

The Servant of India

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Topics of the Week.

Ministers and Ministers.

CEYLON is in the throes of an agitation for further constitutional reforms. It is noteworthy that the Ministers there have taken the lead in the agitation. They drew up a Memorandum themselves and sought the support of the State Council and the public and intend to take a deputation to London. Speaking in the Council of State on the 5th inst., Sir Baron Jayatilaka, the Leader of the House, stated that he soon proposed to introduce a motion in the Council asking the House to accept the proposals embodied in the memorandum of the Ministers and urged that if their efforts were to succeed, the Council and the people of Ceylon should support the motion and speak with one united voice.

In India the Ministers in the provincial governments hardly ever give such lead. It may be that the Indian members of the Executive Councils at Delhi and the provincial capitals are not free openly to take such a stand, though they have not fought shy of pulling strings from behind the scenes, particularly in communal matters. But the Ministers are free openly to give the lead, indent on their administrative and political experience to draw up schemes and seek the support of their Councils and the public, even as the Ministers do in Ceylon. But such leadership is conspicuous here by its absence. Ministers seem to have sunk into pure administrators of their departments and, apart from counting up communal spoils, shied of political leadership. It would make a difference if all the Ministers in all the Provinces met and fashioned a scheme and asked for a mandate to press it on the attention of His Majesty's Government.

But perhaps it is too good to happen. If the Ministers met, what are the chances of their agreeing

on any scheme? In Ceylon, though there are communities and communal differences, Ministers are not chosen on account of their communal complexion; they form a political team and can pull together. In India the case is wholly different. The introduction and confirmation of communal electorates and communal considerations have made such cooperative action well-nigh impossible.

Add to this the fact that very few, if any, of the Ministers owe their positions to the strength of their political parties in the Councils. They are in a very real sense the nominees of the Governors and their chief supporters in the Councils are the official members. There is hardly any difference between the Executive Councillors and the Ministers.

It is also noteworthy that taking the members of all the Governments in British India, Central and Provincial, Indians, whether Ministers or Executive Councillors, preponderate over Englishmen. But that does not seem to have made any change for the better in the spirit of the administration. The Government's repressive policy was no whit mitigated because of the presence of a large number of Indians in the Cabinets. A change in the personnel of the Secretary of State and the Viceroy makes a larger impression on the spirit of the administration than the inclusion of a comparatively large Indian element in the Cabinets. They have been as willing and subservient tools of the Great Mogul at Whitehall as the least of the British members of the Indian Civil Service. There is grim piquancy in the addendum of Sir Malcolm Hailey to Sir Samuel Hoare's good certificate to Indian members of the higher services in India. Sir Malcolm gently put in a reminder that these satisfactory Indians were selected by Britishers! Ministers were not excluded from this category of good boys selected by the foreign bureaucrats, even as they select under-Secretaries.

Powerful without Power.

SPEAKING in Bombay at the celebration of the birthday of Mahatma Gandhi, Mr. Jamnadas Mehta paid a well-deserved tribute to the great and unprecedented national awakening which stands to the credit of the Mahatma. He then went on to describe the unhealthy aspects of his leadership. Independent thinking and leadership have been destroyed, he lamented, and those who had the temerity to differ from him or the Congress, which was but his echo, were dubbed traitors. He finally characterised the Mahatma as the most powerful of Dictators in the world to-day and invited him to retire from politics as dictatorship was incompatible with democracy.

Undoubtedly the Mahatma is a Dictator. But it should be said in fairness to him that he never grabbed power nor held tight to it and refused to give it up. All that he did was to hold fast by his opinions, irrespective of their appeal to others, even his followers, and to decline to subordinate his indi-

vidual views to those of the majority. He made no distinction between politics and religion; it was always a case of right and wrong, and not expedient and inexpedient. He would not be in the "wrong" with the majority; he would be in the "right", even if he stood alone. He would co-operate if his views were accepted; he would retire if they were not. Those who wanted him must accept his views also. "Love me, love my dog". He would gladly retire if his opinions were frankly rejected. The pity of it is that his leadership was wanted but not his programme. No wonder it leads to dictatorship. But it is no fault of his. It is a reflection on his followers. They will neither follow him nor let him retire.

He is powerful. But what does his power consist in? He is not like the other dictators who seized power with the help of an army and waded through blood and brutality. He has no serried battalions to back him and sustain him in power. He has no patronage to confer; no honours to give, no rewards to offer, no offices with rich spoils to share. He is no religious pontiff who could offer rewards in the next world or frighten people with hell or give them absolution from sins committed. Unarmed and unprotected, he has only suffering and the jail to offer as reward and honour. He is powerful with the power that comes of personality, an indefinable category. And that in spite of his views. Mouthed by anybody else, they will be ignored at best. Coming from him, they are venerated but hardly followed. But his personality outweighs this handicap and survives it.

The Mahatma is not like the dictators known to history, ancient or contemporary. His power is neither of the Kings nor of Popes. His power is that of the Prophets, who preach impracticable precepts and fascinate the world. Dictatorship and democracy may not go together. Neither can a prophet subserve democracy. It is for the people to choose between the two.

* * *

Lower Ministerial Salaries.

SPECULATION is rife as to the amount of the salaries that may be payable, under the new constitution, to the Ministers, both Federal and Provincial. The existing arrangement is that they receive the same salary as is paid to Executive Councillors in their respective provinces, unless the legislature concerned has prescribed a smaller one. This standard of remuneration being eliminated along with its recipients in the new regime, the question arises as to by what criterion the salaries of future Ministers will be fixed. The White Paper scheme expects the Constitution Act itself to lay down the maximum number of, and salaries payable to, Ministers, the legislature being allowed latitude to vary both within the prescribed limits. Till the legislature does so, the Governor-General at the Federal Centre and the Governors in the Provinces will be empowered to determine the number of Ministers and their salaries.

The Secretary of State, giving evidence before the Joint Select Committee, was asked whether he had given any thought to the determination of the figures of the highest Ministerial salaries to be specified in the Act. If the questioner's object was not to pin Sir Samuel Hoare down to particular figures but to impress upon him the need of laying down more modest scales than obtain at present, his object must be said to have been largely fulfilled. For the Secretary of State made it absolutely clear that "in the present state of Indian finances there is no scope for very high salaries." This may not be as satisfactory as it well might be; but there is little doubt that the point has been prominently thrust on the attention of the Secretary of State.

We do not know why the questioner stopped short with Ministers' salaries. Perhaps the need to con-

fine his attention to the particular clause of the White Paper being considered by the Committee compelled him to that course of action. But there are doubtless other salaries which seem to us to deserve equally ruthless reductions. We may instance the highly bloated payments made to the Viceroy, the Governors, the Indian Civil Servants, etc. by way of salaries and endless allowances. It is generally felt that these unconsciously heavy demands on the Indian exchequer are justified neither by the present level of prices nor by India's financial capacity. Lower scales are being devised in the case of other classes of Government servants and there is no reason we can think of why the salaries of those referred to above should escape similar treatment. If the question has not so far been raised in London or has escaped the attention of Sir Samuel Hoare, it is eminently desirable that its sympathetic consideration should be pressed on him.

* * *

Election of States' Representatives Indispensable.

