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Topics of the Week.

The late Mr. P. Kesava Pillai.

DEWAN BAHADUR P. KESAVA PILLAI who passed away last week is universally described as a champion of the poor. His public life extended over nearly half a century and though many questions convulsed public opinion during the period, Mr. Pillai mainly devoted his attention to the problem of jail reform and the question of forest grievances, the two departments of Government which so closely touch the lives of the poor people. So deep and detailed was his study of the two questions that he came to be regarded as a specialist in them. It speaks volumes for his anxiety to befriend the dumb and the voiceless that when jails provided asylum for none but criminals and when prison reform had not become a live problem that it has now become owing to their being flooded by what are known as political prisoners, Mr. Pillai kept on agitating assiduously for reforming our jail administration and much of the credit for the present tolerable conditions of jail life which resulted from the deliberations of the Jail Committee must go to the selfless and unostentatious labours of Mr. Pillai in the cause. Problems relating to local self-government and medical relief also claimed his attention and even in those fields he had an admirable record of work to his credit. He was a member of the Madras legislative council for a number of years and was elected its Deputy President for two terms. In 1921 he led a deputation to British Guiana which went extensively into the conditions of life and work of the Indian immigrants in the Colony. It may be recalled that Mr. Pillai was one of the few living patriots who enjoyed the distinction of attending the first session of the National Congress and as

such his death removes a valuable link with the past, besides depriving the Madras Presidency of an experienced and reputed public worker.

The Late Lord Chelmsford.

THE death of Lord Chelmsford last week calls to one's mind the fact of his having been jointly with the late Mr. Montagu the author of the Reforms which were introduced in this country in 1921. These, as will be easily remembered, were the direct result of the declaration of the British Government's policy of granting responsible government to India, which was made in Parliament in August 1917. It is a matter of common knowledge that Lord Chelmsford played an important part in inducing the British Government, amidst the preoccupations of a world war, to make that declaration. One should have expected that Lord Chelmsford's assistance to Mr. Montagu who later visited India at the then Viceroy's invitation would have been whole-hearted in implementing a policy which he did so much to promote. Yet if all one heard at the time be true, Lord Chelmsford gave only a tepid support to the Montagu Mission, if he did not actually try to obstruct it, at any rate in the early days of its visit. However that be, and whatever may have happened behind the scenes, the fact cannot be gainsaid that without the Viceroy's support which never publicly failed him, Mr. Montagu's task would have been a still more uphill one than it actually was.

At the same time it is no use blinking the fact that the people of India have very unpleasant memories of his administration. The Rowlett Acts were placed on the statute book by Lord Chelmsford's Government in the teeth of universal popular opposition and the disturbances that followed in the Punjab were allowed to be used as an excuse for the introduction of the martial law regime there. The horrible excesses of which the troops under General Dyer's leadership were guilty at Amritsar and other places in the Punjab are still too fresh in the public mind and are bound to remain so for a good long time. It is making too heavy a call on one's credulity to be asked to believe that the head of the Government of India was unaware of them. A more forceful personality than Lord Chelmsford's would have placed itself closely in touch with the Punjab happenings at the time and taken effective steps to prevent such brutalities on the part of the military forces. But he left everything to the men on the spot with consequences which have proved nothing short of disastrous on Indo-British relationship.

High-handedness in Indo-China.

DEWAN BAHADUR RAMASWAMI MUDALIAR moved the adjournment of the Assembly on the 30th March last to discuss the expulsion of four Indian bankers by the French authorities in Indo-China

The information elicited during the debate leaves much to the imagination. It was stated that the fall of agricultural prices had created a crisis in Indo-China and the Government had granted a kind of moratorium to protect the debtors from ruin. The moratorium was subsequently withdrawn, and the creditors had recourse to the courts to recover their dues. The French authorities were said to have advised the Indian bankers to accept 20 to 30 per cent. of their dues and write off the rest. They refused and four of them were ordered to be deported and were expelled peremptorily in spite of representations from the British Consular authorities.

It is not clear why the Government did not extend the moratorium or, in the alternative, pass legislation writing down debts. It is not also clear if the expulsion was ordered by mere executive action or in virtue of any law, and if so, whether due processes of law were observed.

It is also not clear if the French authorities' advice to write off the larger part of debts was tendered only to Indian bankers or to creditors in general, and if the latter, what the other creditors did. No adequate explanation for singling out the four Chettiar bankers for precipitate expulsion is forthcoming. We hope the British and Indian Governments will not rest until the whole matter has been probed thoroughly and suitable relief obtained.

Indians are bound to note the vigorous action, leading up to a possible break-off of trade relations, against Russia which the British Government intend to take obviously as a protest against a less serious grievance: to wit, the refusal to accept bail on behalf of Mr. Monkhouse, a British subject working for Messrs. Vickers in Russia. And they will contrast it with the much less vigorous action they apparently intend to take against France for a far more serious grievance: to wit the expulsion of four Indian bankers from Indo-China.

Uplift of Depressed Classes.

RAO BAHADUR M. C. RAJAH, the depressed classes leader, led a deputation to the Viceroy last week in order to plead with Lord Willingdon for the grant of special facilities for passage by the Assembly of the Temple Entry and Untouchability Abolition Bills now before it. The deputationists voiced a section of depressed class opinion, how strong nobody can say, which lays great store on the two Bills as a means of improving their social status. Indeed they seem to suppose that their "permanent emancipation and betterment" is impossible so long as they are not allowed equal rights of entry into temples with other members of Hindu society. In the circumstances their anxiety to see the Bills placed on the statute book as early as possible is quite natural. Their pleadings however made hardly any impression on the Viceroy who refused to be a party to any arrangement which would make it appear as if the Government wanted to rush the Bills through the Assembly. He emphasised what was indeed obvious, viz. the need of "full discussion and examination" of the Bills. All that the deputation besought the Government's help in preventing was unreasoned obstruction and the adoption of dilatory tactics by the members of the Assembly with a view to delaying the enactment of the Bills into law as long as possible. The attitude which the Government has chosen to adopt in regard to the Bills cannot be said to be altogether unobjectionable from this standpoint. For example, the requirements of full public discussion would doubtless not have suffered if the Government had lent their good offices for the purpose of facilitating the acceptance by the Assembly

during its last session of the motion for the circulation of the Bills for the expression of public opinion.

On the day the Viceroy received the Rajah deputation, Government issued a press note detailing the steps taken by Provincial Governments with a view to promoting the moral and material uplift of the untouchables. A perusal of the note leaves the impression on one's mind that the Madras Government is the most assiduous in working for the well-being of the depressed classes and their action designed to that end is also more comprehensive than that of any other local Government. A noteworthy feature of the activities of local Governments in this field is the attempts to secure equal educational facilities to children belonging to the depressed classes and free access for them to such public amenities as roads, serais, hospitals, etc. We are far from implying that what has been done in this direction is all that could or need be done. But there cannot, we believe, be any serious difference of opinion that in the matter of the depressed classes' uplift Government action in the provinces is proceeding on right lines.

Punjab Municipalities.

THE Minister of Local Self-Government in the Punjab, Dr. Gokul Chand Narang, sponsored a bill in the local legislature which seeks to vest in the Government control over the Executive Officers of Municipalities and over certain other matters. The Bill has roused much heated controversy resulting in the walkout, in protest, of the Unionist party. It is generally admitted that since the popularisation of municipalities and the relaxation of bureaucratic control over them during the last decade the efficiency of municipal bodies in parts of India has suffered. This was to some extent inevitable. But there is a limit to which the deterioration can be allowed to proceed. The Governments of several Provinces have had to step in and resume measure of control over municipalities, as is now contemplated in the Punjab. Theoretically, this is indeed a retrograde measure, for the evolution of these bodies tended to make them more and more autonomous and the measure under contemplation in the Punjab is a reversal of the policy. Ultimately again power will have to be transferred to the Municipal electorates and they must be free to mismanage and learn through bitter experience the hard-won lessons of responsibility. Resumption of control by Government can only be a temporary palliative. The chief cause of trouble in the Punjab municipalities is the communal electorate and the proportions of seats allotted to different communities. The true and permanent remedy is the elimination of these undemocratic features. But that at the moment is impossible, thanks to the opposition of the Muslim majority in the Punjab.

In the existing circumstances of maladministration there is no help for it but that Government should step in to arrest the rot in the interests of the ratepayers, the majority of whom care little for the communal composition of the municipalities. The objection to such control was very great in the old days when it was exercised by the foreign bureaucracy. But nowadays the objection loses some of its force. Local self-government is a transferred subject under the control of popularly-elected Ministers responsible to the legislatures. If the Ministers misuse their powers, it is open to the legislatures to turn them out of office. It is true that dyarchy and the communal division of the legislature renders difficult such straight and simple action. But it is far worse to let the municipalities go to rack and ruin to the detriment of the ratepayers.

Commander-in-Chief's Disappointing Reply.

