



EAST INDIA (CAWNPORE RIOTS).

Report of the
 Commission of Inquiry and
 Resolution of the Government
 of the United Provinces.

*Presented by the Secretary of State for India
 to Parliament by Command of His Majesty.*

June, 1931.

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**REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE
COMMUNAL OUTBREAK AT CAWNPORE.****I.**

The subject of this inquiry is the communal riot that broke out in Cawnpore on 24th March, 1931. The occasion was a *hartal* following the execution of Bhagat Singh and two others in Lahore.

Bhagat Singh was a young Punjab revolutionary whose name first came into prominence in April, 1929, when during a sitting of the Legislative Assembly in Delhi he and an accomplice flung bombs from the gallery of the Chamber into the Government benches below. No one was killed. He was arrested, tried and sentenced to transportation for life. Later the existence of a conspiracy with wide ramifications was discovered. Bhagat Singh, among others, was charged as a member of this conspiracy with an offence under section 121, Indian Penal Code (waging war against the King-Emperor), and in particular with the murder of Mr. Saunders, a police officer, who had been shot in Lahore in December, 1928. The remarkable course that the proceedings in that case took brought Bhagat Singh into further prominence. By various devices—hunger-striking was only one—the prisoners succeeded in bringing the usual procedure of the law to a standstill. Eventually, it became necessary to have them tried by a tribunal of three Judges constituted under a Special Ordinance. Bhagat Singh and two of his companions were sentenced to death on the murder charge. By this time he had become a hero to many of the youths of the country. Great efforts were made to secure for him a reprieve. Equally great efforts were made to find legal flaws in the long drawn-out procedure. All efforts failed. Nor was it only the revolutionary associations in the country who were sympathetic. The Congress whose creed is non-violence could not, of course, support methods of violence and murder, but in a carefully-worded resolution moved by the President at the Karachi session of the Congress, the bravery and sacrifice of Bhagat Singh and his companions were extolled and their execution was characterised as an act of wanton vengeance. Sympathy was not confined even to the Congress Party. The Nationalist Party—a confessedly constitutional party—walked out of the Assembly as a protest against the execution. It was even widely feared that the execution, coming when it did, would shake the position of Mahatma Gandhi himself. His Excellency the Viceroy explained publicly that though he was well aware of the interest taken in the fate of Bhagat Singh, he could discover no argument by which commutation of that sentence could have been justified that would not have involved, if justice was to be equal, the commutation of all other sentences involving the death penalty.

It will be seen, therefore, that the execution of Bhagat Singh excited strong feeling among parties covering a wide range of political thought. The Muslim community alone stood aloof.

This brief sketch of what the execution of Bhagat Singh meant has been necessary to explain why a *hartal* on such an occasion contained special elements of danger.

II.

The execution took place on the evening of 23rd March. It became known in Cawnpore next morning.

The Town Congress Committee immediately proclaimed by beat of drum that *hartal* should be kept on 24th March and gave instructions for a procession of mourning to be taken out at 3 o'clock the same day. In the course of the *hartal*, Hindus and Muslims came to blows. This developed into a riot of unprecedented violence and peculiar atrocity which spread with unexpected rapidity through the whole city and even beyond it. Murders, arson and looting were widespread for three days, before the rioting was definitely brought under control. Afterwards, it subsided gradually. The loss of life and property was great. The number of verified deaths was 300, but the death roll is known to have been larger and was probably between four and five hundred. A large number of temples and mosques were desecrated or burnt or destroyed and a very large number of houses were burnt and pillaged.

Serious accusations were made against the local authorities. It was maintained that vigorous action taken at once would have prevented or at any rate would have checked the riot in its initial stages and brought it under control in a few hours. The whole plan followed by the authorities to meet the situation was criticised as ineffectual and mistaken. The police were accused of being supine and indifferent. Some critics went further and said that a policy of inaction was deliberately adopted by the authorities for political ends.

III.

In view of the heavy loss of life and property and the criticism of the measures taken to meet the situation, the Government appointed a Commission of Inquiry into the outbreak by an order No. 1998, dated 13th April, 1931.

The terms of reference were:—

To inquire into and report—

(1) on the predisposing and the immediate causes of the communal outbreak at Cawnpore from 24th March, and

(2) its course from day to day and how it was dealt with at each stage by the local authorities with findings on the adequacy of the measures taken.

The Commission which met in Cawnpore on 15th April and arranged preliminaries was constituted as follows :—

Mr. M. Keane, C.S.I., C.I.E., I.C.S. *President.*

(1) Mr. G. O. Allen, I.C.S.	} <i>Members.</i>
(2) Rai Bahadur Pandit Baldeo Ram Dave Sahib, Chairman, Improvement Trust, Allahabad	
(3) Nawabzada Muhammad Liaquat Ali Khan Sahib, M.L.C., Deputy President, Legislative Council, United Provinces of Agra and Oudh.	

The Commission had no authority in law to compel the attendance of witnesses, so we decided to get into immediate communication with, and invite the co-operation of, the Upper India Chamber of Commerce, the United Provinces Chamber of Commerce, the Chairman, Municipal Board, the Unity Board, the Congress Committee, the Hindu Sabha, the Muslim Defence Association, the district authorities, the military authorities, and the members who represent Cawnpore in the local Legislative Council, the Legislative Assembly and the Council of State.

We announced by beat of drum through the city and by advertisements in the local newspapers, the arrival of the Commission, the purposes for which it had been appointed, and our decision to commence the inquiry on 17th April.

Notices were prepared in Hindi, Urdu and English and were distributed broadcast and posted in all public places. A copy of the public notice is reproduced here :—

“ Notice is hereby published throughout Cawnpore that a Commission of Inquiry into the late riots, appointed by the Government, is now sitting at the Circuit House, Cawnpore.

“ They are inquiring into the causes of the riots, and the adequacy of the measures taken by the local authorities to deal with them.

“ The Commission trust that all persons who have useful knowledge of the events and any evidence to give will come forward and co-operate with the Commission.

“ Such gentlemen are requested to send in their names to the Secretary of the Commission at the Circuit House as early as possible.

“ The sittings of the Commission will be open to the public and evidence will be taken from Friday, 17th April, onwards, beginning at 10 a.m. daily.

“ Accommodation being limited entrance will be by tickets to be obtained on application to the Secretary of the Commission.”

M. KEANE,

President of the Commission.

The issues on which evidence was required, though grave and important in themselves, were few and simple. We prepared, therefore, no general questionnaire but confined ourselves to indicating in the letters which we sent to witnesses fixing the date for their attendance, the lines on which we proposed to examine them. The letter concluded thus :—

“ Among other points on which the Commission are anxious to have your opinion, are the following :—

“ (1) the immediate cause or causes of the outbreak,

“ (2) any conditions existing in Cawnpore or any relations between the different communities that were specially favourable to such an outbreak,

“ (3) the dispositions made by the civil authorities before the outbreak,

“ (4) the day-to-day course of events, and

“ (5) the sufficiency of the arrangements made from day to day by the civil authorities to deal with the outbreak.”

With one exception all the bodies mentioned above willingly co-operated in the inquiry and suggested lists of witnesses who possessed either general or special information. The exception was the local Congress Committee. Though witnesses in close touch with Congress or of the Congress Party gave evidence, no witness gave evidence as a representative of Congress. The President of the Commission invited Mr. Jog, who had been a Congress dictator and is now Vice-President of the Congress Committee, and who had himself been wounded in trying to prevent the outbreak, to give evidence on behalf of Congress. He was, personally, prepared to do so, but the Congress Committee declined to give him permission on the ground that officials had refused to give evidence before a committee which was, at the time, making an inquiry on behalf of the Congress.

A representation was made to us to allow counsel to appear, lead evidence and cross-examine witnesses. We agreed to allow counsel to attend and assist the Commission in elucidating facts, but the inquiry being general in its nature, we were not prepared to accord a right of cross-examination.

We began the inquiry on 17th April and closed it on 8th May. We examined 96 witnesses orally and received written statements from 30 others. The leading men in Cawnpore came forward readily to put their information at our disposal.

PREDISPOSING CAUSES.

IV.

Cawnpore is the second city of the province in population and the first in industrial and commercial importance. Its mills employ over 20,000 workmen and commerce has brought the city much

wealth. In the past it can scarcely be said that Cawnpore has been politically prominent. Business rather than politics was the more active interest. Mr. Gandhi's movement, however, is believed to have attracted to itself, for various reasons, the active support of more business men than has been the case with previous political movements in India. "There is a general feeling," said a witness before us, "that the local authorities did not choose to take immediate and stringent measures because they were displeased with the business men for helping the Congress activities and they wanted to show that without the help of the authorities they cannot protect their lives and properties." This witness himself was a business man and also an active member of the Congress. The District Magistrate also told us that the movement received substantial help (openly and covertly) from the subscriptions of Hindu commercial men. Certain it is that the Congress was active and strongly organised in Cawnpore. *Hartals*, processions, public meetings, and propaganda of every kind were utilised to keep up public enthusiasm. A strong light is thrown on these activities from an unexpected quarter. Mr. James, of the Electric Supply Company, gave us a statement of the traffic stoppages in the tramways of the city since 6th August, 1930. The statement, which is more valuable and instructive than a mere appreciation of political conditions, might be set out in full here.

Statement showing traffic interruptions since 6th August, 1930, to date.

Date.	Hours stopped.		Reason.
	Hours	mins.	
6-8-30	0	20	Congress processions.
8-8-30	3	15	Muslim procession in connection with <i>tanzeem</i> .
10-8-30	1	0	Congress processions.
16-8-30	0	20	Opium raid in Halsey Road.
17-8-30	0	50	Muslim <i>tanzeem</i> procession.
28-8-30	0	20	Congress procession.
5-9-30	0	30	Ditto.
9-9-30	0	50	Ditto.
11-9-30	0	30	Ditto.
21-12-30	2	10	Muslim procession— <i>Rajb-i-Sharif</i> .
6-2-31	13	0	Traffic stopped 10 a.m. and cars returned to shed. <i>Hartal</i> for Moti Lal Nehru.
21-3-31	1	0	Congress demonstration in Halsey Road re Bhagat Sing's appeal.
21-3-31	10	15	Cars to shed from 12.45 p.m.
24-3-31	—	—	All cars to shed at 10.50 a.m.

No traffic from 24th to 30th instant.

Note—The procession under date 21st December was not shown thus in the list as originally given to the Commission. There was simply "ditto" shown in the column of "Reason". When the Commission pointed out to Mr. James that there was evidence that this was a *tanzeem* procession, he replied that "ditto" was a clerical error; the entry should be "Muslim procession (*Rajb-i-Sharif*)".

For the same period Mr. James put in a subsidiary list containing 15 other *hartals* which did not result in the stoppage of tram traffic. With one exception these were all Congress *hartals*.

The effect of Mahatma Gandhi's arrest which had its own repercussions in the political world is recorded in the "Traffic report for the week ending 10.5.30," thus :—

"On Monday, 5th instant, the bazaar closed on account of Gandhi's arrest. There was considerable interference with car passengers who were compelled to get off the cars. This intimidation lasted for about three hours when the Traffic Superintendent saw the Kotwal who arranged with the Congress leaders not to interfere with the cars. Traffic then became normal, but great care had to be used in passing processions, etc. No further untoward incidents occurred, and the cars were in great demand to carry people to the various meeting places."

We see in this, the chief police officer of the city working hand-in-hand with the Congress leaders but the last word is with Congress.

Side by side with all this interference and obstruction, the picketing of foreign cloth and liquor shops went continuously on.

How serious this was, in the view of the Government of India, will be seen from that Statement of Reasons given by His Excellency the Governor-General when he made and promulgated the Ordinance against intimidation in May, 1930. The statement is in part given here :—

" Statement.

"From the beginning of the civil disobedience movement it has been part of the programme of the Congress to use for various purposes the methods of picketing in order to make their will prevail. At the recent meeting of the Working Committee of the All-India Congress Committee, held at Allahabad, resolutions were passed which urged the adoption of such methods on more intensive lines. The information received by my Government makes it plain that activities of this kind are now being pursued in various places in such a manner as gravely to interfere with the liberty of individuals in many directions.

"2. The most common object with which picketing and other kinds of molestation and intimidation are being employed is for the purpose of preventing the sale of foreign goods or of liquor. It is no part of the duty of my Government, and certainly it is not their desire to take steps against any legitimate movements directed to these ends. They are anxious to see the promotion of indigenous Indian industries, and it is perfectly legitimate for any person, in advocacy of this object, to urge the use of Indian goods to the utmost extent of which Indian industry is capable. Nor have I anything but respect for those who preach the cause of temperance.

"But what is not legitimate is for those who desire these ends proper as they are in themselves, to pursue them by means amounting in effect to intimidation of individuals, and to endeavour to force their views on others, not by argument but by the coercive effect of fear. When resort is had to such methods it becomes necessary for Government to protect the natural freedom of action of those who may wish to sell and those who may wish to buy.

"3. * * * * *

"4. In normal circumstances when intimidation is a comparatively rare offence the ordinary law suffices. But when, as now, intimidation in its various forms is carefully organised and constitutes an important part of the programme of a movement designed to paralyse the Government and to coerce the public, it is necessary to see that powers should be adequate to deal rapidly and effectively with a menace to the public liberty. I have accordingly thought it essential to promulgate an Ordinance which is designed to protect the public in general against molestation and intimidation and to check the boycott of Government servants. These powers will not be used to impede or interfere with the legitimate promotion of any economic movement which has for its object the furtherance of indigenous enterprise, nor will they be exercised in regard to any genuine labour dispute unconnected with political objects. The Ordinance is directed only against certain illegitimate activities which are being organised by the leaders of the civil disobedience movement. It will be withdrawn as soon as those activities cease. The Ordinance, moreover, has been so drafted as to be applied only where the powers are actually required. It will not be applied to any province in which the local Government has not satisfied my Government that the activities of the civil disobedience movement have rendered its application necessary. Further, within a province, the powers to deal with molestation or with the boycott of Government servants will come into force only in those areas in which the local Government considers that the situation necessitates their application. But where the situation so demands, I have no doubt that it is my duty to empower local Governments to give protection to those who merely desire to carry on their lawful business and pursuits without let or hindrance, and to safeguard public servants, as far as may be, against the attempt to deprive them, by means of boycott, of the ordinary requirements of daily life."

This and other Ordinances dealing with the civil disobedience movement were applied to Cawnpore and there were no less than 1,433 convictions for offences arising out of the civil disobedience movement in Cawnpore city and district. How did all this affect the relations between the two communities? It affected them most seriously. The Muslims from the first had refused to join the

movement. The effect of this was that as time went on, the Muslims in Cawnpore at any rate, came to look on the Congress organisation as practically a purely Hindu body. Muslim politicians who belonged to the Congress came to speak in Cawnpore but were howled down. Politicians of a communal tinge were listened to eagerly. Picketing was deeply resented by Muslim shop-keepers. They stood outside the movement. They even actively disapproved of it. They could not understand why another community, as they had come to look on the Congress now, should be permitted to impose their will on them. The picketing of the schools and colleges led to similar resentment. Mr. Chatterji, the Principal of Christ Church College, Cawnpore, and now Chairman of the Unity Board, told the Commission :—

“ In my own College, which was made a target of virulent attacks, sometimes accompanied by violence, the seventy or eighty Muslim students remain solidly loyal to their institution, and most of them showed great pluck in attending College in the face of obstruction and intimidation. On one occasion when the mob that usually accompanied the Congress picketers assaulted students, the majority of those who received injuries happened to be Muslims. This incident roused much feeling among Muslims in the town who held a protest meeting.”

The civil disobedience movement, therefore, in the manner in which it developed, accentuated the estrangement between the two communities.

