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Editor : S. G. VAZE.

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Topics of the Week.

Resistance to Aggression.

GREAT BRITAIN has given a specific guarantee to help Poland with all her resources in the event of an unprovoked aggression. This is acclaimed all over as a complete reversal of the Munich policy. If it is really a reversal of Munich, everybody must welcome it. But it is impossible to forget the many pre-Munich and post-Munich utterances of Mr. Chamberlain in which he derided those who advocated resistance to aggression as spoiling for war and the accumulation of deterrents against aggressive countries as only a game in power politics, and it is therefore difficult to credit him with the desire of marshalling the strength of all peace-loving and justice-loving countries within the framework of the League. If, however, he is sincere, nothing could be better for the world, but doubts do not cease to haunt men's minds.

IF only Poland decides upon resistance, it is said, England and France will be at her side with all their strength. But may it not be that, at a time of crisis, England and France will say to Poland that resistance is useless and that Germany should be allowed to have her way? France was bound by a no less solemn compact to go to the aid of Czechoslovakia than England and France now are to help Poland. But did not France say, perhaps at Mr. Chamberlain's instance, that Czechoslovakia should surrender part of her territory and that if she did not agree, no help would be forthcoming from France and England? Can one be certain that an attempt to coerce Poland into acquies-

cence would not be made just in order that the guarantors might escape the obligations now undertaken? And are these two countries more ready now than she was before to resist a Germany which since Munich has increased her strength enormously? Munich has added, it is said, thirty divisions to the German army and now the whole Czechoslovak army is at Germany's disposal. The intervening events cannot be said to have lightened the task of resisting German aggression. One can, therefore, only wait to find out whether England and France are willing to back their words by deeds

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The Rajkot Award.

THE award of the Chief Justice on the Rajkot dispute will come as a surprise to no one. Not even a layman could have thought that Thakore Sahib had left to himself power to reject any of the seven names recommended by Sardar Patel, except on the ground that any of the people chosen by him were not subjects of the State. It was perfectly clear to every one that the Thakore Sahib, after coming to an understanding with the Sardar, was assailed by second thoughts and was trying to wriggle out of the terms to which he had set his hand. So far as interpreting the documents was concerned, we for our part never thought that any other interpretation would be possible. And as Sir Maurice Gwyer has stated definitely that there was no element of fraud or duress in the affair to make the agreement void, there will, it is expected, be no hitch on the part of the Thakore Sahib in fulfilling the other and even more important part of the agreement, viz. that the Thakore Sahib would adopt the recommendations of the Committee to be appointed as settled.

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WHILE the agreement was not signed by the Thakore Sahib under duress, there is no doubt that it was signed under the pressure of a powerful political movement. It is of the essence of all such movements to apply pressure in a legitimate manner, and one therefore fails to understand why the pressure was applied in a round-about way to get first of all a committee appointed in a particular manner and then to obtain an undertaking that its recommendations would be accepted *in toto*. Expressed in this way, the agreement does appear harsh. It would have been much better if the pressure had been applied to get the Thakore Sahib to agree to a definite measure of reforms, indicated in broad outlines, leaving the Darbar to fill in the details. There would then have been no question of an interpretation of an agreement, and if there had been any, it would have been settled not by a judicial interpre-

tation, which after all is not appropriate in such matters, but by the application of further political pressure.

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IF any pressure was applied in this instance at the final stage, it was applied by the Viceroy as representative of the Crown; for it was to him that Mahatma Gandhi turned after undertaking a fast unto death. When, after the fast had begun, Congress Governments begged the Viceroy to settle the matter, it was thought that what was asked of the Viceroy was that the Paramount Power should not compel the Thakore Sahib to go back on the terms of the agreement as it was alleged to be doing, but should leave the Thakore Sahib free to honour the agreement as he was understood to be willing to do. In other words, the general belief was that the Paramount Power was being asked not to intervene on behalf of the Mahatma but to cease to interfere with the Thakore Sahib who was prepared to do the right thing. But the details of the negotiations now disclosed show that the Paramount Power in the person of the Viceroy was asked to interfere with the Thakore Sahib and force him to carry out the terms of the agreement, which the Thakore Sahib himself was unwilling to carry out. And the Paramount Power's intervention was thus invoked, not by the Congress Governments alone, but by Mahatma Gandhi himself in the first instance.

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THE reply given by the Under-Secretary of the State for India to the question in the House of Commons on 13th March reveals the fact that the day after the fast was begun "Mr. Gandhi addressed the Resident alleging that the condition in Rajkot made intervention by the Paramount Power necessary." What an irony of fate it is for Mahatma Gandhi that, after having carried on the whole of the Rajkot agitation on the footing that the breach of the agreement was nominally on the part of the Thakore Saheb, but really on the part of the Paramount Power who was exercising the plenitude of its might on a small Prince and coercing him to dishonour an agreement, the Mahatma's first thought after starting the fast should have been to implore the very Paramount Power to use its authority to force the Thakore Sahib now discovered to be unreliable to redeem the pledge that the latter had given. The Paramount Power was first believed to be the enemy, but it was turned all of a sudden into a saviour! If there is any other explanation we have no doubt it will be vouchsafed soon to people like us, but for the moment we see none. Nor do we see anything in what was done at Rajkot which has any application to the general States problem, unless it be that a popular movement, if sufficiently strong, can make even the States' rulers bend.

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Repression in Kolhapur.

AN orgy of repression is going on in Kolhapur State where people have been clamouring for political reform during the last few months. Kolhapur is the biggest and perhaps the most backward of the States in what is known as the Southern Maratha Country. The people of Kolhapur, not unlike the subjects of most other Indian States, have been, for generations past, labouring under all manner of grave disabilities including excessively heavy land-taxation, insecurity of person and property, capricious and self-centred

rulers and complete want of all forms of civil liberty. However, the wave of awakening that is at present sweeping over the people of Indian States has also reached Kolhapur in some measure. Hungry hordes of peasants, hitherto cowed down by years of oppressive rule, are gathering strength in unity and organising marches—a proceeding unheard-of in the annals of the State and consequently detested in the extreme by the State authorities. Political consciousness, an inevitable companion of demands for economic relief, is rapidly making its appearance and a full-throated demand for complete responsible government is being voiced. The result is the usual one—ruthless persecution of the leaders of the people and the banning of meetings and conferences in the sacred name of law and order.

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ABOUT the middle of January last, the Viceroy visited Kolhapur. Just before the viceregal visit the people of the State had organized a huge demonstration to demand economic relief and political reform. The State authorities did not then commit the folly of launching upon their career of repression; for they evidently wanted the viceregal reception to pass off in peace and unmarred by any untoward event. They succeeded in their plans by exhibiting an entirely novel and very friendly attitude towards the popular demands. Hardly had the Viceroy ceased breathing Kolhapur air, the hand of repression began to descend heavily upon the people.

