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Topics of the Week.

Indians' Folly must Prevail !

SIR TEJ BAHADUR SAPRU has told us that he would soon be going to England. Presumably he will be going there to educate the English people on the political situation in India and the way in which the India Bill must be improved if Indian discontent is to be allayed. Even if this be not the primary object of his visit, we have no doubt that he will, in his usual public-spirited manner, devote a large part of the time that will be available to him to such disinterested service in India's behalf. We are equally certain that any work that he will find it possible to do in this direction will do nothing but good to our country.

WE may, however, utter one word of caution. He may have the feeling, a convinced federationist as he is, that the Assembly's vote against the federation was wrong and injurious to the country's best interests and he may feel tempted therefore to dismiss it as the work of demagogues and the result of an appeal to prejudice. He may even personally wish the British Government to go on with the federal scheme in despite of the hostile expressions of public opinion in India. He is welcome to hold what opinion he likes about the Assembly's vote, but he will have no justification whatever for inciting the Government, by what he says or does, to disregard the vote and ram the federal scheme down the throats of Indians with perhaps a few minor alterations which do not touch the basic principles thereof. On the contrary, we think it his duty to ask the Government in this matter to defer to the Assembly vote, whatever he may think of its merits, for this vote was by no means

freakish but is representative of an overwhelming body of opinion in the country. This must be frankly and fully recognised.

THE situation created in this country by the Assembly's rejection of the federal scheme is very similar to the situation created in the United States by the recent refusal by the Senate to ratify the resolution in favour of that country's entry into the World Court. The failure of the Senate to bring the United States into an international order of jurisprudence was regretted and is bound to be regretted widely in the United States and all over the world, but all those who do so are agreed in saying that if the Senate vote was a mistake, it would be a tragedy of the first order to put the United States, by force, if it were possible, into the World Court. For it is recognised that the vote, however deplorable, substantially represents the public mind in the United States; and the best opinion in the country, even in circles wholly friendly to the United States' adherence to the World Court, is that it would be in the lasting interests not only of the U. S. but of world peace for the U. S. to wait till opinion in it is ripe for the reception of this great idea.

FOR instance, an American paper of great standing, which is an enthusiast for World Court entrance-criticises strongly those who urged that action should have been forced on this matter by manoeuvring the Senate into voting in favour of the World Court. It says :

"But to say that this should have been done is equivalent to saying that the United States should have taken this step without caring whether the people of the United States were heartily in favour of so doing. Would it have been for the good of the nation, and of world peace, to have entered upon an international obligation as important as that of membership in the World Court while a large part of the nation remained unconvinced of the wisdom of that act? We doubt it. On the contrary, we believe that membership entered upon under such circumstances would be more likely to lead to international misunderstanding and strain than to contribute to the growth of a genuine world reign of law."

And yet the World Court resolution missed adoption by a bare seven votes. If seven senators had cast their votes in favour instead of against the resolution, the United States World have been in the World Court!

IN India however, the Assembly resolution against the federal scheme was carried by an overwhelming majority of non-official members, and still, one gathers, there are a number of distinguished Indian leaders, who had not had the courage to do any propaganda for the White Paper or the J. P. C. Report when there was time for it, who inwardly wish suc-

ness to the efforts of Sir Samuel Hoare who is engaged in driving the India Bill through Parliament. Nor is adherence to the World Court such an irrefragable step as adherence to federation admittedly is. There is certainly far more need for circumspection in India than in the United States, and we should be very much surprised indeed if Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, while carrying on his political campaign in England whether in public or in private, in any way encouraged the notion, sedulously propagated, that the Assembly vote does not represent the true mind of the public in India and might therefore be ignored without committing a moral outrage. Such a notion would be soothing to the wounded self-esteem of the ardent federationists who gave themselves up heart and soul to the rearing of the federal structure, but it has no relation to facts. Even their superior wisdom must bow to public opinion, particularly where it is a question of constructing a constitution that cannot later be altered or repealed. We would certainly expect Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, therefore, to say to Sir Samuel Hoare: "I agree with you that the Indian people have behaved foolishly in this matter in undoing all your work and mine, but, I must tell you that I feel strongly that, in this instance, their folly must prevail."

* * *

His work lies here.

WHAT we have said above gains added force by the recent declaration of Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru that while he disapproves of the J. P. C. Report, he is not with the Assembly in rejecting it. This being his opinion, he will be under a strong temptation to advise the Secretary of State to set aside the Assembly vote and proceed with constitution-making on the basis of the Report, and Sir Samuel Hoare himself will be under a strong temptation to seek out this advisor and carry out his advice, though when it was a question of considering the Sapru-Jayakar Memorandum this advisor was a man of no consequence. It may well be that, in Sir Tej's judgment, the Assembly vote does not reflect public opinion. Assuming that this judgment is correct, it would be well for him, before he asks the Assembly vote to be put on one side, to tell British statesmen how public opinion can best be ascertained and to request them to ascertain public opinion through this means. We for our part shall be prepared to accept any test in this matter that he may suggest, but there is one thing which he must not do, and that is to set his own opinion above public opinion, in whatever way it may be discovered, and to get the British Parliament to thrust a constitution upon India. His own opinion may be the right one, but he must get the Indian people to accept it. We therefore think that, in the presence of such a clear divergence, his work lies in India, and not in England. Let him persuade Indians of their error rather than Sir Samuel Hoare of his wisdom.

* * *

Removed from Legislature's Ambit?

AN important question as to the scope of the federal legislature was raised in Committee, to which the Secretary of State was not able to give a ready answer, but which he has promised to look into further. The point was:

Suppose a State, having acceded to the Federation, and having accepted a particular federal subject, is allowed, for special reasons, to administer that subject itself, what power is given to the Federation if that federal subject is not being effectively administered? The answer is twofold. First of all, the Federal Executive and the Federal Legislature would have the right, and indeed the duty, to follow very closely what is happening with that

service. Suppose it appeared that the service was not being effectively administered and intervention was then necessary. The intervention would come from the Governor-General.

On this Mr. Morgan Jones asked:

Suppose in State A or State B there is a suspicion of inefficient administration. Would it be possible in the Central Legislature for a discussion to arise concerning that lack of efficient administration?

To this Sir Samuel Hoare replied:

I feel sure that the Federal Legislature would be able to discuss matters in connection with any service that the Princes had accepted as a federal service. Quite obviously the Federal Legislature in a matter of that kind would have the duty to discuss it.

But Sir Stafford Cripps raised the following objection to it:

In Clause 124 this question is made in the Instrument of Accession a reservation, and, therefore, it is never submitted to the Federation.

The words are:

"Notwithstanding anything in this Act, agreements may, and, if provision has been made in that behalf by the Instrument of Accession of the State, shall, be made between the Governor-General and the Ruler of a Federated State for entrusting to the Ruler or to his officers functions in relation to the administration in his State of any law of the Federal Legislature which applies therein."

That would be a reservation in the Instrument of Accession and, therefore, the administration being reserved to the Ruler would never come within the Federation at all.

According to this view, all matters allowed to be administered by the States through their agency would be removed from the scope of the Federal Legislature. It remains to be seen what the final decision of the Secretary of State is on this question.

* * *

Why Bring in the Governor-General?

IN order to show that in placing on the Governor-General the duty of intervention whenever it would be required, the Government was not making any special concession to the States, Sir Samuel Hoare said that where similar intervention became necessary in the provinces also it was provided that "the intervention had better come from the Governor-General, although acting, of course, in the closest contact with the Federal Government, rather than from the Federal Government itself."

But two wrongs do not make one right. These provisions are thus criticised by Prof. Berriedale Keith in the February number of the *Journal of Comparative Legislation*:

It is doubtful also if it is wise to give to the Governor-General personally the responsibility of directing provincial Governments to secure the execution of federal laws; if the law has been duly assented to, it is for Ministers to advise the action to be taken and the Governor-General would be placed in an invidious position if the directions are made a matter for his special direction; if a provincial Government is overridden by the federation, responsibility should rest squarely with the Ministers responsible. In the same way, it is dubious if the Governor-General should be made personally responsible for orders to the States in matters within ministerial discretion. The States are to be federal units, and there is no logical distinction possible between them and the provinces in so far as the rulers accept federation.

* * *

Balance Sheet of Federation.

SIR P. S. SIVASWAMY AIYER in an article in the *Indian Review* thus sums up what the three parties to the federation stand to gain or lose by its materialisation—the fourth party, viz. the State's people being of course entirely out of the picture:—

The people of British India obtain a shadow of responsibility in the central government and may indulge in the hope that at some distant date in the course of a few generations the shadow may be transformed into a substance. Federation or no federation, they cannot expect any transfer of control in respect of the reserved subjects of defence and external affairs. The Indian Princes will obtain a voice in the management of the central revenues, in the central legislature and in the central government and will be guaranteed in the exercise of autocracy under their claim to the protection of their sovereign rights by the British Crown by virtue of their treaties. The British Government will continue to exercise their powers of control from behind the screen of a responsible federation. One cannot help feeling that one dominant motive behind the new scheme of reforms is how to make the future Government of India safe for British interests, commercial and otherwise, and for the Indian Princes.

Buying Princes' Adhesion.

THE *New Statesman* writes:

The peculiarly evil result of the die-hard attack, on India Bill is that it distracts attention from the real dangers. Quite intelligent and progressive people assume that a Bill which so much annoys Lord Rothermere and the *Morning Post* must be good. They watch Sir Samuel Hoare winning each round against Mr. Churchill; they applaud when it proves that the Princes do not after all want to "kill Federation." They forget, as Miss Rathbone urges in an important article, that the real evil is that the British Government is apparently buying the adherence of the Princes by solemnly promising to uphold their indefensible and antediluvian sovereignty.

The danger before Sir Samuel's declaration on Tuesday (February 26) was bad enough; the situation is now far more serious. We hope that the Labour Party will make an explicit declaration repudiating for its part any such reaffirmation of treaties which are only retained because the often corrupt autocracy they guarantee suits our imperial book.

Burma Vote.

MR. GRAHAM POLE, Vice-Chairman of the British Committee on Indian and Burman Affairs, has done well in explaining to the British public, through the columns of the *Manchester Guardian*, how the Government is forcing federation upon Burma as it is forcing federation upon India. For a long time it was pretended that the decision on this question would be left to the people of Burma, and in the previous debates in the Burma Council the voting was confined to non-official members in order to ascertain public opinion. But the Government, having now made up its mind in favour of separation, ordered the officials to vote in the debate that took place in a special session of the Council on this subject on 14-20th of last month, lest a decision against separation should result. The Council by a majority of 47 to 37 voted for separation, but of the 47 votes cast in favour of separation as many as 16 were official votes. If votes of the elected members alone are reckoned, the decision must be said to have been against separation by 37 votes to 31. Mr. Graham Pole also draws attention to the fact that, in the general election held expressly for the purpose of finding out the wishes of Burma, anti-separationists polled over 5,00,000 votes and separationists 2,70,000. "The voting was there-

fore," he says, "nearly two to one in favour of continuing the association with India and against separation." He concludes his letter in the *Manchester Guardian* thus:—

But the result of the vote in the Burma Council on 20th February last is entirely misleading, as it is only obtained with the votes of officials nominated by the British Government. "The people of Burma" have given their decision by two votes to one in the general election and through their elected representatives by 37 votes to 31 in the Burma Legislative Council. It would look therefore as if Burma had voted for inclusion in the Indian Federation and against the separation that is being forced upon the majority against their will and with a Constitution that is condemned by all—whether separationists or federationists.

Since the Assembly vote, however, the British Government has definitely given up the pretence of consulting Indian or Burmese opinion. Both Burma and the rest of India will have constitutions imposed upon them.

"Committing Rape."

SOME of our readers have mildly protested against what they regard as a lapse on our part from the line of genteel criticism open to any decent newspaper writer when we described in a recent article the Princes' forcing of a federal union, which is necessarily in constitutional theory an indissoluble union, upon British India as tantamount to the committing of rape. The Princes have been wooing British India for the last four or five years; they have said times without number that, even if in social relations a forced marriage is not quite unknown to them, they will not force a political marriage upon British India; that it must be purely voluntary. The British Indian bride has definitely rejected their offer of marriage, and yet they go about this business as if the bride had consented. Such a simile cannot be said to militate against good taste. See what the *Economist* has written in its issue of 2nd February about Western Australia in regard to the appointment of a committee to consider her case for secession from the Australian federation.

