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OF
THE EARL OF MAYO

AS

Viceroy and Governor-General of India.

A MINUTE BY THE HON'BLE JOHN STRACHEY, MEMBER OF COUNCIL
AND LATE ACTING GOVERNOR-GENERAL,—DATED
THE 30TH APRIL 1872.

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THE office of Governor General having temporarily devolved upon me, in consequence of the lamented death of the Earl of Mayo, I feel that there is a melancholy and painful duty which, so far as my ability extends, I must endeavour to perform. I think it right that I should place on record such contribution as I can offer to the history of Lord Mayo's Indian administration. Feeling as I do the deepest respect and regard for his memory, and believing that he will always be remembered among the most illustrious of Indian Governors, I desire to give my testimony regarding his policy and his opinions. Having been a Member of his Government throughout the whole period of his Viceroyalty, and having been honoured by his friendship, I hope that the imperfect sketch which I shall give of some of the main features of his administration may not be altogether uninteresting or valueless to his successor. The duty which I have undertaken is the more incumbent, because I fear that Lord Mayo has left in writing upon official record comparatively little in explanation of his views. This was a result of not the least beneficial of the practical reforms which he has carried out. It is a reform of which the public knows nothing, the almost complete abolition of the ancient system of minute writing in the transaction of the business of the Government.

Although I cannot now give even the barest retrospect of the events of Lord Mayo's Indian administration, I shall endeavour to state some of the main features of his policy.

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The time has been one of almost unbroken, instead of the stirring stories of which our form is so full, there is happily nothing to tell but a story of uninterrupted progress and prosperity.

Before he reached India, Lord Mayo had begun his Indian work. When he arrived in Egypt, the Suez Canal was still unfinished, and it was still the fashion, for Englishmen at least, to express incredulity of its success. Lord Mayo, in company with Monsieur de Lesseps and Lord Napier of Magdala, made a thorough inspection of the works, and I believe that he was one of the first of our countrymen to express a strong conviction that this was no visionary project, but one of which the value and the importance could not be over-rated. In an admirable letter he reviewed the state of the works and the prospects of the canal, and I understand that Mr. Fowler, one of our most eminent Engineers, who was deputed soon afterwards to report upon the subject, fully confirmed Lord Mayo's conclusions. Their accuracy was proved by the ultimate success of this great undertaking, a success which even now is only half understood, for the world seems hardly to have learnt the fact that the Suez Canal is leading rapidly to one of the greatest revolutions recorded in the history of commerce, and to results the importance of which no one can now estimate.

After visiting Aden, examining its fortifications, and inquiring into its wants, Lord Mayo reached Bombay on the 19th December 1868. He remained there about ten days, spending his whole time in making himself acquainted with the people and the city, in visiting barracks and jails and schools and cotton presses, reviewing troops and receiving deputations. From Bombay he went on to Madras by Bypoor, where he was met by Lord Napier, the Governor. After a short stay in Madras, where he left behind him the same impression as in Bombay of his energy and capacity for business, he reached Calcutta, and took his seat as Viceroy on the 12th January 1869.

He began his Indian work under especially favourable conditions. It was no slight advantage to have had a man like Lord Lawrence as his immediate predecessor. For Lord Lawrence was not only a great Governor in great emergencies, but he was an administrator who cared most vigilantly for every part of the business of the State. Never had that business been more thoroughly controlled than during the administration of Lord Lawrence, who made over to his

successor the great machine of the Government of India in a condition of admirable efficiency, with no arrears of current work, and no questions pending of which it had been possible to dispose. Lord Mayo was in this respect as fortunate as his own successor will be now.

There is no department of the Government of India in which his personal influence was more directly felt, and none which will be more closely associated in future history with his name than that which deals with the relations of the British Government with foreign powers. From the moment he set foot in India, Lord Mayo threw himself into international and political questions with a vigour, sagacity, and foresight which have left marked effects far beyond the limits of India, and which have influenced the counsels even of that great European power which shares with England dominion in Asia. The cardinal points of the foreign policy which, in Lord Mayo's opinion, the Government of India should steadily pursue may easily be described. He desired to establish with all our frontier States intimate relations of friendship; to make them feel that though we are all-powerful, we have no desire to encroach on their authority, but, on the contrary, that our earnest desire is to support their power and maintain their nationality. He believed that we could thus create in these States outworks of the Empire, and assuring them that the days of annexation are past, make them practically feel that they have everything to gain, and nothing to lose, by endeavouring to deserve our favour and support.

There is hardly one of the kingdoms that border our Indian Empire of which it may not truly be said that peace and settled government have been unknown in it for ages. The history of one and all of them from Oman to Yarkund is a record of wars, revolutions, and dynastic changes succeeding each other with such rapidity as to leave in the mind of the reader only a confused feeling of bewilderment. This chronic state of turbulence and disorder, destructive of ancient landmarks and boundaries, and producing only weakness and disintegration, both provokes and invites annexation. It ruins the commerce, destroys the productiveness of the soil, scares away peaceful traders who have an interest in the preservation of order and settled government, creates a permanent class whose interest it is to perpetuate anarchy, and produces isolation, jealousy, and distrust in the countries that suffer from its curse. It was this state of things in

India which forced on the extension of the British Empire to the mountains beyond the Indus. It is this state of things more than lust of conquest that has extended, in spite of herself, the dominion of Russia in Asia.

To apply a radical remedy to these evils was the main object of Lord Mayo's foreign policy. Honestly proclaiming and showing by his acts that the spectre of annexation was laid for ever, he taught our neighbours that they have nothing to fear from us. By bringing about a common understanding between the countries on our frontier, as to their mutual boundaries, he sought to remove every pretext for war and aggression. By assisting the rulers of these States to strengthen their internal government, and by bringing both his own personal influence and the moral support of the British Government to bear in putting down rebellions and revolutions, he endeavoured to establish firm, just, and merciful government. By the encouragement and development of trade, he hoped to break down the barriers which isolate those countries from us, and to create, both within and beyond our frontier, a permanent interest in the maintenance of good order. By free and friendly intercommunication, he desired to remove that ignorance as to our policy and that jealousy of our intentions which in past years have been so fruitful of mischief. And lastly, by endeavouring through frank and amicable discussion with the Russian Government to secure the adoption on their part of a similar policy in the countries on the Russian frontier in Asia which are subject to Russian influence, it was his hope that he would be instrumental in securing some degree of peace and prosperity to the exhausted countries of Central Asia, and in removing the causes of disquietude as to the designs of England and Russia which have been so prominent in the public mind in both countries.

It is difficult for me, in the limited space at my disposal, to do justice to Lord Mayo's foreign policy. A reference to it, however, would be incomplete without special allusion to Afghanistan. The interview with the Ameer at Umballa at the end of March 1869 was the first great public duty which Lord Mayo had to perform after his assumption of office, and the course pursued towards the Ameer furnishes the best illustration at once of Lord Mayo's general policy and of its effects.

I shall not attempt more than the briefest sketch of the situation in Afghanistan at the time of Lord Mayo's

accession to office. Sher Ali Khan, after an unbroken series of defeats for nearly three years, had, with the help of his able son Yakoob, re-seated himself on the throne of Cabul. His rival, Azim Khan, the usurping Ameer, was a fugitive, and Abdool Rahman was compelled to take refuge in Bokhara. Even in the earliest days of Sher Ali's return to power, there had been a time when, from absolute want of money, it seemed as if he could not keep together the troops on whom he depended for the retention of his newly-recovered sovereignty. From this strait he was relieved by the arrival of £20,000 sent by Lord Lawrence, who, on learning of his restoration, at once appreciated his urgent need of material help, and followed the first gift by instructions that £100,000 more should be given. Of the total sum, half had been actually delivered to the Ameer when Lord Mayo arrived in India, and the money had been accompanied by a present of some thousand stand of small-arms. The delivery of the remainder of the money, together with an additional present of a heavy battery of artillery, a mountain train battery, and 10,000 stand of arms and accoutrements, followed the visit paid by the Ameer to Lord Mayo at Umballa.

The preliminary overtures for that visit had been made in the time of Lord Mayo's predecessor. Within the first few days of his restoration to power, Ameer Sher Ali had expressed his desire, as soon as the dangers most immediately imminent were dispelled, to visit the Viceroy, and thereby publish to all the world the stability of his friendship for the British Government. From that time, however, till the combat which resulted in the final break-up of the army of Azim and Abdool Rahman, just a week before Lord Mayo's arrival, there was no time when his absence from Cabul would not have been dangerous. Owing to various circumstances into which it is needless to enter, the meeting between the Viceroy and the Ameer did not take place until March 1869. After repeated requests from the Ameer, who attached great importance to the meeting, Lord Mayo determined to grant it. The Viceroy stated his desire that it should take place at Umballa, and to this the Ameer gladly acceded. Leaving Afghanistan, he travelled through the whole extent of the Punjab, seeing our railways, our troops, and our institutions, and gaining an insight into the real strength of the British Government in India. He made no secret of his admiration. The Viceroy received

the Ameer with all the pomp and ceremony befitting the occasion. The principal officers of the Government were present, and many of the most important of the native chiefs.

The Ameer had come hoping for a fixed annual subsidy; for assistance to be given, not when the British Government might think fit to grant but when he might think it needful to solicit it; and for a treaty laying the British Government under obligation to support the Afghan Government in any emergency, and not only the Afghan Government generally, but that Government as vested in himself and his direct descendants, and in no others. These hopes he was obliged to abandon; yet he went back to his dominions a contented man. For he carried back with him not only material assistance in money and arms, but an assurance of warm countenance and support such as had never before been given to any ruler in Afghanistan. Lord Mayo's assurance of future support was couched in the following terms:—

“I earnestly trust that, on your Highness' return to your own country, you may be enabled speedily to establish your legitimate rule over your entire kingdom, to consolidate your power, to create a firm and a merciful administration in every province of Afghanistan, to promote the interests of commerce, and to secure peace and tranquillity within all your borders.

“Although, as already intimated to you, the British Government does not desire to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, yet, considering that the bonds of friendship between that Government and your Highness have lately been more closely drawn than heretofore, it will view with severe displeasure any attempts on the part of your rivals to disturb your position as ruler of Cabul and re-ignite civil war; and it will further endeavour from time to time, by such means as circumstances may require, to strengthen the Government of your Highness, to enable you to exercise with equity and with justice your rightful rule, and to transmit to your descendants all the dignities and honours of which you are the lawful possessor.

“It is my wish, therefore, that your Highness should communicate frequently and freely with the Government of India and its officers on all subjects of public interest, and I can assure your Highness that any representation

“which you may make will always be treated with consideration and respect.

“By these means and by the exercise of mutual confidence, I entertain well-grounded hopes that the most friendly relations between the British Government and that of your Highness may ever be maintained to the advantage of the subjects both of Her Majesty the Queen and of your Highness.”

It had taken many years to obliterate the memory of the disastrous policy of 1839-42, and to convince the Afghan nation that the British power was not a neighbour whose aggression or interference was to be feared. The friendly meeting at Umballa came at the right time to remove the mistrust which had prevented British influence from being effectually exercised in Afghanistan; to bring home to the Ameer's mind the conviction that the British Government had no desire to extend its dominions; and to pave the way for the acceptance of what was to the Ameer the still stranger lesson, that his highest wisdom was to abstain from interfering in the affairs of his neighbours, and to play his part in the difficult task of restoring some measure of peace to the wasted regions of Central Asia.

This advice, repeated in writing from time to time as opportunity offered, the Ameer has not been slow to accept. To the insidious counsels of those of his subjects who have occasionally prompted him to overstep the limits of his dominions and adopt an aggressive policy in retaliation for injuries real or fancied, the Ameer has ever turned a deaf ear. In accordance with the advice which has been given him by the late Viceroy, he has enjoined on his frontier officers a policy of watchful defence and of abstinence from aggression, and has endeavoured to settle his difficulties by diplomatic action, in a manner which has not only astonished his own people, but has excited the admiration of the Russian Government. These results have been carried out without any help from the British Government beyond strong moral support and continued advice. Since 1869 the Ameer has received no subsidy or material assistance. At no time were the relations of the Ameer with his neighbours more peaceful and friendly than at present.

I have already stated that it was one of the principal objects of Lord Mayo's policy to induce the Russian Government to adopt similar measures with regard to the Asiatic states under their immediate influence. The Ameer's recep-

tion at Umballa caused at the time considerable excitement in Russia. Exaggerated rumours of all kinds circulated in Central Asia, and were caught up by the Russian Press. Many affected to believe that some secret compact had been entered into with the Ameer to stir up the chiefs of the countries bordering on the Oxus to resist and repel the advances of Russia. Although these absurd fears were never entertained by the Russian Government, some anxiety was nevertheless exhibited on its part to obtain assurances that the Ameer of Afghanistan would be restrained from molesting the King of Bokhara. An opportunity for frank and friendly explanations presented itself in the mission of Mr. Forsyth to Russia in the first year of Lord Mayo's Viceroyalty. The full exposition of the peaceful policy that was then made elicited from the Emperor himself a statement that the Russian Government entertained no intention of extending their dominions; that if the idea of conquest were banished from the Ameer's mind there would be peace in Central Asia; and that while the good offices of England should be exerted to dissuade the Ameer from aggression, Russia would similarly use all her influence to restrain Bokhara from transgressing the limits of Afghan territory.

The friendly interchange of assurances that both nations intend to devote all their influence to introduce peace into the troubled regions of Central Asia has been repeatedly renewed since then between the representative of Her Majesty's Government and the Ministers of Russia, and the fruits of this good understanding have been frequently manifested. To Russian influence on Bokhara was due the prompt withdrawal of a party of Bokhara troops who had crossed the Oxus in the winter of 1869. To the restraining hand kept by Russia on the Afghan refugees in Turkistan is to be attributed the absence of any attempt on their part to shake the throne of the Ameer. When the most formidable of those refugees, Abdool Rahman, once openly represented that it would be for the interest of Russia to assist him in conquering the throne of Cabul, General Von Kauffmann replied, that hospitality had been afforded him in consideration of his destitute circumstances, and not as an enemy to England, or a pretender to the throne of Cabul. Russia, he said, wished every prosperity to Sher Ali, who had never given her any cause for dissatisfaction. General Von Kauffmann, himself, in the spring of 1870, commenced a direct correspondence, which has been renewed from time to time, and has conveyed

to the Ameer assurances of the neighbourly sentiments entertained by the Russian authorities towards the Afghan Government. There is every reason to hope that the permanent definition of the boundaries between Afghanistan and Bokhara, a matter in which Lord Mayo took deep interest, will before long be accomplished with the consent of all who are concerned.

Much still remains to be done before a feeling of security from foreign aggression is finally restored in those parts. The bitter experience of centuries has led the people to believe that strength is only used as an engine of conquest, and that when a new power appears on the scene its progress would never cease spontaneously, but only when it has encountered a barrier stronger than itself. Any disposition on the part of one or other of the two chief powers who guide the destinies of Central Asia to extend their arms beyond existing limits, would undo in a moment the good that has been effected. But the British Government in Europe and Asia has done its part in endeavouring to avert the possibility of any such disaster. In the last three years it has left nothing undone, by counsel, to bring those who are most immediately concerned to a preference for the ways of peace, and by negotiation to get the principles, which should regulate their action for the future, placed on permanent record, not only as a guide to the immediate actors, but also as a basis for the expression of its opinion by the voice of Europe if peace is again disturbed.

