

The Servant of India

Editor: S. G. VAZE.

Office: SERVANTS OF INDIA SOCIETY, POONA.

VOL. XVIII, No. 23. }

POONA—THURSDAY, JUNE 6, 1935.

{ INDIAN SUBSN. Rs.6.
FOREIGN 15s.

CONTENTS.

	Page
TOPICS OF THE WEEK	293
ARTICLES :—	
Self-Determination for India.	295
An Unamendable Constitution.	297
Sparks from the Commons' Anvil.	298
REVIEW :—	
Economics of Indian Federation. By Prof. S. G. Puranik, M. A.	301
SHORT NOTICE	302
MISCELLANEA :—	
Let India Determine For Herself— Miss Rathbone's Forceful Plea	302
Kerala Conference Resolutions.	304

Topics of the Week.

Why fight shy?

THE *Times of India*, in its comments on Miss Rathbone's proposal to consult British India on the question of federation, says that the proposal was opposed by the Labour Party. This statement is very misleading. For Mr. Morgan Jones as a spokesman of the Labour Party, said, "in regard to the general sentiment (of self-determination) I confess I have considerable sympathy with it," but he found "a difficulty about the method" proposed for giving effect to the principle of self-determination. Miss Rathbone proposed that all the electors in the Provinces whose legislatures would vote for federation would be regarded as having voted for federation though some of them might actually have voted against it. This, Mr. Jones thought, was not right, and Miss Rathbone herself admitted the difficulty. But the Labour Party's opposition such as it was was limited only to the particular method proposed but not to the principle underlying the amendment. The opposition too was not carried by them so far as to vote in the lobby against Miss Rathbone. Some of the members of the Labour Party only abstained from voting. These members, Major Attlee, Mr. Lansbury, Dr. Addison, Mr. Greenwood, Mr. Jones and some others, were 18 in all. But as many as 12 like Mr. Rhys Davies voted for Miss Rathbone's amendment. In view of these facts it is clearly erroneous to say that the Labour Party was opposed to making the establishment of federation dependent upon the Provincial Legislatures accepting the federal scheme.

OUR contemporary refuses to believe that rejection of federation would meet with India's approval. If Anglo-Indian papers and the Government are so

cocksure about it, why not put the matter to the test? If they do not like Miss Rathbone's plan of consulting Indian opinion but fancy some other, why do they not propose it? We shall agree to it in advance, because we want India to be consulted in some shape or other. "If Congress captured the Provincial legislatures under the new constitution and if they used their power to vote against federation, not on principle, but merely to pursue wrecking tactics, the whole idea of central responsibility would be indefinitely postponed. ... That would benefit nobody except those who fish in troubled waters; it would certainly damage India's peace and prosperity," says the *Times of India*. But if more than half the country take to the pastime of fishing in troubled waters and are bent upon ruining India, how is Sir Samuel Hoare going to have calm waters and ensure peace? By forcing the Bill on India? There will be more troubled waters if he keeps on saying to India: you shall go into the federation and shall keep there for ever.

Quetta Earthquake.

IN the early hours of Friday morning last Quetta experienced a shock of earthquake with more devastating consequences than the Bihar one of last year. Owing to the means of communication having been interrupted the full extent of the havoc wrought by the visitation is not yet known; but even the incomplete account that has come through is enough to stagger one's imagination. The toll of human life taken by these tremours of the earth is terrible. The whole of Quetta and a number of villages have been completely wiped out, burying under the debris how many thousands of human beings one does not know. The present estimates vary between 40,000 and 50,000. Whether it is the one figure or the other, there is no doubt that the death-roll is fearfully heavy. The stench of corpses buried under the fallen city is said to be too dangerous to render the work of salvage possible. And very likely the problem will be solved by blowing up the city—a solution not likely to be generally acceptable. The civil power having ceased to function by the death of prominent officers, martial law has had to be declared and the military is now in charge of the situation.

THE number of those rendered homeless or deprived of all their earthly belongings is sure to run into tens of thousands. And the need for relief is very urgent. We are glad to see that this is being organised on all sides. The Viceroy has promptly moved in the matter by issuing an appeal for a relief fund to which he and Lady Willingdon have together contributed Rs. 5,000. We have no doubt that though the appeal comes too soon after India's splendid effort in connection with the King's Silver Jubilee Fund

that fact will not be allowed to make any difference to the public response to it. An unofficial fund has so far not been initiated, but will, we hope, be soon started, as in the case of Bihar and with equally generous response. An appeal for help in a humanitarian cause has never been made to India in vain. We trust her response on the present occasion will be fully in keeping with that tradition.

* * *

Unjustifiable.

MR. MOHANLAL SAXENA, a Congress member of the Assembly, recently approached Government for permission to visit the Andamans with a view to see things for himself. Allegations of ill-treatment of prisoners sent there are fairly common. That all such statements cannot be altogether groundless is proved by the fact that in some cases prisoners there felt compelled to go on hungerstrikes as a protest against such rough handling. There was thus nothing surprising in Mr. Saxena desiring to study the conditions of life in the Andamans at first-hand. But the Government have come in the way of his curiosity being satisfied.

* * *

FROM inspired explanations of the Government's refusal of his request it must be said that their decision was based on a misconception of the purpose of Mr. Saxena's visit. They somehow persuaded themselves that he was out for an inquiry into these allegations of ill-treatment which, they feared, would be prejudicial to jail discipline. Mr. Saxena for his part explicitly disavows any such intention. His whole object in wishing to go there, he says, was to find out for himself whether conditions there were as satisfactory as have been recently described to be by Dewan Bahadur G. N. Chetty who, curiously enough, was allowed to visit the Andamans for the very purpose which Mr. Saxena had in view. There was nothing devious or underhand about Mr. Saxena's visit and it is difficult to regard Government's refusal as at all justified.

* * *

WE do not think that if Mr. Saxena had been allowed to visit Port Blair, it would have been misunderstood, as they seem to be afraid it would have been, as an attempt on Government's part to forswear their responsibility for the welfare of the prisoners in their charge. As a member of the legislature it is part of his duty sometimes to criticise the jail administration. If this criticism is to be based on facts, as the Government undoubtedly desires it to be, is it right for them thus to thwart his attempts to seek information by a personal study of the conditions in the Andamans? Even yet they would do well to reconsider their decision and make Mr. Saxena's visit to the Andamans possible. If conditions there are as satisfactory as depicted by Mr. Chetty, they have nothing to fear from Mr. Saxena's visit. As a matter of fact his added testimony to the spirit of amity and concord prevailing between the prisoners and the prison officials will only serve to raise them in public estimation. In this connection, it is satisfactory to be told that though Mr. Saxena has been prevented from visiting the Andamans his suggestion for the appointment of a Visitors' Board for the Andamans, as in the case of Indian jails, is receiving the serious consideration of the Government.

