

INSTITUTE OF HUMAN RELATIONS

YALE UNIVERSITY

*THE PLANS OF MEN*

THE  
PLANS OF MEN

BY

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To  
BENTON MacKAYE



## PREFACE

LATE in the year 1930 I was attempting to perform a psychological experiment. It was important to keep the laboratory quiet. The experiment seemed to be progressing splendidly: the subjects were behaving as my German professor predicted they would. Suddenly there were noises outside the university which penetrated the laboratory and distracted the subjects. The experiment was ruined, at least for the day. As I tried to leave the building, the porter told me to go out a side entrance: the police, in trying to control a riot which had broken out among Nazi sympathizers and socialist-communist students, were closing the main doors of the university.

I never completed this experiment. The noises from the growing reactionary forces in Germany at that time increased. For months there might be physical quiet; but somehow it did not seem important to add a detail to a theory which had no relevance to what was happening on the street. I had to begin to think systematically about theory and practice.

This book represents my attempt to integrate certain aspects of the social sciences with some of the practical issues that face everyone. I do not claim to be an oracle of social science and I certainly am not sensitive to all of the difficulties of this era. I have, however, one very strong conviction: I believe that connections between science and society cannot be established simply by maintaining that there is or should be a connection.

Instead of preaching, therefore, I have attempted to be very specific. I have said that social science can assist men in plan-

ning their lives and in selecting those plans which promote human welfare. I am aware that scientists in America imagine they must be coolly objective and not concern themselves with the problem of direction and control; but I agree with Robert S. Lynd in his recent book, *Knowledge for What?*, that such a view of social science is both narrow and impossible, especially in a war-torn, maladjusted world.

My aim has been, therefore, to evaluate the difficulties and the potentialities of planning by means of social science. I am of the opinion that only through the motivation of socially oriented research can social scientists become more potent both as planners and scientists. In order to make concrete proposals to planning and social science, I have stressed the significance of regional planning in the United States. I have not convinced even myself that regionalism is the short cut to utopia—it simply appears to me to suggest a very promising way of thinking and acting.

I am especially indebted to my colleagues at the Institute of Human Relations for stimulation and ideas they have unwittingly given me. They—and John Dollard in particular—have created an atmosphere of intellectual inquiry which I have tried vainly to reflect. F. S. C. Northrop has been a goad to my thoughts, although I have not consulted him or made him aware of his rôle. Specific suggestions on various technical matters have been accepted gratefully from William A. Briggs, Patterson H. French, L. H. Herrington, E. A. J. Johnson, George P. Murdock, and Robert R. Sears. Gordon W. Allport, Eveline Bates, and Mark A. May have been good enough to criticize the entire manuscript carefully and have enabled me, therefore, to eliminate a few of its faults. The late James MacKaye is the one person I feel could appreciate

what I have tried to do because he himself was about to do so much better. My very deep appreciation to Benton MacKaye, who has made me see the value in planning, I have tried to express by dedicating this book to him.

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## **PART 1: INTRODUCTION**

# THE PLANS OF MEN

## CHAPTER I

### THE NATURE OF PLANNING

THE plans of men should be designed for men. Communism, fascism, or democracy; centralization or decentralization; freedom or regimentation; individual or governmental initiative; war or peace—with these words most of the crucial problems of the modern age might be and are expressed. When an alternative must be selected, people are compelled to adopt some kind of a plan to achieve whatever goal they desire. Passive resignation is impossible if chaos is to be avoided.

When questioned profoundly, no man will deny that a plan of action should be designed for the men it is about to affect. In practice, however, it is easier to maintain that a particular proposal has merits in terms of some smooth-sounding principle. Reforms are advocated because they are said to promote the welfare of an institution, a tradition, a county, or a country. But the plans of men should be designed for men, the very men composing the group whose welfare is supposed to be promoted. The hollowness of social reasoning that resorts to the cliché and the slogan is certainly being recognized and so it is with sadistic glee that books are written concerning the “symbols,” the “myths,” and the “folklore” which pervade the thinking of almost everyone.<sup>1</sup>

The analysis of a fallacy is not sufficient. Simultaneously it is necessary to be constructive and to push forward. A reason—perhaps the only reason—why men forget that they are planning for themselves and for other men is that there is little or no agreement concerning the nature of man. What is the nature of man? This radical question has been raised

<sup>1</sup> Arnold (7); Bridgman (16); Chase (24). The number in parentheses after an author's name is a reference to his position in the Bibliography given on pp. 386-396.



again and again and the answers which some men have given in order to solve their practical, pressing problems cannot be said to conform to the tentative or dogmatic answers that other men have given. Men do not know the answer to this question; or they do not care to know; or, if they think they know, they often prefer to disregard this knowledge.

The plans of men should be designed for men. This is the thesis of the present book. It is proposed to consider the nature of plans that have been, that will be, and that should be attempted in terms of what is known about man. What is known about man, however, is known only tentatively and, more frequently than not, the connection between this knowledge and a concrete plan is tenuous and uncertain. For these reasons no absolute formula, no pretty generalities, no dogmatic panaceas should be anticipated in the pages that follow. Here is a primer about man and his plans; here is a specific way of viewing and then appraising the problems of a troubled era.

### *Requirements of Planning*

One activity which all men share is the capacity to dream. When the individual is asleep, he nevertheless seems to retain some degree of continuity with his waking existence, an existence which becomes more or less thoroughly real again whenever he awakens. Dreams have been difficult to interpret. By primitive peoples and at earlier stages in this civilization they have been accepted as powerful portents of the future, as the capricious wanderings of the inner soul, as the reincarnation of a friendly or hostile spirit. Conventional psychologists have sought to incorporate the phenomenon of dreaming into the normal sphere of all psychic phenomena by tracing particular dreams to external stimuli that affect the sleeper. And psychoanalysts have partially succeeded in giving a symbolic explanation to many dreams by a reference to the repressed impulses of the individual or to the problems that are confronting him. Dreams, in short, persist, and modern evidence seems to indicate that

they spring uniquely, in some way or other, from the personality of the dreamer.

The transition from the dream of the sleeper to the daytime fantasy of the normal individual is not abrupt. Fancy has been called free because, being anchored only to the person and not to the requirements of his existence, it is really able to soar in a relatively uninhibited fashion. Fancy leads to depressed moods as well as to ecstatic moments.

When many men have somewhat similar fantasies, it may happen that the products of their imagination become embedded in social institutions. The keynote of a spiritual religion is its faith, faith in a deity, in a purpose, or in immortality. And faith is little more than fantasy which possesses a strong emotional attachment. Faith is easier to retain when many other people share the identical attachment, when that attachment has become institutionalized.

To spin a utopia requires an ability to project oneself, one's desires, and one's own cultural limitations into a postulated reality whose existence at the moment of creation is confined to spoken or printed words. Or, instead of merely dreaming oneself into bliss, one tries to visualize a large population, perhaps the entire world, similarly joyous. But utopias that attempt to change the universe of the living perish when too few people share the same dreams and fantasies and when events make them "impractical."

Planning must be distinguished, therefore, from utopian thinking. The latter is self-contained within the imagination of the dreamer and, even when it is communicated to others and secures their support, does not necessarily conform to conditions that exist. Planning, on the other hand, attempts to meet as rigorously as possible certain specific requirements. Planners may be dreamers, but their plans must be judged as potential realities and not as dreams. The line between utopian thinking and planning is not sharp, should not be sharp; yet that line must be noted.

Plans, it may be said, are not dreams when they meet certain specific requirements. It is realized that any statement of planning requirements cannot be considered ultimate or

universally acceptable. The following requirements are intended as a modest attempt to classify the details and philosophy of planning and may serve, it is hoped, as a way of evaluating some of the plans of men. A plan, briefly, is based on:

1. A knowledge of the people who will be affected.
2. A knowledge of the physical and social environments confronting these people.
3. A knowledge of a goal to be achieved.

*Planning, therefore, consists of the discovery of means to achieve a goal for particular people in a specific environment.* Before successful planning can occur, each of these three types of knowledge must be available. The mistake which many planners make, as will be shown, is to assume that it is possible or desirable to formulate a plan on the basis of only one kind of knowledge and thus to disregard the remaining two.

Without "a knowledge of the people who will be affected" planning is pointless and futile. To plan that men must walk on their hands instead of their feet or that everyone must suffer a concussion of the brain twice a month after a heavy rainfall might be agreeable to a group of circus freaks or a crowd of masochistic psychopaths, but such a goal would be rejected by almost everyone else, including prehistoric man and the most bizarre tribe any anthropologist has investigated. In practice, it is much easier to set the limits to planning by selecting such biological absurdities than it is when the more definitely psychological capacities of human beings are being considered. The realization that Brazilians speak Portuguese might inhibit a planner or a dictator from compelling these people to speak Russian or Chinese by the end of the month; knowledge concerning subtler aspects of Brazilian behavior, such as their prejudices and their economic ambition, would doubtless be an important aid in the formulation and execution of more sensible plans.

One phase of the second requirement of planning is sometimes overlooked because technical advances have tended to blunt the senses to the fact that the physical environment

imposes severe limitations upon the plans of men. Crops can grow in wastelands which have been irrigated; efficient vehicles of communication and transportation enable employers to control their subordinates in far-distant parts; refrigeration and hothouses have helped abolish some of the seasonal fluctuations in food supply among technically advanced peoples; floods can be regulated and in many cases prevented; the numerous forms of air conditioning have begun to eliminate the influence of climate inside of buildings—in fact, it is difficult to imagine aspects of the environment that have not been or will not be invaded by the swift economy of man's inventiveness. On the other hand there are dustbowls and droughts that destroy both plant and animal life, natural resources that have been mined carelessly and recklessly, mountains that delay trains and too frequently cause airplane crashes, and a sparsity of natural resources that drives some nations to produce *ersatz* products in a fruitless effort to achieve self-sufficiency. Inventions, it seems, accomplish miraculous deeds most readily in the temperate zones, whereas tropical and arctic regions possess many more natural limitations. To plan for people one must have the physical materials with which to carry out the plan, or one must create them; plans, therefore, must conform to the given or potential conditions of the environment.

The *social* environment must also be taken into account. By this environment it meant the complex system of interrelationships under which people usually have to live. No plan that seeks to progress beyond the stage of fantasy can disregard the social, economic, and political system in which it is to be realized. One of the reasons for the failure of utopian communities in America, for example, has been their unrealistic assumption that they could function in a society which, being hostile to their aims, soon helped corrupt the membership.<sup>2</sup>

No scientist can deny that his particular discipline is able or should be able to contribute knowledge concerning either people or their environments to the process of planning.

<sup>2</sup> May and Doob (105), pp. 58-62.

When the next requirement of planning, "a knowledge of a goal to be achieved," is mentioned, the usual scientific procedure is to accept rather uncritically a goal as it exists in a society or as it is formulated by philosophers or politicians and then to presume that plans should be formulated and executed to attain that goal. At this point it is only necessary to suggest that some goal is necessary, for without an objective there is no need to plan.

If a goal is to be achieved by people in a particular environment, the achievement will come about only through some kind of planning. Not all plans, however, require a planning commission; through their individual activity each member of a society may contribute quite unintentionally to attaining the goals implicit within the social heritage. Whether or not an industrial society can survive efficiently without large-scale plans that are crystallized within the minds of men who are self-consciously planners is an ominous question that must be discussed in a later chapter. What, furthermore, is meant by surviving efficiently?

An exposition of the factors of planning, being abstract, makes the problem sound relatively simple. Closer examination, however, immediately reveals innumerable complexities and almost insuperable difficulties. Consider again the knowledge of the human beings which the planner must possess. This knowledge very broadly may include two kinds of data which, though related, must be disentangled before this analysis can proceed. People who are made to conform to the pattern of a culture—and all people are to a greater or less degree—represent at a given social stage a certain crystallization of human potentialities. They are citizens of a community and therefore are bankers and bakers and criminals and motion-picture stars. Each one of these trades and professions often requires an individual or a social plan, and the plan in turn may be formulated in terms of the needs of the people who constitute the particular group. The understanding and analysis of these needs as they are now functioning disclose the organization of one kind of human nature at the basis of planning.

Planning of this kind accepts people as they are, and some of the remaining details are worked out accordingly. The present constitution and organization of people, it must be remembered, reflect on the whole demands of their culture and are, therefore, passing but significant phases in a long historical series. To draw plans in terms of what men and women are and to neglect what they conceivably might be is extremely myopic. The possibility of breeding a "better" race in the biological and social senses cannot be overlooked. But how can one determine what men and women "conceivably might be"? As soon as the planner talks about potentialities instead of the actualities of human nature, is he not injecting a personal or social value into his plans?

The identical questions can be raised in connection with the physical environment. It may be granted that a given soil is being exploited in particular ways, some of which are very "efficient," others of which are merely traditional. Must the planner accept only the present degree of efficiency and its attending traditions; or should he attempt to alter the methods of utilization? Some North American Indians, for example, roamed and lived in places where the white man now has huge refineries. The chief of a tribe who possessed prophetic powers might have been sorely puzzled if he had felt impelled to choose between buffalo and oil.

Nor is the social environment a factor that is not subject to change. It is known, for example, that any social, economic, or political system is the end result of a long series of events in the past. If these systems have been undergoing change, the question may be properly asked whether the change should not continue. If changes should continue to occur, then in what direction and toward what end is it desirable that they take place?

Similarly it is possible to accept as a goal for planning objectives that have been formulated within a society. An attempt may be made, for example, to realize the principles of a written or unwritten constitution. Or the destruction of war may orient a people. Or the desire to retain the status quo in the face of foreign customs diffusing from the outside

may be considered significant. Conceivably, however, radically different goals can be proposed as the basis for planning.

### *Problems of Value*

This short description of the three requirements of planning has revealed that planners are almost always confronted with a choice between alternatives: they must accept or decide to alter the human nature, the physical and social environments, and the goals which they discover before they begin to plan. A choice between alternatives raises the knotty problem of values.

The concept of value may be used to refer to three related phenomena: the means which are employed to attain a given goal, the goal itself, or the consequences which follow the attainment of that goal. Of value to a hungry man are the ways in which he procures a meal, the meal, and the pleasant feeling of satiation afterwards. For the moment the question of the relationship of these kinds of value will be left in abeyance; now it is only necessary to point out that a value-judgment is involved in the selection of plan, its goal, and its consequences. Later, in Chapter VII, it will be contended that the nature of the human being should determine all three value-judgments.

Values, although they are so numerous and although they may refer to means, goals, or consequences, can be differentiated on the basis of their relation to the present and the future. A value may be a *present value*, in which case the value has already been achieved and effort is expended to perpetuate the status quo. Or there may be a *future value* to be achieved—here the individual seeks a value which, according to his prediction, is going to come into existence at some future time and he is led to believe that this future value will be different from the present one. The future value may be replaced by a *possible value* which is the value that may or may not be attained in the future and which, therefore, will be attained only if the present course of events is altered by the deliberate intervention of people.

To be so pleased with one's momentary mental state and social status that any change in the future is considered undesirable would be an instance of a present value. The individual who anticipates an improvement in the future and who is eager to experience what is about to happen to him is favoring a future value. And a man who is discontented in the present, who expects no improvement in the future, but who suspects that he or someone else could bring about future improvements is extolling a possible value. A present, a future, and a potential value are considered *desirable values* for different reasons.

The basic problem of planning is the determination of desirable values; but to determine them it is necessary to understand their relation to present, future, and possible values. It is foolhardy to believe that a desirable value can propose means, goals, or consequences, any one of which is independent of present, future, or possible values. The formulator of a value cannot lift himself and his ideas out of his milieu. What he thinks and feels is so definitely a product of his culture and the rôle he has played or has had to play therein; what he wants for himself or for others, therefore, depends upon the aspirations he has attained or would like to attain. There can be no complete divorce between a thinker and the events that have led to his philosophy, between a scientist and the traditions that have given rise to his science. In some way or other every man is bound by his own wishes and the present values of his society.

Present values are not completely arbitrary: in subtle ways they frequently reflect the capacity of men who possess them. For this reason, present values must set the limits to desirable ones. As has been suggested earlier in this chapter, men may wish but they cannot realize the impossible. A half-dozen eyes in the human head might be an invaluable aid to more efficient vision; this desire to triple the number of eyes which men now possess is doomed, undoubtedly, to failure. Present values, furthermore, often represent social conditions that cannot be altered through prayers or pious hopes. It might be considered "good," for example, to abol-



ish the machine and return to an agrarian era of self-sufficiency—ah yes, but how is one to do this? In any plan with far-reaching consequences, there is always the period of transition, always a necessary amount of indoctrination.

It is the philosopher who is supposed to be acquainted with desirable values; but he too cannot escape the subjectivity to which all men are prone. An examination of any book of ethics by a professional philosopher reveals: (1) that philosophers are divided into schools of thought concerning ethical imperatives; (2) that the author has his own scheme of ethics and usually a "scale of values," and (3) that both the scheme and the scale might be traced to the biases of the writer or to certain metaphysical assumptions which in turn are based on his biases. This relation between a philosopher's ideas and his biases, more frequently than not, has to be an untested psychological assumption, inasmuch as philosophers seldom furnish their own life histories as an appendix to the statement of their philosophies. Ask a philosopher what he would do about the concrete proposal of a planner and he will say vaguely that a social value is involved; but he will not be able to help add or subtract details from the plan. He will deny, in fact, that concrete details are his professional concern.

It is also the custom among those who attempt to legislate concerning desirable values to employ highly polished phrases which sound as though the problem of value could be solved in a paragraph or two. Aldous Huxley, for example, begins a book called *Ends and Means* by proclaiming: "About the ideal goal of human effort there exists in our civilization and, for nearly thirty centuries, there has existed a very general agreement."<sup>3</sup> This agreement, however, is indeed "very general"; it seems to involve for this particular essayist the words "liberty, peace, justice and brotherly love" or to suggest that "the ideal man is the non-attached man." Unfortunately, even though Huxley is able to establish means which are determined, in more or less logical fashion, by this end, it is still necessary to ques-

<sup>3</sup> Huxley (72), p. 1.

tion the reasons for selecting this particular "ideal goal." To support his statement, Huxley is able to mention only a limited number of selected philosophies and religions which happen to be in what he has called "general agreement." Desirable values cannot be discovered merely by writing brilliantly.

It appears, therefore, that all men are doomed to commit a form of what has been called "the naturalistic fallacy";<sup>4</sup> they must derive desirable values from present or future ones. Short of divine revelation, this seems to be mankind's predicament. "Houses have always been painted purple; whatever is should be; therefore all houses should be painted purple." Obviously the commission of this fallacy can be a reactionary method of justifying all aspects of the status quo.

The fact that philosophers have called a certain kind of social reasoning fallacious does not necessarily brand that reasoning for all time. It has been argued here, for example, that certain components of a desired value have to be derived from present or future values, or else the content of the former may be senseless or unrealizable. It is too easy to expose a mental process and much more difficult through a process of discrimination to select its valid components. The principal reason why naturalistic thinking need not be a mere reflection of present values is that possible values can also be related to desirable ones.

Almost any male infant, for example, might be, almost any adult might have been a ditchdigger. At the moment men presumably are sufficiently wise to say rather dogmatically that the prerequisites of this particular occupation are latent within practically everyone who has a normal nervous system and the normal amount of strength. In like manner some timberland might be converted into a national park, or the present site of a sprawling suburb might have been converted into such a park in the past. The infant and timberland now have and the adult and the suburb once had the indicated potentialities. Here is no blind ad-

<sup>4</sup> Moore (110), esp. chaps. ii and iii.

herence to the present or to what the future is predicted to be—desirability is obviously a combination of the present, the future, *and* the possible.

There is no magic formula to determine the “proper” or “best” blend of present, future, or possible values. All that can be said has already been said: these three kinds of values are related and out of the relationship and only out of the relationship can really desirable values be adduced. To believe in a short-cut or sure-fire procedure is utter delusion.

Full recognition must be given to the relativity involved in this discussion of values. To hold a relativistic position at the present time is not so fashionable as it used to be a decade or so ago. Even liberals and progressives everywhere, who deplore the absolute values which the totalitarian countries seek to promulgate, have grown timid and frightened by the march of events; they believe that a relativistic view of values is dangerous, inasmuch as it gives people no feeling of certainty and security and therefore makes them just that more vulnerable to fascism. What they wish is to have people become absolute devotees of democratic values.

There is social truth in this argument, but there is also another truth that seems to the present writer to be more compelling: the deification of the values of a democracy, in spite of its strategic function, is confusing and dangerous since there is always the tendency to forget that the concrete forms which these relative values assume in a given democratic society are also relative. Such a tendency itself begins to reek of the intellectual atmosphere of fascism. Although democracy may enable relative values to be expressed, it does not follow that the particular modes of expression are the best ones that man can evolve. When men and women are told, therefore, that their relative values are absolute and when they do not grasp the distinction between these values and their momentary social consequences, they may be prone to believe that nascent dictators are also preaching absolute truths. The personal bias that is being defended here, therefore, suggests that delusional schemes

of values eventually will crumble because man's intellectual life cannot be indefinitely repressed; that people should ever be aware of the tentative character of their society; and that it appears better to accept all the implications of a doctrine like relativism, if that doctrine is in accord with the best that can be thought or accomplished by human beings, than to moan about the instability of the universe.<sup>5</sup>

It must not be forgotten that not only are desirable values relative but also that all ideas about men are subject to similar fluctuations. For the data of the sciences that study man are so complex that few competent people agree concerning the derived generalizations. Verification of such generalizations, moreover, cannot be secured through the test of an appeal to sense-perception. Gases form liquids or sparks or solids—the resulting chemical reorganizations may be observed by competent chemists and their impressions coincide almost unanimously. The hypotheses that make men look for liquids or sparks or solids in specific amounts, moreover, are also subjective and really have to be imposed upon the “objective” gases. The “correct” theory concerning the values of human beings very rarely, if ever, can be tested similarly. The crucial conditions in which the theory will receive its proof or disproof cannot be controlled or discovered. Then, too, a theory concerning people's values, to be a theory, has to be held by people who thereafter are usually interested in its validity; and it may very well be they themselves who attempt to put the theory into practice and thus prove its truth by making the necessary conditions come into existence. A Marxian prediction, for example, may be attained because Marxians fight to secure the predicted events, a method of verification which Marx himself, indeed, strongly commended.<sup>6</sup> As is true of ethical standards and values themselves, therefore, there is no body of absolutes among the “facts” and theories of human nature.

In the long run—and many are the theoretical sins committed in the name of this phrase—it might be suggested

<sup>5</sup> Dewey (32), pp. 53-57.

<sup>6</sup> Marx (104), p. 3.

that the values which survive in practice are the "good" or the "correct" ones. The test of social truth would thus be a crudely pragmatic one. No man, it seems, can deny categorically that this is so or that it is not so. It is only true or false from a historical point of view (i.e., in terms of what values have or have not survived from the past) or in terms of the biased values an individual happens to have at the time he passes judgment. The values in which men believe seem to affect the course of societal development, and some of them are considered by certain men to be "good" or "bad." It follows, therefore, that planning is also a relativistic matter, that the plans of men do not have to be and cannot be directed toward eternity.

The next section of this book will be devoted to a survey of the social sciences and certain aspects of the biological sciences. The informal and unavoidably incomplete discussion of some of the topics that are usually included in the scope of these sciences is intended to serve a number of purposes. In the first place, it will be possible to demonstrate how adequate or inadequate man's knowledge is concerning the nature of man, his social environment, and his goals. In the light of present knowledge, is successful, large-scale planning possible? Although gaps in knowledge have to be filled before many types of planning can occur, it will be found, nevertheless, that even now the social sciences are important instruments for determining the nature of man and his social environment and therefore contribute to these requirements of planning. This survey, in addition, will also raise a variety of perplexing problems which confront planners. Simultaneously an attempt will be made to strengthen the relativistic position concerning values that has already been presented. Men and women alone embody values and only by analyzing their various activities can these values be understood. It is believed, consequently, that science represents more of the wisdom than the foolishness of the ages and in this difficult world approaches to wisdom cannot be dismissed by calling them academic or theoretical.

## **PART 2: ACTIVITY**

## CHAPTER II

### BIOLOGICAL ACTIVITY

ALL plans must consider the fact that man is a higher animal and that a great deal of his behavior may be analyzed in biological terms. The evidence that men resemble animals is sufficiently convincing, so that at this point no volume of proof is necessary. The human embryo passes through stages that resemble developments found in mature animals. The physiological structure and anatomy of men are paralleled quite closely among the higher animals. The function of the vital organs is practically identical in all animals that possess them. Some of the great advances in medical science have been discovered or tried out on animals before they have been applied to human beings; the fact that animals are immune to some drugs and bacteria which kill men or make them ill (and vice versa) proves, it seems, that man is an animal with unique physiological characteristics too.

Many of the findings of biology underlie planning but not all of them need be taken into account in formulating and executing specific plans. The details of the human respiratory system, for example, can almost always be overlooked or, rather, assumed; for the fact that men breathe must be taken as a *given* which not even a utopian has ever tried to deny. Similarly the needs for food, for drink, and for eliminating bodily wastes exist and must be provided for by any society.

The problem of value seldom arises in applied biology, since the goal involved is usually the prolongation of life. This particular present value seems so primitive and so widespread in all forms of living matter, including plants, that its importance in almost an absolute sense cannot be denied. The qualifying adjective, "almost," has to be added, since even the preference for life rather than death is reversed under certain circumstances.

*Medicine*

The practice of medicine offers an illustration of how planning may partially fail even when men have knowledge concerning the human being, his environment, and the value to be attained. No one doubts that the physician's task is to prolong life. Laymen in fact appreciate this extremely important function and they joyously bestow upon him all possible honors and social prestige, even when he gives his opinion on nonmedical subjects like religion or the economic system, concerning which he is not necessarily well-informed. When a patient is dangerously ill, he must be placed in the hands of a doctor, he must be cured, and that's that—at least this is the common conception of the way the medical profession should function. Society, as Arnold has pointed out, is willing to spend a great deal of money on an extremely sick tramp but tends to neglect him if he is well or if his disease still enables him to totter about.<sup>1</sup> Medical ethics and legal statutes usually prescribe that a patient suffering from an incurable disease must be kept alive as long as possible, no matter how intense his pain; yet the recent movement in America and England in favor of euthanasia shows that at least in this instance the value of life has been questioned.

Physicians, however, do not succeed completely in their plan to help the sick. Americans, for example, are appalled by the fact that the "estimated waste of productive capacity" as a result of illness "represents an annual loss to the Nation of about 4 billion dollars" at the 1929 price level.<sup>2</sup> With medical knowledge as advanced as it is, the cause of this waste must be due to certain nonmedical factors. Obviously all illness cannot be systematically eliminated; but the astonishingly poor distribution of medical services throughout the country must be held accountable for some or perhaps a large part of the problem:

<sup>1</sup> Arnold (7), pp. 47-48.

<sup>2</sup> National Resources Committee (115), p. 168.



Of the 2,500 rural or semi-rural counties in the United States, four-fifths have no organized health departments. . . . Even in most cities and towns where organized health departments do exist, the appropriations for their maintenance average under \$1.00 per capita of population, less than half the minimum amount which it is known can be effectively expended. . . . The studies of the Committee on the Costs of Medical Care in 1929-31, including almost 9,000 families of all income groups and in all sizes of communities throughout the United States, showed that nearly 50 per cent of the persons in the lower income groups went through a year without any medical attention, that this proportion decreased steadily as income rose, being less than 15 per cent among families with \$10,000 a year or more, although other evidence showed that the need for care among the lower economic groups is somewhat greater than among the higher.<sup>3</sup>

The same author also points out that disease cannot be attacked effectively until the latest medical knowledge can be spread to all physicians, until people in general are educated to consult only professionally qualified physicians at the proper time, and until adequate equipment can be distributed throughout the country.<sup>4</sup> The opposition which the American Medical Association has created against certain schemes involving the socialization of medicine indicates that the practice of prolonging life and relieving suffering does not function in a scientific vacuum but is linked to other social and economic values within the American society. It is also true that by itself a better distribution of physicians cannot hope to solve the nation's health problems; a doctor, for example, dares not recommend a more balanced diet to his poor-white patients who cannot possibly procure one—the difficulty here is due to the entire social structure of Southern economy. It follows, therefore, that the success of medical plans at the moment depends as much upon the practical problem of finding a plan to use present medical

<sup>3</sup> Davis (30), pp. 71-72.

<sup>4</sup> Davis (30), pp. 72-76.

knowledge as it does upon scientific advances within the field itself.

### *Eugenics*

Eugenics is the discipline *par excellence* that regards the breeding and procreation of men as subject to the principles applicable to and derived from animals. Eugenic reasoning in its crudest form would seem to include almost every feature of planning. For it is said that both human and animal characteristics are inherited through the genes; that this inheritance follows known Mendelian principles; that there are individuals who possess "socially desirable" characteristics and others with "socially undesirable" ones; and that the former should be encouraged to propagate and the latter discouraged. Unfortunately, as all competent eugenicists themselves admit, the situation is not so simple: more than man's biological nature has to be taken into account even in eugenic planning; a eugenic program itself is not very feasible; and the problem of value presents difficulties.

In the first place, although it is true that the genes determine an individual's heredity, it cannot be claimed that his total behavior is completely a function of that heredity. Heredity, it is generally agreed, may set certain undefined limits for the individual, but the amount of variation produced by the environment is still very great.<sup>5</sup> There is some evidence, in fact, which seems to indicate that such apparently biological characteristics as bodily form and stature can be modified by environmental factors.<sup>6</sup> The Committee of the American Neurological Association for the Investigation of Eugenical Sterilization recommended in 1936 that "nothing in the acceptance of heredity as a factor in the genesis of any condition considered by this report excludes the environmental agencies of life as equally potent and, in many instances, as even more effective."<sup>7</sup> Any improvement of the human stock through breeding, therefore, has to be

<sup>5</sup> Below, pp. 36-38, 120-127.

<sup>6</sup> National Resources Committee (115), p. 149.

<sup>7</sup> Quoted by National Resources Committee (115), p. 163.

accompanied by social reforms that are sometimes summarized in this connection under the heading of "euthenics."

With man's present knowledge, moreover, it can be said that only a few human characteristics are almost completely dependent on the genes and hence follow Mendelian principles. Among these are such obvious defects as hereditary cataract, color blindness, otosclerosis, achondroplasia, erythroblastic anemia, diabetes mellitus, hemophilia, harelip, clubfoot, amaurotic idiocy, albinism, some kinds of feeble-mindedness, and certain allergies.<sup>8</sup> The evidence on the psychoses is not so clear-cut, but the high familial incidence of these disorders lends significant support to a hereditary hypothesis as a partial but important explanation.<sup>9</sup> Physical qualities like the coloring of the eye, hair, and skin and perhaps certain temperamental dispositions, though presumably resulting only from hereditary factors, are ordinarily not considered by eugenicists to be "desirable" or "undesirable" and do not become incorporated into the breeding program—Nazi racialists have not agreed with science on this particular point.

To be able to make an accurate prediction from Mendelian principles concerning any kind of trait, whether it be acclaimed desirable or undesirable, it is necessary to be acquainted with the characteristics of the genes in both parents. At the moment there is no way of analyzing the constituents of the genes other than the rank empirical method of collecting data on the observed characteristics of ancestors and progeny. Students of animal husbandry and breeding can secure this information reasonably rapidly by selective mating and as a result of the relative speed with which some animals or plants can be made to propagate. No such control, however, can be exercised over human beings. Genealogies are difficult to collect, either because people are not accurately acquainted with their forefathers' peculiarities or because they are embarrassed to mention them. The inherited characteristics of infants result, in fact, from a

<sup>8</sup> Keeler (78), pp. 153-156.

<sup>9</sup> Landis and Page (83), pp. 81-87; Taeuber (142).

combination of two strings of chromosomes obtained from each parent; Mendelian principles under these conditions function in a very complicated fashion. Most staggering of all for a system of practical eugenics is the fact that some of the defects known to be inherited may come from recessive genes. A recessive gene, in contrast with a dominant one, may reside within the carrier without affecting him but may reveal its existence only in future progeny. The Committee of the Neurological Association, mentioned above, feels therefore that "our knowledge of human genetics has not the precision nor amplitude which would warrant the sterilization of people *who themselves are normal* in order to prevent the appearance, in their descendants, of manic-depressive psychosis, dementia praecox, feeble-mindedness, epilepsy, criminal conduct, or any of the conditions which we have had under consideration."<sup>10</sup>

As concrete illustrations of a eugenic program, the elimination of feeble-mindedness and also dementia praecox and manic-depressive psychosis may be considered. Since the genes thought to be responsible for certain kinds of feeble-mindedness are allegedly recessive and since normal carriers of them cannot be detected with present techniques, an enthusiastic eugenicist like Jennings is forced to the following dismal conclusion:

It has been computed that if the proportion of feeble-minded in the population is one per thousand, to decrease that proportion to one per ten thousand will require 68 generations, or two to three thousand years, if it is done merely by stopping the propagation of all feeble-minded individuals. In the main, the eleven per cent reduction at the first generation is what is accomplished by the measure.<sup>11</sup>

Even though the marriage rate among dementia praecox patients is considerably lower than that of the general population and even though this rate is slightly lower for male

<sup>10</sup> Quoted by National Resources Committee (115), p. 163; italics theirs.

<sup>11</sup> Jennings (74), p. 242.

and about the same for female manic-depressive patients,<sup>12</sup> the elimination of these diseases is made difficult by the following facts: (1) "if all manic-depressive and dementia praecox first-admissions were sterilized at the time of first-admission, the number of children of manic-depressive patients would be reduced by less than 10 per cent and of dementia praecox patients 33 per cent";<sup>13</sup> (2) due to recessive genes, "only about 10 per cent of dementia praecox and from 15 to 32 per cent of manic-depressive patients are descended from similarly diseased parents."<sup>14</sup> As a result, Landis and Page summarize man's hopes to reduce these diseases through sterilization in the following way:

... if all dementia praecox and manic-depressive patients were sterilized at the time of first-admission, the incidence rates for the former would be reduced from 2.2 to 3.3 per cent in the succeeding generation, and for the latter disease from 1.1 to 2.4 per cent. The remaining 97 or 98 per cent of the cases would not be eliminated.<sup>15</sup>

Inadequate knowledge, moreover, makes it almost impossible to breed people who are considered to be desirable from a social point of view. "We have not the faintest notion of how to breed leaders, in art, in science, in politics, in economic organization, in religion, in education, nor in any of the other numerous lines of endeavor in which gifted leaders might contribute largely to a more complete type of living."<sup>16</sup> Perhaps only a social plan will enable a society to gather the necessary data for eugenic purposes, since people do not voluntarily give adequate biological information about themselves and their families.

The next item in the eugenicist's program that must be criticized is the assumption that socially "desirable" or "undesirable" traits can be recognized by anyone. To believe

<sup>12</sup> Landis and Page (83), pp. 71-73, 78.

<sup>13</sup> E. Essen-Möller as summarized by Landis and Page (83), p. 88.

<sup>14</sup> Landis and Page (83), p. 156; also pp. 81-90.

<sup>15</sup> Landis and Page (83), p. 156.

<sup>16</sup> Thompson (147), p. 66.

that one knows what is socially desirable or undesirable in any absolute sense is, in fact, to announce that one has complete confidence in a scale of values. That there is no such known scale and that all values seem relative to trillions of factors is a thesis this book is trying to demonstrate and one that should puncture all social cockiness. It is true, however, that the present value of health and life would recommend the exclusion, if possible, of progeny with the inherited defects mentioned above: most people feel that individuals with these defects and the insane are a nuisance to everyone including, perhaps, themselves. And yet—one has to pause always when the statement is made that a value clearly dictates a procedure—and yet the value involved in this recommendation is not simply one that pertains to health and life; it may include an element of “the good life,” “the happy life,” “the full life,” or “the responsible life” which people with such defects cannot pursue. When attention is concentrated upon achieving the implications of this value in a positive manner, the goal of the eugenicist becomes less clear.

For in spite of the exaggerated use to which he put his theory, the self-termed individual psychologist, Alfred Adler, revealed a truth, applicable at least to some individuals, when he pointed out that psychic compensation for real or imaginary organic defects may assume socially desirable or undesirable forms;<sup>17</sup> the particular form adopted depends on the defect, the personality, and the requirements of the society. Certainly no eugenicist would wish to abolish the motivating power of compensation by breeding human animals who never feel the need to compensate. The moment it is contemplated to include in a eugenic program characteristics other than organic defects there seems to be, in short, no way of determining the kind of person that is desired. Since men in power prefer to believe that their particular values are absolute, eugenics in its negative aspects is potentially very dangerous—it is so very tempting to sterilize one's enemies.

Encouraging some human beings to propagate and dis-

<sup>17</sup> Adler (2).

couraging others requires control over a very personal part of their behavior, their sexual relations. Sex, moreover, is seldom if ever an isolated function which is associated, as one wag has put it, solely with procreation and not with recreation. Attached thereto are religious taboos and social requirements. Sterilization laws are usually opposed for very righteous reasons and the dissemination of contraceptive information is retarded everywhere. Even compulsory examination of prospective brides and grooms and the establishment of centers to combat venereal disease have had to fight their way into many societies. A positive rather than a negative eugenic program is also quite discouraging, inasmuch as people mate and produce for additional reasons besides the biological ones. A powerful dictator like Mussolini, who has employed so many different means to increase the birth rate of his country, has discovered that the rate, nevertheless, continues to decline.<sup>18</sup>

Eugenics, then, is not a substitute for planning. The question of value is frequently just as perplexing on a biological level as it is on any social plane. The technical knowledge of the eugenicist is not yet adequate. And any eugenic reform has to be introduced into a society which contains a certain amount of hostility toward the controlled breeding of human beings. Potentially, however, a eugenic program may help eliminate some of the extreme cases involving organic defects through compulsory or voluntary sterilization laws and thus be of some service to planning, provided—oh, provided that its proposals are executed “sensibly” in a society with “good” social values! In the meantime it may be possible to convince normal people with hereditary “taints” in their families not to marry or to have childless marriages. With the exception of the definitely restricted use of sterilization, the sane attitude toward eugenics seems to be, then, that “fortunately human society is so diverse that it needs a large variety of abilities” and that, therefore, “the problem of conserving the biological basis of human culture is not dependent on the formulation of any such perfect human

<sup>18</sup> Tracy (149), pp. 87-88.

type, or devising unworkable means of breeding what is statistically an impossibility.”<sup>19</sup>

### *Contraception*

Frequently eugenicists advocate the use of contraceptives. Such an attempt to plan man's reproductive powers, however, raises at least three important nonbiological problems which involve social, personal, and religious or nationalistic issues. Socially there is convincing evidence to show that those groups in American society which are considered “higher” in respect to most arbitrary but fairly universal criteria have low and declining birth rates. People whose standard of living, whose farm land, whose income, whose place of residence, whose occupation, whose education, and whose intelligence (as measured by the conventional tests) are inferior produce a much larger proportion of offspring than others who have greater advantages in these respects.<sup>20</sup> The basic reasons for a low or a high birth rate in a particular group are difficult to ascertain and therefore it is not possible to ascribe a low birth rate solely to the use of contraceptives. It has been suggested, for example, that the declining rate of urban people in comparison with the rural population “is closely connected with the difficulties of raising children under modern urban conditions, the ambition to achieve personal success, the desire for an easeful life and the striving for a luxurious standard of living, all of which are enhanced by modern urban life.”<sup>21</sup> From such an analysis, it is dangerous to draw the conclusion that city dwellers have voluntarily limited the number of their children; for the data of one questionnaire-study which investigated 308 women of superior status who were married around 1900 reveal that about 75 per cent of childless marriages have resulted from involuntary sterility and that in

<sup>19</sup> National Resources Committee (115), p. 165.

<sup>20</sup> National Resources Committee (115), pp. 136-148.

<sup>21</sup> Thompson (147), p. 63; also National Resources Committee (114), p. 82.



the childless group about two thirds of the couples have never used contraceptive devices.<sup>22</sup> When there were four or more children in the family, however, 90 per cent of the families did employ some form of birth control; and "less than 50 per cent of total reduction in fertility in this sample below the four-child level could be attributed to contraceptive practices admittedly adopted to effect such limitation."<sup>23</sup> The work of Raymond Pearl, Katherine B. Davis, and Grace Baker, moreover, seems to reveal an almost perfect negative correlation between economic status (and hence fecundity) and the use of contraceptives; the lower the individual is in the economic scale, whether he be white or colored, the less likely he or she is to resort to formal or informal methods of preventing pregnancy.<sup>24</sup> Most investigators seem to agree that the age at which people marry has a direct relationship to the number of children they have, a factor which probably accounts for the lower rate of the so-called superior groups;<sup>25</sup> but "the fact that maximum occupational differences in fertility appear among those who married at the youngest ages would seem to indicate deliberate and effective postponement and limitation of births among younger couples in the higher income groups."<sup>26</sup> As has been said in connection with a eugenic program, there is no absolute proof at the moment that certain groups, in this case those who are reproducing more rapidly, are inferior in a biological sense; and yet it seems evident that the very groups whose birth rates are declining are able to give their children more favorable, more healthful surroundings.

From the point of view of the separate individual, however, contraceptives offer a means of planning both the number and time of arrival of offspring and therefore seem justified by the value of health and the general plan of life. With adequate information on birth control, women too weak to produce children are not compelled to abstain from

<sup>22</sup> K. B. Davis, summarized by Lorimer and Osborn (91), pp. 255-259.

<sup>23</sup> K. B. Davis, summarized by Lorimer and Osborn (91), pp. 258-259.

<sup>24</sup> Lorimer and Osborn (91), pp. 270-274.

<sup>25</sup> Lorimer and Osborn (91), pp. 268-270, 323.

<sup>26</sup> National Resources Committee (115), p. 144.

sexual relations with their husbands, and thus they can avoid the possible physiological and psychological evils of abstinence. Contraceptive devices, if properly employed, appear to have no harmful effects upon either of the organisms, nor do they necessarily interfere with the pleasure of the sexual act.

At the moment, though, the social opposition which many groups direct against the spread of information on contraceptives suggests that this question is not one of eugenic or individual importance, but of religious or nationalistic significance. Even such an extremely personal act as sexual intercourse evidently cannot be appraised on its own merits, since its fruits seem to extend beyond the two individuals concerned. To discuss the problem of contraception in terms of sex alone, consequently, is to oversimplify a very complicated social question; related values must be taken into account.

The mere fact, therefore, that man possesses knowledge concerning contraceptives does not mean that this aspect of his life can be satisfactorily planned.

### *Race*

Another biological short cut to planning which has been proposed involves the assumption that there are within the genus, human beings, biologically distinct species called races. For if one race can be proven "superior" to another, then, according to eugenic principles, the former should be encouraged to expand and the latter to contract its members. Or the existence of biologically distinct races might require correspondingly distinct plans forevermore. Abundant research has been carried on and fortunately there is a tentative conclusion concerning this problem of race differences.

Evidence purporting to reveal differences between two groups which on the basis of some criterion are called races has to be examined with extreme caution for a variety of

reasons.<sup>27</sup> In the first place contradictory results in respect to such characteristics as cranial capacity, cephalic index, blood group, and body type may be due to the fact that techniques of measurement have not been standardized or to the fact that the findings of any one study may be based on insufficient or selective sampling of either or both groups whose population usually is so large. Then, the differences between races that have been found are expressed in terms of some statistical norm like the arithmetical average. Such an average simply indicates the central tendency of all the individuals who have been measured in any given respect; therefore it is also necessary to determine statistically to what extent the individuals in the population vary from this hypothetical standard. When this variability is ascertained—and it is signified by a measure called the Probable Error or the Standard Deviation—it is always found that, although the averages of the two groups being compared differ, the scores of many individuals in one group overlap those in the other group. Thus on most intelligence tests Southern Negroes are found to be inferior to Southern whites. Even if such tests measured a biological faculty that is unaffected by the varying opportunities for obtaining an education and by all the other cultural factors not equalized for these two groups—and this is certainly *not* the case—the results would indicate that a large number of Negroes is more “intelligent” (as defined by the test) than the less intelligent whites.

When measurements of biological characteristics are examined in this critical fashion, it is apparent that few differences have been reliably established or that the differences which do appear can be explained in cultural rather than in innately biological terms. There is, for example, “relatively little variation between different races” in respect to respiratory and pulse rates. Orientals usually have lower blood pressure and lower basal metabolic rates than Occidentals,

<sup>27</sup> For an adequate summary of the problem of race differences, consult Klineberg (79) on whom this discussion is partially based.

but it is felt that these differences are due not to race, but to variations in climate, diet, living conditions, mode of life, the reactions of the two groups to the testing situation, and the ways the tests themselves have been standardized. This cultural explanation seems strengthened by the fact that Orientals living in the Occident or Occidentals living in the Orient undergo changes in these two respects in the direction of the native population's norms. The blood pressure and basal metabolic rates of an American living in China a decade or more, therefore, go down, but perhaps they do not quite reach the level of the average Chinese—nor, for that matter, does such an individual lead the completely Chinese way of life that might have brought about a more drastic reduction.

The psychophysiological differences that have been established, like those pertaining to visual sensitivity and intelligence, also vary and overlap one another to a great extent. All of them, furthermore, seem to be rather satisfactorily explained in terms of conditions in the nonbiological, cultural milieu in which the different groups have been reared and trained. Some primitive peoples are able to perceive in detail an animal which is so far away that the civilized anthropologist or traveler can scarcely distinguish it from its surroundings, but they have been taught to develop this sense in order to survive in a difficult environment. Mexican and Italian immigrants living in America seem to have lower intelligent quotients than other groups since their economic and social status is such that they have comparatively little opportunity to acquire the language, the schooling, and the information upon which the tests rely so heavily. As a result of this cultural reasoning the dramatically trite assumption may be made that an exchange of infants between two groups revealing differences of this kind would leave the locus of these differences unchanged.

Even if biological differences were ascertained unequivocally, moreover, nothing significant would be proven, since with man's present knowledge it is not possible to postulate a direct relationship between a biological characteristic and the actual behavior of an individual. To reveal overlapping

differences in respect to nerve conduction (as based on the latency of the Achilles reflex) between various groups of Negroes and whites in America and to demonstrate that the latter tend to have a faster rate is, at the moment, just interesting; for this physiological characteristic, if it be entirely physiological, does not inevitably produce certain types of people or specific kinds of activity. It may be, as Linton has suggested (and admittedly without any evidence whatsoever), that the kinky hair of the Negro is due to "a particular balance of endocrine secretions" which has given this group "a high degree of immunity to malaria" in its native habitat;<sup>28</sup> but it certainly is not known whether such a "balance" has given rise to other physiological tendencies which in turn affect the Negro's mentality and behavior.

Differences between races which are attributed to biologically innate bases, therefore, are either unreliable, overlapping, nonexistent, or meaningless. The obvious and subtle differences that can be observed must be traced to varying conditions in the societies in which the comparative observations are made. The conclusion in respect to the non-innate character of group differences, however, is a tentative one that must be subject to the revision required by future research. If such differences are to be found, it is felt that they may be functions of the endocrine system—but at the moment studies of this system in various ethnic groups are quite inconclusive. In planning, consequently, the implications of the thesis that races are innately more or less equal must be accepted, even though the planner himself remains open-minded.

At the same time there is one path of reasoning that may lead one to suspect that groups have or have had varying biologically innate equipment. The most extreme environmentalist cannot deny that different groups have made unequal contributions to what in Western European society are considered cultural and scientific advances; how these advances are evaluated is irrelevant to the present argument. His explanation for such differences is in terms of varying

<sup>28</sup> Linton (69), p. 29.

cultural conditions and opportunities; and these conditions and opportunities, as will be shown subsequently, are said to result from a variety of factors, including climate, natural resources, historical traditions, contacts with neighboring groups, and sometimes "chance." It will also be suggested below that social changes are so complex that they can be accounted for by innumerable hypotheses. The explanation of group or race differences by a reference to varying cultural conditions and opportunities, therefore, does not preclude the possibility that general, inherited, biological factors may also have been at work. To maintain, for example, that certain primitive tribes with a climate and with natural resources as favorable as those with which Europeans were endowed remained "primitive" because their cultural heritage did not permit changes so easily as did the European culture is to push the problem one step backwards; for then it is still necessary to account for the different cultural heritages in the first place. Different historical events, yes, but their outcome, it has to be admitted, might have been predicted in diverse ways—it is so easy to rationalize events after they have occurred. At this point in the search for an explanation of differences between groups, the racial stock, in addition to "chance," *may* have played a rôle. This reasoning, however, has been added at this point merely to indicate the possible contribution of a truly racial factor to the history of culture; it is a factor whose significance cannot be estimated and one which certainly does not justify the fascist treatment of minority groups; and there *seems* to be little doubt that, for the time being and at the present stage of society, the cultural explanation satisfactorily accounts for almost all if not all of the differences between groups that have been observed.

As a result, it appears that knowledge concerning the race of a group does not signify the precise plan which that group deserves; it merely suggests social factors to be taken into account in formulating a plan.

### CHAPTER III

#### SOCIAL ACTIVITY

THE examination of biological activity has revealed that plans involving medicine, eugenics, contraception, and race cannot avoid considering man as a social being. It is to the sciences of anthropology and sociology that one must turn to secure insight into this phase of existence. The usual distinction between these two disciplines suggests that the anthropologist studies culture (the uniform ways of behavior that are transmitted in the social heritage) and the sociologist studies society (the actual ways in which people behave which may or may not correspond to the norms of the culture). In practice, however, the anthropologist has to observe certain societal elements and the sociologist cannot avoid analyzing the relationship between social behavior and the culture in which it is occurring.

It is not surprising that there is no complete agreement in these two branches of social science when the magnitude of their task is recalled, viz., the description and explanation of all cultures and societies, including historical and primitive ones. The examination of a society, especially one's own, furthermore, is often a dangerous occupation: the destruction of the social sciences within Germany even before the start of the war demonstrates that the régime could not tolerate an analysis of those values to which it has demanded unquestioning allegiance. Through the very nature of the phenomena with which they deal, moreover, social scientists cannot be quite so objective as the chemist, for example, whose chemicals voice no objection when they are ripped apart or put together again.

It must be noted that frequently sociologists and anthropologists have been propagating a vaguely formulated social value as the goal which social activity and planning should attain. Sociologists, it has been remarked, have a strong

penchant for the harmonious, social life. Being concerned with collective forms, they personally seem to acquire values that predispose them in favor of accommodation and cooperation rather than conflict or competition. Auguste Comte's religion of positivism was in reality a sincere gesture toward a stronger collectivism.<sup>1</sup> This biased ethic, however, has not always characterized all sociologists. A notable exception is the group of thinkers following the evolutionary trend popularized by Darwin; but even here the struggle is a struggle between groups and hence loyalty toward one of the struggling factions seems essential in a naturalistic, laissez faire sense.<sup>2</sup> American sociologists, especially those who have sought refuge in the cold statistical facts of rural and urban sociology, have been somewhat embarrassed by the number of renegade ministers and religiously minded laymen who have joined the sociological guild; and it seems fair to say that anthropologists, after they purged their discipline of most traces of nineteenth-century Victorianism (which was continually but impishly shocked whenever it was confronted with the sexual and religious activities of primitive people), have managed to achieve a fair degree of objectivity in describing what their primitive or civilized informants relate. It remains true, nevertheless, that both anthropologists and sociologists, perhaps in an effort to combat the narrow individualism and nationalism characteristic of the era in which they have worked, have tended to stress the underlying uniformity of man's behavior and hence the implication of such uniformity for peace and good will.

### *Socialization*

The human being who is the object of planning is a socialized being, i.e., he has been made to conform to the social heritage of which his parents are a part. There are no mechanisms within him that automatically mature and make him a good citizen of a particular society. Every social be-

<sup>1</sup> Comte (27), vol. IV.

<sup>2</sup> Karpf (77), pp. 25-40, 147-173.



lief, custom, or activity must be learned—included are detailed prescriptions ranging from food habits and clothing to courtship techniques and private or public property. To call a new-born infant an animal is a literary exaggeration only when his human potentialities are neglected.

This necessity for being socialized has certain far-reaching implications for social life. Socialization is not voluntary; it must be imposed upon the individual by his parents and by the representatives of various social institutions like the school, the state, and the church.<sup>3</sup> What would happen to an infant who was allowed to develop as he "wished" is not a matter for sensible conjecture. For in all likelihood he would perish if he had no guardians. The need for self-expression which modern progressive schools attempt to recognize and then proclaim is not an urge that the child pulls out of a pristine nervous system; the "self" that is to be expressed is composed almost entirely of a bundle of impulses grafted upon the child long before solicitous teachers have begun to worry about his soul or his mental health. To socialize an individual, then, some form of compulsion is necessary and therefore any society possesses instruments of social control. Restriction of behavior inevitably appears, a fact, as will be shown later,<sup>4</sup> of utmost importance to planning.

In being socialized the child is made into something. What that something is depends from the outset upon certain vaguely defined and therefore in most cases insignificant limits that are set by his biological organism. His personality as an adult, however, is much more a result of the social demands placed upon him while he is still immature. The language he speaks, the kind of god he trusts, the relationship he has to his government, the clothes he wears, the conceptions he possesses of his fellow men—a million aspects of his behavior are determined in a rough way by the particular groups in which he matures. In a stratified society where caste barriers are rigid, an individual's social fate depends

<sup>3</sup> Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, and Sears (38), chap. iv.

<sup>4</sup> Below, p. 137-141.

almost exclusively upon the parents he happens to have, whereas in a country in which mobility is tolerated or encouraged his destiny is influenced to a greater extent by a complex chain of social events which affect him in more or less peculiar ways. Whether or not a person is branded as criminal, a psychopath, or a genius is decided not only by what he is, but also in terms of the rather arbitrary criteria of criminality, insanity, or desirable deviation present within the particular society. By glossing over the ever-present fact of individual differences and by employing averages rather than measures of variability from such norms, the sociologist and the anthropologist are able to show that varying types of people are produced by different societies and by different historical epochs of the same society.

The process of being socialized into a more or less standardized rôle or rut is of course repressive, but it can also be gratifying. The universal existence of some form of family life, the necessity of finding a partner for heterosexual contacts, the undoubted advantages obtained through division of labor, the joys of comradeship and other social associations, the store of knowledge to which every member of a group is heir, these phenomena all point to the fact that men, in adjusting to one another, are able to find contentment in the very acts of seeking the adjustments. The dissatisfied neurotic who complains that he is a victim of social events or circumstances may be perverting a social value to give himself joy through thus complaining.

Since men's personalities are so much a function of the ways in which they have been socialized, it follows that planning has the potentiality of affecting people, especially by changing the system of education which has such a profound effect upon almost everyone. The perplexing problem for planning, however, involves the value toward which socialization should be directed. The description and analysis of the process yield only the story of the genesis of present values within people—nothing is said in sociology concerning the desirable values which might conceivably direct the socializing forces.

*Social Change*

The enforced period of socialization imposed upon everyone in any society helps to explain why significant social changes are usually so difficult to attain. The concept of generation merely separates two hypothetical age groups which do not necessarily feel alike but which are never completely different from each other; and in between these two groups are many other individuals whose generation for a particular purpose has been disregarded. The breast and the cradle transmit more than nourishment and rest: they help stamp in the ways of living which the solicitous parent has been following. Both dictators and churchmen, as is so obvious, always seek to compete with parents, so that their own interpretation of the heritage will be poured into the child with as few variations as possible. Peasants retain their quaint ways because as children they have been offered no alternative except to be quaint.

Social changes, however, do occur and they must originate somewhere and somehow. Anthropologists who are concerned with the problem of change usually say that in a general way changes are due to one of two causes and frequently to both: invention and diffusion. By invention is meant the rearrangement of old materials or ideas in such a way that something relatively new results. And diffusion may be defined as the spreading of a material or an idea from one region (where it has originated due to an invention or historical circumstances, or where it has been functioning after its diffusion from still another region) into a second region. That which is diffused may be facilitated by some people (missionaries, merchants), inhibited by others (reactionaries, vested interests), or hastened or retarded by varying natural circumstances (distance, transportation facilities). In America it can be shown very clearly that almost all of the major technological innovations have met extremely strong resistance before they were finally adopted.<sup>5</sup> This resistance

<sup>5</sup> Stern (136), pp. 39-59.

has been due to "the psychological factors of habit, fear, desire for personality equilibrium and status, and the tendency of groups to coerce their members to conformity" and to innumerable "cultural factors." Among the latter, economic considerations have played an important rôle, inasmuch as industries have sought to retain their economic advantage by suppressing inventions and inasmuch as the adoption of a new device is frequently very expensive.<sup>6</sup> Sometimes, too, inventions have been blocked through political machinations.

When an invention, moreover, diffuses from one region into another, it may have to undergo changes in function or form if it is to fit within the preëxisting structure of the latter. On an anthropological level, for example, Wissler has shown that the American Indians who inhabited the open grasslands west of the Mississippi first saw the horse when the Spaniards reached their country. Instead of merely riding atop the animal, as the white men did, they adapted the horse to their own culture by enlarging the "kind of drag frame" to which they had been attaching a dog and substituted the horse as the beast of burden.<sup>7</sup> In the modern world certain countries may be said to have a fascist form of government and economic structure, but it is evident that Germany, Italy, and Japan differ from one another in details; even fascism, in short, cannot diffuse without some modification.

There are certain disadvantages in an approach that views social changes in terms of inventions and diffusion. The rise of astrologers and other quacks during a depression does represent the diffusion of a trait into industrial countries from ancient Egypt and Babylonia; and its sudden popularity perhaps can be described in terms of waves that spread from metropolitan areas. Similarly the tenets of Marxism, an invention of two individuals who had been strongly influenced by their predecessors, did spread from Germany, France, and England into Russia and hence contributed to the overthrow of the Czar by the Mensheviki and then the Men-

<sup>6</sup> Stern (136), pp. 59-66.

<sup>7</sup> Wissler (162), pp. 120-121.

sheviki by the Bolsheviki. Just as the economist constructs imaginary demand and supply curves to account for a market price with which he is already acquainted, so apparently is the student of diffusion able to rationalize events that have occurred in the past. But why do people in an industrial depression resort to astrology and similar escapist, defeatist chute the chutes instead of taking extension courses from well-publicized universities? And why did Lenin and Trotsky select Marx and Engels rather than Saint Simon or Jesus Christ? These are the questions which must be asked if the theory of diffusion is to have predictive value for the future. This anthropological approach, it seems, is inadequate by itself to account for the selection and diffusion of one cultural trait from among possible alternatives. Fads do not spring up spontaneously, the way the ripples of a pond do after a stone has been tossed into the middle of the water; nor do revolutions burst forth when someone happens to have revolutionary ideas. It is people who bring about changes, people who are changed by people: invention and diffusion as concepts suggest more complexities than they even seek to explain. Sociologists, therefore, when they discuss concrete instances of change, introduce additional concepts which refer to people and to conflicts between groups.

At any rate this anthropological account of social change, bare though it is, contributes to the picture of planning. A plan, from the point of view of anthropology, must be called an invention, especially if it is a social plan with far-reaching consequences: it is derived from the existing culture, but at the same time it is a new way of approaching the future. As an invention any plan must diffuse into a society and its course will not necessarily be an easy one. If it is to be accepted in the society for which it is designed, it must be compatible with certain aspects of the total pattern. In being accepted, it will probably undergo modifications. Plans, in short, must be viewed in their social contexts; and few plans can be successful at a moment's notice. Here perhaps are valuable clues to the rate at which planning can occur.

Sometimes, in order to formulate a plan, it is necessary to

know whether additional inventions are going to occur. Ogburn, a competent student of inventions, has pointed out that "the number of thousands of patents issued every 10 years since 1880 are the following: 218, 235, 334, 401, and 442 in the decade 1921-30." And then in the very next sentence he adds: "It would be most unusual if such a continuous series of inventions should suddenly cease."<sup>8</sup> Obviously such reasoning is only crudely actuarial; it presumes that a past and present trend will continue into the future. There is, however, no apparent reason why the future will differ from the past and the present in this respect and therefore, short of an abrupt and almost inconceivable change that would inhibit the art of invention, it seems wise to accept the prediction and to plan accordingly. Identical reasoning, which represents probably the best induction which men can make at the moment, can be employed in relation to specific problems; for example, the "outlook for mining costs" in the United States is said to be the following:

... there is no reason to imagine that any ore will be mined in the future much more cheaply than some of it is now. Savings will certainly continue from the more general adoption of methods and machinery already developed in the most successful mines, and new technical advances will doubtless occur. But it seems equally clear that the long run trend will be toward increasing natural handicaps and toward higher wage rates. A dilemma often faced will be whether to produce ore from a greater depth or bring it from greater distance.<sup>9</sup>

It is still more difficult to predict the specific inventions which will become important in the future. Certainly the record of American writers and thinkers of the past is rather pitiable in this respect.<sup>10</sup> And yet "since it requires a quarter of a century more or less for an invention to be perfected and to be put into wide use, it is possible to anticipate their results some years ahead."<sup>11</sup> Due to this "time lag" social

<sup>8</sup> Ogburn (121), p. 5.

<sup>9</sup> Read (126), pp. 165-166.

<sup>10</sup> Gilfillan (51).

<sup>11</sup> Ogburn (121), p. 3.

plans may be able to include probable technological changes.

When an invention takes place within a society or when it diffuses there, not only may it undergo changes as it is accepted in modified form, but it in turn may also affect other aspects of social living. This task of predicting the social consequences of an invention is probably the most difficult one of all, since its secondary or derivative effects may have little or no connection with the invention itself. There was nothing inherent in the original steam engine which could have led even a sage to imagine the rationalized industrial pattern that was to follow. It has been estimated that the radio has brought about at least 150 modifications in American ways of adjusting to the environment.<sup>12</sup> Even though it is now known that the photoelectric cell together with the vacuum tube has hundreds of conceivable uses,<sup>13</sup> it is impossible to foretell the exact changes which will result, wholly or partially, from the widespread adoption of this ingenious achievement of applied science. The mere mention of the fact that "since 1865, patents for pickers or other cotton harvesting devices, including strippers, have been granted every year except 1899, and the total number granted now exceeds 900"<sup>14</sup> must cause any planter to wiggle with despair—but at least with this knowledge in mind he has been forewarned.

Whether or not the consequences of an invention or a change are far-reaching probably depends upon its relationship to the rest of the culture. If people drink tomato juice instead of orange juice for breakfast, no significant social repercussions will occur, except among the orange growers and others who have commercial interests in this fruit. But if they are induced to lose faith in the functioning of democratic institutions as a result of newly invented propaganda appeals, it is conceivable that over a period of time their whole lives will be altered and they may have to do without any juice at all. In practice, however, it is almost impossible

<sup>12</sup> Ogburn (121), p. 9.

<sup>13</sup> Cruse (29), pp. 321-323.

<sup>14</sup> Horne (63), p. 139.

to estimate the exact relationship of a new proposal to the entire culture, and for this reason accurate prediction is almost inconceivable. All that can be concluded is that an invention or a reform cannot be judged on its merits: its possible or probable consequences have to be considered. A plan, therefore, since it is an invention that seeks to produce social changes, may lead to results which lie beyond the queerest guess of any of its formulators.

### *Symbols*

Comparative anthropology has called attention again to the importance of what Francis Bacon once termed "idols," a concept that has been translated into modern usage as "symbol." For, by examining primitive peoples who have utterly different symbols rather than one's own contemporaries whose symbols are more or less the same as the investigator's, it is quickly realized that the social lenses through which an individual views himself and his society introduce certain "distortions." A distortion implies that the real is being transfigured and incorrectly too. The "real" way of viewing social life, however, is arbitrary; it is usually but not always called the scientific way by people in Western European society. It cannot be forgotten, though, that science requires competent scientists and that the competency of a scientist is judged by other scientists with similarly competent standards. Such reasoning is, of course, circular; but, especially in the social sciences, it is unavoidable and simply leads to the relativistic position in which it must be admitted that standards of truth are relative. The earlier Lippmann and the later Chase do not free themselves from symbols by writing so gleefully that the rest of the world possesses them.

The distinction between a world of demons and a world of electrons, as has been so often said, is not very great when one realizes that both are hypotheses which seek to explain and then to control the directly unobservable. The idea of an electron, however, leads to better predictions than does the



idea of a demon, and therefore the former is more scientific than the latter. In the attempt to control the physical universe, then, all men formulate hypotheses. Those of primitive men may be anthropomorphic or animistic, since the relatively smaller fund of knowledge at their disposal almost compels them to use the simplest route to prediction, viz., the attribution to natural events of their own human characteristics or of a generalized doctrine of spirits or forces. It is noteworthy that, from the scientific point of view of those who have more adequate knowledge, such magical or mysterious explanations are usually applied only to those phenomena whose lawful operation is most difficult or impossible to detect.<sup>15</sup> Incantations may accompany the planting of crops and the hunting of animals since success in these activities depends upon so many uncontrollable factors like the weather and sheer chance; but, if a technological activity such as basket-making can be carried out efficiently, it will be viewed "realistically" without resorting to magic.

It is the realm of men's social and religious activities that is pervaded most thoroughly with strange symbols and wild hypotheses. For here, even among civilized sociologists and anthropologists, there are still shakier criteria upon which the "reality" of these activities can be judged. A historical or even an economic explanation of the American Constitution, for example, is considered by most men in their senses to be preferable to one based on divine revelation or predestination. The "scientific" explanation, however, is difficult to test. Does such an explanation help one to say when the Constitution will be amended? Assuredly no. Does it help one to "understand" that document? Assuredly yes, but only because so many Americans prefer to think of innovations in historical or economic terms rather than in divine ones. Does it help one to decide whether or not the Constitution in its present form should be retained, amended, or discarded? Assuredly no, for the answer to this question involves the problem of value, a problem that dare not be treated so glibly.

<sup>15</sup> Sumner and Keller (141), vol. II, chap. xxxvii.

When a primitive tribe places a taboo on certain kinds of food and gives as an explanation that the consumption of the food would cause people's teeth to fall out, the strictly "scientific" retort is obvious: if it can be shown under controlled conditions that dental decay results from breaking the taboo, then this edict should be retained, perhaps, because teeth are obviously important. But suppose, as might be anticipated, that the experiment proved the reverse; should the taboo then be abolished? This question cannot be answered affirmatively without further thought. For the taboo may be an integral part of the culture and, if it is removed, the inhabitants may begin to lose faith in many social institutions that have absolutely no connection with biting food. The question then becomes: should the taboo *and* these beliefs be abolished? Here the anthropologist, if he were advising a colonial administrator, for example, would have to pause and reflect whether the tribe could survive under the more drastically altered conditions. The social value would thus become one involving survival and the anthropologist's judgment might be forthcoming. The administrator, on the other hand, might welcome the opportunity of driving the tribe out of existence by such an apparently innocuous measure as tampering with a taboo. From this illustration it follows that symbolic acts, like inventions, may have far-reaching significance in a society and that, therefore, they may be at the basis of innumerable social values.

When once a social institution is analyzed sociologically or anthropologically and thus stripped of its symbols, it seems to lose its mystical or necessary character. Capitalist countries, for example, adhere in general to the principle of private property. Laymen and many employers believe that this social form is part of the natural order of things. It can be shown, nevertheless, that private property is the result of a chain of complicated historical circumstances; that there have been other societies which have survived without ever possessing many of the forms of individual ownership,<sup>18</sup> and

<sup>18</sup> Beaglehole (9).

that in this changing society the determination of which property is private or public is both from a legal and social point of view quite arbitrary. These statements may not be convincing to those who consider private property a holy right, no more than an atheist is able to convert people away from their particular church by arguing in naturalistic terms; but there does remain a difference between conversion and scientific validity.

Religious beliefs cannot be disproved; evidence merely can be presented to show that an alternative hypothesis seems more reasonable and will be productive of more accurate predictions. Blaming the winds on the forefather of one's line of descent leads neither to control nor prediction, whereas the warnings of the weather bureau are undoubtedly a more reliable guide. The emotional satisfaction secured from the belief in the forefather's power, however, may be greater than the accuracy obtained in scientific fashion—and there is no absolute way of demonstrating to the senses that a play of forces rather than an old man is responsible for a gale or a breeze.

Embedded in people, therefore, is always a series of beliefs pertaining to their important social institutions. These beliefs are usually not in accord with the standards of criticism employed by the trained sociologist and anthropologist. Men and women very rarely are able or wish to be social scientists. They prefer the explanations that are satisfying, not those that are based on cold, "objective" reasoning.

"But religion is good for the masses." "Patriotism is the foundation of all good government." "We are the chosen people." "God is on our side." One could write a list of such clichés that would extend beyond the moon if all similar ones from the beginning of time were recorded. The length of such a list would demonstrate, it seems, that social institutions have been able to manage people by giving them beliefs which transcend the usual modes of explanation, which link prosaic duties to mysterious necessity. In the third book of his "Republic," Plato proposed—in all seriousness it must be assumed—that people might be controlled by means of

“an audacious fiction” concerning their relationship to the state; he advocated, therefore, that rulers be “allowed to lie for the public good.”

Planning, especially social planning, then, has to face this problem of symbols. It would appear that the enthusiasm and coöperation of a people can be secured only by giving them emotional symbols in which they can believe. Does this mean that a society devoid of myths and based on “rational” explanation cannot exist or that some element of the “irrational” is necessary if people are to feel a sense of group-unity?

### *Cultural Relativity and Values*

It is from anthropology and sociology that the strongest arguments in behalf of a relative scale of values can be obtained. Evidence from these two sciences, however, must be interpreted with extreme caution. For, although some conceptions of value can be discarded, it is still necessary to rescue certain universal tendencies of human beings from a social universe that seems constantly in flux.

The idea of an inevitable series of events that can be called progressive no longer appears tenable. Many social scientists of the last century believed that societies had undergone direct evolutionary progress from the simple to the complex. Primitive peoples, therefore, were supposed to represent stages from which the more civilized ones had emerged, or else they were called offshoots that had remained stagnant. In this way it was possible to talk about progress by identifying the term with complexity. More thorough historical investigations have shown, however, that such a view of societal evolution is probably false and merely the product of that century's gesture to grasp everything simply. It is now known that each society has a historical background out of which it has evolved, that many societies have changed without being affected by their contemporaries while others have borrowed extensively, and that complexity is not necessarily correlated with progress in every sense of that misused

word.<sup>17</sup> Thus Western European civilization developed for a number of centuries independently of the great Chinese and Indian cultures; the American Indians and most of the Eskimo tribes had little or no effect upon the outside world and vice versa; and the naked Central Australians whose only shelter is a portable screen to protect them from the winds have had one of the most involved kinship systems ever discovered.