A move, the origin of which is somewhat obscure, was now made from the side of the Muslims, apparently to counter the growing menace from the Hindus. A *Tanzeem* movement appeared or was revived. We could not find that there was any Central Tanzeem Committee or a central organisation of any kind. None the less, small *tanzeem* processions appeared in and paraded through the mohallas every morning. These may have been copied from or suggested by somewhat similar small processions called “ Prabhat Pheris ” which on behalf of Congress or Hindus paraded the mohallas from time to time singing national or religious songs. The *tanzeem* processions grew in numbers and in frequency, and it is stated that on Sundays and on holidays larger processions were taken out on the main roads of the city. We have in evidence that at least on three occasions these processions were on a very large scale and consisted of several thousand Muslims. It is true that one of these was on the birthday of the Prophet (August 8th) and the other on the *Rajb-i-Sharif* day (21st December). So it cannot be definitely said that they were distinctively *tanzeem* processions rather than ordinary Muslim processions. On the other hand, we have no clear evidence that these processions formed part of the celebrations in connection with the birthday of the Prophet and *Rajb-i-Sharif* in other years.

Hindu witnesses all maintained that the *Tanzeem* movement was directed not against the authority of the Government but definitely was anti-Hindu. The professed aim of the *tanzeem* was a religious awakening, but it is clear from the evidence before us that behind this was the idea that since the Hindus were organised in Congress so the Muslims should be organised too, and the *tanzeem* seems to have been intended to wake such a spirit among the Muslims. It appears to have been a fact, too, that the Muslims taking part in *tanzeem* processions made a parade of carrying swords, daggers, and spears. Mr. David, an independent witness, speaking of sometime in December, 1930, states:—

“ I happened to be in Meston Road when I saw a band of 60 or 70 Muslim youths dressed up in khaki with fur caps. They did not carry exactly what I should call *lathis* but they were certainly more than sticks. They were headed by two men who apparently were their officers and who had belts and curved swords. One was at the head of the procession with a sword in its scabbard and the other had a drawn sword. They came up Meston Road and stopped. Then from the other side—which is the Machhli Bazar mosque side—two men came out who were probably more senior officers and this band of 60 or 70 military looking people gave them what one would call ‘ a military salute ’.”

It was not till 16th January, 1931, that Government cancelled the orders exempting swords, etc., from licences. The grounds urged by the District Magistrate for the cancellation was the use being made of these weapons by “ bad characters,” as well as their display by volunteers of both communities. It is not clear whether any effective efforts were subsequently made to deal with the illegal possession of such weapons.

Hindu witnesses have stated, too, that the songs sung by these *tanzeem* volunteers who paraded the mohallas were frequently strongly anti-Hindu. Booklets of the songs which were said to have been recited in the *tanzeem* processions were produced in evidence. There is nothing to indicate from the title page that they were published on behalf of the *tanzeem* or by any *Tanzeem* Committee. If they were the songs that were sung they might easily have a very unhealthy effect on uneducated or semi-educated minds.

One remarkable thing is that so far as we could ascertain no leading Muslims belonged at any time to the *tanzeem*; but the Commission feel that the *Tanzeem* movement had its effect in stiffening the determination of the Muslims and that its importance should not be ignored.

Whether the Muslims were organised or not, it is obvious that during the civil disobedience movement in 1930 the two communities came more definitely face to face with each other than they had

been before. The Congress Hindus generally were irritated with the Muslims for standing aloof from what they believed to be a national movement and Hindu traders in Cawnpore were jealous of Muslims carrying on business as usual. The Muslims, on the other hand, were getting exasperated with what the Secretary of the Upper India Chamber of Commerce in his evidence calls the tyranny of the Congress. It appears that Congress leaders themselves were becoming awake to the position and they did try to temper the picketing of the Muslim shops and to moderate the zeal of their volunteers. On two different occasions during 1930, a clash between the communities was barely averted on this very question of picketing. The fact is that peaceful picketing, if not a contradiction in terms as Mr. Gavin Jones calls it in his evidence, is at any rate extremely difficult to carry out in its purity by the rank and file of any party. Mr. Hoon who believes that "the Congress people would not designedly provoke any man to close his shop against his wishes" told us his experience of picketing :—

"My cloth supplier is a Muhammadan and I have personally purchased cloth from his shop in the presence of Congress pickets. There is no doubt that the volunteer on duty did approach me with a request not to buy foreign cloth, but when I politely told him to please leave me alone, he stood aloof with an expression of disappointment in his face."

Mr. Hoon is a prominent barrister in Cawnpore and the representative in the Assembly of the non-Muslim constituency. His experience would be different from the mass. Those who were not so sympathetic with the methods of the Congress—and Muslims were vastly the largest numerical party amongst them—felt that the Government were allowing to Congress followers a freedom in law-breaking and a licence to interfere with law-abiding citizens that amounted to a grave danger. Many independent witnesses were of opinion that the civil disobedience movement resulted in a weakening of authority and of respect for law and order. We do not attach too much importance to this in itself as a cause of the outbreak.

Its effect in Cawnpore was probably indirect. This is a city familiar with turbulence. Thirty years ago it gained notoriety for plague rioting accompanied by atrocious murders. In 1913, the Machhli Bazar mosque in Meston Road was the scene of a violent outbreak which was communal in its origin but not in its development. In 1927, a communal riot of the same type as the present trouble but less severe kept the city in turmoil for two or three days.

There are two factors special to Cawnpore which appear to add their quota to disorder. The number of mill hands is very large, over 20,000. They are a shifting population, many without any

settled ties. Men with reasons to disappear are naturally attracted to such a big industrial centre. There are therefore elements among this large industrial population always ready for mischief. The second factor here is the existence of numbers of notorious *badmashes* and *goondas*. They are mostly engaged in the cocaine smuggling trade and gambling but they do not confine themselves to any one form of underground activity. The leaders have often large gangs at their disposal. There are wealthy men of the city who are said to pay and protect these *badmashes* and make use of them in various ways.

In touching on the presence of elements such as these the Commission do not wish to convey the idea that the mill hands or the *badmashes* were responsible for the riots. The mills were all working in full strength when the riot began and the men remained at work till about 6 o'clock when the riot was already well established. There is no evidence too that the *badmash* element was noticeable in the early stages. The existence of the turbulent elements contributed more to the spread, continuance and intensity of the trouble than to its outbreak. It is in the increasing embitterment of feeling between the two communities that the cause of the outbreak has to be sought, and the cause of that increased embitterment is to be found in the course taken by the civil disobedience movement. The movement had openly aimed at paralysing Government. It had become in Cawnpore, a Hindu movement with Muslims actively or passively in opposition. It had been carried to such lengths that on 20th October, 1930, all Congress Committees in Cawnpore, and the "Youth League," the "Youth Guard," the "Satyagraha Committee," and the "Vanar Sena" were declared unlawful associations under the Criminal Law Amendment Act. Three months later the Congress leaders were released once more from jail when negotiations with Mr. Gandhi began. The Muslims read in these negotiations a recognition by the Government of the strength of the movement, if not a surrender to it. Several witnesses have also said that the Muslims were angered because during the long drawn-out negotiations Congress opinion, i.e., Hindu opinion, only was consulted and Muslim opinion was ignored. We put this point to the President of the Anjuman Islamia, Maulana Abdul Kafi, who would be more in touch with real Muslim feeling in the town than politicians would be, and he was definite that the ordinary Muslim, the man in the street, was not affected at all by the Irwin-Gandhi pact. What he held was that "after the Irwin-Gandhi pact the Hindus considered they had achieved a success over the Government and wanted to subjugate the Musalmans." The Muslims were certainly perturbed and depressed by the turn that events were taking and they attributed to the Hindus an arrogance of triumph which the latter were probably not feeling. It was at this time of suspicion, alertness and tension that unfortunate clashes between the communities in

other places confirmed Muslims in their suspicions and fears. A communal riot broke out in Benares on 11th February. The incident in which it had its origin is thus described by the District Magistrate, Benares:—

“ On 26th January, 1931, Government of India ordered the release of the members of the All-India Congress Committee. This release, coming as it did on Independence Day, was regarded by the people generally as a great victory for Congress, and Congress activities which had previously been on the wane immediately became more pronounced. Picketing was resumed with great vigour. Among other shops picketed in Benares was that of Agha Mohammad Jan, a well-known cloth merchant, who refused to close his shop at the dictation of Congress. The picketers were all Hindus, while Agha Mohammad Jan, as his name implies, was a Muhammadan. On 10th February, customers coming to the shop were assaulted by the picketers, and arrests were made by the police. That evening Agha Mohammad Jan was shot in a lane when returning from his shop.”

The Muslims in Cawnpore saw in this the same imposing of the will of the majority on the minority which had already made them so restive. The news of this event is reported to have caused much excitement in Cawnpore. A month afterwards in a wild and inaccessible part of the district of Mirzapur, Hindu villagers brutally massacred 11 Muslims. There was nothing modern, nor political, in this crime. A Muslim zamindar sent a haunch of venison to a tenant. Some Hindus said it was beef, not venison, and the massacre of the Muslim inhabitants was the result. This was a crime that might have happened in any period of history, but coming when it did, it inflamed suspicion. In Agra, an outbreak occurred on 15th March, and lasted off and on for several days over the very old question of music before mosques. All these things had their echoes in Cawnpore as over the rest of the province and beyond it, but in Cawnpore careful and impartial observers had by now concluded that feelings had reached such a stage of bitterness and tension that an outbreak awaited only the occasion and the time.

We have left to the last a cause of estrangement which many Muslim witnesses told us exists in Cawnpore. They feel that for the last three or four years municipal affairs are conducted more and more with a communal bias and the minority community are the sufferers. It would require a separate enquiry to adjudge the rights and wrongs of this charge but important Muslim witnesses maintain that this feeling has added undoubtedly to the suspicions and resentment prevailing in their community.

IMMEDIATE CAUSES.

V.

It was in such an atmosphere that the Congress Committee in Cawnpore ordered a *hartal* on the morning of 24th March, as a mark of respect to the memory of Bhagat Singh and his comrades. This *hartal* was only part of a universal *hartal* throughout India. The Cawnpore Committee did not foresee that it would result in a communal outbreak. There was nothing that could have been so hurtful to the cause they had at heart than communal trouble at that time. They may therefore be discharged of any culpable responsibility for the immediate outbreak. The event, it is true, proved their action to be sadly unwise. They must have been aware of the tense feelings in Cawnpore as others were. Lala Dewan Chand, Principal of the Dayanand Anglo-Vedic College, told us that when he heard in Basti of the riot in Agra he returned at once to Cawnpore fearful that there might be trouble in Cawnpore any day on account of "sympathetic contagion." Many others had the same feeling. It must have been present to the mind of the Committee that a *hartal* to the memory of Bhagat Singh would particularly stir the imagination of their younger people and it was through the younger people that *hartals* were accomplished and, if need be, enforced. They were aware, too, that over many of these younger people their control was loose. We have no knowledge of what exact orders, if any, regarding the strictness of the *hartal* were passed on by the Committee to their volunteers and others that day. Orders or none, the boys and young men would see that a *hartal* in honour of their own hero, Bhagat Singh, would be strict and complete. And in this lies the explanation and immediate cause of the outbreak.

Every effort was made to enforce the *hartal* strictly, and in doing so the volunteers on this occasion spared no community. People of all classes were made to get down from their conveyances and proceed on foot. This led to trouble in Halsey Road, one of the main thoroughfares of the city, about 11 a.m. It is stated that Muslim women were made to get out of their *tongas* and walk. A crowd collected and trouble seemed imminent. Some Congress leaders appeared and pacified the people and the crowd eventually dispersed. About one o'clock the forces of disorder were more definitely let loose in a sudden wild rush of about 150 students and youths known as "Vanar Sena" (monkey army) down the Mall from west to east, smashing the windows of the big shops. They eventually turned down into the city. Somewhat later Colonel O'Neill, the Civil Surgeon, who was driving along the Mall, was met by a crowd of youths who tried to stop him. He refused to stop, and they pelted his car with brickbats, injuring his driver severely and also himself. An English lady driving alone from the Cantonments was also similarly assaulted about the same time. These

isolated assaults at first gave the impression that the *emeute* was an anti-British movement in vengeance for the death of Bhagat Singh. This does not appear to have been the case. These attacks were merely part of the strict enforcement of the *hartal* according to which no one was to be permitted to proceed otherwise than on foot.

During the morning, Congress workers had been busy also on Meston Road, another main thoroughfare of the city. The Muslim shop-keepers in Meston Road had not closed their shops. The volunteers at first requested them to do so and subsequently backed up their request by stronger insistence. Meanwhile, the crowds had again begun to collect in Halsey Road about one o'clock, and this time a conflict ensued between the two communities in the course of which Mr. Jog, a prominent Congress leader, who had come there with the object of preventing a clash, was injured. In Meston Road, the interference with the Muslim shop-keepers continued, and about 1.30 p.m. it is said that some Hindus started throwing brickbats at a Muslim shop. This led to disorder and conflict. By this time, too, some looting of Muslim shops in Generalganj had been reported. Mr. Ganesh Shanker Vidyarthi, the most prominent of all the Congress leaders, who was passing that way, saw this looting and tried to stop it. Small parties of people collected now in all the lanes and appeared in Meston Road and Halsey Road and rioting in a big way began.

Some of the Hindu witnesses before the Commission have attributed the immediate outbreak to a plot on the part of the C.I.D. It is said that a C.I.D. officer was chased or got himself chased by a crowd of Hindu youths, that he cycled or ran through Moulganj, and on reaching the Muslim side of Meston Road he shouted that he was being beaten by Hindus, Muslims gathered to the rescue and so the riot began. The evidence of this story is so vague and meagre that we have no hesitation in rejecting it.

It has been put forward by Congress sympathisers as an excuse for the enforcement of a complete *hartal* that Muslims were the first to force a complete *hartal* on the occasion of the death of Maulana Muhammad Ali. We have no means of knowing whether Muslims did use force on that occasion, but we are able to say that the explanation cannot be wholly correct, because we can see in Mr. James' invaluable traffic statements that there was no stoppage of trams on 6th January, the date of Maulana Muhammad Ali's *hartal*. The *hartal* of that date is entered in his subsidiary list when there was no stoppage of traffic.

We are led to think, therefore, that the *hartal* in honour of Bhagat Singh, owing to the strong appeal that his memory made to the younger people, was enforced with unprecedented strictness and that this coming on top of feelings already much embittered was the immediate cause of the outbreak.

COURSE OF THE OUTBREAK AND THE MEASURES TAKEN TO MEET IT.

VI.

Before tracing the events from day to day it will be as well to set out roughly the main features of the topography of Cawnpore so far as they relate to the riots. On the north, next to the river Ganges, there lies a strip about three-quarters of a mile wide comprising Civil Lines. Included in Civil Lines area are two outlying portions of the city, viz., Gwaltoli, half a mile north-west of Colonelganj, and Parmat, due north of Colonelganj on the bank of the river. Separating this area from the city proper is the Mall Road which runs roughly east and west. The main populated area of the city consists of an oblong block running east and west and about a mile and a half deep. At the north-west corner there projects an area comprising Colonelganj and Baconganj, and immediately to the south of that lies Sisamau, one of the chief areas under the Improvement Trust. The main area of the city is divided up by two large thoroughfares; one runs north and south, of which the northern portion is Meston Road and the southern portion LaTouche Road. This is intersected by Halsey Road which runs north-west and south-east, the point of intersection being known as Moulganj cross-roads. All along Halsey Road run tram-lines. At the north-west end of Halsey Road are the tram-car sheds and at the south-east end lie the Kotwali and Collectorganj. One important feature of Meston Road that should be mentioned is the existence of a temple commonly known as the Teli's temple which lies, like an island, in the middle of the road towards the northern end. To the south of this, about half way down Meston Road on the east side and at right angles to it is a narrow lane about 200 yards long known as Chauk Bazaza. It is terminated at the eastern end by Kunjilal's temple, and close to it in the lane is the Chauk Bazaza mosque. On the western side of Meston Road just opposite the Teli's temple lies the Machhli Bazar mosque. Crossing the Chauk Bazaza at a short distance from Meston Road and running parallel to the latter is a narrow lane, the southern portion of which is known as Thathrai and the northern portion as Chauk Sarrafa, in which latter there is the Chauk Sarrafa mosque. The city is bounded on the east side by the Mall Road and the canal with the exception of a small area beyond the canal on the east side known as Sadar Bazar, and beyond Sadar Bazar on the east side lies the railway, and again beyond that Cantonments.