THE upshot of the discussion recently raised by Sardar Jagannath Maharaj in the Council of State will be regarded with keen disappointment all over the country. He moved a resolution which asked that the admissions to the Indian Sandhurst should be increased by 50 per cent. In other words, he wanted that the intake of the Military College at Dehra Dun should be raised from 60 to 90. It cannot be said that the mover's request was in any way unreasonable or extravagant; but, strange to say, even such a modest request failed to make itself acceptable to the Commander-in-Chief. The main ground of his turning down the proposal was that for six or seven years more, i. e., till the Indian officers had become senior and experienced enough to be placed in independent charge of regiments, the military authorities would be unable to make up their minds as to whether they would make capable commanders; and till this became possible, any acceleration of the pace of the Indianisation of the army was simply unthinkable. Assuming the air of an injured innocent, he asked: how can a policy which was arrived at after such careful consideration by the authorities concerned be changed "at a moment's notice"? Sir Philip Chetwode must indeed be living in a world of his own and be blind to contemporary events if after all the adverse criticism to which his Committee's scheme of an Indian Sandhurst was subjected by all sections of opinion since its publication he pleads want of notice before he can bring himself to consent to a more speedy Indianisation. It is certainly open to him to adduce other arguments to emphasise the necessity of the maintenance of the *status quo*; but he cannot pretend as if the demand for larger admissions to the Sandhurst at Dehra Dun was sprung upon him as a surprise. He pointed out that the present size of the Sandhurst was settled not in the light of requirements of the scheme of the Indianisation of the whole army but had reference only to the yearly wastage in the units singled out for Indianisation, viz. a complete division of infantry, a complete cavalry brigade, and all the ancillary services. So it all comes to this that for seven years more no quickening of the pace of Indianisation can be thought of nor can anybody say with certainty that this can be confidently expected even after the lapse of that period. To say the least, the Commander-in-Chief's attitude towards the motion in question displayed a lamentable lack of appreciation of the strength of public feeling behind the demand for the completion of the process of Indianisation within the shortest possible time.

Mixed Feelings.

NOT long ago Sir Mirza Ismail, the Muslim Dewan of the Hindu Maharaja of Mysore, laid the foundation-stone of a Christian Church; last week he laid the foundation-stone of a Hindu temple in the Mysore State. It is a most gratifying evidence of the catholicity of the Maharaja and of Sir Mirza, and of the Hindu citizens of the State. Sir Mirza paid a well-merited tribute to the religious tolerance of the Hindus, a tribute which he himself very richly deserves. Those in authority in India, particularly in Indian States, have great and incomparable opportunities to give the right lead in such matters, as Sir Mirza has done.

The gratification is however tinged with regret that, while far more socially useful institutions, like schools and hospitals of every kind are in need of funds, and some have been languishing for want of public support, temples should still be built and vast sums of money should be forthcoming for the

purpose. Hindu temples all over India have considerably degenerated, have ceased to be centres of light and leading, have become the strongholds of priestly conservatism and reaction and, with rare exceptions, are open only to the higher Hindu castes. There is no reason to believe that the temple which Sir Mirza laid the foundation of, will be an exception. Even if it were, the money spent on temples would be far better spent in promoting social service of a more modern type. We hope persons in authority will use their influence to divert charity to more useful and enlightened channels.

Articles.**WHITE PAPER IN COMMONS.**

IF it is any comfort to our countrymen to know that the White Paper scheme is secure in the House of Commons against the envenomed attacks of the Churchillite group they can derive it in full from the three-day debate that commenced on Tuesday of last week. Mr. Winston Churchill himself and his important coadjutors like Sir Reginald Craddock, Sir Alfred Knox, Lord Wolmer and Sir Henry Page-Croft delivered a powerful assault upon the Round Table constitution from the die-hard point of view, but it only helped Sir Samuel Hoare to repel an equally powerful assault from Labour benches from the radical point of view, and to commend his own proposals to the House as constituting a safe middle course from which no deviation should be allowed in either direction. But those Indians who had looked for a sign that the proposals would be substantially improved at the Joint Select Committee stage would be sorely disappointed. The fact that Government members were at great pains to show that their proposals, even if in some respects they appeared liberal, were really conservative and did not feel it necessary to pay any heed to the Labour complaint that they were not liberal enough shows that if the National Government has not much to fear from Mr. Churchill it has much less to fear from Mr. Lansbury. The Opposition Leader pleaded with great earnestness for the release of political prisoners (going even so far as to imply that Labour co-operation in the Joint Select Committee might be withdrawn if the Congress leaders also were not afforded an opportunity of taking part in the Indian auxiliary committee), and called for a large extension of self-government in the measure to be now put in hand. Other Labour members drew particular attention to the care taken in the White Paper scheme to arrange the details that even where Indians would get real power it would not fall into the hands of extremists, and in this connexion mention was made by some of them to the excessive influence allowed in the constitution to the Princes. Some were even venturesome enough to argue that establishment of a degree of democracy in the States should somehow or other be provided for in the White Paper or at least encouraged by the British Government in such ways as are open to it. The suspiciousness of the Labour Party in general towards the Princes only served to discount its views on federation in the

found the currency troubles too great to be able to pay much attention to this question and it was chiefly during the sittings of the Hilton-Young Commission that the issue came suddenly and prominently before the public. It should be noted that it was entirely in the evidence taken by the Commission in England that the suggestion that an independent Central Bank should be created was put forward and that one of the most emphatic witnesses on this point was Mr. Montagu Norman, the Governor of the Bank of England. The Government of India had before this visualised the possibility of transferring the management of the note issue to the Imperial Bank, but had not thought of bringing an entirely new institution into being. The majority of the Hilton-Young Commission was impressed by the plea for a Central Bank and reported that such a Bank to be called the Reserve Bank of India should be created on the usual model of the Bankers' Banks in other countries. Sir Purshottamdas Thakurdas in his minute, however, expressed the opinion that it would be better to attempt to convert the Imperial Bank itself into a Central Bank. Events after the publication of the Hilton-Young Commission report moved rapidly; and Sir Basil Blackett took up energetically the work of implementing the recommendations of that Commission. The Reserve Bank and Gold Standard Bill of 1927 was drawn up mainly on the lines laid down by the Hilton-Young Commission and it was described by Sir Basil as the most important Indian measure of "financial liberalism." By this time public opinion had veered round to the idea of having a Reserve Bank and in the Assembly almost all leaders of public opinion — including Sir Purshottamdas — supported the conception. There were, however, radical differences in the points of view of Government and the Opposition and the Bill as it emerged out of the joint committee of the two Houses was entirely unacceptable to Government. For it substituted what was virtually a State Bank for a shareholders' bank and provided for a certain number of directors to be elected by the Assembly while Government was most anxious to have the directorate removed entirely from political influence. As Government was unable to suitably amend the Bill in the Assembly, it tried to introduce a new Bill in the ensuing session. This move was, however, foiled by a ruling from the Chair.

Thus India narrowly missed having a Reserve Bank in 1928 and nothing further was heard of the project for the moment until it was made a live political issue by being included in the series of financial safeguards in the second report of the Federal Structure Committee of the first Round Table Conference. The words in which the Sub-Committee expressed this provision were as follows: "The Sub-Committee recommend, with a view to ensuring confidence in the management of Indian credit and currency, that efforts should be made to establish on sure foundations and free from any political influence, as early as may be found possible, a Reserve Bank, which will be entrusted with the management of the currency and exchange" and it further added: "The Sub-Committee recognise that it may be difficult in existing conditions to set up a Reserve Bank of sufficient strength and equipped with the necessary gold and sterling reserves immediately and that, therefore, until this has been some special provisions will be found necessary to secure to the Governor-General adequate control over monetary policy and currency." In the second Round Table Conference a point specially established on the initiative of Sir Purshottamdas Thakurdas was that the creation of the Reserve Bank should be by the Indian legislature and the suggestion was also put forward that pending the creation of the Bank nothing further

was required to ensure financial stability, in addition to the normal powers of veto vesting in the Governor-General, than the creation of a statutory Advisory Council so constituted as to reflect the best financial opinion of both India and London. In the case of neither of these reports was the creation of the Reserve Bank made a condition precedent to the inauguration of the Federation. With the report of the Financial Safeguards Committee of the third R. T. C., however, the aspect of this matter began to change. This Committee agreed with the recommendation made in the second report of the Federal Structure Committee, but further added that "the proposals to be submitted to Parliament should be based on the assumption that such a Reserve Bank would have been created prior to the inauguration of the Federal constitution, and recommended that steps should be taken to introduce into the Indian Legislature a Reserve Bank Bill as soon as possible." It also proceeded to lay down certain requirements which must be satisfied before the Reserve Bank could start operations with a reasonable chance of success. This, of course, was going much further than at any previous time and both Mr. Jayakar and Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru drew the attention of the Committee to it. Sir Tej put it plainly by saying, "I should not like to be a party to any scheme which contemplates that, if there is to be no Reserve Bank, there is to be no responsibility at the Centre in India." In the White Paper the situation in this respect is distinctly worse and the Reserve Bank figures prominently as a "prerequisite of a financial character to the inauguration of responsible Federal Government." The White Paper lays down that "the proposals relating to the responsibility for the finance of the Federation are based on the assumption that before the first Federal Ministry comes into being a Reserve Bank free from political influence, will have been set up by Indian legislation and be already successfully operating."

The enormous difference made in the position of the Central Bank by the report of the Committee on Financial Safeguards of the third R. T. C. is evident. At the first R. T. C. it was contemplated that certain special powers would be given to the Governor-General if the Reserve Bank was not in being prior to the creation of the Federation. In the second R. T. C. an alternative suggestion of an Advisory Council was put forward. The second R. T. C. met at a time of extreme financial uncertainty and it was natural, therefore, for the delegates to think of the possibility of establishing a Reserve Bank as distant. It is noteworthy that Sir Purshottamdas suggested originally that the Reserve Bank should be specified as being set up by the Federal Legislature but as certain members objected to the word "Federal," as unnecessarily narrowing the scope of the reservation the word was dropped. The financial situation in both India and England was a good deal better at the time the third R. T. C. met than at the time of the second R. T. C. and there is nothing in the report of the Financial Safeguards Committee or the proceedings of the R. T. C. to explain why it is thought impossible to inaugurate a Federation even with special safeguards for currency and exchange pending the creation of a Reserve Bank. The only possible explanation one can find is that the British Government felt that they could persuade the Indian Legislature more easily to accept the type of Reserve Bank on which the City had set its heart if on such acceptance the inauguration of the Federation was made dependent. It has also been wickedly suggested that this is nothing more than a device to delay the coming in of the Federation indefinitely. And this suggestion finds some support in the type of conditions laid down which must be satisfactorily

PUNJAB STATE'S PEOPLE'S CONFERENCE.

