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Public Administration in Democracy

By

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'Democracy' On Trial

Government by the freely expressed consent of the people is the essence of democracy. The irksomeness of having to submit to restraints, which are inseparable from the process of government, is rendered emotionally, if not physically, bearable by a consciousness that even the victim of a governmental restriction is in some demonstrable manner sharing in providing and exercising the restraint. The moral awareness of this experience confers on democratic government a virtue which one cannot find in any other form. Government in such a system is a process ~~not a process of freedom~~ of freedom, but is an institutional aid to the fulfilment of free existence. This accounts for the high esteem in which democratic government has been held by all ardent reformers of human society and by all who believe in a progressive human civilization. Government by free consent, however, calls for self-restraint on the part of those who wield authority in the name of the community, and of patience on the part of those individuals in the community who have a sense of wrong in being coerced. A sense of fairness and an unflinching respect for the sovereign people have to characterize the actions of the government as well as the governed in a democratic country. These qualities are essentially the product of habit and tradition. Few peoples can be said to have possessed them at all times, even in recent history, and there are many who have rarely shown themselves capable of practising these virtues for any length of time. The chequered history of democracy as a working form of organizing authority is principally traceable to the possession or flouting of these essential qualities by the people among whom the system has been operating.

In a sense democracy is always on trial. The composition of the citizen body is constantly changing, as new generations gradually and imperceptibly, but all the same steadily and inexorably, are taking the place of older ones. How far the habits and thoughts of the new entrants conform to the requirements of the smooth working of existing forms of government is a matter of uncertainty. Even with those whose habits are already formed the emergence of new problems always constitutes a challenge to old ways. These latter have either to prove their adequacy to meet the new requirements or to show a conscious and deliberate readiness to change so that the problems are adequately faced. The effort involved in either alternative is a trial and even in well-established democracies lack of sufficient restraint on the part of the state or of patience on the part people has tended to strain the basic character of a democracy, namely its foundation in the freely expressed desires of the people. In younger democracies, such as those

established on the continent of Europe at the end of the First World War, or in Asia at the end of the Second World War, the nature of the trial is more obvious. A written democratic constitution, answering to theoretical or speculative merits, can be easily formed. Easier still is the process of adopting a model which has been reputedly successful in some other country. But it is not so easy, in fact it has been proved to be extremely difficult, to develop those habits of restraint and patience, and those traditions of public administration which are based on these habits, which are essential for the success of democracy.

The fact that in the twentieth century world events are moving very fast and no nation can be left to itself to work out its own evolution without having to meet the impact of these world events have made the trial more difficult. The democracies that were established in Europe in the latter half of the nineteenth century, as in France and Italy, were no less of innovations than those more numerous and smaller ones that were established after the Treaty of Versailles. But the former had a much longer trial in comparatively peaceful and stable conditions than the latter could have during the inter-war period. Not that the French or the Italian democracies which had gone all out to adopt the British parliamentary model, with what they thought were additional improvements, were without blemishes. In fact many political observers had noted these defects, which consisted mainly in the failure of the French and the Italian people to produce in themselves those characteristics of habit and tradition which were the foundations of such success as the British model had attained in its home country. The world forces of economic depression and resurgent and aggressive nationalism that overpowered the newer democracies proved too strong for the comparatively older ones in France and Italy as well. In all these cases, old as well as new, the effort of designing a constitution free from theoretical blemish did not suffice to counteract the shortcomings either of political habit or of administrative tradition.

Democracy as the ideal form of government for civilized humanity is conceived in a spirit of liberalism. Freed from particular policies that are associated with the programmes of the so called Liberal parties in various countries, liberalism as a principle or doctrine connotes a just balance between the individual and the state. No constitution can define in a fixed formula the implications of such a balance. It consists in a mental balance on the part of the people themselves, those who are wielding the governmental authority for the time being and those who are living under the authority of that government. The expression of this balanced mentality is most readily traced in the forms of public administration set up in democracies and in the manner in which they are operated. To the extent to which the daily administration is conducted in consonance with the ideal principle of democracy, and to no greater extent, can the higher forms of political democracy, such as are embodied in the formation and

functioning of the legislature and the executive, succeed in producing either democratic or even efficient administration. Italy never made a success of its democratic experiment. France has almost continuously decayed under its democratic regime, its longer spell of free life being significantly due to its better organized system of public administration. The newer democracies devoid of the foundations either of public and local administration or of the desire and opportunity of building these easily collapsed before the brute power of authoritarian elements, at home and abroad. The end of the Second World War has created new difficulties for the older democracies. It has also created new democracies which, in addition to the old difficulties of social existence that they had always to face, have now to face fresh ones incidental to their democratic organization.

To vary a familiar saying regarding greatness, we may say about democracy: some people are born to democracy, some by their effort attain democracy, and some have democracy thrust on them. It may be a matter of opinion in each case to what class among these three a particular democracy belongs. It would be no exaggeration to say, however, that by far the largest number of democracies now in existence either wholly or in part belong to the third category. Both the freedom from external interference and the particular form of democratic organization adopted by them have been forced on them by environmental pressures, in the shaping of which either the genius or the effort of their people has played but a secondary part. But howsoever attained, democracy constitutes a trial and a challenge to the people to make a success of it. The organization and distribution of governmental powers which is the real function of a constitutional act does call for a realism and discrimination which have not always characterized the work of constituent assemblies set up for the purpose. The temptation to incorporate in their constitutions many mutually conflicting principles of government and of exceeding the proper organizational function of the constitution by writing party programmes into their clauses, which possess no statutory validity, has not been resisted by many among the newer democracies. The result has almost invariably been detrimental to the smoothness, the efficiency and the wide acceptability of the forms of government thus established. A scrutiny of democratic constitutions, especially of the newer ones,—which are framed in a hurry and seek to clothe some urgent dictates of policy with a display of governmental principles,—from the standpoints of internal consistency and of conformity to existing conditions would no doubt yield very interesting and useful results. This task has been attempted by several competent and experienced writers in this as in other countries. But the problems of public administration in a democracy have failed to receive the same attention, though they really constitute not only a major and significant part of governmental activity, but are really the basic foundation of the political superstructure.

It is proposed in the course of this essay to analyse the essential requirements of organising public administration in a democracy. The principles on which the administration of public business is carried on at all levels, the provision that is made to associate the people with the framing and carrying out of administrative decisions, the territorial devolution of administrative responsibilities, the setting up of appropriate administrative authorities for dealing with the growing mass of public business, the institution of satisfactory relationships between the different parts of the administrative machinery, the proper staffing and organization of the various services, and similar aspects of the organization and working of the administrative system have in the past been considered as matters of detail. Expediency rather than principle has influenced organization as well as working. In the absence of set traditions, which only a few countries possess, this empirical and shifty attitude towards administration has engendered on the part of governments a disregard for essential democratic principles and on the part of the people a sense of dissatisfaction bordering on opposition. These trends visible in all newer democracies constitute a threat to the stability as well as to the efficiency of democratic government. Unless the inherent implications of the democratic process in public administration are properly understood and unflinchingly followed the career of democracies, it has been proved, is likely to be short and stormy. Any time and labour spent in promoting an understanding of the essential requirements of democratic administration would, it is hoped, help in making democracy more stable and more fruitful.

A discussion of problems of administrative organization is unavoidably a process of reasoning in political principles. In this fundamental and scientific sense it is inseparable from politics. It is, however, not affected by what is popularly called politics, the politics of party programmes and ambitions. To be fruitful and enlightening a study of public administration has to be kept out of party politics. Whatever the party in power and its programme of action may be there is an appropriate administrative structure which alone can be said to conform to the democratic foundations of the state. The analysis of administrative organization proposed to be undertaken in this essay is being offered in criticism or justification of no particular party, here or elsewhere. Nor does it seek to reflect favourably or otherwise on any particular system of economic organization of society. For every state which claims to be democratic in the sense of being based on the freely expressed desire of the people there are certain necessary forms of administrative organization which are indicated as fundamental for its smooth and efficient working under the increasingly complex and changing conditions of modern life. Against the background of experience it is possible to indicate some essentials of democratic administration so that those who believe in democracy may be able to make a deliberate choice in the forms that they favour.

Essentials of Democratic Administration.

Over a large part of the democratic world a regrettable feeling of fatalism has come to possess the minds of the people. The enormous growth in the power and functions of the state, the steady eclipse of the citizen's opportunity either actively to influence the policy of the state or to retain for himself an adequate sphere in which he may live according to his own ideas of freedom and culture, and the gradual removal by the votaries of efficiency of the most significant part of Lincoln's definition of democracy have bewildered not only the common man but also a large proportion of the intelligentsia and their thought-givers. Lincoln defined democracy as government of the people, by the people and for the people. Democracy in the Anglo-Saxon countries still continues to conform in outward forms to this model. But the tendency to treat 'government by the people' as less important than government of, and for the people is even there gaining strength every day. At least for the assured future of democracy this tendency is fatal. In the absence of real opportunity given to the citizen to participate in the forming and execution of policy involved in the task of government, democracies, presidential as well as parliamentary, tend at best to work as benevolent despotisms. Either the overpowering influence of some great event or of a great personality may for a time lull the people into a sense of confidence about the reality and security of their political power. But forms and precedents created by even democratic centres far removed from the life of the people are apt to perpetuate themselves. A reflex effect of the alleged success of authoritarian regimes of admittedly non-democratic character is to strengthen the non-democratic tendencies in democracies themselves. The trend towards authoritarianism within the democratic forms has become so strong that unless the whole complex of the structure of modern administration in the context of the functions of modern governments is analysed from the standpoint of the essential requirements and lasting future of democracy the fatalism about new authoritarian developments is bound to swamp the democratic elements in society. There is no ground for fatalism or indifference in this respect. We must think out principles and forms which will enable democracies to discharge their responsibilities without surrendering their essential characteristics. This has been done in the past, is being done today in a few cases, and the time is both opportune and ripe for a wider synthesis which might guide democratic administrators in all lands.

The new tendency towards increasing the functions of the central administration and towards relying on decrees and directives of government rather than on popular formulation of decisions has exalted the position of the state to an extent inimical to the basic claims of citizens

to democratic freedom. In socialist as well as non-socialist communities this idolatry of the state has reached a point where statism has become almost a new religion. Anybody who suggests an appropriate sharing of authority among constitutionally set up bodies other than the central government is considered a doctrinaire, a dreamer or worse still an anarchist. The pendulum has swung so far to the other extreme from the negative individualism of the nineteenth century that for the restoration of balance between the state and the individual it has become necessary to urge the claims of diversified and decentralized administration. The cult of efficiency can be fatal to democracy, and as has been proved by the fortunes of more than one autocracy in recent times, efficiency itself to be lasting must be based on people's co-operation obtained through reason rather than through fear or greed. The German and the Japanese systems were efficiently organized so far as the mechanics of organization go. But they were so far removed from the co-operation of the common man in framing objectives of policy and modes of administration that in really momentous emergencies they were unable to withstand the pressure of circumstances. By contrast the British system based on more direct contact between the citizen and the government, not only in shaping but also in carrying out policy, withstood the challenge far more successfully. The notion of efficiency in a democratic government must be interpreted neither narrowly nor mechanically. Indeed there are no absolute standards of efficiency anywhere, not even in centralized and authoritative systems. The mechanics of administration has to be fitted into the democratic framework so as to produce the maximum possible efficiency. Democracy must not be sacrificed to alleged notions of efficiency, as these themselves under the stress of modern problems of peace and war would have no validity except on the assumption of the active and whole-hearted co-operation of the people. Only that efficiency which is based on the active and willing co-operation of the people has relevance in a democratic state. Very often when appeals are addressed to the people for their active co-operation what is intended is really their passive co-operation, i. e. they are expected to act as willing agents of state policy which they have not helped in framing. To expect this is not democracy; it is statism. It is essential to democratic administration that associating the people in the process of forming decisions should be treated as an essential requirement of efficiency.

Any other type of co-operation, active or passive, on the part of the people is really not co-operation. There is no common process. It is just conformity, a readiness to fall in ostentatiously and with apparent willingness with the decrees of the powers that be. This subservience is the effect not of reason or of faith but of selfishness or merely of habit. Co-operation must be based on conviction of duty, and in a democracy such a conviction can be real only in so far as a citizen has a feeling that he has contributed to shaping the policy. The other type of co-operation

so much desired by authoritarian rulers is a perverse and corrupt type of conformity. Speaking about recent experience in several states a discriminating author, Dr. Wilhelm Ropke, whose approach to problems of human organization is not just mechanical, but is deeply coloured by sociological and cultural values has observed: "Has there ever been so much lack of character, so little civil courage, so much conformity and cynical opportunism, so many weak knees as in our generation?" Democratic administration cannot be built on the foundation of cynical opportunism. It must be built on the co-operation of the people which is active in both spheres, namely making and carrying out the decisions of the state.