In this way the anthropologist has attempted to remove the idea of progress from his discipline. For him there is just change or perhaps a tendency toward increasing complexity. Neither change nor complexity is good or bad; there are differences in degree, not in quality or virtue.

Even though the sweep of historical progress reveals no progressive trend and hence suggests that values are relative to the culture in which they are formulated, societies seem to be subject to certain restrictions that are of immense significance to planning. Apparently, or thus far at least, countries and nations have met one of three fates: they have perished (ancient groups like the Greeks and Romans), they have stood almost still (primitive groups before the advent of white civilization), or they have increased in complexity. It is exceedingly rare for a society to retrogress by returning to a simpler stage; usually the society is forced by an oppressor to readopt a way of life that has been abandoned or small groups (like pioneers or colonists) withdraw and make new adjustments that resemble the old. It would be reasonable to conclude from the known facts, moreover, that a modern industrial society inevitably grows more complex. This hypothesis would mean that no social plan can be successful which has as its goal the structure or ideas of an earlier era; that no social plan can ever completely abandon what already has been achieved, regardless of whether that something is considered "good" or "bad" in terms of the plan itself; and that, in short, no social plan can contain romantic elements which point toward the good old days of

<sup>17</sup> Linton (89), chap. xxii.

the past. Conclusions like these, however, since they are so far-reaching, must certainly be tentative.

The reasons why societies tend to become more complex are difficult to ascertain. In the first place, there is evidence to show that the achievements of a society do not perish when its own structure ceases to be. Rome fell, but the Byzantine Empire and then Europe at the time of the Renaissance became the heirs to that sprawling synthesis of Greek culture and indigenous practicality. The American Indians were slaughtered by colonial adventurers who then acquired so many of the agricultural, linguistic, and cultural habits of their victims. A culture trait seldom dies without leaving some proverbial trace behind, perhaps because man finds it difficult to relinquish a readymade adjustment to a difficult world.

One of the important mechanisms behind the trend toward increasing complexity is the accelerated rate at which inventions occur. The advances made during the unbelievably large spans of time allotted to the Paleolithic and Neolithic eras are pitifully scanty in comparison with what has been produced since the start of recorded history in the two valleys of the Near East. In modern times the continually increasing number of patents granted by the United States Patent Office has already been mentioned. This tendency for inventions to feed upon inventions is probably due to their very nature: an invention is merely a new combination of older inventions; hence the more complex the culture, the greater the possibility of creating innovations from the heritage of the past. The speed of inventions is greater in the modern world also as a result of the efficiency achieved by vehicles of communication, by commerce, and by science—only military secrets, on the whole, are prevented from diffusing.

Perhaps the most significant conclusion of all that can be drawn from sociology and anthropology is the thesis that human behavior is relative to the culture in which it is exhibited. It is just impossible, unless one subscribes to

Hitler's absurd racial doctrines,<sup>18</sup> to assert that any one social institution as it now exists inevitably springs from "human nature." It seems so obvious that the family has arisen out of the sexual drives of man and the dependence of infants; yet this institution sometimes has had purely economic functions and the sexual or parental ones have been either minimized or ignored almost completely. The laws governing marriage may be endogamous or exogamous, i.e., people may be compelled to marry within the clan or outside of it. Polygamy and monogamy are the most frequent forms of relationship between the sexes, but still there have been instances of polyandry. Incest has practically never been officially tolerated, although it has been maintained that in certain societies the father is compelled, for example, to "marry" his eldest daughter.<sup>19</sup> The biological father and the biological mother need not necessarily perform the social rôle of parents in caring for the offspring. Only the logical process of classification enables the student of society to group all these various forms together under the one category of "family."

In like manner any social institution, whether it pertain to property, to law, to etiquette, or to the treatment of the sick and the aged, reveals almost every conceivable variation when it is examined in all its different manifestations. The amazing plasticity of the human organism is astonishing only to those who are ethnocentric. The clever anthropologist is able to puncture almost every postulated instinct by pointing to some tribe which does not possess it; and the cleverest exposé of all is to be able to say that, in respect to the characteristic under discussion, one society differs radically from its neighbor which is living under practically identical climatic or environmental conditions.

The relativity of human behavior is a powerful argument to employ to "prove" to people that, as far as innate nature is concerned, their particular cultural arrangement is for-

<sup>18</sup> Above, pp. 30-34.

<sup>19</sup> Sumner (140), pp. 479, 483-484.

tuitous. This has been the great contribution of the study of primitive and historical peoples, both from the point of view of theory and for educational purposes. And more recently it has been shown that animals too acquire totally different kinds of "social" institutions as a function of the whims of the experimenter.<sup>20</sup> An examination of the comparative anthropological findings from different cultures is usually the one good reason why almost every generalization claiming to be "a law of human nature" or "a principle of social behavior" has exceptions and can be exploded.

The relativity and plasticity of human behavior have certain consequences for planning. Apparently concrete values must be considered a reflection of social conditions and must be stripped of any absolute qualities that people attribute to them. For this reason the choice of the specific value at the basis of any plan is practically unlimited in the long, long run and is subject only to the inertia created by the values that people possess at the moment when the plan is formulated. Almost any kind of a plan is, therefore, possible or at least conceivable. "Human nature" is potentially ready for innumerable changes—but the most efficient means for attaining a particular change may have to be found. Planning may be nothing more than the search for a balance between the possible and the feasible.

This search, however, has to be conducted within certain limits. For, in spite of the fact that the *specific* form of behavior varies so much from culture to culture, the anthropologist is convinced that every society contains all of the *general* forms of behavior that characterize even the most "advanced" groups. All people speak a language. All people wear clothing and have dwellings, no matter how elementary these protective devices may be. All people cluster together in families and are governed more or less rigidly by a state. All people have theories concerning their own behavior and the movements of animals and objects that surround them. All people worship some type of god and almost all people possess a form or several forms of art. All people differentiate the

<sup>20</sup> Crawford (28); Wolfe (163).



sexes and devise a social organization that assigns rôles and duties to specified groups. All people educate their children and evolve tools to secure the essentials of existence. And all people tend to relax in some rather standardized fashion. This division of men's activities is quite arbitrary, since the institutions of any society and therefore the behavior of the inhabitants, as has been pointed out, are integrated and not separable in everyday living. An early Madonna of Siena in a twelfth-century church represented a pious interpretation of a figure in the New Testament, whereas a few centuries later the Venetian conception of the same personage sought also to praise the secular donor; both are pieces of art, although their social functions were quite different.

The reason for this underlying uniformity of mankind's behavior can be found only in his biological and psychological constitution. All of the other factors affecting his culture like climate, natural resources, historical circumstances, etc., occur in almost infinite combinations and therefore eliminate themselves as causal agents through their very diversity. It is not minimizing the importance of culture when it is pointed out that men see with their eyes regardless of the conditions in which they live. What they see and how they see may be affected by cultural and societal factors, but the biologically given eyes are still the visual mechanism everywhere. The contents of cultures are diverse, according to the view of the sociologist and the anthropologist, as a result of these multitudinous conditions.

The explanation of culture, moreover, is also an explanation of one of its significant components, viz., values. Nowadays competent authorities, at least those in democratic countries, almost unanimously have adopted an eclectic approach to this problem of explanation. Many causes are thought to operate simultaneously. Climate, for example, is known to have an extremely important effect on people, as the numerous books of Huntington have shown;<sup>21</sup> but climate alone—a point which this writer freely admits—does not give the complete explanation either of subtleties of behavior

<sup>21</sup> Huntington (69, 70).

in general (like the appearance of one type of family structure or economic structure in a given society rather than another) or of the peculiarities of the particular individual as distinguished from his contemporaries who are affected by identical changes in temperature and rainfall. Certainly people living in extreme climates, as in arctic or equatorial regions or on top of high mountains, find their way of life more circumscribed by this force than do those dwelling in temperate zones under more or less optimum conditions.

The moment a multifactor approach to culture is accepted, it becomes impossible to claim, as Köhler recently has,<sup>22</sup> that particular societies "require" particular values. Such a position may be conceivably correct, but it is not a feasible or useful one. In the first place, the assertion that the values of a society are those which it requires is based on backward reasoning: the arrangement of the society and its values are attributed to many factors and then the assumption is made that the values are "required" because they already exist. It could be contended with equal force that the arrangement has not yet produced the values that are required or has produced the "wrong" ones. Man is too finite in his observational and reasoning power to be able to claim that innumerable causes have or have not given rise to the "proper" values. Then, secondly, modern societies change so rapidly that the component factors giving rise to the values and hence the values themselves must also be changing. A despotism "requires" despotic values, but plans to overthrow the government alter the situation and then require other values.

The mysticism of Köhler's position can be illustrated by a specific example. The hippopotamus exists in South Africa; it is "natural," consequently, that the Bathonga of that region should hunt him. He is a powerful beast; it is "natural," consequently, that large groups of tribesmen band together to slay him. So far the values and the behavior have emerged from the condition of the society. But it does not seem blatantly "natural" to the present writer that the

<sup>22</sup> Köhler (81), esp. chap. iii.

following pattern be developed in connection with the hunt: the prospective hunter must first have intercourse with his daughter, anoint himself with drugs, and keep certain taboos; then he generally sets out with his son to track down the animal; when the two of them have hurled their spears at the animal, then and only then do they call for assistance from other hunters.<sup>23</sup> It would be difficult to argue that this ritual and procedure (and the values implied therein) are the necessary ones to slay an animal; obviously they spring from other values in Bathonga society. The explanation of the relationship is difficult and involved; only in this *ex post facto* sense can it be rationalized to appear as imperative as the effect of gravity on a falling body.

A more modest conclusion from the existence of uniformity in a relativistic universe which is affected by so many forces is to admit that planning must take such uniformity into account and not to pretend that specific values are ever demanded. In more definite terms, this means that a large social plan will have to provide institutions that satisfy the basic tendencies within people but such satisfaction can be obtained in diverse ways. The family, for example, just cannot be abolished: its present form may and can be altered and yet some intimate group will continue to care for the young unless extinction becomes the social goal. It is indeed almost breath-taking to feel that there are some limitations to the potentiality of man, even though they are so general; but, after all, in spite of innumerable fluctuations in the weather, it does not snow at sea level on the equator.

### Conflict

The view that behavior tends to be relative to the culture in which it occurs can be illustrated by many of the specialties studied by sociologists and anthropologists. Conflict will be considered since this subject is directly related to planning. For the regulation and control of conflict is a task that every planner must face in some form or other.

<sup>23</sup> Goldman (52), p. 357.

Social conflict, like the process of socialization itself, seems inevitable. As has been suggested above, no child is socialized automatically and hence every child possesses a certain amount of resentment toward his socializers. There are always enough people who share these resentments to produce differences concerning objectives and concerning the means of attaining objectives; hence there are conflicts.

The basis for a social conflict, however, cannot always be traced to the socialization of the particular individual. Its genesis frequently can be discovered only by examining historical antecedents in the society. At some time or other in the past the ancestors of the people now in conflict may have resented one another for real or imaginary reasons. The points of difference became part of the cultural heritage and thereafter children are molded to fight the traditional enemy.

Such an explanation, though applicable to phenomena like feuds, wars, and college rivalries, is not complete. Sociologists and others sincerely believe that they have probed the explanatory depths when they succeed in injecting a conflict into the heritage; they simply assume that its transmission is automatic and almost mechanical. But people do not fight just because their ancestors have fought; they fight because this knowledge that their ancestors fought helps to touch off within them momentary impulses which can then be expressed by fighting in the approved fashion. These momentary impulses in turn are related to their entire personalities; and the relationship can be understood only in terms of psychological factors within them, which factors are affected by social forces known to the demagogue and then analyzed by the sociologist.

The conflicts of society, moreover, must also be understood as part of the more or less integrated pattern within that society. In America there are conflicts between producers and their competitors, between criminals and the police, between union organizers and employers, between political parties and their rivals, between clubs and associations—this state of affairs cannot be called fortuitous. For

such economic, social, and political conflicts stem from American traditions and circumstances and also from the defects and virtues of American life. Even a feud among mountain folk is not a characteristic these people possess in addition to their other characteristics; it is derived from their way of living, i.e., from their method of procuring food, their geographical location, their religion, and their political beliefs, all of which are also affected by the feud itself.

One of the most pervasive functions of society is to regulate the social relationships of its inhabitants so that conflicts can be controlled. There is perhaps more truth than fantasy in the common belief that men would attack one another like wolves if they were not compelled to live together on more or less amicable terms. It is a little dangerous, however, to exaggerate the "natural" ferocity of man.

Culture tends to prescribe the values which individuals in a society strive to attain. Even the basic drives pertaining to hunger and thirst are warped in particular directions. More significant for social conflict is the fact that any culture tends to make certain goals artificially scarce. Particular achievements are acclaimed and social prestige is bestowed upon the individuals who accomplish the prescribed activities. Among the Kwakiutl Indians on the Northwest coast of North America honor went to the individual who could afford to destroy the greatest amount of valuable property in the ceremony known as a potlatch and many conflicts, consequently, centered about this ceremony which was solely a cultural artifact.<sup>24</sup> The rivalries among peoples in Western European societies to enter the professions rather than the menial positions are also products of the culture. Some conflicts, in short, might be driven out of existence if the society could abolish the values that not everyone is able to attain.

The society also delineates many of the individual's potential competitors. In most family groups, for example, fighting is outlawed, whereas people are encouraged to compete with members of an out-group. Almost every social scientist has made the observation independently—or has

<sup>24</sup> Benedict (15), pp. 189-203.

agreed with the clear and explicit statement by Sumner—that “the relation of comradeship and peace in the we-group and that of hostility and war towards others-groups are correlative to each other.”<sup>25</sup> This principle has far-reaching consequences for social planning that must concern itself with group life. It has been part of the secret of the temporary stability characterizing modern dictatorships: before the outbreak of war Germans and Italians had less of an urge to dethrone Hitler and Mussolini since they were made to hate the hostile groups within or surrounding their fatherlands. In a more innocuous realm it has been said that the existence of traditional football rivals probably increases the endowment of a university more than its standards of scholarship.

The rules covering social conflicts are another part of the cultural heritage. “You can’t strike a man when he is down,” “You can’t hit below the belt,” “You have to stop fighting as soon as the gong sounds,” these rules of prize fighting are more rigorously applied and obeyed than are the vaguely formulated incantations that are supposed to govern modern warfare. In the competitive economic struggle, people are exhorted to be honest and within the law. A man’s religious or racial background is not considered a legitimate weapon in an American political campaign.

The last example raises the problem of the extent to which individuals adhere to the edicts of their culture while participating in social conflicts. It is true that in all societies there are deviants, antisocial people who are “bad” citizens because they do not conform. A gunman being pursued by the police has committed his crime by going after the right goal (money) in the wrong way (illegally) and he is fighting the very people (police) with whom a struggle is taboo. Most societies try to cope with antisocial individuals by prescribing definite punishments.

The reasons for the outbreak of a conflict are usually manufactured or rationalized. But rationalized from whose

<sup>25</sup> Sumner (140), p. 12.

point of view? Again the answer is—from the point of view of the social scientist who imagines he has grasped the “real” reason for the conflict. Through the propaganda and entreaties of leaders with or without a selfish interest in the struggle, many of the larger social conflicts are made to appear as though they possess divine sanction or as though they are intimately connected with the personal welfare of individuals. Both neurotics and normals tend to blame their opponents rather than themselves for whatever outbursts occur. The scapegoat is an almost universal mechanism by means of which responsibility is avoided and brutality justified.

For large groups of people to engage in conflict with one another it is necessary that the protagonists be distinguished on the basis of some criterion. Neighborhood, section of the country, language, color, clothing, religion, traditional beliefs, caste or class status, occupational habits, political beliefs, family structure, ancestry, physical stigmata, these have been some of the criteria that have served to identify those whom one is supposed to hate and perhaps fight.<sup>28</sup> Each one may be quite arbitrary, according to the rationale of the situation, but all have been effective at some time and in some place. The criterion of color is most useful as a means of marking off a group of people toward whom race prejudice can then be felt; but an abstraction like Aryan evidently can be equally feasible if not as easy to apply at first glance.

Conflicts can exist potentially within a group of people without immediate overt expression. The persecuted victims of a totalitarian régime may want nothing better than to seek revenge against their tormentors and they may transmit this hatred to their children and to their children’s children (provided those in control do not manage to capture the youth completely through their schools and other institutions). The conflict itself, however, will have to be postponed until, as one says in dreams, “the time is ripe.” The length

<sup>28</sup> Dollard (37), pp. 21-23.

of time during which tendencies toward a conflict can be repressed varies as a function not only of opportunities and cracks in the social structure, but also of certain psychological factors (to be discussed below) within the passive combatants.

People may begin a conflict when, from the point of view of the disinterested outsider, the military strategist, or the historian, they have little chance of being victorious. Such faulty judgment may be due to inadequate information concerning the strength of the opponent, or it may result from an overconfidence caused by various psychological circumstances. Or, in rare instances, sheer desperation may cause one side to begin the conflict, even though it has little or no hope of succeeding. The social function of war propaganda is, partially at least, to make exaggerated claims regarding the strength of the in-group and to deprecate the advantages of the out-group, while simultaneously suggesting that this out-group also constitutes a real threat.

By way of summary this rather unwieldy principle may be stated very cautiously: social conflicts occur when individuals seek goals that cannot be shared, when they feel that they have some kind of social approval to engage in combat, when they have weapons to do so, and when they can distinguish their enemy on the basis of some criterion.

The above generalization about social conflict seems typical of the kind of conclusion to which anthropology and sociology are forced when the problem of prediction is being considered. Nothing is said therein concerning the particular individuals who are most eager to begin the conflict; nothing is said concerning why the goals cannot be shared; nothing is said concerning which "rules" are accepted; and nothing is said concerning the psychological mechanisms that underlie the conflict. For this reason prediction in respect to the specific details of *when*, by *whom*, and *why* is difficult if not impossible.

The sociology of conflict, consequently, is not a sharp, precise tool which the planner may employ in attempting to solve certain social problems. It is clear, however, that con-



conflict is a social phenomenon which is grafted upon numerous psychological tendencies of people and that these tendencies by themselves will not give rise to conflict unless the society and the culture furnish the propitious circumstances. Planning, therefore, has the opportunity of controlling to a certain extent the very circumstances which give rise to conflict.

## CHAPTER IV

### POLITICAL ACTIVITY

SINCE many social standards are enforced by government and since some plans are both formulated and executed by public officials, it becomes important to examine the nature of law and government. Are there any principles that describe and explain the political activity of people? From a systematic study of political institutions and their historical development, is it possible to throw additional light on the nature of man, his social environment, and his goals? These are the problems of the present chapter.

The analysis of law and government, like the analysis of society itself, is not easy because men like to deify their political organization and to exaggerate its rôle in the social life. It is not strange that men and women have thought of their changing world in terms of the political systems of democracy, communism, and fascism, even though their own activities include so much more than politics. Similarly almost every American child beyond the fireman or "G-man" stage aspires to become the President of the United States; and newspapers usually find it easier to "explain" their news by referring to the prime minister, the dictator, or the general of the country in which the events originate. The restrictions imposed by the state are considered essential to the welfare of the majority if not all of the inhabitants; to secure "certain unalienable Rights," according to the Declaration of Independence, "Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed." Even though this pious, halfhearted hope that governments must derive their power from the consent of the governed has often been reduced to a mockery by past events in the history of America, no one can feel completely comfortable when he sets out to question a political verity. The inquiry, however, cannot be avoided, inasmuch as so much planning is linked to political activity.

*Political Science and Jurisprudence*

Political science is the discipline that seeks to understand and explain the functions and mechanisms of government; and jurisprudence concentrates upon a specific aspect of government, the law. The former often splits submicroscopic hairs concerning definitions of terms like government, state, and sovereignty; the latter is addicted to needle-point discussions over the function of law, its development into a science, and its flagrant misuse by judges on the bench. Both disciplines tend to be addicted to classifying and expositing. States and governments are assorted into types and historical stages, and the writings of noted theorists are plastered with labels which are said to epitomize their "approaches" to the problems of the field. Laws also can be thrown into categories—constitutional, statute, common, administrative, and international are adjectives employed in this connection; and there is also a law of equity. The formal and, less frequently, actual functioning of governments and their agencies is examined in great detail, an occupation which with the addition of a dash of patriotic ethics has also been called civics. Or scholars of the law determine the trend of legal opinion. Political science and jurisprudence, therefore, are primarily descriptive disciplines; they emerge with few principles and still fewer guides to prediction and, consequently, offer planning little assistance in these respects.

At least from the time of the Sophists political science has also been entangled with the task of political planning. For to teach a man how a government does work, how it should work, how politicians capture power, or how they should capture power is to tempt him to become a politician; at the moment, in fact, there is a discernible trend in favor of deliberately preparing students for "the public service" in schools established for this purpose. Law schools have always tended to be vocational institutions whose primary concern is not with theory as theory but with the potential utility of theory in what is called so delightfully the "prac-

tice" of the law. In this connection, both political science and law seem to share the same fate as all the other social sciences: the teaching of a theory influences students to prove in practice the theory they have been taught, or perhaps to disprove it. That a prospective city manager and a judge require, respectively, both training in and experience with municipal and judicial affairs is a rule few sensible people are inclined to deny; and it is not unreasonable to believe that in the process they will have acquired a set of social values.

For students of government and law throughout the ages have identified themselves and their theories with the institutions they have been studying, or else they have "demonstrated" with their learning the need for reform. The history of political science and jurisprudence is strewn with a long list of apologists and radicals. There has not been, perhaps there never can be, an objective science of politics or law. Even pointing out that an amendment to the Federal Constitution has to be ratified by the legislatures or conventions in three quarters of the states may not be a completely unbiased statement to some people with particular mental sets: implied therein is a value suggesting or preventing change, or concealed is a description of the actual political machinations involved in the process of amendment.

Since governments undergo changes, the political scientist is required to outline the nature of and the reasons for these changes. At this point he turns historian, since frequently the latter likes to call events up to an arbitrary point (like the ending of a relatively recent war) history and succeeding ones political science. Or, if he immerses himself in the details of the present, he may find himself a sociologist or an economist. Political science evidently is one of the borderline disciplines which tries so hard to retain its independent integrity while finding it futile to do so.

The origin of the state is a moot issue since, as Sumner pointed out, "All origins are lost in mystery, and it seems vain to hope that from any origin the veil of mystery will

ever be raised.”<sup>1</sup> Doubtless prehistoric peoples, like certain recent and contemporary tribes, had simpler forms of government, if by simplicity is meant fewer officials; for their communities were smaller and therefore the details of administration were less numerous. Everywhere, though, there has been some form of property-holding; everywhere there have been regulations pertaining to sexual behavior and to murder; and almost everywhere there have been individuals whose function if not whose entire occupation has consisted of policing the citizenry. From this experience, therefore, it is doubtful whether a political plan with anarchism as a goal can ever be successful.

The reasons people have had for banding together in a state are also obscure. There are numerous theories on this subject,<sup>2</sup> but each one of them seems to be more a reflection of a prevailing ideology or value and of the author's bias than it is an explanation in the modern sense. In ancient times the state was considered both a political and a religious body and its form, therefore, was usually thought to have been determined mysteriously; and at the height of the Middle Ages the religious explanation tended to supersede all others. When the sovereignty of the church was replaced by the sovereignty of the individual monarch, so-called natural law was said to derive its sanctions no longer from divine sources but from logical necessity; i.e., laws were considered to be inherent in society in the same way that physical laws are now thought to characterize physical phenomena “due to their given nature.” During the struggle between rulers and their people, the former still stressed divine mandates, while the latter suggested themselves as the source of power. Then by the seventeenth century Thomas Hobbes, still believing in a monarchy, was able to attribute the sovereignty of the state to a social contract in which individual citizens agreed with one another to submit to the same ruler and also agreed to obey his commands in return for protection and

<sup>1</sup> Sumner (140), p. 7.

<sup>2</sup> Heller (59).

internal peace. Thereafter and through the present era there has been a markedly strong tendency for theorists and laymen alike to explain and justify the state in terms of the needs of its inhabitants. Simultaneously, moreover, counter-movements of thought have resorted to an explanation involving values which are supposed to transcend such an empirical description; the romanticism inherent in the Hegelian thesis that the state serves to realize the ideal of an imminent power, for example, has found its reactionary climax in Nazidom. In Marx, Engels, and Lenin the contention is found that the state is an instrument of power to enforce the position of the ruling class; and in Pareto there is complete skepticism concerning the validity of any theory of the state. A more detailed and precise historical survey of political theory<sup>3</sup>—and legal theory has also had to wander hither and yon with the society in which it is formulated—could only substantiate the following conclusion for political planning: it is useless to seek an ultimate explanation for the origin and rise of the state; it is better to accept the state with its form of government as an institution within modern culture; and it is only necessary, therefore, to ascertain, in the finest tradition of strictly empirical political science, the actual functions it performs and to analyze the forces which now bind men into governments.

Governments have been classified into various types. The Greek scheme (monarchy and tyranny, aristocracy and oligarchy, democracy and ochlocracy) is characteristic of the more technical ones proposed by modern theorists. Any classification, however, merely calls attention to the external forms of rules and only implicitly suggests the effect of these rules upon the citizenry and their other institutions.

It is possible, in addition, to outline "the stages" through which Western European governments have passed. Until the advent of communism and fascism, the ultimate goal of this progression has been thought to be democracy. To determine why and when a particular society has abandoned one political "stage" in favor of the "next" requires a careful

<sup>3</sup> Sabine (130).

historical analysis of its structure and the forces of change and stability therein. There seems to be no way of stating which form of government has been "best" for any group of people, except through inserting a gratuitous metaphysical assumption like Pope's poetically glib shout in favor of the status quo or Hegel's faith in any government as a stage in the progress toward the Ideal; much of the rather uncritical praise bestowed so prematurely upon democracy has simply identified "the good" with the last. Political planning, consequently, cannot assume that the details of the ideal political structure for an era are known: like the factor of race, knowledge of a people's government offers insight into their social nature and also suggests some of the mechanisms that can be employed to execute plans.

### *History*

All planning attempts to affect the trend of events; conversely it is important to know whether or not the discipline of history reveals the effect of past events upon political activity and therefore planning. Does a knowledge of history reveal inevitable implications for the present and the future? From the outset it must be noted that every group of people shows an interest in its past. The account of the deeds of one's ancestors or of the genesis of one's cosmology more frequently than not tends to be handed down from generation to generation in an exaggerated form; mythology is an undignified mutation of history. There seems to be an almost universal desire to find some kind of continuity between the here-and-now and what has preceded it. This glorification of the past, this unsystematic curiosity about history has important social consequences. It is one of the ways of securing in-group loyalty and consequently social control by linking people together in a great tradition—and most traditions of a group are considered great by those who believe them. It also strengthens and influences these traditions by coloring the views that people have toward their society. The past indeed affects the present and the future; and sometimes the

effect is reversed, for example, when a nation seeks to foster unity by reconstructing fictitious or exaggerated historical antecedents.

It would appear to be a long distance from the primitive myth to any of the "schools" of history which attempt more or less systematically to give an accurate picture of events and people who no longer exist. Unfortunately there is no such sharp break between vivid imagination and scholarly research. For the sources of errors to which the historian is exposed are insurmountable. What, for example, is an historical "fact"? It is a datum that represents a past occurrence and that could have been perceived by the historian if he had been present. The historian is seldom present at historical events; even if he were there, he would see those events through eyes dimmed by his own biases and he would emerge, therefore, with a somewhat subjective account. As a matter of fact, historians usually have to rely upon second-hand accounts which have been preserved in some transmissible form. The first individual who witnessed the event was in all probability not a historian but a participant whose prejudices were those of his era and his own personality. The prayer of the historian then has to be that all of these errors in observation and interpretation can be wholly or partially eliminated through the coöperative efforts of many scholars who are uncovering the various details of history.

In addition, facts in the sense of perceptible phenomena upon which competent observers *might* agree occur by the million every split second. The historian has to select the relevant ones to include in his monograph or textbook. But what is the criterion of relevancy which can be employed to assort the events of history? The answer seems to be the particular way the individual historian views history; the hypothesis that he has toward the course of history determines his selections.<sup>4</sup> Whether historical "facts" are interpreted in terms of the courtesans of the heir apparent or in terms of crop failures and famines will have a lasting effect on the kind of history that is written. The question as to

<sup>4</sup> Beard (11), p. 51.



whether the history of great men and their personal companions is more or less accurate than the history of economic data either is an academic one unworthy of further discussion, or else it is one to be decided by the tastes of the times and the reading public.

Men have great difficulty in interpreting contemporary events and in discovering casual sequences therein not because they lack data—they are in fact usually surrounded by too many facts—but because any social phenomenon is complicated and simply does not fit into a simple scheme of observation or analysis. To say that they lack historical perspective is of course true. Frequently, however, historical perspective requires not only subjective distance from the events but also the brazen ability to disregard important details or, if sources are inadequate, to be happily unaware of them. Thus Franklin D. Roosevelt's administration now causes more obvious dissension among the writers who swell Sunday supplements and the intellectual magazines than does the régime of Thomas Jefferson among professional historians. If contemporary journalists knew as much about the deeds of Jefferson as they do about Roosevelt's, they might be equally baffled.

A historian, therefore, is an individual who re-creates events and peoples of the past in accordance with his own or society's preconception of them. The essential difference between mythology and history is that the latter's preconceptions are subject to more searching criticism and standards. But both fail to capture the essence, the spirit, or the dogma of an age because these qualities are unknowable in any absolute, final way.

Such a description of history, to be sure, tends to exaggerate the predicament of this discipline. Of course Thomas Jefferson was the third President of the United States and of course Franklin D. Roosevelt has been the thirty-second; the evidence on these chronological points is overwhelming. Yet when the attempt is made to ascertain why either man was elected, a host of sociological, political, economic, and psychological problems arises that defies a simple description

and that prevents anything approaching unanimous agreement. The problem of the causation of past events is a merry battleground among historians; witness, for example, the controversies that still persist concerning the origin of the last World War.<sup>5</sup>

With no decision concerning the causal factors in history, it is not possible to conceive of generalizations based on historical events that invariably affect present and future plans. Some historians, therefore, have found refuge in the collection of political, military, and diplomatic "facts,"<sup>6</sup> in the kind of scholarship that avoids the problem of adducing principles. Conscientious students of history are frequently appalled by overambitious attempts to reduce complexities to simple formulae and they are eager to point out that such attempts, being the products of finite minds, have been based on faulty or inadequate knowledge of the historical "facts."<sup>7</sup> Bewildering erudite theories, like those contained in the German literature of *Geisteswissenschaft*, represent little more than the esthetic appreciation of the past, the defense of a vaguely defined intuition, and the classification of events into "ideal" types.<sup>8</sup> When a historian announces that the problem of history is to discover "how man everywhere has come to be as he is,"<sup>9</sup> he is motivated by a limited conception that "science is, fundamentally, a method of dealing with problems" and in practice he employs a variety of hypotheses to help explain the genesis of the present. It may be the better part of valor not to succumb to the sin of oversimplification and to find, instead, "pluralistic causes" in innumerable sets of circumstances, but this procedure has not produced the synthesis necessary for future predictions.

History, then, is torn between the lay observation that "history repeats itself" and the scientific assertion that "no event in nature is ever repeated in identical form." What

<sup>5</sup> Beard (10), p. 15.

<sup>6</sup> Beard (11), pp. 56-57.

<sup>7</sup> Teggart (145), chap. i.

<sup>8</sup> Spranger (135), chap. ii.

<sup>9</sup> Teggart (145), pp. 1, 5.

usually happens when "a lesson" is drawn from history is this: the historian, the teacher, the politician, or the demagogue resorts to a specious analogy. He hopes to convince the gullible that the consequences of the present event will resemble those which followed an *apparently* similar set of circumstances in the past. "International and national events are now the same as those in 1914..." "When the party of my opponent was last elected to office, remember the chaos that resulted..." "Whenever a society has paid more attention to material rather than spiritual values, it has decayed..."

The difficulty with these analogies lies in their assumption of close identity between the circumstances of the past and the present. Any event, historical or contemporary, is the end product of a series of circumstances, all of which originate in or are experienced by human beings. Two similar end products may result from different circumstances and under different psychological conditions; and similar circumstances and conditions may produce different end products. For this reason wars have had different "causes" or chains of causes; for this reason the oppression of one class by another does not lead inevitably to revolution. To claim that two men are of equal height because their heads reach the same point on the wall of a room is absurd when one of them is standing on stilts.

It is unrealistic, consequently, to assume that two historical events are ever sufficiently similar so that the consequences of the one falling into the future can be predicted from what has previously occurred. In the natural sciences this procedure is fruitful, but it is fruitful only when conditions can be controlled in such a way that they are as similar as the experimenter can ingeniously devise them. In these sciences conditions that might disturb the recurrence of the phenomenon are excluded and only the crucial and the irrelevant ones are allowed to remain; the "system" is really a "closed" one. The historian, however, has to analyze events that are not of his own choosing or arranging and, since no

thoroughly causal analysis of social events is possible or at least has been demonstrated, he is unable to decide which circumstances are crucial and which are irrelevant.

Historians, like all human beings, wish to profit from experience and thus assist their fellows. Their experience with the past, which is supposed to prevent mankind from committing errors a second or a hundred times, has not been theirs, nor are they in a position to derive sound benefits from the second- or hundred-hand reports they receive. The conventional child is thought to fear the proverbial fire after he has been burned the first time. As a matter of fact it has been argued that the fear occurs only when the child appreciates the connection between the fire and the pain.<sup>10</sup> Thereafter, if the story is correct, he avoids anything which resembles a flame. This flame may originate in a fireplace, in a stove, on an electric toaster, or on a bonfire; the potentiality of being burned has been differentiated from many other backgrounds in which it may be embedded. Such a process of analysis, unsystematic though it may be, is the prerequisite to profiting from experience.

In like manner the student of society and the planner can learn lessons from history only when they have been able to analyze the psychological reactions of the individuals who have been playing historical rôles. People who have revolted or have remained at peace have done so under particular conditions and for reasons to be found within them as personalities. To understand the personality of one individual, however, is no mean task, a task that becomes almost impossible when the thousands of people composing a historical incident must be similarly understood. Even though it is desirable to make as many psychological analyses as is feasible, another procedure might be employed. Let the incident be described in terms of the behavior of the individuals. From the historical and from all the conceivable facts that are gathered by scholars, assume or postulate the psychological reasons for this behavior. Then try to embody the particular

<sup>10</sup> Koffka (82), pp. 302-303.

psychological sequences into more general principles of behavior that have been tested under the controlled conditions of the laboratory. If this is done, then the event itself will be intelligible in terms of known principles, and it will have been stripped of its nonessential characteristics. Of course such a procedure, being based on inference, is risky—but no alternative at the moment appears more fruitful.

It must be confessed that a psychological plan for the formulation of historical generalizations has little chance of being fulfilled. Contemporary psychological principles are not always in a utilizable form for historians. Historical data may be neither abundant nor reliable. If this type of research is doomed to defeat, however, it is imperative not to try to guide people and their society with plans that are half-baked generalizations based on crude analogies. In this instance, the proposal of an ideal methodology may serve only to discredit the fallacious ones.

The discipline of history, however, is able to give certain important insights into modern social problems. When students of society or planners gather information concerning social events, they may try to secure data by making a thorough cross-sectional examination and analysis of a given situation and the human participants in that situation. Everything that anyone would like to know concerning the state of the nation obviously resides in that nation's peoples. There is, however, a vast difference between appreciating what one wants to know (even when one is able to locate the probable site of that knowledge) and actually obtaining it. Only the powers of omniscience possessed by a deity or a telepathically gifted genius would be indeed sufficient to ascertain the "true" state of a nation, even if it be as small as Andorra or Lichtenstein.

Due to these human limitations a completely ahistorical, i.e., cross-sectional, approach to a situation and to an individual is beyond the scope of human ingenuity. Data in any field cannot be approached with a blank mind: the investigator needs some kind of a hypothesis to guide him. When

social behavior is being analyzed, a tentative hypothesis is usually obtainable from an examination of historical backgrounds. For historical data, reliable or unreliable though they be, usually exist in some form and, if they do not, they may be gathered from records which never protest or are embarrassed like living persons. To know beforehand that the United States has passed through a pioneer stage and that, on the whole, it never possessed the kind of feudalism out of which modern Europe has had to emerge provides some immediate clues to the personalities of contemporary Americans; exactly how valuable such a clue may be is of course a problem that can be solved only through an investigation in the present. A knowledge of historical antecedents, therefore, offers preliminary insight into the operation of momentary forces; in more formal language, it enables the student or the planner to give a tentative weighting to the variables that compose his hypothesis. The history of a group of people or of a single individual reveals frequently the crucial factors that must then be examined more carefully.

Relying upon historical clues presupposes, however, some degree of continuity between the past, the present, and the future. And more frequently than not it is dangerous to assume the continuity before it has been carefully investigated. There has been a pioneer era in the United States, yes, and there are survivals of its spirit within many Americans; but the frontier is now closed and hence the spirit is different. Historically the American Negro has a cultural heritage stemming from Africa; this heritage has not survived to any great degree the process of acculturation through which the race has had to go; and the rôle of the few traits that have survived is insignificant in comparison with the traits adopted from the white culture.<sup>11</sup> From these two examples it should be clear that, the closer the historical analysis approaches the momentary situation, the more valuable it becomes as a hypothesis for that situation—but the moment it actually touches people who are still living, it is

<sup>11</sup> Herskovits (60), pp. 253-262.

no longer historical but sociological, political, economic, or psychological in nature. Again the caution with which historical data must be handled is apparent.

The first sentence of the introduction to the magnificent book of the Beards on *The Rise of American Civilization* reads as follows: "The history of civilization, if intelligently conceived, may be an instrument of civilization."<sup>12</sup> Therein is suggested the thought that the study of history, regardless of its errors and its limitations, is able to portray the potentiality of modern man by revealing the multitudinous forms his behavior has assumed in the past. In this respect history is similar to the investigation of primitive peoples: it demonstrates that the present values of human nature have evolved from different values in the past and that this nature might be still different in the future. Men who know the history of their group may not be able to profit directly from the mistakes of their predecessors, but at least they can observe the variability that at one time or another has existed.

In summary, then, history as a guide to future plans offers only very tentative hypotheses and hence cannot claim that a plan is doomed to success or failure because of some occurrence in the past. By examining the past, however, it is possible to obtain preliminary insight into the momentary structure of people; plans, therefore, have to take historical factors into account.<sup>13</sup> No man can maintain to what degree and how precisely the past influences the present or the future; but all men can convince themselves that their particular personalities are only incidents in a vast panorama of variation.

### *Behavior of Judges and Jurymen*

Knowledge of the behavior of judges and jurymen is often essential in determining the success or failure of plans which are legally enforced. Students of jurisprudence concern

<sup>12</sup> Beards (12), vol. I, p. vii.

<sup>13</sup> Burgess (18), pp. 4-9.

themselves with what is called "the judicial process." The behavior of judges is supposed to be governed by precedents in the law (known generically as the principle of *stare decisis*) and therefore, if precedents are known, the decision of the judge should be predictable. That precedents do not offer an exact or valid basis for making such a prediction is all too evident. The naive client, for example, is often bewildered when he consults a lawyer and discovers that the latter is unable to state "the law" which is supposed to operate in his particular case or that his chance of winning or losing a suit apparently depends on the particular judge before whom the trial may be conducted. Evidently this historical approach gives neither lawyers nor laymen the certainty they both desire.

Edward S. Robinson was able to gather an impressive sample of evidence to demonstrate that the behavior of judges in interpreting the law is apparently almost as arbitrary in *some* instances as that of any group of human beings in relation to their own personal problems.<sup>14</sup> Such a contention is not surprising, inasmuch as judges, in spite of their dignity and prestige, are actually human beings too and, being human, they are moved not only by the precedents which are supposed to guide them but also by their own prejudices, the peculiarities of the case being tried, their ambitions, their sympathies, and even their digestive systems. Judges are able to rationalize their human impulses and still believe they are conforming to precedent, since precedents are so numerous and often so ambiguous. It is trite to say that there are exceptions to any rule, including a legal one; but it is important to note that judges make exceptions because they are more than mere reflections of a principle that is supposed to be derived from and yet is seldom easily perceived amid the vast number of heterogeneous, conflicting cases of the past. No student of human behavior would try to explain all the actions of men with one principle. It is equally foolish, consequently, to hope to predict the behavior of judges from one principle alone.

<sup>14</sup> E. S. Robinson (128), esp. chap. viii.



Jurists, moreover, are reluctant to admit that the task of predicting a judge's behavior cannot be simplified by an appeal to precedent. And yet the various schools of jurisprudence that exist and have always existed are an indication that no single approach to the problem is by itself adequate. Under certain circumstances it is possible to explain the behavior of a judge in terms of precedents; but under others it may be necessary to resort to hypotheses from economics, sociology, and psychology. The belief of some jurists that, though individual judges are indeed fallible, their combined efforts tend to conform to some kind of transcendental natural or moral or social law is sheer mysticism.

Another reason why predictions of lawyers and jurists concerning the functioning of the law are so poor is to be found in the presence of the jurymen in many trials. The presiding judge attempts to make their behavior conform to legal procedure by having the case presented in an approved, stereotyped manner, by advising them from time to time, and by delivering his charge before they retire to the jury room. But jurymen are laymen and what the judge tells them and what they have heard in the courtroom are only two of the many factors that determine their decision. As they seek to reach a verdict, they spray upon one another innumerable social pressures and each one is moved to cast his ballot by considerations that may seem, from the point of view of a person trained in the law, to be quite irrelevant to the case at hand. Any trial lawyer knows that his knowledge of the law may help him win a case but that it is frequently more important to use extralegal, psychological devices to convince judges and especially jurymen that the cause of his client is just.

It is fair to say too that jurists and lawyers really do not wish to employ the principle of *stare decisis* too rigorously, for then laws would be enforced by judges and jurymen with unvarying precision. Both English and American scholars are proud of the common law for the very reason that it is flexible, that it is able to discover exceptional or extenuating

circumstances in which a "principle" does not apply. The moment there are loopholes in the administration of law, jurists cannot expect to formulate precise predictions and must abandon the quest for certainty or a rigorous science. It can also be concluded, furthermore, that political plans in a society with democratic traditions will not be enforced rigidly, consistently, or uniformly.

Only from a strictly realistic point of view, however, can jurisprudence and law be described in terms of the behavior of judges and jurymen. Men, women, and even jurists and judges themselves are usually not realistic when they think about or participate in the affairs of a court of law. To them courts, being the instruments through which laws are executed, possess a mysterious quality that cannot be "explained" by a reference to the "mere" individuals who compose those courts. The symbolic significance ordinarily attached to the legal process, therefore, is a real phenomenon to those who attach it. Perhaps a realistic analysis of the behavior of judges and jurymen serves to destroy the illusion that their behavior follows principles different from those applicable to other human beings; and for this reason the *sociological* rôle of the legal process in demanding and receiving the respect and awe of citizens cannot be overlooked.

### *Theory and Practice*

The appraisal of the predictive value of jurisprudence raises an old, old question, viz., the relation of theory and practice. The jurist, for example, may say that "theoretically" he could predict the interpretation of a particular law from precedents in the past, but that "practically" more factors are at work in determining that interpretation. These factors include the economic, social, and psychological ones suggested above. The Federal Constitution of the United States became in the hands of John Marshall a document quite different from the one that was in the minds of the founding fathers. The notorious phrase in the Fourteenth Amendment, "due process of law," has been applied

to the rights of corporations and less rigorously to the freed slaves for whom it was originally designed; here "practice" has been determined by changing social conditions. Thus it would appear that jurisprudence is "theoretical" and the actual decision in the courtroom is "practical."

This distinction between theory and practice is usually made by laymen and is most annoying to theorists. In reply the latter deny the distinction and claim that a theory which is impractical is a bad theory in a theoretical sense too. Aside from its attempt to bolster the theorist's self-respect, this contention must be considered absolutely correct. The engineer who designs a bridge according to what he believes to be a correct theory must admit, if that structure collapses as a result of an insufficient margin of error in his plans and not as a result of a natural disaster (like a hurricane in New England) which he could not possibly have foreseen, that his theory was correct only in terms of ideal conditions which did not exist and that, in truth, he must have employed an incorrect theory under the circumstances. The discrepancy is not between theory and practice but between what the engineer thought the conditions would be and what they actually were.

Jurisprudence, consequently, must be accused of formulating theories concerning the law that are inadequate in terms of the actual conditions which exist when law is being administered. A theory describing how wills or contracts must be phrased to be legal in a particular state is a good theory when the will or contract in question actually is declared legal by a court which hears it contested; it is a bad theory only when the lawyer does not foresee all of the circumstances which might induce someone to bring suit. Similarly, if the functioning of a municipal government is described in terms of the provisions of the local charter and the formal debates of the local representatives without reference to the machinations of ward bosses and the shady techniques of politicians, such an analysis must not be called "theoretical": in reality, it is simply inadequate; it is couched in phrases that do not reveal the entire story; it

is the statement of a theory applicable to conditions that do not exist.

All public officials, including the ward boss, the trial lawyer, the lobbyist, and the public relations counsel, are aware that in social situations men and women tend to overstep the formal rules embodied in their social institutions and seek private goals through devices they themselves invent. The conclusion to be drawn from these infringements of official regulations is this: it is probably impossible to formulate theories of human action in the form of laws which will prove to be absolutely good theories in practice. When murder, for example, is prohibited, the theoretical assumptions are, first, that people will obey the law and, secondly, that they can obey; the theory at the basis of this law, therefore, is a rather good one under most circumstances. In contrast, both assumptions behind the defunct Prohibition Amendment evidently were wrong; this amendment, therefore, is now considered to have been based upon a bad theory. In like manner any kind of a plan is derived from a bad theory when it does not succeed in practice—and from the experience mankind has had with its laws and government it seems fair to believe that most plans cannot be completely successful and that, consequently, the theories behind them cannot be altogether good ones. The explanation for such inadequate theories must be sought both in the complexity of the situations with which the theories attempt to deal and in the ever-present differences among all human beings which prevent any one theory from being completely valid for everyone.

#### *State and Individual*

The relationship between the citizen and his government is another clear-cut illustration of a situation that does not conform to rules formulated in advance. This relationship has fluctuated from society to society, but there has always been some bond symbolized by the existence of patriotism or at least by a degree of in-group feeling. A basic factor

promoting group loyalty, in addition to the presence of a threatening out-group, seems to be the extent to which citizens identify their interests and their welfare with the government and its activities.

Close ties between church and state in Western European civilization have usually served to strengthen the identification, for in this way strong religious impulses also become attached to the government of the ruling group. Even in this era when most governments proclaim their independence of the church, politicians still call for divine assistance and exclaim that they and their cause have received supernatural benediction. Sometimes the church too seeks to strengthen itself by supporting the government that is in control.

In the modern world, however, it may be said with some confidence that activities which men find most important usually are related to the economic sphere. Governments, therefore, are considered vital to the extent that they promote industry and agriculture in some way or other. Economic institutions, in short, have tended to replace religious ones within the core of most people.

Since the state under fascism and communism is so concerned with the regulation and control of economic affairs, people in these countries probably have been at least partially convinced that their individual welfare is linked to the particular régime under which they are forced to live. When almost the entire citizenry, for example, votes practically unanimously at a scheduled election, such a phenomenon is, of course, the product of force and intimidation; simultaneously it is a tribute to the gigantic propaganda that serves to impress everyone with the necessity of being enthusiastic supporters of the government and its aims. In the planned economies of Germany, Italy, and Russia, moreover, the relationship of every job, no matter how dull or exciting it happens to be, to the total scheme of things is being continually stressed. For this reason scrubbing floors or striking typewriter keys is glorified by the official propagandists until it is made to appear as a unique, significant contribution to both the political and economic life of the

country. A dictatorship, consequently, may be said to be similar to the church-state of the Middle Ages: both try to absorb almost all of the individual.

In a democracy, on the other hand, government traditionally is the umpire whose existence is assumed but whose personality is never supposed to dominate the battle. Politics, therefore, is segmental to the interests of most Americans. The apathy usually demonstrated toward voting is certainly a reflection of this lack of interest, although the existence of a poll tax in some states and complicated methods of registration doubtless prevent some people from voting. The long list of candidates at a municipal or state election, most of whom are unknown to the voter, represents quite a different situation from that which existed in the town meeting where democratic suffrage first functioned. Only the duties of candidates for national offices are well publicized, and therefore so many voters fail to appreciate the significant rôle which local officials play. Most Americans are probably affected more by petty authorities whose names they cannot even recite than they are by the President or the Senator whose personal lives may be known by everyone. It is little wonder that a few countries like Belgium have had to force their citizens to take advantage of their "privilege" by means of compulsory voting. In America a number of harmless organizations, supported by editorials in the respectable newspapers, have devoted conscientious efforts to "getting out the vote"; for they have believed most naïvely and sincerely that the cure for democracy's ills lies in increasing the number of active voters.

There are, however, certain groups of Americans who believe that their welfare is linked to governmental activities and who, consequently, are most concerned with what happens in Washington, the state or county capital, or the local party organization. Aside from politicians themselves, those who secure positions through political patronage or who obtain "relief" from a governmental agency scan election returns for reasons other than human-interest. In many sections of the South, local politics is a thrilling sport which

serves to make living less monotonous and which enables a submerged class like the poor whites to prove their equality with the middle class and their superiority over their economic equals, the Negroes; here interest in ego-expansion and not an economic motive raises the prestige attached to the election of public officials. As a result of the vigorous activity of the Roosevelt administration, government in America has become more than a traditional abstraction to those who have suffered from the depression; thus Middletown's working class now looks to Washington for concrete assistance<sup>15</sup> and almost 40 per cent of the youth studied in the state of Maryland believe that low wages "calls for some kind of action on the part of the federal government."<sup>16</sup> If people, consequently, are to be made interested in political plans, means must be employed to convince them, either through propaganda or the facts of the situation, that the plans are significant to them.

### *Civil Service*

The efficiency of a government in any country depends to a great extent upon a trained personnel which actually performs the necessary functions. In an industrial society, furthermore, all governments are tending to assume more and more functions and therefore they require specialists as competent as those employed in private enterprise. The employees of the government and of business, then, are required to perform similar tasks and the standards by which they are judged need be no different.

The sneer attached to the word "bureaucracy," however, reveals a problem peculiar to public administration. To be sure, part of the opprobrium placed upon the bureaucrat is either false or exaggerated. Lack of initiative is not an inevitable consequence of permanency of tenure, for men who in a general way have been made secure for life may still have to strive for specific promotions within their depart-

<sup>15</sup> Lynds (95), pp. 366-367.

<sup>16</sup> Bell (14), p. 213.

ments and also for social prestige. Even in the United States, a country so notorious for its spoils system, there has been a slow but clearly perceptible trend away from political patronage and toward the merit system and its characteristic feature, the competitive civil-service examination.<sup>17</sup> Perhaps the small amount of prestige attached to many government positions attracts less capable people; and hence the critic of bureaucracy who claims that the regular receipt of a check automatically changes the personality of the civil servant may be arguing backwards.

A really significant indictment against the bureaucrat is the charge that he tends to be conservative and overcautious.<sup>18</sup> High officials desire to have their departments run as smoothly as possible and therefore they usually are more eager to appoint a sound, stolid individual rather than one with a flair for innovations. They then readily become dependent upon their appointees for information, which information may be colored by the latter's personalities. Before Franklin Roosevelt it could be said that private enterprise was more "experimental" than government. For the former, having the concrete goal of increasing profits, is able to appreciate the necessity for radical revisions in policy, whereas the latter, being concerned with what is so vaguely called "public service" and never being so certain of its domain, has frequently felt that no change is better than any change. In almost all instances governments operate on a much larger scale than does any one private business—and most people, with the exception of a man like Roosevelt, hesitate longer to make a far-reaching change than they do in adopting measures destined to affect fewer lives.

White, an expert student of public administration, distinguishes two types of administrative systems in government, the centralized and the decentralized, and immediately notes that in the United States the former shows a marked tendency to increase. "The term centralization...describes a dynamic relationship between a higher and a lower level

<sup>17</sup> White (159), chap. xviii.

<sup>18</sup> Laski (84), p. 71.



of government, whereby the upper level increases its authority at the expense of the lower"; when administration is decentralized, on the other hand, authority is not delegated to many civil servants by a few men in control but stems from officials in the local regions where the government activity is to be performed.<sup>19</sup> Under both systems workers wish to retain their jobs, just as any person seeks to have economic security for himself and his dependents. When public administration is very highly centralized, however, as it is in countries with dictatorships, the favored few are interested not only in their own personal security but also in their sense of power. A minister or a commissar interprets his position in terms of his own very meaningful impulses and drives. For this reason high officials in a centralized bureaucracy are difficult to depose; for this reason dictatorships give rise to nepotism and cliques; and for this reason, among others, Russia and Germany have to substitute the treason trial or the blood purge for the automatic limits of tenure imposed upon administrative chiefs in a democracy. This tendency for the so-called and often self-appointed élite to consolidate their positions and to refuse to abandon them seems to be unavoidable in governments where through necessity or choice control must be exercised completely from above.

Another feature of public administration, moreover, tends to create a strong temptation to further increases in centralization even though power is already quite centralized. As in private enterprise, the political leader must feel confident that his subordinates will be faithful to him and will obey his orders without much question. Nepotism anywhere is understandable, if not excusable from the point of view of the merit system, when the obvious fact is recalled that men have intimate ties with their relatives and that they therefore tend to trust people who are thus bound emotionally to them rather than strangers. Nor is it at all surprising that political appointees are selected not only on the basis of their ability, but also on their party affiliations

<sup>19</sup> White (159), p. 15.

and service. For men who have proven themselves loyal in the past are likely to be concerned with more than the routine details of their positions; they will also be loyal to their patron. This loyalty, furthermore, may motivate them to work both enthusiastically and perhaps more effectively. After a revolution or a *coup d'état*, consequently, the juicy and responsible positions are allocated to the men who have helped bring about the social or political change. These individuals are, naturally, the most deserving and, in addition, they give their leader a feeling of security that both the affairs of state and his own concerns are in "safe" hands. In fascist and communist societies, moreover, public officials have prestige because they are the most devout, because they exercise so much power, and because their wages are usually relatively high. Thereafter men and women of ability can be given coveted minor positions, but the "old guard," in spite of smoldering protests, attempts to remain on top of the heap.

What has been said concerning the bureaucratic urge to remain in power can be generalized to include almost all political leaders. In the United States it is traditional that the President spends part of his first term worrying about being elected a second time. Prime Ministers in England are reluctant to "go to the country," for fear that their party will not be returned in as great numbers. Dictators practically never contract the various duties they have assumed or usurped; and they tend to be jealous of any of their subordinates who overshadow them in responsibility or popularity. From the sociological point of view, however, this phenomenon cannot be considered an attribute of "human nature." For men, when they grow older or sick, or when they change their personal philosophy, often become weary of public office and voluntarily retire, especially if they are certain to receive some kind of a pension.<sup>20</sup> What seems to be true is that men want security and prestige and that in most societies holding a high political position is the way to secure both. If the ditchdigger were more highly paid and

<sup>20</sup> White (158), chap. xvi.

if he were an honored hero in a society, then there would be rules, like the third term or a compulsory retirement age, which would prevent him from doing his valued work permanently. Or else men would kill one another and then form bureaucratic cliques to retain the privilege of this rough work for themselves and their children.

*Political Power*

The leader or the statesman of a country possesses power over the rest of the citizens. In a democratic country power-hungry men are considered dangerous and a real threat to planning or even the entire political system. Spranger, in listing his types of ideal men, recognizes a distinct organization of personality in the *Machtmensch*, the man who seeks "power" over his fellows.<sup>21</sup>

Unfortunately a survey of "political power" by a writer as competent as Charles E. Merriam produces generalizations that must be considered little more than unreliable descriptions of this human activity. It is pointed out, for example, that governments arise when the need for power is recognized; that the type of leader is a function of his social setting; that power exists in groups other than the government; that power is retained through certain emotional and intellectual devices; that power may be abused; that individuals may resent or revolt from power.<sup>22</sup> From such a survey it is possible to conclude only (1) that power is everywhere, although its forms vary; (2) that, historically, ideas concerning the functions of power have undergone changes.

When the author states, for example, that in his own studies he has "set up as a sort of temporary scaffolding the following series of aptitudes commonly found in a variety of modern leaders" and names six ("high degree of social sensitivity," "high degree of facility in personal contacts with a wide variety of persons," "facility in group contacts,"

<sup>21</sup> Spranger (135), pp. 188-209.

<sup>22</sup> Merriam (107), *passim*.

“facility of dramatic expression,” “some facility in invention, whether of formulas, policies, ideologies,” and “an unusually high degree of courage”),<sup>23</sup> the reader is duty-bound to appreciate the modest adjective, “temporary,” and the evasive adverb, “commonly,” but he is simultaneously inclined to question this list of “aptitudes” and to wonder whether anyone can ever evolve a more permanent “series.” Does the series pretend to distinguish leaders from non-leaders? If it does, on what basis has anyone the right to make the distinction before both the latter and the former have been measured and the measurements have been found to be reliable, objective, and valid? How is such measurement ever to be made? There is an undeniable emotional satisfaction that can be obtained from such rough empiricism, but it is not the kind of science that gives a reliable guide to the future.

Similarly it is comforting to know that there are three ways of resisting power: by “relatively unorganized murmuring and grumbling, obvious disrespect and dissent”; by “organized and active resistance, accompanied by incidental or intended violence”; and by “organized resistance without the use of violence.”<sup>24</sup> Surely all resistance falls into one of these three rubrics, just as an object must be either A, B, or C when these alternatives exhaust all the possibilities. But, again, this is a descriptive classification and nothing more. Under what conditions do men use one and not the other two methods of resisting? Merriam attempts no answer. A classification is better than no classification, but a classification is not a prediction.

Another type of loose generalization is expressed by Soule who observes that “whether or not a given group formally accepts the method of majority rule, its main activity centers about, and is carried on by, a minority.”<sup>25</sup> At a time when fascist countries laud what is called “the leadership principle,” it seems dangerous to emphasize the apparent truth

<sup>23</sup> Merriam (107), pp. 40-44.

<sup>24</sup> Merriam (107), p. 159.

<sup>25</sup> Soule (134), p. 137.

of this observation. Bias aside, it is clear that political power has to be delegated to elected or self-appointed executives if policies are to be practiced efficiently and effectively. Even the enraged mob usually cannot achieve its objective without a leader who can give directions and who canalizes the blind impulses that are being expressed. Only a few men can conduct international negotiations or distribute policemen through a community or tabulate a census. There must be some division of authority and a certain degree of discipline. The precise extent of this discipline constitutes one of the chief problems of political planning; this issue, therefore, will be considered later when democracy and dictatorship are compared and when the political advantages of regionalism are stressed.

## CHAPTER V

### ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

THE analysis of economic activity by the economist bears on the problem of planning in three very significant respects. Many writers have proposed that the study of economic activity by itself affords perhaps the most important clue to an understanding of almost all human activity; it is necessary, therefore, to evaluate the theory of economic determinism for the same reason that a reasonable, modest view of the rôle of biological factors has had to be obtained.<sup>1</sup> Then at the moment economics, of all the social sciences, is most scientific in the sense of working from definite principles and hazarding predictions concerning future events. The advantages and disadvantages of this type of approach must be appraised, in order to determine the utility of economic theory to economic planning. And, lastly, economists have collected the kind of concrete information about people and their economic environment which must be at the planner's disposal before economic planning can occur.

#### *Economic Determinism*

To live men ordinarily must produce. There are very few human needs which, like breathing, can usually be satisfied with almost no effort: most of them require some intermediate activity before they can find adequate release. Materials have to be procured or altered, or both processes must occur. A food supply is seldom present in abundance, animals and plants must be converted into clothing, supplies must be stored for times of emergency. Men, surrounded by natural or artificially created scarcity, have no alternative except to produce; economic activity is inevitable.

Since needs so frequently can be satisfied only by means

<sup>1</sup> Above, pp. 27, 33.

of this intermediate, productive activity, it is not surprising that so-called economic factors, especially when they are not too carefully defined, have been considered decisive ones in the determination of human events. The implicit reasoning behind most theories of economic determinism runs as follows:

1. Activity that is time-consuming affects men and their society.
2. Production is time-consuming.
3. Therefore production affects men and their society.

This syllogism is crude; but its scope can be extended by substituting more specific activities for the word "production" in the second sentence. All of the following activities, for example, are also time-consuming and directly or indirectly affect the satisfaction of human wants: the creation and preservation of capital, the attempt to rise in the economic scale, the struggle against insecurity or starvation, the exploitation of natural resources, and the economic relations among men.

There is, moreover, quantitative evidence at hand to show that men are affected by the economic conditions under which they live. If these conditions refer to occupational status, it is possible to point out that there are more intelligent individuals (as measured by intelligence tests), more geniuses, and fewer people with physical defects among the professional and semiprofessional groups than among the slightly skilled and the skilled groups.<sup>2</sup> On a social level Veblen<sup>3</sup> has explained the effect of upper-class status upon the social and economic life of the rich. And in the realm of politics it has been possible to comprehend at least partially the fruitless pursuit of Mussolini and Hitler for autarchy in terms of their respective countries' deficiencies in mineral and other natural resources.

The difficulty with the theory of economic determinism is

<sup>2</sup> Anastasi (5), pp. 83-93, 209-210, 365-366; F. S. Freeman (48), pp. 120-127.

<sup>3</sup> Veblen (152).

that its scope is not clearly defined. It is impossible to state whether the inferior intelligence of the lower-income groups is caused by their income or vice versa: have such people inferior intelligence because their budgets have not allowed them many educational advantages or have they received little education or economic advancement as a result of their inferior intelligence? The precise techniques of "conspicuous waste" which American millionaires and European aristocrats have employed cannot be accounted for solely in terms of their wealth or their economic position within society. And only in a loose sense can it be said that dictators seek new lands to conquer for purely economic reasons: bound together with their economic motives are both racial and nationalistic philosophies and also the desire to afford their people substitute gratifications for the frustrations they must endure at home.

It is evident, moreover, that the behavior of specific individuals cannot be explained in economic terms alone. In spite of the group differences in intelligence on the various income levels, the fact remains that there are some stupid rich men and some intelligent poor men. There are also rich men who sink in the economic scale and poor men who rise. The term "conspicuous waste" covers a multitude of literal sins whose distribution among members of the upper class seems to depend on other than economic considerations; and, again, there are some wealthy individuals who are shy and do not seek social prestige through consuming luxuries which other people condemn. Although it is known that a higher percentage of delinquents comes from the "interstitial" areas of a city than from other more homogeneous, more stable, more prosperous regions,<sup>4</sup> it would be a vast oversimplification to conclude that crime is merely an economic phenomenon. The child of a poor family may commit a petty theft to obtain an object his parents cannot afford to give him. This economic circumstance, obvious though it be, is doubtless only one of a list of possible factors leading to the crime: his parents may have treated him in such a way that he has

<sup>4</sup> Shaw (133), p. 204.



tried to express his dissatisfaction by securing illegal gratification or by thus damaging the reputation of his family; as a member of a gang he may have learned the technique of stealing from his associates; police protection in the neighborhood may have been inadequate; or his school may not have socialized him sufficiently. All of these circumstances are psychological or social in nature, though each of them has or has had an economic basis. A similar or almost identical condition does not always lead to the same result; Healy and Bronner have shown that a delinquent's brother, sister, or even nonidentical twin who has never become delinquent has kept within the law for intricate personal and social reasons that may have little or no connection with economic factors.<sup>5</sup>

Similar difficulties confront a puristic theory of economic determinism on an anthropological level. Mead and her associates, for example, have studied thirteen diverse primitive cultures and have classified each as a coöperative, a competitive, or an individualistic society in respect to the basic patterns of behavior which individuals exhibit toward one another. They find no relation between such patterns of behavior on the one hand and economic factors like the subsistence level or the major technique of securing food on the other. Naturally each society has been influenced by these latter circumstances, but a knowledge of either or both does not enable one to predict in which of the three broad classifications the group must be placed.<sup>6</sup> Short of a perfect correlation between economic factors and social behavior, there is still room for the operation of other, noneconomic factors, even though their importance in some societies be very small.

Whether the theory of economic determinism be based on the mode of production in a given society, on economic classes, or on climatic or geographic factors, therefore, its utility seems limited to the grosser aspects of human behavior. It seems foolish to hope that any one principle, no

<sup>5</sup> Healy and Bronner (57), esp. chaps. viii and ix.

<sup>6</sup> Mead (106), pp. 462-464.

matter how broadly and indefinitely it is stated, can give the one and only one complete explanation of all behavior. It is comforting to trace everything to one source, but comfort is not equivalent to truth. For certain phenomena and up to a certain point the economic explanation may be useful; thereafter other factors have to be taken into account. Even Trotsky, who is one of the most scholarly and devout of the economic determinists, is able to analyze the Russian Revolution almost exclusively in terms of its economic inevitability *until* he has to estimate the importance of Lenin's arrival in Russia in April, 1917; then he forces himself to admit that without the presence of Lenin at that time "it is by no means excluded that a disoriented and split party might have let slip the revolutionary opportunity for many years."<sup>7</sup>

If men's behavior cannot be explained exclusively in economic ways, it is fair to conclude too that their values may have other than an economic basis. This basis need not be considered "spiritual" in contrast to the "material" one which the theory of economic determinism suggests. Production or economic pursuits in general may be time-consuming; but, since men have other than economic contacts with one another, their values are also affected by these additional activities. Looked at in another way, as Hook has written, "the question of planning involves much more than perfecting a scheme by which production, distribution, and consumption can ultimately balance; it involves profound issues of social philosophy—of a way of social life with consequences for education, politics, and all major social institutions."<sup>8</sup>

### *Economics*

Economics, the discipline that analyzes the economic activity of man, contains a mass of details which are more or less accurate descriptions of past and sometimes present events. This aspect of economics is really a specialized form

<sup>7</sup> Trotsky (150), vol. I, p. 330.

<sup>8</sup> Hook (62), p. 664.

of history and has been evaluated, at least implicitly, in the general discussion of history in the previous chapter. Of greater importance here are the scientific aims of economics, aims that are perhaps more clearly formulated and more nearly achieved than in many other social sciences. Economics, therefore, will be analyzed rather formally.

The faith of the economist can be stated succinctly: back of the scramblings of the stock market, back of the fluctuations in demand and supply, back of the intricacies of public finance, back of the vagaries of tariffs and international trade, back of all the figures, charts, graphs, and guesses there are supposed to be first principles that explain and predict apparently chaotic events. And back of the principles themselves, it might be added, are human interactions which either reflect or influence economic data.

At the outset it is necessary to designate the precise branch or school of economics that is being considered. Two of the so-called schools of economics, viz., the historical and the institutional, have recognized that many of the principles of economics have been established by disregarding the distinctive qualities possessed by men in a given economic era. In an effort to avoid abstraction, they have immersed themselves, respectively, in the origins of the present economic system and in the interrelations existing between that system and other social institutions.<sup>9</sup> It has been the institutional school, moreover, which has challenged directly the generalized psychological assumptions of classical and neo-classical economists; Veblen, for example, sought to discredit the already discredited simplified explanations of behavior upon which economics allegedly was based.<sup>10</sup> One can sympathize with the members of these schools for desiring to be more concrete in a historical and psychological sense, but one need not accept them as truly representative of the most productive economic thought. For they have failed to systematize economics and other data into anything that faintly resembles a science in the customary sense in which that con-

<sup>9</sup> Homan (61); Schumacher (132).

<sup>10</sup> Veblen (151).

cept is employed in English-speaking countries; and, as Robbins has pointed out, they have been misled, perhaps, by the conception of man that the so-called classical economist employs merely as "an expository device."<sup>11</sup> Marxian economics has started from different historical and sociological assumptions, but it may be said to have analyzed the functioning of the contemporary capitalism economy in a formal, logical manner resembling classical economics.<sup>12</sup>

The term "economics," then, is being employed here to refer in general to the schools of thought known as the classical, neoclassical, marginal utility, and Cambridge variety. To be sure, there are significant differences in points of view among the adherents of these schools<sup>13</sup> and it is quite unfair to lump them all together and select Lionel Robbins as their unofficial spokesman. And yet, if the significance of economics for planning is to be ascertained within the modest scope of one chapter, some arbitrary choice and a certain amount of manhandling seem necessary, even though the professional economist may wobble with despair. Only passing and infrequent allusions will be made to less conventional types of economic theories.

"Economics," according to Robbins, "is the science which studies human behaviour as a relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses."<sup>14</sup> This is a precise delimitation of the subject matter of economics: it suggests, for example, why the economist is not concerned with the act of breathing until the means of breathing, as in the installation of air-conditioning apparatus, becomes scarce and can be provided in diverse ways. "Economic laws," furthermore, "describe inevitable implications."<sup>15</sup> Such a statement is the essence of science; it states that the economist, if he knows the circumstances under which an economic phenomenon is about to appear, can predict the nature of that phenomenon:

<sup>11</sup> Robbins (127), p. 97.

<sup>12</sup> Gide and Rist (50), pp. 465-467.

<sup>13</sup> Diehl (33); Dobb (34); Knight (80).

<sup>14</sup> Robbins (127), p. 16.

<sup>15</sup> Robbins (127), p. 121.

Suppose, for example, we wish to exhibit the effects on price of the imposition of a small tax. We make certain suppositions as regards the elasticity of demand, certain suppositions as regards the cost functions, embody these in the usual diagram, and we can at once *read off*, as it were, the effects on the price. They are implied in the original suppositions. The diagram has simply made explicit the concealed implications.<sup>16</sup>

Robbins' claim is most arresting, but unfortunately it is really more a wish than an accomplishment. The sad plight of the professional and not-so-professional economists who dared make predictions concerning future events before the depression of the early 'thirties has been sufficiently satirized and therefore it is not necessary to rip open old wounds. If these prophets were wrong not because they were stupid, not because their theories were incorrect, but because they were willing to predict changes in a real world without sufficient knowledge of conditions, then economics can still be rescued from the pitiless mirth of a man like Thurman Arnold.<sup>17</sup> Yet it must be a little disconcerting to the economist to be reminded that a respectable member of his guild can usually be found to declare that almost any public policy involving economic phenomena is either "economically sound" or "unsound."

