

The Servant of India

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Topics of the Week.

Preposterous Pretensions.

LORD DELAMERE and his gallant group of British settlers in Kenya have again reiterated certain principles of government which cannot be allowed to go unchallenged. In the appeal he made for funds for the deputation to England, he said, "I believe that the essential art of ruling is bred in the inherent characteristics of a people, in fair dealing, in honesty of purpose, in strength of character: it has been granted to few nations in the whole of the world's history; it is indeed a gift that cannot wholly be handed on by teaching or by example." This is on a par with the theory of the divine right of Kings: certain nations have the divine right to rule over others! It postulates that the Natives of Kenya will never, never be able to rule themselves. Lord Delamere with his larger experience of politics discreetly refrained from enumerating the peoples who were endowed with this right. But the *East African Standard*, less experienced and more junkerish, left no doubts in the matter. The acceptance of the common roll in Kenya, it says, will violate the "right of British people to claim that with their race alone, whether as settlers or as officials, must lie the responsibility for the government of primitive people, and the development of the Empire in Africa."

Cold Shoulder.

THESE preposterous pretensions do not seem to have been received with universal acclamation not only in England but also, for a wonder, in South Africa. The comments of the *Natal Advertiser* and the *Cape Argus* must be distinctly disappointing to the saviours of the white empire. The *Cape Argus* says that "there is no particular reason, now or in the near future, why the small white population of Kenya should be given complete control over the destinies of that vast and fertile land." The *Natal Advertiser* takes a bolder and more righteous stand.

"If present world-happenings mean anything at all (and they mean a very great deal) they mean that the non-Europeans of the earth are at last waking to the consciousness that there is nothing inherent in the white man which makes him for ever the arbiter of the destinies of black or brown."

And goes on to say :

But black and brown are not asking to-day for the picture to be reversed. They are not asking that the civilised white should suddenly put his neck under the heel of the savage. They are not even asking for actual power. They are asking only for Hope. They are asking only for that gesture which promises them, as they progress, more and more emancipation from the toils of a present almost subjugation to the least whim of the white man. Nor can they be blamed for this.

And it sums up the duty of civilization in these happy words: "It is only half the toil of life to teach man to obey. The other complementary half is to teach him, in Heaven's good-time, to govern", and roundly condemns the claim of the Lord Delamere group to perpetual domination as "the one (issue) on which the British Empire is more likely to be ship-wrecked than on any other."

Grigg must Go.

BUT there is danger from another quarter. These Empire-wreckers have a fanatic ally in the Governor of Kenya, Sir Edward Grigg. The British Government insisted that the principles adumbrated in the "Memorandum on Native Policy" should be immediately put into effect and that existing policies should be brought immediately into conformity with these principles. The wishes of the Labour Government were immediately complied with in Uganda and Tanganyika, for in these territories there is hardly any conflict between the two. In Kenya, however, far from obeying the orders of the Secretary of State, the Government of Sir Edward Grigg made no secret of their disapproval of the policy of Downing Street and went so far as to give an assurance to the settlers that no action would be taken without the consent of the Legislative Council. It may be said that since the Legislative Council has an official majority, the consent of the Council may be made to mean that of the officials and not necessarily that of the white settlers. Nevertheless there is every reason to fear that the Government of Sir Edward Grigg will do their level best to torpedo in practice the policy of Lord Passfield. It is not in Sir Edward to give whole-hearted support to that policy and his continuance in office is not calculated to promote it. Even as they recalled Lord Lloyd from Egypt, the Labour Government will do well to recall Sir Edward Grigg from Kenya if they wish to give a sporting chance to their policy.

Avoidable Crime.

A more futile, a more provocative and a more

criminal act than the conduct of the police under the inspiration of Sir Ernest Hotson on the 1st and 2nd insts. in Bombay is difficult to imagine. The Bombay Congress "War Council" organised a procession on the 1st, which was the Tilak Day, the tenth anniversary of the death of the late Mr. B. G. Tilak. The procession was to pass along Hornby Road, one of the busy thoroughfares in the City, at the peak hour of traffic. The Police Commissioner, in a courteous, letter to the President of the "War Council", Mrs. Hansa Mehta, prohibited the procession marching along that Road, on the express ground that it would interfere with normal traffic. The processionists declined to obey the prohibition, and were held up by the Police near the Victoria Terminus. The processionists squatted on the road from Friday evening to Saturday morning, drenched in occasional rain! Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya, the venerable veteran of Indian politics and the born ambassador of peace, headed the procession along with several members of the Congress Working Committee, and undertook to lead the procession in fours and subsequently in twos, so as to cause the minimum of obstruction of traffic. Messrs. Lalji Naranji and H. P. Mody, the leading men in commerce and industry, intervened but in vain. The Police Commissioner was obdurate: his order was defied and he would not stand it but he would not use force. It was pointed to him that he might allow the procession to pass on when the traffic thinned down late in the evening, as the reason he gave for prohibiting the procession had ceased to operate. But he would not budge. So the Police and the processionists faced each other the whole long night till day-break, when Sir Ernest Hotson, the "strong man" of the Bombay Government, appeared on the scene, having arrived from Poona. The Commissioner had a talk with him and with his full concurrence ordered the arrest of the leaders and the dispersal of the crowd, after warning, by *lathi* charge. The volunteers stood their ground under the rain of *lathi* blows until they dropped wounded and bleeding. The casualties numbered over 200! The arrested leaders were put on their trial. Only Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya decided to cross-examine the prosecution; the others simply declined to take part in the proceedings. The Pandit was able to "show up" the police as it were. Nevertheless he was fined Rs. 100 and the others sentenced to three months' simple imprisonment. The Pandit declined to pay the fine and chose to go to jail instead. But the fine was paid behind his back, as it were, and he was peremptorily turned out of the jail!

On the merits of it, it was absolutely unnecessary for the Commissioner to have prohibited the processionists the use of the Hornby Road. A little good humour and good sense, and due consideration to the high esteem in which Mr. Tilak's memory is held, would have gone a long way in avoiding trouble. It was again priggish of him not to agree to the proposal to allow the procession in fours and twos. It was absolutely foolish of him not to have allowed it after the traffic had almost died down late in the evening. His conduct was an undignified display of prestige and pique. To his credit it must be said that he refused to indulge in force against the processionists. At day-break arrives Sir Ernest Hotson. While the Police under orders rained *lathi* blows, wounding and drawing blood, this aspiring Nero watched the scene with grim satisfaction, for law, in other words his vanity, was being upheld!

Stab in the Back.

The unkindest cut of all was the fact that this

gruesome performance was staged just when the peace negotiations, difficult and delicate enough in all conscience, were being carried on by Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru and Mr. Jayakar with the cordial consent of the Viceroy and the British Government. There was a comparative lull in the hostilities and hopes of peace rose a point or two. It was just at that time that the Police in Bombay chose to create an embarrassing situation.

It has rendered the task of the ambassadors more difficult. But we are hopeful that they will not be unnerved by it, but will persist in their noble endeavour. They have succeeded in arranging a meeting of the Mahatma, Pandits Motilal and Jawaharlal Nehrus in Yervada jail, where Sirdar Patel, now a prisoner, has already arrived. As we write, conversations are in progress.

Separation of Burma.