If space permitted, I might have attempted to explain the effect of Lord Mayo's policy on the internal affairs of Afghanistan, and particularly in bringing about a reconciliation between Yakoob Khan and his father. I should also have wished to show more at length his policy in connection with the settlement of the Mekran boundary; the negotiations now going on with respect to the Perso-Afghan boundary in Seistan; the opening up of the trade routes to Yarkund, and other important questions. But I have perhaps said enough to show that in carrying out the peaceful foreign policy which I have attempted imperfectly to describe, Lord Mayo's exertions have, to use the words which the Duke of Argyll has applied to the general results of his administration, "been marked with great success, and have not been "surpassed by the most zealous labours of any of his most "distinguished predecessors at the head of the Government "of India."

One of the most difficult questions with which Lord Mayo was called on to deal is the policy to be pursued towards the savage tribes on the eastern frontier of the empire. In the week preceding his assumption of office, serious raids had occurred in Eastern Bengal, in Hill Tippera and the lower villages of Sylhet; and in the week following two attacks were made on tea plantations in the east of Cachar. Before these second raids were known to him, Lord Mayo had announced that, much as expeditions into a barbarous, difficult, and unhealthy country were to be deprecated, he would authorize the despatch of a military force if it were shown to be absolutely required for the punishment of aggression, for the protection of our own frontier, and for the vindication of our honour. The unfortunate failure of the expedition of 1869, however, led him to review very carefully the whole history of our dealings with these tribes, and to adopt a policy which, although repeatedly and lucidly explained, does not appear yet to have been fully understood or appreciated.

I have seen it stated that it was Lord Mayo's avowed policy under no circumstances to authorize military expeditions such as that against the Looshais, which by the prudence and intelligence of all concerned has recently been brought to so successful a termination. But such is not the case. What Lord Mayo did object to was to move bodies of troops and police to effect mere reprisals for outrages committed on our frontier. What he did not admit was, the necessity or expediency of pursuing raiders for days and weeks within their own fastnesses and hills. What he questioned was the efficacy of such a system of reprisals if unaccompanied by other and more humane measures. But he never stated nor did he hold the opinion that circumstances might not occur under which military expeditions may be necessary or desirable as the best means of preventing inroads into our territories and of vindicating our honour. Accordingly, when very serious raids occurred in Sylhet and Cachar in the spring of 1871, so far from excluding a military expedition from consideration, the late Viceroy, after summarizing all the information known regarding the raids, and the persons or tribes by whom they were committed, called for further information regarding the tribes, the route by which they could be most easily approached, and more particularly whether a visitation of them in their own homes by an armed force was absolutely necessary for the future security of our fellow-subjects who live on the Cachar and Chittagong frontier, and, in the event of a hostile

expedition being determined on, what would be the description of punishment which would be most felt by the individuals who took part in the raids, and would have the surest effect in deterring other tribes from committing similar outrages. Having once satisfied himself that an expedition was unavoidable, he threw himself with all the energy of his nature into the measures necessary to make it a complete success. He was determined that there should be no repetition of previous mischievous failures. At the same time he was careful to prescribe that the expedition was not to be a measure of pure retaliation. The main end in view was to show the tribes that they are completely in our power; to establish friendly relations of a permanent character with them; to make them promise to receive in their villages, from time to time, Native agents of our own; to make travelling in their districts safe to all; to show them the advantages of trade and commerce; and to demonstrate to them effectually that they have nothing to gain, and everything to lose, by placing themselves in a hostile position towards the British Government: in short, the expedition was to be preliminary to the adoption of general and wider measures of policy to which I shall hereafter advert. I cannot enter at any length into the reasons on which Lord Mayo's objections to a retaliatory policy were founded. I will only say briefly that he had satisfied himself, from the experience of previous cases, that such measures are rarely successful, though always costly; that a single reverse is more mischievous in its effects than the escape of raiders unpunished; that in our ignorance of the country and its inhabitants, of the relations between the different tribes, of their particular wants, and even of the grievances by which, as it has since been discovered, they were inflamed to commit acts of violence, a policy of retaliation could rarely discriminate between the innocent and the guilty; and that indiscriminate punishment only aggravated the evils we sought to remove. But there was one reason to which I must specially advert, because it has never been allowed a place in any of the public discussions of the question that I have seen. If I have made it clear what Lord Mayo's foreign policy really was, the important bearing upon it of these frontier expeditions will be manifest. Lord Mayo felt that every shot fired in anger beyond the frontier reverberates through the whole of Asia, gives to natives who are no friends to Christian or European rule the notion that among our own subjects there

are men still in arms against us, and corroborates the assertion that the people within our frontier are not yet wholly subjected to our rule, and that British power is still disputed in Hindustan. Our proceedings and movements are caught up and criticized at every Court in Asia, at Mandalay, Yarkund, Bokhara, and even at St. Petersburg. Every frontier war that is not justified by absolute and demonstrable necessity gives a direct lie to all the assurances that we have been giving to Cabul and Russia for the last three years; renders nugatory the advice which we have been giving to the Ameer of Afghanistan and other frontier powers to abstain from aggressions on their neighbours, and tends to undo the policy of peace, the acceptance of which Lord Mayo did so much to secure in the countries beyond our borders. He felt that it was a bad example to set to our great European neighbour; that the arguments used in favour of such expeditions were precisely the arguments which had justified the Russian annexations in Central Asia; that we never can arrive at a common understanding with Russia, unless we ourselves scrupulously abstain from such acts; and that the sacrifice of a policy calculated to give at least the hope of some measure of peace to a quarter of the globe, and confidence to all neighbouring powers in the integrity and disinterestedness of our intentions, was too great a price to pay for the punishment of a few naked savages.

While therefore Lord Mayo fully admitted the necessity for expeditions under certain circumstances, he trusted more to what he himself called a policy of "vigilant, constant, and never-ceasing defence on all those parts of our frontier which are by their position liable to be attacked by foreign tribes;" and no isolated acts of violence, no succession of petty raids could induce him to depart from a line of action which, in his belief, was in accordance with sound policy, the dignity of British rule, and the practice which ought to prevail amongst civilized nations. It was in pursuance of this policy that Lord Mayo never gave any encouragement to suggestions for an expedition against the Mohammed Kheyls on the frontier of the Bunnoo District, who had commenced a long series of petty and irritating raids by a flagrant and murderous attack upon a party of our soldiers. Lord Mayo preferred to inquire fully into, and as far as possible remedy, the grievances, many of them just, which had driven the tribe to assume a hostile attitude; to invest the military

officers on the frontier with full discretionary powers for the prompt punishment of border marauders; to hold them responsible for the prudent exercise of their powers; to assure them of hearty support in all reasonable measures which they might adopt for the chastisement of offenders; and above all he insisted on the frontier officers making themselves thoroughly accessible to the people, and acquiring a salutary personal influence over them and a hold upon their sympathies and affections. In a letter written by his orders to the Punjab Government on 7th November 1870, after reviewing the causes of the Mohammed Kheyl outrages, approving certain steps proposed by the Punjab Government for the punishment of the offenders, and suggesting measures for the improvement of the frontier administration generally, Lord Mayo added:—"But the Governor General in Council will not conceal from His Honour the Lieutenant Governor his apprehension that this and all other palliatives will fail unless the frontier officers, from the Commissioner downwards, make it one of their first duties to acquire a thorough knowledge of their districts and to cultivate easy and friendly intercourse with the leading and influential men; unless they move freely and constantly about their districts in all seasons; unless they are easily accessible to all classes of the people and are well versed in the vernacular languages and local dialects; and unless they are taught to regard it to be their paramount duty to secure the confidence and affections of the people committed to their charge." The result of the measures adopted towards the Mohammed Kheyls was, that after persevering for about fifteen months in outlawry and defiance of the Government, the whole tribe surrendered unconditionally in October last, and with bare heads and with turban cloths stretched over their bended necks in token of submission, placed their arms at the Commissioner's feet. The tribe have paid up the fines imposed upon them for their offences, and the ringleaders are expiating their crimes in the Lahore Central prison. This result, unprecedented in the history of our relations with the Afghan tribes, was in no small degree due to a friendly visit which Mohammed Hyat Khan, a native officer of great intelligence and tact, had, in pursuance of Lord Mayo's policy, paid to the tribes a few weeks before.

On that part of our Eastern Bengal frontier, however, to which I have more particularly referred in a previous part

of this minute, there were special causes of difficulty and complication to be removed. These were explained at length in a letter to the Secretary to the Landholders and Commercial Association of British India, dated 1st March 1871, which was published at the time, and to which it is unnecessary for me to do more than refer. The British frontier on that side of India is almost unknown. The defence of an extensive and scarcely defined frontier extending into unexplored territories was a responsibility which the Government could not accept. The first step towards the permanent defence of the border and the protection of our partially settled districts from attacks such as those which had occurred in Cachar, was to define clearly the limit within which our Government was prepared to establish, maintain, and enforce its authority, and beyond which it would not undertake the responsibilities of administration and protection. This line, when once defined, was to be held by posts at suitable intervals and connected by cleared paths, so that if raids should recur there would be a hope that some of the offenders would be caught red-handed and summarily chastised. But over and above all this, the district officers on the frontier were to use all legitimate means to win the confidence of the tribes beyond the frontier; to endeavour to establish a personal influence over them, and by encouraging and protecting trade with the chiefs, to give the tribes an interest in the maintenance of peace and good order.

Such was Lord Mayo's policy. How far it will be successful time will tell. The measures necessary to give effect to it have not yet in all cases been adopted. But it was a policy noble in its aims, consistent in all its details with those wider views of foreign policy which Lord Mayo entertained, and with his hopes of the gradual cessation of war and anarchy throughout Central Asia. It was grand in its conception and well worthy of a trial. So far as it has been tried, there is no reason to doubt its ultimate success, and it is remarkable that of the tribes concerned in the latest raids in Cachar, not one belonged to those who had been brought within its range. They were tribes which had remained beyond the reach of our influence, while those chiefs on our immediate frontier with whom our officers had become acquainted, have ranged themselves on our side and been of material assistance in the recent military expeditions.

Of Lord Mayo's dealings with the feudatory chiefs of the empire, it is scarcely necessary that I should speak. We have all seen for ourselves the confidence which his genial, frank, and manly bearing inspired. I believe that Lord Mayo's intercourse with the chiefs of Upper India during the short period of his Viceroyalty has done more to convince them that the days of annexation are for ever passed away, than anything that has been done since the issue of Lord Canning's sunnuds. There was nothing he detested more than meddlesomeness and arbitrary or spasmodic interference with their affairs. So long as substantial justice was done, and a decent administration maintained, it was Lord Mayo's desire to leave the Native Chiefs alone, to let them govern on their own system, and develop their administrations in their own way. When improvements were imperatively demanded, it was his desire by personal influence and advice and example to encourage the Native Governments to adopt them spontaneously as acts of their own, and not as measures forced on them from without. At the same time he never sacrificed imperial requirements, or the rights and claims of the populations of Native States, to theoretical views of the position of the chiefs. He felt that the surest and indeed the only way of securing to Native Chiefs their just rights and perpetuating their Government was to require from them the proper fulfilment of their duties. While scrupulously abstaining from needless or vexatious interference, his interference was, as in the case of Ulwur, sharp, decisive, and effective, if oppression, rebellion, vice, waste, or extravagance compelled intervention. On the one hand he taught them that the British Government does not covet an inch of their territories, that a just and prudent ruler has nothing to fear from us, but will be supported in all legitimate endeavours to improve his Government, and will be defended against all disturbers of his rule from within or from without; but that, on the other hand, the British Government will not permit arbitrary power to be used merely as a means of personal aggrandizement; that it will require Native Princes to govern in the interest and for the good of their people; that it will not protect Native Chiefs against the consequences of their own tyranny or reckless waste; that the Princes of India cannot dissociate themselves from the great empire of which their territories form a part; and that the identity of their interests with those of the British Government, which is set forth in the

treaties recording their rights and their obligations, is a reality and not a name. Lastly, Lord Mayo was deeply impressed with the fact that ignorance is the real cause of the backwardness and misgovernment of many Native States; and that without education the princes will never be able to play their proper part in their relations with the British Government, or with their own nobles and subjects. These considerations induced him to found at Ajmere the College associated with his name, for the education of the Chiefs and Thakoors of Rajpootana. To this the princes and nobles of the Rajpoot States have liberally contributed, and he hoped it would be a model for the foundation of similar institutions in other parts of India.

The speech which Lord Mayo addressed to the Chiefs of Rajpootana, at the great Durbar which he held for their reception at Ajmere in October 1870, was so characteristic of himself, so illustrative of his policy and of his feelings towards the nobles and the people of India, and so admirably suited to the circumstances under which it was spoken, that I shall make no apology for quoting it at length.

“ I am much gratified,” he said, “ by your presence here to-day. It is good to see assembled around the Viceroy of India the heads of so many of the most ancient houses of Rajpootana. It is long since a Governor General has met you in Durbar within the walls of this old city; and since the Government of India has been placed directly under our Sovereign, no Viceroy has been able to come to Ajmere. But your welfare and that of your people have, nevertheless, ever been objects of the deepest interest to the British Government. Her Majesty the Queen regards with the utmost solicitude the well-being of all the inhabitants of Hindustan, whether they be chiefs or people, whether they are Her Majesty’s immediate subjects or are ruled over by Native Princes.

“ I, as the representative of the Queen, have come here to tell you, as you have often been told before, that the desire of Her Majesty’s Government is to secure to you and to your successors the full enjoyment of your ancient rights and the exercise of all lawful customs, and to assist you in upholding the dignity and maintaining the authority which you and your fathers have for centuries exercised in this land.

“ But in order to enable us fully to carry into effect this our fixed resolve, we must receive from you hearty

and cordial assistance. If we respect your rights and privileges, you should also respect the rights and regard the privileges of those who are placed beneath your care. If we support you in your power, we expect in return good government. We demand that everywhere throughout the length and breadth of Rajpootana justice and order should prevail; that every man's property should be secure; that the traveller should come and go in safety; that the cultivator should enjoy the fruits of his labor, and the trader the produce of his commerce; that you should make roads and undertake the construction of those works of irrigation which will improve the condition of the people, and swell the revenue of your States; that you should encourage education and provide for the relief of the sick.

“ And now let me mention a project which I have much at heart. I desire much to invite your assistance to enable me to establish at Ajmere a school or college which should be devoted exclusively to the education of the sons of the Chiefs, Princes, and leading Thakoors of Rajpootana. It should be an institution suited to the position and rank of the boys for whose instruction it is intended, and such a system of teaching should be founded as would be best calculated to fit them for the important duties which in after-life they would be called upon to discharge. It would not be possible on this occasion to describe minutely the different features of such an institution, but I hope to communicate with you shortly on the subject; and I trust you will favor and support an attempt to give to the youth of Rajpootana instruction suitable to their high birth and position.

“ Be assured that we ask you to do all this for no other but your own benefit. If we wished you to remain weak, we should say, ‘ Be poor, and ignorant, and disorderly.’ It is because we wish you to be strong that we desire to see you rich, instructed, and well-governed. It is for such objects that the servants of the Queen rule in India; and Providence will ever sustain the rulers who govern for the people's good.

“ I am but here for a time; the able and ardent officers who surround me will, at no distant period, return to their English homes; but the power which we represent will endure for ages. Hourly is this great Empire brought nearer and nearer to the throne of our Queen. The steam vessel and the railroad enable England year by year to

enfold India in a closer embrace. But the coils she seeks to entwine around her are not iron fetters, but the golden chains of affection and of peace. The hours of conquest are past; the age of improvement has begun.

