

The Servant of India

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Topics of the Week.

Pandit Motilal Nehru.

THE Government of India have done the right thing in releasing unconditionally the venerable Pandit Motilal Nehru from jail. The interview given by the Pandit immediately after release still leaves room for much anxiety for his health, which suffered heavily while he was in jail. We cannot help recalling that the Government were very wrong in arresting him at all, and in the particular circumstances in which they did it. In the interview he gave to Mr. George Slocombe in the third week of June and published immediately, the Pandit held out the olive branch and in his "statement" of June 25th, which has since been published, he, as it were, authorised Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru and Mr. M. R. Jayakar to negotiate with the Viceroy. It was a first class blunder to have arrested him just at that time. We fear the incident embittered him and deeply coloured his attitude towards the peace negotiations, and contributed materially to their failure.

The Negotiators.

SIR TEJ BAHADUR SAPRU and Mr. M. R. Jayakar deserve the deep gratitude of the country and all friends of India for the public spirit, the self-sacrifice, the patience and the statesmanship with which they took up and pursued their negotiations with the Viceroy and the Congress leaders for the restoration of normal conditions in India. Their task, as the task of all intermediaries generally, was difficult and delicate in all conscience. It was not rendered easier by certain actions of the Government and the Congress during the course of the negotiations and by the carping, uncharitable and malevolent criticisms of certain sections of Indian public opinion. Unperturbed by

these discouraging distractions, and with single-minded devotion to the cause of peace they strove to bring about an agreement between the Government and the imprisoned Congress leaders. If their efforts unfortunately failed, it was not because of any fault of theirs. No better persons could have been chosen for the task and Pandit Motilal Nehru himself specially mentioned in his statement to Mr. George Slocombe that these two eminent patriots would be acceptable to him as intermediaries. In some quarters they were dubbed the emissaries of the Viceroy, which is an entirely unfounded invention. If they were emissaries of anybody at all, they were Pandit Motilal's. Of the two belligerents it was he, on behalf of the Congress, that first opened negotiations and authorised Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru and Mr. Jayakar to interview the Viceroy. He did the right thing in taking that step, and he is entitled to credit for it. Mr. Gandhi knew of this long before he put his signature to the joint letter of the Congress leaders in Yerawada Prison in which he suggested that the Government should deal with them hereafter through the Congress organisation, and not through these non-Congressmen. It was a discourtesy unworthy of the Mahatma.

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Sanj Vartaman Annual.

THE *Sanj Vartaman* Annual for 1930, upon the excellence of whose get-up we congratulate the proprietors contains as usual many readable articles on subjects of general interest. We wish however to refer here only to one viz. that by Sir Phiroze Sethna on the Round Table Conference. The article was written before the break-down of the recent peace parleys between the Congress leaders and the Government and the hope expressed by him that as a result of the negotiations Congress leaders might find it possible to join the Conference has for the present at any rate been dashed to the ground. But apart from this, no efforts must be spared, as emphasised by Sir P. C. Sethna, to make the Conference a success. Liberals are sometimes criticised for not running down the Congress and undermining its influence, as if they had nothing better to do. Sir Phiroze puts up a spirited defence of the Liberals' position in this matter and justifies their refusal to be "a mere tool in the hands of Government." Then he blames the Government for their cultivation of "the art of doing the wrong thing just at the moment when they might have displayed more reason and turned the tide of affairs to their profit," as was exemplified by their most inopportune prosecution of Pandit Malaviya and others. What he drives at is the conclusion that until at least the deliberations of the Conference are over the Government should display greater tactfulness. Whether the Government will do so or not remains to be seen. He also prophesies that if the decisions of the Conference fail to satisfy even those who are not Congress left-wingers,

"the Indian nationalist movement is bound to assume a complexion permanently and irrevocably hostile to the continuance of the British connection." He is not for ignoring the Simon Report altogether, but would like the Indian Delegation to prepare "a well-considered and well-reasoned reply" to it. To this end he pleads for the inclusion in the Delegation of constitutional experts, whose presence will, in our opinion, be very useful even otherwise.

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Discriminating Criticism and Diehard Opposition.

TWO Englishmen associated with this country not so very long ago deal with the Simon Report in the August issue of the *Nineteenth Century*. One is Sir Stanley Reed, ex-editor of the *Times of India* and the other is that well-known retired pro-consul and a member of the "steel frame", viz., Sir Reginald Craddock. Both lay down the truism that any kind of constitution will work if there is a will to work it. This will to work will obviously be lacking if the constitution fails to receive adequate public support. It is from this standpoint that Indian opinion is pressing that the constitution to be hammered out at the Round Table Conference should be liberal enough to find acceptance at the hands of a large majority of Indians. And yet when they do so, they are complacently styled "irreconcilables" or obstructionists. Sir Stanley Reed apparently thinks that Dominion Status and responsible government are interchangeable terms. All we can say is he is not in touch with India's recent constitutional history. The attempt to draw a distinction between the two emanated, as he ought to remember, not from the unofficial, but from the official, side and gave rise to much misunderstanding in the public mind as to India's ultimate destiny. To set this at rest it was thought necessary last year to make it clear that Dominion Status was the natural result of the 1917 announcement. Sir Stanley Reed will thus see that for the creation of this muddle none but the Government of India under Lord Reading was responsible. He characterises as "bold and wise" the Commission's proposals with regard to the government of the provinces, lending his approval even to the comprehensive special powers proposed for the Governors. This he justifies on the ground that in the absence of parties providing "alternative administrations", provision must be made for the carrying on of the King's government. As regards second chambers, he is clearly of the opinion that with these large powers vested in the Governors there is "no place for a revising chamber". The Commission's proposal to extend the electorate to 10 per cent. of the population does not commend itself to him and he asks: "Why this particular figure of 10 per cent.?" Similarly, he finds the Commission's idea to set up a Boundaries Commission unacceptable and he anticipates "very strong local objections", as in the case of the Bengal partition, if any division of the present administrative areas were contemplated. That however does not mean that he does not see the need for some sort of rearrangement of the provinces. It is also his view that if the provinces are still further cut up, it would "add to the present excessively top-heavy expenditure." Sir Stanley Reed pleads for the introduction of an element of responsibility at the centre, as it is proposed to be constituted under the Simon proposals; otherwise he expects continuous friction between an irremovable executive and an irresponsible legislature. We trust his opinion on this point will carry weight in proper quarters. With regard to the Commission's proposal as regards the Indian army, he has misgivings as to how far it will commend itself to the Federal Legislature and how long the Legislature will

be "content with the diversion of a large part of the revenues to military expenditure over which it has neither voice nor influence." Nobody can say his fears are misplaced.

Knowing Sir Reginald Craddock's antecedents as India does, she has no reason to expect the same discriminating criticism of the Simon proposals from him as from Sir Stanley Reed. In his opinion the Commission have done well in not recommending any element of responsibility at the Centre, as it must be kept strong at all costs. "The army in India must be kept entirely away from politics and political contest." Dominion Status for India "at some date" is not inconceivable to him; but it would be different from that enjoyed by Canada or New Zealand, "if only for the reason that greater India contains both the territories of the Indian princes, which are not democracies, and of British provinces which would be self-governing in the modern sense." Why, one wonders, has the British Government during the century and a half it has been in India taken no steps to convert these Indian autocracies into democracies. The right to secede from the Empire, which is a well recognised incident of Dominion Status cannot, in his opinion, be granted to India as being inconsistent with the 1917 declaration which envisaged her as being an integral part of the British Empire for all time to come! The proposal to eliminate the official *bloc* from the legislatures strikes Sir Reginald Craddock as "a leap in the dark." Whatever politically-minded India may think of it, the proposal to have one or two official Ministers in provincial Cabinets should, he insists, be an essential feature of the provincial Government. According to him, dire consequences will follow the proposed transfer of law and order. "There is real danger that the cause of justice may be tampered with for political, communal, and, I am afraid, sometimes mercenary reasons." We do not propose to comment on Sir Reginald Craddock's views, as comments, in our opinion, are needless. His views have only to be stated to expose their absurdity.

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Indian Hides Industry.

THE recommendations of the Hides Cass Inquiry Committee, which have recently been published, are expected to have far-reaching consequences on the hides and skin industry in India. An industry whose annual value is estimated at Rs. 40 to 50 crores, and which contributes 25 to 33 per cent. to the total world production of hide is one that deserves every kind of encouragement both from the Government and the public. Furthermore, it is an industry which employs millions of hands from among the depressed classes. It was because of it that the industry failed so long to attract the attention of the public and the Government. For one thing, the community which is illiterate, poor and ignorant, is not able to make its voice heard. For another, it is being exploited by big capitalists and merchants. But we see a ray of hope for this community, in the recommendations of the Committee which seek to remedy the tremendous waste to the industry, caused by poor stock, inefficient skinning, and diseases among the cattle. They recommend the imposition of a cess of one per cent. on the export of raw hides and skins, which is expected to yield Rs. 7 lakhs a year. To administer the fund to the best advantage in the improvement of the industry, they recommend the creation of a permanent Cess Committee. We trust speedy effect will be given to these recommendations for we believe that such assistance to the industry will be a powerful factor in improving the lot of a large section of the depressed classes.

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Articles.

BREAKDOWN OF NEGOTIATIONS.