"Never interfere between married couples" is a wise social rule at any time, and it is doubly wise when the potential interferer happens to be mother to both parties, and thus mother-in-law to either. This is enough to explain why the Government and Parliament of the Mother Country have been so slow to give ear to Western Australia's plea for divorce from the Australian Commonwealth. Though Western Australia was rather a reluctant bride, her conjugal relations have not always been so strained, &c. &c. &c.

What we wish to point out is that not only is marriage being forced upon British India, but it is being declared at the same time that it is a marriage of which nullification will not be possible to her in any conceivable circumstances in future, though, as it would now appear, the groom would be able to dissolve the union if the marriage contract is proposed to be varied in the slightest degree. It is a typical Hindu marriage: the man is free, the woman is bound.

Martial and Non-Martial classes.

ONE of the charges frequently levelled by Indians against the Government's military policy is that a distinction is deliberately made between martial and non-martial races by restricting recruitment to the army to the former. The Commander-in-Chief, replying recently to a question in the Upper House, denied the existence of such discrimination in the

mind of the Government and attributed its origin to politicians. The manner in which he dealt with the question showed that even he could not have regarded it as possible that his answer would be taken at its face value by anybody.

* * *

THE matter was more seriously treated in the course of the debate on the resolution on the subject moved by Mr. Sapru in the Council of State last week. All that Mr. Sapru wanted was that recruitment to the Indian army should not be confined, as at present, to classes upon which the Government out of interested motives choose to look as martial. Be it noted that he did not want any classes to be excluded from recruitment. One should have expected that Sir Philip Chetwode would have seized the occasion to show up the utter groundlessness of the public belief on this point. From telegraphic reports of his utterance however it appears that he did no such thing.

* * *

INSTEAD he tried to prove that in the matter of army recruitment all communal claims were fairly considered. This was however beside the point which Mr. Sapru urged. The question is not, as the Commander-in-Chief should have known, how many Hindu or Muhammadan sepoys there are in the Indian army. It is whether they are drawn from particular classes who, under present conditions, are to be found only in particular provinces. As forcibly pointed out by Mr. Sapru, more than one half of the strength of the army is furnished by two provinces, viz. the Punjab and N. W. F. Province. Is it to be supposed that people with martial traditions are produced plentifully only by these two provinces? If such a belief is held in any quarter, it does not seem to derive any support from Indian history.

* * *

MR. SAPRU'S reasonable request was opposed by the Commander-in-Chief on the ground also of administrative difficulties. We wish he had given us some clear idea as to their nature. Are these, in his opinion, so formidable that they cannot be got over? The fact, whatever attempts may be officially made to camouflage it, is that the Government do not wish recruitment to the Army to take place in areas noted for their political consciousness. And so long as this situation lasts, the Government's military policy will continue to be a target of repeated popular attacks.

* * *

Labour in the Assembly.

FOLLOWING his usual practice Mr. N. M. Joshi moved a cut of Rs. 100 in the grant for the Executive Council in order to ventilate labour grievances. The cut motion could of course not be carried; but the debate that ensued helped to draw pointed attention to the unsatisfactory labour conditions prevailing everywhere. If the telegraphic summaries of his speech do justice to Mr. Joshi, his principal complaint seems to be that the Government are dilatory in giving effect to the recommendations of the Whitley Commission on Labour. Four years have passed since the Commission's report was submitted. If even after the lapse of such a long period there are some recommendations of the Commission which have yet to be translated into action, Mr. Joshi cannot surely be accused of impatience or undue hurry when he presses for a little more expedition on the part of the Government.

* * *

EVEN so, his speech was distasteful to the Government which seems to labour too much under a

feeling of self-complacency and self-satisfaction. That they should find it too much to stomach his advice to tolerate communist propaganda was only to be expected in view of their recent drive against it. But what must have come as a surprise to all thinking sections in the country is that the Government did not receive his request for an improvement in labour conditions in the spirit in which it was put forward.

* * *

MR. JOSHI, e. g., attaches great importance to the establishment of an Industrial Council, as suggested by the Commission, which would concern itself with the co-ordination of labour conditions in different parts of India. The non-effectuation of this recommendation of the Commission was officially sought to be excused on the ground that if the body was brought into existence, the prospective autonomous provinces might revolt against it. The reason does not appear to us particularly sound. Is it suggested that its constitution, once settled, cannot be amended to meet provincial objections? Will it be unamendable in the same way as the proposed federal constitution threatens to be? If not, nothing would have been lost by constituting much earlier the proposed Industrial Council in the light of present constitutional conditions, making it possible for the introduction of any amendments that may subsequently be deemed desirable. But the past cannot be recalled. We have no doubt Mr. Joshi would regard his labours rewarded if the Government in future gave evidence of greater despatch in dealing with matters making for an improvement in labour conditions.

Articles.

CONSTITUTIONAL THEORIES.

IT is interesting to see how constitutional theories change according to the convenience of our rulers. When the Simon Commission was set up dyarchy was in force in the provinces, and yet it reported that such a dual system could not be set up in the central government, as was then desired by Indian public opinion. The Commission was not in favour of the grant of any power to the people at the centre, but instead of basing its denial of responsibility on the ground of expediency it took its stand on theory, so as to give its arguments an air of finality. It therefore recommended the establishment of provincial autonomy but opposed the introduction of even limited responsibility in the central government. This meant the postponement of the transfer of control over internal civil administration till control over defence and foreign relations could also be transferred. This adjournment of the grant of central responsibility to a far-off day in the future suited British statesmen, and the principle of "no dyarchy at centre" carried for a long time almost the authority of Holy Writ.

The Simon Commission's report then came to be superseded by discussions at the Round Table Conference, at which the possibilities of a federal constitution were explored. The discussions at this Conference brought into view the use that could be made of the Princes to nullify such central responsibili-

ty as might be conceded. If some degree of central responsibility was to be granted upon the advent of the Princes it became the concern of British statesmen to restrict the sphere of such responsibility as much as possible and the Simon doctrine of "full central responsibility or none at all at the centre" appeared to them to be rather a source of danger rather than a measure of security. They therefore gave up the doctrine and substituted another for it. It was to the effect that "central responsibility was possible only in an all-India federation." This time too they did not base this conclusion on the mere ground of expediency; they raised it to the status of an unalterable constitutional theory. Till then it was thought possible, not only by the people, but by the Government that even full self-government was attainable by British India alone, irrespectively of the association of the States in a federation. In fact the Government had promised Dominion Status to British India without stipulating that the States shall be included in the Central Government. But as soon as the immense potentialities of the States' sovereign rights being exploited to check constitutional development in British India were realized, the inclusion of the States became a condition precedent to the grant of even a small measure of responsibility at the centre.

The cry of "no dyarchy in the central government" was promptly abandoned, lest grant of full responsibility, though under the effective safeguard of the Princes, should become necessary. Then the sovereign rights of the Princes were underscored in order that the States might become a sufficiently heavy deadweight. As the discussions proceeded in the Round Table Conference, it seemed possible to limit the immediate advance to provincial autonomy and to postpone central responsibility to a more or less distant future. This was in effect a reversion to the Simon report, but with the added safeguard of the

then well-established doctrine that a proposal for central responsibility could not be entertained except on the federal basis. But this move was countered by the British Labour Party and by British Indian statesmen, who insisted upon a simultaneous introduction of full responsibility in the provinces and limited responsibility in the centre. In the meantime the dangers of a federal constitution framed on conditions stipulated by the Princes came to be realised by British Indians and there was a disposition on the part of them to ask for full provincial autonomy immediately, leaving over the question of central responsibility on a British India basis for further consideration. This trend of thought found authoritative expression in the resolution passed in the Assembly.

As the perils of federation came to be realised in India its advantages came to be realised the more clearly in England, and a new theory was developed, viz that the accession of the States to an all-India federation was necessary for the conferment not only of limited responsibility at the centre, but even of further responsibility in the provinces. Thus the British Government has lighted upon a doctrine which is most convenient to it: the States must be brought into the central government in order that any forward step can be taken, whether in the central or the provincial sphere. Only four years ago full provincial autonomy could be granted without reference to the Princes; now it is impossible. Only six years ago full central responsibility could be granted to British India without reference to the Princes; now the Princes form the nub of India—the Princes who are the vassals of the British Government. India's political advance may be slow; but the advance of the Britishers in evolving constitutional theories is pretty rapid.

THE RED LIGHT.

MR. CHURCHILL has been making a statement again and again in Parliament* that the federal scheme for all-India represents in its original form a bargain between the Congress on the one

"What happened, as far as we have heard—names have been mentioned, but I will not repeat them—was that some of the Princes, believing that under the Secretary of State Mr. Wedgwood Benn England was really determined to move out, look, stock and barrel, met representatives of Congress and did what in ordinary English language is called a deal. The Princes were to be left to run their territories as despotic and hereditary rulers and to help Congress to get responsible government at the Centre. That was the situation which preceded the so-called offer of the Princes, and that is the explanation, and the only explanation, of their enthusiasm for responsible government."—20th February.

"These were the Princes, these were the minority, who were led to make the so-called offer in 1931 as the result of a bargain with some of the representatives of the Congress, and some of the advanced parties in India. The terms of this bargain—an unholy bargain—were that if, the Princes demanded responsible government at the Centre, then the Congress party would leave them to govern their estates as they liked. That was the outline of it."—26th February.

hand and the Princes on the other. He was challenged to produce the authority for this statement, and Mr. Isaac Foot went so far as to resume his seat in Committee on 26th February in order to give an opportunity to Mr. Churchill to tell the House on what the statement was based. Mr. Churchill, however, did not avail himself of this opportunity, thus giving an impression that it was all a figment of his imagination. But Sir Henry Page-Croft later stepped into the breach, saying that a similar statement had appeared in the *Statesman* of Calcutta. The *Statesman* itself has recently reprinted news of four years ago, which apparently forms the foundation for Mr. Churchill's statement. This news and the paper's comment thereupon are reproduced on a later page in this issue.

Whether the genesis of the federal scheme given by the *Statesman* is true or not, it emphasises one point to which we are afraid sufficient attention has not been given in India. It is the complete failure of those who took part in the Round Table Conference to obtain the general consent of the people for the

scheme which they put forward or supported at the Conference. This scheme proposes a federation which is wholly unique in several important respects. To give only a few instances, it brings into one polity units possessing diverse political constitutions, some democratic and others autocratic, and thus, as Sir Charles Oman said in the House of Commons Committee, it tries to "federate the unfederatable." (Prof. Berriedale Keith has also expressed the same view.) It places under the control of the federal government subjects which are not accepted by all the federal units as federal subjects, but some of which concern only the British Indian provinces, thus giving the States a share in the management of subjects which do not affect them. It admits into the federal legislature representatives chosen on different systems, some by popular election and some by government appointment. It fails to take the ordinary precaution taken in every other federation of requiring all the federal units to submit to such constitutional amendments as may be adopted by a specified majority of members in the federal legislature but gives an option to each State to withdraw from federation if any amendment is introduced of which it disapproves. It places the ultimate power in regard to the different federal units in different authorities, such authority being for the States the Viceroy who is, and must always remain, above and beyond the federal government.

These are among the features which distinguish the proposed Indian federation from every other federation known to the student of constitutional history. It is not the purpose of this article to maintain that all or any of these are either unjustifiable or unnecessary. We shall assume on the other hand, for argument's sake, that it is in the best interests of the country to bring into existence in India a federation of a totally different character from that which exists elsewhere in the world. The point that we wish to make now is that if the peculiar circumstances of India justify and even necessitate a peculiar form of federation, the public in India ought to be convinced about it; and the time to educate public opinion on this question was not after such proposals were formally placed before the Round Table Conference, but before. The fact, however, is that neither before nor after the constitutional discussions began at the Conference has any serious attempt been made at moulding public opinion by the leaders in British India who took a prominent part in these discussions. What was the general expectation of the public when the Conference opened in 1930? That some of the questions to which the Butler Committee had drawn attention in its report would be considered by the British India delegates, that the States' complaint about economic injustice resulting from the present arrangements would be duly weighed, and that an adjustment of the claims put forward in their behalf would be arrived at. Nobody who was not in the know had thought at the time that a proposal for federation would be placed before the Conference and that the Conference would be called upon, almost at a moment's notice, to pronounce on an altogether

unprecedented type of federation.

