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CONTENTS.

	PAGE.
TOPICS OF THE WEEK ...	241
ARTICLES:—	
Congressmen and the Retrocession of Berar ...	243
Opium Policy.—III. In the British Crown Colonies. By P. Kodanda Rao, M. A. ...	245
The North-Western Frontier—II. By Professor Gulshan Rai, B. A., LL. B. ...	246
Indian Cotton Industry. By S. Y. Fonseka, M. A., LL. B. ...	248
Punjab Administration Report. By Sri Ram Sharma, M. A. ...	249
A LETTER FROM LONDON ...	251

TOPICS OF THE WEEK.

IT is a great pity that Mr. Lansbury agreed to drop his motion for the removal of Mr. Justice McCardie from the Bench on his unjudicial conduct in the O'Dwyer-Nair case. There may be more in the Premier's statement than is vouchsafed to us since it satisfied so untamable a spirit as Mr. Lansbury; but we must say, from what has been cabled to this country, that Mr. MacDonald's explanation is highly unsatisfactory. He contends that the Judge's *obiter dicta*, however unfortunate, do not amount to that degree of fault which would constitute a ground for his dismissal. This opinion seems to be based upon the fact that the objectionable words occur not in the judgment but in the Judge's summing up. Speaking as laymen, it appears to us that it is as unjudicial in a judge to give a wrong direction to the jury as to give unjust decisions. Mr. MacDonald also pleads that Mr. Justice McCardie delivered himself of the passage complained of on insufficient information. On the contrary the whole purport of the Judge's remarks is that the Hunter Committee's decision was based on insufficient facts, and that he had since brought to his notice other grounds that had not been presented to the Hunter Committee, and in the light of this further information he laid down that General Dyer was wrongly punished by the Secretary of State for India. Again, it is not only the *obiter dicta* of the Judge that are complained of, but the whole method of investigation adopted by the Judge. It is quite wrong to base the condemnation of the Judge only on his unnecessary and unjustifiable attempt to whitewash General Dyer.

WE wonder whether Mr. Lansbury was satisfied with a veiled censure of Mr. Justice McCardie which the Prime Minister's explanation no doubt contains. If the motion was in any case to be thrown out, as we are told by the *Sunday Times*, he might have thought that this matter had better rest at the indirect condemnation that Mr. MacDonald had pronounced. This sort of censure of a Judge by the executive head affords us no manner of satisfaction, for however deeply concerned we may be to seek the proper constitutional remedy in the case of a Judge who has brought the Bench into discredit, we are still anxious to preserve intact the great principle of the Judge's independence of the executive. The authority to censure a Judge is not the Premier but the Houses of Parliament. Our grief is all the more poignant because we feel that the prime consideration which weighed with the Prime Minister in urging Mr. Lansbury not to press the question was the fear that discussion of the question would exacerbate (Anglo-) Indian feeling in this country. When the *Sunday Times* blurted it out only the previous day, we did not for a moment think it represented Mr. MacDonald's state of mind correctly. But this is precisely the consideration that he puts in the foreground. Well, we suggest it is an altogether unworthy motive which the Premier allowed to dominate him. Where the conduct of a Judge is in question, the only relevant consideration is whether the Judge acted *bona fide* or with a racial or other bias, and it is as wrong of the Prime Minister to seek to burke a question which calls imperatively for a prompt discussion from fear that it will inflame public feeling as for the Judge to import irrelevant questions into the trial. As it is, however what will inflame public feeling is not the discussion of the question but its suppression—by the Labour Ministry, whose clear duty it was to vindicate the people's right to remove a Judge obviously influenced by extra-judicial considerations.

THE personnel of the Reforms Inquiry Committee is now complete. The non-official element in it is, on the whole, well chosen. The selection of Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, Sir Sivaswamy Aiyer, Dr. Paranjpye and Mr. Jinnah is above cavil. The inclusion of Mr. Chintamani in the Committee would have been of incalculable value, but it is too

much to expect that his name would have been recommended by the United Provinces Government, after what they suffered at his hands recently. The refusal of Pandit Motilal Nehru to accept membership stamps the party of Swarajists as persons who will offer unreasonable criticism from outside but who will run away from the test of responsibility. His plea that the scope of the committee is too closely restricted to allow him to be associated with it is much too thin to wear an air even of plausibility. It is true that this Committee is not the Round Table Conference he had asked for, but the non-Swarajist Nationalists, among whom Mr. Jinnah counts himself, had also united in making this demand; still it did not prevent Mr. Jinnah from agreeing to serve on the Committee. Swarajists have no objection to working on other bodies of far less national importance than this Committee, even with restricted terms of reference, obviously is; for instance, Pandit Motilal did not scruple to serve on the Select Committee of the Protection to Steel bill, but he felt there was an impassable barrier between himself and a Committee, whose labours would certainly result in some measure of constitutional advance. If this measure proves to be narrow because of want of sufficient popular support, the Swarajists will have to thank themselves for the result.

* * *

The Responsibility for Vaikom. FROM the beginning we have held the Travancore Government responsible for the struggle that has been going on at Vaikom for the removal of a glaring civic disability on certain Hindu castes. These castes are not allowed to use certain public roads, and we have repeatedly expressed the view that the enlightened Government of Travancore, which has removed several such disabilities in respect of schools, entry into State service, &c, ought to have removed the disability relating to public roads also. Some of our contemporaries, however, were of the opinion that it was not the Travancore Government which stood in the way but public opinion, and if it expressed itself in favour of throwing open all roads to the unapproachable Hindus, the Government would be only too glad to give effect to that opinion. The attitude of the Government towards this question in the Travancore Legislative Council that met some days ago, however, leaves no shadow of doubt that the entire responsibility rests with the Durbar. Several questions were put in the Council asking for a statement of policy of the Government in this matter. The answers were either evasive or not forthcoming at all. A resolution had been tabled and it had found a place on the agenda. But the Dewan-President refused to give facilities for its discussion. The whole of the allotted time was taken up by official business and when a request was made to extend the meeting it was refused point blank. "This is the more inexcusable because the Dewan himself had previously declared that he would abide by the decision of the Legislative Council. The Government apparently changed their mind and adopted a course which was not straightforward when they saw that the decision of the Council

was going to be in favour of the removal of the disability. It is very regrettable, because Travancore is in most respects a very progressive State.