The Police Lines are situated near the bank of the river due north from Meston Road. In the city proper there are only three police stations, the Kotwali, another at Anwarganj, 100 yards to the west of the lower portion of LaTouche Road, and the third at Colonelganj, at the extreme north-west corner of the city. The Gillis Bazar police chauli lies just at the top of Meston Road, and close to it is the District

Board office. The Municipal Board office is at the other end of the town, half way between Collectorganj and the south end of LaTouche Road.

The population of Cawnpore Municipality, according to the latest census, is 242,356, of which the Hindus number over two-thirds. Of the portion of the city lying north-east of Halsey Road, the part to the east of Meston Road is predominantly Hindu whilst the part to the west is predominantly Muslim.

Queen's Park adjoins the north-east corner of the main city area and in it is situated the King Edward Memorial Hall.

VII.

In narrating the course of events from day to day we are only giving an outline, and of the enormous number of over 2,000 registered crimes that occurred in the course of the riots we have referred to the more important that have been brought to our notice or which appeared to us the most typical.

When the news of the execution of Bhagat Singh became public in Cawnpore early on the morning of 24th March, Mr. Sale, the District Magistrate, informed the Officer Commanding the Station and asked him to keep his troops in readiness against any emergency, whilst the Superintendent of Police, as usual, arranged to have his thana police "standing to". As soon as the District Magistrate received information of the "Vanar Sena" attack on the Mall, he telephoned to the Officer Commanding the Station requesting him to send a company of the Highland Light Infantry to Queen's Park to be kept in readiness, and the Superintendent of Police despatched some mounted police (*sowars*) to patrol the Mall. The troops reached Queen's Park at 3 p.m.

We have already traced the course of events under the heading "Immediate causes" down to 2 p.m. on the 24th. On getting news of rioting down Meston Road way, the District Magistrate at once despatched two Deputy Magistrates, Pandit Rameshwar Dayal and Mr. Islam Nabi Khan, to the spot and asked them to telephone him the exact situation there. They arrived there just after 2 p.m. At the southern end of the Thathrai they found brick-throwing going on freely between Hindus and Muslims. They intervened and managed to stop the fighting. They also found two Muslims shops being plundered at that spot. On the arrival of the Deputy Magistrates the assailants made off. Pandit Rameshwar Dayal telephoned at once to the District Magistrate pointing out the seriousness of the situation and asking him for immediate police aid and also requested him to come himself. At the same time, the Deputy Magistrate noticed that a bookseller's shop belonging to a Muslim under the Chauk Bazaza mosque had been plundered and that books and stationery were lying all over the road. He was also under the impression that some form of attack had been made on the mosque.

Meanwhile, hearing the news of rioting at Moulganj cross-roads, Khan Bahadur Syed Ghulam Hasnain, the Kotwal, had proceeded up Halsey Road from Kotwali with eight armed police, leaving a similar number of armed men to guard Kotwali. At Badshahi Naka he heard a rumour that Mr. Jog had been killed. Before reaching the cross-roads, he learnt that Mr. Jog had only been injured. He deputed the Station Officer, Kotwali, and the armed guard to stop the rioting at Moulganj cross-roads and himself went to see Mr. Jog. Finding Mr. Jog with a comparatively slight injury, the Kotwal returned to the crowd to contradict the rumour of Mr. Jog's death. He asked Mr. Vidyarthi also, whom he met there, to contradict this mischievous rumour. The Kotwal then went on to the cross-roads and dispersed the crowds there. He sent the Station Officer, Kotwali, up Meston Road to deal with the trouble there. About this time a cry arose in the Chauk also that Mr. Jog had been killed. Pandit Rameshwar Dayal, on meeting the Kotwal at Misri Bazar, learnt that this rumour was false. On getting this information he returned to the Chauk to reassure the Hindus about the falsity of the rumour regarding Mr. Jog's death. While there, the Deputy Magistrate saw a crowd of Muslims entering the Chauk from Misri Bazar. In attempting to disperse it, a Muslim youth attacked him with a knife and he narrowly escaped injury. Here he heard news of fighting at Moulganj cross-roads and in consequence proceeded in that direction via Thathrai where he found a Hindu shop being looted. At this point he found a gang of about 50 Muslims attacking Shera Babu's Park with *lathis* and hammers. This park consists of a small railed enclosure on the western side of Meston Road. "Shera Babu" is the popular name of Lala Suraj Narain of Cawnpore. His father served under Lord Roberts during the Afghan campaign. This park was constructed in memory of Lord Roberts. As "Shera Babu" was of cosmopolitan views he had placed in the park stone tablets bearing quotations from religious books and statues and images representing various religions, including a cross. All these statues and the cross were broken by the mob.

Fighting was freely going on with brickbats between Hindus and Muslims. One or two Hindu shops were also being attacked near this park. By this time reinforcements from the Police Lines had arrived, Mr. Rogers, Superintendent of Police, having previously about 2 p.m. ordered all available forces at the Police Lines to proceed to Meston Road.

It was at this stage at 3 p.m. that the District Magistrate and the Superintendent of Police arrived at Meston Road. They left their car at Gillis Bazar outpost and walked down Meston Road. Pandit Rameshwar Dayal and the Kotwal met them there. They found a number of brickbats on the road in the vicinity of the Meston Road temple and also noticed angry crowds in the lanes on either side of the road. No actual fighting was going on at the time.

Mr. Sale and Mr. Rogers accompanied by Pandit Rameshwar Dayal and the Kotwal proceeded down Meston Road as far as Shera Babu's house. Mr. Sale here held a conference with these officers at which it was decided that the police could still deal with the situation without military aid, but that it was essential to issue prompt orders under section 144, Code of Criminal Procedure, prohibiting gatherings of more than five persons and the carrying of *lathis* and other weapons and enforcing the curfew. As the conference was closing the Superintendent of Police and the Kotwal had to go off to Moulganj cross-roads to stop a clash between the two communities there. While the District Magistrate was still at Shera Babu's house, some Muslims arrived and asked him to come and see the damage done to Muslim shops in Thathrai and to the Chauk Bazaza mosque. Consequently the District Magistrate accompanied by Pandit Rameshwar Dayal and a few Muslims and some Hindus left Shera Babu's house at 3.30 p.m. for Chauk viâ Thathrai. On the way a large crowd of Hindus also gathered complaining that Sarrafa was being looted. The District Magistrate, who was not accompanied by any police force, thinking that there might be a row, decided to return to Gillis Bazar where his car was and returned to Kutchery to issue the orders decided upon at the conference.

About 4 p.m. the frenzy of the mob considerably increased, the Meston Road temple and the Chauk Bazaza mosque being both set on fire about this time. The Fire Brigade arrived without delay and endeavoured to put out these fires. Meanwhile, the situation definitely grew worse between 4 and 5.

As to this period, Mr. Islam Nabi Khan, Deputy Magistrate, has told us how he found a large crowd of Muslims in the lane by the Machhli Bazar mosque, brick-throwing being in progress between the two communities. He went to them and told them to disperse but they paid no heed declaring that they could not tolerate another mosque in the lane opposite (Sarrafa mosque) being attacked. He continued to do his best and himself got struck by a brickbat. About this time, the Station Officer, Kotwali, arrived with a few armed police. On the Sub-Inspector's endeavouring to get between the two opposing mobs to give the necessary warning before opening fire, he was repulsed by an intensive shower of missiles from both sides, as well as from the houses. The Deputy Magistrate eventually, after threatening to fire, induced the Muslims to withdraw into the lane. The road being clear again, the temple was seen to be on fire.

Meanwhile, after seeing Mr. Sale off, Pandit Rameshwar Dayal returned to Meston Road and finding that a serious attack on the temple was going on he went at once to Gillis Bazar police chauki. There he found only a few constables. He tried to get the District Magistrate on the telephone but the line was engaged. He took a cycle and went off to the District Magistrate at his office. He told

him of the attack on the temple and said that without a police force he was helpless. He added that the situation was serious and getting out of control. He then went back to Gillis Bazar and found the attack on the temple still going on. The temple by this time was on fire. He managed to get hold of a couple of constables but in the confusion they lost touch with him. He tried his best by shouting to quell the disturbance but failing in this he hurried back to Gillis Bazar to get some police help; finding a Sub-Inspector and a few constables there he directed them to proceed at once towards the temple while he himself went back to the Collectorate and told the District Magistrate that the temple was on fire and the outlook was dangerous. The latter wrote a note to the Superintendent of Police and sent it off. Pandit Rameshwar Dayal then returned to Gillis Bazar where he met S. Taqi Husain, Deputy Magistrate. They both rushed towards the temple, the former making for the Hindus at the exit of the Naryal Bazar and the latter for the Muslims at the exit of Machhli Bazar. Fierce brick-throwing was going on, *charpais* being used on both sides as shields. In the course of this both Magistrates got struck by brickbats. The arrival of some police from the lower (southern) side of the temple resulted in the dispersal of the rioters.

As soon as Mr. Sale had reached his office on his return from Meston Road about 4 p.m. he dispatched two other Magistrates, Mr. Anand Swarup and Mr. Gauri Prasad, to go and help the police. These two got to Meston Road about 4.30, taking with them two Hindu lawyers as persons likely to have some influence with their community. They found the temple in flames. Mr. Anand Swarup succeeded in arresting two Muslims who were throwing bricks at the temple. On the dispersal of the crowds at this spot, as mentioned above, he proceeded further and saw at the corner of Misri Bazar a shop being looted and from this he managed to drag out one of the looters while the others ran away. On the Chauk side he noticed two Muslim stationery shops being plundered. Meanwhile the Superintendent of Police who was occupied at Moulganj cross-roads saw some wounded persons and four dead bodies of Muslims brought out from bye-lanes on the Kotwali side and got reports that rioting had commenced in different parts of the city. Realizing that the situation had got beyond his control, shortly before 5 o'clock he telephoned to the District Magistrate asking for the aid of the military. Orders were promptly issued for the company in Queen's Park to proceed to Meston Road. This force, consisting of two officers and 66 British other ranks, was conducted by Mr. Barron, City Magistrate, to Meston Road.

As they were on their way there in lorries they had some brickbats thrown at them in Halsey Road. They found the stretch of road between the Kotwali and Moulganj cross-roads covered with brickbats. At the cross-roads they observed an Indian in a dying condition. There were also large crowds assembled in the vicinity.

They noticed too at that spot an Indian police officer armed with a revolver together with a body of about 30 or 40 civil police armed with *lathis*. The company then advanced up Meston Road as far as the Chauk reaching there shortly after 6 p.m. They met the Superintendent of Police at this point. The Chauk was full of people. A military force of twenty strong was sent down the Chauk to form a picket at Kunji Lal's temple, the mob dispersing as this body advanced. Two fire engines were by now at work at Chauk Bazaza, successful attempts having already been made by the mob to damage the hoses. The rest of the military force was utilised in the posting of two pickets, one by the Meston Road temple and the other at the Moulganj cross-roads.

The period up to the arrival of the military was one of tense anxiety. The rioting had become severe and strong rumours were constantly pouring in all this time of trouble in various parts of the city. Some four or five dead bodies of Muslims were brought from the Chauk side of Meston Road and a dead body was also noticed on the pavement at the other side of Meston Road. By 8 p.m., Mr. Barron, in consultation with Mr. Rogers and the Officer Commanding the Company, realised that more troops were required. A message was accordingly telephoned to the District Magistrate and by 10.30 p.m., a second company of the Highland Light Infantry reached Meston Road. The question what arrangements should be made for the night had been discussed between the civil and military authorities on the spot. The civil authorities asked for ten military pickets but the military were unable to see their way to providing more than the existing three, being unwilling to divide up their force into small bodies. Accordingly, for the night there were three military pickets at Kunji Lal's temple in the Chauk, at the Meston Road temple, and at Moulganj cross-roads, and three military patrols were provided after the arrival of the second company, their respective routes being indicated by the following groups of mohallas :—

- (1) Naya Chank,
Pech Bagh,
Taluq Mohal,
Baconganj,
Sisamau,
Deputy ka Parao, and back along Anwarganj lane.
- (2) Gillis Bazar,
Hijra Mohal,
Ram Narayan Bazar,
Sangam Lal temple,
Patkapur,
Sirki Mohal,
Feelkhana,
Bengalee Mohal,
Chauk.

- (3) Coolie Bazar,
Bara Butcherkhana,
Sabzimandi,
Collectorganj,
Nayaganj,
Generalganj,
Badshahi Naka,
Hatya,
Chhapar Mohal to Meston Road.

These patrols were each accompanied by a Magistrate and police guide. The civil authorities had drawn up a plan to provide police pickets at fifteen spots but found that the forces at their disposal did not admit of pickets being posted at more than the following seven places which were considered the most important :—

- (1) Bara Butcherkhana,
- (2) Pech Bagh,
- (3) Baconganj,
- (4) Sisamau,
- (5) Sabzimandi Street,
- (6) Ram Narayan Bazar,
- (7) Sirki Mohal.

Also Mr. Seward, the Assistant Superintendent of Police, patrolled with an armed force in Colonelganj and Anwarganj areas up to midnight. Each police picket consisted of five armed and five civil. These pickets were posted about 11 p.m.

Between 7 and 8 p.m. the large house of Ram Balak on the eastern edge of Bacanganj was set on fire. There were also fires in Coolie Bazar and some other parts of the city. The Fire Brigade was busy all night.

About 11 p.m., Mr. Sale and Mr. Rogers went to Cantonments and had a conference with the Officer Commanding and after this about midnight Mr. Sale and Lieut.-Colonel McCallum visited Meston Road and found all quiet. The military patrols that were out during the night also reported all quiet except for their finding a certain number of people about in the streets.

VIII

Early on the morning of the 25th the central parts of the city appeared fairly quiet. By 6 a.m. Mr. Seward found arson and fighting in progress in Sabzimandi, Coolie Bazar, and Cooperganj, and between 8 and 9 a.m. fighting was going on to the south of Sisamau.

By now people were noticed coming in from outside, Mr. Gavin Jones having seen 200 people, all armed, coming along the Grand Trunk Road in three batches early this morning.

In the morning the military took up their headquarters at the District Board office at the northern end of Meston Road, a third company of greater strength relieving the previous two companies by 10.30 a.m. The Officer in Command did not consider it necessary to retain the pickets at the Meston Road temple and at Moulganj cross-roads; these were accordingly withdrawn and a picket of reduced strength was apparently left all day at Kunji Lal's temple. Two military parties were out patrolling all day on either side of Meston Road.

With the exception of Meston Road the intensity of the rioting, including murders, arson and looting, increased throughout the day. For instance, at about 11 a.m. there occurred in Bengalee Mohal one of the most ghastly atrocities related to us. Here there are a few isolated Muslims living in a predominantly Hindu quarter. The previous day these Muslims had been assured by their Hindu neighbours that they had nothing to fear. This morning, however, the Muslim womenfolk tried to make good their escape with their children and procured an *ekka* for the purpose, but a Hindu neighbour sent the conveyance away assuring them of their perfect safety. When these women became alarmed by the arrival of a band of Hindus armed with spears and other weapons, they were advised by this Hindu to gather together for their greater safety in the house of a certain Muslim. They managed to reach this house over the roof tops but on arrival there they were stoned off the roof and had to take refuge down below. A gang of Hindus then proceeded to break open the main door of the house and effect an entrance. They then set fire to the house, thus almost suffocating the imprisoned women and children. A search in every corner was then made for the inmates who were dragged out to the number of thirteen and butchered one by one before the very eyes of the witness and her daughter-in-law and child, who were the sole survivors thanks to their feigning death by throwing themselves on the heap of corpses. Even so they did not escape injury as their assailants threw some sacking over the bodies and set fire to it, with the result that these three were very severely burnt. Soon after this there arrived on the scene a body of Muslim volunteers who rescued them. Mr. Vidyarthi also reached this mohalla and successfully assisted in the rescue of a number of other Muslim families in the vicinity. Such murderous attacks on people in their houses of which there are many instances are a hitherto unheard of feature of communal riots and illustrate the pitch of fury reached.

