

The Westminster Library

A Series of Volumes dealing with the History,
Politics, and Economic Life of the British Empire.

Bound in Cloth 3/6 net each

The following volumes are published :

THE EMPIRE : A FAMILY AFFAIR
By PERCY HURD, M.P.

THE LEGACY OF LIBERALISM
By AL CARTHILL

STATE SOCIALISM IN PRACTICE
By ARCHIBALD HURD

TRADE UNIONS
By W. A. APPLETON, C.B.E.

THE FINANCE OF GOVERNMENT
By MAJOR J. W. HILLS, M.P.

THE PROBLEM OF DEFENCE
By SIR GEORGE ASTON

SOME HISTORICAL PRINCIPLES OF
THE CONSTITUTION
By KENNETH PICKTHORN

THE GROWTH OF THE CONSTITU-
TION By E. W. M. BALFOUR-MELVILLE

POLITICS RETOLD By P. G. CAMBRAY

THE COST OF LIVING
By NORMAN DEARLE

THE ORIGINS OF EMPIRE
By IAN COLVIN

THE SOCIALIST MOVEMENT
Part I, 1824-1914; Part II, 1914-1924
By DR. A. SHADWELL

THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF
SOCIALISM By G. W. GOUGH

TORYISM AND THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY

By MAJOR WALTER ELLIOT, M.P.

THE HOUSING OF THE NATION
By F. E. FREMANTLE, M.P.

INDIA: THE NEW PHASE

By

SIR STANLEY REED,
Kt., K.B.E., LL.D.

(Formerly Editor of "The Times of India")

and

P. R. CADELL,
C.S.I., C.I.E.

(Indian Civil Service, Retired)



LONDON
PHILIP ALLAN & CO., LTD.
QUALITY HOUSE, GREAT RUSSELL STREET, W.C. 1

First Published in 1928

*Made and Printed in Great Britain by
The Camelot Press Limited,
London and Southampton*

CONTENTS

	PAGE
FOREWORD	vii
CHAP.	
I. THE APPEAL OF INDIA	I
II. THE REFORMS	6
III. THE WORKING OF THE REFORMS	22
IV. THE INDIAN STATES	42
V. DEFENCE	64
VI. INDUSTRIES : AGRICULTURE	90
VII. MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES.	109
VIII. EDUCATION AND SOCIAL PROGRESS	131
IX. LOOKING FORWARD	149

FOREWORD

As we go up and down Britain, we are everywhere confronted by the question, What is going to happen in India? Thousands of British voters, dimly conscious of the responsibility of Parliament for the governance of India, are baffled by their own ignorance of that great country. The whole object of this little book is to present the main elements of the Indian problem in the simplest form, so that it may guide the British democracy in its influence on Parliament.

Those who know their India will find a thousand faults within these pages. They will remark generalisations which are not wholly true; omissions which ought to have been made good. Our excuse is that we had forty thousand words prescribed as the limit. If we had been given a dozen quarto volumes, we might have met critics on their own ground.

A prominent Indian Nationalist, recently in London, said that, if the British electorate was too busy with its own affairs to give thought to India,

then it must leave Indians to work out their salvation unaided. For good or ill, rightly or wrongly, is immaterial; the British people has this responsibility. It must discharge it. Our purpose is to encourage a serious study of the delicate tissues which make up the majestic fabric of the Indian Government.

S. R.
P. R. C.

CHAPTER I

THE APPEAL OF INDIA

THE appeal and the interest of India is in large measure due to the view of it as an entity in some manner distinct and apart from the rest of the world, even from the continent of which it forms a part. There is some physical foundation for this aspect of separateness. India was once part of a continent now largely submerged, and its connection with the Islands of the Far East was at that time closer than with the Continents of the Old World. Yet it would be easy to exaggerate this separatist idea, since there has always been interplay and intercourse between India and the lands on its frontiers. Although many of the peoples of India, and particularly those who are now despised as outcastes or jungle-dwellers, are of so ancient residence that they may be regarded as autochthonous, yet the most notable feature of early Indian history is the series of its invasions. Dravidians, Aryans, Scythians, Mongoloids, and

Mahomedans of various races have entered and permeated India. Even when the invaders had been for the most part absorbed into the existing population, they profoundly affected the country. From the earliest days, however, India in its turn made its contribution to the outside world, not the less noteworthy because its export took the form of ideas rather than of human migration. The tales which, in the form of Æsop's Fables or the *Arabian Nights' Entertainments*, have delighted countless generations in the West had their origin in India. From India, also, came, in all probability, the foundations of the philosophy of the Greeks. It is, however, in its spiritual outlook that India has been most profoundly affected by importations from the West, and has been most clearly differentiated from the outside world. The cult of the Mother Goddess may have had its origin in Anatolia, and the Sacred City, the first type of civilised polity, may have been first established in Sumerian lands. It is in India alone, however, that they survive as living forces, in the worship of Káli, and in the sanctity of such cities as Benares and Madura. The Hindu religion, introduced by the Aryan invaders, was skilfully amalgamated with the cults of local deities, and, though

it is now perhaps not so much a faith as a system of society, it regulates the life and outlook of two hundred and twenty millions of human beings. Buddhism, alone of the great religions, had its origin within India : yet none other has spread over so vast an area of the Asiatic Continent. The followers in India of Mahomed have, it is true, always looked outside that country for spiritual guidance and for the holy places of their faith. Yet the seventy millions of them now constitute by far the largest body of Mahomedan believers in any country. The Christian population is only a handful of less than five millions ; but the influence of Christian ethics has profoundly affected all aspects of Indian life.

If, however, India can make some claim to be an entity physically and spiritually distinct from the rest of the world, never was there a unit so disunited. Its history, before the establishment of the British power, is a long record of discord. Occasional great rulers, such as Chandragupta or Asoka or Akbar, brought the greater portion of the sub-continent under their sway. None of them, however, ruled, as the British Indian Government does, over the whole of India, to say nothing of Burma ; and their

empires had no permanence. They rose out of disorder, and degenerated into chaos.

Perhaps the most striking proof of the previous disunity of India is the diversity and number of its languages. The Linguistic Survey of India has classified 179 languages and 544 dialects. Even if we reckon only those languages which number many millions of speakers, we find them to be at least thirteen. And be it remembered that there was no *lingua franca* which could claim to be understood over the whole country until English, within quite recent years, came to fulfil the requirement.

With this diversity of races, religions, and tongues, it may naturally be asked whether India can even now be regarded as a nation. Yet the unifying process, though still far from complete, has been real and rapid. A century ago, Hindustan meant to the inhabitants of the country only the north and centre of India, to the exclusion of the west and south. India now comprises every portion of the country from Quetta to Chittagong, from Chitral to Cape Comorin. It has even stretched across the Bay of Bengal to embrace a somewhat reluctant Burma.

One-fifth of the human race is governed by one Administration, a number that can be matched only

by China, a country that supplies a warning rather than a parallel. The growth of national feeling has at least kept pace with geographical and administrative unification. This unification, let it be borne in mind, is due to two great factors : a uniform system of law and order instituted and enforced by British Administration, and the use of the English language in commerce and in higher education. Further progress towards the creation and fulfilment of national consciousness is natural and inevitable. It will be the object of the ensuing chapters to set out the conditions which such progress must face, and the lines which it will follow, if the ultimate attainment of true nationality is to be reached.

CHAPTER II

THE REFORMS

MR. KIPLING tells the story of the ingenious Indian who stuck the label from a soda-water bottle on the approach to a foot-bridge and collected a toll of a farthing from every passer until a brutal magistrate clapped him into gaol. We laugh at the story and at the sanctity attached to labels ; but are we immune from error ourselves? If any hundred men are asked what is wrong in India, the reply of ninety-nine will be that it is suffering from too much Montagu—that an emotional and adventurous Secretary of State disturbed her placid contentment and fastened upon the unhappy land a Constitution totally unsuited to her needs. There is no justification whatsoever for this belief in any study of the history of the British connection.

The examination of the growth of the Indian Constitution reveals two dominant forces : one is the very slow development of liberal institutions,

and the other the tendency of all peoples to think in terms of their own history. The cardinal point in the constitutional history of India was Burke's insistence that the British connection was no mere commercial enterprise, but a trust. Parliament established the machinery for the discharge of that trust in Pitt's Regulating Act of 1784, which endured until it was swept away in the wreckage of the Mutiny. Various Acts in the nineteenth century regulated the law-making power of the Government of India, and the Act of 1861 definitely associated Indians with the legislative authority. True to their own tradition, the Englishmen who constituted the first Councils sought to make them little parliaments, not merely legislative bodies, but inquests into the affairs of the State. The authors of the Act of 1861 strove to exclude this tendency; but it is impossible to concede law-making power without some authority to inquire into the administration which those laws govern. The Indians admitted into the legislative arcana, educated in the English language and nurtured on English literature and history, inevitably thought of the future governance of India in terms of British parliamentarianism. Two other points emerge from this survey—the

•

increasing association of Indians with the work of government, and the establishment of an elective system in practice, if not in name. Both these tendencies found further expression in the Act of 1909, which embodied the Morley-Minto reforms. This Act recognised the elective principle, and the special right of a great minority like the Mahomedans to communal representation ; it admitted Indians into the inner counsels of government—into the Viceroy's Executive Council or Cabinet, and as members of the Council at the India Office in Whitehall, which advises the Secretary of State. Lord Morley expressly repudiated the idea that he was setting up a parliamentary system in India ; he never defined the goal at which he was aiming, and these Councils, with the right of interpellation and of moving resolutions on administrative questions, naturally developed into inquests on the government of India. The Montagu-Chelmsford Report on Indian constitutional reforms showed how ' British policy in India has been steadily directed to a point at which the question of a self-governing India was bound to arise ; how impulses, at first faint, have been encouraged by education and opportunity ; how the growth quickened nine years

ago, and was immeasurably accelerated by the war.'

We have put the awful years of the war resolutely behind us ; but they left an indelible mark on India. Imperial strategy before 1914 was based on the assumption that in time of hostilities India would need to be powerfully reinforced from Britain. How vastly different was our experience ! The moment war was declared the Viceroy pledged the last man and the last gun in India to the service of the Crown. An immense stream of men and munitions flowed from India to the various theatres of the war—a million men for service overseas, a cash contribution of a hundred millions sterling from resources which are not very large. Except for the Ghadr conspiracy in the Punjab, and a momentary flicker of excitement when it was known that an attempt was to be made to land arms and ammunition from Java, the Government of India were free to pursue their Great War activities unperturbed by internal anxieties. Certainly none in India thought that thereafter India was going to stand, politically, on the ground she occupied in 1914. The last part of Lord Hardinge's viceroyalty was devoted to an examination of the changes thought wise and prudent. Lord Chelmsford took

Bi

up the question where Lord Hardinge left it. The Indian National Congress and the Moslem League adumbrated their own schemes ; everyone was constitution-making, and the drum-beat of self-determination raised wide hopes, unloosed soaring ambitions.

Whilst these movements lay on the surface, others of great importance progressed underground. At the Session of the Indian National Congress held in Bombay in December 1916, Lord Sinha, an eminent and patriotic Indian, appealed for a goal and a policy. A small band of men in London, uniting long experience of India with an intimate knowledge of the principles of constitutional authority, sat down to consider how a real measure of responsible government in India could be reconciled with the necessary preservation of parliamentary authority, and evolved the germ idea of dyarchy. What was to be the goal of British policy in India ? That was the question which Sir Austen Chamberlain, one of the best Secretaries of State India has ever known, pertinently asked when these ready-made constitutions were submitted for his consideration ? Was Britain to 'muddle on,' as Lord Morley muddled on in 1909, making mere concessions

to political agitation, rejecting the parliamentary idea but substituting nothing in its place, or was there to be a fixed objective to determine the path of these transitory steps? Wherever this question was discussed in India, there was only one answer: the goal of British policy in India was the development of a self-governing Dominion within the Commonwealth. None could think of any other; the only question was whether this should be an ordered growth or a sudden catastrophic withdrawal of the controlling British authority. All doubts were removed when, on August 20th, 1917, the Secretary of State for India, with the full authority of the Cabinet, made this announcement in the House of Commons:

'The policy of His Majesty's Government, with which the Government of India are in complete accord, is that of the increasing association of Indians in every branch of the administration and the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realisation of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire. . . .

'I would add that progress in this policy

•

can only be achieved by successive stages. The British Government and the Government of India, on whom the responsibility lies for the welfare and advancement of the Indian peoples, must be judges of the time and measure of each advance, and they must be guided by the co-operation received from those upon whom new opportunities of service will thus be conferred and by the extent to which it is found that confidence can be reposed in their sense of responsibility.'

Here we entered on a new phase in the British connection with India. Up to this point we had maintained an absolute government. Absolutism was tempered by the increasing association of Indians with the administration, and by the increased power of criticising the administration in the legislative bodies ; but it remained the corner stone of the government. By a series of Acts the influence of Indian opinion on the administration had been developed ; but no actual power or responsibility had been given ; changes had been made in response to political agitation without any definite objective in view. The reforms which followed the war were subject to this acid test—if

they did not confer an immediate measure of responsibility, and if they did not blaze the trail to full responsibility at some future date, the various stages to be determined by Parliament, then they were a sham. The Secretary of State for India, the late Mr. Edwin Montagu, visited India, and with the Viceroy, Lord Chelmsford, and a band of experienced officials, made an exhaustive study of Indian conditions *in situ*. They embodied their conclusions in an elaborate Report on Indian Constitutional Reforms, with a scheme which formed the material for an amendment to the Government of India Act. This scheme later was examined by a strong committee of both Houses of Parliament under the chairmanship of Lord Selborne, and was then presented as an amended Bill to Parliament, which was passed intact in December 1919. Never in the history of the Commonwealth has a constitutional change been the subject of more anxious thought or more careful inquiry.

The hybrid dyarchy thus introduced into the Imperial constitutional fold is such a strange creation that it has caused no little bewilderment. Yet it is not so freakish a cross after all, if the basic conditions of the problem are kept clearly in mind.

•

These are that an immediate measure of responsibility should be conferred ; that it should be of such a character as to lead by stages to full responsibility ; and that the authority of Parliament should not be impaired in matters of all-Indian or Imperial interest. The greatest change wrought by the Reforms was in the Provinces into which India is divided. Prior to the passing of this Act the administration was carried on by the head of the Province, Governor or Lieutenant-Governor, assisted by an Executive Council, or Cabinet. This Executive Council was subject to the criticism of the Provincial Legislature, which also possessed the law-making power ; but it was in no sense responsible to it. It was responsible to the Governor-General of India, and, through him, to the Imperial Parliament. The scheme of 1919 divided the Provincial Government into two parts—an executive council in charge of certain departments called ' Reserved,' where the authority of Parliament was maintained intact ; and Ministers, chosen from the elected members of the Legislature, in charge of other departments, termed ' Transferred,' these Ministers being responsible to the Governor and the legislature for the administration of their portfolios.

At the same time the Provincial Legislatures were liberalised and re-constituted with an elected majority commanding wider powers, such as the power to vote (and consequently to withhold) supplies ; enhanced freedom of initiation in legislation ; the power to frame their own rules of procedure, subject to the Governor's concurrence. The subjects transferred vary slightly between Province and Province, but, generally speaking, Local Self-Government, Medical Administration, Public Health, Education, Excise, and the Development of Industries are 'transferred' subjects, and the other branches of the administration, in particular those relating to the preservation of law and order, 'reserved.' The objective of the Declaration was in this way translated into vivid practice in the Act. An immediate measure of responsibility was conferred on Ministers and the Provincial Legislatures, and applied in particular to what are sometimes called 'the nation-building' forces—education, sanitation, and local government. Moreover, whilst the ultimate authority of the Governor was maintained, Parliament advised that, when the Governor differed from a Minister, he should ordinarily allow that officer to have his way and fix responsibility

•

upon him. The Act allowed the development of responsibility within its own structure; by the gradual transfer of 'reserved' subjects to Ministers full responsibility could be established at any stage. The changes, so far as they affected the Provinces, were rounded off by deciding the century-old struggle for power between the Government of India and the Provinces in favour of the latter; they were made virtually independent in the administration of their own affairs, and subject to the authority of the Central Government only in matters of all-India or Imperial interest. The Government of India also took into its own hands certain departments, such as Customs and Income Tax, formerly administered by the Provinces on its behalf. Then, as the King's Government has to be carried on, in face of an elected legislature, certain special powers were conferred on the Governor, such as the restoration of rejected grants for 'reserved' departments, authorising expenditure on essential subjects, and even 'certifying' laws necessary for peace, order, and good government if rejected by the legislature.

The Government of India was far less affected by the Act of 1919 than the Provincial Administrations.

The introduction of dyarchy into its constitution was considered and rejected, pending experience of its working in the local governments. The machinery and methods of the Governor-General's Executive Council, the Cabinet, remained the same ; but a considerable change was made in its relations with the legislatures, and in the constitution of those bodies themselves. Thus whilst the Governor-General's Council remained a unitary executive, the legislature was reconstituted on the bi-cameral system. The Council of State consists of 60 members, of whom 34 are elected. The Legislative Assembly comprises 144 members, of whom 104 are elected. The Indian legislatures have the right of voting supplies, of law-making, and of criticising, and, if desired, censuring the Administration. But as the Executive as a whole remains responsible to Parliament, and is confronted by an elected legislature which may conceivably become hostile without the power of appointing an alternative Government, the powers of the Governor-General in restoring financial grants which might be refused and of 'certifying' legislation were made larger ; they cover the whole field and are not confined in their application to categories of subjects.

•

It is remarkable, but perhaps characteristic of political changes in India, that, whilst attention was concentrated on the fabric of the Administration, and a battle royal was fought between dyarchy and a Unitary Cabinet, little attention was paid to a step which experience shows goes to the root of the working of the Constitution. Up to this stage legislators—with a few exceptions representing special interest—were chosen by secondary electorates. The primary voter elected the members of the municipalities and local boards; these in turn chose the members of the Provincial Legislative Council; and these, again, representatives in the Imperial Legislative Council of the Government of India. The system had obvious disadvantages: the electorate was small, there was no direct contact between the elector and his representative in the legislatures, and to that extent there was no responsibility upon, and no political education for, the people who nominally exercised the vote. But there were obvious advantages: the men who came into the Councils almost without exception were fortified by experience of administration in the local-governing bodies, and these bodies themselves gained from the presence of men of position who sought through

them access to a higher field of public work. Moreover, the system was peculiarly fitted to Indian conditions, where the aristocratic tradition and caste system made men of standing averse to the rough-and-tumble of the hustings. With very little consideration of the implications of the change, and with less public discussion, this proved system was scrapped in favour of a direct electorate. The qualifications for electors vary between province and province, but, generally speaking, both in rural and urban areas, the franchise is based on a property qualification, as measured by the payment of a prescribed minimum of land revenue or its equivalent, or of income tax or municipal taxes. The franchise of the Council of State is different. The object of the Act was to secure for this body a character approximating as closely as possible to a 'Senate of Elder Statesmen,' and thus to constitute a body with the functions of a true revising chamber. In addition and as an alternative to a high property qualification, adopted as a means of enfranchising only persons with a real stake in the country, the vote was directly conferred on certain classes possessing administrative experience or a high standard of intellectual attainment. For instance, past

•

membership of the legislature, or high office in local bodies, was treated as a qualification in itself for the vote. The adoption of a direct electorate was the **real** leap in the dark. Whatever form a Constitution may take, the foundation thereof, the fount of authority, and the basis of responsibility must be the electorate; the new Constitution, with the wider powers vested in the legislatures, rested on an electorate which did not exist and had to be called into being.