* * *

Undiluted Racialism.

IN a recent press interview Mr. Andrews, that sleeplessly watchful friend of Indians overseas, exposed the racial character of the Carter Commission's

recommendation in favour of reservation of the Kenya highlands for Europeans. Originally an area measuring 10,045 square miles was reserved for them; and even though the whole of it had not yet been developed and was not likely to be developed in the near future, an addition of another 6,355 square miles would be made to it when the recommendation in question was carried out. Once this reservation is effected, no piece of land in that area can at any time in the future be transferred to a non-European, which in other words means that the best agricultural land in Kenya will continue to be in European ownership for all time. The area now proposed for reservation comprises some land at present owned by a band of agriculturists from the Punjab. Mr. Andrews describes them as an "industrious body", by which we suppose he means that they will leave no stone unturned to develop the property from the agricultural standpoint. So long as they continue in occupation, well and good. But if by any chance the land some time or the other comes to be transferred to European hands, there is no possibility of its ever reverting to Indian ownership. Well may Mr. Andrews remark in disgust:

This proposal seems to me to show more than anything else the racial character of the whole business. These Indian cultivators from the Punjab are doing far harder work than any European is doing; and they are also object lessons of industry to the Africans round about them, because they do the ploughing with their own hands and are cultivators themselves while the Europeans only direct the cultivation. Yet these Indians are to be turned out for good if ever their lands get into European hands. I have actually lived with these Punjabi cultivators outside Kisumu and they have shown me the splendid work they have done.

* * *

The "Mill-Stone" of Permanent Settlement.

AMONG the major Provinces Bihar and Orissa is the poorest in the sense that the standard of expenditure there is the lowest. There are provinces, e. g., C. P. and Assam, with smaller revenue, Rs. 4.63 and Rs. 2.07 crores respectively, than that of Bihar and Orissa which stands at Rs. 5.08 crores. But their standard of expenditure is nearly double that of Bihar, which is Rs. 1,383 per mille. In common with other provinces Bihar labours under the disability of being allocated sources of revenue which for all practical purposes are incapable of any considerable expansion. Land revenue is the main item on the revenue side used by other provinces for adding to their income. But this is impossible in Bihar and Orissa, four-fifths of which is governed by the permanent settlement. As the provincial administration report for 1933-34 so forcefully points out, the permanent settlement acts as a "mill-stone" round the provincial finances. It then proceeds to criticise it as follows:

The arguments for and against the permanent settlement have filled volumes, but it may safely be said that nowhere are the arguments that it was a grievous mistake so strong as in the province of Bihar and Orissa. It has effectively barred the State from any share in the profits arising from the increasing value of land and the extension of cultivation. In Bihar the fixed land revenue bears little relation to the actual value of the land and in Chota Nagpur there is no relation at all. It has been calculated that if the natural expansion of land revenue with increasing development had not been prevented by the permanent settlement the income of the province would now be some two crores greater than it is.

However much the Bihar Government may fret and fume against the permanent settlement, with the enactment of the new constitution the permanent

settlement promises to be even more permanently fixed than heretofore. For under the new regime a Governor is required to disallow any legislation aiming at its abolition. If Bihar is intent upon an improvement in its finances, it must seek it elsewhere than in the cancellation of the permanent settlement.

Indian Mercantile Marine.

AS our readers are aware, the establishment of the training ship "Dufferin" in the Bombay harbour was the first step on the path of furnishing this country with its own mercantile marine, which is now the accepted policy of the Government. A few scholarships are also made available to Indian boys for training in the United Kingdom in mercantile engineering and provision is made since the beginning of the current year for imparting training in engineering on the ship itself to 25 engineering cadets. But all this is obviously inadequate to the ultimate end in view if it is to be reached within a reasonably short period. The absence of action more effectively and quickly to implement the above policy has naturally given rise to public dissatisfaction which found vent in the Council of State by means of a resolution. This asked for suitable action "to build up an Indian mercantile marine at an early date with a view to an adequate participation of Indian shipping in the coastal and overseas trade of India."

THE principal target of the mover's attack seemed to be the studied unwillingness of the Government to reserve the coastal shipping trade for Indian ships. A recommendation to this effect indeed emanated from the Indian Mercantile Marine Committee and a Bill having the same aim was

promoted by Mr. Haji nearly seven years ago—a Bill however which fatally struck the rock of Government opposition. Reservation of the coastal trade for national shipping and the grant of subsidies are, the mover said, the two recognised methods of creating a national merchant fleet. The former measure was in operation, according to information collected by the League of Nations, in 27 out of 32 maritime countries; but had somehow failed to commend itself to the Indian Government, with the result that only 23 per cent. of the total tonnage operating in the Indian coastal trade was Indian.

SUBSIDIES on a large scale in aid of the shipping industry are given in many European countries, in America and in Great Britain itself. But to think of any assistance to the Indian shipping industry on that scale in the present economic condition of the country is not practical politics. Nor was the mover of the resolution unreasonable enough to suggest help on so liberal a scale. If we understand him aright, his proposal, if accepted, would not have involved Government in an expenditure of more than about Rs. 10 or Rs. 12 lakhs. This was certainly not as fantastic a proposal as the Commerce Secretary tried in vain to make out. Any way it did not meet with his approval which is greatly to be deplored. It is strange that in the whole of his long speech he had nothing to say about the mover's concrete proposal that attempts should be made to raise the percentage of Indian-owned and Indian-managed shipping in the coastal trade from 23 to 51 in a period of five years by means of the licensing system, mail subsidies and like. Does the passage of the resolution by the Council indicate a readiness on Government's part to explore the possibilities of the idea? We hope it does.

SELF-DETERMINATION FOR INDIA.

TIME and again attempts have been made in the House of Commons to persuade the British Government to consult Indian opinion on the question of constitutional reforms. The first move in this direction was made by the Conservative Opposition, and for the reason that it emanated from them it savoured of a desire to defeat the Government somehow or other. Lord Hugh Cecil's appeal to suspend the operation of the new constitution till it was accepted by the Legislative Assembly was essentially right and proper. There are precedents in history for this course. But captious objections were raised to it by the spokesmen of Government and the motion was turned down. The amendment which Miss Rathbone brought forward in the House of Commons on the Report stage was free from these objections. She sought only to give to the Provinces of British India the same freedom to accept or reject Federation that the States enjoy. She pleaded for a reciprocity being established between British India and Indian India. This plea is morally unanswerable. As Mr. Morgan Jones said, "The proposition that, if it be right for the States to have a voice, it is equally right that the people of India have a voice, cannot be controverted as a matter of equity." Since the legislatures to which the decision is to be left under Miss Rathbone's proposal are to be the legislatures elected on the

widened franchise under the new constitution, it cannot be said either, as was said by Sir Samuel Hoare, on the die-hard proposal to leave the decision to the present Legislative Assembly, that it will be naturally the interest of these legislatures to perpetuate themselves and not to give room to new legislatures.