As a counterpart to this ferocity we have the picture, for instance, on the Sisamau side, of armed bands of Muslim assassins setting on defenceless passers-by and killing them in cold blood. Mr. Onkar Singh, Deputy Superintendent of Police, has described how he found this morning three dead bodies and fifteen very severely injured Hindus huddled together in a verandah. The story of this incident

is as follows: A postal clerk of a branch office living in the Sisamau area, was going to the General Post Office, to hand over the keys of his office to the Post Master, as owing to the disturbances he was unable to attend his office that day. A number of Hindus accompanied him to see to the safety of their shops in the city, and some wanted to enquire about the welfare of their relatives living in other localities. As the clerk had a gun with him these people felt that they were safer in his company. While on their way, the clerk passed the house of a relative of his and wanted to enquire after him. While he was knocking at the door, a number of Muslims armed with *kantas*, spears, etc., appeared on the scene and began to throw bricks at him and his companions. They were driven to take shelter in the outer verandah of this house and before the clerk was able to use his gun some one from behind came and struck him on the head with a *kanta*, with the result that he fell dead on the spot. This mob then fell upon his companions, killing two of them and severely injuring the rest. The mob took away the gun.

It was on the afternoon of this day that Mr. Ganesh Shankar Vidyarthi was killed while engaged in rescue work. Whatever may be said of the causes of the outbreak Mr. Vidyarthi deserves the highest praise for his selfless devotion during the riots and the fearless manner in which he met his death succouring the distressed. This was in keeping with his known character. When his death became generally known, it must have added greatly to the anger of the Hindus.

The general state of the city was so disturbed this morning that by about 10 o'clock the mills had closed down.

Rioting had also spread by this time to Gwaltoli which had been quiet the previous day. Some looting of Hindu shops in the bazar took place and by 2 p.m. some arson had commenced. Meanwhile rioting was in full force in Sadar Bazar, across the canal, where Mr. Seward was patrolling with a force of armed police. He noticed a huge blaze at a Muslim shop in Nayaganj where some looting was also going on. In Shutarkhana this officer came across large crowds of both communities engaged in throwing brickbats at one another. As they started to throw bricks at the police force as well and refused to disperse, Mr. Seward ordered the firing of nine rounds of buckshot which successfully broke up the mobs. The same morning, in Hoolaganj, at the other end of Sadar Bazar, a *sarai* and a mosque had been set on fire in the course of which five Muslims were murdered.

Looting and burning were also rife in Sabzimandi, and by the afternoon the trouble had also spread to Parmat where rioting, looting and an attack on a mosque took place. In the Baconganj area also much rioting and arson occurred during the day.

A small force of police reinforcements from Lucknow were proceeding from the railway station up Halsey Road about 2 p.m. when bricks were thrown at them. The assailants were dispersed by a *sowar* charge from the Moulganj cross-roads. The violence of the storm reached its height during the day time of the 25th and the following night when murders, arson and looting were rife all over the city and began to subside by the afternoon of the 26th. All night long of the 25th there was continual din and shouting. By 8 p.m. on the 25th the Civil Hospital returns show 49 dead and 216 injured, which is by no means a complete record of all the casualties that had occurred up to that time.

As to the other arrangements made this day to deal with the riots, armoured cars were patrolling the main streets all day from early morning. Mounted patrols from the 50th Battery were also out from midday till evening. Throughout the day parties of police in charge of sub-inspectors were being sent out from Meston Road headquarters in response to reports.

About 11 a.m. it was decided to call out the Auxiliary Force. Their main duty was to patrol Mall Road and prevent the spread of the disturbance into Civil Lines, the areas of Gwaltoli and Parmat that lie within Civil Lines being excluded from the area under the control of this force as they would be put under police guards.

During the afternoon some police reinforcements arrived from other districts which were used to increase the number of pickets in accordance with the original plan. At about 4.30 p.m. three military pickets were put out at the Carshed, Baconganj cross-roads, and Moulganj cross-roads. By about 7 p.m. two companies of the East Yorks Regiment arrived from Lucknow. They made their headquarters at the Municipal Board office. Two pickets from the East Yorks were placed later in the evening at Collectorganj and Badshahi Naka. During the night two parties of the Highland Light Infantry were out patrolling on either side of Meston Road. At 10.45 p.m. a conference was held at the District Magistrate's bungalow at which Brigadier Orton and Mr. Bell, Deputy Inspector-General of Police, who had arrived from Allahabad, were also present. The whole situation was discussed. About midnight Mr. Bell, Mr. Rogers, and Mr. Barron went to Meston Road and made a tour of the main streets.

IX.

On the morning of the 26th riots were still continuing in full force, particularly in the more outlying areas.

About 7.30 a.m. Mr. Souter, Chairman of the Improvement Trust, found some houses burning in the Sisamau area. A large body of Hindus armed with *lathis* and swords were organising a counter-attack on a big crowd of Muslims who were standing some 300 yards away, these latter being undoubtedly responsible for the arson.

By 8 a.m. Gwaltoli Bazar, where there had been trouble the previous day, was a mass of flames, the fire engine being busy there. A large number of huts had been set on fire. Mr. Ryan, Secretary of the Upper India Chamber of Commerce, who was also in administrative charge of the Fire Brigade, describes finding here a crowd, apparently mostly mill hands, of about 150 Hindus and 40 Muslims armed with spears and *lathis* assembled for a battle. He managed to get between them and stop a fight.

When the main riots broke out, the Muslims in Parmat became nervous, but their Hindu neighbours assured them that they would not be molested. By 5 p.m. on the 25th, however, some Hindus began to arm themselves and started throwing bricks at the Muslims and attacking a mosque. The arrival, soon after, of Mr. Onkar Singh, Deputy Superintendent of Police, and two European sergeants with some armed police put the assailants to flight. Nine of them who had been demolishing the mosque and looting a Muslim house were arrested. One Muslim at least had up to now been killed and a Muslim house burnt.

The trouble in Parmat subsided for the time being, but by 10 p.m. on the arrival of armed persons from across the Ganges, arson, looting and murdering of isolated Muslims began again. Mr. S. M. Basheer, Barrister-at-Law, whose house is on the outskirts of Parmat, did his best to summon assistance. About 11 p.m., an Auxiliary Force patrol that passed through the main bazar, where no Muslims live, found all quiet with the exception of a house burning and some people sitting thereabout. Just afterwards, Mr. Barron and the Deputy Inspector-General of Police and the Superintendent of Police also passed through the main bazar of Parmat; they too found all quiet. Unfortunately Mr. Basheer did not happen to meet either of these parties and so could not point out to them where the crimes were being committed just off the main bazar. The Hindus are said to have been keeping a good lookout so as to disappear at once on the arrival of any help from the authorities.

Early on the 26th, Mr. Basheer went to the District Magistrate and then to the Superintendent of Police and to the Kotwal for help, but unluckily his request fell on deaf ears as owing to the previous reports of all being quiet in Parmat no reliance was placed on his statement. By midday on the 26th, about 19 Muslims had been murdered and a number of houses looted and burnt. Some Hindus had given shelter to Muslim women and children who thus escaped with their lives. This is only one of the numerous instances where members of the two communities befriended one another during the riots.

About 9 a.m. the large Annapurna temple in Patkapur, belonging to the family of Mr. Ghosh, a Bengalee, was burnt down by a band of Muslim hooligans. A number of other houses in that locality were also set on fire and looted. About this time, too, the Juma masjid in the same mohalla was attacked.

In Sabzimandi, trouble had started the previous afternoon (25th) when a number of Muslim houses were looted and burnt and some Muslims murdered. Whilst this was going on Mr. Barron with a force of military arrived on the spot. A gang of about 40 or 50 rioters, who were standing at the entrance of a lane, fled on the approach of this force; but Mr. Barron managed to trap six Hindus who were caught redhanded in a house where he found the still warm body of a recently murdered Muslim. This force also effected the rescue of about 50 Muslims who were conveyed to safety in Bara Butcherkhana.

About 7 a.m. on the 26th, Chaudhri Amjad Husain had gone to the Police headquarters in Meston Road to try and get help for the safety of some Muslims who were reported to be in peril in Sabzimandi. On police being available he took them there about 9 a.m. On arrival they found that a number of murders had already been committed and several persons severely injured. Some houses had also been looted and burnt. They found in the adjoining mohalla of Ranjitpurwa that some more Muslims had been murdered and their houses set on fire. They rescued a number of people and took them to Bara Butcherkhana. All these murders appeared to have taken place on the morning of the 26th.

We have already referred to the occurrences of the 25th in the Sadar Bazar area. On the morning of the 26th a mob attacked the house of a Muslim contractor in Harbans Mohal and murdered about eight of his men. They looted the house and set fire to his motor and other property. They also burnt an adjoining mosque and looted and burnt a number of Muslim shops in the neighbourhood.

Looting and arson were still going on to-day in the Baconganj and Colonelganj areas.

Early on the morning of this day Kunwar Maharaj Singh, the Commissioner, arrived from Allahabad. After a brief conference with the civil and military officials and leading non-officials he toured round the city in the area east of Meston Road. He was accompanied by Rai Behadur Babu Vikramajit Singh and Hafiz Muhammad Siddiq, Chairman and Senior Vice-Chairman respectively of the Municipal Board. He was shown a large number of houses and shops that had been burnt and several mosques and temples damaged by fire or otherwise. He came across two wounded Muslims who, only a few moments before the arrival of his motor, had been very badly stabbed by a set of ruffians who were seen running away down a lane in the distance. He also saw some looting in progress in Lathi Mohal. On subsequent days he made a number of tours in other parts of the city.

By the evening of this day the available police forces admitted of special precautions being taken to prevent the arrival of bad characters from outside.

Amongst the special measures taken by the authorities to-day was the division of the city into two circles each under a Deputy Superintendent of Police to patrol continually and supervise police arrangements generally. Owing to the arrival of more reinforcements many more pickets were put out to-day.

At a conference the military authorities agreed to allow more military pickets and by the afternoon eight in all were put out. Armoured cars were patrolling all day as on the 25th. The Auxiliary Force extended their patrolling at night to the Sisamau area.

In the evening the Inspector-General of Police arrived from Lucknow and was taken round the affected areas.

X

By the 27th on the arrival of large police reinforcements the situation showed marked signs of improvement, reports of riot and arson being few in number, though even now the tale of murders was not complete, a woman being done to death this morning in Sadar Bazar. Fires were going on in Etawah Bazar and Chamanganj and some looting was seen in progress in Baconganj where a large house was also set on fire.

Officials as well as private individuals and organisations, such as the Seva Samiti, were now very occupied in continuing rescue work of every kind. Thousands of people are said to have fled for safety by rail and road from the city during the riots as opportunity occurred.

By now one pressing need was the city conservancy which had been completely held up for the last three days; a start was made again to-day with the aid of a few armed constables to give confidence to the menial staff, extended arrangements being possible the following day and the regular service being in operation from the 29th.

By to-day also conditions admitted of the strict enforcement of the orders under section 144, Criminal Procedure Code, about the carrying of *lathis* and the curfew. The improvement in the more central areas is evidenced by the reopening of a few shops in Meston Road this afternoon.

XI

On the 28th the situation continued to show a definite improvement, only a few murders being reported. Arson and rioting had also considerably diminished. A very large number of weapons of all kinds were seized by patrolling parties. A few city shops began to reopen. His Excellency the Governor accompanied by the Home Member visited Cawnpore to-day and toured round the affected areas and met a number of prominent citizens.

One disquieting feature of the day was the spread of incendiarism to villages adjacent to Cawnpore.

In the dry bed of the river Ganges on the Unao side a number of Hindus and Muslims of Gwaltoli had fields under cultivation, mainly, melon fields. Early in the morning some 10 or 12 Hindus crossed over from the Cawnpore side and were joined by about 40 others from the Unao side. They set fire to the field huts and grain stacks of Muslims and then murdered about seven of them, including women and children who were scattered about in the fields and huts. Later on a Muslim accompanied by three constables tried to cross the river to rescue his relations of whose dangerous position he had been informed. This party was, however, stopped at the ferry by some Hindu bad characters who incidentally assured them that these women and children had already been rescued earlier in the day by crossing at another ferry. In the afternoon on hearing of these crimes a Sub-Inspector with a force of police crossed the river and effected the arrest of several suspects and also recovered the bodies of the murdered persons referred to above.

XII.

By the 29th looting and arson had practically ceased. The situation had been brought under such a degree of control that the military pickets were withdrawn. The mills, too, began to reopen.

From to-day the city was divided into three circles, each under a Hindu and a Muslim Deputy Magistrate. They were given a lorry and an armed police guard and were instructed to do what they could in the direction of rescue work, general reassurance and pacification. One immediate result of this was the cessation of the constant shouting at night which had tended to keep up a state of panic.

The disposal of dead bodies, many of which in an advanced stage of decomposition were still left lying in some houses and enclosures, had become a matter of grave urgency, necessitating special sanitary arrangements on a large scale ; from this morning bodies were disposed of direct instead of being brought to the hospital as hitherto, in many cases bodies having to be burnt on the spot.

XIII.

The only instance of disorder reported on the 30th was the looting of a Hindu shop in the city by five Muslims. From this stage a daily narrative is no longer required, as by now the situation had been brought fully under control, the military being finally withdrawn from the Municipal Board office on the morning of 2nd April, and from the District Board office on the morning of

4th April; but military patrols continued on duty in the city till the evening of 5th April. On the morning of 7th April, all the troops of the garrison went for a route march through the city, escorted by mounted police.

XIV.

In connection with the measures taken to meet the outbreak the action of the District Magistrate and the police has been much criticised. Some have blamed them for the outbreak itself, but the majority for the intensity, the violence and the extent to which it grew.

The peace of a district is the special charge of the District Magistrate. His agency for maintaining public order and protecting the people in their daily lives is the police. A less tangible but no less important agency is his personal influence. Many of the critics, but by no means all, belong, we believe, to a political school who think that the power of the District Magistrate has been and to some extent still is a bar to political progress and that the police are too often used in repressing legitimate political aspirations. Their judgment, therefore, may be easily biased by their political leanings, and they may be over-ready to find or to exaggerate faults in the police and the Magistrate. It is an axiom, too, that wisdom comes easier after an event than before it. We have tried to keep these precautionary considerations before our mind in dealing with this section of our work.

Proceedings to stay the execution of Bhagat Singh were still being taken in the High Court on 23rd March. When this final effort was unsuccessful, it was decided that the execution should take place the same evening. This information, it is understood, was passed on to District Magistrates everywhere. Up to that time, therefore, there were no arrangements to be made or precautions to be taken by a District Magistrate. When the *hartal* and mourning procession were proclaimed by the Congress Committee next day in Cawnpore, the District Magistrate asked the Officer Commanding the Station to keep troops in readiness and police arrangements were also made for the procession. After the raid down the Mall by the Vanar Sena, the District Magistrate asked the Officer Commanding about 2.30 to send troops as quickly as possible to Queen's Park which is on the edge of the city. He had before this at 2 p.m. sent two experienced Deputy Magistrates to Meston Road whence trouble had been reported, with instructions to let him know at once the exact situation there. They found rioting going on and shops being plundered. They acted energetically to stop it and at the same time telephoned to the District Magistrate that the situation was serious and asked him to come himself and send police aid. The Superintendent of Police had received similar news and had

ordered all the available police force in the Lines to be sent to Meston road. He then went to the Magistrate's bungalow and they both drove down at once to the city.