Conformity in place of co-operation is inevitably promoted by the state taking on itself functions much in excess of what it can democratically administer. Herein consists another basic principle of democratic administration which can hardly be overemphasized. The structure of democratic administration must be built from the individual upward, from the ward to the locality, from the locality to the district, from the district to the region, and so on. The presumption in all cases should be in favour of the unit wherein the citizen finds it physically possible to apprehend the practical results of policy and to contribute his view in shaping and carrying it out. In the alternative system, where as a rule all functions vest in central authority people develop the habit which is negative of both political and moral content. They know what they want and their only means of getting it is to ask the government for it. Those who are either more powerful or more designing form what are called pressure groups and make it worth-while of the government to concede their desires. On the other hand the weak and the passive nurse a feeling of helplessness and injustice which is the most fertile ground for the development of extreme creeds of hostility to the state. Considering the financial and personnel resources of the state, as also the state of development of democratic institutions among the people, there is a certain optimum of administrative load that a democratic government can carry according to democratic forms. Priorities of essentials among administrative tasks have therefore to be instituted and even desirable programmes of reform have to be postponed if they cannot be democratically administered.

In all forms of government, democratic or otherwise, a sense of justice among the common body of citizens is essential to stability. That the state is not doing enough for them is a lesser urge to oppose the government than a conviction, or even a suspicion, that the state is favouring unjustly some particular section of the community. In an overloaded administration, overloaded in the sense that functions in excess of what can be democratically administered are undertaken by the government, corruption among the strong and frustration among the weak are naturally promoted. In a sense even the weak are corrupted by a weakening

of their sense of self-reliance and by the urge to claim from the state what they feel has already been unjustly conceded to other sections of the community. That the state has no resources other than those of the community itself is most often forgotten. A claim against the state is but a claim against other sections of the community. Unless the responsibility for making and satisfying the claims is brought home as nearly as possible to the same set of governing organizations the working of these bodies becomes a ramble. The moral respect in which the state is held by the people is the real foundation of its political authority. Losing the moral respect of the people because of its increased susceptibility to charges of injustice as between section and section, a centralized and overloaded administration loses the political loyalty of the people as well. Many democracies, especially the newer ones, have succumbed to internal dissensions and disintegration consequent on the spread of a feeling of injustice and frustration, which may not be altogether justified in all cases, but is real and potent all the same. Unless both the notions, of efficiency and of the functions appropriate to the hierarchy of governing authorities, are made conformable to the democratic process the stability of a democratic constitution cannot be assured.

A feeling of impatience on the part of the central administration at the apparent short-comings of other governing organizations nearer to the life of the people has prompted it in many cases to follow patterns of administration which are subversive of democratic, and even of constitutional government. An essential requirement of constitutional government is the responsibility of all those, officials and non-officials, who administer governmental functions to appropriate representative bodies. Any governmental function discharged without such constitutional responsibility is obviously an unconstitutional act. Even the governments of some of the older democracies are not free from this urge to set up ad hoc bodies of nominated persons who supersede the authority of constituted representative bodies. The quality either of the personnel or of the administration of such ad hoc bodies is irrelevant to the argument, which is based on a vital principle of constitutional government, that all authorities must be constitutionally answerable for their acts. The functioning of these ad hoc bodies, composed of ministerial nominees, is not subject to such constitutional responsibility. They have, it may be supposed, to answer in a general way to the minister or the ministry, that has appointed them. But they have not to render an account of their doings to any representative body which can remove them. The infiltration of extra-constitutional elements in the administrative machinery is naturally more widespread in the newer democracies. Power without responsibility is a threat to democratic government against which freedom-conscious people have revolted. Nothing undermines the legitimacy of state action to a greater extent than the reality or appearance of a system of administration in which public benefits are manipulated to the advantage of the supporters of the government of the day.

Constitutional responsibility of administrative authorities has become a more than usually important issue on account of the waning importance of democratic parliaments. Ever since the extension of the franchise so as to cover practically the entire adult population of the country the importance of the members of parliament as such has suffered. They are no longer chosen as a rule because their constituents consider them to be their trusted leaders, tested by local experience, but because they subscribe to and are backed by the party which on the whole the voters prefer to have in the seat of governmental authority. The party is judged not by reference to its local leader but by reference to its record and promises as a whole and by the top leadership that it offers. The candidates for election have come to turn their gaze from their local supporters to the party leaders at the top. Instead of the parliament making the cabinet, it is the cabinet, comprising top leaders, that makes the parliament. In these altered circumstances of relative balance between a minister and parliament, responsibility to parliament has itself lost much of the significance that it had in older days of comparatively loose party organization. The conditions under which elections are now carried on, particularly in countries where methods of proportional representation are not followed, put a premium on strong majorities in parliament. In a more or less packed legislature of disciplined supporters governments push through heavy programmes of legislative activity. The parliaments have hardly the time, even if they have the inclination, to scrutinize the legislative proposals of government. Even well-established practices, such as the select committee for important and complicated pieces of legislation, have often been dispensed with. Bills by the dozen have been passed at a sitting sometimes without a speech other than the formal proposal by the minister in charge. A legislature which cares, or is able to care, so little for the more responsible work of legislation can easily surrender its less obvious function of administrative scrutiny. During the war the very desire to look too closely into the methods of administration could be construed as unpatriotic and inconvenient meddling with the responsible ministers of state. The war is over but not the spirit of impatience on the part of governments. All these circumstances have made administrative authorities practically immune from legislative scrutiny and responsibility.

Speaking about the efficiency of the central government in the United Kingdom, a well-known authority on public administration, Mr. D. N. Chester, observes: "The cabinet has an unusually large and compact majority in the House of Commons, and this, combined with an unusually large legislative programme, has made the House of Commons a much less effective critic of the Administration. Departments have got away, if not with murder, at least with things which at other times would have caused considerable public discussion. It can hardly be expected that circumstances which enable officers to work with less than normal regard for parliamentary and public opinion will continue for ever. For

another thing it is easy at present to explain so much away by reference to the legacy of the war". In countries where the tradition of parliamentary responsibility of administrators at all levels is of a long standing some favourable turn away from the present oblivion may perhaps take place. Though even in their case the other factors mentioned, besides the war, are likely to act in favour of a diminished responsibility. In countries where traditions of responsibility have yet to be established and where in addition to the war the alleged heritage of a now defunct autocratic power can always be used to explain away inconvenient things the parliamentary responsibility of administrators is likely to be even more tenuous, at least for a long time to come. The increase in the volume and complexity of parliamentary business is a secular trend, and apart from the passing conditions of party majorities it is likely to minimize the real responsibility of administrators to the legislature. All the greater reason, therefore, that in organizing the structure of the administration at all levels no authority having administrative functions should be created which is obviously freed not only from all parliamentary but even from any statutory responsibility. This dictum applies as much to the services as to ad hoc bodies of ministerial nominees. In fact with an increasing amount of delegated legislation which in effect empowers the services to write the law, to administer it and to interpret it a new power behind the throne is coming into being which is even more unapproachable than the throne itself. That the civil service is the real government of the country has been repeatedly stated for the United Kingdom by competent British observers. The underlying tendencies are even more pressing in other countries. It is thus essential that all administrative organizations must be subject to statute and must provide for internal and immediate responsibility to the people affected by the actions of each important authority.

Public administration in a democracy has to conform to three sets of principles. Like all organizations designed to achieve a purpose administrative organization has to abide by general principles of organization and management which are common to governmental as well as non-governmental organizations. In so far as governmental organizations have any special features common to democratic as well as non-democratic forms, and differing from non-governmental organizations, democratic administration must possess these. But over and above all the essential attributes of public administration a democratic public administration must be guided by the special requirements emphasized above. To recapitulate, (1) efficiency of administration in a democracy includes and is promoted by widespread opportunities given to the citizens to participate in the making and execution of governmental decisions; (2) when the choice is between doing a function undemocratically and not doing it at all, the latter alternative must as a rule be preferred; in other words the functions of a democratic state should be limited to those which can be democratically administered; (3) in building the admini-

strative structure the individual and his immediate locality should be the base ; higher structures should be resorted to only for such functions as are essential to the safety and welfare of the community, but cannot be administered by local democratic organizations and can be better administered by higher democratic authorities ; and (4) no administrative function should be vested in authorities who are not statutorily answerable for their actions. While it is not possible within manageable limits to pass in review the entire system of public administration in a democracy with a view to ascertain its conformity to these principles an attempt will be made in the present essay to indicate some of the chief features of modern democratic administration in respect of which reformist action along these principles is urgently called for.

Habit and Tradition

The chequered history of human civilization gives the lie direct to the overriding claims of the biological factor in the evolution of human society. The doctrine of race superiority has been repeatedly exploded. The advance of science and the close integration of the nations of the world have made it possible for people of different races to live under similar environmental circumstances and to imbibe the same knowledge and ideas. A change in environment and a change in ideas have been found to alter the capacities and attitudes of people. Englishmen coming to India as a privileged class developed despotic habits and tendencies, while Indians living under the new and more equalitarian conditions, and learning the modern sciences and liberal arts of the West developed into ardent supporters of democracy and equality. The change in either case may not have been as complete and as widespread as to alter the character of the whole people, but it is significant enough to prove the thesis that it is more scientific and more realistic to build our political institutions on the doctrine of sociological and historical relativity than on that of unalterable biological or anthropological traits. Even the latter have their importance, but with every advance of civilization the less permanent and more flexible social factors become more and more significant. Both because we are most intimately associated with it, as also because of its inherent characteristics, the evolution of Indian society in respect of its political habits and traditions is deserving of close study. The wider relevance of this study consists in ascertaining what habits and traditions are helpful, if not actually essential, to the successful working of a democratic constitution, and whether there is reason to believe that given the environment and the will such traditions and habits can be developed among people who lack them.

As with the claims of racial superiority, so also with the superior claims to political capacity of particular nations, it has often been an argument from result to cause, not from cause to result. The claim of the Nazis to superior virtues of Aryan blood was modified to admit the Japanese as cousins, so long as the latter appeared to wage a successful war. The doctrine in practice amounted to saying that 'Top dogs are Aryans', not that 'Aryans are Top dogs'. Such a doctrine is the negation of a doctrine. Similarly, towards the end of the nineteenth century when democracies seemed to be fairly set in Western Europe and North America many English and American writers put up a claim that only the Teutonic races have superior political talent. What they would have said about some of the Teutonic peoples whose democratic institutions have failed so badly in recent years, or of Russia, which

certainly cannot be accused of lacking in political talent, it is not difficult to imagine. It would, in all probability, be another version of the Nazi claim to Aryan superiority being shifted from unsuccessful to successful peoples in turn. Traditions are indeed necessary to administer any social system in its natural and normal form. As the rules of a game have a meaning and a justification only so long as they are read and followed in the true spirit of the game, so also, a political constitution can work smoothly if it is worked in the proper spirit. Tradition, which is accumulated habit, consolidates this spirit. Those who started the practice earlier and kept at it long develop more of the habit and build a tradition, though even these, as mentioned in an earlier section, occasionally find the challenge of new circumstances too strong for the preservation of the old tradition and even of the old rules.

A study of democratic governments and their practice is useful only in so far as it throws light on the essential attitudes towards the problems of the state and the law of the constitution which it is necessary to have if democratic forms of public administration are to be preserved and made to yield that support to free existence in society which is their principal justification. With what amount of care for their relativity to time and circumstance these much canvassed traditions have to be understood will be clear from the following cases. The English people, who have hitherto made the best success of democracy, especially of that form which is called Parliamentary, and which has been accepted as a choice by the political leaders of India, have been described as impatient of authority and as having in a rich measure the capacity willingly and wholeheartedly to follow their chosen leaders. And yet the sphere of submission to public authority has been constantly growing in England. The over-all and integrated controls of the war period have not yet been completely removed and the pursuit of socialistic policies on the part of the Labour government is creating new restrictions of authority. As for following their chosen leaders Churchill was thrown over almost summarily and Prime Minister Attlee was only recently let down in the Commons over the Palestine issue. But the very fact that such instances are rare and that the circumstances in which they occur are of exceptionally grave nature only emphasize the claim that the people at large, and even their representatives in the Commons, cannot just be taken for granted. This habit reflects favourably on the British people's capacity to reconcile their love of freedom with their respect for authority. For the Germans it has been said that they respect public officers, but have a poor opinion of their politicians. Hitler, however, was no officer. He was a politician, of a sort. The Germans followed him through worse straits than they ever had done under any officer of the Empire. Still it is true that the common citizen in Germany became a willing follower of Hitler after he had attained to office. The Slavs, who people the biggest and one of the two really powerful states in the world today, have in the past been described as having little interest in politics in normal times, but as possessing

the capacity for patriotic self-sacrifice in an emergency. It is open to doubt whether the Soviet system of economy would work with an uninterested complement of people, though their political forms would naturally thrive on that alleged trait of national character.

