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TOPICS OF THE WEEK

The Beer Idea. ONE would feel greater respect for General Smuts if he gave up talking cant about justice and fair-play, and declared in a straightforward manner that there shall be no justice for anyone with a pigmented skin in South Africa. With an affected ingenuousness all his own, he said the other day at the Maritzburg Congress, "It is for us to see justice done to all, including the white community, who cannot protect themselves." Poor white community, which is so oppressed in South Africa by the natives and the Indians! Justice to this poor oppressed white community is to be done by allowing municipalities, which are notoriously anti-Indian and are making it in every way difficult for an Indian to obtain a trading license, to segregate Indians both for purposes of residence and trade. Further Mr. Smuts went on to say that the Government would see to it that the areas so set apart for Indians would not be "impossible places"—the South African Government was too just to do anything of the kind. The next moment, however, he gave away the whole show by saying that if in spite of this segregation any whites purchased goods from the Indian bazaar, the fault would not be the Government's. "We want to do what is just and fair, to place the Indian where he should be and leave the rest to the people of South Africa." Obviously Indians born in South Africa, who form about two-thirds of the Indian community, are not "people of South Africa," while recent immigrant whites are. This super-statesman, who in a very superior way preached high principles to the British Cabinet in connection with the Irish question and who is keeping in such an exemplary manner his pact with Mr. Gandhi when the latter called off the passive resistance struggle, is unable to see why such a policy (of segregation) should be resented by Indians or why the break-up of the British Empire should be threatened. But South Africa is an ostrich farm, in more senses than one.

Religious Endowments Bill.

THE deputation that waited on the Viceroy to urge him not to assent to the Madras Hindu Religious

Endowments Bill, fared much better than we had expected. This was partly due to Mr. Rangachariar's skilful advocacy. He took care not to render his weak case weaker by abusing or misrepresenting those who were responsible for the passage of the Bill—unlike the written memorandum submitted last month by this very deputation. The principal reason, however, for its not getting its deserts at the hands of the Viceroy was the fact that the Madras Government had not yet put their case before him. It is most surprising that the Minister—who rushed the Bill through the Council with such inadvisable haste and who knew quite well when the deputation was due to wait on the Viceroy, having already waited on the Governor of Madras—should have allowed quite four months to pass without the case for the Bill being put before the Viceroy, while under the Rules the period within which he can do so is only six months. That is to say a little more delay will kill the Bill outright. We hope this delay is not due to the Minister's enthusiasm having waned to any extent on account of the discovery, after the passing of the Bill, of the opposition to it of a large conservative section of his party. This suspicion occurs to one's mind just now because the younger and more liberal-minded members of the party who strongly favoured the Bill have practically rebelled against him and Sir P. Theogaraya Chettiar for their anti-labour and pro-landlord policy. Hence the temptation to keep well with the conservative section of the party is particularly strong. But to yield to the temptation, however strong it be, would be a shameless betrayal of the Government of Madras, which H. E. Lord Willingdon should guard against. Whatever the reason, the delay is very much to be regretted as it obliged the Viceroy to give a more favourable reply to the deputation than, we believe, he would have otherwise found necessary. It is true he has not committed himself to any course, but he seems disposed to believe that the Bill is an interference with religion, while as a matter of fact it is nothing of the kind.

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The Adi-Dravida Congress. WHILE we welcome every attempt of the depressed classes to organize themselves and to voice their true feelings, we wish their leaders took care that they did not make ridiculous demands. Rao Bahadur M. C. Rajah, M. L. C., of Madras is undoubtedly one of their ablest leaders, but we cannot congratulate either him or the Adi-Dravida Congress, over which he recently presided at Koilpatti in Tinnevely District, on several resolutions of a political nature that were passed thereat. To refer only to the most important of them, one resolution demanded that no less than 20 out of 28 seats now reserved for non-Brahmans should be sub-reserved for the depressed classes. According to the preamble of the resolution this demand is made because no member of the depressed classes

was returned to the Council in the last elections. But that was because no member of the community was a candidate. The fact is, very few persons in that community are in a position to afford the expenses of an election or are sufficiently educated to stand comparison with candidates of other communities. But to demand 20 out of 28 reserved seats is utterly ridiculous. At present there are five representatives of the depressed classes in the Madras Council (really speaking only four), and of them only one, Mr Rajah, is taking an adequate part in the proceedings. But supposing 20 men could be found in the community—which we doubt very much—capable of undertaking legislative duties, the disproportion of the demand should have occurred to the Congress. Similarly another resolution formulated the demand for the reservation of 30 per cent. of the posts in the higher and lower ranks of the Public Services for the depressed classes. The absurdity of this demand becomes obvious when it is remembered that there is only one law graduate in the community and that out of more than 10,000 male students in the colleges at the present moment only 4 belong to the depressed classes. Compare this with 6,323 Brahmans and 835 Indian Christians, who are each of them only one-fourth as numerous as the depressed classes. Their aspirations have a greater chance of being fulfilled if their demands are reasonable.

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LORD MIDLETON'S motion in the House of Lords on 27th June, opposing the reduction of the Indian Army, incidentally proved that the pay of the Army—both officers and soldiers—could be considerably reduced as well as its strength. In fact Lord Midleton agreed to the need for retrenchment and his only complaint was that the India Government was practising "less eligible kinds of economy," leaving alone the more eligible ones; upon which Lord Selborne brought out a fact, unknown to us here in India, that the Joint Committee of the two Houses of Parliament had already recommended the reduction of pay last year, but the military authorities had "neglected the recommendation." Lord Selborne drew attention to this matter not with the object of proving that a reduction in the strength of the Army could have been avoided if effect had been given to the Joint Committee's advice, but in the hope that India would benefit by "a double economy"—a reduction in pay as well as in numbers. That the rate of pay admits of a substantial reduction was clearly admitted in this very debate in answering the objection of those who feared that if the pay were reduced recruits would not be forthcoming. He said, "There is not the least doubt that we can make a *very substantial reduction* in the pay of all ranks and still get those whom we require. The present rate of pay was undoubtedly fixed at a panic height, and I believe that a reduction which will still give to officer and man a wage which will not only be comparable to but proportionately greater than the sort of wage paid in civil life can be made, and a large reduction of expenditure effected in that direction." Lord Peel attempted to explain away his failure to act upon the Joint Committee's recommendation by saying that he had no chance of doing so. As a matter of fact Lord Midleton proved to the hilt that when more recruits were taken in employment, the Secretary of State for India neglected the opportunity of reducing their pay.

* * *

KENYA AND AFTER.