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MR. MADHAVRAO BAGAL, one of the leaders of the movement, was arrested and prosecuted for sedition. Recently he has been sentenced to two years' rigorous imprisonment. Though a political prisoner, it is reported that he is heavily chained, paraded through the streets of Kolhapur and made to do hard labour on the State race course. A session of the Kolhapur State's People's Conference that was to come off some time in April under the presidentship of Dr. Pattabhi Sitaramayya has been banned and the Praja Parishad has been declared illegal. It is reported that papers, receipt books and moneys belonging to the Parishad have been confiscated wholesale, and there are in process arrests, detentions without warrant and house searches galore.

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WE are not at all surprised at these developments. On the contrary, one would have been surprised if the somewhat reasonable attitude taken by the Kolhapur Darbar at the time of the Viceroy's visit had been followed up by an equally reasonable measure of political reform in the Kolhapur State; for that is not the way feudalism operates. We lend our whole-hearted support to the valiant struggle of the people of Kolhapur against oppression and tyranny and for responsible government. We would like to assure the brave leaders of the movement that the repressive policy of the Kolhapur State authorities is only indicative of the weakness of their position, and that the people's movement, being thoroughly in tune with the spirit of the times, is bound to progress from strength to strength, all temporary set-backs and violent reprisals notwithstanding. At the same time, we would like to warn the Kolhapur State authorities that they can no longer afford to safely ignore the legitimate political and economic aspirations of their people; that the institution of autocracy that they are running has already become an anachronism; that their engine

of repression will have to come to a stand-still at a not very long distance of time; and that, in future, they may not expect as much help and support in destroying popular movements from their Imperial masters as they might probably be expecting.

* * *

Stay-in or Sit-down Strikes.

IN the course of the discussion of demands for grants in the Madras Legislative Assembly, the Hon'ble Mr. Rajagopalachari made a declaration of the Madras Government's policy towards stay-in strikes which, of late, have made their appearance in Madras, to the consternation of the employers and the Government. Stay-in strikes, the Madras Premier observed, virtually constituted forcible occupation of premises and forcible possession of machinery. Such methods, in his view were "a mockery of non-violence." Moreover, said Mr. Rajagopalachari, they were "contrary to the spirit of collective bargaining." "If one set of workers were in possession of the premises," asked he in a flourish, "could it be called collective bargaining"? It is apparently on these two chief grounds that stay-in strikes are now declared illegal in Madras. On being asked whether other Congress provinces had done so, Mr. Rajagopalachari said:

I do not want to refer to other provinces or go by precedents. Whether they have declared it illegal or not, we are declaring it illegal. It does not matter what other provinces do. They will reap the consequences of that action and they will come round to the view we have taken. So far as we are concerned, Gandhiji has declared it out and out illegal. That is enough for us.

* * *

MR. RAJAGOPALACHARI is obviously too angry to give reasoned consideration to this new phenomenon, not only in India, but in the whole world. He deals with the problem brusquely, saying that a stay-in strike is a form of coercion, is opposed to the principle of non-violence and must therefore be prohibited. One may here ask whether the army of non-violence that the Congress mobilised in the non-co-operation days did not go on a sort of sit-down strike on a large scale. The boys would go to the houses of their school-mates, lie down at the door and prevent them from attending schools because they themselves were for boycotting all Government or semi-Government institutions. Older volunteers would go to the houses of lawyers, sit *dharma* at the door and prevent them from going to court. And the same tactics were followed in the matter of several other items of the non-co-operation movement. But the votaries of non-violence did not appear then to be inconveniently alive to all the implications of non-violence which Rajaji now draws. Verily, circumstances alter cases.

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BUT we have no wish to be polemical. Stay-in or sit-down strikes have only latterly come into sight, and it is very necessary that all men in authority should approach the subject in a proper spirit. To this end we would draw the attention of all who are desirous of understanding the problem to a statement of the National Council of Fellowship of Reconciliation of the U. S. A. published in our issue of 16th September, 1936. This body is certainly no less devoted to non-violence than Mahatma Gandhi, and therefore this statement should particularly commend itself to

Congress Governments. While deprecating violence on the part of the strikers, though open violence is not necessarily implied in a sit-down strike, the Fellowship refuses to believe that it is wholly or mainly a legal issue. It says:

There are some jurists of standing, though not many, who hold that the sit-down strike is illegal. Nothing is gained, in our opinion, by contending that when workers who have worked in a plant, who have contributed skill, experience and labour to the prosperity of an industry, sit down peacefully in a plant pending the adjustment of grievances, they are simply "trespassers," like the man who occupies another's home against the latter's will.

* * *

FURTHER the Fellowship says:

Unhesitatingly, however, we deprecate any attempt on the part of public authorities or of private individuals or organizations to solve the sit-down problem by violence and bloodshed. As in every other sphere, so here, violence will solve nothing, but will make a real solution more difficult. If violence is resolutely kept out, every other problem will be easier of solution. All real values, including even physical property, will in the end be better protected.

We likewise deprecate any hasty legislation against sit-downs, for more stringent regulation of labour organizations, etc. The movement to stabilise labour relationships must have for its first premise the general and whole-hearted acceptance of labour's right to organise and bargain collectively, and for the rest must depend on free consultation among the representatives of the management, the unions, and the government, as is already the case on the railroads of this country.

A sympathetic understanding must be brought to the consideration of the problem which Rajaji is not at present in a mood to do. The workers resort to such strikes, as the Fellowship says, "primarily in order to establish the right to organise and to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing," and with this basic issue everyone must sympathise.

* * *

Decisions on the Tariff Board Reports.

