-el-Gazal, inhabited by primitive tribes like the Dinkas, Annuah, and Nuerah, and until latitude 10° is reached at Fashoda all the conditions as to cult, culture, and cultivation are purely Central African. North of Fashoda begins the Sudan as most of us think of it, the open

spaces and sparsely populated plains of Darfur, Kordofan, and Sennar, traversed by the valleys of the White and Blue Nile. Here we have a mixture of negroid races and of native tribes like the Baggara, with a primitive Arabic civilisation and professing Islam. North of Khartum, where deserts and dried pastures extend across the Nile to the Dead Sea, there are Arab tribes like the Kabadish and others which are arabised like the Hadendowa and Bisharin, while the settled population along the valley is mixed Nubian and negroid. We have, in fact, in the Sudan at least three regions quite different in character, of which only the northernmost and least potentially important has any resemblance to Egypt itself. To quote a good authority on the Sudan (Mr. E. Grove, *The Times*, August 28, 1924): "A few hundred miles south of Khartum you are in a country as different from Egypt as Egypt is from England. The Arabic speaking Mahomedan of the Nile valley gives place to a native black savage who does not know what Mahomedanism is and whose languages differ from Arabic as completely as Arabic differs from English." Nor during the generation of effective Egyptian occupation of the Northern Sudan did Egypt ever get any hold over the province as a whole. To quote the same authority: "Not one soul in my district knew the difference between an Englishman and an Egyptian. We were all just 'red men.' Not only had they never heard of England, but they had never heard of Egypt." As to the success of Egyptian occupation in developing the Sudan and the possibility that they could continue the civilisation created by the British out of the devastation of the Mahdist revolt against Egypt, there can be no two opinions. To quote Mr. Grove again: "The Egyptian does not regard the primitive black as a human

being at all. He calls all the inhabitants of this country the *abid*, or slaves. Even under British rule there have been appalling cases of cruelty and tyranny on the part of Egyptian officials, temporarily free from British supervision." Nor does this witness allow any doubt as to what would happen if the Sudan were surrendered to Egypt. "The only hope for the country would be that the Egyptian would never face its hardships, and would just leave it alone. The wild no-man's-land on the borders of Abyssinia is the meeting ground of all the desperate characters of the East. Swahilis, Beluchis, Persians, Somalis, and outcast Europeans form camps there for the sole purpose of raiding the slaves and ivory of the Sudan."

If, then, as seems obvious, there can be no question of surrendering this region wholly to Egypt, can a compromise be effected that would be fair to the interest both of the Sudanese and of the Egyptians by establishing a joint Anglo-Egyptian administration? That such a reduced claim could fairly be put forward by Egypt is certain. For, apart from interest in Nile water, the principal cities of the northern zone, such as Khartum, Adowa, and Kassala, were founded during the Egyptian occupation, and until 1925 the country was occupied and policed mainly by Egyptian troops. Moreover, the Convention of 1899 and the *condominium* it established seems to imply, though it does not specify, an association of Egyptians with English in the administration. Thus the *condominium* was, indeed, publicly proclaimed by the flying of both flags side by side and by the fact that the Governor-General of the Sudan was also the Sirdar or British Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian army, while most of the first British officials administering the Sudan were officers in the Egyptian army. In

finance the association was fairly close. Egypt covered the deficits in the first Budgets of the Sudan, and, in return, under financial regulations of 1899, 1901, and 1910, received the right of supervision over Sudanese finance. Sudanese Budgets were, under this system, submitted to the Minister of Finance and the Council of Ministers, while all new and special grants required Egyptian approval. Under this arrangement we find that in 1900 the Egyptian Treasury subsidised the Sudan to an amount of £457,892, of which £282,862 was returned to it on account of the Egyptian troops in the Sudan. These Budget subventions amounted in all to over £5,000,000, against which, however, must be reckoned the Customs receipts in Egypt on the transit trade of the Sudan. There was also an annual Egyptian subsidy of £23,000 for suppression of the slave trade which ended in 1923. Since 1913 financial assistance has been given to the Sudan by the British Government, and since 1923 the Budget has been balanced.