MR. PATWARDHAN'S PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS.

Following is the full text of the presidential address delivered by Mr. A. V. Patwardhan at the fourth session of the Punjab States' People's Conference at Delhi on the 5th inst. :

I am profoundly grateful to the promoters of this Fourth Session of the Punjab States' People's Conference for kindly offering the Presidentship to me. I consider it a very high honour and just for that reason I had great difficulty in persuading myself to accept it. There was another reason, which also made me hesitate very much in responding to your invitation and that was my utter ignorance of the local problems which will necessarily figure prominently on your Agenda. As to these problems I can only play the rôle of a listener and a learner, which I shall be only too glad to do. But what decided me in accepting your offer was the opportunity it affords me of taking counsel with you on the subject of the British Government's proposals concerning the federal Government which is proposed to be set up in India. This chair was to be occupied by my friend Prof. G. R. Abhyankar, as first arranged but all of a sudden he had to go to an hospital and get himself operated upon for diabetic gangrene, which has incapacitated him from fulfilling his obligations. The organisers tried to induce some other workers in the cause of Indian States' people to take up this responsibility; but they were not successful and so this rôle is now on my humble shoulders and therefore I request you all to look at me rather leniently.

The Reform Proposals.

It is a matter of supreme concern to the people of the Indian States, and I consider it to be of the utmost importance that, although their opinions are not invited, either by the rulers or people of British India or by the rulers of Indian India and will not be allowed to influence the final decisions, the Indian States' people should give careful consideration to the proposals in the *White Paper* and state their own conclusions thereupon, in the clearest possible terms, so that no one should have any excuse hereafter, for accepting arrangements prejudicial to their interests in ignorance of their view. I shall confine my observations, as President, if you will allow me, to the Reform Proposals published recently.

States' People Excluded from R. T. C.

These proposals are a cumulative result of three Round Table Conferences, to none of which the representatives of the people in the States were admitted. We claimed admission to all the three, but our claims were rejected, on the ground that the States' Governments, being autocratically organised, the rulers of the States or their nominees alone could speak for the States. Because we have no share in our governments at present, we are to have no share in discussions on future changes therein. Everyone will recognise how hard it must be on us. Our grievance is not merely that the States' People's representatives were excluded from the Round Table Conferences, which evolved the White Paper proposals or will be excluded from the Indian Auxiliary Committee of the Joint Parliamentary Committee, which is to sit on these proposals, but that the rulers of the States, whose interests in constitutional questions are and must obviously be opposed in many vital respects to those of the people of the States, are regarded as the only true spokesmen for the States. The result is that the proposed constitution is just what it might have been expected to be in the circumstances. Imagine a constitution for British India, framed by a body, from which even moderate British Indians like Dr. Sir Tej Bahadur Saprú are rigorously kept out and, what is more, in which Sir Samuel Hoare and other champions of the British Indian bureaucracy are given the sole right to represent the wishes of the British Indian people, without in the least suspecting that they might possibly misrepresent those wishes. Some years ago it was the case in British India; the people had no hand in determining the constitution: to be fastened upon them; but they were always at least consulted. Public opinion was always elicited upon the proposals for change, before they were finally adopted.

States' People Shut out.

In the present discussions, however, at no stage have the people of the States been invited to express their opinion. In fact, if they did express an opinion, which went counter to the views of the Princes, it was promptly put aside, as one which cannot be recognised as the real voice of the States; The Princes alone or their nominees could

represent the States, and I am sorry to say that some big lawyers even say, that legally this is the only correct position. Anyway the effect of taking it up is that in a constitution intended to be democratic, the contribution of the States consists only in introducing rankly autocratic elements into it.

Federal Constitution less likely to Changes.

But this is not all. It is a federal type of government that is now proposed to be brought into existence, and it is well known that a federal system is less susceptible to changes in future than a unitary system. The federation proposed for India, one may be sure, will be such as will be almost wholly unalterable in its provisions relating to the powers of the Princes, except with the *latter's consent*. The reactionary features of the scheme, therefore, for which the Princes will become responsible, will, therefore, for all practical purposes continue for all time, without any machinery being provided, in the constitution, for their eventual elimination. The people of the States, by being denied opportunities of participating in the constitutional discussions, will thus be excluded from a participation not only in the reforms to be shortly enacted but in the reforms that may take their place in future even. If British India gives its consent to such a constitution, it will have on its conscience, nothing less than a permanent deprivation of the legitimate popular rights of the whole of Indian India.

No Place for them in Constitution.

As I have said before, the people of the States do not figure anywhere at all in the White Paper Constitution—in so far as the enjoyment of rights or exercise of responsibility is concerned. Where, however, it is a question of bearing burdens and discharging obligations they fill the whole of the picture. They have to obey the laws and pay the taxes that may be passed by the federal legislature; but in making those laws or imposing those taxes they will have no part or lot. The British statesmen pose to be the guardians of popular rights. 'Taxation without representation' is a thing which the British people will not tolerate in their country; but I am surprised to see that the same British statesmen are allowing this anomalous position to be created in Indian India.

The Anomalies.

(i) The States will have even an excessive representation in the federal legislature, 33½ per cent. in the House of Assembly and 40 per cent. in the Council of State, but there will be no provision in the

constitution for even the smallest share of this representation to be obtained by popular election, or even by nomination from among the unofficials in the States. For all that, the constitution provides all the 225 seats to be allotted to the States out of the total number of 635 in the legislature; both the Houses of the Central Legislature will be filled either by the Princes themselves or by their direct and immediate nominees from among officials. Being excluded from the federal legislature, it goes without saying, that the States' people will inevitably be excluded from the federal executive. (ii) The function of making laws, civil and criminal, and of executing them, in regard to which the arbitrary rule of the Princes works the greatest mischief, is still to remain with the States. The people will not have the benefit in this respect either of federal legislation or of the Federal Court. (iii) The rulers will be able, under the arrangements proposed, to have their autocratic finger in the democratic pie of exclusively British Indian concerns, like the civil and criminal legislation referred to above, administration of Chief Commissionerships and several other things of that character; but the British India side of federation will have nothing whatever to say in concerns which the Princes have reserved to their sole jurisdiction. (iv) Fundamental rights will be guaranteed in the federal constitution—but only for British India. No rights are basic enough or elementary enough to be safeguarded for the people of the Indian States. They can have no protection against the arbitrary acts of the rulers. (v) The Right Honourable V. S. Srinivasa Sastri in his article published in the issue of 23rd March 1933 of the *Servant of India* has pleaded the cause of the States' people in this behalf in the following words. He says, "One would wish to add a further recommendation that such fundamental rights as may be recognised in these two ways should be extended to the *subjects of Indian States, who have been left too much in the cold*". (VI) The federal government is also to be deprived of the right which the existing Government of India i.e. the Governor General-in-Council, possesses of exercising *paramountcy* over the States, by the use of which it could have given them some relief.

Pledge to the people broken.

When the British Government undertook the defence of the States from internal trouble as well as external aggression, it also promised to the people, as a counterpart of its promise to the rulers; to intervene in the internal admini-

stration of the States for the purpose of preventing and righting gross mis-rule, if it occurred on the part of the rulers. The treaties of several States have got clauses incorporated in them to this effect. But the people of Indian States have not in fact derived much benefit from such exercise of paramountcy. The bureaucratic Government of India has been exceedingly slow to move, and it moves more often in the wrong direction than in the right. But the responsible federal government of the future, which is by right the heir to this British suzerainty, would have so discharged this function as to secure a minimum standard of good government to the people of the States. But under the new constitution it is to be divested altogether of this function. The Viceroy will, hereafter, exercise rights of *paramountcy*, as the representative of the British Crown. He will not be left free to exercise them at his discretion either, but if the Princes have their way, he is to consult with and be guided by an advisory body, consisting of members of the very order whose misdeeds may be in question. In sum, the constitution neither admits the people of the States to a share, however small, in responsible self-government at the centre, nor secures them against infringement of civil liberties in local areas, but only whittles away even the ineffective guarantees that they had for a modicum of good government.

Interests Common to both Indias.

To a large extent the people of British India and Indian India have a community of interests, and so have the rulers of British India and Indian India. Relying upon this fundamental fact, many leaders of the States' people had hoped that, although they themselves were to be shut out from the Round Table Conference, the leaders of British India, from motives of self-interest at least if not out of neighbourliness, would advocate their cause against the united opposition of the Indian Princes and the British Government. In the matter of having a Bill of Rights introduced into the federal constitution, for the benefit of Indian India, British Indians would probably not feel the urge of self-interest; for it would not affect them personally in any way. But in this matter the Indian States' people had thought that since British Indians insisted upon a Declaration of Rights for themselves, it would automatically apply to them too. For they had not then conceived of the possibility of constitutional guarantees being enforced in the case of one unit and not enforced in that of another, for which

there is no parallel anywhere in the history of constitution-making. But British Indians have not in fact been deterred from perpetuating what would be regarded everywhere as a constitutional absurdity. In the matter of retaining paramountcy for the future Government of India, as for the present, their self-interest should have taught British Indians to fight their hardest; for it is a question of themselves giving up something, which all along was theirs in theory and would soon be theirs in fact. But they struck no blow at the Round Table Conference, for keeping paramountcy with the Federal government. On the contrary they themselves began repeating constitutional theories, which were propounded earlier by Sir Leslie Scott and other counsels of the Princes and on which they had expended all their legal talent in demolishing. Constitutional theory is not the rigid stuff we had imagined it to be. It is as pliable as—some of our political leaders from British India are.