India has made its choice of a democratic form, for the most part of the parliamentary type. As it is not the purpose of this essay to deal with the constitutional structure at high levels we need not stop to analyse the relevancy and the propriety of several so called special features that have been added to the parliamentary model. As has been said earlier this task has been attempted by others. But if the constitution is to be democratic in essence, and substantially parliamentary in form, it is of the utmost importance to find out whether for working public administration under its aegis the appropriate habits and traditions obtain in this country. For this purpose a dip in the remote past is hardly worth while, especially in view of the remarks made earlier about the essentially environmental and flexible character of the traditions of a people. The ancient tradition in India, as in almost all other countries where democracies have been established in modern times, has been monarchical. The personal qualities of the monarch have played a more important part in India, than say in Great Britain, on account of the lack of any institutionalized political power between him and the organized village communities. These last were more in evidence in the South which had a comparatively peaceful stretch of history than in the North. The guilds of merchants and caste organizations were the only other institutions which mitigated the absolute power of the individual monarch. The monarchs themselves seem to have rarely bothered about the personal or economic life of their subjects. Such latitudinarian attitude of rulers went well with the lack of extensive political interest on the part of the people, and no political institutions of the people having a territorial significance beyond the village seem to have flourished. Beyond the community of traders there was hardly any middle-class. There must have been gradations of income and wealth certainly, but excepting a few areas there was no strongly entrenched middle-class with a political consciousness and organization to play the role of a buffer and an interpreter between the sovereign and the common people. Beyond the village communities, where they existed, there is really very little in our remote past to base any positive judgment about political aptitude and tradition. With the exception of occasional edicts and firmans issued by monarchs even the process of law-making as such had yet to be born.

The survival of village communities as corporate organizations till the British government purposefully, almost callously, contributed to their disintegration speaks volumes for the capacity of the common man, in the areas where they flourished, for not only submitting to common rule in the promotion of common interest but of actively contributing to the making and enforcement of the rule. For all the other features of a

developed political consciousness and capacity we must start with the period of British occupation. Numerous Indian writers, Mr Gokhale amongst them, have repeatedly called attention to the dwarfing effect of the system of British Indian administration. In no department of administrative and political activity had Indians an opportunity to rise to their fullest stature. In pre-British days India had produced great soldiers, administrators and statesmen. Under the British rule there was no opportunity, certainly no free, equal and adequate opportunity, for such talent to develop. But this overall loss of high political talent ought not to blind us to the more widespread opportunities offered during the British period. There was a good deal of leveling down, but there was also a good deal of leveling up. The common status of the Indian citizen before the law, the system of an impersonal administration of laws, the formulation of non-personal municipal law on a purely juridical basis—all these had in them seeds of political advancement which were not slow in growth. When with the diffusion of modern scientific and liberal education ideas of common and civilized political existence began to take root they were naturally of the pattern of British liberal philosophers, who then dominated political thought not only in England but over a large part of the civilised world. With the freedom guaranteed by law and with ideas of a liberal government of the nation political organization took natural and easy root. In several parts of the country political associations advocating political reform and helping citizens in the removal of their grievances were formed and continued to function with a vigour and capacity that would have done credit even to citizens of established democracies.

The formation of national associations for political purposes dates from 1884 when the Indian National Congress was founded. It was no mere coincidence that enlightened Englishmen familiar with India took a leading part in organising the premier political body of the nation. Even the head of the state, though not openly participating in the activities of the Congress, was known to have sympathies with the new move. Since then the number of national, regional and sectional organizations devoted to propagating political creeds and organising mass support for them have increased almost without number. While the British government of India was disinclined to take any active part in the economic development of the country, indeed while it was only too ready to check Indian industrial progress if it appeared to conflict with foreign, especially British interests, its generally non-interfering policy and the peaceful conditions that it ensured contributed to considerable modernising of the economy. The system of transport and the judicial system helped the process. A new middle class consisting of state servants, professional men, and persons engaged in modern business of all types was brought into being. The political ideas of this class, which steadily percolated, mostly through the vernacular press, to the other sections of the community were taken either directly from British sources or from

their new Indian variants. It was an act of enlightened statesmanship on the part of the British rulers first to start deliberately the system of modern education, then to initiate a vowedly political organization of the people, and lastly to admit them by stages to influence and power in the councils of government at the local, provincial and national levels. There have been several dark patches in the history of Indo-British relations into which it is not necessary for our present purpose to enter. But two things are clear. Our association with the British gave to the country that unity, that system of equal laws, those ideas of free citizenship and of representative government which have become part of our national heritage. It is wrong to suppose that the values involved in these possessions are cherished only in the cities and by the educated classes. Under the impact of modern economic life and the activities of the several political associations these have now permeated large sections of the countryside as well.

There is, no doubt, much further work to be done in consolidating and spreading the gospel of nationhood, equality and freedom. But progress along these lines has already gone so far that further advance along the same path will be less difficult than an attempt at retracing the steps and striking a different path. The economic unity of the country, more and more emphasized every day, the progress towards universal literacy and the conferment of a vote for all representative bodies on all adult citizens can only be harmonized in a fully democratic system of government. While the British did much to create an equalitarian and active political tradition in the country, by the exigencies of their position as a foreign government, with an exploitative motive, they deliberately left some things undone, and did some others in a manner not helpful to genuine democratic government. Maintenance of peace was their major objective, and to do this most efficiently and economically a highly centralized system of administration was found to be desirable. This tradition of centralization, so harmful to a real experience of democracy by the people of a vast continent, never really abated under British rule. In fact even today we are definitely the victims of a tradition of centralization which in an indigenous form would deny adequate local freedom to the individual. This centralization was a deliberate act of choice on the part of the British. By sheer inaction and withdrawal of recognition they allowed our local institutions to die out. In a land of villages autonomous institutions in rural areas would indeed have constituted points of resistance to centralized power. The British knew this and willingly acquiesced in their extinction. Shorn of tradition and power the process of their resurrection is proving more than ordinarily difficult. In the meanwhile new forms of governmental and administrative policy, to some of which reference will be found in several places in this essay, are being followed which, unless they are modified in time, will act as impediments in the way of our democratic existence.

Village self-government and personal contact between the administrator and the citizen are the two traditions of our remote past which we can with advantage carry into our present and future life. The tradition of centralization, of exploitation, and of economic indifference set by the British must be definitely abandoned in whatever degree or form these may be still found amongst us. On the other hand the tradition of equality before the law, of the rule of law, of active political life, of representative government, and of the best parliamentary traditions of obedience to self-made law retaining the freedom to change it by means provided by the constitution—this essentially democratic tradition so valued as an aid to civilized life must not only be preserved but more extensively and constructively developed. India's experience and efforts in this respect are likely to have far-reaching effects not only on its own people but on the people of several other countries whose feet are being placed on the democratic highway of civilization for the first time. In preserving and developing these traditions the establishment and working of a democratic system of administration is bound to play a vital role. As a means of vitalising these ideas and of nursing them for the functioning of higher political bodies the administrative system must be designed and worked in conformity with them. The experience of all past governments in India, not excluding the British, proves one thesis beyond the shadow of a doubt. A despotic and efficient government may conceivably work here, as did the British, for a long while, though even the British as much by necessity as by choice, had to set in motion currents of decentralization and popularization which ultimately engulfed their system. A weak government if it is genuinely democratic may also hope to last for a long time, as witness the career of our village communities. Even a non-democratic government if it severely limits both its functions and burdens may last for a fairly long period, as can be seen from the history of several indigenous states. But a government which is at once despotic, that is, not genuinely democratic, and is also not sufficiently efficient, and still attempts to regulate the life of the people will never last long. In view of the dependence of efficiency in modern administration on the willing and active support of the people, this leaves us only with one alternative if we care for political stability—a democratic state with a democratic administration.

IV

Balance in Social Organization.

The state has been defined as a community organized for law. A purely political interpretation of the term law would confine its scope to the dictates of the political sovereign and make coercive enforcement by the state the essential character of laws. This interpretation, however, is too narrow to fit into the varied forms of social organization which have spontaneously been created in society. By the side of the organization of the political state functioning through governmental agencies have flourished a number of other social organizations catering for the religious, social, economic and cultural needs of the community. What is common to all these organizations, including the governmental, is the associated life of the people. It is the extent and purpose of the particular association that explains and justifies the instruments of its operation. Any superiority that the state may claim among social organizations can only be justified by reference to the extent of its activity and the purposes for which the activity is undertaken. That the state is the sole possessor and distributor of the coercive powers of society does not constitute a claim to superiority. In fact morally it is a detraction from the claim to superiority. Organizations which discharge important social functions with the help of non-coercive sanctions are inherently superior to the state in this respect. And those who care for human civilization as a process of advancing the free development of personality should aim at exhausting all the possibilities of such non-political organizations before calling in the state with its guns to administer a function. Even for the state itself, which can never really act normally with the use of force, but must act with the wholesome fear of the same, developing non-political associations among the people, which by limiting the coercive responsibilities of the state help in their more efficient discharge, ought to have a convincing appeal.

A distinction must clearly be drawn between the state as meaning an organized community and the governmental machine organizing only such activities as need to be promoted by coercive power. The organized society, which is really the state, is a much bigger and wider notion than the government. For the government, which is an organization of force, to arrogate to itself all the functions of social organization is to deny the moral and cultural foundations of society. The concept of democracy is based on these very moral and cultural foundations. Hence public administration in a democracy must not deal exclusively with governmental activity. A tolerance, indeed an active promotion, of appropriate social groups having their own law, call them constitution and rules if you like, for administering common functions must be treated as not

only a legitimate but a necessary principle of social organization in a democracy. The pattern of such organizations, as indeed that of the governmental organizations themselves, may vary in keeping with time and circumstance. An activity may be transferred from the governmental to the non-governmental sector, and vice-versa, according as the need for coercive sanctions becomes less or more obvious. In fact there can be several mixed patterns where one or the other element is more in evidence. The definition of functions and adjustment of procedure will in each instance have to be guided by the requirements of the case. Some of these will be referred to in a later part of this essay. But it is of the utmost importance to realize in any attempt at organizing the administration of public affairs in a democracy that governmental organizations, or purely governmental organizations, are not the only forms through which the administration must be promoted. A balance must be secured between the purposes and extent of the activity on the one hand, and the organization and method of its discharge on the other. Too many democratic organizations have come to grief by ignoring the value and importance of non-governmental social organizations.

In a society in which social status and power are very largely determined by economic possession democratic life, apart from any considerations of social and economic justice, would require for its normal working a balance in economic possession and power as well. The unchecked development of capitalism has been justly compared with conditions prevailing under medieval feudalism. The bigger land-owners dominated through their economic power the lives of their less endowed or land-less fellowmen. In industrial capitalism the bigger capitalists have come to dominate the life of less substantial citizens and of persons without any capital. These unequal conditions create unequal opportunities for influencing one's own life and the collective decisions that affect it. Any process by which this centralization of economic power can be arrested and turned back so as to produce conditions of greater equality of possession and power must be welcomed in a democracy. Whether by greater centralization, in fact by a complete centralization in the hands of the state, conditions of equality helpful to freedom would be created is a point on which much, very much, has been written and said. The battle royal is still raging strong among the protagonists of a collectivist and of a liberal state. As the controversy in its detailed argument is extraneous to our purposes no extensive reference to it is necessary in this place. Judging, however, from the incidents of the supersession of political feudalism by a centralized political power, in which equality of status was assured but freedom was not achieved until it was won by further struggles, it is permissible to doubt that the economic equality and freedom which are necessary for the democratic life of the people can be obtained in a collectivist state. It is equality of possession, not an equality of non-possession, that is indicated as an

aid to freedom. If such an equality can be ensured political democracies may not have to pass through the stage of at least a temporary eclipse of their existence which seems to be inseparable from collectivism.

In the context of maintaining a balance of social organization it would appear to be even more obvious that if the state comes to possess all economic along with all political power it indeed becomes a Leviathan, a totalitarian corporation having the occasion and the means of dominating the lives of all the people subject to its power. Not only are the moral foundations of such a state always in doubt, but as it can only work through state agency, that is through bureaucratic methods, the common man, as a free agent, can have little opportunity to influence the making and carrying out of decisions affecting his own life. For a choice, therefore, conditions of economic equality in a democracy must be brought about by an equalization and dispersal of economic power, not by its social concentration. Too much economic power in the hands of the state is a constant danger to the freedom of the individual, even more real than that of too much power in the hands of the capitalist with freely associated labour able to influence decisions by its collective action. To the extent to which dispossession of private capitalists is thought to be socially necessary the administration of the economic functions of society thus rendered obligatory should be entrusted to non-political associations, with suitable safeguards for all the sections of the community affected by their operations. In the meanwhile, and at all times, the effort of a democratic society should be to distribute as widely and equally as possible the means to contribute effectively to the political as well as the economic aspects of the citizen's life in the community.