THE separation of Burma is no longer the question of more or less academic interest that it has been so far. The Simon Commission favours the idea and Sir Charles Innes, the Governor of Burma, in addressing the Legislative Council last week almost took it for granted that Burma would before long be separated from India. As he pointed out, the decision on such an important matter would of course rest with Parliament which would naturally be guided by the wishes of the people to be vitally affected by its decision. Now these wishes have had more than one opportunity of expressing themselves during recent months when Burmese opinion has uniformly endorsed the idea of Burma standing apart from India. In face of such clear expression of Burmese sentiment on the point nobody can be so undemocratic as to propose that Burma should not be allowed the right of self-determination and that she should be coerced into acceptance of her present connection with India. That of course is out of the question. But people wonder whether in insisting upon severance Burma has made sure what constitutional status she will have in the future. In the debate on this question last year in the Legislative Council Burmese spokesmen stated in the plainest possible language that it was because they wanted Dominion Home Rule that they were seeking to cut off from India. While we do not see how India would have proved an obstacle, we are by no means sure that indications point to Burma achieving her goal within a measurable period. There is a rumour that after separation she should be given Crown Colony Government. Seeing that she is already in the enjoyment of provincial autonomy though within a limited sphere, which is doubtless a more advanced form of government than obtains in a Crown Colony, we may, as suggested by the Governor, dismiss the rumour with the contempt it deserves. But can we do the same with regard to a scheme which seems to be in the air? Under this, we are told, Burma would be part of a federation with Ceylon and the Straits Settlements as the other constituent bodies. While we devoutly wish this rumour also to be groundless, the absence of any official contradiction makes one suspicious. All that we have to go upon in this matter is the Governor's assurance that the measure of reform for Burma would be not less generous than that for India. The Burmans have at the same time his explicit warning that Dominion Home Rule in the immediate future is not a matter of practical politics. One or two points arise out of the Governor's ipse dixits. Supposing Burma was offered provincial autonomy of the Simon pattern, can it be called 'generous' and will it be acceptable to the Burmese? Where will the powers now exercised by the Government of India rest under the new arrangement? Will Burma have fiscal autonomy?

These are some of the questions to which Burmans would do well to insist upon a definite reply before they make up their minds finally with respect to separation. We know there are Burmans so blinded by anti-Indian prejudice as to desire separation at all costs, even if it meant progress backwards to the crown colony form of government. We hope these do not form the large majority of the Burmese population; and that what is really desired is "Burma for Burmans." This is natural. But let them make sure that under the constitution they will get they will have full power to order things their own way. Else they might find, much to their disappointment, all real power centred in other hands, enabling merciless exploitation of their admittedly "very undeveloped" country by the whites. This is not quite unimaginable, for with India bent on Swaraj and expecting to get it sooner or later, fresh fields for exploitation may be an urgent necessity. We can only hope that Burma will in all future constitutional arrangements insist upon full fiscal freedom so that the exploitation of its vast natural resources by foreign capitalists may be made impossible.

Dr. Ambedkar on the Situation.

AS President of the All-India Depressed Classes Congress held at Nagpur last week, Dr. B. R. Ambedkar has delivered a thoughtful address. It shows how a depressed classes leader can also be a true nationalist. To say this is however not to express agreement with every single statement in his address; but there is doubtless much in it on which there can be no difference of opinion. There is a general impression,—with what grounds we do not know,—that the Simon proposals are acceptable to the depressed classes. Dr. Ambedkar's address at any rate does not leave any room for such a belief. He emphatically disapproves of the proposed provision for the representation of the depressed classes in the local legislatures. No doubt the method of election proposed by the Commission is an advance on existing conditions under which provision is made for depressed class representation by nomination. But like all self-respecting people Dr. Ambedkar takes very strong exception to the power which the Governor will enjoy under the Simon scheme of certifying to the fitness of the prospective depressed classes candidates. Seeing that such a certificate is to be a condition precedent to anybody offering himself for election it does not need much perspicacity to see that an evil-intentioned Governor can, by refusing to recognise other candidates' fitness for election, virtually convert election into nomination. The proposed safeguard of consultation with organisations of depressed classes is, as Dr. Ambedkar shows, illusory, for it would encourage the coming into being of "bogus associations." As for the Assembly he favours direct as against the indirect election proposed by the Commission, the latter, in his opinion, would be "most appropriate" for the Upper House. At the same time, conscious as he is of the hard realities of the situation, he does not conceal from himself the fact that "indirect elections must remain the easiest method for the representation of the Depressed Classes in either of them." Mere provincial autonomy unaccompanied by substantial responsibility at the Centre fails to satisfy him. His views on the manipulation of the official bloc ought to serve as an eye-opener to many of his friends of the depressed classes. That bloc, he says, is "the friend of nobody but of itself and that its help and friendship is determined by its own interests. I am sorry to say that during these ten years the official bloc took far more from the depressed classes than it gave to them." He is equally frank when he says: "I am afraid that the British

choose to advertise our unfortunate condition not with the object of removing them (disabilities) but only because such a course serves well as an excuse for retarding the political progress of India." It is the fashion with a certain type of retired British administrators to represent depressed classes as caring neither for independence nor Dominion Status, but only for bread and butter. This however is far from the truth, as one can see from Dr. Ambedkar's address itself. Should India have independence or Dominion Status? Dr. Ambedkar of course prefers the latter for the simple reason that "it has in it the substance of independence without the attendant risks involved in complete independence." In common with many thoughtful Indians he blames the National Congress for turning down the offer of the Round Table Conference. Its acceptance would, at the worst, have merely meant the postponement of the Civil Disobedience movement by a year which would not have been too much of a calamity. Should the depressed classes ally themselves with the Congress or with the Government? Dr. Ambedkar wishes them to be independent of both. He does not think that the Congress has done as much as it should have for the removal of untouchability and asks "why did not the Congress prescribe the removal of untouchability as a franchise for its membership?" His strong argument for keeping at an arm's length from the Congress is that it does not yet stand for the masses. In support he instances its support to the 1s. 4d. ratio which deprives it of all "claim to be the guardian of the masses." While we do not deny that Mahatma Gandhi could have done more in the matter of the removal of untouchability, we wish Dr. Ambedkar had shown greater appreciation of his services to untouchables. Nobody can say that they have no disabilities. As Mr. Nadkarni's article elsewhere in this issue shows, they have a number of religious, social and civic disabilities. At the same time there is no gainsaying the fact that much of the credit for making the Congress give as much attention as it is doing to the problem of untouchability must go to him. Nothing would have been lost by Dr. Ambedkar taking proper account of this obvious fact. Let him not misunderstand us. Nothing would please us better if Mahatma Gandhi did all the things Dr. Ambedkar mentions and many more; but that is no reason why his past services should on that account be underrated.

Safeguards.

THE proposals of the Simon Report for the future government of India are dominated apparently by the apprehension that the efficiency and integrity of administration under Indian control, particularly of Law and Order, will deteriorate. They, therefore, include some elaborate safeguards against such a catastrophe. But there is not a word said about the efficiency and integrity of the administration in the Indian States, and no specific safeguards have been recommended to protect them. Is it because the Simon Commissioners are satisfied that they cannot be worse, and that, therefore, safeguards are superfluous? Or is it because the British Government assumes no responsibility for the standards of administration in the States and is precluded from inserting safeguards? The apparent anxiety of the Simon Commissioners for the standards of good government in British India and their utter lack of confidence in British Indians to uphold them is in striking contrast to their confidence in the Indian autocrats, and their utter indifference to the fate of the 70 millions of Indians under Indian rule.

Articles.

SECESSION.