It is obvious, therefore, that at its inception and possibly in its inspiration the administration of the Sudan in association with Egypt was not unlike the relationship between the northern civil governments and the southern military territories of the French North African Protectorates. But this military administration of the Sudan developed rapidly, not, as in Algiers and Morocco, into assimilation by the neighbouring civil government—namely, Egypt—but by transforming itself into an independent British civil service of specially trained British officials to the exclusion both of the Anglo-Egyptian officers and of the Egyptian civilians. In the same way the judicial system rapidly assumed a British or rather Anglo-Indian character; though the codes it administered were largely copied from those of

Egypt. The whole capitulatory system had, as we have seen, been excluded, and the Sheri Courts, though maintained for matters of Moslem status, were put under British supervision. One half of the judges had to be members of the British Bar ; and though both Bench and Bar were at first recruited in part from Egypt, vacancies were soon filled from Sudanese, trained in the Gordon College at Khartum. Now we have to-day an administration of the Sudan which is not Anglo-Egyptian but Anglo-Sudanese. The British officials for it are recruited in England for a special civil service, while native recruits are trained for it in a special college at Khartum. The policy followed by this administration in its continuance of tribal systems of government and of local customs, as well as in its co-operation with British capitalists with a view to converting the population into cultivators, is being highly successful. Association with Egyptians would not only be worthless in every way, but quite unworkable. There is not, and possibly never again will be, a possible partnership between Egyptians and English in ruling the Sudan. Feeling has run too high, and there are hard facts in the way. The Egyptian regiments in the Sudan revolted during the nationalist rising in Egypt, and were only repressed with loss of life on both sides. After their removal in 1924 the Egyptian officers raised against us the Sudanese regiments, and Egyptian emissaries caused disaffection among the Sudanese students in Gordon College and among the military cadets. No serious harm was done, for the Sudanese population showed no inclination whatever to rise in response to Egyptian propaganda. But an association of Egyptians in the administration was thereafter no longer a practical possibility, and would, moreover, be quite improper in principle in view of our responsibility

for educating and employing the Sudanese in self-government.

What was *pro forma* an Anglo-Egyptian Government of the Sudan had thus become *de facto* an Anglo-Sudanese Government long before the ultimatum of 1924. It was certainly a mistake on our part to enforce the evacuation of the Sudan by Egyptian troops and the elimination of the Egyptian sleeping partnership as part of the penalty for the murder of the Egyptian Sirdar and Governor-General of the Sudan, Sir Lee Stack. There was no urgent necessity at the moment to make the forms of Sudanese Government more representative of the real facts. And if there were it would have been better to take advantage of the King and Zaglul having ignored the Convention and insisted on sole sovereignty to denounce it as thereby invalidated. Instead of that, with a characteristic respect for the letter of a law which had been disregarded by both parties in substance, the last relics of the *condominium* were removed without any breach of the Convention. The new Governor-General was no longer Sirdar and a part of the Egyptian Government, but he was duly appointed by decree of King Fuad in accordance with Art. 3. The British and Egyptian flags would still be flown side by side, as required by Art. 2, if there were any occasion to do so. And though the main link with Egypt, the garrison of Egyptian regiments, was broken, yet there was no mention of Egyptian troops in the Convention; there was no breach of that scrap of paper. There still survives the provision for the formal notification of Sudanese laws required by Art. 4, which no doubt is being duly observed by us. But, as a matter of fact, there is to-day no Anglo-Egyptian *condominium* in the Sudan, and Egypt is entirely excluded from Sudanese affairs. Any future

settlement of the status of the Sudan will have to recognise that a *condominium*, in the sense of a co-partnership in Government, never was established, does not now exist, and cannot in the future be entertained.

The fact is that the British are reconstructing the Sudan from the devastation and barbarism left by Mahdism with even greater swiftness and success than they rehabilitated Egypt from the bankruptcy and distress left by Ismail; and that this task is quite beyond the power of Egypt. As we are here concerned with Egypt, and have only to take cognisance of the Sudan in so far as it affects Egypt, the remarkable results of this British reconstruction do not come within our consideration. We have only to examine how far the interests of Egypt are involved in that reconstruction. Such an examination will show that these interests are confined to two economic factors, which are only indirectly affected by the form of government we have set up in the Sudan. Those two factors are cotton and water.