In view of totalitarian tendencies, that is tendencies to acquire control on the part of the state over all the aspects of the life of a citizen, the following extract from the writings of Tocqueville, the famous political philosopher, might bear reproduction : " Government should not be the only active power : association ought in democratic nations to stand in lieu of those powerful private individuals whom the equality of conditions has swept away. If men are to remain civilized the art of associating together must grow and improve." In India's past there have been cases of financial magnates influencing state action. Even now there are some who exercise an appreciable influence over state policy. There are hardly any instances in recorded history, however, to show that this influence was exercised other than in their own interest, in the interest of the liberties and fortunes of the common man. In the Indian tradition, the sage or the wise man of piety has occasionally played such a beneficent role in ancient as well as in modern times. But this is not what democracy is built on. The wise man or even the powerful financier patriotically in-

clined at best mitigates autocracy, often by counter autocracy. They do not create conditions favourable to democracy. These have to be created along lines indicated by Tocqueville. We need not take the existing tendencies towards totalitarianism as inexorable or natural forces beyond our control. They constitute a challenge to our creativeness and capacity for social organization. While all the adaptations and new creations of social institutions that would be necessary as foils and supplements to state action cannot be subsumed in the purposes of this essay those which fall within the scope of public administration will be indicated in pages that follow.

from democracy. Order and purely mechanical efficiency, even granting that the latter is realized in all cases, is at the cost of liberty, that is positive opportunities for the citizens more easily to affect policy.

Centralization has to be severely scrutinized and kept at a minimum for other important reasons as well. Authority operating from above tends to be burdensome in more than one way. Lacking the active co-operation of the people it has to be operated through an elaborate administrative machinery which is costly. The cost of the process is itself felt as a burden, whether it really is burdensome or no, as for instance in the case of an enhanced educational cess where education is centrally administered. As all restraint is irksome, restraints administered by authorities far removed from the people are even more irksome. Even the best-intentioned and most civic minded among the people have lesser opportunities to know the rationale of many aspects of policy, not having had an opportunity of either contributing to, or keeping in touch with the discussions, if any, that lead up to the adoption of the policy. From lack of understanding to misunderstanding, and from misunderstanding to passive or active hostility the progress of public opinion is rapid. That in many cases the central authorities in deciding on policy have been ignorant of local conditions and sentiments adds apparent justification to such recalcitrant feelings. As mentioned earlier the tradition of Indian administration under the British was particularly faulty in this respect, and the comparative ease with which feeling could be worked up against their administration by singling out real or imaginary acts of omission and commission is a good reminder of the evil potentialities of centralized administration. The experience of other countries, be they the newer democracies in Europe or the older monarchies as that of the Bourbons in France, is similar. As contrasted with the sound, broad-based pyramidal structure of democracy, centralized administration of even a democratic state tends to have no more balance than an inverted pyramid or cone. The inherent weakness of all centralized administration has been further accentuated by the ever-increasing number of functions that modern governments attempt and the several points of intimate personal life at which they touch the citizen. Modern democracies, both on account of their claims to active popular support and their ever expanding functions ought to beware even more than the avowedly autocratic states of older days lest centralization estrange them from the people on whose support their power is based.

In every society, howsoever homogenous its racial composition and its cultural traits may be, some conflicts of interest, opinion and even sentiment are bound to develop on several issues. Such disharmonies cannot be avoided in social life, howsoever well organized. By leaving as many things to local organizations as possible the extent of such disharmonies can be narrowed down. They may be reconciled by an

exchange of local opinion without endangering the harmony and unity of the whole state. On the other hand, by taking most things under their immediate authority centralized administrations invite the formulation of these disharmonies on a national level, emphasizing them more, and thus endangering the stability of administration. Failing to resolve the disharmonies and faced with the strong unrest that they engender centralized governments take extra-ordinary powers to themselves in a vain effort to suppress them. If centralization were to resolve a disharmony which cannot be locally reconciled the process would be justifiable, in fact it would be a beneficent use of democratic organization on a large scale. But where the centralized administration itself is led on to an attempt only to suppress it the very foundations of the state might eventually be shaken. As with functions generally, so with regard to functions involving deep seated disharmonies of interest and culture, it is best to remodel lower units of administration wherein these disharmonies are minimised, and leave to these units the maximum possible sphere of governmental action. This way lies the preventive treatment of the disease of social disharmony from which since antiquity many otherwise viable states have suffered mortally.

The experience of several countries who have more or less successfully managed democratic administration is very helpful in assessing the relative strengths of the centralized and decentralized states as solvents of disharmonies. In the United Kingdom and the United States, except for some recent tendencies of war-time origin, almost the entire administration has been left to local units. Even today as a general rule the central British Administration has no agency of its own in the country outside London. Whatsoever laws the Parliament may pass, administration is mostly local. There is a double advantage in the process. Not only are the people organized in their district, borough or county, councils conscious of sharing important powers of administration, but their opinion based on first-hand experience of administering policies counts for a good deal in shaping and reshaping the policies themselves. The credit for relative stability of democratic forms in England, the American Union, the Scandinavian countries and most of the British Dominions is in large measure due to localization of administration. In Canada, which is a democracy composed of two nations, the French and the British, the disharmonies which are inherent and which once threatened the unity of the state under a centralized administration, have now been shorn of their potency for political evil by regionalizing the two nations, and by localising the administration. In the United States even the war-time structure of central powers and administration is being rapidly dismantled and the secular trend in American administrative tradition, that of leaving things to state and local authorities, is being reestablished.

In view of the changes in economic organization and of defence requirements centralized administration in many spheres is becoming

necessary even in these countries. But in all cases an attempt is made to see that the central government does not presume to act as a superior government, but works in harmony with and as far as possible through the instrumentality of local governments. Taking a lesson from certain incidents during the first Roosevelt Administration, when the Federal Government assumed powers extending to several fields of economic regulation, and later went to the extent of packing the Supreme Court in support of its policy, the State Governments, and the Tax Administrations have now formed themselves into National Associations in support of the claims to autonomy of State and Local governments. By influencing opinion within and outside Congress in support of maximum local autonomy the trends towards centralization are being resisted. This incidentally is an instance not only of a strong tradition of autonomy asserting itself, but of the capacity of the American people to build institutions so as to meet the challenge of new forces that threaten it. These organizations are naturally non-party and thus the reality of the claims of local administrations is more emphasized. In Great Britain while on the one hand state socialism is adding to the functions of the central government a far-reaching reform of local administration is being planned so as to make it a more serviceable and an efficient agent of local as well as national policies. Of this some thing will be said in the next section of this essay, but the narration of these developments in countries having comparatively stable and successful democracies would show up the unwisdom of promoting centralization in a new democratic constitution, and of the need to organize local units so as to minimize disharmonies and to leave them the maximum possible functions of public administration.

This discussion about the evils of centralization in a democracy has an obvious bearing on the new democratic constitution that is being evolved for this country, and the appropriate administrative structure to give full effect to the real purposes of the same. India, as has been mentioned earlier, has a strong tradition of centralization inherited from the days of British rule. Even before that time centralization was the keynote of governmental organization, only the paucity of means to implement centralized power permitted local isolation which helped some localization of the administration. That even then the real inadequacy and frustration inherent in that system was well recognized by the common man is borne out by the well-known saying: "Dehli Dur Ast." "Delhi is far away." The common man was thoroughly estranged from and indifferent to happenings in the seat of government. That the common man's instinct in all countries is unerring as to essential judgment on facts of his experience is proved by a similar saying regarding Czarist Russia, about which a Russian tag runs: "The Czar is far away and the sky is high." It must be said, however, for the Czarist government in Russia, and for the British and pre-British empires in India that they neither claimed to have been based on the expressed wishes of the people nor did

they try to reform or meddle with the people's life, save as an exception. As has been observed earlier, even they, however, failed to survive the advance of modern science and economy. In the new Indian constitution which is based on the adult suffrage of the people, and which contains a very ambitious programme of social and economic reform, all the conditions inimical to the success of a centralized administration are prominently included. A corollary of a democratic political constitution is a thorough decentralization of administration. If this is not realized in time the Indian democracy may assuredly look forward to stormy times ahead.

There are several obvious reasons for stating this view. There are some inherent and some developed disharmonies in the complex population structure of the land. Many Indian and foreign observers have noted on these. But there is a school of wishful thinkers who persist in looking upon these observers as reactionaries, or even as enemies of the Indian state. If only they were to realize the universal character of this problem of social disharmonies in a democracy, from which hardly any democracy in the world is free, a more realistic and, for the country, a more hopeful outlook would be induced in them. The communal differences in India are not confined to Hindu-Muslim relations. If it were so the problem would be comparatively easy of solution. There are scores of communities in India who do not necessarily wish ill to one another but only desire to be free to order their lives in their own way, so long as they do not come in the way of other communities doing the same. Such a feeling is at least at this stage of the progress of our civilization natural. It does not constitute a barrier either to evolving and maintaining Indian nationhood or to the working of democratic institutions in India. It is a condition of our democratic life and we must find institutional means to provide for it without detriment to the cause of Indian unity and of democracy. In many cases the communal or sectional differences are more or less territorially defined. In this case communal disharmonies merge into territorial disharmonies as well. In addition to these somewhat deep-rooted differences there are apparently minor differences of cultural and even psychological habits, some may even call them idiosyncracies, which divide the population into mutually non-cooperative groups, like the non-competing groups better known to economists. It may be that at some time in future these disharmonies will vanish, most probably to be replaced by new ones which might cut across the existing ones. It is permissible to hope for this and even to work for this. But it will be extremely unhelpful to the cause of democracy in India to ignore these at the present stage. Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof, and the political evil today is not that these disharmonies exist but that they are not adequately provided for in the political and administrative structure.

It is obviously easier to be united under an autocracy than under a democracy. In the former people are either passively united or are actively associated in a common objective which automatically exhausts itself by its attainment. When it comes to the normal sharing in the powers and functions of democracy it is only the actual experience of sharing authority and of implementing the policies that citizens care for, which would give them a sense of oneness. In the sphere of political unity psychological and cultural considerations have often been at least as powerful as more material ones, such as defence and economic welfare. A democratic state in India would be most unnecessarily and unwisely handicapping itself by delaying or postponing a more natural formation of constituent states than what the present provinces offer. Such a reorganization is an urgent and first necessity for the success of democratic administration in India. This is the only way to resolve and reconcile as well as is democratically possible the obvious disharmonies that are today an impediment to democratic administration, because democratic administration is being attempted in disregard of them. Provide for them within democratic organization; they will then be localized as similar disharmonies have done in other lands, and the resultant units, freed of a complex of suppression, will contribute their share of the rights and responsibilities at higher levels of administration.

Another very obvious line of reorganization of Indian administration in keeping with the newly adopted principle of democracy is to lay the ghost of a Curzon that still stalks the central seat of governmental authority in India. The description is not with reference to the person of the celebrated Viceroy, but with reference to the system of a completely centralized administration that he evolved for the purposes of that type of benevolent Imperialism that he represented. For his purposes he found the system of directors-general and directors, of inspectors-general and inspectors, all ultimately answering to him, both efficient and economical. The will to be done was a Curzon's will, and everybody else was an instrument of that will, whether he was operating at head quarters or in a distant village. All functions, though even at their widest they were just a fraction of what governments in India are now attempting, were ultimately subject to one will, the will of the man who presided at the centre. All the nation's resources were dispensable at his will, the provincial governments when it came to as how-down being no more than glorified subordinates of the Viceroy. All this must naturally change in a democratic context. The will is of the people's, not of the people in the mass, but of individual citizens conscious of their needs, of the burdens that they bear, and of the ways in which they think the latter may be made to serve the former better. They are now endowed with the constitutional right to choose their governors and legislators and to say how the latter will serve them. In these circumstances it is wasteful and unwise to retain at the central headquarters such a multiplicity of functions, and such vestiges of directive authority as are still

We can only have such efficiency as the people throw up in elections. This is the only known method of securing services of policy makers in a democracy. By experience they might learn better, or might devise institutional means to strengthen themselves with efficient aids of their choice. The process of passing down to local authorities almost all the functions of a routine administrative character, the police, revenue, agriculture, education upto the end of compulsory stage at any rate public works other than provincial, and some others which can be easily thought of, may take some time. Considerations of responsibility for the safety and stability of the state may indicate the urgent need of caution. All this is easily understood and readily acquiesced in. But what can neither be understood nor justified is a claim that democratic administration of such big areas as an average province can be built on the assumption of the inherent incapacity of our local bodies to bear responsibility for important functions of government. This claim, if true, would be fatal to our other claim that we can govern ourselves democratically. It is too early to judge of the normal efficiency of our central and provincial governments. At present both at ministerial and service levels they are manned by persons who have gained their experience under the older system, among other places of responsibility in the local bodies themselves. But if they now shy at making our local bodies centres of democratic administration of as many functions as possible they are, as sure as anything can be sure, creating circumstances which will pull down the efficiency of even provincial governments to the level which they now decry in local bodies. If we cannot make a success of democratic self-government in our municipalities and districts, we shall not have any democratic government in the country at all. A centralized government cannot by its very nature be democratic.