From that point of view the proposal of Miss Rathbone is an improvement on the proposal of Lord Hugh Cecil. But from another point of view it places the people of India in a position of some difficulty. Miss Rathbone has evidently formed a very favourable opinion of the provincial part of the new constitution, but she shares with the Indian people a loathing of the federal part. Indians are not enamoured of the so-called Provincial Autonomy either. If one takes into account the many restrictions which have been placed upon the popular power in the Provinces under the Bill, the cutting up of the electorate into communal compartments, the criss-crossing of various conflicting interests and the superimposition of second chambers, Provincial Autonomy will be seen to be a sham. It may be that there are graver objections to the Federal scheme, for this scheme, in addition to being open to all the objections mentioned above, is open to one more, viz. that it brings in, as Colonel Wedgwood observed, "the Princes of India to hold the balance

and control the country." The disillusionment that was caused to the Labour Party on this question of Federation was well expressed by Mr. Morgan Jones, when speaking on Miss Rathbone's amendment.

I started discussion of this Bill (said he) with a far greater measure, not of enthusiasm, but of acquiescence in relation to these federaticn proposals than I now entertain. I frankly confess that as these discussions have proceeded week after week my enthusiasm for and indeed my acquiescence in this form of Federation have steadily declined. As I have seen this machine of Federation being devised and amplified by the Government, concession after concession being given, not from the standpoint of meeting the wishes of British India, but those of the States, my enthusiasm for Federation has steadily declined.

Similarly there are many in India who started with quite a great deal of enthusiasm for Federation but whose enthusiasm for it entirely evaporated when they saw that the Federal scheme in its final shape would, instead of relieving the people from the bondage of Britain would put them under the additional bondage of the Indian States. There is no doubt that the Indian people as a whole are now afraid, as Colonel Wedgwood put it, of what they are getting. They feel, he said, that "they are getting rid of King Log and getting King Stork. It is only fair that they should have a voice and not be punished by being given a compulsory King Stork for previously having demanded a possibly even more voracious bird." Indians are genuinely alarmed at what is happening, but this must not be understood to mean that they are willing to accept the Provincial part of the Bill. At this point Indian opinion is clearly at variance with the opinion which Miss Rathbone expressed.

But leaving this aside and considering the question of Federation as dissociated from the acceptance of the Provincial Autonomy portion which Miss Rathbone's amendment implies, we have no doubt whatever that Indian opinion as a whole would reject Federation. If the question that Miss Rathbone proposes is put to the Provincial legislatures their answer will be emphatically and overwhelmingly against Federation. She entertains some doubt as to whether Indians consider the constitution as a definite step backwards and would prefer to remain under the present constitution. There need be no doubt as to the general feeling. We are glad to find her referring to the Servants of India Society as a body which would much rather continue under the existing constitution than go under the new one, but she isolates the Liberal from the Society and clubbing the Liberals and Moslems together, says that they "would be disappointed if the Bill were withdrawn." Moslems would perhaps be disappointed, they would like to go on with Provincial reform, leaving Central reforms to come when they will. But this will be the view of the more backward section of the Moslem community while the advanced group led by Mr. Jinnah will, like the Liberals, insist upon a comprehensive measure dealing both with Provincial and Central reform. But whatever that be, the Moslems like most other groups will certainly vote against the federal part of the new constitution. In any

case nothing will be lost, as Miss Rathbone and Colonel Wedgwood pointed out, either from the British or Indian point of view, by consulting the provincial legislatures on the question of Federation. If they vote in its favour the Government's hands will be immensely strengthened in putting it into force. If they vote against it the responsibility for maintaining the existing political division between British India and Indian India will be entirely theirs. Sir Samuel Hoare in his reply said, "The safest method of approach to constitutional reform in India is an approach over the whole field. I regard our scheme as a single comprehensive scheme. I am not prepared to countenance any proposal that divides the scheme into two parts and that would make it possible for one part to come into operation without the other." If this is the Government's policy, the whole scheme, and not merely the federal portion of it, will have to be scrapped if the Federal portion of the Bill is rejected by the Provincial legislatures. That will suit the Indian people admirably. There is no objection, therefore, from the point of view of the Indian people to the adoption of Miss Rathbone's amendment, and there should be none from the point of view of the Government either. If the whole scheme of reforms has to be put away it will be because the Indian people have wished it so, and the Government will be quit of its responsibility in the matter.

It is just because the Government is certain that the Provincial legislatures will turn down Federation that it is so unwilling to refer the question to them. "Supposing", said Sir Samuel Hoare, "that a bare majority in the Provinces voted for Federation, I do not believe that you would ever be able to compel the minority to accept that. . . . I hold very strongly the view that it would be dangerous." How is it dangerous? If the Federation can work with a bare majority of the States in, why can it not work with a bare majority of the Provinces in? And if the dissenting minority of the Provinces cannot be compelled to enter the Federation, would it be a better way of solving the difficulty to compel all the Provinces to join Federation irrespective of their wishes? What Sir Samuel Hoare means is: "Don't consult the provinces at all. If you do some of them, at any rate, are sure to keep out of the Federation and then it will not be possible to bring them in by force. If however you have not consulted them at all then it would be easier to get them all into the Federation, for in that case you would always be able to pretend that they all desired it. This pretence will not be available if you started consulting them." But Sir Samuel Hoare makes it plain that he is conscious of what the answer of the Provincial legislatures will be if the question that Miss Rathbone proposes is put to them. If he were sure that they would be favourable to Federation he would have gladly welcomed the amendment. But he knows that he cannot allow India to exercise the right of self-determination in any shape or form, and he made no bones about it. He said bluntly, "It is

scheme for which Parliament is responsible and which Parliament is prepared to set in operation", whether Indians like it or not. To force what is claimed to be a democracy on a people against their wishes is a procedure, as Mr. Bailey put it in this debate and as Lord Hugh Cecil put in an earlier debate, that "reeks of inconsistency." Mr. Bailey

asked, "If you have any faith in the constitution of India, why do you not introduce it constitutionally, democratically, instead of on authoritarian basis?" The answer to the question is, the Government has no faith in the constitution and knows that it cannot come into force unless the people of India are dragged into it.

AN UNAMENDABLE CONSTITUTION.