Sacrifice of Common Interests.

As to election, would any one have thought it possible that British Indians might not insist upon it as an essential condition of federation? In fact however they did not ask for it at all at the Round Table Conference and are now engaged in extenuating and justifying nomination. Dr. Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru argued at the second R. T. C. that nomination was for the States the only correct method to adopt for the Upper Chamber—an opinion which cannot be sustained on any constitutional theory that I am aware of. It might perhaps be legitimate to accept nomination for a temporary period, as a matter of expediency but wholly illegitimate to maintain that nothing else would be theoretically correct. If it was the right and proper method of representation then these statesmen ought to have advocated the adoption of it for the British India Provinces. In the matter of nomination to the Lower Chamber too, British Indians busy themselves in making excuses for it. It is said, for instance, that the Princes must not be understood necessarily to be opposed to election because they do not bind themselves to it. If they did they would be accepting the authority of the British Parliament to fetter their discretion, to which of course they have the strongest objection. The obvious answer to this reasoning is that if the binding be incorporated in the Treaties of Accession and in virtue thereof in the Constitution Act, the States would not have to recognise Parliament's authority. The rulers agree right enough that their nominees shall satisfy certain qualifica-

tions as to age and other things. Why then can they not agree to election without prejudice to their internal autonomy? The fact of course is that even a private undertaking to introduce election is not forthcoming from any Prince except that the rulers of Bikaner and Bhopal have promised for themselves to consult the wishes of their local legislatures in selecting some of their representatives in the House of Assembly. There is an attempt in too many British Indian quarters to make much of this promise so that they may be able to magnify their own achievement. The following points should therefore be noted in this connexion. First, only two Princes have made the promise; secondly, the promise applies only to the choice of a part of the representation; thirdly, the States' legislatures' choice will not be final; fourthly, the legislatures themselves, having an official or a nominated majority, cannot select the truly popular representatives. Election by such legislatures is useless, indeed worse than useless, because it only tends to lull us to rest when we must be wide awake. Then it is said that it will anyhow be open to the Princes to adopt election. So will it be open to the Viceroy to administer the reserved departments as if they were transferred, or to let his reserve powers fall into desuetude. Why then do British Indians make such a tremendous fuss about the reservations and safeguards? Is it because the British Government is more tenacious of power than Indian Princes? If so, why do the people of Berar cry their little hearts out at the prospect of a return from a hard ~~bet~~ to a loving *swadeshi* ruler?

"Nomination as good as Election."

The British Indian apologists of the Princes have other plausible arguments to urge, which must be considered in some detail. Nomination, they say, may be bad in theory, but in the circumstances in which the Princes will make nomination, it will not be half so bad in practice. The federation will deal mostly with technical matters like salt and customs, and income-tax and Posts, in regard to which the views of all members, whether elected or nominated, will be much the same. It is only on questions affecting personal liberty, like repressive legislation, that elected members will ordinarily think differently from nominated members. But these questions do not appertain to the federal government, and the States' representatives will not be allowed to vote thereupon. (This was said when the White Paper was expected to impose upon the States' representatives the disability

of refraining from voting on central subjects. In fact, however, the White Paper contemplates no such provision and so this argument of the British India leaders does not hold good now). There can, therefore, be no objection save on theoretical grounds to the Princes' nominees, who will be just as progressive as the members elected from British India. Another argument used is: the States' representatives will be nominated, not by one appointing authority, but by several, and they will, therefore, not vote *en bloc*. The prejudices and prepossessions of the various States' members of the federation will thus cancel out, and the nomination by them will not, therefore, be practically harmful. The only kind of nomination that is decidedly injurious is the nomination by the Governor-General of non-officials (such as is provided for in the case of the Council of State) or of officials (which happily does not find a place in the future constitution). Nomination in British India, therefore, is what should be objected to and not nomination in Indian India.

This is indeed carrying the war into the enemy's camp. But the reasoning is wholly untenable. In fact, even an official *bloc* (were such to exist in British India) would any day be preferable to nomination by the Princes. For, in British India, though the nominating authority is the Governor-General, nominations will necessarily take place on the advice of his Ministry, which is to consist of elected members and is responsible to the legislature. The persons nominated on its advice, from non-officials, will no longer be reactionaries, as a majority of them are at present, but will be progressive. Even if officials were to be nominated they would all have been ordered to support the Ministry and the Ministry as leaders of public opinion would take, *ex hypothesi*, progressive views. Under the present constitution, in British Indian Provinces the nominated officials in the legislatures only help to swell the popular vote on transferred subjects. Similar would be the case in the new constitution. But the nominees of the Princes cannot but take the colour of those who appoint them. They will be under a mandate to vote as autocrats themselves will vote. It is not contended that the Princes' nominees will personally be less progressive than the nominees of the Governor-General. They will be politically so; because the nominating authority in Indian States will be autocrats and the ministers on whose advice nominations will take place in British India will be

leaders in a democracy. And of course it is futile to maintain that on questions like customs, salt and income-tax, people's representatives will have nothing different to urge from the representatives of autocratic rulers. If such be the case, why do the Princes not meet the demand of their people straightaway by giving the right of election to them? The Princes know better than some of the British India leaders, who espouse their cause. The fact is that the British Government looks to the States' representatives to play the part, which under the existing constitution is played by its own nominees, and it is certain that the Princes' nominees will not disappoint the expectations formed of them. Nor could the British Government secure as many nominated members, as it has secured, in the form of nominees of the rulers of the States.

The Worst Safeguard.

There is no question that this is the most serious defect in the White Paper scheme, not only from the point of view of the Indian States' people, but just as much from that of British India. This defect in fact is far more serious than all the others put together. You hear loud wails from British India about the safeguards which, it is said, altogether nullify self-government. I do not question that statement at all. But if there were no safeguards and the power conceded in the constitution were real over the whole field made over to federation, even then nomination by the Princes would be enough to reduce all this self-government to a mockery of popular government. I would ask British Indians whether all these years their aim has been merely to wrest power from the hands of foreigners and to place it in the hands of people, who are no doubt their fellow-countrymen but who are equally, if not very much more, hostile to the masses of people. Would there be any net gain if the British bureaucracy is dislodged from its position and an Indian autocracy installed in its place? Apparently British Indians think so. They would cheerfully submit to the Princes' domination if thereby they can get rid of British domination. But, fortunately, this does not seem feasible. They thought that by taking in the Princes on their own terms they can keep out the Britishers from the constitution. They are finding that they were labouring under a delusion. For the White Paper constitution is not more liberal in any respect than what they would have got without the Princes. I have no time here to enter upon a detailed examination of the Government of India's dispatch on the

Simon Report and to show that the constitution outlined in the White Paper is no improvement upon the constitution offered by this dispatch on a non-federal basis. If I am right in my contention, what is it that British Indians have won by accepting in a hurry the anti-democratic demands of the Princes? They have accepted the ascendancy of the Princes and have not been able to shake off that of the British. Such a careful student of public questions as Pandit Hirday Nath Kunzru has remarked, in writing of the White Paper, that the Assembly in the new constitution "will lose even the power that it now enjoys." Many other prominent politicians from British India agree in this estimate that the new constitution is, if anything, reactionary. Those who denounce it in this way are not necessarily thinking in terms of popular government; they are very probably thinking in terms of self-government, which in this case is very different. And the salvation of the people in Indian States lies in the happy circumstance that self-government does not appear possible without popular government and that such British Indian leaders as would gaily sacrifice the latter on the altar of the former will have no chance of proving their nationalist spirit in this way. I wish the politicians' indifference to real democracy were always and in all lands punished by their being held in chains by foreigners.

Demands of States' People.

For the moment the hope for the people of the Indian States seems to lie in the fact that British Indian leaders will for their own reasons consider the White Paper constitution to be so radically objectionable as to lead them to reject it *in toto*. For no possible improvement therein can so improve the constitution as to make it acceptable to the States' people. They must above all secure (1) popular election in the federal legislature; (2) a Declaration of Rights available for the people in the States and enforceable through the agency of the federal court; (3) federalisation of civil and criminal law; (4) lodgment of residuary powers in the federal government; (5) continuance of the present practice in the matter of exercise of paramountcy, but a greater alertness in fulfilling the Crown's pledge of good government in the States to the people. These demands of the States' people voiced from many platforms, cannot be met by a mere amendment of the White Paper constitution in detail; they really require the whole basis of the constitution to be altered. The people in the States need therefore be none too sad

at the rising tide of unreserved denunciation of the White Paper leading to the scrapping of the present proposals. Mr. C. Y. Chintamani has definitely expressed the opinion that British Indians would much sooner go without any reforms than have reforms which are anything like those adumbrated in the speeches of the Secretary of State at the third R. T. C., and it must be said in fairness to Mr. Chintamani that he does not, like most other leaders from British India, turn a blind eye to nomination and other defects proceeding from the States' entry into the federation and concentrate his attack on drawbacks due to distrust and suspicion on the part of Britishers. If his view of the merits of the reforms scheme prevails, even if it be only in so far as British India is concerned, then the point of view of the Indian States' people will at least have a fair chance of being considered. This much I know—that the proposed constitution is doomed if it is not rushed through Parliament while many of the politicians of the radical school are not free to make their voice felt. I have reason to believe that several of the Congress leaders will not accept a constitution which provides for the nomination of the States' representatives. But they are kept out of constitution-making now just as much as the States' people. If, therefore only a rejection of the White Paper can make the services of these leaders available to us, we may be excused for hoping that it will be rejected. We may not be certain that as a result of it our position will be improved, but it is only in that quarter that there is some room for hope.

