

**THE LAST DAYS OF THE COMPANY**  
**A SOURCE BOOK OF INDIAN HISTORY**  
**1818-1858**

**I**  
**THE EXPANSION OF BRITISH INDIA**

**THE LAST DAYS OF  
THE COMPANY**

**A SOURCE BOOK OF INDIAN HISTORY**

**1818-1858**

**BY**

**G. ANDERSON, M.A.**

**AND**

**M. SUBEDAR, B.A., B.Sc. (Econ.) London**

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## PREFACE

THIS volume purports to be a collection of excerpts from original sources dealing with a most interesting period of Indian history. We intend that it shall shortly be followed by other volumes dealing with the same period but from different points of view and discussing in particular the development of an Indian policy and the economic and industrial policy of the Company. In the present volume we have tried to tell the story of the expansion of British India from the conclusion of the Mahratta wars in 1818 until the end of the Mutiny in 1858. It has therefore been necessary to deal at some length with the annexation policy of Lord Dalhousie and the conciliation policy of Lord Canning. We have tried as far as possible to give such introductory comments as may be necessary to enable the general reader to understand the trend of events without showing any particular bias one way or the other, and also to enable students of history to form their own conclusions with the assistance of these excerpts. We have also tried to give excerpts representing different points of view on these much-debated problems of history. In dealing with the Mutiny, we have omitted intentionally references to unpleasant happenings, to deeds of violence on the one hand and acts of vengeance on the other. We have preferred rather to dwell on matters of more permanent importance in the development of Indian policy, the nobility of men such as the Lawrences, Havelock, and Canning, the bravery and perseverance of the British soldiers, and the touching loyalty of many Indians. The dark side of the Mutiny, the treachery, the blunders, the violence, the anger, may well disappear, but the nobler features of that period should remain, for it is

upon them that the foundations of Indian development under British rule depend.

This book has been written primarily for the use of the student. The study of Indian history in Indian schools and universities has been degraded by the use, or rather abuse, of text-books. Yet there is no lack of original material, which may be accounted for by the necessity of the British rulers explaining their actions to the Court of Directors in England. It is our desire, therefore, to induce the Indian student to turn more readily to these writings and to learn from them the great events and the motives of the chief actors in the history of his own country. One of the chief objects of historical study is to inculcate in the student the power of judging facts and drawing his own deductions. We have therefore tried to provide the Indian undergraduate with the facts, and leave him to complete the task. We trust also that the period of history dealt with in this volume is of such interest and importance that it may also appeal to some extent to the general reader. If such be the case, we would ask him to forgive our deficiencies and remember our primary object in writing this book.

In the spelling of proper names we have tried as far as possible to make such alterations in the excerpts as are necessary to ensure a certain degree of uniformity.

In conclusion we have pleasure in expressing our appreciation of the kind courtesy of the following Publishers in allowing us to take extracts from their copyright publications as specified. If in any case we may have included any extract for which special permission should have been obtained we can only ask the Publishers' indulgence, and assure them that the oversight has been inadvertent.

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# THE EXPANSION OF BRITISH INDIA

## INTRODUCTION

MR. ROMESH CHANDER DUTT has pointed out that the period of history immediately subsequent to the conclusion of the Mahratta wars was one of peaceful progress both in England and in India, and that Munro, Elphinstone, and Bentinck were inspired by the same reforming spirit as Canning, Grey, and John Russell. That period came to an end in England in 1846, when Sir Robert Peel was successful in repealing the Corn Laws, but at the same time was instrumental in destroying the unity of his own party. English politics then drifted into a state of confusion which was not ended until Mr. Gladstone became the acknowledged leader of a triumphant and democratic Liberalism in 1868.

During this period of transition a few only had a definite ideal before them and were determined neither to give quarter nor to submit to any compromise with their principles. On the one hand were the remnants of the old Tory party, the bulwarks, as they thought, of Church and State, who were banded together first under Lord George Bentinck and then under Lord Stanley, afterwards the Earl of Derby; but their policy consisted chiefly in looking back angrily to the days of their past glory and in cursing the name of their old leader who, in their opinion, had betrayed them. On the other hand were a few reformers, goaded to madness and despair at the poverty and distress of the working classes, and embittered by the knowledge that, so far as they were concerned, the Reform Bill had only resulted in a change of masters and had brought them little nearer their goal. Between these two extremes were the vast mass of middle-

class electors, some Whig and others Tory, jealous of the political influence bestowed on them by the Reform Bill, pre-eminently respectable, but self-satisfied, money-seeking, and devoid entirely of imagination and sympathy.

In those days two men only looked much beyond the immediate present, but each found himself, practically speaking, without a following. Disraeli regarded the spirit of industrial materialism which then prevailed in England with a bitter loathing. What is known to history as the Industrial Revolution had just taken place, and within a few brief years England had been transformed from an agricultural into an industrial country. This development had been attended by a rapid dwindling of the countryside, once the backbone of England's strength, which passed unheeded in those days of smug, self-satisfied complacency. Though the novels of Disraeli were read by thousands the political principles expounded therein were but imperfectly understood. Disraeli, therefore, in the days of his manhood was viewed with suspicion by those very classes who made him their hero only when his strength and his opportunity were gone.

Bright also had the gift of imagination—and those who have read his speeches on India can scarcely dispute the fact—but it was of a kind different from that of Disraeli; for it was founded on a true understanding and knowledge of the people. It is related that Cobden came to see Bright at a time when the latter was suffering from domestic loss, and reminded him that there were at that very moment thousands of homes in England where wives, mothers, and children were dying from hunger; and from that day Bright knew and understood his mission. Disraeli grasped the fact that the strength of England was being sapped by the decline of those very classes who in the past had contributed most to England's greatness. Bright saw equally clearly that the soul of England was being tainted by the grinding poverty of the poor, and by the miserable surroundings in which they lived, evils which were due very largely to the commercial and political tyranny of the times. He mapped out a programme of political development which has been

accepted almost in its entirety in more recent years. Indeed, Bright's career was one of extraordinary success, for he lived long enough to see most of his ideals carried into effect, though by other men.

Except in the matter of the repeal of the Corn Laws, which was a triumph rather for Cobden, Bright was ineffective during these years of transition. He had no administrative capacity, as was shown later during his short tenure of office both in 1868 and in 1880, which were infructuous in the extreme; and he had the profoundest contempt for party politics. "I speak not the language of party," said he, "I feel myself above the level of party. I speak, as I have endeavoured to speak, on behalf of the unenfranchised, the almost voiceless millions of my countrymen." He was therefore a leader of what seemed in those days a forlorn hope, for he fought against established order and vested interests. Like Mazzini and Garibaldi, he sowed for others to reap. The Italian patriots imparted the fire and the imagination to a national movement, but they needed the administrative genius and the practical statesmanship of Cavour, aided by a constitutional monarch such as Victor Emanuel, for the fulfilment of their ambitions. Bright inspired the democratic movement which triumphed in 1868 and 1880, but it was Gladstone and not he who became the first Premier of a democratic England. John Bright was the father of a party which at a later date revolutionised the social and political life of England, even as Disraeli is still a source of inspiration to those whose aim is to transcend the cramping limits of party politics and forge a national ideal.

The people of those days, however, did not want far-reaching schemes of national development, but rather a leader who would flatter their national pride by a vigorous foreign policy and would abstain from impeding commercial progress by hasty legislation and, as they thought it, a sentimental desire for reform. In those days there seemed, at first sight, no lack of leaders. The most probable, perhaps, was Stanley, a man much respected for his great attainments and noble name, but he was unable to take advantage of his

opportunities, and especially at the time of the downfall of the Aberdeen Cabinet during the dark days of the Crimean War. Lord John Russell also was a possible leader, but lacked the personal qualities required for dealing successfully with difficult colleagues. And there was Gladstone, the devoted disciple of Sir Robert Peel and the man most competent to deal with complicated problems of finance, but his connection with Oxford and high Anglicanism, coupled with an inability to make up his mind one way or the other, rendered him impossible as yet as a leader.

And so it was that during the Crimean War the people called for Lord Palmerston, who in his policy reflected their wishes. In his attitude towards foreign countries he was an advocate of an advanced Liberalism, and was ever ready to encourage others in a forward policy which was by no means to his liking when applied to his own country, for in domestic politics he upheld the old order and resisted all attempts at reform. For these reasons he became the popular hero, and therefore dominated English politics for upwards of ten years.

A meddling foreign policy, material progress, and a strong attachment to the old order were thus the leading characteristics of English history during the second quarter of the nineteenth century. Some remarkable parallels are to be found in the history of India during the same period. In consequence of their political position in India, the British were unable to keep aloof any longer either from internal quarrels or from dangerous complications beyond the limits of British India; and these difficulties were accentuated by the tradition of a vigorous foreign policy which was gaining ground in England. Burma, Nepal, Sind, Baluchistan, Afghanistan and the Punjab were all touched by the current, and warfare ensued. The alliance with Ranjit Singh and the promise to co-operate with him in his Afghan diplomacy induced the British to sacrifice much, including their better judgment, and to take part in Afghan quarrels. And the friendship between the Sikhs and the British was short-lived. The forces which the iron will of Ranjit Singh kept in control broke loose at his

death. The Sikh soldiers, impatient of discipline and bereft of wise leadership, thirsted for military glory and yearned for the rich lands protected by the British. A conflict at arms not only led to the break up of the Confederacy, but also prepared the way for a mighty upheaval. The British rulers, being aware of the dangers from which they had just escaped, became unduly apprehensive of further trouble. On the other hand, feelings of suspicion were aroused among Indians who saw only too clearly the possibility of complete conquest by the British. And this suspicion was accentuated by the annexations which successive British rulers felt themselves obliged to effect. Suspicion and apprehension, unless very carefully handled, are bound to end in trouble, and such was the case in India.

Alongside of these martial activities there were also, as stated above, some attempts to carry out social and material improvements. The foundations of an Indian educational policy were laid which have made so deep an impress on Indian life and progress. Judicial reforms, the codification of the law, and the reconstruction of the legislature were also effected during this period. On the economic side also, considerable improvements can be recorded. The narrow economic policy of the East India Company, involving as it did much misery and poverty in addition to the decay of Indian arts, was discontinued by the compulsory withdrawal of the Company from Indian trade and by the restriction of its activities to the work of administration. In the meantime the blunders of the early land revenue system were rectified to some extent by a clear enunciation of the position and rights of Government, the tenant, and the middleman. A uniform currency was introduced, and joint-stock banks were established. Roads were kept in repair and extended. Irrigation schemes were taken in hand; and communications were improved by the railway, the post, and the telegraph. All these changes were calculated to bring about an improvement in the material condition of the people, and so far as they went, they undoubtedly had this effect. The immediate result of these measures, however, was very different from

what was anticipated, as they only served to increase the feelings of general instability and political despair which then dominated the Indian mind.

There were also changes in the methods and policy of the administration. The task before the administrator was no longer to resettle a country ravaged and impoverished by war. The military rulers at the beginning of the century trusted to an intimate knowledge of the people and their needs, and considered a true appreciation of sound principles of government of greater value than an efficient organisation. There followed, as in England, a time when there was a similar reluctance to look boldly towards the goal of future achievements, and a similar tendency to magnify the details of administration at the expense of the policy itself. There were thus new ideas and new men. The old rulers, such as Elphinstone and Munro, who had gained experience on the field of battle and the difficult paths of diplomacy, were giving way to the efficient administrator. The old and the new met strangely at the council chamber in Lahore, where Henry Lawrence, with assistance from friends such as Edwardes and Nicholson, carried on the haphazard but sympathetic traditions of the past, and John Lawrence, acting under the orders of Lord Dalhousie, represented the efficiency of the future. Unfortunately, the changes were too drastic, too sudden, and in the peculiar circumstances of India in those days, it was difficult to effect great changes without disaster.

And so it was that the history of these years culminated in a mighty conflict. It is a story replete with stirring deeds and noble sacrifices, but also with brutal savagery on the one hand and with harsh vengeance on the other. Out of the terror and the panic, the miscalculations and the misdeeds, the outcome was one of peculiar nobility. The British cause in India was fortunate in having at hand men such as Henry and John Lawrence, Outram and Havelock, who showed courage and skill in the face of adversity, but it was doubly fortunate in the Governor-General, who, when the turmoil was over, tempered mercy with firmness and wisdom with fortitude.

## CHAPTER I

### THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN ASIATIC POLICY.

THE establishment of an undisputed British ascendancy in India may be said to date from the beginning of the nineteenth century. It was at the same time that the British rulers in India, fearful of the approach of European rivals by land, began to formulate a definite Asiatic policy which led first to negotiations and treaties, and eventually to wars between England and the foreign powers adjoining or approaching her Indian dominion. Ranjit Singh was at that time in alliance with Sháh Shuja, the exiled monarch of Afghanistan, whom he helped in a fruitless attempt to regain his throne from the hands of Dost Muhammad. The tripartite treaty which was arranged between the British, Ranjit Singh, and Sháh Shuja, therefore, brought the former into intimate connection with the politics of Afghanistan. Moreover, the western part of that country was threatened at that time by Persia, who in turn was threatened by the advance of Russia; and those were the days when the politicians of Great Britain were filled with fear of the intentions of Russia. This was natural. As the British had a great stake in the development of the Asiatic continent, the news that Russia was establishing a predominant influence over Persia was a matter of supreme importance. As Sir Alfred Lyall has put it, "The possibility of the overland invasion of India, and the question of the measures necessary for the security of our north-western frontier, were now occupying the minds of Indian rulers; and the discussion was beginning that has never yet ended."



### The Need of a Frontier Policy

Source.—Sir Alfred Lyall. "British Dominion in India," pp. 280-281. (John Murray.)

The intelligence of Napoleon's projects first diverted attention from the seaboard to our land frontiers, and first launched the British Government upon that much larger expanse of Asiatic war and diplomacy in which it has ever since been, with intervals, engaged. Up to the end of the eighteenth century the field of Anglo-Indian politics had been circumscribed within the limits of India, being confined to our relations with Indian States over which England was asserting an easy mastery, by the natural and necessary growth of her ascendancy. Now for the first time we entered upon that range of diplomatic observation in which all the countries of Western Asia, from Kábul to Constantinople, are surveyed as interposing barriers between Europe and our Indian possessions. The independence and integrity of these foreign and comparatively distant States are henceforth essential for the balance of Asiatic powers and for the security of our Indian frontiers. Before this epoch the jar and collision of European contests had been felt only in our dealings with the inland powers of India; we struck down or disarmed every native ruler who attempted to communicate with our European enemies. But from the beginning of the nineteenth century we have had little or nothing to fear from Indian rivals, and we have gradually taken rank as a first-class Asiatic sovereignty. The vast weight of our Indian interests has ever since weighed decisively in the balance of our relations, not only with all Asia, but with any European State whose views or dispositions might in any degree affect our position in the East. We have thus become intimately concerned in the political vicissitudes of every important Asiatic State on the Asiatic continent. The chronic disquietude, which began at this period, has been the source of some hazardous military projects and premature diplomatic schemes, of two expeditions into Afghanistan, of a war with Persia, and of a policy that is constantly extending our protectorate far beyond the natural limits of India.

Lord William Bentinck may be said to have been the first Governor-General to attempt a definite Asiatic policy. His first step was to negotiate with the Amirs of Sind for the opening up of the Indus to Indian commerce. He also had a meeting with Ranjit Singh on the banks of the Sutlej which ripened into a definite friendship and alliance between the two powers.

Being firmly convinced of the reality of the Russian scare and the possibility of an invasion in the future, Lord William Bentinck made a careful survey of the existing forces of defence in India, and came to the conclusion that "the Indian army was the least efficient and the most expensive in the world." He therefore prepared schemes for its expansion and improvement which involved considerable additions to expenditure. Metcalfe, who became Governor-General for a short time after the departure of Bentinck from India, took the opposite opinion and argued that a Russian advance into India would be faced by such serious difficulties that all speculations regarding it could safely be postponed for the moment. The minutes of these two great Indian statesmen are of such importance that they are given below.

### The Defence of India

*Sources.*—(i) "Minute by Lord William Bentinck," March 13, 1835. Reprinted in Boulger's "Bentinck." (Oxford Press.)

I shall now consider the danger from without, thinking of this as of the other internal trouble, that there is no ground for any present alarm, but that we do not know the time or the quarter, when and where it may appear, but thinking in like manner of both, that it is by immediate preparation only that security can be obtained, and that relief will be too late if we wait, as would be most convenient, the actual occurrence of the mischief.

The following is a brief abstract of our military position. British India may be assailed from the north by the Gurkhas; from the east by the Burmese; from the north-west by the Sikhs, the Afghans, and the hordes of Central Asia, in co-operation or otherwise with Persia and Russia; from the sea on all the other sides of her territory.

An attack from the Gurkhas might partially succeed as a diversion against our hill provinces, but without cavalry or artillery their efforts on the plains could only terminate in disgrace or defeat.

The Burmese have proved themselves totally unequal to compete with forces in the field.

An attack from the sea, even supposing a momentary superiority against us on that element, could only produce an isolated debarkation, devoid of all the necessary requisites for taking the field or to subsist in a fixed position.

The only real danger with which we may be threatened must come from the north-west, and consequently to that important line of operation our main attention must be turned.

Under its present able and judicious leader it is not possible that the forces of the Punjab will be ever directed against us. Ranjit Singh is old and infirm, and there is no apparent probability that the wisdom of his rule will be inherited by his successor. Troubles, upon his decease, will certainly arise, and it is impossible to foresee the result.

The present state of Afghanistan presents no cause of alarm to India. The success that attended the wretched army that Sháh Shuja had under his feeble guidance affords the best proof of the weakness of the Afghan power. The assumption of the supremacy by Dost Muhammad Khán may possibly give greater strength and consolidation to the general confederacy. It is much to be desired that this state should acquire sufficient stability to form an intermediate barrier between India and Russia.

Persia, in its distracted state since the death of the late King, is unequal to any great effort unassisted by Russia, but the co-operation of 20,000 Russians from the Arrus would speedily terminate the civil war, and the advance of the combined force would give them in the first campaign possession of Herát, the key of Kábul.

It is the interest of Russia to extend and strengthen the Persian Empire, which occupies a central position between the double lines of operation of the Autocrat to the eastward and to the westward, and as Persia can never be a rival of Russia the augmentation of her strength can only increase the offensive means of Russia.

From the days of Peter the Great to the present time the views of Russia have been turned to the obtaining possession of that part of Central Asia which is watered by the Oxus and joins the eastern shore of the Caspian. The latest reports from Kábul state that they are building a fort between the Caspian and Khiva. This is their best line of operation against India, but it can only be considered at present as a very distant speculation.

The line of operation of a Russo-Persian army to advance upon Herát is short and easy; the distances are as follows :—

From the Arrus to Tabriz	...	...	60 miles.
Tabriz to Teherán	...	...	300
Teherán to Muschíd	...	...	601
Muschíd to Herát	...	...	228
Total	...	...	<u>1,189</u>

In the campaigns against the Turks the army of Georgia

supplied Paskewitch with 30,000 men. It may, therefore, be assumed that the same army could assist Persia with an equal number as an auxiliary force. With a good understanding between the two Governments, with time for preparation, and with good management there could be no difficulty in transporting this force to Herát. The Russians are accustomed to move in countries similarly circumstanced. In Turkey, the Russian army always carried with it two months' supply of grain and handmills for grinding it, but they never issue any part of this supply until all other means of obtaining it have failed.

What the policy of Russia might be after taking possession of Herát, it is unnecessary now to consider, but it is impossible to deny that she might arrive at that point in legitimate support of her ally, the King of Persia, and it is equally difficult to deny that she may proclaim a crusade against British India, in which she would be joined by all the warlike restless tribes that formed the overwhelming force of Timúr. The distances from Herát to Attock are:—

Herát to Kandahar	...	...	...	560 miles.
Kandahar to Ghazni	...	...	...	190
Ghazni to Kábul	...	...	...	82
Kábul to Attock	...	...	...	200

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1,032

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The Afghan Confederacy, even if cordially united, would have no means to resist the power of Russia and Persia. They probably would make a virtue of necessity and join the common cause, receiving in reward for their co-operation the promise of all the possessions that had been wrested from them by Ranjit Singh, and also expecting to reap no poor harvest from the plunder of India. But however this may be, it will be sufficient to assume the possibility that a Russian force of 20,000 men, fully equipped, accompanied with a body of 100,000 horse, may reach the shores of India, that Ranjit Singh has no means to resist their advance, and that the invaders, having crossed the Indus into the Punjab, would find themselves in possession of the parts of India, the most fertile of resources in every kind, and secure on every side from being harassed and attacked even if they had not on their side a body of irregular cavalry much more numerous and efficient than any we have to oppose to them.

[Lord William Bentinck, acting on the assumption that India was attacked by such a force, then reviews the quality and extent of the army in India. He came to the conclusion that the proportion of European to Indian troops should be one-fourth, a decision which necessitated a large increase in expenditure.]

Steam power must be included among the most powerful means of reducing the difficulties of protection and support to such extensive and distant lines of defence and of multiplying the military resources that we already possess. In illustration of the practical use that might be made of this power, I take the liberty of introducing here an opinion that I have elsewhere expressed :—

"An efficient marine steam establishment in India is called for by considerations more powerful even than those of commercial advantage or improved political control. It would multiply in a ratio little understood the defensive means of the Empire. Let me advert to an event, the particulars of which are still within your recollection, the Burmese War. If five powerful steamers had then been at our command to bring up in quick succession all necessary reinforcements and supplies, the war would probably have terminated in a few months, and many millions of treasure, many thousands of lives, and extraordinary misery and sickness would have been spared. Allow me to submit another estimate of advantage, of the correctness of which you can all likewise judge. The proper station for the principal reserve of our European troops in India is at Bangalore, Madras the place of embarkation. In a few days, at any period of the monsoon, the same five steamers would carry this force to the most distant part of the shores of the Empire. In five weeks, with the aid of the river-steamers, this reserve would reach Allahabad, the most central point of our territories, and one of our most commanding positions. The same steam-power that would enable us to baffle any invader in war would be ample in times of peace to carry into complete execution the whole plan of the Bengal Steam Committee, for which I continue to be a decided advocate."

I regret that these observations should have run to such extreme length, but no one before me has had the opportunity of a season of peace to reflect upon the alterations that the union of our Presidencies with our Government, and of our territories with our Empire, imperatively call for. It would have ill become me, upon a subject so momentous as the safety of this great possession, to have been prevented by any motive of delicacy from the full development of my opinion. I fearlessly pronounce the Indian army to be the least efficient and the most expensive in the world. The realization of the hypothesis with which I started, of the presence of 20,000 Russian infantry on the Indus, with its accompanying multitudes, would now find us in a state utterly unable to resist them. The national resources at home might possibly rescue us from the impending ruin, but we must recollect that we are not likely to have again the same large armies to supply us with great reinforcements, and that men recruited for the occasion would be very inefficient and quite inadequate to bear the effects of the climate.

But even if we could command this aid, it would be utterly inexcusable if, with ample time for preparation, with the sum of

ten millions sterling appropriated to our military establishments, we were not able to secure ourselves against every calculable danger.

Source.—(ii) Sir Charles Metcalfe, Minute dated May 16, 1835.

His Lordship (Lord W. Bentinck) considers our greatest danger to lie in an invasion from the north-west, led by the Russians. He supposes a force of 20,000 Russian infantry and 100,000 Asiatic cavalry to have arrived on our north-western frontier. Supposing such a case, with the time we should have for preparation, we ought to be able to give a good account of the Russian infantry; easily, I should say, if there were no danger of internal insurrection at such a crisis. The 100,000 cavalry would be more difficult to manage, from the impossibility of collecting an equal force of that arm. But is there no impossibility of collecting such a force against us? I doubt the possibility of assembling such an immense body. Are all to be on one side? Is there to be no hostility to the Russians in their progress? Is every chance to turn up in their favour? If it were possible to collect such a force, how is it to be fed and supported? At whose cost? Not at that of Russia or any other power, that being utterly impracticable from want of means. Solely then at the cost of the countries through which it had to pass. If this were possible, it would at least destroy those countries, and the Russian infantry would be starved to death by the operations of its allied cavalry. All speculations, however, regarding our military defence against a Russian invasion may be safely postponed until we know more on the subject. It cannot come on so suddenly as to prevent preparation to the utmost extent that our resources will allow; and preparation for such an event must be on a much larger scale than any that our means could afford without the immediate approach of the event, or for any length of time. Reserving suitable measures until we have reason to apprehend that we shall have to meet this danger, we have, in the meantime, without reference to such a course, ample reasons for putting our army on the most efficient footing, and for increasing it to any extent that our finances will bear.)

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Let us, therefore, pause; let us maintain an army on its present establishment, without attempting changes and restrictions hurtful to its feelings, and consequently injurious to our best interests. Let us make it as efficient as we can without a great increase of charge; let us watch our finances, and if they improve, and afford the means, let us apply additional funds to increase the strength and improve the efficiency of our army in

any mode most advisable. Any outlay that we can afford for this purpose will be well laid out, and it is not necessary to think of the battle of Armageddon or a Russian invasion to justify it. But our military efficiency in peace and ordinary times must be limited by our financial means. It is only in war and a period of necessity, that we can venture to put out of calculation the differences between income and expenditure. Our financial difficulties, actual and probable, are those which are most pressing; and military speculations leading to great increase of expense ought to be suspended until they become unavoidable, or until we see our financial prospects brightening, and light shining through its present gloom.

The crisis occurred when the caution and experience of Metcalfe were replaced in 1836 by the ignorance of Lord Auckland, the new Governor-General. At that time the Whig Government of Lord Melbourne was in power in England, and its foreign policy was dominated by Lord Palmerston, who considered it necessary to counteract the progress of Russian influence in Central Asia. It is probable, therefore, that Lord Auckland arrived in India with a foreign policy already prepared by his political chief, who was alarmed somewhat naturally by the march of the Persians to Herát in 1837. The immediate danger was averted, as has happened so often in English history, by a naval demonstration in the Persian Gulf. Herát, whose defence had been assisted by the skill and gallantry of an Indian officer, Lieutenant Pottinger, was thus relieved by indirect pressure from the south.

The great question for decision after that was the policy to be adopted towards Afghanistan. There can be little doubt that, had he continued as Governor-General, Metcalfe would have abstained from all interference in that country, and would have been prepared to meet the Russian advance, had it ever arrived, on the geographical boundaries of India. The British Government at home, however, took the other course, and insisted that the dependence of Afghanistan was essential to the security of India. Lord Auckland, therefore, took what seems to have been the fatal step of ratifying a tripartite alliance with Ranjit Singh and Sháh Shuja, and sending a "frigid" letter to Dost

*firmans from Simla*

Muhammad, who, under the influence of Burnes, the agent at Kábul, was then willing to "pay no attention," to the Russian envoy. By this action the British power in India was committed to the unpleasant task of dethroning Dost Muhammad, who had the reputation of being an able administrator and a courageous warrior, and of reinstating Sháh Shuja, who had been an exile for years and who, during that time, had not acted in a manner calculated to gain the respect of his old subjects.

#### ✓ The Genesis of the First Afghan War.

*Source.*—Appendix I. to Keene's "History of India." Vol. II. pp. 405-8. (W. H. Allen.)

By the courtesy of the India Office in allowing access to the despatches of the period—never before published, or only in an imperfect form—the whole facts of the case are now, for the first time, forthcoming.

The earliest symptom of the movement appears in the Secret Committee's Letter of June 25, 1836, when the Foreign Office was under Lord Palmerston, and Sir J. C. Hobhouse was President of the Board of Control. The Secret Committee was—it must be remembered—obliged to send out to India whatever instructions might be ordered by His Majesty's Government for the time being. The year 1836 was the last year of the reign of King William IV., and the easy-going Lord Melbourne was nominally head of the Ministry. These things being premised, it will hardly be too much to assume if we attribute the origin of the instructions to the Foreign Secretary.

In the letter above cited there is clear evidence that the information from Persia was beginning to cause apprehension in Palmerston's mind, that the new Shah of that country was being pushed forward to the line of the Indus by Russian instigation, which it was desirable to counteract, yet not directly to oppose. It states that from information supplied by Mr. Ellis, who was about to resign his mission in Persia, it appeared that, so early in the year as the month of February, overtures had been received by the Persian Court from Dost Muhammad, relative to a conquest and partition of the territories on the border then held by Kamran, the head of the Popalzai clan. The Khan of Khiva was also understood to be entering into engagements with the Government of the Czar. The Governor-General was, therefore, enjoined to watch affairs in those quarters, and to counteract the progress of Russian influence, either by a political or commercial mission, as in his discretion might seem best.



He would also hear from the new British Minister at Teherán, Mr. McNeill, to whom the Government in London would communicate their instructions.

Doubtless, this was the original ground of Auckland's frigid letter to the Dost when, on assuming charge of the government in India, he received that potentate's application for advice and assistance in his controversy with Ranjit Singh, the Maharaja of Lahore. Failing to obtain satisfaction from the Governor-General, Dost Muhammad turned to the Shah of Persia for aid against the Sikhs. In July, 1837, the Shah advanced upon Herát; but by that time Burnes was well on his way to Kábul, and had received letters of welcome from the Dost, informing him of the arrival at Kábul of a Russian envoy, and promising to "pay no attention" to him until Burnes should make his appearance. Burnes also heard from McNeill that he had intercepted correspondence between the Russian Minister at Teherán and the Dost's rebellious brethren at Kandahar.

The next important stage in the instructions sent to India through the Secret Committee is a letter dated May 10, 1838, in which the Governor-General is informed that, in consequence of the receipt by the Dost of a letter from the Emperor Nicholas, Burnes is to be ordered to withdraw from Kábul unless the Dost will give up all communication with Russia. At the same time he is warned against doing anything calculated to lead to controversy with the Court of St. Petersburg.

On the 22nd of the same month Auckland reported the withdrawal of Burnes from Kábul, and enclosed his Minute of the 12th, with a copy of his instructions to Macnaughten for the negotiation with Ranjit and Sháh Shuja, which resulted in the Tripartite Treaty. The Governor-General admitted that the "emergency" and the "rapid march of events" might compel him to act without awaiting instructions from London.

On August 13 Auckland reported the fullest details of Macnaughten's negotiations, and assumed the entire responsibility of the projected restoration of the Saduzai monarchy, and he refers to the Government Committee's letter of June, 1836, and May, 1838, as justification. But before that letter had reached the British Government a despatch had been by them dictated to the Secret Committee in which the policy had been sanctioned by anticipation. This, by far the most important of the papers in question, bears the date October 24, 1838, and is deserving of textual quotation:—

"We have heard," the Committee are made to say, "with the utmost regret that the mission of Captain Burnes has failed, and that a Russian agent has been openly received at Kábul. We have hitherto declined to take part in the intestine dissensions of the Afghan State. . . . But as our efforts to cultivate a closer

acquaintance with Dost Muhammad have failed, and his brothers at Kandahar have thrown themselves into the arms of a power whose approach to the Indus is incompatible with the safety of Her Majesty's Indian possessions,<sup>1</sup> it becomes our imperative duty to adopt a policy by which Kábul and Kandahar may be united under a sovereign bound . . . to become and remain the faithful ally of Great Britain." Such a prince, they add, is Sháh Shuja; and they are disposed to concur in the opinion offered by Wade on January 1. "A comparatively insignificant effort," they think, would suffice, but the Governor-General must take "means to prevent almost all possibility of failure."

This letter was forwarded by the Malta mail of October 27, *one day after the arrival of Auckland's despatch of May 22*; and in a subsequent letter, dated November 9, the Committee, referring to the last, observe:—

"You will have seen . . . that, previous to the receipt of your advice . . . we had determined on recommending the course which you had, without any knowledge of our wishes, determined to pursue."

So far, then, one seems to perceive a sort of competition between London and Simla for the discredit of initiating the ill-starred project. But in less than a month, there comes a note of wise but tardy caution. On December 4, the Committee hope that His Excellency has made every effort to conciliate the Dost, and that he has full persuasion of the Sháh's popularity and ability to maintain himself in power without "continued and manifest interference of the British Government."

By that time the Bengal column had assembled at Firozepore; and, before the letter could have been received, was well on its way to join the Bombay column in Sind. Yet the warning might well have been borne in mind, and had it been acted upon when Sháh Shuja was enthroned in the Bala Hissar of Kábul, much disaster might have been averted by discontinuing the manifest interference.

Finally, on December 21, a last despatch was sent out, acknowledging the declaration of August 13, in which Auckland announced his determination "to give the direct and powerful assistance of the British Government to the enterprise of Sháh Shuja in a degree which was not in the first instance contemplated." This was not contravened, or even noticed.

From the papers it can only be concluded that the mind of Lord Auckland had been gradually influenced, until he became impressed with the necessity of substituting the Saduzai dynasty—the "Duranic Empire" as it was called—for the Amirate of

<sup>1</sup> This phrase is remarkable: India was then supposed to be in the possession of the Company.

the Dost, led thereto by fear of Persia and Russia. But it appears almost equally certain that the British Ministry made that policy their own; not merely by adoption but by prior suggestion and subsequent encouragement, so that they would even have enjoined it on the Governor-General if he had not originated it himself. Without seeing private correspondence, long since beyond reach, no more can be known, but Palmerston did much of his work, it is understood, by that channel in India known as "semi-official."

The fatal expedition into Afghanistan then started which was vehemently opposed by experienced thinkers. The Duke of Wellington held that "the consequence of crossing the Indus to settle a government in Afghanistan will be a perennial march into that country;" Metcalfe looked upon it as "the surest way to bring Russia down upon ourselves;" and Mountstuart Elphinstone prophesied that though it might be possible to set up Shuja, it would be hopeless "to maintain him in a poor, cold, strong, and remote country among a turbulent people like the Afghans." After an exhausting march, however, the troops arrived at Kandahar, where, in course of time, Sháh Shuja was enthroned. The fortress of Ghazni was taken by storm soon afterwards, and on August 7 Sháh Shuja marched through the streets of Kábul. It had been anticipated by the originators of the scheme that there would thus be a ruler in Afghanistan who would be dependent on the support of the British and would interpose a solid and friendly barrier between the Russians and India, but the result was far from being consonant with their wishes. To quote the words of Captain Trotter, "no outburst of popular welcome greeted the Sháh's return to his capital after an absence of thirty years. Of those who came out to stare at the passing pageant, very few were seen to offer him a common salaam." The British, therefore, were faced with the unpleasant and difficult problem of maintaining on the throne a weak and incompetent ruler, whilst the supporters of the fallen leader still held out in certain parts of the country and thus rendered the line of communications extremely insecure.

The position then, was one of extreme danger. General Keene said openly that "it would not be long before Kábul

was the scene of a signal catastrophe." If the Sháh was to succeed in restoring order in his unruly kingdom, he had to do so by his own efforts, and not with the assistance of alien troops; but, whether through nervousness of the Sháh's position or through an ambition to destroy the influence of Russia in countries further westward, the Envoy, Sir William Macnaughten, still remained at Kábul with a number of British soldiers. In the meantime, the Whig ministry had been replaced by the Tories under Sir Robert Peel. Lord Ellenborough, the new President of the Board of Control, wrote at once to cancel any orders that his predecessor may have given for an advance on Herát, and stated that the troops should be withdrawn from Afghanistan as soon as the security of Sháh Shuja was ensured.

#### A Change of Policy

*Source.*—Letter written by Lord Ellenborough to Queen Victoria, dated September 15, 1841. Reproduced in "The Indian Administration of Lord Ellenborough," edited by Lord Colchester. (R. Bentley.)

Lord Ellenborough presents his most humble duty to your Majesty, and humbly acquaints your Majesty that having, on the morning after the Council held at Claremont on the third of this month, requested the clerks of the India Board to put him in possession of the latest information with respect to the political, military, and financial affairs of India, he ascertained that on the 4th of June instructions had been addressed to the Governor-General of India in Council in the following terms:—"We direct that unless circumstances now unknown to us should induce you to adopt a different course, an adequate force be advanced upon Herát, and that that city and its dependencies may be occupied by our troops, and dispositions made for annexing them to the kingdom of Kábul."

The last letters from Calcutta, dated the 9th of July, did not intimate any intention on the part of the Governor-General in Council of directing any hostile movement against Herát, and the Governor-General himself having always evinced much reluctance to extend the operations of the army to that city, it seemed almost probable that the execution of the orders of the 4th of June would have been suspended until further communication could be had with the home authorities.

Nevertheless, in a matter of so much moment, it did not appear to be prudent to leave anything to probability, and at

Lord Ellenborough's instance your Majesty's confidential servants came to the conclusion that no time should be lost in addressing to the Governor-General in Council a letter in the following terms—such letter being sent, as your Majesty must be aware, not directly by the Commissioners for the affairs of India, but, as the Act of Parliament prescribes in affairs requiring secrecy, by their discretion through and in the name of the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors:—

“From the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors of the East India Company to the Governor-General of India in Council.

“Her Majesty having been pleased to form a new Administration, we think it expedient that no step should be taken with regard to Herát which would have the effect of compelling the prosecution of a specific line of policy in the countries beyond the Indus, until the new ministers shall have had time to take the subject into their deliberate consideration, and to communicate to us their opinions thereupon.

“We therefore direct that, unless you have already taken measures in pursuance of our instructions of the 4th of June, 1841—which commit the honour of your Government to the prosecution of the line of policy which we thereby ordered you to adopt, or which could not be arrested without prejudice to the public interests, or danger to the troops employed—you will consider these instructions to be suspended.

“We shall not fail to communicate to you at an early period our fixed decision upon this subject.”

It was not possible to bring this subject before your Majesty's confidential servants before the afternoon of Saturday, the 4th. The mail for India, which should have been despatched on the 1st, had been detained till Monday, the 6th, by the direction of your Majesty's late ministers, in order to enable your Majesty's present servants to transmit to India and China any orders which it might seem to them to be expedient to issue forthwith. Further delay would have been productive of much mercantile inconvenience, and in India probably of much alarm. In this emergency your Majesty's ministers thought that your Majesty would be graciously pleased to approve of their exercising at once the power of directing the immediate transmission to India of these instructions.

Your Majesty must have had frequently before you strong proofs of the deep interest taken by Russia in the affairs of Herát, and your Majesty cannot but be sensible of the difficulty of maintaining in Europe that good understanding with Russia which has such an important bearing upon the general peace, if serious differences should exist between your Majesty and that Power with respect to the states of Central Asia.

But even if the annexation of Herát to the kingdom of Kábul were not to have the effect of endangering the continuance of the good understanding between your Majesty and Russia, still your Majesty will not have failed to observe that the further advance of your Majesty's forces 360 miles into the interior of Central Asia, for the purpose of effecting that annexation, could not but render more difficult of accomplishment the original intention of your Majesty, publicly announced to the world, of withdrawing your Majesty's troops from Afghanistan as soon as Sháh Shuja should be firmly established upon the throne he owes to your Majesty's aid.

These considerations alone would have led Lord Ellenborough to desire that the execution of the orders given on the 4th of June should at least be delayed until your Majesty's confidential servants had had time to consider maturely the policy which it might be their duty to advise your Majesty to sanction with respect to the countries on the right bank of the Indus ; but financial considerations strengthened this desire, and seemed to render it an imperative duty to endeavour to obtain time for mature reflection before any step should be taken which might seriously affect the tranquillity of Europe, and must necessarily have disastrous effects upon the Administration of India.

It appeared that the political and military charges now incurred beyond the Indus amounted to £1,250,000 a year—that the estimate of the expense of the additions made to the army in India, since April, 1838, was £1,138,750 a year, and that the deficit of Indian Revenue in 1839-40 having been £2,425,625, a further deficit of £1,087,000 was expected in 1840-41.

Your Majesty must be too well informed of the many evils consequent upon financial embarrassment, and entertains too deep a natural affection for all your Majesty's subjects, not to desire that in whatever advice your Majesty's confidential servants may tender to your Majesty with respect to the policy to be observed in Afghanistan, they should have especial regard to the effect which the protracted continuance of military operations in that country, still more any extension of them to a new and distant field, would have upon the finances of India, and thereby upon the welfare of eighty millions of people who there acknowledge your Majesty's rule.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> To this letter Queen Victoria replied in these words: "The Queen thanks Lord Ellenborough for this clear and interesting memorandum he has sent. It seems to the Queen that the course intended to be pursued—namely to take time to consider the affairs of India without making any precipitate change in the policy hitherto pursued, and without involving the country hastily in expenses, is far the best and safest."

The situation soon became even more critical and, unfortunately, there was considerable indecision and want of purpose on the part of Lord Auckland and his advisers. It was certainly difficult to remove the troops at once without prejudicing the political position, as Sháh Shuja could not continue without their support. The force was cut off from easy communication with India to the south by the Amirs of Sind, who were by no means friendly to the British cause; and, since the death of Ranjit Singh the Punjab had been in a state of anarchy. Moreover, there was general discontent, not only among the Afghan nobles but also among the mercenary troops who had been deprived of certain allowances ~~in~~ the interests of misguided economy. This discontent soon ripened into open rebellion and murder. The Envoy, who had just been appointed Governor of Bombay, and his appointed successor were murdered. After much hesitation, in January, 1842, when it was too late, orders were given for the troops to evacuate the country. The winter was severe, transport was difficult, food was scarce, and the enemy from the hill-side shot incessantly at the unfortunate little party. The catastrophe was so complete that one man alone, Dr. Brydon, struggled into Jelálábad to tell the sad story.

The Government in England now resolved to recall Lord Auckland, who seemed incapable of any decisive action, and sent out Lord Ellenborough in his stead, who arrived in India in February, 1842. He lost little time in announcing his views on the situation. He considered that the occupation of Afghanistan, even if it could be effected, would be a perpetual source of weakness, and that it was not incumbent upon the British to incur any further responsibility in the interests of Sháh Shuja. For the moment, however, he saw the necessity of restoring the reputation of British arms by inflicting punishment on the Afghans for their atrocities, and of relieving the troops then surrounded at Jelálábad, Kelat, and Ghazni. He announced his policy in the following despatch to the Directors.

## The Turn of the Tide

*Source.*—Lord Ellenborough's Despatch on Afghanistan.

The insurrection which has existed in parts of Afghanistan almost from the time of our obtaining possession of Kábul, which, in the summer of last year, led to more than one serious conflict with considerable bodies of men in the vicinity of Kandahar; and, extending itself in October to the vicinity of Kábul, impeded the march of Major-General Sir Robert Sale's brigade to Jelálábad; still more the revolution, rather than insurrection, which commenced at Kábul on November 2, and which, after many disastrous and lamentable events, led to an ultimate destruction of a numerous division of the British Army—a calamity wholly without parallel in our history in India; all these circumstances, followed as they have been by the universal hostility of the whole people of Afghanistan, united at the present moment against us in a war which has assumed a religious as well as a national character, compel us to adopt the conclusion that the possession of Afghanistan, could we recover it, would be a source of weakness, rather than of strength, in resisting the invasion of any army from the west, and, therefore, that the ground upon which the policy of the advance of our troops in that country mainly rested has already ceased to exist.

The information received with respect to the conduct of Sháh Shuja during the late transactions is necessarily imperfect, and, moreover, of a somewhat contradictory character. It is not probable that the insurrection against our troops should have originated with him. It is most probable, and it is almost proved, that he has adopted it, and, powerless in himself, is prepared to side with either party by which he may hope to be maintained upon his precarious throne.

Certainly, as we are at present informed, the conduct of Sháh Shuja has not been such as to compel the British Government, in blind and solitary observance of the Tripartite Treaty, of which the ground has ceased to exist, to peril its armies, and, with its armies, its Indian Empire, in his support.

Whatever course we may hereafter take must rest solely upon military considerations, and have, in the first instance, regard to the safety of the detached bodies of our troops at Jelálábad, at Ghazni, at Kelat-i-Ghilzye, and Kandahar; to the security of our troops now in the field from all unnecessary risk; and, finally, to the re-establishment of our military reputation by the infliction of some signal and decisive blow upon the Afghans, which may make it appear to them, to our own subjects, and to our allies, that we have the power of inflicting punishment upon those who commit atrocities and violate their faith, and that we withdraw ultimately from Afghanistan, not from any



deficiency of means to maintain our position, but because we are satisfied that the king we have set up has not, as we were erroneously led to imagine, the support of the nation over which he has been placed.

But, while the facts before us justify the withdrawal of our troops from Afghanistan, and the refusal of all further assistance to Sháh Shuja, they are not yet such as to make it consistent with our reputation to give our future support to Sháh Kamran, and to make over Kandahar to that nominal ruler of Herát, even were it consistent with prudence to engage in a new speculative enterprise beyond the Indus, which might render it necessary for us to retain, at an enormous cost, a large body of troops in the difficult country between that river and Kandahar, for the purpose of maintaining in the country so made over to him a sovereign personally incapable, and for many years unknown to its inhabitants otherwise than by the fame of his degrading vices.

We are of opinion that it would be erroneous to suppose that a forward position in Upper Afghanistan would have the effect of controlling the Sikhs, or that a forward position above the passes of Lower Afghanistan would have the effect of controlling the Beluchis and the Sindians, by the appearance of confidence and of strength. That which will really and will alone control the Sikhs, the Beluchis, and the Sindians, and all the nations beyond and within the Indus, is the knowledge that we possess an army, perfect in its equipment, possessed of all the means of movement, and so secure in its communications with the country from which its supplies and reinforcements are drawn, as to be able at any time to act with vigour and effect against any enemy.

In war, reputation is strength; but reputation is lost by the rash exposure of the most gallant troops under circumstances which render defeat more probable than victory; and a succession of reverses will dishearten any soldiers, and most of all those whose courage and devotion have been mainly the result of their confidence that they were always led to certain success. We would, therefore, strongly impress upon the commanders of the forces employed in Afghanistan and Sind the importance of incurring no unnecessary risk, and of bringing their troops into action under circumstances which may afford full scope to the superiority they desire from their discipline. At the same time we are aware that no great object can be accomplished without incurring some risk; and we should consider that the object of striking a decisive blow at the Afghans, more especially if such blow could be struck in combination with measures for the relief of Ghazni—a blow which might re-establish our military character beyond the Indus, and leave a deep impression of our power, and of the vigour with which it would be applied to punish an atrocious enemy—would be one for which risk might be justifi-

ably incurred, all due and possible precaution being taken to diminish such necessary risk, and to secure decisive success.

The commanders of the forces in Upper and Lower Afghanistan will, in all the operations they may design, bear in mind these general views and opinions of the Government of India. They will, in the first instance, endeavour to relieve all the garrisons in Afghanistan that are now surrounded by the enemy. The relief of those garrisons is a point chiefly affecting the character of the army, and deeply interesting to the feelings of that country; but to make a rash attempt to effect such relief, in any case, without a reasonable prospect of success, would be to afford no real aid to the brave men who are surrounded, and fruitlessly to sacrifice other good soldiers whose preservation is equally dear to the Government they serve. To effect the release of the prisoners taken at Kábul is an object also deeply interesting in point of feeling and of honour. That object can, probably, only be accomplished by taking hostages from such part of the country as may be taken, or may come into our possession, and, with reference to this object, and to that of the relief of Ghazni, it may possibly become a question, in the event of Major-General Pollock's effecting a junction with Sir Robert Sale, whether the united force shall return to the country below the Khyber Pass, or take a forward position near Jelálábad, or even advance to Kábul.