THE Rt. Hon. V. S. Srinivasa Sastri was subjected in some quarters to hasty and adverse criticism based on a short cabled message from England which represented him to have advocated secession of India from the British Commonwealth. The full text of the paper which he read before the East India Association on the 22nd July last, which we published in the last issue of this paper, must put at rest all doubts as to what he actually said. Even otherwise, those, who were no strangers to his utterances in the past, would not have credited him with the advocacy of India's secession from the Commonwealth. In assessing the Simon recommendations he tested them by the avowed object and aim of British policy in India, which was authoritatively reiterated in November last by the Viceroy in his famous statement. Do the Simon proposals make for Dominionhood? Do they satisfy the tests of that status? Mr. Sastri contended that the right to secede was one of the attributes of Dominionhood.

It is true that, as Lord Chelmsford pointed out in his message to the Association, the Montagu announcement did not use the phrase "Dominion Status", and only spoke of "responsible government." Further it stipulated that India was to be "an integral part of the British Empire." Lord Reading and Sir Malcolm Hailey fastened upon this phrasing of the announcement to draw a distinction between responsible government and Dominion status in 1924. But then and there the Indian leaders repudiated the distinction. If still there were any lingering doubts, they have been set at rest by the authoritative pronouncement of Lord Irwin in which he stated: "I am authorised by His Majesty's Government to state clearly that in their judgment it is implicit in the declaration of 1917 that the natural issue of India's constitutional progress, as there contemplated, is the attainment of Dominion Status." The Simon Commission deliberately avoided that phrase, perhaps for fear of its implications.

Is the right of secession one such implication? In a recent issue of *Foreign Affairs* Mr. Norman Angell, in defending the reluctance of Britain to let India go out of the Empire, instanced the case of the Civil War in the United States to support the view that no member of an association has the right to secede. The claim of the Southern States to secede was decided by the arbitrament of war and not of the Supreme Court in America. But there is a vital difference between the United States and the British Empire. The United States was a federation of what were originally independent States which come together under a written constitution, which amounted to a contract, and which no single partner had the right to denounce. But the British Empire is a growth: it is a case of children hiving off when they attain a certain status. There is no contract to break, or to be held down to.

There have, however, been some high authorities who hold the view that the British Dominions have not the right to secede. Prof. A. B. Keith and Gen. Smuts are among them. Prof. Keith rests his contention on the inclusion in the constitution of the Dominions of the words "under the Crown of the British Kingdom." The King has the right and the duty to veto a secession bill passed by a Dominion and sent up for his assent; and British Ministers have the right to advise the King with regard to a bill of the kind on the ground that it did not concern a single Dominion only but others as well. It is also urged that since the constitutions of the Dominions are derived by acts of the Imperial Parliament, that Parliament alone can by suitable amendments release the Dominions from the Commonwealth. On the other hand, it is contended that if the King had no duty to veto the cession of Jubaland in East Africa to Italy, it is none of his duty to veto the secession of a Dominion. Moreover, the King's constitutional right to veto exists only in name, and he has no special right to resurrect it to veto a secession bill. As long ago as 1919 the Memorandum of Dominion Prime Ministers declared in unequivocal language that the Crown "acts on the advice of different Ministers within different constitutional units." This declaration was further confirmed by the Imperial Conference of 1926. Except perhaps Canada, all the other Dominions have the right to amend their constitutions without coming up to London and there is no constitutional limitation on their passing a bill to secede from the Empire. The British Ministers are precluded from advising the King against the advice of the Dominion Ministers, and King's power of veto having lapsed, he is precluded from turning it down. Thus constitutionally the Dominions have the right to secede.

The question was discussed at great length in the House of Assembly of the Union of South Africa as recently as May last with reference to the Report of the Expert Committee on the operation of Dominion legislation, etc., set up after the last Imperial Conference. That Report, while it eliminated such nominal control as the British Government retained over the legislation passed in the Dominions, made the following recommendation regarding the Crown:

Inasmuch as the Crown is the symbol of the free association of the members of the British Commonwealth of nations, and as they are united by a common allegiance to the Crown, it would be in accord with the established constitutional position of all the members of the Commonwealth in relation to one another that any alteration in the law touching the succession to the throne or the royal style and titles shall hereafter require the assent as well of the parliaments of all the Dominions as of the Parliament of the United Kingdom.

Gen. Smuts, who consistently held that the Dominions had not the right to secede, interpreted this to mean that the unanimous consent of all the Dominions was necessary to the secession of any one of them from the Commonwealth, and that, therefore, it was not constitutionally open to any one of them, by its own action, to break away from the Empire.

This interpretation was hotly, almost indignantly, repudiated by Gen. Hertzog and the Nationalists. They rely on the statement :

They (Dominions) are autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by common allegiance to the Crown and freely associated as members of the the British Commonwealth of nations.

The test of free and voluntary association is the power to discontinue such association if so desired. The Report itself in paragraph 58 gave the fullest legislative freedom to the Dominions, and Gen. Hertzog argued that the paragraph regarding succession to the Crown was meant to prevent contradictory or mutually incompatible proposals being made by different Dominions regarding the occupant of the throne, but it did not take away the right to secede altogether from the Empire. Gen. Smuts himself shifted his ground somewhat during the debate and the Union Parliament finally agreed, in order to leave no room for other plausible interpretations, to the addition of an addendum to the Government's resolution to the effect that the acceptance of Report "shall not be taken as derogating from the right of any member of the British Commonwealth of Nations to withdraw therefrom."

Prof. Keith advances yet another argument to balk the Dominions of their right to secede. In his latest book, "Dominion Autonomy in Practice", he says :

Article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations sheds some light on the point, for all members of the League guarantee the existing territorial integrity of the British Empire, so that the withdrawal of any portion cannot be contemplated as legitimate, save with mutual consent.

We fancy that the Dominions which are members of the League in their own right have also the right to secede from it to if they choose. Once a Dominion comes out of the League, the jurisdiction of the League ceases. It only means that the Dominion will, if the League disapproves of its withdrawal from the Commonwealth, withdraw from the League also. The constitutional right is not in any way adversely affected.

South Africa has thus asserted her right to secede. She did so in May last and so far no action has been taken by the Governments of Great Britain and the Dominions to challenge that decision. No war has been declared on South Africa to bring her to realise that she had no right to secede. The forthcoming Imperial Conference is not likely to challenge the position taken by her. It is, therefore, abundantly clear that the right to secede is one of the attributes of Dominionhood, and that right the Simon proposals do not concede to India.

But it is one thing to assert the right to secede and quite another to exercise it. Even while hotly asserting it, the South African Government under Gen. Hertzog repudiated any intention to exercise that right. Said Gen. Hertzog during the course of the debate in May last :

When it is clear and it is agreed that we have full and unhampered freedom in every respect,... then we will find that I, and other hon. members, will also express the hope and will have the confidence that such a "perpetual" bond, so far as such a thing can be perpetual, will continue.

He repeated again and again that South Africa would offer the utmost co-operation to the Commonwealth provided the unlimited freedom of South Africa was unreservedly acknowledged. The same may be said of India. As Mr. Sastri pointed out in one of his recent speeches in England, it would be unwise to give a different interpretation to Dominionhood when applied to India. The ideal and the aim of the Commonwealth was happily described by Sir Herbert Samuel in his speech at the Liberal Summer School a few days ago :

There have been types of empires which have sought greatness through the power and majesty and splendour of a ruling State; but the only empire which achieves a real greatness is that in which every province is enabled to feel itself not less august than the central State itself.

Freedom and association exist together in the Commonwealth.

BRITISH OPINION ON INDIA.

