

The Servant of India

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Topics of the Week.

The Late Mr. Vithalbhai Patel.

THE death of Mr. Vithalbhai Patel in Switzerland on Sunday last cannot be described as sudden. He had been suffering from heart and kidney trouble for the last two years and more, which apparently got aggravated recently and the frequent bits of news about his health cabled to this country by his friends and medical attendants had in a way prepared the public for the worst. That however no way reduces the poignancy of the grief that will be occasioned in all nationalist quarters by the sad event. Mr. Vithalbhai's name was not much known to fame before he secured his election to the Bombay Legislative Council in 1913. But during the five years he served in that Council he distinguished himself by his industry, his devotion to public interest and the independent and fearless discharge of his duties. The questions that interested him most, related to local self-government and primary education. His ceaseless endeavours to promote the cause of the former were recognised by his being called upon to guide the deliberations of the first session of the Local Self-Government Conference held in Poona, in 1917. Next year he piloted successfully through the local legislature a law, popularly called after him, designed to advance the spread of primary education by permitting local bodies to take the initiative in compulsion. The Act was destined soon to become a dead letter owing to causes beyond anybody's control; but that does not detract from the value of Mr. Patel's labours for the diffusion of literacy.

His record of work as a member of the Supreme Legislative Council where he was sent by the

suffrages of his non-official colleagues in the Bombay Council cannot be said to be equally successful. His chairmanship of the Reception Committee of the special Congress session held in Bombay in August, 1918 and his appearance next year before the Joint Committee on the Montagu Reforms Bill as a Congress representative marked his complete break with the Moderates with whom he was till then acting. No believer in Council boycott himself, he yet stayed away from the first Legislative Assembly in obedience to Mahatma Gandhi's call for non-co-operation but had no difficulty in entering the second one along with a number of Swarajists. To him fell two years later the unique distinction of being the first elected Speaker of the Assembly. To the duties of this position he brought his characteristic industry and independence and an uncommonly close grasp of parliamentary traditions. The separation of the Assembly secretariat was largely due to his exertions. He also rendered meritorious services to the Bombay Municipal Corporation as its President. That he gave proof of scrupulous impartiality in this capacity was borne testimony to by the handsome tribute paid to his work by the then Municipal Commissioner, who was an Englishman. Mr. Patel's death creates a void in the ranks of public workers which cannot be easily filled.

Indian Christians on White Paper.

THE All-India Conference of Indian Christians has recently submitted to the Joint Select Committee a statement of its views on the White Paper which, we are glad to observe, are mostly in line with national sentiment. The Conference has always stood for the attainment by India of full Dominion Status at as early a date as possible but recognises that this is not immediately possible, the greatest stumbling block being the Army. Such arrangements as have been made for pushing on its Indianisation strike the Conference as being extremely inadequate. Seeing that Defence constitutes the crux of the problem, nobody can blame the Conference for its strong insistence on a very much quicker pace of Indianisation.

While not objecting to the future form of the Indian government being federal, the Conference is afraid that the predominance therein of the States and other vested interests which will be rendered possible by the White Paper constitution would make the government "ultra-conservative" and "slow to move." The proposed weightage in favour of the

States is repulsive to the Conference, which stands for the principle of equality of representation on some recognised basis like, say, population—a principle which, in its opinion, may as well be applied to the communities in British India itself. If over-representation cannot in some cases be avoided, the criterion should be made generally applicable. And in any case the weightage, it urges, should be restricted to a "definite period." The reservation of certain departments in the hands of the Governor-General should also, in its opinion, not extend beyond a stated period, which in this case may be ten years. A careful examination of the special powers proposed to be vested in the Governor-General and Governors leads the Conference to the conclusion of their being of an excessively wide character. Financial independence it regards as the *sine qua non* of a responsible India; while the Services safeguard is, in its view, "wholly unnecessary", as also that relating to commercial discrimination.

Nothing would have pleased the Conference better than the total absence of communal electorates from the Indian polity. But since this has been found impossible, the first demand of the Conference is that the rights of citizens should be clearly expressed in a list of fundamental rights to be incorporated in the Constitution Act and that any violation of these rights should be actionable in an appropriate court. In view of the obligation proposed to be placed on the Governor-General and Governors for the proper representation of important minorities in their Cabinets, the Conference asks that Indian Christians should be declared to be an important minority in Madras and to be the third largest minority in the whole country and entitled to representation in the Federal Cabinet "at least alternatively with the Sikhs."

Hindus and Sikhs on Communal Award.

TWO avowedly communal conferences, Hindu and Sikh, were held during the last few days, and, as expected, they condemned the Communal Award in unmeasured terms. Having almost despaired of any modification of the Award by the usual methods of securing redress, the Hindu Mahasabha decided to take the matter, in appeal as it were, to the League of Nations of which India is an original member. Article XI of the League Covenant which is mentioned in this connection concedes to its members "the friendly right" "to bring to the attention of the Assembly or of the Council any circumstance whatever affecting international relations which threatens to disturb international peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends." However disturbing the effect of the Communal Award may be on the communal peace in this country, it will need a good deal of argument to prove that, but for the timely intervention of the League, international peace would be threatened by the Award. Unless we have grossly misunderstood the intentions of the Mahasabha, all that it seeks to ensure is the application to India of the principles of what are known as the Minority treaties; but it is very doubtful, apart from the fact whether it is feasible or desirable, if the League's assistance could thus be invoked under a provision which seems to be clearly designed to prevent war. But the Hindu Mahasabha is apparently not assailed by such inconvenient doubts and is organising a deputation to Geneva with a

view to interest the League authorities in the Indian communal problem. The result of the deputation's efforts will be keenly awaited in India. In the meanwhile, it is clear that the Sabha can no longer be looked upon as a handmaid of the Congress as it has all along been, for, unlike the Congress, it has sounded a clarion call to the Hindu community to capture the Councils. This will still further weaken the hands of the Congress in its non-co-operation campaign.

The Sikhs are no less resentful of the Award; but their recent attitude to it constitutes a welcome departure. Theoretically speaking, they firmly believe in joint electorates as an ideal electoral arrangement; but since minority after minority went on asking for separate electorates, the Sikhs too, in order not to be left behind in the communal race, made a like demand. In their recent conference at Lahore, however, they have improved on this position and, "without reiterating and reserving to itself the right to put forth the Sikh demands when and if it becomes necessary", decided to work for the abolition of communal representation. We must say that in doing so they have given an admirable lead which deserves to be copied by other communities like, e. g., the Indian Christians whose attitude towards communal electorates is almost on all fours with that of the Sikhs so far.

Facilities for Technical Training in England.

THE report of the Indian High Commissioner for last year on the working of the Stores Department once more refers to the notorious disinclination of British manufacturers to admit Indian students to their factories for purposes of technical training. The difficulties experienced by him in the matter seem however to be slowly diminishing. Out of the 143 applicants during last year for such admission, the High Commissioner was able to place 114 with suitable firms, the corresponding figures for the previous year being 120 and 104. 10 applications were withdrawn while 17 had been undecided at the time his report was ready so that only in two cases did he fail to secure the necessary facilities for technical training. The number is no doubt negligible; but why even with his large contract-giving powers he should be unsuccessful even in a single case is what it is difficult to comprehend. Can he not use these powers as a lever with which to make British industrialists give in on this comparatively minor point? In 1932-33, e.g., India purchased her stores requirements as to 95.75 per cent. from Great Britain and their value was £872,553. It is stated that the fall in the value of purchases was about 45 per cent. as compared to the previous year. Even so, the figure of total value of contracts placed with British firms last year is by no means inconsiderable. What prevents the High Commissioner, we wonder, from saying to the manufacturers concerned: "If you want these orders you must be prepared to take Indian young men into your factories and arrange for their training in the technical processes of manufacture"? Why, in fact, can he not make this a condition of giving the contracts to British firms? Under present arrangements the High Commissioner is required to show some favouritism to British firms at India's expense; and orders for warlike stores have necessarily to be placed in England irrespective of considerations of cost. India providing such a large and sure custom to these firms, there is nothing wrong or illegitimate in the High Commissioner asking them for this small concession for her young men. Public opinion will definitely be on his side if he should make bold to take this stand.