THE Cabinet's decision on the Kenya question has naturally caused profound disappointment to India. The extent of this disappointment is indicated by the Viceroy's speech in proroguing the Indian Legislature, when he could not bring himself to defend the Cabinet's decision, as most inexplicably Sir Narasimheswara Sarma did in the Council of State, but announced his intention to address the Cabinet further on the question, conveying the feelings of indignation roused everywhere in this country, and to accept the decision, in case such acceptance could not be helped, only under protest. Mr. Sastri's declaration to a Reuter's representative was still more emphatic. He characterised the decision as a profound humiliation and the deepest affront to India. The interests of the enormous population of India had been pushed aside by the Imperial Cabinet to accommodate the racial spirit of South Africa. Indians were no longer equal partners in the British Commonwealth, but unredeemed helots in a Boer Empire. That Mr. Sastri, who incurred the displeasure of a considerable section of his countrymen by his profound faith in, and eloquent exposition of, the principles for which the British Empire professes to stand, should now have been reduced to despair and have urged the complete withdrawal of India from the Empire Exhibition, the resignation of the Indian members of Government and a combined endeavour of non-official members of all parties in the Reformed Councils to meet this national insult by adopting a policy of absolute self-reliance and fearless use of the constitutional power for forcing the Imperial Cabinet to recognise in practice India's equal status with the Dominions—that such a friend of the Empire (or, rather, the true Britannic Commonwealth) should have so completely lost faith in it, ought surely to open the eyes of the Cabinet to the dangerous situation in India, if they really care for the solidarity of the Empire.

India has always looked upon Kenya as a test case and has taken every opportunity to impress upon Britain that she would judge the latter's sincerity by the decision of that case. Galling as the racial discrimination of the Dominions has been to India, she has readily made allowance for their constitutional position as self-governing colonies and not held Britain responsible for their policy. In spite of much discrepancy between promise and performance, India had hoped that where the ordering of things were entirely in British hands, as in the crown colony of Kenya racial discrimination would not receive countenance. This hope was confirmed by the Imperial Conference resolution of 1921, which recognised the "incongruity between the position of India as an equal member of the British Empire and the existence of disabilities upon Indians lawfully domiciled in some other parts of the Empire", and recommended that the rights of such Indians to citizenship should be recognised "in the interests of the soli-

parity of the British Empire". Only South Africa dissented. The Colonial Secretary had attempted to exclude Kenya altogether from the scope of this resolution, but he had to give up the attitude and to accept the resolution unreservedly, thus undertaking to give effect to it in all the Crown Colonies. Is the present decision of the Kenya question in accordance with the spirit of this resolution? It is because it is emphatically not so that India, and Mr. Sastri who represented India at that Conference, are so deeply disappointed with Britain.

The Colonial Office claims, what sounds very strange in Indian ears, that the present decision is in conformity with the Imperial Conference resolution of 1921. The simple test is: Has the decision left Indians subject to disabilities to which Europeans are not subject? Have rights of citizenship been conferred on Indians in a manner compatible with the position of India as an equal member of the British Empire? If Indians are debarred from holding land in the highlands of Kenya, are they not subjected to a disability from which Europeans are exempt? The reservation of some area in the lowlands for Indians is not a removal of this disability. They have all along been opposed to reservation on principle and the reservation of an area for their own use cannot be acceptable to them, as two wrongs do not make one right. Despite camouflage the highlands have been reserved on racial, not economic, grounds. Not that we would have approved of it if on latter grounds, when it was intended to favour one set of immigrants against another. But it is well to make the issue quite clear. The white settler, who is a large farmer depending on forced native labour, has no fear of economic competition at the hands of the Indians, few if any of whom are agriculturists and who would be the last to avail themselves of forced native labour. The uplands have already been all assigned to the whites, so that Indians can get them only by sale or transfer from the latter. Any Indian who would care to possess those lands would naturally be of the same standard of living as the white settlers and not compete with them to their disadvantage. The Indians attach so much importance to the removal of this reservation, not because it touched their pockets, but because it implies racial inferiority. That racial stigma, far from being removed, is now perpetuated by the outrageous decision of the Cabinet.

Communal representation in the legislative council, awarded by the Cabinet, is also unacceptable to Indians, because of the racial inferiority that it implies. When the negotiations were proceeding smoothly in Kenya, the Indian community had agreed to be represented in the legislative council by fewer members than the whites, although contributing more taxes and numerically $2\frac{1}{2}$ times stronger than they, provided both communities were put on the same electoral roll. If racial equality was guaranteed, they were prepared

to accept a position of smaller influence. Indians are opposed to communal representation in Kenya because, as Mr. Sastri put it, it creates two kinds of citizenship, a higher one for the whites and a lower one for the coloured races. The Colonial Secretary, in defending the Cabinet's decision, said that Indians could not well object to communal representation when it prevailed in India itself in the reformed Legislatures. But there is any amount of difference between India and Kenya in this respect. Communal representation in India does not imply racial inferiority, while in Kenya it does. In India communal representation is given to politically weak minorities at their own request for the representation of their interests. In Kenya it is imposed by a small dominant minority on communities larger than itself, in order to maintain its racial dominance over them. On moral grounds the two are poles asunder. Even so, opinion is growing against it in the communities which are enjoying it in India.

Thus on the reservation of highlands and a common electoral roll, the two most important planks of the Indian platform, the Cabinet has violated the Imperial Conference resolution and upheld the South African idea of race superiority. That the Cabinet has chosen to be silent in respect of the Indian demand that there shall be no racial bar to the promotion of Indians in the civil and military service of the colony, is only another proof of the Cabinet's decision being dominated by racial considerations. Justice, however, requires us to admit that it has refused to go still further in the direction of the white settlers who wanted the entire administration of the Kenya colony to be vested in them and scugh to impose racial segregation on Indians in the townships. This decision is no doubt welcome, but it has not prevented injury to national self-respect, which is what Indians prize more than anything else in their awakened political consciousness. On the question of immigration we are told that while the people of no part of the Empire will be denied admission to Kenya, restrictions will be imposed in the interests of the native Africans. In principle this sounds unexceptionable, but, considering the extent to which the government of the colony has been subservient to the white settlers and in view of the latter's decided antipathy to all classes of Indians, there is little hope of any rules that may be framed being worked without detriment to Indian interests.