The development of cotton, as the staple product of Egypt, and the recent deterioration in the quality of Egyptian cotton, have been already noticed. Both these circumstances combine to make Egyptians very nervous as to future competition from the highly organised British cotton-growing enterprises in the Sudan. The attitude of Egyptian Nationalists towards such British competition is that a Great Power has by force and fraud taken from a small nation its natural *hinterland*, and is now using this stolen territory and its own superior scientific and financial resources to create a competition that will deprive a weaker rival of its livelihood. Further, that this cotton-growing in the Sudan is the artificial creation of foreign capitalist syndicates exploiting servile

labour at a low stage of civilisation. That it is, therefore, an oppression both of Egyptians and of Sudanese. Their feelings, in fact, towards British capitalism in the Sudan can, perhaps, best be understood by us if we imagine how we should feel towards an invasion of India by Chinese and Russian Communism.

This Egyptian case has already been answered in part by previous paragraphs, showing that the Sudan is a country with a past, a present, and a future of its own ; and that the right of the British to rule it is at least as good as that of the Egyptians. Nor is it the case that cotton-growing in the Sudan has been created by us in order to compete with the Egyptian cotton-fields that have now escaped from our control. Not only the growing of cotton but the weaving of coarse cloth (*damar*) was a principal and profitable industry in the Sudan long before cotton cultivation became important to Egypt. Jesuits, visiting Sennar in 1699, report a lively export trade in cotton (Peacock, *Land Settlement of the Djezireh*, 1913). Burckhardt, reporting on conditions a century ago, writes that the cotton textiles of Sennar and Baghirmy circulated throughout North Africa. The Khedive Saad improved the cotton cultivation of the Sudan by importing seed from Egypt. But the industry practically disappeared under the devastations and depopulations of the Mahdi. With the reconquest the industry was revived by the British in the Gezireh. This is the region bounded by the White and Blue Niles and by the Sobat River, from which it gets its name "The Island." Cotton cultivation is carried on at the apex of this triangle between Khartum and the Sennar-Kosti Railway. By 1910 the Sudan Plantations Syndicate was producing cotton superior to that of Egypt, at Tayiba, by pump irrigation from the Blue Nile. The success of this

experiment brought financial support from the British Government for irrigation of the Gezireh, and Lord Kitchener got a guaranteed loan of £3,000,000, which by 1924 had been increased to £24,000,000. In the British Parliamentary debate on the last loan (February, 1924), which was conducted by a Labour Government, considerable attention was paid to the conditions under which Sudanese cotton was being grown by British syndicates, and to the relations between British capitalists and Sudanese cultivators. The official information obtained on these points (White Paper, Sudan I., 1924) only concerns Egypt in so far as it shows that the conditions of cotton cultivation in the Sudan do not constitute an unfair competition with Egyptian cultivation. The cotton-growing enterprises in the Gezireh and Kassala are therein shown to be an interesting experiment in the nationalisation of land (Ordinance of 1921), in development by capitalist syndicates (Empire Cotton-Growing Association, Sudan Cotton, etc.), and in cultivation by *metayer* tenants under the supervision and with the support of both Government and Syndicate. The British Government has therein given no greater help to Sudanese cotton-growers than the Egyptian Government could give to its own cultivators. In so far as the Sudanese are producing better results, owing to more scientific supervision, better centralised control, and greater command of capital, this represents a wholesome competition that will be beneficial to Egypt by bringing about improvements in its own output. There is still time for Egypt to take steps to raise its own standard. For if the Sudan now surpasses it in quality, in quantity it only supplies the equivalent of one per cent. of the Egyptian export. This percentage will, however, increase rapidly as the Sudanese irrigation

schemes increase production. The only reasonable representations that Egypt can make in respect of Sudanese cotton is as to whether there is enough Nile water to develop fully the irrigable cotton-lands of the Sudan as well as the remaining irrigable cotton-lands of Egypt. The question of cotton is, in fact, like almost everything else in Egypt, ultimately a question of water.