* * *

Statelets in C. P. WE saw last week what action the Bengal Government proposes to take in order to meet the situation created by the exercise of obstructionist tactics by the Swaraj party in that province. We do not know yet what the C. P. Government intends to do with a view to escaping from the deadlock created there by the same party. The Swarajists spread the rumour some time ago that the Government would have an election soon and were already busily engaged in manipulating it. But the election seems long in coming. In fact the Swarajists now feel aggrieved that the Government are carrying on without going again to the country and giving the Swarajists another chance of coming out on top. If they were manoeuvring to force the Government to hold an election by their earlier propaganda they have been severely disappointed. There is no reason for Government to imagine that a fresh election would yield any other result. They may also feel that if the constituencies are now to transfer their suffrages to politicians of a different complexion, it is best that the constituencies were brought to a consciousness of the harmful effects of the Swarajist policy, as they are likely to be if the election were postponed for a few months. It may also be that the Government are waiting to see how the Non-co-operator-Swarajist controversy, and also the inter-Swarajist squabbles are going to end, for if there is a clean out between the parties as may well be, Government perhaps expect that the C. P. Swarajists at least will not scruple to accept ministerships, and, when responsibility is once undertaken their policy will be materially different. So far as one can guess, therefore, the C. P. Government's policy seems to be to "wait and see." In any case the general election does not appear to be in the immediate future.

* * *

Jamshedpur Labour. PROTECTION has been accorded to the steel industry, but the grievances of labour remain unredressed. Promises were profusely held out when the tariff bill was being discussed that although labour provisions could not, owing to technical reasons, be introduced in the measure for protection, still the rights of workmen employed in this industry would be protected as if, following the model of Australia, clauses in the interest of labour were inserted in the Act itself. These anticipations have, however, proved groundless, and the public disappointment does not become any less keen because the Swarajists have helped in robbing labour of its due. At a meeting of labourers in Jamshedpur, Mr. C. R. Das, a member of the Conciliation Committee hastily improvised to avert an adverse decision in the Assembly, pompously declared that the Jamshedpur Labour Association had been recognised by the employers "on approved trade union lines." The widely advertised recognition is useless, in the existing circumstances of the industry, if it is accompanied by the condition that the office-bearers of the Association have to be selected by labourers from among themselves or from men who have had experience of such work. As the industry is so young in India, there are hardly any men available who have passed out of this or similar steel works and who can conduct the affairs of the Association in an

independent spirit. For the present, therefore office-bearers have to be selected outside the ranks of labour, from among men who are interested in labour in a general sort of way. Mr. Andrews in his memorandum has laid the utmost emphasis on this, and since the liberty of the Association to choose its own executive, is restricted so narrowly contrary to his recommendation, it is clear that the recognition of the Association is robbed of much of its value.

Indian Law Society. THE Indian Law Society of Bombay which was started last year with the late Sir Narayan Chandavarkar as President, is to be warmly congratulated on having opened a Law College in Poona from the 20th of this month. Hitherto a complete law course could be gone through only in Bombay, and those who know the percentage of casualties that the Bombay climate and Bombay life inflict on the students who go there will agree that the Law Society have done an act of public service in starting the College at Poona. Already about 300 students have joined it and a hundred more may be expected to join in the next few days. The classes are at present held in the Fergusson College and since there is no doubt about the success of the institution, the Society will soon take steps to have buildings of its own—of course with the generous help of the public. Its claim is rendered irresistible by the sacrifice made by the Professors of the College. They are distinguished practitioners at Bombay, Poona and elsewhere and have agreed to serve the College for three years without remuneration, so that the institution may grow. Another object of the Society is to open "People's Classes" where instruction in the law and constitution of India will be imparted to the general public. The first of these Classes is to be shortly opened in Poona and if there be a sufficiently strong demand in other centres the Society will be glad to open classes there also. We wish the Society and its devoted workers every success and long life.

Friends of the Depressed Classes. MUCH of the advice that Sir A. P. Patro gave to the Adi-Dravidas at Trichinopoly was excellent and it will be admitted that the Madras Government, despite a retrograde step that it took last year in connection with the Labour Department, has done more for the uplift of the depressed classes than perhaps any other Government in British India. But we are afraid the Madras Minister played a foul party game when he warned his audience against a class of people masquerading in the guise of 'nationalism' who were misleading them 'by glib tongue and alluring phrases coming out of a heart full of mischief and venom'—meaning thereby the Swarajists. Every political party in India would certainly like to have the depressed classes on its side, the Swarajists as much as the party of which Sir A. P. Patro is a leader. Every party is therefore offering its services to them and trying to get adherents from among them. But that does not mean that any party is insincere in its friendship. As a matter of fact the best supporters of the depressed classes in Madras are to be found in every political party, and it is difficult to say which party is more and which less friendly because the parties are not yet formed on distinguishing principles and programmes. As the depressed classes in most localities have not yet got their own leaders, we hope Sir A. P. Patro will not allow the political complexion of their friends to stifle his sympathies.

CONGRESSMEN AND THE RETRO-
CESSION OF BERAR.

WHEN an ex-President of the Congress like Hakim Ajmal Khan issues an appeal to Congressmen to take up the Nizam's cause in right earnest in the matter of the retrocession of Berar, the controversy assumes a degree of practical importance which it did not possess before. For one thing it will no longer be possible for the Swarajists of C. P. and Berar to be studiously silent. They will have to declare themselves for or against the retrocession, as others have already done. It is privately well known that the Swarajists are opposed to the retrocession, but they have not declared their opinion publicly because it would mean an open preference of British rule such as would not be in keeping with their past characterisation of it. Therefore they have hitherto sought shelter under the plea that the question has not been put to them directly, greatly pleased all the while, no doubt, that the Non-Brahmins and Liberals had unequivocally declared themselves against the retrocession. The Hakim Sahab has now forced them into the open and in that at any rate we admit he has done a public service.