We are fully sensible of the advantages which would be derived from the re-occupation of Kábul, the scene of our great disaster and of so much crime, even for a week, of the means which it might afford of recovering the prisoners, of the gratification which it would give to the army, and of the effect which it would have upon our enemies. Our withdrawal might then be made to rest upon an official declaration of the grounds upon which we retired as solemn as that which accompanied our advance, and we should retire as a conquering, not as a defeated power; but we cannot sanction the occupation of an advanced position beyond the Khyber Pass by Major-General Pollock, unless that general should be satisfied that he can, without depending upon the forbearance of the tribes near the pass, which, obtained only by purchase, must, under all circumstances, be precarious, and without depending upon the fidelity of the Sikh chiefs, or upon the power of those chiefs to restrain the troops—upon neither of which can any reliance be safely placed—feel assured that he can, by his own strength, overawe and overcome all who dispute the pass, and keep up at all times his communication with Peshawar and the Indus; and we would caution Major-General Pollock, and all the officers commanding the troops in the field, not to place reliance upon, or to be biassed by, the representations of native chiefs who may have

been expelled from the country, in consequence of their adherence to us, and who will naturally be ready to lead us into any danger by operations which may have the possible effect of restoring them to their former possessions.

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We cannot review all the circumstances of the present crisis without being deeply impressed with a sense of the danger arising from the dissemination of troops in an enemy's country, having difficult communication, and of the further danger of leaving any force intended for operations in the field, and at any time liable to be called into action, so composed in the several arms of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, and so supplied with ammunition, provisions, and the means of movement as to be, in fact, incapable of executing with promptitude and effect, and even of attempting, without peril to itself, any important operations with which it may be entrusted."

With the arrival of Lord Ellenborough and with the consequent acceptance of a new policy, the tide of disaster soon turned. Jelálábad was relieved, and the British army forced its way to Kábul. No attempt was made on this occasion to repeat former errors by remaining in Afghanistan longer than was necessary. Dost Muhammad was released and restored to power; and with his return one of the most disastrous episodes in Anglo-Indian history may be said to have ended.

Peace, however, was very short-lived, for the Afghanistan blunder brought in its train difficulties with the Amirs of Sind. Whatever may have been alleged as the causes of the trouble, it seems certain that both sides laboured under a misapprehension. The Amirs probably exaggerated in their minds the effect of the British defeats in Afghanistan, and therefore thought that liberties could be taken; the Governor-General, and more especially his impetuous subordinate, Sir Charles Napier, on the other hand, held in a most exaggerated degree that British prestige must be restored at all costs, and that by a signal victory over somebody. Be that as it may, the conquest of Sind was of doubtful morality and may be styled an act of aggression. It was the first act in a new policy which sought expansion of territory, and it was certainly the most ques-

tionable of all such actions. In itself it was a fine feat of arms, for Sir Charles Napier triumphed over a large and fearless army at Miani with a mere handful of men. The brother of the victorious general has given a most vivid account of this remarkable battle, which can stand comparison even with his better-known descriptions of the great battles of the Peninsular War.

### The Battle of Miani

*Source.*—Sir W. Napier, "The Conquest of Scinde." Vol. II., pp. 309-18. (T. & W. Boone.)

The plain between the two armies was about a thousand yards wide. For seven hundred yards it was covered with low, jungle bushes, which impeded the march of the line; but the rest had been cleared by the Beluchis up to the bank of the Fullailli, to give the better play to their matchlocks. They fired long shots now and then at the skirmishers and cavalry, but still lay close and hidden in the nullahs and in the Shikargah.

When the line was formed the General gave the order to advance, and rode forward himself with his staff, and his interpreter, Ali Acbar, an Arab gentleman of high race and true Arab courage, who never left his chief's side in any danger. Constant and heavy was the fire from the Beluchi guns; and though few men could be discovered, the rapid play of the matchlocks indicated the presence of numbers, and marked the position.

The Amirs' right was found to be strengthened and covered by the village of Katiri, which was filled with men: that flank offered no weak point. But in the Shikargah on their left the General instantly detected a flaw. It has been before said that this Shikargah was covered by a wall, having only one opening, not very wide, through which it was evident the Beluchis meant to pour out on the flank and rear of the advancing British line. The General rode near this wall and found it was nine or ten feet high; he rode nearer and marked that it had no loopholes for the enemy to shoot through; he rode into the opening under a play of matchlocks, and looking behind the wall saw there was no scaffolding to enable the Beluchis to fire over the top. Then the inspiration of genius came to the aid of heroism. Taking the grenadiers of the 22nd, he thrust them at once into the opening, telling their brave Captain Tew that he was to block up that entrance; to die there, if it must be, never to give way! And well did the gallant fellow obey his orders; he died there, but the opening was defended. The great disparity of numbers was thus abated, and the action of

six thousand men paralysed by the more skilful action of only eighty! It was, on a smaller scale as to numbers, a stroke of generalship like that which won Blenheim for the Duke of Marlborough.

Now the advancing troops, formed in columns of regiments, approached the enemy's front. The British right passed securely under the wall of the Shikargah, cheered and elated as they moved by the rattling sound of Tew's musketry. Meanwhile the dead level of the plain was swept by the Beluchi cannon and matchlocks, which were answered from time to time by Lloyd's battery, yet not frequently, for rapidly and eagerly did the troops press forward to close with their unseen foes. When the 22nd had got within a hundred yards of the high sloping bank of the Fullailli, the columns opened to their left; and as the companies formed in succession, they threw their fire at the top of the bank, where the heads of the Beluchis could be just seen, bending with fiery glances over the levelled matchlocks. The formation was still incomplete, when the voice of the General, shrill and clear, was heard along the line commanding the charge.

Then rose the British shout, the English guns were rushed forward into position, the infantry closed upon the Fullailli with a run, and rushed up the sloping bank. The Beluchis, having their matchlocks laid ready in rest along the summit, waited until the assailants were within fifteen yards ere their volley was delivered; the rapid pace of the British, and the steepness of the slope on the inside deceived their aim, and the execution was not great; the next moment the 22nd were at the top of the bank, thinking to bear down all before them, but they staggered back in amazement at the forest of swords waving in their front! Thick as standing corn, and gorgeous as a field of flowers, stood the Beluchis in their many coloured garments and turbans; they filled the broad deep bed of the Fullailli, they clustered on both banks, and covered the plain beyond. Guarding their heads with their large dark shields, they shook their sharp swords, beaming in the sun, their shouts rolled like a peal of thunder, as with frantic gestures they rushed forwards, and full against the front of the 22nd dashed with demoniac strength and ferocity. But with shouts as loud, and shrieks as wild and fierce as theirs, and hearts as big and arms as strong, the Irish soldiers met them with that queen of weapons, the musket, and sent their foremost masses rolling back in blood.

The Beluchis closed their dense masses, and again the shouts and the rolling fire of musketry and the dreadful rush of the swordsmen were heard and seen along the whole line, and such a fight ensued as has seldom been known or told of in the annals of war. For even these wild warriors came close up; sword and

shield in advance, striving in all the fierceness of their valour to break into the opposing ranks ; no fire of small arms, no push of bayonets, no sweeping discharges of grape from the guns, which were planted in one mass on the right, could drive the gallant fellows back ; they gave their breasts to the shot, they leaped upon the guns and were blown away by twenties at a time ; their dead went down the steep slope by hundreds ; but the gaps in their masses were continually filled up from the rear, the survivors of the front rank still pressed forward with unabated fury, and the bayonet and the sword clashed in fast and frequent conflict.

Thus they fought in this fearful struggle, never more than three yards apart, and often intermixed, and several times the different regiments, aye, even the Europeans, were violently forced backwards and pushed from the line, overborne and staggering under the might and passion of the barbarian swordsmen. But always their General was there to cheer and rally them. At his voice and intrepid demeanour their strength returned, and they recovered their ground, though nearly deprived of regimental leaders ; for fast those leaders had gone down, dying as British officers should, and always will do, where they cannot win.

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Such was the state of the field at the end of three hours, when that inevitable crisis, belonging to every battle, which offers victory to the commander who most promptly and strongly seizes the occasion, arrived at Miani. Sir Charles Napier was that commander. He saw Clibborne's error on the left; he was hardly pressed on the right himself, and he had no reserve save his cavalry, the action of which was paralysed by the village of Katiri. Yet the battle must be won or lost within twenty minutes! Already Jacob, with the intelligence of an officer able to see beyond his own immediate work, had endeavoured to make way through the Shikargah on his left, with the Sind horsemen, hoping thus to turn the village and get on the flank of the Beluchis' position, but the frequent scarped nullahs, the thick jungle, and the appearance of matchlock men, soon convinced him it was not to be done, and he returned. The General could not quit the right, so thick and heavily the Beluchis pressed on, so stern and dreadful was their fighting, so wearied and exhausted were his men ; but his eye covered the whole field, and on the left he saw victory beckoning to him, though Clibborne was unconscious of her presence. Wherefore, urging his men, by his voice and example, firmly to sustain the increasing fury of the Beluchis, he sent orders to Colonel Pattle, the second in command, to charge at all risks with the whole body of the Bengal and Sind horsemen on the enemy's right.

It was the command of a master spirit, and with fiery speed and courage it was obeyed. Spurring hard, those eastern horsemen disregarded or drove the Beluchi matchlock men from the village of Katiri, and galloped unchecked across the small nullahs and ditches about it, which were, however, so numerous and difficult, that fifty of the Sind troopers were cast from their saddles at once by the leaps. But dashing through the Beluchi guns on that flank, riding over the high bank of the Fullailli, they crossed the deep bed, gained the plain beyond, and charged with irresistible fury. Major Storey leading the Bengal troopers fell on the enemy infantry on the left; the Sindian horse fell on the camp and cavalry, putting all who encountered them to the sword, and spreading confusion along the rear of the line of battle on the Fullailli. Then at last the Beluchi swordsmen, whose fury was scarcely to be resisted before, somewhat abated their fighting and began to waver, looking behind them. The 22nd first saw their masses shake, and leaping forward with the shout of victory, pushed them backwards into the deep ravine, and there closed in combat again. The Madras sappers did the like; the sepoy's followed the glorious example; and at the same time the multitude in the Shikargah abandoned their cover, and joined the left of the line of battle on the dry bed of the Fullailli, where the conflict was now renewed. And how fiercely the brave barbarians still fought may be gathered from this. A soldier of the 22nd bounding forward drove his bayonet into the breast of a Beluchi; instead of falling, the rugged warrior cast away his shield, and seizing the musket with his left hand writhed his body forwards on the bayonet, until he could with one sweep of his sword, for the Beluchi needs no second blow, avenge himself; both fell dead together!

However, the battle was lost for the Amirs, and slowly the Beluchis began to retreat; yet not in dispersion, nor with marks of fear; in heavy masses they moved, keeping together, with their broad shields slung over their backs, their heads half turned and their eyes glaring with fury. The victors followed closely, pouring in volley after volley until tired of slaughtering, yet these stern implacable warriors still preserved their habitual swinging stride, would not quicken to a run, though death was at their heels! Two or three thousand who were on the extreme right, having been passed by the cavalry untouched, kept their position, and seemed disposed to make another rush. The whole of the British guns were immediately turned upon them with such heavy discharges of grape and shells, that they also lost hope and went off with the others. Yet so heavy were the retreating masses, so doggedly did they move, so disposed did they seem to renew the conflict, which would

have been on a level plain without protection for the British flanks, that the General did not think it fitting to provoke them any further. He halted his army, recalled his cavalry, and formed a large square, placing his luggage and camp followers in the centre. Such was the battle of Miani, fought on February 17, 1843, with two thousand men against more than thirty thousand. It was in its general arrangements, in all that depended on the commander, a model of skill and intrepidity combined; and in its details fell nothing short of any recorded deed of arms.

The conquest and absorption of Sind may have vindicated the military reputation of the British, but it also contributed to the deep-set fear and suspicion of the Indian princes. Sir Charles Napier has attempted to defend the actions of Lord Ellenborough and himself in the following words:—

#### British Policy in Sind.

Source.—Extract of a Private Letter from Sir C. Napier. "Conquest of Scinde," by Sir W. Napier. (T. & W. Boone.)

I found the Amirs and our Government in the position in which a treaty made by Lord Auckland placed them. I had no concern with its justice, its propriety, or anything but *to see it maintained*. I found that all the politicals had gone on, from the beginning, trifling, sometimes letting the Amirs infringe the treaty without notice; at others pulling them up, and then dropping the matter; in short I saw it was a long chain of infringement,—denial,—apology,—pardon, over and over. I therefore resolved not to let this which old Indians call, "*knowing the people*," go on; and I wrote to the Amirs, saying, I would not allow it to continue; they of course continued their game, and as I had threatened, I reported the infringements to Lord Ellenborough, who agreed with me that their irritating, childish and mischievous sort of secret warfare and intrigue should not continue; and as letters from the Amirs were intercepted, proposing to other powers to league and drive us out of Sind, Lord Ellenborough thought, and I think justly, that a new treaty should be entered into, which he sent me. I laid before him the proposal, and I think my treaty was a more fair treaty, at least, a more liberal treaty than his; but I do not, as far as I have been able to consider it, think his unjust. Mind, I always reason upon affairs, as both Lord Ellenborough and myself *found them*. I cannot enter upon our right to be *here at all*, that is Lord Auckland's affair. Well! I presented the draft of the new treaty. The Amirs bowed with their usual apparent compliance, but raised troops in all directions. These I was



ordered by the Government to disperse. To disperse irregular troops, they having a desert at their back, and four hundred miles of river to cross and run up the mountains and all this with their chiefs swearing they submitted to everything, to get me into *hot* weather when I could not move, and thus cut off all our communications at their ease, was no trifle. In short, it was to attack a "*Will o' the Wisp*." Every man is armed to the teeth and armies of great strength could assemble and disperse like wildfire.

It was somewhat natural after all that had happened that Dost Muhammad should use his opportunities of revenge and take part in the Sikh wars. When peace was restored in the Punjab, however, better counsels prevailed. Herbert Edwardes, the Commissioner of Peshawar and friend of John Nicholson, set about to foster a spirit of friendship with the Dost. After much consultation and deliberation he won over Lord Dalhousie and John Lawrence to his policy, so that a treaty was signed between the two powers. That treaty was of greater importance than even Edwardes thought at the time. It initiated, in the first place, a new frontier policy of non-intervention in Afghanistan which prevailed for many years, and still holds good to-day; and, in the hour of need a few months later, when the fate of British India was in the balance, it ensured the friendship of the Dost, who loyally kept his trust.

#### ✓ A New Frontier Policy

*Source.*—(i) Paper written by Herbert Edwardes, Commissioner of Peshawar, reproduced in "*Memorials of Sir H. B. Edwardes*," Vol. I., p. 279. (Kegan Paul, Trench & Co.)

The most withering condemnation which has ever been passed upon the whole policy of the old Kábul war was fulminated by Lord Ellenborough in his memorable proclamation, dated Simla, October 1, 1842, written at the same place, in the same house, nay, in the very room, and on the same day of the same month as Lord Auckland's unjustifiable manifesto of 1838. And it was followed in January, 1843, by the free release from captivity of Dost Muhammad Khán, whom we had spent fifteen millions sterling of the revenues of India to dethrone without a cause.

Is it wonderful that six years later, when British India was in the throes of its struggle with the brave Sikh nation, this same

Dost Muhammad Khán should have yielded to the temptation, of joining the Sikhs against us?

The author of this paper feels it one of the greatest satisfactions of his life, and the most useful incident of his service, that he has since then been enabled to heal those open wounds, and be the peace-maker between that ill-used ruler and the Government of India.

When Commissioner of Peshawar, in 1854, he sought and obtained the permission of Lord Dalhousie to bring about the hearty reconciliation which was expressed in the first friendly treaty of March 30, 1855, and subsequently (with the equally cordial approval of Lord Canning) was substantially consolidated by the treaty of January 26, 1857.

At the later juncture, the Shah of Persia had seized Herát, and was threatening Kandahar. England was herself attacking Persia in the Gulf, and the Indian Government now gave to its old enemy at Kábul (worse than enemy, the man whom it had deeply injured) eight thousand stand of arms, and a subsidy of £10,000 a month, so long as the Persian war should last.

We did this, as the treaty truly said, "out of friendship." What a fearful satire on the Kábul War!

We did it too, in the plenitude of our power and the high noon of that treacherous security, that smiled on India in January, 1857. How little, as we set our seals to that treaty, did we know that in May, the English in India, from Peshawar to the sea, would be fighting for Empire and their lives, and that God's mercy was stopping the mouths of lions against our hour of need.

To the honour of Dost Muhammad Khán, let it be recorded that throughout the Sepoy War, under the greatest temptation from events and the constant taunts of the fanatical priests of Kábul, he remained true to the treaty, and abstained from raising the green flag of Islam and marching down on the Punjab. Had he done so, no man who was in India in those dreadful days of September before John Nicholson stormed Delhi, will for a moment doubt that the English would have been driven to their ships—towards them, rather. How many would have reached them is another matter.

And this being so, it is but historic justice to the Amir's memory to conclude that, had his overtures of 1837-38 been accepted by Lord Auckland, his fidelity would have been the same, and the Kábul War, with all its sorrows and disgraces, and other wars and other sorrows which have followed in the train of our lost prestige, would never have darkened the history of England.

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The *Friend of India* has lately contemplated, if not actually advocated, the occupation of Afghanistan as a better policy.

There are three possible policies—

- 1.—To take and hold Afghanistan in our own interest.
- 2.—Never to take it; but, whenever necessary, occupy it as friends, and fight Russia on the Persian or Turcoman frontier.
- 3.—To resolve to stick to our present frontier, and fight Russia, whenever Russia assails us, at the eastern mouth of the passes.

On the threshold of this question we held that we could not adopt this first policy without first having fair cause of quarrel, and we protest against the brigand doctrine, that the white man has a vested right to take the country of the black, brown, or whitey-brown man. . . .

Advancing to the eastern boundary of Afghanistan, as in policy No. 2, would be dividing the difficulties with Russia, bringing on us the enormous expense of transporting military stores so far, making enemies of the Afghans, and departing so far from our base of operations and railroads. . . .

By waiting on our present frontier, we husband our money, organise our line of defence, rest upon our base and railroads, save our troops from fatigue, and bring our heaviest artillery into the field; while the enemy can only bring light guns over the passes, has to bribe and fight his way across Afghanistan, wears out and decimates his army, exhausts his treasure and courage, and, when defeated, has to retreat through the passes and over all Afghanistan—plundered at every march by tribes who would as soon cut the throat of a Russian as an English Kafir; perhaps sooner, for there is a distinct feeling throughout Afghanistan that the Russians are not so trustworthy as the English.

*Source.*—(ii) Lord Roberts, "Forty-one Years in India." Vol. I., pp. 56-7. (Macmillan.)

I have dealt at some length on this treaty with Afghanistan, first, because the policy of which this was the outcome was initiated by my father; and secondly, because I do not think it is generally understood how important to us were the results; not only did it heal the wounds left open from the first Afghan War, but it relieved England of a great anxiety at a time when throughout the length and breadth of India there was distress, revolt, bloodshed, and bitter distrust of our native troops. Dost Muhammad loyally held to his engagements during the troublous days of the Mutiny which so quickly followed this alliance, when, had he turned against us, we should assuredly have lost the Punjab; Delhi could never have been taken; in fact, I

do not see how any part of the country north of Bengal could have been saved. Dost Muhammad's own people came to him during the Mutiny, throwing their turbans at his feet, and praying him as a Muhammadan to seize that opportunity for destroying the "infidels." "Hear the news from Delhi," they urged; "See the difficulties the Feringhis are in. Why don't you lead us on to take advantage of their weakness, and win back Peshawar?"

*Source.*—(iii) Letter from Lord Dalhousie to Sir George Cooper. From "Private Letters of the Marquess of Dalhousie." Edited by J. G. A. Baird. (Blackwood.)

Eight ~~centuries~~ and a half have rolled away, and again Peshawar has become the frontier of the Indian Empire. When the tide of Muhammadan conquest swelled towards the East, its first wave broke against the foundations of Hindu power at Peshawar, "they advanced." And now, when in the lapse of ages the mighty current has changed, we have just seen the latest wave of Christian conquest towards the West break against the mountains hard by Peshawar. I trust that we ourselves shall be firm in saying to this tide of conquest—  
—"Thus far shalt thou go and no further."

## CHAPTER II

### THE EARL OF DALHOUSIE AND HIS POLICY OF ANNEXATION

THOUGH he did not arrive in India until a few years after the end of the first Sikh war, and though he had retired before the great outbreak took place, Lord Dalhousie was the dominating figure of the period reviewed in this volume. Born of Scottish parentage in the year 1812, and educated at Harrow and Oxford, he attached himself to the Tory party with "no wish to perpetuate abuses or to preserve blots." Promotion for him was rapid. In 1843 he was appointed Vice-President of the Board of Trade, serving immediately under Mr. Gladstone. The young politician at once attracted attention, both by his vast capacity for work and also by his remarkable lucidity of expression. On the recall of Lord Ellenborough from India, his name was suggested for the vacant post, but the claims of Sir Henry Hardinge were considered the stronger. In 1845, on the resignation of Mr. Gladstone, he became President of the Board of Trade, a post which gave him admirable experience of railway development; and later in the year he was admitted to the Cabinet. He retired from office with Sir Robert Peel and resisted the blandishments of Lord John Russell and the Whigs, who made tempting offers of political employment. However, in 1847, Sir John Hobhouse informed him that he had reason to believe that the Court of Directors intended to appoint him the successor to Lord Hardinge. Lord Dalhousie replied that his acceptance of office should not be taken "to imply any abandonment of that party in the State with which he had acted, or any adherence, present or prospective, to that of which Her Majesty's Ministers were the leaders."

The appointment of Lord Dalhousie was looked upon even at the time as a big event in the history of India. The mere fact that he was the nominee of his political opponents is significant. His late colleagues were delighted. Sir Robert Peel stated that a better selection could not have been made from the whole of the Queen's subjects. As for Lord Dalhousie himself, he wished to say good-bye to party politics. "From the moment I assume the government of India, politics is a question unknown to me. Party politics, above all, have no existence in my mind." As is usual on such occasions unsolicited advice was poured in from all quarters, and especially by those who desired a change of policy towards the native rulers of India. Lord Dalhousie was far too wise to give vent to preconceived opinions, and was content with these words:—

"I trust the Government of India will ever be found prepared to strike, and to strike hard, whenever the real interest or the true honour of the nation shall require it. But for myself, I shall regard it as a fortunate and enviable lot indeed, if free from foreign aggression and internal turmoil, my chief duties, during the time that I may serve you, shall consist in suggesting and carrying out those great measures of internal improvement which you are so desirous of promoting."

Lord Dalhousie landed at Calcutta on January 12, 1848, when he took the oath as Governor-General of India. Here is his own description of his introduction to Indian official life:—

"On the same night there was a dinner; on the next a greater; and on the third Lord Hardinge gave a ball to Lady Dalhousie. Then my entertainments began. For the first three days the outgoing Governor-General feasts the incoming man; for the next three days, or as long as he stays, the Governor-General in the present tense is host to him who has reached the praeter-pluperfect. So on the next day I gave the same great dinner to Lord Hardinge that he had given to me; all the same people, whisker for whisker among the gentlemen, pin for pin among the ladies. Then came Sunday, and we sat together in the Cathedral under the same canopy. Never was such a sight seen since the sweet-smelling days of the dynasty of Brentford."

## Lord Dalhousie's Accession to Office

*Source.—Friend of India, Jan. 20, 1848. Edited by J. C. Marshman.*

No Governor-General has ever taken charge of the Government of India under such peculiar and advantageous circumstances. The youngest ruler who has assumed the responsibilities of this empire, he receives it from his predecessor in a state of tranquillity which has hitherto no parallel in our Indian annals. He arrives at a time when the last obstacle to the complete, and apparently the final, pacification of India has been removed, when the only remaining army which could create alarm has been dissolved, and the peace of the country rests upon the firmest and most permanent basis. The chiefs whose ambition or hostility have been the source of disquietude to his predecessors have one and all been disarmed. Not a shot is fired from the Indus to Cape Comorin against our will.

Such then was the beginning of the rule of perhaps the ablest of the Governors-General. For the next eight years he was the guiding spirit in the Government of India; and it was he who had the daring and the skill to carry into effect what seemed to him to be right.

Lord Dalhousie was a man gifted with a mind capable of effecting great changes. His was the burden of two wars, the settlement and the pacification of the Punjab, the annexations of Nagpur, Pegu, and Oudh, the difficult problem of deciding the relation between the British as the paramount power and the native States, including Hyderabad. He also found time and means to initiate "the great measures of internal improvement" to which he was pledged.

4. The native States in India were surrounded by the Company's territories, and with their economic and political life almost entirely subordinated to the life of British India, were weakened to their foundations. But they were ruled by personal monarchs, who had great pretensions and were fully alive to the traditions of independence and aggression. Either by incompetence or by provocation leading to a conflict with the British, or by that inevitable fate of personal monarchies, the lack of an heir, they were bound to fall into the hands of a power which was not only too strong for any of them individually, but also too formidable even

for a general combination, which was not to be expected in the absence of any tradition of common action, and under difficulties of distance, jealousy, and unreliability. It seems, however, one of those vagaries of fate in which the story of all nations abounds, that so many of these weakened principalities should have been ripe for consolidation with British India for one reason or another during Dalhousie's régime. He faced each problem regarding a native State as it arose, and came to a decision according to the dictates of his own conscience, the interests of good government, and the honour of his own nation. He has been accused of want of sympathy with the people of India, his policy is condemned as short-sighted and impolitic, and an attempt has been made to brand his memory with infamy by regarding him as the direct author of the Indian Mutiny. Now that the passions of the moment no longer cloud our judgments, we may take a fairer view of the personality and government of this much-maligned administrator.

It is a mistake to trace an event such as the outbreak of 1857, which had so many aspects, to such simple causes as the policy of one single ruler during a brief period of time. And even in so far as any such relation is established between the attitude of Lord Dalhousie towards native States and the stupendous outburst in 1857, that attitude was alike sanctioned by the authorities in England and approved by public opinion of the day. The idea that British arms and prestige should support and perpetuate inefficient and evil rulers at the head of States adjoining British territories, to whose people the British had constructively and actually guaranteed good government, was hateful to a man with such a logical mind and robust heart as Lord Dalhousie.

#### ✓ Lord Dalhousie

Source.—(i) Edwin Arnold, "Dalhousie's Administration of India." Vol. I., pp. 7-10. (Saunders, Otley & Co.)

The prescription which limits to the wearer of a title the post founded and filled by a merchant's clerk, perhaps came never so nearly to selecting the man best fitted for it by power and love of work. By nature, as much as by rank, a lord, the new Viceroy assumed his duties with views as large and ambition



as noble. An autocrat in power, he prepared to make himself the same in labour, ranging with incredible industry from the highest to the lowest concerns of State. No one before ever gathered up the thousand reins of Indian government, and handled them with so sure and nervous a grasp as this last of the Company's governors. Too proud to be wholly dutiful, his enthusiasm for the art of governing supplied the place of Cornwallis' conscientiousness, or Bentinck's philanthropy, and prompted him to unsparing sacrifice of self. A desire to do all things greatly, and the assurance of great gifts, made him impatient of intermediate forms and the obstructive help of subordinate mediocrity. Summaries and reports delayed, rather than assisted, a comprehension which seized by instinct the salient threads of knotty state matters; and often his impatient pen struck out the cautious sentences compiled in hours, to substitute in as many minutes the telling diction of the master-mind. "*L'état c'est moi*" became in Lord Dalhousie's mouth the just expression of a pervading and pertinacious activity, which found its leisure in change of labour. He had, in no scant measure, the two gifts that govern men, a just judgment of character, and a suave and winning address, adapting itself with plastic ease to plain minds and polished. He chose too carefully the comrades of his policy to have the need or the desire to change them often, and those so associated with the Viceroy became sincerely attached to the man. Although boasting of his Scotch extraction, and something of a clansman in patronage, his education and training had freed his mind from the shackles which hamper Scotch thought. Not distinguished as a scholar, he had still a powerful and cultivated intellect. He wrote a lucid and statesmanly English, and many of his official papers may take place among the classics of the country. What this industry and these parts effected, may be gathered from the record of his administration, and will find a summary more naturally elsewhere. But the key to his public conduct would be missing, if no notice were taken of his singular regard for public opinion. The passion for approval and consent, visible in his last anxious act, was conspicuous at every stage of his career; and sprang from something deeper than vanity in one who had witnessed the omnipotence of the popular will, preparing in 1848 to shake the powers of earth. By speeches, by minutes, by reports, in journals and in state documents, before and after action, he constantly strove to keep the public with him. If this salutary habit was not the result of conviction, it was at least well learned from that great political master,<sup>1</sup> whose wisdom knew how to confess error, and did not pretend to govern a people without the people's aid and the people's approbation.

<sup>1</sup> Sir Robert Peel

Source.—(ii) R. Bosworth Smith, "Life of Lord Lawrence."  
(Smith, Elder.)

It was in that much wider and rarer kind of sympathy, which is as much intellectual as moral, and depends mainly on the imagination, that such defects as Lord Dalhousie had, appear to me to have lain. Lord Dalhousie seems, from his letters, to have been unable to clothe himself sufficiently with the feelings, the prejudices, the aspirations, the ideals of those over whom he ruled; and he was unable therefore to understand how the natives of India, recognising, as many of them did, the general benevolence of our intentions and the undoubted beneficence of our rule, were yet disposed to look back, with yearning and regret, on the days when, if they were oppressed, plundered, murdered, they were so by men of their own race, their own language, or their own creed. He was unable, again, as it appears to me, to picture to himself the *cumulative* effect upon the native mind of the policy of annexation which he had openly avowed, and of the numerous additions to the empire, justifiable or otherwise, which, in accordance with it, circumstances had forced on him or he on circumstances. In particular, I doubt whether he thought that the shock given to the religious feelings and the immemorial customs of the people by the blows which he struck at the sacred right of adoption, were deserving of any serious regard on the part of an enlightened English ruler. Nor is there in the whole of his letters, brilliant and incisive and racy as they all are, a single sentence which inclines the reader to pause and say, as he does, again and again, when he is reading the much less brilliant and incisive letters of Metcalfe or Outram, of Henry or John Lawrence, "Here is a man whose chief claim to rule India was that he so thoroughly understood her people." If, therefore, there have been no abler, or more commanding, or more conscientious, or more successful Governors-General of India than Lord Dalhousie, there have been, in my opinion, Governors-General who were more sympathetic with the natives and more beloved.

He was, however, in every way a man of commanding powers. His faults, such as they were, were those not of a small, but of a truly great man. Small, almost to insignificance, in stature, he had a mighty spirit. Weak in health; he did more than the work of the very strongest man. Afflicted with a constitutional disease, which made it a torture to him even to put on his clothes, which often confined him to his room, and disabled him from walking across it even when it was as "level as a billiard table," he yet traversed India from end to end, saw everything with his own eyes, and discharged every duty of his high office, that office which "ennobles and

kills"<sup>1</sup> its holders, during the almost unprecedented term of eight years, with a thoroughness, a promptitude, a precision, and a dignity in which he has few equals. His work connected with the Punjab alone might have been thought enough to occupy the energies of an ordinarily able man. Again and again, as we read his correspondence with the Lawrence brothers, and note the view, alike comprehensive and minute, which he was able to take of every incident and character on the Punjab stage, filled as it was by able men, each of whom, in his time, played many parts, we can hardly bring ourselves to believe that the new province was but a fraction of his whole field of duty, and that he was directly responsible, during a part of his eight years, for some five or six other provinces which he had annexed, as well as for the ponderous charge which had been originally committed to him, and which, as he says himself, had overtaxed and overburdened the greatest of his predecessors. In short, if he was not a Heaven-sent, he was, at least, a born ruler of men. If he was ambitious, his ambition was that of Cæsar. There was little that was personal and nothing that was ignoble about it. He was every inch a king. He felt that he could rule, and that, with a view to the happiness of the millions entrusted to him, it was right that he should do so.

The great impetus which Lord Dalhousie gave to the material development of the country will be considered in a subsequent volume. It is necessary, first of all, to discuss his policy of annexation. The direct results of his actions, judged in the light of additional revenue and territory, were vast indeed, and may be stated in the Governor-General's own words.

#### ✓ Expansion of British Territory during the rule of Lord Dalhousie.

*Source*.—Minute written by Lord Dalhousie, dated February 28, 1856. (*Calcutta Gazette Office*.)

During the eight years over which we now look back, the British territories in the East have been largely increased: within that time four kingdoms have passed under the sceptre of the Queen of England, and various chiefships and separate tracts have been brought under her sway.

<sup>1</sup> "India had now, in rapid succession, devoured three distinguished public men."—H. G. Keene, "History of India." Lord Dalhousie retired in 1856, a hopeless invalid, and died in December, 1863; Lord Canning died in 1862; and Lord Elgin, his successor, in 1863.

The kingdom of the Punjab and the kingdom of Pegu were the fruits of conquest, which followed upon the wars, whose origin and issue have already been stated.

The kingdom of Nagpur became British territory by simple lapse, in the absence of all legal heirs. The kingdom, which had been granted to the reigning Rajah by the British Government when it had been forfeited by the treachery of Appa Sahib, was left without a claimant when the Rajah died. No son had been born to His Highness; none had been adopted by him; none, as they have themselves admitted, was adopted at the Rajah's death by the Ranis, his widows. There remained no one male of the line who descended from the stock and bore the name of Bhonsla.

The British Government, therefore, refused to bestow the territory in free gift upon a stranger, and wisely incorporated it with its own dominions.

Lastly, the kingdom of Oudh has been assumed in perpetual government for the Honourable East India Company, in pursuance of a policy which has so recently been under the consideration of the Honourable Court that I deem it unnecessary to refer to it more particularly here.

The principality of Satara<sup>1</sup> was included in the British territory in 1849 by right of lapse, the Rajah having died without male heir.

In like manner the Chiefship of Jhansi has reverted to the possession of the Indian Government. Lastly, by a treaty concluded in 1853, His Highness the Nizam has assigned in perpetual government to the Honourable The East India Company, the Province of Berar and other districts of his state, for the permanent maintenance of the Hyderabad Contingent, for the payment of certain debts which he had incurred, and for the termination of those transactions which for many years had been the fruitful source of dispute, and had even endangered the continuance of friendly relations between the states.

By the several territorial acquisitions which have just been enumerated, a revenue of not less than £4,000,000 has been added to the annual income of the Indian Empire.

	£			
Punjab ... ..	...	...	...	1,500,000
Pegu (1856) ... ..	...	...	...	270,000
Nagpur (less tribute) ... ..	...	...	...	410,000
Oudh ... ..	...	...	...	1,450,000
Satara ... ..	...	...	...	150,000
Jhansi ... ..	...	...	...	50,000
Hyderabad ... ..	...	...	...	500,000
				£4,330,000

<sup>1</sup> Lord Dalhousie has not mentioned Jaitpur and Sambulpur, which were also annexed by him.

Stated in general terms, the revenue of India has increased from £26,000,000 in 1847-8 to £30,000,000 in 1854-5; and the income of the present year, exclusive of Oudh, has been estimated at the same amount of £30,000,000 sterling.

The causes leading up to each act of annexation differed in many cases. Pegu and the Punjab were the fruits of foreign conquest, and thus the case for annexation in each instance can be decided on its own merits. With regard to the other additions of territory, Lord Dalhousie was dealing with States over whose destiny the Company's Government had undertaken in the past a serious responsibility. Evidence, drawn from many sources, goes to prove that the old subsidiary system, which in its day may have been of great value in combating the designs of the French, had since proved evil in its results. The British Government had abstained, possibly through an ultra-conscientious desire to observe its treaties with subsidiary States, from interference with the evils of internal mis-government, but at the same time, from the very protection which it afforded to the rulers themselves and which took away from the people concerned any hope of successful resistance to tyranny and misrule, it had become in reality a party to the evils resulting therefrom.

### The Development and the Effect of the Subsidiary System.

*Source.*—(i) Evidence of Richard Jenkins<sup>1</sup> before the Select Committee of the House of Commons, 1832. (Parliamentary Papers.)

We first appeared in India as traders, but it was as armed traders, and our various contests with our European rivals, the prospect of which rendered a warlike garb necessary to support our peaceful objects, were the origin of our military reputation in that region. Courted even by the Great Moghul as useful instruments to free his coasts from pirates, we acquired, as the price of our aid, many of those commercial advantages which fixed us on the continent of India. Then again the breaking up of the Moghul Empire led to arming our factories, to protect our lives and properties. The same skill and gallantry which had at first won our way to commercial

<sup>1</sup> Mr. Jenkins has been Resident at Nagpur for nearly twenty years.

settlements, displayed anew, induced the native powers newly arising out of the wrecks of the empire, to court our aid in their contests with one another; and the views of securing and improving our commercial establishments, through the favour of those powers, forbade our refusing to intermeddle with their politics. Here the first step was the decisive one; once committed we could not recede.

The French, in the meantime, had made still bolder advances to empire in India, and our destruction or their expulsion became the alternatives. Could we hesitate which to choose? We now began to raise armies. These were to be paid, and could only be paid by the princes whose cause we espoused against the French and their allies; pecuniary payments often failing; territorial assignments took their place, and we were obliged to exercise a civil as well as a military power. Our whole dominion on the coast of Coromandel arose in this way, and much of that on the western coast; and through it, and the armies it enabled us to maintain, the power of Hyder was checked, and that of his son Tippu was annihilated; the French power and influence in the Deccan was destroyed, and the Mahratta Empire brought under subjection. In Bengal, the acquisition of the Diwanni gave us the nucleus of our power in that quarter; still it was extended, and secured through the same system of subsidiary alliances applied to Oudh; and in fact, if we examine the composition of our territorial acquisitions, we shall find that a very considerable portion of them has accrued to us in payment by the native states of specified numbers of our troops, amounting in revenue to the whole military expenses of Bengal, as the following rough statement will show. The civil charges being deducted, the balance is given as applicable to military purposes.

1827—28.	Revenues.	Civil Charges.	Balance.
Carnatic, in lieu of subsidy	1,404,343	493,279	911,064
Tanjore ... ..	394,672	186,638	208,034
Nizam ... ..	584,369	132,911	451,458
Peishwa, estimated at ...	—	—	430,000
Travancore subsidy ... ..	—	—	89,498
Cochin subsidy ... ..	—	—	22,857
Mysore subsidy ... ..	—	—	280,000
Gackwar ... ..	382,796	147,170	235,626
Oudh ... ..	1,813,565	506,223	1,307,338
Benares ... ..	778,533	232,359	546,174
Nagpur cessions, estimated at	—	—	150,000
Tribute ... ..	—	—	60,000

Total subsidies, and cessions in lieu of ditto £4,689,049

If with these great advantages, and many others, we also experience some inconveniences from our subsidiary alliances, we must not complain; but I really see none of the latter to ourselves at all to be put in competition with the former. I do not believe that we have ever been engaged in a war in defence of our allies which did not call upon us to interfere in their favour whether they were our allies or not. Whilst having the right to guide their political conduct in the minutest points, we are secure from any involvement in hostilities of an offensive nature through their ambition or want of faith, many other advantages of our alliances will be obvious on consideration of the general position of the several states and our own. Our subjects, I presume, derive benefit from any political situation which strengthens our power, and relieves them from the dangers of invasion; and by preserving peace and order among our neighbours, takes from before their eyes the temptation to a life of plunder and irregularity; settles their minds to a determined adherence to peaceable avocations, and opens sources of foreign trade to their industry and enterprise; and such is the result of the subsidiary system.

*Source.*—(ii) Evidence of James Mill before the Select Committee of the House of Commons in 1832. (Parliamentary Papers.)

With respect to the effect of the subsidiary system on the people of the country, my opinion is very unfavourable. The substance of the engagement we make with these princes is this; we take their military protection on ourselves, and the military power of the state into our own hands. Having taken from them the military power of government, that is, all the power, we then say to them, we give up to you the whole powers of civil government, and will not interfere with you in the exercise of them. It is well known what the consequences are. In the collection of the revenue, one main branch of the civil administration, they extort to the utmost limits of their power, not only impoverishing, but also desolating the country. In regard to the other great branch of civil government, the administration of justice, there is hardly any such thing. There is no regular establishment for the administration of justice in any native state of India. Whoever is vested with a portion of power, great or small, hears causes when he pleases, and when he does not please, does not hear. The examination of the case is very commonly very summary and hasty, and liable to be erroneous, when the examiner is but appealed to by something more prevailing than the sense of justice, and then the case is not decided according to the motive by which he is actuated. It has been found by experience that misgovernment under this

divided rule does go to its utmost extent, far beyond its ordinary limits, even in India. And the causes cannot but be considered equal to the effects. In the ordinary state of things in India, the princes stood in awe of their subjects. Insurrection against oppression was the general practice of the country. The princes knew that when mismanagement or oppression went to a certain extent there would be revolt, and that they would stand a chance of being tumbled from their thrones, and a successful leader of the insurgents put in their place. That check is, by our interference, totally taken away; for the people know that any attempt of theirs would be utterly unavailing against our irresistible power, accordingly no such thought occurs to them, and they submit to every degree of oppression that befalls them. I may refer to the instances of Oudh, of the Nizam's territory, and that of the Peishwa while he was in the state of a subsidiary prince. Misgovernment went to its ultimate excess, and there have hardly been such specimens of misgovernment as exhibited in these countries. Complaint has been frequently made of the effect of these subsidiary alliances, in subduing the spirit and relaxing the springs of the government of these native princes. It appears to me that the subsidiary alliance does take away the spirit of sovereignty by degrees from those princes; this is taken from them, along with the sovereignty, at the first step. It does not remain to be done by degrees. We begin by taking the military power, and when we have taken that, we have taken all. The princes exercise all the power that is left them to exercise, as mere trustees of ours, and unfortunately they are very bad trustees.

Faced by these problems, which resulted from the evil effects of this vicious system, Lord Dalhousie very quickly came to a definite conclusion. He saw clearly enough that "the principle of non-interference, combined with a guarantee of protection, entailed a responsibility for misrule which no civilised power could accept."<sup>1</sup> He refused to adopt half measures, such as those suggested from time to time by Lord William Bentinck, Sir Henry Lawrence, and Sir William Sleeman, who advised a system of native rule assisted and guided by British influence and experience rather than a policy of annexation and absorption of revenues. He therefore neglected no opportunity of acquiring territory, and of undertaking the consequent responsibilities for the

<sup>1</sup> "Life of Marquis of Dalhousie," by Sir W. Lee-Warner. Vol. II., p. 111.



necessary improvement of the administration. There is a very wide difference of opinion regarding the wisdom and justice of this policy of annexation. There are some who consider Lord Dalhousie's policy one of the chief causes of the Mutiny; and again there are others who urge that in the fulfilment of his aims alone could the progress and prosperity of the country be maintained.

### Policy of Annexation

*Source.*—(i) Sir W. Napier, *Life of "Sir Charles Napier."* Vol. IV., p. 188. (John Murray.)

I like him (Lord Dalhousie), for he is seemingly a good fellow, but he has no head for governing this empire and drawing forth all its wondrous resources. What the Koh-i-noor is among diamonds, India is among nations. Were I Emperor of India for twelve years, she should be traversed by railroads and have her rivers bridged; her seat of government at Delhi, or Meerut, or Simla, or Allahabad. Her three armies should occupy three camps, one at Delhi or Meerut, one in Sind, and one on the Brahmaputra, each 50,000 strong. No Indian prince should exist. The Nizam should be no more heard of, Nepaul would be ours, and an ague-fit should become the courtly, imperial sickness at Constantinople, while the Emperor of Russia and he of China should never get their pulses below 100!

*Source.*—(ii) Minute of Lord Dalhousie, dated August 31, 1848, reproduced in the "*Life of Marquis of Dalhousie,*" by Sir W. Lee-Warner. Vol. II., p. 116. (Macmillan.)

I take this fitting occasion of recording my strong and deliberate opinion, that in the exercise of a wise and sound policy, the British Government is bound not to put aside or neglect such rightful opportunities of acquiring territory or revenue as may from time to time present themselves, when they arise from lapse of subordinate states by the failure of all heirs natural, and when the succession can be sustained only by the sanction of the Government being given to the ceremony of adoption according to Hindu law. The Government is bound, in duty as well as in policy, to act on every such occasion with the purest integrity, and in the most scrupulous observance of good faith. Where even a shadow of doubt can be shown, the claim should at once be abandoned. Such is the general principle that, in my humble opinion, ought to guide the conduct of the British Government in its disposal of independent states where there has been a total

failure of heirs whatsoever, or where permission is asked to continue by adoption or succession which fails in the natural line.

Source.—(iii) Letter written by Sir W. Sleeman to Sir James Weir Hogg, dated January 12, 1853, "Journey through the Kingdom of Oude." Vol. II., pp. 390-1. (Bentley.)

I write chiefly to call your attention to a rabid article in the *Friend of India*, written by Mr. Marshman, when about to proceed to England to become, it is said, one of the writers in the *London Times*. † Of course, he will be engaged to write Indian articles; and you will find him advocating the doctrines of the school mentioned in my last letter. I consider their doctrines to be prejudicial to the stability of our rule in India, and to the welfare of the people, which depends upon it. The Court of Directors is our only safeguard against these Machiavellian doctrines; and it may be rendered too powerless to stem them by the new arrangement for the Government of India. The objects which they propose for attainment—religion, commerce, etc.—are plausible; and the false logic by which they attempt to justify the means required to attain them, however base and cruel, is no less so. I was asked by Dr. Duff, the Editor of the *Calcutta Review*, to write some articles for that journal, to expose the fallacies, and to counteract the influences of the doctrines of this school; but I have for many years ceased to contribute to the periodical papers, and have felt bound by my position not to write for them. Few officers of experience, with my feelings and opinions on this subject, now remain in India; and the influence of this school is too great over the rising generation, whose hopes and aspirations they tend, so much to encourage. Mr. Elphinstone, Mr. Robertson, and George Clark will be able to explain their danger to you. India must look to the Court of Directors alone for safety against them, and they will require the exertion of all its wisdom and strength.

Mr. Robertson will be able to tell you that, when I was sent to Bundelcund, in 1842, the feelings of the people of that province were so strongly against us, under the operation of the doctrines of this school, that no European officer could venture, with safety, beyond the boundary of a cantonment of British troops; and their servants were obliged to disguise themselves in order to pass from one cantonment to another. In a brief period, I created a feeling entirely different, and made the character of British officers respected and beloved. In the Gwalior territories the same result was attained by the same means. However impulsive on other occasions, Lord Ellenborough behaved magnanimously after his victories over the Gwalior troops; but in sparing the state, he acted, I believe, against the feelings of

his Council, amongst whom the doctrines of the absorbing, annexing, and confiscating school prevailed; and the *Friend of India* condemned him, though the invasion was never justified, except on the ground of expediency. Had I, on these occasions, adopted the doctrines of the absorbing school, I might have become one of the most popular and influential men in India; but I should, at the same time, have rendered our rule and character odious to the people of India, and so far have injured our permanent interest in the country. I mention all this merely to show that my opposition to the doctrines of this school is not new, nor in theory only, but of long standing and practice, as far as my influence has extended. I deem them to be dangerous to our rule in India, and prejudicial to the best interests of the country. The people see that these annexations and confiscations go on, and that rewards and honorary distinctions are given for them, and for the victories which lead to them, and for little else; and they are too apt to infer that they are systematic, and encouraged and prescribed from home. (The native states I consider to be breakwaters, and when they are all swept away, we shall be left to the mercy of our native army, which may not always be sufficiently under our control. Such a feeling as that which pervaded Bundelcund and Gwalior in 1842 and 1843, must, sooner or later, pervade all India, if these doctrines are carried out to their full extent; and our rule could not, probably, exist under it.)

The doctrine of lapse in its most uncompromising form is defined in the following words of Lord Dalhousie:—"I hold that on all occasions when heirs natural shall fail, the territory should be made to lapse and adoption should not be permitted,<sup>1</sup> excepting in those cases in which some strong political reason may render it expedient to depart from this general rule." In spite of this general dictum the actual policy was that of restricted application. In reviewing the course of events in 1854 Lord Dalhousie wrote on June 13:—

<sup>1</sup> Minute dated August 30, 1848.