“ Chiefs and Princes, advance in the right way, and secure to your children’s children and to future generations of your subjects the favoring protection of a power who only seeks your good.”

We see Lord Mayo in every line of this speech; the frank and courteous and enlightened gentleman, but at the same time the strong and worthy representative of the Queen, and the unmistakable ruler of the empire. Every Native Prince who met him looked upon Lord Mayo as the ideal of an English Viceroy. They all felt instinctively that they could place perfect confidence in everything that he told them, and their respect, I ought rather to say their reverence, was all the deeper because, while they knew that he was their master, they felt also that he was their friend.

It had ordinarily, of late years, been the custom for the Governor General to retain in his own hands the immediate management of the Foreign Department only. I think that the public is hardly aware of the great change which has gradually taken place in regard to the disposal of the current work of the Government. The old system, under which almost all business was transacted by the Governor General in communication with the whole of his Council, prevailed until quite recent times, and with it, I may add, an amount of elaborate minute-writing which seems now hardly conceivable. That system became altogether incompatible with the prompt despatch of business when the work of the Government began to assume its present vast dimensions. Twenty years ago the Governor General and the Council used to perform work which would now be disposed of by an Under Secretary. The Viceroy exercises, of course, in all departments a general control, and nothing of real importance can take place without his sanction, but the ordinary current business of the Government is divided among the Members of the Council much in the same manner in which in England it is divided among the Cabinet Ministers, each member having a separate department of his own. During the greater part of his administration Lord Mayo held the immediate charge not only of the Foreign Department, but of the Department of Public Works. Those only who know what a great Indian depart-

ment is, can appreciate the nature of the burden which he thus took on himself. But for the fact that, in addition to his extraordinary energy and love of work, he possessed unusual personal knowledge and practical experience of business of this kind, it would have been hardly possible for him to get through it in addition to the other duties which as Viceroy he could alone perform.

Lord Lawrence, shortly before he left India, reviewed in an elaborate minute the past history of our railways, and stated the conclusions which he had formed regarding their future extension. While fully admitting the great advantages which had followed under the system inaugurated by Lord Dalhousie, which, when the lines already authorized have been finished, will have given us about six thousand miles of railway, Lord Lawrence stated his conviction that the time had come for the adoption of a different system in future. He showed that by entrusting the construction of our railways to private companies, with a guarantee of interest, the whole risk and the whole actual loss fall upon the State, while, on the other hand, the State gets practically no portion of any profit. He declared his belief that the liabilities which the Government had taken on itself had already assumed most serious proportions, and that to go on blindly adding to those liabilities, trusting to the probable increase of traffic and to the growth of the public revenues to make good all demands on account of interest, was a policy which might end in grave financial disaster. He showed that it would be far more economical, and far more conducive to the satisfactory working of the railways themselves, that the Government should raise directly by loan all the money that it requires for railway construction, and gain for the revenues of India the full benefit of any profits that might remain after paying the interest on the borrowed capital. Lord Lawrence hoped that if we acted on this principle, we might reasonably expect to be able, in the course of the next fifteen or twenty years, without placing any undue strain on the finances, to construct some five or six thousand additional miles of railway, and thus virtually to complete a network of lines fairly sufficient to provide for all those wants of the country which we can now foresee.

This great question was taken up energetically by Lord Mayo soon after his arrival in India; he concurred entirely in Lord Lawrence's conclusions; and the same view was taken by Her Majesty's Government. But Lord Mayo was

convinced that these conclusions could only be carried into effect with safety when measures had been taken for very largely reducing the charge of railway construction. The average cost of our guaranteed Indian railways has been about £17,000 a mile. When all the lines already sanctioned are complete, we shall have about six thousand miles of railway, and about £100,000,000 will have been expended. The gross annual charges on account of guaranteed railway interest amount already to $4\frac{3}{4}$ millions, and after deducting the net traffic receipts, the average annual burden upon the revenues of the State for the last three years has exceeded $1\frac{3}{4}$ million. Lord Mayo was satisfied that it was impossible to go on making railways in India at such a cost, and that however urgently they might be required, it would be far better to abandon the further construction of new lines altogether, than to follow a policy which must inevitably lead to financial difficulties of the most serious and indeed dangerous character. As he himself said in the Legislative Council, if we had continued to make our railways at anything like the cost of the existing lines, we should probably have found ourselves fifteen or twenty years hence under an obligation to pay from three to four millions of interest every year out of the ordinary revenues of the State. Lord Mayo therefore said that we must have cheap railways, or none at all; and he strongly supported the proposal that in constructing the new lines, the old broad gauge of five feet six inches should, as a general rule, be abandoned and a gauge of three feet three inches be adopted in its place. I believe that his only doubt was whether the gauge ought not to be still narrower.

The discussions both in India and at home, in regard to the gauge to be adopted for the State railways, were long and troublesome, and they were conducted on both sides with great ability. Into those discussions I cannot attempt to enter. I can only state briefly the reasons which led Lord Mayo's Government to the conclusion which has been adopted. They were set forth as follows, in the despatch from the Government of India to the Secretary of State, dated the 17th May 1870:—"To introduce a different gauge, except in isolated positions, or under very peculiar circumstances, when the railway system of a country is approaching completion, would be open to all the objections of the opponents of a break of gauge. But the railway system in this country is, as yet, in its infancy; and without affirming that a gauge

of 5 feet 6 inches would not have been adopted for India twenty years ago, had the experience of to-day been then available, it would be folly to refuse to avail ourselves now of that experience, seeing what a length of iron road remains to be built before India can be said to have anything like a complete system of railway communication. The railways hitherto constructed have been so aligned as to form a connected system of trunk lines along the great political and commercial routes of the country. Lahore, on the extreme north-west of India, is connected with Calcutta on the extreme east. Calcutta is connected with Bombay on the extreme west, and Bombay again is connected with Madras and Southern India. We may regard these lines as constituting a system in themselves of the first importance. With one or two exceptions, the lines that remain to be taken up can only be regarded as of secondary importance, but they are so extensive that they also may be regarded as constituting a system in themselves." The Government went on to say that it was satisfied that if these secondary lines were constructed on a narrow gauge they would be amply sufficient to carry all the traffic that could possibly come upon them; that it was its duty to reduce to the utmost the cost of constructing its railways, and that the adoption of a narrow gauge would lead to a very large economy. It further stated that it was quite alive to the importance of having the means of meeting sudden emergencies or an exceptional traffic, and that it was therefore essential that we should be able, especially in the case of lines of political importance, to avail ourselves, if necessary, of the reserve of the vehicle stock of a large section of the narrow gauge system. "To take a particular case," it was said, "such as that of the Lahore and Peshawur line, this necessity would be so paramount as to forbid the adoption of a narrow gauge, unless in connection with a much larger length of line on the same gauge, the stock of which could, on occasion, be concentrated." The case of the Lahore and Peshawur and Indus Valley railway was one that was mainly relied upon by those who disapproved the break of gauge. Lord Mayo was firmly convinced that if it were held to be obligatory that this line should be constructed on a broad gauge, it would be the duty of the Government to say that it could not incur so great an expenditure, and that it must abandon the idea of constructing the line altogether. He was satisfied, however, that by adopting the narrow gauge, not only for the section

between Lahore and Peshawur, but for the whole line from Peshawur to Kurrachee, a distance of 1,100 miles, every objection of a military and political nature would be completely met. With regard to the power of transport, it was shown that the resources of one line of 1,100 miles of railway on the narrow gauge are such that nearly 20,000 Infantry with baggage, camp equipage, and ammunition, could be placed at Rohree from Lahore in one week. "If," Lord Mayo wrote, "we could throw 40,000 men in a fortnight on any point of the frontier from Lahore, I believe we could convey them quicker to Rohree than we could possibly mass them at Lahore. It seems to me, therefore, that the resources are amply sufficient for every military contingency."

We owe to Lord Mayo the adoption of this great change in our railway system, and among all the services which he rendered to India, I believe that there is none which will have greater practical importance than this. It has saved us from a serious financial and therefore from a serious political danger, and we shall have a system of cheap railways in every respect as convenient, and as capable of carrying the heaviest traffic which can possibly arise, as the more expensive lines. It is believed that the average cost of the narrow gauge lines will not exceed £5,000 a mile, a sum less than one-third of the average cost of the existing lines, and not more than one-fourth of the more expensive lines. These cheap railways will have quite as good means of earning revenue as if they had been constructed on the most expensive scale, and there is every reason to hope that, with one or two exceptions like that of the Lahore and Peshawur line, constructed mainly for political purposes, they will soon become, if not profitable, at least self-supporting works.

Considerable delay was caused by the discussions regarding the gauge to be adopted, but good progress has already been made in the construction of our new system of State Railways. It is hoped that by the end of 1874 some 700 miles will be ready. The line from Delhi to Rewaree, a distance of 57 miles, is almost finished. The line, 185 miles long, from Agra to Jeypoor and the Sambhur Lake,—a work of the utmost importance for the salt supply of Northern India,—has been let in contract, and will be finished in 1874. The line from Indore to the Great Indian Peninsula Railway at Khundwa, a distance of 84 miles, has also been let in contract; and surveys have been almost completed to join this line, *via* Neemuch, Nuseerabad, and Ajmeer, with the

Agra and Sambhur Railway. Lord Mayo also proposed to order the survey of a line to join Ajmeer with Deesa and Ahmedabad, and form another line of railway communication between the North-Western Provinces and Bombay. The advantage of the narrow gauge has been well exemplified in the Rajpootana railways. One of them being nearly completed, and two others being already let in contract, there is now nothing rash in asserting confidently that their total cost will not exceed £5,000 a mile.

In the Punjab, the Railway from Lahore to Peshawur had been commenced when Lord Mayo arrived in India. The work is being energetically pushed on, but the magnitude of the bridges across the three great rivers forbids very rapid progress.

The Indus Valley line, to connect the Punjab with Sindh and the sea, a distance of about 500 miles, has also been undertaken, and the portion from Mooltan to Sukkur is already in progress.

The discovery of the Chanda coal fields was followed up by Lord Mayo with his usual energy, and a line of railway is already under construction to bring the coal to the Great Indian Peninsula Railway. This line, as well as the important line to be constructed to Hyderabad by the Government of the Nizam, being short branches or feeders of a great broad gauge line, are to be on the broad gauge also.

A few words must be added regarding the arrangements, to which Lord Mayo attached much importance, for the extension of railways in the Native States of Hyderabad and of Indore. In accordance with the proposals of the enlightened Minister of the Nizam, Sir Salar Jung, a railway is being made, at an estimated cost of about one million sterling, from the Great Indian Peninsula Railway to Hyderabad. The line and all the profits of its working will be the property of the Hyderabad State, but the construction, management, and working of the railway will be carried on by the British Government. Thus this important line will be provided without any charge or liability being placed on the revenues of India. The arrangement with the Maharaja Holkar was different. He placed at the disposal of the British Government a sum of one million sterling, as a contribution towards the construction of a railway to unite the Great Indian Peninsula Railway with Indore. On this sum he will receive interest at $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., and one-half of any surplus net profits in excess of that

amount. Thus (I quote from a despatch dated the 29th March 1870, from the Government of India to the Secretary of State), "two Native Governments have of their own accord, and without solicitation on our part, offered to subscribe £2,000,000 of capital for railway construction in their own territories. It is satisfactory to us to note that in the first year after the Government had announced its intention of carrying out further extensions of railway in India by its own agency, two Native States should have subscribed such a sum, on terms so favorable as those that we have described, for the construction of lines of railway which, while they will benefit considerably their own States, may also be regarded of primary importance to India as a whole. We cannot but trust that the example set by the Maharaja of Indore and Sir Salar Jung will be followed by other enlightened rulers, and that we may for the future hope for the more active co-operation of the native chiefs and princes of India in all works of industrial enterprise."

I will not attempt to detail all the other railway projects in Northern Bengal, in the Central Provinces, in Mysore, and elsewhere, which Lord Mayo had taken up. The last act of his administration in connection with railway extension was his discussion at Rangoon of the project for a narrow gauge line from Rangoon to Prome, and this he had determined to advocate. In regard to the working of the guaranteed railways generally, Lord Mayo held strongly that it was the duty of the Government to insist that they should be so managed as to give to the people of India, to the largest extent possible, the advantage of the outlay which has been so heavy a burden on the revenues of the country; and it was a cause of constant regret to him to find that, owing to the nature of the contracts with the Railway Companies and other reasons, it was often impossible to provide for the working of the lines on this principle. One of his last and most admirable papers was written upon this subject.

The other great branch of public works in India, and one, if possible, of still greater importance, is that of irrigation. Although, in regard to the extension of the great works on which, in many parts of India, not only the prosperity but the very existence of the people depends, Lord Mayo had little to do but follow the wise conclusions adopted in the time of his predecessors, there never was a Governor General who devoted greater attention to this subject, and there never was a time in which more was done than

during his administration. A bare list of the great works in progress will give ample evidence of this fact. Besides carrying on the improvement and extension of the Ganges Canal, which after seventeen years has only lately taken its place as a work no longer burdensome to the State, the construction of another canal from the Ganges has been sanctioned and commenced. This work, as large as the original canal, starting from the Ganges opposite Allygurh, will water all the lower part of the Doab from Futtehgurh to Allahabad. An equally great work is the canal which is being constructed from the Sarda to water the eastern half of Rohilkhund and the western portion of Oudh. Another project for a canal from the Ganges through the western districts of Rohilkhund has been almost finished; and a project for a great extension of the Western Jumna Canal to carry the water of the Jumna in the rainy season into the desert west of Delhi has been partially sanctioned by the Secretary of State. The lower Jumna Canal between Delhi and Agra, and the great canal from the Sone through Shahabad and Behar, are also in course of execution. Progress in the Orissa and Godavery irrigation works has been made; projects for irrigation in Sindh have been under careful investigation; and many other projects in Bombay, Madras, and other Provinces have been pushed forward or matured. I shall refer again to Lord Mayo's opinions regarding the financial management of these great undertakings, which in Northern India alone will involve an expenditure of more than £20,000,000.

The so-called Provincial Services scheme, which was carried out in December 1870, and under which the local Governments received largely increased powers of control in many branches of the administration, led to important changes in the Public Works Department. Of the scheme itself I shall give some account further on. The funds allotted for provincial roads and buildings were separated from those assigned for imperial public works, and were placed at the disposal of the local Governments, with virtually complete exemption from interference on the part of the Government of India. In regard to the construction of barracks and other military buildings, Lord Mayo adopted an opposite policy. He came to the conclusion that throughout the Bengal Presidency, these works, intended for the accommodation of troops under the entire control of the Government of India, should cease to be carried out by the local

Civil Governments. I shall have again to notice the great work of barrack construction, which has been in progress for some years. In consequence, as Lord Mayo believed, of the extreme difficulty of executing so many extensive undertakings at the same time, and of finding properly selected officers and establishments for their supervision, several discreditable failures of construction in highly important buildings have occurred. This, under the exceptional circumstances of the case, may have been more or less excusable, but for the future, Lord Mayo proposed to guard against such failures by separating the work of large construction from the current duties of repair and attention to the minor wants of the troops. He determined, therefore, to form a separate section of the Public Works Department for the military works of the Bengal Presidency, divided into two branches, one exclusively for new construction, and the other for ordinary cantonment business, repairs, and minor works. "The recent investigations," it was stated in the Resolution of the 15th November 1871, "as to the extent of existing barrack accommodation in the plains, and the determination of the Government to place an additional number of European Regiments in the hills, have led His Excellency in Council to believe that it will not be necessary to commence any new barracks in the plains upon the standard plan. Thus, as the erection of new buildings is not contemplated, the labours of the Public Works Department in regard to building in the plains will for the present be devoted to the completion of those works already in progress and to their subsidiary buildings. It is considered undesirable that a number of first-class military works should be carried on in different parts of the country at one and the same time. Rapidity of work has not been secured by this system, and it is considered better to place a full and highly qualified staff in superintendence of a few important military works, press them rapidly to completion, and then transfer the staff to whatever undertaking may stand next in order of importance." The arrangements for carrying out this change of system were in progress when Lord Mayo died.