Spirit of Defeatism.

There must arise among the British Indian politicians to whom it falls to take part in constitutional negotiations some who will have the courage to say to the Princes: Keep your autocracy intact if you must in your own States; as to that we can have nothing to say except in the way of a friendly suggestion. But we will not let you come in as autocrats in our constitution. You must put on a democratic garb for the nonce and adopt democratic practices as constituent members of the new polity which you and we are to form together. We will make your way as smooth as possible. But on no other terms is federation possible. If election is ever to remain in the distant future, we must part company. We can resume discussions when you become more friendly to popular government. For it is that which we wish to bring into existence and not merely a change-over from a white to a brown oligarchy. Such a change-over will only

adjourn the day when we can attain our destiny of being a democratically governed people. To say so is, it is generally believed, to make federation impossible. I do not share this belief, and I will give you my reason for it. If you examine the list of federal subjects you will find that in the case of all or most of these subjects the States have already made a *de facto* surrender of power over them to the Government of India. With the States, therefore, it is not a question of surrendering something which they control at present by joining federation. Federation would rather enable them to regain control of what they have lost and get a partial control over British India today. They stand to lose nothing but gain a lot. In these circumstances it is more than likely that they will agree to adopt democracy in handling these subjects if they know that only on this condition can they come into their own. Did not His Exalted Highness the Nizam promise to introduce, not a dyarchy of the kind which prevails at present in British Indian provinces, but full provincial autonomy in Berar if returned to him? Not that the Nizam is a fanatical democrat and cannot bear to see his people groaning under autocracy modified as it is under dyarchy. But he saw that his only chance of having Berar restored to him consisted in his adopting a democratic form of government if only for that province. Why would not then the Nizam and other rulers adopt democracy in so far as federal subjects are concerned provided British Indian leaders produced among them the feeling that on no other condition would federation be permitted and that on no other condition would they be allowed to re-establish control over these subjects? Instead however of impressing them with such a conviction British Indian leaders have convinced themselves that federation is not a necessity for the States at all, but that it is a necessity for British India alone; that without a federation it will be impossible for British India to attain self-government, not merely on political grounds but on constitutional grounds as well (constitutional theories always come in very handy to British Indian politicians on whatever side of the fence they may stand); and that to bring about such a federation the yielding must be all on the side of British India, for on no account and for no reasons whatever can a breakaway of the States be contemplated. This attitude is wholly unnecessary and inexpedient. But it was such a defeatist spirit which informed the endea-

vours of our British Indian politicians in our constitutional discussions. Until that is laid aside, we cannot possibly have a satisfactory constitution.

Unalterable Constitution.

I have had to consider the White Paper constitution so far mostly as it affects British India; for it is through British India that we, the States' people, can at all hope to have the constitution modified. We can neither accept nor amend nor reject the constitution; we simply have no hand in it. We must, therefore, convince British India that what is conducive to our interests is also conducive to theirs. It is only then that we can persuade them to take the line which we would desire them to take. And we must, therefore, make it perfectly plain that the White Paper scheme is of no advantage to us at all; and that we shall lose nothing if it is turned down. On the contrary, if passed, it will seal our fate for all time if it be made, as the Princes propose, almost wholly unalterable in future. One of the Princes' demands is—and this is not a demand that is made only by what is styled as the more conservative section—that merely to propose an amendment a two-thirds vote of the legislative chamber concerned is required, and that the proposal must then be ratified by three-fourths of the States and three-fourths of the members in the legislature from British India. It is obvious that a constitution so framed practically places itself beyond all possibility of amendment—like the law of Medes and Persians. But I am not disposed to quarrel with the rulers on this account. Because they have bodily taken this provision from the United States constitution. A federal government should be and must be difficult to amend, and knowing that it is so rigid and unamendable, we must in framing it be a hundred times more careful than in framing a unitary constitution, which would be infinitely easier to change. British Indians however, are following a contrary course. They are in a terrible hurry to pass the constitution and then would perhaps try to make it easily amendable. In this attempt they are bound to fail. The rulers of States have precedent on their side. Therefore, British Indians had better think a thousand times before agreeing to a constitution, which would necessarily be, and should properly be, incapable of frequent alterations.

Nomination in Perpetuity.

But there are certain matters which the rulers insist upon placing outside the

scope of possible amendment even by such a hopelessly stiff procedure. There must not be even the smallest loophole for a change in certain respects. What are they? The form of government in the States and the method of selecting the States' representatives in the federal legislature. With the former we are not concerned immediately; we shall have to deal with it ourselves independently of the federal constitution. But election cannot be insisted upon by British India at any time in future. British India is very sore that a definite limit of time is not fixed in the constitution for the automatic termination of safeguards which are admitted in general terms to be temporary. In the matter of choosing the States' representatives, the rulers must be free, not only now but for ever and ever, to retain nomination if they so choose. In this case it is not a question of automatic liquidation of nomination; but a definite prohibition is to be imposed upon its ultimate liquidation!! There is another matter which cannot be changed in any State except with its own consent, and that is the list of federal subjects. Supposing a two-thirds majority of the House of Assembly proposes and a three-fourths majority of the States ratify a provision enabling the federal legislature to increase the number of federal subjects—a hard enough condition in all conscience—will the increased list come into force in all the federating States? No. The legislature may enlarge the number but it will have no effect in any State unless that State is agreeable. Why, even the list as it stands today represents, so far as the States are concerned, only the maximum number of subjects that can possibly be put into the federal category. Every State, however, is to be free to pick and choose from this list. The legislature solemnly declares that a certain number of functions are of national concern and must be federally administered, but any ruler can say in reply: "Well, you think so but I don't; and I am going to reserve this, that, and other subject to my undivided control." That being the proposed constitution, it is no wonder that any subsequent addition to the federal list will have no binding force upon any State. Popular election and a due increase in the list of federal subjects are among the first things that the States' people would like to secure. But the proposed constitution bars the way completely to them. It is clear, therefore, that the States' people will be kept out of the federal constitution for as long as the rulers

are so minded, or, rightly interpreted, for all time.

I do not enlarge at this stage upon other demands that the Princes are making; for instance, that a confederation should also be possible within the federation, and that federal laws should not apply in the States in virtue of the fact that they are federal, but because they are adopted by the States. These and such other demands are too ridiculous to deserve any notice. I would rather leave them to be dealt with by those British Indian politicians who have been placing their great talents behind the Princes' autocracy. But, speaking broadly, I cannot honestly reassure you that the White Paper scheme can in the least benefit the people of the States. It is not merely that it denies us civic or political rights of any kind at the present time; but the denial is to be perpetual. It is not given to us, as I have already said, either to accept the constitution or to reject it. But if we could have had a say in the matter, I have no doubt as to what it would be from our own point of view.

Let me finally thank you from my heart for the patient attention you have given me.

Review.

LANDLORDISM IN INDIA.

LANDLORDISM IN INDIA. By DVIJADAS DATTA.
(Taraporevala.) 1931. 21cm. 130p. Rs.3/—

THE book under review is a sequel to the author's earlier book 'Peasant-Proprietorship in India'. His main thesis is that landlordism, which was altogether unknown to the laws and customs of the country during the Hindu period and even the Muslim period of Indian History, is a product of the British administration of the land under the East India Company. In support of this contention references are made to Rigveda Sutras, Kautilya's Arthashastra and other authorities, which favour the theory of peasant proprietorship and joint responsibility of the State and peasantry for success in agriculture. The conquest of India by Islam did not, in the author's view, lead to any change in the Hindu theory regarding landownership and assessment of peasants' holdings, as may be seen from a study of the 'Ayeen Akbary'. With the acquisition of the Diwani of Bengal by the East India Company, which aimed at an increase of its revenue, the scales were turned against peasants' rights in land. In spite of Pitt's India Act which is characterised as the 'Magna Carta' of peasant proprietorship in British India, the peasant was transformed into a rent-paying tenant liable to be evicted and rack-rented by the Zamindar who was a mere collector of revenue under the Moghuls. The Zamindari system was extended to other parts of the country such as Madras. Elsewhere the State stepped into the shoes of Zamindars and proceeded to appropriate peasant's land "under the misnomer of the so-called Rayatwari system," charging rent to

the cultivators for their use. In the opinion of the author, "the confiscation of the peasant proprietorship of the arable land" has been followed by deplorable results—such as, the decreasing yield from the land, occurrence of famines, indebtedness and poverty of the peasantry, etc. He winds up by emphasising the conclusion that there is no precedent for landlordism in India and that the abolition of all rights of property in the land of the peasants on the part of Zamindars or of the Government would be justified in the interests alike of good agriculture and the prosperity of the peasants.

The author's treatment of this problem is both interesting and illuminating. We are indebted to him for many useful references to earlier land customs and for clearing up many an obscure point. His book is a strong plea for the ryot's cause and deserves to be read by every student of land tenure and agriculture in India.