INDIA'S cup of misery is not yet full. So it seems from the deplorable breakdown of the negotiations so gallantly undertaken by Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru and Mr. M. R. Jayakar for the restoration of normal conditions. None but the enemies of India can rejoice in the failure of the negotiations and look with equanimity on the gloomy, nay, ugly prospect that stares the country in the face. A 'war to the finish' will inflict incalculable sufferings on the peoples of India. Even non-violent war, if only because of its economic dislocations and disasters, will not be less injurious than violent war. Whatever be the moral rights and wrongs of the issues involved in the controversy, it requires no great insight to realise that the British Government will not be in a hurry to come down on its knees, if it takes the challenge seriously. Already the damage caused to the people, and the poorer section of it at that, is heavy and it is bound to be heavier if the tension is prolonged. With amazing callousness the seven Congress leaders, who signed the joint statement from Yeravada jail on the 15th August, observe that "great as have been the sufferings of the people among all grades and classes representing different creeds, we feel that the sufferings have been neither sustained enough nor large enough for the immediate attainment of the end," and challenge the statement that civil disobedience had harmed the country. And yet in the next breath they profess that they would gladly stop or suspend civil disobedience. "It can be no pleasure to us needlessly to expose the men, women, and even children of our country to imprisonment, lathi charges and worse." If the movement did no harm to the country and was, on the other hand, beneficial because of the mass awakening, why should they be glad to stop or suspend it and not pursue it indefinitely? To pretend that civil disobedience is not harmful is self-deception of the most unpardonable kind.

Circumstances may be conceived when such sufferings might be inevitable, but it is the task of statesmanship, particularly in these days of the League and peace pacts, if not of satyagraha, to minimise, if not to avoid, such sufferings. It is a mental aberration to seek suffering; it is criminal to inflict sufferings on others, and a perusal of the correspondence released by Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru and Mr. Jayakar will show that it was sheer wantonness to pretend that present circumstances rendered such sufferings necessary or inevitable. An examination of the demands made in the first instance and the response thereto will reveal that there was substantially no difference between the original position taken up by Pandit Motilal Nehru and the response of the Viceroy.

It will be seen that the terms which were offered by Pandit Motilal in his 'statement' to Mr. George Slocombe on the 25th July last, and which

raised hopes of an honourable settlement, asked for a private assurance that the British Government and the Government of India would support the demand for full responsible government for India subject to adjustments and reservations for the transition period, and for general amnesty to political prisoners. The Pandit did not tag on other administrative reforms which the Government should effect as an indication of a change of heart in the Government. Mahatma Gandhi in his Memorandum of the 23rd July desired that the Round Table Conference should be restricted to a discussion of the safeguards for the transition period and further desired freedom to raise the question of "independence." On the constitutional question, therefore, Mahatma Gandhi and Pandit Motilal asked for assurance on four points: (1) the Conference should discuss the safeguards for the transition period and not such matters as the right and capacity of India to govern herself; (2) the Governments of India and of Britain should support India's claim; (3) full freedom to raise questions like secession, independence, etc.; and (4) acceptance by the British Government of the agreement that may be reached at the Conference.

In his address to the Indian Legislature on the 9th July and in his letter to Mr. Jayakar dated the 16th July, the Viceroy gave a public assurance that he, his Government and His Majesty's Government would do everything in their respective spheres to "assist the people of India to obtain as large a degree of the management of their own affairs as can be shown to be consistent with making provision for those matters in regard to which they are not at present in a position to assume responsibility. What those matters may be and what provisions may best be made for them will engage the attention of the Conference." He had further given the assurance in his speech of the 9th July that the agreement reached at the Conference would be the basis of the legislation that the British Government would lay before Parliament. Thus three points of the four mentioned by Messrs. Gandhi and Motilal Nehru were accepted. As for freedom to raise the question of the right to secede, Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru and Mr. Jayakar, on the strength of their conversations with the Viceroy, were in a position to give an assurance that Mr. Gandhi would not be precluded from raising the question at the Conference, if he so wished. Thus even the fourth point raised by the two leaders was met.

In their joint notes to Mr. Gandhi, Pandits Motilal and Jawaharlal Nehru disapproved of the Mahatma's stand on the constitutional issue as it was, in their opinion, inconsistent with their position, their pledges and the realities of the day. And they further insisted that agreement should be arrived at on all vital matters before the Conference. They did not explain what the Conference was meant to do in that case.

On receipt of their joint notes, the Mahatma shifted his earlier position, which was but "provisional." No constitution would be acceptable to him which did not contain a clause giving India the right to secede. In his first memorandum he wish-

ed that the "question of independence should not be ruled out if anybody raises it" and now the right must be an integral part of the constitution!

In the joint letter dated the 15th August, of the seven Congress leaders, including Messrs. Gandhi and Motilal and Jawaharlal Nehru, the constitutional demand was further shifted and stiffened. India's right to secede at will from the Empire should be recognised in so many words. The public debt of India and British interests in India were to be examined by an impartial outside body and those obligations which could not stand the scrutiny were to be repudiated. Besides, full responsible government, including control of the defence forces, should immediately be conceded and adjustments for the transition period should be determined by India's chosen representatives alone. All these demands had to be conceded by the British Government before the Conference met!

The whole tone of the joint letter of the distinguished Congress leaders assembled in Yeravada was unnecessarily provocative, peremptory and dictatorial, a tone which even a victor in a decisive battle would, if he was wise, not have adopted. It drew a sharp rejoinder from the Viceroy who naturally felt that he had not yet been driven to the position of having to submit to Congress dictation. He was willing to facilitate the return of normal conditions in India and the co-operation of the Congress in framing a constitution for India along with other interests who have a stake in the country; but he was not prepared to capitulate to the Congress.

Nevertheless, the high-minded statesman that he is, he was prevailed upon by the persuasive diplomacy of the negotiators to take sympathetic notice of the points raised by the Congressmen. He reiterated in his letter dated 28th August to Sir Tej Bahadur, that "those attending the Conference would have the unfettered right to examine the whole constitutional problem in all its bearings", which obviously included the right to secede, and the question of the public debt of India. As regards the latter, the Viceroy could not accept a proposition amounting to the total repudiation of all debts, but conceded that it would be open to anybody at the Conference to call for an examination of specific financial liabilities of India. Thus every constitutional demand of the united Congressmen was practically met, in substance, if not in the very words used by the Congressmen. But they chose to see red. They persuaded themselves that the Viceroy's offer regarding self-government for India was too vague to enable them to assess its value. It may be remembered that in his statement to Mr. Slocombe, Pandit Motilal Nehru said that, failing an assurance from the Viceroy, he would be satisfied if he had an indication from a responsible third party that such an assurance would be forthcoming. Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru and Mr. Jayakar, whom the Pandit himself chose as trusted intermediaries, gave him and his Congress colleagues the assurance that, in their opinion, there was substantially no difference between the original demand of the Pandit and the offer of the Viceroy. Even if

the Congressmen were not fully satisfied with this assurance there was no justification to snap off the negotiations and plunge the country into greater turmoil.

We need not consider in detail the other conditions laid down by the Mahatma in the first instance, and agreed to by his colleagues subsequently. With amazing naivety the Mahatma suggested that the Viceroy should give in writing an undertaking that breaches of the Salt Act would be condoned while still it was the law of the land. He also demanded that properties confiscated by the Government not only during the civil disobedience movement but also in the days of the earlier non-co-operation movement of ten years ago, should now be restored irrespective of the rights of third parties. It speaks volumes for the patience and forbearance of the Viceroy and the negotiators that they took these impossible demands seriously and attempted to point out the difficulties in the way of meeting them.

It is clear from the correspondence that the Viceroy was genuinely anxious to help the restoration of peace and goodwill, and that he did all that he could to meet the demands of the reasonable Congressmen and that the latter were in no mood to come to terms. The Mahatma and his colleagues could not have committed a greater blunder than to have broken off the negotiations and could not have done a greater disservice to the country they love than by their truculent and intransigent attitude.

Reviews.

ON MORALITY.

MORALITY IN THE MAKING. By ROY E. WHITNEY. (Macmillan.) 1929. 20cm. 167p. 6/6.

This is a lucid exposition of the principles of what passes by the name of morality. The author goes to the root of the idea of morality and distinguishes moral things from those that merely gratify some one of our senses. There are many things which we call good because they satisfy our desires. But all these things are not necessarily moral or right. We say we have done a right thing when the act gains the approval of others or of ourselves. Every thing that gives us temporary satisfaction is not necessarily approved by us or by others. It is the function of conscience to evaluate satisfactions. Mind desires varied sorts of things. But conscience discriminates, upholds some and rejects others. In this way morality may be considered to be natural for every man and woman is endowed with this conscience. But this conscience is not equally developed in all persons. It requires effort and here comes the importance of the problem of moral education. With our pleasurable experience desires are generated and developed. But as already observed our one desire for self-approval evaluates these experiences. The consequence is that the dictates of conscience limit and prescribe the methods by which we satisfy our desires. Every educator, therefore, must try to so build up desires in a boy that they will not fail to gain self-approval; for the author has well said that desire-building is a moral process. In short all desires approved and released by conscience are said to be moral. Unless a man has made a furious effort to be otherwise he cannot discard morality, for the deep-seated and

inescapable desire for self-approval of one's own acts would not permit him to do so.