It is needless to repeat the many arguments outlined in the earlier part of this section showing the inherent incompatibility between centralization and democracy. We must by gradual steps dis-establish the democratically unjustifiable portion of the central and provincial administrations and clothe local bodies at all levels with appropriate functions of government. Policy in many cases may have to be settled on higher levels, but administration must be a local responsibility in almost all cases. Thus alone the citizen can be made responsible both for efficiency and benefit. A more detailed outline of the reorganization of local governing bodies in keeping with changing requirements of democratic life in this and other countries will be attempted in the next section. But for this as also other democracies the common principle of democratic administration that it should in essence be a building from below, not an insertion from above, must be considered to be almost obligatory.

deep-rooted in any political experience realistically obtained, nor were these sobered or systematized by an acquired sense of responsibility. Competent students of modern democracies have listed the fear of responsibility as one of the specific diseases to which inexperienced democracies are prone. The only way in which the enfranchized citizens of a democracy can be trained to a high degree of maturity and responsibility is by interesting them actively in the working of local bodies having an organization which brings them as near the life of each citizen as possible and allots to them important functions of administration so that the interest aroused and the experience gained may be of a high order. It is a pity that in India, where the only heritage of corporate and substantially popular government that we possess is in our village communities, local government should have lost its appeal not only to the common people, who for the most part have forgotten the older traditions, but also to those on whom lies the responsibility of building the foundations of our new democracy. Nobody underestimates the difficulties, even the risks, involved in a rapid decentralization of administrative functions. But, as mentioned earlier, for the preservation of genuine democratic sentiment, for promoting political maturity among the people, for instilling in them a sense of public responsibility, and for ensuring the stability of the democratic state a systematic rebuilding of local government has become urgently necessary in all countries having a democratic constitution.

A reformation of local administration must embrace all its significant aspects. For several good and compelling reasons it has become necessary to review our ideas as to the suitable areas to constitute units of local administration. A local government unit which had an integrity of its own when the bullock cart or the horse tonga was the only common means of communication cannot answer to altered conditions created by improved motor, rail and air transport. The process of civic integration of large areas has been directly promoted by improved transport and the unit of urban as well as rural organization has now to be remodelled on a larger scale. Transport, by itself and through its influence on economic life, has joined the material interests of several adjoining areas, rural as well as urban, in such a strong manner that keeping them apart in local administration leads to the sacrifice of the legitimate claims of the weaker units. As will be observed in a later part of this section, at the best of times local administrations have to work under serious financial strain. The larger and more self-sufficient the unit of local administration it can hope to have more financial resources than would be the case otherwise. The prospect of securing, both among councillors and officers, a better type of talent and experience is also more hopeful in a bigger than in a smaller unit. For all these reasons, which to some extent are valid for almost all democracies, a redrawing of the boundaries of local government units has become desirable.

Recently a Public Commission was appointed in Great Britain for the purpose of suggesting alterations in the boundaries and structure of local bodies in that country. Apart from details, which are valid for that country alone, the general trend of its recommendations is in favour of having larger units wherein the life of urban areas will be treated as a part of the life of their natural hinterlands. Some or all of the reasons for enlarging the units noted above have acted as justification for this recommendation. But there is another reason justifying the same course which has been prominently discussed in connection with the Boundary Commission's report. This has a vital bearing on the discussion of basic principles attempted in this essay. In view of the fact that many local government units are small and comparatively resourceless and that they have lost conformity with new facts of territorial homogeneity the administration of several new functions, of war time defence and of peacetime social security, have either been handed over to newly created ad hoc bodies or are being directly administered by the central government through departmental agency. This encroachment on the autonomy of the local bodies is not only seriously resented by them, but they and their citizens see in the new tendencies possibilities of centralization and bureaucratic rule which they hate as being un-British. In India the district, which is the unit of our rural administration, has never really had any inherent homogeneity. The towns and cities in which local government was initiated, more or less as an experiment and as a sop to political sentiment, have long ceased to be coterminous with the natural boundaries of their civic life. In India, as in other countries a review of the boundaries of our local government units have become necessary no less on account of the political principle of local autonomy than on account of the obvious considerations of administrative efficiency.

Like all territorial reorganizations the enlargement of local government areas is also attended by special problems of administrative structure. The principal problem is, of course, the one most vital to democratic organization. The larger the unit of administration the lesser the opportunity for direct participation on the part of citizens, which is really the principal political justification of local government. This inherent drawback of big areas, otherwise considered as desirable units, can only be removed by a further subsidiary organization of smaller localities within the bigger units. To use a phrase that has gained much currency in similar discussions regarding British local government, instead of the present single-tier system with small areas as units, we must have a two-tier system with appropriately bigger units. The two-tiers or decks are naturally not of the same extent and importance. The overall policy and finance will naturally be vested in the body covering the whole unit, but in respect of the administration of such functions as are likely to be more efficiently and more democratically administered on a smaller scale committees of smaller localities should be set up. Ward or

neighbourhood committees in cities, and village or taluka committees in rural parts answer to this description. The universally bewailed lack of interest in civic affairs, even with present areas, can be partially counter-acted by this means. For instance having education committees and public amenities committees in the several wards of a city, comprising not only councillors from the ward but also some other co-opted members from the area, is bound to help in promoting efficiency as well as public interest. The need for a two-tier administration becomes all the more desirable and necessary if we appreciate the importance of terminating as soon as possible the unnatural separation of the urban centres from their surrounding rural parts. Urban centres have a life of metropolitan character which is really based on their contacts with the surrounding hinterland. It is improper and undesirable to keep the two mutually separated. The problem cannot be solved simply by extending the area covered by a municipal corporation, as thereby the separate identity of smaller units, engulfed within the corporation, and their sense of autonomy in their own sphere, are violated. Along with extension of area of a corporation the second tier, that of ward or neighbourhood organization must be brought into being. Thus alone local government can be really local, otherwise the same inevitable problems of centralization will have to be faced in regard to local government as usually arise in central administrations.

Within the area outside the really big cities the institution of a class of smaller municipalities is extremely harmful to the prospects of a viable local government in those areas. Areas outside municipal limits lacking in the material and personnel resources, which have a tendency to be attracted to urban centres, tend to have weak and inefficient administrations. Their inevitable weakness is made a ground for denying to them a share in more important functions. The whole foundation of local government must be laid on a common rural-cum-urban formation organized on a two tier system as herein outlined. These units will be better endowed and more homogeneous and can be made progressively to share in all the important tasks of administration. It is difficult in all countries to create a strong urge, leave alone enthusiastic support, for problems of local government. But this is a task that constructive statesmanship in democracies has to undertake. In India the need is greater than in other relatively well-established democracies. The centralization and dualism, in several cases the existence of even three sets of administration, is wasteful and undemocratic. By rebuilding the centres of local government on stronger foundations and by making them the principal agency for administration the urgent needs of economy and of democratic stability can be more assuredly met.

This is a task which really brooks no delay, but pending its fruition another interim measure of local consolidation which has found favour and spontaneous support in other countries should be actively promoted.

In several essential functions of local administration, such as water supply, roads and health, on account of the interdependence of areas and considerations of cost, single units, urban or rural, are often-times not able to carry out reform or even routine administration. For such purposes more than one interested local administration should not only be permitted but encouraged to come together and to act either as a single unit for the given purpose or to make contractual arrangements among themselves. In a country with a strong secular tendency towards urbanization the functions involved in developing new townships have to be organized in a manner suitable for the purpose. The rehabilitation of large numbers of refugees in this and other provinces has brought this question to the forefront in India. The nature of the tasks involved in setting up a new township and in getting it on its feet as a going civic unit is of a special character. Methods which are at once more flexible and more calculating than are normal in the day to day administration of governmental business have to be followed in such tasks. Overall long term planning, acquisition of land, setting up of services, development of appropriate areas, attraction and settlement of industrial and other populations—all these are tasks which are beyond the competence of ordinary governmental machinery, if they are to be carried through with speed and efficiency, with understanding and businesslike calculation, subject to any specific decisions of subsidy or grant arrived at by the government. It is financially safe and administratively expedient that development of new townships should as a rule proceed through development corporations specially set up for each township. These should have a constitution representing government as well as the major local interests involved providing for assured implementation of the original policy till the whole task is finished and for eventual transformation of the corporations into normal civic bodies.

No problem connected with local government is more universal than that of the inadequacy and uncertainty of their financial resources. Both on account of the increase in their functions as also on account of the growing costliness of services and maintenance local bodies find it, increasingly difficult to do justice to their responsibilities. In the United States and Great Britain, where this problem is no less real than in India, steps are taken either by increasing grants or by allocating revenues to meet the enhanced requirements of local bodies. No question of transferring to central departments functions adjudged as suitable to local bodies is raised on financial considerations. Here in India on account of the essentially perverse approach to local government problems this is the normal experience. Local services are indifferently managed because they have no funds, and no new functions are given over and the existing ones are taken away because the local services are inefficient. The problem of allocating functions to local bodies should first be decided on political and administrative grounds, and adequate financial

provision should then be made to meet the requirements justified by such allocation. The problem of financial inadequacy is specially acute in India, but as mentioned above really no country is altogether free from it. In fact the recent International Congress of Administrative Sciences adopted a special resolution on the subject. It is to the effect that : with the objective of ameliorating the financial difficulties of local and provincial authorities, without incurring the necessity of large scale extension of grants-in-aid which tend to reduce the real scope of liberty accorded to such authorities, adequate resources for the fulfilment of their functions, and powers permitting their economic utilization must be provided, and at the same time a clear definition developed as to the expenses corresponding to the central power and to the local and provincial governments. The financial problem of local bodies can never be permanently solved. It is in the nature of large scale economic organization that while costly functions for governmental agencies nearer to the life of the people go on increasing, the increasing contribution to revenues arises out of functions which are naturally the concern of higher authorities. A periodic revision of sources and proportions of revenues shared among the several bodies is called for so as to ensure the maximum possible balance between functions and resources of an administration. In India the problem is not so simple and not so normal. So long as the central and provincial governments feel called upon to carry on the traditions of centralized administration they will never be able to acquiesce in any just or effective sharing of revenue with their respective lower organizations. They must divest themselves progressively of almost all functions of routine administration and make their own expenditure liabilities more limited. As an accompaniment of reorganization of local administration so as to do away with the multiplicity of agencies it will be possible to adopt a more rational system of financial allocation. In such a scheme in addition to house and special purpose taxes, and octroi duties now in operation, the entire sphere of property and consumption taxes can be left to local bodies. Uniformity in rates and the system of valuation can be promoted by appropriate regional or provincial bodies.

The growing area and scope of the activities of local bodies has already brought to the forefront the problem of organizing their services on well-known principles of service organization. These will be dealt with in detail in the following section. It is, however, necessary to emphasize that the higher status and wider responsibilities that democratic organization in local areas would justify call for a high degree of efficiency, independence and discipline among the services of local bodies. A comparatively uniform pattern of local government organization may facilitate the setting up of a common local government service subject to entrance by special qualifying examinations and to common rules of promotion and transfer. It has been found possible in other countries to adopt these reforms without encroaching upon the legitimate powers of

local bodies. In fact such reforms which entail a co-ordination of effort on the part of local bodies themselves are best promoted by single purpose or multipurpose organizations of these bodies themselves. Local administration on the widest possible scale must supply the foundation to the whole superstructure of public authority. It follows, therefore, that as new purposes become relevant which call for the setting up of new statutory units these should be made to fit in with the structure of local bodies and that no function involving authority to administer a public duty should be entrusted to persons or bodies not having a statutory position and responsibility.