#### *Nature of Economic Data*

The difficulties of economics, it seems, are due at least to two major factors: in the first place, the kind of scientific reasoning ascribed to economics by men like Robbins is usually impossible since adequate data are lacking; and, secondly, the fundamental assumptions of economics are so narrow that such a restriction of the universe of discourse inevitably does not permit the economist to include enough of the variables that affect economic life.

It may be true that the price of a commodity is a function of its marginal utility both to producers and consumers, but

<sup>16</sup> Robbins (127), p. 122; italics his.

<sup>17</sup> Arnold (6), pp. 115-117 *et seq.*

before the price can be determined that utility must first be ascertained. Demand and supply schedules are usually difficult to draw up and what is done, therefore, is either to illustrate this economic principle by a reference to schedules of the past or to infer future schedules from present or past ones. In the first instance the reasoning is backward: the schedules are inferred from the price, instead of vice versa as the theory demands. And in the second instance the inference, being crudely actuarial in the sense that life-insurance predications depend upon relevant instances in the past, is based on the assumption and the hope that the future will resemble the present and the past, that economic events (like natural ones) are ordained to be uniform. Or else this assumption concerning uniformity is modified to include certain corrections gathered by common sense or from some other discipline. The new advertising campaign of a rival, for example, must lead the manufacturer to assume that the demand for his product will be altered. If he were to know in advance the exact alteration that will occur, then and only then could he modify his own supply—or change his particular brand of advertising. The *formal* discipline of economics, however, is of no assistance to him when he seeks this necessary information, for that discipline requires a knowledge of the new circumstances before it can begin to function and it is precisely this knowledge which the manufacturer lacks. To offset the pending advertising of the rival, this manufacturer might make a market survey in reference to his particular brand. A market survey, however, is a technique which practical businessmen employ and which economists mention only when they are discussing the applied aspects of their subject; it happens to be a technique, moreover, which also involves people, the very people whom the economist for the sake of developing economics into a science must make into unanalyzed abstractions.

The doom of capitalism was predicted by Marx and Engels from their analysis of the way the economic system functions. And yet no time factor was specified and the countries in which the revolution was first to occur varied with the date at which their writings were published. The

truth or falsity of their reasoning need not be questioned here. If their reasoning were correct, the time and place could be determined not only from the reasoning itself but also from the economic *and* social facts characteristic of the society to which the prediction was being applied. The application of a revised dialectic to social processes, an application that transcends economics, has as its aim the prediction of these facts themselves. Even a key Marxian concept like "surplus value" cannot foretell the *exact* wage scale or degree of profits, until the minimum subsistence for workers and the capitalists' conception of an adequate profit are known.

This inability to secure vital information which is essential before a theory can be tested or a prediction can be made is a handicap not only of economics but of all the other social sciences as well. The moment many people are involved in a situation, as they always are in the situations studied by the social sciences, there is seldom if ever a short cut to obtain insight into their behavior or the reasons for that behavior. This is a human defect which has to be recognized both in social science and in planning; and it is a defect which helps explain why men at all times find it so tempting to reason from data that have been gathered in the past to a present or future which does not necessarily resemble that past. A general theory, therefore, cannot always assist theorists in solving specific problems: for practical purposes the gold in the theory usually requires the alloy of crude empiricism.

#### *Assumptions of Economics*

Aside from not having the essential facts at its disposal, economics is faced with a second difficulty that is self-imposed; for economic principles to function it is necessary to make certain broad assumptions concerning society and men. Robbins is sensitive on this point when he writes so trenchantly:

... all that is assumed in the idea of the scales of valuation is that different goods have different uses and that these different uses have different significances for action, such that in a given

situation one use will be preferred before another and one good before another. Why the human animal attaches particular values in this sense to particular things, is a question which we do not discuss. That may be quite properly a question for psychologists or perhaps even physiologists.<sup>18</sup>

If the above be true, then it is useless to take potshots at what the critics of economics like to call the economic man. The contention, however, is true only in a formal sense. He who basks in the sun at a beach must assume the presence of sand; why the sand is there, how long it will remain, whether each grain differs in dimensions and weight from every other one, questions such as these do not disturb him just so long as the sand *in toto* enables him to relax comfortably. The moment the sand disappears due to the tides or winds, the moment it is dampened by rain, the moment it is infested with little animals, at that moment its condition can no longer be taken for granted. Similarly, while human beings crave candy for whatever sensible or stupid reasons, the economist may try to draw a demand schedule for that commodity; but, when chewing gum or cigarettes threaten to replace sweets, the old schedule must be revised. The causes of the revision can be assumed of course, but such fluctuations in demand have to be accounted for in advance, if the economist's prediction is to be valid. To allocate the task to another discipline is perhaps to ignore it.

It seems fair to say, although no economist can be expected to subscribe completely or at all to what is said, that the discipline of economics implicitly or explicitly has had to make certain assumptions concerning the values, rules, technology, and people of the society whose economic life is being analyzed. It is fruitful to examine these assumptions not in order to criticize economics but for several more useful reasons. In the first place, the existence of such assumptions demonstrates how this discipline, which is so ambitious from a scientific point of view, has attempted to operate and with what systematic success. Then, secondly, it will be shown that the number of these assumptions is so

<sup>18</sup> Robbins (127), pp. 85-86.



great that economics seems faced with the alternatives of being strictly scientific and somewhat sterile or of being much less scientific and more valuable. The sad condition of economics is no reason for economists to be filled with despair; rather this condition seems to demonstrate that men's knowledge of man cannot be compartmentalized if man himself is to be understood.

*Values*

The economist, like all of his colleagues in the social sciences, seeks to avoid the problem of value by remaining neutral. Only in an economic sense, i.e., in respect to its contribution to the finished product or to a product which people in a society demand for any reason under high heaven, does the economist try to distinguish between productive and unproductive activity. The manufacture of a deadly drug is productive, provided that people want this drug and that it can be marketed. From the economic standpoint its deadliness is irrelevant.

And yet, since economists are also members of a society, in practice they have been unable to prevent an ethical value from creeping into their thoughts. The mercantilists of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries deliberately favored a more powerful nationalism.<sup>19</sup> There followed in the next century the French physiocrats who argued, among other things, for private property and the importance of agriculture.<sup>20</sup> Like their French contemporaries, the so-called classical economists in England also stressed the importance of private property and individual liberty, since they were convinced that the combined efforts of separate individuals to further their interests almost inevitably were identical with the social good of the entire society.<sup>21</sup> Some members of the German historical school in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries urged a policy of protection in order that

<sup>19</sup> Heaton (58), chap. xvi; Johnson (75), pp. 96-99.

<sup>20</sup> Gide and Rist (50), book 1, chap. i.

<sup>21</sup> Gide and Rist (50), book 1, chaps. ii and iii; book 2, chap. ii.

their new Empire might be able to compete with a more advanced country like England.<sup>22</sup> The very conception of "surplus value" in socialist economics has a certain propaganda value in the direction of a new social order that does not exploit its workers.<sup>23</sup> And, finally, many institutional economists, in showing the sociological roots of all previous schools, have criticized both their professional colleagues and the economic order that has influenced the latter's thinking.<sup>24</sup>

Whether or not these institutionalists are correct when they maintain that on the whole theoretical economics has tended to justify a given economic order is a problem which need not be decided here. That a belief in an "invisible hand" retarded early factory legislation; that reactionaries and muddled laymen have based their prejudices frequently upon what they call quite vaguely "a law of supply and demand" and hence view any form of economic planning with skepticism and distrust; that the popular conception of economic principles has invaded the minds of judges and has induced them to view only the economic aspects of liberty and freedom; that almost automatically the tone of most textbooks in economics smacks of industrial efficiency and tends to neglect other values of people in an industrial society—more or less direct consequences of particular economic reasoning like these may indeed be by-products of that reasoning and therefore cast neither praise nor blame upon the reasoning itself. Still, when economics places itself at the disposal of planning, such by-products cannot be overlooked. For their existence demonstrates again, it seems, that the formulation of a theory, particularly in the social sciences, usually influences people who possess it or who have heard about it. The knowledge that two chemicals can combine into a new form heretofore undiscovered does not make the chemicals themselves seek this union; but men will be quick to take advantage of the knowledge if the resulting product has commer-

<sup>22</sup> Schumacher (132).

<sup>23</sup> Lasswell (86), pp. 132-133.

<sup>24</sup> Homan (62).

cial possibilities. In astronomy a new datum may affect only the behavior of astronomers and a new method of solving a mathematical problem may startle only mathematicians. But in the social sciences only an isolated hermit can have a theory without simultaneously influencing somewhat the trend of events. More or less arbitrarily postulated values, therefore, have permeated economic thinking; it is impossible to imagine a "pure" economic system without implications for the society which it is designed to explain. Economics is not unique in this respect; the other social sciences are in a similar predicament.

A theory in economics which leads to a prediction, moreover, tends to influence those who believe it and hence may be said to contribute to the value that guides their actions. Suppose, for example, that economists in 1928 had possessed enough data from their own discipline and from others to be able to predict the depression that began a year later. Suppose, furthermore, that an academic periodical or a Wall Street news bulletin had informed great numbers of investors and industrialists of the impending catastrophe. And suppose—which requires the greatest burden of all upon the imagination—suppose that these people had had faith in the prediction. This would have been the situation, in short, if there had been a science of economics with real predictive power and if this science had been communicated socially. Under these conditions events might have been quite different. Investors might have sold their stocks and bonds in order to take advantage of paper profits; and industrialists might have begun to contract their production schedules. If this had occurred, then the economists of 1928, being faced with a set of new conditions, would have had to alter their predictions; and, paradoxically enough, it would have been their prediction which, it is assumed, altered the conditions themselves in the first place. It is realized that the suppositions behind this illustration are fantastically unrealistic; but this portrayal reveals, perhaps a little too blatantly, the way in which a theory in social science may affect behavior.

Modern economists appreciate the plight of their predecessors who have tried to introduce a value-judgment into economics or who have unwittingly reflected a value of their society, and therefore they have been determined to avoid the confusion and the biased thinking contingent upon the problem of value. That they cannot be completely successful in making such a resolution is no fault of theirs. At the same time some of them have realized that as human beings if not as economists they may be called upon to evaluate the trend of economic events, or else they have agreed voluntarily to do so. The solution they have found is clear-cut from a logical point of view: they accept an arbitrary value like an increase in productivity, in the national income, or in employment and thereafter judge each economic event by reference to this index. This position is certainly more "objective" than any other; in this light, economics "enables us to conceive the far-reaching implications of alternative possibilities of policy," and it "does not, and it cannot, enable us to evade the necessity of choosing between alternatives."<sup>25</sup> Thus the problem of value is allocated to someone else or at least to a noneconomic plane of reasoning.

Economics, furthermore, assumes the existence of social values before the conditions under which economic principles are supposed to function can be ascertained. Most of these principles are useful only when a value like productive efficiency can be ascribed to the society that is being analyzed. The moment this value ceases to be the exclusive one in the situation, the economic principle becomes more or less useless. This difficulty can be illustrated by a reference to the "law of diminishing returns" under a strongly nationalistic state. A typical statement of the "law" by Taussig is that "as the quantity put on the market increases . . . , cost for every fresh instalment becomes greater"; this "part of the theory of value," moreover, "has its foundation mainly in some unalterable conditions in the world about us, in the fact that nature enables labor to be applied less advantageously under some conditions than under others, and that the continued application of labor on even the most advan-

<sup>25</sup> Robbins (127), p. 156.

tageous sites meets sooner or later a tendency to diminishing return."<sup>26</sup> On the whole this particular economist believes that the principal functions most precisely in the "extractive industries" and is applicable only with reservations to manufacturing; and yet he adds a word concerning the latter: "In the main, however, the poorer establishments do not maintain themselves indefinitely side by side with the better. They are steadily displaced by the better, and these by the still better."<sup>27</sup> Obviously this generalization is a useful one, since it summarizes in convenient form the consequences which under certain circumstances follow an increase in production. It must be noted, however, that the "certain circumstances" have to be specified and that, unless they exist, the "law" is not valid. "Poorer establishments" may be driven out of existence by better ones, for example, only when "economical" or "efficient" production is the social goal. As soon as this economy of enterprise is replaced by a nationalistic one, the "law" may cease to operate and hence a different prediction will have to be made. For the protective tariffs of a democracy and the self-sufficiency schemes of a dictator, which make the goal political rather than strictly economic, frequently require or enable producers to go beyond "the point" of diminishing returns. The warning of the economist that it is less "profitable" to produce under these conditions than it is to trade elsewhere is simply disregarded. What the economist says, therefore, concerning diminishing returns themselves remains true; but the changed value means changed conditions and changed conditions require a correspondingly changed prediction.

The cultures of primitive peoples, moreover, reveal that efficiency in the economist's sense does not always dominate their lives. Edell, an anthropologist who has worked among the individualistic Bachiga of East Africa, reports the following:

One man of my acquaintance had the ingenuity to try to become wealthy in a very original fashion. Most of the Bachiga, despite their delight in smoking, raise too little tobacco to

<sup>26</sup> Taussig (144), vol. I, pp. 182, 183.

<sup>27</sup> Taussig (144), vol. I, p. 185.

satisfy their needs. This man grew tobacco for sale until he had enough to purchase a calf. His success did not act as a spur. As a calf had been his goal, he stopped raising tobacco. Nor is there any systematic advantage taken of the fact that the Banyaruanda, who are settled about Kabale township, do not raise crops and are ready to purchase food. This is in spite of the fact that this way of raising money is readily turned to when funds are necessary for the annual head tax.<sup>28</sup>

Apparently these people want tobacco, but they do not grow enough of it; they could export surplus food to another tribe, but they rarely do so. In another part of the world, the Kwakiutl Indians had a plentiful supply of food and they coöperated quite efficiently to satisfy their basic needs. Their highest value, as has already been pointed out,<sup>29</sup> seems to have been the inefficient one of destroying as much property as possible in order to shame a rival during the prestige bouts that have been identified as the potlatch. To deal with such different societies, the economist needs an anthropological description of the inhabitants—only then can he discuss their “effective demands” under the “peculiar” conditions in which they live. It would seem, in truth, that the economic drive need not always be the most powerful one and that the ways in which “equilibrium” is reached reflect the emphasis a people places upon acquisitive activity.

### *Rules of Society*

In like manner, the economist, in order to limit the phenomena with which he deals and hence to be scientific, has to postulate the operation of certain rules within a society. People obey the law: they tend to commit few crimes, they uphold the sanctity of private property and of contracts, and with few exceptions, most of them pay the taxes that are imposed. The government, if no longer the impartial umpire it was alleged to be and in fact never was, only mildly regulates industry and, on the whole, merely tries to prevent

<sup>28</sup> Edel (41), p. 143.

<sup>29</sup> Above, p. 57.

people from engaging in "unfair" practices and from forming monopolies and cartels. Again such assumptions are quite legitimate and necessary; it would be unfair, for example, to require economists to know as much about teeth as dentists simply because people use their teeth in consuming the products that are produced in accordance with economic principles. The economist, however, has to admit that he is powerless and impotent when people begin to break laws and regulations. A panic on the stock exchange is more than an economic phenomenon; it contains significant elements that are nastily psychological. Regional demands for distinctive foods belong in the realm of custom, not in economics. New Dealers and other reformers are said to be interfering with economic laws or, if the economist retains his "objective," puristic approach, they can be accused merely of altering the conditions under which those laws operate.

The presence of such reforms and regulations and the undoubted influence that modern advertising has upon consumers' demands has forced one school of economics to revise its basic assumptions. Those who now analyze "imperfect competition" or "monopolistic competition" or who refer to the present era as one of "product differentiation"<sup>30</sup> have recognized more of the social realities that underlie the economic system. In practice, however, they tend to think of imperfect competition as a condition halfway between two other conditions to which their old principles and laws can be applied, viz., the condition of "pure" competition and that of monopoly. It is certainly true that successful advertising which differentiates one product from those of various competitors tends to make the demand schedule more inelastic than it would be in a market in which the product is selected on the basis of the human needs that it satisfies instead of on the basis of the prestige of its maker, the color of its wrapper, and the extravagant claims made in its behalf. Such a statement merely means, for example, that an increase in price of a differentiated product will not decrease the demand in comparison with the degree to which it would

<sup>30</sup> Chamberlain (22); Meyers (108); J. Robinson (129).

if the product were undifferentiated; consumers have been made so enamored of the product that they are willing to pay more for it. Again the economist finds refuge in the statement that differentiation alters the conditions of demand and hence his principles must operate differently. Questions pertaining to the reasons for the success of this differentiation, the conditions under which it will be achieved, the kinds of people who will be affected by it, however, he leaves unanswered in the name of making his task more manageable.

### *Technology*

The economist must assume a particular technological development in a society that possesses certain rules to achieve rather definite values. Price levels in most countries tend to be very sensitive, inasmuch as vehicles of communication are so swift that news concerning fluctuations can be spread in some cases almost instantaneously. The telephone, the telegraph, and the newspapers have no inherent connection with the price of prunes and yet they eventually may affect that price. When cities were smaller and when news spread more slowly, a dealer could offer this commodity at a lower price, thus increase the demand, hence sell more, and perhaps reap a larger total profit. In the contemporary world, however, competitors will learn very quickly that he is undercutting them, they too may reduce their prices to his level, and therefore they will be preventing him from attracting new customers. Similarly the demand for workers can be affected by the invention of a labor-saving device; to understand the labor problem in the industry for which the device is intended, the economist has to assume the existence, and then try to understand the functioning, of this technical advance.

### *Economic Men*

Values, rules, and technological state are concepts that are applied to a society by a process of abstraction on the part of some observer. Values, however, function within peo-



ple; rules are obeyed by people; and a technological state is grasped by and influences people. If the economist to make his principles "work" has to assume certain "weights" for these broad, social concepts, then it is almost inevitable that he must also attribute specific characteristics to the people who give them their reality. Robbins has been quoted above as maintaining that "why the human animal attaches particular values in this sense to particular things, is a question we do not discuss." This position of the economist, to repeat, may be logically clear-cut, but it leads to difficulties concerning phenomena that seem to be relevant to economic behavior and the functioning of economic principles.

The economist, then, is unable to explain why the marginal utility of any product decreases at different rates for different people. He cannot explain why a given demand schedule or a portion of it is elastic or inelastic. He cannot explain why a shift in the demand schedule takes place. He cannot explain completely how the "reservation price" of the seller, i.e., the particular price for which an individual is willing to wait before he disposes of his goods, is determined. He cannot explain why some people try to save more money instead of less when the rate of interest goes down. He cannot explain the bargaining process which, among many other factors, determines wage rates. He cannot explain the inelasticity of labor in respect to its mobility from one job to the next either in the short run or even in the long run. Phenomena like these may be called irrelevant to formal economic theory, but it happens that they are vitally important in determining the very phenomena with which the economist is supposed to deal. In an offhand way the economist admits the existence of such pesky details and offers common-sense descriptions of them; but he cannot cope with them systematically in terms of his formal theory. Economics, in short, avoids the problems of human motivation and individual differences.

Whether or not people are as rational as "the economic man" was supposed to have been is of no concern to the present analysis. For fictions have logical justification as

well as symbolic functions. But the planner cannot help seeing that men are deficient in respect to certain knowledge which the economist too easily assumes they possess. It is not true that the individual is able to select the course of action promising him the greatest amount of satisfaction, whether he be a worker, a seller, or a consumer. Workers do not necessarily appreciate the risks and hazards of their occupations; and, from one economic point of view, they are supposed to receive additional compensation only when they do. Sellers cannot plot their "planning curves," i.e., determine in advance their fixed and variable costs and, when advertising is involved, their selling costs; for this reason only the queer business genius is willing to predict the profit he may reasonably expect from any enterprise or, more specifically, "there is no way of telling how long the profit-yielding advantage of product differentiation will persist."<sup>21</sup> Consumers are especially ill-equipped to analyze the many goods and services that are offered by a complex, varied economy which allows advertisers to present deliberate distortions or exaggerated claims in their copy; the very existence of private organizations like Consumers Research and Consumers Union and of the democratically controlled co-operatives suggests that some effort is being made to remedy this state of consumer ignorance. No economist, to be sure, is so naïve as to claim that everyone is both sensible and intelligent, nor does any economist have to. Still the economic system itself is often justified by making this very assumption.

Other than purely economic considerations frequently enter into economic situations. Most economic principles, however, can be applied to relationships in which it must be assumed that the attitudes and feelings which the participants have either toward one another or toward the commodities involved are neutral or can be disregarded. These attitudes and feelings, nevertheless, are factors which influence the various demand and supply schedules and which, from a strictly economic point of view, are just frivolously

<sup>21</sup> Meyers (108), p. 244.

human. "Dollar exchange, franc exchange, mark exchange, are thought of not merely in terms of profit and loss, but in terms of national glory";<sup>32</sup> or, in slightly different words, international trade involves not only economic attitudes but also patriotic ones. High rents for fashionable sites are said by the economist to be "due to custom"; here the word *custom* is a way of summarizing the culturally induced attitudes that men possess for reasons that the economist can only mention without systematizing.

There is, finally, one other psychological factor that pervades the thinking of economists and yet seldom secures overt recognition, viz., that of skill or ability. To understand wage rates, for example, at first one is asked to assume methodologically that people are equal in respect to skill, for then it is easier to see how the supply of workmen is bound to effect the rewards they receive. But when differential rates among the various occupations are explained, it is necessary to admit that men are not equal in skill and ability either as a result of their hereditary or environmental backgrounds and that the supply in any one occupation is bound to feel the effect of these differences; similarly men in the same occupation cannot be expected to receive equal wages. Sellers also differ from one another in respect to their abilities to draw planning curves, take advantage of a good site, enter into trade agreements with competitors, bargain with their employees, etc.

### *A Closed System?*

If the foregoing analysis of the sociological and psychological assumptions of economics is correct, it may be said that the economist deliberately tries to be abstract in order to formulate certain economic principles within a rather restricted level of discourse; that the predictions which he is able to make are possible only when he is acquainted with innumerable economic, political, social, and psychological conditions; that a knowledge of these conditions has to be

<sup>32</sup> Taussig (144), vol. I, p. 456.

obtained elsewhere and is not a part of the discipline of economics itself; and that, therefore, predictions from strictly economic principles are somewhat limited. Economists are also realistic when they wish to be:

The common statement that prices rise or prices fall is, after all, only a way of saying that somebody has decided that it would be wise to raise or lower the price of this and that which is within his personal control, or the control of himself in conjunction with others whom he can persuade to act with him.<sup>33</sup>

But when an economic event is seen in such a way, it becomes extremely complex and it can so easily escape scientific detection and treatment. Little wonder, then, that economic theory has sought to avoid particular cases and has concentrated upon generalities that are removed quite some distance from the concrete realities.

What has been maintained concerning the attempt of economics to be truly scientific can be summarized very briefly: general economic theory tries to set up a closed system but cannot succeed in doing so. By "a closed system" is meant a situation in which all irrelevant factors can be excluded or controlled. The natural scientist formulates principles that are applicable to closed systems whose nature he specifies; thus a chemical law is true only within a particular temperature or pressure range. All economic generalizations are based on the presumption that the numerous sociological and psychological factors that have been mentioned are "equal," i.e., controlled, specified, or considered negligible. Since they are always affecting the situation to which the principle is being applied, however, the economist's system is not closed and consequently his predictions are unreliable.

Without a closed system, then, formal economics by itself can never be of great assistance to planning so far as prediction is concerned. For economic activity is only one of the activities in which human beings engage and they are motivated to produce, distribute, or consume by more than eco-

<sup>33</sup> Wooton (164), p. 47.

conomic factors. The logical chastity of the economist's position, consequently, is commendable only in a formal sense. The hope of predicting economic events for the benefit of planning, if not the hope of economics itself as a science, lies in the ability of men to formulate principles that can include a greater number of variables bearing on human behavior.

### *Empirical Data*

At the moment, however, economics has already made certain important, *specific* contributions to planning. Even though the range of its predictive ability is limited, it remains extremely useful to know, as Robbins has pointed out, the consequences of a set of conditions which planners contemplate will come into existence. If a plan, for example, requires that the gold content of the dollar be lowered, that a minimum-wage scale be enforced, or that a tariff barrier be destroyed, economics can at least suggest some of the effects of such changes.

Economists, moreover, have theories which enable them to arrange crude, statistical data in an intelligible, useful fashion. And they are also able to answer economic questions by presenting the best set of facts that are available. As specific illustrations of economic conclusions, this section will consider briefly certain aspects of the following three topics: the increasing productivity of labor in America; distribution; and factors determining industrial efficiency.

There are laymen and politicians who maintain that a return to the productive level of 1929 will solve almost all, if not all of the country's economic ills. One of these ills is supposed to be unemployment and hence, to increase employment, the plan of the 1929 productive economy is suggested. Obviously this is an economic question and therefore it is the task of the economist to furnish the facts concerning both the 1929 and the present state of production and unemployment.

To evaluate this proposed solution to the problem of unemployment, it is possible to refer to a concrete study made

by Weintraub.<sup>34</sup> From the available data it is clear that the *volume of goods and services* produced in the United States increased from 1920 to 1929, decreased from 1929 to 1932, and then increased from 1932 to 1935 beyond the 1920 but below the 1929 level; that the "estimated full-time man-year equivalents of the average annual number of wage and salaried workers employed" (or, briefly, the *man-years of employment*) followed a somewhat similar trend, except that the peak in 1929 was not so high and the recovery in 1935 was still below the 1920 and the 1929 levels; but that the *productivity of labor* (which is equal to the ratio of the volume of goods and services produced and the man-years of employment) steadily increased with two exceptions from 1920 to 1929, decreased from 1929 to 1932, and then increased in 1935 *far beyond* both the 1920 and 1929 levels. Since technological improvements and other economies, especially in the basic industries, have occurred between 1929 and 1935 in spite of or perhaps as a result of the depression, it follows that a smaller number of workers at the moment is able to produce a greater volume of goods and services; therefore Weintraub concludes that "although the physical volume of production in 1935 was approximately 30 per cent higher than in 1932 and 14 per cent higher than in 1920, a rough calculation indicates that a return to the 1929 level of *employment* would, assuming the 1935 composition of the national output and the 1935 rate of productivity, require an output of goods and services equal to 110 per cent of the 1929 level, or more than 140 per cent of 1935."<sup>35</sup> This means that a return to the 1929 production schedule under 1935 conditions would not require the employment of the same number of men as formerly; instead production would have to be greatly increased. Due to such economic data, therefore, it is necessary to discard a plan which seeks to solve the unemployment problem simply by increasing the production schedule to the point where that

<sup>34</sup> Weintraub (156).

<sup>35</sup> Weintraub (156), p. 78; italics his.

problem was thought to be more or less solved in the past. Other factors, like the increase in the total labor force of the country during the depression, would also render such a plan impractical.

Since money is the means of purchasing many of the important items of existence, planners who seek to reform some of the evils of a society must first ascertain the actual distribution of wealth in the entire population. Average annual per capita income estimates for 1929 which have been prepared by the Brookings Institution<sup>36</sup> include all the income of the individual and, for the rural population "allowances for rent and for food produced and consumed on the farm." This survey shows that the general average for the United States was \$750, for the nonfarm population \$908, and for the farm population \$273. For both groups of the population, there are regional fluctuations: the Far West has been the most prosperous and the Southeast the least. These figures, however, cannot be taken at their face value since they are not weighted for differences in purchasing power. The economist can "explain" why this apparently unequal distribution both among individuals and regions has occurred; and he can offer the data as the basis of reform, even though as economist he cannot necessarily prescribe the precise reform.

When the productivity of labor is employed as an economic concept, the economist realizes that productivity is the end result of innumerable factors, not all of which are enumerated when reference is made to number of workers, hours of work, technological progress, and technical skill. For, from the individual worker's point of view, his own productivity is not only a function of the time he must spend at his machine, the efficiency of that machine, or the amount of training he has had, but also of the standing of his company in the community, the prestige of his job in the factory, the initiative or skill he is able to display, his rapport with his fellow workers or the foreman, and his general

<sup>36</sup> Summarized by National Resources Committee (115), pp. 41-43.

mental health as that health is affected, for example, by his family life.<sup>37</sup> These latter are psychological or sociological conditions which also make an important contribution to productivity; the economist, however, has chosen to observe only the net result, not its causes. The applied economist or psychologist who is called an industrial or personnel expert and is therefore not considered a pure scientist has recognized these subtler forces that promote productivity. It has been he who has sought to improve working conditions and general morale, in order to make the producer more of a consumer of satisfaction while he produces and eventually to increase productivity—this is the open secret of the enlightened altruism of a company's efforts to be benevolent.

<sup>37</sup> May and Doob (105), p. 73.



## CHAPTER VI

### HUMAN ACTIVITY

**T**HE essentially human characteristics of man have already been indicated in preceding chapters. For his unique biological potentialities, his proclivity to associate with his fellows as a member of society, his tendencies to govern and to be governed politically, and his capacity to produce economic goods, while stemming from and often somewhat similar to the activities of other animals, differentiate him as a separate species of living organism. In this chapter it is necessary to observe him as an individual rather than as a "mere biological organism" or as a member of a group or society; to analyze him, in short, from the point of view of the psychologist and psychiatrist.

#### *Learning*

Psychology as a science has been most successful in dealing with those segments of human behavior most closely related to physiology. The various senses, for example, have been investigated systematically, and it has now been rather carefully ascertained under what conditions and in which ways men are able to respond to changes in the outside environment. The concept of conditioning, an extension of an older principle of association by contiguity, has been employed most successfully to explain the process of learning. In a controlled laboratory situation psychologists are able to predict the outcome of an experiment with animals or human beings, provided that the state of the learning organism is known to them or can be assumed. These principles of learning, even though their predictive value in life situations is extremely limited at the moment, are of immense significance: they suggest explanations for the kind of behavior that is involved in all planning. Throughout this chapter liberal use will be made of the theories of Hull and

his associates<sup>1</sup> who have carefully elaborated and systematized behavioristic concepts and principles which have been derived, in part, from the early work of Pavlov.<sup>2</sup>

In order to discuss individual planning, it is not necessary to describe the learning process at any great length. It is sufficient to point out that a great deal of learning begins with *random activity* which is a more or less systematic attempt on the part of the organism to find a solution to a problem or a situation which for various reasons demands solution. When the solution is found, those movements or manipulations or thoughts that have been instrumental in producing the result are *reinforced* and therefore tend to be repeated on subsequent occasions. A man who has been unemployed, for example, must learn certain procedures which will secure him a job. At first his efforts may be of a random nature: he seeks assistance from friends, he answers advertisements in the newspaper, or he walks the streets in search of a sign indicating that a position is open. If he finally is able to succeed, the particular method he has employed will probably be reinforced and therefore, when he finds himself out of work the next time, he will be greatly tempted to use this method again. In contrast, activity which does not lead to a solution is likely to be discarded or *extinguished*. The man who finds no job by answering advertisements will soon abandon this method, since it has not proven to be the solution to his problem. It is clear that material or methods which have been learned are usually employed in situations that may or may not resemble the original ones in which the learning itself has occurred; and that new material or methods which are to be learned will be affected to a certain extent by what has been previously learned. Whether or not a *transfer* or *generalization* of the original learning or the original method of learning will take place from one situation to another is the psychological problem that is involved. Or, specifically, if a child learns one language, will he be more proficient when he begins another one; if he is honest

<sup>1</sup> Hull (66, 67, 68); Hovland (65).

<sup>2</sup> Pavlov (123).

in one situation, will he be honest elsewhere; if he dislikes a few strangers, will this antipathy spread to all strangers including foreigners?

To these questions psychologists have no answer on which they themselves completely agree. From experimental and empirical studies it is now known that transfer is not an automatic process: a knowledge of Latin or of how to square  $x + y$  does not inevitably assist the individual in learning, respectively, French or in squaring  $b_1 + b_2$ .<sup>3</sup> It is also known that some kinds of experience in *certain individuals* invade other fields with great rapidity and thoroughness. A child who has been frightened in one room may exhibit symptoms of fear thereafter whenever he is confronted with a room which, from the point of view of an outside observer like his parents, only faintly resembles the scene of his original fright. From such data as these it is possible to conclude that transfer of experience or of learning "takes place whenever, and in whatever degree, a new stimulus field for a given individual is equivalent to another more familiar field."<sup>4</sup> Transfer, therefore, depends on how the individual personally perceives the new situation, and his perception probably depends upon two factors which can be separated artificially only for the purpose of analysis: the amount of objectively imposed similarity between one situation and the next and the extent to which similar mental sets are transposed from situation to situation. These two factors are interrelated: objective similarity in situation may reinstate a mental set and a mental state may compel situations to be perceived similarly by a particular individual. Thus a child who learns English in one town will understand the English-speaking inhabitants in another locality even though their enunciation may be somewhat different, first because the language the latter employ is sufficiently similar to the one he has been taught and, secondly, because he anticipates that the strangers will be talking English. Whether or not a mental set is transferred will be determined by the way in which the origi-

<sup>3</sup> G. W. Allport (4), pp. 275-276.

<sup>4</sup> G. W. Allport (4), p. 281.

nal learning has been integrated within the personality concerned. The New York City school children who were unable to transfer their knowledge of squaring  $x + y$  to  $b_1 + b_2$  must have been taught the former as a specific exercise and they must have learned the solution to the problem in rote fashion: "A child often fails to see the *principle* of a computation, but the instruction is usually to blame."<sup>5</sup> There is also a vast difference between the warning that one must be honest in the classroom and the social insight that honesty is desirable in almost every situation anywhere. A widespread transfer is considered very efficient when a socially "useful" activity, such as the ability to drive any make of car or to square the sum of any two factors, is involved; it is inefficient when the activity is "useless" or detrimental to the organism, such as the transfer of a compulsive impulse to any situation producing emotional strain within a neurotic.

There is another learned tendency which frequently counteracts the process of transfer or generalization. This tendency is known as *differentiation* and suggests that through learning the organism is able to distinguish between those situations in which he may exercise what he has learned in the past and those in which he cannot. A child, for example, is frightened by one animal and may quickly generalize this fear to all animals. As he matures, however, he may learn to differentiate among animals and to be afraid only in the presence of one species. If individuals did not possess the capacity of being able to differentiate the nature of the situation confronting them, they would respond to every situation in almost identical fashion and they would soon perish.

### *Knowledge, Skill, and Attitude*

As a result of learning modes of behavior during the process of socialization, men and women develop personalities which are more or less unique. In order to designate the important aspects of personality which enable human beings to be planners and to be affected by plans, the nature of

<sup>5</sup> G. W. Allport (4), p. 275; italics his.

their knowledge, skill, and attitudes will be briefly analyzed. As is well known, there is no uniformly accepted terminology among psychologists, but it is felt that these concepts, together with that of drive, indicate important parameters of behavior germane to planning.<sup>6</sup> It cannot be too strongly emphasized that all the subtle variations of personality are not being subsumed under these four variables: man is being examined only in relation to planning. It is believed that knowledge, skill, and attitudes are the culminations of complicated learning processes; whereas drives, although some of them perhaps may also be thought to be learned, represent factors that determine and affect learning.

The inclusion of the term knowledge in this list of variables serves deliberately to call attention to man's subjective life. The conception of the self, the private view of the universe, the philosophy of life, anticipations of success and failure, stereotypes, and delusions simply represent different forms of knowledge. In dealing with this problem of knowledge, it is possible to emphasize either the unique knowledge which each individual possesses or the common knowledge which many individuals in a particular society share.

Both psychologists and modern students of semantics are fond of pointing out the fact that language, necessary though it be, is a clumsy tool because no word ever has precisely identical connotations for everyone. The reasons for these different reactions must be sought either in different cultural opportunities which people have had or, when the opportunities seem similar, in the more or less unique ways in which they have responded to those opportunities as a result of their own personality structures. Since the meanings of words vary, the knowledge to which they give rise also varies. The knowledge of science is probably communicated most accurately—or perhaps communication is still more accurate between lovers or devoted friends who, nevertheless, as the solipsists stress, are forever doomed to be isolated from one another. In this connection it can be said that the feeble-minded have certain limits imposed upon the amount

<sup>6</sup> May and Doob (105), chap. ii.

of language and knowledge they can acquire and that the little knowledge they do have is learned more slowly perhaps but in a manner closely resembling normal methods. It may be, too, that inherited glandular tendencies affect the kind of knowledge an individual acquires; but for the practical purpose of planning this hypothesis is unproven and consequently must be disregarded for the time being.

In the field of anthropology it used to be believed that primitive people employed a totally different kind of logic from that of civilized men in adjusting themselves to environmental difficulties. If this were so, it would follow that one of the important methods of acquiring knowledge must vary from society to society. More systematic and sympathetic investigation of the mental processes of primitive men,<sup>7</sup> however, has revealed that all human beings "can apply logic when it is necessary for the attainment of particular ends, but neither civilized nor uncivilized apply it habitually or, under normal circumstances, use it to test the mutual consistency of the elements of culture to which they have been reared."<sup>8</sup>

It remains true, nevertheless, that, although all knowledge varies minutely or appreciably from individual to individual, some knowledge assumes a general pattern within any society. For the prevailing knowledge of a group has been learned as a result of its cultural heritage and the experiences it has had to have in its environment. It is this close relationship between knowledge and culture that is of importance to planning. It suggests that opposition to planning, for example, is due to a hostile milieu which has given rise, in turn, to a hostile conception of planning. The possibility is also revealed that people may be induced to plan or to coöperate with planners, inasmuch as their very conception of planning can be affected by forces within the society. Both man and the knowledge that man has, therefore, are quite plastic.

<sup>7</sup> Wertheimer (157).

<sup>8</sup> Linton (89), p. 362.

The same optimistic conclusion is possible in connection with human skills. For these adjustments to culture and to specific tasks are also more or less unique and yet result from a combination of hereditary and environmental factors. Once again it seems that heredity sets certain undefined limits and that therefore the progress which the individual makes depends upon what his training and opportunities have taught him.

Not everyone, to be sure, can become a champion in athletics, but the precise coördination and skill which any individual attains depends upon supervised and intelligent exercise. Intelligence itself or the generalized ability to adjust quickly to novel situations, as already noted,<sup>9</sup> can be affected selectively by stimulation from the environment. The skills of an individual, however, always function within the total organization of his personality. To promote industrial efficiency, as suggested above,<sup>10</sup> the employer must be concerned not only with the workers' aptitudes in respect to their particular jobs, but also with their general morale and the type of wage and prestige incentive that is offered them. In some cases, furthermore, a skill like intelligence can be extremely generalized: a man may be a specialist at his own trade and simultaneously be mechanically gifted in a wide variety of situations.

It is perhaps a little too optimistic and misleading to leave the impression that the manual laborer in an industrial society might have been an executive or a professor if his parents' economic status had been higher. Certainly there are many illustrations of self-made men who have risen far beyond their positions as children or adolescents, but it is not possible to say with existing evidence whether their rise has been due to superior ability to learn or to an accidental combination of circumstances including, for some reason or other, a powerful drive to improve their status. There seem to be, in short, two reasonable conclusions to be drawn: first,

<sup>9</sup> Above, pp. 31, 91-92.

<sup>10</sup> Above, pp. 115-116.

there is undoubtedly some kind of limitation placed upon every individual's skill by his hereditary endowment; but, secondly, since heredity alone is not the sole determinant of skillful behavior, individuals living in an unfavorable environment very likely have not been able to develop all the abilities of which they are capable. The laborer, therefore, could never have been expected, perhaps, to secure a position requiring maximum skill; yet under happier circumstances or in a society with other social plans he might have been successful in a position more or less superior to his present one.

People who are faced with problems not only interpret them in particular ways and adjust or fail to adjust with a certain amount of skill, but they also have rather distinct feelings toward the objects or the individuals who happen to be involved. These feelings or attitudes likewise result from past experience and represent dispositions or states of readiness within the personality. It is indeed rare for a person to feel neutral in a situation; his reaction tends to be either favorable or unfavorable.

There are proverbs galore which testify to the validity of first, second, or last impressions and hence to the ease with which previous attitudes influence present perceptions. The term "wise prejudices" has been used to indicate the emotional saving in transferring or generalizing experience gained in one situation to a similar one in the present or the future. Race prejudice is just a special case of an attitude that has spread from one or more persons, experiences, or stories to a whole group of people who can be differentiated on the basis of some criterion.

The attitude within the individual helps determine what he will perceive in the outside world and what he will learn from his contacts with other members of society. If he has a favorable attitude toward a particular kind of food, he will very likely notice its inclusion or exclusion on the long menu he happens to survey. And if he feels friendly toward a specific country, it is more likely that he will pay attention



to pleasant rather than unpleasant items about that nation in his daily newspaper. Attitudes, therefore, seem to act as internal *reinforcing agents* which encourage certain types of learning. Similarly, an unfavorable attitude discourages perception and learning and hence acts, as it were, as a negative reinforcing agent. It is known, for example, that a child who has a hostile attitude toward his teacher does not learn very much from her efforts to educate him.

When it is said that an individual usually has a general, favorable attitude toward members of his own in-group, a sociological principle is being translated into psychological terms and can thereby be made more concrete and specific for that particular person. Sociologically it may be expected that a son is devoted and loyal to his parents and siblings, since devotion and loyalty constitute the "normal" pattern of behavior in this society. Such an expectation, applicable to most sons, may not describe accurately the individual who happens to be the object of study. To say that one child is jealous of his brothers and sisters and prefers his father to his mother is to suggest his unique characteristics by alluding to the particular attitudes he possesses. The source of these attitudes can be discovered only by an examination of his life history which reflects the interplay between his organism and the family situation.

The discrepancy between the cultural norm and the psychological attitude is a point that has not only academic and theoretical significance but also practical bearing on the problem of planning. For, if there were perfect correspondence between norms and actual behavior, people would be mere reflections of their culture and their society and planning would be more definitely limited by the status quo. The fact that feelings, even though they are so personal and intimate, can be altered and are altered from time to time and often from situation to situation is still additional evidence of man's plasticity and of his adaptability for planning. That the intensity of an attitude may be due to certain physiological factors like the functioning of the endocrine

glands—or may be due to what is sometimes called temperament—does not weaken this conclusion: the contents may still vary as a result of cultural circumstances.

### *Drives*

An individual employs his knowledge, displays his skills, and expresses his attitudes only when he is motivated to do so. Without a drive to attain some goal, there can be no activity except on a crude biological level. When an activity leads to a goal which satisfies a drive, that activity will probably be reinforced and hence learned. The goal itself or its concrete manifestation, if there be one, can be thought of as a reinforcing agent. Thus a hungry man is driven to find food. If he attains this goal by begging, the act of begging will be reinforced since it has led to a goal which satisfies the drive; when he is hungry again under similar circumstances, he will very likely beg a second time. The point to be noted is that the man begged because his hunger drive was active.

The problem of drive is crucial to planning. Unless the planner is motivated to formulate and execute a plan, he will remain inactive and, as far as he is concerned, there will be no planning. All plans seek to have people attain certain goals; but these goals will not be sought until certain drives have been aroused. What has to be learned, therefore, is the plan and it will be learned only when it leads to a goal which satisfies a drive. Many plans—such as communism, for example—have been discredited because allegedly they “run counter to human nature”; or, in the language that is being employed here, such plans are said to be doomed to failure because people are thought not to possess the drives necessary for their attainment or to possess drives that cannot possibly be directed toward the goals demanded by the plans. For these reasons, then, it is necessary to analyze the nature of drives at considerable length.

It is to be noted that drives produce behavior that is directed toward a goal. The goal may be specific when the

individual knows what he wants; or the objective may be only vaguely or even unconsciously formulated. But in any case a drive always motivates activity toward some end.

The trail of a list of innate drives that invariably and universally characterizes "raw" human nature is strewn with the corpses of exploded psychological theories. Many of these theories have met their doom in the face of anthropological evidence which, as has been pointed out above,<sup>11</sup> is ever able to find at least two primitive tribes who do not exhibit and who have never exhibited the postulated "instinct" in any conceivable fashion. To retain the "instinct" by assuming that it has been suppressed throughout the ages is both improbable and a violation of the economy of thought. For a decade or more psychologists hoped that the experimental work on new-born infants would reveal the inherited tendencies of the human race; but this research, being confined to the artificial culture of the laboratory, has simply helped to overthrow the older doctrines without offering substitute concepts that would be more serviceable and has added weight to the physiological finding concerning the plasticity of the human nervous system in the process of learning or conditioning.

Both for theoretical and practical reasons the problem of man's innate tendencies cannot be abandoned as a moot question, although there is little doubt that it is moot and tiresome. For even though people's behavior is so varied, it is just as obvious that all peoples share certain common modes of reaction. The account which follows, therefore, is not intended to be a formal list of "instincts," "prepotent impulses," or "inherited drives"; rather it is thought of as a preliminary survey of the subject and as a temporary guide to planning. It cannot be too strongly emphasized, moreover, that the content of any impulse, i.e., the segment of the environment that arouses it and the goal that is sought, has little or no relation to the organism's inheritance and is almost completely a function of the cultural heritage and numerous, specific experiences in a society.

<sup>11</sup> Above, pp. 51-52.

*Sex*

Organic or tissue needs, like breathing, nutrition, and elimination, have already been mentioned in Chapter II. Their presence, variability, and necessity must be assumed. Closely related is a sexual drive. The expression of sex in any form is very definitely a function of physiological conditions. Processes suggested by concepts like puberty, impotence, menstruation, menopause, and lactation are all dependent upon glandular secretions.

The sexual drive, however, can be curbed or released by the individual in innumerable ways. Coitus is the "normal" or "adequate" goal for its satisfaction, just as water or some other liquid quenches thirst. Thirst, however, may be quenched immediately except when the supply of water in a society is scarce, whereas all societies regulate coitus in some way or other. Almost everywhere there is an incest taboo which means that the individual acquires or is made to acquire unfavorable attitudes toward members of his family as sexual objects. In many groups either one or both sexes must remain continent until a certain age or until marriage; such enforced abstinence, when it does not lead to surreptitious smashing of the regulation, results in repression or in substitute activity like sublimation, masturbation, or homosexuality. Extramarital relations are usually limited in certain respects, and in many places pregnant women dare not have sexual contacts with their husbands. In these and many other ways the sexual drive has been regulated. The fact that sexual impulses can lead to intercourse, poetry, symphonies, feats of physical prowess in athletics and war, or neuroses is adequate proof of the plasticity of this particular drive. Freud has even suggested that sex occupies such an important position in the theory and practice of psychoanalysis because it, unlike other basic drives, can be warped and distorted so easily.<sup>12</sup> If people in Freud's Vienna had been compelled to resort to as many subterfuges in procuring a glass of water or food, analysts there might have

<sup>12</sup> Freud (49), pp. 74-76 *et passim*.

discovered neuroses based on water and food instead of on love and hate.

*Psychiatry*

Since the problem of sex faces the psychiatrist in this society almost whenever he attempts any form of therapy, it is necessary to pause and to consider the question of value in relation to individual psychiatry. The subject of sex in the Western European culture quite obviously cannot be discussed so objectively as other basic human impulses. The statement in the previous paragraph that the "normal" or "adequate" release of the sexual drive is through coitus is one that implies the physiological value of "release" or "satisfaction." He who regards premarital chastity as a virtue would call abstinence among the unwed "normal" and perhaps even "adequate," and would consider coitus for them to be "immoral" and "wrong." Here is definitely a clash of social values; in fact the believer in virtue is often willing to sacrifice the health of a youth or else deny that his well-being is really affected by continence.

Since the psychiatrist possesses the values of his culture, he has to be wary of the professional advice he gives his patients. To recommend promiscuity, for example, is undesirable, even when license of this kind might relieve the individual of his anxiety and perhaps bolster a deflated ego: the repressed person who needs the freedom will be inhibited by the social norms that are within him; and then those who uphold morality will be shocked and will frown upon both the psychiatrist and his patient. Other therapeutic advice cannot be given because, even though the advice might be approved by the most respectable, circumstances in the society do not permit its execution. Many neurotic women who need both affection and children cannot be assigned the necessary prerequisite to their desires, husbands, by a psychiatrist or anyone else.

Due to the requirements of society, therefore, psychiatry is compelled to find refuge in the social value of the status quo; hence "adjustment," a very vague concept, is supposed

to be the goal of most therapy. It is a trifle ironic that the psychiatrist must be an upholder of the status quo when he functions successfully, inasmuch as in the psychiatric situation itself he poses as the unmoral auditor, as the sympathetic physician who is never shocked by revelations of his patients. There just has to be this difference between the passivity of gaining rapport and confidence and the activity of making positive suggestions. But when is an individual "adjusted"? The criteria that are employed are usually two: first, the patient must not be a social nuisance; and, secondly, he must be reasonably "happy" or "satisfied."

Severe psychotics are nuisances because they frequently cannot attend even to elemental bodily processes, and mild neurotics are nuisances because they burden friends with their worries, their whines, and their obsessions. A mal-adjusted person, in short, does not or cannot fulfill his social obligations. Psychotics are branded only on this social basis, for it is thought that many of them in their self-constructed universes enjoy a type of synthetic bliss; whereas neurotics, in addition, tend to be "unhappy" or "dissatisfied" at least on a conscious level. The situations in an environment that lead to happiness and satisfaction rather than the reverse are so numerous and peculiar that the psychiatrist is compelled to watch the progress of his patients by accepting the latter's subjective reports or else he *tries* to infer their internal states through behavior that he can observe. Due to this prominent subjective element in the concept of adjustment, the actual changes that the psychiatrist induces in his patients cannot be prescribed completely in advance and they cannot be ascertained with the clarity of perception characteristic of the physician who can say with some certainty that the disease is over or the wound is healed.

A psychiatrist is a planner of people and not a planner of conditions in the social environment that help to make men mentally ill. Among the more progressive psychiatrists<sup>13</sup> there is recognition of the relationship between environ-

<sup>13</sup> Horney (64), esp. chaps. i and ii; Kardiner (76).

mental pressures and the etiology of many mental ailments, a recognition of great significance to planning. But without direct planning to alter these conditions, such recognition will merely strengthen psychiatric theory and not affect appreciably the therapeutic measures that are employed to secure adjustment.

### Gratification

The problem of gratifying the basic sexual impulses is one that is relevant to other human drives. There seems to be within each organism, in fact, a generalized need for gratification through the attainment of various goals. It is difficult of course to define gratification: physiologically it connotes a reduction in physical tension and psychologically it means the attainment of a goal which in turn results in those vague but important mental states denoted with adjectives like happy, pleasant, or satisfied.

As Gordon W. Allport has pointed out so forcefully,<sup>14</sup> it is misleading to say that the individual attempts to gratify his various drives. What he does is to seek gratification for *himself*. The self sounds mysterious and a trifle metaphysical, to be sure, but it is meant to refer to the organized personality which, though difficult to grasp, is a real entity in everyday existence. For the various innate and acquired drives are integrated and therefore it is this integration that is gratified or not gratified, and not its individual components. It is, consequently, almost a truism in psychiatry that, if a patient is advised to "satisfy" one impulse, he may experience further disturbances when the satisfaction of that impulse produces conflicts with other stronger impulses. Since a personality cannot be conceptualized or understood with automatic facility, however, it is often convenient to refer to the gratification of a drive, provided one does not forget that the expression is merely a linguistic artifice.

In addition to the goals that give gratification to organic needs and the sexual impulse, what other goals is the individual driven to attain? For the mature adult the answer

<sup>14</sup> G. W. Allport (4), *passim*.

seems to be: goals which he already seeks to attain. To find a completely hereditary basis for the drive behind such goals is fruitless, since so many can be traced to the life-experiences of the individual. The desire to play tennis or poker, to eat caviar or gingersnaps, to see Paul or Pauline, or to ride in an automobile or an airplane is much more sophisticated than any tendency within the genes. At the same time, as McDougall emphasized,<sup>15</sup> any drive toward these complicated goals cannot be acquired in a void; it must be superimposed upon a preëxisting drive or else the organism will not be motivated to acquire it in the first place. It appears that the safest position to take at the moment is to postulate a relatively undifferentiated tendency toward activity in every human being, to remain open-minded on the question as to whether this tendency is linked or equivalent to a basic drive like sex or food, and to ascribe at least the goals of differentiated drives to environmental experiences. This position deliberately avoids certain difficult problems in theoretical psychology, notably that of secondary reinforcement; it must be remembered that the function of this book is not to suggest solutions to all difficulties but to use available information for planning.

There are, however, at least two specific goals which this generalized drive assumes in any society. As the individual becomes socialized, he is driven to obtain *security* by acquiring certain objects that enable him to adapt himself more successfully to the exigencies of his environment; and he establishes peculiar relationships with his contemporaries. This acquisitive drive may operate only in behalf of the self, or it may include dependents or large numbers of people in the community. It may be released through fierce competition for individual or group gain, or it may result in gentler types of coöperation. It may embrace an empire or a ranch, or it may be confined to a feather or a toothbrush. No matter what the form of behavior, each individual seeks to feel safe in a world that is never completely friendly.

Another relatively invariable goal within people is for

<sup>15</sup> McDougall (98), chap. vi.



*prestige*. An individual with prestige receives homage and respect from members of the in-group: they praise him, they perform services for him, they allow him to monopolize the preferred tasks, or they venerate his memory after he has died. He, in turn, feels the importance of this unique treatment and often possesses a material or nonmaterial symbol of his position such as, respectively, a medal or a title. The older writers used to ascribe a "gregarious instinct" to mankind and by this term they intended to signalize, among other things, the quest for prestige. To say that all men seek prestige is merely to point out that they live together in groups, that human relationships in groups are intimate and emotion-producing, and that for various reasons social rôles are differentiated from one another. It is important to repeat here that the nature of prestige varies from society to society and that within any one society the motivating drive behind the attainment of this goal may have different psychological significance for each individual.

### *Frustration and Aggression*

Human beings are seldom able to attain the goals which their various impulses demand. For everywhere there is natural or artificial scarcity and everywhere there are social conflicts. Only an adequate supply of air is usually present. Food does not tumble into people's laps to be consumed, members of the opposite sex cannot be ravished at will, desirable objects may not be obtained through the stretch of the hand, nor is every man king among his fellows. The human race, in short, is prone to be frustrated—and frustration in this sense is the antonym to gratification.

According to the theoretical system evolved by various members of the Institute of Human Relations, frustration is the condition resulting from "the interference with the occurrence of an instigated goal-response at its proper time in the behavior sequence."<sup>16</sup> In different words, this means that the failure to attain a goal after a drive has been

<sup>16</sup> Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, and Sears (38), p. 7.

aroused produces an unresolved tension within the organism. As a result of this tension, the individual will react in either one or both of the following ways: he may seek to attain a different goal or to attain the same goal in a new way, in which case he may be said to be making a *substitute response*; or he may express resentment or hatred as a result of his failure to release the drive in the anticipated manner, in which case he may be said to be expressing *aggression*. Frustration, then, is always followed by some form of substitute response or aggression.

The sequence of frustration and substitute response is probably learned, whereas the sequence of frustration and aggression is thought to be more or less innate in a very primitive form. The hungry child cries, i.e., he is frustrated, because he does not secure food or because gas in his stomach is causing him pain; then, when he is handled, his crying may turn to rage which would be a display of blind, undirected aggression. As he grows older, he calls for his dinner or actually prepares it himself, both of which are obviously learned forms of substitute response. The adult, moreover, may be cross and irritable if his meal is delayed; this is aggression but contains additional elements of restraint that have been acquired in the course of maturing. The stereotype of the calm, placid individual is presumably a picture of a person who, when he fails to attain an objective, does not become overtly aggressive or angry but is sensible enough, in a conventional sense, to adapt himself to his shortcomings or to the emergency. Inwardly, though, he may be angry and may be harboring destructive or hateful fantasies which must be considered forms of non-overt rather than overt aggression.

There are certain important consequences which follow when both aggression and substitute responses are thought to result from frustration in a situation and when aggression as a concept is made to include both overt and non-overt forms. Ferocity, pugnacity, and other animal-like qualities are seen to be innate only to the extent that the organism, from a very broad physiological point of view, is potentially capable of exhibiting them. But people are ferocious or pug-

nacious only when certain drives have been aroused, only when these drives have been frustrated, only when aggression with little substitute activity occurs, and only when the aggression is expressed overtly in these ways. Whether or not ferocity or pugnaciousness will be exhibited, therefore, depends upon innumerable factors including the seriousness of the frustration and other drives, knowledge, attitudes, and skills within the individual. And from the previous discussion of these latter factors themselves it is clear that they are subject, more or less, to social control.

He who really gets slapped on the face, for example, will feel frustrated if the slap is so hard that the pain actually interrupts the easy flow of his existence, or if being slapped, regardless of whether the slap may be as light as the pat from a loved one, must be interpreted in his society as a personal insult. Were this sudden pressure the sign of election to a secret organization, he would be pleased, even though his face smarted slightly. If the slap is frustrating, many different kinds of behavior are conceivable: a slap in return (overt aggression), the challenge to a duel (overt aggression in a form perhaps receiving social sanction), feelings of anger and hatred (non-overt aggression), a plot to obtain revenge (non-overt and eventually overt aggression), or leaving the scene to avoid trouble (substitute response, undoubtedly with an element of self-directed or non-overt aggression). The display of so-called primitive emotions in adults is only one of the many possible reactions to a frustrating situation and frequently both social and psychological forces tend to prevent their arousal.

Since aggression may be non-overt, it is not always safe to infer from the total absence of overt aggression that the individual is not at all aggressive and therefore that he has not been frustrated by a situation. The Nazis have been fond of pointing to overtly enthusiastic crowds as evidence of the popularity of their rule; but behind the "Heil Hitler" of many a mouth must be a personality thinking thoughts of hatred due to the privations (i.e., frustrations) which have had to be endured. When sufficiently frustrated and under

certain circumstances, extremely mild people have been known to run amuck or to do surprisingly violent things. And the phenomenon of the belligerent drunk whose ability to inhibit latent impulses is weakened by the effects of the alcohol is a well-known and pathetic figure. Instances like these can best be explained by assuming situations in the past that have been frustrating, aggression that has been non-overt (or repressed), and a situation that offers the right opportunity to express the unexpressed drives in overt form.

Aggression, finally, need not always be directed toward the agent who presumably has caused the frustration in the first place; it is often displaced on to another neutral object or person. This process is also a form of learning and is further evidence of the plasticity of the organism and of the fact that the kind of aggression which follows frustration is a function of experience. When injured by one person, an individual may vent his anger on someone quite detached from the original frustrating agent and feel much happier afterwards. The timid soul always blames himself for disturbances that he himself does not cause and thus deflects aggression inward. An important function of totalitarian propaganda is to give the oppressed a common enemy whom they can hold responsible for their oppression. And one of the psychological reasons why members of an in-group develop such strong loyalty toward one another is that they are able to displace their aggression upon a hostile out-group: this is the psychological explanation of the well-known sociological generalization already outlined in a previous chapter.<sup>17</sup>

The ability to displace aggression from one source to another and to express aggression in different ways presumes the existence within all human organisms of additional inherited potentialities that begin to operate under the appropriate circumstances and after some socialization has occurred. When they are forced to do so by external events or by drives within their personalities, men can repress tendencies toward action. Apparently human beings are capable

<sup>17</sup> Above, pp. 57-58.

of repressing more easily than other animals, and some individuals can endure a greater number of repressions without engaging in the desired activity or without becoming neurotic or psychotic. After repression has occurred, moreover, people are able to find substitute if inadequate gratifications. They can sublimate the repressed drives through activity that may or may not be a form of substitute response. They can rationalize the causes for their frustration and repression. They can seek satisfaction on a fantasy level and the dreams they then experience may disturb or enrich either their waking state or their sleep. Such adaptability through repression constitutes still additional proof of man's plasticity and serves to indicate again the presence of individual differences.

### *Social Control of Aggression*

It is on the basis of the innumerable substitute responses and forms of aggression which people can exhibit after being frustrated that social control is exercised. There must be some kind of control to prevent social life from being disrupted by aggressive impulses which are created during the process of socialization. For children, as has been pointed out,<sup>18</sup> have to be socialized in order to conform to the rules and regulations of society; everywhere some behavior is labeled "good" and other is branded "bad." Socialization requires, therefore, that the child's freedom of expression be curbed in a more or less prescribed manner. The organic and generalized drives that spring from his biological heritage and that are so quickly modified by limited contacts in his home cannot be gratified in the way that he desires: he is not always given food when he begins to cry, his body is wrapped in clothes that may not be comfortable, he is gradually taught habits of cleanliness, he is soon restrained from invading the privacy of others and from obtaining or injuring their property, etc. The nature of these restrictions varies from society to society, but there have to be some re-

<sup>18</sup> Above, pp. 36-38.

strictions. Restrictions mean frustration and hence frustration is an inevitable consequence of socialization.

When a child or anyone else is frustrated, he is stimulated to learn a substitute response. For aggression, though somewhat satisfactory as a method of releasing tension, is never completely satisfactory and some tension always remains. A new solution to the frustrating circumstance is more adaptive; learning, consequently, is a significant fruit of adversity in many instances. The person who is not frustrated because he has made an easy adjustment is not forced to change his response; only the disruption of the easy flow of events compels him to behave differently. Scientists, for example, do not seek new hypotheses when the old ones account for the data; revision occurs when the "facts" no longer fit the "theories," when some one scientist is frustrated by the discovery of the discrepancy. Severely frustrated people, however, may be merely aggressive and may not be able as a result of their severe emotional state to learn any form of substitute response; it is not possible to conclude, consequently, that all frustration inevitably promotes learning.

The frustrated child is often willing to be taught by his parents and other representatives of society to adopt substitute responses of which they approve, or else he is prepared to work out a solution for himself. When he reaches for a forbidden object, he is told that his own toys are his and that he should enjoy manipulating them. If he is punished simultaneously, it is likely that his aggression will increase: he may cry loudly, attempt to strike the person imposing the prohibition, or kick his toys as a form of displacement. Thus adults not only frustrate children in order to socialize them, but also continue the socialization in the midst of the frustration itself by encouraging substitute responses and the displacement of aggression.

In Western European society overt aggression toward parents is generally taboo and therefore the child must learn to adapt himself to their commands or else prevent his resentments from being expressed in overt form. Dollard has pointed out that in a Southern community the white

population is able to displace some of its aggression on to the Negro group which consequently serves as a scapegoat, but that the Negroes, unable to turn their aggression upon the whites in a deliberately overt form, usually resort to fantasy revenges or express their hatreds upon members of their own group.<sup>19</sup> No society likes to admit officially that it must frustrate people—real or imaginary compensating gratifications are emphasized or dramatized instead, or else divine, economic, historical, or nationalistic factors are held responsible for the frustration. It is for this psychological reason that social conflicts may remain dormant when people, though sufficiently frustrated, are inhibited from expressing this aggression overtly by the knowledge they possess of and the attitudes they have toward the social structure. Displacement of aggression, moreover, is often facilitated by the fact that no one really knows the “actual” causes of some frustrations like a depression.

The abnormal individual in any society is the unsocialized individual, but he may be unsocialized for a variety of reasons. If he is feeble-minded or a moron, he may simply be incapable of learning the procedures that society compels him to learn. If he is a genius or a reformer, he may have been frustrated by specific social conditions, and he will be attempting to discover new substitute responses through which he can find gratification and thereby perhaps express his aggression. If he is a criminal, as has been pointed out previously, he may be compensating for the hardships he has had to endure, none of which necessarily have to be related to the crime that he commits. If he is neurotic or even a psychotic, he may be developing his symptoms or he may be withdrawing from what other “normal” people call reality in order to avoid frustration, to express his aggression differently, or to find substitute gratification. Frustration, in short, is a key to abnormality in almost all forms, inasmuch as frustrated people are so prone to be aggressive and to acquire new modes of behavior.

Man's ubiquitous interest in religion can be *partially*

<sup>19</sup> Dollard (35), chaps. xii-xiv.

traced to a frustrating circumstance of his existence. For he is always confronted with a universe that defies complete explanation, and the questions of "why," "whence," and "where to" concerning his own life remain unanswered and doubtless unanswerable. Even a small amount of reflection leads one into the mysterious; and the feeling that there is a vast region that cannot be penetrated by the human intellect or by sense-perceptions is indeed frustrating. A religion attempts to reduce this frustration by offering explanations which are at least plausible but which eventually must be accepted or rejected on the basis of faith. And religious institutions seek to instill this faith and therefore to provide the answers even before the frustrating inquiries occur. The most materialistic conception of the cosmos that reduces life to the movements of particles is never completely gratifying even to the hard-shelled—the ever possible occurrence of death, either to oneself or to one's fellows, is a perpetual source of potential frustration that requires some kind of adjustment. Cursing blind "fate" or losing faith in divine wisdom after an unexpected death is a human and an inadequate way of releasing the aggression resulting from this tragedy. The fact that people in so-called civilized societies become more devout when they are sick and as they grow older represents a heroic attempt to ease the greatest of all frustrations which they fear. Yoga, as Behanan has shown,<sup>20</sup> is a religious discipline that deliberately prepares its disciples to meet this frustration; and all religions are concerned with the same problem. The more scientific information an individual possesses, the less satisfied he is with simple religious explanations; but, since not even the most sophisticated science can be completely satisfactory, men and women have had to discover other solutions. And so they believe without applying ordinary standards of criticism to their faith; they formulate their own philosophy; they repress their curiosity and refuse to concern themselves with death or the eternal verities; or they become hypochondriacal or insane. That religion performs these psychological functions is an obser-

<sup>20</sup> Behanan (13), chap. vi.



vation not intended to belittle its social rôle or its metaphysical significance.

When men and women have been socialized and have developed their distinctive personalities, they find it difficult to change. For the existence of new goals requires knowledge or skill they may not possess or may arouse unfavorable attitudes toward the people or objects involved in those goals. As a result they anticipate some kind of frustration and this anticipation tends to make them aggressive toward the circumstances necessitating the change. Significant social changes, therefore, usually occur slowly, unless people are so frustrated that, regardless of their skills, knowledge, and attitudes, they are willing to engage in adaptive activities.

### *The Art of Prediction*

In order to evaluate the utility to planning of what is known about man from a psychological and psychiatric point of view, it is necessary to make a brief excursion into a non-scientific field, art. For since the prediction of an individual's behavior must be part of the knowledge which any planner possesses and since this task is extremely difficult, attention must be directed toward the unscientific but useful techniques which artists have evolved in their attempt to solve this very problem. After all, the nature of the human being is also the artist's chosen field.

Psychological generalizations can be applied to a specific person only "if other things are equal" and only if those other things can be ascertained with a reasonable degree of accuracy. A frustrated individual, it has been said, exhibits aggression or a substitute response or both. This is a useful principle but, before actual behavior can be predicted, questions like the following have to be answered:

1. Why has the individual been frustrated by this situation?
2. What drive within him has been frustrated?
3. What other drives were functioning within him at the time of frustration?

4. What other drives may be related to the drive that has been frustrated?

5. What is his skill in adapting himself to frustrations in general and to this frustration in particular?

6. To what degree is he aware of the possible effects upon himself and others if he expresses his aggression overtly rather than non-overtly or vice versa?

7. What are his attitudes toward people and objects involved in the situation?

8. How badly frustrated is he?

9. How important is the frustration to him?

10. Are there any social requirements which might regulate his behavior and, if there are, to what extent is he aware of them?

The above ten questions are intended to illustrate the complexity of the problem; obviously ten additional ones could be listed and each of the present number could be subdivided into more specific ones. Even if all the sensible and relevant questions could be asked, moreover, the answers would not be forthcoming because neither psychologists nor anyone else possesses the techniques with which the data might be secured. The final difficulty consists of the variations which any measuring device or even simple observation would produce within the frustrated individual by their very presence.

The psychologist, therefore, recognizes these difficulties and states in reply that general principles cannot be applied to specific people without a certain amount of "correction." By correction is meant the attempt to take into account the influence of the other factors that should be but are not held constant when the principles are supposed to be functioning. If this is so, then application can never be precise and the prediction of the behavior of one personality becomes an art. To pretend otherwise is to fool oneself or to misuse the word science.

Art, however, is not without an ability to make predictions; only the basis of artistic predictions is not a logical deduction as in science but an intuitive induction from

vaguely stated principles. Criteria with which the artistic treatment of people are judged "good" or "bad" are about as relative and as fluctuating as social values themselves; nevertheless, at the risk of provoking wordy controversies from righteous representatives of this sacrosanct field of human endeavor, it is possible to suggest certain standards which people in the Western European culture usually employ as they pass judgment. A character in a novel or a play is thought to be "unreal," if he suddenly does something that is not "in keeping with his personality." The reader or the spectator demands a knowledge of the individual as a result of which a crucial bit of behavior, while startling and novel, still appears as an outgrowth of tendencies already revealed in the past. For this reason, especially in Hollywood motion pictures and in the folk literature of a country, there are types of people whose appeals lie in the rather stereotyped way in which they behave.

The insight into the character can be given in various ways. In a novel the author may inject a paragraph or so in which he states quite bluntly the salient traits of the person he is describing. The character may demonstrate through his actions tendencies in the direction of his future behavior. Another character may offer the convenient résumé. Or, as has been suggested, the character may be depicted as a culturally recognized type. Authors are frequently annoyed by the criticism that their characterization is not "true to life," when they know that the incident referred to actually occurred in their own experience. The criticism, however, is valid, since unintelligible behavior, whether in fiction or in everyday affairs, is disturbing and hence considered in-artistic.

What the artist must do, therefore, is to present his character in such a way that some of the general principles of his behavior are disclosed. Presumed is a certain consistency of action or, when the reverse is true, an inconsistency in a consistent fashion. Thereafter crude actuarial predictions can be made by assuming that the consistency or the consistent inconsistency will be carried over from the past into

the present and the future. The revelation of the general principle requires artistic skill. If the principle is established by displaying the character in action, then it is necessary to indicate subtly the particularly significant actions from which the principle itself can be inferred. Until the climax is reached, the principle remains untested and is, consequently, merely a guess or an intuition. Thereafter the novel or the play is called "true to life" if the principle is verified; it is "a false picture of reality" if the principle is not verified or if there has been no principle at all; or the action before the climax is reconstructed, in the light of what has occurred, into a principle.