THE COTTON TRADE CONFERENCES.

INDIA, LANCASHIRE & JAPAN—IV.*

WHEREAS Lancashire is an unimportant customer for our raw cotton Japan is by far our most important customer for this most important of our staple agricultural exports. The fluctuations in the exports and the shares taken by various countries have been very large in recent years. But the general position could roughly be stated as follows. India exports somewhat more than half of its total production of raw cotton. Of these exports Japan's share is a little less than half; the average of Japanese takings of Indian cotton during the three years 1929-30 to 1931-32 has been nearly 1200 thousand bales annually which is almost six times the purchases of Lancashire. And of the total cotton consumed in the Japanese mills, one half is on an average Indian cotton. Further, Japanese mills have been equipped for the use of coarse cotton and the Japanese export markets are mostly in Asia and Africa where the coarser and cheaper lines of cloth are in greatest demand. Japan is thus by its past history and present situation a most important buyer of Indian cotton. It is very difficult to say to what extent Japan would be able to make good its threat of replacing Indian cotton by other supplies. But in view of the ruling low prices of American cotton and the possible availability of Chinese coarse cotton supplies, it is clear that Japan could, if she so desired, at least deal a severe immediate blow to Indian cotton interests. This part of our discussion could, therefore, be concluded with the statement that special discrimination against Japan is not called for in the interests of the Indian industry and that it is likely to harm considerably the interests of the Indian farmer. Such a discrimination, on the other hand, in favour of Lancashire is not likely to result in any material benefit to any Indian interest.

We have discussed hitherto the question in its broadest aspects and defined our views towards the grant of protection to the Indian industry and the need for discrimination against Japan. We now proceed briefly to consider the immediate issues that are being discussed at the trade conferences and the possibilities of agreements between the three parties. In the first instance, it is necessary to define what India desires to achieve by an agreement or agreements. In an article which appeared a few months ago in the *Manchester Guardian Commercial* the ends aimed at in possible agreements by Lancashire and Japan were described respectively, as being the employment of a greater number of men and the securing of a large balance for international payments. And it was suggested in the article that if an agreement regarding the output of the two industries could be arrived at Lancashire would be able to have larger production than at present and thus employ more men and Japan, while its output would be somewhat curtailed, could yet get a sufficient balance for international payments because of the higher price at which Lancashire's exported cloth would sell.

The Indian objective is primarily the protection of an important industry from a sudden and overwhelming competition which would threaten to upset entirely its established economy. For the attainment of this purpose alone, however, it is not in the least necessary that we should seek any conferences with either Lancashire or Japan. We are not interested to any considerable extent in any export market for our cloth production and the limitation of output should not thus affect us. Our concern would be ordinarily to arrange our tariff walls in such manner

as to afford the desired protection to the Indian industry. The conferences are necessary from the Indian point of view only because Japan, it is feared, can harm other Indian interests seriously in retaliation if any specially severe measures are taken against the imports of Japanese cloth into India. The conferences are necessary because of the threatened raw cotton interests. And it is because of this also that the Indian Government has had to take up the matter. This again is an issue as between India and Japan and it is difficult to see where Lancashire comes in. To the primary objective of adequately protecting the position of an important industry is now added the second objective of safeguarding the interests of the producers of raw cotton. An agreement with Japan and for Lancashire would be judged by the effectiveness with which it fulfils these two aims.

An international industrial agreement can, of course, take various forms. When the agreement is purely non-official it usually takes the form of agreed limit to the output of the various units and the demarcation of their markets, while bilateral agreements between governments have of recent years normally adopted the system of import and export quotas. In our case limitations of production are of no practical value. It does not concern us whether and to what extent Japan and Lancashire limit their production and there is no point in arriving at a limitation of Indian production. Further, it should be observed that an agreement to limit production can be arrived at only by strongly centralised national industries. It was pointed out by the League of Nations experts that a limitation of coal output was not possible so long as the coal producers of one important country were not strongly organised in a national body. We have in India no organisation within the ranks of the millowners and a limitation of production, even if it had been desirable, would have been impossible to enforce. As the market for our industry, further, is mainly the home market the demarcation of market territories also is not an important question with us. If, therefore, some sort of agreement is to be arrived at with Japan it can only be on the basis of limitations by quota of exports and imports. Recent examples of such agreements are the Anglo-Danish and the Anglo-German agreements negotiated a few months ago. The present negotiations, of course, are limited to cotton and cotton goods whereas these treaties cover the whole field of commerce as between the two countries. If quotas are to be defined in an Indo-Japanese agreement they will obviously be quotas regarding imports of Japanese cloth into India and the imports of Indian raw cotton into Japan. We feel it important that the latter quota should be made an integral point of any agreement that is reached. Now that the question of the takings of Indian raw cotton has been raised in this form by the Japanese industry, it is necessary that the position of this trade be definitively safeguarded if an import quota is to be granted to Japanese piece-goods. For, it is otherwise likely that even after a formal lifting of the ban, a slow but steady movement towards the displacement of Indian cotton by others may go on in Japan. It should be our objective to prevent this coming about.

Quotas may be in the form of absolute quantities or as shares of production or consumption in the importing country. The quotas are also usually sub-

* Previous articles appeared in our issues of September 28 and October 5 and 12.

ject to certain possible variations and they may be related to a price and vary with given fluctuations in it or they may be related to production in the industry or the consumption of the product. In an Indo-Japanese agreement it is unlikely that the Japanese import quota could be related to consumption in India. It might be linked to production of cloth in the Indian mills, but this is also unnecessary. It would normally be an absolute quota of a given quantity fixed for a certain period. The exact figure is a matter for intricate negotiation and as the Japanese imports are expanding at the expense of Lancashire, the Japanese industrialist would naturally stick out for a figure higher than a mere average of past years. Though the quota need not be fixed in relation to production or consumption the basic price at which the imports come in will have to be determined. It is in the main the extremely depressing effect of the prices at which the Japanese goods sell that the Indian industrialists complain against; and even if Japanese imports are limited by a quota the minimum prices at which they compete with Indian production will have to be indicated. The quota of Indian raw cotton imports into Japan could be fixed either as a percentage of the total consumption of cotton in Japanese mills or as an absolute quantity based on the average exports for the last few years. Both these quotas will, of course, be a part of the same agreement.

We have discussed the possible lines of an agreement regarding quotas, not because we are enamoured of bilateral treaties, but because such an agreement is already under discussion. For our part we believe the quota system to be a particularly obnoxious method of restricting international trade. It is unsatisfactory in many ways. Quotas, being usually based on the average of the last few years, have a tendency of perpetuating the *status quo* and favouring the less efficient of the competing suppliers. The working of the quota system makes necessary an elaborate system of import passes etc. and thus makes room for such evils as favouritism. The presumed effect of the quotas, again, in moderating high tariff walls is wholly illusory. Quotas have the effect of moderating the tariff schedule only because they bring about more directly results identical with those aimed at by high customs duties. The tariff schedules thus lowered bring no relief to the consumer as the higher price is predetermined and is not affected by a lowering of the duties. In fact a quota coupled with a price agreement is worse, in so far as the benefit of the high price is, in the case of the quota, reaped wholly by the exporter and not shared by the government of the importing country as would be the case in a regime of high duties. We would, therefore, favour an agreement on a basis of quotas today only because we feel that a failure to reach a settlement will endanger Indo-Japanese relations and also feel that a bilateral cotton treaty with Japan at the moment affords a good opportunity of strengthening the position of our raw cotton producers.