It is not suggested here that no kind of preparation was made beforehand. Some of the leaders had such a scheme in mind and they had thought out all the details about it. But some 99 per cent. of the delegates were wholly innocent of the scheme. All the preparation had been made in secret, and when the Conference opened a surprise was sprung upon it of a federal scheme which departed in many essentials from the normal type of federation. The proceeding was quite unfair to the Conference as a whole. Sir Samuel Hoare jocularly remarked on one occasion that there was a rush on the London bookstalls, after the Conference commenced, for books dealing with federation. Not many of these delegates could tell then a unitary from a federal system of government and few indeed were there who knew what were the essential features of a federal constitution. The ignorance of the large bulk of the Conference delegates on this fundamental question no doubt helped those who had hatched the federal scheme in secret. In the initial stages, there was almost utter lack of criticism on points on which, if the public were seized of the scheme before, they would have riddled it through and through with criticism. The acquiescence of the delegates in the scheme at first, which was mainly due to ignorance, led them on to maintain more or less the same attitude of acquiescence later lest they be charged with inconsistency, and the acquiescence of these leaders kept the public in India, too, silent—for a long time. This silence relieved the leaders of the necessity for carrying on an educative propaganda which they would have otherwise deemed necessary, and thus the secrecy maintained at first about the scheme of what Sir P. S. Sivaswamy Aiyar justly calls a harlequin federation gave an appearance of a measure of general support to the scheme. But every thinking person knew that such an appearance could not be kept up for long. The more the public considered the scheme the more they were puzzled and alarmed by it. As Col. Josiah Wedgwood said in Parliament, the Indian people began after some time "to see the red light." Nothing was done by the Round Tablers to reason with them and to allay their fears.

The inevitable consequence of this was seen in the contemptuous rejection of the federal scheme by the Assembly. It might well have been that if the new Assembly were as remote from public opinion as was its predecessor, even this scheme would have received endorsement at its hands. But, as it was, the Assembly was composed for the most part of men who, voiced the feelings of the masses, and such a body could never lend support to a federation which stands in a class apart and for the peculiar nature of which no reasoned case had been made out to them. Those who took part in the Round Table Conference are not altogether pleased with the Assembly resolution. They do not much mind the scheme being turned down; what they grieve about is that the scheme was not turned down merely for the reasons for which they were dissatisfied with it, but also for others. The Assembly calls the federal scheme "fundamentally bad."

Such a wholesale condemnation of the basic principles of the scheme is really almost as unwelcome to them as to Sir Samuel Hoare, for it is a condemnation in part of those portions of the scheme in which they and he agreed as well as of those in which they differed. They have accepted the general framework of the scheme and the Assembly's condemnation extends to the framework as much as to details. This will become clear to all those who have been carefully following the debate that is now taking place in the Committee of the House of Commons. The Labour Party is in some respects moving amendments in advance of the position taken up by the generality of the Round Tablers, and Sir Samuel Hoare's defence is that the provisions of the Bill on those points were accepted by Indian opinion. This statement would be true if the Round Tablers had really expressed Indian opinion, but the fact is that they expressed their own opinions without trying to find out whether their opinion squared with Indian opinion or not. If they would even now care to ascertain the opinion of the Indian people as a whole they would come to know that the Labour Party represents the mass opinion better than they did.

Take, for instance, the question of the second chamber in the federal government. A case could be made out for such a chamber if the first chamber were to be composed solely of the territorial representatives elected on a wide franchise. A delaying second chamber endowed with the power of a suspensive veto might then be thought necessary. But what earthly justification can there be for such a body when one-third of the representatives in the legislature are permitted to be nominated by autocratic rulers? Still our Round Tablers acquiesced in nomination; they acquiesced in the second chamber; and they further acquiesced in a second chamber possessing co-equal authority with the first chamber. But our present purpose is not to quarrel so much with the views that they put forward at the Conference as with the method of secret diplomacy which they pursued. They planned, in the utmost secrecy, a most unusual type of federation and tried to foist it upon the Indian people. The Indian people retorted by summarily rejecting their handiwork in the Assembly. And who can blame them? It may be that our leaders are gifted with a larger vision than the masses can claim, but the representatives of the masses are entitled, and in fact bound, to judge of the scheme with such intelligence as they possess. And when have the larger-visioned leaders ever tried to educate the mass intelligence on this question?

It was all right for the Princes to have put forward at the Conference their individual opinions, for they had not to deal with a democracy. But the British Indian leaders ought to have paid more regard for the opinion of the mass of the people in British India than they ever showed readiness to do, for in British India the opinion of the masses, whether right or wrong, must ultimately prevail, and ought to prevail. Yet they conducted the negotiations for British India as if they felt that their opinion was just as final there as the Princes' is in the States.

They are intellectual autocrats as much as the Princes are political autocrats. Why should not the people in British India bow to their opinion as the States' people bow to that of the Princes? This is their feeling. British statesmen have been saying that if this opportunity of building up a federal constitution is lost it will never recur. We believe that the British Indian statesmen too feel likewise. And they are right, too. If the people at large once start thinking about the numerous anomalies in the constitution, to which general consent was given at the Round Table Conference, they will never agree to them. Therefore the one care of the Round Tablers was to keep the people quiet while they get the constitution framed by them passed. Their trouble was that the British Government procrastinated, and in the meantime the masses were aroused and made their voices felt in the Assembly. In India too the ancient and discredited policy of secret diplomacy must be given up and that of open covenants openly arrived at followed, even if it involves a little delay. If the Assembly vote will teach our diplomats a little humility and a little more respect for the opinion of the general public it will have served a useful purpose. It is clear that the best and the only sane policy for the British Government in the existing circumstances is, as the *Statesman* which is a supporter of federation has put it, is to proceed without federation, for the present—i. e. till the people at large come to accept the essential principles of this anomalous federation.

OBSERVER.

ANNUAL MARKET REVIEW.

PERSONS interested in an intelligent and dispassionate study of the movements of finance, industry and commerce have by now learnt to expect the Annual Market Review of Messrs. Premchand Roychand and Sons with keen interest. Their Review for the year 1934 that has recently been published makes very interesting and instructive reading. It is full of first-hand quantitative data which is systematically arranged so as to be of ready use. Facts with regard to trade, production, currency, gold and silver, securities and investments, and money and banking are presented so as to exhibit clearly the trends underlying the dynamic changes coming over each.

But the special interest of the Review lies more in the calm, balanced and experienced interpretation of the current movements of trade, industry and finance rather than in the admittedly valuable statistical information supplied. The background of economic change in the rest of the world against which Indian movements have to be studied has been briefly yet truthfully painted. It is incontestable that lack of confidence is the single most important barrier to world recovery. The two principal causes making for this uncertainty are, of course, the disjointed yet shock-producing American Recovery programme and the almost universal spread of the passion for national self-sufficiency.

It is permissible to hold that these two features are really inter-related and the fundamental fact of recent and current experience is the spread over all parts of the world of that intense nationalism which before the War was characteristic only of West European countries. Howsoever much these countries, and particularly England which has been their prototype and leader, might regret recent developments, undoubtedly the evening out of the balance of political power and economic advantage is a step in the direction leading away

from Imperialism and towards a Commonwealth of Nations. It is to be remembered that special natural advantages will always keep in being a considerable amount of international trade which might be further augmented by producers' goods which cannot be conveniently produced in each country and the ever-increasing number of non-essential articles of consumption.

We in India have to steer clear of two extreme positions. We cannot afford to be unmindful of the pressing claims of the industries of our own country trusting to some remote advantages to be got from unregulated international relations. On the other hand, as the Market Review very wisely points out, we will ill serve our interests if we aim at isolation. We must find markets for our raw produce and in any case for a large number of years to come our position as a debtor nation will cause us concern on account of our external trade. At the same time the task of building up internal strength in Indian industry and business must not be neglected, lest the real advantage of industrialisation may be lost to the nation. It is a pity that neither the industrialists nor the Government have yet adequately taken to heart the very healthy caution that the authors of the Market Review have been annually sounding in this matter.

Even more important are the economic relations between India and the Empire, particularly Great Britain. Unfortunately this topic has become a butt of political prejudice on either side, and hence we will not be the worse for an occasional stock-taking of the real position, as is attempted in the Review. If we were discussing the issue of India's trade relations with U. K. in a political and economic vacuum most of us will agree to the essential validity of the following propositions. England's position as our principal export market and import source, coupled with the long-term investments of British capital in India make our position *vis-a-vis* that country a very important plank of our economic policy. Whether it is exchange, tariffs or investments, a favourable position with regard to England is an inestimable advantage. Fortunately India's exports to England do not materially conflict with the new policy of agricultural conservation upon which the latter has recently launched.

The Review contains very illuminating statistics with regard to the working of the Ottawa agreements which bear out the essential justice of the propositions noted above. But the authors are constrained to admit in another connection that the grant of Dominion Status in the near future and the conferment of full control over economic policy almost immediately are pressing political reforms. The wholesale opposition to any schemes of Empire consolidation and preference which is a marked characteristic of Indian public opinion is really caused by a feeling of being imposed upon and by a suspicion that the inherent advantages that England gets out of India by its dominant position are so great that it is unjustifiable for us willingly to sign away any more. Once the political issue is out of the way the course of an economic concordant between India and England will be far smoother than what the mistrustful British elements now dare to expect.

As indicated above, the range of this economic contact is much wider than is implied merely in a tariff agreement. For instance, currency stabilisation is directly connected with the position of the rupee *vis-a-vis* the sterling. It is encouraging to find that the Market Review now sees nothing inherently objectionable in a lowering of the rupee ratio. In fact it hails with satisfaction the vicarious depreciation caused by the fall of the sterling. The Review further holds that any fresh lowering of the

rupee ratio, in terms of the sterling itself, should be left over to be considered when exchange stability all over the world is restored. The essential justice of the position of the currency reformers in India is thus recognised in the Review and the latter dissent might plausibly be construed as one of detail and procedure.

We feel, however, that the matter is a little more fundamental than what it appears to be at first sight. Whether it is depreciation, stabilisation or a rise, we want our currency policy entirely under our own control. The rupee must not for ever and even against its own will be dragged behind the sterling. The Hilton Young Commission itself had definitely pronounced its judgment against tying up the rupee to sterling, and we fail to see any inherent objection to what is termed 'delinking' of the rupee. Indeed England's position as the principal creditor and trading associate of India will weigh with the Indian currency authorities in determining their relation to sterling. But a rigid and in particular an imposed relation between sterling and the rupee is of doubtful advantage. So also it is inadvisable for India to wait till the sterling is stabilised before it reviews its currency policy. India must have its own say in the matter of future stabilisation and this it can have only if Indian currency policy instead of being dictated from Whitehall as has hitherto been the case is consciously shaped by an independent currency authority.

It is to be hoped that the new Reserve Bank of India will initiate a sound tradition of responsibility and freedom of action in this respect. The Review very correctly observes that the principal task in the financial sphere that is marked out for the new institution is to co-ordinate all the elements of the Indian money market into a well-knit system which will readily react to the manipulations of the Reserve Bank rate. This can come to pass only if the large number of indigenous bankers are encouraged to come within the sphere of the Reserve Bank's influence by a generous and wide adoption of the bill discounting system in India. If the Reserve Bank fails to assert the special claims of India's currency interests and to handle sympathetically all the constituents of the Indian financial world it will have fulfilled the worst fears of its opponents. Let us hope for the best.

That the conditions in the Indian money market are approaching the regularity witnessed in advanced countries is well brought out in the Review. The prevalence of a comparatively steady bank rate throughout the year and the very helpful part played by the ways and means and treasury bill activities of the Government are encouraging features. If only the Reserve Bank rises to its new responsibility of leadership in the Indian banking world a great impetus would be given to India's financial and economic progress.

The most disquieting feature in the last year's economic record is the growing difficulty of the Agriculturist's position. As the Review points out the prices of the majority of the articles that an Indian agriculturist buys have risen during the year; while the prices of his produce have on the whole remained at the low level reached in the previous year. The continued inflow of gold and silver trinkets to urban bazaars tells its own sad story. Let us hope that during the current year things will look up. We cannot, however, exonerate the Government from its responsibility in the matter of helping the agriculturist to reduce his fixed burdens e. g. taxation and indebtedness. This year's Annual Market Review is a worthy example of the tradition for sound economic survey that the authors and promoters of this series have patiently built up for themselves.