<sup>2</sup> *cp.* "From time immemorial, the adoption of heirs in default of natural issue has been the common custom of the Hindus. If a man have no son it is an imperative article in his religious belief that he should adopt one, because it is only through the ceremonies and offerings of a son that the soul of the father can be released from *pūt*,—which seems to be the Brahmanical term for purgatory. The adopted child succeeds to every hereditary right, and is treated in every respect as if lawfully begotten."—Montgomery Martin, "The Indian Empire," Vol. II., p. 38.

" I had a definite principle of distinction in my mind, and I think it is a sound one. There are three chief classes of Hindu states in India.

" 1st. Hindu sovereignties which are not tributaries, and which are not and never have been subordinate to a paramount power.

" 2nd. Hindu sovereignties and chiefships which are tributary, and which owe subordination to the British Government as their paramount, in the place of the Emperor of Delhi, the Peishwa, etc.

" 3rd. Hindu sovereignties and chiefships, created or revived by the sanad (grant) of the British Government.

" Over principalities of the first class I contend we have no power whatever, and have no right, except that of might, over their adoptions.

" Principalities of the second class require our assent to adoption, which we have a right to refuse, but which policy would usually lead us to concede.

" In the principalities of the third class I hold that succession should never be allowed to go by adoption."

In pursuance of this doctrine seven states were annexed. These were Satara, Jaitpur, Sambalpur, Baghat, Udaipur, Jhansi, and Nagpur. Lord Dalhousie also proposed to apply this doctrine to Karauli, but was overruled by the Court of Directors. The cases which gave rise to the greatest amount of criticism were those of Satara, Jhansi, and Nagpur.

The kingdom of Satara was a dependent state created as an act of policy by British sanad in 1819. Its ruler, Pertab Singh, was deported to Benares in 1839 for intriguing against the British and negotiating with Nagpur and Goa. The kingdom which might then have been resumed was given to Shahuji or Appa Sahib, a brother of the ex-king. Pertab Singh died at Benares in 1847, having adopted a son recognised neither by the British Government nor by the Rajah of Satara. Appa Sahib died soon afterwards, in 1848, having adopted a son on his deathbed. Lord Dalhousie referred the matter to the Government of Bombay, which advocated annexation. The Governor-General recorded in a minute that "both as a matter of right and as an act of sound policy, the British Government ought to refuse its assent to adoption and should annex Satara." He recognised the right of the adopted son to succeed to the private property of the Rajah, and also supported the claim of the family to a liberal pension.

The Court of Directors supported him in this policy very warmly. "The result of our deliberations," they wrote, "is that we are fully satisfied that by the general law and custom of India, a dependent principality like that of Satara cannot pass to an adopted heir without the consent of the paramount power; that we are under no pledge, direct or constructive, to give such consent; and that the general interests committed to our charge are best consulted by withholding it."<sup>1</sup>

The case of Jhansi arose in 1854, and is rendered famous by the fearless leadership of the mutineers assumed by the Rani Lakshmibai during 1857. The treaty with Jhansi dated from 1817, rendering Jhansi a protected state. Rao Ramchand, who was then Rajah, died in 1835 without a son and heir. His uncle, a leper, was placed on the throne in preference to a son adopted by the late king on his death-bed. He proved a very inefficient ruler. On his death, three years later, his brother, Gangadhar Rao, was allowed to succeed him, but he was found quite unfit to rule, and the kingdom was administered for him by the British till November, 1853, when he died. He had adopted a son a day before his death. Lord Dalhousie dealt with the question in a minute dated February 27, 1854.

"There is no heir," he wrote, "of the body of the late Rajah—there is no heir whatever of any Rajah or Subadar of Jhansi with whom the British Government has at any time had relations; the late Rajah was never expected by his own people to adopt, and a previous adoption by the Rajah, whom the British Government constituted hereditary chief of Jhansi, was not acknowledged by the British Government. Wherefore it follows that the right to refuse to acknowledge the present adoption by Gangadhar Rao is placed beyond question." It was further argued that there would be a great advantage as the state was situated in the middle of British territories. And it was clear that the people would benefit from the advantage of progressive and firm government.

The annexation of Nagpur brought the largest and

<sup>1</sup> Despatch of the Court of Directors, dated January 24, 1849.

richest piece of territorial accession under Lord Dalhousie's rule by the application of the doctrine of lapse. The rulers of Nagpur had tried the fair field of arms with the British and had been vanquished at Assaye and Argaon. The King Appa Sahib was ambitious to restore the kingdom to its former glory. He conspired with Gwalior and the Pindaris and attacked the Residency in 1817. In spite of his defeat he was restored, but his persistence in anti-British designs led in 1818 to his being exiled. This prize of victory was not appropriated but restored to a child, Raghuji II. There was a treaty in 1826 which rendered Nagpur a dependent state. The Rajah, Raghuji II., died in 1853 without any natural heirs, nor had he adopted a son. Lord Dalhousie decided to annex the state, not only because the political and geographical position of Nagpur would add great strength to the Company's rule and good facilities for improved communication, but because the British Government were within their right in refusing to continue a state which had proved so unfriendly in the past.

## CHAPTER III

### FOREIGN WARFARE. THE PUNJAB AND BURMA

IN this chapter an attempt is made to show the causes and effects of Lord Dalhousie's policy towards two countries situated beyond the limits of the Company's territory, the Punjab and Burma. Nanak, the founder of the Sikh <sup>1</sup> sect, was born in 1469. He was one of India's greatest religious reformers; he hated tyranny and superstition, and strove to bring about religious peace and union between Hindus and Muhammadans. Some hundred years later, a second leader arose. Guru Gobind rejected his predecessor's policy of peaceful persuasion, and bound his followers into a great military caste. Equality among themselves, a bitter hatred of Muhammadan tyranny and cruelty, and a Spartan hardiness of life, then became the chief characteristics of the Sikhs. Their enemies from Delhi strove hard to exterminate this troublesome race, but their strength was already tried to its utmost by Afghan invasions. The Sikh confederacy, therefore, grew steadily in power and, by the end of the eighteenth century, formed an admirable buffer state "between the Company's territories and the thorny countryside of Pathan, Afghan, and Beluchi tribesmen beyond the Indus." And after the departure of Zeman Shah, Ranjit Singh, the Lion of the Punjab, united the hitherto discordant units into one powerful kingdom. The treaty of friendship formed between him and the British soon developed into a definite alliance which was respected by both parties until the death of the Great Maharajah in 1839.

It is difficult to over-estimate the importance of the part played by the Sikhs during the later part of the eighteenth and the early part of the nineteenth centuries. Accounts of the development of their power and of their political importance are given below.

<sup>1</sup> The word means a disciple.

### The Development of Sikh Power

Source.—Sir John Malcolm ; " Sketch of the Sikhs."

It would be difficult to give the character of Nanak on the authority of any account we yet possess. His writings, especially the first chapters of the *Adi-Grant'h*, will, if ever translated, be perhaps a criterion by which he may be fairly judged ; but the great eminence which he obtained, and the success with which he combated the opposition which he met, afford ample reason to conclude that he was a man of more than common genius ; and this favourable impression of his character will be confirmed by a consideration of the object of his life, and the means he took to accomplish it. Born in a province on the extreme verge of India, at the very point where the religion of Muhammad and the idolatrous worship of the Hindus appeared to touch, and at a moment when both these rites cherished the most bitter rancour and animosity towards each other, his great aim was to blend those jarring elements in peaceful union, and he only endeavoured to effect this purpose through the means of mild persuasion. His wish was to recall both Muhammadans and Hindus to an exclusive attention to that sublimest of all principles, which inculcates devotion to God and peace towards men. He had to combat the furious bigotry of the one and the deep-rooted superstition of the other ; but he attempted to overcome all obstacles by the force of reason and humanity, and we cannot have a more convincing proof of the general character of that doctrine which he taught, and the inoffensive light in which it was viewed, than the knowledge that its success did not rouse the bigotry of the intolerant and tyrannical Muhammadan Government under which he lived.

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The history of the Sikhs, after the death of Tegh Behadur, assumes a new aspect (under the influence of his son, Guru Gobind). It is no longer the record of a sect who, revering the conciliatory and mild tenets of their founder, desired more to protect themselves than to injure others ; but that of a nation, who, adding to a deep sense of the injuries they had sustained from a bigoted and overbearing government, all the ardour of men commencing a military career of glory, listened with rapture to a son glowing with vengeance against the murderers of his father,<sup>1</sup> who taught a doctrine suited to the troubled state of his mind, and called upon his followers, by every feeling of

<sup>1</sup> Tegh Behadur, the father of Guru Gobind, who is said to have been born in the year 1661, was murdered by his nephew, Ram Rai. The Moghul Empire was then at the height of its power under the rule of Aurungzeb, whilst the Sikhs were distracted by their own internal dissensions.



manhood, to lay aside their peaceable habits, to graft the resolute courage of the soldier on the enthusiastic faith of the devotee, to swear eternal war with the cruel and haughty Muhammadans, and to devote themselves to *steel*, as the only means of obtaining every blessing that this world, or that to come, could afford to mortals.

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It is here only necessary to state the leading features of those changes by which he subverted, in so short a time, the hoary institutions of Brahma, and excited terror and astonishment in the minds of the Muhammadan conquerors of India, who saw the religious prejudices of the Hindus, which they had calculated upon as one of the pillars of their safety, because they limited the great majority of the population to peaceable occupations, fall before the touch of a bold and enthusiastic innovator, who opened at once, to men of the lowest tribe, the dazzling prospect of earthly glory. All who subscribed to his tenets were upon a level, and the Brahmin who entered his sect had no higher claims to eminence than the lowest Sudra who swept the house. It was the object of Gobind to make all Sikhs equal, and that their advancement should solely depend upon their exertions; and well aware how necessary it was to inspire men of a low race and of grovelling minds with pride in themselves, he changed the name of his followers from Sikh to Singh, or lion; thus giving to all his followers that honourable title which had been before exclusively assumed by the Rajputs, the first military class of Hindus; and every Sikh felt himself at once elevated to rank with the highest, by this proud appellation.

The disciples of Gobind were required to devote themselves to arms, always to have steel about them in some shape or other; to wear a blue dress; to allow their hair to grow; to exclaim, when they met each other, Wá! Gúrújí ká Khálsa! Wá! Gúrújí kí futteh! which means, "Success to the State of the Guru! Victory attend the Guru!" The intention of some of these institutions is obvious; such as that principle of devotion to *steel*, by which all were made soldiers; and that exclamation, which made the success of their priest, and that of the commonwealth, the object of their hourly prayer. It became, in fact, the watchword which was continually to revive, in the minds of the Sikh disciple, the obligations he owed to that community of which he had become a member, and to that faith which he had adopted.

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The character of the Sikhs, or rather Singhs, which is the name by which the followers of Guru Gobind, who are all devoted to arms, are distinguished, is very marked. They have, in general, the Hindu cast of countenance, somewhat altered by

their long beards, and are to the full as active as the Mahrattas ; and much more robust, from their living fuller, and enjoying a better and colder climate. Their courage is equal, at all times, to that of any natives of India ; and when wrought upon by prejudice or religion, is quite desperate. They are all horsemen, and have no infantry in their own country, except for the defence of their forts and villages, though they generally serve as infantry in foreign armies. They are bold, and rather rough, in their address ; which appears more to a stranger from their invariably speaking in a loud tone of voice ; but this is quite a habit, and is alike used by them to express the sentiments of regard and hatred. The Sikhs have been reputed deceitful and cruel ; but I know no grounds upon which they can be considered more so than the other tribes of India. They seemed to me, from all the intercourse I had with them, to be more open and sincere than the Mahrattas, and less rude and savage than the Afghans. They have, indeed, become, from national success, too proud of their own strength, and too irritable in their tempers, to have patience for the wiles of the former ; and they retain, in spite of their change of manners and religion, too much of the original characters of their Hindu ancestors (for the great majority are of the Hindu race), to have the constitutional ferocity of the latter. The Sikh soldier is, generally speaking, brave, active, and cheerful, without polish, but neither destitute of sincerity nor attachment ; and if he often appears wanting in humanity, it is not so much to be attributed to his national character, as to the habits of a life, which, from the condition of the society in which he was born, is generally passed in scenes of violence and rapine.

#### ✓The Political Importance of the Sikhs

*Source.*—Sir Alfred Lyall, " British Dominion in India," pp. 161 and 208-11. (John Murray.)

It may be added that the north-western gates of India were soon to be double-locked against outside invasion. For while this independent Afghan kingdom formed an excellent barrier against all attempts to break into India from Central Asia by the only land routes through which an army can enter, the Afghans themselves were about this time barred off from the Punjab by the Sikhs. The rapid expansion of the power of the Sikhs, who are Hindu sectaries, illustrates the almost invariable process by which in Asia every great proselytising movement tends to acquire a political and militant character. The two tendencies of course react on each other, for while a religious revival is sure to rally under its flag a good deal of political discontent, on the other hand civil commotions usually set up the standard

and appeal to the sanction of religious enthusiasm. Towards the end of the last (eighteenth) century the votaries of the Sikh faith, fanatically hostile to Islam, and in open revolt against their Muhammadan rulers, were gathering into a close association, whose stubborn fighting qualities and rapid political development under military chiefs were extending their power across upper India from the Sutlej to the Indus. They were thus erecting a second and inner barricade against inroads from Central Asia, which cut off the communications between Islam in India and the rest of the Muhammadan world.

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Yet the political vacuum created by the final disintegration of the Moghul empire, and the withdrawal of the Afghans, was already filling up in the Punjab, by the rapid rise and compact organisation of the Sikhs. Under this new Hindu federation, much more closely knit together by ties of race and common faith than the Mahrattas, the people became animated by a martial spirit and a fiery enthusiasm such as the Hindus had not hitherto displayed. The history of the Sikhs illustrates a phenomenon well known in Asia, where an insurrectionary movement is always particularly dangerous if it takes a religious complexion, and where fanaticism may endure and accumulate under a spiritual leader until it explodes in the world of politics with the force of dynamite. The martyrdom of their first prophet, and their persecution by the later Moghul emperors, had engendered in these hardy peasants a fierce hatred of Islam. They had been repressed and broken by the Afghan armies of Ahmed Shah, who routed them with great slaughter in 1761. But in 1762 they defeated and slew his Governor at Sirhind; and in 1764 Ahmed Shah was recalled to his western provinces by a revolt in Kandahar. He died in 1773, after which date the grasp of his successors on the Punjab relaxed, and the Sikh confederation became closer and more vigorous. They were subdivided into *misl*s or military confederacies under different chiefs, who fought amongst themselves and against the Muhammadans, until in 1785 the Sikhs had mastered the whole country between the Jhelum and the Sutlej rivers in the centre of the Punjab, were threatening the Muhammadan princes about Delhi, and had made pillaging excursions eastward across the Ganges into Rohilcund.

To the English in Bengal this revival of Hindu nationality in upper India was exceedingly serviceable and opportune. For, in the first place, their real danger, the only substantial obstacle to their rising ascendancy, lay always, then as now, in the possibility of some foreign invasion by the army of some rival power led by a chief at the head of the fighting tribes of Central Asia. But the Sikhs were making it impossible for any such Asiatic army to penetrate into the heart of the Punjab,

without encountering the obstinate resistance of men united to defend their faith and their fatherland, in a spirit very unfamiliar to the quiescence of ordinary Hinduism. The kingdom founded by Ahmed Shah had extended, from its citadel in the Afghan mountains, on the west over Khorasan, and on the east over the Upper Punjab. It had thus been built up by wresting one frontier province from Persia and the other from India, and as the Afghan ruler was cordially detested in both these countries, whenever he was engaged by invasion or revolt on one flank the opportunity was sure to be taken by his enemies on the other. Even Ahmed Shah failed to hold such a position without great exertions, and after his death it became quite untenable. Twenty years later Zeman Shah, a very able Afghan king, was obliged to retire from Lahore. This last abortive expedition closed the long series of irruptions by the Muhammadan conquerors, who had for seven hundred years swept down from the north upon the plains of India, and had founded dynasties which were only sustained by constant recruitment from their native countries beyond the mountains. Thenceforward the Sikhs were not only able to hold the line of the Indus river against fresh invaders; they also cut off the channels of supply between Central Asia and the Muhammadan powers of the south of the Sutlej, who were, moreover, kept in constant alarm by this active Hindu community on their northern frontier.

When the iron hand of Ranjit Singh had been removed, his soldiers became so overbearing that they proved a danger both to their own people and to their neighbours. Rulers followed each other with alarming rapidity. Kharrak Singh was poisoned; Shere Singh was assassinated; and the young Maharajah, Dhulip Sing, was then recognised as King of Lahore by the British Government. There can be little wonder that Sir Henry Hardinge considered it necessary to strengthen the frontier posts at Ludhiana, Ferozepore, and Ambala, and thus protect British territory from the inroads of predatory bands of soldiers. The nominal leaders of the Punjab were themselves desirous of avoiding actual warfare, but they wished still more to free themselves from the domination of the Khalsa, and thought possibly that "the fury of a foreign army would be a lesser evil than the fury of their own."<sup>1</sup> The soldiers at first were anxious merely for freedom to plunder, but soon became

<sup>1</sup> Sir H. Lawrence, "Essays," p. 83.

alarmed by the presence of large numbers of British troops on the other side of the river. They then came to the conclusion that their country was to be invaded, and thus fell an easy prey to the prompting of selfish schemers.

In the war that ensued four pitched battles were fought, at Mudki, Firozshah, Aliwal and Sobraon, and at length the Sikhs were subdued. Lord Hardinge, however, refrained from annexing territory except the Jullunder Doab. He disliked the idea of annexation, even had it been possible. He decided, in the first instance, to assist indirectly, through the advice of the Resident, a purely Sikh government, directed by the Vizier. When that failed, he took steps to administer the country directly through a Council of Sirdars with the Resident, Henry Lawrence, as President, during the minority of the Maharajah, in the hopes that, when the young prince came of age, he might be strong enough to take over himself the responsibility of independent rule. That the failure of this experiment was considered possible is shown clearly by these words of the Governor-General:—

“If this opportunity of rescuing the Sikh nation from military anarchy and misrule be neglected, and hostile opposition to the British army be renewed, the Government of India will make such other arrangements for the future government of the Punjab as the interests and security of the British power may render just and expedient.”

For the success of this doubtful form of government, two men of outstanding character were essential, one an Indian and the other an Englishman. The first was not forthcoming; for there was nobody of sufficient capacity and inclination to prepare the country for a return to the days of independence when a British military protectorate would become unnecessary. The Queen-Mother had, perhaps, the necessary capacity but not the inclination. She was actuated largely by a bitter hatred of the British, and such was her love of intrigue, that it became necessary to remove her to a safe retreat where she could have no active influence either on her son's upbringing or the administration of the Punjab. The Vizier, Lal Singh, proved an unprincipled and

oppressive ruler and, in his relations with Gulab Singh, of Kashmir, showed that he had not the (necessary honesty). As a set-off against these disadvantages there was one asset of inestimable value in support of Lord Hardinge's experiment, the noble character and peculiar capacity of the Resident. Sir Henry Lawrence, who, as President of the Council of Regency, was given far-reaching powers in every department of the Government, was peculiarly fitted for the post. His sense of honour was such that even the bitterest enemies of British rule trusted his word and his motives; and by his temperament he was in every sense the man "to bridge over the gulf which separated race from race." It was his policy that the old officers of the Sikh Government should carry on the administration, assisted by the advice of himself and his subordinates. His success was immediate, as is shown by these words of Sir John Kaye:—<sup>1</sup>

One common spirit of humanity seemed to animate the Governor-General, the Resident, and his assistants. A well-aimed blow struck at infanticide, at Sati, and at the odious traffic in female slaves. The weak were everywhere protected against the strong. Every legitimate means of increasing the revenue, and of controlling unnecessary expenditure, were resorted to, and large savings were effected at no loss of efficiency in any department of the State. The cultivators were encouraged to sink wells, irrigate their lands, and otherwise increase the productiveness of the soil, alike to their own advantage and the profit of the State—and whilst everything was thus being done to advance the general prosperity of the people, and to ensure the popularity of British occupation among the industrial classes, the army was propitiated by the introduction of new and improved systems of pay and pension, and taught to believe that what they had lost in opportunities of pay and plunder, and in irregular largesses, had been more than made up to them by certainty and punctuality of payment, and the interest taken by the British officers in the general welfare of their class.

An estimate of the character of Sir Henry Lawrence is given below in the words of Mr. Bosworth Smith:—

<sup>1</sup>George Malleon, "History of the Indian Mutiny,"  
Vol. I., p. 9. (Longmans.)

### Sir Henry Lawrence

*Source.*—R. Bosworth Smith, "Life of Lord Lawrence," p. 336.  
(Smith, Elder.)

"To know Sir Henry was to love him," says one of his friends. "No man ever dined at Sir Henry's table without learning from him to think more kindly of the natives," says another. "His character was far above his career, distinguished as that career was," said Lord Stanley. "There is not, I am sure," said Lord Canning, when the disastrous news of his soldier's death at Lucknow thrilled throughout England and India, "any Englishman in India who does not regard the loss of Sir Henry Lawrence as one of the heaviest of public calamities. There is not, I believe, a native of the provinces where he has held authority who will not remember his name as that of a friend and generous benefactor to the races of India."

It has been my duty, in the course of this narrative, to point out some of the specialities in his training and his character which, in my judgment, rendered him less eligible than his younger brother for the post of Chief Commissioner of the Punjab. It is, therefore, all the more incumbent upon me to say that, having studied large portions of his unpublished correspondence, and having conversed with most of his surviving friends and relations, some of them followers and admirers of the younger rather than of the elder brother, it is my deliberate conviction that, take him all in all, his moral as well as his intellectual qualities, no Englishman who has been in India has ever influenced other men so much for good; nobody has ever done so much towards bridging over the gulf that separates race from race, colour from colour, and creed from creed; nobody has ever been so beloved, nobody has ever deserved to be so beloved, as Sir Henry Lawrence.

An account of Sir Henry Hardinge's policy towards the Sikhs is given below in his own words, and also in those of his political chief, Sir Robert Peel.

#### Sir Henry Hardinge's Policy towards the Sikhs

*Source.*—(i) Speech of Sir Robert Peel in the House of Commons, 1846.

The state of the country and the history of the Punjab are probably well known to all whom I am addressing, from the relation in which we stood towards it during our operations in the neighbouring country of Afghanistan. The House is probably well aware that by the ability and energy of an individual (Ranjit Singh) supremacy was established by him in the Punjab; and that for many years, through that ability and energy, he ruled the

destinies of that great country, and kept in subjection and subordination a powerful army. Since his death, which took place in the year 1839, the Government of the Punjab has presented a series of acts of cruelty, of intrigue, of a rapid succession of governors, in consequence of the murder of the predecessor by the successor ; it has exhibited a picture of licentiousness and debauchery so extravagant that it might be calculated to provoke a smile if it were not for the influence such licentiousness and debauchery must exercise over the welfare of millions. The acts of that government have been mainly directed by that powerful soldiery over which Ranjit Singh established his sway ; but which since his death has been in the constant habit of controlling the conduct of the civil authorities, and even of the military commanders, by repeated acts of insubordination and repeated murders, for the purpose of extorting increased pay. Perhaps the best idea one can give of the anomalous condition of affairs, and of the difficulties of speculating upon any acts that may be committed, or upon any measure that may be resorted to is this—that it is quite clear that the main object of the governors of that country, and of the principal landed proprietors and chiefs, has been to provoke collision with the British army, not for the purpose of resenting any wrong, or of sustaining the military reputation of the country, but of freeing themselves from subjection to an insubordinate and licentious force, by provoking a conflict with Great Britain, in which that force should fall a sacrifice. That has been the main object and the strange principle of public policy that has for some time guided the decisions and regulated the acts of the rulers of the Punjab.

I well know what was the object of my friend, Sir Henry Hardinge, in undertaking the government of India. He made great sacrifices from a sense of public duty ; my gallant friend held a prominent place in the Councils of Her Majesty ; he was, I believe, without any reference to party decisions, held in general esteem in this House, as well by his political opponents as by his political friends. He was regarded by the army of this country as its friend, because he was the friend of justice to all ranks of that army. It was proposed to him at a time of life when, perhaps, ambition is a less powerful stimulus than it might have been at an earlier period—it was proposed to him to relinquish his place in the Councils of his Sovereign, to forego the satisfaction he must have felt at what he could not fail to see, that he was an object of general respect and esteem. He separated himself from that family which constituted the chief happiness of his life, for the purpose of performing a public duty he owed to his Sovereign and his country, by taking the arduous and responsible situation of Chief Governor of our Indian possessions. He went out with a high military reputation. Solicitous



to establish his fame in connection with our Indian Empire, not by means of conquest, or the exhibition of military skill and valour, but by obtaining for himself a name in the annals of India as the friend of peace, and through the promotion of the social interests and welfare of the inhabitants. It was mainly on account of the military character and high reputation of my gallant friend that he was enabled to control and keep in check the aspirations of more ardent and impetuous minds bent upon the invasion and conquest of the Punjab.

The view which the Governor-General took of the policy to be pursued in regard to the Punjab, was shortly this; he thought the dominions of the British Crown in India were sufficient for every purpose; that the interests of the Empire would not be promoted by the addition of the Punjab to the possessions already subject to our rule. He was determined, therefore, to resist any temptation to territorial aggrandisement. His desire was to see a native Government established in the Punjab, capable of maintaining its independence, of restoring subordination in the ranks of a great army, composed of men of high natural courage, of great physical strength, accustomed to discipline, and trained to military habits by European officers of distinguished reputation. His wish was that a Sikh Government should be established. He deprecated the formation of a Mussulman Government, or the domination of any other than Sikh authorities. At the same time that he was determined to resist the temptations to direct aggression, he refused repeated proposals that were made to him to interfere in the domestic affairs of the Punjab. Although nothing could have been more easy, although but a word from him would have been necessary to induce the Mussulman inhabitants of the Punjab to rise against the Sikh authorities, who were conducting themselves in a manner so irreconcilable with sound policy or common sense, he resolved steadily to adhere to the line he had chalked out, to abstain from all interference in the domestic affairs of the Punjab, and to observe literally every obligation of good faith.

But while this was his view of the policy that ought to be pursued he was not insensible to the danger to which our Indian Empire was constantly exposed from the maintenance on its frontiers of a profligate and debauched Government, controlled by a licentious and insubordinate army. My gallant friend, therefore, took all precautions. He had to guard a frontier extending on the banks of the Sutlej at least 100 miles. The frontier from Ferozepore to Rupar was at least 100 miles; from Ferozepore to Ludhiana about 77 miles. My gallant friend, cautiously abstaining from the collection of any force on the frontier which could justify aggression, or even remonstrance, on the part of the Lahore Government, took those precautions

which would effectually prevent successful attack on their part. At Ferozepore he stationed a force of about 8,000 men, consisting of one European regiment, seven regiments of native infantry, two regiments of native cavalry, twenty-four light guns, and had mounted in position at Ferozepore thirty or thirty-five pieces of heavy artillery. He intended this to be the advanced post of the British army on the western side of the frontier.

*Source.*—(ii) Despatch written by Lord Hardinge, dated December 21, 1846, reproduced in *Essays of Sir H. Lawrence*. (J. C. Murray.) (Serampore Press.)

I stated that it was the duty of His Highness' Government and the Chiefs to decide upon the course which they might deem to be most expedient ; but that in these arrangements I could devise no interference, further than in giving to His Highness' Government the aid of my advice and good offices in promoting the interests of the State.

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The Chiefs unanimously concurred that a State necessity existed for excluding the Maharani from exercising any authority in the administration of affairs, and the Durbar and Chiefs have come to the decision that Her Highness shall receive an annuity of one lakh and a half.

You will observe that a British officer appointed by the Governor-General in Council, with an efficient establishment of subordinates, will remain at Lahore, to direct and control every department of the State. The feelings of the people, and the just rights of all classes, will be respected

*A Council of Regency, composed of leading chiefs, will act under the control and guidance of the British Resident. The Council will consist of eight Sirdars, and the members will not be changed without the consent of the British Resident, acting under the orders of the Governor-General. The power of the Resident extends over every department, and to any extent. A military force may be placed in such forts and posts, and of such strength, within the Lahore territories, as the Governor-General may determine. These terms give the British Resident unlimited authority in all matters of internal administration, and external relations, during the Maharajah's minority.*

*The concession of these powers will enable the British Government to secure the peace and good order of the country—the authority will be exercised for the most beneficial purposes ; these terms are more extensive than have been heretofore required, when native States have required the protection of an English contingent force. My motive in requiring such large powers has arisen from the*

*experience of its necessity during the last nine months; and my reluctance, on general principles, to revert to the subsidiary system of using British troops to support a native Government, while we have no means of correcting the abuses of the civil administration of a country ostensibly under British protection. A British force, acting as the instrument of a corrupt native agency, is a system leading to mischievous consequences, and which ought, when it is possible, to be avoided.*

The occupation of Lahore will afford the means of counteracting much of the disorder and anarchy which have disturbed the Punjab for the last five years, chiefly owing to a numerous Sikh army, kept up in the vicinity of the capital, in numbers greatly disproportioned to the revenues of the country, and by whose republican system of discipline the soldiery had usurped all the functions of the State.

The control which the British garrison can exercise in enforcing order amongst the disbanded soldiery, will, in conjunction with a British system of administration, protect all classes of the community. The immediate effect of depriving a numerous body of military adventurers of employment (there being still many to be disbanded to reduce the numbers to the limits of the Treaty of Lahore), may be troublesome, and a source of some uneasiness. No policy can at once get rid of an evil which has been the growth of years. But the operation of a system of order introduced into the Punjab, will subdue the habits of this class, as have been the case in our own provinces since the Pindari War, and, by gradually mitigating the turbulent spirit of the Sikh population, encourage the people to cultivate the arts of industry and peace.

A strict adherence to the letter of the Treaty, by the withdrawal of the British garrison at this moment from the Punjab, after the avowals made by the Durbar that the Government could not stand, would probably have led to measures of aggrandisement, and the extension of our territory after scenes of confusion and anarchy. This danger was felt by the most able of the Sirdars, and it reconciled them to the sacrifices which the terms inevitably required for the interest of the Lahore State. By the course which has been adopted, the modification of the terms of the agreement of last March has been made with the free consent of the Sirdars, publicly assembled, who were made fully aware of the extents of the power which, by the new articles, was to be transferred to the British Government.

The confidence which the Sikh chiefs have reposed in British good faith, must tend, by the unanimity of their decision, which partakes, as far as it is possible in an Eastern country, of a national sanction, to promote the success of this measure.

I have deemed it expedient that the ratification of the new

terms of agreement entered into for protecting the Maharajah during the minority, should be made as public as possible. It has, therefore, been determined, in communication with the Sirdars, that his Highness shall come to my camp on the 26th instant; and I propose afterwards, when the agreement will be formally ratified, to pay his Highness a friendly return visit at Lahore.

No efforts on my part will be omitted to preserve this desirable state of things. My views and measures have been uniformly directed to maintain a system of peace, by consolidating the British power on India, and not by objects of aggrandisement, and I trust that the arrangements now about to be ratified will tend to this effect, and that the course which I have adopted will be found by you to be consistent with true policy, and conducive to the interests of British India.

Unfortunately, as so often happens in Indian politics, a temporary illness took away the guiding hand just at the moment when that influence was indispensable. Henry Lawrence's successors tended more and more to go beyond the difficult task of supervision and guidance and to take over themselves the direct administration of the country. The result of this change of policy was that the old rulers of the country became dissatisfied, and the general mass of the people began to doubt whether the British Government really intended to restore the country to the young Maharajah when he came of age. Other influences, still more unfortunate and less reputable, began to make themselves felt. The evil spirits, more eager for their own self-advancement than for the good of their country, reasserted themselves. Intrigue, oppression, and deliberate tampering with the loyalty of the British troops became rampant, and soon led to actual violence. Diwan Mulraj, the Governor of Multan, owing to disagreements with the Government over certain payments, broke out into open rebellion, and connived at the murder of two British officers.

#### ✓ Causes of the Second Sikh War

Source.—(i) Edwin Arnold, "Dalhousie's Administration in India." (Saunders, Otley and Co.)

It has now been seen how the edifice of government, reared by Lord Hardinge, crumbled away from its foundations, leaving the work to do again, and a lasting lesson that the only modera-

tion at present respected by the Asiatic is that shown by overwhelming power. The Sikhs had weighed English forbearance in Eastern scales, and perceiving that Sobraon had not given the victors a will to abolish Sikh supremacy, they had never ceased to hope that a lack of power had been felt. The nation and the faith of the Khalsa were once more against us with all the unanimity of a sentiment more nearly akin to patriotism than any other enlisted against the British Government. The chiefs of the rebellion flung their names and wealth into the venture, with a bold devotion that comes near to the heroic. It is hard to reach the deepest motive of the Oriental heart, which not only conceals its purpose, but counting upon a practice esteemed so natural, accustoms itself to disguise disguise. Yet the Rajahs, Shere Singh and Chuttur Singh, could hardly win more for themselves from a successful rebellion, than all which they possessed already in titles, jaghirs, and the immediate alliance with a protected throne. They grieved, however, to see Ranjit's son leaning on the hand which Ranjit had only touched in haughty friendship; they longed to try out a new Sobraon on a field where treachery should not fight against the Sikh army. Greater indignation, too, had been felt than shown, when the Maharani was taken from her people and child; bitter feelings rankled to witness the Sikh religion no longer paramount, and the Mussulman strutting past the holy tank of Amritsar, "his head 'full of wind' and his belly of cow-beef." All these wrongs, and the means to right them, are set forth in the proclamation issued by Shere Singh, which is also a programme of the rising, and but for its tinge of Punjab ferocity, a frank and straightforward state-paper, as such things go. "It is known," he thereby declares to all good Sikhs—"to those who have been cherished by the Khalsaji—in fact, to the world at large, with what oppression, tyranny, and undue violence, the Feringhis have treated the widow of the great Maharajah Ranjit Singh, now in bliss, and what cruelty they have shown towards the people of the country."

"In the first place, they have broken the treaty, by imprisoning and sending away to Hindostan, the Maharani, the mother of her people. Secondly, the race of Sikhs, the children of the Maharajah (Ranjit Singh), have suffered so much from their tyranny, that our very religion has been taken away from us. Thirdly, the kingdom has lost its former repute. By the direction of the holy Guru, Rajah Shere Singh and others, with their valiant troops, have joined the trusty and faithful Diwan Mulraj, on the part of Maharajah Dhulip Singh, with a view to eradicate and expel the tyrannous and crafty Feringhis. The Khalsaji must, now, act with all their heart and soul. Those who are servants of the Khalsaji, of the holy Guru, and of the

Maharajah, are enjoined to gird up their loins, and proceed to Multan without delay. Let them murder all Feringhis, wherever they may find them, and cut off the daks. In return for this service, they will certainly be recompensed by the favour of the holy Guru, by increase of rank, and by distribution of rewards. Fourthly, let all cling closely to their religion. Whoever acts accordingly, will obtain grace in this world, and hereafter; and he who acts otherwise, is excluded from the pale of the Sikh faith."

*Source.*—(ii) Letter written by Sir W. Sleeman to Lord Dalhousie, dated September 24, 1848, "Journey through the Kingdom of Oudh." Vol. I., p. xliii. (Bentley.)

I hope your Lordship will pardon my taking advantage of the present occasion to say a few words on the state of affairs in the north-west, which are now of such absorbing interest. I have been for some time impressed with the belief that the system of administration in the Punjab has created doubts as to the ultimate intention of our Government with regard to the restoration of the country to the native ruler when he comes of age. The native aristocracy of the country seem to have satisfied themselves that our object has been to retain the country, and that this could be prevented only by timely resistance. The sending of European officers to relieve the Chief of Multan and to take possession of the country and fort, seems to have removed the last lingering doubt upon this point; and Mulraj seems to have been satisfied that in destroying them he would be acting according to the wishes of all his class, and all that portion of the population who might aspire to employment under a native will. This was precisely the impression created by the same means in Afghanistan; and I believe that the notion now generally prevalent is that our proposed intentions of delivering over the country to its native ruler were not honest, and that we should have appropriated the country to ourselves could we have done so.

There are two classes of native governments in India. In one the military establishments are all national, and depend entirely upon the existence of native rule. They are officered by the aristocracy of the country, chiefly landed, who know that they are not fitted for either civil or military office under our system, and must be reduced to beggary or insignificance should our rule be substituted for that of their native chief. In the other, all the establishments are foreign, like our own. The Sikhs were not altogether of the first class, like those of Rajputana and Bundelcund, but they were so for the most part; and when they saw all offices of trust by degrees being filled by Captain this and Mr. that, they gave up all hopes of ever having their share in the administration.

Satisfied that this was our error in Afghanistan, in carrying out the views of Lord Ellenborough in the Gwalior State, I did everything in my power to avoid it, and have entirely succeeded, I believe; but it has not been done without great difficulty. I considered Lord Hardinge's measures good, as they interposed Hindu States between us and a beggarly and fanatical country, which it must be ruinous to our finances to retain, and into which we could not avoid making encroachments, however anxious the Government might be to avoid it, if our borders joined. But I supposed that we should be content with guiding, controlling, and supervising the native administration, and not take all the executive upon ourselves to the almost entire exclusion of the native aristocracy. I had another reason for believing that Lord Hardinge's measures were wise and prudent. While we have a large portion of the country under native rulers, their administration will contrast with ours greatly to our advantage in the estimation of the people; and we may be sure that, though some may be against us, many will be for us. If we succeed in sweeping them all away, or absorbing them, we shall be at the mercy of our native army, and they will see it; and accidents may possibly occur to unite them, or a great portion of them, in some desperate act. The thing is possible, though improbable; and the best provision against it seems to me to be the maintenance of native rulers, whose confidence and affection can be engaged, and administrations imposed under judicious management.

The industrial classes of the Punjab would, no doubt, prefer our rule to that of the Sikhs; but that portion who depend upon public employment under Government for their subsistence is large in the Punjab, and they would nearly all prefer a native rule. They have evidently persuaded themselves that our intention is to substitute our own rule; and it is now, I fear, too late to remove the impression. If your Lordship is driven to annexation, you must be in great force; and a disposition must be shown on the part of the local authorities to give the educated aristocracy of the country a liberal share in the administration.

One of the greatest dangers to be apprehended in India is, I believe, the disposition on the part of the dominant class to appoint to all offices members of their own class, to the exclusion of the educated natives. This has been nobly resisted hitherto; but where every subaltern thinks himself in condition to take a wife, and the land opens no prospect to his children but in the public service, the competition will become too great.

#### Inscription on Monument in Multan

Inscription on monument to Agnew and Anderson at Multan:—

Beneath this Monument  
lie the remains of  
**PATRICK ALEXANDER VANS AGNEW,**  
of the Bengal Civil Service  
and  
**WILLIAM ANDERSON,**  
Lieutenant, 1st Bombay Fusilier Regiment,  
Assistants to the Resident at Lahore,  
who, being deputed by the Governor to relieve,  
at his own request,  
Diwan Mulraj, Viceroy of Multan,  
of the fortress and authority which he held,  
were attacked and wounded by the garrison,  
on April 19, 1848 ;  
and being treacherously deserted by the Sikh escort,  
were, on the following day,  
in flagrant breach of national faith and hospitality,  
barbarously murdered  
in the Eedgah, under the walls of Multan.  
Thus fell these two young public servants  
at the ages of 25 and 28 years,  
full of high hopes, rare talents, and promise of  
future usefulness,  
even in their deaths doing their country honour.  
Wounded and forsaken, they could offer no resistance  
but hand in hand calmly awaited the onset of their assailants.  
Nobly they refused to yield,  
foretelling the day when thousands of Englishmen  
should come to avenge their death,  
and destroy Mulraj; his army and fortress.  
History records how the prediction was fulfilled.  
Borne to the grave by their victorious brother soldiers  
and countrymen,  
they were buried with military honours,  
here, on the summit of the captured citadel,  
on the 26th of January, 1849.  
The annexation of the Punjab to the British Empire  
was the result of the war,  
of which their assassination was the commencement.

From the moment that British officers were murdered, war became inevitable, but Lord Gough decided to postpone active operations until the autumn. The authorities in England, on the other hand, were not of the opinion that the defection of Mulraj necessarily involved any widespread



rebellion. Edwardes, who was at that time on the border, took instant action, and with the help of General Cortlandt, defeated Mulraj and his followers, and pinned them within the fortress of Multan. After some hesitation on both sides, Shere Singh and the Khalsa troops went over to the enemy. There could then be no doubt that the British Government was faced, not by a local rebellion, but by a national revolt backed up by the whole force of the Khalsa. Lord Dalhousie saw that there must be war, and determined that it should be "war with a vengeance." The chances of a British success were not improved by the news that Dost Muhammad Khán and the Afghans had thrown in their lot with the Sikhs. The battle of Chillianwalla was a victory, but of such a kind that "another would ruin us." The news at last stirred public opinion in England to its depths, and forced the authorities to send out Sir Charles Napier, the victor of Miani, to supersede Lord Gough. Before he arrived, however, the decisive battle had taken place at Gujrat, and a hard-fought victory won.

### The Battle of Chillianwalla

*Source*.—J. C. Marshman, "Memoirs of Sir Henry Havelock." (Longmans.)

Such was the battle of Chillianwalla, one of the most sanguinary ever fought by the British in India, and the nearest <sup>1</sup> approximation to a defeat of any of the great conflicts of that power in the East. The British drove the Sikhs from their position, but they were unable to hold the ground which they had won. The victors retired some hours after the close of the day to their own camp; the vanquished traversed in detachments the scene of the conflict throughout the night. Twelve pieces of cannon were the trophies of British valour; four guns of the Horse Artillery were captured by the Sikhs, and the colours of three regiments were lost in the action. The battle had been fought with the view of "effectually overthrowing the army of Shere Singh," before it could be reinforced by the troops under his father. That army was not effectually overthrown. It sustained a heavy loss, but retired without interruption, not more than three miles from the field of battle, and Chuttur Singh joined his son three

<sup>1</sup> "We have gained a victory, but like that of the ancients, it is such an one that 'another would ruin us.'"—Lord Dalhousie, in a letter to Sir George Cooper.

days after the fight. Eighty-nine officers and 2,357 fighting men was the price paid by the British for these doubtful advantages. If moral superiority be regarded, the results of the battle were yet more disheartening to our countrymen. The character of the Sikhs for prowess was considerably elevated ; the reputation of the British cavalry was grievously tarnished. In India, nevertheless, Chillianwalla was declared by the highest authority to be a victory, and the sound of cannon announced the triumph at every station in the three Presidencies. But even here we were anticipated ; for Shere Singh fired his salute on the evening of the fight. His great guns again shook the welkin when his father joined him. But if in India Chillianwalla was decked out by the trappings of victory by the Government, while public opinion deplored it as a calamity and a reverse, in England the intelligence of this great combat excited in every heart, from the Court to the cottage, sentiments of alarm and indignation. British cannon had been captured, British standards had been lost, British cavalry had fled before the enemy. The Indian press had spoken in no measured terms of the conduct of the fight, indeed of the whole campaign, and its deepest tones of vituperation were echoed by the journalists of England. The common people, whose guesses at truth are often shrewd, felt that they had lost sons, brothers, relatives, and friends, and suspected, though they could not define the grounds of their belief, that in this instance deficiency of skill was the cause of their bereavement. The higher classes were not less loud or unanimous in their condemnation. Many individuals knew that after the battle of Maharajpur, the great captain of the age had highly applauded the gallantry of the troops, but freely criticised the manœuvres of the general. The Court of Directors saw already in terrific vision their glittering empire escaping from their grasp, and had become willing, in their perplexity and dismay, to accept of the services of that general<sup>1</sup> who, in the exultation of victory, had scoffed at their authority, defamed their civil servants, and arraigned themselves of incapacity. The Ministers of the Crown and the illustrious head of the army were agreed on the necessity of a change in that command. Within three days of the arrival in London of the details of the sanguinary engagement, Lord Gough had been doomed to taste the bitterness of recall. Revert we now to the theatre of war on which the object of all this distrust and obloquy was destined still to play a glorious part and achieve a victory over his enemies in the field, and to magnify himself at the expense of those who, acknowledging his private virtues, and admiring his martial qualifications, his quick perceptions, his untiring energy and

<sup>1</sup> Sir Charles Napier.

indomitable valour, yet doubted whether nature had designed, or education or experience had justified, him for extended and independent command.

### The Appointment of Sir Charles Napier

*Source.*—W. M. Thackeray, "Story of Koompanee Jehan."

Now there was, when the news came to the City of Lundoon that Goof Bahadur had been beaten upon the banks of the Chenab, a warrior who, though rather old and as savage as a bear whose head is sore, was allowed by all mankind to be such a Roostum as had never been known since the days of Wellington. His name was Napeer Singh. He, with 2,000 men, had destroyed 30,000 of the enemy; he despised luxury; he had a beak like an eagle, and a beard like a Cashmere goat. When he went into a campaign he took with him a piece of soap and a pair of towels; he dined off a hunch of bread and a cup of water. "A warrior," said he, "should not care for wine or luxury, for fine turbans or embroidered shalwars; his tulwar should be bright, and never mind whether his papooshes are shiny." Napeer Singh was a lion indeed, and his mother was a mother of lions.

But this lion, though the bravest of animals, was the most quarrelsome that ever lashed his tail and roared in a jungle. After gaining several victories he became so insolent and contemptuous in his behaviour towards King Koompanee Jehan, whom he insulted, whom he assailed, whom he called an old woman, that the offended monarch was glad when General Napeer Singh's time of service was out, and vowed no more to employ him. . . . When the news of Goof's discomfiture came to Lundoon and the Hall of Lead, and the Queen of Feringhstan, all the Ingleez began to quake in their shoes. "Wahah! Wahah!" they cried, "we have been made to swallow abominations! Our beraks have been captured from our standard-bearers; our guns have been seized; our horsemen have fled. How shall we restore the honour of our arms? What General is there capable of resisting those terrible Sikhs and their Sirdars?"

The voice of all the nation answered, "There is but one chief, and his name is Napeer Singh!" The twenty-four viziers in the Hall of Lead, remembering the treatment which they had received from that General, and still smarting uneasily on their seats from the kicks which he had administered, cried out, "No; we will not have that brawling Samssoon—take any man but him. If Goof Bahawder will not do, take Goom Bahawder. We will not have Napeer Singh, nor eat the pie of humility any more."

The people still roared out, "Nobody can help us but Napeer Singh."

Now, Napeer Singh was as sulky as the twenty-four viziers. "I go," said he, "to serve a monarch who has been grossly ungrateful, and whose nose I have tweaked in durbar? Never, never!"

But an old General, nearly a hundred years old, very old, brave and wise, the great Wellington, came to Napeer Singh and said "O Khan! in these times of danger men must forget their quarrels and serve their country. If you will not go to the Indus, I will go—one of us must." They were two lions, two Roostums, two hooked-beaked eagles of war; they rushed into each other's arms, and touched each other's beaks. "O Father!" Napeer Singh said, "I will go;" and he went forth, and he bought a piece of soap, and he got two towels; and he took down from the wall his bright and invincible tulwar, and he went away to the ship which was to carry him to the sea.

### The Battle of Gujrat

*Source.*—"Private Letters of the Marquess of Dalhousie," p. 56.  
 Edited by J. G. A. Baird. (Blackwood.)

Hurrah for our side! This time we have got a victory and a sniffer.