An average man with undeveloped or uncritical conscience cannot obviously depend on himself for determining what is moral and what is not moral. In the absence of the capacity for self-approval he relies on the approval of others. Whatever is for the time being approved by the majority he prefers to do. Such a man is morally dependent. He will err if others err. But a man of cultivated conscience exclusively relies on his own approval. Such a man is morally independent. A particular behaviour may obtain the sanction of others, but if it fails to secure the approval of himself he will refuse to act. On the other hand if he approves, but others do not, he will not care for others' disapproval and will do the thing despite it. Thus he sows the seed of moral progress. Mr. Whitney, in our opinion, rightly remarks that though desire for wealth has motivated great achievements, desire for self-approval has rendered civilization possible. In the opinion of the author nature is so set up that fullest satisfaction of the succession of desires is impossible except through moral action. This is generally true. But one can imagine individual cases where most, if not all, immoral desires are easily satisfied. Examine the lives of some voluptuous kings. It is not difficult to conceive that a prudently immoral man can pass his life without any disappointments. Weaker people generally extol morality as they want to create a moral atmosphere without which they cannot hope to live happily in this world. It may therefore be doubted whether a man, when he determines on a particular course of action, is in any way influenced by considerations as to the future effect of his action on others or even on himself. He is only afraid, if at all, of his own conscience; therefore conscience must be developed by corrective treatments since the very infancy of a child. But if any one asks what if the conscience is hardened against all sense of morality and if further a man with such a conscience is able to gratify without any appreciable difficulty the wrong sort of his cravings? What answer would the author give to this question is more than what we can say. A Hindu believes in rebirth and therefore finds it necessary to improve his conscience by corrective methods. The Hindu does not believe, as the author wrongly supposes, that death puts an end to desires. Body dies but not the desires. Latter are indeed the cause of his rebirth. But this apart the book is extremely readable. The treatment of the subject is illuminating. It supplies food for thought. Why should there be any restrictions in the name of morality on the freedom of our actions is the question that vexes many a person, but there are very few who know how to answer it. The perusal of this book is calculated to give them satisfaction.

N. G. CHAPEKAR

A DIPLOMATIC DEAL.

POPE OR MUSSOLINI. By JOHN HEARLEY.
(The Macaulay Co., New York.) 21cm. 256p.
\$ 2-50.

"POPE or Mussolini" is a remarkable study of present day politics and its influence on the future. Mr. John Hearley was attached to the American Embassy at Rome in war days and was later a special correspondent in Italy. He could therefore, get ample opportunities to see things at very close quarters and speak authoritatively.

In 1870 Garibaldi's "Red Shirts" took Rome from the then Pope Pious and imprisoned him. Since that time the Vatican had been a prisoner of the State till in 1929 Mussolini and Pope Pius XI effected

a concordat and established the new Papal State. It was this Roman Question which had proved for over half a century so stubborn to solution. The Pope and the Duce have achieved a seemingly-impossible task. "All honour to them," a layman will cry. But what will be the verdict of the discerning public on this smart piece of work? That is the question, the author has set himself to answer.

Will this solution last? Does it not contain noxious bacilli of dissolution and disruption? how will it affect the sovereignty of the Italian State and the Roman Church? will it tell upon the spiritual influence in the world? will the material power corrupt the holy throne of Peter? these and a host of similar questions come to one's mind after reading the book. The learned author has tried to look at the question more or less from an American's point of view. His observations are shrewd. But they are not sufficient.

Mr. Hearley thinks that to the American Roman Catholics the Vatican appealed more as a prisoner in Rome than as a sovereign. It is a significant observation. A person in distress and suffering will move the deepest sentiments of humankind than all the splendours of royalty and riches. The Pope's is essentially a spiritual throne and he must not descend from its high pedestal for small consideration. Material power has a tendency of debasing its possessor. What does the story of our Peethas and Mathas show? As soon as they began to get from their followers and devotees material gifts, they began to forget their holy mission and degrade themselves into pleasure hunts. The history of the Papacy is no way better. There can be no more depressing and humiliating spectacle than the Popes having natural sons. In the 14th and the 15th centuries the temporal power of the Popes was at its meridian point. They could issue Papal Bulls and make and unmake kings. That brought the Holy See into political entanglements which ultimately proved fatal both to its political and spiritual influence. In course of time it lost its hold on the imagination of the public and in the last century practically became the handmaid of ambitious rulers like Napolean Bonaparte.

The great defect in the concordat is that it does not rest on the popular consent. From the start to the finish it appears like an egregious, individualistic thing. It has not the slightest tinge of democracy about it. Every Italian thinks, and rightly thinks, that the present settlement has made the work of Resorgiments statesmen null and void. It was in vain, they think, that Mazzini, Garibaldi, and Cavour spent their noble lives for the unification of their Fatherland. A sovereign Papal state within the Italian state is an idea which they are not prepared to envisage with equanimity. Every student of international politics will have no hesitation in saying that the pope and the Duce have rendered their nation a disservice.

What is at the back of the settlement? The question comes up to one's mind. Mussolini's offspring, Fascism, is of very recent origin. A Chamberlain here and a Coolidge there may praise the Duce and his Fascimo, but the enlightened public in general views his activities with suspicion and alarm. The impatient Italian statesman could not endure this sort of treatment any longer. His resourceful intellect could see a chance in the international influence of the Holy See. He at once applied himself to the task of effecting some understanding with the Pope, and the now famous concordat is the outcome. Herein lies the motive power that has actuated the Duce to recognise the independent papal State. There was no pious wish in the affair but the negation of it on the contrary.

There does not appear any lofty motive, but the selfish desire of the Italian Dictator to secure international recognition to his despotism—he has done it at the cost of the Pope's spiritual influence. Duce's opinions and observations on religion are too well-known for repetition; the Holy Father also was not on the best of terms with the former. Only a year ago Mussolini was being described by Pope as a "limb of Satan", and to-day the same Satan's limb has become Providential instrument! The present occupant of the Peter's chair is telling the world: "I consider that he (Mussolini) was sent by Providence." What particular deed of piety did Mussolini do in this short period, it is difficult to see. This sudden change in the attitude of the Holy Father towards the Fascist Hero throws a flood of light on the Pontifical-Fascist diplomacy, and give one much food for thought. After reading the book one come to the irresistible conclusion that the alliance between the Duce and the Holy See is definitely unholy.

The book is written with ample knowledge of actual facts in Italian politics, and therefore the author has written it with comparative confidence. The style is easy and convincing, though not altogether free from vehemence. However, "Pope or Mussolini" will prove a valuable addition to the international politics shelf, and as such we must congratulate the author and the publishers on their fine production.

D. V. TAHMANKAR.

BODHISATTWA.

THE VISION OF KWANNON SAMA. A STORY OF FAITH AND LOVE LONG AGO. By B. L. BROUGHTON. (Luzac, London.) 1929. 20cm. 154p. 5/—

KWANNON SAMA OR KWANYIN is one of the two Bodhisattwas attendant on Buddha Amitabha (Japanese, Amida),—the third aspect of Buddha, worshipped in the Far East as the symbol of Infinite Light and Life. *The Vision* is not so much a translation from, as a transfusion of the soul of, an Eastern myth about Kwannon, made by one whose study of Buddhism has been so close as to have taken on the character of self-dedication. So saturated is Mr. Broughton with the literature on Buddhism that his own idiom of thought and language has become oriental. In a scholarly introduction he controverts the common misconceptions of European scholars regarding Mahayana Buddhism, evoking, in passing, the soul of that religion, which is, indeed, the essence of all religion: "He (The Bodhisattwa) made the lesser sacrifice, that of property; the greater sacrifice, that of limbs; the supreme sacrifice, that of life. Throughout the universe there is not a single spot where Buddha has not renounced His life for the sake of living creatures." And a few lines below, the author rightly remarks: "The ideal of the Bodhisattwa is the most beautiful ever presented to the human mind, for a being who deliberately and of set purpose refuses all the rewards of virtue and elects to help the suffering in all worlds is the absolute and ultimate crown of unselfish devotion."

There are in the book a few scattered slips of orthography and grammar, and in one place an inaccuracy of date (e. g. on p. 22, Hwen Tsiang, the famous Chinese pilgrim, is put down to the eighth century A. D. instead of to the seventh). On one page, the mention of flying cars in sundry Oriental poems and legends is to the author adequate proof of their having existed.

The story itself, of Kwannon in her earthly incarnation as Miao Shan, is told with an unflinching

beauty of language, sometimes rising to prose-poetry but always giving the reader the genuine wine of the East albeit in a bottle of the West—the inner meaning of the myth, the infinite compassion of God and His sacrifice for humanity being the same as the doctrine of Christianity. The myth of Kwannon Sama is impregnated with a profound religious significance, and Mr. Broughton has enabled its soul to achieve a metempsychosis.

R. SADASIVA AIYAR.

KU-KLUX-KLAN.

THE KNIGHT OF THE DIXIE WILDS. By WALTER E. TAYLOR. (Meador Publishing Co., Boston.) 1929. 20cm. 280 p. \$ 2.00.

WITH none of the extenuating heroism of Robinhood, Walter Taylor, familiarly known as "Buck" of this tale, wields the avenging rod of the wounded superiority of the White men of Southern United States proclaiming an end to the Negro pretensions to equality of treatment. Having nothing but murderous desigus upon the presuming Nigger, the White fever incarnates as the Ku-Klux-Klan and enters upon its sanguinary programme of purging the land of the free Negro. "If the North has not encouraged and supported the Negroes in their effort to force social equality upon the Southern White people, the Ku-Klux-Klan would never have been organised and thousands of Negroes would have escaped punishment and in some instances, death." No sooner the North triumphs over the Southern slave-drivers than they migrate to the backwoods, hiding in which they seek to ward off the Negro peril. More than once "Buck" is caught in the trap of law while engaged in his head-hunting depredations and he is freed from it by the cunning missions of the Klan. His wild heart softens only to the touch of love and he finds himself unable to fix his affections. Blunderingly at last he casts his choice in favour of Kate and becomes domesticated. The story is frankly a shocker. It is all a defence of the savage sense of superiority of the White men of Southern United States and as such will appeal to the Sanatanist Ku-Klux-Klansmen of India who help to prolong the misery of the untouchables.

K. VENUGOPAL RAO.

EMPIRE UNIVERSITIES.

