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CONTENTS.

Topics of the Week.

The Karachi Congress.

AFTER a decade of non-cooperation the Karachi Congress will seriously consider the alternative of cooperation. Though the success of the Baldwin candidate at St. George's election eases the Indian situation to some extent, Mahatma Gandhi will still have a very difficult situation to handle in Karachi. The setting and the atmosphere of the Congress is not as happy as it might have been. There are many ardent spirits, particularly those who in the Congress cause went to jail and were put in C class, who are profoundly dissatisfied with the terms of the Iriwn-Gandhi Agreement. They have not hesitated to accuse him of having surrendered all along the line for a pinch of salt. In the Congress Cabinet itself there are several who have made no secret of their disappointment at the terms of Agreement though they have promised support to the Mahatma. The execution of Messrs. Bhagat Singh, Rajguru and Sukdev on the eve of the Congress is bound to stir up the younger Congressmen to serious revolt against the Mahatma. There is every danger that the background and the setting will draw on itself more attention than the more permanent and vital matters of a constitutional nature. Angry passions over administrative and sentimental grievances may prevail over calm consideration of constitutional problems. It is earnestly to be hoped, however, that Mr. Gandhi's wise appeal that notwithstanding the gravest provocation, the Congress should endorse the settlement and test its capacity to yield the result hoped for will prevail with the delegates assembled in Karachi.

The constitutional problems are themselves by no means easy to solve. The school which stands for independence is likely to make itself felt. The Mahatma has himself played with that word, though he has given several interpretations to it, some of which do not take him further than Dominion Status. But they will not satisfy those that stand uncompromisingly for Independence and severance from the British Empire. The Princes, on the other hand, have made it clear that they would oppose with all their might and main any proposal to take India out of the Empire. Those who pursue the goal of independence will have to face the opposition not only of the British but also of the Indian Princes as well as of a large section of British Indians. The prospect of securing general consent to the Independence proposition is entirely out of the question. It can be achieved only by the Independence group succeeding in coercing the dissenters, who are not a small minority. Dominion Status is the only programme which will receive general consent of all important sections of Indians and Britishers.

Granting that the Congress will vote for Dominion Status, it will next have to consider whether and under what conditions it will accept the federation of British India and the Indian States. The British Parties both in England and India have consented to responsibility at the Centre provided federation is accepted, and the Princes have made their own conditions to enter it. Theoretically it is open to the Congress to let alone the States, drop federation and simply hold the British Government to its promises of responsible government for British India. Considering the conditions imposed by the Princes, there is every temptation to leave them alone, at any rate for the present. Will such a course make it easier to get the consent of the British Parties to Central responsibility? Very likely not. Moreover, until the federation comes about, there is no prospect of the Indian Princes agreeing, even after a transitional period, to the transfer of the Army to the Dominion Government of India. As Sir Mirza Ismail said last week in Bangalore and the Indian States' subjects have been saying all along, the Indian States outside the federation will be so many Ulsters, so many thorns by the side of an incomplete Dominion. It was obviously a realisation of this that made the Working Committee and the Mahatma to accept federation. The Congress will be courting trouble by turning down federation.

Granting Dominion Status and federation, the next and perhaps the most difficult question is the sharing of power in the federation by the various interests concerned—the allocation of power between the States and British India, between Hindus, Muslims and the other communal and other minorities. We hope the discussions that have been taking place in Delhi will result in solutions which, while protecting legitimate interests of all the interests concerned, will not militate against the growth of a healthy democratic system of government in India.

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Arbitration.

THE recent announcement of the Finance

Member of the Government of India that the British Government have agreed to independent arbitration with respect to capitation charges concedes an important principle for which the Indian National Congress has during recent months been fighting. If a wholly subordinate Government was conceded the right to seek independent arbitration, it is inconceivable that a Dominion Government of India will be denied that right. It is superfluous to ask for it; it is impolitic to demand on pain of non-cooperation and civil disobedience a right which is implied and which, when friendship and goodwill subsist between the parties, will never be denied. Some Congress leaders have been demanding in an unnecessarily challenging and provocative tone the right to refer the public debt of India to independent examination. They have recently been taking special care to emphasise that they do not propose to repudiate even a single pie of legitimate debt. On a recent occasion Sir George Schuster, the Finance Member, declared that out of Rs. 1,200 crores of India's Pbublic Debt, only Rs. 200 crorers was unproductive. Prof. D. L. Dubey, in his recent book, *The Indian Public Debt*, goes further and declares that the unproductive debt was in part covered by "tangible assets" which "bring down the uncovered or unproductive debt to the small figure of 81 crores, or 7 per cent. of the total debt." He asserts that "No important country in the world can boast of a stronger financial position as regards its public debt and the corresponding assets." It is also important to remember that as the Public Debt stood in 1930, 57 per cent of it was contributed by the Indian money market. It will not be to the advantage of India to repudiate the productive debt which forms five-sixths of the public debt. Nor is there any need to refer it to independent examination. The only debt that need be examined is Rs. 200 crores, and this includes India's war gift of Rs. 150 crores, given in pursuance of a resolution moved by no less a nationalist and patriot than Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya. Is it worthwhile then to take up just now the question of the examination of public debt, and provokingly assert a right which subsists and create suspicions and distrusts? On the whole, it would be wise policy to take the Government of India as a "going concern" and after the new administration is firmly in the saddle and cordial relations prevail between England and India, to raise, if necessary, the question of examining the public debt of India in a friendly and accommodating spirit.

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Anglo-Indians and Separate Electorates.

IN his recent speech at Bombay Col. Gidney has again emphasised the need of communal electorates for Anglo-Indians; and made it clear that his community was solidly behind the Moslems in their fight for separate electorates. At the same time he betrayed some nervousness lest the Mahomedans, in the changed circumstances of the country, should give in on the point and decide to accept joint electorates. He has guarded against that contingency by expressing the hope that for some years at least the Congress will not insist upon joint electorates in the case of communities who wished to stick to separate electorates. This is to be done, as he stated, "in the interests of a united India." The general experience is that communal electorates tend to perpetuate communal divisions by placing the communities concerned in separate watertight compartments. Col. Gidney apparently thinks otherwise. But apart from this, has he such a poor opinion of his community as to think that without special protection it will not be able to take care of itself? If so, he seems to do it less than justice. The Parsis, we suppose, are numerically an equally small community, but have been able to hold their own without special protection of any kind. Indeed, their influence, their public services and their social status secure for them more seats in the legislature and local bodies than they would be entitled to, if their numbers were alone to be taken into consideration. If they had pinned their faith to separate electorates, as Col. Gidney, very unwisely it seems to us, does, the number of Parsi members of the legislatures would not have been as large as it is today. It is true the Anglo-Indians do not command the same influence; but if instead of remaining stiff-necked and aloof as they have been doing so far, they identify themselves completely with national interests, we are confident it will conduce considerably to their advantage. Col. Gidney justifies his demand for the special treatment of his community in regard to the services on the ground of increasing unemployment among Anglo-Indians, the number of the unemployed having in a decade risen from 1,000 in 1921 to 14,000 in 1930, which represents one-third of the employable male population. We do not regard his argument conclusive. Owing to the general economic and trade depression, unemployment is consistently on the increase. How can Col. Gidney expect the Anglo-Indians alone to escape from the effects of a phenomenon which is world-wide? The fact is that nothing, not even communal electorates, will give as effective a protection to a community as its willingness to think nationally will do. It is that way and that way alone that the Anglo-Indians can earn the trust, love and confidence of the general community, which Col. Gidney wants them to do. In this case the last advice he should have given them was to stand out for separate electorates.

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Burma's separation—a settled fact?

IS Burma to be separated from India or not? To this question the Burmese alone are competent to return a decisive answer. If others, however well-intentioned, were to presume to speak on behalf of the people of Burma, it would clearly go against the principle of self-determination which ought to be the real deciding factor in all such matters. We are glad that in the recent debate in the Legislative Assembly on the question of Burma's separation from India raised over an adjournment motion which was carried *nem. con.* this point of view was strongly stressed; and a suggestion was put forward for the ascertainment of indigenous Burmese opinion by means of a referendum. The local Government is generally regarded in Burma as having irrevocably committed itself to separation so much so that it was even alleged that it left no stone unturned to suppress all expression of opinion opposed to separation. Indeed, the Burmese speakers in the above debate went the length of asserting that freedom of speech, so far as the anti-separationists were concerned, was so far at a discount in Burma that the Assembly was the only forum where they could express themselves freely. Consequently their distrust of Sir Charles Innes' Government is so thorough-going that they would not like his Government to have anything to do with the contemplated referendum, but would leave the Government of India to carry it out with the assistance of a non-official committee representative of all sections of Burmese opinion. The separationists will of course call to their aid the expression of opinion of the Legislative Council which has consistently voted for separation. But the value of its opinion is obviously much discounted by its unrepresentative character due to elections to it having been boycotted by a large volume of Burmese opinion. To seek to rely upon its opinion in these circumstances and to push on separation vigourously, as the Burma Government has been doing, is to rely upon a weak reed and to ensure the failure of the future working of the Burmese constitution. In this connection

it is necessary to remember that even the separationists themselves do not appear to be wholly satisfied with the decisions of the Round Table Conference about Burma. In standing up for separation, they did not desire mere severance from India unaccompanied by any advance in Burma's constitutional status. While the Conference accepted the principle of separation it remained silent about Burma's constitutional future. The question whether the British Government stands committed to separation seems to be shrouded in some mystery, for the Delegates who sit in the Assembly did not speak with one voice on the subject. Dewan Bahadur Ramaswami Mudaliar participating in the above debate spoke of the question as not having been finally settled at the Conference—a view also shared by Sir Cowasji Jehangir (Jr.) If so, it is difficult to reconcile his hope to which he gave expression in the concluding part of his speech that in view of the strong views expressed in the House, the Government would "reopen" the issue. If the issue is not finally settled, where is the question of reopening it? On the other hand, there was Mr. A. K. Ghuznavi, also a Delegate to the Conference, who seemed to regard separation as a settled fact. That shows the need of some authoritative explanation forthcoming as to how exactly matters stand on the point.