On the morning of the 21st we attacked about 9 a.m. We must have had from 20 to 25,000, and 94 guns, 18 of which were heavy. The enemy were 60,000 strong, of which 2,000 were Afghans, and 59 guns. He was posted in and round Gujrat, but without entrenchments. C.-in-C. began with his artillery. He cannonaded for three hours, moving gradually forward. The enemy then began to shake. Sir W. Gilbert carried the village, which was the key of their position. Enemy retired, our people advanced, kicked them from pillar to post, drove them into their own camp, through their own camp, and out of their own camp, broke them into disorder, and pressed on them till they fled in utter rout, dropping their guns, and throwing away their arms as they ran. We pursued for twelve miles, and till nightfall. We have taken 53 guns, many standards, his whole camp, stores, baggage, cattle and ammunition. Their loss is stated from 3,000 upwards. We have lost 96 killed, of which 5 are officers, and 700 wounded, many slightly. Thank God for it! I rejoice heartily that the old Chief has been able to close his career with this crowning victory, and now he may go in peace.

Everything was well managed. Everything well done. The troops of all arms behaved admirably, and as if on parade; and the sight is described as at once beautiful and terrific beyond ordinary cannonades and advances.

It has taken Ossa and Olympus off my head, and for once during the last three months I breathe freely. One is apt, of

course, to over-estimate what happens in one's own time; but I really believe the C.-in-C. may feel that no victory ever gained in India was more important in its results, or more calculated to impress the native enemy with a sense of our invincibility, as arising from military science, and vast military resources, apart from courage and dash.

The Sikhs behaved bravely, and stood their ground obstinately. On one occasion they actually charged our line of guns, were allowed to approach and then were doubled up by grape, and flank-fire from H.M. 29th. Their guns were served, as usual, steadily and rapidly, and their cavalry made repeated attempts to turn both our flanks. They were really *Singhs* (lions) while they stood. But they were fairly *cannonaded* off the field. The Bombay Infantry Division had not a man hurt.

The only question that remained for decision was that of future policy. Sir Henry Lawrence, who had returned in the meantime from England, was opposed on principle to the annexation of the country. Lord Dalhousie had no doubts whatever, and wrote to Lawrence in the strongest terms. He determined to grant a pension to the young Maharajah, Dhulip Singh, on certain conditions, and to annex the Punjab. The Koh-i-noor diamond was surrendered by the Maharajah to the Queen of England.

*hardly to be fetched back.*

#### The Annexation of the Punjab

*Source.*—Letter from Lord Dalhousie to Sir Henry Lawrence, dated February 1, 1849. "Life of Henry Lawrence," by Edwardes and Merivale, pp. 433-4. (Smith, Elder & Co.)

In my conversation with you a few days ago I took occasion to say that my mode of conducting public business, in the administration with which I am entrusted, and especially with the confidential servants of the Government, is, to speak with perfect openness, without any reserve, and plainly to tell my mind without disguise or mincing of words. In pursuance of that system, I now remark on the proclamation you have proposed. It is objectionable in matter, because, from the terms in which it is worded, it is calculated to convey to those who are engaged in this shameful war an expectation of much more favourable terms, much more extended immunity from punishment, than I consider myself justified in granting them. It is objectionable in manner; because (unintentionally, no doubt) its whole tone substitutes you, as the Resident of Lahore, for the Government which you represent. It is calculated to raise

the inference that a new state of things is arising ; that the fact of your arrival with a desire to bring peace to the Punjab is likely to affect the warlike measures of the Government ; and that you come as a peacemaker for the Sikhs, as standing between them and the Government. This cannot be . . . there must be entire identity between the Government and its Agent, whoever it is. . . I repeat that I cannot allow anything to be said or done, which should raise the notion that the policy of the Government of India, or its intentions, depend on your presence in the Punjab, or the presence of Sir F. Currie instead. By the orders of the Court of Directors, that policy is not to be finally declared until after the country is subjected to our military possession, and after a full review of the same subject. The orders of the Court shall be obeyed by me. I do not seek for a moment to conceal from you that I have seen no reason whatever to depart from the opinion that the peace and vital interest of the British Empire now require that the power of the Sikh Government should not only be defeated, but subverted, and their dynasty abolished. . . . I am very willing that a proclamation should be issued by you, but bearing evidence that it proceeds from Government. It may notify that no terms can be given, but unconditional submission ; yet that, on submission being immediately made, no man's life shall be forfeited for the part he has taken in hostilities against the British Government.<sup>1</sup>

### ✓ The Conditions of Peace

*Source.*—Terms granted to, and accepted by, Maharajah Dhulip Singh. Reproduced in "Life of Lord Dalhousie," by Sir W. Lee-Warner. Vol. I., pp. 242-3. (Macmillan.)

1st.—His Highness the Maharajah Dhulip Singh shall resign for himself, his heirs, and his successors, all right, title, and claim to the sovereignty of the Punjab, or to any sovereign power whatever.

2nd.—All the property of the State, of whatever description and wheresoever found, shall be confiscated to the Honourable East India Company, in part payment of the debt due by the State of Lahore to the British Government, and of the expenses of the war.

3rd.—The Gem called the Koh-i-noor, which was taken from Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk by Maharajah Ranjit Singh, shall be surrendered by the Maharajah of Lahore to the Queen of England.

<sup>1</sup> In his reply Sir Henry Lawrence said : " My own opinion, as already more than once expressed in writing to your lordship, is against annexation. I did think it unjust ; I now think it impolitic."

4th.—His Highness Dhulip Singh shall receive from the Honourable East India Company, for the support of himself, his relatives, and the servants of the State, a pension not less than four and not exceeding five lakhs of Company's rupees per annum.

5th.—His Highness shall be treated with respect and honour. He shall retain the title of Maharajah Dhulip Singh Bahadur, and he shall continue to receive, during his life, such portion of the above-named pension as may be allotted to himself personally, provided he shall remain obedient to the British Government, and shall reside at such place as the Governor-General of India may select.

### The Koh-i-noor Diamond

*Source.*—Edwin Arnold, "Dalhousie's Administration of British India." Vol. I., pp. 190-3. (Saunders, Otley & Co.)

One condition of those then accepted provided that, in token of submission, the Maharajah should surrender to the Queen of Great Britain the beautiful and precious gem known as the "Mountain of Light." Taken from Shuja-ul-Mulk by Ranjit Singh, the Koh-i-noor had long flashed in the turbans of the Khalsa Rajahs—itself a kingly appanage. Hindu tradition ascribed a baneful influence to its presence. The history of the gem curiously supports the belief, and, doubtless, suggested it. First of its proud possessors was Karna, King of Anga, a hero of the Mahabharata, who was slain in the war of the Pandava princes. From his keeping, it passed through many hands; death or distress, according to the legend, always accompanying its lustrous beauty. Thus the Rajah of Ujjayin, Vikramaditya, obtained it, and lost his kingdom with the gem to the invading Muhammadans. Thus, too, Ala-ud-din, Sultan of Delhi, wrested it from the King of Malwa, and reigning but turbulently, left it to his descendant; who yielded the fatal prize, together with his throne and life, to the Moghul conqueror. The Royal Baber escaped its sinister influence by declining its possession. "My son, Humayun," say his memoirs, "hath won a jewel of the Rajah, valued at half the daily expenses of the entire world—the which I presented back to him." Vainer of such an ornament, or less superstitious, Aurungzeb's grandson, Muhammad Shah, wore it in his turban when he rode to meet his conqueror Nadir. The glitter of the unparalleled jewel caught the eye of the Afghan chief, and took his heart with a fancy too great for omens. "We will be friends," he said, "and change our turbans in pledge of friendship!" Whereupon, with rude humour, the conqueror transferred to his own forehead the boast of his enemy's treasure-house. Nadir Shah wore his "rock of light"—for so he named it—but eight years, and perished by assassins. Shah Rukh,

his son, succeeded to the beautiful and evil charm; and lost it, with all besides, to Ahmed Shah. Under Timur and Zeman, the successors in its keeping, the Duranni empire wasted away, till Shah Shuja, the last of the line, retained nothing of all its greatness except the fated stone, which seemed thus to blight its masters. When Shah Shuja was in name the guest, and in reality the prisoner of Ranjit Singh, the Maharajah saw and coveted his jewel, and obtained it on the easy terms of a purchaser who can enforce acceptance of his price. The "rock of light" glittered on the old king at many a Sikh durbar; but its malignancy, subdued by a stronger genius, brought him no ills, unless a perturbed death-bed and the eventual downfall of his house be ranked as due to its influence. As the Maharajah lay dying, the Brahmins, more covetous than superstitious, begged the diamond for the forehead-jewel of the Juggurnath. The feeble motion of Ranjit's dying head was interpreted by them as his acquiescence; but the royal treasurer refused to surrender the important bequest upon a testament so doubtful; Kurrack Singh, therefore, succeeded to it and died of poison. Shere Singh wore it in durbar, on the day when he was shot upon the throne. And to the last of its Hindu masters—the little Dhulip Singh—it brought, or might seem to bring, the disaster of two wars—the first of which diminished, and the second forfeited, his kingdom.

The government of the new country was vested in a Board of Administration, consisting of Sir Henry Lawrence as president, his brother John, and Mr. Mansel. As was only to be expected there were grave difficulties, for the attitude of the two brothers towards problems of general policy was different in the extreme. Henry sympathised mainly with the fallen aristocracy, John with the mass of the people; Henry thought much of the troubles of the hour, John of the future of the province over which he was so soon to rule. This difference of opinion clouded, though only for a time, the friendship and mutual respect which had existed between the two brothers, to such an extent that in 1852 Lord Dalhousie decided to appoint John Lawrence Chief Commissioner of the Punjab, and to send his brother as Agent to Rajputana. Judged in the light of an effective piece of administrative machinery the Board had proved a failure; but from the point of view of the welfare of the Punjab it had been a glorious success. The vigour and



efficiency of the younger brother, combined with the sympathy and tenderness of the elder, brought peace and contentment to the land. There are few pages in British history which redound more to the credit of the British race and its talent for administration than that which tells of the early days in the Punjab; and the fact that in the crisis which took place a few years later the Sikhs cast in their lot with the Government is indicative of that success.

### The Administration of the Punjab under the Brothers Lawrence

*Source.*—Sir William Lee-Warner, "Life of the Marquis of Dalhousie." (Macmillan.)

The differences of opinion between Henry and John upon matters of principle grew more and more pronounced; but their attitude towards each other requires neither apology nor concealment. Both the brothers were men of strong will, resolute purpose, and uncompromising devotion to duty. Neither of them had anything to concede to the other in intimate knowledge of the country, the language, and its people. But Henry's sympathies with the leaders of a warlike race, and his inborn tenderness for the fallen, made him specially alive to the consequences which measures of punishment, pacification, and even reform necessarily entail upon individuals and vested rights. If those sympathies were at times overstrained, it must be remembered that the deeply-seated admiration with which he inspired the Sikh nobles conduced perhaps more than anything else to reconcile them to our rule; and that his foresight in this direction was no less the foresight of a statesman than that of his brother, more immediately addressed towards practical issues. John saw vividly the benefits of peace, order, and administrative purity, and the blessings, even though they were not expressed or formulated by a contented peasantry, of relief from high-handed duress; and he never flinched because such results must be accompanied by wringings of the heart. If his nature had not that perfect genius for sympathy which was conspicuous in his brother, it was full of the truest tenderness, a tenderness which showed itself not least in the resolution with which he fixed his eye upon the masses rather than on the few, and upon the permanent well-being rather than on the passing troubles through which society could alone reach the desired end. That the Punjab was governed wisely and well during his administration of the Board is the best proof that neither Henry nor John failed in his duty. The credit of a success which has never been

exceeded in the annals of an Indian province belongs to each of them in equal degree, and posterity, which inherited the rich legacy of their labours and of their differences, can only be thankful for the noble sacrifices made by the two brothers on the altar of public interest.

### The Departure of Sir Henry Lawrence from Lahore

Source.—*Lahore Chronicle*, January 5, 1853. This is to be found in Edwardes' "Life of Sir. H. Lawrence." Vol. II., p. 209. (Smith & Elder.)

The announcement in another part of our columns that the charge of Rajputana has been conferred upon Sir Henry Lawrence, will hardly surprise any one; for certainly there is no public servant in India who is more marked out for it by the rare union of ability to serve his own, and protect a native Government. . . . We who are organs only of public feeling must be excused some sincere regrets on the occasion; not for the loss of a head of society, whose hand, heart and home, open to all, had made him universally beloved; but for the departure of so much kindly association and knowledge of the people out of a country which Englishmen are engaged to govern.

The service of the East India Company has no lack of able and honest men, and from whatever branch of it, or whatever part of the Presidency the vacancy in the Lahore Board may now be filled, we shall be sure that Lord Dalhousie will draw no doubtful arrow from his well-stocked quiver. But Sir Henry Lawrence's successor can never be to the Punjab what Sir Henry Lawrence was. His connection with this country commenced so far back as 1838, as Mr. Clark's assistant at Ferozepore. Ranjit Singh, the founder of the Sikh empire, was then alive, and Sir Henry had seen his successors "come like shadows, so depart," before he was finally called on to be the guardian of Dhulip Singh, the last Maharajah of Lahore. The chivalrous attempt to prop up the falling Khalsa dynasty began in March, 1846, and ended in March, 1849. Sir Henry was the life and soul of it; and it was during his temporary absence that it failed. He returned to witness the second Sikh war, and the final conquest of the Sikh people; and since the Punjab has been a British province, Sir Henry has still been at the head of its Government. Fourteen years of association between a public officer and a people is rarely to be seen nowadays in India! The association has been eminently kindly, too. The Sikhs have always known him as a friend: whether in the Khyber Pass with their regiments co-operating with Pollock, as Resident at Lahore, or as President of the Board of Administration, he has been ever a staunch and hardy comrade to their troops, a "source of honour" to their chiefs,

and of justice to their labouring classes ; and thus it is that at this moment, the planless Ministers, powerless Sirdars, jaghirless Jaghirdars, disbanded soldiers, and other fragments of Ranjit's broken court and army, find in Sir Henry Lawrence a national representative, such as they can find nowhere else, and must inevitably be "disfranchised" by his loss. A people's regret, however, is a ruler's reward ; let Sir Henry go where he will, the kindly memory of him and his good deeds, in thousands of Punjab homes, will follow after him as a blessing.

The story of Burma can soon be told. During the rule of Lord Amherst in 1824, war broke out in consequence of disputes connected with the boundary between Burmese and British territory, the Court of Ava having refused to consider Lord Amherst's remonstrances. The British Government were beset by great difficulties. The Bengal army were opposed to service over seas, and the land frontier between the two countries was situated in a wild and rough country which forbade hostilities on a big scale. The problem was solved by Sir Thomas Munro, who put the Madras forces at the disposal of the Governor-General. Owing to the energy of the Madras Governor, Rangoon was quickly captured, but the next move in the campaign was not so easy. The monsoon had set in, disease was rampant, and the enemy had retired northwards to a tract of country inaccessible to a big army. An advance, therefore, was attempted from the landward side, but after the capture of Aracan fever again exacted a very heavy toll of men. In the meantime, the sea force had been able to ascend the Irawadi, and after some fighting peace was arranged, Aracan and Burmese Tenasserim being ceded to the British. Neither the conduct nor the results of the war can be considered satisfactory. The loss of men and money was very great, whilst the Burmese became more hostile to the British even than before. During Lord Dalhousie's rule, matters again came to a head. British commercial interests in Burma were assailed, a fact which rendered necessary an official remonstrance. The Burmese Government having refused to negotiate, war was declared. Rangoon was taken and, fortunately, better arrangements than on the former occasion

were made for the health and comfort of the troops. The conquest of Pegu was followed by its annexation, and thus another large addition was made to British territories.

### Second Burmese War

*Source.*—Minute of Lord Dalhousie.

When little more than two years had passed (from the conclusion of the second Sikh war) the Government of India again had suddenly engaged in hostilities with Burma.

Certain British traders in the port of Rangoon had been subjected to gross outrage by the officers of the King of Ava, in direct violation of the Treaty of Yandaboo.

Holding to the wisdom of Lord Wellesley's maxim, that an insult offered to the British flag at the mouth of the Ganges should be resented as promptly and as fully as an insult offered at the mouth of the Thames, I should, under any circumstances, have regarded it as sound policy to exact reparation for wrong done to British subjects by any native state. But our relations with the Burmese Court, and the policy it had long pursued towards us, imposed upon the Government of India, at the time to which I refer, the absolute necessity of exacting from it reparation for the systematic violation of treaty of which British traders had now made formal complaint.

Of all the Eastern nations with which the Government of India has had to do, the Burmese are the most arrogant and overbearing.

During the years since the treaty with them had been concluded, they had treated it with disregard, and had been allowed to disregard it with impunity. They had been permitted to worry away our envoys by petty annoyances from their Court, and their insolence had even been tolerated when at last they vexed our commercial agent at Rangoon into silent departure from their port. Inflated by such indirect concessions as these, the Burmans had assumed again the tone they used before the war of 1825. On more than one occasion they had threatened recommencement of hostilities against us, and always at the most untoward time.

However contemptible the Burman race may seem to critics in Europe, they have ever been regarded in the East as formidable in the extreme. Only five-and-twenty years before, the news of their march towards Chittagong had raised a panic in the bazaars of Calcutta itself; and even in the late war a rumour of their supposed march spread consternation in the British districts of Assam and Aracan.

If deliberate and gross wrong should be tamely borne from

such a people as this, without vindication of our rights or exaction of reparation for the wrong, whether the motive of our inaction were desire of peace or contempt for the Burman power, it was felt that the policy would be full of danger; for the Government of India could never, consistently with its own safety, permit itself to stand for a single day in an attitude of inferiority towards a native power, and least of all towards the Court of Ava.

Every effort was made to obtain reparation by friendly means. The reparation required was no more than compensation for the actual loss incurred. But every effort was vain. Our demands were evaded; our officers were insulted. The warnings which we gave were treated with disregard, and the period of grace which we allowed was employed by the Burmese in strengthening their fortifications and in making every preparation for resistance.

Thereupon the Government of India despatched a powerful expedition to Pegu, and within a few weeks the whole of the coast of Burma, with all its defences, was in our possession.

Even then the Government of India abstained from further operations for several months, in the hope that, profiting by experience, the King of Ava would yet accede to our just demands.

But our forbearance was fruitless. Accordingly, in the end of 1852 the British troops took possession of the Kingdom of Pegu, and the territory was retained in order that the Government of India might hold from the Burman State both adequate compensation for past injury and the best security against future danger.

### The Conditions of Peace

*Source.*—Proclamation ending the Second Burmese War, reproduced in Sir W. Lee-Warner's "Life of Lord Dalhousie." (Macmillan.)

The Court of Ava having refused to make amends for the injuries and insults, which British subjects had suffered at the hands of its servants, the Governor-General of India in Council resolved to exact reparation by force of arms.

The forts and cities upon the coast were forthwith attacked and captured. The Burman forces have been dispersed wherever they have been met; and the province of Pegu is now in the occupation of British troops.

The just and moderate demands of the Government of India have been rejected by the king. The ample opportunity that has been afforded him for repairing the injury that was done, has been disregarded; and the timely submission, which alone could have been effectual to prevent the dismemberment of his kingdom, is still withheld.

Wherefore in compensation for the past, and for better security

in the future, the Governor-General in Council has resolved, and hereby proclaims, that the province of Pegu is now, and shall be henceforth, a portion of the British territories in the East.

Such Burman troops as may still remain within the province shall be driven out. Civil government shall immediately be established, and officers shall be appointed to administer the affairs of the several districts.

The Governor-General in Council hereby calls upon the inhabitants of Pegu to submit themselves to the authority, and to confide securely in the protection of the British Government, whose power they have seen to be irresistible, and whose rule is marked by justice and beneficence.

The Governor-General in Council having exacted the reparation he deemed sufficient, desires no further conquest in Burma, and is willing to consent that hostilities should cease.

But if the King of Ava shall fail to renew his former relations of friendship with the British Government, and if he shall recklessly seek to dispute its quiet possession of the province it has now declared to be its own, the Governor-General in Council will again put forth the power he holds, and will visit, with full retribution, aggressions, which, if they be persisted in, must of necessity lead to the total subversion of the Burman State, and to the ruin and exile of the king and his race.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE ANNEXATION OF OUDH

THERE is yet to be considered a state which was annexed to the Company's territory, neither by conquest nor by lapse, but by the mere act of proclamation. No action of Lord Dalhousie has been more criticised than his treatment of the King of Oudh; and the mere fact that feelings were even more bitter there than elsewhere during the Mutiny, added to the violence of that criticism. After the battle of Buxar in 1764, the Company decided that the kingdom of Oudh should continue as a buffer state between their territory and the Mahrattas. In 1801, Lord Wellesley made a treaty with the king by which Oudh became a subsidiary state. The king was left free to carry on the internal administration of the country and, in return for certain money payments, to receive the protection of British troops.

During Lord Dalhousie's rule certain facts had been proved beyond any vestige of doubt. In the first place, the king's rule was both oppressive and inefficient. Lord William Bentinck, Lord Hardinge, Sir Henry Lawrence, Colonel Sleeman and Sir James Outram had each in turn come to this conclusion; and the efforts of the British Government to effect any improvement had conspicuously failed. It therefore followed that the subsidiary system had not succeeded in safeguarding the interests of the people of Oudh. Indeed, the British troops prevented all chances of a successful revolt on the part of the people against oppression. It was clear, therefore, that something had to be done; and the only difference of opinion lay in what that something should be. Lord William Bentinck had advised that the British Government should act as a guardian and trustee, and form an administration entirely native; Sir Henry Lawrence insisted that not one rupee should come

into the Company's coffers ; and Colonel Sleeman suggested either a Council of Regency advised by the Resident or a definitely European administration for a given time. Lord Dalhousie, however, held that reform could not be expected from the king's officers, and therefore argued that the assumption of power by the British should be permanent. At the same time he wished to show tenderness towards the king, who, for all his sins, had maintained an attitude of loyalty towards the British, and to allow him to retain his royal title and rank. Unfortunately the King of Oudh refused to accept the new treaty offered by Lord Dalhousie; and therefore rendered necessary a definite act of annexation.

### British Policy in Oudh

Source.—(i) Minute of Lord W. Bentinck, dated July 30, 1817.  
(Parliamentary Papers.)

During the last thirty years, the earnest endeavours of the Supreme Government have been unceasingly exerted to induce the rulers in Oudh to reform the administration of that mis-governed and oppressed country. It is unnecessary to say that these endeavours have been uniformly and entirely unavailing, and it may not be too much to add, that as long as it shall be held to be inconsistent with a rigid adherence to existing treaties, to push our interference beyond the limits of friendly counsel, or of measures of a merely negative character, the task, for the present at least, must be entirely hopeless. Indeed it may be asked what better prospect does the future hold out when the experiment has been under trial during the reigns of three successive princes of entirely different characters, and has been accompanied by the same results and the same failure.

As this state of misgovernment continues to prevail in a greater and more aggravated degree than in any former period, it becomes necessary to consider, whether any justification is to be found, either in the letter or the spirit of our engagements, for the forbearance to apply a remedy to evils which by no possibility could have existed for so long a period, and to such an extent, except under the safeguard of our protection and power. It is true, that the honourable and much more able persons who have preceded me in the Government have deemed themselves forbidden, by a strict interpretation of existing treaties, forcibly to compel the fulfilment of that stipulation by which the Vizier and his successors have bound themselves to introduce " such a system of administration as should be conducive to the prosperity



of his subjects, and calculated to secure the lives and properties of the inhabitants, as well as to act according to the advice of the Supreme Government." (If I presume to differ from these high authorities, and to recommend a course of decided and peremptory interposition, as more consonant to the high obligations imposed upon us, it is right that I should disclaim <sup>all</sup> idea or desire of promoting any separate British interest, at the expense of the dignity and comfort of the reigning prince of Oudh); the policy, on the contrary, which I think ought to be pursued to all the dependent chiefs subject to our paramount power, except in extreme cases, where the peace of neighbouring states may be disturbed from the effects of anarchy and disorder which the ruler may be unable or unwilling to suppress, or where a system of internal administration prevails, marked by such extraordinary cruelty and oppression as to call down universal reprobation. But these sentiments will be further explained in considering the decision of former governments upon the same question.

I shall now record a memoir submitted to me by the resident at Lucknow, in which is depicted the actual state of that country.

"With the present reign the administration has become still more vicious; the country has been going to ruin; and from want of order, arrangement, or stability in the Government, oppression and anarchy universally prevail; the people have, in consequence, no faith or reliance in their Government, and constant desertion is going on from the capital and the rest of the kingdom. No revenue system on equitable principles can be ever effected by the unaided efforts of the Oudh Government; constant oppression and the habitual breach of all contracts, have so completely destroyed their confidence in their rulers, that they cannot be expected to trust them again, while, as they themselves declare, they would agree to pay much higher rents than at present, if they were assured that the contracts made with them would not be infringed. During the late cold season, hardly a day elapsed that we could not hear at Lucknow the fire of artillery at places which the king's troops were besieging, or in engagements between them and the zemindars. The inefficiency of the police was never so glaring as at present. The capital and its environs are the scenes of nightly robberies and murders, and the roads in the vicinity are so beset by thieves and desperate characters, that no one thinks of passing by day or night without protection. The military force maintained by the King of Oudh is preposterously large, and a considerable portion of it, exceeding in number 40,000 men, with guns, is scattered over the country to strengthen the hands of the local officers, and to secure the collection of the revenue, yet they are not found sufficient for the duty they have to perform."

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With the strong conviction that it is the bounden duty of the British Government to put an end to this cruel state of oppression and misgovernment in Oudh; with an equally strong conviction, confirmed by the experience of thirty years, that advice, remonstrances, and measures merely negative will avail nothing, and that the arm of power forcibly interposed will alone effect this object, I humbly advise and recommend that the sanction of the home authorities may be given for this purpose.

The grounds of my opinion rest upon the acknowledged excessive misgovernment and oppression existing in the kingdom of Oudh, and upon the broad principle, that as the paramount power, from which alone these evils have their source and their endurance, we are bound to put an end to them. I consider it unmanly to look for minor facts in justification of this measure: but if I wanted them, the amount of military force kept up by his Majesty is a direct infraction of the treaty. From this force we have nothing at present to fear; but should circumstances, either of internal or external commotion, occupy our troops elsewhere, it is quite evident that very serious inconvenience and even danger might be apprehended from this large armed multitude, consisting of the finest men in India, and little controllable by their own Government, if the check of our power were removed. It must not be forgotten, that the warlike Rohillas, ever ready to join any standard of revolt, are immediately contiguous to the Oudh frontier.

It may be asked of me—And when you have assumed the management, how is it to be conducted, and how long retained? I should answer, That acting in the character of guardian and trustee, we ought to frame an administration entirely native: an administration so composed as to individuals, and so established upon the best principles, revenue and judicial, as should best serve for immediate improvement, and as a model for future imitation; the only European part of it should be the functionary by whom it should be superintended, and it should only be retained till a complete reform might be brought about, and a guarantee for its continuance obtained, either in the improved character of the reigning prince, or, if incorrigible, in the substitution of his immediate heir; or in default of such substitute from nonage or incapacity, by the domination of one of the family as regent, the whole of the revenue being paid into the Oudh treasury.

Although I have presumed to differ from two of my distinguished predecessors upon the question of right and obligation to force the ruler of Oudh to desist from his arbitrary and tyrannical sway, I beg to express my entire concurrence in the description given by Lord Hastings of the conduct and demeanour that ought to be observed by a British resident towards the King of

Oudh, and to the chiefs of all dependent States. In proportion as our power is notoriously overwhelming and irresistible, so should the display of it be carefully suppressed, and, if possible, invisible; the utmost delicacy should be used on all occasions of intercourse, whether of ceremony or business, to uphold the rank and dignity of the native prince, and to treat him with the utmost consideration and attention. The errors of our policy in this respect seem to have been twofold: first, to interfere a great deal too much in all the petty details of the administration, and in the private and personal arrangements of the sovereign, making, in fact, the resident more than king, clothing him with a degree of state equal to that of royalty itself, and allowing him to act the part rather of a schoolmaster and dictator, than of the minister of a friendly power professing to recognise the independence of its ally. The immense extent of jurisdiction exercised by the resident at Lucknow within the town itself, the actual residence of the sovereign, is totally incompatible with the royal dignity and authority, is often the cause of much complaint and inconvenience, and is strongly opposed to a considerate and liberal policy; and, secondly, not to interfere with sufficient promptitude and decision as the paramount power, when the vital interests of both states, the cause of good government and humanity, imperatively demanded it. It is to the first description of meddling and interference, and the mischiefs of the double Governments which have been so often described, that I am so much adverse. If the political agents for the most part were altogether removed, I believe it would be for the comfort of the sovereign, for the advantage of good government, and for the real interests of both states. This measure is, of course, not possible where we have our subsidiary forces, and where there are large collections of European officers, whose conduct it is necessary to control. But in the minor States, in which this measure has been carried into effect, the best consequences appear to me to have accrued. It is impossible that this *imperium in imperio* can ever be successful; it is directly opposed to every feeling and passion of human nature. If the diwan is the creature of the resident, the prince, as Sir Thomas Munro observes, will necessarily counteract his minister. If, on the other hand, as often happens, the minister is supported by the prince, but not by the resident, the influence of the latter is immediately courted by the faction in opposition, and his conduct and intentions are, contrary to his own will, often misrepresented for party purposes. Again, it often happens that an administration offensive to the people draws, or pretends to draw, a sanction to its proceedings from the support of the British authority.

I have now stated the only measure which, or the threat of which, will in my judgment be effectual in compelling any ruler

of Oudh to govern his country without oppression; it is a sad reflection that few of these native princes, more especially among the Mussulmans, have that high moral feeling which should teach them to consider the welfare and happiness of the people as their paramount duty; they have no education, they are surrounded from their infancy by flatterers and self-interested counsellors, who are always exalting their consequence and dignity and endeavouring to maintain the favour of the prince by administering to all his bad passions. The security afforded by our power remains the only real restraint upon a despot, in his fear of insurrection and of the revenge of his people. But the threatened assumption of the Government brings into action a countervailing power, that will much better supply the place of insurrectionary movement, the immediate consequences of which must be bloodshed, and the final result by no means certain of effecting a remedy. But by a direct assumption, the life of the sovereign and the continuance of his dynasty is not endangered, while all the oppressed find immediate redress, the whole community have a better prospect of future prosperity under their own institutions, and the guilty prince himself, and all his successors, will have an example before their eyes of the certain effects of their own misrule; they, as well as those who surround them, will always feel the heavy responsibility by which they are surrounded, and will discover that their interest as well as their security is to rule well.

Source.—(ii) Sir Henry Lawrence, "Essays in India," published in the *Calcutta Review*, 1845. (Serampore: *Friend of India Press*.)

The condition of Oudh is yearly becoming worse. The revenue is yearly lessening. There are not less than 100,000 soldiers in the service of zemindars. The revenue is collected by half that number in the king's pay. In more than half the districts of Oudh are strong forts, most of them surrounded with dense jungle, carefully rendered as inaccessible as possible. Originally the effect of a weak or tyrannical government, such fortresses perpetuate anarchy. The Amils and other public officers are men of no character, who obtain and retain their position by Court bribery. Only the weak pay their revenue; those who have forts, or who, by combinations, can withstand the Amil, make their own revenue arrangements. Throughout the country nothing exists deserving the name of a judicial or magisterial court. The newswriters are in the pay of the Amils, generally their servants; nevertheless, not less than a hundred acoities, or other acts of violence attended with loss of life, are annually reported; how many hundreds then pass unnoticed! Within the last six months the Government dawk has been

robbed ; within the last three, an Amil has been slain. While we write, the British cantonment of Cawnpore has been insulted ; and month after month the local press tells of new atrocities. In short, the government of the country is utterly palsied ; its constitution is utterly destroyed ; no hope remains. Were any vitality left in Oudh, the country has, during the last twelve years, had a fair chance of recovering. If the system of a King, a Minister, a Resident, and a protecting army, could subsist without ruin to the country so ruled, it has had a fair trial. The scheme cannot be said to have failed for lack of good instruments. The Oudh rulers have been no worse than monarchs so situated usually are ; indeed, they have been better than might have been expected. Weak, vicious and dissolute they were, but they have seldom been cruel, and have never been false. In the storms of the last half century, Oudh is the one single native State that has invariably been true to the British Government, that has neither intrigued against us nor seemed to desire our injury. It may have been weakness, it may have been apathy, but it is at least a fact, that the Oudh Government has ever been faithful, and therefore it is that we would not only advocate liberality towards the descendants of Saadut Khan, but the utmost consideration that can be shown them, *consistently* with the duty we owe to the people of Oudh. Among her ministers have been as able individuals as are usually to be found in the East, and there have not been wanting good men and true as Residents. It is the system that is defective, not the tools with which it has been worked. We have tried every variety of interference. We have interfered directly, and we have interfered indirectly, by omission as well as by commission, but it has invariably failed.

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From this mass of mischief who is the gainer ? It may be supposed that the Amils at least gain ; not they. There may be twenty families in all Oudh that had profited by Government employ ; but all others have been simply sponges. The officials have sucked others to be themselves squeezed in return. Is it to remain thus for ever ? Is the fairest province of Oudh always to be harried and rack-rented for the benefit of one family, or rather, to support in idle luxury *one* individual of *one* family ? Forbid it, justice ; forbid it, mercy ! Had any one of the many Governors-General who spoiled Oudh remained a few years longer in office, he might have righted her wrongs. But, unhappily, while several have been in authority long enough to wound, not one has yet had time to bind up and heal. Hastings began the " stand and deliver " system with the Nawabs. More moderate Governors succeeded who felt ashamed to persecute a family that had already been so pillaged. They pitied the monarch,

but they forgot that misdirected mercy to him was cruelty to his subject millions.

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The result is before our eyes, the remedy is also in our hands. No one can deny that we are now authorised by treaty to assume the management of the distracted portions of the kingdom. All are more or less distracted and misgoverned. Let the management of all be assumed under some such rules as those which were laid down by Lord W. Bentinck. Let the administration of the country, as far as possible, be native. Let not a rupee come into the Company's coffers. Let Oudh be at last governed, not for one man—the king—but for him and his people.

The king has made himself a cypher; he has let go the reins of government; let us take them up. He must be prevented from marring what he cannot or will not manage. In every Eastern Court the sovereign is *everything* or nothing. Mahommed Wajid Ali has given unequivocal proof that he is of the second class; there can therefore be no sort of injustice in confirming his own decree against himself, and setting him aside. He should be treated with respect, but restricted to his palace and its precincts. The Resident should be minister not only in fact but in name. Let it not be said that he works in the dark; but give him the responsible charge of the country, and make him answerable to the British Government for its good and its ill management. While his personal demeanour to the king must be deferential, he should be no more under his authority than the Commissioner of Delhi is under the Great Moghul.

Source.—(iii) Letter written by Sir W. Sleeman to Sir J. Weir Hogg, dated January 12, 1853, "Journey through the Kingdom of Oude." Vol. II., pp. 392-3. (Bentley.)

With regard to Oudh, I can only say that the king pursues the same course, and every day shows that he is unfit to reign. He has not the slightest regard for the duties or the responsibilities of his high position; and the people, and even the members of his own family, feel humiliated at his misconduct, and grow weary of his reign. The greater part of these members have not received their stipends for from two to three years, and they despair of ever receiving them as long as he reigns. He is neither tyrannical nor cruel, but altogether incapable of devoting any of his time or attention to business of any kind, but spends the whole of his time with women, eunuchs, fiddlers, and other parasites. Should he be set aside, as he deserves to be, three courses are open: 1. To appoint a regency during the minority of the heir-apparent, who is now about eleven years of age, to govern with the advice of the Resident; 2. To manage the country by European agency during the regency, or in perpetuity, leaving the surplus revenue

to the royal family; 3<sup>rd</sup> to confiscate and annex the country, and pension the royal family. The first plan was prescribed by Lord Hardinge, in case of accident to the king; the second is what was done at Nagpur, with so much advantage, by Sir Richard Jenkins in 1817; the third is what the absorbing school would advocate, but I should most deprecate. It would be most profitable for us, in a pecuniary point of view, but most injurious, I think, in a political one. It would tend to accelerate the crisis which the doctrines of that school must, sooner or later, bring upon us. Which course the Governor-General may prefer I know not.

*Source.*—(iv) Hon. Frederick John Shore, "Notes on Indian Affairs." Vol. II., pp. 260-278. (J. W. Parker, London.)

The state of this kingdom has, during the last two years, excited considerable interest, and produced no small portion of discussion in the public prints. Like most others, it has had its day, and given way to succeeding topics of temporary interest, and possibly might have been altogether forgotten for the time being, had not the attention of the public been again drawn to the subject by the recent instructions of the Court of Directors, empowering the local government boldly to throw off the mask, dethrone the King of Oudh, and annex his dominions to those of the East India Company. The motives of the Court in issuing such orders are obvious enough—gain. Situated as Oudh is, locally, the taking possession of it would not require us to augment our military force, whereas, it is anticipated, that after defraying the expenses of its civil administration, a considerable surplus would remain for the benefit of the Company; besides which its acquisition would render our territories more compact.

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We have heard so much of the anarchy and misrule prevalent in Oudh, that it appears a sort of heresy to hint the contrary. We are something like the Turk who had all his life so firmly believed that the sun moved round the earth, that to adopt a different idea was like the attempt to acquire a new sense, which his mind had not room to entertain. Nevertheless, I do not fear contradictions to the statement I am about to make from any unprejudiced and impartial observer, who will visit the country, and see and judge for himself.

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But in Oudh, the people have one great resource, of which they have been deprived, in a great degree, in our territories. Not having been cursed with "first-rate collectors," who would ruin a district to procure a good name and promotion for them-

themselves, or with ryotwari systems, by which almost all the middling and upper ranks of society have been reduced to poverty to increase the Government rent-roll, there is still in Oudh a pretty numerous middle class of landholders, to whom the people look up with hereditary respect, and who are of the greatest use in settling claims and disputes, so that but a small portion are referred to the amils. In the towns also, the merchants are very much in the habit of resorting to arbitration.

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With respect to Oudh, there are unfortunately, many profligate and low people about the court; but it is a calumny that all the governors of districts are men of that stamp, or that the districts are universally farmed out to the highest bidders. The court of Lucknow are well aware that the landholders and peasantry are, in the absence of a superior military force, far too high-spirited to be ruled by men of the above description. A great many, perhaps the majority, of the Oudh amils, are not only men of family and respectability, but generally possess considerable landed property.

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A third and very numerous class of critics have never been in Oudh; but form their ideas from the flattery of some of their sepoys, whose object is to make the officers, and, through them, the resident, tools to enable them to obtain possession of land to which they have not the slightest claim, or to perpetrate some other piece of injustice. A sepoy who wishes to advance some unjust claim, procures a letter from his commanding officer to the resident at Lucknow, painting a miserable picture of the injury the poor man has received from some tyrannical amil. The resident hands the case to the minister, requesting it may be enquired into; and orders to this effect are despatched by the minister to the local governor (amil). With the order to support him, away goes the sepoy to the amil, and treats him in the most insolent manner, in open court. The amil having investigated the claim, and finding it without the least foundation (for full nineteen cases out of twenty are such that, were they preferred in our courts, the complainants would not be let off with a simple dismissal, but would be fined), dismisses it. The insolence with which he has been treated he is obliged to digest as he can. Away goes the sepoy again to the resident, with a tremendous complaint of injustice, oppression, etc., etc. The resident again writes to the minister, expressing his "astonishment that, although your Highness sent express orders to the amil, the poor sepoy has not yet been able to obtain justice," or something to this effect. Another order is not infrequently issued, and the sepoy again presents himself to the amil, behaving



with increased insolence of tone and manner, and there have occurred instances in which, by such means as these, a sepoy has obtained possession of a piece of land to which he had no more right than the author of this paper has to appropriate the Government House at Calcutta. Is this sort of proceeding likely to raise a native chief, his ministers, or local authorities, in the eyes of the people? I am aware that much of these proceedings are contrary to the orders of Government; I only describe what occurs in practice.

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But, notwithstanding this favourable picture of the present state of Oudh, there is, I apprehend, little doubt that the downfall of its independence is at hand, and that it will, ere long, be merged into the British dominions. The king himself is a profligate and a sot, devoid of sense, who thinks of nothing but his own licentious pleasures and of the indulgence of every whim. When anything annoys or vexes him, he has recourse to drinking, to drown thought; he squanders his money like a child, spending thousands in building a palace one year, and pulling it down the next. He is surrounded by a host of sycophants of all shades, English, native, and East Indian, who prompt him to every species of extravagance by which they may hope to gain anything for themselves. The minister, Roshun-ud-Dowlah, is said to be a well-disposed man, who is fully aware of the dangers of the path now followed, and who would gladly change its course, and introduce a reform; but he wants nerve to face the storm which would be raised by those who profit by the present extravagance; so he is content to let things go on in their present train. It is lamentable to see money so wasted which might do so much good. Steam-boats, windmills, and other works are begun and partly completed, and then the fancy dies away. . . .

The English Government are mainly to blame for this state of things. How is it possible that native princes who are kept in a state of pupillage, and almost treated like school-boys, should have any self-respect or proper independence of feeling? This has been the case with Oudh, for the last forty years. Had the British Government turned their supremacy to good account, by insisting on the education of the native chiefs, so as to qualify them for the art of government, this would have been a measure entitled to the highest praise; but so far from it, the interference of the residents has been almost always exerted for evil; indeed, so extremely difficult is it to discover the slightest benefit arising to any class of people from the establishment of residents at the native courts that there is even ground for the supposition that the measure has been adopted and maintained for the express purpose of promoting misgovernment and confusion in

the different principalities, so as to afford plausible excuses and opportunity for our taking possession of them.<sup>1</sup>

May 25, 1835.

### ✓ The Annexation

*Source.*—Minute by the Court of Directors to the Governor-General in Council, dated November 21, 1835. (Parliamentary Papers.)

In considering how our obligations towards Oudh, in the present condition of that country, may best be fulfilled, we agree with the Governor-General in rejecting as ineffectual any plan of interference grounded on the provisions of existing treaties. By those treaties, the King of Oudh is bound, in general terms, to govern according to the advice of the Resident, and specially to introduce into his territory a reformed system of administration. But it is also provided that this reformed system shall be carried into effect by his own officers; and throughout the period of more than half a century, during which the treaties have existed, this one provision has frustrated all the efforts which have been made to induce the Sovereigns of Oudh to fulfil their obligations to the British Government, and to their own subjects—efforts in support of which all means have been exhausted, except actual coercion, or the announcement that our connection with the Oudh Government is dissolved.

But the violation, so flagrant an excess, by a succession of Sovereigns, through so long a period (with a few brief intermissions) of the most important conditions of the subsidiary treaty, unquestionably releases us from the obligations towards those Sovereigns which that treaty laid upon us. Having failed to govern in conformity with the repeated requisitions made under the treaty, the King of Oudh has forfeited his right to the protection which it promises, and is no longer entitled to the irresistible support of our arms in maintaining his authority over subjects towards whom he so ill fulfils the duties of a ruler.

The Governor-General accordingly proposes that your Government should notify to the King of Oudh that the Treaty of 1801, and all the other treaties between his predecessors and the British Power, are at an end; that the political relations between the two Governments have ceased to exist; that, if he wishes for their renewal, it can only be on a completely altered footing; and that, unless he shall consent to a new treaty,<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> First published anonymously in the *India Gazette*, a Calcutta daily paper, under the signature of "A Friend to India."

<sup>2</sup> The chief provisions suggested by Lord Dalhousie were:—

- (a) All former treaties be annulled.
- (b) The British Government and the king of Oudh retain sovereignty over all territories they now possess.
- (c) The civil and military administration be vested in the hands of the East India Company.
- (d) The king of Oudh receive an adequate annual stipend.

making over in perpetuity to the British Government the entire administration of his territory, he will no longer be considered as under British protection, and the Resident and his troops will be withdrawn.

The Governor-General appears to have made this proposal under the fullest conviction that the king will be so conscious of inability to carry on the Government without the support of the British power, as to accede unreservedly to whatever conditions it may be thought right to require of him. The contingency, however, of his availing himself of the alternative offered to him, must be admitted as at least a possibility; and the consequences of such an event would be so serious, that the other members of your Government unanimously deprecate his being given the choice. They do so on the ground that, by leaving the country to an anarchy still worse than that which now exists, the most terrible evils would, at least temporarily, be brought on the people of Oudh, whose benefit is the sole motive, as well as the sole justification, of the proposed measure.

If, indeed, the measure which would incur those risks were the only one by which he could fulfil the obligation which we have contracted, of securing to the people of Oudh a good government; if, without the king's consent, we were not warranted in doing more than breaking off our connection with Oudh, and had no right to attempt to procure his consent by any more direct means than the withdrawal of our protection, we should then have no option but to risk the consequences which that withdrawal might involve; for we fully concur in the unanimous opinion of your Government that to leave things as they are, or to attempt any mere palliatives would be equally objectionable.

\* \* \* \* \*

Your Government, in communication with the officiating Resident, Major-General Outram, is in a condition to judge, and perhaps to ascertain, whether the prospect of your declaring the treaties cancelled, and our connection with the Oudh Government at an end, would be so alarming to the king as to render his acceptance of the treaty proposed to be tendered him a matter of virtual certainty. Unless such be the conviction of the Governor-General, the alternative should not be offered to the king; and, in that event, without expressing any opinion on the principles laid down by the several members of Council, we are fully prepared to take the responsibility of authorising, and enjoining, the only other course by which our duties to the people of Oudh can be fulfilled, that of assuming authoritatively the powers necessary for the permanent establishment of good government throughout the country, leaving all questions of detail to the wisdom of the Governor-General, in conjunction with the other members of your Government.

It is on every account to be desired that the great measures which we have authorised should be carried into effect under the auspices of the nobleman who has so long, and with such eminent ability and success, administered the affairs of the British Empire in India—who has bestowed such attentive and earnest consideration on this particular subject—and those acts may carry a weight of authority which might, perhaps, not in the same degree attach to the first proceedings of a new administration. Entertaining full reliance on the ability and judgment of the Marquis of Dalhousie, with the suggestions of the other members of your Government before him, we abstain from fettering his Lordship's discretion by any further instructions; and feel assured that, whichever mode of attaining the indispensable result may be resolved on, the change will be carried into effect in the manner best calculated to avert collisions of any kind, and with every proper and humane consideration to all persons whose feelings have a just claim to be consulted.

It was doubly unfortunate that an act of such importance had necessarily to be carried out during the last few weeks of Lord Dalhousie's rule. It is unfair, therefore, to look upon his policy towards Oudh as a completed whole. It was similar to that of the younger Pitt towards Ireland, a mere fragment of what was intended. The necessary steps were not taken to provide for the legitimate needs of the king, the disbanded soldiers, or the landowners. And, as was the case with the Punjab a few years before, the one essential man left the province just at the very time when his services were most needed. Sir James Outram had to go away in consequence of ill-health and, a few months later, was put in command of the expedition against Persia. By a strange mischance Sir Henry Lawrence was not appointed to the vacant post in Lucknow until it was too late and many serious mistakes had been committed.

#### “Mistaken Policy after the Annexation

Source.—(i) “Private Letters of the Marquess of Dalhousie.”  
 Edited by J. G. A. Baird. p. 401. (Blackwood.)