NO judge from writings in mail week, Lord Irwin still continues to be the target of attack in the diehard British Press. The *Observer*, writing four days after his address to the Central Legislature, regards it as "the presage of almost certain disaster", though the intervening month has failed to show that we are on the edge of a precipice. In the opinion of the paper, "Lord Reading, after winning through a terrible ordeal with wonderful fortitude and skill, left a relatively peaceful India to his successor. Since then, there has been *no firm and supple hand on the wheel*. If his present methods were our only resort, he would be the last of the Viceroys." (italics ours.) The paper then repeats its two questions "to which there has never been an answer. "Dominion Status" split Ireland into two parts. Into how many parts would it split India? It nearly brought about full civil war, and it did bring about some years of murderous struggle, in Ireland. Into how many long years of conflict and chaos would it plunge the complex antagonisms of the Seventh Continent?" The "only one real safeguard" is the representation at the prospective Round Table Conference of the Opposition parties. "Otherwise," it forecasts, "the situation on this side would become the climax of unconstitutional absurdity and a real Imperial peril". Now that all British parties are to be represented at the Conference, we may hope the Empire has been saved the peril which has been on the *Observer's* brain.

Sir Reginald Mitchell Banks, K. C., writes in a similarly panicky strain in the *Sunday Times*, the burden of his song being "the Report in Danger"; and his sole anxiety being that "these labours shall not be rendered fruitless because some people prefer dreams to facts, and "slogans" to practical reme-

dies." He is so sceptical of the effects of pronouncements about Dominion Status, self-determination, etc., that he calls them "cobra's eggs." Was the Viceroy's address intended to placate the Congress and its leaders? To which he replies, apparently to his own satisfaction, "The answer is written in blood in the bazaars of Peshawar and Calcutta and Sholapur. And now with no sensible reason whatever for adding another word Lord Irwin does it again!"

On the other hand, it appears to the *New Leader* that "the Viceroy's latest statement, which has been so eagerly awaited, differs in no important particular from the "efforts in construction" which have already appeared in the Press. It is intended obviously to conciliate Indian opinion and is a fresh attempt to secure the effective co-operation of the Nationalists. In both directions it is bound to fail." It asks: "Can any one looking at the Indian situation today see the slightest ground for a belief that, even if a Conference representative of all Parties can be called together, it can possibly reach solutions acceptable to both countries and all parties and intertests?" It then goes on:

Such a proposal assumes a parity of interest in the form of India's Government as between Britain and India. We cannot accept such an assumption. In our view the form of India's Government is a matter for the determination of Indians themselves and our interest in the matter should be confined to a discussion with free Indians, of the speediest and best method by which we may liquidate our responsibilities and liabilities.

The I. L. P. applies no qualification of time or form to India's right to full self-determination. It is our belief that if the Government had the courage now to cease its military repression, free the political prisoners and abandon the whole system of dominance and tyranny by which we seek to perpetuate our rule, Indians of their own free choice might seek to maintain association with us in a federation of free peoples. But that decision must be left to the free choice of Indians themselves."

Referring to the rumoured postponement of the Round Table Conference to a date in November the *Sunday Times* announces that the Government intend to stick to the date originally fixed for it, viz., October 20. Those who want the Conference held without avoidable delay will be glad that there is to be no further postponement.

In the course of a letter to the *Times* Sir Francis Younghusband to whom India ought to be indebted for his sympathy at this time says:—

"Our declared goal is "responsible government in British India as an integral part of the Empire" And if that does not imply Dominion Status I am left in wonder as to what status it does imply.

But deficient as is my capacity for understanding these fine distinctions I have sufficient acquaintance with Indians to know this much: that what they are chiefly concerned about is their status—their standing in the world. And when we show such reluctance to acknowledge Dominion Status no wonder they chafe. For why should India have any lower position in the world? Did she not play her part in the Great War? Did she not sit at the Peace Conference? Has she not a seat on the League of Nations? Why, then, gird at the Viceroy every time he uses, the expression "Dominion Status"? Why not see that this new spirit in India is in the main to the good? Why not recognize both the greatness of the work we have already done in welding India into a

political unity and also the nobility of the work the Indians themselves are doing in creating a national spirit within that political unity? Why not put ourselves heart and soul into supplying every deficiency which, according to the Simon Report, now prevents India from being able to govern and defend herself? And, as the chief deficiency is in the military sphere, why not with more earnest purpose and at a swifter pace set to work to create a truly Indian Army capable of defending India at least against Afghans and Afridis, even if her defence against a European foe has still to be an Imperial concern?

Could we thus show India that we meant business and were as jealous for her standing in the world as we are for our own—for the greater hers the greater ours—we should not fail to carry her with us. At great times England always acts in a great way. This is a great time. And we are out to do a great thing. India is the comrade—not the "enemy." And we are out to make her responsible for her own government. And once England sees the grandeur of this task she will not falter on her way—nor fail her Viceroy in his time of need.

This naturally gave the shock of their life to the Indian Empire Society which includes Lord Sumner, Lord Sydenham, Sir Reginald Craddock, Sir Michael O'Dwyer, etc. Four days later they addressed a letter to the same paper in which they try without success to meet Sir Francis' arguments. They charge him with passing over "the interests of England and of the Empire and the material interests of India" with "facile optimism"; proceed to show that "responsible government" is not the same thing as "Dominion Status" and as expected, fall foul of the Viceroy for doing "what is logically loose and dangerous", viz. mentioning Dominion Status "without warning or definition." They then take the authorities to task for their supposed sins of omission and commission and tell Indians, what they have known all along, that the Conference is "not a device for settling any question over the heads or behind the backs of Parliament" nor a "quiet and convenient place" in which, like a jury, negotiators divided by acute antagonisms can be shut up till they "are agreed upon their verdict." Sir Francis Younghusband's rejoinder is magnificent:

My whole point is that by helping India to govern and defend herself we are acting in the very best interest of England, the Empire, and India herself. For what better thing could the Empire desire than a self-governing, self-defending, self-respecting India, the joint creation of Indians and British, capable of carrying out her responsibilities to the world?

I am aware of the difficulties, risks, and dangers involved in bringing this about. After all I have myself run risks in India. But I admit I am an optimist. I have faith in the genius of our race—especially the young.

Mr. J. L. Morison's letter to the *Times* also makes one or two very good points. He was in India for two months about the time of the Lahore Congress and can claim some personal acquaintance with this country and its problems. We would allow him to speak rather than paraphrase what he has said.

It is too little recognized that the Report itself proposes to clear the way for the transformation of the Viceroy's Council into a responsible Ministry. It not only places "upon the Governor-General himself the responsibility of selecting and appointing the members of his Cabinet," but recommends that "the directions as to number and qualifications of the Council" be expressed, not in the Statute, but in statutory rules under the Sta-

tute. Given the new provincial autonomy, and the powerful influence of the new Federal Assembly, can any practical politician refuse to believe that the final stage in Indian self-government will be reached within 12 months of the inauguration of the new scheme? If that be an accurate forecast, why hesitate to do voluntarily, and soon, what later we shall concede of necessity?

We fully endorse his advice to "our home politicians" to dismiss "the timidity which seems the chief stock in trade of so many so-called Imperialists and adopting the generous courage which Lord Irwin urges us to display."