The Imperial Government having thus branded India with racial stigma, despite their most solemn pledges and promises, what is to be the future policy of this country? In its natural indignation the Assembly has at one sitting passed the Reciprocity Bill, disregarding the Home Member's amendment for postponement in order to obtain the opinions of local Governments. The Bill itself, however, is not one to which the Imperial Government or any of the Dominions can logically object, the principle of re-

reciprocity being accepted so long ago as 1918 by the Imperial Conference of that year. The Viceroy pointed out, we have to consider how it will affect the lot of Indians in the various colonies. While it will touch very lightly the white colonials, it may very much stiffen their attitude against the Indian settlers, whose position is already deplorable. That was the view expressed by *Indian Opinion* some time ago. But our countrymen there and elsewhere are bound in any case now to be discriminated against far more than hitherto, before the principle of White racial supremacy had been so unashamedly adopted. The Kenya decision has shown us that the old British Empire ideal of equality for all its civilized members will give way, wherever it clashes with the Boer ideal of White Ascendancy. In the circumstances India must clearly and unmistakably declare that she on her part will no longer deal with members of the Empire, as if entitled to every privilege merely because of their Empire membership.

The Empire has no use for India, apparently, on a basis of equality. India surely can have no use for the Empire on any other basis. Our long connection with England, we trust, it will be possible to continue on this basis; and we shall be only too happy to treat other members of the Empire on that basis too, if they on their part do so. But only because they do so; not because they are members of the Empire.

That, surely, is most incumbent on India today to make clear. Hence we too advocate withdrawal from Empire Exhibition and Imperial Conference: just because they are Imperial, and just because we can no longer seem to countenance, even by our silence, the theory of Indian loyalty to an Empire of White Ascendancy.

PARLIAMENT'S INTERVENTION.

THE resumed debate on the India Office Vote, of which the Official Report is now to hand, was not exactly "a feast of soul" as remarked by Mr. Hope Simpson, who himself made a notable contribution to the discussion; it might indeed be more fittingly described as a wearying of the flesh. But it contains some points which cannot but be interesting to Indian readers. Before, however, touching on these points, we would dwell for a moment on the division list which shows some remarkable results. The Committee had thinned in numbers when the voting took place, with the result that even Labour members, who alone voted against the Government, could only muster 74 strong. The Liberal party played a very disappointing part in this affair. The sympathies of the Lloyd-Georgians were more with the Government than with the Indians, and indeed Sir L. Worthington-Evans voted with the Government; but even the Asquithians, who supported the Indian case, remained neutral.

For instance, Mr. Charles Roberts who condemned the Viceroy's action as utterly unjustifiable, would still not go into the Lobby with Labour. Mr. Simpson again was extremely censorious in speech, but one fails to find his name among the Noes in the division list. These two members made in some respects the most important speeches against the Government, and another such speech was that of Sir Robert Hamilton, who also refrained from giving an adverse vote. The reason for this abstention is apparently to be found in the following observations of Mr. Roberts:

"Our complaint against the Viceroy's action is that it is a strained use of a legal authority. I think that it would be unwise if the House of Commons were to fall into the same mistake. There is no doubt about the legal power, but a vote on a matter of this kind is not like the ordinary vote given every day by Opposition members against the Government, marking our sense of disagreement. It is a vote of censure on the Viceroy. That you have the right to give in exceptional cases, but I think that it also is a reserve power which should be used only with much caution, and should be used, in my view, only if there is a proved case of an abuse of power and if there is no other remedy."

This reasoning is of course quite fair. If the check provided in the Government of India Act in the shape of the Viceroy's certification power is claimed by us to be exceptional, we must concede that the countercheck of Parliamentary intervention should also be equally exceptional. But the Viceroy does not treat—in practice—his overriding powers as exceptional; and, therefore, Parliament must not hesitate to overhaul and, if necessary, to set aside his decision. In the present case Mr. Roberts thought that the abuse of power by the Viceroy was accompanied by a pledge not to invoke the power next year if the Government proposed to enhance the salt duty and if the Assembly turned down the proposal. He seized upon certain words in Lord Reading's dispatch, to the effect that the Assembly would next year "be in a position to determine whether... it will vote" for the retention of the salt tax, as Sir Montagu Webb seized upon certain words in Sir M. Hailey's speech, and read in them a solemn promise to leave the question of the salt tax to the unfettered judgment of the Assembly. The Viceroy, said Mr. Roberts, "has divested himself in advance of his powers of certification," and in this view of the matter Mr. Roberts was reluctant to record his vote against the Government. Mr. Ramsay MacDonald also was "prepared to accept the situation" if a definite pledge was forthcoming that certification would not be resorted to next year. But the Under-Secretary, Earl Winterton, gave a plump denial that any pledge was meant to be conveyed by the words used by the Viceroy and said on his behalf that such a pledge was impossible. Even in face of such a clear pronouncement Mr. Roberts refused to vote against the Government.

If even members of the Opposition will not consider such cases of the exercise of reserve power by the Viceroy on their merits and vote accordingly, it is clear that the one safeguard provided by the Act, viz. a review of the Viceroy's action by Parliament, becomes altogether illusory. As for members of the party in power, they are of course bound to vote with the Government if an adverse vote is treated as a vote of a censure on the Viceroy and the Government, and hence a debate in Parliament on the subject must become a mere farce. Sir R. Hamilton put the point forcibly as follows:—

"The (Parliament's) decision will be, and must be, in the nature of things, a party decision. The Government, naturally, is bound to support the action of the Viceroy. We presume that the Viceroy will not take such action as certifying a Bill over the heads of the Assembly without having previously consulted the Home Government. Therefore, the Home Government is bound to support the Viceroy. That is to say, it becomes a matter of confidence in this House. Suppose that an adverse vote was taken on such a matter in this House. What would be the result? The Viceroy would have to resign and the Government would fall. That is very undesirable. . . . From the Indian point of view, they see that the Bill which has been passed over the head of their own Assembly is sent, as it were, to the ultimate tribunal, the House of Commons. By the necessity of the case the Government is bound to support the Viceroy. Therefore, it is a case really of referring the matter to a tribunal which has made its decision beforehand."

The speaker asked for an assurance that a limit would be put to the use of this power of certification. "If the power of certification is to become habitual with the Viceroy every time he finds himself in difficulty, it will be like the appetite growing by eating. He will fall back upon it every time, because it will open to him a way round the difficulties in his path." Sir Robert concluded by saying that he would not vote against the Government on that occasion but "unless they could have an assurance that this power would be strictly limited," he would be bound to do so. The assurance was flatly refused, and yet Sir Robert abstained from voting.