Throughout all these dispositions the District Magistrate in our opinion acted with care and foresight. It has been suggested the police ought to have been posted in the Mall to meet an attack in that direction. The Mall had never been affected by disturbances and when news came of the raid by the Vanar Sena, police *sowars* were sent there. This isolated raid had no further effects. A more common criticism is that troops should have been sent at once into the city, i.e., about 2.30 p.m., when news came of the fracas in Moulganj and Meston Road. We doubt if any one would at the time have seriously advised such action. There was in fact, as we know, a lull about 3 p.m. Pandit Rameshwar Dayal, one of the Deputy Magistrates who had been working so courageously in Meston Road, states :—

“By this time more police force was available. I cannot say what was its strength. This was now a few minutes past 3 p.m.

“Conditions on Meston Road and in its adjacent lanes, so far as one could see, appeared quiet on both sides and the situation on Meston Road for the time being had been brought under control.”

The District Magistrate had asked that the troops be sent to Queen's Park ; all the police in the Lines had been sent to the city and then he went down to the city himself. There is nothing more, we think that he could reasonably have done on the information before him at the time.

The next phase in the day's events is crucial and in this the Commission regret to say that they cannot acquit the Magistrate of grave errors in judgment and in action. He reached the city after 3 p.m., and he very properly held a consultation with his officers at Shera Babu's house near the Moulganj cross-roads. Before the consultation ended, the Superintendent of Police and the City Kotwal had to leave to stop some rioting which had been renewed at Moulganj. Some Muslims then arrived and took the District Magistrate up the road to the Thathrai and Chauk to see the damage done to their shops and the damage alleged to have been done to the Bazaza mosque. He had no police force with him at that time. While he and his party were going down the Chauk, a crowd of Hindus ran towards him shouting that an attack was going on in Sarrafa—a neighbouring street. There was now much noise and uproar. The Magistrate, therefore, turned back and went away. We understand his position to be that he thought his presence there would lead to mutual complaints and recriminations between the two crowds resulting in an open fight, so he thought it better to go away. He did not unfortunately return by the main direct route

up through Meston Road in which the temple stands. He crossed the road and went up through some bye-lanes inside and so merged again at Gillis Bazar at the top of Meston Road where he had left his car. He does not remember clearly why he did this, but he thinks now that people told him that fighting with brickbats was going on in Meston Road and he had better go by a side way.

His object in leaving the city was to go to his office which is in the Civil Lines about three-quarters or a mile away in order to write out orders under section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This was about 4 p.m. A careful comparison of evidence shows that it was at this time that the temple in Meston Road was attacked and set on fire. It was about this time too that the mosque in the Chauk already attacked appears to have been set on fire and probably the mosque in the Sarrafa nearby was set on fire then too or soon after. Word was brought almost at once to the District Magistrate by a Deputy Magistrate of the firing of the Meston Road temple. This was a grave situation. Rioting too was renewed at Moulganj. Before 5 o'clock the situation was out of control and the Superintendent of Police telephoned a message to the District Magistrate to send the troops. Mr. Barron, the City Magistrate, had all this time been kept at the Magistrate's bungalow to deal with any telephone calls or reports which might be received while the District Magistrate was in the city. About 5 p.m. the Magistrate left his office, came to his bungalow and sent Mr. Barron to take the troops who were at Queen's Park into the city. They reached Moulganj at 10 minutes past 6. Thus neither the District Magistrate nor his experienced City Magistrate was in the city in those critical hours from 4 o'clock to 6. It appears to us that the Magistrate was fatally slow in appreciating the seriousness of the situation. The temple in Meston Road had a history behind it. This very spot, where the temple and the Machhli Bazar mosque stand facing each other, was the scene of the serious riot in 1913. Muslims and Hindus both had special memories and antagonisms connected with these shrines. The District Magistrate knew this. He was not far from the spot. It was no time for him to turn aside and leave it. Had he taken a quick decision then, gathered a small force of police who, as we know, were available down the road and gone straight to the temple, he would almost certainly have beaten off the attack and saved the temple from being burnt. He could similarly in all probability have prevented the burning of the Bazaza mosque and the Sarrafa mosque too. It is the common opinion, and the District Magistrate has told us so himself, that it was the news of the burning of the temple and the mosque that caused that sudden fury of passion which swept the riot out of control and carried it with unprecedented speed out into the farthest quarters of the city. This failure to appreciate and to act was a grave error on the part of the District Magistrate. Further, the Commission

believe it to be very important that the District Magistrate in periods of grave disturbance should himself be in the city as much as possible until the situation has been brought under control.

Very many witnesses represented to us that the District Magistrate should at the outbreak of the riot have divided the whole city into circles and put a Deputy Magistrate with a force of police in charge of each circle. They claimed that this was done at the beginning of the riots in 1927 and proved most effective. Witnesses are mistaken in believing that the measures taken in 1927 are a precedent for this course. We examined Mr. Monro, who was the District Magistrate of Cawnpore in 1927, and we also went through the reports made by him to the Commissioner and the Government at the time. He did not during the stress of the riot divide the city into circles and place a Deputy Magistrate with a force of police in charge of each circle. He took this action about the third or fourth day, i.e., after the violence of the riot was over. He did it not to stop the riot but to restore confidence and bring about reconciliation. For this purpose, he put a Hindu and a Muslim Deputy Magistrate jointly in charge of each circle. He did not believe that the course suggested by witnesses would be of any value in stopping a riot. What he did with the Deputy Magistrates was to direct them to keep moving about in different parts of the town and to arrange between themselves that their movements did not overlap. Action similar to this might, we think, have been taken on this occasion but we are not prepared to stress it, for it has to be borne in mind that the rioting then and now was on a different scale. In the fury and violence of the present riots, it would hardly have been safe for a Magistrate of either community to keep moving about alone in the inner mohallas. As the violence of the rioting subsided and as more police became available there were, we think, occasions when it would have been proper to give Deputy Magistrates a police guard to enable them to conduct rescue work more vigorously. It is on record that Deputy Magistrates did ask for such aid but were unable to obtain it.

More use, too, at that stage might have been made of the help of Honorary Magistrates and leading non-official gentlemen. At the same time, it ought to be said that high civic position entails special responsibilities and any one occupying such a position should have come forward freely to exercise his influence. In this there was conspicuous failure.

If the police force were in adequate strength, the suggestion to divide the city into Magistrates' circles each with its own police guard is probably sound. On this occasion the police force available during the first two days was not adequate, nor would it perhaps even be financially feasible to keep in peace time a police force that would be adequate in the event of a violent outbreak to guard the main lines of communication in the city and provide also separate

guards for at least five city circles. We are not able, therefore, to endorse to any significant extent the criticisms of the dispositions made by the authorities in this particular respect.

XV.

Complaints against the police range from accusations of indifference to actual participation in the riots. The most prominent charge was one of general inactivity which can only be satisfactorily judged by splitting it up under different heads.

A criticism that has been urged before us by many is that sufficiently strong action was not taken in the very beginning. Some witnesses pressed that resort should have been had to firing but exactly when this might have been justifiable is not specified, and is no easy matter for us to determine. Some of the animus, too, that has been aroused against the police has emanated from and been fostered by the large number of persons who made requests for assistance with which the authorities were, for the most part, quite unable to comply. A number of witnesses have expressed the opinion that owing to the "Go-slow" policy of the Government during the civil disobedience movement and the criticisms aroused against the police during this period, they were reluctant to use force. These are considerations to be kept in mind.

With reference to the actual events of the 24th we have first of all to consider the position in Meston Road and Moulganj cross-roads between 2 and 3 p.m. while the Kotwal was in charge of the police. In that area the only available force on the spot was the civil police of the Meston Road and Gillis Bazar outposts and the few armed police that the Kotwal brought with him. There were only two Deputy Magistrates there. Brick-throwing was undoubtedly taking place in Meston Road. During this period between 2 and 3 the Kotwal evidently hoped to be able to keep the two communities apart by following a policy of tact or *bich bachao* and by contradicting mischievous rumours. We feel that by now he ought to have realised that they were up against something quite different from the civil disobedience type of disorder with which Cawnpore had been familiar during the past twelve months.

During this earliest stage Pandit Rameshwar Dayal has instanced two cases of inactivity by constables. He found a couple of them in Meston Road making no attempt to interfere with two or three Muslims who were looting a shop on the opposite side of the road and he also noticed half a dozen constables as "listless spectators" of the Muslim attack on Shera Babu's Park and neighbouring shops. That this inactivity on their part was reprehensible goes without saying, but one has to make allowances for a few constables left without an officer to lead them in face of a dangerous situation.

By 3 p.m. we enter on another stage with the arrival of police reinforcements from the Lines. Between 4 and 6 rioting increased to a dangerous degree. The main criticism arising at this point is that the police should have used more force, e.g., firing.

We feel that an opportunity for striking a hard blow must surely have arisen whilst the Meston Road temple was being attacked and set on fire, an operation that occupied a considerable period of time. The same very likely applies to the burning of the Chauk Bazaza and Sarrafa mosques.

On the subject of *lathi* charges it has been represented to us that one peculiar difficulty was that the mobs dispersed on the arrival of the police, but even so several *lathi* charges were in fact made at Moulganj cross-roads when the Superintendent of Police was present and at other places on Meston Road and Chauk. We think these charges might have been pressed home more.

We have heard too of more than one instance of crowds re-forming after being dispersed. We consider that something more might have been done in the direction of warning people that if they again collected together in crowds they would be liable to be fired upon.

As to this period we have not been informed of the dispositions made of the available police force which after the reinforcements from the Lines about 3 p.m. amounted in all to nearly 200, including 97 armed police of all ranks ; but it is clear from the evidence before us that a state of great confusion must have prevailed. More than one Deputy Magistrate who was present on the spot has described his difficulty in laying his hands on any police and the Kotwal himself speaks of there not being sufficient men to take any effective measure. Seeing the number of police that were actually available in Meston Road at the time we felt that the officers in the prevailing confusion must have lost touch with their own men and so failed to make the best use of them. This seems evident from the fact that in spite of the presence of this force the temple and the mosques were set on fire. In Queen's Park too we know that there was a force of between 20 and 30 armed police available who were entirely overlooked during the first day. Some men also were arrested about this time under the orders of Deputy Magistrates and handed over to the police but they could not be subsequently traced. It was the failure to deal with the situation on Meston Road during this period and particularly the burning of the temple and the mosques that led to the fury and rapid spread of the trouble into the adjacent mohallas.

With regard to the criticism made by several witnesses of the concentration of forces on Meston Road, we have definitely been told that the chief objective of the police in the initial stages of the riots was to prevent a clash at Meston Road and Moulganj cross-roads. The two considerations bearing on this scheme are that Meston and Halsey Roads are very wide thoroughfares and that the mohallas to

the west of Meston Road are predominantly Muslim while those to the east are predominantly Hindu. Nothing was more easy therefore than for a pitched battle to take place in Meston Road in which hundreds of deaths might have occurred within a very short space of time. It seems clear that with the forces at the disposal of the police they could not have succeeded as they most certainly did in preventing such a battle, had they at the same time started dispersing their men into the network of lanes in the adjoining mohallas. This initial scheme of concentrating on Meston Road and sending out raiding parties together with increased picketing of mohallas as reinforcements arrived met with the approval of the Deputy Inspector-General of Police ; and the Officer Commanding, when questioned on the subject by us, admitted that he would have adopted the same line of action himself had he been called upon to take over control of the riots. We are decidedly of opinion, therefore, that the authorities acted rightly in concentrating their forces on Meston Road at this stage with the objects above-mentioned.

There is the further question to be considered whether this concentration here was justified later on after the arrival of the military. The troops, of course, were not there till 6 p.m., on the 24th and the military pickets were withdrawn from Meston Road in the morning of the 25th and were not replaced till 4 p.m. There were several occasions, as Mr. Barron has told us, even during the first 48 hours, when the number of armed police on Meston Road fell as low as ten. After the 25th, Mr. Barron considered it would have been possible to reduce the police force on Meston Road and at Moulganj, but he did not consider it safe to do so. We therefore do not attach much importance to this criticism. The possibility of a clash on the broad thoroughfares must have been an ever-present anxiety until the central parts had been brought under control.

As to a further criticism that the Kotwali and not Meston Road should have been made the Police head-quarters, there are several sound reasons for the selection of the latter during the initial stages of the riot. Though this probably did result in a difficulty to some extent in private individuals communicating with the police, there is the important point that this spot was far more central than the Kotwali, and indeed in the reorganisation proposals it was clearly pointed out by the Superintendent of Police that the Kotwali was very badly placed right out of the way in one corner of the city, and the proposal was to erect it on the site of the present Gillis Bazar outpost. It was also closer to the Police Lines and to the Mall, a most important line of communication. Another consideration in selecting Meston Road was the fact that the temple in it was one of the real danger spots. A telephone, too, was available in the house of Hafiz Muhammad Siddiq, one of the most respectable public men in the city, though it is unfortunate that recourse was necessarily had to a private telephone connection, and it is due to this that consider-

able misunderstanding arose on the part of the other community who felt that their requests for help were not receiving the attention they might otherwise have had.

Every class of witness before us who gave expression otherwise to widely different points of view agreed in this one respect, that the police showed indifference and inactivity in dealing with various incidents in the riot. These witnesses include European business men, Muslims and Hindus of all shades of opinion, military officers, the Secretary of the Upper India Chamber of Commerce, representatives of the Indian Christian community, and even Indian officials. It is impossible to ignore such unanimity of evidence. They have given a number of instances and though some of them are capable of explanation, yet there is no doubt in our mind that during the first three days of the riot the Police did not show that activity in the discharge of their duties which was expected of them. In coming to this conclusion we have in mind a number of cases which do not admit of any doubt, e.g., those in Parmat, Gwaltoli, Sadar Bazar, Sabzimandi and Patkapur.

At Parmat, as has been stated, the trouble started on the afternoon of the 25th. There is a police chauki there and in addition to this at 5 p.m. that day an armed guard was also posted. During the night of the 25th there were murders, arson, and looting going on and by noon of the 26th about nineteen persons were murdered, a number of houses looted and set on fire. All this happened not very far from where the police force was posted. They appear to have paid no attention to these crimes.

Then there is the case of Gwaltoli. Mr. Ryan tells us how he found on the morning of the 26th the whole bazar on fire and saw huge crowds armed with all sorts of weapons ready for a fight. A police armed guard was there, but it was not making any attempt to interfere. Mr. Ryan got between the two crowds and stopped them from coming to blows. He asked the guard what they were supposed to be doing and they said that they had come from Lucknow the day before and had been left there without any definite orders.

Then again there is the case of Sadar Bazar. On the morning of the 26th there were two armed police pickets in that locality and yet we have an instance where eight people were butchered, and a house looted and set on fire; at least one of these pickets was not very far from the place of occurrence. They must have been aware that this was going on as large gangs were engaged in committing these crimes in a leisurely manner.

In Sabzimandi, on the morning of the 26th a number of murders were committed and Mr. Islam Nabi Khan, Deputy Magistrate, has told us that from the place of occurrence a police armed guard, which he had posted the day before and which was still there, was only at a distance of about a hundred paces.

In Patkapur, there is a police outpost and in addition to this there was also a police picket, and yet the Juma masjid and the temple of Annapurna Devi were attacked and set on fire.

A number of witnesses have cited instances of serious crimes being committed within view of the police without their active interest being aroused.