THE Government of India have announced their decision on the action to be taken on the Tariff Board recommendations relating to sugar and paper and magnesium chloride. With regard to sugar, it should be remembered that the Tariff Board which enquired into its claim for protection in 1931 had recommended that protection should be given to the industry for a period of fifteen years. The measure of protection, in its opinion was to be Rs. 7-4 as. per cwt. for the first 7 years and Rs. 6-4 as. per cwt. for the subsequent period. The Government of India gave effect to the recommendations of the Tariff Board with the stipulation that, after the expiry of the first seven years, the Tariff Board should again enquire into the condition of the industry and fix the amount of protection in the light of the conditions prevailing then. This led to a fresh enquiry of the Sugar industry by the Tariff Board in 1938. The Tariff Board has come to the conclusion that the fair selling price of Indian Sugar is Rs. 6-13 as.-10 p. per maund, to which should be added 9 as. per maund for freight and 5 as. per maund for quality, making the selling price roughly Rs. 7-12 as. per maund. Java Sugar can be landed in India at Rs. 2-7 as. per maund; so the protection to be given to Indian sugar should

be fixed at Rs. 5-5 as. per maund or Rs. 7-4 as. per cwt. It will be noticed that the second Tariff Board recommends greater protection for Indian Sugar than had been recommended by the first Tariff Board which had fixed the amount of protection at Rs. 6-4 as. per cwt. after the first seven years. This may perhaps be due to changes in the conditions of the sugar market. The Government of India feel, however, that the fair selling price of Indian sugar calculated by the Tariff Board is capable of reduction while the price of Java Sugar quoted by the Tariff Board has been pitched too low. They have, therefore, come to the conclusion that the protection recommended is rather high and should be reduced by 8 as. per cwt. This protection again would be granted to the sugar industry for a period of two years only, after which another enquiry, into the condition of the industry will be undertaken and the extent of protection to be granted determined thereafter. There are other recommendations of the Tariff Board with regard to the general improvement of the sugar industry, on which the Government of India do not propose to take any action at present as they necessitate consultation with the Provincial Governments.

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THE Tariff Board admits that Javanese Sugar can be obtained in India for Rs. 2-7 as. per maund, if the protective duty imposed on it is withdrawn. This means that for the growth and development of the sugar industry in India, Indian consumers are paying thrice as much for sugar than they would have been required to pay if India had been a free-trading Country. It should be remembered that protection had been granted to the sugar industry on the definite understanding that the industry should guarantee a minimum price for sugar-cane and should improve the conditions of its employees. In both these respects, even according to the Tariff Board report of 1938 which, by the way, seems to be friendly to the sugar interests the sugar industry has failed to do its duty. The minimum price for sugar-cane which the first Tariff Board had fixed at 8 as. a maund was never respected by the factory owners, with the result that the cultivators of sugar-cane failed to get any advantage from the protective duty. At last, the Provincial Governments had to intervene and the minimum price for sugar-cane has been fixed at about 5 as. a maund. But it is not the legally-fixed price that is of much importance to the cultivators. They must get a fair deal at the hands of the factory-owners. As regards this, the Tariff Board of 1939 complains that :

Complaints of the conduct of factories and their agents are, we find, widespread and the general truth of the complaints is admitted by all the official witnesses we examined.

With regard to the conditions of the employees in the sugar Factories, the Tariff Board of 1938 makes the following disparaging remarks :

In regard to the remuneration paid to the different grades of labour and to the tenure of employment, the situation is not generally satisfactory. In a protected industry it is to be expected that the labourer in the factory should also share in the benefits of protection, but we find that the interests of labour have not received the consideration they deserve.

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THE other industries for which protection has been recommended by the Tariff Board are paper and magnesium chloride. With regard to paper again, there is a difference of opinion between the Government of India and the Tariff Board. The Tariff Board recommends protection both for the indigenous bamboo and grass pulp. But the Government of India hold that grass pulp is relatively much more expensive and therefore the paper industry of India should not be encouraged to rely on it. It should depend entirely on bamboo pulp alone. Therefore the Government of India have decided to impose an *ad valorem* duty of 25 per cent. on imported pulp which they think will be sufficient to permit the manufacture of bamboo pulp in the country. The Tariff Board had recommended a protective duty on imported pulp of Rs. 35 per ton or an *ad valorem* duty of 25 per cent. which ever is higher. So, in this respect at least, the government's decision does not vary materially from the recommendations of the Tariff Board. As regards the protection to be given to Indian paper, the Government of India think that the fair selling price for Indian paper calculated by the Tariff Board has been pitched rather high, some items of expenditure of cost of conversion having been calculated more than once. Therefore they propose that Indian paper would be given protection at the rate of 9 pies per lb. and not at the rate of 11 pies per lb. as recommended by the Tariff Board. Lastly, though the Tariff Board recommends that the period of protection should extend over seven years, the Government of India have agreed to grant protection for three years only in the first instance after which they have decided to hold a fresh enquiry. With regard to protection to magnesium chloride, the Government of India do not give any reasons why they have departed from the recommendations of the Tariff Board but they have reduced the protection recommended by the Tariff Board by two annas per cwt. The Tariff Board had recommended a protective duty of 15 as. per cwt.

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Empire Gendarmerie.

It will be remembered that last year Lieut.-Col. Macnamara pointed out in the Army Estimates debate how the linked battalion system works out to the disadvantage of India and how it would be cheaper for her to have a Gendarmerie which would be a sort of police force to preserve internal order. He repeated the suggestion this year also. He said :

The second principle should be that for purposes of internal security, virtually police work, in India or any of our other Dependencies, young soldiers organised into fighting armies, which may be moved away in emergency, are not ideal, either from our point of view or the Colony's. I suggest that we should raise a force to be known as the Empire Gendarmerie on the lines of the Canadian Mounted Police, in which might be enrolled older men who know the language and the people. They would do that work in our Colonies and Dependencies, and thus release regular soldiers to get on with their fighting functions in a major war.

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THIS suggestion was, however, rejected by the Government of India. In his reply the Secretary of State for War, Mr. Hore-Belisha, said :

The essence of our system is that we should have troops here who are interchangeable with troops in garrisons abroad. Our system, it might be said, is comparable with a revolving wheel. If you add

another little wheel in the shape of an Imperial Gendarmerie, as suggested by the hon. and gallant Member for Chelmsford (Lieut. Col. Macnamara) in the very comprehensive speech he made, which does not drive any other part of the machinery, you are doing something which is not of real benefit to your organisation. And the same applies to a foreign legion. This Imperial Gendarmerie would be engaged upon different terms of service. The men would

be kept on an older age, I understand, and the problem of marriage would be a further complication. The Regular Army would be deprived of some of its training experience in foreign countries. Of course much depends on where you put the force, but the place generally mentioned is India. You would have to consult the Government of India, which in fact we have done, and the Indian Government rejected this proposal.

THE LAND OF THE NATIVES.