Mr. Simpson, on the other hand, saw nothing wrong in certifying, but the mistake lay, in his opinion, in certifying the salt tax. If, instead, the Viceroy "had the courage to certify the extra income tax to make up the deficit", thus laying the rich instead of the poor under contribution, he for one would have had no objection. Mr. Simpson is however wrong in thinking that certification would at all have been necessary if the Government had decided to enhance the income tax. "The people who are in the Chamber would not have it at any price," he says. No doubt it would have been opposed by a few, but it would certainly have been carried in the Assembly, if the Government had lent their support to it. Sir Thomas Bennett was surprisingly narrow on this question. He denied that certification had to be used only in exceptional circumstances (in "a real emergency" as Mr. Charles Roberts put it, or

"in a first-class constitutional struggle where you get the kind of problem that Cromwell had in his dealing with his Parliament, where you had an irremovable executive faced with an unmanageable Assembly having the power of the purse"), saying that the Act knew nothing of crisis or disaster, to which alone certification was sought to be limited. It was enough if the act was proved to be in the interests of India. In this observation he went much farther than either the Viceroy or the Under Secretary of State who admitted, at least in theory, that the power cannot be brought into use on ordinary occasions, but only on "very exceptional occasions."

On the whole, the discussion has only shown, that the extra safeguard of Parliamentary intervention, whatever its theoretical value, will never be of any practical use.

EUROPE'S FUTURE.

NINE years ago last Sunday there was issued the first of a series of declarations of war, which launched the great war between the 16 crore population of the four "Central" Powers and the 136 crore population of the twenty-three "Allied and Associated" Powers: a war, which, as is only too well known, ended in so crushing a military success, as has marked few other wars in history. If the war was the inevitable explosion following upon the accumulation of inflammable material by the Hohenzollerns and Hapsburgs, at least it ended by blowing up also these dynasties and their empires. Looking back upon English war time psychology, one remembers that nobody at the time seemed to doubt for one moment, that by blowing up Germany, military aggressiveness itself would be swept from the world too. At the present time, we say, one remembers as a fact that such was the general opinion: but one only does so with an effort and even so feels utterly non-plussed, how anybody on earth—oneself unfortunately included—could ever really have believed such arrant, palpable nonsense.

To-day the melancholy fact is certainly too obvious to need labouring, that the elimination of military aggression does not follow upon the elimination of any one military aggressor. On the contrary. Since one military power has only been vanquished by a still stronger military power, the disappearance of the latter does not follow from the disappearance of the former. Thus German militarism has only been succeeded by French militarism; a lesser by a greater. For never has there been such a display of military power in peace time before. The cost of the French army of occupation in Germany alone exceeds the cost of the whole German pre-war army. Moreover, the French standing army of over $\frac{3}{4}$ million men is paralleled by those of its close allies—Yugoslavia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, the armies of all of whom are equipped, drilled and led by France. The military and naval budget

of France for 1922 amounted to 500 crores of francs—as much (taking the franc at its face value) as the whole French expenditure budget of 1913. Only a month ago the French Chamber voted over 21 crores of francs for their air force.

Which last figure is of special interest and significance. For only a few days previously (June 26th) the British Prime Minister had made a statement regarding his air policy, which henceforth was to ensure protection “against air attack by the strongest air force within striking distance” of England; for which reason 34 squadrons were to be added at once (at an estimated cost of half a million pound sterling) to the Home Defence Air Force. As it is, France is to-day absolutely supreme in the air with her 1300 aeroplanes in commission: but that to remain such is her settled policy for the future too is evidenced by the fact that, as soon as Mr. Baldwin had made his announcement, the French Minister of War raised his budget figure from an original 17½ crores of francs to the 21 crores already mentioned—an increase of Fcs 36,120,000 which at the present exchange equal £480,000, the exact amount of Mr. Baldwin’s extra demand for the current year.

Such is the position in Europe to-day, four years after Versailles. Not satisfied with anything less than the annihilation of Germany, France to-day is on the point of achieving her purpose—the political dismemberment and economic destruction of Germany. In any case she has made it quite clear that she will stay in the Ruhr, that she will gradually extend her occupation of German towns, until the torture for the population becomes intolerable, until, hunger-blockaded, horsewhipped, goaded to despair, it will rise in mad frenzy, preferring death and destruction to an existence which has become intolerable. Then, when no Government of Germany is any longer possible, when anarchy, pestilence and civil war have reduced the fair German lands to a wilderness and decimated their populations; then, when France will at last have got the “security” she desires against what once was the German Reich of sixty millions of the most industrious and inventive people of Europe: then, she will be ready to turn to the only rival left to her in Europe—England, as much and more of an hereditary enemy of hers than Germany. Already France’s big guns not only sweep the Channel, but are capable of bombarding London. Already her air fleet can suffocate every industrial centre of Britain. Already her ever increasing fleet of submarines can lame the British Navy and sink the whole of Britain’s Mercantile Marine. What further surprises her “Chemical Warfare” department has in store, we do not know, but we can guess.

Had Mr. Lloyd George been a statesman, he would have foreseen, that war *à outrance* against Germany could only have resulted in this. Had Mr. Woodrow Wilson been a man, he would have forced his famous “peace without victory” on his

unwilling allies. As it was, M. Clemenceau had an easy game and neither Mr. George nor Mr. Wilson, but Marshal Foch, had the last word. Ever since then, Mr. George, as long as he remained in power, knew what was coming, but, having stultified himself by his complicity, could do nothing but plead with France and cajole her with every blandishment he knew. His successor, Mr. Law, was too deeply implicated in the infamy of Versailles, to be able to do much, even if constitutionally he had been capable of meeting trouble half way. The present Premier, Mr. Baldwin, has a clean slate. He knows time is pressing, but he knows also that militarily England is at the absolute mercy of France. He is trying to right things by providing 34 more air squadrons here, by creating a ten million dock there—once more believing, that the only protection against force is more force. Once more he and his people will wake up one day and find that, by doing this, they have leant on a reed. Even the Opposition, even men like Mr. Mac Donald and Mr. Morel apparently, can think of no other remedy, than of yet another “Conference for the Limitation of Armaments”—as if the last five years were not strewn with the rotting remains of all such futile, because necessarily still-born, councils of despair. As long as the idea of national sovereignty remains, just as long will there be a “Next War,” another “The Day.” And that day, we fear, will not be a generation hence. For if anything is certain, it is that the French finances will not stand many years more of the huge post-war deficits which are now accumulating: France must strike, before her bankruptcy is complete; she will strike, to “make England pay.”

As we read current events, the War which broke out nine years ago is not yet over. We are living merely in a lull between two storms; and whilst nobody knows, when the next storm will break, we for one believe that it is very much nearer than public opinion dreams. As far as military calculations go, the odds are all against England. As all military men have always done, the French will believe in taking the offensive, while they can; they will count, as the German General Staff did nine years ago, on a decisive short campaign, if only they take the enemy sufficiently by surprise. There will be no declaration of war; but one night London will be wiped out by gas and bombs from the air. No doubt M. Poincaré will expect, with London gone, that England, Great Britain, the British Empire will have to cave in pretty soon too: nor is there any doubt in our own expectation, that in this M. Poincaré will be supremely mistaken. Paris in its turn will be wiped out; and if the French will have got the start in reducing the British Isles to a wilderness, one can be quite sure, that the British will not be long, before they have reduced all France to a desert too. And so the homicidal game will go on, until the whole of Europe is culturally wiped off the map.