A quota fixed for Japan does not necessarily mean the determination of corresponding quotas for the other importing countries. These imports may still continue to come in freely subject to the customs tariff. But in this case it will have to be guaranteed to Japan that our tariff does not enable its competitors, especially Lancashire, to compete unfairly with it. It is also to the interests of the Indian consumer that nothing should be done by us which will put Lancashire in a special position of vantage as against Japan. We have been repeatedly told that the Indian market for cloth is a price market. This merely means that the Indian demand for cloth is extremely elastic and that with a given

rise in the price of cloth a large number of Indian consumers are unable to buy even a minimum quantity of this necessary material. It is the efficiency and enterprise of the Japanese industrialist that has enabled a large mass of Indians and other Asiatics and Africans to buy cloth throughout the post-war period at a reasonable price. Apart from such measures as are designed to protect the Indian industry it would be foolish on our part to do anything which will unnecessarily raise cloth prices in India. An agreement between India and Japan should not be difficult to reach, unless the course of negotiations is influenced by an unnatural—or rather a natural—solicitude on the part of the Indian Government for the interests of Lancashire.

The stage at which the negotiations as between the industrialists of the different countries have arrived is not known. It is, however, difficult to imagine what the Bombay millowners expect to get from Lancashire and what they can be promising in return. If they are promising Lancashire a special position as against Japan in the market, they are promising something which they, at the risk of jeopardising the interests of Indian consumers and cultivators, have no right to promise. Or are they making common cause with the British industry in the manner of the steel industry agreement of last year and "rationalising on Empire lines"? If they are doing this, that also is not in the national interest of India. But in the case of the cotton industry the saving grace is that any agreement regarding limitation of output or types of goods to be produced that the Bombay millowners negotiate could not be enforced by them in respect of producers in other centres. We wish, however, that the negotiations are proceeding on neither of these lines, but that the Bombay millowners are trying by agreement to regain some of the export markets in cloth which they have lost so rapidly during the post-war period. If some such prospect is in sight some tangible gain in return for concessions to Lancashire may be obtained. If Lancashire expects preferential treatment in the Indian market, it should secure for Indian cloth a similar position in the markets of the other parts of the Empire. On these lines alone could it be thought desirable that Indian industrialists should participate in a tripartite agreement to limit production and divide markets.

CONCLUSIONS.

It would be best to end this series of articles by a restatement of the conclusions reached by us. These are as follows: (i) A long-period high tariff wall is entirely uncalled for in view of the recent past and the present position of the Indian mill industry. (ii) Only such temporary relief should be granted as is necessary to guard the position of the industry against precipitately severe or demonstrably unfair competition. (iii) Such temporary measures will be justifiable only if coupled with provisions which will in the meanwhile effect radical reforms in, especially, the Bombay industry. (iv) The temporary relief will best be granted in the form of specific duties levied on each class of imported goods. (v) A preferential treatment of U. K. piggoods imports to any extent higher than that necessitated by the Ottawa agreement is undesirable. (vi) The possibility of Lancashire absorbing any large quantities of Indian cotton is very small and we must look to Japan as the most important buyer of our raw cotton. (vii) An Indo-Japanese commercial treaty should limit Japanese cloth imports to an agreed quota subject to a minimum price and should correspondingly guarantee a quota of Indian raw cotton imports into Japan. (viii) Such agreement and the consequential stabilisation of customs duties should not undermine the competi-

titive position of Japan as against Lancashire. (ix) In an agreement between the industrialists of the three countries, it is desirable that Indian industrialists should attempt, in the main, to recapture their lost export markets.

BELOW THE MODERATES' MINIMUM.

RECENTLY eight retired British military officers who held high offices in the Indian Army had assured the British public that with the present organisation of the government and the army in India, Britain could hold India indefinitely by military force and that the danger of Britain losing India would arise only if and when the White Paper proposals for the transfer of the army, the police and the civil and the transport services in India were transferred to Indian control. This junker view was promptly countered by Gen. Sir W. C. G. Heneker, who had more recently retired from the Indian Army. He denied that the White Paper contemplated any such transfer of power but added that, "An India held only by force would be no asset to the Empire but a constant drain upon the United Kingdom. A hostile India would be valueless for trade. And if India is not today, in the opinion of the eight Generals, 'a united and virile nation' no measure could be better calculated to make India such a nation than the attempt to hold it down by what the signatories call "an alien military force." Whatever solution of the Indian problem of government may be found, it is certain that there can be no permanent solution either by force or by offering to India a scheme so restricted that it would be accepted by no single party or community in India, and would leave us the problem, which we have not hitherto had to face, of governing India without Indian assistance." This view was reinforced by the letter which Sir Hugh Macpherson, some time Ag. Governor of Bengal, contributed to the columns of the *Manchester Guardian*. He too deprecated reliance on force to hold India down and warned Great Britain of the paralysing effect on the administration and trade of the disappointment of the hopes and aspirations of the moderate elements in India. "In my opinion, we shall make the greatest mistake we have ever made in our dealings with India if at this critical stage we fail to implement our promises and adopt instead a reactionary policy or any sort of policy that falls seriously short of India's legitimate hopes." Sir Samuel Hoare himself apparently realises the impossibility of governing India by force. Speaking to the Oxford Conservative Association a few days ago, he is reported by the "Hindu London Service" to have posed two questions: whether the recent improvement in the political situation in India was due to firm government and if it was, whether it would ensure its continuance indefinitely. He replied both the questions in the negative and added that if the result of the present constitutional discussion was disappointing to moderate Indian expectations, there would be renewed agitation and disturbance.

Apparently Sir Samuel Hoare is under the impression that his White Paper satisfies moderate Indian opinion. Nothing can be a greater illusion. Apart from the communalists and the minorities, who are more intent on sectional advantages than on the advancement of India towards dominion status, the Indian Liberals are perhaps the most moderate element in India. Among them are to be found staunch nationalists who at the same time are friendly to the British connection, men whose zeal has been tempered by knowledge and experience, men who stood by the Montagu constitution and, who, according to Sir Hugh Macpherson, enabled the Government to stave off the first civil disobedience movement. Even such Liberals are not satisfied with the Hoare constitution; they are profoundly disappointed with it. Some amongst them have gone the length of wishing that it was not proceeded with, so worthless, retrograde and unwanted it seemed to them.

The Liberal party which met in Calcutta last April had given expression to its profound dissatisfaction in no ambiguous words. The U. P. Liberal Conference, which met last week-end in Allahabad under the distinguished presidency of Mr. A. P. Sen, reiterated the considered verdict taken at Calcutta. The chief resolution of the Conference ran as follows:—

(a) The United Provinces Liberal Conference places on record its sense of profound dissatisfaction with the proposals of constitutional advance embodied in the White Paper and the efforts that are being made by the Joint Committee to make it even more illiberal. The White Paper proposals make no real or substantial transfer of power to responsible Indian Governments and provide no method whereby India might be prepared to take over the control of reserved subjects. The scheme is permeated with the distrust of Indians and Indian capacity and is overloaded with safeguards both at the centre and in the provinces which are much more in the interests of England than India. The proposals in their present form will neither satisfy Indian opinion nor bring about any improvement in the political situation.

(b) In the opinion of the Conference, no scheme which, while meeting the immediate demands and requirements of India, does not also provide for automatic development to full responsibility and equality of status with the Dominions within a short period fixed in the statute itself will satisfy Indian national aspirations or allay political discontent.