LEGISLATION is being considered in the Union of South Africa which has caused apprehension in the mind of the native population that the safeguards that it enjoys at present for the land now in its occupation or destined ultimately to be in its occupation, insufficient as it is, will be considerably weakened. The Native Land Act of 1913 scheduled the so-called native areas and prohibited the natives from acquiring land in other areas except with the approval of the Governor-General. This was done in pursuance of the principle of racial segregation. The scheduled areas amounted in all to 10,422,935 morgen (a morgen equals about two acres). But it was realised when the Act was passed that the land thus set apart for the natives was entirely inadequate and that much more land must in the near future be made available for them. The Act was thus avowedly a temporary measure designed only to maintain the *status quo*. But further measures in the same direction took long in coming, and in fact it was only as late as 1936 that an Act was passed with the object of adding to the congested native areas. This Act permitted the release of additional 7,250,000 morgen for native ownership and occupation. Land in this released area could either be acquired by natives themselves or for them by the Native Trust established by the Act. Thus the total extent of land that would eventually be available to the natives would be 17,672,935 morgen, which is about 12 per cent. of the area of the Union. The feeling was general that for a population of six and a half million, and showing a heavy rate of increase too, the allocation of land was too small, and that in any case it was unjust to let 69 per cent. of the total population of the country have only 12 per cent. of land, while the two million Europeans forming only 20 per cent. of the population should have all the rest of 88 per cent. of land available to them for purchase.

Even so, the Native Trust is not going expeditiously about its business of purchasing land for native settlement. In the first place, the total morgenage of 7¼ millions of released areas has not yet been even demarcated in full. It appears that 1,173,500 morgen of land has yet to be demarcated, and of the demarcated area only 419,913 morgen were actually purchased by the Trust up to 31st March, 1938. It was promised

when the Act of 1936 was passed that sufficient funds would be voted by Parliament to enable the Trust to acquire the whole of the land which the Act had permitted it to acquire within two years; but, in discussing the Bill now brought in to amend the Act, the Minister of Native Affairs blandly said: "There is a great deal of land which we have still not bought, and it will take us years before we have bought up all the land, at the rate we are going now." It is reported that the purchases for the two years since the Act was passed totals nearly a million morgen. But, as Senator Rheinallt Jones pointed out, "This land was at the time pretty fully occupied by natives, and therefore offered no relief." In the Province of Natal, for instance, no land has at all been bought by the Native Trust for the natives, and in fact no land has been inspected for purchase. Thus, while the Trust is doing its work of acquisition and development of land for native settlement in an exceedingly leisurely fashion, the Government is already bringing in legislation which, if passed, will have the effect of shaking the confidence of the natives that they can at any rate securely hold on to the land which is in their possession at present.

The amending Bill (the Native Trust and Land Amendment Bill) which is calculated to have this disastrous effect was introduced in the Senate of the Union Parliament on 8th February last. It proposed: (1) to give power to the Government, without reference to Parliament, to remove land both from the scheduled and released areas, provided equivalent land was given to the natives in other localities; (2) to expropriate native land provided monetary compensation was given; and (3) to abolish the power given to the Governor-General to establish local boards, which might contain a native, to advise on the purchase and development of land. The Bill, as it was framed, would have had a far-reaching adverse effect on the natives; but fortunately, thanks to the efforts of the senators representing the natives, particularly Senator Jones and Senator Brookes, the Bill underwent considerable improvements in respect of all these matters. It was thought that the scheduled areas, as fixed by the Act of 1913, were sacrosanct and could not be reduced. The Act provided that if these areas were to be curtailed for any reason, every such curtailment would

require Parliamentary sanction by legislation. The Government, however, proposed in the Bill to excise these areas by Proclamation, i. e. by mere administrative action. Much of the scheduled land, it must be remembered, is ancestral land of the natives, being in their occupation for several generations. In Natal, for instance, as Senator Brookes remarked, "most of the land has been in native hands since 1847, that is to say, for 92 years," and if it could now be taken away from them it would mean that the natives would have no security even in regard to the limited amount of land which it was intended that they should retain in perpetuity. The Government has now agreed not to take any land out of the schedule without the consent of Parliament, but Parliament's consent is to be taken, not by an Act as heretofore, but by resolutions of both Houses, which affords, it is obvious, less protection. It is true that this power of de-scheduling scheduled land is being sought, not for the purpose of depriving natives wholesale of the land in their occupation, but for that of giving more rigorous application to the segregation principle. But, once discretion is left to the executive to remove people from land belonging to them for generations, the administration is sure to be subjected to violent pressure from interested quarters carrying the Government far beyond what they might have originally intended.

Even the released areas were marked off under the guarantee that a change in these areas could not be effected without an Act of Parliament; and the Government is unwilling to take Parliamentary approval for excisions of such areas even by resolution. It insists upon taking to itself the power of cutting out released areas merely by Proclamation. All that it has agreed to do, in response to the request of the natives' European representatives in the Senate, is to report to Parliament all such excisions. It is true that under the Bill excisions of land in released areas must be made good by additions of land of equal value in the same province; but if natives of one race are moved to a different part of the province occupied by people belonging to another race, it will occasion serious hardship; and if this is to be done for no other purpose than to straighten out all white areas, in obedience to the principle of segregation, it seems to be unjustifiable. The Government has now abandoned its original plan of doing away with local boards. This is good so far as it goes. The establishment of local boards was after all to be an optional affair. The Government has not yet brought them into existence and, for aught one knows, may not bring them into existence. It also remains to be seen whether, if and when they are formed, natives will find a place on them and, if so, how far they will be placed in a position of turning the boards to good account. A valuable change has

been introduced in the clause in the original Bill relating to expropriation. It would not be possible hereafter to expropriate natives after merely giving them money compensation. Now it is laid down, as the Minister of Native Affairs said, that "such a native can ask the Trust that, instead of the monetary compensation being paid to him, he shall receive a piece of land in a released area, and then the Minister in consultation with the Native Affairs Commission will point out a piece of land of the value of the land that is expropriated." Even in this matter, however, the safeguards are inadequate. The native must apply first within three months. Secondly, it is not certain that if the expropriated native is a registered owner, occupying the land on the system of individual tenure, his title in respect of the land that the Trust will offer him will be just as good. For all the land scheduled under the Act of 1913 is tribal land held in trust for the tribe, and it would not be possible to set any of it aside for a registered owner. It was perhaps in recognition of such difficulties that the amended clause now reads as follows: That the Trust shall offer land for sale to an expropriated native "upon such conditions of tenure similar in so far as may be practicable to the conditions of tenure subject to which such native held land so expropriated," and also "upon such other conditions as the Trustee (i. e., the Governor-General) may deem expedient", leaving room here for importing into the title deed additional conditions which may not be either just or proper. Expropriation is intended to be carried out, it is said, where small black areas are surrounded by large white areas giving the whole locality a chequer-board appearance, and as segregation is the sheet-anchor of the Union Government's policy it is proposed to remove these black islands in the white area or to eliminate the so-called black spots. Probably about 300,000 morgen are affected in this way. This Minister of Native Affairs has stated that "the intention is definitely that the people expropriated in this way will be in no worse position," but it cannot be said that even the amended clause fully carries out this intention. Senator Brookes suggested that all expropriations should come under the control of Parliament, but the suggestion was not accepted. The second reading of the altered Bill was passed by the House of Assembly with the support of the United Party and the Nationalists and against the opposition of the native representatives who, under the constitution, must be Europeans, and of the Labour and Dominion parties. It remains to be seen whether in the further stages of the Bill the safeguards already secured for native interests will be strengthened, as they ought to be.