Great literature has produced intelligible and complicated characters; and the effort of psychologists and psychiatrists to understand specific people has been diminutive by comparison. For the latter, concerned with the discovery and the application of general principles, feel compelled to record what they are able to observe; whereas artists and writers have only the limits of their own imaginations to prevent them from recording whatever they please. It is relatively easier to exaggerate the importance of an incident in art than it is to interpret the probable significance of behavior as it is exhibited in the laboratory or the clinic. The artist's interpretation cannot be definitely wrong because usually there are no facts with which he may be contradicted; it may be only inartistic or "unreal."

The student of personality, therefore, works like an artist but with little of the latter's freedom. He employs the general principles of psychology as guides to the kind of information he must obtain. He attempts to discover the personality's consistent and inconsistent actions. His predictions are often based on the same kind of actuarial induction as the artist's, but he tries to supplement this by determining whether or not his general principles can give him deductive clues.

The artist, moreover, not only creates his character, but also produces with his fancy the situations in his environment which that character has to face. If a war or a death or a depression is necessary for dramatic reasons and for the

development of the character, the event may be made to occur. The psychologist and the psychiatrist of course have to accept social events as they take place; consequently both of them must surround their predictions with a multitude of "if's" referring to changing social conditions. In psychiatry, for example, it has become increasingly evident that the progress of many patients depends as much on conditions in their immediate environment as it does on the reëducation they experience under the supervision of the psychiatrist.

Both in art and in psychology the best technique for securing insight into the consistency of a personality and for determining the necessary corrections in the application of general principles is an analysis of the individual's life history.<sup>21</sup> As was found to be true in the case of an entire society, it is only theoretically possible to obtain complete data through a cross section of the individual at a given moment. People are too complex to enable an investigator to grasp them in their entirety by means of any short-cut method such as this latitudinal one. The life of a single person, whether it be secured through direct observation, hearsay, or recollection, contains millions of isolated incidents whose inclusion or exclusion is a baffling task. It is here where the existence of general principles of behavior assists the student of personality to select the relevant and significant items and to reject the irrelevant and insignificant ones.

Men and women are unique, both in respect to their human qualities and in respect to one another. The study of any one human being is always open to the criticism that it can reveal only his distinctive peculiarities. But normal contact between people establishes within each individual some conception of the personalities who are important to him, even though this conception may not be completely accurate nor the predictions that are made from it always reliable. It is well to recognize this limitation of the human intellect and of psychology and psychiatry, for it suggests that planning can never hope to embrace satisfactorily all the particular details of a single person.

<sup>21</sup> Dollard (36), chaps. I, II.

## CHAPTER VII

### THE VALUES OF PLANNING

**A**FTER surveying the social sciences and some of the borderline fields and after flirting with philosophy, a tentative summary must be timidly presented. It is anticipated, to be sure, that specialists in these various disciplines will be appalled by the violence that has been done to their facts and their theories. Their pardon, therefore, is sought and they are asked to remember that the aim of this section has not been encyclopedic but to suggest how their sciences can contribute to the problems of understanding man, his values, and his plans.

#### *Nature of Man*

What is man? A planner, willing to erase some of his own preconceptions and to consult those who have studied man, would demand a concise picture of contemporary knowledge concerning human activity. Let the following serve for illustrative purposes and solely for illustrative purposes:

1. *Man is a higher animal.* Man is born a higher animal and hence assumes this rôle before all others. His biological heritage resembles but also differs from that of other animals. Many of his activities seem directed toward the prolongation of his life. The principles governing the biological transmission of his traits that are wholly or partially a function of his heredity are similar to those characteristic of animals, even though they cannot be applied too easily or successfully. The so-called race to which he belongs is not significantly different, biologically at least, from other groups that are also termed races; group differences at the moment are accounted for most reasonably in cultural terms.

2. *Man is a social being.* Man always lives with his fellows in groups and his personality is formed by his contacts with them. Before he can be given his social heritage, he must

be socialized; but his biological nature tends to affect the precise ways in which he can accept that heritage. Such socialization, being involuntary, may be quite repressive, although in other respects it is also gratifying to him. Since he believes in the righteousness of his heritage, he is prone to resist many social changes. At the same time the inventions and innovations that diffuse into his society are usually inducing him to change. As a social being, furthermore, he is likely to interpret himself, his social institutions, and society itself in terms of accepted symbols. What he believes and to a great extent what he does, therefore, is relative to the particular social norms he has been forced to accept. His behavior, however, fluctuates within the limits set by his biological organism and seems everywhere to assume certain general forms. Inevitably it appears that he is engaged in some kind of conflict with his contemporaries, but usually his society also attempts to regulate the nature and type of that conflict.

3. *Man is a political being.* In this capacity, man both receives and perpetuates a large part of his social heritage through government and its laws. He seems ever interested in and curious about the origin and history of his society and its government and therefore feels a sense of unity with his fellows; but he finds it difficult to transfer his own or his group's experience in the past to present and future problems. As an active agent in his legal institutions, either as a judge, a juryman, or a civil servant, he functions not according to the formal rules he is supposed to follow but as a result of many impulses within him; and similarly as an ordinary citizen he does not always behave in accordance with legal expectations. He prefers to believe, nevertheless, that he, his government, and its law courts are following sacred and not altogether human principles. He takes an active interest in his state only when his welfare is linked to it or when he is made to imagine it is. The historical record of his behavior as a political and social being reveals some of the vast potentialities and variations of which he is capable; and it also shows that he has a strong tendency,

sometimes, to seek political power over his contemporaries.

4. *Man is an economic being.* For man to live he must produce. Production is time-consuming and hence his personality is formed partially but not completely by the economic activities in which he must engage in order to solve the problem of scarcity. These activities require him to cooperate with his fellows; gradually he has evolved a delicately balanced economic structure which he finds difficult to understand or to control effectively. As a part of this structure his behavior depends not only on his strictly economic relationships, but also on his entire personality as well as the values, rules, and technological development of his society. Many of his social and personal activities are affected by the functioning of the economic system, since as a consumer he is so dependent upon that system and the ways in which it distributes his share of the national income.

5. *Man is a human being.* His human qualities he acquires through learning. Activity that leads to the solution of a problem is learned or reinforced; activity that does not lead to a solution is extinguished. The learning process reveals two counteracting processes: transfer or generalization and differentiation. Through generalization man is able to employ old modes of response in new situations; and through differentiation he learns to respond only to more specific situations. His knowledge, skills, attitudes, and drives depend on inherited, potential tendencies and on the experiences that his society and culture enable or require him to have. All four of these factors are interdependent, and both as an infant and adult man tends to be different from everyone else in these respects. Even though a complete list of his innate drives need not and cannot be given, it seems clear that, in addition to certain organic or tissue needs, he always is driven to attain a number of other goals. His sexual drive is so significant since, apparently, it can be released by achieving a variety of goals, not many of which have any inherent connection with coitus; this particular drive, then, is surrounded everywhere with social taboos. His generalized drive toward gratification leads him



to seek diverse goals that are almost exclusively learned, or it may be directed toward the attainment of security or prestige. He is, however, seldom completely gratified; alleviating his frustrations, consequently, is another of his basic activities. When he is frustrated, he may be aggressive or he may make a substitute response. This aggression may be overt or non-overt, direct or displaced. Man, in addition, possesses the ability to repress the expression of his drives and hence he can sublimate, rationalize, and dream. Some frustration during socialization is inevitable and, while frustrated, man is motivated to learn new substitute or adaptive responses that are socially acceptable and to express his aggression in approved ways. Man is ever faced with the frustrating thought of death and of the unknowable rationale behind his universe; as a result he finds solace in a religion or a neoreligious philosophy. His behavior at a given instant results from a complex interaction within his personality in the face of environmental conditions requiring some kind of a response or an adjustment. As a human being and especially as an artist he is able to understand his fellows intuitively and to make more or less accurate predictions concerning their activities.

When the findings of the various sciences concerning man are jotted down so baldly in five paragraphs, it becomes clear that many of the conclusions are redundant and that a much tighter integration is imperative. If man is accepted as the locus of interest and study, as is the contention of this book that he must be for planning, then certain principles might be formulated quite concisely:

1. Man's biological equipment sets wide limits to what he may learn in the course of his development.

2. Each man differs in some respect from all his fellows both potentially and actually.

3. In any activity, whether it be social, political, economic, or personal, man's personality as a whole is usually involved.

4. Man's knowledge concerning himself, his values, and his society is saturated with symbols and is a function of his

cultural surroundings, his physical environment, and the experiences he has had therein.

5. Man is and can be gratified and frustrated in a variety of ways while being and remaining socialized in respect to the most diverse kinds of social values.

6. The function of man's social, political, and economic institutions, all of which interact upon one another, is to regulate the gratifications and frustrations he obtains and hence his total personality.

7. Man is actively interested in an institution only when the goals he seeks are linked to it.

8. Man and his institutions usually change slowly in significant social respects.

9. Man engages in conflicts with his fellows, he also cooperates with them, and he is always influenced by them.

This, then, is human nature—and it is human nature that must guide planning by giving rise to desirable values. These statements are most abstract since they refer to man everywhere and without regard to time or society. Specific details can and must be provided when a particular individual or group of individuals is examined. To furnish these details each of the separate sciences is potentially useful.

It is to be noted that the psychological aspects of man's nature have been stressed both in this summary and throughout previous chapters. This has been done, not to extol psychology as such, not to imply that this subject is more scientific than any other social science, but to suggest that the plans of men can be understood most effectively only when all of man's activity and not separate segments of it are taken into account. Let the point be developed still further by casual reference to the deficiencies that biology and the social sciences possess *in this respect* when they fail to make explicit the psychological processes at the basis of some of their generalizations.

Eugenics and biological theories concerning race fail to consider the social activity of man; therefore more than the biological basis of behavior has to be known before planning can occur. The sociological concept of socialization, impor-

tant though it is, remains a bare description of a complicated process until the learning process and the accompanying frustrations and gratifications of people are ascertained. Social change too must be referred to specific men and women, or else the anthropologist can display his wisdom only when events have occurred in the past. Even culture itself is "integrated" within people, and cultures disintegrate when people change. Social conflicts which are certainly related to the cultures where they occur are so frequently initiated by leaders who cannot be explained completely in sociological terms. History, being remote from people and closer to events, can be utilized for the present and future only when the psychological circumstances of past events have been interpreted. The regulations of governments and law courts sometimes do not succeed in practice because they are disobeyed by people—to account for their failures the people concerned must be analyzed. States that function well secure the support of the citizenry and obtain the coöperation of their civil servants as a result of psychological ties. Economics, finally, finds its predictive value very definitely limited since its assumptions concerning men are so narrow; people actually do not behave so simply as the classical economist has to believe they do, and, the moment they do not, economic principles run into a storm. Too many so-called economic problems have psychological implications, so that economics cannot function independently for planning.

Whether or not the social sciences with these psychological deficiencies can be effective sciences on their own levels of discourse is a tempting question irrelevant to planning but important to them.<sup>1</sup> Here it is sufficient to reëmphasize the contention that their generalizations cannot be used in planning unless the psychological subtleties are considered and the indicated difficulties faced. Otherwise planning seeks to realize hollow phrases which can be made meaningful only in terms of the individuals they presume.

<sup>1</sup> Lynd (94), chap. iv.

*Potentialities of Man*

All of the sciences which have been examined in preceding chapters offer evidence of man's plasticity and hence of his almost infinite potentialities. Biology offers the fundamental explanation of his plasticity in terms of the nervous system, the endocrine system, etc. Anthropology reveals that almost every conceivable kind of behavior has been exhibited in some culture. Sociology points out the different types of people produced by different societies and within the same society. Political science and jurisprudence describe the multitudinous forms of the state and the legal systems under which man has been able to survive. History furnishes the broad perspective concerning man's numerous forms in the past. Economics suggests his adaptability to changing circumstances within this and other economic systems. And psychology has discovered that almost all of the factors of which behavior is a function are more or less unique and can be altered by changes in the external environment. Together these sciences seem practically to prove that, within the unprecisely defined limits set by his biological heredity and the natural conditions in his physical environment, man is ready to respond to well nigh any kind of social heritage or environmental circumstances and to run the gamut of personal types.

The infant possesses enormous potentialities and the capability of finding so many diverse values desirable, however, only at the moment of birth before his parents begin to influence him in the direction of a particular social heritage. Similarly the planner is confronted with certain limitations, inasmuch as the people for whom his plans are designed already have organized personalities and adhere to certain specific desirable values as a result of their life experiences. "Man and his institutions usually change slowly in significant social respects," it has been said above, and therefore many of his potentialities are difficult to realize. In spite of the fact that the process of change is slow, nevertheless man does change. An Athenian might have been a New

Yorker if he had been exposed to the latter's cultural heritage. A Japanese might have been an exponent of many Occidental ideas before the advent of Commodore Perry if the contact with Western culture had previously occurred. Any man might have been quite different if he had been socialized in another family or another society. Since man's potentialities are theoretically almost unlimited and since he does change, though slowly, his desirable values can be equally flexible and many different kinds of possible values are realizable over a period of time.

### *Gratification and Frustration*

If man is so plastic, then what kind of a person should he become? Science is able to proclaim that all roads are open, at least if one drives with patience; but it does not, in fact it refuses to choose the road to be traveled. It is too clear that possible values do not in themselves necessarily create a single, inevitably desirable value.

In the first chapter of this book it has been suggested that a desirable value cannot be derived directly or in logical fashion but must represent a kind of compromise between present, future, and possible values. It is only the metaphysician who may be expected to point out the alleged naiveté of this solution. But metaphysics, let it be said again, provides no better solution: values that are higher-than-the-clouds stem from philosophers who are rationalizing either their own biases or those of their society or both, as evidence from all the social sciences now seems to suggest so forcefully. Were the reasoning of metaphysicians more than complicated verbiage, there would be more agreement concerning conclusions and there would be greater uniformity of premises. There is a vast difference between voicing the uncontested truth that any science or philosophy requires a metaphysical assumption and deriving a particular set of values from a particular assumption—what must be questioned are the reasons for the assumption in the first place.

Social scientists who study present values, moreover, have not been able to find desirable values to guide people.<sup>2</sup> On the whole the tendency has been merely to account for present values but not legislate concerning them. Sociology and anthropology stress the relativity of values and relate them to the society or culture in which they are functioning. History describes the growth and decay of values as objectively as possible. Political science and jurisprudence analyze the values that political institutions seek to realize and very vaguely suggest that an abstraction like democracy or justice is or should be the decisive value. Economics explains why certain commodities and services in a given society are considered valuable on the open market in terms of their scarcity and the human demands they satisfy; economic determinism is a doctrine that attempts to trace many values to economic roots and fails to do so in every respect. Psychology seeks to account for the individual's particular values by referring to his life history and the experiences he has had that have influenced his scale of values. No one of these sciences has determined desirable values; all have merely dissected them.

The implicit or less frequently explicit preaching in the social sciences has been directed toward maintaining the status quo, or, in rare instances, toward some arbitrary reform. A historical sketch of sociology, anthropology, political science, jurisprudence, history, and economics, as a section in each of the previous chapters has sought to suggest, reveals that the values in these disciplines have fluctuated from time to time and have been affected by each period. In their effects upon people, in truth, social scientists have not been so purely theoretical as they have liked to believe. It has been shown too that the distinction between pure theory and bald practice is not absolute, that the possession of a theory may predispose the individual to react favorably toward the value contained within that theory. Both psychiatry and parts of applied psychology, moreover, take refuge in a value that is called "adjustment" and that is

<sup>2</sup>Lynd (94), pp. 180-191.

just another name for conservatism. Even medicine and eugenics very definitely propose a value and adduce evidence in its support without always considering the consequences in terms of other nonbiological values.

Besides slipping too easily into the rôle of defending their heritage, social scientists and others have tended to disregard individual men and women and to heap praise or abuse upon segments of the society. Claims that governments should or should not regulate business; that there should or should not be old-age insurance, free trade, or a revolution; that specific laws should or should not be passed or repealed; that information on contraceptives should or should not be more widespread; or even that classroom procedures should or should not follow a particular pattern, claims like these obviously are directed toward men but only mention them indirectly through an allusion to mechanisms of social control. Too often it is said that a change is "good," for example, because it will promote efficiency or strengthen an existing institution; but ultimately of course people thereby are made more efficient or people are affected by the strengthened institution.<sup>3</sup>

It is being argued here, therefore, that desirable values cannot be found in institutions since the latter merely express present values. Democracy or fascism or anarchy or communism is neither good nor bad as a political system; its goodness or badness is a function of its effect upon the individuals living under the particular system. Both dictators and ditchdiggers extol their social arrangement eventually by a reference to its people. It is only the demands of demagogy and propaganda that deliberately create confusion by ascribing absolute virtue or sin to any aspect of society as such. Again in this connection it should be clear why the summary of the social sciences and bordering fields has had such a strong psychological bias: their basis within the individual has been stressed whenever possible, in order to direct the attention of scientists and the efforts of planners not to institutions but to people.

<sup>3</sup> F. H. Allport (3).

If it is necessary to turn to the integrated human being to determine the source of desirable values for planning, then such values can be located only by understanding the nature of psychological activity. This activity has already been analyzed: it has been shown that uninterrupted activity leads to the attainment of a goal which in turn brings gratification; and that interrupted activity does not lead to the attainment of a goal which in turn brings frustration. All activity, furthermore, is motivated and this means that certain drives always have to be active. From the analysis of social, political, and economic activity, moreover, it is clear that men and women everywhere seek innumerable different kinds of goals in an infinite variety of ways. It seems impossible, therefore, to ascribe value to specific activities or to specific goals, since both the activities and the goals fluctuate so much from society to society and from time to time within a given society. The only constant desirable value seems to be the consequence of attaining a goal through activity and that value is gratification. Similarly the only constant value that is always considered undesirable is frustration. As a result it is proposed that *it is human nature—and here this slippery, oft-repeated, much abused phrase is being employed deliberately—to seek the maximum of gratification and the minimum of frustration; a desirable value should be directed toward these interrelated ends.* This italicized sentence represents a main contention of the present volume; it is a statement of a point of view whose consequences for planning will be suggested in subsequent chapters. The sole function that this statement must have is not to solve a problem that has been puzzling most thinking men and women ever since mankind has had enough leisure from the chores of existence, but to raise the problem of value and planning in terms of individuals who have the values and for whom all plans should be designed.

If gratification is and should be sought, then it follows that drives must be gratified. The problem, consequently, reduces itself to the determination of the drives which must be gratified as a result of random behavior or activity. It is



now obvious that the basic organic drives and the sexual urge require satisfaction, or else there will be profound frustration. But which other goals must be attained? Security and prestige have been mentioned, but it also has been shown that human beings seek to attain innumerable other goals. What these goals are and should be can be inferred only from the anthropological finding that, since societies everywhere have provided a roughly equivalent set of institutions, there must be drives in people that have led them to establish these institutions.<sup>4</sup> To achieve the desirable value of maximum gratification, therefore, planning must offer the attainment of goals associated with organic drives, the sexual drive, prestige, security, and these other goals.

Whenever men talk of improving their status, whenever philosophers argue that one value is "higher" than or "superior" to another, whenever politicians plead for reform or against it, whenever physicians work for the cause of health, whenever economists warn that an economic principle is about to be violated, whenever psychiatrists adjust their patients to an environment, it could be shown that their conception of the desirable value, *when its consequences upon individuals are determined*, involves the ideal of increased gratification or decreased frustration or both for one person or a group of persons. Their particular conception of value may be expressed differently, to be sure, but it is here asserted that other verbalizations are psychologically equivalent to this formulation that is being proposed.

A specific public issue like governmental control of electric power in the United States may clarify the present discussion. Such a reform is considered "bad" since it is supposed to deprive utility owners of their income and since it will enable government to enter the realm of business to a greater extent. By "bad" is meant—implicitly at least—the frustrations of the owners and, if it be assumed that government ownership of any utility or any business enterprise is also "bad," the eventual frustration of the entire nation. The same reform is also considered "good," since the high salaries

<sup>4</sup> Above, pp. 52-53.

of the utility officials and the large dividends of the stockholders—before 1929—will be abolished and since the consumer will pay for this service at a lower rate. By “good” evidently is meant the gratification of the large number of consumers at the expense of frustrating a few persons who are now being gratified. These “bad” or “good” arguments are bad or good only when they are applied to people’s present, future, or possible values and therefore they must be applied to people if they are to be evaluated. The fact that a question like this is settled in practice by competing pressure groups is a cynical but true observation that is irrelevant to the way it should be settled, for example, by means of social or economic planning.

When the value of gratification and minimum frustration is employed as the basis for planning, “the naturalistic fallacy”<sup>5</sup> is avoided to a certain extent. It is of course being contended that this value is a present, future, or possible one and hence must be also desirable. At the same time, however, the concrete goal and the specific activity leading to the goal are not being linked for all time to the ensuing gratification or frustration. The fact that a mode of behavior is gratifying or frustrating to people at a given moment does not mean that it should be eternally gratifying or frustrating to them or their descendants. Call gratification by another name like happiness, contentment, or satisfaction and it still remains impossible to posit a perpetual relationship between this subjective state and the goals and activities in the environment that give rise to it. The only exceptions, it is repeated, are the primitive organic and sexual drives; but they too have been shown to be directed toward a wide variety of goals. That a man has and will have values which will enable him to be gratified by custard is a psychological fact and a psychological prediction; that he has the potentiality of being gratified by pie is conceivable; that he should be gratified by one or the other is a question for the housewife, the dietitian, or the planner to decide; but that a custard can be called inherently better or worse than a pie without

<sup>5</sup> Above, pp. 13-14.

reference to the actual or potential tastes of the people who consume these desserts seems unreasonable.

Planning, in short, must free itself from absolutes. Human beings can be both gratified and frustrated in such a variety of ways that no one way can ever be called absolutely satisfactory or unsatisfactory *in these respects*. If the task of the social planner, for example, is to arrange the environment so that as many people as possible receive the maximum of gratification and the minimum of frustration, then no environmental arrangement, no institution, no belief can be considered sacred or untouchable—it must be booted into the junk pile, if it can be so booted *and* if its continued existence is a source of frustration to specifiable people.

The problems of ethics and planning are not resolved with any one desirable value and, since people are so plastic, they never can or should be resolved. The present formulation of this value at least suggests the difficulties confronting the planner; and these difficulties are neither more nor less numerous than those raised by any other value. The use of the value of maximum gratification and minimum frustration is reminiscent of the literature of hedonism and utilitarianism which most respectable philosophers believe has been discredited. It can be asserted, for example, that a doctrine of psychological hedonism has been smuggled into the argument by the present writer. In reply all that can be said is to confess the presence of the doctrine (and even to agree that it is a metaphysical assumption), but to deny that its importation has been illegitimate or illegal. If it is agreed that desirable values must be related to men and if the present, future, and possible values of men seem to be directed toward the attainment of this particular broad value, then there is no alternative open to students of society who refuse to be blinded by meaningless phrases or the institutional expressions of values in a particular era. The present conceptualization which has been derived from the scientific study of man, moreover, is not open to many of the criticisms that have been directed against the older philosophical doctrines.

In the first place, the delusion is not being defended that there ever can be a completely accurate hedonistic calculation of gratifications and frustrations. Measurement cannot be perfected for two important reasons: first the subjectivity and the mere presence of him who does the measuring tend to distort the results he obtains; and then people are seldom willing to be measured, since it is not considered pleasant to have one's private mental life invaded for the sake of obtaining data. A plan, however, may be considered good or bad only to the extent that its effects upon people can be determined. Sometimes indirect inference is the only means that can be employed: if an economic reform raises real wages and if it can be assumed that a rise in real wages enables more people to gratify more drives—which is perhaps a valid assumption for an industrial society—then such a reform must be considered tentatively good. Statistical data from economics, however, are relevant only when a psychological assumption that refers them to people seems justified; thus a plan is good not because it increases production but only when, in addition, there are grounds for believing that increased production is truly gratifying. This limitation in respect to measurement, nevertheless, offers no reason for abandoning attempts to gauge effects in psychological terms. The more respected schemes of value usually do not even suggest the idea of measurement; achievement or nonachievement of most ethical standards has to be intuited and this type of intuition is a most unreliable, subjective procedure.

One question that is supposed to have contributed to the downfall of the hedonists and the utilitarians can also be directed at the present formulation: to what extent should all frustration be eliminated and be replaced by gratification? This problem as stated is absurd the moment it is referred to man's nature and the moment it is recalled that this nature sets limitations upon the scope and content of any desirable value. It has been asserted that the *reductio ad absurdum* of this value would be the hedonistic state in which complete gratification without a trace of frustration

could be obtained by swallowing one synthetic pill after another or in which absolute social harmony would signify the height of gratification and the depth of frustration. The proper reply to such caviling is to point out that frustrations cannot be entirely eliminated and that it is foolish, therefore, to imagine that they can. Socialization, it has been shown, is inevitably frustrating and the human organism always has to be socialized to survive and to live in a society. Human interests, due to the ever-present fact that people seek different goals, can never be completely harmonious; hence there will be some form of social conflict and consequently some degree of frustration. Nor can it be forgotten that the learning of substitute responses occurs under the condition of frustration and that some of the activities acquired in this way lead thereafter to significant gratifications for the organism. The hedonistic pill and the society with perfect harmony, then, are figures of speech which attempt to assume that human nature is different from the way it is and then suddenly remember that the assumption is unworthy of serious consideration. The little pill, furthermore, is a device to suggest that human experiences vary qualitatively as well as quantitatively. As a matter of fact, no man can say whether the gratification secured from beer is or is not different qualitatively from that obtained by reading a sonnet; this is an involved psychological or perhaps metaphysical problem that cannot be decided dogmatically but it is one that cannot be avoided and will not be avoided when the planning personality is discussed below. In the meantime, let it be said that qualitative equivalence of all frustrations or gratifications is not being assumed.

Another alleged difficulty of this way of conceptualizing the problem of value is also real only when the actual state of human affairs is disregarded. At first glance the question concerning the distribution of frustration and gratification to members of a society does seem puzzling. The utilitarians tried to solve the problem with the slogan, "the greatest happiness to the greatest number." And abstractly it is possible to imagine two contrasting situations. In the first, a

small clique receives the maximum of gratification by imposing the maximum of frustration upon the vast majority; and, in the second, everyone is simultaneously gratified and frustrated more or less similarly. If fancy runs riot and if it is assumed that gratification and frustration could be accurately measured—as they cannot be—then the amount of gratification in both situations might be considered equal, although its distribution among the people concerned would be quite different. Such speculation, however, is quite foolish. For the present knowledge of human nature reveals that people undoubtedly differ from one another in their ability to attain goals and hence gratification; plan or no plan, variations in this respect are bound to occur. Sociological, anthropological, and historical evidence, moreover, indicates that societies eventually must and do distribute their pains and pleasures in a not completely unbalanced or unequal manner. A badly frustrated majority, for example, is likely to become aggressive and rebellious; efficient methods of communication in a highly interdependent society publicize the advantages of the favored to the unfavored and hence the latter soon appreciate the inequality that exists. For a plan or a society to be successful, consequently, this dilemma posed by sophists is almost automatically resolved; and its method of solution suggests another good reason why desirable values must be related to present ones and why all values must be referred to people as they are known to behave.

A final problem is one that has its historical roots in the previous century. At that time utilitarianism pictured men as calculating creatures who determined in a completely rational manner the gains or losses they would incur from a given action. Here no such assumption is being made concerning man's rationality or irrationality. The great contributions of psychiatry and psychology are so well recognized that it is no longer possible to believe that gains and losses are calculated on a conscious level nor to be convinced that the specific individual actually knows what is "good" or "bad" for himself. It may be said that submitting to the

torture of the dentist is a rational procedure by means of which adults—but not children—accept a momentary pain to avoid present or future ones. But it is just as plain that men do foolish things at the impulse of the moment and that thereafter they may be frustrated due to this immediate gratification; patronizing a disease-infected prostitute is a simple, tragic example. Preaching in favor of the triumph of the intellect over emotions in order to achieve the maximum of gratification and the minimum of frustration in the long run, furthermore, has little justification, inasmuch as cool rationality and a devout adherence to the monotonous golden mean may signify, for some people at least, the imposition of inhibitions that destroy spontaneous joys. Nor is it being asserted that man seeks to attain happiness and to avoid unhappiness, as though human behavior and especially human motivation could be reduced to a simple, brief formula. It does not seem narrowly monistic to point out that it is the multitudinous drives of complicated personalities that do and should find satisfaction in an almost unlimited number of ways: gratification and frustration simply serve to summarize the desirable fates which these drives should have or avoid. The mere fact that the personality is so complicated and that impulses are interrelated should banish any talk of establishing a simple quantitative scale along which all gratification conceivably might be measured.

The implication of formulating desirable values in psychological terms can now be summarized briefly. Man is seeking a maximum of gratification and a minimum of frustration in ways peculiar to himself and his society. His methods of finding gratification and avoiding frustration in the future can be anticipated to a certain extent by the social sciences. Due to the plasticity of his nature he might achieve this value in ways different from the ones he is now employing or can be expected to employ. Through planning he should obtain more gratification and less frustration in a manner that will be based on his present way of life, the kind of life he will live in the future, and the kind of life his nature might permit him to enjoy. To disregard his

present, future, and potential ways of life is, perhaps, to defeat the purpose of planning by adding new frustrations which make him conform to arbitrary values.

### *Prediction and Planning*

The social sciences have also been analyzed in respect to their ability to predict future behavior. Both prediction and planning attempt to indicate the nature of the future. Prediction, however, suggests that on the basis of an analysis in the present the future is likely to assume a specified form, provided that circumstances are not altered appreciably in the meantime. Planning, on the other hand, attempts to influence the future in accordance with a desirable value. Both prediction and planning, therefore, are concerned with possible values: a prediction merely indicates which of the many values can be anticipated and a plan selects a possible value on the basis of a present one and strives to realize it as a desirable one.

Prediction is important to planning, inasmuch as it offers data that contribute to the planned attainment of an objective. In the natural sciences the limit to plans is much more apparent than in the realm of human beings. As a literary exercise it is amusing to plan a universe in which apples fall away from the earth instead of toward it; the sensible prediction of physics, however, would reduce such a plan to merry fantasy. In like manner it is pleasant to plan a picnic, but it might be foolish to do so in the face of an unfavorable weather prediction. From a collection of raw materials the chemist can plan commodities ranging from innocuous shoe polish to deadly munitions and he can calculate in advance, i.e., predict, the precise amounts of each material that will have to be employed. Planning, in a word, can supplement predictions only when events are subject to human control and regulation.

There is no scientific evidence to show that human behavior and events involving human beings cannot be controlled and regulated. In a world beset by depressions and



wars, this statement may sound like an exaggerated delusion until it is remembered that the constituents of these phenomena, like a particular business enterprise or a particular propaganda campaign, can be altered. Depressions and wars seem to be beyond human control at the moment, but there is nothing in their nature, when that nature is analyzed, that eliminates the possibility of ultimate control.

Thus far it has been said that plans must be concerned with predictions. The relationship, however, can be altered, for frequently predictions can be upset by plans. When men subscribe to a plan and govern their behavior accordingly, the plan itself becomes a datum that has to be taken into account in making the prediction. In the examination of the social sciences it has become clear, it is hoped, that a social theory has an influence upon those who have heard of the theory, whether they agree or disagree with it. And a prediction itself has a similar rôle: men who trust the prediction almost inevitably alter their actions as a result of their belief. In the United States, for example, analyses of market trends, of the number of people on a political band wagon, of the progress of a new fad or fashion, and of the course of a mental quirk, these are more or less crude predictions which sometimes succeed because individuals who hear of them believe they are or are going to be correct. A plan, consequently, may affect a prediction and a prediction may affect planning. Theorists of course think of themselves as impartial scientists but, when they influence people or events with their theories, they are no longer so aloof. A planner, however, is quite different from a theorist since he recognizes the desirable values he is attempting to achieve and the means he is employing; but even without such recognition the latter may be changing the future if less successfully and less systematically.

Many of the predictions of all of the social sciences are predictions contingent on certain specified conditions. These are the predictions that are truly scientific, inasmuch as deductions are made in accordance with known principles and explicit assumptions. Perhaps economics and specialized por-

tions of psychology illustrate this type of prediction best of all, for through a process of abstraction they are able to make or presume an ahistorical analysis of events and their attending circumstances at a given moment. Prices will increase or decrease, syllables or mazes will or will not be learned at a specific rate, if all the other things-being-equal are equal and can be specified. Such predictions are invaluable for planning when the conditions really can be presumed. Planning, however, sometimes requires the rearrangement of the very conditions under which the predictions can be made and therefore much of social science is useless for planning. For this reason it has been proposed that psychological principles and predictions are more important than those from sociology, anthropology, government, history, law, and economics, since men and women as individuals exist under all conditions and since the principles governing their behavior can be applied under most circumstances.

The social sciences also employ another type of prediction whenever events over a period of time have been examined. Sociologists, especially in America, for example, are fond of talking about the present and the future in terms of "social trends." Data from the past and the present are collected reasonably carefully and are charted to indicate fluctuations in magnitude; by means of a shrewd guess the fluctuations are made to continue into the future; and the resulting "extrapolation"—i.e., the prolonging of the curve of events beyond the strictly known into the unknown—is the social trend. Such a technique of prediction is the same as the actuarial devices employed by insurance companies. It is based on a crude probability theory which claims that the future is the reincarnation of the past with a few changes. To be sure, the present continues into the future only if and when the conditions under which the present tendencies have been ascertained remain identical later; or, in different words, only when the system can be considered closed. Predictions based on trends, therefore, usually have to be prefaced with a host of qualifying "if's." Such a historical approach, however, is often necessary, inasmuch as

the subject matter of the social sciences is complicated and inasmuch as a knowledge of the history of the organism or the society enables the student to assign "weights" to the variables that are presumably operating. And yet even crude inductions require that certain conditions be specified before the trend or the tendency can be expected to continue; and planning, once again, may seek to alter those conditions and therefore the prediction itself.

The conventional theories of social science have as their dual function the analysis of events that have occurred and the prediction of future events. All-embracing ones, like those propounding economic determinism or a series of cycles, postulate certain broad correlations between environmental conditions and behavior; but they say nothing very definite concerning the details of specific individuals' behavior under those conditions. While it is important to be able to anticipate broad consequences of a particular economic structure and to know that societies grow and decay, such knowledge is not sufficient to plan behavior in any complete sense by altering economic or societal conditions. Thus all of these theories, to be useful for planning, must be expressed and applied in terms of man.

A handicap inherent in the social sciences is an inability to gather adequate data to test theories or even to discover whether the conditions are such that the theory can be tested. People do not like to be guinea pigs; custom prevents the invasion of privacy; social data, being complex and scattered, are both difficult and expensive to collect; or events occur so rapidly that they cannot be perceived accurately or adequately. These difficulties cannot be dismissed as "mere" technicalities, since they hinder both the formulation and the application of principles. The planner, consequently, is doomed to a paucity of essential information.

The social sciences have also not been very successful in specifying the time at which their predictions can be expected to eventuate. When the prediction is a deduction made within a limited, ahistorical frame of reference, the event is supposed to occur in the next moment or close to

that moment. And when the prediction is induced from trends or tendencies, the exact time of its future occurrence is usually vague and indefinite. This lack of precision is due to at least two factors. In the first place, no social scientist is ever certain that the conditions basic to his predictions will remain as he must anticipate they will; a slight alteration in them may retard or hasten the consequence he has induced. Then, secondly, as a specialist in one field the social scientist does not concern himself with predicting these circumstances themselves; this task he allocates to his colleague in the neighboring science. As a result of this necessary buck passing, events just do not get predicted precisely!

Planning, however, requires a certain amount of precision. The planner simply cannot afford to take the risk of passing the buck and, besides, as a practical person he really has to be the very one from whom no responsibility can be shifted. For this reason he must use all of the social sciences and the related disciplines simultaneously. This is no simple task to assign him and therefore it has been suggested that he can find uniformity both in terminology and theory by reducing events to the people who compose them. When he visualizes his plans in individual terms, he has one frame of reference in which he can judge the success or failure of his efforts. And thereafter, when he requires technical information, he can consult the specialists and obtain data from them that he will translate and interpret psychologically.

The very existence of a vast body of knowledge and theory known as science is proof of the fact that man is interested in planning his life. Instead of accepting events as they occur, men and women as far back as recorded history goes have attempted to discover laws and regularities so that they no longer would be at the complete mercy of their environment and of one another. This urge to comprehend the mysterious in an intelligible fashion springs, as has been suggested, from frustrations imposed by events that appear mad and blind; and, biologically, human beings are so equipped that they are able to seek a remedy. Science is just one of the tools that make living easier and successful planning is like science in this respect.

## **PART 3: PLANNING**

## CHAPTER VIII

### INDIVIDUAL PLANNING

IN attempting to describe the nature of man and the social values that do or should govern his plans, it has been necessary to carry on the discussion in abstract terms and to segregate qualities that characterize human beings everywhere irrespective of their particular society. This procedure, artificial though it be, is a venerable and a necessary one. For science requires the separation of the relevant from the irrelevant, the essential from the nonessential, and thereby the attempt is made to reduce chaos to something resembling order. Man, being embedded in his culture, can be understood only when he is disentangled from social forces and then replaced in the context from which he has been ripped. Man's behavior as an individual or as a member of society has not been reduced completely to scientific laws; but at least he can be seen now as an object of scientific study.

To plan, as has been pointed out, man must be observed in terms of his present, future, and possible values. According to the findings of anthropology and sociology, groups of men in one society differ minutely or markedly from groups in all other societies. It follows, then, that plans will vary with the individuals or society for which they are designed. An analysis of planning must be confined to one society, if that analysis is to be concrete and meaningful. For this reason, in the chapters that follow planning will be considered in terms of the peculiar demands of, and conditions in, the United States. Illustrative material from other segments of Western European culture will be introduced, since many of the basic issues of planning certainly occur in other societies of that culture and in different cultures, but the emphasis will be on America.

The United States, however, is vast and scattered, and it is perhaps a trifle bold to generalize concerning a country

of this size and complexity. Social scientists, moreover, lament again and again the inadequate information they possess even for theoretical purposes, to say nothing of planning. Lamentations, though true enough, must not deter at least a preliminary inquiry. For unless research and fact-gathering are directed toward planning in America—in the way, for example, the National Resources Committee has functioned—still more useless data will be gathered; few theoretical or practical advances will be made; and the theories of social science will continue to influence people in diverse ways and without the direction which comes from planning. What is being said here concerning the United States, therefore, is woefully tentative and subject to the corrections of additional facts and sharper minds. In spite of these misgivings, the plans of men will be examined in terms of the knowledge of man that has been gathered by science and they will be evaluated cautiously by the application of the desirable value of maximum gratification and minimum frustration.

Various phases of planning in America will be considered. In this chapter the planning of individuals for themselves is described and analyzed. Subsequently attention will be focused upon plans for large aspects of social living (*social planning*), for the economic order (*economic planning*), for political institutions (*political planning*), and for regions (*regional planning*). By a *master plan* is meant a plan that seeks or attains a rigid control over a significantly large portion of human activity.

### *Regimentation and Planning*

Planning connotes to many people the systematic control and perhaps the regimentation of the economic life of the country with consequent infringements upon the liberties of the population. Here is perhaps as good a place as any to discuss the views of the anti-regimentalists. These individualists are in reality shamefully naïve when they attack planning in the name of freedom. They forget that freedom is a metaphysical entity which has never been realized and

which, if it could be realized, would shock their very souls by its anarchistic apparition. Within them still is an outdated brand of liberalism that seeks to obtain freedom from every type of restriction by the government so that other powerful organizations can impose different restrictions on almost everyone. According to Private Willis who thus "exercises of his brains" in one of Gilbert's ditties, "ev'ry boy and ev'ry gal that's born into the world alive is either a little Liberal, or else a little Conservative," which is a brilliant way of suggesting to Victorians and to all mankind that children are socialized into preëxisting molds. It might be added that the individual is forever doomed to obey certain edicts of his society, that this process of regimentation follows him from the womb to the sod, and that, therefore, "regimentation" can never be completely avoided. Let those who object to planning voice their objections more specifically before they cry out; but a plan as such is not bad just because it is a plan.

Mr. Walter Lippmann is one of the ablest critics of one form of planning. Throughout *The Good Society* he recognizes the ubiquity of regulation. In one place, for example, he attacks the principle of laissez faire for committing the "error . . . in thinking that any aspect of work or of property is ever unregulated by law";<sup>1</sup> in another, he brands the declaration of the eighteenth-century "pioneer liberals" that "laws merely declared inalienable and, therefore, unalterable rights with which men had been endowed by their Creator" as a "great myth."<sup>2</sup> But he himself states:

For in so far as men embrace the belief that the coercive power of the state shall plan, shape, and direct their economy, they commit themselves to the suppression of the contrariness arising from the diversity of human interests and purposes. They cannot escape it. If a society is to be planned, its population must conform to the plan; if it is to have an official purpose, there must be no private purposes that conflict with it.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Lippmann (90), p. 166.

<sup>2</sup> Lippmann (90), p. 243.

<sup>3</sup> Lippmann (90), p. 51.



Thereafter Lippmann maintains that most of the evils in the world, especially those associated with collectivism, totalitarianism, and communism, have their roots in planning. This procedure, it appears to the present writer, is little more than verbal smearing: it beclouds the virtues of all plans due to the defects which certain types of them allegedly possess. Even "the first principle of liberalism" in Lippmann's philosophy, viz., "the market must be preserved and perfected as the prime regulator of the division of labor,"<sup>4</sup> requires *some* kind of planning. Many of Lippmann's criticisms of particular brands of master planning which he dislikes so violently deserve and in truth will receive respectful attention<sup>5</sup> when they are phrased in terms of human beings and human values and not as institutional clichés. It is interesting, finally, to note that both Lippmann and the men he attacks seem to be seeking almost identical changes in society: they differ either in respect to phraseology or means of attaining the ends.

Planning, it must be pointed out to Lippmann and others, need not be confined to curbing the liberties of individuals and groups through economic regulations. Plans are involved, yes, should be involved, in the entire existence of an individual. Without a plan to achieve various goals anyone is disordered and frustrated. "One important habit, that of planning and organizing, regardless of the motive behind it," as Soule has pointed out, seems to be inherent within people.<sup>6</sup> This capacity or "habit" has never been formally included in the conventional lists of instincts because it is obviously a complex propensity containing so many cultural elements. If planning offers means to attain goals, then this ability to plan depends not only on innate and acquired skill but also upon certain accompanying drives, attitudes, and knowledge. It is an ability that is developed and has to be developed in the course of the learning involved in socialization; it is, from one important point of view, a form of self-

<sup>4</sup> Lippmann (90), p. 174.

<sup>5</sup> Below, pp. 288-292, 373-380.

<sup>6</sup> Soule (134), p. 128.

regimentation. The activity which is planning inevitably is reinforced as goals are achieved or it is extinguished when they are not achieved. The fact that almost all personalities reveal a tendency toward some kind of consistent behavior and that experience from one situation is frequently transferred or generalized to another is an indication of the pervasiveness of this ability to plan. The task of the psychiatrist, in fact, might be interpreted as the teaching of a plan to a patient who has been unable to evolve a satisfactory one for himself.

*Individual Prediction*

Since the ability to formulate and execute plans is acquired, it is to be expected that many individuals are not completely successful in planning the details of their existence. In general it may be said that people have strong tendencies to misjudge their own skills or else events themselves often disrupt the attainment of their goals. Individual prediction, therefore, is quite fallible.

In the first place, the wishes, desires, or attitudes of a person may influence his beliefs either concerning the present or the future. Lund<sup>7</sup> and Poffenberger<sup>8</sup> have shown that these subjective factors help determine, respectively, students' reactions to propositions bearing on religion, ethics, politics, and science and their judgments concerning the truth or falsity of claims in advertisements. When individuals are asked to predict the course of social events, moreover, many of their predictions are a function of their preferences in regard to those events.<sup>9</sup> According to McGregor, if the outcome of an event is important to the subject, he is especially prone to venture a prediction in accord with what he would like to have happen.<sup>10</sup> Hayes, for example, ascertained the prediction of 8,419 voters in October, 1932, and discovered that about 75 per cent of the Republicans ex-

<sup>7</sup> Lund (93), pp. 71-73.

<sup>8</sup> Poffenberger (124).

<sup>9</sup> Cantril (20), pp. 380, 384-385; McGregor (99), pp. 182-184.

<sup>10</sup> McGregor (99), pp. 189-193.

pected Hoover to win and 90 per cent of the Democrats predicted Roosevelt's victory correctly.<sup>11</sup>

Even in a comparatively simple laboratory situation, furthermore, when college students are asked, "What will you do next time?" on six tests involving the supplying of synonyms, steadiness, addition, the learning and use of a code, the cancellation of vowels in sentences, and hitting a target with metal discs, it was found that their judgments depended upon "anxiety and insecurity feelings; desire to excel, to succeed, to avoid failure; actual level of momentary strivings and the disparity between this level and explicit estimates; and general past experiences which have helped determine the subject's personality organization and thus his reactions to such demands of inner and outer forces."<sup>12</sup> What this means is that an individual's prediction concerning his own behavior depends not only upon his estimate of his ability as already demonstrated in the past but also upon his momentary psychological state and his entire personality as that personality has been organized through experience in a particular society. There is also evidence from this experiment which indicates that the individual's strivings actually prevent him from giving an accurate estimate of what he will be able to accomplish on the subsequent trial of the same task.<sup>13</sup>

The fact that wishes tend to outweigh knowledge of one's ability is also shown in another way: there seems to be no constantly close relationship between knowledge and attitude. Carlson has revealed that the certainty with which students hold political opinions has little or no relationship to their knowledge of the issues involved.<sup>14</sup> McGregor ascertained the information of his subjects by determining their familiarity with various vehicles of communication and concludes that it is "the *nature* of one's information that is determinative, not the *amount*."<sup>15</sup> Both McGregor and Cantril

<sup>11</sup> Hayes (56).

<sup>12</sup> Gould (53), pp. 111-112.

<sup>13</sup> Gould (53), pp. 42-54.

<sup>14</sup> Carlson (21).

<sup>15</sup> McGregor (99), p. 194; italics his.

have shown that experts in particular fields make predictions concerning events that are no more valid than those of laymen, even though the former's information is more extensive.<sup>16</sup>

The same writers, however, also suggest that personal, subjective factors are not so important in determining predictive judgments when events themselves are "unambiguous."<sup>17</sup> In May, 1936, almost all individuals predicted that Hitler would be in power in May, 1937, regardless of whether they answered the question, "Is your personal attitude toward Hitler a favorable one on the whole?" affirmatively or negatively.<sup>18</sup> Similarly, since the facts in most social situations are so complicated that it is extremely difficult to specify the exact date when an event will occur, experts feel more certain concerning the direction of an event than they do concerning the time when it will take place.<sup>19</sup>

Man's ability to predict his own behavior or the outcome of social events, consequently, is far from perfect. The margin of error seems to be great whenever he expresses himself as a personality, whenever his skill is not the only factor that will be decisive, whenever the situation itself does not "coerce" his judgment. The errors, therefore, can be reduced somewhat; thus the urban students in Lund's investigation revealed less of a correlation between their desires and their beliefs than did a comparatively "naïve," rural group, presumably because the former were living in a more favorable, more critical milieu.<sup>20</sup>

From the evidence that has been presented, however, there is no reason to conclude that man cannot plan at all because his predictions tend to be so subjective. An athlete who can perform almost perfect flying-Dutchman dives, for example, may not be able to estimate the exact degree of perfection he will obtain on a given trial (for he may be nervous or his stomach may be upset), but at least he will know that he can

<sup>16</sup> Cantril (20), pp. 388-389; McGregor (99), pp. 195-197.

<sup>17</sup> Cantril (20), pp. 386-388; McGregor (99), p. 182.

<sup>18</sup> McGregor (99), p. 185.

<sup>19</sup> Cantril (20), p. 388.

<sup>20</sup> Lund (93), pp. 76-77.

approximate the form of the dive. Similarly the motorist cannot guarantee that he will remain sufficiently to the right of the highway to avoid the oncoming car, but he does not sell his car in order to escape this kind of accident. Many individual predictions in life situations, moreover, prove erroneous not because the person is subjective in making the prediction but because of shifts in the situations. More goals could be attained and hence more predictions and plans could be successful if the nature of future situations were known or perhaps planned.

#### *Plans of Parents*

From the outset it is no exaggeration to say that individual planning is inherent in parenthood. Even in America abortions are usually permitted when mothers for organic reasons are not prepared to bear their children. Poor health is undesirable both in the parent and the offspring, and therefore the sick woman is allowed to avoid this potential frustration. The question of birth control, as has been suggested,<sup>21</sup> raises an issue concerned not only with the efficacy of contraceptives but also with religious and nationalistic ideologies. These ideologies, since they exist, must be respected, first because legally they have to be and secondly because those who cling to them cannot be made to change without the imposition of new frustrations. Aside from such stumbling blocks, there is no doubt that birth control offers people a unique opportunity to plan an important part of their existence and of course to gratify their sexual drive. Women apparently are physiologically capable of having children every ten or twelve months, but aside from the vicissitudes of pregnancy and labor such a rapid rate of reproduction is not desirable: the home may be crowded, the father's income may not be sufficient, and each child may not receive the guidance and attention it requires. The proper spacing of children is indeed planning. The alternative to contraception is abstinence or some form of pervers-

<sup>21</sup> Above, pp. 28-30.

sion, both of which may be disastrous psychically if not physically.

Immediately after birth the infant is made to conform to a vast program or plan in being socialized and his consent to such "regimentation," Mr. Lippmann, can never be asked in a strictly formal way. He may protest by crying and by refusing to eat and drink, but eventually he must learn a more or less standardized feeding schedule. He may delay and regress occasionally, but he is always compelled to acquire certain cleanliness habits. He may be brilliant or just average, but by the beginning of the second year he will undoubtedly have been able to respond to definite linguistic cues and have uttered a few himself. He may protest or obey, but at the age of five or six he will have begun to attend school for a minimum of at least eight years. Society through his parents has begun to plan his way of life: it makes him pursue certain goals and reinforces only particular methods of attaining these ends.

In subtler ways the child's parents may deliberately plan to form his personality. Their conception of his early training, for example, will be important in determining whether he is inhibited and docile or whether he is expressive and willful. His interest in playing with fire engines or dolls depends to a large extent on the emphasis they place on the sex to which he belongs. His earliest ambitions and his concern with sexual matters will stem at least partially from them.

Modern, progressive parents pride themselves on the permission they give their children to select a job or a mate in accordance with their own preferences and desires *after* the so-called "age of discretion" has been reached. It is presumed—and, if literary fiction be true, quite correctly too—that subjugation to the parents' will is frustrating and leads, therefore, to an unsuccessful career or marriage. Such subjugation, however, is frustrating only because American children learn in the school and from casual contacts that they alone must make these decisions. A century or so ago and in a different culture or country the parents' choice

might be accepted without murmur; but even with that custom there was no guarantee that in some way or other the adolescent would not acquire drives that might lead him to behave in a manner not acceptable to those interested in his welfare.

Unwittingly, moreover, American parents predispose their children to develop particular adult personalities, no matter what their philosophy of parenthood chances to be. For the "age of discretion" implies a choice between alternate goals which must originate somewhere and some time. And it is not unlikely that the home itself may be the place where they have been acquired: children adhere to an example set by the parents or they rebel. After all, the quiet heroine who wishes to display herself and her talents on a stage, in spite of her father's protest, must have become familiar with the institution of the theater at some tender age. Parents, therefore, plan their children up to a certain point and thereafter other social institutions help form their drives, their attitudes, their skills, and their knowledge concerning themselves and their world. Since there are these other, extra-familial influences, it does seem dangerous for parents to plan the lives of their children too rigorously, inasmuch as the plan may run counter to the latter's organized personalities and be a source of frustration to them.

If plans require social changes, the least frustrating way to bring about these changes is by influencing children before they have developed drives and attitudes that may lead them in contrary directions. The device of the dictator to indoctrinate children by means of political organizations outside the home is effective enough, but it tends to cause friction between parents and children who thereafter find themselves in disagreement. Such disagreement is undesirable since potentially the home is a potent source of gratification. The child who tattles to the authorities that his parents are disobeying the edicts of a four- or five-year plan is not merely coöperating with the régime: he is revolting against the rules of his parents and, as a result, he probably must seek his gratification elsewhere. It is better, though perhaps

more difficult, to secure the coöperation of parents and to have them more or less voluntarily train their children in accordance with the requirements of the social change. For this reason adult education either formally or through the various channels of communication assumes such great importance in social planning.

There are two ever-present sources of potential conflict between parents and children that are indeed frustrating and that apparently cannot be completely eliminated. The first of these is the different knowledge which each generation possesses by virtue of the fact that a discrepancy of ages inevitably leads to varying experiences, especially in a changing society. And the second is due to the eventual and often abrupt severing of the child from his parents when the former becomes an independent adult and citizen. In a happy family some degree of mutual gratification between parents and children is bound to exist and it is always difficult to feel the weakening of these ties. Society, moreover, requires that the adult be relatively independent and the adult himself in most cases, in order to obtain the complete gratifications that are offered to him, must secure this independence. Strong mother- or father-fixations are dangerous retardations in psychic growth. To reduce the frustrations caused by both these conflicts, it is necessary that parents and children be aware of the inevitability of separation and that the former anticipate the latter's maturity as well as possible and attempt to plan accordingly. When the adolescent boy or girl suddenly begins to display a violent interest in sex, the parent must not be caught off guard and be horror-stricken; in his mind he must be prepared for this normal phenomenon and equip his child beforehand to cope with the situation. Thereafter as a more or less mature adult the individual plans or tries to plan his life as completely as possible.

### *Compulsory Plans*

Many of the plans that individuals execute and the goals that they seek are imposed upon them by external require-



ments. The factory hand and the office worker must punch a time clock regularly and they do so for fear that they will lose part of their salary or their jobs; "Of the 49 million people in the United States who today carry on the work of the country, at least 35 million are regimented in detail for at least eight hours of each working day."<sup>22</sup> The farmer must sow, cultivate, and harvest his crops at the whim of climatic conditions and he adheres to these whims in order to have a crop at all and thus survive from season to season. People must save enough money to pay their taxes and they do so to avoid punishment by the state. These are plans that are considered socially necessary and that are constantly reinforced since they are related to the welfare of industry or government and since industry and government in turn are considered essential to all citizens. As the plans are being executed, they must be somewhat gratifying: through them individuals do attain certain limited goals and are able to appreciate the connection between an onerous task or obligation and their ultimate satisfaction. But the annoying alarm clock, the yearning for holidays and vacations, the brute discipline required by the plow, and the numerous jokes about taxes and tax collectors, such stereotypes indicate resentment toward these individual plans and signify a certain amount of frustration.

It is noteworthy that there is nothing inherently frustrating about the tasks themselves which these compulsory plans involve. It is well known, for example, that the tired worker whose job requires him to be active in a physical sense spends a holiday exercising, reports gratification, and claims that he is relaxed. And the less intelligent and poorly educated person may be more efficient in performing a monotonous task and less dissatisfied with this kind of work than a more complicated individual.<sup>23</sup>

It might appear, therefore, that the element of frustration in such individual plans is the compulsion itself. Americans glorify the independent small businessman and the free

<sup>22</sup> Lorwin (92), p. 43.

<sup>23</sup> Viteles (153), pp. 536-540.

farmer, for it is assumed that this way of earning a living, being self-imposed, is more satisfying than work conducted under the direct supervision of an employer. The amateur in any field, be it athletics or sexual activity, is said to be happier than the professional: it is presumed that the former's voluntary status enables him to dictate when, where, and with whom he may exercise his talents.

As a matter of psychological fact, however, a task is frustrating to the extent that it prevents the attainment of *other* goals and the satisfaction of *other* drives that are important to the individual. Monotonous work frustrates more interests in the superior person than in the inferior one. Huxley has touched upon this generalization when he proposes in his "brave new world" that workers be bred and conditioned to develop drives that prepare them exclusively for work and for no other activity; under these circumstances no competing drive would exist to be frustrated.<sup>24</sup> Some intellectuals claim that they can work more efficiently on a rainy day when the bad weather precludes the possibility of more attractive outdoor distractions. The tired businessman collects stamps or snaps a camera, not because philately or photography could be satisfactory to him as a life task, but because his other drives have been sufficiently gratified and frustrated so that a harmless amusement can bring him gratification by enabling him to be successful in another activity and to forget his failures elsewhere. But only a creature of Huxley's imagination or a compulsive neurotic can be gratified through one activity alone.

It is well to recognize, therefore, that all of the frustrations involved in routines cannot be planned out of existence. In an interdependent society certain unpleasant tasks have to be performed and they cannot be made into completely juicy gratifications. Connecting sewer pipes may be a form of sublimated sexual activity, but it is not the same as normal intercourse and never can be. That these tasks can be made more meaningful and hence significant to the individuals who have to perform them; and that compensatory

<sup>24</sup> Huxley (71), pp. 87-88.

gratifications should be offered outside of working hours need not be denied and it can be one of the objectives of planning to accomplish just that.

### *Conflicting Plans*

The individual plans of men may lead to social conflicts. To attain their goals on a broader social scale, for example, Americans form organizations of more or less far-reaching character. A pressure group operates with a very definite plan to influence important legislators so that one individual or a group of individuals can profit from contemplated legislation. Nowadays the American Legion, not content with having obtained fat bonuses, has a plan for the entire country that is vaguely referred to as a species of Americanism. Instead of exerting pressure upon a specific, influential group, other individuals conceive the plan of affecting huge sections of the population. Depending on their plan, their skill, and their wealth, they may decide to operate in various ways. They may form an association and from the dues of the members scatter pamphlets, press releases, and speakers as widely as possible. They may hire shrewd technicians, publicity agents, or public relations counsels to undertake the dissemination of their point of view. Or they may resort to advertising and perhaps simultaneously in almost undetectable ways influence the media in which they appear.

The existence of all these propagandists raises an important problem for planning in the American democracy. According to the Federal Constitution and the entire theory of liberalism that permeates that elastic document, any man or woman has the right to plan his life as he wishes, provided he does not run counter to official regulations or unofficial customs. Included among his privileges is the permission to carry on propaganda almost in any conceivable way—this permission is simply an extension of the rights of free speech, an unhampered press, and unlimited assembly. The assumption behind such permission is that all people will have a more or less equal opportunity to present their

points of view and that in the long or the short run intelligent citizenry will be able to select truth and disregard falsity.

Sociologically, however, it is too plain that the belief in the eventual triumph of truth is quite meaningless. Truth in this sense is little more than a cliché and what is considered true by one generation is dependent upon the spirit and tempo of the age. Particular doctrines, ideas, and practices are not cherished solely on their merits; they are pushed into popularity by their protagonists who may or may not appreciate their complete social significance. For people to accept them they must appear to be potential sources of gratification and, as has been suggested previously,<sup>25</sup> over huge periods of time there is the small possibility that only the satisfactory ones survive. But such survival is ascertained only in a theoretical, conceptual way and does not necessarily substantiate the smugly optimistic faith of liberalism.

There is abundant evidence to show that in "the arena of public opinion" of a democracy the warring parties are unequally matched. The plans of the producer, for example, have a much better chance of being realized than the plans of the consumer: the former is a more active zealot of his cause and through his financial resources occupies a more influential position in American society. Anyone is permitted to found a newspaper, but few people have the capital with which to do so. All political candidates are entitled to equal time on the radio, but the expense involved in a broadcast is usually too large for the campaign chests of minor parties. For this reason the knowledge of the world and its events that most Americans possess tends to be one-sided and consequently there are slight or significant alterations in their personalities.

Specifically, a manufacturer decides to expand his production schedule in order to increase profits. He hires an advertising agency to spread the name of his product. The bright men in that agency either use their intuition and

<sup>25</sup> Above, pp. 15-16.

common sense in preparing advertising copy or else they study the knowledge, attitudes, and drives of prospective customers through market surveys. Sometimes they may advise their clients to change his product slightly or perhaps to wrap or paint it differently. On the basis of the clever "appeals" which they design the product sells more widely. An individual plan has been successful!

It is successful, of course, from the point of view of the manufacturer and the advertising agency. But have the new customers really benefited? In some cases increased production may mean decreased prices for them, since the desired profit can be spread more thinly over a wider area; and there is a certain advantage for the consumer in the uniformity and standardization that are possible in a nationally advertised brand. Additional purchases are made, to be sure, because the consumer believes that the product will benefit him. The belief, however, is based on an integration of his drives and the appeals of the advertiser. If he is ignorant concerning the product, as most consumers invariably are, his purchase may be due to a pure delusion. People with serious organic diseases still have faith in the patent medicines sold by quacks because of the misleading labels on the bottles. Soap is made to appear as more than a combination of chemicals; allegedly it restores or creates beauty, is beneficial to the skin, or may even pose as a substitute for sunshine or a method of reducing bodily fat. Being convinced that the claims of advertising are true and essential to the gratification of an important drive is not a guarantee that the claims actually accomplish all they purport to accomplish. It is not unfair to conclude that advertisers are able to impose their selfish individual plans upon people by convincing them that the product is necessary to their welfare.

What has been said of advertising is equally true of the plans of politicians and other propagandists. All of these "engineers of public opinion" are self-appointed, and so many of them believe very righteously that their own ends or those of their clients coincide with the best interests of

the community. Eighteenth-century liberalism, however, simply has not been successful: the truths that are spread in America remain one-sided. It was a trifle naïve, it now seems, to believe that the government as umpire ever could enforce rules of fair competition between conflicting ideas and practices. For criteria of fairness are lacking and government itself is composed of politicians and other human beings whose interests also are involved in many controversies and conflicts.

Lest people be exploited and eventually frustrated in ways that may not be clear to them, three solutions to the problem of pressure and propaganda have been suggested. All three assume realistically that, where there are no rigorous standards of truth, some kind of propaganda is inevitable and that every individual plan which affects or influences other people is bound to contain some propaganda. The propagandists themselves have proposed a code of ethics to control their own activities. They require that members of their trade associations be "honest" and that, like the legal profession, they accept clients only when they are convinced that the plan is "good." "Honest" and "good" are fine words, but they are vague. How can a propagandist be completely honest when to be successful he has to conceal to a certain extent the exact purpose of his propaganda? How can a propagandist know when a plan is "good" or "bad" except by determining whether it is in agreement with his own ideals, which ideals themselves cannot always be subject to social scrutiny? Such a code of ethics, moreover, is paradoxical: the function of the code is to convince people that they will not be manipulated and exploited; but people are so convinced in order that eventually, being made trustful, they may be further manipulated and exploited.

Another solution is that of government regulation. Even now there are signs that the government is becoming a more active umpire: advertising claims must be toned down, advertisements must be clearly labeled to distinguish them from the "legitimate" portions of a publication, the contents of products must be more or less accurately specified,

certain lobbyists must identify themselves, and there are movements afoot to curb the representatives of totalitarian governments in this country. Whether or not additional regulations should be clamped down upon propagandists is a general issue that applies not only to propaganda but to a host of other social problems to be discussed presently.<sup>26</sup> The issue, being a grave one, cannot be decided merely in terms of this one problem.

Or, finally, it has been proposed that citizens through education be given skeptical attitudes toward propaganda and toward the vehicles of communication in which propaganda lurks; they are to be made to differentiate the "good" from the "bad" forces that are affecting them. Attitudes like these can be developed by debunking propaganda, by teaching the techniques that propagandists employ, and by giving people deep insight into all the social forces that engulf them. Through such knowledge it is hoped that men and women will be able to free themselves at least partially from the individual plans of others which beset them. The growing popularity or notoriety of the word "propaganda" itself, the increasing number of courses in propaganda analysis in secondary schools and colleges, the discussion of propaganda by groups dedicated to adult education, and the existence of the Institute for Propaganda Analysis are significant trends in the direction of this deeper public insight. Education to expose propaganda, though highly desirable, is a slow process and cannot always be effective. People learn slowly and the very forces of propaganda which are being analyzed tend to oppose educational advancement. The American Legion, the National Association of Manufacturers, and the numerous so-called trade associations of the various industries, for example, exert pressure against educators who wish to be socially realistic, and these groups are certainly not averse to promoting their own favored brand of "education."

For this type of education to succeed, it must be reinforced by a genuine drive already active within the indi-

<sup>26</sup> Below, pp. 293-297, 373-380.

viduals who are being educated. At the moment, for example, men and women with anti-fascist leanings are eager to recognize fascist propaganda in America; they can be instructed, therefore, because they rightly fear the frustrations which fascism brings and because they have a vague feeling that they must actively combat this menace. Members of the consumers' coöperative movement are wary of the claims of commercial advertisers: their organization offers them an opportunity to utilize this knowledge by purchasing a better-grade product at the prevailing market price and by securing the purchase-savings characteristic of the Rochdale plan. There is always the possibility, moreover, that the analysis of one kind of propaganda will stimulate the individual to decode all kinds; thus he who is acquainted with fascist propaganda may be able to transfer his perspicacity into the field of advertising in general and the consumer-coöperator may become better acquainted with the ways in which his economic and social system functions as a result of his experience with everyday necessities.

#### *Frustrated Plans*

The plans of some individuals seem doomed to failure. In any absolute sense it is indeed impossible to ascribe responsibility for the failures to the men and women themselves or to the society of which they are a part. The whole question of responsibility is frequently a metaphysical issue. In common sociological parlance, for example, it is said that the slum area in which a particular delinquent has been reared is "responsible" for his infractions of the law. In one rather definite sense, however, the responsibility must be laid directly upon the individual concerned, inasmuch as he and not his contemporary, a child living in similar social circumstances, has succumbed to temptation. The psychologist might then attempt to absolve him of blame by analyzing the peculiar conditions in his family situation; or perhaps an organic defect within him might be held culpable. At some point in the analysis the question of the freedom of will is



eventually raised and at that point all discussion must cease. Even if it be admitted, moreover, that the slum has promoted a career of crime, it remains necessary to account for the slum itself. "Society is responsible for social conditions," it may be argued; but society, of course, is composed of individuals, from which it follows that certain individuals are responsible for the slum. These latter individuals, however, are also the product of innumerable social, psychological, and organic factors, the sum total of which "explain" them and hence, as was true of the delinquent, offer powerful excuses in their behalf.

Fortunately it is not necessary to affix responsibility in any ultimate sense in order to formulate and execute plans. Instead it appears important to make only one, relatively simple distinction: between failures that presumably can never be eliminated and those that can be eliminated through planning. Whether or not the responsibility for the failure is due to the individual, other individuals in his society, or even the natural environment is worth a moment's thought only when the condition under discussion can be improved or reformed. Thus to eliminate delinquency at least partially it is valuable to know that slums, family conditions, and organic defects may be influential in producing crime; the contribution, respectively, of the community planner, the social worker, and the physician or psychiatrist is much more valuable than an intellectual decision concerning the precise cause or the responsible factor.

In any society, then, certain individual plans cannot be successful and the personal or fortuitous circumstances that lead to the frustration appear, on the whole, to be inevitable and incurable. One or both parents may be sterile and therefore they can never have the child or the children they plan to have; if the cause of sterility is physical and not psychical, only medical advances can eliminate this kind of frustration. Contraceptives are bungled at crucial moments and the resulting offspring may be "poorly spaced," as the phrase goes; perhaps methods of birth control can be made fool-proof, but it is far from likely that they will ever be com-

pletely automatic in their operation. Under the influence of alcohol some people reveal strange traits and attitudes which they have planned to conceal; eliminate alcohol and people's tongues will slip or their tempers will burst forth in tantrums or they will talk in their sleep. A rival secures the job or the raise which one individual hoped to obtain in order to balance his family budget; short of absolute security and universal and perceptual equality in wages, this frustration must remain. It rains or it does not rain, it snows or it does not snow, it is warm or it is cold when the opposite kind of weather has been necessary for the fruition of a plan; forecasting the weather may be improved, but adequate control of the weather seems unlikely. A loved one suddenly is killed or dies and his death seems utterly without reason and beyond understanding; accidents may be reduced and life may be prolonged, but death cannot be avoided. Diseases break out and individuals suffer trivial or serious hardships; medical science may advance, but it is doubtful whether the human organism can ever be made immune to all ailments.

In America some plans fail as a result of social pressure that is exerted upon people who are unable to respond. An ambitious man in this society, for example, is one who seeks success with enthusiasm and vigor; and he measures his success in terms of the money and social prestige he is able to acquire. Americans still retain to a certain extent the desire to rise in the economic and social scales and therefore they are frustrated when they are unable to achieve this particular individual plan which they absorb from their heritage. "Dead-end" jobs are despised, for they signify that future progress is impossible. Those whose lives are relatively planless tend to be frustrated as a result of the comparison they themselves make between their own and other people's status. Such individual plans with goals that reach out beyond the individual's skill or opportunity are indeed frustrating. To sing that "a man's reach should exceed his grasp, or what's a heaven for?" is to preach good romantic poetry, but 'tis verily a sad state of affairs when the reach brings more bitterness than the pleasure associated with the unat-

tainable heaven. Indoctrination with the American myth and the selfish efforts of commercial personality-builders and success-boosters are insidious from the point of view of mental health. The recognition of a personal defect or limitation does not necessarily produce feelings of inferiority; without goading social pressures it may result in a satisfactory adjustment through a lowered level of aspiration.

A large group of middle-class women in the United States suffers from ennui and planlessness, not because they have defective organisms but because of their social position. The cinema conception of the bored wife who has satisfied the demands of her society by capturing a sufficiently wealthy husband and by producing a child or two happens to be a reflection of a real, tragic condition. It is the husbands of these wretched women who lead gratified and frustrated lives in an effort to gratify the frustrated wives. Since the women themselves have only a drive toward social prestige to satisfy, their activity consists of a senseless round of vanities and "conspicuous waste" that bore them only a little more than him who attempts to describe their motionless motions. They are struggling vainly to plan their lives and they are frustrated inasmuch as they really do not want a plan, or else they are not permitted by their husbands and custom to find one.