THE new constitution, when enacted, will be incapable of being further amended in India, without reference to the British Parliament, except in so far as express provision is made in the constitution itself for such amendment. There is only one Clause in the India Bill, Clause 176, concerning the Railway Authority, which gives power to the federal legislature to introduce certain changes, subject to the previous sanction of the Governor-General and His Majesty's assent. In every other matter recourse to Parliament is necessary for alterations in the constitution. Both British India and the Indian States stand on the same footing in this respect. Under Clause 134 the States are given the power to contract out of the arrangements relating to interference with water supplies. Except for such small matters, the States too, if they once accede to federation, can have no extension of the powers of self-government proposed in the Bill unless Parliament agrees to it. They too, like British India, have to wait upon Parliament's pleasure. While the States have no power to enlarge the scope of self-government in India, they will possess ample power to prevent the scope of self-government from being enlarged even by Parliament. It is not merely the case that, if Parliament chooses to make any constitutional changes in the federal provisions to which the unanimous consent of all the federating States is not forthcoming, the States that dissent will have the right to claim that the changes made shall not operate within their borders, but they will have the further right to say that the federal structure has been so modified by the changes as to make their very accession to federation void. The effect of introducing changes in the federal constitution without the consent of the States would be to compel or to enable the States to leave the federation. The spokesmen of the British Government of course do not use such vulgar language. They never admit that secession from the federation which they are calling into existence is even theoretically possible. They employ much more polished—and to men like us unversed in diplomacy somewhat ambiguous—phrases. They say, amendment of the federal provisions without consent of any individual State will give the State "(to quote the Attorney-General's form of words) the right to reconsider its position." Reconsideration of the position only means secession or at any rate includes the possibility of secession, and if that is to be prevented, it is obvious that Parliament, which is the only body which can pass amending legislation of any kind, must not attempt

to pass such legislation as may fail to meet with the consent of any single State.

Schedule 2 sorts out the provisions, amendment of which without its consent will not give the right to any State to secede from the federation, but the exceptions to the Schedule, amendment of which would permit of secession, are so wide as to make any important amendment without the States' consent virtually impossible. In Committee Mr. Isaac Foot exhibited much anxiety as to whether substitution of direct for indirect election to the Assembly proposed in the Bill for British India could be made by the States a ground for going out of the federation. The Schedule, as it stood in the Bill, included among the exceptions provisions with respect to "the number of the representatives of British India and of the Indian States in the Council of State and the Federal Assembly and the manner in which they are to be chosen." The word "they" applied both to the representatives of British India and the Indian States, and Mr. Foot's concern lest the restoration of direct election to the Assembly in future should become impossible by reason of the States, making that a cause of withdrawal from the federation was fully justified. In order to relieve his anxiety, Mr. Davidson moved that "they" be changed into "the representatives of the Indian States" making it clear, as Mr. Davidson put it, that "the Indian States could not be entitled to back out (of federation) because of some small alteration in the method of electing British Indian representatives." If this is reassuring in one respect, assuming that the change from indirect to direct election is regarded a small change, it is alarming in another respect. The amendment made in the Schedule implies that a change in the manner in which the representatives of one State are chosen can be made a ground by other States for going out of the federation. Mr. Davidson commented upon the amendment as follows: "They (the Indian States) have got, naturally enough, very considerable interest in the way in which Indian States' representatives are nominated to the Federal Assembly." Let us suppose that some State, in a fit of madness, qualifies in some way the method of rank nomination which most States will adopt or that it introduces even election of one sort or other. Will the other States then be entitled, to quote Mr. Davidson, to back out because throughout the States' territories a system of unadulterated nomination does not prevail? This is a new danger that appears on the horizon. The Bill not only does not give an assurance that the elective method will be adopted by the States at any time in future,

but it definitely puts a serious impediment in the way of such method being adopted.

When asked to state the principle on which a distinction is made between matters the amendment of which would affect the validity of the States' Instruments of Accession and those the amendment of which would not so affect their validity, the Solicitor-General remarked that "minor amendments which would not really make any great difference to the existing position" would be allowed by the States, but matters of importance vitally affecting their position were "legitimate matters on which the rulers of States are entitled to ask that there shall be no amendment without their consent." "It is right," he said, "that any matter which really affects what I may call the general balance of powers, the questions of the reservations of subjects, of executive control and of matters which can be dealt with by the Governor-General in his discretion, matters which are vital to the architecture of the federation to which the States are asked to accede, should not be amended without their assent." Major Attlee put forward four specific points and asked whether the amendment of any of them would require the unanimous consent of all the States. "There is," he said, "the question of the choosing and summoning of Ministers. There is the special responsibility of the Governor-General relating to the peace or tranquillity of India or any part thereof. There is the procedure for the introduction and the passing of Bills. There might be some alteration made there. There is the question of the Governor-General's power to promulgate ordinances in his discretion or in the exercise of his individual judgment." Will the amendment of provisions concerning these matters be dependent upon the consent being obtained of each individual State? The Attorney-General stated, in respect of all these provisions (except perhaps in the case of the procedure in the passing of Bills on which he was somewhat obscure), that their amendment would require the consent of all the States. It will be noted that the reserved subjects and the special powers of the Governor-General which the various safeguards that have been introduced give him fall under the category of subjects in respect of which no change is possible except with the consent of the States. This means that our future progress towards self-government depends not only upon the British Parliament initiating measures in that behalf and passing them, but the federating States accepting them. The dissent of even one State will put a stop to such mea-

asures, for that State will then acquire the right of withdrawing from the federation, and if cessation is not to be allowed for any State on any account it means in practice, though not in theory, that no such progress is hereafter possible. It is no use saying that no State will in fact object to advance towards self-government, and that the difficulty pointed out is only a theoretical difficulty which will not arise in actual practice. By the time the question of amending the constitution in fundamental respects comes some States are sure to have some complaint or other to make against the working of the federation, and the power now given to the States to estop future development of the constitution will be used by them to wring concessions from the Federal Government which it would be unwise to make. "Do this for me, or I go out," is what some States will say. And if they do not get satisfaction on the points raised by them they may be inclined to put into execution the threat of secession which they will hold out. There is another possibility. The British Government may easily put up one of these States which will be under its paramountcy to object to a proposed amendment and make it the scapegoat for the refusal of a concession which it itself is really unwilling to make. In any case a constitution is self-condemned which puts it in the power of any one of the numerous States which will come into the federation to say that the original safeguards shall be retained or that the reserved subjects shall not be transferred.

The Attorney-General gaily said, in attempting to answer this objection, "This does not in any way check for all time the development of India. The Committee will see that these (the points mentioned by Major Attlee) are to be the subject matter of negotiation with the States." This surely is not an adequate answer. For we must remember that we have to carry on negotiations with hundreds of States and the question naturally arises as to what will happen if the negotiations with any one of the States will turn out unsuccessful. To go on the assumption that the negotiations will not fail in any single case and that the contingency need not be considered is a feat of optimism to which the most optimistic amongst us will find themselves unequal. The upshot of all this is, in our judgment, that the constitution now being considered in Parliament is not only thoroughly unsatisfactory and in several important respects reactionary as it is, but that it is wholly unamendable for all future time.

SPARKS FROM THE COMMONS' ANVIL.