There are two other undertakings connected with the Department of Public Works, which I will mention, because Lord Mayo took much personal interest in them. One of them is the bridge over the Hooghly at Calcutta. Lord Mayo was strongly in favour of the design for a floating bridge, and much preferred this to any design for a fixed or

permanent bridge. Acting on the same principles which he desired to follow in regard to works of irrigation, he altogether declined to allow the advance of any money from the imperial treasury for the construction of the bridge, until arrangements had been made for providing complete local security for the payment of interest on the debt. This was secured by an Act passed last year by the Council of the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, and a contract has been entered into for carrying out the work.

The other case is that of the Port Trust at Bombay, formed for the completion of the works for the improvement of the Port, and for the development and convenience of its trade. While Lord Mayo readily accepted the proposals for the purchase of the property of the Elphinstone Company, he was strongly opposed to throwing any burden on the imperial revenues. He was willing to make the most liberal concessions in the interests of the Port of Bombay, but he steadily declined to finish the works out of the funds of the State unless the interest of the money could be guaranteed from local resources. It may be hoped that this policy will be as successful in Bombay as a similar policy has been in Calcutta.

Although the administration of the Army was not so directly under his immediate and personal control as the Foreign Department and the Department of Public Works, I believe that no change or reform in military administration or organization was made which he had not first carefully weighed and considered, and indeed not seldom initiated.

Being in the truest sense of the word utilitarian, Lord Mayo hated waste, but knew that waste follows excessive saving no less than excessive expenditure. He therefore never confounded parsimony with economy; his object was always to reduce what was superfluous, but not to starve what was essential. Thus, while he effected large economies by dispensing with offices and establishments which experience had shown to be not absolutely necessary, he grudged no expenditure to secure the efficiency and working power of what remained. From his first arrival in India he perceived the necessity of having as large a body of our European troops as possible held in reserve in healthy situations. One of the latest orders he issued was to cease all barrack building in the plains that was not really necessary for the health and comfort of the soldiers,

and to concentrate all efforts on completing the stations commenced or sanctioned in the hills. To him also it is mainly due that the troops in the hill stations occupy quarters, or cottage barracks, which, while fulfilling every desideratum of health, comfort, and discipline, enable a whole regiment to be housed for a smaller sum than under the old system of imposing but less comfortable and probably less healthy structures it would have cost to house three companies.

According to the original plans of January 1865, it was estimated that a sum of £10,000,000 would be required to provide complete permanent accommodation for the troops throughout India. Between £7,000,000 and £8,000,000 has been actually expended up to the present time. Although no man was ever more determined than Lord Mayo to spare no cost that was really necessary for the health and comfort of the European troops, he believed that the plans of barrack accommodation which had been adopted were not only, in some respects, needlessly expensive, but that it was possible at a far smaller charge to provide buildings which should be quite as healthy and more convenient. The work of constructing the new barracks had already made so much progress that the economy which Lord Mayo was able to carry out was small compared with what it would have been if the subject had been taken up sooner. It is probable, however, that the savings which have been or will be effected by the changes in the plans and arrangement of the buildings, and by providing accommodation in the hills instead of in the plains, will amount to £1,500,000. Nothing has been curtailed which was necessary for the health and comfort of the soldiers, and the changes that have been made have received the approval of the Secretary of State, and of the Army Sanitary Commission at home.

During the three years of Lord Mayo's tenure of office the military charges in India were reduced by about half a million, while the strength in men and guns was proportionately but little altered. During these years the mobility of the army was increased immensely by the completion of railway communication between Calcutta, Lahore, Madras, and Bombay. Its efficiency and power were also greatly increased by the adoption during these years of breech-loading arms for the British, and rifled arms of precision for almost all the Native troops, and by the establishment of factories for the ammunition required by the new weapon.

Camps of instruction, on a scale similar to that held last winter, have been adopted as a permanent institution.

Fortified by the opinion of the present Lord Sandhurst, of Sir Henry Durand, of General Norman, and of other officers of high distinction and experience, Lord Mayo urged on Her Majesty's Government in 1869, and again in 1870, his conviction that we were incurring a heavier expense annually for Artillery in India than was necessary, or than could be required for any force which could by any possibility take the field. His views, which at no time contemplated the reduction by a man of the Artillery force in India, did not receive entire acceptance at home, and by way of compromise a modified scheme was ultimately adopted.

The result was the reduction of a brigade and five batteries of Horse Artillery, with 30 guns and a brigade and three batteries of Garrison Artillery. But on the other hand there was, notwithstanding the decrease in guns and batteries, an actual increase in the total Artillery strength of 58 men. The true effect of the reduction was, that whereas the batteries throughout India had been declared by the most competent Artillery officers to be undermanned, and to that extent inefficient, they were now all fully manned, able to take the field effectively, to bring every gun into action, and maintain them throughout a campaign. Notwithstanding the reduction in the number of field guns, the Artillery force remaining is sufficient to give four field guns for every thousand men we can ever hope to place in the field. This is the full proportion required by tacticians for even European warfare, and still leaves us two field guns for each thousand men of the reserve forces, with in addition a large force of Garrison Artillery for our forts and defences throughout India.

The saving effected by these measures exceeded £100,000 annually, and this not only with no sacrifice of efficiency, but, as I am informed and believe, with an actual increase to our artillery power. Moreover, there was another consideration which did not escape Lord Mayo, and which he felt would have justified even larger reduction than any he proposed, that by the introduction, which he never ceased to press, of rifled and heavier field guns, in place of the comparatively ineffectual smooth-bores heretofore in use, the power of the arm must be so increased as to place us, in regard to artillery, in an infinitely higher position, both actual and relative, than we have ever occupied in India.

I have felt it right to enlarge on this point, for Lord Mayo's proceedings in the matter have not always been understood, and it has sometimes been assumed that in his strong desire to reduce expenditure he was led to unduly weaken the army of India in this most essential arm. Emphatically this, as I have shown, is not the case, and it would have been in complete disaccord with his known practice and policy.

No one possessed a stronger sense of the importance of sound sanitary measures than Lord Mayo. I have already mentioned his personal share in placing a larger number of our troops in the hills. He was no less urgent for the establishment of lock-hospitals in every large city neighbouring a cantonment, and in securing everywhere the purest possible water-supply. To attain such objects he grudged no expenditure, but for objects which according to his conviction were non-essential, the public money was never with his consent forthcoming.

The foregoing are a few of the military reforms with which Lord Mayo is specially identified. There are others which I need not detail, but there are many more of at least equal importance with any I have mentioned which, had he lived, would, I cannot doubt, have been accomplished.

His carefully thought-out schemes for reduction of expenditure in the Native Army, which would have produced a very large saving, and, as he was satisfied, no diminution of effective strength, would, he was sanguine, ultimately have been accepted and acted upon.

The reductions first proposed by him in the Native Army were calculated to produce an immediate saving of £205,000, and an eventual saving of £284,000 a year. But these proposals for the most part fell through. Accepting the recorded opinion of the Governor of Madras to the effect that "the cost of the Madras Army far transcended the wants of the country, and that retrenchments might be made which would not be contemptible, even with reference to the imperial deficit," and satisfying himself and his Council that retrenchment was possible also in the Native Armies of the other two Presidencies, Lord Mayo desired to reduce the total native force by about 9,000 men. This would have been effected by the reduction of one regiment of Cavalry, twelve regiments of Infantry, and four Batteries of Eurasian and Native Artillery; by the absorption of two regiments of Cavalry and four of Infantry into other corps; and the

reconstitution of the Sindh Horse from three regiments of three squadrons each into two regiments of four squadrons each.

This measure, to which Lord Mayo had given careful personal consideration, would have effected an important saving in our expenditure, while he was convinced that it would not in any way compromise either political safety or military efficiency. It involved, however, the reduction of one regiment of Madras Cavalry, one battery of Madras Artillery, and eight regiments of Madras Infantry. Lord Mayo believed that while retrenchment might be made in the Native Armies of all the three Presidencies, large reduction was only practicable in that Army which occupied a country where war is almost an impossibility, which was admitted to be greatly in excess of the utmost demands which could be made upon it in its own Presidency, which was the most expensive and the least mobile in its organization, which was ill fitted to take the place of a force recruited from the hardier and more military northern races, and, finally, whose employment in other provinces than its own was attended with serious inconvenience and most disproportionate cost. I shall not enter into the reasons which have prevented the adoption of Lord Mayo's views. I am now only stating the conclusions which he himself had formed, and I do this because there was no subject on which he felt and spoke more strongly. He was convinced that the Native Army in India was, on the whole, larger than the country needed, but he would not agree to reduce troops in provinces where he believed that they might at any time be wanted for war, nor could he think it right to maintain in Madras a force which had been admitted to be far beyond its wants. He repeatedly declared his conviction that it would be impossible to continue for any long period to tax the people of India for an army which is not required, and which from its expense, and the nature of the races from which it is recruited, was, in his opinion, unsuitable as a reserve for the main army of India. It was with deep regret that Lord Mayo found himself compelled to maintain a military expenditure which he believed to be excessive.

On this, as on some other subjects, I can only briefly touch, because I wish to avoid everything which might have even an appearance of controversy. I could not have said less without concealing the opinions which Lord Mayo held on a matter to which he attached extreme importance, and on which I myself believe his opinions to have been wise and right,

but I am quite alive to the fact that this is one of the subjects on which there has been much of that diversity of personal judgment which must be expected on every public question, and that other authorities, whose opinions deserve the utmost respect, have taken a different view.

Other military reforms had received much of his attention. He regarded it as an anomaly to have divided authority and control in what is practically one army, and he believed it to be inexpedient to maintain triple establishments where one would suffice. Up to the time of his death he was revolving measures for the improvement of the *Stud* and *Ordnance* Departments, and for enabling the *Lawrence Asylums* in the hills, those excellent institutions for the education of the children of British soldiers, to fulfil more adequately the design of their founder, and it was within a few days only of his death that the eminent officers, whom he had caused to be sent from England for the purpose; submitted their proposals on the means to be taken to render our ports secure from insult, and for supplying the marine requirements of the country.

I cannot attempt to give even a bare outline of the measures with which Lord Mayo was concerned, in connection with the internal administration of the country. I can only refer to some of those in which he was especially interested.

The knowledge which he had obtained regarding the difficult and complicated questions connected with the tenures of land in India was most remarkable. He had learnt in three years more about these matters, about permanent and temporary settlements, *zemindaree* and *ryotwaree* systems, tenant and occupancy rights, and the rest, than most of us have learnt in a lifetime spent in India. The experience which he had gained in Ireland of questions connected with the land, under circumstances strikingly analogous in many respects to those which exist in India, gave him special interest in this portion of his work. He found here over again many of the old problems with which he had long been occupied at home. The views of Lord Mayo on these subjects were most liberal and enlightened.

In regard to the most important of all Indian questions, the settlement of the land revenue, the work which Lord Mayo has done ought always to be remembered in his honour. If the question of extending the permanent settlement of Bengal to other parts of India has at last been decided, as I believe has virtually been the case;

if, hereafter, we hear little more of proposals to repeat the great mistake of the last century, under which, without conferring any real benefit upon the country, we have thrown away in Bengal an annual revenue which may be counted by many millions, and the loss of which forces us to harass the people and the trade of India with a variety of unpopular and mischievous imposts, it will be due in no small degree to Lord Mayo's influence that this result will have been obtained. When I speak of permanent settlements, I do not wish to be misunderstood. I mean only permanent settlements of the Bengal type, for Lord Mayo, as his published opinions have already shown, was strongly disposed to believe that permanency of settlement by no means necessarily involved any such disastrous consequences as those to which I have referred. This great question was still under discussion when he died, and I cannot say what conclusions he might ultimately have adopted, but the views which he has left on record show that he tended towards the belief that a permanent settlement of the land revenue might, under certain conditions, be made upon the basis, not of a fixed money payment, the value of which goes on constantly changing, but on the basis of an assessment fixed with reference to the produce of the land. However this might have been, while no man ever felt more strongly that it was our duty scrupulously to maintain the spirit and the letter of every engagement by which the Government had bound itself in the past, no one has more strongly objected to the extension to other parts of India of a permanent settlement such as that which exists in Bengal.

The policy followed by the Government of India during the last two years in regard to this and other subjects connected with the settlement of the land revenue, and to the important questions which closely depend upon it regarding the imposition of rates upon the land for local purposes, was the result of long and careful deliberation. It is true that it was not Lord Mayo, but his predecessor, Lord Lawrence, and the Duke of Argyll, the present Secretary of State, who laid the foundation of those great measures of local taxation in Bengal which His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor is now carrying to a conclusion. But if Mr. Campbell's efforts lead ultimately, as I believe they will, to the removal of the reproach which has long hung over Bengal, of being in many respects more backward than any great province of the empire, if they cover the country with roads and

schools and the other necessities of civilization which have so long been wanting, I am sure that he would confirm my assertion that his efforts could hardly have been successful without the cordial support and confidence which were always given to him by Lord Mayo.

The laws which were passed last year for almost every province in India, in more or less intimate connection with the great measure to which I shall have again to refer for increasing the financial powers of the Local Governments, have at last distinctly laid down the principle that if more roads, and bridges, and schools, and hospitals, and other works of local utility are required, they must be provided from local resources, and not at the expense of the general taxpayers of the empire. If this principle has at last passed beyond the region of discussion, and it may be assumed that no one any longer contests it, we owe this result in no small degree to Lord Mayo.

It has sometimes been charged against the Government of India that it has lately been disposed to throw, under the name whether of land revenue or local rates, too heavy a burden upon the land; to tamper with the wise policy of our predecessors under which it was laid down as a maxim that the most fundamental condition of the prosperity of the country is the limitation, to a moderate amount, of the demands of the Government upon the land, and that those demands should be altered, during considerable periods of time, to the least possible degree. There never was a more unfounded assertion, or one more inconsistent with the principles by which Lord Mayo's Government has been guided. Although he undoubtedly thought that in some of the late settlements there has been a needless sacrifice of the just rights of the State, there never was a man more firmly convinced that the prosperity of India mainly depends upon the classes connected with the land, and there never was a man less inclined than Lord Mayo to place upon the land any undue burdens. As regards Bengal, no one is likely to assert that the local burdens are heavy; and in Northern India, if all the local rates which have been imposed upon the land be added to the demand on account of land revenue, the total proportion of the rental taken from the proprietors will be found to be much smaller than it was under the old settlements, made more than thirty years ago, under which the land has enjoyed almost uninterrupted prosperity, and has increased enormously in value.

Closely connected in Lord Mayo's mind with these questions of local rating and with his projects of agricultural reform, were the measures which have long been in progress for the completion of our magnificent system of great works of irrigation, the only real remedy against the terrible famines which still, from time to time, devastate this country. Of his views regarding the financial aspect of these undertakings I shall speak hereafter.