THE BOMBAY AGRICULTURAL DEBTORS RELIEF BILL.

IF there is one provision of this bill that calls for more serious consideration than any other, it is clause 21, with its adjunct the second proviso to clause 50 (2 b), as I greatly fear that it will frustrate the object of this beneficent legislation to a large extent, and is also otherwise objectionable. Briefly, the clause and its adjunct provide that where the debtor and any or all of his creditors have come to a settlement in respect of a debt or debts due from him to any or all of them, the Debt Adjustment Board shall, after satisfying itself as to its *bona fides* and as to its being in the interest of the debtor, frame its award in terms of the settlement in respect of the debt or debts to which it relates. This means that in such cases the Board shall not have recourse to the method of debt adjustment laid down in the Act. This method is based on the very sound principle that the only satisfactory way to afford relief to indebted agriculturists is to find out in the first place what is really and equitably due to each creditor (in accordance with the relevant provisions borrowed from the D. A. R. Act), and then to scale down *pro rata* the debts so found due to the level of the debtor's paying capacity, where this capacity is found to be inadequate for paying the aggregate of the debts in full. Clause 21 comes as an anti-climax to this ideal method of giving relief—a supersession of the good by the bad. The sowcars will hail it as a godsend, and will not be slow to take full advantage of it. The ignorant agriculturists are no match for them, and will generally play into their hands. Various devices will be employed to ensnare them into effecting a settlement. Judicious expenditure of a little money to relieve the debtor of his pressing need, and large promises of future accommodation, will often do the trick where persuasion or advice of an inspired well-wisher or elder fails. He could also easily be led to favour one creditor at the expense of another. For instance, in order to make it appear that the settlement made with a particular creditor gave very large remissions and so was manifestly in the debtor's interest, a fictitious pro-note would be passed to swell the aggregate debt due to the creditor. The debtor would be no worse off for this as the amount of the fictitious debt would form part of the remissions. The Board will never be in a position to find out that the debt was fictitious when the settlement is brought to it for being recorded and certified as the only parties before it would be the debtor and the creditor concerned, and there would be no materials before it to reveal that the debt was fictitious. The certified debt will later on be incorporated in the award without any scaling down, and any scaling down that is required to be done will have been done at the expense of the other creditors.

It is true that clause 21 provides that before recognizing a settlement the Board shall satisfy itself as to its *bona fides* and as to its being in the interest of the debtor. But after all the Board can form an opinion only on the materials before it, and where the only parties before the Board are those who want the settlement to be recognized, the materials that would lead to an adverse conclusion will be carefully suppressed, and only the materials that would induce recognition would be brought forward. Debts are generally grossly inflated, and what may appear to be a 50 per cent. remission may be found to be no remission at all if the true state of things is brought to light. The settlement in such a case would appear to be manifestly in the debtors' interest, whereas really it may be the other way about. It requires a very thorough inquiry to find out what is really and equitably due to the creditor, and unless that is found out it will not be possible to arrive at any reliable conclusion as to whether or not the settlement is really in the interest of the debtor. No such inquiry is, however, contemplated by clause 21 or will be possible under the circumstances. If the interest of the debtor were to be judged in the light of the relief that he would be getting under the Act in the absence of the settlement, the presumption would be strongly against its being in his interest. And yet I have very little doubt that there will be settlements galore coming up before the Board, and most of them will be recognized and given effect to. The beneficent provisions of the Act will not have much scope left to them to prove their beneficence.

I think I have now said enough to show that great risk is involved in according recognition to private settlements between parties so unequally matched as the sowcar and his agriculturist debtor, and that the safeguard provided will generally prove ineffective. And I know of no advantage to be gained by recognizing settlements such as would justify the running of the risk. I would, therefore, respectfully suggest that clause 21 may be altogether dropped, or at any rate so modified as to accord recognition to settlements only to the extent of accepting them as settlements of the amount of debts owing to the creditors concerned, while leaving the Board free to scale down all debts *pro rata* to the level of the debtors' paying capacity where this is found to be inadequate for paying the aggregate of debts in full. A settlement between a debtor and an individual creditor could not possibly have been made with an eye to his paying capacity in respect of the aggregate of his debts; so if it is to be accepted it should only be accepted as the equivalent of what on enquiry would be found to be really and equitably due to the particular creditor. Where the settlement is between a debtor and all his creditors, it could not be held to be in his interest if the aggregate amount of the settled debts is beyond his paying capacity. Otherwise the result would be that the debtor would later fail

to carry out the award, and his property would have to be sold for default, or he would have to be adjudicated an insolvent (see clause 62 (2)). In this connection, I must point out that sub-clause (4) of clause 21, which requires the Board to make an award in terms of the settlement in cases in which the settlement includes all debts, is objectionable in view of the fact that clause 21 does not require that in such cases the Board shall hold an enquiry on the lines laid down in clauses 44 to 47 for determining the paying capacity of the debtor in order to determine whether or not the settlement is in his interest, and in the ab-

sence of such an enquiry the Board's finding that the settlement is in his interest would be worthless. If, therefore, clause 21 is not to be either abrogated or modified, at least an explanatory note should be added to it to the effect that where a settlement includes all debts, the phrase "in the interest of the debtor" occurring in sub-clause (3) should be taken to require that the aggregate of the settled debts shall be within his paying capacity, which should be determined by the Board before recording a finding whether or not the settlement is in his interest.

P. J. TALEYARKHAN.

EDUCATION OF SUBJECT RACES.

I

IN the summer of 1936 there was held in Honolulu the Seminar-Conference on Education in the Pacific Region under the auspices of the University of Hawaii and the Yale University. The Conference was attended by sixty-six educationists and social scientists from twenty-three countries mostly bordering on the Pacific Ocean and sat for five weeks and discussed a large number of papers specially written for the Conference on twelve different topics of educational interest. The variety of experience and opinion represented at the Conference was indeed great. The Conference, whose proceedings were not open to the Press and the public, did not seek to arrive at any definite conclusions, and did not therefore, pass any resolutions. To Dr. Felix M. Keesing of the Hawaii University, one of the prime movers of the Conference, was assigned the task of "interpreting" for the public the proceedings of the Conference. He did so in his book, *Education in the Pacific Countries* (Kelly and Walsh, Shanghai, \$1.50.) Every one who had the privilege of participating in the Conference will gladly bear testimony to the comprehensiveness, the impartiality and the accuracy of the "interpretation."