23rd May.

SEX DISQUALIFICATION.

ON Report stage the first item of business to be considered was a new Clause, moved by the Secretary of State, to implement the promise he gave in Committee to remove the sex disqualification of women. The Clause provides that "women shall be eligible for the public services unless the higher authority, that is to say, the Secretary of

State or one of the Provincial Governments, schedules particular services or branches of services or particular appointments as unsuitable for women." The Government was urged to remove the sex disqualification for the professions as well as for the public services, but declined to do so on the ground chiefly that it was not necessary. The main professions such as the medical, the legal and the teaching professions

were already open. Miss Rathbone, however, pointed out that the professions now open might later be closed to women.

The fact that women are now admitted to the legal profession, the medical profession and most of the careers that are open to women in this country, is no guarantee that reactionary forces may not take command in India which women will have very poor means of meeting. The fact that we are leaving power to the Indian legislatures in other matters has not deterred this House from imposing every possible kind of safeguard where British interests are concerned, where the interests of communities are concerned, and in many other ways. We suggest that this is one way in which the Government and Parliament might safeguard a perhaps improbable but by no means impossible future in which we might see, with no power on our part to stop it, women swept out of the professions, where it is most essential that they should be admitted, such as the medical and legal professions, seeing that a woman in seclusion in India can only see a person of her own sex.

Sir Samuel Hoare replied that, considering the state of public opinion in India, it would be imprudent to give such protection. He said: "I am informed that a provision of this kind might needlessly excite all kinds of anxieties, and might give rise to a good many misrepresentations. We have to remember that one of the great communities in India, the Muslim community, looks anxiously at any proposals of this kind." (1)

FINANCIAL INQUIRY.

THE next important subject that came up for consideration was a new Clause moved by Sir Henry Page-Croft providing for the appointment, by Order-in-Council, of a Commission "to inquire into the financial position of India and report whether or not such financial position justifies the establishment of federation." Sir Samuel Hoare agreed that a financial inquiry was necessary and that it would be undertaken, but it would be of a technical character and not like the one which the Conservative Opposition had in mind. For "the more formidable side of the problem is connected with the Provinces" and not with federation. The extra expenditure that would be required for setting up an all-India federation would be about three-quarters of a crore or about £500,000. "The only other expenditure that is connected with the setting up of federation is the expenditure connected with liquidating the tribute of the Princes. That sum, which is spread over a number of years, looks as if it might amount to perhaps a crore." On the other hand, greater additional expenditure will be required for setting the machinery of provincial autonomy in motion. "The sum that will have to be found as a result of the separation between Burma and India—a sum that may amount to between two and three crores as loss of revenue to India—and the sum that is necessary for setting the Provinces on an even keel by means of some kind of permanent subvention from the Centre" "might be from £4,000,000 to £5,000,000, a substantially larger sum than the £500,000 necessary to start the federation." So far as the Central Government is concerned the inquiry is of a simple nature: "Is the Central Budget likely to be a balanced budget? Is

the central credit of India in a satisfactory position? These are very important issues, but they are the kind of issues that do not need a long and expert investigation", and generally the financial position of the country is better than it was three or four years ago. Any way the question at issue was not whether federation could be established or not, but whether the new constitution as a whole could be put into force or not, and for the purposes that Sir Henry Page-Croft had in mind the inquiry suggested was not necessary.

TRADE CONCESSIONS TO BRITAIN.

HAVING failed in the attempt to secure a preferential entry for British goods, the diehards made an attempt to secure a most favoured-nation entry for British goods by moving a Clause providing that higher duties shall not be imposed on United Kingdom imports than on other imports. The imposition of penal and discriminatory tariffs is already forbidden under clause 12 (1f), but that is not enough for the diehards. Mr. Herbert Williams put the case thus: "I can imagine a trade agreement being negotiated by the Government of India with the Government of some foreign country whereby India would accord to the goods of that country favoured treatment and whereby the goods of all the rest of the world, including the United Kingdom, would be left on a higher scale of duties. That would clearly be discrimination in favour of the goods of that particular foreign country. But it might not be regarded as being discrimination against the goods of the United Kingdom because the goods of the United Kingdom were put in the same category as the goods of most other countries... There would be a strong case for saying (to India), 'We think you should treat us better.' But this (new) Clause does not ask that. It simply says that we shall not be treated worse than any foreigner. It is not an unreasonable proposal." The Secretary of State opposed the proposed Clause on the ground that it would contravene the Fiscal Autonomy Convention which had been in force for fifteen years. He said:

I take the view that there are really only two alternatives before the House. There is the alternative of reverting to a system that we brought to an end in the case of the Dominions long before their Constitution Acts were passed into law. In the case of Canada, as early as 1842, more than 20 years before the British North America Act, we abandoned the attempt to control Canada's fiscal policy. So also was it in the case of New Zealand and of Australia. Is it worth while to attempt to go back upon what has been the consistent policy of Great Britain in dealing with the principal parts of the Empire now for nearly a century, and to attempt, even upon this narrow issue, to impose a fiscal policy upon the new Federal Government of India? I should have said myself that it was a great mistake to make any attempt of that kind, that it is much better to choose the alternative and to realize the fact that British trade in the future is much more likely to gain by agreements with India reached between this or that part of the British Empire.

FAR TOO UNILATERAL.

SEVERAL amendments were moved with the object of meeting the objections that had been taken

by the States to the federal part of the Bill. In explaining their effect, the Attorney-General said: "These amendments are given to the States as clarifying the position as it was always intended to be. It was never intended by this Bill to suggest that this Parliament could impose a new constitution on the States. They were of course outside the power of this Parliament, except in relation to paramountcy, which is not in question at this moment. But undoubtedly the words which were used in the Bill were regarded by the States as giving rise to that view or justifying that view, and we have attempted to meet that point, without departing one iota from the principles of the Bill, by the words which we propose to insert." But this explanation was not accepted by the Labour party. Clause 6 of the Bill relating to the accession of States was opposed by them on the ground, as Major Attlee put it, that "it gives everything to the States, and is far too unilateral." The amendments introduced made, in their view, the position still more unilateral. Major Attlee said: "Taking the Clause as a whole, the effect is to give the States a very privileged position and the amendments are all on the side of strengthening the position of the States. We shall therefore vote against the amendment."

SURROUNDING THE PRINCES WITH SANCTITY.