There is no official record of my resolution to disarm Oudh, and for this very excellent reason. The province of Oudh was annexed on 7th February. On the 29th of the same month I handed over the government of India to my successor. I consider that my duty was to do everything that was necessary

for the annexation of Oudh ; to omit nothing which was requisite for the immediate organisation of its administration, for the guidance of his officers, and for the present security of its territory ; but to avoid anticipating the action of my successor, and to leave his judgment unfettered and his hands unimpeded by any orders of mine respecting the future, *which it was not indispensably necessary to issue at the moment in which I was acting.* Accordingly, a large military force was moved into Oudh, and the annexation was effected without firing a shot. It was necessary that from the first hour of annexation a form of administration should be established ; and it was established, the officers appointed, and all sent out to their posts. It was necessary that the principles on which the local administrations were to act should be laid down ; and they were laid down in full and clear detail. It was necessary that the revenue should be at once collected, and the rules for a settlement declared ; and the collection was at once commenced, and the rules in question promulgated. It was necessary that police for the preservation of order should be formed ; and it was ordered, and the officers selected. It was necessary that a local military force should support the police, and should absorb as many as possible of the king's army. The Oudh Irregular Force was formed, and every officer named before I laid down the government. I avoided no labour, evaded no responsibility, omitted no precautions, and shirked nothing which was indispensable for the moment ; but I meddled with nothing, and even made mention of nothing which belonged to the time of my successor ; and it had been decided that the disarming of Oudh should be postponed until his time, for reasons which follow. But the resolution I had taken to disarm Oudh, and the reasons for postponing the execution of it, are fully recorded in my confidential demi-official correspondence with General Outram, the Resident, and subsequently the Chief Commissioner in Oudh. My despatch to the Court of Directors regarding the occupation of Oudh was sent in June. On 12th July I addressed a long and confidential letter to General Outram respecting the measures which were to be taken, and the preparatory arrangements which were to be made in the event of the occupation being sanctioned. As secrecy and celerity were both of great importance, I sent the Military Secretary with the letter to Lucknow. My instructions assumed that the occupation would be sanctioned. The very first measure which they directed was the disarming of the population and the dismantling of the forts. These were my words : " Obviously, the great evil which should be at once grappled with, overthrown, and crushed, is the power of the great landholders, occupying, according to Colonel Sleeman, some 250 forts throughout the country, and maintaining huge bodies of armed men. An effecting this object

I would propose that three or four columns of troops should enter Oudh at different points as soon as the proclamation has been promulgated, and that each column should have a district assigned to it, within which it should do its work effectually and with all practicable speed. It is my intention that not a single fortified place be left in Oudh with the exception of those which belong to the Government. It is further my intention that the whole population should be disarmed, and that no man should be permitted to carry a weapon in Oudh except under licence and rule, as was done with such excellent effect in the Punjab in 1849." Detailed instructions on the same point follow. What I have extracted, however, will show you that from the very first my determination was made known to dismantle the forts and disarm the people of Oudh, *simultaneously with the issue of the proclamation which should make the country ours.* General Outram concurred in the propriety of the measure; but he suggested that if the Court's orders did not permit of the annexation being made until far on in the cold weather, the disarming should be delayed for a few months on the ground that, if it were commenced at once, the hot weather and the rains would be upon us before it could be completed; in which case either the operation must be interrupted, which was inexpedient, or the European troops must be subjected to great exposure, which was more inexpedient still. To these reasons for a short delay I deferred. The annexation was peaceably made, and if I had been G.-G., the disarming would have been commenced in October, 1856, and would have been completed by the end of that year. Not a sepoy would have shown a scruple. If they had, what would it have mattered if the mutinous spirit which had showed itself in May had shown itself in the preceding October, at the commencement of the cold season instead of at the commencement of the hot season, while the Government of India would at least have attempted to do its duty, and take the precautions which prudence required. If the sepoys had not scrupled, and the disarming and dismantling had been effected, in what a different position would our officers in Oudh have stood during this last summer. We should still have had to meet a mutinous sepoy army, but there would have been no armed population to rise in their support. And what a different prospect should we have had now—a helpless and prostrate province to reoccupy instead of a batch of 250 forts to reduce, defended by armed men, whose guilt as rebels will cause them to fight with the feelings of men having halts about their necks. I think this long story of mine about Oudh will have satisfied you that my intention of disarming it was very unmistakably expressed—that it would unquestionably have been carried into effect if I had continued to rule, and that those who neglected or pooch-pooched the measure have much to answer for.

*Source.*—(ii) Trotter, "British Empire in India." Vol. II., p. 96.

That all Oudh should thus have risen against her new masters was a misfortune for which neither Lord Dalhousie nor Sir Henry Lawrence can be held fairly to blame. The former, had he stayed in India, would have taken good care to fill up the place of Outram with some one fitter than a mere Bengal civilian to confront the unwonted difficulties of such a post. On the other hand, had Lawrence been sent a year earlier to Lucknow, the force of his statesmanship and the charm of his personal sway might, perhaps, have done much to reconcile the bulk of his new subjects to a rule which may have aimed at keeping the public peace, oppressing none but criminals, and meting out the same cold justice alike to lord and peasant. If any one Englishman could have forestalled the coming disaster, he was the man. As things stood, however, at the recall of Mr. Coverley Jackson, no power on earth could have prevented the final explosion for which long years of misrule and anarchy had supplied the combustibles, even if Wajid Ali's dethronement and Mr. Jackson's hard fiscal policy had together applied the torch. When Sir Henry Lawrence took up his new duties, the train was already fired. . . . It was glory enough for Sir Henry that, with one weak British regiment at his command, he staved off the worst of the coming crash, even to the end of that fatal June.

## CHAPTER V

### THE DISCONTENT OF THE SEPOY AND OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY

THE introduction of the Enfield rifle in place of the old-fashioned musket provided the spark which fired the powder and caused the actual explosion of the Mutiny. Certain of the sepoys, many of whom were high-caste Brahmins, believed that in biting the cartridges they would lose caste, and that this was part of a deliberate plan engineered by the British Government to convert them forcibly to Christianity. In regard to the actual ingredients of the grease used for the cartridges there was considerable difference of opinion, but the Superintendent of the Royal Laboratory at Woolwich gave his verdict that hogs' lard did not in any way enter its composition. Be that as it may, the sepoys thought differently, and their somewhat natural anxiety was taken advantage of by political agitators for their own purposes, and with disastrous results.

It is still a question whether the great insurrection in its early stages was merely a mutiny of the soldiers or a general revolt of the people, and how far it was a case of the soldiers terrorising the people, or the people working on the minds of an ignorant and suspicious soldiery. The majority of British officers, till the very last, were firm in their belief in the sepoys' loyalty, and could not listen even to the suggestion that their men were not all that they considered them to be. A few more discerning minds, however, for some time past, had felt considerable uneasiness in the matter. The mere fact that the Indian element in the army had increased out of all proportion to the European was in itself a cause for considerable anxiety; and the fact that the sepoys of the Bengal Army were drawn very largely from the same part



of the country, and that from the disaffected portion of Oudh, was still more serious. The European officers, moreover, in many cases were scarcely fitted for the work. A system which depended almost entirely on promotion by seniority, which entailed "the employment of brigadiers of seventy, colonels of sixty, and captains of fifty,"<sup>1</sup> which took no account of an officer's special fitness to manage men of a very different race and religion, and which gave little or no scope to men of capacity except in posts away from their regiments—and the newly-conquered territories made big demands on the services of the better military officers—was bound to end in disaster. In regard to the army itself there had also been of late years a rapid deterioration in personnel. In the early days the practice had been to recruit the native officers from among men of high social position, who had both the power and the capacity to command their fellow-countrymen. Other views had since intervened, and the native officers had become little more so than in name. The result was two-fold. The native officers themselves, who had risen from the ranks by a painfully slow process of promotion, had, as was shown during the events of the Mutiny, little or no influence over the sepoys. And, in the second place, all opportunities for real distinction being removed, recruitment had to be made from the lower strata of society, and therefore the men from the landowning classes who in the past had been the backbone of the army tended more and more to hold aloof and even join the ranks of the political malcontents.

Discipline also had suffered. The kindly control, which had not shrunk from adopting the sternest measures in times of emergency, was rapidly giving way to a vacillating policy which hovered between ill-timed leniency on the one hand and petty irritation on the other. In certain cases the demands for increased pay on the part of the sepoys were only granted after they had broken out into mutiny, a time when no concession should have been allowed. An army which feels that it can dictate to Government in matters of pay and allowances, however just and legitimate they may

<sup>1</sup> Lord Roberts' "Forty-one Years in India."

be in themselves, has gone beyond the bounds of control and, sooner or later, must give serious trouble. The sepoy was subjected also to many causes of irritation and anxiety. Whatever may have been his political predilections, he was disappointed by the policy of annexation. Conquest no longer brought him jaghirs and material rewards as in the days gone by, but only increased his unhappiness by rendering him liable to service in a distant land beyond the Sutlej, in Burma, or in Sind, and without the allowances given for service outside British territory. To him therefore success on the battle-field only brought in its train pecuniary loss and personal discomfort. The recent wars also inflamed his imagination. He saw that the British arms, both in Afghanistan and the Punjab, had not always been successful, and indeed at times had been subjected to defeat, and that at the hands of Eastern soldiers. In consequence, he argued with himself that it was by his aid that defeat had finally been turned into victory, and therefore felt the more the bitterness of his disappointment.

The sepoy, therefore, did not possess moral strength nor was he in the mood to resist temptation; and temptation was ever ready at hand in the gossip of the bazaar, the angry declamations of the vernacular press, and the leaflets scattered broadcast by discontented agitators. And there were many classes and individuals who saw that their own advantage was associated with the downfall of the Company. The British Government had made enemies of the territorial and religious aristocracy in India. The talukdars of Oudh had been treated with very considerable harshness after the departure of Sir James Outram; and there had also been a certain niggardliness in the payment of pensions to the disbanded soldiers in that province. The Brahmins also disliked the march of western progress, the "fire carriage" and the "lightning post," and the development of social reform with its queer ideas of education and family life. Indeed, they saw clearly that the days of their supremacy were fast disappearing, and that the acceptance of western habits spelt ruin for them.

And there were likewise individuals who had no reason

to view the success of British power in a friendly spirit. The most important of these, perhaps, was Dhondu Pant, the adopted son and heir of Baji Rao, the Peishwa who had been given by Sir John Malcolm a pension of not less than eight lakhs of rupees. Lord Dalhousie did not see the necessity of continuing this payment to the heir, who was only an adopted son. In this view he was supported by the Directors who stated that "the large pension which the ex-Peishwa had enjoyed during thirty-three years afforded him the means of making ample provision for his family and dependants." From that day, the Nana Sahib, as he was more commonly known, became a bitter enemy to British rule, and, aided by his wily agent, Azim-ullah-khan, found a fertile field for agitation within the province of Oudh. The ex-king of Oudh was living at Calcutta, whilst many of his old dependants were still at large in Lucknow and elsewhere. The Rani of Jhansi, again, bitterly resented the recent annexation which had been carried out in accordance with Lord Dalhousie's doctrine of lapse.

#### ✓ Dangerous State of the Bengal Army

Source.—(i) Sir C. Metcalfe, Minute written May 15, 1835.

Although Lord William Bentinck appears to despise the dangers of either foreign foes or internal insurrection in India, his Lordship admits some things which are quite sufficient to show that danger exists. He admits that we have no hold on the affections of our subjects; that our native army is taken from a disaffected population; that our European soldiery are too few to be of much avail against any extensive plan of insurrection. This is quite enough, and more than I have hitherto alluded to; for it is impossible to contemplate the possibility of disaffection in our army, without seeing at once the full force of our danger. As long as our native army is faithful, and we can pay enough of it, we can keep India by its instrumentality; but if the instrument can turn against us, where would be the British power? Echo answers, Where? It is impossible to support a sufficient army of Europeans to take the place of our native army.

The late Governor-General appears also to adopt, in some measure, the just remark of Sir John Malcolm, that "in an empire like that of India we are always in danger, and it is impossible to conjecture the form in which it may approach." This senti-

ment expresses the reality of the case in perhaps the truest manner, and I will not longer dwell on this part of the subject.

*Source.*—(ii) Sir Henry Lawrence, Article in the *Calcutta Review*, 1844. (Serampore: *Friend of India Press*.)

Our sepoys come too much from the same parts of the country—Oudh, the lower Doab, and upper Bihar. There is too much of clanship among them, and the evil should be remedied by enlisting in the Saharunpur and Delhi districts, in the hill regions, and in the Malay and Burma States. We laugh at our hill-men, but they are much the same class as form Rajah Gulab Singh's formidable Jummoos. But what inducement do we offer to any but coolies to enter into the Simur or Nusseree battalions; when we give the men only five rupees per month, proportionately pay native officers, and calling the corps local battalions, have them one day at Bhurtpur, the next at Ferozepore. Such policy is very bad; and we should rather encourage the military classes in the hills to enter all our corps. We should have, too, some companies or regiments of Malays, of Chinamen, and Burmese; and mix them up at large stations with our sepoy corps. We would go farther, and would encourage the now despised Eurasians to enter our ranks, either into sepoy corps where one or two here and there would be useful, or as detached companies or corps. We are aware that they are not considered a warlike race. We might make them so, and we doubt not, with good officers, could do so. Courage goes much by opinion; and many a man behaves as a hero or a coward, according as he considers he is expected to behave.

There is no doubt that whatever danger may threaten us in India, the greatest is from our own troops. We should, therefore, while giving no cause of discontent, while paying them well and regularly, providing for them in their old age, while opening a wide field for legitimate ambition, and rewarding, with promotion, medals, jaghirs, gallantry and devotion, abstain from indiscriminately heaping such rewards upon men undeserving of them; and we should at all times carefully avoid giving anything or doing anything, under the appearance of coercion, on the demands of the soldiery. The corps that under General Pollock misbehaved at Peshawar, should at least have been denied medals. Had they been so, possibly we should have been spared late events on the N.W. Frontier and in Sind; and we should remember that every officer is not fitted for command, much less to command soldiers of a different religion and country and that where, as has repeatedly of late years been shown, regiments were found to be going wrong through the weakness or tyranny of their commanders—it matters not whether from too much strictness or too little—full enquiry should at once be made

and remedial measures instituted. If commanders cannot manage their regiments they should be removed from them, and that quickly, before their corps are irremediably destroyed. How much better would it be to pension, and to send to England, such men as we have in command of some corps, than to allow them to remain a day at the head of a regiment to set a bad example to their men. We could, at this moment, point out more than one commander answering our description; and we would seriously call the attention of those in high places to the injury that even one such officer may commit. He may drive a thousand men into discontent, and that thousand may corrupt many thousands—and all this may be done by a man without any positive evil in him; but simply because he is not a soldier, has not the feelings of a soldier, frets the men one day, neglects them the next, and is known by all to care for nothing beyond his personal interests.

*Source.*—(iii) Letter of Lord Dalhousie to Sir George Cooper, dated January 13, 1851. "Private Letters of the Marquess of Dalhousie," edited by J. G. A. Baird. (Blackwood.)

I hope before I leave India to have effected something for the reformation of the army. The Court refuse to believe in the inferiority of the Bengal army in discipline and order; nevertheless, it is true. The Government cannot provide all the remedy. In some things it may, but the supervision of the boys when they join, the maintenance of order in a corps, the discouragement of extravagance and vice, are things which each commanding officer in his own corps alone can effect. But commanding officers are inefficient; brigadiers are no better; divisional officers are worse than either, because they are older and more done; and at the top of all they send commanders-in-chief seventy years old. How can things go on right under such a system? I do my best. I have lately recorded, in very plain terms, my opinion on the manner in which the high commands of the army are filled; and I have told the C-in-C. that whereas the practice has heretofore been to pass over no officer for brigade or division unless he is scandalously or notoriously deficient in character or capacity, I will confirm no recommendation of his Excellency for such commands unless he can tell me that the officer is *undeniably competent* for the efficient and active discharge of his duties. The Court will be frightened I dare say. I am sick of the Court, and care little when we part company.

• *Source.*—(iv) Lord Roberts, "Forty-one Years in India." Vol. I., pp. 436-7. (Macmillan.)

That the long existing discontent and disloyalty in our native army might have been discovered sooner, and grappled

with in a sufficiently prompt and determined manner to put a stop to the Mutiny, had the senior regimental and staff officers been younger, more energetic and intelligent, is an opinion to which I have always been strongly inclined. Their excessive age, due to a strict system of promotion by seniority which entailed the employment of brigadiers of seventy, colonels of sixty and captains of fifty, must necessarily have prevented them performing their military duties with the energy and activity which are more the attributes of younger men, and must have destroyed any enthusiasm about their regiments, in which there was so little hope of advancement or of individual merit being recognised. Officers who displayed any remarkable ability were allowed to be taken away from their own corps for the more attractive and better-paid appointments appertaining to civil employ or the irregular service. It was, therefore, the object of every ambitious and capable young officer to secure one of these appointments, and escape as soon as possible from a service in which ability and professional zeal counted for nothing.

It is curious to note how nearly every military officer who held a command or a high position on the staff in Bengal when the Mutiny broke out, disappeared from the scene within the first few weeks, and was never heard of officially again. Some were killed, some died of disease, but the great majority failed completely to fulfil the duties of the positions they held, and were consequently considered unfit for further employment. Two generals of divisions were removed from their commands, seven brigadiers were found wanting in the hour of need, and out of seventy-three regiments of regular cavalry and infantry which mutined, only four commanding officers were given other commands, younger officers being selected to raise and command the new regiments.

### Causes of the Mutiny

*Source.*—(i) Letter from Sir Henry Lawrence to Lord Canning, Dated May, 1857. "Life of Henry Lawrence," Edwardes and Merivale. pp. 569-70. (Smith, Elder.)

I have received many letters on the state of the army. Most of them attribute the present bad feeling *not* to the cartridge, or any other specific question, but to a pretty general dissatisfaction at many recent acts of Government which have been skillfully played upon by incendiaries. This is my own opinion. The sepoy is not the man of consequence he was. He dislikes annexations, among other reasons, because each new province added to the empire widens his sphere of service, and at the same time decreases *our* foreign enemies, and thereby the sepoy's importance. Ten years ago a sepoy in the Punjab asked an

officer what he would do without them ; another said : " Now you have got the Punjab, you will reduce the army." A third remarked when he heard that Sind was to be joined to Bengal : " Perhaps there will be an order to join London to Bengal." The other day an Oudh sepoy of the Bombay cavalry at Neemuch, being asked if he liked annexation, replied : " No ; I used to be a great man when I went home ; the best in my village rose as I approached ; now the lowest puff their pipes in my face." The General Service Enlistment Oath is most distasteful, keeps many out of the service, and frightens old sepoys, who imagine that the oaths of the young recruits affect the whole regiment. One of the best captains in the 13th Native Infantry (at this place) said to me last week, he had clearly ascertained this fact. Mr. E. A. Reade, of the Sudder Board, who was for years Collector of Gorrackpur, had " the General Service order " given to him as a reason last year, when on his tour, by many Rajputs, for not entering the service. " The salt water," he told me, was the universal answer. The new post-office rules are bitter grievances ; indeed, the native community generally suffer by them, but the sepoy, having here special privileges, feels the deprivation in addition to the general uncertainty as to letters ; nay, rather the positive certainty of not getting them. There are many other points which might with great advantage be redressed, which, if your lordship will permit me, I will submit with extracts of some of the letters I have received from old regimental officers. In the words of one of them : " If the sepoy is not speedily redressed, he will redress himself." I would rather say, unless some openings to rewards are offered to the military, as have been to the native civil servants, and unless certain matters are righted, we shall perpetually be subjected to our present condition of affairs. ' The sepoy feels that we cannot do without him, and yet the highest reward a sepoy can obtain, at fifty, sixty and seventy years of age, is about one hundred pounds a year, without a prospect of a brighter career for his son. Surely this is not the inducement to offer to a foreign soldier for special fidelity and long service.

Source.—(ii) Minute by Sir John Lawrence, dated April 19, 1858. (Punjab Government Records.)

It is my decided impression that the Mutiny had its origin in the army itself, and was simply taken advantage of by disaffected persons in the country to compass their own ends. It is, moreover, my belief that the cartridge question was the immediate cause of mutiny. I have examined many hundreds of letters from native soldiers and civilians, and have conversed with natives of all classes on the subject, and am satisfied that

the general, I might almost add that the universal, opinion in this part of India is such as I have above stated.

Little doubt can exist that these and similar stories were concocted by individuals who had ulterior designs. It is also true that many of the letters of Muhammadans breathed a fierce spirit of fanaticism and ferocity against the English rulers of Hindustan. But unless an ill-feeling had existed in the native army generally the attempts of such people would have proved utterly powerless. My own impression indeed is that the first excitement, the first feelings of disaffection began among the Hindu soldiery, among the high caste men, the Brahmins and Hindus of the Line Regiments, whether cavalry or infantry, and that it subsequently spread among the Muhammadans of those regiments. When once mutiny was in the hearts and minds of the Hindus, it is probable that the feeling was fanned and inflamed by the Muhammadans. That which was in the first instance a mere desire to resist an infringement of their religion speedily extended into a great political movement.

The well-known Munshi Mohan Lal stated that some of the troopers of the 3rd Cavalry told him that when they broke out at Meerut they had scarcely left the cantonment when they held a council of war as to the course they should pursue. The general voice at first was for seeking refuge in Rohilkund. But one of them pointed out that Delhi was their proper point ; that there were the magazines and treasury, strong fortifications, a large city population, the King, and last but not least no European soldiers. This account was corroborated by extensive and minute inquiries made after the fall of Delhi by Brigadier-General Chamberlain. Again, we know from Mr. Ford, the Magistrate of Gurgaon, the district which adjoins Delhi, that a large party of these troopers actually fled through Delhi into the Gurgaon district the very next day after their arrival. Mr. Ford actually seized ten of them and about twenty of the Government horses of the party.

It is very possible, indeed probable, that the native soldiers of the regiments of infantry at Delhi were so far in the scheme that they had engaged to stand by their comrades at Meerut. Such, indeed, was the case all over the Bengal Presidency. The men consisted of a common brotherhood, with feelings, prejudices, hopes in common, and whether they had actually engaged to stand by each other or not, all well knew that as a body such would prove the case.

My own impression is also that in the first instance the Hindustani Irregular Cavalry did not join in the combination. The majority of the men are not connected with the regular army. They came for the most part from a different part of Hindustan, viz., from the districts within a circle of, perhaps,



a hundred miles of Delhi. Except in the common bond of Muhammadanism these irregular troopers have little in common with the line regiments. In all the letters which I examined at the outset of the disturbances I recollect nothing which implicated the irregular cavalry. The misconduct of the 10th at Nowshera is the only exception, and it is doubtless a grave one.

On the other hand, no sooner had the mutineers seized Delhi and raised the bad characters of the city, and by their aid destroyed all the Christians, seized the magazines and treasure and made themselves masters of the fortified city, the case was altogether changed. The King's sons, his troops and his courtiers all joined in the cause, and eventually the King himself consented to head the movement. If there was, indeed, a conspiracy in the country, and that conspiracy extended to the army, how can it reasonably be explained why none of those who adhered to our cause were acquainted with the circumstance? However small may be the number of our adherents when compared with those that took part against us, the actual number of the former is considerable. Many of these men remained true under all trials; others again died fighting on our side. None of these people can speak of a conspiracy in the first instance; none again of the conspirators who expiated their guilt by the forfeit of their lives ever made any such confession that I am aware of, though such confession would doubtless have saved their lives. None of the documents or papers which I have seen lead to such an impression.

The Judge Advocate-General lays much stress on the alleged overtures to Persia, and we have reason to know that intrigues between the two Courts of Persia and Delhi did take place during the Persian War. But had the Shah really intended to give the ex-King any aid, had he even believed that a violent attempt would be made to subvert the power of England in India, is it reasonable to suppose that the Shah would have made peace and freed our troops locked up in that country? Again, had the Shah really been cognizant of such an attempt, would he not have sent his emissaries to Peshawar and into the Punjab? Had he done so, we should certainly have seen some marks of his intrigues. But such was not the case. The loss of Delhi and the insurrection of the King and the Muhammadan population showed the Muhammadans in Hindustan that the time had arrived when they might again strike for empire with the prospect of success. Our power was paralysed. Our means were small, and those means were not so placed as to be easily brought to bear against the insurgents. The European force at Meerut did nothing. No attempt was made even to secure the public treasure at out-stations. The temptation to plunder these treasuries was too great for the virtue of our best disposed native

troops. I cannot myself understand how any man acquainted with India can fail to see that the mutiny and insurrection unless trampled out in the blood of the soldiers who first revolted must spread like wildfire. In the present case, we know that not only no punishment followed, but that great wealth was acquired by each corps as it mutinied.

Had there been a general conspiracy in the country, or even in the army as unconnected with the cartridge question, how is it that the people or soldiers did not rise simultaneously in insurrection? I am told that the time fixed for it was anticipated by the Meerut outbreak. But if such was the case, how came it then that the news of that outbreak was not followed by immediate insurrection? No preparation was necessary. But nothing of the kind occurred. It was only when the native troops saw how powerless we were that they resolved to convert what was a mere combination against what they fancied to be a gross oppression into a struggle for empire.

I have said that I believe that the army had become ill-affected. I think that such was really the case. But it was a sense of their strength and our weakness, combined with the great temptations which our system placed before them that encouraged them to revolt. As regiment after regiment fell away, the difficulties of resisting the contagion increased. I have every inducement to speak well of the Punjab troops. It would be difficult in my opinion to speak too highly of their services during the present war. They resisted great temptations and underwent severe trials. Nevertheless there was a time when it was a question what course they would adopt, and I fully believe that had not Delhi fallen soon after it actually did, their fidelity could scarcely have been proof against the example around them. I myself could not help foreseeing that a day, might come when none but the English soldiers would have remained on our side. That such a day did not arrive is alone due in my mind to the infinite mercy of the Almighty.

While we neglected the commonest rules of military prudence we did some things in Oudh which had the effect of irritating the influential classes, while our tenure was too short to strengthen effectually the hands of those for whom we worked. When then the influential classes found out that the native army were discontented and ripe for revolt, they fanned the flame; and when the crisis arrived, they also rose, and added insurrection to the mutiny. Could we have marched reliable troops instantly into Oudh in sufficient numbers, we should even then have experienced little difficulty in beating down opposition. This we could not do, and months elapsed during which the power of our enemies consolidated; and those most friendly to our rule from sheer

necessity were driven to join against us. The misfortunes and calamities which we experienced in Kabul were renewed and aggravated in Hindustan. That the issue was not equally disastrous has risen from the circumstance that the country was neither so strong, nor the people so formidable, nor our resources so distant. Above all because the Almighty Disposer of Events, though apparently determined to humble, had not resolved to destroy us. (Many thoughtful and experienced men now in India believe that it has only been by a series of miracles that we have been saved from utter ruin. It is no exaggeration to affirm that in many instances the mutineers seemed to act as if a curse rested on their cause; (Had a single leader of ability arisen among them, nay, had they followed any other course than that they did pursue in many instances, we must have been lost beyond redemption. But this was not to be. It was a struggle of civilisation against barbarism, of Christianity against Heathenism. In no other way can we account for our escape.)

*Source.*—(iv) Montgomery Martin, "The Indian Empire." Vol. II., pp. 1-3. (The London Printing and Publishing Co.)

Never perhaps was the condition of British India deemed more fair and promising than at the conclusion of 1856. The new Governor-General, Lord Canning, who arrived in the spring of that year, had seen no reason to question the parting declaration of his predecessor, Lord Dalhousie, that India was "in peace without and within," and that there appeared "no quarter from which formidable war could reasonably be expected at present."

\* \* \* \* \*

Our heaviest calamities and our greatest advantages have come on us by surprise; we have been met by foulest treachery in the very class we deemed bound to us by every tie of gratitude and self-interest, and we have found help and fidelity among those whom we most distrusted. We have failed where we confidently looked for triumph; we have succeeded where we anticipated failure. Dangers we never dreamed of have risen suddenly to paralyse our arms; and obstacles which seemed well-nigh insurmountable have vanished into thin air before us. Our trusted weapons have proved worthless, or worse—been turned against us; and, at the outset of the struggle, we were like men whose pistols had been stolen from their holsters and swords from their scabbards, while they lay sleeping; and who, starting up amazed and bewildered, seized the first missiles that came to hand to defend themselves against a foe whose numbers and power, whose objects and character, were alike involved in midnight darkness.

Very marvellous was the presence of mind, the self-reliance,

the enduring courage displayed by English men and women, and many native adherents, in their terrible and unlooked-for trial; and very comforting the instances of Christian heroism which adorn this sad and thrilling page of Anglo-Indian history; yet none will venture to deny that it was the absence of efficient leaders on the part of the mutineers and not our energy and foresight, which, under Providence, was the means of enabling us to surmount the first overwhelming tide of disaster. Nothing can be more contradictory than the opinions held by public men regarding the immediate object of the mutineers. Some deny that the sepoys acted on any "pre-arranged plan," and declare that "their primary and prevailing motive was a panic-terror for their religion." Others regard the revolt as the issue of a systematic plot which must have taken months, if not years, to organise, and compare the outbreak to the springing of a mine, for which the ground must have been hollowed, the barrels filled, the train laid, and the match fired, before the explosion. A third party assert that our own impolicy had gathered together masses of combustibles, and that our heedlessness (in the matter of greased cartridges) set them on fire.

It is quite certain that the people of India labour under many political and social evils, resulting from inefficient administration. Human governments are, at best, fallible and weak instruments. In Christian England, after so many centuries of freedom, kept and strengthened by unceasing effort, we all acknowledge how far the condition of the masses falls short, in reality, of what in theory we might have hoped for. How, then, can we doubt that there must be in India much greater scope for oppression, much greater need for watchfulness? We have seen in Ireland a notable example of the effects of absentee proprietorship; but here is a case of absentee sovereignty, in which the whole agency is systematically vested in the foreign delegates of foreign power, few of whom have ever acquired any satisfactory insight into the habits, customs, or languages of people they were sent to govern.

It is easier to account for the errors committed by the Company than for the culpable neglect of Parliament. We know that an Indian question continued to be the "dinner bell" of the House of Commons, notwithstanding the revelation of the Torture Committee at Madras, until the massacre of Meerut and Cawnpur showed that the government of India was a subject which affected not only the welfare of the millions from whom we exacted tribute, but also the lives of Englishmen and the honour of the Englishwomen—the friends or relatives, it might be, of the heretofore ignorant and listless legislators.

A right understanding of the causes of revolt would materially assist all engaged in framing measures for the restoration of

tranquillity and for a sounder system of administration. The following enumeration of the various causes, distant and proximate, which are asserted by different authorities to have been concerned in bringing about the present state of affairs, is therefore offered, with a view of enabling the reader to judge, in the course of the narrative, how far events have tended to confirm or nullify these allegations.

Alleged causes of discontent:—

1. Oppressive and pauperising tenure of land.
2. Inefficient administration of justice.
3. Exclusion of natives from all share in the government.
4. Ignorance of languages and aversion evinced towards the natives.
5. Education, religion and missionary operations.
6. Caste.
7. Free Press.
8. Defective currency.
9. Opium monopoly.
10. Neglect of public works.
11. Repression of British enterprise.
12. Recent annexations.
13. Infraction of the Hindu law of inheritance.
14. Extinction of Native States—Satara, Nagpur, Carnatic, Jhansi, Tanjore, Oudh.
15. State of the Bengal Army; relaxed discipline; removal of regimental officers to staff and civil employments; paucity of European troops; sepoy grievances; greased cartridges.
16. Mahomedan conspiracy.
17. Foreign intrigues, Persian and Russian.

For months past there had been rumblings of the impending storm. Fires were taking place in cantonments all over northern India; vague prophecies foretelling the downfall of British power after the completion of a hundred years' supremacy were retold; a proclamation speaking of a restored Muhammadan Empire was found on the walls of the Jumma Masjid at Delhi; and chapátis<sup>1</sup> were being carried from village to village,<sup>2</sup> for reasons unknown to any Englishman. With the authorities there was a general

<sup>1</sup> Flat cakes made of flour and water.

<sup>2</sup> "There is an odd, mysterious thing going on. In one part of the country the native police have been making little cakes and sending them on from place to place. Each man makes twelve, keeps two, and sends away ten to ten men, who make twelve more each, and they spread all over the country. They all think it is an order from Government, and no one can discover any meaning in it."—Extract from a letter written by Lady Canning.

feeling of uneasiness ; with the sepoy a strange moodiness alternating with uncontrollable excitement. At Barrackpore<sup>1</sup> General Hearsey reasoned with the troops and explained the nature of the new cartridges ; at Berhampore<sup>2</sup> Colonel Mitchell behaved less discreetly and also with some weakness. Late in March, the notorious Mungal Pandey became the cause of the first shedding of blood and, in consequence, was hanged. The 19th and 34th Native Infantry Regiments were disbanded, and for a brief season there was quiet.

#### Disaffection at Barrackpore

*Source.*—Letter written by General Hearsey to Colonel Birch, Secretary to the Government of India in the Army Department, dated February 11, 1857. (Selections from State Papers.)

We have at Barrackpore been dwelling upon a mine ready for explosion. I have been watching the feelings of the sepoy for some time ; their minds have been misled by some designing scoundrels who have managed to make them believe *that their religious prejudices, their caste, is to be interfered with by Government, "that they are to be forced to turn Christians."*

I was told that a circumstance occurred at Dum Dum, where the school of practice for the Enfield rifle is assembled, which I may say gave credence amongst them to this supposition.

A sepoy from one of the regiments here was walking to his *chowka* to prepare his food, with his *lota* full of water. He was met by a low-caste *Khalasi*, who asked him to let him drink from his *lota*. The sepoy, a Brahmin, refused, saying : " I have scoured my *lota* ; you will defile it by your touch." The *Khalasi* rejoined, " You think much of your caste, but wait a little, the *Sahib-log* will make you bite cartridges soaked in *cow* and *pork* fat, and then where will your caste be ? " The sepoy made this speech known amongst his comrades at Dum Dum ; the report was not long in travelling to this station ; the men brooded over it for some time at Dum Dum, and though it seems to have been known to the officer there, it was treated as a silly and foolish notion, until Major Boutein perceived it had taken hold of their minds as a fact, and reported it to me. I lost no time in writing to Calcutta, making known what had occurred, and suggesting a small allowance might be granted to the officer at Dum Dum to purchase wax and *ghee* or cocoanut oil

<sup>1</sup> A military station sixteen miles from Calcutta.

<sup>2</sup> A military station near Moorshedabad, the old capital of the Nawabs of Bengal.

by the hands of one of the high-caste men, and direct *him* to grease the bitten portion of the cartridge before the men when they were served out for practice.

This I had every reason to believe would practically convince the men of the fallacy of the *Khalasi's* speech, and that every care would be taken that their caste would not be interfered with. It seems to have had all the effect desired at the school of practice at Dum Dum, and as no cartridges were to be served out or practice was to take place here, I could not dream that it would become a cause of trouble or disaffection at this place.

I had the whole brigade paraded on Monday afternoon, and myself energetically and explicitly explained in a loud voice to the whole of the men the folly of the idea that possessed them that the Government or that their officers wished to interfere with their caste or religious prejudices; and impressed upon them the absurdity of their for one moment believing that they were *to be forced* to become Christians. I told them the English were Christians of "*The Book*," that we admitted no proselytes but those who being adults could read and fully understand the precepts laid down therein; that if they came and threw themselves down at our feet imploring to be made "*The Book*" Christians it could not be done; they could not be baptised until they had been examined in the tenets of "*The Book*," and proved themselves fully conversant in them, and then they must of their own good-will and accord desire to become Christians of "*The Book*," ere they could be made so. I asked them if they perfectly understood what I said, especially the 2nd Regiment Native (Grenadier) Infantry; they nodded assent. I then dismissed the brigade.

I have since heard from the officers commanding regiments that the native officers and men appeared quite "*khoosh*,"<sup>1</sup> and seemed to be relieved from a heaviness of mind that had possessed them. I cannot but with great caution put any man into confinement, unless I can get full proof of his being one of or a leader at a mutinous meeting, and this is yet wanting.

May I state my opinion in regard to the policy of having five or six regiments of native infantry assembled in brigade here, without any European corps of infantry or artillery or cavalry as a *point d'appui*, in case of a mutiny occurring? You will perceive in all this business the native officers were of no use. In fact, *they are afraid of their men*, and dare not act. All they do is to hold themselves aloof, and expect by doing so they will escape censure, as not *actively* implicated. This has always occurred on such occasions, and will continue to the end of our sovereignty in India. Well might Sir Charles Metcalfe say,

<sup>1</sup> Pleased.

“ that he expected to awake some fine morning and find India had been lost to the English Crown.”

### Mungal Pandey

*Source.*—(i) Evidence of Sheik Pultoo, Havildar (late sepoy), 34th Native Regiment. (Parliamentary Papers relating to the Mutinies in the East Indies.)

The sepoy, Mungal Pandey, about 4 o'clock p.m., was straggling backwards and forwards in front of the quarter-guard, armed with a musket and sword; he had on his red jacket and regimental cap, endeavouring to excite the men of the regiment to mutiny, saying that the guns and the Europeans had arrived for the purpose of slaughtering them; some one told the Serjeant-Major of this, and he came towards the quarter-guard, asking the Jemadar of that guard where Mungal Pandey was, and why he did not confine him. Mungal Pandey then fired at the Serjeant-Major, but missed him; he reloaded; the Serjeant-Major, being alarmed, ran into the quarter-guard, and asked the Jemadar why he did not arrest Mungal Pandey, who had reloaded his musket, and told him to send and let the Adjutant know what had occurred on the parade-ground. Shortly after this, the Adjutant, on horseback, arrived at the quarter-guard, and asked the Jemadar where the sepoy with the loaded musket was, and why he had not secured him; the Jemadar did not tell him where he was, but I pointed him out. Mungal Pandey was then standing a little way in front of the quarter-guard. Just as I spoke, Mungal Pandey fired at the Adjutant, and wounded his horse, so that he fell; I assisted the Adjutant to get clear of his horse. The Adjutant then pulled out a pistol from his holster, and said, “That man will kill me, he is loading again.” I said, “You will not be allowed to be killed, for I am with you.” The Adjutant then, with his pistol in his hand, rushed towards Mungal Pandey who, on seeing this, did not finish loading his musket, and commenced retreating. The Serjeant-Major and I followed the Adjutant as quick as we could. The Adjutant, when within twenty paces, fired at Mungal Pandey, but missed him; when the Adjutant reached him, Mungal Pandey drew his sword and wounded him severely. By this time the Serjeant-Major came up; he also was wounded severely. I then came up, and stretched out my hand to stop Mungal Pandey, who was following the Adjutant, and said to him, “Take care, do not strike the Adjutant.” He aimed a blow at the Adjutant’s back, which I received on my right hand; I then seized him round the waist with my left arm; the Adjutant and Serjeant-Major then got away. I then called out to the quarter-guard to come and take Mungal Pandey a prisoner, and told the Jemadar



of the 1st Company, who commanded the guard, to send four men and take him ; that I had hold of him, and would not allow him to hurt any one ; they did not come, but abused me, as also did the Jemadar, and said that if I did not let Mungal Pandy go, they would shoot me. Being wounded, I was obliged to let him go. While I was holding Mungal Pandy, several men of the quarter-guard followed the Adjutant and the quarter-guard, beating them with the butt end of their muskets ; at this time a shot was fired from the direction of the quarter-guard, but I cannot say by whom.<sup>1</sup>

*Source.*—(ii) Letter written by General Hearsey, dated April 9, 1857. (Parliamentary Papers.)

I then rode immediately to the quarter-guard of the 34th Native Infantry, and saw the Jemadar and about ten or twelve men had turned out, and were standing before the quarter-guard house. My two sons and Major Ross accompanied me. I heard an officer shout out to me, "His musket is loaded." I replied, "Damn his musket."

I ordered the Jemadar and his guard to follow me ; the Jemadar said, as I then understood, "The men are loaded" ; but I have since been told his answer was, "He is loaded" (meaning the mutineer), and again shaking my revolver and pointing it partly at him, sharply repeated the order. The Jemadar looked askance at me, and replied, "The men of the guard are putting caps on the nipples." I said in a commanding and peremptory voice, "Be quick and follow me, and front in front towards the mutineer" ; the guard followed my aide-de-camp on horseback, close to the Jemadar, armed with his revolver, my other son also close to the native officer similarly armed, Major Ross in rear of myself ; as we approached the mutineer we quickened our pace. My son, Captain Hearsey, called to me, "Father, he is taking aim at you ; look out sharp." I replied, "If I fall, John, rush upon him and put him to death." Immediately after the mutineer, Mungal Pandy, fired his musket ; the whistle of the bullet was heard by the guard, for all but three men of it bent down, apparently to avoid being struck by it. It appeared that the mutineer had suddenly altered his mind. I suppose, seeing there was no chance of escape, for a body of officers had either joined or were coming up armed and close to the left rear of the guard, he turned his musket muzzle towards his own breast, hurriedly touching his trigger with his toe. The muzzle

<sup>1</sup> The Court were of opinion that Sheikh Pultoo displayed most conspicuous gallantry, by which act the lives of the Adjutant and Sergeant-Major were saved. The Court therefore recommended him for the third class Order of Merit.

must have swerved, for the bullet made a deep graze, ripping up the muscles of the chest, shoulder and neck, and he fell prostrate. We were on him at once, the guard calling out, "He has shot himself"; a Sikh sepoy of the guard took his bloody tulwar (sword) from under him, for in falling he partly covered the sword with his body. His regimental jacket and clothes were on fire and smoking. I bid the Jemadar and sepoy to put the fire out, which they did; and then, thinking the mutineer was dying, for he was shivering and convulsed, directed Brigadier Grant to form a court of inquest from the officers assembled there. Dr. Hutchinson being present, it was soon ascertained that the wound, though severe, was superficial, and the man was conveyed to hospital for medical treatment. He was handcuffed and a guard placed over him. Before I quitted to go to my quarters, I rode amongst the sepoy and reassured them that no person should be permitted to interfere with their religious or caste prejudices whilst I commanded them. I then went, accompanied by Major Ross and my two sons, among the crowd of sepoy of the 34th Regiment Native Infantry (the regiment of Mungal Pandey), and also reassured them, telling them they had not done their duty in allowing their fellow-soldier to behave in the murderous way he had done. They answered in one voice, "He is mad; he has taken bhang<sup>1</sup> to excess." I replied, "Could you not have secured him, and if he had resisted have shot him or unarmed him? Would you not have done so to a mad elephant or to a mad dog, and what difference was there in the dangerous madness of a man, and the same in an elephant or a dog?" They said he had loaded his musket. "What!" I replied, "Are you afraid of a loaded musket?" They were silent. I bid them go quietly to their lines, and they did so, immediately obeying my orders.

The actual outbreak of mutiny took place at Meerut, where a policy of unnecessary irritation was combined with a complete lack of decision. Eighty-five men of the 3rd Light Cavalry having refused to receive the new cartridges, were put in irons in the presence of the rest of the regiment and sent to gaol. The next day, being Sunday, their colleagues, using the opportunity of their European officers being at church, broke out into open mutiny, rescued the prisoners, and murdered their officers. They then fled along the road to Delhi and, by an almost unpardonable act of indecision on the part of the General commanding the station, were not pursued by the European troops.

<sup>1</sup> An intoxicating drug.

The mutineers arrived at Delhi the next morning. They rushed into the Palace, and forced their allegiance upon Bahadur Shah, the old king of Delhi. The town was looted, the European officers and inhabitants, with the exception of those few who escaped, were killed, and the native regiments first wavered and then went over to the side of the mutinous sepoys. The Europeans made what defence they could and then, when all chance of resistance failed, blew up the magazine. Thus, within the space of a few brief hours "the mutiny of a few sepoy regiments had developed into a great political convulsion."

### (i) Outbreak at Meerut

*Source.*—G. W. Forrest, "History of the Indian Mutiny," Vol. I., pp. 33-38. (Wm. Blackwood & Sons.)

On the morning of the 9th May, 1857, a parade was held of all the forces at Meerut, and the finding and sentence of the Court read to the men. The eighty-five troopers<sup>1</sup> were then stripped of their uniform, and for more than an hour the troops stood motionless, their nerves at the highest tension, while the fetters were slowly hammered on the ankles of their guilty comrades by the artillery smith. As each culprit was marched forward he loudly called on his comrades to rescue him. No response came from the ranks. When the ceremony was finished, the prisoners were marched down the line, and sent direct to the jail. The parade was dissolved, and General Hewitt reported to Army Headquarters that "the majority of the prisoners seemed to feel acutely the degradation to which their folly and insubordination had brought them. The remainder of the native troops are behaving steady and soldier-like."

But whatever we may think of the folly of the unfortunate men, it is difficult to exaggerate the folly of the course pursued at Meerut, which irritated without subduing, and forfeited loyalty, while it failed to terrify. . . . The Governor-General was emphatic in his disapproval. He wrote: "The riveting of the men's fetters on parade, occupying, as it did, several hours, in the presence of many who were already ill-disposed, and many who believed in the cartridge fable must have stung the brigade to the quick. The consigning the eighty-five prisoners after such a ceremony to the jail with no other than a native guard over them was, considering the nature of the offence and the known

<sup>1</sup> These men had refused to use the greased cartridges when ordered to do so.

temper of a part of the army, a folly that is inconceivable." No act of folly could have led to results more fatal. The native troopers, maddened by the spectacle, at once prepared for a revolt from the English rule, and in order to recover their comrades, resolved to dare the worst extremity.

The opportunity was well chosen. The next day, May the 10th, being Sunday, while the European residents of Meerut were driving to church in the evening, they were startled at hearing the sound of musketry, and seeing columns of smoke rising to the sky. That sound marked the opening of the Indian Mutiny. The native troops had revolted, and were murdering their officers and burning their homesteads.

When the men of the 3rd Cavalry heard the tolling of the bells they knew that the European soldiers would soon be at church unarmed,<sup>1</sup> and they thought a favourable moment had come for carrying out their plans. Waving their sabres over their heads, they galloped to the prison, broke into the cells and quickly set their comrades at liberty. Meanwhile the infantry regiments showed symptoms of mutiny, and the officers, rushing to their respective lines, tried to allay the excitement, but in vain. Colonel Finnis, a fine soldier, beloved by officers and men, whilst imploring his own regiment, the 11th, to be faithful, fell riddled by a volley of the 20th Native Infantry. Then half mad with excitement, and aided by the scum of the city, the sepoys began the work of pillage and murder. Soon, however, the cry was raised, "Quick, brother, quick! Delhi, Delhi!" and the mutineers fled along the road to the Moghul capital, expecting every moment that the white soldiers would pursue and overwhelm them.

At Meerut there were more European troops than had won many a decisive battle on the plains of Hindustan, but there was no leader equal to the emergency; and those were fatal flaws in our military administration. The rifles could not without delay be supplied with ammunition. A considerable number of the Carabineers could not ride, and there were no horses for them if they could. Those who were fit for action were put through a long process of roll-call, whilst the last precious hours of daylight were passing away. It was dark when the English troops reached the native lines, and they found them deserted. A few shots were fired at stragglers, and the European brigade bivouacked for the night. . . . The whole brigade need not have pursued the fugitives, and eight hundred English infantry, a regiment of English cavalry, and a large body of European artillery were not all needed to defend a cantonment against the possible attack of

<sup>1</sup> Most fortunately, owing to the increased heat, church parade took place that evening half an hour later than usual.

a riotous rabble. Far fewer white men held the Residency at Lucknow against disciplined troops for many months. If a squadron of Carabineers and two hundred rifles had pursued the mutineers and reached Delhi a few hours after them, the Imperial City might have been saved. With a regiment of British dragoons and a few galloper guns, Gillespie, half a century before, had crushed the mutiny at Vellore, and saved the Southern Peninsula from universal revolt and rebellion.

### Final Messages from Delhi

*Source.*—(i) From the Brigadier commanding at Delhi. May 11, 1857. 4 p.m. (Parliamentary Papers.)

Cantonment in a state of siege. Mutineers from Meerut, 3rd Light Cavalry, numbers not known, said to be 150 men, cut off communication with Meerut, taken possession of the bridge of boats: 54th Native Infantry sent against them, but would not act. Several officers killed and wounded. City in a state of considerable excitement. Troops sent down, but nothing certain yet. Information will be forwarded.

*Source.*—(ii) From the Telegraph Clerks, Delhi. (Parliamentary Papers.)