A companion volume to Dr. Keesing's book is *Education in the Colonial Empire* (Longmans, 6s. 6d.) by Mr. Athur I. Mayhew, C.M.G., C. I. F., who was in India for some two decades in the Indian Educational Service and rose to be the Commissioner of Education with the Government of India and is the author of *Education for India*. Mr. Mayhew is now the Joint Secretary to the Advisory Committee on Education in the Colonies, attached to the Colonial Office, London. Besides taking a leading part in the Seminar-Conference, Mr. Mayhew gave a course on Education in the British Colonies at the Summer School of the Hawaii University. In his latest book Mr. Mayhew has incorporated his contributions to the Conference as well as the Summer School. Mr. Mayhew treats of some fundamental concepts of

education, of the principles as applied to the British Colonies generally and of the special features of some selected Colonies.

II

The main theme of the Conference was the appraisal of educational policies of the European imperialist powers regarding their coloured subject races. This is also the main theme of Mr. Mayhew. In essence, it is a question of political considerations of imperialism limiting educational opportunities of the subject races. How much and what kind of education should the imperial overlords give to their subject groups in order to make the latter efficient servants of the former and keep them there? The object of the Conference, as officially stated, was, in the first instance, the consideration of educational problems in dependencies and among "the indigenous minorities of the Pacific the so-called backward peoples, whose lines are now being drastically influenced by western or modern civilization." (Keesing, p. 2). The situation in the Dutch East Indies is thus described:

There is an increasing demand by Indonesians for more education along western lines, raising the question as to what bounds, if any, the governing authority should set, considering the limited opportunities for employment and the possibilities of social unrest. Nationalism is stirring powerfully, and some feel that education is responsible to a considerable degree. (Keesing, p. 19)

Knowledge is power, and knowledge will rouse the subject races to a realization of their subjection and inspire them to challenge imperialism. If imperialism should be safe, education of the subject races should be rationed and the quality kept low. The question was discussed at the Conference: "How far is it wise to press higher education, or even to give it to the ever-increasing number who want it?" The policies of different imperialist powers are thus described:

Judged by the accounts given by members, the Dutch and French approach them with most caution and logic, being exceedingly chary about admitting indigenous students into the channels that lead "into the western superstructure"; British colonial authorities are almost as conservative in practice if not in philosophy; New Zealanders, while cautious along with

Australians in their tropical dependencies, give every encouragement to Maoris entering higher institutions; and Americans push higher education as being a normal part of the learning process, a natural following up of mass education. (Keesing, p. 131)

It will be noticed that while the Dutch and French were repressive and the Americans progressive both in theory and practice, the British were progressive in theory but repressive in practice. The repressive policy, when it is not openly avowed, is sought to be concealed under plausible excuses as, for instance, biological inhibitions of subject races, social disorganization, financial limitations, unemployment, incompatibility of "western" education and indigenous cultures, etc. And there were not wanting anthropologists and sociologists who lent the weight of their scholarship to these excuses. Fortunately there were others at the Conference, equally competent, who showed up the excuses. When a Dutch member offered the thesis that "the more education the better is a bad device" a number of members "leapt vigorously to attack it. Several, including members of indigenous groups, branded it as a device for maintaining the *status quo* of imperialism." (Keesing, p. 136). An American member urged that "there can never be an over-production of truly educated people." (Keesing, p. 144) The right attitude was stated thus :

Every child born in a society should have the right to go to high school and even to a university as a sort of democratic clearing house, and children should be as far as possible in one high school; the high school must be a normal part of mass education, with no idea that it is a superior institution. (Keesing, p. 137).

A good instance of the British policy of theoretical righteousness and its practical frustration may be found in the theoretical and practical attitudes of the British Colonial Governments towards Christianity and Christian missions. Dr. Keesing notes : "A seminar-conference member from India claimed that some of the British administrations gave preferential treatment to Christian mission enterprise : this, however, was denied by a British member." (Keesing, p. 84). A perusal of Mr. Mayhew's book would leave no doubt that the denial was true only in a Pickwickian sense. The following passages, particularly the words, here italicised are relevant in this connection :

The position of the Government in tropical Africa is different from that of the British Government in India, which found a policy of strict *neutrality* imposed on it by the existence in India of ancient religions with fully developed cultures professed by highly educated sections of the population. . . . Totally different circumstances in tropical Africa have enabled the Government not only to advocate religious teaching but also to lay stress on *Christian teaching* and even to provide teaching distinctively though not dogmatically Christian in character in some of its own institutions without wounding the feelings or arousing the suspicions of any communities. Of its more cautious attitude towards Islam there is more to be said later. Broadly speaking, we may assume that *Christian teaching* has been for some time and still is a *prime factor* in the adaptation of schools and colleges to African needs. (Mayhew pp. 100-101).

Most of Christian teaching is imparted in mission schools ; in fact, most of the schools in the British colonies are run by Christian missions, financed very largely from taxes imposed on non-Christian subjects. It will be noticed that religious neutrality in India, according to Mr. Mayhew, is not due to the British Government preference for impartiality towards all religions, but to the resistance of the Hindus and the Muslims. Where the British Government could impose Christianity, it did not hesitate to do so.

In Malaya, the Malays are all Muslims ; and so are the Rulers of the Malay States- "Malay education is given in Government schools", (Mayhew, p. 207).

Religious instruction is part of the school curriculum only in the mission schools. In government schools Koran teaching is provided out of school hours, in the school building or neighbouring mosque, for Malay pupils. The teacher is not usually one of the school staff. (Mayhew, p. 219).

Notwithstanding that all Malays are Muslims and insist on religious teaching in Islam, the Government schools do not provide, as part of the school curriculum, religious instruction in Islam.

In passing, it is interesting to dwell on the italicised words in the following passage :

It is interesting to note that Christian religious knowledge is a *very popular* subject with non-Christian candidates for the Cambridge School Certificate though no teaching of it is provided in their schools. It would be wrong to attribute this entirely to their interest in the subject. (Mayhew, pp. 219-20).

The policy not only of partiality for Christianity but of antipathy to Islam and Hinduism is even more clearly proved by the following recommendation of Mr. Mayhew and Mr. F. C. Marriot, Director of Education in Trinidad, in their joint report on *Education in the West Indies, Proposals of the Commission relating to Trinidad* :

As regards the question of the right of entry of Hindu or Mohammedan priests and "moulvis" into Christian schools, although we understand that, by arrangement, facilities are granted by the denominations for reciprocal entry, we do not feel prepared to recommend that the meaning of the term "denomination" in this context be extended to include any other than a Christian denomination, or that the right of entry be granted to other than Christian ministers of religion. (p. 7).