IN clause 12, by an amendment moved in it, "the rights and dignity" of the rulers of States were placed under the protection of the Governor-General. It was explained that by rights and dignity were meant matters connected with guards, escorts, salutes and so on. One of the privileges that the Princes enjoyed was their exemption from arrest in a civil suit. All these matters were specially safeguarded by the amendment introduced. The Labour Party again took exception to this:

Does this responsibility mean (Major Attlee asked) that the Governor-General is to see that the rights and dignity of the Ruler are upheld in respect of the subjects of the State, and does it mean that we are to have some kind of *lese majesty* in India? I confess I do not like this very much. One of the privileges we in this country have always had is to grumble against our rulers, and against all our rulers. Our papers have always been making fun of dignitaries. Are the Princes all going to be hedged about with some sanctity as if they are all kings? I should like to know what this means, for I think it is very dangerous. I can understand the reference to the rights of Indian States, but I cannot understand it when you extend it to the rights and dignities of the rulers. Some of the rulers have no dignity, and ought not to be protected.

It will be remembered that when the Princes' Protection Act was passed, the restrictions imposed on the freedom of the Press in British India were justified on the ground that the dignity of the Princes which the British Government had given an undertaking to support required such fetters upon the liberty of the Press. Major Attlee's questions were therefore very pertinent, and the amendment made in Clause 12 is not quite so innocuous as it was made out to be. The opposition of the Labour Party was however brushed aside and the amendment carried.

DON'T DISCUSS THE PRINCES!

AN amendment was made in Clause 38 extending the prohibition of the discussion of, or the asking of questions on, the personal conduct of the ruler of a State to that of a member of the ruling family. This amendment too was put forward by the Government as a mere formal one, but the Labour Party considered it to be dangerous. They objected both to the original Clause and the amendment. Mr. Morgan Jones asked:

What is the effect of this provision? Supposing it was alleged that a ruler had been guilty of undesirable conduct within the confines of British India. Is it then argued that if a ruler or his agent is guilty of such conduct, not in the State, but within the confines of British India, he shall not be named (in the Federal Legislature)? The point I raise is important. I can quite understand, and indeed believe that the conduct of a ruler within his State is a matter outside the purview of the Legislative Assembly, but if a Ruler or his agent is deemed to be acting directly for the Ruler in an undesirable way within the confines of British India, is it argued that the conduct of the Ruler cannot be called in question? It is an important point since we know that the rulers of States pass through the Provinces on various journeys.

Sir Samuel Hoare, in defending the Clause and the amendment, indirectly admitted the force of the Labour Party's objection. It is not an absolute restriction that the Clause imposes, he said in effect; it does not make discussion of the personal conduct of a Ruler and his family wholly impossible. It only makes the discussion subject to the Governor-General's previous consent. "Whether or not there should be discussion in the kind of case the hon. Gentleman has mentioned will have to depend upon the Governor-General's decision upon the actual case. Let me further remind the hon. Gentleman that if he is anxious, and rightly anxious, about cases of this kind the action of the Governor-General is in no way restricted by such a provision as this. In the case he had in mind the Governor-General took action under the powers of paramountcy. His action would in no way be compromised by this provision. The only point at issue is whether or not there would be a discussion in the Federal or some other legislature, but that would have to depend upon the Governor-General's view of the case, so that the possibility of discussion is not excluded." This of course does not remove the Labour Party's objection. Why should the Governor-General have power to prevent discussion of the acts of a Ruler or a member of his family done in British India? That was the point of Mr. Morgan Jones's question and it was not answered by the Secretary of State at all.

"INSTRUMENT OF OBSTRUCTION."

CLAUSE 43 provides that any changes introduced in the Instrument of Instructions shall be subject to an Address by both Houses of Parliament. To this the Labour Party has always taken objection on the ground that the requirement of the House of Lords' sanction will make it impossible for the Labour Party to give a progressive turn to the constitution by making suitable changes in the Instrument of Instructions. Sir Samuel Hoare's defence was:

that Indians themselves had asked for Parliamentary sanction and that the Clause as it stood in the Bill had received the support of Indian opinion. The Labour Party's opposition to the Clause was in no way affected by the argument that India desired both Houses of Parliament to stand behind the Instrument of Instructions.

The object of the whole thing is (said Major Attlee) to see that another place shall be able to curb any Government which wishes to move forward in the way of self-government by the use of the Instrument of Instructions. That is the purpose. If there had been such a provision in the past, constitutional advance would have been delayed for years. In effect the Clause gives us special veto in advance, and tells against any administration which wants to go ahead in India. It will not affect any Government which wants to be reactionary. It is quite obvious what the purpose of the Clause is.

Everyone knows (said Mr. Morgan Jones) that the other House is a House whose political constitution and complexion is different from the complexion of the House of Commons when the Government is Labour in character, and, consequently, if a Labour Government wanted to modify or extend or amend the Instrument of Instructions in any way whatever the Clause gives the Conservative Party a permanent veto and opposition to a Labour Government... The present Conservative majority is using this Bill as a means for placing a permanent impediment against a subsequent Labour Government. The Instrument of Instructions is rapidly becoming the Instrument of Obstruction to a Labour Government. It is not just to any future Government which should be as free as the present Government to register advance according to the needs of the times. It is unfair to hamstring a future Government to suit the political convenience of the Government of the day.

Review.

MONETARY MANAGEMENT.

ESSAYS ON MONETARY MANAGEMENT.

By J. STAFFORD. (King,) 1933. 20cm. 230p. 7/6.

THE question of monetary management has become more important to-day since the orthodox Gold Standard, which worked automatically, has been abandoned by the major portion of the countries of the world. If exchange is to be free and consequently flexible it would be difficult to avoid disturbances acting upon the monetary system, and the monetary authority must 'manage' the currency in order to counteract these disturbances. This volume examines the several ways of currency management with a view to study their reactions on the welfare of the community. Monetary disequilibrium has become the order of the day and the author examines the several causes producing such a disequilibrium.

In the introduction the author warns us against neglecting the monetary forces in any discussion of the "structure of industry and the disposition of the national resources" of a community. In Great Britain especially the prosperity of the community depends upon a proper working of the Bank of England with a view to "preserve the links between our monetary system and those of the rest of the world" and secondly to allow savings to be absorbed into enterprise. As India is linked with Great Britain by the nexus of sterling, we are also vitally interested in the sterling exchange.

The first essay discusses the appropriate action

of the banks in preventing a reduction of the national money income, threatened by several disturbing factors. In the first place, the banks should effect an injection of deposits into the active money stream by the purchase of securities from liquid resources and secondly, by stopping withdrawals of money into inactive deposits. In fact, the first duty of the bankers is to see that *entrepreneurs* obtain additional resources by the creation of more credit. The second essay deals with the problem of the relation of the banking technique with the maintenance of an equilibrium. That banks all over the world have miserably failed to maintain an equilibrium during the last decade is an undeniable fact and it behoves the economist to offer guidance to the practical banker. This is done by Mr. Stafford, in the light of a close study of British banking practice. He does not believe in the sacrosanct character of the ratio of the assets to deposit liabilities and recommends a wide latitude to the bankers in varying this ratio. But the most pressing question in this connection is: What guarantee is there that this latitude would not be misused? We think that such freedom is sure to be misused. We are again back to the issues raised by the Charter Act of 1844. With respect to the raising of the price level of a country in order to bring it into a line with that of the other countries Mr. Stafford says: "The banking system could assist the Central Bank in its endeavours to raise the price-level by decreasing the proportion of its most liquid earning assets and increasing that of investments... and increasing the proportion of advances." We are inclined to look askance at such dangerous liberties given to banks other than the Central Bank.