Say what you may, there is no flaw in this logic of coming events as long as the masses will listen to catchphrases of "prestige" and "glory" and believe in the chimæra of "my country's honour." As long as people are prepared to go to hell, nay prefer to do so, rather than abdicate their national sovereignty in favour of a supra-national Government of the world, just so long will they find the road to the hell of modern war and to their own extinction a surprisingly easy one. Of course, the people who urge the going to hell, are not the same people as those that are being urged to go there. But if the handful of men, who to-day rule the destinies of Europe's millions in such a manner, as to make it a practical certainty that Europe, as we know it to-day, will quite soon cease to exist altogether: if these men, we say, are allowed to have their way by the peoples of Europe, who have only just emerged out of the Inferno of the last war—then all we can say is, that the people of Europe deserve nothing better, than to go to that place, which is being prepared for them, even as we write.

H. C. E. ZACHARIAS.

MALABAR LAND TENURES.

IV.—ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS.

WE may now consider why the tenants, whether *kanam* or *verumpattam*, are unable to secure by free contract the rights and privileges which they desire the legislature to guarantee to them. Are the tenants so weak as to require legislative support to enable them to defend their rights; or, are the conditions of the tenants so very bad as to justify State interference for conferring new rights on them in the interests of general contentment and peace? Considered from these stand-points, the problem covers a wider area than Malabar. In fact it becomes an all-India question, and legislation based on these considerations will have equal application and justification all over India. Therefore, before State interference is invoked for the special benefit of Malabar, very strong proof must be adduced that such legislation is necessary and justified, at any rate, more urgent for Malabar than for other parts. An endeavour is made below to show that such justification does exist, inasmuch as certain economic and social factors are present in Malabar, which, even though they may exist in other districts as well, are found in a more intense and aggravated form in Malabar. Further, there are certain other factors which, while not occurring elsewhere, exercise a peculiar influence on the relation between landlords and tenants in Malabar.

Concentration of land in Malabar.—Almost all the land in Malabar, including waste lands and forests, is the private property of the landlords, the Government having but little property in land. And the land is concentrated in the hands of a comparatively small number of landlords. I have not been able to ascertain definitely the actual number of *janmis* in Malabar. But the Census Report and Tables of 1921 throw some light on the subject. Whatever be the reliability of these figures from an absolute standard, they can be depended upon for comparative purposes. The two adjacent districts of South Canara and Coimbatore and also the whole Madras Presidency may be taken for comparison.

The following figures will be found interesting—

Item.	Malabar.	South Canara.	Coimbatore.	Presidency.
1. Area in sq. miles	5,792	4,021	7,225	1,42,260
2. Percentage of cultivable area.	65.1	52.4	60.7	60.1
3. Percentage of cultivated area to total area	36.5	20.8	43.4	38.1
4. Percentage of area under food crops to cultivated area.	56.6	86.9	76.9	75.7
5. Percentage of area under garden crops to (3).	43.4	13.1	6.3	15.2
6. Total population.	3,098,871	1,247,368	2,219,848	42,318,985
7. Density of population to total area (6 to 1).	535	310	307	297
8. Density of population to cultivated area (6 to 3).	1498	1490	707	780
9. Agricultural population and its percentage to the total population	1,905,182	901,586	1,503,353	30,293,165
10. Density of agricultural population to cultivated area (9 to 3).	901	1078	479	558
11. Actual 'workers' of (9) and percentage to 9.	743,021	522,920	706,576	14,843,650
12. Non-cultivating owners and percentage to actual workers (11).	39	58	47	49
13. Cultivating owners and percentage to (1).	17,877	13,469	41,155	715,252
14. Percentage of owners (12+13) to 11.	2.4	2.57	5.8	4.8
	24,402	83,300	349,944	5,395,238
	3.2	16	49	38
	5.6	18.57	54.8	42.8

It will be seen from the above figures that 43% of the total number of workers—as opposed to dependents—in the Presidency, 55% in Coimbatore, 18.6% in South Canara, and only 5.6% in Malabar, were returned as *landowners*, both cultivating and non-cultivating.

But even this low number of *landowners* in Malabar does not indicate the full extent of the concentration of land in the hands of the landlords in that district. The following figures taken from a book entitled "Some South Indian Villages" edited by Dr. Gilbert Slater, reveal a truer picture of land distribution. In the village of Watanamkurassi (Walluvanad taluk, Malabar) 44 *pattadars* own among themselves 989.53 acres of which a single *pattadar* owns as much as 645.04 acres or over 60% of the land. In the village of Kothacheria (Ponnani Taluk, Malabar) 19 *pattadars* own 851.66 acres, of which one *pattadar* owns as much as 718.80 acres or over 80% of the land. These proportions may be said to be typical of the whole district of Malabar.

Pressure of population on land.—The density of population in the Presidency reaches its maximum in the Malabar district. The number of persons per sq. mile of the *total area* is 535, while in South Canara it is 310, in Coimbatore 307, and in the Presidency 297. The density, taking only the *area under cultivation*, which gives a more accurate index of the pressure of population, is 1498 in Malabar, 1490 in South Canara, 707 in Coimbatore and 780 in the Presidency. Considering only the agricultural population and the area under culti-

vation, the density is 901 in Malabar, 1078 in South Canara, 479 in Coimbatore, and 558 in the Presidency.

Scope for extension of cultivation very limited.—

There is not much scope for the extension of cultivation to relieve this pressure. It is true the figures quoted above tend to show that 65.1% of the total area is cultivable, while only 36.5% of it is actually under cultivation, and that, therefore, there is still plenty of scope for the extension of cultivation. But these figures are misleading inasmuch as under cultivable land are included large blocks of hill, rock and lantana jungle which are so intermingled with parambas (gardens) and fields that they have not been separately demarcated. Only a small part of this land is useful for growing occasional fugitive crops of a type of hill-paddy, and the fallow years are far greater than the cultivated ones. They cannot be brought under regular and permanent occupation. There is thus not much scope for extension of cultivation.

Under such conditions, with most of the land concentrated in the hands of an extremely small group of landowners, with this high pressure of population on land, and with no great room for the expansion of cultivation, it can be conceived how great is the monopoly of power of the landowners, how keen the competition among the cultivating class, and how extremely unequal are the two partners, the landlords and the tenants, in the matter of mutual contract. It would certainly be surprising if, under these conditions, the tenants could defend their rights. It appears, then, that there is not only a justification but a demand for Government interference to strengthen the hands of the tenants in bargaining with the landlords.