It is amazing that the Hakim Sahab believes that the case of the Nizam has evoked "universal sympathy and support for him in India as well as abroad." We wonder where he gets his facts from. Apparently he is unaware that Sir Ali Imam, with all the resources placed at his command, is unable to push forward the Nizam's case to any appreciable extent in influential circles in England. But less excusable is the Hakim's ignorance of the resolutions passed at numerous public meetings in Berar and of the opinions that have been expressed in Indian newspapers since the publication of the Nizam's letter. What Indian opinion is agreed about, supported to some extent by opinion in England, is that in getting possession of the administration of Berar, the British Government adopted methods that would not be upheld by our law courts. This is true not only of Berar but of many other parts of British India. And this is true not only of the British Government in the past—and of several Governments in the present also—but of every state or Government established in India, not excluding the State of Hyderabad itself. Can the Hakim Sahab say, for instance, that the first Nizam acted faithfully by his master, the Moghul Emperor, when, being his Viceroy, he declared his independence of Delhi? The unfortunate fact is that, while every state enforces law and justice on its subjects, there is no power above the state to enforce justice and equity upon it. This has been the case hitherto and will continue to be so, until the League of Nations or some other similar super-state organisation will be in a position to enforce its decisions upon even a combination of the strongest states. It is therefore wrong to assume that because Indian opinion has condemned the methods by which Berar was taken

over therefore it is in favour of its being restored to the Nizam. The people of Berar have already asked the question: "If we are to go back to the Nizam, then why not to the Bhonsla?" It is a vain task now to retrace all wrong steps recorded in history. Indian opinion is no more in favour of the retrocession of Berar to the Nizam than it is in favour of the restoration of Nagpur or Sa'ara or other territory equally unjustifiably taken over by the British Government in the past.

Our strongest objection is, however, to the following statement of the Hakim Saheb:—

"The question of consulting the people of Berar in the matter, as some unwise diplomacy may suggest and a left hand policy may likely bring it to the surface, does not arise in this case. It is purely a question of the Nizam's proprietary rights on the province and should be decided purely on its merits."

The Hakim Saheb's conception of the State is obviously antediluvian. He thinks it is property: State and estate mean the same thing to him. Elsewhere he speaks of the Nizam as the 'rightful owner' of Berar. The Nizam is no more the 'owner' of Berar or Hyderabad than the King of England is the owner of India. It is true that in olden days, before the sovereignty of the people was recognised, the state was by some looked upon as the ruler's property, even as woman was looked upon as a bit of property. On not a few occasions territory was mortgaged or sold by a ruler for meeting his private expenses. But those ideas of property prevail no more even in Asiatic countries. There is no tribunal before which the late Emperor of Turkey could claim the 'ownership' of his palace, let alone his territory. The fact is the world has ceased to believe in the divine right of kings. Nowadays, a king is a king only so long as the subjects are willing that he should be one. The next moment he is a private individual, generally banished from his home for the convenience of his whilom subjects. The Nizam's claim over Berar is therefore no more than what the people of Berar are willing to concede. If they refuse to go under the Nizam the British Government cannot drive them at the point of the bayonet, nor allow the Nizam to subdue them by force. It is therefore absurd of the Hakim Saheb to say that the question of consulting the people does not arise. In fact there is no other question whatever. By the way, one fails to understand why he calls consulting the people 'an unwise policy.' If there is universal sympathy and support for the Nizam, as he claims, it is the wisest policy to consult them. It is like having a packed jury in your favour. The inconvenient fact is that all the sympathy of which he boasts exists only in the imagination of the paid and unpaid advocates of the Nizam.

The Hakim Saheb asks further: "Besides, if the Government of India does not see its way to consult the will of the ruled subjects in the moulding of their own policy in many things of importance—and if they did so they could not go on in India with the present form of their government—how could such demands be made in the case of the Nizam?"

The fact that responsible government is the declared goal of British policy in India and that a substantial step has already been taken in that direction shows that the British Government has recognised the right of the people not only to be heard but to govern themselves as they like. That apart, even if the British Government had not insisted on consulting the people of Berar, we should have expected public leaders like the Hakim Saheb himself to have insisted upon it. Are not the Hakim Saheb and his friends insisting on a round table conference for settling the constitution of India? Have they not been refusing to recognise the present Indian constitution on the sole ground that it was forged in the British Parliament, without the people of India being given a chance to exercise their inherent right of self-determination? Is the doctrine of self-determination to be urged only where the British Government is concerned and not against the Nizam and other Indian rulers? That is, we are afraid, obviously what the Hakim Saheb thinks, for he invites the Swarajists to disclose, by supporting the Nizam's claim to Berar, their future policy towards Indian States: as that of protecting the rights of Indian Princes and fully freeing their internal affairs from outside interference. There can be no more reactionary policy than this so far as its effect on the people of Indian States is concerned. The Indian Princes are despotic rulers, generally swayed by old-world ideas regarding their rights. If their ideas are accepted there would be no such thing as people's rights. Many of them do not differentiate between their private purse and state funds. It is the "outside interference" of the British Government that obliges them to maintain even accounts, &c. In fact, the complaint of intelligent subjects of Indian States is that the British Government does not 'interfere' sufficiently to see that administrative reforms are introduced in the States and that they are brought in a line with British India. If they desire more interference, however, it is only with a view to making the Indian Princes allow their subjects to determine their future destiny for themselves. Congressmen who stand for self-determination and self-government for the people of British India, may well give their moral support to this desire on the part of the people of Indian States. Strangely enough, however, one sees prominent Congressmen like Hakim Ajmal Khan and Mr Jayakar, not standing up for democratic ideals in Indian States, but figuring as apologists and supporters of autocracy. The rights of the people remain nevertheless, and the right of the people of Berar to have the last say in the matter also remains.

The Nizam's offer of Home Rule to the people of Berar under his suzerainty has altogether failed to impress them, because they cannot reconcile his excessive solicitude for their own political rights with his denial of all such rights to the people of Hyderabad, who have been uninter-

edly under his rule for generations together. The Nizam will best achieve his object by introducing constitutional reforms in Hyderabad and conferring on his immediate subjects the political rights which he is prepared to concede to the more distant people of Berar. That will gain him more solid support than all the costly propaganda that he has launched. One misconception we would remove before concluding. It is believed, by some Muhammadans that those who are opposed to the retrocession of Berar are influenced, consciously or unconsciously, by the consideration that the Nizam is a Muhammadan Prince, and that if a Hindu Prince had been concerned in the matter, the opposition would not have existed. Nothing can be farther from the truth. If the proposal were the restoration of the province not to the Nizam but to the Bhojals, the opposition would have been on less strenuous. There would be similar opposition to the restoration of other tracts. The belief itself, we are afraid, owes its genesis to the communal bias of those that hold it.

OPIUM POLICY—III.

IN THE BRITISH CROWN COLONIES.