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Prospects of the Textile Industry.

SPEAKING at the Bombay Mill-owners' Association last week, the president, Mr. H. P. Mody, referred at length to the present condition of the textile industry. What with the protection afforded by Government and the wave of swadeshim prevailing in the country, the industry has every reason to look forward to the future with hope. The lower duty on British piecegoods imported into India would, it was anticipated, work to the advantage of Lancashire, in that it would enable it to dump more cotton goods on the Indian market than many other countries. That anticipation, as Mr. Mody stated, had not come true. Indeed, he says, that the drop in imports has been relatively higher in the case of Lancashire than in that of other countries. Japan has captured last year a larger proportion of the Indian market than it did the previous year—a point which has apparently caused much heart-burning in England, so much so that pointed attention was recently drawn to the matter in Parliament by means of a question. The explanation for this state of things is however not far to seek. Boycott of British goods continued to be in force in India as a political weapon for the greater part of last year with the result that it hit Lancashire hard, as it was intended it should. But thanks to the Gandhi-Irwin agreement the use of the boycott as a political weapon is now a thing of the past with the result that the situation may in the near future show some improvement from the Lancashire standpoint. According to Mr. Mody, the one unmistakable effect of the swadeshi movement, which in its wider aspect aims at making India self-sufficient in the matter of her cloth requirements, has been the reduction in imports by nearly 50 per cent.—from 1379 million yards in the nine months ending 31st December 1929 to 713 for the corresponding period of last year. The mill-owners must guard themselves against the temptation to get rich quick by means of profiteering, as they did in 1,905-06. If only they now prudently decide to limit their profits and sell their manufactures reasonably cheaply, the ball may indeed be said to be at their feet. Mr. Mody also assured his hearers that the stock position had returned to the normal.

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Articles.

THE MIRZA CONFERENCE

WHILE the Princes in their public debates in the Chamber of Princes contented themselves with giving a general airy and over-cautious adherence to the conclusions of the R. T. Conference, other conferences which met almost simultaneously in different parts of India of the subjects of the States got down to brass tacks and made clear-cut proposals to improve the recommendations of the R. T. Conference. Conferences were held in Cutch presided over by Mr. L. R. Tairsee, in Poona presided over by Mr. S. G. Vaze and in Bangalore presided over by Mr. B. Narasinga Rao. But special significance attaches to the Conference convened by Sir Mirza Ismail, the enlightened Dewan of Mysore, last week in Bangalore. Before he left India to attend the Round Table Conference Sir Mirza had called a conference of officials and non-officials, of Mysoreans and non-Mysoreans, and taken counsel. Now on his return he repeated his earlier performance, this time to review conclusions of the R. T. Conference and sound public opinion thereon. In passing, we may remark that Mysore is the only State which adopted this enlightened method of open and free consultation with the people, representing every shade of opinion.

The summary of "our" conclusions, as the Dewan put it, is of special significance because he associated himself with them, though only in a "provisional" way. And they are in some respects hope-inspiring. The very first conclusion was that

> There should be a declaration of fundamental rights of citizenship such as security of person and property, liberty of conscience and equality of opportunities for all.

The second refers to standards of internal administration in the States and runs as follows:

> We are also agreed that the States entering the Federation should conform to a certain standard of administration, of which the essentials would be a fixed privy purse, security of tenure in the public service, an independent judiciary and the existence of some consultative body representing public opinion which has the function of advising the ruler in the administration of his State.

Admirable as is this proposition, it brings no comfort to the subjects of the States which decline to join the federation. Even more important than joining the federation is the question of improving the standards of administration in the States. One of the methods of securing this desirable consummation is the linking up of the judiciary of the States with the judiciary in British India and investing the Supreme Federal Court with appellate authority over the judiciary of the States. Dewan Bahadur Ramachandra Rao, who represented the subjects of the States at the R. T. Conference and who attended the Mirza Conference, laid special stress on this desideratum. But, according to Sir Mirza's summary of conclusions, Mr. Ramachandra Rao's proposal was rejected. The Dewan said: "We cannot possibly

agree to such a proposal which is neither necessary nor justifiable," and advanced two reasons in support of his view. "The more important States, like Mysore, have a complete judicial system of their own," and "to accept the authority of the Supreme Court in matters affecting their internal affairs would be to surrender a very important sovereign right." Sir Mirza has not told us what should be done with the many States which have no judicial systems comparable to the one in Mysore or which cannot afford to have one like it. And he knows they are many. His plea of sovereignty of the States is not impressive either. Today it does not exist. Even if it did a federation does involve some sacrifice of sovereignty.

Responsible government in the States was considered from two points of view; its desirability in itself and its desirability to bring about federation. On both these counts the Dewan refrained, and with good reason, from recording a "conclusion" for there could not be general agreement. He contended that, while he had "no hesitation in agreeing that a democratizing process is desirable in the States also", "responsiveness" in the States was "so complete that the need for responsibility cannot be considered urgent." It may be so in Mysore and in another State or two but in the great majority of them it is not conspicuous. He further contended that a federation of autocratic States with democratic British Indian Provinces was not incompatible and quoted in support the classical example of the Bismarckian federation of the German Empire of 1867. Much water has flown under the bridges since then and to-day it is more a sign of weakness of the argument rather than of strength to invoke that antie-diluvian example.

With reference to the representation of the State in the two houses of the federal legislature the Dewan summed up the demand as follows: "We feel that the States should have 40 per cent. of the seats in the Senate, and 33 1/3 per cent. in the Assembly." Dewan Bahadur Ramachandra Rao and Mr. D. V. Gundappa both demanded weightage for the States in the Upper Chamber, the latter supporting it frankly on the ground that the States were conservative and conservative weightage was prudent in the Upper House! We fear this craze for weightage has gone too far. If everybody wants weightage, at whose expense is it to be provided?

As regards the method of selecting the States' representatives it was agreed as follows:

> As in other federal constitutions, the members of the Senate would represent the States and the most appropriate method of selecting them would be nomination by Government.
>
> In the Lower House, a proportion of the seats may be filled by election from the representative institutions, and the rest by nomination by Government in the early stages.
>
> This refers only to the methods to be adopted in the immediate future for it is more than likely that, sooner or later, the representatives to this House would be elected directly by the people or through a constitutional body or bodies according to circumstances.

This is certainly a striking improvement on pure nomination by the Princes to both Chambers for an indefinite period. We cannot, however, congratulate the Conference on this conclusion. Election to the Upper Chamber is not uncommon in other federations, and is certainly more appropriate than nomination by the Governments of the States, particularly when they are personal autocracies. In the second place, it is said that a proportion of seats in the Lower Chamber *may* be filled by election and not *shall*. Thirdly, the proportion to be elected is not put down. And fourthly, the case of States which have no representative institutions has not been considered. No reason has been given why the representatives to the Lower Chamber should not *all* be elected by the peoples of the States directly on the same franchise as will prevail in British India. The method of representation of the States in the federal Chambers is the crux of the question, and on that the Mirza Conference has recorded a disappointing resolution. With unusual warmth, Sir Mirza demanded to know "why should it be supposed that their (Indian Princes') representatives, even if it be, in the beginning, they are nominated representatives, will be reactionaries?" Surely, Sir Mirza knows the reason well enough.

Though no special conclusion was recorded on the subject, it was surprising that a person of the standing of Mr. Gundappa should have supported the Sankey recommendation that administration of matters which are subject to federal legislation should be vested in the States themselves. This is federalism with a vengeance. Those who castigated the Princes who had asked for it and the British Indians who had reluctantly agreed to it, may have to revise their opinion that the subjects of the States were anxious for a unitary type of government in India and that federation was foisted on them. It was British Indian delegates to the R. T. Conference that pressed for the unitary form of government, or, at the least, for federalising the maximum of subjects for legislation and administration, though they had to resile from their positions subsequently.

There are those who have in strong language accused the British Indian delegates of having at the R. T. Conference "betrayed" the interests of the subjects of the States, though they admit that British Indians could not have done so without betraying their own cause. No cause has, however, been shown that British Indians had such ill-feeling towards the subjects of the States that they preferred to cut their noses in order to spite the subjects of the States. Neither has cause been shown that British Indians were so enamoured of the rule of the Princes in their States that they wished to transfer British India from the control of the British to that of the Indian Princes. If British Indians failed to secure an unequivocal declaration and decision that the States should be represented in the federal legislature by election by the subjects of the States and not by nomination by the Princes, it was in their opinion inevitable in the circumstances and it was more prudent to see that no final decision was taken then. There may be legitimate differences of opinion in the appraisement of the circumstances. But to accuse British Indians of having "betrayed"

anybody is as just and fair as to accuse Mahatma Gandhi that, because he was not able to save Bhagat Singh from the gallows, he "betrayed" India.

TANNERY LABOUR IN BOMBAY—III.*

HOLIDAYS:—Let us now examine the position as regards holidays. None of the employees, whether working on the piece work system or receiving fixed wages, gets any holidays with pay. They do not stop work even on Sundays and out of 365 days in the year they work for more than 360 days! The contention of the owners in not closing their tanneries for more than three or four days in the whole year is that if the work is not continuous the hides get spoiled due to the fact that the process of tanning hides is old-fashioned. The workers take only four holidays during the year—the Tamil New Year's Day, two days during the Ganpati festival and one during the Dasara. But even with regard to each of these four holidays the workers are under the obligation to work extra hours on the previous day, even till midnight if necessary, in order to complete the next day's work. That the *Tottiwalas* are not fortunate enough to enjoy even a day's holiday during the year is literally true. For even on these days of great festivals work is exacted from them at least for more than a couple of hours early in the morning.