IT is the contention of Raja Govindlal Shrivastava who presided over the conference of the subjects of Central India States last week-end that an indispensable condition of every Federation is that the lower Chamber of the Federal Legislature should consist of none but popularly elected representatives; and in so far as the White Paper constitution fails to provide for this, the resulting Federation will be no better than a make-believe. "Conditions of India" are vaguely put forward as the excuse for this departure from normal practice. What is this intended to convey? Does it refer to the autocratic nature of the princes' rule and the absence in most of the States of any representative institutions, which could be entrusted with the task of electing States' representatives? If so, the president of the conference seems to hint that it is for the Paramount Power to insist upon their making proper arrangements for such election; and there can be little doubt that if it should do so, the Princes are bound to obey, so that this excuse about the peculiar conditions of India necessitating the nomination of States' representatives strikes him as more plausible than real.

His argument, briefly put, is that if the Paramount Power is so minded, the obstacles in the way of the election of the States' representatives will disappear like mist before the sun, the so-called treaties and engagements with the States notwithstanding. Paramountcy, according to Raja Govindlal, is to be set in motion for the benefit of India, of the people of the States, and of the States, and he is unable to conceive of a case in which its exercise will be more fully justified. If this glaring constitutional blemish be not removed, he fully shares the fear widely entertained in Indian Nationalist circles that the princes' nominees will be a source of strength to the British bureaucracy and "will form a dead-weight against progress in British India, resulting in a constant friction between the two sections." Apart from the injustice which the proposed constitution threatens to perpetrate in relation to the people of the Indian States, its very undesirable repercussions on the sense of responsibility of the Federal legislature within the limited field marked out for its jurisdiction cannot be avoided. For Raja Govindlal certainly does not think of an utterly fanciful contingency when he says that the Home Member and the Finance Member under the new regime may sometimes be drawn from amongst the princes' nominees. The people of British India thus owe it as much to themselves as to the people of the Indian States not to rest content till this defect in the new constitution is eliminated.

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THE COTTON TRADE CONFERENCES.

INDIA, LANCASHIRE & JAPAN—III.*

THE first move in the direction of discrimination against Japan was made in 1930. The move was made by the Government of India and was managed very cleverly. It was presented to the Assembly neither as a step in the grant of preferential treatment to British goods nor as a weapon to be used specially against Japan but entirely as a measure designed to benefit the Indian consumer. There was in the background, of course, some correspondence between the Indian Government and the Secretary of State for India; but this correspondence represented the Secretary of State as merely requesting the Government of India to consider the plight of Lancashire in the event of a considerable increase in customs duties and, indeed, this attitude of the British Government was claimed by Sir G. Schuster as further confirming the so-called "fiscal convention." Sir George Rainy in a special note and in his speeches in the Assembly based the case for the differentiation in duties between British and non-British imports on the following contentions: (i) That the war and post-war development of the Indian industry had been chiefly at the expense of the United Kingdom; (ii) that only about $\frac{1}{4}$ th of the imports from U. K. competed directly with the production of Indian mills. (iii) That a duty higher than 15 p. c. was entirely unnecessary for protecting this portion of Indian production; and (iv) that though a higher duty on British goods might perhaps help Indian industry to develop more rapidly such help would be entirely disproportionate to the total burden involved on the consumer. Thus it was the desire to lay the minimum burden on the consumer that was made the ground for discrimination in 1930. Even this proposal, so disguised, was carried in the 1930 Assembly with great difficulty. The millowners were themselves not enamoured of this preference by the back-door and contended that the area of competition of U. K. goods with the Indian production had been under-estimated by Government. As, however, it was clear that the Government would give protection only if coupled with preference, the millowners and their supporters had to accept the proposals of Government practically as they stood. Within two years of this the political atmosphere had changed a very great deal and when the Ottawa agreement was discussed in the Assembly the representatives of the Bombay Millowners' Association gave it their whole-hearted support. The Ottawa delegation did not pay any attention to the preference given to British cotton piece-goods in India. Because, it was said, the preference had been given chiefly in the interests of the Indian consumer and, therefore, could not be used as part of the bargain. The schedules to the Ottawa agreement, however, include a 10 p. c. preference to be extended by India to the im-

ports of cotton piece-goods from the United Kingdom.

It is not necessary today to refute at any length the arguments on which discrimination was justified in 1930. As the Bombay Millowners' Association pointed out in its evidence before the Tariff Board last year the sphere of competition with U. K. imports was then distinctly underestimated. And with the new movement towards attempting to produce fine goods in India, with the help of imported cotton this sphere is bound to increase very considerably. Further the consumer would be benefitted only if it were a fact that there were certain types of Lancashire goods which neither Japan nor India could competitively produce. If such types existed then for those types a specially low duty would, on the one hand, not harm Indian industry and would, on the other, benefit the consumer. But this is, at least today, not the case at all. India is continuously improving the quality of its production and Japan has victoriously entered the field even of bleached goods where hitherto Lancashire reigned supreme. The case for preference, however, does not now rest on the spacious arguments advanced by Sir G. Rainy but on the solid fact of the Ottawa agreement. And for immediate purposes a 10 p. c. preference must be accepted as inevitable.

The preference, however, that actually obtains is very much larger than 10 p. c. and it is not contended that Japan will protest if the preference is limited to the 10 p. c. laid down in the Ottawa schedule. What is the justification for a high degree of discrimination against Japan and why is this discrimination being sought to be perpetuated? The justification simply appears to be this. The competitive position of both Lancashire and India *vis-a-vis* Japan is, on account of a variety of reasons, very weak. Lancashire, therefore, desires to obtain a special position for itself in these markets i.e. the Empire markets, which it partially politically controls. The Indian interests today also find their home market threatened much more seriously by Japan than Lancashire and are aware that a high protective wall could be more easily raised if it is coupled with high preference than if it is not. They are, therefore, quite willing to join hands with Lancashire in keeping Japan out of the Indian market. And the compact would have gone through with little difficulty if Japan had not promptly retaliated. As this retaliation affected the interests of the Indian cotton-growers it had to be taken serious notice of; and hence the conferences.

The above should have made it clear that we do not consider a high preference in favour of Lancashire as being at all in our national interests. It does not benefit the consumer. During the entire post-war period it is Japanese competition that has kept piece-goods prices down; and this has been done through the whole range of production, from the coarse goods to the finest. If now this factor is to be practically eliminated it is obvious that the con-

*Previous articles appeared in our issues of September 28 and October 5.

sumer is bound to suffer. Neither is such a preference in the interests of the producer, except in the sense indicated above. As a fact, what the industry has all these years demanded is not discrimination against Japan but a protective regime all round and specially a substitution of the *ad valorem* duties by specific duties. Its demand has been, a system of minimum specific duties on all the main classes of imports to be fixed at a level which would bring up the prices of imported goods to a parity with what might be considered to be a fair selling price for the local manufacturers. The ultimate ambition of the Indian mill-owner is to be able to capture the whole Indian Market and to-day he is in league with Lancashire only because he does not immediately fear Lancashire competition in the field he occupies and expects to gain something from Government by this union of forces.