VII

Organization of Civil Services

Whoever formulates the will of the state its execution has to be carried out through a service organization. In a democratic state the will is the will of the people formulated through the processes laid down by the constitution. A member of the service in a democratic state is for this reason a servant of the people and not a servant of the government of the day, except in so far as it constitutionally represents the will of the people. Instances are on record in which members of the service have refused to obey ministerial orders, and much more frequently non-official partisan dictates, which were not according to law. In some vital matters, such as financial, a specific responsibility, is placed on officers to satisfy themselves that the orders of their political chiefs are according to law, and to refuse to obey them and report to the Treasury and the Auditor General if an order inconsistent with law and legal procedure is forced on them. It is not the intention of such special provisions to put up the service against the government. The plain constitutional purpose of this strict requirement is to emphasize the supremacy of democratic sovereignty exercised through law. In all civilized and constitutional governments the supreme master of all those who share in the power of the state is the law. It is open to the sovereign people through appropriate constitutional channels to change the law. But so long as law is what it is all, in and out of office, political as well as service personnel within the pale of office, are in duty bound by it. In non-democratic constitutions it is not so vital to emphasize this point as the custodians of governmental power are themselves the possessors of sovereign authority, as for instance in a monarchy, and to a more limited extent in an aristocracy. But in a democracy sovereignty resides in the enfranchised people, not in any authority, howsoever exalted, created by the people. All authorities are subject to the people through the constitution. The protection of law extends to the services and throws on them in addition to the responsibility of carrying out orders of superior authority, the further responsibility to ensure that they are carrying out only such orders as are made in conformity to law. Their loyalty to the people demands this of them.

The members of the services, in all branches and at all levels, function as public servants in a democracy. It is a narrow and misleading description to call them government servants. Both the government and the services are public servants at different levels and on appropriately differing terms. Especially in new democracies, which have inherited the tradition of identifying government with the sovereign, this differentiation in the ultimate allegiance of the services has to be specially

theoretical or legal implications of this democratic position are not known to the ministers and the service, but lack of experience in the one and insufficient adaptability in the other often twist the normal working of the constitutional process in an unexpected direction. Till new traditions are well established and enough confidence is developed by the ministers special care has to be exercised to see that the generally well-known principles of policy supported by the legislature in each case are truly and faithfully translated into the statute and rules adopted for giving effect to such policy. The task of the service is here restricted but it becomes more difficult in as much as mere high competence is not enough. To competence must be added an innate sense of professional integrity and service abnegation.

Quite a novel and unfamiliar field of activity is opened to the services on account of the growing expanse of the commercial and semi-commercial activities of the state. Even leaving out of account the need to supply personnel for the public corporations created for specific economic objectives, to which reference will be made in a later section, within the normal activities of governmental departments such a large proportion is now related to commercial activity that the difference between business and state administration is well nigh extinct. The former may work for profit and the latter, in many cases, presumably for service. Still all the essential character of the administration of these activities has to conform to the business model if the ends of economical and fruitful management are to be served. Finance, currency, banking, trade policy, industrial planning, agricultural development, transport, housing, labour all these involve, apart from the technical and departmental problems associated with each item, a knowledge about the economic principles and experience which the average administrator is not likely to possess as a result of his training and past service. The adoption of a policy of economic regulation and social planning constantly broadens the scope of these functions, and unless the system of recruitment, training and organization deliberately provides for ensuring the supply of qualified personnel the efficiency of the administration, which means in essence the maximum net output of benefit to the community proportionate to the cost incurred, is bound to suffer.

In service planning we have to start with a clear conception of the qualities that we are seeking among its members. For the most part in respect of the subordinate services, at their recruitment no exceptional qualities, such as are not likely to be in demand over a wide field of similar employments outside the public service, are called for. For the class from which responsible officers are expected to emerge a special effort is necessary to ensure the supply of those qualities which are appropriate to their special responsibilities. Two qualities are basic: all to

be worthy of membership of the public services must possess them. Every public servant must be obviously honest in the sense of neither seeking nor receiving from his public employment any personal advantage other than what the terms and conditions of his service assure to him. All civilized governments, not only democratic, would openly avow support to this desideratum. Yet the record of the several services in this respect is highly disparate. East or West, rich or poor, white, black or brown, makes no difference in this respect. It just happens that some countries and some services have a high tradition of integrity and some others have not. In the latter case neither democracy nor rule of law is honoured. Anything and anybody can be purchased. That Great Britain has travelled on the road of integrity of the public services to an exceptionally advanced stage, since over two hundred years ago a Prime Minister himself declared that every man has his price, has been most reassuringly proved at the recent public trial of some ministers and public servants in connection with alleged corruption. Mr. Belcher and Mr. Gregson, ex-trade unionists who had been rewarded with high office on account of their services to the party in power, came in for severe censure which put an end to their public careers. But all the civil servants were specifically and completely exonerated. But this is not the real measure of the integrity of the British public service. That nobody expected any other decision, least of all the service itself, and that the latter feels in no way specially honoured when people comment on their honesty is the real measure of the depth and the solemnity of the tradition of service integrity in that land. Of few, if any, other countries can it be said that integrity among public servants is so much a part of nature that it passes unnoticed. This is essentially a virtue that the public must deserve and desire, and the administrative system must seek to promote above everything else.

Only next to honesty is another obvious quality which must presumably be treated as elementary. A public servant set to administer a function must know everything about it. Such knowledge is not only necessary for the efficiency of his work, but is what he is in duty bound to offer to the community in virtue of his office. Authority, to be morally effective, must flow from integrity and knowledge. Too often places of authority create in their incumbents not only a disinclination to acquire appropriate knowledge, if they do not already possess it, but they actually create an illusion among the officers that because they are holding an office they do in fact know all about it. It is indeed necessary that they should know, sooner and more, the better for the community. But authority is no substitute for knowledge, and an efficient service must take special precautions to ensure initial, progressive and up-to-date knowledge relevant to each job among its members. Given honesty and knowledge, the merely regulatory functions of the state would require among the services a capacity to get at the essentials of a problem and to form a sound judgment on the facts and the law of each case. A readiness to

shoulder responsibility and to carry out decisions and judgments would naturally be indispensable to executive officials. Understanding of the essential purposes of policy and sympathy for the objects of the same would be additional qualifications necessary for the administration of the social and beneficent functions of the state. With the economic and trading functions of the state arises the need, not for any new moral or intellectual qualities, which are common to all functions, but for special knowledge and practical skills. While every member of the service need not possess all these, a state which deliberately enters on a policy of economic regulation and planning cannot afford to be without adequate staff possessing the necessary qualifications of knowledge and experience. There have been numerous cases under the regime of economic controls where the ignorance and inexperience of the administrative personnel have been exploited for their own purposes by interested parties. A regular system of extensive governmental activity in the sphere of economic and business activities can hardly hope to function without serious inefficiency unless special precautions have been taken to arm its staff with the necessary knowledge and skills.

The required knowledge would vary from function to function, and of this something will be said at a later stage. But the skills involved in business administration are so specialized that they must be deliberately acquired and developed. Initiative is the essence of business organization. While each member is bound by common loyalty to the organization and to its interests he is expected whenever he feels it necessary to act on his own so as to further these most successfully. Initiative carries with it the responsibility to justify action if not in each individual case at least over a series of these. The higher authorities have actively to encourage such freedom of action and the other officers have to prove that they are benefitting the organization by the use of such freedom. A freshness of outlook and a capacity to respond constructively to changing environment are other qualities without which no business unit would ever run, except into stagnation. Personnel management based on moral leadership and a concern for the good-will of the customer are other traits of successful business management. That business management is being taken over by the state in any particular sphere does not render the need for the appropriate skills and qualities less essential. Public management is management by public officials, and unless they have the managerial skills they will make a bad job of their responsibilities as surely as inefficient personnel in private business would do. The only difference would be that in private management failures would be sooner detected and the resulting loss would fall on private parties, whereas in public management, owing to the inherent routine and impersonal nature of administration, it would be some time before failures are detected and the loss will fall on the public, that is on the citizen and the tax-payer. In making this comparison it is not intended to cast a slur on the inhe-

rent capacities of the general administrator, or to belittle the importance of his task. It is, however, necessary to emphasize the special need of recruiting persons with specialized knowledge, aptitude and experience so as to enable the administration to discharge competently and without avoidable loss to the community, the many responsible functions connected with economic regulation and planning that it has increasingly to undertake.

The adoption of a policy of economic regulation involves the need for planning a system of training so as to ensure the supply of the required talent. This is being done in several countries, as for instance in U. K., where the national employment authorities prepare a job budget and guide parents and educationists so that an adequate number of applicants should be forthcoming at appropriate stages. The need for such action is easily appreciated but the systematic effort involved is not so easily undertaken. For the success of democratic administration in an economically integrated society such effort is a desideratum of administrative planning. In almost all democratic countries Public Service Commissions have been established but the extent and the manner in which their agency is utilized in meeting the personnel problems of the state vary from country to country. The administrations themselves having made little attempt to foresee and define their requirements they have no data to supply to the Commission which the latter may utilize to offer advice regarding recruitment. That appointments of strictly temporary or semi-political character should be made without reference to the Commission is easily understood. But a general tendency among governments in immature democracies is to ignore the Commission even with regard to the regular appointments. This of course is not done systematically but only in the wrong type of cases. This only intensifies the wrong which is thus inflicted on the community and on the other members of the services. A government is entitled to have its own recruitment policy, even including reservations, preferences and specific qualifications. The presumption in such cases is that the governmental policy in that behalf has been sanctioned by implication or by explicit authority by the legislature. But within the provisions of the law or the rules defining recruitment policy the Public Service Commission must invariably be allowed to play its part.

The community at large, which is master in a democracy, is entitled to ask not only that the best man for its money has been appointed, but also that the authority created by law to decide who is the best man, has been allowed to function. Only a totalitarian and an authoritarian government can afford to pit its judgment against the community. A democratic government must hold itself as much subject to law as any other individual citizen or organization. Perhaps not by design but only by incomplete knowledge a disregard of the functions of the Commission would lead to unsuitable selection. This would lead to a charge of patronage or favouritism which undermines the moral foundations of the

VIII

Reform in Civil Services

While the common citizen always knows enough, and sometimes more than enough, about his complaints against the services few have tried to understand the difficulties of the services themselves, especially in democracies where appropriate traditions have yet to be firmly established. Excluding cases of unsystematic organization, which allow for a number of officers being appointed who have less than enough work to do, as a rule the services, especially at the higher and more responsible levels, are overworked. First with the war and now with the post-war pressures of work the civil servants' official life is one continuous and almost imperceptible drive from one high priority to another. They seem to live almost permanently in an environment of emergency. There is something in our times, so unsettled and so hectic, which must answer for this. In fact the services are already developing a kind of functional resistance to emergency and priority stimuli. How far the resistance is the effect of a certain adaptation of administrative capacity to take even extra-ordinary situations in normal stride, and how far it is just growing callousness and indifference is more than one can say at present. More probably, it is a case of personal equation. The feeling of strain is, however, noticeable, and unless the government on the highest level learns to use the service more systematically and more humanely it will in the nature of things fail to deliver to the community the highest benefit that it is capable of doing.

Apart from the volume of work and the unadjusted tempo of various items of business there are three specific causes of service difficulties which call for a more appropriate understanding of the proper position of the services in a democratic constitution. Parliamentary democracy, even more than its other variants which in a way provide for political chiefs who by and large have had the opportunity to develop executive and administrative talent, is almost necessarily a government of amateurs. Even granting that by chance some among the ministers have a general or a specific grounding in administration, it is rare indeed to find a minister who has administrative talent and experience and who at the same time possesses full comprehension of the necessary implication of administrative action at high level in a government. While old precedents need not in all cases be followed, they have to be studied and, if necessary, for stated reasons set aside. Even in this case, however, that a new precedent is being created which, in a constitutional government, must be held to be binding cannot be ignored, as sometimes ministers flitting from one individual case to another are apt to believe. It is the

professional and trained administrator who almost by instinct has all these considerations ever present to his mind. The ministers are chosen by the party chiefs, and all members of the legislature are elected by the people, not for their administrative capacity but for their identification with certain policies on public questions. While in office the ministers are indeed the supreme custodians of administrative power, but the *raison-de-etre* of their office is their policy, not their administrative rule. While, therefore, they are like wise masters entitled to ensure that their professional agents are carrying out their policy and that they are acting according to a system which is at once just and efficient they would be, to say the least, wasting their own time and the officials' time, which may be better utilized in their respective functions of policy and administration, if they were to take on themselves the routine tasks of a chief executive. Even in a business concern considerable decentralization of authority is essential to efficiency and progress. In a parliamentary form such a systematic sharing of functions, subject to well-known procedural safeguards, is not only administratively but also constitutionally essential.

In India, the stage called dyarchy and generally the principle of progressive realization of responsibility, has tended to blur the difference between a minister and a member of the executive council. With a fundamental transformation of the constitution new and appropriate forms of administration have to be adopted. The civil servant must not be saddled with functions which, at home or abroad, have a political significance. These belong to the political chiefs and their deputies. Administration is the forte and the allotted field of the services. Subject to directives of policy and a general oversight, for the purpose of ensuring that policy is being justly and efficiently carried out in this field the service should be left free to operate. As ultimately the ministers have to shoulder parliamentary and public responsibility for acts of the administration they must in turn ensure that the service is acting in full conformity with their duties under the law. But this is best ensured by internal organization and supervision not by the ministers themselves acting as super-heads, in an executive sense. Especially when ministers fail to resist the temptation to visit on the service responsibility for shortcomings in the administration it is necessary to ensure that the system has been allowed to function as a normal administrative machine having its own fields of decision and execution within the existing law and policy. The services are an anonymous organization. They must be content in a democracy to remain so, being denied the reception in public of both coins and kicks. It is a refined and advanced stage of democratic organization in which the ministers without losing grip and without entertaining any feeling of loss of authority can get their services to work on their own, and the services while attending honourably and efficiently to their modest tasks of routine administration can lend all possible help to the ministers in their policy making. Like all acquired

skills the conduct of democratic government has also to be learnt by improvisations and experience. The inherent principles of democracy and the proved traditions of advanced democratic governments can and should, however, serve as a guide.