Wages:—As observed above, all the workers in a tannery except the *Tottiwalas* are piece workers. The monthly pay of the *Tottiwalas* varies in different factories. In a few factories they are paid at the rate of Rs. 20 for 30 days and in no factory is the rate of monthly pay less than Rs. 16. Considering the very hard nature of their task, it is beyond doubt that their earnings are utterly out of proportion to their labour. The same is true of the earnings of other workers also. It is very difficult to arrive at any reliable average of their earnings as they vary from day to day, month to month, season to season and year to year. The work that is available to the workers in their tanneries is subject to violent fluctuations owing to various factors. It is affected by the vicissitudes of the seasons. The weekly auction sales of raw hides at the slaughter house at Bandra also influence it. As the tanneries are owned by individual proprietors the violent fluctuations in the amount of work are also partly due to the financial position of the tannery owners themselves. The employers are under no obligation to provide a full day's work to their employees with the result that the earnings of the employees of a particular factory for a particular month sometimes amount only to Rs. 10, whereas the same employee, provided he gets enough work, may be able to earn even Rs 35. Thus there is no certainty as regards the earnings a worker may make. Even so, let us try to have some idea as to their average income. Barring one or two processes, the rates of payment for the different processes is uniform in all factories. Before the workers were organised into a Union which succeeded in securing a 40 per cent. increment in the wages of the workers in February 1930, the average earnings of the workers per month varied from Rs. 23 to Rs. 30. But what is most amazing is that the average earnings of the workers per month have not risen appreciably in spite of this 40 per cent. increment. During the infancy of the industry, the rate of payment was six annas per 20 sheep skins per process. This yielded them only Rs. 12 or Rs. 15 per month. Their wages were increased by 94 per cent. in 1920 during the boom period of the industry when the owners made enormous profits. The rate of annas six per unit of 20 sheepskins or 10 cowhides was raised to annas eleven, as the result of which the workers could earn Rs. 30 or Rs. 35 if they worked for 12 or 14 hours per day throughout the month without a single holiday. Even now the overwhelming majority of workers are able to earn hardly more than Rs. 35 a month.

Those who work as piece workers, besides being required to do their legitimate work for which they receive payment, are also made by the owners to do some other work for which no payment is made. They are asked to do the work of coolies in the tannery. They are required to remove slaked lime out of the tannery, bring bark into the factory, remove it after it is used, prepare lime-water for soaking hides, weigh the bark and tanned hides and do other miscellaneous work in the tannery.

All classes of workers in the tannery including the *Tottiwalas* are treated as daily paid workers. They can be thrown out of employment any day during the month without any notice. I met a number of workers who had put in service ranging from 10 to 15 years in one factory as daily paid labourers without any prospect of being made permanent. In fact, instances in which workers with ten or more years' service to their credit were dismissed without notice and without adequate reason are not rare, so that even the seniormost worker cannot be sure of his next day's job! The lot of a worker who has no savings to fall back upon in case of unemployment and who can be thrown out of work at a moment's notice can be easily imagined. Not even five per cent. of the workers succeed in saving anything. So far as my enquiries went, everybody narrated to me pathetically how in migrating to such a distant place as Bombay his only object was to cease to be a burden to his family rather than send them anything for their maintenance. Indeed, their earnings are so low that any saving is impossible in their case.

Nor is the system of disbursement of wages at all satisfactory. It is most irregular and causes much distress and inconvenience to the workers. No date for the payment of wages is fixed in any tannery. In not more than three factories at Dharavi are the wages paid with any degree of regularity between the 10th and 15th, of the following month. In the case of other tanneries the workers generally receive their wages after the 20th of the following month. In a few factories it often happens that the wages due to the workers remain unpaid even after the second month is

* Previous articles in this series appeared in our issues of March 12 and 19.

over. And it does not seldom happen that some of the workers in the factories have to continue to work without receiving their wages for three or four months. No doubt they are paid about Rs. 5 per month for sundry expenses, against the wages due to them. And when the wages are in arrears for months together, there is sometimes the risk of their losing them altogether. This is a hardship beyond words to which they have to submit.

Indebtedness :—My enquiries into the extent of indebtedness prevalent among these people show that quite a large number of them are suffering from chronic indebtedness, only about 10 per cent. being free from the money-lender's clutches. They have also to pay an abnormally high rate of interest, ranging from 120 to 300 per cent! They borrow money neither from the Pathans nor from the Marwaris but from a well-to-do class of people who are called Nadars, who speak the Tamil dialect and come from the Tinnevelly district. How profitable is this money-lending business will be clear from the case of a Nadar who started the business with only Rs. 300 as his capital and was earning an income of Rs. 200 per month by way of interest! The most wicked part of the transaction is that the money-lenders take blank promissory notes, duly signed and attested by witnesses, with a view to use it as a lever to enforce punctual and prompt repayment. This leaves the borrower under the ever-present fear that the money-lender might enter into the blank promissory note double or treble the amount actually borrowed and sue him and he hurries with the amount on the date fixed for repayment of the loan, only to get it issued afresh. But it would be wrong to suppose that with prompt repayment in full of the loan end the troubles of the unfortunate debtor. Once in the clutches of the money-lender the borrower is hardly able to extricate himself from his grasp at any time. Irregular disbursement of wages, low earnings and general poverty go far to account for the workers' bondage to the money-lender.

Unemployment :—Since the year 1928 the industry has been passing through a period of depression and in March 1928 only 17 out of 23 tanneries were working. Three more tanneries were closed early in 1930. But most of the workers who were thrown out of employment got themselves employed in those tanneries which were working as they could not return to their native villages for fear of facing starvation. A very small number of workers had failed to secure employment in any tannery. The labourers being piece-workers suffer financially a great deal when more than the necessary number of workers are available for work. But what is most admirable with these people is their willingness to make sacrifices for their unemployed brethren by coming foward to share with them whatever amount of work may be available in the tannery. I have noticed instances in which the workers had of their own accord accommodated the workers thrown out of employment and were content with such meagre monthly earnings as Rs. 13 which was hardly sufficient to keep body and soul together in a place like Bombay. Even so the Maistry or the owner of the tannery is reluctant to employ the whole lot though this does not involve the factory in any loss or additional expense.

Complaints :— I now propose to give the reader some idea of the grievances from which the tannery worker suffers. The reasons for this are varied. For one thing, the tannery workers hardly ever come in direct contact with his employer, whom they view with awe and fear. They never venture to approach him with their complaints and to speak to him their mind even when they suffered acutely. If they wanted to go to the owner, they could do so only through their Maistry and in every tannery a Maistry is a mighty personage having unlimited power over the workers. Let us see how he comes to have this privileged position. Each tannery has a chief Maistry who is assisted in his work by two or three assistant Maistries. The Maistries under whose supervision, direction and control the workers have to work are chosen from among the workers themselves by the employers, and are given unrestricted sway over the employees. It is they who engage the workers. Thay can employ anybody they like and refuse to employ any one who dared to incur their displeasure. In the matter of recruitment of workers, therefore, there is no higher authority than the Maistries. They have, therefore, to be gratified with bribes before any one could hope to succeed in securing a job. They also have the power to dismiss any worker at any moment they please and the dismissed employee dare not appeal to the owners against their decision. Nor are they called upon to justify their conduct before any tribunal. As the workers are entirely at the mercy of the Maistries they often fall victims to the tyranny and harassment of the latter. The Maistries, moreover, have also arrived at an understanding among themselves not to employ any dismissed worker in any tannery at Dharavi. Things in this respect have changed somewhat since the workers were organised into a Union. But security of service in the pre-Union days depended solely upon the sweet will and pleasure of the Maistry. Not only, therefore, were they forced to bribe the Maistry to get themselves employed but they had to continue to pay at intervals illegal gratifications to keep him in good humour. On the eve of the Tamil New Year's Day the workers of the tanneries were bound to collect about Rs. 150 for making valuable presents to the Maistries. On Dasara day also the Maistries expect similar presents from the workers. Besides these presents at regular intervals, whenever the Maistry or his relatives left for or returned from their native places, the workers were expected to honour them with suitable presents, which of course involved them in heavy expenditure. I was informed that there was at least one such function on an average in the case of each Maistry. The workers were bound in duty to make similar presents whenever some religious ceremony connected with the children of the Maistries took place. Before the workers were organised into a Union the Maistries used to arrange the Ganpati festival for which purpose they collected Rs. 3 from each workman. Out

of the whole amount collected, it is said they used to spend a portion for the festival and divide the balance among themselves. Such were the exactions to which the workers were subjected before the Union came into existence.

The Maistries were in charge of accounts of the daily work done by the workers, to which the workers were not entitled to have access. In the absence of any system by means of which they could be in possession of the record of the work done by them every day, the Maistries had unrestricted scope to make false entries of the work done by them. The general complaint of almost all the workers was that the account of work kept by the Mastries was not reliable. But they were helpless to prove the falsity of the accounts as they had no record with them of the work done by them. Since the workers were not paid their dues immediately after the month was over they could hardly be expected to remember the details of their daily work and challenge the accuracy of the Maistries' accounts. They had therefore no other alternative but to accept without question the account of work kept by the Maistries, false or otherwise. Whenever the owner wanted to pay the workers their dues his clerk prepared the wage sheet and an amount sufficient to cover all payments to the workers was handed over to the Maistry for distribution. The Maistry distributed the wages according to his own calculations. Often the workers received much less than their rough calculations showed to be due to them. But they never complained to the owner of whom they were terribly afraid nor dared to demand inspection of the Maistry's register. It was here that the Union proved itself a God-send to the workers. No sooner it came into existence than it tackled this question of payment of wages through the Maistries and secured full redress to the workers. It also established the workers' right to look into the register daily. The owners used to pay four annas per worker for soaking the skins in lime pits. Before the existence of the Union most of the workers did not seem to be aware of this fact and this amount was apparently appropriated by the Maistries for their own use, an impression being left on the workers that for soaking the skins in the lime pits they could not claim any payment! Another most unjust and inequitous practice which the Union succeeded in putting a stop to was the 'Dalal System'. The Dalals did the work of supervising the work in the tannery and helping the assistant Maistries in their work. They were monthly paid workers and in each tannery there used to be three or more Dalals. They were paid out of the earnings of the workers.