In administering the Acts providing the means for the execution of local works of utility, Lord Mayo was most anxious that the natives of the country should be associated, to the greatest possible extent, with the officers of the Government, and he lost no opportunity of urging that they should be encouraged to take an active part in the management of their own local affairs. He always said that he was convinced that from one end of India to the other there was no lack of men of ability and intelligence who could afford most useful help to the Government in this manner. The personal patronage of the Viceroy, in regard to the great mass of appointments in India, is so limited, that it was not easy for Lord Mayo to do much towards promoting such objects by appointing natives of the country to posts for which they are fitted. But he lost no opportunity of urging their claims, and of declaring the duty of the Government to open to them a wider field of honourable employment.

The interest which Lord Mayo took in all questions connected with the land, and with the development of Indian agriculture, was one of the most prominent features of his administration.

Broadly, it may, I believe, be stated that if not the first to insist on the vast importance of agricultural reform, he was at any rate the first Viceroy who initiated any serious practical movement in that direction.

His conviction seemed to be that the first and most important object was the improvement of the material condition of the people; that the progress of education, the development of self-government, the introduction of a satisfactorily working legal system, loyalty to the ruling power, every one in fact of the greatest objects at which our Government has ever aimed, must mainly depend on the physical well-being of the people, and that while many other things would doubtless contribute in a minor degree to foster this, the main thing wanting, now that the country was being rapidly opened out by railways and canals, was to increase

largely the quantity and improve the quality of agricultural produce.

It was not, as many have fancied, because of his own personal fondness for agricultural pursuits, nor was it because he was himself an accomplished practical and scientific farmer, that Lord Mayo attached so much importance and devoted so much time and anxious thought to everything connected with the improvement of agriculture in India. It was rather that with a clear insight into the requirements of the future, he saw in this the only prospect of rendering the people comfortable, contented, and happy, and of thus placing them in a position to profit fully by our efforts to diffuse among them a higher civilization.

Simple and incontestible as the truth is that in a country, nine-tenths of whose population depend for their livelihood on the land, the foundations of national progress and of national prosperity must rest upon a healthy agricultural development, Lord Mayo was the first to give it distinct utterance and to act upon it.

We often hear the opinion that Indian agriculture is not likely to be improved by the application of European science to its processes, and that the natives of India have little to learn from anything that we can teach. Lord Mayo was too experienced a farmer, and too enlightened a man, to admit a proposition which is almost equivalent to declaring that ignorance is as good a thing as knowledge. He always maintained that, although there is much that is excellent in Indian agriculture, its processes are essentially rudimentary. In a paper which he wrote on the subject, after describing the extraordinary development of agricultural industry and the extraordinary increase of produce which had taken place in England within his own memory, he said that he was convinced that the whole of this progress had been due to the application of science to husbandry, and to the spread of education, and he declared his confidence that science could do for Indian agriculture as much as it had done in Europe. And he believed that Indian agriculture and Indian commerce go together. As the Government of India wrote two years ago, "agricultural products must long continue to constitute the most important part of our exports; and the future development of Indian commerce will mainly depend on the improvement in the quantity and quality of existing agricultural staples, or on the introduction of new products which shall serve as materials for manufacture and for use in the industrial arts."

Agricultural reform was the first object which Lord Mayo had in view in suggesting the formation of the new Department of Revenue, Agriculture, and Commerce. Opinions differed, as they will differ amongst the best and wisest men as to the expediency of the measure, but all who took part in the discussion know how zealously he laboured to carry it, and with what patience and self-denial he accepted modification after modification of his cherished project, to conciliate the objections of those who differed from him. His project has become a fact, and I believe that, if not in every respect perfect, the measure promises to prove a truly good and wise one; and that if as yet, in its infancy as it still is, no great results have been achieved, it has given the Government of India a stand-point which it did not possess before, from which the most important action may be initiated, and an instrument for guiding that action which it could in no other manner have secured. No one knew better than Lord Mayo how difficult and long a task had to be accomplished before he could appeal to great practical results. It is needless to dwell upon details; but during the short period that has elapsed since he felt himself in a position to deal at all usefully with such subjects, rhea, silk, cotton, rice, cinchona, and other important staples have successively and profitably occupied his attention. The improvement of our indigenous breeds of cattle and horses; the re-organization of our studs, for which, after much labour, he had almost completed a scheme; the diffusion of sound veterinary knowledge; the elucidation of the causes on which depend the terrible cattle plagues, which every year rob our people of vast portions of their capital, and the discovery of measures to prevent and check this great evil; the establishment of model farms and agricultural schools and colleges throughout the country; these and many other matters, all bearing on the great object which he had so much at heart, were considered by him in detail; some steps were taken in all of them, and work was set on foot which, under his guidance, would not have failed in its results.

There is one other subject connected with Lord Mayo's projects of agricultural improvement which I must not leave unnoticed. I refer to the Land Improvement Act (Act XXVI of 1871) which became law a few months ago. The object of this measure was to extend and regulate the system, long known but little developed in India, of giving advances of public money to landlords and tenants for the construction of those minor but invaluable works of agricultural

improvement which require no great engineering skill or the expenditure of large sums of money, but which can be carried out under the direction of the local proprietors themselves—works such as wells, tanks, and subsidiary channels for irrigation. Long before he came to India, Lord Mayo had taken a deep interest in the practical working of the Irish and English Land Improvement Acts, under which advances are made to landholders by the Government or by private Companies. “My experience,” he wrote, “leads me to believe that the principle which appears to have been recognized and acted upon in India long before it was even thought of at home, is one of the soundest and most useful that can be adopted by a Government which desires to make the resources of the State available for the promotion of the wealth and the improvement of the people. It is a system under which money may be lent with perfect security for the great end of making two blades of grass grow where one only, or, more likely in India, none ever grew before. I think that there is no object to which a portion of the reproductive loans which we yearly intend to raise could be so effectively devoted. I therefore propose to place at the disposal of the Local Governments such a portion of the borrowed money of the year as we believe could be usefully lent for these purposes.” The Act which was passed some months ago was introduced by myself, and I had official charge of the measure while it was before the Council, but it was really Lord Mayo’s own. It was framed under his own instructions, and considered by him in all its details; and although it became necessary to make some changes which rendered the Act less liberal in some respects than he desired, he looked forward with deep interest to the development of the system which he had resolved to carry out. “I commend,” he said, “this Bill to the attention and consideration of Local Governments, believing that it will not only have the effect of benefiting the people, but that it will also bring the officers who are engaged in carrying out its provisions into a most agreeable contact with the people, and increase those kindly feelings which ought to exist between the rulers and the ruled.” A similar Act was passed about the same time to facilitate the construction of works of public utility in the towns and cities of India by means of Government loans to Municipalities and other public bodies. Lord Mayo hoped that this Act would give the means of conferring on the inhabitants of our neglected

cities benefits as great and as necessary as those which he anticipated from the system of making advances for works of agricultural improvement. The measures to be taken under these Acts were under consideration when he died.

I must not now say more of Lord Mayo's projects of agricultural reform. It was, unhappily, little that he was actually able to accomplish in this branch of his labours, but the time will come when the benefits of the work which he inaugurated will be a lasting memorial in his honour.

In all questions connected with the promotion of education, Lord Mayo took a deep and constant interest. His policy has been frequently misrepresented, as if it had been one of discouragement to the higher branches of English education. This is a complete error. His policy was clear and simple. It recognised the necessity of the widest possible diffusion of education and the concurrent encouragement of the highest standards of teaching. He desired the enlightenment and elevation of all classes. He felt strongly that, to reach the enormous masses of the people, education could only be conveyed through the medium of their own vernacular languages, while on the other hand he was equally convinced that the advantages of the highest mental training could not be secured, or the study of the higher branches of science be pursued, except through the medium of English. Towards the latter object, especially in Bengal, he found, as his predecessor Lord Lawrence had found before him, that very much had already been accomplished, and that there was no danger that it would be neglected. His main duty was, he felt, to encourage the extension of education to those classes which it had not yet reached, or who had been repelled by the form in which its advantages had been held out to them. It was for this reason that he felt the especial necessity of pressing the development of the lowest class of education, of providing better means for its support, and of encouraging the growth of a vernacular literature. It was with similar objects that he urged the adoption of special measures for promoting the education of the Mohammedan population, who looked with little favour on the system which had been willingly adopted by their Hindu fellow-subjects. He desired that further encouragement should be given to the classical and vernacular languages of the Mohammedans in all Government schools and institutions, and he believed that without infringing the principles of our educational policy, measures might thus

be taken which would have the result of attracting large numbers to our schools, and of enlisting the sympathies of the more enlightened members of the Mohammedan community. But his interest in English education of the highest class was not the less strong, because he thought that it was at the present moment less in want of the special encouragement of the Government. No one who understands what Lord Mayo's policy in regard to education really was, can doubt its practical good sense and its wisdom.

The financial difficulties by which his administration was beset had doubtless an unfortunate effect in compelling the contraction of nearly all efforts of a purely literary and artistic sort. Nevertheless, the establishment of the new Department of Archæology, the careful scheme for the preservation and collection of ancient manuscripts, and other similar measures, some of which have scarcely attracted public attention, testify to Lord Mayo's appreciation of a duty which our Governments have too often neglected. I may mention here another undertaking in which Lord Mayo took much interest, the series of Gazetteers which are in progress in almost every part of British India. Under Mr. Hunter's accomplished guidance they will be combined into a great and comprehensive work, which I believe will give to the world and to our own officers a mass of information, which can hardly be valued too highly, regarding India, its physical characteristics, its people, its productions, its actual condition and its future capabilities.

I will refer only to one more subject of internal administration, because the interest which he felt in it may be said to have been one of the causes which led to his death. To the consideration of questions of Jail discipline Lord Mayo brought long personal experience and great personal interest. He had witnessed and had encouraged the growth of what is known in England as the Irish system of treating convicts, and he sought to make his experience available, so far as it was suited to the condition of the criminal population of India. In modifying the system of punishments and rewards, in instituting schemes of out-door convict labour, in the establishment of prisons for Europeans in the hills, Lord Mayo took the closest interest. He wished to study for himself the peculiar character of the system of the penal colony at Port Blair, and it was his earnest desire to render that system more effective and more economical which induced him to visit that settlement, where unhappily he met his death.

It remains for me to notice the administration of the finances under Lord Mayo's Government. To no department, that was not under his own immediate charge, did he give more close personal attention, and in no department was his intervention more needful and more valuable.

Lord Mayo was thoroughly imbued with the conviction that a sound financial condition was indispensable to a healthy state of the body politic, and that no amount of social or material progress could compensate for the danger to the State of any serious financial disorder. "I don't care," he used to say during the first year of his Government, "if I stop every public work and suspend every improvement in India, but I *will* have the public expenditure brought within the public income." Not that Lord Mayo valued material and social progress lightly. No one better knew its importance or strove more earnestly to promote it, but he valued financial safety even more.

It cannot be gainsaid that Lord Mayo found the finances of India in an unsatisfactory state. When he assumed the Government, the accounts were completed only to the end of 1867-68. That year had ended with a deficit of £1,600,000, of which £1,000,000 was upon the ordinary account. The previous year, 1866-67, had ended with a deficit of £2,500,000.

The estimates presented to the Legislative Council on the 6th March 1869, less than two months after Lord Mayo's arrival, showed, for 1868-69, a deficit on the ordinary account of £970,000, and, including the extraordinary expenditure, of £2,800,000. For 1869-70 they showed a surplus on the ordinary account of £53,000, and a deficit, including the extraordinary expenditure, of £3,500,000.

Even had these estimates been sustained, the position was not promising. But it very soon became clear that they were much too sanguine. Eventually the year 1868-69 closed with a deficit on the ordinary account of no less than £2,800,000, or, if the extraordinary account be included, of £4,100,000. A careful revision of the estimates of 1869-70 was considered necessary, and instead of a surplus of £53,000, it showed that the year would probably end with a deficit of a million and three quarters. The cash balance in India was reduced at the close of 1868-69 to only £10,175,804, a sum so insufficient for the purposes of Government that for many months it was in the discreditable condition of being dependent upon the Presidency Banks of

Bengal and Bombay for advances to meet the actual necessities of the administration. In the three years before Lord Mayo became Viceroy there had been a total deficit of £8,300,000, of which £6,300,000 was upon the ordinary account. During the same period the cash balances had been reduced from £13,800,000 to £10,200,000, that is, by £3,600,000. In these three years the public debt had been increased by £5,900,000, besides the sum of £2,200,000 railway capital received in excess of the amount expended.

I am aware that it would be necessary to enter into long explanations before the precise significance of these figures could be shown. A considerable portion of the ordinary deficits of 1866-67 and 1867-68 was nominal, owing, first to the change of the financial year by which the month of April, a month in which the revenues largely exceed the charges, was excluded from the accounts of 1866-67; and secondly, to the oscillation of policy in regard to the propriety of defraying the cost of the new barracks from borrowed money, instead of charging it against the revenues of the year. As to the depletion of the cash balances, simultaneously with the large addition to the public debt, it has to be remembered that we had in those three years advanced on account of the Abyssinian expedition about £1,000,000 in excess of our recoveries, and we had repaid deposits to the amount of £1,300,000 in excess of our receipts. Still, admitting all possible explanations, it will hardly now be denied by any one that the financial position of the country in the beginning of 1869 was such as to demand the anxious attention of the Government.

The measures adopted by the Government of India in September 1869 are well known, and need not be recapitulated in detail. They were taken under the close personal instructions of Lord Mayo. He was well aware of their unusual character, but he did not shrink from the heavy responsibility that lay upon him. The income-tax and the salt duties were increased in the middle of the financial year, and immense reductions of expenditure were ordered.

"We thought," he said himself eighteen months later, when reviewing these important transactions, "that the honour and credit of the empire were at stake. We took the severe and, in most cases, the objectionable course of ordering extensive reductions in expenditure and of increasing the burdens of the population in the middle of the year." "Remember," he used to say to those about him, "you

have played your last card; such a step as this can never be taken again."

These measures improved the finances of 1869-70 by more than £1,700,000. Nevertheless, but for certain unexpected windfalls credited in the accounts of that year, the year must have ended with a deficit of three quarters of a million. Nothing more need be said to justify Lord Mayo's vigorous action on that memorable occasion—memorable, because it was the turning point in our financial history—the point at which the process ended which, if it had not been arrested, would have led the State to certain disaster. I only pause to remark that it was with the utmost reluctance that Lord Mayo consented to impose, for the time, additional burdens upon the country. No man in India was more unwilling than he to add to such burdens or more anxious to reduce them, and no man has more contributed, by constant and rigid economy, to the prosperous results at which I hope we may believe that we have now arrived. He repeatedly said that he looked upon the dangers into which we are liable to fall, in consequence of the constant tendency to increase expenditure, and to extend taxation, as far more serious than any other dangers to which our Government in India is exposed. He always maintained that if at any time it became necessary to choose between the postponement of the most beneficial undertakings connected with our civil or military administration, and the imposition of fresh burdens on the country, we ought not for a moment to hesitate regarding the conclusion to be adopted.