An extension and definition of the field of discretionary action on the part of the service personnel at all levels are essential to efficient and economical administration. The best traditions of British democratic administration are based on this principle and may with advantage be followed in the newer democracies. In all democracies, however, old as well as new, the services have shown an almost inherent tendency to develop some shortcomings which amount to specific or functional diseases. These have to be treated, like physical maladies, both by preventive and curative methods. All organized services are prone to suffer from a desire to enhance their own influence and to expand their numbers. Considerations of self-esteem and of self-interest both point that way. Especially where a democratic superstructure has been imposed upon an old bureaucratic organization these tendencies are more obvious. While decentralization and discretion are necessary for balance and speed any tendency towards exercising independent influence, and worse still to indulge in interdepartmental tournaments of power must be resisted as undemocratic and wasteful. This is where the real administrative function of the ministry comes in. If they act as a strong and united team then they will be able to check interdepartmental rivalry and lack of co-ordination. Individual ministers can correct, by disciplinary action if necessary, the tendency towards exercising influence independently of the policy of the government. The more insidious evil of expansion can be resisted only by a ministry which has a confidence not only in its policy but also in the correct principles of economy and efficiency. If inter-departmental competitions for prestige possess the ministers also, a wasteful expansion of administrative services, at the cost both of money and real benefit to the people is the easiest thing that can happen. Such things have happened in many new democracies and are actually happening to-day in India. Each department, and often each minister, is interested in developing a particular department and there is none to care for overall needs of economy and co-ordination. In Great Britain, at least till recently, the Treasury was the custodian of these essential merits, and it acted with an independence and authority which even strong ministers, even prime-ministers, found it difficult to resist. Under pressure of politics, which in a democracy is party politics, the treasury also is apt to lose if not an awareness of its role, at least the prestige and the authority that it wields among departments. If newer democracies are not to break on financial rocks created by an expansion of services to which all governments are prone, they will do well to nurse the wholesome traditions of a strict treasury control.

The procedural drawbacks of service administration have often been described as red tape, which has become a byword of criticism. The cure of red tape does not, however, lie in disregarding it. That only lets in another disease equally fatal to good government in a democracy, personal and impulsive administration. It is desirable to analyse the mental and organizational processes that lie back of red tape and to take appropriate steps to check such amongst them as are judged undesirable. The following seem to be the more usual constituents of the evil: dilatoriness, lack of flexibility, avoidance of responsibility for decision, failing to keep in touch with affected persons resulting in aloofness, and forgetting the human effects of their official acts. Official delays are contributed to by unreadiness to shoulder responsibility and forgetting human consequences. In an administrative system which, as mentioned earlier, allows and encourages each officer to go to the limit of his independent action such delays are minimized. Sir John Henry Woods, Permanent Secretary of the Board of Trade in the United Kingdom, writing about a similar problem in regard to his department observes; "We continually impress upon all officials of the Board who have the power of decision that they really must kill their own birds. Everybody is urged, if he is in doubt whether or not he should decide a particular question, always to give himself the benefit of doubt, and decide it. 'Stone dead hath no fellow' is no bad principle for a civil service file at no matter what level." There are few rules of procedure which necessarily prescribe or enjoin reference to higher authority. Where they exist they should be under constant review for the purpose of maximizing discretion of officials nearer to the scene of action. For the rest it is a matter of tradition. Not only must the system of administration in a democracy be decentralized but it must have a tradition of decentralization. Service chiefs and even political chiefs ought to be as ready to check a failure to exercise final discretion as they usually are to notice actions in excess of legitimate discretion. In a well organized system with its own traditions, experienced service chiefs can be relied on to draw the line pretty correctly. The political chiefs, unless they see some grave reason to dissent, would well be guided by advice from their immediate permanent secretaries. Devolution will not only encourage, but call for exercise of responsibility and as this happens flexibility which is at present lacking will also be promoted. Keeping in personal touch and following up the results of administrative action can be increasingly achieved under constant pressure from above, provided of course enough time is placed at the disposal of officers to do this. Partly this depends on a reform of system and partly on tradition.

The delays in office routine are also due in part to out-moded office organization which, in almost all countries, has lagged much behind the improved methods of organization and equipment followed by modern business houses. The efficiency audit, that some of the more pretentious

modern consultants on industrial and office organization have to offer, has only a limited relevance to the judgment processes involved in administrative duties at responsible levels. But in respect of their routine methods of transacting business in governmental departments the expert advice of such consultants has some value. Funds and time permitting democratic governments, like others, can derive much benefit in efficiency and eventual economy in this way. Judgment processes are peculiar to the organization of each function or each group of similar functions. A survey of methods of organization on this level is better undertaken by the initiated, though even here practices followed in well-established and advanced democracies might with advantage be studied by the younger democracies. All these reforms, organizational and mechanical will no doubt keep the alleged drawbacks of the services to a minimum. But we must not expect too much of our services. After all it is true of services no less than of governments that as a rule people get the organization that they deserve. While leaders of thought and government must constantly exert themselves to improve the standards of integrity and efficiency of services it is expecting too much that these will be much higher than those prevalent in the community at large. As regards the smaller blemishes of public services, these must be treated as no more significant than those to which other professions in society are prone. So long as they do not seriously interfere with the execution of the social functions that the public servants have to discharge many of their alleged blemishes should cause more amusement than irritation. Sir Gwilym Gibbon, himself a distinguished British Civil Servant and Director of Local Government Division of the British Ministry, indulging in a lighter mood suggested the following service and hymn for the more typical among his subordinates :

Short Form of Service for Government Officers.—

" Oh Lord, grant that this day we may come to no decision, neither run into any kind of responsibility, but that all our doings may be ordered to establish new departments, for ever and ever, Amen."

THE HYMN

Oh Thou who seest all things below
 Grant that Thy servants may go slow,
 That they may study to comply
 With regulations till they die,
 Teach us, Oh Lord, to reverence
 Committees more than common sense,
 Impress our minds to make no plan,
 But pass the baby when we can.

And when the tempter seeks to give
Us feelings of initiative,
Or, when alone, we go too far,
Chastise us with a circular.
'Mid war and tumult, fire and storms,
Strengthen us, we pray, with forms,
Then will Thy servants ever be
A flock of perfect sheep to Thee.

That no service can be expected to work efficiently unless its conditions of employment, including pay, promotion and nature of work, are satisfactory is an obvious truism. But there is no agreement among competent and experienced administrators and planners as to what constitute satisfactory conditions. There is a school of thought very recently coming into prominence in Western countries which suggests that the state should purchase the best possible talent in the open market by paying them a competitive salary. The more logical among these are prepared to follow up this suggestion with its corollary that both security of tenure and the assured ladder of promotion, which are characteristic features of the older system, will then have to go overboard. In their place will come highly selective promotions and liability to demotion or even dismissal for lack of continued efficiency which are frequent in business employment. As we shall see in the next section, the services recruited for the purely trading concerns under government or semi-government management will have to adopt in substance the commercial by preference to the older administrative scheme. But with regard to the normal administrative services, where commercial management is out of place, and especially where highest direction comes from party governments a straight plumbing for ad hoc salaries, and promotions, demotions and retirements out of turn, are bound to create serious political and even constitutional complications. While, therefore, security of tenure and normal promotions by seniority are features which must be retained in administrative service a more systematic adoption of the principle of positive selection to promotion posts, and of premature retirement for gross inefficiency are features rendered necessary by the exigencies of efficient and economical service.

While the new school would commercialise state services the older school is yet by no means suppressed. In fact the growing responsibilities of constructive and ameliorative functions cast on the services have rendered a new point to its views on service conditions. Mr. R. A. Butler, who has had long and intimate experience of public service, writing about the reform of civil service observes: "It seems to me that the civil service is like the monastic orders of old, with the three vows of poverty, chastity and obedience. It is quite clear that at certain grades civil ser-

vice pay will have to go up, there is no doubt about that. But at the same time it must be said you will never extract from your duty in the civil service the same rewards as would obtain in commerce and industry. I am certain the problems of the service will never be solved by improvements in pay alone. Other distinguished British civil servants have also spoken frequently about the traditions of honourable poverty and have deplored the lack of these in other countries. It must however, be remembered that the poverty, approved of even prescribed by these authorities for public servants, is a relative poverty, not an absolute one, involving privation of any sort. Given a decent scale of incomes depending on the functional needs of the several classes of public servants according to prevailing standards there are obvious reasons not only to justify but in fact to demand that public servants should not be paid competitive salaries. Taking the best organized civil service and comparing it with the best organized business firm not only is security but even integrity better protected in the former. For a really intellectual and competent person administrative work in the service is more attractive than work in business. Several surveys carried out among both prospective and established members of the British service have proved that more important as attractions of the service are the interest and prospects of responsible and patriotic work than pay and conditions. As the service is a human organization these considerations have to be applied with discrimination, and excepting cases of a national conscription of service, we cannot take very literally Mr. Butler's dictum of poverty. Reforms in the service organization suggested in this and the last section which are intended to nurse the self-respect, independence and esprit-de-corps of the services will go a long way in emphasizing the inherently superior and patriotic character of public service in a democracy. In comparatively poorer economies, such as that of India, the distributional aspect of public salaries is of supreme importance. All earnings above the national average must be functionally justified. They must not be merely the outcome of privilege. This would entail a policy of equalization in which inordinately high private incomes will suffer a diminution. Gross inequalities between official and non-official salaries will tend to vanish at both ends.

In view of the growing size and complexity of governmental organization the problem of mutual relations between the government as an employer and the services as employees has come into prominence. So far as the upper grades of service are concerned they are well protected in their service rights by rules framed in that behalf, by their readier access to those who frame policy, and ultimately by a right of appeal to the Public Service Commission. Moreover by their training and professional as well as economic status they are placed outside the pale of employer-employee complex. For the more modestly circumstanced

members of the service, the peons, the clerks, the typists and those who perform mere manipulative tasks the pressure of economic wants is always urgent. That they should compare their position to similarly employed personnel in private establishments is also more natural. On the side of governments, who are their employers, it is more difficult to maintain close and continuous contact with the modester many than with the few who are in responsible office. Mutual relations are apt in the former case to get strained frequently. This problem has arisen in almost all states, and especially in democracies, where the general atmosphere is congenial to the growth not only of a sense of one's due rights but also to strong organizations of state servants. The problem has assumed such wide and urgent importance that the Seventh International Congress of Administrative Sciences, referred to earlier in this essay, adopted a special resolution on the subject. It runs as follows: "This Congress affirms the belief that efficiency and smoothness of administration and the contentment of the staff are promoted by establishing in the public service standing machinery by which representatives of the government and of the staff associations are brought into constant contact for discussion not only of conditions of service and all other matters affecting the interests of the staff, but also of other problems of administration in which the experience and ideas of the staff may be of assistance"

It is improbable that any constitutional government, least of all a democratic one, will now deny the need of establishing and recognizing staff associations. In Great Britain not only are staff associations established and recognized, but active steps are taken by government to encourage new entrants into the service to join and take active part in their functioning. Till recently the tendency in U. K. and some continental countries like Belgium, where these associations have a long and continuous history, was to confine their activities to the ventilation of general service grievances, including those concerning the conditions of their employment. Recently, the administrations have found it both desirable and expedient to utilize them as consultative committees for other matters, e. g. improvement of procedure, formulation of training and recruitment schemes, and other organizational problems. Occasionally these associations are also utilized as courts of honour in cases involving the reputation of the service. The British staff associations are free to register themselves as trade unions and have all the freedoms that trade unions have. Few associations, however, have actually been registered as trade unions and strikes are rare. In other countries there is a feeling of hesitation as to whether staff associations should be free to register as trade unions and to exercise a right of direct, sympathetic or political strikes. Whatever may be said of the theoretical rights of state servants like other workers to operate through trade unions, both practical considerations and the actual experience in Great Britain would indicate that staff associations in govern-

ment departments should be given a status and advantage which are so obviously fair that the very need to have the less privileged status of trade unions should not arise. The workers must be made to feel that as far as possible their conditions of work are being regulated by what they consider fair standards and that their co-operation is sought in other matters affecting the department on which they are qualified to pass a judgment. An impartial arbitration tribunal which will inspire confidence among the workers should be indicated for reference of complaints regarding the conditions of service. If the whole machinery of staff associations is introduced without delay in the newer democracies and allowed to function in good faith the more complicated problems of staff-government relations might not arise at all. Every employer has to take some risks in evolving methods of mutual consultation with the staff. Considering the advantages in contentment and efficiency of the staff the consultative machinery recommended by the International Congress offers the best solution of an intricate and somewhat pressing problem.