We are, however, constrained to point out two defects which have crept into the book, viz., (i) exaggeration and (ii) repetition. In attributing the emergence of the Zamindari system exclusively to the policy of Lord Cornwallis and the East India Company, the author totally ignores the fact that the old institution of Land Revenue had already fallen into decay and come under the influence of the vicious system of revenue-farming and all sorts of grants and usurpations after the death of Aurangzeb. While Lord Cornwallis is to blame for not effectually safeguarding the interests of ryots, it must also be borne in mind that it was not possible for him to do anything like justice to their ancient proprietary rights in land. Then, again, the view that the occurrence of famines, decrease in the yield of land and the poverty of the peasant are the results of the growth of landlordism in India is obviously unsound, as it does not allow for various other economic and social factors which have worked in similar directions. Repetition of the same or similar ideas and arguments also detracts from the value of the book. We certainly admit that it would be a wise act on the part of the State formally to declare its recognition of private property in land, though for all practical purposes the ryot is the *de facto* proprietor of his land. An independent case, however, for this and other reforms in the existing land revenue practices can be on its own merits and it is not likely to be much strengthened by ransacking ancient Hindu documents and mediæval Moghul *firmans*.

S. G. BERL

JUST OUT.

SUGAR INDUSTRY AND LABOUR IN U. P.,

By R. D. AGARWALA, M. A., B. Com.

With a Foreword by Mr. R. C. SRIVASTAVA,
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fulfilled if the Reserve Bank is to operate successfully.

II

We do not, we believe, stretch the analogy too far if we find in this a close resemblance to the treatment given by the Allied nations to Germany or to the conditions laid down by the League of Nations before helping bankrupt nations which seek its assistance. The provision that Reich-Bank Act should be so modified as to make that Bank free of government control was, in the words of a celebrated authority on Central Banks, "part and parcel of a scheme for the payment of reparations and of the financial rehabilitation of Germany, devised by foreign experts at a time when the financial policy of the German Government was suspect and had proved to be economically unsound." It is well-known that the League has evolved a technique of its own during the last decade for the work of financial reconstruction and that in this technique Central Banks occupy a very important place. The Financial Committee of the League have framed general principles which they feel should be incorporated in the constitutions and guide the operations of Central Banks of issue in countries in which the League undertakes a reconstruction scheme. And the League has usually insisted on such a Central Bank being created where none existed before or the statutes of existing Central Banks being modified so as to conform to this model before financial assistance was given to the country in question. The insistence on the prior setting up of a Reserve Bank shows clearly that the British Government thinks of the future Federal Ministry in the same terms in which the Allied nations thought of Germany in 1924 or the League of the bankrupt Governments which seek its assistance. It is neither possible nor necessary to comment on this farther.

In one important respect, however, the position is even worse. For while in these other cases the Central Bank was designed as an instrument of achieving budgetary equilibrium and financial reorganisation, with us evidently it is to be made to wait on these factors. The prior requirements that must be satisfied are, in the opinion of the Committee on Financial Safeguards of the third R. T. O. as follows:—"In particular, that the Indian budgetary position should be assured, that the existing short-term debt, both in London and in India, should be substantially reduced, that adequate reserves should have been accumulated, and that India's normal export surplus should be restored." If we consider to what extent these conditions have been fulfilled in the case of the very large number of Central Banks that have come into existence in the various parts of the world during the post-war period we would discover that such instances are remarkably few. For in most cases the establishment of a Central Bank has been part of a scheme of financial reorganisation and currency stabilisation after both these had considerably deteriorated. Each one of the succession states of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire established a Central Bank when neither the world conditions nor the internal conditions of these countries were half as favourable as the conditions to-day in India. The Austrian Bank was established when economic life was practically at a standstill in that country and when the conditions in all the Central European countries were daily getting worse. When in 1923 it was found that Hungary could not put her house into order without external help the League of Nations prepared and carried through a scheme of reconstruction which entailed the immediate establishment of a Central Bank but contemplated budgetary

equilibrium being attained only by the year 1926. Similarly the conditions prevailing at the time of the creation of the Bank of Greece in 1927 did not at all come up to the ideal laid down by the Financial Safeguards Committee. We should not be interpreted as attaching no importance to budgetary equilibrium or to the balance of international payments. No sane man could question the necessity of maintaining these. Our whole objection lies to laying down the attainment of these ideal conditions—especially at a time like the present—as a prerequisite of the establishment of a Reserve Bank. Sir Otto Niemeyer, whose international financial standing is undisputed, was when he visited Australia in 1930 as an adviser to Government on behalf of the Bank of England also called in to report on financial and currency matters by the Government of New Zealand. Among the various recommendations he made was one for the establishment of a Central Bank. The conditions in Australasia were certainly bad enough when he made that recommendation. New Zealand as a country depending almost entirely on the export of agricultural produce finds today its balance of payments distinctly adverse. It has further been doubted whether a country of that size really does require a Central Bank. Even so we find it following the current fashion and the New Zealand legislature discussing a Central Bank Bill in the December of last year. And as to adequate reserves what reserves are adequate? The events of the last two years should have been enough to convince anybody of the futility of the conception that any banking reserves can be adequate. On this aspect we can think of no better comment than that of Mr. Manu Subedar: "India cannot have a Central Bank better than she can afford and the Central Bank established with such funds as are at the moment available cannot function worse than the Finance Member as currency authority and the Imperial Bank as banking authority are now functioning."

The Finance Member made in 1929 a significant statement in the Legislative Assembly on the question of the establishment of a Reserve Bank, part of which is quoted by the Central Banking Committee in its report and in which the following sentences occur. "The formation of a Central or Reserve Bank is desirable in order that India may be equipped with a mechanism for the control of currency and credit on the lines approved by modern experience. At the same time Government can only proceed subject to their being satisfied as to two conditions: first that the organization of the bank is securely settled on sound lines, and secondly, that there is a measure of general support among the representatives of public opinion for the proposals." Now that the Government has to deal with an Assembly which rarely disagrees with it and that the birth of the Federation is made dependent on the creation of a Reserve Bank the Government, we feel sure, is satisfied that the above conditions will be entirely fulfilled. Further the Finance Member has persistently claimed in his budget speeches this year that he has restored budgetary equilibrium, cut down the floating debt to manageable limits and begun the process of building up reserves. In fact his elaborate justification of the policy of allowing gold exports turned essentially on the help these exports gave in maintaining India's balance of international trade and in enabling the Finance Member to achieve all the above ends. He also talked of the almost inexhaustible stocks of gold that still lay in the country. There is thus nothing from the point of view of the Government of India to hinder the establishment of a Reserve Bank here and immedi-

ately. A draft Bill, as Sir P. Sethna pointed out at the first R. T. C., is ready in the files of Government. This Bill has been examined, at least in some important respects, by the Central Banking Committee. That Committee which contained many representatives of European commerce and industry has, in its majority report, unanimously assumed that the capital of the Bank would be provided by the State and that the Bank would be under Indian control. The foreign experts that advised the Central Committee have also made an important suggestion for extending the scope of the functions of the Reserve Bank somewhat on the model of the Java Bank. This suggestion gets further support from South African experience and is also endorsed by the Central Committee. In the majority report are also contained many minor suggestions with regard to the working of the Bank. The 1928 Bill modified in the light of these later comments should prove very generally acceptable. The controversy regarding the election of some Directors by the Assembly over which it is said the 1927 bill was wrecked (this, however, was emphatically denied by Mr. Jinnah at the first R. T. C.) will not this time cause any trouble. For with at least a semblance of Central Responsibility the election of Directors by the Assembly becomes a minor issue.

III.

We may, in conclusion, thus summarise our position. It is universally agreed that India needs

a Reserve Bank and that one should be established immediately. This cannot, however, mean that there is any justification for believing that an Indian Finance Minister will follow a policy more ruinous to his country and, therefore, also to his country's creditors than has hitherto been done by the British Finance Members or by the Secretary of State. It is clear, on the other hand, that our English creditors and our English rulers insist on treating the future Federation as a potentially mismanaged and bankrupt state and on full provision being made in this behalf. Even so, in delaying the creation of a Reserve Bank by laying down very difficult conditions they are not acting fairly. Perhaps, therefore, we may be permitted here to suspect a mixture of the political and the economic motives. But further even if the conditions stand as at present the Finance Member's recent claims very largely cover them. The principles of Central Banking are to-day very well understood and the League Financial Committee rarely takes more than two or three months completely to frame the statutes for the bank of any country. Their application to India has been thoroughly studied; a draft bill is almost ready. The rapidity, therefore, of the action that Government takes on this question and the type of institution that it seeks to create has now become one of the main tests of the bona fides of the British Cabinet and the British Government in India with respect to Indian Constitutional Reform.

THE WHITE PAPER AND FRANCHISE.