D. G. KARVE.

"GOLD EXPORT FALLACIES." *

BY kind permission of the Editor it is possible for me to add a few remarks on the declaration of gold policy made by the Finance Member in his budget speech last week. Sir James Grigg very cleverly twitted the Congress members by the argument that to discourage gold exports would be harmful to the interests of the "distress" sellers themselves who were getting a handsome price for their gold and thus could save themselves partly from the clutches of the money-lender. He was equally right when he said that Government could not buy all that gold and issue currency against it, as Government would have to borrow one-third of the amount to be paid and could issue only two-thirds in notes, while the gold itself would remain a dead asset. The Finance Member seemed, however, to have had a holy dread for all forms of inflation, bred up as he is amidst the "sound finance" traditions of the City of London. He seems to have already made up his mind as regards the ratio and is dead against its abandonment or revision. "Let me say at once," he declared, "that I will have no part or lot in such a policy, which I am honestly convinced would be disastrous for India in general, and most of all, disastrous for the poor, especially the poorer cultivator." I agree with this statement so far as the *modus operandi* of inflation suggested by an active gold purchase policy is concerned; but I must say that the Finance Member's persuasion as regards the exchange policy is unnecessarily hasty and unjustifiable. A general bankruptcy of trade in the country, a colossal burden of agricultural indebtedness, a wide-spread collapse of industries, the appearance of a nation-wide problem of unemployment—these are, perhaps, matters on which a Finance Member may be expected to give satisfaction in a budget speech. These are matters on which the financial and monetary policies of a Government may be expected to have an important bearing. Sir James Grigg, on the threshold of his financial career in India, may not perhaps have grasped the significance and the gravity of these questions. That may be a reason why he showed a smug self-complacency in his speech that "Government were tackling that problem directly by agricultural research, marketing schemes, grants to hand-loom and sericulture industries and other measures"—a policy which he himself has supported by setting aside a crore of rupees for "work in the villages." It must be said, however, that the Finance Member has not been properly advised if he fondly hopes that this bucket of one crore of his is going to touch the ocean of rural indebtedness and urban bankruptcy. He and the Government whom he represents should realise that they have caught the wrong end of the stick.

The right end of the stick is monetary policy. This has been disastrously deflationary since 1925, the year in which the rupee was *de facto* brought to

* This is an addendum to Professor B. P. Adarkar's article published in last week's issue. It was intended to be published with the article but was received too late for inclusion in it.—Ed., S. O. I.

1s. 6d. sterling. In 1925, England returned to gold at a parity, which is now generally admitted to have been about 10% unnecessarily high and which put England through a process of grinding deflation and severe unemployment at a time when the rest of the world was in the throes of an incipient boom. In 1927, the rupee was tied by law to the chariot-wheel of sterling and at an exchange ratio which has since caused a greater fall in prices in India than in any other sterling-standard country. This fall cannot be dismissed as merely the result of depression; if that were true it would not have been so much more precipitous than in England. India has got a double dose of deflation, in that her currency was overvalued in terms of a currency which itself was overvalued again in terms of gold. These are facts which are as clear as daylight.

The solicitude of the Finance Member for the welfare of the poorer cultivators ill accords with his connivance of these facts. Let him and those of his persuasion rest assured that *no amount of rural reconstruction* is going to touch the basic problem of poverty and unemployment, so long as the rupee remains tied to the apron of sterling at an unnaturally high and strangling ratio. Revision of the ratio and of the standard is an imperative need of the hour and although Government on the advice of London High Finance might be fighting shy of it the fact can scarcely be concealed that it is the only right course of action suggested by present conditions. Reduction of the ratio and later abandonment of the sterling link might, indeed, lead to further exports of gold, but such a policy must, in spite of gold exports, bring a harvest of prosperity to the country and Government.

B. P. ADARKAR.

SUMMONS FOR DISPOSAL OF SUIT.

(Order 5, Rules 1 and 5.)

In the Court of the S. C. C. Munsif of Mahahan at Muttra, Dist. Agra.

Present: B. SHYAM BEHARI LAL, Esq. M.A., LL.B., J.S.C.C.

SUIT NO. 1082 OF 1935.

LACHMI NARAIN s/o JAWAHAR-
LALL, Caste Vaish, C/o Muttra Laldar-
waza, Muttra. } Plaintiff.

Versus

RAMANLALL s/o NATHUMALL,
Vaish, C/o Bombay Madho Bag, on the
shop of Ramchand Halwai (Bombay) } Defendant.

WHEREAS the plaintiff has instituted a suit against you for Rs. 31-12-0, you are hereby summoned to appear in this Court in person or by a pleader duly instructed and able to answer all material questions relating to the suit, or who shall be accompanied by some person able to answer all such questions on the 3rd day of April 1935, at midnight to answer the claim; as the day fixed for your appearance is appointed for the final disposal of the suit, you must be prepared to produce on that day all the witnesses upon whose evidence, and all the documents upon which, you intend to rely in support of your defence.

Take notice that, in default of your appearance on the day before-mentioned, the suit will be heard and determined in your absence.

Given under my hand and the seal of the Court, this 13th day of March 1935.

NAZAR MOHD.,

MUNASERIM,

Munsif's Court, Mahahan at Muttra.

FEDERATION AND DOMINION STATUS.

MR. SASTRI'S ADVICE TO PRINCES.

The Rt. Hon. V. S. Srinivasa Sastri delivered a lecture at Amraoti on March 6 on "The Princes and the Federation", in which he elaborated the conditions he laid down in his Nagpur speech for the Princes entering into the Federation. He said :—

TO-DAY, I propose with you to take up this question where I left it at Nagpur and try, if possible, to fill up the gaps. First of all, I should begin by pointing out that nobody in the beginning thought that there would be the slightest antagonism between the ideal of Dominion Status and All-India Federation. Though I expressed the doubt in the beginning of the Round Table Conference, that a conflict of the kind might arise and begged of my colleagues not to allow the conflict to take possession of their minds but to remember that the future of India was bound up with a complete reconciliation of the two ideals of Dominion Status and All-India Federation, although I did this at that time, some of my colleagues felt that I was conjuring up, by the vividness of my imagination, the difficulty that neither existed nor would arise.

PRINCES AND FEDERAL IDEA.

Ladies and gentlemen, I am very sorry to say that my fear has not proved so groundless after all. For two years now, readers of the Press would have been struck by one fact that, in the Anglo-Indian papers and in such Indian papers as follow them for their own purposes, it is being openly said, "Why do these Indian leaders talk still of Dominion Status? They gave it up long ago." The very moment when they accepted a Federation of British India and Indian India, did they not practically give up the idea of Dominion Status? Some papers vary this opinion slightly. But when the Labour Government promised it in 1929, this Dominion Status was for British India, for that alone was under consideration. British Indian leaders, however, embraced the Princes and said, we will all become one and federate. That means that the All-India Federation had not taken the place of Dominion Status as the political goal of India. Therefore British policy is not justified in working for this Federation idea, and dropping Dominion Status out of view. Alas, the difficulty has been aggravated by the circumstance that it is being pointed out to us that the Princes of India, with whom we have elected to form one coherent political entity and whose views are therefore entitled to as great a consideration as that of Indian leaders, that the Princes of India have practically abandoned the ideal of Dominion Status. And what are the considerations brought forward in support of this extraordinary statement that the Princes of India do not care for Dominionhood now? It is a fact which can be proved that the Princes came forward of their own accord and acclaimed it. They added, "Into this Dominion of India, please let us be admitted", so that it would be strange indeed if those who welcomed the idea at its inception should after a short period have done or said anything to contradict themselves. It behoves us, therefore, to examine whether there is ground for this suspicion that the heart of the Princes has really travelled away from the ideal of Dominion Status to All-India Federation in supersession of the original idea.

THE PARAMOUNTCY QUESTION.

Now what are the considerations? One, two, three, there are seven. Let me mention some of the most important. I must say a word now about a point which I did not bring out in my Nagpur speech. As I do not wish to repeat myself, I like to dwell upon some of the side-issues of this proposition which I kept out of view at Nagpur. I must, there-

fore, refer briefly to what is called paramountcy. It is a somewhat ticklish and delicate subject upon which it is not possible to be perfectly clear without being at the same time open to all sorts of contradictions, exceptions and questions. However, it is necessary for us to have some idea of it, however obscure it may be. Now the Princes are very keen upon this paramountcy not being transferred by the Crown to the future Federation or the Central Government of India upon which not only their own representatives, nominated members, but the elected representatives of British India will sit. You may not know, but it is helpful to remember, that such paramountcy as there always has been, resides now, in the Government of India by statute as representing the Crown. The old statute declared that the Government of India was supreme over the whole of India including Indian States. Matters of primary importance concerning the States came up before the Government of India, that is to say, the Governor-General in Council, although it was quite possible for the Governor General alone to dispose of matters. But cases are known, in which matters of superlative significance were settled by the Government of India acting collectively. This did not suit the Princes. They did not like that the British Indian people, private citizens as it were, merely because popular elections threw them up and certain qualities of the demagogue brought them to the top of public affairs and gave them seats along with the Viceroy should presume to settle matters concerning themselves, and they have always been asking, that they should be emancipated from the control, slight though it may be, that they should be emancipated from the Government of India and declared hereafter they would be subject only to the authority of the Crown, exercised through the Viceroy acting by himself without consulting his Cabinet. Now that movement has been going on for some time. All of a sudden a great impetus was given to it by the findings of the famous Butler Committee. That Committee declared that paramountcy should vest in the Crown and in the Governor-General acting for the Crown, and that the new Government of India Act should bring about this result. Now whether we liked that or not was not considered at all. Some of us liked, some of us did not, and the thing was allowed to slide away; and now it is the reigning doctrine that paramountcy vests in the Crown and in the Crown alone and that the Crown through the Governor-General should deal directly with the Princes by an isolated tie, apart and aloof from the people of India, from the provinces of India, from the Central Government of India, from the Cabinet of India, and that in some way the Crown acting through the Governor-General holds paramountcy in its own hands for the benefit of the subjects and Princes and that we have nothing whatever to do with it.

DIRECT RELATIONS WITH THE CROWN.

It is true, ladies, and gentlemen, that some British Indian leaders, seeing far into the future and not altogether engaged in non-co-operation, paid attention to this matter. They declared that it would be a danger for the future of India, that when British India had become a Dominion and had become free from direct British control, exactly as Australia and Canada, it would be an anomaly that when British India had taken that status, there were on the face of British India 600 large and small territories which

still maintained for important purposes a separate tie with Great Britain and the Crown, that India in that way could not become coherent and the Councils of India should be, therefore, distracted and feeble if the Princes with their representatives should be unable to stand by them. India would never be equal with other Dominions before the world and that they could get into full and perfect control of their own resources and destinies so long as the Crown had a great power over a large part of the surface and a large part of the population of India—I mean, held these under its special custody bound by the engagements, Sanads, Treaties, etc. So long as that was the case, any federation of India would be feeble, would be much less than India ought to be and that arrangement, dual and divided, would naturally keep us for ever as a weak power, unconscious of its own strength and unable to serve its own destinies.

Ladies and gentlemen, I told you a little while ago that the reigning doctrine is that the Crown holds paramountcy over the Princes and, this is a great point, that it can never be contemplated even in the future 20 years, 30 years, 50 years or even a 100 years hence—no, as long as the sun and the moon last—that we of British India should never get into that position. So that is the point. The Princes have in repeated declarations made by them stated that they want this connection with the Crown direct; that they want this connection maintained not for a certain time but in perpetuity as a permanent and unalterable arrangement. We never accepted that and thought it was the courteous and diplomatic language that they adopted. But apparently this view has gone on so much—it has been repeated by them so often—that in certain quarters it is believed to be the accepted position. Now you see, therefore, how under these conditions the ideal of Dominion Status either for British India by itself or for Federation of India, becomes impossible. You cannot have a dominion over a third of India's area and over a fourth of her population. The Crown has such intimate and pervasive control. That is why many people assert, some genuinely, some only to show up our folly, whatever it be, and the view is maintained that when we agreed to the All-India Federation and the Princes declared that their connection with the Crown must be maintained directly and for ever, we allowed the thought of Dominion Status to go away from the centre and it is no use now trying to recall it. That is position No. 1.

CONTROL OF THE ARMY.