Economic factors peculiar to Malabar.—There are, besides, certain other considerations which seem to be peculiar to Malabar and those may now be examined. Evictions from land under occupation are a much greater hardship in Malabar than in other districts and this for two reasons among others.

Evictions from homesteads.—In Malabar there are no communal village sites on which people can build houses. It is an ingrained habit of the Malyalee—and it seems to be a very healthy habit which deserves to be kept up—to build his house in the midst of a garden compound. But except for a handful of landowners, the majority of the people do not own the gardens in which their houses are built. So that eviction means, not only eviction from the cultivation of a particular garden, but also from the homestead. And this is a peculiarly serious hardship. Almost the whole district is the private property of a few landowners and three million population have to depend on the will and pleasure of these landowners for their very dwelling sites. Chief Justice Sir Charles Turner's argument that since all land in Malabar was the private property of the janmis, there was no option for the people but to obtain building sites, even for such obviously permanent buildings as churches, mosques and temples, on such conditions as the janmis chose to impose, has no little resemblance to the Shylockian argument, "It is in the bond."

It must be added that the tenant is entitled, on eviction, to compensation for the buildings he had put up, though there is no compensation for disturbance. In spite of this ancient and most beneficent law of compensation for tenants' improvements, the evictions from homes cannot but be a source of great irritation, ill-feeling and legitimate grievance to the evicted people, particularly to

those who have been in occupation of their houses for pretty long periods, for one or more generations. Even the compensation, the tenant obtains only as a result, very often, of prolonged and ruinous litigation in courts.

Even more than the actual eviction from the houses, the constant fear of eviction is demoralising to the people, inasmuch as they have constantly to be humouring the landowners, who are not above whims and caprices. I have not been able to ascertain the magnitude of these evictions from homesteads and even though the agitation is not taken at its face value, there seems to be little doubt that the hardship from fear of eviction or actual eviction is real and substantial.

A recent development deserves notice here. Hitherto the liberty of the tenant to effect improvements on his holding was not limited by the landowner. The tenant could improve the land as he thought best and was entitled to compensation on eviction. The tenants built pucca and even costly houses according to their means and requirements. The consequence of this freedom was that the more costly the improvements, the more difficult for the landowner to pay compensation, and the greater the security of the tenant from eviction. Though in most cases improvements were made according to the needs of the tenants, there is no doubt that in some cases they were made just for the sake of making it more and more difficult for the landowner to evict the tenants. To forestall such a possible contingency, some landowners are inserting clauses in the lease deeds restricting the value of the improvements that the tenants may effect on their holdings. In such cases, it is not the needs of the tenant, but the will of the landowner that determines what buildings the tenant may construct.

This difficulty about house sites cannot be got over by the Government acquiring and creating village sites in Malabar. For, as already said, the Malyalee is averse to live in houses congregated together in compact villages, but lives in gardens, each house separated from the others. It would be almost impossible to get the millions of Malyalees to change their ingrained habit. Nor is it desirable from the point of view of health, sanitation and aesthetics. Further to tend the gardens, which form so conspicuous a part of Malabar agriculture, it would be necessary for the cultivators to be constantly in their gardens and residence in a village at some distance would hamper their work.

On the other hand, it is very demoralising that millions of people should depend even for their very house sites on the pleasure of a few monopolists of land, who are influenced neither by healthy ancient customs nor controlled by wholesome modern laws. There is thus an overwhelming case for State interference to secure permanent house sites for the people.

Evictions from Coconut plantations.—The second reason why evictions are a greater hardship in Malabar than elsewhere, is that gardening, particularly coconut cultivation, plays such a large part in Malabar agriculture. In Malabar the area under garden cultivation is 43.4 p. c. of the total area under cultivation, whereas in South Canara it is only 13.1 p. c., in Coimbatore 6.3 p. c., and in the Presidency 15.2 p. c. The future of Malabar seems to be bound up with garden cultivation, and particularly, of the coconut. Owing to more causes than one, coconut cultivation is on the increase and even paddy lands are being converted into coconut topes. And it is a passion with the

Malyalee to plant and still plant the cocconut. A tenant takes a piece of land on an improving lease, called "Kuzhikkanam" for twelve years, during which he pays very little or nothing to the landlord. He then invests *his own capital* and improves the land by planting cocoanuts. The first five years are the period of maximum investment in money and labour. The plantation begins to yield a return from about the tenth year. The yield gradually increases and comes down during the next forty years, during which period there is comparatively little investment. According to the terms of the lease, the tenant is liable to surrender the land with the plantation to the landowner at the end of 12 years, and is only entitled to compensation. But this surrender on eviction is felt as a cruel hardship by the tenant. "Frequently a tenant was evicted just when the garden which he had planted with the sweat of his brow and the outlay of all his capital was beginning to repay him for what he had spent on it, and after 12 or more years of hard labour he found himself homeless, with his capital exhausted and the scanty sum allowed for improvements swallowed up in the cost of the inevitable suit" (Logan). A person makes improvements in the natural hope that he, and not others, would enjoy the fruit of his labour. When the fruit can be got before the expiry of the lease, as in the case of paddy lands, there is not much of a hardship in eviction. But in the case of the cocconut plantations, the period of the lease does not cover the period within which the investment can be recouped or the full benefit of it obtained. And hence evictions at the end of 12 years give room for a legitimate feeling of grievance, in spite of the fact that the tenant knew beforehand that the lease was liable to an early termination. Under these circumstances there will be either no incentive for improvements; or the improvements, if made, will be reaped by others. Neither alternative is economic or fair. This persistency in making improvements is itself, it seems to me, a strong proof that the tenants had a feeling that they would not be evicted at all in actual practice, even though they could not claim such a privilege by law.

Effects of the Compensation for Tenants' Improvements Act.—I have not been able to ascertain accurately the effect of the Compensation for Tenant Improvements Act of 1900 on these evictions. From the figures quoted in a previous paragraph, the number of eviction suits has decreased. But without more information, it does not seem possible to conclude that the Act has checked evictions. For, if it be true that for the last 50 years and more, the process of evicting the kanamdars and substituting the verampattam tenure for the kanam tenures has been in operation, then, even without the Act, there must be a continual decrease of these suits as the field gets exhausted.

The Act, however, seems to have given room to at least one undesirable effect. It has led to overplanting. More trees are being planted than the soil can bear efficiently. This is done with a view to increase the compensation payable by the landowner so that the tenant has either greater security from eviction or greater compensation, if evicted. This process of overplanting for compensation is detrimental to the cocconut industry, the efficiency of which is so vital to the progress of the district.

P. KODANDA RAO.

THE SIMLA SESSION.