Such were the ways in which the poor helpless workers used to be exploited by the tannery owners and the Maistries in the pre-Union days. The Maistries ill-treated the workers and were in the habit of indulging in filthy abuses towards them. The workers were mortally afraid of joining the Union and they were always being victimised if they dared to form a Union against the wishes of the owner or the Maistry or even ventured to have anything to do with the officials of the Union when the Union was in its infancy.

The workers in the tanneries are not entitled to benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act as the tanneries do not come under the scope of the Factories Act. Nor are the tanneries included in other concerns the employees of which are entitled to compensation under the Act.

(Concluded)

S. V. PARULEKAR.

THE AGRARIAN SITUATION IN EUROPE.

ANY adequate account of the present condition of world farming in general and the agrarian situation of Europe in particular is at the same time an indication of the precarious economic balance on which the industrial civilisation of our time rests as well as a penetrating commentary on the nationalistic politics so closely connected with it. The extent of the distress prevalent in the great wheat belt covering the United States and Canada, one of the world's principal granaries, may be gathered from reports, now current, of farmers in parts of this region being compelled to subsist on black bread and soup of Russian thistle on account of the phenomenal fall in prices and the prohibitive cost of production resulting therefrom. There is a story, which is said to be typical, of a small United States' farmer sending in sixty bushels of wheat to the market and when, indignant at the sixty cents which is all that he got for it, he asked for the return of his grain, he was confronted with a bill for sixty cents for storage charges! At present quotations wheat is 30 per cent. and sugar 40 per cent. below 1914 prices, and a ton of wheat is cheaper than a ton of raw steel. At the Conference on the disposal of European grain, now sitting in Paris which is the first act of the newly formed committee to bring about Monsieur Briand's project of European federation, it has been recently unofficially stated that the condition of cereal farmers in eastern Europe is deplorable and the combined debts of small grain exporters in the Baltic States, Poland, Hungary, and the Balkans amount to nearly £. 300,000,000.

The agricultural crisis has formed the subject of innumerable speeches at the International Institute of Agriculture in Rome, the World Economic Conference in Geneva, the annual meetings of the International Commission of Agriculture and on countless other occasions. It has long been an important item in the programmes of political parties in various countries and the farmers are as much a thorn on Mr. Baldwin's side as on that of President Hoover. The crisis has now become a profound agricultural slump on account of the world economic depression which has inevitably tightened its grip most over the most inelastic of industries.

The responsibility for this state of things rests not least on the national policy of European countries. For reasons not difficult to discern they are determined to maintain their traditional peasantry and have promoted this policy in spite of the large scale cultivation of cereals in overseas countries which has reduced costs of production to much less than their own. The consequence is that every device

has had to be resorted to for enabling the peasant to keep to his holding, and tariffs, quota systems, either singly or in combination, State purchase boards, etc. are instances of such political action. There is a significant difference in the attitude of Governments when the ill effects of tariffs in general and tariffs upon agricultural products in particular are discussed at Geneva. If the specific tariffs upon wheat in force in some European countries are converted into *ad valorem* rates at today's world parity, results varying from 100 to 200 per cent. are obtained. On sugar, a product of particular interest to Central and Western European countries on account of their beet industry, the duties are similar. Even these tariffs are, however, frequently so little helpful in maintaining the agricultural policy already referred to that the late French Minister of Agriculture put forward a plea to stabilize the internal price of French grown wheat at 61 s. a quarter, which is as much as three times its world price.

This disparity in the costs of production is due to what may be conveniently and adequately described as rationalisation by borrowing a term now much in use in regard to other industries. Both plant breeders and agricultural engineers have brought about inventions which have revolutionised agricultural production and which are increasingly bound to have that effect. All over the world, in sugar plantations and rubber estates, in the growth of new flax or hemp and in the cultivation of groundnut and oil palm, and in raising pastures for cattle technical improvements are evident. Production is destined to go up, when to the effects of these are added the effects of mechanical inventions, no less numerous, with far-reaching influence on world economy.

World prosperity is not enhanced by this increased production because the adjustment of production to demand, always a delicate process in agriculture, is rendered further difficult by the national policy already referred to. At the present time, especially with Russia always in the political background, the tendency is obviously to regard the peasant as a safe conservative element. Agrarian reform, in the years following the war, has followed in the wake of the results of the French Revolution and has meant the subdivision of land to increase the number of peasant proprietors. The only way by which the peasant can obtain economic prices for wheat and sugar, the two marketable crops indispensable to him, under the traditional methods of cultivation is with the assistance of the elaborate machinery for protection afforded by the State. Most European countries are faced with the dilemma that large scale cultivation, with its inveditable effect of driving small farmers out of business, and the existing system of uneconomic production are both alike conducive to political instability by causing distress among the peasantry.

The appearance of Russia again on the horizon as a first-rate factor in the adjustment of world economy is a consideration never to be lost sight of in examining any aspect of this difficult problem. Bitter complaints have come from the agricultural countries of Eastern Europe that the height of tariffs on agricultural products in Western European countries have struck at the root of their existence, and they are, not unnaturally, afraid that the main support of the Briand plan may come from the proposals for inter-European preferential agreements which may render their present situation chronic. On the other hand, the total output of wheat from this part is hardly over half the output from Canada alone, and a number of European countries, including Great Britain, have not had considerable trade connections with them being dependent for their supplies on markets overseas. In the circumstances some suitable arrangement may be arrived at and the Conference at Paris may well prove the first step in what the noted French publicist, Monsieur Francis Delaisi, in his remarkable book *Les Deux Europes* considers inevitable for the recovery of European prosperity, *viz*, the establishment of proper links between the industrialised Western and agricultural Eastern halves of this continent. But that can only be the beginning of a more complete economic harmony extending all over the world, if it is to have an enduring effect, for as the above considerations make it clear, the world is too much knit for the economic or political ills in any of its parts not to have repercussions over the others.

R. R.

Reviews.

LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT IN ENGLAND.

AN OUTLINE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND LOCAL TAXATION IN ENGLAND AND WALES. By ROBERT S. WRIGHT AND HENRY HOBHOUSE. (6th Edn.) (Sweet and Maxwell, London.) 1928. 25 cm. 300 p.

This book is divided into three parts; the first part explains the jurisdiction, the organisation, the purpose and the expenses of the different units of Local Government which are :– (1) The Parish, (2) The Poor Law Union, (3) The Rural District, (4) The Urban District, (5) The Municipal Borough and (6) The County. The Parish is the last unit of Local Government institutions in England and can be said to be analogous to our village panchayats. Looking to the number and extent of work of these Parish Councils, one is inclined to think that India will take a varitey of years before our villages fully realise their responsibilities in regard to civic matters. That is one of the reasons why the Village Panchayats Act so far proved a failure. The Rural District and Urban District Councils correspond to our Taluka and District Local Boards. The Urban Districts are however either District Councils or the Municipal Boroughs. The electoral franchise is the adult franchise and is uniform for the election of all the Local Government bodies. Adult franchise is the ideal even in India, but it will, I am afraid, take some considerable time to come. The principal purpose of these organisrtions is to maintain high-ways and bridges, to enfore the provisions of the Public Health Act, to provide for housing and impart education in their respective areas. Their expenses are mostly defrayed out of the revenue from the General District Rate.

Municipal Boroughs are confined to big cities and towns and are specially constituted under the Municipal Corporation Act. The Borough is governed by a Corporation composed of the Mayor, the Aldermen and the burgesses forming what is called "The Town Council" corresponding to the General Board of the Indian Municipality. The Borough appoints the Town Clerk to act as its chief executive officer. The functions of the boroughs are practically the same as those of the District Councils and the expenditure is met by levying what is know as a Borough Rate.

England and Wales comprise 52 ancient counties and their civic affairs are administered by what are known as County Councils which have larger powers than Municipal Boroughs. The principal powers and duties of these County Councils relate to county finance, housing, paupers, lunatic asylums, county bridges and roads, locomotives, motor cars, reformatories and industrial schools, weights and measures, agriculture, diseases of animals, allotment of small holdings, drainage, elementary and higher education, rating and valuation, midwives, child welfare, welfare of the blind, tuberculosis, venereal diseases-mental defectives, protection of wild birds, employ, ment of children, closing of shops, etc. These functions are far in excess of those that an Indian Municipality is expected to undertake. The expediture of County Councils for general purposes is met out of the County Rate, and contributions from the adjoining county boroughs and from the Imperial Exchequer, while expenditure for such special purposes as police, education and lunatic asylums by levying the special rates only on the affected area of the county limits.

The second part of this valuable book explains in detail "Matters of Local Administration", while the third deals with "Local Finance", comprising principally revenue from local rates and taxation and loans raised with the sanction of the Ministry of Health.

Considering all matters of Local Administration in England, there is much in common with the functions of Indian local self-government institutions. But what impresses one most is their execution of Poor Law. Unlike in India local authorities in Great Britain not only try to see that the poor and needy are employed, but in the absence of employment elsewhere, provide work for them. These poor people were very badly housed during, and especially after, the great War and the local authorities had a very hard job in providing housing accommodation for them. There are regular poor relief and distress committees which carry on their work out of finances provided by local bodies. Local bodies in India are yet a long way off to this consummation.

R. B. HIVARGAONKAR.

A MODERN INDIAN SAINT.

SWAMI VIVEKANANDA. A STUDY. By D. V. ATHALYE. (The Author, 495 Narayan Peth, Poona City.) 1929. 20cm. 280 p. Rs. 4.