THE YEAR BOOK OF THE UNIVERSITIES OF THE EMPIRE. Ed. by Sir H. FRANK HEATH (Bell, London) 1930. 20cm. 840p. 15/—

THIS is an exceedingly useful reference book which gives information about universities in the British Empire. These number 70, 15 of which are in India. This number must be increased by one, for the year-book does not make any mention of the Annamalai University which is at work now for two or three years. We hope this omission will be made good in the next issue of the Yearbook. But the book does not content itself by merely supplying much necessary information about universities; its appendices tell us much that we should know about such matters as e. g. professions and careers for which university studies are a fitting preparation, conditions for the grant of commissions in H. M.' S. forces, admission of students from abroad to universities of Great Britain and Ireland, centres of scientific research and information, etc. If one were to hunt up all this information, it could be done only at disproportionate cost of money and time; and there is no doubt that those who have made themselves responsible for the Year-book have done a very useful public service.

D.

PEACE PARLEYS.

The facts connected with the efforts which we have been making for over two months for the restoration of peaceful conditions in the country are as follows:—

1. On the 20th June, 1930, Pandit Motilal Nehru gave an interview to Mr. Slocombe, the special correspondent of the *Daily Herald* (London), with regard to his views about attending the Round Table Conference. This interview has already appeared in the Press in India.

2. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Slocombe had conversation with Pandit Motilal Nehru in Bombay, as a result of which certain terms were drafted by Mr. Slocombe and submitted to Pandit Motilal Nehru, and approved by him at a meeting in Bombay at which Pandit Motilal Nehru, Mr. Jayakar and Mr. Slocombe were present. One copy of these terms was sent to Mr. Jayakar by Mr. Slocombe as the basis agreed upon by Pandit Motilal Nehru for his (Mr. Jayakar's) or any third party's approach to the Viceroy.

3. Mr. Slocombe likewise addressed a letter to Dr. Sapru at Simla, forwarding a copy of these terms. In the course of this letter Mr. Slocombe said that Pandit Motilal Nehru had agreed to our acting as intermediaries for the purpose of approaching the Viceroy on the basis of these terms. We give below the full text of this document.

Statement submitted to Pandit Motilal Nehru in Bombay on June 25, 1930, and approved as basis of informal approach to the Viceroy by a third party.

If in certain circumstances the British Government and the Government of India, although unable to anticipate the recommendations that may in perfect freedom be made by the Round Table Conference, or the attitude which the British Parliament may reserve for such recommendations,

would nevertheless be willing to give a private assurance that they would support a demand for full responsible government for India, subject to such mutual adjustments and terms of transfer as are required by the special needs and conditions of India and by her long association with Great Britain, and as may be decided by the Round Table Conference,

Pandit Motilal Nehru would undertake to take personally such an assurance—or the indication received from a responsible third party that such an assurance would be forthcoming—to Mr. Gandhi and to Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru.

If such an assurance were offered and accepted, it would render possible a general measure of conciliation which should entail the simultaneous calling off of the Civil Disobedience movement, the cessation of the Government's present repressive policy, and a generous measure of amnesty for political prisoners, and would be followed by Congress participation in the Round Table Conference on terms to be mutually agreed upon."

4. On the basis of this document, we interviewed H. E. the Viceroy at Simla more than once in the early part of July last and explained to him the situation in the country and ultimately wrote to him a letter which is quoted below:—

Hotel Cecil,
Simla,
13th July 1930.

"Dear Lord Irwin,

We would beg leave to draw Your Excellency's attention to the political situation in the country, which, in our opinion, makes it imperative that some steps should be taken without any loss of time to restore normal conditions.

We are alive to the dangers of the Civil Disobedience movement with which neither of us has sympathised nor been associated, but we feel that in the contest between the people and the Government which has involved the adoption of a policy of repression and consequent embitterment of popular feeling, the true and abiding interests of the country are apt to be sacrificed.

We think that it is our duty to our country and to Government that we should make an endeavour to ameliorate the present situation by discussing the question with some of the leaders of the movement in the hope and belief that we may be able to persuade them to help in the restoration of normal conditions.

If we have read Your Excellency's speech aright, we think that while Your Excellency and your Government feel compelled to resist the Civil Disobedience movement, you are not less anxious to explore every possibility of finding an agreed solution of the constitutional problem.

We need scarcely say that we believe that with the cessation of the movement there will be no occasion for a continuance on the part of Government of the present policy and those emergency measures which have been passed by Government to implement that policy.

We, therefore, approach Your Excellency with a request that you may be pleased to permit us to interview Mr. Gandhi, Pandit Motilal Nehru and Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, so that we may put our point of view before them and urge them in the interest of the country to respond to our appeal to enable the big issue of constitutional advance being solved in a calm atmosphere.

We desire to make it plain that in going to them we shall be going on our own behalf and we do not profess to represent either Government or any party, in taking this step. If we fail in our attempt the responsibility will be ours.

Should Your Excellency be pleased to grant us permission to see these gentlemen in jail we shall request you to issue the necessary orders to the Local Governments concerned to allow us all necessary facilities.

We further request that if the necessary permission is granted to us we may be allowed to talk to them privately without there being any Officer of Government present at our interview.

We further submit that in our opinion it is desirable that we should see them at the earliest possible date. Reply to this letter may be sent to Mr. Jayakar at the Hotel Cecil."

Yours sincerely,
TEJ BAHADUR SAPRU.
M. R. JAYAKAR.

5. To the above letter the Viceroy wrote the following reply:—

Viceregal Lodge, Simla,
16th July, 1930.

Dear Mr. Jayakar,

I have received your letter of July 13 in which you and Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru state your desire to do all in your power to bring about the return of peaceful conditions in the country and ask for permission to approach Mr. Gandhi, Pandit Motilal Nehru and Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru with this object. I had occasion in my address to the Legislature on July 9 to define the attitude of myself and my Government both to the Civil Disobedience movement and to the constitutional issues. We consider that the Civil Disobedience movement is doing unmixed harm to the cause of India and many important communities, classes and parties hold the same view. With their help, therefore, the Government must continue to oppose it by all means in their power.

But you rightly recognise that we are not less anxious to see the achievement of the solution of the constitutional problem by agreement among all interests concerned.

It is evidently not possible for me to anticipate the proposals that will be made by the Government of India after they have had time to consider the Statutory Commission's Report or by the Round Table Conference and still less the decisions of Parliament.

But I made it plain in my speech that it remains my earnest desire, as it is that of my Government, and I have no doubt also that of His Majesty's Government, to do everything that we can in our respective spheres to assist the people of India to obtain as large a degree of the management of their own affairs as can be shown to be consistent with making provision for those matters in regard to which they are not at present in a position to assume responsibility.

What those matters may be and what provisions may best be made for them will engage the attention of the Conference, but I have never believed that with mutual confidence on both sides, it should be impossible to reach an agreement. If, therefore, you believe that by the action proposed you may be able to assist in the restoration of normal conditions in the country, it would not be right for me or my Government to interpose any obstacles to your efforts.

Nor do I think that those who have stood side by side with my Government in steadily opposing the Civil Disobedience movement and whose co-operation I so much value would wish me to do so. On hearing from you, I will accordingly ask the Local Governments concerned to issue the necessary instructions which will enable you to make your public-spirited attempt in the cause of peace in India."

Yours sincerely,
IRWIN.

6. With these two documents we interviewed Mr. Gandhi at the Yeravada Jail in Poona on the 23rd and 24th July 1930. During the interview we explained to Mr. Gandhi the whole position and gave him the substance of our conversations with the Viceroy. Mr. Gandhi gave us the following note and letter, to be handed over to Pandits Motilal Nehru and Jawaharlal Nehru at the Naini Jail in Allahabad :—

Mr. Gandhi's Note.

Constitutional issue.

"(1) So far as this question is concerned, my personal position is that if the Round Table Confe-

rence is restricted to a discussion of safeguards that may be necessary in connection with full Self-Government during the period of transition, I should have no objection, it being understood that the question of independence should not be ruled out if any body raises it. I should be satisfied before I could endorse the idea of the Congress attending the Conference about its whole composition.

Civil Disobedience and its calling off.

(2) If the Congress is satisfied as to the Round Table Conference, naturally civil disobedience would be called off, that is to say, disobedience of certain laws for the sake of disobedience, but peaceful picketing of foreign cloth and liquor will be continued unless the Government themselves can enforce prohibition of liquor and foreign cloth, but manufacture of salt by the populace will have to be continued and the penal clauses of the Salt Act should not be enforced. There will be no raids on Government Salt Depots or private depots. I will agree even if this clause is not made a clause in these terms, but is accepted as an understanding in writing.

- (3) (a) Simultaneously with the calling off of civil disobedience, all Satyagrahi prisoners and other political prisoners convicted or under trial, who have not been guilty of violence or incitement to violence, should be ordered to be released, and
- (b) properties confiscated under the Salt Act and Press Act and Revenue Act and the like should be restored, and
- (c) fines and securities taken from convicted Satyagrahis or under the Press Act should be refunded.
- (d) All officers including village officers who have resigned or who may have been dismissed during the civil disobedience movement and who may desire to rejoin Government service should be restored.
- N.B.* The foregoing should refer also to the non-cooperation period.
- (e) Viceregal ordinances should be repealed.

This opinion of mine is purely provisional, because I consider that a prisoner has no right to pronounce any opinion upon political activities of which he cannot possibly have a full grasp while he is shut out of personal contact. I therefore feel that my opinion is not entitled to the weight I should claim for it, if I was in touch with the movement.

Mr. Jayakar and Dr. Sapru may show this to Pandit Motilal Nehru, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Mr. Vallabhbhai Patel and those who are in charge of the movement. Nothing to appear in the Press.

This is not to be shown to the Viceroy at this stage.

Even if the foregoing terms are accepted I should not care to attend the Conference unless in the event of going out of the prison I gained self-confidence which I have not at present and unless among those Indians who would be invited there was a preliminary conversation and an agreement as to the minimum by which they should stand under all circumstances.