I quote here, as characteristic of Lord Mayo's financial principles, the concluding paragraphs of the despatch of the 20th September 1869, from the Government of India to the Secretary of State. They were added by his own hand:—
 "We have described to Your Grace the dangers and difficulties which, in our opinion, surround our present position. We must, however, in conclusion, assure Your Grace that, notwithstanding the somewhat gloomy picture we have been obliged to draw, the general aspect of affairs inspires us with the fullest confidence in the future prosperity of India. We entertain no apprehension of foreign invasion or domestic disturbance. For all purposes of defence, and for the preservation of peace, our military and police organizations are strong and efficient. The splendid revenue of the empire is contributed by a population which, compared with that of other countries, is lightly taxed. As was proved by

the success of our late loan, the credit of India never stood higher. The enriching and civilising effects of the great railway and irrigation works which have, within the last twenty years, been constructed are beginning to be felt throughout the length and breadth of the land. By the blessing of Providence, with the seasonable and plentiful rainfall of the last few weeks, all danger of famine and of the continuance of the late severe distress, has passed away. The steady rise which has taken place in the value of labour must, ere long, materially increase the wealth and contentment of the people. With us then it rests, by careful administration and by a strict adherence to those simple rules of prudence and economy which, in the conduct of the affairs alike of nations and individuals, are indispensable to the attainment of safety and success, to use to the utmost extent, for the benefit of the people, the mighty resources of this great empire."

The circumstances were fitted to try the courage of any man in Lord Mayo's position, but he showed no symptoms of panic, but the calm and wise resolution of a bold and far-seeing statesman. In the principles then propounded Lord Mayo consistently persevered to the day of his death.

The surplus on the ordinary account of the three years of his Government has amounted to no less than £4,300,000, and, even including the extraordinary expenditure for the irrigation works and railways, the outgoings have exceeded the income of the State by less than £150,000. This great result has been obtained without any serious permanent addition to the burdens of the people.

I said before that the precise significance of the unfavorable figures of the year 1866-67 could not be understood without much explanation. I am aware also that there are reasons why we must not be too confident over the very favorable results of the three years 1869 to 1872. I have already mentioned that the accounts of the earliest of the three years of Lord Mayo's administration contain rather large abnormal credits. There are doubtless a few other such items in the other two years. A large portion of the surplus of this period is due also to the development of the opium revenue. But, after all explanations, the plain fact remains that the financial results of the last three years contrast most favorably with those of the three years ending the 31st March 1869, or with any other period that

may be chosen for many years past. I shall not attempt to describe in detail the wise economy which has been effected in every department of the States, without, as I confidently assert, any loss of power or efficiency. In 1868-69, the year before Lord Mayo became Viceroy, the actual expenditure had risen to £52,000,000. In the last year of his Government, 1871-72, the total estimated expenditure has fallen to £47,300,000.

How much of these results is due to the personal determination of Lord Mayo to bring deficits at all costs to an end, is best known to those who had the honor of taking part in his administration.

It was not, however, only to the financial equilibrium of the moment that the late Viceroy gave earnest attention. He had resolved to inaugurate a policy which would, he hoped, render impossible a recurrence of the untoward condition of affairs that he found on his arrival. A principal measure adopted for this and for other objects of hardly less value, was the measure ordinarily known as the Provincial Services scheme, by which fixed annual grants, to be enlarged only in case the financial prosperity of the empire admits, were assigned to the several Local Governments to provide for certain important and growing public services. The effect of this measure, not only on the finances, but on the general administration of the Empire, has been, and will continue to be, of such extreme and indeed vital importance, that I must refer to it at some length.

Under the system which Lord Mayo found in force when he became Viceroy, the Local Governments, which practically carry on the whole administration of the country, had almost no powers of financial control over the affairs of their respective provinces, and no financial responsibility. Every thing was rigorously centralized in the Supreme Government, which took upon itself in detail the provision of funds for every branch of the public service throughout India. The business of supervising in a central office all the details of the receipts and expenditure of the empire had become so enormous that its proper performance was impossible. "I do not think," wrote Sir Henry Maine in 1867, "that anybody can have observed the recent workings of our system of financial control without coming to the conclusion that if it be not on the point of an inevitable collapse, it is at all events in great

danger of going to pieces, unless the strain be lightened somewhere. The rules imposed on the Local Governments depend for their force, like all laws, on the efficacy of the penalty which they threaten in the event of disobedience. The penalty is, in the present case, a reproof from the Government of India. But if any Local Government has become—which any Local Government might become at any day—entirely callous to the rebukes of the Government of India, through discovering—which any Local Government may at any time discover—that these rebukes lead to no ulterior consequences, what impediment remains to the employment of one or more among the hundred expedients by which the Central Government may be morally compelled to condone infractions of its rules, and to allow the share of its revenues which it has allotted to a particular province to be exceeded?”

For many years before Lord Mayo became Viceroy the ordinary financial condition of India had been one of chronic deficit, and one of the main causes of this state of affairs was the impossibility of resisting the constantly increasing demands of the Local Governments for the means of providing every kind of improvement in the administration of their respective provinces. Their demands were practically unlimited, because there was almost no limit to their legitimate wants.* The Local Governments had no means of knowing the measure by which their annual demands upon the Government of India ought to be regulated. They had a purse to draw upon of unlimited because unknown depth. They saw on every side the necessity for improvements, and their constant and justifiable desire was to obtain for their own provinces and people as large a share as they could persuade the Government of India to give them out of the general revenues of the empire. They found by experience that the less economy they practised, and the more importunate their demands, the more likely they were to persuade the Government of India of the urgency of their requirements. In representing those requirements they felt that they did what was right, and they left to the Government of India, which had taken the task upon itself, the responsibility of refusing to provide the necessary means.

* In this statement of the reasons which led to the adoption of the so-called Provincial Services system, I have drawn largely upon former papers and speeches of my own, and on those of Major General R. Strachey, the original author of the scheme; and I have not always thought it necessary to mark my quotations by inverted commas.

The Government of India had totally failed to check the constant demands for increased expenditure. There was only one remedy; to prevent the demands being made; and this could only be done by imposing on the Local Governments a real and effectual responsibility for maintaining equilibrium in their local finances. There could be no standard of economy until apparent requirements were made absolutely dependent upon known available means. It was impossible for either the Supreme or Local Governments to say what portion of the provincial revenues was properly applicable to local wants. The revenues of the whole of India went into a common fund, and to determine how much of this fund ought fairly to be given to one province, and how much to another, was impracticable. "The distribution of the public income," Major General R. Strachey wrote, "degenerates into something like a scramble, in which the most violent has the advantage with very little attention to reason. As local economy leads to no local advantage, the stimulus to avoid waste is reduced to a minimum. So, as no local growth of the income leads to an increase of the local means of improvement, the interest in developing the public revenues is also brought down to the lowest level."

The unsatisfactory condition of the financial relations between the Supreme and the Local Governments led to still more serious evils. Constant differences of opinion about petty details of expenditure, and constant interference of the Government of India in matters of trivial importance, brought with them, as a necessary consequence, frequent conflicts with the Local Governments regarding questions of provincial administration of which they were the best judges, and of which the Government of India could know little. The relations between the Supreme and Local Governments were altogether inharmonious, and every attempt to make financial control more stringent increased an antagonism the mischief of which was felt throughout the public service.

To Lord Mayo belongs the honour of applying the only effectual remedy for these serious evils. He resolved to give to the Local Governments the economical standard which they required; to make over to them a certain income by which they must regulate their local expenditure, and to leave to them, subject to certain general rules and conditions, the responsibility of managing their own local affairs.

From the commencement of the official year 1871-72 the financial control of the following services was transferred to the Local Governments;—Jails, Police, Education, Registration, Medical Services, Printing, Roads, and Civil Buildings. The views of Lord Mayo were stated by himself in the Legislative Council on the 18th March 1871, as follows:—

“Under these eight heads, it is proposed to entrust the administration under a few general conditions to the Provincial Governments, and a fixed contribution will be made from imperial revenue every year. * * It is impossible to prophesy or say at present what can be done in the far future; but I should be misleading the Local Governments if I were not to say that it is our opinion that these sums are now fixed at an amount which cannot be exceeded for at least a number of years. I think it desirable that this should be perfectly understood, because one of our objects is the attainment of as great an amount of financial certainty as is possible. We believe that in justice to other public claims which are certain hereafter to be made on imperial revenue, in view of increased charges for the payment of interest and other objects, we cannot without recourse to large additional imperial taxation increase this sum, as now fixed, to any very considerable amount. We know that if it is necessary, the sums which have been hitherto allotted for this purpose can be increased by local taxation in a manner much less burdensome and much less offensive to the people than they could be by imperial taxation. If it is necessary or desirable to spend more money, that money must come from some other source. It is possible that the wants of the Local Governments may increase, and I dare say they will; but if they do, we believe, after the most mature consideration, that these wants can better be supplied within the limits of the provinces themselves, than they can be by adding to the imperial taxation and to the general burdens of the people. But, in addition to the increased power of administration which it is proposed to give to the Local Governments, an administrative change will take place which I think they will be able to exercise with advantage. They will have a large sum to devote to local objects; the power of allotment will be left absolutely to them, and they will be able to vary their grants from roads, civil buildings, education, and other heads, from year to year, as they may think most desirable. In some pro-

vinces it may be desirable in one year to spend a larger sum on roads; in others it may be desirable to fill up some shortcomings with regard to education or other objects. The Local Governments will thus be able to exercise that power of allotment with much greater satisfaction to themselves and to the public than they did under the old system, when they were obliged to consult the Supreme Government, not only as to the allotments that were made in the beginning of the year, but also with regard to any appropriations that were thought desirable within the year, provided those appropriations exceeded a certain amount. * * I have heard it stated that by the proposals which we make, there may arise a separation of interests between the Supreme and Local Governments. I fail to perceive any strength whatever in this assertion. I believe that so far from there being a separation of interests, the increased feeling of responsibility and the feeling of confidence which is reposed in them will unite and bind together the Supreme and Local Governments to a greater extent than before. * * I believe that we shall see, in place of greater uncertainty, greater certainty; we shall see works and objects carried on with more vigour, enthusiasm, and with less hesitation, when these works and these objects are effected under the immediate responsibility of those who are most interested in them."

These were not the only results which Lord Mayo anticipated from the adoption of this scheme. He believed that it would have a most important effect in stimulating and developing local and municipal institutions. "Local interest," he wrote himself in the Resolution of the 14th December 1870, "supervision, and care are necessary to success in the management of funds devoted to education, sanitation, medical charity, and local public works. The operation of this Resolution, in its full meaning and integrity, will afford opportunities for the development of self-government, for strengthening municipal institutions, and for the association of Natives and Europeans, to a greater extent than heretofore, in the administration of affairs. The Governor General in Council is aware of the difficulties attending the practical adoption of these principles. But they are not insurmountable. Disappointments and partial failures may occur; but the object in view being the instruction of many peoples and races in a good system of administration, His Excellency in Council is fully con-

vinced that the Local Governments and all their subordinates will enlist the active assistance, or at all events the sympathy, of many classes which have hitherto taken little or no part in the work of social and material advancement."

The gross sum made over to the Provincial Governments for these services, and some few others transferred since the scheme was first introduced, amounts, including receipts given up, to about £5,600,000, being nominally £331,000 less than the grants that would have been assigned for these services upon the old system. I say nominally, for it is believed that the sum of £331,000 did not greatly, if at all, exceed the saving effected upon these grants in ordinary years. The Local Governments generally accepted the arrangements with alacrity, valuing the large increase of power accorded to them more highly than the small sum curtailed from their grants, and experience, while it has proved that they were right, has entirely confirmed the Government of India in the belief that the measure was wholly beneficial. From the day on which the Provincial Services scheme was introduced until the present moment, scarcely a single expression of dissatisfaction, affecting the principle of the scheme, has reached the Government of India, while most of the Local Governments have warmly commended the working of the new system. The relief to the Government of India from ever-recurring financial demands leading to embittering controversies has been immense, and the Local Governments have, almost without exception, carried on the services of the first year of their financial emancipation to their entire satisfaction, while they have saved large resources for future years. This really great result has been attained without the least sacrifice of imperial financial power and control, which has, on the contrary, gained in efficiency and completeness. I do not claim for Lord Mayo the merit of devising the scheme. In one shape or another it had been presented to the Government of India, discussed and re-discussed, advocated and rejected, for some years before Lord Mayo assumed the Government. But in such matters the merit of accomplishing the fact is greater than the merit of its invention. I do not hesitate to say that, but for Lord Mayo's sagacity in discerning the absolute necessity of this change in our financial system, but for his tact and decision in obviating doubts and difficulties and carrying the measure through, it would have

been to this hour unaccomplished. The system will, doubtless, be further improved and developed, but the honour of practically inaugurating it belongs to Lord Mayo, and it will remain one of the most important monuments of his administration. I regret that I am at present unable to state with any confidence the actual amount of new taxation imposed for local purposes in the several provinces, in consequence of the adoption of this system. The figures which have hitherto been published are clearly incorrect. So far as I am able to ascertain, the annual amount has not hitherto exceeded £270,000 for the whole of India. It is certainly less than the amount of imperial taxation which has been remitted, and although there has been a change in the incidence of taxation, there has been no increase in the total burdens of the country.

The late Viceroy, though anxious to allow all possible liberty and discretion to the Local Governments, was wholly opposed to the very idea of federalisation. To him the maintenance of the authority of the Central Government was of vital importance, and all that could most distantly tend to its disintegration was to be jealously and sedulously guarded against.

The measure of which I have been speaking is sometimes spoken of as the "Decentralization Scheme." Lord Mayo never heard the term applied to it, however accidentally, without an immediate protest. "I thought we were never to use that word." The Government of India had not, in his opinion, given up any control that it could usefully exercise. The Local Governments were not to be allowed to act otherwise than as administering provinces of an empire one and indivisible.

Another danger that attracted Lord Mayo's earnest personal attention was the growth of the national debt, in the shape whether of loans raised directly by the Government or of capital raised under State guarantee by the Railway Companies. To the increase of debt in either shape he was a constant and determined opponent. I have shown how that in truth, during the three years of his administration, the public debt increased only by the small sum of £150,000. The entire expenditure of the country during the three years exceeded the receipts by only that amount. His firm determination was to organize such a system as should stop the growth of the public debt and close almost completely the extraordinary account. The method by which this most im-

portant end was to be gained was not perhaps fully matured in his own mind, but it was certainly not to be effected by abstaining from useful public works. His policy was that expenditure from loan funds should be restricted far more strictly and definitely than heretofore to works which will certainly be reproductive to an extent sufficient to provide the interest payable on the capital expenditure, and a sinking fund to extinguish the debt.

The principal of the so-called reproductive works, which, under the existing system, are constructed with borrowed money, are Railways and Canals of Irrigation. Lord Mayo was satisfied that each of these two classes of works ought to be practically dealt with in a different manner, although on the same general principle. I have already referred to his views regarding the necessity of reducing the first cost of our railways, and to his conviction that if we could not have cheap railways, it was far better to have none at all, because financial disaster would be the certain consequence of making our new lines on the expensive scale of those which have hitherto been constructed. While he believed that if we made our State railways on a narrow gauge, and on a thoroughly economical system, there was every hope that they would pay their expenses, and throw no serious permanent burden on the general revenues, he nevertheless felt that they could not be looked upon as works which could repay, within a moderate term of years, the capital expended upon them. If the fulfilment of this condition, in regard to railways or any other public works could not be confidently ensured, the work, however valuable it might be, was not, in Lord Mayo's judgment, one for which money ought to be borrowed. It was a work which, if constructed at all, ought to be constructed out of the ordinary revenues of the year. Lord Mayo believed that it was already possible to look forward to the time when this course could be followed in regard to our State railways, and when all borrowing on their account should cease.