MR. D. V. ATHALYE has certainly succeeded well in his study of the life of Vivekananda, one of the greatest men of modern times. Like his biographies of Tilak and Gandhi, this book also is written in an easy style. Although deeply impressed by the almost superhuman qualities of the Swami, Mr. Athalye is not blind to his defects, as can be seen from his criticism of some of the Swami's views about India's downfall. The readers have therefore the opportunity in this book of finding a faithful picture of, one can almost say, the spiritual genius of this age. In Swami Vivekananda, India could show to the world a true Hindu Sannyasin, whose catholicity of views knew no barriers of race, creed, colour and land. His giant intellect, his comprehensive knowledge of all the religions and philosophies of the world, his transcendental perception of the unity between the macrocosm and the microcosm, and above all the supergrandeur of the soul within, purified and blessed by the grace of his Master, Sri Ramakrishna,—all these shine with pristine lustre in the Swami's speeches and writings, and lead the reader, a willing captive, to the regions of the sublime and the beautiful Vedanta, the flower of all the religions and philosophies of the world. And as one goes through the pages of Mr. Athalye's life of the Swami, one surely gets a full and comprehensive idea of the tremendous work done by this illustrious son of Mother India. Swamiji's work is, of course, a part of the almost superhuman uphill task of the conquest of the world through Vedanta,—a task which Indian saints and savants have attempted time and again since the dawn of history.

The vicissitudes of the life of the Swami are vividy the pictured by Mr. Athalye in various chapters of his book. The life of the Swami is, as it were, a map of Hindu culture, and confirms the necessity of man's passing through every step outlined in the process of spiritual evolution. The velocity may differ in the case of individuals, but the process is the same. Vivekananda had to go by the same path. He had to undergo the process of purification at the feet of his master, and pass through a severe schooling in the adversities of life. But like Dnyaneshwar and Ramdas, he had a fund of spirituality to his credit, accumulated in his previous births, which enabled him to reach the highest stage of supreme bliss, *Nirvikalpa Samadhi*, within the short space of six years, and that too when he was only 23! When he reached that stage, all his doubts and dogmas vanished like mist before the rising Sun, and atheism, agnosticism, scepticism, rationalism, and all other isms, yielded to the realism of the eternal bliss. Equipped thus with the superman's powers, it is no wonder that the Swami should be a conqueror wherever he went. Mr. Athalye has painted the picture of the Swami's triumphal tours in America, England and India in fittingly gorgeous colours and certainly deserves praise for placing before the reading public a genuinely beautiful life of one of the greatest saints India has produced in modern times. We wish Mr. Athalye every success in this his third enterprise.

V. M. BHAT.

PRINCIPLES OF FELLOWSHIP.

FELLOWSHIP, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE. BY A FELLOW GROUP. ED. BY MALCOLM SPENCER AND H. S. HEWISH. (Allen & Unwin.) 1930. 20 cm. 288 p. 7/6.

THE study begins "in a world distracted by feuds, biases, cross-purposes and divisions of many thoughts, wherein even men of good will cannot do useful work together; we believe we have discovered a way of fellowship which may be for the healing of innumerable divisions and for the solution of many baffling problems in conduct and policy." The book devotes itself to the study of the simple principles which underlie human character and human life and how obedience to these principles has given an experience to the members of these fellowship groups which has been found worth having for the benefit of other groups and organisations. It has been found in these groups how the personality of the individual is moulded by the group life and the thought of the group life is enriched by the personality of the individuals that make up the group. In the group life

the personality which is only present as a possibility or as a germ of life, is given the chance to come to its realisation. The friendships made in the group centre around reasons of utility, pleasure and pursuit of the good.

The Christian fellowship groups rest upon reverence for personality in all its richness of possibility, yea, even of the possibility that they can become like Jesus Christ and as trustees for the work which Jesus had begun, they are to be the salt of the earth and the light of the world. The Christian group, when it functions according to its kind, encourages each of its members to expect to undergo a gradual transformation from their present feeble and distracted personalities into the likeness of Him in whom the perfection of God Himself was mirrored and manifested.

Another benefit of this fellowship group is to keep the unity of the spirit in fellowship. Here is a great source of discipline for the individual heart and science; a great aid to increasing refinement of perception and insight; great influence towards balance and stability of character which has to tend towards the largest social good. In the formation of such groups there is incentive to enquire into the problems of applied Christianity; there is scope for the interplay of personality; there is stimulus to the individual responsibility, both for the thinking of the group and for subsequent action; there is opportunity to discover the discrepancies and insincerities and unrealities in one's own supposed beliefs; there is a real challenge to make good the high claims of Christianity.

In practice, on the one hand, the individual contributes to the group life according to his gifts and on the other hand, the group life may minister to the richness, strength and flexibility of individual character. It is a sharing in the divine purpose not only with the members of the group, but so far as it is possible with God Himself.

The groups help, by the practical co-operation of the people's representatives, the solution of international, social and labour questions. Even enemies find that in the common pursuit of peace their hostility fades and what is best in the representatives of the conflicting nations is brought out in the common pursuit of a larger ideal. Having set the Divine will first their differences melt away under contact with one another in that spirit. As God is Love, if the group is without Love, the group fights against the Divine will. Unity of purpose and a common submission to the ideal must bridge all differences.

This fellowship brings on fellowship in action, and develops a leadership which will maintain the highest standards. "The method of fellowship and its application in the present age comes to us as a new experiment—it was not indeed untried in the past, and when tried it worked like a kind of magic."

J. R. ISAAC.

THE R. T. C. AND INDIAN STATES SUBJECTS.

MR. S. G. VAZE'S VIEWS.

The following is the full text of Mr. S. G. Vaze's presidential address to the Deccan States' People's Conference held at Poona during the last week-end:—

THE main task before this meeting will be, I suppose, that of reviewing the reports of the Round Table Conference in London in so far as they relate to the Indian States and to form a cool and balanced judgment upon them from the point of view of the people in the States. We had in fact claimed representation at the sittings of the Conference, separate and distinct from the representation accorded to the Princes, even as the people of British India had representation in their own right as distinguished from the representation given to their Government. But our claims were contemptuously ignored by the British Government upon the ostensible ground that, in autocratically governed States such as most Indian States are, the rulers alone have the constitutional authority to speak for the States. We know however that the real reason for our exclusion was the opposition offered by the Princes who declined to participate in the Conference if their subjects were allowed to attend it. The constitutional objection that was put forward was just a makebelieve. If it were otherwise the people at any rate of the South Indian States, in which autocracy is tempered by democracy almost as much as in British India, would have been invited to the Conference. And the subsequent decision of the British Government to admit even the Opposition parties in England, who certainly had a much less constitutional right to admission to the Conference table than the States' people, put it beyond a shadow of doubt that the constitutional difficulty did not really stand in the way. So it has come about that the discussions in England were conducted, without any one of the seventy millions of the States' population being given an opportunity of saying how the constitutional arrangements contemplated for the future would affect them. It is left to us now to raise our voice and make known to all concerned what modifications will be needed in these arrangements in order that they may be acceptable to the States' people.

I wonder if any of you did not feel that, even if the States' people be denied representation at the Conference, their views would still find emphatic expression in the utterances of several British Indian representatives. Some of you probably relied upon their disinterested championship of your cause; but more, I daresay, upon the community of interest felt by nationalist British India and the States' people. The interest of the two parts of India are wholly identical, and you would have thought that, on all the important points that arose in considering the federal form of government, British Indians in sheer self-interest would echo your own thoughts. Giving elective representation to States for federal purposes, widening the field of action of the federal government and maintaining it in full strength, inserting guarantees of individual liberty in the federal constitution, continuing to lodge rights of paramountcy over the States in the Government of India as a whole instead of in the Viceroy alone, in pressing for these and such other points you would have thought that British Indians did not need the urge of any altruistic motives. I was myself confident that the leaders of the people in British India would in their own interest safeguard our rights almost as effectively as if our own representatives were to take part in fashioning the constitution. But I must now own to a cruel disillusionment on the subject. British Indians as a general rule, with a few honourable exceptions, were prepared to sacrifice their own

interests as well as ours. They have betrayed the cause of British India no less than that of the States in evolving a constitution wholly dominated by the Princes. According to Dr. Shafaat Ahmed Khan, the resulting constitution "will in form be democratic; in practice oligarchic." According to Dr. Ambedkar, the change from bureaucratic to responsible government " is shadowy and not substantial, and the responsibility is bogus and not real." Indeed he goes on to declare that if he were given a choice " between the existing system and the cross-bred by the Federal Structure Committee," he would prefer the existing one. In thus estimating the results of the Conference these gentlemen had not the people of the States in mind at all; they were thinking solely of British India. But the princely *bloc* in the federal legislature would, they were convinced, make popular government an impossibility in British India itself. Nor are these gentlemen reputed to be fanatical democrats unable to appreciate a reasonable compromise when it comes. Indeed their opinion is given here just because they are known to be eminently practical and realist in their outlook.

It must therefore be a matter of peculiar satisfaction to us that the Congress party will enter the Round Table Conference when it will be reconstituted. Happily, the London Conference has reached definite conclusions on a very few points; a great many points are left undecided. And even those on which a large measure of agreement was secured in London would, I am sure, be reopened for discussion by the Congress if the decisions on them are unacceptable to the country. There is therefore yet a chance of the mischief done by the Round Table Conference being repaired. And I for my part cherish high hopes that it will eventually be repaired by the efforts of the Congress. The Congress delegates, I verily believe, will have the courage if the Princes once again threaten to block all progress unless they are admitted into the federation on their own terms, to go without a new constitution at all rather than to have the pretence of a popular constitution. That is the crux of the position. The Princes, thanks to their incessant propaganda, have put about the theory, for which there is no foundation in fact, that no advance in constitution is possible except on a federal basis, and they have further made it clear that the only kind of federation they will consent to is a very loose and limited federation in which they must be given an overweighted representation by their own nominees in the federal houses. They thus placed the delegates to the London Conference on the horns of a dilemma, which was thus described by Dr. Shafaat Ahmed Khan: "Without the Princes, the present autocratic regime will continue; with the Princes, the constitution will in form be democratic, in practice oligarchic." The British Indian delegates at the London Conference, painfully conscious of their political weakness, chose the latter alternative. I trust the Congress delegates at the forthcoming Conference, conscious of their strength, will choose the former, if necessary; and if only they are prepared to make the choice the Princes will surely withdraw the threat which they are now holding out. The Congress delegates, I believe, will never consent to what is in effect the substitution of an Indian for a British autocracy, but will press for the institution of a genuine democracy. Mahatma Gandhi has already issued a warning to the Princes against their undiluted autocracy; and I have no doubt that if occasion requires, he will put more sting into it at the Conference itself. We are therefore meeting in very hopeful circumstances, and it is up to us, the people of the States, to state our views fully and frankly, confident that if even in the ensuing Round Table Conference we go without representation, the Congress delegates will make them their own.