To-day—Mr. C. Todd is dead, I think. He went out this morning and has not returned yet. We heard that nine Europeans were killed. Good-bye.

We must leave office. All the bungalows are burning down by the sepoy from Meerut. They came in this morning—we are off—don't—

## CHAPTER VI

### ✓ THE DARK DAYS OF THE MUTINY

THE news from Delhi showed unmistakably the seriousness of the situation. For a while, everything hung in the balance. In Oudh, which was the chief danger spot, Sir Henry Lawrence had been watching the gathering of the storm. On receipt of the bad news, he realised that not merely Lucknow and the province of Oudh, but the whole British Empire in India were at stake. Prudence, firmness, and sympathy were the leading characteristics of his policy. He showed prudence in his determination to fortify the Residency and prepare for a long siege, firmness by appearing the same as usual and thus allaying panic, and sympathy by placing confidence, wherever and whenever possible, in the loyalty of the sepoy committed to his charge. It was on the evening of May 30 that the first overt act of rebellion occurred, which Lawrence referred to as an *émeute*. The danger was removed for a time, but day by day the news from outside became worse. In the early part of June, mutiny broke out at Sitapur, Benares, Fyzabad and Sultanpore, in addition to other stations; and at Cawnpore, where the garrison was under the orders of Sir Hugh Wheeler, the mutineers received the active assistance of the Nana Sahib of Bithoor. On July 1, the famous defence of the Residency at Lucknow began, and a few days later the gallant leader died from the effects of a wound.

#### iii Lucknow before the Outbreak

*Sources.*—Communications from and to Lucknow before the actual outbreak of Mutiny there. (Parliamentary Papers.)

(a) From the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of Oudh to the Secretary to the Government of India, dated May 4, 1857.

I am directed to report, for the information of the Governor-General in Council, that on the second instant the 7th Oudh

Regiment, stationed seven miles from the Lucknow Cantonment, refused to bite the cartridges when ordered by its own officers, and again by the Brigadier. It was ordered to parade on the 4th. On the 3rd several symptoms of disaffection appeared. At 4 p.m. the Brigadier reported it in a very mutinous state. Instantly a field battery, a wing of Her Majesty's 32nd, one of the 48th and 71st Native Infantry and of the 7th Cavalry, the 2nd Oudh Cavalry and 4th Oudh Infantry, marched against it. The regiment was found perfectly quiet; formed line from column at the order, and expressed contrition. But when the men saw guns drawn up against them, half their body broke and fled, throwing down their arms. The Cavalry pursued and brought up some of them. The arms were collected and brought away, and the Regulars were withdrawn. The disarmed 7th were directed to return to their lines, and recall the runaways. They were informed by Sir Henry Lawrence that Government would be asked to disband the corps; but that those found guiltless might be re-enlisted. The corps had, before the arrival of the troops, given up two prisoners to Captain Bertram and Lieutenant Hardinge, and had offered to give up forty more. During the day a treasonable letter had been brought by a subadar of the 48th Native Infantry to the authorities from these two prisoners and others of the 7th, instigating the 48th to mutiny. All the corps displayed the best spirit, and in three hours the troops from three quarters were concentrated opposite the mutineers. During the night everything was perfectly quiet in the city, through part of which the troops marched. They returned at 1 a.m. on the 4th.

(b) Chief Commissioner to Major Bouverie, dated May 12, 1857.

Fifty-seven of the 7th Regiment, including two subadars and one jemadar, are prisoners. The Court of Inquiry is over; not much elicited. I will not disband.

(c) Sir Henry Lawrence to G. F. Edmonstone, Esq., dated May 19.

All very well in city, cantonment and country.

(d) Sir H. Lawrence to G. F. Edmonstone, Esq., dated May 21.

All very well at Lucknow and in the districts; our position now is very strong. In case of necessity no fears are entertained.

(e) Sir H. Lawrence to G. F. Edmonstone, Esq., dated May 21.

I have assumed military command. All quiet; but several reports of intended attack on us. Fifty Europeans sent this morning in dawk carriages and two squadrons of Irregular Cavalry to Cawnpore will arrive to-night.

(f) Sir H. Lawrence to the Governor-General in Council, dated May 23.

Our magazine stores are nearly all moved into the Macbur Bawun, where ten days' supplies for 500 men are stored; 30 guns and 100 Europeans are in position there. I am with 291 Europeans and the European battery in cantonments. We are safe, except external influences. Cawnpore to be reinforced with all speed. Delhi ought similarly to be recovered. When may Her Majesty's 84th be expected at Cawnpore?

(g) Sir H. Lawrence to the Governor-General in Council, dated May 25.

All are yet perfectly quiet here, but all depends on the troops at Cawnpore. Send up there all the European troops you can.

(h) Sir H. Lawrence to the Governor-General in Council, dated May 31.

An *émeute* at 9 p.m. Several bungalows burnt, and two or three officers killed and as many wounded; Brigadier Handscomb among the former. No other loss incurred. Quiet in the city. I am in cantonments. It is difficult to say who are loyal, but it is believed that the majority are. Only 25 of the 7th Cavalry proved false. The effects of this *émeute* may be bad.

(i) Sir H. Lawrence to the Governor-General in Council, dated June 4.

All quiet here, but a rising has taken place at Sitapur, and the Europeans are flying into Lucknow. An escort and carriages have been sent to meet them. Fifty of the 84th arrived this morning. All the mutineers seem bound for Delhi; and unless guns are brought against us, we can hold our own against all comers for a month, after which we may be in want of supplies. Dawk communication from Agra cut off, and we are hourly expecting that the telegraph wire will be cut at Cawnpore.

(j) Supplementary narrative, dated July 4.

A letter from Sir H. Lawrence that he has every reason to believe that the Cawnpore force had been entirely destroyed by treachery. This news was repeated by a kassid who was conveying letters from Lucknow to Allahabad. They said that the Nana<sup>1</sup> swore to protect the party, but after they embarked on board their boats he fired upon them, and entirely destroyed the party.

(k) Narrative of events, dated July 21.

On the 31st June Sir H. Lawrence went out with 200, 32nd Foot, forty sowars, and eleven guns, and came up with a body of insurgents about eight miles from Lucknow; owing to the defection of the cavalry and some of the artillery, he was obliged to retire with considerable loss in men and officers, and six guns;

<sup>1</sup> The Nana was proclaimed Peishwa a few days later.



was pursued to the walls of Lucknow, which has been regularly besieged since that date. Sir H. Lawrence died on the 4th July from wounds received on 30th. On the 10th all was going on well. A few men killed and wounded daily, but little damage to the defences. Enemy's fire slackening and their attacks less frequent. Provisions for six weeks more in store. General Havelock reports from Cawnpore, on 18th, Lucknow all safe for the present.

### Death of Sir Henry Lawrence

*Source.*—Letter from G. H. Lawrence, C.S., to his father, dated Calcutta, January 11, 1858. Taken from "Life of Sir H. Lawrence," by Edwardes and Merivale. Vol. II., pp. 377-8. (Smith, Elder.)

January 11th, 1858.

On July 2nd, about 8 o'clock, just before breakfast (which was laid in the next room at my suggestion), when uncle and I were lying on our beds, side by side, having just come in from our usual morning walk and inspection, and while Wilson, our Deputy Adjutant-General, was standing between our beds, reading some orders to uncle, an eight-inch shell, thrown from a howitzer, came in at the wall, exactly in front of my bed, and at the same instant burst. There was an instant darkness, and a kind of red glare, and for a second or two no one spoke. Finding myself uninjured, though covered with bricks from top to toe, I jumped up; at the same time uncle cried out that he was killed. Assistance came, and we found that Sir Henry's left leg had been almost taken off, high up by the thigh, a painful wound. We carried him from the Residency to Dr. Fayrer's house, amid a shower of bullets, and put him in one of the verandahs; there he seemed to feel that he had received his death-wound, and calling for the head people he gave over the chief-commissionership into the hands of Major Banks, and the charge of the garrison to Colonel Inglis, at the same time giving them his last instructions what to do, amongst which was, "*never to give in.*"<sup>1</sup> He sent for others, such as G. Hardinge, of whom

<sup>1</sup> Major Banks gives in his diary these last directions communicated to him by Sir Henry Lawrence after receiving his wound:—

"Reserve fire. Check all wall-fring.

"Carefully register ammunition for guns and small-arms in store. Carefully register daily expenditure as far as possible.

"Spare the precious health of Europeans in every possible way from shot and sun.

"Organise working-parties for night-labour.

"Entrench, entrench, entrench. Erect traverses. Cut off enemy's fire.

"Turn every horse out of the entrenchments except enough for four guns. Keep Sir Henry Lawrence's horse Ludaku; it is a gift to his nephew, George Lawrence.

he was very fond, told him what he expected from them, and spoke of the future; he also sent for all those whom he thought he had ever, though unintentionally, injured, or even spoken harshly to, and asked their forgiveness. His bed was surrounded by old friends and new friends, and there were few dry eyes there. His old servants he spoke to. He told them of the contents of his will, and whom he wished to look after his children, and he also spoke of yourself and mother with great affection. He was pleased to say that I had been like a son to him, and that though he used to think me selfish, he had found me not so, and lastly gave me his blessing; may it avail much.

We all received the Communion with him, and at one time the doctors thought of taking off his leg, but it would have been of no use. To drown his pain, they gave him chloroform constantly, and then he cried out rather incoherently about home and his mother. He seemed to me at times in great pain, but the doctor said he was not. He spoke, of course, of dear Aunt Letty, and a good deal at intervals of his wife, repeating texts she had been fond of.

\* \* \* \* \*

A better man never stepped, but we must not grieve for him, but try and follow his example. He was buried in the churchyard, where all the rest were, but no one save the padre could attend, as the place was under fire, and every one had to be at his post.

#### The Outbreak of Mutiny at Cawnpore

Source.—A brief account given by W. Shepherd, of the Commissariat Department. (Parliamentary Papers.)

The 2nd Cavalry, finding that they could not prevail upon the Infantry Regiments to join them, determined to go off, and having plea of having received some real or imaginary slight from the officers of their corps, on a sudden, at about 2 o'clock in the morning of the 5th of June, rose in a body with a great shout, mounted their horses, and on leaving their lines set fire to the bungalow of their quartermaster-sergeant. Thence proceeding to the Commissariat cattle-yard, they took possession

“ Use the State prisoners as a means for getting in supplies, by gentle means, if possible, or by threats.

“ Enrol every servant as a carrier of earth. Pay liberally—double, quadruple.

“ Turn out every native who will not work (save menials, who have more than abundant labour).

“ Write daily to Allahabad or Agra.

“ Sir Henry Lawrence's servants to receive one year's pay; they are to work for any other gentleman who wants them, or they may leave if they prefer to do so.”

of the Government elephants, thirty-six in number, at the same time setting fire to the cattle-sergeant's bungalow.

Whilst the main body proceeded to Nawabganje, a few of the ringleaders went to the lines of the 1st Regiment Native Infantry, and used their persuasive powers so well as to succeed in getting the men (who were mostly young recruits, the old hands being away on leave or on command) to join them.

It is to be spoken to the credit of the men of the 1st Native Infantry that when they agreed to go away with the mutineers, they first begged of their officers, who had been for some time in the habit of sleeping in the quarter-guard of the regiment to ensure confidence, to leave them, and ultimately forced them to go away into the entrenchment without hurting them.

This corps left its lines about half an hour after the Cavalry. As the latter left with a shout, an alarm-gun was fired from our camp, and the non-military community all taken into the entrenchment from the Church compound. Nearly all the bungalows to the west side of the canal were that day plundered and afterwards set on fire, so that there was nothing but large blazes of fire to be seen in that direction.

The exact strength of our own people is not known to me, but from memory I give the details in the margin.<sup>1</sup> We had eight guns; for these sufficient ammunition had previously been taken and buried underground. The entrenchment was made round the hospital barracks of the old European Infantry, and of the two buildings thus enclosed, one had thatched roofing, over which a covering of tiles was hastily thrown to prevent its easily catching fire. None of the native writers, Bengalis and others in Government offices or merchants' employ, went into the entrenchment; they remained in the city, where they appear to have received much annoyance from the mutineers, and some had to hide themselves to save their lives. The commissariat contractors all discontinued their supplies from the 6th, or rather were unable to bring them in, from the way the mutineers surrounded the entrenchment on all sides, permitting no ingress or egress at any time except under cover of night.

We had but one well in the middle of the entrenchment, and the enemy kept up their fire so incessantly, both day and night, that it was as much as giving a man's life blood to go and draw a

<sup>1</sup> European troops	...	...	...	210
Indian troops	...	...	...	100
Merchants, etc.	...	...	...	140
Women and children	...	...	...	330
Servants, cooks, etc.	...	...	...	120
				<hr/>
				900
				<hr/>

bucket of water, and while there was any water remaining in the large jars, usually kept in the verandah for the soldiers' use, nobody ventured to the well; but after the second day the demand became so great that a bheestie bag of water was with difficulty got for five rupees, and a bucket for a rupee, as most of the servants of officers and merchants had deserted, and it became a matter of necessity for every person to fetch his own water, which was usually done during the night when the enemy could not well direct their shots; in fact, after the first three days' incessant firing the rebels made it a practice, usually at about candlelight, to cease for about two hours, and at that time the crowd round the well was very great.

The heat was very great, and what with the fright, want of room, want of proper food and care, several ladies and soldiers' wives, as also children, died with great distress; many officers and soldiers also were sun-struck from exposure to the hot winds.

On the 24th June, I applied to the General to go, at the same time offering to bring him all the current information that I might collect in the city; asking as a condition that, on my return, if I should wish it, my family might be allowed to leave the entrenchment. My request was granted, as the General wished very much to get such information, for which purpose he had previously sent out two or three natives at different times, under promises of high rewards, but who never returned. He at the same time instructed me to try and negotiate with certain influential parties in the city, so as to bring about a rupture among the rebels, and cause them to leave off annoying us, authorising me to offer a lac of rupees as a reward, with handsome pensions for life, to any person who would bring about such a thing. This, I have every reason to think, could have been carried out successfully, had it pleased God to take me out unmolested; but it was not so ordained (it was merely a means, under God's providence, to save me from sharing the fate of the rest), for I came out of the entrenchments disguised as a native cook, and had not gone very far when I was taken prisoner, and under custody of four sepoys and a couple of sowars, all well armed, was escorted to the camp of the Nana, and was ordered to be placed under a guard; here several questions were put to me concerning our entrenchment, to all of which I replied as I was previously instructed by our General, for I had taken the precaution of asking him what I should say in case I was taken. My answers were not considered satisfactory, and I was confronted with two women servants who, three days previously, had been caught in making their escape from the entrenchment, and who gave a version of their own, making it appear that the English were starving, and not able to hold out much longer, as their number was greatly reduced. I, however, stood firm to what

I had first mentioned, and they did not know which party to believe. However, they let us alone. I was kept under custody up to the 12th July, on which date my trial took place, and I was sentenced to three years' imprisonment in irons, with hard labour, from which I was released by the European troops on the morning of the 17th idem.

\* \* \* \* \*

The Nana caused to be proclaimed by beat of tom-tom, throughout Cawnpore and its districts, that he had entirely conquered the British, whose period of reign in India having been completed, they were defeated at Delhi, Bombay, etc., and dare not put foot in Cawnpore any more, as he was well prepared to meet any number, and to drive them away from all India.

I forgot to mention that when the Nana broke up his camp after the English entrenchment was vacated, he proceeded to his seat at Bithoor on the 5th July, where he caused 100 guns to be fired as a salute in honour of the King of Delhi, 80 guns in memory of his late adopted father, Baji Rao, ex-Peishwa of Poona-Satara, and 60 guns for himself on being placed on the throne; 21 guns also were fired as a salute for the Nana's wife, and a like number for his mother.

The revolt, therefore, had become general in the province of Oudh. In the adjoining country the Lieutenant-Governor was defending himself in the fort at Agra; the Rani of Jhansi had thrown in her lot with the mutineers, and the rebellion had extended over the greater portion of Central India; and Neild was battling against tremendous odds at Allahabad. The despondency caused by the terrible news from these parts was relieved only by the bravery of the British garrison, the loyalty of most of the native chiefs, the steadfast behaviour of many of the sepoys, and the touching heroism of many Indian servants, who defended their masters and gave succour to the women and children at the risk of their own lives.

### The Outbreak at Agra

*Source.*—Letter to the *Bombay Times*, dated June 18, 1857.<sup>1</sup>

The last few days of May were crowded by important movements throughout the country. Mutinies occurred almost simul-

<sup>1</sup> This letter was written by Sir W. Muir, in charge of the Intelligence Department, and subsequently Lieutenant-Governor, North-West Provinces, and has been reprinted in "Records of the Intelligence Department of the Government of the North-West Provinces." (T. & T. Clark.)

taneously at distant quarters. In some places, as at Nuseerabad, Neemuch, Lucknow and Rohilkund, they were evidently the result of the successful example held out to them at Delhi, and of letters and emissaries from thence.

At Agra the crisis was brought on by another cause. A detachment from one of our native corps here guarded the treasury at Muttra. A company of the 67th native infantry had been for some time performing this duty, and anxiety was felt in consequence of the temptation of six or seven lacs of rupees thus placed in their power. It was resolved, when the guard was next changed, to bring out to Agra a portion of the treasure under escort of the returning company. On Saturday, the 30th of May, the relieving company of the 44th reached Muttra, and in the afternoon the treasure was ready to be brought to Agra by the sepoys of the 67th. Unexpectedly the two companies combined and attacked their officers.

Tidings of this mutiny reached Agra before midnight. It was soon determined that no confidence was to be reposed in those regiments of which companies had behaved in so treacherous and traitorous a manner. A parade was directed early next morning, Sunday, the 31st, and it was resolved to disarm both the native corps.

We were fortunate in having the means for carrying this resolution into effect. In other stations without European troops the authorities are helpless, and have been forced to maintain a show of reliance on the native soldiery, even after doubt had grown into actual mistrust. But with our 3rd Europeans and our European artillery the native corps dared not offer any resistance. The disarming was performed promptly and without resistance. But it was a season of anxiety, and all the European inhabitants were during that morning assembled at various rendezvous. The native troops were double the number of the Europeans; and they must still be overawed in their lines. Our large fort had been partly secured by throwing into it, at an early stage of this eventful period, a company of Europeans. Still, the sepoy guard might have offered resistance. Another element of great apprehension was our central jail with its 4,000 prisoners. Much excitement prevailed amongst them, and it was suspected that efforts had been made to tamper with the strong guard of some 300 men which protected the prison. Any mishap might here have placed the whole station at the mercy of this vast concourse of the most daring and abandoned characters in the country. A couple of guns and a small detachment of Europeans had been before stationed on a neighbouring eminence commanding the jail. All was thus kept quiet.

The city, with its population of about 105,000 persons, though of course excited and apprehensive, remained perfectly tranquil

and loyal throughout these events. Indeed, the alarm of the inhabitants was at what the sepoys might do, and at the anarchy which would ensue if they should rise. A feeling of satisfaction and security pervaded the city immediately they were disarmed. The same feeling was strongly expressed by the Gwalior Durbar. A few days later, as the plots of the sepoy regiments were seen to thicken, it was deemed prudent to desire all the men of the 44th and 67th to proceed to their homes. This they did without demur. And not a sepoy now remained in or near Agra.

On the same Sunday morning (the 31st) on which we disbanded our sepoys, the native troops rose at Lucknow, and a large portion of them, cavalry and infantry, was expected from thence. They struck across the country towards Delhi, passed the Ganges, and joined the Grand Trunk Road. They marched up that road line, threatening Mynpuri and Aligarh. They destroyed all our postal arrangements, and also the electric wires, and thus about the beginning of July completely cut off our communications with Cawnpore and Calcutta.

Shortly after, one of the corps of Oudh Irregular Cavalry, which had volunteered for duty against the mutineers, and had been deputed to the Trunk Road between Cawnpore and Aligarh, itself mutinied. This produced a severe shock in Mynpuri and Farruckabad, and added to the bands of lawless soldiery now laying waste the Doab. During the first week of June rumours of the loss of Shahjehanpur came in, and they were soon confirmed by news of the arrival at Meerut of the civil officers from Moradabad. So far as can be gathered from native report, the facts are these.

All the troops in Rohilcund had, since the catastrophe at Meerut and Delhi, been in an excited state; but this had calmed down, and it was believed by the officers that they would continue quiet unless any party of mutineers came upon them from without.

At Shahjehanpur the 28th Native Infantry had so well concealed their designs that their officers had confidence in them to the end. It was the morning of Sunday, the 31st, while some of the officers were at church, that the regiment rose. The treasury was plundered and the jail broken. The Government dispensary and public offices were burned.

Of the rising at Bareilly we have but meagre information. The ladies had previously proceeded to Naini Tal. It is probable that, if not already concerted with the Shahjehanpur troops, the revolt did not take place until their arrival at Bareilly. It is said that the officers were conducted in safety by the troops to a distance from the station. The mutineer troops concentrated at Bareilly are said to have set up a sort of government here,

headed by an old Sudder Amir, chief of the Hafiz Rehmut family. They sent a detachment to Budaon which plundered the treasury and forced the collector and magistrate to take refuge on this side the Ganges. No out-station in these parts (excepting Farruckabad) has now escaped.

We were not surprised at Neemuch going, as the 72nd left this station a few months ago in a very disaffected state. But in its mutiny the troops of the Gwalior Contingent went also—an unfortunate precedent!

To encourage us amongst these daily reports of revolt and disaffection, despatches came to us from the Headquarters of the Army, giving us most satisfactory accounts as to the Delhi force, which, though painfully late, was now positively advancing in a high state of efficiency, and promised to be before Delhi by the end of the first week of June. It was also becoming evident that the mutinous sepoys had as yet no common object but Delhi and plunder. The exception at Bareilly of a local government was encouraging rather than otherwise. Besides, deprived of their officers, the revolted regiments were everywhere becoming demoralised, and wherever met in action had proved unequal to any steady attack, if not positively weak and cowardly. We began to see, or to think that we saw, the elements of our strength, under God's good providence, in their scattered condition, and the objectless character of their movements.

### Indian Loyalty

*Source.*—Statement of Colonel Lennox, dated July 1, 1857. (Parliamentary Papers.)

About mid-day, we reached the fortified dwelling of the Nazim, and were ushered into the place where he was holding a Council. He bade us rest, and take some sherbet, assuring us that no harm should happen to us; and he rebuked his insolent retainer for hinting that a stable close by would do for us to dwell in, as we should not require it long, it being prepared to kill the dogs. However, the Nazim rebuked him, and told us not to fear, for he would not suffer us to quit till the road was open, and we could reach Goruckpore in safety.

On the second day, the Nazim, fearing the scouts of the 17th Regiment would give intelligence that Europeans were hid in his fort, made us assume native dresses. The Begum clothed my wife and daughter, and the Nazim clothed me; he then sent a party, dressed up in our English clothing, out with an escort, about nine at night, to deceive his outposts, and also the villagers; they returned, about midnight, in their proper dresses; and it was supposed by all, except the confidential persons of the Nazim's household, that he had sent us away. We remained in captivity.



in rear of his zenana, in a reed hut, nine days, treated very kindly and considerately, having plenty of food, and a daily visit from our keeper. After we had been in captivity seven days, the Nazim came to me, and said that he had just heard that the Collector of Goruckpore was at his station, and if I would write a letter to him he would get it safely conveyed.

On Thursday, the 18th of June, an alarm was given that the enemy was in full force coming against the fort; my wife and daughter were immediately hid in the zenana; myself hid in a dark wood godown. The horsemen, however, on nearing the fort, were found to be a party sent by the Collector of Goruckpore for our rescue. The Nazim furnished my wife and daughter with palkees, and the rest of us, on horses, left the considerate and noble Nazim at 11 a.m.; and reached Captaingunge at 4 p.m., where I found Farrier-sergeant Busher, of the Artillery, who also had been rescued by the same party that came to our rescue. The next day we arrived at Baste, and were hospitably received by Mr. Osborne, the opium agent, and his family, who gave us European clothing. After remaining there three days, we proceeded to Goruckpore, Azimghur, and Ghazipore.

Throughout this severe trial, I have found the promise fulfilled to me and my family, "And as thy day, so shall thy strength be."

During the time when these strange events were occurring at Delhi and elsewhere, the new Governor-General remained at Calcutta. In the farewell banquet given in his honour by the Directors, Lord Canning had referred to the peculiar dangers that beset British rule in India. "We must not forget," said he, "that in the sky of India, serene as it is, a small cloud may arise, at first no bigger than a man's hand, but which growing larger and larger, may at last threaten to burst and overwhelm us with ruin." And now the storm had broken. At first the news was intermittent, but at last the terrible truth in all its hideousness was revealed. "The part of the country," wrote Lord Canning, "which gives me most anxiety is the line which stretches through the length of Bengal from Barrackpore close by to Agra in the north-western provinces. In that length of seven hundred and fifty miles there is one European regiment at Dinapore, and that is all. Benares has a Sikh regiment; Allahabad the same; not reckoning a hundred European invalids, who were sent there a few days ago. At one of

these places the native regiment is a suspected one, and at either the temptation to seize the fort or the treasury will be very great, if they hear that Delhi continues in the hands of the mutinous regiments. Therefore, the two points to which I am straining are the hastening of the expulsion of the rebels from Delhi, and the collection of the Europeans here to be pushed up the country." He saw clearly that every hour was of importance and that, so long as Delhi was in the hands of the mutineers, regiments in other parts of the country would be tempted to rebel; but how few were the troops on whom he could rely! Fortunately, the war with Persia was over, and Outram's victorious army would soon be expected back in Bombay; and troops were called for from other parts of India, from Burma, Mauritius, and Ceylon; and some of the troops already on their way to China were intercepted and brought to India. But it was some time before the Ministry in England realised the gravity of the situation and sent out reinforcements. On May 16, a proclamation was issued warning the sepoy against evil influences and affirming Government's intention not to interfere with their casté or religion; and on the same day a message was sent to the Lieutenant-Governor at Agra telling him to transmit a message to Sir John Lawrence that all possible troops should march as quickly as possible to Delhi. For a time, at any rate, all hope rested in the Punjab, for in that province were some eleven thousand European troops, and in the Indian army about thirty-six thousand regular and fourteen thousand irregular troops.

#### Indian Support

*Source.*—Proceedings of a meeting of the Committee of the British Indian Association held on the 22nd May, 1857, at Calcutta. (Parliamentary Papers.)

The Committee of the British Indian Association have heard of the disastrous events which have lately occurred at Meerut and Delhi with deep concern and sorrow.

The Committee view with disgust and horror the disgraceful and mutinous conduct of the native soldiery at these stations, and the excesses committed by them, and confidently trust to find that they have met with no sympathy, countenance or

support from the bulk of the civil population of that part of the country, or from any reputable or influential classes among them.

The Committee of the Association record without hesitation their conviction of the utter groundlessness of the reports, which have led a hitherto faithful body of the soldiers of the State to the commission of the gravest crimes of which military men or civil subjects can be guilty, and the Committee deem it incumbent on them on the present occasion to express their deep abhorrence of the practices and purposes of those who have spread those false and mischievous reports.

The Committee earnestly hope for the restoration of peace and good order, which they doubt not will soon be re-established by the vigorous measures which the Government have adopted in this exigency.

The Committee trust and believe that the loyalty of their fellow-subjects in India to the Government under which they live, and their confidence in its power and good intentions, are unimpaired by the lamentable events which have occurred or the detestable efforts which have been made to alienate the minds of the sepoys and the people of the country from their duty and allegiance to the beneficent rule under which they are placed.

ISSUR CHUNDER SINGH,

*Honorary Secretary.*

### Panic in Calcutta

*Source.*—Extracts from Alexander Duff's letters to Dr. Tweedie. Duff's "Indian Rebellion." (James Nisbet.)

We are at this moment in a crisis of jeopardy such as has not occurred since the awful catastrophe of the Black Hole of Calcutta. It is now certain that we narrowly escaped a general massacre in Calcutta itself. There was a deep-laid plot or conspiracy to seize on Fort William, and massacre all the Europeans. The night chosen for the desperate effort was that on which the Maharajah of Gwalior, when here, had invited the whole European community to an exhibition of fireworks, across the river, at the Botanic Gardens. On that evening, however, as if by a gracious interposition of Providence, we were visited with a heavy storm of thunder, lightning, and rain, so that the grand entertainment of the Maharajah had to be postponed. The European officers, therefore, had not left the Fort; and the object of the conspirators being thus defeated, was soon afterwards brought to light, to the horror of all, and the abounding thankfulness of such as acknowledge the loving-kindness of the Lord. From all the leading stations in the north-west, intelligence of a mutinous spirit manifesting itself in divers ways has

been dropping in upon us for several weeks past. But at this moment all interest is absorbed by the two most prominent cases, at Meerut and Delhi. Such a blow to the prestige of British power and supremacy has not yet been struck in the whole history of British India. All Calcutta may be said to be in sackcloth. The three or four days' panic during the crisis of the Sikh War was nothing to this. Nearly half the native army is in a state of secret or open mutiny; and the other half known to be disaffected. But this is not all; the populace is known to be more or less disaffected. You see, then, how serious is the crisis. Nothing, nothing but some gracious and signal interposition of the God of Providence seems competent now to save our Empire in India. And if there be a general rising—as any day may be—the probability is, that not a European life will anywhere escape the universal and indiscriminate massacre. But my own hope is in the God of Providence. I have a secret, confident persuasion that, though this crisis has been permitted to humble and warn us, our work in India has not yet been accomplished, and that until it be accomplished, our tenure of empire, however brittle, is secure.

Though the Mission House be absolutely unprotected, in the very heart of the native city, far away from the European quarters, I never dreamt of leaving it. Our Mission work in all its branches, alike in Calcutta and the country stations, continues to go on without any interruption, though there is a wild excitement abroad among all classes of natives, which tends mightily to distract and unsettle their minds.

June 16th. Calcutta has been in a state of alarm far exceeding anything that has gone before. Our great infantry station, Barrackpore, lies about twelve miles to the north of Calcutta, and on the same side of the river; our artillery station, Dum Dum, about four or five miles to the north-east. To the south is Fort William, and beyond it the great Alipore jail, with its thousands of imprisoned desperadoes, guarded by a regiment of native militia; not far from Alipore is Garden Reach, where the ex-king of Oudh has been residing with about a thousand armed retainers, the Mussulman population, generally armed also, breathing fanatical vengeance on the "infidels," and praying in their mosques for the success of the Delhi rebels. Calcutta, being guarded by native police only, in whom not a particle of confidence can any longer be reposed, seemed to be exposed on all sides to imminent perils, as most of the European soldiers had been sent to the north-west. In this extremity, and in the midst of indescribable panic and alarm, the Government began to enrol the European and East Indian residents as volunteers, to patrol the streets at night, etc. Happily, the 75th Highlanders arrived during the week, and their presence

helped to act so far as a sedative. Still, when the city was filled with armed citizens, all known to be disaffected to the very core, and waiting only for the signal to burst upon the European population in a tempest of massacre and blood, the feeling of uneasiness and insecurity was intense. Many, unable to withstand the pressure any longer, went to pass the night in central places of rendezvous; numbers went into the fort; and numbers more actually went on board the ships and steamers on the river.

On Sabbath (14th June) the feeling of anxiety rose to a perfect paroxysm. On Saturday night the Brigadier at Barrackpore sent an express to Government House to notify that, from certain information which he had obtained, there was to be a general rising of sepoys on the Sabbath. Accordingly, before the Sabbath dawned, all manner of vehicles were in requisition to convey all the available European forces to Barrackpore and Dum Dum. Those which had been sent to the north by railway on Saturday were recalled by a telegraphic message through the night. But the public generally had not any distinct intelligence as to the varied movements; and even if they had, there would be the uttermost uncertainty as to the result. Accordingly, throughout the whole Sabbath day the wildest and most fearful rumours were circulating in rapid succession.

The great roads from Barrackpore and Dum Dum unite a little beyond Cornwallis Square, and then pass through it. If there were a rush of murderous ruffians from these military stations the European residents in that square would have to encounter the first burst of their diabolical fury. It so happened, therefore, that some kind friends, interested in our welfare, wrote to us at daybreak on Sabbath, pointing out the danger, and urging the necessity of our leaving the square. And, after breakfast, some friends called in person to urge the propriety of this course. Still, I did not feel it to be my duty to yield to their expostulations. There were others in the square besides my partner and myself. Near us was the Central Female School of the Church of England, with several lady teachers, and some twenty or thirty boarders; the Christian Converts' house, with upwards of a dozen inmates; our old Mission house, with its present occupants of the Established Church; in another house an English clergyman, with some native Christians; and in another still, the Lady Superintendent of the Bethune Government School, and her assistants. If one must leave the square, all ought to do so; and I did not consider the alarming intelligence sufficiently substantiated to warrant me to propose to my neighbours a universal abandonment of the square. So I went on with all my ordinary Sabbath duties, altogether in the ordinary way. Almost all the ministers in Calcutta had expostulatory letters sent them, dissuading them from preaching in the forenoon, and protesting against their

attempting to do so in the evening. And though, to their credit, not one, so far as I have heard, yielded to the pressure, the churches in the forenoon were half empty; and in the evening nearly empty altogether.

On Sunday, at five p.m., the authorities, backed by the presence of British troops, proceeded to disarm the sepoys at Barrackpore, Dum Dum, and elsewhere. Through God's great mercy the attempt proved successful. This, however, was only known to a few connected with Government House and their friends, so that the panic throughout Sunday night rose to an inconceivable height. With the exception of another couple, Mrs. Duff and myself were the only British residents in Cornwallis Square on that night. Faith in Jehovah as our refuge and strength led us to cling to our post; and we laid us down to sleep as usual; and on Monday morning my remark was, "Well, I have not enjoyed such a soft, sweet, refreshing rest for weeks past!" Oh, how our hearts rose in adoring gratitude to Him who is the keeper of Israel, and Who slumbers not nor sleeps! Then we soon learnt the glad tidings that all the armed sepoy's had everywhere been successfully disarmed; and that, during the night, the ex-king of Oudh, and his treasonable courtiers, were quietly arrested, and lodged as prisoners of state in Fort William.

### Precautionary Measures in Calcutta

*Source.*—(i) Telegram from the Governor-General in Council to the Lieutenant Governor of Agra, dated May 16, 1857. (Parliamentary Papers.)

Send word as quickly as possible to Sir John Lawrence that he is to send down such of the Punjab regiments and European regiments as he can safely spare them. Orders will meet them on the march. I have written to this effect, but probably the dawk is interrupted. If the telegraph is in order beyond Delhi, you will of course use it for this purpose.

Every exertion must be made to regain Delhi; every hour is of importance; General Hewitt has been ordered to press this upon the Commander-in-Chief.

If you find it necessary, you may apply in the Governor-General's name to the Rajah of Patiala, or to the Rajah of Jhind, for troops. I am very glad you accepted Scindia's. I have sent for a European regiment from Madras and from Pegu; but they cannot be here for a fortnight, and until then I cannot spare a single European from here.

Peace is ratified; but the troops from Persia cannot be here for many weeks. I will send you a proclamation to-morrow morning by telegraph.

I thank you sincerely for all you have so admirably done, and for your stout heart.

*Source.*—(ii) Home Department, Fort William, the 16th May, 1857. Proclamation. (Punjab Government Records.)

Home Department,

Fort William, the 16th May, 1857.

The Governor-General of India in Council has warned the Army of Bengal that the tales by which the men of certain regiments have been led to suspect that offence to their religion or injury to their caste is meditated by the Government of India are malicious falsehoods. The Governor-General in Council has learnt that this suspicion continues to be propagated by designing and evil-minded men not only in the Army, but amongst other classes of the people. He knows that endeavours are made to persuade Hindoos and Mussalmans, soldiers and civil subjects, that their religion is threatened secretly as well as openly by the acts of the Government, and that the Government is seeking in various ways to entrap them into a loss of caste for purposes of its own. Some have already been deceived and led astray by these tales. Once more then the Governor-General in Council warns all classes against the deceptions that are practised on them.

The Government of India has invariably treated the religious feelings of all its subjects with careful respect. The Governor-General in Council has declared that it will never cease to do so. He now repeats that declaration, and he emphatically proclaims that the Government of India entertains no desire to interfere with their religion or caste, and that nothing has been or will be done by the Government to affect the free exercise of the observances of religion or caste by every class of the people.

The Government of India has never deceived its subjects. Therefore the Governor-General in Council now calls upon them to refuse their belief to seditious lies.

This notice is addressed to those who hitherto by habitual loyalty and orderly conduct have shown their attachment to the Government and a well founded faith in its protection and justice. The Governor-General in Council enjoins all such persons to pause before they listen to false guides and traitors who would lead them into danger and disgrace.

By order of the Governor-General in Council.

C. BEADON,

*Secretary to the Government of India.*

#### Dilatory Methods in England

*Source.*—(i) John Lawrence to Lord Dalhousie.

England has done much for us, but she should do more, if we are to recover our lost prestige and diminished power.

This delay in sending out reinforcements in the first instance was well-nigh fatal. As it was, it did us immense harm. It caused thousands to become compromised who would otherwise have remained true. We have never recovered this mistake, and the policy which has hitherto been pursued has enhanced our difficulties. All the bad passions of our nature have been excited. It has become a war of extermination against mutineers, and, in many instances, even against insurgents. It has become, to some extent, a war of races.

*Source.*—(ii) Letter from Queen Victoria to Viscount Palmerston. Osborne, August 2, 1857. "Queen Victoria's Letters." Edited by A. C. Benson and Viscount Esher. (John Murray.)

The Queen has to thank Lord Palmerston for his letter of the 27th July.

The embodying of the Militia will be a most necessary measure, as well for the defence of our own country, and for keeping up on the Continent of Europe the knowledge that we are not in a defenceless state, as for the purposes of obtaining a sufficient number of volunteers for the Army.

The Queen hopes, therefore, that the Militia to be embodied will be on a proper and sufficient scale. She must say, that the last accounts from India show so formidable a state of things that the military measures hitherto taken by the Home Government, on whom the salvation of India must mainly depend, appear to the Queen as by no means adequate to the emergency. We have nearly gone to the full extent of our available means, just as we did in the Crimean War, and may be able to obtain successes; but we have not laid in a store of troops, nor formed reserves which could carry us over a long struggle, or meet unforeseen new calls. Herein we are always most shortsighted, and have finally to suffer either in power and reputation, or to pay enormous sums for small advantages in the end—generally both.

The Queen hopes that the Cabinet will look the question boldly in the face; nothing could be better than the Resolutions passed in the House of Commons, insuring to the Government every possible support in the adoption of vigorous measures. It is generally the Government, and not the House of Commons, who hang back. The Queen wishes Lord Palmerston to communicate this letter to his colleagues.

*Source.*—(iii) Letter from Queen Victoria to Lord Palmerston.

The Queen has received Lord Palmerston's letter of yesterday, and must say that she is deeply grieved at her want of success in impressing upon him the importance of meeting the present dangers by agreeing on, and maturing a general plan by which to replace *in kind* the troops sent out of the country, and for which



the money *has* been voted by Parliament. To the formation of the full number of battalions, and their full strength in companies, Lord Palmerston objects that the men will not be found to fill them, and, therefore, it is left undone; to the calling-out of more militia, he objects that they ought not to be used as Recruiting Depôts, and if many were called out the speed with which the recruiting for the army went on would oblige them to be disbanded again. The War Office pride themselves upon having got 1000 men since the recruiting began; this is equal to 1000 a month or 12,000 a year, the ordinary wear-and-tear of the army! Where will the reserves for India be found? It does not suffice merely to get recruits, as Lord Palmerston says; they will not become *soldiers* for six months when got, and in the meantime a sufficient number of Militia Regiments ought to be drilled, and made efficient to relieve the Line Regiments already sent, or yet to be sent, for these also are at present necessarily good for nothing.

The Queen must say that the Government incur a fearful responsibility towards their country by their apparent indifference. God grant that no unforeseen European complication fall upon this country—but we are really tempting Providence.

The Queen hopes Lord Palmerston has communicated to the Cabinet her views on the subject.

*Source.*—(iv) Speech of the Earl of Derby, December 3, 1857.  
Hansard, cxlviii., pp. 42-4.

Now, my Lords, I come to Her Majesty's Government at home, and I must confess I do not think they have exhibited much more foresight, promptitude, or vigilance than their colleagues in India. They refused from first to last to believe in the serious character of the mutiny. My noble friend (the Earl of Ellenborough), whose knowledge of India and the deep interest he has taken in its welfare qualify him better than any other man to speak on this subject, and who appears throughout to have had an intuitive perception of what was going to be done and what ought to be done, never ceased during the whole course of the last session to press upon the Ministry the necessity of taking the earliest and the most prompt and vigorous measures for repressing that which he represented as a dangerous conspiracy. But my noble friend was the Cassandra of the House. His prophecies were disregarded, and that disregard has lost many a valuable British life, and has well-nigh lost India. On the 19th of May Lord Ellenborough called the attention of the Government to the subject, and urged the necessity of immediate reinforcements. He was told by the noble Lord opposite, the Secretary for War, that the intelligence was not such as to create any apprehension for the safety of India, but that as the Chinese expedition would comprise four regiments which would otherwise have gone to

India, four other regiments would be induced to proceed to that country in the course of the next five weeks. On the 9th of June my noble friend again called attention to the state of India, and especially to the religious aspect of the question, which has been referred to by my noble friend opposite (Lord Portman), and upon which I shall have to say a few words. On the 11th of June the President of the Board of Control (Mr. Vernon Smith) expressed his hope that no alarm was felt by the public with regard to Indian affairs, and stated that owing to the promptitude and vigour displayed by the authorities in India, the disaffection which had existed among the troops in that country had been suppressed, and that any future manifestation of such a feeling would be met by similar decisive measures. On the 23rd of June the President of the Board of Control stated that the 19th Regiment of Native Infantry had been disbanded, and that it was the intention of the Government to disband any other regiment which manifested a mutinous disposition. Well, my Lords, on the 29th of June my noble friend (the Earl of Ellenborough), after some intelligence had been received of the calamities which had occurred in India, again pressed upon the Government the necessity of sending out with the utmost speed other and larger reinforcements to the army, and he suggested, as it would be necessary to dispatch all our available military force in this country to India, that their place should be supplied by the immediate embodiment of the militia. Your Lordships will probably recollect with what cool indifference these suggestions were received. The noble President assured us that the disaffection was not so extensive as was supposed; and that the native princes were co-operating most cordially with the British authorities; that Lord Canning expected that General Anson would shortly be before Delhi; that four more regiments had been ordered out; and that the calling out of the militia would appear to indicate difficulties, and would lower this country in the eyes of the world.

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On the 29th of June, the President of the Board of Control delivered a speech which showed such an utter and hopeless ignorance of the whole question with which he had to deal, and of the arrangements of his department, as I not only never saw equalled, but as I believe never could be equalled; still, after all the disastrous intelligence received by the Government, treating the condition of India as a matter of no pressing importance:—

“I hope,” said Mr. Vernon Smith, “that in the course of a very short time 14,000 European troops, partly reliefs and partly recruits, and partly additional troops will be on their way from these shores to India. I hope that the House will not be carried away by any notion that we exaggerate the danger because we have determined

upon sending out these troops. It is as a measure of security alone that these troops are sent out. Our Indian Empire is not imperilled, and I hope that in a short time the disaster, dismal as it undoubtedly is, will be effectually suppressed by the force already in that country."

Referring to the outbreak which had taken place at Delhi, the President of the Board of Control stated that

"Everything that can be done is being done in India, and troops have been already marched up to surround what the right hon. gentleman (Mr. Disraeli) calls the ancient capital of the Moghuls, the city of Delhi."

Then Mr. Vernon Smith went on to show his intimate knowledge of the city of Delhi by saying,—“ Luckily, the outrage has taken place there, because it is notorious that Delhi may be easily surrounded.” Surrounded!

“ I have no doubt,” continued the President of the Board of Control, “ that it will be reduced by force immediately that a man of well-known vigour of action as my gallant friend, General Anson, who now commands the army of the north, appears before the walls of Delhi.”

Why, the large force which General Anson was able to take with him was somewhere about 2,000 men, if they had all arrived.

“ It is notorious,” said the President of the Board of Control, “ that Delhi may be easily surrounded, so that if we could not reduce the place by force, we could by famine. Unfortunately, the mail left on the 18th ultimo, and I cannot therefore apprise the House that the fort of Delhi has been razed to the ground; but I hope that by the next mail we shall receive intelligence that ample retribution has by this time been inflicted on the mutineers who occupy that city.”

Such was the eminent foresight displayed by the Minister intrusted with the conduct of Indian affairs! The news of the fearful calamities which had occurred in India, and of the occupation of Delhi by the Moghul, did, however, elicit the warmest sympathy on the part of almost every European State. Early in July the Sultan, without hesitation, upon the application of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, granted his firman for the passage of British troops across the Isthmus of Suez. The Pasha of Egypt voluntarily, and without any application being made to him, wrote to the agents of the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company stating that if the British Government wished, through their agency, to send troops across his territory to the Red Sea, he would afford such troops every facility of transit, whether they were in or out of uniform, by hundreds or by thousands, and that they should have the use of his horses, carriages, and the same means of conveyance as if they were his own troops. It is not, I believe, very generally known—though it is right it should be, as it is the highest compliment that

could be paid this country, and shows how wide and general was the sympathy entertained towards us by one of the most powerful monarchs in Europe—that the Emperor of the French of his own accord informed the British Government that if it would be any convenience to them to send the greater part of troops, they were despatching to India across France, they had his full and free leave to traverse his territory, and that every facility should be afforded for their conveyance. Now, will it be believed that the firman of the Sultan, the offer of the Pasha, the promise of the Emperor of the French, were alike disregarded and declined, and that from that time up to the 1st of October no single soldier ever took advantage of the route across the Isthmus? It was said, when it was determined that troops should be sent round by the Cape of Good Hope, and when a considerable number were despatched by sailing vessels in preference to steamers, that there would be difficulty with regard to transport by the overland route when the troops arrived the other side of the Isthmus upon the shores of the Red Sea.

It has been stated—I don't know whether truly or not, but I have not seen it contradicted—that Lord Elphinstone,<sup>1</sup> whose exertions deserve the warmest acknowledgments—made an offer by telegraph to Lord Canning to send out a rapid steamer to catch the mail with the news of the mutiny, and that Lord Canning's reply was that such a step was unnecessary and there was no hurry. It is said, also, that Lord Elphinstone volunteered, if Lord Canning thought fit, to send steamers from Bombay to the Red Sea for the purpose of meeting any troops which the British Government might despatch by that route. But more than this,—the Peninsular and Oriental Company, I understand, offered to the Government in July to make arrangements for the passage of troops from Alexandria across the Isthmus, by which they could have transported from ship to ship within twenty-four hours, and they offered the use of their steamers which, they stated, were capable of carrying 500 men at each trip. If troops had been conveyed by that route across the Isthmus, they would have arrived at Bombay or Point de Galle in six or seven weeks; and, consequently, troops despatched from this country at the beginning of July would have reached India by the middle of August. The Government, however, declined all these propositions. They refused to avail themselves of the offers of the Sultan, of the Pasha, of the Emperor of the French, and of the Peninsular and Oriental Company; they relied upon their own means and resources.