Many individual plans cannot succeed, even though the reasons for their failure do not seem inevitable or necessary. Certain family conflicts may be the immediate consequences of strains placed upon the husband in his job. Ignorance concerning contraceptives or the inability to obtain them is due to limited social facilities. "Unemployment—excluding the unusable man power—during the highly prosperous twenties fell to as low as 10 per cent of the available manpower during a single year"; but "the sharp drop in production subsequent to 1929 and the continued growth of the labor supply resulted in an increase in the unemployed manpower to almost a third of the total available in 1931, and to 47 percent in 1933."<sup>27</sup> Since the men and women who rep-

<sup>27</sup> Weintraub (156), p. 71.

resent these percentages were presumably both physically and psychically able to work, it must be assumed that being without a job constituted a major frustration. In spite of the fact that saving is supposed to be fundamental to a capitalist economy, it may be estimated that only a small proportion of Americans, especially the workers, is able to spare significant amounts from their weekly pay envelopes for depositing in banks or for insurance.<sup>28</sup> With the average income for the country as low as \$750 per year,<sup>29</sup> it is impossible for the vast majority to plan to avoid the inevitable frustrations *that can be anticipated*.

One cannot be comfortable, therefore, during the "rainy days." By this proverbial rain Americans mean unemployment, illness, and old age. The enormous relief programs of the 'thirties were required because the unemployed and the needy were unable to support themselves while waiting for the job that seldom appeared. The inadequate medical services furnished many sections and groups in the United States has already been pointed out.<sup>30</sup> And it seems to be a fact that in 1930 only approximately 60 per cent of the people who reached the age of sixty-five were able to be completely independent of relatives, children, or the state;<sup>31</sup> the increasing number of aged people in America<sup>32</sup> may be expected to aggravate this problem. "Rain," consequently, is an ever-present source of frustration and at the moment simply cannot be planned out of existence through the initiative of the individuals concerned.

There are, moreover, still other sources of discomfort that Americans seem unable to avoid. As a result of low income and low standards of living, many are undernourished and, for this and other reasons, the incidence of certain diseases in different regions is higher than it should be with present medical knowledge.<sup>33</sup> Housing conditions in general are in-

<sup>28</sup> Epstein (44), chaps. viii, ix.

<sup>29</sup> Above, p. 115.

<sup>30</sup> Above, pp. 20-21.

<sup>31</sup> Epstein (44), pp. 497-500.

<sup>32</sup> National Resources Committee (115), pp. 31, 32.

<sup>33</sup> National Resources Committee (115), pp. 178-189.

adequate. According to a "Real Property Inventory" of sixty-four cities of the United States made by the Department of Commerce in 1934, about one fourth of the dwellings surveyed had no bathing facilities, about one fifth had no private indoor water closets, and about one fourth of some of the areas had no running water.<sup>34</sup> "Only about 12 per cent of American farms are being served from a central power plant";<sup>35</sup> "apparently less than two-thirds of the urban population live in homes wired for electricity";<sup>36</sup> and "about a third of a very large sample of urban homes is without gas for cooking and only a negligible proportion uses electricity for this purpose."<sup>37</sup> These are some of the standards of housing which can be more or less accurately measured; but there are other equally frustrating strains on the urban population that cannot be expressed in precise statistical form: the congestion, the noise, the dirt, and the general ugliness that seem inevitably to characterize American cities.<sup>38</sup>

Unsuccessful plans connote the existence of frustration in America and, where there is frustration, aggression is likely to occur. American children, however, have been taught to believe that both present and future gratifications are to be experienced in personal terms, a belief, incidentally, quite different from the fascist and communist insistence that the individual can realize his potentialities only through participation in and assistance to the state. As a result of this faith, Americans during the depression tended to blame themselves whenever their individual plans did not succeed. Thus some of the opposition to the government regulation of business is due to the following characteristically American attitude: "... what Middletown's business class wants is to be let alone to run its own business, and what the working class wants is a job so that it can pay the rent, own a car, and

<sup>34</sup> Summarized by Chawner (25), p. 371.

<sup>35</sup> McCrory, Hendrickson, *et al.* (97), p. 98.

<sup>36</sup> Potter (125), p. 265.

<sup>37</sup> National Resources Committee (114), p. 18.

<sup>38</sup> National Resources Committee (114), pp. 55-70.

go to the movies.”<sup>39</sup> Even the “fear, resentment, insecurity, and disillusionment has been to Middletown’s workers largely an *individual* experience for each worker, and not a thing generalized by him into a ‘class’ experience.”<sup>40</sup> There is some indication, however, that much of the aggression in America is now being expressed collectively rather than individually. The increased interest in the Federal Government has already been mentioned.<sup>41</sup> In Middletown, “despite the fact that tradition, inertia, and intent combine to blur any potential class differences, indications of a sharpening of awareness of some class lines continually break through tendencies to bury them.”<sup>42</sup> And so it seems clear that, until recently, really radical movements of protest and strong labor and union organizations have been few and ineffective: the “normal” method of release has been to growl inwardly and thus to repress the hatred.

Occasionally in the past—and continuing into the present—aggressions have burst forth in overt form. Negroes and other minority groups have served as objects upon whom aggression could be displaced and at times of severe frustration, like a war or a crisis, an out-group has been deliberately created for this same purpose. Many adults have tended to be contemptuous toward the training they received in school; their jibes at the impracticability of their education and the “pure theory” of their instructors is evidence of the discrepancy they have usually found between their country as it has been pictured in textbooks and the actual conditions they have been forced to face after graduation. Sometimes the aggression has been organized on a large scale, as was the case when Herbert Hoover was voted out of office in 1932.

The existence of so much aggression among Americans as a result of their frustrated individual plans is one of the important reasons why the nation tends to be so unstable at the moment. Aggressive behavior by itself, however, is never

<sup>39</sup> Lynds (95), p. 449.

<sup>40</sup> Lynds (95), p. 41; italics theirs.

<sup>41</sup> Above, p. 83.

<sup>42</sup> Lynds (95), p. 450.

completely satisfactory; eventually there must be some kind of substitute or adaptive response. Since individuals in many cases feel powerless to improve their lot, they are also searching for social solutions to their problems. The wildcat schemes that parade themselves across the continent seek to offer Americans some substitute gratification. Mister Coughlin and other fascists seem keen enough to realize that many of their victims are ready to be exploited. Perhaps certain forms of social planning can make such evil suggestions unnecessary.

#### *Leisure Plans*

One of the socially acceptable ways in which Americans are permitted to seek substitute gratifications and to express a little of their aggression is in recreation. "Man cannot live by bread alone," especially when bread is earned under unpleasant conditions. Even the passive forms of amusement to which Americans are addicted, notably the motion picture, the radio, and the professional or amateur contest, enable the spectator to identify his thwarted self with one of the characters or participants and hence to obtain some gratification.

The fact that hobbies are called avocational, however, is indicative of the psychological rôle they are forced to play in the lives of most citizens. The real task, it is asserted, is to earn the "bread"; leisure, though essential and desirable, is just incidental. Business magnates have been known to advocate and subsidize recreation so that "the healthy mind in the healthy body" can compel that body to work more efficiently on the floor of the factory. Pageants and circuses have been employed since ancient times as a means of distracting a frustrated populace and probably reached their abysmal climax in the skillful hands of modern Nazi propagandists before the activity of war was substituted. Americans who are deprived of the necessary gratifications on a bare subsistence level, however, cannot be expected to secure sufficient release, enjoyment, or relaxation in their spare time. The expression, "Monday morning blues," is a sad,

pathetic commentary on the attitudes people have toward the so-called realities of life and it suggests the strains that accompany the regular Sunday holiday or the dreadfully brief two-weeks vacation. Amusements and leisure-time activities have become too incidental to living.

The ever shorter hours of work in modern industry, the growing tendency for commercial interests to seduce the individual to relax in stereotyped fashion, the great amount of leisure forced upon the unemployed, and the new demands made by an increasingly older population have compelled various social institutions to supervise public amusements. It has long been recognized that playground facilities in crowded urban areas have been inadequate and there is some indication that the "ratio of 1 acre of recreation area to every hundred of the population in cities"<sup>43</sup> is guiding the reforms of municipal authorities. National parks have increased and have been improved, although they are accessible only to a relatively small number of vacationists. Both the school and the church have begun to assume greater responsibility in guiding people to spend their leisure time more sensibly and in offering actual opportunities for recreation. Highways have been modernized and, as the puzzling phrase has it, "beautified" to a certain extent. Even the Federal Government through the Works Progress Administration has been the entrepreneur for theatrical productions, symphony concerts, and art exhibitions. The leisure plans of men are being controlled or supervised, then, by outside authorities.

Since recreation is likely to play a more important rôle in the lives of the Americans of the future, it is important to raise certain questions concerning the kind of recreation that will be provided. So much work in this society tends to be frustrating, it has been said, because it does not satisfy the entire personality. Recreation, on the other hand, at least has the potentiality of being absorbing: by definition it releases drives that usually are frustrated behind the desk, the machine, or the plow.

<sup>43</sup> National Resources Board (113), p. 146.



Although a production from Hollywood may bring as much satisfaction to some people as a hike through quiet woods, or a swift ride in an automobile as much as a less rapid glide on skis, or a highball as much as a sonnet, many thinkers and writers have a strong bias in favor of hikes, skis, and sonnets rather than movies, automobiles, or highballs. This belief in a qualitative differentiation among gratifications cannot be completely justified until it can be demonstrated that the former actually are more gratifying than the latter—and a direct demonstration is inconceivable. There is, however, some a priori evidence which indicates that the more active the individual is the more likely he is to be absorbed in what he is doing and consequently the more probable will be his satisfaction. And yet, since the question cannot be settled conclusively one way or the other and since personal tastes do govern the selection of a recreation, it is certainly wiser for a society to provide opportunities for as many forms as possible. If some people prefer primitive solitude, let areas be preserved for them; and do not inject the highway and the hot-dog stand into every forest. If some people are able to lose themselves in the quaintness and grace of a folk dance, let folk dances and folk songs be revived and let there be places where the dances can be danced and the songs can be sung; and do not foster only honky-tonks and beer parlors. There should be, in short, little or no uniformity of recreational opportunities.

It is very tempting to argue "from the experience of mankind" that the goals of dancing, singing, and activity which men and women in all cultures and for all time have sought must be, therefore, the more satisfactory forms of recreation and that the later, more civilized, rather passives ones should be abandoned or at least curbed. Such an argument may be merely a yearning for the lost paradise or for "the good old days" that seem so alluring only because they are in the past. A broad perspective can bring distortions as well as objectivity. Still—it is evidently oh so difficult to cast this line of reasoning aside—the recurrence of these particular forms of recreation *may be* significant; and then it also

seems that each of them potentially at least is able to absorb the entire personality, including direct or sublimated sexual drives. It is one thing to sneer skeptically at Ellis' idea of a "dance of life"<sup>44</sup> and quite another to dismiss the subtle artistry of the implied activity for all time as an outmoded prejudice. For this reason it is proposed quite humbly that Americans, after their more basic drives have been satisfied, be imbued with an almost Faustian craving for absorbing and active participation in diverse and perhaps creative activity.

It is possibly no coincidence that philosophers and theologians have always flirted with perfectionistic ethics. By this code of ethics is meant a series of values, arranged in the form of a hierarchy, that are to be "realized" by every individual to the best of his ability. Tissue needs and the basic drives are usually recognized in such a scheme and, in accordance with an intuitive but apparently correct conception of biological and psychological principles, they are supposed to be satisfied before the higher or superior values can be assayed; a hungry man, for example, finds it difficult to enjoy the colors of a brilliant sunset. Educators, notably the so-called progressive ones, have also arrived at a similar philosophy. Such agreement is significant since it is so universal in this culture: it signifies that a heterogeneous group of men, scattered over historical time, have viewed human behavior with different biases and nevertheless have convinced themselves, first, that some drives are more demanding than others, and, secondly, that adequate or more complete satisfaction can be obtained by the individual only by gratifying subtler, less basic drives. The particular philosophical, theological, or educational scheme of any one venerated sage need not be elaborated here, but the identity of the direction of human groping cannot be ignored.

That the highly acclaimed "spiritual values" are overpraised by various writers and that the "mere" physical ones are rather deprecated may also be just another prejudice; and yet there is sound sociological and psychological

<sup>44</sup> Ellis (42).

evidence that may substantiate the view. Sociologically it is clear that the trend of civilization has been toward increasing complexity and that increasing complexity has meant the technical ability to achieve goals which satisfy these basic drives. The romantic conception of the "noble savage" is now thought to be the delusion of a group of charming escapists who could not tolerate the rationalism that engulfed them; and the simplicity and harmony of ancient Greece are seen as a society based on slaves and permeated with the odor of garbage and excrement. The advances of Western European culture have enabled man, potentially at least, to devote himself more and more to the "higher" impulses and hence mankind as a whole is freer to be more "spiritual" than most primitive peoples and most Greeks of the Golden Age. What has been said is not intended as a hymn of joy to material progress; it is, rather, a description of what has occurred, in order to suggest that such "progress" is not due to mysterious necessity but probably has its origin in socialized human impulses.

From the psychological point of view, too, there is the possibility that the "baser" drives, having on the whole "normal" or "adequate" ways of being satisfied, can be disposed of relatively easily and that thereafter the "spiritual ones," having no systematized or standardized release, occupy the organism. When satiated with food, for example, the individual is content and may or may not begin to collect supplies for his next meal or to produce the means with which to purchase caviar or oatmeal. In contrast the quest for metaphysical knowledge, for the prettiest combination of colors, for the most harmonious arrangement of tones, for "truth," for "goodness," and for "justice" is never ended and the gratifications obtained in the quest are temporary and mere steppingstones to the unattainable. If this speculation be correct, then it might be argued that complete gratification is sterile, since it no longer motivates the organism to overcome frustration by seeking new gratifications through the attainment of different goals and that a certain amount of frustration is, paradoxically enough, necessary

for "complete" gratification. The fruits that tumble into the waiting lap, as the lovely story would have it, taste good and put an end to hunger pangs, but then there is nothing to do, no gratification to seek until more fruit falls or until the pangs are felt again. It may also be that fruit obtained through the sweat of the brow or by diminishing a bank account is more gratifying than that which is brushed down by the breezes. In contrast, the subtler impulses demand ever-recurring release and goad the individual to more vigorous and enduring activity. This, in a few words, is the psychological argument for the complex personalities produced by education and by highly developed societies; this is the argument for having social institutions inject into their members individual plans that reach into the clouds and that induce them to spend their leisure time pursuing ends not intimately connected with their "lower" drives. It is an argument that cannot be conclusively validated, but it is one that seems to be in accord with an important portion of human knowledge and that cannot be refuted glibly.

There is another sense in which the word "leisure" is employed and that is in reference to a "class" of people who are free from the necessity of producing the means for survival and who, therefore, can devote themselves to recreation, science, art, or "conspicuous waste." It is maintained, nowadays with a good deal of vehemence too, that such a group of people is necessary if great inventions, discoveries, literature, and music are to occur. The drive within an individual inventor, discoverer, or artist that prompts his creation can be very diverse: it may result from a frustration caused by the problem that is being solved or it may be the sublimated expression of a totally irrelevant drive. It is not possible to conclude that the garret is more or less efficacious than the well-equipped studio or laboratory; and yet it is doubtless true that the individual cannot be too frustrated if he is to be able to make his social contribution. It is necessary, therefore, to give the scientist and the artist a certain amount of freedom from producing necessities for himself and his dependents, but this is not to say that the freedom

should or must be complete and perpetual. Sibelius, for example, has been able to thrive on the small subsidy given him by the wise Finnish government; yet many teachers in the academic world are productive not only because they are devoted to their work but also because they are compelled to publish articles or books in order to be promoted and receive the accolades of their colleagues. The danger in having too much leisure is illustrated by the descendants of wealthy American families, some of whom are supposed to degenerate into socially useless individuals and who, it might be guessed, cannot lead personally satisfying lives. The mad search for empty pleasures for which the *nouveaux riches* and other wealthy people are notorious also serves no good social end; and for this reason it is difficult to justify the existence of a whole group of individuals in society whose gratifications, being almost automatic, are probably small and petty. Automatic pleasures are soon discarded and replaced by perversions or plans that strive to create petty frustrations where none need be. Increased inheritance taxes are only one indication of the fact that the futility of abundant leisure is being gradually recognized.

An examination of individual plans reveals that planning is an ability which all men have to acquire in the course of being socialized. From the very beginning a child is affected by the more or less systematically planned regimen of his parents who impose upon him their own ideas and those of his society. Planning, therefore, inevitably accompanies social life and is an important way of avoiding frustration.

Individual plans, however, do not always satisfy the three requirements of planning and consequently many of them tend to be unsuccessful. Although it may be impossible to determine the ultimate causes of all the failures, it does not follow that every reform must be abandoned simply because its effect upon people cannot be outlined in precise detail. Some plans, it seems, are frequently better than no plans at all.

At the outset it is clear that the fundamental material of

planning, the human being, is defective. Predictions either about social life or an individual's own performance tend to be imperfect because they are linked so closely both to the immediate situation and the entire personality. The capacity to plan has to be developed gradually and cannot function perfectly unless the person has insight both into himself and into the nature of the events in his environment. In a complex society there are so many forces which induce the individual to formulate plans that he cannot accomplish as a result of his own inadequate skills.

Frequently the individual may understand himself and his environment and may have certain specific goals to be achieved, but his plans fail due to an unfavorable social environment. For the separate plans of individuals conflict with one another, or else the society does not provide the job or the house or the security which are essential. Events as well as other people may wreck plans. Compulsory plans, furthermore, suggest that individuals relinquish certain preferred activities in order to obtain goals prescribed by other plans which they must possess.

The problem of the goal also affects the success or failure of individual plans. Parents, for example, are not always conscious of the type of person they want their children to be and they may not realize that eventually these children must become independent adults. Many of the goals of individual plans are culturally induced and may or may not promote the eventual welfare of those who strive so vigorously. The ways in which people spend their leisure time illustrate the consequence of a set of goals that have led to the formation of particular types of personality; arguments in favor of active participation in recreational activities can be and have been advanced.

Noteworthy too is the fact that this discussion of individual planning has not been able to avoid problems that belong in the sphere of social planning. Men and women are interdependent: when their individual plans conflict or lead to frustration, they tend to become aggressive and, in order to find a substitute response, they soon begin to

look beyond themselves for broader plans which will assist them. Conflict by itself is usually intolerable and offers no guarantee that truth, whatever truth is, will triumph; therefore men unite to establish codes of ethics to regulate their own behavior or to formulate plans for education, or they may appeal to the forces of government to be more active. Leisure is so important that it also begins to demand a social plan.

It is obvious that social plans very quickly begin to affect individual plans. The home appears to be the potential site of social change, although it may merely engender conflicts between the generations represented therein. Social life demands that certain tasks be performed and hence there must be some interference with the plans of individuals. Individual plans, in short, both demand and reflect social plans—both must be analyzed and appraised simultaneously.

When the pervasive character of individual planning is appreciated and when it is realized that many people are frustrated because they cannot plan successfully, moreover, it is possible to reëxamine the question of freedom and liberty in a much more realistic way. Deep down or sometimes on the very surface of every American is allegedly a desire for increased freedom. Desirable individual plans, it is maintained, are those that are selected and executed voluntarily; restrictions, consequently, are bad. That liberty and freedom are not immediately absolute values, however, must also be pointed out. For an individual plan is a self-imposed curbing of one's own activity and thereafter behavior cannot be completely spontaneous or free. The unemployed gladly sacrifice the liberty of being idle in favor of the requirements of a job that is offered them by a private employer or by a government agency. Both freedom and liberty, being very vague terms, have been abused in order to justify certain social practices. It used to be fashionable, for example, to oppose almost all forms of government relief in their name; it was maintained that a "dole" would ruin the recipient's character by destroying the privilege of rescuing or trying to rescue himself. The phrase "due process of law" is sup-

posed to protect people's economic liberty but, as already suggested, it has usually been employed to obtain permission to be ruthless at the expense of the vast body of American consumers and workers. Most discussions of freedom in the modern world end by making a svelte but not a sharp distinction between liberty and license.

The distinction, though not very useful, at least suggests that freedom and liberty should exist when they promote gratifications and prevent frustrations and that they need not exist when they lead to either of the opposite results. There is nothing inherently good or bad about a governmental policy, for example, that regulates economic freedom; it must be judged in terms of the *total* gratifications and frustrations that it creates. The relatively free individual is desirable only if with his freedom he is able to secure the maximum of gratification and the minimum of frustration. If peace-time fascism or communism enables people to be joyful by participating in pageants, even though their individual wishes in economic and political spheres are "regimented" in almost every respect, then such a gratification must be taken into account as fascism or communism is evaluated. Yet the movement toward greater freedom and liberty for the individual is perhaps discernible when the history of mankind is surveyed rapidly; the recent set back at the hands of the dictators may be running counter to a human tendency to be self-selective rather than self-effacing.



## CHAPTER IX

### SOCIAL PLANNING

THE social sciences of anthropology and sociology tend to view man as a mere reflection of conditions in his culture and society. Partially as a result of a similar conception, many people frequently consider planning to be a shorter expression for *social* planning: the hope is implied that men will change when the conditions which influence them are altered through planning. The data of anthropology and sociology, however, spring from many individuals' personalities and more often than not undergo unique modifications when they are interpreted in terms of a particular human being. In like manner, although a social plan has a goal which many people are supposed to achieve, the precise ways in which the plan is executed and its specific effects upon them will vary with their personality structures. A social plan is not executed by people in general; it is carried out by specific individuals. Eventually, therefore, the social plans of men in this sense are individual plans.

When it is said that a social plan seeks to prevent war, for example, the implicit assumption exists that, to be successful, such a plan must make people as personalities lean toward peace rather than war. Frequently the unique individual, however, cannot be influenced or changed by a private tutor, a psychiatrist, or a reformer: only the very general tendencies which he shares more or less with his fellows can be taken into account. All social planning, in short, rests upon the conviction that large groups of individuals may be guided toward the same goal (if for different psychological reasons) by affecting changes in their physical and social environments.

Regardless of one's peculiar preference, evidence from the social sciences has demonstrated that men, to survive, must have social contact with one another. Their individual and their social lives are interdependent and a variety of coöpera-

tive and competitive behavior results. Individuals absorb their plans from a society and its heritage, and they succeed in achieving gratification only in unison with others and by affecting their contemporaries in fortunate or unfortunate ways. The need for some kind of social planning, consequently, seems inherent within the nature of man.<sup>1</sup>

### *Highway Planning*

When there is no individual plan, when an individual plan is inadequate, or when individual plans produce too much conflict, a social plan is evolved. The construction of automobile highways can be considered a clear-cut illustration of the growth of social planning which seeks to modify presumably only the physical environment. An analysis of this type of planning, however, reveals that altered highways also require changes in people, their social environment, and their goals.

For a variety of reasons Americans wish to drive automobiles. Here is a present value resulting from an invention that has diffused widely and that has been able to satisfy and also to create human needs. To own a car not only to be transported but also to acquire social prestige and to express a segment of one's personality is part of the individual plan of almost every American—a car, in fact, has become a precious national symbol.<sup>2</sup> Highways obviously are required if individuals are to be able to drive and their construction, therefore, is considered desirable.

Each individual who drives a car cannot construct his own highway. Nor can the task be allocated to the small community alone, since motorists wish to travel beyond their local boundaries. Counties, consequently, share in the construction of roads and in their maintenance. But counties also end and hence states begin to assume responsibility. States, moreover, run into other states, and some of the highways of the United States extend into Canada and

<sup>1</sup> Above, pp. 174-175; below, pp. 358-360.

<sup>2</sup> Lynds (95), pp. 26, 245, 265-269.

Mexico. The routes of a highway, therefore, must be and are planned at least partially on a national if not on an international scale; individual plans simply are not feasible.

The growth of highways in America has been sporadic and almost without any plan at all. In spite of the Federal Highway Act of 1921, the details of construction have been left to individual counties and states; and the net result has been a series of problems which urgently require some type of solution. The first cars, for example, used roads that had been designed for buggies and bicycles. Such roads became neither safe nor pleasant as technical advances enabled motorists to achieve higher speeds. It was necessary to widen highways and to pave them with smoother and harder surfaces, but these improvements were inaugurated almost entirely as a result of the whims of local authorities. Traffic jams and snarls resulted from the increase in population, the growing concentration in urban areas, the greater number of people who owned automobiles, and the shipping of goods by truck. Merchants began to appreciate the commercial possibilities of the highways and soon the series of hot-dog stands and hideous billboards gave rise to what Eaton has aptly called "the motor slum." Chambers of Commerce convinced themselves that their town could be publicized and the merchandise of their citizens sold if main highways were routed through the principal streets of the community. Almost as quickly as the highways grew uglier and less efficient, the accident rate rose alarmingly. Thus the plans of individuals were deadlocked and a state of chaos resulted: plans for safety, pleasure, transportation, and sales were at loggerheads. No one person could drive as he wished.

Such conflicts proved intolerable since people tended merely to frustrate one another; social plans, therefore, had to be devised to enable individual plans to be successful. No one probably voiced a serious objection in the name of freedom or liberty when the first traffic signs and lights were installed, for it was all too evident that the individual's welfare eventually was promoted by these devices. Gradually it has been realized too that "the motor slum" is an eyesore

and the individual plans of its promoters have been forcibly junked. Even prominent merchants have begun to admit that bottling cars into streets whose sides are lined with cars already parked there does not necessarily increase sales and detracts from whatever quiet charm those streets possess. To prevent accidents there have been pompous outcries against lax enforcement and attempts to educate the motorists through the horror of the "—and Sudden Death" brand of literature.

These reforms do not satisfy all of the requirements of planning: they fail to consider the goal which they really seek to achieve and they tend to neglect the nature of the human being who is supposed to benefit from the changes. In regard to the goal, there must be agreement that the purpose of a highway is to transport an automobile as efficiently and as pleasantly as possible. A road is not a merchandizing device and probably never can or should be. Many mistakes in highway planning have been made in an effort to achieve this commercial objective which tends almost always to be incompatible with the goal of reducing accidents and promoting enjoyable transportation.

When the real function of a highway is appreciated, it is still necessary to plan roads in accordance with the capabilities and limitations of the driver. It is now known that the three-lane road, even though it once seemed perfectly evident that the additional lane would relieve congestion, is extremely dangerous, inasmuch as it encourages speeding, fosters head-on collisions, and creates a veritable deathtrap for the driver who wishes to turn to the left. Knowledge of driving habits might have prevented this particular blunder. Traffic experts<sup>3</sup> who are concerned with the problem of reducing accidents, furthermore, point out that motorists cannot or will not become better drivers when policemen or pamphlets merely shout that they should drive slower or more carefully: their driving must be improved whether they wish to or not. Since structural defects in the car itself cause only about 5 per cent of the accidents and since manufac-

<sup>3</sup> *Fortune* (46); MacKaye (102); Stoeckel, May, and Kirby (137).

turers are quickly improving the safety features of their product, this one factor is not so important from the point of view of planning; the driver and the road have to be improved.

Drivers must be instructed properly from the very beginning. Children can be taught the principles of driving while they are still in school. The physically and perhaps mentally unfit can be eliminated at the initial examination or by means of periodic examinations—neither examination should be a slovenly formality.<sup>4</sup> The present verbal admonitions, especially those which warn that the consumption of alcohol tends to be negatively correlated with coördination and reaction time, must continue. Sensible and somewhat more uniform traffic regulations are necessary and they should be enforced with precision and fairness in contrast to the customary sadism for which the detested state policemen and traffic officers are so justly famous. Only capable drivers, in short, should be allowed to operate motor vehicles and capable drivers must be taught or forced to use their skill at all times.

The improving of the “human element” in driving, however, must also be combined with alterations in the physical environment: well-planned roads can help eliminate physical circumstances that make driving so perilous. Head-on collisions or sideswipes occur when one car tries to pass another and meets a third coming in the opposite direction; let there be a “dividing island” or “median strip” between opposite lanes of traffic and let there be separate lanes for fast- and slow-moving traffic. Cars approaching one another at cross sections may bump; instead of traffic lights or stop signs (which are inefficient or disobeyed), let there be over- and underpasses and “clover-leaf detours” when highways cross. A car which is leaving or entering a highway may hit one that is proceeding on a straight course; let there be accelerating and decelerating lanes which enable cars to turn off into a road without interfering with the normal flow of traffic. Encumbrances on the side of the road are dangerous: let

<sup>4</sup> DeSilva (31).

the shoulders of the road be firm, let there be no parking on main highways, and let abutting property be cleared away or, on new roads, be prohibited from the very beginning. Other reforms, like guard railings, banked curves, highway lighting, uniform signs, and a standardized set of hand signals, are also desirable—but the “limited way,” which is the highway containing the features suggested above, seems to be the one main change which is required to reduce accidents and to enable motorists to reach their destinations with a minimum of tension and delay and with the maximum of enjoyment.

MacKaye has suggested that the highway must be treated like the roadbed of a railroad;<sup>5</sup> and, if this were done, there would be a further reduction in the accident rate and additional pleasure for everyone who has contact with automobiles—and almost everyone does. Railroads very rarely parade through the main street of a large city (as one did until relatively recently in Syracuse, New York) or, if they do, they are segregated from the inhabitants and the latter's other vehicles of transportation. Main roads, consequently, should be routed around but not through a community by means of what is now known as a “by-pass.” To facilitate traffic which just has to invade large cities, elevated highways can be built for automobiles or elevated sidewalks for pedestrians. Streets in smaller communities can be made safer and living quieter by following the plan of Stein and Wright for Radburn, New Jersey: only a few thoroughfares traverse this community, residential streets are culs-de-sac, and pedestrian traffic is mechanically separated from wheeled traffic by means of under- and overpasses.<sup>6</sup> Just as the railroad, moreover, need not always wind its way through hideous advertisements, so the highway can be separated from the equally unattractive outgrowths of commercialism by means of state-owned land on either side which is cultivated and serves as a welcome seminatural landscape.

There is, then, adequate knowledge concerning people,

<sup>5</sup> MacKaye (100).

<sup>6</sup> MacKaye (102), p. 94.

roads, and objectives, on the basis of which an ideal system of highways could be built; McClintock asserts that "if it were possible to apply everything we know about traffic control, we could eliminate 98 per cent of all accidents and practically all congestion."<sup>7</sup> There is some indication, moreover, that this knowledge is being used to good advantage, as the slowly decreasing accident rate and the increasing number of "super-highways" indicate. But unfortunately there is a huge gap between knowledge and actual practice. What is called "politics" interferes with efficient construction, sometimes leads to straight graft, and frequently employs gasoline taxes for other than road-improving purposes. Highway engineers are not always consulted and hence glaring and costly blunders are still being made. Renovating old highways is inordinately expensive and building new ones in accord with modern principles is still more so—the price of the latter ranges from \$75,000 to \$6,000,000 per mile.

Highways, moreover, represent just one aspect of a complicated civilization and, as a result, may feel the effects of other changes in the society. Trucks and busses create traffic problems and are the traditional enemies of the amateur motorist; certainly they exist in such large numbers not always because of their efficiency but because of the lower rates they are able to offer in competition with railroads. Lower rail rates might make some six-lane highways superfluous (although busses must always supplement railroads and trucks must transport goods to and from depots), but such an economic policy has other consequences in its own right. Fewer cars, moreover, would be purchased and the cars themselves, perhaps, would be driven less, if Americans did not have such a proclivity toward this passive form of relaxation and if cars were less widely advertised. The volume of traffic is partially due to the centralized areas in which Americans live; thus a plan with the aim of scattering people into regions almost automatically would tend to mitigate the traffic problem somewhat. There is, finally, al-

<sup>7</sup> Quoted in *Fortune* (46), p. 99.

ways the possibility that a greater volume of airplane traffic will reduce the pressure on the highways.

Plans to improve highways, since they involve many individuals, are bound to frustrate certain people. It is evident, for example, that the owner of an ornate roadside inn will profit as a motorist from the construction of a new road which follows a more efficient and beautiful route, but as a businessman he will suffer losses to the extent that traffic and therefore customers are thus diverted away from his tavern; if he does not drive or use the highway, the whole venture will be a complete frustration to him. Similarly there are always some vested interests who oppose any kind of reform affecting them.

There is no way of denying that planning highways is not simple, since it is related to other problems in the society and since it must cause pain to some. In the meantime, however, people continue to be killed or crippled in automobile accidents and as many Americans as possible use the automobile for business and for pleasure. To keep enumerating the difficulties and the uncertainties of this type of planning, therefore, is rather futile. The "limited-way" type of highway and better drivers are needed and must be planned for now. It simply has to be admitted that the act of achieving any desirable value can never be clear-cut, that no specific or immediately gratifying goal can be achieved for everyone, and that people cannot be expected to enjoy simultaneously all portions of the Elysian fields.

Just as a social plan must supplant the individual driving plans of men, similarly there are additional spheres of behavior in which individual planning is either inadequate or impossible. By himself, for example, one farmer can irrigate his fields or protect them from insect pests only to a very small degree; these projects by their very nature require the cooperation of many farmers in the form of a social plan.<sup>8</sup> It is evident, consequently, that many social plans involve problems similar to those raised by an ap-

<sup>8</sup> McCrory (96), p. 109; Strong (138), pp. 115-116.



parently concrete issue like highways. It is possible now to turn to other phases of man's social life and relate them to planning.

### *Housing*

It is in the home where Americans seek to achieve most of their vital goals and it is the home, therefore, that should be planned in accordance with these goals if the plans of individuals are to satisfy basic drives. Within their private residences Americans relax from the cares of the office or the arduous work in the factory or the field. They eat, talk, plan, make love, are ill, and die there. They train their children, listen to the radio, read the newspaper, write letters, and converse with their families. The housewife does all her productive work at home and may often consume more time in running the household than her husband must spend at his place of work. In rural communities and less frequently elsewhere the home still maintains its function as the workshop; or at least it may be the proving ground for hobbies. In the home, too, the individual is supposed to be safe, safe from enemies, prying eyes, unfriendliness, disease, and unfavorable weather. The sentimentality associated with the home seems justified and, consequently, the building which is the home must attempt to satisfy these very definite requirements. Here is another aspect of the physical environment that should be planned to assist people in finding basic gratification.

On the basis of what is known concerning the ways in which people's drives are satisfied and with existing technical knowledge, it is possible to plan the ideal house.<sup>9</sup> It must be quiet; therefore the rooms should be reasonably sound-proof and the building should be isolated from the noise of heavy traffic. On occasion it must offer isolation and privacy to individuals who crave to be alone; therefore as a minimum there should be no more than two people to a room and, if possible, every person above the age of ten should have a room of his own. It must be comfortable; there-

<sup>9</sup> Chawner (25); Tough (148), pp. 246-253; Winslow and Twitchell (161).

fore adequate heating, ventilating, and illuminating facilities must be provided. It must be relatively free from the danger of disease; therefore the modern conveniences for which Americans are justly famous should be included, the water supply should be pure, contamination from vermin should be prevented, and some kind of refrigeration should be provided. It must be safe; therefore it should be fire-proof so far as possible and common sources of accidents, like dangerously constructed stairways, should be eliminated. It must require only the minimum of exertion to maintain; therefore there should be electricity and running water and its architectural design should lead to economy of movement and to general convenience. It must provide a certain amount of physical freedom, especially for children; therefore there should be a garden or at least the house must be located sufficiently close to a playground. It must enable the family to achieve a certain degree of psychic unity; therefore the living room should be adequately large and attractive. It must be esthetically satisfactory; therefore it should be exposed to sunlight, it should offer attractive views of the surrounding environment, and its appearance should be pleasing to those who live within. These, in brief, are the housing standards which men everywhere have been trying to achieve, at least in Western European culture. Architects and others may disagree concerning the best means of attaining them—it is doubtful, for example, whether any two experts would allocate the same number of cubic feet per member of the family in planning the living room—but at least it has become reasonably clear that any dwelling can perform all these functions only when it is planned as a whole to do so.

The fact that primitive peoples make other demands—that the shelter be portable, that there be a “long house” in which families live together or are separated by mere partitions, or that the protecting roof be only temporary—is not relevant, it would seem, to the problem of housing in America. The Western European type of house is so deeply a part of the cultural tradition and its utility is so patent in terms of the whole structure of the society that any

radical departure is simply inconceivable. It may be anticipated, therefore, that the home in America will continue to serve the purposes that have been indicated, even though technological advances and human ingenuity will combine to alter the precise means by which the objectives are accomplished.

Or is this praise of the existing type (if not the exact style) of dwelling just ethnocentric? It is possible to challenge some of the existing housing standards by referring to other goals which Americans might or should strive to attain. Why, for example, should life be made easier and easier for the housewife through the installation of electric appliances? It could be argued that the harassed farmer's wife of a century ago received more gratifications from being continually occupied than does her modern granddaughter who is able to push so many buttons and operate so many switches. The pioneer joy of being just a little above the bare animal subsistence level is a psychological phenomenon whose significance cannot be ignored. Nor can it be denied that the consumer of electricity is thereby placed at the mercy of technical forces: the disruption of power service during a thunderstorm or a hurricane is a simple commonplace reminder that this technical advance makes one more dependent on others and perhaps all too vulnerable when airplanes drop their bombs on central power plants.

To such arguments there are no adequate replies. It might be said, as has been pointed out previously, that modern trends favor a minimum of what is called "drudgery" and that the satisfaction which allegedly was derived from the chores of the past has been highly romanticized. The dependence upon the source of supply is a risk which most people seem willing to take. Since only a few Americans with highly individualistic philosophies will ever return to a more inconvenient way of living, it must be presumed that the failure to achieve these modern housing standards is frustrating. But there does remain the improbable possibility that Americans may be wrong, that they may be either forced or eager some day to be less safe and comfortable. Here

again it is evident that the faith of men in the values behind their concrete plans can be neither completely nor rationally established.

If it be granted that homes should perform the various functions that have been mentioned, it is immediately clear that many Americans are unable to provide themselves and their families a house which meets the requirements. In numerous instances people are not aware of these standards and select their homes on the basis of frills and the rent they can afford to pay. With average income as low as it is in the United States, a separate room for each child at the age of adolescence, for example, may be out of the question; the overcrowded conditions in urban slums certainly are not accepted voluntarily by the millions who must live in unsanitary poverty. Private, individual builders, moreover, have to be more concerned with profit than with the degree to which their houses conform or do not conform to adequate standards; for this reason, at prevailing building costs and without the advantages of low interest rates and exemption from taxation which public authorities have often obtained, they cannot secure the customary return on invested capital when rents are reduced to meet the incomes of the vast majority of tenants.<sup>10</sup> The general results of this dependence of housing upon profits have been numerous: some owners have been loath to make the capital outlays required to wipe out slums; others have been strongly inclined to sacrifice durability and decency for a quick return on their investments; and in many cities there have not been enough buildings, good or bad, to meet the current demand.

Since Americans would not and could not plan adequate dwellings for themselves, the agencies of government have been forced to intervene. Such intervention has been resisted by vested interests, but on the whole it has not been considered an undesirable leap toward socialism or communism. In large cities tenement laws have been passed that have attempted—and rather unsuccessfully too—to destroy the most unsavory of the antiquated apartment houses. Almost

<sup>10</sup> Adams (1).

everywhere, even in America, there are building codes and ordinances that seek to regulate buildings which already exist and those which are to be constructed. And during the depression, partially in an effort to reduce unemployment, the Federal Government has assisted in the razing of many slums and in the building of really modern dwellings through an organization like the United States Housing Authority. Financial aid in the construction, maintenance, and improvement of homes has been given by the Federal Housing Administration, and the Home Owners' Loan Corporation was established in the cheerless days of 1933 to extend emergency mortgage credit to those in distress.

Almost at every point, then, the housing plans of men have had to be directed by an outside authority. This policy may be considered a good one, provided it is efficient and provided it really achieves an approximation of the standards that have been mentioned. Aside from the building industries themselves, there can be little wholesome opposition to housing reforms or even to the Federal Government entering the real-estate business, except by raising the very general, most baffling issue of government control itself: is it good to help men plan their homes when the help that is given them may be just another step toward the governmental supervision of hundreds of other plans having little or no connection with the home? Here is a real issue that must be discussed presently.<sup>11</sup>

As Mumford has pointed out,<sup>12</sup> the upper classes of the nineteenth century were gradually compelled to concern themselves with the living conditions of the poor: diseases were communicated through articles like food and clothing which the latter produced and which everyone consumed. This is another illustration of the interdependency of individual plans: the communicable disease of the lowliest farm hand eventually may alter the activity of a broker on the stock exchange. Adequate housing, consequently, con-

<sup>11</sup> Below, pp. 373-380.

<sup>12</sup> Mumford (111), p. 176.

cerns the entire community; it is a problem that cannot be avoided by mouthing dreadful clichés.

### *Community Planning*

The finest house imaginable requires appropriate surroundings or else its occupants will suffer physically and esthetically. Men and women who live in modern apartment houses in the midst of the slums, as in New York City, cannot escape the odors of the neighborhood and, the moment they step outside of their homes, they are forced to face the squalid ugliness of the tenements. Someone from the villa on the hill must buy household goods, and stores must be accessible if only by means of the telephone. Electricity can be generated much more efficiently by a central power plant than by the separate units which an individual family can afford to operate. Few dwellings in urban regions have easy access to wilderness areas and in some way or other people must be given the opportunity to enjoy solitude, fishing, skiing, or hiking. It is very rare for a family to be self-sufficient and therefore there must be some kind of a community plan if the maximum of gratification is to be secured. To achieve so many objectives, one house must be planned in relation to the adjoining ones, one neighborhood must be planned in respect to other neighborhoods, and thus the process continues inevitably until the town or the city itself is planned. Again it is clear that human goals and gratification can be attained only by controlling and planning the physical environment on the basis of these goals.

Visitors from Europe are generally impressed with the planlessness of most American communities. For it is clear at a glance that these communities have developed spontaneously and sporadically without benefit of a plan. The utterly chaotic mixture of commerce and homes, of architectural styles and sizes, and of poverty and riches has produced communities that are neither quaint nor convenient. In the absence of any discernible form, American communities tend

to appear somewhat similar in the sense that any kind of confusion is scarcely ever distinctive. Municipalities have gradually realized the disadvantages of this type of individualism and so at least 1,500 of them throughout the country now have zoning regulations; 42 states, moreover, have legislation authorizing city-planning commissions and 26 countenance county planning.<sup>13</sup> Although it appears to be true that many of these regulations and commissions have not been able to remove slums and that some of them in fact have facilitated rather than inhibited the growth of "blighted areas,"<sup>14</sup> their very existence at least reveals the recognition of the need for community planning. This is, perhaps, the most optimistic observation that can be made concerning community planning; it is an observation, furthermore, that is really much too rosy especially when the innumerable legal, political, financial, and social obstacles that face community planners are recalled.<sup>15</sup>

The goals that community planning must attempt to achieve are those concerned with activities that occur both inside and outside the home and that cannot be assisted by planning the nature of the house itself. Inside, for example, the amount of sunshine, the protection from external noises, the general sanitary conditions, and the outside view which the occupants enjoy will be at least partially a function of the location of the house in respect to other houses in the community and of its orientation to the sun's orbit and prevailing winds. Outside people wish to have access to transit, recreational, trading, schooling, hospital, and other social facilities and therefore the site of their individual house becomes extremely important to them. Most of the modern conveniences which ordinarily are grouped together under the heading of public services or utilities can be provided only when groups of people are willing and able to contribute to their support.

These values of community planning represent objectives

<sup>13</sup> National Resources Committee (114), pp. 46-47.

<sup>14</sup> Mumford (111), pp. 245-247.

<sup>15</sup> National Resource Committee (114), pp. 63-69.

that have meaning to the people who live in the community; they are definitely not goals which gratify only a few individuals at the expense of the majority. In historical retrospect<sup>16</sup> it becomes evident that some communities have been planned to please people in general and others to delight rulers or architects almost exclusively. The medieval town was surrounded by a wall or placed upon a hill to offer every inhabitant adequate protection and is therefore an example of planning for people. The broad avenues that traversed the seventeenth- or eighteenth-century city in order to give the wealthier classes and their armies an opportunity to display themselves in exhibitionistic array; the artificially geometrical pattern that dominated the baroque community in the era of Cartesian rationalism; and the ugly, long, rectangular indistinguishable boxes that served as dwellings for workers in the midst of the smell and dirt of the factory and that were economical and efficient in the same sense that a stable serves to keep the horse alive and is close to the wagonshed—these have been communities whose outlines have served special interests and must be condemned. In modern America, there is a strong tendency for the economic value of the land and for the interests of real-estate agents to affect the general form of the community. Rising land values, for example, have induced industries to occupy submarginal ground close to certain rivers. Then, whenever early spring or unseasonal weather causes the water to overflow its customary channel, there is loud talk and agitation for flood-control measures; it is proposed, therefore, that public money be spent to build flood walls and to control the water by constructing mighty reservoirs which then flood other sections located up the river. A community plan that prevented the occupancy of this ground in the first place would have alleviated the necessity for such an expenditure: the natural tendency for the river to overflow could have guided the plan, and industries and landlords in spite of their protests would have been compelled to establish their plants and slums

<sup>16</sup> Mumford (111), *passim*, esp. pp. 14-16, 98-105, 124-135, 152-173, 183-198.



elsewhere. The danger in planning a community, then, seems to be that the desires of a few men, whether they be tyrants, architects, employers, or speculators, will prevail in the face of the genuine needs of the inhabitants themselves.

The question arises as to the possibility of community planning. Cities and towns, unlike buildings, cannot be razed because they do not satisfy the plans of men, inasmuch as they represent much larger financial investments. In addition to natural disasters like earthquakes, fires, or hurricanes, however, certain fundamental modifications can and do gradually occur in every community. Whole blocks of buildings deteriorate or are condemned; streets, sewers, or water systems have to be changed; and the population expands or migrates to new areas. Government, moreover, does retain the right of eminent domain. For these reasons, there is an ever-present need for principles to guide the planning of communities.

The site of every new community that is being planned afresh or of every old one that is being renovated is more or less unique in respect to its physical characteristics; and the cultural and psychological drives of the inhabitants also vary. The details of planning, consequently, must be adapted to each specific community. Certain general requirements, however, which any community must satisfy can be set forth.

First and last, communities should be planned, in Mumford's words, so that "the given conditions of soil and site are accepted and followed, with such reconstructions as convenience and necessity may dictate."<sup>17</sup> In different words, it is being asserted that the natural peculiarities of a given physical environment must be made to serve genuine human needs as adequately as possible. If there is a hill or a river in a community, for example, no attempt should be made to impose a man-thought scheme that is unsuited to the particular circumstances. There is nothing inherently good or bad in any blueprint whether it prescribes a rectangular, a circular, or an elliptical shape; what must be done is to respect the conditions of the site and attempt, then, under the circum-

<sup>17</sup> Mumford (111), p. 236.

stances to evolve the most efficient plan for people. Men never construct in colder climates the flimsy type of dwelling that is so desirable in the tropics; instead they admit that lower temperatures demand more substantial materials. Similarly regular blocks may be convenient in a flat country; but on a hilly site like San Francisco they may prove wasteful when they are made to cut through or across the topographical irregularities.

But what are "natural peculiarities"? Whenever the word "natural" is used, such a challenge must be issued. For it is quite evident that the human race has been able to overcome innumerable "natural" obstacles in its attempt to make more satisfactory adjustments to the environment. In one perverted sense, subways are unnatural since people originally tramped upon soil and did not burrow into it; yet this means of transportation is said to have its advantages. It is frequently useful, therefore, for men to subdue and to alter their physical environment. This principle of community planning, however, suggests that there is some point at which man's ability to outplan "nature" should be limited. Climate is certainly one factor to which only an adaptation can be made. A house that is well oriented leads to certain economies: winds provide natural ventilation and the sun offers, in addition to subjective pleasure, a free supply of radiant heat. Frequently, too, it is less expensive to accept "the given conditions of soil and site" than to rearrange them, especially when there is little to be gained from the rearrangement. Nor can it be forgotten, finally, that men do derive satisfaction from natural, topographical variations and that it seems unwise to destroy to too great an extent the original physical environment.

When the principle is accepted that the community plan must conform to this physical environment *so far as seems feasible*, it is then possible to outline briefly other more specific requirements which appear essential in assisting Americans to achieve their goals. Concerning the actual location, it may be said that for hygienic and esthetic reasons a community should be planned so that residences are sepa-

rated from business districts. At the same time vehicles of communication must be adequate and, when possible, employers and workers should not have to spend too much time traveling back and forth in uncomfortable, crowded conveyances. The inhabitants should have access to at least one acre of land per hundred of the population, the figure mentioned in the previous chapter,<sup>18</sup> for recreational purposes.

In urban centers which already exist but which, nevertheless, plan new communities, there is some ground for believing that the plan of the brave and progressive socialist régime of Vienna<sup>19</sup> might be followed: intimate gratification can be secured by planning within the large city numerous subcommunities, each of which is a relatively self-sufficient unit so far as many life activities are concerned. A group of dwellings or apartment houses can share the same recreational facilities, the same community stores, the same meetinghouse or church, etc.; if the dwellings are planned as unified communities, therefore, a friendly *esprit de corps* may develop among the inhabitants. One authority estimates that "integrated neighborhoods of this character are believed to be most satisfactory in units providing for 3,000 to 6,000 persons, determined in part by the economical size of a primary school";<sup>20</sup> other considerations beside the school, however, must be taken into account.

There are, moreover, additional guides to community planning which raise controversial but highly significant issues. On sociological and psychological grounds, for example, it may be argued that a community must be planned as a whole in order to make its esthetic appearance both apparent and pleasing to its inhabitants. Social living that is relatively devoid of conflict—and presumably this is a value which men do and should seek—requires that the participants possess distinctive and friendly attitudes toward their community. When these attitudes are present, the necessary conformity is secured with little frustration and, on the posi-

<sup>18</sup> Above, p. 197.

<sup>19</sup> Harris (55).

<sup>20</sup> Chawner (25), p. 374.

tive side, it is gratifying to be a part of such a group. Everywhere in America there is some identification with a geographical site, everywhere hackneyed jokes are appreciated when they good-naturedly cast sly slurs upon an out-group which is usually a neighboring community. And yet—the hypothesis must be hazarded—it is doubtless difficult to feel this sense of in-group loyalty or to have the loyalty reinforced when one's community cannot be differentiated from a thousand other communities, when it is ugly and hideous, when it is strung along a main highway, or when it is simply an appendage to or an overflow from a gigantic metropolitan area. Under these discouraging conditions, although doubtless some community pride does exist, it is not so strong as it might be. When the community has a definite shape, when buildings harmonize with one another, when there is, in short, something distinctive about an individual's "home town," it is easier for him to believe that he belongs to a specific group and he will very likely participate in its affairs because his personality is truly involved. The Urbanism Committee of the National Resources Committee has made a survey of 144 planned communities in America and has found within them a "high degree of social cohesion and community spirit" and also "a greater degree of self-sufficiency" than elsewhere.<sup>21</sup>

The same committee raises another important problem for town planning when it suggests that the "borders of the planned community are its weakest points; they should be protected from unsuitable development by such physical buffers as 'green belts' and land acquisition on a generous scale."<sup>22</sup> For emotional identification requires that the object be clearly discernible and, if individuals are to derive esthetic satisfaction from viewing their surroundings, they must have some feeling of uniqueness concerning the community itself. At the moment residents in metropolitan areas are compelled to dwell in artificial sections or boroughs which are frequently little more than administrative names,

<sup>21</sup> National Resources Committee (114), pp. 47-48.

<sup>22</sup> National Resources Committee (114), p. 48.

in order to experience this sense of pride or pleasure. Men everywhere have been eager to establish boundaries, but too frequently they have resorted to straight-line demarcations that have little or no connection either with natural factors in their physical environment or their own social living. The size of the community will of course affect its boundaries and this size, as has been pointed out above, will be a function of the number of families who can be cared for efficiently and of the social unit that is desired. Boundaries, moreover, must be relatively permanent, in order to prevent overcrowding: there is probably less of a temptation to allow too many new people to enter a community when its physical limits are definitely set. At the same time a certain amount of expansion is sometimes necessary and consequently borders must ever be thought of as man-made and hence alterable.

When communities are changed or planned, they seek to satisfy the goals which their occupants chance to possess at the given moment. This is planning based on present values and hence it is planning that necessarily cannot take future or possible values into account. In the third decade of the twentieth century there is little or no opposition when space in a community is allocated for garages or when streets are built for automobile travel. Similarly other details of the modern community are equally obvious: the human, American drives which they satisfy do exist and consequently must and should be gratified. Since desirable values are never absolute, however, there are other goals that may be generated in the future as a result of changing individuals or different social plans. Thus the Russians find it expedient to provide some of their new communities with day nurseries where mothers who are working for the state can deposit their children in the morning and collect them at night.<sup>23</sup> Whether or not this social practice is good or bad depends on a variety of psychological, sociological, economic, and political factors: psychological because the care the child receives in such a nursery is bound to be different—for better or for worse—than that which he would receive from his own

<sup>23</sup> Webbs (155), vol. II, pp. 824-825.

parents; sociological because a working wife creates a home that may or may not resemble one guided by a conventional housewife; economic because there must be a demand for female work; and political because nationalistic aims may or may not create the demand for this type of labor. Obviously, either in terms of the present, future, or possible values, there is no sure-fire way of determining the desirability of this practice for America; hence no man can dare decide whether or not the community should construct such a building now or leave space for it in the future.

Most of the details in a community plan also spring from a social policy which in turn is a reflection of the plans of men and of their personalities. These latter plans cannot be completely determined in advance and for this reason it seems foolish and extravagant to plan communities for a relative eternity. An activity which is reinforced during one decade may be extinguished during the next as a result of changes in the goal to which it once has led. Mumford points out that the heavy capital investments which American cities have in material structures prevent them from adopting improvements that have been evolved or invented in the meantime.<sup>24</sup> To be sure, not all of these investments can be avoided: people live in the present and they will not and cannot postpone innovations and wait indefinitely for other improvements which then may be still further improved. Mumford argues, consequently, in favor of forms that possess the characteristics of "flexibility" and "renewability." Let there be, for example, steel-framed buildings, inasmuch as "the internal skeleton can be fixed, in terms of sunlight and open spaces and density, while the internal and external partitions, which determine the character of exposure, the size of the rooms, the diverse functional improvement, can all be freely recast, as need requires."<sup>25</sup> Such a proposal, however, presupposes the discovery of "a whole series of biological and social constants that will vary little from generation to generation." It seems probable that Mumford is merely utter-

<sup>24</sup> Mumford (111), pp. 440-445.

<sup>25</sup> Mumford (111), p. 444.

ing an ethnocentric prayer when he makes this assumption—the utter plasticity of the human being over long periods of time probably precludes the possibility of ever formulating a list of such “constants” that can be *useful* for architectural designs. In a practical sense, however, it is true that certain forms apparently do transcend the society that builds them and hence Mumford’s advice can be followed to a certain extent. Community planners, in brief, must realize their own limitations, must never believe that their particular solutions are ones that will endure for decades, and must provide for changes that they themselves can scarcely anticipate.

In like manner nothing dogmatic can be said or should be done about architectural style. To most sensitive, socially alert individuals at the moment, the elaborately decorated atrocities of the Victorian era are senseless, useless expenditures of money and energy that might very well be or have been diverted into other channels. Of a modern community, building, piece of furniture, or hardware the demand is now made that it be “functional” and then perhaps beautiful, but by all means functional. When this dictum is applied to a kitchen, it is almost readily intelligible: the room must be convenient, comfortable, and cheerful. These three adjectives, moreover, can be embodied into a blueprint and actually emerge in the form of a properly commodious, electrified, gadget-equipped, colorful room.

In designing a community it may be argued that function should be primary and beauty, at least nonfunctional beauty, should be secondary. Stage sets are a delight to the eye but they cannot house live, struggling people. Columns and pilasters may be fashionable but, if the builder has only a limited amount of money at his disposal or if the tenant can afford only a low rent, it is wiser to spend the money instead for an extra room or a larger one. It seems clear that a community or an object is functional when it enables people to attain their goals with the maximum of efficiency or the minimum of waste.

Functional designs are never deliberately ugly; in fact proponents of functionalism claim that the functional *is*

beautiful. One strongly suspects that in many instances the functionalist forces himself, wittingly or unwittingly, to see beauty in the functional because it is functional! It is also possible to suggest that for some people it may be desirable to sacrifice a bit of the functional in favor of beauty, that the useless column or pilaster may bring more psychic gratification than the extra or larger room. There can, in truth, be no ultimate resolution of this problem of function versus beauty because of the complexity of human personality: people want both utility and beauty, but they want them in varying combinations.

Still more difficult is the question of beauty itself. For that which is called beautiful is so completely cultural and subjective that it defies detailed description. Standards of beauty vary from culture to culture and what pleases a group of individuals is largely a product of their heritage, the particular spirit of the times in which they live, and their own unique personalities. Even in a given era, moreover, tastes vary a great deal, as the Romans pointed out in their proverb that has now grown so trite. It might be reasoned that some of the characteristics of beauty, like balance, symmetry, and the communication of feelings and moods common to mankind, do transcend the culture of the artist or the architect, but these vary so much in their details that they can be only vaguely and abstractly conceptualized. Many modernists, in fact, would deny the transcendent quality ascribed to them.

In the face of this confusion concerning standards of beauty, it seems futile to try to prescribe the esthetic requirements of community planning. Since there is no certain way of knowing which styles might be more gratifying, it seems most sensible, on the whole, to adapt a style to the prevailing tastes of the time, *provided* that the criterion of utility is first satisfied. At least, if this is done, communities will tend to conform to what is generally considered beautiful and thus afford the maximum of gratification immediately.

Let there be Spanish villas in the Middle West and flamboyant Gothic churches in New England, if this is what



people want and if these styles really satisfy other drives besides their esthetic ones. To outlaw such monstrosities—monstrous of course only from this writer's point of view—would be to appoint oneself a universal dictator of human tastes. It is simply not desirable that every individual whose tastes differ from those of the majority or the minority be compelled to live in surroundings which the latter elect. Ideally it would be preferable to have the community plan the general outline or the exterior of a house, and then allow the owner or tenant to add the unobtrusive variations he considers desirable on the outside and to plan the interior in accordance with his own preferences and standards. Were this done, the airplane view might be less harmonious, but the individual would find his own dwelling more gratifying. Fairyland villages which are so, so pretty in rotogravure pictures cannot possibly satisfy all of the inhabitants whose individual tastes have been sacrificed to gain an utterly useless effect.

Complete anarchism of tastes, however, is not desirable. Although it is frustrating to make each person conform to community standards, it is also frustrating in other ways to have a community with no standards whatsoever. Many people, moreover, want what they want because of the social pressure that has been exerted upon them: Spanish villas and Gothic structures have been deliberately promoted by real-estate agents and architects with weird ideas, until Americans have now become convinced that they will lose caste by considering them ugly or useless. Some kind of guidance in the school and the press, therefore, is necessary. The aim of such guidance should be not to change people arbitrarily in the direction of the standards which the so-called experts happen to have, but rather to enable them later to derive still greater satisfaction from the physical outline of the community and perhaps to sacrifice less of the functional for the sake of the gingerbread. Shop-fabricated houses, for example, though far from ideal, still embody many of the housing reforms concerning which experts are enthusiastic and which would also assist Americans in mak-

ing their homes more satisfactory living places; yet their diffusion seems partially dependent upon the "extent to which the public may be willing to sacrifice present styles of exterior form and ornamentation in houses for increased comfort of interiors, less expense, and greater flexibility in subsequent additions or other changes."<sup>26</sup> What might be termed in a biased way the perversion of the public taste, consequently, can be partially eliminated only by means of other social plans.

The plea that has been made here is one directed against the regimentation of tastes unless too many other values have to be sacrificed. In another field, that of music, it would be bad to abolish jazz just because it is popular and just because critics say that classical music is much more complex and hence presumably pleasurable to them. No, let men and women be taught to appreciate both types, since a fondness for one does not necessarily mean that the other cannot be enjoyed too. With people so varied and unique as they are it will probably always remain true that their attitudes toward art and beauty and community forms will be similarly varied and unique within the more or less loose standards set by their culture. The existence of planned communities which through a series of compromises offer a satisfactory mode of life to many people does not mean that everyone will have to live in a community or participate in the affairs of a community—please let those who prefer isolation live in isolation.

### *Public Health*

Before highways, houses, and communities can be effective means of promoting human gratification, corresponding alterations in the physical environment must occur. Eugenics seeks to attain the same general goal, presumably, by altering the biological stock. In the field of public health deliberate emphasis is placed upon a combination of these two approaches to planning: the environment is improved, so that fewer germs will breed or be spread; and people's bodies

<sup>26</sup> Chawner (25), p. 373.

are protected directly so that they will be less likely to fall victim to disease. Words like the following all have pleasant connotations because the practices they represent contribute to the health of the individuals concerned: sanitation, vaccination, inoculation, pasteurization, pure foods and drugs, milk stations, public clinics, visiting nurses, nutrition, anti-venereal-disease campaign, school and industrial hygiene, and, in short, preventative medicine. Only cranks or the feeble-minded are supposed to disapprove of any of these measures.

It is conceivable, however, that the goal of health in the strict physical sense sometimes interferes with other values. An imaginary religious sect may be considered and it may be presumed that one of its principles prevents the disciples from being vaccinated. Such a belief, any medical association would agree, is both "unscientific" and "bad" because without building up an immunity through vaccination these stubborn people may become victims of smallpox and may communicate the disease to their fellow fanatics and to innocent men, women, and children elsewhere. In such a case "the law" may be required to take action and to compel these recalcitrants to conform to "decent, health-bringing standards." It may very well be that submitting involuntarily to the law will create tremendous emotional difficulties for the members of this sect; that they will become, consequently, neurotic, psychotic, or just plain sour; and that thereafter, having violated one of their fundamental religious tenets, they will never be able to make a "satisfactory adjustment." Is the prevention of smallpox in this situation worth the psychic price these people have had to pay?

Dietitians and social workers who are sent among the poorer sections of the population frequently find that the diet of Italians and Chinese is too rich in carbohydrates and deficient in other ways, as a result, respectively, of the quantity of spaghetti and rice these people consume. Here the dietetic principle runs counter to the social custom. Whenever possible, the latter is made to surrender to the former. Once

again the goal of health automatically is placed higher than any other value.

Exercise to "build sound bodies" is usually prescribed by most health experts. But exercise takes time and hence an individual has less of an opportunity to develop himself in other respects. In reply, the student of public health can say, first, that to live at all the good health resulting from exercise is necessary; and, secondly, that development "in other respects" can occur more efficiently with a healthy body. The consumptive poet, however, may have produced a totally different kind of verse if he had fortified his "resistance" through exercise; and his particular poetry is an experience many *other* people would not wish to forego. The end of health through the means of exercise, moreover, may have more drastic social consequences. One method of exercising, for example, is to engage in competitive sports or to be enrolled in a military unit. It is not too far-fetched to point out, consequently, that exercise which gives people competitive or war-directed habits may be leading to future activities and that these activities, being in themselves quite unhealthful, eventually can defeat the original purpose of the exercise. Thus some children's summer camps in America may give middle-class parents an opportunity to relax and may make their youngsters stronger and more thoroughly sunburned; but the by-products of camp discipline (such as the sniveling worship of the strong leader) may or may not be desirable according to other values and judgments.

The promotion of public health, like the practice of medicine, frequently is obstructed not because there is no knowledge concerning the people involved, the physical and social environments, or the goal to be achieved, but because opposition is aroused against certain measures for economic and social reasons. The techniques of preventing most of the important diseases, for example, are known. The draining of swamps in tropical countries, the installation of one physician and a corp of nurses in public schools, and the training

of midwives are all measures whose efficacy in promoting health has been proven again and again. Even though industrial accidents have been decreased considerably within the last few decades, still further improvement in this respect is possible. To prevent disease and accidents, however, money must be expended and adequate financial backing is not always available. Public health officials, therefore, are compelled to devote a great deal of effort to "educating" prominent people, in order to convince them that both private and public funds must assist the progress of preventative medicine. Flagrantly false advertising claims can be as harmful as impure foods; both the control of advertising and the more thorough inspection of foods frequently run counter to the interests of certain producers. To any student of public health, particular reforms in crowded urban areas are both obvious and necessary: sanitary dwellings, recreational facilities, and adequate transportation are mentioned as the most outstanding needs. Real-estate values, though, are affected by such reforms and, before their importance can be diminished, it may be necessary to change crucial features of the entire social and economic system, even including a sacred mos like private property. It is clear, therefore, that large portions of the public health program can be realized only when they are incorporated into a wider social plan that has far-reaching implications for the American society.

That wider social plans are necessary is shown not only by the need to overcome economic and social opposition but also by the existence of a specialized division of public health sometimes known as social psychiatry. The assumption behind social psychiatry, an assumption that is unproven but that seems to be correct, is that neurotic disturbances are partially due to taxing pressures exerted upon the individual by events within his society.<sup>27</sup> It is felt that, if these pressures are relieved by plans which provide greater economic and social security, the tendency among many people to become neurotic will be diminished. People whose fears are allayed and who are given an opportunity to express

<sup>27</sup> Williams (160).

themselves joyfully are less likely to be in need of psychiatric advice. The outlook for the more serious psychoses, however, is not so bright: since it has been shown that these diseases do not increase during a war or a depression,<sup>28</sup> it follows, perhaps, that they result from internal disturbances within the organism rather than from external events. Social psychiatry, moreover, requires that people be assisted in more specific ways; thus the psychiatrist or the psychologist who is stationed in a school or in a factory can serve two functions. He is able to help those children or workers who find that they are experiencing mental and emotional difficulties; and he can make definite suggestions to the principal or the employer to promote a less hectic and more gratifying life by instituting certain changes in general procedure.

From one point of view, all of education itself belongs in the field of public health. For the goals which individuals acquire in school determine their behavior and, unless these goals promote their physical and mental health, they are likely to be doomed to disease and mild or severe neuroses. All social plans, in fact, have to be transmitted to children through the schools. In a democracy the suggestion that children be indoctrinated in a particular way in accordance with any kind of a plan sounds both repugnant and dangerous. It cannot be forgotten, however, that any educational system involves indoctrination, even if it merely transmits an individualistic social heritage or strives to achieve a type of competitive planlessness.<sup>29</sup> The plans that should be taught, consequently, are those that *seem* to be directed toward the achievement of desirable values. It is not necessarily true that plans have to be transmitted slavishly in order to make all citizens obey without reflection. A critical intelligence is doubtless—at least this is the democratic bias—a prerequisite to the good life as that life has been vaguely defined.

Almost any health program and most social plans require a knowledge of the structure of the American population in the near and far future. It is evident that the growth or

<sup>28</sup> Landis and Page (83), pp. 145-148.

<sup>29</sup> Doob (39), pp. 77-88.

decline of the population is largely dependent upon three factors: the death rate, the birth rate, and immigration. If both the death and the birth rates are estimated to be either high, medium, or low and if immigration in the future is thought to be either at the rate of an increase of 100,000 per year or none at all, it is obvious that "hypotheses" for predicting the trend until 1980 can be based on combinations of varying assumptions for each of the three factors. Thus when it is assumed that the death rate will be medium, the birth rate low, and immigration zero, it can be estimated that the population will increase at a negatively accelerated rate until 1960 and then slowly decline; when the same assumptions are made concerning the death rate and immigration but when the assumption concerning the birth rate is changed from low to medium, this negative acceleration will occur later and by 1980 the total population will still be increasing slowly.<sup>30</sup> Here is some insight into the future, to be sure, but it is an insight that may prove misleading. Suppose contraceptives are more widely used, suppose medical science prolongs life beyond the known limits of expectancy, suppose another great war annihilates huge sections of the country, suppose present immigration quotas are lowered to give asylum to refugees from Europe—each of these suppositions has to be examined in its own right and concerning each a separate prediction has to be made. Barring such sudden and far-reaching changes, however, it is possible, almost with any set of assumptions, to anticipate a number of trends: (1) increase in population in the United States is slowing down; (2) the average age of the total population is increasing; (3) the birth rate of the foreign-born, now only slightly greater than the native group, is declining rapidly; (4) the urban population is not and will not be reproducing itself, whereas whatever increase in population occurs will come from the rural regions.<sup>31</sup> These are trends

<sup>30</sup> W. S. Thompson and P. K. Whelpton, summarized in National Resources Committee (115), pp. 22-24.

<sup>31</sup> National Resources Committee (115), pp. 25-26, 29, 127-128; National Resources Committee (114), p. 10.

which are bound to affect the plans of men, if and when they do continue—and with available knowledge it seems likely that they will. This knowledge, it is clear, rests on shaky and wavering assumptions; therefore social planning which requires a knowledge of population trends must be prepared to revise many details in its program if future events produce changes in the factors influencing those trends.

No man can isolate himself from his fellows. Social contacts are inevitable in any kind of society. When individual plans fail—and many of them always do—men and women are forced to seek their goals by obtaining aid from an authority generally associated with government and by executing the social plans which the authority formulates.

With or without governmental aid social plans encounter difficulties when they do not satisfy all the requirements of planning. New highways, homes, or communities cannot be built only by considering the physical environment. Nor can a health program be concerned merely with the bodies and minds of people or with the aspects of their physical and social environments that seem most directly to affect those bodies and minds. It becomes increasingly clear, therefore, that no social plan can be successful if it concentrates upon people or their physical and social environments or their objectives: the three are inextricably interrelated.

No one of these factors, moreover, can be considered stable. The physical environment appears to be immutable and, since it actually does possess certain immutable characteristics, the advice has been repeated that the so-called natural environment does set limits to the kinds of physical changes that can be produced by planning. At the same time it is just as true that this environment must be modified in many ways if social planning is to occur.

When people change, moreover, their goals change and a change in their goals in turn requires modification in the type of highway, house, or community or in the means that will be employed to promote health or education. A paradox of this society is the fact that ever-changing and con-



flicting goals prevent the realization of many plans which so obviously offer gratifying release to people's basic drives. If highways swerve through main streets instead of around them, it cannot be concluded that many people do not want to keep their community quiet or to travel with dispatch—this situation simply suggests that some people desire to profit from the stream of traffic which is compelled to pour into the community. If some homes are little better than hovels, this does not mean that the inhabitants love the places in which they must spend too much of their lives—this situation simply means that other people seek goals that prevent public and private money from being employed to build more adequate dwellings. If men sacrifice comfort for gaudy beauty in their communities, this does not mean that they do not wish to be comfortable too—this situation simply suggests that their goals are in conflict and that one goal has had to be sacrificed. If some physical and mental diseases occur at a needlessly high rate, this does not mean that anyone likes disease—this situation simply suggests that too few people are willing to make the sacrifices necessary to spread the benefits of a public health program to everyone.