Our hope is that although the Princes might be saying this that is because you cannot conceive of their saying anything else. Although the Princes might be saying this, we must consider what the paramountcy doctrine is. Now paramountcy is one of those things which are held to be indefinable. Its precise nature, like the nature of the Deity, cannot be understood by a mortal man. One of them, which is the most prominent, I will ask you to consider with me for a minute. The most prominent attribute of paramountcy is the right and the duty and, therefore, also the power to protect the Princes when their tenure of their *gadis* is in danger. When any trouble comes to them and they feel that their position is a little unstable, that on their call upon the Crown to protect them by physical force, the Crown is bound by treaties to give them that and to maintain them there. Now in order that the Crown may discharge this very important duty, whenever called upon, the Crown must maintain an army. We have always been content and nobody has said anything else; we have always been contending that the army is for India and—every anna of its expenditure is being met from Indian revenue—that one day

the army should be placed entirely under our control and that the Government of India consisting of the Viceroy and the Cabinet and the Legislature of India should some day become the arbiter entirely of this Army. Once that position is reached, we do not know when it will be, it may be 20 or 30 it may be 40 years hence, but whatever that is, once that position is reached, that is once the control of the defence of India, the army and the navy and the air force and anything else that may be, has been made a transferred subject, how could the Crown exercise its first duty of paramountcy? It can no longer protect the Princes of India in their troubles. That protection, whether you describe it as a right or as a duty, becomes automatically transferred to the people of India. It is the Government of that time which should have control of the Army which would for this reason become responsible for the safety of the Princes. This, therefore, that has now been started by the Princes, is an entirely new thing.

How, it may be asked, are we to become responsible for the safety of the Princes? Now any difficulty that you feel is at once lessened when you remember that in the exercise of this very difficult duty our people's representatives in the Legislature of India, that is to say, the Executive Government of India would be helped by the Princes themselves because they come into this Federation and it has been ruled that they should send a certain number of representatives to the Legislature, by nomination, it may be—in due course of time by election—even in the executive Government of India, that is, amongst the Executive Councillors of the Viceroy, which is the present designation but which may change hereafter into "Cabinet," there should be included one or more representatives of the Princes themselves either from the prominent Princes in their own persons or by men in whom they have confidence. Now, you see at once how, what surprises you as a very difficult responsibility becomes an easy and feasible proposition in the exercise of which you will be aided and advised and perhaps controlled by the Princes themselves. Now, this is our hope, and if anything is said or done to prevent this consummation, to that extent it is a subtraction from the dominionhood of India. No mistake. But the difficulty has been seized upon by a certain section of people as a reason for believing that dominionhood has been lost: You may get instead All-India Federation; you will not get Dominion Status or dominionhood because you have allowed paramountcy to go to the Crown and in order to discharge the obligations of paramountcy it must maintain an army. The army, therefore, cannot be transferred to you. You do not get possession of the army. Thus the argument in a circle is complete. You are caught in it. That is the point.

DOMINION STATUS OR FEDERATION.

You see now why I asked of the Princes at Nagpur that they should repeat the first acceptance, which was almost a glad acclamation, of dominionhood for India. Secondly, that they should openly agree that the military policy of India should be the complete Indianization of the Army within a certain definite period and at the end of that period the transfer of its control to our own Government. That is why I asked of the Princes to make these two declarations, for I am inclined to believe that when in the political thought there are rival doctrines, each one of which tries to militate against the other, there should be chaos, and no clearing up of the latter is possible if suitable caution is not exercised from the beginning. There are the doctrines of Dominion Status and Federation of India side by side. I see no essential antagonism between the two. Some people fancy, not only Britishers but our own people,

that so far, Federation has swallowed up your Dominion Status. My opinion is very much to the contrary. My opinion goes further. There is no essential incompatibility between these two ideas; they can be reconciled and made to yield one coherent intelligible and desirable destiny for India. If, however, either in theory or in the practice of things, as it develops in the next few years, we have to make a choice between these two, if we are compelled to make a choice, I have not a moment's hesitation, I will take Dominion Status and farewell—Salams—to Federation. I do not want Federation, if it comes in the way of dominionhood for India, and now from these high grounds, I have to bring your minds down to a somewhat lower level.

DOMINION STATUS—REAL THING.

The point is detailed, but not necessarily less important for that reason. For a study of details often helps us to find out whether the ideal is still maintained or maintained in such wise that it is in real risk although nominally safe. And the point is this. Now, ladies and gentlemen, let me keep you for a few minutes more, as this is necessary to finish my argument on this topic. Dominionhood is a very abstract doctrine and there are people in England who say it is impossible to define it. Whether it is possible to define it or not, nobody can deny that it is a real and powerful doctrine in political phraseology. They call certain territories "dominions". They acclaim them as dominions. Just understand this point; it is parenthetically remarked. It would appear that these several dominions, South Africa and Australia, and you know the rest, New Zealand and lastly Ireland, that these territories are so proud of the status and designation of Dominion that they would not allow it to be assumed by a new territory within the British Commonwealth, without their previous consent. There must be a reality. Those that say that it is indefinable and vague and therefore useless are not talking quite honestly, because they know that it is such a real status and dignity that those who now have it are so jealous—they regard themselves as a separate family apart from the commonwealth,—that they certainly object to India being also called a Dominion. Therefore, they say, it would appear, "Let her be called a Dominion only when she gets full self-government, as we know it". So we are not to be called a Dominion.

You remember how in our mythology, Vishvamitra, however great he was as a Tapaavi, having been born of a Kshatriya, could not call himself a Brahmarshi until Vasishtha came forward and said, "Yes, you are one". Till then the poor fellow could not call himself a Brahmarshi. He was a Rajarshi and not a Brahmarshi. Now our becoming a Brahmarshi requires the consent not of one Vasishtha but of seven Vasishthas.

So that, you see, this dominionhood is something to aspire to, something worth striving for, do not believe in people who say, "Do not care for it". They care so much for it that they do not want you there. If Dominion Status then is worth getting, we must see that we shall have a smooth progress towards it. It is a long and weary struggle that faces us in the course of this march. You know how every time there is political advance in this country, it has got to be made against the determined opposition of interested people. We have to gather every possible progressive force in the country and bring great pressure to bear upon the authorities before they agree to a single step of constitutional advance. Realize that When Dominion Status is distinctly held in view and we have got to take firm steps towards it, you can imagine how much more bitter will be the struggle, how much more will be the opposition of the interested parties. We shall

have to take every step against embattled forces and, therefore, we must be able on those occasions to speak with a unanimous voice, to ask for political advance, to demand it as having been promised and as having been unduly delayed after the due date has passed. We cannot afford to have division in our ranks—can we?

MEDIAEVAL POLICIES TO BE ABANDONED.

This All-India Federation consists both of India and of Indian States and, therefore, in future, whatever struggle and fights there are for the enlargement of Indian liberty and rights, we and the Princes must stand shoulder to shoulder. If the Princes do not assist us they will say, "one of the partners did not assist you, how can we"? If they oppose we are helplessly gone. Our only point is to get the Princes to understand that in the future struggle, which will be much more arduous and difficult than ever before, we have a right to expect their fullest co-operation in the conferment by one party and the acceptance by the other of the newer and larger privileges in the political field. That is perfectly clear, it is so obvious on the face of it.

Now is it possible for the Princes as they are to-day not merely to sympathise with the struggle of British Indian statesmen for an additional status, but to stand by them and support them openly? If it is not possible for them to do so, I call this Federation, that is being fashioned, a weakness. Why should we hide facts or soften opinion for anybody's pleasure? We have to face a desperate struggle and we need every ounce of strength. We cannot afford to be held back, to be pulled back by parties; that is the trouble, ladies and gentlemen.

If then the Princes are to play this big part and take their places alongside of us in our political struggle, if they are to play that part, what I ask is, how can they be champions, unmitigated champions, of policy in their own way? We, of the British India, must advance politically and at the same time how can we maintain that they, the Princes, are quite entitled to deny any advance to their own subjects in the political field? The thing is absurd on the very face of it, and yet that is the position today; and that is why I require of them a complete change of policy. It is not easy for them, we must admit. Nor would it be easy to take rapid strides in this matter. But I ask only, as people who still see into the requirements of the future, to look forward, and declare that gradually and by due steps their subjects would also be given representative institutions so that in course of time they would be really as self-governing as the people of British India are.

Now you may ask, "What is the difficulty?" They say they have got vested rights. They have got a traditionally inherited policy which they must maintain, standards and principles of rule which have come down to them from the hoary past. They want change, but at their will and pleasure. Now the curious thing is that they think, contrary to the advice of every Viceroy, and even of their own political officers, they think curiously enough that it is possible for them to maintain in this country institutions which were perhaps fitting two centuries before. This is an extraordinary doctrine and this was the point that I was coming to.

PRINCES AS A CONSERVATIVE FACTOR.

Into the future federation they are being brought in as forces of reaction, lest the unbridled politics of India should drag India along the path of revolution, red ruin and all that sort of thing. British statesmen say to the Princes, we agree to India getting something provided you take your places amongst them and hold the British Indians in check. The Princes say, "Very well, we will do that. Not only will we

keep India from the paths of revolution, but we will see that those who merely want advanced political institutions will also be compelled to stay out of the way." When Britain resists our political advance, what can these people say? They have been specially put there for the purpose of helping the British. I cannot say 'no' to that. The power of the British Crown is only nominal. It is a non-political power. The moment the Crown exercises political power it is in danger in Great Britain. The era of the Crown in Britain itself, therefore, exercising any actual power has passed. It now glories only in the glories of the people. The Crown is entirely identified with these people. Not only that. Even when, personally speaking, the King does not like certain policies, he is obliged to come to Parliament and say that he specially favours them. Now for our autocratic Princes of India for ever to say that they are intimately connected with the British Crown and that the British Crown, stultifying itself at every step, should protect them whenever they want, is absurd, and yet that is what we have come to. In order to be sure that the Princes coming into these legislative bodies and sending their representatives in the Executive Government will be by their side always and never have to identify themselves with the British Indian statesmen in order to secure that object, you might have seen, if you are careful readers of the papers, that slowly the Political Department seems to be appointing British officers to places of power even in the States. Formerly, for the last ten years, the policy had been otherwise. But silently, quietly, almost unobserved, the opposite policy is gaining power. I am not on the side of the Princes. I know their weaknesses, which require the intervention of strong fearless British officers whom they cannot touch or remove. But why, all of a sudden, is Government being made aware of these defects and is thrusting its officers on them? Why, one does not know. But one result is known, and that is that when Princes nominate their representatives to the legislature and choose their executive officers, when these nominated representatives exercise such power, they will have hereafter to be under the control of a greatly increased vigilance on the part of these political officers. That means, therefore, that the British Government still wants to control the legislature not merely by keeping the power non-voted but merely keeping this and that, but also in the indirect manner that the representatives of the Princes in the legislature shall also be at their own instance. You see, therefore, how you are being hemmed in. All things must be clean and fair in Indian politics. But you see now there is reason for our being very uneasy. No, there is reason for our being suspicious and therefore being upon our guard, fully awake and attempting every minute to bring pressure, the pressure of a united and coherent opinion upon the authorities for seeing that the Princes are not used for the purpose either of defeating completely or of unduly delaying the attainment of Dominion Status. Now, this is the position that I took up in Nagpur. This is the position that I take up today. Not that anything that I say personally is going to command their attention at all. For we of the Liberal Party are not a power such as we should like to be and the present Government in Great Britain has shown that they have no use for us at all. Why should the Princes care for the words of the Liberals? They are not likely to do so. But I have been forced into this controversy, and I have to maintain the ground I took in that speech. I have not abandoned my principles, or acted inconsistently with my thoughts. I am strongly and emphatically for Dominion Status. I am willing and content if there

is an All-India Federation upon which the privilege of dominionhood will be conferred. I do not wish that Federation should be favoured at the expense of dominionhood or to its detriment. That is the position I take. If the Princes desire to be admitted into the inner councils and into the hearts of their subjects and British India how could they desire that their connection should be not with their own kinsmen but rather with another power? If they desire that they should be loved and welcomed in India, as partners, if that is their desire, I should most respectfully but emphatically ask them to say where they stand in respect, first of dominion status, secondly, of the complete Indianization of the army, and thirdly, of the increased political enfranchisement of their own subjects. I have argued for both federation and dominionhood together, not for federation divorced from full dominionhood.

STILL A FEDERATIONIST.

It was after listening to the most fascinating eloquence that I allowed myself to be persuaded, that after all, this fabric was to the greater glory of India. If so, let India become a dominion not merely in that part of her which was British India but in her entirety, in her wholeness as one India. I thought that would be the better consummation. Otherwise, geographical peculiarities of India, her agricultural and scientific requirements, would not be completely answered. If Federation has to come some day in order that India may reach the height of its destiny, why should we not get it today, especially when Princes come forward? When I took up the federation idea, I did so without detriment to reaching full dominionhood. I still am an advocate of Dominion Status and still I am an advocate of federation. I want the two to be reconciled. It is my respectful prayer, first to British Indians, to consider these problems calmly and quietly and secondly, it is my most humble and respectful prayer to the Princes not to drive to despair their British Indian brethren, but to say the word that will soothe, that will comfort, and that will give us some hope.