Administration of Public Corporations

From two different angles state activity is converging on the field of industrial and business management. In democracies, like that of Great Britain, where the policy of progressive nationalization has been adopted by the government of the day several industries are passing under the ownership and direct managerial control of the state. With a view to maintain and promote the productive efficiency of these sectors of business activity a special type of organization is called for. In all business management there is an economic objective. The profit motive may be replaced by revenue motive, or by the motive of giving maximum service at minimum cost, or of maximising production. All of these objectives are such as call for an economical management calculated to promote the particular end in view. Normal methods of selection and appointment, security of service, promotion by seniority are unsuitable for business organizations, whether conducted by the state or by private owners. Like good employers state managements must indeed try in all these respects to maintain fair standards, but as the business efficiency of the concern is the supreme test of management final action has to be guided by considerations of economy and efficiency. The financing of such activities on capital as well as revenue account has also to be determined by considerations of sound investment, and not by service, amelioration or redistributive ends. In so far as these latter objectives figure in state policy effect must be given to them through the normal budgetary processes. If some of these impinge on the operations of the state controlled business their effect on the business aspects of the concern must be fully estimated and allowed for as a state liability. The choice of managerial officers and the field of discretion permitted to them have to conform to the essential character of business as an enterprise, where planning has to be flexible and risks have to be taken without elaborate procedure. Even at law the position of business activities of the state has, in the interests of the common rights of citizens, to be differentiated from other activities, such as the magisterial which more properly and directly flow from the political character of the state.

For these compelling reasons the administration of nationalized industries has to be entrusted to semi-independent units. For legal and financial separateness of these activities the composition and organization of their controlling authorities should make no difference. Even assuming that the control is vested in a fully nominated and paid board, and that the board is subject to government directives on policy as well

as detail it would, within these limits, promote business efficiency and financial soundness to have a separate unit created by a specific or general statute. It has been suggested in an earlier section that a state which is committed to direct participation in business must build up its own managerial and technical personnel organized into a separate service. At certain levels the management of business concerns of the state will touch general administration. Duties of such liaison or supervisory posts will have to be entrusted to officers of the general administrative service who have special qualifications for their job. While a separate section of such officers need not be formed, within the administrative service an effort at recruiting and training enough men to be available for such duties is definitely called for. Both for this purpose as also for the purpose of strengthening the separate business services themselves a practice of recruiting qualified and experienced persons from the private sector of industry is indicated as necessary.

It is too early and difficult to say whether a completely state directed enterprise in a democracy will work efficiently. The personnel factor is of course important. Its importance will grow further as those who have in the initial stages been recruited from experienced managers in the private regime come to be replaced by those who have risen through the normal channels in the business service of the state. Quite apart from this, however, is the prospect of political influences in a democracy causing business policy to deflect otherwise than in directions indicated by the legitimate purposes of a business unit and of public interests. Democracies are prone to the action of pressure groups both within and outside the political parties. These groups do not necessarily belong to any single interest in society. Almost each contending interest attempts to build up its own pressure organization and technique. With changes of party in power and of the group with effective pressure it is possible that the policies of state units of business will be rendered so unsteady as to be dangerously uneconomical. The long history of Indian railway finance would illustrate the dangers of political management of business units very convincingly. It is thus essentially desirable that while retaining to itself the powers of appointment of the governing bodies, of essential directions of policy and of a financial review the management of business units should as a rule be entrusted to separate statutory corporations. These would then have a legal status distinguished from the state, will have a financial nexus that they will have to follow and justify, and will have a considerable autonomy of management essential for efficiency and economy.

While statutory public corporations, as instruments of discharging state functions in regard to nationalized industry, are widely prevalent there is no uniformity with regard to their status and autonomy. The simplest is the British type in which a clear distinction is drawn between

grant-subsidized and self-sufficient corporations. In both management is vested in nominated boards and their personnel arrangements are outside the scope of regulation by the Public Service Commission and the Treasury. Both have substantial internal autonomy and it is a common ministerial answer to Parliamentary questions affecting their working that as the matter referred to in the question is one of internal management the minister has no answer to give. Even the discussion of policy, apart from any private member's resolution that may be admitted, is only at the estimates stage when anything appertaining to ministerial policy is held to be in order. The accounts of all corporations are presented to Parliament but at that stage only retrospective criticism is possible. These accounts moreover, except those which refer to expenditure out of grant money, do not go to the Public Accounts Committee. This means that there is neither an accounting nor a commercial scrutiny of transactions of the corporation as a whole by the Controller and Accountant General whose advice is vital to the usefulness of the Accounts Committee's and the Parliament's discussion. Recently proposals have been made to bring all corporation accounts, irrespective of whether grant is received or no, within the purview of the Accountant General and the Public Accounts Committee. If the Treasury and the Accountant General's office are strengthened by officials having real competence to scrutinize commercial accounts, and if the Public Accounts Committee develops a tradition of constructive and helpful criticism the suggested practice, which is constitutionally sound, will also prove practically useful. The Parliament as the nation's trustee is entitled to assure itself that in broad outline the financial and managerial policies followed by statutory corporations are sound, and are such as promote the ends of public policy underlying their incorporation.

In the United States there is no set policy on the subject, except perhaps that of meeting each case on merits. In fact since the end of the war a policy of winding up many of the corporations is being followed, some being turned into private firms and others taken over as departmental activities. Nationalization has not been accepted as a policy in that country, in fact all the bias is in the contrary direction. State governments run many revenue earning activities on their own. Mills, elevators, banks, insurance, water and power distribution and liquor are some of the businesses directly run by several state administrations. On the other hand, the Government Corporation Control Act passed by Congress sometime ago has resulted in winding up all corporations established under state laws. Presumably direct economic activity of states with a revenue bias, even when conducted through nominated controlling boards is not affected. Henceforward statutory corporations can be created only by Congressional legislation. The position of these corporations is, however, more dependent and insecure than that of either the British corporations or of the American corporations themselves before

the passing of the control measure. The corporations have now to submit to commercial audit by the budget bureau and their corporate status is liable to be taken away by the Director of the Budget subject to the President's sanction. All corporations have to submit to scrutiny and review by Congressional committees. When the corporation status is withdrawn the organization passes under normal departmental control. It will thus be seen that there is an apparent, though only apparent, contradiction between the professed policy of restricting growth of statutory corporations adopted in the U. S. A. and the complete dependence of these on governmental direction. The explanation of this apparent anomaly is to be found in the special approach to the problem of economic activity of the state in that country. Nationalization has not been accepted as a principle of industrial reorganization. The government, either of states or of the federation, is interested in economic activity either as a source of revenue or as a part of their general administrative responsibility. It is, therefore, recognized that while within limits a flexible and semi-independent field for the commercial side of the operations might be permitted the direct responsibility of the government concerned is in no way diminished. The Commodity Credit Corporation, the Export-Import Bank, the Tennessee Valley Authority and the several revenue producing activities of states' all answer to this description.

There is, however, no finality yet visible either in the British or the American attitude towards corporations. The position seems to turn on the extent to which a public purpose within the normal sphere of governmental responsibility is sought to be served by a particular activity. To the extent to which this element predominates either direct state management or regular and effective state control is held to be in order. On the other hand if an activity is taken over by the state in pursuance of a policy of socialization a substantially independent organization would be held to be proper. In modern industrialized society it is always difficult to draw the line between these two purposes, and policy has, therefore, to be flexible. In the circumstances the non-doctrinaire American policy would seem to be a better model than the somewhat rigid British practice. In fact, even in America, the mixed type, based on common capital contribution and common control by private and state agencies is being gradually evolved and seems to be favoured by the reformers.

Democracies which are progressing on the road to socialism by cautious and halting steps will find particular attraction in the mixed and varied types in America. The synchronization of democracy and nationalization is likely to put an almost unbearable strain on the administrative and managerial capacity available to the younger democracies. According to the nature of the public purpose sought to be served in bringing an economic activity under governmental influence

one out of the four methods, direct state management, management through substantially independent corporations, management through a dependent corporation, or management through a mixed corporation wherein government retains sufficient influence and power effectively to guide policy in important matters, will have to be followed. In all the four classes, however, special problems of recruitment and management of personnel will arise, and will have to be solved along lines indicated earlier in this section. Governmental corporations are individually even bigger employers of labour than private business men. This is true even in India where for instance the railways employ a very much larger number of workers, of all classes and grades, than any other concern in the country. As the sector of economic activity subject to state direction expands the competitive effect now exercised by the private sector will tend to vanish. A greater responsibility will thus be placed on the state sponsored corporations to hold the balance even between their employees on the one hand and the consumer or the tax-payer on the other. The element of monopoly and political power involved in state control, direct or indirect, of industrial activity is liable to be exploited by pressure groups. Unless the direction at the top and the administrative machineries working the corporations are equal to their heavy and somewhat invidious responsibilities corporations may well turn out to be engines of exploitation, against which strong reactions may set in. It would, therefore, be a good institutional aid to associate with each such activity an advisory body, without executive authority or functions, which will bring into a common council all the interests involved.

Democratic Civilization

Nuffield College at Oxford which, as is well known, is an institution of post-graduate research in social, including political and economic problems defines its objective as follows: 'to bridge separation between the students of contemporary civilization and men responsible for carrying it on'. The purpose of the Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics is similar to that of the Nuffield College. Those who are advocating and supporting the cause of democracy are presumed to stand for democratic civilization, that is an order of society where authority is supported by freely expressed consent of the people and is exercised in a manner which will broaden the scope of free development of each citizen's personality. It is, therefore, crucial that democratic governments must act in support of, and not in restriction of, free and equal opportunities for their citizens. Those who carry on administration on behalf of the democratic state are committed to act in support of democratic civilization. The essential nature of democratic administration and the experience gathered about its working naturally suggest some points for the guidance of those on whom lies the responsibility for its organization and direction. An attempt has been made in the course of this essay to draw on such aspects of the theoretical and practical knowledge about administration as the author possessed. It is possible that others with different approaches to the theoretical side and with more varied and intimate experience of administration will be able to contribute to the co-operative thought process which organizations like the Nuffield College and the Gokhale Institute seek to promote.

There is a special urgency about discussions regarding the foundations of democratic society at the present moment. Even the oldest democracies are feeling it a strain to resist undemocratic pressure of unthinking or fanatical supporters of authoritarianism. For reasons already mentioned the problem is more staggering for the newer democracies especially those in Asia, whose systems of administration both in the recent and remoter pasts have not been democratical in the modern sense of the term. The theoretician, whether in economics or in politics, has often been twitted on his retrospective wisdom, which is as easy as it is fruitless. On account of a growing mass of experience and also on account of a more lively sense of duty economists and students of political organization are fast mustering courage to play a more constructive role. They are now ready to analyse current events and tendencies in the light of theoretical principles and past experience so that such guidance for future conduct of public responsibilities as their studies may

supply should be available to the administrator as well as to the governments. With the experience of the post-First World War democracies fresh in our mind it is not permissible to be complacent about post-Second World War democracies especially, again, in Asia. Both political structure at the top and the administrative systems operating in the country at large have to be carefully devised and worked in the proper spirit. The administrative system of a country is an index to the cultural life of the community, as all the traits, good as well as evil, are unmistakably represented in the manner in which it is organized and worked. While no analysis and guidance can claim absolute validity it is hoped that the picture of current tendencies and the lines of reform herein presented would meet at least some of the requirements of students of democratic institutions.

Traditional theory both of political organization and of governmental administration has been too much under the influence of contemporary conditions during periods when the theory was developed. Conditions have changed so radically since then that a deliberate attempt at fresh rethinking is called for. On the one hand activities of the state are expanding. For that matter human interests are expanding even faster. An extension of governmental activity need not thus necessarily mean totalitarian state. Secondly the material conditions of life are changing so fast that the conflict of material interests is threatening to drown all progress of civilization. Social institutions, including political and administrative, are as much based on ideas as on interests. For stability as well as for progress, therefore, it is of the utmost importance constantly to keep institutions under review so as to ensure that they satisfy both the material and moral needs of the community. Old ideas that come in the way of newer legitimate interests will have to be revised. It seems probable that in future the real field of creative political thought will lie more in the sphere of administration of the multifarious duties that a state has to undertake than in the effort of state building. Constitutions are important, but there is, at least within major limits set by democracy, only a limited scope for legitimate and useful variation in them. Administration on the other hand is an ever present challenge to social creativeness.

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