It has been stated by the City Magistrate and the Superintendent of Police that all armed guards were given instructions not to hesitate to fire if they saw any one engaged in murder, arson or other serious crimes. It is very strange that all this havoc was wrought in the city and yet none of these police guards ever found occasion to fire on any one engaged in such serious crimes during the first three days of the riot. We feel that from the experience gained in these riots the value of standing pickets posted at wide intervals is over-rated.

In contrast to this, we see what effective action was possible from the success attained by Mr. Onkar Singh, Deputy Superintendent of Police, who was sent to Sisamau on receipt of news of trouble in that quarter and who by prompt action quelled the disturbances and effected over fifty arrests within a short time.

In this connection, we have to consider the question of the Watch and Ward beat patrols linking up the pickets and supplying information. We may take one instance as an example. On the morning of the 25th there were the terrible atrocities committed in Bengalee Mohal at a comparatively short distance from Meston Road headquarters. No information seems to have reached the police though news was received by Mr. Vidyarthi in time to enable him to rescue a number of Muslims of the locality. We have only given this instance but the same applies to the whole of the beat police. It appears to us that these constables were not going on their beats. The authorities were relying on this force for their information but it ought to have realised by the noon of the 25th that their beat police were not doing their duty and they ought to have taken some immediate steps to improve their sources of information.

We are told by a number of witnesses, and the District Magistrate also has said so in his evidence, that complaints about the indifference and inactivity of the police were made at the time. It is to be regretted that no serious notice was taken of these complaints. The great tragedy throughout the worst days of the riots was the inadequate appreciation of the seriousness of the situation by the local authorities, their ignorance of happenings inside the mohallas and consequently their failure to take effective action to protect the lives and property of the people. Even when two circles under Deputy Superintendents of Police were constituted on the 26th, information did not come in as it should have done. In one instance,

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Every class of witness before us who gave expression otherwise to widely different points of view agreed in this one respect, that the police showed indifference and inactivity in dealing with various incidents in the riot. These witnesses include European business men, Muslims and Hindus of all shades of opinion, military officers, the Secretary of the Upper India Chamber of Commerce, representatives of the Indian Christian community, and even Indian officials. It is impossible to ignore such unanimity of evidence. They have given a number of instances and though some of them are capable of explanation, yet there is no doubt in our mind that during the first three days of the riot the Police did not show that activity in the discharge of their duties which was expected of them. In coming to this conclusion we have in mind a number of cases which do not admit of any doubt, e.g., those in Parmat, Gwaltoli, Sadar Bazar, Sabzimandi and Patkapur.

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In Patkapur, there is a police outpost and in addition to this there was also a police picket, and yet the Juma masjid and the temple of Annapura Devi were attacked and set on fire.

A number of witnesses have cited instances of serious crimes being committed within view of the police without their active interest being aroused.

It has been stated by the City Magistrate and the Superintendent of Police that all armed guards were given instructions not to hesitate to fire if they saw any one engaged in murder, arson or other serious crimes. It is very strange that all this havoc was wrought in the city and yet none of these police guards ever found occasion to fire on any one engaged in such serious crimes during the first three days of the riot. We feel that from the experience gained in these riots the value of standing pickets posted at wide intervals is over-rated.

In contrast to this, we see what effective action was possible from the success attained by Mr. Onkar Singh, Deputy Superintendent of Police, who was sent to Sisamau on receipt of news of trouble in that quarter and who by prompt action quelled the disturbances and effected over fifty arrests within a short time.

In this connection, we have to consider the question of the Watch and Ward beat patrols linking up the pickets and supplying information. We may take one instance as an example. On the morning of the 25th there were the terrible atrocities committed in Bengalee Mohal at a comparatively short distance from Meston Road headquarters. No information seems to have reached the police though news was received by Mr. Vidyarthi in time to enable him to rescue a number of Muslims of the locality. We have only given this instance but the same applies to the whole of the beat police. It appears to us that these constables were not going on their beats. The authorities were relying on this force for their information but it ought to have realised by the noon of the 25th that their beat police were not doing their duty and they ought to have taken some immediate steps to improve their sources of information.

We are told by a number of witnesses, and the District Magistrate also has said so in his evidence, that complaints about the indifference and inactivity of the police were made at the time. It is to be regretted that no serious notice was taken of these complaints. The great tragedy throughout the worst days of the riots was the inadequate appreciation of the seriousness of the situation by the local authorities, their ignorance of happenings inside the mohallas and consequently their failure to take effective action to protect the lives and property of the people. Even when two circles under Deputy Superintendents of Police were constituted on the 26th, information did not come in as it should have done. In one instance,

during the patrol of a Deputy Superintendent of Police in an area where crimes were being committed, the picket there and the beat police reported "all quiet."

The inactivity of the police is further illustrated by the very small number of arrests made at the beginning. On the 24th, there was only one and on the 25th only five with the exception of those made in a special raid by a Deputy Superintendent of Police in Colonelganj and on the 26th only two persons were arrested. These figures indicate either inactivity or that no importance was attached to the making of arrests as a means of checking the riots. More than one Deputy Magistrate has told us that no serious effort was being made to enforce the orders under section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure before the 27th.

The failure to make arrests and enforce these orders must have given the bad characters an idea that they were free to do as they liked; and of this opportunity they took full advantage. The policy of making arrests on a large scale at an early stage proved very effective in the 1927 riot. We are not able to get any official figure of the arrests on that occasion but a witness produced an extract from the *Pioneer* of a couple of days after the riots showing that nearly 250 arrests were made during the first 24 hours.

An exact reason for the lack of activity is difficult to assign. Pickets, we were told, even when posted in their places did little or nothing. "They were wanting," says Mr. David, "in any kind of initiative and had no idea or conception of what they were placed there for." Mr. Ryan gave an instance of exactly the same thing. The patrolling by the mohalla police was equally bad. Wherever in fact there were small parties of police on their own, the complaint is that they did nothing. All this points to a lack of leaders possessing drive and energy in charge of the smaller parties of police and a lack of supervision and indifference by immediate superiors. This leadership was particularly essential in the case of disturbances of such extent, magnitude and nature.

There may be some truth, too, in the theory advanced by some witnesses that the police had grown so accustomed to non-interference during the civil disobedience movement that they had neither the wish nor the will to intervene. Now they were not themselves the attacked party and so, to interfere as little as possible may have seemed to many of them to be the line of least resistance and danger. Whatever may be the true cause of the inactivity we consider that had the District Magistrate realised the effect his presence about the city was bound to produce it would have gone some way towards countering it.

In making the above adverse criticisms of police action we consider it only fair to mention the heavy handicap carried by Mr. Rogers in his having only taken over charge four days before the riots

and hence being unacquainted both with the city and the officers under his command. Mr. Seward, his assistant, too, had only arrived on the 16th of March.

In the detailed analysis of criticisms there are some considerations on the side of the police that are liable to be overlooked. They were called on suddenly to meet a very complicated situation. The strain thrown on them was very great. Many of them remained on duty without relief for thirty hours and longer. It was no doubt often in respect to these weary men that witnesses say they found the police sitting down and doing nothing. It was not possible in the stress of the time to distinguish the shirkers from the work-weary. The failure of some brought blame on all. In the open streets of the city—in Meston Road, Moulganj and Halsey Road—where the immediate supervision, control and leadership of superior officers were available, the activity of the police kept the combatants apart and prevented losses on a larger scale.

XVI

The District Magistrate and the Superintendent of Police have both complained of the insufficiency of the police force in Cawnpore in normal times, a fact to which the European commercial community was also alive. In 1928, the then Superintendent of Police prepared a very careful scheme for a permanent increase in the civil police of three sub-inspectors, 12 head constables, 19 naiks, and 289 constables. This included increases on account of:—

- (a) Traffic duties.
- (b) District Intelligence staff.
- (c) Special requirements on the introduction of the Plain Clothes staff.
- (d) Prosecuting staff.

The Inspector-General of Police excluded the figures on account of these four items and asked for an immediate increase of 10 head constables, 16 naiks and 188 constables.

This allocation scheme was put forward owing to the rapid growth in the population of Cawnpore and to the increase in the size of the inhabited area, particularly the parts under the Improvement Trust. An extensive area like Sisamau, for instance, has no thana nor even an outpost. The scheme involved the appointment of an additional Superintendent of Police and the construction of two new thanas and twelve outposts in the city area. It was aimed, too, at curing a very great weakness in the Watch and Ward system. The staff were housed far from their beats, and that defect still exists. It may have been one of the reasons for the unsatisfactory beat work seen during the recent riots. The Government reply was that "In view of the present financial stringency the Governor in Council has dropped your proposal for an increase in the police in Cawnpore."

We are strongly of opinion that in view of the increase in the population and size of Cawnpore city the present police force is inadequate and quite out of date. It is true that on the outbreak of the riot there happened to be in Cawnpore 74 armed police that are not ordinarily there, and they, to some extent, made up for the deficiency in the number of police that a city of this size and development requires; but this shortage had undoubtedly an effect both morally and materially. The police officers must have felt that the strength and arrangements were not what they were entitled to expect them to have been. We are also of opinion that to meet any such emergency in the future a plan of action should be prepared beforehand based on forces that will be immediately available. There was a scheme of this nature in existence prepared after the trouble in 1927 but it proved to be of no practical value as it assumed a far greater police strength than the city had.

Government acted promptly as soon as they were informed of the insufficiency of the force at Cawnpore, and by the evening of the 25th 7 officers and 210 British other ranks and 237 police had arrived in Cawnpore, and by the evening of the 26th another 239 police had also come.

XVII.

In the dispositions made to deal with the outbreak the part taken by the military forces was of great importance. The Officer Commanding the Station, Lieut.-Colonel McCallum, responded promptly to the District Magistrate's request for military aid. He had one battery, an armoured car company (less one section) and three companies of his own regiment, the Highland Light Infantry in Cantonment. He sent one company of the Highland Light Infantry to Queen's Park at 3 o'clock on the District Magistrate's request and on a further request at 5.30, he sent this company at once into the city. The arrival of the troops had an immediate steadying effect within the area of their influence, and throughout the riots whenever and wherever the troops appeared their presence was a signal for peace. Three military pickets were at once posted at central points. As news came in of the spread of the rioting, Lieut.-Colonel McCallum sent a second company of the Highland Light Infantry to the city at 10.30 p.m. At this period a consultation was held between the military and civil officers on the spot. The latter were anxious that the military should extend the picket system as they now had two companies. They proposed that ten military pickets in all should be put out. This the military officers refused to do. They were prepared to send out three patrols from the newly arrived company, but their instructions and the King's Regulations forbade their splitting up their troops into small bodies.

Their contention was not, we think, unreasonable at that time. The trouble had arisen following the execution of revolutionaries whose aim had been the violent overthrow of the British Government. The first that the military officers knew of it was probably the attacks made upon Europeans on the Mall. Their natural conclusion would be that the *emeute* was aimed at the Government. Later they became aware, of course, that it was inter-communal, but in this first night their action might easily be influenced to some extent by their original information. It was then late at night and in face of their orders they would be particularly reluctant to put out small parties in pickets. This early difference of opinion caused, we think, a want of cordiality in the liaison between the military and civil officers. The military officers also undoubtedly held and have given open expression to this opinion, that the police were, for whatever reason, not doing their own work and were inclined to expect from the troops work that was purely police work. It was arranged, therefore, that for the night of the 24th, there should be three pickets and three patrols.

Next morning about 10.30, the Officer Commanding sent a fresh company to relieve the two companies that had been on duty. At this stage the military made what appears to have been an unfortunate decision. With the exception of a small picket of seven or eight men which was left in the Chauk, they withdrew the troops altogether from the city proper. It is not to be understood as was at one time asserted, that they withdrew them to Cantonment. They concentrated them at the District Board office which is only across the road from the top of Meston Road itself. They were, therefore, all the time within very easy reach of the main centres of the trouble. Still the withdrawal of troops is always liable to be misinterpreted, and in the watchful and vengeful mood in which fanatics of both sides then were, the withdrawal was bound to lead to trouble—which it did. The Moulganj picket had hardly gone when a riot broke out at the cross-roads. Military patrolling by armoured cars, mounted men from the battery and parties of the Highland Light Infantry went on through the day. In the evening three pickets were put out and with the arrival of two companies of East Yorks from Lucknow, the system of pickets was extended. This was completed in the afternoon of the 26th and this point—it may be no more than a coincidence—marked the end of the violent stage.

The Commission consider that the Officer Commanding and the officers under him acted throughout with promptitude and gave invaluable aid. There is one point of more general importance to which we would refer. The military officers laid great stress on concentration. They are perhaps bound to do so by their Regulations. We think that an occasion when the rigidity of the principle can and should be relaxed is a communal riot. In the present instance

all the evidence goes to show that on the appearance of troops or police, even in the smallest number, the crowd melted away. There was no disposition to attack authority. The rioters wanted only to get at each other. The splitting up of troops in such circumstances into smaller bodies than usual is not attended with much, if any, danger and would be most effective in meeting scattered rioting.

The Auxiliary Force under Lieut.-Colonel R. Menzies, O.B.E., V.D., were called out on the 25th and the work they did has received universal appreciation.

XVIII.

The Kirana Sewa Samiti have added to their reputation by their tireless and often dangerous work. They removed dead bodies without thought for themselves and helped the wounded. Their social service was of the greatest value, and the Honorary Secretary Mr. Bhasin, deserves high commendation for the excellence of their organisation.

The Fire Brigade of Cawnpore also did tireless and dangerous work day and night during the riots. Mr. Ryan, who worked personally with them and is also in administrative charge of the Brigade, and their Superintendent, Mr. Dwivedi, deserve great credit.

It is not to be forgotten amid this record of crime that there were many mohallas where a minority of either community lived in perfect security among their neighbours and many instances where in moments of danger, members of one community rescued and harboured members of the other community, particularly women and children.

We will only add that an aftermath of bitter feeling still remains in Cawnpore and extreme nervousness exists on both sides which may easily result in panic and a fresh outbreak. It is a most pressing duty and responsibility resting on the leading citizens of Cawnpore to put their heads together and devise a conciliation board of some permanence whose members would work together in a spirit of real co-operation and by their individual and combined influence assuage feelings and prevent actions that thoughtlessly or otherwise might lead to similar trouble again.

NAINI TAL :

22nd May, 1931.

G. O. ALLEN.

BALDEO RAM DAVE.

LIAQAT ALI KHAN.

M. KEANE.

Papers attached :

- (1) A map of Cawnpore.
- (2) Statement No. I showing the strength of Cawnpore Headquarters Police, as supplied by the Inspector-General of Police, United Provinces.
- (3) Statement No. II showing the reinforcements of police arriving each day in Cawnpore from other districts under Government orders.
- (4) Statement No. III showing the outposts and beats in Cawnpore city excluding Cantonment and Nawabganj during the riot of March, 1931.
- (5) Statement No. IV supplied by the Superintendent of Police, Cawnpore, showing the number of police necessary for patrol and picketing work (including a reserve for relief) during a riot in the city (excluding Cantonment and Nawabganj).
- (6) Statement No. V showing the number of houses and other properties burnt or damaged during the communal riot of March, 1931, supplied by the Cawnpore Municipality.
- (7) Statement No. VI showing the number of deaths recorded at the Prince of Wales' Hospital, Cawnpore, up to 28th March, and the number who died of wounds in hospital.
- (8) Statement No. VI-A showing the details of injury cases treated in the Prince of Wales' Hospital, Cawnpore.
- (9) Statement No. VII showing the number of dead bodies cremated and buried during the Cawnpore riots, supplied by the Health Officer, Cawnpore Municipality.
- (10) Statement No. VIII showing crimes reported mohalla-wise up to May 4, 1931, for the first four days of the riot.
- (11) Statement No. IX showing the number of arrests made each day for offences under the Indian Penal Code, Arms Act, and breach of the orders under section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (supplied by the Superintendent of Police on 12th May, 1931).

STATEMENT No. I.