There is a legitimate anxiety in Egypt lest the recent change in the relations between the Empire and Egypt and between Egypt and the Sudan may cause us to use our control of the Upper Nile and our command of capital for the development of Sudan irrigation to the disadvantage of Egypt. When there was, in form at least, an Anglo-Egyptian administration both of Egypt and of the Sudan, the anxieties of Egypt on this subject were appeased by a strict limitation both of the area to be irrigated and of the area to be planted with cotton in the Gezireh. Under Lord Kitchener it was calculated on the basis of one of the worst Nile floods on record (1913), that five hundred thousand acres (*jeddans*) in the Gezireh could be irrigated without in any way affecting Egypt's supply of water. It was decided to restrict this still further to three hundred thousand acres. Moreover, for no reason, apparently, than conciliation of Egyptian interests, the cotton area was restricted to one hundred thousand acres. It seems clear now that both restrictions were unnecessary in the interests of Egypt, and they were certainly obnoxious to the interests of the Sudan, although both these points are now immaterial, as the two restrictions were removed in 1924. What is, however, very material is the mistake that was made in repealing these restrictions as part of the penalties for the murder of the Sirdar. For the assumption thereby involved that Egypt must be prejudiced by full irrigation

of the Gezireh, the arrogation to ourselves of sole authority over a matter of such vital importance to Egypt, and the assertion implied that we would promote our interests in the Sudan as a penalty to Egypt, all combined to convince Egyptian opinion that our command of the Sudan and our control of the Nile would be used, at the worst, to check the development of Egypt, and, at best, to keep it dependent on our good will. It is that unfortunate, and no doubt unforeseen, impression that we now have to remove before we can restore good relations with Egypt or reach a satisfactory regulation of the rights of Egypt and of the Sudan to the Nile water.

We now come, therefore, to this most difficult responsibility of regulating the rights of these two countries in the Nile. Egypt's political frontiers show on the map a compact four-square territory. But economic Egypt is just the delta and then the desert through which runs the irrigable strip of the Nile Valley. Egypt is, in fact, so ancient a civilisation that its cultivation has reached the artificial condition that we suppose to exist in that elder planet, Mars—a desert irrigated scientifically from a seasonal inundation. And even if the preceding pages have been more concerned with politics than economics they will yet have shown the following fundamental facts of Egyptian economy : that the country is, and probably will remain, almost entirely agricultural, and that its agricultural area is limited by the amount of irrigable land and by the amount of water for irrigation. To this may be added the general admission that the recent remarkable increase in the prosperity and population of Egypt has been produced by British improvements in irrigation.

To use the favourite axiom of Egypt, "the Nile is Egypt, and Egypt is the Nile." But of late it has suddenly

been borne in upon the Egyptians somewhat forcibly that though Egypt is still wholly Nilotic, the Nile is now no longer wholly Egyptian. Even before this was the case, Lord Milner wrote: "It is an uncomfortable thought that the regular supply of water by the great river, which is to Egypt not a question of convenience or prosperity, but of life, must always be exposed to some risks as long as the upper reaches of the river are not under Egyptian control." Which thought has now become insupportably uncomfortable for Egypt. Because realisation that its water rights may be arbitrarily restricted has come at a moment when it has just realised that there is an absolute limit to its uncultivated and cultivable land, and no apparent limit to its increase of population. The Egyptian population has already doubled since 1882, when it was between six and seven millions, and it has been increasing recently at the rate of about a quarter of a million a year. The whole cultivable area is about seven million three hundred thousand acres, of which about four million are already cultivated under perennial irrigation, and mostly produce two annual crops. Another million two hundred thousand acres are still under seasonal irrigation, and producing one annual crop. There remain, therefore, for new settlement such supplementary holdings as would result from perennial irrigation of the seasonal area and about two million acres that are irrigable but as yet un-irrigated. On the other hand, in the Sudan Gezireh, with a total area of five million acres, there is just about the same amount—namely, three million acres—that are irrigable. The question is, can the Nile do both?