I reserve to myself the liberty, when the occasion arises, of testing every Swaraj scheme by its ability to satisfy the object underlying the eleven points mentioned in my letter to the Viceroy."

23-7-30 Y. C. P.

M. K. GANDHI.

Mr. Gandhi's Letter.

"Dear Motilalji,

My position is essentially awkward. Being temperamentally so built, I cannot give a decisive opinion on matters happening outside the prison walls. What I have therefore given to our friends is the roughest draft of what is likely to satisfy me personally. You may not know that I was disinclined to give anything to Slocombe and wanted him to discuss things with you. But I could not resist his appeal and let him publish the interview before seeing you.

At the same time I do not want to stand in the way of an honourable settlement, if the time for it is ripe. I have grave doubts about it. But after all Jawaharlal's must be the final voice. You and I can only give our advice to him. What I have said in my memorandum given to Sir Tej Bahadur and Mr. Jayakar is the utmost limit to which I can go. But Jawahar and for that matter also you may consider my position to be inconsistent with the intrinsic Congress policy or the present temper of the people. I should have no hesitation in supporting any stronger position upto the letter of the Lahore resolution. You need therefore attach no weight to my memorandum unless it finds an echo in the hearts of you both.

I know that neither you nor Jawahar were enamoured of the eleven points brought out in my first letter to the Viceroy. I do not know whether you still have the same opinion. My own mind is quite clear about them. They are to me the substance of independence. I should have nothing to do with anything that would not give the nation the power to give immediate effect to them. In restricting myself to the three only in the memorandum, I have not waived the other eight. But the three are now brought out to deal with civil disobedience. I would be no party to any truce which would undo the position at which we have arrived to-day."

23-7-30 }
Yeravada Mandir. }

Yours sincerely,
M. K. GANDHI."

7. Accordingly on the 27th and 28th of July 1930 we saw Pandits Motilal Nehru and Jawaharlal Nehru in the Naini jail at Allahabad and after a review of the entire position in the light of the Viceroy's letter and Mr. Gandhi's note and the letter referred to above, Pandits Motilal and Jawaharlal Nehru gave us the following two documents to be taken to Mr. Gandhi at the Yeravada jail in Poona:—

Memorandum, dated the 28th July, 1930, by
Messrs. Motilal Nehru and Jawaharlal Nehru,
Central Prison, Naini, Allahabad.

"We have had long conversations with Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru and Mr. M. R. Jayakar and they have informed us of the various events which led to their seeking interviews with Gandhiji and with us in our respective prisons in order, if possible, to terminate or to suspend the present hostilities between the people of India and the British Government. We appreciate their earnest desire for peace and would gladly explore all avenues which might lead to it, provided that such a peace was an honourable one for the people of India, who have already sacrificed so much in the national struggle, and meant freedom for our country. As representatives of the Congress we have no authority to alter in any material particular its resolutions, but we might be prepared, under certain circumstances, to recommend a variation in details, provided the fundamental position taken up by the Congress was accepted.

We are however faced with an initial difficulty. Both of us are in prison and for sometime past have been cut off from the outside world and the national movement. One of us, for nearly three months, was not allowed any daily newspaper. Gandhiji has also been in prison for several months. Indeed almost all our colleagues of the original Working Committee of the Congress are in prison and the Committee itself has been declared an illegal organisation. Of the 360 members of the All-India Congress Committee, which is the final authority in the National Congress organisation, subject only to the full session of the Congress, probably 75 per cent. of the members are in prison. Cut off as we are from the national movement, we cannot take upon ourselves the responsibility of taking a definite step without the fullest consultation with our colleagues, and especially with Gandhiji.

As regards the Round Table Conference, we feel that it is unlikely to achieve anything unless an agreement on all vital matters is previously arrived at. We attach great importance to such an agreement which must be definite and there must be no room for misunderstanding or misinterpretation. Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru and Mr. M. R. Jayakar have made it very clear, and Lord Irwin has also stated in his published letter to them, that they are acting on their own behalf and cannot commit him or his Government. It is however possible that they may succeed in paving the way to such an agreement between the Congress and the British Government.

As we are unable to suggest any definite terms for a truce without previously consulting Gandhiji and other colleagues, we refrain from discussing the suggestions made by Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru and Mr. M. R. Jayakar and by Gandhiji in a note of his dated 23rd July which has been shown to us. We might add however that we agree generally with Mr. Gandhi's 2nd and 3rd points. But we should like the details of these points and specially his point (1) to discuss with him and others before we can finally make our suggestions.

We suggest that this note of ours be treated as confidential and be shown only to such persons as see Gandhiji's note dated 23rd July, 1930.

Central Prison, }
Naini, }
July 28th, 1930. }

MOTILAL NEHRU.

J. NEHRU."

Letter dated 28th July 1930, from Messrs. Motilal Nehru and Jawaharlal Nehru, Central Prison, Naini, Allahabad to Mr. M. K. Gandhi, Yeravada Jail, Poona.

Central Prison,
Naini,
28th July 1930.

"My dear Bapuji,

It is a delight to write to you again after a long interval even though it be from one prison to another. I would like to write at length but I am afraid I cannot do so at present. I shall, therefore, confine myself to the matter in issue.

Dr. Sapru and Mr. Jayakar came yesterday and had a long interview with father and me. To-day they are coming again. As they have already put us in possession of all the facts and have shown us your note and letter we felt that we could discuss the matter between us two and arrive at some decision even without waiting for the second interview. Of course if anything new turns up at the 2nd interview we are prepared to vary any previously formed opinion. Our conclusions for the time being are given in a note which we are giving to Dr. Sapru

and Mr. Jayakar. This is more or less brief but it will, I hope, give you some idea of how our minds are working. I might add that father and I are in full agreement in regard to what our attitude should be.

I might confess that your point (1) regarding the "constitutional issue" has not won me over. Nor does father fancy it. I do not see how it fits in with our position or our pledges or with the realities of to-day. Father and I entirely agree with you that we can be "no parties to any truce which would undo the position at which we have arrived to-day." It is because of this that the fullest consideration is essential before any final decision is arrived at. I must confess that I do not see an appreciable advance yet from the other side and I greatly fear a false or a weak move on our part. I am expressing myself moderately. For myself, I delight in warfare. It makes me feel that I am alive. The events of the last four months in India have gladdened my heart and have made me prouder of Indian-men and women and even children than I have ever been. But I realise that most people are not warlike and like peace and so I try hard to suppress myself and take a peaceful view.

May I congratulate you on the new India that you have created by your magic touch? What the future will bring I know not, but the past has made life worth living and our prosaic existence has developed something of epic greatness in it. Sitting here in Naini Jail I have pondered on the wonderful efficacy of non-violence as a weapon and have become a greater convert to it than ever before. I hope you are not dissatisfied with the response of the country to the non-violence creed. Despite occasional lapses the country has stuck to it wonderfully—certainly far more grimly than I had expected.

I am afraid I am still somewhat of a protestant regarding your 11 points. Not that I disagree with any one of them. Indeed they are important. Yet I do not think they take the place of independence. But I certainly agree with you that we should have "nothing to do with anything that would not give the nation the power to give immediate effect to them."

Father has been unwell for the last 8 days ever since he took an injection. He has grown very weak. This long interview last evening tired him out.

JAWAHARLAL.

Please do not be anxious about me. It is only a passing trouble and I hope to get over it in two or three days. Love.

MOTILAL NEHRU."

We have had another talk with Dr. Sapru and Mr. Jayakar. At their desire we have made some alterations in our note but they do not make any vital difference. Our position is quite clear and I have no doubt whatever about it. I hope you will appreciate it."

8. Accordingly Mr. Jayakar alone saw Mr. Gandhi on the 31st July, the 1st and 2nd of August, when Mr. Gandhi dictated to him a note to the following effect:—

"(1) No constitution scheme would be acceptable to Mr. Gandhi which did not contain a clause allowing India the right to secede from the Empire at her desire, and another clause which gave the right and power to India to deal satisfactorily with his eleven points.

(2) The Viceroy should be made aware of this position of Mr. Gandhi in order that the Viceroy should not consider later that these views of Mr. Gandhi had taken him by surprise when they were urged at the Round Table Conference.

(3) The Viceroy should also be made aware that Mr. Gandhi would insist at the Round Table Conference on a clause giving India the right to have examined by an independent tribunal all claims and concessions given to Britishers in the past."

9. After that, a joint interview took place at the Yeravada jail in Poona on the 13th, 14th and 15th of August between us on the one hand and Mr. Gandhi, Pandits Motilal Nehru and Jawaharlal Nehru, Mr. Vallabhbhai Patel, Dr. Mahmud, Mr. Jairam Das Daulat Ram, and Mrs. Naidu on the other. As a result of our conversation with them on these occasions the Congress leaders gave us a letter with permission to show it to the Viceroy. This letter is set out below:—

Yeravada Central Prison,
15th August 1930.

"Dear Friends,

We are deeply grateful to you for having undertaken the duty of trying to effect a peaceful settlement between the British Government and the Congress. After having perused the correspondence between yourselves and His Excellency the Viceroy, and having had the benefit of protracted talks with you, and having discussed among ourselves, we have come to the conclusion that the time is not yet ripe for securing a settlement honourable for our country. Marvellous as has been the mass awakening during the past five months and great as have been the sufferings of the people among all grades and classes representing different creeds, we feel that the sufferings have been neither sustained enough nor large enough for the immediate attainment of the end.