Yet another almost invisible change following on the Reforms is the development of local government. The established system had its origin in the measures instituted during the Viceroyalty of Lord Ripon (1880-4). Local bodies were established all over the country, but they contained a strong official element. This was expressed in various ways, by the nomination of members and official chairmen, and in the case of some of the large cities of a chief executive officer, corresponding in some respects to the German Burgomaster. An essential part of the Reform scheme was the development of these bodies through the establishment of elected majorities and non-official chairmen, with a widening of their financial powers. Further changes were made in

the relations of the Government of India with the India Office, as representing Parliament, and with the great territories ruled by the Indian Princes, which embrace one-third of the area of India and one-fifth of its population. Whilst no structural alteration was made in the constitutional position of the Secretary of State for India, who remains responsible to Parliament for the governance of India, the convention was suggested that when the Government of India and the legislatures were in agreement, the Secretary of State, notwithstanding his plenary authority, would not ordinarily interfere. The Government of India also set up its own office in London for the discharge of agency work under a High Commissioner. The position of the Indian States can best be considered when their part in the polity of India is examined.

With this brief survey of the structure of the Indian Constitution, especially as affected by the Reforms, we can turn to the working of the Act in the seven years of its history.

NOTE.—For the financial relations between the Central and Provincial governments, see p. 170.

CHAPTER III

THE WORKING OF THE REFORMS

ANOTHER commonplace in the discussion of Indian politics is that the Reform Scheme has failed ; that it fastened upon India an exotic form of administration which is stumbling through confusion to chaos. For that generalisation we can find no more justification than for the suggestion that the Act of 1919 was the impetuous invention of a meretricious Jew. Let us consider for a moment the history of representative institutions since the war. In Russia the pseudo-constitutionalism of the Duma, and the promise of a constituent assembly in the first flush of the Revolution, have been snuffed out under the iron extinguisher of a few hundred thousand Bolsheviks. In Italy and Spain well-worn Constitutions have melted under the sun of Fascism and the Dictatorship. Persia and Turkey present pale shadows of Constitutions masking real and vigorous dictatorships. China has since the downfall of the

Manchus been parcelled amongst military adventurers ; in Egypt Nationalism spells instability, saved from developing into chaos by the veiled influence of British authority. In India the Reform Scheme was from the moment of its birth so rudely buffeted by forces quite outside the Act itself that the miracle is not that it limps, but that any form of constitutional government survives.

The Reform Scheme received the Royal Assent in December 1919. Its reception was full of promise. The Indian National Congress, which has passed under the control of extremist Hindus with the backing of a few fanatical Mahomedans, gave it a qualified blessing at the session held at Lahore in Christmas week. It described the Reforms as 'disappointing and unsatisfactory,' but declined to be stampeded into a policy of boycott. The Liberal Conference revealed an earnest desire to make the Reforms a success. The English community accepted the changes in the spirit and the letter, and the Services pledged themselves to work the system wholeheartedly. In a few weeks this prospect of progress by agreement was shattered by three cyclones which swept India—the aftermath of the disturbances in the Punjab in 1919 ; the Khilafat agitation ; and

the acute financial stringency. Each of these merits a few words of explanation.

In the latter months of 1918 and the spring of the following year political opinion in India was inflamed by the passage of what are called the Rowlatt Acts. A careful inquiry into the working of anarchical organisations under a strong committee presided over by Mr. Justice Rowlatt led to a report demonstrating that the ordinary procedure of the courts was inadequate to bring offenders to justice through the terrorising of witnesses, and recommending special tribunals of a strictly legal character. The Bills necessary to give effect to these proposals met with a storm of protest ; in part this sprang from a traditional fear of extra-legal methods, and in part from sentiment ; there was the general feeling that it boded no good for the constitutional progress of India if the first-fruits of the war were repressive measures. Strong in the conviction that these measures were imperative for the peace of the country, the Government carried them through the Legislative Council by the weight of its official majority. The reaction was violent, and disturbances occurred over a wide area. A further complication arose when the agitation was at its height.

The Government was fully aware that the King of Afghanistan, misled by his agents at Peshawar and elsewhere, and anxious to divert attention from the assassination of his father, King Habibullah, was contemplating an invasion of India, and calling the restless tribes of the North-West Frontier to join him in a holy war against the infidel with the bait of the loot of Hindustan. When, therefore, the disturbances spread to the Punjab, through which the main line of military communications ran, with grave rioting at Amritsar, the situation caused those in authority intense anxiety. There is no need now to re-tread the thorny path which leads through the very forcible dispersion by rifle-fire of the meeting held in the Jhallianwallah Bagh at Amritsar, the establishment of martial law in the Punjab, and severe punishments under it; we are concerned only with the reflex action of those events on the working of the Reforms. The feeling which animated large classes in India was not so much resentment at the use of force—in a country where the piercing of the crust between order and disorder often leads to murder, arson, and rape, force is generally the greatest humanity—but the sense that excessive force was used and punishments of humiliation

deliberately inflicted. When the report of the Commission under Lord Hunter which inquired into the events, the action thereon of the Government of India, and the debates in Parliament seemed to justify, or excuse, these practices, a wave of indignant emotion swept over the country.

It is not quite so easy to penetrate the force which lay behind what is called the Khilafat movement—the protest against the peace terms sought to be imposed on Turkey in the Treaty of Sèvres. The drift of Indian Mahomedans towards Constantinople as the lighthouse of Islam is a comparatively modern movement. It was first discerned when the victories of the Turks over the Greeks in the war of 1897 were celebrated by the illumination of the mosques in Bombay. The Mahomedans of India are a minority; seventy millions in a population of three hundred and nineteen millions. As they were very slow to take advantage of Western education, they feel that they are outwitted as well as outnumbered. They reacted towards Turkey as the greatest Mahomedan State, and towards the Sultan as Khalif—that is, the spiritual and temporal head of the faith. The entry of Turkey into the war was for them a time of sore trial. They withstood it with courage and fidelity.

With the exception of an occasional incident, the Mahomedans remained constant to their allegiance to the King-Emperor ; the Mahomedan regiments in the Indian forces overseas were true to their salt. When, the war being over and the crisis passed, terms of peace were proposed which drove the Turks from Constantinople and established the Greeks in Smyrna, large classes of Indian Mahomedans felt that they were the victims of a breach of faith. Possibly this conviction was exploited by a handful of men who, thinking that Swaraj was coming, sought to buttress their position in India by alliance with Islamic States beyond her borders ; but the real force behind the Khilafat movement was the belief that the constancy of the Indian Moslems during the war counted for nothing in the day of victory.

Far more malignant, although its effect was slowly manifested, was the confusion which overtook the finances of the Government of India. The financial policy pursued over a long period of years was one of the most rigid orthodoxy. Severe economy was exercised in all branches of expenditure ; deficits were at once met by increased taxation. Whilst it might be true to say that this laid the dead hand of

unbending control over productive expenditure, it secured for India balanced budgets, high credit, and a very small unproductive debt. Commencing with the year 1920, the process was disastrously reversed. Deficit was piled on deficit ; expenditure breached every barrier of control ; and, swollen by an unexpected military outlay on the war the Afghans wantonly launched, and the struggle with the Frontier Tribes which followed, deficits accumulated until, at the end of the financial year 1923, they aggregated £75,000,000. The one force which might have carried the Reform bark easily over the troublous seas which buffeted it was easy finance ; this would have enabled the Government of India at the head, and the Ministers in the Provinces, to justify themselves by reduced war taxation, or a liberal expenditure on nation-building forces such as education and sanitation. On the contrary, the first duty of the new Legislative Assembly was to heap tax on tax in the vain search for financial stability, and of the Provinces to ply the abhorred shears of drastic retrenchment when the people were expectant of boons from the new democratic institutions.

Nor is the tale of woe fully told even yet. At the

height of the Non-Co-operation movement an English publicist, who was being taken round the bazaars of Bombay, was warned that the merchants had not been swept into this maelstrom by the Punjab disturbances, nor the Khilafat agitation ; but by the currency policy followed after the war. A Governor of Bombay once declared that no one understood Indian currency ; it is really simple, though it has been the cause of an acute controversy for forty years and lingers to-day. In order to arrest the disturbances caused by the fall in the value of silver, the Government of India closed the mints to the free coinage of silver in 1893 and established an Exchange standard, with a ratio of fifteen rupees to the sovereign, or one shilling and fourpence to the rupee, in 1898. This was effectively maintained until the second year of the war, when the insatiable demand for rupee currency to finance the materials demanded by the Allies, and the rise in the price of silver, forced the Government to raise the ratio in order to avoid a loss on the coinage of silver rupees ; by the end of the war the exchange value of the rupee stood at approximately two shillings gold. A committee which sat in 1919 recommended that it should be permanently stabilised at that rate, and

in the following February the Government took steps to give effect to this proposal. But between the signing of the report and the taking of this action a dramatic fall occurred in gold prices. The sterling-dollar rate collapsed. The effect of the Government of India's action in attempting to stabilise the rupee in the face of this world collapse was akin to setting up a paper dam to stem a tidal wave. The export trade was arrested ; immense purchases of foreign goods were made which, on arrival, were not worth a quarter of their nominal value ; violent speculation became rampant. Before they abandoned the attempt the Government lost £55,000,000, and private traders sums which have been estimated at hundreds of millions.

The effect of these forces was immediate. Mr. Gandhi now took charge of the opposition, and declared that, until the ' Punjab wrongs ' were righted and the Moslem claim for better peace terms with Turkey satisfied, he would lead a Non-Co-operation movement, with the aim of making government impossible. Desperate efforts were made to prevent the election of Council members ; meetings were broken up, candidates threatened, and polling booths picketed ; but the movement

was a failure. In only six cases out of six hundred and thirty-seven was election impossible in the absence of a candidate. In one sense the Non-Co-operative movement was a blessing in disguise. The men who came into the Councils and accepted office had a single end in view—to work the Reforms to the maximum of advantage. The absence of declared wreckers gave a sense of sobriety to the Councils, and established a parliamentary tradition. In easier financial conditions this work might have been decisive. Under the circumstances existing, the chief task was to find the funds to arrest progress down the slippery slope which led to bankruptcy. In the Central Legislature a high sense of responsibility obtained; the Assembly voted new taxes amounting to £51,000,000; it cleared up much of the legislative confusion following the conclusion of the war; it established a sense of confidence and sobriety so strong that, in the opinion of competent observers, if it had been succeeded by men equally competent the fight for Swaraj would in effect have been won. Unfortunately, misfortune dogged its footsteps to the end. On the eve of the dissolution of the Assembly, the Government presented proposals for still further

taxation—the doubling of the salt tax—and, when they were rejected, the Viceroy ‘certified’ the impost in exercise of his special powers. The members had, therefore, to return to their constituencies with the confession of impotence. In the election which followed a large proportion lost their seats.

Still, the Assembly had done work which history will appraise highly. Though defeated on the salt tax, it had wrung from the Government the appointment of a retrenchment committee under the presidency of Lord Inchcape, which recommended economies aggregating £14,000,000, including a progressive reduction in very heavy military expenditure. It had demonstrated that there was better work to be done in the Councils than on the platform, and so rent the Non-Co-operation party in twain. There developed within it the party of Council entry, and, although the wilder section kept aloof, these went as the Swaraj Party to the polls. They had, in the special circumstances, a considerable measure of success, but nowhere except in the Central Provinces were they in an absolute majority. In the Central Provinces, by refusing to vote the salaries of Ministers, the Swarajists were able to

•

prevent the formation of a full Government; in Bengal, by uniting with disgruntled factions and working on the personalities, which are the bane of Indian politics, they prevented in the same way Ministers from taking office. But this did not seriously embarrass the Local Governments; the Ministers' portfolios were assumed by members of the Executive Council, and the King's Government was carried on in strict conformity with the provisions of the Act. In the Central Legislature the sound work of the first Assembly bore excellent fruit. With the aid of the new taxes and the economies enforced, the Budget balanced without the increased salt tax. Consequently, although the Assembly, where the Government is in a permanent minority, broke loose on occasion, the special powers of the Governor-General were used without exciting more than passing comment. More marked still was the influence of the Reforms in the third election, held in 1927. The Swaraj Party made no striking gains; the value of ministerships had become so apparent that they were re-established in Bengal and the Central Provinces. Throughout India the Reform Scheme is structurally functioning as designed by Parliament in 1919.

Coming back to our original proposition, if the only purpose of a Constitution was to function, the Reforms have achieved their end. A strong parliamentary tradition has been built up; no matter how high feeling may run, the proceedings of the Legislatures as a whole are marked by a high standard of propriety. There has been a marked diffusion of political knowledge. Ministers have seen something of the problems of administration; members of the Legislatures, especially by service on the numerous committees, have appreciated some of the difficulties of governing three hundred and nineteen millions of people. In the field of sociology the change has been tremendous. The old Hindu system dug an unbridgeable gulf between the Brahmin and the non-Brahmin, and a still deeper chasm between the orthodox Hindu and the sixty millions of Untouchables, whose lot was the most miserable on earth. Secure within his caste, and fortified by a high standard of education and power of work, the Brahmin was on a social pinnacle which none could hope to scale. It would be exaggerating to say that the cause of social reform has been won; it is correct to say that the non-Brahmin and the outcaste has each been given the power to work

out his own salvation from within, independent of the extraneous support on which prior to 1919 he had to rely. The most notable stride was made in Madras, where the non-Brahmins, by sheer force of numbers, swept the polls at the first elections and constituted their own Ministry. Although they have, as a result of internal fission, lost that primacy, they are a force which must be reckoned with. In Bombay the stout Maratha is coming by his own, and the depressed classes are raising their heads. At the first faint blast of democracy the walls of caste and autocracy have cracked; they have not fallen, but they have crumbled beyond repair.

The Constitution functions, and, if that was the be all and end all, we might rest content and leave it normally to develop. But in the special conditions of India that is not enough. Harking back to the genesis of the scheme, the great objective was the immediate establishment of a measure of responsible government, with the ultimate goal of full responsible government. The cardinal feature of the Reforms was the appointment of Ministers, to whom were committed the charge of nation-building agencies like education and sanitation. The Act presupposed that these Ministers would have behind

them organised parties in the Councils, who would support them in driving through their policies, and, if necessary, vote increased taxes in order to carry them into effect. If we inquire whether Indian administration has moved in that direction, the answer is less satisfactory and complete.

It would, we think, be impossible to find in any Province to-day either a Ministry or Ministers supported by an organised party sufficiently homogeneous and disciplined to carry it or them through any controversial policy. A promising beginning was made in Madras, where the triumph of the non-Brahmin party at the first elections gave it a working majority in the Council, and permitted the appointment of a constitutional Ministry. But that party exhausted its mandate, and, torn by internal dissension, has so materially weakened that it is no longer dominant. In every other Province Ministers have been drawn from the Council members who have the largest individual following, and, broadly speaking, they are kept in office by the support of the votes of the nominated officials and the backing of groups incapable of coalescence into a united political force. One seeks in vain for signs of the emergence of a party on which a strong, responsible

•

administration could be based, or for a Minister who would have the courage to propose increased taxation even for an object of admitted national importance, such as the early establishment of universal and compulsory primary education. In another direction the Reforms tend to a spirit of irresponsibility; the power reserved to the Governor-General and Provincial Governors to 'certify' either legislation or grants essential for the carrying on of the King's Government encourages hostile votes, which can be lightheartedly cast in the knowledge that the head of the administration will preserve the community from the mischievous effects of a rash decision. Indian critics say that this defect is inherent in the present transitory Constitution; that, given full responsibility, disciplined parties will emerge and greater sobriety will be exercised in dealing with legislation and financial grants. That may be, but it is a large assumption to make in a country where personalities loom much larger than parties and policies, and where the element of fission is the bane of all politics.

Nor, if we ask if the Reforms have tended to better government, can the answer be entirely satisfactory. It was recognised when the Act was

framed that there might be some reduction of administrative efficiency, and that the price might be paid for the larger object in view, preparation for full responsible government. Certainly, the Government has been brought into much more vivid contact with popular feeling. But we cannot ignore the evidence, which comes entirely from Indian sources, that there has been a decline in administrative vigour—that, with the prospect of acid, often unreasoning, criticism in the Councils, officials are more inclined to pursue the easy path of avoiding controversy than the fruitful course of progressive activity. In a country like India, where the Government enters much more closely into the lives of the people than in western lands where individualism is strong, this must mean stagnation, if not retrogression, especially as it is not counteracted by vigorous policies emanating from Ministers themselves. The backbone of the Indian Administration is the District Officer; to the mass of the people there is no authority other than the Head of the District. The District Officers have had their powers and authority impaired, sometimes unnecessarily, sometimes from a legitimate desire to train the people in administration.

There has been a great increase in the personnel of the Secretariats, involving the withdrawal of more good brains from the Districts, and the growth of a Secretariat caste of officials, which tends to divorce the Administration from the contact with local conditions. The tendency of the Reforms has also been to make the Administration top-heavy—to add memberships of the Executive Council and Ministers to a Cabinet which was never overworked, until in several Provinces seven men are now required to do work which formerly was easily carried on by three. Even more sinister is the criticism—which again comes entirely from Indian sources—that the relaxation of the bonds of administrative control has been followed by an increase in corruption, which officials, weakened by the thought of criticism in the Councils, are less active in curbing.

Again, it is not easy to discern the growth of a real democratic feeling and practice. The forms of democracy exist; there is the machinery of the election address, a certain amount of canvassing, the ballot-box. But of genuine contact between the elected member and his constituents after election there is little sign. "*Tout au contraire,*" as the Frenchman replied, when asked if he had dined

during a rough Channel crossing ; the last body the member of the Legislature thinks of consulting is his constituents. No better illustration of this could be given than when the Legislative Assembly was about to decide whether the ratio of the rupee to the sovereign should be one shilling and fourpence or one shilling and sixpence. This was a matter on which strong opinions were held ; it was genuinely believed in many quarters that one-and-four meant abounding prosperity and one-and-six stark ruin. The largest party in the Assembly, the Swarajists, were divided on the subject. But not one dreamt of consulting his constituents. A handful of the All-India Congress Committee, including a lady who has written some graceful verse, met and issued the edict that the Swarajists should vote for one-and-four, and they did. It might be argued that the electorate was incapable of understanding so complex an issue ; then what becomes of the idea of democracy ?

The Reforms, therefore, are everywhere functioning in the letter. That is no small thing when the representative system has been overthrown in so many countries where it seemed to be impregably installed, and when in India they have been afflicted

since the day of their birth by the convulsions of strong emotions springing from outside sources. But when we inquire whether they are working towards the goal aimed at—genuine responsibility, better government, and the evolution of a stable democracy—the answer cannot be in the confident affirmative. We shall be in a better position to determine the essential features in the constitutional progress of India when we have considered two factors which do not bulk largely in these discussions—the position of the Indian States and the problems of defence ; and when we have sketched the basic economic and social forces of which politics in the ordinary meaning of the term are no more than the expression.

CHAPTER IV

THE INDIAN STATES

THE average man, when he thinks of India at all, pictures it as a great and homogeneous territory directly administered by the officers of the Crown ; as the presidencies of Bombay, Madras, and Bengal, and the Provinces under the Governors. A glance at the map shows how erroneous is this generalisation, and to what inaccurate conclusions it must lead. The eye, resting on a coloured outline of India, is attracted by great patches of yellow in the predominating red. In the north-west is the broad area of Baluchistan ; farther north, again, is the frontier State of Kashmir, rising into the tremendous peaks of the Pamirs and the mountain outposts of Chitral and Gilgit ; in the far north-east are the States of Sikkim and Bhutan, which mark the division of India from Tibet. A little south is an immense tract of country where the land of the chivalrous Rajputs and the varied States of Central

India merge through Cutch and Kathiawar into the Arabian Sea. In the south is the solid State of Hyderabad under the Nizam, and farther south, again, the ancient Hindu State of Mysore, with the hardly less historic States of Travancore and Cochin. These yellow masses are the territories of the Indian States, under their own Indian rulers, enjoying various degrees of sovereignty, all secured by inviolable treaty rights. The States represent one-third of the total area of India ; their peoples one-fifth of the population. Whilst much of the soils—for instance, the deserts of Baluchistan and of Western Rajputana—are what Lord Salisbury once called 'thin' and suited to special methods of tillage, they embrace in the centre and the south some of the richest lands. To think of the future of India without taking account of the Indian States is as sensible a proposition as to discuss the affairs of Germany omitting from consideration all question of, say, Bavaria and Saxony.