(c) The Conference adheres to the resolution of the last session of the National Liberal Federation.

THE IMMEDIATE TASK.

INDIA'S enemies cannot hope to have a better chance for the success of their tactics than the present political situation in the country affords and they are taking full advantage of it. Those of the leaders of public opinion in the country who ought to know better have either ceased to guide the nation or are keeping it in ignorance as to what is in store for it in the near future or are talking vaguely of united action without having the least intention of taking an initiative or, perhaps, without knowing themselves how to bring about united action. Public opinion is in the most chaotic condition, the most energetic minds have been overtaken by inertia and although there is everywhere a sullen discontent, there is no organised expression of healthy political life owing to the utter disorganization of progressive elements. The result is that the political field has been entirely usurped by communalists and political and social reactionaries. These are giving such a noisy expression to their aspirations, fears, views and thoughts that it is quite likely to be mistaken as the real public opinion. The silence of the progressive elements emphasises and brings into relief this noise. The reception which the White Paper had on its publication in this country clearly showed that the so-called 'reforms' outlined therein as the result of the deliberations of the three Round Table Conferences were not at all satisfactory. It may be said without exaggeration that the hopes raised by the first R.T.C. received rude shocks in the second and the third R.T.C.s. This backward progress of the reforms in the course of the R.T.C. deliberations has been noted by all who cared to watch the progress. The White Paper has been condemned as unsatisfactory and inadequate even by such communalist leaders as are sensible and not quite lost to the sense of decency in public life. They were disillusioned to find that while they wanted to share the substance of power transferred from the British Government to the people of India, they were being asked to share a mere shadow of it. They wanted so many annas in the rupee for their communities; they got that proportion more or less, but the rupee was a counterfeit one! The section of communalists dominated by loyalist leaders wanted the Congress and the Liberals to fight for the nation's rights and their task was only to secure a substantial share of the spoils for themselves. This being the game they had intended to play, they could do nothing more than give a mild expression to their disillusionment when the White Paper was published. The other section smarting under the injustice of the Communal Award is thinking of nothing else and is obsessed only by the idea of getting it revised to their own satisfaction. The Joint Parliamentary Committee has taken the White Paper as a basis for its discussion and there is every ground to fear that the reforms that would be embodied in the Bill to be submitted to Parliament may fall far short of those outlined in the White Paper, and further, it is quite likely that in the constitution that will emerge from both Houses of Parliament the reforms may be quite smothered in the net of safeguards. There is thus every likelihood that the nation will ultimately get what it has not bargained for at all.

MORTGAGING THE FUTURE.

The new constitution may show at the most a doubtful advance over the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms, but it will cost the nation several millions every year, and this cost in money will be nothing as compared to the cost that will have to be paid in other direct and indirect ways. The new constitu-

tion is sure to create a number of unforeseen problems difficult of solution and some of the items may prove a permanent bar to further progress in the direction of complete swaraj, even on the model of dominion status. Some of the mischievous principles incorporated in the constitution may be found extremely difficult to get rid of in future and thus prove to be the Old Man in the story of Sinbad the Sailor. Thus the slight advance shown over the present constitution may be overwhelmingly counterbalanced and a permanent set-back may be given to democratic rule. Perhaps India's bondage may be perpetuated. This is by no means an exaggeration. I am sincerely led to believe that some features of the proposed constitution are really very dangerous and will prove for generations to come a serious drag on the nation's progress towards full Swaraj. I do not want to mortgage the future of my country for the sake of a few showy reforms. My political and social ideas are as high as anybody's, but so far as practical politics is concerned my aspirations are very modest, because I know that ideals count for little in actual negotiations and that everything depends on the relative strength of the parties in the negotiations. I will be satisfied with a small measure of self-government in advance of the present constitution, but it must be unalloyed. It must be free from such elements as may ultimately prove to be serious obstacles in the nation's gradual progress towards the ideal.

COUNCIL ENTRY AN IRRELEVANT ISSUE.

Is the Indian nation going to accept the new constitution with all its objectionable features? A few of the Indian assessors in the Joint Parliamentary Committee are, it is true, putting up a valiant fight against the reactionaries and trying their utmost to make the best of a bad job, but their efforts will avail very little and the deliberations of the Committee will end in giving birth to a monster to be foisted in the name of Swaraj on the Indian nation. If the gift of the monster child is to be rejected it must be rejected now. Once it is taken in adoption, you will have to rear the monster, you cannot kill it; you will not be allowed to kill it. It will grow and rule your home. Very few of our leaders seem to have realised this fact. The leaders of all progressive parties know full well that the new constitution is going to be a big fraud. However they think that they can escape its effects. The staunch Congressmen say that they will not touch the reforms even with a pair of tongs and that they will simply ignore their existence. Others, some of whom still style themselves Congressmen but profess to differ from the orthodox section in the Congress camp pin their faith on entry into councils. Both are labouring under delusions, the former in thinking that they will be able to avoid the effects of the constitution by ignoring it and the latter in believing that they will be able to capture the administrative machine through the Councils or to bring it to a standstill by creating deadlocks. Both the methods were tried after the advent of the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms, and both of them failed. Some of the ardent Congressmen are busy discussing a constructive programme or devising ways to whip the dead horse of civil disobedience into life. No constructive programme will yield results immediately. To revive civil disobedience is a hopeless task. Also the question as to whether the Councils under the new constitution should be worked or not will arise only after the inauguration of the new constitution and that too when the Congress will by a majority vote decide to boycott the Councils, and not till then. The preparations of

both the anti-Council party and the pro-Council party are irrelevant to the issue of the moment. The pro-Council party is, by its present agitation, betraying its belief that the new constitution is going to bestow substantial power on the Councils and it is merely a question of securing still more substantial rights for which purpose the Councils could be effectively utilized and that there would be very little in the new constitution that might seriously delay the realisation of the goal. It may be contended that the acceptance of the new constitution in whatever form it may be offered is inevitable. Why the acceptance of the new constitution by the Indian nation should be considered inevitable, I for one cannot understand. I am not a politician and in my simplicity I believe that since the new constitution is being offered to us in response to our demand for Swaraj we have every right to reject the offer, with thanks if necessary, if we have reasons to think that it is a dangerous gift. We can inform the British Government that we shall for the present remain satisfied with the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms and that we choose to wait till we are able to secure a decidedly better constitution for our country or till a true wisdom dawns on the minds of the British statesmen making them lead India along the path of genuine Swaraj. The British statesmen will have no reason to grumble if we reject the offer civilly. The British die-hards will be free from their present anxiety and the domestic squabbles in the Conservative party will ease.

SUPREME NEED OF THE HOUR.

The immediate task, therefore, is to consider the Federation of British India with Indian states, the structure of the Federal Assembly and the powers of the States' representatives to interfere with the progress of British India, the perpetuation of autocracy in Indian States, the Statutory Railway Board, the constitution of the Reserve Bank, commercial safeguards and such other features of the proposed constitution in all their bearings in the future progress of the country in the direction of Swaraj, and to strike a balance between the advance on the present constitution and the complications that may arise as the result of the new constitution dragging the nation backward in its efforts to go forward. We owe it to the present younger generation and the future generations to accept nothing that will fetter their forward movement. *The crucial question refers less to what we want than to what we do not want.* Let all parties, including the orthodox section of the Congress at the one end and the communalists at the other if possible, combine in this essential task and tell plainly the British Government with one voice what they do not want under any circumstances to be incorporated in the new constitution and that they would prefer no blessing to a dubious blessing. This is the supreme need of the hour and once it has been satisfied and the impending disaster averted each party may strive to achieve Swaraj by employing its own methods or pursuing its special programme.