II*

BEFORE proceeding to the consideration of the White Paper proposals with regard to the composition and franchise of the Federal Lower House, I should like to deal briefly with the question of the Princes' representation which is common to both the Houses of the federal legislature. The Princes are given 40 per cent. and 33½ per cent. seats in the Upper and Lower Houses respectively and these seats are to be filled "by the Rulers of State-Members of the federation" by appointment. The White Paper is discreetly silent on the method of appointing the Princes' nominees. Which means that the Princes have been given a *carte blanche* in this behalf. According to the canon laid down by the Lothian Committee, there is no possibility of the proposed electoral system under which the federal legislatures are to contain a solid block of 100 and 125 seats kept permanently at the disposal of the whims and caprices of the autocratic Princes, ever producing legislatures containing the elements which require both stable ministries and oppositions capable of forming an alternative government. It is true that the Princes have been insisting from the beginning that they and they alone must possess the sole right of selecting their representatives for the federal legislatures; and it is unfortunately equally true that some of our foremost politicians at the Round Table Conference succumbed to their demand. Even Mr. Gandhi, the high priest of democracy, got the contagion and chose to leave the question to the

good sense of the Princes. In spite of this, however, voices were raised both in and outside the Round Table Conference against the autocracy of the Princes making an inroad outside their realms and in the federal sphere. Mr. N. M. Joshi, for example, has been crying hoarse that if the federal legislatures are intended to be made popular, they should be popular not only on the British India side but also on the States side. The White Paper has failed to take note of this popular demand and given the most absolute power to the Princes to select their representatives in any way they like. This is highly objectionable and detrimental to the interests of British India. With the formidable phalanx of 125 Princes' nominees aided by British Indian landlords and capitalists, the Federal Lower House will find it extremely difficult to pass any legislation either affecting the vested interests or those of the masses and the working classes. The adoption of Geneva Conventions and labour legislation, for example, will have little chance in a House composed as it will be under a hybrid system adumbrated in the White Paper. It does not even recommend that the Princes should consider, after, say, the first and before the second election, the desirability of setting up an electoral machinery for electing their quota to the federal legislatures, in which their subjects will be given reasonable facilities or adequate voice in the selection. Personally I hold that the Princes should be requested to have the election of their representatives on the same basis as that for British India. If, however, that may not be possible for both the Houses of the federal legislatures, it should be made possible at least for the Lower House. As

* The first article appeared in the issue of 30th March.

for the Upper House, some other device may be found. The point that I want to emphasise is that the Princes should not be given an absolutely free hand in selecting their representatives and that it should be made a matter of negotiations between British India and the States so as to enable the legislatures to become, within a reasonable period of time, wholly elected bodies both on the British India and the States sides. As it is, the recommendation of the White Paper in this behalf is most objectionable and must be resisted as being detrimental to the best interests of British India, to say nothing of the interests of the subjects of the States.

In my first article I have alluded to the retrograde proposal in the White Paper of reducing the size of the Federal Lower House from 450, as recommended by the Lothian Committee, to 375 and to the view held by it that having regard to the vast areas that a candidate has to cover, it would be impossible for any real touch between a member and his constituency being maintained if the size of the Assembly were kept at 250 for British India. This point might also be considered from the point of view of the number of electors that each candidate will have to approach. With 200 members, each candidate will have to approach a maximum of 56,718 electors in Madras and a minimum of 19,050 electors in Bihar and Orissa as against the respective maximum and minimum of 37,812 and 12,700 electors in the same provinces if the Assembly were to consist of 300 members from British India. With a reduction of 50 members, the improvement, that the Lothian Committee sought to achieve, would be reduced to a great extent. In pleading for the indirect as against the direct election to the Assembly, even the Simon Commission had to admit that the proportion of one member per one million inhabitants that would be reached if the Assembly were to consist, as recommended by them, of between 250 to 280 members, was "absurd," if the members were to be elected directly. The Lothian Committee was overmodest and cautious when they recommended 300 seats for British India. But the White Paper refused to pay any heed to its weighty arguments and brought down the number to 250. In view of the fact that the seats reserved for special interests such as women, commerce and industry and labour are going to be the same or slightly increased in one or two cases in a house of 250 as those recommended by the Lothian Committee in a house of 300, the reduction of 50 seats will result not only in the increase of areas and the number of electors per member but also in the reduction in the number of general seats. Would it be too much to expect that the progressive Indians who may go to London at the Joint Select Committee stage will do their best in spurring an increase in the size of the Assembly at least to the extent, if not more, recommended by the Lothian Committee?

I do not propose to deal with the distribution of seats to the communities which is made in terms of the Communal Award. Enough has been said about the injustice that the Award has done and no useful purpose will be served by raking up the old controversy again particularly when we ourselves have

failed to reach an agreement. But I must raise my voice against the extension of separate electorates for Anglo-Indians and Indian Christians. In order, however, to avoid repetition, I would rather deal with my objections when I come to the composition of provincial legislatures. Of the special interests I shall deal, for the same reason with the representation of landholders in a subsequent article. Here I may only protest against the seven seats given to landholders which are unnecessary.

Coming now to the representation of commerce and industry, it will be found that the anomalies and inequalities in the recommendations of the Majority of the Lothian Committee have not only been retained but, in certain respects, increased. In the first place, there is no necessity of retaining special representation for commerce and industry. Past experience has shown that commercial and industrial classes have been able to send a fair number of their men to the legislatures through general constituencies; and there is no reason to believe that they will not be able to do so under the new constitution. The main idea underlying the grant of special representation is to protect those interests which will find it difficult to return their men through general electorates. The past experience being what it is, the grant of special representation to commerce and industry is to give increased representation to that interest and overburden the legislature with more capitalist elements.

In the second place, assuming, without admitting, that special representation should be retained, one fails to understand why there should be separate electorates of European and Indian commercial bodies when the representation is functional and not communal, and why these special electorates should be sub-divided into several groups. If communal electorates are an undoubted obstacle in the way of the growth of a sense of common citizenship, perpetuate class distinction and stereotype existing relations, it is in common interest that their number should be reduced to the minimum, if they cannot be abolished altogether. And I am convinced that commerce and industry is one of the good fields wherefrom separate electorates can be safely withdrawn, without harming the interests of either European or Indian commerce. The former have the least fear because their communal electorates, which I fear will be retained, can be trusted to return a fair number of Europeans engaged in business. If, however, this may not suffice they can be further protected in the combined European and Indian commercial constituencies by reservation of seats. I, therefore, strongly advocate the abolition of communal electorates in commerce and industry, which are unnecessary. And here I must also emphasise that the Indian commercial and industrial community should take the lead in insisting upon this change. The Lothian Committee have stated that this "matter should be borne in mind" and "if hereafter Indian and European commercial interests can agree to combine for the purpose of representation in the legislatures, effect should be given to this arrangement." I may further emphasise that instead

of dividing the commercial interests into several groups, each province should have one combined special electorate for them.

Thirdly, I find that the White Paper has increased the number of seats for commerce and industry from 8, as recommended by the Lothian Committee, to 11, although the size of the Federal Assembly has been reduced from 300 to 250 on the British India side. The Lothian Committee had recommended that the representation of commerce and industry should all be concentrated in the Assembly and that the number of seats in the future Assembly should be the same as that in the central legislature at present. The White Paper has made a departure from this recommendation in two respects. The first is that the seats have been increased in spite of the reduction in the size of the Assembly by Bombay and Bengal being given one additional seat each and by the non-provincial seats being increased to two and the second is that the Europeans have been given representation in the Council of State under the guise of communal representation.

Fourthly, the White Paper has perpetuated the inequality of representation between European and Indian commerce and industry, which must be prevented. According to its proposals European commerce and industry will get 5 seats and Indian commerce and industry 4 seats. Apart from the manifest injustice that this distribution does to the Indian commercial community, it is bound to widen the gulf between Indians and Europeans and increase discontent among the former.

It is a matter of great satisfaction that women have been given nine seats in the Assembly and that their election is to be made by the members of the provincial legislatures voting by means of the single transferable vote. It is indeed a great consolation that the authors of the White Paper have not introduced the communal element in the Assembly elections for women as they propose to do in the case of provincial legislatures.

Lastly, I come to labour representation. The present constitution has done great injustice to labour in giving it only one seat in the Assembly. The injustice was so obvious that the Lothian Committee had forthwith to increase the number to 8 "a number which will give it," in the words of the Committee, "a representation equal in strength to that proposed in the case of commerce." The Committee thus recognised at least the equality of representation between commerce and industry on the one hand and labour on the other. The fairer equality would have been between the representation given to capital as such (and not merely to a part of it) and labour. But even this restricted equality recognised by the Lothian Committee has been taken away by the White Paper by giving labour only ten seats as against 11 to commerce and industry. I cannot too strongly condemn this step-motherly attitude that His Majesty's Government at the head of which is no less a person than Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, himself a great socialist, has shown towards labour. Organised labour in India has never been satisfied with

eight seats; it has always demanded that it is entitled to at least 10 p.c. seats in the Assembly, as also in the provincial legislatures. With the restricted franchise that has been recommended for the Assembly, it cannot be said that its demand is in any way extravagant. This demand, it will be further seen, is not far removed from the actual representation given to capital as a whole. Taking only British India, labour has demanded 30 seats out of 300, or 25 seats out of 250 as fixed by the White Paper; and capital (meaning thereby commerce and industry, landholders and Europeans whose representation as a community is, I repeat, nothing short of commercial representation) has been given 26 seats. Instead of going a step further in the direction of removing the restricted character of the equality recognised by the Lothian Committee and equalising the quantum of representation to capital as distinguished from mere commerce and industry and labour, the White Paper has gone back on the recommendation of the Committee and created inequality by increasing the seats for the former. This reactionary change, along with many other proposals of His Majesty's Government, betrays a frame of mind indicative of their intention to create in India an oligarchy and not a democracy. Labour cannot be satisfied with anything less than its due and legitimate share of representation in the federal legislature.

The second objectionable feature of labour representation is its distribution on a provincial basis. The distribution should have been made on industrial basis. The Lothian Committee has mentioned some of the important industries which deserve special consideration implying thereby that the distribution should be made according to industries. The idea underlying this proposal is that the legislature will be able to secure best men belonging, as trade union officials or members, to important trades and industries and possessing adequate knowledge of the conditions of work and service therein so as to enable them to speak with authority and knowledge when labour questions are discussed. There are certain industries and trades such as textiles, railways which are distributed over more than one province; and, therefore, if the seats are distributed on provincial basis, and not on industrial basis, the result will be that either there will be over-representation of some trades and industries to the exclusion of others or there will be no representation at all of some important industries and trades, and, what is more important, there is a risk of the best men not being returned at all. I am afraid labour will suffer enormously under the arrangement of provincial distribution of labour seats proposed by the White Paper. It is therefore necessary that efforts should be made to get the arrangement changed in favour of those seats being distributed on industrial basis.