The question, What is an Indian State ? has often been asked, and no two authorities will give precisely the same answer. We, therefore, fall back on a definition which has weight behind it ; the late Sir William Lee Warner defined it as 'a political

community, occupying a territory of India of defined boundaries, and subject to a common and responsible ruler, who has, as a matter of fact, enjoyed and exercised, with the sanction of the British Government, any of the functions and attributes of internal sovereignty.' Or, put in simple language, it is a part of India recognised as under the direct rule of its own Prince or Chief, in treaty relation with the British Crown, enjoying the rights and privileges embodied in the instrument regulating its existence. The relations of these States with the Crown vary enormously ; they were broadly summarised in the report on the condition of India presented by Mr. Montagu, the Secretary of State for India, and the Viceroy, Lord Chelmsford, in 1918, when they wrote :

' The States are guaranteed security from without ; the paramount Power acts for them in relation to foreign Powers and other States, and it intervenes when the internal peace of their territories is seriously threatened. On the other hand, the States' relations to foreign Powers are those of the paramount Power ; they share the obligation for common defence ; and they are under a

general responsibility for the good government and welfare of their territories.'

The variation between State and State is so immense that no generalisation has any value. Some, like the Rajput State of Mewar, have their origin so far back in the mists of time that the ruling house claims descent from the sun. After innumerable vicissitudes, the present Maharaja of Mysore may be acclaimed the lineal successor of the great Kings of Vijaynagar, whose wealth was the theme of the historians of pre-Moghul days. Others, again, were hewn from the wreck of the Moghul Empire. For instance, the Nizam of Hyderabad, Asaf Jah, established his independence so late as 1724, in the confusion which followed the death of Aurangzebe, the last of the great Emperors. The States of Rajputana and the Hindu principalities of the south have carried on almost unbroken the tradition of the greatest days of the Hindu kings ; on the other hand, Bhopal was carved out by a bold swordsman from Tirah on the borders of Afghanistan, who converted his reward in land for services to the Emperor at Delhi into an independence when the master's hand was stilled. A Mekrani adventurer founded

a ruling family in Central India, and a Moghul swordsman a dynasty at Radhanpur in the northern part of the Bombay presidency. It has been truly said that political as well as physical geography bears witness to the stress of the destructive forces through which the country has passed.

Equally varied are the States themselves. Wherever consolidating forces were at work before the British advance occurred, large units of territory were welded into Indian States. Such are Hyderabad, with its area of 82,698 square miles and population of 12,471,770—a country two-thirds the size of Italy. Wherever disorder or other disintegrating factors were at work, as in Bombay and Central India, there are a large number of fragmentary territories. Fission was most acute in Kathiawar, where it is possible to pass through several jurisdictions in the course of a day's ride. The result of all these factors is that the term Indian States applies now, and has been applied during the past century, to a collection of about 700 rulerships, which exhibit widely different characteristics; which range from States with full autonomy over their internal affairs to States in which Government

exercises through its agents large powers of internal control, and even down to the ownership of a few acres of land. In the south of India the traveller can pass from the careful order of British India into the jurisdiction of Mysore, insensible of any change ; on another journey, looking from the window of the railway carriage, his gaze is arrested by an almost instantaneous transformation from well-tilled fields and fat villages into pure jungle, and the puzzle is not solved until he realises that he has crossed the borders of an Indian State.

Yet running through this mosaic of the Indian States there are certain clear veins. A feature of all the States is the personal rule of the Prince and his control over legislation and the administration of justice. That autocracy may be veiled in cases by the establishment of the form of council government, the adoption of the British legal codes, or the institution of representative assemblies ; but behind the veil is the absolute power of the Prince. And this power is racy of the soil. None who has visited the Indian States can avoid carrying away a vivid impression of the direct relation of the Prince to his people, of the immense veneration for this visible sign of authority, and of the confidence felt

in the power immediately to reward, redress, or punish, without the endless formalities of a secretariat. Whether the dynasty, measured in terms of history, be young or old, this feature is common to all. Another vein, no less marked, is the tremendous importance which all States attach to their treaty rights with the Crown. So far as solemn engagements go, no rights could be more firmly guaranteed. The policy of the Crown was crystallised in the Proclamation Queen Victoria caused to be issued on assuming the governance of India from the old East India Company: 'We desire no extension of our present territorial possessions; and while we will permit no aggression on our dominions or our rights to be attempted with impunity, we shall allow no encroachments on those of others. We shall respect the rights, dignity and honour of the Native Princes as our own; and we desire that they, as well as our own subjects, should enjoy that prosperity and that social advancement which can only be secured by internal peace and good government.' That guarantee has been repeated in every authoritative pronouncement since: it is the corner-stone of the relation of the Indian States with the Crown

It is the practice of exponents of Indian polity to divide the relations of the Crown with the Indian States into three periods : they are called the policy of non-intervention, or the ring fence ; the policy of subordinate isolation ; and the policy of union and co-operation of the States with the paramount Power. Each requires a brief explanation. The keynote of the policy of the East India Company towards the Princes of the country from 1759—when Clive, after the victory of Plassey, acquired the *zamindari* of the district round Calcutta—to the close of 1813 was one of non-intervention. Beyond the ring fence of the Company's dominion they avoided intercourse with the Chiefs, in the hope that the stronger organisations would absorb the weaker and become settled States. That policy was untenable, from causes beyond the Company's control. On the death of the Lion of the Punjab, Ranjit Singh, the Sikh State fell into inextricable confusion. The military ambitions of the Maratha Princes, and the shelter they gave to the Pindari freebooters, who were the scourge of the country, compelled intervention. Before the Company passed out of existence British authority was extended to the Himalayan wall and to the western seas ; the

large and indefinite blocks of foreign territory left, in 1813, with no external frontiers delimited and no internal divisions fixed were brought under settlement; and the principalities were classified and protected. Three other steps of far-reaching importance were taken. The misgoverned kingdom of Oudh was incorporated in British India; the Rajahs of Jhansi, Nagpur, and Satara having died without direct heirs, their territories were absorbed; the map of India assumed in all essentials the form it bears to-day; with the right of adoption guaranteed, the Princes are secured in the possession of their territories.

The era of union and co-operation of the States with the paramount Power was inaugurated with the assumption of responsibility for the government of India by the Crown. It has been pursued with some fluctuations, but, on the whole, continuous success. The pledge in Queen Victoria's Proclamation, that the rights of the Indian Princes should be respected, was jealously honoured; indeed, the Government was better than its word. Owing to a period of maladministration and long minorities, Mysore was so long under British administration that a generation grew up which had

not known it under indigenous rule ; in 1881 the State was restored to the old Ruling House in an instrument which ensured that there should be no material departure from established practice. In 1911 the Raja of Benares was endowed with full ruling powers over his estates other than the city of Benares. The danger of war with Russia brought the Government and the Princes into closer realisation of their interest in the defence of India, and, on the inspiration of Lord Dufferin, most of the States agreed to convert a portion of their local forces into Imperial Service Troops, armed and disciplined on the model of the Indian Army, although under their own officers. Yet, despite this attractive façade, there were certain discontents. The ruling Princes felt that, whilst their rights and privileges were in theory preserved, there were constant encroachments on them in practice ; that their authority was in effect being undermined by officers impatient for better government. To set these anxieties at rest Lord Minto announced at Udaipur in 1909 a much more decisive practice of non-intervention. He defined our policy as one of ' non-interference in the internal affairs of the Native States.' He was careful to reserve the

right of dealing with misrule, and certain rights essential to any paramount Power, but laid down that 'the relationship of the Supreme Government to the State is one of suzerainty. The foundation-stone of the whole system is the recognition of identity of interests between the Imperial Government and Durbars and the minimum of interference with the latter in their own affairs.'

With the best will on both sides, there are limitations to the operation of the policy of non-interference. Even in the great homogeneous States their interests impinge on those of British India in many ways. Trunk railways often traverse their territories; the telegraphs and posts are interlocked; the currency policy of the Government materially affects their welfare; more recently there has arisen the competition of ports in the States with those in British India. An additional complication was raised when British India deserted the fiscal practice of tariffs for revenue purposes only and embarked on a policy of discriminating protection; Customs duties are in some cases as high as 30 per cent., and the States feel that in consuming high-duty articles they and their people are contributing large sums to the revenues of British India for which they

receive no consideration. For all these reasons it is impossible to separate the States and British India into watertight compartments and pretend they have no inter-relation one with another. Nor are the peoples divided, save by artificial boundaries. As the fairest scene in Scotland is the highroad leading to London, so in the Indian States, where the soil is thin and the resources are poor, the adventurous spirits bred in this hard school find an outlet for their energies in British India. The Western States of Rajputana, Jodhpur, and Bikaner, spill their surplus population into the great cities of Calcutta and Bombay, and to a lesser extent into other industrial and agricultural centres, where they rank amongst the keenest and most successful traders, some of whom have accumulated huge fortunes. The shrewd merchants of Cutch have flocked into Bombay, where they are a very important element in commercial circles. Some years ago the writer, on a visit to Bikaner, rode a score of miles into the desert on camel-back to see how the people fare in that State, where even the Carpenter would have wept to see such quantities of sand. We arrived at a substantial village, where five houses in every six were closed and barred ;

every inquiry as to who lived within was met with the reply, "Banker." The first impression was that the villagers lived by lending each other money ; then the explanation came ; these were the houses of wealthy Marwaris trading in Calcutta and Bombay, kept for holidays and ceremonial purposes. The policy of non-interference has, therefore, obvious limitations.

All these elements were fused in the crucible of the war. The Princes played a great part in the struggle ; from the moment when hostilities were declared they placed their resources at the disposal of the Crown, their troops served in every theatre of the war, they contributed large sums in money and great gifts in kind. The war over, those who took long views asked themselves three trenchant questions : what was to be the future relation of the Princes with the Crown ; with the representative of the Crown, the Viceroy ; and with British India, working with the new leaven, definitely launched on the path to full responsible government ; and, though this voice was less insistent, with the peoples over whom they ruled ?

If we seek to interpret the views of the Indian States, we may say the first position is the absolute

binding power of the existing treaties ; that need not be laboured, for on the highest authority it has been declared that these are inviolate and inviolable. Irrevocably linked with this position is that their relations are with the Crown, not with the Government of India. On this jurists differ. One eminent authority, Sir A. B. Keith, in *The Constitution, Administration, and Laws of the Empire*, says: 'It is important to note that the relations of the Indian States, however conducted, are essentially relations with the British Crown and not with the Indian Government ; and that this fact presents an essential complication as regards the establishment of Responsible Government in India. It is clear that it is not possible for the Crown to transfer its rights under Treaty, without the assent of the Native States, to the Government of India under Responsible Government.' Other jurists hold that the relations of the Indian States are for all practical purposes with the Government of India. In the summer of 1927 the States sent a small deputation to London to secure a definite legal opinion on their status. In the administrative fabric the States deal with the Viceroy as the King's viceregent, not with the Governor-General in Council, the fount

of authority in India on all other questions. The Viceroy is his own Minister for political affairs; they are excluded from discussion in the Legislatures.

The machinery for co-relating the Indian States with the Viceroy and the Government of India can best be considered together. For more than half a century this question was raised and then dropped. Lord Lytton in the 'seventies proposed the establishment of an Imperial Privy Council, which should comprise some of the great Princes. Lord Curzon re-created the idea in a general proposition for a Council of Ruling Princes. When the reforms of 1909 were on the anvil Lord Minto suggested first an Imperial Advisory Council and then an Imperial Council of Ruling Princes. All these ideas were still-born, and it was not until the advent of Lord Hardinge that any definite steps were taken. Lord Hardinge, who won the affection and confidence of the Princes in a remarkable degree, sought their collective opinion as trusted colleagues; his successor, Lord Chelmsford, went farther by calling the Princes into actual conferences. This pointed the path to the scheme embodied in the Montagu-Chelmsford Report on constitutional reform, and

since carried into practice. There was constituted a Chamber of Princes, which meets annually to take counsel with the Viceroy and each other, and a Standing Committee of the Chamber to advise the Viceroy on questions of custom and usage. Simultaneously there was instituted a greatly improved procedure. It was a matter provocative of great soreness that in disputes between the Government of India and Indian States, and between State and State, the issue was decided by the *obiter dicta* of the Viceroy's Secretariat, without any opportunity of a quasi-judicial hearing, and on occasion by appeal to the Secretary of State six thousand miles away. It was agreed that in all such matters reference might be made to a Commission to advise the Viceroy, comprising a high judicial officer and a representative of each of the parties. Further, that even in the case of serious maladministration no ruler should be deprived of his rights and privileges without being heard before a commission of five, which should include a High Court judge and two ruling Princes. Although for various reasons some of the great Princes have stood aloof from the Chamber, it has exercised a powerful influence in bringing the States into closer

touch with the Crown and each other. An important gap remains to be filled. In the great legislative house at Delhi there is provided space for the Chamber of Princes, the Council of State, and the Legislative Assembly to meet severally and jointly ; they have never met jointly, and until they do the Indian States will remain wholly divorced from contact with the Indian governing machine other than through the Viceroy.

Touching on the last point, where opinion is growing increasingly insistent, the relations between the Princes and their own people, we must hark back to the essential factor stressed earlier ; despite the nominal limitations of nascent representative institutions and the existence of codes, the Indian Prince is an autocrat, his rule is personal, his control over legislation and the administration of justice is absolute. In general, this system is well suited to conditions in the States themselves. They are for the most part agricultural ; the peoples are a landed aristocracy and a cultivating class ; there are no great towns, and traders and restless folk migrate to British India. The ease, the cheapness, the directness of this personal rule is understood and appreciated ; the populations of the States are

not less happy, if they are not happier, than the residents of British India. If we could guarantee that all Indian Princes were good rulers, nothing more would be desired ; but this is a human institution, and some must fail ; remembering the temptations to which every Indian Prince is exposed as soon as he has power to think, the wonder is not that a few fall, but that the general standard should be so good. In cases of serious maladministration the Viceroy has not hesitated to interfere. After exhaustive inquiry by a Commission, he deposed the Maharaja of Nabha ; when, in the spring of 1924, the country was shocked by a horrible case of attempted kidnapping accompanied by murder in Bombay, which was organised in the State of Indore, the Viceroy offered the Maharaja a Commission of Inquiry, and he preferred to abdicate ; still more recently the Nizam of Hyderabad was invited to accept expert ' advisers ' to raise the standard of his administration, and he agreed. But opinion is growing more restive of the long period which must elapse between the evidence of maladministration and the interference of the Viceroy ; in the opinion of many who have given this question close study, the Indian States will stand

or fall on the question of some guarantee of good government other than the personality of the ruler for the time being.

But what? Here a personal experience may be permitted. A great friend of the writer, who, working as Chief Minister under a public-spirited ruler, had raised his State to a high pitch of efficiency, remained grimly silent whilst this doctrine was expounded. Followed an invitation to visit the State itself; we motored for days from village to village, surrounded by evidence of contentment and well-being, the peasantry approaching the Minister with confidence with their petitions and delighted to see him. At the end of the visit the motive was disclosed. "You tell me," said the Minister, "that we should establish some substitute for the personal rule of the Maharaja. You have seen the State and the people. Tell me what? But, mark, I will have no eyewash." There was no answer. A suggestion is repeated here which was given publicity elsewhere, with some confidence because it has been enforced by authority in the Indian States. The chief safeguards sought by the peoples of the Indian States are really only two: the separation of the privy purse of the ruler from the general

revenues in order to prevent them from being squandered, and security for the administration of justice. Both could be secured without any material change in the present structure. The twentieth article of the instrument which restored Mysore to the ruling house provided that no material change in the system of administration should be made without the sanction of the Governor-General in Council. It should not be impossible for the States to supplement their treaties by entering into engagements with the Crown fixing the privy purse. There is a simple means of strengthening the administration of justice by allowing appeals to the Privy Council in certain cases. That would involve no infringement of the rights of the Princes, nor of their contention that their contractual engagements are with the Crown. An appeal to the Privy Council is a petition to the Throne.

The copy-books say we can only conquer nature by obeying her ; we can only overcome the problems of India by facing them. The Indian politician brushes aside the question of the Indian States ; they refuse to be so treated. They are founded in history ; they are imbedded in Indian tradition

and sentiment ; they provide in most circumstances a form of government admirably suited to the people ; slight changes would remove the obvious avenues to abuse. The whole question is now under inquiry by an authoritative committee, who will have before them a memorandum representing the views of a large number of the States. This proposes the establishment of three new bodies in the fabric of government—the Viceroy in Indian States Council, which will deal with the relations of the States with the Crown and each other ; the Union Council, comprising the Viceroy in Indian States Council and the Governor-General in Council, which will deal with matters common to the States and British India ; and a Union Court, judicial in composition, to which matters of a juridical nature between the States and the Crown and between State and State can be referred. Whilst these proposals are not binding, they indicate the strong desire of the States for a definition of their position, and for authoritative machinery to uphold it. Anyone who thinks the Indian States can be ignored is committing a cardinal error. They are tenacious of their rights, and refuse to be ignored ; no peaceful evolution of the machinery of government in

India is conceivable which does not give them firm and established place in the future federal constitution.¹

¹In a letter to His Exalted Highness the Nizam of Hyderabad, dated the 27th March, 1926, the Viceroy of India, in fullest agreement with the Secretary of State, set forth the principles which govern the relations of the Paramount Power with the Indian States in the following passages:—'The sovereignty of the British Crown is supreme in India, and therefore no Ruler of an Indian State can justifiably claim to negotiate with the British Government on an equal footing. Its supremacy is not based only upon treaties and engagements, but exists independently of them, and, quite apart from its prerogative in matters relating to foreign powers and policies, it is the right and duty of the British Government, while scrupulously respecting all treaties and engagements with the Indian States, to preserve peace and good order throughout India. The right of the British Government to intervene in the internal affairs of Indian States is another instance of the consequences necessarily involved in the supremacy of the British Crown. The British Government have indeed shown again and again that they have no desire to exercise the right without grave reason. But the internal, no less than the external, security which the Ruling Princes enjoy is due ultimately to the protecting power of the British Government, and where Imperial interests are concerned, or the general welfare of the people of a State is seriously and grievously affected by the action of its Government, it is with the Paramount Power that the ultimate responsibility for taking remedial action, if necessary, must lie. The varying degrees of internal sovereignty which the Rulers enjoy are all subject to the due exercise by the Paramount Power of this responsibility.'