(FROM OUR PARLIAMENTARY CORRESPONDENT.)

SIMLA, 29TH JULY.

ALTHOUGH the prorogation ceremony of the Indian Legislature was invested with all viceregal pomp and grandeur, it must be sadly recorded that the life of the first Legislative Assembly came to an end amid great despondency and despair. The "funeral oration," as H. E. the Viceroy called his speech coming close as it did upon the irritating announcement about Kenya and the subsequent passage of Dr. Gour's Reciprocity Bill, was listened to with cold comfort. The cheers which at times interrupted the rapid but forceful reading of his speech, seemed to me to be more formal than reflective of what was passing in the minds of the listeners. The only time when the cheering was more or less spontaneous was when Lord Reading announced that "the news of the decision regarding Kenya came to me and to my Government, no less than to you, as a great and severe disappointment." In all other respects, his speech failed to create any favourable impression among his hearers. The place of honour that Lord Reading gave to labour legislation in his narration of the achievements of the Assembly during the last three years, may be regarded as a sign of the times.

The intensity of resentment with which the Kenya decision was received by the non-official members of the Legislative Assembly could best be measured by the powerful and outspoken terms in which they issued their manifesto containing their considered views on the decision. Their appeal to the country to adopt "stronger and more effective measures" even at the risk of their involving "a change in India's attitude towards Imperial solidarity" and their request to Government not to hamper them in this task, inasmuch as the Government's "prestige is as deeply involved" as the country's honour will, I am sure, convince everyone of the depth of humiliation they have felt. Another testimony to the depth of their anger could be seen in the fact that even the most cautious elements in the Assembly persuaded themselves to support Dr. Gour's otherwise (in their opinion) defective Bill of Reciprocity in order to "take up a firm attitude" in this matter. Had this bill been tabled before the Kenya decision was announced, I am pretty certain, it would have undoubtedly received "the benefit of opposition" of the Assembly.

The debate on this Bill of Reciprocity was most exciting and animated. Mr. Rangachariar openly admitted it as a measure of retaliation and his "hear, hear" to Sir Malcolm Hailey's reference to it as the first of such measures only confirmed his view. Sir Sivaswamy Aiyer repudiated this view. Sir Henry Stanyon characterised, amidst laughter, the measure as "nonsense." The Hon. Sir Narasimheswara Sarma, the Government's spokesman on the present occasion, on whose brow that day one could easily read extraordinary mental depres-

sion, begged the House not to take any hasty action which would make the situation still more serious and grave and feelingly appealed to "the South African statesmen not to be the wreckers of Empire." Mr. Devaki Prasad Sinha, the Bihar Member, who took his oath of office only four days back, demanded Sir N. Sarma's resignation. Then came the heavy strictures of the Home Member. While expressing sympathy with the principle of reciprocity and vehemently declaring that the social disabilities under which Colonial Indians are labouring, "are unjust and cruel" and "such as every civilisation should disapprove of," he characterised Dr. Gour's bill as "ill-advised in the highest degree," and "useless in inflicting any injury upon the colonials." To Sir Malcolm's enquiry as to whether the Indians in Kenya themselves had demanded retaliation, Sir Sivaswamy promptly produced the cablegram of the Kenya Indian Deputation demanding India's withdrawal from the British Empire Exhibition and the Imperial Conference. The Home Member's attempt to circulate the Bill for eliciting public opinion failed by 16 votes and the unusual process of introducing and passing the Bill was completed after making many drafting and other amendments. The most important amendment was that of Mr. Abdul Kasim's which sought to convert the obligatory character of the Bill into a permissive one. It was carried by 47 votes to 31.

Lastly Dr. Gour moved: "The Bill as amended be passed." Sir Malcolm once more rose to oppose it and challenged the wisdom of the "dying Assembly" in passing this inopportune measure. Referring to Sir N. Sarma's speech, Mr. Rangachariar retorted, "Sir B. N. Sarma preached the gospel of love. Gandhi preached the same gospel and you laughed at him. Moreover, love does not pay always." Munshi Iswar Saran also made a spirited attack upon Government. The bill was finally passed, the Government not daring to ask for a division. And on this note came to an end the first Assembly of the Reform era.

REVIEW.

MORAL RESISTANCE.

CASE, C. M.: NON-VIOLENT COERCION. (The Century Co., New York.) 1923. 8 x 5. p. 423.

In this study Dr. Case, Associate Professor of Sociology in the State University of Iowa, applies the inductive system, in a philosophical spirit, to the problem of what may be called moral resistance in a world of conflict and violence. The subject is dealt with in a manner which compels admiration and the conclusions drawn by him after a careful analysis of the social psychology of the movement carry conviction. Under the apparently self-contradictory title which he has given to the book, the author treats of two categories of resistance, which differ somewhat in aim and method: (1) passive resistance such as that offered by conscientious objectors who refused to bear arms or pay the school tax at the command of the State and voluntarily subjected themselves to pains and penalties rather than obey an order repugnant to their moral sense; and (2) a strike or boycott such as that practised by Korea, Egypt or China. In the first the primary aim is to do nothing forbidden by one's conscience, whatever

be the cost, and the secondary aim is to convince the aggressor by one's suffering that the course on which he has entered is unrighteous and inexpedient. Here there is no passive acquiescence or abject submission, but "an attack upon the higher self" of the assailant or a noble aggressiveness of an exalted moral and religious character. Success or failure in such movements depends upon the tone of ethical thought and the liberal public opinion existing at the time in society, but, whatever be the result, there is no attempt at coercion, but only at persuasion. In the other class of resistance, however, the avowed object is to coerce, to compel your opponent, by the exercise of social constraint of a non-violent character, to reverse his attitude. In the former case all you wish is to be left alone, merely to have a chance to follow your path without let or hindrance. In the latter case you wish to impose your will on others or to force them to further a social policy which you have at heart. And the method therefore changes from one of passive endurance to that of an aggressive attack upon injustice—or, as it is called in the volume under review, "aggression by passive suffering." The rejection of violence is generally a characteristic of both, but it is likely that the resistant will adopt it as a principle in non-coercive resistance and as a policy in coercive resistance; at any rate, human experience so far has shown, that non-violent coercion is resorted to only by those who have no munitions of war and who cannot fall back upon physical force with any hope of success, while passive resistance of the negative type has often been offered by those who were endowed with brute force but who desisted from its use upon doctrinaire grounds and absolute principles.