If, then, there are no direct benefits likely to flow from the grant of a high degree of preference to Lancashire, are there any indirect ones which may be taken into account? Usually there are two such considerations which are put forward. Firstly, there is the political good that may come out of placating Lancashire interests. Their good-will, it is said, may help constitutional advance. We are frankly sceptical of these hypothetical political benefits. There were amongst us last year some who argued similarly, who said a gracious gift of imperial preference by India would bring a change of heart in the British political leaders. We have yet to discern any signs of the change of heart: or perhaps we did not give preference graciously enough! The future constitution is being so deliberately and so deviously fashioned that it is impossible to think that the preference given to Lancashire will affect it much either way. It seems to us unnecessary to confuse the clear economic issues by importing into them the consideration of the political imponderables.

The possibilities of consumption by Lancashire of Indian raw cotton can be determined more definitely. We have ample statistical information on the point. The Empire Marketing Board has issued a few months ago a comprehensive summary of the figures relating to trade and production in fibres. The figures for consumption of the different types of cotton by the important manufacturing countries given in this publication reveal the following situation. During the three years 1929-30 to 1931-32, the annual cotton consumption in the United Kingdom was on an average 2275 thousand running bales, of which only a little over 200 thousand bales was Indian cotton. It may be argued that even though the present consumption is small it can be increased to a considerable extent. But the possibilities of so increasing it are certainly not hopeful in view of the general position of the Lancashire industry. It is well-known that Lancashire uses Indian cotton only for the purpose of mixing it with superior cotton for certain types of production. This means that Lancashire can absorb fair quantities of Indian cotton only when its price is in a certain relation to that of American cotton. If the Indian

cotton prices stand above this parity it does not pay Lancashire to buy Indian cotton for the purposes of mixing. Lancashire is thus not a basic, permanent customer for Indian cotton but one which can only be depended on to take a certain amount of supplies off the market especially when the Indian cotton prices are particularly depressed. Not only is this the present position but it is also obvious that the situation in which the Lancashire industry finds itself will not permit it to extend to any material extent its consumption of Indian cotton in the future. Lancashire has during the last decade been fighting a losing battle in its Eastern markets and has now practically lost all its coarse trade to Japan, India and China. It is inconceivable that Lancashire can regain this trade and it is generally admitted that only in the finer textile fabrics and in certain types of specialised production may Lancashire's high comparative costs best earn their keep. That it is only in these special branches that the position of the Lancashire industry is financially stable is made clear in a recent article in the *Economist* (Sept. 16 last) analysing Cotton textile shares. The development in the Lancashire industry therefore, if any, will be in the direction of further relinquishing the production of coarse goods. And admittedly if this happens the consumption of Indian cotton in Lancashire will further decrease. Any way there are no prospects of its increasing.

The position could also be analysed from the supply side. It is obvious that Lancashire is a customer only for the superior qualities of Indian Cotton and nobody even pretends that with all the good-will in the world and any amount of research it will begin to consume Indian coarse cotton. Now the annual production in India of long staple cotton during the three years 1929-30 to 1931-32 as estimated by the Indian Central Cotton Committee was on an average 714 thousand bales i.e. about a seventh of the total average Indian production of raw cotton. Of this the Indian mills consumed during the same period 398 thousand bales on an average annually. This leaves only a little above 300 thousand bales for export. The Indian mills are rapidly increasing their imports of foreign cotton and the potential home market for long staple cotton is thus being increased. And the greatest difficulties are felt not in the disposal of long staple but short staple cotton. The conclusion is thus obvious that Lancashire cannot help us much in the sale of our surplus raw cotton and whatever help it can give us is in directions where it is least wanted.

THE CONSERVATIVE DECISION.

THERE would appear to be a tendency in some quarters to regard the vote of the recent Conservative Party Conference at Birmingham as in the nature of the Party's approval of the grant of a political advance to India on the lines of the White Paper and relief is expressed in some others that the White Paper has after all been saved. This view however does not seem to be warranted by the Conference proceedings. It is true the Conference rejected a resolution which called in question the adequacy of the safeguards concerning finance, defence, commer-

cial discrimination, etc. provided in the White Paper. But the amendment eventually carried by it by 7:3 votes, far from expressing any opinion on the proposals of the White Paper, amounted to little more than a plea for suspension of the Party's judgment till the Joint Select Committee had reported. Indeed, the Government spokesman at the Conference, Mr. Neville Chamberlain, while not challenging the Party's right to express an opinion on any matter, merely warned it against prejudging the issue. Nor perhaps was any other course open to him in the circumstances. A meeting of the Party held towards the end of June last was induced to refrain from expressing itself definitely on the White Paper on the very grounds which were urged on behalf of the Government at the Birmingham Conference. The situation in the main has not changed since. The Joint Select Committee which was then in session has still not finished its labours. If this was a sufficient reason for the June Conference to hold over its judgment, the more recent one could not obviously adopt a different course without stultifying itself.

The terms of both the resolution and the amendment discussed by the Conference make one thing absolutely clear. Whatever differences may exist within the party about the Government's proposals for the reform of the Indian constitution, no section wants to oust the National Government out of office, the main resolution and the amendment alike uniting in expressing confidence in the National Government. At the same time the Government too appears to be by no means anxious to force the Party to express a definite view on the main issue. This may be due at least as much to their fear of risking a disapproval of their Indian policy by their own party men as by their avowed desire to allow the decision to stand over pending the report of the Joint Select Committee. To say this is however not to share to the full the belief sought to be sedulously fostered about the strength of the die-hard elements in the Conservative Party growing by leaps and bounds every day. Whether this is really so or not, the figures of voting do not support the claim that the die-hards have made too many converts since June last.

Coming to the speeches at the Conference as reported by Reuter, it is pathetic to note the die-hards' new-born solicitude for economy in administrative expenses and their profound concern at the costliness of the proposed reforms. While all possible economy in public expenditure is very desirable and should always be aimed at, it is a sheer commonplace that reforms cannot be had for nothing. Anyhow if the Conservatives like Lord Wolmer have no more convincing argument to advance in support of their condemnation of the White Paper, it is time they realised the weakness of their position. Fear of increased

cost of the administration is no doubt a laudable sentiment; but it cannot be allowed to thwart the course of reform.

The view was expressed at the Conference that if the White Paper constitution was introduced in India, the extremists would capture the constitutional machine. One wonders if this argument is meant to be taken seriously. It does not require a very deep study of the White Paper for one to dismiss this fear as utterly unfounded. The constitutional machinery proposed by the White Paper is so weighted down with "stable" elements like the Princes' and communalists' blocks that all chance of the advanced political elements ever assuming the reins of power is effectively placed beyond the bounds of possibility. The real point seems to be that those who put forward this argument are even yet unprepared to part with a particle of power in favour of the people of this country, whether they belong to the Princely order or are mere commoners. They do want India to remain within the Empire but only to serve as a means of almost limitless economic exploitation to their advantage. As Mr. Andrews has stated in his articles recently published in this paper, such people look at India from no other angle than that of being the supplier of one-fifth of the income of every English family.

Lord Lloyd uttered nothing but the truth when he said that if India was lost, the Empire would go. There is no doubt that with India outside the British Empire, the Empire would be deprived of a very large part of its importance. But the way to keep her as a member of the Empire is not the shortsighted one, that commends itself to people like him, of keeping her perpetually in England's bondage, but of making her happy and contented by raising her to the status of other self-governing Dominions. The White Paper, as it is, does not admittedly aim at this consummation and falls grievously short of Indian aspirations. Indeed so inadequate are its provisions generally considered in this country that it has by now ceased to excite any interest in the politically-minded classes. If it is still further watered down, which Lord Lloyd and his friends are apparently out to achieve, the difficulties of the Government would be immeasurably aggravated. Do the sponsors of the resolution want this to happen? In this case they are doubtless going about the business in the right way. But our consolation is that England yet boasts of more far-sighted people who think that the wiser course is to liberalise the proffered constitution in a manner which will enable the progressive political elements in India to rally round it. To swear by the Simon report, when even the White Paper is turned down as utterly inadequate, as some speakers did at the Conference, is to write oneself down as hopelessly ante-diluvian.