The answer to this appears to be that, when fully dammed, dyked, and ditched, the Nile can. And that any future difficulty Egypt may have in dealing with its surplus population will, in that event, come rather from

lack of land than of water, and will therefore no longer concern ourselves. But this answer, conveyed as it is in British official and technical reports, has not as yet convinced Egyptian opinion. Seeing that, unfortunately, Egyptian nationalism has found in this question of Nile water an opportunity for anti-British propaganda that appeals to every Egyptian peasant, its Nile campaign has been conducted with great virulence, and has taken the form of impeaching not only the competence but the integrity of British officials and experts. Nor has the impression made by these accusations been removed by the results of two lengthy and costly trials and by the reports of two Egyptian Commissions of Inquiry that entirely refuted the accusations. Of the two Commissions appointed the report of the first only has as yet been published. This report effectively dispels the illusion that British experts employed in the service of Egypt, like Sir William Willcox and Sir Murdoch MacDonald, discriminated against Egypt in their schemes for storages of Nile water in the Sudan. On the contrary, it shows that Egyptian interests have been throughout paramount with them.

Nevertheless, the awkward fact remains that Egyptian opinion has now no confidence in our impartiality, and that the construction of all future engineering works for irrigating Egypt will be carried out on territory outside Egyptian control. So long as British engineers and British enterprise was developing the Nile wholly in Egypt and solely for Egyptians all went well. But, with the last Cromer scheme, the Assuan dam (1902), the limit of an easy exploitation of the Egyptian Nile was reached. This does not mean that Egypt could not do a good deal more than has been done, even now, within its own borders. But since then all the great schemes have had their site in

the Sudan. And then matters were complicated still further when the Sudan began to put in a claim on its own account.

The general scheme now in course of construction was inaugurated under Lord Kitchener, and its main features consist in a dam at Makwar, on the Blue Nile, for the irrigation of the Sudan Gezireh, and another dam at Gebel Aulia for the future irrigation of Egypt. The general idea of this scheme seems to be that eventually the Sudan is to use the whole of its own tributary, the Blue Nile, leaving the main stream, the White Nile, wholly to Egypt. For the Blue Nile water is, it appears, of little use to Egypt, and now mostly runs to waste, because Egypt wants its water in the summer. Whereas it will be invaluable to the Sudan, which wants water in the winter. Moreover, if and when the plans for utilising the whole supply of both Blue and White Niles from their respective sources of Lake Tana in Abyssinia and of Lake Albert in Uganda are fully put in force, both the Sudan and Egypt will by this division get as much as they require. But engineering estimates as to this in no way satisfy the Egyptians, who continue to oppose every diversion of water from the Blue Nile for Sudanese development. Much of this opposition is factious, but there is a real difficulty at present in such a distribution of the two Niles between the two countries, for the Makwar dam has been completed and the preliminary preparations for the Tana dam in Abyssinia are being carried out, whereas the Gebel Aulia dam on the White Nile has not yet been begun and no preparations, political or other, have as yet been made for the Lake Albert dam in Uganda. Moreover, the development of the Blue Nile offers no very great technical difficulty, and the necessary financial support is practically assured owing to the big British

interests involved and official sympathy. Whereas the utilisation of the White Nile will be a very costly undertaking, involving, as it will, the cutting of the *sudd* and the canalising of the water through the Bahr-el-Ghazal swamps, which is estimated at no less than £20,000,000. Once this has been done a dam at Lake Albert raising the lake level by twenty-five feet would store forty million cubic metres of water, while the drainage of the swamps would save a vast loss of water by evaporation and bring a vast territory under cultivation. But, obviously, operations on this scale are both technically and financially quite beyond the power of Egypt, even if it were given sole control of the White Nile waterways and the Lake Albert outfall. Yet Egypt's need for this water is rapidly becoming urgent. Meantime the present provisional arrangements for complicated compensations as between the water taken by Sudan and that to which Egypt is entitled get more and more unworkable and more and more unwelcome to both countries.

It is to be hoped that it will soon be realised that the interests of the Empire in developing the White Nile are only second to those of Egypt. It is not only a case of adding to the Sudan immense areas of productive soil that are now pestiferous swamps. Every Lancashire cotton broker knows the effect of a low Nile on British textile exports and on the employment of British workers. Every London Covent Garden wholesaler knows the effect of a low Nile on the price of onions, the poor man's beefsteak. If British capital has so far been more concerned with developing the Sudan it is, we may suppose, only because of the continuance of uncertain conditions in relations between the Empire and Egypt.