There are of course some who object to coercion as such, although it may be non-violent. "Compulsion is not God's way," they say. They would under no circumstances do anything calculated to coerce the will of another by methods, however pacific. "Not coercion, but conviction," is their slogan. Dr. Case touches but lightly on this fundamental objection; it is dismissed as unworkable in actual life. But he makes out a very strong case for all types of moral resistance, depending as they do upon self-suffering for the redress of injustice. The inconvenience and misery caused to those who invoke this method provide an automatic check and penalty for all who would use it too frequently, while the method of violence has no such safeguard. But considerations of practical expediency often rule out in this workaday world the putting of this theory in practice. The conclusions of our author, on this point, though very lengthy, we should like to give *in extenso* :—

The truth is that passive resistance and non-violent coercion are methods of social behaviour that possess in theory the most extraordinary claims upon the consideration of all men and women who are actuated by a zeal for truth and social justice unmixed with the spirit of hatred and reprisal. Indeed, it does not seem too much to affirm that here lies at hand, so far as its *theoretical* merits are concerned, the most powerful weapon conceivable in human affairs. If resolutely applied, in a spirit of unswerving fairness, by populations or classes able to control themselves and to pay the price in suffering, non-co-operation seems capable of destroying every last programme of tyranny and exploitation in the world. But, while the abstract truth of this can hardly be denied, it is valid largely in theory alone. In actual practice the strike, the boycott, non-co-operation and every other

programme of non-violence is dogged by two mortal enemies, to either one or the other of which it is almost sure to fall a prey. That is to say, it either ebbs away through discouragement and apathy, or flares forth into self-destructive violence. And the longer the struggle, the more sure is its defeat through the one or the other of these betrayals. In short non-violent coercion demands a stronger self-control, a more enduring solidarity of purpose, a greater capacity for passive suffering, a higher ethical development, than most human beings have thus far attained. It is capable of great achievements at favourable moments, but its victories must be swift, its campaign not too long drawn out, and its field of operation more or less restricted. In the strike and the boycott, and all other applications of this principle, an unusually heavy draft is made upon human emotions and sentiments, whether of resentment, moral indignation, group-loyalty, class consciousness, or devotion to a cause, all of which require a nervous tension greater than that required for the ordinary conduct of life. Non-violence, therefore, whether it takes the form of *persuasion* or *coercion*, seem too idealistic and exacting to accomplish the every-day work of the world. Yet both these methods are of greatest value when kept within the bounds set by the emotional limitations of human nature.

The book gives an abundance of illustrations of the two above-mentioned weaknesses inherent in such movements. Apart from the physical violence that almost inevitably breaks out in their wake, there is a good deal of spiritual and moral violence or intimidation exercised. The incidents that happened in America on the eve of her declaration of independence (p. 311) should be read in this connexion: non-supporters of the boycott were "discountenanced in the most effectual but decent and lawful manner," they were branded "enemies of the Liberties of the country," and "treated with the utmost contempt." The author rightly says, this was an effort to "revive the ancient pillory upon its mental, though not physical side."

Indian non-co-operation the author regards as the most extraordinary manifestation of non-violent coercion in the history of the world. But it is quite obvious that it takes the first place in his estimation not so much because of the practical results achieved by the movement, in the shape of the amount of hardship caused to the Government by a concerted withdrawal of support from their enterprises and institutions, but because of the pre-eminent position held by the originator of the movement among leaders of thought by virtue of his utter selflessness and his marvellous courage in putting his ideas in force. So far as public response to his appeal for shutting off the supply of social contacts with the Government went, our author, if he had knowledge of the numbers of those who abstained from the law-courts, schools, etc., would have had to pronounce the same verdict upon this extraordinary movement as he pronounced upon the Korean boycott—"a futile gesture of protest and despair." The movement exerted no appreciable coercive pressure on those against whom it was aimed, but it attracted greater attention of the world by the saintly character of its author who insisted here, as was done nowhere else, on a scrupulous avoidance of all violence, not only physical, but what is more insidious and even more injurious, moral violence, as a matter of principle. All the praise Dr. Case bestows upon Mahatma Gandhi for his personal character is more than deserved, but he fails to realise, we think, that the movement was conducted more on Tolstoyan principles than as means of employing a constraining force. It was no doubt really

a blend of the two, but consciously conducted less as a coercive than as a conscience movement. The non-co-operation inhibitions which he urged—namely, the boycott of schools, courts, councils, offices, etc.—proceeded without a doubt from the Tolstoyan interpretation of "Resist not evil." From this interpretation Leo Tolstoy drew the inference that all men must refuse to act as citizens, judges, policemen, &c., and it is not sufficiently realised in India that Mahatma Gandhi as a Tolstoyan would continue to exhort people to carry out all these boycotts in the most perfect type of Swaraj Government exactly as he did recently under a foreign Government as a means of getting certain specific wrongs righted. Again his discrimination between the boycott of British goods and British law courts, for instance, on the ground that the former, unlike the latter, was inspired by and led to the hatred of the British, resulted only from a want of clear apprehension on his part that the whole movement was really one of non-violent coercion, and that, as a coercive movement, all forms of boycott were equally justifiable, ethically, and that no valid discrimination could be made between them.

The Indian movement had one feature which was not shared by any other of a similar character, viz. the boycott of the constitutional machinery. And this feature, adopted in obedience to the teachings of Tolstoy, proved the most ruinous of all. In all other countries extra-constitutional coercive movements took place either because no constitutional machinery existed for the expression of the popular will or because the machinery that did exist was of a very unpromising character. In India, on the contrary, this movement was commenced just when the reforms had thrown into the lap of Indians a large measure of constitutional reform, capable of exerting a far greater coercive force, if utilised for the purpose, than any boycotts could ever do. The Social Democracy of Germany carried on a campaign of moral resistance against the autocracy of Bismarck on the contrary, with a view to the seizure of the constitutional machinery, and by twelve years of intense suffering increased its representation in the Reichstag tenfold, thereby making it impossible for the Government to withstand the increasing volume of moral and political power, with the result that the Government had to repeal the anti-socialist law. In fact everywhere the objective of such movement is to get hold of the Legislature. As Dr. Case says, in the concluding portion of the book embodying his considered judgment on the whole subject:

Those whose sympathies are with the masses in their struggle, will look with approval on their all too feeble endeavours to gain control of Government by the method of public discussion and the ballot-box. This is the fruitful plan of constructive reform, by means of a method which no one can deprecate except selfish foes of democracy and of the general welfare. The proletariat have the numbers, if nothing else, to control the cause of political action.

Speaking of "direct action," he says it is a misleading and fatal cry. "The true direct action would be to get control of the State as the supreme agency of social justice. If the exploited multitudes, every one armed with his ballot, cannot find the wisdom and the patience to capture the State in times of ordered peace, they will never hold it captive long by violence and disorder." And this decision to stand aside from the constitutional machinery was surely the most suicidal part of the non-co-operation programme.

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