P. G. KANEKAR.

Our London Letter.

BY AIR MAIL.)

(From Our Correspondent.)

LONDON, October 13.

THE JOINT SELECT COMMITTEE.

THE Joint Select Committee began its work this week by completing the evidence of the Indian Empire Society, whose distinguished luminaries, Lt.-Col. C. E. Bruce, Lt.-General Sir George

MacMunn, Mr. F. F. Lyal, Mr. Waris Ameer Ali, Mr. O. G. O. Hayter, and Justice W. A. Le Rossignol, appeared before the Committee on its behalf. These witnesses had been so consistently uncomplimentary to Indian polity, character and ability, (Mr. Waris Ameer Ali often excelling his colleagues in his panegyric of British virtues as contrasted with Indian weaknesses) that the Indian delegation, British and States combined, decided that no useful purpose was to be served by examining these witnesses, much to the dismay, as I understand, of certain of the members of the Committee, and I presume also to the surprise of the witnesses themselves.

I extract the following very interesting and admirably pungent passages from the official report of Monday's proceedings:—

Mr. M. R. Jayakar. I was wondering whether any useful purpose would be served by my asking questions about the details, because I find the views these gentlemen hold are so radically different from the Indian sentiment that there is no common ground between us. That is the feeling I have had on the matter, and I do not think I shall take up the time of the Committee by asking questions about the details. These gentlemen hold that it was a mistake to apply democratic principles to India, and that 'the decline commenced from the day when British politicians endeavoured to endow India with democratic government', and that 'the only reality is power'; and I know that these sentiments are so radically different from the Indian sentiments that I do not think I shall detain the Committee by asking any detailed questions.

Sir Phiroze Sethna. I have no questions.

Sir Hari Singh Gour. In view of what Mr. Jayakar has said, I also feel, my Lord, that I should not ask these gentlemen any questions at all.

Sir Abdur Rahim. I also do not desire to ask any questions, as there is absolutely no common ground between these gentlemen and myself.

Sardar Buta Singh. I have no questions.

Mr. Zafrulla Khan. My Lord Chairman, having been told by this batch of witnesses that, since the introduction of the Reforms, or some of them, the administration in India is less efficient, more corrupt and far more expensive, and also that wherever in British India Indians have been interested in self-government the results have been almost invariably disastrous; also that only the brilliant exceptions among Indians achieve success in the higher ranks; also that the better class of Indian does not want democracy; and, finally, that the Indian does not want a vote, that he does not know what to do with it, so he sells it, I think I would not be serving any useful purpose by putting any questions to this body of witnesses.

Mr. F. Thombare. I have no questions.

Sir Manubhai N. Mehta. Nor have I.

The difficulty about these constitutional cave-dwellers is that they are so thoroughly inconsistent that it is extremely difficult to pursue any intelligent argument with them. They appear to be unanimous that all the present trouble in India dates from the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms, both of whose principal protagonists are no longer with us to take up the challenge. The logical effect of the diehard argument would surely be not to proceed with any further reform, but to withdraw those presently in operation whatever the cost, in the obvious interests of the defenceless Indian peasant, for whom they claim to speak with such authority. No wonder the *Church Times* to-day says: "There are... only two ways in which India to-day can be governed: one is with the consent and co-operation of that increasing section of the Indian people that is politically conscious, and the other is by force, which would mean an addition to the Army in India, which this country certainly cannot afford. It is not the supporters of self-government that are the sentimentalists, but the 'sabre

rattlers' who still believe that we are living in 1913." The real trouble is that quite a number of intelligent people in India are asking themselves how much of real and effective self-government is likely to be contained in the new Constitution after the insertion of all the safeguards that are at present contemplated.

INDIANIZATION OF THE ARMY.

There is a passage of some interest in Sir George MacMunn's evidence, in reply to Lord Hardinge on the progress of Indianization in the Indian Army. "I have myself always belonged," said Sir George, "to that school which has said you have made a great mistake by Indianizing regiments separately. The young Indian officers themselves were much happier mixed up with their British officers in the messes than being among themselves... We do not know whether the training we are giving them is going to bring up enough men of sufficient responsibility and power in times of trouble."

INDIA AND BURMA.

This week the Secretary of State for India has resumed his general evidence, some of which has been of a rather technical character and can best be elucidated by a careful perusal of the official Report. He did, however, submit a very important Memorandum on the present position of the question of the separation of Burma, and it was clear from his handling of the matter that he felt that the balance of argument lay in favour of separation, and that that was the real view, in so far as it could be or had been ascertained, of the majority of the Burmese people.

I have reason to believe that there developed in connection with this question an unfortunate misunderstanding arising from the manner in which the proceedings of the Committee were managed. As these proceedings are confidential and privileged, it is undesirable and improper to go into any details thereon, in which connection I may say that certain statements appearing in the *Morning Post* purporting to explain what took place are wholly incorrect and misleading. It is, however, no secret that the delegates have increasingly felt, especially since the resumption of the Committee's work, and in the absence of a number of those who, at an earlier stage, had participated in the work of the delegation, a sense of disparity between themselves and the members of the Committee, and the unfortunate *con-iretempo* to which I have above referred seemed to lend colour to the view that an attempt was being made to accentuate this disparity. I have reason, however, to believe that after the necessary explanations, and certain expostulations from all quarters of the Indian delegation, which, on this occasion, acted as a single unit, the misunderstanding has now been composed and a better atmosphere in consequence prevails. The constitutional inferiority of the Indian delegation relatively to the Committee is obvious to all and was fully recognised by the delegates when they undertook to serve in their present capacity. Every effort, therefore, should have been made to avoid clumsy or thoughtless handling of situations in which the duty would fall to the Committee of coming to conclusions on their own responsibility and in the absence of the delegates. That any occasion of embarrassment or humiliation should have been allowed to arise at all, as I understand was the case this week, indicates a certain lack of proportion and imagination that should have been rendered impossible with the formidable organisation that has been created to deal with questions of procedure. It ought to have occurred to those concerned that, just as a Joint Parliamentary Committee is touchy about its privileges and its rights, so are Indian delegates equally sensitive as

to their position and responsibilities. I have reason to think that the Secretary of State strongly holds the view that, whilst the real status of the Indian delegation is essentially different from that of the Joint Committee, it is not in the least degree inferior thereto, and that it is of a very special character with a peculiar value of its own.

It remains only to be added that the Indian delegation has unanimously decided not to express any opinion for or against the separation of Burma from India but to leave the matter to the decision of the Burmese delegates when they come here. Other questions, of course, will arise when the delegation should have taken its decisions.

MIXED MARRIAGES.