Since the goals of people and the goals within one person are so frequently incompatible, it follows that any social plan cannot be completely satisfactory. Some individuals are bound to be affected adversely by the change and to receive undesirable frustrations. Or an individual has to sacrifice one objective in order to secure the gratification of another drive. It is important, therefore, to alleviate the inevitable suffering as much as possible.

The interdependency of most social plans is becoming more and more obvious. Highways affect houses, houses affect communities, communities affect health, and health affects the social and economic life—or, to reverse the chain, the social and economic life also affects these various social plans. And formal education in the schools must supplement almost every plan and at the same time the educational process itself is influenced by the plans that have or have not been formulated. Any plan, therefore, results from prob-

lems beyond its immediate scope and its consequences may be other than those pertaining to its objective.

As more and more plans are analyzed and appraised, it appears that planning itself cannot be called a short cut to utopia. The mere fact that rearrangements of the physical environment must be tentative in order to provide opportunity for changed people to seek changed goals in the future is an indication of the groping character of social planning. The unprecise knowledge concerning population trends compels planning to be cautious. All of the concrete proposals that are being made, consequently, must be viewed as promising suggestions that seem to promote the achievement of man's present goals in a present physical and social environment; all of them must concede the possibility that, out of the myriad of future and possible values, new desirable ones will be selected. The tone is not one of wishy-washy timidity but of studied humility in the face of staggering complexity. In a world that is filled with underbaked dogmas, the limitations that characterize men and their plans must be continually emphasized.

## CHAPTER X

### ECONOMIC PLANNING

**P**RODUCTION implies planning. Faced with scarcity, men must postpone temporary satisfaction and relaxation and be active in order to enjoy a future gain. The activity may consist of climbing a tree to reach the fruit, planting a seed to reap the harvest, constructing a boat to catch fish, or repeating a mechanical motion to receive a weekly wage. Each of these activities requires a certain degree of foresight, skill, and the ability to adapt present means to future ends. When an activity leads to an economic goal, it is reinforced and becomes part of the individual's repertory of customary behavior.

Production without a plan is inefficient or frustrating or both since it seldom achieves the economic objective. In a complex society in which the farmer is almost completely dependent on the proceeds of what he grows on his land, it is tragic for him to harvest a bumper crop and thus triumph over the vagaries of the weather—and then discover that as a consequence of the glutted market his return barely covers his expenses. Workers in factories demand that the minimum wages they receive be known to them, so that they can plan the details of their existence accordingly. The manufacturer does not produce a commodity in quantities that are determined by a personal whim of his own; instead he has a planning curve which represents a shrewd guess concerning the probable demand for that commodity in the prevailing market.

#### *Individual Economic Activity*

The individual plans of men attempt to provide the means through which production can occur and lead eventually to consumption. Children acquire ambitions to be successful at certain romantically productive pursuits, and the extent to

which they realize these goals later depends upon their own personalities, the opportunities in their society, and the particular class to which they chance to belong. Through experience the entrepreneur acquires the skill that enables him to predict more or less accurately the probable course of his business. When a frontier existed in America, unsuccessful producers could drift westward and frequently find there new and more exciting ways of earning a living.

In colonial times some families tended to be relatively self-sufficient economic units and hence their economic program could be rather easily executed. For then future estimates of production might be calculated with a high degree of accuracy. The head of the household was acquainted with the materials at his disposal and he had insight, more or less, into the ability of himself and his co-workers. Unfavorable weather might interfere with his plans—the most dreaded circumstance of all he called “bad luck” which was a generic term for accidents, deaths, delays, or miscalculation.

In contemporary America, however, few if any families are even relatively self-sufficient. Americans are economically dependent on one another; the purchasing power of the money that an individual earns, no matter how he has earned it, is affected by the activity of almost everyone else in the community or the nation. To plan to increase the output of a shoe factory it is necessary to make an unthinkable number of assumptions concerning the condition of at least three markets: the one in which raw materials and capital goods are purchased; the one from which the supply of workers is drawn; and the one in which the finished products will be sold. The calculations for each market are extremely difficult; the price of leather hides may rise as a result of a drought, the wages of workers may have to be increased due to the activity of union organizers, and the buying public may suddenly fall victim to a fad that directs them to a product different from the one that is being manufactured. Compare this latter complicated situation with the one in which the individual decided during his spare time to produce a pair of shoes for his youngest daughter from hides

which would be available when he slaughtered a particular animal.

Production is frustrating unless it is reinforced by consumption; even when productive activity itself is gratifying, the frustrating circumstance of not attaining the goal of consumption (which releases so many drives in this society) remains. The moment production exceeds the "effective" demand for a commodity, there results a surplus which no one is allowed to consume. It is foolish to gather more fruit than one can eat at the moment, since fruit decays; here the demand that is exceeded by the supply is a physiological one. And it is similarly foolish to produce millions of expensive automobiles in America; for in this instance, even though doubtless almost every American would like to own such a car, the supply exceeds the actual economic demand—or, in plainer words, people just cannot afford the cars. An ideal economic system is one in which every producer can plan exactly the amount of his product that will be consumed—and then proceeds to produce accordingly. Under such a system all productive activity is reinforced and hence leads to gratification.

The housewife may be called the prototype of a successful producer. She knows her family so well that she is able to purchase and prepare the right amount of food. If she calculates incorrectly, if someone suddenly becomes ill or is called away from home, or if all the food is not consumed at a single meal, she is acquainted with more or less tempting ways of serving these leftovers and hence plans her next day's cooking with this surplus in mind. On a larger scale, the cook or chef in a big restaurant is able to offer each patron a large variety of goods even up to the closing hour; his success as a planner depends on the quantity of food which he estimates in advance will be consumed. In certain industries, where future demand can be pretty well predicted from past and present orders, the danger of over- or underproducing can be minimized—but even here a planned schedule of production may fail as a result of a depression or a shift in public taste.

As more and more individuals produce interdependently and as more and more different kinds of commodities are manufactured, it becomes increasingly difficult to plan in accordance with the future demands of the large body of consumers. There are difficulties in all economic planning, but the difficulties increase in number as one ascends the scale from the skillful housewife to the owner of a chain of restaurants or to the manufacturer who has a monopoly on one of the foods served in that restaurant and elsewhere. The consumer not only has to eat, to clothe and house himself, and to seek recreation, but he also has at his disposal such a large variety of ways to achieve these and other goals. America's economic system, to be sure, is not completely chaotic. Some planning is possible. For the infinite variety that confronts the consumer is usually limited by certain rather stable and enduring attitudes he possesses, and therefore his present and past behavior does offer a bit of a clue to what he will do in the future. Market surveys are useful since, by sampling a population and by assuming that expressed preferences will continue, a sufficiently accurate forecast can often be made. Then, too, in an almost statistical way based on the random functioning of a crude code of probability, the activity of a large number of consumers can be predicted better than the activity of any single individual. No man, including both the owner of the restaurant and usually the stray patron himself, can say beforehand what the latter will order for dinner when he surveys the menu; but the experienced chef will know that on a given day—with perhaps the state of the weather indicated—a particular dish will be ordered with a frequency which can be approximately anticipated.

The capricious nature of the consumer's demands cannot be too strongly emphasized. A given demand for oranges must be assumed by all growers, middlemen, and distributors. The orange industry then functions rather smoothly and the fluctuations in price depend almost exclusively on the quantity of the crop that is produced. If the American Medical Association were to make an official announcement—

which is well publicized—that a newly discovered poison in this fruit causes people who drink the juice for breakfast to lose ten years of their life, from what is known of economic principles it could be anticipated that the demand would drop to zero and that the individual plans of orange producers would amount to nought. Or, if it be imagined that this conservative, self-protecting guild might proclaim that orange juice at every meal lengthens the individual's life a whole decade, from the same principles it could be deduced that the demand would rise and that the individual plans of orange producers would again amount to almost nought but in the opposite direction. This illustration is perhaps extreme—but is it extreme in a society where advertising, propaganda pressure, and the force of cataclysmal social events are ever ready to produce such profound alterations in demand schedules as a result of their effects upon the economic activities of individuals? Applied economics can be no more successful than theoretical economics in achieving a closed system.<sup>1</sup>

### *The Price System*

In America, at least in the many economic fields where complete or partial competition still survives, both present and future needs are supposed to be ascertained by means of the price system.<sup>2</sup> The description and analysis of how this system functions have been suggested in Chapter V. Here the findings of economics are directly useful at least to the theoretical problem of planning. Consider some of the simpler operations of this price system. When prices rise, consumption is generally discouraged; and when they fall, consumption is generally encouraged. An exception to these tendencies is the case of a luxury product: if its price declines, people who have been purchasing it because its expensiveness brings them prestige will no longer secure gratification and may discontinue their patronage. In general, however, the price of a commodity *tends* to determine its

<sup>1</sup> Above, pp. 111-113.

<sup>2</sup> Above, pp. 97, 109-111.

market. The word "tends" must be part of the generalization, inasmuch as the inverse relationship between price and demand is not always automatic; products with an inelastic demand, for example, are usually those that satisfy basic drives within people and that are purchased in almost identical quantities even when their price rises or falls considerably.

Not only does price help to determine demand, but it also is a factor in determining supply. An increased demand is reflected by a rise in prices if the supply remains more or less constant; and until the supply is increased, only those consumers who can afford to pay more for the product or only those to whom it is worth more are able to become purchasers. Once again the converse in general is also true: a decreased demand at a prevailing price means that some sellers are unable to dispose of their product; in order to increase effective demand, they reduce the price and thus dispose of their product at a lower profit and perhaps at a loss. Since fluctuations in demand affect price, the seller gains an insight into that demand by examining its price; and thereafter, if he is sagacious and if the other things that are never equal are equal, he expands or curtails his production accordingly.

The economic problem of planning production to suit human needs is, therefore, very complicated. From a psychological point of view, price represents only one segment of the personality, viz., the amount the buyer is willing to give and the seller to receive; since any segment is influenced by the entire personality, many factors are bound to affect an individual's judgment in regard to price and innumerable forces are involved when large groups of people make their judgments. In general, however, the producer partially determines consumption by the price which he, in competition with other producers, sets for his commodity; and the consumer partially determines production by the price which he, in competition with other consumers, is willing to pay for a commodity. Both supply and demand meet in the market place and eventually a price, which may be con-



ceived of theoretically as a point of equilibrium, is reached. Additional complications are present whenever the producer applies pressure upon the consumer to increase the latter's demand or whenever the consumer bargains with the producer to decrease the latter's price.

Since money acts as the medium of exchange, a worker is able to specialize at one task and to purchase with his earnings the consumer goods necessary for survival and for gratification. In this way people in an industrial society are interdependent and obtain benefits from a division of labor. The self-sufficient household requires no medium of exchange since its members consume directly only the products that they themselves produce.

As a result of the important rôle of money within this type of economic system, it seems to be extremely difficult for a government to fix prices, achieve the benefits it seeks through this policy, and yet keep the market "in equilibrium." Whether prices are fixed directly—at a maximum, at a minimum, at a specific point, within a given range, or in relation to other commodities—or indirectly—through the control of production or marketing—the delicate balance of industrial interrelations apparently is upset, as numerous experiences in various countries have demonstrated in the past.<sup>3</sup> The implication from these experiences, however, is not alone the one which suggests that "therefore" there should be no governmental control of prices; for it is clear that the interaction of supply and demand can be affected equally drastically by the component forces that compose them. A shift in public taste as a result of advertising or the power given a producer by the patenting of an exclusive process may lead to results as upsetting as the governmental restriction of crops or limitations placed upon exporters. A truer statement of the problem might be, simply, that the present mode of production and distribution responds easily to almost any type of social change, regardless of whether that change is instituted by a government or by private individuals; and that, since economic contacts are so im-

<sup>3</sup> Backman (8).

portant in the determination of all behavior,<sup>4</sup> an economic innovation is bound to have far-reaching repercussions. The extreme intricacy and complexity of this price system, moreover, have also been suggested in Chapter V: when all of the various forces, in addition to the economic ones, which help to determine price are enumerated, it is less surprising that prices fluctuate so much than it is, in truth, that they have any stability at all.

### *Economic Frustrations*

In common parlance the price system is not thought to be a planned economy. Of course, as has been suggested, there are individual plans that do and must contribute to its functioning, plans that range from the budgeting schemes of the family to the production schedule of the producer; and there are also economic plans, as will be shown below, which function for particular economic activities. But over and above the numerous individual and economic plans there is no single master plan—and a master plan is a plan which attempts to prescribe almost all the goals which individuals can seek and almost all the means they may employ to attain these goals. Each consumer plans in accordance with his wishes which may or may not promote his own or the general welfare; the producer plans to obtain the maximum profit for himself and only indirectly through the price mechanism does he become acquainted with the possible demands or needs of his prospective customers. This is organized chaos from one point of view; and man's dissatisfaction with it is perhaps signified by the invention of a vague concept like "the invisible hand" which, being embodied in the "laws" of supply and demand, is supposed to regulate the economic life and hence perform the task of planning.

There is, however, nothing inherently good or bad in chaos, whether that chaos be organized or disorganized. If the individual plans of men can be executed without benefit

<sup>4</sup> Above, pp. 90-94.

of a master plan either of a social, political, or economic nature, then the society is functioning efficiently in accordance with a particular desirable value. To deplore the absence of a master plan, it is necessary to try to prove two points: first, that its absence is bad in terms of the individual plans of men and, secondly, that its presence would remedy the defects.

To be satisfied with the economic order as that order has functioned during the presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt has been indeed very exceptional. Almost all camps have shouted that some kind of change is necessary. Radicals have desired a type of socialism or communism. Conservatives and reactionaries have deplored most of the New Deal's reforms. And even New Dealers themselves have visualized the President's efforts as mere steps in the direction of an America that has not yet evolved. This aggression must be interpreted as a sign that people have felt frustrated; the precise criticism that is voiced has usually been a function of the individual's class or group allegiance and the particular modes of gratification which that class or group considers essential and which it is momentarily not obtaining. It is difficult, if not impossible, to sift such criticisms and evaluate them in terms of the gratification or frustration they imply for the majority of Americans. All that can be done here is to summarize what seem to be the frustrating circumstances that have given rise to this discontent.

The economic order is said to be inefficient. In the first place, due to competition and the desire to obtain the largest possible *net* profit, natural resources have been exploited ruthlessly. The wastes involved in the mining of coal, the refining of oil, and the gathering of timber have been appalling, so appalling in fact that the government of an apathetic capitalism was forced even as early as the beginning of the twentieth century to foster a conservation movement. No one doubts the importance of land for a variety of purposes: for agriculture, for timber, for wild life, for recreation, and for flood control. It has become clear, however, that American farmers have misused their lands

either as a result of ignorance or an intense desire to survive in a strongly competitive market. The droughts and dust-bowls that now plague the Great Plains Area, for example, have been caused largely by the use of methods which, being suited for a humid rather than a semi-arid region, have led to overgrazing and overplowing.<sup>5</sup>

Competition has also frequently led to unnecessary re-duplication of services; the Interstate Commerce Commission has had to regulate the railroads and other vehicles of transportation not only to prevent too much overlapping, but also to be certain that producers and consumers are charged, respectively, "reasonable" freight and passenger rates.<sup>6</sup> Advertisers and others with more professional sounding names at first "stimulated" demand by means of utterly unscrupulous claims; pure-food and drug laws had to be passed to insure a reasonable degree of honesty. This legislation was also directed against the adulteration of foods that occurred in an effort to reduce production costs. Outright corruption has characterized certain enterprises, and hence the government has had to protect the consumer whenever an undertaking, like insurance, banking, or the stock exchange, affects large groups of people. There is no one theory that satisfactorily accounts for the greatest inefficiency of all, the industrial depression; yet it seems true that overexpansion (with consequent overproduction in an effort to make the individual plans of producers succeed) deserves and herewith receives some share of the blame. All of these inefficiencies are bad; their badness has been denied by almost no one and they most certainly run counter to any desirable social value.

It can be said, too, that the American economic system frustrates people directly in a variety of ways. The inefficiencies just mentioned may frustrate people gradually or may gratify some at the expense of others; but there have been additional ones which have far-reaching and immediate con-

<sup>5</sup> Great Plains Drought Area Committee, quoted in MacKenzie (103), pp. 214-220.

<sup>6</sup> Clark (26), pp. 305-306.

sequences for everyone. As has been pointed out above,<sup>7</sup> there is growing insecurity in respect to obtaining and retaining a job and earning an adequate income. This very frustrating feeling pervades most of America: it is perhaps strongest in the Southern sharecropper and in the unorganized factory worker; and, if their protests are taken seriously, even big businessmen have been disturbed by a fluctuating governmental policy. Paradoxically the increased productivity of labor means that unemployment in the present economic system can be decreased only slowly and with great difficulty.<sup>8</sup> The glaring inequalities in economic and social status that have existed everywhere need only be mentioned here. It is significant, however, that those on top of the heap have begun to realize their dependency upon their employees and the great masses of the population. Henry Ford would be insulted to be called an altruist and yet he shares with many other great industrialists the view that workers' wages must be increased, not for humane or religious reasons, but simply to strengthen their purchasing power—underpaid workers in one plant simply are unable to buy many of the products of that or any other plant.<sup>9</sup>

Another devastating charge that has been made against the economic system is that it is "materialistic." By this label is meant that, since the struggle to survive is so intense, much of the social prestige of the society involves economic matters. The wealthy man tends to be admired merely because he is wealthy. And then, since people know that the way to both security and prestige is through economic success, they tend to develop personalities peculiarly bent only in the direction of this kind of success. When they fail, a few of them may break down and become so anxious, maladjusted, or unsocial that they are designated psychiatrically as neurotic or psychotic.

These, then, are the principal disadvantages of this economic system that functions without a master economic

<sup>7</sup> Above, pp. 191-192.

<sup>8</sup> Above, pp. 113-115.

<sup>9</sup> Ford and Crowther (45), pp. 52 ff.

plan. The frustrations they imply are tragically ironic: they have occurred largely in an attempt to solve what at first glance seems to be such a simple problem, viz., forecasting future needs in order to regulate production; and they have existed in the midst of amazing technological advances whose goal is the more efficient solution of the problem of economic scarcity. In view of the frustrations imposed by the system, in view of the fact that the individual plans of men have not enabled them to achieve gratifying goals, and in view of the unquestioned importance of economic activity in influencing the entire life of the society, intelligent men and women have been forced, regardless of their biases, to appraise or to adopt certain alternatives.<sup>10</sup> It is clear that activity which does lead to a goal is extinguished and substitute responses occur—in this case individual plans are being extinguished in favor of isolated or master economic plans for industry and agriculture.

#### *American Economic Plans*

From the observations of sociologists and anthropologists almost everywhere and even from the experience of a revolutionary land like Soviet Russia, it would seem that changes and reforms in the present economic system will not and cannot occur suddenly. At least this has been true thus far whenever innovations threaten to affect an important part of man's existence. In America, moreover, much inertia can be anticipated in respect to economic plans. Large-scale enterprise frequently has a vested interest in opposing change; since many goals are still being attained, the older ways secure reinforcement. Politically the American democracy always operates slowly: the radical rearrangement of the important political parties has taken decades; both Congress and the state legislatures usually pass important legislation after political jockeying and pressure from lobbyists and constituents; and the Constitution can be amended only through a complicated process of ratification.

<sup>10</sup> Ogburn (120), pp. 32 ff.

In the realm of men's social and economic activities, as has been pointed out so frequently, significant social reforms are seldom accepted readily: their adequacy cannot be tested beforehand and hence there is a tendency to rest content with the status quo rather than risk, in an experimental fashion, a new social arrangement which, being a different activity, may not be expected to lead to the desired goal. England's experience with a "dole," Sweden's experience with producers' and consumers' coöperatives, and France's experience with trade unions cannot be applied directly to this country, inasmuch as these devices have been tried under slightly or greatly different economic, social, and political conditions. That the coöperative movement, for example, has been so successful in Sweden may be due to that country's geographical position which has enabled it to secure profitable orders from the surrounding, belligerent nations. A similar movement in America, where this kind of trade is not quite so important, must be judged in the American context.

When a defect is recognized in the economic system, at the outset government is permitted to execute remedial plans which are thought to be within its province and not within the sphere of private enterprise. It is known, for example, that the plight of the American farmer in general is not a happy one; specifically it can be said that "more persons now are engaged in agriculture than can be supported if a steady rise in rural living standards is to be achieved."<sup>11</sup> There is little agreement, however, concerning the precise plan that should be adopted to help the rural population—most proposals are dismissed by some one group as being "un-American." But when it is pointed out that "foreign markets for farm products are not being reopened rapidly" and that nevertheless "the Nation's farm plant continues to be on a scale capable of sending 12 to 25 per cent of its output abroad in years of average crop yield,"<sup>12</sup> few Americans—at least before the start of the new European War—disapproved of the expansion of foreign trade through indi-

<sup>11</sup> McCrory, Hendrickson, *et al.* (97), p. 101.

<sup>12</sup> McCrory, Hendrickson, *et al.* (97), p. 103.

vidual initiative or through reciprocal trade agreements; this latter kind of economic planning traditionally belongs to government.

The economic plans that operate within the present price system and that seem to arise with not too much opposition are those which are formulated by specific groups of producers or consumers in their own interest. The former run the legal danger of being prosecuted as a monopoly since they tend to have a monopoly's characteristics; the latter constitute another competitive force in the economic life of the country. Both are essentially struggle groups dedicated to their own self-interests and both subscribe to the old dictum of Adam Smith and his followers that the success of their own plans eventually will benefit the entire community and nation. Like an organization of propagandists that attempts to impose a code of "ethics" upon its members, each producer and each consumer finds it to his immediate advantage to try to break the rules to which he has more or less voluntarily subscribed. One producer, to make himself distinctive, may offer an extra "service" with his product and thus attract more customers from his fellow producer who is obeying the literal letter of the agreement. And a consumer will patronize a chain store to secure the savings from a "leader," instead of remaining loyal to the coöperative of which he is a member. The individual plans of men apparently may be stronger than the economic ones that are occasionally formulated.

"In the United States actual accomplishments in the field of planning for a single industry are connected chiefly with trade association activities and trade practice conferences" and through this device "the introduction of simplified practices, industrial standardization, research and the collection and dissemination of information and statistical data" have been accomplished.<sup>13</sup> The existence of these trade associations serves to demonstrate that employers have been made to realize the destructive effect which complete competition may have upon their expansion and profits. Through a monopoly

<sup>13</sup> Michels (109), p. 390.



or a cartel, moreover, a small group of individual producers is able to formulate rather definite production plans: due to their economically dominant position they control the price of a commodity and therefore, to a certain extent, the future demand. By planning production in this fashion, it is possible to eliminate some of the wastes of competition, including a portion of advertising, and to employ workers and other subordinates more regularly.

The Federal Government, however, has gradually interfered with the plans of individual employers and has thus become a more active umpire in domestic conflicts. This activity has had two goals: the prevention of monopolies and trusts and their regulation. The evils of the monopolies which have been "busted" are said to be three. In the first place, the pursuit of profit tends to relegate the ideal of public service to a secondary position or merely to publicize semialtruistic motives in order to secure and then exploit the confidence of the consumers. It is believed by those who support competitive enterprise, for example, that through competition and only through competition will prices be lowered and service improved. Monopolists, moreover, make the same miscalculations that characterize all industry under a price system and for the same reasons. Such mistakes are extremely costly since they involve large groups of workers who subsequently lose their means of gaining a livelihood. Monopolists, finally, are sensitive to the importance of public opinion and therefore they try to influence that opinion in their own behalf. This is accomplished by hiring a public relations counsel, by gradually gaining control of other related industries, and by owning or applying pressure to the various channels of communication. In these ways those who monopolize an industry also attempt to have a partial monopoly on the ideas that people possess; and the latter monopoly, being one-sided, seems often undesirable.

Certain monopolies are tolerated but regulated when, by virtue of almost universal patronage, they have come to be considered public services. According to Dorau, the following four types of services are now under governmental super-

vision: transportation, communication, water, and the trinity of light, heat, and power.<sup>14</sup> In all of these it is said that the fixed capital is utilized only part of the time, that the capital turnover is slow, and that competition would be obviously destructive. Such industries are required to fix a fair price on the services they offer, to make these services reliable and safe, and never to reject customers on any ground other than their inability to pay for the benefits they receive. The idea still survives among some public utilities that the largest net profit can frequently be secured by raising prices as high as possible; as a result government from time to time has forced the companies to lower their prices, a regulation which sometimes has led to such an increased demand that in the end net profits have increased. The reasons for this limited vision are not apparent—can it be that civil servants with their more aloof and “irresponsible” point of view are willing to be more experimental and are less blinded by the traditional rules of business?

The regulation of monopoly is certainly a form of economic planning, even though its scope is quite limited. It is based on the assumption that the individual plans of monopolists do not result in the maximum of gratification and that government, consequently, must interfere. The line between industries—including monopolies, partial monopolies, and those where competition still persists—that require regulation and those that do not is not hard and fast. The economic characteristics of the ones which are now regulated cannot possibly serve as guides to all future regulation. Baking bread, for example, is quite different from the activity involved in furnishing a city its water supply. In times of prosperity and when a particular plant is operating efficiently, most of the fixed capital is being utilized, capital turnover is rapid, and the existence of competition in the baking industry is at least not obviously so bad as rivalry between competing reservoirs might be. Still public authorities interfere with the sale of bread by preventing the individual producer from adulterating his product to too great

<sup>14</sup> Dorau (40), p. 332.

a degree. Whether or not an industry should be regulated seems to be decided not only on economic grounds but also in terms of its psychological and sociological effect upon people. Both regulation and control of business by government are really subsections of the more general problem concerning the desirability or undesirability of competition.

The curious thing about competition is that it seems everywhere to be avoided by almost everybody and that it nevertheless tends to appear in practically every society. As has been suggested in Chapter III, the social heritage of any group lays down rules which either regulate or outlaw certain forms of conflict—and conflict is just the more general term for competition. Indeed under an industrial type of capitalism men and women derive only personal joy from the struggle of competing when their chances of success are fairly high. Individuals seem content to realize their plans, and competition for them is a necessary nuisance. The self-sufficient household, to which frequent reference has been made, does not have to resort to competition in its effort to execute the plans of production; and even cynics seldom question its alleged efficiency. From one point of view a monopoly, either of the government or of private individuals, is the sensible way of producing and distributing goods and services, provided that both quality and low prices can be retained; in addition, it can give workers and everyone else a fair degree of economic and social security. Competition, however, is introduced into, or retained within an industry in order, presumably, to offset the disadvantages of monopoly and to furnish the incentive of insecurity. If Americans and people elsewhere could function so efficiently under monopoly, then competition would be quickly liquidated. Neither competition nor monopoly, therefore, is inherently good or bad; economic activity should be planned in respect to either or both by considering their advantages or disadvantages in the particular situation for which the plan is to be designed.

Workers have attempted to make their individual plans succeed by means of broader economic plans. The strike, the

boycott, and even political activity, sporadic though they have been, are powerful weapons not only to agitate for higher wages and shorter hours, but also to express aggression toward employers and the routine and regimen of a regulated existence. The union itself has been the most successful means of securing gratification that might otherwise have been denied the majority of workers. The employee whose only "capital" is his ability to work and, in many cases, his sheer brute strength is not in a favorable position to bargain with his employer; his position can be strengthened only by the formation of a union which includes all or almost all of the workers in a given plant or industry.<sup>15</sup>

Unions, moreover, usually have to be concerned with their own preservation. Most of them have come into existence as struggle groups: they have had to oppose a strongly organized or entrenched employing class and to seek support among men and women whose first response to them has frequently been quite indifferent or even antagonistic. Union officials, therefore, if they wish to retain their leadership and the status of the union itself, must continually strengthen the in-group loyalty of the membership. As a result unions, like employers' associations, defend their own interests primarily and selfishly. Workers as workers must be shown the benefits of organization; hence the profit of the industry as well as the price the consumer has to pay become matters of only secondary interest, secondary in the sense that the industry must survive if work is to continue. Any union, furthermore, is loath to make concessions to its opponents, even though at times they may seem rational and sensible. While it is clear that the presence of employers as a hostile out-group is usually sufficient to promote in-group unity, there have been occasions, however, when the esprit has been maintained through senseless rivalries with other unions. Unions in many localities still increase their prestige by serving the function of a club or a lodge where members have contact with one another and where they spend part of their leisure time enjoyably. The American Federation of

<sup>15</sup> Brooks (17), esp. chaps. ii, xi.

Labor has largely refrained, very self-consciously, from political activity, but the Congress of Industrial Organizations is now (1939) beginning to show a marked interest in the American Labor Party and the progressive candidates of the two major political parties. It would seem, then, that unions must extend the scope of their activities to achieve their original economic goal.

More and more employers, in formulating their individual plans, have had to become interested in the welfare of their employees. This interest has been due to a fear of unionism, to the knowledge that contented workers produce more efficiently, and, in some cases, perhaps, to humanitarian motives. The personnel manager, the efficiency expert, the psychiatrist, the physician, and the psychologist have become appendages of big industry in this effort to increase profits by improving working conditions and the general morale. Company unions have been a sort of compromise device to give employees a small voice in the industry, lest they demand a larger one through their own organizations. Taylorism, which is the generic term for "scientific efficiency in industry," however, is not always completely good from the point of view of the worker himself or of a more general social value. For the employer or his representative may be tempted to "improve" the worker during working hours to such a degree that the latter is little more than an exhausted animal when he returns home or when he tries to relax during a holiday.<sup>16</sup>

Company-owned and -supervised communities are frequently a mixed blessing. The more basic drives of the inhabitants are satisfied in a formal, mechanical fashion; but often it is necessary to pay an exorbitant rent for the standardized dwellings and to patronize a company store which, like those on plantations in the cotton country, operate at considerable profit. American workers also object to too much company guidance: it is part of their social heritage to demand a high degree of self-supervision.

Americans, faced with economic frustrations, have at-

<sup>16</sup> E. Freeman (47), chap. xix.

tempted, then, to attain their goals in substitute ways: they have resorted to economic plans that require joint, coöperative effort. Each one of these plans, whether it belongs to the employer, the employee, or the consumer, seeks to achieve benefits for its own adherents. As a result, there are conflicts among the varied economic plans and many people have begun to look more frequently to government to be not only the mediator but also the active master planner.

*The New Deal*

The Federal Government, as has been pointed out, has always executed a few economic plans which affect the entire country, but it was not until the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt that such plans increased so markedly and people were able to grasp the general philosophy behind economic and national planning. The Department of Agriculture had carried on research and had given advice to farmers in an effort to improve the quality and quantity of their crops. The graduated income tax was a device to secure not only revenue but also a slightly more equal distribution of the national income. The tariffs that had characterized Republican political strategy since the Civil War served the function of fostering certain home industries in the face of foreign competition and did not always benefit the rural population. The Department of Commerce had assisted domestic industry and, together with the State Department, had endeavored to stimulate foreign trade so that surplus goods could be disposed of abroad. Both the War and Navy Departments had coöperated with American munition makers by patronizing them and by giving them technical aid so that, in time of war, their plants would be equipped to serve the fighting needs of the nation. To the Department of the Interior has fallen the task, among others, of conserving natural resources. The Federal Reserve Act has enabled the Federal Government to supervise and control a large part of the banking system of the country. Even under Herbert Hoover the Reconstruction Finance Corporation

was established to lend money to certain private enterprises in distress and to limited-dividend housing corporations.

Roosevelt's varied alphabetical organizations, therefore, did not spring out of the blue, out of his shrewd mind, or out of the subtle minds of his advisers. In any society, as has been suggested, reforms cannot be imposed too suddenly upon a population: they must be adopted gradually on the basis of preëxisting conditions and they must conform somewhat to the ways in which drives have previously been released and to the attitudes of the people for whom they are intended. The New Deal has given impetus to agencies which began long before Coolidge. The work of the National Resources Committee, for example, has simply supplemented on a broader and regional scale the fact-finding surveys that almost every Federal department has always conducted. Many of the new schemes have merely extended the scope of government regulation by accelerating this old trend. The Banking Act of 1936 has enabled officials to supervise the banks more completely and has compelled state banks to be insured by the Federal Government. Some of the agencies have invaded new fields; thus the Securities and Exchange Commission, like the older Interstate Commerce Commission in its relation to transportation, has extended government supervision to the activities of certain large corporations.

There have been two trends of New Deal activity, however, that represent rather radical departures from past practices: price-fixing and the direct participation in industry and agriculture. These departures, to be sure, are also not completely new, inasmuch as there have been minimum-wage laws and a Federal parcel-post system for a good many years. The astonishing feature of Mr. Roosevelt's policies has been their wider sweep and the present indication that some of them will become a permanent and significant part of the American economic system.

Price-fixing has been attempted through economic and social measures. Important economic agencies have been the following:

1. The National Recovery Administration (an authority that was declared unconstitutional) attempted to set minimum prices for all of the major industries of the country through codes and uniform standards.

2. The Wages and Hours Division of the Department of Labor on the authority of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 has set minimum wages and maximum hours for certain interstate industries.

3. The 1933 Agricultural Adjustment Act (also declared unconstitutional), first employed processing taxes to control the production and marketing of crops in an effort to raise the prices of agricultural products; then the Agricultural Adjustment Administration has sought to stabilize the market supplies of certain crops through marketing agreements, the storage of surpluses, the prevention of erosion, etc.

Certain social measures have had a less direct effect upon prices by creating fundamental changes in the economic system:

1. The National Labor Relations Board has settled industrial disputes and has enabled more workers to bargain collectively through unions of their own choosing; prices, therefore, may have been affected by higher wages.

2. A Social Security Act has provided compulsory old-age insurance for many types of workers and, in cooperation with the states, unemployment insurance and assistance to the needy and dependent; some of these taxes may have been passed on to the consumer in terms of higher prices.

3. Higher corporation taxes, especially the so-called surplus-profit tax, have attempted to curb excessive profits and thus increase wages and dividends and perhaps decrease prices.

The New Deal has also become a powerful entrepreneur or at least a stockholder in innumerable enterprises, as the following incomplete list briefly demonstrates:



1. Housing: Federal Housing Administration, United States Housing Authority, Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Tennessee Valley Authority, Resettlement Administration.

2. Public works: Public Works Administration.

3. Electrical appliances: Electric Home and Farm Authority, Rural Electrification Administration.

4. Employment Bureau: National Reemployment Service.

5. Foreign and domestic commerce and travel: United States Maritime Commission, United States Tourist Bureau.

6. Banking: Farm Security Administration, Farm Credit Administration, Commodity Credit Corporation, Export-Import Bank of Washington.

7. Miscellaneous employment of almost all kinds: Works Progress Administration, Civilian Conservation Corps.

Many of the economic plans of the New Deal have been called temporary affairs to assist the country in recovering from a depression. Before the recession of 1937, public expenditures had actually decreased but that recession quickly caused the President and Congress to "prime the pump" again to the extent of many billions of dollars. It is and will be, however, simple wishful thinking on the part of the friends and enemies of the New Deal to believe that these innovations can be made to disappear by electing a Republican or a conservative Democrat to office or by praying for an earthquake or a typhoon. When ways of doing things and thinking about them are introduced into a society, they cannot be booted out of the culture by a change in administration without some delay. The economic plans of Roosevelt, successful or unsuccessful though they have been in achieving their stated goals, have been satisfying certain large groups of Americans and these groups will not relinquish without a struggle activity that has been so strongly reinforced. The stupid Republican attacks during the campaign of 1936 served to unify the President's supporters who were thus made to see in Landon and his associates a blind

opposition to all of the accomplishments of the New Deal. The permanency of these innovations, however, depends on the continuation of a democratic form of government; were anti-New Dealers to seize the government and then establish a fascist régime, they would be able to replace Roosevelt's plans with social and economic ones of their own.

Whether or not the plans of the New Deal or any kind of deal should be judged good or bad is a question that can be answered only by referring to their immediate and future effects upon Americans. That Roosevelt was elected, that he was reëlected, that Congress has been willing to pass a great deal of the legislation he has requested, that the Supreme Court has gradually been able to interpret "the law" in such a way that more and more New Deal legislation is declared constitutional, and that in spite of mistakes and the courage to state his plans vigorously the President's personal popularity has not declined appreciably, all this seems to indicate that the reforms have been gratifying to large numbers of the population. A Gallup poll has revealed that Mr. Roosevelt has been most popular among those on relief and that his popularity decreases among people progressively and in proportion to the amount of time they estimate they can support themselves without relief if they were suddenly to lose their jobs.<sup>17</sup>

Simultaneously, moreover, alphabetical organizations and all they imply have been frustrating other sections of the population, notably people in middle-class status and higher. The hatred that businessmen and others have felt toward Roosevelt has become the repeated subject for jests, an almost certain sign that aggression has been widespread and deeply felt. The criticisms all seem to suggest one indictment: as a result of the curbing of business by the government and as a result of the uncertainties created by a government that has been forever experimenting, entrepreneurs have no longer been able to formulate or execute their individual plans without fearing that additional restrictions would soon be created and enforced. Or, in more direct words, by adding

<sup>17</sup> *New York Times* (118).

so many patches to the price system of capitalism, the New Deal has been accused of preventing that system from ever functioning efficiently again.

Unfortunately there is no definite and reliable way of determining whether the economic plans of Roosevelt have been good or bad. Conservative arguments from "the experience of the past" are largely irrelevant since the past is past and since the economic present and future operate under very different conditions. Certainly there is still unemployment and poverty, but no man can say whether these evils would have been greater or less without Roosevelt's plans. Certainly houses, roads, dams, and recreational centers have been built, but no man can say whether or not some of them are not mixed blessings. Certainly in the legal sense at least there is more social security, but again no man can say whether or not this kind of security is the most desirable. If frustrations and gratifications could be measured, the guess—and it is simply a reckless, biased guess—might be made that the benefits for the population as a whole of these scattered economic plans outweigh their obvious defects.

The most repetitive charge that has been heard against the New Deal is that it has been "leading the country into communism"—or "into fascism." Both communism and fascism are simply name-calling devices in this connection which serve to discredit what is being accomplished. Lurking within these political systems are economic *master* plans that must be considered on their merits. To brand the New Deal fascist or communistic, more than its economic activity has to be taken into account. The wider implications of master economic planning, therefore, must now be considered.

### *Fascist Economic Plans*

From an economic point of view, the essence of both fascism and communism has been that they are planned economies. The probable needs of the entire population and the consequent amount of production have been planned in advance and thereafter consumption has had to conform to

these plans. A master economic plan, in short, has replaced the price mechanism of a competitive, relatively unplanned economy. Under fascism and communism, goods and services have been sold at stated prices, but these prices have been fixed by the planning commission and have not been established through the complex interaction of supply and demand. In this and in almost no other respect communism and fascism may be lumped together; otherwise their stated goals and their attitude toward private property have differed markedly.

Even before the war of 1939 the individual plans of men in Italy and Germany tended to be almost completely disregarded in favor of the requirements of the master economic plan. Neither peasants nor workers were consulted concerning their future demands; they were compelled to belong to their respective organizations whose expressed purpose was to force them to cooperate with their employers and to conform to the requirements of the national plan. Propaganda then accompanied prices; in Germany, for example, the price of fats had risen to discourage their consumption and simultaneously people were urged to use as few fats as possible. The goal of the first Four-Year Plan in Germany had been to reduce unemployment and this was accomplished by increasing the size of the official bureaucracy and by giving employment in the state-supervised industries that usually manufacture direct or indirect implements of war; as a result taxes remained as high if not higher than in the old Weimar days and the number of so-called "voluntary" contributions to various Nazi enterprises increased at least a hundredfold. It had been planned, therefore, to increase employment by decreasing the consumption of the general population. And the goal of the second Four-Year Plan was to have been the raising of wages and the achievement of a more accessible supply of raw materials. During the first years of this Plan, wages had not been raised, but attempts were made to secure more raw materials by making them synthetically, by concluding trade agreements with countries that possessed them, by seizing Austria and

Czechoslovakia, by the economic invasion of countries "to the East," and by clamoring for the return of the lost colonies.

✓ Behind both of these German plans and behind most of the maneuvers of peace-time fascism were two intertwined motives: to attain economic autarchy or self-sufficiency and to keep people sufficiently gratified so that they would be willing to support the régime or at least not rebel against it. The economic frustrations that had to be endured, the loss of civil liberties and most forms of mobility, and all of the other hardships of fascism were supposed to be tolerated for political and social reasons. To plan a fascist economy people had to be made to believe that their welfare depended completely upon the power of the state and that the satisfactions they obtained from watching and contributing to the growth of that power compensated for the sacrifices they were compelled to make. The economic benefits in terms of actual consumption were minimized or postponed for the future. The aggression that followed these economic frustrations, furthermore, was directed not against the plans and their formulators, in one sense the real "cause" of the frustration, but against hostile nations and also alleged internal enemies like communists, democrats, and Jews. A bold foreign policy, the plundering of helpless countries, and the persecution of the Jews enabled Germans, it was hoped by the régime, to obtain substitute gratifications. To what extent and for how long this displacement of aggression could have continued to occur depended on the actual economic frustrations experienced by the German population and on the progress that was made through propaganda in reshaping German personalities to fit the requirements of fascism. War came and offered a tangible target for displaced aggression.

It can be said, consequently, that the master economic plans of fascism before the war required the control of the individual plans of men and a rather thorough direction of their social and political plans. In contrast to capitalism, fascism did not allow the individual plans of employees to function without interference and it also curbed the plans

of employers whenever an industry's progress could be linked to the general efficiency of the state—and, through one guise or another, any industry could be regimented or seized in the name of that state. But like capitalism, the profit motive was retained for the employer: by following his self-interest it was hoped that he would assist the national plan. When this nice correspondence of plans did not occur, the government cracked down on the employer and forced him to fall in line.

From all available evidence it would appear that the type of master economic planning fostered by fascism is a rather undesirable plan for America to follow—which is truly a very mild, gentle statement.

#### *Soviet Economic Plans*

Russia's transition state, which is a more polite description for "the dictatorship of the proletariat," was anticipated, as Lenin pointed out,<sup>18</sup> by the founders of modern "scientific socialism," Marx and Engels. Very consciously and very wisely these two thinkers refused to foreshadow other details of the communist society. The ultimate goal of all communists has always been the classless state, but the details of economic planning have grown out of empirical necessity.<sup>19</sup> The Bolsheviki have realized that they rule a rural country which has to be managed according to socialist principles, which has to be industrialized if it is to survive in a hostile world, and which has to plan its processes of production. Toward these ends a master planned economy has been instituted to anticipate and create people's wants and produce accordingly.

The economic plans of Soviet Russia have had to be formulated on the basis of the existing economy. Lenin's retreat to the New Economic Policy, for example, was a realistic recognition that, as a result of older skills, drives, attitudes, and knowledge, Russians could be made to produce

<sup>18</sup> Lenin (87), chap. v.

<sup>19</sup> Webbs (155), vol. II, pp. 603-607.

more efficiently by retaining for a while some of the competitive aspects of capitalism.<sup>20</sup> In like manner even now separate "brigades" or whole factories compete with one another; but the profits or "surplus products" as they are called are distributed in small measure to the workers, may be employed to expand the particular industry producing them, may be allocated to another industry that needs them, may be given to the state, or may be used to promote recreational and cultural opportunities for everyone.<sup>21</sup> Similarly the socialist ideal of "from each according to his faculties and to each according to his needs" has had to be sacrificed for the time being in favor of a system which fixes wages in accordance with what is considered the "social value" of the work performed.<sup>22</sup>

In planning production this discrepancy between ideals and the necessities demanded by the transition state is also discernible. According to socialist principles, production should be planned to conform to the expressed desires of consumers. To the extent that democratic control of industry and agriculture exists, to that extent workers are consulted concerning the materials they will require and, in some cases, the commodities and services they will be able to "sell." Under capitalism such decisions are made exclusively by the employer and his plans, as has been shown, are based on the calculation of the profits he desires and the probability he has of attaining them. The Soviet system is not, however, completely a producers' planned economy for at least two reasons. In the first place, since all producers are consumers and since in Russia producers participate in planning decisions, workers are motivated to consider themselves not only as producers but also as consumers when they vote in favor of or against a particular production schedule. Then, secondly, Russia possesses a wide variety of consumers' organizations whose preferences are also taken into account in the formulation of a national

<sup>20</sup> Webbs (155), vol. II, pp. 545-550.

<sup>21</sup> Ward (154), pp. 10-11, 54-66, 112-170.

<sup>22</sup> Webbs (155), vol. II, pp. 697-715.

or regional plan. "Theoretically" at least this system should be an ideal method of determining consumer preferences and hence of constructing plans, for on the basis of their drives and attitudes individuals decide upon the commodities and services that will bring them future gratification; and the combination of all the individual preferences constitutes data for the economic plan.

In practice, however, this ideal method encounters a number of difficulties. First of all, there is the perpetual conflict among present, future, and possible values: which of many values should be the desirable one? Assume that a majority of the local producers' soviets has decided that the production of vodka should be tripled; certainly the "needs" that socialism is seeking to satisfy would thus be almost unequivocally expressed. But the State Planning Commission knows, it thinks, that too much vodka is "bad," bad in the individual sense that it is detrimental to the health and efficiency of the organism and bad in the social sense that it diverts productive activity from industries that are essential to the welfare of the Soviet Union. The Commission, then, to remain consistent with socialist principles, has to maintain that the wrong kind of human nature, the kind that it has inherited from czarist days, has come to a bad decision concerning vodka and that it, being all wise and all powerful, must make the correction by rejecting the plan.

It is also possible that Russians may not be able to plan their existence in advance and that therefore their estimates will be incorrect. The danger is perhaps less in Russia than in America, for in that country the consumer is beset by relatively little propaganda that aims to change or corrupt his tastes and hence those tastes are likely to remain more stable. But the possibility remains that an unplanned child, for example, can disrupt the family plan and the accumulation of similarly unanticipated, though petty events on a national scale can cause a severe change in consumer demands and needs.

Individual suggestions, moreover, stem from individual personalities and suffer the limitations of those personalities.



With all the personal and cultural barriers that face the individual it cannot be expected that his knowledge concerning himself and his society will not suffer from ego- and ethnocentrism; usually only the details of his own existence are at all intelligible to him. From the point of view of the entire national economy, both the individual plans of Russians and also their proposals are bound to be short-sighted. Millions of scattered ideas do not necessarily lead to insight or the best possible value. The State Planning Commission, consequently, has to be more than a clerical bureau which assembles the plans of the comrades and from the assembly derives a master plan. It must impose its value and use the plans that are submitted only as important data in a technical and administrative sense.

The rulers of Russia feel that they have a right to inject their social values into the plans of the country because of what they call their "historical position." Their whole ideological structure informs them that they are "the vanguard of the proletariat," that they are the modern prophets of Marxism and socialism, and that through them and them alone the Russian people can find salvation. It is almost as though a small group of leaders were given the privilege of deciding the destiny of many millions through their own introspections. The goodness or badness of Russian policies is not being discussed at this moment, only the method that is employed.

Economically these rulers wish to industrialize Russia and to fortify it against external aggression—and in the fall of 1939 it was apparently decided that the best fortification against external aggression was for Russia herself to become imperialistic. The first Five-Year Plan was devoted to increasing the supply of capital goods in order to hasten industrialization. And the second, in addition, was dedicated to the purpose of increasing the supply of consumer goods, so that Russians could secure some degree of gratification from their tremendous efforts. These plans, together with a more recent third, have sought to make people more satisfied—whether or not the symptom of rebellion revealed in the

mass political trials and the diplomatic victories of 1939 enable one to say, as one must say of fascist schemes, that reforms are instituted to prevent the ruling clique from losing power is a debatable but very significant question. At any rate Russian propaganda tends to stress the democratic nature of all the economic plans, in spite of the fact that the rôle of the Planning Commission remains considerable.

Unfortunately, it is difficult to evaluate this system of economic planning. Its efficiency cannot be judged on American standards since the skill of Russian workmen has been inferior and since it takes decades to train a population in the ways of industrialism. That there have been graft and corruption cannot be doubted, but whether such practices are more or less expensive than the salaries paid the heads of large corporations in the United States is another problem. The degree of satisfaction that the Russian worker obtains from participating, to whatever degree he does, in the formulation of economic plans must be compared with the frustration he endures when these plans do not succeed and when he is forced to pay high prices for commodities that he cannot always readily secure.

Perhaps this kind of planning is or can be satisfactory in Russia since the Soviets have had to start with such a low standard of living; but if this standard is raised and if people consequently have more and more needs that will "demand" gratification, it may be more difficult and more frustrating to have a planned economy. For "the higher the standard of living, the greater the probability that the choices of different individuals as to the most desirable lines of consumption will not coincide, and the greater, therefore, the chance that a decision which is authoritatively made will in any particular instance be other than that which the individual concerned would have made for himself."<sup>23</sup> Economic data never automatically make themselves known, as the experience of economists has revealed;<sup>24</sup> it is for this reason that the Planning Commission will have to continue

<sup>23</sup> Wooton (164), p. 63.

<sup>24</sup> Above, pp. 97-99.

to improve the techniques by means of which demand can be ascertained and it is for this reason, too, that no set of techniques will ever be perfect. The question which must interest both economists and laymen, consequently, is whether the errors in prejudgment are greater under a price system than under a neocommunist which attempts to gather its information more or less systematically.

The master economic plans of Russia, like those of fascism, have not been merely superimposed upon the old society that formerly existed. To be effective, they have had to be accompanied by political and social plans that deliberately curb the individual plans of men. The consequences of a master economic plan apparently are usually far-reaching, since the economic activity of man is such an important determinant of his total behavior and since a significant change in one respect within a society tends to affect the entire social structure.<sup>25</sup> The accompanying results of a master economic plan, consequently, have to be judged in reference to the social values they attempt to achieve. It appears good, for example, that unemployment does not exist in Russia, that workers are given vacations with pay, that there are adequate forms of social security, and that public health and social psychiatry have made such rapid progress; just as it seems bad that individuals must obey the edicts of a national plan after that plan's requirements have been formulated, that the country has to be so thoroughly policed, and that civil liberties in general are so closely curtailed. Such a tentative evaluation cannot overlook the fact that part of the esprit which motivates Russians is the feeling that their communism is a pioneer experiment which eventually will rescue the rest of the world; that any work, no matter how menial, contributes to the national economy and hence to the welfare of the country and its defense against a hostile country; and that Russia is also beset by enemies of the state within and outside its borders. Through propaganda and especially through the interpre-

<sup>25</sup> Above, pp. 43, 46, 90-94.

tation of national and international events, a strong in-group has been built up, and it may very well be that membership in this group drives the Russian people to the heroic achievements which they attempt to plan in advance.

Economic planning, then, presents a paradoxical problem. Without a master economic plan a democracy is unable to satisfy the individual plans of its inhabitants and is compelled to frustrate many of them in respect to their economic activities. With an economic master plan fascism and communism have been able to plan rather systematically, have been able within limits to fulfill the requirements of their plans, but have been operating in a world situation that requires internal coöperation at the expense of sacrificing many of the individual plans of their citizens for economic ends. Phrased in this way the problem seems to be one of selecting the lesser of two evils; and there are no definite or satisfactory criteria by means of which either evil can be judged. Perhaps the judgment will be made more easily as the advance of time provides more evidence. Has the national economy of fascism depended upon the fanaticism created by preparations for war? Yes, it would seem. To what extent can fascist countries be successful in their attempt to achieve self-sufficiency? They cannot be very successful, it seems. Will the transition state of Soviet Russia ever "wither away" and, if it does, will that country's economic plans function successfully without the fear of attack, without the profit motive, without a powerful drive toward personal advancement in the monetary sense? The soviet state shows few signs of withering, it seems. Even with a definite answer to such questions, the outlook for a "scientific" decision still does not appear particularly happy. For the experiences of Germany, Italy, and Russia have been of course the experiences of Germany, Italy, and Russia; the extent to which they can be transferred to America which is a land with different traditions and with people possessing a different culture is quite questionable both anthropologically and sociologically.

By and large the chief problem of economic planning is the attempt to determine the demand of large bodies of consumers. As a result of amazing technological advances, American producers or planners have comparatively little difficulty in manipulating the physical environment: there is abundant knowledge which enables them to exploit natural resources and to control efficient machinery. And increased production or profits is the accepted goal of the economic system. It is the human factor of demand that cannot be ascertained with comfortable accuracy.

Economic planning can occur successfully in the self-sufficient household since the demands of the occupants are reliable guides to production. Under the price system of industrial capitalism, no producer can ever be certain how many of his products will be purchased and consumers themselves frequently change their preferences as a result of the numerous pressures that are exerted upon them. Since the economic activity of one individual affects and is affected by what many of his contemporaries are doing, it is difficult to interfere with the functioning of the price system without causing subtle or severe repercussions in the entire market.

Production in a technical civilization, therefore, requires foresight and planning. Since the plans of individuals do not always bring them adequate gratification, other economic plans have had to be formulated to supplement the price system. Employers, employees, and consumers have formed their specialized groups in order to further their own ends. These plans tend to be more successful than the separate, individual efforts of those who benefit from organizing: through coöperation portions of the market are made to conform to the planned objectives. Potentially, monopolies and cartels are able to achieve a high degree of efficiency by forcing their plans upon people in general, but legal regulations prevent them from destroying the advantages and from eliminating the wastes of competition.

So many individuals remain frustrated on an economic plane that the agencies of government are required to be

more active in regulating and controlling economic activity. Here again it is clear that government officials become planners when individual plans fail—this principle has been observed to be operating in respect to both social and economic planning. The New Deal in the United States, for example, has accelerated trends that already existed but at the same time it has sought to regulate prices more vigorously and to control or own many enterprises outright. The fact that these measures have met with strong approval and disapproval demonstrates that they have solved some economic and social problems while creating others. Whether or not the New Deal will lead to master planning which seeks complete control over economic activity is difficult to say, but it is certain that the reforms of the Roosevelt government will have a lasting effect upon the pattern of American life.

Master economic planning has replaced the price system in fascist countries and in Soviet Russia. Due to noneconomic measures which have managed to arouse the ostensible enthusiasm of people, the problem of determining consumer demand does not loom so large. Noteworthy is the fact that the principal value which motivates the price system, the pursuit of profit, has been replaced under master planning by the values of national self-sufficiency, national unity, national productivity, or victory in war. Master planning, therefore, tends to disregard the human element and to concentrate upon the control of physical environment in order to attain a goal that has been rather arbitrarily postulated by the ruling group. Or perhaps the goal does represent the will of the people—perhaps.

A master economic plan seems to be successful only by controlling most aspects of social living; it tends to smother all other forms of planning, including the preferences of the individual. Even the most tolerant, kindly planning commission cannot reflect all of the anticipated needs of the population; it must introduce some modification that is occasioned either by technical considerations or by a private, noneconomic value of its own. Nor is it at all clear whether

master economic plans can function in any but a strong in-group that is motivated to cooperate by propaganda and threats of war.

Since the plans of men should be designed for men and since master planning seems compelled to disregard men, master planning should be avoided. But, since economic planning under a price system does not enable many people to achieve their objectives, certain reforms within that system should be provided. There has to be some optimum point at which social planning for social or economic goals ceases and leaves the rest to individual plans. For otherwise men will live in economic chaos or slavery. Chaos by itself is frustrating; when men become slaves, they need have little sense of responsibility and hence probably never reach the heights of gratification to which free men have access.

The peace-time trend in America, as has been suggested, is in the direction of supplementing the individual plans of men with more genial economic plans but certainly with no master plan. The choice between a relatively unplanned, "free" economy and a planned, compelling one is still to be made. Whether the present method which consists of a series of compromises between the two extremes is desirable or whether it can continue in view of the frustrations that Americans still endure and in view of the competing foreign schemes that seek to export themselves from Europe is a matter of concern to everyone. Without a genuine solution to this problem, moreover, there is always the danger that a small group of self-appointed élite will work out everybody's solution for the exclusive benefit of itself.

## CHAPTER XI

### POLITICAL PLANNING

**P**LANNING requires planners and it is government or any agency of government that usually does much of the social planning. At the beginning of democracy in America, when the individual plans of men were almost sufficient to enable them to lead a more or less satisfactory existence, political planning was relatively unimportant. Now the situation has changed and, as more and more plans through sheer necessity become social plans and as the dangers of war become frightfully apparent, the rôle of government has grown increasingly significant. There is still something of the ogre, it is believed, in governmental interference and in political planning. Americans tend to shudder when they think of the power which a fascist or communist bureaucracy possesses. Nor is it easy to deny this tendency for political plans to become master plans.

#### *War*

An insight into political planning can be secured by beginning not with an examination of a relatively simple phenomenon, as has been the procedure in previous chapters, but with an analysis of war, one of the most complicated problems with which human beings must deal. For it is during a war that the government of a country functions most efficiently as a planning agency. Before master planning to wage a war can be understood, however, it is first necessary to examine the reasons for the existence of war itself.

Those men from Mars would be shocked were they to examine the wars on this planet. The present value attributed to war, as that value is usually expressed, would force them to the conclusion that the men and the nations which fight really hate fighting.<sup>1</sup> They would hear people every-

<sup>1</sup> Engelbrecht (43).



where condemning and exposing war in the strongest possible fashion. They would discover that even the most belligerent statesmen seldom seek to justify war in terms of the heroic qualities it engenders—this is indeed an old-fashioned appraisal and only a few idiots or dictators<sup>2</sup> nowadays still subscribe to it—but that they blame their actual or potential participation on necessity or some other group of people. The benefits to be derived from war are never ascribed to war itself but to its alleged consequences—or else its momentary alternative is deplored. Perhaps a small group of mercenaries would brazenly admit its self-interest in war; yet the military cliques of various countries solemnly and, in some instances, sincerely maintain that their desire is peace, not war.

Evidently, then, since wars exist and since by and large they have always existed, it must be said that people's actions belie their peace-time words and deeds. A psychological explanation of why men are willing to fight, therefore, must be briefly presented. It is recalled, as has been explained previously, that the process of socialization is frustrating and that one of the inevitable consequences of frustration is aggression. This aggression, moreover, is frequently displaced and therefore need not be directed against the agent that apparently has produced it in the first place. The aggression may assume various overt or non-overt forms. Whether or not it is overt or non-overt depends not only on the strength of the frustration but also on other factors within the personality such as the individual's attitudes toward the rules of his society. The very complex form of overt aggression that is either a social conflict or war, consequently, is the end-result of a long series of more or less socially determined events.

Before frustration can lead to war, people must be made to believe that they can express their aggression in this way and only in this way. A real danger of group life, it has been suggested, is the fact that in-group loyalty can be secured so efficiently by ascribing many frustrations to

<sup>2</sup> Mussolini (112), pp. 803-804.

a hostile out-group. Thus modern dictators have blamed the vicissitudes their peoples must endure on certain specific enemies and have been able in this way to divert a good deal of possible aggression away from themselves. America has no one traditional enemy and consequently America is not a strongly unified land.

During a war people are given social permission to express their aggressive impulses against an out-group and, especially in a so-called civilized country where the frustrations are so numerous, they have a strong initial tendency to coöperate. The grim excitement and thrills of war, before the filthy trenches are reached and before the aerial bombardments begin, are due not only to the fact that soldiers and civilians may occupy positions which carry an enormous amount of prestige, but also to these impulses which ordinarily are repressed in civilian life and which can be given expression on the battlefield or in fantasy or conversation. In-group loyalty is strongest in war time: almost all of the potential and actual aggression can be drained away from members of the in-group on to the out-group.

War, then, is attractive: it offers means of achieving goals which are not always attained during normal, social life. War, furthermore, is especially attractive to certain specialized groups. There are the war profiteers who certainly are not opposed to the increased demand for commodities and basic materials that war creates. Some military leaders, furthermore, probably are not adverse to exercising their talents in real rather than in make-believe situations. Any society, furthermore, contains sadists who gloat when others are injured and masochists who like to feel the injury themselves. The rôle these groups play in producing war can never be accurately ascertained; but it is not a minor one.

Ordinary men and women, in spite of the fact that war is gratifying in some ways, are convinced that it is extremely frustrating in a great many other, more important ways. Since security is usually preferred to reckless release of aggression or to temporary bouquets of glory, it is necessary to resolve the internal conflict which most people feel by

means of propaganda. It is the function of war propaganda to play upon people's preëxisting attitudes in such a way that the enemy is made to appear the greatest of all possible frustraters. The war is phrased as follows: unless the individual's in-group wins, thereafter he will be killed or his family will be killed or whatever has given him gratification in the past will be destroyed. The content of this propaganda is extremely varied; for, as a result of individual differences, an appeal that may be effective for one person will not necessarily stir another, or the same individual will require new promises at different times. Strict censorship is maintained lest people be convinced by some friend or enemy that the struggle will not really remove future frustrations. The necessity for participating, moreover, is also stressed by frequent references to divine sanction. And at the same time the dreadful frustrations that the enemy is about to inflict are pictured as frustrations which *can* be avoided only by fighting. Thus victory cannot be thought of as inevitable, lest some people convince themselves that their coöperation is not imperative; an occasional defeat must be made known to bolster morale. The general morale, however, may be weakened if too many defeats are publicized; therefore the propagandists in power attempt to seek some kind of happy balance between the appearance of an easy victory and a certain defeat.

People will not fight, consequently, until it is made clear to them by propaganda that fighting is essential to present and future gratification. The economic, political, social, and personal events that lead to the war itself and that generate such propaganda do not in themselves explain why men are willing to fight after the events have occurred and the propaganda has begun; the problem of the "causes" of war, furthermore, are not germane to the present discussion. The significant point to be made here is that the government carries on war propaganda as part of a master political plan which includes not only this bending of public opinion but also certain social and economic plans of national scope.

During a war it is agreed that the individual plans of

men are inadequate to win the struggle. There must be coöperation on a national scale and the only agency that can plan this coöperation is government. Individual plans are ruthlessly curbed and people, being motivated as they are to achieve victory and being convinced by propaganda that subordination and obedience are essential, tolerate the ensuing frustrations for the sake of avoiding worse frustrations and securing future gratifications; they are reasonably satisfied, therefore, to be regimented by the master plan. The responsibility for the frustrations they then experience is placed upon the enemy.

Individual and social plans have to be postponed due to the emergency. Education and all the vehicles of communication are swamped with national propaganda and the question concerning the desirable social value is answered almost automatically by a reference to winning the war. The economic life of the country is dedicated, as Soule points out,<sup>3</sup> to the task of supporting the largest conceivable group of consumers who produce practically nothing, viz., the military forces. While the battles are being fought, few people are sufficiently courageous to protest the practices of government in the name of liberty or any of the other values which are defended more or less devotedly during peace time; civil rights practically disappear and the government regulates or controls both production and consumption. Democracy, in short, must give way to centralization and coördination.

The paradox of master planning during war might seem amusing to the men from Mars, but it is deeply tragic to those who live on this planet. Means are adapted efficiently to ends, social coöperation is willingly given, enthusiasm is eager, and plans are executed successfully—all this is accomplished for the purpose of achieving an unplanned chaos, the war itself and its consequences. War is bad and is considered bad in almost every scheme of values; and yet men seem always ready to begin another one.

The moral to be drawn from immoral war, then, would

<sup>3</sup> Soule (134), pp. 186-187 and chap. vii.

seem to be this: if a master political plan or any kind of a political plan is to subordinate other plans, it must offer an incentive which will motivate people to believe that their entire existence depends upon the success of that one plan. The activity associated with war itself cannot be condemned completely when it is remembered that truly noble and heroic actions frequently appear as men fight; the consequences of war alone are bad. Is it possible, though, to achieve the same degree of gratification, enthusiasm, and technical success when master planning occurs during peace as that which is attained in the midst of war? This is the question that must be answered, or else all master political planning is less than a dreary dream.

If either an affirmative or negative answer is required, the answer must be "no." A completely satisfactory "moral equivalent for war" and for the ways wars make men behave simply does not exist and cannot conceivably exist. In general, fighting nature, fighting for peace, or fighting a personal battle to please a god has not furnished the gratification, illusory though it may be, that fighting for a concrete social group has; and therefore these activities do not result in the formation of the strong in-group feeling which gives meaning to the necessary inanities of existence. A successful master plan, as all of fascism and some of communism demonstrate, only succeeds by draining off the aggression of the present and by promising alluring gratifications for a future that really never comes. Wars and most forms of intense, blind in-group loyalty, consequently, feed on greater wars and greater loyalties, and the end result has to be, it appears, belligerency and chaos.

Complete political unity, consequently, cannot be achieved without a master plan directed toward war. Sometimes, to be sure, there is an approximation of unanimity but this condition disappears the moment that the reasons for its existence do. In Russia and in fascist countries preparations for war have not been the only incentives that have induced people to cooperate; the feeling that communism and fascism are ideal social arrangements which have been executed with

the spirit of a pioneer, as has been noted, also has given meaning to what many people have done. But were the communists or the fascists to realize their ideal on a world-wide scale, this source of motivation would no longer exist. Even in democratic America the early days of the NRA produced a contagious enthusiasm that died as the administration could not successfully improve the economic system or that had to die since the opponents of the program were able to give voice to the aggression they gradually began to accumulate. When people interact with one another and when this interaction is not strictly regulated, master plans are disrupted.

But why should there be complete national unity? There is good reason to believe, in fact, that unity is not desirable. When people are restrained, when their hatreds are directed toward "foreigners," when internal conflicts are prevented by the threat of a potential conflict with this out-group, when all this is done in the name of unity, the personal preferences of individuals which invariably exist everywhere are bound to be trampled upon ruthlessly and, according to shaky historical evidence, the conflict itself actually will occur. War, therefore, is an inevitable consequence of unity and hence unity must be considered bad. It seems wise to express the suspicion of a person living in a democratic country that a frustrated people, whose aggression is displaced on to traditional enemies, are not altogether gratified, regardless of the goals they attain by participating in and cooperating with the kind of group that transcends their individual personalities.

Since master political planning requires the enthusiastic subordination of the population and since such subordination occurs only as a result of war or the threat of war, master planning is doomed to be too frustrating and hence never completely successful. This is, or at least should be, the fear that democratic peoples have when they contemplate the extension of governmental control into more and more spheres which affect them directly. Men and women wish to have their individual plans; they do not desire to conform

to a master plan with whose objectives they are not necessarily in accord. And yet people must live together; they must have some form of government and hence political planning cannot and should not be abolished. Political planning, however, need not be synonymous with master political planning.

### *Peace*

When plans for peace are discussed in this section, it must be clearly understood that it is a peace for America which is the objective. No man dares prescribe peace for European countries—even before the sentence is completed the balance of power there will have shifted. Since the United States is relatively isolated from Europe and since this country appears to be dependent on the rest of the world in very few economic respects,<sup>4</sup> there is some faint reason to believe that Americans need not participate in any European conflict. This nation, however, can remain aloof only by formulating certain plans for peace.

To the problem of planning for peace there is both a psychological and a political aspect. Psychologically, Americans must be made less ready to fight. The advantages of this objective are twofold. In the first place, people will not be so eager to go to war and hence the effect of public opinion upon the activity of statesmen—and that effect cannot be discounted in a democracy—will be in the direction of peace. And, secondly, the statesmen themselves, being after all people too, will be less prone to plunge the country into war.

If the explanation of war that has been given is correct, then it follows that the *tendency* to fight in organized warfare can be reduced but not entirely eliminated by decreasing the frustrations that people have to endure and by enabling them to release some of the aggression they do possess in other channels. Were all men to be certain of their jobs, then very few of them would wish to participate in a

<sup>4</sup> Chase (23), chap. vii.

war for personal, economic reasons. Were all men able to express their various drives in satisfactory forms of recreation, then very few of them would find the release of war so glamorous. Were all men gratified by their family life, then very few of them would attempt to escape by rushing on to a battlefield. All of the individual and social and economic plans that have already been mentioned are relevant to the problem of lessening frustrations: their success could mean that people would be gratified to a greater degree than they are now and that, therefore, they would not have to repress or displace so much aggression. All frustration, however, cannot be eliminated even with the best of plans. People must be socialized and they will always continue to be interdependent. The aggressive impulses they do have, consequently, will tend to disunite their society, it is true, but there is no social or psychological reason why more impulses cannot be released in the course of their daily living or even during leisure time. America and the rest of the world seem to be caught in a very vicious circle: men are made into fighters due to political conditions and then these political conditions are aggravated at least partially as a result of the fact that men have been made into fighters. It would be futile to allow such a circle to continue to whirl in America; therefore one of its components, this tendency to fight, must be planned out of existence so far as possible.

It does not seem very likely, however, that America will be kept out of war merely by attempting to reduce men's impulses to fight. Such a plan can be successful only over a long period of time. At the moment, as nations actually fight one another, it is more important to concentrate upon political means. For the existence of war in Europe signifies that many Americans are sorely tempted to have this country participate. Verbally they may claim that they are still opposed to war; but gradually, as events abroad and propaganda force them to identify more strongly with some of the participants, they will begin to view one side as the agent responsible for their present and certainly their future frus-



trations. The only psychological way in which war in Europe may strengthen America's chances for remaining neutral appears to rest upon the possibility of diminishing frustration among those Americans who secure jobs or additional profits as a result of the increased demand for American goods and services, *if* the war indeed does have this effect in the long run!

Legislation involving this country's relations with belligerent powers must be viewed as a plan to further peace. Unfortunately, no plan can be evolved which will guarantee isolation. For a guarantee would involve the knowledge that only one type of national behavior inevitably can keep the peace; and such knowledge does not exist. It simply has to be admitted that neither social science nor politicians can reason accurately from past war situations to the present one and that no man is able to foresee all the situations in the future which will affect this country's foreign policy in respect to the war.

In view of this uncertainty attending any plan to keep America at peace, it is well to realize again that every plan is fallible. This does not mean, however, that all political plans must be abandoned. For any plan or no plan is bound to help or hinder some foreign nation and will also influence the ways in which Americans view their own rôles in the European situation. A war anywhere, in short, affects the United States and the United States affects the progress of the war.

In conjunction with a political plan for peace, it is necessary to continue to educate people concerning the events and propaganda that shape their knowledge and attitudes. The belief here is that foreign nations recognize the importance of this country's resources and man power; that every effort is being made to influence American public opinion frequently in ways that will not be detected for many a decade; that only a skeptical attitude and the knowledge of the existence of these forces can make Americans less prone to succumb to the appeals. The strong tendency to grow hysterical during war time can be halted only by rea-

son and by reason is meant concrete analysis of events and propaganda.