Special importance attaches to what Mr. Richard Law, son of the late Mr. Bonar Law, has to say with regard to the Viceroy's statement. In common with many Conservatives he too was filled with considerable misgiving as to the effects of the last November declaration of the Viceroy. But during his four months' stay in this country, he tells us, "he had the fullest opportunity to test every shade of opinion not only among Indians but among British people there. And it is a remarkable fact that I found not a single responsible person in either community to tell me that the Viceroy was ill-advised and that I, together with a majority of my fellow-countrymen here, was in the right. *I have, furthermore, been driven to the conclusion that the present disturbances in India, in so far as they can be attributed to the Viceroy's statement, are the result not of the statement itself but of the reception which was accorded to it in sections of the Press in this country.*" (italics ours.)

—a conclusion with which Mr. Norman D. Cliff expresses his cordial agreement in his letter to the *Times*.

In drawing a distinction between equality of status and equality of function, Mr. W. Horsfall Carter says :

British public men who use the phrase Dominion Status are thinking exclusively in terms of practical government, of function. They ignore the essential difference between equality of status and equality of function, which was emphasized over and over again by General Smuts in his speeches in this country and in Canada six months ago. The Dominions, Canada, Australia, and South Africa, acquired equality of status with the Mother Country in the special post-War circumstances. Such equality of status was confirmed unobtrusively by the independent signature of the Peace Treaties and by separate, free, and independent representation at the League of Nations, and in the international field. India too—not British India but India as a whole—acquired equality of status with the Mother Country.

In the case of the Dominions that equality of status was solemnly recognized and affirmed at the Imperial Conference in 1926. Obviously they do not possess equality of function. Moreover, this country, while recognizing fully the adult status of the daughter nations, preserves—and is entitled to preserve—the status of Mother Country, for in matters of defence, shipping, and family constitutional affairs she exercises certain functions on behalf of her daughters.

Now, for obvious reasons, India was not included within the memorable Balfour declaration. Not merely was equality of function looked upon then as a chimera, but equality of status also was denied. In other words India was brutally reminded by a too motherly mother that she was not an adult people, although in the international community she is recognized as an adult. Is it surprising that Indians smart under a sense of injury to their self-

respect, and are impatient to set up house for themselves?

He then points out :

It cannot be too often recalled that Gandhi, Nehru, etc., are clamouring only for Dominion status. They are realists far more than British Conservatives or Liberals give them credit for; and they recognize that the vast sub-continent of India is unfitted for equality of function with an old-established European nation-State like Great Britain, France or Germany.

It is to be hoped that this practical aspect will be borne in mind by those who look upon Indians as unpractical idealists on the ground that they demand Dominion status as the next step in India's constitutional growth.

D. V. A.

THE PROBLEM OF THE DEPRESSED CLASSES.

(i) THEIR DISABILITIES.

THE Report, recently issued, of the State Committee, appointed by the Bombay Government to enquire into the grievances of the Depressed Classes in the Presidency, and the satyagraha that has been going on for some two months now at Suchindram in South India on the part of members of these classes to assert their right to the use of a 'public' road have once more brought this sore in the Indian body politic and the methods adopted for its cure pointedly to the fore.

Their disabilities, though they have all an intimate 'religious' background, can be classified into (1) those which are civic in their character, viz. those due to the ban on the equal use by these classes along with the rest of the population, of (a) public and State-managed utilities like roads, tanks, dharmshalas, markets, schools and hospitals, State-controlled conveyances like ferry-boats and Railway-carriages, and (b) private-owned institutions for the use of the public in general, such as theatres, hotels, and tea-shops, and motor-buses, trams, boats and the like licensed by the State to ply for public hire; and (2) those imposed upon them with regard to the entry into 'religious' institutions like temples, maths, and fair-grounds, which are open to all Hindus but these classes.

Since untouchability in India is fundamentally a 'religious' institution, it is believed that once the second of these two categories of disabilities, viz., those relating to 'temple-entry' are removed, the back of the monstrous custom will be broken. There may be considerable truth in this. The right of temple-entry does not mean merely the right of *darshan* of the Idol. The temple is the town-hall or village-hall of the people. It is the one centre for all forms of collective instruction and amusement, as are our *kathas*, *puran*-readings, folk-plays and the like. By being deprived of the opportunity of attending these, the Hindus of the Depressed Classes are deprived of all these means of mass instruction and pastime. In this sense the ban is also a civic disability, no doubt. But as the non-Hindus in a village, being too poor or too few to provide themselves with such a social centre of their own as a mosque or a church, do with-

out one, so these Depressed Class Hindus, too (we may admit for a moment) could go without the benefit of such social intercourse, religious instruction, etc. as the temple provides to other Hindus. Although such deprivation is a great and undoubted handicap in life for the Untouchables, it does not involve any immediate material hardship, as do the disabilities enumerated under the first category. These latter are purely and pre-eminently civic, as they are also the most tangible ones. While non-Hindus are exempt from them, only the Depressed Class Hindus are subject to them. Such is not the case with the temple ban, though even in this respect non-Hindus receive far better treatment than the Hindu Depressed Classes.

In this connection it may interest readers to learn that both at the Parvati temple in Poona, the venue of the late satyagraha, and at the Kala-Ram temple at Nasik, the venue of the lately suspended satyagraha, Christians and Mahomedans used, according to report, to be allowed inside up to a point to which the Untouchable Hindus are not. It is well known that where schools are located in temple buildings, as they frequently are in the countryside, non-Hindu pupils are as a rule allowed to attend, but not Hindu Untouchable pupils. Such preferential treatment which the 'Touchable' Hindus extend to non-Hindus over their 'Untouchable' co-religionists not only in regard to temples, but in all public places like dharmashalas and wells, and conveyances like boats and buses, disposes of at once the fearful prospect which a Khilafatist leader lately conjured up as he affected to wonder, how ill the Hindus would treat the Muslim minority under Swarej, when they were treating the minority of Untouchables within their own fold so ill. For the fact is that Muslims and Christians have always received far better treatment from the Hindus even under Hindu rule than the Untouchable Hindus.

(ii) SATYAGRAHA AGAINST THEIR DISABILITIES.

As to the conditions governing the fight for the removal of the two categories of their disabilities, it is obvious that, while those of our countrymen who are not professed Hindus or recognised as such cannot well take any direct part in the fight for the removal of the disabilities of the 'religious' category, they are not precluded from fighting against the disabilities of the purely civic category. It would be too obvious to need justification were it not the case that a sad mistake in this regard was made by no less a person than Mahatma Gandhi himself.

The satyagraha at Vaikom, begun early in the year 1924, was the first organised attempt on the part of the Untouchables and their sympathisers, principally Congressmen, towards the removal of a standing grievance which falls under the first category. At Vaikom, an important town in the Hindu-ruled State of Travancore, a temple is situated where four roads meet. They skirt the temple precincts, going round its compound wall, on the outside. The roads were 'public' roads open to the use of all, including non-Hindus; but the Hindu Untouchables alone were prohibited from using those

parts of the roads where they skirted the temple compound, evidently for fear that the temple precincts might be polluted by their proximity or shadow. 'Religion' apparently was at the bottom of it. But the disability as such was clearly of the first category: it was first and last a civic grievance. The ban was on the use of a public high-way, whatever may be the excuse, reason or unreason at the back of it. So when the movement of satyagraha was started, even non-Hindu sympathisers, like Mr. George Joseph, who had only a short time before been editing *Young India* in Mahatmaji's absence at Yeravda, enlisted themselves in the cause, and Mr. Joseph for one suffered imprisonment for it. On the contrary, some, like—of all people—the Editor of the *Indian Social Reformer*, ridiculed and opposed the movement, at first by misrepresenting it as a premature tackling of the temple-entry ban, which it certainly was not. He also opposed it as an unprecedented interference in an Indian State's affairs by British Indian agitators, as though it were a sacrilege for Indians to question the abuses in an Indian State conducted in the spirit of a medieval theocracy in this 20th century. When Mahatmaji came out of jail, he lost no time to study the question and gave his powerful support to the movement. But he imposed one condition, quite as mediævally conceived as the ban which the State authorities enforced. He would allow only professed Hindus to take actual part in the satyagraha, and this notwithstanding the satyagrahi leaders' remonstrance that it being a purely civic grievance, every citizen who felt for the aggrieved was entitled to take part in the fight and deal a blow in defence of what was 'an elementary right of citizenship'. However, a prolonged struggle ended in the success of the satyagraha. The roads were realigned, some of the area occupied by the former roads being included within the temple-compound, and the new roads being laid beyond the polluting distance of the temple. But that is another story, in which, it must be acknowledged, Mahatmaji took a strenuous, memorable part.