Even where there is no such open avowal of partiality for Christianity and Christian missions, the same result can be and is often secured by administrative action. The attempt of non-Christians of Trinidad to organise a non-Christian school was hampered purely by administrative action on plausible but insincere grounds. Mr. Mayhew may as well deny that there is no bar against Indian immigration into the British Dominions because there is no law which avows it. Mr. Mayhew cannot be unaware that a policy of righteous words and unrighteous deeds is sometimes called diplomacy and sometimes hypocrisy.

P. KODANDA RAO.

Reviews.

MALWA IN TRANSITION.

MALWA IN TRANSITION OR A CENTURY OF ANARCHY. THE FIRST PHASE, 1698-1765. By RAGHUBIR SINH. (Taraporevala.) 1936. 21cm. 391p. Rs. 5.

THE glorious history of Malwa in pre-Mohammedan days has been studied by several scholars. But Malwa in later times is a neglected subject. Maharaja Kumar Raghubir Sinh, the learned heir of the Rathor Maharajah of Sitamau, has ably filled in a part of the gap by publishing this scholarly work. It deals with the history of Malwa from 1698-1765. All the available material for the period has been carefully studied and the wealth of details thus ascertained has been presented in neatly arranged chapters of convenient size. The result is a notable contribution to the section of Indian provincial history. The author's intimate knowledge of the topography and genealogy of Malwa principalities has enabled him not only to correct the mistakes of previous writers but also to suggest some new interpretations. The subject matter dealt with in this volume is divided into three periods from the standpoint of extant material.

The first period (1698-1719) dealing with the gradual decline and breakdown of the Mughal Empire is based mainly on contemporary Persian histories and Akhbarats by Mohammedan writers. During the first half of this period Maratha activities were directed to Malwa with the object of diverting the forces of Aurangzeb who had concentrated his army in the south; and later on, after the death of Aurangzeb Balaji Vishwanath marched to Delhi with a large army to help the Sayyad brothers. The bolder spirits among the Marathas were, thus, able to view a part of the empire and the decadent Mughal Court itself at close quarters and to entertain new thoughts regarding their future line of action. The second period (1719-41) opens with the appearance of Nizam and Baji Rao acting as friends in Malwa, but the field of their ambition was overlapping and conflicting. They had consequently to measure swords with one another on several occasions and the Nizam was ultimately vanquished at Bhopal in 1739. The Marathas were thus masters of Malwa by right of conquest. The bold and aggressive policy of Baji Rao not only revived the Maratha state, but what was still more important, emboldened the Maratha sardars to undertake the heavy responsibility of virtually replacing the Mohammedan rule in the North by their own. The importance of Persian material for this period diminishes as the so-called Mohammedan historians felt no enthusiasm for giving a detailed description of the discomfiture of their co-religionist rulers at the hands of the Marathas. The third period (1741-65) begins with the formal cession of Malwa by the Emperor to the Marathas. But for several years the interests of the Maratha sardars, who were entrusted with the management of Malwa, were centred further north. They had to solve very complicated problems in Rajputana and then to deal with a powerful enemy like Ahmad Shah Abdali. During this period of transition, when the atmosphere was reverberating with

cries of war and the wielding of the sword, no great creative effort in administration could be expected from the new administrators of Malwa.

Whether the impact of the Marathas helped Malwa to any extent can therefore be definitely ascertained by studying the period of Malwa history after 1765. The author is expected to deal with this period in another volume. But it must be noted that our author has not left us in suspense regarding his judgment on the Maratha rule; he has already indicated it in the volume before us. The Peshwas, says he, were deep in debt and their main idea was to collect huge sums of money; that is, their objective was purely economic. The theory of Hindu-pad-Padashahi, in his opinion, is untenable; and the success of the Maratha forces in Malwa cannot be attributed to reasons of religious affinity. This reading of Maratha history is somewhat misleading and prejudiced in as much as it gives prominence to minor factors in order to belittle major ones. Peshwas were no doubt in debt but they had incurred it for equipping themselves with sinews of war; or, to put it in other words, their main ideal was political expansion; and economic consideration was an incidental factor. That the Marathas did not declare themselves emperors of Delhi also is undeniable, but that cannot mean that religious sentiment played no part in Maratha politics. In fact their advent in north India was welcomed by leading Hindu Rajahs like Sawai Jaysing and their armies were actually invited to defend the cause of Hinduism by Chhatra Sal of Bundelkhand. The political condition of Malwa, however, was exceptional. As remarked by our author, "Mughal rule had not only failed to create any nationality in Malwa; on the other hand it had destroyed what little of it was there" (p. 18). It was consequently inevitable that Malwa should be ruled by Mughal subhedars like the Nizam and Bangash or should form part of the Maratha Empire. There was no united power, state or group of people in Malwa who could think of creating an independent state of their own. The province was, therefore, regarded as a prize reserved for the victor on the battlefield.

Under these circumstances, the advent of Maratha forces in Malwa cannot indeed be attributed purely to reasons of religious affinity. Several Rajput principalities in Malwa, moreover, like those of Raghoghar, Kotah and Sitamau were the creations of Akbar, Shah Jahan and Aurangzeb and it was natural that they should find fault with the new rulers and call them intruders or 'upstarts.' But in course of time these principalities too accommodated themselves to the changed circumstances. As noted by the author, "the Hindu culture of Malwa received an added impetus from the Marathas, and the Maratha dominion in Malwa led to the adoption, even by the Rajput States, of certain ways and thoughts of these 'invaders.' Many of the Maratha customs like the worship of Ganesh in the month of Bhadrpad and the distribution of *til* on the Makar Sankant day became the practice of Rajput Courts also" (p. 335). The work, under review is, thus, full of interesting information and as such deserves to be carefully studied by all students of Indian history.

D. V. APTE.

IMPERIAL DEVELOPMENT.
THE CRUCIAL PROBLEM OF IMPERIAL DEVELOPMENT. (Longmans, Bombay) 1938. 21cm. 201p. 2/6.

THIS is a collection of papers read at the first conference on Imperial Development convened by the Royal Empire Society, with a foreword contributed by the Rt. Hon. Malcolm Macdonald, the then Secretary of State for the Dominions. The purpose of the Conference was "to consider the relation of consumption and production, practicable methods for stimulating both, and the effects which the successful attainment of these objectives would have upon the prosperity of Empire countries and upon world trade".

The various contributors to the volume realise that the world is still wedded to 'producer' rather than to 'consumer' economics. They stress the need for greater consumption for the sake of health, happiness, and efficiency as well as the need for an expansion of certain types of social services. They want greater attention to be paid to nutrition, housing, education and inter-imperial emigration in order to stimulate consumption. The means for preserving peace, they claim, are economic appeasement and better standards of living for everybody—not only for the Empire countries or for the Whites in Empire countries. Freer trade within the Empire, they believe, would result in freer trade within the world.