CHAPTER V

DEFENCE

WE are so accustomed to think of India as a vast sub-continent, divided from other countries by boundaries of sea, mountain, and desert, that we may be inclined to assume that its natural defences are sufficient to confer upon it some degree of safety, if not of immunity, from invasion. History teaches us a contrary lesson. Darkness enshrouds the records of India down to comparatively recent times. The one fact that emerges is that the country was overrun by a series of invaders. The earliest, perhaps, were the Dravidians, so ancient that their present-day descendants were long regarded as the aboriginal inhabitants of India. It is, at least, certain that the great waves of Aryan invasion entered through the more northern passes of the same frontier. Many centuries later Alexander the Great proved it to be possible for a small but well-disciplined army to traverse the passes, and,

after deployment in the plains, to defeat the hosts of the Indian rulers. Alexander was followed by a succession of invaders—Persians, Scythians, Pathans, Turks, and Moghuls, down to Nadir Shah the Persian and Ahmad Shah the Afghan, whose invasions almost coincided with the first consolidation of the British Empire in India. All these invaders entered India by one or other of the five great passes that pierce the barriers of the hills on the North-Western Frontier of India. We have no record of similar invasions of the North-Eastern Frontier. The presence, however, of so large a Mongoloid element in the population with obvious affinity to the peoples of Eastern Asia indicates immigration, if not invasion, on a large scale.

Most of these invasions occurred many centuries ago. Just, however, as an unusual flood will take a course that has remained free from water for a generation, so can invasion yet follow the tracks traversed under at least equal difficulties by conquerors of old.

All these successful invasions of India, it will be noticed, were made by land. There was, indeed, a widespread ocean commerce between the shores of India and countries so remote as China and East

Africa from the earliest days ; and there must even have been considerable emigration to Java and the Eastern Isles. Such ships of war, however, as were maintained by the rulers of the coast were calculated rather to suppress piracy than to command the sea. With the sole exception of the invasion and conquest of Sind by the Arabs in the eighth century of our era, there is no instance of the command of the sea affecting the Empire on land.

A very different situation arose when the ships of the European nations, able to keep the sea for months at a time, appeared in Indian waters. The first-comers were the Portuguese. Small and weak though their power was, even at its best, it was sufficient to enable them to strangle the trade of the whole coast of India, and in particular to interfere with the pilgrim traffic, so necessary for the spiritual welfare of the Mahomedans, who then ruled over nearly the whole country. It also enabled the Portuguese to establish and maintain a chain of forts down the west coast of India. The prize, however, was too valuable for so small a nation as Portugal to hold, and Dutch, English, and French first swept the Portuguese off the seas, and then proceeded to fight out the supremacy between

themselves. The issue of the question whether the English or the French should be the master Power depended on the struggle between the fleets at sea. The English won ; and, on the firm base of the command of the sea, extended their power over the whole of Hindustan.

With the great increase of trade and the dependence, which must long continue, of India on imports, particularly of military munitions—to say nothing of the value of its exports—the command of the sea is of undiminished importance for the defence of India, and requires our first attention. At present, and so long as the British sea power continues, the Indian Ocean is almost a closed sea, so far as naval operations are concerned. On the west, a chain of British strongholds from Gibraltar to Aden commands the most direct route. Even if that route be temporarily closed for any reason, the alternative road round the Cape is almost as well protected by British strongholds, though more open to attack. From the east there may be more danger, but an impregnable British base at Singapore would close the most dangerous point of entry. There is, indeed, another gateway to the Indian Ocean from the Persian Gulf. Here alone, almost, among British

strategic positions is the command of communications subject to serious attack by land. The gateway is important, because of its comparative proximity by water to the coasts of India. In its neighbourhood, also, the railways of the west and north are likely, in the not very distant future, to link up with the Indian railways, while the air route to India already flies along it. At present, however, this gateway is under British control ; and the Indian Ocean is in one sense the most British of all the Seven Seas, constituting, as it were, an arch of which India is the keystone. The benefit to both Britain and India is obviously mutual. Apart from the question of British trade with India, the latter country lies on the flank of the communications with Australia and with the Far Eastern British possessions. On the other hand, should British protection weaken or be withdrawn, it is difficult to see how India could ever protect of its own strength its extremely vulnerable coast-line, six thousand miles in length.

So far, India has only contributed to its naval defence by a modest annual payment to the British Admiralty. If she is to fulfil the rôle of a self-governing dominion, to which she rightly aspires, she obviously must do more, apart from the fact that

she is more open to attack than any other of the great dominions of the Empire. To do India justice, however, she aspires to take a larger part in the naval defence of her shores. A beginning has already been made towards the creation of an indigenous Indian Navy. Its progress must depend on the aptitude which Indians show for a life of which they have had little experience, and on the willingness of the Legislature to provide adequate funds. There are two directions in which the aid of the British Navy can clearly be supplemented. The first is the provision of means to check the danger done by commerce destroyers like the *Emden* in the Great War. The second is the provision of adequate bases for refitment in India, and the protection of the great ports from attacks by sea. Speaking in general terms, however, any invasion of India by sea is impossible so long as England maintains its sea power. A voluntary separation from the protection of that power cannot be contemplated by any well-wishers of India.

The problems of the land defence of India are of a very different and more complex character. In many respects India is fortunate in its boundaries. On the east and north-east, her relations with Siam,

and with the French Protectorates, are fortunately such as preclude all fears of conflict, apart from the natural difficulties of the terrain, impassable for organised troops. For nearly a thousand miles India's borders march with those of China. The resources of the two Chinese Provinces concerned, Yunan and Szechuan, are great, and it is impossible to foretell whither the pressure of population will ultimately lead. It was, we must remember, the same pressure that originally drove the Turks to conquer Nearer Asia, and much of Europe. At present, however, the Provinces are so backward, and the natural difficulties of access to India or Burma so great, that the question of invasion does not come within the sphere of practical politics. All along the North-Eastern Frontier, indeed, there are many savage and unsubdued tribes. Unlike the tribes on the North-Western Frontier, they are neither dangerous in themselves nor likely to be a formidable factor in the invasions of others. They are, indeed, negligible from the military point of view. As we go farther north, we find the boundary guarded by a series of well-defined States, Sikkim, Bhutan, and Nepal, and still better protected by the natural difficulties of the climate and the terrain. In

the whole area there may be said to be but one pass practicable for troops, that of Chambi in Sikkim, and even that pass can be traversed only by pack animals. The Northern Frontier of India, sixteen hundred miles in length, consists of one vast wall of mountains, inaccessible for invasion. It is not till we get to Jammu, and reach the North-Western Frontier, that the real problem of Indian Defence begins. From this point to the sea the distance is roughly twelve hundred miles, but the interest is really concentrated on a length of six hundred miles from Bajaur to Sharawak. This length is penetrated by five great passes, through which, as we have already seen, successive invaders have passed to the conquest of the Indian plains. The country round these passes is occupied by tribes of fine fighting quality, who have never admitted subjection to any rule, whether it be Persian, Moghul, Afghan, or British. The tribesmen are bound by a common religion. Its bonds may lie lightly upon them in ordinary times, but the flame of its fanaticism may be kindled in any crisis. These tribes make the problem of the frontier a twofold one, affecting, firstly, the policy of international relations, and, secondly, the control of the territory within the

Indian sphere of interest. India's international relations, so far as frontier defence is concerned, are affected by two countries only, Russia and Afghanistan. Persia does, it is true, march with a peculiarly barren portion of Baluchistan, which will in the future doubtless be the corridor for railway communication between India and the outer world. The railway system of India, indeed, already traverses it, and impinges on Persian territory. The conditions and resources of Persia, however, render danger from that country an impossible contingency, unless the pressure emanates from what used to be called the Colossus of the North. The danger from Russia has been the bugbear of Indian frontier policy for fully a century. Nor has the danger been an imaginary one. The Power which could coerce Persia to an ignominious treaty in 1828, and could absorb the Central Asian kingdoms in the 'seventies and 'eighties of the last century, seemed fully capable of overrunning Persia and crushing Afghanistan. The hostility of Bolshevist Russia to the British Empire and its desire to strike at it through India have been repeatedly declared. What Russia has lost in strength it has sought to make up by guile. The Russian railhead is only seventy miles from Herat.

That city is indeed distant from the Indian frontier, but it is the commercial capital of the Afghan kingdom, and the Indian Government must be prepared to support the Afghan ruler in holding it, or else to recognise that he will inevitably make terms with the Power whose aggression he cannot, unaided, check. On the attitude of the Afghan State, indeed, depends the problem of the defence of the Indian Frontier. The policy of the Indian Government in its regards must seem to us often to have been devious and mistaken. The object of that policy has always been the same, to create a buffer State on whose opposition to the further advance of Russia reliance could be placed. Unfortunately, it has been thought necessary to impose this policy on the Afghans by force of arms, with the inevitable consequence of a legacy of mistrust. After the Third Afghan War, an attack of pure aggression by the Afghans, very easily repulsed, the British Government has finally agreed to regard Afghanistan as an entirely independent State. The King of Afghanistan has since steadily aimed at increasing his military strength, and there can be no doubt that the Afghan tribesmen are now much better armed than they formerly were. Yet it is probable that the

situation from the Indian point of view has been improved by the independence of Afghanistan. The more stabilised and regular the Afghan Army becomes, the easier it is to deal with. Our trouble in past wars has not come from the Afghan regular forces. Moreover, the Afghan kingdom is being stabilised in other directions besides that of armament. Trade is increasing, motor roads have been made, and there is at least a possibility of railways. The great bulk of Afghan trade lies with India, and the interests of the trade must become increasingly identified with those of its richest and most stable neighbour. It is unreasonable to doubt, moreover, that the unquenchable patriotism of the Afghan would resist to the utmost the advent of the northern Power which has already wiped out so many Mahomedan kingdoms. It is, in any case, of the first importance that the Indian Empire should be in a position to control and defend its own border-line.

As already remarked, many of the tribes in the neighbourhood of that line have never admitted subjection to any ruler. If there was any admission of sovereignty, it was towards the ruler in authority at Kabul. In 1894 a boundary known as the Durand Line was laid down to demarcate the Afghan and

British Indian spheres. While the Afghan ruler has extended his authority up to his side of the line, a like achievement cannot be claimed by the Indian Government over long stretches in its sphere. The problem of the defence of the Frontier is clearly twofold. The policy adopted must aim at protecting the plains of India from marauders and at keeping the passes open for trade, while it must also provide for the security of India against large invading forces. There has been much inevitable difference of opinion, and much vacillation of policy, in the pursuance of this aim. There was formerly a school of thought which recommended retirement to the line of the Indus. Apart, however, from the fact that a river is a notoriously poor line of defence, this policy would have the fatal effect of isolating Afghanistan, while Indian commitments across the Indus are too great to be abandoned. Moreover, it would be folly to allow the enemy space to deploy in a comparatively fertile country, instead of compelling him to fight in the barren hills. The second line of policy is that known as the Close Border policy. It amounts roughly to leaving the tribesmen alone, and retaliating for inroads by punitive expeditions. The frequency of such expeditions

in the past is, however, the best proof of the failure of that policy, while obviously it does nothing to improve the condition of the tribesman in his own territory. It is equally open, too, to the objection that it isolates Afghanistan, and that it allows the enemy time to choose his place of incursion into the plains. Then we have the opposite or Forward policy, which desires complete extension of authority right up to the Durand Line. It is claimed for this policy that it would, in the long run, be cheapest, and that it would at least provide more healthy cantonments for the British Indian troops than the malarious and heat-stricken stations now perforce occupied. The supporters of this policy point out, further, that administration has been most successful where, as in the Kurram valley, Peshin, and Baluchistan, it has been applied close up to the Afghan Frontier. The circumstances of these tracts, however, admit of easier control. There can be little doubt that the general application of the policy would be very unpopular with the frontier tribes. It would necessitate a greater expenditure of men and money than can well be provided. The policy at present in force savours somewhat of the spirit of compromise so popular with British statesmen.

Military stations are placed in tribal territory, but not in very advanced positions. Roads are opened, and a strong Air Force is provided for observation and for punitive purposes. Beyond the range of the military stations, reliance for the maintenance of order is placed on irregular levies which for the most part provide their own equipment. Hopes for further progress are based on the infiltration of ideas of order and prosperity, and on the raising of the economic standard of the tribesmen. It is undoubtedly true that the armament of the tribes has become much more formidable, so that perhaps 150,000 tribesmen armed with modern weapons could take the field. The effect of such numbers has been enhanced by the greater unity of feeling and organisation now apparent among the tribesmen. It is equally true that the extension of railways and irrigation has rendered a settled mode of life more attractive and possible than it was previously. The policy at least promises well, and affords hope for the future control of the Frontier, while it would also allow of assistance being given to the Afghans against a foreign invader, along a line running from Kandahar to Kabul by way of Ghazni.

The adoption of this, or indeed any other, frontier policy obliges the Government of India to maintain a permanent covering force, as well as a striking force behind it. A certain reserve of strength must be maintained for the preservation of internal security. In spite of the vast extent of the country, the diversity of its peoples, and the acuteness of their religious differences, this task has been performed without difficulty since the troublous days of 1857. To an ever-increasing extent, indeed, the maintenance of internal order has become a duty of the police. The bitterness of intercommunal dissensions, however, and the damage done by the fanatical outbreaks of even so poor and insignificant a people as the Moplahs of the Madras Presidency, furnish sufficient indication of the necessity of maintaining an efficient military force in support of the civil power.

The efficiency of that force will clearly depend on the quality and training of the officers and men who fill its ranks—in other words, upon the human element. The idea of a National Army, such as became familiar in Europe in the nineteenth century, in which every citizen was liable to serve, is altogether foreign to the history and usage of India.

From the earliest days of the Aryans we find the warriors set apart from the rest of the community ; and the universal tendency in India to apply the caste system to every occupation has perpetuated and accentuated this separation. In all parts of India, therefore, the innumerable wars were carried on with armies composed of foreign mercenaries, or of local castes whose occupation was soldiering. The discovery that small bodies of men trained and led by professional officers, and strengthened by European troops, few in number but of high quality, could overcome vast but undisciplined armies was first made by the French under Dupleix, but the example was quickly followed and improved upon by the British. The continuance of the highest fighting qualities depends on the opportunities for their display, unless the particular race concerned has, like the Marathas for example, special qualities or traditions. It is, therefore, hardly a matter for surprise that, with the long reign of peace over the whole of India, the tendency has been to increase the elements in the Army recruited in the north and north-west of India, where the climate is more invigorating and the people have more recent experience of warfare

and greater aptitude for the terrain on which any future war is likely to be conducted. Thus it is that the Madras soldiers, who formed the armies of Clive and of Coote, and crossed bayonets even with the French European troops, have disappeared from the Army, and practically the same fate has befallen the races of the United Provinces who filled the 'beautiful sepoy regiments' of Pollock and of Nott. The Great War revealed many weaknesses in the Indian Army, and the necessity for reform combined with economy made it essential to restrict recruitment to the best available material. Thus it has come to pass that the Army is not proportionally representative of the population, and, in general terms, is drawn to a preponderating degree from the fighting races of the Punjab and of Nepal. Further, although individual corps are not, with the exception of one or two Sikh battalions, the Gurkha regiments, and a few other units, composed entirely of men of the same caste and religion, yet the companies or squadrons of which they are made up are individually confined to a uniform composition drawn from one particular tribe or religious persuasion. This fact is of importance when the officering of the regiment has to be considered.

Few complaints are made by the public or by the politicians regarding the recruitment of the rank and file. It is recognised that the best material must be taken; if local martial spirit requires an outlet, it can best be qualified by enrolment in the Territorial Force, to which reference is made below. It is in respect of the selection and training of the cadre of officers that the loudest complaints are heard, and the greatest impatience felt. Indians naturally and legitimately demand a larger share in the officering of the forces of their country and opportunity to rise to the highest posts. However great the sympathy that such aspirations must excite, it is necessary to remember certain facts, historical and actual. From the earliest days, Indian armies were commanded largely by professional officers of foreign birth. In the centuries before the Europeans came to India, such foreign officers were Turks, Persians, Afghans or Abyssinians; in the later eighteenth and earlier nineteenth centuries the armies of the Indian States were trained and led by men of British, French, Dutch or Italian descent. Further, let it be borne in mind that the landed and moneyed classes which in other countries supply the bulk of the officers for

the Army and Navy have in most parts of India no tradition of military service behind them, at least in warfare conducted under disciplined conditions. There are, indeed, many families in the Indian States and among the landed aristocracy, which exists in some parts of India, though by no means universally, from which suitable material might be expected. These families, however, are found chiefly in Provinces in which traditions of warfare are almost forgotten; nor have the young men belonging to them received the education necessary for the fulfilment of the duties of an officer. The fine fighting stocks of the north, again, while supplying excellent material for the ranks and for the lower grades of officering, have been too deficient in literacy to be suitable for the higher posts.

The fact that no class of suitable officer has existed in the past is obviously no reason why such a class should not be trained up. It does, however, postulate careful selection and education, and the inculcation of character, and the power of giving orders so that they are obeyed. Two most important points must be borne in mind. The first is that the rank and file, formed, as has been pointed out, into companies composed entirely of men of a particular

caste, tribe, and religious belief, will not readily obey one of their countrymen who differs from them in these important particulars, unless by his character and efficiency he can command respect. The second point is that the Indian soldiers have always been brigaded with and fought alongside their European comrades. It is, indeed, impossible to recall any considerable campaign in which both Europeans and Indians have not been intermingled in the British Indian forces. The Indian officers in the higher ranks must, if this happy union is to continue in future wars, clearly be such as will command the respect of the European as well as of the Indian soldier.

Let us consider, then, the progressive steps that have been taken and are proposed to meet the natural aspirations of Indians for the officering of the Indian Army. In early days, the promotion of Indian officers was almost entirely from the ranks, and they could not aspire to higher posts than the command of companies. Splendid fighting men these Indian officers were, but age and lack of education rendered them unsuitable for higher posts. They held their commissions from the Viceroy, and such commissions were confined, except as honorary

distinctions, to the Indian titles of Subadar, Risaldar, and Jamadar. Before the Great War, commissions as captain and lieutenant had been granted to Indian gentlemen of good family, but these were still only Viceroy's commissions, and somewhat local in their character. After the Great War, and the promise to India of an ultimate Dominion status, the commissions were granted by the King, and selected youths sent to undergo the training of Sandhurst. Those who passed successfully through that training were exactly on the same footing as British youths posted to the Indian Army. To meet the demand for Indianisation, it was resolved to aim at making certain units entirely Indian in their officering, somewhat on the model of the Egyptian Army, as reformed by Sir Evelyn Wood. This intention has never been abandoned, though it is believed that the object aimed at is disliked by the Sandhurst-trained Indian officers themselves, and may well be unpopular with the rank and file. A college, moreover—the Prince of Wales's Military College—was established at Dehra Dun, mainly for the education of sons of Indian officers of the old class, and of other men of the fighting stocks, who were likely to fall behind in the general struggle in the

ordinary schools. This college has proved a great success, and may well supply good material for the officers' ranks. The cry for more rapid Indianisation continued, however, and a committee, known from its chairman as the Skeen Committee, was appointed, whose principal recommendation was the establishment of an Indian Sandhurst. Neither the Secretary of State nor the Government of India has been able to accept this recommendation. One of the principal reasons advanced in support of it, namely, the expense to the parents of education in England, has been met by the undertaking by Government to meet the excess of such expenditure over the cost of similar education at an Indian college. The very important change has been made that the number of cadetships, originally fixed at ten annually, has been increased to thirty-seven, and includes a number at Woolwich and at Cranwell. The natural desire of Indians to serve in the technical and Air Forces of their country will, therefore, be met. It may well be doubted whether, for many years, more than thirty-seven suitable candidates would be forthcoming in India. Education in England will produce the great advantage of unity and comradeship with the British Army, without

whose help India could not, it may safely be postulated, contemplate with any confidence the possibility of foreign aggression, or even of serious border warfare.