IN the two previous articles (see the SERVANT OF INDIA, 5th and 19th June) we saw how England could not be held responsible, either directly or indirectly, for the consumption of opium in countries outside the British Empire; we also saw what were the considerations, which, in her own territories, stood in the way of the realization of such anti-opium policy as she was internationally committed to. We may now proceed to examine, if, in spite of these considerations, any substantial progress has been made in combating the opium evil in the British territories in the East. In so doing it would be well to treat India, where opium is primarily eaten, separately from Crown Colonies and Protectorates where it is primarily smoked. For public opinion is strikingly unanimous against opium smoking, but it is not at all strong against opium eating, while medical opinion is divided about the degree of harmfulness of opium smoking as well as opium eating. The detestation of opium smoking in China is proverbial and the feeling is shared in India and in fact, all over the world. It is reflected in the resolution of the Hague Convention which, while calling for the control of raw opium, asks for the suppression, gradually if not immediately, of prepared opium used for smoking. Though a plea might be, and has been, set up to tolerate opium eating, none such is permissible in the case of opium smoking and, as mentioned above, opium is chiefly smoked in the British Colonies and Protectorates in the East.

Now these possessions include the Crown Colonies of the Straits Settlements, Mauritius and Hongkong; and the protectorates of the Federated and Unfederated Malay States, British North Borneo, Sarawak, and Brunei. Ceylon may also be included here, though opium is primarily

eaten there. In all these countries, opium has been taken out of private commerce, and made a Government monopoly, which is certainly a step in the right direction, despite the preposterous statement of Miss La Motte that "the advocates of 'control' consider opium harmless if purchased from a government, but quite deadly if bought from a pedlar." We have already referred to the satisfaction with which Miss La Motte regards the opium situation in Ceylon and Mauritius and the hope she entertains of Hongkong. In Ceylon, opium is sold by Government only to registered opium consumers, and with the dying off of confirmed *habitues*, the number of consumers has been reduced from 24,000 in 1910 to 10,645 in 1921. In Mauritius, the import of opium has fallen from 120 chests in 1917 to 45 chests in 1920. In Hongkong, the import of Indian opium fell from 360 chests in 1916 to 150 in 1922. The total imports of Indian, Persian and Turkish opium fell from 103,375 kilos in 1920 to 39,778 kilos in 1921, and exports from 86,830 kilos to 33,128 kilos. These figures, quoted by Miss La Motte herself, indicate a not inconsiderable reduction of opium consumption in these Crown Colonies.

There is, however, no room for complacency. In the Crown Colony of the Straits Settlements, the consumption of opium has risen from 141,926 lbs. in 1912, when the Hague Convention was signed, to 151,322 lbs. in 1920. This is distressing enough, but it becomes positively ugly, when it is remembered that the Straits Settlements Opium Commission (1909), which was divided in its opinion as to the harmfulness of opium smoking, was, however, unanimous in saying that "considerations of public finance, apart from other aspects of the question, impel the commissioners to come to the conclusion, that the question should be dealt with by increased control, and not by way of prohibition."

The worst opium situation occurs in the British Protectorates. The few figures quoted of opium consumption indicate a rise, instead of a fall, except in 1921, a year of depression and depletion of Chinese labourers. It is the Government of Kelantan that pronounced opium smoking harmless. It is the British North Borneo Chartered Company that found opium consumption very necessary to assure dividends, and it is the Government of Brunei that proposed to attract and retain Chinese coolies by offering the 'recreation'! It should, however, be noted that these Protectorates are governed by native Sultans, though under British advice, and from the information given by Miss La Motte, it is difficult to assess to what extent, if at all, her remark that "British 'advice' generally means Indian opium" to these Native States is true. One thing is certain, that as in the Indian States, England is not quite a free agent in these Protectorates with their Sultans. The reactionary opium situation in these Protectorates may be due to indifference and neutrality of England, as in the

case of the Native States in India, which are in consequence very much behind British India in many respects. Or it may be due to the active collusion of England with the British planters, mine-owners and merchants who exploit these States, who want Chinese labour and who escape taxation as long as these States continue to obtain a good part of their revenue from the consumption of opium by non-Britishers.

Whatever that may be, we can have no hesitation in deploring the opium consumption which is much too large in the Crown Colonies and absolutely unconscionable in the Protectorates and in demanding that opium reform should be speeded up. This *does* depend to an increasing extent on the strength of public opinion in these countries, as has been the case in Ceylon, Mauritius, Burma and Hongkong. It *should* so depend, because in most cases, the loss of opium revenue must be made up by fresh taxation, the resort to which will be greatly facilitated by the consent, in advance, of the people. We cannot, however, be too sanguine of speedy reform, because smuggling of opium from China into these neighbouring Colonies and Protectorates renders effective prohibition of opium smoking more and more difficult and costly. As long as opium production in chaotic China is not efficiently controlled, the salvation from opium evil seems almost impossible.

P. KODANDA RAO.

NORTH-WEST FRONTIER.—II.

AFGHANISTAN NOT A GOOD BUFFER STATE.

THE resistance of Belgium in the early days of the last great European War no doubt gave to the French and the English time enough to prepare themselves against the German invaders. But Belgium and Afghanistan do not stand on the same footing. The people of Belgium are homogeneous, and no portion of them were in 1914 under the foreign rule of France or England. The present territory of Afghanistan, however, is not inhabited by one homogeneous people. The Afghans occupy only the south-eastern corner of modern Afghanistan. The rest of the territory is inhabited by people of other nationalities. The province of Afghan Turkestan, lying to the north of the Hindukush, is occupied by Uzbek Turks. The north-western province of Herat is a portion of the ancient Persian province of Khorasan, and is peopled by Persian speaking people. The south-western territory of Farrah and Registan, which are parts of ancient Seistan, another province of old Persia, is also inhabited by Persian speaking people. More than half the population of Afghanistan speak non-Afghan languages. A country containing several different nationalities cannot offer resistance to a foreign invader so effectively as can be done by a country peopled by one homogeneous people. Afghans, the ruling race in Afghanistan, have to deal with alien subject peoples north of the

Hindukush, and west of the Hazarajat. If foreign invaders, before invading Afghanistan, obtain the willing support of the Turks in Central Asia and of Persians in Khorasan and Seistan, I doubt very much whether the Amir of Afghanistan will be able to offer effective resistance north of the Hindukush or west of the Hazarajat. On the other hand, among the upper and educated classes the Persian language has become in recent times more and more popular throughout Afghanistan. The Afghans living in the districts of Jelalabad, Kabul, Ghazni, and Kandahar, this side of the Hindukush Range and Helمند River, are being more and more Persianised. This must eventually result in still further weakening the national resistance of the Afghans against Persia, if the latter country becomes in the near future a rejuvenated and strongly nationalistic power. So even if the Amir of Afghanistan has perfect good-will towards us and is prepared to bar the way against foreign invaders, he has, as I have tried to show, to contend, in this task, against considerable racial and ethnological difficulties. Any effective resistance that the Amir of Afghanistan will be able to offer to the western and northern invaders would be in the high passes of the snow-clad Hindukush, or in the lofty plateaus of Central Afghanistan,—places backed up in the rear by the homogeneous Afghan population.