Correspondence in *The Times*, initiated by the publication of a letter from a lady missionary of Lahore, has suddenly brought into the limelight the ever-recurring problem of social relations between Indian students sojourning in this country and English girls, resulting, in an increasing number of cases, in inter-marriage. The legal consequences of such inter-marriages were dealt with in an important paper and discussion following thereon at last year's meeting of a Conference convened under the auspices of the British Commonwealth League for the purpose of considering in their most important aspects inter-racial relationships. In the present instance the correspondence has centred mainly upon the economic rather than the racial consequences of such marriage, and whilst the balance of Indian student opinion is very strongly against them, more than one opinion has been expressed on the question of whether, taken as a whole, the economic position of British wives of Indian students upon proceeding to India is of such a character as to cause dismay such as has been expressed in respect of particular cases brought to public notice by the Lahore missionary. Whilst it is quite true that in many cases the students are impecunious and have little or no hope for some time after their return to India, of profitable occupation, and that they may thereby in a number of instances be unable to provide anything like the standard of comfort to which the girls in question had previously been accustomed, the blame, if any, for quite a number of these marriages, must be attributed to the girls themselves who are very often below the student's social level and to whom he is compelled to resort for social intercourse in order, as a writer in *The Spectator* remarks, to get any white society at all. It is difficult to formulate a remedy. Many students are sent here at an immature age and with few, if any, of the qualities, and little of the experience, necessary to fit in with a totally different social system from that with which they are familiar at home. In other cases where the student has already been married in India at a relatively early age, he is overwhelmed upon coming here by the charms and distractions of an entirely different standard of sex relations, and he finds in English female society a companionship and an understanding denied to him in his own family circle. One at least of the remedies is the widespread education of Indian girls to enable them to take their part in the life of their husbands in its many complexities and if possible, though this of course is a counsel of perfection, that they should accompany their husbands when they go abroad, in order that they, too, may share the educational experience of foreign travel. One pleasant feature of the present correspondence is that it has been confined to questions of economic and social difficulties, and that so far racial questions of a provocative character have not been raised.

Review.

ENGLISHMEN IN 18TH CENTURY INDIA

THE NABOBS. By T. G. P. SPEAR. (Oxford University Press.) 1932. 22cm. 215p. 10/6.

DIVIDED into nine chapters the book under review proposes to present a broad survey of the social life led by Englishmen in the eighteenth century India. Mr. Spear is not much interested in what appears to be either picturesque or eccentric in the Englishmen's life in India, as that has already been sufficiently noted. He rather views the period since their advent into India as a connected whole, traces a sort of continuity and a development in their manners and attitude which, he believes, can be reasonably explained with reference to their environment and the part they had to play in Indian history. Thus he brings quite a fresh and an independent point of view to bear upon the voluminous material throwing light upon the period under study, carefully listed and classified in Appendix F. Mr. Spear is not an idle speculator. His book is systematically documented and his readiness to put all available information before his readers is commendable. His selection of material for his informative Appendices and his sketch of the political history of India in the eighteenth century, serving as the background of the whole theme of his exposition, deserve to be specially commended. Exhaustive notes referring ideas in the text to their original sources, with certain details very sparingly intervening and an Index to important topics, are very useful aids to the intending student. The book may serve as a model for dissertations of the kind.

The principal interest of the book consists in the few paragraphs dealing with the evolution of the English factor through the early isolated commercial factory life, giving place to unconscious cosmopolitanism about the middle of the century, which in turn hardened at the end into a new separation based on an official policy of racial discrimination, a missionary and religious repugnance to the abomination of heathenism, and the growth of a herd psychology among the settlers as their members increased. In associating some of these changes with the historical events in India, the author shows great powers of observation and interpretation and is never dull throughout his narration, whether he gives the details of the dietary of the common table of the Company's factors or ridicules Mr. King's anger at the surgeon's wife taking precedence over his own wife. Such details are interesting only so far as they lend support to the author's pregnant conclusions as to the Indianisation or otherwise of the English factors in the course of their close contact with Indians. The author contends that, however much the Englishman copied some of the customs and manners of Indians, he remained at heart very much what he was in England, even when he came here merely as a trader. A process of assimilation would have soon reduced this difference if the intercourse between the Englishman and the Indian would have run the same smooth course of friendship or touch between equals. This was just on the point of being realised when about the middle of the century Englishmen, though only one among many potentates in the Indian field, But events marched quickly. And crash after crash reduced first-rate powers like the Mughals and the Marathas in close succession almost to the dust, thus affording a coveted chance to the English foreigners to assume political suzerainty unrivalled as it proved to be after the crushing defeat that they

succeeded in inflicting on the certainly better Frenchmen. It was hopeless then to expect any condescension from the ruling stranger, who became more and more self-conscious of his superiority and the germs of the modern tendencies of racial discrimination and self-consciousness have to be traced far back when the hand of destiny was forging the political constituents of the sovereignty over India.

These are not very new or very startling conclusions and the general line of argument followed in the book is the same as any sane thinker would adopt under circumstances of well-known Indian history. But they are substantiated in this book from contemporary evidence, filling in several small details from extremely scattered sources. The author has been able to point out several instances of the Englishman's debt to Indians. They would bear reference if only as a matter of curiosity. According to Mr. Spear, the Englishman owes his love for cleanliness, as evidenced in the present baths, his habit of cigar-smoking, and the peculiar form of a bungalow, borrowed direct from India, to the Indians he came in touch with here. In clothes the bunyan and the pyjamas and in games the polo are India's gift. It is interesting to note that all the technical terms of the last item (polo) have been entirely taken from India. This need not surprise those who have seen indigenous paintings of the Mughal period, depicting both male and female players enjoying the game. We heartily recommend the book to the public for its interesting title, interesting treatment and interesting collection of such curiosities as are to be found in the Appendices and the text.

D. V. KALE.

SHORT NOTICES.

HISTORY OF ORISSA, VOL. II. FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE BRITISH PERIOD. By R. D. BANERJI. (R. Chatterjee, Calcutta.) 1931. 27cm. 481p. Rs. 20/-.

THE second volume of this posthumous work fully maintains the standard of the first. The difficult task of arranging and presenting in a readable form the sordid and disjointed history of a land during its decadence and painful death, has been attempted with considerable success, though the author has had to digress very often to state and explain unused, forgotten or discovered original sources, on which that presentation is based.

The chapters on Marathas and British administrations afford much food for reflection to the administrators and citizens of India to-day: Marathas, Oriyas and Bengalis, Indians and Europeans in India, Hindus of different denominations and Muslims, have all poignant lessons to learn, mistakes to avoid, wrongs done to atone for. Appendix V shows the archaeologist, Mr. Banerji to have been an impartial student of modern history as well, and he has rightly drawn attention to the failings of the people of Bengal from the days of Clive to those of Macaulay. This of course does not detract unduly from the reputation of Bengal for eminent services rendered to many parts of India during the greater part of the nineteenth century and down to our own day. It is unfortunately a truth that the different peoples and communities in India, all through history to the present time, have tried to exploit or lord it over one another in various ways, under the aegis of some foreign rule.

In Chapter 29 Mr. Banerji is in his own special sphere, and has certainly made an original contribution to the study of Orissan art and architecture on scientific lines; he has rescued it from many vague

generalisations and guessworks. He concludes that the gap between the first and the seventh centuries (A. D.) in Orissan art history is as inexplicable as remarkable, though he admits that there has not been yet a full and accurate survey of Orissan antiquities, specially in the hill-States. It is possible, in my view, that present-day studies in the origins of the so-called Gupta revival will in the near future show that the early mediaeval (seventh century) Orissan art, fully developed and striking at its first appearance, was only another florescence of the same original Nāga-Vākātaka art (third to sixth centuries), as the Gupta art was; it is of course well known that the Nāga-Vākātaka political influence spread over Western (Hill) Orissa in that period.

S. C. SARKAR.

FOREIGN EXCHANGE IN INDIA. By N. SANKARA AIYAR. (The Book Company, Ltd., Calcutta.) 22cm. 370p.

THE subject of Foreign Exchange is too intricate for the man in the street to comprehend. Bhartrihari

says of politics that it is kaleidoscopic (चारङ्गनेव नृप नीतिरनेकरूपा); Foreign Exchange also partakes of this character of politics. A sophist may even argue that Foreign Exchange is Politics. The subject is even much less understood in India; and Mr. Aiyar has rendered a useful service by writing the book. He gives a lucid explanation of the terminology and working of Foreign Exchange, with special reference to India's trade and money-market. The book gives the necessary statistics which are brought up to date, as far as possible. Teachers of Economics would be well advised to recommend it to their students. To the journalist also it will prove very useful. Its journalistic flavour relieves the subject of much of its otherwise inevitable dryness. Several of the quotations at the head of chapters are curiously interesting. The value of the book would have been further enhanced if the section on Gold Standard and allied topics had been made as exhaustive as earlier sections.