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Now, my Lords, if the advice of my noble friend (the Earl

<sup>1</sup> Governor of Bombay.

of Ellenborough) had been adopted, the offer of the Pasha of Egypt accepted, and troops sent through Egypt in the beginning of June, they might have arrived in Calcutta towards the middle of August; while, as it was, the first reinforcement which did arrive in India, with the exception of the troops diverted from the Chinese expedition and a small number of men from the Mauritius, was part of a regiment which was sent out in the Golden Fleece, a remarkably quick ship, and which made the passage in the extraordinary short space of sixty-eight days, but which did not arrive until the latter end of October. Now, my Lords, look to the circumstances of that garrison upon which the interest of all is painfully fixed; look at the position of Lucknow and the position of the relieving force, and tell me what would have been the effect if those troops which arrived in October had arrived at the beginning, the middle, or even the latter end of September. If they had so arrived the movements of Sir Henry Havelock would have been perfectly safe and secure, and not the slightest risk would have been run by the garrison of Lucknow, with all its helpless women and children, of falling into the hands of their enemies; but if, from the delays of the Government in sending out troops that town should fall, upon them will rest the guilt and the shame of such a fearful calamity.

The news of the outbreak reached John Lawrence on May 12 at Rawal Pindi, where he was staying on his way to the hills at Murree. He understood the magnitude of the occasion. "I consider this to be the greatest crisis which has ever occurred in India," wrote he to General Anson, the Commander-in-Chief, who was then at Simla. "Our European force is so small that, unless effectively handled in the outset and brought to bear, it will prove unequal to the emergency. But with vigour and promptitude, under the blessing of God, it will be irresistible." In regard to his own province Lawrence could do little, for communications were cut between him and Lahore. The responsibility, therefore, lay with his second-in-command, Robert Montgomery, who promptly disarmed the regiments and seized the fort at Lahore, and then strengthened the garrison at Amritsar. Those Sikh chiefs also who had survived the ruins of the Sikh empire, and especially the Maharajah of Patiala and the Chiefs of Jhind and Nabha, rendered invaluable assistance; and Dost Muhammad loyally observed the treaty which he had made recently with the British

power. And there was the same spirit of decision and promptness of action in the Councils at Peshawar. Edwardes and Nicholson were in charge there, and they, together with Neville Chamberlain, who was in command of the Punjab Irregular Force, and Generals Cotton and Reed, held a council of war on May 13. It was agreed that General Reed should take command of the troops within the Punjab, and move down to Rawal Pindi so as to be in close communication with the Chief Commissioner. It was also arranged to constitute a movable column under the command of Neville Chamberlain, which would be ready at hand wherever emergency required, and, as a wise precaution, to move some regular troops to places where they could do little harm, and to disarm others.<sup>1</sup>

It so happened, therefore, that John Lawrence was able to do but little at first to ensure the safety of his own province beyond supporting most generously and emphatically the strong actions of his subordinates. He also communicated his suggestions both to the Governor-General and to the Commander-in-Chief. But John Lawrence looked beyond his province; he saw that "whatever gave rise to the Mutiny, it had settled down into a struggle for empire, under Muhammadan guidance, with the Moghul capital for its centre." He was willing therefore to take risks, so far as the Punjab was concerned, in order to save India; and he realised also the value of prompt assistance. He sought aid wherever it could be found. The regulars he could not trust, and therefore moved them as far as possible to safe places or disbanded them. He enlisted the services of the Sikh chiefs, gave opportunities of service to the irregular troops, and raised two regiments; and he urged all to assist wherever and whenever possible in making arrangements for the needs of the troops. He wrote almost daily to the Commander-in-Chief, advising him in the strongest language to act quickly and join with the Meerut force in a combined attack on Delhi. It is possible that he underrated the difficulties which General Anson had to encounter in the matter of transport, and the terrible results which would

<sup>1</sup> Brigadier Cotton disarmed these regiments at the very start.

have resulted from a premature attack on Delhi. Be that as it may, General Anson arrived at Karnal on May 24 with his relieving force on its way to Delhi. Unfortunately he was there taken ill with cholera and died almost immediately. The command of the field force fell on General Barnard. Such were, in short, the achievements of John Lawrence and his subordinates in the fateful fortnight which succeeded the outbreak of the Mutiny.

### The Rawal Pindi Council

*Source.*—Kaye and Malleson, "History of the Indian Mutiny." Vol. II., pp. 346-8. (Longmans.)

On the 16th, General Reed and Brigadier Chamberlain<sup>1</sup> joined the Chief Commissioner at Rawal Pindi, and on that evening Herbert Edwardes received a telegraphic message summoning him to join the Head-Quarters Council. Making over his own particular charge to Nicholson, he proceeded at once to Pindi, and was soon in eager but confident discussion alike of the present and the future. The stern resolution and unflinching courage of John Lawrence were then lighted up by the radiant aspect of Herbert Edwardes, whose cheerfulness was so unflinching and whose political wisdom so often glinted out in bright flashes of wit, that the Councils of War which were held during that gathering at Rawal Pindi were said to be "great fun." Never, perhaps, in the face of such enormous difficulty and danger, shaking the very foundations of a great empire, did men meet each other with brighter faces or more cheering words. It was an occasion on which the eventual success of our resistance depended, more than on all else, upon the hearts and hope of our great chiefs, on whose words all men hung, and in whose faces they looked for the assurance and encouragement which inspired and animated all beneath them. It was said of John Lawrence, at that time, that he was as calm and confident as if he had been contemplating only the most commonplace events, and that Herbert Edwardes was in higher spirits, more natural and more unre-

<sup>1</sup> It had already been decided with the concurrence of John Lawrence at the Peshawar Conference, attended by the General, the Brigadier, Edwardes, Chamberlain and Nicholson to form a movable column. It was decided to place Neville Chamberlain in command. It was arranged at first that John Nicholson should accompany the column as political officer, but Lawrence decided that Nicholson's services would be required at Peshawar. After a short time, Chamberlain was appointed Adjutant-General, and Nicholson, at the age of thirty-five, was selected to be his successor, with the rank of Brigadier-General.

strained, than he had ever been known to be by men who had served with him in more quiet times. A great and ennobling faith was settling down in the hearts of our Punjabi chiefs. It had dawned upon them that it would be their work, not merely to save the Province, but to save the Empire.

History will take the measure of men's minds in accordance with the extent to which they looked upon this crisis, as a local or an imperial one, and directed their efforts to the suppression of the one or the other. Physically, it is known rarely to happen that men, who have a clear, steady sight to discern distinctly near objects, have that wide range of vision which enables them to comprehend which is observable in the distance; and the faculty, which, either on a large or a small scale, enables a man to grasp moral objects, both immediate and remote, is equally rare. General Hewitt's small mind took in nothing beyond the idea that, as he lived in Meerut, it was his duty to save Meerut. But the great intellect of Sir John Lawrence grasped all the circumstances of the imperial danger and held them in a vice. He had his own particular province in hand—carefully and minutely; no single post overlooked, no single point neglected. He knew what every man under him was doing, what every man was expected to do; there was nothing that happened, or that might happen, in the Punjab over which he did not exercise the closest vigilance; but the struggle for supremacy at his own doors never obscured the distant vision of the great imperial danger. He never domesticated his policy; he never localised his efforts. He never said to himself, "The Punjab is my especial charge. I will defend the Punjab. I have no responsibility beyond it." He would have weakened the Punjab to strengthen the Empire. He would, perhaps, have sacrificed the Punjab to save the Empire. In this, indeed, the strength of his character—his capacity for government on a grand scale—was evinced at the outset, and, as time advanced, it manifested itself in every stage of the great struggle more signally than before.

It was felt in the Findi Council that, "whatever gave rise to the Mutiny, it has settled down into a struggle for Empire, under Muhammadan guidance, with the Moghul Capital for its centre." From that time, this great centre of the Moghul capital was never beyond the range of John Lawrence's thoughts, never beyond the reach of his endeavours. Seen, as it were, through the telescope of long years of political experience, sweeping all intervening time and space, the great city of Delhi, which he knew so well, was brought close to his eyes; and he felt that he had a double duty. Much as he might think of Lahore, Amritsar, or Peshawar, he thought still more of Delhi. He felt as lesser men would not have felt, that it was his duty in that emergency to give back to the Empire, in time of intestine



war, all that he could give from that abundance of military strength which had been planted in the province at a time when the defence of the frontier against external aggressions was held to be the first object of military importance. Knowing well the terrible scarcity of reliable troops in all the country below the Punjab, and the encouraging effect of the occupation of Delhi by the rebel troops, he resolved to pour down upon the imperial city every regiment that he could send to its relief. From that time his was the directing mind which influenced for good all that was done from Upper India, working downwards to rescue our people from the toils of the enemy, and to assert our dominion under the walls of Delhi, where the great battle of supremacy was to be fought.

#### ✓ Mutiny Policy of John Lawrence

*Source.*—(i) Telegram from Sir John Lawrence to Lord Canning, dated May 13, 1857 (on the day after he heard of the capture of Delhi). (Punjab Government Records.)

All safe as yet in the Punjab, but the aspect of affairs most threatening. The whole native Regular army are ready to break out, and unless a blow be soon struck, the Irregulars, as a body, will follow their example.

Send for our troops from Persia. Intercept the force now on its way to China, and bring it to Calcutta. Every European soldier will be required to save the country if the whole of the native troops turn against us. This is the opinion of all leading minds here. Every precaution which foresight can dictate is being taken to hold our own, independent of the natives."

*Source.*—(ii) Letter from Sir John Lawrence to General Anson, Commander-in-Chief, dated May 21, 1857. (Punjab Government Records.)

I telegraphed last night my reply to yours of the 17th. I do not myself think that the country anywhere is against us,—certainly not from here to within a few miles of Delhi. I served for nearly thirteen years in Delhi, and know the people well. My belief is that with good management on the part of the civil officers it would open its gates on the approach of our troops. It seems incredible to conceive that the mutineers can hold and defend it. Still I admit that on military principles, in the present state of affairs, it may not be expedient to advance on Delhi,—certainly not until the Meerut force is prepared to act, which it can only be when set free. Once relieve Meerut, and give confidence to the country, no difficulty regarding carriage can occur. By good arrangements the owners will come forward, but in any cases it can be collected.

From Meerut you will be able to form a sound judgment on the course to be followed. If the country lower down be disturbed, and the sepoy have mutinied, I conceive that it would be a paramount duty to march that day, relieve each place, and disarm or destroy the mutineers. If, on the other hand, all were safe, it would be a question whether you should consolidate your forces here or march on Delhi.

I think it must be allowed that our European troops are not placed at this or that station simply to hold it, but to be ready to move wherever they may be required. Salubrious and central points for their location were selected, but so long as we maintain our prestige or keep the country quiet it cannot signify how many cantonments we abandon. But this we cannot do if we allow two or three native corps to checkmate large bodies of Europeans. It will then be a mere question of time; by slow degrees, but of a certainty, the native troops *must* destroy us.

We are doing all we can to strengthen ourselves and to reinforce you, either by direct or indirect means. But can your Excellency suppose for one moment that the Irregular Troops will remain staunch, if they see our European soldiers cooped up in their cantonments, tamely awaiting the progress of events?

Your Excellency remarks that we must carefully collect our resources. But what are these resources but our European soldiers, our guns, and our material; these are all ready at hand, and only require to be handled wisely and vigorously to produce great results. We have money also, and the control of the country. But if disaffection spread, insurrection will follow, and we shall then neither be able to collect the revenue or procure supplies.

Pray only reflect on the whole history of India. Where have we failed when we acted vigorously? Where have we succeeded when guided by timid counsels? Clive,<sup>1</sup> with twelve hundred men, fought at Plassey, in opposition to the advice of his leading officers, beat forty thousand men, and conquered Bengal. Monson retreated from the Chumbul, and before he gained Agra his army was disorganised and partially annihilated. Look at the Kabul catastrophe. It might have been averted by resolute and bold action. The Irregulars of the army—in short, our friends, of whom we had many—only left us when they found we were not true to ourselves. How can it be supposed that strangers and mercenaries will sacrifice everything for us? There is a point

<sup>1</sup> "Clive, not with twelve hundred men but three thousand disciplined troops beat a large rabble." Forrest, "History of the Indian Mutiny." Vol. I., p. 58.

Again: "The advice to march on Delhi was sound, but, if it had been acted on rashly, it must have led to disaster."

up to which they will stand by us; for they know that we have always been successful, and that we are good masters. But go beyond this point, and every man will look to his immediate benefit, his present safety.

The Punjab Irregulars are marching down in the highest spirits, proud to be trusted, and eager to show their superiority over the Regular troops, ready to fight shoulder to shoulder with the Europeans. But if, on their arrival, they find the Europeans behind breastworks, they will begin to think that the game is up. Recollect that all this time, while we are pausing, the emissaries of the mutineers are writing to and visiting every cantonment.

It seems to me lamentable to think that in no case have the mutineers yet suffered. Brigadier Cotton has indeed managed admirably. With six weak companies and his artillery he disarmed three regiments and thus rendered them harmless. Brigadier Innes seemed to me to have missed an excellent opportunity of teaching the sepoy a lesson which would have cowed them for hundreds of miles round. Her Majesty's 61st Regiment repulsed without any effort the attacks of the 45th, but the sepoy got off with little loss, and even then had not the heart to keep together, but seem to have thrown away their arms and dispersed. At Delhi the sepoy have murdered their officers and taken their guns; but even there they did not stand.

\* \* \* \* \*

Our true policy is to trust the Maharajah of Patiala and Rajah of Jhind, and the country generally, for they have shown evidence of being on our side, but utterly to distrust the regular sepoy. I would spare no expense to carry every European soldier, at any rate to carry every other one. By alternately marching and riding, their strength and spirits will be maintained. We are pushing on the Guides, the 4th Sikhs, the 1st and 4th Punjab Regiment of Infantry, from distant parts of the Punjab in this way.

*Source.*—(iii) Proclamation of John Lawrence, (Punjab Government Records.)

Sepoy—you will have heard that many sepoy and sowars of the Bengal army have proved faithless to their salt at Meerut, at Delhi, and Ferozepore. Many at the latter place have been already punished. An army is assembled and is now close to Delhi, prepared to punish the mutineers and insurgents who have collected there.

Sepoy—I warn and advise you to prove faithful to your salt; faithful to the Government who have given your forefathers and you service for the last hundred years; faithful to that Government who, both in cantonments and in the field, have

been careful of your welfare and interests, and who, in your old age, have given you the means of living comfortably in your homes. Those who have studied history know well that no army has ever been more kindly treated than that of India.

Those regiments which now remain faithful will receive the rewards due to their constancy; those soldiers who fall away now will lose their services for ever! It will be too late to lament hereafter when the time has passed by. Now is the opportunity of proving your loyalty and good faith. The British Government will never want for native soldiers. In a month, it might raise 50,000 in the Punjab alone. If the sepoy neglects the present day, it will never return. There is ample force in the Punjab to crush all mutineers.

The chiefs and people are loyal and obedient, and the latter only long to take your place in the army. All will unite to crush you. Moreover, the sepoy can have no conception of the power of England. Already, from every quarter, English soldiers are pouring into India.

You know well enough that the British Government have never interfered with your religion. Those who tell you the contrary say it for their own base purposes. The Hindu temple and the Muhammadan mosque have both been respected by the English Government. It was but the other day that the Jumma mosque at Lahore, which had cost lacs of rupees, and which the Sikhs had converted into a magazine, was restored to the Muhammadans.

Sepoys,—My advice is that you obey your officers. Seize all those who among yourselves endeavour to mislead you. Let not a few bad men be the cause of your disgrace. If you have the will, you can easily do this, and Government will consider it a test of your fidelity. Prove by your conduct that the loyalty of the sepoy of Hindustan has not degenerated from that of his ancestors.

JOHN LAWRENCE, *Chief Commissioner.*

Source.—(iv) R. Bosworth Smith, "Life of Lord Lawrence." Vol. IV., pp. 42-4. (Smith, Elder.)

Trust the Irregulars and the natives of the Punjab generally, but utterly distrust the Regular army. Utilise the Irregulars in every way you can. Bring them in from the frontier, where their work has been well done, to the points of danger in the interior of the country, where they may have plenty of work of a novel kind. Add largely to the numbers of each existing regiment. Raise fresh regiments, as occasion may require, but do so under proper precautions, remembering that the weapon with which you are arming yourselves may, unless it is well wielded, be turned against yourselves. As to the Regulars, watch them,

isolate them, send them to detached frontier forts, where the population are naturally hostile to them, and where it will be difficult for them to act in concert. If any symptoms of mutiny show themselves, disarm them at once. If mutiny breaks forth into acts, destroy them, if possible, on the spot. If they take to flight, raise the native population against them, and hunt them down. A few stern examples at first will save much bloodshed in the end. Find out the Sikh chiefs living in your respective districts and enlist their martial instincts and their natural hatred of Hindustanis on your side at once. Collect camels and beasts of burden at suitable spots, so that the troops who are moving to the front may face the enemy in the best possible condition. Concentrate bodies of mounted police, so that they may move down on any threatened point in force and crush disturbance at the outset. Remove all Hindustanis from posts of trust and importance. Arrest every wandering Fakir, guard every ferry, examine every sepoy's letter. Keep the regular work of the administration going everywhere. If you are calm yourself, you will help others to be calm also. Don't be afraid of acting on your own responsibility, but keep me informed of anything and everything that happens, and of anything and everything that you do.

## CHAPTER VII

### THE TURN OF THE TIDE

It has been stated already that in the days immediately subsequent to the capture of Delhi there was an ominous calm, characterised by incendiary outbreaks and restless uneasiness on the part of the sepoys, and by ill-timed apathy in some and vigorous action in other places on the part of the British. Unfortunately, Lord Canning had not the means as yet of sending any considerable relief from Calcutta, and, owing to transport and other difficulties, it was some time before the army from the north-west could start on its march to Delhi. In consequence, during the early days of June, the position became well-nigh desperate. In the north-west provinces and Oudh outbreaks became of so serious a nature that, with the exception of fortresses such as Agra, Allahabad and Lucknow, if the latter could be termed a fortress, the whole country was lost for a while. In the Punjab, however, the position was reversed to some extent, there being only sporadic outbreaks, as at Nowshera, Jullundur, and Sialkot, which were vigorously suppressed.

It is now necessary to relate how help came, though slowly at first, from two quarters, from Calcutta in the direction of Cawnpore and Lucknow, and from the Punjab in the direction of Delhi. The British force at Meerut remained stationary for some considerable time after the outbreak of May 10, in spite of the expostulations of Mr. Colvin, the Lieutenant-Governor. It was necessary, apparently, to await the orders of the Commander-in-Chief. That these orders ever arrived was due solely to William Hodson, who hastened from Ambala to Meerut, delivered his message, took a bath, and then returned to the Commander-in-Chief. It was only on May 27 that the Meerut troops began to move under the command of Archdale Wilson, who, after defeating the rebel forces, effected a junction with General Barnard's

army. A pitched battle was fought with success at Badli-ki-serai, just outside Delhi, with the result that the British were enabled to take up their stand on the famous Ridge which overlooks the Imperial city. The investment of the place was out of the question, and indeed "the besiegers were for some weeks the besieged." On June 9, the famous Guides had completed their march from Mardan on the frontier to Delhi and, far from needing rest, joined at once in the fray. The attacks on the Ridge were both violent and frequent, but the little force kept its ground. There were numerous changes in the command, General Barnard dying from cholera, and General Reed having to retire to Simla through ill-health. The responsibility then fell on General Archdale Wilson, with Neville Chamberlain, who succeeded Colonel Chester, as Adjutant-General. The position, however, became so critical that at one time even John Lawrence thought it might be necessary to surrender Peshawar<sup>1</sup> and stake all on the capture of Delhi. Lord Canning vetoed the proposal, and attributed the views held by Lawrence to his failing health. Be that as it may, the Chief Commissioner alone knew, outside those actively engaged, how near to disaster had been the Delhi venture.

John Nicholson assumed command of the movable column in succession to Neville Chamberlain on June 22, and at once proceeded to disarm regiments at Phillaur, Jhelum and elsewhere. Then came the orders for the column to advance on Delhi. On August 14, Nicholson marched into the camp on the Ridge at the head of his men. The reinforcements, naturally, were of incalculable value, and Nicholson himself proved a tower of strength. He had enjoyed a career of extraordinary success on the frontier, where his influence over the wild tribesmen had been remarkable. When the Mutiny broke out, he was at Peshawar with his friend, Herbert Edwardes, and, as has been stated already, attended the famous conference when it was decided

<sup>1</sup> In the event of any disaster at Delhi, what would you recommend? I would make a virtue of necessity. Give Peshawar to the Dost, and bring our European force here from Peshawar, and hold Attock."—(Portion of a letter written by John Lawrence to Neville Chamberlain.)

to constitute a movable column. Lord Canning at first decided—and probably correctly—that Nicholson could not be spared from the frontier, and therefore refused to allow him to accompany the Column as a political officer. However, on Neville Chamberlain becoming Adjutant-General, Nicholson got his chance, which he most ably used.

Nicholson urged continuously on Archdale Wilson the necessity of bold measures, in which advice he was supported by the engineer, Baird-Smith. He led the final attack, which ended in victory for the British cause, but in death for himself. It was only after several days of strenuous fighting, however, that the final victory was achieved. The old king of Delhi fled to Humayun's tomb, some six miles outside the city, whence he was brought back a prisoner by Hodson. Thus was the first signal victory won over the mutineers.

#### ✓ The Critical Period on the Ridge

*Source.*—Letter written by Neville Chamberlain, reproduced in "Field-Marshal Sir Neville Chamberlain," by G. W. Forrest. (Blackwood.)

My dearest Larry,—It is a long time since I have had a good chat with you, such as I used to indulge in when seated on the fore-chest of my waggon in the wilds of South Africa, but I dare say you have often felt a desire to be informed on many little details connected with our life in camp before this place, which the public prints have never properly revealed, so I cannot devote a leisure hour to a better purpose than fulfilling this wish. I joined the camp on the 24th June when affairs looked as unprosperous as they ever did. The previous day the mutineers had struggled from sunset to sunrise to obtain the mastery, believing that as our power in India was founded at Plassey a hundred years before, so it was fated to terminate on the anniversary of the centenary. A few days before that an attack on the rear of the camp had been met with difficulty: the mutineers sent cannon-balls into camp, one lodging in the kitchen of the General Commanding.

Of the original small force many had been killed or wounded, and many had died of cholera. The supply of everything in camp from ammunition to food for man and beast was extremely limited, and every one felt that no trust could be placed on any single Hindustani in camp, whether soldier or camp-follower. Furthermore, at this period of the rebellion it was impossible to say what course the Sikhs and Afghans would pursue, every



one acquainted with native character knowing that if disturbances arose in the Punjab, they might either side against us or return to their own country. That was the real state within the camp, whilst without a line of some miles had to be defended by a handful of men against vastly superior numbers, and whilst our troops and guns had little or no shelter from the mutineers' fire, the latter were protected by the works of the fort and the suburbs. In short, no greater inequality can be conceived, but notwithstanding these disadvantages our eventual success was never doubted. The officers were as cheerful as if quietly in cantonments, and never have I seen a camp where there were fewer croakers! On going round with General Barnard it was impossible but to come to the conclusion that the means thus at his disposal were quite inadequate to the object in view, and I, of course, told him so. I have since heard that on his returning to camp, he mentioned to a brother officer that I did not give him much consolation; but the result has proved that I took a fair estimate of affairs, for had either an assault or approaches been attempted we should not, in all probability, have lived to see our patience crowned with success. Two or three days before my arrival an assault had been determined upon, but fortunately it was prevented by an officer hesitating to carry out an order. After my arrival also, General Barnard was on the point of risking all in opposition to his own judgment, the letters he received from Calcutta, Agra, and Lahore being of a character to unhinge most men, and make them mistrust their judgment; but here again Providence stepped in to uphold us, and the encampment of a large force outside the walls made the sortie impossible. Thus, then, there was no course but to remain where we were or retire, but, with rare exceptions, all felt that there was in reality but *one* plan,—and that was to conquer or let our bones bleach on the hillside.

With this conclusion our attention was directed to strengthening our position, and acting purely on the defensive; except when the communication with our rear was threatened, when, of course, it became necessary to encounter and defeat the mutineers at all hazards, and at any sacrifice of life. In this manner were the troops doomed to an inactivity of all others most trying to English soldiers (and this under a burning sun), and for ten weeks or more were the soldiers constantly under arms ready to meet attacks, both officers and men being struck down by the mutineers' fire, and the men in a proportion, I believe, greater than that suffered at Sebastopol;<sup>1</sup> and having every third or fourth

<sup>1</sup> "The effective force at Delhi never amounted to 10,000 men, and 992 were killed and 2,845 wounded. Many more died from disease and exposure."—Forrest, "History of the Indian Mutiny," Vol. I., p. 150.

day to expel the mutineers from a line of suburbs which it was impossible to allow them to retain permanent possession of without imperilling our safety. All this time, too, cholera was carrying off its victims, and all these causes worked together to thin our ranks, and deprive England of so many and gallant sons who now sleep their last sleep side by side until the coming of that time when there will be no evil, no wrongs to resist.

### Confusion in the City of Delhi

*Source.*—"Two native narratives of the Mutiny in Delhi." Translated by C. T. Metcalfe. pp. 84-87. (Constable.)

On this morning, the 12th, the whole body of native officers of the regiments who had arrived yesterday concerted together and demanded an audience of the King. It was granted; the native officers presented *nazzars* (tribute money) and described themselves as faithful soldiers awaiting his orders. Hákim Ahsanullah Khan secretly warned the King that no dependence could be placed on them, and expressed the fear that as soon as a sufficient number had been gathered together there would be a general plunder of the city. Later in the day Hákim Ahsanullah took counsel with some of the leading men of the city. Their former connection with the Muhammadan power was appealed to, and they were desired to form an executive council for the purpose of maintaining order in the city and providing food for the soldiery . . . All trade in the city ceased entirely, for every shop that was opened was cleared of its contents. Nawáb Hamud Ali Khan was accused of concealing Europeans, and their persons were demanded from him. . . . All this afternoon the Palace was thronged by a turbulent mob of soldiers, calling out that all the grain-shops were closed, and the King's loyal servants were starving. The soldiers demanded of the King that he should pass through the city accompanied by his army, and personally allay the fears of the citizens, and order the people to resume their ordinary occupations. The King yielded, and, mounted on an elephant, passed in procession through the streets. He did personally order the shops to be re-opened, and some were re-opened, and again closed. When the King returned to the Palace, he found the Dewán-i-Khás crowded with the troopers and their horses. They assailed him with loud cries, complaining that the men of the regiment which had mutinied at Delhi had possessed themselves of the treasure from the Delhi collectorate, intending to keep it, and had refused to share it with the Meerut mutineers. The King, utterly distracted and bewildered in the conflicting counsels, ordered the princes, who had been appointed to the command of the troops, to send every mutineer out of the city, locating regiments in separate places, and leaving

only one regiment in the Palace for the defence of the city, and another on the sands in front of the Palace, between the fort and the river. The King pointed out to some of the subahdars present that the Dewán-i-Khás had hitherto been a place sacred to Royalty alone, and had never before been forcibly entered by armed men. Another regiment was ordered to hold the Ajmer Gate of the city, a fourth the Delhi Gate, a fifth the Kashmir Gate. These orders were partially carried out. From house to house the unwilling King was distracted by cries and petitions—all looked to the King for redress. Appeals were made to him to repress the plunder and rapine now common throughout the city.

The King, in a Persian *rubaharí*, beautiful with flowing language, called on all the subahdars to remember that such a state of things was most unbecoming in the reign of a Muhammadan King who was a bright light in the histories of the world, and at whose feet all other kings and monarchs waited with bended knee; and that it must be suppressed. Towards evening a number of his native regimental officers came and again represented the difficulty they experienced in getting rations. Forgetful of the lofty tone of the morning's order, and of the high-toned phraseology expressive of the King's dignity, they addressed him in disrespectful terms. "Listen," cried one, catching him by the hand. "Listen to me," cried another, touching the old King's beard. Angered at their behaviour, yet unable to prevent their insolence, he found relief alone in bewailing before his servants his misfortunes and his fate. Again summoned by loud cries from outside the Palace gates, he passed a second time in procession through the city, calling on the shopkeepers to open their shops and resume trade. Throughout this eventful day he was distraught, perplexed, and cowed at finding himself in a position which made him the mere puppet of those who had formerly been only too glad humbly to obey his orders, but who now, taking advantage of the spirit of insubordination which was rife in all classes of the city in this day of ruin and riot, were not ashamed to mock and humiliate him.

### John Nicholson

*Sources.*—(i) John Lawrence to Lord Dalhousie.

I look on Major Nicholson as the best district officer on the frontier. He possesses great courage, much force of character, and is, at the same time, shrewd and intelligent. He is well worth the wing of a regiment on the border; for his prestige with the people, both on the hills and plains, is very great. He is also a very fair civil officer, and has done a good deal to put things straight in his district.

Source.—(ii) Lord Roberts, "Forty-one Years in India." Vol. I., pp. 59, 60. (Macmillan.)

On one occasion I was surprised to find a camp had risen up during my absence quite close to my tent. I discovered that it belonged to Lieut.-Colonel John Nicholson, the Deputy Commissioner, who was on his tour of inspection, and very soon I received an invitation to dine with him, at which I was greatly pleased. John Nicholson was a name to conjure with in the Punjab. I had heard it mentioned with an amount of respect—indeed, awe—which no other name could excite, and I was all curiosity to see the man whose influence on the frontier was so great that his word was law to the refractory tribes amongst whom he lived. He had only lately arrived in Peshawar, having been transferred from Bannu, a difficult and troublesome district, ruled by him as it had never been ruled before, and where he made such a reputation for himself that, while he was styled "a pillar of strength" by Lord Dalhousie, he was looked up to as a god by the natives, who loved as much as they feared him. By some of them he was actually worshipped as a saint; they formed themselves into a sect, and called themselves "Nicholseyns." Nicholson impressed me more profoundly than any man I had ever met before, or have ever met since. I have never seen any one like him. He was the *beau-idéal* of a soldier and a gentleman. His appearance was distinguished and commanding, with a sense of power about him which to my mind was the result of his having passed so much of his life amongst the wild and lawless tribesmen, with whom his authority was supreme. Inter-course with this man amongst men made me more eager than ever to remain on the frontier, and I was seized with ambition to follow in his footsteps. Had I never seen Nicholson again, I might have thought that the feelings with which he inspired me were to some extent the result of my imagination, excited by the astonishing stories I had heard of his power and influence; my admiration, however, for him was immeasurably strengthened when, a few weeks later, I served as his staff officer, and had opportunities of observing more closely his splendid soldierly qualities and the workings of his grand, simple mind.

Source.—(iii) Herbert Edwardes' Administration Report.

I cannot close this year's report without a tribute to Colonel John Nicholson. Had he been spared he would very shortly have brought the Peshawar district, as he had before brought Bannu, to the minimum of crime and its every official to the maximum of exertion. Even in one half-year he made an impression not easily to be effaced. It is generally supposed that he was a severe ruler. In some senses he was. A criminal had no chance of long escaping him; for his police investigation was the

most extensive, painstaking, able and determined I ever saw. And an incorrigible official had no chance of ultimate impunity ; for to stop corruption and do justice was his vocation ; but I have never known any judicial officer so deliberate in his punishments. He warned repeatedly before he struck. He gave the worst offenders an opportunity of turning over a new leaf, and was generous in overlooking the past when a man set himself to recover his character. Malpractices in the courts disappeared before him, but it was seldom an official lost his place. The very first day he entered the district he suspended a thanadar<sup>1</sup> whom he caught in an act of oppression, and he committed a tahsildar<sup>2</sup> to the sessions ; but I do not remember that any other examples were necessary, and both cases were forced on him by the people. In business he was most laborious, he worked from morning till night—he went everywhere and judged for himself. He was often at the scenes of crime or dispute, realising the rights of cases, and hearing the people as well as the police. He was rapid in settling trials in his own courts, and prompt in hearing appeals ; he used the lash freely to vagabonds and petty ruffians instead of loading the jails and hardening men in crime. The tahsildars, the police, the whole executive machinery was alive under his supervision, and each man felt that there was a master-hand upon the district. The people and the neighbouring mountain tribes all felt it too. As a native well expressed his influence, "The sound of his horse's hoofs was heard from Attock to the Khyber."

I mention these points not in eulogy, but for the right understanding of the great colleague we have lost. It is no disparagement to those who survive that such an administrator leaves no equal. Nature makes but few such men, and the Punjab is happy in having had one.

### The Death of Nicholson

*Source.*—Lord Roberts, "Forty-one Years in India." Vol. I. (Macmillan.)

It was intended, as I have before said, that the assault should be delivered at break of day, but many of the men belonging to the regiments of the storming force had been on piquet all night, and it took some time for them to rejoin their respective corps. A further delay was caused by our having to destroy the partial repairs to the trenches which the enemy had succeeded in effecting during the night, notwithstanding the steady fire we had kept up.

While we were thus engaged, the infantry were ordered to lie down under cover. Standing on the crenellated wall which

<sup>1</sup> Head constable.

<sup>2</sup> Native collector of revenue.

separated Ludlow Castle from the road, I saw Nicholson at the head of his column, and wondered what was passing through his mind. Was he thinking of the future, or of the wonderful part he had played during the past four months? At Peshawar he had been Edwardes' right hand. At the head of the movable column he had been mainly instrumental in keeping the Punjab quiet, and at Delhi every one felt that during the short time he had been with us he was our guiding star, and that but for his presence in the camp the assault which he was about to lead would probably never have come off. He was truly "a tower of strength." Any feeling of reluctance to serve under a captain of the Company's army, which had at first been felt by some, had been completely overcome by his wonderful personality. Each man in the force, from the general in command to the last joined private soldier, recognised that the man whom the wild people on the frontier had deified—the man of whom a little time before Edwardes had said to Lord Canning, "You may rely upon this, that if ever there is a desperate deed to be done in India, John Nicholson is the man to do it"—was one who had proved himself beyond all doubt capable of grappling with the crisis through which we were passing, and one to follow to the death. Faith in the commander who had claimed and been given the post of honour was unbounded, and every man was prepared "to do or die" for him.

The sun had risen high in the heavens when the breaching guns suddenly ceased, and each soldier felt he had but one brief moment in which to brace himself for the coming conflict. Nicholson gave the signal. The 60th Rifles with a loud cheer dashed to the front in skirmishing order, while at the same moment the heads of the first and second columns appeared from the Kudsia-bagh and moved steadily towards the breaches.

No sooner were the front ranks seen by the rebels than a storm of bullets met them from every side, and officers and men fell thick on the crest of the glacis. Then, for a few seconds, amidst a blaze of musketry, the soldiers stood at the edge of the ditch, for only one or two of the ladders had come up, the rest having been dropped by their killed or wounded carriers. Dark figures crowded on the breach, hurling stones upon our men and daring them to come on. More ladders were brought up, they were thrown into the ditch, and our men, leaping into it, raised them against the escarp on the other side. Nicholson, at the head of a part of his column, was the first to ascend the breach in the curtain. The remainder of his troops diverged a little to the right to escalate the breach in the Kashmir bastion. Here Lieutenants Barter and Fitzgerald, of the 75th Foot, were the first to mount, and here the latter fell mortally wounded. The breaches were quickly filled with dead and dying, but the rebels

were hurled back, and the ramparts which had so long resisted us were our own.

The breach at the water bastion was carried by No. 2 column. No sooner was its head seen emerging from the cover of the old Custom-house than it was met by a terrible discharge of musketry. Both the engineer officers (Greathead and Hovenden) who were leading it fell severely wounded, and of the thirty-nine men who carried the ladders twenty-nine were killed or wounded in as many seconds. The ladders were immediately seized by their comrades, who, after one or two vain attempts, succeeded in placing them against the escarp. Then, amidst a shower of stones and bullets, the soldiers ascended, rushed the trench, and, slaying all before them, drove the rebels from the walls.

No. 3 Column had in the meanwhile advanced towards the Kashmir Gate and halted. Lieutenants Home<sup>1</sup> and Salkeld with eight sappers and miners and a bugler of the 52nd Foot went forward to blow the gate open. The enemy were apparently so astounded at the audacity of the proceeding that for a minute or two they offered but slight resistance. They soon, however, discovered how small the party was and the object for which it had come, and forthwith opened a deadly fire upon the gallant little band from the top of the gateway, from the city wall, and through the open wicket.

The bridge over the ditch in front of the gateway had been destroyed, and it was with some difficulty that the single beam which remained could be crossed. Home with the men carrying the powder bags got over first. As the bags were being attached to the gate, Sergeant Carmichael was killed and Havildar Mahdoo wounded; the rest then slipped into the ditch to allow the firing party which had come up under Salkeld to carry out its share of the duty.

While endeavouring to fire the charge, Salkeld, being shot through the leg and arm, handed the slow-match to Corporal Burgess, who fell mortally wounded, but not until he had successfully performed his task.

As soon as the explosion had taken place, Bugler Hawthorne sounded the regimental call of the 52nd. Meeting with no

<sup>1</sup> Lieutenant Home was killed accidentally a few days afterwards. "On the afternoon of the 1st October the fort was blown up, and unfortunately, while superintending the operations, Lieutenant Home was killed. The mine had been laid and the slow match lighted, but the explosion not following as quickly as was expected, Home thought the match must have gone out, and went forward to relight it. At that moment the mine blew up. His death was greatly felt in camp, happening as it did when all the excitement of battle was over."

response, he sounded twice again. The noise of firing and shouting was so great that neither the sound of the bugle nor that of the explosion reached the column, but Campbell, after allowing the firing party what he thought was sufficient time, gave the order to advance. Captain Crosse, of the 52nd, was the first to reach the gate, followed closely by Corporal Taylor, of his own company, and Captain Synge, of the same regiment, who was Campbell's Brigade-Major. In single file along the narrow plank they crossed the ditch in which lay the shattered remnant of the gallant little band; they crept through the wicket, which was the only part blown in; and found the interior of the gateway blocked by an 18-pounder gun, under which were lying the scorched bodies of two or three sepoys, who had evidently been killed by the explosion. The rest of the column followed as rapidly as the precarious crossing would admit, and when Campbell got inside he found himself face to face with both Nicholson's and Jones's columns, which, after mounting the three trenches, poured in a mingled crowd into the open space between the Kashmir Gate and the church.

\* \* \* \* \*

Just after starting on my errand, while riding through the Kashmir Gate, I observed by the side of the road a doolie, without bearers, and with evidently a wounded man inside. I dismounted to see if I could be of any use to the occupant, when I found, to my grief and consternation, that it was John Nicholson, with death written on his face. He told me that the bearers had put the doolie down and gone off to plunder; that he was in great pain and wished to be taken to the hospital. He was lying on his back, no wound was visible, and but for the pallor of his face, always colourless, there was no sign of the agony he must have been enduring. On my expressing a hope that he was not seriously wounded, he said: "I am dying; there is no chance for me." The sight of that great man lying helpless and on the point of death was almost more than I could bear. Other men had daily died around me, friends and comrades had been killed beside me, but I never felt as I felt then—to lose Nicholson seemed to me at the moment to lose everything.

\* \* \* \* \*

The news that we had occupied the palace, and were in complete possession of the city of Delhi, consoled Nicholson on his deathbed. From the first there was little hope that this valuable life could be saved. He was taken into hospital in a fainting condition from internal hemorrhage, and he was enduring excruciating agony; but, wrote General Chamberlain, "throughout those nine days of suffering he bore himself nobly; not a lament or sigh ever passed his lips." His every thought was given to his country, and to the last he materially aided the military



authorities by his clear-sighted, sound, and reliable advice. His intellect remained unclouded to the end. With his latest breath he sent messages of tender farewell to his mother, hoping she would be patient under his loss, and to his oldest and dearest friend, Herbert Edwardes. After his death some frontier chiefs and native officers were permitted to see him, and I was told that it was touching beyond expression to see these strong men shed tears as they looked on all that was left of the leader they so loved and honoured.

Attention should now be turned to the relief coming from the opposite quarter towards Cawnpore and Lucknow. In command of that force was General Havelock, a man similar to John Nicholson in his puritanical faith and in his devotion to his profession, but unlike him in the matter of years, for he was an old soldier who had seen active service in the Peninsular War, in Burma, in Afghanistan, and in the Punjab. When the Mutiny broke out, he was returning from a victorious campaign in Persia, and it was not until June 17 that he landed in Calcutta. About a fortnight later he arrived and took over command at Allahabad, where Colonel Neild with some Madras troops who had maintained a magnificent record of loyalty had saved the fort from the mutineers. Little time could be spent in preparations, and the little army was soon on its way to Cawnpore. "In nine days Havelock and his veterans marched 126 miles under an Indian sun in the hottest season of the year, each man carrying a heavy weight of ammunition, and had won four pitched battles and sundry combats against highly-disciplined troops far exceeding them in number." Immediately Cawnpore had been taken, though unfortunately too late to save the garrison, Havelock set out for the relief of Lucknow. He combined in a peculiar degree "the greatest daring with the greatest prudence." In his march on Cawnpore and in his final journey to Lucknow he was willing to risk all to achieve a great aim; but during the interval between the capture of Cawnpore on July 17 and the arrival of Sir James Outram with reinforcements two months later, he showed the highest moral courage allied with a true sense of responsibility. His critics—and they were many—urged him to press on at all costs, but they little realised the attenuated numbers

of his little army, the intense heat,<sup>1</sup> the ravages of cholera and other forms of disease, and the difficulties of transport; nor did they take into account the vast preponderance of numbers facing them, nor the fact that the mutiny at Dinapore in their rear threatened to interrupt all communications with Allahabad. Havelock refused to court inevitable disaster and retired to Cawnpore; and at one time he even contemplated a still further retreat to Allahabad. In these decisions he received the support of Sir Colin Campbell, who had just taken over command in Calcutta.

### The Difficulties of Havelock's Army

*Source.*—(i) Telegram from General Havelock to the Commander in-Chief, dated Cawnpore, August 21, 1857. (State Papers. Vol. II., pp. 192-4.)

I cannot express the gratification with which I have perused your Excellency's telegram of the 19th instant which has just reached me. The approbation of my operations and views conveyed to me by so distinguished a soldier, more than repays me for the labour and responsibilities of two arduous campaigns undertaken, of necessity, at a most unpropitious season; my soldiers will as highly and deeply value your Excellency's commendation. I am for the present unable to give them shelter from the extreme inclemency of the weather, and the repose of which they stand in need; but sickness continues in our ranks,—we lose men by cholera to the number of six daily. I will frankly make known to your Excellency my prospects for the future. If I can receive prompt reinforcements, so as to make up my force to 2,000 or to 2,500 men, I can hold this place with a high hand; protect my communications with anything that comes against me; and be ready to take a part in active operations on the cessation of the rains. I may be attacked from Gwalior by the mutinous contingent, with 5,000 men and 30 guns, or by the Gurkhas which are assembling at Farruckabad under rebellious Nabobs, which have also a formidable artillery; but as they can partly unite, I can defeat either or both in fight; but if regiments cannot be sent me, I see no alternative but abandoning for a time the advantages I have gained in this part of India, and retiring upon Allahabad, where everything will be organised for a triumphant advance in the cold season. It is painful to report that, in the latter event, Cawnpore and the surrounding countries,

<sup>1</sup> The 78th Highlanders had to fight throughout the whole campaign in the woollen clothing provided for the Persian climate in winter-time.

in fact the whole Doab, would be abandoned to rapine and misery and Agra will fall unsupported. I do not consider that our force would be compromised, for in truth the base of the operation is, strange to say, the Punjab. I have endeavoured briefly to state my case, and must leave the decision of the important question involved in it to your Excellency.

I do most earnestly hope that you will be able to provide prompt reinforcements; my communications with Allahabad will be quite safe as soon as detachments begin to pass upwards. I have sufficiently explained the danger to which I am exposed should the enemy at Gwalior take the initiative with his imposing force; it is to my left rear; and a force would at the same time endeavour to cross from Oudh to Futtehpore; this would cut in my rear, and prevent even the advance of my reinforcements. I have sent a steamer to destroy his boats, but have no news of its success. The Farruckabad force would also assail me, and this column, hitherto triumphant, would be destroyed. The Gwalior force on the Jumna is 5,000 strong, with thirteen guns. The force threatening Futtehpore and Dalmow Ghaut may at any moment, by the fall of Lucknow, swell to 20,000, with all the disposable artillery of the province. The Farruckabad force is 12,000 men with twelve guns. If I do not get any promise of reinforcement from your Excellency by return of telegraph, I will retire at once towards Allahabad. I can no longer bear a defenceless entrenchment; that on the river being taken in the rear by the enemy assembling on the right bank of the Ganges.

*Source.*—(ii) Major North, "The Journal of an English Officer in India." (Hurst & Blackett.)

Now a work of severe trial opens to us.<sup>1</sup> We are about to cross the Ganges, a mile wide here, much swollen by the incessant rain, and against an extremely strong current, our small steamer and a few native boats being the only means of transit. But Lucknow is to be succoured immediately by our shadow of an army, insufficient in itself to cover even Cawnpore, destitute of cavalry, horse artillery, or horse battery, and without a reserve between Cawnpore and Calcutta. Such are the instructions of the Government, and such the means provided by the same authority both for carrying out the instructions, viz., the immediate relief of Lucknow, and also for holding the vast tract of territory between this and Calcutta!

The enterprise is a desperate one, and it will be seen whether a force so weak as ours can do more than make the attempt. The entire population of Oudh is against us. Therefore, we may

<sup>1</sup> This was immediately after the battle of Cawnpore, when Havelock tried at once to reach Lucknow.

anticipate the most stringent opposition ; particularly as its people are remarkably warlike, much attached to their former rulers, and always opposed to our encroachment on their territory. They have not been brought into subjection to us by the sword of the warrior ; their territory has merely been annexed by a stroke of the pen. This annexation was considered at the time an able piece of statesmanship, but it has since borne the bitter fruit of disaffection.

\* \* \* \* \*

Cavalry is utterly useless, it being quite impossible for them to act, from the flooded state of the roads. We are within thirty miles of Lucknow, where our compatriots are beset by our implacable enemy, and yet are unable to succour them. Our little band is decimated by disease, dysentery and cholera thinning our reduced ranks, while the reeking, pestilential atmosphere, incident to swampy ground, engenders those disorders.

To-day we are to retire, an order which, though emanating from such wise foresight as merits applause, is yet most unwelcome to those bold, eager spirits, burning for fresh enterprise and panting to relieve our countrymen. The very idea of a retrograde movement filled them with consternation ; its present reality calls forth the first murmurs I have yet heard. A man of less genuine mettle than our General might be swayed by such demonstrations, but the superiority of his moral courage renders him unassailable, and elevates him far beyond the fear of man which bringeth a snare.

Prudence, as well as courage, is one of the first virtues of a soldier, a duty to be sedulously cultivated ; so much depending on its exercise, and so many human lives. Nor is any act or decision of our leaders more to be lauded than this. To risk a further reduction of our numbers now would be culpable rashness, the more especially as we expect reinforcements shortly.

Eventually the tide began to turn. Sir James Outram arrived at Cawnpore with reinforcements on September 15. He refused to take over command, but waived the claims of his rank and insisted on serving under General Havelock as a volunteer until Lucknow was relieved. A few days later the long-expected message was received at Lucknow that the relieving army had crossed the Ganges and was on its way. Such was the speed of the advance that the noise of the distant cannonade was soon audible within the walls of the city. Then after some severe fighting the Residency was reached. It was found, however, that the garrison had been reinforced, but not relieved. Sir James Outram, who

assumed command on September 26, saw only too clearly that it was impossible to carry out the original intention of withdrawing the garrison to Cawnpore, and that it was necessary therefore to await the arrival of Sir Colin Campbell, the new Commander-in-Chief, with fresh reinforcements.

### ✓ Sir James Outram

*Source.*—(i) Extract from letter written by Lady Canning. Reproduced in "The Story of Two Noble Lives," by A. J. C. Hare. (George Allen.)

There is a telegraph from General Havelock of his having crossed the Ganges, and of a successful charge by Sir J. Outram. This is excellent news, but we think Sir J. Outram ought not to be leading charges of cavalry. He looks upon himself as a volunteer, for he leaves the chief command to General Havelock.<sup>1</sup> This small squadron is of little more than a hundred men, officers of mutinous regiments, and volunteers from infantry regiments, who can ride.