Political planning must also seek longer range means to diminish the political temptation to fight. It remains true that this country is almost always ready to protect its foreign markets or its investments in foreign lands. Such international contacts in turn are largely due to overspecialization which requires that surplus products or capital be disposed of abroad. It is at this point that the need for a political plan to attain peace leads to a suggestion which bears on all the economic plans of the nation. When the so-called profit motive makes the flag follow American business to all corners of the earth and thus takes the country many steps in the direction of war, then this motive, almost regardless of other functions it serves and of the consequences upon the internal economy of the nation as a whole, should be curbed. Toward the end of the 'thirties it has seemed so patriotic to combat "unfair" trade practices of the Nazis in South America by spreading the propaganda of the United States to those rich and undeveloped countries; but such a policy may have been extremely dangerous, unless Nazi economic domination of that continent could be shown to threaten this one. Again one is left in the fog of ignorance, for who is there who can decide whether or not war is less certain for the United States in the short run by avoiding South American trade and then more certain in the long run by enabling the representatives of Hitler and Mussolini to secure a foothold on the American continent? More horrifying is the fact that a similar question might be asked concerning the direct participation of this nation in war.

Eventually the abolition of war requires the diminishing of the ties that keep people together in a nation. From the point of view of the gratifications which individual, social, and economic plans attempt to attain there is no inherent reason why any trace of nationalism at all should be retained. And yet the fact remains that nations exist, that they are powerful, and that they threaten one another; therefore some form of nationalism is bound to remain. The

problem for political planning is to determine the necessary minimum and to provide a more rational basis for whatever unity must exist.

### *Democracy and Dictatorship*

A government always functions through officials who are its actual executors, legislators, and judicial agents. These political leaders, moreover, have some relationship to the people whom they govern. In a democratic country they are, or are supposed to be, the people's representatives; and presumably they are formulating and executing only the people's desires. Under a dictatorship the people's wishes are expressed by assumption and presumption: the leader simply asserts that he is doing what the majority of the people, if they were honestly consulted, would want him to be doing.

The major political issue of the time is whether the wishes of the people and their plans shall be executed by a democratic or a dictatorial type of government. It is sacrilegious to the political scientist to classify all states in this way, because such a bifurcation does not do justice to the many variations that have occurred and do occur. But both sociologically and psychologically there seems to be a clear-cut distinction between a democracy and a dictatorship: in the former people's wishes and plans tend to give direction to the government, whereas in the latter the government tends to give direction to people's wishes and plans. At least this can be the glib phrasing of the differences.

Glibness, however, cannot obscure the fact that the difference between the two in practice is by no means absolute. In the previous chapter it was pointed out that an economic planning commission cannot simply reflect the wishes of the people for whom its plans are intended. Such a reflection is not desirable, nor is it possible. In like manner the elected representatives of a democracy cannot be expected to carry out the wishes and the plans of their constituents. Their constituents may be wrong. And they would have to be diplomatic geniuses to resolve and then integrate the con-

flicting interests of those who have elected them to office. The alleged guide to political conduct in a democracy, therefore, is the conviction that the majority is correct and that the minority can be disregarded until it is strong enough to become a majority. That this guide, being based solely on an arithmetical determination of present values, may not always be good is suggested by the fact that many plans of minority groups eventually have been shown to be correct or at least have been adopted in the long run.

A democracy, moreover, contains additional defects which in practice prevent ballots from ever being accurate reflections of people. Many of the political plans of America tend to be the individual plans of politicians and their parties. These plans usually have as their goals the personal satisfaction of the elected representative and his clique. The corruption of politics in America is a story that has been told so effectively many times that it need only be alluded to here. Ward heeler, lobbying, logrolling, pork barrel, muckraking, and political plums are all well-known terms which connote not only questionable practices, but also the arena of personal and social conflicts in which the political plans of America are laid. When the son of the self-efficient household performs an errand for his father, his own interest corresponds with that of his parent and therefore he usually can be relied upon to be efficient and honest; but the relation between millions of voters and their public officials is not so intimate in a psychological sense and therefore—and therefore, what? Is one entitled to conclude that democracy is based on a false analogy? Or that democracy has never really functioned because the necessary conditions for its smooth functioning have not been established?

Judges represent a special case of the democratic form of government. They presumably enforce laws but, as they admit, they also create laws through their interpretations of past precedents and due to the exigencies of the momentary situation. Like their colleagues in the civil service and in other branches of the government, they find that no mandate from the people can foresee all the intricacies that

confront them in the day-by-day activity of the courtroom. Similarly in an industrial society there is almost always some kind of emergency that cannot be submitted to the voters since it has to be acted upon quickly. Even the farmer's son must make decisions about cattle at the spur of the moment without consulting his elders when an unforeseeable emergency arises.

The ways in which democracy has actually functioned seem to dispel the theory that a democratic government is merely a reflection of the goals and plans of its citizens. Their present values can rarely be completely determined and can never guide practice at every single moment. The official's own preferences and his conception of the desirable value are bound to influence the course of government.

A dictator also has to conform somewhat to the present goals of the people he has chosen to rule. His plans must take their preferences and skills into account or else he cannot be successful. There is little evidence to substantiate his proud boast that he truly represents the welfare of the people, even when his plans do not *seem* to run counter to theirs. Nor is there convincing evidence to demonstrate the contrary, viz., that he is just narrowly selfish and is exploiting people who support him sincerely or halfheartedly.

This bias of a writer in a democratic country leads him to believe that democracy rather than dictatorship is the more satisfactory form of government and that therefore political plans should have as their goal the perpetuation and extension of democracy. Admittedly this view may be little more than pure rationalization and fantasy. But the fact that the bias is shared, verbally at least, by many others who also live in a democracy suggests the possibility that democracy may be more satisfactory for people who have the belief!

The chief argument that can be advanced in favor of a democracy is a negative one: it is extremely risky to entrust the fate of a people to one man or a small group and then make the assumption that the social sagacity of the latter is greater than the collective wisdom of the former.

Before an omniscient deity or before the verdict of future historians, such an assumption may be correct, but in the meantime it cannot be proven. It is tempting to say that a brilliant, well-educated statesman knows more about desirable values than does a stupid, illiterate drug addict, and thus by exaggeration to try to make the point. Since the lure of power is great and human fallibility is apt to be present even in the brilliant and well educated, it seems unwise to entrust everyone to a clique of self-appointed sages. Were someone or other through inspiration to discover the best means to the best ends, it certainly would be desirable to carry out the planned program as quickly as possible and to avoid the delays and inefficiencies that characterize a democracy. This discovery, however, has not been made and, due to the nature of interacting human beings, never can be made. It is simply too frustrating to convert people as they are into the models they allegedly should be without consulting them.

In contrast, democracy admits that there is no sure-fire way to absolute truth and that men are doomed to a process of trial and error to find the ways of living most satisfactory to them. Planning is an aid to democracy since it seeks to diminish the number of the errors and the trials, but such planning never suffers from the delusion that all errors and trials can be eliminated. The leaders of a democracy remain in power only for limited periods of time; their powers are curbed by a written or an unwritten constitution; and eventually they may be recalled or replaced by the electorate. There is a vast difference between a dictator who is politically secure as long as he can pay and satisfy his gang of bloodthirsty, power-hungry subordinates and a president who has to face his citizens every four years.

The democratic form of government at least gives people the impression that they are governing themselves through their representatives. Cynically it may be remarked that there is little difference between support secured through the delusion of the ballot in a democracy and support secured through the effective propaganda of a dictatorship,

inasmuch as a delusion is just as false and effective a psychological way to give people favorable attitudes toward their government as is propaganda. In the same vein it must be said that the political boss of a large American community—Jersey City, for instance—is probably no less insidious and selfish on a small scale than a higher official in a fascist or communist government. There is, however, a significant difference between democracy and dictatorship that tends to destroy their apparent similarity in the longer run, for in a democracy there is always the possibility that falsehood and corruption can be exposed. Democratic institutions are so numerous and so many of them are in conflict that the opposition, though more or less rigidly regulated by statutes, by the rules of the society, and by what have been called “disguised coercions,”<sup>5</sup> occasionally is able to voice its resentments and secure reforms. Thus in America the Socialist party has never been very successful in having its representatives elected to public office and yet many of its proposals, like social security and government regulation of business, have gradually crept into the platforms and then into the legislative activity of the two major parties. A democracy provides the mechanisms for an opposition, whereas a dictatorship is influenced by its opposition only as a last resort to retain power. For this reason a democratic government in spite of its blunderings and inefficiencies has perhaps a greater chance of survival, since it has evolved methods for enabling an opposition to express itself, whereas a dictatorial government that frustrates its opposition so completely is always faced with the possibility of being overthrown by that group. Pareto made the sharp observation that the more or less free “circulation of the élite” is necessary in any society,<sup>6</sup> but he may have been mistaken in presuming that the democracy which he so thoroughly hated hinders that circulation. There is of course no virtue in social stability as such, except that a period of transition (which usually generates some kind of a counterrevolutionary movement) tends

<sup>5</sup> Lorwin (92), p. 42.

<sup>6</sup> Pareto (122), esp. vol. IV, chap. xiii.

to be painful to those who must be resocialized by its directors.

*Regulation of Liberty*

This toleration of an opposition is part of the ideology of eighteenth-century liberalism that still pervades democratic thought and practice. Nowadays it generally has received a sneer from the fascist prophets since they certainly appreciate its wastes and its futility. To defend the toleration of an opposition may be another sign of the writer's social nearsightedness; but, if the premises that men live together in a society and that the value they should seek is the one that gives them a minimum of frustration and a maximum of gratification are accepted, then such a defense is almost an automatic consequence. Men, it must be said again, differ from one another for biological, for psychological, and for sociological reasons; and they differ in respect to the drives, the knowledge, the attitudes, and the skills that they possess, i.e., in respect to the organization of their personalities. These differences invariably lead to different modes of behavior, to social conflict, and to an opposition. To believe that any one political plan—or any kind of a social or economic plan for that matter—can satisfy a large population with differently organized personalities is utterly foolish in the face of what is known concerning human nature everywhere. Even if a plan is quite satisfactory to many people at a given moment, these people, especially in an industrial society, are bound to change and then demand a new plan. Since the desirable value of any plan, moreover, must be based at least partially on the present values which individuals hold, the frustrated must be consulted, lest they continue frustrated and thus defeat the purpose of the plan itself. To suppress all of one's opponents is dangerous, as has been suggested, since they may revolt; and it is bad from their momentary point of view due to the repressions it engenders within them. A democracy, therefore, is good since it is able to tolerate the opposition that must exist.



The burning question which confronts both the sincere and the insincere custodians of liberalism in a democracy is whether or not the opposition of fascist and communist groups should be tolerated. For it is assumed that, were these particular groups to gain control through the freedom accorded them by the democracy of which they disapprove, they would be completely intolerant of all future opposition. On the positive side they would establish master political plans that would allocate the cream and the liberty to themselves almost exclusively. Such an assumption is undoubtedly correct in the case of the fascists, but it may be only half-true when applied to the communists. For the latter, according to their philosophy in general and a tiny part of their actual practice in Soviet Russia, wish to be intolerant only during the transition stage and later they seek to re-instate the liberties of a democratic régime; and there is some reason to believe that even the present government of Russia is more tolerant of opposition, if that opposition occurs within the prescribed rules, than is Italy, Germany, or any fascist state.

The suggestion may be hazarded that neither the professional patriots nor the dogmatic believers in complete freedom are correct in their attitude toward political policy and that desirable practice must be guided by some principle in between the two and closer to the latter. Certainly fascist and communist opposition cannot be squelched. Government can and should plan to ban uniforms and camps and rifles but it cannot automatically affect private attitudes and drives. There are sound grounds for believing that the activity of an opposition is reinforced by repression and that an opponent is not driven out of existence by being denied the rights of free speech or assembly. When government begins to repress some groups, moreover, a dangerous precedent has been established: other groups whose objective may be quite different but not socially acceptable may also be curbed. Society, being unsure of the means through which it may achieve its values and in many cases of the values themselves, dares not take the risk of wiping out of exist-

ence all those who propose different means or different values. *Maybe*, one is forced to say reluctantly, the fascists or the communists are right—this seems doubtful now, but he who passes judgment cannot free himself from the biases of his time. It is much more certain that other unpopular groups may possess some of the truths of the future.

At the same time it would be foolish to allow an opposition with an intolerant and intolerable goal to enjoy the fruits of liberty and thereby seduce large numbers of people into accepting a fascist or communist program which, according to the point of view here presented, is just bad in almost every respect. A strong counteroffensive, therefore, must be continued which will expose the false values advocated by these groups and which contains a feasible program for a more gratifying and less frustrating future. In the meantime, however, until people are awakened to the perils of the opposition to democracy, i.e., until they possess the knowledge and the insight that will render innocuous the propaganda of the intolerant, a political plan which involves some curbing by the government is necessary. Perhaps the present liberal, juristic position is the solution that is less perilous to other opposition groups: let the philosophers of intolerance express themselves but prevent them from organizing armies whose aim is to overthrow democracy by intimidation and violence. Allowing them to indulge in written and oral expression will enable some of their aggression to be released and will diminish, consequently, their new frustrations resulting from the growing counteroffensive in behalf of democracy; and prohibiting their armies will restrain them from seizing power before this counteroffensive is better organized. Whenever a Mister Coughlin or an inflated Kuhn gesticulates, the same privilege through the same medium or perhaps even before the same audience should be accorded the defender of democracy.

It is realized that the analysis of political planning in this chapter has been confined only to the basic, general problems which such planning should attempt to solve.

There remain, therefore, very specific political plans for which provision must be made. How can people be educated and be further induced to take a more active part in the affairs of a democracy? How can the tendency for civil servants, including planners, to become bureaucratic in their ways be diminished? How can political bodies coordinate the separate activities of many planners? These and other political problems can be discussed more effectively, it is believed, in the next chapter on regional planning.

Here it has been shown that one of the most extensive forms of political planning occurs during a war. At that time planners are able to achieve the objective of unifying a people by tapping their aggressive impulses through propaganda. Apparently war is an institution adapted to human nature and therefore plans for war are able to satisfy the first requirement of planning very easily, in fact too easily.

War-time planning, moreover, conforms to the remaining requirements of planning more effectively than almost any other kind of plan. People are motivated to believe that they will be killed or injured unless they participate and hence they agree to submerge themselves and their individual plans for the benefit of the one master plan that will win the war. For this reason it is dangerous to surrender freedom to the plans of war: there is always the temptation to continue master plans after the armistice.

Although the appeal of war can be made to appear so strong, it is impossible for rational people to abandon plans for peace. There may be no adequate substitute for war and yet attempts must be made, first, to diminish the frustrations that lead to aggressive tendencies and, secondly, to prevent America from being entangled in the confused affairs of the rest of the world.

Democracy, in spite of the fact that it is a far from perfect instrument in terms of the gratifications it affords its citizens, at least consults them from time to time or makes them feel that they have been consulted; it is difficult to neglect the human factor in democratic planning. Without

a master plan, people in a democracy must incur inefficiencies in administration, must tolerate an opposition within certain limits, and must stumble about to find the best means to achieve whatever goals they seek. For therein intelligence is relatively free and, when this is so, conflicts over values that still can be considered relative occur and there is little agreement. If democracy is to be preserved, master planning must be curbed and yet, since so many social plans do have to be administered by public officials, there must be some political plans.

With a single quotation it seems possible to summarize a large part of the faith of democracy in planning. This quotation is especially significant because it comes from a publication of the National Resources Committee and therefore reflects a semiofficial point of view, because it reveals the characteristically democratic theory concerning the function of government and therefore represents democracy's final if temporary judgment in the realm of political science, and because it emphasizes the importance not of a cliché or an institution as such but of the people for whom institutions and plans should exist:

Of all our natural resources—natural and man-made—the most important, and the one in terms of which all the others have to be judged, is human life. The safety, welfare, and happiness of the men, women, and children who compose the American people constitute the only justification of government. They are the ends for which all our resources—land, water, minerals, plants, animals, technology, institutions, and laws—are merely instruments.<sup>†</sup>

Such a democratic declaration must be unintelligible to European dictators. Perhaps the only hope of the present world resides in the citizens of oppressed and war-torn countries who, as they think alone and dream, also reflect that they themselves and not the cruel forces which rule them now are and should be the end of social life.

<sup>†</sup> National Resources Committee (114), p. 1.

## CHAPTER XII

### REGIONAL PLANNING

**W**HEN the plans of individuals fail, it has been said, social planning begins. The scope of social planning, however, is quite varied: at one extreme there are housing and community plans which affect immediately only those whose homes and communities will be improved and at the other extreme are master economic or political plans which usually influence everyone in the entire country. Social plans that are formulated for and executed in a territory known as a region affect a larger number of people than do the former and a smaller number than do the latter. The advantages of this intermediate unit will be stressed, for it is felt that regional planning has the potentiality of excluding many of the undesirable features of small- and large-scale social planning and of retaining most of their desirable ones. This chapter, consequently, will be more hortatory than any which has preceded it.

The need for some type of regional planning is comparatively easy to demonstrate. In a country like America the process of interaction among people continues beyond the boundaries of the separate community. Just as one man is never completely independent of all his fellows and one dwelling is affected by other dwellings in the same community, so communities are bound together by ties that they cannot avoid. As a result of these ties certain intercommunity problems have arisen which the plans of individuals and the social plans of separate communities have been unable to solve. During the nineteenth century, for example, the metropolis became so overcrowded that people who wished to avoid living if not working there spilled themselves into sprawling suburbs. These newer communities have remained mere appendages to the large cities as a result of economic and social ties; in many instances they have had to be administered as part of a total unit or region.

*The Region*

The word *region* is achieving increasing popularity in America. As a concept it is playing a rôle in sciences as diverse as geography, economics, and political science. At the beginning of their monumental book on *American Regionalism*, the sociologists Odum and Moore quote in tabular form no less than forty-one definitions from twenty-eight different authors.<sup>1</sup> By no logical process can these separate ideas be congealed into one single statement so as to take advantage of the wisdom they contain or imply.

If the concept of region, however, is clearly recognized as an abstraction from the very beginning, then much of the confusion created by these various definitions tends to disappear. Obviously a region is a large area of land, but one area of land can be separated from adjoining areas only by the individual who thus makes the classification. In this sense alone an island is a "natural" region, inasmuch as it is separated from other areas by water—and yet even here before an island is identified as a separate region it must be abstracted from the mainland by someone for some specific purpose. Thus from a geographical point of view Manhattan Island is a region; but when its social and economic functions are considered, its detachment from the mainland of New Jersey and New York is quite irrelevant. Similarly whenever topographical factors are made to delineate a region, they must be employed somewhat arbitrarily to serve this function. Even when a range of mountains, a watershed, or a great plain is selected as the basis for the region, the fact remains that the choice is determined by the purpose which the area is supposed to serve.

The National Resources Committee points out that "two meanings have been commonly attached to the term region: One, that it is a device for affecting control; the other that it is an area possessed of certain attributes."<sup>2</sup> In its latter capacity the region is an important research tool; anthro-

<sup>1</sup> Odum and Moore (119), p. 2.

<sup>2</sup> National Resources Committee (116), p. 139.

pologists, for example, have employed the culture area as a device to classify and trace the historical development of culture traits.<sup>3</sup> And in its former meaning, the region is made into an administrative area; for convenience both governmental agencies and large businesses have classified the United States into areas which then enable these bodies to function efficiently. The same territory, therefore, can be divided into regions with totally different boundaries. In 1935 the various agencies of the Federal Government had evolved 108 regional schemes.<sup>4</sup>

When the range of man's theoretical interests and his practical problems is considered, it is evident that the number of regions can be extended almost indefinitely. The mere mention of words like plant ecology, postal zones, water supply, natural resources, state boundaries, rural areas, and the Southern literary movement is sufficient to call attention to the magnificent diversity of human activity which, potentially at least, is divisible into regions. The 693-page book of Odum and Moore and the numerous publications of the National Resources Committee also in themselves offer evidence of the magnitude and scope of the regional problem.

So far as planning and control are concerned, two types of large areas or regions must be distinguished: the technical region and the social region. By a technical region is meant one that is conceptualized in order to obtain a specific objective or set of objectives by means of planning. When seven Western states formed the Colorado River compact in order to settle their differences concerning the ways in which the waters of that great river might be utilized, they desired very specific technical advantages which none of them could attain alone without benefit of a regional plan.<sup>5</sup> The Federal Reserve Board has divided the country into twelve districts and has disregarded state lines in its search for "ease of communication and a high degree of homo-

<sup>3</sup> Odum and Moore (119), chap. xiii.

<sup>4</sup> National Resources Committee (116), p. 29.

<sup>5</sup> National Resources Committee (116), chap. vii.

geneity in its divisions.”<sup>6</sup> The various football associations of the United States have established their regions on the basis of geographical proximity and similarity in size of the member colleges and universities.<sup>7</sup> The boundaries of a region, therefore, are determined in order to solve problems beyond the scope of the individual community; the criteria which lead to their selection vary as a function of the objectives to be achieved.

The social region, on the one hand, is a large area in which people are aware of one another as interdependent, co-operating members and in which a degree of economic and social self-sufficiency can be obtained. According to this definition, a technical region very frequently is not a social region. The Colorado River compact established a technical region but was a social region only insofar as the inhabitants of the seven states appreciated the effect of the pact upon their common destiny and insofar as the utilization of the river has enabled them to achieve some autonomy from the rest of the country. The districts of the Federal Reserve Board are merely convenient to the Board itself and the banks it directly and indirectly affects; they serve only one narrow function of social living. The football associations manage to achieve regional consciousness only in the fall or when an intersectional game occurs.

Each of the separate forty-eight states is a social region in a very limited way. Men and women who live in Stamford and Hartford, for example, think of themselves as citizens of the state of Connecticut, but obviously the former have closer and more significant ties with New York City than they do with the latter city. The United States as a whole can be called a social region according to this conception and to a lesser extent so can the people who inhabit the North American continent.

Whether the technical region or the social region should be the unit for regional planning or social planning on a

<sup>6</sup> Odum and Moore (119), p. 197.

<sup>7</sup> Odum and Moore (119), pp. 233-235.



broad scale is a problem raised by planning and not by the definitions themselves. The moment it is contended that the unit for planning should be the social and not the technical region or at least that the technical region should be incorporated into the plan for the social region, the very general question of regionalism is being raised. Before the arguments in favor of regionalism, i.e., in favor of social planning on the basis of a social region, are advanced, it seems wise to consider in some detail a specific illustration of regional planning in America, the Tennessee Valley Authority.

#### *Tennessee Valley Authority*

The region in which the Tennessee Valley Authority is carrying out its gigantic project in regional planning is the watershed of the Tennessee River which begins in the state of Tennessee and wanders southward, westward, and northward until it empties into the Ohio River in Kentucky. The watershed itself includes a portion of the states of Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, and Kentucky. The Valley, therefore, is a "natural" region in that the Act of Congress which created the Authority in 1933 used a nature-given watershed rather than state boundary lines to delimit the area.

The primary objective of the Authority has been to develop the Tennessee River system. Floods are to be prevented, the river is to be made navigable, hydroelectric power is to be generated, agriculture and industry are to be assisted, and in general national defense is to be promoted. These aims are technical ones that are to be achieved in a "natural" region and hence the type of regional planning that is supposed to occur in the Valley is primarily technical and directed toward the end of changing the physical environment.

From the very outset, however, it is clear that this region has also been considered potentially as a social region. In the Act itself, this is carefully implied in two sections:

Section 22. . . the President is hereby authorized . . . to make such surveys of and general plans for said Tennessee basin and adjoining territory as may be useful to the Congress and to the several states . . . *all for the general purpose of fostering an orderly and proper physical, economic, and social development of said areas . . .*

Section 23. The President shall . . . recommend to Congress such legislation . . . for the especial purposes of bringing about in said Tennessee drainage basin and adjoining territory in conformity with said general purposes . . . (6) *the economic and social well-being of the people living in said river basin.*<sup>8</sup>

In order to have "an orderly and proper physical, economic, and social development" or to foster "the economic and social well-being of the people," planning must concern itself with almost every aspect of social living, and, perhaps as a necessary consequence, with the development of regional self-consciousness. Beginning with the statements in the Act and permeating its actual projects this same need for a social region rather than a technical one becomes more and more apparent as time passes. Director Lilienthal has stated that the Authority's "goal is simply this—to conserve the resources and to increase the wealth of the region, and thereby the wealth of the nation."<sup>9</sup> It is reasonably clear that he means "wealth" in a general sense that includes public health and recreation as well as sheer economic well-being.

Before TVA began to function, the region of the Tennessee Valley could scarcely be called a social one. As political beings the two and a half million inhabitants of the Valley and the four million in adjoining territories belonged, as has been said, to seven different states. These people, however, were homogeneous in a number of respects. Aside from Negroes, most of them were American-born whites of Anglo Saxon origin. They were predominantly farmers and, although the region contains rich mineral deposits, they had

<sup>8</sup> Italics added.

<sup>9</sup> Lilienthal (88), p. 2.

been living at an extremely low economic level. The heavy annual rainfall of at least fifty inches produced frequent floods which, together with unscientific agricultural methods and deforestation, brought about appalling soil erosion. Malnutrition, leading to pellagra and tuberculosis, and malaria were rife. On almost any standard ordinarily associated with civilization, like literacy and sanitation, these people were unbelievably deficient. Even their folk culture which has some of its antecedents in the British Isles steadily declined. The homogeneity of the Valley, then, seems to have consisted mostly of common frustrations. Only by means of a false literary analogy could the men and women in this Valley be considered a unified, cooperating whole; and no one could claim that theirs was a relatively self-sufficient region.

On the whole the Authority has had to confine most of its activity to the technical objectives stated in its legal mandate. Regardless of the wish of the directors and their associates to plan directly in accordance with the general phrases of Sections 22 and 23, it seems reasonable to conclude that the Authority has been handicapped by its dependence upon Congress for additional funds, by the criticism from Republicans and other anti-New Dealers, and by suits initiated by the local power companies. It is the technical objectives, therefore, that are being rapidly achieved.

The Authority in all of its official literature continually and quite correctly stresses the interdependency of flood control, navigation, hydroelectric power, assistance to agriculture and industry, and national defense. In much of its publicity, flood control is especially emphasized. For even hostile politicians can appreciate the terrific wastes caused by floods, and almost everyone is awed by the splendid dams which TVA has constructed or is constructing. A dam obviously gives the engineer an opportunity to display his power to plan. Technical information is collected concerning the river and its tributaries and then most efficient techniques are exploited to build reservoirs which store lakes of water at crucial times. A dam, although it is an engineer-

ing feat which can well make man proud of being human, is really such a simple plan. The desirable value, viz., to control floods, is given and the knowledge and materials are readily available. The Authority, moreover, has planned its series of dams with respect to one another, so that jointly they can be harnessed to perform the various tasks for which they have been designed.

When once the dams are completed, other problems are ready to be solved. By constructing locks and by storing water which can be used during the summer when the level of the river is low, the Authority eventually will make the river navigable at all seasons from its source at Knoxville to its mouth at Paducah. Water of course spills over dams and hence several power plants which can supply both this region and neighboring areas with electricity are now operating. Industry is thus promoted by the emergence of a navigable river and by having a source of power to draw from; and agriculture is assisted, for example, through the processing of phosphorous-bearing ores into fertilizing materials. This system of dams, finally, strengthens the nation as a whole since electricity can be utilized to produce materials like munitions required at the time of war; especially important in this connection is the plant at Muscle Shoals which was built during the last war to manufacture nitrates.

These technical advances which the Authority is achieving by means of its dams have certain far-reaching consequences which immediately require other types of social planning involving direct changes in people. The water which is stored by the high dams, for example, forms large reservoirs of lakes and it is necessary to remove families from these areas before they are flooded. By 1939 4,247 families had to be relocated as a result of the completion of the first three dams; and it has been estimated by the Authority that another 6,141 will have to move elsewhere before the waters begin to rise in the four additional dams under construction.<sup>10</sup> Some of these people have been loath to abandon their homes in spite of the generous compensation they re-

<sup>10</sup> Tennessee Valley Authority (146), pp. 20-26, 89.

ceive from the Authority, in spite of the tactful and just methods of land appraisal employed by the agents of the Authority, and in spite of the gentle pressure exerted by trained social workers and students from the neighboring universities. In a few cases property has actually been condemned. These individualists, to whom the thought of abandoning ancestral land, depleted though it is, appears as the worst of all endurable hardships, have to be sacrificed for the greater good that the Authority envisions. Here is another clear-cut illustration of the fact that a large social plan, being concerned with many interdependent people, has to demand real sacrifices from some of them; the problem seems to be to make these sacrifices as little frustrating as possible and to keep their number at an absolute minimum.

The waters of the new reservoirs and lakes, moreover, have flooded not only homes but also highways, railways, and other public utilities. Again there has been frustration for special groups. One of the divisions of the Authority has concerned itself with the problem of replacing submerged highways: it has attempted to ascertain, from a study of people's habits and wishes, whether new roads and bridges really have to be constructed. Many inhabitants of the Valley, furthermore, have objected to the 9,078 graves which have been or will be removed from the flooded areas. These frustrations have been alleviated as well as the Authority can alleviate them under the circumstances: it has been agreed to transport the graves and to rebury them at a designated place within a given radius; and at first professional undertakers were hired to train those who have had contact with the families in reference to this problem, since it was correctly presumed that this guild has the most experience in dealing with affairs of death.

The existence of the reservoirs and lakes in turn gives rise to other problems. The shorelines have offered an excellent place for malaria-bearing mosquitoes to breed. Since the value of health is involved, there has been no opposition to the Authority's technique of "fluctuating the level of its reservoirs before and during the mosquito breeding season

so as to strand flottage and kill shoreline vegetation" and of supplementing this by "shoreline spraying with oil and dusting of the shoreline with paris green dust from boats and airplanes."<sup>11</sup> Two recreational centers have already been established on the shores of Norris Lake and there is some talk of boosting Eastern Tennessee as one of the many "Switzerlands" of America; apparently the attempt is being made to build up a tourist trade, the value of which policy is certainly questionable.

For, even though dams almost inevitably require recreational plans, they do not necessarily demand the particular kind of recreation that is being stimulated. Similarly other by-products of dam building do not automatically assume the shape they have. What is happening in TVA, in truth, is that unwittingly or perhaps deliberately certain values are being fostered, whereas the dams themselves can scarcely be held accountable for the particular plans which the Authority is adopting.

To construct dams, workers must be employed. The engineers in charge simply want efficient man power: for the sake of the huge structures themselves it is not necessary to adopt the enlightened personnel policy which does characterize the procedure of the Authority. It has paid the prevailing rate of wages. It has recognized and has carried on negotiations with unions and other organizations representing its employees. It has set up schemes to train workers and technicians, so that its positions could be filled effectively; and, during the construction of the dam at Norris, workers were allowed to attend a special vocational school, so that knowledge of another trade would enable them to be absorbed more easily by private industry after the completion of the dam. Temporary villages have been built at the site of four of the dams and Norris, Tennessee, has become a permanent town to house members of the Authority's staff. Inside Norris the usual commercial enterprise has not been permitted to take root; instead the few stores that exist have been run on a consumer-coöperative basis. This community,

<sup>11</sup> Tennessee Valley Authority (146), p. 80.

furthermore, has been made self-conscious by social activities—like folk dancing—which take place at a central meetinghouse. A merit system of promotion has been installed for employees and, before a white-collar worker is discharged, he is given, in addition to a physical examination, an “exit interview” in which he may voice any injustice he feels has been inflicted upon him. The Authority, to be sure, is not just exercising a kind of blind altruism in being a fair employer: in the first place, it feels that its personnel policy promotes a general esprit de corps which heightens loyalty and hence efficiency; and, in the second place, it must strengthen its own rather precarious reputation through the tales which its employees spread concerning its benevolence. At the same time, there is little doubt that gradually another social value is being promoted: by demonstrating its ability to deal fairly with over 10,000 employees and by publicizing the technical economies it has been able to achieve—like the use of less expensive, but adequate second-hand equipment and the exploitation of materials that already exist within the area—it may be convincing many Americans that the Federal Government can be an efficient entrepreneur.

The technical objective of improving the soil is also not being achieved without assistance from a broad, social plan. Many inhabitants of the Valley still consider the old ways of living and farming the good and the gratifying ones, even when outsiders from the Authority point out to them that newer ones, when learned and adopted, will be still better and more satisfactory. Due to this resistance, the Authority has had to “educate” the people in almost every possible way, frequently in coöperation with the state colleges of the area and the Department of Agriculture. Experimental stations have been established; “test-demonstration farms” have been set up throughout the Valley and these have been conducted by farmers themselves under the supervision of official technicians; farmers’ associations have been assisted in the construction of terraces which “check the run-off of soil-bearing water from the land”; “the extension services furnish supervision, leadership, and technical

information through their farm and home agents and specialists."<sup>12</sup> Both the Authority and the Rural Electrification Administration have promoted the use of electricity and electrical appliances in rural areas; a "low-cost community refrigeratory," for example, has been developed which, after being installed in a community store or on a convenient farm, is supposed to reveal the economy of electrification in general, which raises the standards of living by preventing meats and other foods from decaying, and which teaches co-operative habits by inducing a group of families to assume joint responsibility for its upkeep. In these and other ways, then, the farmers of the Valley are being changed into "scientific" cultivators of the soil. People in the urban areas of the Valley, in addition, have been able to benefit from lower power rates.

The last social plan of the Authority that will be mentioned—and there are many others which, though of great significance, cannot be described here—is the one pertaining to the industrialization of the Valley. Even before all of the technical objectives are achieved, there is abundant evidence which indicates that industrialization is being encouraged. The language of the official literature foreshadows this value very explicitly: "The Tennessee, fully developed, becomes a link in the great commercial inland waterway system of the country"; "extensive studies are being made of navigation terminals to insure the proper location, design and operation of such structures"; "in addition to sales to co-operatives and municipalities, the largest factor in the improved price obtained for power during the fiscal year was the partial substitution of wholesale industrial and utility customers for sales to subsidiaries of the Commonwealth and Southern Corporation under a contract which expired February 3, 1937"; and "the increasing number of inquiries as to the industrial possibilities of the region has emphasized the need for adequate information concerning the Valley's resources."<sup>13</sup>

<sup>12</sup> Tennessee Valley Authority (146), pp. 38-49.

<sup>13</sup> Tennessee Valley Authority (146), pp. 14, 19, 74, 78.



What is happening, then, in the Tennessee Valley is that, as a result of the technical objectives, a variety of different social values are being promoted. Broader plans may be anticipated in the future, since the Authority has now acquired the power facilities it has desired and since the dams are rapidly being completed. The net results of this type of regional planning may be twofold: first, the issue of government control is being tested; and secondly, industrialism is beginning to permeate a rural culture. The personnel policy of the Authority, its methods of attaining its objectives, its legal battles with private companies, the petty bickerings of its directors, the cost-accounting system it employs, and its resolution to "give increasing attention to the improvement of the methods of administering so extensive and varied a public enterprise"<sup>14</sup> cannot be viewed as isolated issues: as social phenomena they are bound to have a lasting effect upon American public opinion in regard to other regional planning and other governmental activity.

Whether or not the swing toward industrialism is good or bad for the inhabitants of the Valley is a question that is seldom discussed by the officials of the Authority. The immediate engineering and human problems connected with the construction and direct consequences of building dams are much too pressing and time-consuming. It cannot be forgotten that the task of securing the data concerning physical and social conditions in the Valley has been exceedingly difficult. In contrast, it has been so much easier to accept the dominant value of American life, industrialism, as the guide to action.

Perhaps in an immediate sense TVA is correct in allowing dams to give rise to a new culture and a new society. It is no doubt sheer romanticism to praise the quaintness of a folk culture which has survived at such a low and precarious economic level; even though handicraft work is charming, the eroded soil which perhaps necessitates it can scarcely be considered attractive. And yet the cultural lags between the new industrial pattern and the older ways of life are

<sup>14</sup> Lilienthal (88), p. 19.

bound to be great. It is not easy to jump from a neoeighteenth-century form of feudalism into the complicated capitalism of the twentieth century. In any one personality it is possible that everything from a routine to an entire philosophy of living will be affected. A less weary back is not always adequate compensation for an anxious mind.

The Authority of course recognizes the problems resulting from the changes it is bringing into existence. The adult educational and public health programs mentioned above certainly serve to alleviate some of the pain and to make the process of acculturation proceed more rapidly. There is also some coöperation between the Authority and the local school systems, but this collaboration has to be cautious lest the former be accused of interfering with the practices of the latter.

The basic question as to the kind of region this Valley will eventually become, however, would not be solved even if an expert psychiatrist were assigned to every man, woman, and child who is involved in the vast social change. Without a plan that considers the area not only as a technical region but also as a social one, there is every reason to believe that the Valley will be converted into an industrial section that is little different from other sections throughout the country. Thus this culture complex has always diffused and, though Southern draws may continue, it is likely that more of them will be cursing machines instead of mules. The inhabitants may be more willing to accept advanced techniques, modern gadgets, and governmental supervision as a result of the scattered technical plans of the Authority, but such a proclivity toward what is uncritically called "progress" will not necessarily add to their fundamental or superficial gratifications.

### *Regionalism*

A social region as a unit for planning has been defined above as a large area in which people are aware of one another as interdependent, coöperating members and in which a degree of economic and social self-sufficiency can be ob-

tained. Before planning for such a region can be defended, the implications of this definition must be considered in some detail. Thus the United States do not automatically divide themselves into the social regions in which planning might take place and therefore it is important to indicate the bases for the selection of any social region.

Odum and Moore, it appears to the present writer, have offered a significant definition of a region, viz., "the *composite societal region* combining a relatively large degree of homogeneity measured by a relatively large number of indices available for a relatively large number of purposes or classifications."<sup>15</sup> The National Resources Committee refers to such an area as a "multifactor region."<sup>16</sup> The reasons for employing "a relatively large number of indices" are close at hand. From the point of view of administration it seems wise to select the region on the basis of many criteria rather than a single one, since thereafter plans can be executed in accordance with the technical information of which the indices themselves are a reflection. When a group of people, moreover, inhabits an area which has a certain degree of geographical unity, it is a little more likely that their social heritage will be also somewhat unified inasmuch as "natural" factors, as has been pointed out above,<sup>17</sup> tend to affect a heritage so markedly. A large number of indices, finally, will undoubtedly include unifying social factors which means that, even before planning begins, people will be more or less aware of their common heritage and their interdependency.

One of the most important "factors" determining the choice of a social region must be its potentiality for developing a certain degree of self-sufficiency. Self-sufficiency is being used in both an economic and a social sense. Economically the region should be capable of producing many of the commodities that are essential for survival and gratification in a complex society. And socially the inhabitants

<sup>15</sup> Odum and Moore (119), p. 30; italics theirs.

<sup>16</sup> National Resources Committee (116), p. 178.

<sup>17</sup> Above, pp. 90-94.

of the area should have access to a wide diversity of environments so that they will have an opportunity to develop varied drives and interests. That no region in America can be completely self-sufficient in either of these respects is freely admitted; for this reason broader economic and political plans of a national character always have to supplement purely regional plans.

The final problem in selecting a region concerns its optimum size. The area, it would appear, must be large enough to enable some self-sufficiency to be achieved and small enough so that an active sense of in-group loyalty can develop.<sup>18</sup> Such a statement is of course quite indefinite, but it is deliberately so. For the United States has not yet had enough experience with regional planning to enable anyone to say that the country should be divided into six or twelve or eighty regions. Nor can past situations be very helpful, since history itself gives little more than an obscure guide to the future. Only experience in the future, therefore, will help determine the optimum size and number of regions. In the meantime it seems desirable to keep their boundaries quite flexible so that regions can be reformed and restructured as new problems and difficulties arise. Inflexible boundaries, as the existence of rigorously drawn state lines in America demonstrate, always seem to retard progress. The composite or multifactor social region, moreover, can be broken down into subregions when smaller units appear more efficient.

Now that the social region has been roughly delineated in respect to its indices, its self-sufficiency, and its size, it is possible to suggest why planning in such an area appears to be desirable.

### *Social Advantages*

It is through a regional division of the country that cultural diversity can be retained and promoted. For each region has developed or can develop its own traditions not only in an artistic, literary, and intellectual sense but also

<sup>18</sup> Odum and Moore (119), p. 437.

in respect to ways of performing rather menial tasks. No man dares claim that his conception of the beautiful, his scientific theory, or his method of nailing a fence is the perfect one; if he does dare, in most instances he is a fool. People differ and their ways of meeting the problems of their environment, consequently, are destined to vary. In America the trend has been to assimilate immigrants, to "Americanize" them as quickly as possible. This process of acculturation apparently has been necessary, in order to secure the minimum of conformity that enables social living to attain some degree of unity and organization. And yet, as anthropologists and sociologists point out, the American culture has absorbed elements from all its groups, even from the people it has subjugated rather completely and ruthlessly, the Indians and the Negroes. Although an antiforeign attitude still exists among many Americans, more and more people are beginning to feel that complete conformity is both impossible and undesirable. The conviction is growing that American society is or can be sufficiently broad to encourage diversity that does not interfere with basic social adjustments. Spaghetti, bock beer, native folk songs, foreign-language films, the theory of relativity, technical advances, and the variety of other contributions from the old world seem to enrich almost everyone. Even the popular motion picture and radio show some signs of developing regional peculiarities in addition to their admittedly powerful tendency to standardize the country.<sup>19</sup> It is important, therefore, not to destroy both the picturesque and the opportunity to carry on adaptive experiments in the loose and strict connotation of that word; it seems essential to remove the regional inequalities in cultural matters that now exist<sup>20</sup> and to develop, on the basis of the present, nascent regions, areas with more or less distinctive patterns. Uniformity is not only monotonous; from the point of view of people's gratifications it is also dangerous and stultifying; and the toleration of diversity is one of the genuine achievements of a democracy.

<sup>19</sup> National Resources Committee (115), pp. 245-247.

<sup>20</sup> National Resources Committee (115), pp. 229-234.

Politically, too, there is imminent peril in uniformity for America and hence diversity becomes all the more imperative. It has been pointed out above that the symbolic ways in which men view their world, its structure, and themselves can be manipulated easily by means of propaganda. The evils of regimentation are due to the evils of uniformity and the resulting susceptibility to bad propaganda. The medicine man of a primitive tribe probably knows that to all appearances he can terrify or delight an entire tribe with a simple trick; and the propagandist in a country like America can imitate his success only when the attitude and drives of the population are as stereotyped as those which the tribesmen allegedly possess. Of course there must be some uniformity in the country: English must and should be spoken everywhere if only for the sake of easy communication; and all men who grow cotton have to have approximately the same body of knowledge concerning climate, fertilizers, and implements. But such essential uniformity is a far cry from the more or less complete identity in personality structure that people might develop. To have different drives and attitudes, people must live in different social and physical environments; they must produce and consume differently; and they must be the heirs of different heritages. A region, it appears, is a convenient unit through which this diversity can be achieved. And, if such diversity exists, it is a little less likely that any one demagogue will be able to sweep away the ultimate and immediate gratifications of the inhabitants through the intentionally or unintentionally false promises on which fascism thrives.

It is believed, furthermore, that a social region should be characterized by a high degree of in-group loyalty. Such a feeling is known to be strongest in reference to the intimate group, the home, the family, or the immediate neighborhood. It can be extended to the community since therein so many important life activities occur. Then the next step is its extension to the nation as a whole. In a country as large as America, however, it has been difficult to develop a loyalty that has much meaning to the individual; the exception to

this has been the war spirit that is generated by the alleged threat of an out-group. Few people can travel widely, few people have either the skill or the time to grasp the broad panorama in its entirety, and therefore it is tempting and easy to be enslaved by abstractions that assume the form of empty clichés and jingoistic slogans.

The region, consequently, is proposed as a group between the relatively narrow community and the broad nation. Hitherto American regionalism has assumed the form of what Odum and Moore call sectionalism: an intense devotion to the selfish interests of one's general place of residence which in many ways resembles the less desirable aspects of nationalism. The modern world, however, has developed such efficient means of communication and transportation that it would appear to be a little more difficult than formerly to retain an arrogant pride in one's particular section; for this reason the danger is no longer so great that the evils of the older sectionalism will develop out of the new region.

This danger, nevertheless, must be recognized. For while the region can satisfy the interest men and women seem to have in the past, it thereby may give rise to the fierce hatreds for an out-group which in-group loyalty so frequently promotes. It would be ridiculous to believe that the inhabitants of a perfect region can be free from the irrational symbols that inevitably accompany group life. The problem for planning is to design regions which engender the maximum of self-consciousness and the minimum of out-group aggression. The former seems desirable in order to make both the activities within the region and planning itself meaningful to people; whereas the latter seems undesirable because it gives rise to frustrating conflicts. To accomplish any "happy balance" such as this is no easy task: it means that love for the region has to be promoted at the same time that the frustrations which give rise to aggressive behavior are softened or eliminated. All of the plans of men, consequently, are relevant to this objective.

Social self-sufficiency, to a relative degree, can be justified in various ways. MacKaye has suggested that the "en-

vironments" of man can be classified into "primeval," "rural," and "urban," and that a well-grounded life for the majority of inhabitants requires that all three be accessible.<sup>21</sup> It is clear that, on the whole, the sophisticated city dweller prefers the urban environment, the farmer the rural, and the forester the primeval; but even the most narrow individual usually demands variation in his environmental setting from time to time. There is no way known to man to decide which environment is the best; all that can be said is that the three seem essential in varying amounts. MacKaye and most advanced regionalists maintain, therefore, that the region is the area in which some kind of balance of these environments can be secured. People in a social region may dwell, if they so desire, in cities, but they should also be able to withdraw into a rural or primeval environment when they are so inclined.

At the moment, as a result of vast sectional variations in density of population, in standards of living, and in per capita income,<sup>22</sup> America contains areas that are certainly not balanced in many respects. The birth rate, as has been pointed out above,<sup>23</sup> is much higher in rural than in urban sections and people migrate constantly in every direction in an attempt to find greater security elsewhere<sup>24</sup>—these are just two indications of the effects of an unbalanced environment. The evils of the present situation are summarized concisely in the following proposal concerning "the object of a policy for the distribution of population":

... on the one hand, to prevent the density of population and the size of the community from becoming so great that people will suffer from lack of space (at home, at play, and at work), from the inconvenience of long rides on crowded conveyances to and from work and from the noise and dirt and delay incident to great crowds; and, on the other, to prevent the density of population from falling so low that the community

<sup>21</sup> MacKaye (101), pp. 56 ff.

<sup>22</sup> National Resources Committee (115), pp. 38-43.

<sup>23</sup> Above, p. 28.

<sup>24</sup> National Resources Committee (115), pp. 103-112.



cannot provide schools, adequate medical care, wholesome recreation and the many other agencies essential to a fine type of personal development and a healthy community life.<sup>25</sup>

In accounts of the trend toward an unbalanced concentration of the population, many writers tend to stress the disastrous conditions prevailing in crowded cities and to neglect the fact that, when rural regions lose many inhabitants through migration, "the reduced number of people and the transfer of wealth have made the support of local institutions possible only at an increased cost per person"<sup>26</sup> and that the educational facilities there have especially suffered.<sup>27</sup> Predictions concerning future population trends, moreover, suggest the immediate necessity of preventing these problems from becoming still graver. For, even though the United States is not expected to increase its numbers so rapidly in the future, the evidence seems to indicate that the movement directly toward and also centrifugally around "relatively few areas," the cities, will continue.<sup>28</sup>

A degree of economic self-sufficiency within each social region will give rise to a decentralization of industry, for if the products of one region are sold, on the whole, only within the region, it will not be necessary for businessmen to construct large, specialized plants to supply the entire country. Since the depression the social evils of economic specialization have become painfully apparent. Previously the supporters of large-scale centralized industries stressed the undoubted economic advantages of this policy in terms of the increased efficiency of the workers, the opportunity to exploit natural resources where and when they most profitably could be exploited, and the mechanics of national and international trade. But now it is evident that too much specialization prevents the worker from moving from job to job, places him at the mercy of shutdowns, and perhaps tends to warp him as a person. If men in a given area work at a variety of tasks instead of being mere components of

<sup>25</sup> Thompson (147), p. 68.

<sup>26</sup> National Resources Committee (115), p. 111.

<sup>27</sup> National Resources Committee (115), pp. 216-220.

<sup>28</sup> National Resources Committee (115), p. 103.

a factory town, they will have varying interests and hence will be able to stimulate one another diversely. Smaller industries may mean, moreover, that the trend toward democratic control will be strengthened: it is conceivable that producers' coöperatives and workers' councils can be more effective when the scope of the enterprise is not too large. Men and women who inhabit a region whose social life and whose economy they can comprehend may be able to appreciate the significance of their own particular rôles as producers and as citizens; whether they obtain such insight from their jobs, from perceiving the balance of environments, or from education is unimportant, just so long as they transfer their knowledge to as many different situations as possible.

As an example of how planning within a social region may contribute to the solution of a problem not directly related to the region itself, the apparently unfavorable discrepancy in birth rates which exists between the more and the less fortunate groups in the United States<sup>29</sup> may be considered briefly. It seems reasonably clear that people of the middle class are marrying late and producing fewer children because they feel insecure and because, as a result of modern education and a goading environment, they desire first to provide a favorable environment for themselves. The lower classes, on the other hand, have a high birth rate, perhaps, it has been suggested, because they "may feel that they have little to gain by strenuous adherence to some limitation practice" and because they probably employ contraceptives inadequately or not at all.<sup>30</sup> To the extent, therefore, that regional planning or any type of social planning gives the individual a greater sense of security and removes some of the social pressures to rise and rise and rise, it may also be possible to increase the birth rate of the middle class. And similarly, if living within a region develops the general esprit of the lower classes and gives them a sense of dignity and social responsibility which they now lack through little fault of their own, they may begin to appreciate the desir-

<sup>29</sup> Above, p. 28.

<sup>30</sup> Lorimer and Osborn (91), p. 305.

ability of limiting the number of their children. And then a more equal distribution of opportunities and of the goods and services of everyday existence might even diminish the present misgivings that only the socially unfit *are* increasing their numbers.

#### *Economic Advantages*

The incorporation of economic planning within the plans of a social region suggests the possibility that Americans may be able to secure some of the advantages of a master economic plan without necessarily suffering the losses and deprivations which this type of plan forces upon the inhabitants of fascist and communist countries.

It is clear that the present concentration of industries in specialized areas is responsible for some of the aggravating problems that beset the country. In cities the point of diminishing marginal utility in respect to rents has been reached. A one-crop or a one-industry community is especially vulnerable during a depression. Relief is particularly urgent for those who are hopelessly dependent upon the specialized industrial area; other *social* consequences of a large migratory movement toward urban areas have already been mentioned. It is also frequently uneconomical to transport raw materials to manufacturing centers and then to return them in finished form to the consumers who have produced them in the first place; this state of affairs exists especially in the South.<sup>31</sup>

In contrast, a relatively self-sufficient social region can provide a balanced social and economic life which reflects in miniature and with variations the entire country as it now exists. Cities might be linked to the surrounding countryside and enjoy a reciprocal relationship that will not be disrupted so easily by a depression. Cotton growers in the Delta, whose present welfare depends upon the one crop they produce almost exclusively, might have their efficiency increased by receiving a larger share of the proceeds, by coöperating in the production of commodities which at the moment have to be imported from other regions, and by becoming better

<sup>31</sup> Odum and Moore (119), p. 361.

acquainted with the precise rôle they play in the regional economy. "Buy in Your Own Community," a slogan which remains so psychologically meaningful to people in spite of the horror of theoretical economists, might become a really sensible guide to economic activity. Economic regional planning, therefore, can receive strong support from the kind of person whom a social region will encourage.

It is an open question as to whether or not a small industry or business can predict the wants of its customers more accurately than a large-scale one. The former has a smaller clientele and hence ought to be able to secure more insight into prospective customers through intimate contact. But the latter draws a larger sample of the population and hence it is able to distribute its errors of judgment a little more easily. Under certain conditions it seems reasonable to assert that the risks of both types are more or less equal, when, for example, the patronage is fortuitous, when competition is keen, or when the commodity or services that are involved can be replaced by different ones. There is little doubt, however, that the mistakes of large-scale business, when they do occur, are more costly from a social point of view; men are thrown out of work or the consequent lower wages that must be offered contribute to a general price slump and still greater unemployment.

To avoid the costly mistakes both of the little and the big producer, a regional economy is proposed. For here business units need not be so small that they run the risk of dealing with only a few customers, nor so large that they are faced with the danger of affecting a larger group when their plans fail. There is evidence to believe or at least to hope that in a social region the individual plans of producers can function more efficiently and that less master planning will be necessary. Naturally the precise form of the economic system within the social region—whether it is controlled completely by entrepreneurs, by the state, by workers, or by varying combinations of these—will have a significant effect upon the efficiency of its functioning; but it is felt that, in any case, many of the perils of master planning can be avoided.

It is all very well to argue that regional economic plan-

ning should occur, but it is also imperative to inquire whether such planning is occurring or will occur. Historically and up to the present day there have been two opposing tendencies in the economic life of the country. On the one hand, the extractive industries, being so dependent upon natural resources, have tended to scatter people over the entire continent; whereas, on the other hand, manufacturing has been concentrated in a few areas with the result that "200 counties (out of the more than 3,000 counties in the United States) have provided nearly three-fourths of the total manufacturing employment and more than three-fourths of the total wages paid."<sup>32</sup> Even at this moment there is little "movement of industries to scattered towns and villages outside the areas of industrial concentration" and not very much "movement of industries within or between industrial areas"; in fact, "the records both of past migration and of industrial expansion show that workers have usually moved to the factory, rather than the factory to the workers."<sup>33</sup>

Such a trend cannot be accepted fatalistically; it is one of the reasons why planning in America is necessary, why future values must be affected by desirable ones. There are, moreover, other indications which strengthen a bald prediction concerning an increase in decentralization. The development of hydroelectric plants on a large scale like that of the TVA, the comparative ease and economy with which power can be transmitted over long distances, and the greater mobility which the automobile has offered almost everyone counterbalance the advantages possessed by some of the earlier industrial centers.<sup>34</sup> Mumford has pointed out that scientific advances in agriculture have "equalized agricultural advantages over greater areas and removed the incentive toward one-sided specialization" and enable farming to occur in relatively smaller areas; and that the specialization of production permits producers to scatter the plants

<sup>32</sup> National Resources Committee (115), pp. 71-72.

<sup>33</sup> National Resources Committee (115), pp. 71-73; also National Resources Committee (114), pp. 38-39.

<sup>34</sup> National Resources Committee (114), pp. 29-30, 42-43.

which create the individual units of a product.<sup>35</sup> In the present era of specialization many manufacturers have to adapt their products and services to regional peculiarities which even they cannot ignore.<sup>36</sup>

There is, to be sure, a dearth of industrial centers in the Southeast, the Southwest, and the Middle West,<sup>37</sup> but this does not mean that the United States is doomed forever to have its major industries huddled in the northeastern corner. The fact that the population as a whole is only increasing slowly and that the birth rate of the foreign born is rapidly decreasing<sup>38</sup> indicates the development of a fairly stable, more homogeneous population which, since it will no longer be torn by the tension created by sudden shifts in birth or death rates and by enormous hordes of immigrants, may fit into a regional economy more easily than it would have in the past. It simply must be remembered that, even if planetary specialization were most efficient, as many economists have argued,<sup>39</sup> this would offer no reason to give exclusive precedence to such a narrowly economic value.

Complete regional self-sufficiency is not desirable because it is unattainable without the cruel sacrifices in workers' productivity which Hitler has imposed upon Germans. Variations in the location of natural resources and in climatic conditions must be recognized and guide the economic plans of social regions. It is not a question of choosing between no specialization and no decentralization, but of finding a plan that leans more toward the latter than the former.

### *Political Advantages*

All plans, including political ones, should remain close to people or else individual wishes and peculiarities will be overlooked. The more people who are included in the scope of a plan, the greater the possibility that some of them will

<sup>35</sup> Mumford (111), pp. 338-342.

<sup>36</sup> Odum and Moore (119), pp. 217-227.

<sup>37</sup> National Resources Committee (115), pp. 67-71.

<sup>38</sup> Above, p. 236.

<sup>39</sup> Mumford (111), pp. 337-338.

have to be ignored and the greater the probability that significant frustration will result. Since many plans have to be formulated and executed by Federal agencies, it is important that people be concerned with and actually be represented by their government. The beloved picture of the New England small-town democracy has the alluring feature of smallness about it. At such a meeting people could express their preferences and elect representatives, with whom they were reasonably well acquainted, to act on the basis of these preferences.

Previously it has been pointed out that people's interest in government is a function of the degree to which they believe that government affects their lives.<sup>40</sup> Many of the evils of the American democracy are due to the immense expanse of the country which requires a large body of civil servants and which prevents voters, first, from feeling involved in the affairs of government and, secondly, from voting intelligently for politicians who are only publicized strangers to them. Men and women are called upon to choose between two candidates who have been selected at party conventions as a result of preconvention propaganda and political jockeying and whose platforms are usually nothing more than vote-getting devices. Under these political circumstances, it is not one bit surprising that the antics of Congress are the subject for national jests.

It is still fashionable for respectable progressives to maintain that a democracy can really function only when people have been educated so that they truly appreciate both their privileges and their obligations—or else a similarly vague incantation to education is mouthed. Such a statement is true simply because it has little practical significance. It might mean that citizens should be made more patriotic. Or that they should be given courses in history which reveal democracy as the culmination of the evolution of civilization. Or that they should be taught how to mark a ballot or pull the levers of a voting machine. Or that they should be persuaded to register and vote even when the election is not particu-

<sup>40</sup> Above, pp. 80-83.

larly exciting. Or that they must listen to both parties and even to the minor ones and perhaps buy more than one newspaper of differing political complexion. Educational measures like these are of course good, since they seek to preserve democracy and since democracy seems worth preserving for the reasons that have been mentioned; but they are pitifully superficial. They expect reforms to occur and people to change as a result of preaching. They ignore the fact that many of the affairs of government are complex in a technical way and hence beyond the grasp of the average busy citizen. And they neglect to provide the stimulation and incentives that are necessary before people are willing to be educated in these ways or to act upon the earnest pleas that have been carried to them.

It is felt, therefore, that Americans might become politically active when their political ties are to a social region. For in the region and the subregion the modern equivalent of the New England town meeting can be restored: the unit of the community and the larger unit of the region can be sufficiently small and simplified so that voters may be able to grasp the relationship between their votes and their future gratifications and frustrations. In such a social context, moreover, it may actually be possible to induce men and women to take an active interest in their regional government. An effort must also be made to promote individual planning. For activity in behalf of oneself and one's group is the essence of democracy—and democracy cannot afford to tolerate the passivity that master planning demands.

At the moment two trends in the United States must be deplored: the increase in the strength of a centralized, Federal bureaucracy and the power of the states to hinder significant social plans. Since the former trend has been evaluated in the previous chapter, attention may be directed here upon the latter. Each state tends to be a guardian of the rights of its citizens in a geographical unit which in most cases has resulted from fortuitous historical circumstances; separate state plans to deal with local problems have not been "adequate to meet all problems of planning on a sub-



national scale.”<sup>41</sup> Inasmuch as “the fundamental resources which man uses and adapts to his needs are distributed without reference to political lines”<sup>42</sup> and inasmuch as innumerable social and economic problems likewise do not respect these lines, such “supra-state problems” have had to be solved by means of interstate commissions or compacts. This latter makeshift device also “has not proved a satisfactory medium for continuous and progressive planning activity” because “additional grants of authority and frequently approval of action taken must be sought by the agency executing the compact, instead of its having power to go ahead and make its own independent plans.”<sup>43</sup>

To establish some kind of coördination among planning authorities, there must be one area on which their various plans can be focused. If that area is the social region, then overlapping may be avoided and through coöperation political authorities can attempt to make all the plans ensemble contribute to the welfare of people. By decentralizing the staff of planners, officials can “come together in the field, close to the enterprises, close to the people of the regions and within close range of local and regional attitudes and desires.”<sup>44</sup> Since state loyalties do seem powerful and since the existence of states is one, but just one method of preventing excessive centralization of government, the present forty-eight separate entities should not be abolished; for this reason one of the criteria on which social regions must be selected should be some if not complete respect for these traditional boundaries.<sup>45</sup>

If necessary, the basic American principle of permitting everyone to vote for each public office might be modified so that only those directly affected by a particular office will have the privilege of choosing the official. Even now it is recognized that the citizens of Maine should not have a

<sup>41</sup> National Resources Committee (116), p. 23.

<sup>42</sup> National Resources Committee (116), p. 19.

<sup>43</sup> National Resources Committee (116), p. 51.

<sup>44</sup> National Resources Committee (116), p. 188.

<sup>45</sup> Odum and Moore (119), pp. 241-247.

voice in electing a Governor of Nebraska since his activities have little or no connection with their own existence. The constituency of a politician, however, is a specific geographical area that may or may not contain rather uniform interests; for the selection of the simple geographical area as the basis of representation is quite arbitrary and based on the crude ecological assumption of a correlation between place of residence and way of life. If voting were more related to interest, then a public official might more easily represent the voters in a real sense or be able to estimate their preferences more accurately. The disadvantage of such a political system appears to be that various interests would then be directly at odds with one another and, as a result, vote-swapping and compromises would have to occur. Conflicts like these, however, are preferable to a rubber-stamped legislative body that operates smoothly by ignoring, at least partially, the individual plans of the citizenry.

It must be remembered that a million diversities do not inevitably produce a single unified value. It would be comforting to believe, in the manner of the romantic liberal, that out of the masses emerge the values that should be. It is just as likely that the masses express biases and fragments of the social heritage which are opposed to their or the social interest. Since plans that transcend individual formulation have to be formulated by officials and since these officials cannot avoid injecting their own goals, some provision must be made to prevent the representatives of the people from wandering too far from the preferences of individual citizens. For, even though the latter are not a fountainhead of pure wisdom, both their conceptions and their misconceptions of the good life cannot be neglected in the formulation of a plan. If officials are also members of the region in which they are elected, they will have close contact with their constituents and, from the experience they themselves have gained as ordinary citizens, they will be acquainted with many of the common frustrations.

One task of government either within the region or for

the entire country is the collection of the human and physical data on which all plans are based. There must be, therefore, as part of the civil service a group of experts who are trained to provide the materials of planning. Pure lilies do not spring up spontaneously in the affairs of men and women; their purity has to be created through education and through the conditions of the situation in which they function. Planning has to become a career with adequate compensation and prestige, so that men of ability will be attracted to it. To be certain that such men function as scientists and not as politicians, it is important to assign them no executive power and have them confine their activities to securing data and advising officials in the formulation of plans and policies—this is the procedure that is being employed by present state planning commissions.<sup>46</sup> With such duties, moreover, they will be less prone to degenerate into a conservative bureaucracy, inasmuch as the information they collect can be subject to the more or less objective tests of science and in this way their competency can be appraised from time to time, for example, by an outside group of consultants. The continual injection of freshly trained minds will prevent these officials from adhering slavishly to antiquated techniques. Legislators and administrators, on the other hand, must retain their connection with the electorate so that they can respond to its preferences and to changes.

Regionalism, finally, seems to offer a way—but by no means a certain one—of reducing the tendency to participate in a war. For in a social region people might be taught the kind of group loyalty and patriotism that does not thrive exclusively upon hatred for an out-group. It is recognized that not everyone can view the ties of social life realistically and rationally in the manner of the social scientist; in fact, as has been suggested,<sup>47</sup> critical realism and rationalism often produce cold indifference, a quality that seldom strengthens social life. Since there must be symbols, myths, slogans, and clichés, they should be confined to the region. Their signifi-

<sup>46</sup> National Resources Committee (116), p. 18.

<sup>47</sup> Above, pp. 46-47.

cance can be weakened as much as possible but they can never be completely destroyed.<sup>48</sup> If men's loyalties are decentralized in this fashion, then it is less likely that they can be made to respond uncritically to war propaganda, just as it is less likely, for reasons mentioned above, that they will be ready to accept a simple irrational doctrine like fascism.<sup>49</sup> A loyal member of a region, moreover, can be counted on, perhaps, to rise to the defense of the country that includes this region if and when the national emergency, in spite of planning, arises. If many industries, furthermore, are confined to a region and if their production schedules are regulated more or less as a function of the needs of the inhabitants of that region, the necessity for trading or investing outside the country will be greatly diminished; in this way some of the dangers from international trade can be avoided.

It is possible to achieve certain broad objectives within a technical region, as the Tennessee Valley Authority has demonstrated. For specific aspects of individual personality and the social life can be reshaped to conform, more or less, to the goal desired by the regional plan. It is felt, however, that thoroughly desirable values which embrace more of the person and his society can be attained only in the social region. The Tennessee Valley or any other region that is formed to attain technical objectives will not become a social region unless it is planned beforehand as a social region. Without such a plan, the Valley and the entire country will continue to develop only within the stereotyping pattern of industrialism. This trend is to be deplored: it sacrifices too many of the other values which men want, which they should want, and which regionalism may enable them to secure.

Briefly, then, the case for regionalism must be restated. In the first place, it is possible to develop within the social region every type of diversity. There can be environmental diversity and hence people will be able to enjoy the stimulating effect of variation. There can be economic diversity and

<sup>48</sup> Lasswell (85).

<sup>49</sup> Above, p. 315.

hence people will be able to become relatively self-sufficient and obtain the economies of small, but not too small industry. And the existence of various regions throughout the country will tend to prevent the nation itself from becoming too standardized and, from the social point of view, from succumbing to the appeals of any small clique.

Secondly, regionalism will develop activity rather than passivity. The inhabitants will secure gratification from being members of such a region and as a result they will be motivated to participate in the affairs of the government and to become more aware of their own rôles in society. It is possible, too, that public officials will take a keener interest in the social welfare since they will be responsible to a more alert electorate. People who engage in a variety of occupations and who have diverse physical environments at their disposal are likely to be made more alert as a result of increased interaction with their fellows and their surroundings. It is even conceivable that greater activity will diminish the need to express aggression in the form of war.

Nationally, regionalism offers certain advantages. Perhaps the wealth of the nation can be more evenly distributed and perhaps the glaring discrepancies which now exist between the urban and rural populations can be diminished somewhat. To the extent that regionalism promotes security, inequalities in the birth rates of various groups may be lessened. The social region offers planners the opportunity to deal with an area that is larger than the average state and that therefore embraces more problems. The region may also serve as the means of coördinating different planning projects without aid from the Federal Government—in this way a tendency toward master planning can be diminished.

These arguments in favor of regionalism, as they are recited so baldly, may give the impression that the social region represents nothing short of utopia. It must be realized, therefore, that each argument carries only conviction and cannot be "proven" in an absolute sense. Regionalism has been defended so dogmatically because it is felt that no goal for human beings can be attained unless the plan in

which it is to be embodied is at least visualized. Regionalism itself, in short, must be a tentative, groping, and experimental procedure or way of life. The fact that there are so many indications of regionalism in America is not evidence that social regions will be formed without planning; rather it would seem to suggest that, even without the advantages from planning, Americans are striving to discover the regions which will best suit their needs and the requirements of a democracy. Planning, it is contended, must accelerate this slightly discernible trend and must hinder the other much more powerful trend toward centralization and uniformity.

## **PART 4: PERPLEXING PROBLEMS**

## CHAPTER XIII

### THE ABILITY TO PLAN

**M**OST men have the feeling that they are free to select a course of action from among the many alternatives which seem to confront them. The problem that frequently disturbs them, however, is whether they can accomplish what they seek. For this reason educators and other officials have been concerned with the measurement of ability to achieve a given end after that end has been determined.

More or less standardized tests have been evolved to measure skills and abilities. The usual procedure is to examine performance at the moment and then assume that future performance will be sufficiently similar so that it can be predicted on the basis of what the test reveals. Thus the conventional intelligence test measures the subject's ability to solve a set of problems under prescribed conditions and his score is supposed to be an indication of what he will do in similar or dissimilar situations in real life. In like manner, any formal examination, whether in the school or in the civil service, measures what has been learned in the past or can be grasped at the moment, and in this way tries to indicate future performance.

The same criterion of present and past accomplishment must be applied to man's ability to plan in order to assay that skill for the future. It has become evident that at the basis of planning is a complicated form of learning: a specific kind of activity (the plan) is learned since it leads to a goal which the individual seeks or which, in the case of many plans, the individual is motivated by the plan itself to seek. At the outset it would appear that most men in any society are aware of what goals they are seeking and usually are acquainted with means to attain these goals; they are able, therefore, to formulate some of their own individual plans. The principal goals and means they have usually



learned from their social heritage as that heritage is interpreted to them according to the status they possess and the rôle they are destined to play in their society. The individual plans may be very specific or very general. There are children who select their occupation at an early age and then govern their interests and their education to assist them in achieving their objective. There are also individuals who decide to be successful without knowing or specifying the particular ways in which they will achieve success; or people are driven by a Faustian urge to do or know everything.

The formulation of a plan, however, is only a first step; thereafter the plan has to be executed and realized. The ability of men to perform these other crucial steps has not been tested. Were it tested or testable, it would be reasonable to expect the common-sense finding that there are successful and unsuccessful plans; that some individuals can learn activity which leads to certain goals and others cannot; or that in some people drives can be directed to new goals and in others this is not possible. In fact, in the face of the handicaps that confront men when they seek to plan, a high degree of failures might be anticipated.

For in the first place it has been shown that men's ability to predict social events or the simple tasks which they themselves are to perform is affected by their personalities.<sup>1</sup> Human beings can never be completely rational and it is to be anticipated that in many situations they never can or should be expected either to predict or to plan with utmost reasonable caution. A man who is able to play a piano does not exercise this ability when he is atop a horse. It is the potentiality to be rational and to plan that is significant.

Whether or not this potentiality develops into a real ability to plan depends not only on the individual but also on the circumstances which surround him. Previously, for example, it has been suggested that many men and women are bad planners because events in their society prevent them from performing as they wish and as they anticipate they

<sup>1</sup> Above, pp. 175-178.

will.<sup>2</sup> When men are drafted to fight a war, their own plans have to be interrupted or discarded and, if they are ever discharged, they may not be able to continue what they once planned. As a wrecker of individual plans, an industrial depression is frequently as bad as a war.