CALL THEIR BLUFF!

MISS RATHBONE'S PLEA.

The following letter by Miss Rathbone, an Independent M. P. for the Combined English Universities, appeared in the Manchester Guardian of 11th March.

SIR,—You seem to be a warm supporter of the India Bill. So am I, in those respects in which the Bill promises a real step towards self-government and towards improving the lot of the poverty-stricken masses, the depressed classes, and—not least important—the women. The arrangements for provincial government do promise both these things, through the increased measure of provincial autonomy, the greatly increased electorate, and the reservation of seats for interests likely otherwise to be neglected. Even the proposed Federal Government contains vestiges of these improvements.

But I have begun to think that for these gains we are paying too heavy a price, mainly in two ways.

First, we are bartering away the interests of the 81,000,000 inhabitants of the Indian States. These States are complete autocracies, save that in a few there are advisory representative bodies. In many the rule of the Princes or Rajahs is known to be oppressive, extravagant, and inefficient. Yet, as part of the inducement to the Princes to accede to federation, Sir Samuel Hoare has promised to make it clear "in the most solemn and formal manner,

that "we regard the treaties between the Crown and the Indian Princes as inviolate." These treaties—some of them a century or more old—pledge us "to protect the States against rebellion or insurrection" and "to maintain unimpaired the privileges, rights, and dignities of the Princes," subject only to the implied condition that if rebellion is caused by gross and persistent misgovernment or bitter discontent with the form of government we may insist on some steps being taken to mitigate these causes. (See the Butler Report on Indian States.) To leave these ancient treaties standing until there is some grave cause for terminating any of them is one thing: it is quite another for a democracy like ours solemnly to reaffirm all of them, in 1935, as part of a bargain between ourselves and the Princes.

Apart from this reaffirmation of treaties, the proposed Constitution will make it more difficult than before to intervene in the States for the protection of the Princes' subjects. Already many hold that such interventions are far too rare. But in the future we are to depend on the goodwill of the Princes for the smooth working of the Federal Government and for resistance to subversive forces in British India. Reliance on their known loyalty to the British connection is admittedly one of the main reasons for making the accession of 50 per cent of the States a condition of the coming into operation of the whole new Constitution, not merely the Federal part of it. Obviously the Viceroy will hesitate long before he risks losing the goodwill of an important Prince—indeed, of the whole princely order, for they will stick together—by intervening in the internal administration of any State. These are grave considerations.

Secondly, we have the opinion of British India to consider. We have known all along that any Constitution we could offer her would fail to satisfy the demands of those in India who demand complete self-government. But again, it is one thing to offer a Constitution which falls far short of the aspirations of politically-minded Indians; quite another to impose on her a Constitution which most of her chosen leaders regard as no advance at all, but rather a step on a path leading to a morass. Yet the verdict "We would rather have no bill than this bill" does seem to have been pronounced by at least the following:—

By the Congress, by far the largest politically organised body in India, speaking through the Assembly.

By Mr. Gandhi, speaking through his trusted friend Mr. C. F. Andrews in his recent broadcast address.

By Mr. V. S. Srinivasa Sastri, the most universally respected leader of moderate opinion still left in the Assembly.

By Mr. Jinnah, leader of the Nationalist Moslems in the Assembly.

By the Servants of India—that small but devoted band of genuine social reformers,—speaking through the organ which bears their name.

I admit that it is an indecisive verdict. Sir Tej Saprú, a distinguished leader of Liberal opinion, prefers this bill to no bill and believes that most of the Indian Liberals share his view. (See his article in the January *Twentieth Century*.) The communal Moslems apparently think the same, though they have spoken indecisively, and there are others. Also many well-informed people believe that even those who have pronounced for unqualified rejection are bluffing and would be disappointed if taken at their word. If so, there is one way of calling their bluff. It cannot be done (as the Labour party suggested

in Parliament) by taking the verdict of the present Assembly, because that represents only about 1,000,000 electors out of a population of 271,000,000. It could be done by enacting that the Federal part of the Constitution should not come into being until a majority of the new Provincial Legislatures, chosen by the enlarged electorate, had met and said "Fiat!" At present this right is given to the Princes alone. Without their assent the whole Constitution will be a dead letter, even after Parliament has sanctioned it. Why not extend a corresponding right, concerning the Federal part, to British India? Of course, the Government will not agree—at present. But if the Princes withhold assent they will have to reconsider the whole position. Hence this suggestion is perhaps worth ventilating.—Yours, &c.,

ELEANOR F. RATHBONE.

House of Commons, March 6.

PLAYING THE FOOL.

WE observe that the Opposition to the India Bill both in Great Britain and in India assumes that the Princes have rejected federation, and that therefore the federal portion of the Bill is dead. On the other hand, the Secretary of State seems to assume that it is only a question of terms and of misunderstanding of the language of the Bill, that adjustments will be made and the federal portion of the Bill can be proceeded with. The "die-hards" in Britain and the Congressmen in India are certainly technically wrong in saying that the Princes have rejected federation, but on the other hand the Secretary of State and the National Government up to date seem to be gravely underrating what has happened, and to be attempting to carry off the situation somewhat airily.

We are by this time accustomed to the somersaults of the Maharaja of Patiala, who first blessed federation, then damned it, then blessed it again, and has now come as near to damning it as makes no matter. But we do not much like the language of his resolution which was passed by Their Highnesses at Bombay. It declares that "the fundamental points of the India Bill and the Instruments of Accession" are unacceptable, and it further brings what is a serious charge against His Majesty's Government, namely, that the Bill and the Instruments of Accession depart from the agreements arrived at during the meetings of representatives of States with members of His Majesty's Government. The Secretary of State naturally denies this, and we are sure that in any case he has acted in good faith, though we have no means of knowing whether in fact the language of the Bill and the Instruments are legally adequate to implement the agreements reached, and to secure the "vital interests and fundamental requisites" of the States.

The story of federation up to date is not an altogether creditable one to the Princes. We reproduce on another page a telegram sent to the *Statesman* by its Special Representative in Delhi on March 29, 1930. That telegram reveals the origin of the momentous declaration made by the Princes at the first business meeting of the Round Table Conference in the following November. The Political Department was not represented at the March meetings in Bikaner House, and possibly for that reason paid no attention either to them or to the information which appeared in the *Statesman*. In consequence, the British Government and Lord Irwin's Government were alike completely overwhelmed by surprise by the Princes' declaration at the Round Table Conference.

They had known of course that Colonel Haksar and certain other States' Ministers had been advocating federation for some years. They had not for a moment supposed that these Ministers had persuaded their masters. It took the Political Department a long time to be convinced that the scheme was real. Indeed for the next two years it was as freely accused of using its influence against it as for the last two years it has been accused of bringing pressure to bear upon the Princes in favour of it.

On the assumption that they were serious, the Princes have led the British Government and the British people up the garden path of illusion. They have misled the course of the Round Table Conferences from the start, and caused an immense concentration of political and expert effort on the clearing of the ground for a federal Constitution. Let us recall the circumstances in which they settled amongst themselves that they should declare for federation. The decisive months were March and April, 1930. The Congress star had every appearance to them of being in the ascendant. Congress had declared secession from the Empire. Its members had withdrawn from the Assembly and the Councils. Mr. Gandhi was starting on his march to Dandi. Murderous riots were breaking out all over the country. Civil disobedience was in full swing. The Government of India gave an impression of abject surrender. Its methods were so different from those which Their Highnesses would adopt in similar circumstances that it must indeed have appeared utterly contemptible and futile. Inevitably they came to the same misleading conclusion as did the Congress, that Great Britain was "on the run." The hour was ripe for Pandit Malaviya, the ambassador of Congress, to approach them with his federation proposals, and they listened. For at the same moment all their long-cherished grievances against the Political Department came to a head with the publication of Mr. A. P. Nicholson's highly coloured book "Scraps of Paper," expressly written to present their case to the world. In federation as eloquently urged upon them by Pandit Malaviya on the lawn of Bikaner House after dinner they saw the means of escape from control. They would get rid of the Political Department, they would get a share of the Customs duties, they would have a powerful, perhaps an irresistible, voice in the Government of India, and therefore be their own guarantors. Henceforth their treaties and their independence would be doubly secured, for they themselves would be at the Centre to see that nobody interfered with them. Instead of an irksome Railway Board controlling them with its through lines, and its railway stations which provided an asylum for refugees and refreshment rooms which deprived them of legitimate excise duties, they would control the Railway Board. It is by the way of interest to note that the railways are one of the main points of the present disagreement and that the Princes range themselves with Congress in their opposition to the proposed statutory railway Authority.

Such was the picture of the time. Labour was in office in London. The British power in India was apparently breaking up. A scramble lay ahead, and it was time to come to terms with Congress. Pandit Malaviya spoke smoothly, and assured them that the presidential fulminations of Mr. Srinivasa Iyengar at Gauhati and of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru at Lahore did not represent the mind of British India. Mr. Gandhi, it was well-known, had a soft corner in his heart for the Princes.

"He's a good fellow, and 'twill all be well."

Thus we see that the federal scheme is the child of Pandit Malaviya and the princes. Sir Tej Baha-

dur Sapru was converted to it in time for the opening session of the Round Table Conference. He in turn with difficulty converted Mr. Sastri, and the Indian Liberals. British statesmen had perforce to accept it. But at the second Round Table Conference a majority in the National Government sought to postpone it, and to go on for the present with provincial autonomy alone. They were met by the united opposition of the whole British India Delegation—including of course Pandit Malaviya and Mr. Gandhi—demanding provision for federation in the Bill, and the opposition within the Cabinet unwillingly gave way.

Since then it has been the accepted policy. Mr. Baldwin and Sir Samuel Hoare, who were all along willing to proceed with it, have eloquently defended it, and have even declared it to be impossible to contemplate provincial autonomy without it. But in India where the scheme was born and whence it was forced upon them a great change has taken place. Law and order have been restored, the Congress no longer dreams that it can dictate. The authors and advocates of the scheme no longer advocate it at all. The Princes have discovered that it does not simply mean a cheap escape from the Political Department and the attractive task of running a British India from which the British have practically abdicated, and telling subservient British Indian politicians what they want done. Pandit Malaviya has forgotten federation, and is interested only in the Communal Award. Mr. Jinnah's love likewise has waxed cold, and the rank and file of the Mohammedans were never enthusiastic for a vast accession of Hindu population and influence from the Indian States into British Indian Central politics. The Assembly has damned it. Even the members of the British Indian delegation which made it the subject of an ultimatum at the second Round Table Conference have sunk into silence. But the unfortunate Sir Samuel Hoare has had to go on holding in his arms the baby which the Princes and the Pandit have put there.

It is an unpleasant story in which we can see no reinforcement of the argument for self-government for India. It is indeed a story of amazing irresponsibility and of playing fast and loose with Parliament and the British people, who want to do the right thing by India. Nevertheless the work which has been done cannot be allowed to go for nought. Federation is the true ideal, and sooner or later must come. A responsible Central Government for British India alone interlaced as it is with the States is an utter impossibility, and responsibility can only be attained through Federation. But the pace cannot be forced. We shall not be surprised if some of Mr. Baldwin's and Sir Samuel Hoare's colleagues insist on plain recognition of the fact that for the present the Princes under the influence of the Maharajah of Patiala, have "spoofed" them over federation, and that since the Conservative opposition, the Princes, and the Indian Legislature have all wheeled into line in opposing Federation, it is better to proceed without it for the present. It would in any case take several years of negotiation before a federal government could come into being. The negotiations can continue even if the statutory machinery is not now provided and with the actuality of provincial autonomy they are likely to mature at least as fast if the federal portions of the Bill were now made law. The probability of Cabinet reconstruction in Great Britain would also seem to have been increased.

PRINCES' TALK WITH LEADERS.

(FROM OUR SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE.)

New Delhi, March 29, 1930.

THE Maharajas of Patiala, Bikaner and Alwar, the Nawab of Bhopal and other Princes are now in Delhi holding important conversations with Indian politicians, prominent amongst whom are Pandit Malaviya and Mr. Jinnah. The European Group are also represented.