Call for Working an Unwanted Constitution!

WITHOUT a doubt there is keen dissatisfaction felt in Congress circles at the present Congress policy, and the dissatisfaction is widespread too. But it refuses stubbornly to come to the surface. Such of it as is vocal is for all practical purposes confined to those elements that are no doubt in the Congress but were never of it. They have always been dissidents. Messrs. Jamnadas Mehta and N. C. Kelkar in Bombay and Messrs. Satyamurti and A. Rangaswami Iyengar in Madras are among those who are making an effort to bring as many Congressmen as possible into new political

organisations and to give them a new political platform, but it is doubtful to what extent the effort will meet with success. The antecedents of those who are taking a lead in this matter are for this particular purpose against them. They have never shown themselves to be wildly enthusiastic about civil disobedience of the individual or mass variety, which has been the Congress programme for the last few years. Even such of them as did offer civil disobedience in their own person are in fact known to have in a sense been driven to that course of action. And some courted imprisonment in order to prove that, if they

opposed the Congress policy, they did so not from unwillingness to undergo personal suffering, but from inner conviction that the policy was injurious to the best interests of the country. These politicians, therefore, even while in the Congress, were only waiting for a suitable opportunity to persuade that body to give up civil disobedience in favour of something which will be more appropriate to our existing conditions. Now it is clear that, however successful such Responsivists, Nationalists and Independents may be in organising non-Congress forces, they will necessarily be severely handicapped in detaching true-blue Congressmen from the Congress. Many genuine Congressmen have been led by their recent experience to revise their views about the effectiveness of civil disobedience, and they will not take part in the present campaign of individual civil disobedience, which already seems to be coming to an end for want of support in the country. But even so they will hesitate to join any party which Mr. Jamnadas Mehta or Mr. Satyamurti may form. This is but natural. And the pity of it is that they themselves are not in a position to form a party of their own, for the reason that they have no positive programme of work to put before men of their way of thinking. They are convinced that civil disobedience must be discarded, but what they should take up instead they do not know. The so-called constructive work of hand-spinning, temperance, harijan uplift &c., is quite excellent, but dissociated from the political movement as it is, it has no strong appeal to them. Nothing that is not militant can hold their interest for long and they cannot bethink themselves of a fighting programme, to which they may give themselves up in place of civil disobedience. They had pinned their faith so long to the most extreme form of agitation, but being disillusioned about its success, they find that there is nothing they can divert their energies to.

Nor really have Messrs. Jamnadas Mehta and Satyamurti an alternative plan to suggest, a plan which is at once practicable in itself and will be acceptable to Congressmen. They have both of them, independently of each other, raised the cry once again of Council Entry, but I can conceive of nothing that is more fatuous and inopportune at the present moment. Their present effort to bring the country back from the pathway of non-co-operation to that of co-operation is cast in the pattern of an outworn tradition. We have been so much accustomed in recent years continually to exhort the Congress to put away the weapon of direct action and betake itself to that of constitutional action that we have come to think as if whoever disapproves of civil disobedience must, as a matter of logical consequence, approve of Council entry. But, as a matter of fact, circumstances may be such that one may feel constrained to disapprove of one as well as of the other. We do not know yet for a certainty what the future Councils are going to be like; but the anticipation of most of us is that they will not be the kind of legislatures that we would like them to be. At any rate Messrs. Jamnadas and Satyamurti

are altogether without hope in this respect. They feel—and they have been saying it repeatedly—that the future constitution will not only make no advance on the present constitution but will be definitely reactionary. The Kolaba District Conference, following the lead of its President Mr. Jamnadas, recorded a resolution characterising the constitutional proposals embodied in the White Paper as altogether retrograde. It disapproved of the whole scheme of federation saying that such responsibility as might be secured thereby at the centre would be worse than the present irresponsibility. Mr. Satyamurti too has expressed the same opinion. He would rather have no federation and no central responsibility if the latter hangs upon the former than have the kind of federation and the kind of central responsibility that is threatened to be imposed upon us. "Let us have done with federation at all costs," he has said; "it would be infinitely better to have mere provincial autonomy than to have provincial autonomy accompanied by central responsibility under such a federal scheme as is proposed." Well, if Messrs. Jamnadas Mehta and Satyamurti are not using the language of rhetoric in describing the constitution not merely as meagre and inadequate and unsubstantial but as reactionary and retrogressive, if they mean to say in sober truth that we shall be worse off under the new constitution than under the existing one, it is difficult to understand how they can consistently try to prepare the country from now to work the constitution when it is enacted. At any rate it passes one's understanding how they hope to persuade Congressmen who have always stood out of the present legislatures to come into what on their own showing will be worse ones.

As a matter of fact, it is not necessary for one to believe that the future constitution will be reactionary in order to make one come to the conclusion that it should be boycotted. Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru is very far from believing that the White Paper constitution, even if whittled down to a certain extent, will constitute no advance on the present position. Even so, moderate as he is, he is in favour of rejecting, that is, refusing to work, a constitution which is even of a slightly lower level than that of the White Paper, because, then, according to him, the advance would be much too little. Is it because Messrs. Satyamurti and Jamnadas are radical politicians that they would advise the country loyally to work a constitution which they honestly believe will leave us worse than at present? Their reasoning is essentially faulty and will convince no one, and Congressmen the least of all. I do not desire, however, either radical or moderate politicians to plump for boycott. All I want is that they should not commit themselves just now to co-operation either. The time for taking a final decision on the question as to what we should do with the reforms, whether to work them or to leave them alone, will come when we have the reforms before us in their final shape. Just now our predilection should be (if we think with Messrs. Satyamurti and Jamnadas that they are retrograde) not to go near them. But we need not be in a hurry.

to take a definitive decision. Circumstances may be such as to leave us no option but to accept and work a constitution, retrograde though it may be. It is a possibility which no one can leave entirely out of reckoning. But to tell the country in the same breath that the reforms will very likely carry us backwards and that yet we must prepare ourselves to work them when they come is not only a grossly illogical proceeding, but an egregious blunder in tactics.