But the same sort of mistake, or rather a worse one, was made by Gandhiji during the last eight months. When about the end of last year the satyagraha for entry into the Parvati temple in Poona was undertaken by the local Untouchables and their sympathisers from among the 'higher' castes, his opinion was sought on the question. It was at Lahore during Congress week that 'regarding temple-entry Mahatmaji advised them not to resort to satyagraha as it was now being resorted to.' "If you want to gain anything, gain it by love. You may resort to satyagraha. You may even force entry into the temples. But will you see God there? God resides in your hearts. Be pure in thought, word and deed. Then there will be no necessity of resorting to satyagraha." Could not the same argument be used against satyagraha in all circumstances, including the present anti-Government campaign? The unfortunate Untouchables, 'more sinned against than sinning', after securing entry into the temples may not 'see God' there, any more than the dirty ganja-intoxicated bairagis idling away their lives in those temples 'see

'God' there, or any more than the salt satyagrahis by gaining their point can establish *Swaraj* (the Kingdom of Heaven) in India. But clearly the entry into the temples will mean to the Untouchables one material gain. Whether they 'see God' there or not, they will be enabled to participate in and be benefited by the various social amenities of which the temples are the centres. Of course, this will not be possible if the temples are deserted by people of other castes on account of the entry into them of the Depressed Class people; but such desertion is hardly possible when all or the vast majority of the temples are opened to them. Even if a few amongst the many temples in a town are made accessible to them, it will be a gain. While the orthodox high caste people have other temples, the Depressed Class people who have so far gone without any will have the use of those few ones, along with their sympathisers from among the other castes.

The last utterance of Gandhiji on the subject was his article in *Young India* of 17th April last. In it he advised the 'Untouchables' that the 'Touchables' alone may offer satyagraha for entry into 'orthodox' temples by 'Untouchables'. But the question is: How are the Touchables to offer satyagraha for such entry into temples in which they themselves are not barred? It would have been something if Mahatmaji had advised in place of such an impossible satyagraha a campaign on the 'Touchable reformers' part for a boycott by all worshippers of such temples as do not admit the 'Untouchables', till such time as their managers accept the reform. One does not see that any principle of satyagraha necessitated his advice to the Untouchables and their sympathisers to leave off their temple-entry satyagraha and entrust it to Touchable reformers only. Is it not like saying that in the satyagraha against the foreign rulers for *Swaraj*, only the Domiciled Europeans and Anglo-Indians who sympathise with the national demand may take part, and that Indians should keep out? In the Vaikom case, however, Gandhiji had allowed the Hindu Untouchables to take part in the satyagraha. Indeed, on the lines on which the Vaikom satyagraha was conducted there could have been no satyagraha without the Untouchables participating. How would it be possible for temple-entry?

In that same utterance of his Mahatmaji claimed credit, and perhaps justly, for the part played by the Congress in the removal of Untouchability, especially its Anti-Untouchability Committee of which Seth Jamnalalji was the moving spirit. The fact is worth noting that Sethji himself had given his wholehearted support to the Untouchables' satyagraha at the Kala Ram temple at Nasik, in a statement published in the *Bombay Chronicle* of 15-3-30, among other papers. Mahatmaji, therefore, may be said to have disapproved of what Jamnalalji and, by implication, the Congress, have approved. It is also worth noting that at Nasik Mr. Akut was both President of the District Congress Committee, and leader of the opponents of the temple-entry reform who call themselves Sanatanists. One cannot understand such inconsistency.

My own view is that the Untouchables and their sympathisers should concentrate first on securing the equal use of public places and utilities like wells, tanks, roads, dharmashalas, schools, and conveyances, the ban on which or the segregation in which is a purely civic grievance,—while not neglecting or necessarily postponing the temple-entry struggle. The Untouchables, for instance, should not tolerate separate wells for themselves. If the common well in a village be deserted by the Touchables on its use by the Untouchables, and the Touchables demand another, a separate well may be provided for the Touchables at *their* cost; or whatever other arrangement is made, the reservers should be made to pay extra for the exclusive use of any utility they wish to reserve; and the common well or other public utility should be accessible to all including the Untouchables without any special charge, subject of course to the common rules as to sanitation, etc., applicable to all without distinction of caste. The struggle against these purely civic disabilities has this advantage, namely that all citizens, whether professed Hindus or not, can directly participate in it, against all that would deny the Depressed Classes 'the elementary rights of citizenship.'

(iii) SPECIAL PROVISIONS IN THE CONSTITUTION.

While I agree with Mahatmaji that little can be accomplished in the way of the emancipation of the Depressed Classes with a dominating third party ever ready to perpetuate and exploit our internal differences, (witness the authorities' gross partiality to the Touchable opponents in the Nasik satyagraha,) I also believe that more than the achievement of Hindu-Muslim unity the removal of Untouchability is the crux of the problem of *Swaraj*. There is no *Swaraj* without Hindu-Muslim (or rather Hindu-Non-Hindu) unity, and no such unity without Hindu unity, and no Hindu unity without the removal of Untouchability (which is only an extreme form of caste); therefore, there is no *Swaraj* without the removal of Untouchability.

In the light of this, then, it is futile and also cruelly unjust for our unity-mongers to speak as if the Hindus were a single community, while the Depressed Classes are there, a distinct minority, in number as important as the Muslims, and suffering from actual present disabilities, before which the other minorities' fears (real or simulated) of prospective disabilities under 'Hindu majority rule' are as nothing. This point of view I pleaded before Mahatmaji in *Young India* of 13-6-27,* and Mahatmaji seemed to agree. Let me now plead in the words of an untouchable leader himself. Said Mr. R. S. Nekaljay as President of the All-India Depressed Classes Conference at Amraoti on April 26 last:—

"We are 7 crores in a population of 33 crores. Mahomedans also are not more than 7 crores of people and yet

* The burden of this correspondence was: If any community as a community is to have special provisions for itself in the Constitution, let not those who clamour most, but those who need them most, have such safeguards provided for them.

Even the otherwise excellent Nehru Report failed the Depressed Classes in this respect.

they are given a representation in the Councils much more than what they can justly claim. This was done because of the Lucknow Pact of 1917. It was a bargain struck by people out to rob the Depressed Classes. It is the result of an unholy alliance between the Moslem League acting on behalf of Mahomedans and the Indian National Congress acting on behalf of high class Hindus. Both to suit their selfish ends quietly ignored the existence of 7 crores of people. The British Government to secure peace and to carry on the administration of India without unnecessary trouble, gave the go-by to the cry of trusteeship of the millions of people in whose interest they are supposed to be in India. They said not a word that the 7 crores of people known as the Depressed Classes should have adequate representation, but shamefully permitted high class Hindus to hand over to Mahomedans the seats that should have been given to us by right. That is how Muslims got more seats in the Provinces wherever they are not strong in numbers, while high class Hindus retained all their own seats, were very generous to Mahomedans and got some more for themselves, and all that at our expense! It was a legalised robbery done in broad day-light in the presence of the British Parliament, that seat of Justice, of Liberty and of Freedom.