Writing on the problem as it pertains to India, Sir Frank Noyce holds that the yields of Indian agriculture are low, however much they may have increased in recent years owing to researches. Food crops, he holds, should be increased and cash crops regulated. The Indian diet is wrong more as regards quality than as regards quantity, its greatest deficiency being milk. People consume more cereals and less vegetables, fruits, fats and milk than is good for them. The writer recommends more land to be given for raising fodder, especially for leguminous crops. Agriculture should be improved if the purchasing power of Indians is to be increased.

For stimulating the Indian consumption of British made goods, Sir Frank Noyce suggests greater attention to be paid to increased efficiency in production in the villages, increased prosperity and increased demand for foreign things. He is further of the opinion that England should not only buy the raw products of India but also some of her finished goods, if India is to buy the highly specialised manufactured goods of Britain.

In the discussion following the paper, Sir John Maynard argues for a vigorous industrialisation of India, the substitution of large-scale cultivation for small-scale cultivation, and co-operative tillage similar to what obtains in Russia. Others suggest improvement of food crops, the improved quality and grading of tobacco, the cultivation of a regular supply of customers, and emigration to Australia, Africa, Arabia and Mesopotamia.

In the chapter pertaining to the Colonies and Dependencies, the Marquess of Dufferin and Ava holds that the first object of colonial administration should be the fuller and happier lives of the inhabitants. Colonies live for the most part by primary production and their industries are seldom 'economic'. Their biggest

problem to-day is that of marketing. They should produce more of their own needs, without recourse to the suicidal policy of autarchy.

Looking at the problem of production and consumption in relation to the world at large, Sir John Wardlaw-Milne writes that the problem of the world is primarily one of consumption, which in its turn means an increasing standard of life and comfort for all peoples. He holds that the agriculturist and the primary producer should be given a real return for their labour if there is to be world prosperity. Sir George Schuster and others, taking part in the discussion hold that it is "political objectives pursued for their own value that are increasing economic difficulties". They believe that, both autarchy and complete free trade being impossible, the aim should be to bring as many countries as possible into a low tariff scheme. The standard of living for the natives in the colonies should be raised along their own lines, the policy being "to try to find out what they want, give them, what they can understand, give them what is good in our (European) civilisation, and try to encourage them to leave what is bad in their own".

Prof. Bentwich proposes migration of Jews to unoccupied areas in the Dominions. Circulation of men, he says, is even more important than the circulation of money.

Among the other suggestions made for economic improvement, mention may be made of (1) the advisability of England having a Minister of Production and Distribution to act as a liaison adviser between outputs and intakes; (2) intensive development of the colonial empire; (3) maintenance of a stable currency; (4) the starting of an agricultural museum of machinery; and (5) the establishment of a Chair in British or Dominion University on Imperial Relations.

Some of the conclusions of the Conference are:

1. Increased consumption is a way towards economic peace and Empire development.
2. Empire development is a part of world development.
3. Restriction of production as a universal measure cannot cure depression.
4. International peace and economic progress are impossible if wealthy countries are not prepared to make sacrifices.
5. Moral and spiritual factors, being even more important than economic factors, exploitation of the backward people should be eschewed.
6. A far-reaching social policy should be adopted by every government with regard to such matters as housing, especially in view of the increasing industrialisation and urbanisation of the Dominions and India.
7. Migration is not an end in itself. There should be an economic demand for migrants.
8. The problems of the different parts of the Empire are not the same. Therefore, it would be an advantage if Oriental goods were sold in the colonies and the Dominions specialised in primary production and England concentrated on high-class manufactured and capital goods. Industrialisation is essential to India—whether urban or village.
9. Human welfare being the objective of economic progress, greater attention should be

paid to better nutrition, better housing and better social services.

10. Imperial development requires that plans should be made in advance for periods of slump; plans for roads, railways, transport, shipping, aerodromes, etc.

11. Imperial development further requires the prevention of poverty and mal-nutrition as well as removal of preventable diseases and bad sanitary conditions.

12. Appeasement of dictators.

While to most of the conclusions of the conference and suggestions made by individual contributors we may have no objection, trouble arises when we begin to implement them. The book has no doubt rightly diagnosed the situation but the detailed remedy and the willingness to carry it out are still not within sight. While many valuable suggestions are made regarding production and consumption, not much is said about distribution which is the connecting link between production and consumption.

In dealing with inter-imperial migration, it will be worth while to consider the possibility of limited emigration of those among the Indian population who have already adopted the Western standards of health and sanitation or those who are easily assimilable to the Western way of life. Migration from India need not always take the form of wage-earners or shopkeepers. There is a place for a limited number of the *intelligentsia* who are prepared to take their own capital with them and settle in the sparsely populated parts of the Empire and develop them.

The book as a whole is stimulating. Unfortunately a few spelling mistakes have crept into it.

DR. E. ASIRVATHAM.

SHORT NOTICE.

LOCAL AUTONOMY. VOLS. I AND II. By G. F. F. FOULKES. (G. A. Natesan, Madras.) 1937. 19cm. 143p. and 136p. Re. 1 each.

THE author's intention in writing these two books is to attract public attention to "some of the salient matters affecting the daily life of the people", in the trust that the electorate will give heed to the various social, economic, and legislative problems confronting it. The topics dealt with are Education, Health, Co-operative Movement, Civil Justice, Rural Reconstruction, Agricultural Conditions and Policy, Indebtedness, Village Industries and Livestock with an opening chapter on statistics of the Madras Presidency and a closing one containing statistical summaries of conditions in a few villages in the Salem, Ramnad and Madras districts.

The author has taken great pains in securing the necessary facts and figures for his purpose and discusses the situation in a telling manner. He draws remarkable conclusions and engages the attention of all earnest students of rural reconstruction. If the Wardha Scheme of Education and

the activities of the All-India Village Industries Association had been taken notice of and discussed by the author, the books would have gained considerably in usefulness as also in its appeal to the public. It is not clear why no reference is made to them by him.

However, the two books provide interesting and useful reading even if one may not be able to agree with the author's opinions. For example, the opinion that mal-nutrition is not caused by lack of food but by an ill-balanced dietary or that the land-tax is not excessive or oppressive may not be shared by all, but yet the author's discussion is thought-provoking and deserves careful reading.

The statistics in the opening chapter as also some furnished later on might have been with advantage represented more graphically. The printing and get-up might have been better for the fairly heavy price of one rupee per volume.

K. K. I.

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