A brief reference is necessary to the second line of the Army. The demand for increased opportunity of service led to the formation of a Territorial Army. It has been rightly determined that this should form a true reinforcement for the Army in time of war. It is therefore constituted of men in the rural districts of much the same class, though not necessarily of the same castes, as join the Army. The experiment is of interest, as it attracts many for whom there is no room in the Army. It is officered, except for the staff work, for which British officers are supplied, from local gentry. The experiment, though not yet subjected to the test supplied by mobilisation, has been quite successful, most of the twenty battalions being up to strength.

In addition to this Territorial Force, units of the nature of officers' training corps have been established at the universities. These have proved very popular, and, though composed of classes who do not ordinarily desire a military career, may supply some material for the officers' ranks.

There is also the Auxiliary Force, the descendant of the old Volunteers, which is restricted to persons of European birth and descent. This force has been of the greatest value in the past, particularly in the support of the civil power, since its trustworthiness and independence of communal disputes has been of constant usefulness in the prevention and suppression of rioting. Its existence causes some jealousy, and it has now been determined to establish urban corps open to Indians, with the same duties and obligations as are attached to the existing Auxiliary Force.

It is not possible to review at length the organisation and distribution of the Indian Army. Originally, the armies of the three Presidencies were separate and localised, and this inconvenient arrangement continued long after the Bengal Presidency had spread from its original bounds. The old system was swept away and the Army unified by Lord Roberts, and further reform was effected by Lord Kitchener. The Army is now divided into four great commands. The bulk of it is naturally placed within easy reach of the point of danger, the Frontier and the passes of the North-West.

No reference has been made to the share of the

Indian States in the military organisation and in the defence of India. The question is one of great importance, but it is only one of the points involved in the relation of the Indian States to the Indian polity, which is discussed elsewhere.

It is often asserted that the Indian Army absorbs too great a share of the revenues of India. This is especially the complaint of the Indian politician, who, while he rightly desires to increase the nation-building expenditure, realises that taxation is even more unpopular with the Indian voter than it is in other countries. The complaint contains elements of exaggeration. The cost of the Army (including the Indian Navy also, so far as it exists) is between 50 and 60 crores out of a total Central and Provincial revenue of 220 crores. A large sum truly, yet only two rupees per head of population, and thus less than one-twentieth of the individual share of the inhabitant of the United Kingdom. The proportion of Army expenditure is being constantly reduced. It was 25 per cent. in 1927 against 42 per cent. in 1892. Moreover, no less than $4\frac{1}{2}$ crores of the expenditure is on account of schools and military pensions, which would fall on the Civil Estimates in the United Kingdom, or is paid to other State Departments

in the form of railway, post, and telegraph charges. The total percentage can hardly be called excessive when it is remembered that not the wealth of India only, but the lives of its inhabitants depend on the efficacy of the Defence System. A voluntary system is always expensive, and the expense is greater when so many of the volunteers come from overseas. But the system ensures that the whole strength of the Empire is in reserve behind the Indian Forces. Under no other arrangement could India obtain so powerful a defensive organisation at a like cost.

CHAPTER VI

INDUSTRIES : AGRICULTURE

INDIA is primarily and essentially an agricultural country, or, rather, a collection of countries. We are still sometimes told that India is a geographical expression : but, just as there is a national feeling that binds the people together, however different their languages and origins, so there are natural and climatic features that are common to vast areas, however extreme and violent their variations may be. The great fact to be remembered is that, in spite of the increase in trade and industrialism, 72 in every 100 of the people are still agriculturists, while in the rural areas the percentage is as high as 90. It is on agriculture that the wealth of India must, in the future as in the past, depend.

So great an area must present many varieties of soil and fertility. Roughly speaking, however, there are two great divisions ; the Indo-Gangetic plains, watered by great rivers, of the north and north-west,

and the elevated plateaux, in many places a medley of hills and valleys, of the centre and south. There are, as may be expected, great areas of desert land ; but the percentage of the whole that is cultivable is 63, a high figure for an Asiatic country. The rainfall, on which, as in other countries, agriculture must mainly depend, is confined to short seasons, or monsoons, as they are called, and varies enormously from 460 inches annually in Cherapunji, situated in the Assam Hills, to three inches in the arid, and yet fertile, plains of Sind. The rainfall, moreover, is as inconstant as it is variable. Once in every five years there may be a scarcity ; once in every ten a drought of considerable severity, which in former days used to cause heavy mortality, as well as great material loss to the cultivator. The system of rainfall has its advantages and disadvantages. The fixity of the seasons and the great heat of the sun ensure a more certain growth of the crops to fruition. On the other hand, the briefness of the rainy seasons, and the extreme cold of the winter in many parts of India, render it necessary to grow rapidly maturing crops with a low potential yield. The most valuable crops, and the best quality of ordinary crops, can hardly be grown without some help from irrigation.

Further, the violence of the rain during its brief season causes much erosion. In the absence of adequate safeguards, such as embankments, the best soil is constantly washed away, to be carried off by the rivers to their deltas on the sea. The fields are thus denuded to the bare rock; it is true that the rock itself is worn away and yields fresh soil, but the process of replacement is slow and uncertain.

The violence of the rainfall, and its concentration within a brief period, have the compensating advantage that it is possible to store it up for subsequent use in irrigation. This storage is effected most obviously by artificial reservoirs. The system of storage by tanks, or artificial ponds of varying extent, is a very ancient one in India. It is still a great source of cultivation in the centre and south of India. It is calculated that there are still 35,000 tanks used for cultivation in the Madras Presidency, which irrigate nearly $3\frac{1}{2}$ million acres; and there are also many thousands in Bombay. These smaller works are, however, liable to become silted up, and, moreover, dependent as they are on rainfall, are likely to fail just when they are most needed. More reliance is now placed on great artificial reservoirs

such as those which have been constructed in the Bombay Deccan, with the result that the fear of famine has been removed from an area in which its recurrence previously was chronic. The greatest reservoirs of all are those not formed by the hand of man, but by the snow that falls on the great mountains that border India on the north. As the snow and ice melt, the great rivers carry the water to the plains, and the cultivation of vast areas in the Punjab, the United Provinces, Sind, and even Rajputana becomes possible. Formerly the canals that were taken from the great rivers often ran in old channels of these rivers and were only of use while the rivers were in flood. Now, through barrages and other river-works, canals are made which render water available throughout the year and make it possible to grow the most valuable crops.

In addition to the rivers, there is a vast area of subsoil water in India, generally within easy reach of the surface, which is utilised by means of wells, generally as a supplement to the rainfall. The cultivation of about twelve millions of acres is annually carried out, or assisted, by means of wells, which are common all over India.

After this brief examination of the natural features of the country, it is necessary to consider the even more important human factors, since it is on the man behind the plough that the success or failure of his cultivation depends. There are two great systems of land tenure in India : the *rayatwári*, or peasant proprietorship, and the *zamindári*, or landlord-holdings. The former is undoubtedly the most successful and the most consistent with the traditions and the instincts of the people : since the large holdings of landlords are not, as in some other countries, used for the intelligent application of capital to agriculture on a large scale, but are merely let out in small portions to tenants at as high a rent as the landlord can obtain. Large estates cultivated under the intelligent management of their owners are practically unknown in India, with a few exceptions such as the tea estates in the hills, mostly under European ownership and management.

The Indian cultivator has an intimate acquaintance with his land and is a good judge of its capacity ; but, after this, his limitations begin. That Indian cultivation is inefficient compared with similar cultivation in other countries can be easily established.

For example, the output of sugar cultivation per acre in India is one-third of that of Cuba, one-fourth of that of Java, and only one-seventh of what is obtained by American capitalistic methods in Hawaii. The quantity of ginned cotton in India is 98 lb. per acre, compared with 200 lb. in the United States and 450 lb. in Egypt. Even in the case of rice, in which the disadvantages under which the Indian cultivator works should be less marked, since the rice crop can be cultivated year after year on the same land without any application of manure, the out-turn in India is only one-half of that obtained in Japan. The soil of India is, on the whole, above the average in its fertility : its yield is indeed wonderful, when we consider the constant cropping and the absence of manure. The greater part, therefore, of the deficiencies in cultivation must be ascribed to weakness in the human factor. Doubtless this is to some extent due to the fatalism that is induced by dependence on a rainfall which is so often capricious or deficient. The same factor, and the smallness of the individual holding, conduce to the idleness of the Indian agriculturist through long portions of the year, mainly due to chronic under-employment. It would, however, be unreasonable

to condemn the Indian cultivator for weaknesses largely due to the system forged by custom and tradition from which he cannot set himself free. To begin with, his holding is too small to support him and his family. For example, in the Deccan the vast majority of the holdings measure only from one to five acres: yet the best observers estimate the minimum economic holding at a figure which varies from fifteen to thirty acres. Even where the holding is not cultivated under a joint family system, which offers little inducement to individual enterprise, its tiny extent is subject to further sub-division when the cultivator dies and his land is divided equally among his sons. Such sub-division is bad enough, but it is accentuated by the existence of what is known as fragmentation. If a man has five sons and five fields, his property is divided on his death by the allotment, not of one field to each son, but of one-fifth of each field to each of his male offspring. The land is thus divided into portions of incredible minuteness, which it is impossible to cultivate efficiently. Nor is this the only handicap imposed on him by law and custom. He cannot cultivate his land except by the use of oxen. But religion has now placed the cow in particular, and oxen in

general, on a pedestal of sanctity that has rendered them unassailable. The cultivator does not merely lose the value of the meat and bones of his cattle. That loss is far less serious than the fact that the scanty pasturage of the village lands is consumed by animals which are valueless for any practical purpose and yet are as inviolable as the most useful plough cattle. This serious drawback is intensified by the fact that the Indian cultivator is only now learning to grow fodder crops, while the smaller cultivators can hardly afford to do so. The cultivator is further handicapped by the absence of manure. Animal manure is largely used as fuel : and only near the large towns are arrangements possible for the utilisation of town refuse. It is calculated that one million tons of material for manure are exported annually from India, though far more required there than in any foreign country. This does not exhaust the tale of the handicaps of the Indian cultivator. It has been truly said that he is born in debt, lives in debt, and dies in debt. It is not that he is extravagant : on the contrary, he is penuriously thrifty. But inexorable custom compels him to spend far beyond his means on certain social occasions, such as weddings, and, if

not already involved, he binds himself and his children in a bondage that is almost permanent. In ancient days the moneylender lived with the cultivator on fairly equal terms, since the lender could only recover from the borrower a fair share of the crop produce. The occupant of land held from the Government, moreover—and, as the State is the ultimate owner, practically all land was and is so held—could continue to keep his land so long as he paid the assessment to Government, but he could not transfer the land to anyone else, nor could anyone take the land from him. The establishment of civil courts wherein the creditor could obtain legal decrees for the whole of debt that stood in his books against the debtor, and the power of selling the debtor's land under these decrees, have enormously increased the power of the moneylender, and have made it infinitely more difficult for the cultivator to escape from a load of debt, once incurred. Even if the cultivator wishes to borrow for the legitimate object of improving his land, he can, if he does not obtain a loan from the Government, get an advance from the moneylender only at a ruinous rate of interest. The question of Government assessment has been mentioned. It

would be easy to show that it is lighter in incidence than the assessment imposed under indigenous administrations. In ancient days one-fifth of the gross produce was regarded as a lenient demand by the ruler : and the great Akbar, who first of the more modern rulers introduced a general assessment of land, demanded one-third of the gross produce. The demand of the present Provincial Governments is far less than this. It may be admitted that the necessity for the payment of the assessment in hard cash on a fixed date causes occasional difficulty to the cultivator, and may even drive him to the moneylender. It cannot, however, be regarded as an important cause of agricultural indebtedness ; and the Provincial Governments find increasing difficulty in revising the assessments so as to get a fair portion of the increased money value of the crops grown. The assessment, therefore, bears a constantly decreasing ratio to the net value of the crop. There seems some likelihood of this ratio being fixed at a certain proportion, probably about 25 per cent. of the net value of the crop. In any case, the governments of India are far less dependent on the land revenue than they used to be. It now supplies 20 per cent.

of the revenue, against 53 per cent. forty years ago.

With so many difficulties in the path of Indian agriculture, it may well be asked whether there has been any progress or any advance of prosperity. The terms are not synonymous, though they are closely allied, yet it can hardly be doubted that the advance has been real and considerable. In the first place, with the improvement of communications, the dread spectre of famine has been banished. Local scarcity must always occur in the rain-fed tracts, but it no longer connotes starvation and death. Then the markets of the world have been opened, with the result of far higher prices for agricultural products, a portion at least of which has gone into the hands of the cultivator. This has naturally led to an expansion of the 'money' crops as compared with the 'food' crops. India is in a peculiarly favourable position as regards the non-food crops. It has a monopoly of jute, and, if its cotton is not of the longest staple, purchasers from Japan and the continent of Europe are anxious to take as much of the short-stapled cotton as India can supply. In ground-nuts and oil-seeds India has also valuable crops for export. The surplus of grain, apart

from rice, which India has available for export, is steadily falling, and some parts, such as the Bombay Presidency, have now to import grain. This has alarmed some economists, who demand that the export of grain should be prohibited or should be subject to a heavy duty. Any such legislation would, in the long run, defeat its own object, since the cultivator, if cut off from the world market of grain, would naturally try to reach the world market for the non-food crops. Nor is there any real ground for action, since the non-food crops, even including those grown as fodder, are still less than 18 per cent. of the whole, and the proportion is likely to decrease with the fall in world prices. The enormous importance to India of the agricultural export trade may be gathered from the fact that 72 per cent. of the exports consist of raw agricultural products, and 95 per cent. of the whole is composed of articles of agricultural origin. The higher prices received by the cultivator have not, of course, proved an unmixed blessing. The tendency of the superior cultivator to rely on the labour of others, instead of working himself, as he used to do, has been noticed by skilled observers. At the same time, landless labour has become increasingly expensive and

independent. Where it used to be obtained at the absurd rate of three annas, or less than threepence halfpenny, a day, it now costs ten annas, and in Sind and other irrigated tracts it is often as high as a rupee, that is one and sixpence, a high rate for an Asiatic country. Yet there can be little doubt that the industrious cultivator has benefited greatly by the higher prices.

The poverty of the Indian peasant still dominates the situation : yet the average income per head in Madras and Bombay is believed to have risen from 30 rupees to 100 rupees. The greatest change, however, has been brought about by the progress of irrigation. We have already referred to the great possibilities for the storage and distribution of rain and river water in various parts of India. These have been so successful that the area under irrigation has increased from 10,000,000 acres in 1879 to 28,000,000 acres in 1927. New projects under execution or preparation will increase the total to 40,000,000 acres ; and a figure of 50,000,000 acres is ultimately in view. The canal system, it should be remembered, is exotic, and dates from the introduction of British administration. Some of these works, such as those in the Deccan, have

been protective against famine rather than productive. They have to compete with the competition of rainfall, and have not been directly remunerative. Yet the total return to the State from irrigation works has been just under 8 per cent. In areas freshly brought under cultivation, where no water-supply previously existed, the returns have been far greater: for example, on the Chenab canals the return has been 41 per cent., and on the Sutlej 38 per cent., if the interest on the sale value of the Crown lands is taken into calculation. The whole cultivation of the Province of Sind will be changed and enormously increased by the completion of the great Sukkur Barrage.

The abundant supply of water has its drawbacks. The shortage of oxygen in the soil leads to alkali conditions when water is too freely applied, and much land thus becomes salt and uncultivable. The charge for water is based on the area cultivated rather than on the amount of water taken; thus there is waste, and the 'duty' of canal water is far less than that of the water drawn from the cultivator's own well. The system, however, cannot well be changed without the creation of a host of

small officials who would be a curse to the countryside. On the whole, the advantages of irrigation are enormous, more particularly in the opportunities it provides for the growth of superior varieties of crops.

The improvement in methods of agriculture is perhaps less apparent. The main system of cultivation in India must continue to be one of small holdings: and the cultivator has not the means to purchase expensive implements, nor the land whereon to use them economically. Nevertheless, the increased use of iron ploughs instead of the inefficient, immemorial wooden plough shows his willingness to use such implements as are within his reach. The patient labours of the Agricultural Department have selected suitable varieties of seed and have made it possible for the intelligent cultivator to obtain them. Some beginning at least has been made by the superior cultivators in the growth of fodder crops, and the use of silage to supplement the insufficient pasturage; and the usefulness of many wells is being increased by the use of tube strainers.

The greatest hope for the cultivator probably lies in the Co-operative movement. Considering its

difficulties, its progress in India has been far greater than the most optimistic could have predicted. The movement is still hardly twenty-five years old. Yet the number of Societies has increased from 749 in 1908 to 71,608 in 1925. They have saved many a cultivator from the clutches of the moneylender, and have given him a means of depositing his savings, other than a pot buried under his hut, or the ornaments of his womenfolk. To an ever-increasing degree, they are supplying the larger cultivator with capital for improvement of his land. Societies have been successfully formed for supplying seed and marketing produce. Some Societies in the Punjab have even attained success in checking sub-division of land, and in consolidating holdings, though it may be doubted whether anything appreciable can be attained in this direction against the weight of law and usage, supported by the authority of religion. The success of the Societies has naturally varied. They have done best in the *rayatwári* tracts of Bombay and the Punjab ; but even there they have often been brought to ruin by village factions and petty dishonesty. Yet in them lies the best hope of stirring the stagnation and improving the morale of village life.

And what of the future? This brief survey will have indicated how unsatisfactory the present situation is, how much there remains to do. There is not much advantage in pointing out the great results that have been achieved in Denmark and in Germany, since the conditions, social and climatic, so greatly differ. The results obtained by the Japanese in Formosa, and by the Dutch in Java, remarkable as they are, have no great value in comparison, since they presuppose a degree of official supervision and interference, if not of compulsion and expropriation, foreign to the system of government in India. The measures necessary for the improvement, and indeed the preservation of Indian agriculture, have recently been the subject of exhaustive inquiry by a Royal Commission. We can only briefly indicate the lines of possible development.

There is, in the first place, the question of illiteracy. Ninety-two per cent. of the Indian population are unable to read and write. Schools in country areas are few and scattered ; the instruction imparted in them is of little use to the cultivator's sons ; opportunity for his daughters' education does not exist. More and better schools are required ; and for them the children must be collected in carts or motor-wagons.

For this purpose, roads between the villages are necessary. These are required for many other reasons. The Indian Administration has lagged woefully in the provision of adequate road construction. Then the growth of fodder crops must be encouraged, and the Agricultural Department must be supported in its work of demonstration. The problem could, perhaps, be largely solved if that Department worked more directly with the Co-operative Societies. Provided the latter can be kept fairly free from faction and mismanagement, they afford the best avenue for the education of the villages in self-help and self-reliance.

We are sometimes told that the hope of India lies in Industrialism. Everyone is anxious that manufactures in India should increase and that the country should be increasingly self-sufficient. But Industrialism is a false beacon as a means of regeneration. That must arise from and depend on Agriculture. Something could probably be effected by the creation of competent Boards for Rural Reconstruction. The political as well as the material future of India lies with the agriculturalist, once he has realised his power. Practically every holder of land now has his vote ; when he has learned how to use it, his preponderance

in numbers must enable him to command the polls. It is, therefore, of the utmost importance that the politicians who aspire to rule in India should realise the supreme necessity of educating and improving the agriculturalist.

CHAPTER VII

MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES

'INDIA has many ancient and historic cities, but taken altogether they hold but a fraction of her enormous population . . . we may say that 226 out of 244 millions of people in British India live a rural life ; and the proportion of these who ever give a thought to matters beyond the horizon of their village is very small. Agriculture is the one great occupation of the people. In normal times a highly industrialised country like England gives 58 out of every hundred to industry and only 8 to agriculture. But India gives out of every hundred 71 to agriculture, or pasture, 12 to industry, 5 to trade, 2 to domestic service, $1\frac{1}{2}$ to the professions and $1\frac{1}{2}$ to Government service or the Army.' That picture of the social and economic structure of India, drawn by the authors of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report, is, with the variation of a figure here and there, true to-day. And yet the curious fact remains

that at the International Labour Bureau at Geneva, India ranks as one of the great industrial countries of the world. This is one of the many paradoxes with which we are met in any survey of Indian affairs, and it helps to an appreciation of the immensity of the country and the multitude of its people if we bear in mind this single fact—that, whilst agriculture is the one great occupation of the people, the country as a whole is one of the great manufacturing lands.