Pandit Malaviya is making a tremendous effort to undo the ruthlessly hostile attitude towards the Indian States, indicated by the Indian National Congress in a series of presidential speeches, notably those of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru at Lahore last Christmas and Mr. Srinivasa Iyengar at the Gauhati Congress in 1926.

Pandit Malaviya advocates a Federal India in which the Princes would have a powerful voice reserved for themselves by constitutional right, and invites them to accept a self-governing British India as heir in full to all the rights of the British Crown and Parliament. In other words, he asks the Princes to be their own guarantors for their privileges and position.

The present leaders of princely India show a marked disposition to give this view a careful, not to say sympathetic, hearing.

The astonishing outburst of free speech in the hitherto almost monotonously correct Chamber of Princes a month ago indicates which way the wind blows. The Princes believe they have grievances. They are apparently not impressed with the Government of India to-day and may consider that now is the moment to join the largest crowd, which, while not necessarily composed of rodents, is engaged in evacuating an unseaworthy vessel. Something should be done about this.—*The Statesman.*

"CAN'T BEAT IT FOR REACTION."

MAJOR ATTLEE'S CONDEMNATION OF SECOND CHAMBER.

"I have examined the conditions of many second Chambers in many parts of the world, but," declared Major Attlee, "I do not think you can beat this (the federal second chamber in India) for reaction." In moving for the abolition of the Council of State he made a powerful and closely reasoned speech, the whole of which is worth reading, but of which the extracts given below are of particular interest.

WHAT, after all, is the object of the second Chamber? You are merely going to have representatives of the States sitting, it may be, with a certain alteration between the representatives of the States in the upper and lower Chambers which may be convenient, but, so far as I can see, there is no reason for any difference in the States' representatives as regards that side of the Constitution. As far as the representation of British India is concerned, you are merely giving increased representation to the interests. This House has been very much concerned of late in discussing the question as to whether this Bill will be accepted by the Indian States, and very little concerned, as far as I can see, as to whether the Bill will be accepted by the Indian people. The arrangements at the centre are such as to make it certain that the live political movement in India

will never get effective representation at the centre. Whether it is direct election or indirect election does not affect the matter, because in every case they are to be kept in check all the time by this second Chamber—a second Chamber with equal power, and which is to meet the first Chamber in joint meeting in the event of any dispute.

It is certain that those who represent anything like political thought in India are never to have control at the centre. It beats me why hon. Members who agree with the right hon. Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill) should be so alarmed at this central legislature; because it will be composed almost entirely of reactionary elements. It will be composed of the Princes and the wealthy people. The methods of election show clearly that you will only get the very wealthy people in, and nothing like an adequate representation of the masses. The result will be that the central legislature will inevitably be reactionary, and that will set up a strain in the whole federal system. The working of a federal system depends very largely on there being the possibility of something like agreement in general outlook between those who are governing in the federal units and those governing at the centre. It is possible that in some of the federal units you may get ministries and governments representing the live forces of Indian political thought, but at the centre you will get nothing of that sort.

I have heard no argument which satisfies me that there is any need whatever for the second Chamber at the centre. At the best it is a kind of fifth wheel to the coach. If we are to have a federal system and to make it representative of the federal units, a case of course can be put up for getting the representatives of the federal units in one House and representatives of the people at large in the lower House, but that is not being done. This system will not only be expensive, but it will prevent any really effective representation of India in her central Government. That is one of those things which makes this Bill absolutely hopeless from the point of view of expecting the political forces of India taking part in the Government of the country.

Correspondence.

"THE PRINCES IN HIGH DUDGEON."

TO THE EDITOR OF THE SERVANT OF INDIA.

SIR,—I have read your article entitled "The Princes in High Dudgeon" of the 7th March with full approval. I agree entirely with you, that the Federation has now degenerated into a bargain between the British Government and the Indian Princes to their mutual advantage and to the disadvantage of British India. The tragedy of it is that British India is completely and deliberately ignored. It is right and proper that the SERVANT OF INDIA is exposing the conspiracy. I congratulate you on it.—Yours, etc.

S. SATYAMURTI

19, Ferozshah Road
New Delhi, 12 March.

SPARKS FROM THE COMMONS' ANVIL.

5th and 6th March.

THE PRINCES BILL.

MAJOR ATTLEE, in developing an argument in favour of a uni-cameral legislature, happened to speak about the people of India. But he corrected himself immediately. "I am aware," he said, "that in these Debates it is very unusual to talk about the people of India. We are generally talking about the Princes." The India Bill may, indeed, be called the Indian Princes Bill!

THE INDIAN MONEYLENDERS BILL.

ANOTHER member of Parliament on an earlier occasion called the India Bill the Indian Money-lenders Enfranchisement Bill! This is a good description, too—from another point of view, inasmuch as to the extent the Bill gives power it gives it to the propertied classes. It holds down the masses and puts up the vested interests.

Mr. Aneurin Bevan referred to this aspect of the matter while arguing against the special responsibility of the Governor-General for the safeguarding of India's financial stability and credit. He said:

This Bill does not, as a matter of fact, hand over the Government of India to what are euphemistically called the irresponsible masses of India. The Bill only enfranchises the property owners of India, who are very much concerned about Indian credit and are vitally involved in the development of their own commercial concerns. Is it conceivable that those people would carry out a financial policy which would jeopardise their own properties and their own undertakings? It is fantastic. If you were handing over India to the Indian working classes, you would expect them to be slightly irresponsible about the propertied classes, but we are enfranchising only the property owners of India, and I imagined that that would be a sufficient guarantee. But no, the real conflict is between the property owners of India and the property owners of Great Britain, and you want that safeguard in the Bill in order to safeguard the property owners of Great Britain against the rivalry of the property owners of India, so that if any controversy arises in the future, the Viceroy can intervene on behalf of the property owners of this country.

The truth of course is, as **Mr. Joshi** observed in the Assembly, that the Government does not trust even the rulers of the Indian States or the propertied classes in British India sufficiently to give them any real power. Even to them it gives only a semblance of power.

IT WILL STOP SOCIAL SERVICES!

THE Governor-General's special responsibility is really, as **Mr. Oswald Lewis** remarked, for the purpose of safeguarding the interests of the holders of Indian stock—and also of the retired European officials who enjoy pensions. It is the business of the Governor-General to see that "the finances of India are so conducted that funds are available" to meet the claims of the stockholders and pensioners. A fear was expressed by the Labour party that the carrying out of this responsibility in a strict manner will starve the social services. "Under his (the Governor-General's) obligation and responsibility to see to the defence of India", **Mr. Bevan** said, "half

the Indian budget goes there, and the rest, or a large part of it, is already pre-empted. If they propose to expend any additional money in order to improve the social services of the country, the Viceroy steps in." A Governor-General may conceive it his duty to come in and say (Mr. Jones gave this illustration), "No, you must not spend more rupees on that than you spend now, because if you do you will thereby prejudice the financial stability of your country. I must intervene and stop it." Even if he does not stop it, the Ministers can always plead that excuse. In this special responsibility, **Mr. Bevan** said, "they will have a splendid alibi. Whenever discussion takes place, what will they be able to say? 'We cannot do this, because of the veto of the Governor-General.'"

ENTHRONING MONTAGU NORMAN.

AT the least the object of giving special power to the Governor-General in the matter of finance is to tie India permanently to an orthodox financial policy by making the Finance Minister the slave of the Bank of England. **Mr. Seymour Cocks** said:

This Clause means that Indian Ministers must be governed by orthodox views on finance. It means that they may not adopt a policy which is objectionable to banks, to the Reserve Bank of India or to the Bank of England. But it is the policy of the banks which is being questioned now-a-days in all quarters. We do not agree that financial dictation by the Bank of England has been so wise for many years past. Most of the mistakes made in the realm of finance have been made owing to the policy adopted by the Bank of England, by **Mr. Montagu Norman**, and, through him, by the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

The Chairman: I hope the hon. Member will not go off on that King Charles' head.

Mr. Cocks: It is not King Charles' head, Sir Dennis; it is Mr. Montagu Norman's head.

The Chairman: That, perhaps, is worse.

Mr. Cocks: Much worse, Sir Dennis. But suppose a finance minister in India wanted to adopt a different method of currency and to go in for inflation, what would the Governor-General do? The Governor-General of India, who would not be a financial expert himself, would only intervene because the Reserve Bank of India would say, "We do not agree with this; it is all wrong, and it will lead to disaster." So it really means—and I am really sorry to bring in King Charles' head again—that **Mr. Montagu Norman**, besides being virtually King of England, will be virtually Emperor of India. The orthodox policy, which has led to disaster in this country, and not wholly in this country, but in other parts of the world, ought not to continue in India.

"WATCH-DOG UPON THE MINISTERS."

ON Clause 15 dealing with the Financial Adviser to the Governor-General, who was described as "a watch-dog upon the federal Ministers," **Sir Stafford Cripps** made much the same point. He said:

Before the Committee parts with this Clause I should like, on behalf of my hon. Friends and myself, to say that we do take a very strong objection to this appointment of someone whom the right hon. Gentleman (**Sir Samuel Hoare**) describes as rather more than a watch-dog, that is to say, handing over the whole control of the finances

of India, and thereby the control of the Indian Ministers, to someone who is not necessarily at all acceptable to those Ministers.

It is rather worse than the Chancellor of the Exchequer's position in the Cabinet in this country. You will have someone who, quite apart from any of the democratic side of the Government, will be able to step on in every conceivable issue and say that anything that is proposed to be done may interfere with the financial stability and credit of the Federal Government, in much the same way as was indicated by the Lord President of the Council the other day when he said that the credit of the country was jeopardised because someone in the City thought there might be a Labour Government in the future. Any rumour or feeling of that kind which may evince itself in India will apparently be a good cause for this gentleman who is the Governor-General's financial adviser to go to the Governor-General and say, "You must stop this minister or that carrying through this or that bit of policy," which otherwise the minister would have the right to carry through.

From our experience of the sort of financial adviser who has gone to different parts of the Empire in the not very distant past, it is probable that he will be the type of person who will try to curtail every social service because of his quite genuine belief in the very orthodox system of capitalist finance. Therefore, you will have a splendid method by which to shut down the whole of the effective work which might otherwise be done by the Indian ministers. For those reasons, we protest against this Clause and shall divide against it.

WHY DO NOT THE PRINCES OBJECT ?

MR. DAVID GRENFELL wondered why the Princes who are supposed to have stipulated for real responsibility as a condition of their joining the federation did not object to the special responsibility of the Governor-General concerning finance, for, as he says,

Without responsibility and authority in matters of finance there is no self-government in the real sense. There is no power. Power resides in the control of finance in India as in this country. The executive body of the Government in this country has authority because it controls public finance. Without that control it would have no authority; all the authority would rest with the Crown; and this House of Commons and Parliament would have no power.

The simple explanation is that the Princes are no more than the lackeys of the British Government !

THE BLACKMAILING PRINCES !

To the British Government they are unable to stand up, it is true; but they know that they can get what terms they like from the British Government in matters which do not touch it. This came out very well in the discussion on the second chamber.

The case made out by Major Attles for a unicameral legislature was complete in cogency. He said, first of all, that the work of the federal legislature was "extraordinarily small", and that the 635 members in it would be "idle legislators." If, however, such a large number was desired, it would be better to have all the members in one house, which would reduce the size of the constituencies and make direct election possible. Secondly, even without the second chamber there would be enough representation of conservative elements and vested interests, particularly with the Princes' bloc, and there was thus no need to constitute a second chamber, than which, as Mr. Cocks said, it was not possible to imagine a more reactionary chamber.

If direct election had been retained for the Assembly, a second chamber might have been argued to be necessary, but with the substitution of indirect election the argument loses all validity. The only reason that now remains for unsustaining a second chamber is the one given by Sir Samuel Hoare, viz. that the Princes want it, and that therefore it must be set up. Mr. Seymour Cocks had something very pertinent to say about this :

The ordinary federation provides logical reasons for two Chambers, because in all federations until the present one was thought of there was a first Chamber, a lower Chamber, to represent people as a whole, and the second Chamber to represent the respective Provinces. That is the whole theory of two Chambers in a federation, but that consideration has been swept away in this case, because under the Government proposals there is no lower Chamber to represent the people as a whole, both Chambers representing the Provinces, the lower Chamber representing the lower Chambers of the Provinces and the upper Chamber representing the upper Chambers of the Provinces, or the people who would form the upper Chamber where there is not one. Therefore, the logical reason for this particular second Chamber has been swept away. The Secretary of State said that whatever theoretical reasons could be put forward for one Chamber there was one overriding reason why two Chambers were necessary, and that was that the Princes want it. Apparently, the House of Commons is to be blackmailed by the Princes into accepting something they would not accept otherwise.