Needless to mention that we do not in any way share your view or the Viceroy's that civil disobedience has harmed the country or that it is ill-timed or that it is unconstitutional. English history teems with instances of bloody revolts whose praises Englishmen have sung unstintingly and taught us to do likewise. It, therefore, ill becomes the Viceroy or any intelligent Englishman to condemn a revolt that is in intention, and that has overwhelmingly remained in execution, peaceful. But we have no desire to quarrel with the condemnation whether official or unofficial of the present civil disobedience campaign. The wonderful mass response to the movement is, we hold, its sufficient justification. What is, however, to the point here is the fact that we gladly make common cause with you in wishing, if it is at all possible, to stop or suspend civil disobedience. It can be no pleasure to us needlessly to expose the men, women and even children of our country to imprisonment, lathi charges and worse. You will, therefore, believe us when we assure you, and through you the Viceroy, that we would leave no stone unturned to explore any and every channel for an honourable peace. But we are free to confess that as yet we see no such sign on the horizon. We notice no symptom of conversion of the English official world to the view that it is India's men and women who must decide what is best for India. We distrust the pious declarations of good intentions, often well meant, of officials. The age-long exploitation by the English of the people of this ancient land has rendered them almost incapable of seeing the ruin—moral, economic and political—of our country, which this exploitation has brought about. They cannot persuade themselves to see that the one thing needful for them to do is to get off our backs and to do some reparation for the past wrongs by helping us to grow out of the dwarfing process that has gone on for a century of British domination. But we know that you and some of our learned countrymen think differently. You believe that a conver-

sion has taken place, at any rate sufficient to warrant a participation in the proposed Conference. In spite, therefore, of the limitation we are labouring under, we would gladly cooperate with you to the extent of our ability. The following is the utmost response, it is possible for us, circumstanced as we are, to make to your friendly endeavour:—

1. We feel that the language used by the Viceroy in the reply given to your letter about the proposed Conference is too vague to enable us to assess its value in terms of the national demand framed last year at Lahore, nor are we in a position to say anything authoritative without reference to a properly constituted meeting of the Working Committee of the Congress and, if necessary, to the A. I. C. C. But we can say that for us individually no solution will be satisfactory unless

- (i) it recognises, in as many words, the right of India to secede at will from the British Empire;
- (ii) it gives to India complete National Government responsible to her people, including control of the defence forces, and economic control and covers all the eleven points raised in Gandhiji's letter to the Viceroy; and
- (iii) it gives to India the right to refer, if necessary, to an independent tribunal such British claims and concessions and the like, including the so-called public debt of India, as may seem to the National Government, to be unjust or not in the interest of the people of India.

Note:—Such adjustments as may be necessitated in the interests of India during the transference of power to be determined by India's chosen representatives.

2. If the foregoing appears to be feasible to the British Government and a satisfactory declaration is made to that effect, we should recommend to the Working Committee the advisability of calling off Civil Disobedience, that is to say, disobedience of certain laws for the sake of disobedience. But peaceful picketing of foreign cloth and liquor will be continued unless the Government themselves can enforce prohibition of liquor and foreign cloth. The manufacture of salt by the people will have to be continued and the penal clauses of the Salt Act should not be enforced. There will be no raids on Government or private Salt Depots.
3. Simultaneously with the calling off of civil disobedience,
 - (a) all Satyagrahi prisoners and other political prisoners, convicted or under trial, who have not been guilty of violence or incitement to violence, should be ordered to be released, and
 - (b) properties confiscated under the Salt Act and Press Act and Revenue Act and the like should be restored, and
 - (c) fines and securities taken from convicted Satyagrahis or under the Press Act should be refunded.
 - (d) all officers including village officers who have resigned or who may have been dismissed during the civil disobedience movement and who may desire to rejoin Government service should be reinstated.

Note:—The foregoing sub-clauses refer also to the non-cooperation period.

(e) All Viceregal Ordinances should be repealed.

4. The question of composition of the proposed Conference and of the Congress being represented at it, can only be decided after the foregoing preliminaries, are satisfactorily settled."

Yours sincerely,

MOTILAL NEHRU.
M. K. GANDHI.
SAROJINI NAIDU.
VALLABHBHAI PATEL.
JAIRAMDAS DOULATRAM.
SYED MAHMUD.
J. NEHRU."

We sent them the following reply from Bombay:—

Winter Road,
Malabar Hill,
Bombay, 16th August 1930.

"Dear Friends,

We desire to express our thanks to you all for the courteous and patient hearing which you have been good enough to give us, on the several occasions on which we have visited you either at Poona or at Allahabad. We regret that we should have caused you so much inconvenience by these prolonged conversations, and we are particularly sorry that Pandit Motilal Nehru should have been put to the trouble of coming down to Poona, at a time when his health was so bad.

We beg formally to acknowledge receipt of the letter which you have handed to us and in which you state the terms on which you are prepared to recommend to the Congress the calling off of Civil Disobedience and participation in the Round Table Conference.

As we have informed you we took up this work of mediation on the basis of

- (1) the terms of an interview given by Pandit Motilal, the then Acting President of the Congress, to Mr. Slocombe in Bombay on 20th June, 1930, and particularly
- (2) the terms of the statement submitted by Mr. Slocombe to Pandit Motilal Nehru in Bombay on 25th June 1930, and approved by him (Pandit Motilal Nehru) as the basis of informal approach to the Viceroy by us.

Mr. Slocombe forwarded both the documents to us, and we thereupon approached His Excellency the Viceroy for permission to interview Mahatma Gandhi, Pandits Motilal Nehru and Jawaharlal Nehru, in order to explore the possibilities of a settlement. A copy of the second document referred to above has been taken by you from us.

We now find that the terms embodied in the letter you gave us on the 14th instant are such that, as agreed between us, it must be submitted to His Excellency the Viceroy for his consideration, and we have to await his decision.

We note your desire that the material documents relating to these peace negotiations including your said letter to us should be published, and we shall proceed to do so, after His Excellency the Viceroy has considered your letter.

Before we conclude, you will permit us to say that we had reasons to believe, as we told you, that with the actual calling off of the Civil Disobedience movement, the general situation would largely improve, non-violent political prisoners would be released, all Ordinances, with the exception of those

affecting Chittagong and the Lahore Conspiracy cases would be recalled, and the Congress would get a representation at the Round Table Conference, larger than that of any other single political party. We need scarcely add that we emphasized also that, in our opinion, there was substantially no difference between the point of view adopted by Pandit Motilal Nehru in his "interview" and the statement sent to us by Mr. Slocombe with Pandit Motilal's approval and His Excellency the Viceroy's letter to us.

Yours sincerely,
TEJ BAHADUR SAPRU.
M. R. JAYAKAR."

11. Thereafter Mr. Jayakar alone took the letter of the Congress leaders to Simla on the 21st August and had conversations with the Viceroy. Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru joined him on the 25th August. We then had several interviews with the Viceroy and some Members of his Council between the 25th and the 27th August. As a result of the same the Viceroy gave to each of us a letter to be shown to the Congress leaders at Allahabad and Poona. The following is the text of that letter:—

Viceregal Lodge,
Simla,
28th August 1930.

"Dear Sir Tej Bahadur,

I have to thank you for informing me of the results of conversation held by Mr. Jayakar and yourself with the Congress leaders now in prison, and for sending me copies of their joint letter of the 15th August and of your reply thereto. I should wish you and Mr. Jayakar both to know how great has been my appreciation of the spirit in which you have pursued your self-imposed and public-spirited task of endeavouring to assist in the restoration of normal conditions in India.

It is worth recalling the conditions under which you entered upon your undertaking. In my letter of July 16th I assured you that it was the earnest desire of myself, my Government, and I had no doubt also of His Majesty's Government, to do everything that we could to assist the people of India to obtain as large a degree of management of their own affairs as could be shown to be consistent with making provision for those matters, in regard to which they were not at present in a position to assume responsibility. It would be among the functions of the Conference to examine in the light of all the material available what those matters might be, and what provision might best be made for them. I had previously made two other points plain in my speech to the Legislature on July 9th, first, that those attending the Conference would have the unfettered right of examining the whole constitutional problem in all its bearings, and, secondly, that any agreement, at which the Conference was able to arrive, would form the basis of the proposals which His Majesty's Government would later submit to Parliament.

I fear, as you will no doubt recognise, that the task you had voluntarily undertaken has not been assisted by the letter you have received from the Congress leaders. In view both of the general tone by which that letter is inspired and of its contents, as also of its blank refusal to recognise the grave injury to which the country has been subjected by the Congress policy, not least in the economic field, I do not think that any useful purpose would be served by my attempting to deal in detail with the suggestions there made, and I must frankly say that I regard discussion on the basis of the proposals contained in the letter as impossible. I hope, if you

desire to see the Congress leaders again, that you will make this plain.

There is one further comment that I must make upon the last paragraph of your reply to them, dated August 16th. When we discussed these matters I said that if the Civil Disobedience movement was in fact abandoned, I should not desire to continue Ordinances (apart from those connected with the Lahore Conspiracy case and Chittagong) necessitated by a situation which *ex hypothesi* would no longer exist. But I was careful to make it plain that I was unable to give any assurance, if and when the Civil Disobedience movement ceased, that Local Governments would find it possible to release *all* persons convicted or under trial for offences in connection with the movement not involving violence, and that while I should wish to see a generous policy pursued in this matter, the utmost that I could promise would be to move all Local Governments to consider with sympathy all cases individually on their merits. Upon the point of your reference to the representation of Congress at the Conference in the event of their abandoning the Civil Disobedience movement and desiring to attend, my recollection is that you explained the demand of Congress was not for predominant, in the sense of majority, representation of the whole Conference and that I expressed the view that I should anticipate little difficulty in recommending His Majesty's Government to secure that Congress should be adequately represented. I added that if events so developed, I should be ready to receive a panel of names, from the leaders of the Congress party, of those whom they would regard as suitable representatives.