The third essay deals with the functions, responsibilities and policies of the central banks. The first duty of a central bank is to keep steady the value of the monetary unit of a country in relation to the units of other currencies and also to keep itself solvent. The second duty is to manage internal currency in such a way as to subserve the economic welfare of the nation; this latter may involve the control of the price-level and also a frequent alteration of the price-level by the use of its statutory powers. According to the author, "a specific norm for the art of internal management" should be established, although he admits the difficulty of this performance. As internal stability is jeopardised by the alterations in the conditions in the outside world which affect the exchange-value of the monetary unit, they are examined separately. Throughout the analysis the author displays the consciousness that the art of central banking is very difficult and he avoids dogmatism of any sort. As internal stability and external stability are generally incompatible the suggestion is made that a compromise should be adopted. The rest of the volume is devoted to the consideration of the various devices for making this compromise effective. One such method is to adjust from time to time the external value of the monetary standard of a country which would automatically adjust domestic prices to the changing world-prices. Throughout the volume there is an under-current of feeling that a gold standard with a fixed external value is an inconvenient system, fettering the action of the central banks and making central banking full of pitfalls and traps. This is to say that foreign exchange should be left to itself. We think this is a questionable thesis.

The lucidity of reasoning is marred by involved sentences and obscurity of language, making the book repulsive to a layman. If the author wishes to make the book popular, the diction needs to be altered considerably.

V. N. GODBOLE.

SHORT NOTICE.

THE ECONOMIC SERVICES OF ZAMINDARS TO THE PEASANTS AND THE PUBLIC AS ANALYSED BY PROF. BENAY SARKAR.

By PANKAJ KUMAR MUKHERJEE. (N. M. Ray-Chowdhury & Co., 11, College Square, Calcutta.) 1934, 22cm, 22p. As. 8.

IN this small brochure, Mr. Mukherjee examines the views of Prof. Benay Kumar Sarkar about the economic services rendered by the Zamindars to the peasants and the public. The general opinion that Zamindars as a class are parasites upon society is disproved by a reference to the way in which they have played an important part in the economic and public life of Bengal. The Zamindars, according to Mr. Sarkar, furnish the capital required by the peasants for agricultural occupation by adopting a liberal and humane policy towards them in the matter of collecting rents. The Zamindar may not give them cash but 'credit' which is of greater importance than cash in the modern economic organism, is given to them in abundance. Prof. Sarkar says that as a money-lender, the Zamindar is more sinned against than sinning. Besides being the unrecognised furnisher

of agricultural credit, the Zamindar is also the financier of Bengali enterprizes in industry and commerce. It is not true, Prof. Sarkar says, that the Zamindars invest all their savings in land and he gives a list of Zamindars who have taken a pioneering part in the establishment and promotion of industrial concerns. In the same way, they also are patrons of other forms of public activity and have been responsible for the cultural and social developments in the country. "It is the public spirit of the Zamindars" he is quoted as saying "that has enabled them to transfer a part of their wealth to the community by means of gifts in the form of roads, tanks, schools, hospitals, literary and scientific patronage, religious endowments, etc." In the last chapter Mr. Mukherjee quotes Prof. Sarkar as saying that the Zamindar does not appear to have played out as yet. It is a correct estimate and if they continue to identify themselves as before with the interests of the people, Indian public opinion is not likely to go against them. But as it is, their activities deserve more publicity than at present and secondly they have to come out more into the open in the championship of the cause of the people.

C. V. HANUMANTHA RAO.

LET INDIA DETERMINE FOR HERSELE.

MISS RATHBONE'S FORCEFUL PLEA.

On 23rd May Miss Eleanor Rathbone moved an amendment in the House of Commons giving British India the right to say whether it wants federation or not just as the States have the right. Below is given the full text of the speech she made in moving the amendment :

I BEG to move, in page 2, line 35, to leave out "condition," and to insert "two conditions."

This is consequential upon an Amendment later in the Clause—in page 3, line 16, at the end, to insert :

The second condition referred to is that the Provincial Legislatures to be constituted under Part III of this Act shall have been constituted and shall have assented to the establishment of Federation by the requisite majority.

The requisite majority shall not be deemed to have been obtained unless

(a) a resolution assenting to the establishment of Federation has been passed in a majority of the Provinces by a majority of the members present and voting at a meeting specially convened for the purpose of the Legislative Assembly in those Provinces which have only one chamber and of a joint session of the Legislative Council and Legislative Assembly in those Provinces which have two chambers ; and unless

(b) the aggregate electorate entitled to vote at the last preceding general elections of the Legislative Assemblies of those Provinces which have passed the aforesaid resolution constitutes a majority of the aggregate electorates entitled to vote for the Legislative Assemblies of all Provinces.

The object of this group of Amendments is to set up a second condition to be complied with before Federation can come into being, additional to the condition already existing that 50 per cent. of the Princes whose States comprise 50 per cent. of the State population must have acceded. The second condition we propose is that a majority of the Provincial legislatures having been elected under the new Constitution must consent to Federation, and that the electorate of the assenting Provinces must

constitute a majority of the aggregate electorate of all the Provinces combined. It is suggested that in reckoning the electorates the Assembly electorate alone should be taken, because only some Provinces have upper chambers and therefore, to count the electorate of the upper chamber would be to count the votes of those Provinces twice over. To meet the difficulty that in two-chamber provinces one chamber may vote in one way and the other in another, it is provided that the vote shall be taken at a joint session of both chambers. The proposal, of course, is not that there should be any power for dissenting Provinces to contract out of the Federation. The decision of the majority would be decisive on all Provinces. This is obviously a large proposition to bring forward at this late hour in our discussions, and I cannot pretend to hope that the Government are likely to accept it. But we have to bear in mind future discussions in another place, and who can tell that some one with more influence than myself in the deliberation of that Upper Chamber may seize upon this suggestion or some variety of it. Therefore, we think it is worth ventilating, and I will state the case for it briefly and simply without any embellishments.