The traveller by the mail steamer first glimpses India at Bombay. The fifth morning from Aden, if he be abroad, he sees a low, sharply-pointed island, running southward from the mainland, a breakwater guarding the harbour from the battering monsoon seas. As the steamer rounds the southernmost point, a magnificent panorama opens to the view. First the Prongs Lighthouse, which keeps watch and ward over the Indian Ocean. Then a cluster of houses and mills, with the barracks which house the small military force. Skirting the immense bulk of the principal hotel, the mail ship moors alongside the Mole, where it lies securely at anchor, and the traveller can either drive straight to the heart of the city, or else enter one of the special trains which will bear him north, south, or east, at

will. If his eye turns northward, it will be arrested first by a forest of shipping, then the chimneys of some eighty mills, most of them smokeless, for Bombay industry is mainly driven by electrical energy generated from water stored in the hills, which can be faintly discerned. This is the seat of the textile trade, the greatest centre of cotton spinning and weaving in Asia. If the wayfarer has time to stay in Bombay and to drive up the pleasant slopes of Malabar Hill, he can gaze on one of the busiest scenes in the world—the docks and the great harbour, where the navies of the world might lie at anchor, and the dense-packed city, hemmed in the narrow space between the two seas, so crowded that scarce an acre of open ground is visible, and on an endless vista of factory and chimney, mill upon mill, the outward sign of an industry which supports nearly a quarter of a million of people.

Now if the traveller's destination is Calcutta, his *train de luxe* will in half an hour pass out of the industrial area of Bombay into agricultural India. Almost before he is comfortably settled in his seat the landscape changes from concentrated industry to the rice-fields of the mainland, and, after climbing

the range of western hills, he will see no sign of manufacturing enterprise on his forty-hour journey until at Asansol he touches the industrial zone of Calcutta. That is the clue to economic India—a few centres of intense, concentrated industrialism, the chief of which are Calcutta and Bombay, though a few fresh centres of manufacturing activity have sprung up at Ahmedabad, Sholapur and Cawnpore, and at Jamshedpur, hidden in what was until recently primeval jungle, the seat of iron and steel manufacture—*islands of industrialism set in the ocean of an almost all-pervading agriculture.*

Calcutta and Bombay have this in common : both are great seaports ; both owe their origin mainly to the energy of Englishmen and to the security Britain brought to war-torn India ; both have attracted and worked up the raw materials of the hinterland into manufactured products. There the resemblance ends, and it would be difficult to find elsewhere in the world two cities in a single country so far apart. Calcutta is an inland port, eighty-six miles from the mouth of the Hughli, one of the branches of the mighty Ganges. Its great staple, jute, is a monopoly product. Grown in the steamy plains of Bengal, retted in the abundant waters, it defies competition

from any part of the world. Jute spinning and weaving, with the raw material at its doors, is so firmly entrenched that neither in India, nor in any other part of the world, need it fear competition in the staples of jute cloth and jute sacks. Calcutta has behind it the immense Gangetic plain, stretching to the confines of Agra, a scene of amazing fertility. North-east are the tea-gardens of Assam, controlled by Calcutta firms, whose products flow into Calcutta, save the small proportion which leaks out through Chittagong. Calcutta is the nearest seaport to the coal-fields, which centre in the north-east of India, and is the seaport for the iron and steel industry, only a hundred and fifty miles distant. The people of Bengal, distinguished in the arts and professions, have not taken kindly to industry, and commerce and manufacturers are controlled by British firms, whilst the retail trade is dominated by the keen immigrants from Jodhpur and Bikaner in Rajputana. Calcutta has indefinite space within which to expand ; the mills are not huddled into the centre of a narrow island, as in Bombay, but are strewn along the banks of the Hughli, many mills almost self-contained entities. A plentiful supply of labour is drawn from the eastern districts of the

United Provinces ; the business quarter in Clive Street is as dignified as the City of London ; the great retail emporia fronting the open space of the Maidan are more suggestive of Regent Street than the Orient.

Very different is the position of Bombay. When the Island passed into possession of the British as part of the dowry of Catherine of Braganza, it was a collection of seven scattered islands, between which the sea swept at high tide, leaving pestiferous swamps on the ebb. With infinite patience these islands were knit together with causeways, the swamps filled in, and successive blocks of dry land won from the sea by reclamation. With justice and security established under British rule, it became the El Dorado of the keen trading communities of Western India. First arrived the Parsis, Persians driven out by the Mahomedan invaders centuries before, who had led an uncomfortable and tolerated existence under Hindu and Mahomedan rulers of Gujarat. Flocking into Bombay, free from all caste restrictions, they established lucrative commercial contact with China and the West. They were accompanied by representatives of the trading communities, Bhattias, Bantias, Khojas, and Memons, who for centuries in their picturesque

country craft had traded with the Persian Gulf and Africa. Bombay has no such vast, prolific hinterland as the Gangetic plain. True, to the north lies the garden of Gujarat, but south is the arid and stony Deccan, east the cotton lands of Khandesh and Berar. But it is the natural outlet of the cotton trade, and when that assumed world importance during the American Civil War it inevitably became the scene of the textile manufacturing industry. The pioneers were not Englishmen, but Indians ; the first mill was set up by a Parsi, and, though Englishman and Indian work side by side and together, the trade and industry of the city are predominantly Indian. Then, raw cotton is no monopoly of India ; it has to meet in the markets of the world, and even in Bombay itself, the competition of the American product. Cotton manufacturers are subjected to still more severe competition ; the specialised industries of Lancashire for near a century monopolised the trade in the higher qualities of cloth ; of recent years, Japan has bitten deeply into the Indian market and the yarn of the Indian mills has to sell against the cheap product of the mills of Shanghai. Another cause has contributed to the struggle for existence in Bombay. The textile industry was built up on

the production of yarn of low grade which was shipped to China and the Far East. This trade was gradually won by Japan, and afterwards by the Chinese mills, and has now almost touched vanishing point. The mills, therefore, turned to the manufacture of cloth. But there they are faced by competition of factories in the interior of India, at Ahmedabad, Sholapur, and Nagpur, which, situated near the source of cotton growing, in immediate touch with the internal markets, and organised from the first on the basis of cloth rather than yarn production, have of recent years tended to expand at the expense of Bombay. These conditions explain why Bombay, struggling for its life, is the centre of the industrial politics of India rather than Calcutta, secure in its jute monopoly and rich hinterland.

The fiscal system of India was, until comparatively recent years, one of unbending free trade. A low tariff for revenue purposes was reluctantly imposed in order to relieve an intolerable financial strain, but until after the war there was no trace of protection. The early Indian publicists, bred in the Gladstonian tradition, were free-traders themselves, but the Indian manufacturer has always been a protectionist at heart. This move towards protection derived

great stimulus from what must be regarded as the most unfortunate fiscal measure in the history of the Empire. When during the viceroyalty of Lord Northbrook a revenue tariff became an absolute necessity, the manufacturers of Lancashire, by the pressure of their political power, secured first the exemption of textiles from the operation of the tariff, and, when this position was no longer tenable, drove Parliament, in the face of the strong protests of the Government of India and all expressive political opinion in the country, into the imposition of an excise on Indian cloth equal to the import duty. That measure poisoned, and continues to poison, the economic relations between India and Great Britain. Whilst it gradually lost its economic importance, it did not lose its power for political mischief. As the Indian tariff was raised during the war to finance military expenditure, the excise was not raised in proportion, and as the Customs duty was gradually stiffened to eleven and a half per cent., the excise remained static at three and a half. It was not until the close of 1925, when a prolonged strike in the Bombay mills threatened to deprive the Government of India not only of the excise revenue, but of any income tax from the Bombay mills, that the

hated impost was swept away—too late to give the measure any element of grace. This is symbolic of the change which has overtaken Indian fiscal policy. When a Commission was appointed in 1916 to examine the whole field of Indian industry, all questions concerning the tariff were specifically excluded from the inquiry. This policy, combined with the severe financial stringency which followed the war, deprived the recommendations of the Commission of any real value; the elaborate organisation for the scientific assistance of industry it was proposed to set up was perforce abandoned. The first step towards the establishment of a protective tariff was taken when the Joint Committee of both Houses of Parliament which reported on the Reform Bill in 1919 recommended that when the Government and the Indian Legislatures were in agreement the Home Government should not ordinarily interfere. A second Industrial Commission reported definitely in favour of a discriminating protective tariff, with a Tariff Board to examine each case for protection. India is now launched on a definite protective policy, which has been gradually extended to a considerable range of imports. Broadly, it may be said that the fiscal system ranges from a high duty, as much

as 30 per cent., on luxury articles to specific duties on commodities which India can produce herself, proportionate to the needs of her industries, down to a revenue tariff of 15 per cent., with the materials of industry free.

The principal beneficiary from this policy is the iron and steel industry. The indigenous manufacture of iron from charcoal-smelted ore inevitably perished with the exhaustion of the easily-worked forests and the competition of blast furnaces of modern construction. British entrepreneurs established at Kulti blast furnaces for the production of pig-iron and castings, but the effort to manufacture steel was a failure. The modern industry owes its origin to the patience and foresight of one of the most remarkable Indians of the past half-century, a Bombay Parsi, Mr. Jamsetji Nusserwanji Tata. Having made a substantial fortune in cotton mills in Bombay and Nagpur, he surveyed the whole Indian field, and came to the conclusion that the country could not be industrially great until it manufactured its own iron and steel and trained its own industrial experts. After great labour, a hill of iron was located in the jungles of North-Eastern India, amid the hills of Chota Nagpur, in reasonable

proximity to the coal-fields of Bengal and the port of Calcutta. Every effort to enlist British capital in the enterprise having failed, at a favourable moment the necessary funds were found in India, and the Tata Iron and Steel Company was launched. The story of this enterprise smacks of the New World rather than the Old. The engineers had literally to go into the primeval jungle to dam the streams for water and level the ground for the blast furnaces and steel works. The manual labour was done by aboriginal inhabitants whose origin went back to the earliest days of Indian history. A new steel city had to be created from conditions not far removed from those in which the cave men dwelt. When all was done the company found itself manufacturing high-grade pig-iron at low cost, and built up a considerable export trade with countries so far afield as Japan and the Pacific littoral. Steel costs were high, and in this field the competition of the European and American makers was keen. The war intervening, the works were kept at full pressure supplying the essential needs of India, and many of the requirements of the armies based on India which fought in Egypt, East Africa, and Mesopotamia.

The war over, great schemes of expansion were planned, so that the country might become less dependent on overseas supplies for essential commodities like iron and steel. New blast furnaces, additional steel plant and plate mills, were ordered; subsidiary industries were organised for the manufacture of tin plates, agricultural implements, locomotives, and wagons, and working up the zinc concentrates from the Burma mines. In the post-war slump the company tottered. Equipment ordered when prices were at their zenith and Exchanges were high was delivered when costs were tumbling down and the Exchanges had reacted to the general decline in gold prices following the vigorous deflation policy of the United States. Continental steel was dumped into India at less than the manufacturing costs at Jamshedpur. There was a strong demand that the Government should treat the iron and steel industry as one of the keys in the economic position and of national importance. After exhaustive inquiry this position was recognised, and iron and steel are now effectively protected. The actual measure of protection has varied according to the changing position *vis à vis* the foreign manufacturer, and has taken the form

of high import duties, bounties, and definite contracts for rails and wagons for the State railways. It is at the moment consolidated in a flexible scale of duties, ranging round the figure of 17 per cent., with a surcharge of Rs. 15 per ton if not British; British standard metals do not compete with the Indian product. The iron and steel industry was saved from collapse, though there are no signs of its present expansion. The scheme to establish a second steel city in Bengal halts for the time at the erection of blast furnaces for the production of pig-iron.

The procedure adopted in the case of iron and steel follows the precedent generally practised. An industry desiring protection has formally to apply for it, and submit to an exhaustive inquiry by the Tariff Board, a standing body. On the report of that Board the Government frames such legislation as it thinks is required to meet the needs of the industry concerned. The manufacturers of paper and wagons are now substantially protected, and there are industries which benefit from high revenue tariffs, such as sugar, where the import duty is 25 per cent., and matches, where a Customs levy of two shillings per gross of boxes has induced the

Swedish Trust to establish its own factories in India. The Indian manufacturer is a profound believer in protection, and in the natural course of events steady pressure will be brought to bear on Government to extend the range of articles which come within the orbit of the tariff. The great controversy for the moment centres on the cotton-spinning and weaving, which is pressing for much higher duties than the 11 per cent. duty on imported piece-goods and 5 per cent. on yarn now imposed; and, as this will be the great fiscal issue in the future, the position merits closer examination.

The Indian textile industry was established for the spinning of low-grade yarn, which was largely exported or used by the hand-loom weavers in the country. The requirements for piece-goods were almost entirely met by imports from Great Britain. The export trade in yarn was almost killed by Japan, who, after first protecting and satisfying her own market, successfully drove Indian yarn from the Chinese centres. Then China entered the field herself, and great spinning-mills are at work in Shanghai under British, Chinese, and Japanese management. The Indian mills had perforce to weave their own yarn, and simultaneously there

was a great expansion of the indigenous industry in up-country centres, notably Ahmedabad, Sholapur, Nagpur, Cawnpore, and Agra. The extent of these changes can be illustrated by a few figures taken from the exhaustive report of the Tariff Board issued in 1927. In 1898-9 of the 167 mills working 44.3 per cent. were in Bombay; by 1924-5 the Bombay percentage had fallen to 28.8. In 1898-9 the production of cloth in the Indian mills was 102,000,000 pounds to 514,000,000 pounds of yarn; in 1924-5 the figures were 459,000,000 pounds of cloth to 719,000,000 pounds of yarn. In the same period the exports of yarn diminished from 244,000,000 pounds to 46,000,000, whilst the exports of cloth increased from 112,000,000 yards to 230,000,000. The lesson is clear; the up-country industry has increased rapidly in proportion to that of Bombay, and the export trade in yarn has been virtually lost, and is not compensated for by the larger shipments of cloth.

There is another tendency equally marked. During the war Japan secured an entry into the Indian textile market; that she is strongly developing. The reasons for this severe Japanese competition are many. There is no doubt that the Japanese

system of buying cotton in India and America, and of shipping her goods abroad, has been brought to a high pitch of perfection, though the influence of State subsidies and bounties is a matter of controversy. Working in a temperate climate, with the American as well as the Indian cotton-fields to draw upon, her manufacturers make up superior 'mixings.' There is still, and apparently always will be, violent discussion on the influence of Exchange policy on the Indian industry; the textile industry was emphatic in its protest against raising the rate of Exchange from one shilling and fourpence to one shilling and sixpence per rupee. But whilst these are questions on which there is, as the country solicitor remarked to his client, 'a great deal to be said on both sides,' there is one factor in favour of Japan beyond dispute. That country was a signatory to the Washington Labour Convention, which forbade the working of women and children at night. Her Government has not implemented that signature; women and children are employed at night, and the mills work double shifts. The effect of this on the most conservative estimate is to give Japanese textile products in the Indian market an advantage of 5 per cent. The

Government of India has declined to increase the revenue tariff of 11 per cent. to 15 per cent. to offset this advantage, but, in addition to abolishing the Excise, it has removed the duty on mill stores and raised the tariff on yarn to 5 per cent. These measures have not stemmed the rising tide of foreign imports, which in the last figures available had increased by 47 per cent.

One often hears the remark that industry in India commands an illimitable supply of cheap labour. Nothing is farther from the truth. In normal times the supply of labour for industry is almost always deficient; having regard to the output, it is doubtful if it is ever cheap. Wages look low to those accustomed to Western standards. The average wages drawn by the labour in the spinning departments of the Bombay mills—and these are the highest in India—are about thirty-three rupees a month, or two pounds ten shillings sterling. But if careful estimates are made of the work done for these wages they are not much more economical than those paid in the Occident. Indian industry labours under a great disadvantage, especially in the seaport towns, and the remark is more or less true of the up-country centres. It has not yet

evolved a permanent industrial force, except to a limited extent in the engineering trades. The labourer is an agriculturalist by heredity, training, and instinct. Almost every man has some connection with the land in his ancestral village. He leaves this village with reluctance, and only under pressure from an overcrowded soil, to work in the industrial centres. He remains there no longer than he can help, and, as soon as he has accumulated a few rupees, returns to his village, and there remains until his little store and his credit with the money-lender are exhausted. There is a ceaseless *va et vient* in the factories; it has been said that in the generality of cases the whole labour force turns round every year. This necessarily means a low standard of manual efficiency. As soon as the workman has acquired a certain measure of skill at his work he returns to his field, where rough toil destroys his sense of touch. He has lost much of his dexterity by the time he returns for another spell of work in the city. This has the further disadvantage of removing from the workman any personal interest or pride in his factory or his work. To a certain extent this migratory habit grew out of bad housing conditions and a greyness of life in

the industrial centres, but considerable improvements have been made. Good housing in Bombay, for instance, is in excess of the demand. Many employers are active in welfare work ; the Y.M.C.A. and other bodies are encouraging recreation ; sobriety is increasing since Government more rigidly controlled the drink traffic. There can be no general increase in unsheltered trades without an increase in efficiency, and this is bound up with the development of a more stable labour force.

Looking ahead, it is easy to discern a parting of the ways between town and country in India. The manufacturer, faced by the severe competition of highly organised western industries, is increasingly insistent for protection, especially in the trade zones served by the seaports, where low sea freights bring the finished goods to the Indian market. Resentful of Indian produce being shipped abroad, to be returned manufactured and sold in competition with his own goods, he demands export duties on everything. The 70 per cent. of people in India who draw their living from the soil want their small supplies of manufactured goods at the lowest possible price and to be free to sell their produce in the open market without the restriction of export

duties which the grower pays. The real economic needs of India demand the nicest balance between the two forces. The careful development of her manufacturing resources is imperative for the increase in the national wealth and to lighten the dependence of the people on the soil. It is true to say that brains and capital, put into land, would command a higher interest return than any investment in manufactures. But although irrigation has made vast strides, the crops are dependent on the rainfall, and the shock of a failure of the monsoon is broken when a considerable section of the population has an outlet in industry. The true interests of India, therefore, lie in a cautious balancing of the interests of the manufacturing and agricultural industries; any sudden incursion into highly protected industry, with a neglect of agriculture, would inevitably induce a decline of productive power and a rise in the cost of living which would be fatal to both industries. Our own opinion is that the true objective is the gradual raising of the import tariff, with a wide system of Imperial preference. British goods, owing to their quality, rarely compete with Indian manufactures; the real danger is from the Far East and the Continent of

Europe. Unfortunately, the atmosphere has been so obscured by the memory of the Cotton Excise Duties, and the long period when, in the view of the Indian publicist—and it is not without reason—the economic interests of India were subordinated to those of Great Britain, that it is difficult, if not impossible, to obtain a fair hearing for Imperial preference from Indian politicians and industrialists.