"The problem of the Depressed Classes is far greater than the problem of Mahomedans. In education, though they are considered backward, they are second only to the advanced Hindus. They are not suffering from so many social and economic disabilities as the Depressed Classes. With little encouragement they can beat the high class Hindu in every department of life. The Depressed Classes are not only backward in matters of education, but are also frightfully handicapped with every sort of stigma that the diabolically perverted mind of a high class Hindu could invent. That being the real state of affairs between the two communities, whatever degree of political power that may be necessary for Mahomedans to come up to the standard of advanced Hindus, the Depressed Classes will require twice as much, if not more, to do so. Therefore, I urge that, if any representation in excess of what is due to a community by right of its numerical strength in any province is to be granted, it should be stressed in favour of the Depressed Classes. If the Government should think it necessary to yield to the preposterous demands of Mahomedans, then the same reasoning and the same principle of calculation for representation should be applied to us."

He also complained :

"Though there has been a steady enlargement of popular control over the administration in India, the claims of the Depressed Classes were consistently ignored by the British Government. Whenever the question of remedying the standing grievances of these classes in Government Service was taken up, the stigma of Untouchability was thrown at their faces by Government spokesmen. They are not adequately represented in the public bodies, nor is any encouragement given to them to join the Public Services. Government ought to know that by nominating a few Untouchables to the various Councils and local bodies or by giving them occasionally low-paid jobs they cannot radically improve their lot. Their real need is Education. I do not know how far the Government is prepared to put forward any drastic proposal for removing the ignorance of the Untouchable classes. When I examined the educational budgets of the various Provincial Governments, I found no special regard paid for Untouchables even to the same extent as was paid for Moslems and Anglo-Indians."

Let me end with the following resolution which was recently passed by the Council of the Karnatak Provincial Hindu Sabha at Karwar, as it is conceived in the true spirit of justice to the oppressed, and consistent at once with communal self-respect and with rational nationalism:—

"Resolved (a) that in the future Constitution for India, whatever safeguards are provided for communal minorities as such, the Hindu Depressed Classes should be provided with them at least to the same extent as the Mahomedans, inasmuch as the the former, who form a minority not less important numerically than the latter, have been suffering from actual present disabilities, before which the fears of prospective disabilities that the Muslim and other minorities might suffer under with a so called Hindu majority rule under Swaraj are as nothing.

"And (b) that in those Provinces (future as well as present) where the Hindus are in a minority (viz. Sind, the N. W. F. Provinces, Bengal and the Punjab) the distinction and nomenclature should be "Hindu" and "Non-Hindu", and not "Muhammadan" and "Non-Muhammadan", in case there are to be special provisions for the Muslim minorities in the other Provinces, and that the Hindu minorities should be accorded the same preferential treatment as the Muslim minorities in the other Provinces."

S. D. NADKARNI.

Review.

THE GREAT WAR.

THE WORLD CRISIS OF 1914-1918. By ELIE HALEVY. (Oxford University Press.) 1930. 23cm. 57p. 5/-

VOLUMES have been written about the crisis that led to the Great War and the responsibility for it. The bibliography of the subject is daily expanding. There is one school of thought which lays stress upon the part played by influential persons in the direction of the foreign policy of the different countries which were drawn into the war. Another school of thought belittles the influence of individual actors in the drama and ascribes the convulsion of Europe to collective forces and the sentiments and opinions of the masses. The question of the moral responsibility for the war necessarily occupies a large place in the writings of those who belong to the former school. It sinks into comparative insignificance in the eyes of those who believe that the crisis was a necessary result of the collective forces which swayed the different nations and were more or less irresistibly leading them to a conflict. M. Halevy belongs to the latter school of historians. He disclaims any intention of dealing with personalities and their share in the development of events. He claims to approach the question of the origins of the war in an impersonal and philosophical spirit. His thesis is that wars and revolutions are alike the result of a want of equilibrium between the political and economic conditions of the different classes in a country or of different nations, that equilibrium can be restored only by an outburst of violence whether it is called a revolution or a war and that it is often difficult to distinguish between the two manifestations. Wars have led to revolutions and revolutions have often assumed the proportions of war and transcending the limits of a single country have involved other countries in an international conflict. The collective forces that were tending to a revolution in Europe were, in the opinion of M. Halevy, due to the spread of socialism and the conflict of interests between capital and labour. The socialistic movement was very strong and active in nearly all the important countries of Europe during the years preceding the war. But it clearly was not the cause of the war except in the sense that the war was considered by the military party in Germany to be a means of diverting the minds of the people from the movement. M. Halevy holds the view that the war was not brought about by

the international competition for colonial markets. His reason for rejecting the economic interpretation of the war is that the capitalists in the belligerent countries were most anxious to avoid the war. He rejects the economic interpretation of the war and thinks that it was really due to the insurgence of nationalism among the peoples who were subject to the heterogeneous empire of Austria. According to him, the war was from its inception one for the liberties of peoples. This interpretation is true as regards the commencement of hostilities between Austria and Serbia. But it does not appear to be a satisfactory explanation of the motives which led the *entente* powers into the war. The motives of Germany were undoubtedly the pan-German feeling of sympathy with Austria, the desire for political and military supremacy in Europe, the desire for successful competition against England in colonial markets and consequently for the overthrow of her naval supremacy in the world and the fear of the military power of France and Russia which might prove a menace to her security, or at any rate, to her dreams of the hegemony of Europe. In discussing the causes of the war one has to remember not merely the immediate and apparent grounds for the declarations of war, but also the less apparent, but more substantial grounds which precipitated the nations into the struggle. As between England and Germany, the real reason for the entry of England into the war was not so much the desire to go to the rescue of Belgium against the wanton invasion of her territory as to curb the naval and political ambition of Germany and destroy the menace to her own security. France had to enter the war, not because of any desire to help the insurgent nationalities of the Austrian Empire, but on account of her deeply rooted fear and distrust of the military power and designs of Germany. The motive which weighed with Czarist Russia was not the desire to fight for the principle of popular liberties, but racial sympathy with the Slavonic nations of whose interests she considered herself the natural protector and champion. During the course of the war almost every nation engaged in it endeavoured to fix the responsibility upon others and to justify its own conduct and carried on a vigorous propaganda for the purpose, largely based upon false pretences. The truth is that it is useless to seek for any one cause as the explanation of the great conflict. The immediate spark that led to the explosion was no doubt the assassination of the Archduke of Austria at Serajevo. But the real causes and motives were many and varied and were ultimately rooted in the self-interest, real or fancied, of each of the countries that entered the lists.

Whatever might be the similarity of the conditions which, according to M. Halevy, made for revolution or for war, it was not the forces of revolution that were responsible for the commencement or the continuance of hostilities. The revolutionary forces came to a head in Russia in 1917 and in Germany in 1918 and the social and political upheaval which they brought about contributed to the termination of the war and not its maintenance. The account of these forces given by the author does not appear to be altogether relevant as an explanation of the origin of the war. The author prefers to accept the idealistic basis of history instead of the materialistic or economic. Idealism has undoubtedly made revolutions and wars. Nations and their rulers are very often swayed by ideas; but they are often at the mercy of false ideas, errors of judgment and irrational sympathies and antipathies and are led to act against the dictates of sound judgment and humanity. The economic interpretation of history rests upon comparatively more solid reasons. The economic rivalry of the European nations and their

competition for raw produce and markets is an abiding peril to the peace and security of the world.