H. B. BHIDE.

REJECTION AND COUNCIL ENTRY.

I.

A REPLY TO "OBSERVER."

TO THE EDITOR OF THE SERVANT OF INDIA.

SIR,—Those of us in the Congress, who are trying to get the Congress to accept a new orientation of policy, do so under no illusion as to the prospects of the White Paper or indeed of any constitution which is not the result of a real Round Table Conference on equal terms between the duly authorised representatives of the people of India and of the Government of Great Britain. Nor have we any illusion as to the sanctions which alone can compel this Conference. The lessons of history are not lost on us. We believe that the atmosphere today is not favourable for exercising maximum pressure on the Government. We feel that individual civil disobedience is not an adequate or indeed any political programme. We also feel that political life in the country to-day is dormant, thanks to the want of influence among the masses of political parties other than the Congress, and thanks to the momentary triumph of the communal die-hards as seen in the iniquitous Communal Award, and the successive dismissal of all Indians, from the Round Table Conferences and the Joint Committee, except the communal die-hards.

We welcome criticism. We do not claim either the monopoly of wisdom or the monopoly of patriotism. But we do claim that we shall be judged by our words and by our actions and not by a gratuitous attempt to analyse our motives. "Observer" has no right to say that we were "never of the Congress." We are accused of never having been "wildly enthusiastic about civil disobedience of the individual or mass variety." Enthusiasm is of different kinds. I do not know what wild enthusiasm can possibly bring in. But "Observer" really oversteps the bounds of legitimate criticism, when he says: "even such of them as did offer civil disobedience in their own persons are in fact known to have in a sense being driven to that course of action". Speaking for myself, I emphatically deny that charge. An article written from this point of view is not calculated to be very helpful. I definitely repudiate the charge that "these politicians were waiting for a suitable opportunity to persuade the Congress to give up civil disobedience." Even to-day I do not want the Congress to give up civil disobedience for ever. Indeed, I believe that non-violent civil disobedience,

provided we succeed in creating the atmosphere for it even in a small area, is about the only weapon left in the hands of an unarmed people, trying for swaraj and pledged to non-violence. We want civil disobedience to be suspended for the time being by the Congress in theory, as it has been done in practice. We want that with a view to creating those conditions in the country which will make the resort to civil disobedience either unnecessary or possible, if necessary. "Observer" himself recognises that the present campaign of individual civil disobedience is coming to an end "for want of support in the country."

"Observer" thinks we have no plans to suggest. We have. We have explained them in our speeches and in our writings. To give a dog a bad name with a view to hang it is a favourite game. The phrase "council entry" has in the minds of some people got ugly associations. "Observer" fully exploits it. I am not ashamed of or apologetic about my belief, that the Congress should try and dominate the legislatures and the local self-government bodies in the country. I told the Civil Disobedience Committee of the Congress many years ago that I believe in going to the Councils even in a minority of one. I told the special session of Congress at Calcutta, "You will not succeed in boycotting the Councils, you will succeed only in boycotting the best men from them." Time has proved it. "Observer" evidently has a categorical mind. He dubs our programme as one of co-operation, as opposed to non-co-operation.

Council entry is only part of our programme. If "Observer" will help us with his strong views against the White Paper and he can honestly believe that at least 50 to 75 per cent. of the voters in every province who would otherwise have gone to the poll can be made to desist from doing so by organised propaganda, I for one would persuade them to boycott the polling booths of the Government, but to go to polling booths which the Congress will set up to elect a Constituent Assembly to demand India's right and to forge sanctions for enforcing the same. I have no such hope. Our attitude towards the legislatures is not based, as I have already explained, on any expectations that they are going to be really popular, or really responsible to the people. But we know that even to-day they are citadels of reactionaries and communalists. We also realise that under the White Paper constitution, and especially in Bengal and in the Punjab, and in the Federal Assembly they will

become still more so. Nor have we the touching faith of "Observer" that, by some action now short of civil disobedience, we can secure definite improvements in the White Paper. "Observer" holds otherwise. I do not agree. But "Observer" evidently believes in the trick of keeping quiet now and to consider at its proper time how the constitution may be rescued from the domination of vested interests. I would rather be too early than too late. "Observer" patronisingly adds, "We shall perhaps find that strictly constitutional means will not avail. But that is for the future." I can see no such distinction.

Finally, I cannot believe that "unless the White Paper scheme is improved beyond recognition we would rather like to be where we are". "Observer" may like it, I do not. Swaraj is the vital and immediate need of the country. That is our only reason for putting forward our programme. Often, when men like "Observer" criticise us we feel like exclaiming 'Et tu Brutus.' But we know we are right and by God we will succeed! Yours, etc.

Madras, Oct. 11.

S. SATYAMURTI.

II.

"OBSERVER'S" OBSERVATIONS IN REPLY.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE SERVANT OF INDIA.

SIR, — I am very much flattered by your noticing editorially the suggestion made by me in the

SERVANT OF INDIA of 12th October. My suggestion was that, instead of dividing the country, as would inevitably happen, by raising the question of Council Entry just now, when we are some four years away from the general elections for the new Councils, an attempt should be made just now to unify all the progressive parties in a concerted campaign to secure, if possible, the scrapping of the White Paper constitution with which they are all intensely dissatisfied.

Your objections (stated in the SERVANT OF INDIA of 19th October) to this course of action are three: such a campaign would in your opinion be (1) untimely, (2) infeasible, and (3) undesirable.

It would be untimely because men like Messrs. Jayakar and Joshi who are still busy trying to introduce improvements in the White Paper scheme at the Joint Select Committee do not seem to be convinced yet of the necessity for starting an agitation to have the whole scheme dropped rather than altered in details. Really such a movement can be inaugurated, according to you, only if they approve of it; at any rate, we must stay our hands till they are consulted on the matter. Common courtesy, if nothing else, requires it. You show a very fine spirit in giving expression to these sentiments. But I was surprised to see how cavalierly you are prepared to treat the opinion of one who is acknowledged by these politicians as their leader at the Round Table Conferences and the Joint Select Committee. Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru is issuing, as I learn from your own paper, grave warnings to the British public to the effect that, not only if mere provincial autonomy is given, but if central responsibility such as is proposed in the White Paper is further watered down, Indian politicians would give a wide birth to the new reforms. You who are so eager to follow Messrs. Jayakar and Joshi do not however mind giving advice to the country which is in flat contradiction to their leader's. You say the Councils must be filled and the reforms must be worked even if the new constitution leaves us worse than at present, thus wholly stultifying Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru. Nor do I feel certain that you will follow the lead of Messrs. Jayakar and Joshi, if they were to give it, for making a united effort to secure the rejection of the White Paper, for you proceed in

the course of your article to say that it would be undesirable so to change the direction of our efforts. Your objection on this score therefore obviously does not go a long way.

Your second objection on the ground of the impracticability of uniting all progressive groups on this platform has more substance in it. No one can be certain that the new programme will be acceptable to all. The attempt may fail. I can only express my own individual opinion that it has a very fair chance of success, and that at any rate it is worth making. After all, the idea that the country's interests would be better served if the British Government could be made to drop the White Paper proposals instead of its proceeding with them is not new. It has been put forward before the country by some of the best minds that we know of. And, what is more, they all belong to the Liberal Party, which is to the extreme Right of the progressive groups. One finds it difficult to believe that other groups which pride themselves on their being too radical for the Liberal Party will shy away from a line of action recommended by its responsible leaders for the reason that this line of action is too advanced and drastic.