<sup>1</sup> Writing himself in 1859 on his self-abnegation in favour of Sir Henry Havelock and on certain charges levelled against him for needlessly exposing himself to danger, Sir James Outram used the following words:—

"I conceive that as a soldier I was simply in the position of a mere volunteer during the period I abnegated the command to General Havelock. I am not so satisfied, however, that I can justly contend against the impression, which I regret to find is entertained by the Governor-General (Lord Canning), that I too readily ignored the responsibilities of the high civil position in which he had placed me, even whilst its duties were in abeyance from the impossibility of conducting them, while yet we possessed no footing in Oudh. In that view His Excellency's arguments against the course I pursued on this occasion are too cogent, though so kindly and courteously expressed, to allow me to blind myself to the fact that I was not justified in so entirely losing sight, as I cannot but feel conscious that I did, of my position of Chief Commissioner in Oudh. But I beg to be allowed to urge as somewhat extenuating my apparent selfishness in seeking personal distinction in the field, while yet my civil functions were literally *nil*, that until Lucknow fell to our arms or returned to allegiance on relief of the garrison, there could be no possibility of a Chief Commissioner being required; and to effect the great object which we then had in view, every man of the force, military or civil, was required to do the duty of a soldier.

But I hope I was actuated by better motives than the mere seeking of personal distinction. I felt that it was more incumbent on myself than on any man in the force to show the soldiers that I did not shrink from any dangers to which they themselves were exposed, in a struggle which they all knew I had drawn them into.

*Source.*—(ii) Order of Sir James Outram.

The important duty of first relieving the garrison of Lucknow has been intrusted to Brigadier-General Havelock, C.B., and Major-General Outram feels that it is due to this distinguished officer, and the strenuous and noble exertions which he has already made to effect that object, that to him should accrue the honour of the achievement. Major-General Outram is confident that the great end for which General Havelock and his brave troops have so long and so gloriously fought will now, under the blessing of Providence, be accomplished.

The Major-General therefore, in gratitude for, and admiration of, the brilliant deeds in arms achieved by General Havelock and his gallant troops, will cheerfully waive his rank on the occasion; and will accompany the force to Lucknow in his civil capacity as Chief Commissioner of Oudh, tendering his military services to General Havelock as a volunteer. On the relief of Lucknow the Major-General will resume his position at the head of the force.

#### News of Impending Relief in Lucknow

*Source.*—Martin Gubbins, "The Mutinies in Oudh." (Richard Bentley.)

It is impossible to over-value the importance of these visits of Ungud.<sup>1</sup> Again he came, as will presently be related, when hope deferred had made the heart sick; when Europeans doubted; when desertion of natives had become more numerous, and yet more were imminent; and again the certainty of approaching succour revived and refreshed us, and reanimated the languishing fidelity of our native friends.

Our success depended on all being nerved by the same spirit; and the holding back of so prominent an individual as their late General, on the plea of his position as Chief Commissioner, would not have promoted such a spirit. It was an object certainly to inspire our small body of cavalry, in their first contest, with the enthusiasm required to carry them through what we knew they would have to encounter ere we reached Lucknow.

But my interference was little needed to that end with men under Captain Barrow's command, and would not have been exerted, perhaps, had I had previous opportunities of testing that officer's qualifications for command. The cavalry affair, however, was mere pastime to what was before us when imperative duty demanded my exposure; for I state but the truth, to which the whole army will testify, declaring it in self-defence against the imputation of needlessly exposing myself, that had I gone to the rear when wounded on the morning of September 25, the column would not have penetrated into the city, nor without my guidance could it have reached the Residency.

<sup>1</sup> A news carrier.

Nor could any picture more characteristic of the siege be presented than one which should represent Ungud just after one of his midnight entrances, recounting to our eagerly listening ears the events which he had witnessed. The low room of the ground floor, with a single light carefully screened on the outer side lest it should attract the bullets of the enemy; the anxious faces of the men who crowded round, and listened with breathless attention to question and answer; the exclamation of joy as pieces of good tidings were given out, and laughter at some of Ungud's jeers upon the enemy. More retired would be shown the indistinct forms of the women in their night attire, who had been attracted from their rooms in hopes of catching early some part of the good news which had come in. The animated and intelligent face of our messenger, as he assured us of the near approach of help, occupies the foreground. All these together form a scene which must live, as long as life remains, in the memory of us all.

\* \* \* \* \*

Ungud had been sent out again by Brigadier Inglis with despatches for General Havelock on the 16th of the month. He returned on the night of the 22nd, and was the bearer of good news. He brought a letter from General Sir James Outram, which announced to us that an army thoroughly appointed had crossed the Ganges on the 19th, and would, *D.V.*, soon relieve us. The General advised that we should not venture out of our defences; and only attempt anything in aid of the relief force if we could safely do so. . . .

During the morning of the 23rd September the weather cleared, and the sound of artillery in the direction of Cawnpore was distinctly heard. By 2 p.m., the reports became quite frequent and loud. We supposed that they could not be further distant than five or six miles. Later in the afternoon, some field pieces appeared to have advanced much nearer; for shots were heard which appeared to have been fired at a distance of less than three miles. All now was exultation and joy within the garrison. The natives were at length thoroughly convinced that succour was at hand. And as for Ungud, he literally danced with joy, exclaiming at each shot, "our troops have arrived," and upbraidingly asked the Sikhs whether they were lies which he had been telling.

The guns of the relieving army were heard again early on the morning of the 25th, and became louder by ten o'clock. While we were joyfully listening to the sound, a sepoy entered my post, coming in over the works to the great surprise of the sentry. Before the man could raise his musket, however, the stranger produced a letter, and was recognised to be a messenger from our friends. The letter which he bore was an old one, dated the

16th, from General Outram, and announced his intention shortly to cross the river. He soon went out again with the Brigadier's reply. The messenger could tell us nothing more than we then already knew, viz., that our troops had reached the outskirts of the city.

About half-past eleven the firing ceased; but soon after, numbers of the city people were observed flying over the bridges across the river, carrying bundles of property on their heads. An hour later, the flight became more general, and many sepoy, matchlockmen, and Irregular Cavalry troopers crossed the river in full flight, many by the bridges, but more throwing themselves into the river and swimming across it. The guns of our Redan battery, and every other gun that could be brought to bear upon the flying enemy, as well as our own mortars, opened a rapid fire upon them, which was maintained for upwards of an hour. No sooner did this begin, than the enemy assailed us on every side with a perfect hurricane of shot and shell from all their batteries. Fragments of shells were falling everywhere; and the interior of the Residency itself was visited by round shot in places which had never been reached before.

About two o'clock, the smoke of our guns was seen in the suburbs of the city, and presently the rattle of musketry could be heard. At four o'clock, the officers at the look-out could clearly distinguish European troops and officers in movement in the vicinity of Mr. Martin's house and the Moti Munzil. About five o'clock we were aroused by a sharp rattle of musketry in the streets, and a few minutes later the column of the 78th Highlanders and Sikhs, accompanied by several mounted officers, were seen from the Garrison House to turn into the main street leading to the Residency, up which they charged at a rapid pace, loading, shouting, and firing as they passed along; and almost before a cheer could be raised, General Outram rode up, and dismounted at the embrasure of Aitken's battery, near the Bailey Guard Gate. I will here quote the eloquent description of the greeting given to our friends from the account of a "staff officer."

"Once fairly *seen*, all our doubts and fears regarding them were ended; and then the garrison's long pent-up feelings of anxiety and suspense burst forth in a succession of deafening cheers. From every pit, trench, and battery—from behind the sand-bags piled on shattered houses—from every post still held by a few gallant spirits, rose cheer on cheer—even from the Hospital! Many of the wounded crawled forth to join in that glad shout of welcome to those who had so bravely come to our assistance. It was a moment never to be forgotten."



### The Siege and First Relief of Lucknow

Source.—*Annual Register*, vol. 99; *Public Documents*, pp. 455, 456.  
Despatch from Brigadier-General Havelock to the Chief of the Staff to the Commander-in-Chief.

RESIDENCY, LUCKNOW.

September 30, 1857.

SIR,—Major-General Sir James Outram having, with characteristic generosity of feeling, declared that the command of the force should remain in my hands, and that he would accompany it as Civil Commissioner only, until a junction could be effected with the gallant and enduring garrison of this place, I have to request that you will inform His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief that this purpose was effected on the evening of the 25th instant. But before detailing the circumstances, I must refer to antecedent events. I crossed the Sye on the 22nd instant, the bridge at Bunnee not having been broken. On the 23rd I found myself in the presence of the enemy, who had taken a strong position, his left resting on the enclosure of the Alum Bagh and his centre and right drawn up behind a chain of hillocks. The head of my column at first suffered from the fire of his guns as it was compelled to pass along the trunk road between morasses; but as soon as my regiments could be deployed along his front and his right enveloped by my left, victory declared for us, and we captured five guns. Sir James Outram, with his accustomed gallantry, passed on in advance close down to the canal. But as the enemy fed his artillery with guns from the city, it was not possible to maintain this, or a less advanced position for a time taken up; but it became necessary to throw our right on the Alum Bagh, and re-form our left, and even then we were incessantly cannonaded throughout the 24th; and the enemy's cavalry, 1,500 strong, crept round through lofty cultivation, and made a sudden irruption upon the baggage massed in our rear. The soldiers of the 90th forming the baggage-guard received them with great gallantry, but lost some brave officers and men, shooting down, however, twenty-five of the troopers, and putting the whole body to flight. They were finally driven to a distance by two guns of Captain Olpherts' battery.

The troops had been marching for three days under a perfect deluge of rain, irregularly fed, and badly housed in villages. It was thought necessary to pitch tents and permit them to halt on the 24th. The assault on the city was deferred until the 25th. That morning our baggage and tents were deposited in the Alum Bagh under an escort, and we advanced. The 1st Brigade, under Sir James Outram's personal leading, drove the enemy from a succession of gardens and walled enclosures, supported

by the 2nd Brigade, which I accompanied. Both brigades were established on the canal at the bridge of Char Bagh.

From this point the direct road to the Residency was something less than two miles ; but it was known to have been cut by trenches, and crossed by palisades at short intervals, the houses also being loop-holed. Progress in this direction was impossible ; so the united columns pushed on, detouring along the narrow road which skirts the left bank of the canal. Its advance was not seriously interrupted until it had come opposite the King's Palace, or the Kaisir Bagh, where two guns and a body of mercenary troops were entrenched. From this entrenchment a fire of grape and musketry was opened under which nothing could live. The artillery and troops had to pass a bridge partially under its influence ; but were then shrouded by the buildings adjacent to the Fureed Buksh. Darkness was coming on, and Sir James Outram at first proposed to halt within the Courts of the Mehal for the night ; but I esteemed it to be of such importance to let the beleaguered garrison know that succour was at hand, that with his ultimate sanction I directed the main, both of 78th Highlanders and regiment of Ferozepore, to advance. This column rushed on with desperate gallantry, led by Sir James Outram and myself, and Lieutenants Hudson and Hargood, of my staff, through streets of flat-roofed, loop-holed houses, from which a perpetual fire was being kept up, and, overcoming every obstacle, established itself within the enclosure of the Residency. The joy of the garrison may be more easily conceived than described ; but it was not till the next evening that the whole of my troops, guns, tumbrils, and sick and wounded, continually exposed to the attacks of the enemy, could be brought step by step within this " enceinte " and the adjacent palace of the Fureed Buksh. To form an adequate idea of the obstacles overcome, reference must be made to the events that are known to have occurred at Buenos Ayres and Saragossa. Our advance was through streets of houses which I have described, and thus each forming a separate fortress. I am filled with surprise at the success of the operation, which demanded the efforts of 10,000 good troops. The advantage gained has cost us dear. The killed, wounded, and missing, the latter being wounded soldiers, who, I much fear—some or all—have fallen into the hands of a merciless foe, amounted, up to the evening of the 26th, to 535 officers and men. Brigadier-General Neill, commanding 1st Brigade ; Major Cooper, Brigadier, commanding Artillery ; Lieutenant-Colonel Bazely, a volunteer with the force, are killed. Colonel Campbell, commanding 90th Light Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel Tytler, my Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General ; and Lieutenant Havelock, my Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General, are severely, but not dangerously, wounded. Sir James

Outram received a flesh-wound in the arm in the early part of the action near Char Bagh, but nothing could subdue his spirit; and, though faint from loss of blood, he continued to the end of the action to sit on his horse, which he only dismounted at the gate of the Residency. As he has now assumed the command, I leave to him the narrative of all events subsequent to the 26th.

I have, etc.,

H. HAVELOCK,

*Brigadier-General,*

*Commanding Oude Field Force.*

Total casualties appended :

119 officers and men killed.

339 officers and men wounded.

77 men missing.

Sir Colin Campbell arrived in Calcutta on August 13. Like Henry Havelock, he had seen much active service in the Peninsula, at Chillianwalla, and the Crimea, and at the age of sixty-five accepted the responsibility of organising victory over the mutineers in India. He was detained in Calcutta for some time in making preparations which should already have been finished and in awaiting reinforcements from England and China. He reached Allahabad on November 1, and Cawnpore two days later. In the meantime relief was coming also from another quarter. No sooner had Delhi been taken than it was decided to send reinforcements to Oudh by way of Agra under the command first of Colonel Greathead and subsequently of Sir Hope Grant; and of this number was Lieutenant, afterwards Lord, Roberts. Though suffering intensely from fatigue and privation,<sup>1</sup> the little band pressed on faster than ever on receipt of a message from Outram that the Lucknow garrison was in sore straits, and proved a welcome reinforcement to the main body. In making his final plans for the relief of the Residency, Sir Colin Campbell received the most valuable assistance from Mr. Kavanagh, who had made his way from the city across the river to the British camp in the midst of terrible difficulty and danger.

<sup>1</sup> "The Queen's 8th passed within three yards of us. 'These dreadful-looking men must be Afghans,' said a lady to me as they slowly and wearily marched by. I did not discover they were Englishmen till I saw a short clay pipe in the mouth of nearly the last man."—"Notes on the Revolt," C. Barker, p. 70.

"No more difficult and delicate operation,"<sup>1</sup> writes Mr. Forrest, "was ever planned by a commander. With a force of 4,500 men of all arms Campbell had to rescue Outram from the grasp of 60,000 trained soldiers occupying strong positions. He had to carry and hold these positions until he reached the post held by Outram's force. He had to do it, on account of the want of provisions, within a limited period. He had also to hold a succession of posts on the left so as to keep a clear road from the Residency to the open country. He had to bring away the sick and wounded women and children, evacuate the Residency, and withdraw his troops, first to the Martinière and Dilkusha, and then to the Alum Bagh. He had to leave there a small body of men to threaten the enemy, and then proceed with all haste to Cawnpore to save Windham and his garrison. The chances were against him, the risk was immense. But the risk had to be run to save women and children, to rescue an Empire."

Sir Colin Campbell and his troops, however, surmounted all these difficulties, and after the most strenuous fighting cleared their way to the Residency, where they were met by Outram and Havelock. It was decided to evacuate the place, and remove the non-combatants and the sick to Cawnpore. Outram, however, remained outside Lucknow with a force just sufficient to show that the province of Oudh had not been abandoned in accordance with Lord Canning's instructions. But the joy of victory was mingled with great sorrow, for on November 24 Sir Henry Havelock died. He was buried in the Alum Bagh, and Outram himself carved a cross to stand over his grave. "As long as the memory of great deeds and high courage and spotless devotion is cherished among his countrymen, so long will Havelock's lonely tomb, in the grave beneath the scorching eastern sky, hard by the vast city, the scene alike of his toil, his triumph, and his death, be regarded as one of the most holy of the many spots where the patriot soldiers lie."

<sup>1</sup> "History of the Indian Mutiny." Vol. II., pp. 128-9. By G. W. Forrest. (Blackwood.)

## CHAPTER VIII

### THE END OF THE STRUGGLE

THE final relief of Lucknow may be said to close the second period of the campaign during which, in the main, the British were the besieged rather than the besiegers. Henceforward, the contest became one of pitched battles which, though almost invariably successful from the British point of view, were for a time at least very ineffective. Progress was painfully slow. The British armies made triumphant marches, but through their inability to garrison the country, they could not re-establish authority. Even after the arrival of reinforcements, their numbers were so limited that it was almost impossible to keep open the lines of communication, especially in Oudh and Bundelcund, where the inhabitants were almost universally hostile. That this was so is shown conclusively by the history of events. In the march back from Lucknow, as he was conveying the wounded and non-combatants, Sir Colin Campbell heard the sound of cannon from the direction of Cawnpore, which betokened the fact that the garrison there was in difficulties from the attacks of the Nana Sahib and the Gwalior troops, and he was only just in time to turn what might have been a serious reverse into a glorious victory. He then proceeded to regain command of his lines of communication with Delhi and the Punjab beyond along the Grand Trunk Road. By this means he hoped to force the mutineers to the north, where they could be defeated as opportunity offered, whilst the Central India and Gwalior troops could be left to the Madras and Bombay armies which were advancing northwards. In accordance with the suggestion of Lord Canning, he then decided to advance on Lucknow, in which movement he received valuable assistance from the Gurkhas marching down from the north under the command of Jung Bahadur.

Lord Canning saw that Lucknow had become what Delhi had been a few months before, a rallying-place for the sepoys. As they had previously championed the cause of the King of Delhi, so were they then acting in the case of the King of Oudh. Since the relief of Lucknow, Outram had been encamped at the Alum Bagh, where he had maintained his own against vastly superior numbers, and was of great assistance in the final attack. At length, after almost continuous fighting for twenty days, the city was taken and another danger spot removed. During the few weeks that remained until the hot weather set in, Sir Colin transferred his force to Rohilkund, where he won a hard-fought fight at Bareilly.

In the meantime, Sir Hugh Rose had marched up from the south, and taken the fortress of Jhansi, where he defeated Tantia Topi, who was perhaps the most gifted leader of the mutineers. At the very time, however, when the outlook seemed so much brighter, news of a serious nature arrived. Tantia Topi had for some time been intriguing with the troops of Maharajah Scindiah, who, under most trying circumstances, had remained staunch to the British cause. In the battle which ensued, the Gwalior troops went over to the side of the enemy, with the result that the Maharajah himself had to seek refuge in Agra and his fortress at Gwalior was handed over to the mutineers. Fears were then entertained as to the loyalty of the Mahrattas in western India, but fortunately nothing untoward happened, as Sir Hugh Rose quickly retook the fortress. After this, the campaign became, in the words of Sir Colin Campbell, "a hunt of the rebel leaders which was finally brought to a conclusion by the capture of Tantia Topi in April, 1859." The difficulties, however, were immense, as is shown by the great missionary, Alexander Duff, in the following extract :—

#### Slow Progress

*Source.*—Extracts from Alexander Duff's letters to Dr. Tweedie. Duff's "Indian Rebellion." (James Nisbet.)

Notwithstanding all these successes, we who live out here, with no interests to serve except those of truth and righteousness, and eyes undimmed with the haze of red-tapish officialism,

feel intensely that comparatively little has yet been done towards an effectual suppression of the rebellion. To many this may sound a very disheartening statement; and it is an invidious and ungracious office to attempt to force it on the notice of those who are unwilling to believe in the possibility of a prolonged struggle. But to the conscientious there is but one course open; and that is, to tell what is the naked truth on the subject.

That there is a "military revolt" is, alas! far too conspicuously written in characters of fire and blood through all the military stations of northern and central India. But what all the friends and advocates of right measures for the restoration of settled peace and order must persist in reiterating is that it is *more* than a mere "military mutiny,"—that, from the very outset, it has been gradually assuming more and more the character of a "rebellion,"—a rebellion, on the part of vast multitudes beyond the sepoy army, against British supremacy and sovereignty,—and that our real contest never was wholly, and now less than ever, with mutinous sepoys. Had we only sepoys for our foes, the country might soon be pacified. But, having far worse enemies than the sepoys to overcome,—even anarchy or rather lawlessness, the extinction of rule and authority, the dissolution of organised society, and the hereditary taste for war and rapine, on the part of millions, which has been evoked and exasperated by a very plethora of indulgence, we may expect the patience, the disinterestedness, and the energy of Christian principle to be taxed to the uttermost before the tremendous conflict shall issue in a solid and satisfactory peace.

The representation now given I do believe to be, in its leading features, the only true one. And if men were seriously to reflect, it is the only one that can adequately account for the phenomena of the unparalleled struggle which has been carried on for months past. Never has the enemy been met without being routed, scattered, and his guns taken; but though constantly beaten, he evermore retires, and appears again ready for a fresh encounter. No sooner is one city taken or another relieved, than some other one is threatened. No sooner is one district pronounced safe through the influx of British troops, than another is disturbed and convulsed. No sooner is a highway re-opened between places of importance, than it is again closed, and all communication, for a season, cut off. No sooner are the mutineers and rebels scoured out of one locality, than they reappear, with double or treble force, in another. No sooner does a movable column force its way through hostile ranks, than these occupy the territory behind it. All gaps in the numbers of the foe seem to be instantaneously filled up; and no permanent clearance or impression appears anywhere to be made. The passage of our brave little armies through these swarming myriads, instead of leaving the deep

furrows of a mighty ploughshare through a roughened field, seems more to resemble that of the eagle through the elastic air, or a stately vessel through the unfurrowed ocean.

Surely facts like these ought at length to open the eyes of incredulous politicians and dreamy speculators to the dire necessity of the condition of things with which we have to deal, and the prodigious magnitude of the task of subjugation and reconstruction that lies before us. I say not this under the influence of any depression, but rather of buoyant hopefulness. Believing, as I always have done, that the God of Providence has given India to Britain for the accomplishment of noblest, divinest ends,—believing that the present calamities are righteous judgments on account of our culpable negligence in fulfilling the glorious trust committed to us,—believing, at the same time, that our nation, with all its shortcomings, has enough of Christian principle to cause it, under the breath of Jehovah's spirit, to awake, arise, kiss the rod, repent, and return to God in a path of appointed duty,—I never for a moment doubted our ultimate success in re-establishing the British power on a grander and firmer pedestal than ever throughout these vast dominions. Even during those awful nights of panic-terror, when, looking at the radiance of the setting sun, one did not know but his morning beams might be reflected from his dishonoured blood, the uppermost assurance in my own mind was, that were Calcutta, the most conspicuous monument of the ascendancy of Great Britain in the East, burnt to the ground and her sons and daughters buried amid its glaring ashes, such a catastrophe would only cause a mightier vibration to thrill through the heart of the British people, and rouse them to exertions for the reconquest and evangelisation of India such as the world had never witnessed before. And this impression of the ultimate issue is now more confirmed than ever, by the greatly improved tone of the speeches of your public men, and especially by the evangelistic strain of your humiliation-day services. But here I must pause.

Yours ever affectionately,

ALEXANDER DUFF.

### The Capture of Lucknow and After

*Source*—(i) Letter written by Sir Colin Campbell to Lord Canning, dated March 17, 1858, and reproduced in "The Life of Lord Clyde," by Lieut.-General Shadwell. Vol. II., pp. 166-8. (Blackwood.)

My telegrams will have informed you that, as we advance into the city, the enemy gradually give way and advance before us. I think that the contest, as far as Lucknow is concerned, may be said to be at an end. The sepoys have been going off



in very large numbers, mostly towards the N.W. ; but our information is defective, and to what point they have directed their course we have not yet ascertained. The ground near Lucknow is so intersected with ravines and so thickly wooded, and every house and village is so strongly fortified, that I cannot employ the cavalry without infantry, which arm cannot be spared at this moment from work in the city. As your lordship will believe, I think mostly of our army in this matter, and more particularly of the British part of it ; and I am very anxious to have it under cover as soon as possible. From the beginning of April till the middle of August is the period of the year when it is desirable that no one should be exposed, excepting in case of vital necessity. We cannot expect more regiments from England ; and there will be, I am afraid, the greatest difficulty in completing those we now have to their proper establishment. If we are obliged to march our troops about during the hot winds, we shall lose a great many, the excitement of the Lucknow campaign having passed away. I venture, therefore, to submit to your lordship, on these grounds, the expediency of issuing some notice to the sepoys, which may have the effect of dissolving the confederacy between the mutinous regiments. If something of this sort be not done, I am afraid we shall have a most serious business all through the hot weather, which will break down the troops, and will be never-ending. I do not presume to go into the political part of the question ; but I think that some general notice, now that the mutineers have been forced to leave Lucknow, would have the best effect, not only for Oudh, but for Rohilkund, and other parts of the country which have not yet been visited by our troops. In this opinion I find all the authorities unanimous, who are experienced in the effects produced in India by the breaking up of large native armies ; I allude more particularly to Sir J. Lawrence and Sir J. Outram. I venture to hazard one more remark. The punishment of the native insurgent army has already been very severe. If there be no prisoners for secondary punishment, it is because all sepoys have been summarily put to death ; and their number must have been very large, independent of those who have been put to death in the fight.

I congratulate your lordship on the very great success which has attended the operation here. This can, indeed, be scarcely appreciated except by those who have seen the enormous defensive works constructed by the enemy, which were rendered entirely useless by the plan of operating on the left bank of the Goomtee, and thus taking the whole line of defence in reverse, depriving the enemy, in fact, of the only sort of defence—viz., one under cover—which natives can ever hope to offer against European troops. The operation on the left bank of the Goomtee

turned the two first lines of defence. The third, which was in front of the Kaisir Bagh, was a double sap, through which we worked our way under cover into the very heart of the citadel ; and thus in a week, and with small loss of life, Lucknow has been won. We have already in our artillery park upwards of 60 of the enemy's guns.

*Source.*—(ii) General Order issued by Sir Colin Campbell, reproduced in "The Life of Lord Clyde," by Lieut.-General Shadwell. (Blackwood.)

In the month of October, 1857, the garrison of Lucknow was still shut up, the road from Calcutta to Cawnpore was unsafe, the communications with the north-west were entirely closed, and the civil and military functionaries had disappeared altogether from wide and numerous provinces. Under instructions from the Right Honourable the Governor-General, a large plan was designed, by which the resources of the three Presidencies, after the arrival of reinforcements from England, should be made available for combined action. Thus, while the army of Bengal, gathering strength from day to day, has recovered the Gangetic Doab, restored the communications with the north-west of the Empire, relieved the old garrison of Lucknow, afterwards taking that city, reoccupying Rohilkund, and finally insuring the tranquillity of the old provinces, the three columns put in movement from Bombay and Madras have rendered like great and efficient services in their long and difficult marches on the Jumna, through Central India, and Rajputana. These columns, under Major-Generals Sir Hugh Rose, K.C.B., Whitlock, and Roberts, have admirably performed their share in the general combination, arranged under the orders of his lordship the Governor-General. This combination was spread over a surface ranging from the boundaries of Bombay and Madras to the extreme north-west of India. By their patient endurance of fatigue, their unflinching obedience, and their steadfast gallantry, the troops have enabled the generals to fulfil their instructions. In no war has it ever happened that troops should always contend against numerical odds, as has been invariably the case in every encounter during the struggle of the last year, and in no war has constant success without a check been most conspicuously achieved. It has not occurred that one column here, another there, has won more honour than the other portions of the army. The various corps have all done like hard work—have struggled through the difficulties of a hot weather campaign, and have compensated for paucity of numbers in the vast area of operations by continuous and unexampled marching, notwithstanding the season. It is probable that much yet remains for the army to perform ; but now that the Commander-in-Chief

is able to give the greater part of it rest for a time, he chooses this moment to congratulate the generals and troops on the great results which have attended their labours. He can fairly say that they have accomplished in a few months what was believed by the ill-wishers of England to be either beyond their strength or to be the work of many years.

During the later stages of the long struggle, a few looked beyond mere questions of strategy and the infliction of punishment on the offenders, and mapped out a policy by which the dark memories of the Mutiny, the savage vengeance on the one hand and the ignoble treachery on the other, might be effaced, and the two conflicting nationalities join together in the work "of orderly progress and friendly co-operation in the task of national development." The problem indeed was one fraught with difficulty. It was natural to some extent that those who had fought and suffered should be blinded by passion and a desire for vengeance; public feeling ran high in Calcutta and other large centres of population; but it was doubly unfortunate that in the English Parliament speeches should have been delivered which can scarcely be excused. The Commander-in-Chief urged that some pronouncement should be issued which should enable those sepoys who had not been guilty of deliberate murder to lay down their arms without incurring the penalty of death. John Lawrence pleaded that they might be allowed to go back to their homes and start life afresh. Victors and vanquished had to live together in the future, and therefore the sooner that the bitter memories of the past were forgotten the better for all concerned. But the man who took the lead in this noble policy was the Governor-General himself. His was a lonely figure throughout those dark days, but he faced his difficulties, and they were many, with a dignity and forbearance which point to him as one of the greatest, if not the greatest, of England's proconsuls in the East. In the early stages of the Mutiny, his refusal to give way to measures of panic gave his detractors some occasion to charge him with negligence and a lack of decision. And now that the days of terror were past and gone, his refusal to give way to the lust for vengeance

enabled his opponents to accuse him of weakness and an ill-timed leniency. "I will not govern in anger. Justice, and that as stern, as inflexible as law and might can make it, I will deal out. But I will never allow an angry and indiscriminating act or word to proceed from the Government of India as long as I am responsible for it." It was with sentiments such as these that Lord Canning was enabled to meet with unflinching bravery the terrible responsibilities of a Governor-General at a time when his country's cause seemed darkest, and then, having gained the victory, to think not of vengeance but of a new and a better India in the future. In this intention he received the support of Sir John Lawrence and the Commander-in-Chief.

### Treatment of the Rebels

*Source.*—(i) Letter to Lord Canning by John Lawrence. Bosworth Smith, p. 176. (Smith, Elder.)

I do not know whether you may feel disposed or not to grant anything like an amnesty in favour of the least guilty of the mutineers and insurgents in Oudh and elsewhere. But I feel persuaded that such a measure would be very politic. It is much easier for people to advocate the destruction of all offenders than to show how this can be effected. Now that we have taken Delhi, beaten every large body of mutineers in the field, and are prepared to enter Oudh again in force, we should simplify matters much if we issued a proclamation declaring that those mutineers who have not murdered their officers, or women or children, and who gave up their arms shall be allowed to go to their homes and live unmolested.

In like manner I would deal with the common insurgents. We could then deal more easily with the desperate characters. At present, all are held together from the very desperation of their condition. If this continue, it is difficult to foresee when the country will be pacified. When the enemy can no longer keep together behind walls in numbers, they will break up into small parties, plunder the country, and carry on a guerilla war.

At present, many Englishmen advocate a policy of extermination, never reflecting how injurious such a course of conduct must prove to ourselves. In the same way, they advocated the annexation of the Punjab in 1846, utterly forgetful, or rather in total ignorance, of the circumstance that we had not the means of carrying out such a measure. In both the Sikh wars matters were quickly adjusted, and peace and security restored, because

we dealt wisely with our enemies. After the first war, we treated the Sikhs as a nation with generosity. In the second war; we acted with equal consideration to them as individuals. While we put down crime with a strong hand, as regarding the past we were lenient and generous.

I fully admit that we have now to deal with a very different enemy: Still, we should not also forget that, as a ruling power, we have also our shortcomings and want of foresight to answer for. We placed temptation and opportunity before the mutineers, which it was difficult to resist. Hundreds, perhaps thousands, committed themselves simply from the force of circumstances; on the one hand threatened with fire and sword if they refused; on the other, plunder and social advantages were pressed on them. Many hesitated long, but seeing no vitality in our power, no prospect of succour, they concluded that the game was up, and began to act for themselves. It is well known that, in former days, the Mahratta armies were recruited from the people of the very provinces which they were laying waste. Oppressed and plundered to-day, these people became robbers and plunderers in their turn. And so it may prove with our enemies. We cannot destroy them without injuring their relations and connections. The one hundred thousand mutineers of the Bengal army, and its contingents probably represent half a million of men. Will it not then be wise to reduce the number of desperadoes as far as possible?

Unless matters are managed with great tact and judgment, our difficulties in Oudh may only commence after the capture of Lucknow. The mutineers have their homes and families in Oudh, they can fly no further. They will disperse, and may make a guerilla war of it against us.

And again in a letter to Trevelyan :

But strong measures appear to be the order of the day. Everybody calls out for war to the knife, never seeming to see that we have not really the means to carry out such a policy. If some change is not made, we may have the present state of affairs for a year or so; perhaps more. No mutineer ever surrenders; for directly he is caught, he is shot or hanged. Naturally enough, all desire to die fighting. I am inclined to think that if we held out hopes of personal security to the least guilty of the mutineers, they would come in, give up their arms, and go to their homes. These we might, hereafter, keep under police surveillance. In the meantime, we should have breathing time to hunt the desperadoes, the murderers of our women and children. But so long as all are classed under one head, all will hold together and resist to the death. I feel very anxious on this subject, for we are very weak all over the country, and not the least so even in the Pun-

jab. We have barely ten thousand Europeans from the banks of the Jumna, including Delhi, westwards, and Peshawar takes a large slice out of these. We have full eighteen thousand Hindustani soldiers to watch, so that we are literally tied by the leg. If any row broke out, we should find it difficult to move fifteen hundred men. There is danger also that the Punjabis may see our weakness, and their opportunity, and then what would become of us ?

*Source.*—(ii) Letter from Lord Canning to Queen Victoria, dated September 25, 1857. "Queen Victoria's Letters," edited by A. C. Benson and Viscount Esher. (John Murray.)

One of the greatest difficulties that lies ahead—and Lord Canning grieves to say so to your Majesty—will be the violent rancour of a very large proportion of the English community against every native Indian of every class. There is a rabid and indiscriminate vindictiveness abroad, even amongst many who ought to set a better example, which it is impossible to contemplate without something like a feeling of shame for one's fellow-countrymen. Not one man in ten seems to think that the hanging and shooting of forty or fifty thousand mutineers, besides other rebels, can be otherwise than practicable and right; nor does it occur to those who talk and write most upon the matter that for the Sovereign of England to hold and govern India without employing and, to a great degree, trusting natives, both in civil and military service, is simply impossible. It is no exaggeration to say that a vast number of the European community would hear with pleasure and approval that every Hindu and Muhammadan had been proscribed, and that none would be admitted to serve the Government except in a menial office. That which they desire is to see a broad line of separation, and of declared distrust drawn between us Englishmen and every subject of your Majesty who is not a Christian, and who has a dark skin; and there are some who entirely refuse to believe in the fidelity or goodwill of any native towards any European; although many instances of the kindness and generosity of both Hindus and Muhammadans have come upon record during these troubles.

To those whose hearts have been torn by the foul barbarities inflicted upon those dear to them any degree of bitterness against the natives may be excused. No man will dare to judge them for it. But the cry is raised loudest by those who have been sitting quietly in their homes from the beginning and have suffered little from the convulsions around them unless it is in pocket. It is to be feared that this feeling of exasperation will be a great impediment in the way of restoring tranquillity and good order, even after signal retribution shall have been deliberately measured out to all chief offenders.

*Source.*—(iii) Letter from Lord Canning to Lord Granville, reproduced in "The Story of Two Noble Lives," by A. J. C. Hare. (George Allen.)<sup>1</sup>

As long as I have any breath in my body, I will pursue no other policy than that I have been following; not only for the reason of expediency and policy, but because it is immutably just. I will not govern in anger. Justice, and that as stern, as inflexible, as law and might can make it, I will deal out. But I will never allow an angry and indiscriminating act or word to proceed from the Government of India as long as I am responsible for it.

I don't care two straws for the abuse of the papers, British or Indian. I am for ever wondering at myself for not doing so, but it really is the fact. Partly from want of time to care, partly because an enormous task is before me, and all other tasks look small.

I don't want you to do more than defend me against unfair or mistaken attacks. But do take up and assert boldly that, whilst we are prepared, as the first duty of all, to strike down resistance without mercy, wherever it shows itself, we acknowledge that, resistance over, deliberate justice and calm, patient reason are to resume their sway; that we are not going, either in anger or from indolence, to punish wholesale, whether by wholesale hangings or burnings, or by the less violent, but not one bit less offensive, course of refusing trust and countenance and favour and honour to any man because he is of a class or a creed. Do this, and get others to do it, and you will serve India more than you would believe.

*Source.*—(iv.) Speech of Benjamin Disraeli, reproduced in "Life of Disraeli," by G. E. Buckle. Vol. IV., pp. 91-92. (John Murray.)

We may pour out our legions and our fleets up the rivers and through the provinces of India; we may be successful; but to my mind we should add to that success and doubly strengthen our force, and I am prepared, for one, to give any support to Her Majesty's Government which they may require for that purpose—if at the same time we should say to India that suppose she is aggrieved and outraged, to India perhaps despairing of pardon; "Although we will assert with the highest hand our authority, although we will not rest until our unquestioned supremacy and predominance are acknowledged from the Punjab to Cape Comorin, it is not merely as avengers that we appear." I think that the great body of the population of that

<sup>1</sup> The reader is advised to refer in this connection to Chapters x. and xi. of the first volume of Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice's "Life of Lord Granville."

country ought to know that there is for them a future of hope. I think we ought to temper justice with mercy—justice the most severe with mercy the most indulgent.

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The course which I would recommend is this: You ought at once, whether you receive news of success or defeat, to tell the people of India that the relation between them and their real Ruler and Sovereign, Queen Victoria, shall be drawn nearer. You must act upon the opinion of India on that subject immediately; and you can only act upon the opinion of Eastern nations through their imagination. You ought to have a Royal Commission sent by the Queen from this country to India immediately to inquire into the grievances of the various classes of that population. You ought to issue a royal proclamation to the people of India declaring that the Queen of England is not a Sovereign who will countenance the violation of treaties; that the Queen of England is not a Sovereign who will disturb the settlement of property; that the Queen of England is a Sovereign who will respect their laws, their usages, their customs and, above all, their religion. Do this, and do it not in a corner, but in a mode and manner which will attract universal attention and excite the general hope of Hindustan, and you will do as much as all your fleets and armies can achieve.

Lord Canning's policy of conciliation evoked the most violent opposition not only in India but also in England. The European population of Calcutta had gone so far as to petition the recall of the Governor-General, whose "clemency" has become proverbial. "Your Majesty's petitioners submit," so ran the concluding passages of the petition, "that the only policy by which British rule and the lives, honour and properties of your Majesty's Christian subjects in this country can in future be secured, is a policy of such vigorous repression and punishment as shall convince the native races of India—who can be influenced effectually by power and fear alone—of the hopelessness of insurrection against British rule, even when aided by every circumstance of treachery, surprise and cruelty." Lord Canning was also attacked in Parliament and most unjustifiably by Lord Ellenborough. The genesis of the trouble was a proclamation by which Lord Canning had announced his intentions to the people of Oudh after the fall of Lucknow. Punishment was to take the form of confiscation of property, but,



as was shown in his instructions to Sir James Outram, the Governor-General intended that, wherever possible, a policy of leniency should be observed. Lord Ellenborough, who had just been appointed President of the Board of Control, considered the proclamation "excessive and impolitic in its severity," and administered a rebuke to the Governor-General which was made public in England. The folly of this action cannot be exaggerated, and many thought that the resignation of Lord Canning was not only intended but inevitable. The Governor-General's reply is given below.

### Lord Canning's Policy in Oudh

*Source.*—Reply of Lord Canning to Lord Ellenborough's despatch, reproduced in the "Life of Lord Canning," by Sir H. S. Cunningham. pp. 161-2. (Clarendon Press.)

No taunts or sarcasms, come from what quarter they may, will turn me from the path which I believe to be that of my public duty. I believe that a change in the head of the Government of India at this time, if it took place under circumstances which indicated a repudiation, on the part of the Government in England, of the policy which has hitherto been pursued towards the rebels of Oudh, would seriously retard the pacification of the country. I believe that that policy has been, from the beginning, merciful without weakness, and indulgent without compromise of the dignity of the Government. I believe that, wherever the authority of the Government has been re-established, it has become manifest to the people in Oudh, as elsewhere, that the indulgence to those who make submission, and who are free from atrocious crime, will be large. I believe that the issue of the Proclamation, which has been so severely condemned, was thoroughly consistent with that policy, and that it is so viewed by those to whom it is addressed. I believe that policy, if steadily pursued, offers the best and earliest prospect of restoring peace to Oudh upon a stable footing.

Firm in these convictions, I will not in a time of unexampled difficulty, danger and toil, lay down, of my own act, the high trust which I have the honour to hold; but I will, with the permission of your Honourable Committee, state the grounds upon which these convictions rest, and describe the course of policy which I have pursued in dealing with the rebellion in Oudh. If, when I have done so, it shall be deemed that that policy has been erroneous, and has been feebly and ineffectually carried out; or that, for any reason, the confidence of those, who are responsible for the administration of Indian affairs in England, should be

withheld from me, I make it my respectful but earnest request, through your Honourable Committee, that I may be relieved of the office of Governor-General of India with the least possible delay.

The result of this controversy was the resignation of Lord Ellenborough, but for Lord Canning it meant a load of anxiety which he should not have been expected to bear. As the Mutiny began to come to an end, the leaders of both parties in England realised that the old system of dual control was no longer possible. The transference of the Indian Government from the Company to the Crown will be discussed in a subsequent volume, and all that remains to be told is the noble proclamation which was issued in 1858. Queen Victoria was especially interested in the preparation of the document, and requested Lord Derby to "bear in mind that it is a female Sovereign who speaks to more than a hundred millions of Eastern people, on assuming the direct Government over them, and after a bloody war, giving them pledges, which her future reign is to redeem, and explaining the principles of her Government. Such a document should breathe feelings of generosity, benevolence, and religious toleration, and point out the privileges which the Indians will receive in being placed on an equality with the subjects of the British Crown, and the prosperity following in the train of civilisation." The royal utterance was accompanied by another, in which Lord Canning, who had just been appointed Viceroy, called upon the Indian subjects to yield a loyal obedience to their Sovereign, and which was the subject of the following letter.

#### The Queen's Proclamation

*Sources.*—Letter from Queen Victoria to Viscount Canning. "Queen Victoria's Letters," edited by A. C. Benson and Viscount Esher. (John Murray.)

WINDSOR CASTLE,

December 2, 1858.

The Queen acknowledges the receipt of Lord Canning's letter of the 19th October, which she received on the 29th November, which has given her great pleasure.

It is a source of great satisfaction and pride to her to feel

herself in direct communication with that enormous Empire which is so bright a jewel of her Crown, and which she would wish to see happy, contented, and peaceful. May the publication of her Proclamation be the beginning of a new era, and may it draw a veil over the sad and bloody past!

The Queen rejoices to hear that her Viceroy approves the passage about religion. She strongly insisted on it. She trusts also that the certainty of the amnesty remaining open till the 1st January may not be productive of serious evil.

The Queen must express her admiration of Lord Canning's own Proclamation, the wording of which is beautiful. The telegram received to-day brings continued good news, and announces her proclamation having been read, and having produced a good effect.

#### The Queen's Proclamation

Victoria, by the Grace of God, of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and of the Colonies and Dependencies thereof in Europe, Asia, Africa, America, and Australasia, Queen, Defender of the Faith.

Whereas, for divers weighty reasons, we have resolved, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons in Parliament assembled, to take upon ourselves the government of the territories in India, heretofore administered in trust for us by the Honourable East India Company.

Now, therefore, we do by these presents notify and declare that, by the advice and consent aforesaid, we have taken upon ourselves the said government; and we hereby call upon all our subjects within the said territories to be faithful and to bear true allegiance to us, our heirs and successors, and to submit themselves to the authority of those whom we may hereafter from time to time see fit to appoint to administer the government of our said territories, in our name and on our behalf.

And we, reposing special trust and confidence in the loyalty, ability, and judgment of our right trusty and well-beloved cousin and Councillor, Charles John Viscount Canning, do hereby constitute and appoint him, the said Viscount Canning, to be our first Viceroy and Governor-General in and over our said territories, and to administer the Government thereof in our name, and generally to act in our name and on our behalf, subject to such orders and regulations as he shall, from time to time, receive from us through one of our principal Secretaries of State.

And we do hereby confirm in their several offices, civil and military, all persons now employed in the service of the Honourable East India Company, subject to our future pleasure, and to such laws and regulations as may hereafter be enacted.

We hereby announce to the native princes of India that all treaties and engagements made with them by or under the authority of the Honourable East India Company are by us accepted, and will be scrupulously maintained; and we look for the like observance on their part.

↓ We desire no extension of our present territorial possessions; and, while we will permit no aggressions upon our dominions or our rights to be attempted with impunity, we shall sanction no encroachment on those of others. We shall respect the rights, dignity, and honour of native princes as our own, and we desire that they, as well as our own subjects, shall enjoy that prosperity and that social advancement which can only be secured by internal peace and good government.

We hold ourselves bound to the natives of our Indian territories by the same obligations of duty which bind us to all our other subjects; and those obligations, by the blessing of Almighty God, we shall faithfully and conscientiously fulfil.

Firmly relying ourselves on the truth of Christianity, and acknowledging with gratitude the solace of religion, we disclaim alike the right and the desire to impose our convictions on any of our subjects. We declare it to be our Royal will and pleasure that none be in anywise favoured, none molested or disquieted, by reason of their religious faith or observances, but that all shall alike enjoy the equal and impartial protection of the law; and we do strictly charge and enjoin all those who may be in authority under us that they abstain from all interference with the religious belief or worship of any of our subjects, on pain of our highest displeasure.

And it is our further will that, so far as may be, our subjects, of whatever race or creed, be freely and impartially admitted to offices in our service, the duties of which they may be qualified, by their education, ability and integrity, duly to discharge.

We know and respect the feelings of attachment with which the natives of India regard the lands inherited by them from their ancestors, and we desire to protect them in all rights connected therewith, subject to the equitable demands of the State; and we will that, generally, in framing and administering the law, due regard be paid to the ancient rights, usages, and customs of India.

We deeply lament the evils and misery which have been brought upon India by the acts of ambitious men, who have deceived their countrymen by false reports, and led them into open rebellion. Our power has been shown by the suppression of that rebellion in the field; we desire to show our mercy by pardoning the offences of those who have been thus misled, but who desire to return to the path of duty.

Already in one province, with a view to stop the further

effusion of blood, and to hasten the pacification of our Indian dominions, our Viceroy and Governor-General has held out the expectation of pardon, on certain terms, to the great majority of those who, in the late unhappy disturbances, have been guilty of offences against our Government, and has declared the punishment which will be inflicted on those whose crimes place them beyond the reach of forgiveness. We approve and confirm the said act of our Viceroy and Governor-General, and do further announce and proclaim as follows :—

Our clemency will be extended to all offenders, save and except those who have been or shall be convicted of having directly taken part in the murder of British subjects.

With regard to such, the demands of justice forbid the exercise of mercy.

To those who have willingly given asylums to murderers, knowing them to be such, or who may have acted as leaders or instigators in revolt, their lives alone can be guaranteed; but, in appointing the penalty due to such persons, full consideration will be given to the circumstances under which they have been induced to throw off their allegiance, and large indulgence will be shown to those whose crimes may appear to have originated in a too credulous acceptance of the false reports circulated by designing men.

To all others in arms against the Government we hereby promise unconditional pardon, amnesty and oblivion of all offences against ourselves, our Crown and dignity, on their return to their homes and peaceful pursuits:

It is our Royal pleasure that these terms of grace and amnesty should be extended to all those who comply with these conditions before the first day of January next.

When, by the blessing of Providence, internal tranquillity shall be restored, it is our earnest desire to stimulate the peaceful industry of India, to promote works of public utility and improvement, and to administer its Government for the benefit of all our subjects resident therein. In their prosperity will be our strength, in their contentment our security, and in their gratitude our best reward. And may the God of all power grant unto us, and to those in authority under us, strength to carry out these our wishes for the good of our people.