PATHAN UNITY.

But can we rely on the good-will of the Afghans and their national ruler, the Amir of Afghanistan? We must remember that the Moghal province of Kabul consisted of (a) the present North-Western Frontier Province of India, (b) the Administered and British Districts of Baluchistan, and (c) the Jelalabad, Kabul, Ghazni and Kandahar districts of modern Afghanistan. These three tracts are almost entirely inhabited by the Pathans, and their national language is Pashtu. The Pathans living in the British and Administered Districts of the Frontier Province and Baluchistan and in the Tribal Areas of the Frontier Province are now British subjects. The Pathans of the districts of Jelalabad, Kabul, Ghazni and Kandahar are still independent under their national ruler, Amir Amanullah. Do not the Pathans in British territory and within the British sphere of influence desire to join their independent kith and kin in Afghanistan? Does not Amir Amanullah, like his ancestors from Dost Muhammed Khan downwards, wish to recover Peshawar and thus unite all the Afghans under one common rule? These are questions one may legitimately ask.

SERBIAN PARALLEL.

We had a similar state of affairs in the Balkans in 1914. A portion of the Serbian people were independent under the King of Serbia. The Serbs of Bosnia and Herzegovina were under Austria, and the Serbs of Croatia and Slovenia were under Hungary. The ever-present trouble of the late Austro-Hungarian Empire was to prevent her Serbian subjects from going over and joining the

Serbs of the independent kingdom of Serbia. The Allies in the last great European War, France, England, Italy and Russia, took advantage of this trouble of the Austro-Hungarian statesmen. They were able to win over the Serbian people in Bosnia, Herzegovina, Croatia, and Slavonia at any rate the Serbian population in these districts proved a source of great weakness to the Austrians in the great War. If it is the natural aspiration of the Amir of Afghanistan to bring under his rule the Pathans of Peshawar, North-East Baluchistan and of the Tribal Areas, this side of the Durand Line, is it safe, is it wise, to strengthen his military power? Yet that has been the policy of the British rulers of India for quite half a century from 1870 to 1919. During the last Great War the late Amir Habibullah no doubt kept the north-western frontiers safe and did not allow enemy intrigues within his kingdom. But perhaps in doing so, Amir Habibullah was not following a national policy. Perhaps his office and his people wanted him to take advantage of the troubles of England. Perhaps they wished that while England was engaged in a life and death struggle in Europe, Amir Habibullah struck for the recovery of Peshawar, and other Tribal Areas in the Frontier Province, or at least fought for the complete independence of Afghanistan. Amir Habibullah did nothing of the kind. Did not this conduct of his cost him his life? And did not Amir Amanullah, his successor, take advantage of the troubles in the Punjab due to Martial Law, and succeed in winning complete independence for his country? So long as the Pathan population is split up into British subjects and independent people, the Amir of Afghanistan cannot be trusted to be the gate-keeper of India; much less can we help him to become strong militarily. Afghanistan, therefore, cannot like Belgium serve as a buffer state between India on the one hand, and Russia and Middle Eastern countries on the other. In the matter of defence India must rely entirely on herself. She must, whenever opportunity presents itself, push her frontiers right up to the high walls of the Hindukush, all along its length, and recover the ancient boundary lines of her country existing in the time of the Mauryas, the Rajputs, and the Moghals.

But so long as India is not able to recover her ancient and natural boundary lines along the lofty heights of the Hindukush and the Hazarajats, the north-western frontier of India must always be a source of weakness to her. So long as our armies keep watch and ward on the lower heights of the Suleman Range, and not on the snow-clad lofty mountain passes of the Hindukush and the Hazarajats, there can be no hope of reducing our standing army, and in this way of lightening our military burdens.

PERSIANISATION OF PATHANS.

At the same time the Pathan problem must always form an important factor in any scheme devised for the defence of India. We must prevent the Pathans from becoming in India what Serbs

became in the Austrian Empire. The total Pathan population may be estimated to be about 65 lacs. Out of them 30 lacs may be said to be living in Afghanistan, probably 25 lacs of them are in the Tribal Areas of the Frontier Province, 8 lacs in the British Districts of the Frontier Province and about 2 lacs in the British and Administered districts of Baluchistan. So out of 65 lacs of Pathans, 35 lacs are British Indian subjects or under the British sphere of influence, and the remaining 30 lacs are a ruling race in Afghanistan. Now how shall we deal with the Indian portion of the Pathan population? I have already said, that the Pathans in Afghanistan are rapidly being Persianised. The use of Persian language is spreading fast among the Pathans, even in the rural areas entirely peopled by them. The Pathans in Afghanistan form a minority in its total population. The mother tongue of the majority of the peoples in Afghanistan is Persian, and Persian, as I have said, is rapidly spreading even among the Pathans of rural areas living in South-Eastern Afghanistan. Persian is the court language of the Pathans, and though a ruling race in Afghanistan, they are fast giving up their own national language, Pashtu, in favour of the more refined and polished language, Persian. The natural consequence of all this would be to spread more rapidly Persian culture, Persian ways of thought, and Persian civilisation, this side of the Hindukush and Hazarajats.

WHAT HISTORY TEACHES.