It is common knowledge that the Bill has been exceedingly ill-received in India by nearly all sections of political opinion. Only the other day a Liberal Conference in the United Provinces described the Bill as wholly, absolutely and totally unacceptable, and the Congress organisation continues to represent the new Constitution as being forced upon India. The voice of political India has been much less united and much more ambiguous upon the question which, after all, is vital—whether India would actually prefer no new Constitution to this Constitution. So far as one can judge from the Assembly resolutions, the Congress party would prefer nothing to this. So would Mr. Gandhi and Mr. Joshi, and the members of the Servants of India Society, that devoted

body of social reformers. On the other hand, Liberals and various groups of Moslems do not go so far. With the exception of Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, although none of them have said so explicitly, it is plain that the Liberals and Moslems would be disappointed if the Bill were withdrawn. Hence we must conclude that they consider it as some advance, however inadequate. During the Committee stage an Amendment was supported by the Liberal party and the Conservative Opposition which would have submitted the whole Bill to the verdict of the Indian Assembly for acceptance or rejection. The right hon. Member for Oxford University (Lord H. Cecil) made a speech and wrote to the *Times* in the same sense. That Amendment was rejected by the Government on grounds which seemed to me indisputable, that the present Legislative Assembly has no mandate for such a purpose. They represent only 1,000,000 electors out of a population of 300,000,000.

The Amendment which I am proposing is to take the verdict of the Indian people in a different and more satisfactory way. It is true that the verdict will necessarily be taken on the Federation portion of the Bill after the Provincial portion has already come into existence. No one will deny that the opposition to the Bill in this country and in India has been, and is concentrated mainly on, the proposals for the Centre. Even the Conservative Opposition is willing to go as far as Provincial Autonomy, and all the objections of the Labour party and the advanced groups of opinion in India are directed chiefly, though not entirely, against the form of Federation and the degree of central responsibility. Since that is so, is there not something to be said for carrying into effect that portion of the Bill which undoubtedly constitutes a real step towards self-government, namely, the Provincial part, and then refer to the new Provincial Legislatures the question of whether they would or would not prefer no Federation and no responsibility at the Centre to the proposals of the Bill?

These Provincial Legislatures will at least be representative of some 14 per cent. of the Indian people, including some representatives of the labouring classes, of the depressed classes, and of the women. Their verdict would be as near an approach to the verdict of political India as a whole as is practically possible under present conditions. I recognise frankly that if this issue were put before the Provincial legislatures it would be from their point of view a very difficult and very painful choice. Indian political parties have all along declared that they could not accept Provincial Autonomy without responsibility at the Centre. So far as I know they have not swerved from that position. If after that Provincial Autonomy was already an accomplished fact they were to reject Federation, they would in effect be assenting to divorce between two measures which in their opinion ought to be indissolubly united. If they did assent, they would of course only be doing so with the hope that they would be able to achieve a more satisfactory form of union between the two

sides of the proposal at a later date. But is it not at least conceivable that they might commit themselves to the acceptance of a form of Federation, a form of central responsibility, which they profoundly dislike, realising, as they might do, the possibility of changing that form one day in order to get it into existence? Should they not at least be given a choice?

From the British Indian point of view, just consider how this proposal would affect the situation. If the result was that the majority of the Provincial legislatures accepted Federation, this would make it much more difficult in the future for disaffected parties in India to argue that they had no responsibility whatever for the Constitution and were fully justified in doing all that they could to make it unworkable. At least they would have accepted the view that Federation on the terms offered was one step better than no central responsibility at all. Suppose, on the other hand, that the result was rejection, then the Provincial Autonomy which we all recognise to be a real step in advance towards self-government would have been implemented and the proposed autonomy at the Centre, which in any case is bound to continue in existence for some time before Federation can come into being, would have to continue for a longer time, until such time as Parliament in its wisdom thinks fit to bring forward some new form of proposals for the Centre for acceptance or rejection by the Indian people. On the constitutional point of view, would it not be far more in accord with democratic principles, and more satisfactory to the pride and self-respect of India, if we at least told them that just as soon as we had created legislatures which represented clearly the collective opinion of political India we were willing to give those legislatures the chance to decide for themselves before we forced upon them a very great change and an irrevocable change?

It is notorious, I think, that in this House and outside this House a large proportion of Members have assented to the Bill in spite of grave misgiving as to its effect upon British interests because they believed that the Bill, though it did not give all that political India desired, did at least give that something which would go a considerable way towards satisfying their legitimate aspirations and thus bring about better relationships between the two peoples. But suppose this is a delusion, suppose that the majority of politically-minded Indians do sincerely believe what many of their trusted leaders have explicitly stated, that the Federal part of this Bill is much worse than nothing, a step backwards or into a morass instead of a step forward, then what justification have we and what interest have we in forcing it upon them? That is the question I put to the House. If that be a fair statement of the position why should we shrink from submitting the Federal portion of our proposals to the test of Indian opinion for their acceptance or for their rejection? That is the effect of acceptance of the series of Amendments of which I now move the first.

KERALA & THE NEW CONSTITUTION.

Among the subjects considered by the Kerala Provincial Conference which recently met at Calicut were the new constitution and the problem of the States. The resolutions passed by it were as follows:

WHEREAS it is the inalienable right of the Indian people to determine their own constitution and whereas only a constituent assembly, elected by the entire nation and convened when the nation has acquired sufficient strength to achieve its object of complete independence can frame such a constitution, this Conference is of opinion that the constitution which is sought to be forced upon the country should be wrecked.

Inasmuch as the Indian States constitute a political and military support to British Imperialism and a source of feudal backwardness and reaction, this Conference declares that in the interests of the Indian National Congress as those of the people of

Indian States, the abolition of the rule of the Indian Princes can alone assure complete independence for the whole of India and invites the people of the Indian States to fight side by side with the people of British India in the struggle for independence.

This Conference further feels that the Indian National Congress should actively engage itself in organising the States' subjects on the basis of their immediate democratic demands side by side with developing and intensifying the economic struggle of workers and peasants in the States. The immediate democratic demands should include the following:— (1) A single chamber legislature elected on adult franchise; (2) a Ministry elected by and completely responsible to the legislature; (3) the Royal family to have access, as privy purse, to not more than 5 per cent. of the State's revenue; (4) the religion of the Royal families to have no influence on the administration of the State; and (5) freedom of speech, press and association."

The Industrial and Prudential Assurance Co., Ltd.

The Premier Indian Life Office.

Estd. 1913.

Head Office — BOMBAY.

UP-TO-DATE BENEFITS.

LOW PREMIUMS.

BONUS;

Whole Life—Rs. 22-8-0 per Thousand per Year.

Endowment— „ 18-0-0 per „ —

For Agency apply to—Secretaries and Managers,

Industrial and Prudential Assurance Coy., Ltd.,

Esplanade Road, Fort, BOMBAY.

SUPREME FOR YEARS

SUPREME TO-DAY—

QUALITY ALWAYS TELLS



Mysore Sandalwood Oil B. P. quality, the finest in the world, is perfectly blended and milled by a special process with the purest ingredients to make.

Mysore Sandal Soap

"It's good through and through
to the thinnest water"

Available Everywhere.

**GOVERNMENT SOAP FACTORY,
BANGALORE.**