The reader has now been railroaded in this chapter through the dreary wastes of a Blue Book Nile and the

dismal swamps of a White Paper Nile to a point from which a solution can be seen in the distance. A British Government anxious to reach that point must begin as the previous chapter suggests, by cutting a way through these malarial swamps and by clearing the air both for English and Egyptian. One way to do this would be as a preliminary to any negotiation to withdraw the British garrison, to convert the High Commissionership back into a Consulate-General, and to end the alien authority of the Financial and Judicial Adviserships. For none of these has any value as a *quid pro quo* in a bargain, and their continuance merely bars the approach to a real resettlement.

If this resettlement took the form of Egypt becoming a self-governing Dominion within the Empire, then the conflicting claims of Egypt and of the Empire to sovereignty over the Sudan would be dealt with easily so far as concerns principle. Though, no doubt, in practice their adjustment would not be easy and would call for much care and mutual consideration.

If, however, the present course of events continues, and Egypt, through our concessions on other reserved points, becomes a *de facto* as well as *de jure* independent State, then the question of sovereignty over the Sudan will have to be dealt with by treaty with or without the help of the League. A reference to the League seems to offer the best prospect of a satisfactory solution, and in that case the situation would be very similar to that which arose between the Empire and the Turkish nation over Mossul. The solution, we may assume, would also be on very similar lines. The Mossul settlement was, broadly, that the League recommended its retention by the British as mandatory for Irak in the interests of the inhabitants ; while Turkey was given recognition of rights in the oil

and a rectification of frontier. Applying this to the Sudan we should expect that the League would maintain the present Sudanese administration but would recognise Egyptian rights in Nile water and in part of the Northern Sudan. It would, of course, be open to us, once the rights of Egypt were fixed, to arrange a bargain on a financial basis, as was done in the case of the oil rights assigned to Turkey in Mossul.

What then might be a settlement of the Sudan question based on an award by the League? In the first place it is clear that the most Egypt could hope territorially from an award would be the towns of Khartum and Kassala as having been founded by Egypt, leaving all to the south, including the Gezireh, to a British ruled Sudan. But such a partition separating the capital from the Central and Southern Sudan would be so calamitous for the country that it is very improbable. It would also, at present, have political risks for Egypt, as this territory of turbulent and only half-tamed tribes, which contains the pilgrim route from French and Italian North Africa, would lie between the Italian colonies of Tripoli and Erithrea and would adjoin French North Africa. If, however, as seems more likely, the award adjudged to the British Sudan, Khartum and the line to Port Sudan, a very large extension of territory could still be allowed to Egypt without incurring the objections above mentioned. For there is, in Northern Kordofan and in the Eastern Sudan about the Great Bend of the Nile, a large area in which conditions only differ in degree from those in Egypt. Provided the railway line from Khartum to Port Sudan remained well within Sudanese territory, there would be nothing in this area that the Central and Southern Sudan could not very well do without. A line could be drawn from Fasher, between Abu Hamed and Berber, that

would follow the natural frontier along the Nubian desert and would assign to Egypt an area that would increase its territory by as much as a half. Egypt would thereby acquire a considerable extent of the cattle range that it especially requires. Moreover, many of the inhabitants of this region have already acquired the habit of going down into Egypt as domestic servants and have given their name to a useful class there known as "Berberines." In short, such a region might quite reasonably be considered as a natural extension of the national territory of Egypt.

There would then remain only the regulation of rights in the Nile. Here again League machinery might be of assistance. The proposal in the Milner report for a Joint Board to regulate water rights which should represent Egypt, the Sudan, and Uganda, was unacceptable to Egypt, as it put its interest in a permanent minority. This difficulty might be obviated by an arrangement with Uganda as to Lake Albert similar to that recently made with Abyssinia as to Lake Tana, or by letting Uganda transfer to the Sudan the few square miles of remote *hinterland* that would contain the Lake Albert dam. Then Egypt and the Sudan could be given equal representation under presidency of the League. It is difficult to believe that so international an institution would be suspect of British imperialism in the eyes of Egyptian nationalism. But, in any case, general approval and acceptance could probably be secured by financial guarantees that would ensure an early realisation of the White Nile storage schemes.