What has the London Conference done? It has recommended a federation of British India and the Indian States, not for all subjects now handled by the Government of India, but for just a few of them, nor even for these fully, but subject to numerous reservations and qualifications. The administration of these subjects will be under the control of a legislature in which the Princes claim representation by means of nomination to the extent of 40% in the lower and 50% in the upper house. The central legislature will however deal not merely with these federal subjects, but with several other subjects now in the Central Government. Only, while dealing with them, the Princes' *bloc* will take no part either in discussing or voting. The Princes will still have a representation in the executive, and their representative will have a voice in the management of matters of purely British Indian concern as well as of common concern. Indeed it is quite conceivable that he may be in charge of subjects of exclusively British Indian concern. There will be no declaration of fundamental rights inserted in the constitution inasmuch as the Princes object to it. Rights of paramountcy over the States will hereafter be vested in the Viceroy alone, and the Government of India will be deprived of the power of exercising these rights which it now enjoys. The decisions that were taken or the trend of opinion that was revealed in the Conference on all these points are unfavourable to us, the people of the States, just as they are unfavourable to the people in British India. But they suit the Princes admirably and also the die-hard elements in England.

In the first place why is federation being foisted upon us? The present political separation between British India and the Indian States is of course to be deplored and must be remedied. But can it be remedied only by means of federation? No doubt the governments of many countries are federally organised, but in no country in the world was the federal form adopted by choice as the best possible form of government. On the contrary in every country which adopted it it was adopted only because unitary government was under the conditions then existing impracticable. You know the famous saying of John Adams in regard to the federation in the United States that it was " wrung from the grinding necessities of a reluctant people." The states were too jealous and suspicious of one another and too devoted to local autonomy to permit of a complete unity. National patriotism which alone would have induced the states to surrender their separate existences had yet to be created. The statesmen of the time had therefore to hit upon a form of government which, while preserving the independence of the several states, made co-operation between them on certain matters possible. Are not Indian conditions just the contrary? The people of Indian States surely are not so attached to their respective political systems, their local patriotism surely is not so strong, as to require the maintenance at all costs of the several States as distinct political entities. On the contrary the feeling of nationalism has become very strong among them, and nationalism is a deadly enemy of federalism. Is there any doubt that it is not the individual States but the nation as a whole which holds the leading place in the affections of the States' people? The general body-politic of the nation they prize far more highly than the local bodies-politic of the States. Their allegiance, they feel, is owed primarily to the country at large and only thereafter to their several States. There is thus no reason to suppose that they will object to live under a common regime. They do not need the device which secures to a people the blessings of union without unity. They would welcome national unity and would be prepared for all that

such unity implies. In Canada in 1867 it was found that the English and the French, divided from each other by race, language and religion and fighting with each other as traditional enemies for centuries together, could not be brought to favour any system that did not guarantee them their independence, and thus nothing better than a federal union was possible. But are the people of Indian States divided from their confreres in British India by race, language and religion? Or are they moved by antipathy and rivalry towards each other? Why then should this loose form of union be prescribed for India? As in the United States and Canada, so in Australia, Germany, Switzerland and other countries where the federal system obtains. In all these countries the federal system was adopted unwillingly and under the compulsion of adverse political circumstances. In India the only adverse political circumstance is the unwillingness of the Princes to merge the States into a larger unity. Their unwillingness to do so is not hard to understand. Their personal future as rulers is inextricably bound up with the maintenance of the States intact as independent entities. But let it be clearly understood that the people of the States raise no objection to the formation of an all-inclusive Indian State on a unitary basis.

The Princes not only insist upon preserving the independence of their individual States. and thus make federation inevitable, but insist further that, in setting up the federal system, they will be made to yield as little as possible to the federal government. Their spokesmen at the London Conference,. it is understood, made it clear at the early stages thas they would retain in the States as much authority at they were enjoying at present and would limit the list of federal subjects to the barest minimum. They said in so many words that they would have as limited a list of common subjects as possible, and they were as good as their word. If you will examine the federal list you will find that it does not include a single important subject which at present is under the control of the Princes. The federal list contains just those subjects of which the administration is even now either wholly in the hands of the Central Government or subject to its control. The present state of things is the result either of an agreement between the States and the Government of India or of the exercise by the latter of its paramountcy rights over the former. Anyhow the fact remains that what the States are now supposed to be willing to give over to the federal government in form they have already given over to the Government of India in fact. The Princes have taken much credit to themselves for agreeing to surrender to the common political authority to be created hereafter several matters of common concern to the two Indias which within their own borders are under their sole control. Many persons interested to magnify the Princes' contribution to the building up of a federation have lavished much praise upon them for the magnificent sacrifices which they are ready to make in the larger interests of the country. I am however unable to see any sacrifice on their part. If they were willing to give up to the federal government any subject in regard to which they enjoy not merely a *de jure* but a *de facto* sovereignty, they would really be making a sacrifice; but there is no such subject which they are willing to give up. They insist upon keeping to themselves all subjects which have not already passed out of their control, and they are agreeable to submit to the control of the federal government in regard to matters of common interest just to the extent, and no more, to which as a matter of fact they are now submitting to the control of the Government of India. I understand that in the Federal Structure Sub-Committee, Sir Muhammad Shafi, who certainly cannot be accused of unfriendliness to the States, thoroughly exposed the hollowness of the claims put forward on behalf of the Princes. He said in effect: "I know from my experience as Law Member of the Government of India what the so-called sovereignty or autonomy of the Princes is in matters of common interest. Over these subjects they in practice exercise no manner of control, and their Highnesses will be making no sacrifice whatever in handing over these subjects to the federal government." As a matter of fact the Princes, far from making any sacrifice, will only gain by giving up the so-called "subjects of common concern" to the federal government. For, through their representatives in the legislature and the executive, they will obtain a share in the administration of subjects which are now under the exclusive control of the Government of India.

We need not grudge the Princes any *kudos* which they may get by joining the federation, provided that the federation they help bring about is worth-while. But is the federation as sketched in the Sankey Committee's Report really worth-while? Is not the scope of the federal power much too narrow? By limiting the federation to subjects over which they have lost all control, the Princes keep out of the federal list certain important subjects, in regard to which above everything else there must be uniformity and which must therefore be assigned to the federal government. Take for instance the whole body of civil and criminal law. If there is any matter of common concern to the two halves of India, it is this. But it does not figure in the list of federal subjects attached to the Sankey Committee's Report. If a proposal is made to the Princes to add this or any other subject to the list, the reply they make is that it is a matter within their sole jurisdiction. It is an eloquent commentary upon their mental attitude that the Princes should think it a sufficient reason to object to any matter under their control being transferred to the federal government that it *is* under their control. It does not matter if the subject is best dealt with nationally instead of locally. They don't trouble to argue about it. That they are managing it at present is a sufficient reason for their continuing to manage it ever after. The implication of this reasoning is obvious, viz. that they will consent to give up in form only those subjects to the federal government which they have already given up to the Government of India in substance, and the implication is fully borne out by the federal list drawn up by the Sankey Committee. In the United States, the earliest of modern federations, each State enacts for itself its private laws, civil and criminal, which have validity within its own limits, but this led to such an extraordinary diversity of law in that country that it is now universally recognised that the evil can only be remedied by amending the constitution, transferring to the national government the power of determining civil and criminal laws having validity throughout the Union. In all later federations this defect has been removed. The matter is left with the federal government. There are many other matters, of which labour is a prominent instance, which are national in scope rather than local and require the uniformity of regulation which can be secured only by placing them under the control of the central government. But all these matters are intended to be dealt with in our future polity not by the federal government but by the British Indian and the States' governments. What is the advantage of federation if no greater uniformity on matters on which such uniformity is desirable can be secured by federation than under the existing arrangements?

There is, on the other hand, a real danger that the uniformity now existing in British India may be destroyed by reason of the States coming into the

federation for very limited subjects. Seeing that no pressure was being exerted on the Princes to transfer subjects like civil and criminal law to the federal government, the Mahomedan representatives on the Federal Structure Committee were encouraged to ask for the transfer of those subjects from the Central Government to the Provinces. If the States can handle these subjects without detriment to the country's interest, they ask, why cannot the Provinces? If no uniformity is required as between the States and British India, which are both to be federating units, why should it be required between one province of British India and another? It would certainly be disastrous to British India to agree to the Muslim demand, but it cannot be successfully resisted except by persuading the Princes to transfer these subjects to the federal government. Anyhow one uniform system must be adopted. A subject, if it be federal, should be federal for all units; if local, local for all. The hybrid arrangement contemplated by the Sankey Report, under which certain subjects are to be administered for the States by the States' Governments and for British India by the Central Government is unknown to constitutions. In different federations the line of demarcation between national and local subjects is differently drawn; but in no federation is any subject under local administration in some units and under general administration in others. The system of in-and-out which the Sankey Committee recommends for the States' representatives in the federal legislature is equally novel and unprecedented. Nor does it entirely cure the anomaly which it is intended to meet. The States' representatives will be in the Cabinet and as such they will take a share in the control of matters of purely British Indian concern. A federal system of this character is of indubitable advantage to the Princes, but is it of advantage to anybody else? If a federation we must have, let it be of the right sort. It must then comprehend, not only subjects which, having no power over them, the Princes are glad to place on the federal list, but all subjects which are of general rather than local interest. The people of the States as distinguished from the Princes have no objection at all, and indeed would welcome, the addition of subjects like civil and criminal law and labour legislation to the federal list drawn by the Sankey Committee.