There was perhaps no single subject to which he devoted more thought than that of the public debt, and there was no duty which he believed to be more incumbent on the Government than that of preventing its growth. He did not hold this view on financial grounds alone, highly important as they are, but on grounds of policy affecting the most vital interests of England. His predecessor, Lord Lawrence, in his minute on railway extension in India, dated the

16th August 1867, had called, in strong and forcible language, serious attention to the grave dangers which might follow from the possible future growth of the capital required for railways in India. "These considerations," Lord Mayo wrote in a minute, dated 13th March 1869, "seem to me to apply quite as forcibly to the increase of debt from any cause. I most fully assent to the opinions expressed by Sir John Lawrence, that very grave national danger might arise to England, if, in consequence of any political troubles in India, the Indian Government should become unable to pay the interest on the debt or any guaranteed stocks, and if the amount of the debt or of those stocks held in England was very large. Reckoning the fixed debt of India at the present time at about 90 millions, and remembering that the guaranteed Railway capital is already over 80 millions, and will, under present engagements, rise to about 100 millions in the next five or six years, it seems quite within the bounds of probability that the securities held in England, dependent on the revenues of India, might, in the course of the next thirty or forty years (if the former rate of expenditure be maintained for Railways, and the anticipated outlay on irrigation works be incurred, and no measures be taken for discharging these liabilities), amount to 300 millions. The loss of such an amount of capital, or even the temporary suspension of the payment of the ordinary interest upon it, would be a national calamity to Great Britain of most alarming proportions, and it seems to be the evident duty of the Government of the present time to do all in its power to guard against the possibility of such an occurrence."

The public has, I think, failed hitherto to appreciate the extreme national importance of these considerations, but it owes to the wisdom and patriotism of Lord Mayo a debt of gratitude which will some day be understood, for his determination, carried out with unflinching vigour and great success, to prevent the growth of the public debt of India.

Lord Mayo did not hold the same objection to raising loans for great works of irrigation, provided that certain conditions were insisted upon. He believed that these works could certainly be made to repay, within a limited period, the whole of the capital expenditure incurred upon them, and that it was possible for the Government to discharge the duty of giving to the country the only possible protection against famine, without danger to the finances of the Empire.

He believed that this could be done by enforcing provincial and local responsibility, and by refusing to burden the Imperial resources with the interest payable on loans raised for objects which were really local. He was convinced that if proper measures were taken, the necessary security could be furnished without risk of throwing upon any part of the country any heavy, or indeed any appreciable burden. There was hardly any subject to which Lord Mayo attached a greater importance, and I shall quote his own words in explanation of his views.

“The principle,” he said in the Legislative Council, on the 18th February 1870, “upon which the legislature in England has acted in respect to the prosecution of works of local utility is this;—it has always considered it right to charge upon a certain district the repayment of capital and interest and the cost of maintenance, because it is held that the construction of such works confers extensive advantages upon the whole neighbourhood. * * And here I think it right to say that unless such a principle as this guides the future of our great operations of improvement in India, we are likely, at no distant time, to find ourselves in serious difficulty; and I believe that unless the whole of our loan-finance—the whole expenditure of a remunerative character for improvements to the land and other like objects in India—is removed from the ordinary finance of the country, you will find that it will be difficult to continue these most necessary works on a scale at all commensurate with the requirements of the country. I therefore think that those who argue against that principle argue against that upon which all security for the continuance and certain completion of these works is actually based. When we see that the cost of the ordinary administration of this country is such that it can hardly be defrayed out of ordinary revenue, and when we look to the increased cost of that administration which improvement must necessarily bring, I say that it must be plain that it is impossible to add, indefinitely, in regard to reproductive works without dangerously crippling our power in respect of military defence, the administration of justice, the spread of education, and many other objects which are so essential to the safety and progress of the country. I hope that these truths are now beginning to be recognized throughout this land, and it behoves us to look upon these questions, not from a provincial or a local point of view, but to ask ourselves the simple question,—if these works are to go on,

who is to pay for them, and can they go on if their cost is to be defrayed from the ordinary revenue of the country?

It is said that it is unfair that certain persons should pay for certain works, but if they are not to pay, who is to pay?

There is no unlimited fund at the disposal of the Government of India which is available for such a purpose. If a work is not sustained by local resources, it can only be sustained by the contributions of the general tax payers; and I ask, is it fair or right that works constructed for the exclusive benefit of the people in the Panjáb or the North-West should be paid for out of the pockets of the people of Madras and Bombay? It was the early adoption of the principle to which I have been referring that has led to the successful expenditure of the enormous sums which have been borrowed from the State or from private sources for agriculture, municipal, maritime and other objects at home; and I believe that, had it been attempted thirty or forty years ago in England to carry into effect the principle that has hitherto been adopted in India, that is, that the general revenues of the country were to be made liable for works of improvement of a limited and local character, not only would the expenditure on those works have been most extravagant, being conducted without that local control which is so necessary, but that the charge thrown upon the revenues would have been so enormous that the construction of all such works would have long ago been arrested."

Lord Mayo spoke to the same effect in the Legislative Council, on the 31st March 1871. "As far," he said, "as Irrigation is concerned, we hope to be able to take somewhat the same course that we have done with the Railways, and keep down, as far as possible, the first cost of the works. The estimates will be made and carefully criticized, and I may say, without fear of contradiction, that the officers who are engaged in designing these great works are, in their particular branch of their profession, as experienced engineers as any in the world. I have no reason to believe that the estimates which they have made, and the opinions which have been formed, will in any serious degree be contrary to the anticipated result. But, beyond this, we must use every effort to make all these irrigation works really productive and self-supporting. We must establish a system of irrigation and finance that will throw the main burden for the repayment of the capital and interest expended on these works, upon the land which benefits by them. We must follow the

same principles which have been adopted by every other country in the world in which similar undertakings have been constructed. We must take such measures as will oblige the people who are enriched, whose lives are preserved, and whose wealth is augmented by these works, to contribute in a fair proportion to the cost of their construction. We desire to individualize as much as possible each work, in order that the public may be made fully aware of the terms under which it is constructed, its cost, and its returns. We desire to separate as much as possible the finance of our reproductive operations from the ordinary finance of the Empire. We have endeavoured to give effect to some of those principles in the Canal Bill which is now before the Legislative Council, but which I regret to say we have not altogether succeeded in making acceptable to the public. I am surprised at the resistance with which our intentions in this respect have been met. Everybody seems to desire irrigation, but many seem to desire that somebody else should pay for it. But, as a matter of principle, the people in Madras should not pay for the enrichment of the Panjáb, nor the people of Bengal for the irrigation of Sindh. Unless the Government is supported in organizing a system by which these works can be constructed without placing further serious charges upon Imperial revenue, I greatly fear many of these important operations may not be undertaken at all, or if they are undertaken, they may run the risk of being stopped before they are finished. We wish to make these works as self-supporting and as independent as possible; in fact, to put them in such a position that if war, famine, financial difficulty, or other misfortune occurs, they will continue to progress, and go on even to completion. But if we continue, or rather attempt (for these works are only in their infancy), to construct them on the system of mixing up their accounts with the ordinary accounts of the Empire; if we think we can pay the interest of the capital expended on them out of the revenues of the year; if we do not extend to their finance generally, the severest and most business-like principles, we shall possibly have in a few years to witness either financial difficulty or the stoppage of some of these great and beneficent works. Why did some of the great railway works in India progress during the whole of the mutiny? They were carried on under great difficulties, but the work progressed even in districts which were disturbed. We know this was due to the lines being independent of Government, and

because their finance was entirely removed from the ordinary revenue and expenditure of the country. We can take the same course with our State works; but unless we can put them somewhat in the same position, and make them self-supporting and independent of the ordinary circumstances and fluctuations of revenue and expenditure, we shall, I fear, be doomed to disappointment."

These views of Lord Mayo have not been carried out, but I believe them, for my part, to be thoroughly sound. In regard to the manner in which they should be applied in practice, he always admitted that there might reasonably be great differences of opinion, and that the plans which were suitable in one province might be altogether unsuitable in another. In the Punjab Canal Act, which was passed a few months ago, an attempt was made for the first time to recognize the principle for which Lord Mayo contended, by provisions authorizing, under certain conditions, the imposition of a compulsory water-rate on land irrigable from canals. These particular provisions, which were subsequently disapproved by the Secretary of State, were, however, in reality little in accordance with Lord Mayo's own wishes. He accepted them as a compromise, and as a first step towards the establishment of a principle which he thought of essential importance; but they had little other value in his estimation, and he felt that it was hardly possible that they could ever be worked in practice.

With the object of carrying out the policy in regard to reproductive works declared in the foregoing extracts from his speeches, and of ensuring the separation of their finance from that of the ordinary revenues and expenditure, Lord Mayo desired that the whole of the profits derived from works of this character should be specially applied to the discharge of the debt that had been incurred, and that until the entire debt due upon all such works had been cleared off, the income received from them should not be dealt with for the purpose of adding to the resources of the year or of reducing taxation. He desired (to quote the draft of a despatch prepared under his own instructions, but which, for reasons into which I need not now enter, had not been finally adopted by the Government up to the time of his death), "to tell the public that we shall borrow money for a special class of works on the security of the revenues, but on the understanding that the loans shall be repaid from the first earnings of those works." He was satisfied

that unless this was done the debt would go on constantly increasing, and no fund become available for its discharge, and that "the only possible security against this disastrous result is the absolute hypothecation of the income of the new works to discharge their capital debt." To carry out this determination, Lord Mayo desired to constitute a special body of Commissioners, at least one of whom should not be an officer of the Government, whose duty it would be to certify as an independent Board of Audit, "with the public as witnesses," that the sums raised for the construction of public works had really been applied and repaid in strict accordance with the conditions under which the loans were made. "For my own part," Lord Mayo wrote in a letter to myself a few months before his death, "I say frankly that I do desire to fetter the discretion of Government in dealing hereafter with receipts from reproductive works. I believe that for these works the whole of the returns should be kept apart from the general resources of the country, and spent entirely on providing for new works, and so avoid borrowing as far as possible. The whole of the returns would appear in the annual receipts of the State as they do now, but the sums obtained in return for these works should go solely in aid of the loan expenditure of the year, and the budget should be constructed accordingly. I have no hope of this ever being done unless a separate body is constituted such as I have always advocated, armed with powers entrusted to them by either the Government or the Legislature, and, until such a course is taken, I cannot think that we shall ever be safe from the recurrence of those evils which, in respect to the cost of construction of these great works, have constantly arisen."

I do not now wish to discuss again the unpopular income-tax of 1870-71. The high rate which called forth so much opposition lasted only for a single year. During the past year it has been imposed at a very low rate, and it is hoped that it will be possible still further to reduce its incidence. Personally, I am not able to agree with all Lord Mayo's views upon this subject, but there can be no doubt that he had himself arrived at a decided conclusion that although the imposition of the income-tax during the last three years had been unavoidable and necessary, it was in itself a tax not suited to India. Although he did not believe a tenth part of the stories that have been told in condemnation of the income-tax, he nevertheless had satisfied

himself, less by official reports than by his own personal inquiries in many parts of India, that the tax, even at a low rate, was not one that ought to be permanently retained, and few things would have given him greater satisfaction than to have seen its total abolition. If Lord Mayo had lived, I can, however, by no means affirm that this object would have been accomplished within any very short period of time. For, much as he disliked the income-tax, he was of opinion that there were still worse evils in India to be remedied. If the retention of the tax at a low rate would have enabled him to carry out other financial reforms which would give relief urgently required by great classes of the people, he might have consented to keep it, but this was certainly the sole condition under which he would have done so. In a paper dated the 21st January, only a few days before his death, he wrote as follows:—"I am convinced that it is our duty to continue our exertions in favour of reduction of expenditure with untiring zeal; that the *status quo* as regards our financial system is impossible to maintain; that if by cutting down all unnecessary expenditure, we can obtain a surplus in our budget for 1872-73, we cannot venture to maintain the income-tax without offering substantial relief in other ways; that in considering relief, the abolition of the salt line or of a great part of it should be our first object; the equalization of the salt duty the second; the removal of the income-tax the third; and that of the export duty on grain the fourth; that if we determine to continue the income-tax, we cannot leave it in its present shape; and that unless we deal with it very effectually, we cannot maintain it at all."

The equalization of the salt duties throughout India, or such an approach to this end as might enable us to get rid of a large portion of the Inland Customs preventive line was a subject which he had greatly at heart. In regard to the salt duties, Lord Mayo's views were full of practical good sense. He had no quixotic idea of tampering with one of the greatest sources of our public revenue, and a source of revenue which, under proper conditions, is as little objectionable as any which exists. On the contrary, he often said he believed that if instead of trusting to high duties on a restricted consumption, we managed, as we ought to be able to do, to give to the people of India the means of satisfying their naturally almost unlimited demands for cheap salt, we should find in the increased revenue from this source a

substitute for any loss which might hereafter come upon us in consequence of a possible cessation for the demand for opium in China. But Lord Mayo had seen and learnt enough to convince himself that in many parts of Northern and Central India the high price of salt and the extreme difficulty of procuring it are real and grave evils. These evils have been caused more by the insufficiency of the means of communication and of transport between the salt sources and the markets than by the amount of the duties which have been imposed. As the best of all remedies, or rather as the only remedy that could be efficacious, and a remedy without which no alteration in the rates of duty would do much good, Lord Mayo constantly urged on the completion of railway communication with the salt mines of the Panjáb, and the salt sources of Rajpootana. He had hoped to have seen these lines opened before he left India. One great measure he carried out with complete success. The great Salt Lake of Sambhur, containing a practically inexhaustible supply of excellent salt, and, with one exception, the most important source of supply for Northern India, lies entirely within the Native States of Rajpootana. With the prospect of railway communication between Sambhur and our own territories, it was clearly a matter of extreme importance that the supply of salt to our markets should be made independent of foreign influences, and be protected against those imposts and exactions which have had so mischievous an effect upon the provision of this necessary of life to our own subjects. Treaties were therefore negotiated with the rulers of Jeypoor and Jodhpoor, and a satisfactory settlement has been made of the whole question. While the equitable rights of the Native States have been respected, and an annual revenue secured to them larger than that which they had previously collected, the British Government has obtained a lease of the whole of the Sambhur lake and the complete control of its management. Great improvements have also been carried out in the salt mines of the Panjáb. When the measures thus taken by Lord Mayo are completed by the opening of the railways now under construction, we may hope confidently to see a great reduction in the price of salt in Northern India, and a great increase in the supply.

Another great evil in Northern India, and one the abolition of which Lord Mayo earnestly desired, is to be found in the duties which are levied on the export of

sugar from our own provinces into Rajpootana, and into our own territories on the other side of the Inland Customs line. To quote the words used by Major General Strachey in one of the debates of the Legislative Council a year ago, these duties "are without doubt the most discreditable relic of the dark ages of taxation that yet subsists in India." We levy a heavy transit duty on one of the great staples of our own agricultural production, on the borders of those very Native States to which we have been preaching for years on the folly and impropriety of levying transit duties for the benefit of their own revenues. And our only excuse is that these duties give us from £120,000 to £150,000 a year.