I will give one or two quotations from the utterances of these leaders. In April last the Right Hon'ble Srinivasa Sastri said to the Liberal Federation:

I believe our political fortunes are now at such a low ebb that, if I could, I really would withdraw our national demand and beg of our leaders not to press it forward upon this occasion, for they seem to be coming against a dead wall, and the result may be worse, somewhat worse than we look for. But I do not offer you that counsel of despair. The only reason is, *not that it would not be wise to do it if it were possible, but that it is impossible.*

Mr. Sastri no doubt hesitates to advise the country to try and have the White Paper scheme dropped. But he makes it clear beyond a shadow of doubt that it would in every way be desirable; only he doubts our ability to bring about the desired end. But since improvement in the White Paper is declared even by politicians like Sir Cowasji Jehangir and Sir A. P. Patro (who certainly are not known to give themselves up to fits of despondency) to be wholly outside the range of practical politics, nothing will be lost by trying the only other method that is available to us. Even if we fail, we shall not be worse off for the attempt made.

Mr. Chintamani at the same meeting observed as follows:

Speaking for myself and without the slightest intention of committing this Federation or a single other member of the Federation, I desire to say, with a full sense of responsibility, that I do not want this scheme to be translated into an Act of Parliament. Either I shall be given the genuine article or I shall wait for it until a more propitious day comes. I bear in mind the warning uttered by John Stuart Mill to all politicians, that when momentous issues are at stake small reforms not only do not do even a little good, they do no good at all, but they are harmful in that they put off the day of real reform. I want either that the British Parliament should have the good sense and the bona fides (sic) to give us genuine reform or to wash its hands of the business and leave us where we are.

The *Leader*, of which Mr. Chintamani is the editor, follows the same policy. Writing on the eve of the U. P. Liberal Conference which met at Allahabad on Saturday and Sunday last, it remarked:

A perusal of the wonderful proceedings of the Joint Select Committee on the White Paper has only strengthened and confirmed the conviction which we deliberately uttered more than once, that it would be far better if we were left for a few more years under the present constitu-

tion, utterly unsatisfactory as it is, than if we were saddled with the greater cost, the more troublesome complications, the more acute communal and class rivalries and jealousies, the more autocratic heads of government, in a word, the many hypocrisies of the unconstitutional constitution. Besides, the saving of money which the impoverished and over-taxed people of this poor country cannot afford, there will be this additional and undoubted advantage, if we be left where we are, that under more friendly or less unfavourable auspices, we shall be very likely to get a better, certainly a more genuine Constitution Act than the present Government's can be. The dire prospect of the Indian Constitutional reform not being taken in hand for a generation after the next Act based on the White Paper is passed appals us vastly more than the misfortune, disagreeable as it is, of having longer to tolerate the present unconstitutional constitution.

Commenting on the speech of the U. P. Liberal Conference's President, the *Leader* in its issue of Monday last said the same thing more succinctly:

We repeat our conviction for the dozenth time that India will be far better off if she is left to go on with the present constitution for a few more years than she is saddled with this new mongrel constitution which will put off still farther any reform worth the name.

When these two most prominent leaders of a party wedded above all others to working up its way step by step towards full Dominion Status avow themselves to be in favour of holding on to the step over which they are standing at present rather than go on to the next step, which they think would only serve to block further progress, other parties, which have never reconciled themselves to a gradual realisation of self-government, will, it seems to me, not be behindhand in repudiating and doing their best to defeat the project of reforms contained in the White Paper. This project has not really been considered in all its details by public opinion as yet. It is no doubt being condemned everywhere, but I often feel that it is being condemned without a full realisation of the enormity of its defects in most quarters. The warnings of Messrs. Sastri and Chintamani may well create an educated public opinion, and such a public opinion will not take long, I think, in declaring itself unhesitatingly for total rejection.

Your third objection is the most serious of all. When your first and second lines of defence are overcome, you fall back on this last. Supposing that the progressive Indian delegates at the Joint Committee signify their consent to a campaign for rejection and supposing further that the Liberal Party, following the lead of its most distinguished leaders, and all other progressive groups decides to take an effective part in the campaign so that it bids fair to succeed, even then you will, I guess, shrink from supporting it. You will say, "We can ensure the rejection of the Hoare scheme; but can we be equally certain of a better scheme being arranged and put through? Unless we have some kind of guarantee about this, our country will only lose by deliberately working for the abandonment or rejection of the scheme. And surely no one is in a position to give such a guarantee." It is perfectly true that no single individual or group of individuals can give a guarantee that will be worth anything. We can only place our reliance upon an accession to our moral strength in future. It is not only that the Hoare reforms are ludicrously inadequate to meet the present requirements. They are of such a character as to make it impossible later to insert the necessary amendments. Such a constitution must really be re-

sisted without counting the cost. But do you realise that in taking this narrowly prudential view of this matter and in refusing to take any risks, you place yourself in a position of isolation even among the leading politicians of your way of thinking? Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru is prepared to reject the White Paper in certain well-defined contingencies. Mr. Sastri and Mr. Chintamani would like to throw the whole scheme overboard. Surely they must have considered the elementary question that you have raised. They obviously rely upon the natural forces working in their favour and against British imperialism. After all on what do men like Sir Charles Innes, Sir John Thompson, and now Sir Hugh Macpherson base their appeals to the British public to support the White Paper proposals, which in their own opinion are very far-reaching and fraught with no small amount of risk? Do they not say, "However large these reforms may be, they must be passed; for otherwise at a later date Britain will be faced with the only alternatives that will then be available of conferring a very much larger measure of reform or driving India out of the British Empire"? Are these false scares that our ex-civilians raise? If there is any truth in their statements, is that not a source of strength to us? Are we really so helpless as you imagine? These ex-civilians, in commending the White Paper to the British public, assume that it will be acceptable to Indian politicians. The latter will no doubt make a wry face in accepting it, but accept it they will. Sir Hugh Macpherson has observed in a recent communication to the Press: "We weathered the storm in 1920-22 because sane and moderate Indian opinion was satisfied with the reforms of 1921 and stood loyally by our side in fighting the civil disobedience movement." And his argument is that "sane and moderate Indian opinion" will similarly be satisfied now with the White Paper, and therefore it must be passed, unless Great Britain is to rely in future upon her military strength to rule India. He does not know, and other thoughtful ex-civilians do not know, that "sane and moderate Indian opinion" will not accept the White Paper, and my only proposal is that they should be made to realise this at once. When they do so, they will be loudest in making the same kind of appeals to the British public in favour of a measure of reform which is really satisfactory to us. This will not happen immediately; it will take some time. But the first necessary preliminary to this result is that all the progressive groups should unite at once in getting the White Paper constitution, which is at once meagre and rigid (the second defect being even worse than the first) promptly turned down.—Yours, etc.

OBSERVER.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

- HISTORY OF ELEMENTARY EDUCATION IN INDIA. By J. M. SEN. (The Book Co., Calcutta.) 1933. 23cm. 313p. 4/-.
 CHRIST IN THE SILENCE. By C. F. ANDREWS. (Hodder & Stoughton.) 1933. 20cm. 315p. 5/-.
 INDIA ANALYSED. Vol. 1: International. By ALFRED ZIMMERN and Others. (Gollancz.) 1933. 20cm. 192p. 5/-.
 THE NATURE, CLASSIFICATIONS AND PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE. By J. K. MEHTA. (The Indian Press, Allahabad.) 1933. 20cm. 58p.
 IDEALS AND REALITIES. Ed. by DIWAN CHAND SHARMA. (Oxford University Press.) 1933. 20cm. 214p. 2/8.