Statement showing the strength of Cawnpore Headquarters Police, as supplied by the Inspector-General of Police, United Provinces of Agra and Oudh.

	Sub-Inspectors.	Head Constables.	Naiks.	Constables.
A.—Civil Police.				
Strength on paper :—				
(1) Sanctioned for city	17	29	42	430
(2) Temporary D.I.S.	1	—	2	15
(3) Reserve, miscellaneous duties, courts, etc.	11	21	7	148
Total	29	50	51	593
B.—Civil Police.				
Actual strength on 24th March, 1931, excluding those on leave and on guard or escort duty who could not be relieved :—				
(1) City police stations	18	27	42	398
(2) Reserve, miscellaneous duties, etc.	8	16	3	107
Total	26	43	45	505
C.—Armed Police.				
Strength on paper :—				
(1) Sanctioned allocation (permanent)	2	24	32	300
(2) Punitive police (temporary) ..	1	1	2	50
(3) Range reserve	1	7	19	150
Total	4	32	53	500
D.—Armed Police.				
Actual strength on 24th March, 1931, excluding those on leave and on guard or escort duty who could not be relieved :—				
(1) Out of sanctioned allocation ..	2	8	13	132
(2) Range reserve	1	1	4	12
(3) Punitive police	1	2	2	50
Total	4	11	19	194
E.—Civil Police.				
Additional permanent increase :—				
(1) Asked for by district authorities in 1928	3	12	19	289
(2) Recommended by Inspector-General of Police	—	10	16	188
(3) Sanctioned by Government	—	—	—	—

STATEMENT No. II.

Statement showing the reinforcements of police arriving each day in Cawnpore from other districts under Government orders.

Date.	Gazetted officers.	Other ranks.	Remarks.
1931.			
25th March	1	236	Includes— Armed police .. 99 Mounted police 22
26th „	2	237	
27th „	1	57	
28th „	—	34	
Total	4	564	

STATEMENT No. III.

Statement showing the outposts and beats in Cawnpore City excluding Cantonment and Nawabganj during the riot of March, 1931.

Thana.	Outpost and allocated strength.		Serial No.	Beats.
	Non-commissioned officers.	Constables.		Mohallas concerned.
<i>Kotwali Circle.</i>				
(1) Gillis Bazar ..	6	38	1	Parade.
			2	Chauk Sarrafa.
			3	Mahesari Mohal.
			4	Etawah Bazar.
			5	Bengalee Mohal.
			6	Sarsaiya Ghat.
(2) Moulganj ..	5	30	7	Butcherkhana Khurd.
			8	Farrash Khana.
			9	Chapper Mohal.
			10	Chakla Mohal.
			11	Sabzimandi.
(3) Sirki Mohal ..	4	30	12	Naughara.
			13	Nakhas.
			14	Hatia.
			15	Shatranji Mohal.
			16	Generalganj.
(4) Filkhana ..	4	24	17	Nayaganj.
			18	Natchghar.
			19	Sirki Mohal.
			20	Roti Godam.
(5) Patkapur ..	3	18	21	Patkapur.
			22	Kursawan.
			23	Birhana.

Statement showing the outposts and beats in Cawnpore City excluding Cantonment and Nawabganj during the riot of March, 1931—continued.

Thana.	Outpost and allocated strength.		Serial No.	Beats. Mohallas concerned.
	Non-commissioned officers.	Con-stables.		
<i>Kotwali Circle—</i> continued.				
(6) Naharpar ..	3	18	24	Daulatganj.
			25	Gadaria Mohal.
			26	Harbans Mohal.
(7) Collectorganj ..	2	12	27	Shutar Khana.
			28	Guards Barracks.
<i>Colonelganj Circle.</i>				
No outpost (supplied from thana).	1	7	1	Half of Colonelganj, Chunniganj, Bashirganj, MacRobertganj, Khatikana, Idgah, Cemeteries, Talab Subedar, Lodhaura.
No outpost (supplied from thana).	1	6	2	Half of Colonelganj, Bazaria, half of Baconganj, half of Kanghi Mohal, Talaq Mohal, Hata Chotey Mian, Hata Gammu Khan, Muslim Orphanage.
No outpost (supplied from thana).	1	6	3	Half of Sisamau, half of Khapra Mohal, Humayun Bagh, Shafiabad, half of Prem Nagar, half of Qasimganj.
(8) Outpost Jarib	1	6	4	Half of Sisamau, half of Prem Nagar, Akbar Bagh, Shafiabad, Chamanganj, Bhannanapurwa, half of Qasimganj, Deputy - ka-Parao, Anand Bagh, Hata Gulam Ali.
(9) Mannapurwa ..	2	7	5	Pechbagh, Farash Khana, Munnalal Street, Aminganj, Bhainsya Hata, half of Baconganj, half of Kanghi Mohal, half of Khapra Mohal, Mannapurwa, Nazirbagh.
(10) Gwaltoli ..	2	8	6	Gwaltoli, Khalasi Lines, part of Civil Lines, Elgin Mills, Victoria Mills, Lal Imli.

Statement showing the outposts and beats in Cawnpore³ City excluding Cantonment and Nawabganj during the riot of March, 1931—continued.

Thana.	Outpost and allocated strength.		Serial No.	Beats.
	Non-commissioned officers.	Constables.		Mohallas concerned.
<i>Colonelganj circle—continued.</i>				
(11) Parmat ..	3	12	7	Parmat, part of Civil Lines, Muir Mills, Parade, Carshed.
			8	Part of Civil Lines, Courts, Jail, Dayanand Anglo-Vedic College, Hata Gulab, Police Lines.
<i>Anwarganj circle.</i>				
No outpost (supplied from thana).	3	20	1	Hiramanpurwa, Phulwali Gali, Baghia Mani Ram, part of Farrash Khana, Bhoosatoli, part of Pechbagh.
	(for three	beats).	2	Jugrapurwa, Chappar Mohal, Kasimganj, Anwarganj, Khatkana, Bansmandi, Dalelpurwa, Anwarganj, Hata Gur Prasad, Kinara Nahr Gang, Ranjit Purwa.
			3	Sabzimandi, Coolie Bazar, Bara Butcherkhana, Cooperganj, Collectorganj, Badshahi Naka.
Cooperganj ..	2	8	4	Lachmanpurwa, Cotton Mills, Town Hall, Flour Mills, Khalwa.
Juhi	2	6	5	Juhi, part of Bhannanapurwa, Darshanpurwa, Chamaranpurwa, Rairpurwa, Rampurwa, Munshipurwa, Kothi Opium, Babupurwa, Begampurwa and others.
Total ..	45	256		

STATEMENT No. IV.

Statement supplied by the Superintendent of Police, Cawnpore, showing the number of police necessary for patrol and picketing work (including a reserve for relief) during a riot in the city (excluding Cantonment and Nawabganj).

—	Armed Police.			Civil Police.		
	Sub-Inspectors.	Non-commissioned officers.	Constables.	Sub-Inspectors.	Non-commissioned officers.	Constables.
<i>Under Kotwali circle.</i>						
Pickets	—	20	80	—	4	16
Patrols	—	—	—	6	36	108
Reserve	1	12	48	—	—	—
<i>Under Anwarganj circle.</i>						
Pickets	—	10	40	—	5	20
Patrols	—	—	—	5	30	90
Reserve	1	6	24	—	—	—
<i>Under Colonelganj circle.</i>						
Pickets	—	8	32	—	5	20
Patrols	—	—	—	5	28	84
Reserve	1	4	16	—	—	—
Total	3	60	240	16	108	338

STATEMENT No. V.

Statement showing the number of houses and other properties burnt or damaged during communal riot of March, 1931, supplied by the Cawnpore Municipality.

1. Mosques	18			
2. Temples	42			
3. Hindu houses	248			
4. Muslim houses	101			
5. Municipal Board shops	2			
6. Shera Babu's Park	1			
7. Mr. Noronaha's houses	6			
Total							418

STATEMENT No. VI.

Statement showing the number of deaths recorded at the Prince of Wales' Hospital, Cawnpore.

Wounded who died in hospital.						Dead bodies received in hospital up to March 28th, 1931.					
Muslims.			Hindus.			Muslims.			Hindus.		
Males.	Females.	Children.	Males.	Females.	Children.	Males.	Females.	Children.	Males.	Females.	Children.
11	1	1	21	1	1	80	5	1	21	5	—
Totals						<i>Note.—No dead (except one) were taken in the hospital after March 28th.</i>					
Muslims			99						
Hindus			49						

STATEMENT No. VI-A.

Statement showing details of injury cases treated in the Prince of Wales Hospital, Cawnpore.

Date.	Muslims.			Hindus.			Others.			Total.
	Males.	Females.	Children.	Males.	Females.	Children.	Males.	Females.	Children.	
24-3-31 ..	30	—	—	39	—	—	1	—	—	70
25-3-31 ..	52	4	5	84	1	—	—	—	—	146
26-3-31 ..	30	3	5	36	1	—	—	—	—	75
27-3-31 ..	12	—	1	27	2	—	—	—	—	42
28-3-31 ..	21	—	—	10	2	1	—	—	—	34
29-3-31 ..	2	—	—	16	1	—	—	—	—	19
30-3-31 ..	3	3	—	6	2	—	—	—	—	14
31-3-31 ..	11	—	1	5	—	—	—	—	—	17
1-4-31 ..	4	2	2	10	—	—	—	—	—	18
2-4-31 ..	1	—	—	5	—	—	—	—	—	6
3-4-31 ..	6	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	6
4-4-31 ..	6	—	—	4	—	—	—	—	—	10
5-4-31 ..	1	—	—	5	—	—	—	—	—	6
6-4-31 ..	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3
7-4-31 ..	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	2
8-4-31 ..	—	—	—	27	—	—	—	—	—	27
9-4-31 ..	4	—	—	3	—	—	—	—	—	7
10-4-31 ..	1	—	—	6	—	—	—	—	—	7
11-4-31 ..	1	—	—	3	—	—	—	—	—	4
12-4-31 ..	10	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	11
13-4-31 ..	2	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	3
14-4-31 ..	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
15-4-31 ..	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
16-4-31 ..	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
17-4-31 ..	1	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	3
18-4-31 ..	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total ..	201	12	14	292	9	1	1	—	—	530

Muslims. Hindus.

Death due to gunshot wound	1	8
Gunshot wound cases admitted	7	32
Gunshot wound cases operated	7	10
In outdoor	79	63

STATEMENT No. VII.

Statement showing the number of dead bodies cremated and buried during the Cawnpore riots, supplied by the Health Officer, Cawnpore Municipality.

Place and manner of disposal.	No.	Hindus.	Muslims.	Doubtful.	Remarks.
1. Cremated at Bhaironghat.	91	81	..	10	Eight corpses were taken out of deep <i>nalas</i> and sewers.
2. Cremated at canal by Mr. Gordon.	4	3	..	1	Three corpses were taken out of two wells.
3. Cremated at Deputyka-Parao and Colonelganj by Pandit Rameshwar Dayal.	11	11	
4. Buried in Chamanaganj by Pandit Rameshwar Dayal.	2	2	
5. Burnt on spot by Mr. Wood.	7	7	
6. Burnt in Bhannanapurwa and J Block by Mr. Chattarpal Singh.	3	1	..	2	
7. Burnt by Civil Surgeon in Colonelganj.	1	1	
8. Burnt by Seva Samiti behind Baconganj.	30	30	
9. Burnt by Seva Samiti at canal.	1	1	
10. Burnt by Seva Samiti across the Ganges.	25	25	
11. Muslim cemetery ..	119	..	119	..	
Total ..	294	155	119	20	

Note.—These figures included the dead brought from the hospital.

STATEMENT No. VIII.

Statement showing crimes reported mohalla-wise up to 4th May, 1931,
for the first four days of the riot.

Mohalla.	Date.	Murder.	Attempt.	Dacoity with murder.	Dacoity.	Robbery.	Riot.	Arson.	Miscellaneous.	Total.
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
<i>Police Station, Kotwali.</i>										
1. Patkapur ..	24-3-31	—	—	—	2	1	1	1	2	7
	25-3-31	3	10	1	13	1	2	2	—	32
	26-3-31	2	9	—	11	—	—	—	2	23
	27-3-31	1	3	—	2	—	—	—	2	7
2. Bazar Ramnarayan.	24-3-31	—	—	—	—	1	1	1	—	3
	25-3-31	—	2	1	13	—	—	—	—	16
	26-3-31	—	2	—	5	—	—	—	3	10
	27-3-31	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
3. Birhana ..	24-3-31	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1
	25-3-31	—	—	—	2	2	1	—	1	6
	26-3-31	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	2
	27-3-31	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
4. Kursawan ..	24-3-31	—	—	—	—	2	—	1	—	3
	25-3-31	1	—	—	7	—	—	—	2	10
	26-3-31	—	—	—	5	—	—	—	2	7
	27-3-31	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1
5. Daulatganj ..	24-3-31	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	25-3-31	2	—	1	4	—	2	—	—	9
	26-3-31	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	2
	27-3-31	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
6. Harbans Mohal	24-3-31	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	25-3-31	2	7	5	27	—	—	—	2	43
	26-3-31	—	2	2	17	—	—	—	3	24
	27-3-31	—	—	1	11	—	—	—	1	13
7. Gadaria Mohal	24-3-31	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	25-3-31	—	—	2	51	—	1	5	—	59
	26-3-31	—	1	1	32	—	1	3	3	41
	27-3-31	—	—	—	26	—	—	1	—	27

Statement showing crimes reported mohalla-wise up to 4th May, 1931,
for the first four days of the riot—(continued).

Mohalla.	Date.	Murder.	Attempt.	Dacoity with murder.	Dacoity.	Robbery.	Riot.	Arson.	Miscellaneous.	Total.
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
8. Shutar Khana	24-3-31	—	—	—	22	—	—	—	—	22
	25-3-31	3	4	4	23	—	1	2	—	37
	26-3-31	2	6	1	53	—	1	1	1	67
	27-3-31	—	—	1	20	—	—	1	2	24
9. Etawah Bazar	24-3-31	—	—	1	6	—	—	1	—	8
	25-3-31	—	—	1	10	1	—	—	—	12
	26-3-31	—	—	—	7	—	—	1	1	9
	27-3-31	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	2
10. Bengalee Mohal	24-3-31	—	—	4	13	1	—	1	—	19
	25-3-31	—	—	4	19	—	—	3	1	27
	26-3-31	—	—	2	4	—	—	—	1	7
	27-3-31	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	1	3
11. Gillis Bazar ..	24-3-31	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	25-3-31	—	—	—	4	—	—	—	—	4
	26-3-31	—	—	—	4	—	—	—	—	4
	27-3-31	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	1	2
12. Lathi Mohal ..	24-3-31	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	25-3-31	1	—	—	13	—	—	1	1	16
	26-3-31	—	1	—	8	—	—	1	—	10
	27-3-31	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	1
13. Dhobi Mohal ..	24-3-31	—	—	1	6	—	—	—	—	7
	25-3-31	1	—	1	12	—	—	—	—	14
	26-3-31	—	—	—	8	—	—	—	1	9
	27-3-31	—	—	—	3	—	—	—	1	4
14. Parade.. ..	24-3-31	—	—	—	24	—	1	3	4	32
	25-3-31	1	1	1	24	—	1	2	6	36
	26-3-31	1	—	—	11	—	—	1	5	18
	27-3-31	—	—	—	9	—	—	—	3	12
15. Naughara ..	24-3-31	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	2
	25-3-31	2	1	2	9	—	—	2	—	16
	26-3-31	1	—	1	6	—	—	2	—	10
	27-3-31	—	—	—	1	1	—	—	2	4

Statement showing crimes reported mohalla-wise up to 4th May, 1931,
for the first four days of the riot—(continued).