I believe excessive Persianisation of the people this side of the Hindukush will prove a source of great danger and weakness to India. The Hindukush, the Hazarajats, and the sandy deserts of Seistan and Mekran are a natural barrier between India and the Middle-East. The best security for India lies in this, that no foreign influence should be allowed to penetrate South-Eastern Afghanistan from across the high mountain walls of the Hindukush and the Hazarajats. Whenever foreign influence has been allowed to come in through the passes of these lofty mountain ranges, our History tells us, India has always been in danger. The spread of Persian script Khorashti in Kabul and western Punjab, five centuries before Christ, allowed Persian influence to pour in through the passes of the Hindukush and the Hazarajats. Was not this one of the contributory causes of the lack of resistance on the part of Ambhi, the ruler of Northern Punjab, against Alexander, two centuries later? A few years after the departure of Alexander, when Emperor Chandragupta Maurya obtained a victory over Seleucus, the then Emperor of the Middle-East, not only the districts of Kandahar, Ghazni, Kabul, and Jelalabad, this side of the Hindukush, but also Herat on the other side of it, were annexed to the Mauryan Empire in India. Was not this annexation made with the idea of preventing foreign influence from crossing the passes of the Hindu

kush? The decay and disintegration of the Mauryan Empire weakened the control of India over the passes of the Hindukush. Was not then this ancient Bharatvarsha, as a consequence of this weakening of our control over these passes, flooded with Greek influence, and Greek conquest? We were not able to drive this foreign influence out of Hindustan, till the Greek, the Parthian, the Saka, the Kushan, and the Hun conquerors were converted to the then Indian religion of Buddhism, and thoroughly impregnated with Indian culture and Indian civilisation. The rulers of the Hindukush regions, thus Indianised, were well able to protect Hindustan against the Middle-East for the next five or six centuries. The mighty Empires of Persia and Eastern Rome were both subdued by the Arabs within a few years of the death of the prophet Muhammad. But against India the Arabs failed. With the exception of Sindh and Multan they were able to obtain no foothold in India. So long as the Pathans remained Budhists, so long as they remained loyal subjects of Jaipal, the Hindu King of Lahore, the Arabs or the Turks could not cross the lofty passes of the Hindukush. It was not till 400 years after the death of Muhammad that Islam was able to make any real conquest of India. But was not this Muhammadan conquest of India in the 11th and 12th centuries preceded by a peaceful penetration of Islam into the valley of Kabul, Ghazni and Kandahar? It was not till the Pathans of Kabul and Ghazni became Muhammadans, and became imbued with Pan-Islamic spirit, that the newly Muhammadanised Turkish adventurers of Central Asia were able to obtain a foothold in Ghazni. Once foreign military power was established in the valleys this side of the Hindukush, the frontiers of India became unsafe, with the consequence was that India fell under foreign rule. The introduction of foreign influence in the valleys this side of the Hindukush has always been followed by foreign rule in India. This fact has been repeated again and again in the History of India.

GULSHAN RAI.

INDIAN COTTON INDUSTRY.

SINCE the recent labour troubles in the cotton mills of Bombay, the Indian textile industry has been subjected to much adverse criticism and the millowner has been maligned and dubbed a Shylock demanding his pound of flesh. The people have generally believed that the millowner, who made huge gains during the post-war years, has no justification for denying the mill-hands their annual bonus to which they were accustomed since 1919. The legal aspect of this claim finds no more adherents, now that the Macleod Committee has definitely turned it down, but those unacquainted with the history of the cotton industry in the past and present, pour ridicule over the millowners' conduct on ethical grounds. It has been suggested that bonus should have been paid even though the

result of the past year's working has been unfavourable, in view of the fact that the mills have accumulated large reserves in war times. The argument is a plausible one, but a dangerous one too. Its acceptance might have done incalculable harm to the cotton industry in future. No one considered how long this bonus was to continue when there was a world-wide trade depression and the past years' reserves are speedily dissipated. Cotton industry is not a monopoly or semi-monopoly of India like jute. It has to take into account very serious competition from countries like Great Britain and Japan and also the loss of old markets like China as the result of the spread of industry there. The competition of Japan was a thing unknown in pre-war days. So it can least afford to wipe off the reserves on which its very existence is staked. High profits is now a dream of golden days. The capacity of the cotton mills for earning has been seriously reduced with the steady advance in the price of cotton in sympathy with adverse reports of American crop and general trade depression. In addition, the spirit of Swadeshiism which was in the air a couple of years ago has vanished with as much rapidity as it spread. This was a prominent factor in determining the profits of 1920 and 1921. The industry in general has returned to pre-war conditions and though some fortunate mills are in a strong position financially, still with a high bank rate they must be content with a considerably lower margin of profits in future. The following table will show how speedily the war profits vanished and normality returned.

Gross Profits since 1910.

(in crores of rupees).

1910	1911	1912	1913	1914	1915	1916	1917	1918	1919	1920	1921	1922	1923
·60	·53	2·6	1·8	·89	1·86	3·12	3·12	4·9	13	16	15·4	7	2

These figures do not allow for depreciation on block account and the managing agents' commission, which have to be deducted to arrive at net profits. Messrs. Fergusson and Company have, in their evidence before the Macleod Committee, calculated depreciation in 1923 at Rs. 1,71,00,000 for Bombay mills alone, which leave a deficit of forty lacs for them. The ordinary share capital invested in the industry in pre-war years was 6·5 crores, whereas it is over 16 crores at present. The following table shows the growth of the textile industry from 1900.

Year	Mills	Spindles	Looms
1900	193	49,45,000	40,000
1910	263	61,65,000	82,000
1914	276	67,78,000	1,04,000
1919	258	66,89,000	1,18,000
1920	253	67,63,000	1,19,000
1921	257	68,70,000	1,23,000
1922	298	73,31,000	1,34,000

No one interested in the industrial development of India can say that the mill industry is firmly established and that it needs no outside help. The abnormal war profits are not a true indication.

of the earning capacity of the mills, for such profits were reaped in all industrial undertakings at that time. The jute trade, which has been the monopoly of the Europeans, made even bigger profits, but since 1920 it has suffered too and the fact that since April 1921 jute mills have been working four days a week shows the restricted demand for their manufactures owing to the unsettled conditions of the world market. But they are much better off than the cotton mills and are even now making reasonable profits. That industry is exclusively in the hands of Europeans. The capital is mostly theirs. The profits, obviously their legitimate gains, however, are passing unheeded. One may well ask why the public should grudge the Bombay millowner, who is in nine cases out of ten an Indian, his profit, while the jute mill owner, who in nine cases out of ten is a foreigner, can without challenge fill his pockets to overflowing alike in war and post-war years?

In recent years the abnormal export of raw cotton, due to shortage of world supply and its consequent high price, has as much handicapped the industry as that iniquitous impost, the cotton excise duty. The export of raw cotton is increasing beyond expectations. In 1921-22 it was worth 54 crores and next year 71 crores. In 1922-23 it amounted to 3,362,000 bales against 2,989,000, and 2,074,000 in the two preceding years. Japan has been the principal importer, taking 53% of the export in 1922-23. Europe increased its purchases owing to the depletion of the American crop, which has the effect of sending up the price of Indian cotton. The first essential of a thriving industry is ample supply of cheap raw material, which factor is absent under present circumstances. As long as this is not available, the Indian cotton industry will not flourish without extraneous encouragement.

