Seminar on Strategic Genocide

Speaker

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Abstract

We examine the strategic foundation to the systematic assault on human rights, like genocide, when different social groups spend financial and real resources to influence a state executive's policy and use genocides instrumentally. In the existing work, as opposed to ours, the executive seeks support from homogeneous groups (selectorates) to retain political power and undertakes genocides to maximize tax revenues (see Carnegie, 2012 & Esteban et al., 2010). In our work, we combine genocides and product market imperfections to understand the motivations for strategic mass killing by social groups. In our work, we make genocides and other human rights abuses a choice variable of powerful social groups and thereby examine the equilibrium consequence of genocides that are strategically chosen by these powerful social groups. We develop a simple duopoly model to characterize a Perfect Nash equilibrium of genocides and establish perplexing comparative static properties of this equilibrium. The primary intuition here is that genocides committed by oligarchies can have serious impacts on the equilibrium of an oligopoly through their effects on the incentives of, and constraints on social groups. We offer a model of endogenous genocides, to our understanding for the first time, to examine genocides in order to establish that the equilibrium outcome in the oligopolistic product market / economy cannot be fully captured by the standard results of oligopoly unless one incorporates oligarchies and their incentives for strategic mass killings. Researchers have to extremely careful in applying the standard tools of oligopoly to the case of genocides as our results suggest that endogenous genocides can reverse most of the known results of game-theoretic models of interactive decisionmaking.

JEL: F1, H4 **Keywords:** Strategic Genocide, Perfect Nash Equilibrium.