I feel that you and Mr. Jayakar would desire to be clearly informed of the position of myself and of my Government, as it may be desirable that the letters should be published at an early date, in order that the public may be fully informed of the circumstances in which your efforts have failed to produce the result that you hoped and that they so certainly deserved.

Yours sincerely,
IRWIN."

12. The Viceroy also permitted us to mention to the Congress leaders the result of our conversations with him on certain specific points raised by us in connection with the letter of the Congress leaders.

13. We left Simla on the 28th August and interviewed Pandits Motilal Nehru, Jawaharlal Nehru and Dr. Mahmud at the Naini jail in Allahabad on the 30th and 31st August. We showed them the said letter of the Viceroy and placed before them the result of our conversations. *We explained to them that with reference to the several points raised in their letter to us of the 15th August and not covered in the Viceroy's letter of the 28th August, we had reason to believe, from the conversations we had with the Viceroy, that a settlement was possible on the following basis:—*

- (a) On the constitutional question the position would be as stated in the fundamental points in para 2 of the Viceroy's letter to us of the 28th August.
- (b) With reference to the question whether Mr. Gandhi would be allowed to raise at the Round Table Conference the question of India's right to secede from the Empire at will, the position was as follows:—

As the Viceroy had stated in his said letter to us, the Conference was a free Conference; therefore, any one could raise

any point he liked, but it would be very unwise for Mr. Gandhi to raise this question now. If, however, he faced the Government of India with such a question, they would say that they were not prepared to treat it as an open question. If, in spite of this, Mr. Gandhi desired to raise the question, Government should inform the Secretary of State of his intention to do so at the Round Table Conference.

- (c) As regards the right to raise the question, at the Round Table Conference, of India's liability to certain financial burdens and to get them examined by an independent tribunal, the position was that the Viceroy could not entertain any proposition amounting to a total repudiation of all debts but it would be open to any one to raise at the Round Table Conference any question as to any financial liability of India and to call for an examination.
- (d) As regards granting relief against the Salt Act, the position was that (i) the Salt tax was going to be provincialised if the recommendation of the Simon Commission in that behalf was accepted, and (ii) there had already been a great loss of revenue and therefore, Government would not like to forego this source, but if the Legislature was persuaded to repeal the Salt Act and if any proposal was put forward to make good the loss of revenue occasioned by such repeal, the Viceroy and his Government should consider the question on its merits. It was not, however, possible for the Viceroy to condone open breaches of the Salt Act so long as it was law. When goodwill and peace were restored and if Indian leaders desired to discuss with the Viceroy and his Government how best economic relief in this behalf could be given to poorer classes, the Viceroy should call a small conference of Indian leaders.
- (e) With reference to picketing, the position was to be that if picketing amounted to nuisance to any class of people or was coupled with molestation or intimidation or use of force, the Viceroy was to reserve to the Government the right of taking such action as the law allowed, or taking such legal powers as might be necessary to meet any emergency that might arise. Subject as above, when peace was established the Ordinance against picketing should be withdrawn.
- (f) With regard to the re-employment of officers who had resigned or had been dismissed during the Civil Disobedience campaign, the position was that this matter was primarily a question for the discretion of the local Governments. Subject however to there being vacancies and so long as it did not involve dismissing men who had been employed by the Government during the period of their trouble and who had proved loyal, the local Governments should be asked to re-employ men who had thrown up their appointments in a fit of excitement or who had been swept off their feet.
- (g) As for the restoration of printing presses confiscated under the Press Ordinance, there should be no difficulty.

(h) As regards restoration of fines and properties confiscated under the revenue law, that required a closer definition. As to properties confiscated and sold under such law, there might be rights of third parties involved. As to refunding of fines there were difficulties. As regards these the Viceroy should ask the local Governments to exercise their discretion with justice and take all the circumstances into consideration and try to be as accommodating as they could.

(i) As to the release of prisoners, the Viceroy had already explained his view in his letter to us dated the 28th July.

We made it clear to Pandits Motilal Nehru and Jawaharlal Nehru and Dr. Mahmud during the said two interviews with us that, though the time before us was limited, further progress with our negotiations was possible on the lines indicated above. They however expressed their unwillingness to accept any settlement on this basis and gave us a note for Mr. Gandhi which is as follows:—

Note For Gandhiji.

Naini Central Prison,
August 31, 1930.

"We have had further interviews with Messrs. Jayakar and Sapru yesterday and to-day and have had the advantage of long talks with them. They have given us a copy of a letter dated 28th August addressed to them by Lord Irwin. In this letter it is stated clearly that Lord Irwin regards discussion on the basis of the proposals contained in our joint letter of August 15 to Messrs. Sapru and Jayakar as impossible and under the circumstances, he rightly concludes that their efforts have failed to produce any result. This joint letter, as you know, was written after full consideration by the signatories to it and represented the utmost they were prepared to go, in their individual capacities. We stated there that no solution would be satisfactory unless it fulfilled certain vital conditions and a satisfactory declaration to that effect was made by the British Government. If such a declaration was made, we would be prepared to recommend to the Working Committee the advisability of calling off Civil Disobedience, provided that simultaneously certain steps, indicated in our letter, were taken by the British Government in India. It was only after a satisfactory settlement of all these preliminaries that the question of the composition of the proposed London Conference, and of the Congress being represented at it could be decided.

Lord Irwin in his letter considers even a discussion on the basis of these proposals as impossible. Under the circumstances there is or can be no common ground between us. Quite apart from the contents and tone of the letter, the recent activities of the British Government in India clearly indicate that the Government has no desire yet for peace. The proclamation of the Working Committee as an illegal body in Delhi province soon after a meeting of it was announced to be held there, and the subsequent arrest of most of its members can have that meaning and no other. We have no complaint against these or other arrests or the other activities of the Government, uncivilised and barbarous as we consider some of these to be. We welcome them. But we feel we are justified in pointing out that a desire for peace and an aggressive attack on the very body which is capable of giving peace and with which it is sought to treat, do not go well together. The proscription of the Working Committee all over India and the attempt to prevent its meetings

must necessarily mean that the national struggle must go on, whatever the consequences, and that there will be no possibility of peace, for those who may have some authority to represent the people of India will be spread out in British prisons all over India.

Lord Irwin's letter and the action taken by the British Government make it plain that the efforts of Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru and Mr. M. R. Jayakar have been in vain. Indeed the letter and some of the explanations that have been given to us take us back, in some respects, even from the position that was previously taken. In view of the great hiatus that exists between our position and Lord Irwin's, it is hardly necessary to go into details, but we should like to point out to you certain aspects of his letter.

The first part of the letter is practically a repetition of his speech in the Assembly and of the phrases used in his letter dated 16th July addressed to Messrs. Jayakar and Sapru. As we pointed out in our joint letter this phraseology is too vague for us to assess its value. It may be made to mean anything or nothing. In our joint letter we have made it clear that complete national Government responsible to the people of India, including control of the defence forces and economic control, must be recognised as India's immediate demand.

There is no question of what are usually called "Safeguards" or any delay. Adjustments there necessarily must be for the transference of power, and in regard to these we stated that they were to be determined by India's chosen representatives.

In regard to India's right to secession at will from the British Empire and her right to refer British claims and concessions to an independent tribunal, all we are told is that the conference will be a free conference and any point can be raised there. This is no advance on the previous statement made. We are further told however that if the British Government in India were definitely faced with the possibility of the former question being raised, Lord Irwin would say that they were not prepared to treat it as an open question. All they could do was to inform the Secretary of State of our intention to raise the question at the Conference. In regard to the other proposition, we are told that Lord Irwin could only entertain the idea of a few individual financial transactions being subjected to scrutiny. While such scrutiny may take place in individual cases, its scope will have to extend to the whole field of British claims, including, as we have stated, the so-called public debt of India. We consider both these questions as of vital importance and a previous agreement on the lines suggested in our joint letter seems to us to be essential.

Lord Irwin's reference to the release of prisoners is very restricted and unsatisfactory. He is unable to give an assurance that all of the non-violent Civil Disobedience prisoners even will be discharged. All that he proposes to do is to leave the matter in the hands of the local Governments. We are not prepared to trust in such a matter to the generosity or sympathy of the local Governments or local officials. But apart from this, there is no reference in Lord Irwin's letter to the other non-violent prisoners. There are large numbers of Congressmen and others who were sent to prison for political offences prior to the Civil Disobedience movement. We might mention in this connection the Meerut case prisoners also who have already spent a year and a half as under-trials. We have made it clear in our joint letter that all these should be released.

Regarding the Bengal and Lahore case ordinances we feel that no exception should be made

in their favour as suggested by Lord Irwin. We have not claimed the release of those political prisoners who may have been guilty of violence, not because we would not welcome their release, but because we felt that as our movement was strictly non-violent we would not confuse the issue. But the least we can do is to press for an ordinary trial for these fellow-countrymen of ours, and not by an extraordinary court constituted by an ordinance which denies them the right of appeal and ordinary privileges of an accused. The amazing events, including brutal assaults that have occurred even in open court during the so-called trial, make it imperative that the ordinary procedure should be followed. We understand that some of the accused have in protest for the treatment accorded to them been on hunger-strike for a long period and are now at death's door.

The Bengal Ordinance has, we understand, been replaced by an act of the Bengal Council. We consider this Ordinance and any act based on it most objectionable, and the fact that an unrepresentative body like the present Bengal Council has passed it does not make it any better.

In regard to future picketing of foreign cloth and liquor shops we are told that Lord Irwin is agreeable to the withdrawal of the picketing ordinance, but that he states that if he thinks it necessary he will take fresh legal powers to combat the picketing. Thus he informs us that he might re-enact the ordinance, or some thing similar to it, whenever he considers necessary.