CHAPTER VIII

EDUCATION AND SOCIAL PROGRESS

A DECADE ago an eminent Indian addressed a crowded audience in the Senate Hall of the Bombay University on the problems of Indian education. Scholar and poet, an earnest and catholic-minded man, whose services to Indian education and to the enrichment of his own vernacular are recognised by all, he devoted a set lecture, of the type to which American audiences are more accustomed than British, to pouring scorn on any education save through the vernacular. On the morrow he was breakfasting with a candid friend, and asked him what he thought of the lecture. At the end of the usual polite phrases of appreciation, that critic added: "Do you realise that, if your theories had been put in practice, not three people in the audience would have understood a sentence of what you said?" But so it was; Bengali is no better understood by

an ordinary audience in Bombay than Russian in London.

Whilst all generalisations in relation to India are misleading, we would attempt one. It is that the two greatest social forces in India for a century have been the English language and the Christian ethic. We are emboldened in that dictum by the corroboration of a leading Indian social reformer, to whom the question was put in the early part of the year 1928. He replied: "Yes; it is quite true, especially if you speak of the Christian ethic not in regard to the number of converts made, but in its reflex action on other faiths and social conditions generally." Yet there is no subject so misunderstood as the causes which induced the adoption of English as the medium of higher education, and its influence on Indian life and character. Nine people out of ten, if invited to express an opinion, would reply that in an evil moment Macaulay, profoundly ignorant of Oriental learning and saturated with the dogmatic utilitarianism of the Clapham School, fastened English on an unhappy country, and thereby sowed the seeds of all future troubles. The truth is very different.

In 1813 the Court of Directors, goaded into action

by men like Mr. Wilberforce, who were alive to British responsibilities in India, agreed to set aside a lakh of rupees annually for the revival and encouragement of literature and the improvement of the sciences. Forthwith there raged a battle royal between the Orientalists, aiming at a union of Hindu and European learning, and the Anglicists striving for the adoption of western learning. But the real force behind the Occidental movement was not Macaulay—he was only the writer of the brief—but men as wide asunder as the Indian reformer and the Christian missionary. Ram Mohun Roy—deeply read in Sanskrit, but at the time ignorant of English, whose tomb in Arno's Vale Cemetery at Bristol is a scene of diminishing pilgrimage—and his friends saw in English the weapon with which to fight the superstition and ignorance which, in their opinion, were devastating the land. Alexander Duff, the first missionary sent to India by the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, and his associates were firm in the conviction that western learning would most effectively win India for Christ. Vernacular teaching and literature were at a very low ebb, and the choice lay not so much between English and the vernacular as between English and one of the classical languages,

Sanskrit or Persian. Macaulay merely put into official language the decision of the Hindu reformer and the Christian missionary, and, with his vehemence and foolish ridicule of Oriental learning, spoilt their case. Higher education in India was definitely linked with the English language, and the union exists to-day. If we could retrace those steps, there are few thinking people who would.

The scheme of education so launched had a limited objective. The aims were :

(a) The training of Hindus and Mahomedans to assist in the administration of the country.

(b) The increase of its material resources and prosperity.

(c) The enlightened co-operation of the Indian peoples in the suppression of moral and social evils attributable to superstitious ignorance.

Each one of these ends has been in substantial measure attained. From the Universities, which were established in 1854, there issued a constant stream of graduates who manned the public services, and furnished a body of capable men who, by general consent, vastly raised the efficiency and purity of the administration. To a lesser extent, graduates passed into industry and commerce, and brought a

wider vision and general education into those fields. The University graduates, and especially a small body which was permeated with the Christian ethic, though it never professed Christianity, furnished the dynamic force in the movement for social reform, which is now passing into the domain of politics with the passage of the Reform Act of 1919.

The trend given to Indian education, however, went far deeper than that, and unloosed forces little dreamed of in 1835, but which have powerfully influenced India, we think for good. The spread of English gave the educated Indian, Hindu and Mahomedan, the means of communicating freely with his fellow in every part of the country. As the scholar in the Middle Ages had in Latin a tongue understood of the scholar in every European country, so the Indian graduate could commune with his people as freely in the Punjab and Madras as in his own home, with this important difference—English soon became much more diffused than Latin ever was after the fall of Rome. There sprang from this common tongue the sense of nationality. Men began to think in terms of India, not of Bengal and Madras. The first generation of University scholars, products of small classes and bearing the impress of

eminent teachers, were saturated with the spirit of English literature and of English freedom. The command of a common language unlocked for them the literary treasures of England and America ; they found themselves almost as much at home in London as in Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay. The national and public life of India began with the spread of English. This concentration of the active intelligentsia on English and Western learning had other and perhaps untoward results. It induced a certain divorce between the educated core and the mass of the people, and perhaps in that way contributed to the revival of a militant nationalism in the Deccan, and the Non-Co-operation movement which flamed into activity in the year 1920. It caused Indian publicists to look entirely toward English parliamentarianism as the goal of Indian responsible government, instead of seeking for an adaptation more suited to the genius of the people and the state of literacy. When this is admitted, the basic fact remains that the English language has been one of the most dynamic forces in Indian growth for nearly a century.

The true line of criticism of the Indian educational system would seem to be different. The limited

objective set by the founders of the system was pursued when the immediate end was achieved. The neglect of the vernaculars in higher education was never meant to be permanent ; but it persisted. The educational ladder was dominated by literary standards long after the economic needs of the country demanded the study of science and the training of men fitted to take their place in commerce and industry. These errors are in process of correction. There is an increasing interest in the vernaculars, with somewhat curious results. Recently in the examinations for the Bombay University a candidate opted to answer the Persian paper in Kanarese, a language spoken by a limited number in the southern districts of the Presidency, and it required a diligent search to find an examiner qualified both in Persian and Kanarese. Much more attention is given to science, and at the apex is the Indian Institute of Science, founded by the munificence of the Tata family, at Bangalore. The needs of commerce are being studied, and there is an excellent College of Commerce in Bombay. The medical and engineering schools are good of their kind. In the words of an educational authority,¹

¹ Mayhew : *The Education of India*.

‘ The building in its present stage may be included in the second and superior category of rambling, amorphous structures, lacking unity of design, but serviceable, adaptable, and capable of enlargement. It is fulfilling a very definite purpose, though one that would have surprised and shocked those responsible for its foundations.’

If we look at the statistical results, the number of University students, in proportion to population and students in other grades, is abnormally high. The University movement has, of recent years, shown signs of healthy and diverse growth. Ten new Universities have been established since 1902, when the Universities Commission sat, and many of the new institutions have broken loose from the fetters which bound the original Universities to the examining model of London. Several of them are unitary teaching Universities ; the Hindus have their own University at Benares and the Mahomedans at Aligarh. The position in regard to schools is less satisfactory ; speaking broadly, the schools are preparing grounds for the University, and there is little in India to compare with the English grammar school, which aims at a standard of education sufficient for the ordinary walks of life,

and for students who have no intention of taking a degree. The most hopeful sign here is the proposal to establish a new school, on the lines of an English public school, in Northern India, and the increasing recognition of the view that much of the work done in the Universities during the first two years of the student's residence properly appertains to the school, which should be developed for the purpose. The progress of the campaign against illiteracy is, however, desperately slow, and it is the most urgent problem of the hour. Although the expenditure on education has enormously increased, just over 13 per cent. of the male population was literate in 1921, and 3 per cent. of the female population. The percentage of both sexes was just over 8 per cent. The effective position is a little better than mere statistics would indicate. Allowance must be made for the existence of sixty million 'Untouchables,' and for the twenty million aboriginals, who are with great difficulty brought within the orbit of any educational system. Further, consideration should be given to the social conditions which hamper the progress of education amongst girls, though that is now making real strides. If the statistical record is stripped of these factors,

then the state of literacy is much better than the casual student would conclude. But the fact remains that the state of mass education is thoroughly unsatisfactory. Nor, in the opinion of many well qualified to judge, will the position be effectively improved until compulsion is applied, at least to boys.

Under the voluntary system the tendency is for costs to rise, the number of schools to grow, the number of pupils per school to fall, and the attendance to become more irregular and the scholastic results to be more unsatisfactory. Interest is, therefore, centring on the question of compulsion. Towards this policy is moving. In almost every Province legislation has been enacted authorising local bodies to prepare schemes for compulsion and to levy special or additional rates for the purpose. The stumbling-block is finance. In a country where the people have grown accustomed to look to the Government for everything, there is a strong reluctance to face the responsibility for any scheme which means increased rates or taxes. No Provincial Government has now the resources necessary to finance a great scheme of compulsory education, and, although much is heard of the need for economy,

yet it remains that no possible economies which would maintain the present standard of administration would release a fraction of the money necessary to establish universal mass education, especially as the Excise Revenue from the sale of intoxicating liquors, which forms an important source of revenue in every Province, is rapidly declining as the result of restrictions on the trade, leading possibly to ultimate prohibition. Any candidate who went to the polls with the slogan 'Universal mass education, and taxes to pay for it' would not stand the remotest chance of election. Progress is likely to be most vigorous in the towns, and thereby to widen the gulf between town and country; the will to go ahead exists, but until it is linked with the will to pay, the rocks will not be removed from the path. Quite recently this question was under discussion with an Indian manufacturer of progressive and independent views. He was emphatic in the opinion that in any scheme of extended political reform Parliament should insert a mandatory clause, requiring Ministers to establish an effective system of universal mass education within a prescribed period of years. "Otherwise," he said, "nothing will be done; none will face

the unpopularity of the increased taxation which must be levied."

Some years ago the representative of a great American magazine called at the office of a newspaper in India and said he had come to inquire into the work of the Christian missions. The Editor returned him this answer: "If the missionaries had not made a single convert, their work in India would be justified a thousandfold, if only for its reflex action on other national movements." The actual number of professing Christians is comparatively small. According to the census of 1921 it is four and three quarter millions in a population of three hundred and nineteen millions. Of this total 59 per cent. is returned from one Province, the Madras Presidency and its Indian States, where the community, including Nestorians and Syrians, can claim 32 persons in every thousand of the population of the British districts, 27 per cent. in Cochin and 29 per cent. in Travancore. The influence of Christianity and missions is not for a moment to be measured in terms of converts. It is very difficult to realise the extent to which a knowledge of the Christian ethic has spread. Once every twelve years a great pilgrimage is held at the sacred city

of Nasik, near the source of the Godaveri. Devotees come from every part of the land, even from the remote Himalaya. A missionary, well versed in the vernaculars, who preached daily on the banks of the river, amongst the Hindu temples, without let or hindrance, said afterwards that he never addressed an audience which was completely ignorant of the life and teachings of Christ, and he sold copies of the New Testament in the vernacular by the thousand. Many men, who for various reasons never openly professed Christianity, some because they thought that they could render better service to India within the fold of Hinduism than outside it, have been powerfully influenced by the Christian ethic. During the height of the Non-Co-operation movement one of the charges made by Mr. Gandhi was that the British Government had forgotten Christ, to which one who differed strongly from him replied that Mr. Gandhi had never understood His teaching. In no direction has the influence of Christianity been more beneficial than in the uplift of the Depressed Classes. Under orthodox Hinduism their lot was the most miserable in the world, aptly described by the single word 'Untouchable,' nor was the slightest hope held out

that they could ever improve it. Christianity at once admitted them into the equal fold, and into the faith and communion of those who ruled ; small wonder that they flocked to be baptised. More ; the flood of converts to Christianity kindled a new interest in the 'Untouchables' amongst orthodox Hindus themselves ; in the battle for political power they saw that they stood to lose immensely if the sixty million 'Untouchables' remained for ever outside the pale of Hinduism. Quite uninfluenced by any thought of political advantage himself, none has espoused the cause of the Depressed Classes more splendidly than Mr. Gandhi. It would perhaps be optimistic to say that the battle of the 'Untouchables' has been won ; but the ramparts of exclusion, shaken by the Christian missionaries and the social reformers, are now being battered to pieces by the ram of democracy. The magic of the vote is being witnessed, though the electorate is so small a fraction of the population, and, whatever else may happen in India, one thing cannot—the people cannot be placed under a Brahminical oligarchy. Before leaving this question one opinion should be quoted, because it comes from a non-missionary source :

'The writer's personal view is that moral progress in India depends on the gradual transformation of education by explicit recognition of the spirit of Christ. All that he has seen of Christian mission work in India, with all its admitted shortcomings, has convinced him that work inspired by some such aim can alone supply the necessary basis. Recollections of mission settlements where communities, raised from sullen apathy and suspicious resentment to a life of cheerful activity and service, testify wholeheartedly to the triumph of light and love over fear and superstitious ignorance, are before him as he writes this. Christianity is a very vital force in India to-day. The more it spreads, the more it will differ in everything except essentials from the Christianity of the West. The more such difference convinces the higher castes and classes of the possibility of an Indian evolution of the spirit of Christ, the more willing they will become to convert their present sentimental attachment to His personality into practical co-operation.'

Those who look back on the days when, according

¹ Mayhew : *The Education of India*.

to their imperfect means, they sought to serve India in India, recall no happier memories than their contact with the social reformers. No country ever produced a more remarkable body of men. Undaunted by the tremendous pressure of the Hindu social system, with the all-embracing dominance of caste, unshaken by leaders who relapsed under the lure of loaves and fishes, they steadily pursued their path until they can almost say the goal has been reached, for legislation will gradually complete the work they have commenced. Their first efforts were the removal of restrictions and disabilities. Although the number of widow re-marriages may be small, they now excite no comment; widows, often married in infancy, are no longer condemned to a life of degradation, and fields of useful work for them as nurses and teachers are being found by bodies like the Seva Sadan of Bombay and Poona. A sea voyage has ceased to be regarded as anything sinful. There are hundreds of unmarried Hindu girls past the age of puberty—the obligatory marriage age in orthodox Hinduism—who are pursuing their studies in the schools and colleges, and this excites little adverse comment from the community. The nautch girl, the professional

dancer of no morals, is disappearing from entertainments, and the practice of dedicating girls to the service of temples is declining. Reference has been made to the considerable progress of women's education, which has not been choked by the economic reaction after the war. The marriage age, though still deplorably low, is rising in many parts of the country. With the ground so prepared, there is a livelier interest in social legislation, with a view to the raising of the Age of Consent for married and unmarried alike, and, though it may be said that it is useless to legislate in advance of public opinion, yet the mere introduction of such measures, strongly supported by women's conferences in all parts of the country, is a healthy sign of the times. The reformers are now aiming higher. The practice of monogamy is increasing, partly in deference to public sentiment, partly perhaps from the pressure of economic conditions. At the fortieth session of the Indian National Social Conference, which was held in Madras in December 1927, the President said: "If there is one incident of marriage which is intolerable to an educated wife it is the association of another woman in the conjugal bond, and, therefore, I strongly maintain that at

the present time it is not less urgent to introduce the monogamous principle in our marriage system than to raise the age of marriage." The leaven, under the stimulus of education in English and the influence of the Christian missionaries, reflected in the courage of the social reformers, is working strongly, and one force behind the new nationalism is the conviction that only a National Government can strengthen the ferment, a task difficult to an Administration pledged, and necessarily so, to the strictest religious neutrality.

CHAPTER IX

LOOKING FORWARD

THOSE of us who have spent the best years of our lives in India, and whose experience has gone beyond the buying of cotton and selling of jute, are assailed by the question wherever we go : ' What is going to happen in India ? ' Only those triple-plated in the brass of ignorance would attempt a dogmatic or confident answer. The whole world is in the grip of new emotions. Nowhere are they stronger than East of Suez. But, so far as India is concerned, the task of the British people, with whom remains the present responsibility, is clear. The trail is blazed by our history, our policy, and our definite undertaking.

The history of the British Commonwealth is the development of responsible government and self-governing political institutions in every part of the whole, all being not only secure within the Empire and under the Crown, but stronger because they are

within that Empire. Although conditions in India are widely different from those obtaining within the Dominions, it is impossible to imagine any other destiny for that great country ; indeed, the converse proposition has never been advanced by the veriest Die-Hard. Irrevocable steps in that direction were taken nearly a century ago, when the educational system of India was moulded on Western thought ; no one in his senses could imagine that generations of Indians could be nurtured on English literature and English history without being imbued with English ideas of freedom and systems of government. A still more emphatic step was taken in the middle of the last century when the Council system of Government was established, and, those set to work, India began to think of these Councils as little parliaments ; and when Indians were admitted into the legislative councils in order to bring the laws into closer harmony with their thought. Stage by stage, the machine moved slowly, perhaps too slowly, forward toward the inevitable goal. Dry theorists like Lord Morley may have repudiated the idea that they were aiming at a parliamentary system ; they failed to determine what else they had in view. British policy in India has been steadily directed to a point

where the question of a self-governing India was bound to arise ; that it has arisen is the crowning achievement and justification of the British connection.

If there could be any doubt on this issue, it was resolved by the Declaration of August 1917, and the Act of 1919 which sought to give it legislative expression. 'The policy of His Majesty's Government, with which the Government of India are in complete accord, is that of the increasing association of Indians in every branch of the administration and the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realisation of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire.' That Declaration, afterwards crystallised in the preamble to the Reform Act of 1919, was the response to the insistent demand of loyal and patriotic Indians for a goal and a policy ; it was no partisan pronouncement, but the matured conclusion of a Cabinet in which all Parties in the State were represented. With the reservation that the British Government and the Government of India must be the judges of the time and measure of each advance, the broad highway was resolutely staked out ; the pursuit of it is not only the lesson of

the growth of the Commonwealth and the expression of the spirit of our methods in India, but an obligation of national honour. We could not go back, if we would, without blackening our faces before the tribunal of the civilised world. There is no question to-day what shall be the political future of India ; we have only to determine how and when responsible institutions within the Empire shall be established.

The Act of 1919 was a bold, a generous, and a sincere effort to give expression to this determination. An immediate measure of responsibility was established ; within the framework of the Act this was capable of great extension through the further transference of heads of the Administration to Ministers ; and, while in many parts of the world Constitutions have fallen and dictatorships have taken their place, the Act is everywhere functioning in India to-day. Buffeted as was this bark, with the curious rudder of dyarchy, by storms arising from without, and which none could have foreseen, it has yet made the voyage to the first port ; although India has been, and is, wracked by strong political emotions, it has escaped the reactions and despotisms which have wrecked Constitutions in other

parts of the world. The criticism is not that the Act of 1919 has failed, but that it is not working in the direction anticipated. Nowhere is there the direct responsibility of Ministers to organised parties in the Provincial Legislatures which was expected ; nowhere is there a clear link between legislators and the electorate, whilst in the Central Legislature there has been a distinct movement towards non-responsible criticism, because the powers reserved to the Governor-General have been, and must be, exercised to preserve the country from the consequences of an impatient or ill-considered vote. These results have arisen from the nature of the problem : politics in India are dominated by personalities rather than principles ; a democracy cannot function where it does not exist ; and a sense of responsibility cannot reasonably be expected from a Central Legislature which has unlimited powers of criticism but no authority to translate its views into practice.

The Act of 1919, and the form of government and system of administration which have grown up within it, are now to come formally under review by Parliament. The Act contained the unusual provision that not later than 1929 it should form

the subject of a parliamentary inquiry. Much controversy has centred round this stipulation ; but the main facts are not in dispute. When Mr. Edwin Montagu, then Secretary of State for India, and Lord Chelmsford, the Viceroy, undertook the inquiries which formed the basis of their Report, on which the Reforms were based, they were struck by the fact that, whereas in the early days of the British connection with India, Parliament instituted periodical inquests into the affairs of the East India Company, no such grand inquiry had taken place since 1858. Of course, a fundamental change was made in that year. The Crown assumed direct responsibility for the government of India ; a special organisation, the Secretary of State acting with the India Council, was established through which to discharge that responsibility. Therefore, the occasion for further inquests was less urgent ; indeed, it should never have arisen. There was another consideration. The Act of 1919, though it went far, did not go as far as most Indian publicists wished ; they were prepared to accept and work it the more readily as there was this assurance that Parliament, busied with so many other affairs, would not put aside India indefinitely, or

until aroused by agitation or outrage, but would be compelled to examine the working of an admittedly transitional scheme in not more than a decade. The framers of the Act always intended that this inquiry was to be a parliamentary commission. When, therefore, in the autumn of 1927, the statutory provision was anticipated by a year, and the commission was appointed, it consisted entirely of members of the two Houses of Parliament, under the chairmanship of Sir John Simon ; the leaders of the Oppositions were consulted, and a Commission representative of Conservatives, Labour, and Liberalism, was formed to discharge the duty Parliament accepted when it enacted the Reform Scheme.