It is satisfactory that labour seats will be filled from non-communal constituencies; but the electoral arrangements have, the White Paper says, still to be determined. Having regard to the fact that in dealing with the electoral arrangements for labour seats in the provincial legislatures, the White Paper adds that "it is likely that in most provinces the

labour constituencies will be partly trade union and partly special constituencies." I have begun to wonder whether His Majesty's Government are not going to accept the recommendation of the Indian Franchise Committee that Labour seats should be filled through trade union constituencies. If they fail to accept this recommendation, labour representation, whatever its strength may be, will be as good as useless. We shall then have as labour representatives either capitalists or pro-capitalists orummies who will not be able to do much in the interest of labour. The Whitley Commission, which contained some of the most eminent men from India and England representing capital, labour, Government of India and the general public, were emphatic in their view that labour should be elected to the legislatures through trade unions. It is sincerely to be hoped that His Majesty's Government will not commit the indiscretion of turning down a recommendation made by such an authoritative Commission and endorsed by the Lothian Committee.

R. R. BAKHALE.

Our London Letter.

(BY AIR MAIL.)

(From Our Correspondent.)

LONDON, March 24.

RESPONSE TO THE WHITE PAPER.

DURING the present period of profound European disturbance, with absorbing troubles so near home, one would scarcely have been surprised if the future of India had occupied less attention than it has done in the public mind. It is true the public is an ignorant one so far as the realities of the Indian situation are concerned, but the Press has made it aware that the most important event in British history, if not in the history of the world at the moment, is now taking place. The practical introduction of a form of Western democracy into Asia which must have far reaching repercussions on the whole world.

A week's discussion of the White Paper has made three things very plain; first, that the Constitution offered as it stands is unacceptable to India, although it may form a basis for negotiation. It will, however, have to be radically altered during the deliberations of the Joint Select Committee before it can hope to get even partial approval; secondly, that the diehards in this country are uncompromising in their opposition to the transfer of real power; and thirdly, that the Government have already allowed themselves to be intimidated by formidable pressure from within their own party, so far at any rate as to modify the procedure it was believed they intended to follow.

It became quite evident on reading the White Paper that the wording of it was primarily intended to propitiate the old diehard element in this country, and that such a document must create a feeling of profound dissatisfaction throughout India. Its rejection by Congressmen was taken for granted even before the scheme was published, because they have never made any secret of their conviction that nothing good was to be expected from a Round Table Conference dominated by the present Conservative Government. But the fervent hope was still cherish-

ed by many here that the proposals made would be sufficiently substantial to win the approval of those Nationalists and Liberals who have co-operated all along in the work of the Conference.

No one who has during the week studied the White Paper impartially wonders at the criticisms it has evoked even among Indian Moderates. As Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru has pointed out, it is not even based on agreements supposed to have been reached at the Conference itself. In paragraph after paragraph the emphasis is laid not on the means whereby Indian control of Indian affairs can be definitely established, but rather on the checks by which such control can be superseded. The elaboration with which the extraordinary network of reservations has been devised and set out must have had a galling effect upon those who thought that the repeated pledges of Prime Ministers and Viceroy were going to be carried out and India was to achieve Dominion Status, at the next step.

INSIDIOUS PROPAGANDA.

Since the Third Conference rose in December the storm of reaction has gathered daily momentum in this country, and it reached its greatest fury when the White Paper was published last week, despite the concessions to the reactionary point of view which were therein disclosed.

Nor is there as yet any sign that this tearing campaign will be worn down. As has been previously pointed out, the chief danger comes not so much from the comparatively small group of obscurantists who arrogate to themselves the title of "The India Defence Committee," but rather from the influential middle element among the Government's supporters whose fears or prejudices have been exploited by others. A lot of secret but insidious propaganda has been going on, the first fruits of which are to be seen in the White Paper itself.

BEGINNING ALL OVER AGAIN?

The proceedings in the House of Commons next week seem likely to follow a very triangular course. The Government will find themselves between two fires, for their policy will be attacked from both the front and the rear. Until Tuesday it was the intention of the Churchill group to persist in moving an amendment to the resolution setting up the Joint Committee. That was because it was supposed that the resolution would, in effect, involve an endorsement in principle of the constitution proposed at least to the extent of accepting federation and Indian responsibility at the Centre as its basis.

The terms of the motion actually put on the Paper are an indication of the way in which the Government have allowed themselves to be squeezed by their dissatisfied followers. It has been so drawn as to enable everyone of them to vote for it without a qualm. There is, in fact, nothing in the resolution requiring the Joint Committee to make the White Paper the basis of its deliberations. The reference to that document is not much more than a preamble, the main purpose of the Committee being, in the words of the resolution itself, "to consider the future Government of India." The instruction to examine and report, in particular, on the White Paper proposals comes at the end.

As was to be expected, the diehards are crowing over this as a climb-down by Government, and they will take good care to follow their initial victory. The debate will certainly range over the whole field opened up in the White Paper, and as there is no question now of a hostile vote being given from the Ministerial side, freedom of criticism from that quarter will probably be ample as it will be from the Opposition benches. The one thing certain is that

the House of Commons will not be committed to anything next week, although its new Committee will be charged with the drafting of the actual Bill that is to be submitted to Parliament.

MR. GEORGE LANSBURY.

In the midst of Mr. Lansbury's very positive work on behalf of Indian Nationalism, he has suffered the irreparable loss of his wife. The Lansburys have always been cited as an ideal married couple, in which, notwithstanding poverty, disappointment, and strenuous anxious days, they always kept the flame of the beauty of a love union alive. People in all parts of the world will extend to Mr. Lansbury their heartfelt sympathy, and even his strongest political opponents will give him in his sorrow a measure of affection. As a man and friend he has always been popular, and although Mrs. Lansbury took little part in active political life, everyone knew that much of the warmheartedness to be found in the man was due to the understanding and deep friendship of the wife.

Soon after Tuesday's meeting of the Parliamentary Labour Party Mr. Lansbury explained to a friend the reasons which had induced them to appoint representatives to serve on the Joint Select Committee. They do not regret their non-participation in the last Round Table Conference, and they regard its outcome as a sufficient justification of their action, but as the Joint Committee is much more definitively a part of the Parliamentary machinery they feel it incumbent upon them to take their due share in its deliberations.

This decision, however, must not be taken as implying any wholesale endorsement of the White Paper proposals, or of what may develop from their examination by the Committee. The representatives of the Labour Opposition will go on to that body unfettered in every way, and they will refuse to accept any responsibility for what comes out of it. They have sufficiently indicated in the amendment to be moved next Monday their judgment on the proposals as they stand, namely, "Add at the end of the Government resolution :-

"But this House regrets that the present proposals of His Majesty's Government on Indian constitutional reform entirely fail to implement the pledges given to raise India to the status of an equal partner in the British Commonwealth of Nations, is of opinion that the labours of the Joint Select Committee should be directed to the production of a scheme which will command the assent of the people of India, and to this end urges that responsible representatives of all sections of Indian opinion be invited to attend the Committee, and that all persons now under arrest in India for political offences involving no moral turpitude be released."

WHERE IS DOMINION STATUS?

Mr. Lansbury further protested that there was not the slightest reference to Dominion Status in the White Paper, although that goal has been repeatedly held out to India in the past. "What we have got to do," said the Leader of the Opposition, "is to set India definitely on the road to real self-government. All sections of Indian opinion ought to be brought into conference. In our judgment there can be no settlement except by agreement with India.

You may be able to impose this scheme on India, or something like it, but it will be unworkable because the real leaders of the Indian people will not work it. Our men will make it abundantly clear in the debate that in agreeing to send representatives we accept no sort of responsibility for what the Government is proposing."

Mr. Lansbury was particularly indignant because in the White Paper no time limit was indicated for the many reservations which make up the greater part of the document; nor was any date named on which the Federation would come into existence.

It may be added that Labour's decision to participate in the Joint Committee was by no means unanimous. Some members feel that it would have been more consistent with their previous action if they stood aloof on this occasion also. Others, I think, will hold the view that the position might have been considerably improved (so far as the White Paper is concerned) if the Labour Party had put its weight into the last Round Table Conference.

WHAT WILL INDIA DO?

Those friends of India in this country, who have been anxiously awaiting the White Paper are now wondering what will India do next. All the reports that have so far come through are full of condemnation and mainly destructive criticism. Many people will agree with those who hold that it is a waste of time even to discuss a scheme to which the largest party in India is irreconcilably opposed; but some others cannot help feeling that it would be better tactics on the whole to make the voice of India heard in the only way in which that can be done in present circumstances, namely by having competent spokesmen here to tell the Parliamentary Committee exactly what the facts are.

A very significant and valuable article appears in this week's issue of the "New Statesman, and Nation". Whilst condemning the obvious defects of the White Paper, the article closes with this interesting suggestion: "Safeguards and emergency powers are defects of the transitional period, only, even if Sir Samuel Hoare has not the courage to say so in public. If in every Provincial capital and in Delhi, Indians will only enter their Legislatures, will use their powers boldly and with a full recognition of certain special difficulties which democracy must face in India, they will find that the English, fully occupied with their own political and economical difficulties, will increasingly leave them to their own devices. The few hundred British officials, brought up under the old regime, will be either assimilated or retire. After a few years the Governors and the Viceroy will be as powerless to act unconstitutionally as any Governor in the Dominions, for the simple reason that they will have no cadre of officials through which to carry on an alternative administration."

The views of this paper representing a large section of intellectual Socialism, and sympathetic to Indian aspirations, are worthy of serious consideration. Indeed one of the complaints of the diehard element in this country is that in practice the safeguards so forcibly emphasised in the White Paper could not in practice be brought into action for this very reason.