The next major question with which I would deal is the method of choosing States' representatives in the federal legislature. The formula that has been proposed by the Princes in this connexion and apparently approved as well by the British Indian representatives as by the British permits of nomination by the Princes to both houses of the legislature. Some British Indian apologists of the Round Table constitution defend this provision by holding out the hope that, even if the constitution allowed nominations, several States would in fact be represented by elected representatives. This is a vain hope. Even if some Princes were disposed to introduce election in their States for federal purposes, the pressure of other Princes in the opposite direction would hold them back, and nomination would be the general rule. The most backward State would determine the pace of all. Not only would no direct election be possible anywhere, but indirect election or nomination out of a panel of elected members or even appointment of non-officials would be unlikely. The probability is that every State would be represented by officials appointed by the Princes. Can we lend our support to this state of things? It is surely unnecessary at this time of the day to argue in favour of election as opposed to nomination. We had better see the motives which must have actuated the different sections of the Round Table Conference either to press for or to acquiesce in nomination. The motive of the Princes is obvious and need not be enlarged upon. That of the British representatives—Liberal and Conservative—and of the representatives of European commerce, in pressing (as they did) for nomination was to queer the pitch for British India who unitedly insisted upon the grant of Dominion Status subject only to a few transitory but at present unavoidable reservations. They pressed for nomination by the Princes and for weightage being allowed to the States for the same reason for which they asked for a large nominated element to represent the Crown; for the States' representatives being allowed to discuss and vote also upon subjects of purely British Indian concern; for an irremoveable executive; and such other things. All were intended to checkmate democracy. No secret was made of this. Federation was welcomed by this group at the Round Table Conference, just because it would furnish what is euphemistically called the stabilising factor in the constitution. If, like British India, the States too are represented by elected representatives, federation would hardly be the stabilising factor that this group hopes it to be, and would cease to make any appeal to it.

For this very reason federation of the proposed sort, in which the States are represented by Princes or their nominees, should have been entirely unacceptable to British Indian representatives, but somehow it did not meet with their opposition. Some British Indian representatives would of set purpose bring in a conservative element in the shape of the Princes' nominees into the legislature as a desirable set-off against the demagogues who would flock into it from British India. I can understand the caution which leads one to devise the constitution in such a manner that the substance of power is left in the hands of people who are not carried away by passion; but if that is one's objective, one would attain it, I expect, by providing for a limited franchise, or indirect elections or some other device, for the whole area. Would one go about making the part of the constitution relating to one unit of federation ultra-radical and that relating to the other unit ultra-conservative? Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru insists, in respect of British India, upon direct elections to the lower house of the federal legislature on the ground that indirect elections would be rejected out of hand by the country. Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar went the length of saying, I hear, in the Federal Structure Sub-Committee that if indirect elections to the Legislative Assembly formed part of the constitution, the country would refuse to work it and embark on a campaign of non-co-operation. Why were these terrible threats issued? Evidently because it was feared that indirect elections would make the legislature unprogressive. But when in the next breath these critics not only acquiesce in, but welcome, a nominated element to the extent at the least of 30% coming into the legislature from the side of the States, one finds it rather difficult to appreciate their logic. They first of all oppose, and oppose vehemently, the proposal put forward by the British representatives for indirect elections to the Assembly with a view to making it a body of cautious legislators, but fearing that it will become too radical, proceed at once to neutralise the effect by asking that the States' representatives will be appointed by the Princes! Instead of pitting one unit of federation against the other in this way, would it not be a more sensible proceeding to take whatever measures are necessary in order to ensure that both units of federation send representatives who are rather conservative? If conservatism is to be deliberately introduced into the legislature, the plan of the British representatives appears to me to be decidedly wiser than that of some of our British Indian representatives.

There is another set of representatives from British India, however, who, without welcoming,

merely acquiesce in, nomination by the Princes as a thing that could not be avoided. The Simon Report has said that responsible government for British India alone is not possible; the British representatives too make federation an essential condition of responsibility at the centre. The Princes, however, can never be brought to agree to elected representatives sitting in the federal legislature on behalf of the States. There is nothing for it therefore but to take in the Princes on their own conditions. On the part of these it was a weak surrender to the Princes. They went into the Round Table Conference against the opposition of the country. Dare they go back to India without achieving something which might at any rate be made to look like Dominion Status? So far as British India was concerned, they would not hear of indirect election, or of communal election, or of any safeguards. But they could not bring themselves even to make a faint plea for election in the States, either immediate or after a specified number of years. I believe they did not even mention "election" with reference to the States in the course of their numerous patriotic speeches in the Federal Structure Committee. Why raise a point at all which you are unable to maintain to the bitter end? You will succeed thereby only in irritating the Princes who must be kept in good humour if you would carry away anything from the Conference. Thus these tribunes of the people, who made quite brave speeches where it was a question of tackling the British Government, were struck dumb when it came to dealing with the Princes. These held the whip-hand over them, and they adjusted themselves admirably to the new situation.

But these good people might have remembered one or two things. If the Simon Report has declared that no far-reaching reform of the constitution is possible except on a federal basis, there are two declarations of greater authority than the Simon Report—the Montagu declaration of 1917 and the Irwin declaration of 1929—which have promised self-government to British India without reference to federation with the States. Therefore federation, however desirable, is not absolutely necessary. Even assuming that it is, what reason is there to suppose that the Princes cannot be persuaded to accept election? Under the stress of circumstances they are known to have yielded to popular agitation. His Exalted Highness the Nizam, than whom no more absolute ruler sits on the *gadi* of an Indian State, was prepared, as is well known, to endow the people of Berar with full responsible government when he saw that he could not possibly coax them back into his State in any other way? Towards the Hyderabadis he would continue his absolutist regime; but towards the Beraris he agreed to be just a constitutional ruler as it was the only means of recovering Berar. Similarly, if British Indians had insisted, the Princes might have agreed to election for federal purposes, though for local purposes, they might have insisted on nomination or even gone without representative institutions. After all federation is of value to the Princes as much as to British India; indeed of far greater value to them. British India was constantly told at the Conference of conditions on which alone the Princes would enter the federation. Were the Princes ever told of conditions on which British India would enter? I know of no occasion when this was done. British Indian representatives acted as if federation was a matter of supreme moment to themselves but of no moment to the Princes. If they had made elective representation an essential condition of the States coming into the federation the Princes, it is not unreasonable to expect, might have come to terms in London, and if the Congress leaders hereafter impose the condition they may do so now But, whatever be the result of the negotiations you cannot mortgage your whole future to the Princes. Those British Indian representatives who made an ignoble surrender to the Princes preach a homily to us, the people of the States. "You must not be impatient idealists," they say. "Election of course is ultimately the right method, and it will come in course of time. Have a little patience." But I cannot understand why they do not take the lesson to heart themselves. Why does a suggestion of indirect elections put them out so much as to make them hold out threats which they know they can never carry into execution? Why do they fly into a terrific indignation at the very mention of safeguards? Why cannot they take these things philosophically, believing that in God's good time everything will be added unto them? Indeed, why do they not wait a while for federation and if necessary go without reform in British India till the people in Indian States too are allowed to take part in elections? Why is this virtue of patience to be reserved for the especial behoof of the States' people?

For, be it remembered, enlargement of the scope of federation or replacement of nomination by election in the future is by no means an easy affair. These things can come only as a result of a formal amendment of the constitution to this effect. And if a two-thirds or three-fourths vote in a joint session is thought to be necessary by our constitution-makers merely to send the Cabinet out of office, you can easily imagine what size of a majority will be prescribed for amending the constitution. It has been pointed out, with perfect justice, that if the proposals now in the field are adopted, the Princes' nominees alone will be able to keep a Ministry in office for the full term of the legislature, however unpopular the Ministers may be in the country. The rigidity of the process that will be laid down for amending the constitution will surely make the constitution virtually unamendable. But that is not all. The desired reforms cannot be accomplished merely by amending the federal constitution, assuming that it can at all be amended. The States must consent. British India must enter into new treaties with each of the seven hundred odd States separately. Even the United States' constitution cannot be amended at the will of the national government alone. A two-thirds majority is required in each house of Congress merely to propose an amendment. But Congress alone cannot alter the constitution. Three-fourths of the States must consent. You may be certain that in our constitution it will be provided that every single State must agree to send its representatives by election instead of nomination or to expand the list of federal subjects before these changes can take effect. New treaties will have to be entered into. It is not therefore true to say that we have to put up with nomination or other defects of the constitution only temporarily. British Indians, while agreeing to have defence reserved to the control of the bureaucracy, insist, as an essential part of the new constitutional arrangements, upon the establishment of a Military College in India so that in a measurable period the control of this subject also will be transferred to the people. All the safeguards to which they consent are transitory, coming to an end either after the lapse of a certain number of years or after the completion of certain processes which they are careful to put into train immediately. Is any provision intended to be inserted into the constitution which will make nomination transitory? Have we anything upon which we can rely that election will come, if not now, after a while, excepting the profuse assurances given by British Indians that though the letter of the constitution does not provide for it, things will work themselves out eventually in that way? Of course, they will. We have not the least doubt about it. Our only hope is that these reforms will come smoothly

through constitutional action. His Highness the Maharaja of Bikaner in the Round Table Conference lent his great authority to the doctrine that a bad ruler should be eliminated. You and I should have felt great hesitation in enunciating it, and a conscientious objection to enunciating it in the very broad form which the Maharaja has given to it. We for our part would put stringent limitations upon its applicability. We all wish that the elimination, if it is to come, would come by peaceful and constitutional means. Those engaged in framing the constitution are certainly not making this mode of elimination easy.