The theory that the causes of the war should be sought not in the acts or omissions of rulers, ministers and statesmen, but in the sentiments and impulses of nations leads M. Halevy to shift the responsibility from the statesmen to the people and he is of opinion that the real remedy for the evils of war is the substitution of a spirit of compromise for a spirit of fanatical nationalism. While no one would quarrel with this conclusion, it is not possible to accept the view that statesmen are absolved from responsibility for not guiding their nations in the direction of peace and humanity. Prescriptions for the conduct of statesmen cannot be dismissed as pills to cure earthquakes. History does not warrant the view that individuals have no power to avert, accelerate or modify the course of events. It is not true that individuals in positions of authority have no power to influence the decisions of the masses in critical moments in the affairs of their country. The juster view is that nations and their leaders must alike bear the weight of responsibility for momentous decisions.

P. S. SIVASWAMY AIYER.

Miscellaneous.

FOREIGN PROPAGANDA.

In the debate that followed the reading of Prof. Rushbrook Williams' paper on "Indian Unrest and American Opinion" before the East India Association, London, on the 19th July last, Mr. V. S. Srinivasa Sastri spoke as follows:—

The Right Hon. Srinivasa Sastri said he desired to join the previous speakers in expressing admiration for the very great ability and the tactful presentation of his subject by Professor Rushbrook Williams. He said that he was not competent to deal with the state of American opinion on this question of Indian unrest, as his only acquaintance with America was many years ago. There was just one remark which occurred to him which, if he did not make, he would probably have missed an opportunity of stating the truth. In Indian public life to-day they were in the habit very often of examining their own status, their own abilities, and the way in which they presented their case to the outside world. There was much anxious self-examination going on among political parties to-day in India, but these political parties differed widely one from another as political parties here differed one from another. But they would all agree in one remarkable respect—namely, their inappreciation hitherto of the need of propaganda in other countries outside their own; their utter lack of organized means of influencing public opinion in other parts of the world, even in England, with which they were most directly concerned, and there was nothing which he himself lamented so bitterly as their neglect in this respect and incapacity to compass the means of remedying that great defect. That being the case, it struck him as somewhat strange that sober, sensible and well-informed people should express anxiety as to the result of the uncontroverted propaganda perpetrated by Indians in America. In his opinion they had discovered a mare's nest. In particular he absolutely repudiated on behalf of Mr. Gandhi any desire to carry on a vigorous propaganda in other countries. Unhappily, he differed from Mr. Gandhi in many respects and absolutely condemned his present occupation of stirring up trouble in India, but he did desire to say one thing about him—namely, that he was not responsible for carrying on any propaganda outside India. His great name, the reputation he had built up as the most Christ-like man in the world to-day, was responsible for many people admiring him and attaching importance to the smallest things about him; publishing them broadcast over all the world and getting them known. But personally

he had done nothing himself to carry on propaganda—and he blamed him for it. If they examined the accounts of the considerable sums of money that he spent they would probably find that propaganda in other countries came in for a very small sum indeed, if it came in at all. Some years ago they maintained in this country a little newspaper which might be called the only instrument of propaganda that they had, *India*. It did not do much work so far as he was aware. They criticized it up and down the country always, and the little service it was doing in this country was destroyed owing to the influence of Mr. Gandhi. He did not wish any money to be spent upon propaganda in this country, believing that every anna he could get must be spent in India on Indian propaganda. It seemed exceedingly strange that they should be carried away by an idea that Mr. Gandhi at least was responsible for propaganda in America. Many American journalists visited him; he talked to them, and he talked to other people, and he took care that he was presented by them in a proper light, but beyond that he hardly knew of anything Mr. Gandhi did which might be legitimately described as propaganda. However, perhaps that was a small affair. He agreed with Professor Rushbrook Williams heartily in one sentiment, and it was that which he would press upon them there. It was a sentiment which found expression in the last part of Professor Rushbrook Williams' paper: it was to the effect that if this present Indian problem was not satisfactorily settled England would find that the great name of India was used as the name of Ireland was used against her for a great many years, as redounding not to the credit or to the statesmanship of England, but as marking her incapacity to understand the rising forces of the time and to sympathize with the desire of subject peoples to get their freedom. That was the light in which England would be presented to the outside world. Already in self-defence many sections of public opinion in this country were trying to throw the blame and the expected failure of the Round-Table Conference upon certain sections of Indian people and Indian statesmen. To him who had come there out of a desire to help not only India but Great Britain also in the settlement of this problem, it was not wise to look beyond the Round-Table Conference at the present moment or to anticipate its failure. (Hear, hear.) Their common interest lay in the success of that Conference. It was the only way out of the present tangle. Let them all bend their energies towards the success of that Conference. Let nothing come, certainly not doctrinaire ideas or notions of correctness in this matter or that matter, certainly not notions of prestige or false pride, but let them all disregard these subordinate considerations and devote themselves to the discovery of a means of making this Round-Table Conference a success. (Hear, hear, and applause.) Much that was valuable to India—in fact, everything that was valuable to India and a good deal that was of inestimable value to Britain and her honour—depended upon what came out of this Round-Table Conference. In conclusion he would, therefore, ask them all to remember not to think of where the blame will rest when the Conference fails, and not to think at all of the failure of the Conference, but to contemplate only its success and not to hesitate over anything which might be required in order to make that Conference a success. (Applause.)

Correspondence.

LORD ROTHERMERE AND CONSERVATIVE PARTY.

TO THE EDITOR, "THE SERVANT OF INDIA".

Dear Sir,—Surely your paragraph on the "Vapourings of Lord Rothermere" conveys the unfounded suggestion that Lord Rothermere holds a position in the

organization of the Conservative Party? Mr. Baldwin's recent speech, in which he so vigorously exposed and chastised Lord Rothermere's attempt to influence the Party's policy, indicates very clearly that Lord Rothermere receives no countenance from the Conservative organization.

I feel certain that with your usual fairness, you will take an early opportunity to correct the impression that your paragraph may convey at least to hasty readers.—Yours etc.

An English Subscriber of long standing.
[We gladly accept the correction—Ed.]

SHORT NOTICE.

- SOME ASPECTS OF THE RECENT FOREIGN POLICY OF SWEDEN. By ERIC CYRIL BELLOUST. (University of California Press, California.) 1929. 24cm. pp. 251-378. \$1.75.
- THE ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE HISTORY OF THE CIVILIZATION OF JAPAN. Vols. 3. By YOSOBURO TAKEKOSHI. (Allen & Unwin.) 1930. 25cm. pp. 555, 556 and 436. £3/3/.
- KITCHENER. By C. R. BALLARD. (Faber & Faber.) 1930. 23cm. 380p. 18/-.
- LORD MELBOURNE. By BERTRAM NEWMAN. (Macmillan.) 1930. 23cm. 322p. 12/6.
- MATA HARI, COURTESAN AND SPY. By THOMAS COULSON. (Hutchinson.) 23cm. 256p. 12/6.
- NEW ZEALAND IN THE MAKING. By J. B. CONDDIFFE. (Allen & Unwin.) 1930. 23cm. 524p. 15/-.
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