THREE CONSULTED !

MR. MORGAN JONES brought out in his speech on direct election some very interesting facts. The first fact which he mentioned is well-known, viz. that the Secretary of State was influenced in his final abandonment of direct election by the insistence of Sir Austen Chamberlain in favour of indirect election. But the second fact that he mentioned is not known in India, viz. that the Government of India was thrice consulted, and every time it supported direct election. On this point Mr. Jones said :

The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State maintained steadily his position, and the Committee instructed him to take the view of the Indian Government again. A second time the right hon. Gentleman returned, and a second time he returned with the view of the Indian Government that they were in favour of direct election. Again he was instructed to take the view of the Indian Government, and a third time, of course, the right hon. Gentleman could not but come back and see that the vast majority of his Committee were against him, and he said, "Very well, we must accept the decision." I say that the decision of the Committee was taken—I do not say wrongly—in the teeth of the repeated presentation to the Committee, not of the views of Indians, but of the view of the Indian Government itself, and that view of the Indian Government was based upon some 10 years or more of the system of direct election.

LIES HEAVILY ON THE CONSCIENCE.

MISS ELEANOR RATHBONE made several attempts to raise the question of the protection of the States' people in discussing the Governor-General's special responsibilities, but every time she was ruled out by the Chairman of the Committee. Finally she could only get this in :

I have felt a great responsibility in this matter, because this is one of the few parts of the Bill where it did seem possible to raise a matter which lies very heavily on my conscience and which should lie heavily on the consciences of every man and woman in this House, because we must consider what we do as it affects human beings, men and women, and not merely as it affects thrones and Princes.

Is it not very creditable that while this matter does not lie on the consciences of our British Indian leaders, it lies on the conscience of this Englishwoman who has nothing whatever to do with the States' people? With our leaders the whole of this reform business is a political game; it has no relation to their consciences. And they must be wondering why conscience should at all be brought in into this affair.

DEFYING THE WHOLE OF INDIA.

MR. ISAAC FOOT dealt exhaustively in his speech, lasting for one full hour, with the merits of direct election. But he rested his case chiefly upon the fact that Indian opinion was solid behind it. The only Indian to whom he referred as supporting the indirect system of election was Mahatma Gandhi, whose speech on the subject, he said, was "a speech of some difficulty and ambiguity." "The reason," he added, "most people had some difficulty in deciding just what his position was upon the matter was because he went into a labyrinth of philosophy at that time; but the rest, speaking in other language, made their position quite clear." Mr. Foot then referred to a long array of Indian names, among whom he mentioned Dr. Ambedkar, Mrs. Subbarayan, Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, the Aga Khan, Mr. Jayakar, Pandit Hirday Nath Kunzru (President of the National Liberal Federation of India), Mr. Joshi, the Servants of India Society and the Deccan Sabha. Col. Wedgwood, who supports the plan of indirect election embodied in Mrs. Besant's Commonwealth of India Bill, could not bear Mr. Foot supporting his case by a citation of authorities instead of by the weight of argument. His complaint was that Mr. Foot was in this matter an authoritarian rather than a libertarian like himself. He said:

His authorities were not impressive, but the Servants of India (Society) whom he quoted is a very good authority of Indian opinion. I deny entirely, however, that the main objection of the Servants of India to this Bill is the absence of direct election. . . . If you ask in India what the opinion of India about the Bill is, they will not worry their heads about whether it is direct or indirect election, but about communal representation or about a constitution which will commit them, bound hand and foot, to the millionaires and Princes of India.

"A PERMANENT BAR."

THE question of a future Government of a different complexion being left free to change the Instrument of Instructions to the Governor-General was raised before incidentally in Committee, but it was raised again on Clause 13, which lays down that no change can be made in the Instrument in future "except in pursuance of an address presented to His Majesty by both Houses of Parliament." It was, as the Secretary of State said, at Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru's instance that this provision for a Parliamentary sanction to the Instrument had been introduced. But it was little realised by Sir Tej at the time how it would work out in actual practice.

The House of Lords will always give assent to changes proposed by the Conservative Party but will always oppose those proposed by the Labour Party. In this instance the Labour Party wants to introduce, as Sir Samuel Hoare said, "drastic alterations" in the Instrument of Instructions when it will come into power but it will not be able to carry them on account of this provision. Thus, Mr. Morgan Jones said, "the Tory Party would be able to exercise a permanent bar upon the freedom of a Labour Government in its relation to the administration of affairs in India." How the bar is permanent was explained by Mr. Churchill, who said:

The point that I want to put to the Government, the Secretary of State, and the Lord President, turns on this veto of the House of Lords. As far as I make out, the passing of an Address by the House of Lords is not a matter covered by the Parliament Act—I mean that this not a matter amenable to the procedure of passing the Address through the House of Commons in three successive Sessions in the space of not less than two years. It is not a question of a mere time veto; it is an absolute veto that is being provided in this respect in the House of Lords. The absolute veto of the House of Lords is being revived in this matter.

It is thus "a good pucca veto," "an unlimited veto" of the House of Lords. Sir Samuel Hoare agreed with this interpretation. In order to remove this veto, the Labour Party moved an amendment that the Instrument of Instructions should only be laid before Parliament; but it need hardly be said that the amendment was heavily defeated. It is a question of "the Bill, the whole Bill and nothing but the Bill," as Sir William Davison said in another connexion.

CAN HE STOP LAND ALIENATION LAWS?

IN discussing the Governor-General's special responsibility concerning the protection of minorities Col. Wedgwood raised the question of imposing restrictions on land alienation on a communal basis as the Punjab Act does. "The legislation quite simply is," he said, "to prevent Hindus having the right to buy agricultural land whether it is in certain areas or wherever it is. Where that act is in force, the Hindus may not buy land and may not foreclose on it and may not lend on a mortgage. The only purchasers are the Mohammedan landlords who can buy up the land very cheaply from the unfortunate ryots." And Col. Wedgwood's question was: "We are under this Bill setting up a new Province in Sind. In that Province the Hindus will be in a very small minority. It will be almost inevitable that the land legislation which is now in force in the Punjab should be tried in Sind. Is the Governor-General to be in a position to stop that legislation or not?" To this question Sir Samuel Hoare gave no answer, except to say that the amendment proposed by Col. Wedgwood in this connexion would not help.

SO THIS IS SELF-GOVERNMENT!

MR. MORGAN JONES'S SPEECH.

Mr. Morgan Jones made the following speech in the Committee of the House of Commons on 5th March on the Special Responsibilities of the Governor-General.

MY hon. Friend the Member for Gower (Mr. David Grenfell), in moving the first Amendment in our name today, recalled to the Committee that there are some eight points with which this Clause deals. Those are points reserved as special responsibilities for the Governor-General in future. If we put them together they cover an extraordinarily wide field of administration and of legislation. There is very little left outside the confines of these eight points if you put them together. There is "peace or tranquillity" which is a pretty wide term to begin with, and then there is the question of "financial stability" which also touches administration at all sorts of points. Who can precisely define what is connoted by the phrase "interests of minorities"? There again you may be touching at innumerable points in your administration and in your legislation. Then there are the interests of the "members of the public services." They touch at various points, and so I could go through the whole list.

Our first objection therefore is that we consider that these eight points disclose far too great a lack of trust and of faith in the good sense of the future legislators in the Indian Central Parliament. If we are going to give some measure of self-government to these people, it can only be successful in the long run if we start them off in the belief that we think they are capable of exercising the functions which would devolve upon them. But all the time throughout this Bill we find it is a question of giving with one hand and taking away with the other. Look at the phrase "in his discretion" which appears here, not in that particular form, perhaps, but in a collateral form, namely, "to exercise his individual judgment," which practically means the same thing. A friend of mine counted the phrase "in his discretion" for me as a matter of interest, and I believe that the phrase appears in the Bill over 200 times. This shows how we hedge round the freedom of the Indian people in the exercise of these new responsibilities. May I put another side to this problem which perhaps has not been put before? Hon. Gentlemen who have made some study of Indian political history in recent years, and indeed not in recent years only but in more remote years, will know that from time to time difficult and perplexing religious problems have come up through the medium of political legislation. For instance, take the question of child marriage. There is a perplexing problem, and that and other similar problems have had their root, as it were, in religious conceptions which give rise to very violent animosities from time to time. What is our history with regard to legislation that touches upon these problems? Broadly, it is that we have, generally speaking, avoided touching them lest by touching them we may give rise to these communal differences and disagreements. Let me take paragraph (c) of the Clause:

"the safeguarding of the legitimate interests of the minorities."

Suppose a Bill dealing with child marriage were proposed by the Government of the day in the Central Parliament, it would be easy for the minority violently opposed to such legislation to create such a row about it as to make it inevitable for the Governor-General to say, "I cannot allow this Bill to go on, because, if I do, the peace and tranquillity of India will equally be upset." My point is that, by drafting somewhat loosely these eight items in this way we are putting the Governor-General in a position of transcendent difficulty. I have said repeatedly in this House—and I repeat it again, and hope that hon. Members will forgive me for so doing—that my conception of the Governor-General in India in future is not a conception of a person who will be perpetually poking his nose into these local concerns. I want him to be there as the representative of His Majesty the King and nothing more. I do not want him to be constantly putting his finger into this and that pie and interfering here and there, and thereby bringing upon himself criticism that ought properly to be reserved to the administration itself. If he is going to butt in—I cannot use a better expression than that—to prevent this legislation or that because he apprehends some danger to the peace or tranquillity of India, or to minority interests, or because he sees some financial interests are going to be prejudiced thereby—if he is going to have that special responsibility thrust upon him, he will be brought inevitably right into the centre of the arena of public controversy. It is the greatest injustice you can do to the Governor-General or to the Governor, who, after all, are there to represent His Majesty

the King, to bring them in to the centre of their own controversies, peculiar as they are in character.

Therefore, my hon. Friends and I take a very strong objection to the wide way in which this Clause has been drafted. It places upon the Governor-General the duty of interfering on innumerable occasions, and it will be easy for designing people—and I am sure that no one will controvert this—who want to prevent certain legislation from being carried through the Central Legislature to manufacture the occasion that will make it impossible for the Governor to withhold his interference. Once you do that the other side will say, "There is the Governor-General butting in again to protect people's interest other than ours." That is the gravest possible injustice to the office of the Governor-General, distinguished as it must be in the new circumstances in India.

We have indicated also our view concerning the question of reciprocal trade. Let me repeat once more that we do not believe that you can safeguard Lancashire's interests by any artificial method such as hon. Members below the Gangway and on the opposite side of the House sometimes suggest. The only way of safeguarding the trading interests of Lancashire with India and of India with Lancashire is along the path of good-will and understanding. There is no other way. If you give the Governor-General the right to interfere when he presumes that the Indian Legislature is doing something which is inimical to the interests of Lancashire, then we say, and we are entitled to say it on grounds of logic, that the Indians also ought to be able to look to the Governor-General to protect the interests of India in the event of their being prejudiced by any action taken by this country. The Under-Secretary asked us to believe that it is impossible to contemplate that this country would designedly seek to carry through this House legislation which would discriminate against India. I accept that statement; but he is not equally ready to assume that India will not discriminate against England. Those Indians who were members of the Joint Select Committee invited us to believe that it was never their intention to use any power they may possess of discriminating against Lancashire—

Sir H. Croft: They are doing it.

Mr. Jones: The statement they made to us was that it was not their desire when they had been granted self-government to discriminate against Lancashire. I accept their statement. But if you assume, as you do in this Clause, that India may use the power to discriminate against Britain and give the Governor-General the right to intervene, then I say that India has an equal right to expect you to give to the Governor-General the power to intervene in the contrary case, whenever it may be presumed that this country may discriminate against Indian goods. It should be applied both ways fairly. We have stated our view over and over again that in our judgment you destroy very largely the moral value of this gesture you are making to the Indian people through this legislation by hedging round the powers of self-government which are granted to the Indian people. If you give self-government give it frankly. If you do not want to give self-government, do not call it self-government, but say that it is more in the nature of limited self-government. You cannot call it self-government as long as it is possible for the Governor-General, in a thousand and one ways, to interfere with the full expression of the Indian people.