APPENDIX I

BRITISH OFFICIALS IN EGYPTIAN CIVIL SERVICE

SINCE completion of the preceding chapters, a satisfactory settlement has been reached between the British and Egyptian Governments in the controversy that had arisen as to the conditions under which British officials should be employed in certain services that were considered by the British Government as being concerned with safeguarding imperial communications and foreign interests, and as therefore coming by implication under the reserved points.

On the abolition of the Protectorate by the Declaration of February 28, 1922, direct British administration was terminated. The Financial Adviser then ceased to control in, or even to come to, the Council of Ministers, and the controlling posts were filled by Egyptians. The consequent change in status of British officials was provided for in an agreement made in 1923 with the Cabinet of Yehia Pasha, allowing such officials to retire with compensation up to April 1, 1927, after which the Egyptian Government should be free to retain or retire them as it pleased.

As this date drew near, the British Government opened negotiations as to how far such retentions were required under the reserved points, and an agreement between Sir A. Chamberlain and Sarwat Pasha is now reported (May, 1927) as follows :

In the Ministry of the Interior the European Depart-

ment, which is responsible for the security of foreigners, is to be under a British official with a British staff. The commandants and their assistants in Cairo, Alexandria, Port Said, and Suez are to be British, with adequate British assistance to control the police. In the Public Prosecutor's Office there is to be a British inspector and an expert with assistants.

The British Financial and Judicial Advisers are to have adequate British assistance in their responsibility for safeguarding foreign interests.

In the Railways, Telegraphs, and Telephones all the control and essential technical posts are to be held by British. The head of the Port and Light Service is to be British, with adequate British assistance.

These officials are retained at their previous salaries for a term of three years.

G. Y.

June 8, 1927.

APPENDIX II

BRITISH OFFICERS IN THE EGYPTIAN ARMY

SINCE the previous pages were written a somewhat acute controversy broke out over the measure of control to be retained in the Egyptian Army by British officers in right of the "reserved points."

The issue was raised by the recommendation of the war committee of the Egyptian Parliament that the salary of the Sirdar be suppressed. Since the assassination of Sir Lee Stack no Sirdar had been appointed, and the Inspector-General, Spinks Pasha, had been acting-Sirdar. But he had never been accepted in this capacity by the Egyptian Government, and his authority had been almost nullified. It was now proposed to transfer the Sirdar's functions to the Minister of War. Other recommendations included increasing the infantry effectives and the strength of the artillery and machine guns.

This was apparently accepted by the British Government as a challenge by the Wafd of British authority, for a note was delivered, and supported by the despatch of three warships to Alexandria and Port Said because, as Sir Austen Chamberlain explained to the House (June 1, 1927), "reports indicated that efforts were being made to foment excitement."

It was apparently feared by the British Government that a systematic effort was being made by the Wafd to get control of the army for political purposes and to nullify the guarantees in the reserved points. While the Egyptian Nationalists, for their part, feared that the

British Government would use its control of the army to prevent opposition to interventions in the internal affairs of Egypt, and argued that the reserved points make no mention of the army and are not in question at all.

Thanks largely to the mediation of Zaglul Pasha as between the British demands and the defiance of the Wafd majority in Parliament, an agreement has been reached. Documents have not yet been published, but the basis of compromise seems to be that the Egyptian Government accept the maintenance of the *status quo* pending a general settlement with reservations as to ministerial authority and responsibility towards Parliament. The British Inspector-General is to fulfil his existing functions and to have adequate rank, pay, and assistance. The Egyptian Government also agrees that political influences are to be excluded from questions of promotion, discipline, etc., and welcomes co-operation for this purpose.

The significance of the controversy lies in the fact that it concerned the national army, that recourse was at once had to a naval demonstration, and that peace was patched up because neither party wanted war. Which suggests that the present diplomatic relationship between the English and the Egyptians is endangered by ill-defined "servitudes" on Egyptian authority, whose only "sanctions" are our military occupation and our Mediterranean fleet.

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