It is one of the tragedies of India that misfortune should, for ten years, have dogged the footsteps of constitutional progress. When the Act of 1919 was accepted by large majorities in both Houses of Parliament, those who seek to serve India in India breathed more freely ; they seemed to discern the dawn of an ordered political growth which would carry the land peacefully through the transition of dyarchy to a form of responsible government suited to the tradition, genius, and social condition of the

people. Those hopes were impaired when extraneous forces, like the agitation over the disturbances in the Punjab, the Khilafat movement, and the disorganisation of the finances, swept large classes into the Non-Co-operation movement. Non-Co-operation perished as a political force, because it was nothing more than an emotional negation; but it left an evil legacy in the diffused idea that the most effective form of political activity is abstention. Now, the work of the Simon Commission—a task so great that it demands the determined co-operation of both peoples—is clouded by misunderstanding and opposition. The reasons for this are not far to seek. It was always the intention that the Statutory Commission should be a body of parliamentarians. The expression of this intention affronts the strongest sentiment in India to-day—a passionate desire for her recognition amongst the peoples of the world. Indian publicists claimed that, like other constituent partners in the Commonwealth, they should have an equal voice in the determination of their own Constitution. Unfortunately, that was by no means apparent in the early official announcements. The personnel of the Commission was known to many, weeks before

there was an authoritative statement in Parliament ; the actual names were published four days in advance of the definite news. Then it became apparent that, whilst the Commission was to be representative of all parties in the State, it had been found impossible to constitute it of men in the first flight of public life. Nor was there any clear definition of the part which Indians would take in the inquiry. The Prime Minister went no farther than to say that, whilst the Government would not dictate to the Commission, "its task in taking evidence would be greatly facilitated if it were to invite the Central Indian Legislature to appoint a Joint Select Committee chosen from its elected and nominated unofficial members which would draw up its views and proposals in writing and lay them before the Commission for examination in such manner as the latter may decide." A very large body of Indian opinion at once reacted to the belief that this meant their exclusion from the inquiry, except possibly in the inferior position of witnesses. Whilst this was inevitable in the case of the Swarajists, who would probably have rejected any Commission they did not dominate, for they are the lineal descendants of the Non-Co-operators, it was scarcely less strong

amongst the Liberals. These were the men who, in the face of no little obloquy, worked the Act of 1919; they are men loyal to the British connection and deeply attached to British institutions; they had looked for equal participation in the framing of the new Constitution, and at the spectre of virtual exclusion they withdrew into the wilderness of abstention. Later, earnest efforts were made to dispel these ideas. The Prime Minister stated in the Commons that "Indians should dismiss from their minds any thoughts of inferiority. They will be appointed as friends and equals, but the responsibility of Parliament remains." Sir John Simon, in a letter to his constituents in the Spen Valley, used much the same language, and in a message to the Indian Legislatures assured so substantial a measure of equality that the difference was one of words rather than facts. He and his colleagues made a visit of exploration from December 1927 to February 1928. During the recess, whilst they were examining the situation in England, there was a marked reaction towards co-operation with the Commission. The Legislative Assembly refused to set up a committee to work with it, but the Council of State decided to participate in the inquiry; the

abstention of the Assembly was made good by a strong nomination by the Viceroy, on the suggestion of Sir John Simon. Most of the Provincial Legislative Councils have agreed to elect committees to work with the Commission, and outside bodies, such as those representing the non-Brahmins, the Mahomedans of nearly all the Provinces, and the Depressed Classes, will appear before it. The 'All-Parties Conference,' which has framed a constitution representing the extreme element in Indian politics, will not work with the Commission, but the Chairman has undertaken to consider its proposals. The prospects for the evolution of a scheme with the driving force of educated opinion behind it are brighter than at one time seemed possible.

With the task of constitutional revision remitted to this parliamentary Commission, it may seem supererogatory, if not an impertinence, to consider the basic facts which must come under inquiry. Yet they are so insistent that it may be profitable to indicate some of them. It is impossible for anyone who understands politics to visualise India as other than a federal State. The country is so vast, its people so numerous, that a unitary State cannot be created, or function. The difference between

Province and Province is so marked that the dead hand of centralisation must mean something very near stagnation, and, in any circumstances, the binding of the advanced Provinces to the chariot-wheels of the most backward. We are all inclined to speak in terms of India whilst we think in the language of the Province where we have served ; few, if any, are really qualified to speak of India as a whole. In this federal State the Indian States must have their definite part ; they represent one-third of the area of the land and one-fifth of the population ; they have their roots deep down in the soil ; and their existence is guaranteed by the most binding treaties and solemn obligations. Precisions may argue over the exact meaning of the term ' federal ' ; we mean by it a Central Government, responsible for all-India and overseas questions and defence, knitting together a congeries of autonomous administrations, substantially self-governing in all that concerns their local interests.

This Central Government must be in the fullest sense of the term strong in its executive authority, able at all times, and without hesitation, to make its will respected, in internal as well as external affairs. It must be strong for the purposes of

defence. Other States may in the fullness of time be able to place reliance for their existence on the moral force of the League of Nations, with or without 'guarantees'; with its far-flung border-line abutting on rude tribes, instinct with martial qualities, now well armed and trained in mountain warfare, knowing no law but the rifle, the Central Government must always be in a position to move its armed forces resolutely for defence and attack. It must be strong for the purposes of maintaining law and order. One factor in the governance of India is not always appreciated. A population generally so peaceful and law-abiding that order is maintained in normal circumstances by a relatively small police force, is in time of excitement apt to plunge in a moment into murder, arson, and rape; unless, therefore, there is at all times in reserve the authority, of unquestioned efficacy, of the Central Government in support of the civil power, disorders on a tragic scale may supervene. More especially is this the case when nationhood in India is a plant of comparatively modern growth, and to-day is deeply coloured with communalism in a malignant form. There are some who would have us believe that communalism is the peculiar growth

of the communal electorates established to secure the representation of minorities under the Morley-Minto Reforms, and that if this were swept away Hindu and Moslem would live at peace, and non-Brahmin dwell in complete amity with the twice-born. There is no foundation whatsoever for this misrepresentation. Communalism there has been in India for untold centuries ; it sprang from the northern invasions, and was cemented by the rise and fall of alien dynasties. So long as there was one authority only in India, and that British, the sleeping dog was little disturbed ; so soon as the transference of authority from British to Indian hands commenced, great minorities inevitably demanded their share in the new powers and pressed for communal electorates in order to guarantee them. This is, we believe, a passing phase ; when a feeling of security is induced communalism will die a natural death. Until its obsequies are celebrated, there must be this strong central power to keep fission in check. Further, the Central Government must be strong to ensure progress. In India, for generations to come, the forces of social and economic progress must derive their strength in a material respect from above. The establishment

of universal primary education, the removal of abuses remaining from ancient custom, and the economic quickening of agricultural and industrial progress, will for a long time need vivid pressure from above and imposition on an apathetic or reluctant community.

How this strong Central Government is to be reconciled with responsibility in the constitutional sense is a question so complex that it almost baffles the wit of man. What is clear is that there are certain conditions which will assuredly not ensure it. The pathetic belief that the particular form of parliamentarianism evolved in the conditions of Great Britain is suited to all other countries has sustained many rude shocks since the war. Few will be found to argue that it is suited to India. An executive dependent for its day-to-day existence on the vote of a Legislative Assembly could not be strong. An executive which resigned *en bloc* on a hostile vote of the Legislature would be fatal to the peace and progress of India. A Legislature dependent on the direct vote of an electorate largely illiterate cannot be authoritative or representative. These things may come with experience and education, and the growth of parties where there are now only personalities;

that transitional stage has to be bridged. Our own view is that it can be spanned only by maintaining, certainly for a considerable period of years, the combination of British with the Indian personnel in the Central Government ; the establishment of a system of responsibility where the Executive is substantially independent of the Legislature save in major questions of policy ; and the drastic reconstruction of the electorate.

The plan of the 1919 Reforms postulated the existence of a competent electorate and Legislatures which would be truly representative of the people. Neither of those conditions is established. The representative system existing prior to this date was built up on the municipalities and district boards voting in groups, the Provincial Legislative Councils electing the members of the Central Legislature. This was impatiently scrapped in 1919 on the ground that it prevented the representative from feeling that he stood in any genuine relation to the original voter. The authors recognised that such an electorate did not exist ; they thought it might come into being. That was a vain hope, nor can it be fulfilled without mass education and years of experience. The question of the electorate is fundamental. The discarding

of the proved secondary electorates has had many grievous results. It has prevented many Indian gentlemen of position and experience from entering politics, because they will not expose themselves to an illiterate electorate ; it has weakened the municipalities and district boards by withdrawing from them men who would use this training for entry into the wider field of politics ; it has divorced the Provincial Legislative Councils from the Central Legislature by sundering the liaison established when election to the all-India body was from the Provinces. With the reconstitution of the electorate the work of progress will be made much easier. With the village voting as a unit and not as individual villagers, the re-establishment, at any rate in part, of the franchise of the municipalities and district boards, and of the Provincial Legislative Councils, we can look forward with greater confidence to the establishment of autonomous and virtually responsible government in the Provinces and an advance in the Central Government ; but when it is admitted, we must make up our minds to this. The responsible institutions to which we are pledged in India must be based on the intelligence of the few rather than the ignorance of the many ; it must be oligarchic rather

than democratic ; it must be more of an enlightened autocracy than an unenlightened, sham democracy which would inevitably degenerate into a dictatorship. If it be said that this is not democracy, the answer is that we are not in the least concerned with phrases, but with the good of India. The service of India needs recognition of the conditions of the land ; in a country where the historical tradition is one of aristocracy and autocracy, a new democracy cannot spring into being in a decade, and must certainly await the diffusion of mass education.

During this intermediary stage, there are four tasks of special magnitude before the governments in India. They are :

I. *The resolute establishment of universal primary education of a simple character.* This can only be accomplished by making the education of boys compulsory and stimulating the instruction of girls. Primary education has reached a stage when real progress is unattainable without compulsion, and the multiplication of schools means prodigal expenditure, with small attendance and half-hearted instruction.

II. *Steady progress in fitting India to undertake her own defence.* A beginning has been made with

the opening of the commissioned ranks of the Army to Indians and the establishment of an Indian Navy. It is not an easy question. The defence of India remains a vivid issue on the borderland whilst the constitution of the Army is being changed. Officers responsible for security must naturally be averse to exchanging an efficient machine in which they have grown up for a new system which has yet to prove itself. But if we are sincere in our determination to establish responsible government in India we must be equally sincere in our determination to make India self-reliant in her own defence ; the two conditions cannot be separated.

III. *The resolute pursuit of every measure which will raise the economic condition of the people.* The poverty of India is often exaggerated ; it is as much a matter of climate and social custom as of economic conditions. Wages which mean starvation in a cold climate are wealth in the tropics, where the needs of man are fewer. But, when this is said, poverty is terribly prevalent in India, and humanity demands the most rapid development of her agricultural resources, the careful practice of the policy of discriminating protection of her manufacturing industries officially accepted, and the nice adjustment of

the interests of these industries to the overwhelming importance of an agriculture which is scarcely vocal.

IV. *The more courageous use of legislation for the assistance of social reform.* The rigid observance of religious neutrality by the British Government is felt by many Indians to be obstructive of social progress. Whilst it is generally true that legislation must not go ahead of public opinion, that is not wholly true of India, where the stimulus must often come from above. Social reform and the use of legislation for the quickening of social reform go to the root of Indian progress, not least in the economic field.

.

Lord Milner wrote of the Egyptian question : ' It has one radical defect—that it is never simple ; it has one radical charm—that it is never commonplace.' The dictum is even more applicable to India because of the vastness of the land and the myriads of its people. Many are bemused to-day because of the difficulties of the situation which has to be faced. The governance of India was never simple, and never will be. Mr. Baldwin cited in this connection

the words of Milton: 'When God wants a hard thing done, he tells it to his Englishmen.' We have a hard thing to do ; it will be made the easier if we try to understand it and to understand the standpoint of our Indian fellow-citizens.

NOTE ON THE FINANCIAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE PROVINCES AND THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT.

The division of the receipts of revenue between the Central and the Provincial Governments presented difficulties which have not yet been finally solved. Speaking generally, the government of India took the Customs and Income Tax Revenue while leaving to the Provincial Governments the Land Revenue and the receipts from Excise and Stamps. The amount obtained from the two most important commercial Provinces, Bengal and Bombay, was naturally larger than that received from the agricultural Provinces, with which larger amounts of Land Revenue remained. The inequality was to some extent mitigated by an adjustment in the cash contributions which the Provinces were called on to make to the Central Government to meet the deficit in that Government's Budget. As that deficit disappeared with the expansion of the revenues reserved by the Central Government, the cash contributions of the Provincial Governments were first reduced, and finally wiped out. These remissions, welcome as they were, only accentuated the disparity of treatment of which Bengal and Bombay complain. A re-examination of the financial settlement seems, therefore, necessary before the separation of the functions of the Central and Provincial Governments is finally stabilized.

INDEX

A

ACT OF 1784, 7
Act of 1861, 7
Act of 1909, 8
Act of 1919, 13-16, 19, 21-2, 35,
 37, 135, 151-5, 158, 164
Afghanistan, 25, 28, 72-7
Agra, 113, 124
Agriculture, 90-108, 167
Ahmedabad, 112, 116, 124
Akbar, 3, 99
Alexander the Great, 64-5
Aligarh, 138
All-India Congress Committee, 40
Amritsar, 25
Asoka, 3
Assam, 113

B

BAJAUR, 71
Baldwin, Mr. Stanley, 168
Baluchistan, 42-3, 76
Bangalore, 137
Benares, 2, 51, 138

Bengal, 4, 33, 42, 112-13, 120,
 122, 135
Berar, 115
Bhopal, 45
Bhutan, 42, 70
Bikaner, 53, 113
Bombay, city of, 10, 26, 53-4,
 110-17, 124, 131-2, 136-7,
 146
Bombay Presidency, 29, 35, 42,
 92-3, 101-2, 105
Buddhism, 3
Burke, Edmund, 7
Burma, 3, 4, 70, 121

C

CALCUTTA, 49, 53-4, 111-13, 120,
 136
Cawnpore, 112, 124
Central Provinces, 32-3
Chamberlain, Sir Austen, 10
Chambi Pass, 71
Chandragupta, 3
Chelmsford, Lord, 9, 13, 44, 56,
 154
China, 5, 22, 65, 70, 116, 123

Chitral, 4, 42
 Chittagong, 4, 113
 Chota Nagpur, 119
 Christian ethic, the, 3, 132, 135,
 142-3
 Christian missions, 133-4, 142-5,
 148
 Christian population, 3
 Clive, Lord, 49, 80
 Cochin, 43, 142
 College of Commerce, Bombay,
 137
 Curzon, Lord, 56
 Cutch, 43

D

DECCAN, THE, 93, 96, 102, 115,
 136
 Declaration of 1917, British, 11,
 151
 Defence of India, 64-89, 167
 Dehra Dun, 84
 Delhi, 45, 58
 Duff, Alexander, 133
 Dufferin, Lord, 51
 Durand Line, the, 74, 76

E

EAST INDIA COMPANY, 48-9, 154
 Education, 15, 131-41, 145, 147,
 166

Egypt, 23, 120
 English language, 4, 5, 132-6,
 148

F

FRONTIER TRIBES, 28, 70, 74-7

G

GANDHI, MR., 30, 143-4
 Ghadr conspiracy, 9
 Ghazni, 77
 Gilgit, 42

H

HARDINGE, LORD, 9, 10, 56
 High Commissioner, 21
 Hindu religion, 2
 Hunter Commission, 26
 Hyderabad, 43, 45-6, 59, 63*

I

INCHCAPE, LORD, 32
 Indian Institute of Science,
 Bangalore, 137
 Indian National Congress, 10, 23

Indian National Social Conference, 147

Indian States, the, 42-63

Indore, 59

Industrial Commissions, 118

Industrialism, development of, 15, 107, 109-30

Invasions of India, 1, 2, 64-6, 69-71

J

JAMSHEDPUR, 112

Java, 9, 66, 106

Jhansi, 50

Jodhpur, 53, 113

K

KABUL, 77

Káli, 2

Kandahar, 77

Kashmir, 42

Kathiawar, 43, 46

Keith, Sir A. B., 55

Khandesh, 115

Khilafat agitation, 23, 26-7, 29, 156

Kipling, Mr. Rudyard, 6

Kitchener, Lord, 87

Kulti blast furnaces, 119

L

LAHORE, 23

Linguistic Survey, 4

Lytton, Lord, 56

M

MACAULAY, LORD, 132-4

Madras, city of, 136, 147

Madras Presidency, 35-6, 42, 78, 92, 102, 135, 142

Madura, 2

Marathas, the, 35, 49, 79

Mayhew quoted, 145

Medical administration, 15

Mewar, 45

Milner, Lord, 168

Minto, Lord, 8, 51, 56, 162

Montagu, Mr. E. S., 6, 13, 44, 154

Montagu-Chelmsford Report, 8, 13, 56, 109, 154

Moplahs, the, 78

Morley, Lord, 8, 10, 150, 162

Moslem League, 10

Mutiny, the, 7

Mysore 43, 45, 47, 50, 61

N

NABHA, 59

Nagpur, 50, 116, 119, 124

- Nasik, 143
 Nepal, 70, 80
 Non-Co-operation Movement,
 29-32, 136, 143, 156-7
 Northbrook, Lord, 117

O

OUDH, 50

P

- PAMIRS, 42
 Pindari freebooters, 49
 Pitt, William, 7
 Poona, 146
 Punjab, the, 9, 23, 25, 29, 30, 49,
 80, 93, 105, 135, 156

Q

- QUEEN VICTORIA'S PROCLAMA-
 TION, 48, 50
 Quetta, 4

R

- RAJPUTANA, 42-3, 45, 53, 93,
 113
 Ram Mohun Roy, 133

- Reforms, the, 6-41, 162, 164
 Religions, 2-4
 Ripon, Lord, 20
 Roberts, Lord, 87
 Rowlatt Acts, 24
 Rupee, the, 29, 30
 Russia, 72-3

S

- SALISBURY, LORD, 43
 Salt tax, 32-3
 Satara, 50
 Selborne, Lord, 13
 Sèvres, Treaty of, 26
 Sharawak, 71
 Sholapur, 112, 116, 124
 Sikh State, 49
 Sikkim, 42, 70-1
 Simon Commission, 155-9
 Simon, Sir John, 155, 158
 Sind, 66, 91, 93, 102-3
 Sinha, Lord, 10
 Skeen Committee, 85
 Sukkur Barrage, 103
 Swaraj Party, the, 27, 31-3,
 40, 157

T

- TATA IRON AND STEEL COM-
 PANY, 120

Textile industry, 123-4

Tirah, 45

Travancore, 43, 142

Treaty of Sèvres, 26

Universities, 134-5, 137-9

Untouchables, the, 34, 143-4

W

U

UNITED PROVINCES, 80, 93, 114

WARNER, SIR W. LEE, 43

Wilberforce, William, 133

Women's education, 147