Instead of asking the progressive sections in the country to unite in working a constitution which at best will be exceedingly unsatisfactory, why not ask them to unite in defeating it and preventing it from being enacted, while there is yet time? Unity for the former purpose is quite out of the question. Congressmen will never give their co-operation in working a constitution which is commended to them as being inferior even to the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms which they never condescended to look at. And without Congressmen joining you, you can never succeed in your desired object of capturing the Councils—capturing them, that is to say, from the hands of the communalists and reactionaries. Even with the Congress support you may quite possibly fail; but when you have to reckon with the aloofness and even hostility of the Congress, which numbers at least nine-tenths of the progressive elements, your failure is dead certain. If however you ask Congress help in stopping the constitution from coming into force, it will be given readily, not only by those Congressmen who are dissatisfied with the present policy of the Congress but also by those who are cordially in favour of it. The movement led by Mr. Jamnadas and Mr. Satyamurti need not therefore take the shape of a revolt from the Congress, as unfortunately it is doing just now. It should instead be a movement for canalising the energies of Congressmen in a direction which both they and others can wholly approve of. It would be a pity to have to break with the Congress when it has of its own motion stopped mass civil disobedience and when individual civil disobedience too is rapidly coming to a stop. At a time like this it would be the part of wisdom to close up our ranks if possible, at any rate to do our best to devise a line of action which will be acceptable to all. If only we give a slight turn to the programme which Messrs. Jamnadas Mehta and Satyamurti are placing before the country, we can very well rope in the Congress. And after all what we have to guard against just now is that a reactionary constitution (and a constitution to boot which we shall neither be able to amend in parts nor to overthrow in its entirety at a later date) will be forced upon us against our united wishes rather than that the constitution will be worked by the reactionary section of our people. This is the time not for preserving the constitution from our communalists but for preserving the progressives from the constitution. We may yet be able to do so. We have made it plain that we want improvements in the White Paper scheme. But we have not yet made it equally plain that unless the scheme is improved beyond recognition we would rather like to be where we are; and

that since improvements are now out of the question, we do not want any constitutional change at all. If all political parties in the country—Moderates Nationalists, Independents, Swarajists, Congressmen—all, in fact, excepting minority communities and other vested interests say with one voice and quite simply that WE DO NOT WANT THE WHITE PAPER CONSTITUTION, very likely it will go. For Great Britain is not going to change our constitution merely for the sake of changing it. If she is made to realise that no progressive section of the Indian population will have the reforms which she proposes she will yet have the sense to drop them. Even the Tory Government in England is not ambitious of ruling India with the help of vested interests alone, and assuming that it is, the diehard section of the Party who consider even the present reforms too far-reaching will possibly see to it that the reforms do not go through. The implacable hostility of Churchills and Lloyds will stand us in very good stead in this respect. If we fail in our primary object of halting the constitution, as Americans would put it, we may then consider at the proper time how best to rescue it from the domination of vested interests. In such an eventuality we shall perhaps find that strictly constitutional means will not avail. But that is for the future. Our immediate duty is to try and see that such a fight for the rescue of the constitution from the domination of vested interests becomes superfluous by not allowing the constitution itself to come into being. In making this attempt we need not put ourselves in opposition to the Congress; on the contrary we shall be inaugurating a new era of co-operation with it, and it may well be that the co-operation, when once commenced, will continue unbroken for a long time to come.

OBSERVER.

C. P. EXCISE ADMINISTRATION.

THE report on the Excise Administration of the C. P. and Berar for 1932 reveals certain special features which are of more than passing interest. In August 1921, the local Legislative Council declared prohibition as the ultimate goal in regard to liquor only. The local Government, keeping the goal in view, adopted a policy of enforcing intensive restrictions on the sale of all excisable articles. The policy had been in operation for ten years ending 1932. Compared with the figures for 1919-20, which was a normal year prior to the inauguration of the new policy, the licit consumption of country liquor has fallen from 14.70 to 1.88 lakh proof gallons, that of opium from 37.0 to 12.8 thousand seers and that of ganja from 40.1 to 7.8 thousand seers. The revenue from country spirit alone has gone down from Rs. 110.4 to Rs. 21.8 lakhs. This is a remarkable achievement on which the Government and the people of the province alike deserve congratulations.

It is however a matter for regret that the Government refuses to recognise the existence of those impalpable moral forces generated by the intensive, albeit short-lived, mass movements of 1920-21 and 1930-31. On the contrary, they seem to hold that, in

the words of the Government resolution, real progress towards temperance has been *nil*. If by such a statement it is intended to suggest that the whole of the fall in the licit consumption of liquor during all these years has been accounted for by illicit trade, the Government should confess to a complete breakdown of the Excise administration and should lose no time in reconsidering its policy.

In the opinion of thoughtful and unprejudiced observers, however, the temperance propaganda, by creating among the young generation a mentality in favour of total abstinence, has undoubtedly checked the flow of recruits to the drinking habit even among the classes ordinarily addicted to drink, the tendency being most marked in the open and developed tracts. The high prices of liquor have compelled the casual drinker to patronise the liquor shop less frequently than before; but the habitual drinker who has been hit the hardest, is being driven by the pressure of the restrictive policy to resort to illicit practices or to support illicit trade. By laying undue emphasis on the increase in the number of detected cases of illicit distillation the Government has confused the issue. It may be mentioned parenthetically that the figure showing the number of prosecutions for illicit distillation has been incorrectly given in the Government resolution. It should be 3889 and not 6896. It is well known that, in the backward tracts, rich in the material suitable for the manufacture of liquor, which are inhabited largely by the aboriginal tribes, among whom consumption of liquor is sanctioned by religion and social usage, the Government has never been able to control the trade in liquor and that in those areas illicit distillation was widespread even before the introduction of the new policy. The reasons for this are not far to seek. The cost of the illicit article is very much lower than any reasonable price at which Government can supply licit liquor. Moreover these areas abound in the facilities for illicit manufacture of liquor and, speaking generally, local opinion often ranges itself in support of the illicit manufacturer. It is the fear of detection and subsequent punishment that deters these aboriginals from committing excise offences. The number of cases detected depends mainly on the activity and resourcefulness of the staff. The figures supplied are therefore misleading unless carefully analysed.

In the open country, with meagre facilities for illicit distillation, it should not be beyond the capacity of the staff to keep illicit practices in check, but to place temptation in the way of the weaker members of the community by effecting an all-round reduction in the price of liquor is a very retrograde measure which the public at large must view with grave misgivings.

We are told that the issue prices were reduced, in 1932, by nearly 15% in all but four districts, to figures more in keeping with the general level of commodity prices. Our information is that, although the prices have steadied since then, the reduction has been carried very much further during the current year — being as much as 33% in several cases, and that this has resulted in a general increase in

the consumption of liquor without having any appreciable effect on illicit manufacture. This new orientation of excise policy in a province that has hitherto achieved a large measure of success in moving towards the destined goal is profoundly to be regretted. It is just as unwise to talk of prohibition in the backward tracts until the social habits of the people inhabiting them undergo radical change as to reduce unduly the price of liquor in the open country simply because Government cannot provide the staff adequate for checking preventable malpractices.

A TEMPERANCE REFORMER.

FRENCH EXPORT TRADE.

A GREAT many articles in the French Press are devoted these days to considerations about the national budget, which is expected to be discussed in the Chamber as soon as the parliamentary session re-opens. A real anxiety is felt about the large deficit, and great difficulty experienced in devising new sources of revenue, or in effecting sufficiently drastic economies, at a time when the population is already labouring under the depression and its consequent restrictions.

One of the most disquieting features of the French economic situation is no doubt the enormous fall in the export trade. While there is a distinct, if small, improvement of business on the home market, French exports are still steadily decreasing. It is the opinion of many distinguished economists here that only a change in the tariff policy and in the present commercial agreements can alter that state of things.

In *L'Europeen*, M. Fougère publishes an interesting article on the subject, based on the study of figures concerning four typical years: (a) 1913: before the war, before the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France, and before the effect of French chemical industries to become independent of German production; (b) 1929: immediately after the stabilisation of the franc; (c) 1931 and (d) 1932: the period nearest to us, where the fall in exports is particularly impressive.