We ought therefore to insist upon the seats in the Legislative Assembly allocated to the States being filled by direct election. Compromises are possible in the working of details; but on the principle itself we must receive full satisfaction. In regard to the Council of State, indirect election through provincial legislatures will in all likelihood be adopted in British India. The same method ought to be made applicable to the States. The Princes have stated in the London Conference that most of the bigger States have legislative assemblies. There should then be no objection to these assemblies returning members to the Council of State on behalf of the States.

The question of a federal guarantee of civil liberties was not directly raised in the Federal Structure Sub-Committee. It was casually referred to by some members in their speeches, and to the extent to which it received attention at all, it was dealt with most unsatisfactorily. The matter will not, however, be allowed to rest where it is by the minority communities in British India—and there is not a single community which is not in a minority in one province or another—who ask that the private rights of the individual shall be written into the constitution and placed under the guarantee of the Central Government. I make no doubt that, in so far as British India is concerned, this demand will be met, but the question is whether the fundamental rights of citizenship of the people in the States will be similarly protected. When the subject was mooted by Dewan Bahadur Ramachandra Rao in the final plenary session of the Conference, a number of Princes rose in their seats and announced that they had already proclaimed these rights in their own States and that therefore there remained nothing further for them to do. They do not seem to realise however that what Mr. Ramachandra Rao wants is not that a formal recognition be given to individualrights by each Indian State and British Indian province, but that the federal government be given power to see that the member states, whether they be Indian States or British Indian provinces, do not violate the rights of person and property guaranteed to the individual by the federal constitution itself. A mere enumeration of certain rights by the federating units is of no practical use; these rights must be brought under the protecting power of the federal government. A bill of rights is the individual's armour against the government, local as well as general. While it declares that the general government shall not deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law, it also declares that the local governments shall not do so either, and in fact it lays upon the general government the duty of seeing to it that the private rights of the individual are not curtailed by the local governments. This is done by furnishing the aggrieved individual with an opportunity of going to the supreme court for redress. It is this federal guarantee of protection of individual rights that we the people of the States want. This demand was in terms negatived by the Maharaja of Bikaner, who claimed that it was a domestic matter beyond the purview of the Conference. I do not quite know what the Maharaja meant. His idea probably is that since criminal law is not a federal subject, the federal government can have no power to place any restrictions upon the States' Governments in a matter concerning criminal law. The federal government can at best catalogue these personal and property rights; but the individual cannot be allowed to assert them against these governments with the help of the federal government. If this is his idea it is entirely mistaken. In the United States criminal law is a local concern, but the federal government has been given power to protect the individual against oppressive action on the part of any state. I am not surprised that the Princes are unwilling to subject their actions to supervision by the federal government even in respect of the elementary rights of citizens. But I am greatly surprised to see that Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru should think it possible that the federal constitution might contain a declaration of fundamental rights, but that it might apply only to British India. I have it upon good authority that in the Federal Structure Committee he asked for the insertion of a bill of rights in the constitution, leaving it open to the States, however, to take themselvs out of its operation if they chose to do so. Perhaps, as a matter of drafting, this is not altogether impossible, but if this done it will furnish a new model to future constitution-makers, elementary rights of citizenship being guaranteed in one unit of federation and left open to attack in the other! The Congress leaders, I have no doubt, will see to it that the protection is extended to the people of the States as well as to British Indians.

There is only one other matter to which I will refer, viz. paramountcy over the States. A federation, if it comes about, will necessarily reduce very much the area over which paramountcy will operate. At present the Government of India uses this power to prescribe certain standards of administration or a uniformity of policy in regard to matters which are proposed to be made federal in the new constitution. It is obvious that hereafter there will be no occasion for the employment of this power, because the Government of India will in future embrace within its scope the States too, over which it has to exercise general supervision from outside at present. But in regard to all the other matters, which will continue to be dealt with locally by the States, paramountcy will be maintained intact. The power which we the people of the States are anxious to see kept alive above everything else is that of the Government of India's intervention in the internal affairs of the States in cases of gross misrule. It is not a source of any particular pride or pleasure to us that our States should occupy a position of such subordination. It is indeed a matter of profound distress and humiliation to us. But it is but natural that so long as we do not enjoy self-government, we should be loth to give up any means which promises to us some measure of good government. The Viceroy the other day read to the Princes assembled in the Princes' Chamber a lesson on the elementary duties of rulers towards their subjects. "Don't spend too much on your own persons; don't tax the people beyond their capacity; don't interfere with your judges" and all the other rules of self-discipline which he recommended to their Highnesses make us hang our heads in shame. Our shame is twofold: first, that our rulers should need to be reminded of these maxims of good government; and secondly, that the correction should come from the Viceroy, a representative of His Majesty, with whom they claim to be co-equal in authority.

The establishment of popular government in the States alone will put an end to this state of things, but till that time arrives we cannot be expected to impose on ourselves a self-denying ordinance and refuse the help which may come from this quarter. To do so is to leave our rulers without any check whatsoever, which we cannot possibly do. While the Princes admit that they are liable to intervention from outside in their

domestic matters, they are anxious to limit and if possible codify occasions justifying its exercise. With this desire the people of the States fully sympathise. But how is this to be done? If it is the paramount power's duty to prevent and correct misrule in Indian States, the only way by which arbitrary action on its part can be guarded against is to lay down a minimum standard of good government which every State will be under an obligation to maintain. The Viceroy's twelve or "Fourteen Points" in his recent speech to the Chamber about the essentials of good government may well serve as the basis of such a standard. It should not be possible for the paramount power to interfere with the States' administration except when it is alleged that the ruler has failed to maintain this standard. It should not be enough merely to make an allegation of inefficient or unjust rule. The allegation should be proved before an impartial tribunal. The ruler in question should be placed in full possession of the allegations against him and of the papers on which they are based, and he should be furnished an opportunity of disproving the truth of the allegations. As the interventionis avowedly intended in the interest of the people of the States, the latter will very likely have in their possession evidence relevant to the determination of the matter and should be given an equal opportunity with the ruler to produce it. The procedure adopted for the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations for passing the administration of the mandated countries under review furnishes an excellent model which we may adapt to our purposes. It is only in this way, it seems to me, that arbitrary action on the part of the Viceroy or the Government of India can be avoided. It necessarily implies an investigation in public of the administration in States with reference to certain rules of good government If the Princes cannot submit themselves to a public inquiry, they cannot insure themselves against arbitrary and unjust intervention, which is a necessary consequence of hole and corner methods. But the people of the States cannot possibly dispense with the right of intervention vesting in the paramount power. Not only can they not dispense with it, but they will always continue to demand that it shall be brought into exercise on every justifiable occasion.

There is only one means, short of establishing self-government in the States, by which the shame inherent in an outside power exercising this right can be minimised, and that is to Indianise the Government of India completely and to make it responsible to the legislature even in respect of the subject of political relations. In which case it will not be the Viceroy who will interfere but our own brethren in British India, or, in the event of a federation, they and the States' representatives. But, curiously enough, the Princes have been demanding that intervention should take place hereafter on the sole responsibility of the Viceroy. In the transitional period, under the present theory, the Viceroy and his Cabinet, in which the States will be represented, will together take action against any ruler. The Princes themselves will have a share in deciding the question. One would have thought therefore that they would welcome this result and would use their best endeavours to extend the sphere of the Government of India's responsibility to political relations, thus ousting the Viceroy altogether from this matter. On the other hand, they ask for a change in the current theory and the current practice, so that the whole of the Government of India (and with it themselves) will be deprived of their present power of influencing the Viceroy's decision, and the matter will be reserved to the exclusive authority of the Viceroy. By some unaccountable twist in their reasoning, they have shown themselves indifferent, not only to a sense of self-respect, but to that of self-interest. They now invoke a new theory of direct relations with the Crown, into which I need not enter here. It has received what we all thought would be its *coup de grace* in a chapter of the Nehru Report, with the authorship of which Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru's name is popularly associated. There is only one thing that needs to be emphasised in this connection. The present practice also corresponds to the present theory. Questions relating to political relations are in fact considered at present by the Government of India as a whole. The general impression seems to be that while the action that may be taken against any Prince is supposed to be taken by the Government of India, in actual practice it is taken by the Viceroy alone. This impression, however, is not well founded. For Lord Reading, in recounting his experiences as Viceroy, made a definite statement, I understand, in the Federal Structure Committee, which was not challenged by any one, to the effect that during his regime all matters of major importance were dealt with by the "Governor General in Council." So far as the people of the States are concerned, it is of paramount importance to them that the right of intervention shall not only be preserved till responsible government is established in the States; but that it shall be exercised by a Government which is amenable to popular influence, if not subject to popular control.

This exhausts the main points relating to the Indian States that were considered by the Round Table Conference in London. On none of them fortunately have definitive decisions been reached; but can we congratulate ourselves on the discussions of any one of them? Let us hope that repesentatives of the people of the States will be admitted to future sessions of the Conference; but our main reliance must be placed upon the Congress delegates espousing our cause. In doing so they will only be serving the best interests of British India. Of the points discussed by me so far, I attach the greatest weight to the States being repesented in the federal system by popular representatives. If nomination by the Princes is allowed indefinitely, it will ruin democracy in British India beyond repair. The federal idea, it is said, transformed the whole political situation in London. It did; it induced reactionary politicians in England to favour a seemingly large measure of reform. What determined them was not just a partiality on their part for a federal over against a unitary form of government; but the fact that one unit of federation will be represented in the legislature by the Princes themselves or persons appointed by them; that these will receive excessive representation, so much so that their *bloc* may be expected by their own vote to hold up all legislation which is not conservative, and practically to introduce the system of an irremoveable executive; that they will be in the Cabinet shaping the policy of British Indian as well as federal subjects. The reactionaries in Britain had no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that under this kind of federation power would be in safe hands. At every stage of the proceedings they had the Congress party at the back of their minds. Would these be kept out? they asked themselves; and when they were satisfied that the Princes would effectively keep them out of all real power, they agreed to the introduction of responsibility at the centre. This should give the Congress leaders a personal interest in espousing our cause, which is the cause of British India and of democracy. We throw ourselves upon their support and hope they will not fail us

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