The Cotton Excise duty is, as is well known hampering the normal growth of the industry. The history of this impost dates back to 1894 and is interesting. In March of that year, fresh taxation being unavoidable, the 1875 tariff, under which all imports were subject to a duty of 5% was restored, but cotton goods were excepted. This exception lasted for a few months. In December 1894 a 5% import duty was levied on all cotton goods. "Lancashire became active and in response to its agitation some details of the budget were altered involving a loss of revenue to India and an arrangement came to by which an Excise duty similar to customs had to be paid." In 1896 the tariff was revised and reduced to 3½ per cent ad valorem. The Excise duty was defended on grounds of financial pressure, but it was primarily a political impost, as could be seen from the above quotation from no less a person than the present Prime Minister, Mr. Ramsay MacDonald. This duty on home manufactures on financial grounds is indefensible. Why should cotton have been singled out for this impost at the instance of Lancashire, and made to contribute to the exchequer so heavily,

when other industries like jute and tea, which are of monopolistic or semi-monopolistic character, which are more fitted to bear and can also shift the burden on to other shoulders, but are lightly taxed? The annual revenue from Excise comes to about two crores and Government must now be prepared to sacrifice it to vindicate their moral sense of justice, as the circumstances under which it was imposed no longer exist. The export tariff can be manipulated without undue hardship to the producer to make up for this loss of excise income. The whole tariff policy of the Government has been changed since 1917, when Lord Hardinge announced in his budget speech the raising of the tariff wall to 7½% ad valorem, inclusive of cotton imports. The Government have committed themselves to the policy of discriminating protection and they need fear Lancashire no longer, when His Majesty's Government have allowed them a free hand in determining the fiscal interests of India from a new angle of vision.

From the above observations it might be inferred that the writer has taken up cudgels to protect the mill-owner, but the reader may be assured that nothing is further from the truth. One of the aims sought to be fulfilled by the article is to show that unless the industry as a whole is sure of a certain percentage of net return on its capital it will have to face some problems which will create labour troubles and ultimately affect their well-being. An all-round reduction of wages is staring the mill-hand in the face. Bonus is gone for ever. No attempts would be made to house labour in healthy and sanitary tenements. Capital would be frightened away from the enterprise. But if a certain amount of much needed relief were given to the industry by abolishing the excise duty, the way would be paved for the introduction of profit-sharing and other schemes, which would benefit labour and capital alike.

Y. PONSHE.

PUNJAB ADMINISTRATION IN 1922-23.

THE financial year 1922-1923 was rather a period of strenuous work and puzzling dilemmas to the Punjab Government. The non-co-operation movement was not yet dead, but worse still the blundering of the Government in the Sikh problem was at its height. Financially speaking, the Punjab Government was not having an easy time of it as its deficits, the result of avoiding any fundamental economies, were still being piled up. The report under review bears evidence of all these disturbing factors in the province.

It is refreshing to be told officially that, after all that the Anglo-Indian press had been saying, the non-co-operation movement did not result in increasing the number of crimes. If we deduct the persons who went to jail in connection with the Sikh Gurdwara question or the non-co-operation movement, the figures indicate an appreciable decrease in crime. The Guruka Bagh incident has

been mentioned in such a way as to avoid every mention of the inhuman treatment of the Akalis, who are only reported to have been arrested to the number of 3,000. The way in which any mention of Sir Ganga Ram's name also has been shunned is characteristic. Nor is the summary treatment of the Hindu-Muslim riots at Multan any better. If even after convicting so many prisoners and raising such a large indemnity, the Government dares not go beyond "a stone is said to have been thrown"; one wonders why it took all the trouble in appointing special magistrates and extra police there. It is deplorable that there is not a word of regret for these incidents in the report. It once more goes to show that we are governed by a machine which lacks the human element rather than by a Government which consists of persons of flesh and blood. Dealing with land administration the report is discreetly silent as to when it would be possible for the Government to introduce a land revenue bill giving the Legislative Council the right to control the imposition of the land tax. Of course it is said that in deference to the wishes of the Council the new assessment has nowhere exceeded *in total* $\frac{1}{3}$ of net assets. This averaging process does not show that in the case of every peasant proprietor the land revenue does not exceed $\frac{1}{3}$ of the net assets. There is a growing reluctance on the part of the Legislative Council to sanction money for new assessment as was evidenced during the last session of the first Legislative Council as well as in the first session of the present Council. We hope the Punjab Government will soon be able to bring in a land revenue bill.

The report has not much to say of the Legislature which it denominates as moderate and loyal. There is a clear evidence in the report to prove that the Punjab Government gave up the residential qualification for its M. L. C.'s with great reluctance. But one fails to understand the writer of the report when he proclaims that dyarchy is almost at an end in the province as the distinction between the transferred and the reserved halves tends to disappear. The Punjab Government has scrupulously avoided the rise of any conventions in advance of the Reform Act, and has failed even to introduce real dyarchy in the province. It is news to be told now that responsible government in all subjects exists in the province as the report would lead an unwary reader to believe. Pray what regard was paid to the wishes of the Legislature as far as the release of political prisoners was concerned? Indeed the ideas of the Punjab Government as to responsible government must be very queer, if it is held that it was a responsible government that thus treated the Guru-ka-Bagh incident, mishandled the volunteers at Lahore and other places and instituted such an accursed system of jail administration in the province. The claim is indeed too preposterous to merit much criticism.

As the result of the investigation connected

with the 1921 census we are told that the Government has after all discovered that the vitality of the people is decreasing. The death rate per mille has increased from 18 in 1867 to 25 in 1921. This is deplorable and we hope the Minister in charge will be able to afford time from his communal squabbles to bestow a thought on this discovery.