Figures are quoted for the ten most important categories of French export products, both in volume and in prices. It is true that in some cases the figures still remain higher in 1932 than in 1913; but, with the exception of one case (lace and net-work), the fall in exports from 1929 to 1932 oscillates between 41% and 93%!

France being essentially an agricultural country and comparatively more able than many others to be self-sufficient, the French policy of the past few years has been chiefly concerned with the protection of agricultural interests. This was no doubt largely justified by special circumstances, but there is now a prevalent feeling that industries, and especially those industries which predominantly depend on export trade, also deserve attention and care, if they are expected to remain in existence at all.

An instance can be found in the case of the Calais industries thriving almost exclusively on

exports. The local authorities have been compelled to appeal to the Prime Minister, explaining their critical situation, and M. Daladier has found the situation so serious that the Government has determined to enquire more closely into similar difficulties in view of possibly altering the present commercial agreements.

Government is confronted by two alternative solutions. Either to yield to the present world circumstances and lead the country more and more towards a policy of self-sufficiency, colonies being included. Or, on the contrary, to endeavour to re-establish with other countries a normal current of exchanges on the basis of reciprocal agreements. Skilful advocates have been defending one or the other solution.

In spite of France's ability to meet a good many of her own needs, imports cannot be avoided, and the fact should not be overlooked that these imports have to be paid for in foreign currencies. The figures for imports of food-products have remained comparatively so constant from 1913 to 1932 that one is justified in thinking they can hardly be expected to decrease much further. The present level probably corresponds to a necessary minimum:

1913.....	9,087,895	paper francs
1928.....	12,540,524	" "
1930.....	11,822,106	" "
1932.....	10,959,919	" "

Imports of manufactured goods represent a relatively small figure (5,634,000,000 in 1932) when compared with imports of raw material for industrial purposes, which have been estimated as follows:

1913.....	25	milliards
1930.....	29	milliards
1932.....	13	milliards

Imports of food-products and raw materials only amount therefore to 24 milliards, while the figure of our export is no more than 20 milliards.

It is clear that any further reduction of French exports will result in emigration of gold for the payment in excess on the trade-balance. It is equally clear that an unadulterated policy of self-sufficiency can only bring a decrease in the exports of French-manufactured products. For this country as well as for all the countries that have remained faithful to the gold-standard, the stability of currencies is directly subordinated to the influence of the economic policy. And currencies are all the more vulnerable when they are closely dependent on a balanced budget. A constant policy of agreement and mutual support among gold-standard countries would certainly help each one of them to resist monetary depression.

In the present circumstances, the French are beginning to realise that they must not neglect any opportunity to save their economic situation. International solidarity is a fact, before it is a principle, and as such cannot be denied. The only solution to the present difficulties is to be found through a bolder and more liberal attitude. A policy of self-sufficiency is no doubt legitimate to no small extent, but should not be opposed to a policy of international agree-

ment. Both can be devised to be complementary and there is a good deal of scope for wise adjustment and conciliation of interests.

"More than ever", says M. Fougère, "France must endeavour to intensify her exchanges with her colonies, who absorb a growing amount of her exports... Yet this should not prevent the maintenance and development of good relationship with the other nations." And further: "The best means of fortifying spiritual links between the countries is to ensure the conjunction of their material interests."

While France's trade-balance is unfavourable, there are nevertheless other signs which seem to indicate that French finances are really more healthy than pessimists are inclined to believe. First of all, apart from specialized circles, the average public opinion in the country does not appear very much disturbed. Confidence is prevalent, in spite of recriminations.

In the beginning of 1933, the Finance Member, lamenting the lengthy debates which preceded the voting of the budget, was heard to exclaim: "Each hour that passes by costs 1,200,000 francs to the treasury!" This pessimistic Minister has fallen, but the treasury still stands on its legs, and does not seem much the worse for the trial. Half the loan to England has been returned, and the other half is to be repaid soon. If the franc was really in a dangerous position, would foreign money continue to flow into the country as it does, and would there be so much gold in the Banque de France?

The truth is that capital finds more security here at present than it does in New York or Berlin, or even in London, where the fall in the pound also results in heavy losses for the investors. When there is general monetary disorder, capital seeks for a place of refuge and France seems to be considered a favourite one now.

Yet, the present position of the franc is favourable chiefly by comparison with other currencies. As M. A. L. Jeune expresses it in *Paris-Midi*, "We appear healthy, because others are more ill than we are." But if the situation should improve in other countries, in England for instance, the attention of the world would soon be focussed on our deficit budget and capital might well depart even more speedily than it has come.

Moreover, a country cannot indefinitely live on loans. It was the excess of our debt which brought down the franc of late. And the fall of currencies in other countries has also been the result of an excessive national debt, public or private (as in the case of U. S. A.). A growing weight of debts paralyzes exports and depresses the whole country. A day comes when the State must choose between not facing its obligations (at least partially), or paying with a depreciated currency.

It is doubtful whether France would stand another monetary crisis. The memory of the former one, with its destructive anxieties, is still present in all French minds. Desperate efforts and tremendous sacrifices laboriously ensured recovery at the time. But in the present state of things, the

fear of disaster would be still stronger and interests more consciously antagonistic. Such a crisis must be avoided in due time, and that is possible if Parliament shows sufficient energy in framing the 1934 budget.

Paris.

L. MORIN.

Reviews.

CONTEMPORARY ECONOMIC HISTORY.

THE ECONOMIC TENDENCIES OF TO-DAY.

By STEPHEN VILJOEN. (King.) 1933. 33cm. 251p. 10/6.

DR. VILJOEN in this painstaking compilation has made a significant addition to a narrow list of source books of realistic economics. The work is an entirely successful essay in contemporary economic history, which would compare favourably with such recent productions as Dr. Bowley's *Economic Consequences of the War, 1914-18* or that American compilation, *Recent Economic Changes*. The scope of the book is somewhat ambitious, the subjects dealt with covering almost every branch of the economic activities of the world, and consequently the treatment somewhat suffers by condensation of facts into a cryptogram of 250 pages. The author, however, writes in a picturesque style which seems to be more and more favoured by the new generation of economic historians. On page 3, e. g., while describing the squalor and poverty of city life in the nineteenth century, he says:

"There was no system of main drainage, and ash-pits overflowed, spreading "a layer of abomination" about the streets. Even in the capital cities the citizen walked with nose in his handkerchief. As late as 1852 the smells from the Thames through the windows of the House of Commons forced Parliament to take steps to co-ordinate the drainage of London, which till then had been neglected. . . The chronic shortage of food which caused the anæmic expression of the mediæval madonnas, perpetuated its sickly glamour in the pale faces of the eighteenth-century artisan and peasant."