To levy the duties upon salt and sugar we maintain an Inland Customs line stretching from one side of India to the other. With its various ramifications, this line is not far short of three thousand miles in length, and it requires for its maintenance a host of some sixteen thousand petty officials. Every effort has been taken to prevent abuses, but it may easily be imagined what a curse this line is to the country, and how impracticable it is to protect the people of the districts through which it passes against oppression and fraud and harassment. The greater part of the line is maintained solely because the salt duties which we levy in the Presidency of Bengal are higher than those which we levy in Madras and Bombay. Lord Mayo had given deep attention to these great questions, and shortly before his death he was looking forward with much hope to the possibility of soon dealing with them.

There are many other reforms the importance of which no one knew better than Lord Mayo, although financial difficulties prevented him from pressing their adoption. Although the evils connected with the salt and sugar duties, and with the income-tax, were in Lord Mayo's estimation the first that required to be remedied, he was fully alive to the grave defects of our present commercial system. He felt that the state of our Customs tariff is far from creditable to the British Government. We impose heavy export duties, which are paid by our own producers, on some of the most important staples of the country, on rice, seeds, indigo, oils, lac, and spices. By what has been truly called "a refinement of barbarity," we also levy, for the sake of some £20,000 a year, export duties on two of the very few manufactures which India possesses, cotton goods and leather.

Our import duties are not much better. Some of them are absurd; some of them are mischievous; many of them are not worth collecting. Four-fifths of the articles which are now taxed in our import tariff might be removed from the list altogether at a cost of about £130,000. Lord Mayo found it impossible to deal with these questions, but if he had lived he would certainly not have delayed much longer in doing so.

The work of restoring our finances to a sound condition had been almost completed when Lord Mayo died. His next task would have been to carry out reforms such as those which I have indicated. I may properly quote here the words uttered by His Excellency the present Viceroy, Lord Napier, on the 17th April 1872, in the Legislative Council, for they exactly express the truth. "You have now," he said "before you the full result of the energetic action adopted by the Viceroy in your replenished cash balances, in a restored equilibrium between revenue and expenditure, in the confirmation of public credit, in the introduction of a vigilant economy in expenditure. The ends which the Viceroy had at heart have been attained; the first phase of his financial policy was concluded at the moment of his lamented death. If his life had been spared for the benefit of this country, I do not doubt that a second and a different period of his Government would have been inaugurated—a period of prudent remission and re-adjustment of imperial taxation for the welfare and contentment of all classes of the people. Such a task would have been peculiarly congenial to his humane and temperate intelligence."

I will only add that in maintaining inviolate all important financial principles, and in resisting all relaxations of salutary rules, the Financial Department received from Lord Mayo undeviating encouragement and support. If he had done nothing for India save what he effected in the Financial Department, he would have deserved a high place among Indian Governors.

I shall only refer very briefly to the work of legislation during Lord Mayo's Viceroyalty. Although he necessarily had comparatively little to do with the details of most of the Bills that came before the Council, he interested himself in the progress of every important measure; he was always ready to take an active part in the discussion of any principles that might be involved, and he gave

at all times his strong personal support to the Member of Council more immediately responsible for the charge of the legislative business. I am sure that Mr. Stephen will confirm my assertion when I say that without this support he would have been quite unable to carry out the work which he has successfully accomplished.

Lord Mayo was especially fortunate in the fact that this department of his Government was presided over by men possessing the highest and most exceptional qualifications. In the first year of his Viceroyalty, Sir Henry Maine was still a Member of this Council, and Lord Mayo always spoke with gratitude and admiration not only of his work as a legislator, but of the services which (to quote Lord Mayo's own words) he had rendered to the State as "a wise councillor, an impartial adviser, and a minister of originality, sagacity, and resource." When India lost Sir Henry Maine she had the rare fortune of obtaining Mr. Stephen as his successor. Mr. Stephen has himself just left us, and I may therefore say, for it is a fact of which I have personal knowledge, that Lord Mayo felt very strongly how much he owed to the constant help and support which Mr. Stephen had always given him in every branch of the administration.

I shall not attempt to describe in detail the legislation of the last three years. It would be difficult to give it higher praise than it deserves. The time has, I hope, gone by in which it was necessary to repel the charges of over-legislation and precipitancy which have sometimes been most unjustly brought against the Legislative Department of this Government. Its work, as Mr. Stephen observed in one of his speeches, "has been, for a considerable length of time, substantially directed, not to increasing the law, but simply to repealing the existing law, to putting it into order, and to expressing it in a clear and unmistakeable form. Though this involves the passing of a considerable number of enactments, the effect is very much to shorten instead of to increase the law." The number of laws on the Statute-book is now some three or four hundred less than it was three years ago, and I suppose that when the measures actually before the Council are passed, there will be no civilized country in the world the laws of which are comprised within so small a compass. Except in regard to those branches of substantive law, which form part of the Hindu and Mohammedan law, and which we can hardly touch, the consolidation and codification of the law of British India is

practically almost complete; and we have, or soon shall have, in place of the enormous and confused mass of old Regulations and Acts, simple and intelligible enactments regarding almost every matter of importance connected with the administration of the country. The following bare list, made without any attempt at classification, of some of the most important subjects which have been dealt with during the last three years, will give an idea of the importance of the legislation that has taken place during the period of Lord Mayo's Viceroyalty:—the Constitution and Procedure of the Courts, Stamps, Court Fees, Coinage, Paper Currency, Land Revenue, Criminal Procedure, Excise, Customs, Registration, Prisons, Emigration, Pensions, Limitation, Evidence, Contracts, Carriers, Hindu Wills, Native Marriages, Divorce, European Vagrancy, Female Infanticide, Advances for Agricultural Improvements, Canals and Drainage, Local Public Works, Criminal Tribes, Acquisition of land for public purposes, Local Rates.

I may properly close this sketch of Lord Mayo's administration with the last words which he himself uttered, on the 16th January 1872, in the Legislative Council. They are characteristic of his resolution to tolerate no departure from those principles of equal justice and religious equality which constitute the real foundation of our power. They were spoken in the debate on the Bill to relieve the members of the body called the Bráhma-Samája from disabilities in regard to marriage, and to legalize marriages between certain natives of India not professing the Christian religion. "The Bill," Lord Mayo said, "is necessary to relieve a portion of our fellow-subjects from a distinct disability, nay, even from a penalty, under which they labour. It is in thorough harmony with the principles upon which the Government is founded, namely, complete and entire liberty and tolerance in respect of every religious creed within the limits of the empire. I cannot conceive that any man will venture at this time of day to object to this principle, the existence of which is coeval with our rule in India. On the part of the Government I must say that I am prepared to declare that we are determined to carry out that great principle in this matter, and that we intend to relieve this or any other sect of our fellow-subjects from any disability under which they labour. Other religious sects have been similarly relieved, and no matter what reasons may be brought to the contrary, I am prepared here to say that this Government will never

consent to continue a state of the law which has the effect of imposing a severe disability upon a portion of our follow-subjects, going, possibly, even to the extent of making their wives concubines, their children bastards, and rendering the devolution of their property insecure. As far as the principle of the measure, therefore, is concerned, the determination of the Government is to enforce it.* * In confirmation of what I have said, it is only necessary for me to call the attention of this Council to the words of that great proclamation which was issued in 1858, when the administration of the empire passed from the hands of the East India Company to the Crown. The old policy of the Company was then thoroughly approved, and a distinct pledge was given to the people of this empire that no man should be permitted to lie under any disability on account of his religion. The words are 'that all should equally and alike enjoy an equal and impartial protection of the law.' The sect of the Bráhma-Samája has proved that, in respect of their marriages, they do not enjoy an equal and impartial protection of the law. That being so, we intend to give the necessary relief. In consenting, therefore, to the postponement of the further progress of this Bill for one month, I distinctly announce that it is the intention of the Government to press and pass it into law as soon as possible."

I have referred to some of the more prominent features of Lord Mayo's official career in India, but there are many subjects of interest and importance of which I have said nothing. No enumeration, however, of the measures which he carried out, or of the projects which he had formed, can give any sufficient idea of the character of his administration. I suppose that there is no great office in the world which entails upon its possessor more unceasing and more laborious work, and there never was a man who gave himself up with more absolute devotion than Lord Mayo to the performance of his duty. I believe that there is no department of the Government in which, when he died, there was a single case pending which had been laid before him and was ready for his decision. Although no man had taken a greater interest in home politics, his whole thoughts seemed, for a long time past, to be of India alone. He had seen more of India in the three years since he became Viceroy, than almost any man that I have known has seen of it in his life. There was hardly an important province that he had not visited, or a man of mark that he did not know.

I have before me a memorandum showing all the details of his Indian journeys. For this I have to thank Major Burne, Lord Mayo's Private Secretary and friend, of whom I will take this opportunity of saying that he was not only the best Private Secretary that I ever saw or heard of, but that during the last three years he has performed with great ability and rare discretion, as the confidential assistant of the Viceroy, a greater amount of public business of a most difficult and delicate kind than has fallen to many men in India. I sincerely trust that his services may be recognized as they deserve. Nothing could be more characteristic of Lord Mayo than the sketch of his journeys which Major Burne has given me. When all the distances which he travelled over in India, in his official capacity only, are added together, they make up a total of more than twenty thousand miles. As an example of that extraordinary physical energy without which he could not have obtained a tenth part of his Indian knowledge, and as an illustration of one of the striking parts of his character, I will give a sketch, borrowed from Major Burne, of Lord Mayo's life in India during a single year, 1870.

At the close of the previous year, Lord Mayo had received the Duke of Edinburgh in Calcutta with a magnificence which we all remember. On the 7th January, His Royal Highness left Calcutta for Northern India; some days later Lord Mayo met him again near Benares, and after a journey of a thousand miles returned to Calcutta within the week. On the 23rd February Lord Mayo started again for the Central Provinces to open the Chanda coal mines and the first State railway in India, as well as to inaugurate at Jubbulpoor the completion of the line between Calcutta and Bombay. To do all this, he had to accomplish in a fortnight a distance of 2,600 miles. Leaving the railway at Jubbulpoor, he went on to Nagpoor, rode 200 miles to the coal mines, and thence to Akola, where, accompanied by Sir Salar Jung, the Minister of Hyderabad, the Resident, and all the officials of the Berars, he opened the Khangaon Railway, a work commenced under his own orders, and pushed forward to completion with great rapidity. Thence he returned to Jubbulpoor to meet the Duke of Edinburgh, and open the Railway to Bombay, and on the 10th March he again reached Calcutta. On the 7th April, after the budget arrangements of the year had been settled, he started for the Panjáb and the North-Western frontier. After two days' hard

work at Lahore, itself 1,300 miles from Calcutta, he rode on to Goojerat and Chilianwala, where he visited the field of battle, and ordered a monument to those who fell there to be erected at his own expense. Thence he went to the Pind Dadun Khan salt mines, 140 miles from Lahore; he thoroughly examined the mines, and ordered important improvements to be undertaken. He rode on to Jhilum to inspect the railway works, and reached Attok and Peshawur, having travelled from the mines a distance of about 230 miles. Whilst at Peshawur, he visited the Khyber Pass, rode 80 miles to Kohat and back, through the midst of the frontier tribes, and held at Kohat a Durbar of the frontier Chiefs. Next day he rode on again 180 miles to Abbottabad, visited our outposts in the Hazara Valley, and thence on to Murree, a difficult ride of 90 miles over bad hill roads. Thence he went back to Lahore by Rawulpindee and Syalkot, a distance of 270 miles. At Syalkot he met the Maharaja of Cashmere in formal Durbar, and after travelling 280 miles more he finally reached Simla on the 30th April. In this three weeks' journey he accomplished a distance of nearly 3,000 miles, much of it by dint of hard riding 60, 70, and 80 miles a day. From the 30th April to the 3rd October Lord Mayo remained at Simla, constantly at work from daylight to dark, but managing almost every week to take a 30 or 40 or 50 miles' ride into the interior of the hills. On the 3rd October he left Simla, visited the Maharaja of Putiala at his capital, and then started for Rajpootana, a journey of some 700 miles. He visited Muttra, Deeg, Bhurtpoor, Jeypoor, the Sambhur Salt Lake, Ajmere, and Nusecrabad. At Jeypoor he visited the Maharaja, with whom he was on terms of great friendship. At Ajmere he met all the principal chiefs of Rajpootana, and held on the 26th October a great Durbar for their reception. I have already quoted the speech which he made to them.

On his return from Ajmere Lord Mayo visited Benares, the Stud Establishments and the Opium Factories in the North-Western Provinces, and reached Calcutta on the 7th November after a journey of some 2,000 miles. Shortly afterwards he opened the Golunda Extension of the Eastern Bengal Railway.

Thus, in the journeys that I have enumerated, taken in the midst of unceasing work, Lord Mayo in a single year travelled, in his purely official journeys, over more than

9,000 miles of ground, visiting some of the most important portions of the empire, making himself personally acquainted with the greatest Native Chiefs, opening mines and railways and colleges, inspecting cotton fields and model farms, salt mines and frontier outposts; and pushing on everywhere works of public improvement.

Although no one could be less inclined than Lord Mayo to assume that because he had galloped through a district or a province, he had gained a real insight into its character or its wants, nothing was more remarkable in him than the power with which he was able rapidly to accumulate a mass of valuable knowledge, to learn the opinions of the most competent men, to gain their confidence and their friendship, and to store up everything in his memory until the time came for turning it to useful account. When he seemed to be thinking of pleasure only, and no one had a greater capacity for every honest and manly enjoyment, he was always learning. I might say with equal truth that at such times he was unconsciously performing no unimportant part of his public work. For it would be difficult to place too high a public value on that personal and social influence which was felt everywhere as a power in the State. He seemed formed by Nature to be a great Indian Governor. His noble bearing, his magnificent liberality, the dignity and courtesy of his demeanour, the unfailing kindness and unselfishness of his frank and genial nature, made every one proud of him, and made every one love him. But, when I cease to dwell on Lord Mayo's official life, I think of matters of which it is difficult to speak, feeling as I did for him a deeper personal regard than I felt for almost any man in the world.

“For his sagacity, for his judgment, fine temper, and knowledge of men, Her Majesty has been pleased to confer upon him the office of Viceroy of India, and as Viceroy of India I believe he will earn a reputation that his countrymen will honour, and that he has before him a career which will equal that of the most eminent men who have preceded him.” These were the words of Mr. Disraeli when Lord Mayo was first appointed, and his foresight has been amply justified by the event.

It is now a little more than three years since Lord Mayo became Viceroy, and I may fitly conclude this paper with the words which he himself spoke before he left England, regarding the acceptance of his great office. “Splend-

did," he said, "as is this post, and difficult as will be my duties, I go forth in full confidence, and hope God will give me such strength and wisdom as will enable me to direct the government of India in the interest and for the welfare of the millions committed to our care. In the performance of the great task I ask no favour; let me be judged according to my actions; but I know that efforts honestly made for the maintenance of our national honour, for the spread of civilization, and the preservation of peace, will always command the sympathy and support of my countrymen."

The judgment for which Lord Mayo asked has been passed upon him by the Queen and by the Nation, and it has been a judgment of rare and absolute unanimity. It is that he has worthily justified the manly and modest confidence with which he assumed the greatest charge that can be entrusted to a subject of the British Crown. His career has unhappily been short, but it has been long enough to enable him to take his place in the history of India, among the wisest and best of her Governors. The time will come when it will be a consolation to know that the name of Lord Mayo will be remembered as that of a man second to no one of his predecessors in the qualities necessary for the successful government of this great empire, to see that there is no department of the State on which he has not left his mark for good, and to watch the results of those measures of improvement which he inaugurated, or for the progress of which he has done so much.