Mohalla.	Date.	Murder.	Attempt.	Dacoity with murder.	Dacoity.	Robbery.	Riot.	Arson.	Miscellaneous.	Total.
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
16. Generalganj ..	24-3-31	1	—	—	3	—	—	—	—	4
	25-3-31	—	1	—	4	—	—	—	—	5
	26-3-31	—	1	—	2	—	—	—	—	3
	27-3-31	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	1
17. Hatia	24-3-31	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1
	25-3-31	1	—	1	4	—	—	—	—	6
	26-3-31	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	2
	27-3-31	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
18. Shatranji Mohal	24-3-31	1	—	1	1	—	—	—	—	3
	25-3-31	2	2	1	4	—	1	—	—	10
	26-3-31	—	1	—	1	—	—	—	—	2
	27-3-31	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	1
19. Sirki Mohal ..	24-3-31	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	25-3-31	—	—	—	4	—	—	—	—	4
	26-3-31	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	1
	27-3-31	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
20. Roti Godam ..	24-3-31	—	—	—	3	—	1	—	1	5
	25-3-31	—	—	—	8	—	—	2	—	10
	26-3-31	—	—	—	3	—	—	—	2	5
	27-3-31	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
21. Chatai Mohal ..	24-3-31	—	—	—	1	1	1	—	—	3
	25-3-31	—	1	1	3	—	—	—	—	5
	26-3-31	—	1	—	3	—	—	—	—	4
	27-3-31	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
22. Natchghar ..	24-3-31	—	1	—	—	—	1	—	3	5
	25-3-31	—	1	1	3	—	—	—	—	5
	26-3-31	—	1	—	3	—	—	—	—	4
	27-3-31	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
23. Dal Mandi ..	24-3-31	—	—	—	—	1	—	1	—	2
	25-3-31	1	1	—	9	—	—	3	—	14
	26-3-31	1	2	—	3	—	—	—	2	8
	27-3-31	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	1

Statement showing crimes reported mohalla-wise up to 4th May, 1931,
for the first four days of the riot.—(concluded).

Mohalla.	Date.	Murder.	Attempt.	Dacoity with murder.	Dacoity.	Robbery.	Riot.	Arson.	Miscellaneous.	Total.
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
12. Gwaltoli ..	24-3-31	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	25-3-31	—	—	—	5	—	—	6	—	11
	26-3-31	1	1	3	4	3	—	—	1	13
	27-3-31	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
13. Parao Deputy..	24-3-31	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	1
	25-3-31	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	26-3-31	—	—	—	4	—	—	—	—	4
	27-3-31	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
<i>Police Station, Anwarganj.</i>										
1. Purwa Hiraman	24-3-31	—	—	2	12	—	2	—	3	19
	25-3-31	1	—	—	17	1	1	—	6	26
	26-3-31	1	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	3
	27-3-31	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	4	6
2. Anwarganj ..	24-3-31	—	—	—	13	1	5	—	1	20
	25-3-31	1	—	—	37	—	4	6	2	50
	26-3-31	—	1	1	8	—	1	3	1	15
	27-3-31	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	3	4
3. Cooli Bazar ..	24-3-31	2	1	1	48	1	7	2	3	65
	25-3-31	2	6	3	86	1	9	4	4	115
	26-3-31	—	—	5	22	—	—	—	—	27
	27-3-31	1	—	—	—	1	—	2	2	6
4. Cooperganj ..	24-3-31	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	1
	25-3-31	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1
	26-3-31	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	1
	27-3-31	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	1
5. Juhi Khurd ..	24-3-31	—	—	—	4	—	—	1	—	5
	25-3-31	—	—	—	9	1	1	5	—	16
	26-3-31	—	—	—	25	—	1	5	—	31
	27-3-31	—	—	—	—	1	1	—	—	2

STATEMENT No. IX.

Statement showing the number of arrests made each day for offences under the Indian Penal Code, Arms Act and breach of the orders under section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (supplied by the Superintendent of Police on 12th May, 1931).

Section.	24th.	25th.	26th.	27th.	28th.	29th.	30th.	31st.
<i>Within Kotwali Beat.</i>								
454	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	1
307	—	1	2	—	—	—	1	—
148/307	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—
144	—	—	—	11	32	6	1	28
457	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1
302	—	—	—	1	1	—	—	—
379	—	4	—	—	—	1	—	—
19, A.A.	—	—	—	3	8	—	2	—
54/55	—	—	—	5	—	—	—	—
Total ..	1	5	2	20	42	7	5	30=112
<i>Within Colonel-ganj beat.</i>								
144	—	27	—	13	28	3	1	—
19, A. A.	—	1	—	2	2	—	—	—
147/302	—	22	—	—	19	—	—	—
395	—	—	—	27	1	1	7	2
412	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—
143	—	—	—	—	14	—	—	—
Total ..	—	50	—	42	66	4	8	2=172

GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED PROVINCES.

RESOLUTION.

The Governor in Council is indebted to the Members of the Commission of Inquiry for a careful and balanced statement of the conditions precedent to the rioting in Cawnpore and for their dispassionate review of measures taken to suppress it. Their narrative of events makes it unnecessary to deal here with the actual incidents of outbreak, and the Governor in Council can proceed at once to state his own conclusions on the views expressed by them as to the causes which led to such an unusual and deplorable exhibition of communal violence, and as to the action of the authorities on whom lay the duty of suppressing it.

2. Those who give an unbiassed study to the conditions prevailing in Cawnpore at the time of the outbreak will have little difficulty in accepting the views of the Commission that the explanation of the embitterment of feeling between the two communities which was responsible for the severity of the outbreak is to be found in the course taken by the civil disobedience movement. In the words of the Commission, the movement had openly aimed at paralysing the Government, but it had come to be regarded in Cawnpore (more definitely perhaps than in any other city of the province) as a Hindu movement with Muslim activity or passiveness in opposition. It is not, however, sufficient merely to recognise this fact. Judgment on the predisposing causes of the outbreak cannot be complete without some reference to the question whether action taken in Cawnpore to combat the civil disobedience movement, as distinguished from that taken elsewhere, was such as in itself to reduce respect for order and to produce an atmosphere favourable to an outbreak of violence. Looking at the peculiar circumstances of Cawnpore, which are strikingly different from those for instance of Allahabad and Lucknow, the Governor in Council must now admit that he might with advantage have directed a firmer and more consistent recourse to the penal and preventive sections of the ordinary law during the earlier days of the agitation. That is a matter of policy for which responsibility lies on Government and not on local authorities. At a later stage of the agitation various ordinances dealing with civil disobedience were fully utilised and some 1,400 persons were convicted of offences arising under them. As a consequence, in the period immediately preceding the Delhi agreement (March, 1931) outward respect for law seemed to have been re-established in the City; but the general course of events during the period of agitation, and the cessation of all police action which followed the conclusion of the agreement must have conduced to creating a dangerous mentality among many of the more turbulent and criminal elements in the city.

3. The report proceeds next to deal with the immediate causes of the outbreak. Here also there can be no hesitation in accepting the views of the Commission that it was directly due to an attempt to enforce a hartal in connection with the execution of Bhagat Singh. The attitude of the Congress Committee generally, and the action of some of its prominent men during the actual disturbance, acquits it of any deliberate intention of causing a communal outbreak. The Local Government desire to take this occasion to associate themselves with the tribute paid to Mr. Vidyarthi in particular for the efforts made by him to prevent violence, in the course of which he sacrificed his own life. But the attempt made to enforce the hartal on the Muslims, already excited by the knowledge of what had happened at Mirzapur, Benares and Agra, was clearly the direct cause of the outbreak.

4. There is one further matter to which it is necessary to allude before dealing with the findings of the Commission on the adequacy of the steps taken by the local authorities to quell the outbreak. They remark on the insufficiency of the police force in Cawnpore in normal times. They show that in 1928 the Inspector-General asked for a considerable increase in the force to meet the growth in the population of the city, and for further expenditure on buildings in order to provide for a more suitable distribution of the force. The province has for some years been working under severe financial restrictions and the Local Government, though recognising the need for adding to the Cawnpore establishment, felt, at the time, obliged to postpone this item of expenditure. Events have shown this decision to have been unfortunate and steps will now be taken to repair the deficiency. At the same time, it must be remarked as the Commission recognise that no large city can be staffed in such a way as to ensure the immediate suppression of an abnormal outbreak such as occurred at Cawnpore. It will always be necessary in such circumstances to call in reinforcements from the central police reserves or from the neighbouring districts.

5. In commenting on the action taken by the authorities responsible for dealing with the riots, it was inevitable that the Commission should attach the first importance to the part played by the District Magistrate. They hold that in the dispositions made by him, during the first stage of the trouble he acted with care and foresight. They feel, however, that in the stage immediately following, namely, in the course of the afternoon and evening of 24th March, he committed errors both in judgment and action. The Governor in Council considers that in weighing the facts given by the Commission which bear on the action of the District Magistrate at the time he left the city, full account should be taken of Mr. Sale's own explanation as given in his evidence. He clearly did not in the light of what he had himself seen and heard up to that time, take a serious view of the situation; there were complaints of assaults from both sides,

but he did not think that there was any immediate prospect of severe communal fighting. It is also necessary to state that evidence points to the fact that no serious attacks on Meston Road temple, still less any actual burning of it, had started when he was near the spot. The burning of the Chauk mosque apparently took place later still. It is proper to state these facts in justice to the District Magistrate. As events showed, his judgment of the situation was at fault, but in leaving the spot to draw up and issue a curfew order there was, on his part, no idea of shirking his duty. His mistake lay in a failure to make a prompt and correct appreciation of the position. He failed also in realising the necessity of that active personal handling of measures for suppressing disorder which is incumbent on a District Magistrate in emergencies of this nature. His personal control of operations on the spot was the more essential, as the Superintendent of Police was a comparatively junior officer who had only taken charge four days before, with an Assistant Superintendent who had only arrived in the city on 16th March. His failure to appreciate the situation is further evidenced by the fact that he did not, until the morning of 25th March, ask Government for that further assistance both in troops and police, the need of which the position of affairs on the evening of the 24th should have clearly demonstrated to him.

Throughout the course of the rioting he constantly visited the City and remained in close touch with the civil and military authorities actually engaged in the work of suppression; but he would have been better advised had he neglected all other duties in order to take personal charge of the operations within the City itself. Had he done so, he would have inspired greater confidence, not only among the two communities involved in the actual disorder, but also among Europeans who showed considerable alarm at the spread of violence in the factory area. The Governor in Council records these conclusions with greater reluctance because Mr. Sale is an officer whose career has been characterised by conscientious and devoted discharge of his duties and by proofs of a temperament which has secured for him much friendship and goodwill among the people of districts in which he has served. While making full allowance for the heavy strain to which he had been subjected by the course of civil disobedience agitation in a district which, even in normal times, is an onerous charge, the Governor in Council feels that it will not be possible to expect that measure of confidence which is essential to the restoration of peace between the communities in Cawnpore if Mr. Sale remains in charge of the District. There is no reason to hold that the Superintendent of Police, Mr. Rogers, displayed any want of activity in dealing with the riots. If his efforts appear to have lacked effectiveness an adequate explanation lies in the fact, for which he is in no sense responsible, that he was entirely without experience of the City and of the men under his orders. The Deputy Superintendent in charge of the City,

Khan Bahadur Saiyid Ghulam Hasnain is an officer with an excellent record in the past. The Governor in Council does not consider that he showed the leadership which was to be expected of an officer of his position and knowledge of local conditions; but it is noted here that he has lately been obliged to take leave for medical reasons.

6. It remains to deal with the findings of fact recorded by the Commission, which support the allegations that in specified cases subordinate officers of police were guilty of lack of initiative and constables of apathy or positive dereliction of duty. The Governor in Council is not in entire agreement with certain observations of the Commission, as for instance, those concerning the possibility of warning crowds that they would be fired on, for the circumstances seem to have made this unusually difficult, a remark which applies equally to the difficulty of pressing home lathi charges. Again, failure of communications and loss of touch with the Muhalla police was certainly due in part to the unsuitable placing of police stations and the lack of outposts. The Governor in Council also doubts whether it would in the circumstances with which the police were faced during the evening of 24th March have been possible to effect precautionary arrests of bad characters. The precedents of the 1927 riots have been quoted, but not only was the outbreak then on a different scale, but arrests on that occasion seem to have been made after the first outbreaks of rioting had stopped. By the evening of 25th March, when arrests became possible, the bad characters had taken warning and disappeared from their homes. As regards firing on crowds, the report of the Commission itself explains the difficulty arising from the rapid disappearance of rioters when the police approached. It may be noted that the police actually opened fire on 13 occasions, 4 of these instances being by standing pickets, but so far as is known only 2 persons were killed. Nevertheless, taking into consideration the whole of the facts, the Governor in Council is obliged to agree that there seems no sufficient explanation of the fact that, in certain typical cases in particular, such as the burning of the temple in Meston Road or the Chauk Bazaza Mosque, no effective action was taken, in spite of the presence of bodies of police in the vicinity. There is again evidence that individual constables or bodies failed in their duty to attack or apprehend rioters, or to keep in custody those handed over to them. It will be necessary for the Local Government to undertake at once a departmental enquiry in order to assess the responsibility of any individual subordinate concerned in the incidents to which the Commission refer.

The Governor in Council believes, however, that his position will be fully appreciated when, in announcing this decision, he states at the same time his conviction that if the evidence taken by the Commission has revealed that individual members of the police force failed at Cawnpore, this is no indication of an impaired morale in the United Provinces force as a whole. Throughout a long period of most exceptional strain it has maintained its loyalty, its sense of

duty and a high standard of conduct. In recent communal disturbances such as those which occurred at Benares or at Agra its action was effective and decisive. Events which occurred at Cawnpore itself during the recent Muharram celebrations show that it has not lost its capacity for prompt and effective action. It has been suggested that the policy adopted by the Government in the face of an agitation advocating disobedience to law and the final issue of that agitation in an agreement of which the first result was a general release of prisoners, must have impaired the mentality of the police force to such an extent as to render it reluctant to face its duties even in face of severe communal disorder. The Governor in Council declines to believe that this can be true ; he will certainly not accept the events which occurred in Cawnpore in March last as evidence of its truth, for he regards the circumstances as in every way exceptional. The police establishment there had to face a sudden communal outbreak of unexampled ferocity at a moment when its attention had been primarily directed to the possibility of a demonstration against the Government. Its strength was inadequate and its disposition unsuitable, a fact for which the Government has admitted its own responsibility. It unfortunately lost initial control of the situation, and forces were at once let loose which for the moment overwhelmed it. There need be no desire to palliate any proved dereliction of duty ; but those who are best acquainted with the composition and character of the force will be least disposed to draw conclusions unfavourable to it as a whole, if in these circumstances individual subordinates or some of the rank and file failed in their standard of duty.

7. The Commission described in some detail the very valuable help given by the Military Authorities during the course of the disorder and Governor in Council desires to recognise the ready support given to the Local Government by the District Commander, and the action taken by the officer in command of the troops, Cawnpore, throughout the period of the disturbances. The Report of the Commission refers to a change in the disposition of the troops on the morning of 25th March, which, in their opinion, involved consequences which, if unforeseen at the time, were undoubtedly serious in result. The concentration at the District Board Office was obviously based entirely on considerations of a military nature. It also refers to the fact that there were, in the initial stages of the operations, somewhat divergent views as to the most appropriate method of utilising the military forces available. The Governor in Council strongly deprecates any tendency to exaggerate the fact that divergent views existed, and he certainly does not wish to qualify, on that account, his acknowledgments of the value of the assistance rendered by the Officer Commanding and the troops under his charge. Moreover, it is clear that the difference of views caused no personal friction between the two authorities. If there is any inference to

be drawn from these incidents, it is only that of the necessity for agreeing upon in advance, and maintaining up to date, a scheme for dealing with communal, as well as other disturbances. Measures to ensure this are now being taken by the Local Government in consultation with G.O.C. in Chief, Eastern Command.