After a rapid survey of economic conditions in the nineteenth century, the author proceeds to discuss modern economic history under five heads: population, enterprise, transport and power, organisation, and policy, and he succeeds in bringing almost all of the current economic events and topics under these heads. The book bristles with statistics on every page. It is not, however, a mere catalogue of events, for the author has in places given us in succinct language accounts of latest economic theories regarding diverse topics such as population, scientific management and rationalisation, social policy and *Planwirtschaft*. Dr. Viljoen's own conclusions on these are also well-balanced and impartial. Regarding Prof. Pearl's Law of Population based on the Logistic Curve, for instance, Dr. Viljoen rightly asserts that "in spite of Pearl's assurance that in human populations 'the real net correlation between birth-rate and density is of the same character fundamentally as that we have found in experimental populations of flies and hens,' there is really no significant relation at all." Dr. Viljoen takes a bird's-eye-view of other demographic theories and brings out the contrast between the old view typified by the Chinese notion of regarding large families as an "old age insurance policy" and the new view, characterised by the modern tendency in the Western world, of limiting numbers by neo-Malthusian methods.

The chapters on Enterprise and Organisation somewhat overlap owing to the lack of any suggestion of hard and fast distinction as to the categorical nature of the issues discussed. Dr. Viljoen has in these chapters discussed a number of topics connected with industrial life and structure in a critical manner but fails to suggest any way out of the impasse created by large-scale production, faulty distribution and miserably low consumption. In regard to the Labour movement, his conclusion is that "there has been a decided increase in the willingness of Labour to co-operate in the administration of industry." It is doubtful, however, if the author is right in saying that "the tendency towards equality will probably make for relative economic stability," industrial instability being an institutional rather than a distributional factor.

In the chapter on Transport and Power, questions like the almost universal competition of road with rail transport, the development of air transport, the rapid displacement of coal by oil and electricity in the field of power supply, and the increasing tendency towards electrification are exhaustively treated. In the utilisation of electric power, Italy, Canada, U. S. A. and Japan in particular, have made great strides, the development in the last century being from 716,000 kilowatts in 1914 to 3,750,000 kilowatts in 1929. For the world as a whole, the proportion of actual to potential output of hydro-electric power is so low as 1 to 10 only, which shows what an enormous amount of power is going to waste.

Under the heading Organisation, tendencies such as rationalisation, planned economy, scientific management and industrial combination are analytically and descriptively treated. The result of all these is summarised by the author in the following words: "The problem of industry today, outside Russia, is no longer one of production but of marketing. The increased industrial capacity which has followed developments in technique and the automatic accumulation of capital has created a buyers' market." The author, however, has no message to deliver upon the one most deplorable tendency of today of introducing a narrow planned economy with a view to restricted production and seems to agree with the doctrinaire equilibrium economists, who are still willing to allow humanity to die of poverty in the midst of plenty and in spite of the vast potentialities of greater plenty.

B. P. ADARKAR.

IS THE WORLD DISPERSING ?

THE EXPANDING UNIVERSE. By SIR ARTHUR

EDDINGTON. (Cambridge University Press.) 1933. 20cm. 127p. 3/6.

THIS is a valuable addition to a series of popular books written for the benefit of scientific and ordinary readers alike. The book deals with the recent hypothesis that our world is steadily dispersing. Throughout, the book is dealing with the extragalactic region—the idea of whose vastness can be had by the fact that our own galaxy—the so-called 'milky way'—consists of about one hundred thousand million stars of the average size of our sun, and about one hundred thousand million such galaxies known as spiral nebulae go to form the known universe. No one definitely knows how many more such are present in the unexplored regions. It has been observed by spectroscopic methods by Dr. Hubble and others that "the more distant nebulae are going away from us with a speed which varies directly as their distance from us." Some of them possess speed of the order

of 800—1800 kilometers per second, which must be simply inconceivable to a human being. The author then tries to give the theoretical reason for all this. He shows that in Einstein's modified equation for the law of gravitation there is a term which indicates a cosmic repulsive force in addition to the universal attraction. This force varies directly with the distance and hence for greater distances it outbalances the force of attraction and the nebulae begin to run away. The logical conclusion of this is that our world, instead of consisting of flat infinite space, possesses curved space, is of a definite size, finite though unbounded, just as the surface of the earth has no boundary but it has a definite size. The radius of such a universe depends upon the average density of matter in it. The author then tells us that about a billion—i. e. million million—years ago, the whole matter—protons and electrons—were uniformly distributed, the density being of the order of about one hydrogen atom per 1580 cub. cms. and the radius of the universe being 1000 million light years. Then local condensations began to be formed and the equilibrium was disturbed with the result that the universe began to expand, the present radius being nearly five times the original one. Its expansion will thus go on, the nebulae will be scattered away, and even the light from them will not be able to reach us. This is like the bursting of the soap-bubble. The author tries to allay the fear in the mind of the reader, whether the same fate awaits our own solar system, by stating that the dispersal applies to large-scale phenomena like the extra-galactic universe; and its effect upon small bodies like the solar system and the galaxy is quite negligible. The author not only elucidates the above facts, but gives stimulus to further thought and research by trying to establish a relation between very huge quantities like the total number of particles in and the radius of the universe on the one hand and very small ones like the mass and radius of the electron on the other. Herein lies a field for further research. By showing that the wave equation for the hydrogen atom may be a quadratic having two solutions, the author envisages the theoretical possibility of the newly discovered neutron. The treatment throughout is very lucid and can be understood by any ordinary educated reader who knows something of the current ideas in Physics, except for a few places where it has been unavoidably technical.

R. N. JOSHI.

REMINISCENCES OF A HISTORIAN.

THINGS I HAVE SEEN. By SIR CHARLES OMAN. (Methuen.) 1933. 21cm. 290p. 8/6.

THIS is a book of recollections by an eminent historian who had the good fortune of witnessing some of the most impressive scenes in history extending over a wide period of time and place.

France comes in first, the times of Napoleon III and the last days of the second Empire—1868—1870. Napoleon was "the man of mystery" and the dominating figure in Europe; but to our historian, who was a young boy of 8 and whose parents managed to get tickets for one of those military shows, so famous at Paris in those days, Napoleon looked "a very tired old gentleman, wearing civilian garments and looking decidedly ill." The Empress however produced a different impression. She was a commanding figure, looking every inch an Empress. The battle of Sedan gave a blow to the Empire and the Emperor died soon after. The Empress, however, survived the disaster for 50 years and lived to witness the great war and the revanche for Sedan.

Commenting on the nature of public opinion then and now, on methods of war, Sir Charles writes:

"It was the general theory that the civilian must not suffer, since wars were the affairs of monarchs, diplomatists and regular armies." "The land bombardment or air bombardment of open non-military towns, the deportation of masses of people of both sexes, the sinking without warning of merchant ships, would have been things inconceivable in 1870."

Of Germany and the German Empire, we learn a great deal. He was a boy of 10, when William I was saluted by the title of Deutscher Kaiser. At the age of 21, he was an eye-witness of a royal visit that was forced on one of the discontented states of the Empire. The Emperor, 80 years of age, drove in a state carriage through the city of Frankfurt. Bismarck and Von Moltke followed the Emperor. Bismarck "rode like a beer barrel, on the biggest charger that could be found, looking rather sulky at the apparent failure of the ceremony." It resembled more the entry of a conqueror into a captured town than a visit by an established sovereign to a place in his own dominions. Similar feelings of discontent prevailed in other states like Hanover and Nassau.

The Germans of the older generation were against militarism, bureaucracy and the desire "to get rid of old customs and get rich in a hurry." The new Germany of William II arose after the disappearance of that generation. Visiting Germany in 1908, one notices the growing hostility and contempt towards England. During this visit, Sir Charles sat for dinner with Bethmann-Hollweg and thought he had absolutely no epoch-making capacities about him. But he was to make history and we are all familiar with "the scrap of paper" that has been affixed to him forever.