The most interesting chapters are those on education and agriculture. The figures for education are indeed such as the Muhammadan Minister for education can be well proud of. By the artificial stimulus he has provided by restricting admissions to public schools in favour of the Muhammadans, the number of Muhammadan scholars has increased from 2,42,000 in 1921-22 to 3,34,000 in the year under report. This shows an increase of 38%, while the general increase in the same period has been about 24%. The number of Muhammadan scholars has almost doubled in the six years between 1916-17 and 1922-23, while during the same period the increase in the number of Hindu scholars amounts only to 50%. One wishes one were able to congratulate the Minister on this achievement, but when it is remembered that this increase shows a decrease in the facilities for education for scholars belonging to other religions, one cannot make up one's mind to doing it. That the department of education does not view with favour the prospect of a general extension in literacy is clear from the fact that 'steps are being taken to prevent the dissemination of a smattering of education amongst a large number of scholars.' This is being achieved by the closing down of the single-teacher schools. This is surely a step in the wrong direction.

The chapter on co-operative societies makes interesting reading. There are 9593 societies in all, with a working capital of Rs. 4,72,00,000. Their work is manifold. They supply credit to their members. In the district of Jhang an attempt is made to buy back mortgaged land. In Lyalpur district commission sale shops have been opened which advance 75% of the market price of the grain stored with them. In the Rawalpindi division 19 cattle breeding societies are being run by the co-operators. Adult classes are run by the Co-operative Department in conjunction with the Education Department. We wish the Co-operative Department could avoid engendering a spirit of antagonism with the urban classes. To hear some of the higher officials of the Department one would think they are heading off for Government by communes! Yet their interest in their work is genuine and one can pardon enthusiasts many a thing.

We wish while dealing with the political activities of the province the report had adopted a better tone. Anyhow the work done by some of the departments is such that any Government can be proud of it.

SRI RAM SHARMA.

LETTER FROM LONDON.

(FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT.)

LONDON, JUNE 5.

I NEED not write much about Lord Olivier's reply to Lord Peel's somewhat foolish and injudicious interpellation on the Secretary of State's correspondence with Mr. Satyamurti. The principal feature of the speech was Lord Olivier's clear pronouncement that the Swarajists were not people necessarily to be treated with contempt and obloquy, but rather as people of respectability and status, with whom it was desirable to treat seriously. It was a serious rebuke to pompous wisecracks like the late Secretary of State and the former Viceroy of India, Lord Curzon, who could only follow with some "flatulent platitudes." Lord Curzon seemed entirely to have missed not merely the friendly nature of Lord Olivier's reference to the Swarajists, but his enlargement, by implication, of the purposes of the Indian Committee's work and the terms of reference. A careful perusal of the verbatim speech, which, doubtless, Lord Curzon is now making at leisure during the Whitsun vacation, should give considerable reassurance in India.

On the other hand, it is an enormous pity that Mr. Das should have gone out of his way to permit the passing of the resolution commemorating the young assassin of Mr. Day, whilst condemning his action, at the Bengal Provincial Conference. If he had wanted to put up people's backs here he could not have chosen a more effective method. And indeed, even philosophical folk in this country, who are not animated by racial and political passion, will wonder why Mr. Das and his fellow-Bangalis should have thought it necessary to praise the misguided and unbalanced patriotism of the assassin. Is patriotism in Bengal so rare a virtue that it needed this emphasis? Is self-sacrifice in Bengal so perverted that even the perversion is welcome? Surely Mr. Das is not so blind to the effects upon public opinion here as not to see that he creates the impression that he has no real condemnation for the ill-balance that overcomes self-restraint and impels a youthful fanatic to slay another in cold blood in the name of patriotism.

I may take the opportunity of pointing out another matter that is standing in the way of a closer understanding and greater sympathy on the part of even the better-minded people of this country. It is the aloofness of the Swarajist leaders. I have repeatedly pointed out the desirability of their coming here to confer with our leading men. Mr. Lajpat Rai, who, it is no longer a secret, has repeatedly met some of the most important and influential, has shown what useful purposes can be served by even non-official and non-committal private conversations. He has helped to create a different and more helpful atmosphere, and he has seen how the Labour leaders themselves, realising that their time is not yet,

are taking advantage of every opportunity to advance the Labour cause, in spite of daily discouragement. To wait for a formal invitation may be political heroics, but it is not political common-sense, and the failure of the Swarajist leaders to make the most of the many unofficial opportunities that are open to them, with a most unconventional Ministry in office, is regarded in many responsible Labour circles as evidence of an absence of political understanding on their part and as adding to the already unnecessarily great difficulties of the situation. General Booth used to say, when asked why he had several of his best hymns set to popular airs: "Why should the Devil have all the best tunes?" And Labour leaders ask why the Swarajists should be content to let their opponents alone have the ear of the political leaders in England.

Mr. Ramsay Macdonald informed the House yesterday that he proposed, in accordance with the Treaty, to set up a Commission to decide the boundaries between Northern and Southern Ireland. As however Northern Ireland has refused to appoint a Commissioner, complications may ensue, and in order to clear the matter up the question of the interpretation of the Treaty and the nature of the reference on the boundary question are being referred to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council for advice. Probably the Lord Chancellor will preside and the committee will include the Chief Justice of Australia and probably a Canadian Judge, whose appointment will be relatively easy to obtain, as there are a number of Canadian appeals before the Judicial Committee during the Summer Term, when provision is ordinarily made for a Canadian Judge to sit. It is interesting to note that, in the meantime, arrangements are being made for the setting up of the Commission, and that Mr. Justice Feetham, of South Africa, who is well-known to you in India, has been asked and consented to be the Chairman.

This is the closing and twenty-sixth day of the O'Dwyer-Nair libel suit. The Judge has just closed his summing up, and the Jury are now deciding upon their verdict. Justice McCardie has throughout the trial shown himself to favour Sir Michael's contentions and against the claim of the defendant that his comments were justified and without malice. An attempt is being made to clear General Dyer, presumably on the ground that he is a dying man, unable to give evidence on his own behalf. This is how the Judge presented the Dyer episode to the Jury—"Speaking with full deliberation and knowing the whole of the evidence given in this case, I express my view that General Dyer, under the grave and exceptional circumstances, acted rightly, and in my opinion upon this evidence he was wrongly punished by the Secretary of State for India. That is my view and I need hardly say that I have weighed every circumstance, every new detail, that was not before the Hunter Committee." We shall know very shortly what the Jury think of the case.

We are threatened with a lightning railway strike of national proportions. The Communist element has managed to organize an unofficial strike, which is not recognised by the National Union of Railways. The sooner the Union regains control of the situation the better, if it is to retain the confidence of the public. Meanwhile, a large part of the London population, accustomed to getting to and from work, by the Tubes, is faced with the utmost difficulties of travel to-day. One does not know how the matter will end.

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