The reply regarding the Salt Act and certain other matters referred to in our joint letter is also wholly unsatisfactory. We need not deal with it at any length here as you are an acknowledged expert on Salt. We would only say that we see no reason to modify our previous position in regard to these matters.

Thus Lord Irwin has declined to agree to all the major propositions and many of the minor ones laid down in our joint letter. The difference in his outlook and ours is very great, and indeed is fundamental.

We hope you will show this note to Sarojini Naidu, Vallabhbhai Patel and Jairamdas Daulatram and, in consultation with them, give your reply to Messrs. Jayakar and Sapru. We feel that publication of the correspondence must no longer be delayed and we are not justified in keeping the public in the dark.

Even apart from the question of publication, we are requesting Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru and Mr. Jayakar to send copies of all correspondence and relevant papers to Chaudhri Khaliq-Uz-Zaman, Acting President of the Congress. We feel that we ought to take no steps without immediate information being sent to the Working Committee which happens to be functioning.

MOTILAL NEHRU.

SYED MAHMUD.

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU."

15. We accordingly saw Mr. Gandhi and other Congress leaders at the Yeravada Jail in Poona on the 3rd, 4th and 5th September, gave to them the said letter and discussed the whole question with them. As a result of such conversations they gave us a statement which is reproduced below :—

Yeravada Central Prison,
5th September 1930.

" Dear Friends,

We have very carefully gone through the letter written to you by His Excellency the Viceroy and

dated 28th August 1930. You have kindly supplemented it with a record of your conversations with the Viceroy on points not covered by the letter. We have equally carefully gone through the note signed by Pandit Motilal Nehru, Dr. Syed Mahmud and Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and sent by them through you. This note embodies their considered opinion on the said letter and the conversations. We gave two anxious nights to these papers and we had the benefit of a full and free discussion with you on all the points arising out of these papers.

And, as we have told you, we have all arrived at the definite conclusion that we see no meeting ground between the Government and the Congress in so far as we can speak for the latter, being out of touch with the outside world. We unreservedly associate ourselves with the opinion contained in the note sent by the distinguished prisoners of Naini Central Prison. But these friends expect us to give in our own words our view of the position finally reached in the negotiations for peace, which you with patriotic motives have carried on during the past two months at considerable sacrifice of your own time and no less inconvenience to yourselves. We shall, therefore, allude as briefly as possible to the fundamental difficulties that have stood in the way of peace being achieved.

The Viceroy's letter dated 16th July 1930 is, we have taken, intended to satisfy, so far as may be, the terms of the interview Pandit Motilal gave to Mr. Slocombe on 20th June last and the statement submitted by Mr. Slocombe to him on 25th June and approved by him. We are unable to read in the Viceroy's language in his letter of 16th July anything like satisfaction of the terms of the interview or the said statement. Here are the relevant parts of the interview and the statement.

The Interview.

"If the terms of the Round Table Conference are to be left open and we are expected to go to London to argue a case for Dominion Status, I should decline. If it was made clear, however, that the Conference would meet to frame a constitution for a free India, subject to such adjustments of our mutual relations as are required by the special needs and conditions of India and our past association, I for one would be disposed to recommend that Congress accept an invitation to participate in the Conference. We must be masters in our house-hold, but we are ready to agree to reasonable terms for the period of transfer of power from a British administration in India to a responsible Indian Government. We must meet the British people to discuss these terms as nation to nation on an equal footing."

The Statement.

The Government would "give a private assurance that they would support a demand for full responsible government for India, subject to such mutual adjustments and terms of transfer as are required by the special needs and conditions of India and by her long association with Great Britain and as may be decided by the Round Table Conference."

And here is the relevant part of the

Viceroy's Letter.

"It remains my earnest desire, as it is that of my Government, and I have no doubt also that of His Majesty's Government, to do everything that we can in our respective spheres to assist the people of India to obtain as large a degree of the management of their own affairs as can be shown to be consistent with making provision for those matters in regard to which they are not at present in a position to assume responsibility. What those matters may be and what provisions may best be made for them

will engage the attention of the Conference but I have never believed that with mutual confidence on both sides it should be impossible to reach an agreement."

We feel that there is a vast difference between the two positions. Where Pandit Motilalji visualises a free India enjoying a status different in kind from the present, as a result of the deliberations of the proposed Round Table Conference, the Viceroy's letter merely commits him, his Government and the British Cabinet to an earnest desire to assist India to obtain as large a degree of the management of their own affairs as can be shown to be consistent with making provision for those matters in regard to which they are not at present in a position to assume responsibility. In other words, the prospect held out by the Viceroy's letter is one of getting, at the most, something more along the lines of reforms, commencing with those known to us as Lansdowne Reforms.

As we had the fear that our interpretation was correct, in our letter of 15th August 1930 signed also by Pandit Motilal Nehru, Dr. Syed Mahmud and Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, we put our position negatively and said what would not in our opinion satisfy the Congress. The letter you have now brought from His Excellency reiterates the original position taken up by him in his first letter and we are grieved to say contemptuously dismisses our letter as unworthy of consideration and regards discussion on the basis of the proposals contained in the letter as impossible!

You have thrown further light on the question by telling us that "if Mr. Gandhi definitely faced the Government of India with such a question" (i. e. the right of secession from the Empire at India's will), the Viceroy would say that "they were not prepared to treat it as an open question." We, on the other hand, regard the question as the central point in any free constitution that India is to secure and one which ought not to need any argument. If India is now to attain full responsible government or full self-government or whatever other term it is to be known by, it can be only on an absolutely voluntary basis leaving each party to sever the partnership or association at will. If India is to remain no longer part of an Empire but is to become an equal and free partner in a Commonwealth, she must feel the want and warmth of that association and never otherwise. You will please observe that this position is clearly brought out in the interview already alluded to by us. So long, therefore, as the British Government or the British people regard this position as impossible or untenable, the Congress must, in our opinion, continue the fight for freedom.

The attitude taken up by the Viceroy over the very mild proposal made by us regarding the salt tax affords a further painful insight into the Government mentality. It is as plain as daylight to us that from the dizzy heights of Simla the rulers of India are unable to understand or appreciate the difficulties of the starving millions living in the plains whose incessant toil makes Government from such a giddy height at all possible. If the blood of innocent people spilt during the past five months to sustain the monopoly of a gift of nature, next in importance to the poor people only to air and water, has not brought home to the Government the conviction of its utter immorality, no Conference of Indian leaders as suggested by the Viceroy can possibly do so. The suggestion that those who ask for the repeal of the monopoly should show a source of equivalent revenue adds insult to injury. This attitude is an indication that, if the Government can help it, the existing crushingly expensive system shall continue

to the end of time. We venture further to point out that not only does the Government here but governments all the world over openly condone breaches of measures which have become unpopular but which for technical or other reasons cannot be straightway repealed.

We need not now deal with the many other important matters in which too there is no adequate advance from the Viceroy to the popular position set forth by us. We hope we have brought out sufficient weighty matters in which there appears at present to be an unbridgeable gulf between the British Government and the Congress.

There need, however, be no disappointment for the apparent failure of the peace negotiations. The Congress is engaged in a grim struggle for freedom. The nation has resorted to a weapon which the rulers, being unused to it, will take time to understand and appreciate. We are not surprised that a few months' suffering has not converted them.

The Congress desires to harm no single legitimate interest by whomsoever acquired. It has no quarrel with Englishman as such. But it resents and will resent with all the moral strength at its command the intolerable British domination. Non-violence being assured to the end, we are certain of the early fulfilment of the national aspiration. This we say in spite of the bitter and often insulting language used by the powers that be in regard to civil disobedience.

Lastly, we once more thank you for the great pains you have taken to bring about peace. But we suggest that the time has now arrived when any further peace negotiations should be carried on with those in charge of the Congress organisation. As prisoners, we labour under an obvious handicap. Our opinion, based as it must be on second hand evidence, runs the risk of being faulty. It would be naturally open to those in charge of the Congress organisation to see any of us. In that case, and when the Government itself is equally desirous for peace, they should have no difficulty in having access to us.

Y. C. P. M. K. GANDHI.
5-9-30. SAROJINI NAIDU.
VALLABHBHAI PATEL.
JAIRAMDAS DOULATRAM."

16. *We content ourselves with publishing, for the information of the public, the material facts and documents and in strict conformity with our duties and obligations as intermediaries, we refrain in this statement from putting our own interpretation or offering our own comments on the facts and documents set out above.*

17. We may mention that we have obtained the consent of His Excellency the Viceroy and the Congress leaders to the publication of the documents above set out.

Poona, TEJ BAHADUR, SAPRU.
5-9-30. M. R. JAYAKAR.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

- SPEECHES OF V. I. LENIN. Vol. VIII. (International Publishers, New York.) 1928. 19cm. 94p. 50 cents.
SPEECHES OF EUGENE V. DEBS. Vol. IX. (International Publishers, New York.) 1928. 19cm. 95p. 50 cents.
THE WORKERS' SHARE. A Study in Wages and Poverty. By A. W. HUMPHREY. (Allen and Unwin) 1930. 18cm. 92p. 2/6.
MEN WHO ARE MAKING AMERICA. (7th Edn.) By B. C. FORBES. (B. C. Forbes Publishing Co., New York.) 1926. 24cm. 442p. \$3.00.
A HISTORY OF FREETHOUGHT IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY. Vols. I & II. By J. M. ROBERTSON. (Putnams.) 1930. 23cm. 635p. \$ 7.50.
THE TREATY VETO OF THE AMERICAN SENATE. By DENNA FRANK FLEMING. (Putnams.) 1930. 22cm. 325p. \$ 3.00.
THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC HEALTH. By JAMES A. TOBEY. (The Brookings Institution, Washington.) 1926. 22cm. 423p. \$ 3.00.

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