In the year 1901, England was more suspicious of Russia than of Germany. The Russo-Japanese war was yet to come to reveal the weakness of the Russian colossus. Official visits were exchanged between Russia and France. And the Czar Nicholas II paid one of those visits to France. Sir Charles was able to pay the part of an undetected "substitute", by getting the tickets of an absentee deputy and securing a seat within 10 yards of the Emperor on the grand stand, at the military review at Reims. The Czar bore a close resemblance to King George V, "but the English prince was by far the more alert and engaging figure"... "That Nicholas was not of the calibre to play the part of a world-dominating figure looked obvious enough."

Much time was spent in Spain and Portugal, collecting material for his study of the Peninsular war. Spain is normally in an unstable equilibrium. This is due to the existence of incompatible mentalities. As a student guide told him, pointing out a young infantry lieutenant in uniform, who was kneeling before a much petticoated image of the Virgin and telling his beads in simple piety: "That boy is my cousin, but he is living in the 15th century and I am living in the 20th. How can we understand each other?" Spain enjoyed comparative peace from 1876 to 1931. It was something like the peace in India, during the 50 years that followed the Indian mutiny. The memories of the event of 1857 were so bitter that the men of that generation preferred the order that was established to a possible reversion to disorder. Not only was it a period of peace, it was also a period of economic progress, but the Republicans that were excluded from power could not be "comforted by town-planning, electric light or improved sanitation." This underground discontent suddenly burst into an abortive insurrection in 1903, when Sir Charles was spending his time at Madrid. But it was not till 1923, that the monarchy actually came to an end.

In 1910 Sir Charles witnessed the disappearance of monarchy in Portugal.

Italy had also been visited several times both before and after Fascist rule. Sir Charles is an admirer of Fascist rule, especially as a contrast to the weakness of the ancient regime. "No closed galleries, no unpunctual trains, no dilapidated public offices and no undignified haggle with a taxi-driver, a guide, a minor official, whenever one wishes to do something out of the ordinary." And in conclusion, a reflection worth pondering over: "I have the gravest doubts whether there is any justification for injuring a machine that is working because it is not ideally perfect, when one remembers what was going on before that machine was invented."

So much did he see of the modern European world, before and after the great epoch-making war, that his comparisons and contrasts between these two epochs are very realistic and valuable.

Of things seen in England itself, there are two glimpses. One is the last great trial at Westminster: rather an amusing case of jealousy between two sculptors and the other a reminiscence of Mr. Gladstone's stay at All-Soul's College for a week in 1890. Sir William Anson was the Warden. Professor Dicey was a Unionist and resented any welcome to Gladstone. To avoid discourtesy, he was present at the reception, but retired to a remote corner of the room to escape notice. But Gladstone stepped up to him, seized him by the hand and began, "Oxford is too interesting. I did not expect to have the opportunity of meeting you." And Gladstone forced him to a lengthy talk on Dicey's "Law of the Constitution". This was typical of Gladstone.

X. Y. Z.

SHORT NOTICES.

EVOLUTION OF HINDU ADMINISTRATIVE INSTITUTIONS IN SOUTH INDIA. By S. KRISHNASWAMI AIYANGAR. (University of Madras.) 1931. 25cm. 387p. Rs. 6.

PROFESSOR AIYANGAR and his pupil and colleague, Mr. V. R. R. Diksitar, have rendered eminent services to the cause of study and revival of Indian 'arthasāstra', by their recent research publications. It is from the South that from age to age the inspiration of renaissances in political and religious life in India as a whole has emanated; and it would be no wonder if the revived interest in and study of South Indian administration, specially in the line of local self-government and relations between the villages and the central state, does lead in the near future to a re-organisation of present-day Indian polity on its national and traditional lines. An unconscious result of the long continuance of self-governing institutions in South India down to almost the modern age (16th century) is the success of the Madras Presidency in the art of government in recent years. Indeed, one of the greatest gifts of the pre-Aryan civilization to posterity is the village polity and the principle of republicanism, while Aryan conquest and settlement gave us the military monarchy and feudal institutions. In the post-Vedic age pre-Aryanism in India revived through the Buddhist reformation and democracy; in the post-Kushan (Aryan) Age, pre-Aryanism revived through Saivism and Bhara-Siva Naga Federation (counting republics within it); now once again perhaps the pre-Aryan revival is due in Indian His-

tory through a renaissance of the (pre-Aryan) Atharva vedic religious philosophy of Viraj-Brahman and through the resuscitation of a democratic polity as described for the Pallava and Chola ages by our distinguished professor, a modern exponent of the pre-Aryan culture.

S. C. SARKAR.

WARREN HASTINGS AND PHILIP FRANCIS.

By SOPHIA WEITZMAN. (Manchester University Press.) 23cm. 400p. 25/-.

FROM the days of the historic impeachment there have been many attempts to vindicate Warren Hastings. This is one of them, though unsuccessful. Warren Hastings had been long in India before Philip Francis came and joined him. Constant reports of misgovernment and unduly aggressive and selfish oppression of the Indian people and Indian States necessitated the passing of the Parliamentary Act of 1773. That Act appointed a Council of four to be presided over by the Governor Warren Hastings. With the exception of Barwell, the others—Philip Francis, Monson and Clavering—came from England. Before these arrived in India they knew enough of India to make them hate Hastings and his policy. When they landed they insisted on the faithful performance of the duties entrusted to them by the Director of the East India Company. They were not for aggressive imperialism, but for justice to the people of India, which, they believed, could lead to peaceful plenty. When Francis landed, the sly manner in which Hastings met him and the suppressed murmur in official and non-official circles confirmed him in his estimate of Hastings and his work. For a time the trio worked against all odds, and forced Hastings to act according to their decisions, but the majority began gradually to disappear as the two other colleagues of Francis died. When the opposition was reduced to only two, Hastings had his own way by his casting vote. Francis, seeing his stay to be useless, resigned and sailed home. He did not however stop opposing Hastings even after leaving India, but carried on his vendetta against Hastings with greater vigour even in England. This ultimately forced Hastings to resign and go to England. Then began the impeachment which dragged on for a long time and which worried Hastings in his old age, when he badly needed rest. All which history is interestingly chronicled in this book, based upon much original material, so far neglected.

N. S. S.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

- THE HINDU VIEW OF ART. By MULK RAJ ANAND. AN ESSAY ON ART AND REALITY. By ERIC GILL. (Allen & Unwin.) 1933. 20cm. 245p. 8/6.
- REVIVED MEMORIES. By K. SUBBA RAO. (Ganesh & Co., Madras.) 1933. 22cm. 518p.
- A MANUAL OF LIBRARY ROUTINE. By W. E. DOUBLEDAY. (Allen & Unwin.) 1933. 21cm. 248p. 10/6.
- DEPRECIATION IN RELATION TO INCOME-TAX AND ITS RECORD. By GURUKUKH SINGH. (Aryabhushan Press, Poona 4.) 1931. 24cm. 93p. 3/-.
- REAL ECONOMICS FOR REDUCED INCOMES. By BCM/TJSB. 1933. 20cm. 90p. 26.
- ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES 1932-33. (National Industrial Conference Board, New York.) 1933. 23cm. 61p. \$2.00.