A time factor also affects the fate of individual plans. In general, it appears that a plan for the present or immediate future is more likely to be realized than one for the distant future. For the calculations of the moment can be based on an insight into the individual's own capabilities and into his physical and social environments. In a changing society, there is always the strong probability that, as time passes, these capabilities or aspects of the environments will be altered with a consequent effect upon the person, his goals, and the means at his disposal. In some instances, however, the future may be more propitious, for in the meantime improvements in the individual and the environments in respect to a particular plan may have occurred.

There is presumptive evidence to believe that, other things being equal, individual plans can be more successful than social or master plans. For when one person is planning for himself or his immediate dependents, he is likely to be familiar with his own capacities and the conditions that surround him; he knows more or less what goals he wishes to achieve; and with this varied information he may be able to plan accordingly. To the extent that the individual does not possess insight into his own limitations, to that extent he may not be a good planner. The self-knowledge which has been so highly praised at least since biblical times, therefore, has this significant psychological function. The ability to plan, furthermore, will also be increased when the individual appreciates the nature of the problem he must solve. It is for this reason that many forms of education are eventually gratifying since they enable people to understand features of the environment in a specialized or general manner. To win money and prestige by boring for oil is obviously

<sup>2</sup> Above, pp. 189-196.

a plan that conforms to an opportunity within this society, but the site of boring is usually more easily determined by a trained geologist than it is by an ambitious layman.

It has been shown previously that individual plans are supplemented by social, economic, political, and regional plans when the former are not adequate. In terms of the ability to plan, this means that the latter plans replace the former when people are unable to formulate their own plans, when they cannot learn the specific activity that leads to goals, or when they continue to seek goals that bring them too little gratification. Since it is known that individuals can plan for themselves, the real question concerning man's ability to plan must be stated in reference to his capacity for formulating and executing social plans. Can some men plan aspects or segments of the lives of a great many other men? Can any small group really satisfy the requirements of planning for a large group?

In the long and sometimes even in the short run the answers to these questions are extremely important. For all of the social sciences and biology testify that man is almost infinitely plastic and that, therefore, he can be modified in accordance with the requirements of most plans. To be sure, his present nature imposes limits upon the degree to which he can be changed at a given moment; but eventually he or his descendants may be formed into personalities with almost totally different kinds of drives, attitudes, knowledge, and skills. And it is true too that socially men everywhere seem to evolve certain institutions, perhaps as a result of their generalized, innate impulses and of the requirements of group life itself; but the content of these institutions and the social conflicts to which they do or do not give rise are also extremely varied and alterable. Were the potentialities of human and social development more circumscribed, the task of planning on a large scale would be relatively simple: few departures from these potentialities could be either feasible or successful. With so many alternative forms of institutions to select, planners, consequently, are more powerful but also more likely to commit grave errors.

*Techniques of Planning*

To determine whether social plans can be formulated and executed, it is first necessary to inquire whether or not planners can become sufficiently well acquainted with the nature of the individuals for whom their plans are intended. How can a person secure insight into the present values of other persons? This is the first requirement of planning, "a knowledge of the people who will be affected."

Man learns about other men most frequently by considering himself as an adequate sample. In the simpler situations involving predominately biological drives he makes the assumption that the cuts and burns and bruises that bring him pain affect all mankind similarly. In respect to the predominately social drives he introspects and finds within himself the content of his fellows' drives since he too is a product of the same milieu. This method of obtaining knowledge concerning others is necessary, since no absolutely direct communication between two human beings is ever possible. No one knows exactly how the other person feels; one has to deduce that feeling or feel it himself in terms of his own experiences. At the same time it is painfully clear on statistical grounds that one individual can never be completely representative of the entire population. The peculiar kind of personality he inevitably has become due to his unique biological equipment and his unique experiences in the course of his life history is bound to affect all of his judgments. Fascist dictators try to escape this dilemma verbally by proclaiming that they and they alone represent the adequate sample of the entire population. When the dictator happens to be slightly or markedly pathological, he is really asserting that, though he be the smallest or the largest man in the entire land, he nevertheless is really the average that is or the average that should be.

Sane and shrewd men check their impressions of their fellows by consulting associates whom they can trust. If a person's conception of an event fails to agree with what a great many others report, he usually alters that conception

to conform more or less to theirs. In an absolute sense his first reaction may have been correct, but he is led by the majority to believe that he was wrong. Planners and politicians everywhere, therefore, listen to the opinions of their friends before they act on their own beliefs. A successful statesman keeps his ear not "to the ground" but keeps it tuned to the speech of others and fixes his eye upon whatever reports are available to him. The President of the United States, for example, reads the important newspapers of the country to judge "the tenor of public opinion" and holds frequent conferences with his advisers to discover not only what they think but also what their assistants have reported to them from all sections of the country. Even fascist dictators have not always relied upon their own judgments: they may have altered these judgments slightly as a result of the information conveyed to them by their subordinates and their spies.

These are the common-sense, empirical ways in which leaders seek to understand the drives, the attitudes, and the knowledge of their people. There is no magical, no invariably valid method to secure this kind of understanding. The successful leaders are those whose hunches and whose subsequent programs turn out to be correct. The ability to comprehend even one's immediate associates cannot be outlined in black and white, even though the popularizers of psychology attempt to do just this in their best sellers. All that can be said without becoming a quack or without overstepping the facts is that apparently this ability varies from individual to individual, a conclusion that definitely will not assist anyone in answering the question of how to win friends and influence people.

Due to this human limitation, it is clear why international relations are so difficult to manage or to plan successfully. For the diplomat is faced not only with the problems inherent in any situation involving human understanding but also with additional ones resulting from the differences in culture and therefore of personality between himself and his countrymen on the one hand and the foreigners on the other. A foreign language represents more than a difference in

speech: it is usually also an indication of another way of life. Words, as every translator knows, have their own nuances and subtle connotations that run deep into the personalities who feel them. It is for this reason, as well as for the obviously necessary functions that they perform, that representatives abroad are so important in the administration of international affairs. For attachés of the foreign office have an opportunity to become acquainted with the trends of public opinion in a country by participating in its daily affairs. And it is for this reason, too, that modern statesmen use the press as a trial balloon for their tentative schemes, so that they can gauge the reaction of their protagonists and their countrymen.

There are, moreover, scientific or standardized ways by means of which planners and others can understand the particular human nature with which they are dealing. All of these make use of the personal interview in some form; all are valid only to the extent that they are able to secure good rapport with their informants; and all attempt to take precautions not to violate the statistical rule of securing an adequate sampling. The anthropologist, for example, checks the reports he secures from one informant or from a set of informants by attempting to determine to what degree the belief or the action is universal in the tribe. He may consult additional members of the group or he may observe whether their actual behavior conforms to the verbal formulation he has obtained. The content of the culture that he describes in his published monograph is then his own abstraction of the behavior which he has seen or has heard described; it is an abstraction, furthermore, that is made as specific as possible in terms of concrete individuals or groups of individuals who do or do not behave in accordance with the pattern as he has outlined it.

The questionnaire that is the basis of the popular public opinion poll in the United States is, in reality, a series of brief interviews with an adequate sample of the population, a sample that in the final tabulation is weighted in accordance with the influence a given group has had in the past in

determining public opinion. A poll merely gives insight into the attitudes of people at a given moment and, as the proponents of polls admit when they endeavor to make their final survey as close as possible to the actual event itself, it does not offer a completely reliable guide to future attitudes. Even in a very casual interview the agent of the poll is able apparently to win the confidence of people sufficiently well so that they are willing to express themselves truthfully. The intentional or unintentional errors that they commit in answering the questions are ironed out to a certain extent by the size of the sample. The attempt is made, however, to avoid such errors by formulating the questions as clearly, as concisely, and as intelligibly as possible.

The public opinion poll, consequently, is potentially a useful tool for the planner who really desires insight into people and who seeks to check his own opinions and those of his close informants. The accuracy with which the Gallup and the Fortune polls, for example, anticipated the election returns of 1936 should not be interpreted as a chance phenomenon but as the result of careful, thorough, and well-planned calculation. Such accuracy is certainly good evidence in favor of the validity and reliability of this device. It has been estimated, moreover, that the country's attitude on almost any issue can be ascertained, as a result of standardized techniques and mechanical methods of tabulation, within a period of three or four days. The poll, consequently, does not suffer from the delays of academic research but can be utilized almost at a moment's notice. The rapport which the successful poll-gatherer must obtain, however, is possible only when people are willing to cooperate and give honest answers. When they are motivated to be cautious or secretive, their replies become practically worthless. And it must not be forgotten that there are innumerable social situations in which just this kind of motivation exists. Thus Schanck has shown that the expressed attitudes of people in a small New York State community conformed to the standards of their group when they were questioned before their confidence was won; then, when the investigator was trusted, he

discovered that far fewer of these attitudes really followed the group norms.<sup>3</sup> Under a dictatorship a public-opinion poll is almost inconceivable. For people are usually afraid to answer even their friends' questions, if these questions involve political and social events; therefore they certainly would suspect trouble in some form from a stranger who bombarded them with a series of questions. The dictators, of course, will not permit a poll, lest by some miracle its results show discontent and polarize their unpopularity. It is fair to conclude, consequently, that this measuring device can secure valid and reliable data only in a peace-time democracy when people are convinced that their expressed attitudes, as the phrase goes, "will not be held against them."

A still more general conclusion suggests that planners can understand the present values of the people for whom the plans are intended, provided that the people involved are willing to cooperate by giving them this information. Men and women have to be convinced that what they say will be used to help them rather than to frustrate them. The smaller a plan is, furthermore, the fewer individuals there are who are involved, and the easier it is to secure insight into them. Regional plans, consequently, can be better adapted to the population since they include a rather homogeneous group whose preferences might be tabulated with fewer errors than if the whole country were involved.

The contributions which the other social sciences can make to an understanding of people's behavior at the moment can be suggested only vaguely. It seems certain that their techniques of gathering information are extremely useful. For, in spite of their faults, each of these sciences is able to secure data concerning some important features of human relationships and hence concerning people and their social environment; a description and analysis of society, culture, government, law, and economic activity are often necessary before plans can be formulated or even executed.

It is impossible, however, to be too optimistic in respect to the value of the predictions which each separate science is

<sup>3</sup> Schanck (131).



able to make about people and their social environments: throughout the second part of this book it has been shown repeatedly how relatively sterile the social sciences are in this respect. In an attempt to be truly scientific, theorists like the economists have attempted to assume that their phenomena are within an artificially closed system. Since the system in reality is not closed, their generalizations and predictions are true only under conditions that do not frequently exist in pure form. The task of predicting these conditions is usually assigned to another branch of the science or to a totally different discipline. Without a unified science that tries simultaneously to deduce consequences from sets of conditions and to foresee the conditions themselves, the predictive value of man's knowledge concerning men in their social world is not very great. Such predictions, though not always explicit, precise, or accurate, can serve, nevertheless, as tentative guides to planning. A cautious guide, after all, is better than no guide at all.

The actuarial or inductive method also has been revealed as a method of prediction that permeates and has to permeate the social sciences. This technique of prediction likewise involves many risks, inasmuch as the conditions in the future that have to be presumed to exist before the "cycle" or the "trend" can be extended from the known into the unknown cannot be controlled or, frequently, even anticipated. It cannot be denied, however, that predications of this nature, such as those pertaining to the composition of the American population, at least give the predictor and the planner a systematic conceptualization with which the future can be analyzed and, to a lesser degree, anticipated.

The ability of men to formulate social plans, consequently, is very definitely limited by the state of the social sciences. Whether or not these sciences can ever be integrated or at least integrated quickly enough to enable this generation to plan more successfully is indeed questionable. At the moment, social scientists are partially inhibited by a lack of adequate data. If planning becomes more systematic and widespread, these very data may be provided as a by-product of the need

to comprehend the present, future, and potential values at the basis of all plans. Planning, moreover, can act as an incentive for the social sciences to become more scientific by offering them opportunities to use their knowledge and theories in practical affairs rather than as mere teaching material.

Up to this point the ability of the natural scientist to discover the facts concerning the physical environment has been assumed. Reference has been made only to the consequences of mechanical improvements; it has been shown, for example, that inventions have marked effects upon society and that, so far as planning is concerned, many of these more general effects can be anticipated in advance.<sup>4</sup> A few direct words, however, must be said concerning the second requirement of planning which suggests that "a knowledge of the physical environment confronting these people" for whom the plans are designed is as necessary as a knowledge of their social environment.

This faith in the ability of the natural scientist is not unfounded and it is one of the reasons that has led men to believe that they can control not only their physical environment but also themselves. For it is certainly true that jointly the students of geography, geology, soil mechanics, soil chemistry, forestry, engineering, and many other so-called applied sciences have both the techniques and the knowledge to secure a remarkably thorough insight into the dynamic composition and the potentiality of the land on which people live. It is known, for example, that the tragedy of floods could be reduced at least partially, were it not for the fact that fierce competition has led to the use of submarginal land close to the river's bed<sup>5</sup>—here the difficulty is a social, not a technical one.

The big gap in man's technical knowledge seems to lie in his inability to predict changes in weather at all accurately. The Agricultural Adjustment Administration has had to attribute its occasional failures not only to the recalcitrant,

<sup>4</sup> Above, pp. 42-43.

<sup>5</sup> Above, pp. 221-222.

individualistic farmers, but also to the fact that the size of the crop, which is so greatly dependent upon climatic conditions, could not be calculated in advance. Even now, however, in spite of the handicap of inadequate data, some progress is being made in long-range weather forecasting; but it appears improbable that more accurate general predictions or precise ones concerning the size of the crop in a particular locality can be made in the near or far future.<sup>6</sup> There is little hope, at the moment, that outdoor weather can be controlled by man. This failure to predict or control the weather does not mean that agricultural planning must be abandoned; rather it signifies that longer-range plans have to be formulated to take extreme climatic fluctuations into account. The tragedy of the AAA has been that, as a result of political and other pressures, its plans have had to be designed for a short period and its consequences have been judged in terms of the few bumper crops that ruined its buying, selling, and subsidizing program. The success of so many individual plans and of governmental planning projects, nevertheless, offers some evidence for believing that men do have the ability to comprehend their physical environment sufficiently and that in this respect at least social planning is possible.

#### *Difficulties of Planning*

The chief difficulty confronting the planner is not necessarily his lack of knowledge concerning people and their environments but his failure to find the goal that he should attempt to attain through planning. It is in connection with the third requirement of planning, "a knowledge of a goal to be achieved," that man's ability to plan can be seriously questioned. For it has been said repeatedly throughout this book that not only have men no definite or objective way to "verify" the values which are implicit within activity, goals, and consequences, but that they also are limited by their personalities and their society in proposing even tentative

<sup>6</sup> Talman (143), pp. 116-120.

formulations. For this reason, viz., that values have almost no scientific basis, major disagreements between people arise; for this reason there is so much confusion in society. Everywhere men and women are shouting for all kinds of reforms and usually the particular reform is justified "on its own merits." Since so many different types of reform are conceivable, it is not surprising that there is conflict over immediate and even ultimate objectives. Americans, in truth, are like builders who yearn to construct new houses but who do not know where they should begin and for what reasons. It has been argued again and again that the justification for any reform or social or mechanical innovation can be found only by examining its consequences upon specific people in terms of the frustrations and gratifications it will bring to them; it is therefore foolish to plan for the sake of planning or change for the sake of changing.

It is realized, moreover, that the problem of planning is not solved by the suggestion that its ultimate objective should be the gratification of people. For both gratification and frustration, as has been admitted, are not concepts which lend themselves very easily to direct measurement; it is difficult, if not impossible, consequently, to verify the essential goodness or badness of any plan. Human nature, moreover, is so plastic that it can be "warped" by a "bad" plan in such a way that thereafter people will be at least partially gratified by attaining the goals of that plan and hence, paradoxically enough, the "bad" plan will become to that extent a "good" one! It is perhaps only a bias that makes one decry a society in which people attain goals and hence gratification while being oppressed by their rulers; and yet it seems evident that their gratification is not so complete as it might be if their liberties were restored, if they were free to seek other goals. This inability to verify a plan in terms of its value, however, cannot be tossed aside verbally; it is *the* fundamental defect of all planning.

And yet—the bias reasserts itself—and yet perhaps it is just a verbal defect. It most certainly appears to be when only the gratification of the more fundamental and biologi-

cal drives is concerned. For here there is little disagreement concerning what constitutes gratification and verification; the problem reduces itself to discovering the best means to achieve the given end. It is merely being said again that people must eat and that therefore economic plans should be devised that enable them to eat properly. The word "properly," however, introduces difficulties: aside from strictly dietetic considerations, cultural standards are involved and these too have to be planned. No, the defect cannot be dodged completely.

The means to attain goals upon which there is agreement, furthermore, are not always known. Before the general problem of means is discussed in the last chapter, two of the major issues of social planning can serve as illustrations of man's ignorance in this respect. From anthropology and sociology the conclusion is inescapable that any social group requires some degree of in-group loyalty to survive. This loyalty, as has been said, is promoted by the presence of a threatening out-group. In the modern world a really effective devotion to and enthusiasm for a group is obtained through patriotism, and patriotism in turn requires an enemy and mounting preparations for war. It is necessary, as a result, to plan society in such a way that loyalty can be sufficiently strong to insure the continuation of the group and yet not so strong that war becomes inevitable in the psychological sense of releasing aggression in this socially approved way. One would be suffering from a severe delusion if it were asserted that any man knows how this golden mean can be secured through planning, just as one would be a defeatist if one were to resign oneself to the inevitability of war. Regionalism has been suggested as a solution, since the social region seems to possess all the characteristics that might engender loyalty without war. But no one can be sure that this is the correct solution and, even if it be accepted tentatively, the specific details of regionalism are by no means evident to planners or anyone else.

1 Another equally important problem of planning that

raises the question concerning man's ability to plan is the issue of self-sufficiency versus specialization. Ordinarily the implications of this issue are considered to be almost the exclusively economic ones bearing on the advantages of national and international trade; or almost exclusively political in terms of the need for defensive economic measures. And yet it has been shown that a self-sufficient region is apt to produce personalities with attitudes and drives quite different from those possessed by the inhabitants whose occupations are specialized. The entire social structure, moreover, may be influenced by the economic activity of people; the resulting "social problems" to which the economic system gives rise, consequently, should also affect the way in which that system is evaluated. There are, then, advantages and disadvantages to both self-sufficiency and specialization and there is no absolutely accurate method of balancing the two. The arguments in favor of a relatively self-sufficient regionalism have already been given, but they by no means indicate that a certain amount of specialization is not desirable. Again men require a middle road that veers more in one direction than in the other and they are almost utterly ignorant concerning how such a road can be discovered.

### *Challenge to Planning*

Since man's ability and skill are subject to many limitations, planning on a large scale can never be expected to follow a precise pattern or blueprint. It has been shown that all the social sciences and also the neighboring disciplines have not been able to achieve the precision of specifying the time when a predicted event will or will not occur. The variables involved in men's social behavior are too complex to enable them to be strait-jacketed into a time-sequence. Even Hitler in his notorious *Mein Kampf*, which certainly does not deserve the dignity of being called a plan, has not named the exact moment when a united Germany will rape her neighbors or the rest of the civilized world. Planners are so fallible, individual differences must be so

numerous, and changes seem so fortuitous when they occur that the details of a social or a master planning cannot possibly be foreseen. In planning, consequently, there has to be a certain amount of collective learning through trial and error; and no plan can be theoretically correct in the sense that it can anticipate everything.<sup>7</sup> He who wishes to know the shape of things to come must be snubbed or advised to consult a fortune teller.

It is recognized, however, that men and women derive a sense of security from anticipating the details of the society in which they live and that they may be disturbed by social plans that do not conceptualize the future too specifically. Such fear and anxiety no doubt characterize the attitudes of many Americans toward some of the plans which have been proposed to them, inasmuch as this is a changing society in which no one can be certain concerning the future. And yet, as Lasswell has argued, modern socialism and communism have attracted many people simply because their ideal society, being vague and indefinite, enables those who are discontented to exercise their imagination and to obtain satisfaction from their fantasies concerning its form and structure.<sup>8</sup> A country without any plans at all, furthermore, is an enigma that can terrify people as much as a set of plans with no particular blueprint. Planning can ever be challenged as to whether its necessary vagueness in many respects prevents it from securing people's coöperation.

Throughout preceding chapters, in addition, severe doubts have been cast upon man's ability to devise perfect plans. It has been maintained that all frustrations cannot conceivably be eliminated, inasmuch as certain frustrations result from people's own nature and the requirements of any society. Any social plan, moreover, is unable to please everybody: someone is doomed to be affected adversely by the attainment of a new objective. Perfect planning, it appears, is impossible.

Another potent challenge has been issued by Lippmann.

<sup>7</sup> Above, pp. 78-80.

<sup>8</sup> Lasswell (86), pp. 133-135.

He voices the objection that, since "man cannot know and do all things," "there is no possibility, then, that men can understand the whole process of their social existence"; from which it follows, he says, that "if it is true that men can do no more than they are able to do, then government can do no more than governors are able to do."<sup>9</sup> The present state of the social sciences, as has been said, gives added weight to this writer's assertion. Even now, in a society in which there is no special stress on planning, politicians and jurists so frequently misjudge comparatively simple future events and as a result are thrown out of office or are said to lose contact with popular trends. Under these circumstances enthusiasts of planning cannot claim infallibility or wisdom.

Those who agree with all of the implications of Lippmann's statements, however, find themselves in a paradoxical position: on the one hand they are forced to deprecate all forms of planning and to assume a defeatist attitude toward man's efforts to control and plan his destiny; and on the other, if they are sufficiently enlightened not to approve of every aspect of present-day society, they are forced to advocate changes in social policy<sup>10</sup> which, since they will not occur automatically, require planning. A more reasonable interpretation of man's limitations would seem to be that, although he is far from perfect as a planning organism, he is also not completely foolish. Since perfection in planning cannot be achieved, consequently all attempts at planning should not be abandoned, especially in view of the fact that some forms of planning cannot be avoided.

It is important, nevertheless, never to forget the human limitations of planning: plans must be adapted to the capabilities of the planners. No engineer, for example, could be expected to design blueprints for every future dam to be constructed in every part of this country. This intellectual deficiency, however, does not lead people to deplore plans for any particular dam. For it is realized that there are

<sup>9</sup> Lippmann (90), pp. 28, 29, 40.

<sup>10</sup> Lippmann (90), p. 226.



certain principles which can be employed when any dam is constructed, that each blueprint has to conform to the local peculiarities existing at the proposed site of the structure, and that many engineers are quite capable of executing the job. This is the procedure which is employed in planning physical objects like dams and soils and forests and it is one that can be applied to plans designed for human beings under certain conditions. The problem in connection with the latter type of plan is to determine these very conditions, so that planners will attempt only those plans which fall within the scope of their skills.

It is true, nevertheless, that the knowledge at the basis of many social, economic, and political plans is so complex that no one man is able to grasp all of it. For this reason many of the extensive plans in the modern world are administered by trained specialists who very definitely are able to gather and comprehend the significant details. There must be someone who has the broad perspective and it is this individual, whether he be a dictator, a prime minister, or a president, who is subject to so many errors of judgment and planning. Such limitations of the individual in control constitute another argument against centralizing to too great a degree the power to plan or any other power in the hands of a few executives or a potent bureaucracy. So much stress has been placed upon regionalism in this book, because it has been felt that this method of social organization might enable planning to be successful by reducing the scope and difficulty of any particular social plan and thus adapting that plan to the abilities of finite, planning minds.

Man's inability to grasp all the necessary details, moreover, does not necessarily mean that certain plans themselves cannot be successful in terms of the limited objectives which are set. In a military sense, for example, America did "win" a First World War and won that war, not simply by cooperating with her allies, but by planning the social and economic life of the entire nation as efficiently as possible. Russia and Germany have also been able to realize many of the goals of their master plans. Plans like these, however,

have to be ruthlessly executed often at the expense of frustrating in fundamental ways many of the involuntary participants and are therefore certainly not desirable. An all-wise, completely sympathetic master planner, as has been said, seems inconceivable without enormous sacrifices.

Almost regardless of the value that is to be achieved, certain very specific assistance in the form of education can be given as a result of man's present knowledge. The art of budgeting, for example, can be taught. Information concerning dietetics and the actual ingredients of nationally advertised products can be made known. In the realm of social planning it becomes absolutely essential for some regional or national organization to demonstrate to the farmer the folly of the inappropriate methods of farming he has employed in the past. Technical knowledge of this kind cannot be intuitively grasped; it must be disseminated more or less systematically.

Through education each individual must be shown his rôle in the national, regional, and local community and he must be made to realize that many of his efforts should be directed toward the attainment of a plan affecting both himself and his fellows. Society must be presented to him not as a finished product which has achieved all possible virtues but as a co-operative enterprise which is in the process of development and to which he must make his contribution. Such education will be less abstract and less prone to degenerate into meaningless jingoism if it is made concrete in terms of the region in which each person is living.

Education for planning, moreover, must be carried on among adults, inasmuch as the average age of the American population is steadily increasing.<sup>11</sup> The chief problem here is to motivate people to attend classes or discussion groups. When technical information that obviously affects the individual's economic position is given, this problem is not so difficult to solve. But when broader social and political issues are presented, Americans do not readily perceive that their own welfare is involved. Studebaker's open-forum plan which

<sup>11</sup> National Resources Committee (115), pp. 25, 31-34.

he has attempted in Des Moines, Iowa,<sup>12</sup> seems promising, inasmuch as controversial issues are not preached dogmatically and the variety of opinion that is defended can be at least entertaining. Adults, however, will never be too enthusiastic unless the relationship of these issues to their daily problems can be demonstrated; and they will be inclined to retain their own point of view unless they can take some active part in the proceedings. It is suggested, consequently, that adult education for planning be carried out by small groups under expert, but informal supervision and that people be induced to participate by having their local problems discussed and only gradually progressing from these problems to the more general issues of planning and society.

For better or for worse, then, plans are being made and will have to be made. Although man's ability to plan appears imperfect, his past failures do not offer eternal evidence against him or his plans. For planning is an ability that has not yet been thoroughly exercised or tested and it is an ability that can be improved through experience. It may be that only future accomplishments in the field of planning can furnish retrospective proof of planning skill, but it seems reasonable to believe that master planning will always reveal human deficiencies most blatantly.

<sup>12</sup> Studebaker (139).

## CHAPTER XIV

### THE NEED FOR PLANNING

IS planning desirable or undesirable? This question is baffling only when it is forgotten that the value in any activity has to be confronted with present, future, and possible values before it can be called either desirable or undesirable. Since the activity of human beings reveals that they inevitably plan, it is necessary to devise plans which achieve desirable, rather than undesirable values. The need is not for planning but for good planning. Is it true, however, that a great deal of planning is inevitable because people, regardless of their preferences, must plan? The answer to this second question can be found by examining the nature of inevitability or of scientific law in respect to planning; for then it can be determined whether or not men actually must plan.

#### *Scientific Law*

As a concept "scientific law" is ordinarily employed to signify compulsion in the face of existing conditions and thus to suggest an inevitable sequence of events. A heavy object dropped from a building must fall because of the gravitational attraction of the earth. All the prayers in the world will not make it rise, no matter how "unjust" or how "cruel" its descent may seem to be. A change of conditions, however, may cause it to rise: the force of the gravitational attraction has to be altered. This can be accomplished, of course, not by having a human being deny the importance of that attraction, but by overcoming it through putting the object into a balloon, the upward pressure of whose gas can produce the rise; or into an airplane whose propeller and wings are able to overcome the attraction of the earth. In a very real scientific sense, however, a balloon inflated with the proper amount of the right kind of a gas and an air-

plane driven by a motor of a certain velocity and with wings slanted in a particular direction also must rise.

When this principle of lawfulness is applied to human beings and their activities, certain difficulties which are not present in the analysis of inanimate objects seem to arise. An individual's behavior that is viewed scientifically by an objective observer is said to be "determined" by his personality—which is the culmination of all his past experiences and his hereditary equipment as that equipment has been modified by the experiences—and by the situation that is confronting him. In this scientific sense, every human action must occur under the combined conditions of personality and situation. If a very hot object comes in contact with the skin and if the end organs and nervous system are intact, there must be a feeling of heat and pain. The feeling can be changed only by altering the temperature of the object or by securing a person without tactual sensitivity or one whose "conditioning" to hot objects produces another kind of feeling within him. Thus the "objective" analysis of behavior leads to the belief that certain sequences of events are inevitable.

But when the individual himself introspects concerning his behavior *before* it occurs, it is seldom that only one sequence of events appears to him as inevitable. "Shall I do this or that or both or neither?" is a real question to most people and it is clear to them that they are faced with alternative courses of action. Inevitability is admitted only when there has been a drastic change in the external environment. The outside observer, the scientist, who analyzes the behavior of an individual, however, can still maintain that this behavior is lawful by a reference not only to external changes but also to alterations within the individual himself. The "causes" of these latter alterations are difficult to detect: perhaps physiological factors like the secretions of the endocrine glands have been at work, perhaps conscious and unconscious forces of the personality have affected one another. An adult who has to make an intellectual decision will swear that during his oscillations the environmental

pressures have remained unchanged and constant and that his decision emerges from the interplay of forces within himself. Only afterwards, in most cases, can this decision be rationalized by the astute outside observer in a deterministic way. This observer, moreover, could have given just as reasonable an explanation if the individual's behavior had been different, since the data on which the explanation is based are derived from a complex personality and since this type of human complexity can be interpreted in various ways.

Then the moment more than one personality is involved, the outside observer is confronted with a still greater variety of possible interpretations; it becomes extremely difficult, consequently, to postulate invariable sequences of behavior. Thus when two people are contemplating a decision that affects them jointly, the task of predicting the outcome is almost impossible if the analysis is confined to them as personalities under the existing conditions. In the first place, as has been pointed out, an observer seldom knows enough about one individual to be able to deduce his future behavior from the present organization of his personality and from the situation; and in the second place, the interaction of one individual with his environment or of two individuals to one another and with their environments is enormously complex and frequently unforeseeable. When the behavior to be predicted, moreover, concerns a still larger group of people like a parliament, a community, or an entire nation, this observer, if he confines himself to a logical, deductive analysis, feels that he is going insane or that he must abandon the project altogether. It cannot be forgotten, however, that the logical deductive position is still sound even when the data are complex; for a knowledge of these data and of appropriate principles conceivably *could* give the solution.

Since planning always involves many people and since it is impossible, from a practical point of view, to give a precise prediction concerning groups of people who are interacting, it follows that planning or a specific type of plan can never be considered completely inevitable or not inevitable. There remains an important element of voluntarism

in human affairs when the outcome of those affairs is anticipated in advance. The scientific treatment of people and their society does not yield absolute certainty and no doubt never will. The desirability or undesirability of planning, therefore, cannot be determined by a reference to its inevitability in the strict scientific sense.

Science, however, has evolved two other methods for predicting the behavior of many individuals. Neither one of these methods can convince the impartial observer that planning is an inevitable activity of people and hence, to a certain degree, desirable; but together they appear to indicate that many kinds of planning are at least necessary. The first of these methods concentrates upon deducing the gross behavior of masses of individuals and the second upon the conceptualization of trends.

#### *Necessity for Planning*

When the gross behavior of masses of individuals is deduced, it is suggested that certain consequences are bound to follow for some or perhaps for the majority of them. The question of which particular individual will contribute to these consequences is not discussed, for it is sufficient to know that by and large the general sequence will occur. The economist, as pointed out above, is the outstanding example of the social scientist who attempts to exploit this procedure.

One of the most general statements that can be adduced from a survey of the social sciences is this: when men at every level of their existence are faced with problems, they seek to find some kind of a solution. This generalization can be expressed in terms of every social science, but its implications are the same. The kind of solution men find, furthermore, frequently depends on the ready-made solutions at their disposal in their social environments. Planning happens to be a solution which already exists in society and at which individuals arrive as they are frustrated.

Sociologically it seems evident that the mere transmission

of the cultural heritage eventually may lead to disintegration. For, with the exception of a few tribes that have been able to remain isolated, like those in Central Australia and in parts of Africa, environmental conditions are always changing as a result of natural and human activity or of diffusion from other societies. A heritage, moreover, is continually imposed upon a new set of individuals since all men are mortal. These latter individuals accept or reject that heritage in ways that are peculiar to their personality organizations and to the problems of their particular historical time. In the face of necessary change, the society is forced to accept some kind of a social reorganization and such a reorganization is usually planned in some form or other. It is thus possible to interpret the decline of great societies in the past: for varied reasons they have been impotent in the face of a situation that demanded a new plan. The social heritage, in short, when it proves inadequate, has to be bolstered by a plan.

The individual who is faced with personal difficulties, moreover, seeks to free himself from frustration by planning some kind of a substitute response. Aggression, as a response to frustration, tends to be blind and not completely satisfactory to the organism. People who are unable to plan solutions to their difficulties are disorganized and at the mercy of the forces that surround them: they cannot attain goals, their drives are not gratified, and many of their present activities tend to be extinguished. Sometimes the wrong kind of plan from the social point of view is adopted and then the individual is punished for being antisocial or given psychiatric guidance to help his neuroticism or he is incarcerated as an aid to his psychosis. It must be recognized that substitute activity need not always be highly sophisticated. The child, blocked from obtaining a desirable object directly, stands on a chair to reach it; this mode of attack satisfies all the requirements of an individual plan.

Planning occurs, therefore, when the society or the individual is frustrated by a difficulty that cannot be solved automatically. Where there is frustration, it can be antici-



pated that some form of planning must emerge. The emergence, however, may not occur immediately: there may be delay, there may be mere aggression, there may be simply a breakdown of the forces of organization.

The frustrations of American society have been enumerated time and time again throughout this book. Few people pretend even to themselves that the present social, economic, and political arrangements are perfect. The solution they suggest is always some form of planning. Clashes of opinion occur when the question of the precise plan that should or must be employed is raised. The difference, for example, between the rugged individualist and the communist is not that the former is opposed to planning and that the latter is in favor of it; rather the individualist believes that the individual plans of men, together with their self-initiated social plans, are adequate and need not be replaced by the master plans of communism.

There is some evidence which might lead one to predict that the solution to frustration must be individual plans. For such plans, being formulated by the individuals for whom they are intended, are likely to take their personalities into account and be adapted to them. They are more or less voluntarily imposed and therefore do not contain the frustrating element of compulsion. They tend to conform to the peculiar environmental conditions that confront people. And socially they are less expensive to society since their enforcement is personal and does not require the supervision of a vast bureaucracy.

Individual plans, however, do not provide completely adequate solutions and therefore it is probable that they will be supplemented by social, economic, political, and regional plans. Every society has to have certain mechanisms of social control in order to regulate the conflicts that occur when people with more or less distinct personalities live together. The rules of the society must be enforced by specific officials and by specific institutions. To the extent that the youth is indoctrinated with these rules, to that extent a police force becomes less essential. Were Americans, conse-

quently, able to develop comparatively peaceful relations with one another, there would be no need for social, economic, or political planning. The United States would be an anarchy.

There are various clear-cut situations, then, in which the individual plans of men cannot conceivably be adequate to cope with the difficulties that are involved. Some of these have been mentioned in the chapter on social planning; they range from highway construction to flood control and public health measures. If the desirable value inherent in each of these reforms is assumed and if the interdependent nature of society is accepted, then the inevitability of some social planning is patently clear. Individuals alone are simply powerless; only by joint coöperation and by being compelled to conform to the details of a social plan can many of their problems be solved.

Economic plans, on the other hand, cannot be so easily deduced from the problems of the situation they are supposed to remedy. It is true that, in solving the problem of natural and economic scarcity, the technique of encouraging almost completely free competition between the plans of individuals has not been too successful and that the present economic plight of the nation certainly springs at least partially from the ruthlessness of individual strivings and alliances. So many of the economic plans that have been adopted merely represent the feeble efforts of individuals and of government to doctor an ugly situation. Previously it has been shown<sup>1</sup> that the problem of employment cannot be solved by returning to the productive level of 1929, since the productivity of labor has increased so much in the meantime. There is no guarantee that individual producers can or will increase their output over the 1929 level so that more workers may be employed; for this reason some kind of an economic plan whose goal is the increase of employment—whether by increasing production, decreasing hours of work, or a public works program—seems imperative. Similarly since inventions or technological changes continue to occur

<sup>1</sup> Above, pp. 113-115.

with increasing frequency, since many of them eventually affect large sections of the population, and since the entrepreneurs who first adopt them are usually as individuals powerless to alleviate the social problems caused by their adoption, few people are convinced that industry or agriculture is able, for example, to absorb those who are thrown out of work; to mitigate the evils of these changes, therefore, some kind of social and economic plan appears to be the only possible solution. For a variety of reasons, the individual producer is not able to take advantage of all the technological advances that have been made; thus three independent surveys of different industries reveal that in the middle 'thirties over 60 per cent of existing machinery was obsolete.<sup>2</sup> Whether private initiative is able to formulate its plans to eliminate such wastes is perhaps very questionable.

Political plans, moreover, have had to be adopted in order to enforce and execute social and economic plans or to meet realistically the perils of an aggressive international situation. Sometimes they are designed to add profit and prestige to individual plans and are, consequently, peculiar variations of individual plans. On the whole, however, they have attempted to meet the needs of society and its people, even though the mistakes they have made in respect to ends and means have been numerous. And regional plans have come into existence in an effort to solve problems whose scope is greater than that of the separate community or state and smaller than that of the entire nation.

The impression that is obtained after surveying the sweep of planning in America is indeed a chaotic one. Everywhere there are plans and counterplans going off in all directions simultaneously. Perhaps this is as it should be, for it certainly signifies that Americans are not being regimented by one master plan. The existence of so many plans, moreover, seems symptomatic of the fact that people are groping for the plans they must evolve, but that they have not found them.

<sup>2</sup> Ogburn (121), pp. 12-13.

*Trends toward Planning*

Another method by means of which the social sciences predict the behavior of many people is through the use of trends. Here the investigator has no interest in the behavior of any particular individual or small group of individuals but concentrates on mass movements of many individuals. A trend, it has been said, is nothing more than the subjective generalization concerning past and present conditions by a shrewd observer, and it presumes to suggest that these conditions are changing and will continue to change in the future as they have been previously changing.

It is all too evident that America and every industrial society are growing more and more complex. This trend is due, as has been said, to the accelerated rate at which inventions occur as the number of culture traits increases and to the rapid diffusion between all parts of the world which has resulted from efficient methods of transportation and communication. International patents and copyrights merely regulate the financial return and social prestige that the inventor receives; they do not hinder diffusion appreciably. In the modern world only military advances of a technical nature are kept secret; but even here diffusion occurs through spies, through observation of maneuvers and actual wars, and through the deliberate policy of permitting abandoned practices to be sold to foreign countries as soon as they have been replaced by more efficient ones. Both scholarship and science in general have given impetus to what is called cultural and technological advance. As Linton has remarked, "there has never been a time in history when individuals were afforded a better opportunity to add to the material aspects of culture," since "invention itself has become a focus of interest as long as it confines itself to mechanical lines."<sup>1</sup>

In the face of this growing complexity, the individual, if he is to survive in a reasonably satisfactory fashion, at-

<sup>1</sup> Linton (89), p. 322.

tempts to plan his existence. As a parent he sees that his children are prepared and prepare themselves for some kind of an occupation. As a child, he attends a school and learns certain skills that will be useful to him later on. As an adolescent, he begins to practice these skills and to select his job. And as an adult he is obliged to plan the routine of his life in such a way that he can satisfy his basic and perhaps some of his cultural drives. The day of impulsive wanderlust is almost over; instead there are schedules, budgets, instalment plans, and insurance schemes. The American worship of the hero-type of personality is doubtless at least partially a reflection of a yearning for the planlessness and recklessness that have practically disappeared.

Socially, too, plans surround the individual at every turn. When he is born, a midwife or a physician may be provided by his parents or by a social authority; and almost immediately he is placed upon what is thought to be a scientific feeding schedule. When he is young, the task of educating him and indoctrinating him with the rules of his society is quickly taken away from his parents and supervised by the school. When he is well, public authorities make many efforts to prevent him from becoming ill by preventative measures. When he is ill, a corps of physicians with appliances is usually ready to attend him. When he is disposed to recreate, he plays on land designated for that purpose, he winds around roads that have been constructed to carry him, or he patronizes the commercial forms of entertainment that offer him so many alluring inducements to enter or to listen or to see. When, in fact, one of his individual plans fails, he is compelled or he allows himself to be a social charge; or else he agitates to secure assistance from some public agency.

The economic system, furthermore, reveals increasing signs that it is being rationalized and planned in larger units. Monopolies, cartels, department stores, chain stores, branch offices, skyscrapers, all of these terms refer to phenomena that demonstrate the growing consolidation of business. The trend is also discernible even in agriculture

which, with the aid of efficient machinery, is able to exploit many acres of land rather than a few. The craftsman and the small shopkeeper seem to be survivals from an age that has passed. Indeed it is no exaggeration to repeat the banal observation that this is an age of specialization; specializations means division of labor and, for labor to be divided into many hands, some economic plan has been found to be essential. There are, to be sure, sporadic attempts to decentralize industry and agriculture, as has been shown in a previous chapter; but this tendency on the whole, is certainly counterbalanced by the growth of larger corporations in urban areas.

And politically the spirit of the age appears to be, on the whole, a collectivistic one. It is this trend that is most bitterly fought and, according to the point of this book, should be fought at many but not all points. So much of modern social and economic planning is a by-product of political planning that it is difficult to imagine sometimes how master planning can be prevented. Another way of stating that individualism is on the decline is to point out that the rôle of government is on the up-grade. Policeman, law courts, fireman, educators, and tariff commissions have been supplemented with a vast army of civil servants and politicians whose activity embraces almost every aspect of the individual's way of life. The existence of so many different kinds of regions in the United States, finally, is a very definite indication of the need for this type of planning which does transcend the individual plans of men.

There is one other ground for believing that planned activities will increase in the future. Any plan, as has been shown,<sup>4</sup> is a type of social invention and hence may be expected to follow the same trend which all inventions do pursue. Plans also feed upon plans and greater planning experience provides still more information with which to formulate new programs.

The trend everywhere, consequently, is in the direction of planning. One may agree or disagree with planning itself,

<sup>4</sup> Above, pp. 41-43.

but this observation seems inescapable. Even he who opposes planning has to take the trend into account in formulating his plans to abolish planning.

In this chapter it has been shown that planning is more or less necessary and it has been argued that planning appears somewhat desirable since it offers a solution to problems that are perplexing people and since there is a discernible trend away from unplanned chaos. The question concerning the need for planning, however, has not been satisfactorily answered. Men and women must continue to wonder exactly what kinds of planning should be encouraged.

Unfortunately there is no conceivable way of answering this question. All that can be said, perhaps, is to issue a warning: no plan, including an individual one, can ever be completely successful. For success implies the achievement of a desirable value and desirable values invariably remain elusive. As long as there are individual differences, people will vary in respect to their capacity to be frustrated and to be gratified or to attain any postulated goal. The state of knowledge and man's uncertainty concerning values, it has been shown, precludes the possibility of breeding a happy race of people through eugenic means. Were society to possess a recipe for rearing children in such a way that they would be prone to be gratified rather than frustrated and were social institutions to be rearranged so that they would promote only desirable social values, heaven would not yet be within the grasp of mankind. For parents cannot always follow instructions; and the momentary heaven never lasts, since inevitable social changes always create a hell for someone.

It is, moreover, in the realm of social planning that genuine doubts concerning the desirability of planning must be raised. There is no absolutely convincing evidence to indicate that more and more individual plans must give way to social planning or even that men are capable of administering social and especially master plans. Only man's knowledge about human beings allows him to assert that planning

frequently but not always results from frustration; the assertion that social planning results from the frustration of large groups of people, in spite of the discernible trends that this is so, does not seem nearly so cogent. The issue, consequently, is not whether men should plan in general but whether they should plan specific portions of their social life in particular ways.

Planning *does* occur when customary activity fails to lead to the attainment of goals. The difficulty in determining which types of social planning are absolutely essential is due primarily to the plastic nature of man, for in terms of that nature it can only be confidently maintained that some social plans must be devised which will enable men and women to achieve goals relating to their basic drives and to sexual activity. Thereafter, when other drives are considered—those that involve prestige, security, and generalized activity—the prescription becomes less definite: men can crave so many different kinds of goals.<sup>5</sup> It is for this reason that planning must proceed so cautiously and must be limited by present, future, and possible values: what human beings now demand must be taken into account as well as the future and possible demands of their nature.

<sup>5</sup> Above, pp. 131-133.



## CHAPTER XV

### PLANNING NEXT STEPS

**T**HROUGHOUT the preceding chapters it has been shown that American society requires certain reforms and that many desirable values can be achieved through planning. Specific proposals have seldom been made because this writer has not had the courage to delude himself into acquiring the belief that he possesses attractive panaceas which all Americans should adopt. Only the chapter on regional planning has been frankly normative. It is realized, however, that academic analysis is not sufficient at a time when the very structure of the country and perhaps of civilization seems threatened. In order to round out this discussion of planning, therefore, and in order to reveal some of the explicit consequences of arguments that frequently have been only implicitly advanced, a few suggestions will be given.

#### *Means and Ends*

Any plan proposes or presumes both an end and a means. The end is the goal to be achieved and the means constitutes the procedure through which this goal will be attained for people who are living in a particular social and physical environment. When any plan is called impractical, it is frequently being condemned because the procedure it outlines does not seem to promise the successful attainment of the goal. The means of a specific plan, to be sure, can be determined only in terms of the problem to be solved. There are, nevertheless, certain relationships between means and ends that seem to hold true of all plans.

In the development of regions in America, it is often necessary to disregard arbitrary state boundaries. Both the inhabitants of the states and the upholders of the Federal Constitution by no stretch of the imagination can be called

eager to forget these boundaries. Under the circumstances any plan that transcends existing boundaries has to concern itself with the legality of its proposal, and the legality in turn requires the skillful formulation of legislation and perhaps endless arguments in the courts. Short of a revolution, the boundaries cannot be brushed aside. Similar obstacles of a human or mechanical nature must be overcome before almost any plan can be executed. Such obstacles, however, need not be considered here when, from the long-range point of view, they are petty details that simply delay the plan; but when they seem to affect the goal of the plan itself, they cannot be overlooked.

Many social plans require rather significant changes in people's way of life. A soil-conservation program demands that farmers alter their time-worn approach to land and adopt scientifically approved measures. Planning in a social region induces people to be active participants in the affairs of their community and region. Both Russia and Germany have had to alter almost the entire philosophy of living which their people had, respectively, before 1917 and 1933; on the basis of the old social heritage, a new one had to be superimposed. If the ends of these social plans are assumed, for the moment, to be desirable, attention may be directed upon their means.

The process of social change signifies that people are being changed and that during the process they are acquiring new or modified drives, attitudes, knowledge, and skills. The prevention of soil erosion necessitates coöperation with some central authority which directs the work of reclaiming the soil and of planting properly. A regional plan like the Tennessee Valley Authority leads to the supervision of the lives of the inhabitants until its scattered objectives are achieved; and it frustrates those who are unwilling or unable to participate in the project. The postrevolutionary period of a country is an enthusiastic one and the enthusiasm is engendered by hatred for those inside and outside who would bring on a counterrevolution and by the feeling that the leaders are pioneering toward a better world. Eventually,

however, the soil may be conserved, the region may be comparatively self-sufficient, and the counterrevolution may be stamped out of existence. Then what? With the attainment of the plans' objectives, the people will have changed in ways that have been suggested: they have been affected by the means.

A more dramatic illustration of the relations of means to ends is furnished by the military forces after they have attained the end of winning a war. When they return home, they are more or less changed people. Thereafter they may contribute to an increased crime rate. They may experience difficulties in fitting themselves into the old routines. Or they may cherish their esprit de corps through the organization of a group like the American Legion which then affects the rest of the country in more than financial ways.

It seems idle, except in a few instances, consequently, to assert that ends "justify" means. The truer statement seems to be that means can affect ends and that the former should be taken into account when the latter are planned. Ends and means are almost polar categories; any plan, therefore, must be concerned with their relationship.

The difficulty of finding the right means for the good end appears in any discussion concerning the use of violence or revolution. These means are very probably bad for a variety of reasons. In the first place, they tend to disturb too drastically and too ruthlessly an industrial society that is delicately balanced and that cannot always be controlled and managed by the group which seizes power. Good revolutionaries, as many of the old guard in Soviet Russia have discovered, remain good revolutionaries and do not always make efficient managers of the new order; they may be proficient agitators for change but these very aggressive traits of their personalities can prevent them from ever planning constructively. A revolution needs a group of technicians who are willing and able to plan the new society.

Then, secondly, when people have been given an opportunity to express the aggression they have for whatever reasons, they may develop corresponding attitudes toward this

method of expression and subsequently they may be unwilling to curb their aggression in behalf of the new plans which they, perhaps, have only verbally desired. "The longer violence has been used, the more difficult do the users find it to perform compensatory acts of non-violence."<sup>1</sup> And from the sociological point of view it might be said that revolutions cannot escape the stable elements of the society in which they occur; for after the seizure of power the old traditions still persist and people have to be re-created into different personalities.

And yet there are equally potent arguments in favor of the necessity for violence and revolution under certain circumstances. The powers of evil may be so strong that any policy of gradualism is impractical. This is what tends to happen in a democracy when powerful business interests seek to prevent even the expression of a point of view different from their own. Such oppression, furthermore, creates the frustration that leads to the violent expression of aggression in a mass uprising. It may be, too, that a frustrated people requires the release of violence before they will be willing to cooperate with the new order and that a prerequisite to their cooperation is the enthusiasm they seem to have in the postrevolutionary period. Again, on the whole, "the verdict of history" is not clear concerning the desirability of revolution and violence and, even if it were clear, it might not be applicable to modern times. Certainly a revolution should be avoided for reasons that have been mentioned, but just as certainly the conditions that give rise to revolutions should likewise be avoided. What is here advocated, then, is gradualism.

It sounds sensible at first to maintain that reforms and plans should be executed gradually. For in this way and at a given moment some of the cruelties of frustration need not appear. To avoid abrupt changes people can and should be prepared for gradual changes in nonabrupt ways. They must be taught to expect change and then to adapt themselves to the new requirements of the future. If they know

<sup>1</sup> Huxley (72), p. 31.

approximately what is coming, they can make the necessary adaptations in their own individual plans. With gradualism there need not be the painful rift between children and parents, between the new and the old.

Gradualism, however, is a rather fuzzy concept. No man can say how quickly or how slowly a plan should be executed. In some instances, consequently, gradualism may mean simply a premium upon the status quo under the guise of advocating changes that do not actually occur. From the long-time historical perspective, moreover, it may be inefficient to postpone reform; it is possible to argue that, when the present generation is coddled lest it be frustrated by quick changes, the future generation is deprived of potential gratification.

The generation living at the moment can and should have little sympathy with this view that places the utopia in the future for its children. It is true, if fiction and sociological studies are to be believed, that men, especially the earlier Americans, have been motivated to perform heroic deeds and to make sacrifices due to the comforting thought that their children thereby would lead a better life. It is necessary, nevertheless, to be suspicious of this form of fantasy-gratification. People want to achieve their goals here and now, and they may be only deluding and frustrating themselves by transferring the good fruits to their descendants. An impartial god might look with benevolence upon the deeds of one generation in behalf of the next, but little good this sort of immortality would do the first generation while it lived. And then even from a rather mundane, finite point of view such self-denial seems foolish, inasmuch as the desirable values of the future and the society that should embody them are not at all clear. There is a vast difference between securing group cohesion by recalling the sacrifices of its ancestors or motivating people to present hardships "for their children's sake" and the rational view of the individual who is interested in his own immediate welfare and who is no longer susceptible to these tricks of social control. This is the most important argument in favor of gradualism.

It is an argument, moreover, that is applicable to planning on a smaller and more specific scale. In discussing the need for land planning in America, for example, Gray points out that now "practically all land is in private ownership" and that therefore "the execution of a land plan shall be accomplished by voluntary action rather than coercion, that changes in the use of land, which are sufficiently great to alter the nature of the property rights in land, should be accomplished by due compensation."<sup>2</sup> The suggestion here seems to be to institute change on the basis of conditions that exist, to frustrate as few people as possible, and yet to adopt a policy which prevents the ruthless exploitation of the country's natural resources. The extent to which present property holders should be treated carefully and kindly cannot be indicated in any precise sense; and there is always the danger that too much care and kindness may hinder the development of the necessary changes.

Social plans, therefore, should be, whenever possible—again the very difficult qualification—gradual plans. They should be formulated and executed only when the joint effect of individual plans is disorder and frustration. In their execution they should cause only a necessary minimum of pain and maladjustment.

### *Scope of Political Planning*

One issue has haunted the entire discussion of social planning and has a direct bearing upon the desirability of major forms of planning: a particular reform which appears desirable on its own merits is frequently not adopted because it appears to be a step in the direction of government regulation. Plans involving highways, communities, and public health, those seeking to control admittedly unfortunate effects of competition, those attempting to curb certain forms of propaganda and the opposition of the intolerant—such plans are seldom accepted eagerly or without really violent opposition when they are to be formulated and exe-

<sup>2</sup> Gray (54), p. 187.

cuted by civil servants. To what extent, therefore, should the agencies of government control and supervise the individual plans of men? As usual this question, being a significant one, cannot be answered; but at least some of the problems that it raises can be suggested.

Many alert Americans have given their approval to the governmental regulation of public utilities and to the experimental plays produced by the WPA when these projects are considered on their own merits. Power rates are too high, it is felt, and the abuse can be corrected in this noncompetitive field only by having the government interfere; and it is equally clear that unemployed actors should be given a job and that the plays have been entertaining. But, the argument continues, power and plays inevitably lead to more and more governmental activity and eventually to the master planning of fascism and communism. The general trend, furthermore, is certainly in the direction of master planning and elsewhere in the world its culmination *appears* to have been a dictatorial government.

This trend has been deplored; increased political control means that "the devil of arbitrariness in human relations"—to use Lippmann's phrase for everything that is contrary to what he calls "the substance of the higher law" and the achievements of liberalism and civilized mankind<sup>3</sup>—is given greater power since the agencies of government are thus enabled to exercise more capricious control over citizens.

Americans, consequently, find themselves in a contradictory position in relation to political planning: they applaud specific reforms and simultaneously condemn the general trend which the reforms seem to accelerate. The horrifying aspect of this predicament is that no man can say which reforms are merely good for what they accomplish and not too bad in respect to their effects upon the entire society. A reform or a plan is an invention, as has been pointed out, and an invention can lead almost anywhere.<sup>4</sup>

In the face of such a dilemma, men are tempted to stop

<sup>3</sup> Lippmann (90), p. 346.

<sup>4</sup> Above, pp. 42-44.

planning. But they cannot stop every plan. If they did, the unemployed would starve, the aged would be beggars, automobile drivers would die by the thousands every minute, farmers would burn their crops; society, in short, would almost cease to exist. Or even if there were fewer plans in America, the results would also be disastrous.

In very simple terms, men cannot be so intimidated by master planning that they must place their faith in anarchism. There is little doubt in anyone's mind, for example, that the Federal Government is the only agency that can conduct foreign affairs; similarly there are innumerable other political plans that seem desirable. Even with a regional commonwealth, moreover, certain political plans would have to continue or be formulated: plans to collect data that would be useful to many regional units; plans regulating interregional relationships; plans involving the comparatively little international trade that might occur; plans, in a word, that would promote the total, national economy and welfare. There must be some agency to coordinate all of the plans that sweep the country, to deal with problems that are never confined to one section, and to view the United States in its broadest perspective. Any one region, for example, has more or less unique conditions in respect to public health, but the abolition and control of communicable diseases have to be accomplished in rather uniform fashion throughout the country. There must be some standardization of provisions for social security if only to avoid the possibility of migration from a less to a more favorable region. And it is utterly inconceivable that each region can be distinct on the basis of every criteria: there is bound to be some overlapping of crops, industry, customs, and recreational centers and, where there is overlapping, some form of interregional control is necessary. No region can be completely self-sufficient; some centralization is imperative.

The serious rub comes, however, when a more specific and debatable problem is considered. Should aid be given to the unemployed, whether in the form of direct relief or public



employment, by the Federal Government, the state, or the local community? Who should control the most wasteful aspects of economic competition? Who should administer old-age insurance? As answers to such questions one finds only a variety of opinions.

Each plan, it may be suggested, must be judged first of all in terms of its possible effects upon Americans and, *whenever possible*, local authorities should be given jurisdiction. "Whenever possible?" Obviously it is difficult to determine the exact meaning of this phrase in practice. In the first place, there are always advantages and disadvantages to a political plan on a national scale as contrasted with a regional or local one: the former may achieve the efficiency of large-scale administration and incur the wastes of huge graft; whereas the latter may achieve efficiency by intimate contact with the people who are affected and incur the wastes of petty graft. Then, secondly, there is the problem of determining which authority has the more desirable value. It may happen that a particular state or a region is reactionary and refuses to adopt a reform which Federal officials and authorities know is to its own advantage; or the state or region may be more progressive than Federal officials in terms of other values. These are some of the difficulties that face men when they must delegate responsibility to some agency of government.

And so public controversy concerning the scope of political planning is bound to continue. Any plan, consequently, will involve the risks that always must be taken whenever a plunge into the partially unknown is essayed. It is only certain that the attempt to plan will continue so long as people remain insecure and frustrated. For this reason there have been political plans which involve diverse phases of people's existence. Merely shouting at the Federal Government to cease and desist from spending money to prevent people from starving or going insane or being exploited or being ruined—which is the typical reactionary cry—is futile. The fear of centralization simply cannot prevent all reform; if centralization and master planning are to be avoided,

then other plans must be formulated and executed successfully in smaller regions. The invasion of the individual plans of men by government cannot and should not be fought unless really adequate alternatives can be proposed.

In the meantime, political and master plans seem to be most alluring expedients to a people made desperate by the conditions that surround them. It cannot be too strongly emphasized that dependency on government is apt to give individuals attitudes which will make them cling to that government even when the emergency is past and that by clinging they prevent the emergency itself from disappearing. Such clinging does not seem desirable: it inhibits men and women from formulating their own plans and from receiving the gratification that self-formulation seems to offer. Before alternative forms are found, however, and before Americans can be made aware even of the necessity of finding them, there is the real danger that the society will accord prestige only to master plans. This is the peril to liberty that few Americans, no matter what their political faith chances to be, fail to recognize. Perhaps this writer is incorrect in emphasizing the potential frustrations of master plans. Perhaps people do not want to formulate and then realize their individual plans. Perhaps they really are gratified by the cohesive social and economic and political life that a dictatorship is able to achieve. Perhaps master plans are not so bad and the trend toward centralization is not to be deplored as much as it has been. Perhaps all this is so, but it is difficult to believe that it is. Since Americans evidently do hold the contrary beliefs, they must reform themselves and their institutions in such a way that they can prove to everyone, including their children and the children of dictators, that they are correct.

#### *Curbing of Master Plans*

The last sentence in the preceding paragraph is not a bit of hysterical oratory. For there have been indications that semi-fascist or outright fascist plans are increasing in

America. People have become dissatisfied with many of their democratic institutions. The small industrial group whose influence is so powerful has grown bitter toward labor organizations and toward the political and economic plans of government. In addition to the foreign groups there have been at least eight hundred smaller organizations which claim that they find salvation in the fascist type of organization and in anti-Semitism.<sup>5</sup> And the danger of war definitely promotes centralization as a measure of national defense. But must such a trend be accepted and must Americans, therefore, resign themselves to it?

As is true of war, the tendency toward fascism can be overcome only by reducing the general frustration throughout the country and by directing the aggression people possess along nonfascist channels. For this reason every individual or social plan that seeks to gratify people to the maximum degree and frustrate them to the minimum is also relevant to the task of combating fascism. Or, to rephrase the proposal, to avoid fascism there must be planning against fascism and for the better life.

In previous chapters available evidence has been interpreted by the present writer in such a way that at the moment and in the United States some social, economic, political, and regional planning seems desirable, whereas master planning, though frequently necessary, appears undesirable. The thesis is that there can be no anarchy in America and there should not be complete collectivism. The hope of the future—yes, both the immediate and far-flung future—appears to rest in a kind of regionalism small enough to reflect the changing preferences of people, small enough to lay restraints upon administrators and other public servants who are always tempted to inject too much of their own private values into plans, small enough to make life meaningful and sociable; but large enough so that significant problems can be planned, large enough so that some degree of self-sufficiency can be achieved, large enough so that people will develop an in-group loyalty which will motivate them to

<sup>5</sup> Institute for Propaganda Analysis (73), p. 1.

participate in planning without giving them a super-patriotism and hence the inclination to go to war.

Any social plan, furthermore, which is presented and executed in such a way that it is able to arouse the imagination of the people who are affected by it can serve to drain off fascist tendencies. The esprit de corps that characterizes any group whose joint efforts are obviously necessary for the common welfare has been frequently commented upon; it exists even in a modern factory where the attitudes of the workers toward the employer whose profits they do not share are, to say the least, ambivalent. This kind of enthusiasm is discernible in the four- or five-year plans of the dictators, and in democratic countries it is observable in the various coöperatives and social organizations. Thus the figures of a balance sheet are thrilling only when the individual feels that his welfare is tied in some way or other to their progress. The farmers of the Middle West cannot be expected voluntarily to leave one of their fields fallow for a year or two in order to assist a soil-conservation campaign; only when they appreciate their dependence upon the entire plan will they willingly make what seems at first glance to be only a personal sacrifice. An active participation in social planning, therefore, may induce the individual to feel attached to his society, to differentiate between coöperation and compulsion, and to appreciate the importance of his own individual plans in relation to larger plans—and will thus remove somewhat the danger of falling victim to the slippery phrases and unattainable promises of fascism.

If individual plans flourish in a simple society and if master plans seem to be required by the complexities of an industrial, rationalized society, then it is so tempting to suggest that, to avoid master plans, it is necessary to simplify the society that gives rise to them. This suggestion entails little more than turning back the course of history and it happens to be another example of sheer romanticism. In the first place, individual plans do not always flourish in simple societies; some of the most regimented people in the world are "the noble savages" whose social system forces upon

them a very rigid code.<sup>6</sup> In the second place, history cannot be turned back as easily as it is for city dwellers to go on a camping trip in the northern or southern woods. People in an industrial society have been so indoctrinated with the values of this kind of society and they are so inclined to find mechanical progress efficient and satisfying that they cannot be made over into the type of individual who once inhabited a relatively self-sufficient society at an earlier stage. The proposal, finally, seems to be impractical. Men in control and the rulers of opposing nations will not readily agree to walk backwards too, regardless of how alluring a particular desirable value chances to be. The compromise suggestion often given is that the complicated society can be made to stand still by curbing the inventions that lead to rapid changes. Such a moratorium has already been practiced by certain industrial organizations in order to prevent the spread of inventions that would decrease their own profits. On a larger scale, however, it cannot be effective inasmuch as the urge to invent is a function of the inventor's personality and of the size of the social base at his disposal; these factors cannot be curbed completely by an official regulation. It may very well be that society as it continues to expand is doomed to destruction, as the critics of despair point out; but, whether it is doomed or not, it apparently must plan its course.

### *The Planning Personality*

Even an ideal society to be or remain ideal requires people adapted to the opportunities it offers. At the same time, since society is little more than a collective term which summarizes the personalities who compose it, it is really made ideal only by the creation of ideal people. The distinction between individuals and their society simply indicates that people are of different ages and that therefore the older generation constitutes the forming forces for the younger. Children must be planned as well as environments or re-

<sup>6</sup> Above, pp. 48-49.

gions. The eternal paradox of planning is that it involves a dialectical process which can never be halted or disentangled: an environment is planned to help its people and people are planned to respond to their environment. People, consequently, can never be neglected and it is the function of this concluding section to reemphasize this point. When people are being brought to the foreground again, the writer is not merely growing sentimental at the end of his book; he is reminding his readers for the last time that plans of men should be designed for men and that the development of personality is the principal goal of all planning.

Man seeks certainty and it is disquieting to find from the present survey that the solutions to the major problems which annoy him are not at all certain. The plans that he makes are more or less conscientious attempts to better his status or at least the status of one group or class in the nation. He wishes to be free to plan his own life successfully, and with his fellows he is setting forces in motion that seem to be leading to the very kind of master planning he desires to avoid. He is groping for but he has not found a balance between the tendency toward centralization and specialization on the one hand and decentralization and self-sufficiency on the other. There is little cause to wonder that any question concerning desirable values is so puzzling to him.

Nor are the answers of the scientists and the planner very comforting. Binding themselves into little compartments, they deliberately limit the scope of their activity and their thinking and emerge with generalizations and predictions that are feeble and that avoid the problem of value by ignoring it almost completely. And yet it is from science and from its hard-worked sibling, education, that help must come.

What is this help? It is help that must affect personalities in ways that will *almost* make them planners of values. Only through the exercise of systematic scientific techniques can laymen and planners obtain the knowledge of people and their environment that must serve as the basis of planning. The contents of the soil, the flow of a river, the incidence of crime, the private attitudes of citizens cannot be intuited;

they have to be understood and analyzed by scientists who have been trained to perform just these tasks. Only through education can laymen and planners be given the skill with which they can execute or formulate a plan. The ability to cooperate or to visualize the future as concretely as possible is not blown into the nervous system by a divine master mind; it is an ability that is acquired through social participation with one's fellows. Only through approaching people and their environments in a realistic, more or less debunked manner can laymen and planners puncture some of the nonsense that characterizes human beings in their social rôle as members of society. The destiny of the country is a meaningless phrase which serves to snare people into doing what they had not planned to do. The devil take the nation; scientifically or realistically—the words in this connection are practically synonymous—it is the people of the nation who are important and for whom plans should be designed. The word "nation" is a clever cloak that conceals the interests of the small group which perpetuates its symbols. There is nothing good or bad about any plan, about any institution, about any society as such: the goodness or the badness, it is repeated and repeated, can be judged only in terms of the consequent effects these phenomena have upon live people. Through clear thinking, science, and education can laymen and planners, finally, be driven to plan successfully, i.e., to achieve the minimum of frustration and the maximum of gratification. The un-socialized infant may be considered cute, but from a social point of view he is rather ungainly and remains a nuisance until he is indoctrinated with some of the ideals of his society. People are not going to assist one another if the good that is involved for them is not evident to them. People will plan or cooperate with planners only when they have been made into planning personalities.

And people can be made into planning personalities as a result of the contacts they have in their early youth. Psychologists, psychoanalysts, and psychiatrists all offer evidence to show that the years of childhood are extremely

important in determining the kind of personality that is going to emerge as an adult; theirs is the explanation for the diversity of man's behavior that has been observed by other social scientists. If men and women are to plan, therefore, they should be given the ideals of planning before they have developed drives, attitudes, knowledge, and skill which will compel them to live otherwise. Education, for example, should be more than a technical preparation for a given vocation; it should enable each student to grasp himself and his society with insight. The goal of freedom or any other goal within the individual can be attained only by educating him to strive for it.

But what, it must be asked, is the ideal type of individual? It is so easy to say in reply that *he* is ideal who secures a maximum of gratification and a minimum of frustration. This formula, however, is little more than a bare description without specific content. It certainly could not be, for example, a guide to educational policy. Fact is, even though each society seems to possess an idealized type of person, most people deviate from that type or any other one that is postulated. Here again individual differences inevitably do appear and will appear.

Throughout the development of Western European culture and including the present-day democratic countries it appears, nevertheless, that one kind of individual has been considered desirable. Although the labels applied to him have varied, in most instances he is said to embody a code of "perfectionism" or "self-realization." One phase of this type of personality has already been described in an attempt to justify plans for active and creative types of recreation; the praise of this way of life now continues along more general lines.

The man who strives to have as many experiences as possible, to realize all his ambitions, and to free himself at least partially from the restraints of society has been thought a hero and has been looked upon with envy. Romantic fiction, in truth, is usually based upon a character who possesses such diffuse, overpowering drives. The precise goals of the



drives has varied from epoch to epoch: in Greece it was a philosopher, in Rome a warrior-statesman, in the Middle Ages a knight, in the Renaissance a gentleman, in modern industrialism a businessman or perhaps a Bohemian. The gratifications of the perfectionist are diffuse, varied, and deep; the frustrations he endures are necessary, tragic, but in some way or other—usually by contrast—they enable him to appreciate his gratifications all the more. The specialist has always been respected and, even though it is admitted that he doubtless derives enormous satisfaction from his specialty, it is felt that simultaneously he is warping himself and not being so happy as he might be if his interests were broader. In modern times the praise given to hobbies is indicative of the premium placed upon the “fuller” personality.

The self that is “realized” by the perfectionistic, Faustian type of individual, however, is in large part a social self. Food is eaten, beverages are drunk, women are loved, problems are solved, prestige is obtained by the self in ways that are rather definitely culturally determined. The man is not a hero if he is perverse; and perversity is a way of suggesting that behavior does not conform to the goals of the society. In a simpler, primitive society Faust could never even attempt to conquer as much of the world as he did. A rich personality, consequently, not only possesses diverse drives but also lives in a society where the opportunities for gratification are numerous. What has been said, therefore, is not a hymn of praise to the Nietzschean, Nazi type of superman, for he is ruthless and suffers from a strong conscience as a result of the atrocities he must commit.

If any statement could be formulated by finite men that would indicate the goal of planning in terms of the individual personality, *a rich personality in a society with diverse opportunities* might be that statement. It is true: no one individual can ever achieve such a goal precisely. It is true: the ways in which the goal can be achieved are not stereotyped or even indicated. It is true: inequalities of biological equipment and environmental opportunity can never be erased completely. It is true: this statement only

starts the problem of planning without solving it. It is true: oh, there are millions of modifications and agreement is given willingly, *but*, planning, all types of planning, should be directed at least toward this goal.

There is the danger that a book on planning will leave the impression that planning as such is a thoroughly desirable quality for human beings to possess. Planning, however, requires the individual to be rational, to be resourceful, to extinguish spontaneous activity for the sake of future gratification. It is recognized that such a state of intellectualism is necessary only when basic adjustments cannot be made and when there is frustration. Men prefer careless freedom to planned discipline and the joy they derive from planning is not always an immediate one. They must and should plan when the effects of spontaneity are disastrous. Together they must and should plan a fuller life for themselves so that they can remove the necessity for discipline and master planning. The desirable value of planning, a value that cannot be achieved but that must be sought as long as men are more than animals, is to lead a life whose essence is not regimentation or fascism but the freedom to follow individual purposes and desires.

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